THE GREATER ALCIBIADES
attributed to Plato;

An Introduction and Commentary,
together with an Appendix on the language
and the style,

by

R. S. BLUCK, M.A.
# INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introductory</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The date of the dialogue, if Plato wrote it</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A possible Raison d'Etre</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various objections raised:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 'Man = Soul'</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The 'definition of justice' at 127c</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 'Dépendance totale envers la divinité'</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The four virtues</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Zoroaster</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Aristoxenetus' anecdote of Socrates and the Indian</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conception of God</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conception of Mind</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle's Early Works and the Platonic Spuria:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Early Aristotle</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Platonic Spuria</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief Summary</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: the Language and the Style</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A great deal has been written about the Greater Alcibiades since its authenticity was first questioned at the beginning of the nineteenth century. A good deal of the criticism has been unfavourable, but recently some scholars have rallied to its defence with considerable vigour. The history of the Platonic corpus, while justifying doubt in cases where there are good grounds for doubt, must nevertheless make one wary of atheetizing a dialogue through minor points of detail; and it is probably fair to say that a good deal of the adverse criticism of the Alcibiades has been very far from conclusive, and often based on misapprehension. For this reason, while I myself believe that Plato did not write it, I have thought it worth while to discuss some of the points that have been raised before coming to what seems to me to be the crux of the question. The method will, I hope, serve to emphasize what many undisputed points suggest, that the writer was very well acquainted with the dialogues and doctrine of Plato.

If the setting which I give to this work in my Conclusion is correct, the Alcibiades is most interesting as reflecting the reaction of an intelligent member of the Academy to the abandonment of Plato's Forms. Our writer will have been a man of considerable perspicacity as well as considerable literary ability, and he deserves the compliment paid to his work by Proclus and Olympiodorus, who remarked that it formed
the best introduction to Platonic philosophy. If those critics failed to observe when he went beyond Plato, that will be because they had gone beyond Plato themselves: it was a fault of the Neoplatonists that they criticised earlier works in terms of their own beliefs.

A bibliography will be found at the end of the book. I have cited these works by name of author alone, except where otherwise indicated in the bibliography. I follow Burnet's text, except at 130d and 132c: the reasons for my departure there are indicated in the notes.

Fettes College,
Edinburgh.
March, 1949.

R. S. BLUCK.
Two dialogues in which Alcibiades converses with Socrates have come down to us. The Second or Lesser Alcibiades is proved spurious by its manifest dependence on the Greater Alcibiades, and seems to contain indications of Stoic influence;¹ it is dismissed as spurious by Athenaeus,² and disregarded by Albinus, who simply speaks of 'the Alcibiades,'³ when referring to the Greater.

The authenticity of the Greater Alcibiades, which we shall see good reason to deny, appears never to have been questioned in antiquity. This dialogue (like the Lesser) was included, according to Diogenes Laertius,⁴ in the Platonic canon of Thrasylus, and Diogenes seems to imply⁵ that Aristophanes the grammarian, who was born about 260 B.C., accepted all the dialogues in Thrasylus' list. In any case our dialogue must have been generally accepted as genuine by

---
¹ Cf. e.g. A.E. Taylor, pp. 526-9; J. Souilhé, Platon XIII, Dialogues Suspects, 1930, pp. 3 sq. — who, however, denies Stoic influence (pp. 10-11).
² 506e.
³ Didascalicos VI, p. 159 Hermann; ib. III, p. 148.
⁴ III, 59.
⁵ Immediately after listing the works that Thrasylus accepted as genuine, he records that Aristophanes divided some of the dialogues into groups of three, and adds that in Aristophanes' list 'the others' follow 'one by one' (III, 62).
the first century A.D., for Plutarch, who uses it freely as evidence for his Life of Alcibiades, expressly refers to it as Plato’s work. Friedländer has claimed that Polybius seems to have regarded it as genuine, and certainly Albinus did, and later the Neo-Platonists, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Olympiodorus. No doubts, in fact, were expressed about the authenticity of this work until the nineteenth century. But although the ancients were prepared to be critical, their standards of criticism were apparently very different from ours, and they accepted many works whose authenticity no one is now likely to defend. We are therefore justified in judging each dialogue attributed to Plato separately, according to its merits.

The writers of the early part of the nineteenth century

6 Life of Alcibiades c. 2. (Thrasylus also probably lived in the first century A.D.)

7 Am. Journ. of Phil. LXVI. 4, pp. 337 sq. He compares Polybius XXI. 23-30, and claims that the similarities with our dialogue cannot be due to mere literary imitation, since Polybius himself is there a participant in the conversation, but must be due to the fact that Polybius ‘saw Scipio and himself as the more fortunate counterparts of Alcibiades and Socrates’.

8 See note 3.

9 Cf. Prolegomena to Plato’s Philosophy, c. 26.

10 Cf. Proclii diadochi et Olympiodori in Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii, ed. Creuzer, Frankfurt, 1820-5; and Olympiodorus’ Life of Plato c. 2.


12 E.g. the Minos and Theages.
who atheitized the dialogue based most of their arguments for its rejection on assumptions that would not be accepted today. 

More recently a number of writers have attacked various aspects of our dialogue, or particular points that have appeared to them un-Platonic, but it is very doubtful whether the majority of these arguments - even when added together - approach conclusiveness. The dialogue has found staunch supporters in Croiset, Vink, and Friedländer. Any dialogue ascribed to Plato is probably entitled to an a priori presumption in its favour; but we shall see presently that there are, in fact, very strong grounds for rejecting this particular work.

13 Ast (who rejected all the 'Socratic' dialogues except the Protagoras) and Schleiermacher, for example, made no allowance for any kind of development in Plato's philosophy. Among those who accepted our work were Socher, Stallbaum, Hermann, and later Steinhart, Grote, Jowett, and R. Adam. Susemihl and Schaarschmidt rejected it (the latter attacked the authenticity of twenty-six of the works attributed to Plato).

14 E.g. Hirzel, Bruns, Lutoslawski, Arbs, Pavlu, Dittmar, Taylor, Bignone, de Strycker, Bidez, Miss Dorothy Tarrant and Jaegar (see Bibliography). Ritter and Raeder do not commit themselves to a final verdict.
The Date of the dialogue, if Plato wrote it

It could hardly be

No one has ever claimed that the Alcibiades belongs to Plato's latest group of dialogues; and it would certainly be very difficult to imagine circumstances in which Plato might have been induced to write a dialogue of this nature at the same time as the Statesman, for example, or the Philebus.

Use of Ritter's statistics for answer-formulae shows that the Alcibiades differs in this respect very considerably from Plato's latest dialogues, and in Lutoslawski's table based on the figures of Campbell and showing comparative statistics for the use of rare words, we see that the Alcibiades actually differs from the latest works more than any other dialogue in the list except the Charmides. But above all considerations of language, form, and content, so far as they have gone, make it very unlikely that the Alcibiades could be one of Plato's latest dialogues.

15 See Appendix, p. 135-6; also p. 134.
16 Lutoslawski, p. 92. It would be unsafe to draw any conclusions from this as to how long before the last group it might have been written; but these figures do suggest - even though this evidence is in itself slight - that the Alcibiades was not written at the same time as the latest dialogues. Cf. also de Strycker (Bidez, p. 119).
17 See also Appendix, p. 134, n. 3. We may note, too, that the statements about Spartan wealth at 122d sq. are not true of the dramatic date of the dialogue (about 452 B.C., see note on 123d), and would only be true of the period 404-371 B.C. (cf. Taylor, p. 524, note). Though an imitator of Plato writing after Plato's death might easily do so, it is not likely that Plato himself would make statements of such a kind - statements not without importance in relation to the argument - if they were not true of the dramatic date or of the time at which he was writing. This supports the view that the Alcibiades could hardly have been written by Plato after 371 B.C.
Our work is commonly assigned, by those who accept it as genuine, to the earlier period of Plato's writing. Croiset would go so far as to assign it to the period of Plato's stay at Megara, and Lamb to the years immediately following Socrates' death. Now Isocrates makes it clear in the Busiris (222c) that up to the time when he wrote that work no one except the sophist Polycrates had ever asserted that Alcibiades had been a pupil of Socrates. This has been accepted as proof that the Symposium cannot have been written before the Busiris, and the argument will apply a fortiori to the Alcibiades. The Busiris, according to Blass, was written some years after 391 B.C., and since there are good reasons for assigning Polycrates' pamphlet, the Accusation of Socrates, to which Isocrates refers, to about 388 B.C., it would seem that the Busiris could not have been written anyhow before that date. This makes it practically impossible to accept Croiset's dating of the Alcibiades, and also makes it unlikely that Plato wrote our dialogue before the Gorgias, as


19 Cf. Teichmuller ap. Lutoslawski, p. 244.

20 J. Geffken, Hermes 65. 1. 1930; Hackforth, Composition of Plato's Apology, pp. 4, 44-5. The Gorgias, almost certainly written after Plato's return from Sicily, seems to have contained a reply to Polycrates' pamphlet (see Geffken, op. cit.).
Vink and Friedländer believe. That possibility is not, but however that may be, it will suffice for the present indeed, entirely ruled out; but for the moment it will suffice to observe that the implications of Isocrates' remark are in general agreement with the judgement of Taylor, Lutoslawski, and Ritter, that the style of our dialogue is not that of Plato's Socratic works. Ritter would place the Alcibiades, if genuine, after the early works and before the dialogues of the Middle Period, and Lutoslawski holds that 'according to its style, the Alcibiades would be later than the Symposium.'

Many of the arguments that have recently been brought forward with great vigour against the authenticity of this dialogue would appear to be practically conclusive if the only way of defending it were to claim, as its champions do, that it arose out of circumstances closely similar to those which

---

21 p. 139. Vink observes that political interest appears for the first time in the Meno and Gorgias, and also that appears for the first time with a technical meaning in the Gorgias. This suggests that our dialogue would not be one of Plato's earliest works. (The remarks at 134e - 135b about the man who tyrannizes over himself perhaps point to the same conclusion: We are reminded of Plato's decision that the only hope for any city was a union of wisdom and power at the head of the state, which he appears to have reached cf. Ep. VII, 326b just before leaving for Sicily on his first visit.) Further, even Croiset (p. 52) declares that the Platonic analysis of soul into 'parts' can be detected in our dialogue 'en germe'; and even if we go no further than that, it is significant that the 'germe' is not to be found in works earlier than the Gorgias (493b).

22 pp. 240-3.

23 p. 522.

24 p. 90.

25 p. 197.
gave rise to Plato's other works. It is argued against it, for example, that the characterization is poor,\textsuperscript{26} that the succession of questions and answers is not broken up in the way in which Plato achieves variety in, for example, the Laches, Charmides, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Euthydemus;\textsuperscript{27} that Socrates is dogmatic, and not his usual modest, unassuming self;\textsuperscript{28} that whereas in the Symposium Alcibiades is represented as having been an ardent admirer of Socrates, in our dialogue he shows no sign of enthusiasm at first -- on the contrary, Socrates appears as the constant follower of Alcibiades;\textsuperscript{29} and that in general the dialogue has a tendency to lengthiness in argument\textsuperscript{30} and comprehensiveness in subject-matter which suggests that it is a sort of 'text-book'.\textsuperscript{31} The usual method of defending the dialogue against these charges has been to explain them away as exaggerated or as signs of an early date, or else to deny them outright. Friedländer has certainly done valuable work in pointing out the great merits of the work, which the athetizers tend to underestimate, and Vink has shown that alleged imitations or

\textsuperscript{26} Bruns, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{27} Hirzel, op. cit.; de Strycker, (Bidez, p. 108).
\textsuperscript{28} Tarrant, op. cit.; de Strycker, (Bidez, p. 110).
\textsuperscript{29} Taylor, p. 522, note; Raeder, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{30} Raeder, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{31} Taylor, p. 522.
discrepancies between this and the accepted works of Plato prove nothing. Both have shown, too, that alleged imitation of Xenophon, of Antishenes, and of Aeschines of Sphettus cannot be proved.32 But the fact remains that our dialogue does lay itself open to the criticisms which we have enumerated, and some further explanation of its general character would appear to be called for. It will be worth while to consider whether any special circumstances might have led Plato to write one work of a character rather different from that of his others, after 388 B.C. and before his Latest Period.

32 Vink, pp. 42-52, Friedländer D.G.A. pp. 40-8, as against Dittmar.
A Possible Raison d'Être

We have seen that Polycrates' pamphlet was probably published about 388 B.C. We can form some idea of what this pamphlet contained from the speech of Libanius (fourth century A.D.), which is intended to be a reply to it, and Xenophon, when referring to ways in which Socrates had been accused of corrupting the young, is generally supposed to be stating the charges of Polycrates. We infer from Libanius that Polycrates confined himself to the indictment of corruption, and one of the four points of this indictment, as distinguished by Xenophon, was that Socrates had led astray Critias and Alcibiades, and was therefore responsible for the harm which they had done to Athens.

Reference to the misdeeds of Critias and Alcibiades could not have been made by the prosecution at Socrates' trial, in view of Anytus' loyalty to the political amnesty of 403 B.C. Hence there is no mention of Alcibiades or Critias in the Apology, and no need of any mention. But when Polycrates' pamphlet appeared, their conduct was made a specific accusation against Socrates. Such public condemnation of Socrates' memory was probably responsible for the apologetic works of Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aeschines, and

33 Mem. 1. 2.
34 Cf. Hackforth op. cit., p. 71.
35 Ib. p. 72.
Plato himself might be expected to rally to the defence once more. The Gorgias, however, offers little in the way of a reply to this particular charge, although, as we gather from Isocrates, it was one that had not been brought home to the Athenian public before: Socrates is merely made to express his fear that Callicles and 'my friend Alcibiades' may be made to suffer for Athens' troubles, 'though not responsible for them, except, perhaps, in part'. In the speech put into Alcibiades' mouth in the Symposium, two answers are clearly given: Socrates did not foist any teaching upon Alcibiades—Alcibiades was the active party in this respect, for he tried every possible means of inducing Socrates to impart to him some of his wisdom; and Socrates, so far from trying to give instruction, presented a magnificent personal example: he was a model of self-control, endurance and patriotism.

It is not, on the face of the matter, inconceivable that Plato should see fit to write another dialogue with the special intention of defending Socrates' memory against this particular charge, that he had misguided Alcibiades; and it is important to observe that such a pièce d'occasion might...

36 Busiris 222c. But the tradition that Socrates had 'instructed' Alcibiades became very strong, and is to be found in Cicero (de Or. 3. 34. 139) and Nepos (VII. 2).

37 519b.

38 Cf. esp. 217a-b.
easily present those very features which have led critics to condemn the Alcibiades as un-Platonic. The argument of the _Symposium_ - even if we suppose that that work had already been written - would probably not have found much acceptance among the detractors of Socrates: they would be sceptical of the claim that Socrates had been altogether immune to the charms of Alcibiades,39 and that the two had never discussed political affairs. Plato may have decided to allow the possibility that such a discussion took place, and to show, on that assumption, what Socrates' 'instruction' really was, or might have been. This would probably involve a demonstration of the essence of the Socratic creed that might give the appearance of a hand-book of Socratic philosophy; it would be desirable to show Socrates and Alcibiades alone together, and to omit much of the by-play and variety40 and artistically contrived background that enlivened the usual dialogue; Socrates would have to be presented as setting forth positive

39 The _Symposium_, of course, does not deny that Socrates was his 'lover' (cf. 213c fin.).

40 The passage concerning Persian and Spartan education, which de Strycker declares (Bidez, p. 109) 'ne suffit pas a créer de la variété' would not on this hypothesis be intended to create variety, but rather to demonstrate Socrates' attitude towards these potential enemies, with whom Alcibiades had (later) had nefarious dealings. The tendency to lengthiness could be attributed to the pragmatic rather than artistic purpose of the writer, or to a desire to make points plain to a wider public than was usually catered for. Similar reasons might account for the choice of the form of dialogue that had been used for the earliest works.
beliefs - an unusual role for him, and one that might make him appear unusually dogmatic; and since on our hypothesis the purpose of the work would be purely apologetic and contained in the argument alone, characterization might be largely disregarded. Further, if the Symposium had already appeared, it would be necessary to give the new dialogue a setting of a later date than that assumed for the Symposium in order to avoid contradiction. For Socrates must set forth his beliefs in a manner which he had refused to do when Alcibiades was a boy. It would be better that Socrates should make the advances this time: the daemonion could be used to explain his former reticence, while lapse of time would account for indifference at the beginning of the dialogue, on Alcibiades' part - such original indifference being clearly essential even for a minimum of dramatic effect at the end. Lastly, our hypothesis would account for the

41 It would have to be shown that Socrates himself did know the nature of political wisdom: for the special purpose of the moment Plato might project upon Socrates something of his own self-assurance, just as he was beginning, about this time, to father upon him philosophical conceptions that Socrates had never held.

42 The only alternative would be to represent Alcibiades as still hankering after instruction, and Socrates as at last consenting to give it. Socrates' remark that he has never 'conversed' with Alcibiades before may be taken as meaning that he has never before discussed philosophical subjects with him; but if that interpretation be not accepted, it is no less likely that Plato would allow a discrepancy than that an imitator would disregard the Symposium. (On this question see note on 103a.)
absence of any mention of the theory of 'recollection', which has troubled some critics, since the views set forth would have to be those of the historical Socrates. In this way it could be shown that Socrates never recommended treachery, but rather self-improvement as a means of helping one's country to be a match for foes without.

Since, then, it is possible to find a setting for the dialogue among Plato's works that would account for these features to which objection has been taken, it would be rash to reject the Alcibiades as un-Platonic solely because it is not altogether like Plato's usual productions. We shall see presently that there are far more reliable grounds for rejecting it, but first we must consider one or two other points that have been raised.

43 Lutoslawski (pp. 80, 103) and Taylor (p. 522) find a discrepancy between the style and the thought. (If our dialogue was written after the Meno, the absence of mention of the immortality of soul is certainly surprising.) Nevertheless, there are certainly hints of Plato's own thought: see note 21 ad fin. Curiously enough, Raeder (p. 25) would reject this work precisely because, while its form is that of the early dialogues, its contents suggest too late a date: the enumeration of only four virtues is confined, he says, to works later than the Gorgias. If that were so, it would not be a reason for rejecting the dialogue on our hypothesis; but see pp. 21-3.

44 Persia and Sparta might have been specially chosen for discussion at 121a sq. in order to show that Socrates, so far from being responsible for Alcibiades' intrigues with their rulers, had urged him to regard these countries as potential enemies. On this hypothesis the length of the passage would not be excessive.
Various Objections raised

1. 'Man = Soul': 130c.

Lutoslawski has objected that the 'singular identification of the soul with man' at 130c reveals a 'contradiction between the first Alcibiades and the current Platonic teaching'. This objection is unsound, as Raeder has observed, in view of Phaedo 115cd, Rep. 469d, and Laws, 959ab. It implies a too great insistence on verbal precision: Plato believed, with the Pythagoreans, that the soul was the most important part of a man (cf. Phaedo, esp. 82d - 84b), and the statements in our dialogue that soul governs the body (130a) and that man (in that sense) is soul are merely variant forms of the same notion. Understood in the light of its context, 'man is soul' is seen, in fact, to be merely a vivid way of saying that man is a 'soul using a body' (130c: cf. Phaedo, 79c): that the soul, in fact, is the governing principle in man. There is certainly no 'contradiction between the first Alcibiades and the current Platonic teaching' (italics mine); and to say, as Lutoslawski does, that this 'identification of the soul with man (sic)...recalls a passage from a notoriously spurious dialogue (Axiochus, 365e: η ρέις ἐστιν ψυχή)' proves nothing, for the Axiochus belongs certainly to the very end of the fourth century if not later, and the writer of the

46 p. 25, note.
Akiociva might be following the Alcibiades (which would suggest that he thought it authentic), or using language which for other reasons he believed to be in the true Platonic manner. 'Man is soul' may no more be intended as an equation of identity than the Socratic dictum, 'Virtue is knowledge'.

De Strycker claims that the remark at 130c presupposes a clear distinction between body and soul already drawn in earlier works, and points to the trouble taken in the Phaedo to establish it. But this final observation at 130c is certainly not put forward as 'needing neither proof nor even explanation', as de Strycker says: it has been argued at some length and with the aid of several analogies that the agent is distinct from and superior to the instruments that he uses. Even if the Alcibiades could not be placed after the Phaedo (which is not impossible on the hypothesis suggested above, if only the objections so far raised be taken into account), it could still be claimed that what we have here is a preliminary attempt at proving what is further proved in the Phaedo. There is no ground here for rejecting the Alcibiades.

2. The 'definition of justice' at 127c.

At 127c Socrates asks, 'Do we act justly or unjustly, 

47 Bidez, p. 118. Cf. Bidez himself (ib. pp. 122 sq.), who suggests that just as Aristotle's Eudemus exaggerates the distinction between body and soul, and presents the union of the two as an act both violent and contrary to nature, so the Alcibiades, with its 'identification' (sic) of man with soul, is a step in the same direction, though it does not go so far.
when each one of us performs his own particular function?'
and the answer is, 'Justly, without a doubt.' De Strycker regards it as astonishing that Socrates himself should without any hesitation present a definition of justice.

It is at least doubtful whether this should really be called a 'definition' of justice. In its context, we find that the principle presents a difficulty, which is never explicitly resolved: one would have thought that to do one's own job was to fulfill the requirements of justice, and yet enquiry seems to show that if everyone followed that principle there could be no 'friendship' in a state. In our dialogue, this is made the reason for regarding as unsatisfactory the claim that the political art exists to create such 'friendship' or 'unanimity'. A very similar argument is to be found in the Charmides, where it appears, as in our dialogue, that if everyone kept rigidly to his own affairs the state could never be described as well conducted (161e). In the Charmides it is the statement that 'doing one's own job' is temperance that is, ostensibly at least, rejected; but unless we look for an implied conclusion in the all-important passage of our dialogue, 132d sq. 49 - which de Strycker does not do - there is no ground for asserting that the Alcibiades shows any more certainty than the Charmides about the nature of political

48 Bidez, p. 118.
49 That there is such an implied conclusion is suggested in the Commentary, pp. 113-114.
justice. Again, in the Republic itself considerable use is made of the 'one man, one job' theory long before the definition of justice is announced in Book IV at 433a. It is assumed in Book II (359e sq.)—precisely as at Alcibiades, 127c—that one who acts on that principle will be just, although, also as in the Alcibiades, the principle is not at that stage transmuted into a definition; and on our hypothesis that the Alcibiades was written as a result of the appearance of Polycrates' pamphlet, our dialogue could hardly be much earlier, if earlier at all, than the second book of the Republic. Lastly, Busiris, 16-17, contains what is almost certainly a reference to Plato in the course of a discussion of the Egyptian principle 'one man, one job': the inference would seem to be that Plato had discussed it with approval, and, since the Busiris was almost certainly not written later than 385 B.C., 50 that he was doing so at the time when, on our hypothesis, the Alcibiades might have been written.

It follows, therefore, that we cannot use this passage to prove the dialogue spurious.

3. 'Dépendance totale envers la divinité.'

De Strycker has observed that in the works of Plato's old age the tone becomes humble and more devotional: submission to divine authority is taken almost to the point of

denying man's responsibility for his actions; and in the 
Alcibiades he finds both an exaggerated influence attributed 
to Socrates' συλλογικόν, and in general an emphasis on the 
supremacy of deity that is absent from Plato's early works.
'Socrate se sent-il dans un état de dépendance totale envers 
la divinité', 51

It is true that somewhat more prominence is given to the 
συλλογικόν in this work that is usual in Plato's dialogues, 
though not nearly so much prominence as in the admittedly 
spurious Theages. It is true, in particular, that Socrates'
promise at the beginning of the dialogue to explain its 
influence is somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, whether 
Plato wrote this dialogue or not, if it was composed after 
the Symposium some explanation had to be given why Socrates 
was now prepared to discuss philosophical matters, although 
previously he had refused; and to explain this by reference 
to the συλλογικόν would be an easy and natural device. 52

To say, moreover, as Socrates does, that he can help 
Alcibiades, but 'only with God's help', or that Alcibiades 
can succeed in his object only 'if God be willing', does not

51 Bidez, pp. 113-4. Objection to the treatment of the 
ςυλλογικόν is also taken by Wilamowitz (II, p. 326) and 
by Arbs (p. 10).

52 The special explanation of its powers may be due to the 
fact that Alcibiades - even if he had heard something 
about the ςυλλογικόν already (as he must have done) -
would be particularly bewildered by the present situation.
necessarily imply the τά καθαρά exhibited in the Laws.\textsuperscript{53}

Again, if we consider 133c, even if we accept the whole of the passage recorded by Eusebius and Stobaeus, there are no grounds for seeing here an Oriental attitude of abject submission: we have rather the hopeful aspiration of one who is strongly aware of the divine element in man. We cannot reject the dialogue on the ground that it exhibits the humility of Plato's later works.\textsuperscript{54}

4. The four virtues.

De Strycker\textsuperscript{55} claims that the doctrine that there are only four cardinal virtues did not receive its definitive form until Plato wrote the Republic, and that the remarks in our dialogue about the education of a Persian prince (121e - 122a) must presuppose that formulation. He will not accept Vink's citation\textsuperscript{56} of Euthydemus, 279b-c, as a similar passage on the ground that there is no mention there of the number four, which he claims is the essential point. But we know

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. esp. Laws, 716a, 774c, 887e.

\textsuperscript{54} De Strycker himself admits (Bidez, p. 114, note) that in passages recommending us to copy God Plato himself normally uses such expressions as κατὰ διανωτὸν or καθός ἐστι διανωτὸν ἀνθρωπίνως. The absence of such a phrase in the Alcibiades must detract from his argument that it exhibits submissiveness.

\textsuperscript{55} Bidez, pp. 115-7.

\textsuperscript{56} pp. 81-2.
from Xenophon\(^57\) that the virtues enumerated did constitute the main subjects of Persian education, so that if that was to be described at all, we should have to have this list.

If our writer had wished to enumerate what he considered the main virtues in some other passage, the number might have differed in much the same way as Euthyd. 281c\(^58\) differs from Euthyd. 279bc\(^58\). It would seem, moreover, that the list as we have it in our passage was the popularly accepted list before Plato even began to write\(^59\) and if that is so the only faintly surprising thing about Plato's practice is the addition of piety in some of his early works; but we should only have real evidence by which to date a dialogue if he had ever subtracted from the popularly accepted list. Raeder\(^60\)

---

\(^57\) Cyr. VIII. 1. 23 sq. (piety), 26 (justice), 30 (temperance), 34 sq. (endurance). Piety here clearly = religious wisdom. We should note, too, with Friedländer (D.G.A. II, p. 19) that in our dialogue these virtues appear partly in Persian guise - wisdom as the Ἀθλητας of Zoroaster, justice as truthfulness; and partly in the popular, traditional form - courage as fearlessness, temperance as control of desires. Contrast the treatment of temperance (probably our author's own definition) at 131b.

\(^58\) Cf., in fact, the different list of virtues attributed to the Spartans at 122c. True, the Spartan system is not meant to be ideal; but neither, probably, is that of the Persians (cf. Friedländer II, pp. 238-9). Our writer, even if he were not Plato, may have been glad to point to Persian insistence on four virtues that he considered important, but the main emphasis in our passage seems to be on the specialization of these instructors: see Commentary, p. 145-7, and note on 121e.

\(^59\) Cf. Adam on Rep. 427e, quoted by Hackforth C.Q. VII, 1913, p. 266.

\(^60\) p. 25.
who is also suspicious of the list in our dialogue, claims that whereas in Plato's later works piety is counted as a part of justice, in the lists contained in works up to and including the Protagoras and Gorgias piety appears as a separate virtue; but piety appears as a part of justice at Euthyphro 11e - 12e, and there can be few who would agree with Raeder that for this reason the Euthyphro must be placed later than the Gorgias. However that may be, on the hypothesis that our dialogue may have been written in reply to Polycrates, it could have been written after the Gorgias, and the absence of piety need arouse no suspicions. 61

5. Zoroaster.

Jaeger62 believes that the Alcibiades should be interpreted in the light of the Academy's interest in Oriental religion about the time of Aristotle's On Philosophy. His evidence for this63 is the passage that we have just discussed, when he sees 'a parallel between Plato's four

61 Piety is also omitted from the list at Euthyd. 279bc.
63 Jaeger also declares that the purpose of this dialogue is 'to apply theology to the problems of Plato's early days, and to anchor them in a firm dogmatic principle, to wit, the mysticism of Plato's later doctrine of Nus' (p. 165, n. 1). I shall try to give reasons for believing that the first part of this statement is correct, but I believe that our writer's conception of Nus goes even beyond Plato's doctrine. (Jaeger is mainly concerned with the On Philosophy, and does not attempt to go into detail to prove our dialogue spurious.)
virtues and the ethics of Zarathustra'. We shall presently see other reasons for reaching the same conclusion as Jaeger as to the date of the Alcibiades; but it is very doubtful whether we should assume much in the way of Oriental influence, and there is certainly not sufficient evidence of it to prove that Plato himself could not have written the dialogue. Aristotle in On Philosophy seems to have regarded Socrates as the 'restorer of the ethical principle of Apolline religion', and the Epinomis seeks to combine the religion of the East with the religion of Apollo. If the Alcibiades did in fact emphasize the importance of Zoroastrianism, the discussion of the Delphic maxim would indeed suggest that its object was the same; but that discussion can afford little support for Jaeger's theory when taken in conjunction with what may be no more than a casual reference to Zoroaster.

The parallel that Jaeger sees depends largely upon the hypothesis that Plato may have been regarded as an avatar of Zoroaster; but even if the truth of that hypothesis be granted, a writer seeking to combine the Oriental and Apolline religions would have little to gain by pointing to a parallel between Oriental and Platonic ethical principles. The

---

64 p. 130.

65 pp. 133 sq.

66 The four virtues might perhaps be regarded as Socratic principles also, though, as we have seen (p. 71), it has also been argued against Platonic authenticity that they were not formulated into a doctrine before the time of the Republic; and Jaeger specially mentions Plato. (See too note 57 on the treatment of temperance.)
ostensible praise of Sparta and of Persia, moreover, is almost certainly tinged with a good deal of irony, and it would be unwise to base any conclusion as to the authenticity of this work on a passage that admits of another and simpler interpretation.

Such information about Persia as our author shows that he possesses could easily have been acquired by Plato himself, and need be no hindrance to admitting the authenticity of this work, especially if it were dated after the appearance of Polycrates' pamphlet and after the Gorgias.

6. Aristoxenus' anecdote of Socrates and the Indian.

Bidez, following Hirzel, argues that the story recorded by Aristoxenus of an Indian rebuking Socrates for trying to study things human without first studying the divine

---

67 See Commentary, p. 100 and notes on 121e.

68 Plato could have acquired this information during his travels, or (directly or indirectly) through his stepfather Pyrilampes, who had been ambassador at the Great King's court (Charm. 158a); or by this time he might have learned something from Xenophon's associates or Xenophon himself. (The three judges of the lower world in the Gorgias, and the distinction between just men and sinners at Phaedo 114a sq.; perhaps also suggest Iranian influence: cf. Gerffken, Neue Jahrb. 1929, pp. 520-1, cited by Festugière, H. de Phil. p. 6, Platon et l'Orient p. 6.)

69 pp. 123-4. "Il devient loisible," he suggests, "de supposer que, peut-être, c'est le mot de l'Indien rapporté par Socrate qui donna à un platonicien l'idée de composer le Premier Alcibiade."

70 Rhein. Mus. 45 (1890) pp. 419 sq.

71 Frag. ap. Eusebius Praep. Ev. XI. 3. 4. (Frg. 31 Müller.)
would lose all its point if the Alcibiades, with its 'leçon de théologie donnée par Socrate à Alcibiades', had already taken its place 'dans la série des dialogues socratiques'.

Now Friedländer\(^7\) has already pointed out that according to this argument Theaetetus 175b and Republic, 379a, for example, would have to be dated later than Aristoxenus' work. The Platonic dialogues frequently represent Socrates as discussing 'the divine'. It might be argued that this would not prevent the formulation of Aristoxenus' story because neither he nor its inventor (if other than he) would have accepted the doctrine put into Socrates' mouth by Plato as truly held by the historical Socrates. But if the Alcibiades references to the divine do go beyond the thought of the historical Socrates, the ancients would surely have recognized the fact as they did \((\text{ex hypothesi})\) in the case of the other dialogues, so that the point of Aristoxenus' story would still remain unimpaired; while if the doctrine of our dialogue is, as several modern commentators have held, entirely Socratic, it is wrong to speak of a 'leçon de théologie'. There is no need either way to suppose that the dialogue must have been written before Aristoxenus' story was circulated.

Even if we suppose that our dialogue was written by someone other than Plato, whose purpose was similar to that of the inventor of Aristoxenus' story - to insist, that is, that

\(^7\) D.G.A. II, pp. 38-9.
Socraticism must be supplemented by the new religion - there is still no ground for supposing that the Alcibiades could not have been written before Aristoxenus' story was invented. The dialogue would be itself no less symbolical than the anecdote of the Indian, and would presumably be recognized as such. Indeed there are some grounds for arguing that it is unlikely to have taken its place as part of the Platonic corpus after Aristoxenus wrote. Such inclusion could only be accounted for on the assumption that its symbolical purpose had been overlooked; yet Aristoxenus flourished about 318 B.C., and we have seen that the dialogue was accepted as genuine within little more than a century of Plato's death. Some spuria were no doubt incorporated into the canon not long after they were written; but if the Alcibiades had a purpose and origin similar to those of Aristoxenus' story, the fact must surely have been known at least by the first generation or two of its readers.

However that may be, we cannot allow that our dialogue could not have been written before Aristoxenus' story.
One of the two features of our dialogue that make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attribute it to Plato, is the writer's conception of God.

On the hypothesis that the dialogue was written by Plato, we should probably have to allow that Plato purposely omitted, for the most part, un-Socratic doctrine, though he may occasionally have allowed — inadvertently perhaps — something of his own later thought to creep in. Certainly the passage at 133c recorded by Eusebius and Stobaeus, according to which God is the 'fairest mirror', would have to be rejected as blatantly un-Socratic. We have then to explain the words πάν τῇ θεον γνώσις, θεον τῇ καὶ φεώνησιν, which occur at 133c in what Friedländer calls the 'uninterpolated' text; and even if, with him, we suppose that 'φεώνησις' or

73 See note 21 ad fin. and 65.

74 This passage (Ἁρ; οὐ... Ναι) is probably, in fact, authentic, for the λαμπέον at 134d is hardly intelligible without it. This λαμπέον must be intended to recall the καθὸ πρέπει τῇ καὶ λαμπέον at 133c. Further, we have been told that an eye, in order to see itself, must look εἰς κατέστησε τῇ καὶ τῇ προσώπῳ (132e); it may see its reflexion ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταγμής καὶ ἀφίεν ἥπερ ἐν κατέστησε (133a), but it is clear that it could also do so in a real καταστησε. Similarly I take καὶ ἐίς ἄλλο ὑπάρχον τοῦ γόνεων ἀμον ἂν (133b) as preparing the way for mention of the καθαρσίαν ἄφετεν of our mind, which is God. If we accept these lines, the thought clearly goes far beyond Socrates.

75 p. 243, note.
is here equalized with God,' 76 we have to admit that there is no evidence anywhere else that Socrates ever made the equation. Again, the historical Socrates had never met anyone whose claim to wisdom was justified, and it would be very surprising if he nevertheless suggested that an intimation of true wisdom could be gained by simply regarding the nature of mind as reflected in someone else. Lastly, even if we omit the lines that Friedländer would reject, it is difficult to believe that this passage, the climax of the dialogue, means no more than that man is potentially capable of understanding the nature of wisdom. It seems to imply an emphatic belief in God, and in a God who is knowable, a belief such as there is no evidence that Socrates himself ever held.

While this passage is un-Socratic, it is also un-Platonic: for the idea that anyone while still on earth could acquire knowledge of 'all that is divine' was certainly not— at least during the only period to which on other grounds we might ascribe this dialogue— Plato's doctrine. The supreme God of the Symposium, Phaedo, and Republic may be the Good or the Beautiful in its character as first

76 p. 245.
principle of being, 77 though Plato does not say so explicitly; but the contemplation of this principle is only possible after a long process of purification, and only after death: 78 for only then can the whole process of purification, both moral and intellectual, be complete. Yet our dialogue certainly appears to suggest that knowledge of God can be attained by considering mind alone, and that there is every reason to expect success in the search while the seeker is still on earth. 79 Again, in Plato's view at this time, the

77 Festugière, pp. 262-6. Cherniss (p. 606) objects that the Good is the 'cause of virtue, and so it cannot be god but is in some sense the cause of god's being god'. The Good, which is 'divine', is the first principle of being: and cf. the strong arguments of Festugière (loc. cit.). Plato probably never worked out in detail a theory of God's nature; he was content in such matters to accept 'likely stories', which may sometimes seem to conflict with one another. But what he does say could allow of the explanation that God is the cause of his own goodness: God is God because he contemplates the goodness that he himself has caused, as well as of goodness in everything else.

Phaedrus, 247d and 249c 5, where the divinity of gods is described as the result of contemplation of Forms, seems to refer to what the Timaeus calls 'inferior gods'. The Euthyphro, which shows that a good act is good irrespective of the pleasure that it gives to any god, need not mean that that which allows of the existence of a principle of goodness (to which it also conforms itself) is not God. But as the Euthyphro is a Socratic dialogue, it should not in any case be used to illustrate Plato's own later thought. As for Phil., 67a, where οδος is distinguished from τιμώματα, the latter expression does not there mean the Form of the Good, as the context shows (cf. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p. 141 n. 2, p. 126 n. 2). See also note 84, ad loc.

78 Phaedo, 66e, 79cd.

79 Apart from the general implication, cf. 109e with note ad loc.
contemplation of human mind, even if mind could be regarded as an object of knowledge (and he never so describes it), could only have led to recognition of God by prompting 'recollection'.

There was certainly, as yet, no suggestion of identity in essence between minds and God. Yet our dialogue gives no hint of the necessity of 'recollection' or of dialectical procedure.

If it be supposed that our dialogue was written before the Symposium, we cannot say what Plato's conception of God was before that date; and if in the Symposium, Phaedo, and Republic the Good is not his God, it is impossible to say exactly how he did regard God at the time of those dialogues. Yet the Alcibiades suggests that its writer had a very clear conception of God, and suggests, moreover, that there exists between human mind and the wisdom which is God something more than mere 'likeness'—a bond of union, in fact, such as is nowhere to be found in any of Plato's works of his Early or Middle Periods.

In his later works Plato came nearer to the doctrine of our dialogue, but it is doubtful whether he ever quite reached it. The conception of God becomes clearer, and assumes greater importance: even in the Theaetetus the process of purification is described as θεώς (see pp. 35 sq.).

80 Cf. esp. Symp. 210a sq. For Plato only Forms were truly knowable, but he never calls mind a Form (see pp. 35 sq.).

81 176b.
but dialectic, as is clear from the Sophist and the Statesman, is still all-important in the pursuit of wisdom, and human mind is never described in such a way as to imply that by regarding it we can 'get to know God'. Plato's supreme God may still have been, the Good (= the Beautiful) in its character as first principle of being, and we might perhaps identify with this principle the One of the Philebus, and (under another aspect) the Cosmic Mind of the same dialogue, in its capacity as primal Cause. Others take the world-soul of the Timaeus to represent Plato's supreme God; but

82 Cf. Festugière, pp. 252-6, 478.

83 Ib. pp. 205, 265.

84 Cf. Festugière, Platon et l'Orient, p. 21, where he emphasizes that this soul is not only intelligible, but first cause of movement and eternal; but the same writer's earlier argument (Contemplation, pp. 266, 477) that it is dependent on the Ideal world is important. The fact, too, that this soul is said (though admittedly only in a myth) to be compounded of that which is divisible as well as of that which is indivisible makes the identification difficult. It may be, however, that the Cosmic Reason resident in this Cosmic Soul is a sort of self-projection of God the primal Cause, who is represented in this myth as a creator or Demiurge. Cf. Phil. 30cd, where the supreme soul and mind come into being 'through the power of the Cause'; and this Cause is called τὰ πᾶντα πάντα διὰ τῆς γονεύουσαν at 27b (cf. Hackforth op. cit. p. 57). Cherniss (p. 607), who holds that Plato's God was 'soul having ὑάμας', has opposed the view that he was pure ὑός (Hackforth C.Q. XXX, 1935, pp. 4-9), maintaining that according to Soph. 249a ὑάμας must always reside in soul. But this may be true of God only in so far as he has to know us, for which the make-up of the world-soul allows. We may still regard him as a ὑάμας which is 'separable in thought', though he manifests himself to us through the action of a World-soul, of which, no less than of everything else, he is in fact the 'cause'.

Cherniss finds it significant that Aristotle should
the ultimate sanction of knowledge, with which the highest God of the Alcibiades is certainly identified, remains, in the Timaeus, the Forms. Dialectic, again, remains an important part of the philosopher's programme in the Statesman, the Seventh Letter, and even in the Laws. Without dialectic one cannot discover the one that underlies the special virtues. It is true that in the Laws it would appear that dialectical ability goes hand-in-hand with, or perhaps is even the result of, an understanding of the divinity of the heavens, and that 'no one who believes in the gods ever does wrong voluntarily'. Indeed the method of the astronomical study involved in reaching that understanding seems itself to have much in common with dialectical procedure. But even if we allow that in his old age Plato might have omitted all mention of dialectic in a discussion

84 (contd. from previous page)

have little to say about the Demiurge, although he took quite literally the metaphorical 'creation' of the world in the Timaeus. But Cherniss admits that Aristotle called the Demiurge a 'god' (de an. 407b 9-12); and surely Aristotle could not have taken the creation of the world literally at all if he had regarded the Demiurge merely as 'a logical abstraction'. (It is usually agreed, however, that the activity of the Demiurge should not, in fact, be taken literally, any more than God's creation of the Form of God in ref. X: so on the Forms, together support.)

85 341cd, 344b.
86 Laws, 963b sq.
87 966b sq., esp. 967de.
88 885b.
89 Cf. Epin. 991e.
of the foundation of moral and political truth, it is inconceivable that during the period between the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*, whatever he may have believed God's nature to have been, and however anxious he may have been to exclude, for the most part, un-Socratic doctrine, he would have included it to the extent of making wisdom obtainable by the contemplation of divine mind, and yet not even mentioned dialectical method.

We may say, then, that while the conception of God that is manifested in this important passage of our dialogue is un-Socratic, it is also out of keeping with Plato's own view as expressed in the works of his Middle Period, and probably even with the latest works that are generally admitted to have been written by Plato himself. We have here an important reason for denying the authenticity of the *Alcibiades*.

A further reason is to be found in the writer's conception of mind.
We have observed that there is no evidence that the historical Socrates ever equated God with wisdom. We may now add that there is no evidence either that he ever distinguished mind from the rest of the soul in the manner of our dialogue. But the important fact to observe is that whether or not we supposed the dialogue to be written from a Socratic point of view — and our hypothesis would require that that had been the case — we should have to conclude, on the assumption of Platonic authorship, that Plato never made any use of the central doctrine of the dialogue in his later works. If a man can learn the nature of his own mind by contemplating the mind of another, the implication would seem to be that mind itself is an object of knowledge, and that reason and the object of reason (in this instance at least) are essentially one. It would be a curious coincidence if Plato really represented Socrates as holding views very similar to those which, as we shall see, were current at the end of Plato’s life, and yet chose not to record or develop them in any later work in connection with his theory of Forms.

The implications of our dialogue are such as Plato could hardly have failed to recognize. Indeed we twice find the expression οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν, and on one occasion this is

---

90 p. 19.
91 129b, 130d. Cf. also τὸν αὐτὸν, 130d.
contrasted with \( \delta_{\nu} \) or \( \delta_{\nu} \). Such language would be bound at least to suggest the possibility of positing a Form of Self as opposed to the individual person; and along such lines as these Plato would have been able to define precisely the 'kinship' that he assumed to exist between mind and form. This notion, indeed, very soon aroused considerable criticism simply because it was not precisely explained. Again, if Plato had decided to go so far as to call mind a Form, as Aristotle does in the Eudemus, he could have thereby proved at once the immortality of the soul: for if mind was a Form it must be immortal. Even if he did not wish to go so far, we should certainly expect to find the possibility discussed, if it had ever occurred to him.

Now there are some grounds for supposing that the notion of soul as a Form did in fact occur to Plato when he wrote the Phaedo. In that dialogue, of course, soul (which is there regarded chiefly as the seat of reason) is said to be like, akin to, that which is pure and everlasting and ever the same (79d); it is very like that which is intelligible and single and indissoluble, and always bearing the same relationship towards itself (80ab). It would seem to be consistent with this to say that the soul, at least as it exists after it has finally left this world (cf. 79d) is a

---

92 On the reading, see note on 130d.

93 See p. 44.
Form. At 105b sq., moreover, we find that as fire invariably partakes of heat, the triad of oddness, and snow of coldness, so soul will always partake of the Form of life; but whereas at the approach of coldness fire ceases to be fire, and at the approach of heat snow melts, that which is inseparable from the Form of life can hardly cease to be at the approach of death: it must simply 'withdraw'.

From this last argument it might be argued that since the triad is called a Form (at 104d), soul may be one too. But this passage emphasizes the difference between soul on the one hand, and fire, snow, and the triad on the other, no less than their point of resemblance: and we are not told that fire or snow are Forms. Indeed in the Parmenides the question is specially raised whether or not there is a Form of fire or of water, in a way which suggests that there were doubts; and all that is essential to the Phaedo argument is that certain things partake of certain special kinds of Form. We cannot, therefore, say that Plato must have regarded soul as a Form at this time. Nevertheless, the discussion of soul and Forms side by side may have suggested to him the possibility of so regarding it, and this makes it somewhat surprising that although the ascription to the rational soul of the status of a Form would seem to be

94 Cf. Burnet's notes (ed. Phaedo) on 104d 1, 105d 3; and Cherniss, note 372.
necessary for a really cogent proof of its immortality, Plato never calls it one. On the contrary, the description in the myth at the end of the dialogue of the soul's rewards and punishments after death seems quite incompatible with the view of soul as a Form.

There seem to be two conceivable explanations of Plato's failure to call soul a Form in the Phaedo: (1) he felt even at this time that anything partaking of life must necessarily move, whereas a Form must be motionless; (2) he wanted to maintain the immortality of the individual soul, and to preserve the theory of recollection, whereas if 'soul' were a Form it would have to be soul uncompounded with those qualities which distinguish one person from another.

Now Plato may have believed when he wrote the Phaedo that motion was a necessary concomitant of life and therefore of soul, but that could hardly prevent him from positing a motionless Form of soul, if it did not prevent him from admitting - as in fact he did admit - a Form of life itself.

To accept the second explanation, that Plato wanted to believe in the immortality of the individual soul, is not

---

95 Cf. Festugière, p. 114.

96 Cf. Cherniss, pp. 434-7; and on the immobility of Forms, ib. note 374, and p. 538.

97 106d. Similarly in the Parmenides it is finally admitted that there is a Form of man. It is true that the question has been debated, whether there is such a Form: but the fact that man moves does not appear as a reason for doubt.
necessarily to ascribe to Plato a willingness to let sentimentality get the better of his reason if we allow that the soul had not yet been fully analysed, and might be regarded simply as the divine, inseparable vehicle of the Form of life. The logical necessity of the doctrine of 'recollection' may have appeared much more cogent than the possibility that a cognitive element within the soul should be regarded as a Form. But - and this is the important point for our present purpose - if Plato had already in an earlier dialogue carefully distinguished mind from the rest of the soul, and treated mind, thus distinguished, as a generic concept, in terms that he now applied to Forms, to suppress the very possibility of such an identification in those circumstances would be an inexcusable retrogression. The \( \alpha\nu\varepsilon\tau\alpha \tau\epsilon \) would have to be given the status of a Form, even if that meant the abandonment of the theory of recollection\(^9\) and of the survival of the individual personality, unless some new argument could be found to prevent it; we can hardly suppose that Plato would wilfully disregard the threat to those theories, if he was aware of it (as he must have been if he had written the \textit{Alcibiades}) and build the vast edifice of the \textit{Republic} (as well as the \textit{Phaedo}) on foundations that he knew to be insecure.

\(^9\) Aristotle in the \textit{Eudemus} seems to have saved the continuity of consciousness while calling soul a Form (see Jaeger, p. 51).
The Republic, it is true, analyses the soul most carefully into parts, but soul is there probably to be regarded, as in the myth of the Phaedrus, as in essence incohesive: that is to say, when freed from the body, the purified and uncorrupted soul is homogeneous. Like the World-soul in the Timaeus (37a), its 'parts' will be separable only in thought: for according to Phaedo doctrine, which the Republic does not contradict, an essentially incohesive nature is necessary to immortality, and the Republic soul, for all its three 'parts', is certainly immortal. But however that may be, the distinction in our dialogue between the άντίχ ου and the complete individual man is certainly much more clear-cut than that between κώλεγετικον and the complete soul in the Republic. Mind in the Alcibiades is not merely one part out of three, an ϛεγηκων or instrument of the whole (Rep. 527de), but in itself the essence of a man - the generic essence, it would seem, common to all humanity, which can recognize itself in itself wherever it exists.

If, then, Plato had not written the Alcibiades, even if the possibility of regarding soul or mind as a Form had occurred to him, there was certainly no binding necessity

---

99 See Commentary, p. 124.

100 Friedländer (D.G.A. II, p. 14) is clearly right in insisting that we are urged to regard someone else's soul, but I can see no justification for the claim that 'it is not a question of Tom, Dick, or Harry, but of Socrates, into whose soul one must look' (p. 244).
arising out of his earlier philosophical progress for him to
call it one when he came to write the Phaedo and the Republic.
But if he had already written the Alcibiades, it is extremely
difficult to see how he could have disregarded its implica-
tions so completely as to base the works of his maturity on
contrary assumptions without any refutation or even mention
of the possibility of equating mind with Form.

In the Phaedrus Plato bases his proof that soul is
immortal on the assumption that soul is in motion, an
assumption that might\textsuperscript{101} be incompatible, for Plato, with the
view of it as a Form; but if it was, the very fact that he
chose to prove the soul's immortality in such a way as this,
without any hint that he was abandoning an earlier conception,
suggests that he had never seriously considered regarding
soul as a Form. If he had ever seriously considered doing
so, we should expect, moreover, to find an indication of the
fact in the Parmenides, where the question is raised —
probably as a result of criticism of Plato's theory — how,
with mere human intelligence, we can hope to know the Forms.

In Plato's later works we come much nearer to the doctrine
of our dialogue, but still we never quite reach it. In the
Philebus mind is assigned to a special class as 'the cause of

\textsuperscript{101} This would only be the case (cf. p. 38 supra, and note 97)
if he now believed what he appears to hold in the Sophist
(243d sq., cf. Comford, C.A.H. VI, p. 327) that all mind
(i.e. even the mind embodied in man) is as real as the
Forms, but that all mind, both human and divine, must
move.
things', and human mind is related (though rather vaguely\textsuperscript{102}) to the Cosmic Reason resident in a Cosmic Soul; but neither human nor cosmic mind is described even as an object of knowledge, and the Forms, if they have a place in the Philebus scheme at all, are almost certainly not to be identified with the $\mu^2 \pi^{\text{7}} \tau_5 \rho^5 \omega_3$.\textsuperscript{103} In the \textit{Timaeus}, again, there is no suggestion that the Cosmic Soul or the Reason that resides in it is a Form. This soul is described as 'intelligible';\textsuperscript{104} and soul is tentatively so described also in a passage of the \textit{Laws};\textsuperscript{105} but in the \textit{Timaeus} the description is only tentative, and the purpose of the \textit{Timaeus} was to provide not another Form, but a medium of knowledge. It was almost axiomatic that only what is knowable can be.

It is true that the \textit{Timaeus} allows for a measure of similarity between the composition of human and of divine soul; but in the \textit{Seventh Letter}\textsuperscript{106} we again read of the rewards and the punishments that the soul may expect after death, which would seem to be quite incompatible with the view of mind as a Form.

The fact, then, that the conception of mind in our

\textsuperscript{102} Cf. Hackforth, \textit{Plato's Examination of Pleasure}, p. 50: 'he seems indeed carefully to refrain from saying that human reason is part of the divine, and the dominating notion with which he works here is that of affinity or similarity'.

\textsuperscript{103} Cf. ib. p. 39.

\textsuperscript{104} 37a.

\textsuperscript{105} 398de. The purpose of so describing it here, as the context shows, is not to equate it with the Forms, but simply to allow for discussion of it.

\textsuperscript{106} 335a.
dialogue appears to be quite unlike Plato's conception of it at the only time when it is otherwise possible that he might have written this work, and, above all, that Plato never shows any sign of ever having held such a view, provides us with a further reason for regarding the Alcibiades as spurious. This conclusion is supported not only by its treatment of God, which we have already considered, but also by the similarity of its doctrine as a whole to that of later works written by Aristotle and others which probably appeared round about the time of Plato's death.
Aristotle's Early Works and the Platonic Spuria.

1. The Early Aristotle.

In his *Eudemus*, written about 354/3 B.C.,\(^{107}\) Aristotle called the soul a Form.\(^{108}\) This he did, we are told, because in collecting together various notions into groups it resembles τὸ ἑλέον τῆς νομοῦ οὐκ. At the same time he contrives to retain the doctrine of recollection by making memory an essential feature of mind.\(^{109}\) Jaeger holds that when writing this work Aristotle still believed in separately existing (Platonic) Forms;\(^{110}\) but whether that was the case or not, it would appear that Aristotle, in the passage of the *Eudemus* with which we are concerned, was directly criticizing Plato for not calling soul a Form,\(^{111}\) which would confirm our conclusion that Plato never did so.


\(^{108}\) Frg. 46 Rose (recorded by Simplicius).

\(^{109}\) Frg. 41.

\(^{110}\) p. 52. Cherniss (p. 508) observes that Aristotle still regarded soul as a substance when he called it a Form at *Met.* 1077a 32-33; but frg. 41 (about recollection) suggests that Jaeger is right.

\(^{111}\) Frg. 46 seems to show that Aristotle in the same passage criticized Plato for always calling Forms and images by the same name, and for not allowing that the soul can 'receive' Forms: cf. *Tim.* 52a. Since he is clearly basing all his remarks on the description of soul in the *Timaeus*, it would seem that they are all intended to improve upon Plato's doctrine.

In the same fragment we read: 'the true Forms are of the same category as the superior part of soul, namely mind'.
In the Protrepticus we find the same analogy between mental and visual perception as appears in the Alcibiades at 133b sq. This analogy is not to be found in so striking a form in Plato's early works. Plato, of course, often applies verbs of 'seeing' to intellectual perception, but nothing comparable to Alcibiades 133b sq. appears before Republic VI-VII. The analogy appears again later in Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, and may have occurred in the On Philosophy as well. It is more than likely that the Nicomachean Ethics is here following the Eudemian version, of which the central books are lost, and that the Eudemian Ethics derived this analogy, as it derived so much else, from the Protrepticus. Although we cannot claim that the analogy is specially Aristotelian, it is significant that it

112 Iambi. Protr. p. 43 ll. 20 sq.; p. 56 ll. 4 sq. (with which cf. E.N. 1144b 10 sq.).

113 533d, τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀπορία: cf. 508c, 518c, 519c. At Laws 961d the virtues of the head and of the soul are found, respectively, in the eyes and in the mind.

114 1144a 29-30, τὸ ἐπίστημον τοῦτον... τῆς ἐπιστήμης: 1144b 10 sq., 1096b 28-9 (with which cf. Alc. 133b, where sight is said to be the virtue of the eye, while wisdom is the virtue of the soul).

115 Bignone has tried to show that Cicero Tusc. Disp. 1, 27, 66-29, 71 is in its entirety a reproduction of the On Philosophy, but Cherniss (p. 599) denies this. Certainly there is a good deal that is taken directly from Plato in this section of the Tusculans. But the analogy as it appears at Tusc. 1, 27, 66 may come from the On Philosophy.

116 Cf. Jaeger ch. IX passim. The idea is implicit at End. Eth. VIII, 1248a 30 sq.
does not appear in any striking form in Plato's earlier works, and that Aristotle made full use of it on several occasions. 117

The object of the Protrepticus was to advocate the theoretic life as the only life that can give the practising statesman knowledge of the absolute norms that must govern his political acts. The theoretic statesman is superior to the leaders of the so-called κυρίαρχοι of Sparta and of Crete. 118 So too it would seem that according to our dialogue the theoretic statesman can do better than the rulers of Sparta and of Persia. 119 Again, just as the Protrepticus sets forth three 'aims' — the apolaustic, the practical, and the theoretic (which Heraclides of Pontus elaborated into the analogy of those at Olympia who come to make gain, to take part, or to watch 120), so the author of the Alcibiades sets up Alcibiades as aiming simultaneously at worldly gain and practical virtue, and contrasts with his aims the highest life, the life of contemplation. We may note, too, that by

117 Friedländer (Am. Journ. Phil., Oct. 1945, pp. 348 sq.) cites Aristotle's Eroticus, frg. 96 Rose: 'Aristotle said that the lovers glance at no other part of the body of the beloved than into their eyes, in which modesty, reverence, dwells,' and compares this with Alc. 133a sq. He admits, however, that the thought is by no means identical. If there is any similarity, there is no evidence here as to which passage was written first. The analogy appears later in Ps.-Arist. Rhet. ad Alex. 1421a 22, de Mundo 391a 15.


119 See Commentary, pp. 100-1.

120 Cf. Jaeger, p. 98.
the time of the Protrepticus Alcibiades had become recognized as the type of man who has all the advantages that birth and wealth can provide, and yet misuses his position through depravity of soul. Thus Aristotle observes in the Protrepticus that anyone who, 'with the eyes of a Lyceus', could have seen the real man inside that beautiful body would have discovered his ugliness.\[^{121}\]

In the Protrepticus mind alone is immortal, the only divine element in man.\[^{122}\] It is the real 'self'.\[^{124}\] This accords exactly with the part played in our dialogue by the $\alpha \delta \tau \omega \tau \omega \alpha \delta \tau \omega$. Nevertheless, although Aristotle may have believed in Platonic Forms when he wrote the Protrepticus, he kept them, if he did, very much in the background, while aiming at justifying the theoretic life on other more general grounds. He seems to have concerned himself more with the pleasure of pure thought than with the methods which it adopts to achieve its object.\[^{125}\]

But it seems improbable that any Academic who believed in Platonic Forms, and set out, like the writer of our dialogue,

\[^{121}\] Frg. 59.


\[^{123}\] Iambl. Protr. p. 41 ll. 22 sq.

\[^{124}\] Ib. p. 42, ll. 3 and 14.

\[^{125}\] Cf. Iambl. Protr. ch. 6, and Met. A, ch. 1 and 2. At times Aristotle seems to forget the object of such study in his scholarly delight in $\pi \varepsilon \omega \sigma \rho \sigma \epsilon \iota \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma$.\[^{22}\]
with the express purpose of presenting the method and object of philosophical procedure, would have refrained altogether from mentioning either dialectic or the Forms. On the whole, therefore, it is most likely that the writer of our dialogue did not hold the Platonic theory of Forms.126

The abandonment of Plato's theory by his followers left God as the only canon of truth, the only sanction of the possibility of knowledge; and God would have to remain 'the measure of all things' unless mechanistic materialism were to prevail after all. With the rejection of so important a part of the Platonic metaphysics, it may have looked as though ethical philosophy, deprived of its support, might revert to the position in which Socrates had left it; but the situation was saved by the interest in religion that Plato had fostered at the Academy towards the end of his life. God took over as it were, the part originally played by the Forms as the criterion of value. Dialectic, at least as originally conceived, lost its paramount importance in the pursuit of

126 There would be no reason, of course, for anyone writing long after the appearance of Polycrates' pamphlet to keep to purely Socratic thought. The time for such a defence had passed; and even if one were written by way of an exercise, it would hardly take the form of a dialogue like ours. If our writer had believed in Platonic Forms, he would almost certainly have made the fact clear. That this work does belong to a fairly late date is strongly supported by its resemblances to Aristotle's early works and Platonic spuria that are known to be fairly late.
wisdom, an importance which was now transferred to the religious attitude and to mathematical and astronomical study of the cosmos: the heavens were no longer a copy of Forms, but a direct manifestation of God, themselves described as the $\delta\varepsilon\iota\tau\sigma\varsigma\Theta\iota\sigma\Delta\varsigma$. For two reasons it probably seemed that, while few could attain to true philosophical wisdom, man could attain in some measure to an understanding of God by a more direct approach than had been deemed possible in the days of Platonic Forms. In the first place, he who had eyes to see could turn his gaze upon the heavens, and thereby learn something, at least, of the divine scheme; and secondly, the question of the relationship between man's mind and the object that he must know not only became acute, but was answered in such a way as to emphasize his higher capabilities. Whereas before the philosopher had been concerned not only with a supreme God, but also with a whole hierarchy of Forms, the question now was simply of the degree of similarity between human and divine Mind; and it was natural that in these circumstances the similarity should be stressed until the point was finally reached of admitting identity in essence between the two.

This identification appears most strongly in the first

127 God was described not only as 'mind or something beyond mind' (On Prayer, frg. 49), but also as the Heaven or the Cosmos (On Phil. frg. 26 and 12). See note on 133c ($\kappa\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omega\varepsilon\nu\sigma\tau\xi\omega$).

128 Cf. Epin. 977e.
book of the Metaphysics, which, as Jaeger has pointed out, identifies knowledge of God with God's own knowledge. 'Now there are two ways only,' says Aristotle, 'in which it (philosophical wisdom) can be divine. A science is divine if it is peculiarly the possession of God, or if it is concerned with the divine as its object. And this science fulfils both these functions.' 129 This identification of man's mental activity with the sort of 'knowing' that may be attributed to God implies that human and divine mind are essentially the same, and this would seem to be the doctrine of our dialogue. The assertion in On Philosophy that God is Mind 130 accords with the same view.

In the On Philosophy the religious attitude becomes far more pronounced than it was in the Protrepticus: 131 this would be natural enough if Plato's Ideal theory had been abandoned in the interval, and God had been left as the only sanction of knowledge. Even more important for our purpose, however, is the discussion in On Philosophy of the precept 'Know Thyself'. Aristotle claims that this maxim must have been revealed by the Delphic priestess herself - that is to say, that it was an essential feature of the old Apolline

130 Frg. 26: cf. Cherniss, p. 593.
131 Cf. frg. 12, 14, 15. The On Philosophy was probably written at Assos, i.e. between 447-444 B.C. (cf. Jaeger, p. 256).
religion — and that it characterized the mission of Socrates. Aristotle clearly attached great importance to this 'most divine of the inscriptions at Delphi', and though we cannot be certain to what extent he discussed it in this work, we may perhaps see at least the awakening of a desire to re-interpret its meaning in view of the new stage that philosophy had reached, and in the light of the new conception of religion.133

Such a reinterpretation is given us, at any rate, in the *Hellenian Ethics*. This work contains a good deal that is borrowed from the Protrepticus, as for instance Anaxagoras' dictum that happiness depends not on greatness or beauty or wealth, but on divine contemplation.134 Mind is again said to be the real self,135 and now that it has been proved necessary to abandon the Platonic theory of Forms136 wisdom can only be attained if one makes it one's aim to serve and to contemplate God;137 and 'as in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything. In a sense it is the divine in

132 Frg. 1-3.
133 As the interest displayed in On Philosophy in Oriental religion, and its deep concern with astronomy, see below, p. 57.
135 1240b 34.
136 1217b 19 sq.
137 1249b 20.
us that moves everything'. With the aid of this new and clear conception of the relationship between human and divine mind, Aristotle is able to give self-knowledge a new interpretation that would appear to be exactly the same as that of our dialogue. He does so in the course of his study of friendship.

Aristotle observes that the commonly recognized characteristics of friendship may be found to exist in the feelings of the good man towards himself. The aims of his mind and of his appetite coalesce, for he seeks his own true 'good'—just as he wishes 'good' to his friend. Friendship, indeed, always implies 'unity of soul'. A friend is a 'second self', so that 'to perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one's self and to know one's self'; and it is most pleasant to have a friend's company when enjoying the diviner pleasures, because 'it is always pleasant to see one's self enjoying the superior good'. Since, moreover, the primary friendship is a reciprocal

138 1248a 25-7. This is not unlike the Stoic doctrine that human minds are ἀνθρώποι πολιτικοὶ of God. Cf. 1249b 14-15, 'God...is the end with a view to which wisdom issues its commands.'

139 1240b 4-5.
140 1240b 9.
141 1245a 30.
142 1245a 35-7.
143 1245a 39-b1.
choice of the absolutely good and pleasant because it is good and pleasant, and friendship itself is the habit from which such choice springs.\footnote{144} it follows that 'if one wishes to act without injustice, it is enough to make friends; for genuine friends do not act unjustly'.\footnote{145}

Our dialogue would appear to give us this same doctrine expressed in terms of the 'eye' simile that was used in the Protrepticus.\footnote{146} It bids us, if we wish to 'know ourselves', to contemplate our 'selves' in the 'mirror' of someone else's mind, because there we shall see, as Aristotle puts it, a 'second self'.

Aristotle perhaps makes it clearer than our dialogue does why it is that only by means of this self-knowledge a man can become a \( \pi \omega \lambda \iota \iota \omega \gamma \varepsilon \).\footnote{147} Since two friends are, as we have seen, 'one soul', he who considers a friend will recognize that the highest 'good' of the friend and of himself are essentially the same. He will come to recognize, in fact, the real meaning of 'agreement' or 'unanimity' (\( \delta \iota \rho \omega \nu \alpha \iota \alpha \)). 'There is agreement when the two parties make

\footnote{144}{1237a 32-4.}
\footnote{145}{1234b 28-30. God, being perfect, has no need of a friend in order to know himself (1245b 16-19). As being perfect and representing perfection in self-contemplation he might well be described as the 'fairest mirror' even of human virtue; though Aristotle is inclined to think that man cannot be entirely self-sufficient (1244b 21 - 1245b 19).}
\footnote{146}{See note 112.}
\footnote{147}{Alc. 133e.}
the same choice as to who is to rule, who to be ruled, meaning by 'the same' not that each one should choose himself, but that both should choose the same person. Unanimity in this sense is only possible among the good; but goodness is derived from friendship, so that contemplation of the mind of another will result in understanding of true δρακόντα. It is therefore the special task of the political art to create such friendship. This explanation would appear to be also the implication of the Alcibiades, which presents us with an apparent contradiction between the unanimity that friendship would seem to suggest, and the principle of justice, that each man should perform his own job, and then follows this up with what is obviously the climax of the dialogue, the passage about contemplation. The implication must clearly be that such contemplation will

148 1241a 30-32. This sort of agreement is political friendship (ib. 11. 32-3).
149 1241a 21-7.
150 1237a 32-4.
151 1234b 22-3.
152 Friedländer (p. 242) claims that this conflict 'remains unsolved in the aporia of the Alcibiades; whereas in the Republic the structure of the state rests on the reconciliation of these two contrary tendencies'. But even the apparent aporia of Plato's Socratic dialogues usually masks an implied conclusion, and it is unlikely that Plato or anyone else would have set forth this present difficulty without any intention of at least pointing to a possible means of solving it.
resolve all Alcibiades' difficulties, and provide him with the understanding that the πολιτικὸς δίκαιος requires, of justice among friends.

Friendship, according to Aristotle, may result from goodness, utility, or the desire for pleasure. First friendship, ideal friendship, must be based on goodness; but it will then inevitably be pleasant also, and, as being desirable and right, in the highest sense useful. Similarly in the Alcibiades Socrates argues that the expedient and the good are ultimately the same, and that only through goodness can a man be happy. Pleasure, utility, and goodness go together, but wisdom (on which goodness depends) is the decisive factor. This alone can give meaning and value to all our acts.

The very close resemblance between the teaching of our dialogue and that of Aristotle's early works, in particular the Eudemian Ethics, can hardly be purely accidental. This conclusion is confirmed by consideration of certain pseudo-Platonic works that were probably written about the same time.

153 1236a 7-17.
154 1236b 1, 1238a 30-34.
155 1236b 31-2, 1237a 23-33.
156 1245b 10.
157 114e sq.
158 134a, e.
2. The Platonic Spuria.

We may begin, somewhat paradoxically, by considering a work which may possibly not be spurious, though most critics nowadays condemn it. This is the Epinomis. Whether or not Plato himself wrote it need not concern us here, since if Plato wrote it at all, it was certainly his last work.

The Epinomis, whose author, it seems, does not believe in separately existing Forms, emphasizes the importance of a devotional attitude in the approach to wisdom and to God, but gives the assurance that God will not grudge us wisdom if we seek it, since such jealousy would imply 'ignorance of self'. The soul has a power of divination that makes it aware of its own capabilities, but the that gives meaning to reality can only be fully understood by a few, after prolonged astronomical study, through the essential oneness of human and divine mind.

159 Cf. Harward's arguments, The Epinomis of Plato, pp. 26-58. The other works which I here discuss are probably spurious, and are generally so regarded, but we cannot be quite certain about any of them.

160 Cf. 981b, 'there is nothing else that can be bodiless... except...soul'; that which is incorporeal 'has only a single form'. Also 983d, 'existences are of two kinds, soul and body...nothing participates in any third form of existence...soul is the cause of everything'.

161 985c, 990a, 992a, etc.

162 988b.

163 974bc.

164 991e.

165 986d.
first studied the heavenly bodies, but 'there is a great and glorious hope that, under the guidance of education, of the Delphic oracle, and of the legalized forms of worship, the Greeks will attain to a worship of all these gods which will be nobler and in a real sense more just than the revelation and worship which have come to them from the barbarians.'

The striking feature of the Alcibiades in this connexion is the absence of any mention of the stars and of explicit reference to Oriental astralism, and the fact that even where Zoroaster is mentioned and Persian education is discussed the tone appears to be semi-ironical. But to represent Socrates as expounding astral theology would have appeared incongruous to the point of absurdity; and the new religion was by no means entirely due to importation of ideas from the East. While our writer no doubt recognized the merits of Zoroastrianism, he probably felt, as even the writer of the Epinomis did, that 'whatever the Greeks take over from the barbarians, they ultimately develop into something nobler', and he is content to concentrate upon what he considers the essential features of the new doctrine in so far as it solved

165 987e - 988a, tr. Harward (italics mine).
167 See pp. notes on 121a, 121e.
168 Cf. Restugière, Platon et l'Orient, pp. 18-22; E.R. Dodds, J.H.S. LIXV, 1945, p. 25. See note, however, on 133c (καὶ ΑΛΑ/Σ-ΤΩ ἔνδυπτος).
169 987d.
the problem that Socrates had posed. The same would appear to be the case with the dialogues to which we now come, in which Socrates plays the leading part, and no mention is made of astralism or of Oriental beliefs.

Friedländer holds that the Hipparchus is a genuine early work of Plato, and observes a likeness in plan between it and the Alcibiades. In the former dialogue, which discusses in the manner of Plato's Socratic dialogues the true nature of 'gain', and in the same manner suggests the real answer under the guise of an apparent aporia, Friedländer sees a contrast between the good but by no means ideal régime of Hipparchus, and the ideal polity that only Socratic-Platonic education could provide; and similarly in the account in our dialogue of the Persian and Spartan systems of education and government he sees (almost certainly correctly) a picture of a method that is in many respects good, yet inferior to the best, with which it is contrasted. Without discussing here the question of the authenticity of the Hipparchus, we

---

170 It would appear that beyond the star-gods of the On Philosophy, even, there was the unmoved mover who reappears later in Metaphysics. A passage at 133c recorded by Eusebius and Stobaeus suggests that God can be regarded more directly than through contemplation of a friend, the method is probably left unexplained simply because the explanation would involve a discussion of astronomy. But see Commenting, p. 125.

171 pp. 117-127.

may note that if that work is spurious\textsuperscript{173} we have another
dialogue, written probably at much the same time as ours or
slightly earlier, contrasting the methods of apparently
successful practical politics with the only truly sound
method of governing, that which would be based on philosophic
wisdom.

We may perhaps also note that Hipparchus is shown to
have made the mistake of setting out to educate the people
by means of elegiac couplets of his own composition, and
thereby entering into competition with the Delphic oracle,
whose precepts such as 'Know Thyself' would cease to be
regarded.\textsuperscript{174} If this work was not written by Plato, we have
another indication of the importance attributed to this
precept during the period with which we are concerned.

There is an even closer and more striking resemblance
between the \textit{Alcibiades} and the \textit{Amatores}. In this work the
aim of philosophy is discussed: philosophy is concerned with
'tendance' of human beings, and tendance implies knowledge of

\textsuperscript{173} Cf. Taylor, pp. 534-6, Shorey, p. 428. Souilh\'e (\textit{Platon,
Dialogues Suspects}, pp. 45 sq.) claims that the \textit{Hipparchus}
must have been written before the publication of
Thucydides' history because Thucydides rejects the view
(taken in the \textit{Hipparchus}) that Hipparchus was tyrant when
he was murdered. But Thucydides admits (1, 20) \textsuperscript{174}
Hipparchus, in rejecting the popular account of the other
circumstances of the incident (Thucydides' account),
expressly states that he is accepting a version that
seems to him more likely (229b).

\textsuperscript{174} 228de. \textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered} that 'the majority' take that view; and the writer of the
the object of care as well as ability to guide or correct. This is justice, which may be equated with temperance as the art of knowing one's self; and as this guidance or correction is necessary for the preservation of society, the political art may be identified with self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{175}

The Glitophon, too, seems to hint at similar doctrine. This fragment begins with the objection that although Socrates preaches most persuasively the desirability of 'tending one's soul', he has never satisfactorily explained what justice produces, as medicine produces health. It has been maintained that it produces what is expedient or right or profitable or useful; but these answers are unsatisfactory. Again, a companion of Socrates once suggested that it produces friendship in cities; but he admitted that some, as with boys or animals, are not good. True friendship seemed to be agreement or unanimity (\textit{διαφωνία}), which implies knowledge. But no one could explain what such agreement had to be about. Even Socrates has failed to find a satisfactory answer.

It is very unfortunate that the Glitophon breaks off at this point. Taylor suspects that the writer would have gone on to show why the physician of the soul cannot give 'a set of rules for moral regimen', but observes that the importance of what is said about unanimity is proved 'by the very

\textsuperscript{175} 137b - 138b.
irrelevance of the thesis to its immediate context. Now the objections raised at the outset are two, that Socrates does not show how one is to begin to learn justice, and that he does not specify the object of the art; and this latter failing would seem to be no less important than the former. The object of philosophy, with special reference to politics, is the subject of the Amatores, and it is quite likely that the Clitophon would have reached a similar conclusion, that justice (= temperance) depends upon and produces self-knowledge. The solution to the problem of δοξάσμα, whether explicit or implicit, would then be the same as that of the Eudemian Ethics. That the 'companion of Socrates' mentioned in the Clitophon is not the Alcibiades of our dialogue is proved, as Taylor has observed, by the absence in our dialogue of any mention of 'boys and animals'. It may be, however, that both works have the same conversation or dialogue as a common source, and in any case it is most likely that they both reflect the same general interest in these questions as that to which the Eudemian Ethics bears witness.

176 p. 538.
177 408e.
178 409cd.
179 p. 538 n. 2.
180 Taylor (loc. cit.) observes that Speusippus and Xenocrates, as well as Aristotle, treated of φιλαλήθεια.
Conclusion.

We have seen that on grounds of style alone, apart from other considerations, the Alcibiades could not have been one of Plato's earliest or latest works, and that its form and general character could best be accounted for, if it had to be assigned to Plato himself, on the assumption that it was an early work of his Middle Period written for a very special purpose. We have also seen, however, that the conception of God as recognizable in the contemplation of mind is out of keeping with what we know of Socrates himself and with the Plato at any rate of the Early and Middle Periods, and that the treatment of mind would indicate a new attitude towards it which is nowhere discussed or developed as one might expect in the works of Plato's Middle Period; and even if Plato's latest works suggest it, they imply also that Plato had not held the view at any earlier date. Our inference that the dialogue is spurious has now been strongly corroborated by its close resemblance in many important respects to Aristotelian and pseudo-Platonic works of a comparatively late date.

It would appear that our writer's purpose is to set forth his attitude to the problems that Socrates had raised in view of recent developments in philosophy. He has probably abandoned or never held the Platonic Theory of Forms,\(^\text{181}\) and

\(^{181}\) See p. 47-8.
seeks to explain the essentials of the new religious philosophy, beginning where Plato himself had begun. If much of the Platonic metaphysics had had to be abandoned, the new anti-mechanistic philosophy must rest, nevertheless, on the same foundations as those on which Plato himself had built, on Socrates' faith. The new age must look back to Socrates, and make a fresh start with the maxim that inspired him; and it could give new meaning to that maxim through the religious element that was salvaged out of Plato's doctrine, and the new conception of the unity of human and divine mind, of which the development may even have been helped by the abandonment of Platonic Forms. It would be natural that our writer in such an undertaking should recapitulate some of the main tenets of the earlier creed that could still be retained.

It would be natural, too, to choose Alcibiades as Socrates' respondent, for Alcibiades was recognized as the representative of those very ideals which the Academy had always claimed possessed no intrinsic value; and this claim had to be reasserted and proved afresh in accordance with the new doctrine. Our writer is able to demonstrate the superiority of philosophic wisdom both in politics and in private life to all other 'goods', while at the same time showing that in the final analysis the pleasurable and the

182 See p. 49.
expedient coincide with what wisdom dictates. The decision to write a Socratic dialogue will probably account for the absence of astralism and for the failure to acknowledge explicitly the debt of the new doctrine to Oriental theology.

It is possible, moreover, that our writer intended at the same time to help to vindicate Socrates against the change of having been responsible for Alcibiades' misdeeds; and also, perhaps, to reiterate the Academy's main criticism of Isocrates' school. But there is insufficient evidence for us to be at all certain on these points, and if such motives did play a part they were certainly subsidiary to the main purpose of the work.

We can only guess at the approximate date of the composition of our dialogue. As we have seen, it has much in common with the teaching of the Eudemian Ethics, which has been assigned with much probability to the period of

184 See p. 57.
185 See note on 132a.
186 See note on 124e ad fin.
187 Cf. Jaeger, p. 286 n. 3. Many of the points of similarity occur again, of course, in the Nicomachean Ethics, but there the whole conception of philosophy is different because of an entirely changed attitude towards the relative importance of theoretical and practical wisdom. Cf. the sense of φρονος at Alc. 133c.

The Protrepticus, which soon won fame in antiquity,
Aristotle's residence at Assos, 447-444 B.C. Since Aristotle's treatise shows no clear references to our dialogue, and since, moreover, the treatise contains detailed argument whereas our dialogue does little more than set forth the salient points of the new doctrine, it is perhaps on the whole more probable that the dialogue followed the treatise rather than the reverse. If our writer does not believe in Platonic Forms, and sees no reason to discuss them, and if he shows signs of being assured of the correctness of his doctrine, that is perhaps another reason for placing the dialogue after Plato's death rather than before it. It is likely, too, that by the time the dialogue was written Aristotle's self-contemplating God had become a subject of general discussion - and also, perhaps, Speusippus' view that the principles of knowledge can be apprehended by the mind

may have suggested to our writer the idea of a protreptic dialogue (and cf. the 'wealth' and 'reputation' attributed to the Cyprian king to whom the Protrepticus was addressed - frg. 50 - with the advantages possessed by Alcibiades). But the doctrine of friendship in the Eudemian Ethics suggests a somewhat later date for our dialogue.

Since we have now decided that the Alcibiades was not an early work of Plato, there is no reason to suppose that our writer is not dependent, to some extent at any rate, on the Alcibiades of Aeschines of Sphettus (see p. 78). He may have borrowed the form of his dialogue from Aeschines' work, though such philosophical content as that contained was probably very different from that of our dialogue (cf. Friedländer D.G.A. II, esp. p. 44). The Cyrus and Alcibiades of Antisthenes (cf. Joel I, pp. 499-500), and Xenophon's Memorabilia may have contributed as well.

187 (contd. from previous page)
with a kind of vision more clear than sight.\textsuperscript{188} Similarity in subject-matter with the \textit{On Philosophy} and with the \textit{Amatares} suggests a particular interest in the discussions of the group of philosophers at Assos, but it is a little unlikely that our dialogue was written at Hermeias' court in view of its remarks about tyranny.\textsuperscript{189} On the other hand the kindly treatment of Persia would hardly have appeared in the work of any Platonist in the years immediately following Hermeias' capture and crucifixion by the Persians in 341 B.C. On a balance of probabilities we may tentatively assign this work to about 343/2 B.C.

While rejecting the \textit{Alcibiades} as spurious, we have to recognize, nevertheless, that the writer had a very thorough knowledge of Plato's works, a much more pleasing style than most of Plato's imitators, and an ability to set forth doctrine without lapsing into trivialities as many of the spuria do. He was clearly a genuine philosopher himself, and if his purpose was such as we have suggested, he has certainly succeeded in it.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{188} Speussippus frg. 30 ed. Lang. See also p.61, note 180.
\item \textsuperscript{189} 135ab. Contrast the \textit{Amatares}, where the recognition of the tyrant as a practitioner of temperance and justice leads Taylor (pp. 531-2) to connect that work with the group of Platonists at Assos.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
103a - 105b. Socrates offers to help Alcibiades to achieve his political ambitions.

106b - 109a. On what does Alcibiades propose to give advice to the Athenians? If on what is just, when and how has he acquired such knowledge?

110a - 113c. He has never sought it because he always supposed that he possessed it, and 'the many' cannot have taught it to him, for they quarrel about its nature themselves. Alcibiades must be ignorant of justice.

113d - 116d. Alcibiades suggests that he will give advice on what is expedient, but Socrates shows that 'just' and 'expedient' are the same.

116d - 119a. Alcibiades is not only ignorant, but has been guilty of a false conceit of knowledge, like most politicians. Even Pericles, for all his reputed wisdom, could not teach his own sons virtue.

119a - 124b. Alcibiades' real rivals will be the kings of Persia and of Sparta, who surpass him in birth and wealth; the Persian princes, moreover, are carefully educated in each of the virtues severally by experts, while the Spartans excel in courage and temperance and all that is manly. Alcibiades could only get the better of them by suitable training.

124b - 126b. What sort of 'virtue' does Alcibiades really need? How does it differ from other arts, and what must it create?

126b - 127e. Unanimity among citizens, perhaps, is desirable in a city: but that seems to conflict with the principle of justice, that each man should do his own job.

127e - 130c. To return to the 'training' required: what is 'care for one's self'? Care of the soul.

For further details see introductory notes to each section in the Commentary.
130c - 132c. Self-knowledge is therefore not to be acquired by any of the arts concerned with the body.

132c - 133c. But the 'self' itself, as opposed to the individual person, is mind. As an eye can see itself in the 'mirror' of the pupil of someone else's eye, so a mind can see itself in the 'mirror' of another mind. (As a real mirror is brighter than the 'mirror' in an eye, so God is a better mirror than that which is best in our souls.)

133c - 135e. Only wisdom derived from self-knowledge can lead to success and happiness. Alcibiades promises to practise justice, but Socrates is afraid that the people may corrupt him.
COMMENTARY
103a - 106b. Socrates observes that he is the only one of Alcibiades' erastae who has not given up following him. Hitherto he has been prevented from speaking to Alcibiades by the warning of his daemonion, but now its opposition has ceased. Alcibiades has disdained his other lovers, feeling that he needs no one's help in anything. His beauty, his high birth and connexions, and his wealth have rendered him self-satisfied. He must be surprised, then, that Socrates still stays with him.

Alcibiades replies that he had just been going to ask the reason (104d).

The reason, says Socrates, is that Alcibiades is boundlessly ambitious. Before he had conceived his high hopes, he would not have listened to Socrates, which must have been the daemonion's reason for preventing an earlier approach; but now, if a god offered him the choice of remaining as he was, or of dying, he would choose death. He wants supreme power, not only in Athens, but over all Greeks and barbarians as well, and if the god were to limit him to dominion in Europe, he still would rather die. Socrates alone - with God's help - can help him to achieve his ambition: and for this reason Alcibiades will listen.

Alcibiades expresses surprise and curiosity, and Socrates undertakes to prove that he has the power that he has claimed, if Alcibiades will answer some questions.
At the outset we are shown vividly the sort of young man that Alcibiades was: fortune's favourite, well satisfied with his own position and prospects, a man who counts political success and personal power as the only ends in life that are worth attaining.

103a. ἀράντειον. There may be a play on the name ἀλεξέον ( = 'glorious'). Cf. ὁ ἀλεξέον καὶ ἀλεξέον below, 105d; and 113b, Ἀλεξέον ἀλεξέον. If so, the very first words strike one of the key-notes of the dialogue, the illustrious rank of Alcibiades, which is to be contrasted with his ἡμίνια στήσεις, and shown to be of little worth in comparison with philosophic wisdom, even for the statesman. Plato was fond of playing on names: cf. ὁ Καλλίκτης, Protag. 336b. See also 131e note.

οδέος ἔσοειον. Cf. 105de, and 124c Θέος... μὲ οὖ κέλειν ἐν τῇ τῆς ἔργῳ διὰ δεξύντης. Since the Alcibiades of the Symposium is clearly younger than the Alcibiades of our dialogue, there is a discrepancy here unless we take διὰ δεξύντης to mean that Socrates has not discussed with him before philosophical subjects, and τοῦ ἐν ὀδέος ἔσοειον to mean that he has not addressed him at all since his early years, about the time when the meetings described in the Symposium took place.

If the writer of our dialogue was not Plato, he was certainly closely associated with the Academy, and must have known the Symposium. On this matter, and also on the apparent discrepancy with the Symposium concerning the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, see Introd. pp. 13-14; the explanations there given will apply even if we deny Platonic authorship.

τι διμονίον ἥνττομα. Socrates' διμονίον was always, according to Plato - though not according to Xenophon - negative in function. It would prevent him from doing things, but never prompt him to take positive action. The next few words, 'about whose power you shall hear presently,' have aroused suspicions of the authenticity of the dialogue, and it is certainly strange that Socrates should speak in this way, as though Alcibiades (to say nothing of the reader) had never heard of it. We know that Xenocrates was very interested in διμονίκεια, and our writer may have shared that interest, although not exaggerating the influence of Socrates' sign like the writer of the Theages. But see Introd. p. 20.
104a. Kai to to to mev eti. mev solitarium. So. 'but it is not so clear that you are perfect in your soul.' The mev following petan is 'answered' by epi tetev after the parenthesis, where the infinitive construction introduced by otos is continued.

Vendounatai geinous. Alcibiades belonged to the famous Alcmaeonid family, which had twice suffered banishment (after Cylon's revolt, and again under Pisistratus), but since the time of Cleisthenes (who was a member of the family) had played a leading part in Athenian politics. As an indication of Alcibiades' nature, cf. his speech at Thuc. VI, 16.

Miss Dorothy Tarrant (The Hippias Major, p. 41) considers that geinous in the sense of 'family' is poetic; but it seems to be so used at Rep. 366c, Gorg. 523c, Polit. 305e, Laws, 878a, Ep. VII, 351c. cf. also 120c, note.

104b. tostw de tous peoiv mpetos .... The te (petos mpetos te) is not followed by the usual kai: de is here used instead.

phiinous kai suggeneis. Cf. the stress laid by Plato on the importance of reliable associates in politics, Rep. 496c sq., Ep. VII, 325d, 331c.

pee ikei .... eti petan. Pericles became Alcibiades' guardian after the death of Alcibiades' father at the battle of Coronea in 447 B.C. (mentioned at 112c).

Svntai petetiv ew tiv vov bovotimai. The dramatic date being about 432 B.C. (cf. 123d, where we find that Alcibiades is hardly twenty), this is probably not much of an exaggeration.

104c. Eti tostw efistw mev phoein. This is a touch which perhaps suggests special knowledge of Alcibiades' character. cf. 132b, note.

Sou te kereitikos .... ekivov te ... epanthorov. Completed antithesis. Plato uses this more frequently in his later works than in his earlier: see Appendix. Cf. te pote dev ouvgeinous, pote ofi ekkathatomai tov dromos, kal eutwv, ekwn e tepos to pomen (104c infra); ed odov eis kai oik exis (105c - but cf. Meno, 98b); pws die sou moi exwv, kal die sou auk ev gevota (106a); sou de e tepovntos .... allaz ... theumelwos d' exeisth (110b); orounei eis d'dhodois kai mi de eiseosth (111b); sou te to de .... edde' oik thvou ... osk' ev ... 20lka sou (113c); ekwn petetan tiv en kuta, edde' mi douleuwv (122a).
This verb, and the cognate nouns 
διανώσ and διάνωσ, are very hard worked in the passage that follows here. We have διανώσματα 104d, διανώσμα 104e, 
διανώσματα 105a, διανώσματα 105d, διανώσμα, 
διανώσματα, διανώσματα, διανώσμα 106a, 
διανώσματα, διανώσματα, διανώσματα, διανώσμα 106c. Other instances of repetition in this dialogue are: διανώσμα 105b, δίωμα 105d, διανώσμα twice and 
δίωμα 105e (in addition to δίωμα at 103a, δίωμα and δίωμα 104b, which could, however, be explained by the nature of the subject-
matter alone). The only variant here is διανώσμαν, 105c. See Appendix, p. 146.

104d. τι πτοε μπολκε ακι εισ τινα ηπικα βεπονν.

Tantology. Cf. note on completed antithesis, 104c supra, and also: μω... μωκος εμη εκι μω... μωκατ (110b), and perhaps 
εν... κατα μονες (114c). See Appendix, p. 144.

ένοχλεις ης. ένοχλει with the accusative is rare, but cf. Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 2. Ast has no reference to any occurrence of the word in any Platonic dialogue except this; but it is common in Demosthenes.

το οντί. This expression is entirely absent from Plato's latest works (cf. Lutoslawski, op. cit. p. 120).

τα σον πεδυκκ. Cf. 105d, and Protag. 309c, Gorg. 447b, 
Symp. 198e, Grat. 393d, Apol. 20c.

104d - ε. Ακοιση μεν ἢεκ... This apologetic tone, 
used by Socrates when he is afraid of speaking at too great 
length, is in line with Socrates' usual mistrust of μεκεν 
άδος: cf. 106b, 122b, and Protag. 334c sq., Gorg. 461d sq., 
Phaedr. 241e, etc. Polit. 286c - 237a observes that 'fitness' 
is a vague term: the real test of correct length is whether 
a discourse serves to discover truth (cf. Ep. VII, ad fin.). 
The μεκενάδος of the epideictic orators often concealed 
woolly thinking by their verbosity. Plato - and our writer 
too - may have had in mind, amongst others, Isocrates (cf. 
124e note, ad.fin.).

The μεν here is another instance of μεν solitarium. 
The μο... μενο clause probably contains what might have been 
expressed as a δε clause.

104e. χολε των... εκστηγη. Hyperbaton: ηπικα στη 
depends upon χολε των [εκστητην], but is held over for the sake 
of the antithesis with εκστητην. Cf. Ep. VII, 351a (τι 
μενοτατα εν τατις μενοτατα).
Cf. τι μεν καλ' κατων εδικε, τα δ' αυτ; (115a, where καλ' is the complement); and mild instances at 106a (cf. note ad. loc.), and 109c, πεσ τοι' δεκ και σοι θα' δικαιον ..., 113e, δ' αυτ πες μελι το πεδετον δειον. See Appendix, p. 144.

καταβαλοντε. This form of the aorist is found at Protag. 355a and Rep. IX, 578c. The word does not seem to be used at all by other of the fourth century B.C. Late writers like Plutarch and Polybius preferred καταβολον for the aorist.

105a. εν της σοι επιχει Θεευν. This device of a 'speech within a speech' was a favourite one of Plato's. We have the same thing at 105d, 106c, 108e. Cf. e.g. the speech of the Creator to the lesser gods, Tim. 41a sq., and the speech put into Dion's mouth, Ep. VIII, 355a sq.

105b. τοι' δεκ' ε'ιπεν Θεευν. The infinitive in this parenthesis is still dependent on Ἕιγη.

ἐν τοι' δεκ' ενεκ' Ιερευνος. Repetition, as a participle, of a verb already used: cf. 105d infra, and παλαιαν ... παλαιαν supra (though in that instance a parenthesis intervenes).

συνήσεος θεος. This verb, and the noun συνήσεος (= 'influence') are frequently repeated in this passage. See 104c note (συνήσεος ιερευνος).

δου εν της αιθιω. Macedonians, Thracians, and others in the north, presumably.

105c. ουκεν ζυν κα μοι δοκεις εθε'λειν ... ει μη εμπροσθεις.

ζυν εθε'λειν is potential, with a suppressed condition contained in the words ουδ' επι τοι' δεκ' ενεκ' Ιερευνος, and something like ουδ' ενεκ' Ιερευνος σοι εσται should be understood as the apodosis of ει μη εμπροσθεις ...


τισως ζυν αιν εικονος. See 105a note supra.
105d. Ἡ φίλε τῷ κλεινοῦ. See 103a note supra.

ταῦταν γάρ. I.e., I do not leave you for...

τῷ κλεινοῦ. See 104d note supra.

τὸν θεόν. I.e., the god who dominates or sends the divine sign: cf. 124c note. Friedländer (D.G.A. II, pp. 24–5) answering Schleiermacher (II, p. 513), suggests that the term 'god' is used here and at 105e rather than 'the sign' precisely because he wishes now to speak of 'an active, driving force' - the sign being always negative in function (cf. 103a note). But cf. the words 'I waited until he should let me', and note on νῦν δ' ἐδείκνυ, 105e infra.

δὴ τυνικά. Cf. Laws, 772d, the only instance of the word in Plato's accepted works. The word is rare in all authors. It denotes precision: 'exactly when'.

105d - e. ἐνδείκνυσθαι... δινήσεσθαι, σύν... δινήσεσθαι, ἐνδείκνυσθαι... Note the chiasmic order: cf. 104a, ἵππο τῶ ὁμοίωτας ἐξερευνάτω τά τῶν ψυχῶν. See Appendix, pp. 146-7.

105e. παρὰς ἐμοῖς. This claim is quite out of character with the Socrates of the dialogues that are generally accepted as Plato's own work, despite the qualification 'with God's help'. Socrates' normal role is that of fellow-seeker after truth, not that of instructor.

δ' θεῷ. See 105d note supra.

νῦν δ' ἐδείκνυ. Perhaps 'has now allowed me to', rather than 'now he has set me on' (as Lamb takes it). Cf. Herod. 1. 90, Xen. Cyr. 4. 2. 24.

106a. καὶ ταίς σφόδρας ἵστ' ἢδειν καὶ τότε τοιούτος. The order of words is slightly irregular (cf. 105b note). σφόδρας, of course, qualifies τοιούτος, and ἢδειν is explanatory infinitive.

καὶ μὲν σοῦ ... Immo vera: not μὲν solitarium.

καὶ σοῦ ... οὐκέτα. Completed antithesis: see 104c note.
106b. ἀλλ' ἐνεκὼν, διός ... Note the transition to the plural. See also 104d - e note, and 102a, note.

ἀλλ' ἐνεκὼν καθότι μέν σοι. μέν solitarium (sc. 'but I could not make a long speech on the subject').

οὐκ ἐὰν. I.e. 'I would be able to [if you wanted me to, and will] if you are willing to give me a little help.'

106b - 109e. Alcibiades allows, to satisfy Socrates, that his ambitions may be such as Socrates has described. Socrates asks on what subject he is proposing to give advice to the Athenian people when he comes before them. It must be something on which he has superior knowledge: something, in fact, which he has learnt or discovered for himself; and he would never have done either if he had never felt the need. But Socrates knows what subjects Alcibiades has been taught, and he would not, presumably, be going to offer advice on any of them, any more than he would offer advice on shipbuilding or the like, in which he is not an expert.

Alcibiades says he will give advice on the subjects of war and peace, and on other state affairs; that is to say, who it is better that they should fight, how they should do so, and when (107d). But, insists Socrates, knowledge of what is 'better' in wrestling implies γυμναστική. What does knowledge of what is 'better' in playing the lyre imply? Alcibiades cannot say, but on receiving a hint from Socrates correctly answers, χορσίκη (108d). Now what does knowledge of what is 'better' in questions of peace and war imply?
Alcibiades cannot say (109a), but Socrates helps him to see that the answer is Justice (109c). From whom, then, did Alcibiades learn Justice? Or did he discover it for himself? But even that would presuppose enquiry, and hence a time when he believed that he did not know what Justice was.

Socrates is here carrying out the process of reducing Alcibiades to a state of ἄγωγε, before suggesting the manner in which a statesman should try to equip himself for his task. Alcibiades is duly shown to be ignorant of the statesman's real function, but Socrates is not represented, as he usually is, as seeking for knowledge himself, or as sharing in the ἄγωγε to which Alcibiades is eventually reduced at 112d. (On his ironical eagerness to attend the classes of a professional 'teacher', see note on καθ ἐπιμέλειαν, 109d.)

From 107a to the end of 108a we have one of the 'longues enfilades de questions', as de Strycker calls them, and 108b-112d, where Alcibiades cannot for some time grasp the analogy between γονεία and μονοεία, has struck Raeder as un-Platonic, because else elsewhere the analogy is taken for granted. This section is certainly not in the usual Platonic manner. It is the beginning of a painstaking attempt to explain the nature of the 'art' of philosophy. In later sections we shall find a discussion of the nature of the product of the philosophic art; at the moment we are concerned merely to give this 'art' a name, on the implied assumption that it is comparable with other arts. At the
same time we are shown that Alcibiades must be ignorant of it -
a point which the lengthiness of the discussion serves to
emphasize.

106d. Σαλς επηθες κορες. This is
thoroughly Socratic. We need not be surprised at the absence
of mention of the Theory of Recollection if we suppose that
the Platonic doctrine of Forms had already been abandoned, and
that our writer is leading up to an exposition of the new
Theory of the nature of knowledge. It would be natural to
start with a presentation of the problem very similar to that
of the Meno. See next note.

ηθελθος ιπι την συγκειν. At Meno, 80d, Meno poses the
eristic question, 'How can you look for something you do not
know? You do not know what you are looking for, and you
would not recognize it if you found it.' Here we have the
other side of the paradox (with which cf. Meno, 80e, 84c):
you would not begin to look for something which you thought
you already knew. This much is purely Socratic; but after
Alcibiades has been reduced to the required 2ποζα, we find,
as in the Meno, that there are few (if any) who can teach
virtue, so that (also as in the Meno) a means must be sought
of learning it by personal discovery.

106e. ου γαρ ἄν κολαίν γε. Another touch that suggests
special knowledge of Alcibiades' life and character. Cf. 104c
note.

αδε νικτευ ... ἐσμεν ἄφωσθεν. Sc. ἐμε δέδηθος.

107a. παῖς ἄν δε θάσ γε ἔδεον. Potential.

107b. στὰν παρε` μαντικῆς. There is no doubt a touch
of irony in thus putting μαντικῇ on a level, as it were, with
δοκομία, as a scientific art.

107c. σητησουσαι ἱκετον εἰναί τον σύμβουλον. Συγκε
with the accusative and infinitive is poetic outside Plato;
but it is found at Rep. 443b, Charm. 172c, Protag. 322b,
Meno, 90e.

Τὸν προτε ναουκράτεις δέγεσσ. There is a touch of
humorous irony here. The Athenians were, of course, for ever
building ships; but on the Socratic view their primary
interest, at least, should be something different.
107d. περὶ τίνας χειρός εἰσεγήνην περιέσθεν. Here we have a subject which calls, of course, for knowledge of right and wrong, not mere technical experience. Socrates tries to help Alcibiades to define the knowledge required, or at least to give it a name, by introducing the notion of 'that which is better'. Cf. Clitophon 409c.

107e. ἔκει εἰκείεις ἑσδημοῖ. Cf. Aristotle E.N. 1111a 15. A form of loose wrestling in which the wrestlers gripped each other’s hands but did not close.

108b. τι καλῶς ... The answer required is μονατικόν. Socrates will then try to make Alcibiades consider and compare τὸ πολιτικὸν.

τὸ δὲ πάντως δὲθύμε ἔχειν. This use of δὲθύμε was frequently used by Plato in reference to the Forms: cf. μίκρὸν ἑσδημὸν δὲθύμε πολλὰν ἄν, Soph. 253d; but cf. also τὸ πάντων κείμενον, Rep. 580b.

108c. περίποι γῆς ἄν πού ... With this play on καλῶς (in reference to Alcibiades' καλῶς) cf. Protag. 336b (see 103a note).

108d. ἵππες ἐκεῖ ... καὶ οὖ ... ἐνταῦθα. 'As in the former instance...so do you now...'

τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐδέσμεν ὑπόθεσις. Sc. γεγονότερον omitted, no doubt, because of the desire to insert τὴν γεγονότερον in apposition to τὴν τέχνην. There is a slight hyperbaton owing to the addition, after ἐδέσμεν, of ὑπόθεσις (which, if κατὰ τὴν τέχνην be strictly interpreted, is redundant: it was probably added as an afterthought).

πῶς γεγονότερον; Sc. φής τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ὑπόθεσις γεγονότερον.

108e. εἰ μὲν τίς ὅτι ἔλεγοντα ... ἐπείτη δὲ ἐσχηκαίειν.

ἐπείτη is frequently used to emphasize the temporal nature of a preceding participle (usually aorist) in the nominative. Here it is curiously used to strengthen a preceding participle in the accusative, and for this I can find no parallel. 'If anyone, when you said...were then to ask...'
περὶ μὲν τοῦτων ἔχειν εἶπεν: This μὲν is strictly speaking superfluous, as the δὲ that follows (περὶ
δὲ κ. τ. θεοτοκίας ...) answers the original μὲν (εἰ μὲν τις ...)
but these words serve to sum up the rather long 'if' clause.
Cf. Phaedrus, 277e, Ph. 78c, 30d, 81b, Phil. 30b, Laws, 944a.
Similarly the original δὲ is repeated at τοῦτον δ', ὡς ἔκακος
περὶ below.

As subject of ἔχειν understand στε (the accusative and
infinitive depends on λόγος).

109a. τοῦτον δ', ὡς ἔκακος, περὶ ἐκποθείας ... There
is an anacoluthon: the original infinitive construction after
λόγος is dropped, and a new main verb (οὐκ ἱκανόν) is
introduced - hence ἐκποθείας is nominative. ἐκποθείας
itself represents a hypothesis subordinate to the ἔν clause:
'If you will not be able to speak, should you be asked about
this, are you not, surely, ashamed?' The whole sentence is
somewhat clumsy, and has more affinity to the ultra-
colloquialism of some of the best Platonic dialogues than to
Plato's own work.

περὶ τί τε τείνει ... 'What is the meaning of.' This
use of τείνω is common in Plato (cf. e.g. Prot. 345c, Symp.
183d, Rep. 499a); otherwise it is chiefly poetic. But cf.
Gliptophorion, 409c, 410a.

109b. ἐγὼ γε, στι γιὰ τινὰ μενοῦ τι ... Alcibiades
gives a list of particular kinds of δικαίωμα, not the name of
the generic πληθύνα (δικαίωμα) itself.

ἐκκατά τοῦτων. I.e. each of these kinds of treatment,
τί διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ἢ δὲ. 'how the one differs from
the other.'

δὲν τε καὶ πάν. Cf. Phaedo, 79e, Rep. 527c, Laws,
734e, 944c.

109c. εἰ γε καὶ διανοηθάτι τις ... οὐκ ἐν ἑιδολογίας εἰν
γε. Mixed condition, the vivid indicative of the protasis
perhaps implying that there is no such person: but cf. 114e,
116d. See Appendix, p.147.

δὲ νυνὶ γε ἔγνως ὕψωτων βελτίων 'the "better" which I was
asking about.'
109d. ἐμὲ ἐξοφυλάτε. Cf. 106e.

τεσσεριστοῦ. 'introduce'; cf. Laches, 180c.

καὶ ἐμὲ. This is clearly a piece of Socratic irony, but it has the appearance of being introduced merely for the sake of convention. Its occurrence is unnatural, in view of Socrates' magisterial tone throughout the dialogue. Cf. also 124d note.

Οὐ μὲν τὸν Φίλιππον. Sc. Δίκα. Cf. Euth. 6b, Gorg. 500b, 519e, Phdr. 234e.

109e. καὶ μακά γ', εἰς Σητήριος. This ready assurance would seem to suggest that success in the search is easier than any of Plato's accepted works would lead us to believe.

110a - 113c. Alcibiades certainly thought that he knew what justice was even when he was a boy, for Socrates remembers his exclamations if ever an opponent cheated in a game. Hence Alcibiades can never have sought or discovered knowledge. Alcibiades suggests that he learnt knowledge of right and wrong from 'the many' (110e). But while 'the many' may be able to teach their own language, they cannot teach the nature of right and wrong, of which they display their ignorance by differing among themselves (112a); and on this particular subject they have differed so much that wars have been the result. Hence 'the many' cannot have taught Alcibiades the nature of right and wrong, and since he has neither learnt nor discovered it, it would seem that he cannot know it (112d). 'According to what you say, that seems to be so,' Alcibiades admits.

Socrates now takes Alcibiades to task for his answer,
insisting that he (Alcibiades), as the 'answering', is responsible for all the 'saying', and that the statement of his ignorance of right and wrong must be his own admission. Alcibiades agrees (113b), and Socrates points out the folly of his undertaking to advise the Athenian people on matters of which he confesses ignorance.

---

Here we have the proof that convinces Alcibiades of his ignorance, followed by the observation - which reminds us of Socrates' similar observation concerning the slave-boy in the Meno - that all Alcibiades' admissions have necessarily expressed Alcibiades' own opinion. It was an essential feature of the process of reducing a respondent to ἀφηγησία (and of helping him in 'recollection') that he should himself comprehend and admit the truth of each step in the argument.

The point has been made incidentally that goodness cannot be taught by 'the many' (cf. Prot. 319a sq., Meno, 92e, 95b, 96b). We shall find presently that there are few, if any, who can 'teach' the subject. But there is, perhaps, special irony on the part of the writer in making Alcibiades attribute his education in the matter of virtue (a subject of which he is shown to be ignorant) to the people (who are shown to lack knowledge themselves): later on we shall find the hint that while Socrates does not mistrust Alcibiades' nature, he fears that the people may corrupt him (135e).
110a. Τάτε μέν τοίνυν... μέν μέν solitarius (sc. 'though I cannot be sure about other periods').

110b. ἐν διδασκάλου. I.e. at school: cf. εἰς διδασκάλου (109d), a much more common form. Some noun in the dative (or accusative, as the case may be) is understood. (Cf. our idiom, 'to go to the barber's,' etc.).

110c. ἐν τοίῳ χεῖνα ἐσειείναι; Exactly the same line of argument is used in the Meno (85d sq.) and Phaedo (74b sq.) in connexion with the Theory of Recollection. Here, however, our writer is concerned not to prove that Alcibiades has somewhere at the back of his mind a latent knowledge which can be recalled or recollected, but merely that he is ignorant. The point is simply that the recognition of our own ignorance is a necessary prerequisite of the personal discovery of truth by any means whatever.

110d. Ἀλλὰ μὴν... οὐδεὶς μαθὼν ἐφ' ησυχῇ εἰδέναι. This was implied, rather than stated, at 109e.

Τὸ φέναι... This again was not stated in so many words, but was implied at 109e.

Τὸ δὲ τὸς εἰσεῖν. The article is here used as a demonstrative (cf. τὸ γέ πεί τοῦ, 110a, though in that particular phrase the use is very frequent). This τὸ δὲ = τὸ ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰσείν, and is found not infrequently in Plato: e.g. Rep. 340d, τὸ δὲ στρατιωτικός τούτων... οὐδεὶς ἄξις ἐπίσκοπος ἢ μέγας τάγματος. Cf. Symp. 198d, Prot. 344e, Theaet. 157b, Soph. 244a, Laws, 803c, etc.

110e. εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέεσθαι. "Taking refuge with the many." For this intransitive use of ἀναφέεσθαι, cf. Apol. 20e, Rep. 484c, Theaet. 175a, Phdr. 237d.

111a. τὸ ἐπὶ γὰρ ὑφ' εἰσίν. At Prot. 327e - 328a, Protagoras argues that 'the many' teach virtue just as they teach the Greek language. Socrates in that dialogue does not refute the argument, although he has expressed the opposite opinion, but at Meno, 95b, the point is made (as in what follows in our present passage) that those who differ among themselves, as 'the many' do, can hardly be capable of teaching virtue, since their differences imply that they themselves are ignorant of its nature, and those who are without knowledge cannot teach.
111b. ὅμωμεν τε ἔλθοις ὑμὶ ἰδίᾳν ἔφεσθαι. Completed antithesis: see 104c note.

καὶ τοῖς ἐσωτέροις, κηθό... ἐλογοισιν. The transition to the plural here is easy, the first clause being indefinite. For a more difficult transition, see 106b (ἴδιον μικρόν, ἐδοξο...).

111c. Ὀδόου εἰς μὲν τὰ ὃθ... μὲν solitarium (sc. 'but not in some things').

111d. Ὀδόου εἰ μὲν βουλομέθη... Instead of answering this μὲν clause with εἰ δὲ βουλήθεικαν, our writer gives us τὸ δ' εἰ βουλήθεικαν...

δεόντω καὶ τινες κατὰ τίνες μὴ. I.e. τίνες κατὰ τίνες μὴ. Greek often uses τοῖς κατὰ τίνες μὴ loosely; cf. δικρινώσκειν τοῖς κατὰ τίνες μή, 109d supra.

111e. κείμαι διδάσκαλος εἰσιν. The word κείμαι is Homeric (Il. 1. 106), and does not occur in any generally accepted work of Plato; but it suits Socrates' bantering manner here, and the use of an occasional Homeric term is in line with Plato's habit (cf. Vink op. cit. p. 55).

112b. ἔλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ ὑπῆρεν. I.e. he must have heard the rhapsodes, or professional reciters of poetry. Cf. (in reference to Homer) Lycurgus Leocr. p. 209: 'Your fathers considered him so valuable as a poet that they made a law, to the effect that every four years at the Panathenaic festival his epics, alone of all poets! should be recited by rhapsodes.'

τοῖς τῇ Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι Τευτῶν. I.e. the Achaians and the Trojans as well. For this use of Ἀθηναῖοι cf. Gorg. 473d, οὐ πολλῶν καὶ τῶν ἔλλων ἣνεν: and 121b, note.

112c. ἐν Ταύρικα. This battle took place in 457 B.C., when the Athenians under Myronides were severely defeated by the Spartans.

ἐν Καλλίκα. In 447 B.C. As a result of this battle, at which her forces were defeated by the Boeotians, Athens lost the land empire which she had won at the battle of Oenophyta nine years before.
...πες ἑνὸς ᾽Αλλου. Ἀν. ὁ.σ.α. (The ellipse is perhaps due to an original intention of ending the sentence after ἐν ἀνου with something like ἕν.)

112d. ὡς ἔσχις σαλός αὐτοῦς ἐγέρσανται. ἐγέρσανται with a double accusative is fairly frequent in Plato (cf. e.g. Rep. 495b, 506d, Laws 664a, 868e), but otherwise is mostly poetic (cf., however, Thuc. 1. 137, 3. 52).

ἐκ μὲν ἔν ὁ δὲ λέγεις. ἐκ μὲν solitarium (sc. "but in reality it might perhaps be otherwise").

112e. ὧτι ἐκεῖ ὅπες ταῦτα λέγειν. On the passage that follows, see introductory remarks to this section, p. 82.

The scholiast sees here an allusion to Eur. Hipp. 352.

113a. Πει ή τόστων μᾶν ἐγὼ... ἢ σὺ...

η = μαλακον ἢ. This is rare except after verbs like βουδομαι implying a comparison. Cf. Hdt. 9. 26.

ἐν αὐτῆς τε καὶ διάδοχοις. The words became practically technical terms in connexion with dialectic, though they do occur occasionally in works earlier than the Meno.

113b. Φίλον μὲν... μὲν solitarium (cf. 112d supra: sc. "but possibly it may not be so").

'Ἀλκιβίδας ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου. See note on 103a.

The words ὁ καλὸς (or simply καλὸς) attached to a name were often inscribed on cups, or carved on walls, etc., in token of affection: cf. Aristoph. Achar. 144, Wasps. 98, and Theramenes' ironical toast as he drank the hemlock, 'Here's to the lovely Critias' (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 56).

ὀνόματος ὅτε. Ἀν. ὁ.πο.τοδοθ' αὐ.

113c. Τὸ τοῦ Ἐκείνου. The reference is to Eur. Hipp. 352: σοῦ τόδε, ἀεί ἐμοὶ καλέσεις.

σοῦ τόδε... ἀεὶ ἐμοὶ καλέσεις... ἀεὶς ἐγὼ... τόδε σον. Completed antithesis: cf. 104c note.
113d - 116d. Alcibiades suggests that the Athenians deliberate more often about what is expedient than about what is just (for that they consider is obvious); and justice and expedience are very different from each other. Socrates is sure that Alcibiades could never show how he came to 'learn' or 'discover' the nature of expedience; but Socrates will be content with asking him to explain the difference between expedience and justice. Explaining a point before an audience of one or before an audience of many is the same, so far as the knowledge of the subject required is concerned.

Alcibiades is reluctant; and so Socrates undertakes to convince him of the opposite, that justice and expedience are the same: and in order that he may be thoroughly convinced insists that he, Alcibiades, must again be the respondent (114e).

Τὸ δὲ ἠκούσα, Alcibiades admits, are ἄλλα, but they are not necessarily, he thinks, ἄλλα. Socrates suggests that he is thinking of such things as help given to a friend in battle, which is καλὸν in so far as it is help, but κακὸν in so far as it involves wounds and possibly death; but then, Socrates goes on, it is καλὸν and κακὸν respectively, in virtue of two distinct things, courage, and death; but in so far as it is καλὸν (that is, in so far as it is courage) it is also ἄλλα: for of the two opposites, courage and cowardice, Alcibiades would certainly want to possess the former and not the latter, presumably because he thinks them, respectively,
'good', and 'bad'. Further, courage is only noble because it is good: anything, in fact which is noble must also be good (116a).

Another proof of this is that καλὸς πεπτείων = εὖ πεπτείων, which involves the acquisition of γυθοῦ and is therefore γυθοῦ; but εὖ πεπτείων is certainly also καλὸν, so that καλὸν and γυθοῦ are again shown to be the same (116c).

Now justice, it was agreed, implies nobility, and nobility (according to the last two arguments) means goodness; and goodness is expedient. Justice, therefore, is expedient.

The main purpose of this section is to continue the demonstration of Alcibiades' ignorance of political principles. At the same time Socrates is able to set forth his own belief that ultimately virtue pays. The historical Socrates, emphasizing the fact that 'virtue' implied the correct and efficient fulfilment of a function, had always insisted that ἄνθρωπος δεῖ - the correct and efficient fulfilment of man's function as a man - must ultimately benefit him. In this passage Socrates makes his point by producing two 'proofs' that καλὸν = γυθοῦ, the notion 'beneficial' contained in the term 'good' being regarded throughout as implying expedience.

Neither of the 'proofs' that καλὸν = γυθοῦ may seem to us wholly satisfactory. The first certainly shows that we have to consider the quality of καλὸν per se, regardless of
any accompanying attributes; but the 'proof' that \( \kappa \delta \lambda \omicron \nu \) _per se_ is good depends upon Alcibiades' ready admission that courage in itself is desirable. The second 'proof' depends upon the two meanings of \( \epsilon \delta \tau \mu \tau \tau \epsilon \nu \), and is the petitio principii familiar to us from the earlier Platonic dialogues. It may be regarded as an admirable expression or statement of the Socratic standpoint, but not as a proof of anything. In fact, Socrates' belief that \( \tau \delta \kappa \delta \lambda \omicron \nu \) did in all circumstances coincide with 'the expedient' was a matter of faith, not a doctrine that could be proved by argument.

This passage is by no means irrelevant in a work designed to reinterpret Socratic views in the light of later developments. If our author is to show that the source of wisdom is \( \nu \delta \omega \), and that study of \( \nu \delta \omega \) will resolve the problems of the statesman and lead to happiness, he must show how the new philosophy regards the three apparently distinct 'ends' - wisdom, pleasure, and expedience. Aristotle considered that it was necessary to do so in his _Endemian Ethics_, and our author no doubt thought the same. Our present passage proves the identity, in the final analysis, of justice (= the knowledge that contemplation gives, as the subsequent argument shows) with what is expedient, and although the word \( \nu \delta \omega \) is avoided (probably because of the bad significance that it usually had for Socrates in Plato's earlier works, e.g. the _Gorgias_), it is emphasized towards the end of our dialogue that only the just life is truly...
pleasurable. (If the Hipparchus is also spurious, we may cite that too for its clear implication that true 'gain' is to be identified with 'good' in the highest sense; the Clitophon, which mentions 'the expedient' and 'the just' as two possible 'ends', probably reached the same conclusion; and the Amatorres perhaps implies it, in its insistence that justice has a practical use.)

113d. τὸ συμφέευτα. De Strycker (Bidez op. cit. p. 115) has noticed twelve instances in our dialogue (though this one seems to have escaped him) of συμφέευν used absolutely, i.e. without a dative or (in the case of a participle) a genitive to qualify it; and he holds that this word is always so qualified, when it occurs at all, in Plato's works. Now it would, in fact, appear to be used absolutely at Crat. 419a, Laws, 745c, and Ep. III, 318b (probably genuine); but I can find no other instances, and it is certainly true that Plato far more often talks about τὸ ἀφελέρον. It is perhaps not without significance that the use of συμφέευν at Rep. 336c sq. (to which de Strycker refers) is copied in the Clitophon (409c). Cf. also Epin. 979b, for another instance of the 'absolute' use.

113e. ἐποδειγματικά. Σκ. σε μὴ δεθώς δέγειν.

ὅπον σκευεὶσθαι καὶ πᾶσαι μένων. The word σκευεῖσθαι belongs chiefly to the comic poets; it appears to have been used only once (Aeschin. l. 59) in the prose literature of this period.

καὶ οὕτω: ἄν σοι αὖτα ἀμπελώχοι... Potential: 'and you would not wear them any longer'. The next clause (εἰ μὴ... ) has its apodosis understood: '[nor will you accept anything] unless you are given something fresh and unsullied in the way of evidence'.

κρέννυε. This word is very rare (to judge from the appropriate lexic, it does not occur in any prose work of the period), and has a poetic tinge: it is found at Eur. Σ.Α. 1574.
114a. 'Your sallies in debate' (Lamb). περιπολοχα occurs once in Xenophon (An. 4. 7. 10), but nowhere else in any work of this period: and even περιπολοχα, which Plato uses once (Charm. 154a) is mostly poetic.

114b. Εί έδε κ. = Εί δε μή. At this point there is a slight anacoluthon: we should expect another participle, parallel to ενεργείαν, but the construction changes, and we are given an imperative.

114c. τοῦ αὐτοῦ. We may perhaps compare Phaedrus, 261a sq., where Socrates claims that rhetoric must be the same whether it be employed in the law-courts, at other public meetings, or at private gatherings. The important point is that although a judicious use of psychology is desirable in educational instruction (Phdr. 277b c, cf. Ep. VII, 341c d), no sort of 'persuasion' has any sort of value if the 'instructor' lacks knowledge (cf. the Gorgias); and a man with knowledge must be equally capable of helping a single pupil or many all at once. (No doubt individual tuition is better, but no one except the man with knowledge can give any real help in either situation.) Cf. 118d, and Meno, 99b.


114d. Εν εργείαν επιμελετησον. This is the reading of the MS. T: Εν μελετησον B: Εν εργείαν μελετησον. Ast (following Buttmann). The word επιμελετησον has excellent authority at Phdr. 228e, and the compounded verb, as meaning to 'practise upon', gives the best sense here (I can find no example of μελετησον Εν = 'to practise on'). At the same time the word is found nowhere else in any work of this period, and the present use may be due to a conscious recollection of the passage in the Phaedrus.

Επίςερει Ζεύς. This word, which was specially associated with the 'epideictic' or 'display' speeches of the Sophists, is probably used here with intentional irony.

114e. Μη. Sc. οὐκέτας ἔχων, or something of the sort.

Ομοιόν ἔργον λέιεις... ἔργον πεπερασμένον. Mixed condition: the indicative λέιεις is used for the sake of vividness.
Socrates insists that Alcibiades must 'reply', because his 'answers' will necessarily express his own opinions (see p. 52); and if he should be made to reply that justice and expedience are the same, he would then have been convinced.

Δειγματι. Ἡμ. γε τοῦ Σφὸβον ἑπιφάνειαν.

ἐπὶ δὲ ἐνθαρρυθαίνει. 'Will come to any harm'. Socrates (probably correctly) takes this as an assertion that Alcibiades will not be defeated in the argument. This looks like a colloquial use of the word in vogue at the Academy, though there would appear to be no exact parallel.

115a. τὰ δὲ τοῦ μεν καλὸν ἀνθρώπον . . . . There is a slight hyperbaton, since καλὸν is partitive genitive dependent on τὸ μεν, and we might expect it to be placed immediately after that. καλὸν is the complement.

τῶν τῶν καλὸν καλὸν ἐπειδή. Sc. ἐστίν.

ἐπειδή τῶν καλὸν καλὸν καλὸν ἐπειδή. All depends, of course, on the use of the word καλὸν, which Alcibiades is using to mean 'unpleasant'. Socrates proceeds to distinguish the moral aspect of an act from any physical disadvantages that may accompany it.

115b. τὰ δὲ τοῦ λογία . This word is mainly poetic. It occurs at Laws, 877a.

115c. Ἡμ. ὁσκὸν καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀνθρώπεια . . . . De Strycker (Bidez op. cit. pp. 115-6) observes that Plato does not contrast in this way terms that are not in some sense closely allied, as cause and effect, or producer and product. This does not appear to me to be very significant, but it would seem to be true.

ἔμεν τείνει. . . . After equating δέκαμον with καλὸν, Socrates no doubt hoped to win the immediate admission that καλὸν = ἀγαθόν; it would then follow at once that τὸ δέκαμον were always ἀγαθὸν and therefore σουφήσαντε. But Alcibiades would not admit that καλὸν always = ἀγαθόν, so that Socrates has had to show, to begin with, that the καλὸν involved in helping a friend in battle is quite distinct from the element of καλὸν involved in the act. He now proceeds to show that this element is purely ἀγαθόν.

καί τείνει ἐὰν δέκαμον σοι εἶναι. 'What would you rather have?' This use of δέκαμον is regular and frequent: cf. e.g. Gorg., 468e, Laws, 729d.
115d. Os de 56v 2v ev y... Cf. 105a, 60E1d 5v 1160 Evans, "This seems to be a regular way of emphasizing dislike. (Cf. perhaps, Clitophonus 408a.) On the importance of this admission for Socrates' argument, see p. 88.

115e. Kat? 2v 60 82 6v 115d. 'Because it results in a good thing, namely the courage involved.'

116a. GApv 6v kat? 2v 60 82 6v kal. Courage is in itself kal (115b) and y 60 82 (115d). Alcibiades now readily admits that it is precisely this latter quality which makes it also kal (because it is y 60 82 only in so far as it produces good, kat? 2v 60 82 6v).

116b. Eti tovov... Socrates has reached the equation kal = y 60 82 by one means; he now reaches the same equation by another means, before proceeding to the conclusion that 6 kal = y 60 82.

This second 'proof' that kal = y 60 82 depends upon the two meanings of 6 60: (1) 'to act rightly,' (2) 'to fare well.' Unless we are to assume a petitio principii in this very first question, 6 60 here is used in the first sense; but the argument is 'begged' in the second question, when it is allowed that 6 60 (the meaning of which is this time ambiguous) are always 6 60, which means that they must be able to acquire y 60 through to kal 60.


6 50 60 kal 6 60 60. 'And fine action (as we admitted at the start) is noble?' In these last two questions we again have the first meaning of 6 60.

116c. Mvprauv... kov 50 60 60. It was agreed that 6 kal are 6 50 at 115a.

116d. Ti 60; 6 60 6 60 6 60 60v... Cf. 114e.
116d – 119a. Alcibiades confesses that in the face of Socrates' questioning his opinions change from one moment to the next. That, points out Socrates, can only be due to lack of knowledge; but even when allowance has been made for his ignorance, it is certain that he would not have such a tendency to change his mind if he were aware of his ignorance (117b). Alcibiades does not suffer from indecision in matters of cookery or seamanship, because, being aware of his ignorance concerning them, he leaves them to the expert. 'Mistakes' can only occur through a false conceit of wisdom (118a), and of this Alcibiades is guilty: and his guilt is all the greater because the matters of which he, ignorant as he is, supposes himself to have knowledge, are the most important that there are. Most of the city's politicians – except perhaps Pericles – have suffered from the same fault.

Alcibiades interposes that Pericles' wisdom is said to have been derived from learned teachers (118c). Socrates questions the ascription to him of wisdom, since the test of wisdom is ability to teach (118d), and Pericles failed to inculcate wisdom in his own sons, in his ward Alcibiades, or in anyone else.

The first part of this section is a typically Socratic demonstration of the certainty and infallibility that true knowledge must possess. The Socratic dicta 'virtue is knowledge' and 'No one does wrong voluntarily' are implicitly reaffirmed; and Alcibiades is made to see that his chief
fault has been not ignorance, but the false profession of knowledge. After this he will be ready to begin the search for real wisdom.

Pericles is cited as an example of an apparently virtuous man who failed to pass on his virtue in the Protagoras (319e - 320a) and in the Meno (94a b), and in the latter dialogue the paradox is explained by the lack of knowledge, despite the possession of 'true opinion' (99b). In the Gorgias (515d sq.), while it is implied that Pericles may have improved the Athenians in some ways (515e), he is blamed for having failed to control and improve the temper of the people. Such politicians may have provided the city with ships and walls and dockyards (517c, 519a, cf. Alc. 134b), but they have concerned themselves with the body rather than with the soul (517d). Their very neglect of the spiritual welfare of the people results in their own downfall (519a). There can be little doubt that our writer had this passage of the Gorgias in mind: the original mention of Pericles might have been regarded, if standing alone, as purely incidental, but 118c - 119a, which is prima facie a digression, appears to be intended to emphasize the importance of the analogy of Pericles; and if our writer was thinking of the Gorgias, he would have had in mind the contrast there indicated between the politician who, lacking knowledge, thought in terms of bodily requirements and worldly prosperity and practical ability learned from Sophists, and the wisdom of the true
A statesman who cared for the soul. Alcibiades, another scion of the great house of the Alcmaeonidae, ward of Pericles, by nature endowed with all that a man could wish for, owed his downfall also to the impetuous folly of the people whom he should have improved (135e, 132a, cf. Gorg. 519 a b).

116d. ἔσθεν τις πολιτείας... φυσί τί, κατὰ γεινής ἐστιν. Mixed condition: see Appendix, p. 147.

Περί Ὕδαών. These inhabitants of a small island off the coast of Thessaly are introduced as a sort of anti-climax: Socrates means, 'whether he be speaking of a great town or a small one'.

116e. εἴ τις λέγων αὐτῷ... εἴ τείνει. The omission of περίπετην before ἄρον is another poetic trait.

117a. οἰκήμα καὶ μέντα τὰ ἄτα... Sc. ἔστε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. ὁ ποιεῖται πολλὰ.

Οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαιών... This list would seem to be hardly in the Platonic manner, cf. notes on 118a, 122c.

117b. Τί; σῦ... σοῦ ἄδετον... This looks like a quotation from a poet, but the source is unknown. The reference may be simply to Thesp. 797, where άσπις ἔσται is known. See p. 82.

117c. Σοπερείτερον συνεισφέρατον. The illustrations are drawn, after Socrates' usual manner, from the practical arts. (Cookery appears as an illustration in the passage of the Gorgias of which our writer may have been thinking - see p. 74 - when writing this section of the dialogue (517e sq.).

117d. τὸν οἴκον ἐντὼν λυγαίν ἕξι... έκ ὑπὸ. The steering of a ship was carried out by means of two παραλέλαμβάσια or paddles at the stern, one on either side. The ἀσπίδα was the handle of a παράλλαξον, which the steersman would move inwards (towards the centre of the ship) or outwards. But as the two handles may have been (sometimes, anyhow) joined together...
by a tiller (Lucian Nav. 6; cf. Plato Polit. 272e), it may be that 'παραθερισμός' and 'πορτ' were technical terms like our 'to starboard' or 'to port'.

At Soph. 229c, 231b, 

is distinguished from other forms of ignorance as 

accompanied by the concept of wisdom: cf. Laws, 864b sq. According to Ep. VII, it is the 'soil from which all evils spring and blossom forth and bear their harvest, so bitter to those who sowed them, to be reaped in days to come' (336b).

The implication that these epithets will apply to the state of Alcibiades' mind is, of course, already obvious. Socrates appears more severe in our dialogue than in the accepted works of Plato.

Another list, though not as long as that at 117a.

Strictly speaking the ἑγώ should be inside the μνήμον clause if it is not to be taken with both clauses: we must assume a slight anacoluthon.

See p. 32.

The argument of the dialogue is, in fact, a general protreptic applicable to all aspiring politicians.

See introductory remarks to this section, pp. 94-5.

Pythocleides (cf. Prot. 315e) was a musician of Ceos, and (according to the scholiast) a Pythagorean. Cf. Prot. 316e, Plut. Per. 4. Anaxagoras was the famous Ionian philosopher who posited ὀψις as the cause of all things, but, according to Socrates in the Phaedo (98b - 99d) failed to make full use of the idea. (The concept was gradually made more and more use of, however, within the Academy: see Introd. pp. 49 .) Damon was a celebrated Athenian musician and Sophist, who was finally expelled from Athens as a friend of tyranny (Plut. Per. 4).

Pericles first took part in politics about 463 B.C. (Aristotle Ath. Pol. 27 as against Plut. Per. 15). We may conjecture that at this time (c. 432/1 B.C.,
cf. 123d, note) he was somewhere about sixty.

\( \text{σοφός} \)  \( \delta τιον \). 'good at anything'. \( \delta \text{τιον} \) is internal accusative.

καὶ σὲ ἐπολήσε. Sc. σοφός.

118d. ἐλλον σοὶς ὑπλη τε. Sc. παίρνομεν σοφόν.

καὶ ὁ κλήπτεος δὲ... 'And the lyre-player too...'

καὶ goes very closely with ὁ κλήπτεος, so that the position of δὲ is not irregular.

καὶ λαον... τεκρειεν  At Meno, 87c (cf. 99a) it is agreed that if virtue is a kind of knowledge, it must be teachable; and though it is found that there are no teachers of it, the implication would seem to be that ideally virtue would consist in knowledge, though 'true opinion' is all that most 'good' men possess. Virtue comes, it seems, by divine inspiration, 'unless there should be some statesman capable of making a statesman of another' (100a). The Republic shows that the statesman who has knowledge will be able to implant 'true opinion' in his subjects (500d); and the 'leader' in dialectic may be regarded as able to help a pupil to 'recollect'. But the Protagoras and Meno make, it clear that the knowledge that is 'virtue' could not, in Plato's view, be taught in the Sophistic sense, like ordinary technical skill. Even the writer of the Clitophon (407b) acknowledges the distinction. The rather bald statement in our present passage, which gives no indication of the sort of 'teaching' meant, is probably intentionally left ambiguous, because even if it is interpreted in the Sophistic sense (cf. 119a), Pericles can be shown to have lacked knowledge.

118e. τῷ Περίκλεους δεῦ. Paralus and Xanthippus. According to the Meno (94b), Pericles taught them to be first-rate horsemen, and educated them in music and gymnastics and the other arts, but failed to make them morally good. Cf. Prot. 319e - 320a.

'Αλλὰ κληπτεῷ... 'This same Pericles, acting as his guardian, was afraid, it seems, that he might be corrupted by Alcibiades, and so took Cleinias away from him, and placed him in the care of Ariphron to be educated; and within six months he handed him back to Alcibiades, not knowing what to do with him' (Prot. 320a).
119a. \( \text{πυ\trip\θέ\upsilon\omega\varepsilon\upsilon} \). \( \text{A friend of Zeno (Parm. 125)} \): his house provides the setting for the \( \text{Parmenides} \).

126b. \( \text{καὶ \\omicron\upsilon\delta\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon} \). The Athenian general who was sent to recover Potidaea, but was killed in the attempt (Thuc. 1. 61-63).

119a - 124b. Alcibiades thinks that as almost all politicians are 'uneducated', there is no need for him to educate himself in order to compete against them. Socrates retorts that just as it is insufficient for the steersman of a ship which is going into battle to be superior to his own crew, so Alcibiades should regard as his potential rivals not his own fellow-citizens, but the kings of Sparta and Persia, against whom his country has often fought (120a). Alcibiades suggests that they are no different from anybody else, but Socrates points out that to hold such an opinion about a potential rival is always dangerous, and that in this case the suggestion is quite untrue. The best natures are found in noble families, and if such natures are well educated, their virtue is complete; and the kings of Sparta and of Persia are certainly of noble stock, for they can trace back their lineage to Zeus (120e).

Socrates playfully remarks that he too can trace his ancestry back to Zeus, through Daedalus (the inventor of sculpture); but their ancestors have all been kings. Alcibiades' ancestry would not impress the Great King. Great precautions are taken at Sparta to prevent usurpation of the throne; and in Persia there is great excitement at
the birth of a prince – but when someone like Socrates or Alcibiades is born, even the neighbours scarcely notice it. The Persian prince is looked after most carefully from earliest years, and from the age of fourteen is educated by experts in each of the four virtues; yet hardly anyone is concerned about Alcibiades’ education (122b). Alcibiades, again, has nothing to compare with the luxurious wealth of Persia, and if he considers the virtues of the Spartans, he must regard himself as a child by comparison: and no Athenian has wealth that will stand comparison with what the Spartans possess in land, slaves, cattle, and revenues. The Spartans are the wealthiest of the Greeks, and of Spartans the king is the wealthiest (123a).

But even Spartan wealth is nothing by comparison with that of the Persians. Socrates has heard from one who made the journey to the Great King’s court about the vast regions of land that are named after various articles of the queen’s apparel. The queen’s mother, Amestris, would wonder how Alcibiades – whose own mother has perhaps fifty minae’s worth of dresses, and who himself has less than three hundred acres of land in the suburbs of Attica – could hope to compete with her son, except, perhaps, in ἅπερεδέχατο καὶ οὐφί, which are alone accounted of value among the Greeks. If she heard that he was not yet twenty, uneducated, and refused to learn or better himself by training, and that he relied on his beauty, birth, wealth, and natural gifts, she would think
him mad. The queen-mother at Sparta, too, would be surprised, if Alcibiades should think of competing against her son. Yet it were shame that they should know better than Athenians themselves what was needed to compete against them. Alcibiades must trust Socrates and the Delphic maxim, 'Know thyself': Sparta and Persia are the real rivals, and could not be overcome. And only by such means can Alcibiades win fame.

Our writer has clearly more in mind than to emphasize Alcibiades' shortcomings. He is contrasting the value of power based on wealth and the practical virtues with that of true wisdom. Alcibiades, though inferior in all respects to the Spartan and Persian kings, has much the same scale of values as they, and upholds the same ideals; and with those ideals are contrasted the Platonic 'training' and 'wisdom', which can prevail even against Sparta and Persia. Friedländer has recognized this, and compares the Hipparchus (see Introd., pp. 58-9). At the same time there may be a conscious intention of illustrating from life, as it were, the various 'ends' which have been severally held to represent the supreme happiness for man - the pleasure of the delicately-living Persians, the practical virtues of Spartans and Persians alike (taught by experts - presumably hired - in the case of the latter), the wealth and birth that are an aid to either 'end'; and finally the wisdom that is superior to everything else.
These are the 'ends' that were compared in Plato's Philebus and in Aristotle's Protrepticus, On Philosophy, and Eudemian Ethics, and though in our passage they are not explicitly referred to as contrasted aims, the comparison is there. (See Introd. pp. 55 and p. 38-9.)

Our writer has clearly heard something about Zoroastrianism, but the allusions would appear to be too slight to justify any far-reaching inferences. On this matter see Introd., pp. 23-5. While it is clear that the educational methods of the Persians are looked upon with respect, yet in view of what follows, and of the hints that the Persian queen gives about 'training' and 'wisdom', it is clear that this description is a picture of a poor second-best. See also note on 121a, and p. 130.

119b. Καὶ ἔχει βαινή. Alcibiades has his own back, as it were, on Socrates, who had insisted that the discussion must be ἔργην. See 117c, and note ad loc.

119c. Ἐς ἴνα διὸν ἔτι ἂν διέγερσι. See 108c, note.

119d. Ἄλλος καὶ εἰ ... ἥμων ἰδίῳ ... The first ἰδίῳ is pleonastic, merely preparing the way for the one that follows: cf. Laches, 184d.

119e. Ὁτε μὴ ἱδίῳ ἰδίῳ ἰδίῳ ἵκα θαλ. Sc. ἱδίῳ ἰδίῳ, as the following clause shows: otherwise we would have to admit a very harsh change of subject. The MS T has ἱδίῳ ἰδίῳ ἰδίῳ, which may be a corruption of ἰδίῳ ἰδίῳ ἰδίῳ (Schleiermacher).

Even in Socrates' attitude as depicted here we notice
the curious but typically Greek idea that a man should try to be better than everyone else: cf. Homer Il. 6. 208, ἀλλὰ μὲ ν ἔστοιχεν καί ὅπερεος ἔφηρεν ἔλαιον.

For this combination of Theaet. 143b.

A rather poetic expression for τῶν πολεμίων.

120a. ὁκιῶς γαθεῖς ἔλλας... What follows is of course sarcastic, and is hardly in Socrates' usual vein.

Meidias... τῶν δεινογνωστῶν... Cf. Aristophanes' Birds, 1297, where Meidias is mentioned again in connexion with δεινογνωστικά. This apparently consisted in stroking with the finger the head of a quail: if the bird did not flinch, its owner won the money staked.

The comic poets assigned this Meidias to the class of πτωχὲς καθότατας and κλέος τῶν ἀνδρῶν (Phryn. Com. 4, cf. Athen. VI, 230c), so that he would be a very good example, if he did in fact take part in politics; but the Platonic Socrates does not usually single out a particular person for such criticism as this.

120b. ἐτε τὴν μεσαμοῦσδια... Slaves had short hair, either because it was worn by Asiatics (as Athenian slaves mostly were), or because they were not allowed to wear it long: cf. Aristoph. Birds, 911. According to Olympiodorus, the expression 'you have still got the hair of a slave on your head' was applied by Athenian women to ex-slaves who retained their slavish ways. ἐτε τὴν μεσαμοῦσδια... makes a neat alteration of the saying.

ἐτε δὲ ἀμαμεῖσας... The accumulation of participles (which, in Plato, is a mark of his latest works) makes this sentence rather unwieldy.

μὲλλόντα τοιούτον ἄγειν... 'although you are intending to engage in so important a contest'.

120c. ρήττ' ἀσκεῖν... καὶ πάσαν παρασκευὴν...
The negative force of ρήττ' is carried through to the end of the sentence: ἀσκεῖν and ἀσκῶμες (i.e. παρασκευάσκομεν) léve are coupled as two things which Socrates sarcastically suggests that Alcibiades should not do.

τῶν ἠδον. I.e. from the rest of men.
120d. Οὐκ ἔχων ἐν μέν... ἀλλ' solitarium: there is no
in the 'answering' clause (Τῷ δὲ οὖτέρον τῷ οὖν...).

Πότερον εἰς ἑαυτόν... For the idea that better natures will
be found in noble families, cf. Arist. Pol. 3. 8, Plato Crat.
394a (but cf. Rep. 415a-b, where it is said that a father whose
nature is 'of gold' may sometimes have an inferior son, and
vice versa), and the Menexenus, 237a. It is clear from what
follows that γένος here refers rather to family than to
nationality, and on the use of the term see 104a, note. A
suitable φόβος was indispensable, according to Plato, for the

120e. τοῖς ἐκείνοις τῷ οἴκετε... Probably, as the
consideration of γένος is to be only the first part of the
comparison, these neuters are best taken as rather vague -
'our lot with theirs'.

The γένος is answered at 122b, Εἰ
δὲ ἐθεδείς εἰς πλάσταυς ἀποβλέψαι...


As there would appear to be no suggestion elsewhere that
Hercules was descended from Perseus, Sydenham suggested that
the text is corrupt, and that εἰς τὸν ἄλλα should be inserted
after γένος.

121a. εἰς Δαίδαλον. Socrates' father, Sophroniscus,
was a sculptor, and Socrates playfully traces his own lineage
back to Zeus by way of Daedalus, the legendary inventor of
sculpture, and the lame god, made fun of even by Aristophanes,
Hephaestus. This is almost certainly not only playful self-
depreciation, but a parody of the importance so often attached
to genealogies, especially by Isocrates and the Sophists (cf.
Isocrates' Busiris, 3 sq., de Bignes, 25-7). Plato attached
little importance to high birth for its own sake (cf. Rep.
613b, Laws 715c), and though our writer is no doubt half
serious when he makes Socrates say that one may expect to
find good natures among those of noble birth (see 120d, note),
it is significant that the qualities on which Alcibiades in
this passage is said to rely - qualities which, moreover, the
Spartans and Persians possess in far greater measure - are
καλλίτε η καὶ μεγάλης καὶ γενεσί καὶ πλούτου καὶ δόξας
τῆς φύκης (123b); for these qualities are the ideals of
Glantoon in the Republic, who says (366c) that anyone ὁ τοῦ
Δαίδαλος διδάσκει φύκης ἐν καλλίτε τοῖς ὁμοιοῖς ὁ γένος,
will prefer injustice to justice. Cf. also pp. 119 ff.
seems most likely that there is a degree of irony in the praise of Persia and Sparta throughout the whole of the present passage, including the remarks on lineage.

The story went that Alcibiades had managed to have a son by the wife of Agis II. As a result, this son, Leotychidas, was not allowed to reign, and his uncle, Agesilaus II, succeeded to the throne instead.

On this use of ἄνα, see 112b, note.

Nevertheless, the story went that Alcibiades had managed to have a son by the wife of Agis II. As a result, this son, Leotychidas, was not allowed to reign, and his uncle, Agesilaus II, succeeded to the throne instead.

On the view that the mention here of the four virtues is intended to mark the similarity between Oriental and Platonic ethics, and thereby to encourage acceptance of Zoroastrian theology, see Introd. pp. 13 sq. It is more likely that since this passage as a whole contains so much that is clearly ironical (cf. 121a, note), and appears to represent the standards here set forth as but second-best (cf. Introd. pp. 100-101, 130), these remarks about ethical training also imply some criticism. Cf. 122c, note (εἰς τοῦτον).

It is certainly contrary to Platonic principles to suppose that virtue can be taught by paid teachers in the same way as riding horseback, for example, can; and it would seem to be implied that that is the principle, nevertheless, on which Persian princes were educated in virtue. Again, it is quite un-Platonic to suppose that
these four virtues should be taught separately by separate experts; on the Platonic view, all the special virtues depend upon the same knowledge, which is knowledge of right and wrong. For Plato's view of Persian princes, see Laws, 694a sq., esp. 695e sq.

122a. Ζωροαστροχος. Zoroaster was a reformer who aimed at purifying (especially by the exclusion of idolatry) the old Iranian religion. The creed is based upon a conception of hostility between the principles of Light and Darkness, Ormuzd and Ahriman. Man should help the spirits of Light (through whose agency Ormuzd was enabled to create the world and the heavens) by destroying all that is evil, and avoiding the 'Lie'—which included such sins as unchastity, pride, magic and slander. The cardinal Zoroastrian virtue was truth. (See also Introd. pp. 23-35). The Magi were the priests.

122b. Ζωροαστροχος Τον Ερακτον. Our writer's ability to name Alcibiades' πατέρας is another indication of his detailed knowledge of Alcibiades' life. Cf. 104c, note, and 123c.

122c. Ελαιτίων Θα' Νικοδίμος. 'Because Alcibiades especially affected the sweeping robe' (Scb1.).
Here follows another list: cf. notes on 117a, 118a. σωφροσύνα, was certainly the chief Spartan virtue: cf. Thuc. 1. 84, i-ii. But wisdom is conspicuous by its absence from this list. Cf. Meno, 88a-b, where virtues of this sort (regarded as they are popularly conceived) are specially distinguished from the knowledge that alone can give them value. Cf. also Laws, 963a. The praise of Sparta here is probably just as ironical as that of Persia (see 121e, note).

These words are very rare, but they are similarly coupled at Laws, 792d.

122d. Ἐῇ δὲ ἔτεκεν Πεσσένεα. Ἐς τὰν νόδον.

Ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ... μὲν solitarium. Ἕδη is adverbial accusative. 'So far as this is concerned,...'

καὶ Μεσσείας. It is surprising that the town should be mentioned rather than the whole district, Messenia, for the original town of Messene was of comparatively small importance. This is perhaps another indication that our dialogue was not written by Plato: for anyone writing after the foundation of the new Messene by Epaminondas in 370/369 B.C. would naturally write Messene rather than Messenia, even though the new town never came under Spartan domination. (Thucydides always speaks about Messenia or 'the Messenians', never about Messene.)

σοφός ἦν εἰς τὸν θυτησια... 'no one here would dispute about the vast territories which they possess... either in respect of their size...'. Unless some infinitive has dropped out of the text, γὰρ must be taken with Ἐβεροβοστάτει (cf. Gorg. 472d), and the datives will be dativeS of respect qualifying the same verb.

122e. Αλλὰ τώρα μὲν... The μὲν of the last sentence (γὰρ μὲν γὰρ --- ) is here picked up, and the 'answer' follows, μεσσηνικὸν ὁρίζουσα καὶ ὕποπλυετον....

组织领导 γάρ ὅτι γένεδα... Prof. A.E. Taylor observed that 'the statements about the wealth of Sparta would only be true for the period between the surrender of Athens to Lysander and the battle of Leuctra' (op. cit. p. 524, note 6). Cf. Isocrates Panegyricus (written about 380 B.C.) 125 sq., esp. 132 ad fin., τὰς ναομολογίας ὑπομολογεῖτο. On the tribute levied by the Spartans cf. Xen. Hell. VI, 2, 16.

κατὰ τὸν Ἀισιόπουλον μὴ Θεον. Horace mentions the
The Spartans, of course, had no coinage of their own, using only pieces of iron which were not accepted in other cities. The gold and silver that their large export trade brought in was merely stored.

123b. ἀνδρός ποιότον. See Introd. p. 15. We cannot say with any degree of probability who he was.

ἐγγὺς ἀπεσπάσατο δῶν. ἐγγὺς is here used strictly as an adverb. ἀπεσπάσατο δῶν is accusative of extent.

ἐν καλεῖν. The infinitive construction (introduced by ἐν) is continued inside the relative clause. So too ἐν καλεῖσθαι below. Cf. 131e, note.

εἰς τὴν κόραν ἀγαθόν. 'Chosen for the adornment of', i.e. given the name of something worn or otherwise used by the queen.

123c. ἔστιν ἐπιπολεῖν. See 105a, note.

ἐὰν πάνυ πολλὸν. 'at the most'.

πάλαι ὡς ... ὄδε τειχίσκω. Since a πάλαι was 10,000 sq. ft., this would be about 619 acres.

Ἐκλείσων. An Attic village about 15 miles from Athens.

123d. ἐπιχεῖρει. Sc. τὸ ἀπετεύχθε ἔστιν, διαγωνίζεται (and so again in the next sentence).

ἐπικρατείσις ταῦτα ὀφέλει. See introductory remarks to this section, p. 101, and Introd., pp. 46 and 58.

ὀδεῖν γέγονεν ὀφάλεις ἐπιστολὴν. Thus the dramatic date of the dialogue must be about 431/0 B.C. We could hardly put it later because it is implied at 120a that there is no war in progress.

This use of ὀφάλεις with an adjective is most common in the comic poets (e.g. Menander, 481. 6; ἀπεπερασάμενος ὀφάλεις ἀνέρωσ); cf., however, Rep. 361a, Antipho, 55.
123e. See 121a, note. For the association of size with beauty, cf. Od. 13. 289, 15. 413, et saep. I.e. at what Persia can boast in the way of Beauty, etc.

124a. Agis did not become king until 427 or 426 B.C., so that there is a slight anachronism.

124b. Socrates always showed the utmost respect for the Apolline religion (cf. the Apology). Our writer seems to bid his readers return to Socratic first principles, and to the Delphic maxim, which he reinterprets presently. The suggestion that the Delphic inscription itself indicates that Persia and Sparta are Alcibiades' real enemies would seem to support the view we have taken that he is meant not to adopt their standards, but to cultivate true wisdom instead.

There is an anacoluthon. After the participial clause (περί Γαλέρεος ...), the sentence breaks off here, and is followed by a rather long parenthesis, after which the original sentence is forgotten.

See 123d, note supra, and cf. ὄντως ἕγερεώς, 124a.

124b - 126b. Socrates initiates a joint enquiry into the question how they can both become as good as possible; he too needs 'education', and only differs from Alcibiades in that his own 'guardian', the god who stopped him approaching Alcibiades earlier, is wiser, and better than Pericles. Hence he believes that Alcibiades can only find the solution
to his present problem through Socrates.

Socrates asks what sort of δέον they are really seeking. They want to be good – but at what? 'The conduct of affairs' is suggested; but horsemanship, navigation, and so on are not the 'affairs' meant. Nor is it enlightening to say 'the affairs of a gentleman': for while that implies knowledge, it is clear that a man may be good at one job and bad at another, and the 'good' man in Alcibiades' sense cannot be 'bad' as well. [This brings out clearly the fact that the required virtue is not an ordinary τέχνη.]

Alcibiades suggests (125b) that the 'good' to whom he refers are those who can rule in the city. But over what are they to rule? Men engaged in action: but what sort of action? That which is involved in mutual relationships, perhaps; but if these relationships be those of boatswain to rowers, for example, the art of ruling over these men will be that of the ship's pilot. Alcibiades says he means ruling over men who share in and contribute towards a common polity. What, then, is this art to be called? Alcibiades suggests ἀρετή, of which the object is the management and preservation of the state (126a). But the question remains, what does that imply? As good management of the body implies health, what will be the result or natural concomitant of good management in a state?
The need of ἔμπνευσις having been recognized, we turn in this section to consider the nature of the ἔγγραφον that has to be acquired; and the method of the investigation is to consider what ἔγγραφον, or product, we expect it to produce. This is the method adopted in Plato's dialogues, and it appears also in the Amatares and (as the main feature of the work) in the Clitophon. (On Socrates' remark that he too needs education, see 124d, note.)

124c. Να ἐὰν ἔλεγγεν κοινῷ βουὴν. See 119b, note.

... θεός ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης. I.e. the god behind the ἔγγραφον. It is not suggested that the ἔγγραφον is God (malgré Ast; cf. Vink, p. 103). Cf. 105d, note.

The use of θεός in the singular here has been thought by Joel to suggest Antisthenian monotheism: but cf. Vink, p. 52, who quotes 105a-b to show that the writer is prepared to talk also in terms of the popular religion; and Comford, Mind XLVII, 1938, p. 324, Dodds, J.H.S. LXV, 1945, p. 23.

... η ἐπιφάνεια ἡ. I.e. the eminence to which Alcibiades wants to attain. The word occurs nowhere in Plato's accepted works (though ἐπιφάνεια occurs two or three times), but there are a number of instances in Aristotle.

124d. θεόν ἄνω τινὰς ἀνθρώποι... 'to a considerable extent all men (need it), but we two very much indeed'. The epic diction at the end of the sentence suits Socrates' lofty, almost pontifical tone at this point. When Socrates admits his need in Plato's dialogues, he is not ostentatious, and his tone is one of quiet and sincere humility. Cf. also 109d, note.

"Ὅτι μὲν ἐγώ... μὲν solitarium (sc. 'but I should not have thought that it was true of you')." οὐκ εἶπα νόον κοινῷ. See 119b, note.

124e. Ἐπιτείμε ὁ Ἐυθέας ὁ Ζυξιδής. Sc. ὁ

... ἔριτος βοσκοῦσας γένος θεῷ. Of τῷ Ζυξιδή; "Those who are good at what?"
Alcibiades' answer here we may compare the object of education as defined by Protagoras (Prot. 318e): a man must acquire 'good judgement' in his own affairs, knowledge of how best he might manage his own home: and, so far as public affairs are concerned, knowledge of how he might have most influence, both by speaking and by acting, on the conduct of public business'. Socrates says (319b-d) that he had not thought that such knowledge could be taught, because whereas on technical matters only experts are consulted, anyone is allowed to speak on general policy. Protagoras' reply (320c-328d), while claiming that it can be taught, similarly differentiates this special kind of knowledge from the technical sciences. He claims that he can help a man 'to know how to judge' (328b).

Our passage similarly shows that the 'goodness' Alcibiades needs must differ from ordinary technical proficiency, and that to speak of 'the conduct of affairs', 'the affairs of gentlemen' (124e), 'good judgement' (125e), and 'the better management of the city' (126a) is inadequate as an explanation of the nature and object of political wisdom. Our writer must have had the Protagoras in mind; and it is quite likely that our writer, who attributes to Alcibiades these objectives of Protagoras, may have intended, as Plato probably did when writing the Protagoras (cf. R.L. Howland, CQ XXXI, p. 151), an allusion to the Isocratean school, whose system of 'education' was not based on absolute standards of moral values. Cf. 104d-e, note.

$\gamma\theta\iota\omicron$ $\pi\iota\omicron\kappa\iota$; Alcibiades was particularly fond of horse-racing; cf. Aristophanes' Clouds, where his character is portrayed under the name of Philippides.

125a. $\phi\epsilon\omicron\nu\iota\omicron\nu\omicron$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\delta\pi\omicron\nu\delta\eta\omicron\pi\omicron\nu\nu\varphi\epsilon\gamma\alpha\omicron\sigma\iota\alpha\nu$. This use of $\phi\epsilon\omicron\nu\iota\omicron\nu\omicron$ is purely Socratic. Plato applied the term, in the works of his maturity, to the understanding of the absolute nouns: the noun $\phi\epsilon\omicron\nu\iota\omicron\nu\omicron$ is used in this latter sense at 133c. In Socratic usage (as later in that of Aristotle) the word connotes merely practical knowledge (cf. Jaeger, op. cit. pp. 81-2).

125b. $\sigma\varsigma$ $\delta\iota\nu\pi\omicron\nu\nu\gamma\epsilon\iota$; 'Not, I suppose, over horses?'

125c. $\tau\omicron$ $\pi\omicron\epsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\omega$. The point is that 'ruling over men in action' is still inadequate as a definition, as what follows shows. It does not explain the nature of the $\epsilon\gamma\omicron\nu$
or product which, even if we are not concerned with an ordinary τέχνη, it is presumably the function of any sort of knowledge to create (cf. Amatores, 136c).

συμβολίζων ευπορίας. 'engage in business with each other'.

125d. ἐν θείποις ἐγωμενών ἀδελφοῖς. 'leading men in song'.

τι ποτὲ λέγεις... The τι is internal accusative with ἐπομένων: '...men who make use of men in what way?'

ζητεῖ γὰρ αἰ... The apodosis is understood (what would you say?).

125e. ἐπομενῶν ἐγώγε. See 124e, note.

126b – 127e. Again, what must be present if eyes are to be in good condition? Clearly sight. What, correspondingly, must a city possess? Alcibiades suggests friendship between the citizens; and that implies unanimity. Now what art will provide this unanimity, in the same way as arithmetic will make men agree about numbers? And what sort of agreement – i.e. agreement about what – is required? Alcibiades thinks it is friendship and unanimity such as is found between parents and their son, or between brother and brother (126e). But can a man agree with a woman about knitting, when the one understands it and the other does not? It would seem that there can be no unanimity, and therefore no friendship (if that is the same thing) between man and woman, when they do their own jobs. Yet Alcibiades would have thought that
concentration by each class on its own pursuits was precisely what was wanted for the good management of a state and the existence of justice (127c). From what has been said, justice and friendship seem to be incompatible. Alcibiades is thoroughly confused, but Socrates bids him not to be despondent: he is still young: only let him answer the questions asked, and with God's help they should manage to improve themselves.

The apparent incompatibility between justice in the sense of 'each one doing his own job' and the principle of agreement or unanimity (δυναμία) arises, of course, from the interpretation given to the latter term. The sense in which unanimity is desirable in a state is clearly expressed in the Eudemian Ethics (see Introd. pp. 53-4), where, in the treatment of friendship and of its relationship to goodness, there is a great deal that is similar to the conclusion of our dialogue. The perversity of Socrates' discussion of 'agreement' in our passage is obvious, and it would seem certain that we are meant to draw our own conclusions about this particular problem in the light of the subsequent explanation of the nature of political wisdom. (Cf. the scholiast on 131b: ἐκτάνησις is called temperance 'because the political virtues conflict with each other': i.e. the wise man can set a right balance.) The doctrine of the dialogue, in fact, is the same as that of the Eudemian Ethics, not only in regard to the source of wisdom and the
manner of cultivating justice, but also in regard to the question of reconciling the performance of one's own job with the principle of δρόνος. Plato himself seldom raises a difficulty without having some hint to give of a possible solution, though often the solution is only implied. The writer of our present dialogue has made his implied conclusion clear enough: if there is one, and only one, all-embracing Wisdom, it follows that while each man has his own part to play, all must agree about the nature of the common 'end', and so recognize the part that each other has to play.

126b. καὶ ἔστω δε... 'And ears too': the καὶ goes closely with ἕστω: cf. 118d, note.

126c. ὅταν φίλοι μὲν αὐτοὶς... I.e. among the citizens.

Οὐκ οὖν καὶ αὐτοῖς αὐτῷ... I.e. each man will be thoroughly convinced in his own mind, and not be 'of two minds' about it.

δό δ' ζητήσεις μὴν ἔτητες; These examples of arithmetic and the 'measuring' art may be borrowed from Euth. 7b-c, where Socrates observes that on matters with which these arts are concerned there can be no bitter disagreement or enmity.

καὶ ηὐνεί πόλεμε.... Sc. δρόνοις παρακαλεῖσθε.

126e. ἐν πρὸς μὲν σοφίας... μὲν solitariun (sc. 'but I do not know what you may think'). ηὐνεί is perhaps best taken not as = ζητήσει, but strictly for what it is: 'I think I mean friendship and unanimity, which exists between...'. Alcibiades, in fact, still assumes that there can only be one kind of δρόνος.

τῶν μὴ δὲ ποταμεύον... The δρόνοικα really required will depend, of course, on knowledge of the ultimate principle of goodness, which need not presuppose or bring with it knowledge of specialized arts.
127b. ὁμοίως ἔγγραφο. I.e. he thinks that they are well managed in those circumstances.

127c. Δικαίως δὲ πράξις τοῦ ὑποτασσόντος. This, of course, is the definition of justice in the Republic (441c sq.); but cf. also Charm. 161e sq. (for which see Introd. p. 18).

127d. ἔξεσθε ἐὰν ἔστιν ἔτι ὁ ποντιφικός. Sc. ἔστιν.

127e. Τάῦτα οὖν καὶ ηὐλιτεύομεν. Another suggestion of the pontifical attitude: cf. 124d, note. (This foreseeing of the future is quite a different matter from ἕξεσθε τοῦ ἔτι ὁ ποντιφικός ἡμῖν, ἀπὸ διδασκόντως, τοὺς ἐπιμελοῦς, Apol. 40a.) With the assurance that follows, cf. 109e, note.

ἔνεκα γε... 'so far as my answering is concerned'.

127e - 130c. What is meant, asks Socrates, by 'caring for one's self'? Is it the same to care for what belongs to one's self? The art that cares for shoes (i.e. for that which belongs to the feet) is the cobbler's art, whereas gymnastics is the art that cares for the feet themselves: the two arts are not the same. We are not now concerned, then, with what cares for what belongs to us, but with what cares for our selves (128e). Now we could not determine what art would improve shoes if we did not know what a shoe was; neither can we decide what art will improve us, if we do not know what we are ourselves. Only when we know our selves, as the temple at Delphi enjoins, can we know how to care for ourselves (129a).
How can we discover what the 'self' itself is? We may distinguish between an instrument and the person who uses it. Now the shoemaker 'uses' his hands no less than his tools, so that his hands, like his tools, are 'different' from the shoemaker. The same may be said of the body as a whole: it is 'different' from the man who uses it (129e). Now the soul is what 'uses' the body; it rules over it. We may say that man is either soul or body or the two combined; but the body cannot rule over itself, and that being so body and soul combined cannot rule; and since the real man must be the 'using' or 'ruling' element, it follows that man is soul (130c).

We here enter upon the main, constructive part of the dialogue. The ἐπιδείκτικον which was said to be the only means of equipping a statesman to meet all possible rivals (124b) has to be explained. Consideration of the meaning of 'self' results in the preliminary conclusion that man is soul, so that caring for one's self will mean caring for one's soul - the habit that Socrates recommends at Apol. 29e, 30b.

127e - 128a. ἐπιδείκτικον. 'lost by chance': πέλεκτος in this sense is found after εἰ (when used with optative), εἰκ. (+ subjunctive), and (as here) μὴ: cf. Prot. 361c, Thuc. 2. 13.

128a. Καίδεις δέ τι χρειείσ; 'Do you speak of anything as belonging to the hand?"
128a-b. Καὶ ἔκτιτιν... Ναί. These words, preserved by Stobaeus (they are not in the MSS B or T) should probably be accepted as part of the original text. They are balanced in what follows (καὶ γυναικεία μὲν... διευρύνθη δὲ...
128c-d).

128c. Ἐπίθετον δὲ πόσης... Sc. ποιημένη. ἐκτείνοντες δέσφιν γλυφία, 'ring-engraving'.

128c-d. καὶ τῆς Ζώδας... Sc. τέκνας.

128d. οὔτω ἐκδοτον... 'each thing itself', as opposed to the things which belong to it (τῶν οὔτω).

128e. οὔτων... 'a man himself'. (For the emphatic use, which is clearly intelligible in its context, cf. Crat. 432d.)

129a. γνώντης περὶ οὔτος... 'when we have that knowledge', i.e. knowledge of our selves.

129b. οὔτο τὸ οὔτο... The 'self' itself. This is later contrasted with οὔτων ἐκδοτο (130d: on the reading there see note ad loc.: but even if we read οὔτο ἐκδοτο it would have to mean much the same), and seems to denote - as what follows at 133b sq. shows - the innermost essence of our being, which is the same in all men, as opposed to the individual man (cf. Friedländer, D.G.A. II, p. 18). It is made clear at 133c that the οὔτο τὸ οὔτο is the contemplative part of the soul, the part of the soul of which the function is to 'know', as opposed to the whole soul. The οὔτον ἐκδοτος will be the whole individual personality, that is to say the οὔτο τὸ οὔτο plus the particular characteristics peculiar to any particular man.

Hence it would appear possible to regard the οὔτο τὸ οὔτο as a Form, of which individual men partake. We have seen in the Introduction that Plato never called the soul or any part of it a Form, and that possibly he never even thought of calling it one even in his latest works, but that Aristotle explicitly spoke of the soul as an εἴδος; and when Aristotle first spoke of it in this way he was probably using the term, in the Platonic sense, as meaning a Form that was separable. (See Introd. pp. 35ff. and pp. 44 sq.) But if our
writer had intended to represent mind as a Form in the Platonist sense he would almost certainly have said something explicit about immortality, about 'recollection', and about dialectic. (Introd. pp. 47 ff.) We may say that while he may have regarded mind as a Form in the later Aristotelian sense, and was in any case influenced, no doubt, by the Academic use of αὐτῶν in connexion with the Theory of Forms, he probably did not himself believe in Plato's theory. Cf. Introd. pp. 47 ff.

Socrates now argues that as words are distinguishable from the person who utters them, and tools from the workman who uses them, so limbs (and the whole body) are distinguishable from the man who uses them.

129e. Ἐξεῖσ μὲν ὁ Ἄλκιβιάδης, ἔφη Σocrates, ἄνθρωπος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἅπαν πνεῦμα ἢ χώρα ἢ ἡμέρα. Sc. δέ γενόμενον (understood from the last sentence).

130a. ὃς ἀντὶ δὲν ἱλέον ἔν τις ἔστω ἡ ψυχή; This suggestion, in which ψυχή need mean no more than 'personality', contains nothing that Alcibiades could not accept, and in fact he agrees at once (cf. 130c). The idea would not appear strange, in view of the poetic usage (cf. e.g. Soph. El. 1127, Eur. Hipp. 173). But the point is an important one for the argument that is to follow, and Socrates therefore emphasizes it by further argument (down to 130e).

Ωὐκεὔν Ἐξεῖσω; To speak of 'ruling' instead of 'using' does not materially affect the argument, but merely emphasizes the importance of the 'using' element. The conception of the soul as 'ruling' was an accepted axiom of the Academy (cf. e.g. Laws, 896c).

ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ σώματι διάφορον. Following the agreement that man is that which 'uses' or 'rules over' the body, Socrates proceeds to eliminate any possible alternatives to the conclusion already reached, that man is soul.

According to the Phaedrus (246c) man is ψυχὴ καὶ σώμα σαλαγένε, but the conclusion here reached is not necessarily incompatible with that, as the context is different. See Introd. pp. 16 ff.

130c. μηδὲν ἵνα ὃ γεγονότο καὶ Σocrates ὁ παῖς. See previous note.
130c - 132c. Alcibiades is satisfied that man is soul, and Socrates observes that this conclusion, if not very precise, is sufficient for the moment. Accurate knowledge can only be reached by discovering the 'self' itself; but it is enough for the present to know what is meant by the individual 'self'. When Socrates speaks to Alcibiades, one soul is addressing another. Again, it follows from what has been said that a doctor, \textit{qua} doctor, will not 'know himself', since his concern is with the body, which is merely one of the things that \textit{belong} to the 'self'. Farmers and craftsmen deal with what is even further removed from the 'self', namely that which \textit{appertains} (in one way or another) to the body; so that if self-knowledge is temperance, no one of these workers is temperate in virtue of his art. That is why these arts are regarded as held in low esteem (131b). Similarly the business man does not occupy himself (directly) even with that which \textit{belongs to himself} [in the Greek there is a play on the expression, 'doing one's own job', which was said to imply justice (127c)]. Again, he who loves Alcibiades' body will depart when its beauty wanes, but the lover of Alcibiades' self is he who loves his soul, and does not depart: and such an one is Socrates (131e). Socrates will not leave him, so long as he is not corrupted, as many a man has been, by the people; and that is Socrates' chief fear. Alcibiades must be on his guard. He must learn true
wisdom, and make that his antidote against corruption (132b).

Socrates recapitulates the conclusions so far reached.

This section serves as an interlude between the first part of the main argument, contained in the preceding section, and the second and final part that is to be expounded in the next. At the same time it is able to reject the claims of any of the ordinary 'arts' to provide self-knowledge.

130c. Ἐὰν δὲ γένι

130c-d. δὲ νῦν ἔπειτα ἡ θεωρεῖν... Nothing was said earlier on about any intention of passing over the more difficult question, though there was perhaps a hint at 129a that it might not prove an easy one.

130d. Ἀλκιβιάδης τὸ αὐτὸν ἔστω... At 129b.

See 129b, note.

This is the reading of the MSS B and T: αὐτὸν ἄντον. This reading of the MSS gives perfectly good sense, which is not improved by Stephanus' reading. (The neuter γένη need not cause difficulty, as we are concerned with definition: cf. e.g. ἐστὶν ἀδάκτυν ἡ ἰερεία; (Meno, 70a), γὰρ τίνι ἐπιμένειν ἀντέ πότε ήκοτον, Πλάτων, Πέρι τινής 146c.)

τὸ αὐτὸν. Will = αὐτὸν τὸν αὐτὸν, just as ἂν αὐτὸν (e.g. at Rep. 518c) = ἄντο τὸ ἄντον. On the meaning of ἄντον τὸ αὐτὸν and of ἄντον ἐκατόρτου see 129b, note.

130e. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐπερεῖται μένῃ ἐν τῷ... Cf. 129b. Socrates means that what was then said has now been shown to have been strictly accurate. The conversation really is between Socrates and Alcibiades; it is not, it seems, a discussion with a mere face, but one with the real Alcibiades — that is to say, with his soul. (The πρὶν ἐπερεῖται clause is not part of what was said before; it gives what now appears (ὡς ηὐκίνει) to justify these earlier remarks. Strictly speaking, therefore, there is an ellipse after
13la. Ούτες ἔρχεται ἕτει... A doctor's knowledge is concerned with the body, which is not the real self. Hence, unless he has some further knowledge, he will not know himself. He may possess this further knowledge, but he will not possess it simply because he is a doctor. The object of these observations is to deal the final blow to the claims of the highly specialized arts to provide the wisdom that the statesman requires. We have seen in an earlier section (124b sq.) that ability at one such art might be accompanied by 'badness' at another, whereas the truly good man could not be bad as well. That served to show that 'good' is used in a higher sense when it indicates what Socrates and Alcibiades mean than when it is applied to an ordinary ἱέχον. Now we see why: 'goodness' at an ordinary art means ability concerning the body or the things of the body, or even things of a lower order still, whereas the 'goodness' of the statesman denotes knowledge of the soul.

The farmer is concerned, qua farmer, merely with the food that feeds the body – i.e. not even (directly) with τὰ ἐνουτα (the σώμα and its parts), but merely with τὰ τῶν σώματος.

13lb. Ἐτῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ... This rather suddenly introduced hypothesis, which Alcibiades does not question, suggests that the close connection between σωφροσύνη and self-knowledge was generally recognized as well established by the time this dialogue was written. The equation is suggested as early as the Charmides (154d), but there the interpretation put upon self-knowledge proves unsatisfactory as a definition of temperance. In later works Plato emphasizes the importance of self-knowledge, but nowhere equates it with temperance, as here, in a manner suggesting that no one could object. In the Amatorès, on the other hand, we find exactly the same suggestion of certainty when the identification is made (138a). See also p. 60.

13le. ὡς ἑωφρονείκου καὶ Θεία ἔτοι... One is tempted to see here another play on names: see 103α, note.
just as though it had been γαρ. (For another example of the infinitive construction carried through into a subordinate clause, see 123b, note.) The ἵνα indicates that we have here the apodosis of a suppressed condition, which might have been something like 'if I had not anticipated you'.

At Gorg. 519a b Socrates is made to prophesy that the people will turn against Pericles, and perhaps against Callicles 'and my friend Alcibiades', though Callicles and Alcibiades may be οὐκ ἂν Ἰωνίῳ Τινά κακίων, ἵνα ἐγω σοφιάτε τίνων. There is no suggestion there that Alcibiades will be corrupted by the people: but it is generally agreed that the passage in the Republic describing the corruption of the philosophic nature presents a portrait of Alcibiades: cf. Adam on 494c and 560d, Comford (The Republic of Plato), p. 197, note. Alcibiades was 'infamatum a plerisque', though Theopompus and Timaeus praised him (Nepos VII, II). It is true that Thucydides treated him with kindness, and that even Isocrates in the de Bigax attempts to whitewash his character; but Antiphon and Lydias had composed speeches against him (Athen. XII. 9, XIII. 12), and the sophist Polycrates had explicitly associated his misconduct with the teaching of Socrates. The hint in our dialogue may be intended to help free Socrates from blame. (106b perhaps also suggests that the 'long speeches' which Alcibiades heard from sophists contributed to his corruption — a suitable retort to Polycrates.) It would be fitting for a member of the Academy to explain matters in this way.

For the manner in which many politicians truckled to the wishes of the people, cf. Aristoph. Wasps 97 sq., and Gorg. 431d sq.

οὐ μὴ σε ἡνάκας. οὐ μὴ + subjunctive denotes a strong negation: cf. e.g. Phaedo 66b.

Πρὸς πολεμίους. Σcf. ἐλεύθερος ἐν τῇ Τῆς πόλεως: though these words might, perhaps, be taken as part of the relative clause, if we suppose πρὸς πολεμίους to = μὴ παρείη καὶ to have been used instead of οὐ because the clause is generic (sc. ἐνδέξατο).

Cf. Laws, 957d, where it is said that the good judge will guide the state aright because
he will 'possess within himself' the writings of the lawgiver, 

Alcibiades is now listening intently. He has been fully won over by Socrates' reasoning, and, now that they have decided what the individual 'self' is, is eager to learn how he can 'improve' himself - in what way, that is, he can 'care for' himself.

132c - 133c. How can we know things in themselves? If we can acquire that knowledge, we shall know our selves. Perhaps the Delphic inscription contains a hint. If it had said, 'See yourself', you would have to look at something in which the eye could see itself - a mirror or something of that sort (132e). Now the eye contains a sort of 'mirror' - its pupil gives a reflexion of anyone who looks into it. If an eye is to see itself, it must look into the best part - the seeing part - of the eye. Similarly, if a soul is to know itself, it must regard soul, and that part in particular which manifests the soul's 'virtue' of wisdom. There is no part of the soul more divine than the part that has to do with knowledge and contemplation. It resembles the divine; and by looking into this part and acquiring knowledge of all that is divine, of God and of wisdom, a man will best be enabled to know himself (133c).
the 'mirror' in the eye, so God is purer and brighter than
that which is best in our souls. If, then, we regard God,
we shall be using the best mirror there is for giving a
reflexion even of what is human, if we want to understand
the soul's 'virtue'; and in this way a man will be able to
see and to know himself best.}

The purport of the first part of this section is that
if we can come to know and understand the divine element,
the rational part, of someone else's soul, and thereby acquire
knowledge of God and of wisdom - then, inasmuch as what we
are regarding is, as it were, a reflexion of the corresponding
part of our own souls, we shall come to know ourselves. The
implication is that the divine part of the soul (νοῦς) is
the same in all of us, and that this is akin to God because
He also, in Aristotle's words, is 'νοῦς or something beyond
νοῦς' (On Heaven, frg. 49).

The short passage at 133c which, though not in our MSS,
is recorded by Eusebius and Stobaeus, should probably be
regarded as part of the original text (see Introd. p.74, n.4).
Just as the eye can see itself by looking into another eye
or into a real mirror (cf. 132e), so the mind, while able to
see a reflexion of itself in someone else's mind, can do so
even better by regarding the best 'mirror' of all, namely God.
Apart from an apparent reference to this passage at 134d (see
note ad loc.), the parallelism in the analogy of the eye is
left incomplete and unsatisfactory unless there is something into which the mind can look corresponding to the real mirror for the eye.

Doctrinally, both parts of this section go beyond Plato. It may be objected to the second that it is left obscure whether (and if so, how) we can contemplate God except through regarding the mind of a friend. It would seem that according to Aristotle one must practise virtue before one can attain to knowledge of the divine element in a friend's soul (see note on 135e), but that only when such knowledge has been reached can one come near to having virtue in its full perfection; and recognition of the self-sufficiency and perfection of God is probably to be regarded as resulting from the self-knowledge that man can only attain by contemplating a friend. But see Introd. p. 58, n. 170.

On the justification for the interpretation here given of this section, and the similarity between this doctrine and that of Aristotle in his treatment of friendship in the

Endemian Ethics, see Introd. pp. 48-55.

132c. Τίν', οὖν, ἀν ἢ Προγον ... αὐτῷ. This is the reading of the MSS Bε and Tı, which seems to make perfectly good sense. αὐτῷ will mean 'things in themselves'; cf. 128e, ἄγαν, with note ad loc. Schleiermacher conjectured αὐτῷ (accepted by Burnet), while Croiset elaborates this into ἄγαν το αὐτῷ.

132d. ἦν ἐν ἔπειδ' ὁ ἴν τ' ἀριθμόνει; The clause contains two interrogatives: 'How should we understand it to prescribe what?' i.e. 'How should we have understood it, and what should we have taken it to prescribe?'
132e. εἰς καὶ Τοιαῦτα. The καὶ Τοιαῦτα, while colloquially vague and suitable in such a reply, allows for the suggestion of Socrates that follows.

133a. εἰς ὁμολογίαν ταῖς κατ. This is probably in apposition to τὸ πρὸς τὸν as Lamb appears to take it.

133b. καὶ ψυχῆς εἰς μελέτην. On this analogy, and its occurrence in Aristotle, see Introd. pp. 45-6 sq.

133c. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο... The point of the addition, says Friedländer (loc. cit.), 'is not that one should really seek something else that might be considered besides the ὑπερήφανος, but it explains to what extent it is this ὑπερήφανος into which the soul must look (so almost = καὶ τί ἔσται ἐκ τούτου). That interpretation is in line, of course, with his rejection of ἡ θεοτυπία... Μὴ at 133c. But it would be a most curious way of suggesting that there is nothing else to which mind is akin; and the analogy of the eye would seem very unsatisfactory if, while the eye can look into another eye or into a real mirror, soul can see itself in soul and in nothing else. (Cf. 132e, εἰς κατὰ τὸν τοιαῦτα: the pupil of the eye is merely τοῦ ταὐτοῦ.)

133c. Θεοτυπία. Since divinity was always associated in Greek literature with immortality, so that the one almost connotes the other, it is tempting to see here an implicit admission of the immortality of mind, and of mind alone. Aristotle says in the Protrepticus: 'Man has nothing divine or blessed except the one thing worthy of trouble, whatever there is in us of Nus and reason. This alone of what we have seems immortal and divine.' (frg. 61.)
I would read τὰ θεία with T. and Stobaeus (and Croiset) rather than τὰ θεῖα with E. and Eusebius (and Burnet and Friedländer) on the ground that θεῖα usually means now 'is similar to', but 'seems to be' (cf. e.g. Crat. 437a, Prot. 361b, Phaedo 62d), and that while τοῦτο θεία for 'this part of it' seems a little harsh, τὸ θεῖον θυμόν 'the divine part of it' is natural enough.

Friedländer observes (D.G.A. II, p. 14) that these words were not lacking in Olympiodorus' text, as Burnet and Wilamowitz, following Stallbaum, suggest. There is therefore no ground whatever for athetizing them. 'φρονησις or σοφία', says Friedländer (Platon II, p. 244), 'is here equalized with God'. But there is no suggestion in any of Plato's accepted works that either knowledge of God or the acquisition of wisdom is possible without dialectic. This is the climax of the constructive part of our dialogue, of which the purpose is to show how we can 'care for ourselves' or improve ourselves, and if Plato had written such a work after evolving the dialectical method he would have been bound to mention it; and the doctrine here set forth is certainly not such as could be ascribed to Socrates himself. On the other hand, from the later doctrine that God is νοησις and that mind is 'the divine in us' it follows at once that understanding of the nature of human mind will lead to the knowledge of God. See Introd. pp. 28 sqq. and 49 sqq.

καίλλος ἐνοπη. The word ἐνοπη, so far as I can discover, does not appear in any prose work of this period apart from those of Aristotle. Eudoxus, however, composed a chart of the heavens which was called ἔνοπη (cf. Hultsch, Platon's Werke VI, pp. 938-9, 940-4; Festugière, Platon et l'Orient, p. 16), and it is just possible that our writer was thinking of that. I have suggested that his only reason for failing to mention astronomy may be that such a mention might seem incongruous in a dialogue where Socrates takes the leading part (see Introd. pp. 57-8).
Now it was agreed that self-knowledge is temperance. Without it, we may now say, we cannot know what is good or bad for us, or even that what belongs to us is ours; nor could we know what appertains to our belongings. It was wrong to say that some men, while not knowing themselves, do know what belongs to them, and that others know about what concerns their belongings. Only the one kind of art can give knowledge of any of these things, and that gives knowledge of all (133e).

If a man does not understand what concerns himself, neither can he understand the affairs of others: he can never, in fact, be a statesman. He will not really know what he is doing, he will make mistakes and fare ill, and so be miserable, and the same will apply to those for whom he acts. Only the temperate and good man can be happy. Riches, military and naval might, all are of no avail to a city that lacks virtue, and a statesman cannot give what he has not himself got. Alcibiades should not seek despotic power, but looking to God should acquire the temperance and justice that the gods love. Only then will he have true success and happiness. Like the sick man who has not the sense to restrain his desires, or the steersman who lacks the steersman's art, so a city that lacks ἀρετή will always come to grief (135b). If a man lacks virtue, it is better for him that he should be ruled by one who possesses it. Badness is slavish, while virtue befits the free.
Socrates insists that Alcibiades' improvement will depend not on Socrates, but on God. Alcibiades asserts that he in his turn will now be the follower, never leaving Socrates. Socrates observes that his love has been like a stork: it has hatched winged love in Alcibiades' heart, and is now to be tended by its offspring. But though Alcibiades intends to practice justice forthwith, Socrates, though not mistrusting his nature, is afraid that the people may get the better both of Alcibiades and of himself.

In these last few pages the conclusions that follow from the preceding discussion are carefully and fully explained. In particular we may notice that understanding of Τά Ζ ámbων depends upon knowledge of Τά Λύτων (133e). Herein lies the clue to the reconciliation of justice (= 'doing one's own job') with 'unanimity' (όμοσονικα). The two principles converge in the knowledge of the absolute good. The same conception of an absolute goodness allows, in the Eudemian Ethics, for the simultaneous existence of friendship with a friend and 'friendship with one's self': one's own 'good' and one's neighbour's 'good' are ultimately the same. 'A man's friendship for himself is at bottom friendship towards the good' (1240b 17-19); 'a man seems to us a friend who wishes the good or what he thinks to be such to some one' (1240a 23-5); 'by a man's attitude to himself the other modes of friendship...are determined' (1240a 21-3).

In the list of 'goods' that are said to be of no real
value for a city in comparison with the virtue that comes from self-knowledge, it is significant that wealth and size and influence (134b) are among those on account of which Persia and Sparta were said to be so strong (122b - 124b). We now see why their ideals are inferior to the ἐρμηλεία and σοφία which Socrates advocates. Further, in making light of the value of τείχων, τηνηρὼν and νεωρίων (134b), our writer was probably thinking of Gorg. 519a, where Socrates complains that Pericles and others like him ἄνευ σωφροσύνης και δικαιοσύνης, λημένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τείχων καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλαμρίων ἐμπεπλήκτοι τιν Πόλιν.

The weakness of the 'practical' politicians, and of so-called ἐνομοῖο like Sparta and Persia - no less than of the standards which Alcibiades had originally set himself - was that they disregarded the soul.

133c. ὤμολογούμεν. At 13lb.

133d. Οὖς ἡμέρᾳ ἡμετέρα ὀτι ἡμετέρα. The doctor, for example, who concerns himself with the body (τα ἄυτου, 131a), does not really know even that, since the value and significance of the body is derived from and depends upon its relation to the 'self'. Only by knowing our selves can we comprehend the 'meaning' of that which belongs to or concerns ourselves, or know that such a relationship really does exist. (On 'the good' as the condition of knowledge, cf. Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic, pp. 218 sq.)

133d-e. ἐν χώρᾳ ... κατιδεῖν. Hyperbaton: the κατίδεῖν would normally come later than κατιδεῖν. Perhaps κατιδεῖν was inserted at the last minute as an afterthought.
133e. καὶ ἐὰς δύο ἀναγνώσεις. Self-knowledge, in fact, is the basis of all knowledge. On the importance of this remark (and of the next two questions) in relation to the problem of reconciling τὸ μὲν ἀναγνώσθην with ἀλήθεια, see introductory remarks to this section, p. 129.

οὔθ οἷον Ὀμνίκος. Cf. Protagoras' claim to teach a man ἡμῖν ἀναγνώσθην, despite his refusal to recognize an absolute standard of goodness (Prot. 318e). See note on 124e.

134a. ὁ δὲ καὶ ὅς... I.e. (presumably) those who are ignorant but think that they have knowledge, cf. 117e - 118a. (Most politicians do, in fact, suppose that they possess it, cf. 118b.)

κακῶς δὲ πράττειν όν κακὸν ἀθλοῖος; κακῶς πράττειν has two meanings: (1) 'to act wickedly', (2) 'to fare ill'. In the last question, and in this one, sense (2) probably predominates; but since it has been shown that self-knowledge is the source at once of all knowledge and of all true morality, there is justification now for allowing the two senses to coalesce, as Socrates does at 134b below: οὖν δὲ κακῶς τὴν ἀναγνώσειν ἀθλοῖος. In the light of the same explanation we could now justify the similar play on the two meanings of κακῶς πράττειν at 116b, of which we are perhaps intentionally reminded (see note ad loc., and also p. 88).

134b. οὖν δὲ ταύτα... See introductory remarks to this section, p. 130.

134c. Ὅρηται οὖν μεταβολοῦν τοῖς πολίταις. The ruler with knowledge will be able, according to the Meno and the Republic, to create ὑπομονὴν ἑαυτῷ among the citizens: see 118d, note.

134d. Θεοφιλῶς πράτειν. Cf. Symp. 212a, Phil. 39e. (The adverb, however, does not seem to occur in Plato's accepted works.)

εἰς τὸ Θεοῦ καὶ λαμπρὸν δρῶντες. The word λαμπρόν would be difficult to understand if the passage ("οὖν... Ναι") at 133c were rejected: see Introd. p. 88, n. 74.

These words, taken in conjunction with τὸ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν at 134e, might perhaps suggest the influence of the Zoroastrian teaching about the principles of Light and Darkness
(cf. 122a, note), but the Iranian religion posited a Devil, and τὸ ὥσιν is very vague. The metaphor appears in the Republic in the allegory of the Cave (cf. 518c-d).

134e. εἰς τὸ ὥσιν καὶ τῷ σκοτεινῷ. See previous note.

Note the change of subject, inside the relative clause.

135a. διὰ τὴν ἔκτρησιν ἦλθεν ὁ σωματικός. The infinitive is used as a noun, though without the article (sc. τῷ συμβησμενῶν ἐστιν). Cf. Rep. 329d, Ep. VII, 335b.

Τῇ σωματικῇ may be taken either as accusative of respect, or as subject of the infinitive.

Τῷ ἴππῳ νύν ... Cf. the allegory of the mutinous crew, Rep. 488a sq.


ὦκεν τῷ γῷ ἤμενον ... The identity of ἤμενον and καλλίν was agreed upon at 116c.

Τῷ Σάτραπῃ καλλίν πρεσβευτὴν; Cf. Hipp. Ma. 293b sq.

135c. τοῦτο τῷ πεπτικόν ὑπὲρ ζηύκα. This use of πεπτικόν is especially frequent in Plato's later works.

Τῷ πεπτικῷ βοήθηκα at 121d is also, perhaps, periphrastic. Cf. Laws, 677e, 692d, Ep. VII, 325c, 340a b, and also Epinomis, 980d, 982b. For other instances see note on Ep. VII, 325a, in my edition. Often the person in the accusative is in some way unfortunate.

135d. ὁ ἵππος καὶ θεὸς εἰς ἔθελην. Cf. Theaet. 150d (οὐκ ἔν τῷ θεῷ πρεσβεύω).

Παιδαγωγὸς ζήτῃ. For the metaphorical use, cf. Rep. 600e.

135e. Καλαγώνυ ἥρα ... οὔ δὲν σιωσάτω. Aged storks were supposed to be cared for by their young. Cf. Soph. El. 1047.
It would seem from this that according to our writer justice may be practised as a preparation for or aid to the acquisition of self-knowledge. In the Eudemian Ethics, whereas friendship fosters justice (1234b 23-9), so also virtue is useful for the creation of friendship (1234b 23-4, 1237a 33-4). We have seen that our writer appears to regard self-knowledge, and with it understanding of the true sanction of morality, as derived from contemplation of a friend's soul; and it seems that here too the doctrine is the same.

See 132a, note.
Appendix

On the Language and the Style

1. Statistical Evidence.

Ritter points to the occurrence of certain answer-formulae as evidence that the Alcibiades cannot be an early work of Plato. Using the figures that he gives for their occurrence, we can obtain percentage figures for comparison based on the total number of occurrences of all answer-formulae in the Alcibiades and in Plato's accepted works (See Table I). Ritter also notes certain expressions that are not answer-formulae, but again are chiefly found in Plato's later works; in their case we may consider the average number of occurrences per hundred pages in Hermann's edition (see Table 2). Finally, Ritter refers to a few expressions that are comparatively infrequent in Plato's later works. But it has to be admitted that the incidence of these expressions is not incompatible with the theory that the Alcibiades was written after Plato's early works and before his later ones, a view which Friedländer has attempted to support by a very thorough-going statistical analysis of language.

The Platonic nature of our dialogue's language may be further supported by evidence of a somewhat negative kind resulting from study of the distribution of nouns and adjectives in the vocabulary.

\[ \text{p. 97} \text{, \textit{pp. 56-7}} \]

\[ \text{2} \lambda \gamma \beta \gamma \ \lambda \varepsilon \gamma \varepsilon \varsigma \] (an answer-formula), \( \delta \gamma \delta \alpha \nu \delta \tau \iota \), \( \sigma \chi \varepsilon \delta \alpha \nu \tau \iota \) or \( \sigma \chi \varepsilon \delta \alpha \nu \ldots \tau \iota \), and \( \tau \zeta \delta \gamma \delta \tau \iota \) for which the respective \% figures in Table I for the Alc. are 3.8, 18.2, 3.6, 3.6; but cf. \textit{Syrp.}, 13.9, 9.7, 4.8, 3.1; \textit{Phaedo}, 3.4, 7.6, 7.6, 21.5. N. B. also \[ \text{D.G.A. II pp. 56sq.} \]

the proportion of \( \delta \lambda \lambda \lambda \mu \nu \nu \nu : 1 \delta \lambda \lambda \lambda \mu \nu \nu \) (\( \delta \lambda \lambda \lambda \mu \nu \nu \) is more frequent in Plato's later works, while the expressions are used about equally as much as each other in his early works). Friedländer attributes this to chance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALCIB</th>
<th>305</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>1.0</th>
<th>0.3</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>1.0</th>
<th>1.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LACHES</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARM</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crito</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protag.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euthyd.</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorg.</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meno</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symp.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaed.</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crat.</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaedr.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theast.</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soph.</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polit.</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crit.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laches</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apol.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charm.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crito</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euth.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protag.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euthyd.</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorg.</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meno</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symp.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaed.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crat.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaedr.</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theaet.</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soph.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polit.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crit.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using Yule's method, I made a table showing the frequency distribution of nouns in the Alcibiades, and a comparable table (using the spread-sampling system) for the Symposium. I then made similar tables for the distribution of verbs, this time comparing the Alcibiades with the Charmides, the Meno, and the Hippias Major. Though these works differ somewhat in size, it is perhaps worth recording the following results:

**VERBS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alc.</th>
<th>Charm.</th>
<th>Ch. (om.)</th>
<th>Hipp. (om.)</th>
<th>Meno</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of occurrences</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1553</td>
<td>1364</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>171.11</td>
<td>238.19</td>
<td>190.75</td>
<td>281.13</td>
<td>242.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocab. per 1000 ocs.</td>
<td>177.6</td>
<td>201.6</td>
<td>223.8</td>
<td>224.7</td>
<td>237.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vbs. used once only %</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOUNS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of occurrences</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>541.7</td>
<td>405.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>59.06</td>
<td>63.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures for verbs in the Alcibiades and in the Charmides (with emissions) strongly in particular show that there is at least nothing obviously un-Platonic in the distribution of verbs in our dialogue; we can say no more because there is no sufficiently long dialogue that is certainly spurious with which to compare it. But if the Hippias Major is spurious, it is significant that its figures are very similar to those of a genuine work, the Meno.

Next I considered sentence-length, disregarding such introductory remarks as ἐκεῖ and καί, and taking figures only for such 'speeches' as contained in all more than fifty words. But here again,

---

2. 
3. Since the Charm. and Hipp. Major contain reported dialogue, I have omitted verbs introducing such report.
although the average of 20.59 words per sentence for the 151 sentences of the Alcibiades differs but little from the 19.83 per sentence in the first 150 sentences of the Gorgias, the spurious Second Alcibiades averages 21.37 for its 116 sentences, so that nothing positive can be deduced. Finally, if one lists all the verbs in the Alcibiades with ten or more occurrences, and compares proportionately adjusted figures for the Charmides, Menu, and Hippias Major, and then does the same making each of these other dialogues the standard of comparison, one finds a closer similarity between the Alcibiades and the Charmides than between the Charmides and the Menu. ² But though it may be true that in general words commonly used by an author are more characteristic of his diction than those he uses rarely, the words which we are concerned are very ordinary and probably non-evidential. It would seem that while statistics do not exclude the possibility of Platonic authorship of the Alcibiades, their evidence is purely negative; if our dialogue is in many respects similar to what Plato was writing about the time of the Gorgias and Symposium, so also are several of the Platonic spuria.

¹ i.e. multiplied or divided according to the relative size of the work (size = total number of occurrences of verbs). Greater accuracy would of course be obtained by taking samples, but here (as for sentence-length and noun- and verb-distributions) a rough indication of tendency will suffice, as Platonic authenticity could not in any case be proved by these methods.

² E.g. from the figures for the 28 most frequent verbs in the Charmides (with omissions - see p. 137, n.3) only 6 of the corresponding Alc. figures (14 for the Menu) differ by more than 50%.

³ Cf. Yule p. 2.

⁴ E.g. ἀνέγραμμα, ἀποκατάστασις, ἀνέγραμμα, ἀνέγραμμα.

⁵ Cf. de Strycker (§ 136 p. 103), for the verbs of ἀνέγραμμα.
2. Rare Words.

Before considering such words as appear to be un-Platonic, we may observe that the following, and only the following (so far as I have been able to discover), are found, apart from the Alcibiades, only in acknowledged works of Plato: 1 4 ταλαισομεγάλης, 1 ἀπετευθυνθής, 1 σμικρά, 4 πεπτευτικός, 3 περισπαλίω, 1 δέτυοντεςφός, 1 ἐρμελέτης, 8 πασχίγωνγέω, 2 ἐννεοτέσσαρα, 2 συννεώτησ, 4 φοιτήτης, 2 κατὰ βίον. But the first six of these words are words that writers other than Plato would have little occasion to use, and may be described as non-evidential in view of their meaning; the next three are not found earlier than Rep. IX and the Phaedrus. Only the last three may be called in any sense characteristic of the Plato of the Gorgias-Symposium period, and then only with reservation; for συννεώτης is as much poetic as it is Platonic (once in Rep. III, once once in Politicus; twice in Euripides, once in Sophocles), only one of the four occurrences of φοιτήτης is found in a work of the period (the Euthydemus; twice in Rep. VII, once in Laws), and κατὰ βίον (once in Protagoras, once Rep. IX), which is frequent in later writers, may have been frequently used in the spoken language of the fourth century, and colloquial expressions are not uncommon in the spuria. When, in addition, allowance has been made for possible...

1 In compiling this section I have used the following indices or lexica: Ast for Plato and Platonic spuria, von Essen for Thucydides, Sauppe for Xenophon, Preuss for Demosthenes, Mitchell for Isocrates, Forman for Andocides, Lycurgus and Dinarchus, Reiske for other orators; and the Index in Tragicos Graecos of Beaton and Beck. 2 ἐρμελέτησον is a doubtful reading at 114d (but see note ad loc.); πασχίγωνγέω only once (Rep. X) means to 'follow' as in Alc. 3 Cf. D. Tarrant, quoted on p. 145. 4 The numbers refer to occurrences in accepted works of Plato.
imitation even of Plato's use of some of these rare words by a well-read member of the Academy, we must admit that there is no real evidence here to support the authenticity of the Alcibiades.

Our dialogue contains a number of words which, though found in writers other than Plato, are found but rarely. These words, however, are rare in Plato also, and there are few, if any, that can safely be called especially Platonic. That could be done only where a word is used (and rarely used) by one or possibly two other writers, and yet occurs several times in Plato himself; a single occurrence in Plato means little in any case, but means nothing at all if other writers also use the word, however rarely they use it. Indeed if such a word is found several times in other authors, it might be claimed that the word is un-Platonic. But special caution is needed in discussing words that Plato uses rarely, because we possess so few works of the literary genre to which his belong that we can be certain were written by someone else. If a word that Plato uses is absent in the historians and orators, and is rare in Plato himself, we cannot safely say whether the word was Platonic or un-Platonic. I here list only such words as seem to have some semblance of a claim to be Platonic:

In what follows A = Aristotle, D = Demosthenes, Th = Thucydides, X = Xenophon, Aesch = Aeschines, Ant = Antipho, Din = Dinarchus, Iasc = Isocrates, Lys = Lysias. Figures before a word indicate the number of its occurrences in Plato. *Raeder and Ritter have made use of rare words in discussing the question of the authenticity of the Platonic Epistles. Hackforth (The Authenticity of the Platonic Epistles, Manchester 1913) criticises some of their methods, but himself treats as specially Platonic such words as ἐκλεῖσθαι (I Th, 3 D), whose sole claim to be Platonic must rest on a single occurrence in the Meno, and ἀργυρίος (2 Th, 3 X, 2 D, I Din., 2 A), which in Plato (apart from the Epistles under discussion) occurs only once, in the Politicus.
4 ἀξιοῦσι (8 A), 3 ἐς τῆς Ὀ (1 x? 1 A), 3 εὐθέρεια (1 x? 1 A 4 Aesch.), 2 πάλαισωμε (1 Aesch.), 3 ἔξωσι (1 D), 3 ναυτιλία (3 A, 1 x), 2 ἔπη ἐπικράτη (1 Ant.), 8 διάλογος (2 A), 6 ποτέεις (7 A), 2 κομλότης (5 A), 5 ἰδιωτικά (1 x), 5 ὁνομα (2 A), 12 ἐνδοθέν (4 4 D).

The first three words occur, together with at least four other very rare words - 1 γενελυκο (1 x), 1 κολοσθη (1 x), 1 εὐκολία (1 x), 1 ἐκενισιος (1 Isoc.) - in the passage of our dialogue (121a sq.) describing Sparta and Persia, and it may be that our writer drew them all from the same written or oral source, and that these were words specially used in connexion with those countries. In that case the fact that Plato uses some of them slightly more often than other writers is non-evidential. πάλαισωμε ἐς poetic, ἔξως ἐς ἐνδοθέν and ναυτιλία occur only after the Gorgias-Symposium period.

Τοφλότης and διάλογος may be discounted because of their meaning, ἰδιωτικά, ὁνομα, and 6 πη ἐπικράτη occur only once each in comparatively early works of Plato; and ποτέεις, though occurring five times in such works, is still more frequent in Aristotle.

The following words, which occur in the Alcibiades, are also found not only in Plato's universally accepted works, but in some that are of doubtful authenticity: 6 ὁμισχομεν (plus Hipp. Λα.: 1 x, 2 A), 7 ἔνθασω (plus Θεό., Νεοχερος: 1 A, 17 x, 1 Ly.).

'This word does not appear in Sauppe's lexicon, but Liddell and Scott cite Mem. III, xii. i. 2 I omit such words as ὁμισχομεν (6 Plato, 3 A) and ᾧ μο ἀποιασ (4 Plato, 3 A) as obviously non-evidential because of their meaning.
9 ἐκτόδιος (plus 6 Ἰουλ., Ἰ Hipp. Ἱ: 7 A, 1D), ἐκτότωσις (plus 2 Ἰ Hipp. Ἱ: 4 A, 9 soc.), ἐκτόσωσις (plus 2 Ἰ Hipp. Ἱ: 7 A, 9 soc.), ἐκτόσωσις (plus 1 Ἰ Ep.: 14 A), 13 σκέφτηκα (plus 1 Ἰ Ep.: 1 Ἰ Ἰ Ἱ Ἱ: 1 x, 2 Ἰ soc.), 14 μνωκός (plus 1 Ἰ Hipp. Ἱ: 10 A, 3 x), ἐφτᾶμ (plus 1 Ἰ Ep.: 1 Ἰ Ἱ: 3 A), μεγαλοχυομαί (plus 1 Ἰ Hipp. Ἱ: 1 Ἰ soc.). Of these, the first three can hardly be admitted as evidence in view of their meaning, and if the 'doubtful' dialogues concerned are spurious, these words ἐκτόδιος ἐκτότωσις ἐκτόσωσις could not in any case claim to be characteristic of Plato. ἐκτόσωσις at least has some claim, despite its frequency in Aristotle, but it is the sort of word which, though comparatively rare, an imitator might want to copy; and the same may be said of μνωκός and σκέφτηκα. ἐφτᾶμ is admitted as Platonic by Hackforth, but the figures are by no means impressive, and μεγαλοχυομαί occurs only once in a certainly genuine work.

Of words common to our dialogue and to certainly spurious works, only the following seem to have any real claim to be called Platonic: 9 πεσομαιδέ (plus 1 Θεαγης, Ἰ Demodocus: Ἰ X, 2 Th.), 10 μετετεκτικός (plus 2 de Iusto: Ἰ Din.), 11 ἐλλογικός (plus 1 Θεαγης: 2 Ἰ soc.), 4 μουσικ (plus 1 Κλιτογην: Ἰ A), μετετεκτικός and σκέφτηκα were probably copied from Plato by the writers of the spurious who used them, and our writer...
probably did the same; and the other two words, though less frequent and yet, in all probability, characteristic of Plato, may still have been copied in the same way. What one or two can copy, more can; or again, if it is mere chance that some of these words occur in spuria, it may equally well be due to chance that they appear in our dialogue.

The vocabulary of our dialogue, then, presents no clear evidence in favour of Platonic authenticity. We find, on the other hand, a number of words that do not occur in any of Plato's generally accepted works, and yet do appear in other writers; of these the following would appear to be most important:

1. ἐπιφανεία (freq. A, 1 D, 1 Isoc., 1 Isod.), πῶς ἰδιμοῦ (1 X), μικρεῖα (1 A), ἐνυποτέρων (18 A),
2. ἄνθρωπον (1 A, 2 Th., 1 D., 1 Isod., 3 Isodoricos), τοῖς μνήμονοις (5 D., 4 Isoc., 1 Aesch.),

The first two have been noticed by several writers on the Alcibiades, but it seems worth while to call attention to the others also; for in view of the bulk of Plato's output, it would be astonishing if Plato used all these words in the Alcibiades, and never again elsewhere.

Finally, we may note the following, which so far as I have been able to ascertain from the appropriate lexicographers do not occur in any prose writer of the period: Κένυς, δηνόνα, ἔχεντος, ἐλεύθερον τεσσάρως, ἄση καὶ, ἀνδρομένοις. Apart from Κένυς and δηνόνα, which have been noticed by

Others, probably of less significance, are: ἐκέντρος (1 A, 1 D., 1 Th.), ἐκδοτικός (3 Th.), κυρήνος (5 A., D.), πώλησος (6 A.), διήθεσις (1 X.), στηθώς (1 X.), ἐργοδοτικοῦ (1 A.), ἀναμνήσεις (1 Isodoricos, 1 A., 3 Isodoricos, 2 D., 2 Th., 1 Isod., 1 Isoc., 1 Aesch.).

See p. 133.

But Plato uses νεκροὶ in the positive and comparative nine times.

Plato uses ἀνδρομένοις, but even that only twice; Aristotle and Andocides also use it twice each.

Plato uses ἐκέντρον once in Resp. VIII, three times in the Laws.
several commentators, \( \zeta_{\kappa\varkappa} \) (II.1) is the most significant word here. It occurs in Euripides (Iph. A. 1574), but otherwise only in later writers.

3. Evidence of Lateness.

The style of the Alcibiades has a good deal in common with the style of Plato's latest dialogues. It is, of course, by no means identical with it; but the number of points of resemblance make it very difficult to consider the Alcibiades a work written by Plato during the earlier period when his style was at its best. I note the following points of resemblance between our dialogue and the Laws:

1. Anacoluthon: 'in the structure of sentences ... the latter end frequently appears to forget the beginning of them'.

   ... I03a-I09a, I24a-b (cf. I14b, I18b).

2. 'Changes of person and number.'

   ... I06b, I11b.

3. Tautology.

   ... I04d, I10b.

4. Periphrastic περίτοις.

   ... I21a, I35c.

5. Hyperbaton.

   ... I04a, I09a, I16a, I33a-e.

6. Rare adverbs. ... I19b διώκω, δεϊπνω, δεισίω, διάπερικαί.


   ... I25e, φυσική τῆς συνήθους.

8. Redundancy: temporal adverbs. ... τότε τότε (or τότε τότε), I07c, I08a (twice).

9. Redundancy: miscellaneous. ... I14b, Ενκ ... κατα μονάς.

10. Completed antithesis. ... I04c, I05c, I06a, I10b, I11b, I15c, I22a.

'Other such words, of little significance, are: καλοπετέω, κοινοί διοσκορίκαι, and -ος, δημηριανίς, δημοτικογλυφίκα. Points 1-5 are among those noted as characteristic of the Laws by Jowett (trans. of Plato, 2nd ed., vol. V, pp. 12sq.), the rest from noted by Hackforth (op. cit. pp. 140 sq.).'
11. Parenthesis. ... I05b, I08c.

12. Plurals of abstract nouns. ... I22b-c.

13. Abstract forms of expression. ... I22c, ματιων
θ' δας ... διακότων παρθενους λεγοδουθης.

Finally, the following is a list (probably by no means exhaustive) of twenty words not found in Plato's works earlier than Rep.VI-VII and the Phaedrus: 1 λεσιφέρμεκον, δίσιφή,
ἐνεκλειστής, λειολία, εικολοιώδη, επερδιώετα, ἐνευτεκίδων, ἕνεμος, ἡρείων, καθ εἶδον, εὐκτείνω, δικονομικὴ, πλεισαγαγεία, ποτέων, στέρεως, σωτηρίας, διηθεων, διεπονία.

4. Further peculiarities of style.

The Alcibiades in some respects resembles the Hippias Major, which is almost certainly spurious. I quote from Miss Dorothy Tarrant, inserting references to our dialogue: 'The style is very uneven in merit; there are some awkwardly-expressed passages [I13c-17a, I05a, I19b-c, I21a] ... The vocabulary ... shows a marked tendency ... to the use of poetic words and phrases (chiefly from Homer and tragedy) [See below], as a rule with a burlesque application [I24d]. Plays on words [I03a note, I08c] ... are on the whole worthy of Plato. Some words which appear otherwise only in later literature may have belonged to the spoken language of the day.'

1 Campbell found 35 words in the Parmenides that did not occur before the Republic; but he counted words occurring in any book of the Rep., and the Parm. is in any case longer than the Alc. (Latoslawski, pp. 138-9).
4 Our occurrence in the Cynic best (of uncertain date).
As predominantly poetic I note the following: I25c, ἡ βουλία, I22c, ἡ βούλησις, I20b, ἡ ρουσόκλησις, I13e, ἡ μυθιστήμων, I31c, ἡ Θέω, I34b ἡ θετικήλογος, I18b ἡ τίτλω, I13e, ἡ κεράντος, I15b έλκος, I06c ένεσθεῖν, I22c Θερσίκρων, I11e κηφιγνος, I07α πολιορκὴ, I19d συναιτήσεως, I13e σκέυηρεων.

One or two expressions look like colloquialisms: I19b, ἡ τής πεὸς τῆς πολιτείας, I25c συμβαλλόντων εὐνομῶν, I11e οἴδημ οἴδημ βλασφήμος (see note ad loc.), and perhaps the absolute use of συμβαλλόν at I13d (see note). Also probably colloquial is the omission of πνεῦμαν at I11c, of the participle ἀνείκ at I12c, and of μᾶλλον at I11a.

Shorey notes that the alternative 'discover or learn' is thrice repeated (I06d, I12d, I13e), and the idea 'would not learn if you thought you knew' twice (I05d, I09e), and that the verb πλανάσκει (I12d) is repeated seven times within a page. We may further observe the frequent repetition of διερεύνωμαι, διενεργοῦμαι, διερεύνωμαι at I04c, and of διέρωμαι and διέρωμαι at I05b sq. (see notes).

Lastly, we may note that our author seems to be particularly addicted to (1) continuation of an oblique construction inside a relative clause (I23b, I31e); (2) chiasmic order of words (I04a, I05d εἰνδειγμένον... ἐνδειγμένον, I11c ἐνδειγμένος το... τοδ).
II2a μηδεν...έξευενγ, III8c ἃρον τίδε...λαλά αὖ
II3e καλε...έτεέτας (3) mixed conditions, particularly with the present indicative in the 'if' clause followed by the optative with ἀν
(I09c, II4e, I16d, II2c; cf. also note on I05c).

5. Borrowings from Plato.

The following resemblances are discussed by Vink (pp. 30-42), who argues that they do not prove that an imitator has borrowed from Plato. But if we are satisfied on other grounds that our dialogue is spurious and comparatively late, we may believe that our writer had some, at least, of these passages of Plato in his mind.

I19a ... Gorg. 503b
107b-c ... Prot. 313bc
I06de ... Ethyd. 276a
I09e ... Meno 30d
I27c ... Rep. 441d
I26a-c ... Rep. 314e, 351cd, 353b, Laches I90a, Gorg. 504e.

To these we may add, with Shorey (p. 652):

I04b ... Gorg. 466c
I04e ... Rep. 516a
I06b6 ... Meno, 74a9, b6-7, Gorg. 504d6
I09c ... Prot. 329b
I10a ... Rep. 346a, Gorg. 495a
I14a (τέφρας) ... Laches 179d
I14e ... Gorg. 471e, 475e

I04d (τεγαμα...) ... Apol. 20c
I09b9 ... Laches 164de
I09e5 (πεῖς τῇ ἀνάβελ), Laches 190d, Prot. 345c, Crat. 419b, Symp. 188d, Rep. 454ab, 464d.
I11b,c ... Laches 184d, 186d
I14a (δέξεσθος, cf. I09d σκωπτεῖσ) ... Meno 76a9
I19b (ἐν τῇ τῆς τολμῶν, κτλ.), ... Rep. 347c, Gorg. 514c, Symp. 216a5-6
122c5 (εὐχέρειαν καὶ
eὐκολίαν) ... Laws 942d

123e (ἀγάπην καὶ μῦ, ἔχει)

... Rep. 426d (Loeb)

125b9 ... Gorg. 488d, 489d, 491b

Meno 71e

121 sq. (4 virtues)... Rep. 485 sq., I30a9 (συνεργότερον) ... Symp. 209b

I34e (ἀγαυήσεως καὶ ... Pæan. II5d
BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The following works are cited by name of author alone, except where otherwise indicated below.


Arbs, H., De Alcibiade I, qui fertur Platonis, Bonn, 1906.


Bidez, J., and Cumont, F., Les Mages Hellenisés, Paris, 1938. (Cited as Mages Hellenisés)

Bignone, E., L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro, Firenze, 1936.

Bruns, I., Das literarische Porträt, Berlin, 1896.


Chenuiss, H., Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I, Baltimore, 1944.

Croiset, M., Oeuvres complètes de Platon, tome I, Paris, 1925.

Dittmar, H., Die Alcibiadesdichtung der Sokratiker, Philol. Unters. 21, 1912.


Grote, G., Plato and the other companions of Socrates, London, 1865.

Hermann, K.T., Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie, Heidelberg, 1839.
Hirzel, R., Aristoxenos und Platons erster Alcibiades: Rhein. Mus. 45, 1890.

Jaeger, W., Aristotle (English translation, 1948).

Joel, K., Der echte und der Xenophontische Socrates, Berlin, 1892.


Lamb, W.R.M., Plato.

Pavlou, J., Alcibiades prior quò wäre vulgo tribuatur Platoni, Diss. phil. Vind. vol. VIII, pars. 1, 1905.


Schaarschmidt, C., Die Sammlung der platonischen Schriften, Bonn, 1866.

Schleiermacher, F., Platons Werke, Berlin, 1826.


Socher, J., Uber Platons Schriften, Munich, 1820.

Stallbaum, G., Platonis opera omnia, V. 1, 1834.

Steinhart, K., Inleidung tot de vertaling van H. Müller, Leipzig, 1850.


Susemihl, F., Die genetische Entwicklung der platonischen Philosophie, Leipzig, 1855-60.

Tarrant, Miss D., review of Vink's Plato's Erste Alcibiades in Classical Review LIV, Sept. 1940.


Vink, C., Plato's Eerste Alcibiades, Amsterdam, 1939.