Motto. "War is a necessary condition of peace."

[Signature]

by Alexander Y. Jack
"The past, present, and future of South Africa."

In commencing such a study, we require a definition of South Africa; and the most convenient is, Africa South of the Zambezi. It is true that this includes two districts, Portuguese South Africa, and German South West Africa, which are of slight importance; and does not include the portion of Central Africa, now named Rhodesia, which must be connected with South Africa proper, by geographical and political conditions, for some time to come. But our main interest in South Africa, past, present, and future, will be confined well within the defined area.

In dealing with this region, we shall be dealing with a recently developed, or comparatively new country. We shall have to show how this country has developed in the past, what its condition is at present, how it will develop in the future. More particularly, we shall find that its peculiar development in the past has been, historically, the result of the conflict of two opposing parties; we shall have therefore chiefly to examine the origin and nature of these parties, and their action in the past; their inevitable, and probably final conflict in the present; their probable action in the future. The past, present, and future of South Africa; the past, as leading up to and bringing about the present; the present, as completing the past in a very special manner; the future, as still carrying forward the past, under the novel conditions introduced by the present; - such is the subject of our study.

The first period of South Africa’s past has no great importance for our enquiry. In South Africa itself we have a series of isolated events: the discovery of the Cape by Bartholomew Diaz, its rediscovery by Vasco da Gama; the Portuguese capture of the Arab port of Sofala; their subsequent conquests and settlement on the east coast; the visits of various nations, including the fatal one of Francisco d’Almeida, to the Cape itself; the adoption of Table Bay as a regular call port for the eastern trade; the wreck of the Dutch ship "HLaura", leading up directly to the Dutch occupation; and the various conflicts, expeditions, and other events of slight importance in the Portuguese territory on the east.

More important are external events; chief among them the rise and fall of the
Portuguese eastern trade; the rise of the Dutch, English, and French eastern trade, with the formation of the English and Dutch East India Companies; events in Europe and elsewhere, such as the Union of Spain and Portugal, which compelled the Dutch, for their safety in Europe, to strike at the eastern trade of the Portuguese, and thus drew them to the east; the interests of England in America, and the civil wars in England itself, which drew English attention away from the East, and prevented expansion of trade; and the beginning of the struggle for trade between Dutch and English with the Navigation Act of the Long Parliament.

With reference to this barren period two questions arise: Why was no lasting settlement made earlier? and: Why was a lasting settlement formed by the Dutch?

The first cause of the late settlement of South Africa was physical: the needful facilities for communication—rivers and harbours—were wanting. Round the whole coast of South Africa, from the Bongo to the Zambezi, we have no navigable stream. Within South Africa proper the rivers are torrents during the short rainy season, dry torrent beds at other times. Even where there is a constant stream, the bed is rocky and steeply inclined; on two rivers only has navigation been successfully attempted, even for short distances—the Pongue and the Landkoop; only the Zambezi, the northern boundary of South Africa, can be truly classed as navigable. Again, with regard to harbours, the region is no better served. Malfisch Bay is a safe anchorage; Sofala, on the east coast, has always been a reliable shelter; and with these may perhaps be classed Pelagoa Bay. The harbours at East London, Port Elizabeth, and Durban, are artificial constructions; even Table Bay was unsafe at times before artificial shelter was provided; and Palma Bay has never been in favour as a trade port.

These drawbacks, however, have been overcome now; they might have been overcome some earlier.had there been any inducement, no similar drawbacks were likely to overcome on the east coast of the peninsula of Hindostan. But there were no inducements. South Africa had no rich agricultural resources to attract settlers. The foreshore was a barren, grassy region, fit for, and used for, the pasturing of flocks; never much more than a hundred miles broad, it stretched, through a series of forbidding mountain ranges, to the vast inland plateau of the continent, a region still less productive than the foreshore itself. On the west, indeed, behind the harbour of Malfisch Bay, this formation widened out into a more gently rising
region; on the east, at the mouths of the Zambezi and Limpopo, into a naturally rich alluvial belt; but the western region was a waste of sand. Sown by drought: the eastern a stretch of swamp, infected with malaria. Agricultural resources were thus absent; and this was not compensated in any way, for the vast mineral resources of the region, the precious character of which has done so much, of late years, to attract settlement, were then practically unknown. And as a result of this poverty of resource, great native industries, thriving native commerce, such as rendered India attractive to enterprise, were absent likewise; the natives were poor, uncivilised, ignorant, seeking only to supply their immediate wants; trade with them would be practically valueless.

South Africa as a whole, therefore, owing to physical disadvantages, and poverty of resources, could not early attract trade or settlement. One region alone possessed means of attracting enterprise — the east coast district about the mouth of the Zambezi. Here were found a navigable river, and a river valley extending into the interior; a good harbour — that of Inhala: a fertile, though neglected, soil; a steady trickle of gold from the interior; a flourishing trade in Arab hands.

Here then the Portuguese naturally settled; but their settlement, though earliest in time, was not to be the one to encompass South Africa. The unhealthy character of the region prevented permanent European settlement; the same cause, along with the physical features of the hinterland, forbade internal expansion: the tendency of a Latin race to degenerate when brought into contact with lower types operated as fatally as ever: the want of a colonising population in Portugal, the growing weakness of the home government, made for contraction, not expansion. So it is that Portuguese South Africa has been, and is of slight importance for the land generally.

Our second inquiry is more important. At first sight it might seem a mere matter of chance, whether the Dutch or the English should be the first to take possession of the Cape. Three European nations had interests in the east in the seventeenth century, and competed for a share of trade now passing from the hands of the Portuguese: — the Dutch, the English, the French. The last named, whose interest was small and late-developed may be left out of account. Both the Dutch and English had large and growing interests in the east; so both therefore the Cape was important as a port of call on the long voyage. Both nations had entrusted their eastern interests to trading companies, which naturally devoted themselves to trade pure and simple, and
were therefore equally unwilling to form a settlement where profitable trade was imposible. But Dutch interest in the east was probably greater than English during the first half of the seventeenth century. European events, as we have noted, forced the Dutch to develop their eastern trade with a rapidity perhaps unhealthy, while they retarded English trade expansion. So the Dutch sea trade was everything to the English one among several things. Naturally, then, the nation with most interest in the east took possession of the Cape, then practically synonymous with South Africa. The distance of the Dutch settlements or stations in Batavia from Europe, and the accident of the wreck of the Haarlem acted to the same end, being a felt need and a demonstration of the means of supplying it. So arose the settlement at the Cape, connected from the beginning with the east.

The Dutch occupation and settlement forms the second period of South Africa's past. Important events are few, but as such may be mentioned, the introduction of slaves; the commencement of expansion with the establishment of free settlers; difficulties with the Hottentots; resulting in the introduction of pastoral farming by white colonists; the settlement of the Huguenots. During the eighteenth century the colony is naturally in a condition of stagnation; the next important event is the rebellion in the Border districts at the very end of the period; and almost simultaneously occurs the British occupation. Between these events likewise have much influence: such are the Diet of Hanover which drove the Huguenots to the Cape; the bankruptcy of the Dutch East India Company; the French Revolution, and its conflict with the English nation.

During the greater part of this period the central fact in South African history is the gradual growth of a settlement and that growth falls naturally into three sections. The rise of what may be called the trading settlement at Cape Town comes first. The value of Table Bay as a haven for shelter and revictualling had been early recognised; for this purpose the Dutch company established a settlement; and its scheme of cutting a canal to divide the Cape Peninsula from the mainland shows that this was all that it desired. During the 18th century, although the Dutch trade itself slightly declined, yet as its convenience came to be recognised, Table Bay became a regular calling place for eastern trade vessels of every nationality. Thus a considerable local trade naturally sprang up, besides the company's own transactions, and in spite of the restrictions placed on all trade in which the company was not concerned. Here as elsewhere, too, smuggling, half convivial, half criminal, went on side by side with legal transactions; and on
1795. Cape Town was a flourishing commercial port, with a very large interest in the over-sea trade.

The agricultural settlement developed alongside of the trading one. Of course, we may say, at the very beginning of the settlement, when the Company planted a garden for supplying its ships with fresh vegetables. But this system of agricultural administration was found cumbersome; individual effort was desired to. A small export of corn and wine sprung up and continued during the 18th century; and the arrival of the Huguenots caused a great improvement in agricultural methods. As the eastern trade grew, as the settlement at Cape Town increased, so did the agricultural division extend, and at the end of the period it was spread over all the fertile and well-watered valley between Cape Town and the edge of the central plateau.

Rather later developed the pastoral division of the settlement. Fresh meat was one of the chief needs of vessels calling at Table Bay in that time of long voyages to the east; to supply it, cattle must be brought or bred. At first the Company purchased cattle from the Hottentots; but two little wars with these natives early proved the unreliability of this source of supply; some other means of meeting the demand, constant and increasing as Table Bay became a regular call-place, must be found. Breeding by white settlers was resorted to; a ring of pasture farms grew up around the city. As the more fertile lands near Cape Town came under cultivation, the cattle breeders began to cross the mountain ranges into the interior plateau; and so the trekking movement began. Everything favoured a wide expansion of pastoral farming towards the interior. The demand from ships and town increased; the Hottentot flocks were decimated by small-pox. The Company freely issued loan leases of lands not then own; at rents practically nominal; it permitted, for a time, cattle breeders with the natives—a trade which it generally kept in its own hands; it required that the homesteads of pasture farms should be not less than three miles from one another. Long periods of drought rendered pasture scanty and wide-scattered; so the settlers must have large tracts of land, even for small herds, and must leave the numerous waterless regions behind them. The ever-increasing population of a thriving settlement must expand inwards: there was no industry or profession to attract it elsewhere. Unlike the arbitrary rule of the Company unwillingness to bear taxation; profit to be obtained by illicit trade with natives; were all inducements to the same end. No resistance was anywhere met with; the Hottentots were reduced to servitude; the cunning Bushmen, incapable of combination against the white man, were exterminated; only when the advancing columns of the Kaffirs were encountered, did the trekkers pause for a time in their onward journey.
The development of these three divisions of the settlement occupied the greater part of the period of the Dutch Company's administration. But towards the end of that period, the results of the familiar character of the settlement began to appear. These results may be summed up broadly by saying that there arose in South Africa a distinct party division between the trading settlement at Cape Town, supported by the agricultural settlement around it, on the one hand, and the pastoral settlement on the other. This division arose naturally from an antagonism of interest between these two portions of the settlement, which we have now to examine.

The interests of the trading settlement at Cape Town were not in the colony itself, but were, almost wholly, in the eastern sea trade and the Dutch Company. For in those days, the Company was the chief enemy of local industry, had discouraged any attempts at local industry, and the markets for local industry did not then exist. It was not, like many of the sea-ports in the American colonies, a ship-building and ship-refitting town; the want of timber in South Africa checked the Dutch tendency to sea-faring pursuits. But it was, in the first place, a harbour, a trade port, and a strategic point on the commerce route to the east, and this constituted its real importance. We have seen how its development depended on the eastern trade; indeed its very existence was bound up with it. This at first, no doubt, from the chief bond between the free traders of Cape Town and the Dutch Company; but even when that Company's trade with the east had wholly declined, its interests were not separated from those of Cape Town. Nor, in the second place, was Cape Town a port from which the Dutch Company administered the colony; and this was not a bond between Cape Town and the rest of the settlement, but between Cape Town and the Company. A garrison and a large number of officials were stationed there, while the local administration of the interior was largely carried on by unpaid burghers. In Cape Town were spent the proceeds of the local taxation, and the sums annually remitted by the Company to defray the chronic deficit; and hence came no small portion of the town's prosperity.

Turning now to the agricultural division of the settlement we find that its interests, economically at any rate, were bound up with those of Cape Town and the Company. Cape Town was the only market the farmers had for their produce; there it was bought up by the Company or the private traders; hence it was exported to the Batavian provinces of the Dutch Company, or there it was consumed. In return, Cape Town supplied what was necessary to the simple needs of the farmers; in particular, it was the port for the importation and distribution of the slaves needed...
to work the farms. Thus, on Cape Town itself, on the administration at Cape Town, on the overseers colonies of the Company, the agricultural division depended for existence.

In the pastoral division, however, we find a very different state of matters. There was never any real connection between the pastoral and the agricultural divisions, except the trade relationship, which grew weaker with time; and, although the interests of the pastoral community and the trading settlement were at first closely connected, that connection was much weakened during the eighteenth century. The pastoral farmers had at first depended upon the Company's ships and the inhabitants of Cape Town as a market for their cattle; and they still did so. But there had never been any large export trade to give them an interest beyond the colony itself; and circumstances compelled them to centre their interests, not merely within the colony, but almost entirely within their own division of it.

As they proceeded further inland, further away from Cape Town and from each other, they tended to become economically independent of the rest of the world. Their material needs became reduced to a minimum which they could themselves supply. Their heads and the small patch of land which each farmer grew, supplied food for themselves and their Hottentot serfs. Clothes were a minor consideration. Labour was supplied almost wholly by the Hottentot serfs, who were fungurable without reference to Cape Town. Material independence was the result; the interests of the pastoral division were independent of those of Cape Town.

If for only natural economic interests have been examined; for these, always strong in a new settlement, were especially so in South Africa at this time. Other interests were practically non-existent. There was no sense of unity, political, social, ecclesiastical, in the colony. The one interest in political affairs has never been a Dutch characteristic; and, at the Cape, the despotic nature of the Company's rule, the importation from Holland of all prominent officials, were causes sufficient to almost destroy political life. Such life may have been kept up to a measurable extent, by the influence of public opinion at Cape Town on the administration; by the practice of choosing burgesses by a semi elective method to sit in the courts of justice; and, late in the period, to control taxation and prices; and by the appointment of burgesses to subordinate political offices or local administration. But the most powerful influence, towards political consolidation - a common danger - was entirely absent; throughout the period the colony enjoyed almost uninterrupted peace. Its European character was not distinctly Dutch, was similarly undeveloped. Within the separate districts, the social relationship did not give a certain sense of social unity; and in Cape Town and the districts around it, social intercourse may have been common enough; but there was no social unity in the colony as a whole; and no means of developing it. Systematic
education was unknown, even at Boksfontein. There was no healthy circulation of population, for the town offered no openings to attract the agriculturalist. A well organized church, again might have served to bind together the colonists in some measure; but the Dutch church was an utterly decentralized institution. All the lands which unite other communities were almost entirely in this settlement; material interest alone held it together.

It is plain then, that what may be called a party division between trades and handicrafts had at least a potential existence, owing to the want of common interest between them.

During the latter part of the Dutch Company's administration, this latent division became apparent; and the causes of its becoming so are now to be considered.

Among them the administration of the Dutch Company, always bad, and growing worse with the growth of the colony, may be placed first; and concerning it we may lay down two propositions: That the interests of the Dutch East India Company were opposed, generally speaking, to the interests of its South African colonists. We must remember that the Company was entirely unfitted to carry on the work of colonisation, that it had never been empowered to colonise, and that it had never wished to do so in South Africa. Indeed, considering the small and fullyemployed population of Holland, an attempt at extensive colonisations would have been impossible; and the Company feared that the interests of a South African colony might interfere with those of their East Indian possessions. So when a colony did grow up its interests were not taken into account; the Cape was looked on merely as a half-way house to the east; a convenient port for the trade routes; a distant depot of the real object, the Batavian colonies; and like these colonies, rather trading settlements, a commercial concern, expected to pay its way, if not to yield a dividend.

From this point of view the Company consistently administered the colony. The machinery of administration, indeed—a governor, advised by a council of officials, empowered in all legislative and administrative matters—was not bad in itself; official desultions, non-existence of representation, were no anomaly in the eighteenth century. Social evils, of which the central one was the neglect of education, were the natural result of a commercial administration; but more nearly excusable on the score of the smallness of the revenue, and more naturally not much felt by the colonists themselves. Simplicity too, was made for spiritual needs. It was in the material side that the interests of company and colonists really came into conflict. For its own interest the Company from the first established several usages, advantages to itself, but galling to the colonists. Such were: the confining sale to it, by the settler, at its own price, of all agricultural produce for its own use; the enforcement of compulsory loans of property for public purposes; the retention of the cattle trade with the natives as a valuable monopoly. These were at first somewhat mitigated by the petition of the colonists, but there were other more galling still. Free trade was unthinkable of; export and import were alike in the hands of the Company; and industry and expansion were thus discouraged. Taxation, though not
to meet expediencies, was heavy, and collected on bad systems. And when the Company became benignant, it did not hesitate to issue a paper currency; and thus still further reduced the credit and trade of the colony. These acts and usages were all manifestations of the same policy; they were in no way anomalies, as opposed to the then idea of colonial administration; they were the inevitable result of the connection of South Africa with an Oriental trade company.

The Company's officials were generally speaking, opposed to the interests of the colonists. The initial defect here lay in the fact that these officials were part of the Dutch Company's general organization, the centre of which was Batavia. It resulted from this that they had no permanent stake in the colony; for they were generally drawn from Holland, and not from the colony itself; and they looked for promotion to Batavia. It resulted likewise that officials trained in the administration of eastern settlements were sent over a white colony; the commonest point of this anomaly being reached by the usage which made the Governor of the Cape subordinate for the time being to any official of higher rank who might call there. From these and other causes it came about that even where the Company did not wish to be unjust, as in legislation, taxation, and administration of justice, abuses were fostered by the officials in their own interest. Their salaries, not very large, were paid not by dishonest or questionable means. The practice of paying salaries in part by bounties or percentages on gains made on an opening for unjust dealing with and by the colonists, opportunities of private trade by officials were many and were taken full advantage of, to the detriment of the interests both of colonists and Company. The possession of absolute power by the official class prevented the remedying of these abuses. The colonists were primarily kept ignorant of the laws themselves often unjust, by which he was governed; if he appealed to justice against any abuse, his case was tried by a body on which the colonists were not represented, but over which the governor was really supreme; if he wished to carry his appeal further, it must go to Batavia, before officials who were of the same system as, and therefore, perhaps, in full sympathy with, his oppressor; if he attempted a petition to the authorities in Holland, he might be summarily rejected, and imprisoned or transported at the will of the governor.

These abuses affected, and caused discontent in, all three divisions of the settlement, varying degrees. They were probably not felt most keenly at Cape Town. Public opinion there enlightened somewhat by contact with the outer world—must have had some influence upon the nature of the Company's servants' judicial and other evils would be less likely to take place in the town than in the country districts. But trade restrictions, even though varied, prevented emigration; the continuance of official and officials' trade made private venture risky. In the agriculturist the abuses were much more harmful. Among them it would seem that the worst instances of official disposition took place; on them, as producers, fell the weight of the export restrictions, the Company's bounties and other privileges, the private official trade, the taxation, the official bounties; and the burden, though lighten by fraud and falsification, was a heavy one. Among the pasture farmers of the coast again, it was different. They
The immediate causes.

So much for the general administration of the company; let us now note the immediate, or distinct from the general causes which brought it about that a party division revealed itself in South Africa in civil war. In or these acts dictated by the general policy of the company may be mentioned first. Such were: the attempt of the company to prevent the expansion of the pastoral division, and the increasing infringement of its monopoly of cattle purchase, by refusing the issue of loan licenses; the oscillating action of the company in the second conflict with the Zafirs, on the border—a preliminary struggle had occurred earlier—by which they were allowed to settle in the pastoral division; both acts calculated to cause great discontent among the border farmers. In the same policy may be referred the company's refusal to grant administrative and economic changes. And second, we may put the bankruptcy of the Dutch Company, which weakened the administration, and caused the aggravation, if that were possible, of its self-seeking policy, as we see in its issue of patents money. Last we may place a quite external cause—the influence which the American Revolution, possibly, the French Revolution certainly, had upon the colonists, acting as it did upon minds already familiar with republican ideas.

Why these causes

How then are we to explain the fact that, while the traders, the farmers around Cape Town, remained faithful, at least habitually, in spite of justifiable discontent, to the Dutch Company, the pastoral settlers of the interior rose against the rule of that company, declared themselves independent of it, and prepared to support their declaration by arms? It was not because the general abuse of the company's rule affected them most, for we have seen that the contrary was the case. It was not because the particular immediate causes of their rebellion enumerated above had made the rule of the company harder to bear or more hateful in the pastoral division than elsewhere; of the two first-mentioned causes one was an unsuccessful attempt to enforce a trade privilege such as was enforced against traders and farmers every day; the other involved no greater restriction to expansion or domines to prosperity than the ordinary trade restrictions and official malpractices at and near Cape Town. The refusal of reform affected the whole colony; the bankruptcy of the company affected the fleckmers much less than the other two classes which were interested in trade; the influence of the revolutionary spirit must have been potent over the whole of Dutch South Africa. Yet, the real cause lay deeper. The pastoral settlers rose against, and declared themselves independent of, the rule of the Dutch Company, because they were already independent of it. These declaration was merely a statement of an accomplished fact. We have already seen how they had
acquired their practical independence, and their rebellion, in the circumstances, was perfectly natural. The traders and farmers stuck to the company in spite of abuses, because they were in a great measure dependent upon it: the fact that farmers broke away from it became, though they might not feel the abuse so much, they received in return no benefit from the company's administration, they had to bear the burdens of administration without partaking of the advantages. This was, in fact, an instance of the action of the law which we see at work also in the rebellion of England's American colonies, and partly in the results of the colonies of Spain. And we may remark, in passing, the wisdom of the Dutch company's refusal to grant greater administrative and economic independence to the colony. Had they done so, a rivalry of the whites, and not merely of a part of the colony itself, sooner or later, have been the inevitable result.

Thus then did a division grow up within Dutch South Africa. One other important development took place during the Dutch company's administration, very closely connected with the cause of this division: the development of the Dutchess of South Africa of a unique type of race, the Dutchess of South Africa, which has now to be examined.

The central fact in the character of the Dutchess of South Africa throughout their history has been their individualism. They have succeeded in being as individuals, more entirely self-dependent and self-sufficient than almost any other race. Some tendency towards such a characteristic may have been inherited from their forefathers: the original Dutch settlers, mostly of a low class — for the Dutch as a nation, and therefore the lowest class most of all, have always been individualistic; and the Huguenot refugees, among whom freedom and their religion had weakened the feeling of national life. But of much greater importance were the conditions of life in the colony itself, the effect of which has already been touched on. We have already noted the almost complete absence of any political or social life in the colony, which resulted, of course, from the absence of such life among the individual settlers. We have seen, too, how, among farmers and fisher-people, slave and settler laborers considered the individual settler independent, not of the outside world, at least of Dutch law. But this very independence of men of their own race, meaning, as it did, individualism in a lower sense, over the course of time made it easier and easier to administer, of the newly forming characteristics of the Dutch settlers growing race characteristics. For constant contact, and the word of communication, with more intelligent, caused the development of the so-called, a rudimentary dialect of Dutch, having no faculty for any finish but conversation, which through constant use, most of education, and, in particular, the influence of French among the Huguenot immigrants, became the only language of the settlers, a development which cut them off from all intellectual advance, and therefore from all advance whatever. Not was this all. Contact with the natives, especially in youth, and finally a slight admixture of native blood, worked a moral deterioration as great as the intellectual; the settler became profane, lazy, and vicious. The real importance for South African History, if this development of peculiar characteristics lies in the fact that the settler, obliged at first to become individualistic by stress of circumstances, at first grew accustomed to that condition, and then gradually lost all conception of a better, it became, to them, the
deal of life. And so, the central and underlying cause of the party division in South Africa lying in that individual isolation, as long as that individualism, that isolation, continued, and, having become a race characteristic, it was likely to continue long. - a party division was likely to continue.

**Summary.**

To sum up the events of this important period of South Africa's past, we may say, that a settlement began in South Africa, and grew into a colony; that, with this growth, division arose, culminating in an attempt at civil war; that the cause of that division was the practical independence, arising out of individual isolation, of the inhabitants of the pastoral division of the settlement; and that this individual isolation, or rather, the tendency thereto, had become a race characteristic among these settlers.

**The Past.**

**Third Period.**

1795-1809.

**Transition Period.**

1795-1805.

1806.

**Reason of Dutch Occupation.**

The third period of South Africa's past, which we have now to deal with, is, for us, the most important. It may itself be divided into certain periods, in which various features or movements have been predominant, and in this way we shall treat it.

There is, as is natural, a period of transition from Dutch to British rule, rendered longer than ordinary in South Africa by the circumstances of the case; three events alone are important: the first seizure by the British, the return of the Dutch for a short period, and the final and lasting British occupation. The question alone may be treated as belonging to this period. Why did the British take the Cape?

The answer is simple. For the last half-century of these occupations, the Dutch had been at the Cape on sufferance. The trade of their East India Company was gone; while Britain, after the long struggle with France in India, had now become the paramount power in the east; and the Cape, from its position on the trade route, could not be without interest to the British. So long, however, as it remained merely a trading station, it had nothing to fear; for Britain and France both had their own ports of call for their trading vessels, at St. Helena and Madagascar or Mauritius respectively; while the Dutch took care that foreign ships calling at the Cape should be cautiously, but in no sense badly, treated. The small interest taken by the French government in territorial acquisition abroad; the absence of contact, and therefore of conflict, between Dutch and British in the east; the expense of the Cape station itself; all combined to keep the Dutch colony intact. But with the alliance of Holland and France a new phase was entered upon; for the French had not yet given up hopes of an eastern empire, and thus attack on British trade became inevitable; British occupation was necessary as a preventive measure. Hence took place Commodore Johnson's unsuccessful attempt, hence the successful attack of Admiral Collingwood; and likewise the final siege. And hence, also, the British, having realised the value of their acquisition, made the arrangement at the Peace of Amiens.
So much for the period of transition; but before going on to treat of the rest of this, our third period in order, let us see what were the general conditions controlling the history of South Africa at this time. It was evident, in our study of our second period, that the course of events was the result of the varying effect of administrative acts when the three divisions of the colony: divisions which were themselves the result of local conditions and acts of the governing body. It cannot be too strongly insisted on, that these same conditions sustained unaltered, and central events in our present period also.

The three natural divisions of the colony remain, alike, their boundaries and extent may be altered. For many years, Cape Town represents the trading division, increasing in importance with the increase of earlier trade, and the influx of British merchants; the Albany settlement is the first real extension of the division; Kimber in Natal follows. The little town founded in the Orange and Transvaal states are in no sense commercial; but, later on, with the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley, and gold on the Witwatersrand, a vast extension of commercial life takes place. And it must be noted that except in the Albany settlement, and district in Natal, the commercial community remains peculiarly separate from the agricultural or pastoral, having distinct interests and a distinct life; while between its own scattered portions, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, etc., the closest relations, not only commercial, but social, are kept up. The agricultural division extends slightly within before boundary, and not at all outside it; for the English settlements at Albany and in Natal approximate to genuine English agricultural colonies, in alliance with, and not antagonistic to, commerce; it might be said that the agricultural division, late in the period, tends to coincide with the pastoral; but yet its number, wealth, and distinct interests, really give it a position of its own. The pastoral division, lastly, under goes the greatest expansion of all; the Orange Free State and Transvaal may be regarded merely as extension of it, and these, together with the old pastoral portions of Lake Bomy, and a coast of Natal, constitute together a combination, within which communication is constantly kept up, which has in the main, identical interests, and all its fortunes, and which these constitutes a most important factor in the history of South Africa.

The influence of the administration in these three divisions constitutes the history of South Africa during the period, it is only necessary to say here that, even in the latter years of the period, when alarmed to some extent by the grant of self-government, or practical independence, to some parts of the colony, it still remains, behind all, as latent and effective as ever in conditioning events. The factor in its action we may now shortly explain.

The action of the Dutch administration resulted, as we have seen, on was a combination of the action of two factors: first, the company itself; second, the company's officials. Under British rule, administrative action is a much more complicated thing; it is the resultant of four
elements. These are, I. All honourable, though rarely exercised. Popular feeling in England. II. All powerful, in the allegiance of the first, the will of the Imperial government in Britain. The means, endorsed effectively by a home at first decisive, and always great, of the Government and other high officials at the home. VII. Really subsidiary to III., IV., and V., the desire of the trading community in South Africa itself. Let us amplify this statement by examining the nature of these factors, and comparing with them those under the Dutch rule.

Popular feeling in England had of course no analogue under the Dutch company. It influenced South Africa chiefly through party pressure at home, though sometimes directly, as we shall see. But the record of its action belongs to the history of Britain itself, and we must often take it for granted in discussing the action of the home government.

The Imperial government in Britain found its double, under Dutch rule, in the executive of the Dutch East India Co. But there was little indeed in common between the two. We have already examined the spirit of the company's administration; we have seen how its constitution as a trading concern rendered it unfit for the government of a colony; and how, in effect, unable to attain any breadth of administrative view, it governed almost wholly, in the interest of its own house; how defective in principle and practice was its rule. The organization at London, by which South Africa was now governed, was not indeed the best suited for colonial government, but had at least no direct pecuniary interest in the colony, and ruled it as a part of an empire, not as an investment of capital; with the more advanced view of the time on colonial administration, it was willing to take other than economic considerations somewhat into account.

The official class sent out to rule the Cape by the British government was a contrast in every way to that employed by the Dutch company. Of old, as we have seen, the personnel of the administration had been defective both in principle and ability; and usage and custom had led to abuse and misconduct in the relations of official and colonist. But new rules of conduct, and integrity, thoroughly if naively trained in the business of administration are afforded the chief posts; adequate salaries, and the traditions of their service, place there above the possibility of peculation, or interested use of power. Instances of the injurious use of almost despotic authority, of the enforcement of measures against the true interests of the colonists, may occur in the early years of British rule, but are essentially exceptional.

Of the fourth and subsidiary factor, little can here be said, although undoubtedly the trading division of the colony has had an exceptional influence on the administration. It would be unfair to say that the other two divisions have had no such influence; but it has been much less. And the reason for this, degreeing over the subsidiary one of the predominance of British nationality in the trading community, is to be found in the central form of the British administration.
To avoid future difficulties, this central principle may be at once stated, in the following general terms: - The promotion of commerce - a fuller ideal, surely, for a nation of sheep-kinders, has been the ultimate object of British rule in South Africa. This may be a truism; it is certainly a principle applicable to many other portions of the Empire, but of its truth there can be no doubt. The Cape was seized, and kept, as a valuable haven and strategic post on the eastern trade. For sixty years it was considered valuable by the rulers of the Empire, only in reference to the east and its trade. That value was lost; and the Cape became a well-nigh worthless possession, even to clear-sighted statesman, until the indigenous wealth of South Africa gave it an increasing value of its own. The British Government has been little more willing than the Dutch Company, taking account, not account, to shed blood or treasures in South Africa without hope of return. The truism, of it be a truism, has at least the merit of being true.

The action of the administration, under the complex conditions which have been detailed, produced in combination with certain natural causes, three chief movements during this period, each of which almost monopolises a generation of South African history. These movements are:

A movement by which the majority of the pastoral farmers achieve nominal as well as nominal, independence of the colonial administration;

A movement whereby the agriculturists withdraw their allegiance from the trading district, and tend to act alone with the pastoral;

A movement, due to exceptionally fortunate natural causes, whereby the trading divisions increase vastly in importance, these in restoring the balance of factors disturbed by movement second, and leading up to the present; the actual one - the acute strike of the two factors for the mastery.

Let us then examine the role of the administration with a view to discovering the causes of movement first.

Political action, using the word political in a loose sense. In form and spirit the government:

The colony remained a dependency during this part of our period; this was merely a continuation of former conditions; and with it we have no more to do. In respect of local and judicial administration it was different. Local administration under the Dutch had always been something of a makeshift; justice had always been closely connected with, and subservient to, executive power. Factors second and third in our scheme of administrative action - hence imperial and colonial forces - with the narrow views of these time and training could not suffer this; in a spirit of zealous reform they swept away the old system; introduced circuit courts of justice and a new jury system; abolished the local courts of heemraad; changed, probably not only the details, but the spirit of the whole administrative organisation, took away their ancient coveted wages from the conservator Heem, set up English ones in their place.
Social

9. Social action. Again a spirit of reform shows itself: the great blot on the life of the South African colonist is his want of education; the rulers make honest attempts to remedy the defect. Next important, they find the Paal unworkable from the educational, or any other point of view; the Paal is therefore legally abolished, at least as a government despot; English takes its place in all the lower and government offices. Factor third in our scheme is probably chiefly responsible here, influenced no doubt by factor fourth, for the English trader is now becoming more common in the colony.

Economic

1. General

9. Economic action. And here we have the chief part of the matter. First come really valuable reforms: for we have seen how the Dutch Company had hampered the trade of the colony with restrictions; had saved its purse by a system of compulsory corn purchase, of forced furnage, or what we now call commandeering. And these abuses are summarily abolished; free internal trade, free trade to the East is introduced; the compulsory sale system, perquisites, requisitions and so on disappear as rapidly. A satisfactory from the colonists' point of view are the evolution British business capacity in the redemption of the Dutch Company's paper currency at one third value; were still the alteration of the old system of land tenure. And above all, once the reforms in regard to the native question, in the two acute stages in which it presents itself.

First, and probably most important, is the combined problem of slave and Hottentot labour. This labour system had become an integral part of the social life, the economic existence of the agricultural and pastoral divisions of the colony. We have already observed, indeed, how it had been one of the most powerful conditions of the formation of that peculiar life. But against it were arrayed all the factors of administrative action. The trading division of the colony was not so dependent on the system as the other two; and with the increasing influence of English merchants, and the foundation of the Allany settlements, where no slavery ever existed, a party actively hostile to these systems of servitude and slavery was formed in the colony, headed by the numerous missionaries, who may be regarded as an outpost of the Philanthropical party in England. The British officials at the Cape had no personal interest in the system, and, influenced by English feeling, local and imperial would be rather against the retention of such an odious abuse. The rulers at home were unwilling to take any step in such a thorny matter; but were at that time exceptionally under the influence of a party representing, or affecting to represent, the ultimate administrative factors: the Philanthropical party. Under these influences missionaries and not our popular split were taken in South Africa in regard to slaves and Hottentots. The slave trade was early stifled regulations concerning the punishment of slaves became stricter and stricter. Acts against Hottentot rogues were repealed; missionaries began to labour among them, with the consequence...
of the administration. Finally slavery was abolished, and not content with that, the administration refused to have any enactment against vagrancy on the part of the emancipated slaves; and the compensation allotted the owners, originally too small, was rendered still smaller by unnecessary discounting.

Second, we have the native question prior to that is the problem of the treatment of the advancing tribes of Kaffirs on the western border of the colony. It has been already mentioned that the advance of the frontiers to the west in the eighteenth century was checked by their meeting with the opposing forces of the powerful and prolific Kaffir tribes. The results of the conflict between these two opposing forces are uninteresting; it is sufficient to remark that already, the inevitable tendency in the conflict of lesser and keener, healthy civilization had declared itself. The land of the Kaffirs was coming into the white man's possession, more perhaps for the sake of frontier safety than of territorial aggrandizement; the Kaffir tribes were coming under British sway, if not under actual British rule. And we may have added that this process, then in an experimental stage, has been now recognized as natural, inevitable, and in the end best. But the Philanthropic party in England considered any encroachment on native "rights" a matter of contest; the government of the day was guided by that party. The officials in South Africa itself, supported doubtless by all divisions of the colonists, except the missionaries, were strongly in favour of the advance policy. Probably what turned the scale against that policy was the determination of the Governor-in-Chief, Lord Napier, to define the frontier of the home government in a few years. The advance terminated: the Great Trek took place.

How then did these administrative acts affect the different divisions of the colony? To the trading community, they were probably an almost unmixed blessing. The removal of trade restrictions, the influx of British merchants, caused a great increase in prosperity. The judicial reforms were liked by all races by the English of any sect, the redemption of the covenanted settlements. The emancipation of the slave trade might injure the trading community temporarily, but it was aimed for other objects. A general slave and Kaffir question had less influence, or the traders than any one else, as we have noted. The native question question had even less. The farmers of the colony had much less reason to be pleased with the action of the government. They also no doubt benefited by the removal of trade restrictions; self interest still kept them attached to Cape Town and the administration there. But to their conservative nature, the summary overthrows of the old order must have been hard to bear; the abolition of the Tea Act for public use a real hardship. And although the second aspect of the native problem could not affect them directly, the abolition of slavery, most common among them, must have meant a very severe loss.
With regard to the benefits of the interior, it has been maintained that every one of the acts of administration, almost, maintained by us, we, a direct or indirect cause of the Great Trek. But did these acts afford the flocks more or grasper any more than they did the rest of the colony? Trade restrictions or freedom could have little effect on them: money quotations less. The courts of justice did undoubtedly affect them very nearly, in that so many of them were concerned in the cases of native ill-treatment heard in the Black Council. The alteration of land tenure was a grievance, but not more. The abolition of slavery could not have injured them nearly as much as it did the farmers for the freed negroes. The native frontier question was a much more serious one for them; but only those on the immediate borderland were in actual danger. The Albany settlement indeed formed a large part of the boundary. If it be true, as it is true, that these acts of the British government were the cause of the Great Trek, then they were no more than the immediate causes; the real underlying reason is the same, as before, that the flocks were already indolent, and that therefore they objected to interference from an administration from which they derived no visible benefit. In fact, the conviction is true in all its essentials, that what the trekkers really wanted was not good government, but no government at all. And this conviction becomes certainty when we study the early history of the Transvaal.

Some special outstanding causes occurring in this time were: the detention of Napoleon at St Helena, which brought about the upholding of a large garrison at the Cape; the great number and high pay of officials in the early years of British administration; both circumstances which benefited the trading and agricultural divisions, and therefore ensured largely the peaceful transfer of authority from Dutch to British; and, in quite a different way, the so-called rebellion of Blignaut’s trek, which is a magnificent example of the resistance of the independent Boer farmer to government control, and is also influential in causing the Trek, and directly upraised peaceful and restorative channel.

In sum, the alliance between trade and administration has never been drawn closer that ever; the agricultural community is discontented but still bound to the Union; the pastoral division has become independent in reality.

We may now deal with movement number two - the union or attempted union of the agricultural and pastoral divisions. The action of the administration brought this about in the ways.

First, there grew up in South Africa among the Dutch, a feeling of race unity, of their existence as a nationality by themselves. Any such feeling must have been dormant during the rule of the Dutch East India Company; want of contact with the outside world, and internal division working on the well known individualism of the Dutch, must have almost destroyed such a conception; it flares up but still left by the ties of interrelationship, which grew up among...
the colonists. Hence again may be inferred the cause of the weak resistance of the British signers of the treaty. But it has been observed that when the first British settlers were arriving from Holland that country was at enmity with Great Britain; some feeling of traditional hostility may have been handed down to South Africa itself. It is more likely that the short period of well-meaning rule, direct by the government of Holland, did something to prejudice the settlers against change of masters. Under British rule itself, however, once feeling must have developed rapidly. Contact with the incoming British settlers— the first colonists which the colonists had the opportunity of contact with foreigners, the want of assimilation of each other natural in two races at such different stages of development; the introduction of English institutions, the English language, could not but go a long way towards making such feeling. The administration and the incoming English traders were naturally closely connected and besides, the administration there became almost identical with that of the English race. The fact that the missionaries, the only Englishmen with whom a large number of the colonists came into touch, performed many of the most unpalatable acts of the ruling house, with regard to the native question, tended still further to such an identification; and a superficial view of these acts, touching the colonists, as we have learned, in the highest sense: the economic— is enough to show that there was justification for great bitterness of feeling. But such a feeling does not readily translate itself into action; and it cannot justly be said that the Great Trek was the result of such feeling: it might have remained under a continuance of the rule of the Dutch Company. After the Trek numerous causes for a natural feeling arose. The military successes of the Boers; their misfortunes, their persecution by the British government; their final achievement of independence must have immensely strengthened any sentiment that already existed; not only in the minds of the independent Boers, themselves, but in the minds of their race fellows in Cape Colony. Communication being always kept up between the various portions of the Dutch race. And the final touch to this sentiment that which caused it to blossom out into a practical shape: was the assassination and war of independence of the Boers. For several years before, in 19th century, the majority of the British South government, had been preaching the doctrine of the unity of Afrikaner nationality; that unity showed itself during the War of Independence; strongly all over South Africa that the return of the Boers had to take place, and the confederative scheme given up; and within a year now formed the Afrikaner Bond, the national sign of the race yet another.

Race feeling insufficient. To much for race feeling; and there is no need to deny that such is the bond which has held the British to former in South Africa; a common social and religious life, a common language and associations; there is sufficient explanation. But something more is needed before a movement revolutionary, or otherwise, can take place for political unity; economic interest; and we have seen here important it is in South Africa must be common likewise; so we must ask, was this the case in South Africa!
There has never been any important economic interest in common between the pastoral and agricultural divisions in South Africa, and this has been always the weak point of the Afrikaner movement.

We have already seen that the interests of the agricultural division were for a long period bound up with those of the British one, and in so far as there has ever been a tightening of bonds between farmers and industrialists, it has been the result of a loosening of those other connections. And that such a loosening did take place during the boom years under concentration is quite undeniable.

One knows how during the boom years of early British rule the farming and agricultural divisions had stuck to the administration in their own interest, in spite of its harmful acts. Prosperity did not always continue at such a high pitch, but continued down to the next important external event of the period, the opening of the Suez canal. That event immediately deprived South Africa of its importance in reference to the eastern trade, its own commercial importance was small, the home government lost interest in it; the agricultural and pastoral divisions, having more stable grounds of prosperity, immediately gained the upper hand of the traders; a considerable reversal of the balance of power took place. Under the old administrative system, that might easily be undone for years; but the spirit of representative government gave the means of restoring feeling in the colony. It did more: it renewed the colony from the bottom of the home administration, it thus freed the leaders of their most powerful and consistent ally: Cape Colony was now practically independent of the home government, the farmers were the most powerful party in Cape Colony; with the achievement of practical economic independence, race feeling had room to act.

That it acted effectively, we cannot doubt. We see the former of the Afrikaner party in such acts as the re-establishment of the Bond as a medium of education and business; we see the unity of Dutch feeling in South Africa in the successful opposition to confederation, the unanimous moral presence, which might at any time have become rebellion, exercised against the government action in the war of Transvaal Independence. That war, stirred by the bitter organization of the Afrikaner Bond, which upheld the economic preference of the agricultural division in its fiscal and revenue policy and thereby makes a continuation of close race connection among the Dutch, a possibility, and so things continue till we come to the present.

The action of the administration during this period is itself in itself sufficient to show here, that the action of the administration during this period is itself in itself sufficient to show, as that not granting the change in the balance of the South African parties, it has done on the old lines, until the death of the Transvaal was shown that matters have changed. It then realizes that South Africa had decreased in value to the Empire, or rather, the trade of the Empire, and a change in policy takes place, which might, sooner or later, have meant the reparation of South Africa from Britain, the independence of the Transvaal being the first step in such a movement. That such a communication did not take place, that South Africa still remains a part of the Empire is the result of what we have called movement third.
The third movement, the growth in importance of the trading division, begins while the second is still in mid-course, though its greatest extent is reserved till later. We noted, at the beginning, the valuelessness of South Africa from a commercial point of view, its want of natural resources, its inlandness, on the surface at any rate, for the development of any industry. Such it had remained, till the commencement of this movement; its commercial importance, would hardly, if at all, have been due to the connection with the east, if to anything at all. But, by an accidental coincidence, and the opening of the Suez Canal, a new and suddenly developed, very rapidly growing industry, strong enough to fill the breach in some extent, the diamond industry. And many years later, at an equally critical period of South African history, saw the rise of the Transvaal, began an almost equally rapid development of an even more important commercial venture, the gold industry of the Transvaal.

What was the result of these developments? Not least important, they influenced the whole history of the colony at home; they kept up the industrial interest in the colony at a time when it was likely to decay; they kept the factor numbers up, at work. But much more important, they augmented, immensely, the importance of the commercial division of the colony; they afforded the balanced means which had almost certainly gone over to the rise of the new united Republic and colony. And this increase in the importance of the trading community, gave Africa a new commercial interest of its own, greater even than that which it had previously through its old connection with the east, and, to follow this up, the new or reformed commercial interest of South Africa, brought again into action that general principle which we have stated to underlie the whole of British administrative action; the policy, natural at the time, of which the rise of the Transvaal had been the most prominent result, was reversed again; the alliance between administration and trader, founded at first on the mere memory benefit derived from the presence of the administrator, weakened later by the growth of self-government, was restored as strong again as ever, by the rise of new connections as to the door connection of Transvaal and colony, Transvaal and gold. But more than this resulted from it. By the fact that the Transvaal was the location of the gold deposits, the commercial and pastoral communities, once brought into contact, as they had not been for two generations, we have already, that these two communities had really no interest in common; we have therefore characterised these divisions as a petty division, using the word in a wide sense. We have been the most avoided in avoiding conflict by the entire separation of pastoral from commercial; indeed no other method whereby conflict could have been as long avoided, is conceivable. And now again they came into actual contact, actual interference with one another; and the result was the present, as we see it.
The Present

The Present of South Africa has formed our only feature which it is useful to attend to; and that is, the War. With the details of that war we have nothing to do; it suffices for us that the ultimate result is now plain, and merely needs time to be fully worked out. But with its causes and consequences we have some concern; let us first take its causes.

If we premise the statement that the Great New War was the result of the two opposing parties in South Africa, it needs no great historical insight to perceive that that war was a perfectly inevitable consequence from the commencement of South African history. It has been made plain that that party division, which we have so often mentioned, was inevitable result of the natural conditions obtaining in South Africa, combined with the action of the British administration; we have seen in former that the action of that administration was the unavoidable result of the way in which it was constituted. We have shown how that party division was perpetuated under British rule, again by the acts of administration inevitably resulting from the unremittable action of its factors; we have seen the shape which that division inevitably took; we have traced the logical results of events down to the time when unavoidable natural causes bring the same parties, under the same principles, again face to face; and it needs but a short-sighted reason to see the impossibility of avoiding the conflict. There is, indeed, something hateful, something awful, in the way in which abstract causes seem thus to bring about a result; but this essay is not an attempt to treat of that way. Let it be enough that we faced the inevitable, inevitable from the beginning of South African history; from the beginning of British History, of British History, of the History of Modern Europe; inevitable, if you will, from the beginning of time.

But it may be asked: Cannot two states exist side by side, each dominated by a party whose interests have nothing in common with those of the other—like, say, the Orange Free State and the British portion of South Africa—without coming into conflict? All history teaches us that the answer is no! Some or other some form of conflict will arise, and then the strength of the parties must be tested; under present circumstances, was in the only test. And if you would see the real importance of the cause of this war, which we may select as most immediate—the Thetford grievances—in relation to the Imperial, these grievances may be summed up as at bottom depending on the same principles as those which caused the Great War. They are all instances of the imposition of administrative burden without corresponding benefits. But viewed in relation to the cause of the war as a whole, these grievances are no more than its immediate occasion; but every one of their rights and wrongs is really foreign to the subject: they were merely the straws which showed which way the wind blew.

One of the most interesting points in connection with the war has been, that, like the war of
Independence, it has been better than anything else could have done, the position and conduct of the two parties. The commercial community of South Africa has been the essential rallying point on one side, it has been unanimous, and has, of course, been supported, more or less, financed, managed, by the British government acting as an over man its recognized principal. The pastoral community, the real, unembodied, type of black owner, however they may be named, historically, have been as consistent as the other, influenced as race feeling, common interest, blood relationships, or what you will. The really interesting case in which it has defined the position for us, is that of the agricultural community, meaning thereby the Dutch of the Western part of the colony. In spite of the strength of the apparently anti-British Afrikaners Hand in that district, there has been no indication of any insurrection. This is the more curious when we consider the masculinity of South African British against the war of Independence, a masculinity which certainly, there showed signs of universal insurrection. But the attitude of the Cape Dutch farmers, conclusively, the conclusion that the present war is not, in the main, a War of Races, but a War of Parties. In 1870 race feeling and economic interest, if not identical, did not clash; now, in shadow of more perfect race organization, the farmers of Cape Colony have felt the change in economic conditions which, of late years, have placed them in a position of dependent upon the commercial community, and have acted accordingly.

We may compare this situation, for so long as the historical men will, and no longer, that statesmanship could hardly have chosen a better time than the present for the inevitable conflict, at no time could union have been more safe, than when the economic prosperity of South Africa had rendered the commercial community so important, had in both the allegiance of the agricultural division; perhaps most important, had concentrated attention at home on British Africa.

The consequences of the present war lead us into the region of the improbable future, in dealing with which we can only speak of general tendencies, not of particular events. But one thing, however, we may make some fairly certain generalizations concerning the near future.

First, the present war will tend to be final. The way method in which it is being presented, the aroused aim of the directing it, is the first proof of this assertion. The intention is evident, to subdue the Boers entirely, to take away every vestige of independence from the Boer states, to ensure the predominance of the commercial community throughout South Africa. That this will be some or later, accomplished for the nearest by main force, there can be no doubt. Therefore we shall see a long period occupied in reconstituting the fabric of submission, shattered over such a large part of the colony, and during that time there will not in all probability be any attempt to make the results of the war by movement from within.
But the ultimate permanency of the result of the war; its permanent supremacy, is, of the commercial community in South Africa, depends on quite other conditions. It is hardly needful to say that these are mainly economic. When we consider the soil, the rainfall, the general agricultural possibilities of the districts, where the Boers are chiefly settled (the fertile velds of Natal and Rhodesia, colonised under English conditions, have no relation to this question), it does not in the least seem likely that the land interest should again threaten the trade interest. Mineral wealth, rather than agricultural, seems the prominent natural characteristic of the land. So, just as the richness of the diamond and gold mines have given the traders their present supremacy in South Africa, so will such bands of precious minerals give it the same supremacy in the future. Experts tell us that the gold mine of the Transvaal alone will last for fifty years. Even if they gave out before then, we may be sure, from what experience again, that the mining of equal supplies of gold in more northern regions, however gold is not the only important mineral: we hear of vast deposits of iron and other metals; the mining of gold will be but the prelude to the development of these minerals also. So it may be fairly said that, assuming we do that we gave full time of all agricultural or pastoral demand is being supplied by the colonist, the commercial interest will return to supremacy.

This, however, is not all. The supremacy of one party does not mean the unity of all parties. Complete unity of interest is of course, synonymous with stagnation; but in any healthy state, common classes, or party, interests must exist. It has already been pointed out that such common interest must exist between the pastoral farmer, Boer, in South Africa, and any other part of the community. If South Africa is to be a unified whole, such interests must arise; if not, or even were they must therefore be the aim of the administration in this year to come. General lines alone can be indicated: but it is likely that the social evolution of the Boer will break down before increased facilities of communication, and the gradual spread of education, and the English language; economic independence may take much longer to defy, but the probable increase in agriculture, better, which will take place with the spread of British civilisation, and perhaps with the imitation of government schemes, for land improvement, will weaken this central feature of Boer life also. When we see the Boer become dependent on the commercial city, as a weekly market for his food, as an English colonist farmer, then an immense step in the unifying of South Africa will be accomplished. And, as we have seen, the necessary condition of such unity, a strong and widespread commercial community, giving coöperation to the colony by constant business and social communication between its various parts, is likely to exist and increase for many years to come.
connection... The further question too may be asked - will this probably united South Africa bear a part of the British Empire? In the main, the question depends on the supremacy of the commercial community: for not only is that community, almost wholly English in nationality, but the trade in which it is interested is the substantial link which binds the colony to the Empire. Any retrenchment of, or removal of, power on the part of the pastoral community, with its interests centred in itself, would certainly endanger the connection of the Empire and South Africa; and should the commercial community by any chance, for its supremacy, overreach, while race-feeling continues to exist in South Africa, or if it for some years yet then we might expect complications in this direction. As it is, however, there is really little cause for fear. Nor is it to be supposed that foreign nations will likely obtain any dangerous influence on South Africa in the near future. Portuguese South Africa is little more than a name; only its acquisition can unlikely event, by any foreign power could cause trouble. German South West Africa is a more dangerous spot; but the dominion of the land and interest of numerous (except some rubber miners in the South) will prevent its obtaining any real importance for many years. It is now probable that political changes in other parts of the world, a new influence in the Mediterranean, or at the Suez canal might at any time enhance the value of South Africa to the Empire; at any rate, it has lately been sufficiently evident that the Empire is unwilling to yield it up.

So much for general considerations with regard to the future. Within South Africa itself, new factors are now rising up which may have a harmful influence in the future. These are in the colony at present few problems of great magnitude, besides those resulting from the war: no constitutional, industrial, or ecclesiastical questions disturb the mind of the legislature. The question alone looms in the distance on waiting for solution: the native question; which we can hardly more than mention here. No longer a slave, the native in South Africa is still controlled by his circumstances, and known to be the labourer of the community; and so much is this the case that white labour although beset by difficulties in most parts, has been almost driven from the field. This is not in itself a hardship: but with the increase of education and training, and above all his advantage in numbers, the nature seems likely to enjoy much higher position than those of the day labourer. The unskilled agricultural native labour is the native who will not work, affords additional problems. The real question is, not the condition of the native that is now inquired; it is the relative rate of increase in black and white populations which is an object of apprehension. The problem belongs to the future: the experience of the Southern States in America might lead us to hope, not to fear; and civilization may change the condition and number of native community. While a noble question has already in itself which can only be mentioned here.
Such then is our treatment, obviously imperfect and incomplete, of the history of South Africa. It must be pointed out that the subject is too vast and complex, and the available sources too limited, to allow for a comprehensive treatment. However, even in this brief account, certain aspects of the history of South Africa have been highlighted, particularly the role of economic factors in shaping the course of the country's development. It is clear that economic considerations have played a significant role in the history of South Africa, and that they will continue to do so in the future.

In this respect, the study of colonial history is of particular importance. The study of colonial history not only helps us to understand the past, but also provides insights into the present and future. The experience of the South African people under colonial rule has had a profound impact on their society and culture, and this legacy continues to shape the country today. It is therefore essential that we continue to study and learn from the history of colonial rule.

In conclusion, the study of colonial history is of utmost importance for a full understanding of the history of South Africa, and for the development of the country's future. The study of colonial history is not only about understanding the past, but also about learning from it and using that knowledge to shape the future. It is through this understanding that we can work towards a better future for all South Africans.