THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF GASTON FROMMEL
(1862 - 1906)

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Degree of Ph.D.
APRIL, 1972
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The Thesis gives an account of the life and thought of GASTON FROMMEL, French-Swiss theologian, Professor at the University of Geneva from 1894 until his death.

The distinctive elements of his thought are set out, in their own right; in terms of his antecedents - principally Pascal, Kant, Vinet, Secretan and Malan; and in relation to his contemporaries, by way, where relevant, of dialogue and exchange - principally Chapuis, Naville, Sabatier and Bois. Assessment is made of the validity of his thought and of its relevance to theological issues since his day.

Frommel's life and thought were inseparably linked, his conversion experience being motive and norm for all which followed by way of devotional and theological expression. His approach was one not so widely known nor explored as its distinctive quality might appear to warrant, and his premature death meant an unfinished work. While his thought-expression belonged, in its main lineaments, to his time, and his influence was exercised chiefly in personal terms on students and friends, he has yet something to say to every age by way of recall to the fundamentals of Christian experience, the personal validation of the saving power of the Gospel.

He regarded the task of the theologian as that of describing, analysing and giving articulate expression to the data of Christian experience, in terms of Apologetics (the demonstration of Christian truth before the faculty of reason by the constitution of human truth,) and Dogmatics (the exposition of the content of the Christian faith in accordance with its own inner coherence and life.)

The main elements in his thought were:-

(1) The identification of, and the emphasis upon, the experience of the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience, the solicita-
tion of the human will by the Divine, as the area in which to constitute the true nature of man. The will is determinatively obligated in its unconscious mode, and exercises itself in freedom and responsibility in the conscious, reflective mode.

(2) The determination of the Christian faith in terms of a life centred on the Person of Jesus Christ, its validity and its bearing of a distinctive cognitive element, these being given in the experience of commitment in freedom. The intellectual faculty being vitiated by determinism and enslavement to causality and apriorism, the epistemological status of faith is constituted, not in metaphysical knowledge of God as He is in Himself, but in knowledge of Him as He is for us in Christ. The things of the Spirit being inaccessible to natural man, there is required a regenerative experience and a renewal of the mind.

(3) The necessity for the conformity of Christian theological methodology, in both Apologetics and Dogmatics, to lived experience and to its data, rather than to scientific, historical or metaphysical norms and criteria.

(4) The conception of the supernatural as the moral supernatural, replacing naturalist monism or supernaturalist dualism; and the conception of Christianity as that which alone has fullness of the supernatural in virtue of its redemptive, revelatory and regenerative nature.

The perceptibility of miracle is thus concomitant with that of revelation, the supernatural becoming a datum of consciousness in the context of redemptive revelation.

Points of criticism of the Frommelian position:

(1) There was a rather uncritical acceptance of the Malanist psychology of the will as determinatively obligated in its un-
conscious mode while free in its reflective. This must remain hypothetical, and methodological purity was vitiated by the unacknowledged importing of psychological and religious presuppositions into what was claimed to be pure phenomenological description.

(2) There was imprecision in his constitution of moral obligation as the sole, direct, personal mode of relationship between man and God. It may be acknowledged as the supreme mode, but the depreciation of all others may not do justice to the conception of Paul, regarded by Frommel as normative for Christian thinking, that, even in man's natural condition, there is revelation of the Divine nature such as to render man inexcusable. What is inaccessible and indiscernible outside of regeneration and renewal is experience of "fides salvifica".

(3) His Christology, while suggestive in its conception of "solidarity" as the key to the relationship of Jesus Christ to mankind, both as natural and redeemed, seemed to issue in a soteriology which did not wholly break loose from elements of the juridical and expiatory which he thought to avoid.

(4) The element of eschatological tension was missing, such that, although claiming the character of the dynamic, his thought had a certain static quality, the implications for the conception of the renewing of the mind of the Christian, qua viaator, not being explored.

(5) The Apologetic value of his work remains doubtful, doomed, as perhaps all Apologetics, to failure in terms of his own premise, the inaccessibility of the things of the Spirit to natural man, an unbridgeable gulf being asserted as constitutive of human truth. His Apologetics moved, in however unacknowledged
a manner, within the area of Dogmatics, and could not do otherwise in terms of an experience discontinuous with the natural, namely, that of renewal and regeneration concomitant with redemptive revelation.
INTRODUCTION

The study of the life and thought of the Swiss Protestant theologian Gaston Frommel has been a most rewarding one, opening up for me a fresh area of theological concern, both conceptual and geographical.

The subject for research was proposed to me several years ago by the late Prof. John Baillie of New College, Edinburgh, under whom I had studied. For personal reasons it was not possible at that time to pursue it, and I am grateful to the University of Edinburgh, and to Prof. John McIntyre, Dean and Principal of New College, in particular, for permission and encouragement to prosecute the study, this time to a conclusion.

I have not felt at any time that the work has been a matter merely of academic discipline or of arid scholasticism. There has been, throughout, an interpenetration of mind, an excitement of intellect, a challenge of faith, all accompanied by a pervading sense of sincere devotion and spirituality; and I have drawn personal encouragement and satisfaction from the fact that little of the material seemed to be known in English-speaking theological circles. Although we may recognise its limitations and partiality, there is, nevertheless, here a word for our time by way of recalling man to the centralities of human existence and of the distinctive Christian response.

Having visited Geneva and Lausanne in the furtherance of the research, I record the pleasure of meeting Miss May Frommel of Geneva, daughter of Gaston Frommel, and thank her for her hospitality and readiness to make material available to me. I acknowledge also the kindness of M. and Mme. Philippe Daulte of Lausanne. M. Daulte's work, referred to in the Thesis, is the only other analytical study to have been made of an area of Frommel's thought.

My thanks are due to Miss Nancy Watt and Mrs. Pat Clarke for
their help in the task of preparation and presentation of the material.

Finally, I should like to dedicate the completed work to my wife Elizabeth, to my daughter Margaret, and in memory of my parents.
MEMOIR

[Text continues on the page]
PERSONAL MEMOIR

GASTON FROMMEL was born at Altkirch in Alsace on 25 November, 1862. His father was a forest inspector, a man of serene faith; his mother, a woman of exceptional saintliness and courage in face of suffering. If behind Augustine there was a Monica, behind Gaston Frommel there was one of whom he was to write: "Tout ce que je suis, je le lui dois. Elle nous a tous, tant que nous sommes, deux fois enfantés à la vie." Of the many influences which went to the moulding of his character and thought, it was, before all, to his mother that he owed his spirit of absolute obedience to the directives of conscience, a disposition which was to inspire all the decisions of his life.

His parents had married in 1857, the father 's family having had originally Swedish connection. After the war of 1870, a serious decision was taken. Alsace having been annexed by Germany, Frommel's father, rather than become a German subject, moved, not to France, where there would have been a Roman Catholic environment, but to French-speaking Switzerland, where, with what was left of their money, they acquired a rural property, le Pré Mermond, near Avenches. "Although there was suffering there, it was a house of joy," and Frommel grew up in a home atmosphere of secure love and purity of devotion and obedience.

As a boy, he was inclined to solitariness, and seemed often to be shut up within himself. He became intensely interested in animals and nature, and would choose a roundabout path to college so that he might meet no-one, simply giving himself over to attention to, and to communion with, the natural world.

As a scholar, he did not distinguish himself except in French composition and natural science, and his imagination began to be
caught by the idea of going to the Colonies. At the age of 17 he expressed the desire to emigrate, to which his father consented, on condition that he first choose a profession, and address himself to it. This he declared to be veterinary science, and, in its pursuit, he had studied for three terms at Berne (with great acceptance, according to his teachers) when a decisive event took place, which was to determine the whole future direction of his life. He was struck by grave cardiac illness, and, his life being almost despaired of, his mother took him to Hauptweil, to a home under the supervision of Pastor Stockmayer, who addressed these words to him on his arrival: "On the day that you give yourself to God, you will be cured."

There followed a great spiritual struggle and an experience like that of Paul on the Damascus road. Years later, he was to testify to his students that, before this, he had known Christian beliefs and religious customs, but did not yet possess a personal faith and was stranger to the inner experience which makes the true believer. "In the silent immobility to which the absence of all outer goals abandoned me, conscience raised its voice. The more I listened, the more it condemned me.... Everything in me was equally vitiated by self-will. The absolute holiness of God burst upon my consciousness, and, in the clearness of its implacable light, I saw myself judged, condemned, lost." Thus he testified in the personal confession with which he prefaced a course to his students, the account being entitled "Franche Explication". "It was then, by God's grace, that He gave me the experience of salvation, sending me one of His servants, a witness to the redemption which is in Christ. I was thrown at the feet of Christ, and there, without hesitations or theological curiosity of any kind, simply because He was Saviour and I was lost, I abandoned myself and gave myself to Him...."
His mother now saw him going towards the goal which God had placed before him; the service of Christ's Church. Restored to health, he took up study at the Independent Theological Faculty at Neuchatel, and was immediately known for spiritual maturity and lively intelligence. Manifesting more and more reaction against the teaching there for what he considered its traditionalism and scholasticism, Frommel left for Germany and studied, from 1885 to 1887 at the Universities of Erlangen and Berlin. Here he applied himself, according to one report, with a kind of frenzy, to the great philosophical systems. In a letter to Fred. Godet (7 Feb. 1886) he remarked: "My religious life has not suffered by my philosophical studies!" Like Amiel, of whom he was to make a study, he knew, at this time, something of the intoxication of pantheism, but resisted its seductions in the strength of that which was, for him, the impregnable centrality of the experience of the revelatory and regenerative action of God in Jesus Christ.

At Erlangen, he came under the influence of Franck, with whose emphasis upon this central experience he felt himself in sympathy. He also made the acquaintance of Henri Bois with whom, within the bonds of friendship, he was to tilt many a lance in later years, when the latter would be Professor at Montauban. At this time, he wrote to his mother: "I feel more and more a new man growing in me, a man spiritual as well as intellectual."

His literary ability was early displayed and recognised. Notable were his studies on Pierre Loti (Feb. 1886); H.-F. Amiel (Mar. 1887); Paul Bourget (Oct. 1889); Edmund Schérer (Sept. 1891). Others were to follow on Pascal, Vinet, Tolstoy, Secrétan and Malan fils. The lineaments of his later thought, as indeed its antecedents, were to be seen in these first works.
He found in Loti a kind of non-religious mysticism where there are aspirations without object and sufferings without hope. Loti's essential attitude to life, as suggested by the title of his book "Fleurs d'ennui", was that of a sense of abandonment to oneself following on that which Frommel wished above all to preserve, but with a different sequel - the sense of the reality of the contact of the soul with Christ. Loti said of Frommel that he was the one who had best understood his thought.

In Amiel, Frommel saw a religious pantheistic mysticism based essentially upon the experience of "things", in particular, "la terreur sacrée" which he had also sensed among the high Alps. But what was missing was the sense of the majesty and supremacy of the moral law, the imperishability of that which participates in the absolute. Here was an early constitution by Frommel of the crucial rôle of the moral consciousness in the understanding of man's nature, and the solicitation of his will by the Divine. He boldly wrote: "We believe that the conscience would infallibly lead to Christianity anyone who would allow himself to be directed by it." Where Amiel had confessed that the religion of Jacob had become more foreign to him than that of a Kant or a Spinoza, religious psychology being a simple phenomenon without fixed or noumenal validity, Frommel challenged his almost stoical attitude to existence with the sense of the life of Christ known in that of the believer such that the elements of mortality are overcome. It was, further, in his study of Amiel that he used words which were to be recalled and applied to him after his own death: "Pour le chrétien, mourir c'est cesser d'apparaître, ce n'est pas cesser d'être."

Similarly, in subsequent studies, Frommel was to emphasise the centrality of the true understanding of man as a moral being consti-
tuted in freedom. "We can tunnel through mountains and change the surface of the earth; nothing seems to be impossible except to establish a point d'appui for the soul. We ask of the intelligence what we should ask of the will.... Abstract freedom is a chimera; the will either abdicates in desire or realises itself through obedience."

Vinet he regarded as "a sower of gems, too religious for the indifferent, too affirmative for the sceptical, a great man belonging less to the past than to the future." With Vinet, we move from the negative to the positive influences in Frommel's thought. The distinctive contributions of Pascal, Secretan and Malan fils were to suggest the early formulation of Frommel's own position which he was, later, to expound in his major Apologetic and Dogmatic works. The certainty of moral realities was to be regarded as supreme, founded as these were on the experience by man of "le devoir", while attaching to this the sense of the holiness of the good. A philosophy of freedom, such as that of Secretan, presupposed a philosophy of obedience, which Frommel felt had still to be furnished.

The influence of Malan fils on Frommel's thought was a major one, and this was reflected in the latter's study of the son of the great apostle of the revival in the first half of the 19th Century in Geneva. In his rejection of apriorism and of any purely intellectualist approach to human truth, he had made the pivot of human personality and the source of certainty the experience which man has of the feeling of the obligation of conscience, with the double character of proposing itself to man as free, i.e. in autonomy, and, as dependent, i.e. in heteronomy. We first meet here the Malanist conception, adopted by Frommel, of the division of the will into the subconscious and the conscious, or reflective, modes. "Le devoir"
presents itself in terms of an "expérience imposée", concomitant with which there is revelation of the divinity of this obligation under the mode of the absolute and the unconditional. "The believer believes in Christ with the same faith and for the same reasons for which he believed in duty. The experience of man finds its fulfillment in that of the Christian, and that of the Christian consummates itself in living communion with the God-Saviour which constitutes all redemption...."

Frommel's critical, literary work was regarded as being distinguished by inspiration and penetration. "Nothing so strong is being done in Paris, and it seems to come from another moral world", wrote one critic; and the Director of Revue Chrétienne told Frommel that there was a fine place to take in Protestant literature, and that he hoped that he would not let it slip. However, the temptation to follow a purely literary career was resisted, and he set his face to the pastorate and service of the Church.

Back at Avenches, he experienced periods of pessimism as to the human condition and situation of his time. This could be seen through some of his letters - "What seems lacking to this century is the moral temperament. The reasons? Scientific discoveries, Hegelian philosophy transformed into an evolutionist materialism, immorality in capital cities, the growing cult of pleasure, the waning influence of the Church".... (Later) "My soul gravitates round nothingness. An abyss opened beneath me, the fearful abyss of universal nothingness. I did not doubt God, but was sad unto death." (An echo there of the existential 'Angst' of a Kierkegaard, although he never expressed himself in terms of existentialism as a theological movement.)

His own corrective to such moods was to be found in a paragraph
written shortly after, which expressed his true inner position - "No Christian is to be either pessimist or optimist. He is, in a sense, both, for he experiences both death and life, and participates in both the decay and the renewing of the world."

He was in Paris from Dec. 1887 to April 1888, when he presented a thesis to the Faculty of Protestant Theology entitled: "Étude sur la conscience morale et religieuse". But there he felt a stranger in the ecclesiastical and theological milieu, and unhappy in a big city, although he recorded the impression made on him by Notre Dame and other buildings and his preference for sculpture as an art form. He had a meeting with A. Sabatier ("a fine talker, a Southerner of great vivacity.") We find, at this time, a further piece of self-description: "I am an essentially grave man, for gravity befits a life lived under the cupola of infinity. There is a sweetness in gravity worth all the treasures of mirth."

In March 1888 he accepted a call to the parish of Marsauceux, near Paris, where he was to stay from May of that year to July 1891. At his ordination, he confessed himself "the slave of Christ", a phrase which he was often to use, and he felt a sense of loneliness amongst strangers as his family could not be there, because of age, infirmity and distance. He was not to achieve real satisfaction in the parish work, being depressed at the lack of spiritual interest which he found, and feeling "separated by a wall from the indifferent and the lukewarm." He noted, in the matter of Religious Education, that "one has no influence on the minds of children who have contrary teaching and example in the home." At this time he initiated his correspondence with H. Bois, congratulating him on his appointment to the Chair of Philosophy at Montauban.

His pastorate at Marsauceux was interrupted, in 1890, by a visit
to England in the hope of restoring his rather uncertain health. Here he discerned a richness of Christian works and of piety, in a land of freedom where even the faces of the people in the street seemed, to him, to have the mark of character. He heard Dr. Barnardo preach to an audience of thousands, but, over against such evangelicalism, he expressed the view that, in High Church ritualism, Roman Catholicism was at the door of the English Church. However, Anglo-Saxon thought, was essentially simple and organic — "c'est de la pensée vécue, et la vie pensée." As well as London, he visited Torquay and Oxford, where he appreciated the more liberal wing of the Oxford movement as represented by Lux Mundi; but he felt that its reconstruction of traditional theology did not go deep enough, nor was it sufficiently grounded in moral personality and individual experience.

Back to Marsauceux by September, he was to find himself still restless and in variable health, suffering, according to medical opinion, from the effects of cardiac and neuro-gastric trouble. He was to submit his resignation in July of the following year, (1891), having even thought of taking a post suggested to him in Mauritius, in a mood of disappointment and impatience with the French Protestant Church. During the months which remained, he wrote the first part of his work on Schérer, and mentioned, in a letter to Eugène Lenoir, his discharge from all obligations of military service in France, signing himself, in a subsequent letter, "ton vieux terrier d'Écosse"

In the autumn, Lenoir was installed as pastor of the Church at Jussy, and he invited Frommel to pass the winter as assistant to him, thus affording opportunity for devoting time to theological writing and to delivering lectures at conferences. In Jan. 1892, having
asked to be put on the register of ministers of L'Eglise Libre du Canton de Vaud, Frommel accepted a call to the Church of Missy-Grandcour-Chevroux, about five miles from Avenches, and he was there from May until January of the following year. Again he used a phrase to a friend with an "existentialist" ring - "I know what it means to be 'thrown into existence'."

Here he had the first real intimation of his eventual settling in Geneva. In the summer, he was called to give a year's course there, consisting of two lectures per week, on the subject: "De Calvin à Vinet - Histoire littéraire d'un principe". This was to be combined with a preaching post. He described himself at this time as being "in a chrysalis state", sensing that he was about to enter a new phase in his life. Such was further corroborated by his appointment as preacher at the Reformation as from 1 Jan. 1893.

He was now planning to marry, and his letters to his fiancée yield many personal glimpses: "The work of God seems hardly begun in me, and the old man continually revives. You will help me, won't you, and speak the truth in love? ... I am not a simple man; there are many men in me. But we build upon what endures (character), not upon what passes (feeling). From that there is certainty, confidence, absolute security; from security comes sincerity, and from sincerity, peace."

After his marriage towards the end of 1892, he experienced a period of greater tranquillity of mind, reflected in literary and epistolary activity. He received an invitation in 1894 to give two three-year theological courses at Geneva, the occasion of his use again of the metaphor: "Me voici galérien pour six ans!".... He was appointed Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Geneva in succession to Auguste Bouvier. The appointment was not,
however, without opposition, and we read that some criticised his dress – the small, flat hat, the high, black waistcoat and straight-collared coat brought from England; he was, indeed, criticised for "clericalism" in his appearance!

His courses in Apologetics and Dogmatics, were to be published posthumously, as "La Vérité Humaine" and "L'Expérience Chrétienne". These were given – the former four times, the latter five times, along with a third series – over four triennia from the year of his appointment until his death in 1906. He had meant to complete the Dogmatics in terms of "historico-speculative postulates of Christian experience developed under the regulative conception of the Kingdom of God", and of pneumatology, the doctrine of the individual and collective realisation of salvation through the Holy Spirit. At the outset of his course, he told students to write at the top of their note-books: – "Calvin (Instit. Chrts.: 1, 5, 5)'I am not saying anything else but what each Christian experiences in himself."

Despite his prominent position which gave him rich opportunity to display his gifts of warmth and friendship, and to exercise wide influence on the lives of others, particularly his students, he confided to a friend that he was called "Gaston le taciturne", and added that it was perhaps a good name for such a time – "we should speak less and listen more!"

He did not limit his work among the students to lecturing, but gave unstintingly of his gifts in "L'Association Chrétienne Suisse d'Etudiants" and "L'Association Chrétienne Evangélique", with the founding of which he was associated. His name was always linked with Sainte-Croix, at which, on the occasion of the gatherings there, some of his most notable papers were first given, e.g. "Le danger moral de l'evolutionnisme religieux". In a special In Memoriam Sym-
The spirit of the University of Geneva at the turn of the century was one of excitement, buoyancy and life; as well as French students with their grey caps, there were Russian, Bulgarian and Armenian students, and there was "a smell of powder in the air". But the atmosphere was materialistic, atheistic positivism often making alliance with socialist-anarchist doctrines.

Members of the Union Chrétienne were few, and there was hostility to Christian affirmation, posters advertising meetings being even on occasions torn down. Many were to remember, with gratitude, the hospitality of Frommel's home at Grange-Canal where there were two sessions each week, the trenchant discussions, the utter earnestness (and the laughter), the cups of tea, the air thick with pipe smoke, the deep fellowship of mind and heart. Many were to picture the figure of Frommel, tall, eyes kind but piercing, his habit of laying his outstretched hands on one's two shoulders in friendship and welcome.

Three weeks after visiting her son and grandchildren at Frontenex, Frommel's mother died, in 1896, and, during that summer, his health was poor. After a severe relapse in the autumn he was better by the end of the year, but still rather weak. He was to recall his words to Wilfred Monod of two years previously: "I envy you your strength and activity", (when he approved his friend's thought) "Your thought is mine, your goal that which I pursue with you." The persistent weakness and sickness of the body being for him a kind of paradigm of the sickness of the soul of natural man, he defined the Christian, on one occasion, as "un homme que Dieu a en traitement"....

His thoughts on the theological situation in the closing years of the century were centred on that area in which he felt there had
been inadequacy and superficiality. Theology had remained, in the true sense of the term, insufficiently "scientific", i.e. not taking sufficient account of the experiences in religious psychology over eighteen centuries. Being "sui generis", Christian experience, in particular, is not discussable in the sense of being analysable into prior concepts borrowed from profane metaphysics. What should be fruitful in theology would be its removal from the region of speculation, and, treating religious experience in the same way in which natural phenomena are studied, that is, experimentally, its observation, identification, classification and analysis in its own appropriate and self-imposed terms. Christianity was not to be approached from the outside, in terms of, and from the point of view of, heterogeneous norms and criteria.

It is interesting to note that Archbishop Frederick Temple had expressed a similar conviction when he said that "theology has been cast in a scholastic mould, that is, based on logic. We are in need of, and are being gradually forced into, a theology based on psychology. The transition will not, I fear, be without much pain, but nothing can prevent it."

In Frommel's submission, it was not possible to found Christian theology on any other basis, metaphysical, historical or, in the sense of non-commitment, theoretical, because all such are vitiated by intellectual heterogeneity and moral and religious detachment - in sum, by the fact of the indiscernibility and inaccessibility of the things of the Spirit to natural man. It must rather find its point d'appui in the experience of the believer in his relationship to, and incorporation in, the life of Christ. There, in epistemological terms, is the "principium essendi" which is, at the same time, the "principium cognoscendi".
In the matter of communication, Frommel confessed to an occasional feeling of failure, arising from the basic fact that the subject-matter is something living and dynamic. We can but compare the writer-artist with the exponent of real life; the moral and religious convert can no longer be an "artist" - he can only be an "apostle". (There was a hint of inconsistency here when we note elsewhere his view that theological exposition was more of an "art" than a "science". What he was wishing to guard against, however, was, clearly, any kind of aesthetic dilettantism.) "Speech, (he wrote) is truly an instrument of separation; it would like to unite and to communicate - it isolates and separates. When I read: Where there is knowledge, it shall be done away, I say, Bless God for that! This has become one of my strongest hopes".... Man has only one possibility - "raconter"; there is a difference between convincing and creating. A teacher recounts to persuade, an artist to move. Deus interior, sancta ipse creans."

He rejoiced, however, at an overall feeling of success with his students, but this joy was tempered by his suffering migraines, and, as a result of unrelenting pressure of work and a deeply-felt awareness of the theological situation to which he addressed himself, he wrote: "I feel my brain withered in my head like a dry leaf and stiffened like a parchment. But the end appears still more desirable, not an end in nothingness, but in glory."

He was much moved by the death in 1899, of César Malan fils, and he wrote a sympathetically interpretative account of his thought. He did not spare himself, but continued, with undiminished earnestness, to exercise his ministry through contributions to journals and addresses at conferences. In March 1901, he made a visit to Montauban at the invitation of Bois to give lectures at the Faculty
of Theology on his central concept of the experience of the obligation of conscience, and one public lecture, in particular, entitled "Une Crise dans la vie de l'Esprit". Afterwards, he wrote to Bois, thanking him for the welcome which he had received, mentioning that he was engaged on a study of Pascal, and referring to the death of Sabatier, which he felt must have been a grave blow to the Faculty at Paris. By June, he was again suffering from insomnia and extreme fatigue, and was to spend some time, with a view to recuperation, at Gsteig.

At the end of this year, and into the next, there was a running debate, publicly carried on through many journals, in which Frommel took a prominent part, a debate which was not without a certain heatedness of feeling and harshness of expression. This was the sequel to a lecture by Ferdinand Brunetière, at the Victoria Hall, Geneva, by invitation of the Conseil d'Etat, on 17 Dec. 1901. The lecture directed strong criticism against Calvinism on the score of spiritual pride and élitism, being, by its nature, a theology leading to a kind of aristocratic exclusivism. "In England and America, the Calvinists are well-dressed people, with few simple, working people in their number. One would say: a club of intellectuals!..."

Frommel wrote a strong protest at this attack on Calvinism in its very citadel, his article being reproduced in five main journals. It is interesting to find that this, in turn, brought strong criticism of Frommel for his exclusivism, and for his seeking to criticise the Genevan people's right to invite and to welcome an eminent thinker, and, further, for his claiming to be speaking for them. He thus found himself under attack for giving proof of the very spiritual pride for which Calvinism was blamed by Brunetière, and for displaying a desiccated pietism which was the enemy of a developing demo-
In particular, G. Favon, Director of Public Instruction of the Canton of Geneva, thought that Frommel had no right to criticise a distinguished invited speaker in such terms. He wrote: "Ce n’est pas au Salève à critiquer le Mont Blanc!" A Fribourg journal commented on the visit that "the only discordant note was that of Frommel". The fact that Protestants were willing to hear a non-Protestant thinker developing his ideas showed (according to another journal,) that liberalism was making progress and that fanaticism was losing ground. The controversy, which was reported on in places as far apart as Lugano and Paris, sheds an interesting light on the climate of thought at the time.

Over the next two or three years, Frommel concentrated his thinking on certain main themes – the implications of religious agnosticism, the formulation of a theory of religious knowledge, and the nature and psychology of forgiveness revealed by the Cross. He was to keep up a lively correspondence with Bois, mainly on the matter of the basic discontinuity which Frommel was concerned to assert as between natural and regenerate man. He maintained that, while yielding to no-one in recognising the Christian devotion of Bois, the latter's theology was heterogeneous with his experience and the apriorism of metaphysics. He also constantly warned his correspondents and hearers of the intoxication of intellectualism and its essentially frivolous treatment of the problems of man's nature. "God demands (as he put it,) moral consecration, the inner life, effort of will, and prayer – and we reply with the insatiable curiosity of the intellect."

Despite recuperative stays in the summers of 1902 and 1903 at Montana sur Sierre and at Bréquet sur Lens, his creative activity was
subjected to recurrent insomnias and periods of weakness. Even into the spring of the following year, he was to speak of "the sombre ocean of insomnias whose unrelenting waves beat on my poor brain."

Around this time, he entered into deepening Christian friendship with Paul Robert, painter of the Musée de Neuchâtel and the Federal Tribunal, who made his home a centre of hospitality, and between the two there was remarkable interpenetration of souls and minds. Over two years, there were visits and exchange of letters. Unlike Frommel's relationship with Malan fils, there was, in this one, much greater similarity of age, but, as it happened, Robert was not to survive Frommel by long.

In June 1904, Frommel received a call from the Faculté Libre de Lausanne to succeed Jules Bovon, Professor of Systematic Theology there, and he was deeply torn as to where his duty lay. The call prompted a counter-call from Geneva. He had had the situation at Lausanne represented to him as disquieting, this being particularly the view of Robert's son. Did this, in fact, reinforce the call? Or should he still work, as he expressed it, "en pleine mêlée, en plein gâchis religieux, comme à Genève"? He felt that the Lausanne situation was exaggerated, and that, after all, it was a Church which had been decorated by Vinet and Secretan, and was, on the statistics available, to be admired for its Christian liberality. By August, he had made his decision in terms of what he believed to be his duty - to stay at Geneva and to offer two lectures per week at Lausanne as a gesture of appreciation of their invitation. A friend said to him at the time: "You would be happier at Lausanne; you are more useful at Geneva."

Although feeling that, in the subsequent session, his lectures in Geneva raised less discussion, he sensed a weakening of the reign
of intellectualism. The students were conscientious, and, if examination results were a criterion of their worth, there would be cause to rejoice. By the summer of 1905, he had decided on what he called a "chef d'oeuvre" on the Psychology of Forgiveness. This he presented as the theme for the Conference at Sainte-Croix - "La psychologie du pardon dans ses rapports avec la Croix." His conception was that from the side of God, the Cross is the symbol and measure of an eternal divine salvation; from that of man, in that Jesus Christ is our brother and representative, it is the cause of forgiveness, the cause, that is, not of the Divine forgiveness but of the manifestation and declaration of that forgiveness.

At this time also we note his very close relationship with Paul Laufer who was, with René Guisan, to do so much to ensure that his influence would not cease with his death, but would persist through the carefully annotated and edited publication of his major works. In a letter to Laufer in 1905, the expression again appeared: "You are rowing in the galley of the King; I know what it is to have rowed there myself!"

His writing of that year took on an increasingly devotional nature, with studies on prayer and the inner life; and, in December, he was invited to a conference under the auspices of "Foi et Vie", the president being Boutroux. There were further preaching and speaking engagements, and he owned to a feeling of freedom and power greater than for some time past. As he put it, "a man can do only what he has become in Christ; everything else is religious tin-ware!..."

By March 1906, however, he was again in need of physical restoration, and he went to a chalet at Montana, where there was a period of severe weather with "Siberian cold". He achieved a feeling of
relaxation and slept better, safe from the "roundabout of Geneva". But he tired quickly, and recorded that words and thought were at a low ebb. "To live by faith (he wrote,) is to walk into the unknown under the command of God and to fall into the arms of compassionate providence." Even reading became hard, head and heart alike feeling numbed. It was now the end of March, and, while the sunshine rejoiced body and mind, intellectual and physical incapacity persisted. He seemed to have a premonition of the end, when he wrote to his wife: "I remain weak and incapable to a degree which astonishes and alarms me. I can but pray for you and the children.... Otherwise there is nothing new. I await deliverance, and would wish to do so with more patience." These were his last recorded written words. A fall from a sledge, which had caused great head pains, obliged him to remain at Montana until mid-April. A few days after returning to Geneva, his condition worsened abruptly, and he died at Frontenex on 18 May 1906. An autopsy was to reveal the presence of a tumour at the base of the brain.

References to Frommel's life and work were extensive, and tributes to his memory poured in from many quarters. One reference, some time later, was typical and expressive of many others - "Frommel remained essentially a mystery; his last word was not spoken. We feel that we are in the presence of "metaphysical poetry", rather than of a theological system of imperious necessity. He was interested pre-eminently in the inner drama, outside of which he was not in his element. "My mind (he had written as early as 1887) neglects all that is not apparent to it." The reviewer, however, expressed the view that the time was not distant when Frommel the theologian would hardly have any more disciples.

Only one book has appeared in English on Gaston Frommel - a
selection of extracts from his devotional writing, with an introduction by J. Vernon Bartlet, who knew him as a friend from their meeting at Oxford in 1890. Published in 1928 under the title "The Psychology of Christian Faith", it commended Frommel's "profound insight into the human soul, into essential religion and authentic Christian faith, as well as a rare power of psychological analysis and of recalling to the mind its own deepest experience." Such an assessment has not been rendered wholly irrelevant by the passage of the years.

We must acknowledge, however, that, despite such commendation of Frommel's distinctive analysis and contribution, his work has had little lasting influence in subsequent theological trends. After the 1914–1918 War, French Protestantism seemed to return more to the theology of the Reformation, taking on a neo-Calvinist expression; and with growing reflection of the thought of Karl Barth, there was witnessed, in fact, a reaction against subjectivist criteria and theology expressed in terms of "religious experience". We learn that there was little theological response to an edited selection of Frommel's writing published in 1956 under the title of "Pages Choisies" (Editions Labor et Fides: Genève.)

For Frommel, theology was the analysis and exposition of the nature and content of the Christian experience. It is, therefore, no abstract, detached metaphysical enterprise carried out in terms of norms and criteria extraneous to the basic datum of that experience. Its point d'appui could not be determined by the unaided exercise of man's intellectual faculty operating, as it were, autonomously; like-wise, the point de départ was the constitutive experience of the solicitation of the human will by the Divine under the mode of the obligation of the moral consciousness, and the free response of faith
and obedience in terms of which knowledge of God is given as He is revealed in the redemptive, regenerating activity of Jesus Christ.

As with other thinkers, Frommel's life and thought were inseparably linked, the latter being understood in terms of the former. As one writer expressed it, Frommel was an example of "a personal encounter in which the initiative was God's, and yet the individual played a decisive part. Had his personality been overruled, it would have been necessary to give an entirely different description of the experience." He believed that his theological method alone offered certainty and validity, and his distinctive approach was one which has not, perhaps, been so widely known nor explored as its penetrating and suggestive character would seem to warrant.

It was overtaken, in times politically and theologically tempestuous, by headier modes of thought, some of which, while seeking and claiming transcendence over intellectual rationalism and naturalism, may well, in their very anti-rationalist purpose, have fallen into a new rationalism. As Frommel transcended the naturalist-supernaturalist dualism in terms of the conception of the moral, redemptive supernatural operating upon the a-normative "natural", he avoided the rational-irrational opposition in terms of a norm of restored true humanity in which there is rebirth and the experience of the renewing of the mind.

It is a matter of regret that his premature death meant an unfinished work. Had he been given time, he would have developed, and in some points modified, the theological material to which he had devoted his high gifts of spiritual and intellectual power. While his thought-expression belonged, in its main lineaments, to his time, and although his influence is seen as having been principally exercised, in terms of personal devotion and quality of character, on the
minds and lives of those who knew him as teacher, pastor, counsellor and friend, one yet feels that he has something to say to every age, and indeed to our own, by way of recall to the fundamentals of Christian experience, the personal, experiential validation of the saving, renewing power and grace of God in Jesus Christ.

At a time of the "shaking of the foundations", here is an analysis of the nature of Christian faith, noble even in its incompleteness, yielding no greater finality than any other, but one seeking to base itself on a foundation which may not be moved, underpinned to the basic stratum of human truth. Perhaps, to use a metaphor more appropriate to Frommel's living, rather than architectural, thought, at a time when there have blown, since his day, winds of theological change – Protestant neo-orthodoxy, existentialist norms, demythologising of the Kerygma, the death of God and secularist controversies, the conception of religionless Christianity – Frommel's system stands like an oak (he himself employed, in one place, the metaphor of acorn and oak,) craggy, wounded by storms to the shedding of a twig here, a limb there, not having found nor claimed structural or formal perfection, but as one which sought to put down strong roots into the soil in which it grew, and from which it derived, under the benediction of the elements above, its true grandeur and life.

The theme of Frommel's writing, as also the pattern of his life, could be summed up, he told us, as "struggle, crisis, rest, witness", and this was the normative order imposed by Christian experience. More than one writer said of him that he was a "fighter", a "valiant-for-truth", and there was a saying of his, quoted, after his death, in the Journal de Genève: "Le propre de la vie n'est pas de s'établir mais de combattre." His very name, (derived from Fromm Held,) and the motto of his forebears – Gurte dein Schwert und trage dein Kreuz –
epitomised his approach, and summed up his earnestness of life.

His essential teaching may be expressed as follows: The Gospel addresses itself to the need of man who finds himself in a state of struggle and conflict with forces within and without. He endures the supreme paradox in the area of moral duty and of the constraint to obedience in freedom, in that he desires victory but is powerless to achieve it. Human truth is constituted in the experience of the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience. The yielding to Christ is the sole resolution of the struggle, the death of the self being involved, and, with the experience of salvation, at one time regenerative and revelatory, there is given renewal of the mind, faith including its own distinctive cognitive element.

Truth and crisis are given together. As Frommel put it, "man cannot extricate himself from a ditch by pulling his own hair", and so we recognise that the basic surd of human existence is man's moral incapacity. The object of faith, Jesus Christ, is presented to our consciousness as "the supreme miracle of a victorious member of our race"; the holiness which separates Him from us is what causes Him to draw us, in love, to, and with, Him to participation in His victory, faith annihilating the separation. Following the struggle and the crisis, the rest and peace; following that, the witness - to the indwelling Christ.

Called by one writer a "Protestant saint", Frommel wrote, at the age of 25, what served to express the intensity of earnestness and devotion with which he was to live his life: "The will of God becomes a long, solemn way of obedience; this royal road, on which we go singing, is, in reality, a narrow way along which one advances on one's knees, a "via dolorosa" where one carries one's Cross, where one leaves a path traced in tears and in blood...."
The necessary preliminary to a presentation of Apologetics is its constitution in terms of definition, use, history, principles and method. We first consider Frommel's treatment of these and, thereafter, move to a full account of his distinctive and central theme, the "obligation of conscience". This constituted the real substance of his Apologetics, in terms of which the subsequent Dogmatics was to be understood. The unity of his work lay in the coherence of his analysis of "La Vérité Humaine", an exposé of the essential nature of man and the data of religious and moral experience, such as to yield the basis and point of departure of a Christian Dogmatics - both Apologetics and Dogmatics being experimentally and dynamically verifiable in terms of human experience.

Definition

Frommel's own first definition of Apologetics was "the verification of Christian truth by the natural faculties of man". (1) He preferred this to the simpler definition of "the defence of Christian truth", since a defence can be led only before a tribunal, and the sole tribunal in this case can be human nature - or the natural faculties of man; thus verification, as a word, is to be preferred as being more exact. The word is, further, to be used as in Phil. 17 and 17 and 1 Pet. 315, i.e. an "apologia" or verification of the faith before the critical faculties of man.

Frommel regarded apologetics as more of an art than a science, in the sense that there is continual adaptation of the elements of the analysis of Christian truth to the appropriate goals pursued. He regarded it as mistaken, even in the hands of a Pascal or a Vinet, to propose apologetics as "a science of the human heart". The apologist is always obliged to speak in terms of the language and

and thought - forms of his time, and, therefore, while so doing, he must recognise the necessary elements of openness and freedom. The Christian has had to address himself to Judaism, to intellectualism, to Deism, to materialism, to legalism, to moralism. The modifications and changes in apologetic expression are to the central "apologia" for Christianity what tactics are in military science. Tactics are an art, the art of employing a science... We may therefore constitute apologetics as the art of employing theological science in the defence of Christianity, that is to say, the demonstration of the Christian faith before the natural human faculties.

The Use of Apologetics

Its use has been contested on four grounds and, in meeting such objections, we may feel that we sufficiently establish the utility and necessity of apologetics.

(a) In Frommel's view, it was the tendency of Schleiermacher and of Hegelianism to find, in the existence of things, their sufficient justification. A fact is legitimate because it is. To be is to have the right to be. Even Christianity demonstrates itself sufficiently by showing itself, and there is no cause for apologetic defence. The error in this attitude is in the wrong envisaging of religion, and of Christianity in particular, as a natural phenomenon, and of taking the determinism of the physical world into the world of morality, where the criteria of moral truth are alone applicable.

(b) The opposite objection took the form called by Frommel the ultra-spiritualist or transcendental, where, regarding Christianity as "a demonstration of spirit and power, it is maintained that all apologetic is invalid because of the discontinuity between natural and regenerate man. We cannot found a demonstration of Christian truth in the area of the consciousness of those to whom, by defini-
tion, it is inaccessible." Although Frommel, of all people, was aware of this discontinuity, he confessed an inability to see why an intelligent, reasoned apologetics should be regarded as any obstacle to spiritual power nor to its immediate, direct evidence to the heart. This brief dismissal of the objection may surprise us, but the reason is contained in the earlier definition of "apologetics" - the verification of Christian truth by the natural faculties of man. The application of this phrase is of crucial significance. If there is radical discontinuity between natural and Christian man, it would appear that it is futile to claim to prove or demonstrate the Christian faith by parading such absolute truth before the tribunal of human reason. Frommel may be said to have overcome this problem, which has led many to deny successful validity to his Apologetics, judged in terms of his own definition. What he may be deemed successfully to have done was to offer an analysis of man from the Christian point of view, but which, at the same time, could, in terms of his analysis, be regarded as verifiable by man's natural faculties. Verification of the truth about man (La Vérité Humaine) is not the same thing as verification of the datum of Christian experience - with the latter, we would, as indeed did Frommel, constitute its validity in terms of spiritual discernment and renewal of the mind.

According to G. Perlet, (1) "the principal task of Apologetics is to expose to the eyes of the unbeliever the motives for which one might decide to undergo (in the sense of "submit to") the experience." (c) A third objection in terms of the distinction between faith and science raised the question of the nature of religious knowledge. This issue is dealt with in the Chapter on the Epistemology of Religious Knowledge.

(1) Foi et Vie: 1913-14.
(d) The fourth objection, of the same basic nature as the third, was on the ground of the inevidence and inaccessibility, intellectually and "sensibly" speaking, of Christianity. Frommel agreed that it is sharp and fundamental and expressed itself in terms of the ambivalence, as evidential proof, if the physical and moral world; in terms of the ambiguity of miracle, the revelation and veiling of God in Christ, and such pronouncements of Jesus as that there are "those who see but do not perceive, who hear but do not understand."

If all things are equivocal, what validity or purpose can Apologetics have? Frommel would, however, have us follow the Pascalian judgment, that "there is enough illumination to enlighten the lost, enough obscurity to put them to shame; enough obscurity to make blind the reprobate, enough illumination to render them without excuse."(1)

Further, and less paradoxically, the inevidence of Christianity is not a totally uniform matter in its impact on mind and conscience. There are differences of heredity, environment, temperament; there are unconscious motivations and predispositions; there are lacunae of knowledge and experience, a disequilibrium of judgment and a paralysis of moral freedom. The function, therefore, of apologetics is to address itself to these varying conditions, compensating for lacunae, and restoring equilibrium in the area of true moral freedom.

The History of Apologetics

Frommel distinguished certain periods in the history of apologetic (a) the Apostolic, in which Christian apologetic was made in the process of evangelisation. In Frommel's view, the Johannine discourses have an apologetic character and purpose; and he makes the point that there was, in the first period, a field of apologetics with Judaism, viz. the Old Testament; and with Paganism,

(1) Pensées de Pascal: Astié. p. 577.
natural revelation. Paul, likewise, offered "apologies" in terms of the situations to which he addressed himself, these being conceived and presented in very personal terms.

(b) The Patristic, designated by Frommel the period "par excellence", in which the Christian defence was offered by both blood and word. There was confirmation of this view in the "Exposé de théologie systématique" by Grétillat, when he wrote: (1) "while an expiring paganism had come to a great tolerance of the religions of conquered peoples, whose cults Rome absorbed in the vast syncretism of its Pantheon, Christianity alone had the power to disturb this indifference and neutrality." Apologetics spoke of a faith implacable in its attitude to sin, trenchant in its dismissal of the folly of philosophy and human wisdom; a faith to be judged either as an abject superstition or as a manifestation of divine power.

(c) The Reformation, which, despite the controversy and the polemic, was not, in Frommel's submission, fecund in the field of apologetics. One name, however, stands out, of his own, and of all, time - that of Blaise Pascal. As against the sceptical dilettantism of a Montaigne, the scientific doubt of a Descartes, the dogmatic authoritarianism of a Roman hierarchy, Pascal sought to establish the concordance of Christianity with the real needs of human nature. Without neglecting external and historical factors, he founded his thought on the true state of man, in his grandeur and misery, from which to arrive at Jesus Christ. He offered an analysis of man in his greatness, his abasement, his complexity, his faculties of perception and reasoning, the capacities of his heart, to arrive at a demonstration of truth, consonant with human need and aspiration, which involves the enlightenment of the incredulous and the salvation of the sinner.

(1) pp. 16-17.
While Frommel approved the Pascalian method, which differed from that of the metaphysicians who seek for truth with the unaided reason, in that all the faculties of man are to be employed, and all disciplines of knowledge (whether anthropology, psychology, epistemology, etc.); he criticised the emphasis put by Pascal, as mathematician and Catholic, on the eudaemonistic and the intellectual, such that ultimate moral questions tend to be subordinated to these. This correction Frommel sought to offer in his own Apologetics, in terms of the analysis of the experience of the obligation of conscience; but, at the same time, he acknowledged the liberating effect of Pascal's thought, by which apologetic should henceforward be sited in the area of what Pascal called the "heart", which Frommel preferred to call the "consciousness" (i.e. "la conscience" with its two facultative connotations of the perceptive and the moral.) Frommel makes a brief and obviously critical reference to Leibnitz, the deterministic, optimistic premises of whose "Theodicy" could not but compromise at the same time the causes of religion and philosophy.

(d) Modern Period. The greatest modern apologist in the French language he unhesitatingly regarded as Alexandre Vinet, whose whole work was dominated and inspired by the desire to legitimise Christianity before human nature. Without actually formulating a system of apologetics, he exercised a profound influence on contemporary thought, recovering and re-expressing the great insights of Pascal on the competence of the heart, i.e. the will, inclined by grace and submitted to the conscience as the organ of religious knowledge. His task he conceived as that of placing the person of Jesus Christ in front of the consciousness of man, and that consciousness before the person of Jesus Christ, without veil or intermediary,
knowing that the contradictions of the Gospel - in the sense of intellectual problem and mystery - correspond to the contradictions of the human consciousness. There results therefore a perceived conformity of Christian redemption to the moral and religious needs of humanity, in which the drive towards intellectual comprehension is subordinated to contemplation and moral obedience; in which debate and proof yield to self-authenticating truth. It was Vinet who broke the prestige of the supernaturalist apologetics of ancient times, and inaugurated a moral, or inner, apologetic. Unfortunately, in the hands of some of his disciples, his expression of Christian truth was developed along rather humanistic lines. (1)

One more figure was particularly singled out by Frommel - Chas. Secrétan. Inspired by the same method as Vinet, but transporting it into a truly philosophical field, all his work had the character of Christian Apologetics; he defended Christianity against speculative pantheism and experimental positivism, and was noted for his carrying of this defence into the area of social questions. (2)

**Principles, Method and Plan of Apologetics**

Possible methods which have been proposed are four in number -

(a) **The Authoritative.** This consists of imposing the object of the Christian faith - Christian truth - on the strength of reasons exterior to the subject itself. The authority has been diversely identified as that of certain people, traditions, books, institutions, general consensus, and so on. Typical examples are those of Papal or Scriptural infallibility. Anti-authority is a pedagogical error and a psychological illusion, but dependence upon authority to establish Christian truth fails to recognise that such authority is itself derivative. Authority per se is not a suffi-

(1) See Frommel's studies: "Pascal et Vinet" and "Vinet Théologien" in "Etudes Littéraires et Morales".

(2) See articles on Secrétan in the "Etudes litt. et morales", p. 282-311.
cient methodological principle for the following reasons:-

It is one remove from the real subject, and is, as pointed out, derivative. As an expression of Protestant theological method, apologetics could not be derived from what is, after all, a religious method, Protestantism itself. If apologetic is regarded as the verification of Christian truth before the natural faculties, the authoritarian method actually suppresses this verification in its substitution of a non-verifiable principle. Further, Christian truth and experience are in evident to the senses and to the reason, and do not validate themselves to these faculties, not being submitted to analysis in terms of sense-data nor from the principles of metaphysics in which there is latent a priorism. Establishment of truth on authoritarian grounds does not respect this inevidence, but assumes an artificial link between the object of Christian faith and such things as are available to sense and reason, e.g. the Church, the Bible.

Again, the authoritarian principle and method cannot, in fact, yield the constraint hoped and claimed for it, because the claim to authority must itself be always under question on the ground of the validity of that claim. The method has never corresponded to the real requirements of the human mind and heart, and has, in effect, suppressed or by-passed them, being insufficient and inappropriate for the weight it is required to carry.

(b) The Rational. At first thought, the employment of the reason would appear to offer advantage over the previous method. Is it not, after all, a matter of intellectual appreciation and conviction, where true apologetics would yield the object of the Christian faith such as to be verifiable before the bar of reason, before, that is, the natural human faculties? Surely the deployment of intellectual
argument can be the bridge over which incredulity and scepticism may pass to commitment and certainty. The method, however, in Frommel's view, was to be rejected, for the following reasons - there is serious confusion of religion and philosophy, and religious criteria are not to be confused with those of metaphysics, which have this ineluctable 'a priori' basis, irrelevant in the area of religious experience. Such a quality imposes on philosophy an implicit or explicit determinism which denies, directly or by inference, the necessary quality of freedom and self-determination of a faith constituted and verified in terms of such a quality. Religion is not a philosophy, the Christian religion, qua religion, being even less so than any other, and the reason is not the faculty to which Christian truth proposes itself. Religious truth is a truth of correspondence, not of the intelligence with the idea, but of the human will with the Divine Will. It is not to the reason but to the moral consciousness in the first instance that Christian truth addresses itself, and, therefore, it is in this area that methodological validity must be established. It cannot be in terms of a relationship between subject and object cast in the form of dialectical or syllogistic demonstration, forcing a conclusion by dint of logical argument and deduction, while leaving no room for what is known in immediate, intuitive apperception under the conditions of free choice, travail and decision.

In addition, no serious account is taken of the opposition, nor of its nature, which man can and does make to Christian truth. Taking no account of the volitional element, an apologetics proposing itself to the reason is vitiated by its ignoring of the non-metaphysical quality of life and the fact of freedom in human existence. Where rational and volitional elements are omitted or
ignored, apologetics become sterile and non-dynamic. In sum, the inexpungeable element in Christian truth of scandal and foolishness is softened or eliminated, and, with this, the basic redemptive character of Christianity is omitted, denied or made irrelevant. The history of apologetics according to Frommel, is the testimony to the failure and inadequacy of reason as the faculty within which alone to site its methodological principle.

Frommel's strictures on reason generated opposition, and a bitterly critical article appeared in "La Libre Pensée" (Lausanne), on 13 June 1908.(1) This attacked Frommel for his attitude to the Reason. It was headed by a quotation from Frommel - "intellectualism makes more victims among the elite of our generation than alcohol in the mass of the people." The substance of the article was as follows: Frommel's is a vulgar and unjust cry of alarm when he writes, for example, that "instead of obeying the voice of conscience, of this categorical imperative, the intellectual wishes to understand, to discuss, to analyse. Instead of simply doing his duty, he wishes to demonstrate its reality by dialectic, by the functioning of reason, claiming to prove the goodness, the justice, even the existence of God."

Apparently, continued "Phosphile", man is to accomplish his duty by unreasoned obedience. By faith, he becomes as a little child, replying to the voice of doubt: I cannot prove my conviction, but I believe just the same! Anathema, apparently, are the philosophers and thinkers who employed more logic and less feeling, and encouraged men to pass from times of hate and witchcraft and appeals to the grosser instincts. Anathema, apparently, are even such names as Huss, Luther and Zwingli, and Reformers who, by dialectic and reasoning, fired the spirit of revolt towards more honest and

(1) "La Foi Contre la raison" over the pseudonym 'Phosphile'.

intellectual worship...

If Frommel sees the source of the Christian life in the moral consciousness, talking of moral certainty acquired by Christian experience, then knowledge of God and the Christian life can be only for a few chosen, and we are being offered the Calvinist dogma of predestination all over again. Conscience is not a moral organ of divine implantation – it is of physiological and hereditary constitution, and can be altered, lost, corrected, strengthened, by itself and by rational instruction. There is an abyss of manifestation as between the cannibal and the Samaritan, but the substratum is the same. The moral consciousness must not be set in opposition to the reason, of which it is a perfectible complement...

Against such attacks, however, Frommel's thesis remained proof, and to the objection to the rational method in apologetic he adds that of the historical.

(c) The Historical. This, at least, has a real advantage over the first two apologetic methods in that Christianity is undeniably woven in an intimate way into the texture of human history. This fact would, therefore, to a certain extent, legitimise a form of historical apologetic. The form of such an undertaking would be the founding in certainty of facts of evangelical history, the constituent historical data of the Christian narrative, without which there is clear risk of evaporation, or re-expression in terms alien to its nature. It is not a metaphysic nor a religious interpretation of reality.

All too often, the historical method has, almost inevitably, fallen into circularity of argument and non sequitur, where the historicity of Biblican "facts" have been employed to confirm the miraculous (or supernatural) element in the Christian faith, or the
miraculous (or supernatural) nature of the Christian faith to attest the historical. Further, its inescapable weakness lies — as did the authoritative method — in being distinct from the object to which it claims to bear witness, or of which it claims to demonstrate proof, and such discontinuity is fatal. Historical fact, no matter the degree of attestation and certainty, cannot, per se, offer a defence or apology for what is not, in its constitutive essence, historical, but is in the nature of dynamic, living experience.

Historical certainty cannot, in addition, be absolute, and must, therefore, remain a secondary witness to truth; history qualifies, but cannot constitute, Christian truth, such truth, as experientially validated, not being identifiable with, nor of determinist necessity being derived from, history regarded as the chronicle of events or record of beliefs, doctrines, etc. Frommel thought it significant that apologetics resting on historical considerations had tended to flourish, only to expose its weaknesses, at a time when the growth of historical criticism was rendering such dependence the more dangerous in the field of exegesis and textual analysis.

To sum up, therefore; while history may manifest Christianity as a historical phenomenon, it is powerless to constitute its truth, since it reveals these effects only which are capable of self-exteriorisation. The risk in some Protestant attitudes to sacred documents and dogma has been confusedly to identify the object of religious knowledge and experience with such self-exteriorisations; and the opposite error has, as above, been noted, of neglecting, or denying the importance of, the distinctive historical nature of Christianity, leading to its treatment as if it were a non-historical religion, existing in some pure and abstract form, mystically detached from the historical realities of its manifestation.
(d) The Psychological and the Moral. This is the method approved by Frommel as alone meeting the requirements of a true Christian Apologetic. Avoiding the pitfalls of exteriorisation, we place the question of validity in the inner citadel of man's constitutive nature. We seek to establish a relationship in terms of moral psychology between man as given by nature and Christian truth as it is given by the Gospel. This relationship is moral inasmuch as it is appreciated by judgments of value or quality, psychological insofar as such judgments are relative to states of consciousness. We are concerned with a verification of Christian truth, founded, on the one part, on the moral and religious needs of the natural human consciousness, and, on the other, on the response to these needs yielded to that consciousness by Christian truth. Truth is not defined in terms of a theoretical relation of the intelligence to the idea but of a practical relation of the will to its law.

This method proposes itself to us, negatively, because there is none other valid nor sufficient, but, positively, because it alone is adequate and appropriate to the subject matter. The relation of method to object is as direct and immediate as possible, since Christian apologetics legitimately moves between the two terms - Christian truth and man. Man, faced with this truth which proposes itself to him, must decide and choose. It is clear that this decision is not made in the area of sense-experience and intellect, nor in terms of exteriorised criteria, such as authority or history, but in the field of the psychological and the moral, viz. the moral consciousness. In Frommel's submission, a Christian apologetics conceived in this way must be the apologetics of the future, since, other disciplines, e.g. scientific psychology, epistemology, are clearly moving on lines comparable to that of an apologetics legi-
timising itself in psychologico-moral terms.

The Basis of Apologetics: the doctrine of man

We now give a brief account of Frommel's anthropology. Under the title of "La Vérité Humaine", he offered a descriptive, expository analysis of the essential constitution of human nature. It is not necessary, we feel, to give it 'in extenso' as much of the material can be found elsewhere, but we note the comprehensiveness of Frommel's treatment and formulation, which leads to the theme of central importance in his work - the derivations from, and the implications of, his conclusion that human truth is constituted in the dictum: "Je dois, donc je suis." He proceeds by way of examining what have been offered as primordial principles and criteria on which to rest the definitive anthropological analysis. These are:-

(1) Sensationism (Je sens, donc je suis.)
(2) Intellectualism (Je pense, donc je suis.)
(3) Volitionism (Je veux, donc je suis.)
(4) Moralism (Je dois, donc je suis.)(1)*

(1) Sensationism: Hume took to its limit the theory of "sensational" knowledge ("sensationist knowledge"). "Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu." Ideas are the copies of impressions, i.e. there must be correspondence, thus metaphysics is excluded, and 'causality' is not a necessary concept in itself. There is no 'a priori' link of causality between things having spatial or temporal contiguity; the external senses prove no such intrinsic link. The conception of power, energy or force is not furnished as such by sense perception. The causal link is not of an internal origin either, nor an innate idea; it comes from custom or habitude, and is contingent and arbitrary. The results are three-fold - (a) Anthropological: the unity of consciousness of

the essential "I" disappears in illusion; there is no identity or necessary succession, i.e. continuity of perception, only a succession of perception. (b) Philosophical: there is complete Pyrrhonism, i.e. total, radical scepticism. (c) Moral: words like innocence, guilt, and so on, are dissolved.

There is also a psycho-physiological sensationism, in which the physiological organism provides the fundamental unity of the conscious self; its relation to Humian scepticism is one of direct continuity but antithesis. The psychic life develops; it makes itself and has a history; here we have a biogenetic psychology, trying to establish a 'morphology' of the Spirit, connected with biological evolution. There is not a memory, but memories, not a will, but volitions, not a personality, but personal states of consciousness. This arrives back at much the same point as Hume, but claims to find in the physical unity of the individual the raison d'être of an identity not existing in the spirit. An unavowed materialism is hidden in this phenomenalist anthropology. The basis of the physiological domain is movement, while that of the psychic is feeling (sensation), and, according to Tyndall and others, the abyss between them is intellectually unbridgeable. Take the example of the feeling of heat; it comes from many sources – sun, fire, candle, etc. If the idea corresponded to the feeling only as a kind of image, how many would I have? But the idea of 'heat' is an abstracted characteristic or concept. As Prommel puts it, 'you can't warm yourself with the idea of heat!'

Sensationism and Self-consciousness. There is a difference between being conscious of being conscious of something and simply being conscious of something. But, in Hume's view, I can never catch myself perceiving something, I can only observe the perception.
What of the 'I'? The sensationists are really, while using the word, denying its existence.

All conscious operations of thought equally attest a spiritual factor; no explanation hitherto has dealt with how the brain analyses and synthesises its perceptions and memories. Ph. Bridel asserted: (1) "il réclame pour l'auteur un principe distinct, un tiers facteur - l'esprit." Reflective consciousness is not explained by sensationism, and we note a final logical criticism of Hume - what was the cause of his assertion that there is no necessary causality? According to him it is but custom, habit, contiguity, etc., and so, as an assertion, it must have had a cause after all!

(2) Intellectualism - (I think, therefore I am.) In this view, thought is the distinctive element in man. The classic statement is that of Descartes; Cogito, ergo sum. Is thought, then, thought thinking itself? Is man simply 'thinking substance'? Hume finishes in scepticism; Descartes begins with doubt. But Cartesian doubt is doubt for the sake of knowledge; the older formula was "Credo ut intelligam", the Cartesian "dubito ut intelligam..." The paradox lies in this that the same thought can also express the idea of a being which transcends my death; thus the idea of God is indispensable, and there is re-appearance of the Anselmic argument; indeed, without the thought of the existence of God, I would be trapped in solipsism, having no knowledge of the non-self.

The criticism of intellectualism is four-fold - (a) the arbitrariness of the axiom - 'I doubt, therefore I think'. Thought expressing doubt, is doubt; and no account is taken of the element of volition in doubt. (b) The arbitrariness of the axiom - 'I think, therefore I am'. It is not self-evident as a proposition, but assumed as if given 'a priori'; a man's doubt, in fact, is not

(1) Revue Chretienne: 1886.
so radical as he claims. An a priori conception of idea as being is at the foot of all intellectualism and idealism. (c) It is exclusive of true freedom – everything must cohere logically together, mathematically, as it were. Dialectic, the unique method of intellectualism, is exclusive of personal conscience. The only certainty I can have of thought is that I can think it; but if the 'I' is illusory, so also is 'thought'. We should rather say: "I am – therefore I think..." (d) Divine perfection, if established by an intellectualist argument is not a moral, but an ontological perfection; we must not pass from one term to the other so carelessly. Pure dialectical thought is incompetent in the sphere of morals; neither existence (ontic reality) nor value can be dealt with by pure intellectualism. (We may also observe the classic criticism of the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments for the existence of God...) For example, there is a powerlessness of teleological proof in pure intellectualism – man may certainly be the goal of the universe, but this could not be established by rational demonstration alone; neither materialism nor idealism could lead to that conclusion. Quantity and complexity could be seen, but not value, and this is involved in teleology. Dialectic qua dialectic cannot 'appreciate'; teleology must borrow 'value' from another discipline.

(3) Volitionism – (I will, therefore I am). Pure intelligence is a self-contradictory idea – it is, rather, an activity. Is it an activity of self-perception? This would fall into nihilism. To know one's self, one must be. The act which necessarily precedes knowledge and which makes the object of pure intelligence is therefore the act of 'being', the affirmation of one's self, i.e. the will. Can we, then, enclose sensationism and intellectualism in
volitionism, and say: 'I will, therefore I am'? There seem persuasive arguments for it:— Cartesian doubt is not 'necessary'; it is willed. There is manifest intervention of the will in cosmological proof. The will is involved in teleological ideas, where there is a question of value. There can be no sense of 'ought' without freedom, i.e. the exercise of the will, and, indeed, obligation and freedom imply 'will'. Secrétan was important for his emphasis on the will in his philosophical structure, but Schopenhauer, according to Frommel, treated the will as a kind of cosmic substance, unconscious and impersonal, a phenomenalist dynamic "fraternising with pantheistic materialism".

The will is difficult to deal with philosophically, not being found in a pure, undifferentiated state, its two main properties being existence and freedom. The will is an immediate datum ("given"), and a psychology of 'will' is a psychology of 'effort', the point of application of the effort not being exterior to the organism, and the effort being, not on an inert mass, but on a living body; the will is involved in all abnegation, sacrifice, death to one's self — not so much acting on "the body" as on "the life of the body".

But volitionism cannot pronounce on the metaphysical question of the origin of the will — is it, for example, the transformation of unconscious spontaneity to conscious will? It is experimentally insoluble. Or is it that will is born when spontaneous movement of the organism is reproduced intentionally by the subject? This blurs the distinction between intuitional and conscious acts; we say that a child grows up when true volition replaces spontaneous instinctive reaction and action. Volitionism says that conscious personality is born with, from and by the will. As put by Maine De Biran: "du moment où la volonté est causée par elle-même, et relativement à
l'effet qu'elle produit librement, le moi personnel est né." Thus identity is claimed between the will and the consciousness, which latter is not, however, an inert 'given'. Why is there a variation in "strength of wills"? Is not a measure of the moral consciousness of individuals in fact a measure of their strength of will (or, simply, of their will)? For example, there is a suspension of volitional effort in drunkenness, sleep, hypnosis, etc. Volitionism says that thought comes to light as a function of the will. But it is not its antecedent; indeed, thought and will appear simultaneously in "intention", i.e. the autonomous self-determination in view of a goal. Another expression is that intelligence is the reflective 'mode' of the will; but this involves loss of freedom "to think what we wish to think". The origin of thought is in the will; the exercise of thought finds itself, as it should, under the control of the will. I think because I wish to think, and I think what I wish to think. - This would appear to deal with the myth of the absolute autonomy of thought as such. One must consider the place of the will in perception and choice. Perception contains something of the will, being constituted by a "sensation" to which I have given attention (i.e. a personal activity). The influence of the will is in the area of the choice and formation of ideas, upon the act and content of reflection, and upon judgment. Without voluntary attention, no methodical thought is possible; without the will to learn and think, there can be no progress in the clear functioning of thought. Frommel said: "The will alone is susceptible of education". Perception, classification, reflection and judgment are four indispensable operations of thought - all as they are made by the will. In judging among propositions, ideas, philosophies, the will has a decisive role in 'creating truth' - thus the diversity of
scientific, philosophical and theological conceptions; if it were a case of pure sense-experience, pure intelligence, and so on, there should surely be homogeneity. The question is then raised of the 'sovereignty' of the will; it does not have unlimited sovereignty - it is least in sense-experience, and most in the realm of concepts and ideas. It is still not 'exclusive', as is claimed in extreme volitionism.

The 'Freedom' of the Will

Freedom is a primary datum of the consciousness, something given in immediacy. Necessity, or passivity, is the privation of freedom; it is a negative idea, implying the positive one of freedom. If a person denies his freedom, he denies his existence; in denying, he has an idea of what he is denying - that is, he is not passive, and is acknowledging freedom. Although we are passive in many ways, there is an inextinguishable activity; freedom, activity and will are all involved in personal existence.

One attack on freedom has been from the side of intellectualism - yet even scientific determinism does not touch primary evidence and experience, and arguments for unfreedom are derived and secondary. Another point of view is that freedom is but an 'idea', a derived, and possibly illusory, conclusion. This argument, however, bears on 'formal' freedom of choice, not on 'real' freedom, i.e. of action. The conception of 'idée-force' is necessarily realised in the power of action, and is directed to the question of power, rather than the idea of freedom, (i.e. of action). This is not to deny the significance of the power of ideas to move people and influence history.

Another objection to the conception of freedom is the existence of motive. But there cannot be a 'freedom of indifference', al-
though some have thought it possible in terms of equibalance of motives, it being unstable, with conscious and unconscious factors at work.

Volitionism says that, before there are motives for action, there exists the power to act - the "idée-motif" or the "sentiment-motif" determining my action. However, the will is still anterior in its power to create reasons and to engender habits and tendencies of thought. Indeed, in conserving freedom, it seems to take little account of the reality of determinism; to escape it, the will must know an absolutely primary motive which will determine, without constraining it - a motive of obligation. Thus, according to Frommel, volitionist theory excludes the one basic, primordial "datum" (given in the context of freedom) of "le devoir", the sense of obligation, wherein we constitute the will "en fonction du devoir".

In terms of freedom, the material and shape of man's belief are furnished under the operation of the will. "Sincerity becomes obedience and belief faith, because to both is given that which guarantees objective value - obligation itself."

(4) Moralism - ("Je dois, donc je suis"). Frommel analysed, and rejected, all expressions of contingent morality - the sensationist hedonism of Epicureanism, the Hobbesian tyranny, Benthamite utilitarianism, the associationism of J.S. Mill, the egoistic-altruism of Comte and Littre, the biological criteria of Darwinism, the mechanistic transformism of Herbert Spencer. While there are certain principles of interest and utility in moral and religious activities, such contingency in morality is not to be regarded as normative or constitutive.

Contingent morality does not, in fact, treat moral criteria seriously, and offers an insufficient analysis of the term 'morality',
which requires to be constituted in sufficient terms, and not simply derived. Contingency cannot explain the great individual figures of history, but could only describe them as monomaniacs. Further, the variations of progress of collective morality are inexplicable in terms of contingent ethics. In making moral judgments on human activity, we are unconsciously paying tribute to some standard regarded as objective - the same applying to approval and admiration. Self-sacrifice is the final absurdity of a purely contingent morality.

Passing to the matter of religious obligation, Frommel again acknowledged the presence of an element of utility - and, indeed, a certain 'prudential' emphasis in some forms of evangelism - but stressed the existence of elements refractory to all eudaemonism. There is a primordial, unconditional obligation present in religious consciousness as such, despite the existence of "moral atheists", evidenced supremely in mystical rapport in which undifferentiated love constitutes the disinterested element, remote from any Comtian contingent balance of egoism and altruism.

Temptation to religious doubt manifests the power of a subjective element, oscillation of faith and loss of certainty being the preface to radical doubt, brought on by failure to respond in obedience to the solicitation of the will by an unconditioned, non-contingent, divine will. "If you do the will, you will know the doctrine..." A religion of prudence and egoism is one of contingency and idolatry. Supremely normative for the Christian is the person of Jesus Christ. His conception of obligation was absolute, and when the individual, as above, is set face to face with Him, he comes to perceive that obligation is the sole form of the absolute which is accessible to the will, i.e. the sole form of the absolute
accessible to man himself. In non-contingent religious morality we constitute, as belonging to "La Vérité Humaine", the ground of the experience of the obligation of the moral consciousness. Here-in lies the validating principle, the accord of the self with the self.

The Phenomen of "L'Obligation de Conscience"

Here we come to the heart of Frommel's analysis of the nature of man and his constitution of "human truth". The principle sources for an outline of his distinctive analysis are the relevant chapters of his Apologetic work "La Vérité Humaine"; his thesis presented in 1888 - "Etude sur la conscience morale et religieuse"; "Des conditions de la foi"; "Confiance Humaine". (1) (2)

Only one work given over to an analytical study of Frommel's central and distinctive psychological and theological viewpoint has ever appeared, and this was "L'obligation de conscience chez Gaston Frommel" by Philippe Daulte. (3) One is indebted to this writer, not alone for the substance of the critical study, but also for the acknowledgment of the importance of this particular approach, not widely studied nor considered since then.

On the textual side Daulte drew to the reader's notice the considerable editorial task involved in the publication of Frommel's manuscripts by way of syntactical and linguistic revision, the verifying of references and quotations with a view to their proper delineation and identification as such. Nevertheless, the material was to hand, not in summary note fashion, but as a complete text. The essential shaping and balancing of the material had already been done by Frommel himself in both the Apologetics and the Dogmatics.

Frommel made his "point de départ" the conclusion of his analysis of the nature of man, viz. Je suis homme parce que je dois, and

(1) Chrétien Evangélique, 1892.
(2) Revue Chrétienne, 1896.
(3) Thesis: 1917.
initiated an account of the constitutive nature of psychological consciousness. To explicate the basic constitution of man as a being aware of 'le devoir-être' it is necessary to analyse what is implied by psychological consciousness. This, with Frommel, is a distinctive human faculty, along with man's undeniable intelligence, reasoning and memory, and consciousness of things, which are qualities shared, we believe, with superior animals - the distinctive constitutive quality, however, of human consciousness being his consciousness of himself, his 'self-consciousness', his consciousness of consciousness. He is not simply conscious of things, but is conscious of himself as conscious of them. He is not 'determined' in his responsive activity, but is freely determined in that he is conscious of himself making a conscious judgment, rather than being determined by a 'necessary' response-activity.

Thus, if there is a Human Truth it must be a truth of consciousness, regarded as a "phénomène fixe", although the content varies with culture, traditions, impressions, external stimuli, and so on...

If there is a 'human truth', consciousness is thus patient of definition in terms of form, rather than of content. If we are to constitute a 'human truth', we must do so as a truth of consciousness, not as one which would be "true" independent of its realisation the form and content of consciousness.

If there is a 'Universal Human Truth', it must likewise be a truth of consciousness. The nature of such truth is such that it is validated in immediacy, knowledge of 'things' being derived, fortuitous and contingent, being mediated by sense and forming the subject of discursive reason and metaphysical analysis. Knowledge of 'things' has thus an 'accidental' quality. But consciousness is "un monde fermé", the world of representations and emotions, and, in
this immediacy of experience, universal truth, as universal human truth, requires to be experientially validated in the inner citadel of consciousness.

If there is to an 'Immediate (un-mediated) Human Truth', it must also be a truth of consciousness. To claim to arrive at truth independent of consciousness would be, in Frommel's analogy, like claiming to do photography without any photographic apparatus. Thus, according to Frommel, "scientific" truth, as such, is excluded from the role of human consciousness, for, in terms of the 'scientific method' which involves a preponderance of deduction and the exercise of the discursive reason, psychological consciousness plays no determinative role in the subject-object relationship which is of the constitutive nature of scientific enquiry. The non-immediate (mediate) truths of science, as theoretical knowledge, are established in terms of a priori, metaphysical necessity. The word 'theory' comes from the Greek "theorein", meaning "to behold", to "spectate". Thus, by its etymological character, "theoretical" reasoning is reasoning which depends on detachment and separation as between subject and object. By contrast, immediate Human Truth, if there is such, must be a truth validated in human experience, validated, that is, not "accidentally" but immediately.

It is clear that Frommel, without making reference to any possible "existentialist" antecedents, nor to "existentialism" as a philosophical mode, expressed the deepest insight of that mode of thought. By this observation we identify one of the persistent vitiating elements in traditional Christian theology - its uncritical use of rationalistic and metaphysical criteria. Questions of the existence and nature of God, the validity and data of religious experience, soteriological, moral and dogmatic methods and norms,
have been distorted through expression in 'theoretical' form. Totally unsuitable categories of thought and expression have been employed, resulting in refraction and an incomplete avowal, or bringing to consciousness, of the experimental character of Reformed thinking, yielding, indeed, only a new scholasticism.

Frommel considered the relation between the moral and psychological consciousness. As well as consciousness in the general psychological sense, there is consciousness of "le Devoir". That there is a universality of moral consciousness is a matter of historical, social and linguistic testimony. Psychological consciousness does not determine moral consciousness; it is rather that the latter determines the former. Despite other things which absorb the psychological consciousness, such as joy and sadness - strongly possessive emotional states - the moral consciousness achieves hegemony. The psychological consciousness reveals a state of being, while the moral consciousness reveals a state of duty, a sense of the "ought", a sense, that is, of "devoir" which is resolved into a "devoir être". The tension between the two revelatory modes constitutes the nature of human consciousness as such.

One must not confuse the content of the moral consciousness with its mode; the content is variable - the mode is not. Whence, in fact, come "les devoirs" save but from "le devoir"?

Charles Secretan, in "Principe de la morale" (1883), used the word "solidaire", a word which figured largely in Frommel's anthropology and Christology, to assert that a major element in human solidarity is that of the phenomenon of obligation. It is specifically human, it is universal; it is an immediate, preponderant, normative phenomenon. "Les devoirs" are the derivative from that which is constituted as the basic mode of human consciousness, namely, the
sense of "le devoir", the central phenomenon of the obligation of conscience.

The antecedents of Frommel's thought were outlined and constituted by Philippe Daulbe, and it is necessary to note them briefly here. They were Kantian a priorism, English empiricism and the religious morality of such writers as Pascal, Vinet and Secretan. With Kant, there was the establishment of morality in the good will: the "imperative" is not the voice of God, nor a kind of feeling or moral sense - it is the command of the reason. The moral law is an a priori, a universal, necessary and valid for all rational beings, it is constitutive of human nature, not susceptible of deduction from an anterior principle nor of analysis. It is the "categorical imperative". By the principle of the autonomy of the will, man escapes from the determinism of the phenomenal world. The moral law produces a feeling of respect; how a pure idea can do this is a mystery, but it is so. In the Kantian tradition, though his thought is strangely antipodean, Renouvier, a founder of the neo-critical school, denied the duality of the noumenal and the phenomenal, identifying the moral law with a category of the understanding. He insisted on the sovereignty of the moral order, and the rational, a priori, absolute character of duty. In their latter period, Renouvier and his collaborator F. Pillon, broke through the limitations of an independent morality in the direction of an idealist theism. Reason is a manifestation of the Divine mind, by which laws and understanding are projected into our minds, making possible a religious interpretation of the moral law.

By nature, Frommel was favourably disposed to Kant, with his austerity and moral vigour, his advocacy of the primacy of the practical reason, but he could not allow the claim to found morality on
an autonomous base, independent of religion.

The Psychological Nature of the Phenomenon of the Obligation of Con-
sience:

Like all fundamental categories, the idea of "devoir" does not explain itself, because it is not derived from something outside or beyond itself; it is 'given' and irreducible. To attempt to explain it would be to re-define it, or to change its essential, definitive nature. To explain is to condition, to constitute by reference to something extraneous and primary, thus reducing what is 'explained' to the secondary. One cannot, without contradiction, explain the unconditional; it must be acknowledged as a fundamental category or mode of human experience. To 'explain' obligation would be to destroy it: it is not an 'idea', nor a category nor a law - it is a feeling. It may yield an idea or a law, but is not constituted as such; above all it is of 'a priori' origin, an experience of the will. It is an immediate impression of duty (an echo, here, of "l'expérience imposée" of César Malan) anterior to the intellectual formulation of the concrete action or the interior attitude corresponding to it. Kant identified this feeling as 'respect', but such is a synthesis of two other feelings, fear and love. The feeling of obligation is not simply a feeling like others - it is sui generis: it is the specific experience which the moral subject has of a specific object. In the words of Edmond de Pressense(1) - "When we say feeling, moral sense, we do not mean to reduce obligation to a manifestation of sense... It proceeds from reason itself, being its application to the will... It does not exist in the realm of the idea, it takes life in feeling..."

Frommel quoted Henri Bois with approval,(2) "Like all fundamental categories, the idea of duty does not explain itself, because it

(1) "Les origines", 1882, p. 385.
(2) Revue de Théologie et des questions religieuses; Montauban: Dec. 1895, p. 543.
does not derive from elsewhere, because it is an a priori idea, simple, primary, irreducible. Obligation must not be explained...
One would not explain obligation without destroying it...

'Le devoir' is not proved, it is approved. The 'ought' puts me under an obligation because it brings to birth in me a feeling of respect, analysable into love and fear. The most obvious manifestations of obligation are those of repentance, bad conscience, remorse - all feelings, themselves not further explicable in the sense of being conditionally derived.

The question is - if obligation is a feeling, of what is it a feeling? Feeling implies relationship, there being none known which do not correspond to anything. The word 'feeling' suggests, etymologically, the "impression" of an object on me. If obligation is an experience, of what, or of whom, is it so? The distinction must be maintained between psychological consciousness as spontaneous and as identical with the self which it expresses, and the consciousness of "le devoir" which is "imposed" on me. It is imposed, as Frommel said, 'nolens volens', and is a synthesis of the feelings of constraint and freedom - constraint; we are not free not to be obligated: and freedom; we are not constrained to act as obligated.

We have said that obligation is a phenomenon of consciousness, and that it is this constituted in contrast with the phenomena of science. By this we mean that the phenomenological analysis of the sense of obligation, while requiring, and being patient of, methodological correctness, does not confuse its criteria with those of an a priori, metaphysical deduction from sensible reality, i.e. reality regarded as either ideational or factual.

We require to constitute the objective and subjective factors in the experience of obligation. Frommel asks whether the objec-
tive factor be a Fact, a Being, or an Activity. To the proposal to identify the object of the feeling of obligation with a fact, one must assert its invalidity on the following grounds - a fact is something which constrains and requires acceptance. A value-judgment is not present in the response, and there is no freedom, but only a "constraining" fact. Etymologically, the word "fact" reveals a past participial form, suggesting a past action or the result of it. A fact cannot be "absolute" - neither can an action or its result. Even if one could conceive of an absolute being, one could not conceive of an absolute fact.

What, then, of an 'absolute being' as the objective factor in the experience of obligation? As first hearing, it is a plausible hypothesis. Is not 'conscience' popularly called the 'Divine Voice'? There might not seem any "a priori" objection to such an identification - and Frommel had himself so defined it in his thesis. In that work in 1888, before his thought came under the influence of César Malan fils, he had expressed himself in the following terms - all that etymology can afford is that consciousness has always been considered immediate perception from which results a knowledge obtained by the return of the subject to something intimate within me. Like the eye, the consciousness is an organ of apperception; but it is not essentially a part or member of the whole. It is a function of the self in its relation to the non-self, a new mode of perception, but not the same thing as sense-intuition. Consciousness puts us in a relation with a 'devoir-être' which lays hold on the will. The perception of consciousness is not that of exterior phenomena, nor even that of the internal activity of the self, but that of a fact realised within the self before the appearance of any activity at all, since this fact is perceived as soliciting the decision.
which initiates such activity. The perception by the consciousness is obligatory, imposed directly on the will, which undergoes it, and does not create it. The specific character of man is to feel himself placed in face of the absolute; the essence of psychological consciousness is the feeling of the unity of the self, the perception of its different activities from the point of view of a unique centre. "There is no consciousness of self without freedom, and freedom could only be founded on obligation." The fact of obligation is the result of the affecting of the will by the absolute: in itself, obligation is empty and purely formal, being neither law, idea nor knowledge - it is a fact of spiritual perception.

Frommel agreed with Vinet: (1) "Right and duty are the point where man finishes, where God begins; in them we catch sight of that goal which lies beyond ourselves. We are beyond the bounds of the universe and of contingency. We have found the human essence. Man is agent of right and of duty."

We come now to the assertion referred to in the matter of the objective factor in the phenomenon of obligation: obligation places a reality before me, a being who precedes my will, on whom I am dependent, and in whom I must believe, under pain of denying myself in my deepest being. This being must be personal. He is not the God of deism, remote and inaccessible; He constrains me, but not by impersonal necessary. "He does not obligate us to anything which we have not priorly accepted." This absolute being is not a derived being, with some extraneous cause of existence... The absolute is divine, it is divine personality; the absolute is the personal God. There is not involved a claim to furnish proof of the existence of God, but an unfolding and explication of what is intuitively contained in the religious consciousness, In the words of Helmholtz, (2)

(2) 'Die Tatsachen in der Wahrennehmung'.
"to demand a representation which would invariably produce the intrinsic nature of the object would be to seek an effect independent of its cause; our intuitions are necessarily conditioned by the nature of both the object and subject. Our human representations are the images of which the mode essentially depends on the momentary consciousness of being." Frommel categorically departed from the thesis that the object given in the experience of moral obligation is God Himself. It is not an experience of God as an absolute being given as He is in Himself ("en soi"). He constitutes it, but the objective factor is not a metaphysical "en soi"; indeed, if such it were, atheism would be logically, as semantically, impossible.

The objective factor is the experience of an action. Action and will imply one another, and we may constitute the obligation of conscience as expressing in me the experience by my will of the action exercised upon it by a will. It is characterised in its immediacy, being anterior to consciousness and independent of initiative, appearing both normal and peremptory. It does not arise in temporality or contingency, nor from the world of sense, nor from the exercise of reason. It is transcendant and specific, sui generis.

It is, further, imposed; it produces an experience which has nothing of the fortuitous nor of the facultative, obligating our will such that the will is not free to deny its reality. Herein is psychological consciousness distinguished from consciousness of "le devoir" in that this imposed experience is outside of conscious approbation not deigning to legitimise itself. We experience the feeling of the Absolute, while not claiming to have the idea of it. The idea claimed by some is, on analysis, rather that of infinity than of the absolute.
In this connection, and in terms of antecedence to Frommel, we note the approach of Chas. Renouvier.\(^{(1)}\) The background of Renouvier's thought is the Kantian approach to the question of knowledge and the nature of the moral law and of duty. Kant's position, as known from the Critique of Pure Reason, was that we know things only as they appear to us, clothed, that is, in the forms of sense-experience, in terms of the categories of space and of time, and the forms of our representations which are the categories of thought. We know only "phenomena", appearances. Ultimate reality, the Absolute, things in themselves, the "noumena", remain unknowable. But, as Kant went on to assert in the Critique of Practical Reason, we can believe in them; and, on the basis of the categorical imperative, the feeling of duty, Kant constructed a moral edifice with the three postulates of God, freedom and the future life.

Renouvier, more radical than Kant, held that things which are not knowable to us are as non-existent. The essential neo-critical affirmation follows — there are no noumena, only phenomena. He thus fell into a kind of phenomenalism, waging war on substance, on substantiality, and on metaphysics in general. In the appreciation of the thought of Renouvier by Frank Duperrut,\(^{(2)}\) he commented that "Kant was too close to Descartes and to Leibnitz to allow this total discontinuity between the noumenal and the phenomenal. In Renouvier's phenomenalist relativism, there was, of necessity, a depersonalising element and tendency — strongly criticised by Charles Secretan and others. However, in his latter period, he seemed to move to a conception of the monad, echoing, at least, the Leibnitzian monadology, and making thereby a serious effort at an ontology. Renouvier's neo-criticism gave an essential place to logic and the

\(^{(1)}\) See, in particular, the account of Henri Mieville's expose of Renouvier, in the Lausanne Revue, 1902.

\(^{(2)}\) Revue de Philosophie et de Theologie: Lausanne: 1904.
principle of non-contradiction. While offering some victory over materialism, evolutionism, determinism and a narrow monism, it ran the serious risk of becoming simply a 'rationalism'. The principle of non-contradiction, and other rationalist criteria, cannot be applied, simpliciter, to the Absolute, since, by definition, mystery goes beyond us, it is outside of science, it is extra-logical. Renouvier said that it was after long meditation on transcendent methods in geometry, (1) that he came to the pivotal idea of his system. But geometrical and mathematical norms or extrapolations are ruled out when we are dealing with matters of the infinite and the absolute. In the matter of non-contradiction, for example, it is the finite which involves and implies negation. He spoke of the conception of the 'movement to infinity', in order to avoid ontological unintelligibility in the matter of the Absolute, which, as a noumenon, had evaporated with his purely phenomenalist approach. He defined a circle, for example, as a polygon with an infinite number of sides: this, however, as his critic, Raymond, points out, is inadmissible as mathematical analysis, a circle being defined as the locus of points, or of a point moving, at a fixed distance from a fixed point, called the centre.

Even more serious is the confusion of the infinite and the indefinite; e.g. an indefinite integral is quite different in meaning from the conception of infinity. Mathematical 'infinities' are defined by the limits of a relationship, in terms of macro or micro-tendencies by a variable. The infinite conceived of as the last term of a series of numbers is a contradiction and of no useful purpose whatsoever in discussing the nature of the absolute as infinite. The laws of number and the principle of contradiction are powerless to pronounce in the matter of the reality of the absolute. Renouvier

(1) "Logique", p. VII of avant-propos....
himself offers conclusions as to the certitude of knowledge which exceed the premisses laid down. In terms of his neo-Kantian dichotomy of the noumenal and the phenomenal, Renouvier, in denying the reality of the former, renders consensus of experience impossible and illusory.

In his theology, Renouvier's monotheism did not admit God as infinite and absolute. He must have had 'successive states' (an echo of his partiality to mathematical modes and analogies), and He had origin in time and space; if He were absolute (noumenally speaking) he could not have (or as well might not have) personal qualities such as intelligence, will, feeling. But He must be regarded as possessing, or at least, expressing, perfection of morality, goodness and justice. Miracle is abandoned, but not belief in "providence", regarded as a Divine activity manifesting itself in man, and, thus, in history.

The position that the 'real' is not 'intelligible' is here conserved: God may be infinite and absolute — according to Mieville who accepted the inaccessibility of the transcendentally Real to human comprehension — in the sense that, of necessity, as supreme reality, He must be beyond the categories of our understanding, and yet need not, to serve some metaphysical criterion, lose His personal character. He is not a Spirit or person superior to others — as if the infinite and the absolute were, somehow, the last term of an infinite series, or some human attribute raised to an infinite indicial power; He is, in the words of A. Reymond, (1) "Spirit and Personality"...

"Neo-criticism has not proved that the idea of eternity is contradictory, being based on the false premise of the assimilation of eternity to a sum of discontinuous moments of time considered as finite." Mieville wrote: (2) "anthropomorphism is acceptable only as a symbo-

(1) "Le philosophie de M. Renouvier et le problème de la connaissance religieuse", p. 246.
(2) op. cit. p. 229.
lism, we do not take it as a symbol of agnosticism. A symbol is not a veil, it is a revelation; it does not signify what one does not know, but what one does..." This is true, but the problem remains of the inadequacy of the symbol to the reality which it seems to translate and express. Neo-criticism, as a basis for the establishment of the objective factor in the phenomenon of the experience of obligation, does not respond to the exigencies of the Christian consciousness, because of the logico-rational premisses laid down and the internal contradictions involved in its phenomenalist analysis of human experience.

Frommel thus concludes that "obligation is an experience undergone by my will of an initial action exercised upon it by a will of which it feels directly the object." (1) It is immediate, imposed, absolute; it brooks no compromise, no disobedience, and the imperative which it engenders is a categorical imperative, as Kant well understood. "We say precisely: "The obligation of conscience is an experience, imposed as immediate and involuntary, of an unconditional action exercised on the human will by a transcendant will." (2)

We must now ascertain the subjective factor in the experience of obligation. This experience is one of consciousness, morality and immediacy; it has thus to do with the centralities of man's nature—his consciousness of self, awareness of a relation of wills, and the distinction, psychologically required and acknowledged, between the conscious and the unconscious (or subconscious) wills. According to Frommel, and basic to his psychological analysis, the differentiated, reflected, conscious will, is not capable of undergoing an immediate impression. As reflective, it ceases to be simple, being differentiated in the faculties which are the means and the result of reflection. It thus loses immediacy as a constituent of the phenomenon of

(1) Etudes Morales et Religieuses; p. 52-53.
(2) La Verite Humaine. vol. II, p. 69.
obligation, and cannot be the area in which such is felt. The subject of obligation is thus the moral instinct of man, his "virtual" will, or the unconscious principle of his will. If it is objected that this speaks of something unknown, one must point out that this would be true in terms of a certain psychology, e.g. the Cartesian and its derivatives, where knowledge is regarded as being engendered in consciousness, where "being" is given with consciousness and consciousness with "being", both being definitively resolved in thought. The future is not, however, with this kind of psychological analysis; rather, the metaphysical point of view is giving way to observation, the static point of view to the dynamic, the ideas of virtuality, power, and the unconscious playing a decisive role. This has been rendered the more necessary by studies in the fields of the psychosomatic, the parapsychic, and of mental pathology. Absolute divine action does not exercise itself on the conscious self, otherwise it would crush man and take from him all possibility of freedom; it exercises itself on the subconscious principle of the will on which it imposes an attitude of submission. While the conscious will is free, capable of revolt or obedience in respect of obligation, the moral instinct is not, being "incapable of refusing or offering acquiescence to the unconditional action operating in him." Man finds himself over against God in a state of absolute dependence, but not of an ontological nature; he is a slave. "Before making me free, obligation has made me a slave. It has taken possession of me outside of my own consent- in an instant where I could not either refuse or acquiesce..."(1) Not alone does the obligatory action lay hold of the principle of the will beyond its own consent, but it prostrates it before God. Man is thus constrained to realise in the unconscious sphere of his being, under the mode of necessity, an

(1) op. cit. p. 122.
attitude which he is called to accept freely in his conscious life. It proceeds from a sovereign initiative.

Wm. James contends, in 'Varieties of Religious Experience,' that the inferior manifestations of subconscious activity depend only on the subject himself, in the sense that the impressions produced upon him by material objects, elaborated without his conscious knowledge by the subliminal consciousness, are sufficient to explain the ordinary phenomena of automatism. One can conceive that the subconscious may play a double role. If, beyond the material world, there is a dominating spiritual world, one could allow that the subliminal consciousness may constitute more propitious area for such impressions than the 'ordinary' consciousness, absorbed as it is by material impressions coming to it from the senses. The feeling of the domination by a divine power becomes, by this hypothesis, a legitimate assumption. A transcendent force could exercise itself directly on the individual, on condition of possession of an appropriate organ, and this is supplied in a subliminal consciousness....

In the analysis of Frommel, the division of the will in two states, the one virtual and the other actual, the great merit, in his view, was to reconcile divine sovereignty and human freedom, the absolute dependence of Schleiermacher and the autonomy of Kant. Frommel felt that, in defining religion as the feeling of absolute dependence, Schleiermacher was excluding freedom from the relationship which exists between man and God.

Henri Bois(1) offered criticism of Frommel in the following terms - "God exercises an absolute action on the subconscious part of our being. It appears - by a mystery which I have not a duty to explain, never having well understood it - that the being, absolutely determined in his subconscious part, is conscious of himself, not as

of absolute determination and necessity — which, however, would be natural — but as free and obligated. Let me not insist on the difficulty of this genesis." He added, in a note, that he was contesting neither the subconscious nor the action of God upon it; but what provoked doubt and objection are the explanation, the conclusion and the theory. Frommel admitted that he might have been understood to be implying that the subconscious was posited as the explication of the conscious and the movement from the one to the other as an explanation of freedom; or that determination by God in the subconscious appears, without justification, as obligation in the conscious, i.e. as obligating the conscious will.

However, both consciousness and freedom are inexplicable, being without "genealogy" or explication. The movement from the subconscious to the conscious is the condition of freedom; there is a profound difference between constituting things as causally or conditionally related and constituting them as given together. The movement from the subconscious to the conscious is the condition of freedom in the entire psychological life: that which rises to the conscious becomes the material of free, conscious usage. "Why should it not also be so in the matter of the moral instinct, the feeling of duty and of obligation? It is, however, we repeat, not a matter of the explicative, but of the observed, the "given". (1)

Why — and this seems the objection of Bois — does the subconscious will, itself absolutely determined by divine action, not determine the conscious will, but, on the contrary, "obligate" it? The answer lies in the fact that not all the subconscious obligates the conscious: nature, instinct, temperament — these solicit, qualify and involve freedom, but there is not obligation. It might be said that, as the Divine will obligates the subconscious absolutely,

(1) op. cit. p. 90.
without possible resistance, the subconscious will, thus obligated, obligates the conscious will. It does so absolutely, but with possible resistance, because here we deal with consciousness, that is, with freedom. This accords with the principle that each obligatory "agent" touches the next in conformity with its mode, and not otherwise. Thus the objection that a radical duality has been introduced between the subconscious and the conscious, between the spheres of "l'expérience imposée" and "l'expérience proposée", is met by Frommel by what he regards as something mysterious, perhaps, but a fact, however disconcerting to logic.

We now turn to an analysis of consciousness offered by Frommel in a section of the Apologetics, which he omitted from his Course in 1899, because, as he said: "I am not very sure of it." But he took it up again in 1902, and partially amended it, while always considering that it was still "à récrire".

He acknowledged that nothing could be more vague, imprecise or complex that the current idea of the word "conscience". Sometimes it is spoken of as an authority (the authority of conscience), sometimes as an inner self-consistency of feeling (in all sincerity of conscience), as a rule of conduct, as a moral "person", as a state of soul; then, further, speaking of the theological, Christian, moral, aesthetic, philosophic, scientific consciousness. What might be called a certain poverty of language prevents making distinction between 1) the state of consciousness, an ensemble of phenomena of which it is the organ; 2) the different kinds of phenomena of which it is the organ - of sense, intellect and moral awareness; and 3) the organ of the perception of phenomena, (the proper sense of the word.) The Etymology is important, and there is unanimous testimony from the principal languages - Greek:-- suneidesis; Latin:-
conscientia; German: Gewissen. It is always regarded as an immediate apperception from which results a knowledge obtained by the return of the subject on himself. This carries general validity in matters of intellect, senses, morality and religion. The real question is, however, how to represent this return of the subject upon himself. If the whole being were involved in this return movement, it could not return to itself, but would be like a dog chasing its tail. To come back to himself, taking consciousness of himself, there must be in the individual a fixed point which is himself, to which to return the part. We would thus come to define the moral and religious consciousness as "an immediate apperception, a knowledge of oneself with oneself, obtained by the return of the reflected subject (differentiated will) upon the unconscious principle of his will impressed by obligation". The fixed point is the principle of his will and being; it is simple and undifferentiated, therefore unconscious. But it is not bare; it carries an imprint, made upon it by the sovereign action of a transcendent will.

Consciousness in itself is the place and means of an intimate apperception, with a role and function analogous to those exercised in their domaine by the senses; it is an organ of internal perception. But an "organ of perception" must not be thought to apply essentially to the physical members to which the phrase is popularly applied, e.g. the eye, the ear, the nose, etc. After all, an eye, deprived of the power of seeing, can continue to exist as a part of the body, but does not exist as an organ of sight. The physical organ has as function the furnishing of an occasion and place of action and reaction between the self and the non-self. Scientifically speaking, an organ of perception is the seat of such action and reaction, of an opening to the non-self, of a perception. In
this sense, the consciousness is an organ of perception. Its apperception being intimate, it is, in a distinctive sense, an opening, not of the self on the exterior, "sensible" non-self, but of the reflective on the instinctive self, of the differentiated will on its principle. There is involved the return of the free will upon its principle affected by obligatory experience. That is why there is in consciousness before everything the sense of duty or of moral and religious obligation.

Frommel had earlier said, in his Thesis; "Obligation fulfils in its sphere a function analogous to that of the eye in its sphere; it causes a light to shine which changes the aspect of things, conferring upon them a quite new signification; it is, for those who perceive its imperative, what is, to one who sees, the light of the sun, that which could be put in doubt by a blind man, without his suspicion negating the evidence of the rest of men. The world of sounds and colours exists only for those beings whose organs render them able to perceive them, and such a world manifests itself in them in certainty of its presence. The man, within whom there sounds no voice of unconditional commandment, will consider those who do hear such a voice as dreamers or as fools. ...But the conscience is an organ of perception, similar in its own order, to those which bind us to the world of sense. To say that it is so, is not to add something to man, but simply to attribute to him a new faculty of apperception; an organ is only rich by its activity, which consists in being put into a relationship with a new reality."(1)

The relation of the phenomenon of obligation to concepts such as Evolution, the Identity of the Self, and Freedom must be considered. Evolution. The Editor of 'La Vérité Humaine' tells us that in Frommel's MSS., this development is noted as "to be rewritten":

(1) op. cit. pp. 67-69.
since his death supervened, final redaction of his lectures was never achieved, and we cannot say in what way he might have recast this material. From students' notebooks we can say that he began his oral exposition in this way:— "Evolutionism is pantheism; I am not talking of that, but of evolution...." He thus guarded his personal position. He believed that there was a preparation of humanity by nature and that human personality was the goal of cosmic effort. His first work (1886; unedited) was entitled "Le monde une involu-

tion: essai d'une philosophie dynamique", expressing an involu-

tionary conviction which he was to sustain as a muted note in his writing. "Not only is the theory of the fact of conscience not con-

tradictory of the exigencies of an evolutionism sanely understood, but it could even give it credit in some measure in the eyes of those who hold the postulates of morality as more certain than the acquisi-

tions of science." He concludes: "we have maintained two points which seem to be acquired: the one to method, the role of experience in knowledge: the other to philosophy, the principle of evolution."(1)

"Man, who holds to God in obligation, and to man in solidarity, holds also to matter. An unbroken progression attaches him to orga-

nisms which had preceded him on the world scene. Nothing hinders him from thinking, — indeed, everything tends to make him believe — that this long elaboration (the great arena where progress is effec-

ted by struggle, establishing itself by the victory of the most apt) tended to some goal, and that its goal was man.... Through the course of this travail, beings become complex and differentiated, till that point, arrived at the end of its labour, incapable of pro-

ducing or conceiving beyond that, nature gave birth to the human organism, the richest, most complete and the most individual of orga-

nisms. Having arrived there, natural history has spoken its last

(1) Thesis: pp. 65 and 79.
word: it stops, ceases to create, and gives its place to another history, the moral and religious history of humanity which must re-begin and perfect its own, and on which henceforth will be concentrated the effort and interest of Creation." (1)

Along with this we must consider Frommel's later presentation, in which there is remarkably little difference. For example, in "Le danger moral de l'évolutionnisme religieux", (2) - "We deny to evolution, which is a phenomenon to interpret, the right to constitute itself a unique principle of integral interpretation.... The author does not judge in advance of its explicative value in the domain of nature; still less would he think to contest the very fact of evolution - this would be to deny history, its exact synonym...." Later in his Lecture Course, he talks of biological evolution, not just as a hypothesis but as a fact. To this he adds that the ascending march of the being through life could well be an involution, rather than an evolution. For further example, he wrote in his article "De Calvin à Vinet", (3) "An involution is a constant research after unity, not simple unity, but a complex, living unity, becoming effected by the ever more perfect interpenetration of biological factors ever becoming more numerous." Involution has an analogical relationship in the psychical realm to evolution in the biological, involving and implying an unfolding and flowering of the true, natural human endowment according to the rules of its own being and nature. It was sufficient that evolution arrived at man (human organism), to a perfection of life (of virtuality) which allows it to accede to influences, environments, to the surrounding milieu of a new reality. Evolution by itself cannot give account of obligation, and could never have resulted in it. It can account only for the

(1) "Histoire du principe de l'individualisme": 1893 - (unedited).
(2) pp. 305 et 306.
(3) Revue Chrétienne: 1894, pp. 94-95.
conditions necessary to man, namely, a degree of perfection of life capable of undergoing the experience of it.

The nature of the self, as a matter distinct from the previous analysis of consciousness, must now be considered in relation to the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience. Frommel constitutes the essence of psychological consciousness as the feeling of the unity of the self, as the perception of its different activities from the point of view of a unique centre which we call the "I". For there to be a self-consciousness there must be a self, and for there to be a self, there must be a self-consciousness. Self and self-consciousness are concomitant, one with the other. The question which concerns us now is the relation between the formation of the self and the coming of obligation. Some form of relationship seems to carry an immediate verisimilitude; is it one of equality, or might consciousness of obligation have superiority over psychological consciousness, the latter even being dependent on the former? There could not be a true relationship if the Cartesian view were maintained, viz. that the self is an already made "given", a fixed, unmovable quantity, in terms of a division of man into a body and a soul, a psychological viewpoint which lacks the necessary experimental and scientific nature. The self has a history, i.e. elaborates and forms itself. This must derive from its power to do so - Frommel insisted that it has this virtuality, outside of which all genetic conception is rendered absurd and impossible. We cannot say that before the self there was nothing, nor that there was something other than the self, from which the self has come. Before the oak, for example, there was not nothing, nor some other thing, but the acorn, i.e. the oak's virtuality. Thus before the realised self, there was capacity, virtuality, potentiality of the self. The real question is, therefore, how
unconscious virtuality arrives at conscious actuality. Outside the
conception of virtuality and potentiality, we are claiming that pro-
gress involves that the greater arises out of the less — and it is
against this that mechanistic evolutionism is irremediably brought up
short.

(Again we note that this subsequent analysis was not finally
revised by Frommel. The entitlement of sections was his, but the
main developments are based on reference to students' notebooks — in
one case, "consciousness by thought", entirely so dependent...)

We briefly review the ways by which it has been suggested that
self-consciousness arises. It has been constituted as arising in
contact with the non-self. This analysis partakes of the "sensa-
tionism" which had been considered and rejected by Frommel. In that
view, the rise of self-consciousness is regarded as taking place in
the realisation of oneself as a subject over against the object, i.e.
in the contact of the self and the non-self under the aspect of
'sense-experience'. The main criticism, which we repeat here, is
that such a hypothesis asks of a cause an effect of a totally dis-
similar nature; it seeks, for example, in determinism the origin of
freedom.

Again, some have attempted to show its rise in thought. (1) The
intellectualist analysis of the nature of man fails to give adequate
account of the nature and origin of consciousness, with special
reference to the matter of the consciousness of the self. Thought,
conceived of as a first principle, could neither have a real object
nor be other than a precarious subject, and would lead to mechanical
impersonalism, reducing the self to an illusion; further, having
reduced all metaphysics to abstraction, even from a psychological
point of view, "pure" thought would be necessarily affected by

(1) Only the title of this section is in the MSS; its
development comes from students' notebooks.
determinism, denying rather than affirming the subject. In Frommel's phrase, thought, regarded as ultimate principle, becomes a kind of "logical pantheism". But thought is really secondary, coming under dependence on the will. Being, and consciousness of being, do not exhaust themselves in thought, nor are they explained by it. What, then, of the effort of the will on biological spontaneity? Frommel noted that, distinctively in the thought of Maine de Biran, to the will is ascribed the origin of consciousness. The effort of the active will is constitutive of the self and of consciousness of the self, acting as it does on the spontaneity of the biological organism. The phenomenon of consciousness is placed at the point of contact of the will and the organism. This analysis has at least the quality of constituting the phenomenon of consciousness as one of activity, not passivity. But an immediate objection may be one similar to that laid against the constitution of the consciousness and of self-consciousness in terms of the meeting of the self and the not-self in the perceptions of sense, namely, the no less deterministic nature of biological spontaneity as compared with sense-phenomena. If a constitutive factor of consciousness is hostile to freedom, then it cannot be other than hostile to the formation of consciousness. Other objections which might be added are the apparent co-extensiveness, and indeed contemporaneity, of the organism and consciousness, such that, apparently, with the disappearance of the organism, there would be involved disappearance of the consciousness and therefore of the self; and, as above, there would be, the serious non-sequitur, inbuilt as in the first suggestion, namely, the unacknowledged heterogeneity of cause and effect, wherein we require of a cause an effect foreign to its nature.

Frommel saw the way clear to constitute the self and self-
consciousness in the context of the sense of the obligation of conscience. Here we are in the field of the supra-historical and the absolute, being lifted out of the determinations and limitations of historicity and temporality. The experience of obligation is the basic constitutive factor of the self, which is constituted in its addressability by the unconditional. Here we have freedom, not deterministic constraint, and before freedom there was potentiality. Man is not just the subject of duty, he is also the product and the creature; he can be the agent of duty only because he is first the creature. "If he were not the son, he could not be the slave."(1)

Freedom is an immediate datum of consciousness, because it is its condition. We cannot say "self" if we cannot say "freedom". If the self is not free, what is it but an ensemble of equally 'necessary' phenomena? But in point of fact, freedom is frequently denied, and the idea is often vague. Is it relative, formal, real or illusory? In one sphere, however, it is particularly posited, and that of internal necessity; that is the moral. Martyrdom has had as principal cause, not some deterministic matter of metaphysical constraint, but an assertion of the ultimacy of moral or religious freedom. Freedom is felt as responsibility (i.e. etymologically as "response-ability"), and this is not to be confused with responsibility as imputability. Before freedom, there was potentiality or virtuality - (we do not say that there was no acorn before the oak...).

Frommel noted that, for Armand Sabatier, this is of the nature of biological spontaneity, and, for Boutroux, the growing area of indeterminism in the phenomenal order.(2) Before proposing itself to the reflective will, obligation has first "imposed" itself on the

(1) La Vér. Humaine, II. p. 117.
(2) See Sabatier: "L'evolution et la Liberté". Revue Chrétienne, 1885; and M. Boutroux: "De la Contingence des lois de la nature", 1895.
instinctive will. True freedom is thus not suppressed. All other experiences, of sense or intellect, reach me in my reflective will, imposing themselves on it. That of obligation only imposes itself on an already unreflective principle of the will, and proposes itself by that to the conscious will. It implies a personal relationship, making itself felt under an obligatory, not a constraining, mode, offering to freedom the indispensable premisses of its realisation. The experience of obligation is distinguished from all others in that in it freedom arises; it does not directly impinge on my reflective will, so freedom is not suppressed. Thus, obligatory experience is the generator of human personality, under the double aspect of its conscious identity and its freedom. Man is the child of duty. Before duty, man was not, nor could be. He was but the most perfect of organisms – a human "virtuality". Frommel sums up his analysis of man's constitutive nature – self-hood is constituted and brought into being by "le devoir". Humanity as such is born with the "obligation de conscience", and dies with it. "La vérité humaine est une vérité morale."

To know the truth, it is necessary first to do it; and to "do" the truth, it is necessary to be in the truth. To be in the truth is to place oneself in an initial attitude of obedience and complete fidelity to imposed experience, which determines the subsequent role of all the faculties. Frommel appropriated, while critically correcting, Kant's conception of obligation. The latter had presented duty as a basic inner accord of the self, involving sincerity and autonomy. But autonomy, and the conception of an 'a priori' category, was transformed by Frommel into the feeling, or experience, of an action, because there is also an implied heteronomy, which is, in turn, resolved into a theonomy. The distinction between the two
wills is not between the "sensible" and the "intelligible" (i.e. the noumenal, absolutely refactory to experience and thought; it is between the conscious will and its unconscious principle. Frommel's transition to a theonomous interpretation is implicitly prepared for in his formulation - "Obligation is an experience, immediate, involuntary, that is to say, imposed, that of the unconditional action exercised on the human will by a transcendent will..."(1)

Obligation is thus seen as a subtle constraint, a supreme "grace", in which and by which man, as above, is constituted as man. Thus - and this is noted in the Chapter on Frommel's Christology, irreconcilable dualism between law and grace is rejected. Christianity is not regarded as in opposition to the imperative of conscience. Indeed, the redemptive activity of Christ constitutes a second "obligation", analogous to that perceived by natural man, but more evident, tangible and efficacious - for it can triumph, where the first, by the fact of sin, ends with failure.

At this point one wonders if Frommel may have fallen into the error which he criticised elsewhere, namely the confusion of obligation, as a moral fact, with a constraint which, raised, as he said, to the absolute, may not the less remain a natural phenomenon, which, being "sui generis", is not reducible to the ethical order. There is serious risk in two directions - that of incurring his own oft-repeated denunciation of deterministic influences, and of deriving an effect from a cause of a different order. However, he meets this objection by implication when he grounds the experience of obligation, not in some impersonal imposition, not an imposition of naked power, but in a relationship between God and man constituted by the sovereignty of the former, from which the elements, both of constraint and of servility, are excluded. It is of the essence of man's

(1) op. cit. p. 69.
nature to acknowledge the Divine sovereignty, not 'by necessity' in the reflective consciousness or will, but as a freely recognised "datum" of religious experience as constituted in the theonomous structure of the experience of obligation.

Frommel was aware of the objection, which was expressed by Henri Bois in his article "Le Sentiment Religieux". (1) This objection was to the effect that Frommel perpetuated the error of Cesar Malan fils in conceiving of God as an absolute being, condemned by His absoluteness to be unable to act other than in an absolute fashion. Thus He could not act on the conscious part of man, for, if He did, His absolute action would determine the relative creature absolutely, removing all independence from him. So God exercises His action on the subconscious part of man, but, like a force of nature, His action is without deflection or mutability, and one wonders if devotion is satisfied with a God conceived as personal, who cannot act personally, but only with deterministic impersonal constraint. But Frommel claimed that this objection was ill-founded, insofar as it seems to imply a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, conception of the absolute. What is it, after all, which 'obliges' in obligation? Sovereign power? Irresistible force? Its sheer universality and immutability? No; it is its holiness, the feeling of moral esteem, respect and love.

There is, further, a paradox, which must be accepted, that, in God, the quantitative absolute - of power and of being, is not exclusive of the qualitative absolute - of right and of personality. They are therefore not mutually exclusive in the Divine action obligating man in his conscience. A father can, after all, act in different ways to his child without losing his fatherly character. Thus the objection by Bois appeared to be successfully met, as we can conceive

(1) Revue de théologie et des questions religieuses": 1901, p. 480/481.
of God's action in the human conscience in a free, personal manner, variably proportionate to needs and circumstances, without His action ceasing to be sovereign, and, in each case, involving absolute obligation.

A further objection by Bois (1) was to the effect that the religious life is not limited to the subconscious, and that there must be personal and living communication between God and man, consciously entered into. This conscious relationship involves knowledge and confidence, and is not limited to the feeling of obligation. Bois cited the example of Christ, with Whom, in His relation to God, there were requests and answers in a perpetual dialogue in which God is not shown as a Being in bondage to His own absoluteness, but as a Heavenly Father, Who, in His tenderness, can enter into a commerce of freedom with the one on Whom He has set all His affection. We may sympathise with Frommel when he readily meets this objection, damaging at first hearing, by reminding Bois that the fact that the religious relationship is "inaugurated" in the subconscious does not involve its being condemned never to emerge from it. Indeed, neither Malan nor his disciples doubted that one of the conditions of the total and saving revelation of God to consciousness is the historic person of Jesus, and that addressed to the conscious will. Nor did they deny reality to prayer, conceived as a meaningful, personal dialogue. The conscious life has its necessary and important role in religion - as the passing from 'religiosity' to 'religion', and as the vehicle of supports, directions or means of grace by which God acts upon the consciousness. All that is said of the conscious, religious life is that it would have been impossible without its commencement in the subconscious. Man would never have prayed, nor have had the capacity to recognise the religious significance of the

(1) op. cit. p. 481-482.
historical person of Jesus Christ, outside of, or independent of, the original relationship instituted by God with the subconscious will of man.

One is reminded of Frommel's animadversion on obligation in his Essay on Schérer (1) - "Obligation is the most sure and undeniable of facts, giving a base for the self in founding the consciousness of self. We perceive nothing of which we have not become conscious, i.e. what has not first passed through consciousness of self...

Obligation is inalienably imposed on the being who verifies it,... and constitutes the original certainty of man, the normative fact of initial experience...."

Frommel had regard for the consequences, moral and religious, of the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience. What is true of the moral consciousness is true of the religious consciousness, namely, that the same character is presented of universality, permanence and variability. In general terms, morality has always a religious element and religion a moral element. There is a sacred character to moral obligation, or, more exactly, we have intuitive certainty of the sacred character of the authority which it places before us. The authority is not only unconditional and categorical, it is sacred. We have thus an instinctive feeling that violation of the moral conscience involves some kind of sacriligious violation. Whence comes this feeling if we were the sole cause of the feeling of obligation, or if it were in the nature of a metaphysical absolute?

Another constitutive element - thought by Frommel to be dormant in his time - is that of "sin". This distinctive characteristic is not unique to Christianity, but is found in comparative religious studies. It is not simply a matter of moral fault, in the sense of transgression of a moral law, but involves an inexpungeable sense of...

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there being present the rupture of a relationship, a sense of estrangement from the principle and ground of our true life and being. The etymology of the word "religion" (re-ligare in Latin: re-lieer in French) points to its nature as having to do with relationship. Separation and estrangement is implied, which "re-ligion" seeks to overcome in restoration of relationship.

Further, religion presents itself as a matter of Revelation. Without such a central constitutive character of revelation, it is not properly called religion, but rather, speculative philosophy, depending ultimately on human thought-concepts, ideas, projections, and 'a priori' metaphysical determinations. Frommel said he was in entire agreement with Schleiermacher, and with Auguste Sabatier (1) who held that the true, constitutive, positive characteristic by which one defined religion, as distinct from speculative systems of thought, was that of "revelation". The source of obligation is universal, actual, eternal, transcendent, not fortuitous, but essential and imposed, not of our initiative, but received with the quality of absoluteness. The source is personal and living, the 'unknown God' of the Athenians, anterior to our consciousness of self. This, however, must not merely be stated - it must be established. The religious character of obligation leads, therefore, to a consideration of the Divinity of its author. The Athenian "altar to the unknown God" demonstrates the fact that adoration precedes knowledge of the object of adoration. Post-Athenian Christian thinking was to express it thus - "we know that He is; we cannot know what He is" (in Himself). The "God-shaped blank" in the heart of man is to be given substance as the Author of the feeling of absolute obligation, as the One who is 'given' in the experience of 'absolute dependence', as the one 'given' in the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience.

(1) Comp. the latter's "Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion": 1897, p. 34-35.
Frommel distinguished himself in one important regard from the analysis by Schleiermacher. With the latter, man's submission to God is presented in terms of the annulment of man's freedom, to the consequent exclusion of morality from religion. Frommel attributes the absolute dependence to a yet unconscious principle of the human will, leaving a duty to the conscious will of reflection and free consent.

There was also disagreement between Frommel and H. Bois on the foregoing. Bois refused to attach "obligation" to God as its cause, for the following reasons — either (1) obligation comes from God, and we are constrained to obey, because He is the stronger and we are the weaker. Force creates the Divine right, and interest our recognition of the right. It is thus a utilitarian, rather than truly moral, consideration which determines morality and action; or (2) God Himself is subject to an (anterior) moral law. Obligation is thus not imposed by Him — He also is in submission to it. Frommel attributed this objection, an example, he thinks, of the incurable intellectualism which afflicts French neo-criticism, to a false way of conceiving the birth of the religious phenomenon. The implicit premise is that intellectual knowledge of God alone determines religious adoration. As well as the example of the unknown God of the Athenians, Frommel cited with approval the writing of the English divine, F.W. Robertson, who spoke of "the one certain thing among so many subjects of doubt, the reality of the Divine life in the heart of man. It is not by the intelligence, but by the spirit, that man finds God...." Robertson underwent an experience of doubting everything except the sacredness of the good, and returned to faith by life and experience.

The neo-critical intellectualism is further to be criticised for, surprisingly, its anthropomorphic language about God. Frommel
felt that for Renouvier, and Bois, there was no infinite or absolute; God is not infinite and absolute Being - He is simply greater than man, indefinitely and considerably, but is anthropomorphically con-
ceived in quantitative, rather than qualitatively-defined, terms.

On this, we refer back to the account of Renouvier and his move-
ment to infinity as an effort to avoid ontological unintelligibility of the Absolute, a movement which we saw to involve the evaporation of the noumenal in terms of an intellectualist phenomenalism.

According to Frommel, there are 5 consequences of the experience of the obligation of conscience. The first is that it involves the certainty of the existence and reality of God. "Pourquoi suis-je religieux?" asked Auguste Sabatier. "Je ne puis autrement. C'est une nécessité morale de mon être." The objection of moral atheism will be dealt with later - that is, the case of those apparently faithful to obligation, but without acknowledging its Author.

Secondly, there is involved a revelation of the personality of God. Personal activity must be postulated of the Author of obliga-
tion, as personal responsibility cannot be generated by impersonal activity. The divine activity conforms to my personal dignity, in that it has the qualities of freedom and personality which I find in myself. Again Frommel notes the objection, but does not, in this place, develop it. The objection to this consequence of obligation is the existence of pantheism.

Revelation of the sovereignty of God is a third consequence. While all activities known to me present themselves as conditioned, caused and determined, this Divine activity, by contrast, presents itself as conditioning, determining. The personal will which im-
pinges on mine in the experience of obligation of conscience differs in its unconditioned nature from any other known. The sole law of
of the Author of obligation is His own freedom, realised by Him in
the act of willing. He is therefore sovereign Being, for a freedom
without law is a sovereign freedom. The objection, mentioned, in a
sentence, by Frommel, is that of dualism and polytheism. Freedom and
self-determination are the constitutive qualities of absolute sove-
reignty, the necessary derivatives from exclusive monotheism.

A fourth revelation is that of the living "causality" of God.
His historical initiative is constituted in His activity as the agent
of "l'expérience imposée", and His will is dynamic, not static. He
is not the immobile God of philosophical deism, inactive, imprisoned
like the Allah of Mahomet, in His own transcendence. He is immanent
as much as transcendent, but His immanence, being that of a voluntary,
personal action, is in no way that of pantheism, nor does it in any
way contradict His transcendence. The objection to living causality
and historical activity in the constitutive nature of the Author of
obligation is that of 'Deism', where God is not involved in a perso-
nal, dynamic relationship with His creation.

The final element of Frommel's analysis was of supreme impor-
tance, involving the derivation of the moral and spiritual consti-
tuents of the Divine nature. (1) Having formed in me the capacity
for a moral and religious life, God remains active, present in this
central place of my will, not reached by myself, that is, by my re-
flexive will, - in this sanctuary, where, though masterful, He does
not break me, nor reduce me by force. God treats man so respect-
fully, so to speak, as to prefer his freedom to servile prostration
before His authority. Such a God is moral and spiritual. This,
according to Frommel, is the extent of the field of natural revela-
tion - depending, even there, on the attention and obedience offered
- the attribution I am invited to make to the Author of obligation of

(1) La Vérité Humaine, vol. II. p. 172f.
the characteristics of reality, sovereignty, personality, living activity and spirituality. This, after all, is only to distinguish the attributes accompanying, and involved in, the experience of obligation; they are given in that experience, perhaps obscurely recognised and constituted, even before intellectual analysis or comprehension. One might wonder why the God thus revealed - the God of theism, the highest religious conception of mankind - is not thus recognised and acknowledged by all mankind. Many have, indeed, held the monotheistic view, both in prophetic Hebraism and in Islam. To this final thesis, there is the objection of 'idolatry', i.e. the acceptance of the conditional as if it were unconditioned, the determined as if it were the self-determined.

We have spoken of a revelation in the experience of obligation of a moral and spiritual God. This is not otherwise self-evident, as is manifest in the widespread idolatry of man, who, as "homo religiosus" requires an object of veneration and worship. But, in terms of the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience, God is not defined as an Idea presented to the intelligence for acceptance by the rational faculty, but as the One known in the response of moral obedience and spiritual discernment.

Certain data ("données: Latin 'data' = given) in the experience are analysable and distinguishable as subjective and objective. The subjective data are, first, the intellectual and imaginative representation of the pure feeling of obligation. This feeling is of a sacred dependence, but, in its pure state, is void of ideational content. The undifferentiated experience of the obligation of conscience requires and involves intellectual rationalisation as to this ideational content, and the response of the will as a function of the imagination. On the other hand, the representation of divinity,
which, by hypothesis, is its issue, is a representation, in which there are both idea and image. Where the idea predominates on the image, religion becomes more dogmatic than sensual - and where the image predominates on the idea, we have a religion more sensual than philosophical. But to all forms of divinity man has attached, in varying proportions, concept and image.

Idolatry is, etymologically speaking, a psychological necessity in the human religious impulse. Man is, by nature, an idol-maker, and, since a balance is to be achieved between idea and image, it is achieved in the inter-relationship of the subjective data of the intellectual and imaginative representation of the pure feeling of obligation.

The subjective data are further constituted in the wide range, fluidity and mobility of religious experience and knowledge. Infidelity to that which is experienced leads to deprivation and loss. The experience is not only "imposée" but "proposée", i.e. it is facultative, free and responsible, so, where there is imperfect obedience or incomplete fidelity of the reflective will to what its principle proposes to it, there are lacunae and imperfections in knowledge. In the words of Jesus, "to him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." The range and mobility of the experience in its subjective aspect are not arguments against their having an objective counterpart, but bear simple witness to the reality of that to which they, in varying degrees, testify. To the mobility of religious experience there is a correlative mobility of religious knowledge. Frommel returned again to that basic methodological requirement of experimental knowledge, namely, experience; and of moral and religious experience, namely moral and religious obedience. It is necessary, and in conformity
with natural law, to the moral law and to the requirements of scientific method, that a man who refuses to make experience of God in conscience — and, indeed, in consciousness — exposes himself to ignorance and uncertainty as to God Himself. Faithful response to "la donnée" leads to deeper experiential validation, as opaqueness to the sense of obligation leads to decreasing subjective validation of its reality.

The objective data will be constituted as follows:— According to Frommel's distinctive view, God touches man's consciousness "subliminally", asserting His authority rather than revealing His character. Theism is the limit of the revelation of consciousness in its religious aspect, and, while there can be found, even in paganism, a presentiment of theism, it is nevertheless not universally acknowledged. The reasons are that there may not be obedience and fidelity of the reflective will to the "imposée" and "proposée" of its instinctive principle, and that the God of conscience remains a "hidden God". I am given enough to require prostration, but not enough to attach a "name" to the object of prostration. There is not complete revelation save where God discloses His name, reveals and manifests, not the mystery of His essence, but the plenitude of His character. His sacred authority prostrates my will, which apprehends His sovereign action, an action, however, voiceless and wordless. Frommel remarks (1) that the assertion that "conscience is the voice of God" is inexact. The Divine action is, so to speak, dumb — it is the recipient which gives it a voice, and this voice is human. The obligation of conscience is not communicated in propositional form, and in this subliminal "contact", God affirms His authority as the Author of "le devoir". Natural man has thus a "presentiment" of theism (as above), without achieving fullness of noetic

(1) op. cit. p. 180.
conception. This is the standpoint of St. Paul in the classic passage in Romans Chpt. I, where he analyses the implications of the 'natural revelation' of God in man's constitutive nature. God has sufficiently disclosed Himself even to natural man, that he, having "known" Him, but not glorified Him - indeed, having taken refuge in idolatry - is left, qua man, "without excuse".

God, made known in the experience of unconditional obligation, is yet "unknown" through this mode of manifestation. As we have said, there is not fullness of noetic conception. In fact; there also appear contradiction and irreducible antinomy. By this Frommel means that obligation, simple and undifferentiated in itself seems immediately to polarise into two antithetical modes, one of inexorable severity, the other of infinite tolerance, which are mutually exclusive and contradictory. There is judgment without appeal set in antithetical juxtaposition with limitless patience and longsuffering. There are, on the one hand, the elements of holiness, justice, judgment, each implied as absolute in obligation; and, on the other, incomparable, illimitable patience in the appeal to the good even through the most humbling capitulations of conscience. The two modes seem to exclude, even to annul, one another. This is not an exaggeration, as appeal to fact and experience will show. Though the sin or abandonment of duty be never so heinous and I consent to the idea of merited judgment, yet nothing happens in exterior or inner life to confirm or execute the sentence. It ministers to indifference and scepticism that nothing happens and evil does not appear to be condemned. This, as Frommel carefully pointed out, is the position as observed by empirical man, natural man. Death appears merited, even required, but is not, in fact, experienced. God appears to consciousness as afflicted by a dualism in which this double characteri-
sation seems manifested, that of absolute holiness and infinite tolerance. Religions inferior to theism nevertheless have in obligation their source and pivot. Among them there are intermediate and transitional positions but non-monotheistic human religious expressions may be categorised as follows: animist, pantheist, dualist and polytheist. (1)

Frommel passed to the determination of the moral consequences of obligation, and the reciprocal relations between morality and religion. He noted, in the writing of H. Bois, a definition of religion as a "social or supra-social relationship", the religious feeling being one attached to a being distinct from ourselves, maintained by us as a specific self outside of ourselves, and morality as a "law making an integral and profound part of our nature, regulating our supra-social relationships with God, as with our fellows...." (2)

Frommel agreed with the first part of this so far as it went, but not the second. Indeed he clearly wrote: (3) "Morality is not specifically different from religion: it is the same thing (italicised) as religion, but in another domain, this new domain being that of the social relations of man with man. In each case the constitutive, essential phenomenon is that of social relationship, without which there would be neither religion nor morality. The differences are those of the different spheres in which they are realised. Realised between man and man we have morality (obligation as moral); realised between man and God, we have religion (obligation as religious)...." Although with different aspects and functions, there is not heterogeneity between the two. They are like two sides of the same coin.

(1) That the last word in anthropomorphic polytheism was spoken on the Altar to the Unknown God is the thesis of César Malan in "Le grands traits de l'histoire religieuse de l'humanité".

(2) "Le sentiment religieux": Revue de théologie et des questions religieuses, Dec. 1901. p. 479.

Morality is, while, in one sense, as "religious as religion", in another sense, necessarily inferior insofar as its point of application is human, whereas that of religion is divine.

It is not that theology and morality are totally different and distinct disciplines, nor do we derive the one from the other. Ultimate human truth is a truth of moral theology or of theological morality. While there is a moral derivative from the experience of obligation, that obligation is theologically constituted, partaking, as it does, of the unconditional, unconditioned nature of the "impressed experience" of a divine, active will.

The imperative of conscience is generally defined as a law rather than an obligation, obligation itself being regarded as a function of the moral law, claiming that it is the law which obliges the will. The law is thought of under the form of an idea or category, and is regarded as primary, obligation being secondary, derived and dependent. This is broadly the Kantian position and that of neokantians like Renouvier in the critical strain of French theology. We saw above that Bois regarded moral feeling as one attached to a law. However, according to Frommel, obligation preceded, and engendered, the moral law; he regarded himself as almost alone in this analysis. In a note he said that Secrétan had some animadversions in that sense; and even Kant spoke of the imperative of conscience produced by the relation of the phenomenal to the noumenal will. Moral law is the direct intellectual interpretation by the reason of the pure feeling of obligation. It is the transcription into the "idea" of the "obliger" and sacred character of obligation. Law, or moral rule, is constituted by the abstract synthesis, and by intellectual generalisation of the concrete moral judgments enunciated by the subject, individual or collective, under the control of obligation,
in a given time and situation. This is the content, the variable and mobile element, in the law and moral rule.

A difficulty arises as to how a purely formal obligation (a pure "devoir être" and "devoir faire") can formulate a given, concrete moral law, in view of the possibility of different interpretations. Differentiation, rather than unity, would be the result. A grave objection was raised by Guyau in his "Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction", (1905). Guyau thought that the most important ethical works were (in England) 'Data of Ethics' by Spencer; (in Germany) 'Phénoméologie de la conscience morale' by de Hartmann; and (in France) 'Critique des Systèmes de Morale Contemporaine' by Alfred Fouillée.

Two main points emerged - naturalist morality does not furnish invariable principles, either of obligation or sanction; and idealist morality, if it does furnish these, it is purely theoretical, not assertive. Thus the imperative as absolute and categorical disappears either way. The morality of the future will be not only "autonomos" but "anomos".

Actually, Frommel had already quoted Guyau with approval, (1) where the latter pointed to "the eternal confusion of action, the sign of the will which may vary as all sign, with the inner will which can remain the same under the most divers signs. Customs change and are in perpetual evolution. It remains to be seen if morality itself contradicts itself and changes. He who carries out with good intention the most bizarre actions, is still obedient to what he believes to be moral, just and good..."(2) Frommel saw this as evidence that, as the same conscience both scandalises through variation, and reassures by identity, we are correct in distinguishing between its mode and its content.

(2) Guyau - La morale anglaise contemporaine, p. 388-389.
Guyau's moral analysis was of importance to the analysis of obligation, in which we have already constituted the distinctive Frommelian view. Contrary to the speculations of de Hartmann on the folly of the will-to-live and the "nirvana" imposed by the reason as logical duty, Guyau held, with Spencer, that conduct has, as its spring of action, the greatest and most varied life. But he disagreed that the unknowable could furnish a principle of conduct and justice. The only permissible equivalents of 'duty' are - the consciousness of our power, to which we see 'le devoir', in practice, reduced; the influence exercised by ideas on actions; the growing fusion of feelings, the increasingly social nature of pleasures and sorrows; the love of risk in action; the love of metaphysical hypothesis, a kind of 'risk' in thought. As for moral sanction, it is suppressed as containing a basically immoral element of "expiation" - the purpose is the determination of the capacity and extent of an exclusively 'scientific morality'.

We discussed above how natural, empirical man felt, through the natural revelation of the experience of obligation, a certain antinomy - death, required by Divine holiness, but not experienced, leading to moral scepticism. Frommel's psychological analysis seemed justified by reference to Guyau where he had written(1) "Basically, mankind bothers little enough about God. No martyr sacrificed himself for this solitary being in the sky. What one saw was the power capable of rendering us immortal. Man invented God to stretch out His hand to him.... If one said tomorrow to 400 million Christians: there is no God, there is only a Paradise, a man Christ, a virgin mother and saints, they would console themselves very quickly...." In the light of the menace of death to all human hopes and love, Guyau says that the problem of God, religion and ethics is

(1) op. cit. p. 50.
really re-expressed in the question of immortality - but all the evidence seems against it. "Croire à la science, semble-t-il, c'est croire à la mort."

What, then, of the feeling of obligation? "The feeling of obligation is not, indeed, properly 'moral', it is "sensible" (i.e. a thing of sense). Kant, after all, had agreed that it is impossible to conceive a priori how a pure idea, which itself contains nothing of feeling, produces a feeling of goodness or evil, of pleasure or of pain. Guyau discussed the "morality of faith", and asserted that "the temples having lost their idols, faith has taken refuge in the sanctuary of conscience; ... there remains the inner and ideal God, "le devoir", which is perhaps, itself, destined to die one day."(1)

Faith can have no more obligatory action on such as no longer have faith. "The duty to believe does not exist for those who believe already; to believe outside of what one knows can therefore never have anything of the obligatory."(2)

Guyau referred to Fouillée who made his point of departure the experimental fact that we have consciousness. Solipsism is as inadmissible in morality as in metaphysics because of its logical irrefutability. Guyan called Fouillée's morality a "morality of doubt", since it acknowledges doubt as to the knowable; the possible must be conceived and represented. "The idea of moral rule supposes not the simple conception of the possibility of the unknowable but a representation of its nature, an imaginative determination of this nature, finally the belief in a possible action of the will upon it or on its future realisation."(3)

Doubt is thus a limitation of egoism. Darwin had said that, if animals had our intelligence, their instinct would give place to a feeling of obligation. "All instinct tends to destroy itself on becoming conscious."

(1) op. cit. p. 63.
(2) op. cit. p. 68.
(3) op. cit. p. 79.
Moral obligation is a double consciousness - of the power and fecundity of superior idées-fixes, and of the resistance of contrary and egoistic tendencies. "Moral action is like the sound which awakens in us the more harmonics, the most durable and richest vibrations." (1)

Man has a need to feel great, and this sublimity he acquires in struggle, against himself and his passions, or against material or intellectual obstacles. "Rarely does an individual descend low enough to commit an act of cowardice with complete indifference." The difficulty remained, however, as to the sanction or ground of moral obligation. We cannot, in the writer's view, take account of metaphysical hypotheses to construct a positive ethic, yet neither will an exclusively scientific ethic give a definite or complete solution to the problem of moral obligation.

There is "metaphysical risk" in speculation. The noumenal, in the moral sense, is a construction of our own mind, of our own metaphysical imagination. Metaphysics, in the domain of thought, are like "artistic expenditure in the domain of economics". A hypothesis produces in practice the same effect as faith, even engenders a subsequent faith, but not one so dogmatic or affirmative as the other. Man, freed by doubt from a 'total' obligation recovers his freedom; for absolute truth is an abstraction, like a perfect circle to the mathematician. Guyau hoped for the day when there is no "orthodoxy". "Let every man be his own Christ, attach himself to God as he wills and is able, or even deny God... Happy are those to whom Christ would say: Ye of little faith! - if it meant men not prostituting their reason nor lowering their dignity: to be men of intelligence and scientific spirit...." (2) This seems an odd conclusion in view of what the writer said above - that "an exclusively

(1) op. cit. p. 139 - quoted by Guyau from his own "Education et Hérédité", p. 63.
(2) op. cit. p. 170.
scientific ethic will not give a definite or complete solution to the problem of moral obligation...."

Is there, then, a 'moral law' in nature? No – neither guilt nor punishment exist in nature as such. To "break" a natural law is but to offer a further example of its "inviolability". In fact, instead of violation there is verification. Indigestion or the results of drunkenness are not moral in character – they are physical; and medicine can, in many cases, nullify the ill-effects of a human action. There is nothing of moral or divine sanction, since the laws of nature, being scientific and to do with the physical, are amoral. Any harmony between nature and morality can be seen in respect rather of the species than the individual.

Guyau referred to Renouvier as an exponent of the morality of duty, who, while criticising the "lex talionis" as a moral basis for the conception of moral judgment (in the matter of equivalence of punishment), yet tried to conserve it in the highest sense as an expression of the soul's inbuilt concern for justice. Renouvier had written, in his "Science de la Morale"(1): "Whoever has violated another's freedom has deserved to suffer in his own." But Guyau did not find this formula acceptable, from the point of view of the Kantian generalisation of intentions. Justice should be manifested more in terms of restraint than of retribution. What, after all, is justice, if evaluated in terms of equivalence? But man has an inbuilt hatred of injustice, and regards the evil individual as having an ugliness more repelling than physical ugliness. Reward, as well as punishment, seems to be a natural requirement of the human instinct, "the penal sanctions of society being a "defence" exercised by individuals in whose place we can put ourselves in spirit, against others in whose place we do not wish to put ourselves."

(1) II, p. 296.
In the matter of religious and metaphysical sanction for morality, the writer limited it to being a kind of "guard-rail", having usefulness only where there is a road laid down and someone walking on it. Where religion employs sanctions, it is forgotten that God cannot, without reprehensible anthropomorphism, be "outraged", nor require to punish (nor reward) in terms of penal or expiatory equivalence. The noblest religious view is not that the holiest is, ipso facto, the most powerful, but rather the contrary. Frommel, of course, agreed with this in his analysis of the conception of Divine Sovereignty.

Basically, according to Guyau, even in the Kantian morality, sanction is but a supreme expedient to justify rationally and materially the formal law, the moral law. The sanction is added to the law to legitimise it. But "we must find a principle of action which is common to the two spheres - of the conscious and the unconscious - and which, becoming conscious of itself, will strengthen rather than destroy itself."(1) Here Guyau was dealing with a psychological analysis basic to Frommel's position, and went on to assert that we have found such a principle in the most intensive and extensive life possible. In a sense we have united egoism and altruism, the fundamental law being - "life is not only nutrition, it is production and fruitfulness. To live is to spend as well as to acquire." Duty is a detached expression of power tending of necessity to pass over into action. Instead of "je dois, donc je puis", we say "je puis, donc je dois." This dictum contrasted with the conclusion of Frommel, "je dois, donc je suis", to which he arrived by his analysis of constitutive human nature.

Frommel agreed that his thesis would be false and immoral if Guyau's objection had weight, but he denied that it had.

(1) op. cit. p. 245.
While it may be said that obligation in itself is bare of idea and empty of formal content, the being on whom it imposes itself is not bare and empty, a 'tabula rasa', an abstract entity. The 'material' of duty is furnished by the very nature of man, and obligation becomes concrete when it touches man, actualising and incarnating itself in human nature, and becoming determined and precise in the nexus of natural laws of human existence, which themselves have a goal, namely, conducting us to a point where they are developed in a higher sphere, the responsible consummation of the human organism in spiritual personality.

There is here an echo of Secretan, on the proper goal of nature. For example, an extract from a passage in his "Le Principe de la Morale",(1):- "In what does duty consist? I do not know. The obligation to search for it shows only that there are many roads, of which one is the good. What appears to my consciousness as duty is really my essence, my nature. I arrive at this strange yet inevitable result, that it depends upon me to "realise my nature". I must go on to seek what that true nature is - "Learn to know thyself and the world, then act in conformity with that knowledge." Individual and collective progress, the affirmation of oneself in the affirmation of others - these are the ineluctable conditions of human existence, outside of which man will only work his own destruction. Thus the goal, indefinite in the scepticism of Guyau, is to derive the particular and the concrete from the general, (i.e. the content as well as the mode), and, in sum, to achieve the full flowering and essence of man's constitutive humanity.

We now consider the relationship, according to Frommel, of the moral to the religious consciousness. His acknowledged difficulty was that of the independence of the moral phenomenon and of moral

(1) 1883, p. 129-130.
certainty in regard to the religious phenomenon and certainty. There are those who assert the independence of morality, and those who make religion a function of morality ("morality tinged with emotion", according to one definition). It seemed to Frommel that the relative independence and greater empirical certainty which attends the moral consciousness, as compared with the religious, arises from the fact that man cannot for an instant abstract himself from the historical world in which birth placed him. We may, indeed, frankly say that problems of conduct are, if not more grave or important, more immediate, actual and pressing, than those of religion. To arrive at moral consciousness, it is sufficient to be attentive to the result of obligatory action (the feeling of duty applied to conduct), while, to arrive at religious consciousness, man must be attentive to the feeling of duty (le devoir) and to its distinctive character related to its Author. The more a human life is immersed in historical activity, the more it courts the risk of identifying obligation under a single mode; for, to form a distinct and complete consciousness, the reflective will must return to the impression sustained by its principle (the unconscious) and be attentive in recollection and silence. The other reasons for the empirical inferiority of the religious, as compared with the moral, consciousness are the fact that the God of the obligation is a 'hidden' God, a "contradictory" God (as above) known in the antinomy of holiness and tolerance, and that these modes trouble the subject of obligation, leaving him uncertain and perplexed. But we again stress that the inferiority is only empirical, relating to secondary, rather than primary, reality.

Is morality contingent or absolute? Frommel opened his analysis with a critical exposé of types of contingent morality. In terms of the subject-matter, we may agree that contingency and reducibility
are the qualities of a morality which is not the derivative of the "expérience imposée" of the unconditional sense of obligation. And a further distinction must be made between moral activities involving value-judgments and legal activities involving the judgment and sanction of the State. In man's external acts and duties, we may speak of his legalo-moral activity, the sanctions here being obviously contingent and variable, only mistakenly being heightened to the "absolute", since they are not, in themselves, unconditional or unconditioned.

It is not necessary to review in detail the utilitarian moralities of Epicurean, Hobbesian or Benthamite, or other expressions. It suffices to note that whether the utilitarian principle be that of sense-pleasure (the Epicurean), in terms of which, for example, La Mettrie says: "the senses are my masters and my philosophy"; or of the benevolent tyrant (the Hobbesian); or of social legislation (that of Helvetius); or the calculations of interest, and the fact of solidarity (the utilitarianism of Bentham and Adam Smith); or the associationist ideas operating without conscious reflection (the ethics of James Mill, and developed by Stuart Mill); or the balancing of altruistic social instincts with, and indeed their emergence from, the egoistic instinct of self-conservation, their co-existence and conflicts (the universal biological evolutionism of Darwin and others.);(1) or the physico-biological "science of conduct", i.e. the adaptation of acts, conceived as means to pursued ends (the transformist, evolutionist morality of Herbert Spencer - referring particularly to his "Les Bases de la morale évoctionniste";(2) - it is clear that they all partake of contingency, and, in some cases, actually annihilate "morality" as an independent discipline of value-judgments. We may agree with Chas. Secretan when he writes: "We

find in ourselves the feeling of a duty... and we refuse to explain this feeling is such a manner as to make obligation vanish." (1) "It is absurd to talk of unknown duties, or of violated obligation, if it is not I who depend on duty, but duty on me. I form it, and it has only existence, reality or validity, for so long as I practise it. A philosophy, with that as its result, is a mockery of conscience, seeking to explain it only after it has evacuated it of its essential content...."

It is evident that history does not confirm the Spencerian theory of mechanical, necessary development. The very opposite has sometimes been the case - man has displayed elements of moral savagery at the very time when, in history, he has known a refined material and even intellectual culture. The reason, according to Frommel, of the quite high morality of the English nation in the 19th Century, was the impulse of the religious revival of Wesley. The authority, validity and influence of the sense of duty and obligation drew its power from the sudden outburst of religious fervour; and religion, far from being contingently constituted is, in fact, the transcendent, the absolute, the unconditional, penetrating the human soul. And uncountable thousands of Christians have testified that it was only by, through and as from their religious conversion that they took serious account of the moral life and the authority of duty. What, then, are the constitutive elements of the moral and religious consciousness? While denying that morality is contingently constituted, Frommel allowed that contingent elements are to be found in it. Legalo-moral activity is a basic constituent of human life and experience. By this we mean that life bears a moral and legal imprint in respect of all social relationship, "legal" referring to specifically external activities, and having reference to penalties and laws

(1) "Le Principe de la Morale, p. 169; and see H. Mieville: "La logique et l'expérience morale et religieuse": Societe de Zofuigue: Aug. 1901."
exacted by the State, and "moral" referring to the field of value - judgments by the individual in respect of private or public thought, intention or activity. Their reciprocal relationships are infinitely complex, and we may assert that there is an essentiality and universality in these, in that there has been no people known to history who do not give evidence of legalo-moral awareness. Likewise there is universality of religious activities, and we note that no religion has ever been without practical implications. The Divine object of religious belief has always represented an order of the universe to which the worshipper should submit himself in the response of obedience.

But it must be recognised that there is a legitimate element of satisfaction, a principle of interest, in religious activity. This "utilitarian" element is inseparable from that relation of interest which binds the believer to the object of his faith in even the most exalted religion. In its contingency, however, it is not the constituent element of religious activity, the absolute and unconditioned nature of it not being thereby dissolved or even threatened. The same contingent element of utilitarian interest is, of course, also present in legalo-moral activity.

Other contingent elements are the exterior and interior collective supports of public opinion and general consensus. Dependence and influence extend beyond the contemporary generation, and the authority acquired by tradition, custom and heredity is incommensurable in the individual life. This is of the nature of the authority expressed by the Catholic dictum "Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est."

It remains now to constitute the absolute elements of the moral and religious consciousness. The relative obligation accorded to
the imperatives of the utilitarian morality can only be explained as the consequence of an absolute individual obligation. One does not feel obligated to an evil will, only to a good will. "The conception I have of the good will is fixed" so wrote, one might think uncharacteristically, Guyau, in his "La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine." "He who performs even the strangest acts with good intention, yet obeys what he believes to be moral, fine and good." (1)

There is also the universal sentiment of approbation and esteem of the good, with its correlative sentiment of repulsion and outrage in the presence of evil perversity. Sacrificial heroism and self-immolation would exclude utilitarian contingency and demand a moral absolute. Likewise repentance and remorse cannot be constituted, as some psychologists have done, as a kind of suffering, a feeling of offence to our "amour-propre". In the context of socially-exacted penal sanctions, and, indeed, in the world of the literary artist, particularly in theatrical drama, there is present the underlying implication that, behind the mobile and the contingent, there is the ultimate ground of the "absolute", without which the contingent would be deprived of its raison d'etre.

What of the absolute elements in religious consciousness? Frommel made the interesting assertion (some would say; admission) that "the religious consciousness of humanity, even more than the collective moral consciousness, betrays feelings and preoccupations unexplainable in terms of religious eudaemonism"... (2) If anywhere, there can be prudential and utilitarian elements in religion, and it has been maintained that the appeal and invitation of Christ is not altogether in disinterested terms. But its central theme and constitutive element is refractory to all eudaemonism, and testifies to the existence of an unconditional and primordial obligation. Indeed,

(1) op. cit. pp. 389 and 387.
(2) op. cit. p. 415.
if utilitarianism is more openly avowed in religion than in morals, it is true that absolute imperatives are equally more absolute and manifest. Mystical doctrines of the pure love of God and unhindered contemplation of His Being are, where such are claimed, transcendent of eudaemonism. The dramatic book of Job has, as its central theme, the struggle between absolute religious obligation and religious eudaemonism; here, victory belongs, not to utilitarianism under the aspect of retributive justice, but to a disinterested religious relationship.

The supreme denial of utilitarian eudaemonism is in the highest manifestation of Biblical faith. It should be from the highest, and not from a baser, form that we should derive our norm. As Frommel put it elsewhere, we do not read off final norms and constitutive natures from life's protosae, but from the most highly differentiated and developed organism. Thus - "le croyant ne se sert plus de Dieu, mais il arrive à servir Dieu."

One is aware of a possible "non sequitur" in the deriving of a norm from a historical instance. Frommel was aware of this as early as in the presentation of his thesis in 1888, where he wrote: "In examining the life of a Buddha or a Mahomet, the factor of absolute-ness tends to disappear, all their actions, taken in isolation, can be traced to motives of ordinary psychology. The same procedure, applied to the life of Jesus, could make one believe that one had completely explained Him... But to deal only with what is observed may obscure the great delineaments of existence. As Amiel put it: "On peut pulveriser une statue sous pretexte de la mieux voir." In Reformation times, an Erasmus did not become a Luther, because he did not submit his being to the same imperatives; his were utilitarian and derived...." The last thing to be formally constituted is the
nature of the absolute. If it be agreed that an absolute element penetrates life and being, it is not found directly, either in sense-experience or thought. Sense-experience is obviously a relationship of the being to the world, i.e. a relation between two contingent factors. Neither can thought contain anything absolute - the total collapse of the so-called "proofs" of the existence of God proves that one concludes, as before, that it is man's will which alone touches the absolute, and, if that is so, it is only susceptible under the form of obligation, but this not in a mode of annihilating constraint. The expose' of Frommelian dogmatics will be seen to be basically dependent on this constitution of obligation as the sole form of the absolute accessible to the will, that is, to man himself.

What are the possible attitudes in the face of the thesis of absolute obligation?

(1) Independent Morality. This is a debate of continuing and contemporary interest, and it had been a lively issue for some time when Frommel wrote. He considered that it would be so for some time to come. Independent morality can be both starting and finishing point - starting point for the French neo-critical school, in which we found Renouvier, for example, while not denying outright the possibility and validity of the religious phenomenon, yet asserting the sufficiency for him of a cosmic law of good.

The independence of ethics from religious or, indeed, metaphysical sanctions is held by many to reflect the uncertainty with which they feel the latter to be pervaded. Guyau says that, for many, "the conception of the good will is fixed", while metaphysics and religion have foundered. People without religious faith still retain moral faith, and there are "moral atheists" who still feel attached to an absolute moral obligation. We ask: Can this be
indefinitely sustained? Others again, as above, regard an autonomous ethics as more disinterested than one resting on religious obligation, which may involve an element of utilitarianism stemming from fear of God, servility, or mercenary evaluation in prudential terms. Thus independent ethics would be superior to a religious morality.

(The following critical analysis, based on Frommel's MSS. are noted as "à refaire", but his death supervened before revision or re-expression could be undertaken...)

The first point to be made is that independent ethics would be "inconsequential" ethics. By this we mean that a denial of man's totality and solidarity is involved, in that, apparently, unless one also denies dogmatically all metaphysical and religious reality, there is, first, a serious lacuna in the metaphysics or religion, and/or, secondly, no rapport between the metaphysics or religion and the practical realities of living. Areas of man's experience must 'dove-tail' in some way, and one cannot contemplate an "absolute" in ethics which could be so constituted without reference to metaphysics or religion. This "absolute for us" - does it not, in its imperious certainty, bear witness to an "absolute in itself"? This may be unknowable, but certain. There must, then, be, in this conclusion, the germ of all metaphysics and religion. Independent ethics can only persist by the arbitrary denial of all metaphysical and religious thinking, and must therefore be judged "inconsequential".

The charge of utilitarianism in religious morality comes strangely from the exponents of independent morality, in which the utilitarian element has been so powerful and dominant. Actually, the greatest exponents, from whom the norm should be derived, of religious ethics are those with whom the utilitarian element is most
obviously absent; we think of a Job, a Paul, a Jesus.... The great
superiority of religious consciousness over moral consciousness is
constituted in this that morals without religion are either fatally
utilitarian and contingent, or disinterested and 'independent', and
a synthesis cannot be made. But with religious morals, punishment
and reward are of the same order as fault and good, both participa-
ting in the same absolute. The reward of duty is its accomplish-
ment, of holiness, to be holy, of love, to love perfectly; the puni-
ishment of sin is sin itself.... Thus, in religious consciousness,
there is unification and identification of disinterested and utili-
tarian elements - both are rendered possible in the domain of the un-
conditional.

Independent ethics are absolute only in appearance, for they are
deprived of sanction. The absolute means that which is inviolable,
sovereign and ultimately real. Obligation, not working in terms of
determining constraint, can be violated in fact, and is so constantly.
It would cease to be the absolute, if, violated in fact, it did not
remain inviolable in right. This right is precisely the sanction.
An absolute obligation can remain absolute only if its absoluteness,
v violated in fact, remains inviolate in right. The feeling of sanc-
tion is inseparable from that of obligation. Judgment, and the fear
of it, is manifest in popular consciousness; it is a sanction of
obligation, forming part of universal ethical experience. One might
indeed feel that this apprehensiveness and the concomitant desire for
ultimate justice would indicate the religious nature of morality, and
would demand a sanction beyond the contingent relativities of earthly
pain and pleasure. Far from being self-sufficient in itself, the
phenomenon of obligation demands an author and a guarantee as abso-
lute as itself. God is implied as Author of obligation and judge of
the moral life. Human truth is not only a moral truth, it is a religious truth.

(2) Religion as a function of morality. There are two main expressions of this view. The first is the envisaging of morality as the means of conducting the subject to religion. This usually involves the fallacy of confounding the moral law with obligation, making of the obligatory imperative a sovereign code, then passing from the law to the legislator. The moral phenomenon is primary, the religious secondary, as derived.

At least, it does not share the inconsequential nature of independent morality, doing justice to the solidarity of the moral and religious phenomena, but it seems an odd argument that God is a conclusion of moral thought - if morality is a divine creation, religion is a human construction upon it! The first rebuttal is that the cause and effect is not a necessary bond, either in logic or experience; moral atheism refuses apparently the logical conclusion, and the opposite phenomenon is also found, of religion without morality (in the sublimest cases, that of the mystics.) The second rebuttal is that the argument leads, not to true religion, but, in fact, only to metaphysics or theology. To conclude God from the law of good is to operate a syllogism and carry out a process of reasoning. God is not the object of thought, the conclusion of syllogistic reasoning, in which the reality of religious life and piety is ruled out. He does not come to man as a legislator inferred from the intermediary of the moral law.

Others, again, have envisaged the moral absolute as conditioning God Himself. Kant, for example, having, in his "Critique of pure reason" destroyed the metaphysical pretensions of intellectualism, arrived, in the "Critique of the practical reason", at the postulate
of religion and, consequently, the existence of God. Religion is thus made a function of morality for reasons of the theory of knowledge, and this tradition is carried forward by the neo-Kantian French critical school, represented by Renouvier and others, eminent among whom was H. Bois of Montauban, who categorically asserted, "it is an illusion to imagine that we perceive God in immediacy acting directly in and upon our soul.... What we find is a specific idea, the idea of obligation provoking a certain specific exercise of our 'affections'. There are feelings of remorse and moral satisfaction - but moral obligation is not itself a feeling. If one speaks of a "feeling of obligation", it is to recognise the presence of a specific idea, that of invariable and universal law, of categorical imperative, of duty...." Elsewhere, he said that obligation is a constitutive law of our reason, one which our reason imposes on our will. Frommel's analysis was antipodean to that of Bois. The latter starts from an a priori intellectualism, the former from an experimental volitionism. Thus Bois held obligation to be an a priori category of reason, which reason transmits to the will, while Frommel held obligation to be an experience of the will, transmitted by it to the reason.

Bois himself acknowledged a certain weakness in his derivation of the idea of God from moral postulates. One would more properly say that God should exist, or must exist, rather than claiming that He does exist. The existence of God is not so stringently associated with the moral law as are freedom and immortality - if virtue could find itself sufficient reward, God would no longer have a raison d'être. The true position of neo-criticism is shown to be that of 'independent ethics', where it is possible, if the syllogism is not accepted, to affirm a moral law without a law-giver, to affirm jus-

(2) op. cit. p. 547.
tice without a judge. It is, in effect, to replace an uneasy Kantian "theodicy" by a "cosmodicy", in which the postulate of God is arbitrary, not necessary. But man is a religious being at the same time as a moral being. He does not become religious because he is moral - it is rather that he is moral because he is religious.

(3) Reciprocal independence of religion and morality. There is similarity here to (1), but the emphasis is on their mutual conformity, convergence and interpenetration. There is disagreement again between Frommel and Bois, while similar positions to that of Bois had been advanced by thinkers like Grétillat and Paul Chapuis. In his "Discours sur le sentiment religieux", (1) Bois affirmed that "moral and religious feelings are two distinct types of feelings, although in the normal forms they are closely mixed, so that superficial observation is tempted to confound them." He said elsewhere that they are two irreducible phenomena, and founded the distinction, or heterogeneity, between the moral and religious feeling on historical and psychological grounds - moral feeling is attached to a law, an idea forming an integral part of our nature, while religious feeling is one attached to a being distinct from ourselves, a self outside of ourselves.

This must be criticised on the ground that, as above, moral obligation cannot be explained either by an idea or by a law - it involves a relationship, of person to person, of will to will. Obligation is moral when applied to social relationships, religious when applied to our relationship with God. The argument that, where there are two things really one and the same, the disappearance of one involves the disappearance of the other, is valid only where there is identity of essence and function. The practical separation in their lives, by some, of religion and morality (one appearing, to the

seeming exclusion of the other) is offered by the neo-critics as proof of the heterogeneity of the two, and of their essential independence. But the logical contradiction inherent in the assertion of heterogeneity is made manifest when we find that its exponents yet attach, in one way or in another, the moral law to God, saying that "with the religious man, the moral emotion combines, unites, and even identifies, itself with religious emotion." In other words, observation falsifies logic, a logic basically vitiated, in any case, by a primary contradiction. Having postulated heterogeneous origins of obligation, (the result of a fact, idea or law; and on the other hand, of a personal relation, between God and man), we cannot have homogeneity of essence. Of course, Bois escaped from this dilemma by denying the existence of a properly "religious" obligation.

Finally, studying the life of Christ, we cannot distinguish, in the simple unity of His consciousness, between the moral and the religious. This realised unity attests the rejection of the theory of irreducibility as being only apparent, and therefore false as unfaithful to the facts of observation. Any dissociation is relative, and we conclude that man is not moral in one part and religious in another, perpetually vacillating between them. They are two functions of his being, being expressions in their own domains of the one generic, constitutive experience of obligation.

(4) Morality as a function of religion. Frommel constituted, as the formula of human truth, "the essentially religious character of absolute obligation in the human consciousness." He said that he arrived at this conclusion, first, by negative exclusion - the failure of sensationism, volitionism, intellectualism, and the arguments from contigence, independence, heterogeneity and irreducibility. This would, however, still leave the case hypothetical.
The supreme object for study and analysis is the observable Christian faith and life. Even without claiming exclusive uniqueness, it remains, in its historical manifestation, the purest, most lasting and effective, the most beneficial, expression of the divine-human encounter and experience. It has an obviously historical function - the moral redemption of man, i.e. the redemption of his moral capacity depending on the religious relationship renewed with God by Jesus Christ. It is important to remember that, in citing historical Christianity, "abusus non tollit usum", and we are constituting the norm of Christian faith, morally and religiously, in terms of the witness to, and of, Jesus Christ.

Frommel admitted a certain apprehension in approaching the final analysis. The results were of supreme importance, and he had felt himself at times somewhat lonely in the enterprise, since, among those who had come to determine morality as a function of religion, co-terminous with the primacy and autonomy of the religious phenomenon, he was not aware of any thinker who had arrived at the conclusion by exactly similar reasoning.

He went on to name those who had been his most important antecedents, reckoning, as we have seen, Schleiermacher as "the founder of modern theology". He had, unfortunately, defined the root of the religious phenomenon as a feeling of absolute dependence, thus ruling out freedom, and obtaining the absoluteness of religion at the cost of the suppression of a true morality which requires freedom of response, i.e. responsibility. The supreme task has, in fact, been to establish religious obligation as an absolute, primary fact, while yet maintaining the absolute character of moral obligation. By attributing origin and cause to it, we would be explaining it; and, by explaining, we condition it, and remove its absoluteness. We
would then, indeed, be conditioning the unconditional, which is a contradiction; and we would be annulling the specific concept of obligation in favour of a quite different one, constraint.

The required analytic method is, therefore, not one of stating an "a priori", nor is it one of logical demonstration, but, rather, a "showing", a describing, of reality. One does not prove that which is; one can but describe and declare it. In the phrase noted elsewhere, "on ne peut que raconter". In this, Frommel was surely right, in terms of his own methodological principle. He, further, acknowledged the antecedence of Secrétan's thought to his own in this field, and the following account of the thought of "le philosophe de Lausanne", as he was called, shows that this acknowledgement was justified.

Secrétan declared his theologico-ethical purpose thus:- "the perfection of life is the final goal of all the strivings of thought." He laid supreme emphasis on moral consciousness, and, within that, upon freedom as its great prerequisite. From his "Recherches de la methode", we learn that "the moral consciousness is not the only function by which our soul arrives at truth: but it is it which gives us the most important truths. Observation, dialectic, conscience are the guides to whose counsels the seeker must be constantly attentive. Their harmony is the secret of method."

This accorded with the approach of Frommel - the necessity of being subservient to the terms and discipline of the subject.

The following was the distinctive approach of Secrétan - "Morality must not be subordinated to metaphysics, but it is not independent of metaphysics.... Philosophy will endure because it is necessary to morality, and morality is necessary to humanity. But morality founds theoretic philosophy rather than is founded by it. To

(1) In, for example, his "Philosophie de Leibnitz".
determine the material of duty, a certain anthropology is necessary, hence a certain metaphysic. The feeling of obligation must have a theoretic justification; there cannot be an ultimate antagonism between thought and life, between theory and practice - we must reconcile "le droit et le fait".

Moral consciousness is something irreducible and absolute; it is the inner voice saying "tu dois". Secrétan accepted the usage of the word "sentiment" (feeling), but averred that it is not just a feeling but a certainty. It is immediate, instinctive certainty of obligation, which is the witness yielded by reason to itself in our mind. Reason is that which has consciousness as its obligatory characteristic. Moral consciousness is not a particular faculty, but an aspect, an application of the reason. It is the reason applied to the will, to freedom. Consciousness is the obligatory character of reason. Secrétan does not agree with the Kantian distinction between the theoretic and practical reason - an "essential" unity is the necessary consequence of the indefinable, but incontestable, unity of the human mind.

The religious character of obligation is derived from the impossibility of man being unconditionally obligated by a part of his own nature. There is a revelation, therefore, in obligation, of a higher, an unconditioned, order; the supreme subject can only be described as God. "All morals are religious, perhaps unknown to them; ... croire au devoir c'est croire en Dieu." Conscience, i.e. consciousness in its moral mode, is a function of a living being. Thus diversity of view on what constitutes good is not, per se, an argument against it - far from judging something good because it pleases us, we should learn to find our pleasure in what the reason tells us is good. This did not, for Secrétan, involve a
petitio principii, for, as above, it is the immediate, instinctive certainty of obligation which is the witness yielded by reason to itself in our mind. "Moral truths are eternal, universal and necessary in their principle, just as are logical and mathematical truths, but we find that moral assessments are not unanimous among human beings. An insight to be used by Frommel was this of Secrétan that "the true creation of man in nature, is the appearance of the moral consciousness. Progress and error notwithstanding, the Creator put within a free humanity a "germe divin". The sovereign mystery, moral and metaphysical, is the mystery of grace - "the Eternal God wishes to be born and to grow in humanity."

What is, in fact, commanded in "le devoir"? All subjective morality is illusory, and that which is ordered in conscience is to be 'logical', i.e. to make ourselves in reality what we are in principle and by destiny, to strive to become conformed to our essential nature. We must therefore strive to 'know ourselves'. The result is to find freedom and solidarity, good being constituted in an activity of the first within the context of the second. The supreme duty is sincere devotion, and the cardinal virtue, love.

Frommel also paid tribute to another writer, who had no doubt that the moral phenomenon is essentially a religious phenomenon, and that there is no place for an "independent morality". He was J. Bovon, whose "La Morale Chrétienne", he had favourably reviewed. (1) it is, he says, "the crowning of a great work, in days when so many things are questioned. Christian morality, as experimental, is separate from philosophy as it concerns itself with the life created by Jesus Christ, whereas philosophy is concerned with the study of customs as observed. Christian ethics are distinguished from dogmatics as life is from truth." Frommel, however, questioned Bovon's

(1) Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie: 1899.
view that "like causal law, duty is an innate idea, but of the moral order", and he was sceptical of the affirmation that "the morality of duty starts from the idea of the good". Can an idea oblige? It is rather the other way round – one starts from the fact of obligation to arrive at the idea of the good. In the field of psychological determinism, Bovon trounced the attack on moral freedom, as one must in other determinisms, evolutionary, metaphysical,

As Secretan had said, "It is possible to doubt duty and its absolute validity – but the doubt is criminal!"... This described "man without the law"; Bovon also analysed "man under the law", with special reference to what is implied in the Judaic pre-Christian era, viz. the problems of indifferent actions, supererogatory works and conflict of duties – "legalism must, however, lead straight to the Gospel".

Freedom is also the element stressed by one whose writings Frommel accounted as contributing to the shaping of his thought—Maine de Biran, called "Le Solitaire de Bergerac", and, in the context of his ethical writing, "un stoicien manqué". Psychology and ethics agree on the necessity of responsibility and freedom as correlate and central concepts in the realisation of duty. De Biran said (2) – "to put freedom at issue is to put thereby the feeling of existence of the self, which is the same thing, at issue. Freedom is nothing else than the feeling of our activity, or our possibility of activity, of creating the effort constitutive of the self. The necessity opposed to it is the feeling of our passivity.

(1) The main outlines of his thinking are to be found in "Oeuvre Philosophique de Maine de Biran" (Cousin: 1841), and "Maine de Biran – Sa vie et ses pensees"; (Ern. Naville: 1857); thesis by Ernest Murisier – "Maine de Biran: Esquisse d'une Psychologie Religieuse" (Paris – Imprimerie des Ecoles (Jouve): 1892.

Necessity and passivity are but a privation of freedom, and to deny freedom is like denying existence."

Moral obligation differs from physical and logical necessity in that man preserves autonomy and the right to refuse submission. But the will is free only on condition of remaining intimately united with the ideal it should pursue; when duty is lost sight of, and man falls under the dominion of egoism, passions take control and freedom perishes. The intelligent, active being does not annihilate the passions, but uses their strength to reach the goal more rapidly, like a sailor using contrary winds and currents.

Here is a germ of the Frommelian insight into the constitution of human nature in terms of the experience of the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience; it has within it intimation of its normative character which is to be achieved through, and in terms of, realisation, ("Réalise ta nature..."). The error of Pelagianism was to regard good and evil as if equidistant from some 'point d'appui'; this is not to treat of a real human being, but of an abstract, fictitious entity. At each instant of living, man is not equally free in his actions, for past activity and experience determine his present and future. Freedom has, thus, a highly paradoxical nature - it is required for moral responsibility, yet is not present in a "bare" sense. This found its echo in Frommel's analysis of the will, as being subliminally and unconsciously constrained, yet, having freedom, in the context of the recognition of "le devoir", known in the experience of obligation, in the reflective will to respond. Schelling, speaking as a metaphysician, rather than as a psychologist, had said: "The act of willing is the first condition of self-consciousness." The essence of de Biran's psychological analysis is that the will exercises itself on the
brain, the centre of spontaneous activity, which it represses, and over which it gains the advantage, cerebral effort being inseparable from a felt resistance. It is clear that Frommel, in his psychology of the will, avoided any suggestion of the reflective will acting on the organ of knowledge or perception, partly through his fear of handing over, as it were, the experience of obligation to that faculty in which there can be only the constraint of the logical and the necessary, and partly because the brain is not the seat or originator of dynamic action. The constitutive nature of obligation is in the rapport of one personal will with another, in which the reason can act only as an agent of interpretation. According to Ribot, for example, (1) "Consciousness knows only two things, arrival and departure - the "I will" and the act produced or brought about. All intermediate states escape it, and it knows them only by acquired knowledge and indirectly."

We now note the most important reactions to, and criticism of, Frommel's distinctive analysis - the principal one of German-speaking Switzerland, a Lausanne-centred dialogue, and an account of the continuing discussion between Frommel and H. Bois of Montauban. The chapter ends with a summing-up and an Appendix setting out references to the Apologetics in periodicals.

First, we refer to the outline and critique by Adolf Keller entitled - "Die Menschliche Wahrheit; Ein Apologetisches Werk von Gaston Frommel." (1) He prefaced his outline and critique by an approval of a non-theological journal's noticing of the work of an influential French (Swiss) Protestant thinker in the noble line of Naville and Secretan and Vinet. His abiding and almost exclusive concern is with the moral point of view - "le scrupule Protestant"; it is a kind of saving ark of absolute ideas in a flood of relati-

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(1) In his "Psychologie de l'attention", p. 72.
vities and meaninglessness. Keller followed with an expose of Frommel's thought, in which man is constituted as man in the experience of obligation, all utilitarian, eudaemonistic or evolutionary considerations being ruled out. There is a pure feeling of being obligated - "zu etwas verpflichtet zu sein". That which is experienced in the will is an activity, unconditioned and unmediated located in the subconscious which has hidden, inner powers, being simple and undifferentiated and not under the dominance of reason. "Es ist das Potentielle oder die Virtualität unseres Wesens, eine blosse Möglichkeit oder Fähigkeit oder Anlage, die nach Verwirklichung drängt...."(1) In this lies the unconscious principle of morality, and also the genetic root of religion. At first the Divine activity is voiceless, until it is translated and formulated into intellectual and moral concepts and laws. The formula "réalise ta nature" points to both individualisation and solidari-
sation; this is why, while 'morals' change, 'morality' remains. The mood of West Swiss Calvinism is determined by the persuasion of the reign of unconditional duty, and here lies the root of its moral rigour; German Switzerland thinks historically and relatively, while the French emphasis has been more on bringing history under the judgment of the idea. The danger of the latter is of constructing a theology foreign to reality; of the former the loss of an indis-
pendable absolute standard for the analysis of reality. Frommel sited his work in the area of the ultimate problems of being and thought.(2)

The root of religion lies, not in reason or logical thought, nor even in the reflective consciousness, but in the affective and ima-
ginative part of the mind, inaccessible to the critical conscious-
ness. By siting the influence of God in the unconscious, psycho-

(1) op. cit. p. 104.
(2) op. cit. p. 109.
ology is removing a certain form of exclusive relationship of the self to God, a claim energetically maintained by Karl Heim in his work "Glaubensgewissheit". God in a relationship both transcendent and immanent is a conception in line with the mystical view of Meister Eckhart, the infusion of God and the soul. But there is a risk of subjectivism, there being other "unconscious" influences, and indeed unsavoury influences, in the subconscious; there are also to be reckoned with animal instincts, "the power of collective mind, race, mankind and its history - even evil and demonic forces, not concerned with moral obligation, but with powers of temptation and the constraints of blind destiny."(1)

Keller felt that man's nature and existence are richer and more complicated than Frommel allowed. As well as a feeling of absolute obligation, there are other tendencies of the soul - to paganism and gnostic religious forms. Frommel did not make clear why he took the moral powers and elements in the subconscious as Divine activity; there are others, and he seems to make an arbitrary selection. We cannot avoid asking how God is "given", e.g. as Creator, under the aspect of the subconscious, and it seems unscientific to propose something, and leave it as an unsubstantiated hypothesis. This was the substance of the criticism of Frommel by Wernle in an article in the "Basler Nachrichten" through the Waadtländer Theologen Jung (vers la vérité éternelle). There is thus evinced criticism, and no unconditional approval, of Frommel's work. Rationalistic theology of course regards the preoccupation with the subconscious an escape into myth and a flight from logic - it may be "als eine Verkürzung der Tatsacher...."(2) But a living religion pulsates through his work, and he always placed himself under the constraint of moral obligation and the majesty of a holy, divine will. He

(1) op. cit. p. 114.
(2) op. cit. p. 115.
transcended in his impelling strength the limitations and weaknesses of historical embodiment.

We next take account of the dialogue between Pierre Bovet and G. Berguer. (1) Bovet thought that Frommel's analysis was not "scientific", depending on a mystical belief; this, however, in itself does not necessarily deny it validity. If we, in our theoretical analysis of an element of human experience, go beyond the purely phenomenal and pass through and beyond secondary causes, we may not be "scientific" in the simplest sense of the word, but we must not, in the name of science, deny validity to the conclusion. Obligation, as the constraint of "le devoir", is not patient of rigorous "scientific" analysis without profound alteration of its nature. There is a necessary heterogeneity, but no necessary antinomy nor contradiction, between ethics, the sphere of freedom, duty and the absolute, and science, the sphere of the necessary and the relative and contingent. As Boutroux said, "Science studies that which is, ethics that which should be, that which is appropriate or obligatory. It is impossible to fit the one to the other." Similarly, Bovet: "As a man of science, the psychologist must refuse to admit in advance the absoluteness of duty." It may fairly be objected that Frommel did not distinguish clearly between simple experience and objective psychology and what might be termed subjective beliefs. On the other hand, when Frommel offers his doctrine as "scientific", he means by that that it is experimental and descriptive, that is to say, faithful to empirical data. His use of the word "scientific" is dictated, not by rationalistic considerations nor metaphysical criteria, which imply reasoning rather than description, but rather in terms of his own methodological standards (see thesis references to 'Method'). To be scientific, i.e. to apply the "scientific method",

(1) Published in the Lausanne Revue: 1913, under the titles of "Le Mystère du Devoir", and "A propos d'un Mystère".
implies submission to the terms and discipline of the particular faculty and area of study.

What is obligation? Is it a "feeling"? We must distinguish between feeling as pure, i.e. passively defined, and feeling as inclination, i.e. actively defined. Feeling may be regarded as experience, i.e. inner perception, what Wm. James understands, generally, as intuition, immediate apperception of a psychic fact; it is that which gives contact with the non-self. It may be regarded as a tendency whose nature is to solicit without constraint, or, in simplest terms, pure feeling of pleasure or pain. It is clear from this diversity, that the phenomenon of obligation is not so simply constituted as Frommel would suggest, but is complex, a psychological synthesis comprising active, cognitive and affective elements.

As we have already seen, the neo-critical analysis of obligation makes of it a rational, a priori category, in line with the Kantian view defining obligation as an "idea". Careful definition is required - while he acknowledges that duty is often presented under an intellectual form, bordering therefore, on the ideational, Frommel yet refuses to constitute obligation as "idea". Philippe Daulte, however, writes: (1) "The feeling of duty, as Frommel allows, always comprises an idea. Thus we cannot reduce (the phenomenon of obligation) to pure feeling or tendency; enveloped in the feeling is a confused idea, a vague notion of duty. The term 'moral law' is not so explicit and definite in Kant as Frommel thinks. For Kant and his disciples, the a priori moral law is but a form, a pure "tu dois", not a concrete law, a code of morals analogous to the Decalogue... ...it is the conclusion of Boutroux, that it is "at the "prick" of the idea of duty, that we make ourselves define our duties"... Thus, it appears true to say that the idea of duty

(1) op. cit. p. 110.
accompanies the feeling of obligation - what is the matter of duty and the content of obligation is not always actual and perceptible. Indeed, to pronounce on which, as between feeling and idea, is anterior or antecedent to the other, one feels that empirical analysis must give place to the domain of metaphysics or to that of epistemology. Frommel's opposition to the primacy of the "idea" in the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience was grounded in his reservations regarding the function of the reason in its analysis. Obligation cannot be a function of the reason because, in terms of causality, it excludes freedom; because, being a secondary faculty, derived in relation to the will, reason cannot supply a rule or norm; and because a law can only constrain, not oblige.

Bovet pointed out that, before Kant, ethics had not been defined as the science of duty but as that of the good. The ancients did not conceive the moral ideal under the form of a law or command, nor did even Descartes, Spinoza nor Leibnitz. Where philosophers to a small extent concerned themselves with the notion of duty, they talked, as if in psychological terms, of a 'feeling' of duty. Kant's work was a refutation of the empiricism of Locke and Hume, who derived the feeling of obligation from agreeable or disagreeable sensations; by isolating it, Kant gave the concept of obligation a certain mystery. Bovet went on to give an account of the distinctive Malanist analysis of obligation, which denied obligating power to "an idea, even be it universal". It was after all the view of Wm. James, that it was from the publication in 1886 of Malan's "Conscience Morale" that great progress was made in the field of psychological understanding. There was the distinctive conception of the affording by the subconscious of an area in which the Divine Will acted under the aspect of obligation. The danger with this,
however, was the introduction of an element of mystery which may nullify scientific validity. The statement "the feeling of duty is the feeling of a Divine action" could be, perhaps, just a sophism, or else the affirmation of mystic evidence not amenable to discussion, not being a "scientific" hypothesis. We may note, in this connection, Frommel's own assertion, in "Lettres et Pensées" - "In psychology, the word God is but a value-judgment"...

Bovet took the opposite view to that of Kant, where the latter said that "the respect which we have for a person is in reality the respect for the law of which the person gives example". Bovet rather thought that "the prestige of the law is explained only by the prestige of the person to whom we accord it." That is to say that the mystery of duty is the mystery of the prestige of personalities. Society and Reason indeed give a 'sense of duty', but, to theologians, the supreme factor is 'divine action' conceived as that of a personal will. For Christians the moral law is furnished in terms of Him who "spoke with authority."

"One must read the Gospels not to find there texts and precepts, but there to contemplate a Person who is the principle of the obligation of conscience. Love duty?... How?... It is the miracle of the Gospel, that, in loving Jesus Christ, one loves duty."(1)

Berguer agreed that Bovet's treatment of the idea of duty was strictly "scientific", but such has its limitations - in particular, that questions of origin and validity have to be left to one side. This may be required from a phenomenological point of view,(2) and theologians should not be too disturbed - after all, they, within the terms of their discipline, are not attempting, nor are they committed, to offer a 'psychology', but are discussing God and His actions. Sometimes they must enter the sacrosanct domains of those

(1) Frommel: "Lettres et Pensées".
(2) See Chapter on Phenomenology.
who, in the name of science, exclude transcendence. The purpose of Malan and Frommel was primarily a religious concern as to the basis of morality, rather than claiming to outline a scientific theory of obligation and duty. The originality of Frommel lay, not simply in placing a subconscious divine action at the base of duty, but rather in his analysis of duty, particularly that there is comprised an irreducible inner duality - the divine and the human factors. In his reply to Bovet, Bergner suggested that Bovet was influenced by the sociological school of Durkheim, and others, who added obligatory social customs to the rational imperatives of Kant. There could be confusion here, as already pointed out by Kant, between 'moral obligation' and "social constraint". But there must be present an element of introspection where obligation is to be acknowledged along with the autonomy of the individual. There seems to arise in all experience a distinguishing characteristic of duty, distinguished, that is, from all other psychic manifestations by a character "sui generis".... "Moral obligation gives to the individual the impression of an imperative in accord with his personal autonomy, while yet reaching past it, soliciting the individual to action, but essentially within, without, and sometimes against, outer human interventions"...

But Bovet did not seem to study the feeling of duty which has led his subject to submit himself to the experiences from which he received. Duty arising in a 'conflict of tendencies', there is introduced, a voluntary heteronomy - there being only an 'imitation', agreed to for the moment, of the true feeling of obligation, which, though unconditioned, is experienced in terms of the autonomy of the subject. It would appear that, outside of the imperative of conscience, all morality would be reduced to a sociology, which would
raise a question of phenomenological reductionism, as affecting a matter "sui generis".

Berguer warned against allowing the autonomy of duty to fade, to the advantage of vague social heteronomies, and was concerned to know by what criteria we might prefer one personality to another in terms of "prestige". It could lead to Caesarism or to anarchy. There is a risk in displacing the centre of gravity of duty, and a Protestant principle is even endangered by the introduction of a "principle of authority" under the symbol of "prestige".

This pinpoints a dangerous element in Frommel's thought in respect of the relationship between Christ and duty, between the Gospel and ethics. So deeply moral - some would say 'moralist' - is his thinking that, in his Dogmatics, there is uncertainty as to the relationship between nature and grace. Although it is, in fact, a false charge - false to the true nature of his piety, and, indeed, his mysticism - his expressions sometimes give the appearance of proposing the new faith and obedience to Christ as in terms of a new 'moralism'.

Bovet did not think the gap between him and Berguer was so wide as suggested, disclaiming the suggestion that he had treated obligation in terms of conflict of tendencies, and agreeing that the reasoning faculty is not the whole of man. "As a man of science, he said, (1) - the psychologist must not admit in advance the absoluteness of duty; he knows that he could be morally obliged to deny moral obligation. But the analyses and deductions from concepts will never lead the abstract intelligence of the logician into the domain of that which is; nor will causal determinations - nor those of the psychologist or the biologist ever make our concrete personality leave the world of duty which is its own...." Berguer's

(1) "Les Conditions de l'obligation de Conscience".
alternatives of Caesarism or anarchy are not all-embracing or exclusive of any other. Indeed the Christian one is legitimate dialectically, expressing the "normative" pattern of obligation in the encounter of the Divine and human wills, and a "normative" nature of man in the historical person of Jesus Christ. Bovet quoted approvingly from Hume - "There is no method in philosophical disputes, commoner or more to be condemned, than to attack a hypothesis because of the danger it might bring to religion and morality. An opinion is certainly false if it leads to absurdities - but it is never so on the ground that its consequences are dangerous."

Frommel had in H. Bois of Montauban both friend and theological adversary. Their dialogue, public and private, extended over the years from 1887 till Frommel's death. That which divided them was the question of the status and nature of the reason in its relation to the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience and to the experience of the regenerative activity of God.

As early as Dec. 1887, Frommel wrote to Bois commenting on his article in the "Chrétien Evangelique" entitled "De la certitude Chrétienne". He said that in the essay he detected the baleful influence of Renouvier in the somewhat abstract treatment of regeneration. Three months later, he wrote again: "I agree that theology is a philosophical conception of religion, and that it cannot be done without the employment of the reason; further, that the intelligence remains identical in its functions, no matter to which object it is applied. What do you mean by philosophy? If it is a systematisation of cosmic laws, among which are the laws of the Christian life, and, if theology, as the philosophy of the religion of Christ, takes its departure-point in human experience and is then extended to include Christian experience, I think you are a thousand
times wrong." Some days later, he continued: "For philosophy not to be simply a soap-bubble, it must rest on experience. Schérer wrote wise words in 1857: 'the Church is in danger so long as she has not shown that faith has its own method and its special lights.'

Bois, in turn, reproached Frommel for his oft-repeated assertion that causality, in a metaphysical deterministic sense, is the distinguishing nature and principal category of the reason. There are surely other categories, e.g. time, number, quantity; and, while scientific thought finds in reason the principles and forms of its distinctive task, metaphysical and moral thought equally find in reason the laws and categories with which to describe the world without detriment to the ideas of personality, freedom or value.

Other similar exchanges followed, culminating in their main confrontation in 1902-03. In sum, the position of Bois was that "obligation is itself a rational idea", while that of Frommel remained as clearly set out in his Apologetics, namely that obligation is more properly constituted as a feeling, an experienced phenomenon, the solicitation of the human will by the divine, "une expérience imposée" rather than a metaphysical conception vitiated by a-priorism and the inescapable determinism which afflicts the intellectual faculty.

As Frommel put it: "despite considerable agreement in the field of the religious life, the disagreement is about the "point de départ"; your theology is based on an extra-Christian philosophy, only becoming Christian by a "coup de force" and a fortunate, but artificial, change of direction. There is antinomy, indeed dichotomy, between the neo-critical (the abstract) and the Christian (the concrete) life."

A little asperity of tone crept into one of the letters by

(1) See, in particular, "Sentiment religieux et sentiment moral" - Revue de Montauban: 1902; and letters from 1902 to 1904.
Frommel, (Apr. 1904): "Are Renouvier and Pillon Christian as well as Protestant? Protestantism is, after all, but a Christian method. Your outburst on Pillon and Miéville amused me. If we comprehend only by categories, one has been lacking in you in reading me - that of humour! It would not even be sufficient to adopt a non-intellectualist conception to be saved from intellectualism. What I deplore is that your theology is so little your own, and that it seems to follow a system heterogeneous with yourself..."

In contrast with Renouvier, who had defined obligation as a synthesis of freedom and necessity, resulting from putting the moral law and the will in contact with each other, Bois, following Pillon, considered obligation as an irreducible rational category, and, to the question of the heterogeneity of obligation and abstract thought, Bois would reply that obligation is a special category, because, if it is defined as "a feeling", it would be deprived of absoluteness and universality, since feelings are individual and contingent, and there could be no reason to assume that as a feeling it had this validity sui generis. Although, according to Frommel, obligation is anterior to reflective thought, we may feel that this does not prove that it is anterior to the subconscious. The will is submitted to a rational law, feeling obligated before the vise of conscious (i.e. reflective) thought - otherwise, reason requires the intervention of the will to apply its categories to thought and activity. If man were 'pure reason', the moral law could have no effect and might as well not exist (effectively). According to Bois, the moral law had all the characteristics of a rational law, belonging to the essence of our mental nature, its role being rational. There was, however, a certain Berkeleian démarche involved where Bois, echoing an earlier assertion which still dominated his
thinking, conceived the moral law, as all constitutive laws of the mind, as deriving from the continuous presence and irradiation of divinity in our minds.... This passage from a psycho-metaphysical analysis of obligation as a rational a priorist category to its founding in Divine Creation and Conservation is exactly the heterogeneity of which Frommel complains in his letter, quoted above.

Must we choose, in absolute terms, between Montauban and Geneva? We have a special datum, sui generis, seeming always to go beyond the limits of the category under which one tries to subsume it. Reason, for example, comprises more principles and diversity of function than Frommel admitted, but it must be said that it still does not follow, 'ipso facto', that duty is one of these. Other a priori categories are those of identity, and of sufficient reason, in the Leibnitzian sense; and the law of contradiction. How do these go with the imperatives of conscience? The answer, with Bois, lay in a "hierarchy" of categories according to extension and necessity.

A major difficulty would thus appear - if obligation makes its imperious demands in and to the theoretical reason, it cannot itself be a category of the reason. Further, obligation is "inevident" as a category of the reason, not as illusory or subjective, but in the Cartesian sense, of not being "clear and distinct ideas, but such as remain an 'object of faith', i.e. a value-judgment and not a matter of intellectual constraint. The laws of reason, indeed, cannot be "proved". Even if we create a category of obligation, difficulty is not removed, and, in fact, a tautology is gratuitously introduced, viz. that the moral law obligates because it obligates, being "sui generis". It is still difficult to see how a law (or

(1) "La philosophie idéaliste et la théologie". Revue de Montauban, 1895, p. 561.

(2) op. cit. p. 116f.

(3) See his "Monadology".

category) of reason can act on feeling and determine a will. Both Renouvier and James pointed out that "ideas" have a tendency to be translated into actions - but we are not dealing with "forms of thought", a quite different matter.

Through all this, Frommel's position remained clear. It was based on a fundamental premise, of which an earlier expression was that of Chas. Secretan - "duty itself is God; of what more He is all are equally ignorant, but those who believe in Him know that He is duty."(1) It is in and by obligation that God is revealed in a living way, the judgment not, however, resting on scientific knowledge nor on 'rational' evidence, but on mystic intuition; duty manifesting itself as the voice of a Person, the solicitation by a holy will of ours. As Guayau conceded(2) - "There is no duty, save toward someone. Theologians were hardly wrong to represent duty as addressing itself to the Divine Will. At least, "on sentait quelqu'un par derrière...."

It was the judgment of Daulte, with which we agree, that, since, empirically, we cannot judge between the idea of duty and the feeling of obligation in the matter of logical precedence, the weight of reason is with Frommel, who, metaphysically, gives precedence to the feeling, from which then flows the idea, of duty.(3) Reason is thus to be regarded, not in the cold, arid and mechanistic terms in which Frommel seemed mostly to envisage it, nor having, through one of its own categories, the power to generate the phenomenon of self-determining obligation, but as a supreme mode of understanding, not limited to the sphere of logic and contingency, but transformed into a dimension of metaphysical comprehension under the influence of obligation.

Some of the misunderstanding and criticism of Frommel might have

(1) Mon Utopie, p. 90/91.
(2) op. cit. p. 58.
(3) op. cit. p. 126.
been avoided if he had had the time - or the inclination - to develop an idea found in his early thesis: "For intelligence to become reason, it must pass through a moral will. The absolute, experimentally lived in duty, and carried into thought, brings reason to birth."(1)

As noted above, Frommel asserted not only that God 'obligates' but specifically constitutes the source of obligation as the Divine Will, as did Secretan. In the neo-critical view, this appeared to remove the moral character from God, simply presenting a blind force; and, thus, to safeguard the ethical quality of God, holiness is to be defined analogically with ours. However, this would appear to imply subordination of God to an exterior law, a certain antinomian dichotomy in the nature of God, as if to place the Divine reason above the Divine Will. Frommel and Bois represent two main theological emphases - (1) the accent on divine sovereignty and spirituality, the absolute freedom of God, a self-determining will, free of inner or outer necessity; the good is what God wills, and is so because God has willed it; and (2) the accentuation of the rational side of the Divine nature, with subordination of the will to the intelligence, God willing the good because it is the good. Frommel was surely right to define the good as that which God wills; any other speculative analysis of the Divine nature is presumptuous, involving inference of ontological conclusions. Before defining God as He is in Himself, we seek to characterise Him as He is for us, particularly as He is manifested in the phenomenon of obligation of conscience.

One would say that the good is what God wills, and that by the Divine Will we mean a reflective, conscious will. Further, God is, in Daulte's phrase, "le Bien substantial", in that all which He

(1) op. cit. p. 113.
wills is good because He is perfect Being. Holiness is not confused with sovereignty, the will of God being holy, not just for its exercise on us of an unconditioned activity, but because it gives rise in us to the feeling of moral respect, producing an indefinable impression of holiness. Obligation is not, then, a simple moral command, a pure duty; it is a Divine action, the supreme grace, without which we would not be, as it creates our personality and spiritual life. In Secretan's words, "the self finds in itself a greater than the self", and this relationship is doubly known — as the source of my being, and as the one who prescribes my goal, made known in the experience of obligation."

Frommel himself offered the phrase by which to sum up his essential Apologetics. (1) It is "une philosophie de l'obéisance." Obligation was, for him, the base or point d'appui for the whole structure. In those terms, therefore, it must be judged. One admires the moral and religious fervour with which it was presented, the fearless and rigorous analysis of the concepts involved, the literary grace with which it was expressed. Despite the powerful attraction of his thesis, it is open to one basic criticism, similar to the kind of criticism he himself directed against others — that one dare not erect a system, however skilfully built, on one insight, however truly perceived. Obligation is one of the factors of the psychological consciousness, but it is not the only one; the basic flaw is, therefore, the omission of the others or their relegation to a secondary role. Obligation implies a relationship with God, but does not exhaust it; as a source of morality, it also qualifies religion, but is not sufficient to afford its ground. Above all, the influence of César Malan fils, while fruitful in respect of the conception of "l'expérience imposée", must be regarded

(1) "Etudes Littéraires et Morales", p. 311.
as baleful in committing him to the distinctive view of the division of the will into a subconscious (constitutively determined) and a conscious (constitutively free). This distinction, however strikingly and courageously expressed, proves unequal to the task of sustaining a whole edifice of theological construction, and moral and epistemological theory.

The question also poses itself: how far is it possible to express moral and theological insights without depending finally on some kind of rational structure, in which the original intention to be free of rationalism, in favour of an experimental dynamic, is inevitably lost and negated by being driven to accept some other key-concept? In the case of Frommel, is the sheer experimental dynamic of the living "human truth" to be accepted as finally and alone properly expressed in terms of what might be regarded by many as a still "a priorist" analysis of obligation (determined as the meeting of the Divine and human wills), it being constituted, not as a category of the reason, but as a datum of human experience? Is not this simply to site the "a-priorism" in a different area? One feels that Frommel was establishing a conclusion of which he was already persuaded, one which had made a profound psychological and religious appeal to him; and it might appear that, despite the claim to have broken out of the intellectual restraints of Kantianism, he remained more Kantian than he knew — in the sense that P.T. Forsyth (echoing the acknowledgment, by Kant, of the impossibility of man, qua philosopher, achieving a "theodicy") constituted such a theodicy, not as an answer to a puzzle, but as a "victory in a struggle".

Aware of the intractability, conceptually regarded, of a dynamic of inner impulse — in which field a Guyau could derive a morality without sanction or obligation — Frommel sought escape from the
aridity of rationalism into the living domain of religious psychology. While his Apologetic work was widely respected and its qualities of spiritual insight were acknowledged, it was not, however, as we have seen, beyond the reach of criticism.

The fulcrum of his theological work was the establishment of "La Vérité Humaine" to which is then applied the distinctive datum of Christian experience, the redemptive activity of God. This was seen to involve the constituting of man, in his natural state, as, in fact, sub-natural, in a condition of estrangement from his true nature, while being, at the same time, determined as to his mode of being and self-understanding, not in terms of sense-experience, pure volition, or rational thought, but in terms of moral obligation, the sense of "le devoir".

Beyond a Cartesian ego-centricity or a Kantian moral a-priorism, looking back rather to a Pascalian mystical intuitionism, Frommel developed the moral insight of Vinet in the light of the religious psychology of Secrétan and, in particular, of Malan, whom he called "the theologian of the future", making the starting-point of the whole analysis of man the sheer fact of experience.

Frommel saw the sense of obligation as an immediate experience, given in the consciousness prior to reflective, self-conscious and free reaction of the human personality. It is universal, permanent and accompanied by original, primary certainty. The sense of "le devoir" appears as an experience impressed upon the unconscious nature of the soul, regarded as "will" ("l'expérience imposée") putting it into a spontaneous attitude of homage prior to any reflective or free choice by the whole person as "will". This division of the will into unconscious and reflective was, indeed, dangerously hypothetical, and Frommel committed himself, virtually without reser-
vation, to the Malanist conception of the will - determined in its unconscious state and free in its conscious state. While claiming to be a simple, experimental, objective description, it presupposed, in fact, hidden moralo-psychological premises. The experience of obligation was to be regarded as imposing itself as a living impression, not as an intellectual representation, effecting in the moral order what sensation does in the physical, giving to the "I" that contact with the "not-I" which is the very condition of experience. As a living impression, there must be included perception of a mental object, i.e. an idea given in intuition, though not an intellectual representation or conception, which involves reflection. The sense of obligation to realise the good accompanies intuitions of moral value, as does that of admiration those of aesthetic value. Thus we may agree with Frommel that, in the feeling of obligation there is experience of an act, i.e. of a "given" determining the attitude of man's higher nature, prior to any act of will on his side.

Moral obligation was not, with Frommel, either an idea or a category of the reason, but a special disposition constituted in absoluteness and sacredness, such that a reality is supposed which transcends the subject, namely, an Absolute, Divine Person to whose initiation the experience is due. Where there is imposed experience, there is experience of an act of imposing or giving, which in turn presupposes a will as adequate cause; and a will presupposes a Person.

Criticism has been made of Frommel's constitution of moral obligation as the sole valid mode of direct personal link between man and God as being too narrow and exclusive of all other modes of apprehension. In terms, however, of his own analysis of other
modes, whether of sense or intellect, his conclusion was irresistible, and his ambition was to be faithful to the Evangelical record and the Apostolic witness, in which he found man's experience of God to be essentially in terms of moral obedience. His analysis may be regarded as an extended commentary on, and exposition of, the classic passage in Rom. I - "All that may be known of God by men lies plain before their eyes; indeed God has disclosed it Himself to them. His invisible attributes... have been visible... to the eye of reason, in the things He has made. But, knowing God, they have refused to honour Him as God.... Hence, their thinking has ended in futility, and their misguided minds are plunged in darkness." Thus is distinguished "natural" knowledge (the kind which Frommel regarded as "necessary and constraining" in terms of apriori deduction and metaphysical conclusion, therefore fundamentally inappropriate to its subject-matter in the area of solicitation of the will in freedom) and the knowledge of God, not as He is in Himself but as He is for us, given in the context of the obedience of faith. "He that doeth shall know...." 

Frommel constituted as the primary area of man's addressability by God his moral consciousness, such that, in the feeling of obligation, he acknowledges the solicitation of, and the action upon, his will by the Divine. There is echo of the same emphasis in, for example, John Baillie's "Our Knowledge of God", in his personal affirmation at the outset; and in his posthumously published Gifford Lectures: "The sense of the Presence of God"; e.g. "Faith is apprehension through commitment. This alone is true faith... It is at one and the same time a mode of apprehension and a mode of active response to that apprehension. There can be no apprehension without commitment, (and) no commitment without apprehension." (1)

(1) pp. 90-91.
Baillie goes on to cite similar statements from Brunner, Bultmann and others ("Scripture does not aim at imparting scientific knowledge, and therefore it demands from men nothing but obedience, and censures obduracy but not ignorance.")

Frommel's position was, therefore, that it is not because man depends ontologically upon God that he comes to recognise duties towards Him and to worship Him, but that, on the contrary, it is because man finds himself placed under an absolute obligation, that he takes knowledge of his ontological dependence. Criticism has been led from thinkers like Bois to the effect that a distinction must be asserted between a feeling of mystical, natural or ontological dependence and one of moral dependence. Daulte agreed to draw a distinction between them, but prefers not to pronounce as to which has the primacy, as truth seems to be expressed partially in each. This reminds us of Brunner's phrase, that in thinking of this matter, we keep moving between the "indicative and imperative mood."

The last words, in this central area of Frommel's work - here presented in terms of his own expression, the antecedents of his thought, his dialogue with others, the assessments, appreciative and critical - may well be the felicitously expressed summing up by Phil. Daulte - (1) - "All serious apologetics must be founded - above all, if not exclusively - on the moral consciousness. Frommel asserted this with all his passionate soul, and he was right. If there are many roads leading to the sanctuary, there is but one door which opens into the most Holy Place - that of "la soumission au devoir".

(1) op. cit. p. 204.
Appendix

Reviews of "La Vérité Humaine":

La Vérité Humaine. Vol. I

Largely uncritical reviews:

Feuilleton du Journal de Genève
  - A.P. Jorimann 23 Jan. 1910

La Luce: Roma
  (La Verita Umana) Jan. & Mar. 1910

La Vie Neuvelle
  - J.-E. Neel 2 Apr. 1910

La Semaine Littéraire
  - H.B. 9 Apr. 1910
  (described as a powerful pedagogic work, based on
   an "anatomical" exposure of the basic elements.)

Poi et Vie
  - G. Perlet 1913/14

La Vérité Humaine (vols. II and III.)

Less uncritical:

La Semaine Religieuse
  - Aug.-A. Lemaître 22 Jan. 1916
  (the work does not claim complete novelty, large
   developments being derived from Secretan and
   Naville (vol. III.).

Journal Religieux (Neuchatel)
  (it is as a course of lectures, rather than as a
   book, that the work is to be judged; it is also
   incomplete.)

Journal de Genève
  - Ch. Gd. 12 Dec. 1915
  (A work of calm persuasion and certainty appearing
   during the tumult of war, and against a background
   of crumbling values.)

Gazette de Lausanne

" - A. Chavan 16 July 1916
  (more particularly vol. III
   - see Reference in Chapter on the Problem of Evil
     and of the Supernatural.)

" (ditto) - A. Chavan 2 Jan. 1916
  In his view, 'je dois, donc je suis,' is not the sole basis
of all Christian Apologetic. Christianity is too rich, too comprehensively human to lean exclusively on one of the fundamental human experiences. The feeling of obligation is not the only constitutive element in man. One can erect upon it an apologetic, but not the apologetic. Might it not be: "J'aime, donc je suis" – or "Je crois, donc je suis"?

The validity of a scientific apologetic is debatable, be it even psychological and experimental, and Chavan feels that Frommel's is hardly accessible except to an intellectual elite, and, within that, to a group of strongly tempered moral consciousness. The work, however, reminds us that the true 'apology' is the life. Jesus proved the Truth by being it.
DOGMATICS

The doctrine of dogmatism or dogmatics is the study of the principles, methods, and criteria of knowledge. In this context, dogmatics is important since the actual application will determine the quality improved in terms of the context and conditions of the situation. Dogmatics is the application of certain principles to produce the results or theory to satisfy restrictions expected as equally possible. The principles and the realization using such methods. Their application of presently methodical basis, of necessity, to certain conclusions. To treat dogmatics to treat a question in its entirety, both in principle and in practice, and in terms which alone yield valid discussion and analysis. The basis, therefore, of the dogmatic theology, as of the dogmatism, is methodological.

In short, then, are constituted the method and the scientific validity of dogmatic theology? The method is taught and practiced in terms of the scientific validity, which were, therefore, the method.

Scientific Validity of Dogmatism

According to Koyzard, dogmas include in the concept among (a) knowledge, (b) a certain knowledge, (c) a statement by natural knowledge. The objects of knowledge, in Koyzard, are objects of reality, relating to society and society of its influence, to knowledge of life in here, and to (scientific) organization of youth.
The Course of Dogmatics given by Frommel at Geneva formed the substance of the 3-volume work entitled "L'Expérience Chrétienne": Neuchatel; Attinger Frères, 1916. It was introduced by an analysis of the validity and method of dogmatic theology, of the nature of dogma and dogmatics, and of the principles governing the organisation of dogmatic material.

Method; and the question of scientific validity

Frommel regarded method as supremely important since the method employed will determine the results achieved in terms of the nature, scope and validity of the former. In his view, "method" is the application of certain criteria or principles regarded as primary to certain realities regarded as equally primary. The principles and the realities being once agreed, their application, if properly methodical, leads, of necessity, to certain conclusions. To treat of method is to treat a question in its entirety, both in origin and in results, and in terms which alone yield valid discussion and analysis. The task, therefore, of the dogmatic theologian, as of the apologist, is methodological.

In what, then, are constituted the method and the scientific validity of dogmatic theology? The method is indeed constituted in terms of the scientific validity, which must, therefore, be first analysed.

Scientific Validity of Dogmatic

According to Frommel, science implies in the widest sense (a) a knowledge, (b) a certain knowledge, (c) a systematically ordered knowledge. The object of science is, therefore, an object or relationship tending to certainty of its knowledge, to knowledge of its nature, and to intelligible, systematic organisation of such
There are, further, distinct scientific disciplines - in the areas of (a) the certainty of the reality of such objects and relationships (existence), (b) knowledge of their quality (nature or character), and (c) the systematisation of such knowledge. In these terms, Christian dogmatics is to be regarded as a science, but Frommel acknowledged that this assertion is widely denied in scientific circles, on the following grounds -

Pragmatic: Dogmatics, claiming this kind of validity, has been regarded, even by a section of opinion in the Church itself, as an enemy of faith. There have indeed been errors and excesses, pretensions of infallibility, heterogeneity of criteria, formalism and persecuting zeal. But these do not furnish logical or sufficient arguments against the construction of a true dogmatic, in which there should be no confusion as between the domains of the natural and moral sciences. "Abusus non tollit usum".

Theoretical. Objection, here, is led in terms of the inadmissibility of the material of religious belief and experience in the context of scientific validity, and the objection is expressed primarily in the form of "a priori" metaphysics. There is, in particular, the positivistic theory of Aug. Comte, with its hierarchy of orders of knowledge - the theological or fictitious, the metaphysical or abstract, the scientific or positive. We have, further, the various expressions of a basic Kantianism, which have had, in many minds, the same outcome as logical positivism, viz. the tendency to regard the evidences of sense and of reason as alone valid in a scientific methodological sense, other evidences being non-scientific. Such an epistemological view is, however, narrow and inexact and omits, or fails to take serious account of, one basic fact - an evidence, albeit unanalysable and undemonstrable, which results from a relation of
conformity between subject and object, which is the condition of certainty as of knowledge. The one practical "a priori" that may be allowed is the empirical constraint involved in the basing of all knowledge on anterior intuition relevant to the mode and object of knowledge. Religious and moral beliefs, as scientific knowledge, have criteria of their own order. If the latter are in the field of demonstration and necessity, those of the former are in the domain of the data of the experience of the obligation of conscience. Duty, good and evil are self-attesting to the consciousness, as are the realities of sense to the senses, and reason to the understanding. The only difference between the criteria of the scientific and religio-moral evidences is, as Frommel puts it: (1) "not to believe in the first is to be a fool; while not to believe in the second is to be dishonest". The criteria of moral and religious knowledge are not arbitrary, but are in terms of a proper intuitive response to what is given.

Following Kant, in his exclusion of metaphysics from the field of human knowledge, the thought in Frommel's time was reserving the term "belief", in the philosophical sense, to everything not resting on the evidence of the senses. The existence of morality and religion was not denied, but they were regarded, not as yielding scientific knowledge, but as yielding free and individual opinions, by their nature personal and uncontrollable by way of scientific judgement. As above, Frommel rejected this setting in opposition of the knowledge and certainty of science and the subjective, hypothetical beliefs of morality and religion, in which noetic value is attributed to the former only. It is significant that Wm. James, in his work entitled "Religious Experience", writes: "Our own most rational beliefs are founded on proofs similar to those invoked by the mystics.

(1) op. cit. p. 7.
We say that our senses guarantee the reality of certain facts to us; but mystical experiences are immediate intuitions, just as are our sense-feelings." This may lead us to conclude that the epistemological function and noetic status of religious experience are similar, in their order and sphere, to those in the field of sense-experience.

Religious experience is the departure point and the substance of a knowledge and a certainty, yielding a need, a capacity and a competence to know. Thus, while there is a radical distinction between the two spheres, and, hence, between the orders, of knowledge, there is to be recognised (a) identity of function (placed in the presence of the given real); (b) identity of intelligibility (the same capacity of the mind to "think" the data of the experience); (c) identity of effects (the same proclivity, in the subject, to extract a noetic element from his experience.)

The analysis of other beliefs and hypotheses as to their probable validity is in contrast to the analysis of the Christian faith, because of its distinctive claim to absoluteness and finality, its special character as redemptive, and its experimental realism, in which the experience, given primary vitality, yields, not a "philosophy" of belief or of faith, but a noetic factor, given by, and in, it, immanent in it. It is this knowledge which it is the task of dogmatics to express - as brought out by the meaning of the German word "Glaubenslehre". Dogmatics gives expression to a "scientific", or, if it is preferred, an "experimental", knowledge of the phenomena of religious experience, not claiming ultimate knowledge of "the thing-in-itself", the pretentious goal of some metaphysics. Religious knowledge - and its systematisation in Christian dogmatics - is a scientific discipline, founded, as it is, on evidence, experience and experiment, appropriate to itself.
One objection to this thesis has been the multiplicity and proliferation of dogmatic material and the fluctuations of Christian expression, in contrast, it has been claimed, with the greater uniformity of scientific knowledge. This, however, is to ignore the fluctuation, diversification and modification in the latter—which are not regarded by the scientist as betraying, or departing from, the basic characteristic of science, its method. There is likewise the basic element of experience, in which the relationship of Christian truth to reality is in terms of a moral and mystical "personal equation", placing Christian knowledge in a different order from that of scientific knowledge.

As compared with the contingency of the laws of nature, and the secondary causes of observed phenomena, religious knowledge is concerned with the Divine-human encounter. It deals with a "becoming" rather than a "become", the former involving exercise of the will and the conception of the "ought", whereas the latter, as "become", is statically conditioned by necessity, involving not an "ought" but an "is", in which there is the compulsion of rational recognition. There may be claimed noetic validity for religious knowledge, which deals, as Frommel expressed it, with a "doit-être", not a "peut-être" only, although possibility must be antecedent to duty. In scientific knowledge, there is the constraint on the reason of the fact, the datum; in religious knowledge the constraint on the will of the datum ("la donnée") of religious experience, viz. the action of the divine on the human, to which to respond in terms of "le doit-être" is to move to experimental (i.e. scientific) validation of the reality of that experience and to constitute within it its noetic element.

Frommel insisted in the first volume of the Dogmatics that, to understand the point of view and orientation of his Dogmatics, it was
necessary first to have studied his Apologetics.

The methodology of Dogmatic

What are the validity and scientific method of dogmatic theology? There are two basic methods in science, the deductive and the inductive, i.e. the "a priori" and the "a posteriori". The deductive sciences are those using, either exclusively or preponderantly, the process of reasoning, and are constituted by the exact or mathematical sciences, their certainty being conjoint with the initial certainty of thought, and their possible object being in external reality, the world of phenomena and nature, but by hypothesis and contingency only; their primary object, as alone true and necessary, is in the laws of the mind, categories, forms, the laws of thought in their logical or mathematical functioning. The final organisation is given by the same activity of the mind, in its function as an organ of knowledge, operating according to the conditions appropriate to it. The inductive sciences are the empirical and the natural, their certainty being born of experience, and the knowledge of their object coming from observation, the organising of this knowledge reproducing that of the object observed. The two methods are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and it is evident that the natural sciences include the deductive element, but the inductive method is supreme; otherwise observation gives way to the objectification of thought and the conclusions of thought in their hypothetical validity, rather than in experimental verification.

Is Dogmatic theology properly dealt with as inductive or deductive, or as a mixture of the two; and, in this event, is the preponderant factor in the analysis of such faith and experience the dialectical or the experimental? A major tendency in methodology has been that under the Hegelian influence. Representatives of this
school have claimed to reconstruct Christian truth entirely by the deductive method. For example: Rothe wrote, "Speculative thought can start only from some 'given' (datum) found in thought itself. This immanent datum is the very act of thinking; or, more exactly, the act in which the feeling of the self is raised to clarity of thought. For the human conscience this primal fact of thought is of immediate certainty; speculative thought, therefore, attaches itself to this with confidence, making of it the object of its operation, and it analyses it logically. It is excited to the production of new thought, thus engendering a continuous series of ideas ordered in mutual relationship forming a system describing a priori and faithfully the ideal image of empiric reality."

If speculative thought of this nature be applied to the elaboration of Christian science, the result is a perfect example of deductive theology. The method is that of the exact sciences, but it is not legitimate in theology, there being an essential incompatibility between the deductive (or speculative) method and the object of theology. While not denying a speculative element, one must forbid it as a principal method, and this for two main reasons:— Deduction, subsisting only in terms of the logical enchaining of thought, is heavy with a determinism which cannot take account of the moral element in Christianity, and which tends of necessity to abolish it. Further, deduction, being subjective in its departure point, excludes consideration of the historical facts which constitute an integral part of Christianity.

In addition, speculative knowledge implies an ontological status, leading to an abstract, metaphysical theology (knowledge of being—in-itself: "en soi"), not to a religious theology (knowledge of God as

(1) "Theologische Ethik"
He is for us: "Dieu pour nous"). Indeed, all intellectualist theology, orthodox or heterodox, must be rejected. In general terms, "rationalism" uses, not the didactic laws of reason and metaphysical thought, but what it regards as the "rational" and the "reasonable" data of the intelligence to construct a science of reality, and, in dogmatic terms, of Christianity. There is thus introduced a most dangerous element of arbitrariness in "rationalism"; its basic concept of good sense is not a fixed quantity, and is indeed a quite unscientific basis or method for any intellectualist development of the germ of Christian truth. What is rational in one age is not necessarily accepted as rational in another; e.g. the eighteenth century had a supernaturalist rationalism, but, since then, in contrast to its admission of miracle as reasonable, we have had a rationalism which rejects miracle as absurd and contrary to reason.

Is the method of Dogmatic, then, to be that of pure induction or of mixed induction? It has to be a science of observation, of experience, of witness - but whose? As with apologetic, the external witness of history has been offered, and, as with it, there is the risk of error and falsification, either by the confusion of identifying the object of religious knowledge with its self-exteriorisation, or the evaporation of what is a historically-centered Christianity into something self-existent in a pure or abstract sphere. Frommel saw this tendency as a characteristic of the Paris school of theology, as exemplified in the symbolo-fideism of Sabatier and Menégoz.

An inductive method, based purely on external, historical, "sense-available" evidence is seen to be insufficient, and the way is clear for the distinctive methodological approach of Frommel. It is that of induction based on internal evidence - but he drew immediate
attention to the inherent danger of leaning exclusively on the moral side of such evidence, to the neglect or the subordination of the religious. Christian theology is a moral theology, never actually formulated in a methodologically precise way; it remains rather a characteristic tendency, sufficiently persistent and exclusive to determine a theology of a special character. Incontestably, moral theology does justice to one of the essential elements in Christianity, and has arisen at times of anti-intellectual reaction, e.g. at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Linked with it have been names such as Ritschl, and, by his intermediary, retrospectively, Kant; it existed still in the neo-critical school and in the writing of Henri Bois of Montauban. Ritschl, guarding against intellectualism and historicism, made of Christianity a morality without serious historical or doctrinal content, with the resultant loss of its essential substance. It was not the inner, inductive nature of this moral theology which vitiated it, but, rather, that the point of departure was constituted as moral instead of religious. Frommel's own theology was, later, to be described as "moralistic".

Turning from the theoreticians to those who simply believe and live their Christianity, we find that they do not deny the doctrinal, intellectual, ethical and historical elements in the Christian faith, but they claim that it is essentially a life, total and contemporary with all ages, in which every soul may participate - doubtless one whose starting-point was constituted once and for all in history, whose practical expression is a morality, whose intellectual manifestation is a doctrine, but whose source and centre are elsewhere, such that, even in default of historical or dogmatic knowledge, it can come into being and subsist. It can surmount the seemingly unfavour-
able paucity of intellectual or historical validation, having its source in a religious experience of the will of the believer, an intimate, immediate, actual and certain experience attested by piety— and peremptorily as belonging to it. The Gospel is essentially a demonstration of the spirit and power, and this spiritual power is not just some "dynamism", but has identifying characteristics. It has the secret of deliverance from condemnation (forgiveness), normal relationship with God (justification), and deliverance from the power of sin (sanctification); bringing to realisation our unity with God, with our fellow-men and ourselves, and bearing with it the capacity for a good conscience before God, a victory over evil, a life of love in inner peace and joy—things inaccessible to the natural and moral efforts of man by himself.

We have thus found, declares Frommel, the method of scientific Christian knowledge, and, consequently, of dogmatic theology. The object of Christian theology is something contingent and free, not yielded by metaphysical determinism nor historical necessity (historical, that is, in the sense of "sense-data"). But there are historical conditions and consequences ("des manifestations sensibles"); these are "phenomenal" in that they are observable phenomena. The object itself remains an inner fact, a fact of conscience, and the method is constituted as one of internal or psychological introspection.

There is an immediate connection between devotion and theology in method, certitude, and the possibility of knowledge, and, therefore, in systematic organisation. The first Christian thinkers were aware of this, e.g. Paul, John and Peter, but it has not always been recognised and felt. Experience, the condition of knowledge, is energetically claimed by Christian piety, which, in proclaiming the
experimental nature of Christianity, proclaims at the same time the noetic element in Christian experience. At the moment when popular or scientific thinking takes refuge in religious agnosticism, theology claims possession of a method common to all knowledge, basing its legitimacy on a foundation of directly perceived experience of which it seeks to be the theoretic exposition. This experience responds to the "δόσ μαι ποι οὖν την" demanded by Archimedes to lift the world.\(^{(1)}\) Frommel found a certain sympathetic echo of this position in the writing of F. Leenhardt,\(^{(2)}\) and of the Belgian astronomer Lagrange, in his work of the same title. In respect of the former there is, however, a reservation; experience is not of the same nature, certainty nor order as the scientific or phenomenal experience (i.e. as response to sense-data.)

Frommel then noted the nature of the objections made to his methodology. The first is the "scientific", and there are three strands to it:—

(a) The most radical is that the experience called Christian is just an affair of the imagination, or mystical sensibility. This objection must be immediately rebutted by showing that it rests on an "a priori" deterministic metaphysic, negating the moral life and its possibility, and evincing complete ignorance of the contested experience, which discredits the objection as scientific. Frommel says to such objectors: "Vous parlez du Christianisme comme un aveugle de la lumière..." Without submission to the terms of the Christian experience, there can be no scientific qualification to affirm or deny what this experience is, and, where there remains even the conjectural possibility of the validity of the experience, the objection falls.

(b) The second form of profane objection is to admit by hypothesis

\(^{(1)}\) op. cit. p. 62.
\(^{(2)}\) e.g. "Une attitude à prendre", and "Le Christianisme et la méthode "expérimentale"".
the noetic validity of Christian experience, but to deny its establishment as distinctively or specifically Christian; the experience is one of a general religious nature, Christianity being defined as a "religious variety". The answer to this is given in Frommel's definitive outline of the Christian faith's constitutive nature - in the section on Phenomenology.

(c) The third form of the objection is that, while admitting, by hypothesis, the reality and the proper nature of the Christian experience, its scientific validity is denied because, by its special character, it lacks universalism with its qualities of possibility and controllability. It is a specious objection since there never was a claim to establish a knowledge universally and indifferently available to all. As dogmaticsians, we are not addressing ourselves to all men, but only to Christians. It is a Christian "science" as seriously and exclusively Christian as the piety to which it makes appeal. We do not expect it to legitimise itself in the eyes of the indifferent and the sceptical. There is a Christian science as there is a chemical science; as chemistry cannot be pursued without a laboratory and experiments, nor music if one is deaf, one cannot enter into Christian knowledge unless one cultivates the organ which yields experience of its distinctive reality. Does the fact that there are blind people prevent painting, or that there are deaf people, music? Christian experience has its conditions as natural experiences have theirs.

The other objection, in strange juxtaposition with the first is "theological"; it finds expression in differing forms.

(a) The first to be noted is that the claimed scientific validity of Christian experience does not belong to it either in fact or in right, because faith is primary and normative, and it is not
experience which founds faith but faith which founds experience. For example, in the words of George Godet:(1) "my faith does not rest on my experience. It carries with it a certainty confirmed, but not created, by religious experience, a certainty independent of it because it precedes it, so independent of it that it often subsists when experience has ceased to produce it or appears even to contradict it..." Frommel pointed out the misunderstanding by which this objection must be seen to fall. Either, faith has no object, and its certainty, of the deductive order, is a mathematical certainty, conjoined with, and deriving from, pure thought. How could this be of a moral and practical nature, and how could it be a basis and a departure-point for a life qualitatively different from that of nature? Such a definition of faith is its negation, rendering superfluous Revelation, the Gospel, the historical Christ, and all the other means by which God attains human apperception, to enter, with man, into an experimental relationship. Or - faith has an object. This is the belief shared, of course, with the objectors. For example, in the same work, Godet had written: "Faith is naturally born of the meeting between the consciousness which aspires to good and the Christ who realises it... from this contact, "faith" is born." Now, if faith has an object, it should not be denied the experimental character which it thus acquires. Experience is, by definition, a certain relation of subject to object. The certainty of faith is in essence an experimental certainty, from which we can conclude that faith does not find its verification only in intimate experience, but that it still finds there its source and substance. Experience engenders faith - better, this experience constitutes faith. Faith and experience are not to be set in contradiction; they are identical phenomena.

(1) "Sur quoi repose notre foi", p. 10.
(b) A further theological objection is that the claimed scientific
validity of Christian experience is vitiated by its subjectivism,
mobility, inconstancy and variability. Frommel turns this objection
by denying that the point of departure and the interpretative centre
are located in the subject alone. If it were so, there would be the
danger as above, but it may well be asked if, outside of the exact
sciences, there is any inductive science not susceptible of the same
criticism; in other words, the inherent subjectivism which is
supposed to invalidate inductive theology is an element in any empi-
rical science, and this has led to a reaction of exaggerated positivi-
sm, i.e. a minimising of the subjective element. Why should
Christianity be less positive than natural experience, since the
objective element is preponderant and determinative? The only
explanation for the objection is an unavowed scepticism, or, as
Frommel is inclined to think, it may rest on a mystical or atomist
error in assessing the nature of Christian experience.

(i) This error consists in seizing Christian experience in its
emotional resultants, or, if it is preferred, in its affective
extension, which may well issue in subjective fluctuations. In
fact, it is not Christian experience proper, but its effect and
recollection which are being described. Frommel considers that
this is the position taken by the anti-experimental school as
represented by Godet, in whose writing we find words used in the
description of Christian experience such as "impression",
"assurance", "certainty in turning in upon myself"; and alludes,
though kindly, to the risk of imbalance inherent in the prac-
tice of the Salvation Army, for example, of emphasising personal
"testimonies". Such is a false basis for a scientific dis-
cussion of the validity of Christian truth. Religious
experience is the one thing in the world the least mystically subjective, for it implies a moral relationship of the moral will of man with an object which is itself none other than a moral will, the absolute moral will.

(ii) The "atomist" error consists in envisaging Christian experiences as subsisting independently of each other, constituting isolated phenomena without mutual coordination. This view is consonant with the reproach levelled against Christian experience of variability, inconstancy and instability, but it is not a necessary, logical derivative from it. It lacks analysis and true observation, suggesting a detached, spectatorial exteriorisation of Christianity. True piety pronounces that Christianity is a life, the life of a given being, man. In this there is unity with diversity, growth to maturity, and organic continuity throughout between one human being and other — first, in their common experience of natural existence, and then in their growth into the "full stature of Christ", the "new" man; so that, while the Christian does not cease to be "man", he lives a life of which the life of the man Jesus Christ is normative.

(c) The third theological objection is as follows:— the noetic validity attributed to Christian experience is insufficient to carry the weight of a constructive theology, the dogmatic thus based being that only of the individual Christian, not that of Christianity itself. The previous argument was concerned with the variation between differing representations of Christian experience; this one with the variation between Christian subjects. Frommel again quotes Godet: (1) "If one systematises experience to draw dogma from it, the point of departure is necessarily an incomplete individual experience ... 'autant d'individualités chrétiennes, autant de dogmatiques'..."

(1) op. cit. p. 7.
Undoubtedly, the history of Dogmatic offers striking evidence of this variation, and Frommel devoted a study to it, but it may be doubted whether Luther and Calvin were claiming to systematise their Christian experience as individuals. The real question is whether we should speak of the Christian experience, the Christian conscience, and so on, or of my experience and my conscience. With Luther and Calvin, as with the Church as a whole, even where there seems at first glance disagreement, we assert a certain stable, unique, permanent element which constitutes the objective part of Christian experience. It may differ, but it is qualitatively identical. The Church has always asserted that there is a unique element constituting the objective part of Christian experience. Speaking of the natural moral conscience, Vinet, one of Frommel's predecessors who exercised such a decisive influence on his thought, said: "Frappez sur les consciences; elles rendent toutes le même son." It is thus with Christian experience, and with the Christian religious conscience, that, although with differences of timbre and of tonality, of force and of purity, they yield the same sound; this fundamental sound is properly understood as the echo and the prolongation of the voice of Christ, and its purity and harmony is in proportion to the completeness and perfection of the Christian life emitting it.

Is there, or can there be, any example of theology which is pure from all individual point of departure? One must start somewhere, and it is an individual who starts the process of theologising.

Frommel saw the root of the above methodological objections in their moral psychology, which, with some divergences of detail, show the objectors as Kantian in their emphasis. Thus, the moral element, the obligation of conscience, remains a category of the will, an "a priori" of the practical reason, something abstract, by times vague
or certain, which they forbear to analyse, resulting, for them, in the difficulty of discerning an experience in the obligatory evidence which lays hold of all human will in the presence of the historical person of Christ, evidence from which they must derive, as we do, the principle of faith.

The centre of the Christian life, and the starting-point of dogmatic theology, is the moral communion of the believer with the person of Christ and, through Christ, with God. It is, in theology, the irreducible element of a primary nature, finding itself its only "raison d'être", as the molecule in chemistry, the axiom in mathematics, and the fact in history. Theological science is a science based on the experimental nature of faith; outside of Christian experience there is no Christian theology. This statement is not tautological—it is definitive and constitutive. Disinterestedness, indifference, impartiality—these constitute basic incompetence in the matter of the methodology of Christian dogmatic. Specific Christian experience is implicitly postulated by the very existence of Christian theology considered as a cycle of studies, distinct, complete and closed. This experience gives to theology not only its certainty and object, but also its unity and sufficient reason.

DEFINITION OF DOGMA

Dogma, from the root dokein, signifies in Biblical usage something with the status of edict or commandment, but was not applied to Christian doctrine as such. The starting-point seemed to be the passage Acts 15:28: "edoxen—it hath pleased (the Holy Spirit...)", but there was still no decision on order or discipline. The word as it has been long used by the Church lacks etymological basis and justification, and we should feel free to use the word as convenient to us. In the Catholic tradition, dogma has implied decisions of
the Church carrying binding authority and being regulative in matters of the faith. In Protestantism, the word, although not found in the Bible, is regarded as applying to what is therein implicitly or explicitly expressed and contained. The word is never identified in the New Testament with Christian doctrines, but passed into ecclesiastical usage in the fourth century, borrowing from the Stoic usage e.g. - Cicero: "Decreta quae philosophi vocant dogmata". (1)

Dogma is not a set of propositions 'dropped down' from God, nor revelatory statements to be 'mined' from Holy Scriptures; it is to the Christian life as biological laws are to the general phenomenon of life. The Bible is refractory to the general conception of dogma as such; dogmas found there have been read into it by the reader. What we read are the resultant expressions of the intellectual interpretation of the intimate religious experience of the authors. There would only be Biblical dogma if God had Himself "written" the books - the very idea of Biblical dogma excludes human intermediaries. A theopneustic attitude would alone justify it. But Christianity is a life before being a comprehension, and the comprehension follows its being a life. Revelation is not an idea but an activity, and faith is not a belief (idea) but a response of the will to the divine action. Frommel adopts the distinction by Ernest Martin (2) between doctrine and dogma - the former is composed of the substance and also the fragmentary elements of dogma, while the latter embraces many 'doctrines' and attempts a unity and synthesis.

The following headings appeared in the MSS of Frommel's lectures, presumably for oral expansion:-

(a) The psychological error and idolatry of dogmatism.
(b) The pedagogic error of a dogmatism.
(c) M. Sabatier and the indefinite evolution of dogma; why the

(1) Quaestiones academicae.
(2) Study of Christian Experience - 1894.
evolution of dogma is not definite.

(d) The mediate authority of dogma. It is not in formula but in experience.

DEFINITION OF DOGMATICS

Dogmatics consist of the total system of doctrines and dogmas, the scientifically ordered and systematic expression of Christian experience, its conditions, laws, its knowledge of its object.

Christian dogmatic knowledge is a religious knowledge, religion, being, not a thing in itself, but a relationship between two beings 'given' together - indeed, between God and man considered as personal wills. We therefore exclude ontological knowledge; religious knowledge is not ontological knowledge. It is, in fact, inductive and scientific as against ontological, deductive knowledge, and it is not concerned, qua knowledge, with the nature of God as He is in Himself nor with man as he is in himself. It is phenomenal as all science is phenomenal; but, while not being deductive and not raising the ontological question, it does not, as in scientific positivism, and as more or less theologically, with Ritschl, deny 'being-in-itself'.

General scientific knowledge is essentially quantitative, and has an inbuilt aspiration towards Cosmological knowledge, or "connaissance existentielle". Religious knowledge, however, is qualitative, concerned with moral obligation, human and divine freedom, etc. Christian theology must be delivered from the pretensions of thinking itself a cosmology or a metaphysic and from involvement in the adventures of philosophy and natural science. Christian dogmatic must preserve its independence vis-à-vis sciences guided by an 'a priori' metaphysic.

Ecclesiastical dogma contains experience under the form of the didactic, the systematic, the anonymous, while the Gospel contains it
under the form of the historical, the anecdotal, the biographical and personal; but this is not an absolute distinction for there are in
the Bible, not dogmas, but doctrines and the rudiments of dogma.
Christian experience is not without its appropriate milieu, and is
produced in relation with ecclesiastical dogma and evangelical script-
ture; it comes from the activity of the Spirit and the gift of grace -
these are its necessary condition and occasion.

(a) Individual experience. It alone has the privilege of cer-
titude - but it has its limits. For one thing it is rare in its
perfection; and it is incomplete, even although authentic. In
fact, no individual is completely transparent to the Divine, nor can
an individual represent complete humanity. Therefore unhindered
plentitude of truth is beyond individual acquisition, even while there
is certainty of the reality of religious experience.

(b) Ecclesiastical Dogma. This is the counterweight to indi-
vidualism, representing as it does a kind of doctrinal consensus; it
depends on individual experience, but endeavours to universalise and
enrich experience as knowledge, even while being inferior in cer-
tainty. Differences of expression and emphasis have, of course,
been seen, as, for example, in the Hellenic and Hebraic modes of
thought and language.

(c) Scriptural Revelation. There is a necessary didactic and
historical relationship between scripture and dogma - the latter
sometimes reconstituting itself under the tutelage of scripture. If
a comparison is allowed, scripture is essentially creative, dogma
receptive, while, both in collective and individual experience, there
is nourishment from Gospel history. The interior revelation of
experience gives certainty, while the exterior revelation of history
gives knowledge. As was found in 'activity' in the Gospels, the
revelation is mediated interpretatively in the Apostolic literature - the object of faith had first to be the subject of faith. The holiness of Christ is the secret and sufficient reason for the authority of Scripture in the matter of faith, it directly guaranteeing the witness He bears Himself as the object of faith. Thus experimental dogmatic follows experience. In all this, we must guard against the errors of Biblicism, e.g. confusing the document of revelation with the revelation itself, the 'a priori' theopneustic theory of revelation, or a 'flat' reading of the Bible, having no regard to historical criticism or exegesis.

THE ORGANISING PRINCIPLE OF THE DIVISION OF DOGMATIC

The principle is given by the experimental method - i.e. an organic division, grouped in accord with experience and certainties of the Christian life, e.g. unity, diversity, continuity, progression, dynamically related. Above all, it need hardly be said, Dogmatic is Christocentric. The experimental Dogmatic, of which an over-all synthesis is realised in faith, though not simultaneously, comprises six main divisions:-

Christian Synedology (constitutive Christian experience)
Christology (person of Jesus Christ)
Special Theology (Nature of God revealed in Christ)
Anthropology (Doctrine of man as revealed in Christ)
Soteriology (Work of Christ; action of God in Christ)
Pneumatology (Work of the Holy Spirit).

The Reality of Constitutive Christian Experience

The starting point is the empirical placing of the constitutive element in Christian experience. That is where it is constituted, not in historical origins, documents, or certain delimited periods of time. Before it is a doctrine, tradition or history, it is a devo-
tion, i.e. a kind of interior life, a type of moral and spiritual 'biology', conditioned and produced by a certain relationship of man with God. All historical and traditional witness is reducible to an experience, history and tradition being the expressions of spiritual experience through sense and intellect. We go, not from experience to history, but from experience to experience across, and through, history. The criterion is religious and moral evidence, resulting from the conformity between Christian experience and that brought to us by tradition and history. "Nous resterons ainsi dans la certitude en restant dans la vie..."

Constitutive Christian experience is displayed, formally, and with apologetic relevance, as follows:

The Historical Role of Christianity - One can be expansive on the historical role - the source of advance, progress, true development, sweetening and amelioration of society, the release of power, energy, dynamic ideas, etc.

The Existence of the Church - Where there is no Church, there is no Christian influence, but, as with the historical role of Christianity there must be borne in mind the things for which the Church must accept blame and guilt. However, the historical Church is a phenomenon "sui generis" in history. Christianity and the Church always exist together, and they wax or wane in correlation; but they are not, of course, the same thing. Outside of Christianity there are philosophical, moral or religious 'schools', holding man only in the periphery of his being - they repose on ideas, rather than experience.

The social principle is a distinctive element in Christianity; there is diversity, but an underlying unity. Brotherhood comes from common Fatherhood. The fact that there is a distinctive Buddhism, Islam, etc., reminds us that there is also a distinctive Christian
society, the Church, which, as thereby constituted, reflects a specific (Christian) experience.

The Interior Life of the Church – Having observed the historical phenomenon of the Church, we have regard to the real heart and centre of it. The 'history of dogmas' as such is the history of the inner life of the Church, and this has usually reflected the doctrines and ethics of different epochs. The basic subject-matter remains, but there is diversity and progression and sometimes serious divergence. The Church has, however, a striking ability to reform its own nature and to re-express its own knowledge as intellectual expression of experience; this derives from the permanent role played in it by the Bible and by Jesus Christ. (1)

The Role of the Bible – One could again be expansive in delineating its role and influence – in literature, society and culture. It is a divine-human work, the effects of which are visible in its own periodic Salvation and resurrection, and, over against a false Bibli-cism, its lasting quality and its universality are explained by the same characteristics of the experience of which it is the document.

The Person of Christ in the Church – Frommel quoted approvingly from Dr. Fairbairn: "Christ in Modern Theology", setting out the unique status, impact and significance in history of the Person of Jesus Christ. (2) The impact of Christ is unexplainable except in terms of the true cause, the supreme Christian claim. Again there must be reiterated the rational principle of cause and effect, and the necessary correspondence and conformity of subject and object. But one is not born a Christian as one may be born a painter, musician, poet, and so on; an inner transformation is necessary – "natural man receives not the things of the Spirit of God... they are spiritually discerned"...

(1) Refer to "Études Morales et Religieuses", p. 16.
(2) op. cit. pp. 179-183.
This is a 'scientific' formulation in the sense that it meets the formal requirements of a theory of knowledge in common with all inductive sciences; transpose the expression into its scientific equivalent, i.e. for religious term "spiritual" read "experimental", and the same theory of knowledge is sustained.

The Specific Character of the Experience - There have been rudimentary and typical forms of Christianity, and two main attitudes have been engendered by it - the negative response of hate, and antipathy; the positive one of sympathy, acceptance and love. Jesus brought "not peace but division". Christianity is for "the good of the soul" and where this is not desired, it will be rejected; but aspiration to the Divine is not by the intelligence but the conscience, and is concerned with the free response of the will. The ideas, or the intellectualisation of the experience, do not themselves constitute the experience. Thus the secret of Christian homiletic lies not primarily in rhetoric as such, but in the actual communication established by the speaker between Christ and those who make the response of faith. The great majority, unfortunately, are content with undeveloped manifestation of faith and belief. "Ce sont des protozoaires spirituels..." (1) We do not limit biology to a study of molluscs and polyps, but seek out highly developed, differentiated forms of life. Some Christians are 'religious' only in respect of their object. "They exist in a state of virtuality only, rather than actually living the Christian life... They lack name, character and power, receiving, and giving, nothing to Christian history".

We are not without guarantees of authenticity of real knowledge and of universality. The Apostle Paul affords a supreme example of a life which offers to history a testimony and a criterion. By his we may test the authenticity of others. Paul is the supreme giver,

not borrower; intellectually and spiritually cast in a unique and large mould; he wrote widely, and put himself wholly into his writing; of all Christian documents, his have been put into the severest crucible of criticism. His thought, though with marked personal characteristics (e.g. Rabbinic dialectic and wide typology) has the marks of universality, particularly in the way of experimental, dynamic and psychological method. Theologies divorced from the supreme Pauline material have lost their truly Christian character. Paulinism has always been present in true revival, and must be regarded as normative. The centre and point d'appui of his thought is the indwelling Christ - "I no longer live, but Christ liveth in me". "For me, to live is Christ...", etc.

This is not an identification or a pantheistic dissolution of one life in another; it is a completely personal and intra-personal communion of love and obedience. For empirical man, to "live" is to realise the "given" in and by human nature; for Paul, to "live" is to realise the "given" in and by the nature of Christ. The communion is vital, immediate, not intellectual or purely volitional. The Pauline relationship to Christ is one in which the initiative is with Christ, whom he calls Lord, and of whom he regards himself as a 'slave'. Similarly, in Pauline communities, the basis is not dogma, nor tradition, nor even the Church, but solely Christ. The Pauline "Christonomy", is central to his thinking, and implies an 'instrumental' relation vital to Christian experience. For Christian experience to have changed since the apostolic era it would be necessary for the action of God in Christ to have changed - or man's fundamental nature to have changed - but such is not the evidence of historical lives, past or contemporary.

Submission to the nature of things is necessary in other fields;
there is therefore the element of obedience as a condition of Christian experience. There must be accepted the authority of Christ for the believer, and his spiritual communion with Christ, the object of experience being, not a thing, nor a person considered qua "thing", but a person, a divine personal action. "L'expérience Christonomique est le point d'appui suffisant, parce qu'irréductible et stable, de toute connaissance et de toute certitude chrétienne". (1)

THE CONDITIONS OF CONSTITUTIVE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

A primary condition is in the constitutive nature of humanity itself as constituted in the normal experience of obligation and the abnormal experience of sin; humanity is divine but fallen, sinful and redeemable. One does not believe in conscience because one believes in Christianity, but the other way round. Moral consciousness is a primary constitutive factor of 'humanity', presupposing moral obedience and religious adoration, and Christianity does not address itself to the atheist and the a-moral: it offers no proof or evidence to such. But it addresses itself to the immoral, i.e. to a being who is 'moral' even in his immorality. It does not create faith 'out of nothing' — it uses a pre-existent certitude, religion and obedience, and state of consciousness. Outside of these it would fall into a void.

The believer does not find in the Gospel an unknown God — he re-finds Him; he does not know God, as if unknown — he re-knows Him. Belief in conscience is, indeed, re-inforced, for there is a pre-established harmony between conscience and the Christian faith. With preaching there is an awakening of the living preception of human condition as constituted by the supra-historical experience of obligation and the historical experience of sin. This awakens an echo and response, except in the rare cases of moral imbecility,

(1) L'expérience Chrétienne, p. 224.
blindness and deafness, and those — unhappily more frequent perhaps — where the conscious will refuses to hear. (1)

The other primary assertion is the existence of an objective factor. That which becomes the object of human experience is a supra-historical factor, itself transcending its historical actualisation; there are the corresponding conditions of activity and receptivity in a state of reciprocal interpenetration and rapprochement.

Three erroneous tendencies must be avoided —

Christian experience must not be reduced to the human dimension alone (a danger in liberalist theology); in an explanation and exposition of Christian experience, we must not confuse the hunger with the food. Christianity supposes a need, but is not itself the need; it is the means by which the hunger and thirst are assuaged.

Christianity must not be stripped of all metaphysical elements, just because we cannot describe God as He is in Himself; the business of theological exposition is not to make metaphysical affirmations about God, considered as a metaphysical entity, but to speak of God "for us", i.e. the attributes and activities of God as they are for us, in terms of religious experience experimentally and from an inductive stand-point.

There is a risk of traditionalism, the servile submission to authority of tradition, in which the work of Christ is separated from His person, and historical facts are exalted as being the object of faith, which would then be dependent on historical certitude. And, in any case, a fact is not an action; it makes a claim on the intelligence, but not on the will.

There is also a fundamental confusion of eternal activity and historical manifestation. Unfortunately, the action of God

in Christ, while universally accessible in principle, is not universal in fact.

A further condition is the preservation of the historical character of Christianity against mysticism, in which there is an unhealthy exaggeration of the mystical element in the Christian faith, and a sitting light to its historical manifestations, claiming direct contact with God and by-passing the historical process, tradition and corporate experience. The cardinal error of Protestant Biblicism has been the misunderstanding of the significance of history; in the Reformation, there was still not a full break with historical 'tradition', and it was apparently forgotten that the Church was antecedent to the Scriptures (the oral period), and that, if the ante-scriptural oral tradition was theopneustic, the post-scriptural period should, ipso facto, be likewise. In establishing the scripture as the sole material principle of faith (the "principium essendi"), the historical question was illogically ignored, and the historical element in Christianity (necessary, though inferior, secondary and not of its essence), has been ambivalently and ambiguously understood.

Christian Experience and Natural Experience

Natural experience is the analogue of Christian experience in natural humanity, i.e. the moral and religious experience of man as man. The Christian experience involves an enrichment of the other, a 'modification' of its state. In becoming Christian, man does not become another thing than what he should become as man; there is both 'difference' and 'identity'. What is the relationship between these? According to Frommel, the distinction and relationship is difficult to define, because (a) we live in a civilisation with a long history of Christian influence, wherein 'natural' man is no longer altogether 'natural', and, alas, Christians not complete Christians.
Respective manifestations can resemble each other. (b) Christian experience is of variable rather than measurably fixed quantity or quality - a wide spectrum of intensity. (c) There is a certain element of identity making rigid separation difficult and the sources traceable. But a profound difference is also recognised and accepted, and testimony to this is given by the use of the term "Christian virtues". It is an inexact and theologically dangerous expression, but does imply a certain homage to Christianity as compared with "natural" morality and obligation.

The distinctive Christian judgements are - judgement on sin; and the appreciation (recognition) of sin. One might say that Christianity gave the world the conception of 'sin' as such. The idea of sin, as the interpretation of evil in terms of its moral and religious character, characterised the Christian thought in the ancient world in contrast with non-Christian thought.

Repentance, confession, conversion are all essential elements in Christianity. Natural man may judge evil, but more empirically and pragmatically, i.e. in terms of its experienced results and consequences. Christianity is concerned with evil as such, and reprobation of sin is conjoined with a greater degree of certainty as to the moral and religious realities of life than is found in natural man; the latter's perception of it is weaker and more sporadic, and his resistance correspondingly less. Natural man can become morally and religiously sceptical; by definition and nature - and therefore manifesting the distinction - the Christian, as Christian, cannot become so.

A most significant feature of the Christian experience is the growing feeling, indeed certainty, that, in terms of his Christonomic obedience, he becomes a participant in truth, and has entered into an
eternal order of things, receiving peace, joy and assurance in the face of suffering and mortality. Thus the concept of Salvation is involved, and although there is such a thing as ameliorisation in natural man, there is no analogue of Christian salvation. Sin is seen as 'practical' atheism and amorality, and natural man finds himself oscillating between scepticism and dualism, the twin follies of intellectual escapism and the unresolved contradiction of tolerance and aspiration.

Another contrast is the conception of "brotherhood". One must not confuse the theoretical "fatherhood" of God of the philosopher with the practical, daily filiality, in which the heart, rather than the thought, of the believer lives. Since brotherhood can only stem from Fatherhood, natural fraternity, while not strange to natural man as an idea, is inaccessible to him as a fact.

These various manifestations are the signs of a state of soul, persistent and characteristic, such as to suggest the delineation of a special psychology - or should we say physiology? According to Frommel, the moral and religious psychology of natural man may be summarised in terms of the exposition of "l'homme que je suis, jugé par l'homme que je devrais être."

The constitutive fact of humanity is the phenomenon of consciousness. At the centre, and determining it by right, is the moral consciousness, at the centre of which is the consciousness of obligation. This is not an innate idea, law or category of the practical reason, but an experience of the human will. The objective factor is a sovereign action, implying holiness and divine origin, while the subjective factor is the human will in its, as yet, subconscious principle; the conscious will, reflecting this, becomes religious and moral.
Frommel identified the author of the experience of obligation as a living God, remaining, however, unknown and contradictory, because holiness and love throw man into moral and religious scepticism, requiring "revelation" from outside. Man experiences evil or sin as something "necessary" yet abnormal, which, from a religious point of view, is a culpable disruption of man's relationship with God. Man feels himself both victim and guilty, and, incapable of saving himself, requires a redemption, which is, at the same time, a revelation.

Thus, the psychological image of natural man was constituted by Frommel as a theonomic autonomy - autonomous in his freedom of will, theonomous as obliged by God. He experiences an "evolution" of obligation, a passage from potentiality to action under the control of an absolute obligation. Natural man has a "bad conscience", consciousness of a wrong state of will, this involving a three-fold judgement, that of moral duty, moral incapacity and moral condemnation.

The state of the Christian conscience is one of a "good" or "pure" conscience, e.g. Paul before the Sanhedrin, before Felix, and references in Timothy and Hebrews, the phrase being absent from the Gospels, appearing with Christian experience properly so-called. There are conditions and a cause for the salutary change effected on the basis of man's primal theonomic autonomy - from psychological disintegration to life-tendency, i.e. persevering in being by psychological regeneration. The conditions, classically set forth in the Gospel and in apostolic and traditional witness, are conversion, sanctification, regeneration; the cause is the Gospel, or Jesus Christ, or putting it another way, the action of God in Jesus Christ. Christonomy is the person of Christ become for the human consciousness the object of a new moral and religious obligation. Frommel approves the saying of Vinet and Secrétan: "L'Evangile est la Con-
The action of God in Jesus Christ takes, with the Christian, the place and role taken, in empirical man, by the general divine action by which he feels himself obligated in his conscience. The Person of Jesus Christ takes, with the Christian, the place which empirical man approves as the obligation of conscience in his (unacknowledged) theonomic autonomy. The characteristic word, for Christian experience, is "life", and there is in the principle of obligation or duty proper to the Christian conscience a power of redemption, an efficacy of salvation, which does not exist to the same degree in the principle of natural obligation; natural man has, indeed, the germ of this moral and religious life, but cannot bring it to complete fruition and realisation.

The normal and the Christian conscience are alike moved by the same God, and therefore share a solicitation of the reflective will by the same principle under the absolute mode of a judgement of moral and religious holiness. Man becomes Christian to be able to be the man he should be, and which he cannot become by himself.

CHRISTOLOGY

The object of Christian Experience

We turn from the experience as such to the object of the experience. Experimentally, the effect reveals the cause because the cause is in the effect. The effect is the cause manifested, rendered visible and observable — it is the "cause realised". We reject the Humian scepticism as to cause and effect — it may hold in the realm of the phenomenal, but not in the matter of the will and the moral faculty.

In Christian experience there is not a detachment (chronological or otherwise) between cause and effect; experience is a communion of
wills - not 'successiveness' but 'co-existence'. The cause and object of Christian experience is Jesus Christ, and He is distinct from merely "the witness to Him". Frommel, in one of his MSS., entitled his analysis - "Christology: the justification of the Christonomic attitude of the Christian subject. What and who is Christ as the object of Christian experience?"

The manifestation and 'cause' of the knowledge of the historical Christ is in the "Christ pneumatique". When Paul speaks of 'knowing Christ after the flesh', and 'knowing Him thus no longer', he is not opposing sense-knowledge to some kind of mystical, spiritual knowledge; there are not two Christs but two ways of knowing Christ. The word 'historical' comprises also 'theological', 'traditional', 'ecclesiastic'.

Dogmatic must proceed from the interior to the exterior Christ, i.e. from the Christ validated to the will by His action upon the will, to the Christ as appearing in history - from the noumenal to the phenomenal, from certitude to knowledge, not (as would be the sequence in Apologetic) from knowledge to certitude. As to certitude we interpret the Christ of history by the Christ of experience; as to knowledge, we interpret the Christ of experience by the Christ of history. Evangelical history reflects the double character of Christonomic experience - the elements of solidarity and authority in Christ, i.e. as reflecting the human and divine aspects.

The Humanity of Jesus Christ

What Frommel called the "psychic humanity" may be constituted as follows:- His corporeality, as against Docetism; His perfectibility, attested in physical and moral growth; His relativity, as dependent upon God; His passibility, emotional response and involvement in suffering; His fallibility, evidenced in accessibility to moral
struggle; His solidarity, with all humanity, in respect of the foregoing, and indeed, of all human experience.

The humanity of Christ, like His robe, was all of one piece—nothing is lacking to Him such as constitutes humanity. He was not just a Son of Man; He was the Son of Man. We are men—He is man. He remains astonishingly contemporary despite His particular historical context—a man of all races and times. "Individualité historique et typique, en lui le type humain devient parfaitement historique et chaque moment de son histoire porte à son tour le type humain tout entier..." (1)

The "moral" humanity is displayed in an identity of moral phenomenon in Jesus and ourselves, under the two aspects of (a) His understanding of man's moral obligation:—This is grounded in religious feeling—not an innate knowledge of good and evil, or an immanent moral law, or, in a Kantian sense, a category of the practical reason, or a principle of 'secular' morality. The obligation of conscience is a divine activity, although the action of God became a matter of deterministic pre-destination in Calvinism. The attitude of free obedience involves two phenomena—of receptivity and activity ('hear' and 'do'). There follows, in the Johannine sense, experimental validation of truth. "Man becomes autonomous only on the basis of theonomy (religious morality), and takes knowledge of his theonomy only through his autonomy (moral religion)". and (b) His understanding for Himself of the fact of moral obligation:—There is the unique narrative in Luke, of Jesus at age 12. His response to Mary's rebuke is one of astonishment—He felt the inner constraint of moral obligation which now transcended that of His parents. Likewise, the Temptations displayed a humanity coterminous with our own, in a testing of the interior armament of moral and religious

faith. Victory resulted from the internal authority of the obligation of conscience, to which is directed the reflective will. Similarly, the 'agony' in Gethsemane is concerned with an inner area of real struggle, involving the indispensable conditions of the moral and religious life.

The Perfection of Normal Humanity in the Son of Man

Plenitude of humanity with perfection of moral character constituted the moral holiness of Jesus, asserted Frommel, and resulted from a total religious consecration. He became, in fact, what we should be. He is not a stranger - He is myself, "normally speaking". He is more "identical" with and to me than I am to myself; He is more like my true self, more myself than my empirical self. (cf. Parable of Prodigal Son.) But what proofs have we of the holiness of Christ? There can be no "rational" proofs, but there is testimony and witness, as follows:

(a) The Gospels. The contemporary impression was of One with no sense of separation from God, nor inner disharmony. He was endowed with supernatural power, but without the usual moral depravity and with no element of sorcery or magic. He distinguished, as we can hardly do, between the sin and the sinner, and regarded as the worst manifestation of all the hypocrisy of the Pharisee. There shone through all His speech and activity a love, a filial relation to God, a peace of conscience, a regal freedom. As Vinet put it - "the Gospel offers us something to see and contemplate well before offering us something to believe, and, above all, to understand..."

(b) The Modern Conscience. Even Strauss and others, having separated the historical Christ from the object of devotion, accord nevertheless, to the historical Christ our ideal of holiness; (1) Renan could find no answer to the challenge; "who amongst you will

(1) op. cit. p. 58.
convict me of sin?" Although a fine figure, Buddha does not equal or surpass Christ, and the order and universe of discourse of his morality is different.

(c) **The Church.** Although some have seen a danger of circular argument or tautology in the Church's testimony to the holiness of Christ, it remains true that the motives of belief and experience have led men to allow their whole destiny, interests, conduct and faith to depend on the holiness of Jesus Christ. The Christian faith is sanctifying, for the object of its faith is holy; otherwise it would not be so. This faith and belief is a common element in all the Churches.

(d) **The First Believers and His Contemporaries.** Again the objection has been raised that there took place subsequent idealisation of the image of Christ. But this seems to forget the continuing emphasis on His humanity.

(e) **His Own Testimony.** He excluded Himself from the Dominical prayer (need of forgiveness), and was always acknowledged as speaking 'with authority'. He regarded Himself as self-determined in His activity, as speaking with a divine mandate. The moral perfection of Jesus was conditioned by His obedience to God.

Does the Temptation narrative, however, involve the presence of some amount of evil, however small, in the character of Jesus, to which there could be an appeal? An older Dogmatic reduced the reality of the Temptation out of respect of His holiness. But the holiness, as above, is in fact constituted in His obedience, and His humanity would be in question were it otherwise. Frommel thought that Schleiermacher fell into error in ascribing to the historical Jesus 'accidental impeccability', and in proposing the dilemma of Temptation and "Sundlösigkeit" (anamartesia) resolved only in terms
of feelings of pleasure or sadness as indications, though not the determining factors of a state. According to him, "between the temptation of Jesus and ours there is such a difference that the human identity between us is broken."(1)

The sundering of the relationship rests on two errors:-(a) the psychological error. This is in the form of either Intellectualism or Phenomenalism - the former confusing the being with the idea, reason or thought, so that the idea or thought of the fault is the fault itself; whereas temptation (as testing) is in the struggle of the will against intellectual representation. The latter is the identification of the being with consciousness (or conscience); thus the evil element is already in the conscience causing a participation, which would exclude the reality of the effect of the will on the conscience. (b) a generalisation from our personal experience. We judge the testing and tempting as if "in itself" from our own. We know Temptation as interior and exterior but with Christ it was exterior only. We already have a certain complicity and concupiscence.

The temptations of Christ are to be seen in their Messianic Significance - it was not so much a 'whether' or 'what', but a 'how', and they were concerned with understanding the Divine will (which had already been accepted in principle). They were, of course, to be historically linked with Caesarea Philippi and Gethsemane.

Frommel acknowledged(2) his understanding of the general outline of the terms of the Temptation (in particular, as can be seen, the distinction of the "how" and the "whether" of messianic obedience) as being guided by G. Fulliquet.(3)

The Holiness of Christ

There was clear indication of the interest in this area of

(1) "Der Christliche Glaube, par. 98.
(2) op. cit. p. 90.
(3) cf. his "La Pensee religieuse dans le nouveau Testament", pp. 88-91.
Christological discussion, as evidenced by a number of works of the period. (1) Chapuis saw the question as beyond analysis, while Trial and Gilard tried to safeguard the integrity of Jesus in terms of a historical, moral and spiritual compromise. Frommel however denied its unanalyserable nature. (2)

(a)Was the Holiness of Christ objectively true in itself? Sabatier had hesitated to answer; according to him, only the subjective holiness, the state of integrity of conscience, is available to research. Godet and Gretillat sought to escape uncertainty by psychological and historical arguments, e.g. that the 'subjective' integrity could not have been maintained except as expression of 'objective' holiness; and that, since we must take account of the possibility of "folie religieuse" or monomania, the "proof" that it was not so with Christ lies in an appeal to the manifestations of supernatural power, particularly the Resurrection; likewise there was His own appeal to "the works which I do". However, the frailty of these arguments is in passing from the historical to the moral sphere. There may be mutual interaction, but they are heterogeneous, and, in this form of argument are simply 'leaning on each other'. Indeed, the order is grievously wrong - we do not accept the Gospel or believe in Christ because of the miracles; it is the other way round.

(b)Is it founded in history? No, at least, not in 'bare' history, because it would imply total dependence on documents,

Paul Chapuis: La Sainteté de Jesus de Nazareth.
Rev. de théol et de philos. Lausanne, 1897.
L. Gilard: La Sainteté de Jésus - ibid, 1898.
L. Trial: La Sainteté du Christ - Revue Chrétienne, 1898.

(2) op. cit. p. 108.
recollection, and presentation of 'facts' which themselves have still
to be interpreted. We could only claim that Christ achieved the
highest point of moral perfection, but we could not actually affirm
His perfect holiness. Indeed, in trying to do so, we exceed our
human competence - after all, it is He who judges us. Thus our
relative certainty is founded outside of history.

(c) Is it founded on dialectic or speculation? There under-
lies this question a confusion between belief and faith. Belief may
be held in terms of critical arguments and rational considerations,
and to found the holiness of Christ on 'a priori' reasoning from the
nature of truth and goodness as such would be to reduce it to the
level of an 'idea', which might be true for us, but is not of nece-
sity true in itself. Religion is not a 'game of ideas', but a life,
an immediate and vital relationship of being to being. Ideas have
their cradle in impressions; moral ideas depend on moral impressions;
i.e. the experience of conscience, and so the basis of our certainty
of the holiness of Christ is thus of an experimental nature. But
what of its validity? Are we to admit, with Chapuis, that the im-
pression of the holiness of Christ is an "impression escaping analy-
sis"? The idea of holiness is "God perceived and contemplated under
the aspect of will", i.e. in consciousness of obligation His holiness
is given in His absolute conditioning of our moral life. Thus it is
God who is given in the experience, and the argument must be falla-
cious if we claim to find the same "absolute" in our response to
Christ. Rather, Christ incarnates the sovereign will which lays
obligation on Him, as there is identity of action as with God and
Christ. What we give to Christ, we do not take away from God; we
achieve unity with the Father, because we do not know the Father as
Father except by the Son. God reveals Himself completely to us only
by Jesus Christ. We therefore believe in the holiness of Christ because we believe in the holiness of God, and because the will of Christ and of God reach us as indissolubly united and equally sovereign and authoritative; thought can conceive it; reason can legitimise it; beliefs can postulate it – but faith lives it, and it becomes an experimental truth of experience.

The Divinity of Christ

The relationship of the human and the divine in the matter of the person of Jesus Christ is the "Crux theologiae". Expansive reference could be made to the impression made on His contemporaries and on Christians through the centuries. There is His self-constituting authority, moral and religious autonomy, and the co-extension of word and action. The following are, in Frommel's phrase "les pretendues preuves" of the divinity of Christ, given as showing the contrary position to his own, which remained one of founding the divinity of Christ on the direct impression of moral authority assumed and justified by Him before the conscience.

(a) From miracle – The "proof" from, and the appeal to, miracle is found in some ancient, and indeed in some modern catechetical material. It is basically misguided, since physical or historical certainty is of a different order from the moral, and the divine cannot be interpreted in terms of the human; we constitute the argument from miracle a "husteron proteron". (1)

(b) From Holiness – This is a worthier form of argument, lifting the discussion out of the ontological and metaphysical into the moral and religious realm. But one must guard against siting the discussion in the metaphysical area. For example, it would appear that Chapuis absorbed the divinity of Jesus in His human holiness; reflecting an evolutionary pantheism, the distinction between

(1) See Thesis chpt. - The Supernatural and Miracle.
the subject and the object of the religious relationship falls, and, with it the religious relationship, i.e. "religion" itself. But the basic weakness of this position is the syllogistic nature of its establishment, moving, as it appears to do, from the premiss of religious and moral holiness to the conclusion of divinity, via the middle term of His self-testimony in terms of His religious and moral authority.

Frommel's earlier position was to be found in his deliverance given at Lausanne 1893.\(^{(1)}\)

The study opened with an assessment of the contemporary situation. Five or six centuries ago, one came to the Christian faith by many doors when it was co-extensive with society and culture. Faith, or at least belief, governed most human activity; theological science dominated others as "la science", and the Christian ideal was normative. The intermingling of theology and philosophy in Catholic theology has given way to dissociation in the Protestant. Must we accept Schérer's dilemma - belief or knowledge, the conditions of each being mutually exclusive? No, there is not antinomy, but distinction of order, faith not being the result of intelligence and the spiritual authority of the Church being founded on the basis of experimental, observed phenomena.

The Christian phenomenon has, at its centre, the historic person of Jesus. The testimony of the centuries is of the unique impression, of the irresistible sympathy mingled with astonishment, of the near-defiance. Man is also impressed with a feeling of moral identity, although under the conditions of absoluteness. In Jesus, perfection of human nature is conjoined with perfection of moral nature; He has taken on an axiomatic character - the axiom of human life. But we are faced with the scandal and the offence - the infinite under

\(^{(1)}\) Published in "Etudes morales et religieuses", pp. 29-71, under the title "Des Conditions Actuelles de la foi Chrétienne".
the conditions of the finite? God in flesh? God-man? The belief in the Son of God is conditioned by one's belief in the son of man, and the "unity", refused to the understanding, is given in obedience; we lay hold, in the historical Jesus, of the Eternal Christ of God. The hidden author of obligation, the unknown master of the will, reveals Himself as a Father - who was, doubtless, always Father, but who said so to me for the first time in Christ.

In the matter of the holiness of Christ, Frommel approached the question in terms of the nature of ultimate obligation and the conditions of knowledge and faith. These are human and accessible, open to the humble rather than to the wise, known in obedience, an obedience exacted in conscience before being exacted by Christ. "If any man will do the will of Him who sent me, he will know..." - this, in the matter of Christological analysis and recognition, is the condition of certainty.

This earlier position held by Frommel was now criticised by him as hazardous and out of accord with experience. It is, rather, a matter of intuitive recognition of divinity than of an acceptance of divinity as a quality derived, by reasoning, from the property of holiness. Logically, holiness is a necessary, but not a sufficient, pre-condition. Metaphysically conceived, divinity and holiness might be regarded as mutually irreducible, if reciprocal, qualities; but they are rather homogeneous qualities reciprocally complementary, mutually harmonising and qualifying each other. Moving from holiness to divinity is inadequate and contrary to Christonomic experience; some would, indeed, express the movement of thought the other way round.

Jesus would not be divine by divinity but by holiness, i.e. the inevitable reduction of the argument would be to confound the two
terms, the holiness becoming the substance of the divinity, instead of, as claimed, its basis. Allied with this, it is to be noted that the holiness, being of immediate evidence, will alone be immediately certain, while the divinity, being of mediated demonstration, will be only mediately certain. (1)

In terms of experimental proof, the divinity of Christ is imperiously claimed by the Christonomic obedience it provokes. The true root of His claim is in the irresistible impression of authority produced in contemporary and spiritual witness; it is not a "proof" but the only worthy testimony of absolute belief. This may be thought a slender foundation but He seems not to have chosen to commit Himself to anything else than the moral and religious evidence of natural humanity, i.e. to conscience. It is also very subtle, but what "proofs" are there of the distinction between good and evil? - the distinction is "morally" discerned. Likewise the divinity of Christ is a matter, not of proof, but of discernment in the experimental response of faith.

Does the foregoing correspond to an analogous certainty in the consciousness and conscience of Christ Himself? His silence on His divinity would not have the same consequences for it as silence on His holiness would have for it. While in the matter of holiness there was a struggle and moral victory, in the matter of divinity there was little in the way of definite claim - there was simple self-authenticating action, and He was never more divine than when most human, nor more human when He was most divine. Renan particularly stressed the unique filial consciousness of Jesus. Early theology and some modern conservative orthodoxy explain His consciousness in terms of 'pre-existence', but this would seem to denigrate His humanity by putting His consciousness outside of human consciousness.

(1) op. cit. p. 132-137.
B. Weiss and A. Sabatier sought to found the matter in the consciousness which Christ had of His 'moral relationship' to God. Frommel took the view of this last group, linking them with Fülliquet,(1) placing the foundation of the mystery of Divine filiation in the human conscience, the area of the consciousness of obligation. Jesus identified His Person with the moral order and life itself, accepting unquestioningly the titles of Master and Lord. Despite the obvious reliance on Johannine source material, the other Gospels can also be called to witness, and, although exegetical questions arise, the basic witness remains.

Many references can be cited showing that Christ identified the divine authority with His own, but not integrally, resting it rather on a perfect subordination and filial obedience. "He who rejects me rejects Him who sent me"... He is in the line of the prophets and is the one to whom they looked forward. The Divine authority as perceived in human conscience is manifest in that Christ refuses to answer the question on the nature of His authority, but rather invites those who wish to know the doctrine to do the will, i.e. it is an appeal, not to the reason by way of credentials, but directly to the conscience. "Si quelqu'un veut sérieusement faire... il connaîtra..."

Human wills submit to that of which they already have inner knowledge. So, theologically, the authority of Christ is identical and subordinate to that of God; anthropologically, His authority is identical, contiguous and superior to that of obligation. Thus, in the issue of authority, Christonomic experience has been legitimised before the moral reason, and has been described in its rapport with the constitutive experience of natural man.

The Reformation, according to Frommel, emphasising the work and Person of Christ, revived old questions, and in the Lutheran and

(1) La Pensee religieuse dans le Nouveau Testament p. 67.
Reformed types respectively, there was seen a representation of the monophysite and dyophysite strands in Christology. Luther's sacramentalism led to the doctrine of consubstantiation and the "communicatio idiomatum", which he adopted from 1529. The 'reformed' criticism of Lutheranism was directed against the basic flaw of talking of the unknowable as if it were known, e.g. human nature per se, divine nature per se, and it was seen to be an escape from one type of intellectualism of the abstract to another. The underlying axiom was "Finitum non est capax infiniti", and the natures were interpreted as in terms of the finite and infinite. Christology thus again seemed to face a choice between Docetism and Arianism.

Frommel characterised Reformed theology as taking cognisance of the "vices of Lutheran Christology", but not knowing how to reply adequately to it. In particular, he indicts the speaking of unknowable things as if they were known quantities, e.g. the human nature, and, above all, the divine nature. Rothe proposed a "progressive union" of God and man in Jesus Christ, culminating in the resurrection. Schweizer spoke of the human incarnation of an "idée-force" - the constitutive element historically being the pre-existence. Over against this there is the strand represented by "Kenosis", and this, too, obviously involved pre-existence. According to Gétiillat, "the earthly Christ is the second person of the Trinity, voluntarily stripped of the Divine nature and 'dressed' in human nature". The Kenotic theory is still based on a basic dualism of divine and human. There is no simultaneity, only succession, over against the Biblical witness to plenitude of humanity and divinity.

The Christian conscience is really concerned with 'how does God reveal Himself to us in a person?' rather than 'how does God become man?'

(1) op. cit. vol. II. p. 186.
A third approach to Christology appears to have attempted a suppression of the differential qualities, meeting the difficulties by eliminating or attenuating them. For example, Socinianism flourished in its last stages in 1840-50, a view in which Jesus was a simple man of supernatural birth and miraculous powers, elevated to heaven and made an object of worship; here we had sterility in the fields of religious need and metaphysical reasoning. Chapuis, at one time approving the Kenotic approach, recognised the difficulty of explaining the divinity by the holiness, for then the holiness required explication; he then suggested an ideal and particular divine predestination. But this is too much and too little, seeming to purge Christianity of all ontology and to exclude all first cause, disembarassing itself, it thinks, of all metaphysic and reducing the Gospel to purely moral and religious categories. Once more, it puts an unbridgeable gulf between Jesus and ourselves. (1)

At one time, Chapuis was a strong partisan of Kenotic theory, but he came to adopt Secretan's position – that the holiness of Christ constituted the centre of religion, which is a life, not a philosophy. This holiness rests on the divinity of Christ, in accordance, in his view, with ancient orthodoxy. Modern thinking, for Chapuis, saw in Christ a man of history, where the perfection is moral, and would be a human attribute. Further, in respect of the humanity of Christ, holiness does not imply intellectual infallibility. Chapuis once made the revealing remark to Pérriraz - "the problem of Scripture remains the Protestant problem par excellence. For four centuries, it has not ceased to attract the attention of theologians and Churches". (2)

(1) The Christology of Paul Chapuis is briefly delineated by Louis Pérriraz in his "Histoire de la théologie Protestante du XIXe Siècle"; Sect. III - Le problème Christologique; (Neuchatel: 1956).

The Religious Solution to the Problem

(1) op. cit. pp. 209-336.
ciple of human personality. "La personne" is not created — it is "given birth to", indeed, it creates itself, or, rather, forms itself, and this engendering is a datum of experience, the experience of obligation. This is different from 'things' around us, which, not being able to be 'begotten', must have been created; they require creativity outside themselves. This level of creation escapes experience and comprehension; we cannot conceive of a previous existence of something outside of God, which could form a basis of personal production.

We apply these data to the Christological problem — He is not a 'created thing' but a personal action of God, humanly personalised, because the property of divine action, as we experience it in conscience, is to bring 'la personne' to birth. The sonship of Christ implies two antithetical, but not contradictory, qualities: — Limitation, insofar as He is not the Father; He is not God in the metaphysical sense of the latter's essential aseity, but derives from God in the genetic sense; part of this filial consciousness is in His subordination to the Father. and Extension: His dependence is not that of a 'creature', but He has the life of the Father as we give life to our children and they have life in themselves. What the Father is, the Son is, and what the Son is, the Father is; there is not a metaphysically irreconcilable juxtaposition, but the interpenetration of persons. Frommel referred(1) to the treatment of the Christological question by Prof. A. Bouvier (1826-1893), his predecessor in the Chair at Geneva, in his "Dogmatique". (2) The "Dogmatique" is a lively and well-written work, with an immediate thought and owing much to Schleiermacher. In Jesus the man the Divine life has appeared under the conditions and form of human per-

(1) op. cit. p. 227.
(2) Published, and freely edited, according to Bovon, in his article in the "Revue de théologie et de philosophie"; Lausanne, 1903 by his Colleague E. Montet.
sonality. This could not have taken place save but by express Divine will. Bouvier considered that he, representing the new Christology, escaped the traditional dilemma making of Jesus rather a 'Divine man' than a 'God-man'; Jesus, living in perfect communion with God, was the perfect revealer of God, the initiator of a new humanity.

Bouvier did not really escape from the dilemma, and Frommel believed that he had transcended it in the foregoing analysis, of which the purpose was to avoid irreconcilable, metaphysical antinomy, in favour of the mystery of personal interpenetration. The "mystery" is not thereby removed but it is of the same order as the mystery of ourselves qua persons; though inaccessible to thought, it is experientially lived. If it is objected that this involves a reduction or a kind of disguised humanism, it may be pointed out that nowhere is there a denial in the Gospel that man is destined to be a child of God; far from conceiving Jesus in the image of man, we are conceiving man in the image of Him. He is the "norm" of man, the second Adam. Humanity, through and in terms of His solidarity with it, became in Him what it should have been in itself - fully personal and fully filial.

Quantitatively and qualitatively, Jesus Christ is the Son of God par excellence, the protagonist of a new humanity in which there is no break between Jesus and God or between Jesus and us. The 'cosmic' significance of Christ is a larger problem; the experienced effects are, however, nearer at hand. As a simile, we still say that the sun "rises", "declines", etc; this description reflects our subjective experience of its movement, even although geocentricity has given way to heliocentricity. Similarly, the pre-existence of Christ as a metaphysical concept is a matter of rationalistic theo-
ology rather than of personal faith and experience. It seems to
rest on a view of time as something in which God exists, rather than
that time exists for God, and that it is a subjective category of our
mind. Eternity is the negation, not the extensive prolongation, of
time, the negation also of succession and contingency. Pre-existence
is a projection, under temporal form, of a judgement of absolute
spiritual value, surpassing, and of another nature than, the metaphys-
cical terms of time and space; thus, Kantian strictures on the tem-
poral and spatial categories apart, Christology must include the
element of "pre-existence". From the side of God, everything is
eternal - from the side of man temporal.

Christian Experience as Religious Revelation

The older Protestant theology spoke of Christ as Prophet, Priest
and King - the theory of the three offices. Frommel had some liking
for the Ritschlian division - Royal Prophet and Royal Priest, but
suggested what he thought a better description: - Revelatory Kingship
and Redemptive Kingship - as to the manner and general conditions,
the phrase "Christian revelation" conveys the idea that there is no
antecedent to 'Christian' revelation. However, the Bible assumes
that man is in some relationship to God, even if hostile, and there
is some kind of disposition or aptitude. Hence, no 'proofs' are
found of the existence of God. The experimental nature of revela-
tion is common both to "original" and specifically Christian revela-
tion. Original, natural, revelation is often held to be innate and
'a priori' but wide variation is historically found. Divine know-
ledge is not simply "intellectual" but involves moral response, and,
in the area of the will, the obligation of conscience. Secondary
revelation, also of an experimental nature, results from an action by
which God renders witness to Himself in the distinctively Christian
consciousness, under the aspect of the inner or pneumatic Christ. Revelation is linked with experience; without experience, there can be knowledge, but there is no 'revelation', for there is no transformation of life, nor conformity of feeling and thought.

Revelation and redemption are aspects of each other. Christ does not save without revealing, nor reveal without saving; neither function is a condition of the other - they are both given together, having as unique condition the Christonomy of the Christian subject. Natural and Christian revelation enjoy reciprocity of mode, since there is identity of Author - this would not be so if natural religion rested on Kantian 'a priori' concepts - thus a Christian anthropology and theology come within the scope of the same revelation, itself dependent on the sovereignty and redemption of Christ, and of Christian experience as its necessary presupposition.

According to Frommel, the Christian has no further need to acquire knowledge of God - he possesses it in possessing the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. This revelation is better than knowledge because it is "a demonstration of spirit and power", a living certainty, a spiritual experience. Every Christian is of necessity a theologian, taking intellectual account of that experience.(1)

The ever-present danger in theology is the establishment of "idols", i.e. representations of God - whether of sense, imagination, intellect or idea - inadequate to the Divine revelation; and the intrusion into the interpretation of the revelation of factors foreign to it.

The other temptation is to claim to "think" or to "represent" God. This should be seen as impossible because God is the primary condition of thought as He is of all existence. But despite this, paradoxical as it may sound, God must be thought and represented, or

He would not be a revealed God. "Le Dieu inconnaissable est le Dieu des agnostiques et non plus des chrétiens". (1)

Bovon and Secretan agreed that we dare not deny the infinite on the pretext that all our knowledge is relative. (2) Two distinctive schools were to be observed in French Protestant theology - those of Montauban and Paris. The first of these evinced an over-riding necessity to 'represent' God, i.e. in the suppression of the metaphysical and the transcendent, to subsume the unknowable under the knowable. Starting from the phenomenon of conscience there was, however, a fatal identification of human with divine individuality, of created with uncreated. God is a kind of extension or extrapolation from human experience and thought. In the Paris tendency we find the "symbolo-fideism" of Sabatier and Ménégoz - the opposite of the other tendency. Here was proclaimed the unthinkable and unknowable character of God, but in denying analysis of experience it denies its revelatory character. This intellectual agnosticism destroyed the specifically Christian characteristics of revelation and must lead to religious esotericism and exotericism. God is either the great 'unknown x', or, to the uninitiated, a venerable, bearded father image. The fault lay in the confusion of religious revelation with metaphysical knowledge and the introduction of the tyrannous concept of 'symbolism' (representations and attributes of divinity to be symbolically construed). As a result of this religious and moral scepticism, adoration of the "unknown God" is the only possible course open to 'natural' man.

Man, in Frommel's submission, in becoming Christian, 'comes back' to God (like the prodigal son). He was always a son because he is a moral being, and his filiality is constituted morally rather than ontologically. However, if it had not first been ontological, it

(1) op. cit. p. 262 and see Chapter on Epistemology.
could never have become moral. Man becomes what he was potentially and, above all, by right. As Vinet put it: (God is) "a father who was always father, but who said so to me for the first time in Jesus Christ..." Candlish had identified the primordial relationship of God to man as that constituted by creative sovereignty, and Christians come into filial status by adoption — otherwise there is no revelation of divine paternity. The paternity embraces the sovereignty, and indeed legitimises it.

Divine Fatherhood — This was constituted by Frommel in terms of a three-fold modal revelation:

Absolute Universal Causality. We must guard against the God 'in Himself' being absorbed in the God 'for us', and against a narrow anthropomorphism. But fatherhood implies generation, i.e. a particular form of causality, and this causality alone gives sovereignty, which is to say, authority, its sufficient reason. Since Christian experience involves regeneration, man experiences divine causality in an immediate, absolute form. God, since He Himself by definition is not acted upon by any extraneous cause, is indeed absolute and universal causality.

Absolute Universal Finality. As the cause, God is also the supreme 'end' of all that is. There is not only causality but purpose and end in the divine self-constituted nature.

Divine Infinity. This, as above, follows as an expression of the divine transcending of time and space. It is not a negative idea but one given in the natural experience of the obligation of conscience; there is transcendence and immediacy on the one hand, actuality on the other. Activity perceived under the mode of actuality supposes nontemporality, (as similarly, with the mode of space). Causality, Finality and Infinity in no way exhaust the content of the
Christian revelation, but are necessary theological elements, affirming the transcendent and incomprehensible factors in the nature of God vis-à-vis ourselves.

Both sides of the divine-human equation must be personal. If God were merely causality, the relationship would be of physical necessity; if merely finality, one of rational necessity; if merely infinity one of separation and partiality. There cannot be a moral and religious relationship in which one side only is personal. The word 'Father' is not purely a symbol, nor indicative of pantheism or the icy abstractions of Deism. There is a finite character to the personal element in us; not being 'pure activity', it is formed not by activity alone, but by reaction, i.e. the coming against the non-self. Personality is a self-conscious being, a self-determining being, but the more passive a being is the less personal. Thus we recognise the incompleteness of the concept of personality as humanly known, and therefore the infinite, as completely self-determining, is the necessary basis of supreme or perfect personality. Only an infinite God can be an 'absolute person'. Infinity can remain an abstract conception, but in becoming personal, the negative quality is transformed into a positive.

There is, further, the seeming dualism involved in the relation of absolute personality (infinity) and contingent personal existence (finitude). But, as with other apparent dualisms, the two terms of the antinomy are affirmed by the Christian consciousness; the difficulty does not come from it, but from thought seeking to give account of experience. It is, in fact, given expression in the divine transcendence and immanence. There is a mysterious relationship between the person and the personal act - the relationship of transcendence and immanence. The principle of contradiction is the
criterion of the intelligible, but not of the real. As in the ques-
tion of synthesis of freedom and determinism, the infinite and the
finite are the approximative logical symbols of the real which itself
goes beyond the logically intelligible.

The absolute must also be unique and spiritual; the one-ness of
God results from an experimental religious impression as much as from
dialectical necessity. Indeed the word monotheism seems a pleonasm;
all theism is monotheism, and all theism is necessarily spiritual.
Certainly the ultimate nature of spirit - and of matter - escapes us,
yet we make the distinction; in simple terms, the material is
suggested by multiplicity, separateness, etc., the spiritual by the
principle of undifferentiated unity. So spirituality is not a logi-
cal corollary of divine finality, but, like one-ness (uniqueness) has
its basis in Christian experience. God is the supreme 'subject' not
the 'object' of another object. In the phraseology of Bovon - "the
God - Spirit, thinking and willing Himself as Spirit, determines
Himself as sovereign personality".

The final quality is 'life'. In an older theology, the deadness
of a unitarian theism was consciously opposed by a trinitarian formu-
lation of the intra-divine life. (Frommel did not achieve his
intention to deal with the Trinity in a later Dogmatic account of the
Kingdom of God and its successive modalities in history.) The
 Divine identity results from the fact that God as subject can have no
other object than Himself; this is not a fact of nature, that is, of
divine passivity, but a free, spiritual activity, displaying the
absolute sufficiency of the divine life. This was called by ancient
dogmaticians the "divine felicity". The next mystery to consider is
how, if God is His own sufficient object, it comes about that He
places others beside Him, to draw them to Him and make them partici-
pants in His felicity...

By the existence of Divine attributes, we mean their reality for God, and not just their reality for man; but is there a correspondence with something objective? Schleiermacher made a subjective interpretation of divine causality envisaged as alone objective. Again we find divergence between the schools of Montauban and Paris. The former interpreted the Fatherhood and Personality anthropomorphically, the qualities absorbing and covering the "en soi", so that God ceases to be the Absolute, the Infinite, the unknowable; the latter regarded Fatherhood and Personality symbolically - God reveals Himself, but as the unknowable. Thus His attributes and our modes of knowledge must remain subjective. Frommel sees this as a false antithesis - the Montauban school denying, in effect, that God requires to reveal Himself at all, and the Paris school affirming, in effect, that He reveals Himself only as unknowable. Of God, as a metaphysical entity (le Dieu "en soi"), the attributes will be subjective, and do not necessarily correspond to a divine reality, being subjective human categories; but of God revealed ("le Dieu pour nous"), i.e. God as personality, we affirm their Divine objective reality, where the attributes appear as personal. The necessity of the Christian life is to have less and less abstraction and negativity and more of the concrete and the positive - the ascending order is from the least intelligible religious concepts to the higher plane of the experience of the revealed God.

We now set out, briefly, the metaphysical attributes of God, to which, somewhat surprisingly, Frommel committed himself.

**Negative (a) Eternity** - Time is a necessary form and element of human experience; we cannot say if it is also so with cosmic phenomena - we are captive by the conditions of our human perception.
Eternity, as an abstraction, is not contained in Scripture. God is anterior to all things, and the New Testament adjective "aionios" marks an indefinite succession of time, not its negation; it is rather that God dominates time - there is a sovereignty of God over time of which 'eternity' is the condition. (b) Immensity - Similarly as with time, the concept of space. By immensity we mean the quality of immeasurability - He is the negation of space as 'extension'. "Immensitas Dei in eo consistit, quod essentia divina non potest ullis locorum terminis mensurari aut includi..." (c) Immutability - As time and space are conditions of human experience, change implies succession and movement. Immutability thus expresses the synthesis of attributes pertaining to the transcendence of time and space.

Positive. (a) Omnipresence - This corresponds to immutability, describing the efficacious omnipresence - the "omnipraesentia operativa" of ancient dogmaticians. Again it is not found in Scripture. (b) Almightiness - Applied to co-existence, i.e. to space, omnipresence becomes almightiness. It is the attribute by which God works and maintains the unity of the universe in spite of its own inherent spatial principle of disorganisation. (c) Omniscience - As almightiness corresponds to 'immensity', omniscience corresponds to 'eternity' of God. He unites in Himself what time disperses, and there is an indissoluble linking of "all-powerful knowledge and omniscient power".

Personal. The above does not necessarily imply 'personality'. We could think in metaphysical terms of omniscience as a universal state of pantheistic knowledge.

(a) Wisdom - There is a fundamental distinction between wisdom and knowledge - the former signifies the choice of the best of all
possible means to attain and realise the goal of divine finality; it is, as a personal determination of knowledge the best possible use of the divine omniscience.

(b) **Freedom** - The condition of divine wisdom lies in freedom. It is the faculty by which, in the exercise of His almightiness, God determines Himself as He wills. Freedom depends on wisdom or it would not be anything but the arbitrary exercise of a sovereign power.

(c) **Truthfulness** - God cannot "deceive" either Himself or man. It effects the synthesis of wisdom and freedom; it corresponds to the divine omnipresence, constituting the identity of personality and the free exercise of wisdom and omniscience. "The word of God endures for ever" - this implies the personal expression of His immutable permanence.

(d) **Holiness** - The Hebraic conception of Holiness implied "belonging to God", not necessarily of limited application to something with moral nature, e.g. buildings, objects. It referred to something consecrated to God, set apart for His exclusive service, thus necessarily extending to people, e.g. priests, and finally the people, the nation, as a whole. The prophets strove to infuse 'moral' quality into the idea of holiness. Divine holiness became understood as the affirmation of the absolute character of God's Personality; the duty and right of possession becomes, first in the human manifestation, the duty and right of moral correctness through relationship with (moral) personality.

(e) **Love** - The idea of love contrasts strongly with that of fear in non-Christian religion. It is not simply the "amor intellectualis" of Spinoza, nor an expression of a basic egoism in the worshipper seeking capricious response. The love of God for man does not date from Christianity - but, for the first time, He has told man
of it in Jesus Christ, because it was the first time He could do it - He found a man to whom His love was not veiled by any evil disposition of the heart. If the love of God is separated from its manifestation in Christ, it becomes an abstraction, an idea. The divine Fatherhood and love are an individual and particular revelation, not intellectual, but dynamic and interior. "Amor Dei est, quo ipse cum objecto amabili se suaviter unit". (1) The initiative is with God, the receptivity with us. The revelation of the love of God is the revelation of divine causality by which we came into being, i.e. creation is a part of the revelation of divine love. We do not say "God is love", because that is a form of language, and love is not a subject, but the attribute of a subject. The love of God is an infinite love, eternal and absolute, the first and last motives of divine causality. "Dieu est la personnalité qui aime absolument".

(f) Fatherhood - What natural revelation necessarily disjoins into two contradictory relations (holiness and love, irreconcilable to thought), Christian revelation unites indissolubly, and makes of them the one and only relationship of God with man. God must not only be Father, He must reveal Himself as Father. Fatherhood is not susceptible of direct revelation, so indirect revelation as the Son is required; the Son, known and manifested, reveals and manifests the Father. In Christ divine fatherhood became accessible to thought, and object of intellectual comprehension. Jesus Christ, as "La parabole", furnished it to mankind under the form of the one non-symbolic anthropomorphism which displayed the divine fatherhood and human sonship.

Frommel suggested the form of a Christian anthropology as a necessary introduction to the central theme of Soteriology. The revelation of God - especially theological revelation - finds its

(1) Dogmatician Quenstedt.
counterpart in a Christian anthropology. Few thinkers have thought
to modify their doctrine of God without modifying their doctrine of
man, or vice versa. In religious revelation, separation is impos-
sible, and a distinctively religious understanding of man is not
without consequences in scientific or philosophical anthropology.
In Frommel's Apologetics, natural revelation of God - the obligation
of conscience - had to do with the natural knowledge of man.

The basic datum is that man feels himself a moral and religious
being, but one incapable of realising his moral and religious des-
tiny; he is an enigmatic, contradictory creature, a "monster incom-
prehensible to himself and others". (1) The doubt, contradiction
and negation are always fragile and uncertain. Behind practical or
intellectual atheism, there is continually met a moral and religious
experience; this is nearly universally admitted. The atheist
faced with sudden danger emits a religious appeal, a 'prayer'; "of
neither monkey, elephant nor pig do we expect this!" The uncon-
scious triumphs over the conscious, the religious instinct over the
atheistic reason.

The great paradox (Rom. 7) lies in that man, though 'desiring'
the right, does not perform it, because he has not the power nor the
true desire; he is overwhelmed by sense of powerlessness, frustra-
tion, hopelessness. The categorical imperative imperiously orders
"You must" - nature protests "I cannot", and the human being emits
the sigh "I should"; to this the Gospel replies with a Revelation
which becomes a Redemption.

Jesus Christ is the answer to the question: What is man? He
has shown Himself as the Son of Man. He did not primarily teach;
He appeared. The human problem did not admit of an answer by way
of dialectical demonstration - it could only be resolved by and in a

(1) Pascal.
human life actually lived. Not only did he utter the Word — He was the Word. The Word and the Person — we are not to interpret either by the other. The Revelation is in the Person manifested by the Words, in the Words interpreted by the Person. This is the justification of Protestantism and a warning of the insufficiency of doctrine, dogmatic and catechism. The two cardinal errors to which Christology is prone are Docetism and Ebionism. The Revelation in Christ is not theoretical, but concrete and actual, and man must contemplate and come to knowledge of, Him, not just as He is in the Gospels, but as He is encountered through or behind them. The Gospels are not to become a 'tomb' for Him. Jesus Christ realised in His person the revelation of man by the synthetic hierarchy of His interior being, of its function and activities, by the synthesis of knowledge, desire and power. The explication of His miracles lay in this — that there was the employment of divine causality in the service of divine personality, a manifestation of the sovereignty of spirit over matter \(1\).

"The world is convinced of sin, justice and judgement", in the revelation of Christ. This is a further paradox from the human point of view — in respect of sin, there is both condemnation and hope. His word is like a two-edged sword, convicting man of duality, which he tries sometimes to mask - duality of good and evil, fault and duty. Man recognises guilt, as a wrong direction of the will; separation, as its powerlessness. The rejection of Jesus Christ is the historical actualisation of human sin and guilt. He "came to His own, and His own received Him not". It was the expression of man's continual fall into religious ritualism and moral legalism, and the setting forth of man's fallenness, guilt and separation. This might be called the 'negative' anthropology of the

\(1\) See Chapter on Supernatural and Miracle.
Revelation of Christ, sombre, tragic and real, as the 'positive' side is luminous and sublime - the contrast drawn between man as 'he should be' and as 'He was' in Christ. The Christological and Soteriological paradox and mystery are that, through guilt and condemnation, there could come, by the Divine alchemy, forgiveness and salvation. To this question we now turn.

**Soteriology**

Frommel constituted Christian experience as a Redemption, linked to the person of Christ. Traditionally, the problem had been thus expressed - Man being powerless, salvation must confer new power, i.e. a regeneration. Man being guilty, salvation must confer new justice, i.e. consist in a pardon. The salvation cannot come from man, but from God only. It could not come from God without man, but man could not do it.

Laws, customs, traditions and morals all display the influence and effect of centuries of Christianity; Christian civilisation has a normative ideal of the good in the Christian church, which derives from the Gospel, and this last from Christ. In Himself He is the source of hope and a prophetic revelation; no matter what doctrine we hold of Him, He is acknowledged as a turning-point in the history of the race. The response to Him is 'personal', and in the personal response to Christ there is no mere 'historical' response - it is a response to a glorified, pneumatic, mystic Christ. The dying to self, and the Christ living in us is a fact before it is a theological idea: it must therefore be the function of the Reason to seek to explicate it, not to destroy nor deny it. The Cross, as the Symbol of the Christian faith, is in the sanctuaries of the Church, because it is first in the inner sanctuary of the heart...

The basic Christological question is that of the necessity of
the death of Christ qua Redeemer. It is a major expository theme of the Bible - the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world", and there is agreement, no matter which strand is examined - whether Pauline, Johannine, Petrine, Judao-Alexandrine or Apocalyptic literature. There is the quite unique nature of the sacrifice of Christ, not as the victim of a cult, but as the Founder of a faith. Apart from the main strain which has made Christ the propitiatory victim and the sacrifices for believers, there have been negative, destructive hypotheses, e.g. of Renan, in his "Vie de Jesus", to the effect that Jesus suffered a progressive onset of megalomania, under the pressure of apocalyptic delusion - and that of Strauss and Baur; in which the Resurrection faith was the product of the disci- ples, who came to regard Him as an immortal, glorious figure.

To redress error and imbalance, phases in His ministry are to be observed in the Biblical record; the idea of His death, although explicit in the later, is yet implicit in the earlier, and total antithesis should not be maintained. Frommel regarded as superfi- cial the judgment of Stapfer that Jesus "decided to make of His violent death the greatest act of His life - but always hoping that it would not be necessary..."

The refutation of Baur and Renan would lie in the wonderfully timed question at Caesarea Philippi; this is not the material of dementia and disequilibrium, rather, there is spiritual and intel- llectual health at the antipodes of the picture offered by such thinkers. A further phase is constituted by Christ's teaching on "the Kingdom"; there are the elements of the giving of His life as a ransom, and the institution of the Messianic reign, not on force but self-giving, not on government but fellowship. Death is not inflicted - life is offered freely, thus transforming martyrdom into
sacrifice; the inflicting and the giving are Complementary.

The last phase was constituted in the institution of the Last Supper, after the Messianic entry and Christ's final taking of the initiative.

The crucial question to be considered is - to what need of the human conscience does the death of Jesus make response?

Man is revealed to himself as a prisoner of egoism - yet not entirely; he can display great qualities of sacrifice and abnegation, yet total freedom is never gained - he seems to lack a point of leverage of character. "Le plus levier du monde, s'il manque de point d'appui, ne souleve rien." (1) Indeed, man, glorifying in his triumphs, forges a further chain of pride, and efforts at self-regeneration all lead to discouragement and despair. Man is caught in a fundamental antinomy of egoism and love; "We are egoists, and it is necessary to love..." Man acknowledges the radical impossibility of 'loving God', which would be the only ground of Salvation. The very holiness of God which I perceive on trying to approach Him makes me flee Him. It is said that men 'fear' God. Why? Because He is evil? No - because man has a guilty conscience before Him. Now, the biggest motive of regeneration is also the biggest obstacle, namely, the consciousness of sin. It is necessary that God pardons without relinquishing holiness and delivers without ceasing to condemn; the psychology of man's need is that his need is for a pardon which is both judgment and regeneration.

Some have thought that it is enough to know that "God is love" and is not 'to love' 'to pardon'? But whence would or could conscience learn that God is Love? Absolute love rejects egoism as vigorously as does holiness, and it is the testimony borne by the

(1) Frommel attributed much of this and the following material to the general thesis of Ch. Bois: "De la nécessité de l'expiation". Revue Théologique, 1888.
conscience and the conscience of the holiness which requires to mediate the forgiveness. If God were simply pardoning love, He could be impersonal and indifferent, without moral character, a kind of 'natural force' like the sun, beaming indifferently on evil and good alike. Such a doctrine of God would, in fact, "reduce" man, moral truth, and God Himself, in the name of a false tolerance, which would be man's own tolerance of evil; issuing from moral and religious scepticism, it offers new reasons for that scepticism.

For forgiveness there must be Repentance, not just temporary sorrow or remorse. Here there is the danger of the subjective element entering into a doctrine of repentance and pardon; have I sufficiently repented to merit forgiveness? Thus, 'natural' repentance becomes a transaction with God, there remaining in it an arbitrary element and a subjective element. As Frommel put it, it is "opening an account with God". There would also remain a basic uncertainty, opening the way to the repentance through works of merit.

In both Testaments, forgiveness is an important motif, but they do not operate at the same depth of understanding as to the nature of 'sin'. The Scriptural pattern is a scheme of action, rather than human thought or activity, made known through promise and prophetic word, culminating in the Cross.

Some would reduce the office of Christ to that of prophet, proclaiming the forgiving disposition of God. This is a flagrant unfaithfulness to the Gospels; He came, not to condemn (as He might well in holiness) but to save, by communicating the power of a new life. Nor was it just a matter of example and challenge. The death cannot be separated from the life, the love from the holiness, nor the remission of the law from its application. A love which tolerates without judging is not holy love, not a divine or absolute
love. The absence of vigour and decision in the Christian witness and life of the Churches is the result of the element in the presentation of the Gospel of the austere, virile and tragic being omitted or insufficiently stressed. Loyalty to the scientific method of documentary examination and criticism forbids such mutilation of facts and documents as to interpret the Cross as a historical accident.

The death of Christ has been regarded by some as a strange and intolerable "crowning" of a life of obedience, renunciation and holiness, the word to be used ironically and paradoxically as though it were accidental. But this fails to recognise Jesus' own attitude to His death, His horror of it and His agony in the Garden, and the inherent falsity of the idea that He sought a 'martyr's death' to show that He was holy - which would be an act of self-justification. The death of Christ cannot validly manifest His love or holiness except as it is necessary for man's good, i.e. it must have salvation as its goal.

Frommel rejected the classic definition of atonement as the making amends for a fault by punishment but, rather, since there is no common ground between moral fault and physical pain (although there may be a pedagogic and preparatory relationship), expiation must be of the same order; it must be compounded of moral and voluntary elements, and is to be, not sustained, but willed. Although not always immediately and visibly linked, there is an indissoluble connection between sin and suffering; atonement is not only a fact, it is a principle, a law, and a moral necessity. One can observe the approbation or protestation of the conscience as it is, or is not, realised. It is not an outmoded quality of primitive cultures - it is an expression of a built-in principle of justice, the nece-
ssary correlation of evil and suffering of some kind. To become indifferent to this correlation is a sign of laziness and moral torpor, since such correlation belongs to the basic lineaments of moral and religious feeling, the idea of moral respect being a synthesis of love and fear.

In the origin of moral feeling there is a transcendent "given" - a fear in the respect and a necessity in the obligation, together constituting the imperious character of the "ought". The need of atonement can only be removed from man at the cost of his demoralisation, and moral obligation is seen as having no origin, object or sanction other than God. God being present to the heart, atonement is required. "As the body is incomplete without the soul, the thought of a world without a God who punishes is a despairing thought. The presence of God "constitutes" the soul, which is reassured by the chastisements of God, even as it is made afraid..."(1) Atonement could be said to be achieved in and through repentance (provided this is not only 'remorse', and involves the holiness of the individual, and entails his death.) This cannot, of course, be achieved. "Who shall deliver me from this body of death?"... Yet the paradox remains - from the point of view of holiness, the sinner must die; from the point of view of love, he must live. Our task will be to say in what sense Christ died by or for our sins, so that the Cross becomes a place of judgment, but not of despair, manifesting "the power of God to save".

Frommel distinguished two main strands of soteriological theory - the juridical and the moral.

Unfortunately it has sometimes been the Protestant Church which has furnished the most inflexible and unacceptable formulae; anything rendered false by experience is to be condemned as theological

(1) Vinet - Études sur la littérature française an XIXE Siècle.
fiction ("théologoumène"). An interesting phenomenon was the absence of developed dogma on the death of Christ in the early centuries.

Irenaeus centred a theory on the idea of Ransom, this being paid to the Devil, God giving the life of His Son in exchange for the life of men. Origen developed the Ransom theory, as a trick played on Satan; two sacrifices were recognised but distinguished, one earthly, one heavenly. Athanasius adumbrated a theory of substitutive immolation in his "De incarnatione Verbi", whereby the power from which man was brought back was not the Devil, but death. Thus the centre of gravity has shifted, from the rights of Satan to the Divine Perfection.

In the hands of the scholastic doctors, Western (Latin) theology took on a more juridical and legal aspect as compared with Eastern theology, which was more Hebraic, emphasising the sovereignty of God. The tendency to juridicism had been already visible in Tertullian, Cyprian and Augustine; against that background, Frommel saw the importance of Anselm's "Cur Deus Homo".

What, then, did Christ offer? Obedience simpliciter? But He owed that as man; He could offer only that which He was free to refuse - His life. Being holy, He would have been beyond death, but the Divine honour was given the maximum obeisance - the offering of His life. The sacrifice was for humanity, not in place of it - an important distinction. However, there were clearly still strong juridical overtones; "aut poena, aut satisfactio." But even where there is substitution, there is the element of solidarity of humanity, both in guilt and satisfaction. This tendency to "compensation" appears in the Germanic theological strains, e.g. as suggested by Harnack, and Ritschl, and a study by Cremer: "Der Germanische
Satisfaktions begriff in der Versohnungslehre".

Thomas Aquinas still interpreted the death of Christ in terms of "satisfactio operis", and of equivalence and merit. A new note was struck by Duns Scotus, the great opponent of Thomism and of scholastic juridicism. If Christ's punishment is either equal to, or superabundant beyond, humanity's offence, it is only if God, in His sovereignty, thus regards it: in itself Christ's immolation is not comparable with merited chastisement. Juridicism is not altogether conquered, and an element of caprice and arbitrariness is introduced. Another area of debate is required than simply that of the 'good pleasure' of God. Scotism engenders a certain doctrinal scepticism, reaction against which produced some Protestant dogmatic attitudes.

Even Calvin, to speak briefly of him, scarcely escaped from juridicism, but emphasis was on the justice of God and the eternal decree, these being identical in the scheme of salvation, the one being indeed the explication of the other. A new idea, however, does emerge - that of the voluntary aspect of Christ's death, i.e. to display its truly moral character.

The moral conception of the Atonement was, in Frommel's view, represented primarily by Socinianism, Kantianism and Ritschlianism, which he summarised in the following way -

Socinianism. There was a reduction of the death of Christ to the level of example and model, accompanied by a sense of loss of moral agony. If the juridical interpretation opened a gulf between Divine justice and love, the effort to bridge it could lead to an evacuation of the terms of their meaning; and, indeed, it might appear that, if Jesus "paid the price" for sin, there is nothing left for us to do; there might even seem a licence for sin, since
all is covered. Frommel constituted the weakness of Socinianism as losing the sense of the continuity of Jesus Christ with the believer.

Kantianism. Stressing the inflexibility of the moral imperative, only the ideal of expiation and atonement may have been in the death of Christ - indeed, Kant regarded this as having symbolic value. There is a higher conception of the vigour of morality than in Socinianism, and Frommel preferred the Kantian view to the Anselmic; it is one in which there is a call for the 'new man', for a self-crucifixion which gradually effects an expiation.

The principal objections to Kantianism are that the law remains 'broken', and therefore has not been totally upheld. Punishment suffered by the new man is made proportionate to the fault in the old man, and this is a theoretical conception; the fault is radical, but the remedy is not (the radical penalty would be death); even more gravely, that this radical conversion is not, in fact, possible outside of Christianity, but the basic Kantian belief is that "man can, because he should"; even if it could be sustained the terms of psychological and moral truth, to Christian experience, moral individuality consists in a relationship with Jesus Christ, but, in the Kantian view, this is only 'accidental', symbolic and not real.

Ritschlianism. In the Ritschlian attempt at escape from juridicism, forgiveness is granted on condition of membership of the community founded by Christ of which moral perfection is the goal. There is little suggestion of amendment or regeneration, and, basically, no divine justice is satisfied - there being none to satisfy - so words like atonement, justification, etc., tend to be explained away by evacuation of their meaning. This whole scheme is not true to the words of Christ Himself, nor to the experience of the faithful.
Juridical and moral theories seem to make opposite errors - the former isolates God, the latter, man; they each lack the element of real psychological solidarity, a legitimate solidarity, the great N.T. passage on solidarity being Rom. 6. This element should be the golden thread running through the great theological formulations of the Church.

**Redemption from the point of view of solidarity**

The fundamental question is - what was accomplished by the Son of Man for humanity? There is a true individualism, but there is also the mystery of the "individual in history"; absolute individuality is impossible, and we are introduced to the conception of 'solidarity' - indeed, individualism and solidarity are two faces of human truth joined to form total truth about humanity as such. Solidarity is a fact of history - in races, nations, cultures and religions; there is development, life and death of nations, like 'collective persons'. It is essentially a mystic notion, e.g. nationalism, in the good sense, yields grandeur and value. Christianity offers another solidarity, interior rather than exterior - human brotherhood through divine sonship. We are given definite, concrete existence; an individual is not a "tabula rasa" in the matter of temperament, faculties, tendencies and limitations. There are the facts of imitation and dependence, and the effect of family, school and friends. The horizon of solidarity widens out, to include race and history. A man is accompanied by, and accompanies, all his fellows before the Tribunal of God.

Solidarity and freedom are indissolubly linked, not just in fact, but by right; conscience approves it. Solidarity is constitutive of the moral world, as of the physical; there is necessity of individual freedom for the formation of the moral universe, and a
reciprocal relationship between the two. The most 'free' individuals have exercised the profoundest influence on their contemporaries and descendants, and everywhere the denial or the interruption of freedom has hindered the movement towards solidarity; freedom and solidarity are not opposed nor inimical to each other.

Solidarity is necessary to the formation and exercise of freedom. As Vinet pointed out, even Robinson Crusoe himself was not 'alone' on his island— a whole civilisation was there with him... Individual freedom confirms and achieves itself in the requirement of moral solidarity, a solidarity approved by the conscience; the results of 'the sins of the fathers'—as of their beneficial deeds—are approved by the conscience. "Justice" is done, since man does not approve of benefit accruing from wrongdoing. There have, likewise, been individual consciences and persons distinct and separate who may have had to suffer, the innocent with the guilty, i.e. they 'share a responsibility' with the guilty. The doctrine of the inherited fault of Adam is not, in this light, entirely without validity since we can distinguish between an act and the motive of the act, between the fruit and the tree itself, between that which we do and that which we inwardly are. I can justify myself intellectually, but there is not an inner feeling of justification; I cannot justify myself morally, but submit to 'une expérience imposée'. Before the individual reality of the self, abstract ideas of nature and freedom disappear in the moral sphere. The ineluctable, austere verdict of the conscience is that the one reality and unity of the human species enfold both the solidarity (nature) and the individuality (freedom) in the same responsibility; the natural and moral sciences claim a common solidarity founded on the reality of the species.
Solidarity is a central concept of the Bible. This is true historically, morally, religiously. The object of Hebrew literature was a people, and the solidarist basis of the Decalogue is familiar. The Abrahamic covenant is of solidarist conception, and examples could be multiplied. Morally, the Bible knows nothing of "individualism" in the inferior sense. No man lives or dies to himself alone; and Paul, so often cited as normative by Frommel, stated the theme of altruism in terms of solidarity when he was willing to be "anathema" for his brethren. It is likewise supremely true religiously. Sin, in the Bible, is not merely an individual act but expresses the common alienation of man from God. The remedy is solidarist, in that Jesus Christ, the "second Adam" initiating a new humanity, invites beneficial participation in solidarity with Him.

Jesus Christ was specific individuality, from the physico-psychic point of view, representing and bearing in Himself the whole race - the second Adam. This is so from His psychic and normal nature in virtue of which He was more representative of solidarity with men than we can be. He 'realised' the religious and moral function of humanity, and was the norm of humanity, i.e. He was 'normal', in that He 'realised' man's destiny. Egoism is moral abnormality; love fulfils the law of solidarity. It is also so from the point of view of His freedom: in the "Temptations", He was not open to moral disobedience, as we are in temptation. But His experience of temptation was involved in His solidarity with man; He willed this solidarity, His victory being freely secured, not as an Essene or hermit, but in the midst of His people. It is so, further, from the point of view of His suffering. There was the true 'sym-pathy', and moral suffering beyond the normal experience
of man. But it is important to state that the difference between His suffering and ours is one of degree, not of kind; and His final solidarity with man was not refused in the Cross. "He suffered with us" is transformed into "He suffered for us" — thus as solidarity was the means, redemption was the goal.

There was moral internal solidarity. He did not just suffer material, external solidarity, there was internal identification; this was shown in His Baptism. And there was solidarity based upon love; His holiness was a function of His love. He did not only wish, but feel, Himself identified with man; to love is to involve one's destiny with the other, leading to the giving of one's self to be at one — thus leading to the essence of love as substitution.

His love infinitely transcended human love, which has always a measure of calculation even in avowals of devotion. In His love, He made the sin, the penalty and the suffering, of mankind His own. Holiness is a measure of power, and involves the 'right' of solidarity — what He willed in love, He could in holiness.

The solidarity of Christ with man, with guilty humanity, is explained by His mission. Subjective imputation must correspond with the objective, i.e. what Jesus did and willed, God Himself did and willed. His task was to do the will of the Father, or, more exactly, to do of His own will the very will of the Father. In 'objective imputation', there is the risk of the undesirable element of the juridical theory, but it is not a juridical appeasement — rather a pedagogic manifestation of justice before men. The Resurrection and Ascension (the Glorification) are the consequences and extension of the last words "it is finished" — humanity, in its perfect norm, has accomplished the necessary work, to die to sin and to live again in dying.
With Frommel, the solidarity of God with Christ led to the assertion that God suffers by, for and from the sin of man; this is unique to Christianity, and a necessary concomitant of serious, moral monotheism. Philosophy can only deal with postulates, while religion lives by revelation, and the Christian faith declares that the suffering and death of Christ was the human transcription of the divine suffering. The Father was always with Him, above all when He felt Himself abandoned by God.

What Jesus Christ did, willed and was was what God willed, did and was; and what God willed, did and was was what Jesus Christ willed, did and was. This is what is meant by the Solidarity of God with Christ - "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself..."

The crux of the matter is in the nature of forgiveness. Justice claims payment of a debt, reparation of an offence, punishment of a fault. Forgiveness suspends the exercise of justice - it is as if the debt has been paid, reparation made. But the worse the evil, the more difficult the forgiveness. He who forgives, in the measure that he forgives, substitutes himself for the one he forgives, giving of himself to extinguish what would have been required by justice. We do violence to ourselves in forgiving; it is but a faint image of the Divine forgiveness. Monod had said:- "Que Dieu sauve d'abord la majesté de sa loi sainte: qu'Il me sauve après, si possible..." But, by contrast, Frommel asserted, not an "open" possibility, but a discernment, by man, in the Cross, of a supreme demonstration and manifestation of forgiving love.

In the face of the Crucified one, and in solidarity with His death, Man is led to a deep communion with Him, a union which might be called an identification. "To live is Christ". This
possession is not the fruit of superstitious exaltation, nor does it imply abdication of the self nor the annihilation of the individuality of the believer. The most individual Christians are those in the greatest solidarity with Christ... "I am crucified with Christ" — this and many other Pauline citations show that the exterior and objective expiation thus become interior and subjective. Thus is realised the paradox which is the condition of a moral salvation — faith, not works, being the means of justification, moral activity not being the agent of forgiveness but its result. Faith, as in contrast with "belief", is an act of the will, not arbitrary but free, in which the sinner attaches himself to Christ, and wishes to enter into solidarity with Him.

Acceptance of Christ leads to real, effective solidarity with Him and involves real, effective rupture with the solidarity with Adam. Decision against Christ involves continued solidarity with Adam, not only as inherited but as freely chosen; Adam's revolt is approved and audaciously maintained. It justifies God in His creation of men as 'free' (with the risks of freedom), and as 'solidarist' (men participate in the slaveries of their solidarity). Thus is declared the intimate accord between God as Creator and Redeemer; the design of creation is in redemption, the explication of nature in grace. Hence the sovereign and decisive role of the Cross.

There is, Frommel asserted, agreement between his soteriological conclusions and the earlier definition of the distinctive character of the Christian experience.

Frommel regarded as his most important work of Christian devotion, and as a natural extension of the Dogmatics, his study of the Cross. He noted, as trends of his time, an emphasis on the historical Jesus, with a loss of the dimension of the transcendent, and
separation of morality from religious sanction; loss of understanding of sacrifice in the Pauline sense, with consequent diminishing of emphasis on any expiatory doctrine. He wished to stress the objective condition of forgiveness as repentance, and the subjective condition as sacrifice – since love and forgiveness are not to be confused, the former being a feeling and disposition, prevenient and gratuitous, the latter, however, being an action. In human experience there may be achieved quantitative "satisfaction", but the exigencies of Divine forgiveness are rigorous and absolute. "On n'offense que Dieu, qui seul pardonne". The desperate state of the sinner consists in this, that the more he needs to recognise his sin to repent it, the more disabilities of conscience harden him against repentance.

The Cross revealed a Divine action, for a forgiveness without justice would be a forgiveness without love; this a hypothetical philosophical theism is powerless to pronounce. We may feel that no one doctrine of the Cross can explore, nor do full justice to, the mystery of "how" God, in Christ, has effected man's salvation. In terms of Frommel's whole position, based as it was on the moral obliquity of man set over against the holiness and love of God, he could but express the significance of the Cross as exhibiting a grace in which the inexorable majesty of the law is seen in the sacrifice which our forgiveness cost the Author.

Assessment of the Dogmatics

As noted in the discussion of the distinctive method employed by Frommel and the relevant question of the scientific validity of dogmatic theology, he required of the reader a prior acquaintance with his Apologetics.

We may feel that, not surprisingly, the Dogmatics is superior
to the Apologetics, since Frommel's method was that of induction and exposition from the inner experience of the believer. The weakness of his, as of all, apologetics, lay in the fact that, if the things of the spirit are not discerned by the natural man, if there is radical discontinuity between natural and regenerate man such that there is required and undergone a "renewing of the mind", this discontinuity must vitiate all apologetic and render it powerless.

The value of Frommel's Dogmatics for Christian theology lies less in the actual schematic elaboration of the material than in his carefully expounded method, one which we may think is the correct method for authentic Protestantism, in terms of true freedom and faith. As an (undated) review of the work in "Le Semeur" by Victor Baroni reminds us, there was that saying of Calvin: "Let us, then, take our stand on this, that the meeting of our soul with God is the true and only life". The Dogmatic of Frommel was an extended commentary on, and analysis of, this basic datum of Christian experience.

Frommel had given notice of the methodology of his Dogmatic (as of his Apologetic) in an essay, written in 1892 (1) - "Let us do to the Christian phenomenon what we have done to the human one: take from it all that is accessory, variable and superfluous: get to its centre, Jesus Christ, and set the historic Jesus, as He is presented to us, in the Gospels, face to face with man - man at his true height and the subject of the obligation of which we have been speaking." The twin bases of Christian Dogmatic are (1) a feeling definable as a phenomenon of absolute moral certainty founded on the perception, in Him, of an absolute identity, of nature and obligation; (2) a concomitant, yet distinct, feeling of unease as to

(1)"The Present Conditions of Christian Faith".
His unique, Divine Sonship. The mystery remains impenetrable save in response to the challenge to self-identification with Him, from which a synthesis comes wherein the oneness of the Son of Man and the Son of God is justified by the identity of the consciousness of Jesus which the believer perceives in proportion as he surrenders himself to it. The hidden author of duty is revealed as a Father "who was always Father, but first told us so in Jesus Christ" whose love and holiness correspond to the patience and the severity of the moral law. Christianity, under the aspect of the dogmatic formulation of experience, rests on the distinctive and stable element of our humanity, and addresses itself to the moral within the psychic man, to the universal within the individual. The solidarity of Jesus Christ with mankind and with the believer was the key to Frommel's Christology and soteriology.

His difficulty — and criticism asserts his failure to deal adequately with it — was to avoid allowing the interdependence of religion and morality to become a virtual equivalence, or even, for the Christian faith to appear to be evaporated into a moralism. How, then, did he understand the nature of faith in relation to the concepts of law and grace? As always, his thought was an expression of his own deep, personal devotion, and the language is that of lived experience, rather than that of the categories of moralistic and theological analysis. Though they are not irreconcilable such as to yield inconsistency, there are yet two strains in Frommel's work as it comes down to us — one reflecting his mystical, intuitive, introspective nature; the other the bold, lucid, analytical structuring of that material which was first the datum of immediate, personal experience. Expressing the latter, we have the Apologetics, Dogmatics, and Epistemological analysis; the former, the letters
and devotional writings, where he was friend and spiritual coun-
sellor.

If Christianity is not a 'moralism', how did Frommel determine
the nature of faith? He first constituted it as an original, primit-
tive factor in man's lived existence; he lives by faith, even be-
fore he is justified by faith. This is psychologically true in the
matter of the concentric spheres of consciousness, the perceptive,
the intellectual, the moral. As man responds to the claim of obli-
gation, he finds that burden is transformed to privilege, constraint
to freedom, fear to love; he thus comes to Him Who as personal,
transcends duty, who is the Author of duty Himself. To love duty is
to love God, and the response of man to the Divine action in the
soliciting of his will under the mode of obligation is what is pro-
perly understood as "faith".

The crisis of faith is experienced in terms of the perception
of the impossibility of accomplishment of that which is given in the
Divine, therefore absolute and categorical, obligation. How can man
surrender himself to God, whose absolute holiness could result only
in condemnation? Faith involves a death, which it cannot survive
unless it becomes Christian faith and so rises to the recognition of
the identity of the God of conscience with the God of nature and
history. Frommel related the law and grace in this way—where the
law condemns and paralyses, grace divests it of this character, such
that it ceases to be constraining (and therefore condemnatory), and
becomes privilege, i.e. freedom. The antinomy of love and judgment
can be resolved only with the death of the guilty, and this, in
turn, could be accomplished only by Him Who put Himself in solidarity
with all mankind. In solidarity, therefore, by faith, with Him, we
die with Him to enter into the life which He offers, a life charac-
terised by the freedom of obedience.

Faith, for Frommel, was not belief that certain propositions about Christ are true; it was, rather, constituted in personal trust and obedience, and validated in terms of dynamic, lived experience. From his general point of view, Frommel would seem to be justified in a soteriology taking its rise from a recognition of the impotence and need of the human heart. His real concern lay with declaring and testifying to a reality of experience, rather than in the theoretical area of an attempted analysis of the divine mystery of redemption and salvation; and his true greatness lay in his witness to, and transmission of, a living personal faith rather than in the formulation and theoretical structure of the implications of the data of the normative Christian experience. Frommel's purpose was to offer, in act, and, if possible, in concepts, an extended commentary on the central Pauline affirmation: "The life which I live, I live by faith of the Son of God"...

When the work was first published (in 1916), it drew more uniformly approving review than the Apologetic already referred to. For example, there was the largely expository account of it given in the Basle Sonntagsblatt, (1) in which tribute was paid to the memory of a man possessed of such qualities of mind and character. In another uncritical assessment (a cutting still extant, from an unnamed, undated journal) the writer feared that much of this fine material may never come to the public, and suggested to the editors that they should bring out a "Pages Choisies" to preserve what is of the greatest religious value.

The caveat which we may feel must be entered against an uncritical acceptance of the Dogmatic is in terms of emphasis and balance, and, in one matter, of consistency. (1) There was an obviously

(1) 8 and 15 Apr. 1917, under the heading "Die Christliche Erfahrung".
present risk, in Frommel's analysis of Christian experience, of sub-
jectivism and individualism. He was, however, so aware of this
himself that he guarded himself, in his exposition, against such ob-
jection. Indeed, as we have seen, his distinctive analysis was in
terms of "solidarity". His thesis, therefore, being accepted as
valid in its terms, one would be more voicing one's own fear than
actually identifying his error. This is the area in which nuances
of meaning or emphasis may constitute the difference between validity
and invalidity.

(2) There was, further, the risk of anti-historicism. This
risk is concomitant with the first, in terms of which the historical
elements pertaining uniquely to the Christian faith may be evacuated
of their crucial role in the production and sustaining of that faith-
experience. To deny to historical facts their validity as, in them-
selves, the sole data of Christian revelation, or their necessary
constraining power, is not to deny to them their value as evidences
of that to which the inner testimony and experience of the indivi-
dual consciousness bears experimental witness.

The point might be made, also, that Frommel, appearing not to
take account of exegesis or historical criticism, read the Gospels
in terms of the letters of Paul (leaning, particularly, and signifi-
cantly, on St. John).

(3) The section where a question might be raised as to consist-
tency of method is that which deals with the metaphysical attributes
of God. This came in Vol. II - "the Divine object of the Christian
Revelation", - particularly the subsequent analyses of His "Negative
metaphysical attributes" and "Positive metaphysical attributes".
While not contending these attributes on the ground of their validity
or invalidity as such, the question could be raised as to whether the
methodology is the same as in the assessment of the validity, in terms of the scientific method, of Christian Dogmatics. In other words, is this exposition and analysis of the Divine attributes solely in terms of induction from the data of Christian personal experience? Did it not, indeed, rest, at least in part, upon elements not derivable from experience, but from material either Biblical or such as could be derived from the Evangelical Corpus of belief by the exercise of the speculative reason? This point was made by "A.T." in an article in the Journal Religieux, Neuchatel, where reference was made, in an otherwise sympathetic review of Frommel's Dogmatics, to writers such as the Godets and Gretillat, who asserted that Christian truth is given in the Biblical data, independent of experience, which is to be regarded as always partial and fragmentary.

In conclusion, we note these typical assessments, by which to sum up the intention, the material and the spirit of Frommel's Dogmatics:

J. Breitenstein (2) said of it: "The work rises like a "jet puissant" with the characteristics of power and sincerity." (One is reminded of the striking "jet d'eau" on the waterfront at Geneva).

Aug. Naville made a shrewd judgment of the significance of the Dogmatics, when he wrote, in 'La Semaine Religieuse' (3): "One wonders if such a great Dogmatic is not in reality more of an Apologetic than the Apologetic itself"...

There was an appreciation and criticism of Frommel's position by A. Chavan, presented to the Vaudois Society of Theology in 1907, with which we would agree in acknowledging his eloquence, his power of analysis and his intensity of religious life. We would, with Chavan, enter a reservation in the matter of what would appear to

(1) 23 Dec. 1916.
(2) In the Journal de Genève, Jan. 1917.
(3) Jan. 1917.
remain a commitment to an essentially expiatory view of the death of Christ for all his own disavowal of the adequacy of any juridical or moralistic theory. We feel we would say, rather than that repentence is, for God, the objective condition of forgiveness, that it is, for man, the subjective condition of its assimilation. There is also a certain echo of "patripassianism" in this passage from Frommel's essay on Forgiveness - "Divine forgiveness is effected by an act of substitutive solidarity in virtue of which the Heavenly Father, Who remits the fault, achieves a gratuitous suffering in His own person of the just expiation commenced in the repentance of His children". (1)

Frommel was not the first, nor the last, to wrestle with this central mystery. He spoke essentially the language of prayerful devotion and experience, and believed that his thought, like his life, was under the direction of the Spirit of God, and that it was controlled by faithfulness to Biblical expression, to religious and moral psychology, and to Christian experience. His failure - which he would have been the first to acknowledge - to achieve finality of exposition is a measure of the inaccessibility to human formulation of the Christian experience of forgiveness and redemption; we can but say: "it was necessary for Christ to suffer". "Ave Crux spes unica"...

Fallot summed up Frommel's life and work, when he wrote: "The Cross is the Arc de Triomphe to which directly lead up all the avenues of the Gospel". To it, indeed, led all the avenues of the thought of Gaston Frommel.

(1) op. cit. p. 64.
APPENDIX

Additional references to "L'Expérience Chrétienne" :—

Le Semeur (undated)

- by Victor Baroni.

The Dogmatics is superior to the Apologetics, not surprisingly, in terms of Frommel's method, which is by induction from the inner experience of the believer. The value lies in the method, the true method for authentic Protestantism.

Journal Religieux (23 Dec. 1916)

- by A.T.

Uncritical review, mentioning two main schools of theological emphasis: that of Christian experience, represented by figures like Astie, Sabatier, Frommel; and that in which there is assertion of the giving of Christian truth in the Biblical data, independent of experience, which is always partial and fragmentary, represented by the Godets, Grétillet and Doumerge.

Semaine Religieuse (20 & 27 Jan. 1917)


Almost entirely uncritical, but expressing surprise at the omission of the Parable of the Prodigal Son from the discussion on forgiveness.

One wonders whether such a great Dogmatics is not, in fact, more of an Apologetics than the Apologetics itself. It was a saying of Ménegeos of Paris that "a good Dogmatics is the best of Apologetics"....
To answer and outline Peirce's phenomenological approach to his central theme of Christian experience, it is helpful, first, to state what is to be understood by the "phenomenology" of religion. There are three main applications of the word:

1. It is that part of phenomenological philosophy devoted to the study of religion.
2. It is that part of phenomenological philosophy utilizing phenomenological methodology; that is, study as analysis, will involve its description and its interpretation in terms of philosophy, psychology, history, ontology, and other related disciplines.
3. It is the application of general phenomenological methods to the whole spectrum of religious ideas, activities, institutions, customs, and symbols. This approach is not dependent on already established sociological models, but is conducted in the light and in terms of the data presented. This was the basic requirement of the phenomenology of Benedict - "back to the data."

We note also the difference between the phenomenology and the philosophy of religion:

1. The former is not exclusively, nor necessarily primarily, concerned with religious ideas and activities, forms of expression not being reduced to their emotional content.
2. It does not attempt to analyze, beneath cultural forms of expression, as some common ground, but seeks, rather, to raise to the level of consciousness, reflective awareness of what is taking place in religious activity.
3. It seeks to describe, rather than in examples, religious
PHENOMENOLOGY

To assess and outline Frommel's phenomenological approach to his central theme of Christian experience, it is helpful, first, to state what is to be understood by the "phenomenology" of religion. There are three main applications of the word:—

(1) It is that part of phenomenological philosophy devoted to the study of religion.

(2) It is that part of the study of religion utilising phenomenological methods; thus, the study, as analysis, will involve its description and its interpretation in terms of philosophy, psychology, history, sociology, and other related disciplines.

(3) It is the application of general phenomenological methods to the whole spectrum of religious ideas, activities, institutions, customs and symbols. This approach is not dependent on already established methodological norms, but is conducted in the light, and in terms, of the data presented. This was the basic requirement of the phenomenology of Husserl—"back to the data".

We note also the difference between the phenomenology and the philosophy of religion:—

(1) The former is not exclusively, nor necessarily primarily, concerned with religious ideas and doctrines, forms of expression not being reduced to their ideational content.

(2) It does not attempt to arrive, beneath cultural forms of expression, at some common ground, but seeks, rather, to raise to the level of conscious, reflective awareness what is taking place in religious activity.

(3) It seeks to describe, rather than to explain, religious
The modes of this descriptive analysis comprise the following:—

**Ontology.** By this we understand concentration on the object towards which the religious activity is directed in terms of the conception of "being", as distinct from that of substance or essence.

**Psychology.** Here the interest and emphasis are sited in religious behaviour, in the activity itself as an observable phenomenon, rather than in the object of the activity.

**Dialectic.** This concerns the constitution of the unique relationship which may be held to exist between the subject and the object of such religious activity, the true subject-matter of the phenomenological analysis being the encounter itself between subject and object in religious experience. This experience will be found to assert the requirement of existential participation, and the invalidity of theoretical demonstration from an 'a priori' metaphysical standpoint.

Finally, we constitute as the main concepts in phenomenological analysis, relevant to the matter of this aspect of Frommel's work, the following:—

**Description.** The attempt to offer bare description of phenomena impels inevitably to what the scientific method would seek as 'description', namely, explication in terms of what constitutes the phenomenon as such. Thus attempt is made to get behind the 'data' of experience to "laws", thus seeking the construction of models as organisational structures for the data. The danger is of losing sight of the data, resulting in scientism or reductionism, where there is identification of causes with meaning and significance, while data, not amenable to quantitative evaluation, are dismissed as "subjective". There can also be danger of schizophrenic description, e.g. "speaking as a scientist", "speaking as a sociologist",
"speaking as a religious person", etc. In true phenomenological description, the empirical method of natural science is rejected as leading to reductionism, as is the deductive method of logic, the 'necessary' logical development of basic ideas, propositional contents or axioms.

Reduction. In distinction from 'reductionism', this mode of approach involves what is termed the "bracketing-out" of the question of existence to draw attention to the question of meaning. Something exists "for me" in that I can think about it: I may regard myself as either observer or participant: but its existence "in-itself" (en soi) is simply "bracketed out". Thus meaning would be grasped through intuition, and this has led to the charge that such an approach lacks precision and even seriousness. Such objection, however, obviously pre-judges the question at issue (the possibility or otherwise of some mode of knowledge beyond the intuitive of the-thing-in-itself), and it must be conceded that we have intuitive knowledge of the principles of logic, of our own feelings, and of other people, such knowledge not being deductive nor inferential.

Essence. For some, phenomenology will involve, not just a description of particular things, but of essences, i.e. what one is referring to when using a general term like "chair" or "man".

Mediaeval philosophy saw this as a question of "universals" and the reality of universal ideas, abstractions built up from multiple particular instances; this reality was, however, questioned by idealism which asserted the experience only of particular things. Modern idealism and realism have tended to reverse the older usage, while phenomenology has sought to avoid the question in that form, and attempts to describe the "essential phenomenon", the essence of the phenomenon, bypassing 'location', as it were, in favour of meaning.
One may feel that this will run the risk of falling into reductionism.

Intentionality and World. In an earlier philosophy, intentionality was the unique dimension of psychical existence which distinguished it from physical existence, the former being characterised by having "intentionality", there being no such thing as "pure feeling" or "pure thinking". (To this we return in the matter of the Cartesian constitution of man in the "Cogito".) We imply, indeed, unifying relationship - a primordial unity - of subject and object, with continued insistence on the primacy of lived existence.

The "world" is not something existing prior to reflection. Prior to reflection, there is lived existence but this is of the nature of immediate, non-reflective spontaneity. The world emerges at the state of reflection, implying reflective organisation and rationality; it is something which we create, and phenomenology is thus essentially an attitude of wonder, of inquisitive respect, of putting oneself in the position where the world will disclose itself to me in its mystery and complexity.

It is clear from the theological approach of Frommel that his description and analysis of the Christian faith and experience could not be fitted, without artificiality or anachronism, into ready-made categories of phenomenological theory, such as have been outlined above. His interest was, clearly, not in that part of phenomenology devoted to the study of religion, nor yet, in that part of the study of religion utilising phenomenological methods; but we may yet assess his work from a phenomenological point of view.

There emerges from his theology of Christian experience a balanced analysis of the subject and the object of that experience, and of their unique relationship in religious devotion and activity. He avoided
any claim to offer, either in the name of dogma or experience, an "ontological" description of God as He is in Himself. The question of His existence is not "bracketed-out", but, as we see in his epistemology of faith, where he constituted the noetic element in the phenomenon of Christian experience, knowledge of God is in terms of our experience of Him "as He is for us". Neither does he offer a purely 'psychological' description or analysis of man in isolation as the subject of such experience. Frommel defined as fundamental the encounter (the constitutive essence of the experience) between the subject and the object; this is not in terms of dialectical opposites, dichotomy nor juxtaposition, but in terms of living, intra-personal relationship. Truth is known in existential participation, not by theoretical demonstration from a metaphysical 'a priori' standpoint, logically derived from its own inner rationale or its compulsive ontological reality. The analysis of the basic experience is, thus, conducted in ontic, rather than in ontological terms. To use the language of simpler expression, we are concerned with religion rather than with theology.

Frommel frequently referred to "la donnée", the "given", in constitutive religious experience, thus echoing the requirements of Husserl; Back to the data (literally, the given). As emerges from his Apologetics and Dogmatics, Frommel employed purely phenomenological concepts with great discretion, where he consciously used them at all. Under the heading, for example, of Description, he did not seek to get behind the data of experience to "laws of nature"; neither empirical methods nor deductive logic are to be employed. As above, the "bracketing-out" of the question of existence associated with reductionist phenomenology was regarded by Frommel as a spurious form of religious agnosticism. In the analysis of the conception of God
as the object of experience in the Christian experience, we do not
claim to offer a phenomenological description of Him, a constitution
of the essence of His a-seity; we emphasise rather the relationship
within which God is known, not as He is in Himself (en soi) but as He
is "for us" (pour nous). Thus knowledge of God is uniquely constitu-
ted from the point of view of its epistemological status. To
assert that He is involves a very different phenomenological position
from the claim to assert what He is. The Biblical tradition, while
not phenomenologically determined, nor resting on any 'a priori'
metaphysics, clearly speaks of God as He is for us. This is the
constant emphasis of Frommel, especially in his soteriology.

There is an echo of this position in the view of Feuerbach,
according to whom, consciousness is consciousness of the infinite,
but not as implying "knowledge"of everything. I cannot know of any-
thing I cannot know. I cannot name a thing I cannot think of. If
a thing is "beyond comprehension", it is not anything which can be
thought of. What we "know" is a synthesis, a product of the thing in
itself and the way we look at it - it is another facet of ourselves as
we are reflected in the object. "The object of any subject is the
subject's nature taken objectively", so we cannot know things as they
are in themselves. God, on this analysis, is unknowable in Himself,
and only His attributes are described - anthropomorphically. This
approach, however, as phenomenologically determined, does not take
serious account of the nature of Christian revelation. The only
place where Frommel makes extended reference to the "attributes" of
God is the section of the Dogmatics devoted to that subject, and the
criticism was there made that his treatment of the Divine attributes
seemed not to fit in well with his general position (the experience
of the activity of God "as He is for us".)
The Phenomenology of Christian Experience

An account, in those terms, is found in the section of his Course of Dogmatics (L'expérience Chrétienne) headed "the reality of the constitutive Christian experience." Being 'dogmatically' conceived and expressed, the analysis follows the conviction of the reality, and serves, not to establish by argument what might not otherwise be accepted, but to achieve and express the certainty and conviction concomitant with the experience. The business of theology is to treat of Christian experience, and it is concerned with its reality, interpretation, exposition and application, its components being textual exegesis, Biblical theology, history of dogma, moral theology and homiletic. To abstract such studies from their necessary foundation is to lose for them their centre of gravity and their functional unity, putting them in danger of joining the parallel disciplines of secular knowledge.

Frommel saw the task as essentially 'descriptive', proceeding concentrically, i.e. beginning with facts in their widest extension, and arriving, by progressive concentrating, at the determination of the phenomenon of Christian experience. It is not to be analysed in terms of imported norms, such as phenomenological or metaphysical status or essence of the object of the experience; it must be constituted in terms of a relationship and a rapport which are its ground and raison d'être. Likewise, the description is not to be regarded as a sub-section of a metaphysic of the "world" as something existing prior to dynamic, lived experience, the product of reflection, and dependent on 'a priori' requirement or derivative.

In this concentrating pattern, we consider -

(a) The Historical role of Christianity

The outermost circle is that determined by the undeniable
percolation and transforming effect of Christianity in Society. It has been the supreme factor in the historical development of humanity.

It is of the nature of history to be constituted in collective human experience, this, in its turn, being the sum of individual experiences. Historical facts, derivative from the facts of individual experience, are not "ideas" which age or lose their influence. It is only partly true that "ideas rule the world"; they do so for so long only as they correspond to general experience. The secret of the historical influence of Christianity is to be found in a moral experience of the human will to which it perpetually furnishes an identical effect-producing object. That is to say, the Christian phenomenon, the historical manifestation of Christian belief in its nature and rôle, is grounded in a specific individual experience of man's moral will. (See the distinctive analysis which Frommel offered of the relationship of "le droit et le fait" in La Vérité Humaine, vol. II. chpt. 3. pp. 213-233.)

(b) The Existence of the Church

"Where there has been no Church, there has been no Christian influence". The second concentrating of thought asserts the necessary connection between the historical Church and the essence of Christianity. "The visible existence of the Church is a phenomenon 'sui generis' in the history of man. Its appearance dates from the appearance of Christianity, and follows Christianity through the centuries as a shadow a body". It is not to be identified with Christianity, but is to be seen as its immediate and necessary consequence. The mutual growth or dissolution of the two, as inextricably linked, is an
incontestable phenomenon basically distinguishing Christianity from moral or philosophical ideas, which do not, in fact, generate a "Church", but can only bring into being a "tendency" or a "school". Christianity is thus a social, as well as a historical, principle of experience. Brotherhood of man and fatherhood of God as 'ideas', or as not specifically Christian in their constitution, are given experiential validation in the life of the Church. Thus, as with the historical role of Christianity, experience precedes the organisational effect and consequence, and indeed constitutes it as to its nature.

Frommel allowed that any religion founds a religious society which becomes in its turn a social organisation; but this organisation and society are assessed by the ultimate worth of the generating religion, and to Christianity may be attributed supreme moral and religious excellence, and its unique founding of the brotherhood of man on the fatherhood of God – not as an "idea", but as by virtue of the Incarnation.

(c) The Interior Life of the Church

This is the inner circle of our concentric analysis. Christianity, as a historical and social phenomenon, is now constituted in the moral and religious life. The history of Dogmas is but the history of the interior moral and religious life of the Church, and, especially, of Christian experience. The object of Christian experience is the absolute stability of the constitutive, but living, elements of Christian piety. There is an astonishing vitality and permanence in the Christian constituent factors of morality and belief, their underlying unity in diversity being in perpetual contrast with those of the life of natural man. Christianity alone among the religions
has been, and is, "reformable" by itself, such a reform always coming, not from doctrines or a book, but from the witness of the conscience to such doctrines or book.

Two phenomena are attached to the inner life of the Church, whose character manifests and assumes the existence of the Christian experience. These are the role of the Bible in the Church and in human affairs as the source of religious edification, and the permanent place occupied by the Person of Christ in the Church and by the Church in the world. The Bible is, basically and in its nature, a document of an experience of which it becomes the source and condition. Likewise, no phenomenon in the history of the human spirit has had more permanence or greater self-identity than the faith and trust of Christ in God. The Person of Christ, in His relationship to the faith of the Church and the development of human civilisation, has exerted an influence for which there could be no scientifically sufficient cause except that claimed by traditional piety and faith, namely, a trans-historical unity of personal experience constituted in the moral and religious nature of man.

Phenomenology, as attempting to analyse, describe or constitute the essence of man's natural knowledge and experience, has this major disability in the matter of Christian experience - it cannot utilise, without vitiating irrelevance, the criteria of natural analysis, the considerations of rational philosophy, the apriorism of metaphysics. For Frommel, it is a crucial principle: "Natural man does not receive the things of the Spirit of God; he cannot know them, for they are spiritually discerned." This is a perfectly scientific formulation, since, if we replace the word "spiritually" by "experimentally", we have a principle of knowledge of equal validity with
that of any scientific induction. But the subject-matter is inaccessible to natural man, and any phenomenological analysis must be in terms of empirical verification in terms of the appropriate discipline, in terms, that is, of submission by the subject to the "imposed conditions" of the material (cf. the importance given by Malan and Frommel to the conceptions of "l'expérience imposée" and "la donnée" - the "datum" of experience).

Competence to analyse Christian experience qua human phenomenon is analogous to that required in musical, artistic, literary and scientific assessment - lack of lived experience, rather than lack of intellectual power, is the real basic incompetence.

One of the great dangers of a rationalistic theology is of regarding faith and reason as if they must be phenomenologically constituted in some kind of dichotomous relationship. Where philosophy claims autonomy of domain, faith may be regarded as something of a psychological order, to be studied qua phenomenon; but, in the terms of an autonomous reason, this could be only in terms of its 'appearance', its visible extension, manifestation, etc., not in terms of 'essence', because, if the Christian experience involves a renewing of the mind, and faith has, indeed, a noetic content, then the dichotomy is broken and the autonomy of the reason is broken - a conclusion intolerable to natural reason. Faith, in Frommel's view, is more deeply constituted than in purely psychological manifestation, consisting, in living experience, of submission to the Divine will in free obedience. It is not defined in terms of submission to metaphysical constraint, but rather of a response in which the mind is renewed. Reason is, however, a psychological function, being the exercise of the thinking faculty - or, better, reason is the faculty constituted in the experience of man as thinking. Man, as thinking,
is, at the same time, man, as feeling, acting, willing, etc., and there is no such thing as "bare thinking", in, as it were, a total facultative vacuum. There seems little question that, by regarding 'faith' purely as a psychological phenomenon, non-Christian philosophy would devalue it, both inside and outside of the Christian theological context. Faith is not to be - by a process of phenomenological "reductionism" - reduced to a Kantian intuition. The theologian must carefully constitute the nature of reason - does he treat it as some archetypal faculty, a fractured human faculty, or as one undergoing renewal in a condition of eschatological tension?

We remember the words of Gilson ("the Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy", pp. 12 and 36) - "there is no such thing as a "Christian reason", but there may well be a Christian exercise of the reason, The idea of 'Christian philosophy' has no more meaning than Christian physics or Christian mathematics". This warns of the error, against which, we may feel, Frommel was hardly proof (especially as Apologist,) of thinking that the Christian, as Christian, could re-structure elements given by natural philosophy in terms of elements of revelation, such as to yield some new structure of reason.

A modern writer, Roger Mehl, says, in his book quoted in the section on Epistemology - "The condition of the Christian Philosopher", distinctively constitutes the intentionality, rather than the re-structuring in the work of the Christian philosopher.(1) On the other hand, A. Reymond ("Philosophie et théologic dialectique"; Rev. de Théol. et de Phil. Lausanne: 1935) expressed the view that the philosopher, if a Christian, will accept as true the fact of revelation, because this constitutes, in his eyes, the source of rationality."(2) This commits the error of regarding revelation as brought in to confer phenomenological validity on a philosophy, re-structured,

(1) op. cit. p. 29.
(2) op. cit. p. 278.
as it were, in terms of it, rather than seeing revelation as that which confers intentionality on the Christian philosopher "as renewed in his mind" (Mehl's phrase).

Another danger is of phenomenological analysis becoming merely phenomenalistic. Religious revelation has value so long as it does not "objectify" itself into a phenomenon. As science can fall into scientism, a "Christian philosophy" may be no more than a religious phenomenalism. Of this danger Frommel was aware, and avoided it.

It must be acknowledged that, in assessing the phenomenological implications of Frommel's distinctive analysis of Christian experience, there is risk of importing elements of phenomenological theory and expressions foreign to his modes of thought and work. Indeed these had phenomenological implications, while he did not seek to express them in such terminology or concepts. Such phenomenology was already implicit in the methodological and epistemological criteria which we have considered elsewhere; they are involved in his basic position - the Centrality of Christonomic experience. Evangelical history reflects and is commentary upon its double character - His solidarity with the faithful (humanity) and His authority over them (Divinity). Christ, in His holiness, represents "normal" humanity of which we have knowledge and intimation in the experience of obligation, man being constituted in his relationship with God, having, despite sin, a "thirst for the living God".

On the basis of the Fatherhood of God, revealed to man in both his modes of being, the contradiction, but not the mystery, is solved and overcome. The phenomenon of religious experience is that of feeling the action upon the individual will of the Divine, of solicitation in terms of obligation, "le devoir". In free response to what is recognised as unmediated and unconditional, man "realises"
his true nature in a dynamic, lived experience which carries with it, concomitant with the response and obedience of faith, a cognitive element.

The specific character of Personal Christian experience is at the centre of the concentric analysis. In this section of the Dogmatics, Frommel saw the response, both of hate and of love, to the Christian faith as an additional, valid witness to its essence, not simply as either fact or doctrine, but as determined in a divine action laying hold of man at the living centre of his being. Only a divine action, imperious, sovereign and categorical, is capable of provoking such violent reaction, both negative and positive. In terms, therefore, of the evidence, we make a religious, rather than a theological, appraisal of the phenomenological status of the Christian experience. The man who seeks inner peace and integration discerns, not by the intelligence but by the moral consciousness, the divine action, alike truly supernatural (as redemptive) and normal (as revelatory) conveyed to him by Christianity.

The phenomenological status which we seek must allow for the fact that there are inferior and superior degrees of Christian experience. Many are content to remain rudimentary Christians, displaying a chaotic, nearly amorphous way of life. There are, in Frommel's phrase, "spiritual protozoa", having the form without the power, not distinctively Christian except insofar as the pronouncement of formulae and the registering of a feeling. Such a life is constituted as Christian only by its object, manifesting but the "virtualities" of Christian experience. This is a justifiable phenomenological approach, since one does not expect to obtain complete elucidation of general biological laws and phenomena by examining only polyps and molluscs, but by pursuing the analysis and quest among the most ele-
vated, individual and differentiated living organisms. Similarly, one will not find the supremely constituted expression of "spiritual biology", its laws and phenomena, except with the most specifically and perfectly Christian individualities.

So, to make proper assessment of the constitutive nature of Christianity, we seek a type of Christian consciousness ("conscience chrétienne") as universally guaranteed, recognised and acknowledged as possible. The choice and norm would therefore be the Apostle Paul, whose personality, noble, fervent and holy, is accessible to all, and whose writings, despite their fierce submission in the crucible of historical criticism, have bespoken a universality of appeal and witness to that experience which is to be regarded as constitutive and normative for all Christian experience - "I live; yet, not I, but Christ lives in me"... "The life which I live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God"... There is not an identification of the Christian with Christ, nor a mystical absorption with loss of personal identity. Rather, in terms of the sovereign and normative place occupied by Christ in the life of the Christian, we constitute the essence of the phenomenon of Christian experience as a personal communion of love and obedience.

As, for empirical man, to "live" is to realise the "given" in and by human nature, for Paul, to live is to realise the given in and by the nature of Christ. This excludes belief defined as a motive or an amalgam of motives to wish to believe; the communion - which is constitutive of the experience - is immediate, vital, not intellectual nor volitional, and it is realised by faith, defined as trust in an experience of conscience and in its object, the object being the Person of Christ.

Thus, transcending the conventional criteria of (phenomenologi-
(cal) analysis, particularly those of 'a priori' metaphysics, or mere historicity and description, we constitute the distinctive, normative phenomenon of Christian experience as "Christonomic" in its primal character. The Pauline and the Johannine Christocentricism is the determinative and specific characteristic of such experience. Christonomic experience is the sufficient "point d'appui" of all Christian knowledge and certitude, being an irreducible element offering, not a theoretically detached, but a dynamic, 'modus operandi' (the correlate of a "modus vivendi"), leading to deeper analysis by rigorous induction.

Frommel sought to determine the 'conditions of Christian experience', (a chapter in "L'expérience Chrétienne" taken from an older revision of a course of Dogmatics.) These are not, in the simplist view, the Bible and its reading - as in Protestantism; nor the Church and the sacraments - as in the Catholic, or indeed Lutheran view. The primary condition is the universal fact of humanity, as it is constituted at one and the same time by the normal experience of obligation and the abnormal experience of sin; humanity, that is, sinful but redeemable. Christianity does not regard man as atheist or as amoral; it regards him as immoral, perhaps, but moral in his immorality, and as always religious. In the Gospel, the believer does not find an unknown God, he re-finds Him there. A constitutive phenomenon of Christian experience is the reaction which comes solely from the affinity and pre-established harmony existing between the faith of conscience and the Christian faith, which proves their conformity; indeed belief in the conscience is the primary, inalienable condition of Christianity. Outside of moral imbecility or blindness, the Christian witness awakes a responsive echo in man. It is important to note, in respect of some theological emphases
since his time, that Frommel did not attribute to Christianity, in
the preaching of the Gospel, the rôle of a creator "ex nihilo". The
phenomenon exhibits a unity - of the intimate witness of obligation
as preceding and conditioning faith in, and response to, the external
witness of the Gospel. (1)

Frommel thought it of basic importance to make precise statement
of the character of absolute objectivity, to oppose the stripping
from Christianity of all metaphysical elements, and to state the
actual and supra-historical character of the objective factor in
Christian experience. Three debilitating tendencies were to be ob-
served: (1) the tendency to take account of the human element alone
in Christianity, reducing it to moral and religious aspiration, with-
out giving to these a precise object; Christian experience tran-
scends, in assuaging, human need. In the distinctive phenomenon of
Christian experience we have, not just a hunger and thirst, but a
satisfaction and a nourishment, with an imperious certainty of the
essential reality of its objective factor. (2) the claim, asso-
ciated with the work of Ritschl, to remove all metaphysical elements
from Christianity. There can be a mistaken reaction to the confu-
sion of making a religious metaphysic take the place of a true theo-
logy (the science of the phenomenon of religious relationship), in
which the fear of metaphysics leads some to try to exclude metaphy-
sics in the name, and by means, of metaphysics! Such positivism
betrays the original, necessary 'caveat' against any pretension to
treat of God as He is in Himself, of the attributes and the activi-
ties of God "en soi", instead of considering Him and His activities
as these are "for us". Such affirmations as are made in metaphysi-
cal terms regarding Christian experience are made, not from meta-
physical, but from religious considerations; that is, the terms are

those of religious experience, a phenomenon analysed, described and constituted by the method of induction. (3) the "traditionalist" tendency, as Frommel called it. This places the object of Christianity in an exclusively historical past. Historical facts, such as the work of Christ, separated from His Person, are made the object of faith, yet there is no "experimental" relationship between a past fact of history, which can, in any event, have only historical probability, and man in his actuality. Failing to distinguish between an eternal action and its historical manifestations, such a view misses the true purpose and function of history, which is to cause to make known discursively the character of the action there manifested, and the action itself which transcends its manifestation. The action of God in Christ, of which the Christonomic attitude is witness, is an action objective and real, religious and metaphysical, actual and present - and universally accessible. Universal accessibility in principle, however, where there is not universal acceptance or participation, may be regarded by some as destroying the rigour of the conclusion. The necessary condition of Christian experience is, indeed, history - the same history against which the above word of warning was sounded.

Between the subjective and objective factors of Christian experience, as the means of mutual approach and contact, the historical factor is required; it is the indispensable intermediary. It determines the "comment", but not the "que" of experience. History is the occasion, rather than the cause, of a phenomenon which is causally constituted in the two factors of the experience, the human and the divine.

In allowing Scripture as the sole principle of faith, the "principium essendi", Protestantism may forget the historical primacy
and chronological antecedence of the Church as the community of those who were partakers of that common experience, itself, we repeat, historically occasioned but not constituted by history "per se". If the ante-scriptural oral tradition was theopneustic, why should not the post-scriptural be likewise? Such an antithesis arises from a failure to disengage the secondary, historical conditions of Christian experience from those conditions which are alone essential, the theodynamic and anthropodynamic.

The concern of the dogmatician, in treating of the phenomenon of the Christian faith and experience, is primarily with the "que" rather than the "comment", i.e. he applies the method of induction to the object of Christian experience, constituting as secondary, non-essential, inferior but necessary, the historical element in the formation of this experience, the self-exteriorisation, that is, of the "historical" Christian faith.

In relation to the conception of "world" in phenomenological description, where there is implied reflective organisation and consideration of basic rationality, Frommel, regarding as totally false the idea of deducing truths of religious experience from 'a priori' metaphysical concepts, constituted lived existence as prior to reflection, and Christian experience, in particular, as described in its reciprocal relationship with, and indeed the fulfilment of, natural experience, this last being understood as the analogue of Christian experience in natural man, i.e. the moral and religious experience of man as man. Despite the difference between natural and Christian man, there is not repudiation of common humanity and solidarity - the suprervention of the distinctive phenomenon of the encounter and experience which the latter has had of the person of Christ, ("le Christ pneumatique" of Christonomic experience,) does
not make him other than he should have become as man.

Frommel acknowledged the difficulty of seizing on and fixing the precise mode of differentiation as between the moralo-religious manifestations of natural and Christian man, and this for three reasons:

(a) Because of the long, permeating influence of Christianity in our civilisation, the difference (to the observer of a "phenomenon", as it were,) may be blurred, and there is not such an observable polarisation of position, neither natural nor Christian "humanity" being found in perfect and simple mutual distinction.

(b) Because the Christian experience is not, as such, a 'fixed quantity', but, as we have noted, is characterised by different degrees of intensity in its outward manifestation.

(c) Because, while essentially distinct, the manifestations have elements of outward identity, making difficult total phenomenological separation as between discrete entities. There is, for example, inexactitude in the expression "Christian virtues". The Christian would not, in fact, qualify his actions as "virtuous", as if the word were used univocally with the language of natural morality. The phrase appears as a kind of homage to Christianity, in which the actions flowing from the distinctive Christian experience (and its concomitant sanctification) are so named and described as from outside of it, in terms, that is, of a qualitative (and, sometimes, merely quantitative) assessment of them, and of the aspirations of natural man.

As compared with natural man (and not in terms of external observation) there is, with Christian man, a fundamental correlation between the reprobation of sin and the certainties of moral and religious realities. The certainty of natural man, while it exists, has the characteristics of the sporadically deaf. Natural man can
become morally and religiously sceptical, but the Christian cannot become so without ceasing to be Christian. In this, a fundamental distinction is characterised. Lastly, any analogue of Christian Salvation is invalid, the mystery of the new life in Christ being hidden, inaccessible to external phenomenological observation in terms of the "world" (as constituted in reflection rather than in lived experience); the Christian has the certainty of having entered into an order of eternal things. Frommel approvingly quotes: "man is a religious animal" - the phrase pointing, as he said, to a constitutive phenomenological description of man to whom is offered Christian experience under the mode of Christonomic obedience.

Phenomenology and the epistemological status of faith

In the chapter of Epistemology we note the neo-critical position of H. Bois of Montauban, in opposition to which Frommel sharpened his own distinctive analysis of the nature of religious knowledge. Through most of that discussion there ran an unacknowledged thread of phenomenological implications. Frommel said to Bois in a letter (26.12.97) - "You have gained a great victory over me in forcing me to renounce "substantialism". I am, with you, an idealist and "un phénoméniste". But the difference between us is my accentuation of the dynamic idea of God." Where the Christian theologian seeks to base a Dogmatic on an analysis of Christian experience, he must face the seemingly insuperable difficulty - and, it may be, the vitiating error - of subjectivism and anthropocentricity.

For example, we read in E. Schaedler's "Religion und Vernunft" (1917), p. 60 - "never will the psychological life lead to any conclusions qualified to influence decisions on any aspect of religious truth. Psychological research will never attain the absolute, the divine; it is totally anthropocentric". Frommel clearly saw that
the key to the problem, and the way out of the impasse, was in the Christological analysis of this experience; as a phenomenon, it was Christonomically determined and constituted. Thus, in the Revue du Christianisme Social (Jan. - Feb. 1936), J.-D. Benoit looked back to the Christonomic emphasis of men like Althaus, Frommel and others, who strove, by separating their thoughts from Kantian apriorism, Hegelian metaphysics, and the pantheism and determinism of Schleiermacher to find their theological point d'appui in the area of man's inner, dynamic experience.

Frommel, as noted above, spoke of the "Christ pneumatique", and Bois equally sought to avoid a purely ontologically conceived Christology, which would ultimately depend on a metaphysic of substance. One may safely constitute the "phenomenological" question and interest of the Frommelian period as being primarily "Christological"; and the fault and danger of ontological doctrines of the person of Christ were seen to be that of claiming to deal with a living reality in static terms.

As Bois put it, in a small but significant work "La Person et l'oeuvre de Jésus-Christ" (1906) - to constitute as a metaphysical dilemma the nature of Christ - either a man who made Himself God, or a God who made Himself man - is to show complete misapprehension of the Gospel and of Christian devotion. The divinity, plenitude of which was in the human soul of Jesus, was not metaphysical but moral and religious, the result of moral obedience and spiritual communion. This, Bois felt, was more consonant with the New Testament record than the metaphysical attributes of ancient theology.

Frommel, while approving the rejection of metaphysical or ontological doctrines, passed beyond what we might feel the risk (as with Bois and others) of adoptionism or even monophysitism to a bold
determination of Christ as "the personal action of God", the historical personalisation of the redemptive activity of God. He was the 'new beginning', the second Adam, in whom humanity became fully filial. "He was the supreme, definitive, humano-divine personality, the protagonist of a new humanity, made up of those who, like Him, and in solidarity with Him, are born into the life of the Spirit." (L. Pérriraz: Histoire de la Théologie Protestante au XIXme Siècle: chapter entitled 'Le Problème Christologique').

It is evident that Frommel, in his Christology, as throughout his Epistemology, avoided erecting any kind of intellectualist phenomenology. For him, the word "phenomenon" was essentially descriptive and constituted in dynamic experience, in lived existence. The central phenomenon, of human experience, the determinant of 'La Vérité Humaine', is the experience of the solicitation of the human will by the divine under the mode of unconditional obligation - to which to respond, in moral freedom, is to constitute the faith which carries with it, in its full Christonomic determination, its own certainty and knowledge. The phenomenon of the new life in Christ, as inaccessible to natural man, could, therefore, by him qua philosopher, only be phenomenologically described in terms of visible, historical sense-data and exteriorisation.

According to Frommel, our knowledge of God is not as of a simple existence, i.e. as an object. He is a presence, and we may not treat of Him "philosophically" as though He were a thing or an idea to be reached and described as a phenomenon. This emphasis is seen in part of a letter which he wrote to Bois (Avenches - 11 Apr. 1903) - "You challenge me to say what it is which precedes categories and is independent of them. I could, in intimate conversation, tell of experiences which would defy all categorising, but I will simply say
this: before existence there is life. I know it - I have had experience of it in the very abolition of all feeling of 'existence'. Existence and representation are in categories; life and the immediate datum of consciousness are not. The phenomenon is not what is "la donnée" - it does not exist for the immediate consciousness; it is already a product of the reflective consciousness and of thought, a "représenté". Categories themselves, the creation of the mind, are but approximative symbols of the real; the ground of the real escapes them." Frommel seemed there to come dangerously close to the area occupied by the 'symbolist' school of the Ecole de Paris, who, particularly through the influence of Sabatier, had asserted what Frommel regarded as a form of religious agnosticism - (see the section of Chapter on Epistemology). But Frommel was here referring to categories, and not to the question of the meaning of language, in particular, the word "God", for example.

It would appear that he became more careful in the use of terms which might bear (theoretical) phenomenological implications. For example, in his Thesis, presented in 1888 to the Faculty of Protestant Theology in Paris, he wrote: "Modern philosophy professes almost total agnosticism in metaphysics. Following Kant, the noumenal world is unknowable as not responding to any corresponding intuition of the subject. The intuition of the thing-in-itself is precisely the contact with the absolute outlined in this study. Instead of postulates, we have analytical explication of a primordial fact, and metaphysics becomes a permitted science."(!) "But we aver that man is a moral being before he is a knowing subject." This last sentence was to constitute, as we know from "La Vérité Humaine" (note, an apologetic work,) the basis of his anthropology - the priority of "je dois" over "je pense".
Ten years later, writing to his brother from Frontenex, on 5 Dec. 1898, he said: "Theology has really remained insufficiently scientific, not taking stock of experiences in religious psychology. The experiences are not discussable; their observation, classification and analysis, their treatment, as natural phenomena are treated - this should be a fruitful work, taking theology out of the region of pure speculation."

There is serious risk there of a purely descriptive phenomenological analysis, but we realise that such "external" implications were far from Frommel's mind. A still later letter confirms this - (Frontenex, 17 June 1904) "From the psychological point of view, the word 'God' is a value-judgement, the supreme value-judgement possible. Thus we are obliged to turn to Christ, and to seize in Him, not God Himself, metaphysically, but God revealed. As Pascal said, "le Dieu de l'homme, c'est-à-dire le Dieu pour l'homme".

A modern writer has criticised the incomplete analysis of Christian experience as found in the Genevan representatives of the school of "Christian experience" - Malan, Frommel and his successor, Geo. Fulliquet. G. Widmer wrote in "Expérience Chrétienne et intelligence de la foi": Lausanne: 1961 (p. 125) - "The theologians of experience have not sufficiently examined this structure, and seem to have limited themselves too much to examining the phenomenal aspect alone of religious experience without sufficient analytical search for the theological principle of Christian experience. In the matter of Christology, "Christ proposed Himself to consciousness, which, solicited by the devoir-Être, becomes moral consciousness. But this total dependence on moral obligation alienates us from the structure of the word of God by fixing our attention on the psychological phenomenon of obligation."
Christian experience brings about a renewal of the intelligence and finds itself illumined by it. Distinction must, however, be made between "intellectus" and "ratio", where the former is understood as the religious faculty of thought capable of knowing the intellectibilia, the latter being the agent of knowledge of the intelligibilia; the former being beyond all mode of sense-approach, the latter being accessible, if only by similitude. "The function of the intellectus is, for Judaism, knowledge of the law, and, for the Christian, knowledge of the work of Christ and the redemptive activity of God in Him". (1)

So far as one can assess Frommel's phenomenological position, it must be said, to avoid anachronism, that he never sought to develop a distinctive phenomenology, using the word in a technical, metaphysical sense. He simply regarded his work as an explication of the fundamental datum of consciousness and of religious experience in psychologically valid terms. His rejection of the Cartesian "cogito" in favour of the "je dois" of obligation was, we feel, partly based on a misrepresentation of the former's meaning, by which the element of "intentionality" was glossed over. The great characteristic of consciousness is self-transcendence; the scope of metaphysical experience must not be arbitrarily limited, not identified with sense-experience.

The main postulates of a purely phenomenological psychology has been that mind and thoughts cannot be conceived of independently of the world which appears to mind, and that this world can be conceived only through philosophical investigation of the world's structures as revealed to mind. These compare with Kantian categories and Husserlian essences. Husserl acknowledged that he had been helped to avoid 'psychologism' by Wm. James; so Bruce Wilshire reports in

(1) op. cit. p. 130.
his "Wm. James and Phenomenology" - (Indiana Press - London, 1968). James had said that: "a scientific psychology is one into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint." One of these joints is the cognitive relationship regarded as external. Frommel always insisted that externality is fatal to the analysis of the phenomenon of Christian experience, in its essence inner and dynamic, and could not, therefore, be properly expressed in terms foreign to its true nature, such as static, metaphysical categories implying purely dialectical or ontological criteria.

This finds an echo again in Mehl's analysis (1) - "metaphysical experience cannot serve as a basis for a Christian Dogmatic. There is, in it, no Anknüpfungspunkt for grace; there is fundamental discontinuity between a metaphysical quest for God and the Scriptural revelation of Him". (There follows the necessary constitution of eschatological tension in the work of the Christian dogmatician.) One feels that Frommel's approach to the problem of discontinuity with natural knowledge would surely, given the opportunity of completion, have arrived at a position which would have taken more account of existential thinking and eschatological tension in the theological expression of Christian experience, leaning less exclusively on the unique criteria and data of moral obligation. The importance of his thought lay in its overall movement and purpose, its insistence on the primacy of lived existence, its constitution of the distinctive Christian experience of the redeeming love of God in Christ.

(1) op. cit. p. 93f.
EPISTEMOLOGY

The Nature and Status of Religious Knowledge

For Friesen, the question of the epistemological status of faith—the nature of religious knowledge—was of very great importance. It pertained, after all, to the basic nature of the constitutive Christian experience. To now set out, by way of noting his relation to precurators and contemporaries, and his own distinctive analysis of the issues he faced, the lineaments of his thought and the relevance of these issues in recent discussions.

The primary material of his approach to this aspect of the subject was in the first issues of a Journal at Göttingen as "the initiators of modern theology". While acknowledging the significance and influence of such thinkers as Kant and Hegel, Friesen, as we have noted elsewhere, regarded Schleiermacher as a "true theologian" and, indeed, as the father of modern theology. As it was whose task was that of founding theology as a "science", independent of philosophical material; and his most important foundational conception was that of religion as a "feeling" which arose from an original contact, appetible to conscious recognition of it, of the self with the principle of the universe, with the absolute non-self. Becoming conscious, it gives birth to religious feeling and intuition.

His inductive method was of supreme importance in securing Protestant thinking free and scholasticism, but Friesen felt that, in Schleiermacher's thought, there was omission of freedom. This proceeded from the conception of "absolute dependence", for which a better expression would have been "immediate" dependence. This element of metaphysical necessity vitiated Schleiermacher's epistemology, hermeneutics and, finally, his ontology.
EPISTEMOLOGY

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His inductive method was of supreme importance in rescuing Protestant thinking from arid scholasticism, but Frommel felt that, in Schleiermacher's thought, there was exclusion of freedom. This proceeded from the conception of "absolute dependence", for which a better expression would have been "immediate" dependence. This element of metaphysical necessity vitiated Schleiermacher's soteriology, hamartiology and, finally, his epistemology.
A true basis of religious epistemology is lost through a certain Spinozan pantheism, as it was lost through the Kantian apriorism and his autonomy of the reason. This point is also made by Louis Fèrrias in his "Histoire de la Théologie Protestante au XIX° Siècle": Neuchatel 1956 – the weakness of Schleiermacher is his monist philosophy. This essentially prevented him from developing the kind of analysis of religious knowledge which might have been yielded by his conception of theology as "Glaubenslehre".

Cesar Malan fils. While the main contribution of Malan was in the area of the psychology of religious experience, his analysis of this experience had clear epistemological implications. As Maurice Nèeser wrote in his study "The Logical Expression of Religious Experience" (Lausanne: 1908), "religious knowledge results from the combination of two elements, – experience furnishing the matter, and logical categories the form. The logical expression of religious experience will consist of the application to this latter of the corresponding intellectual concepts. All logical expression of a real experience is legitimate if it is established that knowledge has experience as source and the logic of the mind as form."

Such a distinct epistemology is implicit, if not explicit, in Malan's work, and it was to exert crucial influence on the thinking of Frommel. The main lineaments are clearly seen in two definitive accounts by Malan, "L'Etat actuel de l'homme" (tel qu'il ressort du fait religieux) and "La Conversion, comme le retour de l'homme à sa vraie nature." The question as to the "discontinuity" between the old and the new man is crucial.

Through our consciousness we are made aware of the absolute authority accompanying the sense of "le devoir", and in our resistance to this we are also made aware of a state which we might term
"abnormal". We are not, however, in a state of passivity, but with a religious relationship from which there should flow activity. Something other than intellectual criteria is involved in which we perceive that being "created in the image of God" must mean being "created with the end of realising the divine likeness". (1) Man appeared after the creation but before sin, and is, in his nature, appropriately constituted for his task. His position has radically altered, while his nature has remained essentially the same. His "arrested development" involves continuity of natural status (destined to realise the image and likeness of God) with discontinuity of actual position; he does not possess true life as actual fact, but as "possibility" rendered useless by his revolt. Conversion thus involves less of what may be called an ontological "de novo" than of a renewal and restoration to divinely destined status. Knowledge vitiated by sin becomes knowledge of God "in which standeth eternal life."

This view of "l'état actuel de l'homme" seemed, to Malan, congruent with Scripture, where, at the outset, the practice of "religion" was regarded as the construction of a tower of Babel, man seeking, or claiming, knowledge of God in terms of his own categories of thought. But, if natural man has an untarnished image of God as a constitutive fact, he has no need of salvation or Saviour. (2) Many are, indeed, merely avowing a kind of "Christianised Deism", while others, in terms of a false conception of "discontinuity", seem to imply a magical doctrine of regeneration where man is changed into some new creature, rather than that there is continuity, or, better, a return, to his true intended nature by virtue of his creation. As Malan expressed it (3), "instead of saving humanity, God has replaced it with another humanity!"....

(1) Revue de Lausanne p. 259.
(2) op. cit. p.370.
(3) op. cit. p.378.
Rather would he say that conversion is a return to a state of
which, doubtless, man has lost consciousness, but was yet existent in
virtue of his divine creation. Without this renewal, such conscious-
ness would have remained dormant till the 'judgement', which will
bring the temporary to an end. Theology, properly understood, is
the expression we give, in intellectual terms, of our experience of
God. "We could not allow the possibility of such theology if it
were not for entering, with our Creator, into a relationship of know-
ledge. Supreme, absolute Being could not be known "in Himself", (en
soi), at a distance, so to speak, or by having regard to His histori-
cal activity. Such knowledge, if it existed, would be foreign,
astonishing and frightening. The epistemological status of religious
experience is conserved in terms of the "obedience of faith", in
terms of the congruence of the Divine response to the hunger and need
of man, fallen but still normatively constituted in his created
nature.

Renouvier. In the matter of the competence of the faculties and the
validity of their claimed experience-data, he was more radical than
Kant. Going beyond the position that phenomena only are known, the
noumena remaining unknowable, he asserted that that which is unknow-
able to us is as if non-existent. It follows that there are no
noumena, only phenomena, such phenomenalism waging war on substance,
substantiality and metaphysics in general. Renouvier, in his early
period, gave expression to a radical phenomenalist relativism.
Later, however, he moved to a conception of the monad, echoing
Leibnitz, and made a serious attempt to construct an ontology.

The particular characteristic of his neo-criticism was the cen-
tral place given to logic and to the principle of contradiction,
this yielding, it was thought, victory over materialism, evolutionism
and determinism. But the risk was of an arid rationalism, the principle not being applicable to the Absolute, to the Infinite, since, by definition, mystery goes beyond us, and is extra-scientific, extra-logical, not, in fact, subject to a law of contradiction. Renouvier said that it was after long meditation on transcendent methods in Geometry (1) that he arrived at the pivotal idea of his system. This led to an unusual dependence upon a mathematical concept, this concept being that of movement to infinity. For example, he defined a circle as a polygon with an infinite number of sides. In his theology, Renouvier strove with the conception of God as infinite and absolute, and, echoing his mathematical conception of the infinite, he regarded God as having had successive states, as having origin in time and space, but being unable, as absolute, to possess personal qualities such as intelligence, will and feeling. He has, however, perfection of goodness and justice. The purpose of Renouvier's mathematical analogy was epistemological, and was designed to bridge what was thought to be the total gulf which had opened up between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Discontinuity was to be overcome by the conception of discrete movement from the finite to the infinite. Although "God" was unthinkable, the "conception" of God was not unthinkable, being analogous to the projection to the infinite of the finite. But one does not "think" or "represent" the absolute, and so, in Renouvier's view, the noumenal/phenomenal quality of the Divine was transcended, and the agnosticism, felt to be the concomitant of the Kantian analysis, was avoided.

This perhaps rather sterile area of discussion was referred to by Frommel at that point in his Dogmatics where he dealt with the nature of the object of the Christian revelation, and the danger and difficulty inherent in the necessity of "thinking" or "representing" God.

(1) Logique, p. VIII of Introduction.
He wrote: "One does not think the absolute; one does not represent it. It goes beyond human capacities. Renouvier furnished unanswerable proof of this". (1) Frommel, however, was hardly likely to use Renouvier's phenomenology as a basis for his epistemology, since, to him, it was but another example of intellectualism of a peculiarly rationalistic kind. The work of Renouvier was not a major epistemological influence, being overshadowed by names like Sabatier, Ménegoz and Secrétan, and his dependence upon mathematical concepts was hazardous and mistaken. The main lineaments of his thought emerged in a study of him by Frank Duperrut (2).

We would agree that geometrical and mathematical pre-occupations and criteria are inappropriate to matters of the infinite. The word "ineffable" would seem to be the proper one to employ to convey the sense of transcendence in the experience of the presence of the "object" of our worship and love. Renouvier introduced the conception of the movement to infinity, defining a circle, as above, as a polygon with an infinite number of sides. This, however, is not its prime definition, which is the locus of a point moving in equidistance from a fixed point called the centre. More serious, even, was the confusion between the infinite and the indefinite; e.g. an indefinite integral is quite different from the conception of infinity, which is non-representable save in terms of limiting concepts. Any such asymptotic approach to divine truth, or conception of infinity as the last term of an infinitely extended series, is basically self-contradictory and serves no useful metaphysical or theological purpose.

Such rationalistic structures are powerless to pronounce on the "real", as is fully worked out in the section of "La Vérité Humaine" dealing with "intellectualism". Renouvier himself offered conclu-

(2) Rev. de théol. et de philos.: Lausanne, 1904.
sions as to epistemological certainty which exceeded the premises laid down, the identity of the laws of thought and of nature being compromised by the fact of freedom. He failed to distinguish between them in terms of his neo-Kantian dichotomy between the noumenal and the phenomenal, and in virtually denying the former, consensus of experience was rendered illusory and impossible. The same point was made in "La philosophie de M. Renouvier et le problème de la Connaissance religieuse", by Henri Mieville, (Lausanne: 1902); The impasse was reached by going beyond the Kantian position, adopting the categories with the exception of the "noumenon": "ontologically this becomes unintelligible". In the view of A. Reymond(1) Mieville rightly conserved the position that the real is not necessarily intelligible; God may be constituted as infinite and absolute in the sense that, qua absolute reality, He transcends the categories of our understanding without losing His personal character. He is not a spirit or a person – He is Spirit and Personal. "Neo-criticism has not proved the idea of eternity contradictory, being based on the false premise of the assimilation of eternity with a series of discontinuous moments of time considered as in themselves finite."(2)

Such anthropomorphism as we allow to give validity and content to our epistemologically structured statements about God is acceptable only as a symbol; but such anthropomorphism is not to be understood as a symbol of agnosticism. A symbol is not a veil, but a revelation, signifying, not what one does not know, but what one does.

Apart from these considerations as to the nature and object of religious knowledge, Renouvier stressed the reality of the moral act, constituting in it the freedom of the will against the crushing out of individuality and personality through evolutionist naturalism and

(1) Revue de Lausanne – 1904.
(2) op. cit. p. 246.
collectivist socialism. In the opinion of Secrétan, there was, in Renouvier's "Science de la Morale" more of justice than of love, and he called it "an excellent treatise on natural duty."

Renouvier, in his "Nouvelle Monadologie", claimed to have preserved "all the great delineaments of Christian philosophy". Duperrut allowed that, at least, neo-criticism could be an ally of Christian spirituality, in that these are united in their opposition to naturalism. Frommel's oft-repeated response to neo-criticism was that it did not respond to the real exigencies of the Christian consciousness, because of its intellectualist presuppositions, its dependence upon 'apriori' metaphysical and logical premises, and the inner contradictions which it displayed.

Maine de Biran. A more positive influence upon Frommel's thought was exercised by Mainde Biran, whose primary contribution in the field of epistemology was his analysis of human consciousness. There were immediate implications as to the nature of knowledge in his psychology of religion, and his placing of the terms of the discussion in the inner citadel of human experience and freedom commended itself naturally to Frommel. The most readily accessible accounts of de Biran's thought are "Maine de Biran: sa vie et ses pensées", by E. Naville, 1857; and "Oeuvre Philosophique de Maine de Biran", 1841. A later work, appearing in 1892, came during the period of Frommel's own activity - it was a thesis by Ernest Murisier, "Esquisse d'une Psychologie Religieuse". (1)

De Biran defined religion as a personal relationship in terms of which the dogmas of sin and redemption have, as anthropological basis, the conception of free and responsible personality. Likewise, "le devoir" - the sense of "the ought" and of duty - constitutes the reality of freedom and of self. Scepticism appeared to assert

(1) Paris: Imprimerie des Ecoles (Jouve), presented to the Faculty of Theology of the Free Church of the Canton of Vaud.
either that there are, so to speak, two truths, the postulates of the practical reason being unverifiable in psychological experience; or that there are no truths, yet contemporary sensationists can offer no account of the origin, nor, indeed, of the true constitutive nature, of the consciousness. Instead of the Cartesian intellectualising "cogito", volitional effort should be seen as manifesting the personality; this could be expressed as "J'agis, donc je suis." Effort, considered in terms of psychological manifestation, is not purely "mental", as claimed by Renouvier. Religion is a "life", and it is the business of Christian psychology to mark the opposition between the natural and the spiritual orders and states. It is the business of Christian dogmatics to systematise the truths of the higher order.

Frommel followed de Biran's stricture on the Kantian idealism, namely, that it held to a defective psychology, in which, with neglect of the role of "attention", free activity is thought to render experience impossible by breaking the chain of causes and effects. The author of the "theoretic reason" did not think to sacrifice the notion of freedom, but banished it to a chimerical world. Logic is no ally of freedom, for who says 'logic' says 'necessity'. In de Biran's words, "to contest the primal fact of freedom in the name of thought and logic is to put these in a state of revolt against their source, against the condition of their existence." Although being in itself remains as much hidden as the thing in itself, internal observation allows penetration beyond phenomena to being. We are ignorant of complete essence as it appears in the eyes of God, but we conceive the essential self under this aspect, at least, as manifested effort. The unknowable verities in which we believe are the necessary complement of the data of experience. De Biran considered a psychological fact which had also drawn the attention of
Schleiermacher, namely that man seems to have a natural disposition and an aspiration towards the invisible and the ineffable, a superior sense which seizes a reality foreign to this world's interests.

Frommel followed de Biran in the emphasis upon freedom and the inhospitality towards it of the metaphysically necessary. In the first volume of his Apologetics, he constituted the experience of freedom as being that in which is transcended the stultifying categories of the 'a priori' and the 'necessary'. As de Biran put it, "to put freedom at issue is to put thereby at issue the feeling of existence or of the self. Freedom is the sense of activity, or of the possibility of activity, of creating that which is constitutive of the self. The necessity opposed to it is the feeling of our passivity; necessity and passivity are but a privation of freedom the positive mode being presupposed by the negative."

Another strand in de Biran's thought was echoed by Frommel in the latter's insistence on treating the most highly differentiated beings as normative of real humanity, rather than what he termed "spiritual protozoa". Hence his great emphasis on St. Paul in his analysis of normative Christian experience in his dogmatic work. De Biran had spoken of man's tendency to occupy in the world of the mind and spirit, a level analogous to that of the polyp in the animal ladder; where naturalists discern in the zoophyte a plant and an animal, psychologists may discern in man a similar double life, sensitive and active, an animal and a moral personality.

According to de Biran, ("Pensées"), "agir, méditer, prier - voilà les seuls moyens de faire naître et durer la vie spirituelle". This basic principle is written large in the life of Frommel. As de Biran was called "le solitaire de Bergerac", so, too, did the subject of our study think of himself as "le solitaire".

Aug. Sabatier. In the area of epistemological discussion in French Protestantism, one of the most influential voices was that of Sabatier. The "locus classicus" of his treatment of the question of religious knowledge was Chapter IV of his "Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire". (1) An implicit or explicit theory of religious knowledge, however, underlies his whole theological position.

According to him, "the object of religion is transcendent, it is not a phenomenon. Our imagination deals with phenomenal images only, and our understanding with logical categories only, which have extension in space and time." (2) We are therefore condemned to explain the invisible by the visible, the eternal by the temporal, spiritual realities by sense images. From the first metaphor to the most abstract thought, the notions in religious knowledge are necessarily inadequate to their object, and can never be offered as an equivalent. "Symbolism is the only language suitable to religion." (3) The symbol remains the only response, in terms of validity and content, to the double postulate of devotion, namely, the reality of experience and the requirement of formulation and expression.

In the symbolo-fideist view, all sensations and feelings are accompanied by images (representations), and religious feeling does not come to consciousness by any other way. It is a state or conscious movement of the soul, and thus becomes a principle of knowledge. The idea, or the image, has the mysterious power of reproducing or renewing the sensation or feeling of which they are born. On this is founded tradition and the art of pedagogy.

Sabatier's theory of knowledge was suggested by his conception of 'revelation'. "The subject and object of revelation penetrate each other, becoming as one... The object of religious knowledge is

(1) Paris 1903.
(2) op. cit. p. 390.
(3) op. cit. p. 394.
immanent in the subject himself... Religious consciousness can never get out of subjectivity; we call subjective all knowledge implying the identity of subject and object...."(1) Further, "who says mystery says, at the same time, veiling and revelation; in becoming present, living truth still remains veiled". Thus, moral and religious knowledge cannot express their object without the use of metaphors borrowed from phenomenal experience. Our intellectual life is like an ellipse with two foci, the receptive and the active. The object of religious knowledge is not a phenomenon, being immanent in the subject, revealed in his subjective activity. Through the Kantian analysis of the reality of the external world, we arrive at the concept of the thing-in-itself, and a door is opened to scientific scepticism.

In science, objectivity is secured by elimination of feelings and will by way of observational detachment. It is otherwise with religious knowledge, for God is not an external object or phenomenon to be observed. As Sabatier expressed it - "what I do not find in myself, I shall never find outside."(2) Therefore, to incarnate God in any phenomenal form is superstition or idolatry. Nothing is gained by trying to demonstrate the existence of God as though He were an object of phenomenal knowledge - it is impossible to him who has no devotion, and superfluous to him who has.

Science is competent to deal with secondary causes only; teleology, however, should be the essential element in religious knowledge, because, when talking of God, it is not His metaphysical nature, but His will, which is to be sought. Epistemological analysis should, therefore, be in teleological, rather than purely ontological, terms. We are not representing God as He is in Himself, nor claiming a scientific nor metaphysical definition of Him; the power

(1) op. cit. pp. 375, 376, 379.
(2) op. cit. p. 379.
of the symbol in religious knowledge comes from the primal organic unity of the feeling of devotion and the image which first transmits it to the consciousness, constituting truth in constituting life.

When metaphorical elements go from religious ideas, they become negative, contradictory; such are ideas of the absolute or the infinite. (1)

According to symbolo-fideism, devotion must become conscious and discernible, incarnated in its expression or intellectual image, (representation,) for there cannot be a religion without doctrines, nor devotion without thought. The explication of religious knowledge has as object the tradition of a society conserved and developed in its historical movements, such tradition, however, not appearing as dead and immobile, but like a living body with a soul. The error of some orthodoxy has been to misunderstand the historically and psychologically conditioned character of our religious conceptions by raising the temporal to the absolute. The error of rationalism, "brother but inseparable enemy of orthodoxy", is of the same nature, but in the contrary sense. "Orthodoxy deceives itself on the nature of the body of religion; rationalism deceives itself on the nature of its soul." (2)

One can thus adhere to a formula without appropriating its religious content; one could be orthodox without being Christian. To avoid adherence to a formula without appropriation of its religious content was the central purpose of the symbolo-fideist position, in which a doctrine of religious knowledge was thought to be sustained, in which the epistemological status of faith was conserved and expressed. Another representative of the school, Néhéz, wrote, in his "Le Fidéisme et la notion de la foi" (3) - "Symbolism has liberated souls... giving them inner peace in the presence of the formidable crisis threatening the ancient edifice of ecclesiastical tra-

(1) cf. Renouvier.
(2) op. cit. p. 407.
(3) Paris: 1900.
Frommel's view of this approach was that it did not necessarily lead to agnosticism, but that it could, in practice, lead to scepticism and intellectual laziness. Formulation is necessary for action, discouragement and inactivity being the stultifying consequences of intellectual scepticism. Life engenders formulation, and formulation stimulates life. His main criticism of the symbolism of the Paris school comes in the section of vol. II of his Dogmatics - "The Divine object of the Christian revelation". (1) Frommel agreed with the fundamental postulate of both the Montauban and Paris schools of French Protestant theology, namely the impossibility of "thinking" or "representing" God. Renouvier was right to remind us of this (2); but Bovon was also correct in his warning that "to deny the infinite under the pretext that all knowledge is relative is to revert to an arid rationalism in which the comprehending faculty is made the supreme rule of life." (3) If the tendency of the neo-critical schools was to attempt to bring the unknowable under the aspect and terms of the knowable by the destruction of the transcendent and the metaphysical, that of symbolo-fideism, as represented by Sabatier and Menégoz, has been to constitute a form of intellectual agnosticism. While they again declare the character of God as not patient of thinking or representing, they do not appear to take serious account of His accessibility to experience, His appreciation by the heart, His presentation to the consciousness. Thus, with them, the revelatory character and constitution of Christianity is destroyed, the universality and exoteric nature of symbolism effectively annulling the (in one sense) esoteric character of the distinctively Christian revelation.

(1) pp. 265-267.
(2) op. cit. p. 261.
Religious Agnosticism

Frommel was concerned to establish the distinctive epistemological status of Christian faith, to constitute the nature of religious knowledge, and to combat what he found as a comparatively new mental attitude, religious "agnosticism", seeking, for the first time, to legitimise itself by serious theological considerations. It reflected a fresh psychological analysis of religious concepts, and was not, in itself, a-religious, but it bore the mark of current epistemological attitudes, such as rational criticism in the phenomenological field, a metaphysical scepticism typified by symbolo-fideism in particular, the whole area of discussion related to, and drawing upon, with differing directions of emphasis, the Kantian approach to the nature of knowledge.

Frommel's systematic analysis of this situation was offered in his important two-part work "L'agnosticisme religieux". The main themes of the discussion were raised by reference to three particular works, and we take account of Frommel's relationship and dialogue with contemporaries.

(a) The first work was: "L'application de la méthode scientifique à la théologie: -Essai théorique et pratique" - by a Genevan pastor, G. Berguer. Is religious agnosticism, asked Frommel, a psychological fact or a definitive mental attitude? Berguer had written:

"We are convinced that man can acquire truth by this higher "sense" which has been given to him, and which is called consciousness. But we are no less convinced of this, that this moral, religious, inner truth has nothing intellectual in it. We can possess it; we cannot understand it. My intelligence cannot comprehend what does not present itself to it under the categories of intellectual knowledge." (3)

(1) Lausanne Review: 1903 and 1904, and published as booklet by G. Bridel and Co.

(2) Genève: George et Cie, 1903.

(3) This work, by Berguer, was reviewed, critically but sympathetically, by Paul Chapuis in the Gazette de Lausanne, 14 Jan. 1904.
Frommel said, of the paragraph quoted above, that the conclusion to be drawn was that "the moral, religious, inner life is unintelligible, that is to say, inaccessible and untranslatable to thought in terms of knowledge."

(b) Another work dealing with the question of the relation of faith to intellectual representation was "Le Chemin de l'Espérance" by Warnéry. Here we find a personal recovery of faith allied to intellectual scepticism. Frommel took the following quotation from it - "What proof have I that the universe is engaged on a mysterious work, of which humanity should make itself the agent, I myself being in humanity? None. No reason of an intellectual order sustains my conviction. I may be mistaken in thinking this, but it is my personal, incommunicable and, as it were, instinctive conviction. I shall not debate, for to debate is to fight."(1) Warnery went on: "I cannot propose to myself to believe against my own reason. That this reason is fallible, and that I can be mistaken, I have no difficulty in acknowledging. But, if I am mistaken, it is in good faith. Multitudes, immense and growing ever more numerous - it is for them that I open my soul; for them that I shall throw this confession to the wind..."

(c) A more penetrating analysis, however, in Frommel's view, was the study of Religious Agnosticism by N. Flournoy.(2) The subject of the study was reported to have passed through certain theologico-religious stages; in childhood, religious feeling was constituted by the fear of God conceived as judge, alternating with an inexpressibly pleasant feeling, that of being loved by the very judge who condemned. Religious feeling had become that of intimate dependence, in the sense, not of Schleiermacher, but, rather, of César Malan fils - "Religious feeling is not, for me, a simple feeling of sentimental

(1) A reminder, again, of P.T. Forsyth's remark, quoted in Chapter on Apologetics.

(2) Archives de psychologie: Oct.1903.
"Schwärmerei" or mystic exaltation, but an instantaneous supplication of inner prayer and received answer, implying an effort and an act of courage and trust. As to the intellectual and theological aspect, I do not believe I have ever united it to religious feeling, properly speaking. It interested me passionately, but that was all, and now it bores me prodigiously...."

Thus we see a religious agnosticism caused by the withering of the theological element in religious experience, such that, at best, dogma becomes an intellectual symbol, the intellectual part of a functional religious phenomenon, taking a form according to the nature of the subject. Frommel commented that "this belief has no relationship whatever (other than that of psychological necessity) with experience and its object. It is inevitable illusion, nothing more. It corresponds to nothing."

Another Flournoy quotation followed - "since self-consciousness necessarily contains a physiological factor which death must dissolve, or at least "transform" in whatever sense we understand that work, 'le fond de ma pensée reste agnostique..." Is religious experience, then, a hallucination? Is it mere auto-suggestion of the benevolence of ultimate reality? Is it an instinctive, unreasoned - or unreasonable - act? ("Je veux croire..."). Here we are led to what Frommel calls "le paroxysme agnostique" - the use of the phrase by the agnostic writer: "le mensonge de la theologie". Religious agnosticism has constituted itself a living, real attitude, a psychic reality, a definite psychological fact.

It is not, however, to be equated "simpliciter" with scepticism nor liberalism; the latter represented a desire for freedom of thought, to which importance was attached, where, by contrast, religious agnosticism refuses definitive value to thought as such.
There was an optimistic, naturalistic element in liberalism, which accentuated the role of the will and the moral sense, but, as Frommel pointed out, the agnostic type in Flournoy's study belonged to a quite different religious temperament, where there seemed to be a preponderance of the religious and mystical over the moral, and little of the naturally optimistic. This agnosticism appeared to be seeking a personal account, a new expression. Apparently "the agnostic is free to express, to formulate. What he does not allow himself is to confuse truth in itself with the more or less uncertain rays which he reflects of it." Could such be an honest effort to express the Pauline conception of knowledge - 1 Cor. 13: 'now we see only the reflection in a mirror'? Was St. Paul an 'agnostic'? Such a dramatic conclusion is not justified - especially when judged in terms of Flournoy's assertion that religious agnosticism is the absence of direct, intellectual expression; "it is religious experience in its pure state, vital, mystical, inward, without doctrine or philosophical concepts, attaching to, or preceding, it... c'est avec croyance, mais sans croyances..."

The theologian, in this view, is a man who believes in a religious manner but who knows that there is nothing in that faith possible of expression, intellectually speaking, and that not only thought, but reason also, are imperfect mirrors.

Frommel constituted as the primary cause of this temper of religious agnosticism the conflict held by some to exist between science and religion. This was to be, however, more carefully and precisely defined as between scientific knowledge as such and gnostic religion. In terms of this conflict, science has tended to occupy position after position surrendered by its rival. Gnostic religion has claimed the same order of knowledge as science, ignoring, or, by
implication, pretending to ignore, the Kantian reservations. Indeed, it has claimed a superior order of knowledge, claiming absoluteness. It is the claim of non-historical mysticism, and has also been linked with modes of ecclesiastical and scriptural infallibility, in which the notion of 'revelation' is expressed propositionally, rather than dynamically. (1)

Each human discipline is determined by its own subject-matter, and, with increasing awareness of this basic axiom - allied, paradoxically, with a misunderstanding of its theological implications - separation and compartmentalising of thinking has resulted. Agnosticism reflects, on the one hand, the dominating influence of purely materialist scientific knowledge, and, on the other, the dominating influence in metaphysics and theology, of the Kantian epistemology. The 'practical reason' does not "know", in the true sense of the word, and religious knowledge is rendered impossible by metaphysics (transcendental knowledge). As symbolic, it is deprived of noetic status and validity, its usage being figurative and practical. This leads straight to the symbolo-fideism of l'Ecole de Paris, where belief had two elements - the act of will, the important aspect of faith; and the mental representation, symbolic and without importance, neither for knowledge, nor even for faith. Frommel, indeed, constituted symbolo-fideism as "the proper formulation of religious agnosticism."

The question of the moral consciousness is basic, because "what really lays hold upon us at the heart is religion, not theology". The essentially moral character of religion is central to its proper appreciation, as well as its emotional, volitional and mystical elements. The strength and function of religion is to be religious, to realise its proper essence; it must guard, however, against identi-

(1) See discussion in thesis chapter on Dogmatics, and thesis by Willy Margot; The notion of Revelation in A. Sabatier and G. Frommel, 1917.
Eying itself with its doctrinal wrappings. The scientific attitude has its own discipline of the sovereignty of facts and the obedience of thought. But this attitude, legitimate in the order of physical phenomena, is no longer so when it is a matter of phenomena in the psychic order. In this field, the last word does not belong to science, but to morality. The proper function of consciousness consists in making judgements of quality or value, ceaselessly to judge what is in a relation to what should be, in a relation to duty and the law of perfection which reigns in the consciousness itself..." Thus is the autonomy of religion conserved, with its own epistemological discipline.

The relation of religious agnosticism to the Church and its corpus of belief.

Frommel drew attention to the role of 'the word' in religion. As he put it, "the history of comparative religions shows that the role of the word in them is exactly correlative to their spiritual superiority." From the point of view of edification and mission, the role of the word is crucial, witness its virtual absence from inferior religious expressions, such as fetishism, animism, polytheism, pantheism. Historical Judaism bore witness to the tension between sacerdotalism and prophetism, and, in Christianity, the word has played a supreme part, deformation being caused by any weakening of its role. Religious agnosticism would render the Church dumb and debilitated. In all "word", there is an element of knowledge, a cognitive factor, outside of which the word would be extinguished and become a pure Corinthian glossolalia. Likewise, from the social aspect, religious agnosticism, rejecting doctrine on the pretext of fear of the doctrinaire, lacks a dimension of communication, being disobedient to the apostolic precept; "render an account of your faith."
As above, "who could be an "agnostic apostle"?" - asked Seippel, in "L'Esprit Souffle ou il veut". Religious experience is always an exulting and liberating one, adding another dimension, as it were, to the life of the subject, raising him above himself. Religious agnosticism implies the effacement, or at least attenuation, of this experience. It appears solitary and taciturn, unfaithful to experience as a psychological fact, being deficient in the elements of self-consciousness, communication, formulation, relationship, value-judgement and - in the matter of epistemology - of noetic understanding.

The interaction of doctrine and action is crucial. Action is generated by doctrine, and doctrine by action. Frommel quotes, approvingly, from the last chapter of Wm. James' "Manual of Psychology" - "the point where the will directly applies itself is always an idea. To pay attention to an idea, there is the act of will, there is the sole inner voluntary act which we ever accomplish. All the drama of the will is a mental drama ... The mysterious mechanism, which links between them thought and the motor centres, comes into play; and, in a manner which we cannot guess, action follows thought."

Religious agnosticism would remove from the religious subject the conditions for decisive action by which alone he could conform his will and his life to his spiritual ideal. It emasculates the religious life, diverting it from its essential goal, which is to transform man and to construct him on the pattern of his faith. A further weakness lies in the arbitrary distinction introduced between faith and belief; it is, by implication, a psychological disjunction, involving, apparently, irreconcilibility of mode between intellectual belief and faith, because of lack of common psychologi-
If we refer again to Flournoy's study, we find that it claims to
give, firstly, the religious phenomenon in the pure state, — and,
secondly, the double reaction religiously positive and intellectually
negative — of the subject of the primitive phenomenon, this "pure
phenomenon", apparently, being "to feel inside me, at the depth of
religious feeling, an action, a pressure — in a word, that I am the
object, before being the subject, of a spiritual action; I have the
experience, not of doing, but of receiving — the source of life is
beyond my conscious self..." This is described as "a testimony ren-
dered to a kind of profound, vague feeling." But it is not that
alone, for the writer adds, significantly, "it is, if you like, also
a rudimentary belief, reduced to a state as near to the unconscious
as possible; it is, in a measure, a belief, since it contains a
philosophical affirmation." Thus, as it becomes conscious, reli-
gious experience encloses an element of knowledge, i.e. a noetic fac-
tor. Faith thus thinks, and, if it thinks, it must speak. The
"word", as above, should develop and correspond to the genesis and
growth of faith. It would appear that here religious agnosticism
supervenes as a theory of knowledge and separates what nature would
conjoin. Faith is condemned to stultifying silence. The reaction
should, in fact, be belief — moral and voluntary (faith-belief,
fiduciary), and intellectual (faith-thought, noetic). The agnostic
clings to the first and denies the second. This is expressly stated
in the study — the first is asserted; but, "as to the second, I
remain before an insoluble enigma (as to whether the object of reli-
gious experience is God, or the profound self of the subject), and I
do not need to give it a name to live by it; I have even a horror of
doing so — it is for me a lie, "le mensonge de la theologie".....
In this analysis, we have tended to consider religion in general, and one thing seems to follow religious agnosticism, namely, desolidarisation of the religious phenomenon in itself, with all affirmation, conclusion, explication, or any intellectual "envelope" or doctrinal philosophy. The distinctive nature of the Christian gospel is its constitution in terms of a historical message and a spiritual power of redemption. "Faith comes by hearing" (Rom. 10:17); does not, then, agnosticism suppress the real character of the Christian religion, that of invariability and universality of access? One could, perhaps, conceive of an absolute religion without doctrine, but Christianity is not such. Here, therefore, we consider two less extreme passages from Flournoy. Some allowance is made for the fact that collective experiences have issued in the intellectual result called "Christian doctrine", which serves as a kind of beckoning 'lure' to individual experience, but is, as such, conditioned by period, temperament and culture. Further, the Bible offers witness to the experience, in which the emphasis is more on receiving than doing, a witness which is also a recital of the inner life. The personalities incarnating this experience have been recognised by the collective consciousness, and conserved in a unique literary monument. The same could be said of Buddhism and Islam, and the author of the study is, in fact, stating the agnostic thesis that there is only an accidental co-existence, rather than a necessary connection between experience and doctrine. All this takes no serious account of the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian life, a spiritual life normalised by the direct communion with God of Jesus Christ, and the inerasureable element of doctrine contained in the phrase "good news" (Gospel) both of which involve a mental and conscious representation of the character of God.
The heart of agnosticism, in Frommel's view, was the descriptive principle perceptively constituted by P. Seippel. He wrote: "Religion is conceived by those who recognise in it a reality of a superior order like a relationship between a thinking, feeling man and an infinite Christ, unknowable, which no name can express; it is that being, "ondoyant et divers", spoken of by Montaigne, leading to a relationship which must therefore be infinitely variable."

God reduced to an unknown, unknowable Christ, denies the Gospel, and, indeed, the nature of religion itself. Far from "variability", man in himself is always the same, sinful and redeemable. Indeed, the invariability of the context in which the Gospel is heard fixes the distinctive Christian religious experience and the historico-psychological doctrines which express it. Christ did not issue "doctrines"; He is the doctrine of Christians, because, and insofar as, He realised and lived in His person the true nature of the normal relationship of God to man and man to God. Agnosticism is a solvent of Christianity refractory to and incompatible with it, hostile to its goal to "lead all thought captive to the obedience of Christ".

Religious Knowledge

We now consider the epistemological implications of agnosticism in the matter of religious knowledge. Seippel tells us in his memoir that he recalls sharing a climb with Frommel; he followed him breathlessly up the rocky path of Sanetsch, and remarked when they paused for a rest: "How nice to stretch out on this lovely sward." Frommel replied: "Yes; I shall come here to pass a whole day reflecting on the theory of knowledge".....

A theory of knowledge - or, rather, the nature and conditions of Christian knowledge - had been a basic concern of Frommel's from the first. He had written in his thesis presented to the Faculty of

(1) See "In Memoriam" of Frommel: "La Semaine Litteraire" Geneve, 2 June 1906.
Protestant Theology of Paris \(^{(1)}\) that all that etymology could afford as to the meaning of suneidesis (carrying with it the overtones of 'das Bewusstsein', psychological consciousness; and 'das Gewissen', the moral consciousness) was that "la conscience" implies immediate perception, from which results a knowledge obtained, as it were, by the 'return' of the subject to something intimate within one. It is an organ of "apperception" (distantly echoing the Leibnitzian monadology) but not essentially a part, or member, of the whole. It is a function of the self in its relation to the non-self, a new mode of perception, not to be identified or confused with sense-intuition.

"The perception of consciousness is not that of exterior phenomena, nor even the internal activity of the self, but is that of an action realised within me before the appearance of an activity, because this fact is perceived as soliciting the decision which inaugurates the activity..."

In Frommel's thetic development, the growing metaphysical agnosticism in philosophy was noted. Following Kant, the noumenal world is unknowable as not responding to any corresponding intuition of the subject. The intuition - if not the knowledge - of the "thing-in-itself" is the contact with the absolute, which is lacking in the Kantian analysis. Instead of "postulates", Frommel believed he had arrived at an analytical explication of a primordial fact; the metaphysics of religion (not, of course, in the sense of the intellectualist "a priori" deduction, but of induction based on experience) could become a permitted science and the word 'knowledge' be appropriately used. Putting the theoretical reason anterior to the practical was the radical Kantian error, because man is a moral being before being a knowing subject.

To the danger in intellectualising Frommel has drawn attention in

\(^{(1)}\) "Etude sur la Conscience Morale et Religieuse": Feb. 1888.
his essay on Amiel(1) "We must guard against thinking that we can embrace the world in thought - its reflection, yes, but not its reality. All thought is representative, dissolving without remainder when one tries to seize it. To know is not to live, and it is living which matters. Man achieves reality in action. Existence is an actualisation of himself. Science subjects us to what is; the will liberates us from it. If the moral will is the will par excellence, the moment of moral obedience will be the supreme moment, the one true one in the life of man." In this early work of Frommel we see the elements of his later development of thought.

An associated emphasis is found in M. Guyau.(2) There is metaphysical risk in speculation. The numinous, in the moral sense, is a construction of our own mind, our own metaphysical imagination. "Metaphysics in the domain of thought is like artistic expenditure in the sphere of economics". Absolute truth is an abstraction, like a perfect triangle or circle to the mathematician.(3)

Thought starts from experience, as in all human wisdom; the religious man does not postulate religious realities; he experimentally experiences them, and lives them directly. Man is not the subject of a sole type of experience, the "sensible", but of two - the sensible, arising from the phenomenon and addressing itself to consciousness by the intermediary of organic feeling, and the religious, or morale-mystic, arising from the numinous or the ground of things, addressing itself to the consciousness independent of organic intermediary. There seem to be no reasons why, a priori, religious experience is less intelligible than sense experience, and, a posteriori, both manifest the same fundamental characteristics.

Frommel again quotes Wm. James(4) - "our most rational beliefs are

(1) "Etudes Littéraires et Morales", p. 56-7.
(2) "Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction"(1905).
(3) op. cit. p. 161.
(4) "Varieties of Religious Experience", p. 423.
founded on an evidence exactly similar, in its nature, to that
invoked by the mystics for their belief. Examples prove that, while
the use of the five senses plays no role in experience or mystic
feeling, it is absolutely 'sensual or sensible' in its qualities or
epitomological functions. It is, like our sense-experiences, the
direct presentation of what appears to exist in immediacy of
accessible reality." There is thus similarity of noetic effect on
the mind, but there remains a distinction of spheres, and, thus, of
orders of knowledge. In all spheres, however, one purpose of know-
ledge is to discern "laws". Value-judgements arise from religious
experiences and by them the religious life. The obligation of con-
science is the great, imposcrivable law of the spiritual world,
governing its manifestations, playing, in the sphere of the spirit, an
analogous role to gravitation in the physical world. One does not
"understand" gravitation; it is as unintelligible in itself as duty.

It would almost appear at this point that Frommel was conceding
two orders of knowledge, and this would tempt the agnostic to assert
the superiority, or even the sole reality, of the rational and scient-
tific, the other being illusory, or, at best symbolic. Actually
this disjunction does not follow, for Kant had described scientific
knowledge as involving symbolic forms and categories, no less anthropo-
morphic and subjective. The data of the phenomenal world are
essentially subjective, the real noumenon eluding us. In any equa-
tion of the known with the real, scientific knowledge is not superior
to religious knowledge; radical scepticism cannot be excluded, and
confidence is, in both cases, instinctive and spontaneous, without
metaphysically necessary legitimacy.

The convictions and religious beliefs of a man express his most
original and profound self; it is otherwise with scientific know-
ledge. Some have said that the difference lies in that science addresses itself to the 'phenomenon' which alone is knowable, while religion addresses itself to the ground of things, and its formulation varies since this discloses itself differently, because, in the words of Littré, "it is a limitless ocean, without barque or sail"; or, as Kantian theory put it, it is a noumenon, by definition, unknowable. We should prefer to express the matter as follows - Religious knowledge includes and requires the personal equation; scientific knowledge excludes it. Religious knowledge deals with what is becoming; scientific knowledge deals with what has become and what is. The future of religious knowledge is that it will follow the march of experience, it will universalise itself and achieve uniformity; nothing is more favourable to error or stagnation than religious agnosticism.

Frommel considered that Christianity is not just like religion in general, and its 'knowledge' is of a different nature. It normalises the religious experiences to which it gives rise, solidarising them with a Person, religiously and morally perfect, and thus normative, grouping them round that Person in an organic living manner. It is, indeed, its risk and boldness, its historical contingency which distinguishes it, for in it alone the Person of the Founder is uniquely central, supreme and normative. Doctrine comes into existence through the Person of Christ, Who is not only the model and guide, but the way and the life, the end, the author and the means, the Revealer and the Revelation, the condition and the object of faith.

This, therefore, has two results, the mystically noetic and the scientifically noetic. Because of the central Christian doctrine of the indwelling Christ, there is, in this mystic participation, the
organic reproduction of a distinctive life; we are thus dealing with a constitutive architecture of Christian experience - an image of Christ, in the faithful. In the matter of what is known, there is no arbitrariness of doctrine, but, rather, development, "vertebration" to the stature of Christ, with accompanying noetic discernment. If knowledge could ever attain to perfect expression of the Christian experience and of its object, it would be "la vérité même"....

But there is also a phenomenal aspect which comes to Christian knowledge from evangelical history. The same Christ, active spiritually in the believer to regenerate him to His image has made Himself known historically: He has been "phenomenalised", being made flesh in Jesus of Nazareth. He is historically accessible and knowable - in the context of historical certainties. Christian knowledge is unassimilable to any other religious knowledge. At the one time phenomenal knowledge and knowledge of the ground of things, it can claim a title, everywhere else contradictory, a "metaphysical science" - we say "science", in distinction from philosophical speculation; "metaphysical", in distinction from the phenomenal, the sole object of ordinary science. It is well described by the word "Glaubenslehre". Christian doctrine is as rigorously captive to the person of Christ as scientific knowledge is to the phenomena which it studies.

Frommel finished his study of religious agnosticism with "practical Conclusions". He felt that one must protect those who feel the impact of religious agnosticism from its contagious influence. There must be understanding and patience. For some, it has been a matter of applying the Kantian categories of thought to the question of religious knowledge. But outside of the intellectual élite there is a widespread "epidemic", so to speak, in popular thinking. "I do
not retract my language of 'contagion' and 'cure'; we are witnessing a fact of life, a kind of feebleness or pathological deformation of religious life which I would characterise as 'spiritual psychasthenia'. There is a spiritual anaemia, a dilettantism; instead of living religion, there is religiosity ...

Justifying this strongly-worded paragraph, Frommel drew attention again to an assertion in Flournoy's work. The subject said that he had "sufficient with which to live". In other words, there was acceptance of and satisfaction with a minimum content - instead of the abundance of life offered by Christ. Further, in the same study, "probably, if my religious life had been more intense, I should never have taken cognisance of the subjective character of dogma; ... even if I come to claim to see the face of God, I must still take account of the fact that what I see is but a reflection, and not the reality itself, an adaptation made by God Himself to my intelligence..." This is not, however, other than what has been affirmed by the great mystics and saints. Jesus Himself, although speaking of those who will "see God", did not in His humanity, know God as He is in Himself, but God "for Him". "God for us" implies a revelation, not of the inscrutable mystery of His essence, but what He is, and wills to be, for us.

Religious experience, according to Frommel, is made on the knees; we do not conquer - we receive; our activity is one of reception. We do not form God in our image - He forms His image in us, and transforms us to His. This image is human, anthropomorphic, in the sense that it uses the forms and categories of the mind, but the Kantian impasse is overcome in a power and fullness of life. Religious doctrine is not 'given' as such in experience; the moment of grace gives place to belief, in which there is the voluntary effort of faith on one part, and, on the other, the noetic effort of the
thought of the subject; this succession is normal in the life of the believer.

Agnosticism will not be met by doctrinal argument so much as by the witness to, and of, a superior personal experience, itself authentic and intelligent. People are led, not to a dogma nor an institution, but to a Person, and thence to religious activity. Exercise and activity fortify the religious life as they do the physical, helping to make precise and real the elements of experience. The order—the key to the orientation of our efforts at therapy—is "Do the will; know the doctrine...."

We are reminded of earlier dicta of Frommel—included in "Lettres et Pensées":(1) "God has been pleased to reveal Himself to the weak and to children; one may not know nor understand, but one may always obey. All may be impossible but one thing, the abdication of oneself, and the surrender of one's being to the Divine Will" (1887).... "Do not look for dogma in the Gospel. You will find there only actions, of which the special character is to be transformed into principles of consciousness. Once these have become yours, once you have lived them, you will be authorised to conclude in the formulation and understanding of the dogmas which repel you now, and by which no man has entered into the sanctuary." "Where God is an idea, He is a conclusion of human reason, and man is religious. Where He is a Being, He is the initiator of human obedience, and man is believing"...(1891).

Similar emphasis on dynamic, rather than theoretical intellectualist, verification was the theme of his letters, addressed to "Mademoiselle", from Gsteig and Avenches,(2) "You are surprised that you do not understand God? What would you say of a man who was astonished at not being able to hear colours or see sounds? Is it

(1) Attinger Frères, Paris et Neuchatel—1913.
(2) 1 Oct. 1901.
not a similar mistake to seek understanding in intellectual and rational terms of that which does not permit of it? Man comprehends God, not by the intelligence but by the heart; and, remarkably, the intelligence then appears satisfied..."(1) "The important thing is not intellectual, theoretic belief... it is trust and faithfulness. The rest "(i.e. the noetic element)" will follow. Experimental certainty triumphs over doubt. Christian faith is, and makes, an experience ... which precedes and directs thought."(2) ...(On subject of agnostic feeling) "You judge yourself rightly when you say that your whole heart believes, and wishes to believe, but your reason is still not at rest."(3)..."Doubt shows the presence of a germ of faith... the faith, implied by doubt, is something instinctive, given... Doubt engenders and confirms doubt, as faith engenders and confirms faith".

The most important reaction to Frommel's analysis of the intellectualist presuppositions of agnosticism was that of Pastor G. Berguer, to whose work on the application of scientific method of theology we have alluded. Chapuis had gone on record as approving Berguer's central epistemological principle that "theology is the science which has, as object, religious phenomena, these constituting, from the scientific point of view, a large part of religious psychology. It is not of metaphysics that theology treats, other than as an element in the psychological order."

Berguer felt that Frommel was exaggeratedly severe against religious agnosticism, being carried away by his literary eloquence, distorting the picture, the better to denounce it. The other criticism would be that it is to misunderstand the spirit and motivation of "religious" agnosticism not to acknowledge that agnosticism is, properly speaking, an attitude and disposition of thought manifested in

(1) 15 Dec. 1901.
(2) 5 June 1902.
(3) Dec. 1902.
every field, drawing attention to the limits of knowledge in terms of the relative validity of all intellectual expression, and thus being the opposite of the doctrinaire.

Berguer felt that Frommel's examples of agnostics were, in fact, such as were agnostic in all matters, not just in religion. See, for example, Flournoy: (1) "Because I have been agnostic, no intellectual form of the inaccessible is any longer for me more than a simple representation, without validity in itself, of reality". In the work as cited by Frommel, it was said that "scientific determinism is but a convention"; and in Warnery's 'Chemin' that "perhaps I deceive myself in thinking there is a goal to creation. It is more than likely that my representation of the world leaves me as far from truth as the childish conceptions of primitive humanity..." This is agnosticism in the field of scientific knowledge. Frommel would have been better to speak of agnosticism in the face of religious questions; it would seem strange and paradoxical that he appeared to accept the Kantian scepticism in the matter of scientific knowledge - "the realities of sense, the phenomena, are presented to the mind, under its own categories and forms only, e.g. space, time, number, casuality. Are these 'given' or 'imposed'? Scientific knowledge cannot answer more than religious knowledge - it is on the same basis, and does not exclude radical scepticism. (2) Now, if one accepts this agnosticism in science, why combat it so fiercely elsewhere? Science has not been hindered in its development by this agnosticism, so why should agnosticism be so hostile to the development of the Christian 'science'?

Berguer objected to the Frommelian generalisation that "the religious agnostic is one who in his personal life affirms and realises a total distinction between the moral and mystical phenomenon and the

(1) 'Observations de psychologie religieuse', p. 335.
(2) op. cit. p. 47-48.
intellectual one, their constitutive reciprocal inequality, and the
absolute unintelligibility of religious experience and its object."

This seemed altogether too facile, and he would rather say that
the agnostic is one who in his personal life affirms and realises a
total distinction between the phenomena, as above, and who, remaining
sceptical on their reciprocal causation, does not affirm the absolute
unintelligibility of religious experience and its object. Thus
agnosticism is made less absolute, and what should be acknowledged is
that a substratum is found at the depth of religious experience which
eludes the intellect. Admittedly the phrase "mensonge de la théolo-
gie" is too violent a phrase, being used polemically rather than
with cold, intellectual precision.

Berguer then considered psychophysical parallelism as a possible
ground of reconciliation. There is the agnostic assertion of inequa-
lity between religious and intellectual phenomena - could not agno-
sticism be re-defined as the assertion of a parallelism between the
two, in which they could both be admitted, while not asserting any
causal link? This might be a true agnosticism, but such an attitude
cannot be considered as truly religious; it lays claim only to
intellectual rectitude, and has nothing to do with religion, which is
an affair of the heart and the soul. It appeared to be a similar
error to that into which some psychologists, e.g. Ribot, had fallen,
by affirming an a-causal psycho-physical parallelism.

Agnosticism is not an intellectual attitude "simpliciter", and
the debate should perhaps be clarified by limiting the field in which
agnosticism may legitimately move, thus leaving the wider area free
for affirmations of a pistic order, insofar as they do not claim to
legitimise themselves before the pure reason, but only before the
religious consciousness.
Berguer wondered whether Frommel regarded it as an advantage to the growth of religion to have or to lack knowledge. Everything depends, obviously, on the use of the term. In the ordinary sense, it implies intellectual activity, and the whole Kantian analysis comes into play; indeed, in popular usage, "knowledge" means "scientific knowledge" which will, further, be admitted by some to include, along with sense-data, concepts, ideation, perception of causal and other relationships. What is the status of religious knowledge? Although Frommel seemed to give it a different meaning from that in scientific discussion, one is a little perplexed when he reproaches the agnostics(1) with "their refusal to accord to religion the privilege of issuing noetic propositions." Is there no religious knowledge without noetic propositions? There might seem to be some equivocation in speaking of religious knowledge in the spiritual sense and, in analysing this, to appear to draw conclusions which are applied to noetic knowledge.

We refer again to the Flournoy study where the subject spoke of "feeling within, at the depth of religious feeling, an action, a presence; in a word, I am the object before being the subject of a spiritual action ... I have not the initiative, but the duty to wait and to listen..." Could one say that the writer is refusing to issue noetic propositions in terms of his religious experience? He added: "Dogma is like a simple intellectual symbol, the mental element in the religious phenomenon, which must take on some intellectual character; this character is belief". To this Frommel rejoined that here is a claimed representation of belief, one which has no relationship with the experience and the object. "It is an illusion; it corresponds to nothing". However, it may be felt that there is, surely, a psychological necessity to make connection between the two, and that

(1) op. cit. p. 23.
this need not be ruled as invalid in terms of an a-causal parallelism.

Berguer agreed with Frommel in general terms as to the rôle of "the word" in religion. But the rôle of the word in Christianity must be carefully assessed, since no-one more than Jesus Himself judged and stigmatised the "mensonge théologique", the icy, dead doctrine of Pharisaism. He Himself, as 'the Word' was the living accusation of the doctrinal lie. Must agnostics, then, be dumb? A certain measure of true a-agnosticism may be necessary to the Reformed insight which should save religion from being immobilised in credal, doctrinal formulations.

As to the social context, Berguer advises caution in the use of the word 'doctrine'. Once again it is essentially against the 'dogmatique' that agnosticism makes its case. The agnostics must still speak, explain, and address themselves to the consciousness in terms of thought and idea; hence 'doctrine', however embryonic, is involved even in the repudiation of regulative doctrine. The struggle against formulae will not necessarily in any way diminish the social rôle nor the dissemination of Christianity. The value of the agnostic challenge may be to act catalytically in the ongoing and necessary theological activity of the Reformed Church - "reformata, sed semper reformanda".

It is also to suggest a dangerous doctrinal uniformity of formula - and, indeed, a confusion of terms - if it be maintained, as Frommel appeared to do that the apostle is one who articulates dogmatic affirmations. This runs the serious risk of reducing preaching to the pronouncement of statements regarded as having revelatory validity in themselves. Does not the character and substance of the preaching of the apostolate vary, e.g. a Luther, a Calvin, a Wesley? St. Paul compared the progression of thought in Christian experience
to that from the child to the man. A form of true Christian agnostic-ism would not be totally contradictory to the concept of pro-
gression and development in the intellectual representation of spiri-
tual experience and reality.

On the nature of religious experience, Berguer felt that Frommel
was led into circularity of argument by following Wm. James' psycho-
logical observations and analysis, observations, however, based upon
those who were not agnostic. Frommel had constituted three basic
characteristics of religious experience - exaltation and freedom;
love; certainty and knowledge. Thus a truly scientific analysis
should include all categories of men calling themselves religious,
otherwise some are excluded by circularity of definition. The first
two characteristics would be acceptable, but the third would obviously
require the application of the distinction between religious and inte-
lectual knowledge. Referring to what Frommel said:(1) "the subject
who did not know, knows; he understands where he did not understand.."
This comprehension is not less than intellectual, in the sense of
having noetic content; while the enthusiasm and certainty are, above
all, of the nature of feeling.

In Berguer's submission, Frommel appeared to make doctrine a kind
of goal, ("Do the will - and you shall know..."), and at the same time
the generator of religious action - which would seem rather a defence
of agnosticism than a criticism. Doctrine certainly emerges from
religious activity, but there must also be embryonic doctrinal ele-
ments in the first response and 'hearing of the word' - a certain
element of intellectual cognition and understanding in the comprehen-
sion of the phrase 'the Will' to achieve the response of action,
which, in turn, generates understanding and confers on the total
experience epistemological status and validity. (Although Berguer

(1) "L'agnosticisme religieux", p. 29.
did not go on to give a detailed development of his argument, this would seem its substance.)

If agnosticism be thought to create a kind of inferiority in the good ordering of thought and of apostolic eloquence, it will give him, on the other hand, said Berguer, a certain authority and tact in the cure of souls; the agnostic will have certain doctrines, but these will remain subjective and not be imposed on others. Frommel was to be criticised for affirming, without demonstration, an arbitrary distinction between faith and belief. While Flournoy's research displayed the religious phenomenon in the "pure" state, and the double re-action, religiously positive, intellectually negative, Frommel directs our attention to the fact that the author himself avows finding a belief "in the proper description of the phenomenon". What, then, is the cause of the derivation of a philosophical affirmation from a religious experience? It cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the experience and the affirmation displaying a parallelism, not a causative link. "Ce n'est pas la foi qui pense; c'est le croyant qui croit, et qui pense en même temps"(1) this is, in fact, the arbitrariness affirmed, but not demonstrated.

In the general matter of a "theory" of religious knowledge, Berguer found himself in large agreement, the reservation being on the equivocal use of the word knowledge. Frommel's conclusion that doctrines are "hypotheses to verify", seemed, rather than the establishment of a disjunction between 'belief-faith' and 'belief-thought", a justification of their connection. The use of the word "hypothesis" echoed that of Kant — "to admit the existence of this supreme intelligence (God) is linked with the consciousness of our duty, even if such an admission belongs to the theoretic reason; so that, considered relatively only to itself, as a principle of explanation, it

(1) Rev. de théol. et de philos. 1905, p. 420.
may be called a "hypothesis". But relatively to the intelligibility of an object, nevertheless given to us by the moral law, (the sove-
reign good,) setting out from a need to a practical end, it can be called a belief."(1) This suggests an agnostic view, in which doc-
trine is not an acquired truth, but a tentative approximation.

Berguer therefore felt that, in view of Frommel's acceptance of the idea of hypothesis-verification, it seemed odd for him to write;
"Far from rendering belief dumb, every believer must proclaim it, affirm it, propagate it."(2) Would it not be better to say "propose it", since it is just a hypothesis? Is this not what Vinet would have called "the free manifestation of religious convictions"?

What, then, of agnosticism in the face of Christianity? Here, Berguer felt himself more in agreement with Frommel. Christianity is a historic and redemptive religion. In Jesus, the psycho-
religious parallelism is overcome; He gives rise to a religious experience, and is its object. He is in the continuum of history — but, even here, there is a condition of the order of faith, not of the intellectual order. It requires an act of the heart, of the good will, to find, in the historic Christ, the unique Son of God. In a word, Christian knowledge is of the pistic order, depending on a movement of the soul, not of the intellect. There will thus be agnostics who will remain agnostic in face of the historic person of Jesus, and the historic message of His life will not be a 'message' but a historical account posing an interrogation mark. Nothing may be affirmed or denied — all must remain enigmatic until there is an address to the heart.

Agnosticism should not be considered as religious or irreligious — it is an a-religious attitude, and can only be combatted by showing it its real nature. We may agree with Berguer that, rather than

(2) op. cit. p. 52.
denouncing agnostics, or denying that some have genuine religious experience, we should show them that their intellectual agnosticism is not an insurmountable obstacle to Christian faith, because it is not, and cannot be, of the same order. The conclusion would be that the viewpoints were not in such total opposition. As Berguer put it, Frommel set out from what might be called the "religious convention", and judged agnosticism unfavourably; while the agnostic sets out from the "scientific convention", and judges religious gnosticism unfavourably. Agnostics are conscious of a "dualism" between scientific and religious thought, as they see it; Frommel, aware of the Kantian epistemology, could yet overcome the "dualism" in an act of faith, which, expressing religious experience with its distinctive noetic content, asserts a legitimate Christian knowledge, affirming itself in the superiority of religious certainty over the certainties of sense. Where Berguer saw his opposition to Frommel was in the relativity of all intellectual knowledge, which is that of the agnostics, and in the positing of a Christian "gnosis", which has, however, only symbolic validity.

Berguer allowed Frommel to see the mss. of his critique before publishing it, and the latter acknowledged his courtesy in so doing. He felt that Berguer presumed that an agnostic in religion is one who by that token puts science under the same symbolic approximation as he ascribed to theology. This would seem purely theoretical and not in agreement with the facts. Did Berguer's definition of religious agnosticism, allegedly opposed to Frommel's accord with the expressions employed by Seippel and by the subject of Flournoy's psychological study? There is obviously a more radical scepticism than that of which Berguer speaks.

Frommel acknowledged that he might not have been sufficiently
precise in his use of the word "knowledge". All knowledge rests on prior intuition, whether of sense, reason, morality or religious experience; but Berguer was implying a distinction between pistic and intellectual knowledge in religion, a discontinuity and heterogeneity to which Frommel could not subscribe. All sciences are, after all, the abstract extension, analytically ordered, of their respective intuitions, and the distinction between the pistic and the noetic is not greater than the discontinuity between instinctive and reflective knowledge. If one defines one's point of view in terms of the "scientific", rather than the "religious" convention, the pre-occupying questions are essentially preliminary and formal, involving the application of the scientific method to religious psychology. Significantly, this was the implication of the title of Berguer's work - "L'application de la méthode scientifique à la théologie."

Chapuis, in his review of Berguer cited above, recalled a witticism of Secrétan - "philosophy is the science of what one cannot know!" He thought that Secretan applied analogous judgement to theology and the moral sciences, where Sabatier, with greater justification, took the position of making theology "the science of religion." Berguer would share this latter position, but would define theology as the science which has as its object religious phenomena.

Frommel's position was that one must go beyond the preliminary and the formal, or suffer impoverishment of religious life and understanding.

The Relation of Philosophy and Theology

Conjoint with the general question of the nature of religious knowledge is that of the relation between philosophy and theology. It was a question to which Frommel directed much attention and to which he devoted a considerable amount of writing. The most syste-
matic stating of his position was in his review of a work by Ernest Naville, entitled "La philosophie et la religion", (1) and in his extended debate with Henri Bois of Montauban – articles appearing in 1889 and 1890 in the Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie; Lausanne. His later treatment of the question does not materially differ, and is found as a ground-theme to his major work "La Vérité Humaine", implicit and sometimes explicit in the consideration of the intellectualist and metaphysical analyses.

Naville (2) treated of the agreements and differences between religion and philosophy, with simplicity and sincerity, according to Frommel, who agreed with the writer that "philosophy, as a search for unity, is hostile to polytheism, and religion, as a manifestation of freedom, is hostile to fatalism". However, Naville went on to assert that, if philosophy is the exercise of reason to search for God, harmony is possible between philosophical spirituality and monotheistic faith. Harmony, but not identity, comes from the juxtaposition of the answer, by philosophy, to the question; "what must I think to find peace for my intelligence? and the answer, by religion, to the question: "What must I do to be saved?" Frommel expressed concern at the assertion of a harmony to the affirmation of which there seem grave objections. Naville's conception of the genesis of spirituality rested on the idea that human thought is necessarily concerned with ultimate questions – of origin, of end, of the nature of man and his relationship with God, and that the simplicity of the Gospel can be translated into philosophy, and there seen, without leaving the domain of science, to be the best of philosophies. The doctrine would be extracted from dogma in a form of spirituality not involving an act of faith, but as the subject of scientific study, its divine or supernatural origin not being at issue.

(1) Published "Etudes de Théologie Moderne".

(2) op. cit: Bibliotheque du chercheur.
We would agree with Frommel's objection that philosophy, as such, cannot validly make the Christian life the object of study from the viewpoint of pure scientific method. It is a life "hidden with Christ in God", beginning and subsisting by a miracle, experimentally involved in realities unknown to natural man, who cannot, therefore, discern the norms of its validity. The new creature in Christ remains incomprehensible to sense and reason, the abyss being unbridgeable by the intelligence. The manifestations of my life, perceived only through the prism of a certainty foreign to its essence, can but yield imperfect or false results. Philosophy is not derived from a dogmatic, but is transformed into a dogmatic, i.e. it becomes a science, not basing itself on universal "human" experience. Philosophy could, in fact, analyse dogma and the Christian life only by treating them as natural phenomena, in line, perhaps, with human evolution. But there is a difference between the order of creation and the order of redemption. Philosophy does not produce truth - it develops it in a system more perfect than its parts, composed of elements drawn from general experience. These elements are not those of dogma or the Christian life, such elements existing only for such as consent to testing them in experience. Some appear to hold that philosophy is an explication of the world by the world, a science, that is, in which others find their place and synthesis. Frommel allowed that, in leaning on the moral consciousness of the philosopher, philosophy could escape the implacable laws of logic and the necessary enchainment of causality. The anthropocentric point of departure of philosophic thought is, for it, legitimate, the eventual accord which it must try to establish between its propositions and the result of objective science not being neglected.

Within the limits traced, the hypothesis of Naville had legiti-
macy - but only to the degree of validity conferred on philosophical thinking by virtue of the fact that evangelical preaching may have vivified obscure germs of moral and religious life in society in general. There is a certain almost insensible penetration of the mass of people by the spiritual atmosphere created by the diffusion of the Christian faith, a penetration which lacks, however, the phenomenon of "regeneration". One is reminded of the bold, if dangerous, phrase of Tertullian - that the soul is "naturally Christian". But the crucial matter is the regeneration involving the "new creation", such that there is the miraculous existence of a new being within the heart of natural individuality.

Faith and thought are made, wrote Frommel, to illumine each other, but an accord between the modern world and Christianity will not come along the path suggested by Naville, because it is intellectually impossible, and is accomplished in practice by the changing of hearts alone. At this point we sense that this discontinuity raises a basic difficulty in the matter of the rôle of the Christian philosopher as "apologist", who tends to be imprisoned in circularity of argument, and we have noted elsewhere our feeling that Frommel, as other apologists, is similarly imprisoned. By the terms of the analysis, harmony cannot be achieved between theology and philosophy because of mutual disparateness of criteria, although there may be some rapprochement going beyond mere co-existence. The co-existence of natural and Christian humanity as a problem, had, according to Frommel, a paradigm in the matter of the relation - and separation - between the Churches and the State. The Church has its sufficient reason in itself, possessing its own principle of knowledge as well as its distinctive principle of organisation.

Frommel had an extended exchange of views on the relation of
theology and philosophy with Henri Bois of Montauban, both through published articles and by letter. A quotation from Frommel's "Pensées" sets the norm for his whole subsequent attitude - "Il n'y a pire erreur que de chercher un remède intellectuel à la douleur morale". Likewise, he had written to Bois as early as Dec. 1887, "You seem to treat regeneration abstractly and in isolation", and, later, after asking Bois his opinion of his thesis,\(^1\) "your mind works more in terms of logic, mine by inner, mystical evidence. (Perhaps we have not, even yet, secured our final divergence"). Writing to F. Godet\(^2\) he said: "Please do not think that Jesus Christ has become for me simply an idea. On the contrary, more than ever, He is a Person with whom I have Communion. Do not fear that I could ever be a prey to intellectualism". He wrote, to a correspondent, near the end of his life: - "God demands moral consecration, the inner life, effort of will, and prayer - and we reply with the insatiable curiosity of the intelligence on subjects where the conscience and the will are alone competent. There is an intoxication in intellectualism..."

The starting point of the exchange was the occasion of the delivery of an inaugural lecture by Bois at the outset of a course on the relationship of Hellenism and Judaism at the Faculty of Montauban, 1888, which occasioned Frommel's article entitled "Théologie et Philosophie: à propos d'une leçon d'ouverture".\(^3\)

Frommel opened by quoting Schérer approvingly - "the Church will be in danger so long as it has not shown that faith has its own method and its special lights". The effort of theology, in Frommel's view, had ceased being extensive to become intensive, e.g. the problem of Christian certainty. As science had progressed by using its appropriate method, so it was with Christianity; its proper

\(^{(1)}\) 29 Mar. 1888: from Avenches.
\(^{(2)}\) 22 Aug. 1888.
\(^{(3)}\) Revue de théologie et de philosophie: Lausanne, 1889.
essence is to rest, not on a dogma to be believed, but on a fact of life, of experimental certainty, of the same title as other certainty, but in a different sphere. (1)

It was evident that we had here a field of real debate, that of the intellectual understanding and epistemological status of the Christian faith, and Bois entered it with his "manifesto", to be upbraided by Frommel for his irony and "humoristique" style. However, the matter to which Frommel made strong objection was Bois' affirmation that "Christian theology is a philosophy...... the intelligence of the theologian existed before he became a theologian, even it were 'tabula rasa' from a philosophical point of view, and human reflection cannot but be philosophical. There has never been a Christian theologian not shaped under the influence, and from the point of view of some philosophy". Bois had previously concluded that "although there is often hostility between the two in fact, there is, in right, identity between theology and philosophy. There are no more distinctions between theology and philosophy than exist between different philosophies". (2)

Frommel wrote that we must be struck by the audacity of these assertions and by the danger in their consequences of irremediable eroding of the distinctive character of the Christian revelation. He accepted that theology could be regarded as a philosophical conception of religion, and that Christian theology is a "Christian philosophy"; further, that theologies have been always formed under the influence, and from the point of view, of some philosophy, (3) but he would contest that it should be so. Perhaps it was appropriate to scholasticism, but that era has passed.

This element of Frommel's article was paralleled in his letters of 19 and 28 Feb. 1889, to Bois, from which the following extracts

(1) op. cit. p. 502/3.
(2) "Philosophie, Théologie et Religion"; Revue théologique, Jan./Mar. 1888, p. 60.
(3) op. cit. p. 507.
"Thank you for sending me your "Leçon d'ouverture." I accept the general idea of your discourse. I agree that theology is a philosophical conception of religion, that it cannot be done without the employment of the reason; further, that the intelligence remains identical in its functions, no matter to which object it is applied... But I disagree, as before on regeneration. What do you mean by philosophy? If a systematisation of cosmic laws, amongst which are the laws of the Christian life, and if theology, as the philosophy of the religion of Christ, takes its departure in human experience and is then extended to include Christian experience, I think you are a thousand times wrong".

"...Our essential difference is in that you bring together philosophy and theology, making reliance solely on moral experience, and on separation from science; where I do the opposite, considering that moral experience (i.e. 'natural' experience) is not sufficient in itself, being not a definitive state of life, but a stage towards another goal, a simple 'possibility' of the Christian life.... For philosophy not to be merely a soap-bubble, it must rest on experience - hence the weakness of scholasticism founded on intellectualism. The Church is still looking for an appropriate 'philosophy' and is far from having found it...."

Christian theology, continued Frommel,\(^{(1)}\) must be constructed from the point of view of the Christian religion, and not from that of any philosophy, as it is sometimes hostile, and always foreign, to the Christian idea, even when it appears to be the product of it. Christianity is a life, and this life produces thought as the natural life produces thought; this Christian thought is "theology", and it will receive from Christian life its form and content as does that

\(^{(1)}\) op. cit. p. 507 et sequ.
from natural life. As the Christian life is inaccessible to man outside regeneration, Christian thought, as its issue, offers the same characteristics and is inaccessible to natural thought.

We might question at this point the consistency of Frommel's position with regard to the exercise of the thinking faculty of man. Perhaps, he did not sufficiently distinguish between the mechanics and the material of thinking. His fear of "intellectualism" as a metaphysical viewpoint, with its attendant determinism and constraint, seemed to blind him to the valid exercise of the reasoning faculty. In his letter of 19 Feb. 1889, he wrote: "the intelligence remains identical in its functions, no matter to which object it is applied."

This observation seems to cut across the thesis that Christian thought is in absolute distinction from natural thought, and is inaccessible to it. Is there not a "renewing of the mind", which would imply that the intelligence does not remain truly identical in its functions - unless 'intelligence' is understood to mean the 'reason' alone and not the 'understanding'? Not that it is possible to consider Christianity in an objectively detached manner, nor to envisage it as one of the numerous constitutive facts with the universal cosmic fact. No-one is denied access to theology, but it is evident that the Christian is alone qualified to carry it out.

Bois seemed to Frommel to define philosophy as "l'explication universelle". But there is none the less required a particular point of departure, namely, the person of the philosopher. But, to be universal, thought must rest on an original certainty, which could come only from a subjective experience. Now, the experience which determines the course of the thought, as it does its origin, is infinitely variable - Descartes had said - Je pense, donc je suis; Maine de Biran said: Je veux; a neo-Kantian, Je suis obligé...
It is from being that knowing is derived, the "principium cognoscendi" being equivalent to the "principium essendi". Frommel was to return to this point later, as his fundamental disagreement with Bois was to persist. Witness his letters of March 1903, written to Bois from Frontenex: *(1)* - "What separates us is the "point de départ". Your theology is based on an extra-Christian philosophy, and only becomes Christian by a "coup de force". There is an antinomy or dichotomy between the neo-critical (the abstract) and the Christian life (the concrete) - - .

*(2)*... (with Renouvier and others, Christianity has been approached from outside, from the point of view of a non-Christian psychology. But Christian theology must not start from any other philosophy or theory, because all are vitiated by sin - it must take its rise only from Jesus Christ, and the psychological experience of Christians of the redemption in Christ. There is the 'principium essendi', which is also the 'principium cognoscendi'....)

I am not contradicting myself in placing the universal in the individual, and vice versa. Place yourself in line with Christ, who has manifestly universalised religion in individualising it.... No Protestant theology is truly Christian, if it does not revolve around the axis of sin and salvation. **It is not enough to adopt a non-intellectualist conception to be saved from intellectualism.** I deplore in you that your theology is so little your own, that it seems to follow a system heterogeneous with yourself....*(3)*

You challenge me to say what precedes categories and is dependent of them. I shall simply say this - before existence there is life. Existence and representation are in categories; life, the immediate datum of consciousness and consciousness itself are not. The pheno-

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*(1)* 14 Mar. 1903.
*(2)* 31 Mar. 1903.
*(3)* Apr. 1903.
- it is already a product of the reflective consciousness, of thought, a "représenté". Categories themselves, the creation of the mind, are but approximate symbols of the real; the ground of the real escapes them....

Bois answered under the title: "Théologie et Philosophie". (1)

According to many contemporary thinkers there was no relationship - indeed there is an abyss - between theology and philosophy; so that the person claiming to do both must be involved in a duality (2).

But, according to Bois, there was no such abyss - theology is a philosophical conception of religion, and Christian theology is a Christian philosophy.

Frommel he thought, was wrong to consider his "Leçon" a manifesto, and he is disturbed to find Frommel annoyed at the use of irony. Did Jesus never use it? Did Pascal never smile? Frommel had concluded, from his methodological point of view, that faith determines the divergences between its propositions and those of science, because it knows that an identical method, applied to dissimilar matters must lead to dissimilar results. There is to be opposition between profane and Christian knowledge, reminding us of the story of Pompanace - it was proposed to absolve him as a Christian, but to burn him as a philosopher. In his article, Frommel had drawn a distinction between the orders of creation and redemption, but this is accompanied by a surprising approval of those who desire to give an account and to justify it before the reason (the substance of apologetic). We might share Bois' surprise at what here appears a contradiction (in the matter of the legitimacy of Frommel's apologetic). Bois went on to make clear that, even if both agreed that philosophy is "universal explication", no such system could be found, because of the element referred to, of subjectivity. In fact, if the

(2) See, particularly, "De la certitude chrétienne"; Essai sur la théologie de Frank; Revue théologique de Montauban, Jan. 1888.
subject is Christian, the philosophy will be Christian, and, if not, not. We may question Frommel's argument that because of the dis-
tinction between Christian and extra-Christian philosophies, the
title of "philosopher" as such is not to be applied to the Christian
dogmatician. Again, it is a matter of definition, as to whether the
words 'philosopher' and 'reason' are to be applied "univocally".

The central point of the discussion was in the assertion by
Bois(1) that there is a necessity for a philosophical basis, perhaps
a new one, since "theology is a work of the reason - of the natural
reason. There is none other; There are not two kinds of reason".
Is this not, after all, in line with Frommel's assertion on the
'intelligence', above? Bois felt that he is falsely accused of
confusing philosophy as method with philosophy as discipline, because
he distinguished between religion and theology. He also made clear
that philosophical method rests on a theory of knowledge, in other
words, epistemological considerations are paramount. Far from there
being an "unbridgeable gulf"(2) theology has in common with natural
philosophy its method, and a certain part, even, of its content.

The philosophy least hostile to Christianity is surely that of
the moral consciousness, and Bois felt that Christianity could rest
precisely on that. In the rupture of nature and grace and the
assertion of their separating abyss, there is a forgetting of the
world of morality of which we recognise the rights and sovereignty.
When Christianity proposes itself to us, it affirms that sovereignty,
the absolute primacy of good, while at the same time revealing human
impotence, a natural inclination to evil, worthy of punishment. It
offers forgiveness and reconciliation, and appears as the satisfac-
tion, the easing, and indeed the postulate of the moral consciousness.
Grace comes to raise nature, to purify and sanctify it, it is in

(1) op. cit. p. 108.
(2) Frommel: op. cit. p. 504.
nature that grace acts, through and for nature. It is the natural man whom grace intervenes to save, not by killing him and putting another in his place, but by freeing him from his slavery. We are not to isolate Christianity from the world to safeguard its distinctive character. Bois comes near to saying "gratia perfecit naturam" when he writes (1) "the goal of Christianity is to arrive at a complete fusion of nature and grace".

Frommel, however, always regarded philosophy as resting on the rigorous application of the principle of causality, and therefore as not having the right to admit, without denying itself, the hypothesis of miracle. Bois found this attitude confusing, since the discussion was of the relationship of theology and philosophy, not, as Frommel appeared to be interpreting it, between theology and science. The application of the principle of causality in science is not so applicable in philosophy, which is "morally" obliged, not to reject, but to take into account, the data furnished by the moral consciousness. This, we may allow, is really to respect the criteria laid down as to method by Frommel himself, viz. the submission of the subject to the terms and discipline of his material. Obviously, the question of freedom is also raised, since neither freedom nor determinism can be proved by demonstration - but the moral life, to have reality, develops in the context of the belief in freedom, where science is involved in the deterministic hypothesis.

We may cite other examples of belief in the 'non-discontinuity' and, indeed, the correspondence between Christianity and humanity. This Frommel would not deny, except in the matter of the "discernment" required for recognition of evangelical truth. Astié had said (2) that "the new method, as practised by Vinet, set out from the assumption of a correspondence between Christianity and humanity; one

(1) op. cit. p. 113.
(2) "La Théologie Allemande Contemporaine", p. 247.
learns from Pascal and Vinet that the gospel is the consciousness of the consciousness itself, the consciousness raised to the highest power. The data of Christianity find an immediate echo in the very soul of a man; in the words of Vinet, "all true belief is 'en route' to the Gospel". Similarly, with Neander, in his "Vie de Jésus", there was a pre-established harmony between Christian and moral principles.

Bois noted that Lobstein also was offended by his making natural certainty a base for Christian certainty, and doubted whether Frommel's apologetics could have any general appeal when this total distinction is insisted upon.

Frommel answered in a further work entitled "Théologie et théologie". He opened with these lines: "If all certainty is experimental and thought is but an extension of life, the problem of the relationship, divergence or identity between profane philosophy and Christian philosophy (or theology) is intimately linked with the problem of the Christian life itself. As life, as experience; as experience, as certainty; as certainty, thought - an irresistible logic leads from the one to the other".... Now, the specific character of the Christian life is that of which the new type is in Christ, and of which the origin is the new birth. In Frommel's expression, Christian regeneration holds the same place in theology as does the biological fact in the ensemble of natural sciences.

Frank, the "theologian of Erlangen", had echoed Frommel's view of the new birth as "a creation in the proper sense of the word", and had been likewise criticised by Bois in the latter's "De la certitude chrétienne : Essai Sur la théologie de Frank". According to Bois, such was contradiction in terms, irrational, a form of predestimation; what is, in fact, to prevent God creating an infinite

(1) "Theologische Literaturzeitung", 22 April 1888.
(3) Paris: Fischbacher, 1887.
series of "selves"? The redemptive, experiential and experimental efficacy of the death of Christ would be by-passed by a simple divine fiat.

To be "born again" is to operate on oneself, and to allow God to operate upon one, the profoundest change which can be accomplished without destruction of the personality. It is re-constructed, re-made; but it consents to the re-making, and contributes to its re-construction. It is a change, not a development, a revolution, not an evolution, radical, not superficial. Man is re-orientated....

Against this, Frommel asked, if objection is made to regeneration as a new creation in terms of by-passing Christ's function, what is the function of His death? And does such objection do justice to the Pauline conception of Christ, as the second Adam, bringing to birth a new humanity? Does it go beyond the purely moral element in religious experience, and do justice to the deepest, "ontological" nature of the Christian life? Frommel felt that Bois treated his moral postulates in isolation from life, and, imprisoning ideas in a dilemma, cries; Tertium non datur, - the great weakness of intellectualism. It is not in metaphysics, but with the biological and embryological sciences, that regeneration has its analogy - Jesus used the image of the grain of wheat sown, dying and then bringing forth life and fruit. There is no place in the Gospel for any theory of amelioration, only for the non-metaphorical terms of new life and re-birth.

In a further article(1) Frommel maintained his central thesis. He was afraid of any equation between nature and grace. There was not, despite his critic, any strangeness in speaking of "justifying faith before the reason"; it is only strange if we erroneously identify reason with philosophy; i.e. philosophy as method with

(1) Revue de théol. et de philos, Lausanne, 1890.
philosophy as discipline. Nor is there established some ontological duality between natural and specifically Christian certainty; Paul's self-analysis in Rom. 7 makes clear that the Christian life is a struggle. It is legitimate to say, with Bois, that, "by right, the philosophy of everyone should be Christian" - because everyone should be Christian!(1) But this "right" is not a "fact", and there is enough natural internal logic in life for the formation of at least a philosophical representation, taking account of the moral consciousness, but not going beyond amelioration as a goal. Frommel found two things paradoxical in his critics - that he was depreciating the moral elements leading to conversion; he was rather stressing the divergence between the natural and Christian consciousness in the matter of sin and regeneration; or that he was in opposition to the apologetic of a Pascal or a Vinet - these were his masters!

The purpose of apologetic, in the matter of the relation between theology and philosophy, is, first, to predispose souls in favour of the Gospel, presenting it as the satisfaction of their deepest needs; and, second, to defend the Gospel against the attacks of incredulous science and profane philosophy. One may be more popular and fruitful, the other more scientific and less likely to make proselytes; but we need not hesitate to say to the sceptic; you speak of Christianity as a blind man of the light....

In concluding the debate, Frommel conceded the legitimacy of Bois' anthropocentric point of departure, in which philosophy escapes from the implacable laws of logic and the necessary bondage of causality. Philosophy is the attempt to explain the universe in terms of natural humanity, and it is to be agreed that it is only where philosophy is confused with science that the deterministic pre-suppositions of the latter are applied to the former. Where philosophy imports hetero-

(1) op. cit. p. 103.
geneous elements, of revelation or revealed doctrine, it ceased to be subjectively controllable by all men; and, although the philosopher may not use his freedom to become Christian, nature may be thought to testify to the need it has of grace. Although moral life "tends" to Christian life, an abyss exists between moral man and the child of God; to deny the principle of regeneration is the corollary of the identification of theology and philosophy.

That the question of the relation of theology and philosophy was a live one in the French Protestant tradition of the time is witnessed to by the general focus of interest in its literature, in which the primary themes were those of the nature of Christian experience, of the spiritual life and of sin and salvation, of the nature of evil and its origin, and the question of the "supernatural". One echo of the Frommel-Bois discussion may be mentioned; the theme is so similar to that of Frommel that it need not be given in extenso. It was the inaugural lecture read at Lausanne University by Louis Emery, on 30 Oct., 1890, under the title "Religion et Philosophie". (1)

All his life, Frommel resisted the encroachments of intellectualism in Christian theology (by which, of course, he meant, as we have seen, the intellectualising of that which is spiritually discerned, and the application of scientific norms - in distinction from the application of the scientific method - in the adumbration of a Christian philosophy). His relationship with Bois remained one of friendship and of theological dialectic, which these final excerpts from letters of 1897 and 1903 make clear:

"Thank you for your articles on Sabatier. Not only am I persuaded that he was wrong, but that he could be overcome only in a psychological and philosophical field similar to the one you defend."

"... there is still a difference (between us) - not just our

(1) Revue de Théol. et de Philos; Lausanne, 1890, pp. 533 - 556.
theory of religious knowledge... but the *dynamic* view of God which I strongly accentuate, and which you seem to take more lightly.

"What separates us, despite great agreement... is the 'point de départ'..."

(Following the exchange of articles and letters,) ..."when will it come to an end? ...Perhaps I should simply state my main positions finally, and put a 'punctum finale'".

**Post-Frommelian Discussion and Assessement**

**Theology and Science** - The general thesis of Frommel may be accepted - it was not, after all, original - viz. that the subject-matter of theology cannot be treated along the lines of the distinc-tively scientific approach to reality. Scientific *method* is accep-table in the terms delineated above, where it is the use and deploy-ment of the reason which is alone involved. By this we mean, not some autonomous reason, but the intelligence shaping the subject-matter of experience. Knowledge of God is incommensurable with the knowledge of natural phenomena. As with scientific knowledge, theo-logical knowledge has the character of the experimental, but, in religion, laws are not deduced "a priori", but are verifiable in terms only of the experiential. Their certitude is given through dynamic verification, not by the necessary constraint of causality and logically determined conclusions.

Protestant theology has been chary of calling itself a 'science', but Frommel felt justified in not denying it that title. Theologi-cal ("sacred") science is such only in a mystical continuity with the word of God - it is "doctrina sancta", its epistemological status being constituted in the enablement by faith of our participation in God's knowledge of Himself. As science does not involve the knowl-edge of the 'thing-in-itself', neither does theological science
claim knowledge of being-in-itself, (the pretension of an absurd phenomenalism) nor of God-in-Himself (the pretension of a non-mediated mysticism). As science does not mistake the "noumenon" for the "phenomenon", theology, as scientific, (i.e. in terms of method) does not confuse "God-as-He-is" with "God-as-He-is-for-us".

A modern Thomist writer has distinguished within the unity of theology the "revelation itself" (the object of faith) from the "virtual revelation" (the proper object of theological science.) There is "not only a datum, but a psychological and religious continuity wherein the light of faith constitutes the indispensable milieu for the knowledge of what has been revealed". The expression "Christian philosophy" is controversial, for the adjective tends to swallow the noun, but what is meant is the permeation of all philosophical reflection by faith; reason preserves its autonomy, but is illumined by the light of faith. "Belief is an intensely personal act which, though a work of intelligence and not of some vague sentimental experience, is in a difference category from any objective acceptance of a mathematical theorem... The spiritual role of theology is the "intellectus fidei". As to method, Chenu agreed with Frommel that it is in prayer and adoration that theology, the understanding of the word of God, is born and lives. "A theology which could be true without being devout would be a sort of monster".

We might feel that the 19th century gave an inflated importance to Apologetics, often at the price of weakening theology itself, whose primary task is really the explication of the faith-experience which forms the material of theology. "Theology seeks the knowledge of its conclusions only that it may better understand its own first

(2) op. cit. p. 33.
(3) op. cit. p. 41.
principles". A theologian is one who, when he has heard the word, is possessed by it, so that it becomes his own thinking; he is the "new man", and, by engendering theology, faith finds the true logic of its perfection. Theology is not something outside of faith — it is truth produced within the human mind by the incarnation of that faith.

The position of Bois in the Frommel exchange sometimes appeared surprisingly similar to the Thomist position and to reflect the spirit of the dictum "Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perfectit", which involved the establishment of the competence of faith, trusting in reason, to construct a theology wherein the distinction between nature and grace will not disturb the religious homogeneity of our knowledge. The methodology of theology is constituted in its relationship to the Divine word, as the methodology of science is constituted in its material and structural analysis; and, "because God speaks in human language, theology is conjoined to the theandric mystery of the word of God". (1)

The hinge of this area of discussion was, clearly, the meaning given to the word "science". There remains the inescapable imprisonment of the apologist in circularity of argument — unless he agrees to some form of continuity, indeed homogeneity, of language and concept, as between theology and philosophy; there is not, we may allow, a Christian logic nor a Christian metaphysic, but, with the renewal of the mind of the Christian man who becomes a Christian philosopher, there is discernment and certainty in the matter of the "datum" or Christian experience, a discernment which, even with the application of the scientific method to the processes of philosophical reasoning, is not otherwise attainable. Although, as Frommel agreed, in his review of Naville's "La philosophie et la religion", philosophy

(1) op. cit. p. 119.
escapes the implacable laws of logic and the slavery of contingency and causality by its awareness of moral consciousness and freedom, yet, by its anthropocentricity and its "point de départ", it finds itself, as expressing an extension of the scientific method of understanding the world, facing, across a gulf unbridgeable by the intelligence, the "data" of the new creation in Christ, for ever incomprehensible to sense and reason.

The correct use of the word, in Frommel's view, was as suggested by a letter to his brother (1) ..."Theology has really remained insufficiently scientific, not taking stock of the experiences in religious psychology for 18 centuries. The experiences are not "discussable"; but their observation, classification and analysis, their treatment as natural phenomena are treated, should be a fruitful work, taking theology out of the region of pure speculation..."

Theology and Philosophy Frommel's analysis of their relationship was in terms of his epistemology of religious knowledge. He tended to present them as water-tight disciplines, related only in terms of their discontinuity; and their necessary opposition was defined and constituted by reference to natural understanding and spiritual discernment. He did, indeed, allow that philosophy has a greater affinity with theology than has science, because it places itself in the area of man's consciousness. We might feel, however, that total opposition is an abstraction. Is there such a being as a theologian devoid of all philosophy, or a philosopher devoid of all theology? Opposition would be conceivable, and indeed necessary, only if such were seen to exist. Only if theology is defined in terms of non-communicable, esoteric revelatory statements, and philosophy in terms of a purely subjective, metaphysical construction bound by its own created categories of understanding to which theo-

(1) Frontenex: 5 Dec. 1898.
logical truth is inaccessible, could there be such total discontinuity.

Even where the Frommelian discontinuity is accepted, faithful as it is intended to be to the Evangelical witness, the word "association", rather than "opposition" should be employed. The problems which characterise the research and thought of theologian and philosopher are the same in themselves, but are presented in the inverse order. They are united in a common humanity, and a 'pure' theology is as much an abstraction as a 'pure' philosophy; where theological explication moves from the Creator to the creature, from the higher to the lower, philosophical explication moves from the phenomenal, hoping to attain the noumenal, from existence to Being, from reason to ultimate principle; where theology concerns itself with questions of the relationship of the Creator and creature, with man's deliverance and reconciliation, sin, freedom, etc., philosophy shows concern with the idea, the phenomenon, contingency, causality, the thing-in-itself, essence, existence, etc.

Are these concerns distinct or similar? The matter of vocabulary is not a light one, and conflict of faculties may come to be seen as conflict of words. We are there reminded of an observation of Chenu,(1) "Words are the raw material of the theologian. One might say that the theologian is a philologist from the moment he seeks to understand and elaborate his belief". How true this is of words in the theological-philosophical confrontation such as reason, knowledge, truth and being!

If there is not a "Christian logic", is there a "Christian philosophy"? Or does the adjective, as one has said, swallow the noun? We would rather frame the question differently, to avoid the abstraction of total opposition (which is another thing than ontological

(1) op. cit. p. 54.
discontinuity) - "Can there be a Christian philosopher?" Yes, in the sense that, while the truth of Christian experience, and the new life of which it is the concomitant agent, is 'spiritually discerned', the subject, qua theologian, must describe and analyse the experience in terms of the forms of thought and language, and of the mechanics of philological and semantic norms, current in profane philosophical expression.

Referring to the history of philosophy 'post Christum natum', Karl Barth writes (1) "Could not one well ask: "Is any philosophy untouched by theological reflection and language? Can there exist a philosophy which is not Christian in even a feeble sense of the term? Is not such philosophy "crypto-theological"?" (2) The theologian finds it strange that the philosopher, in the 'post Christum natum' situation can still seek truth in the ways of men, to see if they lead to God, from the creature to the Creator; and the philosopher, engaging perhaps in "natural theology", resents the intrusion into theological reflection of what are claimed as data and criteria not "discernible" to him as philosopher. In the view of Bois and others, Christian philosophy is in danger of being subsumed under general philosophical explication, and against this Frommel's protest is justified - discontinuity is constituted in the need of regeneration. Barth, however, suggested an association of the disciplines of theology and philosophy in their co-humanity, wherein the philosopher has responsibility to find place in his thought for the psychology and ontology of religion, and the notions of faith and revelation, and the theologian may admire the penetration of the autocomprehension of the creature, "this priest administering the mystery of the elevation of


(2) op. cit. p. 22.
man", and be reminded to have regard for true man, as he has given prime place to the true God...(1) The theologian should be grateful for the existence of the philosopher - or, more accurately, that he, as theologian, philosophises; for he employs philosophical language to offer an Apologetic and a communicable explication of the life-experience which is the "datum" (in Frommel's phrase, "la donnée") of theology as such. The movement must always be from above to below; we may feel that much theology has been vitiated by its acceptance of the inverse, wherein the exponent has "become a crypto-philosopher, and, in consequence, a pseudo-theologian".

In the post-Frommelian era, there has been a continuing concern with the question of the relationship of theology and philosophy, expressed primarily as an analysis of the nature and function of reason. As expressed by Pierre Thévenaz, (2) "modern radicalism in philosophy hinders a settlement of the question of the nature of reason, its essence and basis, but awakes in reason a consciousness of itself. Echoing Pascal, its proper goal and principle are hid in an impenetrable secret, but it knows that it can perceive some appearance "du milieu des choses".

Discontinuity, but not dissociation, follows what might be called the "expérience-choc" of Christian experience. There is in this a contesting of our life and traditional thinking, and, as with Maine de Biran, Malan and Frommel, the experience must become the 'point de départ' of a new metaphysic, in which the reason has to render justice to the experience. Philosophy was born the day when reason began to contest itself". (3) Abdication of the reason,

(1) op. cit. pp. 36 & 38.
(2) "La Condition de la Raison Philosophique"; Etre et Penser; Cahiers de Philosophie - Editions de la Baconnière, Neuchatel: 1960.
(3) op. cit. p. 31
leading to scepticism, is not required, such logic being destructive, "where a void tends to appear around the reason, the void of the possible, the presence of an absence of reason, the presence of a radically other than reason. Reason seems to reach an impasse. But the "sacrificium intellectus" is a phantom, the sacrifice of an effigy; so that where one seriously speaks of it, the "intellectus" is already absent. Reason can no more commit harakiri than prove its own foolishness... The consciousness of the impasse is not an impasse of consciousness, but rather a beginning... We may speak of the "autism" of reason; it is the kind of "animal" life referred to by Maine de Biran. The "expérience-choc" (described by the more traditional term of re-birth or regeneration by Frommel) is "like the sudden revelation an irreducible, unassimilable "other", and the broken autism allows reason to take consciousness of itself". (1)

Man thus becomes a being taking consciousness of himself, but not in the context of a false dichotomy between the rational and the irrational. The theologian must recognise himself as a pilgrim, a "viator". It is a movement, as between polarisations, from the position of "La raison, c'est l'homme" to "La foi, c'est l'homme", from the position of initiative to that of response. The temptations of the reason are neutrality and absolutisation, but a disabsolutised reason is unlimited in its function. It is not a Pascalian disavowal of the reason, nor a Frommelian inaccessibility, but rather an appeal to the reason which is at the same time an appeal to it to go beyond itself. (2) This calls to mind the similar insight of the French mystic, Simone Weil - "the highest function of the intelligence is to comprehend that that which it does not comprehend is more real than what it does comprehend".

Frommel's position in the matter of the relation of theology and

(1) 'L'expérience chrétienne et les tentations de la raison philosophique': op. cit. ch. 2, and pp. 17,31,46 and 51.
(2) op. cit. p. 142.
philosophy may be seen in terms of a certain historical dialectic. The thesis was the traditional Catholic view of the relation of nature and grace, the perfecting function of the latter on the former, without total or radical discontinuity; to which he opposed an antithesis of apparent total discontinuity, and the inaccessibility of Christian thought-experience to the natural reason. The movement of thought since then has been to seek escape from this dilemma, into a synthesis in terms of the dis-absolutising of the two poles which are to be seen to be neither wholly irreconcilable nor mutually exclusive.

This, we feel, is an important area to which Frommel's thought has led us, namely, the conception, to which the movement and development of his insights would have surely led him, of conversion, the experience of the Divine regenerative act, as metanoetic, rather than metaphysical. Coupled with his constitution of Protestantism as a theological "method",(1) his theology of experience would have become a theology of discernment, finding its "point d'appui", with greater structural consistency than he attained, in the implications of the Pauline phrase - the renewing of the mind, where there is not implied intellectual suicide, but reform of the understanding in which the believer finds himself, as "viator", in Thévenaz' phrase "en route de soi à soi".(2)

The final sentence of Thévenaz' work read: "only a disabsolutised reason, conscious of its condition, is autonomous in relation to God. Christian experience renders finally possible the autonomy of philosophy". One aspect of the issue of agnosticism is thus resolved - it is not, as such, a necessary concomitant or result of the disabsolutisation of the reason. Both rational demonstration and agnostic suspension may be seen to belong to the exercise of what is regarded as the absolute reason, i.e. in the sense of the natural, autonomous

(1) Letter to Bois: Apr. 1903.
(2) op. cit. p. 125.
intellectual faculty so distrusted by Frommel.

The same question is studied, with particular emphasis on the phenomenological aspect, by André Marc. His last work, before his death in 1961, was "Raison et conversion chrétienne". Marc's interest, writing from the Catholic theologian's point of view, was the implication of this analysis of reason, in particular as outlined in Thévenaz' "L'homme et sa raison". His preoccupying question was the relation between a philosophy of concrete being in authentic Thomism and the philosophies of reflective analysis and phenomenological method. By a "philosophy of reflective analysis" we understand him to mean the type of approach exemplified by Frommel, the psychological analysis and description of religious experience arrived at by induction, and expressed without necessary dependence on "a priori" rational or metaphysical concepts. Marc sought a synthesis of the attention to the self in reflective analysis with the intentionality of the consciousness to the world in phenomenology. A philosophy deprived of the absolute (disabsolutised,) finds its authentic meaning in a Thomist ontology, for Thomas, according to this writer, proceeded analogously to Thévenaz, but did not stop half-way. Being is "presence with God and the other"; conversion, involving disabsolutisation of the reason, implies movement to the beyond, intentionality of consciousness to ultimate Being, to Christ.

Taking up Gilson's word that "la foi est génératrice de raison", Marc maintained that, without denying the impossibility of reconciling the Christian God with the 'God of the philosophers', philosophy yet offers a foundation, not of faith, but of the possibility of faith. A philosophy of the human condition, placed under the "choc" of Christian experience, is constrained to acknowledge the existence of sin and the possibility of redemption. Ontological discontinuity

of nature and grace is thus again discounted in favour of metanoetic, rather than metaphysical, conversion.

As another writer concerned in this area of debate we cite, briefly, Wilhelm Kamlah, born in the year before the death of Frommel. Representing a strong teutonic strain in theology, we find a different emphasis - less preoccupation with scientific processes than with their human value, less with the world and nature than with man as a moral being, less, according to J.-Claude Piguet,\(^1\) with epistemological theory than with "pedagogy". A key concept with Kamlah is the "profane". Dedicating his first work to Augustine and his "Civitas Dei", he thought at this stage that a Christian philosophy was possible; then he came to regard the city as a profane, secular expression of the eschatological vision. Only a world which has been Christian can be, so much as is the world to-day, 'deprived' of God. This chimes in with the assertion above that no philosophy 'post christum natum' can remain untouched by Christian influence.

The traditional choice has been between a "religious philosophy", i.e. one structured by a religious dimension, and Kamlah's thesis that philosophy does not have in it, ontologically, the religious dimension because it has lost it to become 'profane'. The philosopher remains at the centre, refusing both a philosophy which excludes theology and a theology which excludes philosophy. This position appears closer to that of Bois than that of Frommel, who would still insist on radical discontinuity.

In assessing Frommel's analysis of the nature of religious knowledge, we would refer to his own self-imposed standard, as found in his letter to Bois\(^2\) where he discussed their divergent approaches - "It is not enough to adopt a non-intellectualist conception to be saved from intellectualism nor vice-versa..." Fifteen years earlier,

\(^1\) Revue de théologie et de philosophie, Lausanne, 1961.
\(^2\) Avenches: 11 Apr. 1903.
he had similarly expressed himself(1)- "Your mind works more in terms of logic; mine by inner, mystical evidence". Frommel's problem was, therefore, as one endowed himself with high gifts of intellect, to constitute the true nature of religious knowledge in terms which should be intellectually defensible yet not depending on the intellect for their ground or validity. In other words, such "knowledge" must be conceived in dynamic, living terms grounded in experience, rather than in static terms grounded in the categories of the "a priori" and the necessary.

This was the key to the methodology of his Dogmatic and Apologetic work. In his analysis of man(2) he adopted a classification which we have regarded as not altogether satisfactory. His classification was misleading insofar as there was no real regard taken for nuances of meaning and overlapping of supposedly compartmentalised analyses of the experience of a living subject; and it is incomplete, as noted by such writers as Ph. Daulte. We may, therefore, reproach Frommel in terms of his own prescription - that, striving to be non-intellectualist, he has yet fallen prey to an intellectualism in his analysis of the reason. He made of the reasoning faculty a somewhat deterministic response to bare necessity, demonstrably or syllogistically valid. To this extent, there was a misrepresentation of the Cartesian and Kantian positions. For example, we take the following quotation from Descartes in his "Second metaphysical meditation", "What, then, am I? A being who thinks... that is, a being who doubts, who understands, who conceives, who affirms, who denies, who wills, who does not will, who imagines, and who feels."

Thus, one cannot deny the presence, alongside of the intellectualist, determinist strain in Descartes, of another, voluntarist and free. Frommel is not in such opposition to Descartes as he suggests when,

(1) 29 Mar. 1888.
(2) La Vér. Hum., vol. I.
he constitutes, in doubt, "an element of will". (1) The voluntarist element in Kant is also well known, but is rather overlaid in Frommel's strictures on the "a priori", the theoretical, and the conception of category. The legitimate place of "feeling" seems to be omitted in his analysis, almost as if it had been subsumed under the heading of "sensationism". But it had already appeared in Spinoza, Rousseau and, supremely, in Schleiermacher, who placed the "feeling of absolute dependence" at the centre of psychological consciousness. To experience feelings is distinct from 'having sensations'. One agrees with Daulte when he writes,(2) "it is to be regretted that Frommel neglected to make an analysis of the doctrine which one could term "le sentimentalisme"."

While one approves Frommel's attack on pure intellectualism as a sole basis of anthropological analysis, it must be acknowledged that he does not appear to distinguish between the understanding ("intellectus") and the reason ("ratio"), treating them as if identical. He regards reason as being the theoretic reason, whose mode is dialectic, involving the necessary link between cause and effect, and the acceptance of rational principles as being those of identity and causality. Indeed he categorically asserted (3) that "the principle of causality is the very essence of thought". Reason is thus able only to co-ordinate, in a logical and necessary order, ideas which derive from experience, and which appear "a priori". The idea of cause is not innate, nor is it from empirical observation; it comes, according to Maine de Biran's thesis, developed by Frommel, from an inner, generating power. We are in the presence, not simply of pure, but of moral, will, in submission to an absolute obligation. A dilemma is, however, thereby created - that the same principle of obligation produces, apparently, freedom of will and determinism of

(2) op. cit. p. 60.
(3) op. cit. p. 277.
thought; that is, that either thought proceeds from the will and is therefore not essentially hostile to freedom and to moral and religious values, or it is under absolute necessity, not directed by the will, and therefore deterministic in terms of 'a priori' categories.

In his historical theological situation, Frommel's theory of knowledge had value in its constitution of a distinct religious knowledge as well as scientific knowledge and philosophical belief. The Kantian denial of a 'science' of faith was accounted for by his failure to appreciate the cognitive element in spiritual experience. Out of sympathy with contemporary thought-movements in which "science" implied philosophical or psychological agnosticism, Frommel was less of an innovator than he thought, in trying to by-pass Kantian and neo-Kantian epistemology. The movement was also present in which there was a search for a less arbitrary and a more direct path to knowledge of God.

Frommel's purpose, and, indeed, claim, was to offer a descriptive analysis and interpretation of religious experience and of the phenomenon of the obligation of conscience. This, if successful, would carry with it its own epistemology, free of intellectual apriorism. Consciousness of a supernatural action exercised upon the will would be given without intermediate representation, without the presence of any faculty of sense or intellect. But this pure, or bare, state is illusory, because the feeling of obligation — regarded by Frommel as modally identifiable with religious experience — is contained in an idea or representation. However immediate the divine action, it reaches the consciousness only through mental forms and the categories of the understanding. Pure intuition is as chimerical a concept as Renouvier's quasi-mathematical concept of the infinite; it is an ideal limit to which approach is made asymptotically, not having
in itself psychological substance or reality.

As remarked elsewhere, we know that Frommel, although seeming to gloss over the necessity of intermediate representations, acknowledged that the object of religious experience is not itself given in immediacy; what is immediate is the feeling, not the object itself. We do not experience God Himself, but God as He is for us; we experience the result of His action. While the idea of an object does not necessarily imply its existence, psychological considerations would allow the reasonable inference that there is something in the ultimate nature of things analogous to the good will, so that this good will be not a purely human chimera. Such an induction is not imposed by necessity or by axiom, but in freedom. What appears obligatory is not a metaphysical conclusion but a respect for a holy will which makes contact with ours to purify and sustain it. Before the adherence of the intelligence there is the submission of the will. Rational consideration does not produce a living faith—it follows it. Thus, as above, the question of the nature of religious knowledge must be conceived in dynamic, rather than in static, terms—or, as it might be expressed, religious knowledge implies the "personal equation". It is "subjective" in the best sense of the word, having as its organ the heart, in the Pascalian usage, not the cold, impersonal reason. In the words of Ph. Daulte, (1) "Christians affirm that perfect truth exists, that it took flesh in the course of history being incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ who remains...the eternal entering-point into life and, thus, into religious knowledge".

In terms of the structure of the word of God, from which we must be careful not to alienate ourselves by fixing our exclusive attention on the psychological phenomena, dogma provokes religious

(1) op. cit. p. 190.
experience and gives it consistency. Conscious of the dangers of orthodox formalism and of irrationality, we must link religious experience, by a bond of causality, to that which is presented to us in the concreteness of history and defined by precise doctrine. We reiterate here the main conclusion of the Dogmatic analysis, that there is no true or valid Christian experience outside the hearing of the efficacious Word of God. Christian experience is not that of the irrational, but it is the condition of the renewal of the intelligence, and is, in turn, illumined by it. There is not a "sacrificium intellectus", but a "renewal" of the mind.

As noted, Frommel did not allow for the classical distinction between "intellectus" and "ratio", the former being the faculty of a more than purely discursive understanding, an understanding which results from the illumination of the soul by grace; it is, so to speak, the "religious faculty of thought", capable of knowing the "intellectabilia". This was the view of G. Widmer in his Inaugural Lesson as Professor (extraordinary) of Systematic Theology at the Autonomous Faculty of Protestant Theology of the University of Geneva, on 1 Dec. 1961. (1)

"The 'intellectus' is the religious faculty of thought, capable of knowing the 'intellectabilia', i.e. the Divinity always one and identical beyond all way of sense-approach, as the 'ratio' is equipped for knowledge of the 'intelligabilia', i.e. created things accessible by the 'similitude' of sense. What is the function of the intellectus? For Judaism it is knowledge of the law; for Christians, knowledge of the work of Christ and of the redemptive plan of God." (2) The "apprehension of faith" produces a properly theological knowledge, and signifies an effort of apprehension of the divine mysteries revealed in Christ ("l'intelligence des objects de

(2) op. cit. p. 130/1.
la foi, des dogmes") with an illumination of thought by faith ("l'intelligence que donne la foi."). The history of "intellectus fidei" through the Greek fathers, Augustinianism, authentic Thomism and the Reformers confirms this analysis, in which there must not be any basic sundering of reason and faith on the ground of distrust of the renewing power of the Holy Spirit. There is to be "alliance", as there was of God and man in Christ and the Incarnation - faith and the use of reason yielding to the "gnosis" of which Paul and John speak". (1) This "gnosis", of course, must not be understood in intellectualist terms - its noetic validity is in the mode of "comprehension", i.e. pistic knowledge, deriving from the renewing of the mind.

Further to quote Widmer - "Christian experience closed to "l'intelligence de la foi" reverts to a vague religious sentimentality; the other way round leads to fantasy or to 'natural' theology." "The ways by which God makes Himself present to the world (transcendence descendante), and by which man travels in illumined inspiration to the City of God (transcendence ascendante), reveal the articulations and the living unity of theoretical dialectic and of salvation... One cannot devote oneself to theology without consenting to Christian experience and without giving one's assent to "l'intelligence de la foi". (2)

A major emphasis in Frommel's epistemology was his insistence on the incompetence of science and philosophy in the field of Christian knowledge. As "natural" disciplines, they lack the factor of "discernment", which is inaccessible outside of the regeneration of the subject. His concern was, therefore, to separate Christian truth from that which is regarded as universal explication by the metaphysician. As noted in his methodological analysis of the terms of

(1) op. cit. p. 133.
(2) op. cit. p. 133 and 134.
Dogmatic and Apologetic formulation, he regarded the validity of these in terms of a deductive/inductive conflict. This, however, is, partly, unreal and therefore misleading, stemming from his basic conception of philosophy as being constituted in deduction from a priori principles. In the scientific method, there is, after all, employment of both deduction and induction, these being necessary to the formulation of hypotheses. Further, freedom in metaphysics was denied by Frommel on the ground that the categories (borrowed from science) of necessity and causality preclude it; and, with insufficient justification, he transferred this disability to philosophy in general, regarding it as simply a construction of the human reason, itself disabled, as above, in the matter of discernment. But he allowed, as we noted above, to philosophy a superiority over science insofar as, unlike the latter, it took, as its "point de départ", the moral consciousness of the subject.

A further point of danger lay in the area of particular concern to Frommel and others of that French-Swiss Protestant tradition, viz. the nature and psychology of religious experience. The danger was that of seeking to build - either Apologetically or Dogmatically - on "bare" religious experience. The theologian's attention will tend to be addressed to states of consciousness rather than to the structure of the revealed. A modern writer thus expresses the weakness - "When Frommel defines Dogmatics as 'the systematic and scientific expression of Christian experience, of its conditions, laws and knowledge of its objects' (1) we feel that to him also the post-Kantian fear of the thing-in-itself bars the access of true Dogmatics" (2). A more satisfactory view had already been offered by Frommel himself in the same vol. of his Dogmatics, (3) where he had written; "Christian

(3) op. cit. p. 152.
Dogmatics do not deal with general religious knowledge, that is, with the relations between God and man as moral wills in general, but with the moral relationship between God and man as this is constituted in the Gospel." This difference of emphasis is real and important. Theology must be kept in such a relation to philosophy that the "discontinuity" must be understood, not in purely ontological terms, but, rather in terms of renewal, involving, it could be said, a re-structuring of the mind in terms of the regenerative experience. The matter of the preservation - or continuity - of the subject's personal identity across the gap between nature and grace will take into account intellectual, as well as moral, renewal.

The danger inherent in the psychological expression of the subject's religious experience is that of the derogation of philosophy on the ground of the inaccessibility to it of the new life in Christ, only to make it re-appear as the methodological discipline required by man, qua rational being, in the explication and transmission of that experience. The antinomy seems to be stated in false terms, because man, under grace, yet remains, though as renewed, a rational, thinking being.

It could hardly be said that even the most evangelical theologian is not deploying the gifts of intellect in his work, be it apologetic or dogmatic. One could agree with Frommel in his strictures on "intellectualism" without denying value to the intellect, as renewed, in any Christian anthropology; but the warning must remain, against regarding dogmatics as a rationally-structured development from a number of postulates - it is a manner of understanding the experience of revelation itself. While there is a re-structuring, so to speak, of the mind, there is not a definite end-product, a "Christian philosophy", regarded as a metaphysical or ontological structure. This
conception would involve the errors of gnosticism and/or mysticism; as above, the Christian must remember his status as "viator". Where this is forgotten, the temptation to "philosophise" seems inescapable, and the temptation is not overcome (indeed, in a manner, is yielded to) by making 'revelation' the point de départ; taking the Christian revelation as a "datum" (Frommel's "la donnée") would still result in a philosophical exercise, faith being constituted, as in Kantianism, as a mode of intuition (an "Einfühlung"). Likewise, with Schleiermacher and Sabatier, there was acknowledgment of the uniqueness of revelation, but this was absorbed and interpreted in philosophical terms. As Mehl reminds us, (1) "Any knowledge requires a permanent adjustment of the cognising subject to the object of his cognition... but faith is not the "mode of knowledge" specially adapted to God, as reason is the faculty adapted to mathematical knowledge. God does not become for faith a determined and definite object, requiring a certain kind of cognitive adaptation in order to be known... The objects, (e.g. Bible, history, personal experience) at the same time as revealing, also conceal... God's attributes remain equivocal, not univocal. The knowledge of God is accounted for by a miraculous initiative on His part, triumphing in us over the obstacles erected by our endeavour at knowledge. He must be grasped in the midst of a reality which denies and contradicts Him. Natural knowledge presumes conformity to the nature of the datum; there cannot be any natural knowledge of God - He is both the object and the subject of our knowledge, since He produces it and gives it form". This bears crucially on the matter of the epistemological status of faith and the relationship between theology and philosophy. Faith, as the comprehending of revelation, is as miraculous as revelation itself. It is not some new mode of knowledge, and if we

(1) op. cit. p. 129.
thought that our knowledge of revelation was knowledge of a scientific kind, we should be destroying revelation in the name of theology.

Frommel gave the appearance of employing the word "knowledge" univocally across the gulf of discontinuity between nature and grace (revelation). This tends to vitiate his epistemological theory insofar as the word may not be so applied. The situation is unique—as, of course, Frommel had distinctively said—in that there is, from the point of view of the reason, discontinuity between cognitive discovery and revelation, but this should lead to the assertion that Dogmatics have ineffable mystery as their objects, rather than to their constitution as a phenomenological structure of objective truth.

Acknowledging that Frommel's work was unfinished, criticism must take account of that fact. It is much to be regretted that his untimely death overtook his intention to complete his theological writing and lecturing with a study of pneumatology—the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, in respect of intra-trinitarian relationship and the life of the individual and the Church. But the element, of the lack of which one is particularly aware in his work, even as unfinished, is that of eschatological tension. Theology, and more particularly dogmatics, is the activity of a Church, which lives in this state of tension, having equivocal existence and reality as in, yet not of, the present age. The serious risk to which the "theology of experience" exposes itself is that of not taking account of this eschatological tension. It thus tends to obscure the difference of implication as between Christian philosophy and the thinking of the Christian philosopher—the latter must be eschatologically conditioned, involving dialectical tension, and is a condition of the mind as "renewed" (Ephes, 4.23), where the former may be a system of ideas,
thinking to save itself from the charge of naturalism by using the 'datum' of revelation as its point de départ. While knowledge requires the adjustment of the cognising subject to the object of cognition, faith, as above, is not a "mode of knowledge", and the supreme paradox of Christian experience is that the new life is "hid with Christ in God", such that, epistemologically as ontologically, that life is not an empirically detectable anthropological reality; and that, instead of claiming that we know, we confess that we are known. The Christian philosopher, as theologian and viator, must not confuse 'confession of faith' with a "theologia gloriae"; he may speak only in terms of an eschatological perspective wherein reason (vis-à-vis truth) and time (vis-à-vis eternity) have been deprived of their autonomy.

In this analysis of the nature of Christian thinking, the Frommelian discontinuity between the 'old man' and the 'new man in Christ' is not in question. What would be in question would be any proposal to regard the word "knowledge" as univocally used on both sides of the regenerative experience, while constituting its object and structure as radically different. The attempt, if such be made, to establish a relationship, even if negatively in terms of discontinuity, across the gulf would be a contradiction in terms, since "relationship" presumes a common measure of some kind. Total severance of theology and philosophy is not the necessary result, however, of logical, rather than empirical, discontinuity. The Christian philosopher, in his condition of eschatological tension, is not delivered from risk of error (his is not a theologia gloriae) because he is not simply deducing, with what Frommel calls, in his analysis of intellectualism, the constraint of metaphysical necessity, a philosophical explication of the datum of the revelatory experience.
The matter was well summed up in the title of Kant's work quoted in chapter on Apologetics - "The failure of all philosophical attempts at a theodicy"; where he wrote that "where a transcendent subject is involved, a theoretic-objective knowledge is impossible of attainment, and a seeking, groping humanity stands before an insoluble riddle".

Emil Brunner expresses the essentially eschatological field of reference when he writes: "In the place where philosophy has a theodicy, the Bible places eschatology; that is, while speculative philosophy claims to master the contradictions of the world in thought, the Bible regards them as such as can be removed only by the divine act of redemption".

One feels that, had he lived to complete and develop his work, Frommel would have found the resolution of the problem of discontinuity in the matter of the nature of the knowledge vouchsafed in the experience of regeneration and renewal in this distinctive area of eschatological tension in which faith would be constituted as including its own "rationale". For him, faith was not an "irrational" activity, but was rather constituted in the experience of the bridging of the unbridgeable. We might even assert that he would have approved the language of a later existentialist theology which has spoken in terms of faith going beyond intellectual acceptance, beyond even traditional concepts of personal encounter, such as to affirm itself in the sphere of Being-itself, as a state of being grasped by the power of Being-itself. This is not claiming knowledge of God as He is in Himself, but as He is for us, i.e. in the eschatological tension between "being known of Him" and "knowing Him", between a confession of faith by "viatores" and a "theologica gloriae".

That the central idea of Frommel's theory of knowledge - that
there is a distinctive religious knowledge, as there is scientific knowledge and philosophical belief — was correct was the view of Daulte, to whose thesis reference is made elsewhere. He felt that Frommel was actually not so much an innovator as he thought, since it seemed clear that the 19th Century had had, as a central purpose in theology, the by-passing of Kant, with a view to establishing a more direct and sure path to God than that of postulates or of arbitrary, unverifiable beliefs.

Too often, however, Frommel seemed, in his analysis of religious experience, to ignore the distinction between the experience and the interpretation of the experience. Claiming to offer bare experience, he offered, in fact, an interpretation or description which was in terms of his own personal point of view. This is why, while admitting his general conception, we question whether, in epistemological terms, the object of the experience is given in the consciousness without intermediary representations, and, therefore, whether the intellectual faculty should be said not to intervene. What is immediate is a feeling of being the object of an activity, an action (according to Frommel himself, a divine action, the soliciting of the will); the instigating subject and agent of the action is not Himself given in immediacy. There are, we must feel, intermediary representations and modes of apprehension of the experience, and these must form the material of epistemological analysis in terms of the renewing of the mind as sequel to, and concomitant with, the religious experience. Daulte thus expressed it: "Religious knowledge implies the personal equation... For Christians, perfect Truth existed, historically incarnated, and He remains the entrance into life and into religious knowledge". (1)

Frommel would have surely approved these, the closing, words from

(1) op. cit. p. 190.
the work by Mehl already cited: "The problem is not to abstain from any philosophical terminology, but to know how to use it. Dogmatic elaboration must be accompanied by philosophical criticism. All Christian philosophy seems to reside in the Christian's decision to bear witness, in the philosophical field, to the reality of the renewing of the mind... Christian philosophy places man in a universe whose dimensions are given us by Jesus Christ". (1)

(1) op. cit. pp. 197 and 211.
THE SUPERNATURAL AND THE
QUESTION OF MIRACLE

Froesch's distinctive review and analysis of the associated questions of the Supernatural and Miracle were against the background of contemporary debates in the area of religious and theological concern. He said that he was constrained to some degree of brevity in his contribution to the subject, necessitating a full and complete examination of the issues and extended quotations. His analysis was therefore presented, in a carefully sifted form, with precision and economy of style, accessible even in his work distinguished, as always, by clarity of expression and language.

The main divisions of Froesch's analysis were: (1) the Constitution of the Supernatural in the relation to science and society; (2) the relation of the Supernatural to Miracle; (3) the Compatibility of miracle; and (4) the question of Revelation. These questions had been debated on in varying degrees by various writers, e.g., Maritain, Sabatier, Béze, Barthou, and others, but the work, in particular, offered a distinctive and extended treatment and review of the problem of the Supernatural and of Miracle. This was by Paul Chopin, the biennially published Froesch by the press.
THE NATURE OF THE SUPERNATURAL AND THE QUESTION OF MIRACLE

In this, and in the subsequent section, we note Frommel's treatment of the problems of the Supernatural and Miracle, and of Evil and the Fall. These are associated with the general Apologetic question, but are treated in separation. Normally, the question of Evil, in particular, would have been considered before that of Soteriology, but this would have been an artificial re-arrangement of Frommel's material, since the issues are not presented as structurally included in either the Apologetics or the Dogmatics. Such is, indeed, an inescapable consequence of the incompleteness of his work.

Frommel's distinctive review and analysis of the associated questions of the Supernatural and Miracle were against the background of contemporary debate in this area of religious and theological concern. He said that he was constrained to a measure of brevity in his contribution to it, necessitating, so far as possible, abstention from polemic and extended quotations. His analysis was therefore presented, in a carefully edited form, with precision and economy of style, noticeable even in his work distinguished, as always, by clarity of expression and language.

The main divisions of Frommel's analysis were:— (1) the Constitution of the Supernatural in its relation to science and morality; (2) the relation of the Supernatural to Miracle; (3) the perceptibility of miracle; and (4) the question of Revelation. These questions had been touched on in varying degrees by several writers, e.g. Ménégaz, Sabatier, Bois, Berthoud, and others, but one work, in particular, offered a distinctive and extended treatment and review of the problem of the Supernatural and of Miracle. This was by Paul Chapuis, who pre-deceased Frommel by two years.

The Supernatural and Science

Frommel constituted as the starting-point the conception of
"nature", in terms of which we may define the supernatural. In terms of one, so will the other be. Nature is susceptible of study from either the scientific or moral point of view. The point of view of the first in terms of the definition, observation and recording of phenomena, is such as to exclude the super-natural and to deny it. Nature is all that there is, and when something is presented to science with perfect attestation, as being supernatural or miraculous, it seeks to explain it by natural causes, or, where such explanation is not possible, it rests in the belief and hope that an explanation will one day be offered. The attitude necessitating this approach is three-fold - science works on the hypothesis of determinism, which must exclude the supernatural, since such a concept suggests the intervention from outside of a force or of forces not amenable to experimental analysis, thus introducing a principle of indeterminism, of which science may not take account; science is concerned with secondary causes, and with phenomena manifesting themselves to the senses and to the reason; something claiming to transcend these is necessarily suspect; correlate with the first two, there is the implicit postulate that all natural fact has its cause in nature. Nature is closed and self-explanatory from within - otherwise, science, as such, is impossible.

Frommel, therefore, constituted science as incompetent either to deny or affirm the supernatural. In itself, it is neither hostile nor favourable to it; it is simply foreign to it. Science is a mode of human knowledge; it shows the mind functioning in a certain way. But it does not represent man himself, the whole of man. "The knower is subordinate to man, as science is to life". (1)

But the scientific point of view is neither the sole nor the most important one. To admit the sovereignty of the moral order -

as does the whole Frommelian thesis - is not only to allow the legitimacy of the moral judgment but is to constitute the sovereignty of the appreciation of the moral order over that of the natural order, i.e. of the moral judgment over the scientific judgment. Frommel expressed concern at the Deistic tendency of some recent theological writing, e.g. Ménégos, Sabatier and Chapuis, where we find the phenomena of nature ascribable to Divine activity, though not in terms of personal intervention. For example, Sabatier wrote: (1) "The truth is, at the present time, that the grand and sovereign regularity of natural laws and the harmony of the universe has penetrated every mind, and that devotion, in its times of illumination, does not rebel against these laws, but makes us regard, as essentially religious, the act of contemplating, admiring, and submitting ourselves to, them." Likewise Chapuis: (2) "nature is order, willed order, and I do not feel that I have the right to enter into debate with the supreme author of life." We agree with Frommel when he points out that the conclusion of this position must be the Divine perfection of nature; the impossibility, and indeed impiety, of a doctrine of the supernatural; and that nature, being a Divine revelation, can yield proof of the existence of God. On the last point, one would wonder: whence the failure of 'natural theology', and the fact that, for a large number of people, the spectacle of nature is a motive of atheism?

This Deistic approach to nature flies in the face of the moral judgment to which human consciousness bears witness, namely, the existence of disorder, of physical and moral evil, in nature as experienced. The use of the word "law", likewise, can be misleading, since the same law which renders possible the good, renders possible the evil; the same law which causes the organism to live

(1) "Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion", p. 83.
(2) op. cit. p. 108.
causes it to die. The whole conflict of which Jesus was supremely conscious was against evil, suffering and death in nature, and we would agree with Frommel that this is not, in Chapuis' words, "to debate with the supreme author of life." Regarding any scientific analysis of nature as necessarily a-moral, Frommel constituted as the real issue the question of man's moral nature and that as essentially spoiled - sub-natural, as below what he should be in terms of moral possibility; and anti- or un-natural, constituted in rebellion and the experience of evil. From this we derive the possibility, i.e. the moral legitimacy, of the supernatural, and the determination of the kind of possible supernatural. This will be achieved, not by metaphysical or rational extrapolation, but solely in terms of moral legitimacy.

As Naville's work was the particular antecedent of Frommel's in the matter of the problem of Evil, Chapuis was similarly related to Frommel in this matter of the supernatural, his work being entitled "Du Surnaturel". (1) Chapuis acknowledged that the climate of thinking at this time (the closing years of the 19th century) was hostile to miracle, in terms of the popular conception of the "laws of nature", and that the supernatural had become identified with religion, agnosticism speaking of "inaccessible regions", and materialism denying all such as dream and illusion. "He who believes in God, believes in the supernatural" - but what kind of God? Not the God of Deism, but one making a claim on my conscience. We should therefore speak of the "morally" supernatural. We have tended to think more and more in terms of rigid uniformity of natural law, and to assume it in practical, everyday affairs. Religious faith has characterised this as an expression of divine faithfulness, without which scientific research is impossible. But "laws" are created by induction,

(1) Etudes de Philosophie et d'Histoire religieuses: (Lausanne.) 1898.
which always lacks finality and logical sufficiency, being open to contradiction and modification by the facts, being an extrapolation from a certain number of instances.

We find reference to this conception of "law" in Chas. Secretan: "he who declares a fact impossible, by founding himself on experience, has really no other reasons than that, in man's recollection, the fact in question has never been seen. He would then have to propose as a principle that everything which has not been seen is impossible, and that no real fact has ever been perceived for the first time, for all these formulations are equivalent." Frommel, in his own way, agreed with this, where he acknowledges "gaps in our knowledge", such that a conception of law based on observation and induction has insufficient rigidity and necessity to rule out miracle. (2)

Chapuis went on to warn against raising the relative to the absolute, referring to a useful analysis by Emile Boutroux, Prof. at the Sorbonne, of types of laws - logical, mathematical, physical, biological, psychological, sociological. As one goes higher in the series, fixity and rigidity diminish, and greater complexity and richness supervene. Chapuis spoke under the influence of Kantian epistemology when he regarded our knowledge as subjective, such that we do not seize the thing itself, but as perceived by our faculties, thought being regulated by its own laws. Thus, from the point of view of philosophical analysis, the objective supernatural is a notion which cannot be entertained - it is unintelligible - it does not fit into natural or mental laws. There is to be constituted a total difference between what we term a mystery and any phenomenon to which attaches the mark of logical contradiction. The conclusion must therefore be that given our mental constitution, the supernatural has no intelligible place in the natural order, as it

(1) "Le Miracle et la Philosophie", Bibliothèque Universelle, T. LIX, p. 267.
(2) "La Vérité Humaine", vol. III. pp. 327-328.
is "unthinkable".

As well as the objection of philosophical scruple, there is that of the religious conscience. By this we mean the seeming impropriety of God's intervention in a world which He was supposed to have created good, the impiety seen to be involved in the view of the supernatural as a derogation of natural laws. Chapuis acknowledged that some seek to avoid this conclusion by describing it as the displacement of one law by a higher. He sympathised with this expression as it seemed faithful to experience, where, in even the simplest actions, the superior law bears, even if momentarily, on the inferior. We cannot, for example, deny the power of the will in the name of the inviolability of physical law. Some would state a paradox — that the supernatural is a 'natural phenomenon' which has the special quality that divine action is manifestly revealed. Augustine and Leibnitz have, in their different ways, made the supernatural "revert" to nature. It found clear expression in Spinoza, "miracle is something of which we cannot explain the natural cause by the example of another familiar thing. The power of nature is nothing but the power of God, which we can no more understand than natural causes; since we lack sufficient knowledge to pretend to know all about natural powers, we must try, without pride, to explain prodigious happenings by natural causes. It will be sufficient to suspend judgment, and to edify religion on the sole doctrine of wisdom."

Chapuis noted that, while Renouvier regarded miracle as a particular intervention of the divine will "to modify established causality", it seemed fashionable in Protestant apologetics to deny the ancient conception of miracle (to which most theories seem eventually to come), that it is an event contrary to, or appearing to be

(1) Tract. theol. polit. VI; de Miraculis; quoted by Chapuis. op. cit. p. 87.
contrary to, natural laws. Thomas Aquinas had said that "a miracle is above and beyond the order of created nature. It goes beyond nature, in regard to substance of fact, place and time, mode and order." (Summa Theolog. Pars. I. Quaest. 105, par. 6.) Chapuis observed that we are constituted in our minds so as to apprehend phenomena through the category of law, thus ruling out, as we think, objective physical miracle. But the problem is not exhausted in terms of the relationship of supernatural to natural laws - beyond nature, there is God, the source of being, and it is in this direction that our thought should move.

There seemed to lurk an uncertainty in this part of Chapuis' work, as to whether or not to be committed to a neo-Kantian view of the knowledge of phenomena. Frommel, however, expressed himself more definitely when he came to discuss the legitimacy of the supernatural. (1) He noted that a basis has been sought in philosophical terms, this taking the form of assuming or admitting discontinuity, while at the same time requiring a continuity in terms of which alone metaphysical thought can proceed. But this remains a juggling with words and no subtlety of reasoning can establish it. It must (to anticipate) become a datum of consciousness in the context of revelation and redemption. A metaphysical structure, whether monistic or dualistic, still revealed an underlying continuity, namely, the metaphysical elements of rational thought, by which is imposed, nolens volens, a monistic form even on a dualistic system.

The Moral Legitimacy of the Supernatural

Frommel determined the true legitimacy of the supernatural as in the field of morality, i.e. in terms of sin and its affecting of nature. Outside of this, it becomes a metaphysical and psychological monstrosity, unworthy of God from the aspect of what is implied.

regarding the perfection of divine creation, and unworthy of man, implying a kind of constraint, derogatory to his responsibility and freedom. In a word, "if redemption were superfluous, so would be the supernatural". (1) Man could then achieve his destiny on the basis of his original freedom, coming to the full revelation of God through the natural play of moral and physical laws. Religion without the supernatural, unhistorical and unredemptive, would be sufficient for man to achieve spiritual communion with God.

To remove sin and redemption from the analysis of the idea of the supernatural was, according to Frommel, like trying to offer a theory of colours without troubling oneself about the light, or an account of the seasons without taking into consideration the inclination of the ecliptic plane. It is to reduce the Christian supernatural to the level of the marvels of pagan religions. Unfortunately, this has been the fault of many recent thinkers, both the attackers and the defenders of the supernatural. Frommel put names like Sabatier and Chapuis among the former, and Bois and Teissonnière among the latter. Admittedly, they all allowed the sinfulness of man, but did not give this the appropriately decisive place.

We are therefore led to define the supernatural, not by the capricious and the marvellous, but in terms of redemption. This conception of the supernatural does not question the wisdom or power of God as Creator, but involves rather the conception of God as Redeemer, in which there is response to the basic and vital need of humanity. It changes nothing of the pre-existent order of things, but gives man the strength and will to accomplish his task, the restoration of the Divine creation. The supernatural is not in opposition to the normally natural; it does not touch, nor contradict, harmony, order and laws - it rather fulfils them by allowing man to

(1) op. cit. p. 279.
consummate his work and his spiritual destiny. The supernatural is the supernatural only to that which is below, or contrary to, nature, i.e. to the fallen part of nature.

Frommel then offered an analysis of the nature of the possible supernatural. In defining the supernatural in terms of redemption, an essentially moral concept, we have constituted its distinguishing nature. As moral, it is distinguished from a long-assumed form, the phenomenal, the prodigious; miracle, that is, in the sense of a physical phenomenon imposing itself on the senses. Many Christians have attributed apologetic value to such, but there is serious risk of superficiality and superstition, because the appeal may be to the senses rather than to the conscience. If there be such miracles (and Frommel did not deny their possibility), the supernatural does not reside essentially in the miracle nor is it its source nor essence. It is not the physical supernatural which proves the moral supernatural, but, on the contrary, the moral which gives meaning to the physical, such that the miracle is related to redemptive activity.

As redemptive, it is distinguished from what might be a philosophically or religiously conceived, "spiritualism", such as Frommel sees in the thought of Chapuis, Sabatier and Emery. Chapuis, for example, (1) said clearly: "The supernatural is religion; ... religion is the supernatural..." Frommel criticises the confusion of the specific reality of the supernatural with what is, after all, accepted by him as its condition, namely, the religious area of man's experience.

We would feel that Emery, in particular, was guilty of a serious reductionism when he equated nature with matter, i.e. physical substance, and the supernatural by the mind or spirit. The latter, he

(1) op. cit. p. 284 f.
had written, is what constitutes personality in terms of self-consciousness and will. There is thus synonymity between the personal and the supernatural. Nature is comprised of all beings mineral, vegetable or animal, liquids, solids, or gases, which do not possess self-consciousness."(1) Again, Frommel would agree that personality is a condition of the supernatural, but not its nature or essence. In defining the supernatural in terms of redemption, we are opposing the world of the powers of redemptive activity, of grace, to that where is deployed the simple activity of fallen man. It is only in opposition to sub- and anti-nature, i.e. sin and its consequences.

There is also avoided the element of the arbitrary, the capricious, the fantastic, such as seems to be involved in the dichotomous basic position of Chapuis, who said, at the very beginning of his work:

(2) "the domain of the supernatural embraces an order of particular phenomena whose essential character is to be either understood or perceived as being outside of the regular course of things. They do not have continuity nor fixedness, and can be produced in a given case, without one having the right to expect their repetition in another, but identical, given case."

As Frommel preferred to express it,(3) "the redemptive supernatural will be a capacity of obedience, a power of synthesis in the moral, religious and psychological consciousness of the subject...

We boldly affirm that justification and Christian regeneration, the supernatural 'par excellence', bound, as it is, by certain moral and even historical conditions, is yet no less supernatural, precisely because it works in man what is, at the one time, contrary to his evil will, and superior and inaccessible to his fallen nature."


(2) op. cit. p. 8-9.

(3) op. cit. p. 289.
This conception prepares the way for Frommel's consideration of the perceptibility of miracle and of its revelatory nature.

The basis of the certainty of the supernatural is, therefore, to be sought in the opposition between the consciousness of duty in sin (i.e. the consciousness of powerlessness and moral guilt) and the consciousness of duty in grace (i.e. consciousness of duty in moral freedom and rediscovered religious communion). Here, again, Frommel regarded the moral category of human experience as determinative and as constituting the true criterion of the supernatural. As we have seen elsewhere, the conception of "le devoir" is sovereign over considerations of sense-experience or metaphysical construction; and, in this context, it has the great value of placing the discussion in an area free of the vitiating difficulties implicit in the attitudes of natural science (in the matter of perceptible phenomena) and of philosophy (in the matter of the metaphysical relationship of the supernatural to the natural.) The certainty of the supernatural is not in terms of historical or philosophical considerations. The testimony and witness of history neither give nor remove certainty, and Frommel rightly judged as misguided the theological tradition of a past era which made the possibility of miracle a matter of philosophy and the reality (or certainty) a matter of history. This still seemed to be the position of Berthoud, to judge by his "La Possibilité du Miracle"(1) and of Sabatier in his "Esquisse" (referred to below, in the matter of the assessments of his position by H. Bois.)

The reasons for this inability of history are - first, that as evidence, it can only carry probability; the "point d'appui" of certainty would, of necessity, move from the event reported to the report being given and to the person reporting it. In other words,

(and we agree with Frommel's objection) the basis of the certainty of the supernatural would lie, not in terms of the supernatural, but in the area, quite foreign to it, of the reliability of the witness, involving, therefore, considerations of historical and psychological judgment; and second, that the supernatural in history is hardly observable except in the form of the phenomenal (i.e. physical miracle), and, for seriously scientific history, the most extraordinary miracle is reduced to an "unexplained" phenomenon. Ménégoz pointed the issue clearly when he said: (1) "One can prove, in certain cases, and in an absolutely conclusive manner, the reality of an extraordinary phenomenon. But there the proof stops. It is impossible to demonstrate that the event is due to a supernatural divine action, and not to natural cause..." Chapuis introduced the ideas of relativity and subjectivity of judgment in the matter of recognising the supernatural in the chapter entitled 'The Supernatural and Revelation'. There he wrote: "If religious fact is an immediate perception of the divine, then religious impression can be only subjective, which in no way suggests the illusory. If God is not in us, no power in the world will demonstrate Him outside of us. The supernatural is relative. A thing can be supernatural for one and not be so for another - in other words, it does not correspond to an objective reality arising from the natural order. It constitutes a subjective phenomenon, a subjective impression. It appears mediate through natural laws - we perceive it immediate. The same phenomenon can thus be natural and supernatural, natural in respect of subjective, religious impression." (2)

Another citation will show the ambivalence, from the point of view of determining the supernatural, of a historical event. H. Bois(3) referred to Sabatier's position in an article entitled:

(1) "La Notion biblique du miracle": Paris 1894 - p. 24.
(2) op. cit. p. 158.
(3) Revue de Théologie et de Questions religieuses: Montauban. 1898.
"Miracle from the Christian and from the symbolo-fideist points of view", and quoted, as follows, from Sabatier(1) - "the conception to which I have come has two aspects - the negation of dogmatic miracle from the point of view of science, and the affirmation of religious miracle from the point of view of devotion. Let me be accused of contradiction, if you will... suffice to say that, for me, it is not one." Sabatier had offered, for example, a "natural" explanation of the Red Sea Crossing, which seems to Bois to make it - and any other similar - a "providential fact". Why did wind and tides act in this way and at this time? - Because God intervened in a special way, without violating laws, making them thus produce an effect which they would not otherwise have produced. "The essence of miracle is the special action of God".(2) Secondary causes do not, ipso facto, destroy miracle, and we must allow full historical criticism of Bible narratives in the matter of "materiality" of miracles. For Bois, the Biblical miracle may lose its "marvellous" content without ceasing to be miracle, while, for Sabatier, the Biblical miracle could not lose its marvellous quality without ceasing to be miracle - this because of his providential interpretation of miracle as such.

The clarity of Frommel's treatment is refreshing. As a basis of certainty is not to be found in history, neither is it to be found in philosophy.(3) Although many thinkers sought to place it here, relating it, as Chapuis mentioned in his introduction, to the theories of knowledge and the laws of scientific observation, these, said Frommel, are irrelevant. Belief in the supernatural does not come by philosophical induction, but by experience, wherein the supernatural - defined in terms of redemption - becomes an integral part of man's moral life in the experience of the effects in him of a power superior and contrary to those which operate in his fallen

(1) "Vie Nouvelle"; 26 March 1898.
(2) op. cit. p. 431.
(3) op. cit. p. 291 f.
nature and guilty will. The supernatural then becomes an immediate 'datum' of consciousness. Definition may be difficult, but certainty is present.

Given this constitution of the supernatural, we may assert that this is the essential property of Christianity. We say indeed that Christianity and the supernatural are one and the same thing. Christianity is a redemption, and redemption is another word for supernatural. But we must guard against saying that the supernatural is "religion", of which Christianity is regarded as a supreme instance. Doubtless, all religion, by definition, contains affirmation of the supernatural, but it is an abuse of language to apply the word absolutely univocally to all forms of religion and to Christianity. Whence, then, comes the idea of the supernatural in "religion"? It derives from this, that all human religions have had a sense of a requirement of moral redemption, involved in their feeling of a relationship between man and God, vitiated in some way, and wishing for restoration. No matter the expression of the redemptive element or motivation, religion implies a sense of man standing 'over against' some divine (or non-human) power, involving the idea of moral impotence and therefore a desire to transcend it through a victory or liberation achieved or received. Hence, Christianity, as the only religion possessing the full reality of redemption, alone possesses the full reality of the supernatural.

Frommel defined the relation between the Christian (redemptive) supernatural and the extra-Christian religious supernatural as that which reality bears to its symbol, truth to its prophetic foretaste. The idea of Chapuis that there is nothing in our mental constitution by way of predisposition to the supernatural seems to involve a contradiction. He said that the notion of law is another name for the
reason; we see the world reflected in the mirror of our mental constitution, thus affirming the subjectivity of our knowledge, in which we do not seize the object itself, but as it is perceived through our faculties. "From the point of view of philosophical analysis, the objective supernatural is a notion which cannot be entertained; it is unintelligible... our conclusion is that, given our mental constitution, the supernatural has no intelligible place in the natural order - it is unthinkable." Then, in the first part of the section of his work, entitled The Historical Problem, (pp. 175-184), he gave a review of the place of miracle in extra-Christian cultures, e.g. the animistic, Greek, Roman, etc., leading to the post-Renaissance period in which grew the modern hostility to miracle. He seemed to regard both accounts as tending against the reality of the Christian supernatural. We might ask, as did Frommel, (1) - "if man feels no need of the supernatural, and has no faculty to discern it how does it come about that man creates, imagines and invents it? If he so universally does so, is it not a sign of universal need?"

There is surely in the depth of our being a constant and legitimate protest against what science calls "natural". As Schérer had said, "the supernatural is the natural sphere of the soul." Frommel preferred to express it thus - the supernatural is the necessary postulate of the consciousness as religious, because perfect morality, as such inaccessible to fallen nature, is of the nature of the supernatural. In this conception of redemption, we have the hidden, but legitimate, root of all the flourishing of the 'marvellous' in the history of man.

The Supernatural and Miracle

While many will accept as legitimate Frommel's analysis of the nature of the supernatural in terms of redemption, the point at

(1) op. cit. p. 296.
issue, now to be faced, is whether the supernatural, moral and redemptive, can be only moral. Can it become physical? Is miracle, as the phenomenal supernatural, excluded by the moral, or is it implied, either as necessary or at least possible? We begin from the conception of freedom. The Christian supernatural is not defined in terms of pure freedom but rather of redemption — that is, Divine freedom applied to a certain end and in a certain field; but freedom is involved — the freedom of God to save, and of man who could sin, only because he is free.

Kant defined freedom as the power to leave the chain of causes and effects and constitute a new beginning. In affirming Divine and human freedom, we affirm the power of God and of man to make new beginnings independently, yet within the context of the universal continuum of linked phenomena. The supernatural would thus be seen to be an effect not necessarily determined by natural antecedents. Freedom and the supernatural are the same thing, with this difference that every free act is a cause of the supernatural, and the supernatural the effect of a free act. As Teissonnière wrote: (1) "to believe in freedom, human and divine, is to believe in the possibility of the supernatural (not yet the Christian supernatural, but the supernatural in general); it is to believe in a constant power of the supernatural." The weakness of this assertion is its imprecision as to which form of supernatural is meant, the moral only, or the physical as well. Likewise, Divine and human freedoms are different, the former being sovereign and absolute, the latter relative.

In a work by H. Bois, "Le Surnaturel d'après M. Chapuis," (2) there was criticism of the latter's constitution of miracle as a supernatural phenomenon outside of the ordinary causality of things, and as a special act envisaged as a divine action. The virtual

(1) "Le Problème du Surnaturel", p. 9.
(2) Revue de théol. et de quest. relig. - Montauban, 1898.
omission of the moral element was the capital vice of Chapuis' work, which never seemed to shake itself free of the conception of physical miracle. The ideas of Chapuis were nevertheless defended by A. Fornerod in a lecture at Lausanne in March 1898, entitled "La Vie Chrétienne et le Surnaturel". He referred to physical miracle as "the immediate action of God without secondary causes."(1) Bois criticised the omission of freedom in Chapuis, on the ground that human freedom operates, after all, in the physical world without violation of natural law. The question of the relation of physical miracle to scientific laws is not the same as that of the relation of miracle to the principle of causality; the real question at issue is the interpretation of causality in a determinist fashion. The idea of freedom is as rational as that of deterministic necessity.

Further, on the question of freedom, Bois asked, in the chapter headed "Miracle and Science", whether it is possible to make acts of human freedom the subject of science, and agreed with Chapuis that there is no relation between science and the supernatural, which cannot be an object of scientific observation. We may compare this with the observation of Renouvier(2) - "Whatever there is of the order of, or dependence on, free will in the world is outside the conditions of inflexibility and invariability of natural laws, outside the certainty of prevision, outside the sciences". There is, then, nothing to distinguish a miraculous physical fact from a non-miraculous physical fact, but, unlike Chapuis, Bois held that miracle is not just subjectively recognised, for, if it results from the special activity of God, it has objective reality. In all this we see evidence of the confusion against which Frommel warned when he constituted the terms of the discussion as in the field of redemp-

(1) Revue de Lausanne; July 1898, p. 322.
(2) "Critique philosophique": Feb. 1876.
tion, rather than in the sterile area of philosophy or historical science.

In the matter of the physical supernatural Frommel noted the implications of human and divine freedom as follows: It is obvious that human freedom is not limited to the moral order, but impinges and acts upon the physical. We remember Teissonnière, above, who, mistakenly, in Frommel's view, constituted the supernatural, not in moral terms, but in the dangerous imprecision of that which intervenes in the physical order, disturbing its inbuilt causality. (1)

In this, we are not defining the Christian supernatural, but simply acknowledging that the world of the material and phenomenal is not in a state of deterministic self-enclosure, and that there is no unbridgeable chasm between the physical and moral orders in the matter of the intervention of acts of freedom. Consideration of the divine freedom leads to a distinction between mediacy and immediacy of the physical supernatural. It is not permissible to apply, as if univocally, the word "freedom" to man and God; the divine freedom is sovereign, and there is the attendant risk that divine activity, regarded as ubiquitous, evaporates the conception of miracle altogether. "Where all is miracle, nothing is miracle." More practically, the distinction between mediacy and immediacy, was made first by Secretan, who constituted the true supernatural as freedom, saying that the moral supernatural implied an order in which there is a taking consciousness of divine activity, not mediately, but immediately perceived. This, in turn, might, however, lead to the dangerous conclusion that if religious fact is an immediate perception of the divine, then religious impression, or experience and certainty of the supernatural, can be only subjective, and, in a personal sense, relative.

(1) Teissonnière, op. cit. p. 10.
Frommel's treatment of the question of mediacy and immediacy was distinctive, and rested on the conception of the divine freedom. God, he writes, (1) "in Himself, is not "free"; He is "sovereign". But in relation to the world, He is free. His sovereignty, in face of a world which limits Him, becomes freedom, the world limiting the divine sovereignty because God respects its existence, and the conditions of existence, viz. physical and moral laws." All this is the implication of theism, and the relationship of God to the world is what is called Providence. "Every phenomenon, considered as a product, direct or derived, of a divine action, is regarded as providential."(2) (a) What, then, is the nature of the moral supernatural which God produces in the soul? We may describe it, firstly, by relation to the analogy of one man becoming, by suggestion of another, and by the influence of his will, his "medium". Man becomes, by this token, the medium of the divine will. But, more systematically, in the light of Frommel's analysis of the experience of moral obligation, to affirm the moral supernatural is to affirm that God renews and intensifies the action by which He obligates us in our conscience, such as to solicit a decision which we should not otherwise have taken, producing an obedience and a faithfulness of an order of which we are otherwise incapable. The complete penetration and possession of the human will by the divine is of the essence of the 'miracle' of redemption. The supreme demonstration of the "supernatural" is embodied in the declaration: "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." (b) What of the physical supernatural? By mediacy in this connection, Frommel means us to have regard to the fact of psycho-physiological parallelism, by which we understand the concomitance of physical and psychic phenomena in the life of the soul and in the corporeal and nervous system.

(1) op. cit. p. 303.
(2) op. cit. p. 305.
He referred to the work by Flournoy: "Méthphysique et psychologie";\(^\text{(1)}\) a writer whose work on the psychology of religious belief is referred to in the chapter on Epistemology. "To every state of consciousness, there corresponds a special molecular state of our brain."\(^\text{(2)}\)

One's first feeling is of the irrelevance of this line of thought, because the underlying conception is one of parallelism rather than causal relationship or chronological sequence. Frommel goes on to quote from a rather unlikely source – Guyau – from which writer's "L'irreligion de l'avenir"\(^\text{(3)}\) he cites this passage:– "Some have thought to suppress miracle by supposing an act of Providence, not on the material world, but on human thought... Science has established such a connection between thought and movement that it is impossible not to see in all action exerted on thought an action exerted on the material world." Frommel concluded from these corroborative extracts that it is illogical to affirm the moral supernatural without also affirming the mediate physical supernatural; they are mutually implied, in both human and divine freedom.\(^\text{(4)}\)

While one would allow the logic of this argument, one is a little surprised to find Frommel depending on psycho-physical reasons for allowing the reality of the mediate physical supernatural, after constituting the supernatural as morally redemptive. Considering his strictures on the rational and the metaphysical, one might not have anticipated his use of these criteria – but it demonstrates the difficulty of conducting all one's apologetic in terms of the "new creation" in total discontinuity with natural thought. Frommel clearly stated, in his subsequent discussion of the immediate physical supernatural, that "the true and real supernatural is the moral, the physical being but the concomitant or subsequent expression of

\(^\text{(1)}\) Geneva, 1890.
\(^\text{(2)}\) op. cit. p. 5.
\(^\text{(3)}\) p. 387.
\(^\text{(4)}\) op. cit. p. 307.
it." A certain theology, he said, has called this the "great supernatural", and it includes inspiration, revelation, healings, etc. There is then, the "little supernatural", not on a moral, but on a physical, basis; this we call immediate, implying, not action upon man in terms of the human or divine freedom, but, in the first instance, upon nature itself directly, and, thus, derivatively, upon man. Examples of these are the feeding of the multitudes, the turning of water into wine, (if one accepts its historicity) the stilling of the storm, and many Old Testament miracles. Basically, one's treatment of these narratives is determined by one's doctrine of God. Deism, for example, excludes providence, while pantheism excludes freedom; theism, however, asserts the activity of God in the world, His transcendence and freedom with regard to it.

Frommel claimed to do, for the immediate, what he did for the mediate physical supernatural, namely to judge it by human analogy, and to show its moral acceptability. The human analogy is that of telepathy and telekinesis in which there seems indubitable proof of immediacy of relationship between minds, i.e. without visible intermediary, and, even more strikingly, there seems similar proof of the action of minds on physical nature. While these metaphysical, or para-normal, phenomena are suspect by both religious and scientific thinkers, they cannot be, in the name of either of them, dismissed. Thus, by analogy, Divine action on physical nature may not be - in theistic terms - ruled out. This approach raises, of course, the moral question - as to the appropriateness of such activity.

Wherein, for example, would lie the moral value of levitation? There would, at first thought, seem to be nothing in common between the marvels of pagan magic and thaumaturgy and the Christian conception of the supernatural in terms of redemption. Frommel shows
his awareness of the feeling of uneasiness which his arguments may arouse in his readers' minds in a footnote\(^{(1)}\)(referring to the movement of his argument, by analogy, from the human to the divine) "the reality of the one involves the possibility of the other. Why? - in virtue of this minimum of anthropomorphism without which religion is not possible, even less still, Christianity." Are the application of argument by analogy and the admission into Christian thinking of a measure of anthropomorphism not concessions, which we would not have expected him to make, to the use of the natural reason, to which the Christian conception of the supernatural must remain opaque? It appears to be another illustration of the difficulty of the apologist in his effort to demonstrate the validity of Christianity before the reason.

Frommel also alluded to the unwillingness on occasion of Jesus to perform miracles where these were sought as demonstrations of the validity of His claim. But, where He did perform miracles, what might be described as those of material divine psychodynamic, even where they were not directly redemptive, they could be regarded as indirectly redemptive in their moral and spiritual pedagogic aspect, and this both subjectively and objectively. The subjective element consists in the differing responses to the world of nature; this should manifest to man a part, at least, of the character of God ("His power and divinity" - Rom. 1.), but the fact of sin distorts this response, and the revelation is obscured. The same constancy of natural laws testifies to one subject of the faithfulness of God, to another, fatalism and impersonality. The objective element consists in the recognition that nature and history are not "intact", being rendered other than what they should be by a power characterised by hostility and disorder, such that they are an offence to

\(^{(1)}\) op. cit. p. 312.
the human conscience and tend to demoralise man. Thus, some are
inclined to abandon the God of nature and history in favour of the
God of conscience. It is striking to read the following in view
of the highly moralistic nature of Frommel’s theology: “This ex-
clusively moral position, this separation of the God of nature and
of history from the God of conscience, useful and necessary at the
outset, becomes, in the long run, dangerous and precarious. Having
served to found faith, it serves likewise to destroy it again.
One has the right to ask why the God of conscience should not also
be the God of nature and history, and whether it could not belong to
the living, true God to be at the one time the one and the other.”
The ground of Frommel’s allowance of such possibility was his view
of history, which is of a historical, progressive revelation leading
to the Kingdom of God on earth, i.e. in history and nature; by
which token, these contain traces of redemptive activity. Indeed,
he writes elsewhere in this area of discussion: ”the God of grace
can also be, when He wills, the God of history.” The eschatologi-
cal implications of this are never worked out by Frommel since his
work was uncompleted. However, the material possibility of miracle
as a direct action of God in nature is given in the constitution of
human psychodynamics, and the moral acceptability is given in the
solidarity of miracle with the redemptive supernatural. What is
given, Frommel emphasised, is not the credibility of all miracles,
but only the material possibility and the moral acceptability.

In an appendix to this section, Frommel made a three-fold
classification of Biblical miracles — (a) those accomplished by man
without Divine help (the category of the "human physical supernatu-
ral"); (b) those accomplished by God through men (the category of
the mediate "Divine physical supernatural"), and (c) those accomp—

(1) "La Ver. Humaine, III. p. 315."
lished by God without the help of men (the category of the immediate moral or physical supernatural." ) What, then, of the perceptibility of phenomenal miracle? Frommel criticised the view of Chapuis that, "given the constitution of our mind, we lay hold on (grasp) phenomena in terms of the category of law," whence it results that there is no supernatural in the physical world, no objective miracles - or, if there were, we should be incapable of conceiving of, or perceiving, them as such."(1) According to Chapuis' development of this theme, we are involved in a form of agnosticism rather than a total scepticism. As Renouvier had said, to suppress miracle pure and simple is to declare its impossibility in the name of the supreme mastery of reason; but we do not have the right to banish miracle from history in the name of uniform experience. The real problem is not that of knowing whether miracle is theoretically possible, but whether it actually exists in phenomenal reality. Chapuis is approved, however, by Frommel when he points out that the moral side of the problem is of paramount importance - in other words, the real question is not whether God is capable, but whether He wills. The matter of perception and recognition is, therefore, crucial. Is it necessary for each divine prodigy to be accompanied by a second, imparting to us a mental condition by which we perceive and recognise it as such? Throughout Chapuis' treatment, he seemed to be trapped by a syllogistic conclusion resulting from dubious premises, his reasoning appearing to be that, given the unintelligibility of miracle by its nature and the impossibility of the recognition or the perception of the unintelligible, miracle is therefore imperceptible in terms of perceptible phenomena, and must either be denied or declared as perceptible only by those whose mental constitution has been, or is, so structured. The weakness of Chapuis was

(1) Chapuis, op. cit. p. 92-93, 123.
that, while he accepted that what is called the "natural" should, from a certain aspect, be regarded as the sub-natural, the ab-normal, he yet made the recognition by this "natural" faculty the criterion of the perceptibility of phenomenal miracle. Our mental constitution, he wrote, cannot, as made for sub-nature, encompass in intelligence the true 'nature', and this latter remains indiscernible. Prodigy, if it exists, is excluded by definition from the field of phenomena perceptible to our mental structure.

Frommel expressed a certain sympathy with the demand of Chapuis for that "miracle" which would transform our mental state to make perceptible what to our present mentality is imperceptible. (1)

According to the former, of course, the organ of perception is the conscience, where the moral supernatural is experienced, and borne witness to, by the human will acted upon by the Divine Will in the context of the obligation of conscience. This experience is not simply to be discussed as a possibility - with which perceptibility is a correlative but ambiguous property - but as a reality in a new order. It is constitutive of what Frommel calls the "Christian noetic", in which the experience of the moral supernatural is the redemption by which our mentality, that is, our psychological, moral and religious consciousness is transformed, and we are translated into the order of redemption, of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ.

The Supernatural and Revelation

The question of perceptibility involves, of necessity, the nature of revelation. The approaches of Chapuis and Sabatier were those, chiefly in terms of, and in contrast to, which, Frommel's own analysis is to be seen.

Chapuis, we find, prefaced his discussion by quoting from Thomas Aquinas the classic division, sometimes elaborated into opposition,

(1) Frommel: op. cit. p. 324; Chapuis: op. cit. p. 63-64.
of the two spheres of divine activity: "miracula naturae, quae per Deum, fiunt in rerum natura sensibus subjecta ad propagandum regnum divinum; miracula gratiae, quae per Deum fiunt in hominis animo ad ipsum salvandum." Chapuis drew attention to the commonly-made distinction between the general and special activity of God, the latter being of the nature of a special intervention called revelation, rendered necessary by the Fall - this conception being a mixture of Greek rationalism and Hebrew supernaturalism. Modern thought, however, since Vinet and Schleiermacher, has insisted, instead of discontinuity, on the inner harmony between the ideas and facts of revelation and the needs of the human soul. But in much Protestantism, the "miraculous" infallibility of scripture has persisted. "Revelation is a phenomenon as universal as religion"(1) - they are two names for the same phenomena. "Revelation is God in us! Religion is us in God!" We cannot thus speak of a double form of divine activity without contradiction. Intervention is contradictory of the idea of God, supposing that, outside of Him, there exists some possibility of being, that He is not supreme causality. Beyond, and above, laws, religious feeling lays hold on God, and we no longer think to revive the cosmological proof, on the powerlessness of which both Pascal and Kant agreed. "We affirm that the moral consciousness is the seat or intimate sanctuary of being. It does not only furnish the feeling of obligation, but directs the feeling of dependence which is, to speak appropriately, religious feeling. The source, or, at least, the seat, of religion is not in thought, although it has its part; it is not, further, nor exclusively, in feeling, although it helps at its birth. It is in consciousness."(2) This reminds us of what Secrétan said, that the true supernatural is freedom, the moral supernatural implying an order in which there is

(1) op. cit. p. 142.
(2) op. cit. p. 148-149.
a taking consciousness of divine activity, not medially, but immediately, perceived. Thus, if religious fact is an immediate perception of the divine, religious impression can be only subjective, (which in no way implies the illusory). If God is not in us, no power in the world will demonstrate Him outside us.

According to Chapuis, therefore, the supernatural is relative, a thing being supernatural for one while not for another. It does not correspond to an objective reality arising from the natural order; it appears mediate through natural laws, and perception of it is immediate. As there are no objective miracles, there are subjective miracles, i.e. phenomena which can impress religiously. In the profound intimacy of our being is the domain of the supernatural. "A miracle does not offer any more revelation of God than the daily circumstances of our lives. The adoration of God as spirit, in spirit and truth, is the goal of higher religion of which the Nazarene was the incomparable initiator." (1)

The ideas of Chapuis were vigorously criticised by H. Bois (2) and defended by A. Fornerod. (3) One's criticism of Chapuis would be that he omitted the moral supernatural, appearing to constitute miracle as a supernatural phenomenon escaping from the ordinary causality of things, and as a special act envisaged as a divine action. Thus, limiting himself, it seems, to miracle as constituted in terms of physical phenomena, he was driven to deny its objectivity, asserting only its subjective recognition. He appeared to be trapped in the dilemma - that either miracle is regarded as belonging to the order of physical phenomena, in which case it is to be denied demonstrable objectivity (it is not, as he said in his introduction, to be

(1) op. cit. p. 197.
(2) "Le Surnaturel d'après M. Chapuis": Revue de théologie et des questions religieuses, Montauban - 1898.
(3) In a lecture entitled "La vie chrétienne et le surnaturel", given at Lausanne on 22 Mar. 1898, and published in the Revue de Lausanne, July 1898.
identified with "the unexplained or the inexplicable"; or it does not belong to that order, in which case it is a matter of individual recognition and perception. The reason for this was, as Bois pointed out, that he never really freed himself from the conception of miracle as physical. In association with this, he appeared to sacrifice freedom to a principle of causality, regarded as belonging intrinsically to the scientific understanding of the world. But since when has it been possible to make acts of human freedom the subject of science? And if there is nothing whereby to distinguish a miraculous physical act from a non-miraculous physical act, why should room not be left in our constitution of it for an exercise of freedom, for the exercise of the freedom of the divine will? Too much of Chapuis' thinking was in bondage to current ideas of the sovereignty of "the scientific method". His view of the absolute-ness of science did not require to be inferred from even such a pronouncement as that of Renouvier\(^{(1)}\) - "whatever there is of the order of or dependence on, free will in the world is outside the conditions of inflexibility and invariability of natural laws, outside of the certainty of prevision, outside of the sciences."

One would have preferred to follow Secrétan, where he wrote:\(^{(2)}\) - "the a priori denial of miracles would be justifiable to me only in systems of absolute science and universal determinism. Such systems we repulse, not out of love for miracles, but out of respect for the moral order which such systems would suppress, and in terms of sincerity to the facts." This view emerged as much more acceptable to Frommel than that of Chapuis.

With Sabatier, the perceptibility of miracle was directly linked with the doctrine of revelation. Divine revelation is the history of the activity of God in the heart of humanity, this activity being

\(^{(1)}\) "Critique philosophique": Feb. 1876.

\(^{(2)}\) Le miracle et la philosophie; 1877 - Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue Suisse, LIX, p. 288.
historically and psychologically conditioned. The activity is inte-
telligible and is the material of knowledge. God acts in organic
penetration in accordance with His own sovereign laws, using natural
and historical facts to release religious feeling and experience in
the heart of man. The manifestations of God in nature are always a
matter of faith, His acts, even through the tissue of secondary
causes, being "perceived" by the vigilant and the faithful. "For
the deaf, the universe is dumb."

The interiority of revelation was, for Sabatier, constituted in
the immanent action of God. His transcendence is known to us only
through His immanence. "Le Dieu intérieur" is all that we can know
of God. The events of nature and history are the intermediaries of
revelation, but they are not revelatory to unbelief. Religious
truth is not a "supernatural" gift fallen from above, legitimised by
signs and wonders. Revelation is one, always supernatural and
natural at the same time - supernatural in cause, natural in effect.

His attitude to history gave it greater significance in doctrinal
elaboration than did that of Frommel. Over against the latter's
constitution of revelation in terms of redemption and regeneration,
Sabatier's criteria of perceptibility appeared subjective and depen-
dent on the explicable of the supernatural in terms of the
natural. This was the criticism by Bois in the Montauban review. (1)
Bois quoted Sabatier - "the subject and the object of revelation
penetrate each other, becoming but one. The object of religious
knowledge is immanent in the subject himself." The epistemological
implications of this were clear in the matter of the perceptibility
of miracle. Bois' comment was "the thing which is missing in this
theory is the living, free, spiritually active personality of God."

Sabatier appeared to betray his own concept of the spiritual

perceptibility of miracle, and to fall back on a mistakenly created tension, if not a dualism, between the modes and orders of knowledge, when he wrote, in "La Semaine Littéraire",(1) "Science and miracle are two notions exclusive of each other, the first being the explained, the second the unexplainable."

We now turn to Frommel's analysis of the relation and dynamic link between the concepts of the Supernatural and Revelation. He agreed that the nature of revelation will determine the question of the perceptibility of miracle. In his general methodological approach, he set aside any method but that of induction founded on internal evidence, no valid basis being allowed to speculation, history or other norm. The religious life has its source in an experience of the will of the believer, intimate, immediate and actual, attested by devotion. Devotion, as the vital realisation of religion, yields the object of theology, the "given" not being exterior fact, either of history or "sense". But, phenomenally speaking, there are historical conditions and observable results. The antinomies of our being are not constitutive of the essential character of the human creature, being, rather, "accidental", resulting from the Fall; and this fact affects our ability to "perceive". Since the experience of this immediate, unconditional activity exercised by a transcendent will on the unconscious principle of the human will constitutes the true principle of religion, and this, by its universality, transcendence and personal quality is regarded as experience of the Divine in obedience and worship, the feeling of obligation is the means, and, indeed, the bearer, of religious revelation.

Frommel distinguished natural, or primary, revelation from secondary, Christian, revelation. The content and limits of the first are as follows - theism should flow from the universal expe-

(1) 11 Dec. 1897.
rience of the obligation of conscience, but it does not. This is explainable in terms of imperfections and lacunae in religious experience leading to incompleteness of revelation, and involving a feeling of dualism (a tension between the holiness and the tolerance of God.) Lack of unanimity and clarity of perception is due to the Fall, the introduction of a radical rupture within man's nature, the reflective will being at odds with the unconscious principle. Thus, experience, thought of as normal, should really be regarded as abnormal, such that the revelatory language of obligation does not reach the reflective will. "Natural man knoweth not the things of the spirit."

As to the second, the morbid characteristics of abnormal experience are abolished in Jesus Christ. Separation from God is replaced by communion, and revelation of God is given in the consciousness of Christ. In Frommel's distinctive view, this harmonious consciousness is found to be transmissible. History shows that Jesus was not mistaken in believing that His followers would become participants in His state of consciousness. There are, however, two differences - with us, the state is not "given", but is in the way of realisation; it is implied and guaranteed, but is not complete or absolute. Further, and unlike Christ Himself, it is a perpetual struggle with the antecedent, natural state of consciousness.

"Jésus, conscience de leur conscience, rend à la revelation naturelle toute la force, tout l'éclat et toute l'évidence dont elle avait été privée par le péché." Revelation is, at the same time, a redemption; indeed, revelation and redemption are inseparable, being, religiously speaking, one self-same phenomenon.

Frommel established a parallel between natural and Christian revelation in that, although there is an obvious radical discontinuity,
there is also the necessity to the postulate of Christian revelation of the anterior 'natural' religious revelation, there being complementarity and a certain affinity, and the common mode to both is that of being experimental. Natural revelation varies in proportion to faithful moral response to the experience of obligation, (compare the argument of Rom. 1.); Christian revelation in proportion to the moral faithfulness of the individual to the experience of Christ accorded to him, this being a grace not attained by virtue. Natural revelation, with Frommel, was distinguished from the category of a Kantian "a priori" intellectual understanding. The "Natural knowledge" of God, as in the Pauline passage, is in terms of moral obligation and the testimony of the moral consciousness, not in terms of metaphysical perception. Perception being vitiated by sin, re-establishment of revelation is given in, and as, redemption. Perceptibility of miracle is, therefore, constituted in terms of the conferring of spiritual discernment. The question is to be settled, not in the context of metaphysical natural/supernatural dualism, nor ontological demonstration, not yet by giving in to a form of scientific reductionism, but in the context of faith and of the new creation. Perceptibility is conferred by faith and discernment by the renewing of the mind.

Causality and Contradiction

Consequent upon the foregoing, Frommel noted, in the penultimate section of the work, that his thought was distinguished from that of Chapuis, in particular, by the attitude to the principles of causality and contradiction. Near the beginning of his study, Chapuis had clearly said that there is a total difference between what we call a mystery and any phenomenon to which applies the sign of logical contradiction, the conclusion being that, given our mental consti-
tution, the supernatural has no intelligible place in the natural order, being "unthinkable".

He made a superficial analysis of the idea of scientific law, identifying it simply with the principle of causality, and appeared, despite Hume, Kant and Renouvier, to confuse the principle of contradiction with that of causality. His extraordinary conclusion(1) was that "if God had wished it, He could have made a square a circle and light darkness, for there is nothing conceivable above or beyond the Divine will"! This would seem to have no foundation either in the Bible or in metaphysics, and, rather than rule out miracle on the ground of contradictoriness or unintelligibility, we would agree with Renouvier that "reason and what we know of 'laws' do not oblige us to deny the possibility of miracle." In the latter's view, while neither affirmation nor denial can be the attitude of philosophy qua philosophy as to the reality of miracle, miracle may be "regarded as a particular intervention of the divine will to modify established causality".(2) Again, trapped by syllogistic reasoning, Chapuis moved from the "exclusion of prodigy, if it exists, from the field of phenomena perceptible to our mental structure", to its essential subjectivity.

It was, as remarked by H. Bois,(3) a strange conclusion that it is subjective judgment which could alone constitute a miracle. It is subjective judgment which constitutes belief in miracle - a very different thing. In all this, there is an echo, one feels, of the sceptical view of E. Renan, where he wrote:(4) "it is not for us to demonstrate the impossibility of miracle; it is for miracle to demonstrate itself... A being which is not revealed by any action is, for science, a being which does not exist." Before giving

(1) op. cit. p. 117-118.
(2) Quoted by Chapuis - op. cit. p. 90.
(3) op. cit. p. 673.
(4) Dialogues philosophiques, p. 245-246.
Frommel's own conclusion, we note an exchange of view between H. Bois and L. Lafon (pastor) on what constitutes "modern orthodoxy". The latter disclaimed absolute allegiance to the school of Sabatier (symbolo-fideism). He chided Bois for using the phrase, "the spontaneous play of natural laws" when he (Bois) did not think that these laws have their principle in themselves (the implication of "spontaneity"). Bois, however, thought the matter of definition unimportant, since miracle remains the affirmation of actions accomplished by the divine freedom proceeding with regard to laws already existent, as does human freedom, miracle being the particular action of the divine will, distinct from the general divine will expressed by the natural order of things. Lafon regarded nothing as miracle "pour Dieu", but said that, for man, there is miracle when he finds himself in the presence of a divine phenomenon for which he cannot find explanation in natural laws. "I am sure that Jesus did not distinguish between the general and special activity of God." Bois' rejoinder to this was that this effectively destroys miracle as such, instead of establishing it.

Frommel corrected Chapuis' error in constituting the law in terms of which we apprehend phenomena as being solely that of necessary causality, i.e. determinism. The word "necessary" confuses the issue. All phenomena have a cause, be the cause 'necessary' or free. Reason tells us that every phenomenon has a natural or necessary cause, otherwise no science is possible; but, outside of the self-imposed bondage of reason, man acknowledges that, while cause is required, it may be necessary or free. The perceptibility of miracle is thus sited in the recognition of the intervention of a free cause. This is not "mysterious", because we may make the same discernment in everyday things.

(1) See "Le Miracle et l'orthodoxie moderne", by L. Lafon: Revue de théologie et quest. rel.: Montauban - June 1898.
Being ourselves the subjects of an immediate Divine action, we readily acknowledge the possibility of other similar activity, the organ of the supernatural being the moral consciousness. In this, as noted earlier, Frommel agreed with Chapuis as to the need of a primary miracle, the mental transformation involved in revelatory redemption, (or redemptive revelation,) conferring the gift of perception. This leads, according to Frommel, to the constitution of a specifically Christian "noétique", in which there is judgment of the possibility of miracle in general by analogy with our experience of freedom and obligation, and of the reality of redemptive miracle by analogy with the reality and character of the redemptive experience of which we have become the objects.

Tantalisingly, and disappointingly, Frommel, for whatever reason - either purposely, or through the untimely ending of his work - offered no further development of his basic thesis. Indeed, he wrote, (1) "There would be much to say. I am indicating the way to follow - it is for you to go in it"... We would have wished to know his treatment of miracle from the point of view of the historicity or otherwise of Biblical narratives, but this would raise linguistic and exegetical considerations which find little place anywhere in his work. The ending of the Apologetic with the two "theses" on the questions of the Supernatural and Evil resulted inevitably in a feeling of "added material", related, but, in effect, discontinuous. We were to be dealing, as Frommel said, with "intellectual problems", and we may ask whether - as in the chapter on Epistemology - the material will be accepted by the general reader in terms of Apologetic validity, or whether it will be felt to move, in however unacknowledged a manner, more within the analysis of dogmatic.

(1) op. cit. p. 326.
The conclusion of this part is slightly anti-climactic, coming after the acknowledgment by Frommel that the reader has now to follow the guide-lines suggested. As a summary, however, it is useful—the following being a paraphrased translation:—Current definitions of miracle are rejected as incompatible with the idea of God, (miracle as a violation or contradiction of laws, which, being the expression of the divine will, must involve God contradicting Himself), either as incompatible with the idea of miracle itself (defining miracle as the expression of a rare or unknown law reduces miracle to the scientifically inexplicable, without religious value); or as improper (miracle regarded as the suspension or replacement of one law by another). We would define miracle as we have defined the moral supernatural— as a special action of God on the world, possible without violation, derogation or suspension of natural laws, analogous to acts of human freedom, and in terms of the over-arching principle of the inferiority of the physical to the moral and the subservience of matter to, and in, the service of freedom.

The final, decisive analysis is in terms of a universe comprising a hierarchy of orders, laws and forces. Two writers in particular may have inclined Frommel to this conception—Boutroux;¹ offering a hierarchical structuring of laws—logical, mathematical, physical, chemical, biological, psychological, sociological, in terms of mounting importance and diminishing determinism.... and Aug. Comte;² where the orders of phenomena with their 'sciences' are in 'échelons' of mutual superiority or inferiority. Nature is to be understood in the double context of the divine and human freedom; and the appearance of freedom in man, and his exercise of it, being 'super-natural', inexplicable, miraculous in regard to inferior orders, the divine freedom and its exercise will, by the same title,

(1) "De la contingence des lois de la nature".
(2) As quoted in an article in "Christien évangélique" 1895: "La notion biblique du miracle".
be a miracle to man, inaccessible and inexplicable to natural man, but becomes known and perceptible in its sovereign causality in the context of revelation, i.e. supernatural redemption. If this thesis can be acceptable in terms of even a simple, theistic conception, how much more valid it becomes in terms of a lost world on which operates the supreme power of redemptive grace.

In this analysis of the supernatural, Frommel could be said to have anticipated the direction of later theistic debate. A modern writer has expressed his concern "not to abolish transcendence (for without transcendence God becomes indistinguishable from the world, so superfluous) but to find a way of expressing transcendence which would not tie God's reality to a supernaturalist or mythological world view."(1)

The terms of the debate are as he later constituted them; (2) the supernaturalist projection "represented the reality of God in human experience by the existence of a God or gods in some realm above or beyond that of everyday relationships." Belief in the supernatural would thus be tied up with the acceptance of the reality of such a Being or Person. Frommel was already giving expression to a developing theological unease as to the validity and the effect of attaching Christianity to a supernaturalist projection, in which elements of the prodigious, the capricious, the monstrous even, might obscure and vitiate the conception of Deity, which should be defined in terms of moral transcendence and redemptive activity.

In defining the supernatural in terms of the moral and redemptive, Frommel moved beyond the terms of his own constitution of the nature of God, employing the language (as in the relevant section of the Dogmatics) of attributes and properties. We have seen how he specified that certainty of the supernatural was not in historical

(2) op. cit. p. 35.
nor philosophical terms.

The trouble with much discussion of the "existence" of God has been that existence has been regarded as ontologically defined, and the natural-supernatural relationship, instead of being constituted in terms of self-transcendence or of the moral and redemptive, was forced into the unsuitable mould of an ontological dualism, or even dichotomy. While Frommel fully agreed with Pascal as to the "powerless proofs" of the existence of God, his only escape from the traditional framework of thought, in which God is regarded as a Being, is in his analysis of the implications for religious knowledge of the distinctive Christian experience. Such knowledge is not of God as He is in Himself but as He is for us. This yields a dynamic, rather than a static, conception of God's being, the revelation being constituted, not in ontological, but in moral and redemptive, terms.

Frommel's Christology could have carried the weight of a fuller development of the theistic discussion. The Christonomic constitution of the experience of the believer could have decisively shaped subsequent development in that area of theological concern, but its influence and impact remained small, and other modes of thinking became dominant. However, in the modern analysis of transcendence, secularism and associated questions, there is echo of the Frommelian emphasis; instead of seeking the reality of God through the conferring upon Him of essence and existence (considerations of metaphysics and ontology), His reality is to be discerned in terms of activity - in Frommel's submission, moral and redemptive - (considerations of functionality and personal relationship.)

"It would be a great victory for Christian apologetics if the words God and existence were very definitely separated except in the paradox of God becoming manifest under the conditions of existence,
that is, in the Christological paradox."(1)

This emphasis upon Christology as the key area of theistic discussion in which alone metaphysical dualism may be overcome, is consistent with Frommel's rejection of a bare scientific naturalism (instinct with reductionism) in which the transcendent is evaporated or reduced to a dimension of the natural.

The supernatural is not some dimension in which we place the existence of a supreme Being - who may, by that token, be only deistically related to the dimension of the natural. We assert, rather, that the dimension of the supernatural is that in which the dynamic activity of God is constituted in its moral, redemptive mode. We further assert God's transcendence and freedom with regard to the world in terms of His redemptive purpose; and "justification and regeneration as the supernatural par excellence, working in man what is, at one time, contrary to his evil will, and superior and inaccessible to his fallen nature."(2)

(2) Frommel: op. cit. p. 289.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE FALL

Plato's discourse of ideography bids, as we have seen, three distinct divisions: personal, in good and evil; and as follows:

First Part: Negative and subsidiary, declining the possibility of the principles and methods employed in the search for moral ends.

Second Part: Positive and subsidiary, analyzing the nature of the anchorite as the principle of justice, and the nature of the moral of the period of calculation of particularly intellectual problems. The main themes are those of apologia and stagnation and the problems which arise from them are those of evil and of the supernatural. The issue to be developed in the whole period of the maximization of obduracy is the nature of the relation of the order of nature and the order of Salvation. Plato acknowledges that these problems existed by themselves, real problems of his own, specially denoted apologetic, and that, accordingly, any harm be treated more widely, and without rigorous attachment to the problem already posed.

The sense of the problem now to be seen in definitions, in these can we discern, of the "supernatural", quite and well, a book to be accurately, yet a certain caution still be acquired. From the point of view of the moral consciousness, good to the accomplishment of duty, the achievement in reality of what in nature is possible; and by right, the attitude of the activity in the good will. From the point of view of feeling (as a mode of consciousness) it has been regarded as happiness, the joy of well-being, superior welfare. It is to be maintained, universal value.

Even the point of view of the Aristotelianism, namely, the consciousness of the activity and form of the intellectual, it is
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE FALL

Frommel's course of Apologetics had, as we have seen, three distinct divisions constituted in purpose and content as follows:—

First Part: Negative and eliminatory, examining the validity of the principles and methods employed in the search for 'human truth', summed up in the question: "Quel homme suis-je?"

Second part: Positive and thetic, establishing the supreme validity of "le moralisme" as the principle of certainty and the means of the knowledge of 'human truth'.

Third part: The analysis of particular "intellectual" problems. The main themes are those of Apologetics and Dogmatics and the problems which flow from them are those of Evil and of the Supernatural. The first is involved in the whole analysis of the phenomenon of obligation, the second in the relation of the order of nature and the order of Salvation. Frommel acknowledged that these problems existed by themselves, even outside of his own specially conceived apologetic, and that, therefore, "they must be treated more widely, and without rigorous attachment to the premises already posed."

The terms of the problem are to be seen in definitions, if these can be found, of the "correlates", good and evil. Such is not easy, but a certain consensus will be agreed. From the point of view of the moral consciousness, good is the accomplishment of duty, the achievement in reality of what is present in potentiality and by right, the attitude and the activity of the good will. From the point of view of feeling (as a mode of consciousness) it has been regarded as happiness, the joy of well-being, supreme self-realisation; it is a primal, universal drive.

From the point of view of the intellectual consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of the activity and laws of the intelligence, it is
knowledge, or truth. The great postulate of the reason is the accessibility, with view to possession, of knowledge and truth. It may be said that these three can be subsumed under one form and definition, viz. order, by which is meant harmony and congruence between the subjects and exterior objects, conditions of existence, activities and destiny. Order implies propriety and excellence of function, the right 'ordering' of things according to the inner laws of their being and the norms of their existence and co-existence. This order not being universally attained nor experienced, we would constitute it as "what should be", i.e. for the intelligence, truth; for the heart, happiness; for the will, duty. Frommel constituted the moral order as supreme, dominating and conditioning those of the heart and the reason.

Chas. Secrétan had written that "if there exists an order, it is clear that the moral order, being supreme over all, contains the reasons of all. No-one could contest that without denying himself, for it is to be false to oneself, or to proclaim one's ignominy, to put anything in the scales with probity." (1) We have noted elsewhere, the antecedence of Secrétan to Frommel's thought, and we now find a striking dependence on the form, and a considerable dependence on the substance, of the important study by Ernest Naville, "Le Problème du Mal": 7 Discours. (Geneve. Librairie Cherbuliez 1869). Frommel's treatment of the problem of evil, while his own, is cast almost in the form of a critique and development of Naville's thetic analysis. Naville constituted the basis of the discussion of the problem of evil as follows

On "the Good" - "the real sense of the word 'good' is that of order, when a thing is in harmony with its purpose. Good is 'what should be'. When reason conceives of the good, it becomes, in a

(1) "La Civilisation et la Croyance", p. 128.
way, the organ of absolute conscience, pronouncing a universal "d'etre".... The paradox of our situation is to fear and yet love the good, and, as with the Greeks, to think that to know the good will be to wish to do it. The determination of the good is the accomplishment of the moral law; the three great duties, which are really one, are those of dignity, justice and goodwill.... The paradox of our situation is to fear and yet love the good, and, as with the Greeks, to think that to know the good will be to wish to do it. The determination of the good is the accomplishment of the moral law; the three great duties, which are really one, are those of dignity, justice and goodwill....

On "obligation" - "What constitutes the voice of conscience is the immediate feeling of an obligation linking our will to an action it must accomplish. Obligation is not desire, for it often contradicts it; it is not a constraint, for it addresses itself to our freedom... it is a primitive fact, constituting for us a duty, i.e. a Command which we acknowledge as legitimate. We are free, but are not the masters of our freedom. As Kant says ("Crit. of Practical Reason" p. 262) "duty and obligation are the sole two words by which to express our relationship to the moral law".

Frommel noted that some have equated good, the supreme good, with God. If this is conceived of as divine substance, it is in error; good is manifested and constituted as a relationship, a harmony, an order - not in a "substantial", metaphysical sense, but in a dynamic. The idea of order, or pattern, that should be is conceived by thought only under the condition of the moral imperative. It is not a state of fact or present reality, but presents itself as a "becoming" under the category of obligation. Affective and intellectual order and harmony, being concomitant with reality and human destiny, are likewise constituted in terms of what should be, and therefore subsumed also under the universal category of obligation.

As Naville writes, "God is the guarantee of good. Nature, humanity, heart, reason and conscience suppose Him. He is the

(1) op. cit. pp. 8,9,27.
(2) op.cit. p. 4-5.
(3) op.cit. pp. 47-53.
postulate, and the guarantor, of good — and this is not a vicious circle of thought.... He is the personal principle of good which is the direct manifestation of His eternal will. To say 'good' and to say 'the will of God' is to say the same thing twice. Thus is the atheist's argument vitiated — it is founded upon the idea of God's goodness; man appears, in the extremity, to prefer the folly of atheism to the crime of blasphemy....".

Frommel further reminds us that, as evidence of instinctive human urge towards order, mankind is outraged at suffering, particularly the suffering of the innocent — an indication that well-being is implied in obligation, in the sense that such well-being is the "epi-

phenomenal" accompaniment to the response of the human organism to the "expérience imposée" of the obligation of conscience. The good is that which is ideationally conceived by the reflective will, intuitively apperceived by the non-discursive reason as subliminally touched by the 'fons et origo' of good, and which constitutes itself as "order" in its teleological functioning of the human organism as such.

What, then, as to the constitution and definition of Evil? Frommel began with a quotation from Neville(1) — "Evil is not the absence of good; the absence of a thing is nothing. Evil is in no way 'nothing' — it is a reality all too unhappily real... a disorder in the relation between beings." If evil is the "contrary" of good, a disorder which should not be, it will manifest itself as such in the three spheres as above — viz. in the intellect, as error; in the area of feeling, as suffering; and, in the moral consciousness, as

sin. We may consider these separately:—

**Error.** Evil is not a logical contradiction: it is, as suggested, a contrary, involving negation, hostility, and, con-

(1) op. cit. p.57.
sidering the good as order, dysteleology. Defining it as error is not to define it as ignorance. We might feel that, although Frommel did not specifically mention it, he was implying by the definition, the presence of fallacious syllogistic reasoning (that of the "un-distributed middle term"), since, obviously, not all ignorance is culpable, in the sense of carrying moral guilt. This, indeed, was the fallacy of the Greek equation of virtue and knowledge. Knowledge and ignorance refer to the reflective, rational faculty which constitutes a part only of the totality of man's being, in the area of cognition and sense-appreciation where metaphysical, a priori, considerations would exclude the determinative, free activity of a moral agent responding, or not responding, to "L'expérience imposée", the sense of the obligation of conscience. Naville, while constituting sin as the violation of known law, the revolt of the will against the power and authority of conscience, added that, when the law is not known, it may have been veiled from our eyes by our own fault. Pleading intellectual ignorance obscures the fact that man, as sinful, is involved in moral blindness.

**Suffering** — It is a tempting hypothesis, that of constituting suffering as the essence of evil. It would appear easy to state the case of suffering as a universal disorder which should not be. But the paradox is that the reason which would constitute suffering as evil finds itself driven to recognise its ennobling, remedial, beneficial and, indeed, redemptive nature. Mankind acknowledges the profound truth instinct in the recognition by poets, philosophers and moral teachers of the place of suffering as an inescapable element in human experience. Was not Jesus Christ, the norm of humanity, a "man of sorrows"?

All apologies for suffering seem to be offered under the three
headings of "warning, remedy, punishment". (This classification is found in Naville(1) and in Frommel(2)). (The editor of La Vérité Humaine, vol. III, mentions in a footnote (pp. 9-10) that there are other quotations from Naville built into Frommel's text besides those which are acknowledged and annotated; this is one of them.)

We may not define evil as suffering 'simpliciter'. The Christian understanding of suffering has not been to characterise it as evil in itself - rather to link it to the suffering of Christ, thus finding in it an element of redemption and creativity. It may, therefore, have remedial and refining power, but this is to be regarded as "accidental" and dependent on a factor outside of itself, namely, the will of the sufferer to wrest value from what is itself morally and spiritually ambivalent. In the Divine economy, it may be warning, remedy and the manifestation of justice, viewed pedagogically. It is not an end but a means. It is, paradoxically, in its "disorder", a measure, witness and guarantee of ultimate "order", in the three-fold sense outlined above. Frommel asserts(3) that suffering "in the actuality of human existence, is a relative good, or, if one prefers it, a useful evil, a "necessary evil", but not good in itself, and must not be considered as such.

Frommel's treatment of the question of evil, up to this point, was brief, and his outline of the relation of suffering and evil somewhat summary, but the real focus of his thought is to be the nature and origin of evil, rather than a treatise on the question of suffering. He was criticised for this by Arnold Reymond, in his "Le Problème du Mal et l'Apologétique de Gaston Frommel": (Revue de théol. et de Philos., Lausanne, 1917). At this point we note Reymond's criticism of the Naville-Frommel three-fold division. He preferred to regard the manifestation of evil as in the three fields

(1) op. cit. p. 82.
(2) op. cit. p. 25.
(3) op. cit. p. 29-30.
of intelligence, feeling and will - corresponding, without significant difference, to the Frommelian manifestations of disorder, viz. error, suffering and sin; and complained that Frommel dealt in 4 pages with a problem (the relation of knowledge to virtue and of ignorance to sin) which has troubled the great philosophers from Plato to Renouvier. "Error, disorder of the intelligence, is a disorder which should not be; and, if it should not be, that is to say, if it is culpable and responsible, if the fault always falls back on someone, it is that it has its root in moral evil." (La Ver. Hum. III p. 22). Reymond agreed that all error, even scientific, is an imperfection, but questioned whether imperfection of perception is necessarily linked with individual moral guilt. As Reymond did not himself expand this point, we may judge that Frommel is within his theological rights as constituted, namely, that disorder in any sphere is linked, ultimately, if not immediately causally, with "cosmic" disorder, the sign of humanity's estrangement and abnormality of existence. As always, he determines his material from a 'religious' point of view, and is not under obligation to establish, from a detached, philosophical point of view, the metaphysical or ontological link here requested. This highlighted the abiding problem of the "apologist", his task, necessary yet perhaps impossible, of defending the substance of the faith before the profane reason.

Reymond did not so seriously criticise Frommel's analysis of evil experienced as suffering, broadly accepting that suffering has been legitimised in that the "man is the apprentice, sorrow the master". It may be warning and remedy - but to what point is it "merited" as chastisement? There was, at the back of his thought, a feeling (not explored by Frommel) that there is, in essential terms, discontinuity between moral sin and physical suffering. Did not Micah point to
this discontinuity in his phrase (Mic. 6:7) "the fruit of my body for
the sin of my soul"?

On the subject of suffering and sin, a deeply-felt devotional
study was offered to the Société Vaudoise de Théologie, in Nov. 1898,
by a Swiss Pastor, J. Raccaud, under the title "Souffrance et Péché",
its substance being as follows:-- The reality of suffering cannot be
denied -- no pastor could be unaware of it. Description and examples
are readily furnished. Raccaud agreed with Naville and Frommel that
the word best suited to describe it is the perception of 'disaccord'
and adds that of 'abnormality'. There can be justice in suffering
where it is the fruit of foolish and evil activity, and utility as
the occasion of acquiring strength of attaining development. The
study further treated of the origin, the anthropological determi-
nation and role of suffering.

On the first of these, thought must be tentative. If, with
man's first sin, suffering came into the world, the problem is
whether there was perfection before man's sin, (God making all
things, and seeing that they were good,) or whether creation was per-
verted by a power other than earthly man. Could we accept this view
that suffering is the law of a developing world, proof of the educa-
tive action of God who foresaw the fall and chose suffering as the
means of constraining the creature to march forward? We think not.
Some take the view of Julius Müller, that we are never free of fault;
we are born sinners, "in sin", yet feel responsible. We must have
had some kind of pre-existence, the initial evil act being anterior
to present existence. This, of course, is not an 'empirical' pheno-
menon, but "un fait intelligible". (We shall find an interesting
echo of that phrase, when we come to Frommel's own analysis.)

The weakness of this view is its eluding of experimental control
or experiential analysis, and its location outside of Biblical authorship. However, Raccaud did not share the disdain of many of his contemporaries for the idea of Satan, and thinks Grétillat was right in his hypothesis that man has replaced Satan in a heritage denied to him because of his Fall. But in all this there was much imprecision.

The phrase "un fait intelligible" appeared in the "Dogmatique" of J. Boyon (1) and from this work the following was taken by Riccaud (2) on the question of the relation of death, as the extreme example of suffering, to sin:—"our physical constitution can allow no other issue to natural existence than dissolution. If death came by the Fall, the sin of Adam must have changed his corporeal nature — a bizarre conception difficult to sustain." Riccaud constituted this as raising a false issue — the real issue being, not the exterior circumstances of life, (i.e., physically regarded) but the way of envisaging them, (i.e., so as to conserve the real seriousness of sin.) Making his peace with the broad evolutionary hypothesis, our writer sees man, as the crown and king of creation, making his appearance in a world where already reigned suffering and death, and being called to transcend this by complete communion with God.

Falling into sin, he became the victim of suffering and the prey of death. Suffering, therefore, warns man that he is a sinner. He may thereby come to imputation of the self — of which Christ Himself is the model; ("He learned obedience by the things which he suffered" — Heb. 5:8). We may share in the redemptive suffering of Christ, through the mystery of "Solidarity".

We find a report, by the retiring President of the Société Vaudoise de Théologie, Ernest Combe, in June 1899, of the contributions to the Society, where reference was made to Prof. Jules Boyon.

(2) Vol. I. p. 496.
and Pasteur J. Riccaud, giving a summary of their thought. Mention is also made of the effort by Petavel-Offiff at conciliation between Sabatier and Frommel, in which natural evolution is seen as preparatory to the higher evolutionism, such that, the earth being regarded as the cradle for candidates for immortality, with the evolution of freedom, the relation of sin and redemption can be maintained.

Turning again to Frommel, we find continuing congruence between his analysis and its format and those of Naville. Both considered the negations of evil that have been known. To deny the reality of evil, to assert that everything is in order, is to torture and outrage the reason (Naville). "To regard evil as somehow illusory, or as the complement, corollary or even contrast, of the good is to destroy the very essence of good, and therefore by the same token, evil as evil." (1)

It is not that some deny the experience of suffering - it is rather that they explain it as 'necessity' or 'appearance'; evil does not have independent reality but is included in the description of the world as normal. There is also the metaphysical treatment of evil as appearance. In a particular speculative ontology, good is defined as, and confused with, "being" as such, hence evil is privation of being, privation of good. This metaphysical view, in effect depriving evil of ontological status, has underlain, implicitly, philosophical and theological systems as diverse as those of Plato, Origen, Thomas, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Hegel.

Granted, therefore, that we do not "evaporate" the problem as above, it must be seriously faced and solutions considered. The terms of reference are constituted as the existence of a holy and sovereign God, and the experience of the obligation of conscience - so that the problem must be resolved in the area of human freedom.

(1) op. cit. p. 37.
"Freedom, the condition of evil, is not an evil, but a good. If God created us free, He has not created us bad, but only capable of becoming so, which is quite different. And if He created us free, it is because He wished us to be good and happy, and because there is neither happiness nor true goodness outside of freedom. The solution (must) respect the supremacy of the moral order."(1)

Proposed solutions were considered by Naville and Frommel, each, in its way, found unsatisfactory and insufficient. They were essentially two - that evil comes from the body (or flesh), or that it comes from the social organisation of man. In the case of the first, some have seen semi-Platonic over-tones in the Pauline Conception of "sarx", and the suggestion of Gnosticism and Manicheanism that a first reading of the passages about 'the flesh' and 'the spirit' might offer. But Paul was not guilty of such error of dualism, since the true context of "sarx" is that of the experience, desires and affections of man as delivered over to the elements of this world in the area of the reflective intelligence and will, yet finding emancipation from them in the response to the experience of transcendent obligation, in which the conflict of flesh and spirit is not Manichean, but is in terms of spiritual discernment, refused or accepted. In siting evil in the physical, sensory world, instead of that of man's moral and spiritual consciousness, we constitute an intimate link between dualism and asceticism. As Frommel put it, they are "cousins".

There are, secondly, echoes of Rousseau's social philosophy in the view that evil is socially constituted. Expressed with dangerous brevity, 'man is good, society bad', 'man is free, but finds himself in bondage'... But how could it be that, by adding together good apples, you get a collection of bad apples? Logic would seem

(1) Frommel, op. cit. pp. 48-49 n.
on the side of Vinet, who regarded the social organism or state as the inevitable fruit of the sin of man. Its malaise, the elements of constraint, fear and deceit — these are the elements of man's nature, written large. Social reformers are often unrealistic in the matter of man's nature, where they seem to regard evil as something accidentally present in society, instead of something constituted in the individual. Yet it was Rousseau, as quoted by Naville, who said: "I am sure there is no man, be he as honest as may be, if he always follows that his heart dictates, who would not become, in a short while, the worst of criminals!"(1)

Frommel was careful, however, to avoid any purely "individualist" solution. The only true evil is that which is actual and individual, in the sense of being the act of the individual, constituted in his personal freedom. But the "individualist" view of evil as constituted in this personal activity as such omits the element of universality. The characteristics of evil are generality and essentiality,(2) the classic example of the denial of such being Pelagianism, in which the individual is regarded as having, within himself, a total, real and free choice in the matter of moral activity, he, as an individual, being in self-determining discontinuity with all other individuals, i.e. with humanity as constituted in solidarity and interdependence. But human truth is known in human solidarity, and, for this reason, the individualist solution is discarded.

Deeper analysis of human consciousness yields recognition of a "tendency (disposition) towards evil", the individual or private "satan" being personalised as an expression of an ineluctable, universalised disposition. The significance of heredity is not a physical transmission of culpability, but in the sharing of the "generality and essentiality" of constitutive human experience and nature. Man is

(1) op. cit. p. 146.
(2) Naville, op. cit. p. 140.
heir to a nature characterised by elements of inner conflict and disharmony, what St. Paul calls "this body of death", this condition of being "under the law of our members". In the presence of this nature, the free will consents or resists.

In all this there must be allowed the pressure of evil on the individual and the weakening effect of habit on the will. There must likewise be allowed the beneficent influence of education, and influence combined of example, and authority. In Naville's summing up, "le passé de la liberté se montre dans le présent de la nature". (1)

Having constituted the existence and fact of evil, we raise the question of its origin or cause. Frommel feels that there are really only two main alternative theses, and these are - evolution or fall.

Evolutionism is a word in the use of which must be distinguished two strains of meaning. There is scientific evolutionism, the hypothesis giving an account of natural phenomena, and philosophical evolutionism giving an account of moral realities. The first does not necessarily imply the second, which, however, borrowing concepts from the first, has sought to explain man's moral nature, and, in the question of evil, its origin, transmission and manifestations. Applications of the theory, in varying forms, had been found in the work of Schérer, Bouvier, (Frommel's predecessor in the Chair at Geneva) and A. Sabatier. Writing in the times of early excitement at theories of biological evolution, the idea had been carried over in most hazardous fashion into other fields of thought. There is temptation and risk in approaching these other fields - of morality and religion - in terms of biological teleology and evolutionary norms. Evil may be defined in terms of inherited animal instincts, and there tends to emerge, (as above, with the dangers of monism and

(1) op. cit. p. 141.
pantheism), a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, difference between good and evil. There can be a basic optimism inherent in evolutionary moral theory, with a dominant belief in amelioration and progress towards a consummation of the historical process; thus it may fail to satisfy as an analysis of evil, treating it deterministically and in terms of criteria alien to its constituted nature; and it may fail to justify its optimism before the bar of human history, or to give a real and serious account of the appearance of evil in the human consciousness.

Philosophical evolutionism does not exclude morality, but, almost inevitably subordinates it to the natural order. Evil is constituted in the distance between the virtual and the actual, the origin and the consummation, the imperfect and the perfect - but, in personal consciousness, evil is experienced as voluntary, free, and, in a mysterious sense, culpable, rebellion. There is an essentially frivolous element in evolutionary morality in that evil is not, indeed, treated in existential seriousness, but is subsumed under the natural explications of human experience; this is inevitable by the heterogeneity of criteria, which involves evaporation of the concepts of moral guilt and spiritual freedom. With evolutionary morality, theism is, further, at stake - by which assertion Frommel reverted to his analysis of "l'expérience imposée", in which is involved, not an impersonal legalism nor a constraining law in an evolutionary, teleologically-determined sense, but the experience of the activity of a will, an absolute, unconditioned will, a Divine will. Evolutionary morality, on this analysis, is theistically frivolous. If evil were regarded as some kind of necessity in the process of refinement and amelioration, there would be two logical conclusions to be derived, namely: that, if God is posited, the
determinism of evil leads to the assertion that He is the effective cause of it; and, that evil, as teleologically necessary, must belong in a cosmic 'order', which is self-contradictory, if it has been constituted a 'disorder'. This is to pervert, we may feel, the meaning given earlier by Frommel to the phrase 'necessary evil', where its 'necessity' was to constitute the good as good, which lacking would mean that good was not good, nor evil evil, distinction being obliterated in a spurious monism.

The God revealed by an evolutionary hypothesis could be only a God conceived in terms of natural progress and historically - conditioned morality. But these, again, could be nothing but self-stultifying media of revelation since they themselves reveal an inextricable melange of order and of disorder, of good and evil; a melange whose two correlative elements would seem equally willed by God. They become, therefore, as above, equally legitimate and necessary from the point of view of a theistic evolutionism, in which, as Frommel says,(1) "God may be God in power but not in holiness, some kind of equivocal demi-urge... of whom the idea disturbs the reason and demoralises the conscience; ... no longer the God of the moral, but of the natural, order."

It is noteworthy that, while Frommel followed much of Naville's thesis, both in form and substance, there was no discussion of the matter of evolutionary morality in the earlier writer's work.

**Evolutionism and Evil**

The locus classicus of Frommel's analysis of evolutionism was the series of lectures given, in whole or in part, at Sainte-Croix, Geneva, Lausanne and Paris, the theme of the study being the bearing of religious evolutionism on religious conviction and activity, on the principle of Christian morality. The overall title was "Le

(1) op. cit. vol. III. p. 98-99.
Danger Moral de l'Evolutionisme Religieux". (1) He was speaking from a real concern, as he put it, to put the Church on its guard against the danger of this way of thinking, while disclaiming any prejudgment of the validity of the scientific hypothesis of evolution in the natural order. He confessed awareness of imperfections and lacunae in what was not conceived in terms of finality and definitiveness.

Frommel noted, as justification for his concern, the steady infiltration of evolutionary ideas into evangelical theology, not alone in Germany, (particularly under the influence of Hegelian philosophy,) but in England, France and Switzerland. The dangerous belief which such ideas bring with them is that of necessary progress and ameliorative development, involving the conception of the explanation of later, in terms of anterior, psychical phenomena. Proof that this is not an exaggerated fear can be found, to quote one example, in Sabatier's "Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion, d'après la psychologie et l'histoire": - "a history of religion is nothing else than the progress of the religious consciousness of humanity... Our religious and doctrinal ideas are but psychical phenomena, to be explained by similar previous phenomena. In fact, the historical method has made to triumph everywhere the evolutionary point of view, that is, the very idea to which all our discourse is devoted. In vain to rebel against this law of history which is that of life - we shall not hinder its sovereign exercise..."(2)

Evil is not treated with real seriousness by religious evolutionism, from the point of view of history, psychology nor dialectic - historically, because it in fact imposes a point of view on history in terms of extraneous premises; psychologically, because it gratuitously impoverishes and reduces the data of the basic human

(1) Edited posthumously, the study was originally dated 1897.
(2) op. cit. pp. 111 and 324.
experience (the analysis of the obligation of conscience); and dialectically, for real distinction between good and evil is lost. "Cosmic evolution goes from the simple to the composite, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from brute matter to living matter, from physical life to the life of the mind and spirit."(1) As Frommel saw it, this meant that distinctions, however considerable they are supposed, remain contingent, i.e. with the evolutionary principle as their common denominator. In other words, evolutionism remains basically a monism, an explication of the totality of phenomena by means of a single cause, substance or law. It involves relativity of view, (material or spiritual interpretations) and a possible agnosticism, which we are not surprised to find expressed in symbolo-fideist terms.(2) Chapuis had said that "perhaps what appears to us as an evil is a condition of order and progress."(3)

There is an almost mystical expression of the reconciliation of the religious character of obligation, with the idea of evolution in the thought of Chas. Secretan. Reference was made to this by Ph. Bridel in a memoir of "le philosophe de Lausanne" in the Lausanne Revue of 1917, where it was asserted that, in Secretan's view, man cannot be obligated unconditionally by a part of his own nature, and there must be an expression of a superior law, the revelation of an external order. "Moral truths are eternal, universal and necessary in their principle, as much so as logical and mathematical truths."

Then comes the reconciliation - "the true creation of man in nature is the appearance of the moral consciousness; progress and error notwithstanding, the Creator put inside a free humanity a divine seed. The sovereign mystery, moral and metaphysical, is the mystery of grace; the Eternal God wishes to be born and to grow in humanity..."

(1) Sabatier: op. cit. p. 90.
(2) See reference in chapter on Epistemology.
(3) op. cit. p. 105.
One wonders whether Frommel had that passage in mind, when he wrote, in his study on evolutionism, (1) "between logic and morality there are more affinities than one is sometimes accustomed to imagine. A confused thought is rarely the sign of a right will; moral rectitude engenders, as a rule, intellectual clarity - the principle of contradiction, governing conduct as it does intelligence, renders imperious the distinction between good and evil, the one irreducible and objectively certain thing given to man to perceive."

Evolutionism seems, in fact, to assume a teleological principle and movement towards dénouement by its inner structural logic and nature. But is it mechanical or dynamic? Is it gross with materialism, denying Divine existence, or dynamic in the sense of relation to God, conceived as either transcendent to, or immanent in, it? It was the opinion of more than one critic of Sabatier that, although he spoke of the transcendence of God, the whole logic of his system impelled him to a conception of immanence, with loss of Divine qualities of personality and freedom, (2) "Sabatier does not seem only to start from the inner God, but seems to remain there and to sacrifice to Him the transcendent God, without Whom there would not be an inner God."

By this effort to justify religious evolutionism, God becomes a principle of explanation, a kind of inner dynamic of the process, present and active at every instant, producing indifferently the evil and the good; or, alternatively, He is thought to be explained and revealed by the evolutionary process. All this impinges disastrously on the doctrine of the revelation of the Divine moral will in the context of the experience of the obligation of conscience - Frommel's central analysis of religious experience, "l'expérience imposée", "la donnée", the solicitation of the human by the divine will under the aspect of the unconditional and the holy.

(1) op. cit. p. 317-318.

(2) (M. Schmidt: "Témoinage", March, 1897); similarly, R. Hollard (Revue Chrétienne: Apr. 1897).
In Frommel's view, there was complete antithesis between religious evolutionism and the supreme evangelically constituted conceptions of conversion, justification and regeneration. A time of spiritual enfeeblement is the correlate of attenuation or neglect of them. The rupture with the old, the discontinuity with nature, the new birth and the new life - these are irreconcilable with any view of natural development as implied even in a religious expression of evolutionism. The initiatory phenomenon of Christian morality is, by right, if not always in fact, a radical and decisive crisis; it has always been, for the believer, "the experience of the salvation of God which has given him the profundity of understanding to see, in the Fall, the corollary and the indispensable, premise of Christian Conversion". (1) The Bible alone puts us in the presence of a God who responds to our search by His own, and whom we find because He has first found us in Jesus Christ. This is impossible to evolutionism where these two modes of relationship are not known, or are confounded through the evacuation of the concepts of man's unassuaged need and the Divine provision. The status of Jesus Christ is likewise prejudiced in evolutionism and His historical significance put at risk; His uniqueness is rendered dubious by the evolutionist view that religious truth, with mankind, is still in a condition of development, and the finality of the revelation in Him obscured. This had been boldly faced by Chapuis(2) - "It is said that true religion is made, given; we say that it makes, and will make, itself, as all human things." At the end of the volume, evolution has continued and humanity, ceasing to have Jesus Christ before it as an ideal of religious perfection, turns back to Him to "erect a spiritual monument" to Him beyond whom they have henceforth gone....

Frommel challenged the evolutionist to say what he could offer

(1) op. cit. p. 366.
(2) op. cit. pp. 291 and 296.
to the human soul burdened with sin and guilt. Did he seriously think that he could evince anything but a sigh of regret and the bitterness of deception? "Atavistic moral degeneration, before which human therapeutics remain without help or remedy, is the primary fact on which breaks the theory of religious evolutionism, which, in its rigorous expression, is divorced from evangelical Christianity." (1)

The real danger before men is not a reversion to ancient polytheism but a steady movement towards a still more pernicious humanist pantheism; and this had been pointed out many years before by Alex. Vinet in his "Manifestations des convictions religieuses". (2)

A study appeared in the Revue Chrétienne (Paris, Mar. 1899) by E. Petitavel-Olliff, entitled "Darwin et Jésus-Christ". (3) This was born of the controversy between Frommel and Sabatier, arising out of the latter's lectures given at Geneva, and published in his "Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion". The "Semaine Littéraire" of Geneva had featured an article by Frommel protesting against the evolutionist view of Sabatier, a view stemming from a hypothesis which had become tyrannical. His main objection was that, if evolution were divine and continuous, God was being made the author and originator of evil, and we were stepping outside the ancient and traditional belief of original fault. Frommel developed the theme in the brochure on "the moral danger of religious evolutionism", receiving support in his protest from Profs. Charles Perret and Jules Bovon of Lausanne.

As Petitavel-Olliff put it, he thought that these three were right, and that Sabatier was not wrong! Reconciliation, he believed, was possible. The opponents of Sabatier should accept,

(1) op. cit. p. 390.
(2) pp. 409-410.
(3) Étude sur l'évolutionisme chrétien: Essai de conciliation entre M. Sabatier et Frommel.
as a provisional hypothesis, the theory of evolution as to the origin of species and of the human species in particular, and the necessity to submit the interpretation of the Biblical narratives to this hypothesis. It is theistic evolutionism which is to be defended, not any form of atheistic theory denying freedom in God and man.

Traditional evangelicalism must guard against scientific obscurantism. In London, the author remarked, in 1863, offence was caused by suggesting that the six days of Genesis could signify long periods of time. One is readily dubbed a "rationalist", but honesty is required in face of geology, palaeontology, biology, embryology and so on. The evolutionary hypothesis had been allowed by religious thinkers such as Secretan, Grétilat, Naville; and Frommel himself had said: "It is not possible, as some would have wished, to deny evolution."(1) What is to be opposed is pantheistic or atheistic evolutionism. Pétavel-Olliff felt that the title was unfortunate - surely a truly 'religious' theory would escape the dangers and objections. Other examples of the contemporary theological climate were: the congress of the Anglican Church at Shrewsbury in 1896, where the Bishop of Rochester went so far as to say of Christian evolutionism that "Darwin had opened new perspectives for the Church and a providential way leading us to the very throne of God!"

Drummond also was cited: "Evolution and Christianity have the same Author, the same goal, the same "esprit". They must not be at war with each other. Christianity is the crowning of evolution. Man can say: I shall attain my ideal". A growing number of theologians regarded the first chapters of Genesis as figurative, and one might put it this way, - concede the first chapter (Elohist) to Sabatier, reserve the Second (from v. 4b, Jahwist) for Frommel and Bovon.... The first is not immoral, rather pre-moral or "anéthique"; the

(1) op. cit. p. 108.
second, (Adam representing man) would represent collective race-experience acquired in previous epochs, this being the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil, the ascent from animality being symbolised by the feeling of shame. There are present the elements of guilt and redemption, which Frommel is right to note as absent from rationalistic evolutionist theory. Where Sabatier saw continuous evolution, we should distinguish two periods separated by the intervention of revealed law, one of involuntary ignorance and one of voluntary disobedience. (1)

Pétavel-Olliff agreed with Sabatier in this analysis of the thought of Paul, ("L'Apôtre Paul") according to whom the psychic (instinctive, carnal, natural) life preceded in man the spiritual and free life, and there was no phase of justice or holiness anterior to the fall of the first man. According to a traditional evangelical, Prof. Westphal, "primitive man was a child, and, like a child, his emerging consciousness was dominated by the reflex movements of physical life, natural desires, instincts and appetites. His reason and freedom doubtless existed in potentiality, but not in act". Frommel had contended that evolutionism made God the author of evil, but Pétavel-Olliff wished to put the argument the other way - if God is the creator of all things, evolution cannot be essentially immoral. Man, having come to a certain rung on the ladder of animate beings, is invited to the next one, of which the man Jesus Christ was the first occupant. In Sabatier's image, rebel individuals expose themselves to the danger of becoming "fossils" of the future world. The hidden-ness of God in evolution should not disquiet us, nor is it an argument against its theistic, teleological principle. A saying of Pascal could be applied - "God has remained hidden under the veil of nature; and, when it was necessary

(1) op. cit. p. 120.
to appear, He was yet more hidden in covering Himself with humanity". Pétavel-Olliff concluded with the assertion that the reality of sin and of redemption can be maintained in the evolutionist point of view, which takes on, indeed, the character of a "theodicy" wherein the great doctrines of the Gospel are maintained on a scientific base. But in this over-enthusiastic concession to reason, we may feel that the writer has betrayed his cause. Frommel was more careful when he wrote: "Many of our distresses have as their source the antagonism between the scientific and the religious mind - almost to paroxysm. It is a secret fissure through which flows out, without profit, the clearest of our strengths. To close this wound, to make of rivals sisters, associated for the common task of the moral and material progress of humanity, this is one of the most pressing duties for man...."

Frommel referred to the contribution of Pétavel-Olliff - particularly his view that physical evil stands as a kind of symbol of moral evil, with the introduction of which into the physical world, the reality and gravity of evil is manifest - as presented with good humour and spirit, but considers this view of the desolidarisation of physical evil before the Fall and moral and physical evil after the Fall as mistaken (to give only one refutation) since it appeared to deny the basic definition of evil, namely, disorder. Suffering, whether physical or mental (disturbance of the consciousness of what 'should be'), contradicts the idea of order. Certainly the sense of the 'ought', par excellence, is that of the moral conscience because it involves the Divine morality, but the sense of the 'ought' in the consciousness of sense and feeling is not of little importance, because it involves the Divine goodness, which is, in turn, involved in the holiness and morality of God. (1) Frommel was, surely, right

in his objection which finds an echo in the thought of Paul who speaks of "the whole creation groaning and travelling together in pain, waiting for redemption...."

Another contribution to the debate on evolution came from Prof. A. Fornerod, who presented a paper entitled "Péché et Evolution".\(^1\)

While he expressed a warning that evolution once admitted into theology necessarily leads to a negation of evil, it seems clear that he had the same kind of mechanistic, natural evolution in mind as had Frommel. He agreed with Frommel that one does not contest the fact of evolution — but the evolutionist idea of mankind marching forward in necessary progress is contrary to the historical facts, and he was right to point out its dangers. We see rather periods of progress, of retreat and of stagnation. In justifiably attacking metaphysical evolutionism, Frommel, however, seemed to deny the possibility of all religious evolutionism. All evolutionism is not to be defined as determinist and materialist. Fornerod used an image, of which Frommel made use elsewhere, when he wrote that the acorn, in which the oak is teleologically present, may not necessarily become one; it depends on circumstances. In other words, where there is free moral personality, evolution would lose its deterministic character.\(^2\)

As the acorn requires the right circumstances for growth, the moral and religious virtualities of man require favourable terrain, namely, the free co-operation of man with God, the Author of these virtualities. Thus, according to Fornerod, the evolution of the moral and religious consciousness of man, far from suppressing the action of God on souls, would presuppose and claim it. Evil and sin are not denied in their experienced reality; rather is sin regarded as the agent of the arresting of the proper development of the person and of the interruption of the advance of humanity, this latter the more

\(^1\) To La Société Vaudoise de théologice, 20th Sept. 1898. Lausanne Revue: 1899.

\(^2\) op. cit. p. 71.
displayed through human solidarity. There are in history these two
movements - the centrifugal and the centripetal; the antithesis
shown in all its force in the heart of Christianity, the Cross on
Golgotha, the power of sin and the power of forgiveness. Fornerod
concluded with a disclaimer that he was dealing in his essay with
the question of an Adamic fall, or a metaphysical fall anterior to
the whole evolution of the universe, but that he sought only to show
that evolution and sin were not antithetical terms.

Fornerod’s contribution was more slight than that of Petavel-
Olliff, its value lying mainly in his assertion of freedom within an
evolutionist hypothesis, but one wonders if the conception of evil
and of sin as essentially dysteleological elements in a teleologi-
cally conceived process is adequate. The thesis seems to fall under
the judgment which Frommel passed upon it, (1) namely, that the dis-
missal of Adam as an abstraction of theological speculation does not
necessarily lead to the assertion, (which is incapable of proof) that
neither does sin come, with all its disastrous consequences, from a
"near parent of the troglodytes". If natural evolution conditions
the moral life of man, the cave-man is primitive man; and if the
moral life conditions human evolution, and the Fall, therefore, con-
ditions that which is subsequent to it, namely, evolution, it must be
permissible to constitute the cave-man as degenerate man. Frommel
agreed with the counsel of Th. Flournoy, who, in his discourse to
L'Association Chrétienne d'étudiants de la Suisse Romande(2) asked
for generosity with regard to science, but demanded a simple answer
to the question; was cave-man, primitive man, to be constituted qua
"man", or not? This point is considered in the subsequent section
on the question of "the Fall", where Frommel considered the objection
of Fornerod that there has been confusion, in the traditional debate,

(1) "La Vérité Humaine", vol. III, pp. 116-117, and
149-151.
(2) "Foi et Science" - Sainte-Croix, 1898.
between metaphysical and historical theories of the origin of evil, the popular view having been that, treating the matter historically, rather than mythically, all things have followed Adam's sin, in terms of chronological consequence by transmission of the results of this "peccatum originale, vitium originis", rather than in terms of the solidarist conception of the human species.

Another contribution to the field of discussion was the paper presented to La Société de théologie de Nîmes, on 2nd May, 1899, by Pastor O. Bordage, entitled "Le Péché". It was distinguished by clarity of expression, but was essentially a mapping of the field, rather than an original contribution; written in a spirit of true devotion, it sought to present the basic material of the discussion - man as sinner, and as free.

Sin is a universal fact - there is none righteous, no, not one - and appears innate, with an ineluctable quality of necessity. But we also feel a certain freedom not to commit sin, such that it then displays the qualities of accidentalism and voluntariness. Traditional doctrine has had it that all humanity sinned in Adam, man thereby becoming incapable of doing the good. Despite the "servum arbitrium" of Luther and the predestination of Calvin, it is actually the synergism of Melancthon which is accepted by the majority of Protestants. Yet one has to be careful not to give the creature a share in the work of salvation, lest one falls into Pelagianism; that he has still freedom to accept what is offered is what is claimed and understood.

A popular objection to the traditional view has been that there would seem a disproportionate consequence to a historically-conceived Adamic fall. But the idea that we were all "present" in Adam is not really Biblical anyway, the Old Testament being silent on the
transmission of sin to humanity. There is no word of "original sin" in the teaching of Christ, and the doctrine is traditionally sited in Pauline writing. It was Julius Müller who took up the idea of Origen of a fall in an earlier existence, by which our first parents brought with them an inclination towards evil. There was thus, with Adam, a state of sin - but consciousness, implying freedom and, therefore, responsibility, was not yet present. Müller maintained the individualist view that man is responsible only for actions freely committed. Schleiermacher held that sin is produced by determination of the race, original sin being regarded as the common act of the race, thus as the fault of all humanity; Rothe, on the other hand, denying determinism, saw evil actions as reflecting an incomplete development of man's personality which it is his business to constitute in disengagement from his animal nature.

There seems, in this, a too facile movement from the natural to the spiritual, from the unconscious to the responsible. (1) Entirely deterministic, Schérer's expression of view (2) which called forth strong and critical reaction, was to the effect that freedom was a "feeling of freedom" which made possible the modification of the self by turning from self-satisfaction to the idea of the good. This interpretation of conversion involves the necessity of sin to morality (i.e. morality presupposes real freedom of choice), and the Fall is the condition of a new and higher state wherein redemption is seen as the complement of creation. The weakness of Schérer's position, as criticised by Frommel, was its imprisonment in a logical dilemma, and that not merely formally; if sin be regarded as necessary to morality as a human phenomenon, whence and why should there be feelings of shame and remorse? And if sin is inevitable,

(1) For an analysis of Rothe's position, see F. Leenhardt: "Le Pêché, d'après L'Ethique de Rothe", particularly p. 206f.
(2) Revue de Théologie de Strasbourg: 1853.
It appears that sin "should not be"; yet has to be, to give rise to morality. Five years later, in the same Revue, Bois affirmed that the solution of the problem of sin must be found in the relation of the individual and the race, but any theory of solidarity was powerless to explain the feeling of guilt which sin brings to the individual. Further, while Adam had physical descendants, Jesus did not—hence, the analogy of natural transmission broke down. Errors such as these issue from any system which rests on ontological, metaphysical, or quasi-historical, rather than moral, considerations. Sin must be constituted as a conscious, voluntary transgression of the divine law, its content becoming more extended and complex as man comes from adolescence to maturity, as there can be ignorance of the moral law, and loss of the sense of sin. Man is free, so far as this is the requirement of the "ought", though this freedom may be wide or narrow; he is also determined, insofar as what we call a sinful act is attributable to our imperfection, to our nature as constitutively human. This paradox, agreeable in essence to Frommel, seemed in line with the classic self-analysis by Paul (Rom. 7).

As to the teleological element in human history—apart, that is, from a purely evolutionist description—we may think of God as working with man, assisting him to find his lost freedom, supremely taking possession of our minds and spirits through Jesus Christ. There is fusion, union and penetration of two wills, Divine and human, Christ being seen as the first-born of that new humanity. The false antinomy between necessary evil and individual responsibility is removed; choice is real, and solidarity is real, both in evil and good. The goal is the flowering of the spiritual life in evergrowing numbers of mankind.
Evil and The Fall

We turn now to the analysis and exposition of Frommel in the matter of Evil and the Fall. It is found, as noted, in vol. III of his Apologetic work; (Les Problemes Intellectuels.) The terms of the problem, according to him, are that evil is universal and hereditary – the latter word not, however, implying simple physical transmission. This is almost the same description as that given by Ernest Naville in his work, cited above. Having rejected as an incomplete solution, that the origin of evil lies in the individual exercise of wills, Naville(1) constituted the characteristics of evil as generality and essentiality. Frommel accepts that we are born with an inner predisposition to evil (a corrupt nature), and in a situation predisposing us from outside to evil. Evil seems almost to be our predestined state, experientially "necessary", in the sense of inevitable. The supreme problem is, therefore, that of the origin of evil, and this must be linked to the question of the origin of man. He agreed with Secretan when the latter wrote that "as there was a first man, there was a first sin;"(2) but he did not accept Naville's use of the word "essentiality". Without specifically referring to Naville, he constituted evil, if inevitable, as yet not "essential" to the moral life, rather as "accidental", arising from moral freedom. Only a doctrine of the Fall saves man from the blasphemy of attributing all things as they are seen and experienced equally to the direct creation of God. Precisely there, indeed, would we identify the vitiating element in any purely "natural" theology, which argues from "what is", not taking account of the disharmony between "what is" and "what should be".

What do we mean by "Fall"? We mean that evil was introduced into the world, in a manner conformable to the witness of conscience,

(1) op. cit. p. 140f.
(2) "La Philosophie de la Liberte", II, p. 72.
by freedom; "the theory of the Fall is the theory of moral individualism applied to the origin of evil."(1) In other words, the idea of moral individualism is pushed to the point where individual freedom was not circumscribed and dominated by the hereditary transmission of evil, that is to say, to the first man, by whose action, guilty and free, sin came. Some have seen this theory as hazardous, complicated and remote from experience or validation; does it safeguard the Divine honour, the moral order, the truth of conscience, the hope and dignity of man?

Again, we note the treatment of the question by Naville. Humanity, he said, is corrupt because it has corrupted itself. A primitive act of humanity has created, by the abuse of free will, by revolt against the law, the "bad heart" of humanity. In each individual there is personal, responsible will, and human nature for which he is responsible, not as an individual, but in his quality as man. The Christian dogma of the Fall encloses a philosophical doctrine giving the best account to the reason of the data of experience by which is posed the "problem of evil". The act which disturbed the order of Creation is that of a "primitive individual in whom as primitive our nature found itself in its entirety, such as to call him "l'homme-humanité"; all humanity was really present in this one who fell. But is this the literally implied sense of the Christian teaching? Naville disclaimed the task of establishing historical origins and facts - the exposé of the doctrine is his sole responsibility. He would have us define the good, not as perfect nor complete, but in terms of propriety to destiny and fulfilment. In the world of the spirit we cannot imagine one originally perfect; it is rather a potentiality, perfection being something striven towards, in exercising freedom in response to the approp-

(1) op. cit. p. 111.
rivate law. The great paradox of the freedom of the will is that it has freedom to choose, but also freedom to do what it wishes. We might feel that there is a certain begging of the question in the last part of that assertion; but Naville went on to say that, in the first sense, a law is supposed, while, in the second, absence of law is supposed (that is, "law" in a determinative, necessary sense.) "The soul wills what it loves; when it acts in loving, it does all which it wills, because it cannot will anything outside of its love. For him who loves the good, the law disappears for it is absorbed in love, and the command of conscience bases itself on the impulsion of the heart. The freedom of choice between good and evil remains a "metaphysical possibility", but the evil remains "morally impossible." To the "thou must not" of the conscience replies the "non possumus" of the heart."(1)

But, with the vitiating of the heart (by which one assumes Naville to mean man's natural disposition) freedom is compromised; nature, born of the will, paralyses the exercise of it. Dominated by its inclination, man feels himself the slave of his vices, while retaining in remorse the witness to his freedom. Error comes from this perversion of the heart, and the enfeebling of the will, and this, veiling natural light, deforms the conscience. Evil, then - similar to Frommel's assertion above - is "essential" to the world as it is, and as it has been made by the revolt of the creature. Again we would feel that, where the word "essential" is employed, care should be exercised by way of constituting it as "per accidens", lest it be thought to imply some ultimate, definitive phenomenological "property". Naville, and Frommel, who defined the matter more carefully, both agreed that evil is, but it should not be, and its possibility is the condition of freedom.

(1) op. cit. pp. 175-176.
In seeking to analyse the problem, the only method open to us is that of observation and reflection. Frommel likewise constituted this as the method appropriate to theology, regarding his method as that of psychological analysis and descriptive explication, rather than that of a priori derivation from metaphysical principles. The fundamental elements of our nature - its supreme "data", according to Naville - are the consciousness of duty and the feeling of a divine order. But as Pascal put it, "the inclination towards self is the beginning of all disorder". But whence comes this inclination, this tendency? If primal innocency prevailed before the Fall, there could be no temptation, yet sin is not possible apart from temptation. This must therefore be in the nature of a rebellion, the expression of a desire for independence.

We cannot, indeed, think of a creature who "could not sin"; he would be "necessarily good", which implies the destruction of the meaning of the word "good" (and, for that matter, the word "evil"). This simple constitution of the nature of responsibility in freedom cuts through the metaphysical, speculative involvement of the scholastic distinction between the phrases "posse non peccare" and "non posse peccare". There is, as Naville wrote, "a temptation inherent in freedom, independent of any evil disposition of the heart."(1)

In the question of the rendering of the species responsible for a common fall, the objection is not so much lack of memory, participation or transmission, but that of absence of existence. Because of the analysis offered of the nature of temptation and freedom, we seem faced with an ultimate disjunction - if the human race fell, it must have been in an epoch before it was historically manifest on the world scene. Was there not, then, "existence" in any sense? Frommel, it will be remembered, employed elsewhere the analogy of

(1) op. cit. p. 215.
the acorn and the oak. The relation of the seed and the tree is analogous to that between the individual and the race; thought cannot yield a meaningful answer to the question of their chronological relationship. It is better to say that the seed exists in potentiality, and that that which is termed potentiality does not create, but manifests that which was. The tree existed in the species before its individual manifestation. Individuals pass, the species remains. "In a metaphysical" (one might have preferred the word "mystical") sense, we have existed since the origin of humanity\(^{(1)}\) and there is, further, the supreme law of human solidarity. As Vinet had put it: "\text{Individuality} is not \text{individualism}. The latter is entirely related to self, seeing everything exclusively in these terms; the former consists of the wish to be oneself so that one may be something other than oneself.... the one is the sworn enemy of the other".\(^{(2)}\)

Frommel's treatment of the problem is distinctive. He allowed a certain existential validity to the doctrine of the Fall as a form of moral individualism applied to the metaphysical question of the origin of evil; but metaphysical or historical validity must elude it, its validity consisting in the insights which it appears to conserve. Homage is paid to the supremacy of the moral order and the solidarity of mankind, but the freedom constituted by some as primary is assumed to be unconditional, as if man exercised moral choice in a total vacuum. Paradoxically, justice is not thereby done to the concept of "sin", which is a disposition in which total freedom is not present and individual acts are the manifestations, not of undetermined freedom, but of a basic normative condition of human nature. A main objection to the traditional doctrine of a Fall has been that led in the name of biological evolution, on the

\(^{(1)}\) op. cit. p. 220.
ground that, as discussed above, anthropology suggests, not a man like Adam, in some kind of primary perfection and plenitude of human faculties and resources, yet capable of voluntary disobedience, but rather the probability of the troglodyte, a savage, brutal creature, more beast than man, more with animal instinct than reason and human consciousness. As we noted, Fornerod had said: "the Adam of the doctrine of the Fall is an abstract being, a schema of theological speculations.... All the tragic and disastrous consequences of sin cannot have issued solely from an act of gluttony on the part of a near parent of the caveman."(1) It must be clearly stated that Frommel did not seek to deny the theory of evolution in the name of a literalist Biblical interpretation, but, while reminding the evolutionists that their hypothesis must remain a hypothesis, would assert that, if it is true, it is not a matter of total disjunction and irreconcilability between it and a doctrine of a Fall. There is also confusion where identity is asserted between evil and animal instinct as such. For example, hunger is not a sin; gluttony is, where it is forbidden by the conscience. Hunger may be the occasion of gluttony, but is not the necessary cause of it.

Biological evolution cannot pronounce on the matter of when and how man became constitutively "man". At this point in his analysis, Frommel suggested the tenability of "the hypothesis of the introduction of evil in humanity by the fault of a human protagonist and a subsequent fall" - not exclusive of whatever evolutionary theory the science of the day renders probable. He claims as intelligible and coherent the thesis that, not supposing man "in statu integritatis", but capable of sin before its reality, innocent and knowing duty, he could be supposed to be capable of positive development in good, without passing through the experience of evil, a development which

(1) "Peche et Evolution", p. 62f.
could have transformed native (that is to say, not abstract) innocence into acquired holiness. This passage would not have excluded struggle nor effort, but would have excluded error as a condition of progress. Although this may appear to us as, at first hearing, speculative, we may feel it has the value — indeed, to Frommel, this was largely its justification — that man is to be constituted distinctively as man in his discontinuity with other creatures, while at the same time allowing his possible continuity, in terms of the biological evolutionary hypothesis. He quoted, approvingly, the striking paragraph from "Studies in Philosophy", (1) by the English evolutionist philosopher, Courtney: — "I was once really an anthropoid ape, really a mollusc, really a piece of primitive protoplasm... but today, I am these no longer. When I was an ape, I thought as an ape, I lived as an ape; but since I have become a man, I have put away ape-like things. The moral nature of man is what it is, and not what it was (before he was man)"....

**Individualist and Generic Theories**

Frommel went on to consider the two main theories of the Fall — the individualist and the generic. The first is perhaps the one of more widespread acceptance, although its representation is easier than its conception, and it finds a ready complicity of heart and imagination — of the former, for it is easier to feel the victim of sin than to feel and acknowledge guilt; of the latter, in that evil is treated in terms of rational explanation, or, at least, explication. Actually, the individualist theory evaded personal responsibility in terms of heredity, whereby the sin of the protagonist — free, conscious, responsible, the consequence of independence — became the determination of our nature, an inherited nature constituted in necessity. We may agree with Frommel's criticism that, in this conception, evil has

(1) Ch. VI.
gradually changed its nature; from being free, it becomes necessary; from spiritual, natural. Man was the author, then becomes the transmitter, and indeed the slave, the victim, of sin. The complicity of the intelligence is no less evident - a primary fact is determined, namely, the enslavement of man to evil, and this is "explained" by heredity. A rational theory had always, for Frommel, implied the constraint of necessity and causality, and, where there is absence of freedom, there is absence of responsibility. Thus, despite the complicity of heart and mind, one might say, in strictness, that the problem is not being morally felt, and, therefore, remains. "Sin, and the consciousness of sin, have developed parallel with the development of the religious and moral consciousness; while, for example, animism is above all amoral, the feeling of sin appears in the polytheistic religions, bursts forth in Hebrew monotheism, and manifests itself in all its horror in the cross at Golgotha." (1) Frommel recognised that Fornerod was trying to remove the idea of chronological time from the doctrine of the fall ("the Fall is as much our act as Adam's"), and noted his denial of the "man-humanity" conception of Naville, - "there is no such thing as an "apple-tree species"; the species exists only in the numerous varieties of apple-tree. Similarly, the human species is manifested only in the collection of men constituting humanity." (2)

Further objection against the individualist doctrine is by way of doubting whether there has been an increase in the sense of sin, which one would expect to result from greater resignation to the inner evolutionary purpose, and of questioning the view that animism is distinguished by amoralism, and its supposedly chronological successors of polytheism and monotheism showing an exact parallel of moral development. Rather than picturing mankind as at first a pure spring of

(1) Fornerod; op. cit. p. 6.
(2) Frommel; op. cit. p. 151.
water which became gradually sullied, we could see the effort and progress in civilisation as tending to neutralise and mask the consequences of sin, while basically accepting it as a "necessary" element in human experience. One could say that society becomes moralised, while, within it, individuals may corrupt themselves with impunity. We note that Frommel, writing, as he was, at the end of the 19th Century, thought that "civilised humanity was perhaps as wicked as it had ever been, or could be, "and that a limit and crisis was being approached."(1)

The individualist theory may be criticised by considering the case of the drunkard, for it could be applied only to an analysis of his drunkenness, and, not, with any reality, to sin in general, of which drunkenness may be a manifestation. It seems to be forgotten, or glossed over, that the drunkard was a sinner before he was a drunkard, that it is not his drunkenness which constituted him as sinner, but his sin which constituted him as drunkard. There is confusion of sin with its manifestation. To these criticisms one might finally add the question: "if the fall is brought about by individuals, how can they not, as individuals, undo it?" The fact is, of course, that they cannot, because, in contrast with the individualist theory, the Fall may be seen as an anterior predisposing element in the constitution of the human individual as sinner.

Frommel then considered the "generic" theory of the Fall. Here, humanity is not constituted as a collection and succession of individuals but as a real, moral and physical unity of individuals - in a word, a species. Man is more than "an individual"; before being which, he is "man". The original error, then, was not that of an individual only, but was both individual and generic, the protagonist incarnating in himself, representing in himself, realising in

(1) op. cit. p. 154.
principle in himself, the whole species. "He was the first man, i.e. the species individualised for the first time, and thus contained in entirety, without remainder, in this first individualisation."(1)

If the species was morally and physically individualised in Adam, we were therefore morally and physically in Adam. His sin is our sin.

Frommel reminded his readers that he was using the word 'Adam' as more usual and intelligible than the word 'protagonist', and that the theory was, at the moment, independent of the Biblical narrative and of Christian dogma. Adam is, of course, the Hebrew for "man", so, by this interpretation, all mankind is made guilty with, and in, him. Thus the natural evil which oppresses us is one in whose creation we co-operated; we participated as men, that is, as species, in the specific evil which enslaves our individual freedom. It does not mean that individual freedom (moral individuality) is evacuated of meaning. Although fallen, qua man, the individual retains responsibility within the limits of fallen nature. As a representative member of humanity (individualised in Adam) each individual displays Adam's constitutive nature, in which there is conferred the possibility of the moral life and the overcoming of temptation. The possibility, however, is not complete because man, in the Biblical usage, is constituted a sinner and not a fully free moral agent; the "disposition to sin" is there. The retained freedom, therefore, is one of moral freedom in respect of actions, but is not a freedom from the constitutive nature of man qua man. Thus is maintained the juxtaposition of freedom and guilt, of enslavement, yet of responsibility.

Chas. Secrétan had said(2) that despite the revolt of our feelings against the reality of our merited condition, "to believe and to affirm", it is necessary to "understand". Frommel thought it would be better to employ the word "entendre" than "comprendre",

(1) op. cit. p. 159.
(2) "Le principe de la morale", p. 265.
because understanding depends upon representation, and we are not here dealing with something phenomenally apparent to the senses.

What is, after all, most difficult to comprehend is the moral character of the species, yet it must have this if it is capable of error and fall. The supreme paradoxical expression of this is that we have "sinned in Adam", and the task is, therefore, that of legitimising and justifying this conception. It is required, in establishing a generic theory, to constitute the biological and spiritual character of humanity, thereby to determine the physical and moral reality of the species. As biology attests the reality of the species, so embryology attests its continuity; mortality and immortality are interfused, as it were, in the embryonic, cellular structure. This, to which Secretan made reference, afforded continuity of species despite the death of individuals, and offered a meaningful answer to the question; How can there be responsibility for what happened before I was born?

Taking again his analogy of the oak and the acorn, Frommel said that an oak, or the oak, pre-existed all the oaks which it has produced, the pre-existence being "in potentiality". Neither oak nor acorn can be conceived as having chronological pre-existence to the other. We are not to think in terms of creation, but of possibility, potentiality, virtuality, i.e. in terms of species. History and chronology are not being asserted, but species is constituted in its actuality of being and nature in terms of inner or realised possibility and, of that which it "virtually" is. Frommel stressed that this analysis imposed itself by inference and induction; it is intelligible, but not comprehensible in the sense of being demonstrated or represented.

We pre-existed in the species, as the oak in the acorn. As individuals, we are of yesterday; as men, our age is the age of

(1) op. cit. p. 153.
humanity. Since Adam sinned, we were, therefore, there. Thus Frommel thought to avoid the dilemma between an individualist theory with its insoluble chronological and moral difficulty, and loss of reality of freedom, and a pseudo-solidarist view of a non-individu- lised, non-personalised "species" of which Adam is an individualised representative. Whether as the acorn or the oak of the analogy, the individual and the species are constituted in terms of their true biological, moral or spiritual nature. There is a moral and psychic unity of humanity - the moral is evident in that we live in, by and for others in a state of mutual interdependence and solidarity; and the psychic, in the fact (and mystery) of the experience of common thoughts, wherein we are pointed to a psychic unity in which, before and after thought, and particular thoughts, there is something which we may call "intuition", the power of direct intuition, under the as- pect of the cognitive. There is likewise the vicarious power of "sym-pathy", and the common quality and property of consciousness - not an infinite number of "atomised", non-interrelated conscious- nesses. But in the matter of the will, Frommel discerned a confu- sion in Naville - whom he has otherwise largely approved - where the latter had referred \(^1\) to the objection to the theory of involvement with the protagonist which is that "acts of will are exclusively in- dividual, and the responsibility which follows them has the same character." Frommel agreed that such acts are individual, but not exclusively so; for two reasons one might question whether the will is manifested in this purely individual manner - first, an analysis of the psychology of crowd behaviour, in which there is manifested a de-individualised collective will; and second, the matter of custom and heredity, where there is a double phenomenon, the impersonalisation of the will in the nature created by it, and the individualisa-

\(^1\) op. cit. p. 228.
tion of nature in the will conditioned by it. Responsibility, even, is not exclusively an individual manner, in that one is involved responsibly in the action of another, whom one may have (with primary personal responsibility) led into evil activity. There can, finally, be discerned a justice in history, even if this is not always contemporaneous with the evil acts; there can be an ineluctable working out of judgment on evil, for which humanity, qua humanity, accepts responsibility. All this goes to demonstrate the solidarity of the species, psychically and morally.

It is interesting to note that both Naville and Frommel quoted with approval the motto of the Swiss confederation - "un pour tous; tous pour un." The former said that this is the supreme law of the universe, and Frommel similarly approved it. Frommel concluded this discussion of the conception of solidarity by reference to the two main elements of Prayer and Love. In the life of prayer there is an acknowledged solidarity in confession and intercession and the exercise of a universal priesthood. In love, there is the fulfilling of the law in a life in which there is the true freedom of the living out of the Divine life in ours, the response to the constraint of the Divine love, the free acceptance of solidarity. The perception of our human solidarity, indeed, increases or diminishes as there is increase or diminution of love. The voice of love - as the voice of egoism is its opposite - is the voice of our acknowledged human solidarity.

We are a little startled to read Frommel's final expression of the nature of love in the context of solidarity, after he has quoted with approval from Secretan's "La principe de la morale" a passage in which this writer had constituted love as the fulfilling of the law; since love sustains justice and freedom, it could be said to include

(1) op. cit. p. 240.
justice within it. (1) Frommel continued (first in a footnote, then in the text) (2) "that duty is at the root of love, that the obligation of conscience should blossom in charity, would be interesting to show, if we had time.... Love, which is a justice, which is justice, is therefore a duty, is therefore duty. But the duty which love is is double; I have duty to myself at the same time as to my neighbour." It might appear that Frommel has, albeit unconsciously, moved over into a form of "moralism", which Secrétan avoids, although he comes dangerously near to it when he had written (3) "if we have a duty to love our neighbour perfectly and ourselves perfectly, it is because our neighbour is ourselves...."

We are left, after this discussion of love as the working-out of justice in human solidarity, with a fear that there is apparent contradiction between Frommel's earlier and later treatment of the social organism. Having allowed what must be for him a dangerous psychological conception, that of the de-individualised collective will (as modifying individuality of action), we can but refer back to his analysis of the individualist solution of the problem of evil, where he definitively stated: "No will is moral and free but the individual, will. The individual alone has a conscience; he alone is a moral person; everywhere else the "moral person" is a juridical fiction and the "moral consciousness" a form of language. (It) engenders an illusion - the identity of collective with personal consciousness...." In a footnote he posed the dilemma - "Either society has a conscience and the individual has not, or the individual has a conscience and society has not." (4) Frommel appeared to reject this as an inescapable dilemma, because he accepted individualism in the matter of personal,

(1) op. cit. p. 196.
(2) op. cit, p. 196-197.
(3) op. cit. p. 194.
(4) op. cit. pp. 61-63.
moral guilt, but rejected it as a sufficient analysis of the problem of the origin of evil, in which the element of human solidarity is to be given its due place. The underlying psychological constitution of "individuality" is what is really at issue, and it might be said that Frommel embarked on the study without actually defining the "individual". He assumes a somewhat "atomised" conception in which the individual appears as constituted in a self-conscious isolation before being aware of his membership of society.

There is a sense of discontinuity between Frommel's somewhat individualist constitution of "La Vérité Humaine" and his solidarist analysis of the great concepts of duty, love, guilt and redemption. He frankly said that if the individualist theory of evil seemed to satisfy the exigencies of morality, it did not, however, take serious account of sin and its consequences, and would require completion by a theory affirming the moral character of the species, the individual and the species being not exclusive but complementary. Does this, then necessarily lead to a doctrine of a representative Fall? We see that Frommel considered the generic theory to be at least the one more in accord with Biblical data and the requirements of psychology and morality. Humanity being constituted as a species, the species was "individualised" in Adam, in whom, morally and physically, we participated in respect of his sin. (I sinned, as man, before I sinned as a man...) The strength and appeal of this analysis if its claim to preserve the moral freedom of the individual, though it is one restricted to his acts, his constitutive nature depending on the species. Is this meant to imply that the species has a moral nature from which individuals derive theirs? This would seem to contradict Frommel's assertion of the sole reality of the individual moral consciousness constituted in the experience of "le devoir".
"Je dois, donc je suis.") In fact, one might feel that, if individuals derive their nature from the species, of which they form constitutive elements and in which they essentially consist, it could be said of the individual: "Je suis (homme), donc je dois."

In further consideration of the question of the relation of the individual and the species, we may ask, in the use of the simile-analogy of the oak and the acorn: in applying this to Adam and the human species, was our guilt not enclosed in him in only a potential manner? Of what did it really consist? It is surely different from our individual guilt, and the moral relationship between the two kinds of guilt is not really defined. Many have seen as a major objection to the theory of a representative fall, expressed in terms of virtuality and potentiality, the seemingly disproportionate punishment by way of suffering visited on the species regarded, by such theory, as at that stage infantile and rudimentary.

Frommel always regarded morality as ultimately defined in terms of man's response to the Divine holiness and the experience of the solicitation of the human will by the Divine. Thus, when he implied a moral relation with God as involved in the spiritual unity of the species and its solidarity, we may feel that, to be responsible and subject to Divine justice, the species would require to be envisaged as a person - but the psychic, moral and spiritual life of a social organism is of a different order from that of an individual. Frommel accepted this, yet appears, without definition of relationship, to move, analogically at least, from the one to the other, and more confusingly, while asserting that "every act is essentially, voluntary, personal, individually responsible; no act is, exclusively, individually voluntary and responsible; (Thus) the imputation of the common fall becomes morally acceptable as conserving the elements of perso-
nal and collective responsibility.... Not only can we recognise this; we must. It is written into the facts.... (1) Frommel went on to agree that the conscience as such is dumb on the question of inherited guilt and punishment, and indeed revolts against it, but it can be educated to see the justice of shared responsibility in the context of moral solidarity. This again might seem a dangerous admission, depriving it of the sovereignty hitherto claimed for it; indeed, Frommel said that "the testimony of conscience (may be) suspect - it may be less than our egoism which is speaking through it." (2)

We now turn to Frommel's analysis of further allied problems; the Fall and physical evil, the Fall as comprehensible ("intelligible"), and the Biblical hypothesis of the Fall.

The basis of discussion remains that to which Frommel felt the analysis hitherto had led - a moral, original, generic fall; moral, to safeguard the Divine honour and the supremacy of the moral order; original, to take account of the universality and inheritedness of evil; generic, to do justice to the experience of solidarity. Four approaches are offered; the first is frankly to renounce the conception of a moral fall as such. This may be regarded as an abdication of moral concern and thought in the face of physical fact, and some take refuge in the evolutionary view which sees physical evil anterior to humanity as a definitive element in that theory. Many see this as constituting the impossibility of making physical evil the consequence of moral evil, and they therefore tend to regard the moral order as epiphenomenal, a favourable illusion necessary to social life. Now the abdication of moral thinking before the physical fact involves its subordination to the latter, and its loss of sovereignty. It seems strange and perverse that there are some who do not approach the question of physical suffering in terms of a sense of "moral

(1) op. cit. p. 184.
(2) op. cit. p. 187.
shock". This approach is, therefore, to treat the problem by evasion.

A second position is that typified by Petavel-Olliff in his essay: "Darwin et Jesus-Christ". His thesis was that there was a pedagogic manifestation of evil in the lower creation. Primal evil was purely physical, while subsequent evil took on moral significance; the word "evil" in the first sense is therefore being wrongly used, for what is referred to is not "moral" evil but suffering, treated rather in its facticity than in a context of moral evaluation. He asserted that, since evil supposes responsible people, and animals are not persons, then, in that context, we are seeing, in physical "evil", but a morally innocent picture of moral evil. He offered, as a quaint example, the moral innocence of the ichthyosaurus accused of infanticide! This separation of the physical and the moral is false from more than one consideration. Physical and moral evil are not linked in terms of purely chronological sequence, as if the animals ceased to exist with the appearance of man; they co-exist, as Petavel-Olliff acknowledges, and thus the logical bond between the pedagogic and the responsible is of obscure establishment. Further, this discontinuity is not permissible in terms of the original constitution of evil as disorder, and suffering, wheresoever it be found, manifestly contradicts the sense of "ought" in the intellectual and sentient consciousness. It is "humanly" impossible not to feel continuity with the animal kingdom in the matter of suffering, i.e. evil under that aspect. We remember the bold assertion of Paul that "the whole creation groans together in pain".

The third position is a derivative of the second. Accepting connection between moral and physical evil, and making a distinction between human and animal suffering in terms of the introduction, by
man, of the new element of morality, there is, as above, the concept, chronologically determined, of pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian evil. The life of the spirit dominates the material, and egoistic expression is changed into altruistic co-operation, so that evil is constituted as failure to set forward this process. But, as Frommel pointed out, there is no serious account taken of the fact of death: it might be regarded from an evolutionary point of view as the supreme example of dysteleology, yet, as fact, it is concomitant with life, whether pre- or post-lapsarian existence is being considered. It is constituted as a necessary end of physical existence, and has not disappeared with evolutionary development. Suffering and evil are not being profoundly analysed where there is no serious account taken of death; and it is significant that Biblical thought links death with man's nature constituted as sinful. ("As by man came death", and other passages...) By this is proposed, not a chronological, historical Fall, but a timeless constitution of man's nature as such, in his addressability in the consciousness of the sense of obligation, serving to inspire in him a sense of mortality. Physical suffering - and death - are inescapable constituents of the existence of sentient beings, a necessary condition of living under the categories of time and space. We cannot, by our reason, give any ideational content to a conception of pre-lapsarian immortality being replaced, in chronological sequence and historical continuity, by a post-lapsarian mortality.

We are thus driven to the agonising question as to the goodness of God in creation. How do we relate evil, moral, physical and physico-moral, to the basic data of the conscience and the revelation in Christ, in respect of the sovereign, i.e. unconstrained holiness and goodness of God? To admit constraint, internal or external,
would be, in Frommel's view, to pass from theism to pantheism or dualism; and, if there is not constraint, do we require to accept the view, derived in Augustinianism and Calvinism, that it was for the manifestation of the Divine glory? Frommel frankly says: "it is a mediocre glory which is revealed by inevitable suffering" ...(1)

He therefore proposed a fourth position to which he believed we are led. The imperfection in creation anterior to man does not have its cause in physical necessity nor in God Himself, but in a moral necessity, inherent, not in God, but in the world, and which God respects. He could have created a nature of primitive perfection, but He did not will to do so; or, more exactly, He did not will to be able to do so, and was not able to will to create otherwise. (2) He had to respect, and take moral account of, an antecedent moral fact, namely, the existence of moral evil which preceded the creation (at least of our universe,) and which dominates, and, therefore, explains it. We can see, in this bold hypothesis of Frommel, an implicit rejection of any purely metaphysical solution, such as the selective idealism of Leibnitz in the latter's concept of the "creation of the best of all possible worlds". Leibnitz is briefly referred to, in the early pages of "La Vérité Humaine", Vol. III, as among the "pantheists" like Plato, Spinoza and others. But the Frommelian hypothesis was criticised, particularly by Pétavel-Olliff as above, on the ground that it was speculative and raised more questions than it solved. Frommel agreed that it is a hypothesis, but denied that it was chimerical. It is not born of fantasy nor individual caprice, but has a moral basis, commending itself to the highest ethical and religious requirements of man's conscience. It is more important to establish the justice and sovereign goodness of God than to yield place to a scientific theory.

(1) op. cit. p. 215.
(2) op. cit. p. 217.
What is being established is the meaningful hypothesis that moral evil pre-existed the creation of the actual universe; but how it pre-existed, or how it is suitable to represent its origin and mode, is less important. We are reminded of the phrase of N.P. Williams (The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin: lecture 8) - "a pre-cosmic vitiation of the whole life-force at the very beginning of creation." We are, therefore, concerned to satisfy the data of actual "experience imposée", i.e. man's sense of estrangement by sin from, yet his relationship with, a God whose sovereign goodness is made known in the constraining power of His soliciting will in the experience of the obligation of conscience.

Frommel designated as "intelligible" the theory of the fall outlined, in preference to the term "ante-nebular" suggested by Petavel-Olliff, for the reason that it denotes precisely a fall which can be conceived but not represented. The individualist version of the theory - going back to Origen - found extended expression by Julius Müller in his "Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde", in which the full paradox is faced that man never knew himself free of fault, that we are born sinners, yet feel ourselves responsible for sin; we must therefore have lived before coming on the earth, and the initial evil act is anterior to present existence. We may feel that this view borrows something from the Hindu notion of metempsychosis, and Müller appeared to be thinking in terms of individuals being incorporated in Adam in terms of the concept of reincarnation. The two main objections to such a theory are that one cannot attribute real meaning to the idea that fallen individuals could be reincarnated in Adam to fall a second time in a historical context; and that it does not really deal with the objection which it was supposed to refute, namely, the primitive existence of physical evil. Frommel had logic on his side...
when he said that only the most fantastic extension of metempsychosis could justify the hypothesis of the reincarnation of fallen souls.

The generic form of the theory of an "ante-nebular" or intelligible ("comprehensible" in the sense of "conceivable") Fall is found only in the writing of Chas. Secrétan, so far as French-speaking theologians were concerned. As it was developed in the Second Volume of "La Philosophie de la Liberté", the basic concepts were the unity of the race and the reality of the species, allied with the distinctive assertion of the priority of the species over the individual, a priority not of value only, but of existence. The species, now fragmented, was once represented, in actuality, by a primal creature (the idea, again, of "l'homme-humanité") who sinned, in terms of the moral freedom; humanity thus sinned in that actualisation of itself, and the wages of sin, i.e. the violation of the conditions of being, were death. Thus there was passage from actuality to virtuality, by which we recognise that individuals only have reality in the context of natural solidarity, and the moral good and ideal of the individual is to reconstitute (in actuality, that is, rather than in virtuality) the personal unity of the species by solidarity in love. The primitive creature destroyed himself as individual by fault, subsisting as virtuality within the species. Thus, individuals in this state of virtuality did not participate in, nor therefore in the same degree share the participatory guilt of, a Fall taking place before they existed in actual, personal form.

The species did not, and could not, foresee the consequences of its sin, and thus remains redeemable; but these consequences impose themselves on the individual, reminding him of the Fall of which he is the result, and imparting to him the horror of sin. We thus safeguard the goodness of God in creation, and may even catch a vision of
a cosmic evolution as a preparatory stage in redemptive atonement, the course of which is implied in the moral history of humanity. The purpose of this analysis is that, as all sought solidarity is a reaffirmation and partial reconstitution of the species, and an affirmation of its primal, actualised state, it might be seen to link with the conception of the Kingdom of God, when translated into Biblical terms. Frommel, we find, was less critical of this theory, but we may agree with him in seeing the danger that it hides an implicit utilitarian ethic, and that it tends to depose the individual as such, glossing over the personal, individual experience of the constraint and solicitation of the Divine will in the experience of the obligation of conscience.

Frommel passed from the "intelligible" theory - which he says truly belonged to Secrétan, and whose merits are its superiority over individualist theory, its conformity to the moral order, (the explanation of physical by moral evil), to the justice, goodness and love of God (primal, physical evil depending on the Fall, manifesting both justice and the means of redemption,) and to the data of experience (the unity and anteriorness of the species to the individual, the actualisation of the virtual species in the moral voluntary solidarity of individuals,) - to the Biblical hypothesis of the Fall. In the original manuscript, there is no break between this and the previous material. The Editor of the published lectures rightly separated this section from what had gone before under the general title of "Solutions incompletes".

But there is continuity, although with significant difference. Preceding hypotheses established the identity of the moral subject of the Fall with man - man as individual or as species. According to Frommel, however, in the Biblical conception it is not man but a moral
creature, similar to, but distinct from, man, who was the true author and initiator of evil in God's creation. This primitive creature (a being, not a "principle") has been variously named Satan, Devil, Serpent, Adversary, Tempter, Prince of this world, etc. The Fall of man is regarded as a historical Fall, placed, not anterior to history, but to the origins of moral history. Physical evil did not depend on man's sin, but preceded it, arising, as it did, from the moral evil of the first fallen creature, Satan. Frommel insisted that he did not guarantee orthodoxy or infallibility in his approach, but he believed it to be Biblical, in the sense that it is derived from the Bible, and not from the 3rd Chapter of Genesis in isolation. It is in terms of the religious unity of the Bible, a unity not constituted solely in terms of structural and canonical unity, nor of literary and historical unity, but constituted in terms of a unity of Divine action, an action pedagogic and progressive in form, but identical in authorship, object, goals, means and ends, an action of revelation and redemption. (1)

In the Biblical view, man is, from the outset, a guilty and unhappy victim of that mysterious creature or being, the initiator of evil; man is in a fallen state, but is not the inventor or introducer of evil into the world. He was tempted and seduced by a Tempter, an Adversary. The supreme question is thus; why did God create man in a world where reigned suffering and death, and why, in creating him, did He subject him to the possibility of such temptation? Frommel's answer was that man is the being willed by God to achieve the reconquering for Him of a world lost by its first occupant's fault and the consequences of that fault. The moral restoration, that is, the restoration of Divine spiritual sovereignty, can be achieved only by free, moral decision and choice of a spiritual creature - and this

(1) See Frommel's "Leçon particulière aux étudiants", in "Etudes morales et religieuses", 1907.
creature is man. "His situation is as critical as his task is glorious". A moral drama is being played out on the earth of which humanity is the hero. God could not undertake the task Himself, for, to restore by force proves only force, not moral character. It required the context of freedom. Man is constituted as free, his destiny being to realise, as a free moral creature, the proper fulfilment of that nature, and to justify God to guilty creatures, this justification rendering him guilty in his own eyes, ending in rejection, denial and death, or in repentance and salvation. It is significant that the writer to the Hebrews constitutes man as a creature higher than the angels.

Frommel defined his relationship and attitude to Biblical theology and criticism by an analogy - that of the different approaches to the structure of a cathedral. The builder sees it in terms of its elements, stone, wood, bricks, metal, tiles; the workmen look to the masonry, carpentry, roofing, ornamental sculpture, etc; the architect considers the whole, the conformity of its parts, the style, the artistic thought inspiring and dominating the whole building. To these correspond respectively, the historical, theological and Christian points of view.

Constituting his position as that of the last of these, Frommel saw a three-fold witness to the existence of this fallen creature distinct from, and anterior to, man, a testimony found in the origins, centre and end of revelation. The centre-point of the Biblical witness is the presentation of Jesus Christ in the Gospels. He is engaged in a formidable and tragic struggle, and the object of that combat is Evil. This evil is not simply seen in terms of human acts, nor even general human sinfulness; it is presented as a struggle on a cosmic scale. Whether it be the Temptations, the

(1) op. cit. p. 239.
agony in Gethsemane, or the drama on Golgotha, the conflict is seen by Jesus as with "the Prince of this world". Did He derive this expression from tradition or personal experience? Whatever title is used, it is clear that Jesus conceived the object of this struggle in personal terms; we are not dealing with poetry as with Job, nor symbolic tradition like Genesis. Jesus is not likely to have accommodated his ideas and expressions to popular thinking, and, while some have objectted that He was ignorant in the fields of physics, mathematics, history, astronomy, or Biblical criticism, He never made pronouncements in these spheres; but we could hardly allow His incompetence in the matter of moral and spiritual authority. Unless on the grounds of textual criticism — and Frommel said he did not know of any — we may not excise the reference of Jesus to "The Prince of this world", "Beelzebub", "Satan".

The first Biblical reference to Satan is in the prologue to the Book of Job, where he is presented as a wicked creature, accusing man before God, exercising rights over man, and having as goal, not man himself, but his own justification before God. Then there are the first chapters of Genesis; call them poem, myth, legend, as we will, but, beyond the 'matter', they are instinct with creative inspiration — as in two examples only, the contrast at the outset between order and chaos, and the psychological versimilitude of chapt. 3. The same reality of struggle is found in the Pauline writings, with their clear sense of cosmic conflict, and one may assert that the Satanology of the apostolic writers has nothing of pagan demonology. Indeed, Frommel discerned development in the Pauline thought — in his earlier writing he spoke of the opposition of the flesh and the spirit, the law of sin and grace, in his later, the element of personalisation took over (e.g. Ephes. 6.11-12).
Other Biblical citations may be adduced—e.g. the protoevangelic reference to the role of humanity in the struggle against the evil one and the justification of God (Gen. 3.15); and, as above, the book of Job, with its theme of the trying of a man, such that, if he had sinned, Satan had triumphed, and man could reproach God for creating him guilty. But the man triumphed, and Satan was condemned, his cause lost; God is justified—i.e. His sovereign goodness is conserved—and it was man who justified Him. Thus again is set forth the rôle of humanity. We must also take into account the "locus classicus", (Rom. 8.19-21)—"the creation waits with eager longing for the revelation of the sons of God, for the creation was subjected to vanity (futility, R.S.V.) not of its own will, but by the will of him who subjected it in hope that it also will be liberated from its bondage to decay into the glorious liberty of the children of God." From this, Frommel's conclusion, which we might feel to be inescapable, is that the creation, in its actuality, is not, or is not exclusively, divine, carrying with it the bondage of the one who involved it in his rebellion, and that it is man who, in re-establishing the Divine rule, must free the universe, re-conquering it for God. In passing we may note two implications of this hypothesis, first, the nullity and invalidity of proofs of the existence of God derived from 'nature', since, that which is in the "bondage of corruption, groaning together and waiting for redemption" can hardly yield such proofs as if they could be "read off" by rational deduction; and, second, with respect to the Person and work of Christ, Who in His victory over the forces of evil, in solidarity with mankind, gave earnest of final triumph. "By man came death"; in terms of truly normative "man" comes "life", i.e. victory over the elements of sin and death.
In the estimation of Frommel, there are really in the last analysis, only two hypotheses between which to choose, that of Sèrénan, a philosophical theory which makes humanity itself the subject of a "comprehensible" fall, suppressing the historical fall of Adam; and the other, as he believed, the Biblical hypothesis, in which there is maintained the historical fall of humanity, attributed to the temptation by a wicked creature, and which makes the subject of the "comprehensible" fall a primitive creature other than humanity. The choice between them is to be made, not in terms of equality of validity, but of inequality of authority, which must therefore lead us to the latter. (1) Further, the apologetic purpose of the doctrine requires us to commend the solution of the problem of evil which has been termed "Biblical", the following considerations being crucial: Frommel regarded as the decisive consideration the witness and life of Jesus Christ, Who should be reckoned the most competent authority in the moral and religious field. Evil is taken in terms of ultimate seriousness, not as a matter of intellectual theory or metaphysical speculation, but as something to be faced, grappled with, and defeated. In the matter of the possibility of error, we cannot dissolide error from holiness in the central doctrine and belief as to His nature.

Add to this the further matter of the already constituted religious unity of the Bible. Across whatever differences and heterogeneities claimed by critical theology, there is this unassailable unity of dominant theme - man in a condition of estrangement and of separation from the true ground of his being, man in bondage to sin, with a paradoxical sense of freedom compounded with guilt; but, supremely: man as the object of the redemptive activity of God.

This theme of redemption is centred on man, who, extra-Biblically, is

(1) op. cit. p. 216.
often regarded as the author, and, in some sense, the creator of evil, but is presented, Biblically, not as identifiable with the evil he commits, but as being seduced by evil regarded as an extraneous agent. We may agree that a new dimension of meaning and purpose is imparted to human existence where man is seen, in particular in terms of the narrative of Job and the testimony and life of Jesus Christ, as the being to whom was entrusted the justification of God and the reconquering of the world for Him.

Further, depersonalisation is always fatal to morality and religion, whose proper sphere is that of personal relationships. Where these are abandoned for phenomena, laws, or impersonal causes, we have departed from faithfulness to the realities of human existence, of "La Vérité Humaine". We are reminded again of the central thesis of Flournoy\(^{(1)}\) that faith is constituted in personal relationship and that "the foundation and basis of things, from the religious point of view, is a personality". The whole of man is involved in the Biblical, "pistic", conception of faith, not the intellectual nor sense-faculties alone. This is its distinguishing nature, to be intra-personal, in contrast with extra-Biblical philosophies constituted in impersonal terms in face of phenomena and laws, constructed under the constraint of a priori metaphysical necessity and determination.

Another commending quality of the theory is, in Frommel's view, that it escapes the charge of being "simplist" while retaining, paradoxically, a "complex simplicity". A simplist conception would fail to take account of what is implied in all serious theism, namely, the plurality of created beings and of divine creations. The vitiating weakness of most theories offered, not excepting Secretan's, has been that of determining themselves in a context of astronomical

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\(^{(1)}\) "Foi et science: Conférence de Sainte-Croix, 1898, p. 264."
and moral geocentricity, and, therefore, of treating man as if he were the only moral creature in the entire universe, or, at least, as if there were no solidarity whatever between different parts of the moral universe created by God. In face, then, of man's propensity towards dialectical thinking, the Biblical view may be seen, not as irrational but as paradoxical; it takes account of the tendency to intellectual polarisation, but seeks to overcome it in the actualities of human experience. Simple, therefore, but not simplistic, the hypothesis outlined deals pragmatically, rather than theoretically, with the question of the origin and existence of evil in the world.

Lastly, our author saw justice done by the hypothesis to the question of the seeming inequation of guilt and suffering. No pastor nor reader of history can be unaware of this deep human problem, and it is the great merit of the Biblical approach to relieve the matter of a mathematical or legalistic evaluation, and to set suffering in the context of redemption. In the experience of Christ, and in what we might term the paradigm of Job, we transcend the metaphysical and the moral, and man is constituted as involved by his peculiar destiny and vocation to "justify" God to the world, and to be the means of its restoration and reconquering for Him.

At the close of his analysis, Frommel defined his goal as a practical one - that his students might teach, exhort, console and retain the certainty of faith. Not all will have followed him in his exposition, but at least a certain orientation of thought has been offered. "I have constructed the house wherein I shelter my faith. It is for you to construct your own. My purpose is achieved if the materials of mine can be useful to you...."(1)

From this account of Frommel's thought certain features emerge as to his method and purpose which dominate and explain his distinc-

(1) op. cit. pp. 268-269.
tive approach. These were his burning passion to communicate the Gospel in the context of the Biblical understanding of man; to furnish students for the ministry with richness of material presented with care as to order and form; to employ clarity and logic of expression; and, very distinctively with him, to mark, and therefore, to avoid, the danger of the explication of the dynamic nature of religious experience in terms of the categories of the metaphysical, the a priori, the intellectualist, these implying and involving, as he believed, the constraints of determinism and causality.

An important assessment of Frommel's position was offered by Arnold Reymond in "Le Problème du Mal et l'Apologetique de Gaston Frommel". (1) He was critical of La Vérité Humaine as an unfinished work, which the author would not have thus left, and considered that the harmony of the whole was more apparent than real. He complained of a certain repetitiousness, and one wonders whether there was an intended implication as to the title of Frommel's work when he commented as an excellent volume that by Ch. Jung-Dartienne (Genève: 1916) called "Vers la vérité éternelle"...

On the part of the study outlined, his main criticism was of Frommel's conception of the human species which he seems to treat as though "envisaged as a person". We have already drawn attention to the risk of confusion if it is not clearly stated that the psychic and moral life of a people is of a different kind from that of an individual; and, that the individual conscience must simply recognise "the justice of moral solidarity" on the grounds of the acceptance of the justice of history, and the appeals to feelings of sympathy in the context of concern and prayer, was contested by Reymond on the ground that the former heightens, rather than resolves, the problem, and that the latter, as elsewhere in Frommel's thesis, rests

(1) Lausanne Revue: 1917.
on an unacknowledged legalism. The heart of the problem is really the relationship between justice and love, but we may feel that Reymond is less happy in his analysis of this. He wrote (1) "in effect, for Frommel, love is the extension of justice. This is an error not committed by Chas. Secrétan. We should not say, with Frommel, "j'aime parce ce que je dois", but "je dois parce ce que j'aime". This is inversion—what has to be constituted is the completion, fulfilment, and indeed the dissolving, of duty in love. Reymond criticised Frommel's argument, which led to the constitution of man—"Je dois, donc je suis". Not only did he find it "moralist" but "simplist", and he felt that the argument need not stop there, but should issue in "J'aime, donc je suis", since "love is not only the substance of duty, but its source". We might feel that this point is not well taken, for Frommel was seeking to define "man", as man actually is; he is saying that man is constituted in terms of what he is, a creature conscious of the "ought". He ought to be, but he is not. Love, therefore, as the fulfilling of the law, of the "ought", cannot be the property of the natural man; it is only possible to the new man in Christ. The "love" of natural man cannot evade the taint of egoism, calculation or self-preservation; so Frommel was right in halting his analysis at "je dois", which is, from his point of view, in terms of the obligation of conscience, the true constitution of "La Vérité Humaine", (the truth about man).

Reymond remarked that Frommel had decided, of all criteria offered by philosophy, to retain only the criterion of morality. This has to do with that which should be, but this, in turn, is a function of the reality in which we live. This reality is discerned as illumined by reason, the testimony of all the human faculties being necessary to the knowledge of "that which should be" and in the

(1) op. cit. p. 152.
search of truth. It is clear that Frommel could not accept this primary rôle of reason in the constitution of truth, because of the overtones of implied metaphysical necessity. To the objection that he retained only one criterion, that of morality, he could justifiably reply that, in the constitution of "human truth", the criteria offered by the senses, the feelings, the intellect, had validity in their own spheres, e.g. in the application of the appropriate methods in the natural sciences, but, in terms of his analysis of man qua man, "human truth" is constituted with reference to man as a moral being. He was not, after all, claiming to offer a "theodicy". Admittedly, he regarded the work as an "Apologetics", and this carried the attendant risk of circularity of argument. As in the chapter on the Epistemological status of faith, we would judge it a matter of greater wisdom to recognise our condition as Christian philosophers as "viatores". From this recognition derive our true criteria of utterance, and thus the fault of Frommel may be seen, not in the selection of the criterion of morality as such, but in apparently proceeding on the assumption that "human truth" could be patient of analysis in terms of any fixed ideational concept, however lively, when, because of its dynamic character, (as he indeed allowed when he asserted that the true descriptive method is in the expression: "Do the will - know the doctrine"), human truth is, in fact, not susceptible of that kind of analysis, from an apologetic standpoint, i.e. as demonstrating Christian truth before the profane reason.

In the opinion of Reymond, a too schematic moralism was as dangerous to the flowering of the religious life as logical intellectualism. Each, in effect, and in its own field, tries to explain the unexplainable before which bow faith and adoration. Judgments of value are in two distinct groups - one concerning what I should be
or become, the other the universal "ought". In the first there is implied the existence of evil as moral fault, and there is the legitimising of certain postulates relative to God; in the other, the judgment has, for object, not a personally undertaken change, but one in the external world and our relationships with it. Our ignorance of the world, its structure, nature, etc., is so profound that, in face of such mystery, we must hesitate to pronounce on "what is", let alone "what should be". It would appear that either the "ought" applied to the exterior world is chimerical or at least deprived of moral significance, or we start from the Frommelian "je dois", and, unduly extending its postulates and derivatives to the whole universe, declare that all evil has voluntary and individual fault as cause. Reymond found Secretan's hypothesis "interesting" - that originally the human species existed in the form of a sinful creature, free and conscious in his acts; but that, after the Fall, conscious individuality was lost, the one thing remaining being solidarity. We have seen that, for Frommel, the hypothesis of an anterior moral fall alone allows us to hold to the holiness and omnipotence of God.

In the estimate of Reymond, Frommel's claim that the hypothesis is Biblical was not substantiated. Although the intention was to transcend literal exegesis in favour of the "spirit", yet we must acknowledge that the Scriptures are largely dumb on the subject, except in the book of Job. Jesus says nothing of the origin of Satan, stressing only his earthly dominance and His own sense of conflict and confidence in ultimate victory.

Jewish and Christian thought is essentially eschatological, forward- rather than backward-looking, simply stating an inexplicable duality of good and evil. The prophets did not use the language of precision or definition, where, by contrast, the New

(1) op. cit. pp. 155f.
Testament language is of incarnation in a personality. There may be psychological or metaphysical reasons for this, but the matter remains a mystery. Both Testaments recognise duality, but this is temporary, i.e. strictly, belonging to time; eventually, the power of evil will be overthrown. There is no Biblical "theory of the Fall" as Frommel uses the term, one thing only seeming certain to the sacred writers, namely, the participation of the human will in the work of evil, which is treated in Genesis as a seduction. Paul alone took up this idea and the reference to Adam, not to assert the guilt of all humanity in him, but to demonstrate the superiority of the effect of grace over evil.

We feel that Reymond's criticism of Frommel was essentially destructive and negative. A more cogent criticism of Frommel's treatment would surely be, not so much to criticise his exposition of the Biblical material - which is hazardous, in view of his unexceptionable references - as to make more definite and precise the objection, not that the theory is faulty or invalid, but that the words "hypothesis" and "theory" should not, perhaps, be used at all in the Biblical context. By this we mean that there are no "hypotheses" in connection with any of the great questions of human existence; there is no "hypothesis" of the existence of God, nor of Incarnation, nor of redemption nor of soteriology, and so on - hence no "hypothesis" of evil and its origin. There is the witness of experience, the testimony of a religious dynamic. There are doctrinal and dogmatic formulations in embryo, but it is dangerous to constitute as a hypothesis material which is being offered - and this is the important point - within an apologetic context. It would thus become the substance of profane discussion and analysis, and, by Frommel's own oft-repeated emphasis, there is a radical discontinuity debarring
the discerning, by natural man, of the truth hidden in the Christian experience and life. Indeed, as another writer puts it, only those who acknowledge that they have been saved from sin truly know what sin is... In this understanding, Frommel would be right; but he would be mistaken if he thought that, by expounding Biblical citations, he could elaborate, far less transmit, apologetically, a Biblical hypothesis of evil and its origin. We must, therefore, regretfully conclude that, apart from any devotional or intra-Biblical validity, such a hypothesis, being offered in an apologetic context, must be seen to fall, by Frommel's own analysis, under a judgment of invalidity so far as it becomes the subject-matter of the profane reason.

In terms of the foregoing, we have more agreement with Reymond's other criticism, where he said that, philosophically, Frommel's theory does not offer a satisfying solution to the problem of evil. This is true, as a statement of fact, because, the problem has simply been put back a stage; we have still to deal with the questions — what meanings can we give to the terms involved in the ante-nebular, or "intelligible", theory? Whence the evil in that domain and context? Who was Satan, and why did he rebel? But it must be pointed out that while, as pointed out, Frommel unwisely exposed himself on the apologetic flank, he never imagined that he was offering a philosophically satisfying hypothesis. Thus the objection is somewhat beside the point, if not gratuitous. Before ultimate questions, human reason, even where illumined by faith, even where there is, in Mehl's phrase, the renewing of the mind, stands baffled, and should, perhaps, confess itself inarticulate. We must accept our limitations as "viaatores".

A fitting conclusion to this discussion would be some closing
sentences from Reymond: (1) "The mystery is too great to be contained in a formula... A too schematic moralism is as dangerous to the flowering of (the religious life) as logical intellectualism. Each is, in effect, seeking to explain the unexplainable before which bow faith and adoration.... The great questions are shrouded in mystery. The believer's attitude is compounded, above all, of hope and confidence in a world of spiritual realities of which he is aware, and which transcend him. Of one thing is there certainty, the power of goodness and love. The Gospel is the "pole" of (his) thought, since it proclaims the mystery of the Divine love..."

(1) op. cit. p. 162.
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MEMOIRS


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EXTRACTS FROM JOURNALS (under subject headings)

L'Expérience Chrétienne

Journal Religieux (Neuchatel) Dec. 1916
Journal de Genève Jan. 1917
La Semaine Religieuse Jan. 1917
Sonntagsblatt (Basle) Apr. 1917
Le Semeur 1917

La Vérité Humaine (Vol. I)

Gazette de Lausanne June 1910
Journal de Genève Jan. 1910
La Luce (Roma) Jan. 1910
La Semaine Littéraire Apr. 1910
La Vie Nouvelle Apr. 1910
Sonntagsblatt (Basle) May 1916
Poi et Vie 1913/1914

La Vérité Humaine (Vols. II and III)

Gazette de Lausanne Jan. 1915
Journal de Genève Dec. 1915
La Semaine Religieuse Jan. 1916
Jeunesse Mar. 1916
Journal Religieux 1915/1916

Etudes Religieuses et Sociales

Le Semaine Littéraire Nov. 1907
Tribune de Lausanne Dec. 1907
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<td>L'Essor: Lausanne</td>
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La Visite de Brunetièrè

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MATERIAL BY FROMMER

Gazette de Lausanne

"La Conscience populaire". Sept. 1895

La Semaine Littéraire. (Genève).

Les Conferences d'Aug. Sabatier. Apr. 1896

La Religion et la Culture moderne d'après Sabatier. May 1898

Gazette de Lausanne.

"Un bivouac dans l'Alpage". July 1899

La Semaine Littéraire.

"A propos de Calvin". Aug. 1899

Journal Suisse.


Gazette de Lausanne.

La situation politico-religieuse en France. May 1903

La Semaine Littéraire.

Letter on "Le suffrage féminin". Mar. 1904

Journal de Genève.

"L'idée de Dieu d'après W. Monod". May 1905