The separation of the temporal and the divine spheres: the moral and political implications of "secularisation", c.1580 – c.1620

Anna-Anastasia Constantinidou

Thesis presented to the School of History and Classics for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Edinburgh
November 2005
To my parents, to whom I owe everything
and to Sassa, who did not last to see the completion
of what took me away from her
Abstract

This thesis addresses the problem of the challenges posed to the role and status of the revealed Christian religion and theology in people’s lives and world-views in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It examines the problem as faced and expressed by certain thinkers of the period in western Europe, broadly defined.

Although these challenges have been long been regarded by historians within the general notion of ‘secularisation’, this was not the case for the period in question. That religion was inescapable for the period in question is indisputable; therefore, what did, in fact, characterise the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was a growing uneasiness, a questioning of the role of religion, a fluidity of the boundaries between sacred and profane and a continuous redefinition of fundamental concepts. Religion was thus central even if challenged, as thinkers were struggling to define their views with reference to, or as opposed to, its precepts. In view of that, in place of the terms ‘secularism’ and ‘secularisation’ this thesis prefers to talk about the distancing between the temporal and the divine spheres, and the redefinition of public and private. The focus of this dissertation is on some aspects of this vast question; it aims to address some of its implications in the moral and political realms this questioning could have, as experienced through the struggle of Europeans to determine the role they wanted to ascribe to religion within their life and world-views.

In order to accomplish this, this thesis brings together four thinkers who actively engaged with the question from various angles and from different geographical, experiential and intellectual standpoints. More specifically, it examines four cases from four distinct areas of what now constitutes western Europe. It looks at the writings of four very influential thinkers of the period c.1580 - c.1620: Pierre Charron, a French theologian (1541-1603); the work of Justus Lipsius, a Flemish scholar (1547-1606); the work of Paolo Sarpi, a Venetian friar and advisor to the Venetian Republic (1552-1623); and lastly, the work of King James VI of Scotland and I of England (1566-1625). The four authors have been chosen mainly on the grounds of their contribution to the discussion about the relationship between politics and religion, and morality and religion. They represent a growing body of people who
during the period that concerns us here had begun to doubt the singularity and authority of the Christian religion in matters of politics and morals. In this respect, the four case studies serve to illustrate the types of questions raised about the role of religion in people’s lives and world-views in the period, in the wider area of western Europe. They thus exemplify the various areas from whence those questions arose, while the variance in the genres of the texts and the situation of their authors operates as an indication of the different facets of the same inescapable problem.

All four authors in question grappled in their works with the question of the status of religion as a defining factor in the way people conceived of the Church, the state, politics in general, truth and ethics, sacred and profane - ideas about divine and temporal morality and their relation; the distinction between public and private; separation of ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction; the distinction between an internalised notion of religion and an external; theory and practice; and finally the relation and compatibility (or not) of religion with politics; religion and philosophy; and politics and morality. What makes these contemplatives additionally interesting is that they were regarded as ambivalent in their religious convictions. In this respect, this thesis is essentially an exploration in the world of ideas and shared assumptions (mentalities), addressing questions regarding the ‘limits of the thinkable’ and the ways in which people of the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century understood the world around them and its structures.

Alongside this main issue, the dissertation is also interested in questions pertaining to the implantation and circulation of ideas, and appropriations of intellectual themes, while also addressing some aspect of the complex relationship between theory and practice. More particularly, it concentrates on the degree to which experience informed theory or the other way round, as all the authors under scrutiny were theorists engaged with events around them. Finally, this thesis highlights the benefits of studies of intellectual history or mentalities that are not circumscribed by traditional national and confessional boundaries or between political and religious considerations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface & Acknowledgements

Note on Texts and Translations

Introduction (p.1)

**Chapter One: Moral Implications (I): Divine and Human**

Pierre Charron, *De la Sagesse, Trois Livres* (1601)

Introduction (p. 30)

I. *At the Heart of the Religious Wars: Charron’s Life* (p. 34)

II. *Human Wisdom: De la Sagesse, Trois Livres* (p. 40)
   i. Charron’s Synthesis
   ii. Versions of *De la Sagesse*
   iii. *De la Sagesse, Trois Livres: Themes, Ideas, Languages*

III. *The Challenge Exposed:*

   *Reception, Interpretations and Controversy* (1623-26) (p. 83)

   Conclusions (p. 89)

**Chapter Two: Moral Implications (II): Public and Private**

Justus Lipsius, *De Constantia* (1584) and *Politica* (1589)

Introduction (p. 93)

I. *Lipsius’ Life: Humanism in Times of Public Adversity* (p. 97)

II. *De Constantia and Politica* (p. 107)
   i. ‘Constantia’ – ‘Prudentia’ (or Ethics and Politics)
   ii. *Lipsius and (Neo)Stoicism (or Philosophy and Religion)*
   iii. *Lipsius and Religion (or Politics and Religion)*
Chapter Three: Political Implications (I): Secular and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction

Paolo Sarpi, *Historia del Concilio Tridentino* (1619)

*Introduction* (p. 154)

I. Background (p. 158)
   i. Sarpi's Life
   ii. Sarpi and the Interdict

II. The History of the Council of Trent (p. 176)
   i. Publication and Reception
   ii. The History of the Council of Trent: *Style and Method*
   iii. The History of the Council Trent: *Themes and Ideas*

Some Final Considerations: Politics Through Religion (p. 211)

Chapter Four: Political Implications (II): The King as Divine:
From Secular and Ecclesiastical to Lay Supremacy

James VI and I, *Workes* (1616)

*Introduction* (p. 219)

I. Background (p. 223)
   i. Imagining James VI and I

II. Texts (p. 235)
   i. The Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance and the International Milieu
   ii. Intellectual and Experiential Background: Two Treatises on Government
   iii. Parallel writings: Religious Unity and Division

Conclusion (p. 286)

Conclusions (p. 288)

Bibliography (p. 306)

Appendices (p. 327)
I confirm that all this work is my own except where indicated, and that I have clearly referenced/listed all sources as appropriate, while I have also acknowledged in appropriate places any held that I have received from others.
As much as (historical) research and writing is carried out in secluded libraries and desks, it is unrealistic to think that it is conducted in isolation from surrounding events. The relationship of the past with the present is a complex one - for the historian, the one informs the other. It is more than commonplace to say that the present can sometimes be the stimulus that forces us to think about our world and society, while occurrences and set circumstances in the past can serve as examples that help to see things in different perspective and gain insight for the present. Whereas the composition of this thesis was not inspired by contemporary events, its writing coincided with two events with immense impact for our world. Its beginning was marked by the dreadful occurrences of September 2001 and its closing stages by the death of Pope John Paul II, one of the longest serving Popes in the history of the Catholic Church. The probing of notions of 'secularisation' in early modern Europe and the associated moral and political implications, while these two major events took place and developed, was a striking reminder of the relevance of the study of history. Thus, the analysis of the relationship between the religious and the political elements in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provided an intriguing parallel to events around us. It was fascinating, for instance, to contemplate that in the September 2001 incidents politics conceived in religious terms clashed with politics conceived in secular/temporal. Meanwhile, among the suggested measures in Britain, remarkably, was the implementation of an Oath of Allegiance to the Queen and the State that subjects from all religious professions would have to take. Similarly, in Rome, the funeral of John Paul II demonstrated the international political importance of a spiritual leader, echoing to some extent the position and role of his sixteenth and seventeenth century predecessors. Even more arresting, perhaps, was the fact that among the comments made in the aftermath of the accession of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger to the Papal throne, was an appeal to the Christian Churches to overcome their differences and unite with Rome in a battle with the real enemy, 'secularism'.
All these were an affirmation that our world is not as secularised as some of us might have liked. They were also a reminder that the subject matter of this study was particularly topical, as the past few years witnessed a rigorous renegotiation of our attitudes towards religion, and the role that it plays in our conceptions of the world, of ethics and politics. Even if one puts the palpable anxieties raised by religious fundamentalism to the side, one has only to think about the debates on what constitutes offence to religious sensitivities; the discussions on the display of religious symbols; debates about the theory of evolution; the ethics of the issue of intervention and modification of genetic codes and cloning; abortion; suicide and euthanasia. In view of these, this thesis proposes that a period when people went through analogous redefinition and renegotiation of religion’s role in life may provide us with useful hindsight to contemporary tensions, uneasiness, and reconsiderations.

For the completion of this dissertation I am greatly indebted to a number of people. First and foremost to my ‘advisor’, Richard Mackenney, whose breadth of learning and perspective of European History inspired but also allowed this undertaking - a small part of which is hopefully reflected in the scope of this thesis. To Patricia Allerston, for her invaluable structural comments and advice, and for asking difficult questions; to Tom Webster, for insightful discussions, for comments and advice on James and various other aspects of the thesis; to Thomas Ahnert, for kindly accepting to read and comment on the whole thing. I have received encouragement and advice at different stages of the research from Michael Angold, Glenn Burgess, Owen Dudley Edwards, Rod Lyall, Joseph Bergin, Roger Mason, David Allan, Julian Goodare, Alan Hood, Chris Brooke, and Stephen Lloyd. The then Department - now Subject Area - of History, at the University of Edinburgh provided me with some funds towards my studies and some much appreciated work as a tutor for four years. I have to thank Keith, Finn and Victoria for stimulating discussions and laughs, but mostly for keeping one another going. Efty, Alex, Aileen, Ioannis, Tom and Helfrid deserve a note for putting up with sharing an apartment with me, while Craig and my friends from home for always lending a supportive ear. Words, finally, cannot express my gratitude to Chris for all the roles he played throughout this - I’m not sure I could have made it
without you. Finally, my family (all three of them); my parents were the ones who gave me the love of travelling in time and in space, supported me financially, and were always there for me – even if that meant at the other end of a telephone line. This thesis is for them.
Note on Texts and Translations

In this dissertation I have used contemporary translations of the texts analysed, checking translations for accuracy against the originals or other contemporary translations.

In this manner, for Charron I have used the French edition of 1607, while most of the quotations are based on the English translation [?1608] by Samson Lennard: Peter Charron, OfWisdome (London: Edward Blount, ?1608); reprinted by Da Capo Press, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam and New York 1971). The original text of the quotations from the French edition can be found in Appendix III.

A small number of remarks have been left in the original French.


For James VI and I's texts, I used primarily the 1616 edition of his collected works: James I. The Workes (1616), facsimile edition (Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971).

For the Trew Law of Free Monarchies and the Basilikon Doron, I have relied on the editions by the Scottish Text Society, by James Craigie: James Craigie (ed.), The Basilicon Doron of King James VI. 2 vols., (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Text Society, 1944-50). The edition reprints both the original edition of 1599 as well as the one of 1603; unless otherwise stated, all references are to the 1603 edition; and James Craigie (ed.), Minor Prose Works of King James VI and I. (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982).

Throughout the text, a full reference is given the first time a source is cited in a Chapter, and in the Bibliography; thereafter the author and a short title only is presented.

Unless stated otherwise, the italics in the text are from the original texts.
Introduction

This thesis addresses the problem of the challenges posed to the role and status of the revealed Christian religion and theology in people’s lives and world-views in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It examines the problem as faced and expressed by certain thinkers of the period in western Europe, broadly defined. The period in question is often viewed as the transitional stage between the deeply religious culture of the ‘dark’ middle ages and the predominantly secular culture of modernity (‘the age of reason’). The process that brought about what Charles Trinkaus described as the ‘displacement of the consciousness of God as the prime directive force in the universe by a notion of human powers and of ‘natural’ forces’, is generally known as ‘secularisation’, first used in its modern sense in the nineteenth century.1 Scholars, accordingly, have long been engaged with their research in locating individuals and ideas that ‘gave birth’ to our modern culture, searching for figures that promoted what they view as secular ideas.2 Evidently, of course,


what this process amounts to, ultimately, is the appropriation of this material into the various commentators' own concepts of modernity.\(^3\)

Yet a number of caveats ought to draw away from the interpretative model of 'secularisation'; the first one is that the notion in question is based on a teleological assumption and implies a linear process necessarily leading to a secularised society. In this respect, one of the main elements that this assumption ignores is that our modern world is not necessarily a secular one - although perhaps some would like to consider it as such. The second and most important one, is that, as it has long been suggested, religion was intrinsic for the period in question, thus rendering any discussion for outright secularising tendencies redundant.\(^4\) What did characterise the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, however, was a growing uneasiness, a questioning of the role of religion, a fluidity of the boundaries between sacred and profane, and a continuous redefinition of fundamental concepts, such as the relationship between divine and temporal and public and private. Religion was thus central even if questioned, for thinkers were struggling to define their views with reference to, or as opposed to, its precepts. The most difficult task perhaps, according to one view, was their attempt to 'clarify the relationship of secular and religious values, while somehow preserving both'.\(^5\) This, however, in accordance with Durkheim's fundamental stance, would be almost impossible, as the realms of sacred and profane are considered in a religious society as

---


\(^4\) See the almost unsurpassable classical study by Lucien Febvre on how religion circumscribed every aspect of life, from the everyday practice to vocabulary, creating a framework very difficult to escape indeed; according to Febvre, it was nearly impossible for the people of early modern period to think beyond religion. Lucien Febvre, *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century. The Religion of Rabelais*. trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1982), esp. Part IV.

entirely separate and different, so that the two 'cannot even approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time'.

In view of these considerations, in place of the terms 'secularism' and 'secularisation' this thesis prefers to refer to the distancing between the temporal and the divine spheres, interchangeable with the redefinition of the boundaries between public and private, as in a 'secularised' society the role of religion is entirely confined to the private sphere of human activity. In terms of the relationship between the divine and temporal, it may be useful to imagine the two points of reference like two magnets, drawing and repelling one another. In this manner, both spheres were dependent on one another, but the degree of their dependence varied according to circumstances, and different perceptions. With regard to the notions of public and private on the other hand, we could think of at them as two areas where the one fuses in with the other, as the limits between the two were constantly being negotiated and redrawn.

The starting point for what follows, therefore, is the dominance of religion in all aspects of life and thought; theology was for a long time in people's perception of the world the 'queen of sciences', reigning over any moral and political considerations. As this world was perceived to be subject to the divine sphere and the next world, morality, political organisation and philosophy were defined by the revealed truth and ultimate metaphysical purpose. The role of religion, however, underwent serious reconsideration during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, through the challenges for reform, the continuing rediscovery of the classics and the civil strife that

---

6 Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1964), p. 40. The way in which this position relates to the issues discussed here will become more intelligible when we come to discuss the relationship between languages, particularly that of theology and that of Tacitism.

followed the Lutheran protest. The focus of this dissertation, thus, is on the implications in the moral and political sphere this questioning could have, as experienced through the struggle of Europeans to determine the role they wanted to ascribe to religion within their life and world-views. This thesis does not presume to answer this vast question in its entirety; it proposes instead to address some of its main aspects in the moral and political realm and consider it from new perspectives.

In order to accomplish this, this dissertation brings together thinkers who actively engaged with the question from various angles and from different geographical, experiential and intellectual standpoints. More specifically, it examines four case studies from four distinct areas of what now constitutes western Europe. It looks at the writings of: the French theologian Pierre Charron (1541-1603); the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius (1547-1606); the Venetian friar and advisor to the Venetian Republic, Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623); and lastly, King James VI of Scotland and I of England (1566-1625). Though these authors and their texts may at first sight appear disparate and unrelated, this study will demonstrate that they share common interests and ultimately refer to the same fundamental questions. Rather than being a problem, their disparity in fact serves two useful functions. On the one hand, it reveals the various strands of thought which challenged the status of religion. On the other, the variance in the genres of the texts and the situation of their authors ought to be taken as an indication of the different facets of the same inescapable problem.

The four authors have been chosen mainly on the grounds of their contribution to the discussion about the relationship between politics and religion, and morality and religion. They represent a growing body of people who during the period that concerns us here had begun to doubt the singularity and authority of the Christian religion in matters of politics and morals. In this respect, the four case studies serve to illustrate the types of questions raised
about the role of religion in people's lives and world-views in the period, in the wider area of western Europe. They also exemplify the various areas from whence those questions arose. The cases of Charron and Lipsius, for instance, reflect the effects of the spread of humanist culture, combined with the experience of the religious wars of the sixteenth century, which sharpened the perception of contemporaries about what kind of politics and morals were necessary in their world.\footnote{Richard Tuck, \textit{Philosophy and Government 1572-1651}. (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), p. 33.} Sarpi and King James, on the other hand, draw attention to the shortcomings of the Church itself, such as worldliness and avarice, the critique raised from within by Conciliarism and evangelism, for example. In view of these, they both argue that the lay authorities ought to take control of ecclesiastical affairs, what was essentially the temporal facet of the sacred element. On this question of the limits of jurisdiction between the sacred and the profane authorities, both Sarpi and the Scottish King were involved in a clash with the Papacy - the most powerful spiritual leader on earth.

It should not be surprising, in this regard, to observe that all four of them operated outwith the confines of what was generally accepted by the doctrine they adhered to. Three of them, Charron, Lipsius and Sarpi, were nominally Catholics. Two of those, Lipsius and Sarpi, were accused (in the case of Lipsius, lawfully) of traversing confessional lines, while the third, Charron, was accused of atheism. King James, similarly, a Calvinist by name, was also accused of crossing religious boundaries, as his policies did not appear overtly 'Protestant' and he was in regular communication with Catholics. Their 'heterodoxy' and the criticisms raised against them are therefore instructive towards an understanding of the conceived confines of the religious intellectual milieu.\footnote{Cf. Johnson, 'Religion', \textit{Writing Early Modern History}, p. 146.} They, their premises and the networks they belonged to are indicative of a diverse, but substantial and influential body of opinion in early modern Europe.
disaffected by the principles and claims of the institutionalised religion. All four authors thus grappled in their works with the question of the status of religion as a defining factor in the way people conceived of the Church, the state, politics in general, truth and ethics. Importantly, their views, as articulated in their texts, are in dialogue with one another. This does not imply that they all agreed on the same points, but that they shared similar assumptions, and their texts dealt with different aspects of the same problem. Comparing them allows us better to grasp the problem as a whole, as their different concerns feed into one another.

These considerations lead us to the first related topic that this thesis addresses, alongside the main question of the repercussions that the distancing between temporal and divine spheres and the interrelated realignment of the boundaries between public and private could have on a moral and political level. Directly associated to the main theme, is the circulation of ideas. This thesis is essentially an exploration in the world of ideas and shared assumptions (mentalities). In this respect, it draws its inspiration from and owes a great deal to the work begun by Bloch and Febvre earlier in the century and their intellectual heirs, and the questions they raised regarding the 'limits of the thinkable' and culture as a system of shared meanings, attitudes and values, and the symbolic forms in which these are expressed or embodied.10 It is engaged, accordingly, with mapping out a mental world, and the ways in which people of the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century understood the world around them and its structures. The dissertation, therefore, is interested in questions pertaining to the implantation and circulation of ideas, and appropriations of intellectual themes. It delves into the manner in which elusive and abstract concepts travel, their popularity and how they are situated

according to specific environments and contexts, and their appropriation by very diverse groups for different or similar reasons. As we will see, Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and King James, although from four distinct environments, share some basic assumptions. This common awareness can simply be attributed to similar interests; however, it can, also be explained by considerations of intellectual exchange and a sense of unity and community.

Several links can be established between the authors in question. Charron was aware of Lipsius's work, whom he acknowledges in his own. He had read Lipsius through French translations that followed the publication of the Flemish scholar's texts almost immediately. The two of them, moreover, shared an admiration for Michel de Montaigne, with whom Charron is alleged to have met and forged a friendship, and Lipsius corresponded. Sarpi's texts betray an awareness of both Lipsius and Charron.11 Meanwhile, a number of common friends from the politque and Gallican circles link Lipsius, Sarpi and James VI and I in less immediate ways. There is evidence, for instance, that both Lipsius and Sarpi had enjoyed the hospitality of the Neapolitan nobleman Gian Vincenzo Pinelli (b. 1535) in Padua, where he resided from 1558.12 Sarpi befriended Arnaud du Ferrier, an acquaintance of Montaigne and was in communication with the famous François Hotman.13 His History of the Interdict was to be included in de Thou's History of his Own Times.14 On a different perspective, both Sarpi and Lipsius were in communication with Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine; the Cardinal warned and advised the Flemish scholar about

11 Besides the textual similarities and resonances, Sarpi corresponded with Peiresc, who was involved in the transcription of Charron's letters to his editor, La Rochmailet; see Peter N. Miller, Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth-Century. (New Haven; London: Yale UP, 2000), p. 6 and p. 220, note 88. See also Vittorio Frajese, 'Sarpi Interprette del De la Saggesse di Pierre Charron: I Pensieri sulla Religione', Studi Veneziani XX (1990), pp. 59-85.
13 Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 9, 11.
14 Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 105
dangerous' extracts of his work, while he was involved in a passionate and intense pamphlet exchange with the Venetian friar, whom he had once been friends with.15 Other links between Sarpi and James include Sir Henry Wotton, and Sir Dudley Carleton, English ambassadors to Venice, with whom the Friar was in close connection. Sources indicate that Sarpi had received in 1612 a pressing invitation from the king, transmitted through Sir Dudley Carleton, to make his home in England.16 The admiration of Sarpi and the Scottish King was mutual, although the Venetian's enthusiasm wore off as James proved less dynamic ('active') than the Venetian had hoped for. Nonetheless, James was so much taken by Sarpi's writings, that he sponsored the publication of his major work, the Historia del Concilio Tridentino (London, 1619). A less evident connection worth noting is the French translation of the History (Geneva: E. Gamonet, 1621), made by Jean (Giovanni) Diodati; most interestingly, Diodati's brother, Theodore, was working as a physician in the court of James I.17 Sarpi was further admired by Hugo Grotius, an intellectual with close affiliations with James I's circle.18 Sarpi's correspondent, finally, Jérôme Groslo, had been James's co-pupil under Buchanan; he had also travelled to England and knew Philip Sidney, for whose death he wrote memorial verses.19 In the same way, members of James's close surroundings such as Isaac Casaubon were of Lipsius's correspondents.20 James was thus aware of Lipsius's work, but even

15 Wootton, p. 9.
17 I am particularly grateful to Prof. Rod Lyall for pointing out this fascinating connection. See also Frances A. Yates, 'Italian Teachers in Elizabethan England', Journal of the Warburg Institute 1 (1937), p. 105, n. 2.
19 I am indebted to Prof. Rod Lyall for these biographical details.
20 Andriana McCrea, Constant Minds. The Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584-1650. (Toronto; London: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 15-6, 32, 34, 236; Mark Morford, Stoics and
though he admired it at first, he later denounced it because of the Flemish scholar's religious inconsistency. Above all, however, all four men were members of the 'republic of letters', the imaginary community of scholars in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe.\textsuperscript{21}

The relationship between theory and practice is a third theme of this thesis. The dissertation aims to examine some aspects of this complex relationship; in particular, the degree to which experience informed theory or the other way round. While the four figures under scrutiny were theorists, they were not purely contemplative individuals, secluded from events around them. Charron and Lipsius led intense lives, and were affected to a great extent by the religious wars that plagued their countries. Sarpi and James on the other hand, were actively involved in the 'political' affairs of their states. This difference of the level of engagement is reflected in the ideas that the four authors put forward - as we will see, James and Sarpi deal more with the details of government and authority and problems of jurisdiction. Charron, however, is more interested in the more general problem of knowledge and virtue. Both he and Lipsius wrote from the perspective of a subject, praising the glories of private life and advising the non-involvement of subjects in public affairs. In a way, as it will be shown, the writings of the two former provide the conceptual framework within which the two latter could operate and put their ideas into practice; in other words, the views of Sarpi and James make more sense when considered against the intellectual background offered by Charron and Lipsius.

\textsuperscript{21} Peter Burke, in his paper 'Towards an Archaeology of Libraries' (unpublished), delivered in the conference 'Material Cultures and the Creation of Knowledge' (The University of Edinburgh, 22-24 July 2005). Peter Miller's \textit{Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century}. (New Haven; London: Yale UP, 2000), is a valuable exploration in the republic of letters.
The questioning of religion's authority in the conceptual world as well as in everyday life, for the decades that interest us here, originated from a combination of theoretical and experiential factors. From the theoretical point of view, the intellectuals' preoccupation with classical studies and the classical tradition had a formidable effect. The more widespread study of classical texts that followed on from the engagement with antiquity in Italy from the beginning of the fourteenth century - the so-called Italian Renaissance - which called for a direct access to the culture of the ancient world, and in its own terms, independently from any mediations accumulated by time, in combination with the preparation and printing of new editions extended the realisation that morality and politics could be based on something other than revealed truth. This, in combination with the preparation, printing and wider circulation of new editions made it very difficult to ignore the fact that ancient Greek and Roman intellectuals, who were unaware of Christian teachings, had managed to excel in matters moral and political, such as Socrates, Cicero, Aristotle or Plutarch demonstrated.

In terms of experience, conversely, the state of affairs of the Church had caused serious criticism from various fronts, against the claims of the clergy to be the sole authorities in morals. The perceived increased worldliness of the Church, the Great Schism of 1378-1417, and the transformation of the Papacy into a temporality in the course of the second half of the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth century had disillusioned a great number of the faithful. This disenchantment had found expression in a number of movements, such as the mystical trends of the late middle Ages (Lollards, Hussites, etc.) that were condemned as heretical. Additionally, it had given rise to calls from within for 'reform in head and members', but also in the more juristic Conciliar movement, that called for a greater check on the Papal authority and return to a more collective form of Church government, rather than the Papal form of monarchy.
The religious division of the sixteenth century, moreover, and the associated distrust in the institution of the Church, drove some people to seek unity through a natural religion, rather than a historically established religion. With regard to the more immediate politico-religious experience of the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century, the horrific conflicts that followed the Lutheran Reformation created a widespread cynicism on both the moral and political front. The realisation that a great number of people used religion as a pretext in a struggle for power, be it at a local (within the politics of a village), or a national level – such as the struggles between the rival families and factions of the Guise and the Bourbons in France - created resentment towards the institutionalised form of religion among many believers. Equally, and precisely because the conflicts had religion at their root, a more politicised approach was called for, in order to resolve the problems peacefully. By the same token, the civil disorder caused by religious strife had led to a reconsideration of the relations between Church and State. In the case of Italy, meanwhile, where religious conflict did not erupt as such, the disenchantment in the realm of politics came by the sixty year-long Italian wars (1494-1559) and the Papacy's infamous involvement in them. All this brought about some serious questions on whether (Christian) morality had any place in politics, and ultimately, whether religion was compatible with politics.

Yet despite this multifaceted assault on the status, role and authority of religion, the seventeenth century witnessed an attempt by the state to re-appropriate religion and transfer authority to the person of the prince himself. This is the effect of James's arguments in which he insisted that the sovereign was God's lieutenant on earth, responsible for the welfare of the body and soul of his subjects. This is another instance that contests the 'secularisation' model: in the decades after the period under examination, the prevalent notion was that of a king as the representative of God on earth. Instead of 'secularised' politics,
thus, we are now faced with sanctified politics (see Hobbes) and a deified monarch (see Louis XIV), or as Charles Trinkaus described it a 'tendency to secularise the sacred while simultaneously sacralising the secular'.

Put in the terms of this thesis, the distance between the temporal and the divine sphere became so great, that the king had to replace God in this world. From a different point of view, the void that was left by the Church's inability to provide the references that integrated social life was filled by the political authorities, who replaced the collapsed order through political law.

The years between c.1580-c.1620 were indeed turbulent and chaotic. In the aftermath of the religious wars and severely traumatised by them, people were trying to rebuild their confidence in the political and ecclesiastical structures. The Council of Trent (1545-52, 1562-3) had failed to reconcile the two bitterly opposing religious denominations, while in the German Lands the only viable religious settlement seemed to be the Peace of Augsburg (1555), an essentially 'political' solution. The publication of the Tridentine canons and decrees, furthermore, prepared the ground ideologically for the wars that began in the 1560s, as it defined the limits of 'Catholicism' in a strict sense. At the point where this thesis begins the religious and civil strife in France and the Netherlands was at its height; the English intervention in the Low Countries with the expedition of the Earl of Leicester (1585) ended badly, while in France things escalated on a different level with the rebellion of the Catholic League (1585) and the assassination of Henri III (1589). On the other hand, the Spanish, the main Catholic players in the wars, were defeated in 1588 (Spanish Armada),

---

while the French joined forces with the English and the Dutch against them in 1596.

Yet there seemed to be a relatively peaceful pause after the cessation of strife in France and the Low Countries and with peace between England and Spain (1604). The wars that had afflicted the kingdom of France for almost four decades (1562-98) came to an end with the abjuration of Henri IV (1593) and the later Edict of Nantes (1598). The illusion of stability that these major events had given, however, was quickly shattered by the religious overtone of the assassination of the French king (1610). In the Low Countries, the bloody contention with Spain that had lasted for five decades (1566-1609) came to a halt in 1609 with the Twelve-year Truce that divided the Low Countries along a confessional line. The temporary nature of truce, however, left no delusions about the stability of the situation. The state of affairs in Britain was far from stable either; James VI’s accession to the throne of Elizabeth (1603) may have settled the succession problem but it created a great number of others. For James’s Catholic subjects the attempt of 1605 was their last hope of returning the country to the bosom of Rome. In Italy, the relations between the Venetian Republic and Rome underwent serious tension between 1606-7, the period of the Interdict. All these unresolved and interrelated issues caused a widespread uneasiness, and some awareness that tension was building for a later clash. The conflict eventually began in 1618 in Bohemia, and involved the whole of western Europe, in one way or another, for thirty years.

This intense set of circumstances forms the historical background against which the following examination of the role of religion in people’s perception of the world ought to be located. From an intellectual point of view, it is further crucial to acknowledge that any discussion that took place on the subject of morals or politics did so within the framework of ‘languages’ or ‘traditions’. There have been extensive debates, mainly among scholars of political thought,
as to which of the two terms is more helpful, but the two are generally used interchangeably. The main difference between them is that the concept of 'language' entails less self-consciousness by the person who ascribes to it.\textsuperscript{25} The theorists that concern us here, however, quite intentionally aligned themselves with specific traditions and utilised their respective languages accordingly. The two main languages available to the \textit{literati} of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were that of theology, and that which can generally be described as humanistic. The latter was associated with the \textit{studia humanitatis} that centred around classical learning, and in particular the study of grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral philosophy.\textsuperscript{26} A third, very closely associated with the humanistic was the juristic language of civil law. These three languages, in turn, can be sub-divided into others: some of the branches of the theological strand and ones that will be referred to in the course of this study were, for instance, Augustinianism, scholasticism, Arminianism, and in a different form, Conciliarism. Offshoots of the language of humanism were Scepticism, Stoicism, Tacitism, and Ciceronianism. It is important to note that it was common for all these languages and sub-languages to be used interchangeably or in combination with one-another in discourse. Sceptical arguments, thus, that emphasised the limitations of human reason and the weakness of the human condition were particularly compatible, as we will see in due course, with


\textsuperscript{26} For valuable discussions on the concept of 'humanist' see Paul F. Grendler's 'Five Italian Occurrences of Umanista, 1540-74', \textit{Renaissance Quarterly}, 20 (1967), pp. 317-25; and 'The Concept of Humanist in Cinquencento Italy' in \textit{Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron}, ed. A. Molho and J.A. Tedeschi (Florence/De Kalb, Ill.: Sansori Editori & Northern Illinois UP, 1971), pp. 447-63; reprinted in idem (ed.), \textit{Culture and Censorship in Late Renaissance Italy and France} (London: Variorum Reprints, 1981), ch. 6. In the latter he notes the changes the meaning of the term underwent from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century, indicating that during the sixteenth century the humanists were seen as scholars in disciplines unrelated to the active life.
doctrines of Augustinianism and orthodox Calvinism that placed great stress on the effect that original sin had on human nature. Conversely, the prominence given to nature, human reason, and by consequence free-will, was an element that brought together Thomist, Neo-Aristotelian, Stoic, Jesuitical, and even Arminian stances. The employment of different modes of expression depended on a number of variables, such as the topic one intended to tackle, the desired effect, the training and the profession of the author. In this manner, for instance, the humanist scholar Lipsius, as we will see in the following chapters, used a primarily Stoic line of reasoning in the Constantia, but modified it with theological elements in order to make it acceptable to his audience. Similarly, although much of James VI and I’s line of reasoning depends, as we will see, on the theological language, he also makes use of juristic argumentation as the issues he deals with are of that nature.

The issue of languages is important inasmuch as it determined specific approaches to moral and political questions. Discussing politics or morality, thus, within a Christian theological framework, had a different effect than discussing these issues in a humanist or naturalistic context, both of which placed more emphasis on earthly values. The fundamental assumption of the theological discourse was that temporal affairs had as an ultimate end the divine sphere; this world, and people’s conduct on earth were subject to a metaphysical cause. In this context, politics and morality had to rely on revealed truth and divine precepts. The naturalistic/humanist approach, however, stressed that the basis could be found on earth; morality thus could exist autonomously, and the end of politics was the welfare of the people (subjects) on this earth in general, according to the examples of ancient traditions that managed to exist unaware of the Christian God.

The difficulty in defining the limits of sacred and profane or political, religious, and moral discourses for the period in question reflects the intense
process of reclassification taking place around fundamental notions. The fluidity of basic concepts upon which people of the period in question constructed their lives with the redefinition of concepts such as 'reason', 'providence and free will', 'superstition', 'welfare of the public', 'prudence', 'reason of state', legitimation of 'authority' and 'resistance', corresponds to the reconfiguration of the limits between profane and sacred and public and private and to the parallel redrawing of the boundaries of 'academic' disciplines. Theology was to be stripped of its position as the 'queen of disciplines' while subjects such as (natural) philosophy, history and law emerged as autonomous disciplines in their own right, of equal importance to theology. Indeed, what this transformation denoted was the emergence and recognition of the possibility of different world-views.

For the modern commentator, this difficulty in definition(s) becomes most apparent when one discusses and defines terms that sit uncomfortably on what modern thinking understands as the borders of these spheres and discourses. For this reason, 'problematic' terms and modes of thought have so far been examined as distinct entities, in isolation from one-another, ignoring the many interconnections between them. Thus the notion of superstition, on the border between the sacred and the profane, terms and bodies of thought that lie in-between concepts of Church and state (or politics and religion) such as the Conciliar movement, Gallicanism and Anglicanism, the doctrines of the politiques, what came to be known as 'Erastianism', toleration, divine right monarchy, and eirenicism have always been regarded as problematic, and because they are in themselves complex, they are rarely juxtaposed. Further than these, however, the complexity of political and religious issues is perhaps nowhere more obvious than in the concept of 'Protestant' and 'Protestantism' themselves, notions at the heart, namely, of the religious and political culture of the early modern period. As Richard Mackenney has pointed out, although we
are used to identifying the term with a set of religious beliefs, it derives from a 'refusal voiced by secular rulers in a secular assembly against their secular superior - in the matter of religion' (Imperial Diet at Speyer, 1529). One of the principal aims of this dissertation, therefore, is to re-emphasise the role of religion in our understanding of the history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and underline its function as a principal 'mental tool' in discussions of politics and morality of this period, as people of the time would see it.

This thesis proposes to study the relations and interconnections between several concepts as they were understood by four selected thinkers at the start of the seventeenth century, as expressions of the problem of the reconsideration of the role of religion in their concept of the world. The four case-studies of writings by Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and James, accordingly, provide us with evidence regarding the construction of relations between wisdom and morality, politics and morality, wisdom/knowledge and religion, morality and religion, politics and religion, divine and temporal, public and private. Discussion on some of these terms was conducted within the context of closely related theories, such as the fourfold scheme of (the cardinal) virtues, and the theory of passions. Both were essential for discussions on morals, as they provided a canon of principles to be followed and of the passions to be avoided. ‘Cardinal’ (from cardo: a hinge,

---

29 The phrase ‘mental tool’ refers to Fevre’s famous analysis of the outillage mental; see Religion of Rabelais, Part IV, ch. 10. The interconnections between politics and religion, or religion and the state - more so, perhaps, than the interconnections between morality and religion - have attracted some more interest recently; see for example Harro Höpf, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630. (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) and Jotham Parsons, The Church in the Republic. Gallicanism and Political Ideology in Renaissance France. (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2004). See also the very interesting collection of essays on the issue of superstition by Helen Parish and William G. Naphy, (eds.), Religion and Superstition in Reformation Europe. (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 2002).
that on which a thing turns, its principal point) were the four principal virtues (prudence-temperance-justice-fortitude) upon which the rest of the moral virtues revolved, in the sense that they were the common qualities of all other moral virtues. Their origin could be traced to classical sources (Plato, Aristotle), while they were also treated by St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, modifying Plato's theory, situated the cardinal virtues in the faculties. He placed prudence in the intellect, justice in the will, while he associated temperance and fortitude with the sensitive appetites, the former to restrain pleasure, and the latter to urge on impulses of resistance to fear which would deter a person from strenuous action under difficulties. The theory of passions was intimately linked with the virtues, since, according to Cicero the source of passion is 'intemperamentia', a state in which the passions are not controlled by the reason. This theory was also classical in origin, and it was particularly in vogue with the Stoics and the Sceptics, for whom man's ideal condition was 'apatheia' (ἀπάθεια: indifference, composure) and 'ataraxia' (ἀταραξία: state devoid of any perturbation or distress). The two schools, however, differed as to whether passions were to be eradicated or moderated. The theory was taken later on by Augustine who assigned the management of passions to the will rather than reason, thus accentuating the moral implications of the handling of passions.

Conceptually, the notions of divine and temporal, public and private, their subdivisions and the related virtues can be visualised as a quadruple circular model (figure 1). The model assumes that the sphere of religion's dominance can be broken down into four different aspects. First, horizontally, between divine and temporal; this separation is most eloquently expressed in

the work of Pierre Charron, which will be examined in the first chapter. Second, vertically, as a division between public and private, for which separation we will be using Lipsius as our guide (Ch. 2). The two incisions create four compartments: divine and private (faith); divine and public (piety, worship); temporal and public (prudence, civility); and temporal and private (constancy, according to Lipsius or ethics).

Figure 1

The subdivisions of this scheme are helpful in discussions of jurisdiction—modern western concepts of politics are confined to the section of temporal and public, while religion is conceived as divine and private. In the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, however, the Church claimed jurisdiction over the areas of divine public and private, temporal and private, as well as public and temporal. The rhetoric of separate jurisdictions or 'two kingdoms' argued for distinction between temporal and public (civility) and divine and public (religious practice). Ideas of toleration were based on the concept that the temporal authorities should not have any jurisdiction upon divine and private, as long as subjects were obedient in all the public aspects of their duties. The four authors considered in this dissertation acknowledged the distinct existence of these four compartments, with distinct features and - to a greater or lesser degree - independent of one-another. Theocratic writers of the time however, did not recognise any differentiation between these aspects; they saw them all as part of the same whole. When Papal apologists spoke of the separation of jurisdictions they granted control of public and temporal to lay authorities. The authors examined here, by contrast, regarded the realm of politics as corresponding to the human/temporal and thus morally inferior sphere - they saw, on the other hand, private as corresponding to the divine. This implies that as political affairs were inherently corrupt, there was a greater degree of leniency, while moral integrity and communication with God would be limited to the inner compartment of human affairs. This also relates to the other more general question that this thesis is addressing, the association between theory and practice. In this context, we can take, for instance, the divine sphere and the private compartment to be analogous to theory, and the general principles that only remain intact when they do not become tainted with the temporal realities, politics, and ultimately, practice.

From this point of view, there is an ascending scheme in this study, as it begins with the author least involved in affairs of the state (Charron), to the one

---

most involved (James VI and I). This is clearly reflected in the types of texts they compose, and the arguments they put forth. Charron and Lipsius’s treatments on the separation of the divine and temporal and the public and private spheres are thus more theoretical than the texts by Sarpi and James that placed more emphasis on the issue of the separation of jurisdictions. As they deal more with theory, they also provide the conceptual bases for understanding the ideas that Sarpi and James put forth. Sarpi’s proposal for the separation of jurisdictions is directly founded on the notion of a private, internalised religion, in immediate contact with the celestial God. It is, moreover, related to the notion that temporal reality is not closely linked to the divine, at least not while people wander the earth. The same pertains to James’s view that religious dissent was to be tolerated, so long as it did not find expression in the public arena. Equally, his request for his subjects’ pleading of allegiance corresponded to the notion of the detachment of the temporal sphere from that of the divine, as it forced his subjects to give priority to temporal affairs while on this earth, and leave the celestial considerations for the afterlife.

All the theorists considered here understood the four notions as more or less distinct and the quadruple division of the scheme as a given. The discussion of their works and views will begin with an examination of Pierre Charron’s De la Sagesse, Trois Livres (1601) (Ch. 1). The text, a treatise on wisdom, and a handbook on how to attain human—as opposed to, divine—wisdom, sets the ground for the first conceptual division, between celestial and earthly concerns. The discussion on Charron’s human wisdom will introduce the languages associated with the classical tradition, such as Stoicism, scepticism, Aristotelianism and neo-Platonism, which the author employed in his analysis, occasionally blending them with some Augustinian elements. In this manner, the chapter will refer to the relationship between certain classical traditions and religion, and the sort of questions the use of these currents of thought raised for
the role of religion. In the next chapter, attention turns to Justus Lipsius’s two texts, *De Constantia Libri Duo* (1584), a book on moral philosophy prescribing the individual’s conduct in times of public afflictions, and *Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex* (Leiden, 1589), a treatise that belongs to the genre of the ‘mirror for princes’. With these two works Lipsius established two distinct codes of conduct in private (*Constantia*) and public (*Politica*) affairs. The analysis of these two texts leads on to discussions of Lipsius’s particularly favoured traditions, the Stoic line of reasoning, and the Tacitean style. This discussion will show the implications the two traditions brought to questions on morality, politics and religion.

Chapter Three takes as a case in point Paolo Sarpi’s most important work, the *Historia del Concilio Tridentino* (London, 1619; translated as *History of the Council of Trent*, 1620). This is a historical work that deals with the issues raised by the Lutheran Reformation, the reaction of the Papal and Imperial side and the failure, as Sarpi sees it, of the Catholic Church to reform itself through the long process of the Council of Trent (1545-52, 1562-3). One of the main themes that concerned Sarpi in this work was the separation between political and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, a position that almost naturally ensued from Lipsius’s and Charron’s standpoints: the civil authorities, as inherently temporal, had to have control over earthly affairs, in the public realm. According to Sarpi, the Church, on the other hand, as an institution in contact with the divine, ought to have jurisdiction over spiritual matters, and the salvation of souls. These concerns were, moreover, confined to the private realm, where they would cause no problems to the peace and welfare of the state. His specific position in the *History* was that, at the root of the problems that gave rise and impetus to the protest of disaffected believers, was the Church’s intrusion into temporal affairs – which had left the Church devoid of its spiritual nature and purpose. Within these premises, the solution could only
come from lay authorities, the only source of power equipped to deal with the
affairs of this world. The analysis of Sarpi's History leads naturally to the
discussion of Conciliar modes of thought in ecclesiastical matters, and to notions
of evangelical internalised forms of religion, both of which form an integral part
of his viewpoint and arguments in support of it.

King James's works deal with very similar problems and from a similar
perspective. The specific problems that faced James while in Scotland, having to
establish his authority in an environment in which the process of the
Reformation had produced a church financially dependent upon the state but all
the more anxious as a result to stress its autonomy, combined with the fact that
his position was undermined through Papal intervention in the aftermath of the
Gunpowder Plot, made him quite assertive in his understanding of the limits of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. His position as the sovereign of his kingdom
(kingdoms after 1603), gave him the conviction that only under lay control
would the Church flourish without problems. The concern, thus, of the fourth
chapter will be to discuss these viewpoints through the examination of several
of James's works, starting from the ones produced during his clash with the
Papacy on the issue of the Oath of Allegiance. The discussion will touch on
James's theological conception of monarchy that cut across Charron's division
between divine and temporal. It will also discuss his use of Conciliar arguments
against the Papacy, and his frequent references to the Byzantine example of
Church-state relations, that placed the Church within a historical - and hence,
temporal - context placing it under the Imperial ('political') control. In this
manner, the four case-studies demonstrate both the domains from whence the
attack on religion originated, as well as the implications of this attack for
matters moral and political. Yet it is essential to note, that in a world and an era
as deeply religious as the one in consideration, neither the attack nor the
implications could be as extreme and conclusive as the following examination
may imply. What is more, the theories expounded were not always fully
developed by their advocates, neither were they without flaws. They do,
however, represent some of the more influential modes of expression and
traditions of thinking in their time.

The exposition of the texts and the main themes that they concentrate on
brings us to the last major point of this study: in addition to caution directed
against the dangers of anachronism and teleology, this dissertation raises some
questions about the usefulness of some traditional boundaries in our
conception, and consequently, our examination of early modern history. The
first categorisation refers to the somewhat simplistic distinction of history of this
period into political, religious, and cultural sectors, and the subdivision of early
modern history of the mental world into various classifications of history, from
intellectual, to literary criticism and history of political thought. It can be argued
that these categories are more a reflection of academic disciplines than it is self-
evident in contemporary texts themselves.33 The centrality of religion in the
period under examination is more influential in approaches to religious culture
and the manifestation of popular devotion and worship, than in studies of the
shared assumptions behind these.34 This is above all evident in the selection of

---

33 The most prominent example in reference to this study is Cardinal Bellarmine, a prolific and
ingenious author, and the main propagandist of the Papal side, whose work has not seriously
been studied by intellectual historians or historians of political thought; the only existing
monograph on him is more in the area of hagiography than history as we understand it: James
Brodrick, Robert Bellarmine. Saint and Scholar. (London: Burns & Oates, 1961). Similarly, the most
thorough study of the Council of Trent has been produced by Hubert Jedin, a Catholic priest: A
History of the Council of Trent. 2 vols., trans. Dom Ernest Graf (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1957-61).

34 The division of the history of religion between the study of beliefs and the study of practices is
fairly traditional, although the boundaries between these fields are often elusive; Johnson,
'Religion', Writing History, p. 140. See for example the wealth of studies in popular religious
culture such as – indicatively – Keith Thomas’s pioneering Religion and the Decline of Magic.
Nicolson, 1971); John Bossy, Christianity in the West, 1400-1700. (Oxford: OUP, 1985); R. W.
Scribner and Trevor Johnson (eds.), Popular Religion and Popular Culture in Germany and Central
texts for analysis by modern commentators. In this case, Sarpi’s extended discussions in the History of the Council of Trent on doctrinal and sacramental questions, and James’s frequent usage of a theological language, have not attracted much attention from historians of political thought.

The second boundary not always useful in studies of the intellectual world of the period in question, and one that will become especially apparent in the course of this thesis, is that of nation. The international nature of the so-called ‘republic of letters’, an ‘imagined community of scholars extended in time as well as space’, has long been acknowledged. Its members, who felt that they shared common interests and concerns, were in frequent communication with one another through the exchange of letters. Even though vernacular (not yet ‘national’) languages started to emerge at the beginning of the seventeenth century, all scholars were versed in Latin, and most of the intellectual exchange took place in Latin. When assessing thinkers or ideas at the start of the seventeenth century, hence, we ought to consider them in a wider framework that supersedes national contexts. In the cases that concern us here, James, Sarpi, Charron, and Lipsius moved in similar circles, had common friends, some of them were in communication with one-another, and were certainly aware of one-another’s works. The exchanges between French and Italian, French (mostly Huguenots) and Dutch, Dutch and Italian, Scottish and French, and English, Dutch and Italian intellectuals are generally acknowledged. Yet the case for England as part of a wider European context is more contentious; English historiography has long insisted on the peculiarity and insularity of the English

---


36 Burke, ‘Towards an Archaeology of Libraries’. 
case and experience, and has also treated the history of the British Isles as such. And even though there are some valid reasons for this insistence, this thesis shows that at least for the reign of the early Stuarts (James in this case) it does not stand. This is perhaps more obvious in cases of politico-religious matters than religious-moral issues. It was certainly linked to the fact that although one could talk about the emergence of a small number of 'national' Churches, the general frame of reference for the Catholics was still Rome, while Protestantism undoubtedly also demonstrated elements of 'internationalism'.

In these respects, the present thesis is intended to supplement and amplify existing work, more particularly – and most strikingly, in the area of interaction across confessional boundaries. The four cases examined here serve as an indication that occasionally people found it easier to communicate with followers across the lines of confessional demarcation than with people who nominally belonged to their own doctrine. Lipsius characteristically switched confessions a number of times in his life; Sarpi although a friar was always, and often still is, regarded as an atheist or (crypto) Protestant; and James, raised as Calvinist, was throughout his life liable to accusations of Catholicism. This element is only intelligible if we recognise the 'shadings' of religious doctrine; 'temperate' Catholics and Protestants were closer to one another than they were to the extremists of the respective sides. Thus, evangelical reforming Catholics (whose ideas later found expression through the Jansenists), who were marginalised by Tridentine decisions, were – and indeed some of them felt - closer to the 'Protestants' than it is generally acknowledged. From a different perspective, 'Arminian' Protestants who put great emphasis on the freedom of will, were strikingly close to the teachings of the Jesuits.37

37 Cf. Fulgenzio Micantio's (Sarpi's close friend and biographer) letter to Marco Antonio de Dominis: 'I remember that ... not only myself, but Padre Paolo [Sarpi] had a conceit that [Arminianism] ... is a very dangerous doctrine unto the Reformed Religion, and by going along
Calvinism promoted theocratic views of state and society that were indeed almost identical with the extreme Papalist doctrines of the same sort. It is also reasonable to speak of similarities between the arguments put forth by the Anglican and the Gallican Church, as both advanced their independence from Rome and some state control over Church matters. Overall, the blurring of these confessional boundaries and identities was due to the considerable variation that existed within the doctrines, greater than either the respective Churches or the historiographies have acknowledged. Awareness of this will contribute to a better understanding of the complexities involved in the study and analysis of the troubled sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With regards to the specific texts examined here, one can say that most of them broadly belong to the confines of the Catholic world, but they are unconventional texts: most of them caused controversies, or were put on the Index of Prohibited Books. They were, thus, directed against the organised Catholic Church - which was the point of contact with the writings of James, whose stance was inherently anti-Papal.

Reservations about these boundaries also lead to questions about the usefulness of the boundaries of periodisation; the period of c. 1580-1620 is variously described as ‘late Renaissance’, as the age of the ‘Counter-’, ‘Catholic’, or ‘Tridentine’ Reformation, or the age of the ‘baroque’. Similarly, the expression of fervent religious feeling that contributed to the horror of the

---

38 Thus James in his Premonition to all Mighty Monarchs (1609) about (the Jesuit) Bellarmine: 'But it is no wonder he takes the Puritanes part, since Jesuits are nothing but Puritan-papists', in James I, The Workes (1616), facsimile edition (Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971); p. 305.

39 One could perhaps venture to suggest that the modern scholars' unawareness of the shading of religious doctrine is a reflection of the 'confessionalisation' of the Academy itself.

religious wars that plagued the continent throughout the sixteenth century, together with the 'confessionalisation' process, makes for comparisons between the 'secular' and 'reason-driven' Renaissance(s) with the more passionate and devout 'baroque', thus obscuring our perception of continuities between the findings of the earlier Renaissance thinkers and their later counterparts.\textsuperscript{41} Accordingly, thinkers such as Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi or James, who defy classification and who acknowledge their debt to their immediate and more remote past, become difficult to categorise.\textsuperscript{42}

That difficulty itself questions the presupposition that a process of secularisation took place, let alone that it was a predetermined development. In this respect, the line followed in the examination of the four figures in question and their works is not one of assumed progression and teleology; that is to say, the thesis does not start with the less 'secularised' and move to the more 'secularised' position. On the contrary, the whole idea of secularisation itself comes into question if one considers the divine-right theories that we will see James advancing they were in fact closer to medieval concepts of governance than they were 'modern', as we understand the term. In the case that, as James advocated, the king assumes the position of God's representative on earth, then

\textsuperscript{41} The irregularities and contradictions of such periodisation are perhaps more eloquently illustrated in the case of England, where the 'Renaissance' post-dated the Reformation.

the notion of 'secularisation' as a linear and completed process becomes redundant. What is more, it has to be underlined that in the terms of this dissertation, the separation of the divine from the temporal sphere should not be understood as being the same as the subordination of the former to the latter. The arguments and positions that will interest us here originated within a system that, whether it acknowledged some autonomy of the temporal sphere or not, still operated under the condition that everything depended on the divine to a smaller or a greater degree.\footnote{Trinkaus, 'Humanism, Religion, Society', p. 689.}

On that account, the views that will be examined provide interesting angles on what essentially constitutes one problem, the questioning of the relationship between the temporal and the divine spheres. The most eloquent expression of this problem will be the subject of the first chapter.
Chapter I

Moral Implications (I): *Divine and Human*

Pierre Charron, *De la Sagesse, Trois Livres* (1601)

---

Pierre Charron’s *De la Sagesse, Trois Livres* (1601) is a work so diverse and rich that a key Renaissance historian was led to assert that its author, Pierre Charron (1541-1603), might be ‘one of the keys to our understanding of how the Renaissance gave way to the seventeenth century’.\(^1\) With a somewhat uncommon title and subject for its time, a guide for attaining human wisdom, the *Sagesse* was destined to be at the centre of heated controversies for centuries following its initial publication. The author, a French theologian, preacher and trained lawyer who took part in the French religious wars on the side of the Catholic League, was himself an interesting figure. The *Sagesse* was not his first or only written work; he composed a few other texts, mainly Catholic apologetics; his name, nevertheless, would not necessarily have survived, had it not been for the *Sagesse*. The popularity it enjoyed is evidenced by its numerous editions: thirty-nine from 1601 to 1672 (despite the fact that it was placed on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1605), of which, no less than thirteen appeared between 1618 and 1634.\(^2\)

---

2. In addition to these, Richard Tuck talks about eight English editions between 1608 and 1670; *Philosophy and Government* 1572-1651. (Cambridge: CUP, 1993); p. 83. See *Index des Livres Interdits*,...
Studies on Charron have been coloured by the theologian’s association with the great Michel de Montaigne (1533-92): he was conceived to be the latter’s disciple or, less flatteringly, Montaigne’s plagiariser or ‘herbier’, or, according to a different interpretation, Lipsius’s and Montaigne’s synthesiser. Conversely, and equally controversially, he has been variously described as a precursor to Hobbes; an advocate of an autonomous ethics, and his name has been placed next to Machiavelli’s, while his Sagesse has also been labelled as the breviary of the Libertins. Twenty years after its publication, moreover, the work was at the centre of heated religious debates between Jesuits and their adversaries, as a text that promoted atheism. Even contemporary scholars

---


6 Cf. the nuncio Del Bufalo’s dispatch: ‘Every day some scandalous book comes out off the press, among them a recent one, similar to the impious doctrine of Machiavelli, entitled *Wisdom*, and composed by a theologal and canto of the Cathedral of Condom, who had no sooner finished this foul work filled with heresies when he suddenly died’ (Del Bufalo to Aldobrandini, 10 Feb. 1604), cited in A. Soman, ‘Pierre Charron: A Revaluation’, *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance*, XXXII (1970), p. 71. For a refutation of Charron’s ‘machiavellism’ see Jean Dagens, ‘Le Machiavelisme de Pierre Charron’, *Studies Aangeboden aan Gerard Brom* (Utrecht & Nijmegen: Dekker & vd Vegt, 1952), pp. 56-64.

cannot really decide whether Charron was a stoic, a sceptic, a fideist, an atheist, or whether he is worth considering at all. As this suggests, his legacy remains a much-disputed point.

The ambivalence in Charron’s work is partly what makes his book on wisdom of particular interest within the scope of this project. The other aspect of the work that renders it important for this study is that it constitutes an attack on epistemological and religious dogmatism. As this chapter will demonstrate, his work was a reflection of the intellectual, moral and religious crisis that dominated the second part of the sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth. In the final stages of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the effects of which were accentuated by the experience of the religious wars, the authority that religion and faith held as the source of truth and morality was seriously undermined. It is within this context that Charron’s attack is intelligible. Likewise, the fact that he was the author of two distinct major texts on two different kinds of wisdom is also fascinating. *De la Sagesse* was in fact his second composition, following a theological treatise entitled *Les Trois Vérités* (1593). The latter had set out to prove three fundamental truths: the existence of God, the existence of a ‘revealed’ religion, and finally, that Catholicism more specifically was the only true form of Christianity. *Les Trois Vérités* dealt in other words with divine wisdom; conversely, the *Sagesse*, his philosophical work, concentrates solely upon the question of human wisdom. Charron’s ambivalence, accordingly, lies in this double output: the two texts can either be interpreted in conjunction with one another, or separately. Taken together, *Les Trois Vérités* can be read as the foundation of the *Sagesse*, and divine wisdom as the basis of human. Read separately, however, the two texts give us ample reason to infer that Charron saw divine and human wisdom as divergent and

---

8 Soman, ‘Revaluation’, p. 57
independent, with all the implications that this has on moral considerations. Accordingly, and with regard to his attack on epistemological and religious dogmatism in the Sagesse, the attack on the former materialises more effectively than the attack on the latter. This can partly be explained by the scope of the text itself. Additionally, an attack on excessive forms of piety and belief would have been a risky and complicated task for a theologian, at a time when religious fervour was still running high in a country that had just emerged from civil strife, and was trying to heal its wounds, following the Edict of Nantes of 1598.9

In what follows then, we have a manifold objective. An initial brief account of the author's life will be followed by a close textual analysis of his chief philosophical work, the Sagesse. This textual analysis is necessary, for previous examinations of the text have tended to adopt a thematic approach that does not do justice to the length, complexity, and ambiguity of the work. A close textual analysis facilitates an interpretation of Charron's position, by taking into account the languages he used to convey his thoughts. The author was extraordinary in this respect in that he used a combination of languages in composing and revising his text. It will be shown, that the Sagesse provides a richness of material that can either be read as a work with stoic resonances, or as sceptic or Augustinian (theological), according to the set of arguments on which the reader decides to give greater emphasis.10 This element builds on the discussion about languages in the Introduction, on the one hand, while it also

---


10 Bouwsma in his assessment of the 'Two Faces of Humanism', where he discusses the two currents of thought, Stoicism and Augustinianism notes that 'citations for both sides often come from the same figures', with Charron being one of the examples he uses. William J. Bouwsma, 'The Two faces of Humanism. Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought', in idem, A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 19-73; on p. 58.
sheds some light on the reason why his name and this work have for so long been the subject of debate. In this context, we can view Charron’s work as an example and an expression of the problems and consequences of accepting the existence of a duality of spheres, the divine and the human/temporal. It will further be suggested that the centrality of the problems discussed by Charron is witnessed by and reflected in the debate surrounding his name and his work. What people saw in the Sagesse, and how it could fit so many viewpoints and be claimed by so many different parties, are related issues that also need to be addressed. The chapter will conclude by suggesting that all of the above difficulties are resolved only when set against the peculiar circumstances of the second half of the sixteenth century. In short, Charron and his Sagesse, were peculiar products as well as testimonies of the effects that the humanistic tradition could have, particularly when combined with the experience of the religious wars.

I.

At the Heart of the Religious Wars: Charron’s Life

Charron, born in 1547, was marked by the religious conflict that plagued France for four decades (1562-98). Yet the information that we have on his life is fragmentary and incomplete. It is based on two sources: the first one is the Eloge Véritable ou Sommaire Discours de la Vie de Pierre Charron Parisien Vivant Docteur ès Droits, par G.M.D.R., which was composed and published by his

11 For his life the standard account is given by Sabrié De l’Humanisme au Rationalisme, pp. 19-141; see also Charron, The ‘Wisdom’ of Pierre Charron, pp. 59-84; Renée Kogel, Pierre Charron. (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1972), pp. 15-24. Alfred Soman has challenged these accounts on the grounds that their main source, the Eloge is not reliable; he argues, in fact that ‘during his lifetime, Charron appears to have been little known and without connections’ (p. 66); that he only managed to get the patronage of a somewhat marginal bishop, Claude Dormy, and that ultimately, he was of minor importance as a writer. His account, however of course does not explain the undisputed popularity of his works. For the account that follows, I have used all three of the above in conjunction to one another.
friend and editor of his works after his death, Gabriel Michel de la RocheMaillot. The second source is a collection of letters from Charron to la RocheMaillot. The Eloge first appeared in the 1607 edition of De la Sagesse. It does not exactly constitute a biography of Charron: as a eulogy, its character is one of praise for the author who had died in 1603. La RocheMaillot, furthermore, is especially untrustworthy with dates. The letters, forty-seven of them, were sent by Charron to his friend and later editor within a time-span of fourteen years (1589-1603). These letters provide an interesting connection with other prominent figures of the period: they were copied by no less a figure than Gabriel Naudé (1600-53) in 1628, on Gassendi’s request, for Nicolas Peiresc (1580-1637). Pierre (Petrus) Gassendi (1592-1655), scientist, priest, and professor of Mathematics, was one of the greatest French philosophers of the first half of the seventeenth century and a member of the Libertin Tétrade, who we know had expressed admiration for Charron’s work. This detail is significant, as it lends substance to the association of Charron and the libertins in the decades following his death.

Notwithstanding the survival of these letters and the eulogy matter shortly after his death, the picture we have of Charron’s life is one full of obscurities. From the little that we know, he was born in Paris in 1541 to a family of booksellers. According to the Eloge, sometime before 1571, he obtained

---

12 The letters were published by L. Auvray: ‘Lettres de Pierre Charron à Gabriel Michel de la RocheMaillot’ in Revue d’Histoire Littéraire de la France, I (1894), pp. 308-329.
14 In a letter to Henri du Faur de Pibrac, Gassendi thanked him for sending a copy of Charron’s Discours chrestiens but explain that the Sagesse pleased him more: ‘Tu fais bien de me recommander d’emmener Charron dans ma solitude. Quel juge plus sûr? Surtout si on lui donne pour compagnons ceux dont il a lui-même fait son profit: Montaigne, Lipse, Sénèque, Plutarche, Cicéron’, quoted in Miller, Peiresc’s Europe p. 220, note 88.
a doctor's degree in canon and civil law, possibly at the Universities of Orléans and Bourges; later on, however, he turned to theology. It seems that he was quite eloquent, and that he consequently quickly gained a reputation as a preacher. Five years into the religious conflict, we find him in Montpellier, as théologal and canon, where he experienced first-hand the misery of the wars himself. As a member of the clergy, he was taken prisoner by Protestant forces during their control of Montpellier (1567). He was captured together with other church officials, and kept for a period of six to seven months, until his ransom was paid. The sources are silent as to the effect this had on our author. Yet this must have been a dramatic experience, if we judge by later aggravations, and by the manner in which he described the horror of the civil wars in the Sagesse:

Now there is not a mischief more miserable, no more shameful, it is a sea of infelicities. ... it is not properly war, but a malady of the state, a fiery sickness, and frenzy. And to say the truth, he that is the author thereof, should be put out from the number of men, and banished out of the borders of human nature. ... To conclude, it is nothing but misery.16

It seems that between 1571 and 1576, having left Montpellier, he was working in the area of Bordeaux as a preacher and was later appointed as a lecturer in theology. In 1576, we find him back in Bordeaux where he was elected chanoine (canon) and soon after made écolatré (clergyman in charge of a school attached to a cathedral or abbey). It is during this time that critics believe he made the acquaintance of Montaigne: due to his duties, he would have been in frequent contact with the civil authorities and Montaigne had been elected Mayor of Bordeaux in 1581. The extent of this relationship remains unclear; La Rochemaillet says that

il prit connaissance et vescut fort familièrement avec Messire Michel de Montaigne ... et le sieur de Montaigne l’aimoit une affection reciproque, et avant que mourir, par son testament, il luy permist de porter apres son decez les plaines armes de sa noble famille, par ce qu’il ne laissoit aucuns enfans masles.

As a token of this friendship, the essayist apparently gave Charron a copy of Bernadino Ochino’s *Catechismo* (Basle, 1561), a heretical work. Yet the assertions for intimacy between the two men are undermined by the fact that there is not a single reference to Montaigne in Charron’s letters, or any reference to Charron by Montaigne. The issue is one of importance because implicit in the claim of their relationship is the assumption that has given rise to the tradition of regarding Charron as a disciple of the essayist.

Another reference from Rochemaillet, that the letters verify, states that Charron attempted twice to join a monastic order; first, a Carthusian monastery in 1588 without much success, and later a Celestine one with similar results. His attempt to adopt a monastic vocation should be taken as a serious indication of his desire to retreat somewhere peaceful and solitary to escape events around

---

17 *Eloge* in *Sagesse*, n.p. [p. 5].
18 The book does indeed survive in the Bibliothèque Nationale (D2 5240 Rés): it is inscribed ‘Montaigne’, and below that ‘Charron ex dono dicti domini de Montaigne in suo castello, 2 Julij, Anno 1586'; see Soman, ‘Revaluation’, p. 64
19 Cf. Soman, ‘Revaluation’, pp. 64-5. As further proof for a close relationship between the two men, scholars also take the information that in his will Charron left the sum of five hundred écus to Montaigne’s sister and made her husband Thibaud de Camain, his universal heir and executor of his estate.
20 In this respect, according to interpretation, there exist different views on the extent of the relationship between the two men: J.D. Charron, for instance, stresses the fact that they were close friends but that they also both had the same material available; he even tentatively suggests that Montaigne’s scepticism might have derived from his discussions with Charron (*The Wisdom* of Pierre Charron, pp. 120-1). Soman argues for no connection between the two besides one possible meeting that is testified by the existence of *Catechismo*. Popkin, who argues that Charron was the intellectual heir to Montaigne suggests a close friendship between the two (*see History of Scepticism*, pp. 42-64, esp. pp. 56-7). Kogel, *Pierre Charron*, pp. 33-42, considers him neither a plagiarist, nor a disciple. She suggests that Charron read the *Essais* and was impressed by them; she acknowledges Charron’s borrowings from Montaigne, but she explains them by stressing that the two men shared similar sentiments on many issues. She finally, however, comes to the conclusion that Charron was his own man when he wrote *Sagesse*.
21 See letters I-VIII (Feb.-July 1589); Auvray, ‘Lettres’, pp. 314-6.
him. Nevertheless, having left Bordeaux, Charron managed to find himself precisely in the middle of that which he was trying to flee - political and religious turmoil. During the opening sessions of the *Etats Généraux* of Blois (1588), he was in Angers. In the early months of 1589, after the assassination of the Duke of Guise by Henri III (1589), the town was in considerable tension and full of Liguers. As Mark Greengrass remarks, the language and mood of violence in Catholic circles that dominated those early months of 1589 is difficult to recapture. In these circumstances, Charron seems to have joined the League. Just before Easter, however, the town was taken under the control of the supporters of Henry of Navarre. Charron was once more placed under arrest, by the Royalists this time, and was forbidden to preach. His distress is evident in a letter composed a few months later: 'L’agitation publique m’afflige fort ... J’ai envie de me cacher en quelque coin...'. Charron had thus been confined twice on the grounds of his religious convictions and actions. The first time by zealots from across the confessional divide, the second by supporters of a political solution to the crisis created by religious differences, who would not tolerate the radicalism of the Catholic League.

Against this background, the publication of his first book, the *Trois Vérités*, a treatise of apologetics and polemic for the Catholic faith, should not seem surprising; it was an expression of Charron’s reaction to the experience of religious strife. The work came out anonymously in 1593 and the timing was


24 ‘...J’ai été inhibé de prescher et mis à arrest par la ville ... j’ai permission maintenant de prescher et fus restitué hier en la chaire, jour de l’Ascencion, mais l’arrest dure encore...’ Letter from Angers, 12 May 1589; Auvray, ‘Lettres’, p. 315-6.

25 Letter from Angers, 1 July; Auvray, ‘Lettres’, p. 316.
crucial, as Henry IV had just abjured Calvinism. The first two books of the *Trois Vérités*, accordingly, sought to establish the existence of God, while the third one – which bore a special separate dedication to Henry IV - was devoted to a refutation of the Huguenot leader, Du Plessis-Mornay’s (1549-1623) *Traité de l’Église* (1578). The first edition of the *Trois Vérités* sold out in six months, an indication that it enjoyed considerable popularity.

In 1594, Charron was in Cahors, working as théologal at the University (he was later promoted to the post of Vicaire Général). The next year he took part in the general assembly of the clergy of France that Henry IV convened in Paris, as a representative of the province of Bordeaux; he was also assigned as secretary to the assembly. He returned to Cahors after the completion of the proceedings. Interestingly, during this time in Cahors, namely within a few years from the completion of his religious text, Charron seems to have undertaken the composition of the *Sagesse*, the philosophical work that is of interest to us here. The *Sagesse* was finished in mid-1599 or 1600, but its publication was only possible after Charron had obtained royal privileges for the printing. Just a year earlier, he had moved from Cahors to an even more remote place, Condom, a small town near Bordeaux.

During this time, Charron also worked on a smaller tract, the *Petit Traicté de la Sagesse* – a summary and an apologetic for the larger text, which appeared posthumously, together with the *Discours Crestiens*, a collection of some of his

---

27 This position was usually the last step before elevation to the bishop’s seat.
28 Joseph Bergin, *The Making of the French Episcopate 1589-1661*. (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 1996), p. 384. Interestingly, this assembly was one that drew a lurid picture of the state of the French church and forcefully complained against the subversion of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the secular magistrates; it demanded, moreover, the adoption of the Decrees of Trent, and the restoration of Episcopal elections.
29 Cf. for example letters from Cahors, 8 March 1597, and 4 June 1598; Auvray, ‘Lettres’, pp. 318-9.
30 Letters XXVII (6 May 1600) and XXIX (12 November 1600); Auvray, ‘Lettres’, pp. 321-2.
sermons (1604). Charron spent the last years of his life writing and preparing a second revised edition of the Sagesse, the text that he clearly considered as his most important. This revision of the Sagesse was dictated both by the fact that it had been 'wrongly perceived', and that Charron wanted to obtain approbation from the Sorbonne before the publication. While in Paris to supervise the publication of the second edition, however, he died of a sudden apoplexy. La Rochemaillet was left to complete the revision, some of which was prescribed by Jeannin (Pierre Jeannin, 1540-1622), the President of the Parlement of Paris, while he also had to deal with the difficulties raised by the Sorbonne. De la Sagesse 'revue corrigé et augmenté' finally came out in 1604, but was still placed in the Index of Prohibited Books the year after.

Overall, Charron led an intense life. A rather restless mind, like the ones he describes in the Sagesse, his life was torn between continuous travelling and preaching around the South and West of France where he twice became personally involved in the conflict, and his desire to retire either to a monastery or to his private retreat at Condom. When the civil conflict was finally over, he managed to distill his experience into writing and articulate his religious and philosophical views to an even greater audience. The unusual contents of his philosophical work, his guide on wisdom, are the next topic of this chapter.

II.

Human Wisdom: De La Sagesse, Trois Livres

Charron's challenging and tumultuous life ought to be kept in mind while we analyse his most important and famous work, De la Sagesse. A number of issues need to be addressed in this section. Starting with an overall discussion of the subject of the work, we will then turn to the problems in assessing Charron's

work that arise from the existence of four different editions. Next, a close textual analysis of the work will demonstrate why the *Sagesse* is so important in the context of this thesis. It will reveal it to be both an example of the moral connotations of the separation of the divine and the temporal (human) spheres, and an expression of the intellectual and religious crisis of the second half of the sixteenth century. This consideration will also focus on the peculiarity of the nature and content of the text, the naturalistic emphasis of which makes it an especially unusual composition at a time when religion played such a prominent role in the manner in which people lived and thought. The chapter will also discuss the author's sources and languages, giving some account of his ambiguity and varied interpretations. The discussion will thus demonstrate the bases that have given rise to the debates surrounding the *Sagesse*; as it will become clear, these can largely be accounted for by the extraordinary richness of the work itself.

i.

*Charron’s Synthesis*

Charron’s work is a handbook on how to achieve human wisdom and a guide on how to lead a wise and moral life according to the dictates of the four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Divided into three parts, it purposely leads the reader through various stages to acquire the *sagesse humaine*. The first book is an examination of human nature: using the Socratic dictum *nosce te ipsum* (*γνώθι σεαυτόν*, or know thyself) as a starting point, it works as a preparatory stage and necessary disposition to wisdom. Charron undertakes to purge man of any predispositions in order to be able to accept the

---

33 The classic study on the role of religion in setting an almost impossible framework from which people had great difficulty in escaping is Lucien Febvre’s *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century. The Religion of Rabelais*, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1982).
teachings of wisdom. The reader is by this point cleansed and ready to move to the heart of the subject-matter: the instructions and the principal rules of wisdom which are contained in the second book. In this book the candidate in search of wisdom discovers its foundations. The primary one, according to Charron, is true and essential honesty and probity ('probité & preud’hommie'). The author then goes on to explain the offices of a wise man according to a three-fold system: towards God, men – that is, people around him - and himself. The double duty to God and men, interestingly, is analogous to the two tables of the Decalogue. We should however take the reference to the duty to one’s self as an indication of the increased importance the self was acquiring in the minds of the people of the seventeenth century.34 The second book concludes with what Charron calls the fruit and crown of wisdom, the (Stoic) skill to maintain oneself in true tranquillity of mind. The third book is rather different in character; organised on the bases of the four moral virtues, it is to a great degree instructive and analytical, giving specific guidance on how one should lead one’s life by following their principles in order to combat the various passions.

It is essential to recognise the purposefulness of the book’s structure. Nothing better illustrates its importance and centrality, than the length of the second book: it is the shortest of the three. After a long introduction, what Sabrié calls a ‘vast hors-d’œuvre’, the reader is introduced to the second part, the substance of the work, which only consists of twelve chapters.35 Notably, even the tone changes from the first to the second book; whereas the former is fairly critical of the human race in general and more descriptive, the latter has a more glorifying and advisory character, in a sense reflecting Charron’s vocation as a

35 Sabrié, De l’Humanisme au Rationalisme, p. 240. Book I is comprised of fifty-eight chapters in the first edition (1601) and sixty-two in the second (1604); for the contents of the two editions see Appendix I.
preacher. The last book, meanwhile, is a more systematic account of the second one; in another forty-three chapters, the author expands upon the outline set out in Book Two, providing specific instructions on the duties of the wise man and the manner in which he should be leading his life. The whole work is exhaustively analytical, and has often been described as dull and tedious, perhaps due to its nature as a handbook. The reader can move easily through the systematically organised material and find what he is looking for at specific points.

Above all, however, the centrality of the second book is underlined by its greater originality. In the preface of the second edition Charron explains to his readers that it is more his own than the other two, and that he was in fact intending to publish it on its own:

So here is in a few words the picture of human wisdom and folly, and the summary of that which I propose to handle in this work, and especially in the second book, that expressly contains the rules, traits and offices of wisdom, and which is more mine than the other two, and which I once thought to have produced (publish) by itself.  

The problem of Charron’s originality is a recurrent theme in the accounts of his work. Anthony Levi’s evaluation, that the whole work is ‘little more than a systematic arrangement of opinions, phrases, sometimes whole paragraphs of other works’, encapsulates the general criticisms raised against De la Sagesse.37 There is indeed a good deal of truth in the argument, and we will examine these borrowings in more detail throughout its analysis. It is nonetheless essential to remind ourselves of the general trends of the age in which this work was formulated, and assess it with some sensitivity towards them. Borrowing and incorporating extracts from various works – and usually not acknowledged – was commonplace among humanist scholars. Their purpose was to enhance the text or to add more authority, while readers seemed to expect and enjoy them;

36 Sagesse, pp. 9-10.
'mimesis', after all, was a mark of respect.\textsuperscript{38} Charron himself acknowledged in his preface to the first edition that he made use of material from other authors who had treated the subject of morality and politics. He specifically indicated Seneca (4 BC/AD 1-65) and Plutarch (AD 46-120), both very popular and influential moralists during the period of the composition of the \textit{Sagesse}. He also pointed, however, to the use of 'modern' authors concluding that he 'collected the material during his studies, but the order and the form are his'.\textsuperscript{39}

Within the text itself, Charron acknowledged by name two living authors: the French Guillaume du Vair (1556-1621) and Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), but did not reference authors who were no longer alive. This has made Renée Kogel suggest that the need to acknowledge his debt to the two authors should be taken as an indication of his fear that either du Vair or Lipsius would challenge him in print for his use of their works, had he not mentioned them.\textsuperscript{40} This argument might also offer an explanation as to why our author does not refer to his greatest intellectual debt, that owed to Michel de Montaigne.\textsuperscript{41}

Richard Tuck suggests that Charron's synthesis was quite openly an attempt to put the ideas of the writers from which he borrowed into a more philosophically systematic framework and to extend them in various ways; in this way, he

\textsuperscript{38} In this manner, the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius who we will be examining in the next chapter had composed a book on politics literally by sewing together citations from ancient classical authors, only a few years before the \textit{Sagesse} appeared in print. Justus Lipsius, \textit{Politicorum Sitae Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex} (1\textsuperscript{st} edition Antwerp, 1589). See below, chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Sagesse}, p. 748. Sabrié discusses his sources in detail; \textit{De l'Humanisme au Rationalisme}, pp. 255-284; see also Kogel, \textit{Pierre Charron}, pp. 31-45.

\textsuperscript{40} Kogel, \textit{Pierre Charron}, p. 30.

would not necessarily feel apologetic in using material as liberally from other sources.42

As mentioned above, Book Two of the *Sagesse* is almost entirely Charron’s composition, while Books One and Three are the ones based on secondary material. In addition to Montaigne and du Vair, Book One features Juan Huarte de San Juan’s *Examen de Ingenios* (1575, French translation in 1589) and Jean Bodin’s (1529/30-96) two very important works, *Theatrum Naturae* (translated in French in 1597) and *Six Livres de la Republique* (1576). Book Three, on the other hand, is largely based on Justus Lipsius’s *Politicorum Sive Civilitis Libri Sex* (1589).

ii.

*Versions of De la Sagesse*

One of the principal problems in dealing with *De la Sagesse* is the existence of four separate editions.43 It seems that the appearance of the first edition in 1601 caused some reaction, although we do not have any concrete evidence as to the manner this was expressed and the reasons behind it. In his letter to la Rochemaillet on 10 June, 1602 Charron recognised the fact that his book was misunderstood, expressing at the same time his disappointment. He undertook, thus, to revise the book:

> I know that this book has been diversely understood. Some things were said a little too strongly; this is why I have revised and corrected it, and in many parts sweetened/moderated it.44

In October of the same year he wrote to la Rochemaillet declaring that he had completely ‘corrected and augmented it’; if there were no bad intentions, no one

---

42 Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, p. 84.
43 The existence of four different editions has not been noted by critics, as far as I am aware. Scholars do remark the differences between the first and the second edition, but tend to overlook the fact that the 1607 and 1635 editions themselves are rather dissimilar.
would find anything offensive in it.\textsuperscript{45} It is not exactly clear whether the revisions were complete at the time of his death in 1603, since La Rochemaillelet had to make some further changes. We should presumably regard these latter modifications as the result of La Rochemaillelet's attempts to get the advance approval from the Sorbonne that Charron so much desired, before the work was published in Paris.\textsuperscript{46}

As a result of all this editorial activity, we have to deal with a number of varying editions. The edition of 1604 differs from the first one in three respects. First, it has a different preface. In the revised preface, Charron attempts to explain and clarify his intentions and method, in defence of his work. Second, the chapter sequence of the first book has been somewhat rearranged. And lastly, several passages from Books One and Two have been omitted or modified; these are the ones especially referring to the immortality of the soul, human feebleness, or true piety as the first office of the wise man. These adjustments, as mentioned, came both personally from Charron as well as from the decrees of Parlement. Evidently, the modifications are a valuable source of information with regard to the reception of the work. Though the first edition had an initially pessimistic impact on the reader, it gave an overall quite naturalistic impression. The second edition, meanwhile, had a more optimistic opening, but went on to moderate its naturalism with references to the ultimate dependence of man upon the grace of God. Significantly, in a separate section at the end of the 1607 version of \textit{De la Sagesse}, one can find the original preface, together with the extracts censored by Charron himself, as well as the ones dictated for change by Jeannin, the president of the Parlement. La Rochemaillelet clearly pointed out in the text, with separate headings, which changes came

\textsuperscript{45} Auvray, 'Lettres', p. 323.

from which source. In the table of contents, moreover, he indicated to the reader the original order of the chapters in Book One. It is even more interesting, however, that in 1635, the publisher of Charron’s complete works decided to follow the text of 1601, because the ‘curious demanded the edition of Bordeaux’; he re-incorporated, namely, all the parts that were up until that point read outwith the body of the work. He kept, however, the chapter arrangement of the second and third editions, thus creating an altogether new version of the work. Nevertheless, it is of great significance that despite the fact that later versions included the passages omitted from the second edition, none of them – as far as I am aware – indicated which sections were added to the original one, in the author’s attempt to modify, clarify or enhance the meaning of the text.

Viewing this evidence, it becomes apparent that it is almost impossible to consider any kind of discussion of De la Sagesse without taking into account the variety of versions available. Admittedly, Charron himself had stated that the meaning was not much altered: ‘[the changes] without altering the sense and the substance will serve well those three purposes’. The case, nevertheless,

---


48 This is true even for the ‘critical’ edition by Barbara de Negroni (1986); she includes all the omitted passages, but she does not specify which ones are not to be found in the 1604 edition. Maryanne C. Horowirtz is among the only commentators who make some references to this detail that is, however, significant, since Charron’s additions modify the tone of the text. See her ‘Natural Law as the Foundation for an Autonomous Ethics: Pierre Charron’s De la Sagesse’, Studies in the Renaissance, 21 (1974), pp. 204-227.

remains; the *Sagesse* was ultimately a fluid text, of which each reader had virtually his own version. In other words, it is possible to talk for each reader’s different Charron – a detail that adds to the work’s and the author’s ambivalence.

Under these circumstances, one is faced with the problem of which edition to regard as authoritative – if there can be any such thing as an ‘authoritative’ edition in the case of the *Sagesse*. It would be a somewhat natural assumption to regard the first one as the one closest to his original beliefs, since we know that the changes were made to adjust the text according to the audience’s reaction. The information we have of his line of reasoning and his intentions for the tailoring of the work comes from his correspondence; Charron wrote to his friend and later editor that the changes were necessary in order to ‘silence the malicious, please the simple people’, and facilitate an approbation from the Sorbonne.\footnote{‘...je cognois qu’il est fort expedient, pour fermer la bouche aux malitieux, contenter les simples, faciliter une approbation des docteurs’; 13 January, 1603 (Auvray, ‘Lettres’, pp. 324-5).} Most scholars indeed agree that the modifications were intended to temper the more unconventional and radical claims of the book, such as his stress on naturalism or the insufficient references made to the grace of God.\footnote{Cf. Soman’s comments; he argues that on the basis of Charron’s letters one could make a case that the edition of 1604 was not a clarification or advance of the first edition, but a retreat. He points out that most of the changes tended to moderate the over-sharp distinction he had drawn between virtue and piety, and strived to disprove criticism that he had allowed too little room for divine grace in his system of humanistic ethics (‘Methodology in the history of ideas: The case of Pierre Charron’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. XII, 1974 pp. 495-501) citation on pp. 497-8; also Levi, *French Moralists*, pp. 99-100. Belin seems to agree with this view: he regards the modifications mainly as a way to accomplish the official acceptance of the book. Commenting on the corrections dictated by the official censure by the President Jeaninn and the fact that despite them, the book was still placed on the Index of 1606 he suggests that it ‘must have been the whole (‘ensemble’) of the work and the sentiment that were estimated dangerous and not only individual phrases formulated in one way or another’; *L’Œuvre de Pierre Charron*, p. 210, n. 3.} Still, it was the second version and even more the third (1607) that enjoyed more circulation.
Taking into account all the above, the following analysis is based on the 1607 edition, for two closely associated reasons. Rather than trying to discern what could have been Charron's cast of mind, this thesis is concerned more with the popularity of ideas and the interaction between author and audience: that is to say, tracing the intellectual trends developed as a reflection and consequence of the circulation of ideas. From this perspective, the version of 1607 that both bears the marks of the disapproval towards the cynicism and naturalism of the first edition, as well as including the more conventional modifications, seems the obvious one on which to concentrate. This was, moreover, the one that enjoyed more circulation since it was reprinted more than twenty times between 1607 and 1635. Furthermore, it was within this time-span that we find the *Sagesse* in the midst of intellectual debates; we should thus infer that the point of reference at this period were the reprints of the 1607 edition.

iii.

De la Sagesse, Trois Livres: *Themes, Ideas, Languages*

After these introductory remarks, we can now subject the *Sagesse* itself to a more thorough analysis, paying specific attention to the issues that are of relevance to the scope of this thesis. The preface to the second edition - reprinted in the third - is of particular interest, as it was intended as an explanation and justification of the purpose and the method of Charron - an 'ingenious, but not cogent line of defence', as Levi puts it.\(^5^2\) In this respect, it also serves as an indication of the sort of criticism raised against Charron's text.

There are three types and degrees of wisdom, Charron declares: divine, human, and mundane. These correspond, in turn, to God, Nature pure and entire, and Nature vitiated and corrupted. All three are the subjects of various

\(^{52}\) Levi, *French Moralists*, p. 100.
writings and discussions, each one 'according to his own manner and fashion'. The first sort of wisdom is the subject of theologians, the second of the philosophers. Worldly or mundane wisdom, on the other hand, associated with the common sort, is the lowest level of the three ('la plus basse'), and not worth addressing, except to disparage and condemn it. After this classification, Charron attempts a description and an exposition of the differences between the two main sorts of wisdom, the Divine and the Human. Philosophy, he tells us, according to those who practise it, is the 'knowledge of principles, first causes, and highest power to judge of all things', even God. This wisdom according to philosophers is inherent to the understanding. It is, moreover, the first and highest of intellectual virtues, in such a way that does not require either honesty, action, or any other moral virtue in order to be complete.

Theologians, conversely, regard it as the knowledge of divine things, out of which derives a judgement and rule of human actions. They see it as twofold: either acquired by study, in which case it would resemble that of the philosophers; or infused and given by God, which could only be found in people just and free from sin. It is essential to stress the radicalism of Charron's approach: the preface effectively justified an assault on the authority of theology as the 'queen of sciences'. By insisting that philosophy was an equal alternative means of understanding the world, the author was undermining the long-established worldview that all knowledge and understanding derived from revelation and from God.

Yet Charron seems unaware of the significance of his claims; having described the types of wisdom as distinct, he goes on to proclaim that it is not his intention to speak of Divine wisdom because he had to some extent dealt

53 *Sagesse*, p. 3.
54 *Sagesse*, p. 3.
55 *Sagesse*, p. 4.
56 *Sagesse*, p. 4.
with it in the first of his *Trois Vérités* and in his *Discours Chrestiens*. In contrast to this exclusively practical concept, the wisdom of the philosophers and the divines is more concerned with relating theoretical underpinnings to practical issues. The contrast between theoretical principles and practical problems had evidently been prevalent since the early stages of the Renaissance, as the debates concerning the active and contemplative life denote. His inclination towards practice could also serve as evidence of the primacy practice and 'empiricism' had increasingly been gaining in the course of the sixteenth century. This can further be associated with Charron's general attack on pedantism in the *Sagesse*, the sterile theoretical knowledge that is detached from any sense of experience.

In this context, the Preface spells out that while the philosophers link their subject to Nature and action, the theologians relate it to divine wisdom and belief. Astonishingly, Charron points out that philosophy is more practical, relevant, and deals with matters regarding families, corporations, commonwealths, and empires, while theology is more interested in the eternal good and salvation of the faithful. This remark evidently derives from Charron's view of the division between theology and philosophy. What is remarkable, however, is not only that he clearly favours the latter - at least in this work -, but that he has additionally no reservation about declaring his preference. This is quite extreme, particularly when one takes into account that it is coming from a theologian at the start of the seventeenth century.

57 *Sagesse*, p. 4.
59 *Sagesse*, p. 5.
presents the question, nonetheless, there is the implication that the 'true, real' problems are, in fact, the ones people are facing here on earth, namely the subject of philosophy, whilst divine preoccupations can be a little too theoretical. He even goes as far as to state that '...the Philosophers handle [the subject] more sweetly and pleasantly, and the Theologians more austerely and dryly'.\textsuperscript{61} And he goes on to make another extraordinary comment, that Nature is more ancient than Grace and the Natural precedes the Supernatural.\textsuperscript{62}

For Charron, philosophy's pre-eminence is further confirmed by the living examples of its representatives. In this context, he explains, his discussion of philosophers refers not only to the universally acknowledged ones such as Solon (640-560 BC), Pythagoras (c. 582-?497 BC), Socrates (469-399 BC), Plato (c. 427-347 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC), but it also includes 'those great men who have made singular and exemplary profession of virtue and wisdom, like great politicians, kings, and generals.\textsuperscript{63} The Preface further pronounces the astonishing intention of the author, to favour and follow the advice and sayings of philosophers over the positions of the theologians. For although the two concur in substance, Charron concedes, his aim was to compose a book with instructions on civil life, for men of the world. To defend himself from the expected criticism, he explains that had he undertaken to write for people who live in cloisters he should have followed the advice of the theologians:

> If I had undertaken to instruct the cloister, and the retired life, that is, the profession that attends the advice/secrets of the Bible, I should have followed the counsels of the Theologians; but our book gives guidance for the civil life, and shapes a man for the world, that is to say, for the human wisdom and not the divine. [my italics]\textsuperscript{64}

Having made clear at the outset his somewhat unusual approach - particularly in the context of the religiously charged atmosphere of the start of

\textsuperscript{61} Sagesse, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{62} Sagesse, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{63} Sagesse, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{64} Sagesse, pp. 7-8.
the seventeenth century, - the author turns now to a general description of human wisdom as he conceives it:

this human wisdom is a kind of law, a beautiful and noble composition of the entire man, both in his inward part and his outward, his thoughts, his words, and all his actions. It is the excellence and perfection of man as man, that is to say, according to that which the first fundamental and natural law of man holds and requires.\footnote{Sagesse, p. 8.}

Charron maintains that four qualities especially distinguish wise men: first, the knowledge of one's self; second, liberty of mind. The third component, imitation of nature, covers a large province of wisdom, making the author assert that even following it alone could suffice for someone to become sage. Charron designates lastly true contentment as the ultimate fruit of wisdom; lack of any of these qualities, he says, should be taken as an indication of an ill-advised person.\footnote{Sagesse, p. 9.}

According to the Preface, some people are born with a natural predisposition to Charron's ideal of wisdom. Alternatively, however, it can also be acquired, through the study of philosophy, especially moral philosophy. Within the notion of moral philosophy, the author stresses the pre-eminence and importance of natural philosophy; according to Charron, natural philosophy is the light, guide and rule of our life explaining and representing in us the law of nature.\footnote{Sagesse, pp. 10-11.} Charron is adamant in emphasising that his view of wisdom is above all opposite to pedantic knowledge. He categorically contests what he sees as professed wisdom, purely speculative, presumptuous, sterile and based on memorised knowledge. In this respect, he refers the reader to the frontispiece of his work, where the personification of wisdom stands triumphant amidst the embodiments of passion, opinion, superstition and pedantic knowledge.\footnote{Sagesse, p. 10.} Charron thus declares his resolve to combat with
his text any form of intellectual (pedantic knowledge) or religious dogmatism (superstition).  

Nothing better illustrates the author's purpose than the particular caution he directs with regard to the readership of his work. Charron declares that the *Sagesse* is especially addressed to sensible people, and not the vulgar sort:

This book is not for such, which if it should popularly be received and accepted of the common sort of people, it should fail much in its first purpose and design.

The matter of the audience is an important one: the fact that his work had been read and judged by people to whom it was not directed, had led Charron to undertake its revision. This concern is interesting, as it demonstrates an awareness on behalf of the author of the radical nature of many of the work's elements.

...many things which may seem too harsh/raw and brief, too rude and difficult for the simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser will have stomachs warm enough to put together and digest all) I have for the love of them explained, enlightened and sweetened, this in this second edition, reviewed and much augmented...

As we can see from the preface, therefore, the author introduces the reader to all the main constituents of the three books and sets the tone for the rest of the work. The reference to the different ways in which one can talk about wisdom is of special significance for our purposes. In many ways the position that Charron describes in his text, that theologians, philosophers and the 'common sort' adopt distinct approaches in order to address the question, is equivalent to the discussion in the Introduction, about the existence of certain distinct languages in which one could talk about politics and morals in the late

---


70 *Sagesse*, p. 20.

71 *Sagesse*, p. 21. Galileo claimed the same thing in his own defense, that his findings would cause confusion to the minds of the common people; see 'Letter to Grand Duchess Christina', *Galileo Affair*, pp. 92, 95, 98.
sixteenth and early seventeenth century. In rough terms, one can identify the philosophers’ approach with the language of humanism, and the theologians’ with what in the Introduction we called the theological (Augustinian) tradition, thus lending substance to the proposed model. The fascinating detail is, of course, that the author himself having been trained both as a lawyer and a theologian could master, as a result, both languages. What is more, in the *Sagesse*, although he proposes at the outset to use the humanistic language for the reason that he is composing a guide to civil life, he occasionally leaps into the use of the ‘theological’ language (examples of which we will soon see). This can partly be explained by the criticism raised against the book, as most of the theological argumentation appears in modified sections, and partly by Charron’s training as a theologian. What is particularly significant in this context, is, furthermore, the author’s eagerness to stress the separate existence of a human and a divine wisdom: the two are complementary to one another, but they can also suffice individually. His evident preference for human wisdom and philosophy in this work at least can to a certain extent be seen within the framework of the crucial role he ascribes to Nature and natural law.

Philosophy’s purpose is to link higher practical problems with nature, he told us. As a final point, we should remind ourselves that the inherent duality in his mode of thought is further testified and confirmed by Charron’s composition of separate works on the two sorts of wisdom, the divine and the human.

*Book I*

The First Book of *De la Sagesse* opens with a passionate exhortation to the reader to study and know himself; this, according to Charron is the foundation of wisdom and the path to what is good: ‘the true science and study of man, is man
himself'. By the knowledge of himself, man reaches sooner and better the knowledge of God; becoming truly wise cannot originate from anywhere else but within ourselves. As a case in point the author mentions the oracle of Delphi, where the axiom Know thyself was engraved. Socrates, we are told, was accounted the wisest man in the world not because his knowledge was more complete, but because his knowledge of himself was better than others. In this sense, truly to know man we must look into his inward part ('en son privé'), and examine how he behaves every day. Charron here alludes to a point he will come back to later, and what was Lipsius’s central point, the distinction between a man’s interior being and outer conduct, or public and private.

The author is now able to embark on his consideration of man. The first aspect of this consideration is the natural, namely, the different elements that man consists of and his place in the natural world. Man consists of three main parts, the body, the soul and the mind; Charron is clearly in favour of the mind, which he defines as ‘the highest and most heroic part, a diminutive, a spark, an image and dew of divinity’. This description is worthy of notice, as ‘sparks’, it will be recalled, were an essential notion of the stoic tradition, together with the idea that the law of nature - frequently equated with God - is imprinted in us by birth. Similarly, in general discussion on the soul ('De l’Ame en General'), Charron is mainly drawing on classical philosophers, while the Church Fathers figure rather marginally. Indicatively, with regard to the thorny issue of the immortality of the soul, the author opts for a rationalisation, astonishingly

---

72 Sagesse, p. 23.
73 Sagesse, p. 25.
74 Sagesse, pp. 26-7.
75 Sagesse, p. 29.
76 Sagesse, p. 31.
77 Sagesse, Book I, 2 (pp. 35-6). The quotation is on p. 35.
78 Sagesse, Book I, 3-6 (pp. 36-49).
explaining it by the ‘hope of glory and reputation and desire for immortality of our name’.79

In the next crucial block of chapters Charron touches upon the five faculties of the soul. He discusses, among others, the ‘sensitive’ faculty and the ‘Senses of Nature’, while he also talks about the intellectual faculty (‘et vrayment humaine’), and more particularly the human mind (‘l’esprit humain’) of this last faculty. The account of both the physiology of the body, as well as the description of the human faculties are probably derived from Jean Bodin’s book *Theatrum Naturae*.80 The chapter on the soul, however, contains many elements that can also be attributed to Juan Huarte de San Juan’s *Examen de Ingenios* (1575, translated into French in 1580).81

This sequence of chapters devoted to the senses, the intellectual faculty, the human mind and their connection, forms the bases of Charron’s theory of knowledge. Some basic points have to be made at the outset; first, that his epistemological views present a continuation of Renaissance arguments, mainly drawn from the teachings of Neo-Platonism, combined with traditions that became more popular later, such as Stoicism and Scepticism. His line of reasoning is neither consistent nor entirely clear; he does not follow a specific system of thought. His inconsistency is demonstrated time and again when he writes a point and then refutes it within the same page (or a few pages later) using a different set of ideas. In his exposition, Charron employs arguments

79 *Sagesse*, pp. 61-2. Cf. Pietro Pomponazzi’s (1462-1525) treatise, *On the Immortality of the Soul (Tractatus de Immortalitate Anime*, 1516), which offered philosophical, that is Aristotelian, grounds for rejecting the idea of personal immortality.
80 Translated into French in 1597, the book was intended to be an ‘encyclopaedia’ of the natural sciences in the sixteenth century, covering subjects from astronomy to human anatomy. Sabrie, *De l’Humanisme au Rationalisme*, pp. 262-3; Kogel, *Pierre Charron*, p. 43.
81 Huarte was a Spanish physician whose work concentrated on linking mental ability to the existence of the four temperaments or humours present in the brain: heat, cold, moisture, dryness. Following this, for example, Charron associates the three abilities of the intellective faculty, understanding, memory and imagination to dry, moist and hot humours respectively.
drawn equally from ideas associated with various humanistic trends, as well as the theological language of Augustinianism. The upshot of this unsystematic line of argument is the rise of a number of conflicting interpretations of his work starting from Charron’s own time. Modern scholars equally struggle with a variety of readings; most common - and perhaps the easiest one to argue - is the approach that tries to discern which one mode of thought Charron did, in fact, advocate. To substantiate their findings, scholars favouring this sort of interpretation give precedence to either one set of arguments.82 More synthetic views argue for a clearly defined and executed plan on behalf of the author; that he intended, namely, to cleanse the reader’s mind from ‘accumulated learning and traditional opinions’ in order to arrive at wisdom. In the process of achieving this goal, they argue, Charron employs sceptical arguments as a device, but later carries on to refute them with a series of arguments that stress his belief in the power of human intellect or reason.83 Analogous is the point of view that the author’s sceptical thought is limited by an innate belief that the seeds of knowledge are in man from birth, allowing thus for the combination of both arguments.84 Whatever his plan was, however, the fact still remains that his accounts on the epistemological problem have caused certain conflicting readings of his intentions. A close consideration is thus in order, so that we can begin to understand the complexities involved.

Charron opens the chapter ‘On the Senses of Nature’ (Book I, 12) with the traditional belief of the ‘schoolmen’ (scholastics) that all knowledge derives

---

82 As a result, Sabrié, Popkin, and J.D. Charron consider Charron a supporter of sceptic/fideist ideas stressing the precedence of sceptic elements in his work, while E.F. Rice, P.F. Grendler M.C. Horowitz, argue for a primarily Stoic influence in his work. For a Stoic interpretation of Charron cf. also Leontine Zanta, *La Renaissance du Stoïcisme au XVIe Siècle* (Paris, 1914).
84 Horowitz, ‘Natural Law as the Foundation of an Autonomous Ethic’, p. 208.
from the senses; nevertheless, he sets out within the next chapters to disprove this position.85

The common received opinion that came from Aristotle himself is, that the Mind knows and understands by the help and service of the Senses, that it is of itself a white empty paper, that nothing comes to the understanding, which does not first pass the senses, Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu. But this opinion is false...86

Aristotle’s traditional standpoints had been variously challenged since antiquity; the sixteenth century, however, experienced a revived interest in ideas originating from the Platonic Academy and Pyrrhonism.87 These arguments, generally recognised as ‘sceptical’ had come down to the early modern period through the writings of Cicero (106-43 BC), Diogenes Laertius (fl. 3rd century AD) and St. Augustine (AD 354-430). It remains true, however, that the trend towards Pyrrhonian scepticism in the second half of the sixteenth century was facilitated by the rediscovery of the works of Sextus Empricus (fl. AD 200), the only Greek Pyrrhonian sceptic whose works survived.88 In France, Montaigne was perhaps the most prominent thinker to be attracted to and influenced by sceptical ideas; he was, moreover, according to a modern critic ‘one who felt most fully the impact of the Pyrrhonian theory of complete doubt

---

85 *Sagesse*, p. 69. Interestingly enough, in the first edition the passage does not include the underlined qualification; Charron’s view, thus, in the 1601 version appear more Aristotelian than in the 1604. (See Horowitz, ‘Pierre Charron’s View on the Source of Wisdom’, p. 446)

86 *Sagesse*, p. 88.

87 Pyrrhonism was the sceptical movement that had taken its name form the legendary figure of Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-275). Both trends are generally recognised as ‘sceptical’. They advocated somewhat different positions however: according to Academic scepticism, no knowledge is possible; conversely, Pyrrhonian scepticism’s view was that there was insufficient and inadequate evidence to determine if any knowledge was possible – hence, one ought to suspend judgement on all questions concerning knowledge. See the introduction of Popkin, *History of Scepticism*; definitions on p. xiii.

and its relevance to the religious debates of the time'.

The long-standing debate on whether to classify Montaigne as a stoic or as a sceptic has partly been resolved by the more cogent view that distinguishes two phases in the composition of his essays, a stoic first, and a sceptic later. Nonetheless, the Apologie de Raimond Sebond, one of his most famous essays, and one from which Charron drew heavily for the composition of the section of De la Sagesse in question, is markedly sceptic in tone. It was also during this 'crise pyrrhonienne' that Montaigne had adopted his famous motto 'Que sais-je?'

Against this background, Charron, though he acknowledges in his text the senses as 'first gates, and entrances to knowledge', also repeats the warning of the sceptics against their weakness and incertitude: 'From the weakness and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, error and mistakes'. He highlights, furthermore, their susceptibility to the passions of the soul: bitterness, love, hatred have the power to 'dull' or 'shut' the operation of the senses. These points are a few among many in the work where Charron emphasises the relativity of knowledge and man's inability to attain it. His line of reasoning is that ultimately the senses need the assistance of the mind, as the interpreting faculty. To prove his point, he refers to the inequality of human perception; if it were up to the senses, all human beings would have equal abilities; the fact that they do not, is evidence of the role of the mind. The senses are in fact dependent upon it:

89 Popkin, History of Scepticism, p. 42.
90 Cf. M.A. Screech's comments in the introduction of the Essays: 'Montaigne was first, it seems as we read him, a Stoic, then a Sceptic, then an Epicurean. In fact, he could hold all three philosophies in a kind of taut harmony. .. There is certainly a shift in his thought from a melancholic and stoic concern with dying to a full and joyful acceptance of life; a change of emphasis away from Seneca and towards the happier eclecticism of Cicero'; in The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, trans. and edited by M.A. Screech, (Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press, 1991), p. xviii; see also Levi, French Moralists, pp. 58-9.
91 Sagesse, p. 70.
92 Sagesse, p. 73.
93 Sagesse, p. 89.
...but I say in defence of the honour of the mind, that it is false that it depends upon the senses, and that we can not know anything, understand, reason, discourse without the sense: for contrariwise all knowledge comes from it, and the senses can do nothing without it.\footnote{Sagesse, p. 90.}

The centrality of reason and understanding for Charron’s model becomes apparent, then.\footnote{Cf. also Sagesse, p. 87.} Even more compellingly, Charron exhorts the reader to have faith in the human mind on the basis that the seeds of virtue and knowledge are to be found in man by nature:

because (as all the wisest have affirmed, and has been before touched) the seeds of all sciences and virtues are naturally dispersed and insinuated into our minds, so that they may be rich and merry with their own.\footnote{Sagesse, p. 88.}

The author uses, thus, in these passages arguments and ideas associated with the Stoic tradition of thought. The image of seeds implanted by God in man at birth was fundamental in the doctrines of the ancient Stoa. Seeds, semina, sperma\_\_\_\_\_\-, or ‘common notions’ were generically related to spermatikos logos (\(\sigma\rho\varepsilonρ\rho\muα\mu\iota\kappa\\iota\kappa\\sigma\\lambda\\omicron\varsigma\) translated as ‘seminal’ reason, ‘seminal principles’ or ‘creative reason’), the principal force and law according to which nature works. Implanted in man by nature, they provided him with the ability to reason and attain knowledge, since the seeds of it were within man already.\footnote{Cf. Galileo, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, Galileo Affair, p. 94.} This ‘Ratio’ was also sometimes equated with God, as the principal reason of being, and Nature.\footnote{See Horowitz, ‘Natural Law as Foundation for an Autonomous Ethic’, pp. 204-7 and idem, ‘The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man: Four Themes’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 35 (1974), pp. 3-16; on pp. 3-5. Charron also makes this association a number of times in the Second Book; see below.}

Clearer references to Stoic ideas of knowledge follow in the next chapter (Book I, 14), where Charron considers the human mind.

[Mind] let it be called the image of the living God, a taste of the immortal substance, a stream of the Divinity, a celestial ray, whereunto God has given reason, as an animated stern to move it by rule and measure, and that is an instrument of complete harmony;

\[61\]
that by it there is a kind of kindred between God and man, and that he might often remember him, he has turned the root towards the heavens, so that he should always look towards the place of his nativity... 99

Yet this confident and optimistic impression dissolves again within the same chapter in the following pages. Charron discusses the mind’s objective, that is, the inclination towards the search for truth: ‘there is no desire more natural than to know the truth’. In the end, nonetheless, all our efforts are insufficient - we cannot possess the truth. It is worth quoting at length the passage in which the author discusses the futility of our endeavours, as it is one of the most wonderful of the Sagesse:

we assay all the means we can to attain unto it [the truth], but in the end all our endeavours come short; for truth [will not suffer] to be possessed by any human mind. It lodges within the bosom of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knows not, understands not anything aright, in purity and truth as he ought; appearances do always compass him on every side, which are as well in those things that are false as true. We are born to search the truth, but to possess it, belongs to a higher and greater power... Errors are received into our soul, by the same way and channel as the truth is; the mind has no means either to distinguish or choose ... The means that it uses for the discovery of the truth are reason and experience, both of them very weak, uncertain, diverse, wavering. The general argument of truth, is the general consent of the world. 100

It is difficult to ignore the sceptical tone of the above lines: man has no way to distinguish truth from false, reason is ultimately weak, and the only case we have for truth is an imaginary consent by people. The impression is intensified by the dangerousness attributed to the human mind by Charron: its unruliness can explain why man has found good reasons to keep it

within narrow bounds, to bridle and bind it with Religions, Laws, Customs, Sciences, Precepts, Threats, Promises mortal and immortal 101

This underlines Charron’s emphasis on human disorder and relativity of human affairs.

---

99 Sagesse, p. 92.
100 Sagesse, pp. 97-8.
The examination of the intellectual faculties concludes with a reference to memory and imagination, from whence all confusion, disorder and passions derive. Charron then enters another great section of the first book of *De la Sagesse*, concerned with the will and its principal adversaries, passions and affections, on which he reserves a more detailed explanation and ways to control them for later (Book Three). He also finds appropriate at this point to acknowledge his debt to the theory of passions to Guillaume du Vair. Du Vair was a popular moralist of his age, having composed works of strong Stoic character that audiences found especially suitable for the troubled times they were living in. Book One of the *Sagesse* contains material drawn possibly from *La Sainte Philosophie* (before 1585) and his *Traité de la Constance* (?1590). Following du Vair, thus, Charron defines passion as:

...violent motion of the soul in the sensitive part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the soul thinks to be good for it, or to fly that which it takes to be evil...

After treating a series of passions, Charron’s displays his cynicism as regards man in his *Second Consideration of Man* where he draws a comparison of God’s greatest creation with other creatures on earth. The reader is hence made to face the blurring of the boundaries and the definitions of what constitutes man and what makes a beast. The author of the *Sagesse* then goes on to discuss what he describes as man’s ‘disputable advantages’ over beasts; and the first

---

102 *Sagesse*, p. 111.
103 *Sagesse*, p. 111.
104 In contrast to his practice of analyzing, summarizing and condensing of other works, Charron seems to copy liberally from du Vair, almost transcribing whole passages. Nonetheless, the text of the *Sagesse* on the theory of passions ultimately diverges significantly from that of its original source, confirming the view that the author of the *Sagesse* reformulates much of the existent material within his own work. See Sabrié, *De l’Humanisme au Rationalisme*, p. 268 and Levi, *French Moralists*, pp. 104 - 111.
105 *Sagesse*, p. 111.
106 *Sagesse*, Book 1, 19-33 (pp. 117-150).
point on his list, interestingly, is the ability to reason. In this respect, his treatment can be read both as an ultimate challenge to human intellect, as well as a reflection of the author’s contempt for what he calls the ‘base minds’ that differ considerably from the sages. Even the moral superiority is disputable: man is a mostly unjust, unthankful, traitorous, lying and deceitful animal; his principal quarrel is against other men. The chapter concludes with an exhortation to lead a life following nature, as animals do, in order to live more freely, securely, moderately, and contentedly.

The cynical comparison of man with the other animals of the universe is tightly linked with the sequence of chapters that underline human vanity and presumption, Charron’s - and Montaigne’s - familiar and much-loved theme. The same tone is maintained in the Third and Fourth Consideration of Man, where Charron stresses the value of human life, which not many people seem fully to acknowledge, and what he sees as ‘man’s declining state’. The two sections are full of references to the frailty of human life and man’s vanity, weakness, inconstancy, misery and presumption. It is useful to recall that these sections were the opening chapters that the reader was faced with in the edition of 1601, thus determining a far less optimistic mood for the rest of the work. Transposed, however, to a less prominent position in the second edition, the forcefulness of the chapters is reduced, thus allowing for a more positive reading.

The section reaches its peak with the now familiar idea of man’s great desire but ultimate weakness to reach the truth, to which neither reason nor experience can help him:

107 Gray, ‘Reflections on Charron’s Debt to Montaigne’, p. 379. He also concludes that ‘there is a greater distance between a man and a man and a man and a beast’; Sagesse, p. 160.
109 Sagesse, pp. 170-1. See Book I, 36-40 (pp. 175-228).
Now both of them are so feeble and uncertain (though experience the more weak) that nothing certain can be drawn from them. Reason has so many forms, is so pliable, so wavering, as has been said, and experience much more, the occurrences are always unlike; there is nothing so universal in Nature as diversity... 110

Against this background, Charron launches his attack on the superstitious, the formalists and the pedants (Book I, 39: ‘On Misery’).111 This section should be viewed as his official attack against religious and epistemological dogmatism that he had announced in the Preface. He portrays the first as ‘injurious to God, enemies to true religion’, people that ‘cover themselves with the cloak of piety, zeal and love towards God’.112 This could well be read as a criticism of ‘Christian piety, with the mysticism of the saints and the popular devotion’.113 It is crucial to recognise that this condemnation is only intelligible in view of the experiences of the religious strife in France. He and his contemporaries had witnessed first-hand the effects of blind religious fervour. Similarly, attacks on superstition were a common trend in writings of the time, reflecting the reaction to the bloody contention originating from it; as we will see, Lipsius, Sarpi and James all shared the same feelings.114 Charron takes also on the formalists and the pedants in this chapter, calling the latter ‘inept, impertinent, presumptuous, obstinate’ men, who ‘have their memories stuffed with wisdom of other men’ and none of their own.115 The former are dangerous because of their exaggerated attachment to forms and their little having to do with tangible problems, in the same way that the pedants are stuck to theoretical knowledge with no practical appliance. All three types of misery, however, have one thing

111 Cf. Montaigne’s essay, Du Pedantisme (I, 24).
112 Sagesse, p. 215.
113 Sabrié, De l’Humanisme au Rationalisme, p. 243.
115 Sagesse, p. 216.
in common: their dogmatism, that does not allow for adaptability according to realities around us (or experience).

Linked to dogmatism is human presumption, another of the constant themes of the work: we make too much of ourselves, says Charron; ‘it is an enraged folly to think to know as much as possible is to be known’. He then resumes his assault against established tradition, the relativity of knowledge and the feebleness of human understanding, unable to tell truth from false; the chapter culminates with the following pronouncement:

Every human proposition has as much authority as another, if reason makes not the difference. Truth depends not upon the authority and testimony of man: there are no principles in man if Divinity have not revealed them; all the rest is but a dream and smoke.

This passage is one of those that have given Richard Popkin and others ground to argue for a more theological reading of Charron, or for a fideist interpretation. According to this approach, having renounced the ability to reason, the author acknowledges that the only source of truth is divine revelation.

The Fifth (and last) Consideration of Man explores social formations and divides men to categories according to various factors. The consideration opens with a broad chapter on the difference and inequality of men (Book I, 41), where Charron explains that these differences are affected by the environment: the sun, the air, the climate and the country in which each of us is born define the

116 Sagesse, p. 225.
117 Sagesse, p. 223.
118 Sagesse, p. 226.
119 According to Popkin, a fideist might deny or doubt that necessary and sufficient evidence can be offered to establish the truth of the proposition ‘God exists’, and yet he might say it could be known to be true if one possessed some information through faith, or if one believed certain things. He also adds, that the decision as to how to define the word is partly terminological and partly doctrinal: Roman Catholicism has condemned fideism as a heresy, and has found it as a basic fault of Protestantism, while the non-liberal Protestants have contented that fideism is a basic element of fundamental Christianity, and an element that occurs in the teachings of St. Paul and St. Augustine. (History of Scepticism, pp. xix-xxi). Sabrée and Kogel would agree with a fideist interpretation – and perhaps also Boase: see The Fortunes of Montaigne, pp. 77-89.
diversity in soul and body. He also divides the minds into weak, born to obey, serve and be led; of ‘indifferent judgement’ who generally rely on commonly held opinions; and highest, the quick and clear minds, those who prefer to doubt, and are of strong and solid judgements. The ideas and most of the material that feature in this last consideration are drawn from Bodin’s *Six Livres de la République*. The theory of the climate influence, a commonplace topic for the period, was clearly formulated in Bodin’s work, where he attributed different characteristics to people living in the North, the South, and in-between, from whence Charron is copying a great deal. The author of the *Sagesse* has also used Bodin’s discussions on the problems relating to the organisation of a state, the structure of the family, the paternalistic authority, the different forms of monarchy, and the causes of rise and decline of a republic. Taken as a whole, however, this last section could provide evidence for sustaining a position of relativism, historical and geographical, that was especially common among the French civil lawyers of the sixteenth century.

*Book II*

There is a marked change of emphasis in the Second Book that deals with the ‘doctrine of wisdom itself’. Having challenged man’s vanity and presumption, and demonstrated his defects and ‘miserable condition’, Charron provides in this part of the work the instructions to wisdom as a remedy, in order to live well. He first deals with the two dispositions to wisdom. The first

---

120 Book I, 42.
121 Book I, 43.
125 *Sagesse*, p. 305-6.
one is 'liberation from a double captivity', outwardly and inwardly. The outward is the general corruption of the world, the popular opinions and vices, while the inward are the passions. With regard to the former, Charron recommends shunning the company of 'illiterate' and 'ill-composed' people, and - an advice that would prove very popular a few years later with the libertins - to remain 'in the world, without being of the world'. The author's treatment of the passions, meanwhile, and his recommendation that these ought to be avoided advances a quality very close to what, as we will see in the next chapter, Justus Lipsius describes as 'constancy'.

The second disposition to wisdom, according to Charron, is 'a universal and plain liberty of mind in both judgement and will' (Book II, 2). This is a particularly long and complex chapter; it is furthermore one, which, as it touched upon such thorny issues as 'suspension of judgement' and the 'will', underwent consequently many modifications from the first to the second edition. Charron underlines the liberty of the mind to judge with a powerful assertion: 'They shall govern as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not my mind, for that, by their leave, hath another master'. It is on these grounds that Charron advocates the difference between outward behaviour and inward judgment, one of the issues for which his work was most criticised.

Now a wise man enjoying this his right to judge and examine all things, it many times will come to pass, that the judgement and the hand, the mind and the body, contradict one another, and that he will carry himself outwardly after one manner, and judge inwardly after another, will play one part before the world, and another in his mind, which he must do to preserve equity and justice in all. That general saying, vniuersus mundus exercet historiam, should properly and truly be understood of a wise man, who is another man within than he outwardly shows.

126 Sagesse, p. 315.
127 Sagesse, p. 320.
128 Sagesse, p. 324.
129 Sagesse, pp.324-5. This contrast between outward behaviour and inward thinking does not appear in the 1601 version.
He was not the only one of course, advocating this divergence between outward behaviour and inward thinking; in an age of intense religious strife and heated passions, there was an increasing tendency to stress the importance of outward conformity that could potentially co-exist with a simultaneously private differentiation of opinion. From a somewhat different perspective, the issue was also one of survival: fear of persecution, thus, religious heterodoxy and atheism could make one resolve to disguising (‘dissimulating’) one’s true opinion/belief. In the same vein, as we will see in the following chapters, Lipsius and others maintained that it was acceptable to tolerate religious dissent so long as no disturbance found expression in public. Charron encouraged conformity of the more ‘free’ minds, as he calls them, an element directly linked to his assertion of the need of laws in order to tame the mind. Outward compliance should especially be the case, as Charron points out, if it was for justice and the sumum bonum. These statements resonate to some degree with the doctrines of the ‘politiques’ who during the tension of the religious wars were promoting the possibility of religious plurality provided there was conformity towards the monarchy and stability within the commonwealth, for the sake of the general good. Later in the work, Charron will even argue that it suffices for wise men to accommodate laws of countries that do not necessarily follow

130 Cf. Perez Zagorin’s work, Ways of Lying. Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1990). Cf. also Paolo Sarpi’s admittance of having to hide in order to survive – whether it was for political or for religious reasons: ‘... I am compelled to wear a mask. Perhaps there is nobody who can survive in Italy without one’; letter to Gillot, 12 May 1609, cited in David Wootton, Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and Enlightenment. (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), p. 119.

the universal law of nature, if their judgments and opinions are kept in accordance with the latter.\textsuperscript{132}

Charron returns to his argument of the relativity of knowledge, stressing that man is incapable of telling the difference between truth and falsehood, that there are no shared views, and that there are always two ways of looking at things. He points out that philosophers 'have made a profession of ignorance' emphasising that in fact, 'we are ignorant of much more than we know'.\textsuperscript{133} He then launches another attack on Aristotle and the 'schoolmen' in general. He condemns the dogmatists who do not see that 'there is a kind of ignorance and doubt more learned, more certain, noble and generous than all their science and certainty'; this was the virtue that made Socrates so renowned for his wisdom.\textsuperscript{134} To demonstrate the urgency of the matter, Charron tells his readers that he had asked to be engraved over the gate of his house in Condom (in 1600) the motto 'I know not', to remind him of human uncertainty.\textsuperscript{135} The association of our author's 'Je ne sçay' with Montaigne's 'Que sais-je?' has often been noted - Charron's phrase, however, underscores human ignorance much more forcefully than the latter.

Charron resumes his attack on the conceited philosophers and dogmatists, exclaiming that presumption is the source of troubles, sects, heresies, and seditions. The reference here is clearly aimed not only at the rise and spread of Protestantism and its various sects, but more importantly, the troubles this religious division and obstinacy had created for his country. He insists that the sceptical approach to things 'does more service to piety, religion and divine operation' because it cleanses and purifies people, making them

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Sagesse}, p. 434.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Sagesse}, p. 330.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Sagesse}, p. 333.
\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Sagesse}, p. 333.
‘tabula rasa’ to accept the miracle of God’s revelation. The author then embarks on another one of his pessimistic views on man that has strong Augustinian resonances with the importance that he assigns to revelation:

That all the wisdom of the world is but vanity and lies ... That God has created man to know the truth, but that he cannot know it of himself, nor by any humane means: And that it is necessary that God himself, in whose bosom it resides, and who has wrought a desire thereof in man, should reveal it as he does. But that the better to prepare himself for this revelation, man must first renounce and chase away all opinions and beliefs, wherewith the mind is already anticipated and besotted, and present himself plain, naked, and ready to receive it.

It is important to note that the above passage did not appear in the original 1601 edition; we can assume therefore, that Charron felt he had to add it in order to moderate his insistence on nature and his apparent lack of reference to God’s might. Charron explains in the revised edition that the purpose of this extract was to make the reader ‘Academic and Pyrrhonian’, both of which were entirely compatible with the Christian teachings: ‘an Academic or Pyrrhonian was never a heretic, they are things opposite’. Charron brings the discussion about the liberty of the mind to judge to an end with a note on its universality; he wants the wise man to be a ‘citizen of the world’, much like Socrates was, pointing out that ‘the most beautiful and greatest minds are the more universal, as the more base and blunt are the more particular’. He further argues strongly against partiality identifying it as an ‘enemy to liberty’. These comments should be regarded as echoes of the rhetorics of moderation from the French wars of religion, and the attitudes that played down doctrinal differences, while emphasising the common universal

136 Sagesse, pp. 335-6.
137 Sagesse, p. 336.
138 Cf. Erasmus’s support for the Academy: ‘human affairs are so manifold and obscure that nothing can be clearly known, as it is rightly taught by my friends the Academics the least arrogant of the philosophers’; The Praise of Folly, trans. C. H. Miller (New Haven, Yale UP, 1979), p. 71. The particular passage by Charron has led Popkin to claim that for Charron ‘Pyrrhonism provides the intellectual basis for fideism’; History of Scepticism, p. 61. It should be remembered, however, that it was only inserted after the author’s revision.
139 Sagesse, pp. 337-8.
values shared by all Christians. In order to unite people in general, and as the only viable answer to civil turmoil, any such approach had to be devoid of fervour of any sort.

The second part of the chapter is concerned with the issue of the freedom of will; yet the author manages to avoid the matter by cautiously stating at the beginning of the section that the will he is interested in is ‘not ...the free will of man, according to the manner of Theologians’.140 Aware of the great theological controversies regarding the freedom of will and the associated doctrine of efficacious grace in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century (de auxiliis), Charron steered clear of a potentially disastrous topic. An urgent and widespread question, though decided upon in the Council of Trent, the issue of the will still troubled many thinkers on both sides of the confessional divide (and would do for a long time to come). As we will see below, both Lipsius and Sarpi struggled with it, in one way or another. The chapter concludes with a new remark about conformity; every one of us, Charron says, plays two parts in life: the one external and thus apparent and the other one internal but more fundamental. While maintaining his freedom of mind and will, a wise man will conform to everything because the laws and customs of the country he lives in require it, and because it is in the interest of the public good.141

We have reached thus, the third chapter of the second book, one of the most crucial to the whole text (Book II, 3). The author introduces here the candidate to wisdom to its first and fundamental part that is, true and essential honesty and probity (probité & preud’homme).142 Significantly, Charron explains that as he set out in the preface of the work, the honesty he will be dealing with is the human one – as opposed to the Christian.

140 Sagesse, pp. 343-4.
141 Sagesse, p. 348.
142 Sagesse, p. 349.
This honesty I will describe in this place, ... following the design of this book declared in the Preface, I speak of human honesty and wisdom, as it is humane, whereby a man is called an honest man and wise, and not of Christian, though in the end I may chance to speak a word or two thereof. [my italics] 143

The effect that the above passage would have caused to a reader of the early 1600s can only be a matter of speculation, as we do not have information on specific reactions by readers or the authorities. The boldness and radicalism of juxtaposing and differentiating between the human and the divine or Christian wisdom should be quite plain. Charron attaches this (human) honesty to Nature:

The jurisdiction of this honesty is Nature, which binds every man to be, and to make himself such as he ought, that is to say, to conform and rule himself according to it. Nature is together both a mistress which enjoys and commands honesty, and a law and instruction which teaches it to us. 144

There is a natural and universal obligation for every man to be 'honest' following the intention of his creator. Charron insists that this honesty should come to men from within by an 'inward instinct' and not from any outward reason. He then goes on to give more details on the doctrine of Natural law in an excellent example of Charron's usage of Stoic arguments:

Now the pattern and rule to bee honest, is this nature it self, which absolutely requires that we be such, it is, I say, this equity and universal reason which shines in every one of us. He who works according to it, works truly according to God, for it is God, or at least, his first fundamental and universal law, which hath brought it into the world, and which came first from God, for God and nature are in the world, as in a state, the king, the author and founder, and the fundamental law which he has made for the preservation and government of the said estate. This is a lightning and ray of the divinity, a stream and dependence of the eternal law, which is God himself and his will... He works also according to himself, for he works according to the stern, and animated instinct, which he has within himself moving and stirring him ... for this law and light is essential and natural in us, and therefore is called Nature, and the law of nature. He is also by consequence an honest man, always and perpetually, uniformly and equally at all times and in all places: for this law of equity, and natural reason is perpetual in us, edictum perpetuum, inviolable, which can never be extinct nor defaced, quam nec ipsa delet

143 Sagesse, p. 352.
144 Sagesse, pp. 352-3.
iniquitas; vermis eorum non morietur, universal and constant in all things, and always the same, that neither the time(s) or the place(s) can change or disguise ...145

The greatest part of this chapter is devoted to repeating and expanding on the principal doctrine according to which Nature, Natural Law, Reason and God are all inextricably linked and a number of times equated.146 Charron tells us that the Law of Nature is so substantial that any other kind of law is a small reflection of it.147 This law, as connected to God, is divine; yet it is at the same time inherent in man. Man partakes in this law as it was implanted in him at birth; the seeds of universal reason and virtues are thus within him, in his soul. As a result, by working according to this law, man works according to himself; by following nature, he works according to God.

Charron moderated his largely naturalistic approach in the second edition adding some sections of a different tone:

I will here add a word or two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of detraction, and to stay the plaints of those, that dislike that I attribute so much to nature (although it be God as hath been said, and this book speaks not but of the natural and humane) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be required.148

In the style of the revised preface, he justifies his position returning to the claim that his work is concerned with the human things and he attempts to rebut any accusations of naturalism by adding a few words on Divine grace. The grace of God, as he explains, is the only thing missing from the equation of natural reason and human nature to make the creation 'complete and perfect':

is brought forth in his due time, and receives it last and perfect portrait, it is elevated, christened, crowned, that is to say, accepted, verified, approved by God, and made (after a sort) worthy its due reward ... Now this good consists not in long discourse, precepts and instructions, neither it is attained by our own proper act and labour, it is a free gift from above, from whence it takes its name, Grace.149

146 Cf. Sagesse, pp. 356, 357 and 362.
147 Cf. Sagesse, p. 356.
148 Sagesse, p. 367.
149 Sagesse, p. 367-8.
Honesty and grace, we are told, are not contrary; neither the latter destroys nature, but it perfects it: grace takes the form of a crown on man. Both nature and grace originate from God but each has its separate jurisdiction. Charron at this point concedes ambiguously to infidels and pagans attaining virtue, but immediately counters his claim by asserting that virtue cannot be without grace. He does, nevertheless mention the examples of Aristides ('The Just', 530-468 BC), Phocion ('The Good', 402-318 BC), Caton (Marcus Porcius Cato, 'The Younger', 95-46 BC), and Socrates as ethical individuals returning, thus, to his earlier position. This is particularly significant, as it asserts the claim that the pagan cultures of antiquity ought to be understood as autonomous and independently of a Christian framework. In other words, this is also an assertion of the independence of the temporal world from the divine.

Certainly, the above references to God's grace and its role in achieving virtue can give substance to an Augustinian - fideist reading of Charron's text. Yet it should be increasingly obvious that a great number of elements emphasising man's dependence on God were added during his revision of the work. Charron's own views, however (since he manages to mislead many of our attempts to reach them), are less important in this consideration than the text his readers were actually faced with. The reference to God's grace, thus, can be seen as a reflection of Charron's contemporary intellectual conflict in the theological circles. As a trained theologian, the author of the Sagesse would have been acutely aware of the significance of passages referring to grace and their connotations. All the same, his fluctuation of stance on this matter would have made his work more vulnerable to attacks from religious writers - as indeed was the case two decades after its publication.

---

150 Sagesse, p. 370.
151 See below.
The discussion on the foundations of wisdom is followed by a consideration of the offices of wisdom. Charron's dictates, in this respect, are instructive: the first office, crucially and equivocally is to 'study true piety' (Book II, 5). The ambiguity of the chapter lies above all on the fact that Charron lists piety as an office to wisdom, subordinating, in essence, piety to wisdom.\textsuperscript{152} Piety holds the 'first place in the rank of our duties'. Charron's discussion on religion in general is equally astonishing: he begins by recognising the existence of a great diversity in religions of the world, while he points to the great concurrence between them.\textsuperscript{153} The author of course notes the pre-eminence of Christianity among the diverse religions, describing it as the only true one, as he had argued in detail in his Trois Veritez. The whole chapter has frequent references to this religious work, inducing some critics to make interesting claims about inter-textuality.\textsuperscript{154} The author of the Sagesse then presents the view that all religions agree in that they are not based on reason, they are irrational.\textsuperscript{155} Man cannot conceive them through his intellect, and the greatest mistake of the disbelievers is that they apply their 'natural instruments' in their attempts to understand them. Religions, however - note the plural in the discussion - can only reach humans by divine revelation, and by faith.\textsuperscript{156} The treatment of religion takes a fascinating turn with Charron's remark that religion is, largely, not a matter of personal choice:

the nation, country, place, gives the religion, and that a man professes which is in force in that place and among those persons, where he is born, and where he lives...\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{152} Cf. Horowitz, 'Natural Law as the Foundation for an Autonomous Ethic'; esp. pp. 223-227.  
\textsuperscript{153} Sagesse, pp. 379-80.  
\textsuperscript{154} Notably Belin; L'Œuvre de Pierre Charron, p. 7.  
\textsuperscript{155} Sagesse, p. 383-4.  
\textsuperscript{156} Cf. Tuck, Philosophy and Government, pp. 86-7. This would also be one of Galileo's arguments a decade and a half later; see 'Letter to the Gran Duchess Christina', Galileo Affair, pp. 87-118.  
\textsuperscript{157} Sagesse, p. 385.
That a trained theologian and a canon of the Catholic Church claimed that religion is subject to social conditioning is simply astounding; it is, further, a powerful indication of the intellectual atmosphere of the time that he was both able to present his views in print and that these had a wide appeal among his contemporaries. Charron's examination of the issue continues with another attack on superstition: for superstition is the feature furthest apart from true piety, and yet nothing resembles it as much.\footnote{Sagesse, p. 388.}

The term was a commonplace one in the intellectual atmosphere of the sixteenth century, used as an all encompassing term for the 'other'. Yet even in the passionate polemical exchanges of the Reformation period and its aftermath, it did not lose its association with error through ignorance.\footnote{See the Introduction of Helen Parish and William G. Naphy (eds.), Religion and Superstition in Reformation Europe. (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 2002), pp. 1-22.} Charron contends, superstition is the characteristic of the vulgar sort and barbarous natures. However, it is usually also favoured - or at least not hindered - by men in authority, because they 'know it is a very fit instrument to lead people'.\footnote{Sagesse, p. 390.} His full-scale attack on religious zealotry will follow a few pages later; as a prelude, however, he distinguishes between piety and true honesty (præud'hommie):

Let me only give this one advice necessary for him that intends to be wise, and that is, not to separate piety from true honesty, whereof we have spoken before, and so content himself with one of them, much less to confound them and mingle them together. These are two things very different, and which have diverse jurisdictions, piety and probity, religion and honesty, devotion and conscience ... should be jointly in the wise man - the one cannot be without the other entire and perfect ... (my italics)\footnote{Sagesse, p. 396.}

True, he does point out that the preferred condition is to have piety and true honesty combined. When, however, he examines cases where a person has one of the two qualities instead of both, he implies, astonishingly, that the lack of
honesty is graver than the lack of piety. He also talks forcefully about people using ‘piety as a cover for their impiety’ or a ‘cloak’ for their wickedness. Yet religion is ‘easier to have’, of greater show, and it is the trait of ‘simple and vulgar minds’, whereas honesty is ‘far more laborious and difficult’ to practice, of less show, and for minds ‘valiant and generous’.

The disparity of religion and the other virtues is underlined by a note that he had made in the preface and that he repeats here, that religion is a later virtue. In a similar manner, in an omitted extract of the first edition, while maintaining that religion is posterior to preud'homme Charron makes the remarkable claim that true honesty can cause and engender religion, since the former is the more ancient and natural but the reverse is not possible. Religious zealots on the other hand advance that honesty should follow religious faith:

[They] on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that religion (which is acquired and received by an outward cause, ...) engenders honesty, which we have showed it should proceed from nature, from that law and light which God has put into us, from our first beginning. These men will that a man be an honest man, because there is a paradise and hell ... I will that you be an honest man, not because you would go to paradise, but because nature, reason, God wills it, because the law and general policy of the world where you are part, requires it — doubtless such honesty occasioned by the spirit of religion besides that it is not true and essential, but accidental, it is likewise very dangerous producing many times very base and scandalous effects under the fair and glorious pretext of piety. What execrable wickedness has the zeal of religion brought forth? Is there any other subject or occasion that has yield the like? ... And he that has religion without honesty, I will not say he is more wicked, but far more dangerous than he that has neither the one nor the other ... they believe things whatsoever, be it treason, treachery, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not only lawful and sufferable, being coloured with zeal and the care of religion (my italics)

Honesty, thus, according to Charron should originate from nature and not from religion, because when occasioned by the spirit of religion it turns into a dangerous feature; a person that has religion without honesty, he writes, is far

---

162 Sagesse, pp. 396-7.
163 See below for similar descriptions of religion as a 'cloak' (Chapter 3 and 4).
164 Sagesse, pp. 397-8.
165 Sagesse, pp. 6 and 398.
166 Extracts from the 1601 edition; Sagesse, p. 788.
more dangerous than a person who has neither. The conflicts of 1562-98 had shown that people of that sort were susceptible to the seditions and discords that condemned the French society to a period of 'malady', 'frenzy' and, ultimately, misery.\textsuperscript{168}

That his views had given rise to certain discontent and were fairly unconventional is evidenced by president Jeannin's amendments. Most of the points that could raise questions and doubts are removed in his version, notably preud'hommie's precedence and primacy over piety; there is, furthermore, added emphasis on the might of God and Divine grace.\textsuperscript{169} What is especially striking in Charron's writings is the stress on the distinction between piety and probity and his evident preference for the latter. His inclination can be accounted for by a combination of theory and experience. The theory derived from the teachings of the classical antiquity, and the experience had been the civil and religious strife that convulsed most of Europe. The former provided evidence for a morality that could exist outside a Christian context, while the latter demonstrated the need for such a (human) morality, independent of religious zeal and adherence to specific doctrines.

The remaining seven chapters of the Second Book of the Sagesse treat the other offices of a man with the aspiration to be wise; following the duty of man to his creator (piety), the other offices are to himself and the people around him. Thus, Charron exhorts him to govern his desires and pleasures and to carry himself moderately and equally in all conditions life may bring, while also conforming to the environment he lives in. A special reference should be made on the duties of a man to his country. Charron elaborates on the advice that a wise man should conform to the laws, customs and ceremonies of his realm.

\textsuperscript{168} Cf. Sagesse, pp. 615-8.
\textsuperscript{169} See Sagesse, pp. 793-802.
He establishes the importance of authority in this world; he talks about the power of laws and custom. Much in the same way that he treated the diversity of religions, Charron remarks on the variety of laws and customs in the world, using a number of examples. The extracts are to a great degree reminiscent of Montaigne’s writings on the diversity of custom in the world. The author urges the reader to observe the laws and customs of the realm, not because of their justice and equity of necessity, but essentially for ‘public reverence and their authority’. Laws are especially necessary for the common sort: they cannot do well, nor know what they ought to do, without laws. But there is a difference between the vulgar sort and wise men: ‘By right a wise man is above the laws, but in inward and public effect, he is their voluntary and free obedient subject’. A wise man should moreover examine separately all laws and customs, compare and judge them:

faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of the truth and universal reason and nature, where he is first obliged ...It may fall out sometimes, that we may do that, by a second particular and municipal obligation which is against the first and more ancient, that is to say, universal nature and reason; but yet we satisfy nature by keeping our judgements and opinions true and just according to it....the world has nothing to do with our thoughts, but the outward man is engaged to the public course of the world and must give an account thereof.

This passage repeats the pre-eminence of the law of Nature, to which a wise man can be loyal even when he is required to comply with human laws. This is particularly in the case that the public good is at stake: Charron here echoes the arguments of the politiques who in the midst of civil turmoil were calling for some co-existence between the opposing sides, within the framework of commonwealth (république).

---

170 Sagesse, p. 422.
171 Sagesse, p. 423.
172 Cf. his essays, De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy receue (I, 23); Des cannibals (I, 31); Des coches (III, 6).
173 Sagesse, pp. 430-1.
174 Sagesse, p. 433.
175 Sagesse, p. 433.
176 Sagesse, p. 434.
The ultimate fruit and crown of wisdom however, is the wise man’s skill to maintain himself in true tranquillity of mind, a reference to the need for personal (internal) retreat from the disorder and misery surrounding the inhabitants of the second half of the sixteenth century.177

Book III
The role of the Sagesse as a manual to wisdom is realised in the Third Book where Charron treats the specific advices of wisdom following the four moral/cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. As a result, the tone of the Book is exhortatory and didactic. As on the whole, the Book does not deal much with theoretical issues, we will be paying less attention to it. Yet the fact that it occupies more than one third of the work is important in itself, as it confirms the moral character and practical function of the work. This is further evidenced by Charron’s placing prudence at the highest level of the four virtues.

Prudence for him is the ‘queen, superintendent and guide’ to all the other virtues and it is the skill to handle man’s perverse nature. As an empirical quality, it stems from experience – sometimes associated with history - and practice; prudence, consequently, also implies accommodation to circumstances.178 Closely linked with man’s reason, it amounts to dispassionate judgement and action in accordance with it. Charron distinguishes two main types of prudence: private, and public or political prudence. This was a distinction made by Aristotle and has been followed by authors writing on

177 Cf. titles of books published in reaction to the religious turmoil and enjoyed wide circulation: Justus Lipsius’ De Constantia in Publicis Malignis (1584); Guillaume du Vair’s De la Constance et Consolation es Calamitetz Publicites (71590).
178 Sagesse, pp. 482-3.
politics since.\textsuperscript{179} Prudentia politica had to be different from that of private and simple men, because a Prince was responsible for the well-being of his subjects. Charron acknowledges his debt to Lipsius in his analysis of political prudence, whose views we will examine in depth in the next chapter.\textsuperscript{180} Particularly relevant to the arguments we have seen so far is the author’s reference to the piety of the prince and the role of religion within the state. Importantly, Charron’s view, following Lipsius, was that religion could be a factor of stability within a state, promoting obedience from the subjects.\textsuperscript{181} In this manner, the author undermines again the role of religion, subordinating it to political expediencies. This fits well with the exposition of religion and piety within the whole text that gives prominence to the human qualities of honesty and civility within society. The view was not one, nonetheless, that agreed with the official position of the Church, or with the stance of a canon of the Catholic Church; as we will see in the next chapter, Lipsius’s \textit{Politica} was to be placed under the Index of Prohibited Books, for putting forth the same position.\textsuperscript{182}

Charron discusses in the rest of the book the role and attributes of justice\textsuperscript{183} and fortitude, the second and third moral virtues respectively. The author identifies the role of fortitude as a defence against outward evils, such as sickness, exile, poverty and death, and inward passions. The latter are also the most dangerous.\textsuperscript{184} Charron, thus, gives at this point specific rules on how to deal with fear, sorrow, compassion, hatred, envy, revenge, jealousy, as he had

\textsuperscript{179} Sagesse, p. 491; Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, III.iii.6: ‘Ετι δὲ η αυτη αρετη αρχοντος τε αγαθου και ανδρος αγαθου, πολιτες δ’ εστι και ο αρχομενος, ουχ η αυτη αν εις πολιτου και ανδρος, τυνις μεντοι πολιτου’ ου γαρ η αυτη αρχοντος και πολιτου...’ [And if the goodness of a good ruler is the same as the goodness of a good man, yet the person ruled is also a citizen, so that the goodness of a citizen in general will not be the same as that of a man, although that of a particular citizen will; for goodness as a ruler is not the same thing as goodness as a citizen...].

\textsuperscript{180} Sagesse, p. 487.

\textsuperscript{181} Sagesse, p. 489.


\textsuperscript{183} Sagesse, p. 570-3.

\textsuperscript{184} Sagesse, pp. 676-683.
promised in the First Book. The author’s account of fortitude resembles greatly Lipsius’s concept of constancy against public adversities.185 The Flemish author, as we will see in the next chapter, emphasised steadfastness in the face of public (disruption in public life) and private evils, namely, passions. The work concludes with temperance, a wise man’s guide in prosperity; moderate conduct, according to Charron is an indication of a wise life.186

In this manner, the Sagesse is brought to a closure. The richness of its material and the radicalism of several of Charron’s claims within the text, made it susceptible to diverse criticisms and conflicting interpretations, a number of which will be the subject of the following section.

III.

The Challenge Exposed: Reception, Interpretations and Controversy (1623-26)

Considering the extraordinary nature of the content and claims of the Sagesse, it is, perhaps, surprising to reflect on the fact that it took almost two decades for it to be at the centre of heated intellectual controversies.187 The specific debate is one of particular interest, as it reveals the intellectual tensions prevalent in the first decades of the seventeenth century. As an exchange, furthermore, principally between theologians, on the questions of atheism, naturalism, and the role of grace and free will, it also demonstrates the prominence of the religious crisis of the period and the unresolved deep ecclesiological problems

---

185 Sagesse, p. 676. For Lipsius’s notion of Constantia see below, Chapter 2.
186 Sagesse, pp. 720-2.
that this reflected.\textsuperscript{188} For a primarily philosophical work to be at the centre of a theological debate, moreover, is an indication of the complex interconnections between questions of religion, philosophy and morality.

The debate in question had its start with the publication of the Jesuit Père François Garasse’s (1585-1631) \textit{ Doctrine Curieuse des Beaux Esprits de ce Temps, ou Prétendus tels} in 1623, with which he attacked what he believed was a growing threat: libertinism.\textsuperscript{189} In this general and vague term the Jesuit included fideists, deists and atheists, namely, people who either challenged the prominence of religion, or raised concerns about the uniqueness of Christian religion, or questioned man’s abilities to experience ‘revealed’ religion. The Jesuit had two main objections against these ‘libertins’: first, he censured them for ‘opening the gate of Paradise to persons like Homer, Socrates, and Theseus…’.\textsuperscript{190} Second, and linked to our examination of Charron, he condemned those who attributed divine powers to Nature and advocated that man should abide by it.\textsuperscript{191} Although Charron was not the Jesuit’s main target, he was included in his denunciation as the author of the ‘breviary of the libertins’, as the polemicist took pleasure in calling the \textit{Sagesse}. The \textit{ Doctrine Curieuse} accused Charron of ignorance in religious matters and for use of immodest language. It also classed Charron as a very dangerous type of philosopher, because although he continued to profess the Catholic faith, he was tearing it apart from within.


\textsuperscript{189} In a dictionary published in 1611, the term was linked with ‘epicureanism, sensuality, licentiousness and dissoluteness’; cited in Keohane, \textit{Philosophy and the State in France}, p. 144. It was also used to denominate ‘free-thinking’in general. Garasse in his \textit{Les Recherches des Recherches et Autres Œuvres de M.E. Pasquier} (Paris, 1622) formulated a definition of the term that permitted him to regroup all of his enemies under a common and practical denomination: ‘par le mot de libertin je n’entens ny un Huguenot, ny un Athée, ny un Catholique, ny un Hérétique, ny un Politique, mais un certain composé de toutes ces qualities: le fons est catholique, relevé par après de couleurs bizarres et changeantes à proportion des humeurs, des discourse, des compagnies, des sujets qui se présentent’; cited by Belin, \textit{L’Œuvre de Pierre Charron}, p. 241.


\textsuperscript{191} Ibid. Cf also Boase, \textit{Fortunes of Montaigne}, p. 167.
Importantly, Garasse also claimed that Charron was an author who ‘favoured libertinism by not keeping enough distance from certain philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism’, emphasising what he perceived as incompatibility between Christian teachings and pagan philosophies.\textsuperscript{192} Critics seem to agree that the \textit{Doctrine Curieuse} as a whole is not of high intellectual quality, perhaps because the author was not at ease with critical analysis of ideas. The result however was that Garasse, an excellent propagandist, wrote a fiercely polemical work, but did not dwell much upon theological issues and argumentation, making his work susceptible to a response.

This response came from Father François Ogier (?1600-70), who within the same year published the \textit{Judgement et Censure du Livre de la Doctrine Curieuse} (1623). His refutation of the Jesuit’s work was not particularly well-founded, however; instead, it was a loaded counter-attack, which in turn caused the reaction of père Garasse.\textsuperscript{193} The Jesuit answered with his \textit{Apologie} the following year: in this, Charron was brought to the forefront of the atheists and libertines, with the accusation that he ‘choke and strangles sweetly the feelings of religion as if with a silken cord of philosophy’.\textsuperscript{194} The criticisms were more rounded this time; the Jesuit Father repeated the charge that the author of the \textit{Sagesse} was promoting Epicurean philosophy, but he was especially critical of his account of the variety of religions and his effort to indicate the similarities between them, without sufficiently exalting Christianity.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{192} Belin, \textit{L'Œvre de Pierre Charron}, pp. 242-245.  
\textsuperscript{193} A remark characteristic of the tone of the work is the following: ‘Garasse, my friend, that which is above us is nothing to us. The works of Charron are a little too high tone for low and vulgar minds like yours’; cited in Popkin, \textit{History of Scepticism}, p. 111.  
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Apologie du Père François Garasse, de la Compagnie de Jésus, pour son Livre contre les Athéistes et Libertins de Nostre Siécle, et Response aux Censures et Calomnies de l'Auteur Anonyme} (1624). The citation is from Popkin, \textit{History of Scepticism}, pp. 112-2.  
\textsuperscript{195} Belin, \textit{L'Œvre de Pierre Charron}, p. 250.
Ogier's defense of Charron had also caused a more elaborate response within the same year, this time by Père Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), the later philosopher and mathematician, friend of Galileo (1564-1642) and Descartes (1596-1650). In his pamphlet L'Impiété des Deistes (1624), Mersenne was especially critical of the Pyrrhonist approach, because for him this mode of thought damaged the foundations of religion.\textsuperscript{196} The Impiété further disparaged the libertin claim of the soul's mortality, because, as Mersenne very perceptively argued, such a belief led man to conduct a licentious life on earth, without any concern for the after-life.\textsuperscript{197} To put it in the terms of the present study, Mersenne recognised that the belief in the immortality of the soul was one of the bonds that kept the temporal sphere linked to the divine, and the kingdom of God united with the kingdom of man. Referring to Charron more particularly, he interestingly pointed out the diverse reception of the Sagesse and criticised its author's choice of discussing questions of religion in such an equivocal manner as 'inexcusable'.\textsuperscript{198} He addressed Charron's 'pragmatism' and discussed the relation between theology and philosophy, arguing that only 'strong minds' (following Charron's classification) do not distinguish between the two. He tried to give a fitting definition that would join together the concept of both the sagesse human and Christian, and condemned the libertins for not seeing the link between wisdom and religion. Mersenne further criticised their conviction that they could 'philosophise' without studying theology at the same time.\textsuperscript{199} By taking the knowledge of God and revealed religion out of the equation, the libertines were in fact establishing a new worldview, based on ancient

\textsuperscript{196} Belin, L'Œvre de Pierre Charron, p. 406.
\textsuperscript{197} Sabrié, De l'Humanisme au Rationalisme, p. 404.
\textsuperscript{198} Cited in De l'Humanisme au Rationalisme, p. 456.
\textsuperscript{199} Cf. 'C'est que j'ay souvent pensé touchant la Sagesse de M. Charron, mais le temps et le loisir ne me l'ont encore permis, et ay toujours attendu que quelqu'un l'enterprist, donnant une sagesse qui soit aussi chrestienne qu'humaine, et politique, à ce que ca police et la religion se conjoignent par le lien d'une veritable harmonie'; cited in Belin, L'Œvre de Pierre Charron, p. 258. Cf. also p. 259.
philosophy and nature. Mersenne’s work was far more sophisticated than any of Garasse’s; he based his refutation on solid theological argumentation, and demonstrated a number of heterodoxies contained in contemporary texts, making a special reference to the *Sagesse*.

Yet Garasse did not feel that the controversy had come to a successful end; he published another work, the four-volume *Somme Théologique des Vérités Capitales de la Religion Chrétienne* (1625), evidently following St. Thomas’ heading, with the intention to settle all the issues under dispute. The *Somme* had a large scope indeed; it set out to give a decisive account of problems such as the nature of religion and the double nature of the person of Christ – both of which had immediate resonances with the matter of divine grace and its role. The Jesuit attacked with it the views of any and all kinds of atheism: ‘furious and enraged’; ‘atheism of libertinage and corruption of manners’; ‘atheism of profanation’; ‘wavering or unbelieving atheism’; ‘brutal, lazy, melancholy atheism’. Charron’s atheism, according to Garasse’s classification, belonged to the fourth type, the melancholy atheism. What seemed to be the source of all evil in the *Sagesse* was the promoted ‘indifference’, and the impassiveness either for or against God. In this respect, Garasse denounced the principle of ‘conscientious ignorance’ and what he thought Charron to be advocating, that religion is a matter of convention, and not a serious question. More interestingly from our perspective, he accused the canon of paganism and of preaching the scandalous maxim of ‘following nature’.

---

200 In his dedication to Cardinal Richelieu, the author explained why a new *Summa* was necessary: ‘This title which I place at the head of my works, having been used for four or five centuries, deserves to be revived, and since the libertine types have beclouded our times with new darkness, we must seek for new lights to illuminate the Truth’; quoted in Popkin, *History of Scepticism*, p. 112.


The whole debate took a most interesting turn in 1626, when Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de St. Cyran (1581-1643), the later Jansenist leader and sworn enemy of the Jesuits, intervened with his *Somme des Fautes et Faussetez Capitales Contenues en la Somme Théologique du Père François Garasse*. Amidst his refutation of the work, he pointed out thirteen of Garasse’s misinterpretations of Charron and offered a reading of the latter’s text in entirely Augustinian terms. In this regard, Saint Cyran was most applauding of the First Book of the *Sagesse* where Charron explains the mutability and weakness of the ‘human condition’, as we have seen; from the perspective of the *Somme des Fautes*, human feebleness was perfectly accounted for in Charron’s work. This weakness, moreover, was the result of original sin, from which the Augustinians concluded that man could only hope to escape by the grace of God. The Jesuits, on the contrary, according to the Augustinians-Jansenists, paid little or no consideration to original sin. In this respect, and as Sabrié points out in his analysis of the controversy, Saint Cyran was more an adversary to the Jesuit Garasse than an apologist to Charron. Popkin however, recognises that the later Jansenist’s leader willingness to make common cause with the author of the *Sagesse* can be attributed to the anti-rationalism that they both shared, the one in theological matters, the other in philosophical. Sabrié, however, remarks that Saint Cyran must have read the work very cursorily and superficially, without getting at the heart of it; had ‘the Doctor of grace’ realised the centrality of naturalism in the *Sagesse*, he would have denounced it instead of defending it.

---

203 Sabrié, *De l’Humanisme au Rationalisme*, p. 488.
205 Sabrié, *De l’Humanisme au Rationalisme*, p. 488.
Conclusion

The controversy illustrates nicely the various interpretations of the *Sagesse* and the challenges that this work presented to the authority of religion as source of truth and morality. Charron had produced a very rich and diverse work, drawing from a number of authors, and combining distinct languages. Yet he had managed to give a distinct character to the material he incorporated, creating an original synthesis. This richness was partly the reason behind the variety of conflicting interpretations of the *Sagesse*. His critics made the accusation that his preference of ancient philosophical texts had led the author to a pagan way of thinking, which induced him in turn to distinguish between theology and philosophy, and generated a greater concern for temporal things than divine. This was further associated with the accusation of naturalism.

Charron's arguments on the link between human understanding and nature and the law of nature as a guide to moral conduct, largely drawn from the Stoic tradition of thought, could be used as arguments for the independent existence of nature and man. On a different level, Garasse and Mersenne expressed a profound distaste for Charron's emphasis on human weakness and his call for acknowledging human ignorance; these were the Sceptic and Augustinian or fideistic overtones of his text. They were also the exact grounds upon which Saint Cyran had defended him.

Overall, nevertheless, Charron's discussion of *preud'honnime* is what makes his work most arresting and interesting. *Preud'honnime*, which the author effectively identifies with wisdom, derives from nature; it is human and not Christian/divine - and although he does equate God and Nature a few times, throughout the whole work it seems that Nature is closer to the human-temporal sphere than it is to God. As the ability to act according to nature, it is fundamentally a practical virtue; thus, wisdom for Charron does not have as great a theoretical or theological meaning as for some of his intellectual
predecessors or contemporaries. He distinguishes it, furthermore from grace; the two have different jurisdictions. His insistence that lack of probity is in fact worse than lack of piety and his remark that probity can engender piety but the reverse is not possible is just startling. Hence, Charron plainly argues for a morality that is independent from God, derived from Nature and is associated with human things rather than divine. It is his contention of a morality disassociated from God that makes him deem pagans such as Socrates virtuous. Charron’s own determination throughout the work, moreover, to distinguish between divine (piety, grace) and human (preud’homme, honesty) wisdom is further sustained by the fact that he wrote two separate books on the two separate wisdoms. What is ultimately undermined in Charron’s philosophical scheme, of course, is religion and the place of God in human affairs.

The association of morality with human things is further related to his attack on intellectual and religious dogmatism, even though the former features much more prominently in his work than the latter. Yet Charron does not hesitate fiercely to criticise superstition and dogmatism, which he sees as the source of troubles, heresies, sects and seditions. The attack on intellectual (moral) and religious dogmatism is additionally advanced by Charron’s emphasis on religious and legal relativism. Charron puts forward the remarkable claim that religion is dependent upon social conditioning. This relativity is perhaps more evident in his views about the conformity of wise men. As a universal mind and citizen of the world, a wise man ought to

---


207 See Horowitz, ‘Natural Law as the Foundation for an Autonomous Ethics’; Kogel, Pierre Charron, ch. 4; and Alan Boase.
conform to the laws of his homeland, as these cannot really restrain him if he remains faithful to the law of Nature on the inside. The author therefore advances the disparity between inward 'freedom' (of conscience?) and outward conformity, one that we will see Lipsius and King James ardently endorse in their arguments about religious dissent and constancy in times of troubles. This cannot be viewed independently of the religiously explosive environment in which Charron and his contemporaries were living in. Relativity of laws and religions implicitly also referred to relativity of doctrines, as Lipsius and Sarpi would argue in their own works, and practice in real life. In the same vein, Charron’s call for universalism can be viewed as a call for ecumenism on the same bases that James VI and I would plead for a reunion of Christendom.

The importance of the Sagesse, therefore, should not be underestimated. The richness and ambivalence of the work ought to be taken as evidence and a reflection of the intellectual tensions of the time, primarily expressed in Charron’s ardent attack on any kind of intellectual or religious authority and his contempt for religious zealotry and intellectual dogmatism. These tensions were the result of two things: first, the increasing circulation of ancient texts and the problems that this brought with it. Were ancient philosophies to be regarded as equivalent to Christian or were they to be dismissed? Second, if accepted, were they to lead their adherents to paganism or was there a way of reconciling the two? These problems, as Hans Baron pointed out, had been troubling thinkers since the Renaissance.208 And this brings us to the second point: what was different now was the fact that scholars had begun to realise the effects of pagan philosophy, since it had been around for longer and made accessible to a much greater number of readers. More important, many people of the second half of the sixteenth century had been through a devastating experience that the

inhabitants of Renaissance Europe had not: the religious wars, that showed them that perhaps the disassociation of the temporal and the divine was essential, if they were to survive. Nature, instead of a particular dogma, could show the way, and the ultimate benefit would be the much longed-for tranquillity of mind. After all, man had a divine ray of light within him that would help him find the way on earth.
Chapter II

Moral Implications (II): Public and Private

Justus Lipsius, *De Constantia* (1584) & *Politica* (1589)

Ego e Philologia Philosophiam feci
Lipsius to Woverius, 3 November 1603 (Ep. Misc. 4.84)

One religion is the author of unietie; and from a confused religion there alwayes groweth dissent
Lipsius, *Politica* IV, 2

The impact that the spread of humanism had, when combined with the effect of the religious wars of the second half of the sixteenth century is perhaps more obvious in the work of the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) than it is in Charron. This is especially the case regarding perceptions of the relationship between the temporal and the divine spheres, the role of religion in people's perception of the world, and the moral connotations associated with these issues.

Several links can be ascertained between Charron and Lipsius. The two men were almost exact contemporaries: Lipsius was born six years after Charron, and the two of them died within three years of each other. Both lived intense lives and were equally marked by the most turbulent and disastrous conflicts that plagued most of Europe at that time. They shared a love of letters and classical studies, and both had, to the distress of some of their contemporaries, a special interest in law and philosophy in general, and in moral considerations in particular. With regard to the subject matter of their works, the most striking parallel is the emphasis they placed on the disjunction between one's outward conduct and private thought. Lipsius, however, took the
notion further than Charron, insisting on different principles of conduct for the two domains, even at the expense of Christian ethics in the public realm, so long as one was in close contact with God in one’s private domain. Related to this, the two of them further shared parallel views on the position of religion in public life. The works of Charron and Lipsius both enjoyed great popularity throughout the seventeenth century and were translated into many languages. Lipsius was a renowned humanist, producing, during his life, outstanding editions of Tacitus (AD c. 56-c. 117) and Seneca (4 BC/AD 1-65). He had, furthermore, a tremendous reputation as a teacher, corresponded with most of the great minds of his time and his services were claimed by powerful princes.

As with Charron, the Flemish humanist’s legacy was controversial even within his lifetime; his perceived ambivalence, however, was due to different reasons from his French counterpart. The principal reproach against Lipsius was his ‘inconstancy’ in religious matters: having been born a Catholic, he took up positions first at a Lutheran and subsequently at a Calvinist University, before finally returning to the Catholic doctrine. His views especially on the contentious issue of the role of religion within the state caused controversy with the polemicist Dirck (Theodore) Volckertszoon Coornhert (1522-90). Religious ambiguity stigmatised Lipsius for centuries; it would be fair to surmise that this partly accounts for the reluctance, particularly on the part of Protestant world, to recognise his value.1 This could consequently also explain the relatively small attention that had been paid to his work until recently: in the Anglophone intellectual community, he only started receiving the consideration he deserves

1 Cf. Mark P.O. Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius.* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1991); p. 18: ‘His departure [from Leiden and the Protestant world] saddened and perplexed his friends, students and colleagues at Leiden, and his reputation has never been fully reinstated. In 1987 for example, in the exhibition devoted to the early history of the University, his name appeared only in a list of distinguished scholars attracted by Dousa, while at Amsterdam Coornhert’s portrait shares the place of honour with that of William of Orange in the exhibition in the Rijksmuseum devoted to the history of the Netherlands’.
in the last two decades, beginning with the translation of part of Gerhard Oestreich’s work. Nonetheless, studies of his life and work have lately been flourishing; a number of recent studies take Lipsius as a starting point, as more students of seventeenth-century ideas have come to acknowledge his significance through his adoption and popularisation of the principles of Tacitism and Neo-Stoicism amongst the intellectual circles.

This chapter will focus on Lipsius’s fundamental concept of the divide between public and private matters. This has three aspects. First is Lipsius’s use of classical sources, in which Stoicism is the principle in personal matters, and Tacitism the example for public affairs. Second, are implications that the fundamental notion of the disjunction between public and private had on the role of religion in private life and within the state. The chapter will lastly also concentrate on the way in which the emphasis on philosophy mixed with the Christian teachings. The examination of the issues in question will depend on Lipsius’s two most widely circulated books, the Constantia and the Politica. The former, De Constantia Libri Duo (1584), a book on moral philosophy prescribing the individual’s conduct in times of public afflictions, was printed forty-four times in the original Latin, fifteen times in French, and was also translated into Dutch, English, German, Spanish, Italian and Polish. On the other hand, the Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex (Leiden, 1589) is a work on politics that

---

2 His main monograph in English is Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, edited by Br. Oestreich and H.G. Koenigsberger, trans. by David McLintock (Cambridge: CUP, 1982). Cf. his remarks on the insufficient attention that Lipsius and Neo-Stoicism had thus far attracted (p. 57).

3 The recent interest on Lipsius is primarily evidenced by the editions of collected essays, the results of a number of conferences on the Flemish humanist; (see the relevant publications in the bibliography). For studies on Neo-Stoicism and Lipsius’s wider influence especially in literature cf. David Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland. Neo-Stoicism, Culture and Ideology in an Age of Crisis, 1540-1690. (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000); the less successful Adriana McCrea, Constant Minds. The Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584-1650. (Toronto; London: University of Toronto Press); Barbour Reid, English Epicures and Stoics. Ancient Legacies in Early Stuart Culture, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998) and others.


5 Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, p. 13.
can on the whole be located within the framework of the ‘mirror for princes’ literature. The Latin original went through fifteen editions within the first ten years of its appearance (1589 to 1599), and it was soon translated into Dutch, French, English, Polish and German, followed by Spanish and Italian editions in 1604. In fact, there was almost a new edition every year up to 1618, reaching the total of eighty-two editions by 1752.6

Several factors contributed to this popularity of Lipsius’s works. First and foremost, was the appeal the ancient philosophical teachings presented to people in their struggle to deal with public disruption; Lipsius demonstrated this application in his *Constantia*, in a very immediate and personalised manner. Secondly, the wars of religion increased the perception of and possibilities for people to participate in public affairs, while they also raised serious questions over the role religion ought to have in a state. Both these issues were dealt with in Lipsius’s *Politica*. These are also the reasons that make Lipsius’s work germane in the scope of this thesis. In parallel to Charron’s dualism of spheres (divine and human wisdom, each dealt with in a separate book), the Flemish scholar presents his audience with another type of dualism: private conduct and morality dealt with in the *Constantia*, and civil conduct and the associated morality, in the *Politica*.

The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to assess Lipsius’s opinions on the separation of a public and a private morality, his association with Neo-Stoicism as a refuge from the crisis brought about by religious fervour, and his stance on the role of religion within the state. To this purpose, an examination of the eventful life of the author is first required, as it will provide a context for the discussion of his two main works. A summary of the contents of the *Constantia* and the *Politica* will then lead to the main analysis of the texts and their themes.

---

Similarly to the previous chapter, we will see that we can perceive Lipsius’s positions and popularity as an instance firmly positioned within the context of the religious and civil conflict that he, together with many other Europeans, experienced during the second half of the sixteenth century.

I.

Lipsius’s Life: Humanism in Times of Public Adversity

That the civil and religious strife that afflicted his country had a great effect on Lipsius is evident throughout his work, most notably in the *Constantia*, which he famously wrote from his real need for support during the calamities of the wars.7

...who is of so hard and flinty a heart that he can anie longer endure these euils? wee are tossed, as you see, these manie yeares with the tempest of ciuill warres: and like Seafaring men are wee beaten with sundrie blastes of troubles and sedition. If I loue quietnesse and rest, the Trumpets and rating of armour interrupt me. If I take solace in my countrey gardens and farmes, the souldiers and murthres force mee into the Towne... [Langius:] Thy countrey (I confesse) is tossed and tormoyled grieuously: What part of Europe is at this day free? ... Hereto I [Lipsius], rashly ynough, replied: Nay surely, I will forsake my countrey, knowing that it is lesse griefe to heare report of euils, than to bee an eye-witnesse vnto them...8

This extract captures the tribulation facing the inhabitants of war-tormented areas of Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century. The religious divisions affected Lipsius’s life in many ways: timid, pacifist and vain, he fled from the troubles a number of times, seeking refuge at a safer place and a different university. His flights, however, also necessitated changes in his religious allegiances, which aroused serious disapproval from Catholics and Protestants alike. His problems engaging with, or enduring the genuine distress

---

8 *Two Booke of Constancie*, trans. by Sir John Stradling (London: Richard Johnes, 1594); eds. Rudolf Kirk and Clayton Morris Hall (New Brunswick; New Jersey Rutgers UP: 1939), pp. 72-3. I have primarily consulted this edition, in conjunction, however, with the Latin edition of 1590, and the revised edition in Lipsius’s *Opera Omnia* (1637); all the citations will be from the English edition (heretofore referred to as *Constantia*), unless otherwise stated.
the intense confessionalisation of his world brought, were expressed in what can be described as laxity in his sense of doctrine, together with the traversing of confessional boundaries. The same problems can also be detected in the rigidity of his views in the role of religion within a state, which brought him into conflict with opposing standpoints on religious issues. His vanity, moreover, together with his great reputation and his questionable outlook also meant that he constantly felt the need to justify himself to his surroundings and to posterity. One such attempt at self-fashioning is one of the two sources that we have for his life: an autobiography that survives in the form of a letter to Wouverius (Jan van der Wouver, 1576-1635), one of his close pupils. The other source is the Vita Justi Lipsii, composed by Aubertus Miraeus (1573-1640) and included in the Opera Omnia (1637).

According to these sources, Lipsius was born in 1547 in a Catholic family in Overisjsche, between Brussels and Louvain (Brabant), and was later educated at the Jesuit College of Cologne, where he studied classical literature and history, alongside rhetoric and philosophy. He seems to have been a devourer of books from a very early age, and showed a special interest in works of philosophy, ethics and politics; so much so, that the Jesuit Fathers, alarmed by his attraction, confiscated his books. Even though these Fathers hoped to enlist Lipsius in their order, he left Cologne after what he claimed to be an

---

9 The letter is dated 1 October 1600, and it was written while Wouver was in Seville (Ep. Misc. 3.87); for a critical analysis of it and Lipsius’s preoccupation with posterity see Morford, Stoics and Neostics, pp. 96-100. For his life see Saunders, Justus Lipsius, pp. 3-58; Rudolf Kirk’s introduction in the Constantia, pp. 3-12; Leontine Zanta, La Renaissance du Stocisme au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 1914) pp. 151-166; Mark Morford’s Stoics and Neostics is, however, by far the most updated and researched. Valuable information can also be found in Jacques Klyukskens, Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) and the Jesuits. With four unpublished letters’, Humanistica Lovaniensia 23 (1974), pp. 244-270.

10 Miraeus based his Vita partly in Lipsius’s correspondence, and partly on his works: notes on the side of his text refer to his sources; Justus Lipsius, Opera Omnia, vol. I, pp. xlix-lxviii.

11 Vita, Opera Omnia I, p. I.

12 Cf. Lipsius’s Epistle to the Reader in Constantia, pp. 205-6.
intervention by his parents. However, he retained close relations with the Jesuits throughout his life.\textsuperscript{13} He then went to the University of Louvain where he continued his classical studies, together with Law.

Lipsius’s eagerness to further his studies and his career is witnessed by the composition of a work that was published before he was twenty years old. \textit{Variae Lectiones} (Antwerp, 1569) was dedicated to Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle (1517-86) and attracted his favour; Lipsius accompanied him as his Latin secretary on a journey to Rome.\textsuperscript{14} Lipsius spent two years in the ‘eternal city’, where he frequented all the major libraries and became acquainted with important scholars of the age. After his return to Louvain, in 1570, he settled on presenting himself to the Emperor Maximillian II in Vienna; there is no evidence, however, that this venture was successful. In the course of his journey back to Louvain he had his first contact with the conflicts, hearing about the troubles in the Spanish Netherlands and the cruelty of the Duke of Alva (Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, 1508-83), who had been sent by Philip II to enforce order and the true religion in the Low Countries. Alva’s ‘reign of terror’ through the ‘Council of Troubles’ involved looting, arrests, condemnations, executions and excessive taxation (he imposed the infamous ‘Tenth Penny’); it managed to curtail the first wave of uprisings, but famously led to the seizure of Brill by the Sea-Beggars.\textsuperscript{15} In the midst of this disorder Lipsius’s property was confiscated by Spanish troops. As a timid individual, Lipsius chose to keep away from the turmoil. With the recommendation of Joachim Camerarius (1500-

\textsuperscript{13} According to Kluyskens, however, who bases his view on a letter of the rector of the College to Jacques Laynez, Superior-General of the Order, contrary to Lipsius’s assertion that his parents made him change his mind, he had, in fact, taken the vows in the Society of Jesus. He later chose to erase this fact, as he would not want to be associated with the Jesuits from a Protestant point of view, and his position would be far worse towards the Catholic side having betrayed his Order as well as his faith. (Kluyskens, ‘Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits’, pp. 245-6 and 262-4).

\textsuperscript{14} Saunders, \textit{Justus Lipsius}, pp. 7-8 and Morford, \textit{Stoics and Neostoics}, p. 56.

74), the famous German scholar and friend of Melanchthon (1497-1560), the Flemish humanist managed to secure a chair as Professor of History and Eloquence at the University of Jena, in central Germany (1572). The University had been founded in 1559 in the midst of the religious controversies and was home to some of the leading Protestant scholars in Germany.\textsuperscript{16}

Here Lipsius made his first of a number of switches of doctrine, as in that environment a born Catholic was required to make a public confession of Lutheranism in order to be able to accept this type of position. His stay in Jena lasted eighteen months. As it appears, however, Lipsius did not restrict himself in just confessing Lutheranism; he delivered, while he was there, various orations of strongly anti-Papal and anti-Spanish character. Some of these speeches finally came to light almost thirty years after he had left Jena, causing him problems with the Catholic Church, to which he had in the meantime returned. Concerned about the damage that this could bring to his reputation and the sincerity of his beliefs, Lipsius tried to disclaim them.\textsuperscript{17} After his departure from Jena in 1574 and while at Cologne, he married the widow Anna van der Calster. Here he switched confessions again: as his wife came from a Catholic family, Lipsius would have had to return to Catholicism to be able to marry her.\textsuperscript{18} Lipsius's confessional traversing is significant and in both cases, his acceptance of the position in Jena and his marriage, can be interpreted


\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Kluyskens, 'Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 252. The 'De Duplici Concordia' was by no means the most anti-Catholic of Lipsius's Jena orations, but as one of the two published during his lifetime (the other was the funeral oration for the Duke of Saxe-Weimar), it attracted attention and caused alarm to Lipsius. He wrote an open letter to the Magistrates of Frankfurt, disclaiming authorship, while Jan Moretus (the younger) personally went to Frankfurt and bought up as many copies of the \textit{Iusti Lipsi de Duplici Concordia Oration non prius edita} as he could, in order to destroy them. The speech was placed on the Index in 1613. See Morford, \textit{Stoics and Neostoics}, pp. 126-30; Saunders, \textit{Justus Lipsius}, pp. 11-12 and note 2; Kluyskens, 'Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 252; \textit{Index des Livres Interdits}, ed. J.M. Bujanda, vol. XI: \textit{Index Librorum Prohibitorum} 1600-1966 (Canada and Geneva: Médiaspaull and Librairie Droz, 2002), p. 551.

in two ways, in terms of this thesis. From one perspective, it can be suggested that Lipsius put temporal (personal) interests above divine. From a different point of view, and as he himself would argue later in his texts, outward appearances did not really matter as long as he kept inward constancy.

The next year (1575) Lipsius published his edition of Tacitus, on which he must have been working since his visit to Italy. His interest in Tacitus, furthermore, returned him to the study of Law; he acquired, accordingly, the degree of Doctor of Law from the University of Louvain in 1576. The next year, in the contemporary trend, he brought out a collection of letters to various scholars and friends, the *Epistolicae Quaestiones* (Antwerp 1577).

The political situation at the time, nevertheless, was becoming increasingly tense with the appearance and the victories of Don Juan of Austria (1547-78) in Gembloux (1578). In the face of the coming threat, Lipsius fled again, this time to Antwerp, where he stayed with the printer Christopher Plantin (c. 1520-89) for a while. His association with Plantin has also given rise to speculation about Lipsius's involvement in the 'Family of Love', as the printer was one of the key members of the 'Family'. The 'House of Love' was a mystical sect that put strong emphasis on virtue; it further advocated public conformity to the customs of the communities in which the members of the 'House' lived, alongside private practice of Familism. The elite character of the cult would have appealed to an intellectual like Lipsius. Its Stoic principles,

---

19 Saunders, *Justus Lipsius*, p. 16.
20 See Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, pp. 186-190.
21 Lipsius's involvement in the sect was first suggested by the Netherland theologian Adriaan Saravia (Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics*, p. 131). Plantin was close friend of Hendrik Niclaes, the founder of the sect. For the 'Family of Love' more especially see Alistair Hamilton, *The Family of Love*. (Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 1981). The suggestion for Lipsius's involvement has been primarily based on the letter Saravia sent to Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury in 1608, where among other things he described a visit of Barrefelt (patriarch of the Family of Love after Niclaes) to Lipsius's house. The letter went on to describe some of the Familist doctrines and establish their attempt to adapt Christian doctrines to Stoicism! (*Family of Love*, p. 98).
moreover, that promoted a morality without belief - or ‘Christian doctrines without Christ’, as one commentator has put it - would have made it even more attractive to an individual tormented by the crises of religious strife. Despite these, however, we are lacking concrete evidence that would confirm his involvement in the ‘House of Love’.22

Lipsius’s flight from Louvain was just in time; for the second time during the wars, his property was assaulted. The soldiers sacked his house and took his manuscripts and books. Lipsius was only able to recover them through the intervention of his Jesuit friend Martin Delrio (1551-1608).23 The next turn in Lipsius’s life came with the offer by the United Provinces of a chair as Professor of History at the newly-founded University of Leiden (South Holland).24 This time Lipsius found himself in a situation where to be able to hold his position he would have to convert again, and confess allegiance to Calvinism. The easiness with which Lipsius did this, is instructive for a period of intense confessionalisation. His professed temporary acceptance proved to be one of thirteen years.25 There is some indication that he might have felt like an exile during his stay and been tormented by it, as throughout his time in Leiden he maintained contact with friends living in Catholic countries.26 It has also been suggested that perhaps these feelings of nostalgia made him immerse himself in

23 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 18 n. 2; and Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 93.
24 See Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 145.
25 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 18. In his autobiographical letter, he says, notably that he looked upon it as no more than a temporary exile from his home and excuses his long stay by the turmoil in the Spanish Netherlands (Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 99).
26 In one of his letters he descried how his conscience told him one thing, his interest another and that he felt that he was living among strangers like a Ulysses (Ep. Misc. ii. 9); cited in Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 20.
work: *De Constantia*, the only text that he did not compose for fame, came out in 1584.\textsuperscript{27} The *Constantia*, according to his writings, were one of the two works closest to his heart.\textsuperscript{28} During the same period – as early as 1583 - he had started working on his *Politica*, the other one of the two.\textsuperscript{29}

Lipsius eventually left Leiden in 1591; various reasons have been proposed as grounds for this departure. A contemporary report suggests two main factors: the political insecurity of the North and Lipsius’s controversy with Coornhert.\textsuperscript{30} Morford espouses the first view, asserting that the assassination of William of Orange in July 1584 weakened Lipsius’s sense of security.\textsuperscript{31} The arrival of the Earl of Leicester (Robert Dudley, First Earl of Leicester, 1532-88) the next year, sent to the Low Countries by Elizabeth I of England with forces to aid the Dutch, and his ultimate recall in 1587, after the emergence of opposition towards him, did not really bring the longed-for political stability in the area.\textsuperscript{32} Yet the controversy with Coornhert, the second alleged reason, is likely to have had a more influential effect on Lipsius’s decision.\textsuperscript{33} Coornhert’s criticisms against the *Politica*\textsuperscript{34} were focused on the crucial issue of toleration, one that was debated intensely in the new Dutch republic.\textsuperscript{35} What made Lipsius’s position more vulnerable were Coornhert’s challenges to his religious affiliations and the

\textsuperscript{27} *Opera Omnia* IV, 371.
\textsuperscript{28} *Ep. misc.* iv. 84 (3 November 1603, to Woverius); cf. also *Vita, Opera Omnia*, I, lxiii.
\textsuperscript{29} ‘I am preparing a work on Politics, something a little more grandiose than I have done up to now’ (*Ep. Misc.*, I. 91); cited in Saunders, *Justus Lipsius*, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{31} Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 106-7. See also Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, p. 207.
\textsuperscript{32} For the agreement between Elizabeth and the States-General and the arrival of Leicester see Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, pp. 261-21.
\textsuperscript{34} *Vita, Opera Omnia*, I, liv-lv. See also Morford, 106, 111, and 117 and his return to the South due to the pressure from the Catholic intellectuals, most notably Torrentius and Delrio; Martin Van Gelderen, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590* (Cambridge: CUP, 1992).
\textsuperscript{35} See Van Gelderen, *Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt*, esp. ch. 6.
insinuations that he was, in fact, supporting the Spanish side with his writings. That after he had made his decision to leave he sent different letters to his Protestant and Catholic friends respectively, explaining his reasoning on different grounds, however, is indicative of the insecurity of his personality and his instinct for self-fashioning.\footnote{Morford, \textit{Stoics and Neostoics}, p. 107; Saunders, \textit{Justus Lipsius}, p. 29.}

In 1591, having managed to be granted six months' leave of absence, Lipsius left Leiden for Germany (without his wife, so he would not arouse suspicions), never to return. At Mainz, and on his way to the Spanish Netherlands, he made peace with the Jesuits.\footnote{Saunders, \textit{Justus Lipsius}, pp. 34-5.} The difficult tasks facing Lipsius now, were to renounce his stay in the land of the 'heretics', convince everyone that he had been 'compelled to stay there' and that he had remained a true Catholic throughout his years in the North.\footnote{Cf. the letter that he sent from Mainz in 1591 to his close friend, the Jesuit Delrio, as cited in Saunders, \textit{Justus Lipsius}, p. 36.} The extent of Lipsius's disloyalty becomes evident when one takes into account the fact that professors at Leiden took an oath that they would obey the Curators and Burgomasters. This can also explain the surprise of the Leiden authorities once they realised his decisions were final: even close friends wrote to him reproaching him for his actions.\footnote{Morford, \textit{Stoics and Neostoics}, p. 117; Saunders, \textit{Justus Lipsius}, p. 38.}

Lipsius succeeded in obtaining a first pardon from Alessandro Farnese, Duke of Parma and governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands (1545-92), and then from Philip II (r. 1556-98) himself.

Lipsius's fame made several Catholic princes claim his services after his return to the Catholic world.\footnote{Letters apparently arrived from Duke William of Bavaria, his brother Ernest, the Prince-Bishop of Cologne, the Bishops of Salzburg, Würzburg and Breslau, Pope Clement VIII, the Cardinal Ascanio Colonna, Gabriele Paleotti, Federico Borromeo, Francesco Sforza, Henry IV of France, the cities of Padua and Bologna, Duke Ferdinand I (de'Medici) of Tuscany, and others. \textit{Vita, Opera Omnia} I, Iv-Ivi; Kluyskens, 'Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 250.} He refused on the grounds of ill health, yet it is
more plausible that his refusal had more to do with his desire to maintain some form of independence. In 1592 returned to Louvain, where he accepted the chair of History and Latin Literature at the University. His appointment may be linked to the poor state of the university after the devastation of war: in view of that, Laevinus Torrentius (Lieven Van der Beke, 1525-95, Bishop of Antwerp) and the Catholic authorities were instrumental in ensuring him a chair because they recognised that he would be influential in restoring it to its former glory.41

Within the next few years Lipsius’s career was both challenged and gratified. First, he was disillusioned to be informed that the *Politica* would be placed on the Index of prohibited books, as the Curia found the chapters on tolerating private dissent in the state offensive - the same chapters, ironically, that Coornhert had criticised.42 In order to avoid this, Lipsius, like Charron, would have to make modifications to his book. As we saw, however, the French author - perhaps overall more audacious - had also added a long preface to his own work, responding to the criticisms raised against him. This incident is very interesting, as it illustrates the difficulties thinkers were faced with in finding a middle way between extreme positions; Lipsius’s case is informative, as he was a figure in a sense caught between two worlds. The whole incident lasted three years and caused him aversion together with great fear about being silenced or punished by the Catholic Church.43

Conversely, in 1594 he acquired his greatest recognition by receiving the rank of *Historiographicus Regius* by Philip II. The position, although only titular, brought a great honour to the Flemish scholar and also provided him with some extra resources; it also, however, effectively made Lipsius subservient to the

41 Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics*, pp. 122-4. Torrentius was rather influential in Lipsius’s decision to leave Leiden for the South and sustained his candidacy for a chair. See also Kluyskens, ‘Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits’, p. 251.
Yet Lipsius must have felt to some extent confined in his new life and home; his various attempts to go to Italy were brought to a halt by circumstances, varying from the authorities' control, to his ill health. Lipsius's loss of (intellectual) independence is also evident in his literary production. Among other works that he composed during his years in Louvain, were a number of Christian apologetics of no considerable quality, which Lipsius composed in an attempt to prove the sincerity of his faith; their poor quality was greeted with scorn and criticism from Catholics as well as Protestants. Perhaps the second greatest honour was made to Lipsius by the Archduke Albert and his wife Infanta Isabella, daughter of Philip II, who attended one of the famous humanist's lectures in November 1599. This has been read as a gesture that confirmed his status as the 'leading scholarly light of the University of Louvain and strengthened the bonds tying him to the Spanish interests of the Netherlands'.

In the next years Lipsius undertook the last projects of his life on classical philosophy, the great edition of Seneca's works (1604) and two volumes on Stoic philosophy: the *Manductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam* and the *Philosophia Stoicorum* (both published in 1604). The former was an introduction to Stoic ethics, while the latter dealt with Stoic physics. Both works showed a more mature approach to Stoicism than the earlier text of *Constantia*; the philosophy of Stoicism, Lipsius

---


45 *De Cruce Libri Tres* (1593) was an examination into the historical origins of the Cross as a Christian symbol. Another work, commemorating reported miracles that had occurred in the shrines of the Virgin Mary at Hall and Montaigu was criticised from both sides of the religious spectrum; Saunders, *Justus Lipsius*, pp. 44, 51-2. Cf. Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics*: 'Dousa was right to mourn the loss of his intellectual independence...'; pp. 118-9.

was convinced, was reconcilable to the Christian faith.47 Lipsius finally died in March 1606 after a sudden deterioration in his health.48

As evident, one of the dominant features of the Flemish scholar’s life were his frequent movements from one place to another, away from the religious troubles of the time and the changes of religious allegiance associated with these movements. These flights and the associated confessional alignments attracted strong criticism from various sides; the same reaction was caused by his works, which he had to amend in order to conform to accepted principles. These elements, while helped to form Lipsius’s ambiguous legacy, are clearly reflected in his two major works, the Constantia and the Politica.

II.
De Constantia and Politica49

Knowledge of Lipsius’s life is essential in understanding his two works that concern us, the Constantia and the Politica.50 The basic premise of this analysis is that these two treatises advocating the subject’s conduct in his private but also in his public life, represent the separation of public from private morality. Associated with this principle, is the issue of differentiating between a person’s outward actions and inner beliefs. Accordingly, as the state of affairs of the public domain affects the whole of the population, and as this is furthermore often subject to conflict, Lipsius was plainly pronouncing that whilst the virtue

---

47 Lipsius dedicated the edition of Seneca to Pope Paul V. He received a note of thanks which included the advice from Rome to devote his pen to the glory and propagation of the faith; Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 56.
48 There is a famous incident related to Lipsius’s death; while lying in his deathbed, as he was encouraged to remember the consolations of Stoicism, the humanist replied that ‘those things were vain’ and pointed to the crucifix saying that ‘this was true Constancy’ [...illa sunt vana ... haec est vera patientia]; cited by Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 132-3; cf. Vita, Opera Omnia I, lx.
49 For an outline of the subject matter of the two works, see Appendix III.
50 Cf. Oestreich, Neostoicism and the early modern state, p. 17.
according to which we should lead our life in private matters (at troubled times or not) is constancy, the virtue required in public life is prudence.

This treatment of the two works will begin with an outline of their substance. The main part of the examination will consider the two treatises simultaneously, as it is generally accepted that they complement each other.51 Some reference will be made to Lipsius’s concern with the current of Stoic ideas in view of the duality of the public-private domain and in conjunction with inward-outward morality. The discussion examines the manner in which the two sets of arguments feed into one another, and whether this dual concept is derived from this set of philosophical ideas. Last but not least, this chapter will focus on the question of religion. It will explore: Lipsius’s views on the role of religion in private life and within the state; the existence of any possible relation between his adoption of Neo-Stoic views and his position on religion; the significance of his experience of the religious strife in shaping his stance on the matter; and finally, the extent to which his personal conduct in religious matters can be used as a context in understanding his views. This discussion of religious issues will also touch upon the controversy he was involved in because of the Politica, shedding some further light on Lipsius’s position and placing him in the intellectual milieu of his time.

(i.) ‘Constantia’ – ‘Prudentia’ 52 (or Ethics and Politics)

51 Cf. for instance Günter Abel, Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit, zur Entstehungsgeschichte Modernen Denkens im Felde von Ethik und Politik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 1978), p. 78; Gündner, Toleranz-Problem, pp. 92-3 and others. Cf. also McCrea, Constant minds (p. 3), where she describes the Politica as ‘companion volume’ to the Constantia.

52 That the two virtues were the ‘pillars’ of Lipsius’s thought is illustrated by the design of Lipsius’s Opera Omnia title-page by Rubens (although the engraving was by Cornelis Galle), where the two allegorical figures of virtue and prudence appear as the fundamental elements of his political and philosophical work, the Constantia and the Politica; they correspond, moreover, to two figures on the top of the picture, the personifications of Philosophy and Politics. See Morford’s analysis of the frontispiece in Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 139-43 and plate 17.
The disparity and complementarity, at the same time, of Lipsius’s two works, is primarily evident from an overview of their substance. The first of the two, the Constantia, is written in the form of a dialogue between the person of Lipsius and Langius (Charles de Langhe, c. 1521-73). The dialogue is set in 1571-72, during Lipsius’s journey to Vienna, after which he did not return to Louvain, but instead ended up in Lutheran Jena. The Flemish scholar had in this trip visited Langius, in his home in Liège, where the latter was a Canon at the Cathedral. Written with strong Stoic resonances and drawing mainly from the writings of Seneca, the text is concerned primarily with the utility of the doctrines of that ancient trend as a way of strengthening the mind in the face of internal and external troubles. The discussion revolves around the miseries of the civil conflict that plagued the Low Countries, from which, Lipsius admits to Langius, he was running away. Langius soberly observes that flight is not the solution, since there was no part of Europe at that time free of turmoil. In fact, as the older man explains, misery comes from inward opinions about outward events. The young Lipsius of the book is therefore exhorted to constancy, the virtue that will enable him to survive and endure the public calamities.

The Politica, conversely, is composed as a treatise in the fashion of ‘mirror for princes’ literature. Most extraordinarily, it consists of a compilation of quotations of ancient texts, a ‘learned and laborious tissue’ (docte et laborieux tissue), as Montaigne described it. The Politica draws a great deal from the Roman historian Tacitus, whose works Lipsius had recently edited. The work is composed with the hindsight he acquired from studying the Roman historian,

---

53 Constantia, p. 71.
55 Constantia, pp. 71-2.
56 Constantia, p. 72.
making the lessons from him available to the Princes of his age, to whom the work is dedicated. Tacitus was acknowledged as a perceptive author who recorded all the ghastly details of political life. Moreover, his use in writing about politics, as has been suggested, also denoted a special emphasis on the depravity of politics and the prominence of reality and experience over theory and ideal.58 The work, therefore, dealt in realistic terms with the 'mysteries of state', or arcana imperii; it explicated the main principles of public life, the organisation of the state and gave advice on how princes ought to conduct themselves in political affairs. In this manner, whereas the Constantia was intended for subjects, the planned audience of the Politica, as set out in the Epistle to the reader, was the Emperor, Kings and Princes.59

An examination of the two key notions of constancy and prudence from the two works will demonstrate Lipsius's sense of distinction between the two, while it will also elucidate some aspects of their association. In this respect, the fact that in the same fashion that Charron composed one work on divine wisdom (and morality) and another on human wisdom, Lipsius produced a book on one's conduct in his inner being (Constantia) and a second one concentrating on one's conduct in civil/public life (Politica) is significant. This disjunction is further emphasised by the fact that he assigns two separate guides to the two different domains: the inner existence ought to be directed

58 This is the central thesis of Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State.
59 Epistle to the Reader ('Imperator, Reges, Principes'); Opera Omnia, IV, 5-7. I have primarily used the English translation of 1594, but cross-referenced it with the edition of the Opera Omnia (1637) and the French of 1590. Significantly, the English translation is based on the original – as the French is – while the one reprinted in Opera Omnia is the revised edition of 1586. Unless otherwise stated, all my references are to Sixe Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jones (London: Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonby, 1594); reprinted by Da Capo Press, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam and New York, 1970), henceforth referred to as Politica.
by constancy, whilst our social activities are to be administered by prudence.60

The significance of this disjunction will become more apparent when we consider the implications that this has on perceptions of the role of religion in people’s lives in general, and more in particular in the state.

Lipsius defines constancy as

a right and immovable strength of the minde, neither lifted up, nor pressed downe with externall or casuall accidentes. By STRENGTH, I vnderstande a steadfastnesse not from opinion, but from judgement and sound reason.61

Steadfastness, reason (as opposed to opinion), and finally external accidents, are therefore the fundamental components of constancy. Significantly, the above extract establishes the close connection between constancy and wisdom or reason; the latter two, although not at any point equated, are sometimes used in alternation in the Constantia.62 The two are coupled as virtues essential to an individual in his struggle against the ‘diseases of the mind’.63 Constancy, moreover, appears in the text as ‘regulated by the rule of right reason’. In the general discussion of reason, the paired concepts of reason-constancy are contrasted with opinion which constitutes the opposite of logic and a malice that leads to inconstancy.64

The strength of mind indicated in the definition is confirmed by the allocation of patience as the mother of constancy.65 This internal strength that works against external evils is magnificently described in what is one of the

---

61 Constantia (I, 4), p. 79. Cf. Montaigne’s definition: The role played by constancy consists chiefly in patiently bearing misfortunes for which there is no remedy; also ‘The state of the Stoic sage is fully and elegantly seen in the following: Mens immota manet, lachrimae volvuntur manes [His mind remains unmoved: empty tears do flow]; Montaigne, *Essays* (I, 12) ‘On Constancy’; in Screech, *The Essays of Michel de Montaigne*, pp. 47 and 49.
62 The notion of reason will be discussed in more detail below, pp. 39-41.
63 Constantia (I, 3), p. 76: (title) ‘That it is the mind which is sickle in vs, which must seek remedy from Wisedome and Constantia’.
64 Constantia (I, 4), pp. 79-80.
65 Constantia (I, 4), p. 79.
most lyrical passages of the whole work. Lipsius is setting down a ‘praise and earnest exhortation’ to constancy:

...Thou shalt be a king indeed free indeed, only subject vnto God, enfranchized from the seruile yoke of Fortune and affections. As some riuers are said to runne through the sea and yet keepe their streame fresh: So shalt thou passe through the confused tumults of this world, and not be infected with any brinish saltness of this Sea of sorrowes. Are thou like to bee cast downe? CONSTANCY will lift thee vp. Doest thou stagger in doubtfulnessse? She holdeth thee fast. Art thou in daunger of fire or water? She will comfort thee, and bring thee backe from the pits brinke: onely take vnto thee a good courage, steere thy ship into this porte, where is securitie and quietnesse, a refuge and sanctuarie against all turmoyles and troubles: where if thou hast once more thy ship, let thy country not onely be troubled, but euen shaken at the foundation, thou shalt remaine vnmoveed: let showres, thunders, lighteninges, and tempeasts fall round about thee, thou shalt crie boldlie with a loude voyce, I lie at rest amid the waues.  

Constancy, accordingly, represents liberation from internal and external evils; it is the medicine for sorrows and steadfastness to outer turmoil. False goods and false evils ‘disturb’ constancy. While Lipsius includes ‘riches, honour, authority, health’ and ‘long life’, affairs that give rise to the passions of desire and joy in the former, it is the latter that he wants to concentrate our attention. False evils involve ‘poverty, sickness, infamy’ and ‘death’ and cause fear and sorrow to men. What we have here then, is the standard theory of passions as used in general terms by late sixteenth-century moralists, to which Charron devoted his Third Book of the Sagesse. The role of reason, however, is in this case taken up by constancy which is juxtaposed with the bodily and intellectual afflictions.

---

67 Constantia (l, 7), p. 85.
68 Cf. Montaigne, Essays (l, 12) ‘On Constancy’: ‘Not even the Stoics claim that their sage can resist visual stimuli or ideas when they first come upon him; ... So too for all other emotions, provided that his thoughts remain sound and secure, that the seat of his reason suffer no impediment or change of any sort, and that he in no wise give his assent to his fright or pain. ... For in his case the impress of the emotions does not remain on the surface but penetrates through to the seat of his reason, infecting and corrupting it: he judges by his emotions and acts in conformity with them. The state of the Stoic sage is fully and elegantly seen in the following: Mens in moto manet, lachrimae volvantur inanes [His mind remains unmoved: empty tears do flow]. The Aristotelian sage is not exempt from the emotions: he moderates them’; Screech, The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, p. 49.
The third constituent element of the definition of constancy (external accidents) refers to Lipsius’ distinction between the interior being and the outer compartment, which is of paramount importance in his ‘private-public’ scheme. This distinction takes different forms in the Constantia; in one instance it is emphasised on Langius’s reproach of the young Lipsius of the book – and potentially any readers with similar feelings - for his alleged suffering by witnessing the calamities plaguing his country. As the old sage demonstrates, the mourning and the distress of the people are not for their country; they are caused, rather, by the threat this situation poses to themselves.69 Everything is a stage-play, dissimulation: Langius criticises, thus, in the face of young Lipsius all the people who mourn over their private misfortunes under the pretence of grief for the common adversities, when they are in reality lamenting over their private misfortunes.70 Put differently, the mishaps are only affecting one insofar as one is involved. The remedy, thus, is to disengage oneself from the disorder of the outside world and remain peaceful in one’s inner stability.

The inner-outer distinction appears strikingly in the contrast at the opening scene of Book Two of the Constantia, with the serene atmosphere of Langius’ garden. The image of internal and private tranquillity of the surroundings offers Langius’ interlocutor (together with the readers) a place of peace and calmness - both literally as well as metaphorically - away from the tragedy of war and the outer turmoil.

... Beholde (Lipsius) the true end and vse of gardens to wit, quietnes, with drawing from the world, meditation, reading, writing ...here I lay vp some wholesome lessons in my minde, as it were weapons in my armorie, which are always ready with me at hand against the force and mutability of Fortune. So soone as I put my foote within that place, I bid all vile and seruile cares abandon me, and lifting vp my head as vpright as I may, I condemne the delights of the prophane people, & the great vanitie of humane affaires...

Doest thou thinke when I am there that I take any care what the Frenchmen or Spaniards

69 Constantia (I, 8), pp. 88-9.
are in practising? who possesse the scepter of Belgica, or who be depriued of it? ... No; none of all these things trouble my braine. I am guarded and fenced against all externall things, and settled within my selfe, carelesse of all cares saue one.71

Nothing better illustrates the disjunction between the inner peace and stability and the outer disorder than the above extract. It is essential for an individual in order to preserve this private harmony and steadfastness to detach himself from the outer expressions of motion and tension.

It becomes evident then, how the essential elements of constancy come together; immovable strength, mind, reason and wisdom are all marshalled in opposition to external affairs. Constancy is the virtue that ought to preside over the individual’s private life and provide him with the strength to endure any misfortunes as well as the disorder caused by the passions.

Lipsius’s second favourite virtue, on the other hand, prudence, is quite a different quality, with disparate characteristics. Its definition in the Politica is that of

\[\text{an understanding and discretion of those things which we ought either to desire or to refuse, in publike and in privat.} \] \[72\]

It is the ‘art of living well’ and it disposes, further, ‘of things present, foresee things to come, and calls to memorie things past’.73 The author names as the parents of prudence ‘use’ (experience) and ‘memory’ (experience and knowledge either read in books and histories or heard by others). Yet, despite that, Lipsius includes private affairs in his definition of prudence, he declares at another point that the use of prudence is necessary above all in government.74 He further repudiates his claim about the utility of prudence in private matters elsewhere, by prescribing prudence as a guide in the actions

---

71 Constantia (II, 3), pp. 136-7; (my italics).
72 Politica (I, 7), p. 11.
73 Politica (I, 7), p. 12.
74 ‘The use of Prudence is necessarie in all worldly affaires, but especially in gouernment’; Politica (III, 1), p. 41.
of a Prince, and virtue as a guide in his life. Prudence as a quality particularly linked to the affairs of government, as treated in the *Politica*, is compared by Lipsius to the use of a compass in the navigation of a ship. Lipsius accounts for prudence's allocation by pointing out the unruly nature of men, much like Charron did in his work: humans are stubborn creatures who need to be handled with great skill.

Understanding, judgement and coming to the right decision are the three elements that comprise prudence; these are informed by experience of the past that furnishes the individual with foresight. Still, Lipsius further distinguishes between the general, universal prudence and the extraordinary and far more formidable prudence of the Prince (*prudentia propria*). The whole of Book Four of the *Politica* is dedicated to the analysis of this 'proper' prudence, which, as the author asserts, 'can hardly be tied to precepts': 'it extendeth very farre', and 'no certaine rules can be giuen therof'.

...that which doth peculiarly belong to a Prince, which is indeed a spacious field, for who can find out any certaine way or limits thereof? It [proper prudence] is a verie diffused thing, confused, and obscure. First it is diffused, for what is there that stretcheth further then the affaires of the world? unto which generally Prudence belongeth, yea to euery particular action. ...but particulars are infinite, which is the cause why we cannot comprehend them within the compasse of Art ... For Precepts ought to be limited and certaine. And if rules cannot be determined by art, they are without the reach of wisdome. Next it is a confused thing, because all that we call Prudence, is indeed, unstable and wavering. For what other thing is Prudence, then the election of those things, which neuer remaine after one and the same manner? ... it [prudence] is not only tied to the things themselues, but to their dependents ... and for their least change, she changeth her selfe, which is the reason why she is not in all places alike, no nor the same in one and the selfe same thing.

---

76 *Politica* (III, 1), pp. 41-2. His exceptionally critical attitude towards common people is expounded in Book Four (IV, 5), where he describes them as unstable and inconstant, subject to passions, void of reason, and prone to judge many things by opinion (p. 68); all of which, incidentally, are the exact opposites of his account of a person with wisdom and constancy. Cf. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, XVII.
77 *Politica* (IV, 1), p. 59.
78 *Politica* (IV, 1), pp. 59-60.
To the stability of constancy, hence, Lipsius juxtaposes the instability of prudence: 'Imprint CONSTANCIE in thy mind amid this casuall and inconstant variablenesse of all things'. The disjunction between the two virtues can evidently be explained by the fact that they apply to different fields with very different conditions; prudence as a flexible virtue can be more attuned to the unstable outside world and the challenges of public life. And although constancy has to face the instability of the outside world as well, it does not need to adjust - man can escape the insecurity caused by wavering by remaining firm and steadfast.

The adaptability of prudence is particularly explicated in the chapters dealing with what Lipsius calls 'mixed prudence' (prudentia mixta). The views of the Flemish scholar on this matter have gained him the reputation of a 'Machiavellian' and the label of a 'reason of state' writer, a shrewd pragmatist who would sacrifice (Christian) morality for the sake of politics, advocate of the theory that the end justifies the means. The question of 'mixed prudence' as

79 Constantia (I, 17), p. 111. Cf. the account the Venetian doge Leonardo Donà gave for his decision to allow for some room for compromise with the Roman Curia during the Interdict crisis (winter of 1606-7): 'Let us not deem it the duty of a prudent man always to have the same opinion, but that which the accidents and rather variable conjunctures of human affairs counsel. And certainly, since the principles and accidents of things vary, it is essential for the deliberations based on them also to vary. Thus he who otherwise might pretend to the title of consistency and constancy in his opinions should rather deserve a reputation for imprudent pertinacity and unconsidered obstinacy, since everyone, even of superficial intelligence in things of state, knows that civil matters are variable and subject like the sea to the diversity of the winds, to the violence and diversity of accidents. For this reason man should regulate his opinions exactly as on a sea voyage, according to the quality of the winds. Nor is he obliged always to have the same opinion, but rather the same end: the good and safety of the Republic'; cited by William J. Bouwsma in his Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty. Renaissance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation. (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), pp. 410-11.

80 With the exception of Robert Bireley in his The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), who characterises him as an 'anti-Machiavellian' (ch. 4), this is the manner in which Lipsius is generally portrayed in the literature of political theory of the late-sixteenth-early seventeenth-centuries. For the association of 'mixed prudence' and 'reason of state' theories see for example, Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, pp. 48-9.
Lipsius formulates it in his own words is whether ‘it be lawful ... to mingle [prudence] lightly, and ioyne with it some dregs of deceit? I judge it may ...’. It is necessary in this context to examine Lipsius’s view of the realm of politics; for him, as for Sarpi, as we shall see, politics was a sphere with extraordinary rules, where, when the benefit of the people or state was at stake, princes had a greater allowance in the conduct of the affairs. This is particularly the case, as the other princes they have to treat with are ‘malicious persons’, who seem to be made of ‘fraud, deceit and lying’:

These Princes, with whome we are to treate, are for the most part of this number: and although they shewe themselves to be like Lyons, yet are they in their corrupt hearts, dissembling Foxes. Let some man now come and tell me, that we must doe nothing treacherous, that we must not use dissimulation, nor doe any thing deceitfulis. O pure men, nay rather, pure children. The Philosopher doth note, that kingdoms are subuered by subtilitie, and guile. Doest thou say it is not lawfull to conserue them by the same meanes? and that the Prince may not sometimes having to deale with a foxe, play the foxe, especially if the good and publike profit, which are always conioyned to the benefit, and profit of the Prince doe require it? Surely thou art deceived: the forsaking of the common profit is not onely against reason, but likewise against nature. ... we desire, that the Prince be of a notable and excellent wit, and yet that he be able to intermingle that which is profitable, with that which is honest. 

The author allows thus the intermingling of honesty with deceit, as he does not regard the integrity of prudence damaged by this combination - so long as honesty is still a part of the mixture. He explains this position by using a remarkable simile:

Wine, though it be somewhat tempered with water, continueth to be wine: so doth prudence not change her name, albeit a few drops of deceit bee mingled therewith ...

Lipsius goes on to give details about how far deceits are to be accepted; he famously distinguishes three degrees of deceit, according to their distance from virtue: light, middle and great deceit. The first kind, to which distrust and

---

81 Politica (IV, 13), p. 112.
dissimulation belong, is recommended to princes by the author. Lipsius attributes deceit and the purchase of favour to the second kind, which he tolerates, but he categorically condemns the third degree, to which 'treachery' and injustice belong.\textsuperscript{84}

The abstracts above, as well as the whole exposition in general, especially with the use of the lion and the fox metaphor, echo quite obviously Machiavelli's text, who in the \textit{Politica} is referred to as the author 'who poore soule is layde at of all hands'.\textsuperscript{85} This open defence of the Florentine writer was an unusual phenomenon for the late sixteenth century, despite his unspoken popularity: any relation of a text to his writings was denied by contemporary authors themselves, even at the time when the unprecedented conditions of the second half of the sixteenth century called for 'extraordinary' policies.\textsuperscript{86} The fact that political theorists did, in fact, gradually accept some stretching of conventional moral principles could be necessary in political life notwithstanding, Machiavelli's perceived amoralism was considered

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Politica} (IV, 14), p. 115. The detailed discussion of mixed prudence and the degrees of deceit, together with the extent to which they are accepted or not, is on pp. 115-123.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Politica} (IV, 13), pp. 114-23, esp. pp. 114-5. Cf. also the epistle 'De consilio et Forma nostri operis' that he added to later editions of the \textit{Politica}: 'Nisi quod unius tamen Machiavelli ignium non contemno, acre, subtile, ignem: et qui utinam Principem suum recta duxisset ad templum illud Virtutis et Honoris! sed nimis saepe deflexit, & dum commodi illas sentiae intente sequitur, aberravit a regu lac via...'; (\textit{Opera Omnia}, IV, 9-10). Bireley in his valuable study of early modern political theorists on the issue of reaction to Machiavelli's views on the dichotomy between Christian ethics and politics, classifies Lipsius as an 'anti-Machiavellian'; \textit{The Counter-Reformation Prince}, ch. 4. This position runs contrary to the widely-held view that Lipsius adhered to the Florentine's standpoint. Although it would be difficult to argue for an identity in their views, especially since Machiavelli was a writer who had not experienced the religious wars, even engaging in a dialogue with the (in) famous Italian (i.e. accepting the basic premises of his arguments) would be enough to make an author accept at least some of his views, as I believe Lipsius does in Book Four. Cf. also the discussion of Bireley's position by Christopher Brooke in 'Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in European Philosophy and Political Thought, 1640-1795', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Harvard University, 2003), pp. 42-5.

incompatible with any politics within a religious moral framework.\(^{87}\) What distinguished, however, the authors writing half a century after the Florentine from their predecessor, was their conscious attempts – whether successful or not - to shape political theory within the religious milieu.\(^{88}\)

What becomes evident in this sense is the effect experience had in the manner in which politics were theorised. The grave effects the intermingling of political and religious interests had in the conflicts of the second half of the sixteenth century forced people to think hard about the relationship between religion and politics. Furthermore, the transformation of the language of politics into one that was more realistic and pragmatic had the parallel effect of its 'purification': the more depraved people believed that politics was, the more they felt the need to purify it by instilling theological values into it. Lastly, the popularisation of treatises of political nature that referred to antiquity as an example made the distinction between Christian and pagan politics more apparent. In this respect, the attempt to reconcile politics with Christian ethics suggests a number of things, some of which are astounding. First, Christian ethics and politics were not regarded as necessarily compatible. Second, and related to the first assertion, is the fact that in the challenge to this reconciliation, it was the Christian-divine ethics that would ultimately lose. By adulterating the 'absolute', 'revealed' ethics with human ethics, theorists were essentially undermining the Christian principles.\(^{89}\) A third point relates to the discussion of

\(^{87}\) For discussions on the relation of Machiavelli and what are conventionally called 'reason of state writers' see for instance P.S. Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State*. (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), pp. 112-3; Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, pp. xii-xiv and others.


\(^{89}\) Cf. Emile Durkheim’s contention, that the realms of the sacred and the profane are by definition absolutely and fundamentally different that it is impossible for the two to 'approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time'; *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. by Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1964), p. 40.
the two languages available to thinkers of the period to discuss politics. In their efforts to place politics within a Christian framework, theorists were effectively working towards an amalgamation of the two languages. Lipsius does this to some extent, so too do Sarpi and James VI and I, to a greater degree, who will be the subject of the following chapters.

As indicated earlier, the principle behind the above consideration of the notions of constancy and prudence as they appear in the Constantia and the Politica respectively, is to demonstrate the disparity between them. As two separate virtues, diverging to a fair extent in their characteristics and prescriptions, were intended to guide an individual in the two areas of his life, the public and the private, then we have to infer that the two domains are distinct. We also have to infer from Lipsius’s treatment, that he understood the two domains as governed by disparate sets of rules, namely, that two distinct moralities were in place. This becomes clearer upon a review of their relation to virtue and deceit.

It is evident throughout the texts of the Constantia and the Politica that Lipsius’s interpretation of prudence allows for more laxity in moral conduct than his analysis of constancy does. Particularly telling is the fact that he allows for some degree of deception in public life, but not in private. A good example in this direction is Lipsius’s treatment of dissimulation. In the Constantia the use of it is gravely reprimanded: in Book One (Ch. 8 and 9) Langius criticises severely the ‘vainglorious’ dissimulation of men who pretend to be grieving for the evils besetting their country, when they are in truth anxious for their own fortune. On the contrary, in the Politica the use of dissimulation is in fact recommended to the Prince:

Dissimulation so necessarie for a Prince, that the old Emperour sayd, that he knew not wel how to beare rule, that knew not how to dissemble. And Tiberius being of the same mind sayd, that as he thought, hee loued no other vertue so much as dissimulation. 91

The first of the two quotations in the above extract was commonly attributed to the French King Louis XI (r. 1461-83), but was widely in use in late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discussions about public affairs. 92 The second citation was taken from Tacitus and was again a favourite in political writings of the same period. 93 Despite the fact that dissimulation as a quality was not automatically regarded as compatible with moral precepts, its acceptance as an essential trait in political conduct was beginning in this period to be more widespread. 94 Hence Lipsius in the following comment attempts to retain the integrity of private life by assigning the use of dissimulation in civil life only:

This will peraduenture displease some liberall and free heart, who will say, that we must banish from all conditions and sorts of life, disguising and dissembling. I aduouch, it ought not to bee amongst priuat persons, but in a state I utterly deny it. 95

It is extremely intriguing, from this point of view, moreover, to look at Lipsius’s justifications for the use of deceit in politics, in spite of the possible challenge to God’s commands and Christian ethics. In a rather poorly argued section he explains:

But what if I consider that vpright and divine law? I do sticke very fast and sweat. It seemeth to forbid vs these things: [...] Thou which art a Politician, what repliest thou thereunto? ... Truly it is hard, eyther for you or me to find out any starting hole here, were it not that the sayd holy father sayth: that there are certaine kind of lies, in which there is no great offence, yet are they not without fault. And in this ranke we deeme that light corruption and deceit are only then, when a good and lawfull king vseth them against the wicked, for the good of the common wealth. Otherwise, it is not onely an offence, but a great sinne, howsoever these old courtiers laugh thereat ... 96

91 Politica (IV, 14) p. 117.
93 The citation is from the Annales, IV. 71: ‘Nullam aequae Tiberius, ut rebatur, ex virtutibus suis quam dissimulationem diligebat’.
94 Cf. Jesuits’ discussion of dissimulation; Höpf, Jesuit Political Thought, pp. 150-55.
95 Politica (IV, 14), p. 117.
96 Politica (IV, 14), p. 120.
Lipsius defends deceit, thus, under the preconditions of the virtue of the Prince, if directed against depraved individuals, or if its ultimate end is the public good. It becomes evident then, that he - as others of his time - perceived the realm of politics as quite distinct to the private realm and subject to separate rules, not applicable to the private domain.97

According to a commonly held view, and one that Lipsius himself promoted, the rationale for the disjunction of his two treatises (and as a consequence the two respective dominant virtues) lies in the fact that they are addressed to diverse audiences. In a manner reminiscent of Charron's sensitivity about his audience, Lipsius addressed Constantia to lawful subjects, but the Politica to princes and people generally involved in the affairs (or mysteries) of the state.98 Yet this interpretation, however true, is by no means sufficient to explain the paradox of the polarisation of the morality of the Prince and the morality of the subject (among others uttered by Aristotle in antiquity), and the consequent separation of the principles that guide the public and the private domain.

Further substantiating the assumption that, in contrast to the private sphere, the realm of politics is one where virtue has a questionable role, are the following points. 'Goodness', according to Lipsius is one of the constituents of virtue, one of the two guides to civil life. Goodness, however, as it appears from

---

97 An example in the reverse is Shakespeare's Henry IV where Hal, after his transformation into King, rejects his former friend Falstaff. This is an indication of how deeply entrenched the idea of the different morality between princes and subjects were. It serves, furthermore, as evidence of the communication of these notions to a broad audience from within the Globe.

98 See Lipsius's epistle De Consilio et Forma Nostri Operis presiding his Politica (Opera Omnia IV, 9): 'Quod nunc tibi damus POLITICA esse videas. in quibus hoc nobis consilium, vt quaedammodum in Constantia cives formamimus ad patiendum & parendum; ita hic eos, qui imperant, ad regendum'. Cf. also Vita, Opera Omnia I, liv. See also Jacqueline Lague: 'Dans le cas extrêmement fréquent d'une situation défavorable ou de malheurs publics, la vertu de l'âme prendra deux formes connexes: pour l'individu, celle de la constance, pour le Prince, celle de la prudence'; ('Juste Lipse: L'âme et la vertu', p. 103.); and Seneca Epist. 67, 10.
the text, has no place in civil life: it 'properly hath no place in this our ciuile building, but belongeth to morall worke.'99 The assertion is enforced a few paragraphs later, when Lipsius exclaims 'What would virtue be without prudence?'100 This position is manifested also in the chapter where Lipsius touches upon the Prince's ministers and counsellors. Lipsius advises ardently that the courtier be patient and circumspect in court and show, above all, constancy, as this is an environment of deceit and conspiracy. His non-involvement in the court intrigues will secure the courtier's survival from the enemies that are to be found in the princely entourage.101 Lipsius confirms in this manner the idea that politics are associated with immorality and dishonesty.

This suggestion becomes even more interesting when seen in a different light. As proposed in the Introduction, the realm of politics can be seen as corresponding to the 'human' or temporal - and consequently morally inferior - sphere. On the other hand, the private sphere can be linked to the divine and morally superior sphere- as attested to by Lipsius's contention that religious conformity on the outside is not as important so long as one is faithful/constant at heart. The moral purity of the interior being is preserved by immediate and personal connection with the Deity as well as by the detachment from the outer corrupt (human) reality. This assumption is corroborated by the difference in the nature of prudence and constancy. Constancy, as a notion associated with stability and immobility represents the inner peace and equanimity (the Stoic notion of 'ataraxia' / atapa$\acute{\text{s}}$ia) in the face of outer motion. Prudence, conversely, as we have seen already, has a more flexible character. It is subject to change, and as a result, prone to assimilate some of the elements of 'depravity' of

99 Politica (I, 6), p. 10.
100 Politica (I, 7), p. 11.
101 Politica (III, 11), pp. 56-8.
temporal affairs. Both constancy and prudence accordingly are qualities that aid the individual in order to cope with the instability of public life. Both constancy and prudence accordingly are qualities that aid the individual in order to cope with the instability of public life.102 - or, to take it a step further, and yet again invoking Machiavelli, fortune.

A sufficient number of commentators have paid attention to the role of Fate, Destiny, Providence, or Fortune in the Constantia and its relation to constancy, primarily for the reason that Lipsius himself directs the reader's attention to this important discussion. The same critics, however, with very few exceptions, have been unsuccessful in addressing the issue as it appears in the Politica, through the lens of the Constantia and examining its ensuing relation to prudence.103 Crucially, Lipsius's earlier treatise seems overwhelmingly to undermine man's control over his life in the face of the greater scheme of things - even though Lipsius does attempt to argue for compatibility between God's Providence and the Christian stress on free will, his reasoning does not work very convincingly.104 This incongruity was pointed out to Lipsius quite early on, but did not make him alter his position.105 Yet despite this evidently deterministic element in the Constantia, Lipsius, in a remarkable quotation, asserts in the Politica that 'all things yield obedience onto Prudence, even Fortune itself ...'.106 This assertion is more intelligible when considered in the light of the etymology of the word prudence; a contraction of the Latin term providentia

---

102 Cf. Waszink, 'Virtuous Deception' where he suggests, among other things that Lipsius's two treatises, the Constantia and the Politica address the question of how to deal with the reality of conflict and disruption in public life. (p. 250).

103 Cf. Bireley for example: 'Lipsius's doctrine of providence is most important if he is to be understood as an anti-Machiavellian'; The Counter-Reformation Prince, p. 77.

104 Cf. Christopher Brooke: 'the emphasis on divine providence in De Constantia points to a much stronger affinity to the Stoics' argument about the desirability of making a rational submission to the existing order of things [...], for the Stoic recommendation of cultivating apatheia is grounded in an understanding of the world as a deterministic, providentially-ordered whole: physics and ethics are inextricably linked.'; 'Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism', p. 46.

105 Both Laevinus Torrentius and Coornhert had written to him challenging his writings as 'too Stoic'.

This virtue makes man able to compete with God's Providence when it comes to human affairs. This could also explain Lipsius's equivocal claim of prudence's superiority to virtue: 'For what can vertue be without Prudence?'. To put the matter in simpler terms, the Flemish scholar's political work conveys the impression of the distancing between the temporal sphere on the one side, where man under the guidance of prudence, an entirely human virtue, is in control of his fate, and the divine sphere on the other side. Man can still be constant in his private life, however, through the special relation with God that the kinship of the human and divine reason gives him. So long as all evil and vice are expelled in the outside world, the ugly human reality of the temporal affairs, the individual can survive within a well regulated state, safe in his virtuous inner realm, and with an eye to the heavenly world that expects him after he departs this one. If this system is more of a paradox than a resolved relationship, it is a paradox inherent perhaps in the endeavour to reconcile temporal and divine, politics and morality, political participation and dispassionate non-involvement (or active and contemplative), otium and negotium, Providence and free-will, or Christianity and Stoicism. It is to the last of these pairs that we will now turn our attention.

(ii.) Lipsius and (Neo)-Stoicism (or Philosophy and Religion)

The significance of the contribution of the Flemish scholar to the revival and reformulation of Stoicism for contemporary audiences is nowadays widely acknowledged. Neo-Stoicism, as this philosophical trend is generally known, enjoyed a great popularity throughout the second half of the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth, and survived throughout the eighteenth century. Its

109 *Política* (I, 7), p. 11.
popularity in this period is witnessed by a great upsurge in editions of ancient Stoic writings, such as those of Epictetus (AD c. 55-c. 135), Seneca, Marcus Aurelius (AD 121-80), and Cicero’s works of a Stoic character, such as De Officiis, and others. However, despite the general consent on the appeal these writings had for a number of people of the early modern period, there is a recognised difficulty for the students of the resurgence of Stoic ideas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in defining ‘Neo-Stoicism’ as a single coherent body of thought. What scholars broadly accept as a defining characteristic is the attempt by early modern theorists to interpret a set of essentially pagan views within the Christian framework. This trend, as it developed, tended to combine Stoic views, particularly ethics, with Christian belief. The particular appeal of Stoicism can partly be understood by the relative ease that it gave to the thinkers of the period to discuss moral issues within the framework of the school of thought and irrespective of particular dogmas. This was only under the condition, however, that Stoic understanding of the physical world, which would contradict more strongly with Christianity, ought to be left out of these discussions.

The problems associated with definitions of ‘Neo-Stoicism’ can be accounted for by a number of reasons. First, and very importantly, one needs to point out the variety of standpoints inherited by the scholars of the sixteenth


111 Cf. Bouwsma’s comments in his important account of the two faces of Renaissance humanism: ‘It is ... hardly remarkable that Renaissance humanists were often far from clear about the precise lineaments of Stoicism, nor it is surprising that modern scholars who are not technical historians of philosophy more often refer to than try to define Stoic philosophy’; William J. Bouwsma, ‘The two Faces of Humanism - Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought’, in idem, A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 19-73; on p. 23.

and seventeenth centuries. As a school of thought that had survived for almost five centuries, Stoicism was, naturally, subject to change over this period. The central problems associated with the ancient tradition were two. The first revolved around the belief in virtue and necessity. Yet if everyday life was devoid of virtue, as it apparently was, how would one preserve one’s virtue in this immoral world? Second, and closely related, was the problem of the tension between the belief in a greater necessity but emphasis on the power of reason and will at the same time. Put differently, one’s outward subjection to fortune, was in dire contradiction to one’s proclaimed inward liberty. But this was also a matter of different emphasis, especially between earlier and later advocates of Stoic doctrines (Greek and Roman respectively). As W.B. Sharples points out, it has become ‘something of a commonplace to contrast ancient Greek intellectualism in ethics with Latin voluntarism’. At the same time, some of the core problems intrinsic in the philosophy remained unresolved by the ancient philosophers themselves, leaving an ambivalent legacy that could be interpreted in various ways, depending on the prominence the modern scholars would decide to assign on some texts rather than others.

To complicate matters even more for modern scholars, the relationship between the ancient philosophy and Christianity is a rather peculiar one. Stoicism’s stress on strict moral behaviour always gave the sense of possible compatibility with Christian religion and ethics. The congruence between the


\[114\] Cf. Reid Barbour’s comments: ‘...In other words, there is a Stoicism that emphasises will and the self; there is a Stoicism that emphasises fate and the whole; and there is a Stoicism that works to bridge the gap between the extremes [...] among the Continental Neostoics, there is Du Vair who is largely influenced by the Epictetan emphasis on the will in charge of its own destiny, but also Lipsius who devotes a chunk of his treatise on constancy to deciphering the exact relations between Stoic fate and Christian Providence’ Barbour, *English Epicureans and Stoics*, pp. 15-6.

two systems, however, can also be attributed to the fact that the early Church
fathers seem to have been to a certain extent attracted to Stoic teachings and
writings.\textsuperscript{116} Both elements would work towards an explanation for the survival
of Stoicism throughout the middle Ages and the interest of the Christian
humanists such as Erasmus and Calvin in writings that underlined the
importance of nature, reason and virtue.\textsuperscript{117} In the age of religious struggle,
nonetheless, Stoicism gained an increased importance as it could be employed
as a mode to communicate about moral behaviour and training in a disorderly
world, as well as to give consolation to the distressed inhabitants of a devastated
Europe.

The influence of the Stoic system can be discerned in many aspects of the
intellectual spectrum of the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. We
can see its traces in philosophy, politics, and religion. In terms of philosophy,
the principles of the Stoic cosmic scheme, with the role of providence, fate and
destiny gave some people the ability to endure the devastation menacing them,
while its insistence on the role of the intellect and reason gave individuals a
sense of liberty in the inner world. William Bouwsma brilliantly summed up the
Stoic inspiration with regards to existential predicaments stating that it became
a strategy by which, ‘through a combination of enlightenment and disciplined
accommodation, the individual could come to terms with the humanly
pessimistic implications of a cosmic optimism’.\textsuperscript{118} Its epistemological
implications were also appealing: in direct contrast to the challenges of
scepticism, the assumption that since man partakes in the divine reason, he has

\textsuperscript{116} Cf. Allan, \textit{Philosophy and Politics in later Stuart Scotland}, pp. 7-8. One of the most famous
elements interwoven with this idea is the suggestion of the alleged correspondence between St.
Paul and Seneca.

\textsuperscript{117} Cf. Bouwsma, ‘Two faces of Humanism’, pp. 28-31. Calvin for example had written a
commentary on Seneca: \textit{Calvin’s Commentary on Seneca’s De Clementia}, ed. F. Lewis Battles and A.

\textsuperscript{118} ‘Two Faces of Humanism’, p. 38.
the ability and the possibility of attaining some part of the truth would have
struck a chord of relief in a period when challenges to authorities religious and
secular caused great agitation. More generally in terms of religion, the
representation of God as fire and reason gave Him a more abstract form than
the more specific doctrinal attributes. Stoicism, thus, enabled more writers to
communicate their ideas about morality and virtue in a universal and
undisputed vocabulary. As a system, moreover, that advocated man’s
participation in divine reason (the instrument responsible for moral conduct for
the Stoics), it facilitated the assumption that man was able to find his own way
on earth and define his own moral codes, thus reinforcing the distance between
the divine and temporal spheres. Stoicism’s disjunction between private and
public, of the inner peace with the outer turmoil, gave further grounds to the
encouragement of distinct public and private expressions of religion and a
promotion of outward conformity while maintaining inner freedom of
conscience. Finally, so far as Stoicism’s dictates on politics are concerned, we are
again faced with one of its paradoxes. This time the contradiction entailed on
the one side the promotion of active participation, while on the other it would
imply the advice for retreat from the ‘amorality’ of public affairs, together with
the retreat from impassioned civil wars.

Lipsius’s initial attraction to Stoicism, as he tells us, was precisely this
withdrawal and the need for the Stoic comforting effect in the face of the
disruption of the civil wars. Thus, the De Constantia, his first recognisably
Stoically-inspired work, is - unsurprisingly within this context - more concerned
with the utility of the philosophical trend, rather than with any intentional

---

119 Cf. Christopher Brooke, ‘Epictetus in Early Modern Europe’, paper presented to the Roman
Stoicism Seminar, Classics Department, UC Berkeley (April 1999); available at
<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1368/research/epictetus.pdf>, pp. 2-5.
120 Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland, p. 13.
exposition of its doctrines.\footnote{Cf. Seneca, \textit{De Constantia}.} Lipsius’s engagement with Stoicism, nevertheless, continued through his work on Seneca, and the publication of the classic author’s complete works. His later Stoic works, the \textit{Manductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam} and the \textit{Philosophia Stoicorum} were both a great deal more mature and comprehensive expositions of the Stoic principles. As noted above, although scholars at the start of the seventeenth century were by and large interested almost exclusively in Stoic ethics, turning a blind eye to the physics of the school, the Flemish scholar’s distinctiveness was that he paid attention to its physics as well. This has led to some suggestions that he was attracted to Stoicism more than in a purely intellectual and moral sense. From a different perspective, it could also be argued that Lipsius’s particular version of Neo-Stoicism was typical of the eclecticism of the time and the attempt to reconcile Christianity with ancient philosophy.\footnote{Lipsius’s eclecticism is, among others, noted by Zanta, \textit{Renaissance du Stoicisme} p. 165; Rudolf Kirk, \textit{Constantia}, p. 47 and Long, ‘Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition’, pp. 379-81. More particular, as Long suggests, Lipsius did not know or did not use the evidence of Galen, Sextus Empiricus, Aristotelian commentators or Marcus Aurelius – even his citations of Cicero were few compared with what he drew from Seneca and Epictetus. Lipsius also tends to confirm or correct the sources that he cites by additional reference to Platonism and Christian writers, thus blurring or distorting the original Stoic doctrines. Furthermore, according to Long, he accepts Christianity as the criterion by which to assess the meaning and propriety of Stoicism and takes Stoic statements about human \textit{voluntas} to imply ‘free’ will, and thus to be in line with Christianity.}

Some of the intrinsic contradictions of the (early) modern variant of Stoicism that we touched upon above are evident in Lipsius’s work. His work is also typical of its inability or its unwillingness to resolve these inherent paradoxes of the Stoic teachings. Two of these are most apparent in the \textit{Constantia} and the \textit{Politica}. The first is the tension between the stress on the Stoic Destiny-Fate on one hand, and the emphasis on free will that was briefly mentioned in the previous section. The second example is more obvious from the outset: the advice to disengage from the civil life in order to maintain one’s
tranquillity in the *Constantia* (‘vita contemplativa’), is contrasted with the urge for participation in public affairs in the *Politica* (‘vita activa’).

With respect to the Stoic elements in the two works under scrutiny, the *Constantia* is the one more concerned with Stoic teaching. It will moreover be recalled that Charles de Lange was for Lipsius the ideal of the Stoic sage.\(^{123}\) It is in him, hence, that the author attributes the instructions intended for the distressed audience. Four themes inform the exposition of Stoicism in the work; reason, constancy, the metaphor of the garden as a double symbol of nature and inner peace, and last but not least, providence. To start with, reason’s elevation to a prominent position as a guide is a fundamental assumption, associated with its role in the protection of the (isolated) self from both external evils, as well as from the even more detrimental tribulations originating from within. Reason has moreover a particular importance as the link between man and God; human reason is thought to derive directly from Divine reason: the two are of the same essence. Reason is often depicted as fire or sparks and the remnants of it are to be found in man, illuminating him in his conduct of life.

Lipsius presents these fundamental ideas in an eloquent manner. The relationship between human reason and God is described by Langius: man partakes in this divine reason because some of the divine sparks are implanted in man.\(^{124}\) As a result of its kinship to God, human reason is always looking towards the divine as the flowers are continuously adjusted towards the sun:

> Reason hath her offspring from heauen, yea from God: and Seneca gaue it a singular commendation, saying, *That there was hidden in man parte of the divine spirit.* For albeit the soule be infected and a little corrupted with the filth of the bodie and contagion of the senses: yet it retaineth some reliks of his first offspring, and is not without certaine cleare sparks of that pure fiery nature from whence it proceeded ...Those little coales doe

---

\(^{123}\) See for example Lipsius’s description of him in the opening of the *Constantia*, *Constantia* (I, 1), p. 71. Cf. also Lipsius’s obituary for Langius, as cited in Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics*, p. 65.

\(^{124}\) Cf. also *Politica* (I, 5), p. 8: ‘Now conscience is a remaine, and sparkle, of right and perfect reason in man, judging and manifesting good or evil deeds’.
always shine and shew forth themselves, lightening our darknesse, purging our uncleannesse, directing our doubtfulnes, guiding vs at the last to Constancy and virtue. As the Marigold and other flowers are by nature alwayes inclined towards the sunne: so hath Reason a respect unto God, and to the fountaine from whence it sprang...  

As described above, reason is also the guide to virtue, since for the Stoics virtue is identified with wisdom/knowledge. A wise person would always do what was right and this was possible only if he only knew what was right; hence the virtuous man must be a wise man, and virtuous because he was wise. The images of sparks, coals, sun, and ultimately the struggle of light against darkness can be found throughout the Constantia. The brightness of reason is, however, set in opposition to the mist and clouds created by opinions (impressions) and the internal passions, in the same way that they are contrasted in Charron’s work. The origin of grief (in the case of the Constantia linked to the troubles afflicting the Low Countries) is, in fact, within oneself. Lipsius is, as a consequence, carrying the angst with him wherever he goes. The real remedy for the young Lipsius of Constantia is not forsaking his country, but his affections. Man is susceptible to attacks only if reason lets her ‘sceptre’ fall down:

It is the mind that is wounded, and all this external imbelicitie, dispaire & languishing, springeth from this fountaine, that the mind is thus prostrated and cast downe. The principall and soueraigne part hath let fal the Scepter, and is become so vile and abiect, that it willinglie serueth his owne servantes.

The wise man following the dictates of reason ought to adopt an attitude of ‘apatheia’ (ἀπάθεια: indifference, composure) in order to become immune to these attacks. We arrive thus at the second Stoic theme of the work, and the

---

125 Constantia (I, 5), pp. 80-1.
127 Constantia (I, 1), p. 72.
128 Constantia (I, 2), p. 75. Cf. also ibid. (I, 3), p. 77; Langius/Lipsius continues the argument stating that all other affections have an end: a lover, to enjoy his desire; an angry man, to be revenged - while sorrow does not.
principal one, the virtue of constancy.\textsuperscript{129} In order to achieve the ideal of inner peace, one has to face one's passions and be able to control them. Constancy liberates man from the 'servile yoke of Fortune and affections'\textsuperscript{130} - even if one cannot exert control on the outside world, one can still reach the desired state of freedom inside. Langius points to two things likely to attack constancy: false goods and false evils. From these two roots springs the typically Stoic set of passions against which one has to protect oneself: desire and joy, fear and sorrow.\textsuperscript{131} The false evils are again subdivided into public (war, pestilence, famine, tyranny, slaughters) and private (sorrow, poverty, infamy, death) concerns.\textsuperscript{132} Of the two, according to Lipsius, the public evils are worse; they are the source of a number of affections: dissimulation, piety, and commiseration or pity. Lipsius's more extensive treatment of the affections instead of the 'evils', is evidence for the stress he put on the passions rather than the misfortunes that cause them.\textsuperscript{133}

The third theme with Stoic connotations appears in the opening of the Second Book; the garden, as it has been suggested, works in the \textit{Constantia} on many levels. Although the garden was primarily associated with the teachings of the Epicureans, sensuality and pleasures, Lipsius, as Mark Morford has shown, in a magisterial manner reclaimed it and re-invented it within a Stoic framework.\textsuperscript{134} First of all, the symbolism of the garden alludes to the Stoic doctrine of life according to nature. Langius/Lipsius expounds wonderfully, moreover, the specific qualities of the garden; it is a place of relaxation and a place where men can withdraw from troubles and forget their sorrows. It is a

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Constantia} (I, 3), p. 78.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Constantia} (I, 6), p. 84.


\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Constantia} (I, 7), p. 86.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Constantia} (I, 9), p. 88 and (I, 9-12).

\textsuperscript{134} Morford, 'Stoic Garden'.

133
space suitable for meditations, recreation and wisdom; in fact, a great part of philosophy had originated in gardens.\textsuperscript{135} Langius outlines thus in the \textit{Constantia} the true use of gardens as the 'honest delight and recreation of the mind'; the extract is worth quoting at length, as it is of the most lyrical of the work:

For they [gardens] be ordained, not for the body, but for the mind: and to recreate it, not to besot it with idleness: only as a wholesome withdrawing place from the cares and troubles of this world. Art thou weareie of the conference of people? here thou maist be alone. Haue they worldly businesses tyred thee? here thou maist be refreshed again, where the food of quietness, and gentle blowing of the pure and whol some aire, will euen breath a new life into thee. Doest thou consider the wise men of olde time? They had their dwelling in gardens. The studious and learned wits of our age? they delight in gardens; and in them (for the most part) are compiled those divine writings of theirs which we wonder at, and which no posteritie or continuance of time shall be able to abolish. ... [Gardens are suitable for learned meditations and writings] – For why? the mind lifteth vp and advanceth it selfe more to these high cogitations, when it is at libertie to beholde his owne home, heauen: Then when it is inclosed within the prisons of houses or townes. Here you learned Poets compose yee some poems worthy of immortalitie. Here let al the learned meditate and write: here let the Philosophers argue and dispute of contention, constancie, life, and death.\textsuperscript{136}

Importantly, Langius goes on to assert that in the peacefulness of the garden he is free from all the cares of the world, and he can there concentrate on subjecting his 'broken and distressed mind' to 'Right Reason' and God.\textsuperscript{137} The first edition of the \textit{Constantia}, nonetheless, only referred to subjection to reason, and not God. In a similar manner to Charron's case, Lipsius added the 'Godly element' in the revised edition, after objections were raised against the character of the \textit{Constantia}. Lipsius consciously attempted in this way to link the Stoic metaphor of the garden with the Christian elements; undisturbed contemplation, away from troubles and passions would lead one to wisdom and virtue, and ultimately, God. The pagan-inspired elevation of human reason thus, was

\textsuperscript{135} Cf. Morford, \textit{Stoics and Neostoics}, p. 66: 'it was also a place for the negotium animi, from which the philosopher would return to the \textit{vita activa} refreshed and inspired by the Stoic attributes of wisdom and reason'.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Constantia} (II, 3), pp. 135-6.

tempered by the admission that this can only operate within God's province (and providence).

The analysis of Lipsius's exposition of Stoic philosophy would be incomplete without a reference to the school's cosmology, the last Stoic theme of this examination: the associated concepts of Providence - Necessity - Destiny (Fatum) and man's role within the Divine scheme of things. The importance the matter has for Lipsius is witnessed by the fact that the discussion occupies ten chapters of the first book (I, 13-22). Lipsius introduces the subject within his argumentation for the constancy: as public evils stem from God, men are not in a position to complain.138 God's Providence is described as

_A watchfull and continual care (yet without cark) whereby he beholdeth, searcheth, and knoweth all things: And knowing them, disposeth and ordreth the same by an immutable course to us unknowne._ 139

In the text Lipsius joins necessity to Providence, claiming that it springs from God, and that it is a power of Providence. It is more linked to the nature of things; everything is naturally subject to alteration and eventually decay.140 He gives an account of the Stoic definition of Fate and discusses part of the critique against their views. While admitting to finding their teachings appealing, Lipsius notes what he understands to be the two main problems ('impieties') with their interpretation: the fact that they seem to make God subject to destiny, on the one hand, and that they appear to deprive man of his liberty, on the other.141 Lipsius links Destiny with the Stoic fatum, and using the root of the word (fari: to speak) he describes it as the 'saying and commandment of God'. By describing Destiny as the decree of God, thus, he is able to subject it to God. What is of particular interest, however, is Lipsius's cautious effort to reinstate

---

138 Constantia (I, 14), p. 104.
139 Constantia (I, 13), p. 103.
140 Constantia (I, 15), pp. 106-7.
141 Constantia (I, 18) p. 115. Cf. also p. 117.
the liberty of the will; while discussing the crucial issue of man's free will, he remarks in a marginal note that

Whatsoever I speak here, let the wise be judges of it, I will amend any thing upon admonition. And albeit happily I may be convinced of folly, yet will not of frowrdness 142

Lipsius brings the discussion to a resolution with the following passage explaining how God's Providence does not enforce man's will:

As the highest spheare with his motion swayeth about the rest, yet so as it neyther barreth nor breaketh them of their proper motions: So God by the power of destiny draweth al things, but taketh not away the peculiar facultie or motion of any thing. He would that trees & corn should grow. So do they, without any force of their owne nature. Hee would that men should use deliberation and choyse. So do they, without force, of their free-will. And yet, whatsoever they were in mind to make choyse of, God forsaught from all eternitie. Hee fore-saw it (I say) not forced it; hee knewe it, but constrained it not: hee for-told it, but not prescribed it. [Damascenus]143

One of the most critical passages was his explanation on man's propensity to sin; how it was exactly that man would sin out of his own free-will if everything were part of God's Providence.144

Lipsius's case, however, did not appear convincing enough for his contemporaries. Catholicism's strong emphasis on man's free will made his attempt at reconciling it with his view of Providence as well as his explaining of tricky issues such as responsibility for sin susceptible to criticism. Coornhert, with whom Lipsius had corresponded earlier with regards to the translation of the Constantia into Dutch, was particularly sceptical about Lipsius's treatment of sin. For Coornhert, there could not be any compatibility between free will and submission to Destiny.145 Lipsius, however, chose not to

143 Constantia (I, 20), p. 122.
144 Constantia (I, 20), p. 122.
respond to the questions he received from him on the specific chapter (I, 20), and the correspondence between them ceased.

Lipsius's friend Laevinus Torrentius (Lieven Van der Beke, 1525-95), Bishop of Antwerp, a scholar, a humanist, and a Prince of the Church, was also among those who reacted to the views presented in Constantia. Alarmed by his preference for Stoic views over Christian doctrine, he wrote to him stating that it would have been much better had he taken Christ and his followers as moral examples. In the same letter Torrentius urged Lipsius to add a third book to the Constantia, written, this time, from a Christian and not a profane point of view. Lipsius's published version of the reply to Torrentius included the following:

For I had wanted to reconcile ancient philosophy to the Christian truth, and, while I was totally absorbed in that intellectual task, some things crept in and slipped out which perhaps have more of the flavour of the former than the latter. He also defended his use of Epictetus and Seneca. In a separate published letter, Lipsius claimed that it was his ignorance of theology that had aroused the slander against him:

They say that elephants love rivers but do not rashly go into the water, because they do no know how to swim. This is the case with me and Theology; I love it, I value it, and I gladly dip my mind in its health-giving waters, but I do not immerse myself.

In the same way Lipsius had insisted in his Epistle to the reader of the Constantia on his use of philosophy, despite his awareness that his work would most likely be censured and that he may have 'slipped' at points. His response to the

---

146 'If you compare the decrees of the Stoics or any other [school] to the doctrine of Christ, what else are they than mere show and deceitful seeking after popularity?'; cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 104.
148 Cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 105.
149 'There is a warmth in the writings of Seneca or Epictetus, which reaches the reader also; and they seem not so much to discuss virtue as to plant it and impress it upon him'; cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 105.
150 Cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 106.
151 Epistle to the Reader, Constantia, p. 205.
criticisms against the work and his orthodoxy was to defend himself in a number of letters. Additionally, he made some minor amendments to the text, and added some explanatory marginal notes, none of which made a significant difference to the substance of the work. Lipsius also attached a second preface (‘Ad Lectorem pro Constantia mea Praescriptio’) placed at the beginning of the work. In a rather sarcastic tone and perhaps with a hint of conceit Lipsius explained in the preface that the criticisms against him were based on alleged errors in his account of ‘Right reason’, which he accentuated to a great degree, as the ancients did. In a similar manner to how Charron tried to defend himself, Lipsius replied to this accusation that for him ‘Right reason’ was only directed by God and revealed by faith. It was within this framework that he had inserted in the second edition the name of God in the text, in the extract where Langius was asserting that free of troubles in the garden he could subject his mind to Right reason and God. Lipsius further defended himself in the preface by distinguishing between theologians and not, in the same vein that Charron distinguished between theological and human wisdom. Lipsius claimed that, had he assumed to be a theologian, then it was fair to say that he had had erred; and although he recognised the significance of theologians, he suggested that he conducted himself not just as a philosopher, but a Christian philosopher.

In any case, it is of significance that despite his repeated claims that he would make amendments, Lipsius ultimately defied suggestions both from Torrentius and Coornhert, demonstrating his firm belief that his views were right. This is confirmed by a letter he sent to a friend of his, saying that the changes he made to the Constantia were few, and that he had only added an

152 Opera Omnia, IV, 367-8.
epistle explaining his position against ‘some defenders of piety’, themselves little pious and even less advised. This statement is important, however, as it alludes to the greatest accusation against Lipsius and his Constantia: that of impiety. It is to Lipsius’s views on religion, its role in the state and considerations of religious dissent that we will now turn our attention. As we will see, criticisms were directed against the Politica as well, although for apparently different reasons.

(iii.) Lipsius and Religion (or Politics and Religion)

We arrive then at one of the most crucial matters discussed by Lipsius, and one that sparked controversy both during his lifetime and for centuries to follow: the role of religion within the state. The chapters of the Politica dealing with the ‘divine’ part of the prudence of the Prince (IV, 2-4) were under attack by various parties from very early on, both during his stay in Protestant Leiden as well as during his time in Catholic Louvain. That Lipsius was aware even before the publication of the Politica that his views were not going to be received equally well by all is witnessed in his correspondence. In the Protestant world – albeit against a Catholic - Lipsius found himself defending his position soon after the appearance of the book, from attacks that the polity he was proposing was too authoritarian and not tolerant enough. Conversely, the Roman Curia deemed that the same views were too tolerant. The debates of Lipsius with both parts – although in the case of Rome there was not much room for a debate - occupy a notable chapter in the greater topic of toleration.

155 ‘Negant fatis pié hoc argumentum á me tractatum’; ‘Ad Lectorem’, Opera Omnia IV, 367.
156 According to Hoven, however, at receiving the Politica both Lampsonius and Junius reacted saying more or less that Lipsius had repeated the same mistakes he did not manage to correct in the Constantia; ‘Les Reactions de Juste Lipsé’, p. 421.
157 Cf. his letter of 17 June 1588 to Lampsonius; cited by Güldner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 94.
and its limitations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and have been sufficiently examined by various scholars.158

Adequate attention, however, has not been paid to some especially interesting preliminary points on the subject of religion made by Lipsius early in the Politica, in his account of virtue. These points are exceptionally valuable, as they are directly linked to the views expressed later in the book, making them more comprehensible. While introducing the concept of virtue, Lipsius associates it with piety and goodness.159 Piety for him is the belief in and the worship of God, in other words, the theory and practice of religion. In terms of worship, significantly, he differentiates between a double form of service, internal and external.160 It seems reasonable in this case to recognise this duality of internal and external worship as a parallel to Lipsius’s understanding of an inherent differentiation between the internal peace and the outside world. In the same chapter (I, 3) Lipsius talks about the difference between religion and superstition, an issue to which Charron also devoted considerable attention. Like Charron, Lipsius regards superstition as an enemy to religion, and he recognises that superstitious people are easily manipulated by princes. His aversion to superstition can be viewed from the lens of a Stoic: superstition is a blind passion that takes hold of one’s reason and threatens the individual’s tranquillity.161 In keeping with his stress on internal peace, the internal manifestation of piety is for Lipsius significantly more important than the external. He suggests, however, that a wise man

159 Politica (I, 2), p. 2.
161 Politica (I, 3); p. 5.
ought to conform to customs of worship for the good of the community in which he lives.

And yet we must not altogether contemne externall things, although the most part of them (as one will haue it) pertaine rather to custome, then to the substance of religion. But a wise man will obserue them as enioned and commaunded by lawes (not as acceptable of themselues to God) if they be not manifestly wicked and impious: otherwise, we ought to yield to religion, and not stubbornly reject the vse and custome allowed of in the common-wealth wherein we liue. 

He continues in a strikingly similar manner to Charron’s discussion of the distinction between preud’homnie and piety, to declare that piety is inadequate without honesty:

vpright life, as well in the carriage of our selues, as in all our actions ruled by honestie. Yet I may not ouerslip it, to the end you may know how necessarie it is, being fastened into Pietie, or rather joine into it. Without good demeanour, Pietie is not only vaine, whatsoever shew you make in countenaunce, in word, in zeal, or deuotion, but as it were nothing at al like the apples which grow in Indea, which are no sooner touched, but they consume into vapour and smoke: euem such is lippe Pietie, without the vitall juice of deeds.

Two things are discernible from this preliminary account: first, the separation in Lipsius’s view of the notion of piety into internal and external. The emphasis on the importance of the former has for him as an essential consequence outward conformity. As public observance is not as significant, it follows that as long as people remain faithful in their private life, they do not sin in the eyes of God by following the dictates of the state publicly. It is tempting to assume, of course, that through these assertions Lipsius was in fact offering justification for his own positions. The second element of importance in the above account is the distinction between virtue (honesty) and piety; Lipsius separates, in a manner very similar to Charron’s, the divine inspiration from the more basic notion of honesty. He claims, thus, a distinct space where men can exist without the direction of God, and where they ought to be honest, but not necessarily pious.

---

162 Politica (I, 3); p. 5.
163 Politica (I, 6), p. 10.
Having set the ground in this opening chapter Lipsius returns to the issue of religion in the Fourth Book of the *Politica*. There he ascribes the role of the protector of religion to the Prince. Although Lipsius very meticulously points out the limits of the Prince’s duties, he does not delineate them precisely; he asserts, however, that the Prince does not have a ‘free hand’ in religious issues.

and that prudence (I say) is used in matters divine, which toucheth, ordereth and directeth holy things, and religion, only so farre forth as a Prince ought to haue care of them. I do justly and with reason try this prudence hereunto, because the Prince hath not free power in holy matters; God forbid he should; but a certaine insight, and that rather for their defence, then to attribute to himselfe, as judge to determine of them.

Above all, religion is for Lipsius the bond that keeps society together:

*Religion and the fear of God are the only things which do conserve society amongst men: Take away this bond, and the life of man shall be overcharged with folly, mischief and cruelty [...]*

One religion is the author of vnitie; and from a confused religion there always growth dissention.

Having lived through the tragedy of his age and himself experienced the disastrous results of religious strife Lipsius is resolute in this point. His despair is evident in the following lines:

I cannot consider without tears, Good Lord, what firebrands of sedition hath religion kindled in this fairest part of the world? The chiefest heads of our Christian common wealths are at strife amongst them selues, and many millions of men haue bin brought to ruine, and do dayly perish, vnder a pretext of piety.

People were being killed in the name of piety and religion. In these circumstances, the public good is harmed by the fanaticism that accompanies religious plurality (or ‘confusion’, as Lipsius prefers to call it). Yet religion could lead to peace and tranquillity provided that it is followed by everyone in the state. And it is first and foremost the duty of the wise man to lead the way by

---

164 The title of *Politica* (IV, 2) reads as follows: ‘The definition of that [proper or princely] Prudence which properly belongeth to a Prince, into Civill, and Militarie. Civill prudence againe is desuided into humane and divine. That the Prince ought to haue care for the latter, and to obserue and defend one religion’; p. 61 (my emphasis).
165 *Politica* (IV, 2), p. 61.
166 *Politica* (IV, 2), p. 62.
maintaining the laws of his ancestors; only by keeping the inherited customs in public can society continue to exist in peace. This is immediately related to Lipsius’s fundamental concept of the division between public and private; when one religion is observed in public, concord will reign over the polity.

This standpoint alludes also to his next series of arguments dealing with the question of whether public or private dissent is to be tolerated. For Lipsius, and in line with his prime concern for public order, public dissent is far more damaging than private. Along the same lines that King James would later acknowledge recusants, the Flemish author suggested that private worship is to be tolerated, on condition that people show outward conformity: ‘No Prince can rule the mindes in like sort as he may the tongs of men. God is the king of mens minds. …’ He also repeats the maxim of King Theodoric (r. 494-526), that he could ‘not command religion, because no man could be enforced to beleue against his will’.

As already suggested, Lipsius’s views brought him into contradiction with both opposing poles on the issue of religious toleration. In the Protestant world, Coornhert’s protest was aimed against Lipsius’s advocacy of the observance of one single religion in the state and the persecution of heretics (public dissenters). The Roman Curia, on the other hand, raised objections to his more moderate claims of allowing private dissent. Both cases deserve some attention as they shed further light on Lipsius’s stance on the issue of religion as well as giving some indication of the intellectual climate of the time and of the tensions between various standpoints.

169 Politica (IV, 4), p. 65.
170 Politica (IV, 4), p. 66.
In this respect, the dispute with Coornhert is instructive. Coornhert was a multitalented author; he had published treatises on the theological, moral and political issues of the day, as well as translated various classical works into Dutch; his main preoccupation, however, was freedom of conscience, expression and public worship. The debate between him and Lipsius on the occasion of the views contained in the *Politica* started off initially as an exchange of letters (the two men knew one another at least from 1582); Coornhert wrote to the Leiden professor asking him to clarify his views with regards to the role of religion in the state and the punishment of religious dissidents. After Lipsius's dismissive reply, Coornhert made the critical decision to publish a refutation of the three chapters of the *Politica* in question (IV, 2-4), dedicating his work to the magistrates of Leiden. The fact that the *Trial of the Killing of Heretics and the Constraint of Conscience* (1590) was written in Dutch provoked Lipsius, because it made the debate more public. Lipsius was initially determined not to respond; he nonetheless did, a few months after the publication of the *Trial*, with *De Una*

---


172 Despite the sufficient treatment of Coornhert's religious disputes, very little reference is made to his religion by scholars; this is rather surprising, considering the importance of such a piece of information for the greater understanding of the religious debates. Born a Catholic, he was very early on attracted to the works of the great reformers, Luther, Calvin and others. He never officially embraced Protestantism, and he, significantly, disagreed in theology in many points with all three denominations, whether Catholic, Calvinist or Lutheran; it seems, generally, that he was more influenced by the various spiritual tendencies of the period, such as the teachings of Sebastian Franck and Castellio. (Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation*, pp. 273-6).


Religione Adversus Dialogistam Liber (1590).\textsuperscript{175} Regardless that the circulation of the Trial was suppressed by the magistrates of Leiden within a year of its publication, Lipsius’s reputation was damaged by this and it seems that this controversy was the principal reason behind his permanent departure from Leiden in 1591.\textsuperscript{176}

What is of particular importance for our consideration is the apparently striking similarity between the views of the two men. They both argued for the separation of the two spheres and jurisdictions - the ecclesiastical and political - but they were doing so from entirely opposing standpoints: Lipsius’s focus was the order of the state, whilst Coornhert was more concerned with individual conscience and the independence of religion from any interference by temporal authorities.\textsuperscript{177} Some examples of their writings will reveal the simultaneous divergence and correspondence of their positions. Coornhert was acutely disturbed by the way in which he thought Lipsius had breached the separation of the two spheres by making the ruler the defender of one religion.\textsuperscript{178} He was, moreover, alarmed by Lipsius’s refusal to state explicitly which religion this would be, surmising that the Prince would defend whatever religion happened to be dominant in the state. This could well have been Lipsius’s case, but the Flemish scholar was prudent enough not to push his argument to its limits. In the same vein, he did not go all the way to explain that he was, in fact, aiming at the complete exclusion of theologians from the political sphere. The

\textsuperscript{176} Among the other factors that contributed to his departure seem to have been the displeasure with what he considered the lukewarm rallying to his cause by certain authorities (even Prince Maurice, who had been Lipsius’s student had bought copies of the Trial), and the ‘political insecurity’, i.e. the expectation that the north would lose the struggle with Spain. See Voogt, ‘Primacy of Individual Conscience’, p. 1247; Gündner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 117; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 117. Lipsius himself admits in his autobiographical letter to Woverius that it was Religio ac Fama (religion and reputation/fame) that compelled him to leave Leiden; cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{177} Voogt, ‘Primacy of Individual Conscience’, p. 1237.
\textsuperscript{178} Voogt, ‘Primacy of Individual Conscience’, p. 1239.
circumstances in which he was writing did not allow such a position to become so explicit.179

Coornhert, on the other hand, was arguing in purely theological terms; indicative in this context is the fact that his list of sources does not include any classical authors.180 He acknowledged, thus, the primacy of the divine matters at the expense of politics:

I ... confess that I consider men's eternal salvation to be of more importance than their or the state's temporary prosperity. For states exist for the sake of the people, not the people for the sake of the state.181

Equally, he maintained that the subjects 'are not bound to obey the government in all its commandments.' In times of conflict they should 'obey God rather than man'.182 The two areas, the temporal and the ecclesiastical - or, politics and religion - should be kept separate 'for they are as different as heaven and earth', equating in the same way that has been suggested in the Introduction, politics with the temporal sphere and religion with the divine. Coornhert also addressed the question of human limitations: how could people trust the defence of the church to the princes, since throughout history there had been many examples of unwise, unjust or cruel princes: God gave to none besides Himself power in His realm, not even the prince.183 Decisions about religious doctrines, in this respect should be made by the Church, which is spiritually guided by God and not the prince; conversely, the Church ought to engage only in spiritual considerations and not in worldly ones.184

183 Cf. Van Gelderen, *Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt*, who cites Coornhert's assertion that the government was not ordained to 'punish the errant in matters of faith and even less to exterminate the weeds of God's field' (p. 252).
One of Coornhert’s fundamental objections to Lipsius’s stance concerned his claim that people should follow the established religion as a matter of custom. The polemicist recognised that this position had the potential to undermine the position of the Christian religion:

...This would mean that one religion is not any better than another one, and that one can attain salvation in any religion, no matter how false or idolatrous it might be. And this would be complete Libertinism, and a shoe that is made to fit any foot. 185

Coornhert pointed out that Lipsius’s treatment of religion was essentially one that subordinated it to the state. He further accused Lipsius of using it as an instrument of support for the state, in order to achieve temporal grandeur, the most abhorrent of things. 186 It is significant in the context of the discussion of Charron’s case in the previous chapter, that Coornhert challenged his adversary’s reliance on pagan, classical sources and mocked Lipsius for using them as a fetish. Lipsius had defended himself from accusations that he did not use religious sources for the composition of Constantia. Yet the fact that he did not feel that in the case of the Politica he had to defend his sparse use of ecclesiastical writers, was a confirmation of his belief - and Coornhert’s charge at the same time - that theological writings did not have anything to do with politics. This was a bold claim, very similar to Charron’s insistence that theology and philosophy were distinct domains. These, however, were also the fundamental arguments on which assertions such as Sarpi’s for the separation of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction could be based.

Lipsius’s defence against Coornhert was principally based on the reiteration that the prince ought to promote one religion within the state which he had the duty to oversee; he had no rights over the church, but he had to prevent disorder. Two issues, above all, infuriated Lipsius among Coornhert’s

polemics. First was his opponent’s questioning of his private religion and the insinuation that he was on the Spanish side. Lipsius’s irritation could partly be explained by his own sensitivity in that the accusations were close to the truth. He would have been unable, however, to respond to accusations about his own faith. As Güldner accurately suggests, doing so would have damaged the principal foundation of the *Politica*, which was ‘politics beyond confessionalism’. 187 The other source of Lipsius’s anger was the fact that Coornhert had opened up the debate to the more general (literate) public, who ought to be excluded from the *arcana imperii*; the *Politica* was written as a book for princes and those who rule; common ‘plebes’ ought to be kept out of these matters.188

Against the views of the Dutch controversialist, then, who argued from the one extreme of liberty of religious conscience and for some form of religious toleration, Lipsius’s position appeared too authoritarian. The Roman Church, on the contrary, and perhaps not entirely surprisingly, viewed the same stance as allowing for too much religious freedom. Thus, in 1590, within a year of its publication, passages of the *Politica* were to appear on the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* of Pope Sixtus V (Felice Peretti, 1585-90). The chapter in question this time was the one in which Lipsius explained that private dissent in religion was to be tolerated (IV, 4).189 The sudden death of Sixtus in the same year had as a result that his Index was never published. The same chapter of the *Politica* was, however, included in the Index of Clement VIII (published in 1596).190 Lipsius was warned in 1593 by Cardinal Bellarmine about its imminent publication; after some letter-exchanges with the Jesuit Francisco Benci (1542-94), Cardinal Cesare Baronio (1583-1607), and Bellarmine (1542-1621), Lipsius

finally submitted his revised version. The amendments, which had probably been dictated by Bellarmine, only involved one chapter: Book Four, Chapter Four. The significant citation by Theodoric was omitted in the new edition, and some edge was added to the rather moderate and pacified tone of the chapter.

As with Charron’s case, the criticisms raised from both extreme positions on the freedom of worship can give us an insight into Lipsius’s position on the issue of religion. Coornhert’s disapproval originated from his view that Lipsius only ascribed an instrumental role to religion as an ‘author of unity’, thus subordinating it to the dictates of the state. By the same token, the Church of Rome held that, by allowing private dissent provided that the subjects conformed outwardly, Lipsius was using religion as a political tool. Both sides were equally disturbed by Lipsius’s rendering considerably more importance to politics and temporal affairs. Indeed, if one takes into account that Coornhert and the Papacy represented two opposite poles, Lipsius’s position was somewhere in the middle: public uniformity of religion, that would ensure peace, allowing at the same time some liberty of conscience, so long as this was kept private. Lipsius’s via media, furthermore, can account for the contrasting interpretations of his work - the one that represents him as an

191 Güldner discusses the corrections on pp. 119-128; see also his appendix, pp. 170-4. The alterations are also accounted in some detail in Crahay, ‘Problème du Pluralisme Confessionnel’, pp. 175-180.
192 For the amendments, see Appendix IV. Cf. Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex Qui ad Principatum Maxime Spectant (Leiden: Plantin Press, Franciscus Raphelengius, 1590), pp. 127-129 and Opera Omnia IV, 48 for the revised edition. Significantly, the English edition of 1594 is a translation of the original version of the chapter (as, of course, is the French of 1590). It would be safe to assume, and rather ironic in the circumstances, that at least for the French case the Huguenot initiative for the translation of the work was associated with what they regarded as Lipsius’s advocacy for toleration.
194 Cf. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 110. Parallel, although not entirely identical is Kluyskens’ interpretation that Lipsius longed for concord and unity in the divided Christian world; it is in this context, Kluyskens adds, that he intended to contribute to reconciliation within his own country. Similarly, Lipsius’s motto Antiquus moribus, appealing to the doctrines of the early Church, were a way of appealing to the common and unifying elements of Christianity. (‘Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits’, p. 254-62).
authoritarian writer who would relentlessly persecute heretics, and the other that depicts him as an advocate of too much religious freedom. His middle way could not entirely satisfy the agents of either one of the two far opposite positions.195

Such an interpretation of Lipsius's views, moreover, gives substance to the suggestion that his ideas were close to those of the politiques.196 In this context Güldner notes, for instance, the esteem Lipsius had for the work of Michel de l'Hôpital and the policies of Henry IV.197 Evidence indicates, moreover, that the French King had invited the Flemish scholar to France after his departure from Leiden.198 Güldner also places Lipsius in the same group as Montaigne, for whom Lipsius had great respect,199 the Chancellor l'Hôpital, Charron and Du Vair, intellectuals, namely, who 'promoted one religion for the state, without themselves being engaged in religious matters, but who viewed, like Lipsius, moral philosophy as a necessary foundation for such an endeavour'.200 This view of course fits well with Lipsius's interest in (neo)Stoicism - and we already saw his firmness in its utility - as an alternative manner to contemplate about ethics, independently of confessions, and as a way to endure the disaster brought by religious passions.

195 Similar ambivalence continues to haunt the legacy of Lipsius in present-day scholarship; cf. for example Gerrit Voogt, who sees him as an advocate of authoritative policies, while Morford or Crahay regard Lipsius's writings as rather tolerant for his time.
196 It is in the same vein, we can surmise, that Lipsius was classified together with Bodin and Machiavelli in a sermon preached before the English Parliament of 1621 in London by William Loe; the latter complained that too many Englishmen 'studie Bodines Commentaries, Lipsius Politiques and Machiells Prince...'; cited by McCrea in Constant Minds, p. 31.
197 Cf. the reference to Henry IV in his Monita et exempla politica (1605): 'Gallorum regnum potens et florens, a Faramundo primo rege usque ad Henricum IV. qui tunc feliciter regnat...'; cited in Güldner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 112.
198 Vita, Opera Omnia I, lvi.
The discussion of Lipsius's views on religion cannot be brought to a conclusion without some reference to his notorious changes of religious allegiances. From Catholicism to Lutheranism, then to Calvinism and finally back to Catholicism, Lipsius has been described in history as 'inconstant'. He has further been paralleled to the mythical creature of Proteus, who kept changing his form, and to a chameleon. According to this line of reasoning, it was a natural result of Lipsius's lax sense of religious conviction – an assumption, admittedly, rather hard to resist - for him to suggest that religion should have a secondary role to the state and politics. His views and his religious inconstancy have also been explained with speculation about Lipsius's involvement in the 'Family of Love'. But since there is not enough evidence for

---

201 James advises his son in the Basilikon Doron (Edinburgh, 1599): ‘keep trewe Constancie, not only in your kindnesse towards honest men; but also invicli animi against all aduersities: not with that Stoicke insensible stupiditie that proud inconstant Lipsius persuadeth in his Constantia’. The quotation in italics was expunged from the second edition of the work (1603), and the passage read like this: ‘not with that Stoicke insensible stupiditie wherewith many in our dayes, preasseing to winne honour, in imitating that ancient sect, by their inconstant behaviour in their owne lives, belie their profession’; James Craigie (ed.), The Basilicon Doron of King James VI. 2 vols., (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Text Society, 1944-50), pp. 156-7. See also the comments by J.H.M. Salmon in his 'Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England' in Linda Levy Peck (ed.), The Mental World of the Jacobean Court (Cambridge: CUP, 1991) p. 186 and note 22, and McCrea, Constant Minds, p. 175 and note 22. For different reasons behind James's dislike of Lipsius see D. Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland. Neo-Stoicism, Culture and Ideology in an Age of Crisis, 1540-1690. (Edinburgh: Tuckwell Press, 2000), chs. 1 & 2, where he argues about the appearance of Neostoicism in Scotland in the 1590's.

202 Lipsius Proteus ex Antro Neptuni Protractus et Claro Soli Expositus (Frankfurt, 1614) was a work published by Thomas Sagittarius, a professor at Jena that proved beyond doubt that Lipsius had professed Lutheranism while at Jena. (Morford, Stoics and Ne stoics, p. 128).

203 Lipsius was ridiculed by the English divine Joseph Hall in his Mundus Alter idem (1605); the latter while giving an account of the imaginary land of Fooliana the Fickle, he described some old coins that ‘were round, hauing on one side one in a gowne, seeming to bee of a middle age, leaing his hat vpon the head of a little pettie dogge [Lipsius’s love for dogs was also renowned], and holding in the left hand, a booke’; on the other side of the coin was a chameleon, and was inscribed ‘Const. Lips.’ [From the English translation of John Healey, ?1609]; cited by Rudolf Kirk in the introduction of Constantia, p. 12.

204 It is in this sense that we have to regard the famous proverb that has survived about his life, that he had said at some point ‘(For) all religion and no religion are to me one and the same’ (cited by Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 19.); whether true or not, this statement fitted well with the image that Lipsius had. For the sequence and parallels between a Machiavelli, Proteus, and a chameleon, see also Richard of Gloucester in Shakespeare’s Henry VI, 3 III. ii.
us to establish the extent of Lipsius’s involvement in the ‘House of Love’ or the degree of his devotion, the suggestion of Familism does not provide the answer to the puzzle Lipsius presents us with, or the popularity of his works. According to another suggestion, we should look for the answer in Stoicism, the ‘unifying force’ in his life.205

Yet both interpretations concentrate on the approaches Lipsius took to solve his main problems: the disruption of religious wars. He turned to Stoicism as comfort and refuge from the devastation around him, and through the Constantia he managed to provide solace to other people as well. The Politica was his version of what kind of politics was needed for the circumstances he was living in, and what role religion ought to occupy within this type of politics. This also amounted, however, to a distinct differentiation between public and private. Within this scheme, all the ugliness and depravity of politics were expelled and confined to the public realm, the one that corresponded to the ‘temporal affairs’, and ethics, belief and piety were preserved by their internalisation, and through the direct contact with the divine. Yet his views were not entirely accepted by his contemporaries – his attempt to combine theology with philosophy raised similar criticisms to the ones to which Charron was later subjected, as it led to a kind of indifference towards doctrinal matters. His views on the role of religion within the state came under fire both for being too lenient and for not being lenient enough – both sides, however, agreed that Lipsius’s treatment of religion effectively subordinated it to the (temporal) interests of the state. There is a lot to be said about the use of his works in order to justify his religious changes. Evidently, this refers to the extent to which

theory justifies and influences practice and, conversely, to the degree that experience informs theory. All the main issues in Lipsius's work, nonetheless, become more intelligible when set against the background of the religious wars: his fundamental separation between public and private, inward constancy against outward strife, inward conviction and outward conformity, the paradox of politics and ethics, and his search for an alternative source of morality - as Charron did, at about the same time - away from the dangers of religion. And here lie the reasons for his (un)popularity as well; in the midst of religious warfare, a more moderate and humane approach to religious issues seemed to provide the answer for the problems, which could only be solved on a temporal level, and under the guidance of a prudent prince. Yet similar views, perhaps surprisingly, would be expressed by someone who did not go through the experience of religious strife; they were also voiced in the South of Europe, by a friar, who followed and studied the events from a distance.
Chapter III

Political Implications (I): Secular and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction

Paolo Sarpi, Historia del Concilio Tridentino (1619)

God has instituted two governments in the world, one spiritual and the other temporal, each of them supreme and independent from the other.

Sarpi, from a consulto of 1608

An almost inherent implication of the separation of public and private spheres was, as Lipsius was suggesting, the expulsion of religion from the public domain and the privatisation of it. This shifting of domains has, in turn, a two-fold bearing on the role of religion. The extreme internalisation of spiritual considerations can, on the one hand, render an almost mystical role to religion. Equally, the removal of sacred elements from the public realm can have the effect that religion, stripped of its sacred elements assumes a purely political function. Whilst both these repercussions are, perhaps, to some extent to be expected in the work of an individual who had been personally affected by their experience of the religious wars, the expression of equivalent views by someone with no direct contact with religious warfare could be regarded as less so. A few years after the death of Lipsius, nonetheless, the notion of the separation of ecclesiastical and political jurisdictions, the idea of an internalised religion, and the political control of the institution of the Church, were promoted by an extraordinary Italian figure, the Venetian friar Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623). Yet Sarpi had been involved in a different sort of religious warfare, having to face the
crucial task of defending, on behalf of the Venetian Republic, its temporal jurisdiction against Papal encroachments.

An enigmatic and fascinating individual of this age, Paolo Sarpi was widely controversial, primarily for what was perceived as a stark contrast between his political and religious convictions. He enjoyed varied and broad intellectual interests: much like Charron and Lipsius - whose work he would have been aware of - he combined theological with philosophical pursuits, as well as demonstrating a vivid interest in mathematics, natural philosophy and anatomy.1 Sarpi was also an active member of the so-called 'republic of letters'. Like Lipsius, he corresponded with a great number of prominent thinkers of his time, as well as people engaged in the affairs of state and religion. The greatest part of his legacy, however, lies with his appointment as state theologian to Venice (28 March 1606) and his conduct during the ensuing period of the Interdict crisis (April 1606 - April 1607). His polemical efforts made him rise to an international status with his tracts enjoying very wide circulation indeed. The other part of the friar's legacy rests on his most famous work, the Historia del Concilio Tridentino (London, 1619).

Similar to Charron and Lipsius, Sarpi's name is surrounded by contention: a friar involved in political affairs, strongly anti-papal and anticlerical, excommunicated by Pope Paul V, and a competent and fierce polemicist, he was a figure that the Curia almost certainly wanted dead.2 Like the other two authors Sarpi was described as an atheist, both during his lifetime

as well as in our time, and as a (crypto) Protestant, while he himself would admit to often behaving like a chameleon, wearing the appropriate mask according to the person he was dealing with. These are all elements that render Sarpi of particular importance for the present study. The ambivalence of his religious convictions and standpoint, his profound questioning of the authority of the Church, and his strong views about the separation of ecclesiastical and political jurisdiction make him a critical part of the argument this thesis is constructing, on the wider moral and political connotations of the separation of temporal and divine spheres.

The primary task of this chapter, therefore, will be to examine Sarpi’s fundamental notion of the separation of ecclesiastical and political jurisdiction as developed in his greater polemic against the Papacy. It will point to links between the friar’s work and the Conciliar tradition, to which Sarpi referred, when constructing his polemics. The analysis will also discuss extensively the contemporary context, that is to say Venetian religious policies and the way these were proclaimed and defended in the face of Roman challenges. Finally, it will explore whether any associations can be discerned between Sarpi’s deep convictions about the relationship between religion and politics, and their separate jurisdictions and his religious outlook. The examination will primarily

---

3 This is the central thesis of the otherwise excellent study by David Wootton, Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and Enlightenment. Wootton has based his interpretation on a reading of Sarpi’s Pensieri Filosofici, and he argues that only against this alleged atheism can anyone make sense of the otherwise undecipherable Friar. It seems that accusations of atheism, however, were laid against Sarpi even during his lifetime: see his early biography by his close friend and associate Fulgenzio Micanzio, The Life of the most Learned Father Paul, of the Order of the Servie. Councellour of State to the most Serene Republicke of Venice and Authour of the History of the Councell of Trent. (London: for Humphrey Moseley and Richard Martin, 1651); p. 186 (wrongly numbered as p. 166).

4 ‘My character is such that, like a chameleon, I imitate the behaviour of those amongst people who are reserved and gloomy I become, despite myself, unfriendly. I respond openly and freely to people who are cheerful and uninhibited. I am compelled to wear a mask. Perhaps there is nobody who can survive in Italy without one;’ letter to Gillot, 12 May 1609, cited in Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 119.
be based on the Venetian's most famous work, a work that preoccupied him much of his life, the History of the Council of Trent. This monumental text was first published in London (1619) in Italian, at the initiative of Archbishop Abbot and almost certainly James VI and I himself. It was, moreover, translated into Latin and English within a year of its first appearance (1620), as well as into French (Geneva, 1621). It enjoyed, accordingly, wide popularity, in spite of having been placed on the Index of Prohibited Books immediately after its appearance.

This chapter will start by examining Sarpi's life and his involvement in the Interdict crisis, setting thus the background for the scrutiny of his major text. The analysis of the History will provide us with themes that reflect some of Sarpi's views on the separate jurisdictions of the temporal and ecclesiastical domains, as well as his more general attitudes towards religion and politics. In this manner, it will become obvious how the dualisms of temporal-divine and public-private, the subjects of the two preceding chapters, translate into a separation of authority. It will be argued, moreover, that the specific resurgence of the separate jurisdictions' rhetoric can be accounted for by a double set of circumstances. It can first be seen as a reaction towards the perceived increasing worldly preoccupations of the Papacy and its encroachments into temporal powers beginning from the sixteenth century and continuing, to varying degrees, through to the seventeenth. It can also be regarded within the

---

5 For the history of the publication, see below. The French translation was made by Giovanni Diodati, the prominent Protestant academic. Diodati had also come to Venice in August-September 1608 as part of a plan to educate Venice in the reformed faith; the whole attempt, however, fell through, and Diodati left disappointed and with a strong impression that Sarpi was 'unduly prudent' (he was reproached for his fredda prudenza). For the attempt, see for instance Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 99-104; Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton, Logan Pearsall Smith (ed.), 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907); vol. I, pp. 86-98; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defence, pp. 505, 528-9.

framework of the Lutheran revolt and the subsequent series of issues that arose because of it, such as civil (or religious) obedience, religious tolerance and questions of authority. In this respect, Sarpi’s text is ideal as the focus of such a consideration, since the history he was writing epitomised all of the above issues, as they were expressed in the almost forty-five-year struggle surrounding the summons, procedure, and conclusion of the Council of Trent. What is more, according to the author’s view, one generation later, these were still far from resolved or settled.

I.

Background

i. Sarpi’s Life

As in the cases of Lipsius and Charron, Sarpi’s life is very important in understanding the primary preoccupations of his work. Without doubt, the single most significant event in the Friar’s life was his appointment as state theologian to the Venetian Republic – remarkably, only one month before the Interdict of Pope Paul V – and his subsequent conduct during this struggle. Sarpi himself regarded this event as a turning point in his career, and an abrupt change from the contemplative to the active life. This is of particular importance, as this position gave him the opportunity not only to make public his views on certain issues that preoccupied him throughout his whole life, but also vigorously to promote them. Three inter-related elements are of great significance for a consideration of Sarpi’s life. The first is his association with Augustinian theology through his Order, the Servites, though not always observed in studies of his work. Second, are his links with surviving reformers,

---


some of whom had taken part in the Council of Trent. Third, come his profound distrust of Rome that made him seek the company of Protestants, Gallicans, Anglicans and eirenics alike. An examination of the History of the Council of Trent should be set against the context of his life-long concerns about ecclesiastical and secular questions, issues of reform and Sarpi’s rivalry - official, as much as personal - with the Papacy.

The main source we have for his early life is the biography by Fulgenzio Micanzio (1570-1654), one of his closest friends and associates. Born Pietro (Paolo was the name he took up as he entered the monastery), Sarpi was the son of a merchant, who died while Pietro was still a child. His education was initially entrusted to his uncle, who taught children of noble families, and later to the Servite Father Gian Maria Capella of Cremona (1564). Sarpi studied philosophy and theology, mathematics and natural philosophy, and was well versed in languages. At the young age of fourteen he entered the Augustinian Order of the Servites (Servants of Mary), probably under the influence of his instructor. At eighteen the bishop of Mantua made him a reader in canon law and positive theology (1570). While in Mantua he formed a relationship with Camillo Olivo, who had been secretary to one of the legates at the Tridentine Council, Cardinal Gonzaga. This contact probably was the first source of Sarpi’s life-long interest in Trent. Sarpi was ordained as priest at twenty-two (1574) and soon after moved to Milan, having been recruited by the Archbishop Carlo Borromeo (1538-84), the reformer, to assist him in his task.

---

9 Vita del Padre Paolo de l’Ordine de’ Servi e Teologo della Serenissima Republica di Venezia (Leiden, 1646). As the Vita is the only source we have for Sarpi’s early life, it is difficult to establish its reliability; it appears, however, to be in agreement with other sources for Sarpi’s later years. All my references are from the English edition, cited above.


On a different level, Sarpi took a doctorate at Padua in 1578, while the next year, at the age of twenty-six, he became Provincial of his Order in Venice (1579). While holding this position, he was chosen as one of three Servite scholars to revise the constitution and rule of the Order. In connection with this task, Sarpi spent several months in Rome studying the decrees of Trent. This is very important in the light of his later writings, as his research involved a serious consideration of the Council's impact. Equally important in this respect, is the fact that during his stay in Rome it seems that he came in contact with a number of surviving reformers; this, evidently, also led to his reassessment of the Church's reforming objectives vis-à-vis the Council.

In 1585 Sarpi was promoted to Procurator-General of his Order, next in authority under the General of the whole Order, and as a result of this promotion, he spent the next three years in Rome. This time he met Roberto Bellarmine (1542-1621) there, with whom - ironically, since the two later became rivals - he quickly developed a friendship. He also formed a friendship with Cardinal Castagna, the later Pope Urban VII (1590). During that time Sarpi formed an opinion concerning the extent of corruption at the Papal Court that completed his view of the Church as a corrupt institution from which reform could not derive.

Back in Venice Sarpi taught philosophy and theology in the city's Servite convent. He also frequented the house of Andrea Morosini (1558-1618), the future historian of Venice, as well as the famous 'Golden Ship' shop in the Merceria, both places of vigorous intellectual exchange, which hosted debates on

15 Micanzio, *Life*, p. 34. For Cardinal Castagna see the relevant article in the *New Catholic Encyclopaedia* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, McGraw-Hill, 1967); worthy of notice is the fact that he had taken part at the second phase of the Council of Trent (1562-3), as president of several commissions.
a number of current issues. It was in these circles that Sarpi learned of the situation in France during the religious wars, a topic he was very interested in, and met with other famous thinkers of his time. Sarpi's acquaintances were indeed wide-ranging. He was a friend of Arnaud du Ferrier (c. 1508-85), twice French ambassador to Venice, and a man with close connections in Gallican circles. Du Ferrier, importantly, had also been the person representing the French king during the last stages of the Council of Trent. Other friends and correspondents included: Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), the scholar Peiresc (1580-1637), the jurist-historian Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553-1617), the Protestant Dudley Carleton (1574-1632), English ambassador to Venice (1610-5) and to Holland, the Protestant scholar Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614) - for whom he obtained a copy of the Koran in 1603 - prominent Gallicans such as Edmonde Richer (1559-1631), Jacques Gillot (c. 1550-1619) and Jacques Leschassier (1550-1625), and eirenics such as François Hotman (1524-90). This heterodox group of correspondents that shared ideas about reform, challenges to Roman authority and ecumenism aroused great suspicions in Rome, in view of which Micanzio offers a very defensive account of Sarpi's piety and adherence to orthodox beliefs. Micanzio also suggests that Sarpi had been consulted on the major question of the efficacy of grace, the famous controversy de auxiliis. Not surprisingly, as an Augustinian friar, his conclusions on the issue emphasised the importance of grace in man's salvation. Rome, moreover, also seems twice to have refused him a bishopric, either on the basis of personal rivalries or

---

because of his suspect beliefs. It is possible that this rejection may have affected his attitude to the Curia.\(^{22}\)

It can be surmised that Sarpi's rare combination of knowledge on theological and legal matters was the reason behind his appointment as consultore teologico-canonicoc on the eve of the Interdict crisis.\(^{23}\) Sarpi's view of this event as a defining moment in his career, and a shift from the contemplative to the active life, is consistent with the fact that there is little evidence that he had concerned himself with political matters before the threat of the Interdict.\(^{24}\)

During that troubled period (April 1606-April 1607), as the spokesman for the defence of Venice against the Papacy Sarpi produced numerous pamphlets and engaged in a series of debates, for the most part against his former friend, Cardinal Bellarmine. His writings were primarily concerned with the limits of ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction and the separation of the two. Although the crisis was finally resolved early in 1607, it is safe to assume that the attempt against his life in October 1607 can largely be accounted for by his conduct during the struggle against Rome.\(^{25}\) Sarpi himself tellingly named the stiletto (dagger) that stabbed him as Styloromanae Curiae, while Micanzio indicates the involvement of Cardinal Borghese, the Pope's nephew.\(^{26}\)

Nevertheless, it is of importance that the period of the Interdict as well as the years following proved to be the most productive for the Servite. Besides the pamphlets that presented the official line of the Republic, he composed the History of the Interdict, which was intended to be included in Auguste de Thou's History of his own times; the History of the Inquisition, requested by the Venetian


\(^{25}\) For the attempt against his life, and the warnings about a possible Papal-instigated assault, see the vivid descriptions of Micanzio, *Life*, pp. 112-129.

\(^{26}\) Micanzio, *Life*, p. 126 and 118.
Senate and completed in 1613; the History of Benefices, which remained unpublished until after his death; and last but not least, the History of the Council of Trent, completed in 1616.

The last work was one that had preoccupied him throughout his life.27 Micanzio stresses the length of time and amount of energy Sarpi devoted to acquiring material relevant to the Trinitarian Council, reiterating and accentuating, in effect, Sarpi’s similar claims at the beginning of his text.28 We have already seen that other sources also attest to his life-long concern with the Council: his personal contacts with surviving delegates, for instance, and his own research of the Trinitarian decrees. In like manner, his early friendship with Camillo Olivo, and his association with du Ferrier, as well as his reforming aspirations, all cultivated a growing fascination about that great conciliar endeavour. Yet his interest seems to have become more topical with the occasion of the Interdict, since, as Bouwsma noted, during the crisis the Papal side repeatedly cited Trent against the defiant Venetians. Appropriately, there is evidence that within a year of the issuing of the Papal censures Sarpi was systematically collecting information about the Council,29 while a letter of the

27 Cozzi, Opere, p. 731.
28 Paolo Sarpi, The History of the Council of Trent, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John Bill, 1629); p. 1 [henceforth referred to as History]. All the references are from the second English edition of the text, that, interestingly incorporates some fascinating material. It refers to the alleged supremacy of the Pope (Epistle of Pope Gregory VII to the Emperor Mauricius) and with extracts from Guicciardini's History of Italy touches upon the historical origins of the Papacy and its temporal aspirations. There are also included some letters from French Ambassador to Trent; epistle of Bishop of Five Churches to the Emperor Maximilian II about the Communion of the Cup and marriage of priests (issues deliberated and decided in Trent); a letter explaining the refusal of England to send representatives to the Council – material, in other words, that serves as complimentary as well as evidence to Sarpi’s text. I have compared it with the Italian edition, although scholars seem to agree that it is a faithful translation of the Italian edition.
papal Nuncio in Venice some years later (1609) gives evidence of Sarpi’s research:

He studies much and, it is said, is writing a book about the authority of the supreme Roman pontiff with the idea of having it printed abroad... 30

Sarpi indeed continued writing and working long after the Interdict, publishing his works abroad, for the most part. In this context, there is further information that may suggest his involvement in a greater behind-the-scenes anti-Papal plan, trying to create a general alliance of states with similar disposition towards the Curia, such as the British Isles and the Low Countries. The general plan was that there would be an invasion of the Italian peninsula with the ultimate aim an attack on the Papacy. In this direction, he was in communication with a number of key Protestant figures, the most prominent of whom, and the one with the most energetic part to play, was Sir Henry Wotton (1568-1639), three times English Ambassador to Venice (1604-10, 1616-19, 1621-3).31 It was in this context that an attempt to introduce the reformed religion into Venice came about, with the involvement of Giovanni Diodati, the ‘Protestant Pope’. The whole endeavour did not have the desired effect, partly because of Sarpi’s reluctance to commit to something so radical.32 Against this background, however, accusations about Sarpi’s (crypto) Protestantism become much more intelligible - of which, more in due course. Nevertheless, none of this series of intense activities would have occurred had it not been for the Interdict. It was this critical event that gave Sarpi a platform to present his views and gave him the possibility of putting them into practice and bringing about a diminution of Papal power. The close link between the friar’s entry into the active political life,

and the creativity that this spurred in him, necessitates, therefore, a closer inspection of the events of 1606-7 and the associated rhetoric from the confronting sides.

ii. Sarpi and the Interdict

As seen above, Sarpi’s most prolific period corresponded with what he perceived as his transition from the *vita contemplativa* to the *vita activa*. Even though he was gradually marginalised after the Interdict, these were the years during which he produced all of his significant works. The correlation, thus, between issues and arguments raised by the *Consigliere di stato* during the Veneto-Roman conflict and the views articulated in his works not immediately associated with the Interdict, should not be surprising. This section, in consequence, will give some details on the confrontation between Venice and the Curia and the principal positions of the two parties. It will then focus on some of Sarpi’s utterances during the Interdict clash, which will serve, in turn, as an appropriate context in which to situate or juxtapose the issues expressed in the *History of the Council of Trent*.

As David Wootton has very astutely remarked, there was nothing novel about the causes of the Venetian Interdict: the Republic’s rhetoric of sovereignty and independence in the management of ecclesiastical affairs had long been the object of the Papacy’s discontent.33 That Venice’s position appeared as an

obstacle to Papal policies in the Italian peninsula, was evidenced by the fact that censures against the Serenissima had occurred twice before in the past, first under Sixtus IV (1482) and later by Julius II (1509). The reasons alleged, however, at the beginning of the seventeenth century were of a somewhat different nature. The explanation of the two Papal briefs delivered to the College by the Nuncio on Christmas Day 1605 referred to issues of Church property rights and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Bull of Interdict and Excommunication of Paul V (Borghese, 1605-21) was finally issued on the 17th of April 1606, to which the Serenissima responded with an edict pronouncing the Bull to be null and void; the Venetian edict further instructed the clergy to disregard the Papal Bull and continue to perform their pastoral duties, or be expelled. Within the ensuing months it became quite clear that the situation had reached an impasse, as neither party would concede. The stalemate was only resolved with the mediation of France, through Cardinal Joyeuse (1562-1615). The Papal interdicts were removed and Venice revoked the relevant edict; the laws, however, that had led to the Interdict in the first place, were not withdrawn and the Republic did not publicly admit absolution from the Papal excommunication.

With regards to interpretations of the conflict, Bouwsma read into the Venetian Interdict a wider importance - not unduly when seen, as has been suggested by J.H.M. Salmon and Francis Oakley, in the context of a series of contests between the Pope and temporal powers during the critical years of

Interdict of 1606-1607", Catholic Historical Review 82 (1996), pp. 369-396 is very good on the ideological dimension.

35 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 372-3. This edict also led to the famous expulsion of the Jesuits from Venice; see ibid., pp. 374-75, 384-87.
More particularly, Bouwsma saw in the Venetian crisis of 1606-7 a reflection of the resurgence of the Papal claims to interference in temporal affairs, associated with the rhetoric of 'indirect power', vigorously pronounced in the writings of Cardinal Bellarmine. He particularly linked this resurgence, moreover, to the person of Pope Paul V, a Pope who 'ominously' named himself after Gian Petro Caraffa, the formidable - and mad - Paul IV (1555-59). The Interdict crisis attracted, indeed, a European-wide attention, coinciding, as it did, with another major controversy, over King James VI of Scotland and I of England’s attempt to establish an Oath of Allegiance (1606-7). In the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot, the Pope’s intervention was directed towards discouraging Catholics from taking the prescribed Oath. This concurrence of circumstances substantiates the idea that the two first decades of the seventeenth century witnessed a tension in the relations between the Papacy and lay rulers, especially when seen in connection with the assassination of Henry IV in France (1610) and the controversy instigated in the French Estates General over imposing an oath parallel to the Oath of Allegiance (1614). In fact, Venice itself addressed a European audience during its struggle with the Pope, in an attempt to attract support, and presented its case precisely within this


40 For a more detailed account on the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance and the arguments employed, see below, Ch. Four.
context: as one instance in the struggle between sovereign states and princes and Papal claims for intervention in temporal affairs.41

It is hardly surprising, then, that the twelve or so months of the crisis generated a deluge of pamphlet and other literature on the matter of sovereignty and jurisdiction from the two conflicting sides, Venice and the Papacy. The war of words, significantly, started with a publication by Sarpi. The Servite published translations of two short treatises against the abuse of the power of excommunication, originally composed by the famous theologian and adherent of Conciliar theory, Jean Gerson (1363-1429). Sarpi’s choice was alarming enough for the Curia. By electing to publish a text from the Conciliar and Gallican milieu, the Venetian skilfully situated the Republic’s defence in a long, rich and influential tradition that would invite support from a range of interested parties - first and foremost, France.42 The seriousness of the threat was met by the employment of Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine from the Papal camp, one of the chief advocates of the Roman positions and, ironically, one of Sarpi’s close acquaintances, a person whom he highly respected.43

More specifically, of particular importance for our purposes is the set of arguments that Sarpi employed in his struggle against Papal rhetoric. Two questions arise as regards the extent to which his polemic was representative of

42 The extent of Gallican assistance in the controversy can be exaggerated; the theologians of the Sorbonne were somewhat reluctant, but jurists such as Jacques Leschassier and Louis Servin did indeed publish on Venice’s defence. With regards to Sarpi’s immediate links, it seems that doctors of the Sorbonne like Edmund Richer sent him through Priuli, the Venetian Ambassador to France a list of works whose republication would have the desired effect. Richer himself republished a treatise of Gerson on excommunication (Apologia pro Ecclesiae et Consilii Auctoritate Adversus Joannis Gersouii, Doctoris Christianissimi, Oblrectatores, 1607), the same one that Sarpi had translated into Italian the year before; Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense*, p. 399; Oakley, ‘Complexities of Context’, pp. 386-87.
43 Oakley, ‘Complexities of Context’, p. 372 and Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense*, p. 395. In the aforementioned article Oakley offers an insightful and thorough analysis of the significance of Sarpi’s choice for publication, the reaction that caused on the Papal side and Bellarmine’s subsequent response.
Venetian policy. One refers to the discussion in the Introduction of the complex relation between theory and practice. That Sarpi’s proclamations about ecclesiastical and temporal jurisdictions cannot be considered as descriptive of actual Church-State relations in Venice is not of major significance for this study, as it focuses more on the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice model. The second problem, as to the degree that Sarpi’s views can be associated with the official state positions, is not pertinent in the following account, inasmuch as we accept that his writings served Venetian interests and were indeed used as part of the State’s defence. We will thus assume a basic identification in the cases presented by Sarpi and Venice. Besides, when Venetian policies towards Rome changed after the end of the crisis, it should be recalled, the Republic was quick to disassociate itself from Sarpi’s positions.

The central line of reasoning of the Consigliere di stato during the confrontation was the basic assumption of the existence of two separate and autonomous spheres, the temporal and the spiritual. This fundamental duality was for him also reflected in terms of jurisdiction: the two authorities, the lay

---

and the ecclesiastical could not, and ought not, to interfere in the province of the other.\textsuperscript{45}

God has instituted two governments in the world, one spiritual and one temporal, each of them supreme and independent from the other. One of these is the ecclesiastical ministry, the other is the political governance. He has given the spiritual to the care of the prelates, the temporal to the princes ... Therefore where the salvation of souls is involved all men, including princes, are subject to the ecclesiastics; but where public tranquillity and civil life are involved all men, including ecclesiastics, are subject to the prince.\textsuperscript{46}

On the basis of this principle, the Roman attack signified for Sarpi a breach of the spiritual limits: the legislation for which Venice was reprimanded was of a temporal nature, and Rome’s interference was an infringement upon the Republic’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{47} From Sarpi’s (and the Republic’s) standpoint, the clergy was for the sake of public benefit equally obliged to abide by laws of the secular authority. The particular argument employed by the State that maintained the theory of dual authority had a long tradition. Frequently utilised in the middle Ages during the Caesaro-Papal struggles, it was alternatively put forth by the weaker side, with the objective of establishing limitations to the powers and area of influence of the rival party. Originally constructed in a way as to contest the hierocratic way of thinking, it served as defence of the temporal jurisdiction. The core of the theocratic theory was the concept of unity in earthly and divine matters; there was not and could not be any separation between them, since temporal things existed for a spiritual end. For the Papal advocates the denominations of temporal and spiritual power merely described jurisdiction granted by the Pope to laymen and clerics respectively; they did not signify the existence of two powers, but that there is a \textit{potestas duplex}.\textsuperscript{48} The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} Cf. Sarpi’s consulto of 1611, as cited in Bouwsma, \textit{Venice and the Defense}, p. 490.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Sarpi, from a consulto of 1608, cited in Bouwsma, \textit{Venice and the Defense}, p. 540.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Cf. \textit{Venice and the Defense}, p. 400.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ironically, of course, the Papal idea itself had developed as a response to Imperial divine-right theories, and had only switched to the offensive during the years of Gregory VII. For very elaborate and penetrating discussions on these issues see Michael Wilks, \textit{The Problem of...}
\end{itemize}
persistence of this rhetoric up until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is evidenced by the appearance of reformulations in writings by Vitoria (c. 1483-1543), Suárez (1548-1617), and Bellarmine, among others. The latter was one of the staunchest advocates of the theory of the Pope’s indirect power; according to his version, the Pontiff had the prerogative deriving from his spiritual authority to intervene in temporal things on occasions, for the advancement of spiritual good. More to the point, the persistence of this rhetoric is important for us because it appears in the arguments used by the Papal side during the Venetian Interdict.

Two things were principally questioned from the Venetian side: the precedence of spiritual power over temporal concerns, and the authority of the Pope. The two points are important. That lay jurisdiction (or politics in general) has a separate and autonomous existence from the spiritual and ecclesiastical sphere, was one of the Republic’s firmest positions. It was a stance, moreover, that could find validation in the famous words of Christ ‘Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s’ and ‘My Kingdom is not of this world’. The second dictum was, in fact, printed as a frontispiece in Sarpi’s response to Bellarmine, while both mottos appeared in the famous procession

---

Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages. The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists. (Cambridge: CUP, 1963), chs. 1&2; and Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen & Co, 1961), parts I&II.


50 Thus in the De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Rebus Temporalibus, ‘the Pope as Pope directly and immediately has no temporal power but only a spiritual power; nevertheless by reason of his spiritual power he has at least indirectly a power in temporal things, which is a supreme power (eamque supremam)’; cited in Murray, ‘Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power’, p. 496.


52 John, 18:36 and Matthew 22:21 respectively; cf. also Mark, 12:17.

53 Apologia per le Oppositioni Fatte dall’ Illustrissimo, & Reverendissimo Signor Cardinalio Bellarmino alli Trattati, et Risolutioni di Gio. Gersone sopra la Validità delle Scommuniche (Venice, 1606); the frontispiece is also reproduced in Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 12.
of the *Corpus Christi* of 1606 that had been converted into a powerful public statement on behalf of Venice.\(^5^4\) With the assertion that God's kingdom belonged to a different world, it followed that the holders of spiritual office did not have any jurisdiction within this world; their function ought to be severely limited to 'spiritual things, that is administration of the Sacraments, indulgences, masses, divine offices and burials'.\(^5^5\) This world was to be managed by lay rulers, whose end was temporal peace and public benefit. This view amounted to a claim for an independent existence of politics, in direct contrast to the assertion that all types of earthly government were included in 'the City of God, which is the Church Universal'. Bellarmine's inherent conclusion was, thus, that the aims of politics were inferior to the spiritual.\(^5^6\) The same case was eloquently made by Bovio (Giovanni Antonio, c. 1560-1622) in the following useful extract:

> Politics and religion cannot rule in distinct countries separated by mountains, rivers, or other boundaries; because every community of men, like every man in himself, being made by God and subject to him, must have within itself religion, with which it renders to God due tribute of worship and adoration. ... Now we see which of the two must be subordinated to the other. Politics undertakes to procure the felicity of this earthly life, religion that of celestial life. Politics ordains the whole body of the republic under an earthly prince, religion orders both the entire republic and its head under the supreme Head and Lord God. Politics rules and governs earthly things, religion directs them to the eternal. Politics is occupied for the most part with what pertains to the body and to corporal things, religion with that which concerns the salvation of souls. Who does not see clearly, therefore, that just as man is subject to God and the body to the soul, and just as this life is ordained as the way to the heavenly fatherland and these earthly things as a stairway to celestial, so politics is subject and subordinate to religion, and the prince and temporal government to the head of religion and of the church?\(^5^7\)

---

\(^5^4\) In the procession, there was a series of representations which dramatised the Venetian cause against the Pope; the congregations of the secular priests, most of the orders of the regulars and the *scuole grandi* participated, the latter contributing numerous tableaux bearing scenes and mottos that proclaimed the distinctions between sacred and secular authority. Cf. Wotton, *Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton*, vol. I, p. 350, Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense*, pp. 389-90 and Edward Muir, 'Images of Power: Art and Pageantry in Renaissance Venice', *American Historical Review* 84 (1979); pp. 48-9.


\(^5^7\) Bovio, *Lettera al R. P. M. Paolo Rocca nella quale si Discorre sopra a due Lettere del Doge e Senato di Vinetia al Clero e Popolo del suo Stato et sopra a due altre Scritture intorno alla Validità delle Censure da
Rome’s view of government of temporal things as inferior and corrupt—very much corresponding to Lipsius’ analysis of political life—was expressed in the accusation made against Venice as a state adherent to the base rule of *ragione di stato* that disregarded the superior divine principles. 58 Sarpi himself was equally warned that he would be held to account in heaven for having ‘abandoned God for the world, the cloister for the court, and religion for politics’. 59

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Venetians insisted on the idea of two separate and autonomous spheres of equal significance, maintaining that a distinct set of rules was applicable to politics. This is analogous to Lipsius again. His notion of prudence as we saw it developed in the previous chapter, meant that practicality and flexibility had to be the chief attitudes in political affairs. Equally, in the face of Papal criticisms of corrupting politics, the Republic and Sarpi in particular, charged Rome with quite the opposite: he accused the Curia of debasing religion. Sarpi avowed that over the centuries the Papacy had degenerated into an institution only concerned with mundane things, such as temporal gains, and that the interdiction against the Serenissima was a prime example of this attitude, since Venice could be perceived as an obstacle to the temporal supremacy of the Pope. Instead of working towards superior spiritual ends, the heirs of St. Peter had abused their power for profit:

Thus he [the Pope] has renounced all the offices that Christ gave to St. Peter: to preach, to teach, to minister the sacraments, to feed the flock of Christ; and he has transformed

---

this pastoral office into a fiscality etc. as though the glory of God did not consist in the salvation of souls and internal goodness but only in these external things. 60

It is essential to recognise the deep historical perspective that Sarpi had developed in understanding the circumstances of his world, a sign of which are the several titles of Histories he composed. The Venetian traced the answer to the decline and corrosion of the Church in the past; he more specifically situated the beginnings of it in the separation of the Western and Eastern parts of the Empire, with the Papacy’s assumption of control of the fractured Italian peninsula over the fifth to the eighth centuries.61 Set against the background of the early Christianity, all Papal claims for supremacy were nothing more than usurpations that occurred at a particularly difficult time in the past. Within this interpretation, the spiritual censure of the excommunication against princes was one of a number of Papal abuses of power, just as interdiction had no precedent in the primitive church.62 The distancing between clergy and laity, equally, and the exclusion of the latter from the all-encompassing name of the *Ecclesia* or congregation of the faithful were for Sarpi entirely unacceptable and unfounded.63 Furthermore, Sarpi - as many other Catholics of his age - contended that the question of the Pope’s unrestrained and tyrannical rule of

60 Cited in Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defence*, p. 460.
61 Significantly, Prof. Ullmann gives a similar account of the development of the Western Church - in contrast to the Eastern - in his *Principles of Government*, pp. 110-14. He suggests that in the East, due to a long history and tradition of politics, there existed a historical conception of Empire, within which the Church was merely a department, and the Emperor was the head. The Church, as a result, 'could not only not take action against its head, but was also dependent on him.' In the West, due to absence of similar political tradition, the Church was wholly independent of any king or emperor; the Western *respublica Christiana* was an ecclesiastical unit. In adopting a historical view that reached back to the early Christianity and the Emperor Constantine, thus, Sarpi gave primacy to the political - as opposed to the Western/Papal point of view that 'did not and could not rest on history, but on the a-historical consideration of the primacy of the Pope through the medium of the Petrine commission'.
62 In his *consulto* of 28 Jan 1606 Sarpi supported that interdiction had no precedent in the primitive church but was of relatively recent origin; cited in Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defence*, p. 369.
the institution of the Church, without Conciliar check, and by extension the question of Pope's superiority over the Council were not in any way settled. In this respect, the History of the Council of Trent, our specific concern here, can be placed within a wider perspective. For Bouwsma, it marked the transition between an idyllic and pure past of the early Church, described by Sarpi in the History of Benefices, and the contemporary decay, evidenced by the Interdict and its History. What is important for our analysis, is that Sarpi placed the crux of the problem in the assumption by the Church of authorities that were properly under the lay jurisdiction. He criticised, namely, the breaching of the limits between the two domains, the profane and the sacred.

Having discussed the close association between Sarpi's entrance into the active world of politics, the positions he advanced as the official adviser on theological matters during the Interdict dispute and his greater historical perspective, it is time to consider the work that furnishes our main interest, the History of the Council of Trent. To start with, it is important to have some understanding of the circumstances surrounding its publication in London in 1619.

---

64 Cf. Oakley, 'Complexities of Context', pp. 379 and 385, 389-91; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 462; Jedin, however, disagrees: his view is that Conciliar theory, although not yet vanished in the mid-16th century, was generally losing ground; he concedes, however, that the general idea that any Church problems ought to be resolved within a Council had become somewhat dominant: 'The struggle was not about Sacrosancta, but about Frequens: in other words, the great concern was not so much the question of the supremacy of the Council as the holding of a Council there and then': Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent, 2 vols., trans. Dom Ernest Graf (Thomas Nelson and Sons: London, 1957-61); vol. I, ch. 2; quotation on p. 61. 65 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 580.
II.
The History of the Council of Trent

i. Publication and Reception

The story of the publication of the work is germane within the subject matter of this study, as it reflects the process through which ideas and concepts travelled. It offers an indication, furthermore, of the broad and common interest in certain specific notions, although during the process of their appropriation these notions were modified according to the particular environment and context in which they were received. The first publication of the History of the Council of Trent in London in 1619 opens a wide range of perspectives in our understanding of the framework of the circulation of ideas, as it is a tale almost as fascinating as the work itself.66 Publishing anonymously and abroad was a common practice after the establishment of the Index of prohibited books, and was carried out particularly in the case of dangerous books that would bring the wrath of Rome.67 As we have seen, Sarpi was already Rome’s target; having been marginalised, moreover, by the Venetian state, after the end of the Interdict, he would have felt safer to publish abroad.68

Thus the first edition of the History in Italian came from a printer to King James VI and I and had the royal coat-of-arms on the title page. The author was named as Pietro Soave Polano an anagram of Paolo Sarpio, Veneto and the

---

67 Although Rome had already published two Indices, one in 1557 and one in 1559, it was only after the Council of Trent that a formal decision was taken to establish the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (1564). See Index des Livres Interdits, vol. VIII: Index de Rome, 1557, 1559, 1564, pp. 25-108.
68 Cf. for example the case of Leon Modena, a Venetian Jew (1571-1648) whose Historia de’ Riti Hebraici (written 1614-15), was published in Paris in 1637, with great anxiety by its author; Marc R. Cohen (ed.), The Autobiography of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1988), pp. 11-12 and 29. With regard to Sarpi, note that besides the pamphlets directly linked to the Interdict crisis, Sarpi’s works were either intended for publication abroad, or came out posthumously.
dedication was to King James I, signed by Marco Antonio de Dominis, Archbishop of Spalato (1560-1624). The association of the name of Sarpi with De Dominis is particularly worthy of note, because it gives us an idea about the reception of Sarpi’s work in the British Isles. De Dominis was known for his anti-papal convictions, but was mostly famous for his flight to England, in 1616, where he converted to Anglicanism. His migration, for which he quoted his ‘quest for truth’ and ‘distaste against the corruptions of Rome’, had caused a sensation among his contemporaries. He also seems to have had a keen interest in the reconciliation of the Eastern and Western Churches, and of the Protestant and Catholic ones. This was partly the subject of his massive, three-volume work, De Republica Ecclesiastica (London and Edinburgh, 1617-22). It was thought for some time that de Dominis was the person who secured the copy of the History directly from Sarpi himself, and brought it with him to England; this hypothesis had been founded in the somewhat ambiguous phrasing of the dedicatory epistle, signed by De Dominis. After meticulous research, however, it has been established by the work of Frances Yates and Gaetano Cozzi that De Dominis’ involvement amounted to nothing more than the final editing of the text. The protagonists involved in acquiring and publishing the manuscript were, in fact, none other than King James himself and George Abbot.

---


70 De Dominis had, in fact, taken part in the Interdict Controversy, with two (anonymous) books, on the side of Venice. (Patterson, King James VI and I, pp.226-7). Among his other works, were Papatus Romanus (1617) and The Rockes of Christian Shipwracke (1618), both anti-papal. He also contributed to the controversy over Arminianism, by writing to the Synod of Dort (1618-9). He eventually returned to Rome, where he was arrested as heretic and died while in prison.

71 From his book Concilium Profectionis (or A Manifestation of the Motives); cited in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 30.

72 See the text in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, pp. 40-1.
Archbishop of Canterbury.73 The Archbishop of Spalato, however, as the person who added the epistle to the reader and also an aggressive subtitle - echoed in the English translation - furnished the work with an overtly polemical tone not really matching the subtlety of Sarpi’s style of writing.74

Evidence for what may have happened in actuality is provided in the dedicatory epistle to Archbishop Abbot in the first English edition. Nathaniel Brent, an ecclesiastical lawyer and the scholar who translated the work, writes:

This book I have translated out of Italian into our vulgar language, presuming to commend it to the royal protection of his sacred Majestie, for whose sake (as some reasons induce me to believe) it was principally composed. And because I undertooke this worke at your Graces command, who have beene the chiefest cause why the originall crossed the Seas before the just nativitie of it, and saw the first light within his Majesties dominions...  

A similar view is found in Izaak Walton’s Life of Wotton, first published in 1651,76 but the most conclusive evidence for the involvement of Archbishop Abbot has been located in some letters of Basil Brent, Nathaniel Brent’s son, published in 1705. These show that Brent was in Venice during 1618, at the Archbishop’s request, in order to secure the text, which he smuggled back to England with the assistance of a network of Dutch merchants, in several instalments.77 It seems, moreover, that Brent was sent to Italy by the Archbishop, under order from the King, for the specific purpose of securing a transcription of Sarpi’s manuscript of the History.

73 Cozzi, Opere, p. 729.
74 In which (Besides the Ordinarie Actes of the Councell) are Declared Many Notable Occurences, which Happened in Christendome, During the Space of Fourtie Yeeres and More. And Particularly, the Practises of the Court of Rome, to Hinder the Reformation of their Errors, and to Maintaine their Greatnesse. For Sarpi’s style, see below.
75 Cited in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 44. For Nathaniel Brent (1573/4-1652) see the relevant article by A. J. Hegarty in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography; apart from Archbishop Abbot, he had close connections with Sir Dudley Carleton, with whom Lievsay suggests he was related.
76 See Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 45.
77 See also the relevant letters Basil Brent (son of Nathaniel), and the correspondence between Abbott and Brent, while the latter was in Venice, as cited in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 47
James VI and I's involvement is especially notable. The King's awareness of the composition of the work and his specific interest in its contents in terms of his own policies, are clear from the following letter, sent to him by Sir Henry Wotton, the English ambassador in Venice:

The book of Maestro Paolo touching the Council of Trent is newly finished. It containeth many rare things never discovered before, and surely be of much benefit to the Christian Church, if it may be published both in Italian and in Latin. Whereunto the author, upon your Majesty's persuasion, doth well incline; but I have not yet received his full resolution which he will take about his own person.78

The value of Sarpi to James's political stance is further witnessed by the earlier invitation to the Venetian by the Stuart King in 1612, transmitted through Sir Dudley Carleton, to make his home in England.79 This was, of course, consistent with the widely acknowledged policy of James of offering patronage to fugitive intellectual figures who also suited his greater plans; thinkers of the likes of Isaac Casaubon and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), advocates of ideas of religious reconciliation, had been entertained and found shelter at his Court.80 The suggestion for James's crucial involvement is further confirmed by another letter of Wotton, sent in June 1619. In the letter, Wotton reports to his King that he has been telling the German princes:

of a discourse that was ready to come abroad, wherein should be discovered by a great intelligent man ... all the practices of the Council of Trent, out of the original registers and secret papers; wherein your Majesty had a hand for the benefit of the Christian world.81

Various interpretations have also been offered on the question of who provided the inspiration for Sarpi's undertaking of the work. In this vein, Professor Cozzi suggested that it was Sir Dudley Carleton who convinced Sarpi

to publish the work as a history, instead of his original idea of a collection of relevant documents. Carleton, a staunch Calvinist and thus an opponent to conciliatory positions, was accordingly keen to expose the Council of Trent in an unfavourable manner. The trigger for Sarpi, according to Cozzi, was a book by Carleton’s cousin, *Consensus Ecclesiae Catholicae Contra Tridentinos*, which the English Ambassador presented to him.\(^8^2\) True or not, the detail about Carleton illustrates perfectly the employment of one work for a range of purposes: in contrast to James’s embracing of Sarpi’s work for eirenistic reasons, Carleton promoted it for the exact opposite. Despite their conflicting starting points, however, both parties agreed about its strongly anti-papal character, which corresponded well with the more general outlook of the whole of the British Isles. Across the Channel, the comments by the French (Catholic) scholar Peiresc, who was alert to the different readings to which the text could be subjected, give an indication of the reception of the *History*. He complained that the preface, signed by De Dominis, threatened to discredit a great work in the eyes of those ‘who are not of his opinion’. Similarly, the preface would prevent the *History* from making its way into the hands of Roman Catholics and even Italy; \(^8^3\) indeed, the work was placed under the Index almost immediately.\(^8^4\)

Above all, what the above reactions to the publication indicate is the richness in substance and scope of the *History*; Sarpi had composed a magisterial text of astute criticism and of unsurpassable style that offered a great deal of material to be used for various purposes – first and foremost, however, it constituted a challenge to the official Roman version of the Council.

---


\(^8^3\) Cited in Patterson, *King James VI and I*, p. 248.

Sarpi was convinced that his challenge was warranted: the Acts of Trent had not been published for everyone to see what had transpired in that Synod, and various sides had particular reservations about the way matters were handled in the Council.\textsuperscript{85} Sarpi, who was more than anyone else a committed opponent of Rome, and had faced the real implications of the outcome of Trent with the Papal assertions of temporal supremacy, would not let the ‘deceit’ about the proceedings continue for any longer. His text was thus an exposition of the ‘real’ and ‘definitive’ version of the story of Trent. Sarpi’s declaration at the beginning of his History is plain enough in maintaining this: ‘My purpose is to write the History of the Council of Trent’. He justified his undertaking by asserting there had not appeared so far a study that adequately related the causes and the events of the Council.

I wil relate the causes and managings of an Ecclesiasticall Conuocation, by some, for diuers ends, and by diuers meanes procured and hastened, by some hindered and deferred for the space of 22. yeeres: and for 18. yeeres more, sometimes assembled, sometimes dissolved, alwayes celebrated with diuers intentions, and which hath gotten a forme and conclusion contrary altogether to the deseigne of them that procured it, and to the feare of those, that with all diligence disturbed it; a cleere instruction for vs to referre our selues to God, and not to trust in the wisedome of man.\textsuperscript{86}

Sarpi thus dissects the history of the Council for the reader. He narrates the twofold story of what for him was the ‘catastrophe’ of the Council; the failure of the reform movement at Trent was in his view directly linked with the controversy and the conflict that dominated the whole undertaking, the corruption and the behind-the-scenes intrigue, all of which he compellingly exposes.

For this Council desired and procured by godly men, to reunite the Church which began to be diuided, hath so established the Schisme, and made the parties so obstinate, that

\textsuperscript{85} Cf. History, p. 136. For an outline of the History’s subject matter, see Appendix VI.
\textsuperscript{86} History, p. 1.
The discords are become irreconciliable: and being managed by Princes for reformation of Ecclesiastical discipline, hath caused the greatest deformation that euer was since Christianity did begin... and hoped for by the bishops .... 87

The above extracts give a clear indication of Sarpi’s distinctive method and style of writing. As both these features impress mostly upon the reader, they deserve at least a cursory reference in this examination of the work. Assessing them will also facilitate two other tasks. It will contribute, first, to our understanding of a work as complex as the History is, and the intentions of the author. Second, an analysis of Sarpi’s approach will add substance to the idea set out in the Introduction, that political and religious ideas during the period under consideration were developed not only in what would be classified as religious or political treatises, but in a variety of tracts. Equally important, in this context, is Eric Cochrane’s observation that Sarpi’s History stands some halfway between sacred and profane history.88 This is consistent with the scope and the basic assumptions of this thesis, as Sarpi’s text represents a combination of two languages, the theological and the humanistic. It is also a detail that is further symptomatic of the process of the delineation of disciplines and redefinition of basic concepts such as sacred and profane or divine and temporal and of the resultant fluidity of such notions. This section of the chapter, therefore, intends to consider the author’s alleged sources, the particular method he used in approaching the topic and the style in which he presented it to his audience.

That the Council of Trent was a life-long preoccupation for Sarpi has been referred to already, yet Sarpi was also eager to publicise his early interest in the proceedings of the Council to his readers:

For my selfe, so soone as I had vnderstanding of the affaires of the world, I became exceeding curious to know the whole proceedings thereof [the Council]: and after I had diligently read whatsoeuer I found written, and the publique instructions, whether printed or diuulged by pen, I betooke my selfe, without sparing either paines or care, to search in the remainder of the writings of the Prelates, and others who were present in

87 History, p. 2
In terms of actual sources, we know that Sarpi had personally met a number of people who had taken part in the Council themselves and examined their memoranda, notes and so forth. His acquaintance with Camillo Olivio, for instance, the secretary to the Legate Cervini (1501-55, later Pope Marcellus II), provided him with some valuable material from the latter. Sarpi had also met with Cardinal Castagna in Rome, who had taken part in the second phase of the Council as the president of various commissions. He also had at his disposal the letters of Cardinal del Monte (Giovanni Maria del Monte, later Pope Julius III, 1550-5) one of the Papal Legates, while he was aware of the correspondence of Arnaud du Ferrier, the French Ambassador to the Council, with whom he was in communication. The reliability of his sources, however, and the way he used them, is harder to verify. Historians are in accord that Sarpi’s composition includes some degree of his own inventiveness: in the manner of ancient historians, he would generally fill any gaps in the information he had, and put arguments and orations into the mouth of the assembled dignitaries. The extent to which he has manipulated his material is, nonetheless, difficult to ascertain, as not all of the notes at his disposal have survived.

Yet the most significant aspect of Sarpi’s History from our point of view is not so much its accuracy, but the fact that it is a work that divides its attention equally between the ‘political’ and the religious sides of dealings relating to the

---

89 *History*, p. 1.
90 See below for Sarpi’s claims on his sources within the text of the *History* itself.
Council. Hence, even though the author's intention was to compose the history of the Council, the analysis of the developments outside Trent - both before as well as during the Council - was for him of equal importance. This consideration should be taken as a reflection of his understanding of the dynamics of the Council as largely associated with the outside political factors, while it should serve, at the same time, as a direction in any attempt to review Sarpi's interpretation. The originality of his method has been described as an 'incorporation of sacred history into humanist history' or as an application of 'humanist historiographical standards to sacred history'. This approach, however, should be seen against the perspective of the author's position; it is no coincidence that this work was the product of a person deeply involved in both spheres of life and learning, the sacred and the profane. Sarpi's theological training and his place as a member of the Servite order were combined with an excellent humanist education and a significant involvement in 'active' political life, all of which are aspects incorporated in his pronounced title as official 'state-theologian'. Whereas Charron and Lipsius composed distinct works on the different domains of the sacred and profane (public and private), divine and temporal, Sarpi managed to integrate the two into a single undertaking.

The History is a problem-centred work; it seeks to answer the question of what the reasons were for the failure, according to the author's view, of the Council of Trent to reconcile the divisions of Christendom and reform the abuses of the Church. It is with this task at hand that Sarpi narrates the causes and proceedings of the Council. It can be surmised that Sarpi's intention was to present to the world the perspective of the side that had, in fact, lost in the Council. Sarpi was acutely aware that the defeated side in the Council was

---

92 At a rough estimation Sarpi devotes four of the eight books in purely theological discussions and the other four in the political developments surrounding the Council.

93 Cf. Cochrane, Historians and Historiography, p. 476.
made up of a consortium of forces - the temporal princes, the bishops, the
Protestants, and ultimately, the Church, in the shape of the reforming elements
within the institution. Nonetheless, he was also conscious of the fact that these
otherwise disparate forces were strongly united by one common cause: their
anti-papal objectives. Sarpi, therefore, reveals in his work the part of the history
that was obscured by the triumph of the papal policies in the Council and
demonstrates, in this manner, that what by his time was regarded as (papal)
orthodoxy was just one version of the truth - one version of religion
(Christianity) and one form of perceiving relations between political and
ecclesiastical issues.\footnote{Cf. Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain and the Papacy: Paolo Sarpi and the Renaissance Tradition' in E.

It is thus important in understanding his interpretation to underline the fact, that his recounting of political events and the circumstances
in the run-up, but also running parallel to the Council, do not form the
background of the discussions taking place in that small Italian town, but a vital
part of the author's understanding and analysis.

It is essential to stress Sarpi's competence as a narrator. Despite the
History's length and comprehensiveness, the author manages to maintain the
interest of the reader throughout the work. In order to achieve this, Sarpi has
magisterially imitated the technique of an ancient tragedy. That he treats his
subject as a drama or an epic is intimated in his description of the history of the
Council very early in the text as the 'Iliad' of his time.\footnote{History, p. 2.}

Accordingly, the story is initially announced in the prelude, then the scene is set, and the plot is gradually
developed starting with the building up to the Council. The narrative reaches a
peak twice: the first time with the disappointment of the Protestant arrival
(Book Four), while the second time the climax is much more powerful with the
intensity of the discussions on the Communion of the Cup, residence and
episcopal jurisdiction (Books Six and Seven). The story finally reaches its closure with Lorraine’s involvement and the conclusion of the Council (Books Seven and Eight).96 The dramatic effect, which has generally been overlooked by scholars, is accentuated by Sarpi’s intervention at every stage, preparing the reader for what to expect, as is the announcement, for instance, of the significance the issue of episcopal residence was going to assume at later stages of the Council.97

Furthermore, the text’s appeal lies in the fact that Sarpi emerges throughout it as a very conscious and immediate writer. His appreciation that he is addressing an interested audience is evident, as is his awareness that his work will cause some reaction among the readers, and that his positions will be put under scrutiny. As a result, although the History is on the whole a straightforward narrative, he very animatedly diverts intermittently from the pure sequence of events in order to speak directly to the reader. The aim and function of these short intervals is different each time; they have the overall effect, however, that they give the reader a greater sense of involvement in the story. A number of times he refers to the practical problems he encountered in the course of composing the text, and his choice of method. In this context, he occasionally excuses himself for all the details that he had to incorporate in the text, reassuring the reader that all the particulars of his account are of some importance:

Some that reade this relation may thinke it superfluous, because it containeth matter of small weight: but, contrarily, the writer of the Storie hath thought it necessarie to make knowne, from how small riuers, so great a lake, which possesseth all Europe, hath been raised....98

97 Cf. the effect of ‘proeconomia’ (προοιμονή) practised by ancient Greek authors, who forewarned their audience of what was about to follow.
Yet the most effective and important type of intervals are unquestionably Sarpi’s discussions on specific issues relevant to or debated in the Council. The ‘discourses of the author’ on a specific subject are explanatory passages of one to two pages in length, usually preceding the narrative of the relevant topic. All the crucial issues, thus, such as the role of the Councils throughout the ages and the way in which decisions were made in them (‘giving voices’), considerations on Indulgences, monastic exemptions, residence, plurality of benefices, episcopal jurisdiction, prohibition of books (Index), are treated by the author under the guise of explaining to the reader the origin and development of the problem. These discourses serve the task of identifying the topics that matter most for the author and draw the readers’ attention to them; they also reveal what we can reasonably assume to be very close to – if not indeed Sarpi’s own - point of view on the specific subject.

Of additional interest is Sarpi’s frequent allusion to his sources; throughout the text he appears somewhat anxious to confirm their reliability. Several short interludes, thus, are devoted to reassuring the reader that everything in the text derives from material he had confidentially collected from people personally involved in the Council. These confirmations add to the general impression conveyed in the text, of the History as an impersonal, rational and objective discourse. This impression is also advanced by Sarpi’s style of writing. In the History, the author moves between presenting aspects of a fascinating subject in an engaging way, and exhaustive analyses and narration of detail, that make at times for a dry and monotonous read. The History is a text

---

99 See the discourse of the author on Indulgences (History, p. 4); on the issue of ‘giving voices’ (pp. 135-7); on residence (pp. 216-8); on exemptions (pp. 220-1); on benefices and their plurality (pp. 250-1); on episcopal jurisdiction (pp. 330-3) on prohibition of books/ Index (pp. 472-3).

100 Here are also some examples: pp. 42, 114. With regard to the Decree for the translation of the Council, pp. 268, 517, 706, 815.
that demands the undisturbed attention of the reader.\textsuperscript{101} In this manner, it presents itself as a scientific work that speaks to the reader's intellect, thus distinguishing itself from works that sought to make an impact on emotion through rhetoric.\textsuperscript{102} The author appears distant and wholly detached from the proceedings, while his voice seems present only in order to recount the events. As one is gradually immersed in the text, however, one becomes increasingly aware of the author's personal input in the form of irony and sarcasm towards incidents and protagonists of the story. Sarpi's expression of approval or disapproval occurs in a very indirect manner, employing the method of an 'immensely complex Renaissance dialogue' as Bouwsma has described it.\textsuperscript{103} Thus, his voice is to be traced in a variety of arguments throughout the course of the narrative, and more specifically, to the remarks from several groups of people whom he suggestively names as 'men of understanding', 'godly and well disposed men', or 'those of the wiser sort'.\textsuperscript{104} This type of commentary usually follows statements primarily on the part of the Pope or the Emperor, the two most powerful men upon whom the fate of the Council and reform depended. Sarpi assesses the Tridentine decrees in a similar mode, by referring extensively to how these were censured in Germany, the principal domain of opposition to the manner in which the Council was conducted.\textsuperscript{105}

Sarpi likewise influences the understanding of the reader, emphasising what he regards as the most significant issues by announcing them, as it will be

\textsuperscript{101} Cf. Cochrane, \textit{Historians and Historiography}, pp. 476-7, where he talks about the 'morass of details' and the possibility that 'readers might be falling asleep' with them.
\textsuperscript{102} Cf. Bodin's description of a good historian as 'rid of all emotions': 'There are ... three kinds of historian, I think: first, those very able by nature, and even more richly endowed by training, who have advanced to the control of affairs ... The best writers are equipped on all three counts, if only they could rid themselves of all emotions in writing history'; \textit{Method for the Easy Comprehension of History}, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia UP, 1945), p. 43.
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Venice and the Defense}, p. 572.
\textsuperscript{104} Cf. Cozzi, \textit{Opere}, p. 735. For examples see pp. 12, 17-8, 41, 45-6, 63, 163, 228-9, 320-1, 789-92.
recalled, before they take place in the story - as he notably does with the issues of residence and the reformation of the Princes.\textsuperscript{106} Sarpi’s style is captivating: it is so successful in mesmerising the reader, that as one is drawn further into the narration, one feels compelled to agree with the author. It thus becomes apparent, that what at first is presented as a dispassionate distance on behalf of the author is an illusion.\textsuperscript{107} His carefully allocated scorn and censure of men and events, his cynicism and sarcasm generate what is, essentially, a morally charged history; for Sarpi there is, in fact, something to blame for the situation of Christendom and the subsequent failure of reform through the Council: the Papacy. The Friar’s stance on the Church’s faults is very specific. This is further underlined by his treatment of the ‘political’ figures in the work: even though Sarpi recognises and calls attention to the mishandlings and shortcomings of the Emperor Charles, for instance, or the French kings, he however makes allowances for them. Sarpi’s distinct attitude towards the two authorities should remind us of Lipsius’s different treatment of the public and private; for both authors the conventions of the political or public domain are much more accommodating - and consequently much less subject to moral principles. The Church, on the other hand, as an institution representative of, and in direct communion with the divine sphere, that addresses the private needs and contemplations of the individual, is subject to an unconditional notion of morality; in other words, the Church for Sarpi has no excuses for the vices that had led to its current corruption.

The question of whether Sarpi’s History is ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ rather than ‘unscientific’ and ‘partisan’ has some bearing on the question of whether it is, in essence, the work of a contemplative or of a man of action. Simply put, it

\textsuperscript{106} History, p. 617; and p. 761 \textsuperscript{107} Cf. also p. 218 where the author refers to the issue residence (1546).
reflects the much debated question of whether it is a work of propaganda with ulterior intentions or just an individualistic view of a remarkable thinker. Historians have long been in disagreement on the issue. Whereas David Wootton, for example, sees the History as the product of a Sarpi retired from and disillusioned by political life, Bouwsma was conversely convinced that during the composition of the work the Servite was still an active political agent, albeit marginalised from the official Venetian line of policy.108 Although the question is rendered partially redundant in view of the fact that any kind of history is subject to the author’s personal and particular circumstances, the problem of intention and personal stance remains. What is more, it becomes more complicated a propos the History of the Council of Trent as Sarpi’s approach in the text is fundamentally negative and disapproving, offering very little indication of any systematic views of his own.109 To surmise, thus, and reconstruct from his negative standpoint Sarpi’s ‘positive’ viewpoint, namely what he regarded as the proper state of affairs in the allocation of authority and the role of morality in the political and ecclesiastical domain, will be the object of the next section of this chapter.110

iii. The History of the Council of Trent: Themes and Ideas

Following the discussion of the style and the method employed in the composition of the History, we can now consider the ideas underpinning the text. In order to define the Venetian’s stance on the relationship between

---

108 See Wotton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 47, 64-8, 105 and 114-5; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 512-3. Cf. also his remark that Sarpi’s view of history was utilitarian: not a matter for idle contemplation, but an instrument of the active life (p. 598).
110 Cf. Bouwsma: ‘The polemical vigor of the I storia del Concilio Tridentino should not be allowed to obscure the positive convictions on which Sarpi’s attack on the Council was based’; Venice and the Defense, p. 583.
political and ecclesiastical affairs, it is particularly important to examine some of the central themes of the work more closely. That Sarpi’s bias is eloquently reflected in his interpretation of the Council’s outcome notwithstanding, his specific positions are more difficult to define, given that the text under consideration is a historical work, and thus inherently a less immediate discourse. It has already been shown, however, how Sarpi’s own ideas, even though disguised, do appear in the History: interwoven within the narrative, and in the words of numerous persons throughout the text, they need to be drawn out. We can thus arrive at conclusions about his positions though the comments, remarks and discourses that he incorporates in the main body of the narrative.

The issues arising in such an extensive and complex work as the History are, certainly, numerous; nonetheless, Sarpi’s interpretation can be reduced to some basic concerns. As in most of his other works, the single most significant issue that preoccupies him in the History is the limits between temporal and ecclesiastical authority: in his reading, this is the crux of the reasons behind the failure of the Council. As we have seen, the perceived increased preoccupation of the Papacy with worldly matters and the Holy See’s outlook as temporal principality was, for him, directly linked to the ‘abuses’ and the institutional decline of the Church that led to the Lutheran protest in the first place; it was, furthermore, the most important reason behind the disastrous outcome of the Council. Assembled with the aim to reform the Church and reunite Christianity, its result was for Sarpi the exact opposite: the Schism was not resolved, but confirmed. In contrast with the temporal Princes’ desire for

---

111 Cf. Sarpi’s emphasis on the fact that Luther initially protested against Indulgences, and he moved on to doctrinal issues later; History, pp. 7, 20, 766. Cf. also Sarpi’s general/historical assessment on p. 578. For an analysis of people’s perception of the Church’s shortcomings and a contrast to the condition of the Church according to surviving evidence, see Jean Delumeau, Catholicism Between Luther and Voltaire: A New View of the Counter-Reformation, trans. Jeremy Moiser (London: Burns & Oates, 1977), pp. 154-61.
reformation, the Council had, in fact, produced the greatest ‘deformation’ since the beginning of Christianity. The Bishops’ intention to restore Episcopal authority was crushed by the Pope who compelled them into greater servitude than what they suffered already. Lastly, despite Rome’s dread in the face of the possibility of a Council and the inherent threat to Papal supremacy, Trent reinforced the authority of the Pope to an unprecedented degree.

The purpose of what follows, therefore, is to examine Sarpi’s preoccupation with the delineation of the limits between ecclesiastical and temporal authorities as expressed in the manner he perceived the proceedings of the Council. A closer analysis of Sarpi’s interpretation will demonstrate another aspect: that his reading is determined by two fundamental standpoints. First, that in the initial development of the Protestant Reformation and the conduct of the Council of Trent later, the question of doctrine was of secondary importance. As for Sarpi, Luther’s protest was brought about by the Church’s shortcomings, the reaction of the Curia to the grievances ought to have been, according to him, a comprehensive institutional reform. This Trent failed to realise, precisely for the reason that it was handled by most interested sides as a ‘political battlefield’. Second, and immediately deriving from the first principle, is Sarpi’s position that in times of trouble in particular, and in view of the corrupted state of the Church, the managing of ecclesiastical affairs ought to be left to the temporal rulers. Both these underlying convictions can be distinguished in the author’s approach to his subject and his treatment of almost everything that surrounds Trent.

112 Cf. Delumeau’s discussion on the expectations by the faithful, the disappointments by and the weaknesses of the Council; Catholicism Between Luther and Voltaire, pp. 4-9.
Sarpi's broad understanding of the proceedings and outcome of the Council is presented to the reader in the very first pages of the work, effectively pre-empting, as Hubert Jedin has remarked, what is going to follow.113

For this Councell desired and procured by godly men, to reunite the Church, which began to bee divided, hath so established the Schisme, and made the parties so obstinate, that the discords are become irreconciliable: and being managed by Princes for reformation of Ecclesiasticall discipline, hath caused the greatest deformation that euer was since Christianity did begin: and hoped for by the Bishops to regaine the Episcopall authority, vsurped for the most part by the Pope, hath made them loose it altogether, bringing them into greater servitude: on the contrary, feared and avoided by the See of Rome, as a potent meanes, to moderate the exorbidant power, mounted from small beginnings by divers degrees vnto an unlimited excess, it hath so established and confirmed the same, ouer that part which remaineth subject vnto it, that it was neuer so great nor so soundly rooted.114

In this fashion Sarpi eloquently encapsulates in just one extract all the main themes that will concern him throughout the whole work. The overriding ambitions of the Papacy in worldly affairs are exposed in the History in two respects: in the shape of an ongoing conflict with the sovereign rulers on one hand, and on the other in the Popes' treatment of the Council. An overview of the two sets of antagonisms is, thus, in order, for our analysis of the limits of the temporal and the divine. It should be noted at the outset, however, that it is often difficult within the text to disentangle one struggle from the other, inasmuch, as the Conciliar protest, for example, could seem as if it was largely a French national movement. Similarly, the antagonism between Popes and sovereign states is often expressed in debates about the convening of the Council, its nature and its aims throughout its duration. The confusion and intertwining of these matters serves as a perfect illustration of the utter intermingling of religion and politics in general for the period on which this thesis concentrates.

114 History, p. 2.
The Pope's contest with the Council can only be understood against the twofold background of the Conciliar threat, and the proposed reforms. Both these factors are directly associated with Papal authority - with either the acknowledgement of the doctrine of the supremacy of the Council or with the realisation of the proposed reforms of the abuses, Papal power would be diminished. This is the thrust of Sarpi's argument: the power of Rome had increased at the expense of the temporal authority by breaching the prescribed limits between the spiritual and temporal jurisdiction. The argument that Rome had been transformed into a Princely court was put forward by a number of critics, not least of all Machiavelli and Luther. Sarpi ascribes the following extract to the latter:

... that it was a great fault of the Romanists, to establish the Church with gouvernements taken from humane reasons, as if it were a temporall State. That this is that kind of wisedome, which S. Paul saith, is accounted foolishnesse with God, as not to esteeme those politique reasons, by which Rome doeth govern, but to trust in Gods promises, and to referre to his Maiestie the managing of the Church affaires, is that humane folly, which is wisdome with God.

The process of a Council itself as a remedy to problems and abuses had originally been the responsibility of temporal princes, which the Papacy arbitrarily assumed at some point in time. The very essence of Trent was thus for Sarpi flawed from the beginning, as the Papal claim of authority in convening and directing a Council was, in fact, a usurpation. Sarpi expands on this view in his discourse on the issue of 'giving voices':

But after that it pleased God to giue peace to the Christians, and that the Romane Emperours receiued the holy faith, there happening more difficulties in doctrine and discipline, which ... troubled the publike quiet, another sort of Episcopal assemblies had beginning, congregated by Princes or their Lieutenants, to remedie the troubles. In these the action was guided by those Princes or Magistrates which did call them together, who also were personally present, proposing and gouerning the treatie, and decreeing interlocutorily, the occurring differences, but leauing the decision of the principall point,

---

115 Machiavelli's treatment of the Papacy as a temporality is striking and striking similar to Sarpi's; see Machiavelli's Discourses, I, 12 and The Prince, XI.
116 History, p. 76.
for which the Councell was congregated, to the common opinion of the assemblie. This forme appeareth in the Councils, whose actes doe remaine. ... After the Easterne and the Westerne Empires were separated, there remained still in the West some marke of the ancient Councils. ... At last, Princes being absolutely debarred to intermeddle in Ecclesiastical matters, that kind of Councel grew in disuse, and that alone remained which was called by the Ecclesiastikes themselves; the convocation of which ... was almost wholly assumed by the Pope. ... And after a certaine time hee tooke that power to himselfe which the Romane Emperours vsed, to convocate a Councell of the whole Empire. ...

[plurality of the voices of the Nations] So it was obserued in the Councils of Constance, and Basil: which use as it was good where the government was free, as it was when the world had no Pope, so it ill befitted Trent, where they desired a Councell subject unto him.117

Here the reader becomes acutely aware of the author's fundamental objections to the Council of Trent as it was conducted; the references, moreover, to Basle and Constance as free and true disclose Sarpi's Conciliar inclinations.118 The author presents the case that in contrast to the persistent demands on the part of the Germans - primarily Lutherans, but Catholics as well - for a 'free, Christian general Council in the German lands',119 Rome generated a Council entirely subjected to the Pope.

Sarpi skilfully draws the picture of the Papal control of the Council. He first gives a detailed account of the twenty-eight year delay of the summoning of Trent, for which he holds the Papacy wholly responsible. Because of their intrinsic aversion to Councils, the Popes did everything in their power to present the Christian world with copious obstacles, preconditions and false promises procrastinating for as long as was possible the convening of an

117 History, pp. 135-7.
118 There is a number of Conciliar references throughout the text, particularly regarding the Council's superiority over the Pope; they do, however become more frequent during the second phase of the Council, where these are attributed to French assertions: cf. for example pp. 566, 658-61, 718-9, 729-30, 802-3, 819.
See also Sarpi's dramatic description of the arrival and reception of the Ambassadors of the Duke of Wittemberg and the Elector of Saxony, pp. 355-72, esp. p. 359 and 367-8.
assembly to deliberate on the German protests and issues of reform.\textsuperscript{120} From all the Popes in the run-up to the Council, Clement VII is singled out by Sarpi as the most detrimental to the Conciliar endeavour. Due to his contested election and descent, he had a specific abhorrence to Councils; he was, moreover, a Pope far too profoundly concerned with politics and territorial contests to give any attention to issues of Church reforms. Clement VII personifies thus for Sarpi the type of Pope that bore the blame for the current situation of the Church and the urgency of reform.\textsuperscript{121}

Papal manipulation was for Sarpi even more obvious in the actual proceedings of the Council. The Legates, as the Pope's direct representatives, exercised tight control on the agenda of the sessions. Sarpi stresses, moreover, the frequent correspondence between the Legates and Rome, in which they gave accounts of the proceedings of the sessions and received instructions on how to continue.\textsuperscript{122} That the control of the Council was intolerable by any advocate of a free council is evidenced by the Legates' anxiety to conceal this communication from the other prelates in Trent. Sarpi speaks of one case where the correspondence was indeed exposed, testifying that the disclosure gave rise to the circulation of a famous proverb:

\textit{...so that a blasphemous Prouerbe was generally vsed, that the Synod of Trent was guided by the holy Ghost, sent thither, from time to time, in a cloake-bagge from Rome ...}\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{120} Cf. for example \textit{History}, pp. 19, 32, 34, 36-8, 49-50, 60, 73, 85-6, 100, 109, 259, 302-3, 399-400, 403. Perhaps the most striking extract in that direction is, however, the following: '... but that, to make some thing arise which might hinder the Councell, which not proceeding from him, might be ascribed to another, hee [Pope Julius III] desired a warre betweene the [French] King and the Emperour'; p. 315.

\textsuperscript{121} Cf. \textit{History}, pp. 36-7, 42, 45-6, 67; also Jedin, \textit{Council of Trent I}, pp. 219-21; Mullett, \textit{Catholic Reformation}, p. 32.


\textsuperscript{123} \textit{History}, p. 497. Evidently, the source of this proverb might well have been Sarpi himself - it is indicative, in any case, of the spirit of the opposition to the Council and the extent of Papal control.
Much more drastic confirmation of the Council’s servitude was, for Sarpi, Rome’s success in finally transferring the Synod in 1551 to Bologna, which was nearer and easier to control.\(^{124}\) The friar was convinced that the decision for a translation had been made from the opening of the Council, but was implemented at the first instance of problems, with a ludicrous excuse.\(^{125}\)

In Rome the Court was glad they were delivered from danger...
But none was so simple as not to believe that all was done by his [the Pope’s] commandment, it being certain that nothing, however small, was handled in the Council, without order first had from Rome ... But that which could not be concealed, and which did scandalize everyone, was, that, by that Bull it appeared that the Council was in servitude. For if the two Legats could command all the Prelates, at once to part from Trent, and compel them by punishments, and censures, let any man say that can, what liberty they had?\(^{126}\)

In the same way, the reader is not really surprised when Sarpi exposes the final dissolution of the Council in 1552, after four years of minor activities, under the pretext of war.\(^{127}\) The author had conditioned his audience to expect the worse from the Papacy – as Rome did not want the Council in the first place, it would do anything to discontinue it. The Papal deceit became apparent when the intended two-year suspension turned into a ten-year one.

Even the resumption of the Council in 1562, Sarpi reveals, was dictated by an outside threat – and against the wishes of Rome. The outburst of religious wars in France had created the possibility of a National Synod there that presented Rome with a twofold danger: the undermining of its authority in resolving religious problems on an international level, as well the risk of a

\(^{124}\) *History*, pp. 266-8.

\(^{125}\) Jedin, importantly agrees with Sarpi’s position; he suggests that there are ‘no sure grounds for assuming the existence of a large-scale epidemic, one that would disrupt the continuation of the Sessions’; he concedes, moreover, that there were other reasons behind the translation (*History of the Council of Trent II*, pp. 416-21). Although in contrast to Sarpi, he views the decision not as the work of the Pope, but largely of the Papal Legate Cardinal Cervini (Ibid., pp. 437-43), Jedin, nonetheless, reaches to the remarkable conclusion that the translation was a great blow to the final outcome of the Council and the reformation in Germany! (Ibid, p. 443) For a thorough discussion see Ibid., ch. 11.

\(^{126}\) *History*, p. 268.

\(^{127}\) *History*, p. 376.
possible break of France from Rome, a Schism.128 The last sessions (1562-3) were the most dramatic for Sarpi; it was there that the full sway of the Curia manifested itself. He portrays the particularly severe strain as the debates focused on the critical issue of residence and the Legates’ reaction by continuously postponing the congregations. He highlights, finally, the dramatic climax of the whole undertaking, the triumph of the ultimate Papal manipulation in enlisting the Cardinal of Lorraine – the chief of the opposition – to push the proceedings and persuade the prelates to conclude the convention.129 Still, the crucial claim that Trent was not a free Council is not only made indirectly through the way Sarpi presents the succession of events; he makes the assertion explicit repeatedly throughout the text. He often attributes it to German comments during negotiations of the possibility of Lutherans attending sessions, reiterating their call for a ‘free, General Council’, ‘such as Trent was not’.130

That the fears that led the Papacy to exert such tight control on the Council were justified is evidenced by all the key issues that were raised during the sessions. Most important, after the arrival of the French, the question of the Council’s superiority to the Pope was posed frequently.131 On a smaller scale, Sarpi was in no doubt that the correction of all the main abuses would have as an immediate result the diminution of Papal claims to supremacy that had led to the decline of the Church, in the first place – and this is why he supported it. A right and proper reformation would reverse this process: it would make the bishops return to their dioceses instead of serving as courtiers (the issue of residence), diminish papal superiority over the rest of the bishops (the issue of

128 Cf. History, pp. 423, 476, 478, 796. This course of action was hinted at various occasions by the French side; see Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 157.
130 Cf. History, pp. 115, 149, 309; similar objections are raised by other parties, as well, such as Henri II of France and the Parlement of Paris at the end of the Council; cf. pp. 319, 412, 641.
episcopal jurisdiction) and reduce the income of ecclesiastics to levels within acceptable limits (the issue of plurality of benefices). Sarpi himself acknowledged the centrality of these matters in the reformation process; in the *History* he lays particular emphasis on them by devoting a 'discourse', on each one of these issues, exposing, as referred to above, his personal viewpoint. Sarpi's discourses, moreover, are very informative with regards to his understanding of things: the fact that they all address institutional problems of the Church excluding any consideration of doctrinal questions, such as the most contested issues of original sin, justification by faith, or free will, furnishes the argument that for him the institutional reforms were considerably more important than the doctrinal ones. This, together with the little attention to doctrinal differences between Lutherans and Catholics in the *History* - in fact, these are deliberately played down throughout the text132 - is also consistent with the more general Venetian attitude conveniently to ignore doctrinal issues concerning the Protestant Reformation.133

This element corresponds to Sarpi's conviction (or awareness) of a distinction between external and internal expression of religion, such as Lipsius endorsed. When it came to the Church and its jurisdiction, as the institution strictly responsible for the salvation of souls, its authority on external (worldly) issues should be limited to the strictly necessary aspects. The corruption of the Church, besides, originated in its involvement with temporal things. This, combined with the belief that man's involvement with the Divine word only led to contention and disputes on a factional level, brought the conclusion that man could only address and correct the deformations that he had caused himself. In

other words, the Council of Trent could only deliberate on reformation issues and not on doctrinal ones.

This stress on matters of jurisdiction rather than doctrine, nicely leads the discussion to what was for Sarpi the Papacy’s second front in its claims for supremacy: the contest with the temporal rulers. The text vividly reflects the author’s in-depth awareness of the historical precedents of the Caesaro-Papal struggle, a contest with its roots in the early centuries of Christianity. Examples of famous episodes, however, such as the Investiture contest of the eleventh century or the ‘Babylonian’ exile of the Papacy in the fourteenth century (1309-77) and the subsequent Great Schism (1378-1417), all characteristic of the swinging balance between the two sides, endured long into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at least in the collective memory of scholars. It is within this intellectual tradition that we have to place Sarpi’s understanding of the antagonism between the Pope and the representatives of temporal sovereignty. Charles V, Francis I, Henri II, Ferdinand, Philip II, and to a lesser extent Henry VIII and Elizabeth I figure as the main opponents of the Holy See in the History. Sarpi distinguishes in his work the tensions between the Papacy and the Emperor from those between the Pope and national rulers, such as the King of France. The distinction is important; the Emperor and the Pope represented two contrasting views of universal control, inevitably at odds with one another, as both sovereigns asserted their right to rule over the same body of people, the conceived notion of Societas Christiana.134 This monumental clash was above all apparent in the case of Charles V, as the Habsburg Emperor had emerged in a position of power and territorial control somewhat reminiscent of the position of the great medieval Emperors. Indeed, Charles V had a ‘strong dynastic consciousness and a medieval conception of Imperial dignity’.135 Charles’s

status is to a certain extent reflected in his coronation (1530) - the last Emperor to receive a Papal validation of authority.\textsuperscript{136} The clash with smaller national rulers, conversely, was on different grounds: their claim to control their 'national Churches' threatened to shatter the unity of Christianity and agitated Rome.\textsuperscript{137}

It is against the background for universal control that the two rival authorities clash in Sarpi's text on the crucial matter of handling the outbreak of the religious problems. The question was all the more complicated, given that problems originally deriving from the Church found expression in civil strife. Sarpi introduces a number of closely associated matters arising as a result of the Emperor's and the Pope's different stances on jurisdiction: first, of who ought to deal with the dissidents, and related to this, of whether it was appropriate for the two authorities, the temporal and the sacerdotal, to deal with the problems separately, as prescribed in the theory of dual authority.\textsuperscript{138} In the case of Germany, in other words, this was a matter of whether the strife was to be dealt with by the Emperor and the reformation by the Church.\textsuperscript{139} The friar, nonetheless, favours another alternative: that both the reformation and the Lutheran insurgency ought to be handled by one and the same authority. In Sarpi's view, the Emperor was the most reliable power to deal with the religious issues. As a Christian Prince, aware of what was best for his dominion, Charles would manage matters according to the public benefit; the clergy, conversely, as only interested in its private profit and greatness, was unsuitable to manage the fate of the faithful. The Curia, even worse, was too far away to have any

\textsuperscript{136} See History, pp. 49-52.
\textsuperscript{137} Cf. pp. 33, 52, 56, 88, 93, 423. Cf. also Jedin, p. 215: 'to permit the meeting of ... an assembly would amount to allowing one nation to hold another faith than that of the universal Church and thus to conjure up a Schism. ... The demand for a national Council was emphatically rejected by the papal legate because it involved the danger of the apostasy of a whole nation'.
\textsuperscript{138} Cf. History, pp. 15, 36-7, 107, 289, 292.
\textsuperscript{139} Cf. the terms of the Peace between the Pope and the Emperor in 1529, History, pp. 46-7.
awareness of all the specific circumstances in the German lands. Sarpi's own view is unmistakably presented in the following passage, thinly disguised in his usual manner of anonymous comments; the remarks refer to the Peace of Nuremberg (1532):

At Rome the Emperor was reprehended, for putting his sickle (as they sayd) into another mans harvest, euery Prince being obliged, by the strictest bonds of censures, to the extripation of those that are condemned by the Pope ... But others commended the pietie and wisedome of the Emperour ... That the Maxime, so renowned in Rome, that it is more meete to persecute heretikes, than Infidels, was wel fitted to the Popes dominion, but not to the benefit of Christendome. ... That it was the duetie of euery Christian Prince, to indevoue equally, that his Subjects maintaine the true faith, as also that they obserue all the Commandements of God... But when a vice cannot bee rooted out, without the ruine of the State, it is acceptable to the Maiestie of God to permit it ... None knoweth how to gouerne a territorie, but the Prince himselfe, who alone knoweth all the necessities of it. Hee will overthrow his State, whosoeuer will gouerne with respect vnto the interests of others, and it would bee to as much purpose to gouern Germanie as the Romanes desire, as to gouern Rome as the Dutch-men please. ... For the case was, whether euery Christian Countrey ought to bee gouerned, according to its own necessitie and profit, or was a slauue of one onely Citie, to maintaine the commodities whereof, all others should spend themselues and become desolate. The times following haue taught, and will teach perpetually, that the Emperours resolution was conformable to the lawes of God and man.140

Sarpi supports the same position, that it was the Crown's role to resolve problems of religious dissent in the case of France.141 The French situation, however, differed from the Imperial as to the level of the struggle: the clash between Pope and Crown was one of a universal view antagonising a national view. Nonetheless, the terms in which, according to Sarpi, the French King and the Emperor articulated their positions share some significant common ground, as can be seen in extracts of an oration ascribed to Michel de l’Hôpital (St. Germain, 1562):

the Chancellor declared in the Kings name, that they were called to consult how to remedie the stirres raised in the Kingdome. Hee made a recapitulation of all the things that hapned, adding that the differences of Religion should be referred to the Prelates, but when the Peace of the Kingdome, and keeping of the Subjects in obedience to the King is in question, that this could not belong to the Ecclesiastiques, but to those whom the King would appoint to consult of it. ... That lawes were to be fitted to the time and

---

140 History, pp. 63-4.
141 Cf. History, p. 422.
persons, as the shooe to the foote. ... wherein they were not to dispute which Religion was the better, because they tooke not in hand to frame a Religion, but to put in order a Republique; and that it was not absurd to say, that many might be good Citizens, and not good Christians, and that those who were of divers Religions might liue in peace. 142

It is indeed very difficult not to imagine Sarpi behind these lines explaining the fundamental differences between ecclesiastical and political jurisdictions and defining their limits.

The struggle on authority that the two contrasting positions of the Papacy and the sovereign princes generated is manifested in numerous instances in the History, either outside or within the Council itself. The problem of jurisdiction, first, with regard to the Council translates in the text into debates about whose responsibility it was to call the General Council, the Pope’s or the Emperor’s.143 Similarly, Sarpi elaborates on the Papacy’s fierce efforts to prevent any possibility of national Councils first in the German Lands and later in France. The reaction, accordingly, in Rome at the news of religious settlements was one of astonishment as the author records (or fabricates). The Interim of Augsburg (1548), for example, which prescribed ‘what to believe until all was established by a general Council’, was not received very well:

When the copie came to Rome, euery one was amazed; first in generall, that a temporall Prince, in a secular assembly, should meddle with Religion, and not in one Article onely, but in all.144

As Sarpi shows the Papacy’s great effort to avert a Council at all costs, he also makes a point of highlighting Charles’s continuous endeavours to secure a General Council that would deal with the problems of his subjects.145 He

142 History, pp. 470-1.
144 History, p. 289.
145 Cf. History, pp. 35, 40-1, 61, 274-5, 279-81, 300-1, 311, 729-30. This position agrees with Jedin’s assessment that the more the Papacy was delaying the matter, the more Charles proved to be the driving power in the convening of the Council; Jedin, History of the Council of Trent I, p. 224. Cf. also Charles’ own autobiography, as cited by Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe, p. 186. Charles’ endeavours were continued by Ferdinand: cf. History, pp. 412, 683.
presents the Emperor’s demands for a relatively free Council, preferably within the confines of the Empire, where the complaints of the Protestants would receive an appropriate consideration and response, underlining Charles’s firmness in his efforts to ensure the presence of Protestants in the Council. Although the political motives of Charles do not fool Sarpi, his determination that the appearance of Lutherans would have contributed to a better Council makes him present extensively all the attempts in that direction. He is also persistent in depicting the views and arguments of the Imperial prelates during the sessions, as their attitude was very close to his stance. The request that issues of doctrine, for instance, ought to be discussed in the presence of Lutherans, or the serious disconcertedness at the Council’s transfer to Bologna - contrary to any façade of complying with Protestant demands for a Council within the confines of the Empire - were all positions on which Sarpi was in agreement with the Imperial party. Correspondingly, in the second phase of the Council Sarpi supports the French stance; the French had taken over in acting as the opposition to the Papacy. They were the driving force for a new General Council, not to be held in Trent, and not to be recognised as a continuation of the earlier sessions, so that would be entirely disassociated from the previous decrees, preserving, thus, some hopes for a compromise.

The Venetian’s view on the struggle between the Papacy and the sovereign Princes is much more obvious in his account of the discussion within the Synod of the issue of the reformation of the Princes. Sarpi’s strong reaction to the notion that an ecclesiastical body could even deliberate on such a matter is noticeable even through his detached writing. According to his reading, the reformation of the Princes was used as a threat by Pius IV, and as a means to

---

146 See for example History, p. 481, after the decree on safe conduct for the Lutherans.
appease assaults against the Papacy during the second phase of the Council. He resorted to this in the face of the continuous debates about residence and episcopal authority together with the dreadful prospect of the French delegation’s arrival.\textsuperscript{149} The whole issue brought to the surface fundamental problems with regard to separation of jurisdiction between the two representatives of authority. Indicative in this respect of Sarpi’s position is the letter he attributes to the French King, sent to the Council when the King was informed about the proposed reforms:

\begin{quote}
hee signified, that hee had receiued the Articles, imparted to them by the Legates, and did see that matters were farre from the hope hee conceived, because to establish these was to pare the Kings hayles, and to make those of the Ecclesiastiques longer. ... That he saw how lightly they passed ouer the reformation of the Clergy, who onely haue giuen the scandals to those that haue separated themselues fro the Romish Church, and how they assume authoritie to take away the rights and prerogaties of Kings, to break their Consitutions and Customes, prescribed by time out of minde, to anathematize and excommunicate Kings and Princes, all tending to sowe disobedience, sedition, and rebellion of subiects against their Soueraigns; whereas it is manifest to the whole world, that the power of the Fathers, and of the Council, extendeth onely to the reformation of the Clergie, without touching matters of State, or of Secular power and iurisdiction, which is wholly distinct from the Ecclesiastical...\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

Whether this letter was indeed written by the French King or invented by Sarpi makes little difference; both men would certainly concur with this resentment of the infringements on temporal power. On a greater scale, however, and much more overtly, the author portrays the contrasting viewpoints of the Papacy and the sovereign rulers in defining religious and political issues with regards to the war against the Schmalkaldic League. He juxtaposes first the two sets of rhetoric put forward by the Pope and the Emperor to instigate war. Sarpi portrays Charles advocating that the premises of his attack were ‘matters of state’ and that he was combating disobedient subjects. The plausibility of this position is

\textsuperscript{149} See the first threat by Pius IV (History, p. 505); cf. also p. 617. For the articles of the proposed reformation as recorded by Sarpi see below, Appendix VII for the relevant chapter from the Decree of General Reform that was eventually voted.

\textsuperscript{150} History, p. 765 Cf. the Gallican Pierre Pithou’s comments on the inadequacy of the clergy to discuss matters of state, as cited in Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 91.
facilitated by the fact that some of his Protestant subjects remained on his side, because they did not regard the Emperor as a threat to their religious demands.\textsuperscript{151} The author contrasts this, however, with the proclamation by the Papacy that the war had instead been undertaken for matters of religion, and that the real objective was to extirpate heresy.\textsuperscript{152} Evidently, this was also the way in which a good number of contemporaries perceived the war, as evidenced again by Protestant reactions.\textsuperscript{153} Nonetheless, the point of interest for us here is that the author reveals his own view by exposing (or assigning) concealed motives on both sides. In Sarpi’s reading Paul III had, in fact, encouraged the war in Germany in order to divert Charles’s attention from Italy. Such a campaign would also have the added benefit of offering a distraction from any attempts for a Council and a reformation.\textsuperscript{154} This interpretation corresponds to Sarpi’s broader viewpoint, underlining the \textit{History}, of the Papacy as a temporal power with worldly aspirations that would do anything possible to shun the impending reformation and the celebration of a Council – both major threats to its established authority.\textsuperscript{155} But at the same time, the mere profanity of the Papacy’s motives deprived it of any reliability to have a say in the managing of the affairs of Christendom.

As mentioned already, Sarpi was shrewd enough to recognise that Charles’s motives were not that innocent – or religious, for that matter – attributing the Emperor’s conduct to personal ambition, the desire to subdue Germany under his yoke and make the Empire hereditary, using religion merely

\begin{footnotes}
\item[151] Cf. \textit{History}, p. 189.
\item[152] \textit{History}, pp. 200-1.
\item[153] Cf. \textit{History}, p. 190.
\item[154] Cf. \textit{History}, p 78; see also p. 222, where Pope Paul III recalled his forces after seeing the Emperor’s successes; his reaction to the news of Charles’ victory at Mühlberg (pp. 270-1), and in the case of France, p. 628.
\end{footnotes}
as a means to his ends. Still, Sarpi’s censure of the Emperor is not hard in comparison to that directed against the Popes; this distinction can be explained by his deep-seated belief of their different respective duties and moral responsibilities. The contrast between these two types of monarchs is evident throughout the text. Although he does not offer a characterisation of Charles – or other temporal monarchs – the author presents the reader with individual portraits for almost every Pope. Sarpi’s Popes are normally described as less than pious, liberal in spending and promoting their kindred in high positions of power, avaricious, rigid, cruel, prone to indulge in pleasure rather than business, inclined to follow their private affections and live extravagantly. They are usually of an angry nature, and Sarpi often depicts them as having fallen into excessive rage and perturbation of mind - most imprudent and inconstant passions as both Charron and Lipsius would concur.

The strongest antithesis between Pope and Emperor is perhaps articulated in the following passage that juxtaposes Charles with Paul IV:

It gaue much matter of discourse, that, this yeer [1556], Charles the Emperor parted from Flanders, and passed into Spaine, to betake himself to a priuate life in a solitary place; so that they made a comparison beweene a Prince, trained vp from his infancy, in the negotiations and affaires of the World, who at the age of little more than fifty yeers, had resolued to quit the World, and onely to serue God, changed from a mighty Prince to a meane religious person; and one, who had formerly abandoned the Episcopal charge, to retire into a Monastery, and now, being at the age of 80. yeers, and made Pope, did wholly addict himself to pomp and pride, and endeauoured to set all Europe on fire with War.

156 Cf. History, p. 311. Charles’ ulterior motives are a frequent theme for Sarpi; see also pp. 78, 129, 202, 268, 360, 372.

157 For portrayal of Papal personalities see for example History, pp. 3, 4, 71, 298-9, 300-1, 391. Sarpi even ascribes the death of Paul III to ‘perturbation of mind’ (p. 298). The only two Popes receiving a better treatment from Sarpi’s pen are Adrian VI and Marcellus II; it is clear, however from Sarpi’s account that he regards them as (unfortunate) exceptions who did not manage to make much of a difference during their office – Adrian because he was unaccustomed to the Curial practices, and Marcellus because he died very soon after his creation. For their Papacies see pp. 19-30 and 389-91 respectively. Cf. also Jedin’s assessment of the Papacy of Adrian VI in History of the Council of Trent I, pp. 205-10.

158 History, p. 404.
The Popes of the *History* then, emerge as purely worldly princes - in many ways more princely than the temporal princes themselves - subject to human passions, hungry for power, even tyrannical. Evidently, the profane nature of the Papacy was first and foremost witnessed by the long drawn-out territorial struggles that Rome was involved in, of which Sarpi does not fail to give elaborate and detailed accounts. The infamous implication of the Pontiffs in the long Italian wars between the Habsburgs and the Valois (1494-1559) together with the dynastic interests and conflicts over towns such Naples, Milan, Parma and Piacenza, feature prominently in the *History* substantiating the notion of the Pope as an Italian prince. This notion was entirely in opposition to Sarpi’s conception of the Church as a purely sacred institution and the Pope as a spiritual ruler; the Holy See’s worldliness was for him an infringement of the spiritual limits of its authority.\(^\text{159}\)

It might appear as an inconsistency then that, against the background of dual authority, as already indicated, Sarpi in fact promoted in his polemics the assumption of the managing of ecclesiastical affairs by the lay rulers. Yet, as has been observed, this was an intrinsic problem in theories of jurisdiction: the border between the secular and the ecclesiastical jurisdictions ran through the person of the king.\(^\text{160}\) From Sarpi’s perspective, the explanation for this seeming contradiction lies in two fundamental elements of his thought, the first one of which is his deep historical understanding. Accordingly, although the prescribed separation of profane and sacred had been in place in the early Church, some particular circumstances resulted in its breach on the part of the Church. This infringement gradually led to a degeneration of the principles that governed the early Church and corruption, to which the religious protests of the sixteenth century was a reaction. Sarpi’s historical understanding is particularly


\(^{160}\) Parsons, *Church in the Republic*, p. 182.
apparent in his discourses, all of which, strikingly, follow the same pattern: the
descriptions start with the appeal to the idealised past of the primitive Church,
locate the beginning of the decline with the separation of the western and
eastern Empires and the consequent assumption of additional influence by the
erclics, and culminate with the landmark Papacy of Gregory VII (1073-85). But
The most characteristic and comprehensible of all discourses, and certainly the
longest one, is Sarpi’s discussion on episcopal jurisdiction, a passage indeed
worth quoting at length, since it represents a lucid reflection of the author’s
perception:

The judgement of the Church (as is necessary in every multitude) was fit that it should
be conducted by one ... This care, due to the most principall, and worthy person, was
always committed to the Bishop. ... This forme was still on foot in the yeere two
hundred and fiftie ... But the principall cause of the change was the ceasing of
Persecutions. ... Afterwards some Bishops, beginning to abuse the authoritie given them
by the law of Constantine, ... an ordination made, that they should judge causes of
religion, and not ciuill, ... Which law being not much obsuered in Rome, in regard of the
great power of the Bishop ... Justinian did establish vnto them a Court, and audience,
and assigned to them the causes of Religion, the Ecclesiastical faults of the Clergie, and
divers voluntary jurisdictions also ouer the Laitie. By these degrees the charitable
correction, instituted by CHRIST, did degenerate into domination, and made Christians
loose their ancient reverence and obedience. It is denied in words, that Ecclesiastical
jurisdiction is dominion, as is the secular, yet one knoweth not how to put a difference
betweene them. But St. Paul did put it ... that a Bishop should not be greedy of gaine,
nor a striker. Now on the contrary, they make men pay for processes, and imprison the
parties, as is done in the secular Court.

But the Western Countries being separated, and an Empire made ... the Bishops, for the
most part, were made Councillors of the Prince, which, by the mixture of spirituall and
temporall charges, caused their jurisdiction to encrease exceedingly. Before 200. yeares
were past, they pretended absolutely all judicature, criminal and ciuill, ouer the
Clergie, and, in some things, ouer the Laitie also, pretending that the cause was
Ecclesiastical. ... they appropriated all vnto themselues; ...[they made up a rule for
every case that did not fall into the accepted categories] that euery cause is devolved to
the Ecclesiastical Court, if the Magistrate will not, or neglect to doe iustice. But if the
pretensions of the Clergie were contained within these bounds, the state of Christian
Common wealthes were tolerable. ... For after the yeere 1050. all the causes of the
Clergy being appropriated to the Bishops, and very many of the Laitie, vnder title of
spiritualitie, and almost all the rest vnder the name of a mixt judicature, and placing
themselues above secular Magistrates, vpon pretence of iustice denied, they came to say,
that the Bishop had that power to iudge, not by the grant or connivency of Princes, or by

161 Cf. contemporary Gallican arguments that ecclesiastical power came about through the
absence of political; Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 160.
the will of the People, or by custome, but that it was essentiaall to the Episcopall dignitie, and giuen to it by CHRIST. ... And not staying heere they adde, that neither the Magistrate, nor the Prince himself, can meddle in any of those causes which the Clergie hath appropriated, because they are spirituall, and of spirituall things the Laiques are vncapeable...162

The second fundamental element in Sarpi’s understanding is the moral responsibility; due to its nature, the sacred authority cannot err; as a body claiming to represent the divine sphere, it, by necessity, ought not to be involved in the mundane affairs of this world. As the Church allowed worldly interests to corrupt its sacred character, it deprived itself, Sarpi believed, from the right to control its affairs, at least in the institutional domain, its temporal facet.163 This deformation, moreover, generated the current state of affairs, the division of the faithful. The managing of ecclesiastical matters should pass on to the lay monarchs whose responsibility entails, in any case, the administrating of the affairs of this world, and they are skilled in the managing of them. Their duty does not necessarily involve moral flawlessness, as the affairs of this world (politics) are devious and corrupt, anyway. This reasoning can account for the apparent inconsistency between Sarpi’s call for separate jurisdictions and his claim on greater control of ecclesiastical matters by lay rulers. The Venetian’s argument, nonetheless, was flexible enough to accommodate objections:

... that he neuer said that the King had free power ouer Ecclesiasticall goods, but that all did belong to the Prince, in time of instant and vrgent publike necessitie, and he that knew the force of those words, did vnderstand well, that, in such a time, neither request, nor authoritie of the Pope could take place...164

Here Sarpi made the French Ambassador du Ferrier skilfully to retract some fairly radical points that he had made in the Council. By the same token, one can imagine Sarpi modifying his position according to his audience.

162 History, pp. 330-3. Cf. also the discussion on p. 578.
163 Cf. the distinction made by Micanzio in Life, p. 183 (wrongly numbered as p. 163).
Thus, Sarpi’s understanding combined thoroughly Lipsius’ notion of corrupted politics and the separation of divine and temporal spheres as we saw expounded by Charron. His approach represented the immediate implications that the theories of his two Northern counterparts had on the world of action: as a statesman, Sarpi was able to articulate and adapt his positions according to circumstances. His views, however, were also deeply infused with his religious and ecclesiastical training, the other half of his personality; to these we will now turn our attention.

Some Final Considerations: Politics through Religion
To acknowledge the significance of Sarpi’s religious thought in order to present an analysis of his stance on ecclesiastical and political jurisdiction, is entirely in keeping with the principle suggested in the Introduction, namely that any consideration of political issues for the period under examination ought to be seen in the light of the religious aspect. An enquiry into Sarpi’s views, therefore, would be incomplete without a parallel consideration of his religious outlook. In this respect, the latter is important inasmuch as it can account for, or is parallel to his political views.

Like Charron and Lipsius, Sarpi’s religious beliefs were seriously questioned during his life-time, and are still the subject of speculation and debate among critics. As already noted, Sarpi’s fierce anti-Papalism, as expressed in his plans and his contacts with Huguenots, Anglicans and French Gallicans, raised questions about his religious orthodoxy; what is more, it made his enemies at the Curia accuse him of Protestantism, and even downright atheism. Of course, as Bouwsma has observed, the question of Sarpi’s Catholicism can be rendered obsolete, in view of the various shades of Catholicism that existed long before Trent defined the Roman Catholic
orthodoxy. Since, however, political and religious elements in his stance are in many cases too closely intertwined to be distinguished, it is valuable to find indications about Sarpi’s particular position within the greater body of religious doctrines that referred to the Apostolic See as their head.

Defining Sarpi’s religious attitudes, nonetheless, is in itself a challenge, owing to a number of reasons. The first difficulty in that direction is that he did not clearly articulate his religious views. An explanation for this could lie in his awareness that these did not belong within the accepted frame of beliefs and their concealment through outward conformity or dissimulation served as a means of protection from religious persecution. The second point that is open to discussion is, whether it was the case that his religious beliefs determined his political beliefs, or the other way round: whether, namely, due to his official position and his greater political interests, he deliberately avoided asserting his views explicitly. Finally, as it has been observed, it is not entirely certain that his religious convictions remained unchanged throughout his life.

Nonetheless, even though we are in the dark about much of what he believed on a religious level, there seems to be an agreement about the fact that Sarpi placed a great emphasis on the importance of grace. Support for that comes from two main sources: first, the conclusions he reached when he was assigned to assess the de auxiliis debate between the Dominicans and Jesuits, the

---

165 Bouwsma, ‘Venice, Spain, and the Papacy’, p. 356: ‘Whether Sarpi was truly a Catholic, seems to me equally anachronistic – for several generations before the appearance of Martin Luther a rich doctrinal ferment, both various and free, had permeated Western Christendom; and this variety persisted among men who continued to think of themselves as Catholics long after the last session of the Council of Trent. What true Catholicism was, what the authority of the Council was and what its decrees meant, were still open questions for many thoughtful Catholics in Sarpi’s time’.


same controversy of which versions were meant to plague Catholic Christendom until well into the seventeenth century. The other indication that we have for the importance Sarpi placed on divine grace is his approval of the outcome of the Synod of Dort, as expressed in a letter to Hensius, the secretary of the Synod. Evidence of Sarpi's Augustinian conviction of man's ultimate weakness and the feebleness of human reason can be found scattered in the *History*, but the most prominent appears in the very first page of the text:

I will relate the causes and managements of an Ecclesiastical Convocation, by some, for divers ends ... hindered and deferred... sometimes assembled, sometimes dissolved, always celebrated with divers intentions, and which hath gotten a form and conclusion contrary altogether to the design of them that procured it, and to the fear of those, that with all diligence disturbed it; a clear instruction for us to refer our selves to God, and not to trust in the wisdom of man.

Sarpi's *Pensieri*, moreover, provide enough material to substantiate a great degree of scepticism in his thought, and profound distrust towards human reason. This scepticism, as we already saw in the discussion of Charron's thought, ties in very well with a fundamental reliance on revelation. A further consequence of the incapacity of human reason is the realisation that man is unable to reflect on religious issues. Accordingly, to apply the subtle definitions and distinctions of human reason to the content of the faith was for Sarpi a shocking contamination of heavenly with earthly things. In return, this can also account for Sarpi's relative indifference towards doctrine and doctrinal diversity: doctrinal differences were a human invention or product, and hence

171 *History*, p. 1.
172 The best interpretation of Sarpi's sceptical elements is provided by Wootton, *Paolo Sarpi*, ch. 1.
173 Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain, and the Papacy', p. 370
trivial. If human understanding is fundamentally based on divine revelation, any dispute on doctrine was entirely unfounded and out of place. It is along these lines that Sarpi viewed the Council of Trent and the debates that took place in its sessions; the positions expressed were but human and factional. Similarly, the triumph of the Papalist side, which he explicitly presented as the result of intrigue and manipulation was merely the triumph of one version of the received Truth.

Sarpi's convictions, in this respect suggest an affinity with the evangelical currents that characterised Venetian spirituality since the early sixteenth century; his evangelism, however, was an expression of personal piety. Locating Sarpi's religious attitude within the spectrum of the more mystical, divinely-revealed Christianity that requires the assistance of grace unlike Tridentine Roman Catholicism, and denies the importance of free-will has two facets. It explains, on the one hand, the Venetian's opposition to the decisions of the Council of Trent from a doctrinal point of view: the views that Sarpi seems

---

174 His overall understanding is strikingly similar to Marsilius of Padua who argued that the existence of God is not susceptible to rational proof and that God has no contact with human life. His theory cut right across the Christian tradition of a unitary theory of knowledge, regarding philosophy and theology as completely separate disciplines. Marsilius emphasised, moreover, the absolute autonomy of the spheres of revelation and reason, claiming that Nature and supernatural were two completely separate realms. See Wilks, *Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 96-7.


176 That Sarpi's position in questioning the outcome of the Council of Trent was not that unusual is evidenced by similar oppositions in Italy in the late sixteenth century: see Martin, ‘Religion, Renewal and Reform in the Sixteenth-Century’ in Marino (ed.), *Early Modern Italy, 1550-1796*. Cf. also Bouwsma, ‘Venice, Spain, and the Papacy’, p. 356; Cf. also Oakley, ‘Complexities of Context’ who with regards to the Bull *Exercabilis* that forbid the reference to future Councils suggests that this ‘was viewed less as an authoritative pronouncement than as a statement of the views of one particular faction’: p. 379; cf. also pp. 385, 389-91.

177 John J. Martin. *Venice’s Hidden Enemies. Italian Heretics in a Renaissance City*. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993); p. 225. See Martin’s discussion on the spread of evangelism in Venice (pp. 71-96), and its eradication by the last quarter of the sixteenth century (pp. 199-233).
to have endorsed were the ones that were condemned in Trent.\textsuperscript{178} Their exclusion from Catholic orthodoxy, moreover, pushed them and their adherents dangerously towards the margins and very close to what was now defined as 'heretical' or 'Protestant'.\textsuperscript{179} Sarpi’s association, hence, with Protestants, which – besides the common 'political' interest - was also due to a certain affiliation on theological issues (such as the importance of grace) rendered him a Protestant in the eyes of his contemporaries, as well as some of his modern students.\textsuperscript{180}

Sarpi’s conviction that men could not deliberate on doctrinal issues can also be seen as an aspiration to a sort of 'super-confessionalism'.\textsuperscript{181} This had a strong political flavour and brought him very close to ideas promoted by the \textit{politiques} during the Wars of Religion in France, some of Sarpi’s most intimate friends. The \textit{politique} stance was absolutely denounced by the Papal side.\textsuperscript{182} For Sarpi, nonetheless, as experience had showed, a ‘political’ accommodation was sometimes necessary for the sake of the public good and salvation of the human community.\textsuperscript{183} In these cases, it was the theologians with their insistence on trivial detail who presented the obstacle for the pacification of the people.\textsuperscript{184} The political authority ought to take matters in hand, then, and provide for the general benefit.

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{178} Mullet, \textit{Catholic Reformation}, p. 45.
\item\textsuperscript{179} Sarpi is very explicit in depicting the arguments of the Prelates in Trent during the theological debates as deliberately fashioning their view in opposition to Lutheran doctrines. Cf. for example \textit{History}, p. 156: ‘to agree to this would bee to yeild to the Lutheran claims...’
\item\textsuperscript{180} Simon, ‘Isaac Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et l’Eglise d’Angleterre’, p. 61.
\item\textsuperscript{182} Cf. \textit{History}, p. 27, 693; see also the reactions of the Prelates at Trent at the same news: (pp. 696-7): ‘This was blamed by the greater part of the Fathers in Councell, who said it was to prefer the things of the world, before the things of God, yea to ruine both the one and the other. For the foundation of a State, which is religion, being remouued, it is necessary that the temporall should come to desolation; whereof the Edict before was an example, which did not cause peace and tranquillitie, as was hoped, but a greater War than before’.
\item\textsuperscript{183} Cf. \textit{History}, p. 388.
\item\textsuperscript{184} Cf. Sarpi’s account of the Diet of Ratisbon (\textit{History}, p. 183).
\end{enumerate}
The primacy to politics that this view endorsed is consistent with both the atheistic and anti-clerical tendencies that Sarpi was accused of, but is also compatible with an internalised and spiritual notion of religion and the Church, such as Lipsius advocated. This notion is one that is evident throughout Sarpi’s work. As Diodati put it,

Sarpi is rooted in that most dangerous maxim that God cares nothing for externals, provided the mind and heart are in pure and direct relation with Himself. And so fortified is he is he in this opinion by reason and examples, that it is vain to combat with him.185

An internalised and entirely spiritual or mystical conception of religion justifies Sarpi’s fierce criticism and attack on the Pope and the Roman Curia. The Church’s external jurisdiction, from this point of view, ought to be limited to the strictly necessary aspects of worship. Similar points are expressed in the following extract from the History of the Council of Trent, from Sarpi’s discourse on episcopal jurisdiction:

Yet the light of trueth was not so put out, but that learned and godly men, in those first times, did oppose that doctrin, shewing that both the Premisses of that discourse were false, and that the Maior, that is, that the Laiques are vncapeable of spiritual things, was absurd and impious. For they are adopted by the heauenly Father, called the sonnes of God, brothers of CHRIST, partakers of the Kingdome of heauen, made worthy of Diuine Grace, of Baptisme, and of the Communion of the flesh of Christ. What other spirituall things are there beside these? 186

Very fittingly, Sarpi was to die having refused, as his friends claimed, to say confession or to receive extreme unction.187 Whether this is true or not, is not necessarily important: as an anecdote, it corresponds to the life and convictions of a strongly anti-papal friar, who spent the last part of his life serving the state.

Sarpi’s positions, thus, are intimately related to the ideas explored in the two previous chapters: his views were the next natural step. Although he had

186 History, p. 333.
187 Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 65.
not himself been through the experience of religious strife, his conclusions had come from observing the same occurrences through time and from a distance. He had, moreover, been involved in a different sort of religious warfare, defending during the Interdict the Venetian Republic in the face of Papal encroachments of its temporal authority. Yet for him, it was all part of the same picture: Sarpi’s deep historical – hence temporal - understanding of the Church had convinced him that the corruption that plagued the institution had originated in its assumption of temporal jurisdiction after the separation of the Western from the Eastern Church. It was then that the (Constantinian) ideal of imperial control over Church affairs had first been undermined, and Rome was allowed to corrupt religion with its political aspirations. The great Conciliar tradition had for some time struggled to contain this effect, but to no avail.

The other great landmark was for Sarpi the Council of Trent, his life-long preoccupation. For him the Council symbolised the ultimate assertion of Roman supremacy, along with the devastation of any hopes for religious reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants. Its proceedings had also had the effect of redefining Catholicism in a very narrow manner, excluding any real impetus for reform that would purify the corrupted institution of the Church and restore its sacred nature from the worldliness of its leaders. The dealings at Trent had further demonstrated that the Church on the whole had deprived itself of the right to control its affairs, as not only had the religious troubles originated from its temporal facet in the first place, but they had also led to confrontations that endangered the peace and welfare of the Christian states. His stance was therefore very close to Gallican and Anglican attitudes, on the one hand, that defended the right of the state to control Church matters.

His fierce anti-papalism, on the other hand, and his theological understanding brought him very close to ‘Protestant’ (‘Reformed’) positions. His Augustinian conception of grace induced him greatly to distrust human
nature, and assert that man could have no say in doctrinal matters. For him, the human and the divine - irrespective of whether the one was dependent upon the other - were not only separated from one another, but they were also very distant. Consequently, man had to survive on his own in this world, through his internal connection with the Creator. The Church's role was to assist this relationship, but as worship ought to be internalised, its role is restricted to providing for the salvation of the souls. Religion and the Church ought not to meddle with more corrupt and feeble human affairs, because doing so only blemished them. Sarpi, nonetheless, was only a legal and theological adviser to his Republic, and hence did not have the means to put into practice any of his views. He could only advise - unlike James VI and I, who, as the actual head of his state (and after 1603 of the Anglican Church), could put the same views into practice.
Chapter IV

Political Implications (II): The King as Divine:

From Secular and Ecclesiastical to Lay Supremacy

James VI and I, Workes (1616)

God gives not Kings the stile of Gods in vaine:
For on his throne his Scepter doe they sowy:
And as their subjectes ought them to obey,
So Kings should feare and serue their God againe
James VI and I, Basilikon Doron, The Argument - The Sonet

Give unto Caesar what is Caesars, and to God what is Gods. Regnum meum non est huius mundi...
If these examples, sentences, titles, and prereogatiues, and innumerable other in the Olde and New Testament doe not warrant Christian Kings, within their owne dominions, to gouerne their Church, as well as the rest of their people, in being Custodes vitriusque Tabulate, not by making new Articles of Faith, (which is the Popes office as I said before) but by commanding obedience to be giuen to the word of God, by reforming the religion according to his prescribed will, by assisting the spirituall power with the temporal sword, by reforming of corruptions, by procuring due obedience to the Church, by iudging, and cutting off all friuolous questions and schisms, as Constantine did...

James VI and I, Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologue for the Oath of Allegiance (1607)

Sarpi's conclusion that the management of ecclesiastical affairs had to be assumed by the secular authorities was, in fact, the principle followed by King James VI of Scotland and I of England (1566-1625) for most of his 'diverse and interesting' reign.1 It has been observed that Sarpi had reached this position through a twofold experience: first, through his observation of the decay of the Church, and the ensuing division and the bloody contention that this caused, and secondly, through the encounter with the Papacy as a threat to the temporal

---

sovereignty of the Venetian Republic. Remarkably, King James VI reached similar conclusions in the distant kingdom of Scotland, located at the other end of the notional area of Europe. Although, like Sarpi, he did not directly experience religious warfare himself, James had been through the aftershocks of the aggression of the Reformation in Scotland. He lived through the tension between the advocates of further and 'complete' reform and the remaining Catholics, the latter always a potentially subversive element in the kingdom, as they were in continuous communication with Spanish forces. Similarly, as the successor to Elizabeth I, he had also come face to face with one of the last waves of Catholic resistance to the Reformation in England, almost losing his life, and again like Sarpi, he had to defend himself against Papal claims of temporal supremacy. Unlike the Venetian, however, who could only act as an advisor to the Republic, the Stuart King was in a position to enforce, to a considerable extent, the principles that the two men shared.

In the vein of Charron, Lipsius and Sarpi, James was a contemplative; by the nature of his office, however, he was a 'contemplative in action'- although perhaps not as dynamic as Sarpi and others would wish. He was exceptionally widely read, and had a number of intellectual interests, as evidenced by the diversity of his writings. He was aware of the work of both Lipsius and Sarpi. Although in the end he lost his esteem for the former, he was an ardent admirer of the latter, whose work he sponsored to be published in London. James had received an excellent humanistic education, having had the fortune (as well as the misfortune) to be taught by one of the best indigenous humanists of his time, George Buchanan. At the same time, he had also received very good theological training by his other, less famous, tutor, Peter Young, a former student of

---

Theodore Beza at Geneva.3 The King grew up, accordingly, to be very competent in theological debate while he showed his inclination towards the art of writing at a very early stage, producing several texts in poetry, prose, scriptural exegesis, politics and more. We can thus trace what Kevin Sharpe has called James’s ‘sense of the centrality of writing to his exercise of rule’, to his thorough education under these two great intellectuals, as well as the more general outlook of a scholarly king, also somewhat disparagingly known as ‘the wisest fool in Christendom’.4

As with the previous three figures examined in this dissertation, James’s religious outlook was called into question a number of times throughout his life. Born of a Catholic mother, but raised under strict Calvinist supervision, he was criticised in Scotland for the lenience he showed towards his Catholic subjects, as well as his unwillingness to accept that his kingship was to be subjected to the spiritual control of the Kirk. Similarly, as the King of England, he came under fire for his stance towards Catholicism and Catholic powers and his decidedly ambiguous policies with regard to Protestant interests. A great number of his subjects felt that he did not live up to the role of the leader of Protestant Europe, especially when compared to his predecessor, Elizabeth. From the Catholics’ point of view, this was a king who did not grant them the much-anticipated toleration, but became embroiled, instead, in a decade-long controversy with their spiritual leader and his publicists.

The politico-religious framework of James’s life and reign, his deep preoccupation with issues of ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction, together with


the fact that the practice of his kingship was based on conceptual foundations that he himself put to paper, make him an ideal case in point for this study. His case will also draw this survey to a conclusion, as the theory and practice of the Scottish King bring together in interesting ways most of the elements and concepts analysed so far. The object of this chapter, hence, will be to examine James VI and I’s views on jurisdiction, as expressed in several of his writings, in conjunction with the manner in which he sought to put them into practice. As James was a prolific writer, the examination will necessarily be based on a selection of tracts mostly written in response to critical occurrences of his reign. It will point to the strong theological resonances in the King’s writings that constitute a reflection of his wider perception of his kingly role as a ‘divine’, that is, a mediator between his subjects and God, and, as an extension, an administrator of the affairs of the Church.

This chapter, it should be noted, does not aspire to give a complete re-evaluation of James’s reign and writings. It aims at assessing James’s views against the background of notions already examined, on the relationship between the temporal and the divine spheres, public and private domains, and views on the two forms of jurisdiction, lay and ecclesiastical. These notions acquired prominence on the Continent through the experience of politico-religious tensions in the late part of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. They were also intrinsically connected to the variety of issues that were in the aftermath of – in the English case ‘incomplete’ – Reformation, relating to questions of obedience, toleration, and foundation of authority. Yet although the intellectual response to these questions for the authors examined so far was, as we have seen, the promotion of conceptual dualisms, James dealt with the same issues in a slightly different manner. As we shall see, while still operating within the same theoretical framework and accepting the distinctions as his starting point, the King took the theory a step further, redefining the lines
of demarcation. This was above all evident in the case of the jurisdictional divide, where James promoted a sort of lay supremacy.

In view of the above, the analysis in this chapter is based on the assumption that during his reign as the sovereign of the 'Three Kingdoms' James did indeed aspire to partake in wider European affairs and developments, although perhaps in the world of rhetoric more than actually in practice. This will give us the occasion to associate the intellectual milieu of the Stuart King with that of the Continent, as so many of his views and policies were formed in relation and in reaction to wider European developments. This interpretation runs somewhat counter to the traditional historiographical views, to some of which we will now turn.

I.

Background: Imagining James VI and I

The imagining of James VI and I presents a number of problems to students of his reign and thought. While it is commonplace to say that his reputation has suffered over time, it is also slowly but steadily becoming a commonplace to assert that his reputation has, for a while now, been under review and is undergoing a restoration. Counter to the traditional view of James as a stammering, slobbering, timid and sexually deplorable figure, who spent his free time in futile literary exercises, during the last twenty-five years the Scottish King of Britain has emerged as a serious, intelligent, moderate, ambitious and fairly successful king.⁵

---

⁵ The literature on James and his reign is daunting. Historiography, however, still lacks a definitive biography of the Scottish king; the most reliable is still the rather unfavourably disposed by David H. Willson, *James VI and I*; both Jenny Wormald and Glenn Burgess are in the process of composing biographies of the king, that would incorporate new research and the revisions of James's political achievements. Two recent books by Roger Lockyer and Pauline Croft represent attempts to integrate new findings and reappraisals of James into a narrative: Roger Lockyer, *James VI and I*. (London and New York: Longman, 1998); Pauline Croft, *King
If this aspect of James VI and I's persona and reign is starting to be resolved, the contextual problems arising from his accession to the English throne and his move from Edinburgh to London (in April 1603) are less so. The shift of focus in government that naturally resulted from the King's translation south of the border is reflected in the way historical research has since taken place. The problem is perhaps most eloquently expressed in the title of Jenny Wormald's famous article 'King James VI and I: Two Kings or One?', where she locates the basis of the duality of a long historiographical tradition in the attitude of James's northern and southern subjects respectively to regard him as their king. What is more, it seems that the two separate dominant historiographies - English-centred and Scottish-centred - are not in dialogue with one another, thereby perpetuating various respective misconceptions and eluding any real sense of continuities or discontinuities before and after 1603.

An additional and significant difficulty that faces the historiography of the Stuart king from our point of view is his positioning. He was cramped in-between a queen with a strong Protestant image and policy, and a king.

---

Wormald, Jenny, 'James VI and I: Two Kings or One?', *History* 68 (1983), pp. 187-209. Wormald, however, is posing the question from a slightly different angle; she is more concerned in establishing how it is that James the VI is generally regarded as a successful king of Scotland, whereas James I has the fame of a weak, easily fooled, and overall unsuccessful king. Despite the studies that have appeared since the renewal of interest in the early Stuarts, the problem of perspective is still insufficiently treated, since it is inextricably entangled with the problem of 'British' history as a whole. For some insightful perspectives cf. the collection of essays by Roger A. Mason, (ed.) *Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603.* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994); and Glenn Burgess's critique of the problem of a 'British' historiography, in his review article 'Scottish or British? Politics and Political Thought in Scotland, c. 1500-1707', *Historical Journal* 41 (1998), pp. 579-90.
generally perceived as (crypto) Catholic, who allowed for Catholic masses to take place in his Court and accepted that his Archbishop impose liturgical reforms that, his subjects thought, brought the Anglican worship dangerously close to the ‘Popish’. Any consideration of James’s religious and ecclesiastical outlook thus suffers from a comparison to his predecessor and successor, and by the looming spectre of the wars that plagued the Three Kingdoms in the 1640’s. All these aspects are, of course, interrelated, and as we will see, when viewed as a whole are much more intelligible. Historians famously disagree on his political beliefs, as well as his religious and ‘foreign’ policy – all elements that caused tension during his forty-year reign, and will be touched upon below. James’s foreign policy as the king of ‘Great Britain’ has been the subject of criticism from the very years of his reign. The question of England’s involvement in the Thirty Years’ War, James’s attitude toward the Papacy, his inadequacy to assume the role of the Protestant warrior, and his policy of rapprochement with Catholic powers such as Spain, France and Venice, were all issues that gave anxiety to his subjects and caused widespread opposition. From a contextual point of view, Scottish policy towards the Continental powers had traditionally been different from that of the English; this is particularly plain, for instance, in the case of the special relationship between Scotland and France. The other major factor that has increasingly been gaining ground in assessments of James’s foreign policy and will be discussed in this chapter, is his renowned pacifism, together with his much-pronounced plans for a general Christian reunion.

In fact, controversy regarding his religious policy dates from quite early on, during his early years in Scotland, long before he succeeded Elizabeth on the English throne. Historians debate his relationship with the Scottish Kirk and the Anglican Church, and are divided as to how successful his ‘middle’ way was. They disagree as to how tolerant of religious dissent and non-conformity he tried to be, discussing extensively his treatment of religious extremists, Roman
Catholics and Protestant purists. From this perspective, some stress the sense of 'consensus' and the relative calm in place during his reign, while others place more emphasis on the widespread dissatisfaction among James's subjects. The latter underline the hardening of the confessional lines, especially in the last years of his reign, partly due to his growing favour towards Arminian elements and the ever-widening of the definition of Puritan tendencies.7

James's 'political' beliefs will only concern us here inasmuch as these relate to his theological understanding of kingship and his view that kings were God's lieutenants on earth. The long-lasting tension among scholars of (primarily English) political thought as to whether James was an advocate of divine-right monarchy and 'absolutist' ideas can be explained to a great degree by some scholars' emphasis on comparisons with Continental 'absolutist' ideas and by some others on James's conformity to the language and precepts of the Ancient constitution and the common law.8 According to the more recent compromise, some of these problems can be resolved by giving some more attention to the Scottish context – something that scholars had failed to sufficiently do so far. According to this interpretation, some of James's views were articulated in the face of opposition from advocates of the liberties of the Presbyterian Kirk. The same views, however, when translated and reedited in

---

7 Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake, for example, seem to stress more the success of James's attempt to follow a middle way, although they refer to the relative failure of the settlement by the end of his reign; see Fincham and Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I', Journal of British Studies 24 (1985), pp. 169-207; and 'The Ecclesiastical Policies of James I and Charles I', in Kenneth Fincham (ed.), The Early Stuart Church, 1603-1642. (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 23-49. On the other hand, a good example of the stress on the dissatisfied and alienated subjects of James I is the work by Lori Anne Ferell, Government by Polemic: James I, the King's Preachers, and the Rhetorics of Conformity, 1603-1625. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998). John Morrill's article, 'A British Patriarchy? Ecclesiastical Imperialism Under the Early Stuarts', in Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts (eds.), Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain. Essays in Honour of Patrick Collinson. (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp. 209-37, is much more subtle in pointing out the areas in which Jacobean religious policies were successful and the areas that were not.

8 The two contrasting views are represented by Johann P. Sommerville and Glenn Burgess; for the relevant works, see the bibliography.
England for the benefit of the King’s new subjects were misunderstood and misinterpreted by his English subjects.9 In other words, the stronger and more ‘unconditional’ language of James was caused and called for by the unfavourable environment in which he had to establish himself as a young king, but was later tempered and modified according to the new setting in which he found himself.

It is worth looking at some of the above issues from a different perspective. To paraphrase Wormald, James may, in fact, be three personae in one – what all the above viewpoints do not take adequately into account is James’s conscious positioning against a wider ‘European’ background, that is, his ‘European’ face. One of the objects of this chapter, thus, will be to situate the Stuart king in a European context both in terms of wider European developments and considerations, as well as intellectually. Several facets corroborate this assessment – first and foremost, the attitude of James himself. The fact that a substantial number of his texts were written with a continental audience in mind, and that he specifically addressed some of them to European monarchs shows that he was ‘extremely sensitive about his continental reputation’.10 This was true as much for his intellectual reputation as for his views on kingship. James’s purposefulness in presenting himself as an emerging major European player after 1603 has already been observed.11 From an intellectual point of view, it is quite important to note that the significance he

---


11 For an interesting account of the ‘marketing’ of James’s ideas in continental Europe with the Low Countries as a starting point see Roderick J. Lyall, ‘The Marketing of James VI and I: Scotland, England and the Continental Book Trade’, Quaerendo 32 (2002), pp. 204-217, where he argues about the expediency of the publications of James’s works.
placed on religious exchanges made him automatically more cosmopolitan than several of his compatriots, as the language of theology was inherently international (ecumenical) in the Christian world. After all, all confessions based their doctrines on shared scriptures and they had all been part of the greater Societas Christiana before the divisions.

James's cosmopolitan outlook was expressed in many ways, from his humanistic pursuits to the policy of offering a refuge and acting as a patron to a number of international thinkers of his time, most notably Isaac Casaubon, and Pierre du Moulin among others.12 Although James's interest and appreciation of Continental art cannot be compared to that of his heir, he was certainly responsible for opening up England to Europe.13 This newly-found interest in continental art and painting was above all illustrated in the career and role of two very important diplomats, Henry Wotton and Dudley Carleton. The consuls of the two diplomats operated as sojourns for Britons on the nascent trend of the 'grand tour'. They were also responsible for developing cultural relations of all kinds, collecting art and acquiring important books and manuscripts for publication in London.14 It is within this context that the offer of shelter to Sarpi that we saw in the previous chapter was made.

At the same time, the King's frequent interventions in continental politics, whether in the form of intervening in the Dutch Estates-General on the issue of the appointment of Vorstius, intellectual relations with the Greek Orthodox Church, or a resolution of the explosive situation in the Palatinate through a Spanish match, constitute an aspect that cannot be ignored by any

12 See William B. Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom. (Cambridge: CUP, 1997); ch. 4, 'Foreign Visitors'.
student of his political theory and practice. Most important, however, one ought to take into serious account James’s European considerations because it was these that ultimately mattered. As various scholars have suggested, his (domestic) religious policy, without doubt the most important facet of his kingship, was essentially determined by the dictates of James’s ‘foreign’ (religious) policy. This can only be intelligible when one considers the centrality of religion in James’s ‘thinking and self-fashioning’. For James, there was no perceptible divide between a ‘religious’ and ‘foreign’ policy: both were part of the same whole. But since, as Patterson has shown, the King’s ecumenical vision could encompass the religious situation of his kingdoms, his priorities would have naturally lied with the overall picture that ‘Britain’ would be a constituent of.

Seen against such a background, James’s political and religious theory and practice are intelligible in different ways. Such a perspective can, for instance, supersede the problem of a dual Scottish and English context, for from 1603 onwards James considered himself as the ruler of ‘Britain’. It can also explain many of the intrinsic ambiguities of the King’s outlook that have largely been regarded as mere paradoxes of his policies. Yet James was always ready to offer to the public an explanation and justification of these, no matter how explicit, in his numerous texts.


A number of problems face the student embarking on an examination of James’s views on the relationship between politics and religion and political and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, based on his texts. The biggest difficulty arises from the number and diversity of the texts bearing the King’s signature. James was a writer of voluminous output, composing texts throughout his life and in response to several different circumstances. He was moreover, an author who, like many humanist scholars, enjoyed writing in various genres. He created poetry; wrote scriptural exegesis and meditations; composed tracts more readily recognised by modern scholars as ‘political treatises’; wrote theological and ecclesiastical disputations, while furthermore discussing the subject of demonology, and the evils of tobacco.

Modern scholarship’s difficulties in coming to terms with James’s production are reflected in the texts selected for editions of his work published in the last century. These difficulties echo some of the problems discussed in the Introduction, namely the use of inadequate and somewhat anachronistic definitions of terms like politics, religion, and the associated problems posed by divisions between academic disciplines when studying the past. The standard selections of texts in editions of James’s works exclude – with one exception - texts with theological resonances.17 Editions of his political works, furthermore, do not include any of James’s poetic exercises, for instance, or the king’s work on demonology.18 Yet as scholars have acknowledged for some time now,

---


18 See for example James Craigie (ed.), The Basilikon Doron of King James VI. 2 vols., (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Text Society, 1944-50). The edition reprints both the original edition of 1599 as well as the one of 1603; unless otherwise stated, all references are to the 1603 edition, henceforth referred to as Basilikon Doron. See also James Craigie (ed.), Minor Prose Works of King
'political' elements are to be found first and foremost in his theological disputations, as well as in his poetic works, the most notable example being the epic *Lepanto* which was frequently reprinted by James; his poetry, however, has largely remained unexplored.19

In terms of the larger subject addressed in this thesis the variety of the nature of James’s texts supports the contention of the interchangeable nature of religious and political elements. A notable example in this case from the king’s work is the early paraphrase on the Revelation. In this tract the Pope was identified with the Antichrist and was juxtaposed to James and Protestantism. James appropriated the language of the Apocalypse to promote his views on the balance of powers in confessional Europe. To a similar argument the King would return in his later *Premonition to all Mightie Monarchs* (1609), a tract more universally accepted as ‘political’.

Yet on a more general level, it can be argued that as a political and public person, all the texts that James authored ought to be regarded as ‘political’ actions and part of the King’s exercise of authority.20 In this respect, historians and literary critics are in agreement about the Stuart king’s fundamental conception of the authority of the printed word and the fact that James was quite conscious in exercising his royal supremacy through writing. As two of his critics put it, he ‘recognised textual representation as crucial to the construction of both the political subject and the sovereign, whose power depended on

---

19 For the *Lepanto* see Peter C. Herman, “‘Best of Poets, Best of Kings’: King James VI and I and the Scene of Monarchic Verse’, in Fischlin and Fortier, *Royal Subjects*, esp. pp. 77-103. The same volume contains some interesting essays on part of James’s poetry. The same volume marks a great turn in the study of James’s works, as it examines a variety of his less studied texts. Interestingly, the fact that most of the contributors are literary critics is an indication of the present situation; this may also however mean that historians will not give it its due attention.

creating such a subject'.\(^{21}\) Furthermore, as the kingdoms' sovereign it was self-evident that he would rule in all areas of life, as he avowed in his *Basilikon Doron*: ‘...I bid you knowe all craftes: For except ye knowe euerie one, how can ye contolle euerie one, whiche is your proper office?’\(^{22}\) Hence the royal exercise in a variety of genres and topics. In James’s case, however, scholars are quite fortunate in assessing the King’s view of royal authority through his own written word, as we have the official collected edition of his works from 1616. This collection of works includes various types of tracts and should be considered as the official expression of what James wanted the people to associate with his name and reign.\(^{23}\) In this chapter, however, for reasons mainly of priority and scope, it is necessary to be highly selective.

Before we move on to the main area of examination, nonetheless, some further points have to be made. At the outset, the question of James’s authorship is one that has critically been raised by his biographer, David H. Willson. In an early article, unfavourable, though insightful, Willson showed that the King’s literary activity was much more complex than assumed. Essentially with the aim of undermining James’s achievement, Willson demonstrated that the texts that appeared under James’s name throughout his reign were the product of a collaborative effort. In this respect, the article pointed out the pleasure the King took in discussions during meals, his enjoyment of having books read to him during his repast, and his discourses during hunting.\(^{24}\) As for the actual process of the composition, the article paid attention to the role of James’s divines in collecting material for him, commenting on his writing and even co-authoring tracts. James Montagu, thus, for instance, was partly responsible for the

\(^{22}\) *Basilikon Doron*, p. 143.
\(^{23}\) For a list of the works included, as well as the contents of the McIlwain and Sommerville editions, see Appendix IX.
\(^{24}\) David H. Willson, ‘James I and his Literary Assistants’, *Huntington Library Quarterly* 8 (1944-5); p. 36.
composition of the Apology; Lancelot Andrewes had assisted the writing of the Premonition, while the Remonstrance can largely be credited to Pierre du Moulin. What is important, however, for our purposes is Willson’s final admission that although James was not the one who had written them, ‘the thoughts were his’. Whether he was the one putting every word of his tracts on paper is of less consequence than the fact that he actually signed them, thus, effectively endorsing them. Moreover, the fact that the views expressed in these texts were not only representative of the King, but also of an influential and wide-ranging intellectual circle around him, adds to the case that preoccupation on several of the issues discussed in the course of the present dissertation was wide-spread throughout European intellectual circles.

In terms of the body of the texts, various arrangements imposed on them can make the surveying of James’s work easier. Besides the question of genre, one can separate the King’s writings in terms of context, into the ones he composed while in Scotland, like the Daemonology (1597), the True Lawe of Free Monarchies (1598), the ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΟΝ ΔΩΡΟΝ (Basilikon Doron, 1599), and so forth, and his writings while in London, such as the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance (1607), the Premonition to all Mightie Monarchs (1609) and many more, that were penned after his accession to the English throne. Secondly, and more importantly, the texts can be arranged according to the alleged intended audience – whether James was writing to himself, his subjects (Scottish, English or both) or a wider European audience. This is a much vaguer distinction as even texts that were initially intended for a limited audience, like the True Lawe of Free Monarchies or the Basilikon Doron were later officially endorsed and

26 Cf. Wormald, ‘Two Kings or One?’. 
published with the King’s name on them. These types of texts, however, seem much more fascinating as they give the illusion that they are much more personalised. James himself, for instance, would describe the former as a ‘discharge of conscience’ and the latter as his ‘Testament and latter will’. On a similar tone, a much later text, the Meditation upon the 27th, 28th, and 29th Verses of the 27th Chapter of Saint Matthew (1619), was composed at a point when the King thought he was dying.

In what follows we will concentrate on an indicative sample of James’s writings. These are, in chronological order (although not the order in which they will be examined here), the pair of the Scottish treatises on government, the True Lawe (1598) and the Basilikon Doron (1599); the King’s Speech at the opening of the Parliament in 1604; the texts associated with the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance; and lastly, the two later meditations, on the Lord’s Prayer, and on the 27th Chapter of Matthew (both 1619). Our concern is, therefore, with texts that have quite dissimilar outlook, in terms of purpose, audience, and content. All tracts, moreover, are the King’s responses to specific sets of circumstances, and contingent, thus, upon their particular context. As royal articulations, furthermore, reflecting the image of an accommodating sovereign who aspired

27 For the idea that these texts were at least at the time of their conception not intended for wide circulation see Wormald, ‘James VI and I, Basilikon Doron and The Trew Lawe of Free Monarchies: the Scottish Context and the English Translation’, in Peck, Mental World, pp. 50-1. Cf. Basilikon Doron, p. 13. This is also linked to the existence of two different intellectual circles around James: one, while in Edinburgh during the 1580s and 1590s, and the other one in London, after 1603.

28 True Lawe of Free Monarchies (spelling of the 1598 original edition) in Craigie, Minor Prose Works, p. 60; heretofore referred to as True Lawe. Cf. Advertisement to the reader, A Meditation upon the 27.28.29. Verses of the XXVII Chapter of Saint Matthew or a Patterne for a Kings Inauguration, in James I. The Workes (1616), facsimile edition (Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971); p. 606; heretofore referred to as Workes. The confessional/personal character of the work is witnessed by James’ discussion of the crown of thorns as an allegory to the burdens of kingship: see ibid., p. 613.

to policies of religious unity both domestically as well as internationally, they had to be as flexible as possible, thereby leaving room for a wide spectrum of opinions. Accordingly, modifications of James’s attitude over the years and throughout his writings are subtle and almost indiscernible. Yet, despite all the constraints, the remarkable sense of unity they exhibit ought to be perceived as evidence of the sincerity and consistency of the King’s fundamental beliefs.30 This unity allows us to look at the texts as a continuum that mirrors the circumstances in which James reigned; it can also operate as a backdrop against which we can set the writings of the three other authors, as all four of them dealt with and had to respond to essentially similar conditions, tensions and unease. The universality of these issues was manifested above all during the reign of James VI and I in the years of the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance, a dispute that aroused international attention and was taken as an indication of the same fundamental problems. It is to the heated years of this international debate and James’s texts associated with it that we shall now turn our attention.

II. Texts and Themes

i. Controversy Over the Oath of Allegiance and the International Milieu

At the core of this controversy was the decision to impose an Oath of Allegiance in 1606, the year after the attempt on James’s life with the Gunpowder Plot.31

31 For accounts of the imposition of the Oath and the subsequent controversy see the Introduction in McLlwain, Political Works; Johann P. Sommerville, ‘Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance’, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Cambridge, 1981); chs. 1&2; Patterson, King James VI and I, ch. 3; Willson, King James VI and I, pp. 223-42; James Brodrick, Robert Bellarmine: Saint and Scholar (London: Burns & Oates, 1961), pp. 264-296; Harro Hopfl, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630. (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), ch. 13. Beginning from the early seventeenth-century, and still having some supporters, there is the theory that the Gunpowder Plot (Powder-Treason) had, in fact, been an orchestration from above, that would unify James’s Protestant subjects – as it did; for a modern advocate see Ferell, Government by Polemic, esp. pp. 62-7; cf. also Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 75-6.
Interpretations for the objectives behind the decision for this Oath have been abundant. The more favourable ones run along the lines that the Oath would simply distinguish the potentially subversive extreme Catholics from moderates, who would pledge allegiance to their monarch. James is perceived to be granting covert toleration or simply trying to conciliate his moderate Catholic subjects. Less favourable interpretations, on the other hand, argue for a Jacobean policy of persecution, which the imposition of the Oath would put into force.32 James’s assertion that he wanted to set ‘a marke of distinction betweene good Subject, and bad’, if taken at face value, supports the first point of view.33 In terms of evidence, particular attention to a clause that obliged soldiers fighting abroad to take the Oath seems to add to the argument that its purpose was the security of the polity.34

By taking the Oath the subjects denied that the Pope had any authority to depose the King, or to dispose of any of his kingdoms or dominions. It also meant that the Pope could not authorise any foreign Prince to invade the country, or to discharge any of the subjects from their oath of allegiance and obedience to his king. The oath further bound the subjects to admit that they could not be incited by the Pope to rise against their king, state or government; similarly, they also swore to regard as heretical the position that allowed the deposition and assassination of kings who had been excommunicated by the Pope.35 The contents of the Oath, accordingly, went against some of the basic

32 Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake seem to agree with the view that it was planned as a means to distinguish between the radical and the moderate Catholics; see their article ‘The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I’; on pp. 185-6; also Patterson, King James VI and I, p. 78.

33 Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance; Workes, p. 274. Cf. also Premonition to All Most Mightie Monarches, Kings, free Princes and States of Christendome; Workes, p. 292.

34 Sommerville, in his discussion on the reasons for the establishment of the Oath in ‘Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance’, pp. 25-7. According to him, soldiers who did not take the Oath, it was feared, would rally under the Archduke and then turn their swords not against the Dutch, but against England.

35 Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.
principles of the Papacy, as expressed in their extreme form by the Dictatus Papae of Gregory VII (Hildebrand, 1073-85).36

Pope Paul V's involvement in the form of a letter to the Archpriest George Blackwell, the head of the Catholic community in England since 1598, instructing him not to take the Oath (September 1606), struck a chord with James. The Pope had based his orders on the grounds that the taking of this oath would be damaging to the Catholics' faith and salvation of their souls, for it contained many points that were contrary to faith and salvation.37 James considered this 'thunder' as an outright interference in his jurisdiction, provoking his subjects to refuse 'to professe their naturall obedience' to their sovereign.38 As Blackwell had refrained from circulating the first Papal letter, a second one arrived less than a year later (August 1607), to confirm the authenticity of the first one, repeating the order to the followers of the Catholic faith to avoid taking the oath.39 An interesting development in the events came with a more personal letter sent by Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine to Blackwell (September 1607). That letter aimed, nevertheless, at the same point, to hinder the English Catholics from swearing the Oath. The Cardinal was much more instructive in his letter, claiming that the real objective behind this measure was to deny the authority of the Apostolic See and to transfer this authority to the successor of Henry VIII.40

The timing of this correspondence could not have been more remarkable. The first Papal letter had been dispatched right in the middle of the crisis of the Venetian Interdict (April 1606-April 1607), a crisis that James himself had followed very closely. It was extremely difficult, therefore, not to perceive the

37 Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.
38 Apologie; Workes, pp. 248-9.
39 Apologie; Workes, p. 258.
40 Apologie; Workes, pp. 260-2.
situation as an orchestrated assault by the Papacy against temporal
sovereignties - Bellarmine, after all, had also been at the forefront of the dispute
with Venice. At the height of the international pamphlet war that was already
in full swing, James chose to give a response to both the Pope and the Cardinal.
Besides, the King’s fondness for theological disputation, especially when this
was paired with a challenge to his own authority, made the choice of putting
pen to paper almost irresistible to him. The question of whether there was in
practice actual danger of the Pope excommunicating and deposing James, or of
a Catholic coup, is a matter for speculation. James, however, lived in real dread
of being either excommunicated or assassinated. Whether it was for the
practical implications, or whether it was just that the theoretical principles of the
assault ought not to have been left unrequited, James resolved to respond with
his Triplici Nudo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance.

The tract came out anonymously in early 1607, giving another dimension
to the issue of the controversy. It was quickly translated into French, Latin and
German and had a wide circulation. The European interest aroused, the Papal
side had to respond; Bellarmine was thus persuaded by the Pope to provide a

41 Sommerville, ‘Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy Over the Oath of Allegiance’, pp. 34 and 51-2.
42 Patterson’s argument, that James was deeply moved by a conviction that his motives had been
misunderstood in Rome, is a little more difficult to prove, especially if we consider that his later
writings are of a more polemical nature; King James VI and I, p. 84.
43 Sommerville argues that although the Papal deposing power was accepted by almost
everyone in Catholic circles, it was generally perceived that there was little point in putting it
into practice against James, as the Peace of 1604 with Spain had effectively squashed all
prospects of the restoration of Catholicism by force and there was low probability that a Catholic
uprising would have succeeded. The threat of deposition, on the other hand, could be used to
courage James to tolerate Catholicism; Sommerville, ‘Jacobean Political Thought and the
Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance’, pp. 39-41.
44 See Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 84-90; Willson, James VI and I p. 234; Cf. also Lyall, ‘The
Marketing of James VI and I’: James’s defence of his policy appeared in at least nineteen separate
editions, in five languages, and printed in at least eight different countries. The English
ambassador to Venice, Sir Henry Wotton records that the Apologie was being read in Venice
before the end of March; Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton, ed. Logan Pearsall-Smith, 2 vols.
reply. Nevertheless, Bellarmine’s tract, which had come out under disguised authorship, contained a bombshell for James: the Cardinal brought to light information that the King had been in communication with Clement VIII while still in Scotland, making serious insinuations about James’s inclinations to Catholicism. The King’s religious identity was a critical factor in his ability to maintain unity within his domains: when in later years James chose to follow a pro-Spanish (‘pro-Catholic’) direction, his policy brought about widespread opposition and the resurgence of Puritan feeling. Any sense of doubt, thus, as to the King’s allegiance, posed a threat to the general religious consensus. The severity of the blow is reflected in James’s reaction; in order to clear his name, he first brought publicly to justice James Elphinstone, his former secretary in Scotland, who had allegedly made him sign a letter that James had not read.

James then set about refuting the Cardinal quite determinedly. He re-edited the *Apology* under his name with an added *Premonition to All Most Mightie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes and States of Christendome* (1609), personally addressing the Emperor Rudolph II and all the ‘temporal powers’ generally. The double tract was almost immediately translated in Latin and French, while a Dutch edition followed soon afterwards. Patterson shows the Curia’s marked concern; as he notes, ‘almost every papal concern in Europe – Gallicanism in France, heterodoxy at the Emperor’s court, the anti-Papal stance of Venice, the growth of Calvinism in the Rhineland, and the loyalty of Roman Catholics in Britain seemed likely to be affected in some way by the British king’s

---

45 Bellarmine brought his text out under the name of his chaplain Matteo Torti. The full title of the work was *Matthei Torti, Presbyteri & Theologi Papiensis, Responsio ad Librum Inscriptum, Triplici nodo, Triplex Cuneus, Sive Apologia pro Iuramento Fidelitatis* (1608).
manifesto’. According to James’s plan, copies were presented individually to all the princes and principalities. Papal nuncios throughout the continent, nevertheless, had been entrusted to prevent the acceptance and circulation of the Premonition, admittedly, with considerable success. In the text James responded to both Bellarmine and Robert Parsons, the English Jesuit who had also written against the King, demonstrating that the problem of Papal claims to temporal authority was not specific-related but that it had strong roots in history and that it ought to be of shared concern to all the sovereigns. That James’s rhetoric in the Premonition, underlined by the specific address to the European monarchs, did have an effect is witnessed by the subsequent international involvement in the discussion. Some of the most notable contributions to the Papal stance, besides Bellarmine’s Apologia (1610), were tracts by two Jesuit theologians in Germany, Martin Becanus and Jacobus Gretser; a highly erudite response by the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez, the Defensio Fidei Catholicae (1613); in France, a reply by the Jesuit Andreas Eudaemon-Johannes as well as by the Dominican Nicolas Coiffeteau; a tract by the Flemish Jesuit Leonard Lessius and the Dutch theologian Adolf Schulken. Conversely, the positions professed by the King were supported among others, by William Barclay, a Catholic Scot who taught at Lorraine; the famous classical scholar Isaac Casaubon; the Calvinist pastor Pierre du Moulin; the Catholic-inclined poet John Donne; and the divine George Carleton, cousin of the

---


50 Parsons’s work was The Judgetment of a Catholicke English-man, Living in Banishment for His Religion, Written to His Private Friend in England, Concerning a Late Booke Set Forth, and Entituled, Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance (1608). Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 333.
diplomat. This sort of input is indisputable evidence of the universality of issues at stake and the degree to which thinkers from various parts of the Continent could relate to them.

To focus more specifically on the *Premonition*, it has been argued that its publication was a somewhat imprudent move: in addition to arguments associated with the core of the dispute, the text included a section on James’s profession of faith, and, what is more, a twenty-page demonstration that the Pope was in fact the Antichrist. In this manner, it revealed James’s vulnerability in matters of his personal faith. The King’s compelling words, furthermore, were a poor contrast with his actions: to the disappointment of Sarpi and others the King of Britain was not a man of great action, as Sarpi, for one, noted.51

Still, within the more general context of the discourse, the language and line of reasoning of the Scottish King is remarkably similar to that of the Venetian friar. The most significant element of this shared stance was their profound hatred of the Papacy. Evidently, there is a good deal of truth in the argument that the King’s aversion has to be seen on confessional grounds. That said, however, it is important to recognise that, as will become apparent from the following analysis, the confessional element is not sufficient in explaining James’s standpoint. This is first and foremost evident in James’s assumption that all rulers, Catholic as well as Protestant, were on the same side of the conflict; they all shared the same interest and were all under the same threat of Papal intervention in the domain of their jurisdiction.52 As referred to above, James

51 Mark Sarpi’s disillusionment and disappointment: ‘If the King of England were not a doctor,’ he wrote in 1612, ‘we might hope for some good’, but, he noted, instead of arms and money James contributed nothing to the cause of political liberty but books and words; - also: ‘It is one thing to be a clever theologian, quite another to be a valorous king’; cited by Bouwsma in *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty*, p. 526.

tried to promote this point by enlisting a number of Catholic supporters to write in defence of his standpoint. For both the Calvinist James and the Catholic Sarpi, the most abominable feature of the Papacy was its claim to temporal power, which they saw as encroachments upon the temporal authority of sovereigns and sovereign powers. The premise informing James’s defence of the Oath of Allegiance was therefore the same one that formed the core of the Venetian rhetoric during the Interdict crisis.

In this respect, the King’s line of reasoning has as a starting point the familiar Biblical proverb *Give to Caesar what was Caesar’s and to God what was God’s*, in conjunction with the declaration that Christ made: *Regnum meum non est huius mundi*. Both these mottos are repeated frequently in the first two texts under consideration, the *Apology* and the *Premonition*.53 We have already seen the extensive use of the same dicta on behalf of the Venetian Republic, appearing both as banners in public processions – an event that Henry Wotton himself had recorded – as well as featuring prominently in Sarpi’s work.54 We have also observed, in the course of the discussion of Sarpi’s positions, their integral association with the rhetoric of the separation of ecclesiastical and temporal jurisdictions. According to this, as God’s kingdom belonged to a different world, it followed that the holders of spiritual office do not have any jurisdiction within this world. Temporal matters were to be administered by sovereign rulers, who, in turn, were only answerable to God. The Pope and the clergy’s responsibilities and jurisdiction were centred on sacerdotal matters, entirely separate from secular issues.

King James’s principal argument throughout the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance, thus, that the Oath in question did ‘only meddle with the

53 See for example *Apologie; Workes*, pp. 256 and 284; *Remonstrance for the Rights of Kings; Workes*, p. 417
ciuill and temporall Obedience, due by Subiects to their naturall Soueraignes', can be firmly located within this shared discourse.\textsuperscript{55} According to the text of the Oath, James's subjects would avow that the Pope had no authority to depose their king, or to dispose of any of his kingdoms or dominions; that he could not authorise any foreign Prince to invade the country; most important, that the Pope had no authority to discharge any of the subjects from their allegiance to the king, or to allow any of them to rise against the person of the king or the government of the state.\textsuperscript{56} Conversely, in his first letter to the English Catholics the Pope had insisted that the text contained elements quite contrary to their Catholic beliefs; as a result, the taking of the Oath would amount to the damaging of their Catholic faith and the salvation of their souls.\textsuperscript{57} For James, on the other hand, there was a clear and obvious divide between earthly and celestial affairs, just as Charron had expressed them in the \textit{Sagesse}. Temporal matters were of a different nature to the divine. Consequently, for James it was incomprehensible how the profession of the 'naturall Allegiance of Subiects to their [temporal] Prince' could be opposite to the faith and salvation of his subjects' souls.\textsuperscript{58}

James's conviction of the separation of spheres of jurisdiction as a corollary of the earthly-celestial divide is plain in his concern that the Oath would only contain the profession of 'naturall Allegiance, and ciuill and temporall obedience'. As he explains in his \textit{Premonition} to the Princes,

The trueth is, that the Lower house of Parliament at the first framing of this Oath, made it to containe, That the Pope hath no power to excommunicate me; which I caused them to reforme, onely making it to conclude, That no excommunication of the Popes, can warrant my Subiects to practice against my Person or State; denying the deposition of Kings to be in the Popes lawfull power; as indeed I take any such temporall violence, to be farre without the limits of such a Spirituall censure as Excommunication is.\textsuperscript{59}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Premonition; Workes}, p. 295.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Apologie; Workes}, pp. 250-1.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Apologie; Workes}, pp. 250-1.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Apologie; Workes}, p. 254. Cf. also p. 256.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Premonition; Workes}, p. 292.

\normalsize
The divergence between this position and that of Cardinal Bellarmine, the prime representative of the Papal camp is, however, patent when considering that the latter advocated that to deny the Pope the power to depose Kings was to deny his power of excommunication. To this categorical position, James put forward a much more accommodating one, where he would make a distinction between ‘good subjects’ and ‘bad’ - or ‘sheep’ and ‘goats’, as he graphically put it, possibly alluding to the religious metaphor of the damned and the saved. The subtlety of James’s stance is particularly well illustrated in a juxtaposition of the Oath of Allegiance with the Oath of Supremacy, first devised by Henry VIII. To the accusation of the Cardinal that the Oath that James wanted to impose was merely a reiteration of the earlier one, the King responded with a comparison between the two. He explained that

in that Oath [of Supremacy] onely is contained the Kings absolute power, to be Iudge ouer all persons, aswell Ciuill as Ecclesiastical, excluding all forraigne powers and Potentates to be Iudges within his dominions; whereas this last made Oath containeth no such matter, onely meddling with the ciuill obedience of Subjectts to their Soueraigne, in mere temporall causes...

To substantiate this and make the contrast more evident, James cites the Oath commanded by his predecessor; the text of the Oath of Supremacy began like this:

I A.B. doe vtterly testifie and declare in my conscience, that the Kings Highnesse is the only Supreame Governour of this Realme, and all other his Highnesse Dominions and Countries, aswell in all Spirituall or Ecclesiastical things or causes, as Temporall... The Oath confirmed the English King’s complete control and supreme jurisdiction over spiritual affairs. The Scottish King further explains that the objective behind the Oath of Supremacy had been to distinguish between followers of the Catholic faith and followers of ‘our own Profession’. James’s

---

60 Premonition; Workes, p. 295.
61 Apologie; Workes, p. 260.
62 Apologie; Workes, pp. 263-4.
63 Apologie; Workes, p. 264.
intent, conversely, was entirely different: he wanted to differentiate between ‘civilly obedient Papists’ and the ‘perverse disciples of the Powder-Treason’.64 The distinction he makes can be found in a number of his texts; it can, furthermore, also be seen as one between moderate Catholics and zealots; James, besides, blamed the excessive zeal for religion for the attempt against his life.65 This zeal, moreover, was, in the King’s way of thinking, associated with a degree of superstition,66 a feature often cited by both Charron and Lipsius who regarded it as enemy to religion and piety. James’s line of reasoning and his classification of subjects into zealots and moderates rather than Protestants and Catholics lend substance to the view that his position was not determined by confessional divides. His attitude can be described more as one of lenience: his subjects’ religious affiliation was not particularly important, so long as they professed their loyalty to him. This attitude is of course strongly reminiscent of politique doctrines, to which we saw that both Charron and Lipsius adhered. For James, as for the advocates of politique doctrines, lawful subjects ought to acknowledge the supreme authority of the monarch in temporal matters and render their submission to him, while also submitting to the spiritual authority of their Church.

In contrast to this concept of two parallel authorities, Rome maintained (through Bellarmine’s pen) that the clergy was above temporal sovereigns; they were, consequently, ‘exempted from the power of the earthly Kings’.67 The priests’ superiority to Princes, according to the Cardinal, was reflected in the coronation ceremonial: ‘The anointing which is powred vpon the head of the

64 Apologie; Workes, p. 263. That the King was in effect partially granting toleration is generally suggested by Fincham and Lake, ‘The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I’; Sommerville, ‘Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance’; Patterson, King James VI and I; John J. LaRocca, in ”’Who Can’t Pray with Me, Can’t Love Me”: Toleration and the Early Jacobean Recusancy Policy’, Journal of British Studies 23 (1984), pp. 22-36.
65 Cf. for example Apologie; Workes, pp. 248, 274; Premonition; Workes, p. 291.
67 Premonition; Workes, p. 296.
King by the Priest, doeth declare that hee is inferiour to the Priest.’ Bellarmine additionally claimed that all secular power derived from men, as opposed to the power of the Pope that derived immediately from God. Accordingly, the Holy See had the right to depose kings from their status of authority once they were ‘in fault against Christian religion’. Furthermore, it had the right to exercise its indirect power in temporal affairs when a ‘concern of faith’, ‘the salvation of souls, the welfare of religion, the preservation of the Church’ were at stake, or more in general, a ‘necessity of the Church’ required so. In order to remove any sacerdotal connotations from kingship, the Cardinal argued, moreover, that kings were created by the people who transferred the authority to the king. The people, however, retained their habitual power in their hands and could withdraw it from the kings.

In this respect, although Bellarmine seems to have recognised boundaries between spiritual and temporal power, he nevertheless promoted the position that some breaching was occasionally necessary, as he viewed the spiritual to have priority over the temporal. Seen from this angle, the clerical order, as the representative of all things divine, ought to have more influence than the lay order. It is in this light that Bellarmine’s request to Blackwell, therefore, ought to be viewed: the Cardinal urged in his letter to the Archbishop not to prefer a liberty in this world at the expense of a liberty in the world of God.

For James, a different order was in place. The devout King would not contest that celestial concerns take precedence over temporal ones – still, his stance was plain on the fact that in this world the secular leader ought to administer all earthly affairs. The sacerdotal element would still be under the jurisdiction of the clergy, insofar as it involved issues of belief and spiritual

---

69 Premonition; Workes, p. 331.
70 Apologie, Workes, p. 262.
guidance. James rebutted the suggestion that anyone had the authority or the right to interfere in civil government that was under the direct jurisdiction of the sovereign monarch. From this perspective, and as Sarpi maintained, the Papal claims were nothing but a usurpation of the Popes upon the temporal power of kings, a usurpation that ran altogether counter to the writings of the Scriptures, of the Church Fathers and ancient Councils. The conceptual framework of this view was the fundamental notion of the separation of the divine and temporal spheres, the same basis that Charron uses as a starting point in his twofold examination of the divine and human wisdom. James gives it full expression in his *Premonition*:

...I utterly deny that there is an earthly Monarch thereof [of the Church], whose word must be a Law, and who cannot erre in his Sentence, by an infallibilitie of Spirit. Because earthly Kingdomes must have earthly Monarches; it doeth not follow, that the Church must have a visible Monarch too: for the world hath not One earthly temporall Monarch. Christ is his Churches Monarch, and the holy Ghost his Deputie: Reges gentium dominantur eorum, vos autem non sic.71

Here we have a definite articulation of the double separation, temporal-divine and secular-ecclesiastical; temporal bodies ought to have an earthly head; this, however does not apply to the body of the Church, which is directly guided by Christ. In the same model, and refuting the Papal arguments, James insisted that, according to the Scriptures, Princes were invested with their authority by God. Obedience was thus rendered necessary in the Christians’ duties towards God, for the sake of peace and order, even in the case of an apostate king.72

Two further parameters associated with these arguments deserve attention so as to obtain a more rounded understanding of James’s position. The first consideration is the King’s contention that Papal usurpation of power stemmed from the Pontifical preoccupation with worldly gains at the expense of the Papacy’s pastoral duties, and which eventually led to the arrogance and

71 *Premonition*; Workes, p. 306
72 Cf. the example of Julian in *Apologie*; Workes, p. 255.
ambition expressed in the claims for temporal supremacy—a contention, namely, identical to Sarpi's understanding of things. The second issue involves James's assertion that, in fact, according to Bible precepts, not only was the role of the temporal and secular authorities entirely different and separate, but that certain control over ecclesiastical affairs ought to be under the lay jurisdiction.

Regarding the first parameter, James founded his position, that assertions of Papal rights in temporal things constituted infringement of their religious duties, firmly on Sarpi's use of ecclesiastical history and the Bible. The King emphatically declared that this late 'vsurpation of Popes over the temporall power of Princes, is against the rule of all Scriptures, auncient Counsels and Fathers'. To substantiate this assertion to the Princes he was addressing himself, he offered a number of examples as evidence explaining that the primacy of the Apostolic Sea had 'slender grounds on the word of God': 'For in all the Scripture, especially in the New Testament, I neuer read of Pontifex Maximus'. James did not hesitate to address the theological foundation of the Papal claims, devoting a concise discussion on the dictum 'Pasce oves meas' and the status of Peter among the rest of the Apostles. The King was particularly sensitive to what he saw as distorted readings of Christ's instruction. Above all, he was infuriated by the Catholic interpretation that Christ had instructed Peter to oversee the whole world. In order to refute it, James addressed the issue from a historical point of view, referring particularly to the lives of the Apostles, the early years of the Church, and the Church history after the establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire. He pointed, thus, to many incidences from this period in time that demonstrated that in actual fact the primacy of the Papal See was not always recognised; he uses, thus, the

73 Premonition; Workes, p. 295; cf. also ibid., p. 292.
74 Apologie; Workes, pp. 281 and 286 respectively.
example of Pope Leo I (440-61) who was in contention with the Patriarch of Constantinople as regards the primacy, pointing out that the Council of Chalcedon (the 4th, 451 A.D.) did not recognise any privilege to the Papal See – the Council, on the contrary, had decreed that New Rome was of the same status as Old Rome.76

The claim for Papal supremacy in spiritual causes was regarded by James, as by other Christians of his time - Protestant as well as Catholic - as a novelty, a new article of faith that had not been irrefutably concluded upon:

nor yet were euer concluded, and defined by any complete generall Councell to belong to the Popes authoritie; and their owne schoole Doctors are at irreconciliable oddes and iarres about them 77

This was especially part of the thesis of the advocates of Conciliar theory who challenged the doctrine of Papal supremacy by insisting on conciliar check upon potentially corrupted, ambitious, heretical or authoritarian Popes. We saw how eloquent Sarpi had been, working within the same discourse, in revealing the repeated evocation of this question in Trent as one that had not been settled. He exposed the disagreements between different factions and prelates at the Council on this issue, and he emphasised the strong voices heard throughout its duration supporting the declaration of the Council’s superiority over the Pontiff. Needless to say, an almost natural alliance existed between the doctrines prompted by the scandal of the Great Schism and anti-papal claims of temporal rulers. James’s criticism falls squarely within this tradition as he develops the same body of ideas; more specifics on the subject, however, will be discussed shortly.

In his exposition, James refutes, first the title of the universal bishop to the Bishop of Rome, referring to Gregory the Great (Pope Gregory I, 590-640)

77 Apologie; Workes, p. 265. An interesting contradiction is apparent between Bellarmine’s positions and Cardinal Du Perron; see Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 422-3, 448.
who had refused it when it was offered to him. Using evidence from history, again, James shows how Emperors and monarchs had long suffered Papal encroachments on their authority. Among the first examples that he cites is the humiliation of the Emperor Henry IV by Gregory VII (1076), as an indication of the long attempt of Popes to deprive monarchs of their estates and their habit of using excommunication as a means for advancement in their struggle for temporal authority. As a conclusion to this historical account James mentions another instance, particularly close to him and therefore more intimidating: Elizabeth’s excommunication, together with the subsequent threats to her life and the general undermining of her power as a result of this.

James was aware of course, that the course of Caesaro-papal contests was to a great degree dependent on the power of the two contestant parties. After his list of Papal acts of aggression, he emphasises how far the emperors had been at times from acknowledging the supremacy of the Pope. Citing several instances to confirm his argument, he claims that it was the emperors who, in fact, held sway over the Church, creating, controlling and deposing Popes. A similar attitude was adopted by the kings, who had long denied the temporal superiority of Rome. James paid particular attention to France, in this regard, referring to the Pragmatic Sanction between Pius II and Louis IX (1463); he praised the immunity of the Gallican Church, and pointed out the great likelihood of France declaring its independence from Rome, renouncing its obedience to the Pope and electing a Patriarch of its own. This possibility, it will be recalled, and the threats by the French Crown that it would actually

---

78 Apologie; Workes, p. 279. See also the article on Pope Gregory I in the New Catholic Encyclopaedia by A.C. Rush and K. Hester.
81 Premonition; Workes, pp. 297-8. Also Premonition; Workes, p. 297.
enforce it, are mentioned by Sarpi himself in the *History of the Council of Trent*.\(^{83}\)

We should also be reminded of the Venetian’s own fondness and frequent references to the Gallican Church in his polemics, as well as his correspondence with prominent Gallicans of his time. Importantly, moreover, for our purposes, the references by Sarpi and James to the French case, as an example of defence of the liberties of a ‘National’ Church against Roman claims of control, lend substance to the argument about the supra-confessional character of the opposition to the Papacy. As discussed in the previous chapter, such an instance denoted a blow to Papal claims for superintending the universal Church, which, in turn, ought to coincide with the *Societas Christiana*.

We should return to the point on Conciliar doctrines, however. As referred to above, Papal claims to supremacy had been under attack for centuries from within the Church as well. Conciliar references in James’s *Premonition* should not come as a surprise, then. He links them with his account of the French Gallicanism, using the figure of Jean Gerson, and his work. The King indicates the long subjection of the Popes to General Councils, but mentions, most importantly, the Council of Constance – dreadful for Rome – that had deposed three Popes.\(^{84}\) As we will see below, James uses many more Conciliar references in his *Remonstrance for the Right of Kings*. Despite the constitutional resonances, thus, inherent in the Conciliar tradition, James made the most of arguments associated with it in his rhetoric against the Papal positions.\(^{85}\)

Yet an association of King James - or for that matter other early seventeenth-century authors in Britain - with Conciliar theories has not always

---


84 *Premonition; Workes*, p. 307.

been obvious. The neglect of this aspect in studies of James’s ‘political’ thought must partly be explained by the problems that Conciliar theories posed to princely authority. This does not fully justify, even so, the absence of comprehensive studies on the Conciliar tradition in its variant in England, a fairly important subject that is connected to a number of other issues. This brings us to a second point, linked with this lacuna in historiography, that not many students of political thought consider Conciliar theories necessarily relevant to their object of study. This, in turn, refers back to the observations made in the Introduction about the historians’ preconceived notions of what constitutes ‘politics’ and ‘political’ tracts, or theory, in our time, and whether these are useful in studies dealing with notions and concepts almost five centuries removed. Additionally, and perhaps not surprisingly, Conciliarism and its links with James VI and I, has received some more attention by scholars of Scottish ‘political’ thought, notably by James H. Burns and Roger Mason. The former has demonstrated the survival and development of the Conciliar movement in Scotland through its strong links with the University of Paris. John Major (Maior, Mair), who taught Scottish students in Paris as well as in Scotland, is significant in this light. Burns further indicates that it is possible to establish a connection between Major and Buchanan, the later tutor of James, leaving room to suggest that at least some of these ideas were communicated to the future King of England by his tutor.

---

86 Some notable exceptions, however, include Charles McIlwain, Francis Oakley, J.H.M. Salmon, Roger Mason, William Paterson and Johann Sommerville.
Hence the fact that this current of thought has attracted the attention of historians who have either dealt with an aspect of James's reign that placed him within a wider European context, or scholars of Scottish history – Scotland had an notable degree of intellectual exchange with the Continent - signifies that arguments about the English insularism or the exceptionalism of the English case have prevented historians of English ‘political’ thought from exploring this wider and wide-ranging direction.

With reference to James’s arguments, in the *Premonition* he forthrightly condemned the disuse of the institution of General Councils, and remarked bitterly on the replacement of the custom by the College of the Cardinals.88 He further scorned at the ‘recent invention’ of the Cardinals, citing that their creation was associated with the Papacy of Gregory I in the seventh century.89 It is essential to repeat that James’s particular set of arguments - its Conciliar references, the discontent with the current state of the Church, its centralisation in the person of the Pope and the ensuing abandonment of General Councils, as a check to papal ambitions - was identical to the one informing Sarpi’s polemic.

An additional integral part of both authors’ position was, evidently, the charge that the Apostolic See itself had long been corrupted. This corruption, they were in agreement, stemmed from the Papacy’s ever-increasing hunger for power. It was, thus, partly the result of and partly reflected in the Church’s worldliness. Although James pays due reference to the degeneration of the Papal office, he was, clearly, not the only man of his age to think that about the Church of Rome. This had been the rhetoric that almost a century earlier Luther employed in his vociferous calls for Reform against the degeneration of the state

---


88 *Premonition*; Workes, p. 329.
89 *Premonition*; Workes, p. 329.
of the Church, and cries for reform ‘in head and members’ from within had increased throughout the course of the sixteenth century. What is important for our consideration, however, is the fact that for both James and Sarpi, and contrary to what a substantial part of Roman Catholics believed, the Council which had finally summoned in Trent had failed in its purpose. We have examined in depth Sarpi’s thesis that this long-awaited Council did not bring about the necessary reforms of the abuses, but had, instead, made the conditions of the Church worse, by asserting the Papal supremacy. By the same token, James was adamant, in repeating the assertion that there had not been a proper Council to deliberate on the questions raised by the Reformers.

To focus on the argument as it is developed, the King emphasised in his tracts the novelty of the Papacy’s claims. Far from being similes Petro the Popes had lapsed into an unprecedented vanity and arrogance that made them equate themselves with Gods upon earth:

But how they are now come to be Christs Vicars, nay Gods on earth, triple-crowned, Kings of heauen, earth and hell, Iudges of all the world, and none to iudge them; Heads of the faith, Absolute deciders of all Controversies by the infallibility of their spirit, hauing all power both Spirituall and Temporall in their hands; the high Bishops, Monarches of the whole earth, Superiours to all Emperours and Kings; yea, Supreme Vice-gods, who whether they will or not cannot erre: how they are now come (I say) to the topp of greatnesse, I know not: but sure I am, Wee that are KINGS haue greatest neede to looke vnto it. As for me, Paul and Peter I know, but these men I know not: And yet to doubt of this, is to deny the Catholique faith...

---


92 Cf. for example *Remonstrance; Workes*, pp. 423, 448.

93 *Premonition; Workes*, p. 307; the reference to similes Petro is in *Apologie; Workes*, p. 270.
This form of corruption and the worldliness that went alongside it were for James unmistakably manifested, first and foremost in the dishonest manner that the Popes were elected.94

It is useful to recall, that these were some of the elements that led Sarpi to the claim above and beyond his fundamental principle of separate jurisdictions, that the institution of the Church ought to be overseen by temporal monarchs. Yet James’s views on this point are much stronger than that of the consigliere di stato. Whereas Sarpi’s suggestions in that direction appear rather tentative and are contingent on his audience, James was much firmer in declaring that the secular authorities should control the Church. This apparent divergence in opinions, however slight it may be, can be accounted for by a number of factors. James’s troubled background in Scotland had undoubtedly contributed a great deal in the formation of a much more resolute attitude regarding the position and the role of the clergy within a polity. In addition to their dissimilar backgrounds, and from a different perspective, an important factor in the way the two figures expressed themselves was the difference in rank. James was writing from a greater position of power – and whatever his fears might have been in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot for a possible excommunication, he was still the sovereign of three Kingdoms, and resided considerably further away from Rome than Sarpi. Advocating, thus, a position as drastic as the subjection of the Church to temporal authorities was potentially more dangerous for the Friar, who was a subject and subordinate to the Venetian Senate, in whose defence he was employed to write. Venice was furthermore, in a more vulnerable position and was in urgent need of the international support, as there were already rumours circulating with regard to Spanish preparations.

94 Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 332.
for attack.\textsuperscript{95} James’s potential danger on the other hand came primarily from his subjects, whom he would not necessarily convince through his writings; rather, his texts formed part of his ‘foreign policy’.

These differences are manifested in their respective texts. While Sarpi used the motto ‘Give to Caesar what amounts to Caesar and to God what amounts to God’ as a justification and support for the separation of ecclesiastical and political jurisdiction, James’s use took the connotations of the same motto a step further. The King employed the two proverbs in order to assert the rule of the Kings over the Church, as was, after all, inscribed in the Bible:

In the old Testament Kings were directly Governors over the Church within their Dominions, purged their corruptions; reformed their abuses [...] And as to the New Testament ... Give unto Caesar what is Caesars, and to God what is Gods. Regnum meum non est huius mundi... If these examples, sentences, titles, and prerogatives, and innumerable other in the Olde and New Testament doe not warrant Christian Kings, within their owne dominions, to gouerne their Church, as well as the rest of their people, in being Custodes vtriusque Tebulae, not by making new Articles of Faith, (which is the Popes office as I said before) but by commanding obedience to be giuen to the word of God, by reformating the religion according to his prescribed will, by assisting the spirituall power with the temporal sword, by reformating of corruptions, by procuring due obedience to the Church, by iudging, and cutting off all friouloous questions and schisms, as Constantine did...[my italics] \textsuperscript{96}

This passage is crucial as it encapsulates all of James’s main views as to the type of involvement he envisaged the King to have in ecclesiastical matters. The extract points to the Prince’s role as protector of both tables of the Decalogue, that is, guardian of the people’s duties towards God and towards one another. According to James, it was not in the kings’ jurisdiction to have a say in doctrinal matters, but it was their responsibility to command obedience, implement reformation of abuses, and eliminate heresies and schisms; to assist, in other words, the ‘spiritual power with the temporal sword’.

\textsuperscript{95} This was particularly the case after the signing of the truce in the Low Countries in 1609, that freed Spain for action in Italy; see Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 116-7; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 502.

\textsuperscript{96} Apology; Workes, p. 284.
The extract alludes, moreover, to the historical aspect of the problem, of which James was very conscious. By using the Emperor Constantine as a case in point, James, like Sarpi, referred to an ideal past where the Emperor had granted Christianity its role as the official religion of the state, while retaining at the same time the imperial authority and control over the Church. Constantine had notably demonstrated his role as protector of the Church by summoning the first Ecumenical (General) Council in Nicaea under his auspices, to deliberate on the heresy of Arius (325 A.D.). James was therefore keen to emphasise the subjection of Councils to the Emperor throughout the early years of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire, pointing to the first four General Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople (381 A.D.), Ephesus (431 A.D.), Chalcedon (451 A.D.), and repeating his claim that kings were God’s Lieutenants on earth.97 James’s most decisive argument, however, against the Papal positions was a reference to the circumstances of the primitive Church:

Neither was it euer doubted by any Christian in the Primitive Church, that the Apostles, or any other degree of Christians, were subject to the Emperour.98

This was a crucial point. Christianity, ultimately, had been born and flourished within an organised polity, the Empire. Of particular importance in this regard was the practice in the primitive Church of adapting to the political structure of the Empire, thus essentially recognising its subjection to it.99 As this

---

98 *Premonition; Workes*, p. 331.
99 Similar arguments were raised by Gallican theorists, since after all in France the physical divisions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction followed exactly that late-antique administrative geography to which the Roman law referred: ‘The Christian law having come into the world under the Roman Empire [and] while the dominion of that people was widely distributed in diverse regions and provinces’, its hierarchy followed the divisions of the empire; cited in Parsons, *Church in the Republic*, p. 156.
was a widely known and accepted fact, why did the relationship between Christianity and Empire have to be renegotiated in any way?100

Clearly, the implementation of such a view with all its connotations would substantiate Bellarmine’s assertion that James’s intention was to transfer the authority of the Church of England from the Pope to the King himself.101 Yet the King was careful enough to underplay the full extent of the implications of his views and to qualify it by differentiating between the role of the ‘guardian’ of the Church and the role of ‘leader’ of the Church, although he did emphasise that the authority of the Church rested on the head of the King.102 This subtle variation on the same theme raises, of course, a number of issues pertaining to the relationship between theory and practice, as discussed in the Introduction. Regardless of how attractive the notion of a Church subject to the head of the State might have seemed to James, this did not necessarily mean that it was an easy task to realise. Furthermore, as mentioned above, his rhetoric was tailored according to the audience. Hence, when James wrote more directly for the consideration of his subjects, it will be seen shortly, he felt he could be much more assertive and authoritative. This shift of emphasis will become more apparent when we examine some of his writings while in Scotland and at the first summoning of the Parliament after his accession to the English throne.

Our next stop before that, however, is the tract that the Stuart King authored in response to debates in France concerning the imposition of an oath similar to his Oath of Allegiance. The Remonstrance for the Right of Kings and the Independance of their Crownes (1615/16), published under the King's name, was another tract concerned with problems in the international arena. It was written in defence of a proposal of the Third Estate during the Estates General of 1614,

101 *Apologie; Workes,* p. 260.
102 *Apologie; Workes,* p. 279.
and in the aftermath of Henry IV’s assassination to impose an oath that would confirm the subject’s loyalty to the Crown. Moreover, the tract that was published first in French (1615) and in English the year after, was a response to the oration of Cardinal du Perron, the person who had been responsible for dissuading the Estates from approving the measure.

Although its greater part was authored by the Calvinist pastor Pierre du Moulin, the Remonstrance followed lines of reasoning similar to James’s arguments in the two texts immediately associated with the Oath of Allegiance Controversy. Using arguments drawn from conciliar theory, and a considerable degree of historical evidence, the text presented a number of contentions: it maintained the limits between temporal and spiritual jurisdiction; the novelty of the Papal claims to supremacy in temporal matters and the common interest of the secular authorities in their struggle against the Papacy. In advancing the last, the Remonstrance repeatedly cited the Gallican liberties, and made frequent allusions to the parallels between the French case, the English case and the Venetian interdiction. The tract also called attention to the corruption of the Apostolic See and the role of the Councils as a check to Papal power; it touched upon the decline of the role of the General Councils, and raised the standard criticism that Protestant grievances had not been addressed adequately in a Council so far. A further point that the Remonstrance highlighted was the apparent widespread disagreement of the Papal side as to the extent of the Papal deposing power and the grounds required for a deposition, pointing out

---


104 See Patterson, *James VI and I*, p. 183. See also *Remonstrance; Workes*, pp. 389-90.

105 Willson, ‘James I and his Literary Assistants’, p. 50.
the difference of opinion between Bellarmine and Cardinal du Perron on this issue.\footnote{106 Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 422-3, 448. It is also worth remembering that Bellarmine’s work was not accepted by the Pope as granting very limited authority and was placed under the Index; cf. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 1978); vol. II, p. 180.} More specifically, some attention is due to a few of the more interesting and pertinent themes of the text. In this tract James appears distinctly concerned with the problem of obedience to the monarch and he diligently aims at discrediting resistance theories which were flourishing.\footnote{107 See Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. II, Part Three, pp. 189-348. (Chs. 7-9).} Directing his criticism towards the second estate, he underlined the fact that the clergy had been the root of recent uprisings, both in France as well as in England:

Now, haue not all the calamities, which the third Estate haue sought prouidently to preuent; have they not all sprang from the Clergie, as from their proper and naturall fountaine? From whence did the last ciuill warres, wherein a world of blood was not more profusely then prodigiously and vnnaturally spilt, .... From whence did these bloodie warres proceed, but from the deposing of the said king [Henry III] by the Head of the Church? Were they not Prelates, Curats and Confessours; were they not Ecclesiastics, who partly by seditious preachments, and partly and partly by secret confessions, powred many a larre of oyle vpon this flame? Was not he that killed the forenamed King, was not he one of the Clergie? Was not Guignard a Iesuite? Was not John Chastel brought vp in the same schoole? Did not Rauailiac that monster of men, ... did not he referre his examiners to the Sermons made the Lent next before ... Are not Bellarmine, Eudaemoniohannes, Suarez, Becanus, Mariana, with such other monsters, who teach the doctrine of patricides ... are they not all Clerics? ... What were the heads, the chiefe promoters, the complices of the powder-conspiracie in my Kingdome? were they not Ecclesiastics? ... Is it not also the general belief of that order, that clerics are exempted from the condition of subjects to the king? \footnote{108 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 393.}

This feature was indicative of the King’s fundamental belief that the clergy ought to obey the civil authorities of the state in which they resided, since they were subjects of an earthly kingdom. As he often stressed, the offenders during the Gunpowder Plot had been tried as traitors and punished by civil authorities, and not on the basis of their religious allegiance. He established, furthermore,
that it was possible to obey the clergy while at the same time remaining loyal to the monarch, and the other way round.\(^{109}\)

James once more accused Rome of crossing the boundaries of the spiritual domain, on the grounds that Popes in the past had, in fact, excommunicated and deprived Princes of their Estates for purely civil reasons, such as the control of monastic privileges and revenues, or the granting of Benefices, as well as adultery and matrimonial matters (cf. Sarpi).\(^{110}\) This went contrary even to the claims of the Papal publicists who professed that the Pope's deposing power was applicable in cases of heresy, apostasy or infidelity, cases that James seemed to concede to their jurisdiction.

James traced the origin of these abuses, like Sarpi, to the transformation of the heir of St. Peter's Seat into a temporal monarchy:

For by such deceitfull, craftie, and cunning practises, the nature of the Pontificall See, merely spiritual, is changed into the Kings-bench-Court, merely temporal: the Bishops chaire is changed into a Monarchs Throne. And not onely so; but besides, the sinners repentance is changed into a snare of pitfall of couening deceit; and St. Peters net is changed into a casting-net or a flew, to fish for all the wealth of most flourishing Kingdomes.\(^{111}\)

The transformation had absolutely no foundation in Scripture, according to James; on the contrary, it was the result of a long struggle between Rome and a series of secular monarchs. It was only, moreover, fully brought about with the Papacy's impinging on temporal affairs at a period when princes were suffering temporary setbacks. James commented a great deal, in this respect, on the role of Pope Gregory VII, who famously excommunicated the Emperor Henry IV and forced him to appear in the guise of penitent.\(^{112}\) He also drew attention to the corruption that had been plaguing the Curia for the last three to five centuries,

\(^{109}\) Remonstrance; Workes, p. 433.

\(^{110}\) Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, p. 389; see also pp. 396-7. For the same themes, see Sarpi, History, pp. 220-21, 250-51, 664-68, 697-701, 736-37.

\(^{111}\) Remonstrance; Workes, p. 477.

\(^{112}\) Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 402-3. For the episode, see Ulmann, Short History of the Papacy, pp. 154-60.
mockingly commenting that if one were to judge the legitimacy of the elected person's position based on whether simony, canvasses or bribery had been used, there would 'hardly be found two lawfull Popes in the three last ages'.

The issue of the conciliar check upon Papal power features more prominently in this tract than the other two considered earlier. It is reasonable to suppose that the French origin of the primary author should account for this preference; one should also keep in mind, in this respect, that as the text was initially addressed to a French audience, Conciliar references would increase its appeal. The Remonstrance names in this vein a long tradition of Conciliar authors and cites some of the central themes in their writings. It also makes frequent references to the Councils of Constance and Pisa, the former considered as highly problematic by the Papal side, and the latter condemned as heretical ('Conciliabulum'). The text above all reprimands the decline of the role, function and purpose of the General Councils, especially in light of the appropriation by the Pontiff of the prerogative of their summoning. The author is explicit that Councils ought to be summoned by the secular rulers, as it was the custom in the early years of the Church. The Emperors then made good use of Councils by moderating the Synods, by assessing whether the prelates had come to decisions that would endanger the order of the Empire, by judging whether the final decrees were in accordance with decrees of earlier Synods and ultimately, by executing the Decrees.

 Crucially, James referred finally to the view that Trent had not been a fair Council, since it did not provide a forum where the Protestant grievances would be heard and seriously addressed.

---

113 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 413.
114 Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 417, 418-22.
115 Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 414, 424.
116 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 423.
117 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 427.
[Arian’s doctrines] powerfully convicted by God’s word, and lawfully condemned by the ancient general councils, where they were permitted and admitted to plead their own cause in person. But as for the trewth professed by me, and those of the reformed Religion, it was never yet hissed out of the Schooles, nor cast out of any Council, ... where both sides haue bene heard with like indifferencie.

Yea, what Council soever hath bene offered vnto vs in these latter times, it hath bene proposed with certaine presuppositions: as, That his Holinesse (beeing a partie in the cause, and consequently to come vnder judgement as it were to the barre vpon his triall) shall be the Iudge of Assize with Commission of Oyer and Determiner: it shall be celebrated in a citie of no safe accesse, without safe conduct or convoy to come or goe at pleasure, and without danger: it shall be assembled of such persons with free suffrage and voice, as vphold this rule.118

That much in this extract reminds us of the view conveyed in Sarpi’s monumental work on the eponymous Council should not surprise us, given the affinity that we have indicated between the positions of the two figures. James seems further to share Sarpi’s view that all that was accomplished in Trent was a reaffirmation and continuation of authoritarian Papal policies, and absurd claims. He also very interestingly identified with Sarpi’s exasperation on the issue of the Reformation of the Princes, a decree that both saw as effectively validating Papal claims for temporal interference.119 Last but not least, the Remonstrance draws attention to the common cause of all the temporal powers, frequently praising the liberties of the Gallican Church, while also expressing admiration for the Venetian position during the Republic’s recent confrontation with the Papacy.120

Overall, however, the most striking feature that a parallel examination of Sarpi’s History and the above tracts reveal, is the extent to which these two ostensibly distant authors – in fact more, if one includes James Monatgu, Lancelot Andrewes, Pierre du Moulin and others - drew from the same body of thought, that was a collection of distinct elements of Conciliar notions, marked arguments on the separation of jurisdictions, and an abundance of historical

118 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 448.
119 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 449. See also Appendix VII for the Reformation of the Princes.
120 See for example Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 382, 393, 394, 414, 416, 417, 418-22, 424, 452, 482.
evidence from the imperial and ecclesiastical history.\textsuperscript{121} One could perhaps argue that in the specific historical conjuncture of the almost contemporaneous Gunpowder Plot and the subsequent controversy over the Oath of Allegiance, the aftermath of the Venetian Interdict, the assassination of Henry IV, and the attempt to implement an equivalent of the Oath of Allegiance, the authors involved read and composed their tracts in a similar language. This is in keeping, for instance, with the overflow of re-edition of Conciliar tracts during this period that Francis Oakley and others have argued for. The case of James is instructive, in this respect, however, because a consideration of his earlier work illustrates that he did not arrive at these conclusions after his assumption of the English throne in 1603 and his subsequent exchanges with the Papal side. Remarkably - and this is a point which scholars of the King’s ‘political’ thought do not usually take into account - he had expressed the bases (if not all) of his views in his earlier writings, some of which we will now briefly turn our attention to.

\textbf{ii. Intellectual and Experiential Background: Two Treatises on Government}

James’s two first most celebrated treatises of government, the \textit{True Lawe of Free Monarchies} (1598) and the \textit{Basilikon Doron} (1599) are works of consideration. To understand them properly, it is necessary first to give some details about the historical circumstances surrounding their composition.\textsuperscript{122}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Cf. Parsons, \textit{Church in the Republic}, p. 168.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Both texts have been treated as royal assertions of a king eager to establish his emerging position as the ruler of a heretofore unstable kingdom; and they certainly were. They expressed James's attempt to refute flourishing resistance theories. In so doing, the two texts described the opposition that the Stuart King had experienced from mutinous nobles and the ecclesiastical establishment. The latter had been very effective in promoting 'parity' in principles of polity, in accordance with the religious reformation that had taken place largely in defiance of the crown in Scotland. The texts thus constituted, to a great degree, responses to Presbyterian elements in Scotland, which had endorsed principles put forward by George Buchanan. They were also, however, the articulation of James's perception of his role as a king, and were written, at the point when he felt most confident about his ability to direct the affairs of his kingdom, having successfully dealt with factional and ecclesiastical opposition. This had not been an easy task; despite having been crowned at the young age of thirteen months, it was not before the age of eighteen that James managed to take hold of his regime (November 1585). It took almost another decade before he began to contend with the challenges he felt the Kirk posed to his rule. The politics of religion had played an important role throughout James's reign. To begin with, he had himself been the object of predominantly factional struggles almost from his birth - his captivity was, after all, the result of fears that his Catholic mother and her husband would reverse the Reformation in Scotland. The rest of his minority saw feuds about who would have control over the young king, as a result of which he was trusted to a number of successive regents. Rival factions in Scotland, however, to a greater or lesser extent, also meant rival religious orientation.

123 Cf. Roger Mason: 'There are not many kings who have felt the need to go into print to explain to their subjects why it is that they ought to be obeyed'; in 'George Buchanan, James VI and the Presbyterians', p. 195. Cf. Basilikon Doron, pp. 75-89.
Problems with regard to religion did not end there, however. Regardless of how revolutionary it had been, the Reformation in Scotland had left a number of issues unresolved. Although, for instance, the authority of the Pope had been abolished in 1560 by the Parliament, it had not been declared who or what would be the new head of the Church. On the one hand Mary had regarded the Reformation as illegal, although in practice she was forced to tolerate it, and on the other, the succession of regents during James’s minority had not resolved the question of headship in a definite way. The result was that, by James’s time, Scotland had a Calvinist Kirk largely grown outside the crown’s control and alongside the structure of the old church; an act of uniformity was not imposed on pre-Reformation clergy until 1573. In real terms, this amounted to two problems. First, there were fundamental questions about the polity of the Church, centring on whether a system of oversight would be exercised through a form of episcopacy or by a system which involved ministerial control through presbyteries, first introduced in 1581. Closely associated with this question was the issue of royal prerogative, first firmly set out in James VI’s reign in the ‘Black Acts’ parliament of 1584. Secondly, on the question of the fate of the remaining adherents to Catholicism, the Kirk was adamant that measures ought to be taken against potentially subversive Catholic Scottish magnates – they either had to be expelled, excommunicated or coerced to denounce their allegiance to Rome. James, nonetheless, particularly on the last issue felt that the Kirk’s demands purported to interfere with affairs of the state, since for

125 The Concordat of Leith in 1572, for instance, was a settlement that was intended to operate as an interim; MacDonald, *Jacobean Kirk*, p. 11.
126 Patterson, *King James VI and I*, p. 7; Mason, ‘George Buchanan, James VI and the Presbyterians’, p. 197.
political reasons he deemed it necessary to tolerate the powerful Catholic
families of Scotland.127

The standard interpretation of the reign of James VI tells the story of the
strong opposition he had to face in his effort to subdue the presbyteries, impose
episcopacies and control the Kirk according to the principle of divine rule. The
same story tells of the opposition his policies met with, on the grounds of the
theory of the ‘two kingdoms’, namely the separation of sacerdotal and civil
jurisdictions. A number of concerns, nevertheless, have been recently raised
against this common view of James’s reign, and new emphasis has been placed
on the impact James’s policy of toleration towards the Catholic earls (the Earl of
Huntly in particular) had in uniting the Kirk against the King.128 From this point
of view, Alan R. MacDonald has argued, the doctrine of the ‘two kingdoms’ was
not part of everyday language. It was only raised as a part of a crisis that had
eventually reached a head over James’s leniency towards the Catholic magnates.
In this sense, the greater ‘question of where ultimately authority lay’, became
‘entangled’ with the specific confrontation.129 Be that as it may, it is important
from our perspective to stress two aspects: first, that in cases of urgency this sort
of argument was indeed employed, second, regardless of whether the Kirk and
advocators of the ‘two kingdoms’ theories represented a real threat or not,

---

127 James had a number of reasons for tolerating the Catholic magnates: first, at least before 1603
he did not have the power to effectively control them. Secondly, such demonstrations of good
will towards Catholics were important in the crucial period of the last two decades of the
sixteenth century, when Spanish power at its height and when there was so much Spanish
activity in the Low Countries. Lastly, the Kirk was especially agitated about James’s favourite,
the earl of Huntly - but of course, James would not give up his favourite because the Kirk told
him to do so.

128 See Alan R. MacDonald, who has shown that that the supporters of the liberties of the Kirk
had gradually been won over by the King; Jacobean Kirk, p. 82.

129 In Scotland, ‘thair is twa Kings and twa Kingdomes ... Thair is Chryst Jesus the King, and his
Kingdome the Kirk, whose subject King James the Saxt is, and of whose kingdome nocht a king,
nor a lord, nor a heid, bot a member’; from Andrew Melville’s diary, cited in MacDonald,
Jacobean Kirk, p. 64; cf. also p. 71.
James conducted his policies and composed his texts, with the assumption of their existence.130

The *Trew Law of Free Monarchies* and the *Basilikon Doron* were composed after James had resolved to assert a greater control over the Church in the aftermath of the disturbing riot in Edinburgh (1596).131 This spirit, as a result, permeates both tracts, as James stressed in them a great deal more the kingly duties of overseeing the conduct of the Church, than in the tracts already examined. Yet the basic premises behind these two texts are similar to the ones underpinning the tracts associated with the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance. The author still touched upon the limits between the spiritual and civil jurisdiction, but here he was keen primarily to underline the limitations of the jurisdiction of the clergy, justifying a certain degree of royal control of the Church on the grounds of the special relationship that he believed existed between kings and God. From a slightly different perspective, thus, the *Basilikon Doron* insists that spiritual officers ought not to interfere with affairs of the state:

And when any of the spirituall office-bearers in the Church, speaketh vnto you any thing that is well warranted by the word, reuerence and obey them as the heraulds of the most high God: but, if passing that bounds, they urge you to embrace any of their fantasies in the place of Gods word, or would colour their particulars with a pretended zeale, acknowledge them for no other then vaine men, exceeding the bounds of their calling; and according to your office, grauely & with authority redact them in ordour againe.132

The above passage is indicative not only for its firmness in proclaiming the boundaries within which the Church ought to operate, but also for the widespread resentment it echoes. The latter is, of course, related to the bitter experiences that James had from his early years, as is evident from another extract from the same treatise. There James speaks of the animosity he had to deal with during his rule, not because of his person but because of extremist

132 *Basilikon Doron*, pp. 49-51.
religious teachings, according to which ‘all Kings and Princes were naturally enemies to the libertie of the Churche’. Throughout both the Trew Law and the Basilikon Doron James appears at once acutely aware of and concerned by the threat posed to the order of the state by people who feel directly subject to God without the mediation of God’s lieutenants on earth, the kings. As James writes, religious ‘purists’ of this sort held the civil magistrates in contempt; from their point of view, their own personal relationship with God was the criterion dictating everything else with regards to their conduct on earth. The rhetoric of the two separate spheres in this sense was useful to a King trying to reassert his authority over people who only recognised a voluntary and nominal subjection to their earthly monarch. In other words, religious zealots of this kind did not recognise any division between the divine and the temporal spheres, or if they did, they dismissed the temporal as insignificant, ‘temporary’, and entirely dependent on the celestial.

All the same, it is essential to recognise the significance of James’s modifications to the standard rhetoric in terms of his political attitude, as a skilful policy-maker who was able to manipulate his way through established principles while maintaining balance and moderation. By using the same language, he was able to shift the boundaries of the lay and spiritual domain so that he would incorporate into his area of influence some jurisdiction over the institution of the Church as well. His texts, accordingly, are more concerned with indicating the limitations of spiritual jurisdiction rather than delineating the boundaries between the two sorts of authorities. This finds further expression in the fact that the King sees God as the sole judge of princely actions. Commenting on the reigns of Nebuchadnezzar and Nero, for instance, James points out that even in these two extreme cases God still ordained His

---

133 Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9; cf. also pp. 145-7.
134 Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9; cf. also pp. 16, 47-9.
people to subject themselves to the respective kings, following the dictum ‘Give to Caesar what amounts to Caesar and to God what amounts to God’.135

This fits perfectly with James’s world-view, according to which kings are not ordinary people: their office requires them to be in-between the two realms, the temporal and the divine. This standpoint and the King’s stress on his strong bond with the Creator is particularly apparent from the structure of James’s mirror for Princes, where he discusses the king’s duties first in relation to God, and then to his subjects. This is also the meaning of the image James uses, of the king as the custodian of both tables, the first one being man’s duties towards God and the second one referring to our duties towards our neighbours.136 The king is appointed by God with the responsibility to procure for the welfare of his subjects’ souls and bodies; his vocation is established by the oath he takes in his coronation, according to which he ought to maintain religion.137 James has a very clear notion of the kingly office; for him, the king upholds two professions: as he often reiterates, the King has two callings.138 Similarly, and equally graphically, he advises his son Henry to wear his clothes in a ‘middle forme, inter Togatos & Paludatos’:

...wearing your cloathes in a carelesse, yet comelie forme: keeping in them a middle forme, inter Togatos & Paludatos; betwixt the grauitie of the one, and lightenesse of the other. Thereby to signifie, that by your calling ye are mixed of both the professions; Togatus [citizen], as a judge making and pronouncing the lawe; paludatus [soldier], by the power of the sword: as your office is likewise mixed, betwixt the Ecclesiastical and civil estate. For a King is not mere laicus, as both the Papistes and Anabaptistes would have him, to whiche error also the Puritanes incline over-farre.139

135 True Lawe, p. 69.
136 Basilikon Doron, pp. 145-7. James uses the same simile in the Apologie; see Workes, p. 284.
137 True Lawe, pp. 61-2. Cf. the Sonnet in Basilikon Doron, p. 5.
139 Basilikon Doron, p. 173.
Along the same lines, James insists that one of the most important elements of good kingship is for the Prince to be a ‘louing nourish-father to the Churche’.\textsuperscript{140} It is against this background that we need to place the Scottish king’s policy in the model of that of the Emperor Constantine, to summon, preside and regulate the agenda of the General Assembly of the Kirk.\textsuperscript{141} With regard to the image and example of Constantine, a further point needs to be made. Although identifying ‘influences’ in James’s \textit{Basilikon Doron} is a complicated task, it has been suggested with very interesting connotations, that some of its sources are Byzantine.\textsuperscript{142} This possibility is especially worthy of note, as it fits very well with the idea of James consciously fashioning himself according to the example of the early Christian Roman Emperors. First established by Constantine, the perpetuation of this model was to be found not in Rome any more, but in the Byzantine Empire.\textsuperscript{143} There the Emperor was responsible for maintaining the welfare of the Church, and convening and presiding over General Councils. This was the same system that James had pursued in Scotland, and it was in accordance with both his Scottish experience, as well as the Imperial tradition, that James proposed the responsibility of the temporal rulers in presiding over a General Council convened with the purpose of discussing the divisions of the Universal Church.

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Basilikon Doron}, pp. 81-3.
\textsuperscript{142} See Ihor Ševčenco, ‘Agapetus East and West: The Fate of a Byzantine “Mirror of Princes”’, \textit{Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Européennes XVI} (Bucharest, 1978), pp. 3-44 reprinted in idem (ed.), \textit{Ideology, Letters and Culture in the Byzantine World} (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982), ch. 3; on p. 19. Ševčenco, moreover, refers to comments by Jean Hotman, the French translator of the work, who had also suggested that in writing the \textit{Basilikon Doron} James had been inspired by three ‘mirrors for Princes’ of Byzantine origin (ibid. note 54). I am particularly grateful to Professor Michael Angold for this reference.
\textsuperscript{143} The literature on the subject is vast; see indicatively, however, the seminal study by Gilbert Dagron, \textit{Emperor and Priest. The Imperial Office in Byzantium.} Trans. by Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Past and Present Publications, CUP 2003); Walter Ulmann also offers concise and insightful points in \textit{Principles of Government}, pp. 110-14 and in \textit{Short History of the Papacy}, ch. 1.
Additionally, James’s perception of the potential threat posed by religious extremists was associated with his conviction that religious reform was also among the duties and responsibilities of kingship. We can relate this in turn to the King’s view of the Church being prone to ‘Pride, Ambition and Avarice’, an issue that drew strong views from Sarpi as we have seen. The Basilikon Doron contains, thus, an extraordinary exposition and criticism of the way in which the Reformation came about in Scotland, from the bottom up rather than the Crown’s initiative, namely the way it ought to have happened, according to James.

But the reformation of Religion in Scotland, being extraordinarily wrought by God, wherein many things were inordinately done by a populare tumult & rebellion, of suche as blindly were doing the work of God, but clogged with their owne passions & particular respects, as well appeared by the destruction of our policie; and not proceeding from the Princes ordour, as it did in our neighbour country of England, as likewise in Denmarke, and sundry parts of Germanie; some fierie spirited men in the ministerie gote such a guying of the people at the time of confusion, as finding the guste of government sweete, they begouth to fantasie to themselues a Democraticke forme of government: and hauing (by the inquity of time) bene ouer-well baited vpon the wracke, first of my Grandmother, and next of my owne mother, and after vsurping the liberty of the time in my long minority, setteld themselues so faste vpon that imagined Democracie, as they fed themselues with the hope to become Tribuni plebes: and so in a populare gouvernment by leading the people by the nose, to beare the sway of all the rule.

This extract shows in a very clear and unambiguous way the intermingling of political with religious elements and how a religious reformation from below would also imply a political revolution and the establishment of a ‘Democratic’ form of government, the most abhorrent of polities for the period under scrutiny. Such an intermingling, moreover, was a threat to the social order of the state; the destructive traits of such an intermingling, as the bloody contentions of that period bore witness to, confirmed the urgent cry for a strong authoritative government that would control the public face of religion, the exclusion of religion from the affairs of the state, and the separation of religion.

144 Basilikon Doron, pp. 73-5.
145 Basilikon Doron, p. 75.
and politics. The work of both Pierre Charron and Justus Lipsius attested to the shifting religious, social and intellectual attitudes and the altering intellectual atmosphere with regard to the notions of public and private, political and religious.

The universality of these issues and the widespread concern about the intertwining of politics and religion is above all evident, in this case, in James's references to the troubles afflicting France at the time. James's understanding of this situation and the problems the French Crown faced from extreme preachers 'of whatsoever religion' was indicative of his appreciation of the affinities of the situation there, and problems that he had to face in the early years of his reign. He was thus categorical in condemning the French uprisings as pure rebellion disguised under the 'cloak of religion' and was extremely disconcerted with the Catholic League's opposition to the lawful king's inheriting the throne.146 His attitude towards Catholic zealots, the Liguers, was of course a reflection of his own feelings towards the Puritans and the opposition that he himself had met in Scotland. Consequently, James's fundamental principle of rule throughout his reign was the pursuit of a middle way between the two extreme sides of the religious spectrum that he viewed as equivalent.147 The King's moderation is an important aspect in this examination, in that it leads us to the next point that will concern us here, that of his policies as an attempt to conciliate subjects from both ends of the religious spectrum.

iii. Parallel Writings – Religious Unity and Division
Throughout his reign, spanning over three kingdoms and over forty years, James did his utmost to maintain a policy of balance between the two extremes of the adherents to Rome, and the advocates of 'pure' and complete reform. He

146 Cf. True Lawe, pp. 80-1, and p. 68.
147 Basilikon Doron, pp. 81-3.
made a more comprehensive exposition of this specific stance and a delineation of his religious policy in his first address to Parliament, to which we will now briefly turn our attention. In his speech of 19 March 1604 James clearly divided his subjects into three categories, according to their religious outlook: the one professing the 'trew religion', namely the one that he himself professed; the Catholics; and lastly what he called 'not really a religion', but rather a 'sect', the Puritans. He categorically pronounced his intention of not persecuting his Catholic subjects, as he did not mean to interfere in matters of conscience, as he put it. Regarding the latter, in particular, James was surprisingly forthright in declaring in his oration that he had to

\[\text{put a difference betwixt mine owne private profession of mine owne salvation, and my politike governement of the Realme for the weale and quietness thereof.} \] 148

This is an exact implementation of Lipsius’s understanding of the separation between public and private. According to it, the King had to draw a distinction between his own private profession and public practice. Thus for political reasons, the welfare of his subjects and the interests of his state, he had publicly to acknowledge subjects of a different profession, so long as they remained steady in number and otherwise loyal to him.149 In this context, James split the Catholics first into clergy and laity, and then further subdivided the laity into two categories: the quiet Catholics on the one hand, and on the other the 'factious stirrers of sedition, perturbers of the Commonwealth'. The King, then, used the same classification, that within the next two years he felt he needed to put into effect after the disastrous Gunpowder Plot, between people who were willing to pledge their loyalty to him, regardless of their religious allegiance and people who would not. The problem that James identified at this early stage of

---

148 A Speech, As it was Delivereed in the Vpper House of the Parliament to the Lords Spirituall and Temporall, and to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses there Assembled, on Monday the XIX. Day of March 1603; Workes, p. 490.
149 Speech; Workes, p. 492.
his rule as the sovereign of the three Kingdoms was the dangerous threat posed to him by the 'seditious' point of doctrine maintained by supporters of the Catholic faith, namely, the Papal supremacy. According to this, the Pope claimed

to have an Imperiall ciuill power ouer all Kings and Emperors, dethroning and decrowning Princes with his foot as pleaseth him, and dispensing and disposing of all Kingdomes and Empires at his apetite.\textsuperscript{150}

The second point of doctrine, and an extension of the first, was the principle that these subjects were (or felt) free of their obligation to loyalty once their monarch had been excommunicated ('cursed') by the Roman See. They were, thus, potentially subversive, as they were effectively sanctioned either to revolt or to assassinate their king. Yet, importantly, James acknowledged that similar challenges were posed to him by the Puritan 'sect', who were
euer discontented with the present government, & impatient to suffer any superiority, which maketh their sect vnable to be suffred in any wel gouerned Common wealth \textsuperscript{151}

In this manner James famously placed the 'Papists', the extreme Catholics and Jesuits, in the same class as Puritans; the one represented for him an external and the other an internal peril. The latter, he admitted, did not differ much in doctrinal matters from the followers of 'true religion'. James stressed, however, the profound disagreement that set them apart in points of policy, much like the way in which he thought about the Roman Catholics - both sides were staunch advocates of the doctrine that his secular jurisdiction ought to be subject to the spiritual authorities.\textsuperscript{152} It is reasonable to assume that one aspect of James's positioning in the middle of the two extreme religious standpoints was his relative aversion to excessive expressions of sacred sentiment; as he avowed in the same speech, he was 'neuer violent or unreasonable' in his profession.\textsuperscript{153}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Speech; Workes, p. 492.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Speech; Workes, p. 490.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Speech; Workes, p. 490.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Speech; Workes, p. 491.
\end{itemize}
Moderation of violent passions was certainly part of his duty as the leader of his state.\textsuperscript{154} His specific stance, however, was also determined by his view of his role as the supreme governor of the Church, as eloquently expressed in his description of his relationship with his state and subjects: ‘I am the shepherd and it is my flocke’.\textsuperscript{155} This understanding of his position can provide an insight into a later contention of the same text. James claimed that for as long as his subjects were going to differ from him in terms of religion, they would be ‘half subjects’. The King, nevertheless, desired the better half, their souls:

\begin{quote}
as long as they are disconformable in Religion from vs, they cannot bee but halfe my Subjects, bee able to doe but halfe service, and I to want the best halfe of them, which is their soules.\textsuperscript{156}
\end{quote}

This declaration was quite radical, in effect, as it not only refers to the assumption of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the King, that we have already seen, but in this case also to a breakdown of the Lipsian divisions between public and private. The King expresses that he, in fact, wished to control not only the public persona of his subjects, but also their private sentiments, their ‘souls’. As clearly, that would have been impossible in practice, so the King had to settle for an outward subjection on behalf of the religious dissidents.

The special significance of this speech for us lies in the fact that it operates as a bridge between the views James had expressed in his earlier writings in Scotland, and the new realities he had to face in his new role as the King of a unified Britain, while it points to the issues he would raise within the next five years. Meanwhile, it continues the rhetoric of the separation of jurisdictions, punctuating it with, however, an enhanced degree of royal control of ecclesiastical affairs, in accordance with his assertions in Scotland and with his new role as the supreme governor of the Anglican Church. James’s oration

\textsuperscript{155} Speech; Workes, p. 488.
\textsuperscript{156} Speech; Workes, p. 493.
prefigures, lastly, the separation between loyal Catholics and Papists that he would attempt to make with the Oath of Allegiance, the measure that was meant to provoke the ire of Rome. The Speech, however, has to be seen also as part of the official proclamation of the greater eirenic policies that James intended to pursue from the greater stage he had stepped on to. In this sense, the union of the English and Scottish crowns was a prelude to his greater vision of reunification of divided Christendom.157

The importance of eirenicism as a facet in assessing James’s views on kingship and the role of the king as protector of the Church has for the most part been acknowledged by historians. Its full impact, however, on our understanding of James’s domestic policies, has not yet fully been realised, apart from the formidable case put forward by William Patterson.158 Although it is not the intention of this chapter to assess James’s domestic (religious) policies, some suggestions will be made to relate some of the greater implications of his world-view with more specific decisions and alignments that he had to make as the sovereign of religiously diverse kingdoms.

According to this announcement of James’s plans, the reunification of the Churches could be achieved if the two sides could meet half-way, ‘so that all novelties might be renounced on either side’:

...I could wish from my heart, that it would please God to make me one of the members of such a generall Christian vnion in Religion, as laying wilfulnesse aside on both hands, wee might meete in the middest, which is the Center and perfection of all things. For if they would leave, and be ashamed of such new and grosse Corruptions of theirs, as themselues cannot maintaine, nor denie to bee worthy of reformation, I would for mine owne part be contente to meete them in the mid-way, so that all novelties might be renounced on either side. For as my Faith is the Trew, Ancient, Catholike and Apostolike

158 Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom. Unfortunately, it seems that no one has seriously engaged in a dialogue with this significant work. Part of the problem is, of course, the concentration on domestic issues that plagues English (less so Scottish) historiography, with the effect of almost ignoring the impact of James’s foreign policy.
faith, grounded vpon the Scriptures and expresse word of God: so will I euer yield all reverence to antiquitie in the points of Ecclesiastical policy.\\footnote{159}{Speech; Workes, p. 492.}

It is vital to recognise that the call for a Christian unity, as is apparent from this extract, was essentially founded on James’s moderate approach to religious issues. This was paired with the underlying notion that Christianity comprised a number of fundamental and indispensable doctrines, and a number of issues ‘on which debate and disagreement were acceptable among Christian brethern’.\\footnote{160}{Fincham and Lake, ‘The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I’, p. 182.}

Or, to use James’s contemporary vocabulary, between ‘points of saluation’ and things indifferent.\\footnote{161}{Cf. Basilikon Doron, p. 49. See also David C. Hard, ‘Doctrinal Adiaphora in the Debate Between Erasmus and Luther and its Impact on the Early English Reformation’; available at <http://www.ournet.md/~theology/adiaphora.htm>}

Thus the exposition of James’s concept of doctrine in the 

\textit{Premonition}:

\begin{quote}
I am no Apostate, nor yet a deborder from that Religion ...Neither can my Baptisme in the rites of their Religion make me an Apostate, or Heretike in respect of my present profession, since we all agree in the substance thereof, being all Baptized \textit{In the Name of the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost}: vpon which there is no variance amongst vs...I am such a CATHOLIKE CHRISTIAN, as beleeeueth the three \textit{Creeds}; that of the Apostles, that of the Counsell of \textit{Nice}, and that of \textit{Athanasmus}; the two latter being Paraphrases to the former: And I beleue them in that sense, as the ancient Fathers and Counsels that made them did vnderstand them...I reuerence and admit the foure first generall Counsels as Catholique and Orthodox...\\footnote{162}{Premonition; Workes, pp. 301-2.}

James’s ecumenism was a conscious and purposeful policy. Moreover, as Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake have shown, it corresponded with his domestic policies. As they have argued, his aim to encourage understanding and respect between Christian Churches throughout Europe was mirrored in his policies of incorporating a wide spectrum of (moderate) theological opinion and practice while systematically excluding radicals of either side. Crucially, however, as Fincham and Lake point out, these categories were mutable, for they were contingent on political circumstances.\\footnote{163}{Fincham and Lake, ‘The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I’, p. 171.} Such a theoretical
framework, thus, left James with considerable room for manoeuvre. This in practice meant that he could move from a reconciliatory position that appealed to his Catholic subjects - also giving them (false) hopes about the King’s intentions to convert - to a strong anti-Papal rhetoric after Rome’s unwillingness to cooperate in such a project, and especially after the events of November 1605 and Rome’s reaction to the Oath of Allegiance. This move permitted James to incorporate strong Protestant elements in his following as these rallied to his support against the Papacy. On the other hand, his more eirenic policies, such as the refusal to take sides at the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War, and his attempts to resolve part of the problem through an approach with Spain that would include a Spanish match for Charles, was appealing not only to his Catholic subjects, but also to ‘anti-Calvinist’ or ‘Arminian’ elements of his court.

Rome’s refusal to co-operate is very interesting, for it has strong resonances with issues examined in the previous chapter. James’s plea for the convening of an ecumenical Council raised concerns in Rome. According to the Apostolic See, there was no need for a new Council, as most of the issues that James insisted should be included in its agenda had already been discussed in Trent. A new Council, moreover, would raise questions of who would call it, who would preside, as well as the problem of how voting would take place. All those issues, of course, both James and Sarpi agreed, had not sufficiently been resolved in Trent, hence the need for a new Council.

Rome’s discouraging stance had the effect of making James modify his approach. Thus, in his call for an ecumenical Council in the Premonition, Rome is taken out of the equation and James has reverted to practices established during his reign in Scotland, where he had assumed the responsibility of convening and

---

164 Lori Anne Ferell has even suggested that the issue was in a sense too convenient for James in his endeavours to appease/subdue Puritan resistance, insinuating that it was probably a governmental invention; see Government by Polemic, esp. pp. 62-7.
presiding over the General Assembly of the Kirk. According to the Premonition, the grounds upon the proposed reunion ought to be an alliance between temporal monarchs, the rightful superintendents of General Councils and religious matters in this world:

But the speciall harme they [the College of Cardinals] do vs, is by their defrauding vs of our common & Christian interest in General Councils; they hauing (as I said) ytterly abolished the same, by rolling it vp, & making as it were a Monopoly thereof, in their Conclaue with the Pope. Whereas, if euer there were a possibilitie to be expected of reducing all Christians to an vniformitie of Religion, it must come by the means of a Generall Councel: the place of their meeting being chosen so indifferent, as all Christian Princes, either in their owne Persons, or their Deputie Commissioners, and all Church-men of Christian profession that beleuee and professe all the ancient grounds of the trew, ancient, Catholike, and Apostolike Faith, might haue tdatum accessum thereunto; All the incendiaries and Nouelist fore-brands on either side being debarred from the same, as well Iesuites as Puritanes.165

In this extract James also returns to the rhetoric of religious moderation with the parallel exclusion of extremism that was represented equally by Jesuits and Puritans. Religious moderation, nonetheless, in an age of religious wars was under the danger of being perceived as inherently ambiguous - and there is ample evidence to show that James had problems proving his spiritual identity. Accusations of religious ambiguity, for instance, were apparently one of the primary reasons behind the re-edition of the Basilikon Doron; thus in the preface of the revised edition:

...some sentences therein should seeme to furnishe grounds to men, to doubt of my sinceritie in that Religion, whiche I have euer constantly professed...
The first calumnie (most greuous in-deede) is grounded vpon the sharp & bitter wordes, that therin are vsed in the description of the humours of Puritans, and rashe-headie preachers, that thinke it their honour to contend with Kings, & perturbe whole kingdoms.
For my booke, suppose very small, being deuyded in three seuerall parts; the first part thereof onely treats of a Kings duetie towards God in Religion: wherein I haue so clearlie made profession of my Religion, calling it the Religion wherein I was brought up, and euer made profession of, and wishing him euer to continue in the same, as the onely true forme of Gods worship.166

---

165 Premonition; Workes, pp. 329-30.
166 Basilikon Doron, p. 14.
The attack referred to in this passage was associated with his aim of reintroducing the system of episcopacies, a system unmistakably ‘Popish’ for the Scottish reformers. Conversely, James had also been continuously criticised, it will be recalled, for his policy of favouritism towards Catholic earls. His via media made James susceptible to blows from various directions. His dealings with the Papacy, on the eve of his succession to the English throne and his continued communication after 1603, raised suspicions that he would follow Anne of Denmark in her conversion to Catholicism. As a result, James was extremely disconcerted when Bellarmine touched upon the Scottish king’s correspondence with the Papacy, alluding that he had negotiated better treatment for his Catholic subjects in exchange for Papal support to his claim to the throne, and adding that there was a general impression that James did not ‘abhor the Catholic faith’. That this accusation was credible, and as a result could prove severely damaging to his position, is verified by James’s urgent reaction by imprisoning his former secretary in Scotland, James Elphinstone. Bellarmine’s charge was also the reason behind the exposition of James’s doctrine of faith in the Premonition, where he had laboured to prove in five folio pages that he considered himself to be no apostate or a Puritan. Yet the ambivalence of the Stuart King’s position as reflected in his writings is above all evident in the flexibility of his assertion that the Pope was the Antichrist. After having spent twenty pages proving this claim, James added the startling offer that he was willing to refute the accusation should the Pontiff withdraw his claims to temporal supremacy.

Evidently, the greatest problems arose for James with the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War, especially when combined with his attempts to secure a

168 Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 86-7.
169 Premonition; Workes, pp. 301-7.
170 Premonition; Workes, pp. 328-9.
Spanish match for his son as a means of bringing the two sides together. James strongly refused to take a confessional view on the issue of the Palatinate, writing to the Pope as 'his holy father' to request his cooperation in the restoration of European peace. His stance was not received well by his subjects and when opposition started to appear James issued instructions that in their sermons the clergy were not to represent the conflict 'as one of religion, which would stir up all Europe'. In spite of James's measures, though, 1618 marked the resurgence of radical Puritanism. It is remarkable to consider that in an age that viewed most things through a confessional lens, James had managed to obtain his subjects' allegiance on the grounds of jurisdiction and anti-papal interests.

James's attempt to maintain a *via media* and a balance between his foreign and domestic policies, thus, created problems, as in the process he alienated Protestant elements that had been supportive of him until then. In this manner, in the face of opposition and having to deal with a situation where affairs of the state were discussed from the pulpit, the King's fears of extreme Protestantism resurfaced. To support his position in European affairs James had to turn to divines whose theology was more receptive to a non-militant Protestant stance and a rapprochement with Catholic powers. The so-called rise of Arminianism in the Stuart court, therefore, with the parallel hardening of attitude towards Puritans must be viewed within this context. This complex combination of domestic and foreign policies is also the background against which we can read the final two small tracts in our consideration, the *Meditation upon the Lords Prayer* (1619), and the *Meditation vpon the 27.28.29. Verses of the XVII Chapter of St. Matthew or a Paterne for a Kings Inaugoration* (1619).

---

The Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew returns to the familiar fundamental principle of the separation of jurisdictions and the role of the King as superintendent of the Church. This tract, as he tells us in the advertisement to the reader, he intended as an outline for another treatise on kingship, but in the meantime, he offered the Meditation to his son Charles, as a forewarning and preparation for his succession.173 This fairly small tract is valuable, in that it verifies the assumption that James’s main principles of Kingship as well as the main issues preoccupying him did not change much throughout his life and reign. In the text we find reiterations of the idea that Christ did not exercise any temporal jurisdiction during his time on earth, in direct contrast with the usurping claims of the Papacy:

He had no use of a sword then, nay, he found fault with Saint Peters vsing it, telling him, *Hee that striketh with the sword shall perish by the sword; leauing it belike to those that call themselves Peters successors, who come in the spirit of Elias with fire, adding gunpowder and the sword vnto it. But our Saviour knew not how to set both crowne and mitre vpon one head: nor yet was he acquainted with that distinction, that a Churchman may use the temporall sword, to procure bonum spirituale.* 174

In the same tract James alluded to the special relationship between God and Kings, and pointed out especially the association of the Roman Emperors with the person of Christ. This challenged the traditional association of the Pope with St. Peter, since the notion of the Emperor as the heir to Christ implied that the Emperor was, in fact, superior to the Pope. This was, as we have already seen, a concept prevalent in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire and one endorsed by Constantine. James also referred to the role of the King as a mixed person, in-between a cleric and a lay person, stressing that the duties of a king included the responsibility to oversee and compel the Church to do her office, to purge all abuses, and to procure her due reverence and obedience of all his temporal

173 Meditation upon the 27,28,29. Verses of the XVII Chapter of St. Matthew or a Paterne for a Kings Inavguration; Workes, p. 606.
174 Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew; Workes, p. 619.
subjects with his sword.\textsuperscript{175} Importantly, the text also made a plea to Christian unity in this age of war, using the metaphor of Christ’s coat:

\begin{quote}
...only his coate, without any seame in it, was to fulfill the prophecie of David, that they should cast lots for it; and did also signifie the indiuisible unitie of the Church, which I pray God the true Church of Christ would now well remember\textsuperscript{176}
\end{quote}

In a rather different tone, the \textit{Meditation upon the Lords Prayer} set out to discuss the meaning and significance of this prayer as an integral part of a Christian’s service of God. The interest of this text lies in the fact that through an analysis of the Lord’s Prayer James pointed out theological and ecclesiastical errors of both the Papists and the Puritans, signalling, in this way, his own moderate and ‘middle’ approach. Nevertheless, the balance of the criticism placed within the \textit{Meditation}, a tract intended for the ‘benefit’ of all of James’s subjects as is indicated in the title, leans more towards the Puritans, as James accuses them for their emphasis on preaching instead of praying:

\begin{quote}
the Puritanes will haue vs hunt for hearing of Sermons without ceasing, but as little prayer as yee will, turning the commandment of the Apostle from \textit{Pray continuallie} to \textit{preach continually}\textsuperscript{177}
\end{quote}

The King chastises the Puritans’ aversion towards ceremonies, their opposition to the polity of Bishops and their over-familiarity, to the degree of lack of respect, towards God. Equally, the text’s publication coincided with the deliberations of the Synod of Dort in the Low Countries and so it was intended to comment on the proceedings. James, therefore, finds the opportunity to touch upon some Arminian positions in it, by discussing the situation in the Low Countries and the teachings of Vorstius. In terms of theology, the text reproaches the doctrines of free-will advocated by the Dutch Arminians,\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{175} Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew; Workes, p. 611.
\textsuperscript{176} Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew; Workes, p. 611.
\textsuperscript{177} Meditation vpon the Lords Prayer; Workes, p. 575. For expressions of the different forms of churchmanship between Puritans and Arminians, namely the emphasis on preaching or praying respectively, see Fincham, Prelate as Pastor, pp. 5, 300-4, and esp. 248-293.
\textsuperscript{178} Meditation vpon the Lords Prayer; Workes, pp. 581, 594.
while in terms of Church organisation it reprimands the development of numerous small sects who called themselves Churches.\textsuperscript{179} This sort of critique, finally, would not be complete without some reference to the errors of Catholicism; James thus reprimands the adherents of the Roman faith for their view of Purgatory and the associated sale of pardons on behalf of the Pope. He criticises their use in the liturgy of a language that no-one comprehended as well as their invention of numerous mediators between Christians and their God. The text also repeats the plea for Christian unity:

\begin{quote}
Wee are then to pray, that his revealeed will may bee obeyed in earth by his Militant Church, as it is by his Triumphing Church in heauen: then would this Militant Church vpon earth obserue better the two Tables of the Law, then now they doe, and then would the Church bee free of Schisms, Heresies, and all new opinions.\textsuperscript{180}
\end{quote}

The text thus, operates on many levels: as a theological treatise identifying mistakes in doctrinal and ecclesiological doctrines, as well as a call for unity based on the fundamental elements common in all Christian varieties like the Lord's Prayer. At the same time, however, it represents the royal prerogative of protecting the Church, of commanding obedience to the word of God, but most importantly, of resolving differences and seeing to the removal of heresies. Therefore, its particular emphasis on the errors of the Puritans renders this a polemical tract. Although the Puritans, as has been shown, appear next to Papist Catholics as the villains in the King's writings throughout his reign, by 1619 they had almost become the sole enemy. The fact that James allowed in a sense his stance on Ecumenical matters to take precedence over the domestic interests of his state suggests that his position in the greater European milieu was ultimately more important for him. The religious settlement that he had so strenuously managed to establish was seriously undermined by his lenience towards Catholic matters and his refusal to see the Thirty Years' War as a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[179] Meditation upon the Lords Prayer; Workes, p. 576.
\item[180] Meditation upon the Lords Prayer; Workes, p. 581.
\end{footnotes}
confessional strife. Yet although France having experienced a few decades of religious warfare was able to accept the Crown’s (or the Cardinal’s) more political stance on the issue of the war, James’s kingdoms would not endure the same.

Conclusion

Having taken the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance as a starting point, we have thus come full circle in this analysis of James VI and I’s views as articulated in texts issued in his name. The richness of the material has given us the opportunity to bring together most of the issues explored in this thesis. As a King, James was able to articulate his theories of government – in reality, nonetheless, we have seen the extent to which these were the product of his experience in the practice of government. By expressing them on paper in turn, James was conscious of the fact that he was exercising his royal authority by defining the limits within which his subjects could dwell. This was above all evident in his understanding of his role as the overseer of the Church in his domain. His views on this matter were closely associated with the perception of himself as a subject of God, who, in turn, served his Lord by procuring for the welfare of the bodies and souls of his subjects. His theological understanding of kingship, based both on the scripture as well as on the temporal history of the development of the early Christian Church within the confines of the Roman Empire, both cut across as well as renegotiated the conceptual divisions advocated by Charron and Lipsius. As God’s lieutenant upon earth, the King was a mediator in-between the divine and the temporal sphere. As a sovereign ruler, however, and a public person, he was mostly content to control his

subjects' public personae. In terms of the ecclesiastical establishment, although James claimed control only over issues of public religious practice, in reality, by perceiving and articulating himself as a divine, he also claimed authority over doctrine – he was, after all, the King who published the authorised version of the Bible. He was, therefore, a godly person who served God through worldly means.

Taken to the extreme, however, his position could imply complete subversion of the divine by the temporal – both in terms of whose interests the King would serve, the state's or God's, as well as in terms of jurisdiction. James was thus adamant in defending his authority in the face of assaults from the spiritual sphere, both from the Papacy and the extreme Protestants. Furthermore, in an age when the full consequences of religious dissent were being felt, a king as a divine could offer impartial and dispassionate resolution to the divisions that plagued Christendom. Untainted by passion and superstition, God's lieutenant upon earth would be able to distinguish between extremities, important and non-important things and thus lead to reconciliation, in his kingdom, and, indeed, in the whole of Christendom. That he failed to do so at home was an indication of the mutual misapprehension between him and his subjects. Not only was James more of a 'European' than most of them, but either because of his superior position or his conceived special relation with God, he was also above 'temporal trivialities' such as doctrinal differences. The latter applied also to his ecumenical plans: it is perhaps ironic that advocates of such eirenic visions were perceived as natural allies to 'political' (politique) doctrines, whereas the staunchest religious devotees, entrenched in 'temporal' passions, failed to overcome their deep hatred of one another.
Conclusions

To start with Pierre Charron and the French religious wars and finish with James VI and I and his three kingdoms, may have seemed unusual. However, this investigation of the mental worlds of Europeans in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries has been revealing on several levels. Most markedly, in the course of this journey we have encountered a number of crucial similar preoccupations, in apparently disparate texts, of ostensibly incompatible figures. From philosophical treatises on the attainment of wisdom, to works on the consolation of the individual in the face of civil wars, mirrors for princes, histories of ecclesiastical councils and works defending the royal supremacy in the face of spiritual assaults, we have seen the manner in which the questions and problems with which their authors grappled merged and were closely inter-related. In fact, the great difference between the authors, their texts and the genres of those texts, makes the parallels between them all the more striking. This in turn substantiates the case made by this thesis, that the range of questions to which the four authors were responding, were variant facets of what was essentially one problem: the struggle Europeans went through at the start of the seventeenth century, in determining the role they wanted to ascribe to religion within their life.

The challenge to religion’s supremacy in people’s lives and world-views has been interpreted by scholars as part of a longer process, that of the ‘secularisation’ of European society and thought. By describing, however, what has here been called the distancing between the divine and the temporal spheres, as a process, scholars have imposed an almost deterministic reading on what was essentially a long, and definitely non-linear development – and
ultimately, one that has still not been brought to a close. The widespread view that sees the early modern period as the turning point, after which the largely religious Europeans of the middle Ages turned into the ‘secularised beings’ of the Enlightenment and more modern times, has been under attack for some time. Within this context, this thesis has advanced a more general model, along the lines of a continuously changing and adjusting relationship or a negotiation between the two spheres - the divine and the temporal. This approach is at once much more appropriate and nuanced, as it allows for the general intellectual uneasiness and politico-religious tensions that we saw characterised the period between c 1580 and 1620. More specifically, the four case-studies examined in this study exemplify the anxieties of the decades between the end of the religious wars and the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ war, which forced the thinkers of the time repeatedly to (re)negotiate and reconfigure the principles and values of their world.

And this is the second important element that emerges from a close consideration of the period in question and the main issues that preoccupied the four authors we studied. The problems that all these authors faced and tried to resolve were time-specific, or at least had acquired a specific sense of urgency at that particular time. It was only a few generations after the first stages of the rediscovery of classical tradition that came to be known as the ‘Renaissance’, and even fewer after the Protestant Reformation that the full impact these two great challenges posed to established truths, institutions and social structures started to be realised. The development of printing had had the effect of spreading ideas at an unprecedented scale and rate. If during the initial stages of the Renaissance the philosophy of the classics was rediscovered by a small, primarily Italian, cultured elite, the sixteenth century significantly increased the availability of all the texts. The circulation of these and contemporary translations made by the humanists of the Quattrocento reached a greater part of
the literate, this time, albeit still a small part of the whole.\textsuperscript{1} Similarly, the criticism Luther had raised against the established Church had been the first movement fully to make use of the new discovery – even for the illiterate.\textsuperscript{2} Furthermore, the religious wars that plagued most of Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century, and of which, arguably the Thirty Years’ War and the civil wars in the Three Kingdoms of the British Isles can be seen as extensions, accentuated the effect of the Protestant Reformation on a moral, political and religious level of unparalleled degree, while consolidating the ‘confessionalisation’ of the continent and hardening the attitude between opposing sides.

Apart from the specific historical \textit{conjuncture}, however, theorists of the time, as has been shown, were themselves also aware of their place in a long intellectual tradition.\textsuperscript{3} We saw how Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and King James based their arguments on classical and scriptural sources, using these as examples to justify their own positions. More specifically, reference was made to the relationship of Charron’s \textit{De la Sagesse} with the Aristotelian, Stoic and Pyrrhonist tradition, while exploring Lipsius’s conscious revival and usage of Tacitean and Stoic patterns of thought. Sarpi, on the other hand, was deeply immersed in an historical understanding of the Christian Church as it developed in relation to the Roman Empire, and he was particularly fond of the Conciliar tradition. King James worked in a similar framework, discussing the history of the Church from the point of view of its relations with temporal princes, in the Western as well as the Eastern Church, and making extensive use

\textsuperscript{1} Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, \textit{The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe}. (Cambridge: CUP, 1983).
\textsuperscript{3} Cf. Quentin Skinner: ‘I regard it as ... essential to consider the intellectual context in which the major texts were conceived ... context of earlier writings and inherent assumptions about political society, and of more ephemeral contemporary contributions to social and political thought’; \textit{The Foundations of Modern Political Thought}, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 1978); vol. 1, Preface, p. xi.
of the scriptures. While aware of the long intellectual traditions and in spite of their identification to some degree with one or more of them, authors of the time are characteristic in their attempt to address contemporary issues. Their choice and usage of strands of thought thus, although partly an indication of their views, should also be considered as a mode of deliberating on and communicating matters contemporaneous. Worthy of notice in this respect is the manipulation and handling of their original sources, a remark that applies to all four of the contemplatives examined.

Such a critical usage of sources liberated the men of letters on the one hand from notions of ‘authority’, while it opened up new ways in which to cope with issues and redefine their perceptions. The contemporary break-down of older sources of authority and the redefinition of social, political and religious structures and bonds, together with the new horizons available to the theorists of the time, is plainly reflected in the agitation and tensions within their works. More specifically, of the four cases we examined, Charron struggles with the question of the foundation of wisdom and what its relationship with morality was. He contrasted the wisdom deriving from nature with revealed wisdom; he contemplated which one came first and which of the two was more important; he considered, finally, whether natural wisdom could exist independently of revealed wisdom and the other way round. He was particularly exercised by the fact that if one accepted that wisdom and consequently morality only derived from God, then classical figures such as Socrates could not be regarded either as wise or ethical.

Raising comparable questions, Lipsius, Sarpi, James VI and I, and their critics speculated upon the origins of authority and upon the issue of where sovereignty lies. If authority derived solely from God, then society and the state ought to be organised in a theocratic manner. If, on the other hand it derived from nature in the vein that classical authors such as Aristotle suggested, then
the formation of the state ought to be purely secular. By the same token, even if
authority derived solely from God, did He then remit it to spiritual or temporal
officers? These questions, of course, led to the much-debated and complex issue
of jurisdiction and its limitations, and the problem of the ‘one or two kingdoms’,
which was discussed extensively in the course of the thesis with particular
reference to Sarpi and James, and to a lesser extent Lipsius. The three of them
agreed that there were boundaries between the civil and ecclesiastical domains
of jurisdiction, but they granted a degree of control of spiritual matters to the lay
authorities, to varying extents. All four theorists in question also struggled to
define the relationship between politics and religion, and to establish a claim for
some form of independent existence of the former from the latter. This ran
opposite to arguments promoted by theocratic writers exemplified here by
Coornhert and Bellarmine, according to whom politics ought to be subject to
religion in all respects. The latter authors based their position on the writings of
the Bible that underscored the temporary nature of this world, pointing out that
the ultimate end was the next world. Adherence to divine principles, thus, was
to be preferred, in the same way that eternal salvation was to be preferred to
this life. Our writers provided different responses to this stance. Influenced by
Stoic doctrines of free-will and man’s participation in divine reason, Charron
and Lipsius argued that God had provided man with everything he needs to
survive on this earth. As a result, not only did politics exist independently, but it
had, in fact, a priority over religion in this world; religion’s sphere of influence
was in the afterlife, while in this life it was restricted to internal and privatised
expressions of piety. Sarpi, likewise, although he had considerably less faith in
the abilities of man, echoing Charron, firmly believed that the divine sphere was
at a great distance from the temporal, so men had themselves to mend the
disorder caused by human feebleness.
This line of reasoning reflected the more general question of the role of morality in politics that particularly exercised Lipsius and Sarpi. Simply put, if one accepted that this world is morally corrupt due to its dependence on human feebleness then, by definition, the administration of it would also be corrupt. Seen from a different perspective, this situation was only to be dealt with by an equal moral laxity in the realm of politics, represented by a notion as subtle and adaptable as only prudence could be, provided that the primary aim of the prince was the welfare of the people in general. But then if politics was inherently corrupt and immoral, perhaps the road to salvation lay in people detaching themselves from the outside world and public life, secure and constant in their inner compartment. Charron and Lipsius thus talked about the disjunction between private and public conduct, and argued that as long as one adhered to societal and state precepts in public, one could then maintain and practice one’s personal convictions in private.

This was particularly relevant to the main question of the role of religion within the state, which again related to the general welfare of the subjects. This was especially pertinent in the cases of religious differences – a personalised and internalised form of religion, such as Charron, Lipsius and Sarpi advocated, would ensure peace and unity in a state, as it would prevent religious differences to being expressed by public confrontations. It was along these lines that King James pronounced he could accept his recusant subjects, provided that they kept quiet and did not create problems within the state. The devastation of the religious wars had brought about discussions on notions of toleration that can be traced in the writings of all four authors examined here. We saw, however, how Bellarmine, a pronounced critic of this position, asserted that
notions of tolerance and concealment of true religious allegiance amounted to the prioritisation of temporal interests at the expense of eternal salvation.4

Similar preoccupations centred on expressions of piety and the point at which piety turned into superstition; Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and King James, all considered religious zealotry to be a menace to reasonable thinking, moral conduct, and the peace of the state. Their works are characteristic in their attempt to play down doctrinal differences and to communicate on a supra-confessional level. This was certainly a reflection of the tumultuous circumstances in which they lived; it was a way of dealing with the conflict religious hatred brought and a way of surviving. It is reminiscent, moreover, of the rhetoric of 'things indifferent' of the early Reformation; if all Christians agreed on a basic level they could co-exist peacefully.5 All four authors, in this respect, were critical of religious extremists and of the hardening of the confessional lines, such as, according to Sarpi, was the effect of the Council of Trent. James's active promotion of policies that aspired to a reunion of the divided Christendom both affected and was inspired by his view of the common fundamental elements shared by all Christians. Significantly, the laxity Lipsius, Sarpi and James demonstrated towards doctrinal differences gained them the reputation of religious ambivalence: all three were criticised as heretics and accused of traversing confessional boundaries. Equally, Charron's naturalism and use of philosophy made him susceptible to accusations of atheism, despite the fact that he had also published a book on Christian (and more specifically Catholic) apologetics.

---

It should be plain from the above account that these preoccupations are all closely interlinked. The interconnection of these elements has been analysed in detail in the course of the thesis. What this blending, however, leads to, is the conclusion that we are—as much as the thinkers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were—essentially faced with a single problem that presented itself in various facets: the role that religion ought to hold in people's understanding of the world around them, in their life, and political and social organisation. The challenge to religion's authority and the formation of world-views and structures independent of— or less dependent on— it ('secularisation') was expressed as we have seen, in many ways. The most characteristic expression, however, is perhaps the fluidity of fundamental notions upon which people of the period in question constructed their lives. Debates on the definition of 'reason' for example, and the different connotations it had according to a theological— whether it be Jesuitical or Augustinian— or philosophical— Stoic or Sceptical— line of argument; on the concept of 'providence and free will' among Calvinists, Arminians, Jesuits, Augustinians and Dominicans; over the definition of 'superstition' between Protestants who denounced Catholic ritualism, religious authorities faced with unorthodox practices and beliefs of the population at large and on a different level the term being used against religious zealots by more moderate believers (or not); the delineating the 'welfare of the public', or 'prudence' shifting from a notion truly originating from wise behaviour to a notion accommodating to practicality and thus more morally ambiguous, 'reason of state' as representing the will of God on earth as opposed to 'reason of state' as a priority (since life on earth precedes life after death), legitimation of 'authority' and 'resistance', again, according to the dictates of God or man, stemming from 'political' or divine purpose; these forceful debates correspond to the reconfiguration of the limits between profane and sacred and to the parallel redrawing of the boundaries of 'academic'
disciplines. Theology was to be stripped of its position as the 'queen of
disciplines' while subjects such as (natural) philosophy, history and law
emerged as autonomous disciplines in their own right, of equal importance to
theology. Indeed, what this transformation denoted was the emergence and
recognition of the possibility of different world-views.

It is important to recognise the relation between the development of
alternative possible perspectives and the issue of languages, first put forth in the
Introduction and frequently referred to throughout the thesis. Through their
education in and adoption of a specific idiom in which to discuss politics,
philosophy, religion and morality, the thinkers of the early modern period in
general, and at the start of the seventeenth century more specifically, subscribed
effectively to a particular way of seeing and understanding the affairs of the
world. This circumscribed to a considerable degree the mode in which they
thought. Adopting a humanist language, for instance, gave one the ability to
discuss politics and morality, based on Plato, Aristotle, Stoic or Sceptical
writings. It also, however, drew one's attention to questions about the
compatibility or not (or the independent existence) of philosophy, politics and
morality with the same areas as defined by divine revelation, since the classical
tradition had developed and existed before the Christian vision of the world
was known. By the same token, it enabled its users to discuss politics within a
historical political tradition, confined, however, to the principles and practices
that were in place when the treatises of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and the rest were
written.

From a different point of view, the assumption of a theological language
of discourse limited the argumentation to an un-historical perception of state,

---

6 J.G.A. Pocock, "The Concept of a Language and the Métier d'Historien: Some Considerations in
Practice" in A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe. (Cambridge:
CUP, 1987), pp. 19-38; and Andrew Lockyer, ""Traditions" as Context in the History of Political
Theory", Political Studies 27 (1979), pp. 201-17.
Church and Empire. It followed the precepts as set forth in the Old and New Testament, referring to the main principles and structures of politics within a Christian framework, pointing to notions of the moral duty to obey, the king’s and subjects’ responsibility towards God, and the hierarchical structure of society according to patriarchical concepts of authority and so forth, but was less able to discuss the details of government. As one historian of political thought has remarked, ‘theology provided the purpose’; the means were provided by the humanistic idiom and that of civil law. The latter was more suitable to discussions of the details of public administration and the manoeuvrings associated with the affairs of the state. In several ways this could conflict with the language of theology: first, the allegiance of civil law to the Romanist tradition made it inherently dangerous to the Christian tradition. Second, the increasing role jurisprudence was acquiring throughout the sixteenth century made some jurists talk about a ‘civil science’ that would touch upon and regulate all aspects of human relations. Third, the group’s preoccupation with the law was somewhat linked to forms of relativism. This was due to the jurists’ perceptions of law as a notion that had to be accommodated to the needs of each individual society; after all, ‘jurisprudence’ denoted the application of prudence - namely accommodation to circumstances - on law.

Of course, these general and distinct forms of language could again be subdivided into more branches. Scepticism, for example, was not the same as Stoicism, nor did the Ciceronian style have the same effect as the Tacitean; more importantly, perhaps, the Augustinian (later Jansenist, but also evangelical)

---

emphasis on grace, was diametrically opposed to scholastic (and later Jesuitic) stress on free will. What is even more interesting, is the crossover between philosophical and ecclesiological traditions. Charron’s sceptical elements, and the emphasis on human feebleness, as we saw, were thus attractive to Augustinians, so much so that St. Cyran defended Charron’s text against the Jesuit Garasse. In the same way, Lipsius’s close relations with the Jesuits could also be viewed from the point of view of the stress on free-will, which for Lipsius was based on Stoic elements of thought.

It has also been demonstrated, that this web of strands of thought contributed to scholars normally using a mixture of languages in their writing. Languages and traditions were usually combined, either on purpose or unconsciously, according to the person (their education, preference), the subject treated, and so forth. Thus Charron combined the humanistic idiom with the theological – especially in the revised version of *De la Sagesse*, in order to temper the naturalistic elements of the first edition. Significantly, he also incorporated some parts with a juristic essence, notably in his discussion of social formations, organisation of a state, and political prudence - the parts, namely, for which he relied on Bodin and Lipsius. Lipsius used primarily a humanistic language in the *Constantia*, while also adding elements of Christian theology.\(^\text{10}\)

The needs of a subject such as the *Politica* tackles, on the other hand, required the use of the humanistic reasoning, tightly interwoven with juristic argumentation; the religious elements of the work are limited to the discussion of the duties of the prince towards God and to a lesser extent the role of religion within the state. Sarpi’s approach is a magnificent amalgamation of the theological and the humanistic standpoint. The former is especially evident in his accounts of the doctrinal and sacramental deliberations in the Council, while the latter

\(^{10}\text{It should be recalled that when accused of impiety he defended himself by asserting that he was a philosopher, albeit a ‘Christian philosopher’; see Ch. 2, above.}\)
dominates his sense of ecclesiastical history (the Popes are treated in the same manner as the princes), and his account of the events surrounding the Council. Ultimately, however, his theological language is a mere methodological tool: his approach reflects his fundamental belief that history belonged entirely to the temporal realm, with no metaphysical ultimate purpose.11 James, meanwhile, wrote in a much more overtly religious idiom and his texts are permeated by the sense of the ultimate divine purpose; everything that happened here was directed towards the divine sphere. His role as a king, however, and the experience derived from it, also gave his writing a more pragmatic outlook; the True Law of Free Monarchies, thus, by definition uses many juristic (and humanistic) examples, and Basilikon Doron, a manual on royal government, is full of practical advice.

The above is by no means an exhaustive account of either the available languages and their combinations, or how they are used in the texts considered here. This rough summary, however, can offer us a better understanding of the functions of languages and the possibilities that these offered to the scholars who used them. To return to the earlier point, an appreciation of these different viewpoints and their uses can give us insights with regard to the intellectual premises from which the assault on the status and role of religion stemmed. As described, on the moral and political level, the preoccupation with classical texts persuaded intellectuals that it was possible to base morality and politics on nature or the principles of the ancient civilisations. Furthermore, the religious wars made scholars turn to other modes of expression (classical) in order to resolve and communicate about current problems, as was the case for instance with Lipsius and Charron. The victory of the ‘politique’ party - in the sense that

territorial and political concerns dictated the final peace treaties - in the German lands, France and the Low Countries, moreover, demonstrated the suitability and adaptability of the language of civil jurisprudence in resolving and negotiating issues between opposing parties, at the expense of the theological approach.12 This theoretical and conceptual background, however, could not have brought about notions of secularisation, had it not been mixed with experience: the contemporary conjuncture of the disillusionment originating from the religious wars, had the effect of disenchanting thinkers such as Charron and Lipsius with the moral and political conventions that failed to deal with the disruption brought about by religious warfare. In many cases, after all, religion itself, they realised, had been used as a pretext in the struggle for power. Therefore, religious extremism had to be dispensed with, particularly in situations like these where one party could emerge triumphant without annihilating the other, and bringing about the destruction of the state in the process. The success of the via media or the 'political way', however, also signalled the break-down of the notional societas Christiana (for the second time, after the schism with the Eastern Church) and the triumph of national churches over the Papacy: a political and temporal concept of the Church over an all-encompassing and transcendent.

Yet the Papacy had partly caused this itself. In the case of Italy, Sarpi's cynicism on the subject of the role of religion in politics had its roots in the Papacy's transformation into a temporal power and in the collective memory of the experience of the dreadful events of the Italian wars.13 Thus, the theoretical framework of Italian (civic) humanism combined with the historical circumstances produced, throughout the sixteenth century, explicitly political

13 Cf. Kelley, Beginning of Ideology, p. 34.
treatments of the affairs of this world, from Machiavelli’s *Prince* (1513, published in 1531/2) to Botero’s *Della Ragion di Stato* (1589) – despite the fact that the latter presented itself as an attempt to reconcile political expediency with Christianity. According to the new trend of Tacitean history and politics, political conduct could only be justified according to reasons of state, and morality did not necessarily have any place in politics.\(^{14}\) All of these elements are apparent in the way that Sarpi had composed his history and in his understanding of political and ecclesiastical affairs.

Lastly, the assault on the place of religion in people’s lives was intimately associated with the corruption and deformation that was perceived as having penetrated the Church. Based on a perhaps idealised notion of the early Church, calls for reform had been voiced long before Luther’s protestation. Within this context King James insisted that the Anglican Church, having detached itself from the corruption of Rome, was the heir to the true faith, and it was its role to protect and restore it in a regenerated, unified Christendom. On a different level, advocates of Conciliar doctrines had insisted on a less authoritative form of Church administration, as denoted in the literal meaning of the word Church itself (congregation of the faithful). Similarly, evangelical ideas that had been spreading long before either Luther or Calvin arrived in the picture promoted a kind of mystical view of piety. This, joined with a growing type of anticlericalism of the sort to which Sarpi adhered, also contributed to concepts of exclusion of religion and the Church from the public domain.

Furthermore, the experience of religious extremism, its politicisation through the rhetoric of resistance to the monarchy, and the threat that this posed to the welfare of the state, led theorists such as Lipsius and James to advocate

that religion ought to be controlled by the political authorities. Such erastian notions of state-controlled Churches, however, as mentioned above, fundamentally undermined the higher status that religion possessed until then, as they reduced it to a mere instrument of the state.

In a sense, this study has been an examination of many layers of overlapping circles – yet the breadth of the adopted perspective has been instructive on a number of fronts. It has demonstrated the degree to which, although to a certain extent conditioned by the distinct milieux in which they lived and wrote, Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and King James shared a number of fundamental assumptions and preoccupations. This highlights the benefits of studies of intellectual history or mentalities that are not circumscribed by traditional national boundaries.\(^\text{15}\) This makes sense particularly when we take into account the international character of the ‘republic of letters’. Its members felt that they belonged to a community that shared common interests and concerns; they were, moreover, in frequent communication with one another through the exchange of letters. It should be recalled that both Lipsius and Sarpi maintained a wide network of correspondents throughout Europe, and that most of the authors examined were familiar with one another’s work. The same applies to assumptions of confessional boundaries; in this respect, the thesis has illustrated that viewing doctrinal differences in terms of shades\(^\text{16}\) is much more appropriate than the oversimplified view that contrasts ‘Catholics’ and ‘Protestants’. A classic example here is the degree to which Sarpi’s version of ‘Catholicism’ was closer to evangelical beliefs than it was to Roman orthodoxy;


similarly, James's version of 'Protestantism' was considerably close to Papal convictions. By the same token, the passionate controversy over the role of the efficacy of grace ('de auxiliis') was paralleled with the division on the subject of free will between Arminians and orthodox Calvinists. In terms of how religious convictions translated into polities, moreover, Papal theocracy resembled Calvinist doctrines of theocracy. Meanwhile, moderates from either side found it easier to communicate with one another; in France, their coming together generated the pursuit of religious concord in a political framework that is associated with the so-called 'politique' party.

Further to these, a more general and comparative approach has the added benefit of drawing attention to differences between varying intellectual and geographical milieus. Through the consideration of the circulation and communication of ideas, this study has also indicated some of the differences in the manner in which some of the ideas were adapted in various environments. It has been pointed out, accordingly, how the Conciliar tradition was more prominent in Scotland than it was in England, because of the close links the former maintained with France. Correspondingly, it seems that considerations with regard to the role of morality in politics seem to have been much more crucial to Italians, the French, and thinkers from the Low Countries, in areas, namely, where the preoccupation with the Tacitean tradition was much more widespread.

The breaking down of national and confessional boundaries should also be accompanied by a waiving of the boundaries of approach between academic disciplines. Throughout this examination it has been established that modern-

---

17 Bouwsma, The Waning of Renaissance, pp. 100-1.
day classifications of genres and disciplines are not applicable to the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The most obvious example germane to discussions in the present study is the arbitrary division between ‘religious’ and ‘political’ matters that modern scholars impose on their material. In this context, preconceived notions of what differentiates a ‘political’ text from that incorporating ‘religious’, ‘moral’, ‘philosophical’ or ‘historical’ considerations can inhibit a more comprehensive understanding of the shared assumptions of the people of the period. This examination has therefore shown that what can seem as incongruent texts and genres, share similar underlying assumptions and concerns.

Finally, the present analysis has sought to contribute to discussions about the relations between theory and practice, and the extent to which theory is informed by practice, and vice versa. The relation between theory and practice has permeated many of the themes considered here. In many ways the first two chapters provide the theoretical framework in which Sarpi’s and James’s views can be understood. It is important, in this respect, to remember that out of the four figures under scrutiny, Charron and Lipsius were the least active, while the other two were most clearly engaged in the affairs of the state, Sarpi as an advisor to the Venetian Republic and James as sovereign of his kingdoms. From this perspective, by establishing the separation between the temporal and the divine spheres, and between public and private domains, Charron and Lipsius offer the conceptual bases on which Sarpi and James could apply their positions about jurisdiction.

Seen from a different angle, we could equate theory with the divine sphere or higher principles, and practice with the temporal and more ‘corrupt’. The relation between the two spheres during the extraordinary circumstances of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries underwent great adjustments: it swayed from tension – as political practice and everyday life contradicted
higher principles - to a disassociation of the temporal from the divine. The period in question, nonetheless, witnessed practice assuming prominence over theory, as evidenced for instance by the importance that prudence, the practical aspect of wisdom, assumed in political affairs.\textsuperscript{19} The significance that the temporal realm had started to take in the minds of a number of people of the period can be observed in the case of prudence, a quality that primarily drew from practice. Similarly, the emergence and recognition of politics and civil jurisdiction as an independent and superior art in controlling the affairs of this world was an indication that the role of religion was in the process undergoing serious re-evaluation.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. the importance of the notion even in treatises composed by Jesuits; Harro Höpfl, \textit{Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630.} (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp. 164-81.
Bibliography

A. Primary Material


____, *De la Sagesse, Trois Livres* (Rouen: Claude le Villain, 1618).


____, *Minor Prose Works of King James VI and I*. (Edinburgh: STS, 1982).


B. Secondary Literature


Donaldson, Peter S., Machiavelli and Mystery of State (Cambridge: CUP, 1988).


Hayden, James M., France and the Estates General of 1614 (Cambridge: CUP, 1974).


_____., ‘King James I. and Fra Paolo Sarpi in 1607’, The Athenaeum, 4062 (September 2, 1905), pp. 304-5.


Lockyer, Andrew, ‘’Traditions” as Context in the History of Political Theory’, Political Studies, 27 (1979), pp. 201-17.


Miller, Peter, Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century. (New Haven; London: Yale UP, 2000).

175.


_____, ‘The “Hidden” and “Revealed” Wills of James I: More Political Theology’, *Studia Gratiana*, xli (1972), pp. 365-75.


Ullmann, Walter, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages.


_____, ‘The Venetian View of Church and State: Catholic Erastianism?’ Studi Secenteschi, 19 (1978), pp. 75-106.
Appendix I

Pierre Charron's De la Sagesse, Trois Livres:

Organisation of chapters in Book I of the first edition (1601)

3. Vanité
4. Foiblesses
5. Inconstance
6. Misere
7. Presomption
8. Seconde consideration de l'homme, qui est par comparaison de lay avec tous les autres animaux
9. Distinction premiere, et generale de l'homme
10. Des proprietez singulieres du corps humain
11. Des biens du corps, Santé, Beaute, et autres
12. Des sens de Nature
13. Du veoir, ouyr et parler
14. Des vestements du corps
15. De l'Ame en general
16. De l’Esprit humain, ses parties, fonctions, qualitez, raison, inuention, verité
17. De la Memoire
18. De l'imagination & opinion
19. De la Volonte
Des passions et affections, aduertissement
20. Des passions en general
Des passions en particulier, aduertissement
21. De l'Amour en general
22. De l'Ambition
23. De l'auarice & sa contrepassion
24. De l'Amour charnel
25. Desirs, cupitidez
26. Espoir, Desespoir
27. De la Cholere
28. Hayne
29. Enuiie
30. Ialousie
31. Vengeance
32. Cruaute
33. Tristesse
34. Compassion
35. Crainte
35. De la profession militaire
36. Estimation briefuelé, description de la vie humaine, & ses parties
   Cinquieme et derniere consideration de l'homme, par les variete et differences grandes qui sot en lui, et leurs comparaisons
37. De la difference et inegalité des hommes en general
38. Premiere distinction & difference des hommes naturelle & essentielle, tirée de la diuerse assiette du monde
39. Seconde distinction & difference plus subtile des esprits, & suffisances des hommes
40. Troisieme distinction et difference des hommes accidentale, de leurs degrez, estats, et charges
   Des estats et degrez des hommes en particulier, avertissement
41. Du commander et obeir
42. Du mariage
43. Des parens et enfans
44. Des Seigneurs et esclaues, maistres, et seruieteurs
45. De l'Estat, Souueraineté, Souuerains
46. Des Magistrats
47. Des Legislateurs, Docteurs et instructeurs
48. Du people ou vulgaire
   Quatiriesme distinction et difference des homines tiree de leurs diuerses professions, et conditions de vie
49. Distinction et comparaison des trios sortes de degrez de vie
50. Comparaison de la vie ciuile ou sociale avec la solitaire
51. Comparaison de le vie menée en commun, et menée en propriété
52. Comparaison de la vie rustique et des villes
   Cinquiesme et derniere distinction et difference des hommes tiree des fauertes et defauertes de la Nature et de la fortune
54. De la liberté et du seruage
55. De la Noblesse
56. De l'honneur
57. De la Science
58. Des Richesses et pouréte
Contents of the second edition (1604) - and all subsequent

LIVRE PREMIER, qui est de la conoissance de soy et de l'humaine condition.

Exhortation à s'estudier et coñoistre
Preface du premier liure

Premiere consideration de l'homme, qui est naturelle par toutes les pieces dont il est composé
1. De la formation de l'homme
2. Distinction premiere, et generale de l'homme
4. Des proprietez singulieres du corps humain
5. Des biens du corps, Santé, Beauté, et autres
6. Des vestemens du corps
7. De l'Ame en general
8. De l'Ame en particulier, et premierement de la faculté Vegetatiue
9. De la faculté sensitie
10. Des sens de Nature
11. Du veoir, ouyr et parler
12. Des autres facultez, imaginatiue, Memoratiue, Appetitieue
13. De la faculté intellective & vrayment humaine
14. De l'Esprit humain, ses parties, fonctions, qualitez, raison, inuention, verité
15. De la Memoire
16. De l'imagination & opinion
17. De la Volonté
18. Des passions et affections, aduertissement.
19. Des passions en general
21. De l'Amour en general
22. De l'Ambition
23. De l'auarice & sa contrepasion
24. De l'Amour charnel
25. Desirs, cupitidez
26. Espoir, Desespoir
27. De la Cholere
28. Hayne
29. Enuie
30. Ialousie
31. Vengeance
32. Cruauté
33. Tristesse
34. Compassion
35. Crainte
34. Seconde consideration de l'homme, qui est par comparaison de luy avec tous les autres animaux
Troisieme consideration de l'homme, qui est par sa vie.
35. Estimation briefueté, description de la vie humaine, & ses parties
Quatriesme consideration de l'homme morale, par ses mœurs, humeurs, conditions, bien vivue et notable
36. Vanité
37. Foiblesse
38. Inconstance
39. Misere
40. Presomption
Cinquieme et derniere consideration de l'homme, par les varietez et differences grandes qui sot en luy, et leurs comparaisons
41. De la difference et inegalite des hommes en general
42. Premiere distinction & difference des hommes naturelle & essentielle, tirée de la diuerease assiette du monde
43. Seconde distinction & difference plus subtile des esprits, & suffisances des hommes
44. Troisieme distinction et difference des hommes accidentale, de leurs degrez, estats, et charges
Des estats et degrez des hommes en particulier, aduertissement
45. Du commander et obeir
46. Du mariage
47. Des parens et enfans
48. Des Seigneurs et esclaues, maistres, et seruiteurs
49. De l'Estat, Souueraineté, Souuerains
50. Des Magistrats
51. Des Legislateurs, Docteurs et instructeurs
52. Du people ou vulgaire
Quatriesme distinction et difference des hommes tiree de leurs diverses professions, et conditions de vie
53. Distinction et comparaison des trios sortes de degrez de vie
54. Comparaison de la vie ciuile ou sociale avec la solitaire
55. Comparaison de le vie menee en commun, et menée en proprieté
56. Comparaison de la vie rustique et des villes
57. De la profession militaire
Cinquesme et derniere distinction et difference des hommes tiree des faueurs et defaueurs de la Nature et de la fortune
58. De la liberté et du seruage
59. De la Noblesse
60. De l'honneur
61. De la Science
62. Des Richesses et pourété
LIVRE SECONDE, contenant les instructions et regles generales de Sagesse.

1. Exemption et affranchissement des erreurs et vices du monde et des passions, etc.
2. Vnuierselle et plaine liberte de l'esprit, tant en jugement qu'en volonte, seconde disposition à la Sagesse
3. Vraye et essentielle prud'hommie, premiere et fondamentale partie de Sagesse
4. Auoir vn but et train de vie certain, second fondement de Sagesse
5. Estudier à la vraye pieté, premier office de Sagesse
6. Regler ses desirs et plaisirs, second office de Sagesse
7. Se porter moderement et egalemnt en prosperité et aduersité, Troisiesme office de Sagesse
8. Obeyr et observer les loix, coustumes et ceremonies du pays, comment et en quell sens, quatriesme office de Sagesse
9. Se bien comporter avec autruy, cinguesme office de Sagesse
10. Se conduire prudemment aux affaires, Sixtiesme office de Sagesse
11. Se tenir tousiours prest à la mort, fruit de Sagesse
12. Se maintenir en vraye tranquillité d’esprit, le fruit et la couronne de Sagesse et conclusion de ce liure

LIVRE TROISIESME, à quel sont traittez les aduis particuliers de Sagesse par les quatre vertus morales

Preface

De la prudence premiere vertu
1. De la prudence en general

De la prudence Politique du Souuerain pour gouuerner estats
2. Premier partie de ceste Prudence Politique, et gouuernement d’Estat, qui est de la prouision
4. De la Prudence requise aux affaires difficiles et mauvais accidens publics et priuez.

Preface
(1) Des maux et accidens qui nous menacent
(2) Maux et accidens presens, pressans et extremes
(3) Affaires douteux et ambiguiz
(4) Affaires difficiles et dangereux
(5) Coniurations
(6) Trahison
(7) Emotions populaires
(8) Faction et ligue
(9) Sedition
(10) La Tyranne et Rebellion
(11) Guerres ciuiles
(12) Aduis pour les particuliers en toutes les susdites diuisions publiques
(13) Des troubles et diuisions priues
De la justice seconde vertu
5. De la justice en general.
6. De la justice et devoir de l'homme à soy-mesme
   De la justice et devoir de l'homme envers l'homme, advertissement
   Premier partie, qui est des devoirs généraux et communs de tous envers tous, et premierement.
7. De l'Amour ou amitié
   8. De la foy, fidelité, perfidie, secret
   9. Verité et admonition libre
   10. De la flatterie, menterie, et dissimulation
   11. Du bien fait, obligation et reconnaissance
   Seconde partie qui est des devoirs spéciaux de certains à certains, par certaine et speciale obligation. Preface
   12. Devoir des mariez
   13. Mesnagerie
   14. Devoir des parens et enfans
   15. Devoir des maistres et serviteurs
   16. Devoir des souuerains, et des suiets
   17. Devoir des magistrats
   18. Devoir des grands et des petits
   De la force troiesme vertu. Preface
   19. De la force ou vaillance en general
   De la force ou vaillance en particulier
   20. Premier partie des maux externes
   21. Des maux externes considerez en leurs effets et fruits
   Des maux externs en eux mesmes et particulierement. Advertissement
   22. De la maladie et douleur
   23. De la captiuite ou prison
   24. Du bannissement et exil
   25. De la pourete, indigence, perte de biens
   26. De l'infamie
   27. De la perte d'amis
   De la mort
   Seconde parties des maux internes etc. Preface
   28. Contre la crainte
   29. Contre la tristesse
   30. Contre la compassion et misericorde
   31. Contre la cholere
   32. Contre la hayne
   33. Contre l'enuie
   34. Contre la vengeance
   35. Contre la jalousie
   De la Temperance quatriesme vertu
   36. De la Temperance en general.
   37. De la prosperité et aduis sur icelle
   38. De la volupté et aduis sur icelle
39. Du manger et boire, et sobriété
40. Du luxe et de la bûche en tous conuerts etc.
41. Plaisir Charnel, chasteté, continence
42. De la gloire, et de l'ambition
43. De la Temperance au parler, et de l'Eloquence
Appendix II

Citations from Chapter One

Unless stated otherwise, all the quotations below are taken from Charron's *De la Sagesse, Trois Livres* (Paris: David Douceur, 1607). The first number refers to the page, and the second to the footnote.

50, 53-4: 'Or nous pouvons dire qu'il y a trois sortes et degrés de Sagesse, Divine, Humaine, Mondaine, qui répondent à Dieu, Nature pure et entière, Nature vitée et corrompue:... le Theologien de la divine ... Or n'est il point parlé d'elle en ce livre, que pour la condamner'; p. 3.

51, 57: 'De cette sagesse divine n'entendons aussi parler icy, elle est en certain sens & mesure traitée en ma premiere verité, & en mes discours de la divinité'; p. 4.

51, 61-2: 'Davantage les Philosophes la traittent plus doucement et plaisamment, les Theologiens plus austeremment et sechement ... La Philosophie qui est l'aïnée, comme la nature est l'aïnée de la grace, et le naturel du supernaturel...'; p. 6.

52, 63: '...mais aussi tous ces grands homes qui faisoient profession singuliere & exemplaire de vertu & sagesse, comme Phocion, Aristides, Pericles, Alexandre, que Plutarque appelle Philosophe aussi bien que Roy, Epaminondas, & tant d'autres Grecs: les Fabrices, Fabies, Camilles, Catons, Torquates, Regules, Lelies, Scipions Romains, qui pour la plus part ont esté generaux d'armées'; p. 7.

52, 64: 'Si i'eusse entreprins d'instruire pour le cloistre, & la vie consiliaire, c'est à dire professions des conseiles Eucangeliques, il m'eust faillu suyure, adamussim, les aduis des Theologiens; mais nostre liure instruit à la vie ciuile, & forme vn homme pour le monde, c'est à dire à la sagesse humaine & non divine'; pp. 7-8.

53, 65: '...cette sagesse humaine est une droitture, belle & noble composition de l'homme entiere, en son dedans, son dehors, ses penseées, paroles, actions, & tous ses mouuements, c'est l'excellence & perfection de l'homme comme home, c'est à dire selon que porte & requiert la loy premiere fondamentale & naturelle de l'homme'; p. 8.

53, 67: 'Le second moyen est en l'estude de la Philosophie, je n'entendе toutes ses parties, mais de la morale (sans toutefois oublier la naturelle) qui est la lampe, le guide, et la regle de nostre vie, qui explique et représente tresbien la loy de nature, instruit l'homme universellement à tout, en public et en privé, seul, et en companye, à tpute cpnversonation domestique et civile, ooste et retrace toute le sauvagin qui est en nous, adoucit et apprivoise le naturel rude, farouche, et sauvage, le duit et façonne à la sagesse. Bref c'est la vraye science de l'homme...'; pp. 10-11.
54, 69: ‘Or à tels esprits foibles de nature, preoccupez, enstez, et empechez de l’acquis, comme ennemis formels de Sagesse, ie lay la guerre par expreuz en mon livre, et c’est souvent sous ce mot de pedant, n’en trouvant point d’autres plus propre, et qui est usurpé en ce sens par plusieurs bons auteurs’; pp. 14-5.

54, 70: ‘Il n’y a que les sots qui se laissent ainsi mener, et ce livre n’est pas pour eux, s’il estoit popularemente receu et accepté, il se trouveroit bien descheu de ses pretensions...’; p. 20.


56, 72: ‘Le plus excellent & divin coseil, le meilleur & plus vtile advertissement de tous, mais le plus mal practiqué est de s’estudier et apprendre à se cognoistre: c’est le fondement de sagesse et acheminement à tout bien: folie non pareille que d’estre attentive et diligent à cognoistre toutes autres choses plustot que soy mesme: le vraye science et le vray estude de l’homme, c’est l’homme’; p. 23.

56, 77: ‘L’esprit la treshaute et tresheroique partie, parcelled, scintille, image et defluxion de la divinite en l’homme...’; p. 35.

59, 85: ‘Toute cognoissance s’achemine en nous par les sens, c’est dit on en l’escole, mais c’est ne pas du tout vray, comme se verra après...’; p. 69. Interestingly enough, in the first edition the passage does not include the underlined qualification; Charron’s view, thus, in the 1601 version appear more Aristotelian than in the 1604.

59, 86: ‘La plus commune opinion venue d’Aristote est que l’esprit cognoit et entend par le minister des sens, que de soy il est comme une carte blanche et vuide, qu’il ne luy arrive rien qui ne soit passé par les sens, nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu: Mais elle est premiерement fausse...’; p. 88.

60, 92: ‘De la foiblesse et incertitude de nos sens viennent ignorance, erreurs et tout mesconte...’; p. 73.

61, 94: ‘...mais nous disons pour defendre l’honneur de l’esprit, qu’il est faux qu’il depende des sens et ne puisse rien sçavoir, entendre, raisonner, discourir sans les sens: car au reburs toute cognoissance vient de luy, et les sens ne peuvent rien sans luy’; p. 90.

61, 95: ‘Son action est la cognoissance et l’intelligence de toutes choses: L’esprit humain est capable d’entendre toutes choses visibles, invisibles, universelles, sensibles, insensibles. Intellectus est omnia. Mais soy-mesmes ou point selon aucuns ... ou bien
sombrement, imparfaitment, et indirectement par reflexion de la connaissance des choses à soy-mesmes, par laquelle il sent et cognoit qu'il entend, et a puissance et faculté d'entendre, c'est la manière que les esprits se cognissent...'; p. 87.

61, 96: 'car comme tous les sages ont dit, ainsi qu'il a esté touché cy dessus, et renvoyé en ce lieu, les semences de toutes sciences et vertus sont naturellement espares et insinuées en nos esprits, dont ils peuvent vivre riches et joyeux de leur propre...'; p. 88.

62, 99: 'Nous essayons tous les moyens que nous pensons y pouvoir servir: mais en fin tous nos efforts sont courts, car la verité n'est pas un aquest, ni chose qui se laisse prendre et manier, et encore moins posseder à l'esprit humain. Elle lodge dedans le sein de Dieu, c'est là son giste et sa retraite: l'homme ne scait et n'entend rien à droict, au pur et au vray comme des apparence, qui se trouvent par tout aussi bien au faus qu'au vray: nous sommes nais à quester la verité: la posseder appartient à une plus haute et grande puissance... Les erreurs se reçoivent en nostre ame, par mesmo voye et conduite que la verité, l'esprit n'a pas de quoy les distinguer et choisir... Les moyens qu'il employe pour la descouvrir, sont raison et experience, tous deux tres-foibles, incertains, divers, ondyans. Le plus grand argument de la verité, c'est le general consentement du monde'; pp. 97-8.


63, 102: 'Le matiere des passions de l'esprit est tresgrande et plantureuse, tient un grand lieu en cette doctrine de Sagesse: à les sçavoir bien coignostre et distinguer ce qui se fera maintenant moderer generaux, c'est pour le second livr: aux remedes particuliere d'une chascune au troisieme livre, suyvant la methode de ce livre mise au preface'; p. 111.

63, 103: 'Et n'ay point veu qui les despeigne plus naivement et richement que le seur du Vair en ces petits livrets moraux, dequels je me suis fort servy en ceste matiere passionnée'; p. 111.

63, 105: 'Passion est un mouvement violent de l'ame en sa partie sensitive, lequel se fait ou pour, suyvre ce que l'ams pense luy estre bon, ou pour fuir ce qu'elle pense luy estre mauvais'; p. 111.
65, 110: ‘C’est chose estrange, l’homme desire naturellement sçavoir la verité ... neantmoins il n’y peut parvenir: Si elle se presente, il ne la peut comprendre, s’il l’a comprend il s’en offense ... L’homme est fort à desirer et foible à prendre et tenir. Les deux principaux moyens qu’il employe, pour parvenir à la cognoscence de la verité sont, la raison et l’expérience. Or tous deux sont si foibles et incertains (bien que l’expérience plus) qu’en ne pouvons rien tirer de certain. La raison a tant de formes, est tant ployable, ondoyante comme a esté dit en son lieu. L’expérience encores plus, les evenemens sont toujours dissemblables il n’y rien si universel en la nature que la diversité...’; pp. 187-8.


66, 116-7: ‘La verité et le mesonge ont leurs visages conformes; le port, le goust et les aulleurs pareilles; nous les regardons de mesme ceil; ita sunt finitima falsa veris, ut in precipitem locum non debet se sapiens committere’; p. 224. Cf. also p. 223: ‘Suivant cecy nous voyons presque tout le monde mené et emporté aux opinions et creances, non par chois et jugement, voire souvent avant l’aige et discretion, mais par la coutume du pays, ou instruction receué en jeunesse...’

67, 118: ‘Toute proposition humaine a autant d’autorité, que l’autre, si sa raison n’en fait la difference. La verité ne dépend point d’autorité ou témoignage d’homme: il n’y a point de principes aux homes, si la divinité ne les leur a revelé: tout le reste n’est que songe et fumée.’; p. 226.

67, 125: ‘C’estoit un prealable que d’appeler l’homme à soy, à se tater, sonder, étudier, afin de se conoître et sentir ses defaults et sa miserable condition, et ainsi se render capable des remedes salutaires et necessaires, et qui sont les avis et enseignemens de sagesse’; p. 305-6.

68, 128: ‘Ils gouverneront tant qu’ils voudront, ma main, ma langue, mais non pas mon esprit s’il leur plaist, il a un autre maistre: Empescher la liberté de l’esprit l’on ne sçauoir, le vouloir faire, c’est la plus grande tyrannie qui puisse ester, le sage s’en gardera bien activement et passivement, se maintiendra en sa liberté et ne troublera celle d’autruiy’; p. 324.

68, 129: ‘Or joüissant ainsi le sage de ce droit sien à juger et examiner toutes choses, il adviendra souvent que le jugement et la main, l’esprit et le corps se contrediront, et qu’il fera au dehors d’une façon, et jugera autrement au dedans, jouera un roole devant le monde, et une autre en son esprit, il le doit faire ainsi pour garder Justice par tout. Le dire general, universus mundus exercet histrioniam, se doit proprement et vrayement entendre du sage, qui est autre au dedans qu’il ne montre au dehors’; pp.324-5. This contrast between outward behaviour and inward thinking does not appear in the 1601 version.
70, 133: Cf. ‘Cette surceance est fondée Premieremment sur ces propositions tants célèbrées parmy les sages, qu’il n’y a rien de certain, que nous savons rien, qu’il n’y a rien en nature que le doute, rien de certain que l’incertitude, solum certum nihil esse certi, hoc unum scio quod nihil scio: Que de toutes choses l’on peut également dire, que nous ne faisons de quester, enquérir, tattoner à l’entour des apparences, scimus nihil, opinionem versimilia, que la vérité n’est point de notre acquest, invention, ..., que la vérité et le mensonge entrent chés nous par mesme porte...qu’il n’y a opinion aucune tenué de tous et par tout...que toutes choses ont deux anses et deux visages, qu’il y a raison par tout... Bref c’est la doctrine et la pratique de tous les sages plus grands et plus nobles Philosophes, qui ont fait expresse profession d’ignorer, douter, enquérir, chercher’; p. 330.

70, 134: ‘...il y a une sorte d’ignorance et de doute, plus docte et assurée, plus noble et genereuse que toute leur science et certitude...’; p. 333.

70, 135: ‘Je dirai icy que j’ai fait graver sur la porte de ma petite maison que j’ai fait bastir à Condom l’an 1600 ce mot, je ne scay.’; p. 333.

71, 136-7: ‘Que tout le sçavoir du monde n’est que vanité et mensonge... que Dieu a bien créé l’homme pour connaître la vérité, mais qu’il ne la peut connaître de soy, ny par aucun moyen humain. Et faut que Dieu mesmes, au sien duquel elle reside, et qui en a fait venire l’envie à l’homme, la revelé, comme il a fait: mais que pour se préparer à cette revelaçon, il faut auparavant renoncer et chasser toutes opinions et creances, d’ont l’espirit est des-ja anticipé et abrevé, et le luy presenter blanc, nud, et prest’; p. 336.

72, 140: ‘L’autre liberté qui est de volonté, doit être encores en plus grande recommandation au sage. Nous ne parlons pas icy du liberal arbitre de l’homme à la façon des Theologiens; Nous disons que l’homme sage pour se maintenir en repos et liberté, doit monsager sa volonté et ses affections, en ne se donnant et affectionant qu’a bien peu de choses, et icelles justes (...) et encores sans violence et aspérté’; pp. 343-4.

73, 143: ‘Je la veux icy descrire, advertisant Premieremment que suivant le dessein de ce livre declaré au preface, je traite de la prud’homme et sagesse humaine comme humaine, par laquelle l’on est dit homme de bien et sage, et non de la Christienne, combien qu’encores en diray-je en fin un mot’; p. 352.

73, 144: ‘Le ressort de cette prud’homme est Nature, laquelle oblige tout homme d’estre et se rendre tel qu’il doit, c’est à dire se conformer et regler selon elle. Nature nous est ensemble et maistresse qui nous enjoint et commande la prud’homme, et luy ou instruction qui nous l’enseigne’; pp. 352-3.

74, 145: ‘Or le Patron et la regle pour l’estre, c’est cette Nature mesmes qui requiert si absolument que le soyons, c’est di-jë cette equité et raison universelle qui éclaire et luit en chacun de nous: Qui agit selon elle, agit vraeyement selon Dieu, car c’est Dieu, ou bien sa premiere fondamentale, et universelle luy qui l’a mis au monde, et qui la
premiers est sortie de luy, car Dieu et Nature sont au monde, comme en un estat, le Roy son authur et fondateur, et la loy fondamentale qu’il a bastie pour la conservation et regle dudit estat. C’est un esclat de rayon de la divinité, une defluxion et dependance de la loy eternelle, qui est Dieu memes, et sa volonte ... Il agit aussi selon soy, car il agit selon le timon et ressort animé qu’il a dedans soy le mouvant et agitant ... car cette loy et lumiere est essentielle et naturelle en nous, dont aussi est appellee Nature et loy de Nature. Il est aussi par consequent home de bien tousjours et perpetuellement, uniformement, et egalemment, en tous temps, et tous lieux: Car cette loy d’equite et raison naturelle est perpetuelle en nous, edictum perpetuum, inviolable qui ne peut jamais estrer eteinte ny efface, quam nec ipsa delet iniquitas: vermis eorum non morietur, universelle et constante par tout, et tousjours mesme, egale, uniforme, que les temps ny les lieux ne peuvent alterer ny deguyser...’; p. 355.

74, 147: ‘La loy de Moyse en son Decalogue en est une copie externe et publique, la loy de douze tables, et le droit Romain, les enseignemens moraux des Theologiens et Philosophes, les avis et conseils des Jurisconsultes, les edits et ordonnances des souverains ne sont que petites et particulieres expressions d’icelle... Bref toutes les loix du monde ne sont que des copies et des extrait produits en jugement, contre toy qui tiens caché l’original...’; p. 356. [my italics].

74, 148: ‘Je veux icy adjouster un mot selon que j’ay promis pour deboucher la pointe de la mediasance, et faire cesser les plaints de ceux qui trouvent mauvais de ce que je fais tant valoir nature (bien que ce soit Dieu comme a été dit, et que ce livre ne parle de naturel et humain) comme si cetoit tout et ne fust plus rien requis’; p. 367.

74, 149: ‘C’est qu’apres tout ce que j’ay dit il reste encore une chose pour rendre louradge complet et parfait, c’est la grace de Dieu par laquelle cette telle prud’homme, bonte, vertu, est animée, mise à jour, et reçoit son dernier trait visuel, est relevée christianisée couronnée, c’est à dire acceptée verifiee, emologuée de Dieu, rendue meritoire, et digne de recompense eternelle... Or ce bien ne consiste point en long discourse, preceptes ou enseignemens, ni se s’aurit par nostre fait et labour proper, c’est un pur don n’enhaul, dont il en porte le Nom, Grace...’; p. 367-8.

76, 157: ‘Quand à la reception... la particuliere reception ce fait bien tous les jours par voye, mains, et moyens humains, la nation, le pays, le lieu donne la religion: l’on est de celle que le lieu et la comagnie où l’on est né tient...’; p. 385.

77, 161: ‘Seulement ay-je ici à donner un advis necessaire à celuy qui pretend à la Sagesse, qui est de ne separer la piété de la vraye prud’homme, de laquelle nous avons parlé ci dessus, se contentant de l’une, moins encore les confondre et mesler ensemble: ce sont deux choses bien distinctes, et qui ont leurs ressors divers, que la piété et la probité, la religion et la prud’homme, la devotion et la conscience; je le veux toutes deux jointes en celuy que j’instruis icy, comme aussi l’une sans l’autre ne peut être entiere et parfaite, mais non pas confuses’; p. 396.
78, 164: ‘...sçavoir qui vaut mieux religion ou prud’homme, je ne veux traicter ceste question: seulement je diray, pour les comparer hors de là en trois points, que la premiere est bien plus facile et aysée, de plus grande montre et parade, des esprits simples et populaires: la seconde est d’exploit beaucoup plus difficile et laborieux, qui a moins de montre, et est des esprits forts et genereux’; pp. 397-8.

78, 166: ‘La religion est posterieure à la prud’homme, c’est aussi chose apprise, receu par l’ouye, fidex ex auditu et per verbum Dei, par revelation et instruction, et ainsi ne la peut pas causer. Ce seroit plutot la prud’homme qui devroit causer et engendrer la religion, car elle est premiere, plus ancienne et naturelle...’; (Extracts from the 1601 edition) p. 788.

78, 167: ‘Ceux cy veulent au rebours qu’l’on soit religieux avant preud’hom, et que la Religion qui s’aquiert et s’apprend au dehors... engendrer la preud’homme, laquelle nous avons montré devoir ressortir de nature, Loy et lumiere que Dieu a mis au dedans de nous dés notre origine, c’est une ordre renversé. Ils veulent que l’on soit home de bien, à cause qu’il y a un Paradis et un Enfer... je veux que tu sois home de bien, quand bien tu ne devrois jamais aller en Paradis, mais pource que nature, la raison, c’est à dire Dieu le veut, pour que la Loy et la police generale du monde, d’où tu es une piece, le requiert; ainsi et tu ne peux consentir d’etre autre que tu n’ailles contre toy-mesme, ton estre, ta fin. Certes telle preud’homme causée par l’esprit de religion, outre qu’elle n’est vraie et essentielle, n’agissant par le bon resort authere de nature, mais accidentale, encore est elle tres-dengereuse, produysant quelquefois de tres-vilains et scandalueux effets (comme l’expérience l’a de tout temps fait sentir) sous beaux et specieux pretextes de pieté. Quelles execrables menchantez n’a produit le zele de religion? mais se trouve il autre sujet ou occasion au monde, qui en aye peu produire de pareilles?... Et qui a religion sans preud’homme, je ne le veux pas dire plus mechant, mais bien plus dangereux que celuy qui n’a ny l’un ny l’autre... croyent que toute chose quelle qu’elle soit trahysyon, perfidie, sedition, rebellion, et toute offese a quiconque soit, est non seulement loisible et permise, colorée de zele et soin de religion...’; pp. 398-9.

80, 175: ‘Par droit le sage est par dessus les loix, mais par effet externe et public, il est leur volontaire et libre sujet obeissant’; p. 433.

80, 176: ‘Finalement c’est l’office de l’esprit generieux et de l’homme sage (...) d’examiner toutes choses, considerer à part et puis comparer ensemble toutes les loix et coutumes de l’univers... et les juger (...) de bonne foy, et sans passion, au niveau de la verité, de la raison et nature universelle, à qui nous sommes premierement obligez...; et se contenter de rendre l’observance et obeissance à celles, ausuelles nous sommes secondement et particulierement obligez... Il adviendra quelquefois que nous ferons par une seconde particuliere et municipale obligation (obeyssant aux loix et coutumes du pays) ce qui est contre la premiere et plus ancienne, c’est à dire la nature et raison universelle: mais nous luy satisfaisions tenant notre jugement et nos opinions saintes et justes selon elle. ... le monde n’a que fairew de nos pensées mais le dehors est engagé au public, et luy en devons rendre conte...’; p. 434.
Appendix III

Justus Lipsius's *De Constantia Libri Duo* (1584)
and *Politicorum Sive Civillis Doctrinae Libri Sex* (1589):
The Subject Matter

i.

*De Constantia*

That *De Constantia* was written with the aim to serve as consolation in times of public afflictions is declared by the title of the work: *De Constantia Libri Duo, Qui Alloquium Praecipue Continent in Publicis Malis* (Two Books of Constancy, Which Especially Contain Consolation in Times of Public Adversity). Equally, in a much quoted extract from the Epistle to the Reader of the same work, Lipsius himself tells us that the text was written as a means of personal solace:

*I haue sought out consolations against publick euils ... To conclude, ... I haue written many other things for others; but this book primarily for my self; the former for fame, but this for saluation.*

The text is in the form of a dialogue between the person of Lipsius and Langius (Charles de Langhe, ?1521-73). The dialogue is set in 1571-72, during Lipsius’s journey to Vienna, after which he did not return to Louvain, but instead ended up in Lutheran Jena. The Flemish scholar had in this trip visited Langius, in his home in Liège, where the latter was a Canon at the Cathedral. Twenty-five years older than Lipsius, the Canon was a man devoted to religion, studies and horticulture; he had also edited some of Cicero’s (106-43 BC) works in 1563, mainly the ones of a Stoic character.

Langius then is an appropriate figure to have playing a leading role in a Stoic moral treatise such as the *Constantia*. The work’s focus, however, is not on setting

---

1 Cf. Seneca, *De Constantia*
3 For Langius see *Biographie Nationale de Belgique*, 44 vols. (Brussels: 1866-1986).
4 *Constantia*, p. 71.
5 Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics*, p. 66.
forth the principles of Stoicism; it is concerned rather with the utility of the doctrines of that ancient trend as a way of strengthening the mind in the face of internal and external troubles. The discussion begins with Lipsius making complaints to the elderly man about the situation in the Low Countries and admitting to the fact that this was the cause of his leaving. Langius soberly observes that flight is not the solution, since there was no part of Europe at that time free of turmoil. In this vein, Lipsius uses the opening chapters of the first book (I, 2-3) to explain how misery comes from inward opinions about outward events. Through Langius he indicates reason as the instrument to judge and regulate matters and (he) associates it with the virtue that the whole work is dedicated to, constancy. The young Lipsius of the book is exhorted to constancy, the virtue that will enable him to survive and endure the public calamities. The work then goes on to contest the honesty of the feeling of the young fugitive, accusing him of dissimulation; according to Langius the young Lipsius is more concerned with his own fate than with that of his country.

After this somewhat long introduction and outline of the basic principles, the work proposes to demonstrate the triviality of public evils based on four arguments. The first two, providence and necessity, are dealt with in the first book; they are also more directly relevant to this chapter as they convey some of the author's fundamental Stoic views. According to this line of reasoning, civil calamities are part of God's divine Providence; they are, furthermore, the results of natural necessity, according to which all things in this world are subject to alteration and decay. Lipsius creates an opportunity, in this manner, to consider the closely related notions of providence, necessity and destiny, and to discuss the differences between the Stoic position on these concepts and the Christian interpretation of them. The first book comes to a conclusion with the account of these crucial issues, and with a final brief reference to man's role within the divine scheme of things.

7 Constantia, pp. 71-2.
8 Constantia, p. 72.
9 Constantia (1, 13-22).
The second book of *De Constantia* opens with the serene picture of Langius's garden. Occupying three chapters, this literary device operates on many levels; in the first place, it works as a contrast between the raging wars outside and the tranquillity that is the aim of the Stoic sage, as signified in the image of the garden. It also represents the Stoic ideal of life according to nature; as a place of reflection, moreover, it urges to wisdom and constancy. With this transition and the reference to constancy, Lipsius resumes his reasoning for the exhortation to the same virtue.10 The two remaining arguments of the work refer to a more practical level than the more abstract discussion of the first book.11 Thus, the third case for constancy is drawn from usefulness ('utilitas'): as Lipsius puts it, since public evils derive from God, the ultimate purpose for their existence must be good, as God through them can exercise and strengthen virtuous people, and make them an example to the rest, punish the wicked. Finally, they work within the greater scheme of His Providence for the conservation of the world.12

The last argument in the author's line of reasoning is the fact that civil struggles are not as grievous as they appear. The persona of Langius shows that ills such as the loss of property, banishment and death only seem to be great; their triviality becomes especially evident when considered alongside the teachings of Stoicism, and Christianity. The last seven chapters (II, 20-26) compare the situation of the Low Countries and of Lipsius's age with other civil wars and destructions in history to prove that the present misery is exaggerated. The examples and accounts, furthermore, that the author employs are not restricted to this part of the world: as he

---

10 The description of Langius's garden extends over three chapters (II, 1-3). Lipsius's own love for gardens and horticulture is well attested; cf. for example *Vita, Opera Omnia* (I, lxiv); see also his letter to Willem Breugel (Sept. 29, 1575): 'May I remain at peace, far from the stormy sea of the city, in this tranquil rural haven, and so grow old. Here I may worship God, first, piously, and purely. Next, may I engage in the study of wisdom and the Muses, and of all else that promotes the use and education of the mind. Here may I hear no trumpets or bugles, nor see the crows of the court or market. Rather may I live moderately and peacefully, for myself and with myself, free from ambition and pale cares'; cited in Mark Morford, 'The Stoic Garden', *Journal of Garden History* 7 (1987), pp. 151-175 (p. 164). The article discusses thoroughly the Stoic connotations of the garden and Lipsius's uses of it.


12 Cf. Lipsius's powerful metaphor of God as a farmer cultivating his field (the world); *Constantia* (II, 11), p. 157.
explains, Italy, Germany, Britain and France are either experiencing the same menace or they are about to in the near future. The dialogue concludes with a further exhortation to constancy and the exclamation of the young Lipsius: 'I haue escaped the euill and found the good'.

ii. *Politica*

Of the most frequently quoted extracts from Lipsius's correspondence is the part where he mentions how out of all his works, he valued the *Constantia* and the *Politica* most, and that he considered that they would last as long as Latin letters. The *Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex Qui ad Principatum Maxime Spectant* (Leiden, 1589) matched indeed the success of the *Constantia*.

It is useful briefly to place side by side the two works. It can be observed from the outset that the *Politica*, in contrast to its predecessor's form of a dialogue, is composed as a treatise in the fashion of 'mirror for princes' literature; the author, thus, does not use in this case another persona to convey his views. What is most extraordinary about the composition of this political treatise is that it consists of a compilation of quotations of ancient texts, a 'learned and laborious tissue' (docte et laborieux tissue), as Montaigne described it. Lipsius is in this manner demonstrating his exceptional knowledge of classical writers by sewing together their words in order to create a new text. According to a contemporary criticism however, this

13 *Constantia* (II, 26), p. 199.
14 *Constantia* (II, 27), p. 201.
17 In the text itself the quotations by other authors were printed in italics; this is also preserved in the English edition of 1594, although the quotations here are translated from the original language. In the two French editions of 1590 and 1594, however, this is obscured: there are no italics in the citations and these are translated in French. For an interesting interpretation of the purpose behind Lipsius's construction of his text as a commonplace book and as an example of the possibility to maintain an equilibrium between unity and multiplicity see Ann Moss, *Vision
Juste Lips (1547-1606) was a perceptive author who recorded from studying the acquired citations. It has been observed that, in fact, a quarter of all the citations comes from the works of Tacitus. Having completed the 'final' and 'definitive' edition of the Histories and the Annals four years earlier (1585), Lipsius then turned to write a book with political observations founded on the hindsight he acquired from studying the Roman historian. Tacitus was acknowledged as a perceptive author who recorded all the ghastly details of political life:

[Tacitus] presents kings and monarchs to you — in a word, the theatre of our life today. I see in one place a ruler attacking the laws and constitution, and in another subjects rebelling against the ruler. I find the ways and means of destroying liberty; I find ill-fated efforts to recover lost liberty. I read in turn of tyrants overthrown and laid low; I read of power insecure when wielded to excess. I read too of the evils of liberty restored, disorder, rivalry between colleagues, greed, looting, wealth acquired from the people, not for the people. Tacitus, good God!, is a great and useful writer. He should be in the hands of those in whose hands are the rudder and tiller of the state...20

And this is what Lipsius did in the Politica; he made the lessons from Tacitus available to the Princes of his age, to whom the work is dedicated. This marks another distinction from the De Constantia; whereas the latter is intended for subjects, the former's planned audience, as set out in the Epistle to the reader, is the Emperor,

18 Cf. Gerrit Voogt, ‘Primacy of Individual Conscience or Primacy of the State? The Clash between Dirk Volckeretz Coornhert and Justus Lipsius’s, Sixteenth Century Journal 28 (1997), pp. 1231-49: in his last work, a reply to Lipsius’s De Une Religione Coornhert accused the latter of hiding behind his quotations and disavowing their obvious message; ‘If you have a different opinion [i.e. from the quotations], Coornhert enquires Lipsius, ‘then why don’t you write it? or do you lack the learning, artifice, and words straightforwardly to state your opinion?’ (p. 1246).
19 Mark Morford, ‘Tacitean Prudentia and the Doctrines of Justus Lipsius’s in T.J. Luce & A.J. Woodman (eds.), Tacitus and the Tacitean tradition. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 142. Cf. the dedicatory epistle, where he clearly states his preference for Tacitus, explaining that this was because of Tacitus’ intelligence (prudence) and because he had more material than all the other authors; Opera Omnia IV, 16.
Kings and Princes. The *Politica*, therefore, dealt with the 'mysteries of state', or *arcana imperii*, which were in a sense, exchanged in confidence between theorists of politics. The trend in the early modern period to use history as a means of writing commentaries on contemporary political life has long been observed by historians. Tacitus's use originally came about as an alternative to Cicero, who had been the favourite source of reference of the Renaissance authors; since the early 1570's, however, with the change of the political atmosphere humanists began to be drawn to the more pragmatic Tacitus. This shift to the use of Tacitus, as has been

---

21 Epistle to the Reader ('Imperator, Reges, Principes'); *Opera Omnia*, IV, 5-7. I have primarily used the English translation of 1594, but cross-referenced it with the edition of the *Opera Omnia* (1637) and the French of 1590. Significantly, the English translation is based on the original – as the French is – while the one reprinted in *Opera Omnia* is the revised edition of 1586. See also p. 54, note 217, below. Unless otherwise stated, all my references are to Sixe Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jones (London: Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonby, 1594); reprinted by Da Capo Press, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam and New York, 1970), henceforth referred to as *Politica*.


23 Cf. Montaigne (III, 8), 'On the art of conversation': 'I have just read through one go Tacitus' *History* [...] I know of no author who combines a chronicle of public events with so much reflection on individual morals and biases. And it appears to me [...] that, as he has the particular task of following the careers of contemporary Emperors [...] as well as the noteworthy deeds which they provoked in their subjects above all by their cruelty, he has a more striking and interesting topic to relate and discourse upon than if he had to tell of battles and world revolutions [...]. This manner of history is by far the most useful. The unrolling of public events depends more on the guiding hand of Fortune: that of private ones, on our own. Tacitus' work is more a judgement on historical events than a narration of them. There are more precepts than accounts. It is not a book to be read but one to be studied and learnt. It is so full of aphorisms that, apposite or not, they are everywhere. It is a seed-bed of ethical and political arguments to supply and adorn those who hold high rank in the governing of this world. He pleads his case with solid and vigorous reasons, in an epigrammatic and exquisite style following the affected manner of his century. [...] Tacitus can more properly [than Seneca] serve a sickly troubled nation like our own is at present: you could often believe that we were the subject of his narrating and berating'; in Screech, *The Essays of Michel de Montaigne*, pp. 1065-6.
suggested, also denoted a special emphasis on the depravity of politics and the
prominence of reality and experience over theory and ideal.\footnote{24}

Lipsius’s purpose in the \textit{Politica}, thus, is to instruct the reader in civil life.\footnote{25} As
an introduction, accordingly, the whole of Book One is devoted to the discussion of
the general (moral) principles of politics: prudence and virtue are ascribed by Lipsius
as the guides to civil life. Prudence is the special virtue that Lipsius associates with
civil life and political affairs – and it is, in a sense, equated with virtue a number of
times; at other points, however, Lipsius notes its primacy over virtue.\footnote{26} The Flemish
scholar differentiates between domestic and civil prudence and traces the sources of
this practical virtue in use and memory. The concept of prudence and its relation
with the other virtues are issues that we will return to anon.

The Second Book of the \textit{Politica} deals with government in general. Lipsius
demonstrates his preference for the Principality as the ideal form of government and
shows that the purpose of kingdoms is their own preservation and continuation.\footnote{27}
Similarly, the Prince’s actions ought to have as their prime objective the benefit of his
subjects. Later in Book Two Lipsius touches upon the princely qualities, such as
justice, clemency, modesty, but pointing especially to the two guides of civil life,
prudence and virtue.\footnote{28}

Books Three and Four are entirely devoted to the analysis of princely
prudence, which is distinguished from that of the ordinary people. Lipsius explains
that prudence is twofold, from ourselves and from others; a Prince, therefore, is in
need of assistance, which would come in the form of counsellors and ministers.\footnote{29} The
rest of the Third Book, hence, discusses the duties and qualities prerequisite of
counsellors and ministers, features to be avoided, and how the Prince ought to
conduct his advisors. Interestingly, it concludes with some recommendations from

\footnote{24}This is the central thesis of Viroli, \textit{From Politics to Reason of State}.\footnote{25} \textit{Politica} (I, 1), p. 1.\footnote{26} \textit{Politica} (I, 7), p. 11.\footnote{27} Cf. Tuck, \textit{Philosophy and Government}, where he talks about the Stoically-inspired notion of
preservation and he associates it with the political notion of preservation of the state; pp. 51, 62-3
and 92.\footnote{28} Cf. Seneca, \textit{De Clementia}.\footnote{29} \textit{Politica} (III, 2), p. 43.
Lipsius himself to counsellors and ministers, on how to survive the evils and machinations of court life, advising, above all, constancy.  

The Fourth Book is probably the most commented upon part of the *Politica*, as it contains Lipsius’s views on the role of religion within a state and the rather controversial account of *mixed prudence*. The book opens with the bold statement that ‘proper’ – that is, princely – prudence can ‘hardly be tied to precepts’, it ‘extends very far’ and thus ‘no certain rules can be given of it’. In his favourite manner, Lipsius divides princely prudence into civil and military; civil, in turn, is again separated into human and divine concerns. In relation to the latter, Lipsius puts forth the position that in order to maintain peace and unity in a state, only one creed should be observed. This view, as indicated above, was to be at the root of the controversy that arose between the Leiden scholar and Coornhert, and it is also crucial to our understanding of Lipsius’s stance on religious matters. The discussion on human prudence is centred on the author’s view of the nature of people, on how a Prince should attain the love of his people as a means to authority and stability, and how this authority and stability ought to be safeguarded against conspiracies and treason. The book concludes with reference to *mixed prudence* that is accepted for the Prince to use. In the account of mixed prudence, Lipsius famously distinguishes three levels of deception and crucially, he accepts – even recommends – some use of deception on behalf of the Prince when the benefit of the state requires it; it was statements such as these that gained him the title of a Machiavellian, as we will see later.

Military prudence, the other part of princely prudence is the subject of the Fifth Book of the *Politica*. As a recent commentator has pointed out, one could well imagine Book Five being published as a separate book. The author deems military

---

30 *Politica* (III, 11), pp. 56-8.
31 *Politica* (IV, 1) in the title; p. 59.
32 *Politica* (IV, 2), pp. 61-3. Cf. for example the famous quotation on p. 62: ‘One religion is the author of vnite; and from a confused religion there always groweth dissention’.
33 The discussion of mixed prudence occupies the chapters (IV, 13-14); pp. 112-123.
prudence necessary for a Prince, as the way to defend and preserve his kingdom. In this section Lipsius defines the essentials of lawful warfare and war; the book concludes with a general 'earnest exhortation to peace'.

The last book of the *Politica* (Book Six) is especially dedicated to the subject of the civil wars, as another area under the jurisdiction of military prudence. This is a critical concern for the author, as is obvious from the frequent references to the devastation of his time and the prayer for peace at the end of Book Five. Lipsius treats, thus, the miseries of the civil wars, their causes, as well as, significantly, the conduct that an honest man should follow in case public calamities do break out: the author advises him to abstain from taking sides. The Book concludes with an account of the ending of civil wars and the reiteration that their outbreak ought to be resisted at all costs.

---

37 *Politica* (VI, 6), p. 206 (wrongly numbered as 106).
Appendix IV

Justus Lipsius’s Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex:
Changes in IV, 4 (on religious dissent)


CAPVT IV


Secvnda Quæstio est, de his qui in Religione peccant priuatiim. Ecce labes errorum in meā mente, sed neminem maculo: quiesco domi & sileo. Hicne talis etiam puniendus? Non videtur. Tacere licet, nulla libertas minor
A rege petitur.
Fortasse nec nımis inquirendus. nam qui bono? Nemo rex perinde animis imperare potest, ac linguìs.
Mentium rex, Deus est.
Itaque terrore illo, hoc saltem efficies, vt vultu, qui maximè servit, asuentuatur.
Numquam corde. Quis enim imponat mihi necessitatem vel credevi quod nolim, vel quod velim non credendi?
Nihil tam voluntarium, quàm Religion: in quâ si animus auersus est, iam sublata, iam nulla est.
Fictiones ea res inducit. & Purpureae cultures aliquot efficies, non Dei.
Bene olim rex Theodericus: Religionem imperare non possimus, quà nemo cogitatur vt credit iniitum.
Quanto mitior & tutior via altera, Docendi ac Ducendi! Fides suadenda est, non imperanda.
Ingienia nostra, vt nobiles & generosi equi, melius facili fræno reguntur.
Europam hanc cogitatione peragra. videbis acerbis istis iudiciis vastari magis ciidtates, quàm corrigi.
Ita profectó est. Tolluntur hæc talia quæ sensibus insident, docendo magis quàm iubendo, monendo quàm minando.
In fidibus siquid discrepat, non abrumpis per iracundiam, sed paullatim reducis ad concentum: in Fide cur non idem fit? & peccata sic compescis, vt sint quos pecasse pœniteat?
Atque hi tales, sæpe meliores. Multò firmior est Fides, quam reponit pœnitentia.
Quod ò benigne & miserator Deus (nam voto & suspirio locum hunc claudio) da nobis: & efficie vt multitudinis credentium sit cor vnum, & anima vna.

CAPVT IV

An puniendi singuli, & quieti? item que an extrahendi & perquirendi? Neutrum (si intenti quidem fiat) ex vsu videri. Doctore primim his opus, non tortore.

Secvnda Quæstio est, de his qui in Religione peccant priuatim. Ecce labes errorum in meà mente, sed neminem maculo: quiesco domi & sileo. Hicne talis etiam puniendus? De quietis temporibus, non disputo: de turbidis, ambigo. & interdum illa valeant,

Tacere diceat, nulla libertas minor
A rege petitur.
Nemo rex perinde animis imperare potest, ac linguis.

Mentium rex, Deus est.
Sanènimio aut intempestiuo terrore quid efficitur? vt vultu, qui maximè seruit, assentiatur. Corde minimè. Quis enim imponat mihi necessitatem vel credi quod nolim, vel quod velim non credendi?

Fictiones ea res inducit. & fortasse Purpuræ tuae cultures aliquot efficies, non Dei. Vide ne, in statu simili, tutior via altera, docendi ac ducendi. Fides suadenda est, non imperanda.

Ingenia nostra, vt nobiles & generosi eque, melièris facili fræno reguntur.
Et errantem per agros ignorantiae viae, melius est ad rectum iter adjungere, quàm expellere.
Ita profectò est. Tolluntur hæc tali que sensibus insident, docendo magis quàm iubendo, monendo quàm minando.

In sidibus siquid discrepat, non abrumpis statim, sed paullatim reducis ad concentum: in Fide cur non idem fit? & peccata sic compescis, vt sint quos pecasse penìtèat?

Atque hi tales, sæpe meliores. Multiè firmior est Fides, quàm reponit peccavit.
Eti Pæna etiam sæpe repòsitus. & lentis tepidis que animis quoq cohaeritio quieta non suasit, minax subitò terror extorsit.

Sed quid Tempora, quid etiam Pietas poscat, Princeps videto: id que de piorum sententiïa. Tu ò benignæ & miserær Deus (nam voto & suspìrio locum hunc claudo) diuisa hæc iunge; & effice, vt multitudìnus credendentium sit cor vnum, & anima vna.

352
Appendix V

Citations from Chapter Two

Unless stated otherwise, the quotations below are taken from Lipsius's *Two Bookees of Constancie*, trans. Sir John Stradling (London: Richard Johnes, 1594); eds. Rudolf Kirk and Clayton Morris Hall (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 1939), and his *Sixe Bookees of Politickes or Civil Doctrine*, trans. William Jones (London: Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonby, 1594); referred to as *Constantia* and *Politica* respectively. The first number refers to the page, and the second to the footnote.

109, 53: Here is how Lipsius opens the scene for the dialogue to follow: 'A fewe yeares past, as I travelled towards Vienna in Austrich, I turned aside (not without Gods direction) to the towne of Liege, being not far out of my way ... [had some friends]. Among whom was Charles Langius, a man (simplie and without boasting be it spoken) for vertue and for learning the chiefe of the Flemmings ... he was the man that opened mine eyes by driewing away the clouds of some vulgare opinions'; *Constantia*, p. 71.

109, 55: '...To whom [Langius] when I had spoken much of the troubles of the Low-countries, of the insolencie of the gouernours and soldiers, I added lastly that I pretended other excuses, but this in trueth was the cause of my departure. For (said I) who is of so hard and flinty a heart that he can anie longer endure these euils? wee are tossed, as you see, these manie yeares with the tempest of ciuill warres: and like Sea-faring men are wee beaten with sundrie blastes of troubles and sedition. If I loue quietnesse and rest, the Trumpets and ratling of armour interrupt me. If I take solace in my countrey gardens and farmes, the soldiers and murtherers force mee into the Towne. Therefore (Langius) I am resolued, leauing this infortunate and vnhappie Belgica (pardon mee my deare Countrie) to change Land for land, and to flie into some other part of the world... For, to see and suffer these thinges daylie as heretofore, I cannot, Langius, neither haie I anie plate of steele about my heart. ...' *Constantia*, pp. 71-2.

109, 56: 'O fonde youngling, what childishnes is this? Or what mindest thou to seeke safetie by flying away? Thy countrey (I confesse) is tossed and tormoyled grievously: What part of Europe is at this day free? [...] Wherefore (Lipsius) thou must not forsake thy countrey, but thy affections'; *Constantia*, p. 72.

111, 64: 'Beware here, least OPINION beguile thee, presenting vnto thee in stead of Patience ... But vertue keepeth the meane, not suffering any excess or defect in her actions, because it weigheth all things in the ballance of REASON, making it the rule and squire of all her trials. Therefore we define RIGHT REASON to be, A true sense and judgement of thinges humane and divinie. But OPINION (being the contrarie to it) is defined to be, A false and friuolous coniecture of those thinges.'; *Constantia* (I, 4), pp. 79-80.
111, 65: 'But the true mother of Constancie is PATIENCE, and lowlinesse of mind, which is *A voluntarie sufferance without grudging of all things whatsoever can happen to, or in a man*'; *Constantia* (I, 4), p. 79.

113, 69: 'Thou sayest thou canst not endure to see these public miseries, that it is a grief, yea euen a death vnto thee. Speak you that from your heart, or oneli from the teeth outward? ... I speake in good earnest for that many of your crue doe beguile the physitians, making them beleue that the publike euilles doe grieue them, when their priuate losses are the true cause. I demaund therefore againe, whether the care which now doth boile and bubble in thy breast, be for thy countries sake or for thy own? ... You *play a Comedy*, and vnder the person of your country, you bewail with tears your priuate miseries...'; *Constantia* (I, 8), pp. 88-9 (my italics).

113, 70: Cf. *Constantia* (I, 9), p. 91: 'Wherefore (Lipsius) take away these stage-hanginges, draw backe the curtain that is afore thee, and without all counterfeiting or dissimulation avs vs with the true cause of thy sorrow'; and (I, 7), p. 87: [Langius:] 'See how thy country of Belgica [Flanders] is afflicted with sundrie calamities, and swunged on every side with the scrotchinge flame of ciuill warres ... Are thou not grieu herewith? Yes, I am sure, and grieu diuerslie, for thy self, for thy countrymen, and for thy countrey. Thy owne losses trouble thee: the miserie and slaughter of thy neighbours: the calamitie and ouerthrow of thy countrie'...

115, 76: 'It is a strange thing that thou canst not tame, and bring wild beasts into subiection, without certeine handling and art, and doest thou imagine to get the upper hand of man?...there is no living creature more stubborne, nor that requireth to be handled with greater skill...It is more easie to govern all other living creatures, than man. We ought therefore to use prudence...'; *Politica* (III, 1), pp. 41-2.

133, 129: 'But thou young man, if thou be aduised by me, shalt stand to it, and set sure footing against this thy aduersarie SOROW. Aboue all things it behoueth thee to be CONSTANT: For by fighting many hath gotten the victory, but none by flying.'; *Constantia* (I, 3), p. 78.

133, 131: 'There bee two thinges that doe assault this Castle of Constancie in vs, FALSE GOODS, and FALSE EVILS. I define them both to bee, *Such thinges as are not in vs, but about vs: And which properlie doe not helpe nor hurte the inner man, that is, the minde*.... From these two rootes doe spring foure principall affections which doe greatly disquiet the life of man. DESIRE and IOY: FEARE and SORROW ... Al of them doe hurt and distemper the mind, and without timely precaution doe bring it out of al order: yet not each of them in like sort. For whereas the quietnesse and constancie of the minde resteth, as it were, in an euuen balance, these affections do hinder this vpright poise and euennesse: Some of them by puffing vp the minde, others by pressing it downe too much ...'; *Constantia* (I, 7), p. 85.
134, 137: '...none of all these things trouble my braine. I am guarded and fenced against all external things, and settled within my selfe, carelesse of all cares saue one, which is, that I may bring in subiection this broken and distressed mind of mine to RIGHT REASON [and GOD], and subdue all humane and earthly things to my MIND'; Constantia (II, 3), p. 137.

135, 138: 'Thou therefore in loosing the raynes thus to thy sorrowe, and grudging that thy countrey is so turned and ouer-turned, considerest not what thou art, and against whome thou complaignest. What art thou? A man, a shadowe, dust: Against whom doest thou fret? I fear to speak it, euen against GOD'; Constantia (I, 14), p. 104.

135, 141: 'I come to the Stoickes my friends (for I professe to hold that sect in estimation and account) who were the authors of VIOLENT FATE...'; Constantia (I, 18), p. 115. Cf. also p. 117: 'I doe in good earnest give this commendation to the Stoickes, that no other sect of Philosophers auowed more the maiesty and prouidence of God, nor drewe men neerer to heauenlie and eternall things'.

136, 144: 'How can it be (say they) if God foresawe it that I should sinne, and his foresight cannot be deceived, but that I doe sinne necessarily? Foole! Who denieth it? Thou sinnest necessarily, and yet of thine owne free-will. Forsooth thus much did God foresee, that thou shouldest sinne in such sort as he foresaw, but he saw that thou shouldest sinne freeli, therefore thou sinnest freely and necessarily.'; Constantia (I, 20), p. 122.

140, 160: '[internal] is that, which conceaueth in the heart, and yttereth from the hart; praiers, praise, and thanksgiving vnto God: the latter [external] is that, which expresseth the same things, but by certaine rights and gestures'; Politica (I, 3), p. 4.

140, 161: '... least the people fall to superstitition, which is an viter enemy to religion ... Neither doe great ones hinder this, because they are certainly persuaded, nothing hath more force to range the multitude in better order then superstition, which we ought to eschew and avoid, for after it hath once ceased on our hearts, we are never at rest, this difference being betweene religion and superstition, that the religious person doth loue God, the superstitious dreadeth him'; Politica (I, 3), p. 5.

142, 166: '... and that according to the ancient custome, for it is the part of a wise man, to maintain the lawes of his Ancestors, by observing their holy ceremonies.... '; Politica (IV, 2), p. 62.

143, 169: 'The second question ariseth, concerning those who do offend priuately in matter of religion. As for example, such a one his mind is corrupt with errors, but he infecteth no man therewith, he is quiet and silent at home. Whether is he to be punished, or no? It seemeth he ought not. [... ] No Prince can rule the mindes in like sort as he may the tongs of men. God is the king of mens minds. [...] he who doth most of all seeme to be
obedient, doth in outward show consent [...] There is nothing more free then religion ...'; Politica (IV, 4), p. 65.
Appendix VI

Paolo Sarpi's *Historia del Concilio Tridentino* (1619):

The Subject Matter

It is clear enough from the outset of the work that Sarpi wanted to challenge the official Roman version of the Council: the Acts of Trent had not been published for everyone to see what had transpired in that Synod, and various sides had particular reservations about the way things were conducted in the Council.38 Sarpi, who was more than anyone else a convinced opponent of Rome, and had faced the real implications of the outcome of Trent would not let the deceit about the proceedings continue for any longer. His text was thus an exposition of the 'real' and 'definitive' version of the story of Trent.

Sarpi's declaration at the beginning of his *History* is plain enough in maintaining this: 'My purpose is to write the History of the Council of Trent'; he justified his undertaking by asserting there had not appeared so far a study to adequately relate the causes and the events of the Council.

I wil relate the causes and managings of an Ecclesiasticall Convocation, by some, for diuers ends, and by diuers meanes procured and hastened, by some hindered and deferred for the space of 22. yeeres: and for 18. yeeres more, sometimes assembled, sometimes dissolved, alwayses celebrated with diuers intentions, and which hath gotten a forme and conclusion contrary altogether to the deseigne of them that procured it, and to the feare of those, that with all diligence disturbed it; a cleere instruction for vs to referre our selues to God, and not to trust in the wisedome of man.39

Sarpi thus dissect the history of the Council for the reader; he narrates the twofold story of what for him was the 'catastrophe' of the Council; the failure of the reform movement at Trent was in his view directly linked with the controversy and the conflict

38 Cf. *History*, p. 136: 'It is a new opinion, and seldom practiced, though established in Trent, that the Decrees only are called Acts of the Council, and ought only to be published; but in the ancient Councils all was given unto all. ...'

that dominated the whole undertaking, the corruption and the behind-the-scenes intrigue, all of which he compellingly exposes.

For this Council desired and procured by godly men, to reunite the Church which began to be divided, hath so established the Schisme, and made the parties so obstinate, that the discords are become irreconciliable: and being managed by Princes for reformation of Ecclesiasticall discipline, hath caused the greatest deformation that euer was since Christianity did begin... and hoped for by the bishops ....

The story of the Council in itself, however, does not start but halfway through the second of the eight books of the work. The first book Sarpi devotes to setting the scene where the drama will unfold - the 'Iliad' of his age as he calls it, conscious of the significance of the subject and the complexity of his narrative. Book One consists of an overview, thus, of the situation that led to the summons of the Council; beginning with an account of the Roman Church at the turn of the sixteenth century, Sarpi deals with Luther's protest and its aftermath, and renders all the political intricacies that dominated the long wait of almost twenty-eight years to the eventual convocation of the Council in 1545. To follow the text more closely, the exposition of the author's intention and the primary questions are followed by an account of the role of the Councils. Sarpi explains how it had been an 'ancient custome in the Church of Christ to compose the differences of Religion and to reforme the corrupted discipline, by the conuocation of Synods'. He points out that the Councils acquired their universal character with the establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the state under the Emperor Constantine; he recognises, moreover, the coincidence of Empire and Christianity as the reason behind the authority of the Roman Emperor to convoke the Councils, as 'the spread of the religion' tended to cause more extensive divides. He explains how the meaning of the term 'ecumenical' further lost its significance with the separation of the Eastern and Western Empires, as the latter ascribed the title to 'vnitie and communion of those Kingdomes and States' which obeyed the Pope 'in causes Ecclesiasticall'. According to the Servite, the nature of these summonings had changed over the years as well:

---

40 *History*, p. 2
41 *History*, p. 2.
And the assembling of these hath beene continued, not to appease the dissensions about Religion principally, as before, but either to make warre in the Holy-land, or to compose Schisms and diuisions of the Church of Rome or else for controversies betweene the Bishops and Christian Princes.42

Sarpi then goes on to claim, that around 1600 no reasons deemed urgent enough to call for a Council, despite the various problems throughout the sixteenth century and complaints 'against the greatnesse of the Court'; this is an expedient way to refer to most of the criticisms raised against the Church: he talks thus about the troubles in Bohemia, about Jan Hus, the contest between Louis XII and Pope Julius II, the French King's excommunication, and the consequent dangers of a new Schism.43

The imperiousness of the Roman Court was made especially plain with the corruption of Popes such as Julius II (della Rovere, 1502-13).44 Luther's revolt, Sarpi attributes precisely to the overall corruption of the Papacy; he associates it specifically, however, to the issue of Indulgences at the time of Leo X (de'Medici, 1513-21). Of noble descent and educated in the humanities, Leo would have been a Pope 'absolutely complete', Sarpi sarcastically comments, had he also had some knowledge on things related to religion, and some more propensity towards piety. Leo's liberal spending, his nepotism and patronage of the arts was already a cause of disapproval, when he on top 'thought fit to serue himself of that of Indulgences', as 'other fountaines' from where the Court of Rome was usually drawing money had 'dried vp'.45 Sarpi argues that the Curia was also responsible for not handling Luther's protestation effectively – in fact, according to the Venetian it was the Pope's defenders who turned the disputation into an argument on the Pope's authority.46 Luther claimed in response that the Pope was inferior to a lawfully called general Council and called for one to resolve the problems.47 On the other hand, Leo was accused by ecclesiastics of negligence and for

42 History, p. 3.
43 History, p. 3.
44 History, p. 3.
45 History, p. 4.
46 History, pp. 6-7.
47 History, pp. 6-8. Skinner points out that the leaders of the Lutheran movement were quick to associate themselves with the earlier critics of papal authority. It was in this context that Luther called for a Council; his appeal was published in the form of a tract, The Appeal of Martin Luther to a Council (November 1520); Foundations of Modern Political Thought, p. 47.
not using ‘powerfull remedies’ in ‘so great dangers’. In this manner the idea of the need of a Council resurfaced as the place where the controversy with Luther might be decided, together with abuses, ‘long since brought into the church’. ‘Godly’ and ‘well disposed men’, came thus to realise, according to the author, that at the root of the innovations in the German Lands were the Church abuses and the negligence of the pastors.

Sarpi’s penetrating narrative identifies at this point the various interest groups expecting to take advantage of a possible Council for their own ends. As he tells us, Luther’s followers expected that in the Council not only would they be able to defend their doctrine, but they would also be able to get it approved. Another substantial group, that of the secular princes, were hoping that the Council would reduce the many temporal jurisdictions the priests had usurped and ensure their return to the secular princes. ‘The meaner sort’ on the other hand, ‘though they had not much knowledge of the affairs of the world’ desired the moderation of the ecclesiastical authority that repressed them in the form of taxes, corrections and sentences. Finally, the Court of Rome, evidently the most interested party in question, wanted to restore obedience to the Pope, his authority having been under attack for many years before Luther’s assault. A Council, nonetheless, was not an easy enterprise, as Sarpi was very well aware. The author stresses that the first and foremost obstacle was the unwillingness of the Papacy and of the Roman Court in general. He does not tire repeating, that since a Council would have the authority to reform the Papacy, it was a prospect that was abhorred in Rome: a Council would ultimately mean the removal of a great part of the Curia’s income. As a result, the problem of convening a Council turned, as Sarpi points out, into a matter of shrewd diplomacy; it took, as he tells us, a Pontiff unfamiliar with the Curial affairs to admit the Church’s responsibility for the uprising

49 History, p. 13.
50 History, p. 18.
51 History, pp. 18-9.
52 The Pope’s difficult position is described in a splendid passage, History, p. 19.
53 Cf. History, pp. 18-9; also pp. 23-4 and p. 29.
in Germany. 54 The rise of his successor to the See of Rome, however, Clement VII (de' Medici, 1523-34) marked a dramatic change in conciliatory policy. Clement had a distinct aversion towards councils, chiefly because his claim to the Pontifical throne might have been challenged through a council, both because of questions of his lineage, as well as due to allegations of simony during his election. 55 Clement, as depicted by Sarpi was the embodiment of everything that was wrong with the Papacy: a considerably princely Pope, entangled in family politics and worldly preoccupations, he displayed very little concern for the spiritual problems of the Church.56 In addition to these, the author draws attention to the very crucial question of jurisdiction: under whose authority was it to call for a Council, the Pope, the Emperor or even the Cardinals. In this fashion, Sarpi shows how the issue of the convocation became the subject of manipulation in the struggles between the Pope and the Emperor. The Council was a real urgent matter for Charles in his desire to pacify the Empire, so in the face of Rome's reluctance the Emperor exerted as much pressure as would eventually secure a General Synod of the Church, even by threatening that he would assemble it himself or by enlisting the assistance of the College of the Cardinals. 57 The remainder of Book One, thus, is devoted to the endless political manoeuvres of struggles for and

54 Adrian IV (Dedel, 1522-3) was the Pope who finally admitted the Church's responsibility for the Reformation in Germany. Sarpi explains that he believed that the differences between Luther's followers and the Catholic Church were not of a doctrinal nature, but rather of a jurisdictional nature. Sarpi, however, makes only too clear that his sincerity and perhaps innocence were because of his foreign origin (he was from Utrecht); he describes him, moreover, as a devout and ascetic prelate, a strike contrast to the Italian Popes. (History, p. 20) Adrian's admittance was not received well by the Curia (History, p. 29). His successor, Clement VII (de' Medici) 'being skilfull in the knowledge of negotiations, hee saw clearly that Pope Adrian contrary to the stile of wise Popes, was too facill, as in confessing the defects of the Court, so in promising the reformation'; History, p. 30.

55 Cf. History, p. 42.

56 See for example, History, pp. 45-6; Jedin concurs to this view, writing about Clement that he 'became wholly tied up in politics', while his thoughts were almost exclusively determined by the categories of Italian dynastic policies'. He suggests, moreover, that Clement considered it his duty to 'extricate the States of the Church from encirclement by the empire of the Habsburgs' who controlled Naples and Milan, as 'to secure the independence of the Holy See'; Jedin, History of the Council of Trent I, pp. 220-1; also Michael A. Mullet, The Catholic Reformation (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 32.

57 See Charles' promises in the Diet of Spira (1526) to secure a Council (History, p. 35) and his letter to the College of Cardinals exhorting to call one themselves (History, pp. 40-1).
against a Council. Sarpi treats the debate on Imperial Diets as part of this same struggle, stressing Rome’s anxiety that no discussions on religious questions should take place in them, in contrast to the Emperor’s wishes, who laboured for anything that would provide some solution to the problems in his lands. Last but not least, Sarpi refers to what seemed to complicate matters even more for Charles (and for a Council), the Habsburg-Valois war, pronounced by Francis I, to the delight of the Pope.58

The scene for what is going to follow is thus set in the First Book; Sarpi makes explicit that these inherent problems in the leading up to the Council would not be properly resolved in the course of the work, prescribing in a somewhat determinist manner the ultimate failure of the Council. Following the same pattern of paying equal attention to the religious and political affairs, Book Two narrates two parallel stories, of the developments both within and outwith the Council. With the opening of the Council in Book Two, all the aforementioned difficulties become apparent: the location of the Synod, for instance, and the fact that it was assembled under the auspices of the Pope ran against the requests of the Protestants, who pleaded for a 'free, Christian Council' in the German Lands.59 Similarly, that the Papal Legates appeared not to have specific orders as to the manner in which to proceed in the Council reflects both the indecisiveness on the sort of Council Trent was intended to be, as well as the fact that for Paul III the Council was not of primary concern.60 The question, moreover, of whether the Council represented the ‘universal’ Church was a matter of debate at the opening sessions, giving us a pre-taste of debates with strong conciliar resonances that occurred regularly among the prelates. Similar disagreements in the opening stages as to what issue would be discussed first, reformation or doctrine, manifested the contrasting views between the Holy See and Charles as to Trent’s purpose.61 Moreover, after the initial discussions on residence, plurality of benefices and some theological issues - on which, as the Friar marks clearly, very few delegates had the appropriate

58 History, p. 102.
59 The request runs throughout the work; cf. for example History, pp. 27, 33, 61, 149.
60 Cf. History, p. 111, also p. 133 and p. 146.
61 Cf. for example History, pp. 138-43; 144-5; 166; 188.
learning in order to resolve\textsuperscript{62} - the picture of the dissent and disarray in the Council that Sarpi draws, is particularly lucid. \textsuperscript{63}

Book Two concludes with the dramatic translation of the Council to Bologna, the author of which, Sarpi was convinced, was the Pope. In the text the Pope comes to the decision seeing a double situation; on the one hand the potential dangers arising out of the debates in the Council and on the other, what Sarpi insists that really mattered for him,\textsuperscript{64} namely, Charles’ successes in Germany, against the Schmalkaldic League. \textsuperscript{65}

Under a ridiculous pretence then, the Legates presented the reasons for a transfer of the Council to Bologna, confirming to everyone the complete control of the Council by Rome. \textsuperscript{66} The translation was inevitable, even with the strong reaction from the Imperialist party. \textsuperscript{67}

Book Three depicts the stalemate of the situation of the Council and the intensification of the conflict between Charles and Paul III. Sarpi describes the Emperor’s eager attempts to reassemble the Council, his crushing victory over the Lutherans and the composition of the Interim of Augsburg. The territorial struggle between the two heads of Christendom takes on another turn with the alliance between the Pope and Henri II, which Paul III instigates as a counterbalance. \textsuperscript{68}

The alliance falls out, however, in Book Four under the new Pope Julius III (del Monte, 1550-5) with the serious implications for the Council’s status, as the French King declares that he does not recognise it neither as general or free. \textsuperscript{69} In view of that, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Cf. \textit{History}, p. 163.
\item \textsuperscript{63} See the serious division of the Council with regard to the question of original sin (\textit{History}, pp. 172-81) and justification - by faith alone or not (\textit{History}, pp. 194-200). See also the incident on the publication on 2 separate and different books on the issue of free-will (\textit{History}, pp. 216 and 229-30); (\textit{History}, p. 216). Cf. also the disagreement between Franciscans and Dominicans about grace in Sacraments, and the efforts of the Legates to settle things; \textit{History}, pp. 237-8.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{History}, p. 144. See also p. 223.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Here is Sarpi’s account of how the Pope made the decision for the translation: \textit{History}, pp. 258-9.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Sarpi’s account of the translation is a masterpiece of sarcasm; \textit{History}, pp. 266-8.
\item \textsuperscript{67} \textit{History}, pp. 267-8.
\item \textsuperscript{68} \textit{History}, p. 272.
\item \textsuperscript{69} See Henri II’s letter (\textit{History}, p. 319) where he criticises the Council as being General or free, and that no safe access had been granted to Protestants in order to attend it. Henri suggests
\end{itemize}
Counsellors of Paris issue a ruling claiming that the decrees of the Council could not be binding to states that had not been present during the deliberations. Sarpi gives accounts of discussions taking place in Bologna, among what was left of the original congregation on issues such as the Eucharist, communion and the major issue of transubstantiation.

Yet the same Book features one of the most significant turning points in the course of the Council: the arrival - and departure - of the ambassadors of the Protestant Princes, the Duke of Wittenberg and Saxony. The situating of this event in such a central Book is, of course, not an accident and bears witness to Sarpi's meticulous arrangement of the work. The representatives of the Lutherans had been sent to the Council in accordance with the terms of their defeat to Emperor Charles. Sarpi illustrates the disappointment of this endeavour through the direct refusal of the Legates to let the ambassadors present their doctrine to the Council. He presents however some of the Lutherans' points - most of which are the author's as well - through an oration, in which the Lutherans request a reconsideration of safe-conduct, on the grounds that the divines of the Protestants were reluctant to appear in a Council where they were already regarded as 'heretics' and 'schismatics'. The oration also makes an appeal for the pronouncement of the Council's superiority to the Pope for the implementation of reform: as the Popes were responsible for the abuses and the hindering of reform, the assembly ought to be free of its dependence to the Court of Rome; in this vein, there ought to be a re-examination of Decrees already issued. In this context, the reader is not really surprised with the announcement of the final suspension of the Council by Julius III, under another excuse, this time about the looming Habsburg-Valois war. In Sarpi's view, it was in fact the Protestant presence that it was, instead, convened for the interests of particular parties - namely Charles V and Julius III.

70 History, p. 320.
71 History, pp. 355-371.
72 History, pp. 359-60. As the Legates make clear to them, the deputies would be required to accept the Papal Legates as presidents of the Council; this, of course, was in direct contrast to the assertions and the claims of the Lutherans: see History, p. 368.
73 History, p. 368.
74 History, pp. 375-6.
in the Council that had accelerated the Pope’s realisation that nothing beneficial would come out of it; the suspension ‘freed’ him ‘from many cares’. 75

Book Five, accordingly, marks another interval between sessions; the intended two-year postponement, however, resulted in a ten-year interruption, ‘verifying’, as Sarpi sarcastically observes, ‘the maxime of the Philosophers that the causes ceasing, the effects doe cease also’. 76 The first cause, according to the author, the hope that a Council would cure the ‘diseases of Christendome’ had been plainly disillusioned. The second cause Sarpi identified as the desire of Emperor Charles to subdue Germany ‘by means of religion’ and make the Empire hereditary and his son Philip (later Philip II of Spain) his heir. But after his plans met the resistance of his own family, Ferdinand and Maximilian, Charles abandoned all efforts to restore Catholicism in Germany and consequently any efforts for a Council. Sarpi reverts therefore to a political narrative, as the ten-year disruption of the Council marked a period of general unrest, both within the individual states as well as internationally, above all during the pontificate of Paul IV (Caraffa, 1555-59). The author refers to the conflicts and persecutions in England and France but also to the long-awaited Peace of Augsburg in Germany, a Peace, nonetheless, that was severely censured in Rome. Paul IV, a violent anti-Habsburg Pope,77 had no inclination in (re) convening the Council, and especially not in Trent. 78 Things seemed to take a more positive turn after the Peace Treaty of Cambray (Cateau-Cambrésis, 1559) between the Henri II and Philip II, one of which clauses was that the two monarchs would work together for the solution of the religious differences, the reformation of the Church and the celebration of the Council. 79 And indeed, as Sarpi

75 History, p. 381. Cf. also p. 315.
76 History, p. 381.
77 Significant, in this respect as Richard Bonney’s comments about Paul IV: ‘He claimed that Charles V had prompted heresy in order to crush the Papacy and make himself master of Rome, that is to say, master of Italy and the world’. And he adds later: ‘Though 79 at the time of his accession in May 1555 Paul IV was a man of astonishing energy. He could remember the time when Italy was free from “those heretics, schismatics, cursed of God, a race of Jews and Moors, the dregs of the world” – free, that is, from the Spaniards’; Richard Bonney, European Dynastic States: 1494-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 124 and 127. See also the not-so-sympathetic article (!) that is devoted to him in the New Catholic Encyclopaedia.
78 History, p. 399.
79 History, pp. 412-3.
spells out for the reader, it was ultimately the pressure from the temporal princes that made the next Pope, Pius IV (de’ Medici, 1559-65), consider the possibility of a Council. Sarpi puts great emphasis in the explosive situation in France during the minority of Francis II that dictated an urgent form of religious reconciliation, whether nationally or ‘internationally’. He demonstrates, moreover, that it was in the face of the possibility of a French National Synod, that the Pope convened one himself, for the second time in Trent. Such a beginning, however, as the author makes only too plain, left unresolved the key question of whether this would be a continuation of the earlier Council: contrary to the plans of the Spanish and the Curia, the French Crown and Emperor Ferdinand were categorically against a continuation, as this would cause the discontent of their Protestant subjects.

In Book Six we see the impact of that debate dominating the first sessions of the 1562 assembly, together with the ongoing religious unrest in France. As Sarpi establishes, however, it was in terms of ecclesiological questions that the new congregation caused the most problems to the Papacy: the discussion on the critical issue of Episcopal residence divided not only the prelates assembled, but the Papal legates as well. Things, in fact, turned even worse during the discussion of order and hierarchy: whether bishops were superior to priests, and whether this was according to divine or pontifical law. Sarpi makes the full implications of this matter plain to the reader: if the superiority of the bishops was de iure divino, it followed that bishops were

---

80 Sarpi writes that Pius IV initially opposed strongly the possibility of a Council as well. After deliberations, however, he reached to the conclusions that he could not do otherwise, especially since he could not openly refuse the convocation of a Council; History, p. 419.
82 Sarpi shows how the decision to call the Council in Trent was deliberate; the location would serve as reference to the Council of 1545-1552, but at the same time there was no clear announcement whether this would be a continuation or not; cf. History, p. 435: This of course caused the reaction of Princes (History, pp. 428, 441-3). Moreover, the problem appears repeatedly during the 1562-3 sessions, and it is not resolved even with the closure of the Council; cf. pp. 468, 505-7, 508, 689, 804, 819.
84 See for example History, pp. 496-7; 507-8.
equal to the Pope and that the Pope was nothing more than *primus inter pares*, severely damaging the Roman primacy.  

Book Seven traces the escalation of the dispute; Sarpi is ruthless in exposing all the manipulation the Legates employed in order to avert the situation; he demonstrates how they assigned the General of the Jesuits Laynez to give a special oration on the issue, and how they resolved, additionally, to postpone any subsequent sessions until the ‘heat was quenched’. That the situation would be exacerbated is augured by Sarpi’s frequent references to the impending arrival of the Cardinal of Lorraine. A formidable and astute prelate, of the powerful family of Guise, Lorraine was indeed an enemy to be reckoned with and was dreaded by both the Legates and the Pope. Unsurprisingly, with his arrival he assumed the position of the leader of the opposition party. Sarpi describes graphically the seriousness of the state of affairs in the Council, the impasse, the extensive uneasiness and the series of informal meetings between prelates - since formal sessions were not in order. Amidst the unrest and the stalemate some voices – particularly French – found opportunity to call for the proclamation of the superiority of the Council to the Pope, citing frequently the Councils of Constance and Basle. Yet Sarpi does not lose the thread of the conditions in France itself and the ongoing religious wars: the prelates at Trent were even more aggravated at the news of any truce there, questioning the authority of the French Crown to draw decrees on religious issues. The Seventh Book of the *History* comes thus to a strained conclusion with a double realisation on the part of the French Crown and the Emperor that nothing good can come out of the Council; Ferdinand’s conclusion, nonetheless, as the author asserts, was ‘facilitated’ by the secret negotiations between him and Morone, one of the newer Legates. Despite Sarpi’s admission that he could not have ascertained

---

85 *History*, p. 609.
86 As Sarpi makes clear, the Legates allowed Laynez, contrary to the principle, to speak for a whole session: cf. *History*, p. 609 and p. 610.
87 *History*, pp. 614-5; the Legates reached to the decision to postpone sessions, after Laynez’s discourse did not have the effect they had expected on the Prelates. Cf. p. 618.
88 Cf. *History*, pp. 557-9, 600-1, 603, 617; the Cardinal of Lorraine’s arrival is on p. 624.
the content of these negotiations, he is convinced that these negotiations amounted to the beginning of the ‘catastrophe’, the disastrous conclusion of the Council.  

Thus, having gravely pre-empted the end, Sarpi assigns to Book Eight the place of a long finale: a matching epilogue to an equally lengthy introduction of the History. Sarpi allocates, as the protagonist of the Council’s last stages, the Cardinal of Lorain, who fervently worked in bringing to a close in the best – namely, the most moderate and conciliatory – manner the remaining issues of the institution of the Bishops and residence, the authority of the Pope and the reformation of the Princes. Ironically, the conclusion of the Council is finally hastened by a sudden sickness of the Pope and the dreaded possibility of his death while the Council was still in session. Still, Sarpi points to a number of issues that the frenzied closure of the Council left unresolved. In this manner, he refers to the dispute concerning the decrees of the earlier Synod, to the reaction the Council’s outcome caused in Germany, the response of the Spanish King who had been offended by the closure of the Council, and lastly, the censures of the decrees in France, together with the condemnation of Lorrain’s conduct by the Parlement of Paris. The work closes with a final sarcastic note from Sarpi; he refers to the promotion of nineteen Cardinals of prelates who supported the Papal positions during the Council; it paid off to support the Apostolic See. He concludes the story of the Council, thus, with the ‘catastrophe’ that he had announced at the very beginning of the work. Through a carefully structured narrative, with great doses of sarcasm and detachment, Sarpi manages to bring to life the mesh that Trent had been, while offering, at the same time, a biting criticism towards the institution of the Papacy.

---

91 The dispute of whether the decrees of earlier session were to be read at the closing of the Council confirmed for Sarpi that the question of continuation had been left unanswered. Cf. p. 804.
Appendix VII

Council of Trent: The Reformation of Princes

A. The Proposed Articles of the Reformation, as recorded by Sarpi

That the Synode, besides the things constituted concerning Ecclesiastical persons, hath thought fit to correct the abuses of the Seculars, brought in against the immunitie of the Church, hoping that the Princes will be content, and cause due obedience to be rendred to the Clergie. And therefore it doth admonish them to cause their magistrates, officers and temporall Lords, to yeeld that obedience to the Pope and constitutions of the Councell, which themselves are bound to performe. And, for facilitation hereof, it doth renew some things decreed by the holy Canons, and Imperial lawes, in favour of Ecclesiastical immunitie, which ought to be observed vpon paine of Anathema.

1. That Ecclesiastical persons may not bee judged in a secular Court, howsoever there may bee doubt of the title of Clerke ship, or themselves consent, or haue renounced the things obtained, or for any cause whatsoever, though vsnder pretence of publike vtilitie, or service of the King, nor shall be proceeded against there, in cause of murder, if it bee not truly and properly a murder, and notoriously knowne, nor in other cases permitted by the law, without the declaration of the law going before.

2. That in causes spiritual, of matrimonie, heresie, patronage, beneficall, ciuill, criminall and mixt, belonging, in what manner soever, to the Ecclesiastical Court, as well ouer Persons, as ouer goodes, tithes, fourths, and other portions appertaining to the Church, or ouer beneficall Patrimonies, Ecclesiastical Fees, temporall jurisdiction of Churches, the temporall Judges shall not meddle, neither in the Petitorie nor in the Possessorie, taking away all appeale vpon pretence of justice denied, or as from an abuse, or because the things obtained are renounced: and those who shall haue recourse to the Secular magistrate, in the causes aforesaid, shall bee excommunicated, and depruied of their rights, belonging vnto them in these things. And this shall be observed also in causes depending in what instance soever.

3. That the Seculars shall not appoint Judges in causes Ecclesiastical, though they haue Apostolike authority, or a custome time out of mind: and the Clerkes who shall receive such Offices from the Laikes, though by vertue of any prouiledge whatsoever, shall bee suspended from their orders depruied of their Benefices, and offices, and made vncapeable of them.

4. That the Secular shall not command the Ecclesiastical Judge, not to excommunicate without licence, or to revoke or suspend the Excommunication denounced, nor forbid him to examine, cite and condemne, or to haue Sergeants, or Ministers for execution.

5. That neither the Emperour, Kings, nor any Prince whatsoever, shall make Edicts or Constitutions, in what manner soever, concerning Ecclesiastical causes or persons, nor meddle with their persons, causes, jurisdictions, or tribunals, no not in the Inquisition, but shall bee bound to affoord the secular Arme to the Ecclesiastical Judges.

369
6. That the temporall iurisdiction of the Ecclesiastikes, though with meere and mixt power, shall not bee disturbed, nor their subjectes drawne to the Secular tribunals, in causes temporall.

7. That no prince or magistrate shall promise by Briefe, or other writing, or give hope to any to haue a Benefice within their dominions, nor procure it from the Prelates, or Chapters of Regulars, and hee that shall obtaine it by that meanes, shall be depruied, and vncapeable.

8. That they shall not meddle with the fruites of Benefices Vacant, vnder pretence of custodie or patronage, or protection, or of withstanding discords, nor shall place there either Bayliefes, or Vicars: and the Seculars who shall accept such offices, and custodies, shall bee excommunicated, and the Clerkes suspended from their Orders, and depruied of their Benefices.

9. That the Ecclesiastikes shall not bee forced to pay taxes, gabels, tithes, passages, subsidies, though in the name of gift or loane, either in respect of the Church goods, and of their Patrimonial, except in Prouinces, where by ancient custome, the Ecclesiastikes themselues doe assist in publike Parliaments, to impose Subsidies both vpon the Laifie and the Clergie, to make warre against the Infidels, or for other vrgent necessities.

10. That they shall not meddle with Ecclesiastical goods, mouable or immouable, vassalages, tenths or other rights, nor in the goods of communities or private men, ouer which the Church hath any right: nor shall rent out the depasturing or herbage which groweth in the lands and possessions of the Church.

11. That the letters, sentences and citations of Judges Ecclesiastical, especially of the Court of Rome, so soone as they bee exhibited, shall bee intimated, without exception, published, and executed; neither shall it bee necessarie to require consent or licence, which is called Exequatur, or Placet, or by any other name either for this, or for taking possession of Benefices, though vpon pretence of withstanding falshoods, and violences, except in fortresses and those Benefices in which Princes are acknowledged by reason of the temporalitie; and in case there shall bee doubt of falsitie, or of some great scandal or tumult, the Bishop, as the Popes delegate shall constitute what hee thinketh needfull.

12. That Princes and Magistrates shall not lodge their officers, servants, souldiers, horses or dogs, in the houses or Monasteries of the Ecclesiastikes, nor take any thing from them for their foode or passage.

13. And if any Kingdome, Prouince, or place shall pretend not to be bound to any of the things aforesaid, by vertue of priuiledges of the Apostolike Sea which are in actuall vse, the priuiledges shall bee exhibited to the Pope, within a yeere after the end of the Councell, which shall bee confirmed by him, according to the merites of the Kingdomes or Prouinces, and, in case they be not exhibited before the end of the yeere, they shall be vnderstood to bee of no force.

B. Article of Ecclesiastical Liberty, or Reformation of Princes, as recorded by Sarpi
(Decree on General Reformation, article 20)

20. In the end, the Article of Ecclesiasticall libertie, or reformation of Princes, which had beeene so much examined, was read. In it the Synod doeth admonish secular Princes, hoping they will grant to the Church the restitution of her rights, reduce their Subjects to reverence the Cleargie, and not permit their offices and inferiour Magistrates to violate the immunitie of the Church and Ecclesiasticall persons, but that, together with themselves, the Princes, they will be obedient to the constitutions of the Pope, and of Councils, determining that all constitutions of general Councils, & of the Apostolike Sea, in fauour of Ecclesiasticall persons, and libertie, shall bee obserued by all: admonishing the Emperour, Kings, Republiques, Princes, and all, to reverence the things that belong to Ecclesiasticall right, and not to suffer them to be violated by inferiour Lords, their Magistrates, or Ministers; that the Clerkes may reside and performe their dutie, without impediment, and with edification of the people.

C. The Council of Trent: Decree on General Reform, Chapter 20 (Session 25)

The holy council desires church discipline not only to be restored among the Christian people but also to be perpetually protected and preserved safe from all obstructions. Hence, over and above its rulings about ecclesiastical persons, it has thought it right to warn secular princes too of their responsibility, trusting that they, as Catholics whom God has wished to be protectors of the holy faith and of the church, will not merely allow a restoration of the church’s law, but will also recall their subjects to due reverence towards the clergy, both parish priests and those in higher ranks; and will not allow officials and magistrates of lesser degree to violate the immunity of the church and of ecclesiastical persons, which has been established by the ordinance of God and canonical rulings, for any motive of greed or by any act of contempt; but will see that together with the princes themselves they give due observance to the sacred constitutions of popes and councils. It therefore decrees and commands that the sacred canons and all general councils together with other apostolic rulings, that have been published in favour of ecclesiastical persons and the freedom of the church and against their violaters, all of which it renews by this present decree, be rigorously observed by all. Wherefore it also charges the emperor, kings, republics, princes and each and all of whatever rank and dignity they may be, that the more amply they are endowed with temporal goods and with power over others, the more devoutly they should revere what is of ecclesiastical right, as the special care of God and protected by his patronage; and not allow them to be damaged by any barons, squires, stewards, rulers or other temporal lords or magistrates, and particularly by servants of these princes themselves; but severely punish any who obstruct the church’s freedom, immunity and jurisdiction; and to all of these may themselves be a model of devotion, religious practice and protection of the churches, in imitation of the best and most religious of their predecessors as princes, who were the first to advance the good estate of the church by their authority and generosity, as indeed to avenge it of the injury caused by others. May each do his duty in this matter with exactness, so that divine worship is devoutly conducted, and prelates and other clergy are allowed to continue at peace and without obstacles in their residences and at their tasks, to the great profit and edification of the people.

Appendix VIII

Citations from Chapter Three

Unless stated otherwise, all the quotations below are taken from Paolo Sarpi's *The History of the Council of Trent*, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John Bill, 1629). The first number refers to the page, and the second to the footnote.

161, 17: Micanzio, *Life of Father Paul*, p. 49: 'being growne very numerous, and frequent because there came thither a great part of such as proffest learning, and not onely of the nobility whereof some subjects are since risen to be great Senators, and like stares in the firmament of the most serene Common-wealth for goodnesse, Religion, learning and civill prudence; but there were likewise admitted into that meeting all sorts of *virtuosi*, as well as seculars as religious, beside the most eminent persons of learning that were then met at Venice, or in Italy or of any other nation that did not faile to be present at that place, as in one of the most celebrated conventions that had ever beene consecrate to the Muses...'.

'At this time the civil warrs in France flam'd out, and the father was pleased to heare such as could discourse of them. And that pleasure continued with him to his lives end, to heare and understand any thing of the state of the world and how things were carried'; Micanzio, *Life of Father Paul*, p. 50.

161, 20: 'But concerning his communication with heretiques, although nothing was proved, yet it tooke a very great impression in Clement the eight, who remembered it against him a good while after'; Micanzio, *Life of Father Paul*, p. 59.

162, 23: 'Because the matter being partly Theologicall and partly legal, the most excellent Senate came to a resolution, to chose next after their consultors in Jure, a man that was both divine and a Canonist'; Micanzio, *Life of Father Paul*, p. 57.

162, 24: 'By this time (wee may say) that the fathers quiet studies and his private life were come to their period, and that from hence till the end of his life, he entred upon another world; or rather came into the world, wherein it pleased God to call him into employments, which he had never thought he should applied himselfe to. But man is not borne alone for himselfe, but principally for his Countrey and for a common good'; Micanzio, *Life of Father Paul*, pp. 85-6.

171, 51: Cf. Bovio: 'It is appropriate for the church to have ecclesiastical liberty, because its power is supreme and exempt from any other; but to the secular power, which according to all the doctors ... is subject to the ecclesiastical, secular liberty in this sense does not belong ... laymen being mortal [but churches perpetual, the cause of religion being more favoured even among the barbarians than that of the world, and finally

373
(which is most important) the two powers by which these laws are made not being equal but the ecclesiastical superior' Bovio, Giovanni Antonio, Risposta alle considerationi del P. Maestro Paolo de Venetia (Rome, 1606); cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty, p. 424.

173, 59: See how Sarpi records Papalist arguments in the History: [Nuncio's reply to German request for a General Council] '...For it was not conuenient to tolerate an euill, that good may come thereby, and that they ought to esteeme more the saluation of soules, than worldly tranquillitie.' (p. 27); see also the reactions of the Prelates at Trent at the news of an agreement between the French King and the Huguenots (pp. 696-7): 'This was blamed by the greater part of the Fathers in Councell, who said it was to prefer the things of the world, before the things of God, yea to ruine both the one and the other. For the foundation of a State, which is religion, being remooued, it is necessary that the temporall should come to desolation; whereof the Edict before was an example, which did not cause peace and tranquillitie, as was hoped, but a greater War than before'.

174, 60: Cf. Leonardo Donà's account for his decision to allow for some room for compromise with the Roman Curia: 'Let us not deem it the duty of a prudent man always to have the same opinion, but that which the accidents and rather variable conjunctures of human affairs counsel. And certainly, since the principles and accidents of things vary, it is essential for the deliberations based on them also to vary. Thus he who otherwise might pretend to the title of consistency and constancy in his opinions should rather deserve a reputation for imprudent pertinacity and unconsidered obstinacy, since everyone, even of superficial intelligence in things of state, knows that civil matters are variable and subject like the sea to the diversity of the winds, to the violence and diversity of accidents. For this reason man should regulate his opinions exactly as on a sea voyage, according to the quality of the winds. Nor is he obliged always to have the same opinion, but rather the same end: the good and safety of the Republic'; cited by Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty, pp. 410-11.

174, 63: 'Yet I will not speake of those happie times when the name of the Church was common to all the congregation of the faithfull, vnto which did belong the vse & propriety of the goods which are called Ecclesiastical... But I will begin from the time when the Name of the Church was appropriated to the Clergie onely, all other Christians being excluded ...'; Histotry, p. 250.

177, 72: 'In departing from Italy to place myself under the August mantle of your Clemency, I attempted to secure a copy, in so far as it was possible for me, of various compositions by the most elevated spirits ... which might be pleasing to your Majesty as True Defender of the True Catholic Faith. ... I have known the Author, a person truly of much Learning, of great judgement and integrity, and of most upright intention. ... This Work of his, known to me and to a very few of his intimates, I adjudged worthy to be guided into the light of day, wherefore I labored not a little to get a copy out of his hands; and this precious jewel obtained (by him little regarded), I have not judged that
it should any longer remain hidden, even though I knew not what the Author might think nor how he might have to construe this resolution of mine to publish it; cited in Lievsay, 

*Venetian Phoenix*, pp. 40-1.

178, 76: ‘These contests [between the Papacy and Venice] were the occasion of Padre Paolo’s knowledge and interest with King James; for whose sake principally, Padre Paolo compiled that eminent *History of the remarkable Council of Trent*; which history was, as fast as it was written, sent in several sheets in letters by Sir Henry Wotton, Mr. Bedel and others, unto King James, and the then Bishop of Canterbury, into England, and there first made public both in English and the universal language.’; cited in Lievsay, *Venetian Phoenix*, p. 45.

178, 77: ‘What I can say of Father Paul is but little material; however, to satisfie your desire, I send you this Account, viz. That my Father (having been once before at Venice) was sent by George Abbott Arch-bishop of Canterbury, a second time, on purpose to procure the History of the Council of Trent ... and my father sent it over weekly, as [they] compos’d it, to the Arch-bishop in Italian; to whose hands it came after five or six Superscriptions to other persons for the greater Security’ (extract from a letter of Basil Brent, son of Nathaniel.

There is also a series of letters between Abbott and Brent, while the latter was in Venice, that refer to a number of ‘Canzoni’ that Brent was sending over to the Archbishop, ‘canzoni’, obviously being a code word for the installements. Finally, the letter of 24 Sept. 1618 (from Croydon) indicates the completion of the operation: ‘I have received all the Packets which you have sent unto me, so that there is in my hands the full Story’; both citations in Lievsay, *Venetian Phoenix*, p. 47

181, 85: ‘It is a new opinion, and seldom practiced, though established in Trent, that the Decrees only are called Acts of the Council, and ought only to be published; but in the ancient Councils all was given unto all. ...’; *History*, p. 136

186, 96: ‘Here I must make a great mutation of stile. For whereas in the former narration I have vsed that which is proper to describe varietie of minds ... hereafter I must make relation of one aime only, and vniforme operations, which seeme rather to flie than run to one only end, whereof I can giue but one cause, not to repeate it in all places, that is, the ioynt resolution to precipitate the Councell’; *History*, p. 782

186, 98: ‘The custome of those who write Histories is, to propose, in the beginning, a modell of what they meane to handle. Which I haue thought fit to deferre vntill this place, making it an abstract of the which is related already, and a desseigne of that which is to follow. Hauing resolued to give to the memorials which I had collected, some forme, which might not exceed my power, and yet best befit the matter, I considered, that, of all the negotiation considered, that, of all the negotiations which haue hapned among Christians in this world, or perhaps will happen hereafter, this is the most principall, and that most men are desirous to know whatsoeuer doth belong to that which they doe esteeme, even the last things of all. Therefore, I thought first that
the forme of a Diarie would best agree to this subject. But two oppositions did crosse mine opinion: One, that that forme could not befit the occurrences of twenty nine yeeres, spent in making preparation for the birth of this Councell, nor of the fourteene yeeres which passed while it slept, it not being known whether it were alive or dead. Another, that all the matter which continue Diarie doth require, could not possibly be found. Therefore, fitting the form to the matter, as nature doth, not the matter to the forme, as the Schooles, I thought it not absurd to write the preparatory and interconciliary times by way of Annals, and in those of the celebration to make a Diarie of the occurrences of those days, the knowledge whereof I was able to attain; hoping that whosoever shall read this Treatise, will excuse the omission of those which could not be known... For these causes this Treatise of mine is subject to some disealitie of Narration; and howbeit I might say, that as much might bee found in some famous Writer, yet this shall not bee my defence; but this, that if others have aunyed it, they have not written the History of the Councell of Trent, nor any other like vnto it.'; History, pp. 583-4.  
Cf. also History, pp. 90-1: 'When I set myself to write this Story, considering the number of Colloquies, some onely intimated, and some held, to compose the differences in Religion, I doubted whether it was fit to make mention of all, hauing concluding reasons for the one part and the other. In the end, considering that I haue proposed to my selfe to relate all the causes of the Councell of Trent, and observing that none hath been intimated or held, but to hinder or diuert, or delay, or to hasten and accelerate the Council, I resolued to make mention of every one, especially for the fruit which may be gathered from the knowledge of the notable particulars which happened in them...'; p. 226: 'When I had made this short narration of the Decree, I began to thinke it superfluous, seeing all the decrees of that Councell are printed in one volume, and in euery mans hands, and that in the Composition of the Actes that follow, I might referre my selfe to that booke: and I was about to teare this leafe. But considering that some might desire to reade the whole continuation in one booke only ... I resolued not to change ... and the rather, because I am grieued, when, in Zenophon and Tacitus, I see the narration of things, most known to their times, omitted, which remaineth vnknown to mee, because there is no meanes to know it againe: and I hold it for a maxime, that one ought neuer to referrre himself to another.';  
p. 633: 'I haue often rehearsed, and continue still, many particulars, which I am sure many will thinke not worthy of mention, as I haue thought my selfe; but finding them preserued, and noted in the memorialls of those who were present in the actions, I perswade my selfe that for some respect, vnknown to me, they haue deemed them worthy of commemoration, and therefore, according to their judgement rather then mine owne, I haue thought fit to relate them. Perhaps some sharpe witte may discouer in them some thing which is not penetrated by mee, and those who doe not esteeme them will lose but a little labour in reading them.'

187, 100: History p. 114: 'All which particularities, with many more that shall bee spoken of, hauing taken out of the Register of the letters of the Cardinall of Monte, I haue not beene willing to conceale them, because they servue to penetrate the depth of the treaties';
Cf. also p. 42: 'But I have not been able to learn what was the negotiation of the Councell of Spira, having not found any mention thereof, but in the foresaid Manifest, and in Paulus Iulius in the name of the forenamed Cardinall.';

with regard to the Decree for the translation of the Council, p. 268: 'Yet, following the notes which I have seen, as I have said before, I assure my selfe, that it was made two yeeres, and sent 18 moneths before this time.';

p. 517: 'And the register of the letters written by him (Bishop of Vintimiglia), with much acutenesse, and judgement, hath been shewed me, out of which a great part of those things which follow hath beene drawnen.';

p. 706: 'The trueh of this particular I put in the number of those things, the knowledge thereof I cannot attain unto. But it is certaine that the Catastrophe of the Councell, which it was thought could not possiblie haue a quiet conclusion, had beginning in this time.';

p. 757: 'I have not found in the memorials who was Author of this great aduantage; as many other particulars of importance are hid from mee also, whereof I would willingly make mention ...';

p. 815: 'Cardinal Annulis, in whose memorials I have seen this negotiation, said...'.

189, 106: 'And hence the reformation of Princes began, which, in the relation of the things that follow, will afford vs much matter'; History, p. 617;

p. 761 'To this effect, the Reformation of Princes was made, whereof wee haue spoken already, and will hereafter, more at large'.

Cf. also p. 218 where the author refers to the issue residence (1546): '...which because it produced a small controersie in the beginning, a greater in the progresse, and in the end (which was in the yeeres 1562 and 1563) greatest of all, it will not be vnseasonable to make some recapitulation...'

191, 111: Sarpi's general/historical assessment: 'Which things hee that shall observe plainly, shall see which were the ancient incorrupt institutions, and how corruptions began for worldly respects and interests. For when men began to place Heaven below the earth, good institutions were published to be corruptions, only tolerated by antiquity, and abuses, brought in afterwards, were canonized for perfect corrections'; History, p. 578.

196, 120: The papal standpoint is perhaps most eloquently expressed by Paul IV during the Council's long intermission, and while considering whether it should be re-assembled, and under what conditions; the following, according to Sarpi took place in 1556: '...Some told him that it was necessary to handle such a thing in a generall Councell; which he heard with great indignation, and said hee had no neede of a Councell, himselfe being above all. ... hee (Paul IV) concluded that, if a Councell were necessary, it should bee held in Rome, and that it was not needful to goe elsewhere; that he never consented that the Councell should be held in Trent; as was knowne to them all, because it was in the middest of the Lutheranes, that the Councell is to consist of Bishops onely; that other persons might be admitted for counsel, yet onely Catholikes, otherwise the Turke also ought to be admitted; that it was a great vanitie to send into
the mountaines three score Bishops, of the least able, and fourtie Doctours of the most unsufficient, as was twice done already, and to beleue that, by those, the world could be better regulated, then by the Vicar of CHRIST, with the College of all the Cardinals, who are the pillars of the Christendome, elected for the most excellent of all Christian Nations, and by the councell of the Prelates and Doctours which are in Rome, who are the most learned persons in the world, and more in number then, by any diligence, can be brought to Trent.'; History, p. 339.

197, 124: Sarpi's account of the translation is a masterpiece of sarcasm: 'And it hapned fitly that many in the families of the Prelats were sicke, either by the disorders of the Carnoval, or because the aire had been moist many daies before ... And after the session a Bishop dying opportunely, interred with the obsequies of the whole Council, made the matter more conspicuous. Whereupon all Trent was full, that the disease was contagious, and the fame was spread in all the bordering places.... Monte proposed the Translation of the Council, saying he had Apostolike authority to doe it from the beginning ... to translate it into some other City, more commodious, opportune and secure ... In Rome the Court was glad they were delivered from danger ... But none was so simple as not to beleue that all was done by his [the Pope's] commandment, it being certaine that nothing, how little soever, was handled in the Council, without order first had from Rome ... But that which could not be concealed, and which did scandalize every one, was, that, by that Bull it appeared that the Council was in seruiutude. For if the two Legats could command all the Prelates, at once to part from Trent, and compell them by punishments, and censures, let any man say that can, what liberty they had?'; History, pp. 266-8.

197, 127: 'Therefore perceiving that every place, Germanie especially, is on fire with discords, and that the Dutch Bishops, especially the Electors, were departed to make provision for their Churches, it hath determined not to content with necessitie, but to be silent vntill better times. And therefore they doe suspend the Progresse for two yeeres, with condition, that if all be quiet before that time bee ended, the Councell shall bee vnderstood to bee restored; but if the impediments shall not cease at the end of two yeeres, it shall be vnderstood that the suspension is taken away so soone as the impediments are remoued, without a new Conuocation of the Councell, his Holinesse, and the holy Apostolique See, hauing giuen consent and authoritie to this Decree.'; History, p. 376.

199, 133: And the divisions at this day, that are among Christians so irrevocable by any other means than the omnipotent and miraculous hand of God, he held it for certain that they were bred not so much by obstinacy in diversity of opinions, and contrariety of Doctrine, as from the strife about jurisdiction, which after by degeneration, and growing into Factions hath taken up the Mask of Religion; Micanzio, Life of Father Paul, p. 136.

200, 134: Cf. the Pope's letter to Charles V: '...that hee should not violate the rules observ'd by Christians, which command that, in the cause of religion, all should be
referred to the Church of Rome: and yet hee, not esteeming the Pope, who onely, by the law of God and man, hath power to call Councils. And to decree in spirituall matters, was willing to thinke of assembling a General or National Councell ... that the Scripture is full of examples of the wrath of God, against the usurpers of the office of the High Priest ... That God hath alwayes exhalted those Princes, that haue beene deuoted to the See of Rome, Head of all Churches, Constantine, the Theodosii, and Charles the Great: and contrality hath punished those that haue not giuen respect unto it. ... And not Princes only, but whole Nations haue beene punished for it ... That he commendeth him for desiring the amendment of the Church, but withal doth advise him to leaue the charge thereof to him, to whom God hath giuen it. That the Emperour is a Minister, but not a Gouernour, nor an Head. ... That it belonged to the Emperour himselfe, to give way that it [the Council] may be celebrated, by making peace, or deferring the warre, while matters of religion are handled in the Councel. That he should obey the fatherly commandes, exclude from Imperial Diets all disputes about religion, and referre them to the Pope .... otherwise to performe his owne dyetu, that he shall be forced to vse greater seuerity against him then hee would'; *History*, p. 107.

201, 137: 'Hee (the Pope) sent the Bishop of Viterbo, with institution, to shew him (the Spanish King) that a Nationall Council of that Kingdome, would bee a kinde of Schisme from the vniuersall Church, giue a bad example to other nations, and make his Prelates proud, assuming greater authoritie, which diminution of his owne; that is generally knowne how earnestly they desire the restitution of the Pragmatique...'; *History*, p. 423.

201, 139: 'the Pope required that the Emperor would make the Lutherans return to the Church of Rome by the force of arms and the Emperor that the Pope would convene a General Council: 'it was resoluted to stand in this article in generall tearmes, and concluded, that, to reduce the Lutherans to the union of the Church, the Pope should vse spiritual meanes, and Charles and Ferdinand temporall; who also should make warre against them if they remained obstinate'; *History*, pp. 46-7.

202, 141: 'This generall and sudden combination made the gouernours of the Kingdome resolve, that there was neede of an Ecclesiasticall remedie, and that very quickly; and a Nationall Synod was proposed by the whole Council. The Cardinal of Armignac said that nothing was to be done without the Pope... But the Bishop of Valence said, that a sudden remedie could not be expected from the Pope, because he was farre distant, nor a fit one, because hee was not informed of the particular necessity of the Kingdome, nor a charitable one, because he was so busied in making his Nephewes great; that GOD had giuen to all kingdomes, all things necessary to gouerne them; that France had Prelats of its owne to regulate the causes of Religion, who better know the wants of the kingdome; that it would be a great absurditie to see Paris burne, hauing the riuers of Some and Marne full of water, and to beleue that water must be brought from Tiber, to quench the fire'; *History*, p. 422.
203, 143: ‘... imploy themselves to diuert the Pope from so pernicious a deliberation, in which if he shall remaine vmoueable, they may exhort him to call a Councell; whereunto in case he will not condescend according to order of law, hee beseecheth their most reuerend Paternities, and the sacred College, that, the Pope denying or deferring the conuocation, they would call it themselues, observing the due order. Wherefore if they shall refuse to grant him this just demand, or shall deferre longer then is conuenient, he will make prouision for it himselfe by the Imperial authority, vsing the meanes that are iust and fitting;’ *History*, p. 41; also p. 57: ‘The Pope haung receiued aduice from his Legat, of what was done in the Diet [Diet of Augsburg, 1530], was touched with an inward grieue of minde, discovering that ... [Charles] had not proceeded as advocate of the Church of Rome, vnto whom it belongeth not to take knowledge of the cause, but to bee a meer executor of the Popes Decrees: whereunto was quite contrary to haue receiued the confessions, and caused them to bee read, and to haue instituted a conference to accord the differences. ... But the promising of a Councell, which hee so much abhorred, pressed him aboue all: in which, though honourable mention were made to his authoritie, yet to subscribe six moneths, to call it, and a yeere to beginne it, was to meddle with that which was proper to the Pope, and to make the Emperour the principall, and the Pope his minister’.

203, 145: Cf. also Charles’ own autobiography: ‘For it must be known that since the year 1529, when, as already stated, he visited Italy for the first time, and had an interview with Pope Clement, he never ceased whenever he saw either Pope Clement or Pope Paul, and in every journey, and at every Diet in Germany, and at every time and opportunity, continually to sollicit, either personally or through his ministers, the convocation of a general council to provide a remedy for the evils which had arisen in Germany, and for the errors which were being propagated in Christendom’; cited by Mackenney, *Sixteenth Century Europe*, p. 186.

204, 146: ‘... howsoever, the most understanding men did beleue that the Synod was assured that no Protestant would come to Trent, with any safe conduct whatsoever, except it be by force, as it happened in the yeere 1552. because of the resolution of Charles; a thing which could no more bee put in practice’; *History*, p. 481.

204, 148: ‘He [the French King] intimated also, that they ought not to make a continuation of the things begun in Trent, but to abandon them quite, and make a whole new Councell.’ Ferdinand had a similar reaction: ‘no mention ought to be made of a continuation of the things begun in Trent. For the Lutheranes would never consent otherwise, yea, the very name of Trent would make them refuse’; *History*, p. 428.

205, 149: ‘[Lorraine boasts that he will cause many important and questionable issues to be discussed] To crosse this purpose, they determined to propose the abuse of the Kingdome of France, and to let the Ambassadours understand that they would make prouision for them; because all Princes, who desire a reformation in the Church, would not willingly endure any at all of themselves, so that they thought, that if any matter of
importance were handled to their prejudice, they would not forbear, and make their Prelats forbear also to speak of things prejudicial to the Apostolique Sea. Therefore after some packets had passed between Rome and Trent, it being judged a good course, the abuses were collected, which were said to be principall in France, and partly in other Dominions. And hence the reformation of Princes began, which, in the relation of the things that follow, will afford vs much matter; History, p. 617.

205, 150: Cf. Pierre Pithou's comments: 'For a long time all the science of Europe ... had been cloistered among those who are called clergy: who, being for the most part by profession entirely removed from the conduct of worldly things, discussed the affairs of state not merely as a clerk would speak of weapons, but even worse as one blind from birth would discuss colours'; cited in Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 91.

206, 151: History, p. 189: 'But the Emperour made shew he vndertook the warre, not for Religion, but for matters of State, for that some denied him obedience, plotted with strangers against him, and refused to obey the Lawes, vsurped the possessions of others, especially the Churches, going about to make Bishoprikes and Abbacies hereditarie: and that having prooued divers gentle meanes to reduce them, they euer became more insolent.

...But many of the Protestants kept themselves on his side, because they could not beleue, that hee had any other respects, then of State.

Cf. also p. 201: 'The Emperour, in conformity to his purpose of concealing the cause of Religion, ... published a Bando against the Saxon and Landgrawe, laying to their charge that they had always hindred his designes, and had never obeyed him ... and covered all these things with the glorious and sweet name of Religion, peace and liberty, but hauing indeede rather any other end. Therefore hee doeth prescribe them, as perfidious, rebels, seditious, guilty of high treason, and enemies of the publike peace'.

206, 152: '...the Pope published a Jubile in Rome, the fifteenth of Iuly: by which he eased the Princes of Germany of the paines to find out, or persuade others, the true cause of the warre. ... Hee therefore wished them all to haue recourse vnto GOD by prayers, fastings, confessions, and communions, that GOD of his Divine Majestie, would giue a good issue to this warre, vndertaken for his glory, exaltation of the Church, and extirpation of heresies'; History, pp. 200-1.

206, 153: The Elector of Saxonie, and the Landgrave seeing this [that the Archbishop of Collen followed the Emperor], they published a Manifest the eleuenth of Iuly, declaring that the warre was vndertaken for Religion, and that the Emperour covered his meaning with a cloake of taking revengue against some few for rebellion, to disioyne the confederates'; History, p. 190.

206, 154: 'the Pope [Leo X], whose thoughts were wholly bent to make an Italian Lord of that State, and therefore proposed the warre of Germanie, not so much to suppress the Lutherans (as hee said openly) as to diuert Caesar from possessing Milan, which was his principall end, though secret ...'; History, p 78;
see also p. 222, where Pope Paul III recalled his forces after seeing the Emperor's successes; his reaction to the news of Charles' victory at Mühlberg (pp. 270-1): 'These things did much afflict the Pope, who considered that Italy was without helpe, and remained at the Emperor's discretion. Yet he was comforted, that having gotten the conquest by force, hee would bee compelled to maintaine it by the same meanes, and could not remoue his army from thence very soon. In the mean space, he had time to treat and agree with the new French King, and the Italians, and to secure himselfe'; similarly in the case of France: 'There was an opinion that he [the Pope] secretly wished some good success to the Hugonots in France, and some advantage to the Protestants in the Diet of Germany, that the Council might be dissolved, and not by his means.'; History, p. 628.

207, 156: 'The Emperour, whom the Councel did more concerne, holding it to be the onely meanes, to make himselfe absolute Master of Germanie, sent a safe conduct in an ample forme, to all the Protestant Orders of that Empire, for themeselues, their Ambassadours, and Diuines'; History, p. 311.

207, 157: Sarpi even ascribes the death of Paul III to 'perturbation of mind': '... the seventh of November, the Pope, seeing a letter of Duke Octavius, his nephew, that he would make an agreement with Ferdinand Gonzaga, to enter into Parma, which City the Pope caused to be held in the name of the Apostolick See, he was so assaulted with perturbation of mind and anger, that he swooned, and, after some few hours, coming to himself, he fell into a Feaver, whereof he died within three daies'; p. 298.

208, 159: 'The Pope, beside that he is the head of Religion, is also a Prince, and one that from above 500 years to this day hath aspired to the Monarchy of Italy ... And what wonder can be made of it, if he practice all the means he can to enlarge his jurisdiction. He hath three great charges upon him; that of Religion; that of Ecclesiastical affaires; and the temporality of his Estate. And the Fountain from which all ill is derived, is in this, that his right is not well distinguisht from that of Princes.'; Life of Father Paul, p. 183 (wrongly numbered as p. 163).

210, 162: The passage concludes like this: 'I will omit to speake how the painses of so many, besides the obtaining of the wished end, to make themselues independent of the publike, haue, before they were aware, rysed an Empire, there being a more difficult opinion sprung vp, taking root with admirable progress, which giueth to the Pope of Rome, as much at once, as hath, in 1300 yeeres, been gained by so many Bishops, by such extraordinarie means, not making the power to binde and loose the foundation of jurisdiction, but the power of feeding and so affirming, that all iurisdiction was giuen to the Pope by CHRIST, in the person of Peter, when he sayd to him, Feede my sheepe.'; p. 333.

210, 163: Cf. the distinction made by Micanzio: 'There are also three kinds of Canons, of spiritual things, of temporal things, and those that are mixt of both; Of the first, the care ought to be in Ecclesiasticks, of the second none can carry the exercise beyond their
own temporal estates, and for the third, it is as much the duty of Princes to take care, as of the Ecclesiasticks themselves, if not more'. Having neglected their duties, the Ecclesiastics have effectively relinquished their right of control over the third category, of mixed authority'; Life of Father Paul, p. 183 (wrongly numbered as p. 163).
Appendix IX

Contents of James VI and I's Workes (1616 and 1620)

A paraphrase vpon the revelation of the Apostle S. Iohn.
A frvitfyll meditation, containing a plaine and easie exposition, or laying open of the VII. VIII. IX and X. Verses of the 20. Chapter of the Revelation, in forme and manner of a Sermon.
Dæmonologie, in forme of a Dialogye, Diuided into Three Bookes.
ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΟΝ ΔΩΡΟΝ. or his Maiesties Instvctions to his dearest Sonne, Henry, the Prince.
The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, or the Reciprock and Mvtvall Dvetie betwixt a Free King and his naturall Subjects.
A counterblaste to Tobacco.
A Discovrse of the Maner of the Discoverie of the Powder-Treason, joyned with the examination of some of the prisoners.
Triplici Nido, tripexus cuneus. Or an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. Against the two Breves of Pope Pavlus Qvintvs, and the late Letter of Cardinal Bellarmine to G. Blackwell the Arch-priest.
A Premontion to all most Migtie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendome.
A Declaration concerning the Proceedings with the States Generall, of the United Provinces of the Low Countreys, In the cause of D. Conrads Vorstvs.
A Remonstrance for the Rights of Kings, and the Independance of their Crownes, against an Oration of the most Illvstriovs Card. of Perron, Prononvced in the Chamber of the third Estate. Ian 15. 1615.
A Speach, as it was delivered in the vpper Hovse of the Parliament to the Lords Spiritvall and Temporall, and to the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses there assembled, on Mnvnday the XIX. day of March 1603. being the First Day of the first Parliament.
A Speach in the Parliament Hovse, as ncere the very words as could be gathered at the instant.
A Speach to both the Hovses of Parliament, delivered in the Great Chamber at White-Hall, the last day of March 1607.
A Speach to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-Hall, on Wednesday the XXI. of March . Anno 1609.
A Speach in the Starre-Chamber, the XX. of Ivne. Anno 1616.
Contents of Modern Editions of James's 'Political' Works


Basilikon Doron
The Trew Law of Free Monarchies
An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance
A Premonition to all Christian Monarches, Free Princes and States
A Defence of the Right of Kings, against Cardinall Perron
Speech of 1603-4
Speech of 1605
Speech of 1607
Speech of 1609-10
Speech in the Star Chamber, 1616

B. King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge: CUP, 1994).

Basilicon Doron
Triplici Noto, Tripex Cuneus. Or an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance
Speech to parliament of 19 March 1604
Speech to parliament of 9 November 1605
Speech to parliament of 31 March 1607
Speech to parliament of 21 March 1610
Speech in Star Chamber of 20 June 1616
A Meditation upon the 27th, 28th and 29th Verses of the 27th Chapter of Saint Matthew (1619)
His Maiesties Declaration, Touching his Proceedings in the Late Assemblie and Convention of Parliament (1622)
Appendix X

Citations from Chapter Four

The quotations below are taken from James I. The Workes (1616), facsimile edition (Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971) and from Craigie, James (ed.), The Basilikon Doron of King James VI. 2 vols., (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Text Society, 1944-50); and idem, Minor Prose Works of King James VI and I. (Edinburgh: STS, 1982). The first number refers to the page, and the second to the footnote.

234, 27: Thus James in his prefàce to the reader in Basilikon Doron: 'And amongst the rest of my secret actions, whiche haue (unlooked for of me) come to publick knowledge, it hath so faires with my Βασιλικὸν Δορόν directed to my eldest sonne: whiche I wrote for exercise of my own ingyne and instruction of him, who is appointed by God (I hope) to sit on my Throne after me... I onely permitted seuen of them [copies] to be printed, the printer being first sworne for secrecie: and these seuen I dispersed amongst some of my trustiest seruants, to be keepe closelie by them... But since contrarie to my intention and expectation,..., this booke is now vented, and set foorth to the publike viewe of the worlde, and consequentlie, subject to every mans censure ... I am nowe forced...both to publishe and spread the true copies thereof, for defacing of the false copies that are alreadie spred, as I am enformed; as likeways, by this prefàce, to cleare suche parts thereof, as in respect of the concised shortnesse of my style, may be mis-interpreted therein.'; Basilikon Doron, p. 13.

234, 28: 'I onely write this a ground, whereupon I meane (if God shall spear mee dayes and leisure) to set down at large (as in the descant) the whole principal points belonging to the office of a king'; Workes, p. 606.

236, 33: Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 292: 'This Oath now grounded vpon so great and iust an occasion, set forth in so reasonable terms, and ordained onely for making of a trew distinction betweene Papists of quiet disposition, and in all other things good subjects, and such other Papists as in their heart maintained the like violent bloody Maximes, that the Powder –Traitours did'.

237, 37: 'As likewise you cannot, without most euident and grieuous wronging of Gods Honour, bind your selues by the Oath, which in like manner we haue heard with great griefe of our heart is administered vnto you... it must euidently appeare vnto you by the words themselves, That such an Oath cannot be taken without hurting of the Catholike Faith and the salvation of your soules; seeing it contains many things which are flat contrary to Faith and salvation.'; Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.

237, 39: Apologie; Workes, p. 258: 'That our Apostolike Letters were written not only upon our proper motion, and of our certaine knowledge, but also after long and weightie deliberation vsed concerning all those things, which are contained in them;
and that for that cause ye are bound fully to observe them [the letters] rejecting all interpretation persuading to the contrary...'.

239, 47: *Premonition; Workes*, p. 288: ‘To the Most Sacred and Invincible Prince, Rodolph the II.(Emperour), ... and to all other Right High and Mightie Kings, And Right Excellent free Princes and States of Christendome Our louing Brethern, Cosins, Allies, Confederates and Friends’.

240, 49: Cf. James: ‘And thus may ye now clearly see, how deepe the claime of the Babylonian Monarch toucheth vs in all our common interest...’, *Premonition; Workes*, p. 333.

241, 52: Cf. *Premonition; Workes*, p. 289: ‘To you, I say, as of right belongeth, doe I consecrate and direct this Warning of mine, or rather Preamble to my reprinted *Apologia for the Oath of Allegiance*. For the cause is generall, and concerneth the Authoritie and priuiledge of Kings in generall, and all supereminent Temporall powers.... The consideration hereof hath now moued mee to expone a Case vnto you, which doeth not so neerely touch mee in particular, as it doeth breach against our Authoritie, (I speake in the plural of all Kings) and priuiledge in generall.’

243, 58: ‘For how the profession of the naturall Allegiance of Subjects to their Prince can be directly opposite to the faith and saluation of soules, is so farre beyond my simple reading in Diuinitie, as I must thinke it a strange and new Assertion, to procede out of the mouth of that pretended generall Pastor of all Christian soules.’, *Apologie; Workes*, p. 254. Cf. also p. 256: ‘Temporal obedience to a temporal magistrate did nothing repugne to matters of faith or salvation of soules...’.

245, 66: Cf. *Basilikon Doron*, pp. 47-9: ‘And fore keeping your conscience sound from that siknes of superstition, ye must neither lay the safetie of your conscience vpon the credite of your own conceits, nor yet of other mens humors, howe great doctors of divinitie that euer they be; but ye must onely ground it vpon the expresse Scripture...Beware therefore in this case with two extremities: the one, to beleue with the Papists, the Churches authority, better then your owne knowledge; th’ other to leane with the Anabaptistes, to your owne conceits and dreamed revelations. But learne wisely to discerne betwixt points of saluation and indifferent things, betwixt substance and ceremonies; and betwixt the express commandement and will of God in his word, and the invention or ordinance of man: since all that is necessarie for saluation is contained in the Scripture.’

245, 67: *Premonition; Workes*, p. 296: ‘he [Bellarmine] is so bolde as to affirme, that Church-men are exempted from the power of earthy Kings; and that they ought them no subiection euen in temporall matters, but onely *vi rationis* and in their owne discretion, for the preseruation of peace and good order.’
246, 68: Cf. also Apologie; Workes, p. 282: ‘Wee doe constantly affirme, that all Christian Kings are so farre vnder Bishops and Priests in all matters appertaining to faith, that if they shall continue in a fault against Christian Religion ... for that cause they may and ought to be deposed by the Bishops from their temporall authoritie they holde over Christians. Bishops are set over temporall kingdomes, if those kingdomes doe submit themselves to the faith of Christ. We doe justly affirme, that all Secular power, whether Regall, or any other, is of men. The anyointing which is powred vpon the head of the King by the Priest, doeth declare that hee is inferiour to the Priest.’

246, 69: ‘And as for the setting vp of the People aboue their owne naturall King, he bringeth in that principle of Sedition, that he may thereby prowe, that Kings have not their power and authoritie immediately from God, as the Pope hath his: For euery King (saith he) is made and chosen by his people; nay, they doe but so transfterre their power in the Kings person, as they doe notwithstanding retaine their habituall power in their owne hands, which vpon certaine occasions they may actually take to themselves againe. This, I am sure, is an excellent ground in Diuinitie for all Rebels and rebellious people, who are hereby allowed to rebell against their Princes; and assume libertie vnto themselves, when in their discretions they shall thinke it conuenient.’; Premonition; Workes, p. 331.

246, 70: ‘yet do not preffere a temporall liberty to the liberty of the glory of the Sonnes of God: neither for escaping a light & momentarie tribulation, lose an eternal weight of glory...’ Apologie, Workes, p. 262.

247, 72: [Augustine discussing Iulian] They distinguished their eternall Lord from their temporall, and yet were they subiect euen vnto their temporall Lord, for his sake that was their eternall Lord and Master. Apologie; Workes, p. 255.

248, 75: See pp. Premonition; Workes, pp. 306-7. Cf. also ibid., p. 296: ‘Thus hath he set such a new goodly interpretation vpon the wordes of CHRIST, Pasce oves meas, as if it were as much to say, as, depose Christian Kings; and that Quodcunque solueris gaue the Pope power to dispense with all sorts of Oathes, Vowes, Penalties, Censures and Lawes, euen with the Naturall obedience of Subjectts to their Souereigne Lords; much like to that new coyned glosse that his brother Baronius made vpon the wordes in Saint Peters vision, Surge Petre, occide & manduca; That is (said he to the Pope) Goe kill and confound the Venetians.’

250, 78: ‘And when it [title of Universal Bishop] was offered to himselfe the wordes of S. Gregory be these, refusing that Title: None of my predecessours [Bishops of Rome.] euer consented to vse this profane name [of vniversall Bishop]. None of my predecessours euer tooke vpon him this name of singularitie, neither consented to vse it, Wee the Bishops of Rome doe not secke, nor yet accept this glorious title offered vnto vs. And now, I pray you, would he that refused to be called Vniversall Bishop, be stiled Caput fidei, vnlesse it were in that sense, as I haue expressed?’; Apologie; Workes, p. 279.
250, 80: Cf. *Remonstrance; Workes*, pp. 402-3: ‘It is to be observed withall, that when the Emperours were not of sufficient strength, and Popes had power to beard and to braue Emperours, then these Papall practices were first set on foot’.

250, 81: ‘The Popes in that age writing to the Emperours, vsed none but submissive tearmes, by way of most humble supplications; made profession of bowing the knee before their sacred Maiesties, and of executing their command with entire obedience; payed to the Emperours twenty pound weight of gold for their Inuestiture... ’; *Premonition; Workes*, pp. 297-8. Also: ‘Yee shall first see how farre other Godly and Christian Emperours and Kings were from acknowledging the Popes temporall Supremacie ouer them; nay, haue created, controlled and deposed Popes: and next, what a number of my Predecessors in this Kingdome haue at all occasions, euen in the times of the greates Greatnesse of Popes, resisted and plainely withstood them in this point...That all Archbishops and Bishops should receive their Inuestiture from the Emperour... ’ *Premonition; Workes*, p. 297.

250, 82: ‘But that the King of France and Church thereof haue euer stoken to their Gallican immunitie, in denying the Pope any Temporall power ouer them, and in resisting the Popes as oft as euer they prest to meddle with their Temporall power, euen in the donation of Benefices, the Histories are so full of them, as the onely examples thereof would make vp a bigge Volume by it selfe. And so farre were the Sorbonnistes for the Kings and French Churches pruiledge in this point, as they were wont to maintaine; That if the Pope fell a quarrelling the King for that cause, the Gallican Church might elect a Patriarch of their owne, renouncing any obedience to the Pope. And Gerson was so farre from giuing the Pope that temporall authority ouer kings (who otherwise was a deuout Roman Catholike) as hee wrote a Booke de Auferibilitate Pape; not onely from the power ouer Kings, but euene ouer the Church’; *Premonition; Workes*, pp. 298-9.

251, 84: ‘To conclude then, The trewth is that Peter was both in age, and in the time of CHRIST calling him, one of the first of the Apostles; In order the principall of the first twelue, and one of the three whom CHRIST for order sake preferred to all the rest. And no further did the Bishop of Rome claime for three hundred yeeres after CHRIST: Subiect they were to the generall Councils, and euene but of late did the Councell of Constance depose three Popes, and set vp the fourth’; *Premonition; Workes*, p. 307.

255, 94: Cf. *Premonition; Workes*, p. 332: ‘...so it is well enough known to some of you (my louing Brethren) by what holy Spirit or casting of Lots the Popes vse to be elected; the Colledge of Cardinals, his electors, hauing beene diuided in two mightie factions cuur since long before my time; and in place of casting of Lots, great fat pensions being cast into some of their greedy mouthes for the election of the Pope, according to the partiall humours of Princes.’

389
257, 97: ‘And yet he that gaued so much to Peter, took nothing from Caesar; but gaued him both his Titles and due, giuing the power of calling a Council to the Emperor’; Apologie; Workes, p. 280.

258, 102: ‘When yee go about to disturbe, diminish, or take away the authoritie or supremacie of the Church, which resteth on the head of the King, within his dominions, ye cut off the head and chiefe gouernour thereof, and disturbe the state and members of the whole body.’; Apologie; Workes, p. 279.

259, 104: ‘The text included: ‘that since he [the king] is known to be the sovereign in his state, holding his Crown from God alone, that there is no power on earth whatever, spiritual or temporal, which has any authority over his kingdom, to take away the sacred nature of our kings, to dispouse [or absolve] their subjects of the fidelity and obedience which they owe them for any cause or pretext whatsoever’, quoted in Patterson, James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom, p. 183.

261, 110: Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 396-7: ‘They [the Popes] depose Princes for infringing, or in any sort diminishing the Priuiledges of Monasteries... They depose for naturall dulness and lacke of capacitie... They depose for collating of Benefices and Prebends... They depose for adulteries and Matrimoniall suites... Finally, faine would I learne into what Heresie or degree of Apostasie, either Henry IV. or Frederic Barbarossa, or Frederic II. Emperours were fallen, when they were smitten with Papall fulminations, euen to the depriuation of their Imperiall Thrones.’

261, 112: Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 402-3: ‘It is to be obersued withall, that when the Emperours were not of sufficient strength, and Popes had power to bearde and to braue Emperours, then these Papall practices were first set on foot.’

262, 116: ‘And whereas nowdays a General Council cannot be held, except it be called and assembled by the Popes authority ... and how the pope can be president in a council, where himself is the party impealed?’; Remonstrance; Workes, p. 423.

262, 117: ‘It is willingly granted, that Emperours neuer challenged, neuer arrogated, to bee Soueraigne Judges in controversies of doctrine and faith; neuerthelesse it is clearer then the Sunnes light at high noone, that for moderation at Synods, for determinations and orders established in Councils, and for the discipline of the Church, they haue made a good and a full use of their Imperiall authoritie. The first Council at Constantinople, beares this title or inscription; The dedication of the holy Synode to the most religious Emperour Theodosius the Great, to whose will and pleasure they haue submitted these Canons by them addressed and established in Councill. And there they also beseech the Emperour, to confirme and appoue the said Canons. ... This was not done, because Emperours tooke vpon them to bee infallible Judges of doctrine; but onely that Emperours might see and judge, whether Bishops (who feele the prick of ambition as other men doe) did propound nothing in their Convocations and Consultations, but most of all in their Determinations, to vndermine the Emperours authoritie, to disturbe
the tranquilitie of the Common-wealth, and to crosse the determinations of precedent Councils'; Remonstrance; Workes, p. 427.

268, 133: '... wher-through I was ofttimes calumniated in their populare sermons, not for any euill or vice in me, but because I was a King; whiche they thought the highest euill. and yet for all their cunning, whereby they pretended to distinguishe the lawfulness of the office, from the vice of the person, some of them would some-times snapper out well grosselie with the trueth of their intentions: informing the people, that all Kings and Princes were naturally enemies to the libertie of the Churche, and could never patiently beare the yoke of Christ: with suche sound doctrine fed they their flocks.'; Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9.

269, 134: Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9: 'For if by example thereof, once established in the Ecclesiasitcall governement, the Politicke and ciuill estate should be drawne to the like, the greate confusion that there-upon would arise, may easily be discerned. Take heede therefore (my Sonne) to such Puritanes, verie pestes in the Churche & common-weale: whom no deserts can oblishe, neither oathes or promises binde; breathing nothing but sedition and calumnies, aspyring without measure, rayling without reason, and making their owne imaginations (without any warrant of the worde) the square of their conscience.'

270, 135: 'If then Idolatrie and defection from God, tyrannie ouer their people, and persecution of the Saints, for their profession sake, hindred not the spirit of God to command his people vnder all hiest paine to give them al due and hartie obedience for conscience sake, giuing to CESAR that which was CAESARS, and to God that which was Gods, as Christ saith; [...] the duety, and allegeance of the people to their lawful King, their obedience, I say, ought to be to him, as to Gods Lieutenant in earth, obeying his commands in all things, except directly against God, as the commands of Gods Minister, acknowledging him as a Judge set by God ouer them, hauing power to judge them, but to be judged onely by God, whome to onelie he must giue count of his judgement...'; True Lawe, p. 69.

270, 137: True Lawe, pp. 61-2: 'Kings are called Gods by the propheticall King DAVID, because they sit vpon God his throne in the earth, and have the count of their administration to give vnto him. Their office is, To minister Justice and Judgement to their people .... To advance the good, and punishe the evill ... To establishe good lawes to his people, and procure obedience to the same ... To procure the peace of the people ... To decide al controversies that can arise among them ... To be the minister of God for the weale of him that doth well, and, as the minister of God, to take vengeance vpon them that do euiil...As a good Pastour... And therefore in the Coronation of our owne Kings, as well as of euery Christian Monarche, they giue their Oath, first to maintaine the Religion, presently professed within their countrie, according to their lawes, wherey it is established, and to punish all those that should presse to alter, or disturb the profession thereof.
270, 138: 'Bvt as ye are clothed with two callings, so must ye be alike carefull for the discharge of them both: that as ye are a good Christian, so ye may be a good King, discharging your office (as I shewed before) in the points of justice and equinity: whiche in two sundry waies ye must doe: the one, in establishing and executing, (which is the life of the lawe) good lawes among your people: the other, by your behauior in your person, and with your seruantes, to teach your people by example ...'; Basilikon Doron, p. 53.

271, 140: Basilikon Doron, pp. 81-3: 'And to end my aduice anent the Church estate, cherishe no man more then a good Pastor, hate no man more then a proude Puritane: thinking it one of your fairest styles, to be called a louing nourish-father to the Churche; seeing all the Churches within your dominions planted with good Pastors ... as the flourishing of your churche in pietie, peace, & learning, may be one of the cheefe points of your earthly glory'.

272, 144: 'The naturall sicknesse that haue euer troubled, and beene / the decay of all the Churches, since the beginning of the world, changing the candle-sticke from one to another, as Iohn saith, haue bene Pride, Ambition, and Auarice: and now last, these same infirmities wrought the ouer-throwe of the Popishe Churche, in this country and diuers others'; Basilikon Doron, pp. 73-5.

273, 146: Cf. True Lawe, pp. 80-1: 'And so to refuse him, or intrude an other, is not to hold out vncomming in: but to expel, & put out the righteous King. And I trust at this time whole France acknowledgeth the superstitious rebellion of the Liguers, who, vpon pretence of heresie, by force of armes held so long out, to the great desolation of their whole countrie, their natie and righteous King from possessing of his owne crowne and naturall kingdome'.

273, 147: 'being euer alike ware with both the extremities; as well as ye represse the vaine Puritane, so suffer not proude Papall Bishops... '; Basilikon Doron, pp. 81-3.

278, 161: 'But learne wisely to discerne betwixt points of saluation and indifferent things, betwixt substance and ceremonies; and betwixt the express commandement and will of God in his word, and the invention or ordinance of man: since all that is necessarie for saluation is contained in the Scripture.'; Basilikon Doron, p. 49.

281, 167: Cf. Basilikon Doron, pp. 16-7: 'that are persuaded, that their Bishops smells of a Papall supremacie, that the Surplice, the cornered cap, and suche like, are the outward badges of Popish erreours'.

281, 170: 'Thus hath the Cardinals shamelesse wresting of those two places of Scripture, Pasce oves meas, and Tibi dabo clause, for prouing of the Popes suprême Temporall authorettie ouer Princes; animated mee to prooue the Pope to bee THE ANTICHRIST, out of his foresaid booke of Scripture; so to pay him in his owne money againe. And this opinion no Pope can euer make me to recant; except they first renounce any further
medling with Princes, in any thing belonging to their Temporall Jurisdiction.';
Premonition; Workes, pp. 328-9.

284, 175: 'Kings therefore, as Gods Deputie-iudges vpon earth, sit in thrones, clad with long robes, not as laikes and simply *togati* (as inferior secular Judges are) but as *mixtæ personæ* (as I said in my ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΟΝ ΔΩΡΟΝ) being bound to make a reckoning to God for their subjects soules as well as their bodies. Not that they ought to usurpe any point of the Priestly office, no more then the Prist shoule the Kings, for these two offices were deuided in Aaron's Priesthood; but it is the Kings office to overse and compell the Church to do her office, to purge all abuses in her, and by his sword (as *vincex viriúsque tabulae*) to procure her due reverence and obedience of all his temporall subjects.';
Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew; Workes, p. 611.