The
SERVICE OF THE SCOTTISH MERCENARY FORCES
IN IRELAND.

FROM 1565 TO 1663.

WITH
AN ACCOUNT OF THE MERCENARY SYSTEM IN IRELAND
AND OF ITS EFFECT ON SCOTTISH HISTORY.

A Thesis presented in the University of
Edinburgh for the Degree of Ph.D. in
the Faculty of Arts.

by
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"On aird thuaidh thig an chobhair" (Assistance comes from the North.)

- Old Irish Proverb.
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NOTE as to Gaelic Proper Names:

Considerable difficulty must always be experienced in the interpretation of Gaelic Proper Names in a Historical work not itself composed in the Gaelic language. So-called English spellings are largely corruptions - very often quite incorrect. In these pages, therefore, it has been felt better to keep as close as possible to the Gaelic spellings. Sometimes, however, arbitrary procedure is necessary - as in the case of MacDonald - usually rendered in Ireland Mac Donnell, also Macdonald, Macdonnell. (There is no distinction whatever between MacDonald, McDonald, and M'Donald). Here the usual Scottish spelling is adopted. The following are some of the Gaelic spellings:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gaelic, or correct, Spelling</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>&quot;English&quot; Spelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somhairle Buidhe.</td>
<td>Suh-erl-</td>
<td>Sorley Boy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S'ean O'Neil.</td>
<td>Shawn.</td>
<td>Shane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tir Conaill.</td>
<td>Tcheer.</td>
<td>Tyrconnell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gir-riogitha (sub-chieftains)</td>
<td>Cre-ree-uchtha</td>
<td>Urraghta.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of names such as Donald and Randal, the Scottish form of spelling is followed - the more correct Gaelic spelling is, of course, Domhnall and Raghnall. The name S'ean ("English" spelling - Shans) is often Anglicised John, but this is purely arbitrary; as is Samuel for Somhairle.

Nicknames are preserved, as they are often the only means of distinguishing two persons of the same Christian name in a family - as, Donald Gorm (i.e., dark-haired, or complexioned) and Donald Bealach (recte, Ballach - i.e.
freckled, or speckled.)

Technical words referring to the mercenary system - as buana (plural-buannadha - a mercenary soldier) and galloclog (pl. galloclaigh) a particular type of mercenary, are spelled as in Gaelic, such being preferable to the "English" renderings, bonnacht and galloglas or gallowglass.
CHAPTER ONE:

THE BACKGROUND OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCOTTISH AND IRISH AFFAIRS.

(to circa, 1565.)
CHAPTER ONE:

THE BACKGROUND OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCOTTISH AND IRISH AFFAIRS.
(to c. 1560)

In the draft of the proposed treaty of 1570 between England and Scotland, made out while Mary, Queen of Scots, was still a captive of Elizabeth, a significant item occurs: Mary "shall suffer no Scotsman or any of the outlaws of Scotland to enter into any part of Ireland without license of the Deputy there, and neither shall receive any rebel or fugitive of Ireland or suffer any such to be maintained in Scotland, or in any part of the Isles." Again, in the treaty made at Berwick in 1586, and assented to by Elizabeth and James VI, a similar clause occurs: "quocumque tempore contigerit Subditos seu Incolas cujuscunque Partis seu Provinciae Regni Scotiae... cum aliqua extraordinaria Militum Manu et Numero more hostili in aliquam Hiberniae Regni Partem intrare, idem Rex per dictam Serenissimam Reginam de hujusmodi Ingressu certior factus, Edicto publico, dictos Infestatores hostiliter in eo Regno grassantes, tanquam Rebelles publicae Pacis Perturbatores et Perduellionis reos denunciabit et persecuetur."

The prelude to the sixteenth century incidents which were responsible for these articles is the long story of Scoto-Irish interconnection - a background stretching to the distant days of St. Columba, and a record of events in that most eventful region, the Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland. The dispute concerning the exact relation of the Dalriadic colony to the earlier inhabitants of Scotland, how-

ever, is best left to the pages of Skene and of those who have replied to him. It is quite sufficient for us to commence with the fact of the close relationship between the Argyll district and Ulster which becomes evident about the time of Angus Og, Lord of the Isles, son of Angus Mor, and sixth in descent from Somerled. This prince married a daughter of O'Cahan, a subsidiary of O'Neil of Ulster, in 1305. From this time onward until the Ulster chieftains were crushed at the beginning of the seventeenth century, it is quite true to say that northern Ireland, while remaining to a great extent a terra incognita to the English authority in Dublin, was in active and constant communication with the West Highlands. Indeed the parallel between Ulster as unknown and misunderstood by Dublin and the Isles and Highlands generally as similarly misunderstood by the Edinburgh court is very striking. The significance of the term "wild Irish" as applied at one and the same time by Edinburgh to the West Highlanders and by Dublin to the native Irish is a matter not to be overlooked. The inhabitants of the Isles, said Don Pedro

3. For the terms "Irish" as applied to the Highlanders and "Ireland" to the Highlands, vide: "Erischry" (Barbour's Brûce); "Hibernienses" (Chronicon Pictorium apud Innes); sub Erischry: Macpherson: Geog. Illustris. Sc. Hist.; note that the Highlands were officially called "Ireland" in 1590 (Under the scheme of Chancellor Maitland for tightening up control over the Highlands and Isles - Act. Parl. Scot., July, 1587 - a special commission was appointed with a special minute book entitled "Liber Actorum penes Hyberniae, Insularum et Marciarum Regni Ordinem" - Reg. Privy Council Scot., IV, Intro. by Masson, IV.) Further examples are: Argyll's "Irishmen" in 1543 (Hamilton Papers, I, 398 and lxxii): "Erishe" Campbells (C.S.P., Scotland, II, 112-119, 1565); Maclean, MacLeod, Moidart and Campbells called "Irishmen", 1569 (Id. II, 453-454) same in 1572 (Id., IV, 135 and cf. V, 376.)
de Ayala, an independent observer, in 1498, "speak the language and have the habits of the Irish", and even Skene admits the close and increasing contact and sympathy between the Scots and Irish from the time of Angus Og.

Whether or no this contact was the result, or, rather, the continuation, of closer earlier relations than Skene and his school are ready to admit, it had two important results for Scotland and for Ireland. The first was the settlement of a branch of the Clan Donald in Ulster, the second the initiation of an extended system of mercenary service, whereby the inhabitants of the Isles and of the mainland adjacent hired themselves out as fighting men to the Irish. To a great extent they are both manifestations of one movement—the migration of Scotsmen to Ireland—and it is as thus closely connected, one with the other, that we must examine them.

It was during the period of Angus Og and his father, that is, during the course of the latter half of the thirteenth century that a strange figure made his appearance in Irish military history. He was known as a Gall-óglach, or, as the sixteenth century English corruption has it, a Galloglass. He was nothing more or less than a native of the Scottish Isles who was employed as a free-lance soldier by the native Irish in


5. Skene: Celtic Scotland, III, 337-338. "...the spirit and tendency of the whole race (of the Lords of the Isles) was essentially Irish"—Skene in Intro. (xxxI) to Skene and MacLauchlan: Dean of Lismore's Book.
Ulster. The derivation of his name appears simple enough — as "Gall", meaning "foreign", and "óglach" meaning a "warrior", or, more exactly, a "young fighting man" — but there are many points about him which are, and, seemingly, must continue to remain, obscure. We do not know, for example, why he was called "Gall"-óglach any more than we know why the inhabitants of the Isles at a corresponding period were called "Gall"-Gaedheal. Very likely the solution of one question is also the answer to the other. It may, or may not, be as the Macdonal historians suggest that the Gall-Gaedheal of the Isles were roving bands of Scots with Norse connections who took on the mode of life of the Vikings. Certainly it appears much more likely that this was so than that they were as Skene suggests. At all events, the Galloglaigh in Ireland have a peculiarly Scandinavian flavour which, unfortunately, Scottish historians have largely lost sight of in assaying the extent of Scandinavian influence on the Hebrides.

The first mention of the Galloglaigh element in the annals of Irish warfare occurs in 1347, when a chieftain


7. Macdonalds: Clan Donald, I, 16-17. cf. Dugald Mitchell’s view (Hist.Highlands, 147). The name Gallgaedeal, he says, begins to appear during the later years of Kenneth’s reign (c. 843 A.D). He says that the Norwegian equivalent of this as a territorial name is Gaddgedda, and takes it that "Galloway" is derived from it. Note the Norse rendering of Gall-Gaedheal as "Vikingr Skotar" (an exact equivalent) by Arefrodi — quoted: Skene: Highlanders, 191, seq.

8. Skene: Celtic Scotland, III; cf. his Highlanders.
named Mac Somhairlidh fought in the ranks of O'Donnell, 9
prince of Tir Conaill, and the first mention of Gallóglaigh
as such in the Annals of Ulster is made in 1290. From
this time onward the Gallóglaigh spread rapidly all over
Ireland, and mention of them in the records, both native and
English, is commonplace. They are described many times by
sixteenth century writers, but each time unsatisfactorily.
Briefly the position appears to have been thus: up to the
time of the Norman invasion there had been no standing
force at the command of the Irish leaders, and so the dis-
ciplined English men-at-arms found little difficulty in
overcoming their yeomen opponents. During the Irish revival,
for some generations before the invasion of Robert Bruce and
from the time of that event down to the period of the Tudor
offensive, however, a new military scheme was being perfect-
ed in Ireland. Trained fighting men were introduced from
Argyll and the Out Islands to aid the Irish. Coming first to
Ulster they proved their worth against the invading English
there and were thence quickly brought south by those of the
Irish chieftains who stood in need of forces offensive and
defensive. "Better a castle of bones than a castle of stones,"
said one of the family of the Savages in the Ardes in Co.
12
Down in the fourteenth century, and the peculiar signifi-
cance of the old Irish proverb "On aird thuaidh thig an

10. A.Ulst.,1290: The gallóglaigh of the Clan Donald and others
helped to depose Aedh O'Donnell of Tir Conaill - "Clainn
Domnaill 7 galloglaic n-imda aile".
11. MacNeill, ubi.sup.; O'Rahilly: Irish Dialects, pp.161-2;
What comes from the North in the matter of the building up of the mobile force of Gallógláigh which supplied the "castle of bones" is not to be missed. These Hebridean soldiers fought, at any rate during the earlier period, in bodies of their own organisation; each body appears to have been composed of members of one or other of the several clans which were engaged in the service, and there were recognised hereditary leaders and, seemingly, a definite system of payment. They became latterly a military caste in the country of their adoption, settled on land which became theirs by hereditary right, and the service which they rendered to the Irish is no small reason for the great success of the Irish reaction from the early fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth.

Such is the meagre information concerning these Scottish soldiers which the few scattered references to them afford. Until very recent years they were either totally ignored or entirely misunderstood by Irish historians.

It is certainly an extraordinary thing that this system of employing Hebridean soldiers in Ireland should have gained such strength as the documentary evidence of the sixteenth century proves - for it seems that the organisation of the Gallógláigh clans never lost its military character, and although territory was possessed by the Clan Donald in Co. Mayo, Co. Tyrone and Co. Kildare, by the Clan Sweeney in Donegal and in Munster, by the MacCabes in Fermanagh and by the other free axe clans, the MacSheehys, MacRorys and MacDougalls elsewhere, these bodies never lost their military character and never forsook their mercenary profession for territorial consolidation.

13. For reference to these clans and to the Gallógláigh generally and for an examination of the Mercenary system, vide Appendix No. I below.
It has been remarked that the Gallóglaigh are first mentioned in the Irish records in the year 1290, but it is to be noticed that this reference to them is quite incidental. They are not described, nor is their presence explained. Why it was that Hebrideans should come to Ireland at all we can only surmise. When they first came we do not know. An English mandate exists under date 1260 which denies admission to Ireland to Scotsmen, and which authorises the Justiciary of Ireland to arrest any who may be found in the country. This seems to point to an earlier ingress. It appears also that the great majority of the Scottish soldiers who settled in Ireland came over during this early period, as there is no record of any further large bodies coming from Scotland, except to Antrim, until the sixteenth century when the character of the incomers underwent a change.

At a period coincident with that during which the Hebridean influx to Ireland is first mentioned the affairs of that country were undergoing a change. During the hundred odd years which had elapsed since the arrival of the Normans the settlement of Ireland as a conquered country had been going ahead. It was a conquest, of course, merely in name, and the settlement was of the most scattered and unsatisfactory nature, yet success attended the English arms in so far as a superstructure of feudalism in the form of a string of Norman families settled upon the land was imposed upon the basis of the Gaelic system. The oldest of these had not been established in Ireland for more than four generations.

14. Pat. 44 Henry III, No. 73, m. 3 – Cal. Docmts. relating to Ireld., Vol. 1235-1284, No. 652. In 1259 an O'Conor of Connaught married a MacDonald bride in Ulster and received as her marriage portion eight score Scots' fighting men, whom he brought to Connaught – Gwynn: Hist. Ireland, p. 126.
however, when the superstructure which they represented was to a large extent threatened with disaster by an upheaval of the base. From the commencement of the fourteenth century onwards the inevitable happened. Isolated centres of English civilisation marooned in a sea of Gaelic institutions, the Anglo-Norman families were speedily broken in upon and their members became Hibernores Hibernios 1290s. The first of the Irish revivals had followed the Danish Invasion; the second had now set in. The influence of the English crown was weakened in every part of the country as the planted families one by one adopted the Irish institutional system, and when England made her first attempt to recover her position in the reign of Henry VIII she found herself deprived of authority in every part of the country except within the bounds of the small district about Dublin which had come to be known as the English Pale.

The military side of this Irish revival was represented by the introduction and settlement on a large scale of the Gallógaigh clans. The first general manifestation of the changing system as an active force to be reckoned with by England was apparent in the invasion of Edward Bruce. MacNeill, however, is careful to point out that the Irish revival was not, as is sometimes held, the result of the Bruce invasion, but, rather, that Bruce was invited to Ireland because a revivalist spirit had animated the Irish chiefs at a period anterior to 1314. Bound up closely with the coming of the Bruces is the coming of the Hebridean mercenary forces. Although Robert

Bruce was not of Gaelic stock, his Gaelic was nearer to that of the Irish than his English was to that of London, and the spirit which animated the Irish when they called upon him for assistance was that which caused their chieftains to summon mercenary aid from the Isles. Furthermore, it was with the assistance of Angus, Lord of the Isles, that the Bruces crossed to Ulster, and the Lord of the Isles was the formal overlord of the mercenary clans, the members of which were all, mediately either or immediately of Clan Donald stock.

From the strictly military point of view, the Bruce expedition was a failure in Ireland. The native force of Connacht which was about to join Edward Bruce was defeated at Athenry, and the main Scottish army was ultimately overthrown at Faughart, but the results of the entire were to prove as important for Ireland as the work of Robert Bruce did for his own country. The action of the powerful Norman family of de Burgo, or Burke, in Connacht is typical of what went on all over Ireland during the aftermath of the Scottish invasion. Here as in Munster, Ulster, and in Leinster right up to the walls of Dublin, the English yoke was thrown off - chaos was the result, and yet it was in this seed period that the Irish people were stamped as a race-entity apart. In 1333, two scions of the Burke family, hitherto the pillar of English Government west of the Shannon, threw off their allegiance and divided the family estates between them, reverting to the Irish scheme of tanistry as they did so and repudiating the feudal law of primogeniture. This struggle of two totally

distinct systems: Celtic tanistry and Brehon Law generally as against English primo-geniture and feudal conceptions: was to be the keynote of the later Tudor strife; the failure of the English Government and of the English jurist even to understand that such a struggle was afoot complicates Irish History down to the Penal days.

In the Isles also, and in Scotland generally, the fourteenth century saw the initiation of a period of change. The real significance of the Lordship of the Isles as an entity apart from the Scotland which was centred on Edinburgh cannot be too strongly stressed. There were two states in Scotland, not one united state, and the fact that the early Scots of the Argyll district had supplied the ruling family to the Kingdom of Scotland should not lead us to any supposition other than that the progeny of Malcolm Canmore had abandoned their race-stock in substituting Scone for Iona and had alienated themselves from the original Scots in obtaining suzerainty over the various other elements in what gradually became the Scottish race. The Lordship of the Isles as a focal point for Gaelic sympathy in the West Highlands and Isles was not entirely broken down until the reign of James VI, but by the early fourteenth century internal dissension and an indication of what was later to prove the external pressure of a consolidating Scotland had already marked the pathway of ruin for the independent Lords. The later misfortunes of the

house of Somerled are foreshadowed in the fate of the senior branch of the line of the Isles in the time of Bruce. Alastair Óg, fifth in descent from Somerled, who succeeded to the Isles in 1295, took up the cause of Edward I of England against Robert Bruce and was accordingly forfeited when Bruce won the independence of his country, Angus Óg, his younger brother, who has already been mentioned as having married O'Cahane's daughter, being elevated in his stead. Alastair Óg died a prisoner in Dundonald Castle, but his sons fled to Ireland where they established themselves as Gallógláigh commanders, received land in recompense for their services from the variouschieftains for whom they fought, and were responsible for the MacDonald septs of Tyrone, Mayo and of Leinster.

21. Ibid., 11, 83, 4, 87-8, and Cap. IV generally. The MS of 1450 recites the sons of Alastair Óg as: Black John, Reginald, Somerled, Angus, Godfrey and Charles. The MacDonald MS, attributed to Hugh Macdonald of Skye, however, gives only two names, both of which are different: Hector and Isacc (printed in Macphail: Highland Papers, I, 17-19). There is considerable discrepancy between the two accounts - that accepted by the authors of the Clan Donald and that to be deduced from Hugh Macdonald's statement. The ClanDonald pedigree from Angus Mor downwards appears to be involved in much doubt - cf. that in Robertson: Scotland under her Early Kings, with that in the MacDonald's Clan Donald, III, and note the variation between the MS of 1450 and Hugh Macdonald's MS. See also Appendix No. V, below. The MacDonald historians (Clan Donald) derive the ClanDonald sept of Tyrone (Clan Eoin Duibh - MS of 1450 - settled at Cnoc na Cluith, Co.Tyrone,A.F.M., V, 1365: Bk of Clanranald in Reliquiae Celtica, II, 159) from Black John and Charles Mor, the sons of the forfeited Alastair Og. Hugh Macdonald, on the other hand, traces the descent of this sept from Reginald, son of Reginald, son of the original Somerled, which Reginald was a brother of Donald, Lord of the Isles, and the father of Angus Mor, who, in his turn, was the father of Alastair Óg (cf. Macphail, Op. cit.) Hugh Macdonald calls the lands given to this sept by O'Neil, for whom they fought, Crock-Conight and Clansairnice (Co.Armsgh). Cnoc na Cluith, where the sept was indisputably settled at a later date (A.F.M., loc. cit.) can scarcely be identified with Crock-Conight. The significance of Cnoc na Cluith is "the hill of sport", vide O'Donovan's note to A.F.M., sub anno 1523, and Ordnance Survey 6 inch sheets for Knockinlomy, the modern Cnoc na Cluith, townland in the parish of Pomeroy, barony of Dungannon, Co.Tyrone. Note, that Hugh Macdonald makes Alastair Óg the brother of Angus Mor, not of Angus Óg. He does not reckon Alastair Óg as Lord of the Isles at all, but agrees that he was opposed to Bruce cf. also Dagald Mitchell: Hist. Isles (305 seq.) who neglects the issue.
In 1266 the Isles were by treaty with the King of Scotland nominally brought under control of Edinburgh, and the marriage in 1350 of John, Lord of the Isles, and Margaret, daughter of the Steward of Scotland, afterwards King Robert II, might seem to have gone far to bring about a state of affairs which would lead to a peaceful assimilation of the Isles to the kingdom of Scotland. Such, however, was not to be the case. The battle of Harlaw in 1411 showed pretty clearly the power of the Lords of the Isles, and the arrest of Alexander, the son of Donald of Harlaw, by King James I. was the first open indication of the impending struggle between Edinburgh and the Isles. The faction of the Duke of Albany, the former regent, had been hostile to the Macdonalds since the time of Harlaw; the fact that Alexander continued to hold Ross in succession to his father, and the real evidence of the extensive power of a prince who, as Hugh Macdonald of Skye relates, "possessed and governed all the lands between the Mull of Kintyre along the sea coast, and Strathnavern, with the western Isles"—these things eventually incited the Court against Alexander and his successors. As Skene says, "the struggle between this great Celtic family and the Crown assumed an aspect at length which could only terminate in the ruin of the former or the humiliation of the latter." The policy of dividing the Gaelic chieftains and pitting part against part to the ultimate destruction of the whole seems first to have been availed of by Government against the Isles in the proceedings which led up to the battle of Inverlochy in

22. For the marriage vide Hugh Macdonald apud Macphail, and also I, 81 of the Highland Papers.
23. Ibid, I, 35.
Hitherto the Council of the Isles sitting at Finlaggan in Islay or in Eigg had represented at least an approximation to unity for western Gaeldom; now the policy of the Court represented MacDonald as a prisoner in Tantallon, his power and influence gone, and the insidious diplomacy of Huntly in the north and of the Argyll family in the south later initiated the policy of spreading dissension among the members of the Isles confederacy. The strong separate clans arose, the Clan Donald split up and fell, the Macleans, leaning on the Campbells on one side and on the MacNeils upon the other, became gradually prominent in the South Isles; the MacLeods bid for supremacy in the North until broken by the MacKenzies.

It was perhaps only natural that the self-same policy of pitting the Gaelic chieftains one against the other should be adopted by the English Government in Ireland when the offensive was taken by the central authority against the Irish reaction, but it is interesting to find still another and more subtle method of breaking down Gaelic institutions at work at the same time, although independently, in Edinburgh and in Dublin - the scheme of educating the heirs of chieftains in Court and sending them back to spread the alien views which they had acquired among their people. John, the son of Alexander, Lord of the Isles, was thus brought up in the society of the Scottish Court, under the care of James II, and his later actions give us no reason to doubt Hugh

27. For examples of the working of this scheme as later extended in Ireland, vide C.S.P.,Ireland,1, 77,78,94.

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Macdonald's description of him as "a meek, modest man, brought up at court in his younger years, and a scholar, more fit to be a churchman than to command so many irregular tribes of people." His policy of securing the support of MacLean and others by grants of land could only sow the seeds of intestine strife. By 1493, however, he had gone the full length in resigning his hereditary title, and, although no official record of a formal forfeiture exists, there can be no doubting the significance of this both to the Lordship and to the Crown.

The century which followed was a period of increasing disorder for the Isles and for the West Highlands. The Tudor reaction against the Gaelic revival in Ireland and the reaction of the Hebrideans against the change in system necessarily occasioned by the downfall of the Lordship of the Isles came about together. The backgrounds were similar: the struggle of Gaelic institutions against the new idea of the consolidated sixteenth century state; a disunited Gaelic people, their affairs complicated by the tradition of an earlier union and the jealousies and feuds which the downfall thereof had occasioned, fighting among themselves and occasionally against the common invader, their internal strife taken advantage of, their scheme of life uniformly and everywhere misunderstood, they themselves considering their aggressors as unsympathetic aliens. Many writers have been at pains to disprove allegations of treason made against the Clan Donald for the activities of Domhnall Dubh and of James of Dunveg in the mid sixteenth century attempts to revive the Lordship

28. apud Macphail, ab supra, 47.
of the Isles - yet not until as late a date as 1590 under the Chancellor Maitland did the Edinburgh executive make any direct move to extend to the Highlands the benefits of central control. In Ireland the natives were denied at one and the same time the use of their own legal system and recourse to the English law; in the Isles the Earl of Argyll, "ane puir baron of the realmes", was appointed lieutenant, and the ClanDonald were similarly deprived of any advantage which might be theirs under the scheme of the Lordship and of any direct recourse to the Court in Edinburgh which had taken it upon itself to protect them.

James of Dunyveg, however, the leader of the ClanDonald South, was no mean opponent of Campbell aggression. While Domhnull Dubh obtained money from London as "therle of thisles" in 1545 James remained neutral, and, although he lapsed after the death of Domhnull in Drogheda, in a few years' time he was once more in high favour in Edinburgh and in 1555 he was in receipt of "clois writtingis" by special Court messenger. If James Macdonald was a traitor in 1546, the Earl of Argyll was not free from the same stigma in 1543, when the English Privy Council made overtures to him and promised

31. Intro. by Brewer to C.S.P., Carew, II, passim.
32. Macdonalds: ClanDonald, II, 515 seq.
34. See his petition as elected Lord of the Isles to the English authorities in Dublin for aid in 1546 - State Papers, Ireland, Henry VIII, III, 584. Vide also Hill: MacDonnells of Antrim, II, 43-44.
35. The Accounts of Ld. High Treasurer Scot. reveal an extensive correspondence, 1555-1562, as follows: 1555, Jan 7 - "clois writtingis" to James Macconnell (X, 268-9); 1558, July 5 - "to one boy passand of Edinburgh witth twa clois writtingis of the Queenis grace to James Macconnell and Hectour Maclane" - iii 11. (x, 359); 1562, Feb. 13 - the same to James Macconnell "witth diligence" (XI, 112); 1562, May 29 - the same (XI, 172); 1562, Dec. 31 - the same (XI, 235)
him money to aid the English interest in Scotland.

Upon the failure of the last attempt to revive the Lordship in 1546 a period of doubt and uneasiness, breaking forth all too frequently into open strife, was entered upon. It was a time of transition, of the overthrow of one system and the rise of another. The forfeited land of the Isles belonged in theory to the Scottish Crown, but in practice it was held by the ablest swordsman. The MacDonalds finally split up into the clans of Dunyveg in the south and Sleat, Glengarry, Clanranald, Keppoch and others in the north: between them lay the traditionally hostile MacLean - MacNeil confederacy: on the mainland over against the territory of that Donald south lay the Campbells, who had advanced steadily in power since James III had created their fourteenth chieftain Earl of Argyll in 1437 and who were ruled from 1542 onwards by Archibald, the fourth Earl, and the first of his family to embrace Protestantism. Speaking of the tenant entered into between Alexander Carragh, father of James MacDonald of Dunyveg, and Sir John Campbell of Calder, the MacDonald historians make the position as regards the Clan

36. Hamilton Papers, Vol.II.p.229. In 1548 John Brend received 250 from the English Privy Council to defray his expenses on a special mission to the Earl of Argyll "uppon occasion of writing sent from the said Erle giving hope of his de-vocion" - Acts Eng; Privy Council,II,170 and vide also, 543. With regard to Domhnull Dubh's insurrection of, the language of the document of credence to the emissaries empowered to treat for him with Henry VIII, with that of the Scottish Government Proclamation against him. The Isles document: "we have beyne auld enemys to the realme of Scotland, and quhen they had pacscene with ye kings hienes, thei hanged, bedit, presoned, and destroied many of our kyn, friends, and forbearis". (Printed in MacNeil: Clan Macneil,53-55). The Edinburgh document: the supporters of Domhnall described as - "tending to do (all) that is in thame to bring the hole Illis and ane grete part of the ferme land of this realme to the abesance of the King of Ingland, in his contemptiou of our Soverane Ladyis autor-ite, havand na respect to the samyn." (Reg.Privy Council Scot., I, 4-5).

37. House of Argyll and Clan Campbell, 32-42.
Campbell abundantly clear - "The numerous bonds of maunent by means of which the Campbells sought to extend their territorial prestige had, as it turned out, the opposite effect. The cloven foot was seen, and the Western Clans swore eternal enmity against the race of Diarmid." Of this whole period subsequent to the failure of Domhnull Dubh, Gregory says: "Repeated failures seem to have made the western clans sensible of the impossibility of re-establishing, in any shape, the old Lordship of the Isles; and they gradually learned to prefer holdings their lands under the sovereign directly, to being the vassals of any subject, however powerful. Having now no longer a common object, they became, by degrees, more estranged from each other, whilst each chief laboured either to extend his own possessions, or to defend himself from the aggressions of his more powerful neighbours."

We have noticed the many points of similarity between the state of affairs in the Isles and conditions in Ireland when Henry VIII came to the English throne. It had become abundantly clear that there were only two alternatives for Ireland - a native monarchy must arise, or else the country must be thoroughly conquered. Henry accepted the position, adopted the title King of Ireland in substitution for that of Lord of that country borne by his predecessors, and set about the reorganisation of Irish affairs. His policy, however, if not a mere makeshift, was singularly arbitrary in many respects. Mainly, he aimed at winning the country through the chieftains and establishing such a system of

counterschecks as might be calculated to substitute feudal
English law for the Brehon system. Henry could devote but
little attention to the affairs of his troublesome Irish king-
dom, however, and it was left to Queen Elizabeth to push forward
the Tudor policy of re-conquest. Her scheme, although in the
main a continuation of Henry's, was very different in many
respects. It was, says Richey, "honest in intention, noble
in its aspirations and persistently pursued, but founded upon
principles radically erroneous." Briefly, she aimed at
the establishment of the rule of English law in Ireland; that
was the end of her administration, and, as such, it obscured
much that should have been borne in mind in the choice of
means. Set upon the performance of what they thought right,
the Elizabethan executive in Ireland entirely neglected to
examine into the native legal and administrative system. They
did not try to understand the Gaelic civilisation; blinded by
noting more or less than ignorance, they condemned it unheard.
"By wise and conciliatory treatment," says Brewer, "the great
mass of the people, like the Lowlander in Scotland, would have
proved a barrier to the turbulence and insurrections of the
chiefs. But, indifferent to the condition, the wants and the
wishes of the broad mass of the population, the Tudor
sovereigns merely sought how to force the Irish into compliance
with English manners, English habits, dress and customs; and
when the task proved impossible, nothing remained except to
retreat or to ride rough-shod over all obstacles to good govern-

41. Walpole: Kingdom of Ireland, 116.
42. Richey: Lectures in Irish History: series 2, 38.
ment and improvement." If this was the state of mind of the central authority, what was that of the soldiery, the local officers and the smaller fry of the new conquest? Again and again the documents of the period prove the truth of Froude's statement in their regard - "Placed in the country to repress banditti, they were little better than banditti themselves. Their scanty numbers were a temptation to disturbance....they came at last to regard the Irish peasants as unpossessed of the common rights of human beings, and shot and strangled them like foxes or jackals."

The native Irishman, brought up in a system presenting many points of radical difference to feudalism, could not hope to understand the many novelties presented suddenly to him for his immediate acceptance. The Clan O'Neill, for example, could not understand why their chief's position had changed when he became Earl of Tyrone at the hands of Henry VIII - how the land which was the collective property of the clan could ever become the estate of the chieftain, who was no better than any other member of his name. Circumstances nearly drove both English and Irish then - as it drove

44. Froude: The English in Ireland, I, 51.
45. U.J.A., VI, 109-110: Ginnell: Brehon Laws, and cf. the text of these in Ancient Laws of Ireland, published by the Commissioners appointed for that purpose. The difference is fundamental. According to the Brehon Law, the ownership of the land of each tribe was vested, not in the chieftain, but in the men of the tribe. It must have been impossible for the Irish to understand that all land belonged ultimately to the Crown, even though the fact is allowed for that at the Elizabethan period the strict letter of the Brehon Laws had been broken in upon vide post, p.386.
46. Again, there was no such thing as land tenure by ordinary military service. Vide Spenser: View of the State of Ireland, I,6. Curry: Civil Wars in Ireland, I,3.
47. For patent of creation of Con O'Neill Earl of Tyrone in 1543, vide Rymer: Foedera, XV, 7-8.
them later in Cromwellian days - into the dilemma: either the English withdraw from Ireland or the Irish people be exterminated. There was no general rising under Henry VIII, but the reign of Elizabeth saw a series of outbreaks. In Ulster, Seán O'Neill, whom they called Seán the Proud, defied the administration for many years, in Connacht the Burke septs burst forth in rebellion many times, in Munster James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, and later other members of the Desmond house, in Leinster the O'Moores and Viscount Baltinglass - all were goaded to extremities. But the climax was not reached until the closing years of the reign, when Ulster again broke out under the O'Neill and O'Donnell confederacy and the fires of insurrection spread all over the country. This, however, was the last stand, and after the battle of Kinsale (1602) the offensive was once more resumed by England. The result of this half-century, and more, of almost continuous fighting was the reduction of the country to a miserable state of exhaustion, the annihilation of the native aristocracy, the reversal of the Irish revivalist movement - more than this, it was the downfall of the Celtic system and the triumph of the rule of English law, and that, after all, was the real issue.

Throughout this period the members of the Galloglaigh families saw continuous service. The ClanDonald Galloglaigh


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sept of Tyrone, previously mentioned, served under O'Neil, 48
their hereditary employer; their relations in Co. Mayo
served with the Lower Burkes, as the MacWilliam Burke sept of 49

Lower Connacht were called: in Leinster, the third great  

48. It appears that temp. 1542 a breach had occurred be-
tween Con O'Neill and Gilleasbuig MacDonald, head of this
sept. The Four Masters (sub anno 1542) record that
"the son of O'Neill, Felim Geagh, the son of Con, son of
Con, was killed by one cast of a javelin by MacDonald
Galloglaigh". In May of the same year both O'Neill and
MacDonald submitted to the English Government (L.Dep.
Seillegery to the King - C.S.P. Ireland, Vol.I, p.63 - and
vide terms of surrender of MacDonal in S.P. Ireland,
Henry VIII - Vol.X, No.60,1). Gilleasbuig MacDonald seems
so far to have broken with O'Neill that he desired the Govern-
ment to permit him to remove with his sept out of
O'Neill's country to land at Green Castle in Co.Down.
To this the King agreed (C.S.P. Carew, I,p.198) and the
MacDonalds (Clandonald, Vol.II, p.87) took him that
the sept of Gilleasbuig actually left Unca na chluithi,
their hereditary seat, and transferred themselves to
Green Castle - although there is no proof that they did
so. The MacDonalds (loc.cit.) are certainly wrong in
saying that the Tyrone sept served as Galloglaigh under
the Government in 1548 - although Gilleasbuig offered
to do so in 1542. They confuse the references to the
Leinster (Tynekill) sept in C.S.P. Ireland, Vol.I, pp.84-85
and take them as having to do with Gilleasbuig and his
people. In 1549 O'Neill and either Gilleasbuig or Arthur,
his apparent successor (Vide Appendix No. Y), were still
quarrelling (Calendar Carew MSS., I,210), but in 1551 the
MacDonalds were in their usual place in O'Neill's army in
action against O'Donnell (A.F.M., sub anno 1551). In 1571
Furlough Luineach, then O'Neill, refers to the Cladonnell
Galloglaigh as being among his vassals (C.S.P. Ireland,Vol.
I, p.445).

49. The MacDonalds, going on the authority of the MS. of 1460
(Clandonald, II, p.113, seq.) trace descent for the Mayo
sept from Somairle, son of Alastair Og of the Isles, who
fled to Ireland in the time of Bruce - the Tyrone line,
just considered, they derive from Black John and Charles,
two of his brothers. For early references to this Mayo
branch vide Annals of Loch Ca,l,35; A.F.M., sub annis,
1377,1397,1398. The MacDonalds admit the impossibility
of tracing the descent in the Connacht line later than
Somairle Buail, son of Marcus, son of Somairle, son of
Alastair Og, who was killed in 1398. They are not clear
(Clandonald, II,p.115) as to whether or no they consider
the MacDonalds who were established in South Mayo and in
Co. Sligo in the sixteenth century as of the same sept,
although, indeed, there can be no reason to suppose that
they were not. Sir Henry Sidney mentions seven lineages of
the Mayo Cladonald in 1575 (Memoir, U.J.K., Vol.V and see
Hogan: Description of Ireland in 1598, p.141,note and Knox:
Hist.Co.Mayo, p.183) although their relationship is not
clear. "I won MacWilliam Og'staithe's chief force from him
in getting these Cladonnells", he says. See further in
Appendix No 1w X. For the Co.Sligo MacDonal Galloglaigh
branch of that portion of the clan for which descent is claimed from Alastair Og, Lord of the Isles, had become the employees of the English Government, and were the only body of Gallógaigh in Ireland consistently to serve with the crown forces.

Of the other Gallógaigh families, the main septs of the MacSweenys fought under the O'Donnells in Tirconaill, with separate septs in Connacht and under the MacCarthys in Co.Cork; the Mac Sheehys fought under the Earls of Desmond in Co.Limerick and also in Co.Clar; the MacCabes were with Maguire in Co.Fermanagh; the MacRories were some under the O'Neills and some in Connacht: the MacDougals were also with O'Neill.

The general position of these Scottish forces and the background of affairs in the Isles whence they came and in Ireland wherein they pursued their military avocation have now been made sufficiently clear. The Gallógaigh Scots must first be understood before the question of relationship between the Isles and West Highlands in the latter portion of the sixteenth century is entered upon. With them had been

50. For this sept, known as of Tynekille, vide Clandonald, Vol. II, pp.116-130; Calendar of Carew MSS., vol.II,p.105; incidental refs. throughout C.S.P. Ireland - e.g. Vol.I, pp.94-95; and article in U.J.A. Vol.II. Note also the significance of the Act of the Irish Parliament passed in 1560 which modifies that of 1558, and explains that it is not illegal to employ Scots as mercenaries when the Government is the employer - Irish Statutes,II Eliz.seesn. I, cag.VII.

51. For all these septs vide Appendix No.III. The tables compiled from the Plants (Irish -Ed.VI,Mary and Elizabeth) which appear in this the first attempt made to tackle the problem indicated by MacNeill as to whether or no the sixteenth century Gallógaigh were all descended from Hebridean sources.

52. Mathew, the author of The Celtic Peoples and Renaissance Europe, is greatly at a disadvantage in omitting all consideration of the Gallógaigh connections when he examines the relationship of the Isles with the Irish rebellions in the Elizabethan period.
established for the Irish by that time a tradition of aid from Scotland which was at least two centuries old. The point has been already made that their coming seems to have been more or less spontaneous, and that no great numbers of them which can be traced entered Ireland at a date much later than the Bruce period. These who came at this time, at all events, and who all appear to have been belonging to the clans mentioned, seem to be the only Scots who are entitled to the name Gallóglaigh. With the coming of the war period in Ireland, and coincident with the disruption which followed the final overthrow of the Lordship of the Isles, however, fresh bodies of Scots began to enter Ireland as mercenary soldiers. They were never referred to as Gallóglaigh, from whom they remained distinct, and they did not settle in Ireland. It is with them that this work professes to deal. Between the time of the original coming of the Gallóglaigh and the period of the general arrival of these later Scots, however, a distinct inroad of Hebrideans was made to Antrim, where a branch of the ClanDonald South acquired extensive possessions as the Mac Donalds of Antrim. These three incomings, each distinct from the others in the factors which brought it about, and yet all three related in that the personnel of the incomers was of the same general family stock of the ClanDonald, have become inextricably mixed in the minds of Irish historians. An intermixture there undoubtedly was between the settled Gallóglaigh families, the Macdonalds in Antrim and the mercenaries who arrived in the Tudor period, and there can be no reason to doubt a general movement to and fro between the Isles and Highlands generally and Ireland during the entire period from
the time of Bruce to the accession of James VI to the throne of England, but there were three distinct phases of this movement, and it seems better to stress the distinction between them than to risk confusing them. The Gallógaigh septa came in what may generally be called the time of the Bruce invasion. No exact dates can be assigned for their coming nor can any real reason be given for it, but the effect of it is known in the settlement of the Gallógaigh as hereditary soldiers in various parts of Ireland. The descendants of these incomers can be pointed out in the sixteenth century with a tolerable approach to certainty. The MacDonalda began to move into Antrim after the marriage of Eoghan Naor, brother of Donald, Lord of the Isles, to Margaret Bisset the heiress of the Clans of Antrim in 1399, and gradually they consolidated themselves there. They remained in close and constant connection with the house of Dunyveg and their growth in numbers and power in Antrim was gradual. These were the first two phases of the migration to Ireland, their reasons distinct, their results discernible. The superimposing of the third upon the other two has caused the difficulty. In the sixteenth century, and separate from the movement then going on into Antrim, a sporadic movement of Islanders and Highlanders into Ulster and thence into Connacht is traceable - perhaps it would be better to say that the mercenary forces began in this century to come to Ireland in much greater force than they had done formerly, and that a movement which had been gradual since the Gallógaigh days now became very considerable indeed. It is among these comparative late-comers that a new departure in procedure is noticeable. Unlike the Gallógaigh and unlike the Antrim settlers,
they did not remain in Ireland, but hired themselves out there to the highest bidder and returned to their Scottish homes when the "season" was over. No Irish historian has seen proper to distinguish between these "New Scots", as it is convenient to call them, and the Gallógaile, and yet contemporary state documents are careful not to confuse them.

Three reasons may be assigned for the coming of the new Scots: the Gallógaile tradition which held out prospects of gain for the Scots in the sister country of Ireland, the outbreak of extensive warfare in that country in the Tudor period, which demanded increased forces of mercenaries, and the disturbed conditions in the West Highlands and Isles which gave rise to the broken clans and landless men, men bred to the sword who could find an outlet and a livelihood only in Ireland.

The effect of the passing to Ireland of these mercenary forces in the latter half of the sixteenth century upon affairs in Scotland and the result of their activities in Ireland both on the actions of the native chieftains and upon those of the English Government it is the purpose of this work to trace.

53. As well, however, as the understanding of the background to which reference has been made, it will be found necessary to look to the scheme of administration and organisation of mercenaries in general in Ireland before the complicated position of the hiring of the Scots can be appreciated. For this vide Appendix No. I below.
CHAPTER TWO:

THE SCOTTISH MERCENARY FORCES OF TURLOUGH LUINEACH O'NEIL IN ULSTER, AND THE SERVICE OF THE SCOTS IN CONNACHT. (1565-1575)
"We think it necessary that the service begun in Ulster for the expulsion of the Scots and reducing that country to obedience should go forward, as thereon depends the reformation of Ireland."

- Queen Elizabeth, in 1574.

As the year 1567 progressed it seemed that affairs in Ulster had taken a turn favourable to the English Government in Ireland. The Tudor offensive in that country was then in full swing, and the attitude of England towards the employment of Scottish forces by the Irish had not changed since the passing of the 1556 Act had made illegal the "bringing in of Scotts, retayninge of theym, and marrying with theym". Queen Elizabeth was set upon a policy which involved the reversal of the native order in Ireland, and so far she had met with no serious opposition except that afforded in Ulster by Sean O'Neil, head of his clan, and unquestionably the strongest man in the province. In 1566, in reply to overtures

1. 3 & 4 Philip and Mary, cap xv - Irish Statutes, I. In 1560 an explanatory Act was passed, entitled "An Act that the Acte of retayninge of Scotts shall not extende to the Governours of this Realme" - ii Eliz., sess, I,cap.vii - Id.,I, 359-360.
made by Elizabeth, Sean had said: "For the Queen, I confess she is my sovereign lady, yet I never made peace with her but by her own seeking...My ancestors were kings of Ulster, Ulster was theirs, and shall be mine. And for O'Donnell, he shall never come into his country, if I can keep him out of it, nor Bagenall into the Newry nor the Earl of Kildare into Dundrum or Lecale. They are mine; with this sword I won them, with this sword I will keep them. This is my answer." But Sean O'Neil was now dead, defeated in battle by this same O'Donnell of Tir Conaill who had been his lifelong enemy, and finally cut to pieces by a band of Scots in Co. Antrim under Alexander Og MacDonald, brother of James of Dunyveg. A serious obstacle to the English settlement of the country had been removed, and it must have been with feelings of satisfaction that Sir Henry Sidney, the Queen's deputy, received the submission of Turlough Luineach O'Neil, the successor of Sean, at Castle Corbra in Co. Tyrone on June 18th, 1567. Turlough, although he had been in league with Sean some time previously, had, in the May preceding, been entrusted with the command of a company of English soldiers against the rebels, and, now that he expressed himself as willing to renounce the name of O'Neil and all that it implied in the clan system, it seemed that he was about to enter upon his career as leader of his people in the favour of the Government.
Sean O'Neil had never been friendly either to the Scots in Antrim or to their parent house in Dunyveg in the Isles. At the battle of Glensheek in 1565 which he fought against the Clan Donald in Antrim, Sean had captured James of Dunyveg, and James had later died in captivity, being succeeded by his son Archibald in Scotland. He had carried on extensive intrigues in Scotland in an endeavour to obtain aid in his rebellious proceedings, now from Mary, Queen of Scots, and now from Argyll, but the pretensions of the Clan Donald to Antrim had rankled in the mind of "the Great O'Neil" as had the claim of O'Donnell to Inishowen and that of the Bagenalls to Newry. Consequently, during the rebellion of Sean, the English Government was thrown by circumstances into a partial alliance with the Clan Donald South, every enemy of O'Neil being a potential friend of the English. In 1560 Elizabeth tried to approach James MacDonald through Argyll, and in the following year he had entered into an indenture with her for certain of the lands in Antrim which he claimed and held as the Bissett inheritance.

A change of front on the part of the English Government in dealing with the Clan Donald in Antrim is noticeable in the 1557-1558 period, when a policy of friendship took the place of warlike measures after the unsuccessful attempts of 1551-1557 to oust the MacDonalds from Ireland by force of arms.

9. Id. I, 164, but note that, in December, 1561, Elizabeth wrote to Mary, Queen of Scots complaining of the inroads of James on Ireland, and requesting her to stay him in accordance with the treaty of peace "betwixt us two" - C.S.P., Scotland, I, 572; C.S.P. Scot (Thorpe) I, 176.
Sean O'Neil and the Clan Donald of Antrim had nominally been in league in 1556 and 1557, and Sean had aided James and his brother Somhairle Buidhe MacDonald against the English attacks of these years, but the decision apparently taken by the MacDonalds about the year 1560 not to aid O'Neil any further, and to concentrate upon guarding their own interests, as well as the change in the English policy, had isolated Sean and had in some measure committed Elizabeth to friendship to Dunyveg. This is shown pretty clearly in a passage in the Proclamation of High Treason brought out against Sean O'Neil: when the Scots had entered into terms with Queen Elizabeth, this document states, Sean had turned against them, "and so being always as a traitor, and freynde to them when they were Toren enymies, became also a traitor and enemye to them when they grewe trwe and frendlie to thyse estate." In 1562 the Earl of Sussex advised that the Queen "should not only tolerate with the Scots of James McConell's sept now in Ireland, but should also gratify them in their requests, and by all the mean that may be retain them in her service, which they earnestly seem to desire."

13. C.S.P., Carew, I, 334. In December, 1562, Randolph, the English agent in Edinburgh, wrote to Cecil telling him of a dispute between James MacDonald and Sean O'Neil - C.S.P., Scot. (Thorpe), I, 186. In January, 1563, he wrote again saying that James was well affected to Elizabeth, and at enmity with Sean (id., I, 187, and see 190). In February he reported that if James were given a lease of the lands which he claimed in Ulster he should be friendly to the Queen - C.S.P., Scotland, I, 663, and cf. II, 110. Note what appears to be a piece of treachery on the part of the English Government in 1563: Deposition of John English on his own behalf and that of Capt. Petypase and Wm. Johnson (pirates) made on March 23. They will undertake to bring James MacDonald or any nobleman in the North isles of Scotland "were youre honerse thenkes good" (what exactly does this mean?) Reply of English Privy Council: If they "do some service" against Sean O'Neil or those who aid him, pardon for piracy is to be expected - C.S.P. Scotland, II, 1.
The duplicity of the English Government, however, did not become fully apparent until 1565. In that year Sean O'Neil turned suddenly on the Antrim Scots and defeated them at Glenshesk, taking both James MacDonald and Somhairle Buidhe prisoners. The Government made no attempt to conceal their pleasure, for O'Neil had now done what they had failed to do in 1551-1557. The Dublin administration even went further, and, profiting by the resentment against O'Neil which this last move of his had increased, overtures were speedily made to the Clan Donald to come openly to Ireland to avenge themselves with English connivance. In response to these, Alexander Og MacDonald, brother of Somhairle Buidhe and of the dead James, landed in Antrim in May, 1567. It was this force which was responsible for the death of Sean O'Neil.

This was the position, therefore, as regards the Scots in Ireland when Turlough Luineach succeeded Sean: they had been tacitly tolerated in Antrim as being a check upon the Irish rebels in Ulster, and also because the English administration had failed to expel them by force; the Queen was indebted to them for the death of Sean; their numbers had greatly increased, both in Antrim and with those of them who were willing to come over to serve for a stated period as mercenaries, since the failure of Domhall Dubh in 1545 had shown the impossibility of reconstituting the Lordship of the Isles. Again, the uproar which the late rebellion had caused in Ulster had to a considerable extent disorganised the administrative scheme in Ireland and the Dublin executive.

14. Randolph announced this to Cecil from Edinburgh on May 11, 1565.
15. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 333.
had not been free to deal directly with the intruders of the Scots.

There was no denying, however, that the Queen hated the Scots as intruders. She could not have failed to remember that James of Dunyveg, who was now dead, had been closely involved in the French plots of 1549-1551, that he had caused his brother Angus to transport Monluc, the French ambassador, from Ireland to Scotland, and that he had acted in Ulster in concert with the schemes of Mary of Guise. In 1561 she had complained to Mary, Queen of Scots about him. Somairle Buidhe, his younger brother, was continually in disfavour in the English Court as the member of the family who had most to do with Irish affairs. In 1558 Somairle had "sayd playnly that Inglysch men had no right to Ireland". In January, 1567, Elizabeth declared her mind regarding the Scots to her Irish Lord Deputy, saying: "We take it for certen, that the best way were, as you also have thought (if tyme and other opportunityes might serve us) to suffre no Scot to have any habitation or abode in Ireland." It was, therefore, in accordance with the Queen's wishes that Turlough Luineach O'Neil undertook, upon his succession, never to employ Scottish mercenary forces without special licence to do so.

17. C.S.P.Scotland, I, 572, Eliz.to Mary.
Now that Sean O'Neil was out of the way and the apparently docile Turlough in his place, and that the Government was further pleased to learn of the departure of the unwanted Somairle Buidhe for Scotland, it only remained at the moment in Ulster to clear up the matters of Alexander Og MacDonald. His work was done, now that Sean had been decapitated, and the more speedily he could be got rid of the better Elizabeth would be pleased. Having been informed how affairs stood, therefore, and with this end in view, she wrote to the Lord Deputy in July telling him to reward the Scots for their service, and to see that they went back to Scotland at once. If they did not go peaceably they were to be expelled by force. In fact a general clearing of Scots was to take place, and only those who had been for a long time settled in Antrim were to be allowed to remain. At the same time the Vice-Chamberlain in Ireland, Knollys, expressed it as his opinion that Turlough Luinesach should not be allowed to succeed, but that his territory in Tir Eoghain should be given to Alexander Og MacDonald and his Scots—a reflection of the English idea that it was better to allow the Scots and Irish to fight among themselves than to have either, or both, of them oppose the Government. It does not appear, however, that Knollys's opinion was ever considered, for by the end of July, and as a result of the machinations of Captain Pers, an English officer in the Carrickfergus garrison, Alexander Og and his force had been persuaded to go home. It is, at least, a matter to the

credit of the MacDonalds, if the opposite to the English Government, that Alexander never received the blood money which he had been promised by Pers upon his arrival in Ireland.

Meanwhile in Scotland the disturbing factors to the peace in the South Isles appear to have been MacLean of Duart and Archibald, the fifth Earl of Argyll, who had succeeded to the title on the death of his father in 1558. The former had for some time previous to 1560 desired to possess the district of the Rinns of Islay, lying to the west of that island, and which was undoubtedly MacDonald property, although apparently held by the MacLeans in return for some tribal services. In Islay and in the adjoining island of Jura both of these clans possessed land, and it is apparent that their interests were too often conflicting and that their territories were far too close together to permit of peace between them. The MacLeans at this time were consolidating their power as a comparatively new force in the Isles; the

25. Gregory: Highlands and Isles, 191. A certain John Douglas, a Scot, and the servant of Sir Henry Sidney, the Irish Viceroy, appears to have had some hand in conducting Alexander Og and his followers to Ireland for the purpose of acting against O'Neil. In April, 1570, he claimed a reward for his part in the affairs - C.S.P., Ireland, I,430. He can be traced through the following series of activities: Nov., 1555 - sent to the Primate of Armagh by the Earl of Argyll; June, 1566 - lately sent by Sidney to Scotland to purchase jacks, sculls, etc. (Sidney Papers, I,12 and below, p.45); 1567 - inringer of the Scots (C.S.P., Ireld., I,430; Sidney Papers, I,34-35); August,1568 - sent into Scotland by Sidney to sound Argyll (Sidney Papers, I,34-35); Apl., 1570 - wrote to Sir Wm.Cecil telling of his necessity, and craving a reward for his services (C.S.P., Ireld., I,430); May,1573 - went to England with a letter of Sidney's.Where references are not quoted in above, vide Thomas: Historical Notes, III,1184.

Clan Donalot, upon the other hand, were losing strength, and the absorption of the Dunyveg branch in Irish affairs was doing nothing to arrest the decline. It was merely part of the changing system in the Isles, and the revolutionary force of the charter is apparent as the struggle for the Rinn of Islay progresses. The reaction of this clan struggle now beginning upon the scheme of Scottish interference in Ireland is also abundantly clear at a later date. It was the beginning of the end for the Clan-Donald South of Dunyveg and Islay. At the beginning of 1562 an informant of Randolph, the English ambassador in Edinburgh, wrote to the later from Glasgow telling him of a great convention of the Irish - i.e. the chieftains of the Isles - which was held at that time in an effort to patch up peace between Hector MacLean of Duart and MacDonald of Dunyveg. Although the deliberations lasted for fourteen days no agreement was reached. The matter not being settled locally, it was, in 1563, referred to Edinburgh, and in December of that year an order was made by

28. C.S.P.Scotland, I,599-599. C.S.P.Scot. (Thorpe) I,178. A peculiar passage occurs in this letter (John Willock to Randolph). Having reported the unsuccessful issue of the deliberations Willock says: "so as my lord of Argile's friends think to travail with the Queen of England that he have no places of refuge on that side." It is doubtful (1) to whom the word "he" refers and (2) what is meant by "on that side". Evidently "he" is not Argyll, and the editor of the Calendar seems to be right in suggesting that James MacDonald (who is mentioned shortly before in the context) is meant. If "on that side" means in the Queen's territory of Ireland, as it may well do, then it is clear that a suggestion is afoot that Elizabeth take advantage of the MacLean feud to crush the ClanDonald between her forces in Ireland and those of Maclean in Scotland. Elizabeth had recourse to this policy at a later date. Vide infra, pp.217-218. On Jan.15 Randolph reported to Cecil that Argyll had gone to Glasgow "to accord MacConel and Maclene that lately fell out about the slaying a man". C.S.P.Scot.I.p.593.

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the Queen and the Lords of Secret Council that both claim-
ants to the Rinns of Islay compear before the Council on
the first of April following. On that date MacDonald ap-
peared but MacLean did not, and the Council, reserving the
right to re-open the case, agreed that MacDonald should hold
the lands. In the following year both the claimants were
in Edinburgh and had to give security for good behaviour
before they were allowed to leave the city. For a time
the dispute simmered, but the fact that MacLean held on to
Lochgorm Castle in the contested area showed that it would
not be allowed to die out.

The second disturbing factor in the West Highlands
was Archibald Doun, Earl of Argyll. He was chosen as a
Councillor by Queen Mary in September, 1561, and, with one
momentary lapse at the time of the Darnley marriage, he remain-
ed until the end a supporter of the Queen. His attitude
towards the Ulster rebels and the English Government during
the O'Neil disturbance is, however, very hard to assay. From
the confused muddle of his conduct towards Queen Elizabeth's
Edinburgh agent, Randolph, emerges only one fact: that he
was entirely indifferent as to how Queen Elizabeth or Sean
O'Neil should consider him. Whether this was because he was
playing his own game throughout or because his movements were
dictated by regard for the interests of his own Queen must
be a matter of opinion. From 1560 to 1565 he sent message

30. Id., I, 273.
32. Id., I, 157; Hume Brown: Hist. Scot., II, 85. Mary had come
to Scotland on August 19th, previous.
after message to Randolph assuring him of his entire devotion to the Queen of England; he forwarded letters which he had received from Sean O'Neil requesting aid; he assured Randolph that he should be answerable for James MacDonald's disowning of the Irish rebels - in fine, he seemed to suit the English purpose well and to act as a kind of West Highland agent for London. In 1560 Queen Elizabeth herself wrote to him to thank him for information concerning Sean O'Neil which he had sent in. On top of all this he seemed suddenly to waver in what he had claimed to be his allegiance to England, to play with offers of assistance to O'Neil - perhaps, indeed, he had been doing this in secret all the time, for we are necessarily restricted in our examination of affairs in that the English records only are preserved for us - to alienate English sympathy, and finally to disappoint the Irish rebels. This change of front on Argyll's part occurred in 1565, and it is significant that it corresponds with the momentary change in his attitude towards Queen Mary. On July 29th of that year Mary married Darnly and in August Argyll, who opposed the marriage, joined the Earl of Moray in a party against the Queen of Scots. For some time he conducted himself like a sovereign prince in his own territory, and towards the end of the year Randolph reported that he was apparently lending an ear to O'Neil's requests for aid. In February 1566, he understood Argyll and O'Neil to be confederated.

34. C.S.P. Scotland, I, 477.
In March Rizzio was murdered, and Morton, Ruthven and others outlawed. The rebellion of the anti-Darnley party came to nothing, Argyll made his peace with the Scottish Government, and in April he was back again in his place in the Council.

From this date onward, however, Queen Mary herself must be suspect of dealings with O'Neil - perhaps she acted on the analogy that if Elizabeth aided Moray she also might aid the enemies of England. O'Neil, who had not been miscalled in his own day "Sean the Proud", had apparently besought Mary to acknowledge him as her subject in 1565, and it should be noted that his subsequent addresses to the Scottish Court may have been responsible for the forcing of Argyll's hand. A messenger of O'Neil's returned in May, 1566, with fair words from the Queen, and Randolph, who was not to be put off by Moray's assurance that Argyll would not directly aid the Irish, believed that Argyll had the Queen's support in his dealings with O'Neil. The matter is further complicated by the presence in Argyll's company of a son of James MacDonald, and by the activities of the boy's mother, who did all that she could to prevent the passage of aid to her husband's slayer.

In June, 1566, Sir Henry Sidney, the Irish Lord Deputy, discovered that Sean had had an ambassador of his with Argyll for some time. Argyll had taken him with him to Edinburgh and had treated him well, confessing that he was much beholden to Sean for the offer of succour in Ireland when

37. Ibid., II, 277-278; C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), I, 233; C.S.P., Foreign, I, 60, 64.
40. C.S.P. Scotland, II, 285. In January, 1565, Randolph had reported that James MacDonald was "honest" - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), I, 235.
he had been banished in Scotland. When O'Neill discovered Sidney's priority to this knowledge he excused himself by saying that his man had been sent to Argyll merely to show him the size of his glib! In this same month Argyll sent a thousand men to Ireland to parley with Sean, as was claimed, but at this point he seems to have changed his front again in an apparent effort to regain the reputation which he must have tarnished considerably in the eyes of England, for he told Moray - who promptly passed on the information to Cecil - that his dealings with O'Neill were "not maible to be estemit" and were "now na gretar nor the use has bene betwix there houssais of auld, beinge neir aycntbowris."

41. Sidney Papers, I, 12; Sidney to Cecil - C.S.P., Ireland, I, 304. The glib was the bob or fringe of hair which was worn, according to the Irish fashion, overhanging the forehead.

42. C.S.P., Scotland, II, 290, 294; C.S.P., Foreign, I, 95. A summary of the Argyll - O'Neill intrigue in 1566 and 1567 is as follows: 1566 - May 4, Randolph to Cecil from Berwick; one of Sean's countrymen with the Queen of Scots (C.S.P., Thorpe, I, 233); Queen Elizabeth heard of this, and of the answer given to Sean's messenger, by Randolph's letter of May 13. On May 23, she wrote Randolph to learn secretly Argyll's disposition to her, and to assure him of her goodwill towards him, using the religious argument to dissuade him from aiding Sean (Id., I, 234): May 26, Randolph wrote Cecil to say that Argyll had been commanded by Moray to support Sean (Id., I, 234): June 13, Randolph (Berwick) said that O'Neill's Scottish assistance came by means other than the Earl of Argyll (C.S.P., Foreign, I, 86); June 24 Sir W. Drury wrote from Berwick to Cecil to say that an Irish ambassador had come to Argyll to Edinburgh (Id., I, 93); on the same date Henry Killigrew wrote Cecil from Edinburgh to say that O'Neill was not likely to have any great aid from Scotland (Id., I, 93): June 28, Killigrew reported the sending of men to O'Neill, but said that it was to a parley about the MacDonald territory in Antrim (Id., I, 95): In June Elizabeth sent a messenger to Mary to protest against the giving of aid to O'Neill and in July O'Neill sent another to Darnley to solicit it (C.S.P., Scotland, II, 287-8, 293-4) Mary denied that she had sent aid or knew of Argyll's having sent it (C.S.P., Scot., Thorpe, I, 235; Melville's Memoirs, 156, 160). 1567 - March 30, Drury reported to Cecil from Berwick that a messenger had lately arrived from Sean with a present for Argyll and a chain (sic) from MacLean's daughter (C.S.P., Foreign, I, 198). MacLean's daughter was O'Donnell's wife who was then living with O'Neill, cf. Wright: Queen Elizabeth, I, 65, who is led into considerable error concerning this lady. For further concerning Argyll and Sean - Id., I, 71, 74, 78, 198, 218-19, 221, 240, 243.
At all events, whether the Scottish court countenanced a policy of covert aid to the enemies of England in Ireland, or whether Argyll had taken such a scheme upon himself, he was prohibited by Queen Mary from going to Ireland to treat with O'Neil in the Autumn of 1566. At the same time a secret emissary was despatched to Edinburgh by the English Privy Council to find out if it were true that Argyll had authority to send a hundred men of the Queen's bodyguard to O'Neil. If such were found to be the case, he was to deliver an ultimatum, which he bore with him, to Queen Mary. It is unfortunate that no record of this ultimatum has been preserved, nor can the result of his mission be known.

The death of Sean O'Neil in 1567 put an end for a time to the complicated intrigue of the Argyll House with the English Court and with the Irish rebels. Indeed the deaths of O'Neil and of James MacDonald, occurring as they did within two years of each other, mark the commencement of a new phase in the affairs both of Ireland and the Isles. If it has

43. O.S.P., Scotland, II, 300-301. Argyll intended going to Ireland, it was said, to have Sean O'Neil release Somealairle Buidhe, who had been captured at Glenesk. To avoid suspicion the Queen had countermanded the journey - also, C.S.P., Foreign, I,135. Killigrew and Wm. Maitland on Argyll's proposed journey for this purpose - C.S.P., Scot. (Thorpe), I, 236, 238.

44. Acts of English Privy Council, VII, 313-314. The information regarding this project did not come through the usual channels, but from Sir John Forster, English Warden of the Middle Marches.

45. The neglect of the realm in general during the hurried events which led up to the downfall of Mary, Queen of Scots had the usual result in the Isles - an outbreak of private feuds. On April 28th, 1567, Mary, who was then at the Castle of Dunbar, appointed Argyll to proceed against Hector MacLean of Duart "who had, since the death of James MacDonald of Dunveg, ravaged with fire and sword the Isle of Gigha, being part of the jointure lands of Lady Agnes Campbell, MacDonald's widow" - Gregory: Highlands and Isles, 207 and note. C.S.P., Scot. (Thorpe), I, 236, 238. -39-
been found necessary to go back somewhat in the consideration of the relations of the Earl of Argyll with the late Ulster rebellion, the advantage of doing so must later be apparent, when the subsequent dealings of the Earl and of his two successors with Irish affairs are treated of.

Alexander Og Macdonald, the leader of the band which had slain Sean O'Neil and who had returned to Scotland, as we have seen, in July 1567, was under no illusions concerning the attitude of the English Government towards him. Archibald, the son of James of Dunyveg and the nephew of Alexander Og, had succeeded to the Scottish possessions of the ClanDonald South, and Angus, Archibald's brother, was to succeed him in due course. Alexander Og and the remaining brothers of James, including Somhairle Buidhe, therefore, must hold the Glens of Antrim or go without an inheritance. It appears that Captain Pers, English officer at Carrickfergus, had undertaken to plead Alexander's case with his government, but in October Alexander became suspicious of the intentions of Pers and sent a messenger to that worthy with enquiries as to how his case was proceeding. Meanwhile Alexander and Somhairle Buidhe collected some twelve hundred men in Cantyre and the messenger was soon discovered by Pers to be the bearer of more than an open letter from the MacDonalds. He was found to be negotiating with the lesser MacDonald chiefs who were all the time in residence in Antrim and to be sounding them as to their attitude to a direct invasion which the brothers of James were planning. In particular, the messenger had made an effort to detach Owen MacGilleasbuig who was serving with a band of Scots in Queen Elizabeth's service. Pers dealt with
the matter in accordance with what had been Elizabeth's
general instructions with regard to the Scots and expelled
all those of MacGilleasbuig's force who were natural born
Scots. He had scarcely done this, however, when he discover-
ed that MacGilleasbuig himself had been tampered with, and he
committed him forthwith to prison and disbanded the entire
force of three hundred and forty men.

This was done early in November. On the 17th of the
month Somhairle Buidhe landed in Antrim with six or seven
hundred men. During the Autumn he and Alexander Og had been
busy collecting forces in the Isles and West Highlands, and
they appear to have reached some understanding with the Earl
of Argyll, for the present force contained many Campbells.
From this time onward it is apparent that Somhairle is playing
for his own hand against even his brothers, and that he con-
ceived, although he did not as yet express it openly, that
the clan territory in Antrim was small enough for himself.
In November also Turlough Luineach, the new O'Neil,
took a new departure, broke his submission promise of June,
and hired the services of 140 Scots. Lord Justice Fitzwilliams
in Dublin immediately saw the danger of this and wrote to
Cecil that Turlough would undoubtedly be a much more danger-
ous rebel than Sean; his predecessor, as Sean had never liked
the Scots "as by his deeds to them, and their rewards to him, 49
appeared."

46. S.P.Ireland,Eliz.Vol.xxii,No.25.I. For further concerning
Alexander Og, vide Cox: Hibernia Anglica., I, 324, 327.
He was killed by Turlough Luineach in 1568 - Mitchell:
Hist.Highlands,399. Thomas: Historical Notes,III,1241;
C.S.P. Ireland,1,333,333.
47. C.S.P. Ireland,1,355; and vide Hill: MacDonnells of Antrim,
p.146.
48. C.S.P. Ireland,1,350.
49. Ibid.,1,351.
The English Government had little, in reality, to fear from Turlough Luineach O'Nei,

for although his actions from this time until the year of his death were as contradictory

and as seemingly alarming as ever Sean's had been, he lacked his predecessor's determination; he was crafty and vacillating where Sean had been blunt and resolute, quiescent where Sean had been active, a disturber of the peace where Sean had been a revolutionary force. Had Sean had a tithe of the opportunity which was presented to Turlough he could have had little difficulty in making good his claim to be King of Ulster.

At the moment O'Neil was entering upon the first of his many phases of hostility to England. He and O'Donnell, chieftain of the district comprehended in the modern Co. Donegal and then known as Tir Conaill, sent messengers to Scotland, as the Irish Council put it "for wives". A Scottish wife was very desirable for an Ulster chief at that time, for a Highland spouse meant Highland aid. O'Neil sent two emissaries into Scotland to seek the hand of Lady Agnes of Dunyveg, the widow of James MacDonald and the daughter of the fourth Earl of Argyll, commonly known at the time as Lady Cantyre or Lady Agnes Campbell. At the same time he sent his son, Alexander Galte O'Nei, to open up negotiations with Somhairle Buaidhe MacDonald. He had scarcely done these things, however, than he commenced to show another face to the English Government and proclaimed it as his in-

50.C.S.P.Ireland, I, 350.
52.C.S.P.Ireland, I. 352.

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tention to aid the crown forces in resisting Somhairle. To make matters still more complicated he offered himself as a suitor for the hand of the wife's sister of Bagenall, an English official, and he wrote himself to the Irish Council to say that he had attempted to communicate with the Earl of Argyll to have him attack the ClanDonald on his side, but that his messengers had been prevented from reaching Scotland.

This last statement was undoubtedly pure bluff.

Somhairle MacDonald made the next move. About the middle of December he called for a truce with the English garrison in Carrickfergus, and this was granted until the 1st of May, 1568, Somhairle agreeing to send home his Scots, but in reality hiring out some of them to Turlough, who showed no intention of pursuing his purpose to oppose him. Lord Justice Fitzwilliams makes it clear that the Dublin and Carrickfergus authorities had no alternative but to agree to peace with Somhairle, as it would have been extremely difficult to oppose him now that O'Neil so completely supported him. As he puts it, "Turlough Luineach daily bindeth in friendship with the Scots". When Somhairle did go back to Scotland by way of Rathlin Island in January of 1568 he left

53. Ibid.I, 352. The emissaries sent to Scotland for wives for O'Neil and O'Donnell in November, 1567 were Ferrall Mac
vy Eyre and Ferdoragh MacNymye, both rymers (the latter described as "the richest rymer in Ireland" - May 11, 1563)
- Thomas: Historical Notes, III, 1220, 1223.
54. Turlough alleged to the Irish Council that his messengers to Argyll had been stopped by Rory Og MacQuillin, chief-tain of his name in West Antrim. On January 3rd, following we find that this Rory has meanwhile married Turlough's daughter (C.S.P.Ireld., I, 359).
55. C.S.P.Ireland, I, 338.
56. Ibid., I, 359.

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his forces quartered on the Tyrone and Antrim chieftains who were subsidiary to O'Neill, and in the same month, but whether from Somhairle's forces or not it is impossible to discover, Turlough received 130 Campbells, specifically mentioned as the Earl of Argyll's kinsmen. On January 20th Turlough wrote to Carrickfergus from his castle at Benbor again saying that he intended sending messengers to Argyll to ask him to attack the ClanDonald. He might curry favour with the Government by this, as the ClanDonald, the chief Irish interlopers, were in especial disfavour in England, but it cannot be shown that he ever sent such messages. On the contrary, indeed, he remained a friend of Somhairle Buidhe, and it was announced in February that he was confederated with him to bring in 1,000 Scots. In this month also Turlough's two emissaries returned from Argyll bringing news of his agreement to the proposed marriage with Lady Agnes Campbell and promises of aid. In March Turlough was in the O'Cahan

57. Ibid, I.361. 58. Ibid, I.363. 59. Ibid, I.363. Turlough stated that the Scots whom he retained at this time were of the Clan Veguibh(e) (C.S.P., I, 363) or Clan Meguibhge (Id. I.364), and that they were enemies to the ClanDonald. Bagwell (Tudors: II,126-128, note) takes it that by the Clan Veguibh(e) Turlough means the Campbells. Turlough had Campbells with him at this time, but it is hard to say why he should call them the Clan Veguibh(e). The only Scottish clan name which bears any relation to this is that of the Clan Innes or MacInnes, in Gaelic Clann Mainnsechta. This clan, about which very little remains on record, was seated in Morven in Argyllshire, and it is quite conceivable that members of it were in Ireland as mercenaries at this time. Turlough had, it is apparent, many more mercenaries than the 130 Campbells referred to.

60. The Earl sent on this occasion as a present to O'Neill "a Taffatae hatt, with a band sett with bengles" which Bagennall (letter to Lords Justices in Dublin, C.S.P. Ireland, I. 364) reported that he had refused to accept. Either Bagennall was in error or the refusal had no significance, for Turlough remained friendly to Argyll.
country by the Bann awaiting the arrival of his bride, and with, apparently, every intention of celebrating the event of his marriage by going into rebellion with the assistance of the fighting men who were to be her dowry. A rumour reached Captain Pers in Carrickfergus that Somhairle Buidhe, who was then in Scotland, had fallen foul of the Campbells, and that they had come to a battle, "which," he remarks, "will be some stale of their intents hither," but the Scottish authorities are silent as to any such happening.

Great indeed were the preparations made both in Ireland and Scotland for the forthcoming wedding which was originally fixed for April, 1568, but which did not in fact take place until August, 1570. In it, and in the alliance which had also been arranged between O'Donnell and the daughter of Lady Campbell, the Government of Elizabeth saw a serious threat of a powerful Ulster combination against authority. Linked up with this in the mind of the Queen of England was, there can be little doubt, the fact that Argyll fully approved of the marriages, and that he was hostile to Moray who ruled in Scotland for the infant James VI since Mary had abdicated in July of 1567. During these years matters were moving anything but smoothly in Scotland with the deposed Queen imprisoned in Tooch Leven, and what would come of a sudden movement with Argyll to back it in Ulster none could tell.

62. S.P. Ireland, Eliz., Vol. XXIII, No. 74, - March 8, 1568 - Capt. Pers and Malbie to Lords Justices. On March 16 Somairle was in Islay whence he wrote to Captain Malbie in Carrickfergus concerning the negotiations which he and his brothers seem to have had in hand with Pers since 1567. (Id. I, 374) In August of this year Sidney's Scottish spy, Douglas (vide ante, p. 33.) brought news of a league between Argyll and Donald Gorm MacDonald of Sleat, "pretendinge to be Soveraigne of the Iles", with a view to create disturbance in Ireland. Sidney suspected Argyll of double-dealing - Sidney Papers, I, 34-35. cf. Bagwell: Tudors, II, 150.
An attempt was made to detach O'Donnell from what might become a dangerous conspiracy, and the Irish Council wrote to him hinting at "suspicious tales of his combination with the Scots". Turlough Luineach, however, continued to be the chief stumbling block, seeking, as he did now, to draw in some of the MacAllisters who were in Antrim, and also Mac Cuillin, to aid him and intent as he was upon erecting a fort at Dunnalong, upon Loch Foyle, a usual landing-place of the Scottish galleys. So far, however, his only direct violation of the law lay in the hiring of mercenaries, contrary to the Act of 1556, and to his agreement of 1567, and it was upon this head that the Irish Privy Council wrote to him demanding that he dismiss the Scots who were with him. His excuse that they were not MacDonalds not having carried much weight, Turlough now said that he was unable to dismiss his mercenaries because he had contracted for their hire for a certain period which had not yet elapsed. He was promptly told that he should pay them for the whole time for which they were engaged and then dismiss them. To this O'Neil made no reply, but he continued to keep his forces intact, and began to display some of Sean's spirit in terming himself an independent prince.

The rendezvous with the Lady Agnes and with Somhairle MacDonald, who was to come either with her or independently,

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64. Ibid., I, 373,374.
65. Ibid., I,373,374.
having been given for the end of April in Antrim, the English
now took another step, and extra forces were drafted into the
Glens. Lord Justice Fitzwilliams moved to Carrickfergus in
command, and he estimated that, in all, Turlough Luineach's force,
when ready, would make up some 3,400 men. On April 24th,
Cecil sent over authority to the English ships of war in Irish
waters to invade Scotland by sea if by that means the project-
ed invasion might be stopped, and Fitzwilliams and Bagendall
moved up to Market-town. At this point there was an unexpect-
ed hitch in O'Neil's arrangements and the coming of his bride
was postponed. It is not improbable that Argyll had some hint
of the important events which were about to fall out in Scotland,
for it is evident that it was he who was responsible for the
delay. On May 2 Queen Mary escaped from Loch Leven and fled
westwards, and it was not until the disturbance which this
move had created had partially subsided that Argyll turned
again to Irish affairs. Perhaps if the issue at the battle of
Langside had been different Ulster would have figured more
largely in the Scottish scheme. News of the turn which events
had taken after the flight of Mary across the Solway Firth
would not have reached Dublin when the Council there proclaimed
a general hastening against the Scots. Somhairle Buidhe, who
was acting independently of all happenings in his own country,
arrived in Antrim some time previous to May 24th and Turlough

67. Ibid. I, 376.
68. An informant, Donald MacMarques, said to Capt. Pers on Apl.
26th that no Scots would come to Ireland until an agreement
had been reached between them and O'Neil. He said that
when they did come, Argyll would aid O'Neil and that the
69. ClanDonald would support O'Donnell (Id. I, 377). Halliday
- May 20, 1568. For the Queen's flight, etc., cf. Hume Brown
and Lang, op.cit.; Wright: Queen Elizabeth, I.269.

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went immediately to the Bannside to meet him. In Scotland the English agent Elphinstone approached Moray some days after the battle of Langside, and Moray promised to interfere in Argyll's project with regard to O'Neil. Of this, it seems, and apparently of Somhairle MacDonald's latest move, Moray was informed by one of Argyll's council who had been captured in the battle.

By June no new Scots had come to Ireland, and Turlough found it necessary, in order to maintain his position, to engage 400 of the older Scottish gallóglaigh who were settled in the country. Captain Pers took it that the Scots were too busily engaged upon their own affairs in the West Highlands and Isles to trouble with Ireland, and indeed this was true, for there was considerable commotion in Argyll's country and in the Isles at this time. Argyll was not at all friendly to Moray or to the supporters of the infant King and, apparently, after his defeat at Langside, he held a convention of the chieftains including MacLean, MacLeod, MacDonald of Moydart and Donald Gormeson of Sleat. It is not quite apparent what point he wished to gain by this, unless his hope was to strengthen his own position with regard to his neighbours. It seems that the only result of the negotiations was to renew the truce between Archibald of Dunyveg and MacLean with regard to the conflicting claims to the Rinns of Islay.

70. C.S.P.Ireland, I.378. Turlough brought with him 600 Scots, whom he still retained in pay. In early June he had dismissed 88 of his Campbells, who were at once employed by MacMahon. Id.I, 382.
72. C.S.P.Ireland, I.379,381. The gallóglaigh whom Turlough engaged were probably of the Tyrone ClanDonald sept, or of some loose forces which had become detached in Ulster. He appears to have preferred the Scottish mercenaries who came directly from the Isles, and only to have employed these settled Scots when he had no alternative.
for Donald Gormeson who, even at this date, seems to have had some wish to renew the Lordship of the Isles in his own person, left the meeting "in great grief", and MacLeod actually came to blows with some of the Clan Campbell and seized some of their boats.

After his meeting with Turlough in May, Somhairle MacDonald had returned to Scotland where, by August, he had fallen out with his brother, Alexander Og, and had allied himself with Donald Gormeson of Sleat. Argyll, as Lieutenant of Mary, Queen of Scots, issued a Proclamation from Largs calling on all persons between the ages of sixteen and sixty to be ready by August 10th, "boding fear of war" to assist against Mary's enemies, and he set about making galleys, although the Campbells had never been a seafaring family. In order to prevent this shipbuilding activity of the Earl's, orders were sent from Dublin to Carrickfergus to prohibit the export of timber to Argyllshire, and on August 16th, the Regent Moray issued orders for a convention of the Scottish Estates to forfeit Argyll, Huntly, and their supporters because of their failure to recognize the then Government. The intervention of Queen Elizabeth prevented war in Scotland, and Argyll was eventually reconciled to the Regent's Government.

73. Information sent by John Willock, who had just the returned from the West Highlands to Edinburgh, to Cecil - C.S.P., Scotland, II, 453-454. It should be mentioned that it is not quite clear whether MacLeod fought with the Campbells or with MacDonald of Sleat. For Argyll and Moray, vide House of Argyll and Clan Campbell, 38.

74. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 386.

but Elizabeth had considerable reason for alarm at Argyll's activities nevertheless, and she wrote plainly to him to put a stop to the Irish enterprise which he intended or to suffer the consequences at her hands. She referred to the goodwill which she herself bore to the Queen of Scots, then in England, and spoke of the Islanders as a "barbaroos rude people".

Having received Elizabeth's letter in Glasgow on August 22nd., Argyll replied formally to it on the 24th. Concerning the Irish reports, he assured Elizabeth on his honour that she should not find them true, and that no forces were being levied either in his territory or that of the Earl of Cassilis with a view to the promotion of disturbance in Ireland. He was the more fixed in his desire not to injure Elizabeth, he said, because of his hope that she would restore his own Queen to her "auctority Ryal". This was the formal statement, but in November Sir Henry Sidney became acquainted with what were more likely Argyll's real views on the matter. Sidney said that it was Argyll's intention, unless Elizabeth would help Mary, to invade Ireland in person with 5,000 men, and that Lady Agnes Campbell was willing to have Elizabeth appoint an Irish husband for her if the ClanDonald might enjoy their Antrim possessions unmolested, but that otherwise "as long as any of the Clandonnells live, they will not cease the prosecution of their title."

The uncertain state of affairs in Scotland during the first year of Mary Stuart's captivity, however, kept Argyll quiet. The opportunity of creating a diversion in Ireland in her favour - if that was what he had intended - had been lost with his defeat at Langside. It should be noted, however, that his support of Mary was largely dictated by a policy not altogether disinterested, and although he left with the English authorities the impression of an Irish intrigue in her favour, it is impossible to say what his motives in negotiating with O'Neil really were.

In February, 1569, one, Nicholas White, on his way across to Ireland to take up a post in the Queen's service there, held converse with Mary Stuart in Tutbury Castle, where she then was under the wardenship of the Earl of Shrewsbury. "I perceyve by my Lord of Shrewesbury," said she, "that ye go into Ireland, which is a troublesome countrie, to serve my sister there." "I do so, madame," answered White, "and the chiefest trouble of Ireland proceeds from the north of Scotland, through the Earle of Argile's supportation." But Mary made no reply, and Cecil, to whom White reported the conversation, was left to place upon it what construction he wished.

Until the Autumn of 1569, the only Scots who troubled the English in Ulster were the kinsmen of Somhairle. Early

81. In November, 1568, Turlough O'Neil had with him 1,000 Scots' mercenaries "who eat 60 beeves, besides wages" (C.S.P., Ireld., I, 394). In the same month some of Capt. Malbie's horsemen murdered Randal Og MacAllister Saraghe in a feud. Of this Sidney said, "the doinge was evil, but the deede good." (Sidney Papers, I, 41). In February, 1569, Pers and an English force overthrew 400 Scots and Irish of Antrim in Clandeboye (C.S.P., Ireld., I, 403.)
in August the long-awaited bride of Turlough Luineach arrived in Ulster. Having news that her coming was definitely planned upon this occasion, Sir Henry Sidney had made an effort to prevent it by sending his servant John Douglas, to Scotland. Indeed the messenger could have done little to stop the Lady Agnes even if he had been in time, but it was the 3rd of August when he passed through Carlisle, and when he reached Cantyre by way of Glasgow she had already departed. He bore letters to the Regent who promised to do all in his power to stay those Scots who were minded to seek employment in Ireland, but who, in reality, could do very little in the West Highlands owing to the opposition of Argyll.

O'Neill had at last received the support from Scotland which he had so long awaited, and for some months it seemed as if Ulster might again break out in open rebellion. The Lady Agnes had with her some 1,000 men, made up from both the clans - the Campbells and MacDonalds - with which she was connected. These forces seem to have gone on at once to O'Neill, but the Lady Agnes herself remained in Rathlin Island where the nuptials were celebrated in the course of the month. At about the same time O'Donnell of Tir Connaill was married to the lady who was always referred to as Inneen Dubh, or "the Dark Daughter", the daughter of Agnes Campbell.

82. Douglas to Cecil from Dumbarton, Aug. 15, 1569 - C.S.P., Scotland, II, 669. Douglas, when similarly in the employ of England earlier, had been partly responsible for the inbringing of Alex. Og when Sean O'Neill was killed. Vide ante, p. 33.
83. Ibid., loc. cit.; C.S.P. Ireland, I, 415, 416-418, 420.
Turlough was for the moment in command of a very considerable force. He had his own command, consisting of his clan levies of ceatharnaigh, or light armed native soldiery, and of whatever galloglaigh and Scots' mercenaries he had about him before the arrival of his wife; he had his wife's force; and he had as well a force of MacLeans who had come in to Loch Foyle of their own accord and whom he had hired. 

Fitzwilliams said on September 12th that he had more than 3,000 Scots in all, and as many Irish as had ever followed an O'Neill. He commenced to overawe Maguire, O'Rourke, and MacManon to the south and O'Donnell in West Ulster, and a rumour went about that he intended marching on the English Pale. An O'Neill had never had a better opportunity: Connacht, as we shall see later, was in a ferment and the Geraldine Rebellion was going ahead in Munster after the arrest of the Earl of Desmond and his brother. A determined stroke would have placed Turlough at the head of an all-Ireland rebellion. Furthermore, Somhairle MacDonald was on the eve of another of his regular descents on Antrim, but upon this occasion a more ambitious one than formerly. In August he was in Islay, in communication apparently, with his sister-in-law's force then leaving for Rathlin, and he intended landing himself at Michaelmas, not so much for the purpose of securing the districts of the

85. These MacLeans had come in to MacSweeny Banagh's country by Loch Foyle in the middle of August, apparently in pursuit of some agreement with Con O'Donnell, a sub-chieftain in Tir Conaill (C.S.P. Ir. I, 417) They had fallen foul of MacSweeney and of Hugh O'Donnell, the leader of his name, and had taken to the sea again. Turlough then hired them, and Con O'Donnell came with them into his confederacy. (Id. I, 417-18).

86. Ibid., I.420.
Route and the Glens in Antrim, which were his already, as to extend his sway into what is now Co.Down, where he had a powerful ally in the person of Sir Brian MacPhelim O'Neil of Glandeboye. With Somhairle Buidhe paralyzing the Carrickfergus force, the way was open for Turlough to march on Dublin, if he were so minded. But the incipient rebellion broke down for want of a leader, and the result of the protracted marriage negotiations and of the intrigue of Argyll is an anti-climax. Turlough's first misfortune was to quarrel with his wife; she was a strong-minded woman who remained attached more to her own clan than to her husband's interests, and by the end of the year news of their unhappy relations led Sir Henry Sidney, the Lord Deputy, to anticipate a separation. Misfortunes did not come singly upon

87. U.J.A., IX, 67. The writer of this article in the Ulster Journal takes the information of Leonard Sumpter, given on August 13, 1569, to refer to the force being gathered by Somhairle. Somhairle was gathering forces then (C.S.P. Ireld.I,417-418,) but the large force (which, indeed, must be taken as exaggerated) referred to by Sumpter was much more likely that of Lady Campbell, as there is no record of Somhairle's coming with any such extraordinary numbers. The information of Sumpter is as follows (S.P.Ireland,Eliz. vol.xxix,No.38)- "The fourth day of August we came from the sounde of Moll in the Iles of Scotland MackLane beinge Lord of the same Ile unto the sound Ilay, an Ile nearest to Ireland where there was xxxij galleys with a greate companie of Iland Skottes, which was readie to departe into Ireland to a place and haven called Loughfoyle. There was also a nomber of uther botes. And as we were informed by one of McAlanes men, that there were aboute foure thousands men in the same galleis and botes. What was there pretence to do in Ireland he knew not. And the Reaport was, that Surly Boy was one of the chefest leaders of them. "By me Leonarde Sumpter of Bristowe merchant." Since the information is given by a Maclean, this may be an exaggerated account of the Maclean force which came into Lough Foyle in mid August and which may have been in touch with Somhairle before departure. The Islay shore of the Sound of Islay was MacLean territory. It may be too late to refer to Lady Campbell's force as she had landed in Ireland by August 5th. (C.S.P.Ireland,I.415.)

88. C.S.P.,Ireland, I. 424.
Turlough, for his allies grew tired of him, and the large force of Scottish mercenaries which he strove to maintain overtaxed his resources. As Sidney tritely puts it, he was "eaten out". Force of circumstances soon rendered O'Neil innocuous, and when, in April following, he attempted to profit by his marital relations in sending his wife to Scotland for further aid, her son by the first marriage, who was leader of the ClanDonald South, promptly forbade her return. Such was the end of the first phase of Turlough's relations with the Scots.

IV.

It now becomes necessary to turn to the consideration of events in the provinces of Connacht and Munster, to which areas forces of Scottish mercenaries coming through Ulster were now being introduced. In Connacht especially they were present in such force as to provide an effective stiffening to the native forces in action against the Government during the series of rebellions which followed the Elizabethan attempt to reduce the province to English order and obedience. Connacht affairs display some difference from those of the northern province, for in this quarter the leaders of the

69. Ibid, I, 428. This was either Archibald of Dunyveg or his brother, Angus. Archibald died c. 1569 (Macdonalds: Clan Donald, II, 545.) On February 18, 1570, Argyll wrote to Randolph from Glasgow expressing his willingness to serve the Queen and desiring to confer with Randolph - C.S.P., Foreign, II, 189.
people were of Anglo-Norman stock and were not of the native Irish as were O'Neil and O'Donnell. The struggle, however, was, in the main, the same, for the Clanricarde Burkes in Galway and the related branch of the MacWilliam Burkes in Mayo had long since reverted to a considerable extent to the Gaelic system of land holding and of local organisation. The Earldom of Clanricarde, which was created in 1543 under Henry VIII's scheme of winning over the chieftains was the first cause of the trouble, for the systems of feudal English law and of Irish tanistry conflicted when the succession came in question. To the "petty captains, the which maketh war and peace for themselves without licence of their chief captains" no less than to the turbulent leaders of the two Burke septs, Scottish auxiliary forces became a very desirable adjunct, and since 1563 their arrival in Connacht had been a matter of grave concern to the English authorities in Dublin.

93. C.S.P.,Carew, I, 223.
94. The first coming of the Scots into Connacht was in 1553, when they were introduced by Sean MacOliverus Burke, later to be head of his name as MacWilliam of Mayo. They were on this occasion defeated in the Curlew Mountains by the second earl of Clanricarde who was then loyal (Knox: History of Co.Mayo,171). In 1557 MacDermot of Moylurg hired another band and, with their assistance, burned the Abbey of Boyle and plundered the O'Kelly country of Hy Many (Annals of Loch Ce,1537; D'Alton: History of Ireland, III,28-29). In the following year a force of 1,100 Scots, either Campbells or MacLeans, were introduced by Richard-an-Iarainn, the then MacWilliam, or head of his name in Mayo, and were similarly defeated by Clanricarde on the Moy (A.F.M.1558 O.S.P.Ireland, I,152) The first petition to Queen Elizabeth from Connacht, and the first sign of the reformed religion in that province in her reign was made by the notables who recommended Clanricarde to praise for this last victory - Ronan: Reformation in Ireland under Elizabeth, 3-4, where S.P.Ireland,Eliz., I,15 is quoted.
For the more speedy reduction of Connacht the Earl of Sussex, Viceroy in 1562, thought it "fit to have a President of England birth, who may best reside at Gallowaye and Athelone", such a local representative of the central authority to be assisted by a provincial council, and not alone to dispense authority but also to levy the new Governmental duties which it was proposed should completely supersede the tribal exactions, buannacht or free quartering among his clansmen for the mercenary forces hired by the chieftain as well as the rest. In accordance with this policy, Sir Edward Fitton was appointed first president of the Council of Connacht in July, 1569, and he took up office at the time when rumours of Turlough Luineach O'Neil's marriage were causing Governmental uneasiness.

Fitton's first quarrel took place in Co. Mayo over the cess which it was proposed to levy for the upkeep of the Government forces. There was no other way to pay them, for Elizabeth was notoriously parsimonious in the payment of her troops, but it was felt that, if the natives had to pay for soldiers at all, then why should they not be allowed to keep Scots in the usual fashion, and to defend themselves?

95. C.S.P., Carew, I, 335.
96. Bagwell: Tudors, II, 170; O'Conors of Connaught, 186; Mac Geoghegan: History of Ireland, 459. A further step in the Tudor reconquest scheme was taken in this year with the passage through the Irish Parliament of "An Act for taking away Captainships and all Exactions belonging thereunto from the Lords and Great Men of this Realm", and "An Act for turning of Countries that be not yet Shire grounds into Shire grounds" - Irish Statutes, II Eliz. session 3, caps. VII and IX.
97. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 448.
98. Sean MacOliverus Burke, who stood out as MacWilliam (the leader of his name) in 1570 against Richard, who had been MacWilliam since 1558, expressed himself on the matter as follows: "I am in a miserable case. If we stand out altogether and maintain Scots for our defence, I see the destruction of the country; again, if I shall take upon me the name of MacWilliam, I shall be driven for maintenance thereof to spoil it myself, and if we shall submit ourselves to the English nation, they will be as burdensome as either MacWilliam or Scots. God give me grace to do the likest". (Quoted by Bagwell: Tudors, II, 182-3; and vide Sidney to Privy Council, June 24, 1570, and Fitton to Cecil, Aug. 27, 1570 - C.S.P., Ireland)
The result of the impasse was the battle of Shrule (June, 1570) which Fitton and the Earl of Clanricarde fought with the Mayo Burkes. Neither party could claim a victory, but MacWilliam Burke was soon after forced to submit and to agree to the payment of a yearly rent of two hundred marks to the Queen. That this was only a truce, however, was soon apparent from the actions of both parties. In the spring of 1571 Sean MacOliverus Burke succeeded to the MacWilliamship and commenced to hire Scots; and Fitton replied by an indictment of all the gentlemen of Lower Connacht and their freeholders, "so that in Easter Term the Queen may be entitled to one half of Connaught". This was a direct incitement to an uprising, and the inevitable rebellion followed. The abandonment of the indictments by Fitton and the temporary submission of MacWilliam in March, 1572, brought no peace to Connacht, for the commotion had not subsided in Co. Mayo when trouble broke out in the adjoining county of Galway, the eastern portion of which constituted the territory of the Earl of Clanricarde. Fitton had proved himself so tactless as to fall out with the Earl, who was, in 1571, fined a thousand marks by the Irish Privy Council for contempt towards the President. It has never been proven how far the Earl was responsible for the conduct of his sons, John and Ulick Burke, who were indicted in March, but seemingly it was thought

99 A.F.K., anno 1570; Knox: History Co. Mayo, 178. This battle was chiefly remarkable because of the representative forces of galloglaigh engaged upon either side. Fitton had, as well as his own Presidential force, five battalions of the Clan Sweeney galloglaigh, a battalion of the Clan Dongal, and the forces of the Government ClanDonald galloglaigh of the Leinster sept of Tynekille, under Calvagh MacDonald. Sean MacOliverus Burke opposed him with his own clan force, some of the O'Flaherties of Iar-Connacht, the Battalions of the ClanDonald of Mayo, and a force of as many mercenary Scots as he was able to procure. It is characteristic of the mercenary service that the separate septs of the ClanDonald were upon opposite sides. Vide. U.J.A., II, 37.

100 C.S.P. Ireland, I, 437.
1. Ibid, I, 440-441.
4. C.S.P. Ireland, I, 440-441.
better to arrest him at the time. He had scarcely been
confined in Dublin, however, when the rebellion broke out with
great ferocity in Connacht, the recalcitrant Burkes securing
the services of the galloglaigh of the Clan Sweeney and the
Clan Donald of Connacht and of some 1,600 Scots who came into
the province. Fitton manoeuvred ineffectually in the vicinity
of Claregalway Castle and of Knockmoy in Co.Galway, being
greatly hampered by lack of supplies, and the Burkes entrench-
ed themselves at Loughrea, effected a junction with their
relations who had again risen in Co.Mayo, and ravaged the
country with fire and sword to the gates of Athlone, attack-
ing "every person who was on friendly terms or in league with
the English." In June a reinforcement of 350 men came
hurriedly from Dublin to Fitton, but by July the Burkes had
plundered eastwards into Westmeath as far as Mullingar, and
had doubled back on Athlone which they burned to the ground,
being led in their attack on the Government storehouse in
the abbey there by one of the Mayo ClanDonald, a captain of
Scots, and James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald who was later to rouse
Munster in rebellion. Returning to Co.Galway, the rebels
burned Meelick Castle and the town of Athenry.

So violent had the revolt in Connacht now become
that it was thought better to release the Earl of Clanricarde
in order that he might pacify his sons. This was accordingly
done, and in October the Lord Deputy wrote to the authorities
in London saying that the Earl hoped "speedily to banish the
Scots out of Connacht". Undoubtedly these interlopers were

5. Halliday MSS., fol.16,p.293.
7. A.E.M.,1572; C.S.P.Carew, I.420; C.S.P.Ireland, I.474;
8. C.S.P.Ireland, I.474,477; Bagwell: Tudors,II.219; MacGeoghegan:
   Hist.Ireland, 465.
9. C.S.P.Ireland, I.486. For the release, see Halliday MSS., fols
   23-25,p.293.
in a great measure responsible for the bold front which the rebels were enabled to maintain. The presence of James Fitzmaurice in Connacht was another contributory factor to the disturbance, as it was he who was responsible for keeping the rebellion alive in the province of Munster after the operations of Sidney in 1569 had done much to break up the Geraldine League. His main desire at this time was to secure Scottish mercenaries to aid him in Munster, where Castlemaine was holding out for him against Perrott, then President of that province, and he appears at this juncture to have influenced the Burkes and their Scots to move southwards with him. In August he crossed the Shannon into Munster, aided by John and Ulick Burke, sons of the Earl, and by Sean MacOliverus Burke of Mayo, and in conjunction with over a thousand mercenary Scots and a band of galloglaigh. The movement, however, came to nothing, as it appears that the Scots were not too anxious to move so far afield. Most of them seem to have returned into Connacht with the Burkes, and Fitzmaurice was beaten into the Glen of Aherlow with a small force. In Connacht, too, the revolt had outgrown its strength, and although a general reconciliation did not take place until 1574, there was no open strife after November, 1572, when John and Ulick Burke prayed for pardon from the Lord Deputy.

The English Government was considerably perturbed.

10. C.S.P., Ireland, I. 482.
12. Ibid, I, 488, 489. The Earl requested that a pardon might be granted to them.
CONNACHT
IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 16th CENTURY.

COUNTIES AND COUNTY BOUNDARIES
IN RED. DISTRICTS IN PURPLE.
BATTLES ................. X
CASTLES, etc. .......... 0

ROUTE TAKEN BY THE INCOMING SCOTS TO ARDNARNA
IN 1586 (MAP NO. PAGE ) ;
MALBIE’S MARCH AGAINST THE MAYO BURKES
IN FEB., 1580 ;

MAP NO. 1 , FACING PAGE 61 .
about the Scottish mercenaries, for it was a new departure for them to show such force in Connacht. In 1573 a special messenger was sent from London "to understand...how the Earl of Clanrykarde is stayed, and what hope there is of his loyalty, and how his sons do behave themselves, and what is become of the Scots that served there", and the Lord Deputy was warned "to withstand the incursions of the Scots, who have so of late entered into that realm (Ireland) throughout and by the said north parts of Ulster, by invading and overrunning of Connaught, entering into Munster, and spoiling some part on the east side of the Shenon, as the like hath not been seen in any like time, nor may not be suffered." In 1574, the Earl's sons were pardoned, the province divided into shires or counties, and the way paved for the Composition of 1585.

§ V.

Connacht had not yet been quietened before Tulough Luineach O'Neil became restive once more in Ulster. Despite the fact that his first movement at the time of his marriage had come to naught, Queen Elizabeth became increasingly anxious of his confederacy with the Scots as the century progressed. Early in 1570 when she had debated the release of Mary, Queen of Scots, one of the articles which the Queen of Scots was to perform, but the fulfilment of which was qualified as uncertain, was as follows:—"she shall suffer no Scotsman or any

of the outlaws of Scotland to enter into any part of Ireland without licence of the Deputy there, and neither shall receive any rebel or fugitive of Ireland or suffer any such to be maintained in Scotland, or in any part of the Isles. By the end of the year Elizabeth made a more direct move and, profiting by an understanding which existed between Donald Gormeson MacDonald of Sleat and Captain Pers in Carrickfergus, a messenger was sent from the Irish Lord Deputy to Sleat to enlist the Skye MacPonalds in the service of England against Argyll. The Regent approved of this scheme, and despatched a messenger of his own to Skye to offer the revenues of the bishopric of Ross to Donald if he joined the English. The influence of Argyll, however, seems to have been too strong in this quarter for Elizabeth, for Donald of Sleat was one of those whom the Earl brought in in 1572 to swear allegiance to the young King James VI. That Elizabeth lost no opportunity of interfering in Scottish affairs to prevent the coming of the Islesmen to Ireland is again proven by the instructions which she gave to Lord Hunsdon in October, 1571, when he was sent to treat with Grange and Lethington, the "Castilians" or Scottish lords, who were holding out against King James in Edinburgh Castle, to insert a clause in the treaty similar to that mooted for Mary Stuart in the previous year.

14. C.S.P.Scotland,III,163. In October this was agreed to on the part of the Queen of Scots (III,371). Vide a variant rendering of this (eleventh) article in C.S.P., Rome, I,355. There is a proviso in this last that Elizabeth, by way of surety for the performance of the article, may occupy "such a castle or fortress as she may choose in the Province (sic) of Galloway or that of Cantyre" for three years. Needless to remark, these articles came to nothing.


17. Ibid,IV,20. Lethington told Elizabeth in the Summer of 1571, that when King James came of age he would find "a confused chaos, and the country divided into two or three hundred petty kingdoms, like Shan O'Neil's in Ireland" - C.S.P., Foreign,IX,460; Lang: op.cit.,II,237.
Early in 1571 Turlough Luineach's wife had come back to him, and, whether as a result of her persuasion or not, he made an effort once more to conclude peace with the English. Agnes Campbell wrote to the Queen in his behalf in March, and also to the Earl of Morton, who was then in London, to plead her cause, and in the following month Turlough wrote himself to Elizabeth offering submission and desiring only to retain preeminence over his sub-chieftains. A treaty with Turlough was eventually concluded, and he dismissed the Scottish mercenary forces which were then in his service. Turlough, however, could neither be a successful rebel nor a peaceful subject, and he spent the succeeding two years in alternate raids upon his neighbours and complaints to the Government. He never ceased to employ Scots except when he lacked the wherewithal to support them, his relations with his wife continued to be strained, and the only constructive part of his policy seems to have been his endeavour to make friends with O'Donnell. The relations of this latter with his own wife were much easier, and through her influence as the sister of the chieftain of the ClanDonald South, Tir Conaill was well supplied with Scottish aid. In September 1572, Turlough returned from a raid into Breifne and concluded peace with O'Donnell, the latter agreeing to assist O'Neil in the payment of Scottish forces, 1,000 Scots having come in to Loch Foyle in that month. In November, however, Turlough and Agnes Campbell came to an open rupture and she went off forthwith to Scotland taking with her most of O'Neil's mercenaries.

18. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 439, 445. In May the Protestant Archbishop of Armagh said that O'Neil's conditions were not tolerable. (Id.447) Among the sub-chieftains over whom he claimed sovereignty was MacDonal d, the leader of the ClanDonald galloglaigh of Tyrone.
20. C.S.P. Ireland, I, 466, 467, 483.
21. Ibid, I, 483, 484.
Throughout this period the ClanDonald continued to hold Antrim, Somhairle passing back and forward regularly between Islay and Cantyre and Ireland. In February, 1572, Owen Mac Ian Dubh MacAllister, Laird of Loup, and leader of the Clan Allister, was slain in a skirmish with the Carrickfergus garrison in which he and Somhairle took part. In this year also the English resolved to try a new policy with the Scots in Antrim, and a plan to introduce English settlers into the Ardes was propounded by Sir Thomas Smith and supported enthusiastically by the Government. The only result of this plantation, however, and of the extension of it which was attempted by the Earl of Essex in 1574, was to arouse the distrust of the native Irish of Ulster. The Queen's Government was losing ground against Somhairle MacDonald, and it was found possible to hold with certainty only Coleraine and Carrickfergus and the land immediately adjoining the latter garrison, as English outposts in East Ulster.

The Spring of 1573 saw Turlough O'Neill further incensed against the English by Smith's proposed plantation, and he at once hired a band of Scots which came into Loch Foyle.

23. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 466. For some time previous to this the MacAllisters had been supporting the MacDonalds in Antrim. The standing of the clan in Scotland at the time appears to have been small, but the Irish State Papers refer to this Owen as having been "more esteemed than Sorley Boy". Vide also Macdonalds: ClanDonald, II, 41, 42: III, 184, seq.


25. C.S.P., Carew, I, 484. For Carrickfergus, vide Fleming: Town Wall Fortifications of Ireland, 83, and U.J.A., III, 289, seq. It was proposed in November, 1573, that as Somhairle was a "mercenary man and a soldier" he might be made a citizen (Irish citizenship was denied to Scots under the 1556 Act) and employed in the English service as a captain of auxiliaries (C.S.P., Carew, I, 449 - Essex's suggestion). Hill (Macdonnells of Antrim, 153) says that Somhairle would not have entertained such a proposal, but note that other members of his family accepted such commissions.

The statement which has found credence with several writers that he visited Edinburgh on April 23rd, "and gave in ane complent aganis Angus M"Coneill, because he wald not be subdewit to the erle of Errgyle" must be discounted as untrue, because he was in his own country in that month, and there is no mention whatever of his absence at any time in 1573, in the Irish contemporary authorities. He may perhaps have sent a messenger for this purpose. The English ambassador Henry Killigrew, who had arrived in Scotland to succeed Randolph in September, 1572, was instructed at this time to complain once more of the passage of Scots to Ireland, but, although the Scottish Privy Council made general ordinances against the raising or transport of mercenary soldiers, no attempt was made to apply them to the Isles with regard to the mercenary trade with Ireland. Killigrew, with a shrewder eye to affairs than Randolph, and in a manner forecasting the later policy of Elizabeth in the Isles, suggested that the "greasing of Argyll's palm might work more in this direction than open

27. The sole authority for the statement is the Diurnal of Occurrents, 330. It is repeated by the Macdonalds: Clan-Donald, II, 547, and by others. Although the portion of the Diurnal in which the entry occurs is usually taken as being fairly accurate (vide Preface thereto) it is certain that this entry, at least, is in error. On April 21st, Turlough addressed a letter to the Irish Lord Deputy from Benburb in Co.Tyrone - S.P.Irel., Eliz., XL.No.52 iii. Very likely the writer of the Diurnal confused an emissary of O'Neil with O'Neil himself - cf. Henry Killigrew, English agent, to the Earl of Leicester on April 14, 1573, reporting the arrival of "a great man from Ireland" - C.S.P.Scott.(Thorpe), I,373.

28. C.S.P., Ireland, I,514. Reg.Privy Council Scot., II,219, 235, 702-3, cf. also 237, 238, etc. These acts were intended to refer to the emigration of mercenaries to the Low Countries and to Sweden, but they are general in wording, and might have been applied to the Isles - Irish service. For Melville on Killigrew - Memoirs, 243.
Turlough Luineach was fighting primarily to be allowed to retain his preeminence over the Ulster sub-chief-tains, for it was upon their lands, in accordance with the Irish clan system, that he quartered his hired forces. These chieftains, in their turn, became exasperated at his exactions, and so he was forced continually to employ Scots to maintain his position. In April he threatened the Leinster borders with 4,000 men, being confederated with O'Donnell and Sir Brian MacPhelim O'Neil, and in June he skirmished about Newry, his forces being augmented by the daily arrival of Scots.

When the Earl of Essex arrived in an attempt to plant English settlers in Antrim in the Autumn, Sir Brian MacPhelim of Clandeboy submitted to him, and the Scots were to some extent beaten over the Bann and out of Antrim, but O'Neil still maintained a strong mercenary force intact. Essex made a poor business of the plantation, principally because he had neither cooperation nor supplies from Dublin, because his forces were useless, the adventurers who accompanied him finding matters as difficult as did the Fifemen in Lewis at a later date, and because he could not conceal that his movement was hostile to Scots and Irish alike. By March, 1574, Elizabeth showed that she had no illusions about him, and that


30. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 505, 515. In July O'Dogherty, Lord of Inishowen, was in Scotland with the Earl of Argyll (Id., I, 518). The O'Dogherties were always on friendly terms with the Campbells.

31. Authority to Essex to undertake plantation, etc. - Fiants, Eliz., Ireld. - 2325, 2326, 2345, 2349, 2362, 2341 and 2462.
she recognised that it would be hard enough to hold on even to Carrickfergus. In the Autumn, Essex, who had been made Governor of Ulster, attempted to relieve the pressure in Antrim by an expedition against Turlough Luineach. Except for a sudden night attack, O'Neil did not molest him, but although he reached as far as Lifford his movement had no practical results.

The Regent Morton had written to Elizabeth in January, 1574, promising his assistance in restraining the Scots on the Scottish side, and the Queen, in an effort to do her part in Ireland, instructed the Lord Deputy in the following terms: "We think it necessary that the service begun in Ulster for the expulsion of the Scots and reducing that country to obedience should go forward, as thereon depends the reformation of Ireland. We would have you, therefore, endeavour to reduce Munster and Connaught to quietness, to the end that all the forces that may be spared may be employed in Ulster." The Deputy was to proceed against O'Neil and to concentrate upon the slaughter of his herds of cattle, so that he should have neither butter, cheese, nor meat - the principal items of diet with the mercenaries - to feed the Scots. In the following year, 1575, these latter made great preparations to come to Ireland, as was usual for them in the Spring, but

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32. C.S.P., Carew, I, 464.
33. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 521, 533; Badwell: Tudors, II, 284 seq. In this year Pers referred to Agnes Campbell as "a great practiser for the bringing of that part of the realm (Ulster) to be Scottish" - C.S.P., Carew, I, 490-491.
34. C.S.P., Scotland, IV, 638.
35. C.S.P., Carew, I, 464-465. In connection with this new offensive, Essex was asked to certify the number of Scots in Ulster, how many of them were owners of land and how many were mercenary soldiers. (Id., I, 471).
Essex made a final effort, and O'Neil, deserted by O'Donnell and by Somhairle Buidhe MacDonald, was driven into the bogs and waste lands, a fort was hurriedly thrown up on the river Blackwater, and, frustrated in an effort to take this, he was finally compelled to sue for peace in June. A truce was accordingly agreed upon, during which Essex, exasperated at the previous inroads of the Scots, fitted out an expedition to Rathlin Island where he massacred some six hundred Scots and burned eleven galleys. In revenge for this last Somhairle Buidhe assembled a force, attacked Carrickfergus, overthrew the garrison in a pitched battle, and considerably frightened the English administration.

Sir Henry Sidney, who took over command in Ulster in the Autumn of 1575, said that if anything unexpected should occur by reason of the machinations of the Scots, he was not to be blamed, as he had already warned the English Privy Council of the danger of their inroads. He proceeded into Antrim and found the Glens and Route "full of corne and cattle, and the Scott verye hawtie and prowd, by reason of the late victories he hath had againstoure men." Somhairle Buidhe, who knew when to show a bold front and when to resort to policy, surrendered to him, and at Armagh Agnes Campbell came in, and after her Turlough himself. With this latter Sidney entered into a formal treaty, one article of which allowed Turlough to employ a bodyguard of Campbells, but pro-

38. Sidney to English Privy Council, Sept 28 - Sidney Papers, I, 73.
39. Essex remarked of Agnes at this time that she was "a wise and a civil woman, and an earnest instrument of peace" - C.S. P., Ireland, II. 73.
hibited him from hiring MacDonalds.

Commenting in November on the state of affairs in Ulster upon the occasion of these two treaties, Sidney said that while Somhairle Buidhe enjoyed possession of the territory of the Glens, he (Sidney) thought that this area should of right descend to the son of James MacDonald, the then chief-tain of the Scottish branch of the Clan Donald South in Dunyveg. He noted that Agnes desired a grant of the Glens for her second son who would undertake to defend the territory against Somhairle and his sept. As to the adjoining area of the Route, Sidney wished that Somhairle's claim to it be flatly denied. He said that because MacQuillin had not formerly been able to defend it the inhabitants of the area had "imbraced the Scott"; now that there were men of the rightful issue qualified to rule the district he did not see why the Scots should be allowed to remain there. Somhairle Buidhe should have the Glens despite the better claim of the sons of Agnes and James MacDonald, but the Route should remain in Irish hands.

That this was not a peace, however, but a momentary lull in the conflict, was to become speedily apparent. Ulster had not yet been conquered, and, until it had, it would be found impossible for the English to keep the mercenary aid of the Isles and West Highlands from the Irish.

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40. For the articles of this treaty, vide S.P.Eliz., Ireland, Vol.44 i. See Sir Walter Scott's comments on the treaty, Turlough Luineach, and the Scots in his notes to Derricke: Image of Irelande,xvii1,117; and see text, 89. See plate representing the submission of Turlough in Drummond Collection, Edinburgh University Library (reproduced in Small's edn. of Derricke, 1883), and note Scott's remark on the proposal of Sidney to present one of Queen Elizabeth's gowns to Lady Agnes, and the fact that, although Scott was not aware of it, this was later done - see below, p 41. Sidney Papers, I, 77-79.
CHAPTER THREE:

THE SERVICE OF THE SCOTS IN MUNSTER AND ULSTER, AND IN CONNACHT DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD CLANRICARDE REBELLIONS.

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(1575-1581)

"The Scots be the only hope that any evil-disposed Irishry have to sustain them in their enterprises".
-Sir Nicholas Malbie.

§ 1.

No sooner had rebellion been put down in one province in Ireland during Queen Elizabeth's reign than it burst forth in another. Nothing but a thorough exhaustion of the entire country could bring about quietness, and the peace with O'Neil in 1575 did not cause any falling off in the demand for Scottish mercenary forces. It almost seemed, too, as if the supply from the Isles was inexhaustible, and, indeed, during this period, it was very great, for the relatively large population of the Hebrides and western seaboard, disorganised as to central leadership as they were by the changing conditions, had come to accept as part of their life the periodic descents upon Ireland in search of mercenary employment.

1. Relative to the rest of Scotland, the Hebrides seem to have supported a large population in the 16th century - cf. the figures for the risings out given in the document prepared for English information in 1593 (S.P.Scot., Eliz., II, 86) with the Government population returns (Comparative Account, printed 1831) and vide appendix No. 4 of this volume. For the established nature of the system of sending mercenary forces to Ireland, vide the Description of the Isles written c. 1577-1595, printed in Skene: Celtic Scotland, III, 439-440 - no agricultural labourers are permitted to leave the Isles on warlike expeditions that the crops may not be left uncared for "albeit thai (i.e. the fighting men) byde furth ane haill zeir, as offtimes it happeis quhen ony of thair particular Ilands hes to do with Ireland or neighbours". Again, cf. this statement with a similar one in the MS in the Record office referred to, and for the large population, vide also Logan: Scottish Gael, II, 82 seq.
It has been remarked that, as the century progressed, the Scots displayed a tendency to come in increasing numbers further south into Ireland than Ulster, and in this they received active encouragement from the chieftains in other parts. In 1573 an emissary of theirs changed his Scottish attire for Irish garments, went south into Munster and promised five hundred of his countrymen to the Earl of Desmond, and early in the following year the Mayor of Limerick reported the coming of three hundred Scots and seven hundred galloglaigh, arquebusiers and ceatharnaigh into his vicinity. Essex, in 1575, said that the Scots feared to stay any longer in Antrim and wished to go into Connacht, and Malbie, from Connacht, reported a similar wish on their part in 1580. Turlough Luineach O'Neil never seems to have agreed well with his mercenaries, and at all events there was more active service to be seen in Connacht and Munster for the ten years succeeding 1575 than in Ulster.

It was a poor commentary on English authority in the President of Connacht's home county of Galway that, in 1574, Government adherents found it hard to go to the sessions in Athlone because of the number of marauding Scots in the county. The sons of the Earl of Clanricarde counted their submission of that year as nothing more than nominal, and although they

2. C.S.P., Ireland, I, 530.
3. Id., II, 9. In March, 1574, the "Scots provided for Munster" are reported as being in Connacht, probably on their way south. This may have been the band promised to Desmond.
4. Id., II, 73, 211.
5. S.P. Ireland, Eliz., XLV, 13, 1 - Archbishop of Tuam and Bishop of Clonfert to Fitton, March 5: "But as lately it is so dangerous to journey from one place to another on account of the coming and staying of the Scots in Clanricard...and not content with the Scots now present, other Scots to the number of 700 are to come shortly with John son of the Earl." Some men from Kylkellay are the guides who bring the Scots to these parts. Vide. Hardiman: Hist. Galway, 88, for the danger to travellers in this region.
surrendered again in 1576 to Sir Henry Sidney, the Viceroy, they were in open rebellion once more shortly after, and they maintained Scottish forces continuously. In June, 1576, John and Ulick Burke took Claregalway Castle and again preyed, Aine Henry, but they were driven off from an attack on Loughrea, an English garrisoned post under Captains Lestrange and Collier, although they were assisted by a "power of Scots". Sidney, being made aware of these events while in Co. Limerick, returned to Connacht and rebel operations died down in Galway, the Earl of Clanricarde being once more arrested. Sidney, who was greatly troubled, as he says, by the presence in Connacht of some 2,000 Scots who had come there from Ulster, then turned his attention to Mayo, where this sudden rebellion was confined to the sept of the Burkes of Castlebar assisted by the Clan Donald of Mayo, and in September he took Castlebar. When the Scots heard of his approach into Mayo, in which county they were encamped, they quickly dispersed, and most of them retired to the territory of the Route in Co. Antrim. The Queen's MacWilliam then collected his forces, and, knowing that he had the influence of Sidney's name to back him, fell suddenly upon the remaining Scots shouting "Bowes, Bowes, which voice so suddenly given (and they thinkinge it indee to be true) it stricke..."
soche a terror into the amased myndes" of the Scots that they fled forthwith, leaving their prey behind them, and were chased out of the province. Why what was evidently a call to the archers to use their bows should frighten the Scots it is difficult to say. Perhaps the cry led them to believe that there was a disciplined English force with MacWilliam. At all events, Sidney, who reports the matter, makes no attempt to explain it.

There was evidently a considerable conspiracy to introduce Scottish mercenaries in force into Connacht at this time in which the Earl of Clanricarde was implicated. In the Spring of 1577 he was examined on the charge of having attempted to bring in Scots, and, although he denied all privity to the scheme, the weight of evidence would seem to show that he had sent special messengers to Ulster through one of the Burkes of Mayo in an effort to hire ten thousand Scots for Connacht. If it had been found possible to engage half such number, and if a junction had been made with them by the disaffected in Connacht, it should have gone hardly with the English in that province. As in Ulster, however, so also in Connacht, the Earl of Clanricarde was no more the man than Turlough Luineach O'Neil to understand the difference between

9. C.S.P., Carow, II, 64-69; Sidney's reports to the English Privy Council on August 15 and Sept.20, 1576, and on January 27,1577 - Sidney Papers, I, 126,129,130. On July 17, 1576, Salsingham wrote to Sidney, saying that he had heard that "one Angwys and Mr. Connel, of the Scottisme Isles" (sic - apparently should be "Angus McConnell") had 130 galleys in readiness, seemingly to invade Ireland, although the Earl of Derby feared that they intended a descent on the Isle of Man - Sidney Papers, I,123.

10. See the depositions in C.P., Ireland, Eliz. - LVII, Nos. 39 xxiv - 39 xxvi and 39 xxxiv, in which last is contained the Earl's denial. The Irish Lords in Council wrote to Elizabeth on Sept.12, 1577 to say that, whatever might be affirmed to the contrary, the Earl of Clanricarde was responsible for the rebellion of June, 1577, a matter which had been conspired by him in the May previous - Sidney Papers, I,215.
a disturbance of the peace and a concerted rebellion.

Sidney, who went to Newry on January 27th, 1577, to parley with Turlough Luineach, gives us an interesting view of Tur-

lough's relations with his wife and with the Scots at this time. His view of the Lady Agnes having, seemingly, undergone a change since the November of 1575, he suspected that her "lewd counsell" was the real reason for Turlough's uncertain conduct with regard to the English authority. Her plan was, he said, to make her younger sons by James MacDonald "starcke in Ireland", the eldest son by this marriage having been al-

ready provided for in Scotland as successor to his father in Dunyveg. Holding that she was not in Ireland for any purpose but the benefit of her sons and the good of her countrymen, Agnes prevented Turlough from keeping to the terms of his peace with the Government in the hope that if he remained uncertain the Scots would get a better footing in the north of Ireland. Thus, Sidney argued, she would not let him take the oath to be made a freeman of Carrickfergus in the fear that it might prejudice her case. Turlough had told Pers, the Carrickfergus Governor, that if Sidney would come to Ulster and do one day's service against the Scots to show them his power, Turlough would put away Agnes and do his best to expel the Scots. O'Neil was growing old and somewhat indolent, and he had an unextracted bullet or two in his body, but al-

though he wished for peace, he knew that he was not greatly liked by his own clan and that he was powerless without his 11 Scots mercenaries.

The last hope for the Earl's sons for the moment having been defeated by the success of Burke of Mayo over the incoming Scots, Connacht remained in uneasy quiet during 1577, but the dragooning policy adopted by Sir Nicholas Malbie, the successor of Fitton, boded ill for the future. It was a period of change for the province, as for Ireland, of change from the clan system of centuries to the English organisation of affairs which no Irishman understood, and it was the cause of much unnecessary bloodshed that the change was forced. One reason for the immediate pushing forward of the Elizabethan attempt at conquest, however, was the ever present fear that the continental enemies of England might take advantage of the state of Ireland. This apprehension was continually at the back of the Governmental mind in the attempts which never ceased to cut Ireland off from the aid which her rebels were receiving from Scotland. Very properly, Tudor

Thomas Randolph and subsequent English ambassadors in Edinburgh received constant instructions to treat with the Scottish Court for the stay of forces coming to Ireland from the Isles, and Argyll and the Regents during the minority of James VI were continually approached - for England does not appear to have realised fully until a later date either that

11a. The fear that Scottish aid might work an unmanageable revolt in Ireland is never lost sight of. The whole English administrative position is criticised from this point of view by the Secretary of State in Ireland in 1578 - cf. S.P. Ireland, Eliz. - R.O., London - Vol. lxii, No.5.
Argyll's new position of prominence in the Edinburgh councils had made him no more disposed to wield what authority he undoubtedly possessed in the Isles and West Highlands in any interest but his own, or that the influence of James of the Regents in that area was anything but nominal.

In January, 1578, Randolph had instructions from the Queen specially to approach the Regent on the subject, and in February and again in May she wrote in a friendly fashion to Colin, who had succeeded Archibald as sixth Earl of Argyll. This same Colin told Robert Bowes, the English agent, in November that although the traditional relations of his family with the O'Neils in Ulster had included the assurance of a yearly pension to the Campbells for aid given and allowed to pass into Ireland, he was willing to break off his Irish connections in Elizabeth's interest. Colin, however, was no more or less willing to be made a tool of by England than his father had been.

In connection with the increasing danger of the presence of the Scots in Ireland to the English administration in that country, four of the Queen's ships of war were commissioned in 1577 to patrol the west coast for the double purpose of interfering with any Scottish galleys which might be met with and of guarding against "foreaigne traffique" be-

13.Letters to the Argyll Family, pp.15-16,17. In these, although she does not mention Ireland, Elizabeth's obvious intention is to keep on terms of friendship with the new leader of the Clan Campbell. Colin succeeded in 1575. Until 1579 he acted in a very independent and lawless fashion - Mitchell, 413-414.

-76-
tween the Irish rebels and England's continental enemies.
That the Government had a real reason to link up the incursions of the Scots with the activities of Spain and the Vatican in regard to the projected invasion of Ireland at this time is proved by a letter which was written by the Bishop of Killaloe in 1578 to the Papal authorities and which is preserved in the Vatican Library. Having referred to the expected invasion of James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, the Bishop proceeds - "Duo denique filii Comitis Ricardinorum, qui olim assistebant Domino Iacobo in bello, iam nuperrime insurrexerunt contra Anglos, qui non parum adiumenti et accessionis possunt praestare negotio. Duo etiam filii domini Ioannis O'Niall defuncti, habentes sexcentos milites Sootos, obviam venturi sunt Domino Iacobo, cum primum intellexerint eius adventum."

15. C.S.P., Carew, II. 83.

16. Printed in Hagan: Miscellanea Vaticana Hibernica, appearing in Archivium Hibernium, VII, 142, 343. "Duo filii Comitis Ricardinorum", are, of course, the sons of the Earl of Clanricarde, Ulick and John Burke. "Duo filii domini Ioannis O'Niall defuncti" are the sons of Sean O'Neil, who contested the succession with Turlough Luineach and created considerable disturbance later (see below, p. 103). For this letter vide also C.S.P. Rome, II, 521. In the same volume of the Archivium (202) is printed another letter from the Vatican archives received by the Protonotary Dandino from the Cardinal of Como, dated Sept. 27, 1579, telling that Fitzmaurice has been supported in Ireland by some Scots troops - "una buona truppa de soldati Scozesi" (Vide also Ronan: Reformation in Ireland under Elizabeth, 593-4). On March 31, 1578, the Bishop of Mayo wrote from Paris to the Cardinal of Como in Rome to say that a favourable moment for Fitzmaurice to be assisted had then come - "for the Scotia, who speak the same language as ours, and are bound to us by ties of friendship and treaty, are up in arms and on the move" - C.S.P., Rome, II, 396, and cf. art in Catholic Bulletin, Jan., 1929, quoted by Ronan: op. cit., 569.
James Fitzmaurice was fully aware of the use which could be made of Scottish forces in Munster, and shortly after his descent upon Smerwick in Co.Kerry with a small Spanish force in July 1579, he wrote to Randal MacColla MacDonald, the nephew of Somhairle Buidhe, telling him to come south at once with all the mercenaries he could gather.

It was too late for Fitzmaurice to avail of Scottish aid, however, for he was killed in Co.Limerick while going northward to rouse Connacht. John and James Fitzgerald, the two brothers of the Earl of Desmond, maintained the rebellion in Munster and were momentarily successful in overthrowing the Government forces at Gort-na-tuibrid. At this point, Dr. Saunders, an English Catholic ecclesiastic who had arrived with Fitzmaurice in Kerry, made an effort to carry out the dead leader's policy and to involve Connacht and Ulster in an all-Ireland rebellion. Fitzmaurice had been in earlier communication with Turlough Lúineach O'Neil, and the Government, aware of this, regarded O'Neil with distrust. Moreover, O'Neil had resumed his policy of overawing O'Donnell, whom he had hired Scots to raid in this year, and was endeavouring to maintain himself as an independent prince in Ulster.

In September, Dr. Saunders wrote to the sons of the Earl of Clanricarde, the Burke leaders in Mayo and the chieftains of the ClanDonald and Clan Sweeney galloglaigh in that county.

17. At the same time he wrote to Ustian MacColla, leader of the Mayo ClanDonnell, to the same end. (Knox: Hist. Co. Mayo, 187-188). For his letter to MacColla see Journal of the Kilkenny Archaelogical Society, new series, II, 345;362; and Hill: Macdonnels of Antrim, 53. Randal's usual place of residence was in the island of Colonsay, MacFie, or MacDuffie, territory. In 1593, it is noted as pertaining, with Oronsay, to MacFie, a dependent of the Clan Donald. In that date the two islands could raise a hundred men (Description of the Isles - S.P. Scotland, Eliz. Vol.II,86). Vide also Munro's description of 1549, p.29.
urging them all to rise and to make common cause with the Munster rebels. The Government was fully aware of the gravity of the situation, and the fear was evinced that John and James Fitzgerald might be driven into Connacht where they might combine with a force of Scots which had lately landed in that province, stir up the Clanricarde rebels once more, and effect a junction with O'Neil, who, it was felt since he had been involved with Fitzmaurice, would not resist their overtures.

If the success of Gort-na-tuibrid had been maintained in Munster, Connacht might have risen, but the Fitzgeralds were soon defeated near Croom in Co.Limerick, and Ulick, having retained Dr, Saunders' letter for a month to see how affairs would go meanwhile, handed it up to Malbie and remained quiet. He had promised to raise a thousand Scots, and to assist the Munster forces with their co-operation, but he was apparently won over by Lord Justice Pelham who met him in the closing months of 1579. The only stir in Connacht upon this occasion was that made by Richard-an-Iarainn Burke in Mayo, who had hired a hundred Scots from Ulster, and who had with him also the ClanDonald of Mayo. This Richard was seeking further Scots in Ulster, but Malbie was astute enough to make an agreement with O'Rourke and O'Conor Sligo to prevent any bands from coming into Connacht to his assistance. Malbie then marched against him - in

19. S.P. Ireland, Eliz., LXIX, No.30. O'Rourke of Breifne was also giving trouble at this time with a band of Scots of the surname of MacAvie (C.S.P., Ireland., II, 169, 186).
22. C.S.P., Ireland, II, 216.
February, 1580 - and after some service in severe winter weather he took the MacDonald castle of Clooneen and forced his Scottish mercenaries followed him, and where he was compelled to surrender on February 18th.

§ III.

O'Neil watched all these movements from the aloof security of his Ulster wilderness, his wealth in the great herds of cattle which he drove further into the wilds in case of attack, his people warlike and independent in their virgin freedom from English interference, he himself caring little for the Queen, but yet afraid to attempt a bold movement against her. He had been described in 1560 as "a man very expert in martial affairs," and, although he had grown somewhat inactive since the date of his marriage, he had made an inroad on Somhairle Buidhe MacDonald in the late summer of 1577 during which a son and a brother of Somhairle's had been killed. Sidney, who spoke with him subsequent to the date of this affair, was very pleased at the discomfiture of the Scots, and was actually so inconsistent as to say that Agnes Campbell was responsible for her husband's good behaviour. Agnes deserved praise when she incited her husband again her countrymen, blame when she urged him to attack the English. Sidney thought so well of her just now that he urged

the Queen to bestow one of her own gowns upon her as a mark of esteem. The Queen, too, would prefer Turlough as a friend than as an enemy, and when he was ill in 1578, Agnes received the gown, in the hope that she might be "a contynuall good instrument to contynewe him in guyett". It was rather ironical that in the Spring of 1579 Turlough's daughter married Somhairle's son. Turlough had never suffered direct military attack in his own country at the hands of the English, he had never been goaded into rebellion as the Earl of Desmond was in Munster, his people had not been dragooned into despairing action as were the people of Connacht under Fitton and Malbie, his was not a struggle for existence but rather an intrigue to maintain supremacy over his sub-chieftains, and so he remained throughout 1580 and 1581 in a kind of armed yet inactive hostility to the Government. He was no Fitzmaurice, and so his real sympathies were bound up in Ulster, not in a united Ireland. January, 1580 saw a renewal of the coastal patrol, and the Queen's ships "Handmaid" and "Achates" were commissioned to stop and seize any Scottish ships except those bargained for and freighted by the merchants of corporate towns. A convention of the West Highland chieftains which the Earl of Argyll was to call together in Glasgow in February set the

26. Sidney Papers, I, 218, 224; C.S.P.; Ireland II, 155-156. The gown must have been rather disreputable, as Lord Chancellor Gerrarde, who presented it, had to have a new "foreparte" made for it, the Queen having "slobbered" upon it!

26a. C.S.P., Carew, II, 199-200. In 1571 John Crofton was granted a licence to trade from Galway with Scotland - Fiants, Eliz., Ireld., 1711.
English representatives in Edinburgh wondering what he might be about, and some suspicion centred on a visit which Turlough's wife was about to make to Argyll and to the Scottish court. There was a new stir in Antrim, also, where two brothers Crawford appeared in support of Somhairle MacDonald and with the privity of Angus of Dunyveg and, apparently, of Argyll, and set about the fortification of Rathlin Island.

A point of disquiet to the English was that they claimed to be doing this in the name of James VI, although the Edinburgh court denied all complicity in the matter. It is certain, however, that there was something unusual about the Crawford force, as they are described as "Inland Scots", that is, men from the in-country and not of the Islands, and in March Somhairle was in concert with them in Antrim and O'Neil was reported to be collecting his forces.

In the following month the English administration in Ireland felt certain that O'Neil's actions were dictated by some understanding which he had with Scotland, for, having marshalled his forces, he came down towards Newry with 1,900 Scots and 4,000 Irish, loudly praising the young Scottish king, and, as it was reported, actually contemplating the bringing of him to Ireland as his foster son.

In May Agnes Campbell arrived at Stirling, and the King came to some arrangement with her regarding the lands which her family held in Scotland. Robert Bowes approached

28. Ibid., loc. cit.
29. C.S.P., Ireland, II, 212. In 1578, on the depriving of the Regent Morton, the government in Scotland was nominally assumed by King James, then 12 years old, but Capt. James Stewart, later Earl of Arran, held real power. - Hist. K. James Sext. 159-160; Gregory: Isles, 215.
30. Ibid, II. 218-221.
her to see if she had no ulterior motive in coming, and both Argyll and Agnes assured him that she had not, praying him at the same time - and Argyll asked this the more as an especial favour to himself - that Elizabeth might allow Turlough to hold his lands peaceably in Ireland. Turlough's own movements, however, were not very peaceful at the time, for no sooner had Bagenall, an English officer on the Ulster border, withdrawn to Dublin to confer with the Irish Council, than O'Neill took advantage of his departure to assemble 7,000 Scots and the risings out of his own country. It was not expected that he would attempt anything definite, however, until the return of his wife from Scotland with further forces, but it was noticed with disquiet that when she did come Turlough received as well messengers from the Earl of Desmond, from O'Rourke of Breifne, and from Viscount Baltinglass. This last named had gone into rebellion in Leinster in this year, and in August he and O'Byrne of Wicklow practically annihilated the army of Grey, the new Lord Justice, at Glenmalure. O'Rourke was also a dangerous rebel, for he commanded the passage from Ulster to Connacht, and it was through his country that the mercenary bands of the Scots spread southwards. At this time O'Rourke was in league with O'Donnell and the two were in open rebellion against Malbie. Malbie had seen service in Antrim before his

31. C.S.P. Scotland, V, 421; Bowes Correspondence, XXVI, 58.
32. C.S.P., Ireland, II. 227.
33. Id., II. 243. Agnes, upon her return, commanded 2,000 Scots in a raid on a subsidiary O'Neill chieftain. In August Grey called Agnes "a pestilent instrumente, altogether Scottisshe" - Wright: Queen Elizabeth, II, 111-112.
34. For Malbie's service against him at this time, vide C.S.P. II, 297. For the present writer's article on that subject in Journal of Galway Archaeological Society, double number of 1933, 141 seq. — Appendix No. IX bate.
appointment as governor in Connacht, and it was a result of the knowledge which he had gained there, as well as an understanding of the general position as it then was, that he could put the situation so clearly to the Earl of Leicester — "The Scots," said he, "be the only hope that any evil-disposed Irishry have to sustain them in their enterprises, which being cut off from them, it is no great work to govern the Irish, neither any hard matter to expulse the Scots." It was Malbie also who said, upon the return of Agnes from her mission to Stirling, that she, her daughter, and Somhairle Buidne MacDonald would make a new Scotland of Ulster.

Once again a critical moment had come for Turlough — a moment at which all Ireland seemed to look to him for a lead. There can hardly have been so great a force of Scots in Ulster since 1569, the year of his marriage, Munster still held out against the Queen and further Spanish aid came to Co. Kerry in October, Leinster had newly arisen, Connacht was soon to rise again. But it does not appear that Turlough ever realised his position. He had scarcely received the emissaries referred to from Desmond and Baltinglass than he said secretly to Captain Pers that his only desire was, as formerly, to have his sub-chiefains recognise him. If the Queen aided him in this, he said that he would turn upon the Scots as Sean O'Neil had turned upon them, and that he would not leave a Scot in Ireland. The threat was scarcely meant, but the wish — for it is the wish which dictated all his actions —

was sincere. If O'Neil intrigued with Pers, however, he intrigued also with Baltinglass to whom he promised four thousand footmen and five hundred horse; and he made what was evidently only a feint to keep his promise in coming down with a force towards the Gap of the North, the road out of Ulster to the south-east, in October.

Connacht, which had been restless during the year, rose again in November, and, alarmed by the capture of Loughrea by John Burke, Clanricarde's son, and by the sudden spreading of hostilities, Walble said that "if her Majesty do not use her sword more sharply she will lose both sword and realm." The Earl's sons were fighting for the abolition of English law and a reversion to tanistry, and the same cause sent Richard-an-Iarainn Burke of Mayo into insurrection in conjunction with them. It is significant that the first action of Richard Burke in setting himself up as MacWilliam

38. Chancellor Gerrard to Burghley: Id.II, 255.
39. Same to same, id., II, 260. On Oct 24 Bowes wrote to Burghley and Walsingham: "Havynge sent to understand whether any forces have passed, or be in redynes to passe, owt of Argyle and other partes in Scotland, into Ireland, I am advertised that none have gone over of late owt of Scotland into Ireland, neyther is there any number prepared or redy to passe, notwithstanding the brute gaven furthe to the contrary" - Bowes Correspondence, lxxii,155. However, on Jan,26, 1581, Sir Henry Wallop wrote to the Earl of Leicester from Dublin: "It is advertised that Scottes are landed of late in great numbers in Ulster, and are distributed by Tyrloughe into Connought and other partes, whereby he easeth his own charge in their mayntenaunce, and hath them still at his devotion, whencsoever he fyndeth opportunity to publish himself in rebellion, which in my opinion he will not long cover, for as every moonlight (sic) he gathereth forces and maketh shew of invasion, to withdraw the Lord Deputye from presenting (sic) the rebels in other partes, so is he now in a parley with Sarleboy (Somhairle Buidhe) and such as are sent to solycitt him from the Erle of Argile, to be backed out of Scotland, and by th' Erle's meanes (it is said) he hath adopted the King of Scots as his foster sonne (sic), which may be the occasion of the coming hither of the inland men of Scotland, which now serve him under Craforde" - Wright: Queen Elizabeth,II,128.
40. C.S.P., Carew,II,314; A.F.M.,1580.
in opposition to the Government candidate was to send messengers northward for Scots." 41. The action of Malbie in preventing a meeting between the Clanricarde rebels and those of Mayo did much to break up the rebellion, and it influenced Richard Burke to surrender at once. In March, 1581, Malbie having refused to treat with Burke unless he broke off negotiations with the Scots whom he had hired, Burke and the Governors set out together to expel the Scots from Connacht. These latter had come as far south as Slieve Carna in Mayo in response to Burke’s invitation, and were encamped there to the number of six hundred men. Now that Burke had broken his agreement with them, they had no alternative but to march north. This they did at once, outdistancing the pursuing force until the River Moy was reached. At a ford on this river Malbie came up with them, but they beat his horsemen back and got across in safety, retreating into the woods and bogs where the English force could not follow them in a high rage at the manner in which Burke had treated them.

42. Malbie’s account of the expedition — S.P.Ireland, Eliz. Vol.lxxxii. No.42]. It is recorded that Burke had hired Scots in the November previous at the agreed rate of £4,200 quarterly (C.S.P., Ireland,II,294). Although it cannot be proven that this was the same band, there is no reason to think otherwise. Some of them were killed by Malbie, but if we take it that they were no more than seven hundred when they entered Connacht it must appear that this was uncommonly good pay for mercenary forces, even if payment were to be made pro rata in kind — amounting to some £6 a man for each quarter. Hugh O’Neil, in 1601, was only prepared to give £1 a quarter and (apparently) a hundredth share of a yearly bounty of £30 (Vide Appendix No. IV below.) Perhaps they may have been exceptionally good men, and, indeed, Malbie says that they were “all as well appointed men as ever I saw for their faculty”. 180 of them were horsemen, an unusual thing in itself for the Scottish forces; the galloglaigh were uniformly footmen, and this is one of the few references to the Scots having been mounted – 180 more were armed with targets, 100 had long swords, and the rest, had darts, firearms or galloglaigh axes. The traditional weapons of the Highland Scot were a target, or small circular shield, and a broadsword (John Major, in 1512, quoted in Collectanea de Rebus Albanicis, 28) For the use of a target in battle vide Pacata Hibernia, 1. 35. For the use of Irish round leather targets, vide Spencer: View of the State of Ireland, 102. Spencer, 103-104, also mentions “long wicker shields” as peculiar to the Northern Irish and the Scots. Scots with long swords are also mentioned in C.S.P.Carew, II, 310.

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It appears that these Scots were led by Alexander MacDonald, the son of Donald Bealach and a nephew of the James of Dunyveg who had died after Glenshesk. This Alexander with, apparently, all his father's brothers except Somhairle Buidhe, had taken to mercenary soldiering because of their lack of an inheritance either in the Cantyre and Islay area or in Antrim — the sons of James having succeeded to Dunyveg and Somhairle to all intents and purposes to Antrim.

The peculiar fate which befell them after Burke had failed in his promises towards them affords a remarkable insight into the uncertain nature of the mercenary service. Marching northwards from the Moy towards Ulster, Alexander and his followers were unfortunate enough to encounter O'Conor Sligo's nephew, who attacked them, and whom they killed. They went then to O'Rourke of Breifne, who hired them until the Autumn of the same year (1581) when they were hired into the Government service by Malbie, who had the authority of the 1560 Act to hire Scots, and were billeted on the territory of the same O'Conor whose son they had earlier killed. While they were here, in revenge for his loss, and apparently after some obscure negotiations with Malbie, O'Conor attacked them at night, and, scattered as they were

43. It is not certain, however, if the Scots concerning whom the sequel above is related were the same as those whom Malbie drove across the Moy. See Note 44.
up and down the country, slew Alexander and a great number of his followers.

While these events were happening in Connacht, Turlough O'Neill was still active about Newry, where he raided O'Hanlon and one of the Crawfords, either John or his brother, who is referred to as Captain Crawford, wrote to Agnes Campbell saying that King James had granted him six hundred men which he would bring to Carlingford. There is no evidence but Crawford's own, as transmitted by Bagenall, that King James had done any such thing, and, at all events, Turlough was persuaded by Bagenall to keep the peace. Captain Pers, however, seems to have been better able to manage Turlough than any other of the English officials, and when Turlough sent him presents for Christmas, Pers wrote to Walsingham.

44. Malbie is our authority for the statement that the Scots on their way northward from the Moy killed the son of O'Connor Sligo's brother - Malbie to Walsingham; S.P. Ireland, Eliz. Vol. lxxxii, No. 44. With this he was made acquainted by a letter which he received from the youth's father, but which, unfortunately, is missing from the Record Office (he enclosed it to Walsingham). The Four Masters (A.F.M., 1581) say, however, that the Scots who killed O'Connor did so while acting under Malbie's orders, which cannot have been so if they were at all the same body that Malbie had chased over the Moy. Another obscure point is that while the Annals refer to the dead youth as Cathal Og, son of Teige, son of Cathal Og, the State Papers call him the son of Cathal Og. The Annalists are the authority for saying that Alexander MacDonald was the leader of the Scots who were massacred, and their fate is certain whether or no they are the same as the body referred to by Malbie. O'Donovan has amended the original version of the A.F.M., absolving Malbie from blame for the massacre, since the Scots are stated to have been in his employment, but O'Rorke: Hist. Co. Sligo, I, 127-129, implicates Malbie.

recommending the granting of some of O'Neil's requests in order that O'Neil, in return, might be induced to attack the Scots. This last, remarks Pers, would be a considerable advantage to England if Scotland should quarrel with Elizabeth. Pers' views for Ulster were not subscribed to, however, by the Irish administration as a whole, and no immediate move was made either to conciliate O'Neil or to oppose him when he received fresh Scottish forces in January, 1581. These latter are described as having been upon this occasion better appointed than usual, and they seem to have come, if not under the patronage, at least with the connivance of the Earl of Argyll, and to have been conducted to Loch Foyle by Captain Crawford.48. Grey, the Lord Deputy, felt that James VI was implicated in the matter, and when Elizabeth sent over a reinforcement of 1,000 men in April he was ordered by the English Privy Council to proceed against O'Neil at once, at the same time employing the ship Handmaid to cruise on the north coast and to prevent the coming of further Scots to O'Neil. It appeared for the moment as if matters were to

46. Id.II.281: Purs to Walsingham.
47. Id.II.283. cf. Note 39 ante.
48. In March Walsingham instructed Randolph in Edinburgh to charge the King and Council concerning these forces, the transport of which to Ireland was "a matter tending to the breach of amity". He was particularly to stay Crawford, who had returned to Scotland meanwhile, from collecting fresh forces for O'Neil - C.S.P.,Scotland,V, 657-658. Later in the month Crawford said before Randolph that he went to Ireland for no other reason than to have restitution for a ship and goods taken from him by two Bristol merchants. Id., V, 686.
50. Bagenall to same: C.S.P.,Ireland,II,301.
be forced to a head, for in April also William Nugent, an indefatigable worker in the interests of Viscount Baltinglass, intrigued with Turlough and Somhairle Buidhe for aid, and it was reported that 4,000 Scots under Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg, 2,000 under MacLeod of Lewis, and 2,000 under MacLeod of Harris, intended to land in Antrim. This is a sign of the implication of these more northerly clans of the Isles in Irish affairs, and, although the invasion does not appear to have been carried out on this occasion for some reason, the MacLeods were later to come to Ireland in considerable numbers. Turlough was to send six hundred Scots to O'Rourke early in the year, and now he "vowed to stir in Ireland if any attempt be made by Scotland against England." He had a very considerable force at this time, amounting to four thousand heavy armed footmen, two thousand five hundred of which were Scots and the rest gallowglaigh, as well as seven hundred horse and a great number of his own lightly armed Irish levies, or caetharnaigh. Every fresh addition of power in the nature of military force to which Turlough attained, however, he used in the same way - to overawe O'Donnell; and all during November he lay in Inishowen, facing O'Donnell's force which was upon the other side of Loch Foyle. Active preparations which were being made in the Isles during the summer and autumn to assist Turlough were stayed by the

51. Grey to English Privy Council: Id.II, 310. O'Rourke, refusing to make peace with Malbie except on his own terms, said that if these terms were not granted he would "send for Scots, and would do much hurt" - O'Conors of Connaught, 190. cf. Grey in Wright: Queen Elizabeth, II,147.
52. Waterhouse to Walsingham: C.S.P.Ireland, II, 313.
Earl of Argyll, while Turlough and O'Donnell sent their two Scots' wives - mother and daughter - across the Loch with 53 messages between them. Not until the next generation would the hereditary enemies of Ulster agree to forget their differences over the possession of Inishowen and to make common cause, with Scottish aid, against the English Government.

53. Patrick Culan to Bagenall: Id.II, 333.
CHAPTER FOUR:

THE EFFECT OF THE COMPOSITION IN CONNACHT, PERROTT'S FAILURE IN ANTRIM, AND THE SUSPECTED IMPLICATION OF THE COURT OF KING JAMES VI IN IRISH AFFAIRS. (1581-1586)

A period of stability in the Irish and Scottish affairs at this time shows that a continual agreement was at work to subvert the power of the MacDonals of Cantyre and place the Clan Donald generally by the Clan Campbell's central organisation about which the affairs of western Scotland, willingly or unwillingly revelled.  To this end were involved the MacDonals of the Ochil and, because of their interference with John, bishop of the Isles, "in upholding the villainy, forgeries, treachery, perfidy and deceit of the said bishopric that divine unity" indicates rather the inability of the central authority to make the King's writ run in the Isles than any successful interference of Edinburgh in the West Highland.  Not until the end of the sixteenth century was James VI able to bring active press...
"The Scots have no fansie to com into Connaught any more except they may comm many, which no Connaught man ys able to enterteigne."

- Sir Nicholas Malbie, 1582.

A review of the state of affairs in the Isles and West Highlands at this time shows that a continual movement was at work to subvert the power of the MacDonals of Cantyre and Islay and to replace the ClanDonald generally by the Clan Campbell as the central organisation about which the affairs of western Gaeldom, willingly or unwillingly, revolved. The failure of the letters of 

ure to bear on the Isles. Meanwhile a series of clan disputes kept the area involved in incessant warfare. In the Outer Hebrides the MacLeods were at feud with the Clanranald, which latter independent branch of the ancient family of the Isles had for some time been consolidating its power in Uist. Further south, the MacLean-Macdonald feud over the ownership of the Rinns of Islay still smouldered and was soon to break into flame. Midway, in Barra, the MacNells maintained a technical independence, but in reality they followed the MacLeans, who, in their rise to prominence, had succeeded in bringing the Mackinnons and even the Macquarries of Ulva into line against the ClanDonald. It was a period of move and countermove on the part of Angus of Dunyvec, who, although he maintained friendship as yet with the Campbells, entered into bonds of manrent with the Lamonts, Stewart of Bute, and the MacAllasters for his own protection in the centre of greatest Campbell influence. Although the MacLeans did not enter into similar bonds with the Campbells until after the death of Colin, the sixth Earl, it was quite apparent that the Argyll family was all along merely awaiting eventualities to profit by the dissensions between Duart and Dunyvec.

The results of this troubled state of affairs were many. The conflict of the clans meant that numbers of leader-

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2. MacLeod: MacLeods of Dunvegan, p.103.
less and lawless men were set loose in the Isles, men who, during a momentary lull in the hostilities in their own area, were only too anxious to cross to Ireland to earn the reward of mercenary service there - or even to seek a settlement on the land such as was denied them in the Isles. Isolated contemporary references and examples indicate that bands of outlaws of this nature were more common in the Isles after the final disruption of the Lordship than is generally supposed. The MacGhitthichs, although exterminated in Harris about 1555, remained outlaws in Trotternish and other places for a long period, and Munro, in 1549, mentions the islands of Pabay, off Skye, Rona off Raasay and Ellan Ewe and the district of north Uist as lurking places for "rebellis", "thieves, ruggairs, and reivairs". In 1593, Sir Richard Bingham mentions a Scot, Neale M'Barrie - evidently a MacNeil - "that usually maketh his summer's course to steal what he can", apparently coming down on the Irish coast as far south as Connacht with a fleet of galleys and smaller boats. Again, a result of the disturbed state of affairs and of the gradual realisation on Elizabeth's part that James VI had little authority in the Isles, even if he wanted to use it to her advantage, led the Queen to seek in the disorder a method of adding the plans

6. C.S.P. Ireland, V.125. For the MacGhitthichs, vide Bannatyne MS. in MacLeod: Macleods of Dunvegan, 25, 53-56. Mac Geoch, the same name, although not common in Scotland, is to be found at the present day in Ulster. Munro: Isles, 39, 40, 49, 63. A relationship might be suggested between MacGhitthich and Mac Shithigh (MacSheehay).
for Scottish activity in Ireland by inciting one Isles chief to attack another in an effort to involve the Islesmen in their own affairs. We have seen how Donald Gormeson of Sleat was approached to this end in 1570. Her chief concern, however, was to crush the Islay family, the disturbers of the peace in Antrim, and the unfortunate Angus soon found himself opposed, either covertly or openly, by the crowns of England and Scotland as well as by Maclean and Argyll.

Besides the landless men who were ready to resort to Ireland, however, and the ClanDonald who had their settlements there to look to, the names of some prominent Scottish noblemen, and even of King James himself, became at this time involved in anti-English intrigue in Ireland, and from 1580 until the end of the century the activities of the English court, now secret, now open, are redoubled in Edinburgh and in the West Highlands. In January, 1581, an anonymous Scottish writer advised Walsingham to raise a party in the English favour in the Isles, and even to "plant Engles menne in places necessarie" there to hinder those who sought to resort to Ireland and to "spwle them of their bestialles and goodes"; and in 1577 the English Court was supplied with a descriptive list of Scottish peers which included the chieftains of the Isles.

7. Vide, ante, p. 62
8. MacDonalds: Clandonald, II, 547-548. et seq. for opposition of James VI.
9. Advice of Bishop of Walsingham - whether a man sur-named Bishop of a dignitary of the Church it is impossible to determine - C.S.P., Scotland, V, 599.
10. Ibid, V, 256-263. Of the ClanDonald in this list it is said: "there are none now but the children of James Macdonell and Charlie Howe (Somhairle Scuith) a 'concourser' in Ireland". Of Macleod - "The Lord of the Isles of Skye and Lewis, called Macloud, of good power and living in his country, but of small power to bring to the south of Scotland to 'armie royall', and so not much to be esteemed."
While Ulster remained in uneasy quiet after the failure of Essex, and while the mutual hostility of O'Neill and O'Donnell was the only source of satisfaction in that province to the English, the Tudor conquest was pushed forward in Connacht. It is easier to estimate the position of hired Scots in the Irish system in this province than in any other. In the organisation of the Irish clan the employment of Scottish mercenary forces and the billeting of them upon the clansmen was a usual and allowable expedient of warfare.

The period 1581-1585 saw the final struggle in Connacht on the part of the natives to maintain and on that of the Government to overthrow this system. In this struggle the natives invoked the system itself in its own defence and constantly sought to introduce Scots. When they were successful in doing this last they made some headway, but without the Scots they stood little chance against the English soldiery.

The Irish could never understand why it was that their holding of land should be subject to the payment of rent to an "owner", and when MacWilliam Burke of Mayo was placed in that position by reason of his submission to the English government, he was refused payment by the sept of the rival claimant to supremacy in Mayo in May 1582. This rival, Richard MacOliverus Burke, soon collected a following among the disaffected, and his first action in initiating a new rebellion, was to go into O'Donnell's country in Ulster to hire Scots. The significance of the part played by


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these mercenary forces in the clash of English and Irish systems is thus clearly shown. Burke, however, was not successful in hiring Scots at the moment, and he had to return to his own country with merely a promise of their future coming. Of this Malbie informed Burghley on June 23, saying: "All Connaught (I thanke God) standeth the fast yet, and (I) do hope yt will still be upon the mending hand. Rychard Mc Olyverus is retourned from O'Donnell and can get no Scottes. They have no fansie to com into Connaught any more except they may comm many, which no Connaught man ys able to enterteigne."

Malbie, however, was over sanguine, although he was very likely right in suspecting that the Scots would be wary in Connacht after their treatment in that province in the previous year. In July the Scots did come in, one thousand two hundred strong, but with them was Con O'Donnell who had remained a friend of Turlough Luineach against his own chieftain, and the traditional hostility between the Clan O'Donnell and O'Conor Sligo seems to have led O'Donnell into hostilities with O'Conor who held Sligo for the Queen with a force of English soldiers. The Scots could have avoided Sligo in their journey south to Burke's aid, but instead of this they lost time and strength in burning the town and attacking the castle. "If this great company of Scots be not broken in time, all Connaught will be lost", said a Government informant, but their succour never reached Richard Burke, for, upon the speedy approach of Malbie from Athlone, they withdrew over the Erne with a prey of two thousand of

13. S.P. Ireland, Eliz., xciii, 56.
O'Conor's cattle. Deprived of this expected support, Burke submitted on July 20th. In the same month the Earl of Clanricarde died and Ulick, his son, succeeded him. This latter had now a position to maintain, and South Connacht acquiesced in the English settlement from this time forward.

§ II.

During the Autumn of 1582 Turlough Luineach remained quiet, but he took care that he should be well supplied with Scots, two thousand of whom landed in August. In October he had two thousand four hundred of them, and Malbie, who was convinced that the last attack on Sligo had been his doing, complained that he had only a hundred English foot and seventy horse to hold Connacht. By November, however, O'Neil had made peace once more with O'Donnell, and the Dublin authorities took advantage of this to offer him the services of a force of English soldiery, being desirous that he should get rid of his Scots at all costs. Turlough showed himself in some way agreeable to this and dismissed some part of his Scots, but these latter merely created further disturbance by going into Clandeboyse with the intention of settling there. Meanwhile, Angus of Dunyveg had crossed from Scotland to attend to his possessions in Antrim and had also entered Clandeboyse.
where he preyed Hugh MacPhelim O'Neil. The Government, desirous of showing that it could protect the Irish against the Scots, and in an effort to prevent them from waging Scots on their own accord against the ClanDonald in Antrim, sent seventy English footmen to MacPhelim, and, another English band having fallen on the ClanDonald, Angus was forced to return to Scotland. On this occasion the Scots were forced to embark in a storm and a hundred and forty of them were drowned. During the Spring of 1583, the new policy of aiding the Irish clans against the Scots was pursued, and MacQuillin was reinforced by two hundred soldiers.

Following a private quarrel between the two sons of the late Earl of Clanricarde, John sent an emissary to Scotland in March, and it is very probable, although no details have survived, that his wish was to enlist aid against his brother, Ulick the new Earl. Had John not been slain by Ulick in a night attack while his messenger was in Scotland, there can be little doubt that the Scots would have entered Connacht again in the summer of 1583. Somhairle and the other Clan-Donald brothers were anxious to come southward to O'Conor Sligo's territory to avenge the murder of Alexander, their kinsman.

In April it was reported that Angus of Dunyveg

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20. Same to Eng Privy Council, Nov. 5, Id.II,409; same to Walsingham, and Piers to Justices, Dec. 10-20, II, 418. 21. Lords Justices to Walsingham, C.S.P., Ireland, II, 433. 22. C.S.P., Ireland, II, 440; 444. In March Maguire of Fermanagh said that he dared "refuse no Scot or other rebel passing through his country since Sir Henry Sidney did grant O'Neil to be his sovereign" - Id.II,440.
was about to come to Ireland again to make up for his reverse of the preceding year; meanwhile Somhairle Buidhe came and entered once more into friendly relations with Turlough. The inhabitants of Carrickfergus made ready to fly from the town, so warlike were the preparations of the Scots, and it was thought that Turlough and Somhairle Mac-Donald would march on the Pale. Hugh MacPhelim and Mac Quillin joined together to oppose the Scots, but, although they had with them an English force, they were overthrown, and MacPhelim and seventy of the English killed. It was undoubtedly the news of this Scottish success which led Elizabeth in May to complain once more to James VI about his rebellious subjects and to tabulate among the heads of advice concerning the Government of Scotland which she sent him at the same time an item which counselled him to reduce the disobedient people of the Isles to order.

In the same month Turlough took suddenly ill, and it was mistakenly reported, and believed for some days in Dublin, that he was dead. There was a sudden panic that the successful Scots in the north might set up a son of Sean O'Neil's in his stead, thus forestalling the loyalist Hugh O'Neil, Baron of Dungannon, who had been educated in the

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24. Ibid., II,443.
25 Requests of Elizabeth for her ambassador to James - C.S.P., Scotland, V, 466; Heads of Advice, Id.,V,438. This advice was conveyed by the Queen to James Colville and Colonel Stewart, whom James VI, had sent as ambassadors to London. See the item at length (signed by Walsingham) in Colville's Letters, 228-229, May,1583, On May 1 of this year Bowes wrote to Walsingham to say that he had shown to King James a series of heads presented by Mary, Queen of Scots, to Queen Elizabeth. Item 5 referred to the stopping of Irish intercourse, and James said that, as far as he was concerned, Elizabeth could command him in the matter - Bowes Correspondence,cxviii,426. For Huntly's intrigue with Argyll in Oct. and Dec., 1582, vide Id., cii,195 and cxi,286.
English Court with a view to his succeeding Turlough. An English force was sent north with all speed to prevent this, but the Baron himself, the object of the aid, denied the rumour, saying that, although Turlough had been thought dead for twenty four hours, he was indeed alive still.

During the Summer of this year two Irish visitors went to Scotland to the disquiet of the English Government. In June Edmund Eustace, the brother of Viscount Baltinglass, the Leinster rebel, crossed and at once entered into an intrigue for Scottish aid, not in the Highlands but in the Scottish court. Later Lady Agnes Campbell went over, but, as she assured the Irish Lords Justices on her return in November, "for no disloyal purpose".

It is impossible to trace Eustace after his arrival in Scotland, but it would be very desirable to do so, for he soon became actively involved in a conspiracy in that country to supply aid to the disaffected in Leinster who had gone into rebellion under his brother in 1580. This intrigue had its beginnings, seemingly, with William Nugent, brother of Sir Christopher, ninth Baron Delvin, who was named in 1580 as one of those implicated in the Viscount's treason. This William escaped capture and fled with one Brian MacGeoghegan to Turlough Laineach in April, 1581. Turlough was then described as "the very root and seedman of all the rebellion of Ireland", and it was feared that the

27. Lords Justices to Eng.Priv.Council, June 14 - C.S.P. Ireland, II, 451; Agnes Campbell (in Latin) to the Lords Justices, Nov. 4 - Id. II, 477-478.

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machinations of Nugent with O'Neil and Somhairle Buidhe would breed trouble in Westmeath. From April 1581, until the end of that year Nugent worked ceaselessly to gather the rebels in Westmeath, to procure aid from O'Neil, and to intimidate some English soldiers to whom he had access. It was said that his conspiracy was "like to work such a mischief as hath not been heard of since the conquest". Finding, however, that foreign aid was indispensable, Nugent and MacGeoghegan crossed in January 1582 to Scotland and apparently sought access to the Scottish Court. It is not clear how long Nugent remained in Scotland; in December of 1583 he was in Rome, and he seems to have gone thence to Spain and from there through France, back to Scotland, and so once more to Ulster. In December, 1584, he was apprehended in Ireland. How far the Scottish Court was involved in the schemes of Nugent for foreign aid for the Irish rebels it is difficult to determine, but it is clear that, on the occasion of his second visit to Scotland when the Viscount's brother was there also, he had access to some prominence in the Court to whom he delivered letters from the Duke of Guise. He said himself, in his examination before Perrott after his capture, that he had letters for King James, and he specially referred to one in cipher for the Master of Gray which concerned the King. At all events, Walsingham suspected the worst, and he wrote in July, 1584, when Nugent had arrived in Scotland on his way back from the continent,

to Hunsdon, the English Governor of Berwick, saying that King James was suspected of being implicated in preparations then being made in the West Highlands for a descent on Ireland. He thought the summons of this the more credible in that Nugent and MacGeoghegan had lately arrived in Scotland, where they were well received and had a secret interview either with the King himself or with a confidential courtier.

§ III.

The sequel to these protracted negotiations which now took place in Ireland went far to implicate the Scottish King in English eyes. In August, 1584, the new Lord Deputy, Perrott, reported that a hundred and twenty galleys were being prepared in the Isles to transport a special force of trained men to Ireland, and he deplored the fact that he had not better spies both in Spain and Scotland to warn him of real dangers such as he apprehended this to be. In June over a thousand Scots landed and were hired by O'Neil; in August a force of some two thousand Macleans came ashore in O'Donnell's country and plundered MacSweeney. These latter were well-appointed men, and they were supplied with some pieces of artillery. The apparent reason for their landing was to set up one of the sons of Sean O'Neil as O'Neil in opposition to Turlough Luineach. These recalcitrant O'Neils had been

30. Walsingham to Hunsdon - C.S.P., Scotland, VII, 244.
32. Id., II, 516, 520. This band preyed O'Donnell of 3,000 cattle and 40 of them were killed by him.
conducting an intrigue of their own with the MacLeans, and although Perrot informed the Queen that their force, which he said consisted of "inland Scots", was sent by the King of Scots, there seems to be little likelihood that there was any truth whatever in this, or that the MacLeans were at all implicated in the Nugent intrigue.

At all events, Perrot was alarmed and the violent offence which he conducted against the Scots in Ireland, and for which the Queen later censured him, commenced at this time. He claimed to have unearthed a plot which led him to believe that Turlough O'Neill, a messenger from whom he apprehended, was to be assisted by the Scottish King's forces, and that he was to go into rebellion in conjunction with the Munster and Connacht rebels and a force of Spaniards which was to land at Sligo. He was aware that the MacLeans claimed to be opposed to Turlough, yet he seems to have looked upon them as involved in the general scheme. O'Donnell's information regarding the arrival of the Scots was accompanied by a reminder that that chieftain was "plagued for minding

33. Hugh O'Donnell to Perrot, July 27, C.S.P., Ireland, II, 520: Oliver Stuastoe to Sir Lucas Dillon, July 26, Id.II,520: Perrot to Queen, Aug.3, and to English Privy Council, same date, Id. loc. cit. Capt.Lynoe to Perrott on Aug.3 gives details of the force - S.P.Ireland, Eliz., cx1.3911. O'Donnell refers to the leader of the force as "Makelayen" the Scot, Custace calls him "M'Ilane". Referring specifically to these entries the editor of the Calendar identifies "Makelayen" and "M'Ilane" with Archibald, seventh Earl of Argyll. It has become a practice with Irish historians thus to take MacIlane or MaCaillen in all cases to refer to the leader of Clan Campbell, apparently on the analogy of MaCaillean Mor. There is no justification whatever for this as a general rule. In this case it is an obvious mistake. Vide also Sir Nicholas Bagennall to Earl of Leicester - Aug. 24, from Newry - C.S.P., Carew, II, 376.
34. C.S.P., Ireld., II, 520.
his Prince's will", that O'Neil, who was a transgressor of it, was more favoured than he, and that he might receive what Scottish aid he pleased if he wished it and would allow the Scots to pass through his territory to invade and spoil Connacht.

The real attitude of Turlough towards the MacLeans is shown by his putting in his son as a pledge with the Government and his declaration of willingness to assist Perrott in the expedition against the Scots in Ulster which the Deputy at once set about arranging. Perrott was spurred on furthermore by information such as that received from a Wexford merchant, lately returned from Spain, who said that a Scottish ambassador had been made much of at the Spanish Court and that a proposal was afoot to marry one of the King of Spain's daughters to James VI, and he set out with a force for Ulster on August 25, proposing as he did so that an English expedition should be fitted out against the Isles. Turlough stood

35. Id., II, 523. Ulick, Earl of Clanricarde, also entered his son as a hostage, and declared himself ready to assist Perrott against the Scots, Id., II, 524.

36. Id., II, 524-525. Perrott summed up the Scottish forces which had lately arrived in Ulster as follows:

Under "MacIlane's sons", that is, of the MacLeans who had landed in Tirconnell, in all over 2,400 men - composed of:

Bowmen over 1,100 ............... 1,100.

supplied with firearms of whom

200 are "inland trained men in the service of the Low Countries........ 500

swordsmen. 800. 2,400.

Under Angus MacDonald who came to Antrim .................. 1,600.

Under Somhairle Buidhe in Antrim (300 or 400) ............... 300.
fast, being threatened by the sons of Sean, his rivals, and their MacLeans, but some of his sub-chieftains went over to the Scots. Sir Richard Bingham, who was appointed military governor in Connacht after Malbie's death in June, 1584, brought the Connacht forces up to the River Erne on the Ulster border, and the general concentration of the English forces on the north seems to have scared off the MacLeans, many of whom returned to Scotland shortly after their arrival in Ireland without having afforded any active assistance to the sons of Sean O'Neil.

Meanwhile there was some activity in English circles on the Border and in Edinburgh in an effort to discover if James VI had countenanced Nugent and Eustace, and if there was any connection between the activities of the Scots in Ulster and the conspiracy which it was felt by Walsingham was being hatched in Scotland. In pursuit of the request of Walsingham in July, Hunsdon in Berwick wrote to Arran on August 18 for information, acquainting him of the suspicions of the English Court. Arran opened the matter with James and quoted what he said were the King's own words in his reply to Hunsdon - "ze sall," said the King, "assure my good cusing me Lord Hunsdon I never gaiff any suche charge direclie or indirectly (to aid the rebels in Ireland), neither promisit to any quhatsumever to over se it or vink at it, nor knew at any tyme off any suche matter bot be yis zoure lordship's lettir."

38. C.S.P.Irel., II, 525; Cox: Hibernia Anglicana, 380-381.
Davison, the English agent in Edinburgh, was making similar enquiries, having been informed by Perrott of the landing of Scots in Ireland, and of the fears of the Lord Deputy that they intended to combine with the Irish rebels, expected Spanish aid, and came with the Privity and consent of King James. His informants were the wife and some friends of the Earl of Argyll who happened then to be in Edinburgh, and who, apparently were the only ones to whom he could apply for information concerning the happenings in the Isles. From these he learned that Lachlan Maclean of Duart had gone to Ireland with eight hundred men for the purpose of setting up the son of the late Sean O'Neil whose claim upon their support lay in the fact of his being Sean's son by Maclean's father's sister. They had attempted to set up their nominee "by strong hand" and had raided Turlough's country for the purpose, but had since come to some agreement with Turlough. All this Davison communicated to Walsingham on August 27th, and he further informed him that, although large forces had been collected in the Isles during the summer, their intent was not against Ireland but rather, at Argyll's instance, against MacLeod of Lewis who had attempted to disinherit his son Torquill, who was under Argyll's protection, and to name as his successor a son by an earlier wife. Argyll had dispatched a force against him and had incited MacKenzie to attack him. Davison did not, however,

40. There is no record of Perrott's communication with him. It must have been made before the news reached Perrott of the landing of the MacLeans. These latter did not land until August 1st. (Myne's report - S.P., Ireld. Eliz., cxi, 391). Davison wrote Walsingham on Aug. 27th, and had been making enquiries for some time previous to this.
deny, as Arran had declared James to have done, that William Nugent did attempt to obtain aid from the King, and he reported the presence in Edinburgh of another Irish intriguer in the person of Maurice Fitzgerald, brother's son of the late Earl of Desmond, who communicated with the Earl of Arran.

Before he had received a reply either from Davison or Hunsdon, however, Walsingham had written to both of them, to Davison on August 22nd., and to Hunsdon on the day following. The purport in either case was the same, and it shows that Walsingham's suspicions had been aroused against Arran. He declared it his view that the descent on Ireland had been arranged in the preceding January in Scotland when James MacDonald, the son of Angus of Dunyveg, was in court, that the arrival of Nugent in that country during the summer of 161.

Davidson to Walsingham, Aug. 24 - C.S.P., Scotland, VII, 289-290; C.S.P., Scot. (Thorpe), I, 484. Cf. also in Thorpe, Killigrew to Davison, Aug. 15; Walsingham to same, Aug. 22 (stating the suspicion of James MacDonald related above); Mr. Carmichael to same, Aug. 24; Walsingham to same, Aug. 29 (I, 485-486) Describing Colin Campbell, the Earl of Argyll, in 1583, an anonymous informant of the English Court said that he was "religious, and of good nature, but weak in judgement, and evermore led by his yowf; a man very sickely, and not like to live longe" - Bannatyne Miscellany, I, 52-53. Colville said of him in 1582 that he had the "bludie fluxis" and that he was forced to retire to his own country through ill-health - Colville's Letters, 4. He died in September, 1584 - a month after his wife's report to Davison. Davison reported his death from Berwick, where he heard of it when on his way south, having been recalled from the Embassy - Sept. 17, to Walsingham - C.S.P., Scot. (Thorpe), I, 488.

Concerning the MacLeods and MacKenzies: In 1581 a feud raged between the MacKenzies and MacDonalds of Glengarry. In 1582 MacDonald was seized by MacKenzie, and, after investigation, MacDonald's castle of Strone was placed temporarily by the Government in the custody of Colin, Earl of Argyll, while MacKenzie was detained in ward in Edinburgh. As late as 1588 he was a prisoner in the Blackness. The Gerloch MacLeods were at deadly feud with the MacKenzies of Gerloch - Mitchell: Hist. Highlands, 412-414.
had furthered it, and that James MacDonald had received money for the purpose, apparently through Nugent and with the privity of Arran - "howsoever they otherwise plead ignorance and seem to take no knowledge of the matter?"

Upon the receipt of Davison's letter of the 24th. in London, however, whither it must have gone post-haste, the English Privy Council began to suspect that Perrott had overstated the immediate danger to Ireland from the Scots, and they communicated with him at once to that effect, although they did not countermand his proposed expedition against them. Perrott continued his operations, ordered up reinforcements from Munster, and proceeded into the district of the river Bann, where he commenced to besiege Dunlute Castle which was held by a Scottish garrison for Somhairle Buidhe. Here he was waited upon by Turlough Luineach O'Neil and by his wife, Agnes Campbell, who had met him at Newry on his way north.

42. Walsingham to Davison and to Hunsdon, J.S.P., Scotland, VII, 288, and C.S.P., Scot. (Thorpe), I, 484. cf. Bagwell's view in Tudors, III, 128-130, who believes that the views of Davison and Morroes (who said that the Scots who came to Ireland on this occasion were bent only on their customary fetching of meat") are less correct than that of Perrott. For James MacDonald's sojourn in Edinburgh, vide Bowes to Walsingham from Berwick, Feb. 24, 1584: "Mackon Gill being lately at Court, hath renewed his lease for the isles, and thereon he offered, as I hear, very largely to take the possession of the Isle of Man, seeming (sic) that the same might be done without great danger or difficulty" - although this seems to refer rather to Angus. - Wright: Queen Elizabeth, II, 217. For the Isle of Man scheme, vide infra, p. 226, cf. Calderwood, under date, 1584: "James Macconell of the Iles (a declared enemie to the estat of England), upon promise to kill the said erle [of Mar], was richelie rewarded with an hundred pund land, of old extent" - Hist. Kirk, IV, 250.

43. Privy Council England, to Perrott, August 31 - C.S.P., Ireland, II, 528.
The news of his coming had caused the dispersal of the Macleans who had entered into O'Neil's country, and their galleys had got out of Loch Foyle but one hour before the arrival of the ships which he had sent to intercept them. They had been pursued by sea, but either because of some negligence or because of the springing of a sudden leak in one of the Queen's ships, they got away in safety. Perrott said that the Scottish captain of Dunluce, upon being summoned to surrender, answered in very good English that he would hold the place to the last man for the King of Scots, and he denied that he had overstated the numbers of the Scottish forces, saying that "howsoever Mr. Davyson was abused by his intelligence, they were in number little fewer, their training and furniture no worse, and their purpose no better than I wrote."  

§ IV.  

At this time it is apparent that Perrott felt confident of making a success of his Ulster expedition. Two points of view in the matter of the Scots in Ireland seem to have been peculiar to him among the Elizabethan officials in that country: the first that the young King of Scots, or, rather, Arran and those who altered the "possession of the boy" at the Castle of St. Andrews when the Lords of the Raid of Ruthven

44. Perrot to Privy Council, England, Sept. 15, C.S.P., Ireld. II, 587; to Walsingham, Sept. 18, Id. II, 588; and 826, and see also, Id. III, 80 seq.
were overthrown, and who now seemed to maintain an ascendency over him, were implicated in the incitement of the Highlanders and Islesmen to cross to Ireland; the second that Donald Gorm MacDonald, the brother of Angus of Dunyveg, and one of the sons whom Agnes Campbell wished to make "starcke in Ireland", might with advantage be set up in the English interest against Somhairle Buidhe in Antrim. Whatever point there was in his first suspicion will appear in the sequel. It is certain that he was only partly in the right in his second, for, although there was a certain enmity between Somhairle MacDonald and the other members of his family, the putting into practice of Perrott's scheme to benefit by the dissensions in the House of Dunyveg had far different results than the Deputy intended.

Perrott had always displayed a resolute pursuit of his own views which must sooner or later bring him into conflict with the diplomatic Elizabeth, however, and in September 1584, he set about winning over Donald Gorm by entering into an agreement with him for possession of the Glens. It has been held that Somhairle Buidhe was content that Donald Gorm should hold the Glens if he himself was guaranteed possession of the Route, but it is quite clear that Perrott thought...

45. Articles of agreement - C.S.P., Irel., II, 534; C.S.P., Carew, II, 391, 394. It was agreed that "the said Donnell or his heirs shall not serve any foreign prince or potentate. He shall keep no Scots but such as he native of Ireland, and deliver the book to the Knight Marshal (Sir 'Iochlas Bagenall) or to Sir Henry Bagenall, his son"; and, further, that he shall "serve against Sauerlie Bwaye and any other foreign Scot". He agreed to pay a yearly rent to the Queen and to find a rising out of eighty footmen.

he was gaining a point against Somhairle as the most formidable of the MacDonalds in making this grant to Donald. At the same time extensive indentures for the maintenance of English soldiers in the north were entered into with Turlough Luineach O'Neil, O'Donnell, MacQuillin, and the Irish chieftains of Clandeboye, and it is evident that Perrott flattered himself as having subdued Ulster. It must have been matter for great satisfaction that O'Neil was "impotent and not able to command his followers." The queen was so far pleased with his endeavours up to this that she caused Walsingham specially to commend him, and she charged him to find out how far King James had been responsible for the Scottish descent during the summer. From this, and from Walsingham's statement that a Scottish ambassador was expected in London with an explanation, it is apparent that little faith was placed in Arran's denial of complicity on behalf of the King.

In October, Somhairle MacDonald returned to Scotland, and it was soon made apparent that the hopes which had been centred on Donald were far too sanguine. After the death of Colin Campbell, Earl of Argyll, in September, there was some disorder in the Isles, but the chief danger to England was in the report that Somhairle Buidhe was hard at work there collecting fresh forces, and

47. C.S.P. Ireland, II, 534.
49. Walsingham to Perrott: Id., II, 535.
MAP OF
ULSTER

MADE BY
JOHN GOGHE in 1567

PRESERVED IN P.R.O., LONDON;
PRINTED IN S.P., HENRY VIII (18), III, p. 3.
NOTE THE REPRESENTATIONS OF
THE THREE SEPTS OF MACSWEENY
GALLOGLAIGH IN TIR CONAILL.
that so far was Donald from showing any inclination to abide by his agreement that he was once more actively hostile to Perrott in Antrim. The two recorded attempts upon the life of Sean O'Neil and that which was later successful in the case of Hugh O'Donnell, show that assassination was no very unusual policy of the Elizabethan administration in Ireland, and we are not surprised to find a plot afoot at this time to remove Somhairle MacDonald. The Clan Donald leader must, however, have been on his guard, for Dawtrey, the Seneschal of Carrickfergus, reported to Perrott on November 18 that he found it impossible to have either Somhairle or his son assassinated. Meanwhile Donald Gorm had fallen foul of the English forces in the Glens with considerable loss upon either side, and the Scots were reported to have banished all among them who were of Irish birth, which, if it was true, was in direct violation of Donald's agreement.

If Somhairle had for some time contemplated a usurpation in Antrim which would consolidate the clan possessions there in his name, no rift had as yet occurred in the family of which Perrott could presume to take any advantage, for the new year had hardly opened when Angus and he arrived in Ireland with two thousand Scots to assist Donald. Sir William

51. Id., II, 539. This was no private scheme of Perrott's, as Dawtrey's letter was duly forwarded to Walsingham.
52. Id., II, 539-540.
53. Id., II, 547-548. Hill: MacDonnells of Antrim treats of Somhairle's usurpation of Antrim. There appears to have been some difficulty among the Islay family as to how Antrim should be divided between the brothers of James and his sons. In this at least Perrott was right.
Stanly, who was in command at the base camp at Dúnanany, was attacked, suddenly, and the English forces, weakened by the posting of small outlying garrisons, were hard put to it to hold their own. Perrott had made a blunder, and the Scots had scored a good point in appearing so suddenly from Cantyre at a season when their arrival was not in the least expected. Perrott could only complain that the English Privy Council had not reinforced him, and he admitted that the Scots were superior as soldiers to the Anglo-Irish levies. The trust which he placed in Donald Gorm was not, however, the Deputy's only mistake. His forces, as has been said, were scattered, and his arrangements to have supplies sent to Ulster by sea were inadequate, and were seriously interfered with by reason of the inclemency of the weather. Members of the Irish Council began to complain to London of the Deputy's Ulster expedition, saying that the English forces were beaten in every encounter and that they had been no party to the offensive against the Scots.

Perrott's belief continued unshaken that if the Scottish court did not expressly aid the ClanDonald, James and his advisers were to some extent guilty because they had taken no steps to prevent the coming of the subjects whom they claimed to control, and as Walsingham held the same view it was undoubtedly in response to English overtures that James for the first time resolved actively to interfere

54. Stanley to Bagenall, Jan 5, 1585; Id., II, 547-548; Perrott to Burghley, II, 547. Perrott requested Walsingham to send over some English bowmen on Jan. 17, saying that "the Scots bowmen have done more hurt than our shot." Id. II, 548.

55. Id., II, 549.
in Elizabeth's interest in the Isles. It is reasonable to suppose that the young king himself had had no earlier part in intriguing with the emissaries of the Irish rebels, but Arran and Argyll are not altogether free from suspicion, although it is difficult to see what the former had to gain by it. It was a period, however, of cross purposes and of divided interests among the Lords of Scotland who plotted for possession of and influence with the royal boy, and the tangled ends of rumours concerning the Catholic League and the suspected intrigue of the Duke of Guise in Mary Stuart's interest and of the kirk dissensions coincident with the banishment of Angus, Mar and the other lords to England become inextricably mixed up with plots for the transporting of Islesmen and Highlanders to aid the rebellious subjects of Elizabeth in Ireland. We have seen how Nugent claimed to have delivered letters from Guise to Esme Stewart the younger, the Master of Grey, and as early as 1566 Argyll said that he would break off negotiations with Sean O'Nei1 only on condition that Elizabeth undertook to preserve the reformed religion in Scotland. This, too, is a time of redoubled activity on the part of Elizabeth to bring about a treaty or league with Scotland, and every happening, every rumour, every breath of suspicion in the Scottish court is faithfully retold to London by the English ambassador and his spies. In 1584-5, Davison, Walsingham's secretary, Lord Hunsdon, the cousin of the Queen and Edward Wotton were sent to Scotland as men better fitted for the duties of the embassy than was Bowes. What

57. Burton: History of Scotland, V, 495, 502-503. Davison was sent previously in 1583. In that same year John Colville and Col. Stewart were sent by Scotland to England to demand the Lennox estate. In 1584 the Master of Gray was sent from Scotland to England and Davison from England to Scotland. Wotton did not go until May, 1585 - Thomas: Historical Notes, III. 1077.
the English court really believed about Scotland it is hard
to determine - Elizabeth indeed can scarcely have believed half
of the rumours which reached her - but on one point both
courts were certainly mistaken, and that was the belief that
James VI could at this date rule in the Isles by proclamation.
This is a point which up to this had not been calculated on.
James was soon to realise it, as was Wotton on behalf of
Elizabeth, but, as James could not afford to admit it and as
Elizabeth seems scarcely to have understood it, the fiction
was maintained on both sides.

In response to overtures by Elizabeth occasioned
by Ferrott's reports, King James issued a Proclamation under
the signet on February 10, 1585 recalling Angus of Dunyveg
from Ireland and ordering his appearance within fifteen days
before the Privy Council to show cause for his going there.
Angus had arrived in Ireland by January 7th previous and he
did not leave that country until the beginning of March.

58. In view of this, a somewhat different complexion is placed
on the charges of Ferrott and Walsingham against James.
Having no real control in the Isles, James could not
have incited the Islanders to aid the Irish rebels if
it were not to their own advantage to do so. Again, it
would make little real difference whether or no he
"winked at" the various expeditions. Probably Argyll was
the only man at court who either understood matters or had
authority in this connection. It may be said that Eliza-
beth understood this when she kept repeatedly in touch with
the Earls of Argyll, but it must be understood that she
did this more because the Scottish Government was dis-
turbed in itself, and for different reasons, than from
any realisation that the Lowland authority was long but
nominal in the Isles. Her repeated applications to the
Edinburgh court prove this. Nor must it be forgotten
that James was all this time a minor - he was only
eighteen years old in 1584. It is hard to appreciate this
fact from the conversation of Bowes and others with him
(See Bowes' Correspondence) Vide Lang: Hist.Scot.,II,306-
307, for a striking word-picture of the King in 1584.
59. Steele: Calendar of Tudor and Stuart Proclamations,II,ii,
243.
As he did not appear in Edinburgh until April, he did not comply with the letter of the law, nor was he censured for it. James and his advisors took advantage of the declaration of their intentions contained in the Proclamation to issue further instructions for the explanation of the matter to Sir Lewis Ballenden of Achinowle, Justice Clerk of Scotland, under date February 16, who was despatched as an ambassador to Queen Elizabeth. The desire not openly to offend England when negotiations were already afoot for a league between the two countries was apparently uppermost in the Scottish mind. Ballenden's instructions were as follows:

"Gif anything salbe movit to you toward the leveing and transporting of some forces in Ireland be Angus McOneill (quhairof a great pairt have bene reported to be inlandis men of our realme, quha had servit in the Low Countrayis) ye sall in our behalf signifie to the Queene, our dearest suster, how we have gevin ordour for revoking of the said McOneill be a charge under the pane of treasoun, commanding him also to dissolve and disimise his forces and to abstene from all incursionis and infesting of our said dearest susteris dominions or subjectis, and to appeare before us and our Counsale to answer for that his attemptat committed without our knawlege and privitie, quhairof we have caused delyver yow a copy to be shewin to our said dearest suster, quhome ye may assure that in the said McOneillis company there was na

60. Fenton, from Dublin reported his return to Cantyre on March 7 - C.S.P. Ireld, II, 555. Perrott, also from Dublin, noted that he was in Edinburgh on April 24 - Id., II, 561. He appeared before the Scottish Privy Council on April 23 - Reg.Privy Council, Scot. III, 739, and vide infra p.120.
inlandisman, nor that had servit utherquhair, bot a nombre of rascallis and erring vagabondis assemblit within his awne boundis and vicinitie.

"Ye may bauddlie affirme McOneillis repair in Ireland did not proceid of any desire we had to advenge thairby the intertenement of our rebellis in our said dearest susteris realme (as some there do misconstrue it) althocheath thereby we had no small occasions of mislyking be their publict residence permitted there and their more slow and laiter removing from the Bordours then we luked for. Yit certanelie we knew nathing of the said McOneillis repair in Ireland till efter his transporting, nether wald we have permitted or can allowe thairof, and do meane syncerelie to continewe with all integretie in trewe freiddship and a-fauld amitie, of late more straitlie vowed betwene us, as we sall alwayis give and do Fermelie expect to resave effectuall pruif on the pairt of our dearest suster in sig things as ye have to imparte to her concernyng our persoun and crowne."

61. Laing MSS - Edinburgh University Library, I,10. (Note that the original MS was not formerly numbered in the Catalogue, and was therefore difficult to find) The allegation that the "inland men" who landed in Loch Foyle in August, 1584, went to Ireland in the service of Angus of Dunyveg is on the authority of Berrott. K.James is right in denying this, but he does not say anything about the Maclean expedition. We have noted that whatever "inland men" were reported were included in this last. Note also the reference to the Banished Lords. This was the period of the Border dispute between Kerr of Perniehurst and Forster, and the eve of the combination of the two banished Hamiltons with Maxwell for the overthrow of Arran. It might be suggested that Arran, who was antagonistic to the Banished Lords then removed south from Newcastle to Westminster, meditated sending or allowing aid to Ireland - at all events the English court believed so, and it was afterwards made a charge against him (Burton: Hist.Scotland,V,495,503-510; Piteaum: Criminal Trials, I,119: for implication of Arran, vide Wotton to Walsingham, July 30,1585 - C.S.P.,Scotland, VIII,42-43, and below, p.(23). Sir H.Ballenden returned to Scotland in May, 1585. It was on this date that Edw.Wotton arrived in his company - Thomas: Historical Notes, III,1077.
That these protestations of King James were paper motions made to placate Elizabeth must be apparent from what followed. During the early months of 1585 warfare continued in Antrim between Perrott's garrisons and the Scots. O'Neill, who was for the moment playing a loyal part, prevented them from crossing the Bann into Tyrone - what must have been his difficulty with his wife, Agnes Campbell in doing so we can only guess, as her sympathies must necessarily have lain with her sons by the first husband, Angus and Donald MacDonald. This Angus, as we have seen, left Ireland early in March, and took with him such a force that Somhairle Buidhe was considerably weakened. This was the signal for a renewal of the English offensive, and the island of Rathlin was taken by a landing party from one of the Queen's ships. The Route was utterly wasted and both Somhairle Buidhe and Donald Gorm thought it better to follow Angus to Scotland, leaving James, the son of Somhairle, to attend to Irish affairs until the storm should pass. James MacSomhairle fled from place to place with a hundred and twenty men, and offered, evidently on his father's behalf, to give up all claim to the Route if he were granted the Glens by the Queen.

Perrott must already have found reason to congratulate himself on his new success in Ulster when he received a sudden and unexpected reprimand from Queen Elizabeth. The

62. C.S.P., Ireland: Letters of Perrott's officers in Antrim to Perrott, and of members of the Irish Council to Walsingham and Burghley - II, 552-553, 555-556. Hill: Macdonalds of Antrim, 167 seq. The view of the Macdonalds (ClanDonald, II, 550) that Somhairle considered the Route his own and was willing to let Donald hold the Glens is shown to be erroneous by the letter of Bagenall and other officers to Perrot, March 22 - S.P.Eliz.Irel.d.,Vol, cxv, No.37.
explanation of King James had done its work in London by April 14, when Elizabeth wrote to her Lord Deputy in Ireland "a clause in her own hand giving a sharp rebuke to him for believing that so great numbers of Scots had come, and a caution against such rash unadvised journeys (as his Ulster expedition) in future". A letter of Walsingham's on the same date tells of the Queen's hope that King James will recall his subjects from Ireland and her belief that the proposal to give a pension to MacLean of Duart to prevent the Clan-Donald from leaving Scotland would be a needless expense. James and Davison had been believed and Perrott had not. All three had confused the independent project of the Macleans against O'Neil, with the ClanDonald designs on Antrim, and yet there was undoubtedly more truth in Perrott's reports as to the number of Scots who had come to Ireland during the summer of 1584 than the Queen affected to believe. To refuse the suggested allowance to MacLean provided that he harried the ClanDonald - which, indeed, he was doing of his own initiative - was merely in keeping with the Queen's parsimony; to repose confidence either in the power or the good faith of James and entirely to throw over Perrott was nothing less than a blunder.

When Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg appeared eventually before the Scottish Privy Council on April 23, there is no

63. C.S.P., Ireland, II, 560; Queen to Perrott; Walsingham to same. The matter is needlessly involved by the confusing of "MacIlane", meaning MacLean of Duart, with the Earl of Argyll by the editor of the Irish Calendar. See Perrott's defence of himself - C.S.P., Ireland, III, 80 seq. He denies that the Antrim expedition was as costly as was made out.
record of one word having passed between him and the councillors with regard to his recent exploits in Ireland. On the contrary, he declared himself a good subject to the King and was well received, and so far was the council from suspending that threat of treason over his head which had been mentioned to Elizabeth, that the Scottish court took him into its protection and ordered proclamation to be made in the west changing the lieges in that quarter "to ryis, concur and assist the said Angus McDonell, in defence of him, his landis and cuntreyis", because it was found that he had been harrassed by "pretendid quarrellis movid againis him be his aychbouris". These quarrels evidently concerned the long standing dispute over the Rinns of Islay which had taken on a new aspect in the winter of 1584-1585 when Donald Gormeson of Sleat had become involved in a quarrel with MacLean, because the Privy Council on the same day ordered MacLean of Duart, MacDonald of Sleat, and the Mac-eods of Lewis and Harris to appear before them "tuicheing the gude Seull and quieting of the Ilis and Hielandis." Some short time before this momentary settlement in Edinburgh, Angus had entered into negotiations with Perrott to be received as a subject of Queen Elizabeth and to hold the clan territory in Ireland from her. At this point it is

64. Reg.Privy Council,Scot.,III,739. Proclamation issued on April 25 - Steele: Cal.Tudor & Stuart Proclamations,II, ii,244. Lady Agnes Campbell accompanied her son to Edinburgh on this occasion, but there is no record of her business there.
apparent that there were three contestants for Antrim: Angus, Donald Gorm (not to be confused with Donald Gorm of Skeat who succeeded his father, Donald Gormeson, in 1585), and Somhairle. The two last seem to have for a time pooled their claim, the grant of the Glens to Donald having been forfeited by his behaviour. Angus makes his position clear by his promise, if Antrim be granted to him, to exclude all Scots from Ireland except his own followers. Perrott expected Angus and his mother, the Lady Agnes, at Newry to negotiate on August 10, but events had been moving quickly in the Isles since April, and Angus had his hands quite full with the MacLean feud.

Returning from a visit to his kinsman of Sleat, Angus had been so ill-advised as to interfere with MacLean in an effort to settle the feud between Duart and Sleat. Remembering the older Dunyveg feud, however, Sir Lachlan MacLean profited by the presence of Angus in Mull to seize him, and he was held by the MacLeans until his promise had been exacted to allow Duart to take possession of the Rinns of Islay.

Meanwhile, Wotton was keeping in close touch with affairs in Elizabeth's interest in Edinburgh, his chief purposes being to bring about a league with England and to secure the overthrow of Arran. He felt that the latter was implicated in the creation of disturbance in Ireland.

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66. Previous to his hearing in Edinburgh, Angus had put in a claim in Dublin to be a subject of Q. Eliz. in return for his lands in Antrim and to keep out other Scots - C.S.P., Ireld. (Ap1.20) II.560.
68. Gregory: Highlands and Isles, 250; MacDonalds: ClanDonald, II, 554, seq; MacLauchlan: Hist. Highlands, I, 97; Mitonell: Hist. Highlands, 418. Angus was forced to leave with MacLean his son James and his brother Randal as hostages.
and awaited only the proof of it to bring it forward as a charge, along with that of implication in the Ferniehurst affair, against him. In July, Wotton had information that preparations were being made in the Isles to send some seven or eight hundred men to Ireland, and he spoke to the King of the matter. The King readily enough undertook to prohibit the expedition, but whether through unwillingness to do anything definite or through a realisation, since the failure of the orders for the Isles issued in April, of inability, no active steps were taken to prevent the movement. It was really an admission of powerlessness on the King's part to say, as he did, that unless the expedition were abandoned, Maclean should be permitted to waste and burn the ClanDonald country.

Elizabeth was too anxious to have Arran overthrown to let slip any chance of a charge against him, and in August Wotton was instructed to include the following in the indictment being prepared:

(1) receiving into his house at Kinneil "certen of hir evill affectid subjectes of Ireland and ... conveyng...them over into Fraunce" - a certain bishop of the O'Neills, for one, with whom Arran was suspected of having sent letters to the Duke of Guise;

(2) plotting with Angus MacDonald and Somhairle Buidhe to the end that aid be sent to the rebels in Ireland; and

generally acting in such a fashion that the Highlanders bore themselves "greatly upon his countenance and credit."

As Elizabeth exerted all her resources of diplomacy to dislodge Arran, it is not to be supposed that she enquired too closely into any information which came to her ears and which might be used against him. These unsupported statements of hers do not, therefore, necessarily condemn the successor to the old Hamilton title to the scheme of intrigue which they suggest, but it must be admitted that his own subsequent actions go far to support the suspicion in which he must be held of complicity in the affairs of the Isles to the disadvantage of England.

In April King James wrote to Perrott complaining of some piracies on Scottish shipping in Irish waters, and in June Perrott, being then at Dungannon in O'Neil's territory, took occasion to send Captain Nicholas Dawtry, late Seneschal of Clandeboye, to Scotland with a reply.


71. With the return of the banished Lords and their seizure of power at Stirling on Nov. 4, 1585, Arran, who had been confined within the bounds of Kinniel, fled to the Highlands - Burton: Hist. Scot, V, 510-512. He was for some time in Bute and in Cantyre with the MacDonals, and in the late Spring of 1586 he was in Ireland. He returned thence to Scotland, his movements being consistently watched by the English ambassador in that country - C.S.P., Scotland, VIII, 160, 232, 308, 311, 316, 364, 615, 627. MacGeoghegan (vide ante, p. 401) seems to have been mixed up in the Arran intrigue and to have turned his coat to supply information to the English in 1586 - C.S.P., Scot. (Thorpe), I, 498-9, 513.

72. In the list of orders made out during the Viceroyalty of Perrott (catalogued under July 31, 1586 - C.S.P., Ireld, III, 110) is the following: "Item - an order for the sending of Captain Dawtry to the King of Scots, with answer of his Highness' letter, in which service he was allowed 20s. sterling per diem, and 50 l. impress, 8th June, 1585. The King of Scots' letter, bearing date the 24th April, 1585. The answer to the same, bearing date 6th June, 1585." Neither of these letters can be traced.
was not to restrict himself to representations concerning piracy, however - although he was to make a counter-claim on behalf of some Irish merchants spoiled by the Scots; as well as this he was to make open complaint to King James concerning the aid from the Isles received by the Irish and to conduct some little secret service work on his own. He seems to have been chosen as a man who had had some earlier connections with Scotland and he was apparently accredited to Wotton. To this latter he reported on August 14th, that, the King's promise to interfere notwithstanding, one thousand five hundred Islanders had gone to Ireland where they were very successful against the English garrisons in Antrim. He also secured a reply from the King to Perrott, under date August 8th. from St. Andrews. Having referred to the matter of the piracies, James said that Angus MacDonald and his brother - perhaps Randal - Somhairle Buidhe's brother and his sons and their followers should be prohibited under the pain of treason from making incursions into Ireland. If they attempted the contrary, Maclean should be authorised to attack them, but at the same time Perrott should lend an ear to their just demands.

73. King James to Perrott - C.S.P., Carew, II, 404. Dawtry to Wotton - Hamilton Papers, II, 575. Dawtry appears in 1582 and 1583 as an English officer in the Clandeboye district - C.S.P., Ireland, II, 340, 341, 375, 433. For his surrender of the Seneschalship of Clandeboye, vide Planta, Eliz., Ireld., 4207 and 4976. In April, 1584 he supplied information from Carrickfergus to Lord Justice Wallop regarding the internal politics of Scotland, including a list of the Scottish nobility with an indication of the political bias of each (C.S.P., Ireld., II, 507-508). We have already seen that he was mixed up in the scheme to assassinate Somhairle MacDon-ald (ante, p. 113). On July 4, 1485, we find mention of a deputy appointed to execute the office of Seneschal in Clandeboye during Dawtry's absence in Scotland (Id. II, 571). On August 30 his name appears in a list of Irish suitors to whom sums of money are to be paid (Id., II, 577), and on Sept. 9, he was sent by Wallop to Walsingham with a re-commendation that he receive recompense for "his charge-able journey to the King of Scots". (Id., II, 579) He must have returned from Scotland immediately after his report to Wotton. See also Cox: Hibernia Anglicana, 386.
Wotton, acting on Dawtry's information, and with the text of the intended Sco-English league, of which he was in possession since July 31st., in view, again approached King James. The force to which Dawtry referred was that under Somhairle Buidhe's son which had come ashore in Claneboye in July, and as the league, if ratified, provided that James should prohibit any of his subjects from going to Ireland or, if they went, denounce them as rebels upon being informed of their going, Wotton was thus provided with an opportunity of testing the sincerity of James. It might be remarked that, since James had done nothing in July to prevent the expedition, it was useless to expect anything from him now that the Scots had gone to Ireland, but in so far as the intended league was concerned the King satisfied Wotton, for he promised to write to the MacDonalds commanding them to return and to proceed against them according to the draft articles if they did not do so. The significant point in the matter is not, however, any doubt of the King's sincerity, but the expression by Wotton, and for the first time of a doubt in his ability - "Thoughse I thincke", he wrote to Walsingham, "the Kinges meanyng to be good, yet I cannot promise unto your honour that his letter will woorke the desired effect. For these Highlanders (as farre as I can see) care but little for the king, and will obeye him at their owne pleasure." This being so, Wotton proposed the adoption

74. Wallop to Burghley - C.S.P., Ireld.II,574. Wallop mentions only 400 Scots; Dawtrie's figure was 1,500.
75. The eighth article of the intended league according to the draft of July 31 - C.S.P., Scotland, VII, 44.
of the scheme of employing MacLean against the ClanDonald which the Queen had already considered needless. Referring to the Islay feud which had broken out again, as we have seen, at this time, Wotton said "I am of opinion, that yr her majestie wolde bestowe a yerelie pension of one hundred or two hundred pounds upon Mak clan, yt wold save her 4000 or 5000 pounds everye yere in her Irish expences, - for this Makolan (being a great lorde in the Highelandes) and having a deedily feude against Agnus (Angus MacDonald), upon whom hee borderethe, were hee her majesties pensioner, wolde be redye at all tymes, whansoever eyther Agnus or Surleboy sholde sterte into Irelande, to spoyle and burne their countryes." There is no proof, however, for the suggestion of the Macdonald historians that MacLean of Duart may have received English money at this time, and although the plan of employing him was not lost sight of, all activities of the English in Scotland were made subsidiary to securing acceptance of the league. If this were ratified, there would be an open clause governing Highland relations with Ireland which James must at least make a show of enforcing. If he did not, or could not, then MacLean might, with the stimulus of an English pension, be made to take upon himself the enforcing of it - his motion coming, after the inimitable manner of Elizabethan diplomacy in Scotland "as from himself."

76. Wotton to Walsingham: Hamilton Papers, II, 582; C.S.P., Scotland, VIII, 79. Wotton was then in Dumbarton (Aug. 22) and apparently in touch with Highland affairs. In the C.S.P. Scot, Somhairle Buidhe or "Sor le boy" as Wotton calls him, is printed "Selby", causing confusion with Sir John Selby, Deputy Warden of the March.
The Scottish offensive in Antrim which King James had failed to avert gathered force during the summer of 1585. Angus of Dunyveg being employed by the Maclean feud, Somhairle seems to have had matters to himself in Ireland where he soon won back what he had lost to Perrott. The manner in which he could retreat at will, and with forces practically intact, to Cantyre gave him a great advantage, and his repeated raids into Antrim laid so great a strain upon the resources of the English administration that, when he sued to hold the Glens of the Queen in August, it was felt that it might be advantag-eous to allow him to hold the territory of which it was impossible in reality to deprive him. In September, and again in October, Wotton besought Walsingham to give heed to his advice regarding Maclean. The latter made a direct offer to him to serve the Queen either in Scotland or in Ireland, saying that he could do much in Tyrone through his relations, the sons of Sean O'Neill, but to all Walsingham as yet turned

77. Secretary Fenton to Burghley, C.S.P., Ireland, II, 377; Bagwell: Tudors, III, 146. In the Autumn of this year there was an engagement in Inishowen between a band of Scots under Alexander, the son of Somhairle Buidhe, and an English and Irish force under Capt. Merriman and Hugh Dubh O'Donnell. Alexander was killed in a deceitful manner and two brothers of Somhairle were also slain - Cox: Hibernia Anglicana, 386; Gregory: Isle, 226; U.J.A., V. 142.
In November the Banished Lords, who had joined forces with the two Hamiltons and Maxwell, got access to James, Arran fled to the Highlands, and the intrigue of Elizabeth bore fruit in her favour.

At this point the Scots, whose activities in Ireland during the past few years had been confined to Ulster, found another arena for their services in Connacht. The Munster rebellion, which had dragged on in a series of isolated actions since 1581, was brought to an end in 1583, by the betrayal and capture of the Earl of Desmond in Kerry. For a time Ireland was in a state of uneasy quietness, and in Connacht Malbie was able to report on the altered system as follows: "If any principal lord or chief of a country be ill dealt withal by his own freeholders and such as dwell under him, where the said lords were wont for suppressing such to entertain Scots and Æræne and galloglas, they call to me for her Majesty's forces. At such times they give the soldiers their victuals gratis." Bingham, Malbie's successor, set about consolidating the change to English order in what is known as the Composition of Connacht in pursuance of a commission issued to him in July, 1585. In-

78. Wotton to Walsingham, Sept. 31, and Oct. 7 - C.S.P.Scotland, VIII, 116, 122. Wotton says that MacLean has at his disposal 2,500 Highlanders. An anonymous writer (probably Bagenall) on the state of Ulster in 1586 urges the employment of MacLean in a similar fashion: "The people which most annoy Ulster from Scotland are the Clandonells, who are ever in continual wars with another sept of the people of the Isles, named Macalanes; and if on Macian her Majesty would bestow some convenient pension, he will (I think) undertake to keep the Clandonells so continually occupied as they shall be able to send none of their people to disturb her Highness' subjects in Ulster" - C.S.P., Carew, II, 437-439.

79. Burton: Hist.Scot.V, 508-512. The news of this counter-revolution reached Ulster and was communicated from Down by Bagenall to Perrott on Nov. 3. On the day following the Lords seized the King at Stirling (C.S.P.Ireland, II, 585.)

80. C.S.P., Carew, II, 364.
dentures were entered into with the chieftains whereby all irregular exactions which were part of the Gaelic system, as well as the cess which was due for the Government forces when billeted, were compounded for and embodied in an annual revenue to the crown. The chieftains thus became, in fact, Government rent collectors, and although County Galway was largely quiet under the new Earl of Clanricarde, the Burke septs of Mayo in whose minds "did stick the abolishing and taking away their MacWilliam, with their sulde irish customs and cuttings" proved recalcitrant. The violent conduct of Bingham, who changed the work of the commissioners in many places into a series of lootings and burnings, was not calculated to smooth out difficulties, and in September 1585 a sept of the Mayo Burkes was in open rebellion in the Loci Mask area. Considering that it was "vaie to speake of planting lawes, and plotting pollicie, till (the Irish) be altogether subdued," Bingham went against the Burkes, who communicated with the Scots in Ulster with a view to obtaining aid. The rebels at first retired into Hag's Castle in

81 Sir Henry Dozwra, quoted U.J.A., V,304. For the Composi-
tion see: C.S.P. Ireland, II, 582-583; O'Flaherty: Iar-
Connacht, where the results are tabulated (The report of
the Commissioners, Co.Clarke portion, was filed in the Rolls
Office, Dublin - Misc.23 - but unfortunately destroyed in
the fire during the warfare in Dublin in 1922. The only
version now extant seems to be that in the P.R.O., London
mentioned above); O'Conors of Connacht,194; Hayden and
82 O'Rorke: D'Alton,loc.cit; Flowden: Hist.Review of State of
Ireland, I,81-82; O'Donovan in O'Conors of Connacht, loc.cit;
Haverty: Hist.Irel., 433-436; MacGeoghegan: Hist.Irel.,
483; O'Sullivan: Hist.Catholics in Irel., cap.21- all con-
sider Bingham to have been responsible for the rebellion.
Knox: Hist.Mayo (passim) absolves him, as does the con-
temporary Dozwra: Relation (Miscellany of Celtic Society,
1849) There is a further defence by Knox in Vols IV and V
of Journal of Galway Archaeological Socy.
83 Spencer: View of the State of Irel., 19.
Loch Mask but were compelled to abandon the place and were
hotly pursued by Bingham until Perrott interfered and
ordered a truce that the reason for the strife could be
examined into. During the period of truce, two further Burke
emissaries were dispatched to Ulster for the Scots. By July,
1586 Perrott found it impossible to come to terms with the
Burkes and hostilities were recommenced, the country soon
being swept clear of rebels except for a small band which
held out near Castlebar.

At this juncture the Connaught emissaries got in touch
with Donald Gorm MacDonald, who seems to have abandoned his
claim in Antrim, and who had landed in Inishowen in the late
summer of 1586. With Donald were Alexander and another of
his brothers and Gilleasbuig MacDowell, who is described as
being of the House of Argyll. Extensive promises of land
upon which to settle in Connaught - over and above the usual
mercenary entertainment - having been made to the Scots,
and the position of the English in the province having been

85. C.S.P., Ireld., III, 54; C.S.P., Carew, II, 429-434; A.F.M.,
1586; Knox: Hist. Mayo, 207; Docwra: Relation; MacGeoghegan:
Hist. Ireld., 462.
86. A.F.M., 1586; C.S.P., Ireld., III, 154. There seems to be no
reason for the statement (U.J.A., VII, 247 seq.) that Donald
took to mercenary soldiering because the English Government
was unable to help him to dispossess Somhairle in the Glens -
rather had he himself fallen foul of the Government there.
Neither can it be said that he was the "rightful heir" to
the Glens as it cannot be proved that James, his father,
made any division of his property between his sons at his
death in 1565. Angus, if anybody, as heir in Scotland,
was heir in Ireland also.
represented as weak by reason of the withdrawal of soldiers to the Low Countries, Donald Gorm agreed to go southward to the aid of the Burkes. After some skirmishing in Maguire's territory the Scots reached the Erne where they remained for some time awaiting developments. Their sudden incursion caused considerable excitement in Dublin which, however, seems to have been allayed for a time by the erroneous belief of Wallop, the Treasurer of the Council, that no fresh force of Scots had arrived in Ireland, and that, even if all those at the time, in Ulster were to combine, they would not amount to more than six hundred weaponed men, and those "but bare-tailed beggars."

On August 28th or 29th Bingham moved to Sligo with a force and wrote to Donald asking why it was that he sought to enter Connaught. He received the following reply:

"This is the answer of James his sons to the Governor of Connaught, that they are come over the Erne with a great number of men, being drawn in by the Clanwilliams and the Clandonnels, who are their cousins, and that Shane Entleve, son to M'William, and Edmond Kykraghe, son to Davie Bane, are with them, to draw them to M'William's country, and they shall give them entertainment and the spoil of Connaught. And James his sons have no other shift, but to take an enterprise upon themselves for such as will give them...

87. C.S.P., Ireland, III, 139, 146.
88. Id., III, 144 - Wallop to Walsingham, who says also that Perrott wanted to go against them but was dissuaded by Cecil.

DRAWN FROM A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE ORIGINAL MAP MADE IN 1586 BY JAMES GRAPTON. PHOTO. BY MCLEOD MONGER & MARCHANT, LONDON; DRAWING BY G.A. HAYES-MCCOY, EDIN. 1935.

BINGHAM'S MARCH AND COUNTER-MARCH ARE SHOWN:
THE MARCH OF THE SCOTS:

THE ORIGINAL MAP IS IRISH MAPS VOL. I, NO. 4, RECORD OFFICE, LONDON.

MAP NO. 3. FACING PAGE 133.

AND SEE APPENDIX NUMBER NINE.
most, as all other soldiers in the world do use. And whosoever in Connaght shall forbid or let them thereof, they will not take it at their hands, except they be stronger than they, or of greater power. This is sufficient.

"I, Donell Gorme"

"I, Alexander Carragh."

The issue having been thus clearly stated, Bingham commenced manoeuvring to draw the Scots on to ground suitable for an engagement. Donald, however, was not to be outwitted, and until September 14 the opposing forces moved back and forward in east Sligo, the Scots holding tenaciously to the rough ground upon which Bingham could not attack them. On this date Donald made a surprise move and got past Bingham into the Ox Mountains in West Sligo. Outwitted so far, Bingham now moved southwards and the Scots, thinking that he had left that area, encamped at Ardnarea on the Moy, where, doubling back by forced marches, the Governor fell upon them suddenly on September 22 and massacred practically the entire force.

90. Details of the manoeuvres and massacre are available in Doéwra: Relation. See also C.S., III, 150, 161, 165, 179, 255; A.F.M., 1586; D'Alton: Hist. Ireld, III, 113. Is in error in stating that the attack at Ardnarea took place at 3 a.m. on the 22nd. See O'Donovan in O'Conors of Connaught, 199. The names of the leaders of the Scots and the numbers of the slain are given as follows: S.P., Ireld. Eliz. vol. No. 18. "The names of the captains of Scots and their several companies slain at the battle of Ardary, the 23 of Sept., 1586. "Of the sept of the Clandonells, Imprimis, Donnell Gorme son to James M'Donnell, had Continued
No reference to this massacre occurs in any of the Scottish contemporary accounts, but, as the greatest single

under his own leading. ............... 300
Alexander Carragh, his brother. .... 400
Of the house of Argyile,
Gillaspeik M'Dowell. ................. 400
The Clanellestrans. .................. 300
The Clanvees. ......................... 300
Alexander M'Hugh Galt. .............. 100
M'MickHugh Duff. .................... 100
Neil Oge M'Evee. ..................... 100
Alexander M'Rancollie Boy. .......... 50
Morrough Ne Marte, a Munster Man. 100
See of the Gwirkins out of Gallen in Mayo. ......... 30
Shane M'Garrot, my Lord of Kildare's base brother. ....... 30

And four score horsemen, some of O'Cahan's men, some of O'Neill's, some of Sir Owen M'Towell's, all which horsemen were gone before the overthrow, saving a forty, of which a score escaped. ......................... 40
And in gross account according to their divisions, under Donnell Gorme's leading, 1,300; and under Alex.Carragh's leading, 1,000. Besides women, boys, churls and children, which could not be so few as so many more and upwards."
This requires some explanation. Gilleasbuig MacDowell is not a member of the Clan Dowell, or MacDougals (a Clan Donald clan) but Gilleasbuig, the son of Dowell, or Dougal (A.F.M., 1586) and specifically a Campbell. The Clanellestrans are, of course, the MacAllisters of Loup. Unless the Clanvees are the same as the clan of Neil Oge Mac Evee, later mentioned, it would be difficult to place them. MacEvee is several times mentioned in the State Papers - (e.g., C.S.P., Ireld., II,156. cf. MacFie of Colonsay? - Irish Gaelic, MacDhubhshichte). MacMick Hugh Duff is simply Mac Mhic Aodha Dubh. If Mac Aodha is the clan name, and Aodha, or Hugh, not merely the personal name of this man's grandfather, then he was of the MacKays, a West Highland clan which followed the ClanDonald. It is a disputable point if these are the same as the Siol Morgain, or Sutherland MacKays. MacAodha is Anglicized variously as MacKay, Mackie, MacCoy, MacHugh. Morrough na Mart, the Gwirkins, the horsemen and the rest were not Scots at all, but perhaps some of the "haughty robbers" whom the Four Masters (sub anno,1586) record as having flocked to the Scottish camp when Donald first landed in Inishowen. They were very likely broken men from the

(Continued......}
slaught of Scots in Ireland since the days of Edward
Bruce's overthrow at Faugdart, it must have been the cause
of much lamentation and anxiety in the Isles. It certainly
put a stop to the interference of Scottish mercenaries in
what was for them the unlucky province of Connacht for several

91 (continued)

south (O'Neil mentioned, however, is one of Sean O'Neil's
sons and the other leaders of horse are also Ulster men)
and in all probability a band of Galloglaigh, very likely
MacSweenies, which fled northward after the break-up of
the Desmond rebellion. MacGeoghegan (Hist. Ireld., 491)
mencions a Morrough na Mart from Munster as having been
in the service of O'Rourke of Breaffine with 200 MacSweenies.
Who the "Gwirkins" were, it is difficult to say: Gallen is
the territory at the bend of the Moy above Ardnaarea. In
November, 1590, a pardon was issued to Teige o Togher M'C
Qurekan in Co. Mayo - Fiants, Eliz., Ir. 5495. Perhaps Gwirkin
is really M'Curekan. Even then it is hard to place, but
it may be MacGuickian, MacGuigan or varts., in Gaelic - Mag
Eochaidehin (spoken language) or MaGualain: MaGuirk or
MacGuirk, Gaelic - MacGuirc, or (?) MacDhuarcain; or per-
haps Quirk, Gaelic - O'Cuirc. (Vide Wolfe: Shloinnite Gaedheal
is Gall - Irish Surnames - under These). cf. Note 94 below.
At the sessions in Galway in the December following the
massacre "Edmond Og MacSheehy and eight soldiers of the
Geraldines along with him were put to death, information
having been given against them that they had been along
with those Scots who were slain at Ardnaarea." (A.F.M.,
1586). These were of the Clan Sheehy galloglaigh of Des-
mond.

91. There is an incidental reference to the massacre in a
letter of Davison's to Burghley on Oct. 8, 1586 (G.S.P.,
Scott., IX, 92) but Davison was at this time in Windsor. The
Macdonalds (Clan Donald, IX, 551-552) say that the negotia-
tions with Angus of Dunveg for a grant of the Glens were
carried a step further "probably after Donald Gorme's death".
The indenture with Angus to which they refer, however, was
entered into on May 16, 1586; Donald was not killed until
Sept. 22 of the same year. This indenture, as an indication
of positive failure in the Glens, may have decided Donald
to take to the mercenary profession, but indeed all the
sons and brothers of James, except perhaps Angus and Som-
hairle, were engaged at one time or other in the mercenary
service. There is a further reference to Colla as a mer-
cenary in the MS quoted in Hill: Macdonnells of Antrim, 52-
85. On May 16, 1586, the date of the indenture with Angus,
there is a record of a pardon granted to "Dowell gorme
M'Connell, Alexander M'Connell, and Randall M'Ynesse,
gentlemen in Co. Antrim" (Fiants, Eliz., 4855) which
neither Hill nor the Macdonalds mention. There is no
reason to suppose that the first two were any other than
the leaders at Ardnaarea. For the massacre see also Stowe:
Chronicle of England, 720-727 - who seems to follow Docwra's account
closely reflecting some errors which seem to have originated
with Docwra.
years and bore out the hope expressed by Sir Luca Dillon when he wrote to Burghley on the day after the massacre, saying "I doubt not but by this happy overthrow of the Scots, that nation will be less willing to come into those parts and the bad affected of this nation the less confident in their own bad actions and in the force of the Scots."

The year 1586 was one of general settlements on paper, both in Scotland and Ireland, which gave some momentary hope for a settlement of the mercenary inroads and of the ClanDonald activities in Antrim in the English favour. In May an indenture whereby Angus MacDonald undertook to hold what he claimed in Antrim from the Queen was made out in terms earlier mooted, and in June in acknowledgment of the practical usurpation which he had by this time consummated, Somhairle MacDonald got all the territory between the Bush and the Bann. The latter was received as an Irish citizen and given very favourable terms. "So ended," says Hill, "Sorty's long and stormy controversy with the State."

92. C.S.P., Ireland, III, 157-158.
93. Macdonalds: ClanDonald, II, 551-552 where the document is quoted from C.S.P., Carew.
94. Hill: Macdonells of Antrim, 181. On Feb 22 of the preceding year Perrott and the Council had presented him with a velvet mantle adorned with gold lace (Cox: Hibernia Anglicana, I, 409). For the terms of the grant of the Glens see Plants, Eliz., 4893 and 4894. He was to hold in tail male by the service of two knights' fees and among the conditions incident were: that neither he or his followers serve any foreign prince; that he endeavour to prevent any Scot disturbing the peace; and that he book the names of his followers and deliver a list to the Queen's marshal. On June 20 pardons were issued to his followers. A list of these is interesting from the genealogical viewpoint: Besides Somhairle and James, his son, they are -

(Continued...)
The Scottish Estates having authorised the conclusion of a league of amity with England, Queen Elizabeth issued instructions to commissioners to treat with the Scots at Berwick in June. The draft articles of 1585 were debated, and among the objections of the Scots was one to the item concerning Scottish intercourse with Ireland—"with the seventh also they found fault, for they said that divers of Scotland had land in Ireland, and had been possessed these 300 years, and whereas they have been put out by force, they could not be restored by justice and are now forbidden to enter by force." Informed of this by Randolph, the Queen, being aware also of the negotiations being carried

94 (Continued)

Randall m'Owen Arenaghe (probably "of Arran")
Eanes rowe m'Mick Allester (a MacAllister)
Dowill oge M'TEvie (vide Note p.134 ante)
Eanes m'TEvie.
Sawreluy m'Eanes,
Gillesspick M'Caye (MacKay - p.134 ante)
John duf M'Alexandre (probably a MacAllister)
Donnagh M'Morye,
Donnell sallagh M'Evrahowne (Mac an Buireitheamhan - anglicized Judge?)

Donnagh M'Caye,
Eanes M'Randall M'Alexandre,
Alexander duf M'Alexandre,
Colla m'Tirlagh M'Alexandre,
Henry Callagh m'Gilduff m'Rorie Callagh,
Redmon O Caham m'Neyl m'Rorie (an Irishman)
Owen O Caham m'Neil m'Rorie. (do.)
Donnagh m'Morice O Caham, (do.)
Rorie Callagh O Harre, chief of his name (do. - O'Hara)
Phelim m'Gillegain m'Mahown M'Gillegain,
Rorie m'Gillegain m'Mahown (MacMahon is a galloglaigh clan)
Donell m'Gillecollo M'Myline (MacMillan?)
Eanes m'Alexander carragh M'Rannell,
Cormock O Harre, (O'Hara)
Cale O Harre, (do.)
Fealim duf m'Owen carragh,
Cone M'Coine deau (deadaws) of Ardmoyle,
Teig oge o Coine,
Donell m'Ferdorche M'Allaster,
Molmorry O Haggart,

Wm.M'Gwigen (Mac Gúigean, mod. Ulster name) - Vide ante, Note,90.

(Continued....
on in Ireland with Angus and Somhairle MacDonald, could afford a direct reply. The point that Elizabeth had the Scottish treaty in view in bringing about a reconciliation in Antrim with the MacDonalds has been lost sight of by the clan historians, yet such must appear to have been the case, as Anglo-Scottish diplomacy for many months had hinged upon the league which James and the restored Lords thought desirable, but which England considered as imperative.

On July 4, Elizabeth replied to Randolph as follows:

"In the seventh article, we marvel it is found for a fault that a Prince should prohibit his subjects from invading his confederate’s country. This matter has been moved to the King, as you, Thomas Randolph, do know, and never been refused by him.

"Whereas it is said that divers of Scotland have been possessed of land in Ireland these 300 years, and have been put out by force, it is well known by what title they pretend, and why they have been put out, who with force have invaded the realm and maintained rebellion in most parts of Ireland, even where they pretended no title.

"It is well known also that justice was never denied

94 (Continued)
Randall m'Owen Earenagh (i.e., "the Irishman")
Donogh O Hogan,
Conor m'James M'Henry (Fiants, Eliz., 4897)
Note the proportion of names evidently Irish, and, among the Scots, the number of MacAllisters. In the grant were included the territories of Munerie, or Mowbray, and Carey where the MacAllisters were recorded as numerous in 1568. C.S.P., Ireld., I, 363). Vide MacDonalds: ClanDonald, II, 27, seq. III, 184 seq. For Munerie and Carey families vide Hill: Antaím, 147. 95. That this was true only in theory Elizabeth knew as well as Randolph. Acta Parl. Scot., III, 381; C.S.P., Scot., VIII, 414-415. For the League vide also Lang: Hist. Scot., II, 320-321; Hume Brown: Hist. Scot., II, 199-200.
them when they asked it, as two at this very time in Ireland have proof of, in that one of them, Angus MacConnell, had that which he demanded granted to him by our deputy, and the other, Sorleboy his uncle, was reasonably well used, though his title was no other than an assign to his nephew Angus."

This diplomatic statement of facts by the Queen appears to have silenced the Scottish argument on this head, and the article concerning invasion of Ireland by the Islesmen and Highlanders was finally included in the treaty in the terms in which it had been drafted in 1585.

96. Queen to Randolph - C.S.P. Scotland, VIII, 503. This letter shows that the Queen was in possession of all the facts (although she may not yet have heard of the actual grant to Somhairle of June 16) including the connection between the MacDonalds in Antrim and the Scottish mercenary forces elsewhere in Ireland.

97. For the final draft vide Rymer: Foedera, xv, 804 - already quoted, ante p. 1, cf. this with the draft of July, 1585 (C.S.P. Scot. VIII, 44) The eighth article of the draft becomes the seventh of the treaty. The only material difference is that, in the wording, for "the subjects of Argyll" is substituted "of the district of Argyll and places in the Isles adjacent to that district."
CHAPTER FIVE:


(1586 - 1594.)
CHAPTER FIVE:


(1586-1594)

"...the Scot, the known firebrand and nurse of rebellion through all parts of the kingdom...never took footing here, but being called in by some great man, either for his own defence or plague to his next bordering neighbour."

- Sir Henry Bagenall, 1592.

§ I.

Towards the end of the year 1586 we are made witnesses to the extraordinary spectacle of the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Sir John Perrott, at open feud with Sir Richard Bingham, the Governor of Connacht - each party seeking to show that he is the more loyal to the Queen by reason of the fact that he has killed more Scots than his adversary. The animosity which existed between Perrott and Bingham was a deep-seated one, but it is of interest from the point of view to notice their own respective claims to prominence because, on the one side, Perrott had chastised the Scots in Antrim in 1585, and, on the other, because
Bingham had massacred them at Ardnarea in September, 1586. Again, in December when Bingham suspected that Perrott was scoring a point over him in the eyes of the Queen by reminding her that it was he (Perrott) who had been responsible for the death of Alexander Mac Somhairle, the jealous Governor of Connaught wrote forthwith to Burghley saying that while Perrott could only claim to have killed the son of Somhairle Buidhe he had killed Donald Gorm and Alexander Carragh MacDonald, and that it was well known "that Sorley Boy and his son were but followers of James MacDonnell's sons, and men of a far meaner quality."

Apart from this insight into the respective standing of the sons of James and Somhairle MacDonald and the general view we are afforded of the importance of the Scots in Irish affairs, however, the feud has brought to light one other point of considerable importance. Referring to the Ardnarea massacre Bingham says almost incidentally, that the Scots were induced to come to Mayo on that occasion "under pretence to be repossessed of their lands which their cousins the Clandonnells (i.e., the ClanDonald Galloglaigh of Mayo) possessed." It is quite clear from this statement that the long settled branches of the ClanDonald in Ireland were in active and sympathetic communication with the clan in Scotland at this period.

1 C.S.P., Ireland, III, 226. In reality Alexander M'Somhairle was wounded by Captain Merryman, and afterwards beheaded by a soldier, but Perrott could claim to have posted Merryman in Ulster. See Cox: Hib. Anglic., I, 386.
2 Notes of Bingham's services - C.S.P. Ir., III, 242. The term "cousins" is in all probability imitated by him from the MacDonalde's letter - vide, p. 133 ante. cf. C.S.P., Ireland, IV, 84-86.
The Mayo ClanDonald leaders were men who had held land in Connacht for some time in return for hereditary military service; Donald Gorm and his brother were mercenary soldiers fighting for their own ends, and at the same time ready to help their "cousins", now that the position of the latter was endangered by the English attack on the Gaelic system. The one representative of the Galloglaigh Scots; the other of the 16th century Scottish mercenaries whom we have distinguished by the name "new Scots". 

§ II.

In July, 1586, while the deliberations between the representatives of Scotland and England were still proceeding at Berwick, Lachlan MacLean of Duart came south to Islay to take possession of the Rinns in accordance with the forced surrender of Angus of Dunyveg in the preceding year. In view of MacLean's treachery to the MacDonald leader in 1585, it is rather difficult to account for Lachlan's short-sightedness in allowing Angus to turn the tables on him on this occasion. In response to an invitation from Angus, MacLean while in Islay went to visit him at his house of Mullintrea, and Angus very naturally profited by his presence to make a prisoner of him. Only on the intervention of King James was MacLean liberated. He had so far failed to possess himself of the Rinns of Islay, and in all particulars the MacLean - MacDonald feud remained unsettled. An internal rift

3. That the movement to displace the galloglaigh, as an anomaly in the new English system, was taking place at his period not alone in Connacht but also in Munster is shown by the petition of the Munster undertakers under date Jan 29th, 1587. These worthies request that "all kerne and galloglas be removed out of Munster, other than such as shall give themselves to manure the ground, or such a competent number to attend the Irish lords, as their masters will give assurance for their good behaviour." (C.S.P. Ireld., III,249)

in the affairs of the Clan MacLean was disclosed at this juncture in the activities of Allan MacLean, a kinsman of Duart, who made it clear that he was willing to avail of the hostilities with Dunyveg to displace his own chieftain and set himself up as MacLean. The fact that the Earl of Argyll was a minor also furthered the disturbance in the Isles, as rifts were beginning to appear in the Campbell bloc between the rival claimants for the guardianship of young Archibald, and the Edinburgh Government, finding the Campbell influence unequal to the task of maintaining order, was forced to make another effort to legislate for the Isles by direct proclamation. The Act of Parliament known as the General Band was passed in 1587 in an effort to secure peace in the Highlands by making the various chieftains responsible for their acts and those of their followers, and King James caused a proclamation to be issued ordering Angus to place the hostages which he had extracted from MacLean in the hands of the Government. The deception of both parties to the feud, however, so inflamed the MacDonald and MacLean passions that quietness was restored only for a short period.

5. On March 23, 1586 a bond of friendship was entered into between Duart and the guardians of the Earl of Argyll, the latter, in his minority, not being competent to subscribe to such an instrument - Bands of Manrent, Breadalbane Papers: Black Book of Taymouth, 240, No. 101. MacLauchlan (Hist. Highlands, p. 99) neglects the fact that Argyll was a minor.

6. Aeta. Parl. Scot. III, 427-521; for the Band, vide Collect. de Rebus Albaniciis, 37-38; Reg. Privy Council Scot., IV, 781-782. Act of Privy Council, ApI. 16, 1587 (Reg. P.C. Scot. IV, 159-160) calling upon Angus to liberate MacLean and to deliver his hostages to the keeping of Argyll, and ordering all parties to the feud to keep the peace. The Royal herald was interrupted in his mission of proclaiming this to Angus, and the Campbells could do no more than use their influence with Angus to liberate MacLean (MacLauchlan p. 99); Gregory: Isles, 237, Angus, having failed to liberate the hostages, was outlawed, but MacLean, having declared himself a loyal subject, was received into favour - Reg. Privy Seal Scot.
How closely the affairs of Ireland and the Isles were knitted is shown by what followed. In Ulster Turlough Luineach O'Neil had at this time a rival in the person of Hugh O'Neil, the former Baron of Dungannon, now Earl of Tyrone and the Queen's known nominee to the succession to the chief-tainship of the Clan Neil. A settlement had been effected between the two whereby Turlough was to possess north Tyrone and the Earl the south, but this seeming harmony was disturbed by the ambitions designs of the Earl himself, by the consistent policy of the Lady Agnes Campbell of seeking the aggrandisement of her sons by the first marriage, and by the intrigue of the sons of Sean O'Neil to overturn both Turlough and the Earl."

It is clear that Angus MacDonald was in Ireland at some time in 1587 - probably in the summer, and certainly after the date of the Privy Council Proclamation of April - although his particular purpose in going there remains obscure. MacLean at once took advantage of his absence to renew the struggle in the Isles and, disregarding the danger to his hostages which MacDonald still held, he wasted a great part of Islay. When Angus returned he retaliated by invading Mull and Tiree. In August the Lady Agnes crossed to Scotland and exerted herself to quell the disturbance, and

8. Dugald Mitchell, who mentions his visit (Hist. Highlands & Gaelic Scotld., p. 416) throws no light on the matter (Nor does Gregory - p. 235) The Irish records are silent on the point. Mitchell seems to indicate that Angus made this visit before the enactment of April, but this cannot be so, as MacLean was his prisoner in April and had been released before Angus went to Ireland (Vide, Reg. Privy Council, ut. sup.)
Lord Deputy Perrott, who reported this matter, commented upon it, with a fine sincerity of purpose but complete lack of knowledge of the facts, as showing in some way best known to himself that King James had commanded Angus to bring over forces to disturb Ireland. How far Agnes was responsible for the momentary lull which ensued we do not know, but at all events MacLean remained quiet until the following year.

Although the Earl of Tyrone was in favour with the Dublin administration at this time, there is strong reason to believe that he, as well as the Lady Agnes, was involved in the Island warfare in pursuit of his own ends. He was soon to take the place of Turlough Luineach as the chief employer of Scottish mercenaries in Ulster, and as he must already have been planning rebellion in 1587, we can well see his advantage in ingratiating himself with the MacDonals. Again, he was naturally hostile to the MacLeans as the continued champions of his rivals, the sons of Sean O'Neil. Proof of his actual implication in the MacLean-MacDonald feud rests largely upon the interpretation of a name in a contemporary State Paper. On August 9, 1587, Perrott conveyed to Walsingham his suspicions of the Earl, saying that he could not but find fault with him "that he hath sent any of Her Majesty's subjects into Scotland, or that he should make

9. L.Deputy to Engl.Privy Council: C.S.P., Ireland, III, 375. Perhaps Perrott's reference is to the visit of Angus to Ireland earlier in the year. If it is, it is the only Irish mention of it. For Angus's activities at this time vide also: MacLean: Hist.Island of Mull, II, 48-52; MacKenzie; Hist.MacDonalds, 195 etc.
MAP OF ANTRIM MADE BY JOHN NORDEN, 1609-1611.
PRESERVED IN P.R.O., LONDON;
PRINTED IN S.P., HENRY VIII (IR.), II, pt.3.

MAP NO. 4. FACING PAGE 146.
any compact to have Scots come in to aid him." This is a comment on the Earl's own statement to Perrott that he had "sent Nyse M'James 40 shot to help him against M'Eulane, in hope to get the like of him." Nyse M'James is, of course, Angus, the son of James MacDonald. If by "M'Eulane" MacLean is meant, then it is clear that the Earl of Tyrone did send aid to Angus against the MacLeans. The editor of the Irish Calendar, however, interprets "M'Eulane" as MacQuillin, an Irish chieftain on the Bann. This being so, some doubt must remain, but it seems reasonable to indicate a strong probability in favour of the view that the Earl of Tyrone was an active adherent of Angus MacDonald.

In December, an informant of the English Government reported that the Earl had messengers in Scotland, and that he was confederated with the Earl of Glentere, and, in view of these rumours of a new Scottish intriguer in the person of the Earl of Tyrone, we are not surprised to find

10. Perrott to Walsingham, enclosing Earl of Tyrone to Perrott: S.P.Eliz.Ireland,Vol.cxxx, Nos.63,63. Against the interpretation of the editor of the Calendar, which is specifically indicated by him as open to question (C.S.P. Ireld., III,398), it may further be stated that the sense of Perrott's letter seems to indicate the interpretation of MacLean for M'Eulane. There are no other references to Tyrone's sending any forces to Scotland.

11. C.S.P. Ir., III,451. Here again we must be at a loss to interpret a name, for the editor of the Calendar explains this as meaning "Cantyre or Argyle". If Cantyre, then evidently Angus M'Donald is meant, although he was not an Earl.
Fitzwilliam, the new Lord Deputy designate who was to replace Perrott, applying to the English Privy Council for guidance in the matter of his future line of conduct towards the Scots. The answer of the Councillors is a concise statement of their Scottish policy in Ireland at that date. It was their opinion that, so long as Somhairle Buidhe was allowed to enjoy the composition which had been made with Perrott, it was unlikely that any great number of Scots would come to Ireland. Turlough Luineach O'Neil would not bring them, because he should be unable to give them bonacht, except upon those who were now the Earl of Tyrone's tenants. As for the Earl, he was bound by his tenure not to employ them, and this was considered a sufficient bond. O'Donnell dared not entertain Scots while his son, Hugh Ruadh, remained a hostage in Dublin Castle, having been secured there as the result of a trick practised by Perrott, and it was felt that O'Cahan and Maguire, Turlough's air riagtha, or sub-chieftains, would prefer to throw themselves on the Queen's protection rather than be cessed with Scots at Turlough's instance. In general, nothing was to be anticipated from the Highlands or Isles unless war should break out between Scotland and England. If, however, these hopes proved too sanguine, and any great number of mercenaries should come over, Fitzwilliam was instructed to employ the Queen's shipping against them on the Ulster coast.

The chances of war between Elizabeth and James were, in reality, negligible. In the February previous Mary, 12

Queen of Scots, had been executed. There was a suggestion that the Scottish Parliament of July had asked King James to lead his people against the English in revenge, and undoubtedly the Catholics and Indifferents felt the outrage keenly, but the Protestants were calm in their reliance upon James. There was certainly no national crisis - the normal relationship with England was scarcely strained. The burghers of the sea coast towns were incensed against England because of the activities of her pirates, and the Border raids went on, but James himself had meekly swallowed the insult. Since he had made no move and seemed about to make none, Scotland must needs remain quiet.

§ III.

Fitzwilliam’s patent as viceroy is dated Feb, 17, 1588. Even before that date events had proven the English Privy Council far too trustful of the Earl of Tyrone. Evidently in pursuit of what it later became apparent was the concerted scheme of making Tyrone supreme in Ulster, the new year had hardly been ushered in before his brother and kinsmen, all too apparently at the Earl’s contrivance, invaded and plundered O’Reilly of Breifne. Bingham,


13a. C.S.P., Ireld., III, 466. The invading force consisted of 300 horsemen, 300 Scots, 400 Gallóglaigh, 400 ceatharnaigh, and 140 shot. As this composition is typical of the Irish campaigning force at the time, it is of interest to compare it with that of the English (a foot company raised in Somersetshire for Irish service, July, 1569 - evidently per 100 men) - 50 harquebusiers with calivers and furniture thereof, with morions only, and no other armour; 10 archers, with long bows; 40 pikemen, with Almayn corselets and burganets (Thomas: Historical Notes, III, 1156.)
alive to the danger of such raiding parties from Ulster, urged Burghley in February to garrison Sligo castle, "for," said he, "it is the only place in those parts that doth front many ill neighbours, and stands upon the passing to keep out the Scots, or the like ill-disposed persons, making their recourse that way out of Ulster." Despite repeated warnings of the growing disaffection of the Earl, however, the English Government took no active steps to interfere with his preparations for rebellion. And yet in time he grew to be a greater rebel even than Sean O'Neil.

In February also the trend of affairs in Scotland had the effect of bringing Angus MacDonald round to friendship with England, and we note with interest an attempt on his part to revive the traditional Isles policy of alliance with London against Edinburgh. The favouritism of King James towards MacLean, which later became so apparent, had begun to alarm Angus, and a messenger from Dungley made a strong case in Ireland on Angus's behalf for an alliance of Elizabeth with the MacDonalds. If Elizabeth supported Angus he promised that "he would kindle such a coal of fire in Scotland, and at her Highness's will and pleasure so keep the King occupied with stirs and troubles, as he should have little leisure to hearken after foreign practices, nor attempt anything with Spain or France, which might disturb Her Majesty or her dominions." This last point is significant in a period when rumours of the Armada were loud in the

air, and although Elizabeth might feel assured of James VI from the manner in which he and the Presbyterians had accepted the execution of Queen Mary, there was an uncertain Catholic party in Scotland, and the cautious terms of the muster order issued by the King in April showed that in the Spanish war his policy was to be nothing more than one of armed neutrality. At the date of Angus's statement James was held in some suspicion by England. By May the sincerity of his intention to oppose the Catholic party in Scotland, as promised to the General Assembly of the Kirk in February, was made clear by his expedition in person against Maxwell into Dumfriesshire, upon which occasion he took Lochmaben Castle. But it is quite evident that only alarm at what James might do could have led Elizabeth into her statement in favour as to the succession to the crown of England. This she made in August. One question only was deeper than that of the succession — and that was the question of the maintenance of Elizabeth as Queen.

Elizabeth had some time previously toyed with the very suggestion which Angus now put forward, and had considered it "not amiss" that he, enlisted as a pawn in the English scheme of defensive intrigue, and that a pension of two hundred pounds a year be assigned to him. Now, however, that Angus had declared his willingness to support

16. The offer of Angus in February, 1588, is disclosed in a letter from Sir Geoffrey Fenton, the English Secretary in Ireland, to Burghley - C.S.P., Ireland, III, 478-479. (For Fenton, vide, Dict. Nat.Biography, xviii, 323, seq. He was considered a confidential advisor of the Queen). It is Fenton also who records the earlier scheme of Elizabeth mentioned above. He was present in her Council when it was mooted. For tendency of King James to favour MacLean, vide, Gregory: Isles, 243, 253. For Scottish events: Reg. Privy Council Scot., IV, 286-293: Calderwood: Hist. Kirk, IV, 678-679; Lang: Hist. Scot., II, 340, 342; Hume Brown: Hist. Scot., II, 206-207.
England in return for support against MacLean, Elizabeth saw fit completely to ignore his proposal. In all probability the astute English Council had no relish for a quid pro quo which could only incense James, and which, although it could scarcely be calculated to weigh more in his mind than the chances of his ultimate succession to the English crown, which he fully realised to be best served by his keeping quiet, might possibly goad him into some open action which would be detrimental to the tortuous interests of the Queen. At all events there is no record of any reply having been made to the overtures of Angus, although Fenton states that he expected one.

In March, 1588 the Lady Agnes was again in Edinburgh, busily engaged in a further effort to bring about peace between MacLean and her son, Angus. It is reported that at this date James was greatly displeased with Angus, but the effects of the negotiations of the Lady Agnes and of the impression which this remarkable woman made upon the King are alike swallowed up in the hurried rush of events which saw the murder of Stewart, the brother of Arran, in the streets of the capital, and the threatening manoeuvres of

17. Note that, in accordance with what appears to have been a rule with him, the editor of the Irish Calendar interprets the "M'Alaen" mentioned in Fenton's letter as "Archibald Campbell, seventh Earl of Argyle." Angus would undoubtedly refer to the Earl as MacCailean (vide Dugald Mitchell: Hist. Highlands, 271-272), but in this case it is quite clear that MacLean is meant (Argyll was then barely twelve years old, and the open hostility of the Campbells to the MacDonals cannot be said to have commenced until after the death of Lachlan MacLean in 1598 - cf. Cunningham: Loyal Clans, 189-190.) The editor of the Calendar appears to have neglected the MacLean - MacDonald feud, and, with the knowledge of later Campbell hostility to the ClanDonald at the back of his mind, to have seen a MacCailean Mhor in every MacAlean, MacAllen, MacAilean, or whatever spelling the English-speaking scribes saw fit to give to the Gaelic MacGille Eathain, or MacLean.
Huntly, in the north. Angus himself made a great show of activity in paying the Queen's rent for his Antrim territories, doubtless with a wish to ingratiate himself with Elizabeth, as he renewed his offer of an alliance at the same time.

§ IV.

In September the reality of the Spanish Armada was brought home to both Islesmen and Irish by a number of wrecks off their coats - a circumstance which had immediate repercussion in both countries. In Donegal a considerable force of Spaniards landed and were hospitably treated by the Mac Sweeney's, O'Donnell's hereditary gallóglaigh. The Irish Council, alarmed at this, evinced the fear that the Earl of Tyrone would rebel, join the castaways, call in Scottish mercenary forces to aid him, and kindle an all-Ireland revolt.


20. For details of the shipwrecks, vide C.S.P. Ireld., IV, 40, seq. etc (and Intro. to this vol.); C.S.P. Scot., IX, 618; for Mac Lean's information to King James of a wreck in Islay; Bagwell: Tudors, III, 172, seq.

21. C.S.P., Ireld., IV, 53. Two significant items of military disposition in Ulster are mentioned at this time: O'Rourke's sending all his gallóglaigh to Hugh Maguire who had just become Maguire, on the death of his father, Cuconnacht. (Id., IV, 54 - note in connection with this Sir John Davis's statement in 1606: "the natives of this country (Maguire's country of Fermanagh) are reputed the worst swordsmen of the north...and for this cause M'Guire in the late wars did hire and wage the greatest part of his soldiers out of Connaught, and out of Breny O'Reillye (O'Reilly's country of Breifne), and made his own countrymen feed them" - Davis's Letter to the Earl of Salisbury in Vallancey's Collectanea de Rebus Hibernicis, I, No. 2, 151-152: The Galloglach family of MacCabe (sp. Mac an Abs-MacNab?) appear to have been more strongly represented than any other of that nature in O'Rourke's country. Out of a total of 43 mentions of the name MacCabe (either specifically as galloglaigh or with no occupation stated) in the Flantes, Eliz., Ireld., from 1565 to 1591, 23 are in Leitrim - O'Rourke's country. In an interesting report made after the date of O'Rourke's execution at Tyburn (Feb., 1592), the following occurs: "The chief ordinary forces and strength of men to serve O'Rourke in his wars are, the M'Loughlins, the M'Morrices, and the Clantyernens. These

-152- (Continued.........
Another report had it that Turlough Luineach would enlist the Spaniards in making war on the Earl. As it proved, however, neither the Earl nor Turlough had aid from the Spaniards, as they suffered a second shipwreck off the Antrim coast in crossing to the Isles, where, it seems, they were to have been enlisted by Seán Og O'Neil, the son of Sean O'Neil, who was then with the MacLeans and who meditated a descent on Ulster to oust both the Earl and Turlough with their aid. Lachlan MacLean of Duart was not behindhand in taking advantage of circumstances. Earlier in the year he had continued the Islay feud by imprisoning MacIan of Ardnamurchan, an ally of Angus, whom he had enticed into his presence by a singularly deceitful trick, and, now that an Armada ship had been wrecked upon his coast, he contrived to enlist the services of the Spaniards against the Clan-Donald. With a force of a hundred of these unfortunate

(Note 21 continued....)

had 16 qurs, land amongst them as their inheritance, called Ylvaugh, and the lands of Cleanloughe. These had never bonaught of O'Rourke, but only their shares of preys and spoils that were taken". S.P., Ireld., Eliz., P.R.O., cxliii,43. The second item - MacGlanachie (MacFhlanachadh - modern Clancy, a chieftain in O'Rourke's country) hiring what Bingham calls ceatharnaigh.(C.S.P. Ir., IV,25 - Sept.5,1588). This is the only reference to the hiring of ceatharnaigh which I have come across.

22. C.S.P., Ir., IV,55. Turlough Luineach was granted a pardon on June 29,1588 - Fiants Eliz.,Ireld.,5213. In this his wife is called Anne Campbell.

23. This is the view declared by an informant Henry Duke (C.S.P. Ir.IV,65). More likely, however, the Spaniards from Donegal attempted to cross to the Isles to join forces with their comrades who had been wrecked in Mac Lean's country. The sons of Sean O'Neil may certainly have contemplated enlisting them. Vide also Id., IV., 53,64. For the pass given to Spaniards by the Provost of Edin- burgh, vide, C.S.P.,Scot., IX,624. These were the remnant of another crew wrecked off Ulster who arrived in Edinburgh about the 10th or 12th of October - Id.IX,623, 628. Also, C.S.P. Ir., IV,93.
and the levies of his own clan, he ravaged Rum, Eig, Canna and Muck, islands possessed by the Clandonald North. As the result of some subsequent dispute with the Spaniards, however, who seem to have refused him two cannons and a hundred hagbuttiers which he desired to besiege a house of Angus MacDonald's, MacLean caused the bulk of their ship, which they still inhabited, to be treacherously blown up. With it perished most of the unfortunate Spaniards.

Nor was Angus slow to retaliate. Assisted by a band of English mercenaries, he invaded MacLean's islands of Mull, Tiree, Coll and Luing. As a result of these hostilities it is only natural to suppose that both clans were considerably exhausted, and their interference in Irish affairs slackened accordingly for the moment. In September, Bingham had sent in a report of the landing in Ulster of

25. Aston to Hunsdon, Nov. 8, 1588 and Ashby to Burghley, Nov. 13-C.S.P., Scot., IX, 629, 635. The Macdonalds (ClanDonald, II, loc.cit.) seem to confuse M'Lean's activities when supported by the Spaniards with his raid on Islay in 1587 (vide ante p. 144.) Angus MacDonald was not in Ireland in the latter half of 1588. Perhaps the ship which was wrecked on MacLean's coast was blown up before MacLean ravaged the Isles. Egerton, writing to the Irish Lord Deputy in Jan. (?), 1589, calls her a galleon of Venice of 1,200 tons (C.S.P., Ireld., IV, 121). Mitchell calls her the "Admiral of Florence" (Hist. Highlands, 419); Gregory, the "Florida" (Isles, 239). The explosion is recorded Nov. 8, 1588 - "this day word has come", etc. - by Aston to Hunsdon (C.S.P., Scot., IX, 629) Egerton says that the galleon was blown up with c. 700 men aboard, including five of MacLean's pledges: one captain and 100 men of the Spaniards are with MacLean "and take pay of him". (He also has a reference to the Spaniards in Edinburgh, but these he mentions were wrecked on Fair Isle, off Shetland - Earl of Bothwell providing them with a double fly-boat of his own to go to Spain - as above, C.S.P. Ireld., IV, 121) cf. also Id.IV, 97 and Reg. Privy Council Scot., IV, 341-342.
26. Mitchell, and Macdonalds, loc.cit. It is interesting to find English mercenaries employed by the MacDonalds.
Callough MacJames MacDonald, Angus's youngest brother, with 1,500 Scots, 600 of them bowmen, and 300 described as "English Scots". He characterises this, however, as merely a report and not greatly to be credited, saying that MacDonald was said to intend going into Connacht "for a revenge". As there is no further reference to this expedition, we may discount it as merely another of the persistent rumours which disquieted the English administration in Ireland, and it seems safe to say that the only one of the MacDonalds who could even temporarily afford to remain outside the feud in the Isles at this date was Somhairle Buidhe. This latter was married to the daughter of Turlough Luineach O'Neil at Strabane in October. At the close of the year, Somhairle and Randall M'Neece (Angus's representative in Antrim) went over to the Isles to attend a convention which was held at that time in a further effort to bring about peace with MacLean.

27. Bingham to Fenton: C.S.P., Ireld., IV, 31. The Clann Donald had much to avenge in Connacht: the treachery of the Mayo Burkes towards Alexander, son of Donald Bealach, in 1581, ante, p. 36; the slaughter of the same Alexander and his followers by O'Conor in the same year, ante, p. 37; and the massacre of Donald Gorm and Alexander Carragh and their followers by Bingham in 1586 (ante, p. 131 seq.)

28. C.S.P., Ireld., IV, 63. With regard to Bingham's report, note that it includes the statement that Capt. Merriman was killed by Callough MacJames's Scots. This, for one point was not true, as Merriman was alive at a later date.

29. Capt. Charles Egerton (in command at Carrickfergus) to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam. C.S.P. Ir., IV, 121. He reports that the Earl of Argyll was very anxious to reconcile Angus and M'Lean. This meeting is not mentioned by any of the Scottish authorities, nor does the presence of Somhairle Buidhe square with the usual statement of historians that he was unfriendly with Angus over the Antrim settlement.
In a piece of information conveyed from Edinburgh to Walsingham on Jan 4, 1589, we are afforded a momentary glimpse behind the scenes with regard to the standing of the Edinburgh and London courts in relation to the mercenary trade with Ireland. The informant is one Thomas Fowler, and he reports that Sir John Maitland, Lord Thirlstane, Chancellor of Scotland, said to him concerning the death of the Duke of Guise, that King James could play the game of the Continental enemies of England without appearing to do so—"what if the Kinge," Maitland is reported to have said, "will but wink at the putting over ten thousand men into Ireland, which may be done and cost him not a plak, and make your Queen spend a hundrethe thousands pound or she get them owt." It was only a breath of the suspicion which was undoubtedly felt at Elizabeth's court, but it serves to keep before our minds the very close connection between even the details of Hebridean and Ulster warfare and the policies and affairs of Scotland and England. For some time James had been toying with a policy of bringing the Isles and Highlands more effectively under his control. The MacLean feud gave him an opportunity to interfere in Hebridean matters, and from 1581 onwards we find him interesting himself more and more in the Isles, until gradually the general lines of what it must be apparent was his policy emerge: actually to wink at the mercenary service while he

30. Fowler to Walsingham: C.S.P.Scot., IX,666. This was Sir John Maitland of Thirlstane, brother of the late Maitland of Lethington. (See Lang,II,338 - who says "that he remained a good Protestant and favourable to the English alliance until his period of office closed in 1595.")
felt it advantageous to show his power to Elizabeth, and then, as the century progressed, and as it became apparent to him that he must succeed not only to the advantages attaching to the throne of England, but also to the disadvantages, and as he saw disturbance in Ireland to be one of these latter - then to change his attitude, and to devote himself to the extent of his power to curbing the Islesmen and to cutting off their connections with Ireland.

§ V.

In February, 1589, however, a far more obvious conspiracy against the English order in Ireland was brought once more to the fore in the practical renewal of the plot of Sean O'Neill's sons to oust their two opponents from power in Tyrone. We have seen how actively the clan MacLean was engaged in furthering this scheme in 1586; since that date the O'Neils concerned appear to have remained in the Isles with the MacLeans, and it was still under the auspices of that clan that Hugh Gavelagh O'Neil landed at Dunnalong,

31. This is the view of affairs to which Masson subscribes - see his cogent statements in this regard in his Introduction to Vol.VII of the Reg.Privy Council,Scotland, pp.xlix-I, and see below, p.34. Also Cunningham: Loyal Clans,187-9. The interest of the Scottish Court in the Highlands and Isles up to 1588 is shown by the following series of enactments in that regard: 1581, Act against the "clans of thieves"; various proclamations concerning the M'Lean-M'Donald feud (1587 etc.); 1587, General Bond, or Act against uncontrolled jurisdiction of chieftains; 1588, proclamation against M'Lean for ravaging in the Isles; 1588, general order of the Privy Council for the better administration of justice in Highlands and Borders (Reg.Privy Council, Scot., IV,295-300). For Gregory's view on these - Isles, 241-2. One reason was the anxiety of the King to have a revenue from the Isles. For James's view on Isles - Cunningham, op.cit., 107-109.
near Strabane, to prosecute his claim on this occasion.  
He brought no forces with him, and he seems to have relied on some particularly serious and secret matter which he had to reveal against the Earl of Tyrone to secure his displacement. His relationship with Turlough Luineach is even more obscure. What it was that constituted the alleged skeleton in the Earl's cupboard is made clear for us by an informant of Bowes in Edinburgh - secret dealings with the Spanish enemies of the Queen. Tyrone himself was in Dublin on April 8 for the purpose of answering "a heinous matter" with which Hugh had charged him. At all events, Hugh did

32. Foxe to Walsingham, C.S.P. Ir., IV, 123. Sean O'Neil had two legitimate and five illegitimate sons (Bagwell: Tudors, III. 9). The Sean Og O'Neil mentioned ante, p. 153. was one of the illegitimates, being by Catherine Maclean, the third wife of Archibald, fourth Earl of Argyll, whom O'Donnell of Tiroconnell had married after Argyll's death in 1558, which lady had subsequently (circa 1565) come into the power of Sean O'Neil. (vide, Mathew: Celtic Peoples and Renaissance Europe, pp. 122-123, note). This lady, after Sean's death, retired to her own people in the Isles, Sean Og remaining with her. It was shortly after her death that Sean Og had contemplated enlisting the Spaniards in 1588 to aid him in Ireland, his mother having kept him from interference in that country during her lifetime (C.S.P., Ireld., IV, 65). The two legitimates were Hugh Gavelagh and Henry (Bagwell, loc. cit., states that Henry was the elder). Lord Dep. Fitzwilliam said of these sons of Sean O'Neil at this time (March 5, 1589) - "The sons of Shane O'Neil be seven in number and all save one of Scottish race. They are greatly beloved of the people, and will attempt to succeed to the O'Neillsip" (C.S.P., Ir., IV, 153). Another son Conn - apparently one of the illegitimates - is also mentioned (C.S.P. Ir. IV, 123). He had been in durance with Turlough Luineach for a long time, but was released at this juncture, when he apparently joined his brethren. They seem to have made common cause alike, and all to have been aided by the Macleans. The others were Brian, Art, Edmund and Turlough. Henry and Art escaped with Hugh O'Donnell from Dublin Castle in 1592. Art died in the flight, but Henry reached Tyrone, where the Earl imprisoned him. In 1594 Henry, Con, and Brian were all in Tyrone's hands - Bagwell: Tudors, III, 226-7 and note.

33. Capt. Merriman to Fitzwilliam (Feb. 16) C.S.P. Ir., IV, 132; Hugh Gavelagh to same (Feb. 17), id., 133; same to Lawrence, Feb. id., 123. Fitzwilliam said on March 6 that the sons of Sean O'Neil would endeavour to reduce Ulster to the former state of Irish government.

34. C.S.P., Ireld., IV, 142. Bowes' informant was John Achiross, the secretary of Lashlan Maclean, concerning whom we shall have much to say later - cf. his letter to Bowes, March 25, 1595 - S.P. Soot., Eliz., LV, 61. Cox: Hibernia Anglicana, 397-398.
not get the satisfaction which he considered himself to merit, and he withdrew to the company of his brethren in Ulster, where they remained quiet until the July following.

Meanwhile, there were evidences of disaffection in two other quarters. In Donegal, Inneen Dubh, the wife of O'Donnell, continued to prove herself a worthy daughter of Agnes Campbell. Fitzwilliam, who visited Donegal during his viceregal progress at the period of the Armada wrecks (December, 1588), refers to her as "the Scottish woman", and notes that the three MacSweeney chieftains and O'Gallagher, a chieftain in the vicinity of Ballyshannon, were all not alone devoted to her, but also very well affected towards her race. In February, 1589, she was in Scotland, where she was undoubtedly busy in canvassing for mercenary aid, for it seems quite clear that the O'Donnells were only restrained from going into revolt by the fact that Hugh Ruadh, the eldest son of the house, still remained a hostage in Dublin Castle. The second quarter of disturbance was Connacht. Here the Mayo Burkes, O'Flaherties, Joyces and Clan Donald Gallóglaiagh had a standing grievance in the presence of Sir Richard Bingham. Among their numerous complaints against him, the most interesting from our point of view was that concerning the execution of Ustian MacDonald towards the close of 1588. This was the gallóglach leader who had long been associated with the various rebellions in Co. Mayo, and while Bingham alleged that he had been

35. Fitzwilliam to English Privy Council, C.S.P., Ir., IV, 93-95. Bagwell: Tudors, III, 196-197. He also met Turlough and Agnes Campbell upon this occasion. They were "most eager and sharp" to have better consideration from the Government.

36. C.S.P., Irld., IV, 123.
hanged in the due execution of martial law because he was a general disturber of the peace and because he had given aid to the Spaniards, the Burkes and their associates maintained that his execution was a gross breach of faith, as they said that he was under a protection at the time. At all events, acts such as this on Bingham's part were largely responsible for goading the Mayo Burkes into rebellion in 1589. In March the various septs which went to make up the MacDonalds of Mayo were busily engaged in making galloglaigh axes, and by the following month the county was in open rebellion. Further north, Sir Brian O'Rourke of Breifne was also in revolt. It was reported that this latter was acting on secret instructions from the Earl of Tyrone, and that he had sent a messenger, one Ferdorough M'Evie, to Somhairle Buidhe to solicit mercenary aid.

36. Bingham's allegation that Ustian "had never a foot of land in the world of his own" would apply to any galloglaigh. The peculiar point is that he sought to make this a justification for the execution. For the points in the controversy, vide C.S.P., Ireld., IV, 150, 180, 266, 271-272; and Bagwell: Tudors, III, 203-204. Ustian was of the sept of Hugh Boy MacDonald (Id., IV, 143-144). He was granted a pardon on Nov. 23, 1587 - Fiants, Eliz., Ir., 5075. His son was put in as a pledge on March 19, 1589 (C.S.P., Ir., IV, 143-144).

37. Comerford to L. Dep. (March 20) and Bermingham to Sir L. Dillon (ApI. I) - C.S.P., Ir., IV, 145-147. This is the only reference to the manufacture of galloglaigh axes.

38. Bingham to Lord Depty., C.S.P., Ir., IV, 196. Bagwell: Tudors, III, 204-213. O'Rourke had secured a grant of a large part of his country in accordance with the provisions of the Composition of Connacht on June 2, 1585 - Fiants, Eliz., Ir., 4683. In April, 1589, Bingham reported (C.S.P., Ir., IV, 157) that 200 MacSheehy Galloglaigh from Munster - evidently portion of the galloglaigh forces displaced in that province after the Desmond rebellion (vide ante, p. 78 sqq.) - were in Tirconnell and had sought employment under the Queen. If the Queen did not engage them they should go to O'Rourke, and, in order to prevent this, Bingham advocated their employment. These may have been Murtagh Og MacSheehy's men. He sued to submit to Queen in Feb. 1596 - C.S.P., Ir., V, 476.
Somhairle MacDonald had his hands full in Ulster at this juncture, however, for the indefatigable sons of Séan O'Neil continued an active intrigue in that province. As the year 1589 advanced, Tyrone displayed a tendency to ally himself with Somhairle Buidhe against the MacSeans and Turlough Luineach. Why Turlough should countenance rival claimants, we do not know, but he was not at all well disposed to Tyrone, as a re-settlement of the clan country between them which was to have taken place in 1588 had been postponed in the Earl's favour by the Lord Deputy, who continued to support the Earl as the only loyal O'Neil. As the MacLeans remained active adherents of the MacSeans, the alignment of MacLean against MacDonald was reproduced in Ireland, but here again it is difficult to account for the position of Agnes Campbell, as her sympathies, if not with Somhairle, 39 must certainly have been with Angus MacDonald. In July, Somhairle conveyed the news to the Government that the MacLeans contemplated an immediate descent in force on the Ulster coast — whether against his own Antrim settlement or against O'Dogherty in Inishowen he did not then know. He discovered later that their destination was Loch Foyle, and warned the Earl of Tyrone to this effect, desiring the latter to request the Lord Deputy to send the Queen's ships against them. In the same month twenty-six boats landed,

39. This alignment of forces is to be observed from the letters relating to the MacSeans in July and August, 1589 - C.S.P., Irel., IV, 226-228. Undoubtedly it was dictated by circumstances. For the standing of Tyrone with regard to Turlough Luineach, vide Bagwell: Tudors, III, 218.
40. Somhairle to Capt. Henshaw of Carrickfergus, C.S.P., Ir. III, 226. Fitzwilliam despatched this to Burghley with a note to say that the Queen should write to King James to stay such incursions.
41. Id., IV, 227. Here the MacLeans are called Clana Leoyne — marginal note to the English translation of S.B.'s letter.
conveying a force estimated at 2,000 men under a MacLean commander. Their purpose was to aid the MacSeáns, and in August these latter with, as the Earl himself reported, the connivance of Turlough Luineach, preyed Tyrone and forced the Earl to employ 500 Scottish mercenaries which he obtained from Somhairle Buidhe and who were under the commandment of Somhairle's son.

The MacLeans, however, although their show of force was as great as in 1585, did absolutely nothing, and, as there is no further reference to their expedition, it must be taken that they returned at once to the Isles and left the sons of Séan O'Neill to their own devices. There were some hostilities between Turlough and the Earl in the course of which the former suffered more than the latter, but by October they had compounded their differences, Hugh Gavelagh and his brethren remaining, however, outside the settlement.

There is a suggestion that these latter continued to receive aid from Turlough, but their conspiracy soon came to an end with the seizure of Hugh Gavelagh by some of the Maguires, who handed him over to the Earl of Tyrone. Tyrone had him summarily executed.

42. Bingham to Walsingham, July 26; Tyrone to same, Aug 11; Rhys ap Hugh to Perrott; and Duke to same (Perrott was then one of H.M. Council in England) - C.S.P. Ireld., IV, 222,227,228. Of the MacDonald force which Tyrone employed, 300 were native Scots, the rest had been born and bred either in the Route or the Glens (Id. IV, 252.)

43. Id., IV, 252.

44. Fitzwilliam to Burghley, Nov. 14 - C.S.P., Ir., IV, 261.

Shortly after the date of the MacLean expedition and, seemingly, without warning, seven galleys arrived with 600 Scots in Erris on the western coast of Mayo. They had for their pilot a son of Grainne, the then leader of the clan O’Maille, or O’Malley, of the Owles, and they appear to have understood at first that the Burkes would hire them. They are referred to as "of the sept of the Barrones," which may mean that they were MacNeils. The action of the Burkes towards them is peculiar. Bingham understood that the Burkes had contracted with them to come to Ireland to serve as mercenaries, and yet the Irish forces combined against them, blood was spilled on both sides, and the Scots were finally driven out. It is true that the Scots had been engaged in a little cattle-lifting in the vicinity of their landing place, and when they put to sea they took with them the hides and tallow of over a thousand cattle by way of spoil, and this may have been the occasion of their quarrel with the Irish. At all events, it was still further proof that Connacht was an unlucky province for the mercenaries. In October (1589) the rebellious Burkes had set up a MacWilliam, contrary to the Composition, and a MacDonald of Mayo was also made in the person of Marcus Mac an Abbe.

C.S.P. Ir. IV. 232, 236, 242; Knox: Hist. Co. Mayo, 240. Vide infra, p.69, for a subsequent landing in Mayo in which the MacNeils were definitely involved. Note the reference of Bingham to Neale M’Barrie in 1593. (ante. p.94) Bingham to Burghley, Sept.14th, C.S.P. Ir. IV. 236. There is an indication that the Castlebar sept of the Burkes was in correspondence with Scotland at this time, the messenger being one Henry M’Gin - Id. 240.

46. Id. IV. 242, 243.
47. Id. IV. 251, Bagwell: Tudors, III, 215. This Marcus Mac an Abbe Macdonald was of the Togher, Co. Mayo; in 1586 he and his three children secured pardons. They were then described as among the "sub-officers and servants" of Francis Berkeley, late sheriff of Mayo - Planta, Eliz. Ir. 4872. His selection as MacDonald would seem to indicate the seniority of his sept. This is interesting in view of the Macdonalds’ statement (Clan Donald, II, 116) that it is not possible to trace the Connacht branch as late as this. Vide genealogical sheet in appendix below.
In November, after his settlement with Furlough Luineach, the Earl of Tyrone gave a fresh instance of the independent nature of his proceedings in inviting Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg to visit him. This was a time of momentary quietness in the Isles, and Angus came to Ireland and was entertained by the Earl with a great display of cordiality. Presents were exchanged, Angus receiving seven of the best horses in Tyrone and giving in return some Scottish plaids and sculls which he had brought with him for the Earl's men.\(^50\) Both Angus and Tyrone were nominally friendly to the English government at the time, but we are not surprised to find their display of amity treated with considerable suspicion, for undoubtedly the visit of Angus was the occasion of much plotting which was later to bear fruit against the Queen.

In January 1590 Somhairle Buidhe MacDonald died.\(^51\) Of all his clan he was the one who had interested himself most in Irish affairs, and it was largely due to him that the Scottish settlement was so strongly intrenched in Ulster. He was succeeded by his third son, James MacSomhairle, who reproduced in many respects the characteristics of his father - love of intrigue, fixity of purpose, courage, pride.

Rory MacQuillin of the Route, who had been half dispossessed

\(^{50}\) Capt. Merriman to Walsingham, Nov. 13, C.S.F. Ir., IV, 261. This is a reference to the attire of the Highland Scot which has escaped the notice of the controversialists. There is no reason to accept the Macdonalds' interpretation. (Clan Donald, II, 562.)

\(^{51}\) Owen Wood to Perrott, Jan. 26, Id. IV. 298. Somhairle had by his wife, Mary O'Neill, daughter of Con, first Earl of Tyrone, five sons of whom James was at this time the eldest surviving. (Although Hill does not say so, Eudar was undoubtedly illegitimate.)
by Perrott's settlement with Somhairle, saw in this an opportunity not to be neglected, and he wrote at once to the Lord Deputy to sue for the return of his lands, complain- ing as he did so that Mac Somhairle had a great piece of Spanish ordnance in Dunluce Castle. James Mac Somhairle complained of MacQuillin, asking, in the manner of his father, that the Irish chief be compelled to cease his violence or that he himself be authorised to compel him to do so.

The Lord Deputy and Council were somewhat perplexed in the matter, which they referred to the English Privy Council for decision, but in the end Mac Somhairle kept the Route. 52

In the same month the Mayo Clan Donald, who had been getting the worst of it against Bingham, offered to

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52. MacQuillin and MacSomhairle to Lord Deputy and Deputy and Council to Privy Council—Feb. 1590. C.S.P. Ir. IV. 313. MacQuillin says that Angus MacDonald (? The Lady Agnes or Angus of Dunyveg) sent for the Spanish gun, but Mac Somhairle did not surrender it. In 1589 Somhairle's force was estimated at 200 men. (Id. IV., 279). The lady Agnes was in Glasgow in April, 1590, whence she wrote on the 25th to Robert Bowes requesting him to forward certain of her letters to the Queen, Burghley and Perrott (Id. IV 334, and C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe) II. 574.)

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submit and were granted peace.53 Marcus mac an Abbe lost his title of "MacDonald" in accordance with the English law, and became once more MacDonald of the Togher. Bingham's determined offensive brought in the Burkes also, and O'Rourke was compelled to seek refuge in the MacSweeny country in Donegal, whence he crossed to Scotland. This was early in 1591, and in March of that year Queen Elizabeth wrote to King James to apprehend him and to forward him to London.54 For the first time in the history of the relations of the two countries with Ireland, James acted promptly. On March 16th an order was made in the Scottish Privy Council (at the request, as it is stated, of Robert Bowes) for the "apprehension of one Irishman...namyt Crorig," and in the following month he was taken and sent to London, where he was hanged at Tyburn.55

53. See their letters and the Lord Deputy's reply (Jan. 1590) C.S.P. Ir. IV. 300-301. Marcus Mac an Abbe was the prime mover on their side. The pardon which he eventually secured is dated Aug. 27th 1590 - Fiants, Eliz. Ireld. 5452. A MacMarcus MacDonald of the Togher secured a pardon on July 9th, 1591 - Id. 5574, - he is probably a son of Marcus Mac an Abbe (see also C.S.P. Ireld., IV. 591-3.) Others were Ferlagh MacDonald (not mentioned in the Fiants, and no indication of his sept); TNurlough Roe MacDonald, (Two)

MacNurlough Roe MacDonalds mentioned 23rd Nov. 1587;

rularagh MacDonald Roe mentioned 27th Nov. 1587 - he was of Baile Irille, which appears to be in Galway or Clare;

rualagh MacDonald of Baile Irille - varr, Arellye - T again mentioned, 23rd March, 1590; Felim and Cahir MacNurlagh MacDonald of Ballymacgibbon, Co, Mayo - perhaps sons - pardoned Aug. 27th 1590; Fiants, Eliz. Ir. 5075, 5083, 5401, 5451; Alexander M' Hugh Buaid MacDonald (pardoned along with a Feelim m'Hugh Buaid, 23rd Nov. 1587 - Fiants Eliz. Ireld. 5075.

54. Eliz. to James, 6th March, 1591, C.S.P. Scot. II. 589. (Thorpe)

The province of Connacht was free from open disturbance after this until it was involved in the great Ulster rebellion at the end of the century. It is not too much to say that had the Ballyshannon passage between the two provinces been effectively garrisoned even at this date, the English should have been able to keep Mayo quiet and the rebellious activities of O'Donnell, Maguire, and the new O'Rourke should have been seriously interfered with.56

Affairs in Ulster which had been troubling the administration in Dublin for some time began in 1590-1591 to assume a still more serious aspect. The views of Perrott and Fenton with regard to the Earl of Tyrone in May, 1590 are interesting. Perrott says that he should be compelled to renounce any claim to superiority over the hereditary O'Neil oir riosta, and that he should be "bound neither to send aid to Angus MacDonald nor any other Scot in Scotland." Fenton strikes a similar note, and says further that order should be taken "that he meddle not with entertaining foreign Scots."57 The fact was that Tyrone had arrived at the view that his living as Earl was not all that he might have or should have, and that he was in active contemplation of ousting Furlough Luineach and of asserting his traditional superiority as de facto O'Neil over Maguire, O'Cahane and the other sub-chieftains. It was a revival of the scheme of Séan O'Neil.

The Earl, however, was a clever man, and he was very careful not to break openly with the English until the time was ripe for a coup d'etat in Ulster. Throughout this seed-period

56. See this view put forward at length in the present writer's art. "Ballyshannon", Journal of Galway Archaeological Socy., appended hereto.
of his rebellious policy he kept an eye on Hebridean affairs, for no chieftain, great or small, attempted a revolt in Ireland in the latter half of the 16th century without soliciting mercenary aid in the Isles.

In 1589 King James had granted a remission to MacLean of Duart, MacNeil, MacKinnon of Strathordell, and MacQuarrie of Ulva "for being art and part in the treasonable burning and destruction of the islands of Rum, Canna, and Eig." Angus of Dunyveg was also granted a remission for his part in the hostilities of the winter of 1588, and the two chieftains, Angus and MacLean, as well as Donald Gorme of Sleat were cited to appear in Edinburgh to answer for the future good rule in the Isles. In spite of the remissions, MacDonald and MacLean were imprisoned in Edinburgh upon their appearance there, fined stilly, and bound over to appear upon twenty days warning and to keep the peace with the Queen of England's subjects in Ireland. They were not liberated until the summer of 1591, Campbell of Calder standing surety for Angus and Campbell of Ardkinglass for MacLean. Under date March 20th of that year a minute addressed from Edinburgh Castle and containing the excerpt from the Act of the Scottish Privy Council which relates to their keeping the peace with Ireland, is filed among the Irish State Papers, having evidently been sent either to Dublin or London as an evidence of James's good faith towards Elizabeth.

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58 Macneil of Barra: The Clan Mac Neil, 60.
59 This minute is S.P. Eliz., Ireld. P.R.O. Vol. CLVII., No. 47. For the dealings of James with the chieftains, vide: Dugald Mitchell: Hist. Highlands and Gaelic Scotld. 420; Macdonalds: Clan Donald, II. 563; Mac Lauchlan: Hist. Highlands, I, 100, who (relying on Gordon: Hist. 192) places these events under 1592, instead of 1591. For the deceit of the Edinburgh Government to the chiefs - Gregory: Isles, 241.
In June, 1591 a second descent of Scottish forces on Erris in West Mayo took place. The circumstances are exactly similar to those of the descent of August, 1589. In both cases the Scots seem to have acted more of their own accord than as a result of any express invitation on the part of the Irish. There is a probability, certainly, that the Burkes had made some overtures towards them in 1589, but in this present case there is no indication whatever of such, and while the O'Malleys had assisted the Scots on the former occasion we now find them acting against them. All considered, we can only conclude that this 1591 expedition was a piratical descent pure and simple. The Scots' force consisted of 700 men, who were conveyed in thirteen galleys and were commanded by Enyse MacLean and Rory MacNeil of Barra. Among the other leaders who were with them were Owen MacNeil, evidently Rory's brother, and a son of MacLeod's* (of what branch of the clan it is impossible to ascertain.) This Rory was undoubtedly the Rory the Turbulent who was to succeed Roderick as thirty fifth chieftain of his clan, c. 1598.

The Mayo Burkes at once assembled their forces against the Scots whom they attacked and drove out with loss of Owen MacNeil and MacLeod's son, suffering on their own side the loss of the late MacWilliam Burke's two sons. The cautious policy of Bingham is illustrated in his forbearance to go to the assistance of the Burkes with the small English force 60.

Bingham's letters to Burghley and to the Lord Deputy are the only records of this descent - C.S.P. Ir., IV. 396, 397. Vide also Knox: Hist. Co. Mayo, 246. For Rory MacNeil vide MacNeil of Barra: Clan MacNeil, 62. This Rory had a long career of piracy, and was on one occasion arrested by King James (through Roderick Mackenzie, tutor of Kintail) for plundering an English ship off the Irish coast. Elizabeth having demanded that James bring him to justice, MacNeil is stated to have replied to the charge by saying that he thought it only proper to plunder the subjects of the Queen who had killed King James's mother. Mackenzie secured a nominal superiority over Barra for his share in this business.
at his command because of his fear that Irish and Scots might unite and make common cause against him. The changing nature of affairs in Connacht is exemplified by the willingness of the Irish to oppose their former allies.  

Although Ireland did not witness the actual arrival of further Scots - at least not in any force - until the summer of 1592, the intervening period was one during which the possibility of a concerted Ulster rebellion was never absent from the English mind. King James of Scotland remained to some extent an uncertain factor; the fighting qualities of the Highlanders and Hebrideans from whom he claimed allegiance, as well as their power to work mischief in Ireland had been proven again and again - therefore it was alarming that such a report of Spanish ramifications in Scotland as that extracted from a captured priest in January 1592 should come to light. This latter enlarged upon what he said was the King of Spain's purpose to send over ships and money to transport as many Scots as possible into Ireland, and even though Burghley and those about him might venture to discredit this in view of the failure of the Armada, still it must have been felt that Ulster was far too open to Scottish intercourse to permit of that easy coercion of Ireland to Tudor rule and good order which was all the time subtly in progress.  

61. Vide Bingham, loc. cit. He says that Grainne O'Malley was preparing to pursue the Scots with 20 boats. The O'Malleys and O'Flaherties of West Mayo and West Galway and the O'Driscols of South West Cork were the only Irish clans which ever aspired to sea power. Vide also below pp. 325 seq.  

62. Examination of Honlough O'Keynai, priest - Jan 5th, 1592 - C.S.P. Ir. IV. 453. When news of a Spanish fleet due to arrive in the North Isles reached Edinburgh the Scottish Court took active defensive measures, not alone in King James's interest, but in that of "the Queen of England, his darrest sister and cousin" - Reg. Privy. Col. Scot., IV. 739 - April 4, 1592.
An event of the same month had the effect of forcing matters to an issue in Ulster. This was the escape of Hugh Ruadh O'Donnell, the pledge for the good behaviour of his clan, from Dublin Castle. The traditional hostility of the O'Donnells to the O'Neils had been a continuous curb on Nurlough Luineach during his more active days following his Scottish match; earlier, the same feud had been directly responsible for the downfall of Sean O'Neil: if young Hugh Ruadh should now agree to reverse the policy of generations and to ally himself with Tyrone, then Ulster would in one stroke be united. A united Ulster might mean a united Ireland - and there was every probability of O'Donnell and the Earl coming to terms, since the former was married to the Earl's daughter, and since Tyrone had been active in attempting to secure Hugh Ruadh's release. Of all this the English were aware, yet as the events which they feared fell out step by step during the succeeding years, their administration seemed to be palsied in inaction, the officers of their government unable to thwart the intentions of the Ulster leaders.

It was thought for a time that Hugh Ruadh might seek refuge in Scotland, as there was internal strife, of which the Lord Deputy hoped to take advantage, in his own clan, but the English hope of creating an opposition in Firconnell failed, largely through the skilful manipulation of Inneen Dubh the Scottish MacDonald mother of Hugh Ruadh. As these events occurred, the English administration was naturally reminded once more of the ever-present danger from

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62. C.S.P., Irl., IV. 457; A.F.M. sub anno, 1592; Bagwell, Tudors, III. 221-223.
the Scots. Sir Henry Bagenall, from Newry on the border of Ulster, urged that Xurlough Luineach and the Earl of Tyrone be played off one against the other, and that O'Cahane, O'Dogherty and the other oir-riogtha be made directly dependent on the Crown. Ulster, he felt, should be divided into factions at all costs, but he seems to have thought that this division would stop all warfare, for he goes on as follows: "when this is accomplished, and consequently all matter of quarrel between the great ones removed, the Scot, the known firebrand and nurse of rebellion through all parts of the kingdom, shall never be able to annoy, who never took footing here, but being called in by some great man, either for his own defence or plague to his next bordering neighbour."63 The Protestant Archbishop of Cashel re--echoed this sentiment in May when he urged the fortification of the passages over the Bann and the Erne, saying that this would bridle not alone the Ulstermen "but also the Scots, not to run from Claneboy to Ulster, and from Ulster to Connaught, and from thence to Munster, at their wills."64

In May, the chieftainship of the clan O'Donnell was surrendered to Hugh Ruadh by his father, and the new chief proceeded to inaugurate himself by dismissing the Queen's sheriff from his clan country and by conducting successful raids in traditional fashion upon Xurlough Luineach, O'Cahane, and others. He was supported by a force of Scottish mercenar-

63. Bagenall to Burghley, Feb. 20th, 1592 - C.S.P. Ireld, Ix. 460. See his Notes for Q. Eliz., -Id. IV. 492 (sections 20 and 21).
64. Lord Deputy to Burghley, June 2nd - C.S.P. Ir. IV. 518, and see 521, A.F.M. 1592. Hugh had been opposed in Donegal by two rival claimants: Hugh Dubh the uncle of old Sir Hugh, the present Hugh's father; and the sept of Calough O'Donnell. See Archbishop of Cashel's Notes, ubi. sup. and O'Donovan in Appendix to A.F.M. There were similar rivals in the clan O'Neil: (1) Xurlough Luineach, (2) Earl of Tyrone; (3) sons of Sean O'Neil; (4) sept of Turlough Breasaalagh O'Neil, uncle to the late Sean O'Neil. Vide also Genealogical chart in Arch. Ulster.
Although Tyrone had allowed his own son to indulge in a raid on MacKenna, who was a government supporter as a result of the recent composition and settlement of Co. Monaghan, he foresaw that the time was not yet ripe for an open break with the Queen, and, on the advance of Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Dundalk, he went into Donegal and persuaded Hugh Ruadh to make peace with the government. This O'Donnell did in July, being received into favour and engaging to dismiss the Scots whom he had hired. How closely the affairs of the provinces were connected is shown by the fact that some of the Mayo Burkes in Connacht, who were again become restive, began to brag openly that they should now secure the services of O'Donnell's unwanted mercenaries to protect themselves from Bingham. Very likely the "bag full of Irish letters" which was being carried from the Burkes to Hugh Ruadh by Hugh Ruadh's "own gallowglass" and which was intercepted by Bingham during the summer of this year had some relation to

Bingham to Fitzwilliam, Aug. 3rd. 1592-C.S.R. Ir., IV. 570.
For O'Donnell's submission vide A.F.M. sub anno 1592;
Bagwell: Tudors, III, 228. For the settlement in Monaghan vide Planta, Eliz. Ir., 5582, 5603, 5719–5744 generally.
Note the extensive list of MacMahons - a Hebridean gallbglaigh family; and see the Hebridean names: MacDonald, MacCabe, MacSweeney (M'Quyn) in the grants. The full return is printed in Repertory of Inquisitions of Chancery, Irel. II. Ulster, xxi–xxxii. The MacKenna mentioned above was Patrick MacKenna, late chief of his name, who secured three ballybetaghs of land (c. 16 tates in a ballybetagh, each tate comprising 60 acres varietes in the different Irish districts. A ballybetagh is literally "a town capable of affording hospitality." The rent to the Crown for a tate was 20/- (English) as well as a rent (usually 12/6 per tate) from 91 tates held principally by his own clansmen - all in the barony of Trough, Co. Monaghan.
(Fiants, ubi, sup)
In September a rumour was current in Clandeboye that Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg and MacLean of Duart, having, as was held, composed their differences in the Isles, a great force of Scots was about to invade east Ulster. The news was passed on to Fitzwilliam, and he thought it worth sending to Burghley with the recommendation that King James be written to to stay any such motion in Scotland.

The affairs of the West Highlands at this date were disturbed by the Campbell part of the wide conspiracy which involved Huntly in the north, and which aimed at the removal by assassination of the Earls of Moray and Argyll, the very existence of which, and the later shielding of the prime movers therein, proved, if such further proof be necessary for us, the Royal incapacity in Highland affairs. Angus, despite the order to abstain from interference in Irish matters which had been taken in 1591, could afford a surreptitious journey to Ireland, and it was true that the MacLean feud was in one of its many phases of abeyance. We cannot, however, say whether or no Angus fulfilled the rumour by crossing to Antrim himself in 1592, but it is apparent that, during the winter of 1592-1593, he devoted himself to some extent to the affairs of his clan in that quarter. In the May following he crossed to Ulster, and, as the Earl of Tyrone put it, "took James Mac Somhairle in hand," with the evident intention of reviewing the new position created in Antrim since the death of Somhairle Buidhe. But in this month also a more

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67 Bingham to Burghley, C.S.P. Ir. IV., 591-593.
68 Fitzwilliam to Burghley, Sept. 16th, 1592 - C.S.P. Ir. IV. 579.
70 C.S.P. Ir. V. 99. Tyrone to Council; incidental ref. to landing of Angus in Bingham to L. Dep. May 30 - Id. V. 105.
important thing happened in Ulster: Turlough Luineach, who was now old and tired of the continual strife, resigned his claims in favour of the Earl. First O'Donnell, then O'Neil; step by step Ulster was advancing towards unity and towards rebellion. Already in the Loch Erne district the flame had been kindled, and, although the Earl remained cautious for a time, actually in this year of 1593 the last great Tudor war period had been initiated. The Irish were not to see defeat until 1602.

§ VII.

On the Connacht border the new O'Rourke kept Bingham busy, and in Fermanagh Maguire assembled his forces for an attack on Monaghan, the recent settlement in which last county represented an English invasion on Gaelic Ulster. It was the age of youthful chieftains - a new O'Donnell, a new O'Rourke, a new Maguire - each of whom embraced the Celtic system of society and turned resolutely against sheriffs and sessions, English land-holding and English titles. It was clear where the Earl of Tyrone's sympathies lay, despite his actions, for he permitted the two O'Hagans, captains from his country, to remain at bonaght with a hundred Tyrone men in Fermanagh, and to aid Maguire in his attack on the English garrisons in Monaghan.

Bagwell: Tudors, III. 233; A.F.M. sub anno, 1593. A.F.M. 1593: Bagwell, loc. cit; confessions of Donald Albanagh, evidently a Scottish mercenary seized by the English - May 25th and 27th, 1593 - C.S.P., Ir. V. 105, 106. According to the last-named Maguire's force was composed as follows: the two O'Hagans from Tyrone, with 85 shot and 15 pikes; Turlough M'Caffer (the MacCafferkeys, Gaelic MacEachmharáigh, were hereditary standard bearers to the O'Neils,) with 90 shot; Maguire's own ward and a MacGauran and an O'Luman, with 100 shot; Alexr. MacDonald Oge MacSweeney, with 100 galloglaigh; and the Fermanagh rising-out of about 1,000 men.
While O'Rourke and Maguire were thus engaged in south Ulster, Maguire wrote to the Earl relating of their success and notifying him that he intended keeping the O'Hagans and their buannadh for some time longer. He further requested him to send William Mac Croddan, the Earl's brehon, or Irish legal functionary, for some special purpose of which the Earl was aware. Furlough Luineach O'Neil, however, intercepted this letter and promptly sent it to the Dublin Council as an evidence of Tyrone's treasonable practices. A further letter of Maguire's to the son of Angus MacDonald came similarly into the hands of the Lord Deputy. It is interesting from our point of view. As translated it reads as follows: "Maguire's commendations to Angus M'Donnell, and I do send to you that there is some wars rising upon me, and I have some bonies (buannadh - i.e., the O'Hagan's force) and I have no more time of them saving a fortnight or three weeks, and come to you five or six hundred men of tall men, well armed (evidently the "to" should be omitted here, and "with" inserted before "five"), and I will give you meat, till I entertain yourself and whomsoever else I shall in like sort entertain both for meat and wages. And I do send to you that I do not marvel if I were in distress that you should give me your help unto me for a quarter of a year for a little hire. And moreover I think that you shall have better spoils than your wages from me till the end of that three weeks (i.e., until the actual period of hire begins.) Bring a great sort of shot with you, and if you get no more but three hundred itself, come with them as soon as the letter comes to you and leave order for the rest to come after you, and understand
Brian Oge O'Rourke is a partner with me in my wars, and that he is drawing of you likewise as I am." This epistle, giving as it does a clear insight into the standing of a Hebridean chief, as mercenary leader, with regard to the Irish, is endorsed "Let me be given to M'Gilasbig M'Angus Ilay." 73

Although these letters were intercepted, it is quite apparent that Maguire found another method of communicating with the Scots in Antrim, for, as will be seen, he had the assistance later of a Hebridean mercenary force. In June, Tyrone, having been given a commission despite the doubts of his loyalty to bring in Maguire, held a parley with him, but Maguire was suspicious of the intentions of Sir Richard Bingham, and he refused to come in unless he had assurance of the good faith of the governor of Connacht.74 The latter was troubled at the same time by the appearance of thirty galleys belonging to the MacNeil pirates from the Isles off the Connacht coast, and by the fear that O'Rourke would receive the Scots who had been employed by the Ulster rebels and would seek to disturb Connacht.75 Although the MacNeils do not appear to have come ashore on this occasion, a report that Donald Gorme of Sleat was assembling a force of 5,000 men in the Isles for a descent on Ireland added to the general uneasiness of the situation.

C.S.P. Ireld., V. 113-114; the letter to the son (?) of Angus, (quoted above from contemporary translation) is S.P. Eliz. Ir. P.R.O., CLXX, 23 XVI. It was translated either at the instance of Turlough Luineach or by the official Irish interpreter in Dublin. This latter, at the commencement of Fitzwilliam's deputyship in 1589, was one Thomas Cahill, who received a stipend of 13s 4d per day. Fitzwilliam, Eliz. Ird., 550, and see Id.5559 and 5201.

This was made by one, John Stevenson, a Scottish merchant, who traded with Carrickfergus - C.S.P. Ir. V.126. The number is undoubtedly an exaggeration. In 1593 it was estimated that the Sleat MacDonalds could raise 1,200 men out of Trotterish and Sleat in Skye - Note of the Waste Isles of Scotland, S.P. Scot., P.R.O. Lond. LI, 86. See also Capt. Egerton to Bagghall July 8th - C.S.P. Ird, V. 127. There was a suspicion that Donald Gorme had some designs on the Isle of Man.
and in July some Scots undoubtedly landed in Firconnell.

The obvious course to pursue at the moment was to placate Maguire, have him dismiss his hired companies at all costs, and assure him that he had nothing to fear from Bingham, and the Lord Deputy and Council wrote to both Tyrone and Bingham to this effect. Bingham had previously fallen foul of Maguire on Midsummer Eve when MacElan, the leader of Maguire's Scots had been killed, and he wrote to Burghley to say that some Scots were about to come into Co, Mayo. The conduct of Tyrone it is very hard to assay at this juncture, and it can only be said that Maguire was not brought in. Hugh Ruadh O'Donnell and his mother sent into Scotland for mercenaries in September, and in the same month there was a further conference of O'Donnell and Maguire with Tyrone. O'Donnell was then at Ballyshannon and Maguire at Enniskillen, their allied forces thus completely cutting off Ulster from Connacht. Maguire had succeeded in stirring up one of the Burkes in Mayo, promising to send him three or four companies of Scots by boat. Fitzwilliam appointed Tyrone and Marshal Bagenall - the Earl's inveterate private enemy - to subdue Maguire, and the two advanced from Clones to the Erne near Belleck, where Maguire unsuccessfully contested the passage and was overturned. Tyrone was badly wounded in the thigh and the Marshal received a severe blow in the shin from the flat of a galloglach axe. This was the last service which Tyrone rendered to the English, and we can only believe that, as the Irish annalists say, he rendered it unwillingly. This defeat then, while being but a temporary reverse for Maguire, marked the active entry of Tyrone into

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7. C.S.P. Ir. V. 126. For Scots' landing in Firconnell - Id. V. 126. 78 Id. V. 129, 136.
the rebellion. 79

It has been said that O'Donnell was on his way to aid Maguire before the battle but was prevented from doing so by a messenger from the Earl, who desired him not to compromise Tyrone while he was in the English service in view of the fact that Tyrone intended changing sides forthwith. 80 At all events O'Donnell, who despatched further messengers to the Isles for aid after the date of the overthrow, closely associated himself with the counsels of the Fermanagh chieftain thereafter. A wild report reached Carrickfergus about the time of the Erne engagement to the effect that King James had turned Catholic in Scotland and had taken five abbeys from the Earl of Bothwell and, further, that his Queen, the princess of Denmark, had fled from him because of his "revoltation," 81 and Fitzwilliam became once more interested in Scottish affairs because of an intercepted letter from O'Donnell to Angus of Dunyveg which showed O'Donnell to be actively soliciting Angus to send over aid to Maguire. The Lord Deputy at once wrote to Angus requesting

79. A.P.M., sub. anno 1593; O'Sullivan: Hist. Catholics, III. lib. 2. cap. 7; Tyrone's own account to L. Dep.; C.S.P. Ir., V. 167, 169; Bagwell: Tudors, III, 234-235. We are given an idea of the composition of Maguire's force from a list of the principal men slain on his side: three of the sept of MacSweeney Fanad, who had 460 gallógláigh under their command; one of the sept of MacSweeney na d'Tuag, who had 160 gallógláigh; a MacSweeney Banagh, who had 200 gallógláigh, (thus the three septs of the Donegal gallógláigh were represented in force); one of the MacDonals, leader of 200 Scots; Gilleasbuig mac Alexander mac Nece Mac Donald of Islay, leader of 600 Scots (this latter was badly wounded, but escaped to O'Donnell. This MacDonald force evidently came to Maguire in response to overtures similar to that intercepted by Turlough Luineach.) Note that Maguire's force seems to have consisted entirely of mercenaries, whether of the new Scots or the gallógláigh. (C.S.P. Ir. V. 169.) For MacSweeney's side also gallógláigh, see in C.S.P. Ir.


81. Capt. Egerton to L. Deputy, Oct. 8th- C.S.P. Ir. V. 165.
MAGUIRE IN
REBELLION:
OPERATIONS ON THE
ERNE, OCTOBER, 1593.

A: MAGUIRE RAIDS MON-
AGHAN, SEPT., 1593.
B: HE RETIRES TO ENNIS-
KILLEN.

C: THE EARL OF TYRONE AND
BAGENALL MARCH AGAINST MAGUIRE
FROM CLONES.

D: MAGUIRE FALLS BACK ON
THE BELLEK FORDS, OCT.

→ MAGUIRE'S MARCH.
→ TYRONE AND BAGENALL.
(Routes in each case approximate)

MAGUIRE.
O'DONNELL.
O'NEILLS OF TYRONE.

O'ROURKE.
O'REILLY.
O'CONOR SLIGO.

THE ABOVE ARE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, RATHER THAN SPECIFIC CLAN TERRITORIES.

THE NEWLY-SHIRE COUNTY OF MONAGHAN.

MAP NO. 5, FACING PAGE 180.
him not to give ear to such solicitations, and, in the approved manner of Perrott, he wrote also to the English Privy Council asking that Queen Elizabeth should write to James about the matter. 82 Certainly as the year 1593 drew to a close it became quite apparent that Maguire was in as strong a position as ever. His losses at the Erne had been confined to the mercenaries then in his service, and as he became the more closely allied with O'Donnell the latter sent him galloglaigh reinforcements from Donegal, and, in November, a force of 300 Scots with a promise of 1,000 more. O'Donnell's mother, Inneen Dubh, was to go to Scotland at this time to engage men, but for some reason she was stayed by O'Donnell until the winter should be over, and there is no record of any Scots landing in Donegal except a band of less than a hundred under a leader named MacDonough. 83

Apparently as a result of Fitzwilliam's information of the previous month, Elizabeth wrote on December 9th to Robert Bowes desiring him to approach King James with a view to forestalling O'Donnell's intentions in the Isles. In a fashion characteristic of her communications of this nature with Scotland, she sought to belittle the Irish rebels. She can, of course, easily deal with them; in the end she can have them "either dead or alive," but she is informed 82.

There is no indication how O'Donnell's letter was intercepted. The translation of it is S.P. Eliz. Ir., P.R.O. CLXXII 18 I. In it O'Donnell warns Angus not to receive or give ear to a certain Càirne Mac an Bhaird. We find this individual (he was of the Donegal sub-clan of Mac an Bhaird, anglicized Ward) giving information to the English regarding O'Donnell and Maguire and their Scottish practices on February 18th, 1594 (C.S.P. Ir. V, 215.) If not an accredited English spy, he was certainly suspect among the Irish. Fitzwilliam's letter is C.S.P. Ir. V, 173.

83. Id., V. 186, 189.
that O'Donnell intends calling in some mercenaries from the Isles, and if he does this she will have to send more forces against the rebels and incur further expense. James and the Earl Morton are to be required not to allow the Islesmen to go to Ireland, for if the Queen's interests in that country "shall receave prejudice by suche tolleration or allowance, wee cannot dejeste it in any sorte, though, thankes be given to God, wee have little cause to fear any eventes there, more then the trouble" which the suppression of a rebellion will occasion. In response to the motion of Bowes, James at once ordered the Earl of Argyll to see to it that the Irish received no aid from Scotland, and on January 4th, 1594, the Queen wrote to the King of Scots to thank him for his promptitude and assistance "for the staying of any resort to our realm of Ireland by any subjects of yours who usually frequent the company and actions of diverse barbarous rebels in the northern provinces of our kingdom, whither being drawn by such means as the Irish can afford them, for mere begging they run after them in most of their rebellions." In February, while O'Donnell and Maguire were in camp at Lifford awaiting the arrival of great numbers of Scots, Angus Macdonald of Dunyveg sent his son Randal to

84. Eliz. to Robt. Bowes, Dec. 9th, 1593 - S.P. Scot., Eliz. P.R.O. Lond., LII, 7. Elizabeth says that Maguire's force is reduced from 1,000 men to 100. Writing on Dec 4th from Dublin to Sir Robt. Cecil, Sir Ralph Lane said that Maguire had once more 1000 men with him, exclusive of the Scots, which O'Donnell was to send him - C.S.P. Ir. V. 169.

Newry to Marshal Bagenall with information of a very important nature. This was evidently in response to the Lord Deputy's overtures of the November previous, and in consonance with Angus's offer of service in 1588.\textsuperscript{87} It consisted of a complete betrayal of the manoeuvres of the O'Donnell and Maguire agents in the Isles and of the preparations of MacLean and the Campbells in response to them, and it is not easy to see why Angus, if he were still friendly with Tyrone, should make such disclosures. It is significant, however, that Tyrone's name was kept out of the business, although the English officials before whom Randal appeared made an effort to get Randal to involve him, and, this being so, it must be assumed that Angus was actuated more by dislike of MacLean and the Campbells than of O'Donnell and Maguire. The deposition was as follows: first, Randal was instructed to say that his information was given in strict secrecy; second, that it was certain that between the Easter and May following 4,000 Scots of the MacLean and Campbell clans would cross to Ireland, landing in Loch Foyle or Loch Swilley, having assembled their forces before the crossing in Jura on the first Sunday after Easter, and that their purpose in doing so would be to assist O'Donnell, Maguire, and O'Rourke. The informant went on to say that these three and James Mac Somhairle Buidhe MacDonald were the persons who had desired that the expedition be despatched, and that it was the wish of Angus that the Queen's ships be employed at Easter to break up the project. The message of Angus finished with the expression of his desire of a con-

\textsuperscript{87} Vide ante. pp. (49\textsuperscript{co})
ference in Ireland between himself and Marshal Bagenall before the projected date of the expedition, at which Angus would have more to reveal. Having heard this information, the English officials proceeded to question Randal closely as to his own view of the affair. He said that he knew of no other Irish chief who had solicited aid (although no names were mentioned it is quite apparent, as stated, that the desire was to implicate Tyrone), but that he was sure that the four whom he had named were involved, because he had seen in Angus's hands letters from O'Donnell and MacSomhairle, and because some agents of O'Donnell — including one of the MacCleriis the representative of a scholarly sept in Donegal — had been in Dunyveg territory. He said further that O'Donnell had written to the Earl of Argyll and to MacLean, both of whom had promised him assistance, and that MacLean had in turn written to request Angus to join them.

Having been told by his auditors that it was very improbable that such a force of Scots would come to Ulster except upon definite assurance and pledge that they would be paid and entertained, and that, since the repulse of Maguire at the Erne, the Irish were not in a position to give such pledges, Randal answered that he knew of no pledge except the word of O'Donnell and Maguire and that, at all events, a doubt on this head would not deter the Scots who, if they were not paid, would proceed to plunder and would

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88. Or the Earl of Argyll? In the examination Argyll is called "M'Alane" and MacLean "M'Allen". As these spellings are varied later in the same document by the introduction of "M'Allane," it is impossible to say which of the two is meant in any one case. The editor of the Calendar assigns "M'Alane" to Argyll and "M'Allen" to MacLean, but he admits that this is questionable.
should certainly accuse him of duplicity towards the Scots—it is regrettable that, since they can only give one side of the story, they should be in many instances the only accounts available.

In an effort to pursue the offensive which had met with momentary success at the Erne, Bingham advanced from Connacht into Fermanagh and took Enniskillen Castle which held out for Maguire. Maguire himself fell back into Tyrone, but Bingham's desire to be allowed to take Bundrowes Ballyshannon, and Belleck from O'Donnell not meeting with the favour of his superior authorities, the success of the English arms at the Erne and at Enniskillen could come to nothing. The Commissioners who were appointed in March to treat with Tyrone, who had numerous grievances to ventilate, did not at all see that it was impossible "to stay O'Donnell from further dealing with Maguire," according to the tenor of their instructions, as long as O'Donnell held the passages of the Erne.91 The Earl protested his loyalty to Elizabeth

91. These Commissioners were also instructed to stay the Earl from dealing with the Scots—C.S.P. Ir. V., 227. In the same month Harmer, a vicar, choral in Christchurch, Dublin, and author of the "Chronicle of Ireland," (1571-printed in Vol. II. of Ancient Irish Histories, Hibernia Press, Dublin, 1809) wrote to Burghley of Tyrone—"and if he make a fire upon the bank (i.e. a beacon on the rocks) within seven hours he can have an endless supply of Scots, by whom he is greatly favoured." C.S.P. Ir. V. 229. This was, of course, an exaggeration. It would have applied to Somhairle Buide in the 1585 campaign, however, in April another wild rumour reached Dublin, this time to the effect that the consort of King James VI had become a Catholic, and that the King would be influenced by her to send a force into Ulster—information of Richard Nugent, Apl. 19th. 1594—Id. V. 232. This was very likely a reecho of Bothwell's Raid of Leith on April 3rd—Hist. King James the Sext. 306-314; Lang. Hist. Scot., II. 384-385.
and alleged that Bagenall and Fitzwilliam were guilty of trickery towards him, but he did not say anything of the fact that Edmund Gavelagh MacDonald, evidently the leader of the Tyrone sept of the Clan Donald - and the captain of the Earl's gallowglaigh, - was at that time serving with Maguire. 92

Easter 1594 passed without any sign of a Scots' invasion. There was no assembly in Jura and no descent on Loch Foyle or Loch Swilly, and Angus MacDonald did not hold any interview with Bagenall. There is no mention in the State Papers of any defensive preparations in Ireland, and although arrangements were undoubtedly going ahead in the Isles, we can only conclude that the English had some information which led them to discount Angus's statements as to the projected date of the incursion. At all events, no further movements are recorded in the matter until the month of June. On the 20th of this month Captain Egerton, the Constable of Carrickfergus, notified the Lord Deputy that Angus MacDonald was expected in the Glens. The Scots in Antrim were at cross purposes among themselves and with the MacQuillins at this time, James Mac Somhairle maintaining the feud with the latter and at the same time refusing to be ruled by Angus or his lieutenant, Randal MacNeice, and opposing, on occasion, a hostile front to his compatriots in the Glens. Egerton also relates that the Earl of Tyrone intended taking Mac Somhairle and

C.S.P. Ir. V. 233. There is another reference to the captain of Tyrone's gallowglaigh (his name, however, not given, and therefore he may not be the same) under date June 16th, 1596 - Id. V. 541-542. - below p. (338)$, 581$.
MacQuillin in hand with a view to effecting a settlement between them.\textsuperscript{93} Apparently towards the end of the month, or early in July, Angus arrived on a hurried visit, but returned to Scotland without having come to any agreement with MacSomhairle. Before his departure he wrote to Egerton protesting his loyalty to the Queen of England.\textsuperscript{94}

§ VIII.

After the departure of Angus matters came suddenly to a head with the arrival of the expected Scottish force. The Irish situation at this time must occasion our close attention, for it, no less than the position in Scotland which is treated of in the next chapter, immediately affected what followed. Tyrone was still wavering. He was as yet unsure of his position, and for the moment it appeared that he was about to follow the vacillating policy of Turlough Luineach at the time of the marriage of the latter to Agnes Campbell. Incensed against Bagenall, whose sister he had married against the Marshal's wishes, he seemed to be meditating immediate rebellion, and yet he was willing to treat with the Commissioners and to assure all and sundry of the English of his loyalty to the Queen. Maguire, O'Donnell, and O'Rourke were out in the open as rebels, and Enniskillen, which Bingham had garrisoned some months previously, was strongly besieged by the Irish. This was

\textsuperscript{93} Egerton to L. Dep. C.S.P. Ir. V. 256.
\textsuperscript{94} MacSomhairle maintained a hostile front to the English. At this date he was undoubtedly, as Angus had said earlier, confederated with the Ulster rebels. Egerton to Fenton, July 15th (Angus had returned to Scotland by this date) - C.S.P. Ir. V. 258.
the position in July, when Fitzwilliam awaited the arrival of Sir William Russell to supercede him as viceroy. The rebellion in Ulster had not yet become the united action of the north.

Late in July, Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat landed with a force in the Route and was joined by MacSomhairle. At about the same time a second force of Scots landed in Inishowen, where they were joined by Donald Gorm. Of these events the Earl of Tyrone at once informed the Dublin Council, saying that the Scots had not upon this occasion been hired by any of the inhabitants of Ulster. This statement was untrue, but Tyrone, for one, did not wish the contrary believed at this juncture. Upon arrival in Inishowen, Donald Gorm of Sleat and MacLeod of Harris, who were the leaders of the fleet, sent immediate messages to O'Donnell to say that they had come in response to his earlier invitation, but that if he did not at once come to meet them they should return to Scotland forthwith. O'Donnell, who was engaged in Fermanagh with the forces which were besieging Enniskillen, went accordingly to Loch Foyle and "bade them welcome." They were attended and entertained for three days and three nights with strong drink and every sort of food that was best in the country. Donnell Gorm took leave of O'Donnell and left with him his youngest brother with five hundred armed soldiers and robust troops. MacLeod


96. Tyrone to Council of Ireland, (July 25th.) and to Lord Deputy and Council (July 29th.) — both from Dungannon — C.S.F. Ireld., V. 259, 260. Vide Bowes's statement below.
remained with the same number and O'Donnell retained both of them. These were recognised among the Irish soldiers by the difference of their arms and clothing, their habits and language, for their exterior dress was mottled cloaks to the calf of the leg with ties and fastenings. Their girdles were over the loins outside the cloaks. Many of them had swords with hafts of horn, large, fit for war, from their shoulders. It was necessary for the soldier to put his two hands together at the very haft of his sword when he would strike a blow with it. Others of them had bows of carved wood strong for use, with well seasoned strings of hemp, and arrows sharp-pointed, whizzing in flight. 97

The fear was evinced that these Scots would march to the support of Maguire and his confederates who were then pressing closely upon Enniskillen, and they undoubtedly saw considerable service in Fermanagh before being dismissed by O'Donnell when the appointed period of their hire had expired. When they ultimately went home to the Isles they promised to return to O'Donnell at "the very beginning of the following summer." 98

Meanwhile in Antrim Mac Somhairle raided in the vicinity of Carrickfergus and threatened the town. 99
Early in the month of August, Sir Henry Duke and Sir Edward Herbert, who had been despatched with an English force of 600 foot and 76 horse to relieve Enniskillen, were attacked by Maguire and Cormac MacBaron, Tyrone's brother, at the ford of Drumane on the river Arney and completely routed. Fifty-six officers and men were killed and sixty-nine wounded on the English side, and Duke and Herbert were, as they say themselves, glad to escape alive. Bingham, who was coming north to support the relieving force, fell back when he heard of the Irish success. Maguire was aided on this occasion by the Scots who had landed at Inishowen.

With the Irish successful in Fermanagh, Bingham's efforts rendered nugatory, and Mac Somhairle plundering at his will in O'Cahan's country and in Clandeboye, the complete volte face now carried out by the Earl of Tyrone, Maguire and O'Donnell must be the occasion of surprise unless it is considered as a matter of subtle policy. The Earl arrived unexpectedly in Dublin on August 15th and submitted himself without protection to the new Lord Deputy Russell. The latter and the Council were ready to believe his protestations, and he was heard sympathetically and allowed to return freely to Ulster. Shortly afterwards Hugh O'Donnell and Maguire both sent in supplications for pardon and agreed to dismiss

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100. Duke and Herbert to Lord Deputy, Aug. 10th, from Cavan, on which they retreated - C.S.F. Ir. V, 262. Bagwell: Tudors, III, 244. O'Sullivan: Hist. Cath. III, 2. cap. 11; A.F.M., 1594 (where dates somewhat confused.) The provisions for the besieged garrison having been lost in the encounter, the battle is always referred to by the Irish authorities as "the battle of the ford of the biscuits." Cox: Hibernia Anglica, 405.
These submissions brought about a momentary cessation of hostilities in Ulster. This was exactly what the Irish, who were playing for time, wanted, and the Earl of Tyrone at least could certainly pride himself on having hoodwinked the new and inexperienced viceroy. In Scotland, Robert Bowes took up the matter of Donald Gorme's expedition, at the request of Burghley, and sent emissaries to Argyll to seek information concerning it. Burghley sent him the Irish statement that the Scots had numbered 3,000, and Bowes forwarded to London two alternative versions of the expedition. The first, which he had "by two honest persons of Irvine and by a baron adjoining," stated that Donald Gorme had landed with 1,800 Scots at the Bann and at places close by, had been received by James MacSomhairle, but had returned to the Isles upon the receipt of letters thence commanding him to do so. The second agreed with the Irish statement in point of the numbers of the Scots, but said that Donald's force had become scattered at sea, and that some part of it had returned home. In all likelihood both reports were partly true, the force having divided and one section having gone, not home, but to Inishowen.

101. Bagwell: Tudors III, 242-243. O'Donnell's and Maguire's supplications - C.S.P. Ir. V. 270. From the Earl of Tyrone's letter to Russell on Aug. 25th (after his return to Dungannon) it would appear that a son of Angus MacDonald had then newly landed in Inishowen with 800 Scots (Id. V.270) This cannot have been the same force which came ashore there in the previous month. There is much ambiguity in the references to the landings of the Scots at this time. While in Dublin Tyrone renewed the promise which he had made in 1590 to banish the Scots. The Earl's own statements - On Aug. 25th, he wrote from Dungannon: "The son of Angus McConnell is landed in Inishowen with 800 Scots"; on Sept 1st. he wrote from the same place: "Angus McConnell is to land with a great number of Scots." (Apparently in some days' time). C.S.P. Ireland, V. 270.

By August 31st Bowes was able to say definitely that Donald Gorme had arrived in Scotland. He reported also a rumour to the effect that Donald intended to put away his wife and to marry O'Donnell's daughter, and that he would in future follow the O'Donnells and not Argyll.\textsuperscript{103}

Seven days later, his spies having returned from Argyll meanwhile, he was in a position to supply still further information. He said that in the May preceding O'Donnell and O'Neil,\textsuperscript{104} had sent a messenger to the Earl of Argyll to renew the "auld friendship" that had been between their houses, and to offer him a yearly pension of £8,000 Scots, "which his predecessors had of theirs," if he allowed some of his men to come over to Ireland to reinforce them.

This message, apparently, Argyll had at first received in good part, but as he was at that time troubled by the Huntly-Campbell conspiracy, which has already been referred to, and which is further treated in the following chapter, he had had no time to deal directly with the Irish chieftains. This being so, he had written to Donald Gorm of Sleat in the beginning of June requesting him to take the matter in hand, and Donald had accordingly gone to Ireland, whence he had since returned and was at this date along with Argyll in his offensive against Huntly.\textsuperscript{105} This information fits in pretty well, except for the dates, with the statement of Angus of Dunyveg in February, and there can be no reason to doubt its veracity.

\textsuperscript{103} Same to same, Aug. 31st - S.P. Scot, Eliz. The O'Donnell's daughter mentioned would not, of course, be the then O'Donnell's daughter, (Hugh Ruadh) but that of the previous O'Donnell - Hugh Ruadh's sister. Evidently Tyrone is meant.

\textsuperscript{104} Enclosure in letter of Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 7th. 1594. S.P. Scot, R.O. Lond. LIV. 62, III. Achinross to Bowes, March 25th, 1595. (Id. LV. 61) says that Donald made a bond with Tyrone and O'Donnell on his own behalf and on that of Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg.

\textsuperscript{105} -192-
CHAPTER SIX.

THE ENGLISH INTRIGUE WITH LACHLAN MACLEAN OF DUART, THE ABORTIVE EXPEDITION OF 1595, and SECRET SERVICE WORK IN THE ISLES.

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(1594-1595)
CHAPTER SIX:

THE ENGLISH INTRIGUE WITH LACHLAN MACLEAN OF DUART, THE
ABORTIVE EXPEDITION OF 1595, AND SECRET SERVICE WORK IN
THE ISLES. (1594-1595)

"But for the quatuor of Audin, it were a hell
to live in Farumper." (But for the service
of Queen Elizabeth, it were a hell to live in
Scotland.)

- John Colville, 1595.

It appears that the far-reaching conspiracy
within the Campbell clan and in the North Highlands,
previously alluded to in the foregoing chapter, took form
in the spring of 1592, although the exact principals therein
and the details of their aim and object were not disclosed
until the following year. In brief, one section of the
Campbells led by Lochnell and Glenurchy, and to some extent
by Ardkinglass, made common cause with the Earl of Hunitly
to remove the enemies of each in the persons of James, the
"Bonny Earl" of Moray, Archibald, the sixteen year old
seventh Earl of Argyll, Colin Campbell of Lundy, the heir
apparent to Argyll, and John Campbell of Calder, his principal
guardian. Further subscribers to the Campbell part of
the band were MacLean of Duart, whose ancestor had been
slain by Calder's grandfather, Stewart of Appin and MacDougall
of Dunolly, and the Chancellor, Maitland of Thirlstane,
was also involved in the plot. It was on the whole nothing
but an example of personal spite and worldly ambition on
the part of individuals, and it is interesting from our
point of view merely as showing in the first place the chronic
weakness of responsible government at that time in Scotland and in the second as indicating the distracted affairs of the Campbells during the minority of the seventh Earl. That this last was only eight years of age when his father died in September 1584 and that the affairs of Argyll were managed during the eventful years which followed by a council of Campbells, the six members of which were at continual loggerheads, is a point that is not to be missed in assaying the Campbell position with regard to Ireland. Historians are too apt to accept the young Archibald — and indeed the young King James after his mother's imprisonment — as persons fully endowed with all the authority and circumstance of their names.

In Argyll, Calder was the only victim of the feud, being shot by an assassin in Knapoch in Lorn. The young Earl and his brother do not appear to have been closely threatened, but elsewhere Huntly encompassed his own special desire in the murder of the "Bonny Earl" of Moray. Huntly was closely abetted in this by the Chancellor.¹

Huntly's position at this time was peculiar. Heir to the Gordon inheritance and occupying in the North the position of Argyll in the West, his power was founded, as was that of the Campbells, largely upon his partly Celtic, partly feudal, position in the Highlands and his standing as a considerable magnate at court. But Huntly was a Catholic, and to all intents and purposes there was an independent Catholic principality in Badenoch and Glen Aven.

The complicity of Thirlstane in the Moray affair and the

nominal incarceration of Huntly in the Blackness, whence he was liberated by King James on surety after six days imprisonment, coupled with the scapegrace career of Francis Stewart, Earl of Bothwell - these things were an indication of extensive Catholic intrigue in Scotland to many contemporary observers.2 The vacillating line of conduct pursued by the King, which had by now become characteristic of the man, merely increased the general uneasiness. Despite the Presbyterian uproar over the affair of the Spanish Blanks and the apparent fright of James, Huntly remained in 1593 as strong as ever in the North.3

From 1592 to 1594, while the forces making for the last Tudor rebellion in Ireland were gathering way, Scotland was in as distracted a position as she had been since the days of the civil wars under the Queen Regent and Mary Stuart. The ramifications of the Campbell and Huntly - Moray feuds and of the wider intrigues of Huntly and the Catholic Lords were considerable. In the West Highlands, the Stewarts of Appin, who had been involved in the murder plot of Lochnell, found themselves engaged in a disastrous struggle with the Campbells of Calder.4 Over the Border, Queen Elizabeth and Sir Robert Cecil intrigued with Huntly and the Catholic Lords with the intention of bringing about in some way, mysterious even to the student who is familiar with the tortuous nature


3. For a summary of the Catholic position in Scotland at this time vide Elder: Spanish Influence in Scottish History, 159-222.

THE WESTERN ISLANDS:
CLANS AND FIGHTING STRENGTH, A.D. 1593.
[S.P. SCOT., B.O., LOND., LI, 86]

MAP NO 6, PAGING PAGE 196.
KEY TO COLOURING ON BACK.
SCALE: RULED IN 10 MILE SQUARES ALONG SIDES.
The figures in brackets on this map refer to the strength in risings out of the clans and clan sections. The document on which it is founded is printed in Appendix to Matthew: Celtic Peoples and Renaissance Europe.
of Elizabethan diplomacy, the union of Catholics and Protestants in Scotland. King James undoubtedly indulged Huntly; he indulged Bothwell also until he became afraid of him, after which time he carried on a strange game of hide-and-seek with him, escaping almost by chance from his doubtful attentions, once at Falkland in 1592 and on two occasions at Holyroodhouse in 1593 and again in 1594. Further, the King was undoubtedly engaged in an intrigue of his own with the Papacy — no scheme which might suggest itself to one so deeply learned in "king-craft" as likely to further his chances of succeeding to the English throne being too wild for his consideration.

It is as against this background of misrule, of party feud and intrigue, of plot and counter-plot, vague rumour and subtle diplomacy, that we must consider the connection of Highland and Irish affairs. They had come to assume an international significance — every movement of the MacLeans, the MacDonalds and the Campbells on the one side and of the Earl of Tyrone, O'Donnell and the others on the other to fit in as a cog, large or small, in the wheels of an involved theoretical diplomacy and practical relationship. The general state of Scotland being as it was, it is not unexpected to find Angus Mac Donald of Dunyveg, MacLean of Duart, and Donald Gorm of Sleat, the three Island chieftains who had been released from prison on Campbell surety in 1591, little disposed to respect the central authority.

5. Lang. Hist. Scotld. II. 375-376. This intrigue was continued until as late a date as Sept. 6. 1593.
6. Vide Note 2 ante. It is not difficult to believe that the English were ready to give credit to any wild story concerning Bothwell, so arbitrary were his actions. Vide Colville: Letters, 98.
7. Burton, VI. 54-56.
As a direct result of the Campbell disturbances they thought proper to repudiate all conditions to keep the peace, and they became openly hostile to the government. In June 1592 Parliament made a motion to reduce the Isles to order, and in the following year summonses for treason were brought out against Angus of Dunyveg, Sleat, Mac Ian of Ardamurcanan and others, but the government found itself far too much involved with the business of Huntly, Angus, Errol, and Gordon of Auchindoun, who were accused of plotting to restore Catholicism, to find either the opportunity or the means to execute them. When, in June 1594, a commission was given to the young Argyll, Atholl, and Lord Forbes to proceed against Huntly, both MacLean of Duart and Mac Donald of Dunyveg were declared forfeit. Mac Lean, however, was included in the force which Argyll raised in conformity with the government principle that it was expedient to employ the Western Highlanders to crush their brethren in the North. On October 3rd Huntly signally defeated Argyll, who had with him levies of the Mac Neils, the inevitable part-takers with the Mac Leans, the Mac Gregors, the Mac Intoshes, and the Grants, at Altachoylachlan, or Glenlivet.

Notwithstanding their success in this battle Huntly was compelled to fly abroad with Errol, and Angus

forced to hide in Douglasdale when King James took the field against them. It does not appear that the young Earl of Argyll, then in his nineteenth year, discovered the full implications of the Campbell-Huntly plot against him until after his defeat at Glenlivet. Indeed Lochnell played the part of a traitor in his camp during the battle. By December Argyll was collecting fresh forces, and subsequent to that date he proceeded to take vengeance on those elements in his own clan, which by their earlier adherence to those of his relations who had plotted to murder him, had declared their disloyalty to their chieftain.

§ II.

The last three months of the year 1594 are remarkable as a period of comparative quietness both in the Isles and in Ireland. Apart from the relief of Enniskillen by Russell, the status quo was maintained in Ulster. There was no open activity, but behind the scenes O'Donnell and Tyrone continued to solicit aid from Scotland, and, on the other side, Elizabeth was active in addressing Argyll and the King to prevent its passage. On October 25th, she wrote to James in a decidedly conciliatory tone, informing him that, relying on his former assurances, she had not up to this date taken any very active

12. Lang, II. 395; Burton, VI. 64-65. See Bowes' description of the state of the armies of Argyll and Huntly at Glenlivet-3.F. Scot. R.C. Lond. LIX, 64. Note that Bowes uses the same obsolete word "plomps" to describe the disorder of Argyll's force as Bingham does in 1586 to describe that of the Scottish mercenaries at Andarca.

steps to cut off the mercenary traffic, principally because she was "desirous the world should take notice that we had no other course for impeaching any subject of yours from parting with our rebels - than by procuring your own commandment for the restraint." She went on to say that when she did finally take in hand the quieting of Ulster - an easy matter, the Irish being but "a rable of traitors" - she would be loth to have to use her sword against any Scottish subjects.14 On the same date the Queen wrote to Argyll a letter in which flattery of his house and of his own loyalty to his king is subtly employed in an effort to have him restrain his neighbours from the Irish traffic. He is commended for his late integrity at a time when "practice and corruption" have appeared in the greatest houses in Scotland, and reminded that Elizabeth can very well repay him upon some future occasion for any goodwill which he shows her.15

During the lull in Ireland Tyrone continued to make active preparations for rebellion. On October 28th a report from Carrickfergus stated that "there is landed in the Route as much lead and powder as cost the Earl of Tirone in Scotland 300 l."16 In the same month and in November the Earl as overlord, according to his own interpretation, of

14. S.F. Scot., R.C. Lond., LIV. 73. The Queen mentions the enclosure with this letter of a note for James's information whereby he may understand "how certain numbers of Scots daily come to the Irish, and where they are dispersed, as also the names of some of the principal from whom they were sent." It is to be regretted that there is no trace of this enclosure in the F.R.C. in London. A similarly described enclosure in the Queen's letter to Argyll mentioned above is likewise missing. Bagwell: Tudors, III. 244-245. O'Sullivan: Hist. Catholics, III. 2, cap. XI.

15. S.F. Scot. R.C. Lond. LIV. 74.

Ciandeboye, fell foul of Randal MacNeice, Angus's Irish representative, refused him bonacht for his forces in Ciandeboye, and so threatened him unless he agreed to join him in his activities that MacNeice was compelled to apply to Egerton the Seneschal at Carrickfergus, for assistance. That reciprocal arrangements for the Irish rebellion were proceeding meanwhile in the Isles is made apparent by Nicolson's letter to Bowes, dated Nov. 20, from Edinburgh. He informed him that Donald Gorm of Sleat and MacLeod of Harris, who were then at their own houses subsequent to their return from Ireland some time previously, were both engaged upon marshalling forces to cross once more to the Earl's assistance soon after the ensuing Candlemas, in accordance with the promise which they had given him. They had both been very well treated in Ireland, where according to report, they had received great profit, and they had left with the Earl a force of men who were to remain with him over the winter. Nicolson further certified that the Earl of Argyll had requested Donald Gorm to appear before him, but that the chieftain of Sleat had refused to conform to his wishes.


18. S.P. Scotland, R.C. Lond., LIV. 89. Contrast these statements with those of Tyrone to the Irish Council at the time of Donald Gorm's landing in July - ante pp. 185. Nicolson's reference to the position of Sleat with regard to Argyll conforms with that of Bowes in his letter to Burghley on Aug 31 - ante p. (192.)
Shortly after the date of Nicolson's letter, Argyll wrote from Holyroodhouse to Bowes in reply to the Queen's letter of October 25. It is rather strange that he did not think it proper to address Elizabeth herself, particularly so in that her letter to him was of the most friendly nature. Strange, too, is the tenor of his reply, for he denied all knowledge even of the existence of the persons whom the Queen mentioned as active in supplying aid to Ireland. Perhaps at its face value his letter is nothing more or less than an example of the characteristic Campbell caution as exemplified in a refusal to discuss details while professing extreme cordiality in vague generalisations. The missive is brought to a close in the latter strain: "for the present only I will assure your lordship of my good-meaning towards Her Majesty's government and that... I shall endeavour myself to withdraw from her Highness's enemies not these only who are of my jurisdiction, but also such of my neighbours, the Islesmen, as either by my threatenings or allurements may be moved thereunto." 19

Before the end of the year there was in Argyll a messenger from O'Donnell offering double pay to any who were willing to go to Ireland as mercenaries. 20 The canvassing

19. S. F. Sco. R.C. Lond., LIV. 93. The particular persons referred to above are those mentioned by the Queen in the enclosure to her letter to Argyll, which, as has been remarked, is now missing. Argyll's words are: "In very deed I am not 'acquent' with these names, perhaps because they are not set down apart the meaning here must continue to be obscure. Notwithstanding, in respect I have not thought it necessary to write to her Majesty until I 'be better scin' in the matter and 'tak further tryell' what these persons be who are mentioned in the memorial."

20. G. Erskine (Argyll's agent) to Robt. Bruce - Dec. 1, S. F. Sco. R.C. Lond. LIV. 99. An anonymous correspondent wrote evidently about this time either to Lord Deputy Russell or some member of the Irish Council to say that "an English Scot" [i.e. Lowlander] had brought a packet of letters to Tyrone - C. S. F. Ireld., V. 288.
was thus strong upon both sides. Up to this the Irish had the advantage, as they worked directly with the chieftains and clansmen in whom they were interested. The English efforts were made largely through such intermediaries as their own ambassadors, King James, and the Earl of Argyll—the last two of whom were persons whose particular interests in the business often conflicted with those of the Queen.

The coming of the new year, 1595, displayed a change in the English tactics. More direct methods of approach to the Highlanders, and Islesmen were then adopted, and a complicated scheme of intrigue set up, with what general results and peculiar detailed eventualities we shall see.

In January, 1595, John Colville entered the lists as an English intriguer in connection with the mercenary system. A new force was brought to bear on the Islesmen in the interests of Queen Elizabeth, and for the first time information of a really authoritative nature was made available in London. Argyll and James were no longer solely relied upon, formal complaints in Edinburgh gave place largely to a detailed and complicated system of espionage in Argyll and the Isles, and it can scarce be an exaggeration to say that the entire internal economy of the Island chieftains was more...

21. There is a Memoir of John Colville prefixed to the Bannatyne edition of his Letters. Vide also Thomas: Historical Notes, III, 1084. In 1582 Bowes had found him willing and able to serve night and day for Elizabeth—Bowes to Walsingham, Sept. 14 and Oct. 9th—Bowes Correspondence, XCV. 185 and CIV. 199.
fully appreciated in the English court than in that of James. With John Colville this change of system was inaugurated. It was he who procured the services of James Campbell, the younger, of Lawers, one of the multitudinous followers of the Argyll house, and by the commencement of 1595 this Campbell was supplying Colville with information relative to the intentions of the Islanders respecting Ireland. On January 5th Colville relayed Campbell's observation to Bowes that the Islanders were to some extent agreed with Argyll, and that they meditated an early descent on Ireland. He said that neither the king nor Argyll had the power or the inclination to aid Elizabeth and that the prime movers in the mercenary trade were forfeit, and hence beyond the law.

In so far as the king was concerned, he said that James did not wish the danger for Elizabeth from the Isles removed, because it was his belief that "the fear of that matter will move you (Bowes) to agree to his other desires." "Tak tharfor what you can gett" was Colville's significant advice. In other words: let England use James, but let her not rely on him. Let her rather take the matter into her own hands and use every means which arises - the agency of Colville and Lawers, for example - directly to interfere in the Isles and so to cut off the Irish from Scottish aid. 22

Although Lord Deputy Russell held that Tyrone had great hopes of aid from Huntly, even at a date when the downfall of the latter was apparent, 23 it is clear that the defeat of Argyll at Glenlivet was the cause of some

22. Colville to Bowes - S.P. Scoot. LV. 3. Lawers appears to have been a party to the Huntly-Glenorchy band against Moray and Argyll in 1592-3 - Hist. King James the Sext. 248-249.
disquiet in Ireland. On the 8th January a messenger from O'Neill and O'Donnell came to Argyll to know how he was placed since that battle, if he had suffered great losses, and if he should find it possible to send some men to Ireland during the spring. If he could comply with this last wish, Argyll was promised "his yearly tribute" from the Irish, and their aid when he should need it. The messenger further enquired particularly after the welfare of a certain MacConnachie (MacConchochy), a follower of Argyll and one who had earned the respect of the Irish as a leader of mercenaries in that country upon a former occasion. News that this MacConnachie had been slain at Glenlivet had come to the Ulster chieftains, and they now desired, if this were true, that Argyll should "be good to his wife and bairns" and that he should send over to Ireland such of the latter as could bear arms. The respect in which MacConnachie was held becomes increasingly apparent as time goes on.

Argyll thanked this messenger for his master's good wishes, and assured him that, contrary to report, MacConnachie was still alive. As to the sending of aid, however, he was careful enough to promise no more than this - that "he could not do anything therein without the advice of his friends."

All this was carefully reported by Lawers to Colville, in his position as a Campbell clansman, was well placed for the securing of such information. He saw that there was promise of wealth and advancement in the business of

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A Dougal Macconachy of Invera, was a captain under Colin, Earl of Argyll, in 1576-79. He may have been the same.
espionage, and he was quick to declare himself willing to undergo any exertions in the service of Elizabeth. At this date he promised of his own initiative to go into the Isles, whither the Irish messenger had gone after the completion of his mission in Argyll, and there to pry out the intentions of Donald Gorm, Clanronald, Angus of Dunyveg, Maclean and others, and to do all in his power to dissuade them from any intended Irish enterprise. In case he should be unable so to dissuade them, the far-seeing Lawers undertook to find out their numbers, the time of any intended embarkation, and their landing-place and confederates in Ireland. If, in the end, these chieftains should land a force in Ulster, Lawers proposed to employ MacConnachie as a spy in their camp, and, if the queen might think it proper, to go over there himself with five hundred men in her service. 25 "Unless," Colville wrote to Bowes on January 23rd, "you provide this remedy, I do not see that either the King or the other (i.e. Argyll) will take great care of it." 26. Lawers commenced operations by interviewing MacConnachie and other leaders who were accustomed to cross as mercenary captains to Ireland. He found that they had no alternative means of a livelihood, being compelled by the late governmental order against broken men to take to the mercenary trade. This one reflection on the state of society in the Isles, conveyed now, in so far as we can know, for the first time to the ear of the English administration, is of far more significance than all the "brotherly" protestations of James, who never seems to have understood it.

25. Ibid. This letter is signed: 'James Campbell of Lawiris, younger.'
or the promises of Argyll who was too astute to descend any deeper than vague generalities. MacConnachie and the others who were similarly placed, intended, Lawers stated, to go to Ireland as soon as their preparations might be complete. He himself would do his best to stay them, and would hold all "in suspens" pending definite instructions from Bowes.

But Bowes was slow to move. The traditionally correct method of approaching King James with regard to this matter which, after all, was primarily a concern of his, in that his subjects were involved, having been employed in the sending of the queen's letter of November, it was thought best to await a reply to this last before embarking on Colville's scheme. Nicolson, Bowes' deputy in Edinburgh, however, and Roger Aston, one of King James' own men, had by now been for some months engaged upon the business of influencing James to make some answer to the queen, but to no avail. Of this Nicolson informed Bowes on February 5, saying further that if Colville did not receive a reply to

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27. Lawers to Colville, Feb. 3. forwarded by letter to Bowes on 5th, S.F. Scot. IV. 27. Lawers writes from Edinburgh, but refers to his intended journey to the Isles. He evidently met MacConnachie in Argyll before coming to Edinburgh. In forwarding the letter to Bowes Colville refers to it as "the inclosed from Junior - " Junior being the cipher name for Lawers, (Colville to Bowes - S.F. Scot. LV. 29.) Lawers hints that Bowes will need to dispense some material advantage if the mercenary leaders are to be won over from their Irish project: "Bot the peapill with quhome I haiff ado, being men that men ather be stayit Upon hol sum easie commodie or (?) laboured, going over to kelp intelligence upon the lyk respect, I pray you to signify this much to the ambassadour (Bowes) and to know his mind therein," Colville wrote to Bowes on Feb. 1. saying that Lawers wished to know if Bowes would appoint anyone in Ireland to receive his (Lawers') reports, or if they were to come through Colville - Colville, Letters, 138.
his letters, and some immediate satisfaction or future encouragement as the reward of his efforts, he might be expected to throw up his project. 28

Occasional pieces of Irish news of an alarmist nature at this time must further have perplexed Burghley and the English Council. About the date of the receipt of Nicolson's letter by Bowes, Burghley had post haste from Russell, the Irish Lord Deputy, a note from the bailiffs of Dundalk. These worthies had discovered through a Dublin merchant that Tyrone and James, the son of Somhairle Buide MacDonald, had imported £500 worth of gunpowder from Glasgow, and that 4,000 Scottish mercenaries were ready to come over to the Earl's aid when he should write for them. 29 Tyrone himself was in arms once more at this time, and by the end of February he had taken Blackwater Fort. In the following month he was threatening Newry. The castles of Monaghan and Enniskillen still held out against him as the result of Russell's expedition in the previous year, but it was quite clear that the tide of rebellion was flowing rapidly southward. James MacSomhairle did not, however, continue to support Tyrone for very long at this juncture, for on February 22nd

28. Nicolson to Bowes, 1625, Scot, LV. 30. Nicolson himself was in favour of employing the direct scheme of Colville - same to same, Feb. 14. Id. LV. 34.
29. C. d. F. Ireld, V, 296-7. Note that Glasgow seems to have been noted for the manufacture of armaments. See the fact that L. Dep. Sidney purchased sculls, etc. there - ante, pp. 33, 47. Cf. the desire expressed by Mary, Queen of Scots during her progress against Hunsly in 1562 to be a man and to be armed, among other things, with "a Glasgow buckler" - Randolph's news to Cecil, sub anno, quoted Dugald Mitchell, 399.
he wrote to the Lord Deputy from Dunluce declaring himself the Queen's true subject and saying that in proof thereof he had arrested 2,000 of powder and 1,000 of lead which commodities were passing by his territory on the consignment of Tyrone.

Colville continued to keep Bowes informed not alone of the doings of Lawers but also of general events in Scotland. On February 13th, he wrote that "the Council is now only busied upon the Irish matters, how they shall have sure bonds from Argyll and Atholl for restraining the incursions of their broken men." On the 15th another letter of his desired Bowes to keep Lawers' letter (i.e. that of January 16th) "to be our ground." Lawers himself was to go definitely to the Isles at the end of March, for at that time the Islesmen were to decide whether or no they should go to Ireland. Colville urged that a friendly letter be.

30. L. Dep. and Council to Eng. Privy Council, Feb. 26. relating the state of Ulster and expressing the wish that two small pinnaces might occupy the northern seas to intercept the 4,000 Scots; L. Dep. to Burghley, March 12; James Mac Somairle Buidhe to L. Dep. Feb. 27 - C. S. P. Ireld.; V. 299-300, 303. On March 28, L. Dep. Russell was still asking for the pinnaces, Id. V. 308.

31. Colville to Bowes, S. F. Sctt. IV. 32; Colville Letters, 139. Note that "Irish" in this case is more likely meant as applying to Highland affairs (in accordance with the custom of referring to the Highlanders as "the Irish") than as referring to those of Ireland. The interest which King James evinced in Highland matters at this time, coupled with his short imprisonment of Argyll in Edinburgh, may perhaps be the reason for Sir Robert Salesbury's statement to Burghley on March 3rd that "the Scottish king has more absolute command over the Island Scots than formerly" - Salesbury to Burghley, from Newry, C. S. P. Ireld., V. 301.

Note that in 1590 Sir James Melville had advised the king to transfer his residence to the Highlands, saying that the Kings of Scotland had never been rich since they came to the Lowlands - Melville's Memoirs, 392-393.
written by Bowes to Lawers to encourage him, and then brought his own missive to a close by the cipher sentence - "But for the quatuor of Audin, it were a hell to live in Forumper," which reads in English, to the eternal shame of this unnatural Scotsman, "But for the service of Queen Elizabeth, it were a hell to live in Scotland." 32

Apparently Bowes and his advisers in London had at last come to the conclusion that the offers of Colville and Campbell of Lawers were too good to be turned aside, or that, at all events, it was expedient that these two self-appointed spies should be offered such encouragement as would keep them in hand, for it is apparent that Bowes wrote a conciliatory letter to both of them at this time.33

If the "quatuor of Audin" appealed more to some of his subjects than to King James, then perhaps Elizabeth would be the better served if Bowes read his own meaning into the advice of Colville to "tak that for what you can gett." Lawers was so far pleased with Bowes' encouragement that he announced his intention of leaving Edinburgh for the Isles on February 23rd, whence he should inform Colville early in March of the intentions of the Islanders with regard to a spring campaign in Ireland.34

33. It arrived on Feb. 14th, addressed to Colville. The latter read it to Lawers. There is no copy of it now to be found, and our knowledge of its having been written is derived from Colville's mention of it on February 22nd - S.P. Scot., LV. 39.
34. Colville to Bowes, Feb. 22nd, S.P. Scot. LV. 39; Colville, Letters, 141. The cipher reads: on 23rd Junior will go to July (the Isles) and August (the Islanders). Note that Bowes was discharging the duties of Queen's Treasurer at Berwick at this time.
On March 1st, the indirect policy of English interference in the Isles through the Scottish King bore some fruit in the despatch of the long-awaited reply of James to the Queen's letter. As Argyll had done earlier, James wrote to Bowes: "Concerning the Irish matters mentioned in her Majesty's last letter," he says, "we have deferred to make answer, not for unwillingness or dislike thereof, but only for taking order with Argyll. Before he be enlarged, or immediately after, he shall receive our commandment that good friendship and neighbourhead be kept in that behalf, omitting no occasion that may strengthen the amity." 35

More formal words on James's part; but if Bowes and Burgalay were in any doubt as to which course they should follow, the traditional one which elicited such responses as this, or that propounded by Colville, the scales must certainly have been removed from their eyes on the receipt from the latter of Lawers' letter dated at Bunawe on March 7th. "I part," says Lawers, "to Tarbar, quhair sum twa or thre cumpanis wer in readines to pas to Ireland. Bot according to my promis I have swa travel with thame that they ar stayit for the present, quhilk hes been veray trubsum and expensive to me. Nochtwithstanding I sall omit no dewtie, but according to my promis I sall ether stay all thais frome

King James to Bowes - Colville, Letters, 143-144. The original is Cott. Calig. D. ii. fol. 190 - and is not in P.R.C. Lond. It should be noted that Argyll was under restraint in Edinburgh at this time - hence the King's reference to his enlargement. In this letter the King further informs Bowes that he has pardoned, or, rather, withdrawn his charges against, John Colville - holding "mercy as the repose of his conscience, the staff of his estate, and the chief ornament and note of every Christian empire." Colville had earlier incurred the odium of the King on a charge of embezzlement of the funds in the Scottish Treasury. Earlier in 1595 this is mentioned as a reason why Colville could not work as he might in the English secret service.
tyme to tyme that ar to pas thair or uthervayis sail mak
now dew adwerteilment in all poyntis according to promis
specifiit in my first lettir to that effect."36 This was
more, if we are at all to believe Lawers' statements regarding
his own proceedings, than King James had ever done. A bribe
effectively placed could command the landless, shiftless
mercenaries in a manner in which no Royal Proclamation or
act of the Estates could away them.

An Irish spy writing to the Lord Deputy from Tyrone's
house at Dungannon declared at this time that the Earl and
Hugh O'Donnell had lately sent a messenger to Scotland to
engage the services of six thousand soldiers.37 Fittingly,
associated with this piece of information is that sent from
Edinburgh on March 25th to Bowes by one John Achinross, a
kind of general secretary to MacLean. Lachlan MacLean of
Duart here again makes his entry into the story of active
intrigue in the Isles. His old prejudices against Tyrone
and the Clan Donald are still matters with which the Irish
have to reckon, still levers, if but adroitly used, for
English diplomacy. Achinross's letter is an odd jumble of
information, promises, and offers of service. O'Donnell,
he said, had written many times to MacLean requesting aid, and
MacLean's assistance was especially necessary now, because
Donald Gorm of Sleat and Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg were

36. Lawers to Colville (Signed: "zour sone Junior," addressed:
"To his worscipful father. Y."
37. C.S.F. Ireld. V. 3C8. He said also that O'Neal's
first attempt in force was to be made on Newry.
Cavan had been burned by the Irish at the commencement
of March. Bingham wrote on March 18th to say that
O'Donnell and 300 of the banished Connacht rebels had
raided and burned from Ulster into Connacht - Id. V. 3C1,
3C8.
banded together to aid Tyrone since the date of Sleat's visit to Ireland in the August previous, and yet were unable to make a move to cross to Ireland because of their uncertainty as to what MacLean might do in their absence. Huntly was also a subscriber to the band, but apparently the Clan Donald were not altogether on friendly terms with him. In order to obtain MacLean's assistance, or at least his guarantee of neutrality, Angus and Sleat had offered to obtain the liberty of MacLean's son and that of other pledges given up by him to King James, passed by the King to Huntly at some earlier date, and now in the hands of MacKenzie who received them of Huntly upon bond to redeliver them under pain of 20,000 marks. How they were to effect this complicated redelivery is not apparent, but at all events Achinross went on to say that they had further offered to Duart the land that was the subject of dispute between the Clan Donald and the MacLeans, and, for further security, that they desired that Lachlan's son marry the daughter of Angus MacDonald and that Angus's son marry Lachlan's daughter. It seems, somehow, to be too good to be true that the Clan Donald should have been ready to forego the claim to the Rinns of Islay and the other territories over which so much blood had been spilt in simple return for MacLean's countenance to the honouring of the bond with Tyrone. If there is any truth at all in it, as an offer made at this time, then Angus and Donald Gorm must have expected far more advantage to accrue as a result of the success of Tyrone's undertakings than is readily apparent.

Such was the information given. Now came the offer of service and Duart's reasons for turning down the Clan Donald proposals: MacLean suggested that Elizabeth employ
him and Argyll to prevent the passage of the Clan Donald to Ireland, and "that Argyll send men with McLean to Ireland to pursue the rebels on the one side, while her Highness's army pursues them on the other side at an appointed time". If this was agreed to, then it would be well if three or four ships were sent to the Ulster coast to victual the MacLean-Campbell landing force and to protect their galleys. MacLean had apparently turned down his neighbours' proposals and had offered this service - apart from his undoubted hope of gain in good English money - for the single reason that he bore no good will to Tyrone. Tyrone in 1589 had hanged Hugh Gavelagh O'Neil the son of Sean O'Neil and had, to Duart's mind, encompassed the death of Art O'Neil, Hugh's brother. These were sons of the great Sean by Catherine MacLean, Countess of Argyll, and "fader sister" to Lachlan. If it is too much to suppose that for this reason alone Duart was prepared to turn down such startlingly favourable offers as those made by the Clan Donald - that is, if we consider Achinross's statement of these to be a diplomatic exaggeration - still it is quite true that the MacLeans had upon more than one earlier occasion purely out of regard for the offspring of the "fader sister" to their chieftain, opposed the Earl of Tyrone in arms. Such, at all events, was the tenor of Achinross's communication on his master's behalf.38 Nicolson, with whom Achinross held converse in Edinburgh, thought the project of employing MacLean a good one, and was of the opinion that, if the queen took the matter in hand, Argyll might be, as

38. S.P. Scot. LV. 61. It must be questioned further, in the light of subsequent statements, if MacLean offered Argyll's active assistance with the latter's express consent.
he puts it, "brought upon this platt" very readily. He felt that something should certainly be done to counter the Irish machinations in the Isles, for it was rather serious to have lately combined with Tyrone through the Lochaber and Sleat Mac Donalda "all to trouble her Majesty." He kept the matter secret, nobody in Scotland knowing of it save himself and its authors, MacLean and Achinross. He seems to have felt the necessity of Bowes' presence, since he himself was merely agent to an ambassador, now that two distinct lines of intrigue in the Isles centred on him - this new MacLean business, and the project of Colville.

In connection with this latter, Lawers reported from the Isles on April 7th that he had been for some time treating with MacConnachie in an effort to prevent his crossing to Ireland with four hundred men in response to an urgent request from the Ulster leaders. The order recently taken by the King for the quieting of the Highlands had forced the "haill brokien men" of the Isles to be in readiness to depart to Ireland, making a mission such as Lawers had in hand one of increasing difficulty. In MacConnachie's connection, at all events, he had succeeded in surmounting the obstacles in his way, for he was able to report that he had for the moment stayed him. The Ulster messenger, or "legat" as Lawers calls him, had not, however, confined his attentions to MacConnachie, but had approached Argyll himself, by this time returned to his own country from Edinburgh, to the same end. Argyll, as usual, had been careful to compromise himself with neither party, saying that he must await the advice of his friends, and that

40. Same to same, Ap. 3. Id. LV. 71.
he would send a messenger to O'Neil and O'Donnell by the 20th of the month. Angus MacDonald, Donald Gorm, and MacLeod of Harris, Lawers noted, were joined together in an effort to bring about a treaty with MacLean. In this connection it is interesting to note Lawers' independent confirmation of Achinross's statement, that the Clan Donald had offered MacLean "his hail landis that was deteinet fra him be McKonigil (Mac Donald? - the Ri'Ns of Islay?) quilk is luirkit sal componis the hailis."

The position of the broken men in the Highlands and Isles is made clear in a despatch of Aston's. Order having been taken by the King in Council, the majority of the chieftains had put in pledges for the keeping of good order, and those who had not already done so were about to compear to that end. An integral part of such agreements was the admission by each chieftain of responsibility for the acts of his clansmen or those under his hereditary jurisdiction. It was inevitable that numerous bodies of broken men, as they were called at this and much later periods, should be left outside the law, no chieftain being willing to answer for them. Such outlaws had no alternative but to maintain themselves as best they might in their own areas in defiance of the law to which, nominally at least, their neighbours had subscribed, or else, in accordance with settled tradition, to seek a livelihood by the sword in Ireland. Many elected to adopt the latter course. Such a one was MacDonald Ruadh, described by Aston as "a great chieftain of Argyll." This personage had apparently maintained himself formerly in a rough and ready fashion in Argyll, but neither Argyll himself

41. Lawers to Colville, Apl. 7. - S.P. Scot. LV. 77. And see Colville to Bowes, Apl. 1 - Colville, Letters, 152.
42. Roger Aston to Bowes, Apl. 18 - Id LV. 88.
nor any other chieftain having seen fit to answer for him in the general Highland band, he now found himself beyond the law. In all likelihood he was one of those over whom Argyll and the Council had haggled during the temporary restraint of that nobleman in Edinburgh. The isolated bands of Scots which made sporadic landings in Ulster were undoubtedly made up of such broken men as MacDonald Ruadh. The Queen's ship Charles which had been commissioned during April to patrol the northern coast of Ireland "to impeach the landing of the Scots" was, through some mismanagement, rendered quite ineffective. The Lord Deputy wrote to Burghley to say that she had not been victualled for more than a ten days' voyage, and in her consequent absence from duty the Scots had the freedom of the entire coastline.

§ IV.

That preparations for a more extensive expedition to Ireland were afoot in the Isles at this time, however, we are informed by a letter from Lachlan MacLean to Bowes. In effect this is but a re-hash of Achinross's letter of March 25th, in so far as the offers of service are concerned. MacLean, as he quaintly puts it, awaits "your Qweynis mynd to me heinament" and, if he sees "ane doing with her" he will refuse all offers of a truce which are daily being made to him by the Clan Donald, Angus, Donald Gorm and the others being chary of absenting themselves in Ireland without a definite undertaking of neutrality on the part of MacLean. It appears

43. See Colville's reference to these proceedings in his letter mentioned ante p. (209) and note No. (31)
44. Cf. C.3.F. Irel. V. 313.
45. Ibid. V. 314 - Apl. 22.
that O'Donnell had redoubled his attentions by this date, having sent advancements of pay in the shape of some wrought silver work to the MacDonells to provide for the enlistment of men. These chieftains, on their part, were making extensive preparations to fit out an expedition of 4,000 men for the assistance of the rebels in Ireland.46

In contrast to these open statements of MacLean was the ever cautious policy of the Earl of Argyll. He certainly was not one to lay his cards on the table. We know that in April a messenger from O'Neill and O'Donnell had visited him. There can be no doubt whatever that through this messenger, if not through other sources as well, he had some knowledge of the Irish situation, yet he wrote to Bowes from Stirling on April 23rd to say that the ambassador's silence had led him to think that the Queen's affairs in Ireland "had been brocht to sum gud fyne", that is, had been concluded in a manner favourable to the Queen's interests. He alleged this as his reason for not examining closely the movements and intentions of his neighbours with a view to preventing their taking part in "the Iyrland services," declared that he would now remedy this defect in his attentions to the Queen, and finished by enlarging upon the increasing difficulty of late in preventing Irish intercourse, now that those involved were the King's rebels.47 This letter of Argyll's was in response to a note from Bowes delivered to

46. MacLean to Bowes, S.F. Scot., LV. 88.
47. Argyll to Bowes - S.F. Scot., LV. 96. Note that Argyll writes "her Majesty's rebels," where, obviously "his Majesty's rebels" is meant.
him by George Nicolson. Although Nicolson makes no comment on the Earl's caution and does not seem to see that his motive is to commit himself on neither side, he is nevertheless our informant in connection with the redoubled efforts then being made by the Irish to enlist Argyll for their support. To this end a special messenger from Ulster visited the Earl, offering not only full payment for all things past— which would lead us to think that there were some arrears outstanding—but assurance of assistance to Argyll in the future, if only he would aid C'Neil and C'Donnell at this juncture. Argyll resolved to delay reply to this messenger until May 8th, and Erskine, Argyll's secretary, who seems to have been approached by Nicolson, and who was understood to be biased in the English interest, undertook further to delay it until the 22nd of that month. Nicolson believed that unless Argyll received "contented answer"—that is, something very like a bribe or the promise of it—by this last date, he would be sorely tempted to accept the Irish offers and to give full consent to those under his jurisdiction to go to Ireland as mercenaries.

48. We have no copy of this note. With it Nicolson delivered to Argyll in Stirling "her Majesty's placard," whatever this may have been. On April 25th Colville wrote to Bowes to say that if Argyll did not get licence to depart from Scotland (whither?) he would privately steal away, and that therefore Lawers was to be the more highly valued as watching him—Colville, Letters, 157-158.

49. Nicolson to Bowes, Apil. 26th from Edinburgh—S.F. Scot., LV. 92. Nicolson had then enlisted Sir George Hume as one interested in furthering Elizabeth's interests in this matter and ready to speak to the king therein. He relates also a current rumour that 3,000 men were at that time to go from the Isles to the rebels' aid in Ireland, and that James Cg., son of Angus MacDonald, was already there. George Erskine was an advocate, and the brother of the Earl of Mar. In 1591 the Calder-Ardkínglass party had desired to have him nominated as one of the guardians of Argyll. The nomination rested with Argyll himself on attaining his pupillarity, and through the influence of Calder and Ardkinglass it was brought about. (Ardkinglass died in 1591, and the feud which had arisen between him and Calder was perpetuated by his son)—Gregory: Isles, 347.
While Argyll was thus playing with both sides, while MacLean was stolidly declaring his hatred for Tyrone and his desire to serve the Queen, and while Lawers was spying in the Isles, and Colville in Edinburgh, the Glasgow merchants, practical men, were turning a fair margin of profit in the sale of swords, gauntlets, pistols, hagbuts, steel bonnets, powder and lead to the Ulster Irish.

Lawers, who had now been silent for some time, sent word to Nicolson in the first week of May to the effect that the Highlanders intended some surprise or invasion of the Isle of Man and were resolved to procure some shipping on the Clyde to aid them in their attempt. This is certainly reminiscent of the earlier days of the Lordship of the Isles, and it is a rumour that we shall find later repeated.

To the more definite preparations for an Irish expedition, however, Lachlan MacLean once more referred on May 10th in response to a letter of Bowes to Achinross. Donald Gorm MacDonald and Angus, he said were preparing a force of 4,000 men with the funds advanced by Tyrone and O'Donnell. Daily, he said, the MacDonalds "hes their message at me to haif ane greter securitie of my pace nor they haif," but he, in a kind of semi-Campbell subtlety, had "continewit tym with them." Alarmed, however, at their hostile preparations, MacLean had assembled and maintained about him a force of six hundred men of his own, and had warned his clan to be in readiness to arm. This standing force, of course, cost money, and he hinted that Queen Elizabeth was rather slow to appreciate what he was doing in her behalf. He was not very clear on

51. Nicolson to Bowes, May 8 - Id. LV 1C0.
the matter of Argyll's standing with the Queen, but he seems to have supposed that the Earl was of the same mind as himself in considering it a highly meritorious thing to serve Elizabeth. Achinross was not afraid to make his hints a little broader than those of his master, saying cryptically that as MacLean had been put to expense he should "haif for the samyn which as yet he cannot name"—meaning, very obviously, that he should be paid. Let us hope that the Queen did not see the letter in which Achinross made this suggestion, for, in speaking of the rebellion of Tyrone and of the seriousness of the cause which that Earl had in hand, he was sufficiently tactless as to relate that it was the general opinion that "he sould naif continewit ty quhill (procrastinated until) hir departing this wyrld." One of Elizabeth's nature would scarcely like to be reminded of her declining years.

Captain Thornton, it appears, was by this time stationed off the northern Irish coast with some of the Queen's shipping from Dublin—a matter which gave the Duart intriguers no little satisfaction, for the united Clan Donald

52. MacLean to Bowes, May 10, Id. LV. 101.
53. Achinross to Bowes, May 10, Id. LV. 102. On the day following, Achinross wrote again to Bowes to say that Angus MacDonald, had sent two of his sons on an expedition to the glens of Antrim. That he had done so seems to be contradicted by Achinross's later letter (May 21) referred to below (p 223)
54. Achinross's letter of May 11—Id. LV. 103. This was received from Duart by Nicolson in Edinburgh on May 16—C.S.F. Scot. (Thorpe), II. 68C.
would appear to have been largely the superiors of the Clan Gillean at sea. In Ireland, Tyrone was growing somewhat anxious over the delay in the arrival of the force which the Macdonalds had promised him. He seems to have expected them in the spring, and it was hoped among the English that, if it were possible to prevent their coming until the summer was over, he might thereby be reduced to great straits and his rebellious intentions frustrated. That he delayed operations in expectation of their succour is evident. At an late a date as June 24th, Sir Geoffrey Fenton expressed to Burghley his belief that the Earl would "stick to his box" until the Scots arrived.

It developed thus in large measure into a race for time between the Earl's messengers in the Isles and the intriguers and spies in the English interest. The former redoubled their efforts to conciliate MacLean, to enlist the support of Argyll, and generally to push forward the Clan Donald preparations, trying to bring about unity of purpose for their own ends in the Isles, distributing some money and promising more. The latter endeavoured to keep MacLean opposed to Dunyveg and Sleat, to encourage the MacDonald fear of quitting the Isles while MacLean remained unreconciled, lest he might seize the opportunity of attacking Islay or Skye in the absence of their defenders, to influence Argyll so that he turn a deaf ear to Ulster offers and forbid his clansmen

55. Sir G. Fenton to Burghley - C.S.F. Ir., V. 318 - May 19.
56. Sir Robt. Salesbury to same, June 3 - Id. V. 321.
57. Id, V. 332. Vide also V. 329 where the Bishop of Meath mentions Turkill M'Elin as one sending from Ulster for Scots. Who this was is hard to say. Also V, 331.
to go to Ireland, and to enlist support for the Queen wherever it might be found, without, however, having anything more material than promises with which to conduct the necessary bribery. If the Earl received aid he might readily combine the Highland mercenaries with his own men who, even the English admitted, had lately become very skilful soldiers, and sweep southward in a vigorous summer campaign on the English districts. Already by June Macquaire had retaken Enniskillen, Sligo had fallen to O'Donnell, and Bagenall found the greatest difficulty in throwing supplies into Newry, although supported by a not inconsiderable force of the new levies which had lately been sent over from England.

In the midst of these high employments, it is rather quaint to find that Campbell of Lawers had been so prosaic as to fall sick in the Isles. He had been busy enough there, it seems. At any rate, he had stayed MacConnachie, and when he became "convalest" he hastened towards Edinburgh to convey what news he had gathered to the ear of Nicolson, passing through Glasgow on his way, and preventing the hiring by the Islanders of such boats as, in accordance with the rumour which he had previously reported, he understood to be intended for the Isle of Man enterprise. Nicolson, who had news that Tyrone was "plainly" in the field and that the Lord Deputy was far from having things his own way, spent an anxious week or two in Edinburgh without definite information

Lord Deputy Irish Council to English Privy Council, June 4 - C.S.P. Ir. V. 321.

Achinross to John Colville (from Stirling May 21 - S.F. Scot, L.V. 111) This is calendared by Thorpe (C.S.P. Scot II, 661) as "Laird of Lawers to Colville" and specified as anonymous. It is addressed to "Y" - i.e. Colville. It is endorsed by Bowes as "Mr. John Achinros to Mr. John Colvill," and as well as this the sense of the letter is against Thorpe. Note that in the printed edition of Colville's Letters it is (277) said to be from Campbell of Lawers.
either of Lawers or of his chieftain, Argyll. Of the former he knew nothing except that he was ill; of Argyll he had become suspicious for he knew just enough of his movements to suspect more. He knew that he had gone home to his own territory and there was a rumour that he had had a quarrel of some kind with George Erskine. That was all. But quarrels between the Earl and Erskine were matters to be disliked, since Erskine was more amenable to English approaches than was his master. Although Lawers was, as we have seen, at one time on his way to Edinburgh, he did not go there for some reason, but seems to have returned to his own country of Argyll after his proceedings in Glasgow. Thence on June 3rd he sent information to Nicolson by John Achinross. The two lines of communication, that through Colville and Lawers and that through MacLean and Achinross, cross at this point, but we do not know how far Lawers was privy to the scheme of MacLean. Achinross had a new story to tell. It appears that Angus MacDonald had been bribing some persons about Argyll and that, through these, and by open inducements, he had so far prevailed upon Argyll to countenance Tyrone that Argyll expressed his intention of allowing such of his clan as would volunteer for the employment, to go to Ireland under the

captainship of Duncan Campbell of Danna. Lawers was closely watching these manoeuvres. He was aware that certain of Argyll's advisers were set against the scheme and, through them, he hoped to bring it to nought. As for MacConnachie, he had succeeded in keeping him in hand by assigning him some land of his own, and apparently by obtaining for him further holdings in Glenlyon. The rumour concerning Erskine Achinross said to be false, but he conveyed 61. It is interesting, in view of the statements already made that the Irish service appealed particularly to such Highlanders as had fallen foul of the law in their own country, to examine the dossier of this Duncan Campbell of Danna. He is described as "father's brother's son to Dougall Campbell of Auchinbreck" (1598- in bond mentioned below.) In January, 1590, he was sued by Colin, natural son of the late Archibald, Earl of Argyll, for wrongful intromission with his lands. He was allowed time to produce title. In July, 1591, he claimed the tithes of the vicarage of Rothesay. A decree was given in favour of another claimant. In February, 1592, he and others were charged by the son of Campbell of Kilmore with attacking the castle and tower of Castle Swyne (cf. Orig. Paroch. Scot. II, 1, 40 - and Watson: Celtic Place Names of Scotland, 173) ejecting the pursuer with his wife and children therefrom, etc., and with taking away jewels and writs from the Castle. In March, 1596, he was proceeded against by John Stewart, Sheriff of Bute, for taking part in the spoliation of cattle from his lands of Lochgirnshad. From 1593 to 1600 he was the defendant in a case brought by Sir James Scrymgeor of Dudop for recovery of 6,000 merles. Acts and Decrees, 1542-1660 - Major Campbell: Clan Campbell, VIII 110, 117, 119, 131, 133, 135. It would appear that in 1595 such a man should have been well pleased to quit Scotland for Ireland. Note that, Danna crosses tracks with John Cunningham, the Edinburgh burgess, there being in existence a "Bond by Duncan Campbell of Danna, father's brother's son to Dougall Campbell of Auchinbreck, to John Cunningham, merchant burgess of Edinburgh, for 250 merks for merchandize, dated at Edinburgh 29th July, 1596." - Register of Deeds in the Books of Council and Session, 1554-1660 (under date Aug. 21, 1593) - Clan Campbell, as before, IX, 66.
a very pointed reminder from Lawers that the colour of a little English money would be gratifying to the sight of a newly "conwalest" man who had begun to have some doubt if the glories of the "quatuor of Audin" issued in any very practical benefits. In short, he said that it was Lawers' ultimatum that unless Bowes should give him more credit for what he had done in the queen's behalf, he (Lawers) should be pleased to take leave to trouble himself no further therein.62

Events, however, had not become so favourable to the Irish as it may seem. The Clan Donald North, under Sleat, certainly passed southward to effect a junction with Angus of Duntveg in their interests,63 and it did appear as if the mercenary trade were something inevitable which neither Lawers nor MacLean could stop, but affairs had become so violently complicated in the Isles that it must have been well-nigh impossible for anybody to forecast eventualities. In early June, for example, Argyll, who seemed definitely drifting towards an Irish alliance, sent his henchman, the Provost of Kilmun, to Bute to parley with Angus MacDonald in the hope of bringing about a conference between himself, MacLean, and the Clan Donald leaders. Why Angus should object to this is not at all apparent, although he may have doubted Argyll, since Argyll claimed later that his intention had been to use the conference to dissuade Angus and the Clan Donald from participating in the Irish scheme, but he certainly spoiled

63. Duncan M'Dougal of Dunallycht to John Cunningham, burgess of Edinburgh, June 6th - Id. LVI, 5.

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any chance of amicable relations by giving a "sleicht answer" to the worthy Provost. This line of conduct he followed by throwing in "swill vordes", saying that he never would of his own will appoint a meeting either with Argyll or MacLean, but would let them take care of their own affairs as he would be content to take care of his. But the Provost proved as nettlesome a man as Angus. He took up the gage and gave answer for answer. The result of the parley was an agreement only in so far as Angus and the Provost appointed a day upon which to meet at what is quaintly spoken of as "the singular combait," resolving to fight it out in a spectacular manner in the assembled presence of Clan Donald north and south and the "haile cunterie and boundie" of Argyll.64 It seemed for some time as if an affray reminiscent of the celebrated affair on the North Inch of Perth were about to take place on what is referred to as the "skeip marsche," somewhere in Argyll or the South Isles.

It was becoming clear that England was losing ground through the absence of a regular ambassador from Edinburgh. What Bowes would have done if he were there at this time we can only speculate; it is quite apparent that Nicolson actually did, or could do, nothing more than pass on to Bowes the information which he received. His position must, to say the least of it, have been decidedly embarrassing. He had the power, seemingly, to make no decisions, and yet Lawers, MacLean, Argyll seemed about to fall away from him through lack of proper handling. A subtle Argyll, at all events, required the presence of a subtle ambassador; and that Argyll's subtlety showed no signs of

64. MacDougal's letter, ut. sup.
deserting him is apparent from the fact that while his master was scheming as the result, apparently, of his decision with regard to Danna, George Erskine spoke with Nicolson in Edinburgh, giving him scraps of information regarding Donald Gorm's journey south, but letting no word drop with regard to the Earl's dealings with the Islesmen. Apparently Erskine's pliability was largely a figment of Lawers' imagination. Nicolson, although he suspected something to be concealed in the Campbell sleeve, could do no more than hope for news from MacLean or Achinros.

65. Indeed Nicolson appears continually to have been awaiting news of one kind or another. When, by June 18th, he had word through Lawers that the Islanders believed Tyrone to be gaining ground, but that report had it that Angus would not oppose the queen although he would go to Tyrone in order to receive the promised payment, the harassed ambassador's agent was awaiting the return to Edinburgh of one John Cunningham, a go-between with Duart, before he would believe anything. 66

s V.

Lachlan MacLean, having been summoned by the Earl to confer with him, was in Argyll, but he had delayed so long in going there that Argyll had been unable to wait for him and had been compelled to go to the Lowlands without seeing him, "haifing to do in court." Matters were thus hanging fire - just as the English desired, for Tyrone's offensive was being delayed. 68 Meanwhile Nicolson

66. Same to same, Id. LVI. 13. This John Cunningham was a burgess of Edinburgh. He is frequently referred to in the State correspondence of the period as "the merchant."
68. Achinros from Dumbarton on June 22 to Nicolson - S.P. Scot. LVI, 16.
approached Argyll in Stirling with a view to having a heart to heart talk with him about the whole matter. But Argyll was as canny as his name. He said that it was impossible for him to stay the MacDonald force from the intended Irish expedition by open means. This was a hint, if Nicolson wished to take it, that they might be stayed by some underhand process, but whether or no Argyll intended to employ such he could not make appear. Beyond the Earl's statements that the expedition would have been at sea on the 5th of the month but for some disagreement between Donald Gorm and MacLeod of Harris, and that MacConnachie had finally broken with Argyll and might be expected to be the leader of the Irish venture, Nicolson secured no real information.69 Dissatisfied, Nicolson followed Argyll and the other nobles of the court to Linlithgow on June 22nd, whither they went to meet the King. The English agent was rather timid in the royal presence; but Roger Aston secured him an interview. He spoke openly enough to James, requiring him to order Argyll to stay the preparations of the Islanders. James said that the MacDonalds were open rebels and not at his commandment, that Donald Gorm of Sleat claimed to be "King of the Isles," and that no matter what was done it would be impossible entirely to prevent a movement of irresponsibles to Ireland. Nicolson replied that it would be no great matter if a few went, provided that the large forces in preparation at the moment were stayed. At this point the King called in Argyll. "Much reasoning they had how to stay them, being in arms together and not at the

Argyll said that he had given MacConnachie presents and had entertained him, but that he had gone from him on Argyll's refusal to give him land. He further mentioned that Lawers was very "inward" with MacConnachie, and that unless he stayed him nobody could.
King's or Argyll's obedience." The King wanted to remind Angus MacDonald that Lord Hamilton was a suitor for his remission and that he might lose his land if he were not more careful, but Argyll opposed the direct course, saying as he had said in Stirling, that "no feare, but wyles, must do it." The King eventually agreed, praying him to stay them then by wiles, Argyll protested twice or thrice by his troth to Nicolson that he would do so, and Nicolson felt that they were both very earnest in the matter. He knew that Argyll distrusted Angus because of some fear of his that Angus was dealing with Hultly, but he was still cautious enough to remind Bowes, in reporting the matter to him, that the Queen would get nothing for nothing in Scotland. Colville had said the same thing at the beginning of the year. It was now June, and many pages of complicated reports had been covered meanwhile. The heart of the matter had been touched, it is true, since a stream of secret information was flowing in from the Isles, but ciphers and the symbols and paraphernalia of espionage were all very well but practical achievement would be better. The six months had meant nothing but procrastination and delay. It was really accidental that delay of this kind was what Tyrone and O'Donnell desired most to avoid. In so far as Nicolson was concerned, one thing only was clear: that money was needed to be used for bribery. There was ample evidence that Tyrone on his part had plenty of it and knew how to use it without resort to signs and symbols. It was all-important that MacLean be secured, as Argyll, Nicolson felt, could do nothing, despite his talk of "wyles," but through the Clan Gillean. Bowes should remember this and take steps to set up a Queen's party in Scotland, being careful to use money
freely and to employ Gaelic speakers in treating with the Highlanders. 70

By the beginning of July the position was thus: MacLean was in Argyll, hunting and generally passing the time until Argyll should come to confer with him; 71 John Cunningham was on his way from Edinburgh to speak with MacLean as an agent of Nicolson's; 72 Nicolson had met Erskine and had incited him to have Argyll assist MacLean and countenance his doings in the English interest; 73 Lawers was inactive, having become incensed at Bowes' neglect of him; MacConnachie appeared ready to go to Ireland; 74 and the Cantyre force was stayed because of the uncertainty regarding MacLean and because of the patrol of the Queen's ships off the Ulster coast. 75 But there were numerous complications. When Cunningham reached MacLean at Carrick Castle by July 4th it had become apparent that the enforced idleness in Argyll had been breeding uncertainty in the Duart chieftain's mind. On that date MacLean wrote to Sir Robert Cecil in London and also to Bowes. 76 Cecil he merely thanked for favours to Cunningham, but to Bowes he explained his own position. Cecil, who at this late date was merely feeling his way, had apparently asked Duart what exactly he might do to prevent the sending of aid from the Isles to Tyrone. Duart now replied through Bowes that he might stay himself and his clan

71. Achinross to John Cunningham from Dumbarton, June 22nd, Id. LVI, 19. (Enclosure)
72. Cunningham to Bowes from Edinburgh, June 25th, Id. LVI, 19.
73. Nicolson to Bowes, Edinburgh, June 25th, Id. LVI. 20.
74. Nicolson had done this at the request of M'Lean.
75. Ibid.
76. James Fullerton to Nicolson, from Ayr, June 30th, Id. LVI, 23.
With this patrol was Capt. Gregory Rigges in the pinnace Charles. See his information of June 29th-C.S.P. Ireland, V, 337, and see also 510. Fullerton also advised Nicolson that powder and bullets were being daily conveyed to the Scots assembled in Cantyre from Ayrshire (and from Glasgow?) S.P. Scot., LVI, 26, 27.
from going to Ireland and that no Campbell would go there against his wishes. For three months he had maintained six hundred men in garrison for the purpose of overawing Donald Gorm and Dunyveg, but, as this was an expensive proceeding, and as he did not appear to receive any advantage from the Queen by interesting himself in the matter, he had lately disbanded his force. The result of this was apparent in that the ClanDonald pushed on their preparations the more rapidly now that they understood MacLean to have declared his neutrality. The MacLeods of Lewis and Harris, furthermore, had become interested in the expedition, Tyrone's golden bait having been dangled to some purpose even in the Long Island. These two men MacLean described as young men of spirit, his own friends and ones whom he might possibly dissuade, but at the same time youths very anxious to "acquaint thame" in wars. He summed up his statement by saying that he was still anxious to serve the Queen, as he hated Tyrone, and that he had in this revealed his whole mind, without any dissimulation. He did not even know if Bowes had received his last letter. If Cecil was still willing to accept MacLean's offer, however, he should send forthwith some of the Queen's shipping to Duart Castle. With the aid of such force MacLean might prevent the mobilisation of the northern Islesmen to assist Angus of Dunyveg.77

So much for M'Lean's position. In so far as that

77. That Cecil saw the force of this we know from a marginal note in his hand affixed to M'Lean's letter: "The pynance to come to Castle Carrick." M'Lean wrote the letter from Carrick but wished the shipping to go to Duart. Bowes sent on M'Lean's letter to Cecil.
of Argyll was concerned it was complicated by the Kilmun affair. The quarrel occasioned between the Provost and Angus by the fact that the latter "geif him prooid Iaingaig" and because "thaip paisseitt leis betuix thame", was still outstanding. It seemed at the moment that it was about to involve the MacDonalds and the Clan Campbell in open hostilities. We must further remember that Argyll was not aware of M'Lean's dealings with the English government. In so far as the minor characters in the intrigue were concerned, we find evidence of bad management on the part of the English authorities in that, first of all, Lawers and Erskine remained unrequited for their services and, secondly, in that Cunningham was sent to M'Lean without any definite commission to treat for the stay of any clan but MacLean's own from Irish interference. Whatever about Erskine, Lawers deserved something, and, although MacLean was the key man, there was nothing to be feared of his assisting Tyrone.

Tuesday, July 8th, was the day fixed for the "singular combait" between Angus Macdonald and the Provost of Kilmun. In anticipation of trouble, Argyll had sent orders to his own country to assemble his clan, and he had further written to MacLean to be ready to assist him against the Clan Donald by sea. The Campbells accordingly mustered 2,000 strong.

This is the estimate of John Cunningham in his letter to Bowes, July 9th - S.P. Scot. LVI. 35.
See M'Lean's letter last quoted for a reference to this, Nicolson (June 25th) confirms M'Lean that it was kept secret. For Lawers, see Nicolson to Bowes, July 5th. - S.P. Scot, LVI. 29. At this date Lawers was in Edinburgh. In this, note that Nicolson is wrongly informed that M'Lean has returned to Mull. He was in Carrick on July 4th. July 7th is the correct date of his return to Mull without having met Argyll.
Erskine's information to Nicolson - Nicolson to Bowes, July 8th - S.P. Scot., LVI. 32. As to date of the proposed combat: that July 8th was fixed upon is confirmed by John Cunningham's statement on Wednesday, July 9th, that the meeting was to have taken place on the previous Tuesday, (Id. LVI. 35). This must, however, have been a postponed date, as Duncan McDougal (ante, p.226) writing on June 6th said that Angus and Kilmun intended meeting on "Tysday nixt."
and set out with the Provost to keep the appointment. If Angus defaulted they intended ravaging the Clan Donald territory; if he met them, and there was a possibility that he might be supported by the presence of Donald Gorm of Sleat and the two MacLeods, it was more than likely that all present would be involved in a general conflict. Either result would be a net gain for Queen Elizabeth, for the more the Islanders quarrelled among themselves the less was their opportunity of contributing to a united Irish rebellion. As it happened, however, the affair finished in a compromise - as such affairs indeed, have a singular habit of doing. Angus defaulted and later apologized to Argyll for any insult which he had offered him, and the Campbells made no show of carrying out their threats towards the homesteads of Cantyre.82 Bad blood remained, however, and the Campbells thought it well to continue in arms, The Earl of Argyll was greatly hindered at this time by divided counsels among his own clan advisers, by absence from his territory, and by reason of a violent if not protracted illness.83

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82. For reference to the affair see the following letters in the Record Office, London: Cunningham to Bowes, July 9th (LVI. 35); Achtness to Cunningham, July 9th (LVI. 37). Nicolson to Bowes, July 5th (LVI. 32); Nicolson to Bowes, July 19th, (LVI. 44); Nicolson to Bowes, July 12, (LVI. 36.) Cunningham says that the combat was to have taken place at "Emtheonpereitn," with two-handed swords, and without armour. Whether this place so prohibitively named is the same as the "Skeip mersche" mentioned as the venue by Duncan McDougal on June 6th (vide. ante. p.277) there seems no way of knowing. Note also that Cunningham attributes responsibility for the bringing about of the quarrel to M'Lean, saying that M'Lean had "poutt ane trobeill" between Angus and Argyll. Argyll (LVI, 44) said that the Provost had been sent originally to Angus to dissuade him from going to Ireland. See Nicolson to Bowes, July 8th (LVI, 32.) The first mention of Argyll's illness is made here. By the 12th Nicolson reported him to be decaying so fast that some thought him bewitched (LVI. 39). On the 15th, however, he was recovered (LVI. 44) Argyll told Nicolson later that the combat was fixed between the two principals and six more on either side. For security, and to assure fair play, Argyll had caused 2,000 men to be with the Provost. Angus did not appear and the Campbells dissolved. Soon after, Angus and his friends arrived and offered combat. - Nicolson to Bowes, Aug. 10, S.P. Scot., LVI. 85.
MacLean had returned to Mull on the day previous to that fixed for the combat. He had as yet received no letter from Bowes or Cecil, but his going was the Earl of Argyll's will and he was himself sufficiently involved in the business already as to desire to prevent the M'Leods allying themselves, even for the purposes of the expedition, with Angus. If the M'Leods came in, the Isles were, in effect, united against him. Furthermore, there was a rumour in Argyll after the date of the unfulfilled engagement with the Provost of Kilmun that Donald Gorm and Angus had had enough of MacLean's vacillation and were about to invade Mull in arms. Even the Earl of Argyll was becoming uneasy. It seemed for a moment that Lachlan MacLean in pursuing his hatred of Tyrone had brought a hornets' nest about his ears. Messengers who had "cum vit fyiff hunter lib starling" to the MacLeods had evidently turned the scale in the Earl of Tyrone's favour, for on Friday, July 11th, the chieftains of Lewis and Harris arrived off Mull with 2,500 men on their way south to join the Clan Donald. MacLeod of Lewis and representatives of MacLeod of Harris came ashore at Duart to speak with MacLean. MacLeod of Lewis sought to persuade MacLean at least to remain inactive as to the expedition, but, such was the force of Duart's suasion, that MacLeod not alone supplied him with all the information which he

83. Before July 9th MacLean had sent messengers to Harris and Lewis to request the MacLeods not to combine with the Clan Donald. - Achinross to Cunningham, July 9th - LVI. 37. On the 15th Nicolson again prayed Bowes to give some recompense to Duart and Argyll for their exertions. (Id. LVI. 39) For Argyll's feelings and the threat to invade MacLean, vide Nicolson to Bowes, July 19th, (LVI, 44.).
desired concerning the counsels of the expeditionary force, but also agreed to desert the project himself in the interests of MacLean. Suspecting that MacLeod would leave them and take away his clan, however, the other North Isles chieftains contrived to carry him away from Mull by force, and so to defeat MacLean's scheme. Having assured MacLean that their only object in going to Ireland was to secure the great monetary recompense offered by the Ulster chieftains, and that they would never consent to aid the Clan Donald in an attack on him, but would rather always be found ready to assist Duart against his enemies, they took to the sea again and held on their course.84

Meanwhile Nicolson in Edinburgh was becoming more and more sensible of the difficulties of his position. He needed more power - the power at least to make decisions in the affairs of the smaller fry in his secret service system - and he told Bowes very plainly that he should procure fuller authority for him or else secure his recall as agent.85 One effort of his, however, met with success. Under date June 18th the slow-moving governmental machinery of Scotland had brought out the first of the enactments against the giving of aid to the Earl of Tyrone. The "king craft" of James had at last begun to prescribe that in James's own interest Ireland should be quietened. He had suspicious dealings with Tyrone himself at a later date, but such conduct can scarcely be counted odd in one to whom nothing was odd.

The Privy Council having produced the enactment, Roger Aston, the King's man, and one who seems to have been singularly

84. Achinross to Nicolson, July 16th and July 22nd, from Dumbarton - Id. LVI. 45, 52. Nicolson to Bowes, Aug. 10 LVI. 85 - news through Argyll. MacLeod Lewis was MacLean's nephew.
85. July 8th, LVI. 32.
obliging to Nicolson, sent the agent a copy of it before it was publicly proclaimed. Nicolson found that, although Angus and Donald Gorm MacDonald were mentioned as the King's rebels, and loyal subjects were debarred from aiding them in their present enterprise, the Queen's rebels in Ireland were not mentioned in a sufficiently specific manner. Finding thus that the Proclamation was not pointed enough, Nicolson gave it back to the Clerk of the Council's man to have it substantially mended. That an outsider had the power thus to change an act of the Privy Council must be a matter of surprise, but at all events it was amended to include mention of the Irish rebels, received the King's signature, and was actually delivered to Nicolson for proclamation by July 15th. No contemporary comment is made on this seemingly strange constitutional usage of proclaiming the law through an ambassador's agent.86

The tenor of the enactment was as follows:87

"Forasmakle as Angus McConéill of Dunnyvæg and Glennis and Donald Gorme of Slaitt, accompanied with a number of rebellious and disobedient subjectis, inhabitantis of the Ilis, ar myndit, as the Kingis Majestie is informit, to transporte thamseleffis ouer to Irland, and to joyne with the Srl of

86. Nicolson to Bowes, July 12th; Roger Aston to Bowes, July 15th. LVI. 36, 40. It was undoubtedly through Aston's good offices that the matter was so handled. Note that the enactment of the Privy Council is given under date June 18th, (Reg. Privy Council Scot., V. 223-224.) The Proclamation made out in consonance with this must afterwards have been amended by Nicolson. See Steele, Cal. Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, II, 2, 253, who notes that no printed copy of the actual Proclamation is now extant. The MS. copy is S.F. Scot., Eliz. LVI, 42.

Tyrrowne, O'Donell, and utheris of the rebellious people of that land, for troubling of the quyet estate thairof; as alswa sindrie of his Majesteis subjectis, inhabitantis within the schirefdomis of Lanerk, Renfrew, Dunbartane, Tarbet, Bute, Air, Wigtoun, and bailliereis of Kyle, Carrik, and Cunynghame, daylie furnissais the rebellis of Irland with victuallis, waponis, poulder, bullett and uthir munitioun of weir, be the quhilk doing the peace and amitie standing betuix his Majestie and his darrest suster and cousine, the Quene of England, thair realms, dominionis and subjectis, may be gritelie endangerit: and thairfoir ordains letters to be direct to command and charge all and sindrie his Majesteis lieges and subjectis,...that none of thame tak upoun hand to assist, tak parte, hyde, gang, accompany, nor yit to furneis and sell (to) the saidis rebellious and disobedient subjectis nor yit to the saidis rebellious people of Irland, any kynd of victuaill, waponis, pulser, bullett, or uthir munitioun of wear, for thair furnissing in sa unlauchfull ane enterprise, or to minister unto thame any maner of conforte or supporte, undir the pain of tressoun."

Brave words, undoubtedly, and kingly words as well, but mere wordiness if you will, since those at whom the law was aimed were most of them beyond the law already. It was quite true that before King James could fashion a stick to beat the Highland dog he must first chain the animal. Duart Castle, cutting in wedge-like between Clan Donald North and Clan Donald South, and the power of Argyll in the Loch Fyne and Loch Awe Country, facing on Jura and the South Isles - these were more effective deterrents and a more practical sanction than Holyroodhouse. But, all these things admitted,
the Proclamation was an English advantage, the amending of it a politic move of Nicolson's, for it could be used in one very practical, if unexpected, way: it could be used to quieten those of the Irish lords and chieftains who were wavering in their English allegiance, those who would think twice of going over to Tyrone if they could be shown that assistance from Scotland was indeed a broken reed upon which to lean. Tyrone liked to encourage the belief in Ireland that the King of Scots was his ally. Here was the King of Scots' hand to a document which forbade Highlands and Lowlands to aid Tyrone.88

At this very moment, indeed, the Earl of Tyrone was thinking rather hardly of the Scots.89 The promised aid from the Isles was now three months overdue; the height of the summer was over and the Irish successes of 1594 had not very generally been followed up.

Lord Deputy Russell and the new General, Sir John Norreys, had, in June and July, advanced as far north as Armagh, which they had fortified. Tyrone had razed his castle of Dungannon to the ground before them, and they had relieved Monaghan after much skirmishing but no regular battle. On June 23rd, Tyrone was formally proclaimed a traitor to the Queen at Dundalk.

88. Vide infra, p. 322, when a later Proclamation was thus used.
89. English intelligence, July 12, 21 - C.S.P. Ireld, V. 345, 346.
After this tale of delay and inaction it is rather a relief to find that, when the force from the North Isles reached Cantyre, the united Islanders at last put to sea on the 18th or 19th of July in the direction of Ireland. In all, they made up some three thousand men, Donald Gorm MacDonald of Sleat, a son of Angus MacDonald's, MacLeod of Lewis and MacLeod of Harris being the leaders. It will be noticed that Angus himself for the moment remained at home. He did so to watch MacLean, and it was his intention, if a last minute truce could be made with Duart and Argyll, to follow the expedition with a supporting force. As it is not to be expected that the weight of three months' irresolution could be shaken off at once, however, we are not greatly surprised to find that this movement was a false start. Apart from the fact that the expedition was badly supplied with military requisites and that Donald Gorm and his companions were like to starve in Cantyre if they did not make a move of one kind or another, there were divided councils.

90. Achinross to Nicolson and to Bowes, from Dumbarton on July 22nd - S.P. Scot. LVI, 50, 51. The sudden launching of the expedition at this date was quite unexpected in all quarters. MacLean, perhaps, was the only one not surprised. Erskine, (writing to Nicolson from Stirling on July 22nd- Id. LVI, 53,) did not know of it, and suggested that the Islesmen might not put to sea before August 10th. Lawers had the information by July 23rd in Edinburgh, but had no details. (Id.LVI, 54.)
and dissentient voices among the principals. Shortly before they had set out, Tyrone had sent them £300, and there was a promise of £600 more upon their landing - £300 in money and an equal sum in armour, clothes, and horses, yet they were some days at sea off the Mull of Cantyre before they had made any kind of decision at all to go to Ireland. Achinross thought on the 27th that they had gone to the Isle of Man, and many conflicting rumours as to their proceedings for some days prevailed. It should be remembered that, with the possible exception of MacNeil of Barra, the MacKinnons, and some minor septs, all the clans of the Isles were involved in the affair on one side or the other. For the chieftains and their followers from Cantyre to Lewis it was

Achinross to Nicolson and Bowes, July 23rd, S.P. Scot., LVI, 50, 51. If MacLean had kept his 600 men together the Clan Donald had been so hard pressed that "the one of thame had eittin the uthir." As it is, Donald Gorm has "wraikit" his country in holding his forces so long together, and now they are but "ane stark companie." MacLean claimed credit for having interrupted the passage of military supplies to them. Although Nicolson understood that the Scots who went to Ireland expected to have lands assigned to them and to settle down there (LVI, 32), Achinross now said that most of them were householders in Scotland and that MacLean might make them return by attacking their homesteads, since they should count their loss in Scotland greater than their gain in Ireland. Both were, in a sense, true, since there were undoubtedly two elements in the expedition: broken men of the M'Connachie, MacDonald, Ruadh, or Campbell of Danna type, who had nothing to lose in Scotland and every chance in a new country; and persons of credit, such as the MacLean leaders (although nominally forfeited) and the MacLeods. MacLean (through Achinross) continued to seek employment in the Queen's service although the expedition had set out.

Achinross (signed Filius) to Bowes, S.P. Scot., LVI, 58. News had come to Lawers and Achinross in Edinburgh that the Islesmen had left for Man on July 21st - 2,400 strong or thereabouts, in 120 vessels, small and large. The captain of Clanronald and MacIan of Ardnamurchan were said to be with the expedition. That this was not so later appears. On hearing that Angus MacDonald had sent for MacConnachie, to join him, Lawers at once set out to stay MacConnachie. It should be noted that Cecil and Bowes had at last seen fit to pay their agents; Lawers had just at this time received a "token" of 100 angels. For the money received from Tyrone - Achinross to Nicolson, July 22nd - LVI, 52.
a moment of crisis. A considerable armed force, composed
to some extent of broken and shiftless men, was at large on
the sea off the Mull. Nobody knew what exactly was about to
happen. Naturally enough, Argyll took alarm for the safety
of his country, and it is to his credit at least that the
tactics he pursued were the very opposite to those adopted by
his successor, Colin Gruamach, who fled from Inverary in
1644 on the approach of Montrose and his Highlanders.
 Archibald Campbell made all haste from the Lowlands to Argyll
and at once set about furthering the preparedness of his clan.
Dunoon was fortified, and from Loch Crinan to Glenorchy,
the Campbells were hurriedly arming and mustering. On July
23rd, the very day on which Argyll arrived in Campbell
country, Queen Elizabeth was writing a flattering letter
to him in Greenwich, telling him in courtly phrases that
she trusted that Lachlan MacLean and he would protect her
interests in the West Highlands; but there was little of
the courtier left in Archibald at that moment. It is rather
ironical to compare the Queen's honied words with Erskine's
blunt assertion to Nicolson that his master was likely to
bring upon himself a dangerous war through his efforts to

93. Erskine to Nicolson, July 25th, from Carrick-
S.P. Scot. LVI, 60.
uphold the Queen's "particular." 

It does not appear that the MacDonalds suspected MacLean of being actively involved with the Queen to break off the preparations towards aiding the Irish, but there is evidence to show that they at least appreciated Argyll's standing in the matter. Through a warning supplied by Tyrone, Donald Gorm was advised of the "kindness" existing between

Erskine's letter of July 25th. The Queen's letter reads:

"Right trustie and right wellbeloved Cousin, wee greet you hartelie well: wee haue vnderstoode so fullie by our seruent Bowes, of your great care of such thinges as he of late hath recommended vnto you, that wee cannot any longer forbeare to acknowledge the same by our owne lettres, thereby to assure you, that such is our contentment to find you alswell the successor of your noble fatheris love and good will to our estate, as the Inheritour of his fortune, that wee are more and more desirous to understand from you in some particular, how wee might demonstrate our desire to pleasure and gratefie you, being one, whose actions have confirmed to the worlde, not only your constancie and faith to your soverignge in tyme of greatest tryall, but also your Judgement in discerning clearelie howe dishonorable it would be for any man of noble blood to yelde the least countenance and assistance to so base and malitious Rebellis. Lett these lynes therefore serve wee pray you for this tyme, and for some other particular give faith to our servant Bowes.

And where wee vnderstoand that your Cousin Maclane is much at your devotion, and one of our servants, and commandment in those Iles of the North, wee doe desire you, that he may find by you, howe well you are disposed towards vs, which wee doe knowe will much directe his courses, and for which wee wilbe found most ready to requitt him. All which wee doe the more recommend to you, because wee are informd, that our dearest Brother the King of Scottis did deale with you for the same in the presence of one of our owne servants employed in Bowes his absence. Yeouen, at our Mannor of Greenewich, the xxiiijd day of Julie in the xxxvijth yere of our Raigne 1595.

Your most assured Lovinge Cousin
"Elizabeth R."

(Letters to the Argyll Family, 31-32.)
Argyll and the Queen, 95 and it may be that a similar knowledge had led Angus into his sharp words with the Provost of Kilmun.

With the seeds of dissension, which MacLean had sown through MacLeod, in their midst - afraid of MacLean on the one hand and suspicious of Argyll on the other - the navy came by easy stages around the Mull of Cantire to the Island of Arran. 96

This is Argyll's own statement (to Nicolson when Nicolson came to Dunoon some days previous to Aug. 10th - Nicolson to Bowes, LVI, 85) and we must consider it as such - i.e. that Argyll exaggerated the effect of this on the MacDonalds in order to excuse himself with the English government for not having prevented the expedition. It is rather hard to reconcile Donald Gorm's angry feelings against Argyll with the statement (by Nicolson, July 26th - LVI, 62 - unfortunately Nicolson does not give his authority) that he had sought an interview with the Earl in Argyll a few days before the latter's return from the Lowlands, and had said to the Captain of Clan Allister that if Argyll had been within thirty miles he should have gone to visit him with twenty-four men. Argyll continued throughout to play the part of one willing but unable to aid the queen. On Aug. 7th he wrote in this strain to Bowes (S.F. Scot., LVI, 79): and on the same date he replied to the queen's letter of July 23rd (this reply must have been by return of conveyance) saying that he would use all his power with MacLean and others in her interests.

(Id, LVI, 86.) Nicolson noted on Aug. 4th to Bowes, (LVI, 75) that Argyll had had extensive offers from the Irish and from the Clan Donald alliance for his support, and that it would be well if the queen sent him some reward for his fidelity, as well as an honorarium for MacLean. See further: Argyll to Bowes on July 15th from Edinburgh, S.F. Scot., LVI, 49; and Erskine to Nicolson, July 22nd, from Stirling, Id LVI, 53. Erskine mentions the suspicion on the part of the Islesmen that Argyll is merely an English agent. It was knowledge of this that made Nicolson shy of having Argyll nominated to proclaim the King's enactment relating to Irish assistance, for he feared (and Erskine agreed with him) that the Islanders should deem it to have emanated from Queen Elizabeth when it was given such a mouthpiece (see Nicolson to Bowes, July 19th - LVI, 44.) Nicolson had been for some time trying to find out what kind of reward would suit Argyll. In this connection Bowes made a slip which, had not Nicolson known better than his master, might have been fatal. In sending on the secret service money to Edinburgh he saw fit to include only £20 for MacLean! We can imagine the Duart chief's feelings if Nicolson had attempted, as he says, to "saven" him with that paltry sum. Lawers and Achinross received belated payment at this date (July 23rd.) The latter was now a fully accredited secret agent and apparently this entitled him to the term "filius," in the correspondence. (Nicolson to Bowes - LVI. 55.) Lawers (the "Junior" of the cipher, and apparently already a "filius") received 100 angels (Achinross to Bowes, signed "Filius", July 24th, LVI, 55.

This is conjectural. Erskine calls it "Aving." It was at all events an island on the insshore side of the Mull. Described as six miles "on this (Argyll) side" of the Mull - by Erskine, Id, LVI, 67.
Here a council of war was held. The lack of real unity of purpose and the general unwillingness to make any move which would prejudice the principals in the Isles which were made evident therein foredoomed the entire venture to failure. As Furlough Lane on O'Neil had failed in not adopting a policy sufficiently resolute in 1569, so the Islesmen failed now. A power greater than that of Elizabethan intrigue seemed to prevent united action at any time by the Gael of Ireland and the West Highlands. When the Irish were struggling among themselves and were unprepared to receive it, at that moment the Islesmen proffered willing aid; when the Irish had made a common cause of their grievance and were in union in rebellion, then the Islesmen were at each others' throats and unable to send any assistance to their fellow Gaels. The courses of action between which the Islesmen at Arran had to decide appear to have been three: first, they might assail Argyll and Maclean, overthrow them and then sail for Ireland, on the principle that they could not afford to leave an active enemy lying across the lines of communication with their base; second they might assail the Isle of Man, to what end it seems quite impossible to say: and third, they might in accordance with their first intentions, cross to the Earl of Tyrone's support without further delay.97 This last course was finally adopted. This résumé of the deliberations of the Islesmen is given by Erskine. (S.F. Scot., LVI, 67, July 31,) and it must therefore be remembered that it partakes of the nature of Campbell propaganda. For example, Erskine does not mention an attack on Maclean as well as Argyll in the first head, and yet if this proposal were put forward at all some provision must have been made for dealing with Maclean. It must always be remembered, however, that the MacLeods would not act against the Macleans. Their presence in the expedition was sufficient to ruin it as a united venture. Again, the suggestion to attack Man is very hard to account for. (Vide ante p.101.) What exact designs the Islesmen could have on Man at this late date must, it seems remain a mystery. Erskine says that they were "only hinderit by tempest" from going thither on this occasion. On Nov. 15th, 1595, Angus of Dunyveg sent in a request to King James to be allowed to invade the Isle of Man - &c, S.F. (Thorpe), Scot. 11, 698, and see 899.
It is certainly peculiar that while to aid the Irish and to secure monetary payment and the chance of a settlement on the land in Ireland as a reward was the only point upon which all parties to the expedition seem to have been united, yet, such were the chronic dissensions which they took with them from Scotland, that this was the very last thing they had a chance of doing. On July 22nd, they set out from Arran, almost 5,000 strong, in a hundred galleys and craft of all sizes - MacDonalds of Cantyre, MacDonalds of Sleat, MacLeods of Lewis and Harris, and, we may be sure, broken men from one corner of the Isles to the other. Angus of Dunyveg did not adhere to his earlier decision to remain in Scotland, for he went to Ireland also at this time, whether with the main force or not does not appear. It is clear that there were numerous stragglers, and that the sailing was not made in a compact flotilla. On or about the date of the main departure from Arran, a supporting force of MacDonald's and MacIans, nine hundred strong, was coming south by the Isle of Mull to join the others off Cantyre. The Captain of Clanronald and three of his uncles, the Laird of Knoydart, MacIan of Ardnamurchan, and a brother of Donald Gorm of Sleat were the leaders. Being weary after a day at sea, they put in at "ane tytill (little) yle on the crest of our gret yle of Mull, called the Gallow, their

98. Colville (to Bowes, Aug. 7th) calls them "a naked, disordered company." - S.F. Scot., LVI, 81, and Letters, 173. Other estimates vary. Nicolson's is "over 3,000." (S.F. LVI, 78.) MacConnachie was not with the force, the arrival of Lawers' stipend having persuaded the latter once more to seek him out and to stay him. The Irish, not knowing that Argyll was "out with him" (Nicolson's phrase is reminiscent of modern slang), continued to write to the Earl requesting his services. (Id. LVI. 44.)
to rest the nycht tym." MacLean with his household guard
of three hundred men - a hundred in "coit of maelye as ve
use with twa handit swordis and heidpeice of yrne and utheir
hunder of fyirmen and ane hunder of bowmen -" laid a trap for
them, possessed himself of their galleys, birlings, and
smaller craft, and eventually succeeded in taking their
entire force captive. The principals he at once imprisoned,
sparing "na yrnes to induis thame the bettr to tak eis in
patience," but the clansmen he ferried over from Mull to
those parts of the mainland nearest to their dwellings.
Achinross, who remained at Dumbarton in the capacity of
MacLean's trusted agent, lost no time in informing Nicolson
of this successful coup in the interests of the Queen. 99

After the ultimate departure of the main body of
the mercenaries for Ireland news concerning their activities
did not arrive in Scotland for some days. When it did come it
was largely of a garbled and contradictory nature. This,
coupled with the fact that the Irish State Papers give a very
thin account of the expedition, makes it impossible for us to

Speaking of MacLean, Achinross says: "dieveris tymes he plaid
this dance heir agais his enemais." The captives are,
of course, described as the most feared and able men in the
Isles. The delightful part of the entire is Erskine's
statement (to Nicolson, from Dunoon, also on July 31st) that
it was at Argyll's direction and with the aid of a force
of Argyll's men that M'Lean had seized MacMan and the
MacDonalds! Who is to be believed, when downright pravarica-
tion is deemed a small matter in the currying of royal favour?
At all events, Argyll reaped the advantage. Not having his
eggs all in one basket, he thought best to apply rather to
his own King than to Elizabeth, and was quick to inform him
that he had stayed sundry Islanders from going to Ireland.
"Whether it be true or not, I know not," said Roger Aston,
in relaying the news to Bowes, but James at least credited the
Earl, wrote him "a loving letter," and granted him a suit
which he had previously been refused - a tack of the
herring customs formerly held by Ardkinglass.
(St. Scot., LVI. 89) Aug. 15th, Edinburgh.
account in detail for the manoeuvres of the fleet when the Irish coast had been reached. The first official news of a landing was received by Sir Geoffrey Fenton in Dublin on July 29th. Beyond this it is impossible exactly to date of the events, the general trend only of which is discernible.

It appears that the Scottish galleys arrived in Ireland in a scattered fashion, the various clan elements very likely keeping mutually separate. The first landing was in the Ards where a contact seems to have been made with emissaries of Tyrone. The Scots had no sooner arrived here, however, than they took ship again, perhaps to pass up what is now Belfast Lough towards Cladedge, where Tyrone seems to have been assembling cattle for the purpose of victualling them. Captain Thornton having been anchored meanwhile with the Queen's ships Popinjay and Charles off Olderfleet had news of these proceedings, and he at once weighed anchor and made south across the mouth of the Lough to intercept the Scots. On his way he overtook five or six galleys, some at least of them belonging to the Clan Ronald. Some of them he sunk with considerable loss to the Scots, and the others he drove to seek refuge in one of the Copeland Islands, off the north of the present Co. Down, where they were joined by the main body

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Horrors to Burghley, Aug. 1st., Sir Ralph Lane to same, Aug. 3rd - Id. V, 353, 358. Lane says that Tyrone had offered to give in marriage to the Scots' bachelors the daughters of the gentlemen of his clan, to every one a wife of degree proportionate to that of the man who was to marry her. We can see that such a scheme of general nuptials as this contemplated would have been decidedly favourable to the Earl as binding the Highlanders to his service.

John Morgan to ( ) Aug 1st, Id. V. 359.

Thornton to Bagenall, encl. in Aug. 16th. Id. V. 369-370. The Charles was a pinnace - the Popinjay was in all probability of similar build. Capt. Gregory Ridges was with Thornton.
of the fleet. There was some kind of engagement here, and the Scots seem to have been run ashore. Thornton stood on and off the Islands, keeping the Scots cooped up and preventing their communicating with Tyrone, and the Carrickfergus forces turned out to support him. It does not seem at all probable that he attempted to come to close quarters with them, since the Scots had a powerful force in comparison with that at the Captain's disposal. But the Scots were at best but half-hearted opponents. MacLeod of Lewis certainly, and in all likelihood most of the others as well, would be better pleased to return to Scotland than to fight their way to the Earl. Why they should have come together at all and so offered so large a target, or why they had sought to land in this part of Ulster, right in the jaws, as it were, of Carrickfergus, are matters difficult of explanation. The

This seems the most probable and authenticated story - pieced together from Thornton's letter and from the examination of two captured Irish priests, Frs. Fergus Cavell and Patrick O'Bearne - Id, V. 370. The accounts related in Scotland are various: Aston to Nicolson, Aug. 20th (S. P. Scot. LVI, 92) - the Scots met with a merchant ship on their way across and secured four or five tons of wine which they drank freely. The merchantman later fell in with Thornton and Rigges who were thus informed of the passage. These latter came upon the Scots suddenly and drove them to the Coleplands where they slew them both in their ships and in the water. Aston also said (Aug. 15th, LVI, 89) that King James rejoiced as much at the overthrow as if it had been the Earl of Bothwell (sic) who had been defeated. Achinross heard of the defeat, but with no details, in Stirling on Aug. 9th (LVI, 83.) By the following day he was able to supply the following to Nicolson (LVI, 85) - Capts. Thornton and Rigges had met and sunk near the Island of Rathlin thirteen galleys. The only survivor from the crews of these told them that his squadron had been the hindmost, that the entire fleet was going to Tyrone, that the other galleys had spoiled Clandeboye, and that these latter with the remainder of the force were now at the Copeland Islands. Going on to the Copelands the English had overthrown the Scots' force. This story is internally contradictory, as a squadron off Rathlin could not be the "hindmost" of a fleet sailing from Clandeboye to the Copelands.
elaborate fumbling of the leaders and the mismanagement of the entire can only have sufficed to discredit the Scots as soldiers in English eyes.

Eventually Thornton held a parley with one Stewart, the secretary of Angus MacDonald, and - apparently after a further attack on the galleys - hostilities were suspended and pledges surrendered by the Scots.\(^4\)

During the period of truce which followed\(^5\) the Scots seem to have been allowed to leave the Copelands and to scatter. On July 30th Angus and Donald Gorm, the two chief leaders, wrote to Thornton and Riggess requesting permission to pass over to the Antrim shore and leave to send a messenger to the Lord Deputy to offer their swords to the Queen.\(^6\) This last shows conclusively the essentially mercenary motive which characterised the entire undertaking - for over three months the Islanders had been plotting to come to Tyrone's assistance and now at the turn of a hand, as it were, they declared themselves willing to negotiate with his enemies with a view to entering service against him for pay. So much for MacLean's earlier statement that the Clan Donald were so anxious

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106. Re negotiations concerning pledges: On July 28th, Angus and Donald Gorm MacDonald wrote to Thornton and Riggess offering to put two pledges into the hands of the governor of Glendeboy to be retained until the Scots had returned to Scotland. They further desired to send a messenger to the Lord Deputy to offer him their assistance against the Queen's enemies (a complete change of front) - C.S.F. Ir., V. 370. To this Thornton seems to have replied agreeing to the truce, for on the same date the chieftains again wrote him saying that they were sending as pledges the heir of Angus MacDonald's father's brother and a gentleman of Donald Gorm's (Id. V. 370). MacLean later (S.P. Scot, LVI. 94, etc.) made a great point of Thornton's having been fooled into accepting four servants (sic) as pledges when - such was the danger of the Scots - he could have had principals if he so desired. It is at least clear that if the pledges were but unimportant persons, and not such as the MacDonals pretended, Thornton had no suspicion of deception.
107. C.S.F. Irel., V. 370. They desire to pass to "the other shore" (evidently Antrim since Donald Gorm was in the Glens on Aug. 3rd.) and to send to speak with "the Governor" - the Lord Deputy.
to assist the Irish that they were willing to buy his neutrality by the surrender of the disputed lands in Islay. That the statement of willingness to serve with the English was no mere politic stroke to free the Scots from Thornton's attentions and to gain time until the damaged galleys should have been repaired is proved by Donald Gorm's letter to the Lord Deputy on August 3rd. By that date the untenable position of the Copelands had been evacuated. Donald was in the Glens of Antrim and any danger from the Queen's shipping had been passed. Sleat reminded the Deputy that his father, the Lord of the Isles as he claimed, had been well regarded by Queen Mary of England, and he offered plainly to enlist his men in the English service if he were satisfied as to the rates of pay.

Having sent off this letter, and in accordance with the terms of the truce with Thornton, Donald Gorm returned to Scotland; Angus also went home and with them the greater body of the mercenaries. Surely few expeditions have been more futile! MacLeod of Lewis did less even than the others to justify his coming south. Whether or not he reached Ireland at all we cannot say, but before August 23rd he was homeward bound, calling in at Duart on his way. The extraordinary point of the entire, if we are to believe MacLean, is that Tyrone seems to have paid something to the Scots for coming to Ireland even after the purposeless nature of their manoeuvres must have become apparent. MacLean says that,
even after the surrender of the pledges, the Scots were bound by "writ" to serve Tyrone and that they had received largely of his "geir", getting more even than had been promised prior to their going to Ireland. Angus received more than the rest as the prime instigator of the others, and there were still six horses "in coming" to him. Angus certainly cannot be convicted of double purposes as there is nothing to show that he was privy to Donald Gorme's scheme of going over to the Queen's service. Further proof of Angus's sincerity is afforded in his sending his son, also named Angus, to Tyrone with 600 men because he thought it a shame that "materis ar nicht keipit to the erle."

This company under Angus Ug MacDonald and the force conducted by MacLeod, the Tutor of Harris, and consisting of a similar number, were the only bodies of Scots that remained in Ireland and their service the only material gain to the Irish as a result of the expedition. MacLeod of Harris appears to have conducted himself more honourably than any of the chieftains. Having landed with his clan in some unnamed part of Ulster, he was charged by a company of English horse and driven back to his boats after a number of his men had been slain. Piqued at this reverse, and in considerable wrath with the MacDonalds because of the abortive nature of their manoeuvres, MacLeod swore revenge on the English. It does not appear that he was present at the capitulation at the Copelands. It would rather seem that he went directly to O'Donnell in Tir Conaill and entered service with him according to his promises. Not even a letter from Argyll requesting him to come back to Scotland and to leave the Queen's rebels could move him to
return ere he had had revenge for his losses on the English. Referring to his clan, Erskine said that they were "of all the Islesmen the most courageous and of best spirit." 110

§ VII.

When definite news of the general failure of the expedition arrived in Scotland, MacLean and Argyll renewed their exertions against the Clan Donald. It became increasingly clear that their attentions were in reality directed more towards the extermination of the ill-fated House of Islay than towards the "quatuor of Audin." MacLean, stimulated by the promise of a thousand crowns from the Queen, claimed that MacLeod of Lewis, at his instigation, had been a greater force in bringing about the return of the Scots than either Thornton or the Queen's pinnaces. Argyll threatened to invade the territory of the Clan Donald South in order to make Angus more amenable to the Campbell interpretation of reason. But the enemies of Dunyveg were not numbered alone among the Campbells and MacLeans. In some way MacLean had won over his late ironed captives, MacIan of Ardnamurchan and the Captain of Clanronald, and Argyll hoped to have their assistance in a general attack on Angus MacDonald. MacLeod of Lewis, too, was to lend a hand. The merry work was to start at once, provided that Queen Elizabeth contributed the greater part of the charges. MacLean, Argyll, MacIan,

Erskine to Bowes, Aug. 24th S.F. Scot., LVI, 98; MacLean's letter as previously quoted: Aston to Nicolson, Aug 20th (LVI, 92) and Erskine to Nicolson, Sept 9th - C.S.F. Scot (Thorpe) II. 694. Aston said that King James was very sorry that any pledges had been taken, and that he regretted that all the Islesmen had not been put to the sword. Note that Erskine says MacLeod Harris's force numbered 800. MacLean is the authority for 600. Achinross (to Nicolson, Aug, 22nd, LVI, 96) said that the occasion of Angus's return was not so much the loss that he had sustained as the finding that certain conditions undertaken by O'Neill and O'Donnell had not been fulfilled.
the Captain of Clanronald, and MacLeod of Lewis were ready upon the sight of English money to fall upon Dunyveg at a moment's notice. The Campbell intrigue to possess Cantyre and Islay, later consummated, was already afoot. He who could keep up the game of trickery the longest was to win. It had not yet become evident that Maclean was a Campbell dupe and no match for the subtlety of Argyll. 111

Although it was still but August the main activities of the Scots with relation to Ireland were over for the year. The course of affairs in the Isles for the remaining four months was even less definite than during the Spring and Summer. The Irish continued to solicit the service of MacConnachie, but Lawers saw to it that he remained in Scotland. 112 As for Argyll, although Erskine said plainly to Bowes that if the queen neglected his offers of service at this moment she might look in vain for his friendship again, no attempt was made by the English authorities to aid him in his proposed descent on the Clan Donald. MacLean renewed his...

111. MacLean's letter, as quoted: Achinross to Nicolson, Aug. 22nd, (S.P. Scot., LVI, 96); Erskine to Bowes, Aug. 24th, (Id. 98). It is, of course, to be expected that Erskine claims for Argyll all the credit of having caused MacLeod Lewis to return! The machinations with MacIan and the Captain of Clanronald are obscure. Note that the two chieftains of Clanronald were present at the Copelands, where they appear to have put in pledges, but of little consequence, of their own. On their return they were in Islay by Aug. 24th. How far the Captain rather than the immediate chieftains could command the Clanronald is difficult to say. He perhaps had his own following against the chieftains - or it may be that Argyll merely used his name, as well as that of MacIan, to lead Bowes into an exaggerated notion of the strength of the anti-MacDonald alliance. The Clanronald was, of course, of MacDonald name and stock and MacIan had been a MacDonald supporter throughout the Rins of Islay struggle. The Captain of the Clanronald was to visit Argyll within a few days after Aug. 24th.

112. Achinross to Nicolson, Aug. 22nd, S.P. Scot., LVI, 96. Nicolson to Bowes, Aug. 25, Id. 101. Lawers' activities were curtailed for a moment at this date by reason of his nuptials. He appears to have been quite "conwa.lest" by this. See also Colville to Bowes, Aug. 2nd - Colville, Letters, 173.
offer to serve the Queen in Ireland, proposing as before to attack Tyrone from the rear with 2,000 of his own men and 2,000 of Argyll's. It should be noted, however, that Argyll never, at least on paper, committed himself in this regard and, in so far as we can tell, it was quite true to say that he remained in ignorance of MacLean's intrigue with Bowes.

The continuity of matters in so far as MacLean was concerned is well brought out in that chieftain's letter of August 22nd. It will be remembered that Hugh Gavelagh O'Neil and his brothers, cousins of MacLean, had spent some time in the Isles previous to the execution of Hugh by Tyrone in 1589. MacLean now claimed that he had still with him two young boys, the sons of one or other of these cousins of his, and so persons who could make out some claim to a succession to the O'Neil titles in Ireland. The bar sinister undoubtedly entered into the matter, but MacLean's proposal that he be employed to set them up as rivals to Tyrone must have unfolded to the Tudor mind prospects of such internal clan strife as had done much elsewhere in Ireland to break the Celtic system.

Partly in response to Lachlan MacLean's earlier request for support by a pinnace of the Queen's and partly, we must suppose to sift his offers and project at first hand, Captain Thornton was despatched from Irish waters to Duart early in August. There he met MacLean and one, Archibald Campbell, an emissary from the Earl of Argyll. Duart repeated his offer of service and desired Thornton to have the Queen write to Argyll requesting him to countenance the project and to support it with his own forces. Thornton notes that Hugh Gavelagh O'Neil was a kinsman of Argyll's as well as of Lachlan's, as,
of course, he was, and he further tells us that, as Argyll was Lord Lieutenant in the Isles, MacLean could not raise forces without his authority. This last, of course, was stretching the matter somewhat, and Thornton's entire neglect of King James and of the fact of Scotland being a separate entity when he mentions the possibility of the Queen's writing to Argyll to request him to license MacLean to raise forces must strike us as quaint. Thornton himself seems to have been in favour of the project. He says that the Queen's ships were no match for the Island galleys in the matter of speed - and this, we must remember, was only shortly after his own success at the Copelands. He had left Scotland by September 24th and was back in Dublin by October 5th, and the Lord Deputy sent on to Cecil the information which he had gathered in Mull, together with a recommendation that MacLean's offer be considered. 115

115. L. Deputy to Sir R. Cecil, Oct. 4th; Thornton to same, Oct. 5th; Thornton's information of Oct. 1st - C.S.P. Ireid, V. 410, 412. The negotiations in Hull had been on a businesslike basis, the question of pay having been considered on both sides. Thornton gives a valuable statement on this head: every Scot serving with longbow or halbert is to have by the quarter 10s wages; every man serving with a piece, by the quarter, 30s wages. Over and above this, every man is to have for victuals three wadders of butter and six wadders of oatmeal each month. In cases where food is not forthcoming, every man is to have in lieu thereof 10s. over and above his wages each month. The composite pay by the month of 30 days, (including both actual pay and allowance for victuals) is: for those serving without firearms, 13s. 4d; for those with pieces, 16s. 8d. These, says Thornton, are the usual rates of pay for Scottish mercenaries then prevailing in the north of Ireland. For Thornton's mission, see also Erskine to Nicolson, Sept. 9th, Nicolson to Bowes, Sept. 12th; MacLean to Bowes and to Cecil, Sept. 12th; Achinross to Nicolson, Sept. 15th - C.S.P. Scot., (Thorpe) II. 694-3; F. Scot., LVII, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15. Note that MacLean, Argyll, and others were received by King James in audience on Aug. 28th. There is no indication whether Irish matters were discussed - Achinross to Bowes, Aug 25-3; F. Scot., LVI, 104. Nicolson to same, Sept. 1. C.S.P. Scot., (Thorpe) II. 683.
We can only suppose that the information was filed in London for future reference. Nobody could accuse Burgley or Cecil of precipitate action in such matters. Or perhaps we should refer the cause of the interminable delays which characterised English Highland dealings solely to the queen's parsimony.

In Ireland the rebellion continued slowly to gain ground. Ulster was, of course, the centre of revolt, and from this province along two lines of approach the attack was made upon the English districts. South west of Loch Neagh and on through Newry to the north Pale area: that was one line of approach, and along it came O'Neill's own forces, advancing, skirmishing, threatening, right across Armagh, coming on suddenly and isolating the English garrisons of the march lands, as suddenly retreating to the security of the wilderness that the war had made of the Ulster border. By Ballyshannon across the Erne and through Sligo to Mayo and Galway: this was the second line of attack. Here O'Donnell conducted operations, sweeping south almost at will, outwitting Bingham's defence and destroying in a few years the entire Tudor work of winning Connacht for the English order. Between these two spheres of operations lay the Irish districts of Tyrone and Fermanagh, largely untouched by the English, remote and secure. South of them were the march counties of Monaghan and Cavan. The failure on the English part to hold Enniskillen and to set up Monaghan as an ordered shire had permitted secure communication between O'Neill's sphere of operations and that of O'Donnell. By holding the centre the Irish could attack on the wings, compel the English attention in these quarters, and by careful manœuvring gradually wear
out the parsimoniously administered Tudor military machine. If Munster could be induced to rise, the English might be caught between two fires, north and south, and squeezed eastwards to Dublin. And the way to Munster was through Connacht - through the unguarded Ballyshannon passage and so on by Clare.

The importance of effective Scottish mercenary forces in such a scheme of operations must be evident. That Tyrone had money with which to pay for them - although it was a point of continual wonder to the English administration - was certain. That he had sufficient lands under cultivation in Ulster on which to feed them was equally so. Further, if he once won south he could plant them upon the land in Connacht and perhaps in Munster. We have seen what an incentive this last was to the landless, broken men of the Isles.

It is significant that what small force of Scots reached the Irish as a result of the generally abortive Scottish expedition just dealt with was thrown at once into service against the English. By August 16th O'Donnell was preparing with 700 Scots to distress Ballymote and the scattered English holds in North Connacht. On the 20th Bingham reported that he had thrown a force of Scots into the province with the intention of winning Galway and Clare. By the end of the year 1595 he was strong enough in Connacht to set up Tibbot Fitzwalter Burke as Mayo, or Upper, MacWilliam after the Irish fashion. (Dec. 27,) and to take pledges from the Mayo Clan Donald Galloglaigh to support him.116

Bingham's summary of the state of Connacht, Aug. 16;
Bingham to Burghley, Aug. 26th, Capt. Brabazon to L. Deputy, Dec. 29 - C.S.P. Ireld. V. 371, 446. During the truce at the beginning of 1596 O'Donnell claimed a service of 120 horse and 240 galloglaigh with certain rents out of Sligo - undoubtedly with a view to strengthen his position in this area as a basis for a future attack in Connacht. - Id., V.456. (Jan. 19th, 1596.) A.F.M., sub anno 1595; Bagwell: Tudors, 111, 260. See Map. No. 9. Facing p. 374. For the operations and areas referred to above.
In the more easterly sphere of warfare the force of Scots under Angus Og, the son of Angus MacDonald, saw similar service. On September 4th they were engaged with the Irish in a skirmish with the crown forces about nine miles out of Newry. Here the Irish received but slight hurt while the English failed to relieve the pressure on Newry and the marauding holds. As well as the Cantyre force, the Earl had here the assistance of a body of Scots sent by James Mac Somhairle from Antrim. Shortly after this date, however, it would appear that Tyrone was deprived of the services of Angus Og. Sir John Norreys says that he fled from him after the skirmish.117

We have seen already that MacLean said that Angus, his father, had sent him to serve the Earl. Captain Charles Egerton, governor of Carrickfergus, makes us believe, however, that there had been some quarrel between father and son when he reports on September 25th that they have been reconciled and that Angus has given his son a proportion of land in the Glens to live upon. As Angus and Donald Gorme of Sleat communicated with Egerton at this time with a view to having the Copeland pledges returned, now that they had fulfilled their promise to Thornton to return to Scotland, there is a possibility that Angus feigned displeasure with his son and disclaimed authority for his being with Tyrone, since any assistance to the Earl as a result of the expedition.

17. To Sir Ri Cecil, Sept. 10th - C.S.P. Ireld, V., 356. See Achinross to Nicolson, Sept. 19th, from Inverary - S.P. Scot, LVII, 15. Bagwell: Tudors, III 256-257. Tyrone at this time was adopting a policy of skirmishing and ambushing without permitting Norreys, the English general, to draw him into a general engagement.
was a violation of the truce. 118

Since James MacSomhairle, whom we last saw interfering with Tyrone's supplies of powder and lead from Glasgow in February, plays an important part in the affairs of the next few years, it will be as well to see how he stood at this juncture. He was present with Tyrone in the operations around Newry in September, but, shortly after, he returned to his own country in Antrim and held a parley with Captain Egerton on October 4th. He desired to submit, saying that although he himself had no wish to serve the Earl it was difficult to keep his followers from doing so. He requested that his brother Randal, then a prisoner in Dublin Castle, be sent home to reassure the clan, and said that it was quite true that he had stayed the Earl's munitions and that he had them yet. Pending an arrangement with the government, it should be understood that if he sent some small force to

118. Egerton to Lord Deputy, Sept. 25th, C.S.F. Ireld, V. 408. Note the reference to a grant of land in the Glens of Antrim. This is a point which those who claim that Angus had by this date lost authority in Ireland to the house of Somhairle do not take into account. Note also that Angus is styled as "of Dunnyveg and Glennis." in the Scottish Privy Council enactment of June 18th previous - vide ante, p. 238. The Lord Deputy (to Burghley, Oct. 4th. Id. V. 408) notes that Donald Gorme had returned home to Scotland before his safe-conduct to come to him (the Deputy) had arrived. Donald was undoubtedly being licensed by this to converse with the Deputy on the matter of his service offered to the queen. The Deputy had, of course, no authority to employ him, and Burghley gave him no instructions one way or the other. At what date MacLeod of Harris's force left O'Donnell we have no means of telling. The Lord Deputy assured Burghley on Sept. 8th that there were not more than 100 (Scottish born) Scots either in Ulster or Connacht (C.S.F. Ireld V. 383) This can scarcely have been true, however, as Angus Og at least does not appear to have left Ireland by this date.

* For p. 207.
the Earl it would merely be for policy's sake, as he could not defend himself against him and dared not break with him without the Queen's aid. 119.

There were indications of a somewhat new departure in the Isles before the year 1595 was out. The advent of Thornton in Mull had led MacLean more into the open, and he now decided definitely that he could put his scheme of aiding Elizabeth in Ireland into practice only if Argyll countenanced it. The scheme in question was, of course,  

119. C.S.P. Ireld. V. 413-414; 416-417; Egerton was discharging Christopher Carlyle's duty as governor in his absence. Note a statement of his to Burghley on Oct. 7th. (Id. V. 413-414). He said that he had employed, at his own charges, "a burgess of this town (Carrickfergus) named John Logge, most part of the last winter into Cantire with Agnus (Angus) 'Connell, the which as he hath already showed unto the state here was the only means that kept three or four thousand Scots from serving the traitors who was in that time wonderfully solicited with offers of great wages from the Earl of Tyrone." There seems no end to the persons who claimed to have been solely responsible for staying the Scots. There is no mention of John Logge in the Scottish sources. With regard to the passage of munitions, it will be well to note the following: on Aug. 1st. Achinross wrote to Nicolson regarding the Scottish proclamation forbidding the traffic. He said that Tyrone had men in Glasgow at the Lammas Fair to purchase supplies. These were "Fatrik Conucher (C'O'Conor?) a servant of John Beagh, merchant in "Traybane" (Strabane?) in Ireland, John and William Wilson and another. Achinross feared that, with the connivance of some in Arran, Bute and others, "that dwell not in burgh" (since the proclamation was addressed to the burghs) these agents would transport their warlike purchases to Ireland. He thought that they should be arrested as a warning to those who were willing to connive at the defeating of the ends of the proclamation. (S.F. Scot., LVI, 70). On Aug. 26th, Roger Aston reported to Nicolson (Nicolson having, no doubt, approached the Scottish authorities meanwhile) that the Wilsons and John Beagh himself had been arrested in Glasgow. Their boat had been searched, but nothing of a treasonable nature had been found. John Beagh confessed that he had intended transporting powder, halberts, and other "fornesing", but, finding that the proclamation forbade this, he had desisted from his enterprise. Surety was taken in the three cases and the men released. Aston recommended that trade from Glasgow to Ireland should be only through Dublin, Waterford, Limerick, or such other towns as were held by the Queen's good subjects. (S.F. Scot., LVI. 103.)
that which he had propounded early in the year and
that which Wotton had advocated in 1585. When Thornton
returned to Ireland, Russell, the Lord Deputy, wrote to
Bowes to inform him of MacLean's offers and of those of
Archibald Campbell on behalf of Argyll.120 Shortly after
this, MacLean wrote to the Lord Deputy saying that he was
willing to give ear to Thornton's request that he do all in
his power to stay his neighbours from aiding Tyrone, but
that the Queen, if she really wished anything done in the
Isles, must first confirm Argyll in her friendship and adopt
a settled course of action towards him.121 In this attitude
he persevered until the end of the year. Two matters,
however, deserve notice in connection with the scheme to
employ MacLean: the first that Burghley, with whom the
decision lay, had not yet adopted it or given any great
indication of a desire to do so, and that the negotiations
through Russell could not come to anything without Burghley's
assent; the second that, although MacLean made a great point
of the necessity of Argyll's assent, we cannot say whether he
did so with Argyll's connivance, or what, indeed, were the
ture views of Argyll on the matter at all. Both parties,
therefore, Russell and MacLean, were putting forth proposals
and arguments which were as yet quite theoretical.

Nicolson in Edinburgh still besought Bowes to
have Argyll definitely employed and to have MacLean's
promised "token" of 1,000 crowns sent on.122 MacLean, who

120. Russell to Bowes, Oct. 3rd, Dublin - C.S. - Soot. (Thorpe)
II. 696.
121. MacLean to Russell, Sept. 12th, Duart, Id. II, 696.
Tyrone still continued to make overtures to MacLean for
his support - Achinross to Bowes, Sept. 20th, Inverary,
Id. II, 696.
122. Nicolson to Bowes, Sept. 24th and Oct. 3rd - Id. II. 695, 696.

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blew hot and cold in accordance with the likelihood or otherwise of his receiving the Queen's money, began to think in November that he was being cheated, and so took occasion once more to remind Bowes that Tyrone was as anxious as ever to employ him. In the following month he wrote again to the ambassador saying that he had so far denied Tyrone, but that he wanted to know finally if he were going to receive the 1,000 crowns or not.123

Upon this note a year of close intrigue in the Isles is brought to an end. Of solid achievement England had little to her credit. The main movement of the year - the allied Clan Donald- MacLeod expedition - had, it is true, been rendered abortive, but how much had the Queen really done to mar the plans of Angus and Donald Gorm? Was it not rather the jealousies of the Islanders themselves, the position adopted by MacLean, and the part played by Argyll - was it not the combination of these and the interplay of one or the other that had delayed the expedition until uncertainty had eaten into the spirit of it and so spoiled it? What had Elizabeth done to win Argyll? It is not to be supposed that a few flattering letters had swayed him; what he did was for his own benefit and at no other instigation than that of the seemingly inherent craftiness of his house. It was incidental that he had to some extent played into the Elizabethan barrow. The Queen could claim no credit here. And MacLean? The dangling of the "token" of 1,000 crowns before him had undoubtedly been something. Certainly,

123. Achinross to Bowes, Nov. 14th, Edinburgh; MacLean to same, Dec. 20th. Duart - Id. II, 695, 702. See MacLean to Bowes, Oct. 5th, Inverary, II, 696.
were it not for MacLean, Tyrone and O'Donnell would have been enabled to conduct a vigorous summer campaign with the backing of practically the united strength of the Isles. But how far was MacLean swayed in his policy and in his intrigues by clan antagonism to Angus of Dunyveg? How much of what he had done would he have performed even if he had been ignorant of the Queen's existence? Greed for the Rinns of Islay and hatred of Tyrone were motives in themselves. Nor should it be forgotten that the more encouragement from the Queen was responsible for MacLean's endeavours, the less real credit does the Queen gain - for all will admit that MacLean was treated with consummate meanness in being deprived for so long of the 1,000 crowns. Whether it be called an honorarium or merely a bribe, it had been promised to him, and he expected to receive it.

It is clear that Bowes should have been kept at his post in Edinburgh during the year, and undoubtedly more could have been done through Colville and Lawers than was achieved - for while Achinross was MacLean's man, Erskine Argyll's, and Roger Aston the King's, these two were to all intents and purposes unattached. Again, if King James had shown himself a little more amenable to English approaches through Nicolson, he had good reason to do so - apart from the subterranean reasons dictated by his desire to succeed to an ordered state - for by 1595 he was in receipt of a fat annuity from Elizabeth.}

125. See a note of these annuities in S.P. Scot., LVI, 105. This was seemingly made out by Burghley's clerk in, although it bears no date, August (1595). The annual sums paid to James out of the Exchequer are noted: 1592, £2,000; 1593, £2,000; 1594, £2,000; ( ) £2,000. The last figure can be interpreted as the payment to August, 1595, or the agreed figure for the year 1595.
Over and above these things, however, the year's activities had resulted in a general clarification for the English government of the position in the Isles in so far as the Irish mercenary service was concerned. Henceforward there were definite facts upon which to go. Although the advice of Colville to seize advantage where it might be found had not always been followed, or, if momentarily adopted, had been rendered ineffective through parsimony or procrastination, still the principle with which his name is associated had come to be appreciated. 126

126. For Lawers' proceedings after the date of his marriage (Aug. 5th) see Colville to Bowes, Sept. 10th - Colville: Letters, 180. Lawers is here expressed as wishing to know if the Queen would approve of the sending of any Highland captain to stay privately with Tyrone as a spy in her interest, or if she would wish a leader of 500 men to aid her in Ireland. Lawers could find such a man (perhaps MacConnachie?)
CHAPTER SEVEN.

THE SUCCESSES OF THE IRISH IN REBELLION,
THE ENGLISH SUSPICION OF KING JAMES IN
THAT REGARD, AND THE COURSE OF THE
MACLEAN-MACDONALD FEUD IN THE ISLES.

(1596-1598)
CHAPTER SEVEN:


"Between Spain and Scotland, the one for money and the other for men, this dangerous rebellion of Ireland is born up."

-Sir Geoffrey Fenton, 1598.

§ 1

As a result of MacLean's offers to serve the Queen and of Captain Thornton's investigations in that regard, Russell, the Irish Lord Deputy, had become a firm advocate of the employment of Scottish mercenaries in the government service. He thought that 2,000 Scots would do more against Tyrone than twice as many English,¹ and certainly if he had had the ordering of the matter the offers of Donald Gorm and of MacLean would have been closed with at once. A period of truce with the Ulster rebels had been entered into at the end of 1595, but Russell thought their demands for a permanent peace so unreasonable that the only alternative left him was to continue to use all the force which he could command to subdue them. Even if Burghley did not permit the employment of MacLean, Russell felt that the threat of doing so should be kept up and noised abroad among the Irish, because, as he said, they feared the Scots as opponents more than they feared the English and had a prophecy that none but the Scots should

prevail against them. When Burghley pointed out that if such Scots were actually engaged by the English, the military authorities could never have absolute security from them that they would not desert the ranks upon some whim of their own and go over to the Irish, probably with disastrous results, Russell was deferential but unconvinced. If they found that the Queen would not employ them, he said, they would not long resist the overtures of Tyrone.

Burghley and Sir Robert Cecil saw both sides very clearly: they were afraid to employ the Scots and they were afraid not to employ them. Where the military leader would have felt compelled to take a risk one way or the other, the skilful diplomatist had a far simpler way out of the dilemma. So far they had played with MacLean and there was nothing to prevent the game going forward; he might be kept in hand and prevented from any activity by the use of a little more guile. Therefore instructions were issued by Cecil to Bowes on February 18th to procure MacLean’s assistance against the Irish rebels. This was the official sanction, but the withholding of the official payment would, of course, conveniently confuse matters. It was apparently hoped that a state of affairs such as had prevailed in the Isles in 1595 might be again brought about in the coming spring when the usual time for the despatch of mercenary expeditions arrived.

Bowes moved at last to Edinburgh to take over from Nicolson and set about carrying out the order concerning

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3. Same to same, Feb. 12th - Id. V. 471.
MacLean. He was armed, of course, with no more than the usual ambassadorial powers, but he was able at all times to cut more of a figure than Nicolson, and MacLean, Argyll and the others had been accustomed to write directly to him even when he was in England. MacLean, however, was in one of his haughty moods upon Bowes' arrival, and — a usual result of that state — he took no care to hide the fact that he had lately received a further request from Tyrone to join him. Bowes' first despatch is, therefore, a rather gloomy affair. He feared that MacLean and Argyll had recanted their offers, said that MacLean's power was now greatly increased, and admitted that he should have to employ certain means to win over MacLean once more. \(^5\) Cecil, on his part, seems suddenly to have been struck by the thought that at least another promise of payment would be necessary to keep MacLean quiet, for he wrote to Bowes on March 4th from Richmond instructing him to pay MacLean what was owing to him and to dispense something further among the agents to the intrigue. \(^6\) In this motion we can only condemn Cecil for placing Bowes in a false position at the outset of his resumption of active duty, for it is clear in the light of subsequent correspondence that the ambassador had no funds at his disposal out of which to make any such payments. If Cecil had presumed upon the success of such a trick to serve the Queen's interests in Scotland he had certainly reckoned without MacLean. Whether the purse appropriated to the making of such payments was held in Edinburgh or in London

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\(^5\) Bowes to Cecil, Feb. 24th, Edinburgh - C.S.P. Scot (Thorpe) II. 705.

\(^6\) Cecil to Bowes, March 4th - Id. II, 706. It is not clear whether Cecil had received Bowes' letter of Feb. 24th on the despatch of this. Even at as late a date as 1754, when the roads were somewhat better, it took twelve days at this time of the year for a stage coach to make the journey between Edinburgh and London.
was a matter of little moment to the Duart chieftain. He felt that he had earned his money and he was resolved to resist further English overtures until the matter of arrears had been cleared up. In response to a note from Bowes, he demanded first his 1,000 crowns, upon the receipt of which he offered further services. Indeed the dissatisfaction at Bowes' not having come provided with ready money was not limited to MacLean. Cecil had other creditors to face in a country where Nicolson had assured him he would get nothing for nothing.

Meanwhile Bowes had recourse once more to the Edinburgh merchant, John Cunningham, whom we have already seen in the capacity of English messenger to MacLean. On February 26th, or shortly after, Cunningham was despatched to Duart by Bowes to find out MacLean's disposition towards a resumption of his former activity and to sound him with regard to his proposed employment as a mercenary leader in Ireland. Matters remained in suspense until the end of March in so far as this enterprise was concerned. In the meantime, and as was usual at the commencement of each year, rumours circulated relative to the preparations of the Islanders to fit out new forces for the Irish war. It was reported that Angus MacDonald intended sending his son once more to aid Tyrone, and Tyrone on his own behalf was not slow in sending an agent to Cantyre to solicit assistance. By March 7th...
16th. Bowes had an offer from Argyll to serve the Queen, and one from Lawers to procure the services of MacConachie, and although he had not yet heard from John Cunningham, concerning his mission, he had good hopes for MacLean, if only Cecil saw fit to send him the 1,000 crowns.\(^{10}\)

When Cunningham did reach Duart and had conveyed Bowes' promises and offers to MacLean, MacLean was so far reconciled as to write to Bowes offering his usual services and assuring him of his goodwill towards the Queen. This he did on March 18th, being then in the island of Coll. By April 2nd, Cunningham had returned to Edinburgh, bringing with him John Achinross, and assuring Bowes that MacLean was willing to invade Ulster in the English interest and to make war on Tyrone.\(^{11}\) The thawing out on MacLean's part can only be accounted for as having been due to the good offices of Cunningham, who was a personal friend of his and who could usually influence him. Perhaps, too, MacLean had resolved that a waiting game on his part could do his interests no harm.

Bowes' one purpose in so far as the Isles were concerned was to keep MacLean in hand and to come to some agreement with Argyll. Argyll must be placated, for MacLean would not stir without him, and if Scottish mercenaries really were to be employed by England in Ireland it could only be through the joint action of these two. On the other hand, if the authorities in London decided to repeat the policy

\(^{10}\) Bowes to Cecil, Id. II, 707.

\(^{11}\) MacLean to Bowes, and answers to heads proposed by Bowes, Coll, March 18th; Bowes to Cecil, March 26th and April 2nd - Id. II, 707, 708. Bowes said that he proposed sending Cunningham and Achinross to England, presumably to explain MacLean's position to Cecil.
of 1595 as the least costly - that is, to contribute to the keeping of the Isles in a confused and unsettled state in order that the Irish should have little chance of receiving effective aid from Scotland - then also some understanding with the Campbell and MacLean clans would be necessary. There was in Scotland at this time a certain Dionise, or Dennis, Campbell, Dean of the City of Limerick, and a kinsman of Argyll's. This man had, it appears, some cause at issue with the Bishop of Limerick, and he appears to have sought out Argyll to solicit his influence in having it decided in his favour by the English government. Here was the chance of a quid pro quo too promising to be neglected, and Bowes, being informed of the Dean's mission, was quick to take advantage of it. The Dean wanted to curry favour with the government, the Earl was a kinsman of the Dean's; if the cause were decided in the Dean's favour, then Argyll might, by being made sensible of this relatively small obligation, show himself willing to co-operate with MacLean as he had done in 1595. And, in large measure, so it was done. The Dean of Limerick met the Earl at some date subsequent to April 2nd and on the 16th of the month Argyll wrote to Cecil to thank him for his courtesy to his kinsman, and for procuring his (Argyll's) father's favour in the cause outstanding with the Bishop. The Dean on his part worked very effectually with the Earl, and the upshot of the entire was an
appointed meeting between Argyll and MacLean.12

It needed but one thing to assure the Queen of an active party in Scotland once more, and that was a general payment of principals and agents. Cecil seems at last to have realised that he could no longer postpone this with safety. MacLean, especially, had had quite enough of trifling. By the beginning of May the necessary money had come through to Edinburgh, but it was a month later before the recipients acknowledged their shares. MacLean, whom, it will be remembered, Cecil had earlier seen fit to "eaven" with £4, received £150 and the promise of a pension; Achinross got £30 and Cunningham £20. Nicolson, too, was rewarded but with what sum does not appear.13 This, it must be remembered, was a settlement in return for services rendered in the previous year. In so far as the future was concerned nothing save promises was involved. Cecil had not taken the step of actually engaging MacLean for the Irish service.

12. Bowes to Cecil, Apl. 2nd, and Apl. 30th, and Argyll to same, Apl. 16th (from Stirling) - S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II. 706, 709, 710. In connection with the negotiations proceeding with MacLean, Bowes sent his agent Nicolson to London on Apl. 5th (Bowes to Burghley, and instructions to Nicolson concerning Irish affairs to be communicated to Sir R. Cecil - Apl. 5th, Id. II, 706, 709.) On the 30th Bowes wrote to Cecil to know the Queen’s pleasure before the date of the appointed meeting. (Id. II, 710). See also the Dean’s observations on the Islanders and the expedience of their employment in Ireland by the Queen - Id. II. 710 (S.P. Scot. LVIII, 72) With this cf. an account of the Isles in the handwriting of Bowes' clerk, March 21, 1596 - Id. LVIII, 41). The Dean had returned to Ireland and was in Dublin by July 20, 1596. Thence he wrote to Cecil assuring him that Argyll was well affected to the Queen. He said also that one, Font, who had "compassed the whole of Scotland," intended setting out a perfect description of that land, and that he had ordered a copy for Cecil on the first edition - C.S.P. Ireld., VI. 40. Hume Brown:Early Travellers in Scotland, does not mention Font. In the "List of the preachers of the army in Ireland," December, 1599, there is: "The Dean of Limerick, per week, 30s. A Scot; he attendeth in garrison, but lieth at Dublin" - C.S.P. Ireld., VIII, 360.

13. Bowes to Cecil, May 7th and May 18th; MacLean to same, June 8 (Edinburgh); and Achinross to same, June 8 - Id. II. 710, 711, 712, 713.
Meanwhile in Ireland the rebels sought every means of involving the whole country in warfare. Despite the Scottish proclamation and the surety which he had been compelled to lodge for his good behaviour, John Beagh, Tyrone's Strabane agent, still continued to transport powder, calivers, and muskets from the Lowland burghs to Ulster.\textsuperscript{14} Turlough Luineach O'Neil had died in the autumn of the preceding year, and with him had passed the last obstacle to the Earl of Tyrone's undisputed leadership of the clan O'Neil. The truce with the English was kept in a very nominal manner upon both sides, the Irish working behind the scenes and merely seeking to gain time, Singham actually in arms in Connacht in an enterprise to throw supplies into Ballymote.\textsuperscript{15} For some time now the Ulster leaders had displayed a desire to send some force to the support of Feach MacHugh O'Beirne, a Leinster chieftain who was maintaining an insurrection in the fastnesses of Co. Wicklow almost overlooking Dublin city, and who was a great thorn in the side of the English administration.\textsuperscript{16} With their intentions in this regard the English were well acquainted, and, in view of the remarkable strategic position occupied by O'Beirne, and whence it had proved impossible to dislodge him, it was vital that they be frustrated. The attempt was made late in February and in March from Connacht through the Midlands. In the bogland area beside the river Shannon

\textsuperscript{14} Fenton to Burghley, March 10th; report by Gillaboy O'Flanigane, May 12th, C.S.P. Ireld., V. 489, 522. Vide ante, p. 262, note. \textsuperscript{15} Id. V. 386; Bagwell: Tudors, III. 262-263. \textsuperscript{16} Bagwell: Tudors, III, 247.
in what is now the county of Offaly, O'Madden, a chieftain of the district, joined the rebels and secured the support of a band of Scots' mercenaries from Connacht. A little north of him, in Roscommon, O'Conor Roe was reported to have engaged the services of some of the ClanDonald gallowgaigh. So significant were these movements that the Lord Deputy deemed his own presence necessary in order to frustrate any attempt to throw a force eastward to O'Beirne.  

He came accordingly from Dublin through Mullingar. Prior to his arrival, however, some of the Connacht Burkes and O'Maddens with their Scots had crossed the Shannon five hundred strong and had penetrated into Offaly and Leix. While they were encamped rather carelessly in these confines, Captain Thomas Lee, the leader of a band of English soldiers quartered in the Midlands, had suddenly surprised them when they were not in arms, and they had been thrown backwards over the river into Connacht. One section of them had taken refuge in O'Madden's castle of Cloghan. Here Lord Deputy Russell found them entrenched upon his arrival from Mullingar. He laid siege to the castle and, after a vigorous and spirited defence, carried the place by assault, and slew the entire garrison with the exception of a few women.

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Lord Dep. to English Privy Council, and to Burghley, March 14th, from camp at Cloghan; Sir J. Norreys to Cecil, March. 20-1d.V., 490, 491, 497, Cox: Hibernia Anglicana, 409.

Sir William Russell's own Journal, which contains an account of this affair is Brit. Mus. MS. Add., 4728. See an extract from it in O'Donovan: Hy Many, Appendix, 151, in which the following, being in O'Madden's service, are noted as having been killed in action on the day before the castle was taken - "Leve O'Connor of ye Countie of Sligo, a cheife gent. & a leader of shott and Scots; he was buried at Millicke. Ferdoregh Mc Everye, a Cap. of Scots. McConnell, cheife of the Scots."
While this attempt which, if it had been successful, would undoubtedly have redounded to the great advantage of the rebels in the southern parts of Ireland, was being frustrated by the ruthless proceedings of the Lord Deputy, James MacSomhairle Buidhe MacDonald was causing trouble for Tyrone in Ulster. We have been witness to his negotiations with Captain Egerton at the end of 1595. During the Spring of 1596 he continued his efforts to gain an English pardon, the support of the crown forces against Tyrone, and the release of his brother Randal from confinement in Dublin Castle. In April, when there was some talk of concluding a general peace with Tyrone and O'Donnell, he prayed that Tyrone should not be given commandment over him, and sought to have Randal exchanged for his younger brother Eudar. Throughout May and June the tension between Mac Somhairle and Tyrone seemed about to lead to open hostilities, and it became apparent that what Mac Somhairle really fought for was possession of MacQuillin's land which he had seized upon his father's death and in which Tyrone now also alleged an interest as overlord of Ulster. It seemed as if the Antrim Scots were fated never to become absorbed quietly into the body politic of the province.

These, however, were really only side issues of the main struggle. Negotiations, as we have seen, were going on during the Spring and early summer between the rebels and the administration in the hope - at times a very forlorn hope indeed on the part of the English - of bringing the protracted general hostilities to an end. In reality, both sides were merely seeking to gain time in such truces as that contemplated:

19 Lord Dep. to Burghley, Feb. 15th - C.S.P. Ireld., V. 474. James MacDonald to (probably the L.Dep.) Apl. 13th; Capt. Egerton to L.Dep., May 27th, and June 7th; Francis Stafford to same, June 10th - Id., V. 514, 531, 536, 537.
20 -276-
Tyrone and O'Donnell hoped for active aid from Spain and from the Isles; the English required a breathing space in order to estimate where exactly the Irish tangle was landing them, draining as it did the resources of every shire in England in men and money.

In so far as our present topic is more immediately concerned, we find that, negotiations or no negotiations, the Irish did not for a moment relax their efforts to further the mercenary trade. By April, Angus MacDonald had in readiness a force of Redshanks in their behalf, and Egerton had fortified Belfast Castle in order to secure his communications and to guard Clandeboye in expectation of a landing. A message had also been sent to MacConnachie inviting him to bring to Ireland a thousand men, and it was reported that Angus expected Donald Gorm and others to join him later with a view to the transportation of a large force to Ireland. Late in the month of May, Gilleasbuig, an illegitimate son of Angus MacDonald's, landed at the Red Bay in Antrim with 600 Scots, and at about the same time further forces came ashore in three different places in Tir Conaill. With the Antrim force was a son of Donald Gorm's.

Owing to the unsettled state of the Antrim area where MacQuillin, Mac Somhairle, MacCaughlan, MacGuinness and Tyrone were mixed up in the dispute over certain lands, there were eager bidding for the services of the mercenaries. MacGuinness wished to engage three or four hundred of them against MacCaughlan; MacCaughlan bid for a hundred, led by

21. James M'Somhairle's letter of Apl. 13th, Dunluce, and Egerton to L.Dept., Apl.22nd - C.S.P. Ir. V, 514. For the negotiations, see Bagwell; Tudors, III, 264, seq.
22. Bowes to Cecil, Apl. 15th and Apl.30th-C.S.P. Scot, (Thorpe)II. 709,710.
Donald Gorm's son, but was frustrated by Tyrone, whose relations with MacSomhairle were becoming more and more strained, and who secured them for himself. How long the mercenaries remained in this quarter or whether they saw any active fighting we do not know.\textsuperscript{24} In Donegal, it is clear that O'Donnell engaged the forces that had come to his shores,\textsuperscript{25} although he sought to convey the impression that they were unwanted intruders to the English administration. In this last connection the subtlety of both O'Donnell and Tyrone is evident. In accordance with the proposed negotiations with English commissioners, the Ulster chieftains were to meet and confer in Connacht with representatives of the English authority. In reality, they had little desire to do other than gain time, and very skilfully they worked off the arrival of the Scots as a reason for the postponement of the meeting. The longer was the delay the more chance there was of help arriving from Spain. On May 23rd, O'Donnell wrote from Derry to Norreys, one of the commissioners, to say that he could not go to Connacht until he had expelled the Scots who had landed suddenly in his country, and two days later Tyrone wrote from Castle Rowe to Norreys and Fenton to the same effect.\textsuperscript{26} On June 4th Sir Henry Wallop informed Sir Robert Cecil that Tyrone had intimated that, by reason of the coming of the Scots, he would not be \textit{at leisure} at least during that month to receive his pardon. Such was the language

\textsuperscript{24} Egerton to L. Dep., May 27th, Id. V. 231.

\textsuperscript{25} Information of Turlough Duff Macqui (MacSweeney) of Leitrim, June 3rd; Egerton to L. Dep., June 26th, who says that O'Donnell entertained the Scots brought over by Gillesbuig Macdonald - Id. V. 531, VI, 3C.

\textsuperscript{26} C.S.P. Ireld. V., 556, and see V. 520. Concerning the Spaniards and rumors regarding them then circulating, it is interesting to find the Mayor of Galway writing to the Lord Deputy on May 23rd to say that the Earl of Huntly had returned to Scotland with an army of 12,000 Spaniards. (Id.V.527).
which Tyrone could adopt on occasion. The English were naturally suspicious of what was afoot, but nothing, it was seemingly decided, could be gained by calling the bluff. Norreys thought that the Queen's pinnacle and some other shipping should be employed to beat round to Lough Foyle and Lough Swilley to oppose the Scots, but it was certainly too late for that. Egerton, in the midst of the alarms in Antrim, wanted to know what he should do with Belfast Castle, and the Lord Deputy had recourse to his own pet panacea of the employment of the Scots against Tyrone, saying to Cecil that "the pride of the Earl and the traitors of Ulster cannot be brought down but by bringing of Scots by a commander known to be well affected to Her Majesty's service."27 On June 16th Tyrone gave notice to Norreys that two hundred Scots had lately gone into Sir John O'Dogherty's country and that Angus MacDonald himself was shortly expected to arrive in Ulster. He denied that he was privy to the schemes of Angus and said that O'Donnell had refused to engage the Scots and that they intended going into Connacht. Under this same date the translated copy of a letter from Tyrone to O'Donnell is filed in the Record Office. The effect of it is to desire O'Donnell to bring in his followers and allies and to submit to the English, and it further intimates that Tyrone should himself have gone earlier to the commissioners if he did not fear that the Scots would spoil his country in his absence.29 At its face value, this

27. Wallop to Cecil; Norreys to the Lord Deputy, Mullingar, June 4; Egerton to same, May 27; Lord Deputy to Cecil, June 22nd - Id.V.529,530,531,537. Capt. Mansell in Carrickfergus said that the Scots lately landed in O'Donnell's country would not depart unless he yielded them a quarter's pay (V,530,Id.) Tyrone to Norreys, Id.V.542. He was still promising to appear for the meeting as soon as the supposed danger from the Scots had been averted. He said that MacSomhairle was not likely to make any provision in the way of land for Macquillin. Tyrone was at this time backing Macquillin against MacSomhairle. (This letter is calendared at greater length in Id.,VI.9) C.S.P. Ireld, VI.9.
would, of course, destroy the theory that Tyrone and O'Donnell were bluffing with regard to the Scots in order to gain time; but the very presence of such a letter in the State files is sufficient to lead to a suspicion of its authenticity, for the question naturally arises, how did a private letter from O'Neil to O'Donnell get there? The reply that it might have been intercepted by an English spy and sent on to Dublin and thence to the sanctum of Burghley and Cecil is discredited by the fact that in all cases of letters seized there is at least some reference elsewhere to the seizure - they are enclosed in covering letters, or subsequent letters make mention of them. The only way, then, that the English authorities could have been possessed of this missive is that Tyrone had sent it to Dublin as a manifestation of what he wished it believed was his good faith. This, of course, in a moment dams it as part of the bluff.  

See further: Tyrone to Norreys: June 22nd (from Bann side) C.S.P. Ir. VI, 9-10. Norreys, for one, seems to have been inclined to believe the Earl - see his notes, enclosed with July 27th (Id.VI.55). Here, referring to the Scots, he says: "it is known to all men that they be no welcome guests, and, though they come often into the country, it is never but when they are drawn in by some faction to annoy others, or that trusting to their own force they run about the country, making no difference to spoil whom they can; and so they would have done now if the Earl and O'Donnell had not put both their forces in the head of them, and compelled them to return. It is like, nevertheless, that both of them have entertained them with some contract to employ them if they shall have cause."
Having, as we are told, earlier kept a "solemn Easter", Angus MacDonald himself now came to Ireland on June 21st. He had, no doubt, been watching matters closely both in Ireland and Scotland, and his visit at this time seems to have been made with two main ends in view: to confer with Tyrone relative to the position of affairs, and to devote some of his attention to his possessions in the Glens. In this last connection James MacSomhairle was undoubtedly considered by Angus as somewhat troublesome, but what was Angus's position in the matter of a truce which was made at this time between Tyrone and MacSomhairle does not appear. MacSomhairle was now on "proud terms" with the English, having secured possession of his brother Randal in return for a payment of £200 to the administration and the lodging of a "bastardly child"—apparently Eudar—as a pledge in Dublin Castle.

Again, Angus had not as yet paid his cattle-rent for the Glens to the Carrickfergus authorities, and Egerton, being in need of victuals for his garrison, had accordingly been forced to apply to the Magees for beeves and to meditate a distress upon Angus's territory.

When Angus arrived in the Route, the Earl of Tyrone, who was then close by in the vicinity of the River Bann, sent at once forty horsemen to guide him to his presence at

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31. Bowes to Cecil, Ap. 30, C.S.P. Scot., (Thorpe).II.710; Egerton to Lord Depty., and Stevenson, the Mayor, and Mansell from Carrickfergus to same, June 26th - C.S.P. Irel.VI.30-31. In his letter to Norreys on June 22nd Tyrone said that he had that day taken order with Angus for his immediate return to Scotland. He had, of course, done nothing of the kind—at least not until he should have conferred with him. Later statements prove this.

32. Norreys to Cecil, July 7th - Id., VI. 23.
Castle Rowe. Angus himself appears to have had six hundred men with him as a bodyguard. Two rumours as to the conference were at once afoot; that Tyrone had sent for Angus to arrange for the transport of what mercenary forces were assembling in the Isles; and that Angus had come to the Earl to solicit aid against MacLean who was said to be threatening Islay. Both stories were undoubtedly true, and we can be sure that the affairs not alone of Ireland but also of the Isles were well debated by these two principals in Castle Rowe. Referring to Angus on July 10th, Captain Francis Stafford of Newry said that he and the Earl were "upon the word." When exactly Angus returned to Scotland is not clear, but it would seem to have been some time in July. Upon the conclusion of a truce between James MacSomhairle and Tyrone, the latter deserted the cause of MacQuillin whom he had earlier supported in his struggle to retain what was really his patrimony. Under the patronage of the Earl, Macquillin had taken a fort of MacSomhairle's, and this Tyrone now redelivered to James. The Earl wanted to get the important castle of Belfast into his hands, it was reported, in order that he might raze it to the ground, saying that there were already too many castles in Ulster.

33. The Carrickfergus letters of June 26th, already quoted; Stafford to Lord Depty - C.S.P. Ireld, VI. 33.
34. Sir Ed. Moore to L. Depty, from Mellifont on July 4th said that the Scots who were with the Earl had departed. This was undoubtedly Angus's force, but whether he left Ireland then or went into the Glens we cannot say.
35. Stafford to L. Dept., July 10th, ut sup
36. John Eliot to same, July 21st, Id. VI.45-46. Eliot also said that Angus as well as Tyrone had made friends with James MacSomhairle. Concerning Ulster fortified posts, see Norreys' view that a garrison should be established on Loch Foyle to keep out the Scots - July 27th, Id.VI.52. This was later done in Derry. Vide also Discourse of Francis Shane, 1596. N.d., - C.S.P. Carew,III, 260 - suggesting that garrisons be planted at Ballyshannon, Billeek and on Loch Foyle (Inishowen.) This last might, he says, be victualled by the Lowland merchants of Irvine (Urwin) and Ayr for money.
His recent movements in treating both with Angus and MacSomhairle were the occasion of no little governmental surprise. It was admitted that MacSomhairle might possibly be serious in allying himself with Tyrone, despite his late offers to submit to the Queen, and the conference and apparent agreement between the Earl and Angus were no less taken as facts, but how was MacSomhairle to be squared with Angus, since they had a standing disagreement over the possession of the Glens? The truth indeed was that however Tyrone reconciled the MacDonalds at the moment, if at all, their feud was of a sufficiently deep-seated nature as to be the cause of much later turmoil. The Lord Deputy and Irish Council reported to London on August 13th. that, since the date of the agreement, James MacSomhairle had put himself into possession in the Glens, held legally of the Queen by Angus, and that Angus Úg, the son of Angus MacDonald, had fled to Scotland to secure aid from his father to retake the territory. It will be remembered that, in 1595, there had been some question of Angus making provision for Angus Úg in this area. The Council could do no more than say that, although such might be the face value of the movements, there was also the possibility that the entire was a scheme of Tyrone's to hoodwink the administration and to have a Scottish force brought to Ireland under cover of an internal ClanDonald struggle, but in reality for his own uses. They found great difficulty in, as it were, seeing the wood for the trees, and were led rather to suspect that Tyrone had some deep plot afoot than to worry unduly over the actual presence of bands of Scots in Ulster.
at the moment, since it was the usual annual practice of these latter to resort thither in search of employment at this season.\(^{37}\)

In mid-August MacSomhairle and his brother, Neice Ultagh, raided into Lecale, a district lying to the south of the modern co.Down, and carried back with them to the Route extensive booty and some prisoners.\(^{38}\) It was again made quite apparent that they were worthy successors to their father, Somhairle Buidhe, whose independent course of action had been the despair of the administration in his time.

\(^{\text{a IV.}}\)

While the consideration of these Irish affairs has been occupying our attention, Bowes had been closely occupied in watching affairs in Scotland. Due to the scheme of diplomacy which the London council saw fit to adopt, negotiations with MacLean and Argyll were allowed to hang fire, and we do not know what was the issue of the meeting which was to have taken place between these chieftains in May or June. Tyrone and the advisers of the Queen had adopted a cat and mouse attitude, each watching the movements of the other, both sides negotiating, apparently idle, yet feverishly active behind the scenes.

37. L.Depty and Council to Privy Council, July 16th and Aug.13th; Egerton to L.Depty, July 31st - Id.VI,35,69,71. Capt. Mansell writing from Carrickfergus to the L. Depty on July 31st (Id.VI,72) speaks of it as policy on the Earl's part to foment a jar between MacSomhairle and Angus. Capt. Stafford to L. Dep., Newry, Aug. 24., Russell and Fitzgerald to L. Dep.,Aug 29th - Id.VI,95,103. A family of English extraction named Savage, long settled in this quarter, suffered most in these depredations.
If England took the initiative in the Isles and resorted to the admittedly dangerous experiment of engaging mercenaries on a large scale, who could tell that Tyrone might not submit suddenly and make his peace, as Turlough Luineach had done before him, leaving the Queen to foot an unnecessary bill in Scotland? - that the Scots might not turn suddenly on their new allies once they had set foot in Ireland? - that Argyll and MacLean might not be diverted into a renewal of clan warfare with the MacDonalds at the moment when the Queen had placed reliance on their assistance? These were undoubtedly some of the cogent reasons which led Burghley and Cecil to prefer uncertainty to a definite contract with the Islanders. So Bowes was set to watch and to promise rather than act as recruiting agent.

The movements of King James with regard to his Island subjects gave Bowes plenty to occupy his mind. In view of the fact that the summonses of treason issued in 1593 had produced no effect and that the Island chiefs continued hostile to the Scottish government and paid none of their dues, King James resolved, early in 1596, to fit out an expedition against them. At first his intention was to proceed against his rebellious subjects in person, and a proclamation of muster was made out calling on loyal Scotsmen to aid their king by their presence in his army. MacLean, realising the seriousness of his position, yet conscious at the same time that there was a possibility of gaining some

little advantage to himself as a result of the new complexion which the King's resolve had placed upon the situation, was quick to submit, and Bowes records that by June 2nd, he had been received into the royal favour. By the 14th he had entered into a composition with the King, and, under date of the day following, an act of the Scottish Privy Council cancelled his forfeiture and restored him. This act recited that by reason of MacLean's submission and his having satisfied the Lords Auditors of Exchequer "anent all thingis quhilkis wer layed to his charge," the King had received him and had promised "in his princelie worde" to secure the ratification of Parliament to the revocation of his forfeiture. In similar fashion Donald Gorm of Sleat and all the chieftains indicted submitted themselves with the single exception of Angus of Dunyveg. This being so, King James relinquished his earlier idea of attending in the Isles in person and committed the care of the expedition against Angus to Sir William Stewart, Commendator of Pittenweem.

Angus now began to cast about him in search of assistance against the King, for it is plain that his first resolve was to resist authority. In all probability his visit to Tyrone in June had had some reference to the impending troubles in the Isles. It is not too much to say that he had expected assistance from him. This, however, he did not receive, and he was further made a witness to the submission of his neighbours in the Isles. At what date he

40. See Bowes to Burghley, June 14th, Id.II, 713. Reg. Privy Council Scot., V. 295, and note thereon.
approached James MacSomhairle we do not know - indeed we have only MacSomhairle's word that he did so at all - but at all events it becomes clear that much of the complicated negotiations in Antrim which had so puzzled the Irish Council to account for were undoubtedly dictated by this sudden emergency in Scotland. How far MacSomhairle was fighting for his own hand alone is made abundantly clear by his action at this juncture. On October 26th he wrote to King James the following remarkable letter: "Most myghtie and potentt Prince...your Grace shall understand that our forberars heathe bene from time to time your servandes into your owen kingedome of Scoteland, and our father and brother ended there lyues into your Hienes service heir in Yrelande, and now ve our selves ar heir as your true subjectes, and your servitoris duringe our lymes.

"Vnto vs heir it is informing of your Grace's intromittyng vithe the landes appertaneinge to the Clan-Donnell in Scotelande, vnto the whiche landes, as it is well known, we have (be tytil of ryghteousnes, and more lawfullie descended and gotten be the act of trew matrimonie) more ryght vnto these landes and contreiis then ony that possessed the sameing befor your Hienes intromitting vithe it.

"The viche fornamed landes, and contreiis, and territoresiis, if it valde please your Hienes to bestow these landes vpone vs, ve will yeilde all submissioun and shew all obedience, and pay all dueteis...vnto your Grace....

"Your Hienes shall most verelie and trewlie understand that Angus Macdonnell of Dunnevage hathe offered me the most part of the landes perteaninge vnto himself att this instaunt,
and to enter in rebellion with him against the garrison and armie send (sic) vnto Ventire be your Grace, and to varre vpone them bothe daylie and nyghtlie. The whiche offer alluiterlie is be me refuised from him, vnto suche time I heir from your Grace...hopeinge that your Grace shall bestowe parte of my owen ryght vpone me...

"From Donluche the 26th of October, 1596."

Certainly nobody but an unscrupulous adventurer would have made such a claim. MacSomhairle had not an atom of proof to substantiate his statement as to Angus's illegitimacy; his claim that his father and brother had died in the service of King James was fantastic. These things being so, and the evident intent of the whole letter being to eke out a bad claim, it will be hard to believe MacSomhairle's unsupported statement that Angus had appealed to him for aid against his king.

42. The original of this is in the Balcarres Papers in the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh. It is printed in the Miscellany of the Spottiswoode Society, II, 1845, 372-374. It has secured a historical prominence not so much for what it is as by reason of Skene's argument that the passage "...our forbears heathe bene from time to time...." etc., at the commencement, affords a proof of the non-Irish origin of the Scottish Gael. In this connection, incidentally, the remark might be ventured that Skene in his hypothesis neglected the context of the passage: that MacSomhairle inserted the remark to bear out his case. Throughout, MacSomhairle seeks to prove that, although his sept had been resident in Ireland for some time, their Scottish allegiance was not thereby impaired. Thus he would say that his forbears had been "from time immemorial" (as Skene points out the reading is) Scottish subjects merely to show that by going to Ireland they had not deserted King James. The penultimate paragraph of the letter - omitted above - shows this very clearly: "In lyk maner your Grace shall understannde that all ar heir vnder tribuitt vnto the quene of Englande since our first generation; and, thankes to Gode, hir Maiestie's officers in this realme hathe nothinge to lay to my chardges of my promise vnto them granted: and mucche more bound should I be to keip all service and promysse vnto your Grace, being my native Prince, and I your borne subiect." It should be noted that the two first statements in this were untrue. Gregory: Highlands & Isles, 268, has the further statement that King James wrote, apparently in September (he says) to MacSomhairle promising him a high reward if he gave such assistance to Pittenweem against Angus as might be required of him.

43.
Meanwhile another James MacDonald in the person of James, the son of Angus, who had for some time been held as a pledge for his father in Edinburgh Castle, was released and sent to Dunyveg to persuade his father to submit himself as his neighbours had done. The King was treating his recalcitrant subject skilfully, as this action showed, and his show of force at the proper moment in sending Pittenweem from Glasgow into Cantyre on October 22nd worked the desired effect.

On November 1st., 1596, at a Royal Court held in Cantyre Angus formally submitted and he was subsequently confirmed in his lands with some reservations in favour of the Crown. If the King had been able to curb Argyll, who, indeed, had retired from court in disfavour and with the threat of horning suspended over him in September, an era of peace in the Isles might have been initiated.44

44 Mitchell loc. cit.426-427; Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 17th (for Argyll ref.) and Sept. 23rd - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorp) II, 720, 721. The terms on which Angus was reinstated are to be seen in the Balcarres MSS. VI, 77, - also printed in Spottiswoode Miscellany II, 1845, 374-376. These were subscribed to on Angus's visit to Edinburgh in 1597 when he received the Royal forgiveness. Summarised, they were: (1) Angus to retain all his own lands; the King's right as owner to extend only to such lands in the South Isles as are already his; (2) Angus to hold by law for agreed rent (except a forty merkland adjacent to Loch Kilkarran in Cantyre reserved to the Crown); (3) the King to have a right to erect burghs in that part of Islay not set to Maclean, Jura, Colonsay, or the forty merkland aforementioned; (4) Angus not to be "straitlie handlit" for the "compositioun of the biganis auchtand" (arrears) to the King. He shall be reasonably treated also in the matter of finding security for his future behaviour; and (5) If Angus cause future trouble it will be his own fault if "his haill posteritie be wirakit." Mitchell (loc. cit.) mentions as further terms that Angus remove his clan from Cantyre and the RInns of Islay, deliver up Dunvegan Castle to the crown, and agree that his son, (by this time Sir) James remain as a hostage in Edinburgh. The original record of the Court held in Cantyre by Pittenweem, showing by roll the holdings of the inhabitants there and also the amount of waste land, is preserved in H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh. See further with regard to the RInns of Islay, below. pp. 315, 249.
Before the year 1596 was over the project of employing the Islanders in the Queen's service was once more brought forward. Information received from a spy that O'Donnell had undertaken to the King of Spain to employ 3,000 Scottish mercenaries and to seize with their aid upon Strangford Lough as a base for the landing of Spaniards who were eventually to descend on Dublin, together with the certainty that the Scottish trade in munitions was still continued by the Earl of Tyrone and that certain Scots were actually employed at his headquarters at Dungannon upon the manufacture of firearms - these things kept the Scottish question prominently before the minds of the Irish Lord Deputy and the members of his Council. Writing to Sir Robert Cecil on October 8th., the Lord Deputy again pressed for the employment of Scots as eminently suitable for Irish warfare, and in a note concerning the opinion of the English Privy Council on Irish matters written by Burghley on December 26th, it is recorded that the Lords wish it "to be considered" what exactly it would cost to hire a force of Scots to attack the Ulster rebels from the rear.

MacLean's name is mentioned by Burghley in this last as that of the most suitable leader. It is rather

45. Anonymous information, Aug. N.d; Information received at Newry from Capt. James FitzGarrett, Aug. 12th - C.S.P., Irel. VI. 75,97-98. For Tyrone's munitions, see also Memo. for Cecil by James Nott, late secretary of Tyrone's, won over to the English and become a state informer, July, 1597 - C.S.P. Irel., VI. 362. Nott said that Alexander Steward, a citizen of Glasgow, at one time sold to the Earl 22,000 worth of gunpowder and brought to him three Scottish workmen to make muskets, calivers, and pistols. He also said that if Tyrone was defeated in Ireland he contemplated a retreat to Scotland. Id., VI. 139,189. The Privy Council note is mostly in Burghley's handwriting. See also Declaration (no date) of Irish L. Dep. and Council for Privy Council - C.S.P. Carew, III, 97.

46. Id., VI. 139,189.
interesting to remark that MacLean, within a week or so of the date when the Privy Councillors were speaking of him, by some precipitate action of his during a tumult in the street in Edinburgh, was unlucky enough to earn the disfavour of King James, and very nearly to destroy the good impression which his actions during 1596 had created with his sovereign.47

1597 was a year of comparative quietness - the lull before the impending storm which burst in Ireland in the year following. The scheme of employing MacLean for the Queen was still canvassed, but nothing was done. Sir Geoffrey Fenton took up the cudgels in Ireland as one who opposed it utterly. He alleged two reasons, the first that to be effective a Scots' force must be large and so as dangerous to the employer as to the enemy; the second that the Islanders were age-old allies of the O'Neills and should never be trusted. "It hath been always a rule of policy in this government," he said, "to keep the Scots out of Ireland, as a people that have wild pretences to Ulster, and have long time (been)

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King James made use of this street riot, which was not alarming in itself and should otherwise have passed unnoticed, to declare himself in danger at the hands of the Presbyterian party. As Hume Brown (Hist. Scot. II, 224-5) remarks, it was a turning point in his career, as thenceforward he ruled alone as king. MacLean, happening to be in the streets of the capital at the time (Dec. 17th), took alarm for the safety of the King and rode at once to Stirling to Argyll. He seems to have thought that Argyll and himself should marshal their clans to protect James. As James was playing his own game and did not want outside interference he was greatly vexed at MacLean's mistaken loyalty and never forgave him for his conduct. Vide Lang; Hist. Scot. II, 417-418; Tytler, IX. 285; Calderwood: Hist. Kirk. V. 726; Bowes to Cecil, Dec. 21st, C. S. P. Scot. (Thorpe) II, 727. Argyll and MacLean rode in and met the King on the day after the riot. Bowes says that MacLean at this time renewed his offer to serve Elizabeth in Ireland with 2,000 or 3,000 men. Nicolson sent in notes of a scheme relating to such an offer in January, 1597, C. S. P. Scot. (Thorpe) II, 730, C. S. P. Ireld. VI. 225. (distinct documents, but perhaps copies.)
footed in some parts thereof, and yet the Crown of England cannot expel them. 48

Slowly the Irish were gaining ground, and by April, 1597, the only places held for the Queen in Ulster were Newry, Carrickfergus, Carlingford, Green Castle, Armagh, Dundrum, and Oldrelflet. 49 There is reason to believe that Angus MacDonald again visited Tyrone in March, but no details relative to the occasion survive. 50 In the following month he certainly was in Edinburgh in connection with his submission to Pittenweem in the November previous, and we know that by May 11th he had departed from the court to his own country in some discontent at the way matters were shaping in his regard. MacLean, too, was becoming somewhat piqued at the Queen's failure to accept his Irish offer. He had been ill early in the spring, and we have seen the occasion of his fall from the royal favour of James VI. According to his by now usual practice when fishing in the Tudor pond, he baited his hook with a threat, saying to Bowes, through Achinross, that overtures had again been made to him by Tyrone for aid and that he now fully intended sending his men to serve the Irish

48. Fenton to Cecil, Feb. 6th, Feb. 14th, and to Burghley, Feb. 16th, C.S.P. Ireld., VI, 227, 232, 234. Sir John Norreys thought that the main difficulty in employing Scots in Ulster would lie in victualling them - Id. VI, 236.
50. The only report of this is in "Advertisements delivered to Sir Henry Wallop by A.B.," March 24th. A.B. says that Angus intended taking Tyrone's eldest son into fosterage and that the Earl of Argyll was ready to marry the Earl's daughter, formerly O'Donnell's wife. He also supplied the astounding information that "the Earl of Argyll amongst the Northern (evidently the word Irish is to be supplied here) is called James M'Connell, Lord of the Irish Scots." This statement, of course, makes no sense whatever, and is in error, yet it is accepted by Mr. Atkinson, the Editor of this volume of the Irish Calendar — see Index thereto, under Argyll.
rebels unless the Queen engaged them. This was in May.
In August he made another effort to press his services on
the English Government, and in September he was a party
to what was very like a plot to force the Queen's hand.
Due to the diplomacy of Argyll, Lachlan and Angus were
temporarily reconciled, and they both sent in offers to help
Elizabeth - MacLean on November 1st., from "Duart to Bowes,
and Angus in September to Sir John Chichester, the new military
governor at Carrickfergus. It has been advanced as a reason
for Angus's change of front that he had turned the rage
against MacSomhairle, which he took no pains to hide since the
date of the Antrim chieftain's attempt to traduce him in the
eyes of King James, upon Tyrone who still kept up an uncertain
alliance with MacSomhairle. This may have been so, but it
must not be forgotten that the relationship between Tyrone
and MacSomhairle was never very cordial upon either side,
and it is a disputable point if Angus wished to injure Tyrone.
At all events, the Irish Council looked askance at the sudden
reconciliation of the two Scottish clans until recently "at
pike" with each other. They thought that the bad state of

52. Same to Cecil, March 9th; Achinross to Bowes, May 6th,
Dumbarton - Id., II, 733, 736. Achinross said that Tyrone had
received supplies of armour and money from Spain, and that
two pavilions ("pallionis") which were being prepared at
Glasgow - one of them to hold 300 men, with beds - were
thought to be for Tyrone.
53. Bowes to Cecil, Aug. 15th; Achinross to Bowes, Aug. 8th -
Achinross was then in Edinburgh - Id., II, 740.
54. Bowes to Cecil, Sept. 20th, C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe) II, 742;
MacLean to Bowes, Nov. 1, Id. II, 744; Sir John Chichester
to Burghley, C.S.P. Ireld. VI. 397. Argyll had earlier in the
year been seeking an English passport to leave Scotland -
Bowes' letters of March 9th and 23rd - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe)
II 733, 734. See Gregory: Isles, 274-275, for the suggestion
that Angus allied himself with MacLean against Tyrone in
order to bring about the downfall of MacSomhairle. Mitchell:
Hist. Highlands, 428, also has this view, and vide infra
P. 318 for the suggestion of the Macdonald historians.
Ulster was like to be made worse by reason of the machinations of Angus and MacLean who were "both labouring vehemently to come into Ulster, and bring with them 2,000 or 3,000 Scots under pretence to make offer to serve her Majesty," but who, they felt sure, if they did get foot in Ulster, would "convert their forces to serve the traitor, with whom it is (not) to be doubted they have contracted underhand."

The council suspected that the Islanders were either being set on by the Earl of Huntly or by Tyrone.55

In the matter of munitions and warlike supplies, Tyrone seemed to have constant and uninterrupted access to the Glasgow market. This was a matter which the new Irish Lord Deputy Burgh was quick to take notice of, but even less was done to hinder this traffic than that of the fighting men. Burgh had arrived in Ireland to take over from Russell during the summer, a pretence at negotiations with Tyrone was still being kept up at the time of his arrival. He complained to London of the passage of munitions in August and September, saying that the Queen should write to the King of Scots requesting him to inflict the penalties provided for by the Proclamation of 1595 on offenders. He recognised that it would not be easy to bring the Scots' merchants to order as they were receiving 2s.6d. a pound for gunpowder, but he said that, although the Earl had had plenty of money before this," now it scanteth, for his charges have been beyond his ability, and he hath cessed the country almost to the utmost penny to keep his Connaghs together this summer."

55. State of Ireland, debated in Council, Nov. 5th, 1597 - C.S.F. Carew, III, 272.
56. L.Depty. Burgh to Burghley, Aug 16th and Sept. 10th; same to Cecil, Sept 5th; C.S.P. Ireld. VI. 383, 390, 393.
Burgh also said that some munitions came to Tyrone from Denmark. For his arrival, etc. - Bagwell, Tudors, III, 278.
For the negotiations - Moryson: Itinerary, part II, 2, Cap.I.
Bagenall also wrote to inform Cecil of a fresh cargo of powder, lead, and match from Scotland which was landed in Loch Foyle in October, and there is evidence to show that Burgh was only prevented by his sudden death from employing an agent to go to Scotland to King James whom he hoped to have arrest Alexander Steward, a Glasgow merchant who had had dealings with Tyrone, and one Garlon, the Earl's man there.57

During the administration of Lord Deputy Burgh a determined but unsuccessful attempt was made to put down the rebellion in Ireland by military force. Tyrone was attacked suddenly between Newry and Armagh, and, after a series of skirmishes in that area, a fort was set up on the river Blackwater. An experienced soldier, Captain Thomas Williams, was appointed in command. These events took place in June and July. By August, Burgh's general plan of attack was in force, but Sir Conyers Clifford, the new Governor of Connacht in Bingham's room, was beaten off by O'Donnell, Maguire, and O'Rourke from an attack on the Ballyshannon fords, the Blackwater fort was closely beleagured by Tyrone, and Burgh could do no more than throw a supply of provisions into the place before his death in Newry.

57 Marshal Sir Henry Bagenall to Cecil, Oct. 29th; James Nott to same, Oct. 26th. - C.S.P. Ireld., VI. 429, 431. This James Nott (vide ante, Note 45, p. 290) was the agent in question.
The fear that King James was aiding Tyrone was survived towards the end of 1597. Certainly if we can convict for a strong suspicion, James was guilty of such practice in violation of the theoretical amity between England and Scotland, but it is as well to make it quite clear, in view of the seemingly general assumption to the contrary, that no real proof in the matter can be brought forward. The suggestion is that the Scottish King communicated secretly with the Irish rebels for his own ends. What these were is not, of course, clear. It is not so much, however, a matter of proving a motive, and above all things it must be remembered that whether or no secret intelligence was maintained between Dungannon and Holyroodhouse it had no issue in anything like a working understanding between the king and the Earl. In James's Highland policy at these dates, open in so far as we can estimate it, secret in so far as it has been made open for us in an examination of the correspondence of the period, we cannot lay our fingers upon one resolution, one activity, and say: this was actuated by the sympathy existing between Tyrone and King James.

In September, Bowes reported a rumour in Edinburgh that some communication had passed between the King and the Earl. In October, Tyrone passed close to Blackwater Fort, the new erection in the Ulster marshlands, and held a parley with Captain Thomas Williams. Williams (according to his own report) charged the Earl with having sent letters to
Spain and to the King of Scots. Tyrone confessed to both, saying that he had sent to know if King James would send him any men, and that "he would send to any prince in the world to be relieved." Williams concluded that if the Queen did not take up the offers of the Islanders to be employed, Tyrone would engage them against her.68

On October 31st, Geoffrey Fenton was informed by an anonymous spy that a letter had come to Tyrone about eight days since from the King of Scots. The spy said that Tyrone had summoned his chief counsellor and secretary, Henry Hovenden, that they had made out an answer, and that this had been forwarded to Scotland by the King's messenger. He further informed Fenton that King James was willing to join Tyrone upon certain unstated and apparently unknown conditions. This information was the subject of a debate in the Irish Council, and, in ultimately communicating it to Sir Robert Cecil, Lord Justice Norreys and the Councillors remarked that they did not give any opinion thereon, "considering how uncertain and variable those intelligences are, grounded often more upon private device than upon verity of matter."59 On Nov. 12th the same or another spy — this time signing himself "Sine Nomine" — reported that Tyrone was "very merry" on the alleged receipt of King James's letter.60 What the English Privy Council thought of the matter we do not know, but in December when a parley was being arranged between Tyrone and the Earl of Ormond, the latter acting on behalf of the English, it was stipulated

60. Sine Nomine to Fenton, Nov. 12th, Id. VI,449.
that if Tyrone was to be pardoned he must first of all dismiss out of the realm all Scots in his employment. Ormond was further advised to remind Tyrone sharply of his late dealings with the Scots and to stipulate that they did not again occur. The parley not having issued in any agreement, Tyrone continued to pursue his intrigues.

While it is thus hard to prove anything out of these reports of relationship between Tyrone and King James, the latter is found during 1597 and 1598 to be entering into quite open friendship with James MacSomhairle MacDonald. It is rather a pity that Scottish historians should neglect the fact that the rumours of the Tyrone intrigue provided a background for this other open relationship in the Tudor mind. There is evidence to show that the King's friendship with an Irish chieftain in the midst of rumours of a most wild and contradictory nature was seized upon in London as a reason for suspecting that some deep purpose was afoot involving Edinburgh and Ulster. Lang unfortunately makes the blunder of confusing James MacSomhairle with James the son of Angus, with the result that in his account the affair is complicated in an absurd fashion.

In July, 1597, it was being urged in Ireland that the Government enter into some agreement with MacSomhaire in return for which he might be set up in opposition both to Tyrone and to Angus of Dunyveg. It will be remembered that MacSomhairle himself had been earlier negotiating with

61. Heads of Farley, Dec. 5; English Privy Council to Ormond, Dec. 26th - Id. VI. 463, 481. See also Notes concerning Ireland, 1597, N.d. Id. 494.

62. Lang: Hist. Scotland, II, 434-435. Gregory adopts the view of Hill (MacDonells of Antrim) that Angus was deprived of his Irish inheritance by Somhairle Buide – Highlands and Isles, 274-275. As has been shown in several places in this work, there is distinct evidence that Angus held territorial power in the Glens until a much later date than is allowed by either Hill or Gregory.
Captain Egerton along these lines, but by September Sir John Chichester, the new military governor at Carrickfergus had reason gravely to suspect him. He was not yet openly disobedient to the Queen's government, but he and his newly liberated brother, Randal, had refused to do her any service except in return for maintenance. They had not paid the crown rents, although payment had been demanded, and, having broken down their castles of Glenarm and Redbawn, they were actively fortifying themselves in Dunluce, one of the strongest natural fortresses in Ireland. Here they had set up the three pieces of ordnance which had been saved from the Armada wreck of 1588, and Chichester was further bewildered as to their intentions by the report that one of them was about to marry Tyrone's daughter.63 Late in October, James MacSomhairle renewed his correspondence of the previous year with the King of Scots.64 In September, he wrote to Bowes to inform him of Tyrone's receiving supplies from Glasgow, and to request that he might have the Queen's warrant to seize all the Scotsmen who sought to cross to the aid of the rebels in Ireland, — an assumption, by the way, of a power which he could not be expected to possess. It is thus difficult to see what he aimed at until November, in which month a circumstance in Antrim brought him into the open for a moment in so far as the English administration was concerned. It would appear that on the 4th of this month James and his two

64. Aston to Bowes and to Cecil, Sept. 1 and 7, C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe) II, 741. Note that Aston makes the slip of calling him Somhairle Buidhe. In February, 1597, King James had received a present of some horses from Ireland — most likely from MacSomhairle — Anon. letter of Scottish advices, Id.II, 732.  
brothers, Randal and Niece Ultagh, accompanied by a force variously estimated as between 600 and 1,300 strong, came down towards Carrickfergus to parley with Chichester concerning some cattle taken from them by Captain Mansell. It seems that Chichester had a counter claim against them in respect of stealths committed by them on the Magees of Island Magee, supporters of the government. Chichester accordingly marched out from Carrickfergus with a force drawn from the garrison and fronted the Scots at some little distance from the town. The forces present upon either side were an incitement to disorder, and some of the more hot-headed officers on the government side, in the persons of Moses Hill, commanding the horse, and Captain Merriman who had seen considerable earlier service against the Scots, were quick to advise Chichester to attack the MacDonalds there and then and to settle the issue of the parley by the sword. In this advice Chichester was rash enough to acquiesce and the government forces fell upon the Scots in a disordered charge. The MacDonalds, however, were ready for them, the charge was repelled, a counter-charge made and the English totally overthrown. Only the skilful manoeuvring of a relief band which came from the town to assist the main body saved Carrickfergus from pillage and destruction at the hands of the victorious MacSomhairles. Chichester was among the slain and numerous prisoners were taken by the Scots.66

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66 Egerton to Burghley, Nov. 7th., account of Lieutenant Hart, dated Nov. 4th. C.S.P. Ireld, VI, 441-443. MacSomhairle sent to Tyrone the head of the ill-fated Chichester (Egerton to (?) Norreys - Nov. 5th. Id., 444-445). Tyrone, it was said, was sorry that it was not Merriman's head instead of Chichester's. (Id. VI, 465-467,) but Merriman did not long survive the disaster. Early in January, 1598, he was drowned overboard off a ship bound for Dublin when three miles out of Carrickfergus (Egerton to Fenton, Jan. 6th. Id., VII, 25.) For an account of the battle vide also art. by Hore in U.J.A. V, 188, seq. Bagwell: Tudors, III, 289-291, makes the action take place after James MacSomhairle's visit to Edinburgh, related below. Hill: Macdonnells of Antrim, 192.
NORTH-EAST ULSTER - PERIOD 1586-1603.

BASED ON SPEED'S MAP OF 1610, &c.

NOTE THAT EXACT BOUNDARIES OF AREAS ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO INDICATE - SPHERES OF INFLUENCE ARE RATHER TO BE UNDERSTOOD.

- ELAN DONALD OF DUNYVEG AND ISLAY (TERRITORY OF THE GLENS)
- MAC SOMHAIRLE SEPT OF CLAN DONALD
- TERRITORIES HELD BY THE IRISH CLANS.
- TERRITORIES UNDER ENGLISH RULE.
- IRISH-ENGLISH MARCH LANDS.

CASTLES AND TOWNS IN BLACK; NAMES OF TERRITORIES IN RED.
On the day following the overthrow, Egerton, who was now once again in temporary command in Carrickfergus, wrote to James MacSomhairle expressing surprise at his action and asking him whether he now intended peace or war. To this MacSomhairle replied, saying that he had come to negotiate and, having been attacked, that he had had no alternative but to fight. It is not possible to say how far the MacSomhairles had received the countenance or active aid of Tyrone in this affair. The marriage alliance between the Ulster leader and James was still being negotiated, and it was reported that, three days before the overthrow, James and his brethren had come from Tyrone with whom they had been holding council. James MacSomhairle, it was stated, had been forced by the superior power of the Earl to ally himself to him against his will, but he received in recompense the right to billet 200 men in Clandeboye and 800 in Kilultagh, Kilwarlin, and in MacCartan's country. On the part of the English, Sir Thomas Norreys and the Irish Council hurriedly sent on a reinforcement of three companies from Dundrum to the relief of Carrickfergus, for it was feared that the Scots might receive aid from Tyrone to take the place.
Having thus vindicated himself in Ireland, James MacSomhairle saw fit to go to Scotland to prosecute his extraordinary claim to the Scottish territories of the Dunyveg MacDonals in the presence of King James. Gregory asserts that the King had written in reply to his original claim of October, 1596, inviting him to Edinburgh with the implied intention of hearing him on the matter. By the end of December, 1597 MacSomhairle was in that city—having apparently gone to Scotland immediately after his defeat of Chichester—and Roger Aston reported to Sir Robert Cecil that the King had refused him an audience. Robert Bowes, the indefatigable ambassador, had died on November 16th, and Nicolson was once more acting in his stead.

If, however, MacSomhairle had been refused the royal presence at first, he was certainly received later, and quite sympathetically treated by James. He brought a present for the Queen of Scots and was knighted Sir James MacDonald of Dunluce by the King. His claim to the Dunyveg territories was not, however, entertained, his plea concerning the illegitimacy of Angus being too far-fetched to receive the credit of the Scottish Privy Council. Besides, the settlement in favour of

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70. Gregory: Highlands and Isles, 273-274. There is no other proof that King James had so encouraged him.
70. C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II, 745. Aston said at this time also that Tyrone had sent a messenger to Huntly.
71. Id. II, 744. For the visit of MacSomhairle to Edinburgh, vide also: Anderson's MS. history: Chronicle of Scottis Kingis (Maitland Club); Chambers' Domestic Annals Scot. I. 286-7; Birrel's contemp. Diary quoted Hill: Macdonnells Antrim, 128. When James knighted him he granted him also the estate of Cullelungart with Kilkevin and other parcels in Cantyre—cf. Orig. Faroch. Scot, II, 6-7,-11, and Hill, loc. cit.
Angus had been made prior to his arrival. MacSomhairle certainly cherished no animosity against James for the loss of what he could really never have seriously expected to gain, and in the August following we find him presenting a cannon - probably one of the Armada ones - to the King in token of friendship. On his departure from Edinburgh the new knight of Dunluce was saluted by a volley from the guns of the castle. 72

These independent proceedings of James MacSomhairle had immediate repercussions in Ireland in the form of a remarkable crop of rumours concerning the extent to which King James was involved in Irish affairs. A certain Captain Richard Atherton, or Allerton, claimed that while off Carrickfergus his ship had been forced by stress of weather to run over to the Scottish coast. There he had found trace of the passing of James MacSomhairle and his brother Randal on their way to Edinburgh, and he was informed that James had made a proclamation in Ayr calling upon mercenary recruits for his service in Ireland to be ready to join him at that place upon his return from court. Atherton was told further that King James had treated MacSomhairle very kindly and had given him a force estimated at 150 or 500 strong and leave to engage as many as would volunteer to enter his service for pay. It was reported that MacSomhairle was to marry a sister of the Earl of Gowrie, and Atherton, inflamed by these rumours

wrote to the Earl of Ormonde suggesting a wild scheme of his own to thwart the projects of the Antrim chieftain. In Ayr or thereabouts he had met the Laird of Gilhilte, a gentleman claiming family connections with the Earls of Kildare, and the two had evolved a scheme whereby two or three hundred of the Queen's soldiers were to be transported to Scotland to lie secretly in Gilhilte's castles, whence they were to issue and attack the MacSomhairles on their way back from Edinburgh. This scheme was not such as would commend itself for adoption to the English authorities in Ireland, but the news of MacSomhairle's activities which Atherton brought back to Carrickfergus was sufficient to cause Egerton to believe that there was every likelihood of war between Scotland and England.73

§ VII.

Sir Geoffrey Fenton, while he was cautious enough to doubt if all Atherton had heard was true, was greatly alarmed at the turn which events had taken, seeming as they did to lend some colour to the statements that King James and the Ulster rebels were communicating with each other.74 By March, the Earl of Ormonde was in a position to add further fuel to the fire. This Earl had been appointed to supreme military command in Ireland after the death of Burgh, and, in December, 1597, he had renewed negotiations with Tyrone. The latter had more than held his own during the year, but he now showed himself disposed to enter into one of his

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73. Atherton to Ormonde, Carrickfergus, Jan. 5th; Egerton to Fenton, do. Jan 6th - C.S.P.°, Ireland, VII, 10-11, 24-25.
74. Fenton to Cecil, Jan. 3rd, Jan. 20th, Jan. 21st - Id. VII. 7, 24, 33.
periodic truces. He agreed on December 22nd, 1597, not to
attack the Blackwater fort - the only gain of the English
from Burgh's offensive - and a cessation of hostilities was
accordingly entered upon for two months. In accordance with
these provisional terms Tyrone had been bound to acquaint
Ormonde with any letter or message received by him from
overseas. In view of this, therefore, he sent him in February
the copy of a letter which Tyrone alleged he had received from
the King of Scots. This Ormonde sent to the English Privy
Council saying that he could not vouch for its veracity,
seeing that he had not had view of the original. This was
undoubtedly a document which would, were its contents known
to us, throw some little light upon the intrigue, and it
must be regarded as unfortunate in this connection that it is
wanting from the Record Office files. It should not be too
highly regarded, however - and it certainly would not,
whatever the nature of its contents, constitute any proof
against King James - since of its very nature it is contaminated
as having come from Tyrone. In all probability Tyrone, being
aware that he was suspect, composed a harmless letter supposedly
from the King and sent it to Ormonde at once to throw the
English off the scent and to score a point as one willing to
be bound by his treaty obligations.73

In May the Irish Council felt obliged to send a
statement of the Scottish position to London. Tyrone, they
said, expected soon to have the support of 3,000 or 4,000
Scots; munitions continued to come to him from Glasgow;

73 Ormonde to Privy Council - Id. VII, 69. For the truce,
vide Moryson: Itinerary, sub annis, 1597-1598; the documents
the probability of the privity of the King of Scots to his designs became daily more apparent. In view of these things, they felt that the Edinburgh ambassador should be instructed diligently to enquire into the state of affairs as regarded Ireland in Scotland.74

Nicolson, who had been handling English interests in Edinburgh, since the date of Bowes' death, was meanwhile keeping up the endless round of watching, promising, spying, reporting. He promised money to MacLean, regretted that Argyll seemed to be growing "strange," watched closely the dealings of King James with his Island subjects - and reported as usual every breath of rumour to Cecil and Burghley.

But the King continued to prove himself stranger than any of his subjects. On March 2nd, at the height of the rumours of his complicity with Tyrone, he caused a new Proclamation to be made against assisting the Irish rebels. None were to go to Ireland, or to assist those who meditated going, upon pain of treason.75 A copy of this document, sent

Irish Council to English Privy Council, May 4th - Id.VII,140. Re. munitions: in January it is recorded that one, Capt. William Warren, had enticed away from Tyrone all the workmen who had been sent to him to make firearms (by, it is said, the King of Scots) - VII, 49; in March there is mention of a man named Fleming, described as a Scotsman and "an agent for Tyrone to buy powder and other things" - VII, 106; in April, Garland, brother of the Garland who acted as a Scottish agent for Tyrone (vide ante, p.295) reported that the King of Scots had promised Tyrone men and munitions - VII,120. Fenton, writing to Burghley on April 22nd, said that King James had promised Tyrone a fleet of ships to act against the English and to frustrate any attempt to plant a garrison on Loch Foyle - VII, 128. (all C.S.P., Ireland.) See Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 15th; to Burghley, March 5th - C.S.P. Scot., (Thorpe), II, 747. Enclosed in Nicolson to Burghley, March 5th. Found only in MS - S.P. Scot. Eliz., LXII, 8 I; vide Steele: Calendar Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, II, 2, 263.

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by Nicolson, reached Burghley some days later and was apparently considered a sufficient answer, at least for the moment, to the allegations being made against the King.

The MacLean intrigue dragged wearily onward, MacLean and Achinross reminding Nicolson of the repeated offers being made them by Tyrone and requesting him to pay the pension which had been promised to Lachlan by Sir Robert Cecil. MacLean's animosities and the reasons for his offers we know of old - as a matter of fact, it should be rather disappointing to find any slackening off in his bombardment by letters, to such an extent do his half threats, half supplications tend to become an institution - but we now come to the point where the other Isles chieftains seem to have begun to fret a little over the fact that there had not been an expedition in force to Ireland since 1595. A constant going and coming there was, undoubtedly, but the failure in 1595 had marred matters in 1596, and the King's drive against his rebels in 1597 had precluded the possibility of large scale action in that year. Donald Gorme of Sleat, who continued to call himself Lord of the Isles, felt in March, 1598, that it was a shame to remain inactive while there was a chance of earning money, and so renewed his offer of 1595 to serve the Queen. In many respects the letter which he now sent in through Nicolson is the most extraordinary in the whole series of communications to the English crown from the Highland chieftains, for it offers nothing short of a concerted rebellion in Scotland if it is the Queen's desire to

77. Achinross to Nicolson, March 1st, 1598, March 31st, June 17th; Nicolson to Burghley, April 15th - C.S.P. Scot (Thorpe), II, 748, 749, 751.
bring about such a movement. "Donald Gorme makdonall Lord of ye Illis of Scotland and chieff off the haill clandonall Irishehemen quhairsoeur" with the assistance of his sworn followers "the Captane of ye haill clanrandell, the laird of glengarrie, the laird Makrandell in Lochquhaber, the Captane of ye clancameron, the laird Makean of Ardnamurchin, the laird mak Kynnon of Straithordill, Neill Makcloyde Tutor of ye leveiss and brother Germaine to vmq 11 Torquille dov M'cloyde of ye Levis and with the further assistance of his brother-in-law Macleod of Dunvegan and Harris and of Sir James MacDonald, son of Angus of Dunyveg, promised at the Queen's word to plunge the West Highlands into war. Sir James the son of Angus and Donald MacLeod of Harris might, Sleat claimed, "stire up rebellious and trouble within all ye boundis of ye mayne land and In countreyis nearest their haill boundis quhairsoeur and thairby inquiet ye peceable estate of ye hoill In countrey and fasche, his Maie long yneuch theiranent, and wearis the whole estaitis of yis land by raising nev stentis and taxatiounis." The King would not be able to put down such rebellion without the consumption of "greatt stoirs of money, quhairof his Maie is veray skarsse." Referring to the chieftains whom he claimed to be able to involve in such a revolt, Donald Gorm said: "If hir Maie think expedient to have yis matter accomplisshed, vpon certane guid motives and reasonable consideratiounis to be schovin and usd tovards thame, it salbe accomplisshed."

That such a scheme could even be put forward at as late a date as 1598, apart altogether from the fact that
the union of Island chiefs which it contemplated would surely be an impossibility, goes far to show that the old Lordship of the Isles had been no more than nominally incorporated in the Kingdom of Scotland.

The letter proceeds: "Or vthirvayis (the Isles chieftains mentioned) salbe moved to direct and send sick numbers of their Irischemen vnder ye lording of certane speciall gentilmen of their avin kin as comandars to yame upon reasonable conditionis to be employed in ye Queenis seruice against hir rebellis in Irland. Thir men ar ye rather and ye moir easelie to be inducet heirunto, be reason of ye great rigor and seueritie used towards thame be his Maie (throv ye counsell of certan particular corrupt men and brybing courteours) anent ye compositionis for the richt of their landis and levings: so iff thay can find ony suir succours...thay mein and intend novayis to aknowlege his Maesis authoritie nor obedience willinglie during thair lyftimis." If this were anybody's opinion but that of Donald Gorm himself the Royal settlement of 1596-7 were indeed in vain. There can be little doubt, however, that Donald was but piling up a weighty list of names to make out a case for his own employment. The feeling of animosity towards charter holdings and central authority susceptible to the attentions of "corrupt men and brybing courteours" was undoubtedly strong in the Isles, but the inherent faction feelings had been well enough demonstrated in the affairs of 1595 to preclude any possibility of a concerted movement. When this last was to be a mercenary one at the behest of England either against the King of Scots or the Queen's
Irish rebels, the possibility of it becomes still more remote.

It seems clear that what Donald hoped for was the organisation of another expedition in which North and South Isles would be represented and of which he would be leader — with this difference, however, that the movement would be in the Queen's name and that the war chest would be filled by English gold. If the Queen wished that the King of Scots be frightened, then James might prove convenient enough to feel overawed; if she desired the Scots to oppose Tyrone, then it would be merely the mercenary scheme over again with a chance of greater gain at the hands of less experienced employers. If it is true to say that these were the hopes of Sleat, however, we can only remark that he was attempting to dispose of his services to a singularly fickle entrepreneur. It can clearly be shown that whatever sums the Islanders had received as a monetary recompense for their services at the hands of the English were not a fraction of what they were paid out of Ireland.

Donald Gorm's letter concludes with a statement of what he can do against Tyrone. He says: "I am priuie of ye Erll of Tyron his laite secreitt course and practizes heir with his Maie of Scotland in whois fauours the Erll of Huntly delt veray earnestlie and secreitlie with his Maie to haue had Tyron his sute granted. I can discover at large ye circumstances yairof, his Maes anser huntlyis anser and advyss to Tyron." Further, he knows all about the three lately resetted Earlis, Huntly, Angus, and Erroll, and can make himself privy to the Spanish plots, to the Queen's
advantage, through his friendship with the Jesuit, James Gordon, and through Walter Lindsay. A strange friendship this last must have been, we must remark, since the diplomatic Donald refers to these two Catholics as ones "whois diabolical pestiferous and antichristiane cours practizes and intentionis I hai the now with my hoille hartt and soulle I protest now, before God and his angellis."78.

Far from considering the English interest in Scotland furthered now that such a champion as Donald Gorm had declared himself ready to enlist in its defence, Cecil treated this offer in a manner almost cynical. His only comment on it is in a letter to Nicolson from Greenwich on May 13th in which he refers to the offer "which some person has made of serving her Majesty" as something which he (Cecil) does not see how he means to perform?79

§ VIII.

The mention by Sleat of Sir James MacDonald of Dunyveg necessitates some reference to the general progress of events in the Isles where the stage was set for the final acts of two principals who have for many years held our attention in that quarter: Angus MacDonald and Lachlan MacLean. It will be remembered that, during the negotiations with Angus in 1596, the King had released Sir

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78. Offers of Donald Gorm to Queen Elizabeth, March, N.d. 1598; C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe) II, 749. (S.P. Scot. Eliz. LXII, 19. II)

79. The document is printed at length in the Macdonalds: Clan Donald, II, appendix, 757 seq.

Cecil to Nicolson, C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II, 750.
James, his son, in order that he might influence him to submit to authority. This James is usually described as having been a young man made crafty by his long residence and education in court, and it appears that, possibly by representing to Angus that the King would grant better terms to a guiltless son than to a long offending father, he had succeeded in having the family inheritance made over to him by Angus. It should be noted that this had no legal effect at the time as the estates were already forfeited, and that, as the re-grant is to Angus, the proof of any real transfer is obscure.80 At all events, Angus having given no indication of any intention to comply with the terms of his release from forfeiture, the King saw fit in 1598 once more to release Sir James the courtier to exert his influence over his Highland father. Sir James is the person, although he has confused him with James MacSomhairle, whom Lang fittingly describes as "a man of the world at Holyrood, a determined and traitorous ruffian in the heather."81 Arriving in the Islands, Sir James now laid a subtle plot to oust his father and set himself up in his stead. He found a feud afoot between MacAllister, Laird of Loup, and the sons of his former Tutor. MacAllister had killed the Tutor, and his sons were at Askomill under the protection of Angus. Sir James took the side of the Laird and the two of them beset Askomill Castle, set it afire and seized Angus, whom his unnatural son forthwith committ-

ed to prison in irons for several months at Smerbie in Cantyre. As this entire affair is involved in much obscurity in the matter of the dates of the various actions, it is difficult to assay the exact motives of the parties. Sir James, we know, secured a letter from the King approving of his imprisonment of Angus, and from the reference to his actions in the letter of Sleat's already quoted it would appear that they had the sanction of that chieftain. At all events, after the imprisonment of his father and at some date prior to March, 1598, Sir James took command of the Clan Donald South and soon adopted an attitude of hostility to the King. 

King James took up the gage, and on June 29th a muster was ordered of the burghs and shires in the West Lowlands to meet at Dumbarton on August 20th and to accompany the King in person against the MacDonalds, "considering the proude rebellion, defectioun, and disobedience of the inhabitantis of Kintyre and utheris pairtis of the Illis and Hielandis of this realme."

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82 Mitchell: Highlands, 429; Macdonalds: Clan Donald, II, 569-570.
84 Note the views of the Macdonald historians on these events. (Clan Donald, II, 570-571). It is here suggested that the temporary alliance between MacLean and the Clan Donald (vide ante, p. 293) "with the view, ostensibly, of aiding Queen Elizabeth against her Irish rebels" took place, not towards the end of 1597, but in 1598, and after the date of the Askomill affair. This cannot, however, be so (indeed it seems to have been advanced as a way out of the difficulty of squaring Lachlan and Angus - but as the movement came to nothing this is not really so insurmountable.) Reference to the authorities quoted in Note 54 ante proves this. This source (Clan Donald, loc cit) also seems to indicate that Sleat was acting with MacLean in offering his service to the Queen, but MacLean's name is conspicuous by its absence from Sleat's document.
85 Mitchell: Highlands, loc. cit. The date is fixed by reference to Sleat's letter. Most of the Highland historians would lead to the belief that it was later.
86 Act. Parl. Scot. IV. 172-173; Reg. Privy Council Scot., V. 466. Note that this act appears under date June 29th in the Acts and June 30th in the Register.
King James, who had made quite a practice of displaying his intention to lead expeditions in person only later to withdraw, withdrew from this one also, and the command was given to the Duke of Lennox. Before anything could be done by Lennox, however, the sudden renewal of the Rinns of Islay feud completely altered affairs in the Isles and led to the indefinite postponement of the expedition.

Out of the confusion occasioned in 1596-7 by the protracted surrender of Angus and the negotiations following, MacLean had come by some way not very clear, and therefore open to suspicion as underhand, armed with a Royal grant of the long disputed territory of the Rinns of Islay. So considerable were the ramifications of this feud that it is not an exaggeration to say that its history was that of the South Isles for the period of its duration. About the focal point of MacDonald-MacLean antagonism the affairs of the other clans revolved. The reverberations of the struggle were heard alike in Holyroodhouse and in Westminster, in the farthest Northern Isles and on the plains of Connacht. The course of the Irish wars was at times conditioned by it. Finally, it was responsible for the death of Lachlan MacLean and for the total overthrow and absement of the House of Islay.

88. Mitchell: Highlands, 430; Gregory: Highlands and Isles, 264; MacDonalds: Clan Donald, II, 565 - who say that the King, through exasperation at the proceedings of Angus, gave the Rinns to his rival. But the King was not friendly with MacLean at the time - ante, p. (291). By May 11th, 1597 Angus had departed from Edinburgh, as Bowes says, in discontent. (C.S.P., Scot - Thorpe - II. 736.) This may have been occasioned by the King's grant to MacLean. In the preliminary arrangement (after surrender of Angus on Sept. 23rd, 1596) made on October 8th, 1596, there is no mention of an alienation of the Rinns. (Reg. Privy Council, Scot. V. 321.) Vide ante p. (289)
Lachlan MacLean did not make any effort to gain possession of the Rinns until August, 1598. Since June he had entered upon one of his periods of coolness towards Queen Elizabeth. He represented himself as sustaining considerable loss as a result of her continued neglect of his offers, and by July 26th he had reached another of his periodical ultimatum: unless he received more recompense than mere words he would not be subject any longer to the Queen. Beyond the £150 received in 1596, he had not handled a penny of English money, and the promised pension was, of course, conveniently forgotten. 89 Apparently thinking Sir James a more pliable person than his father, and, at all events, armed with the Royal authority, Lachlan once more turned his attention to Islay. On August 5th he met Sir James at Lochgruinart, apparently with a view to negotiations. Sir James made some offers, intending a settlement, but Lachlan, against the advice of his friends, pressed for possession of the entire territory in dispute. What followed is involved in some obscurity. Gregory holds that both parties came armed to Lochgruinart, the MacDonalds having the smaller force, that hostilities arose between them and that MacLean was killed in a clan battle. 90 The MacLean apologists, going on the statement of Nicolson to Cecil regarding the affair and on Calderwood's account, will have it that Duart was killed treacherously, having been invited to a friendly

89. Achinross to Nicolson, June 28th, July 26th - both from Dumbarton - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II, 751, 753. With regard to the money, note that the above statement is made on the ground that the £150 is the only sum mentioned as having been paid. It is to be inferred from the correspondence that MacLean received nothing further.

At all events, at this point Lachlan MacLean, who had for long been a central figure in the Isles and who has so often crossed our path in the consideration of the Irish connections of the Islanders, passes out of the narrative.

The results of the affair at Traigh Ghruinneart were swift and far-reaching. Prompted by the desire for revenge, Hector, the son and heir of MacLean, with the assistance of MacLeod of Dunvegan, Cameron of Lochiel, MacNeil of Barra and MacKinnon, invaded Islay and defeated the MacDonals at Bern Bige. Sir James, who had been maimed at Lochgruinart, appealed to the King in August, 1599, proposing that his clan evacuate Cantyre, agree to have Dunvegan in Islay garrisoned for the Crown, and that the lands in Islay remaining be confirmed to him. Although the Scottish Privy Council accepted these proposals, they were never carried out — apparently because Argyll and Campbell of Calder intrigued in their own interests to bring about the final downfall of the MacDonals of Dunyveg. Referring to the sweeping westward extension of the power of Argyll which followed upon this disastrous feud, the Macdonals say: "The duplicity of the Chiefs of Campbell, who were rapidly rising into favour with the royal simpleton at Holyrood, was only equalled by the simplicity of their dupes, who very soon became entangled in a network of intrigue from which extrication became impossible."


These warlike proceedings in the Isles were in reality sufficient to preclude the possibility of any aid reaching Tyrone from that quarter for the time being, yet, whetted by the fear of an intrigue with the King and by the desire to frustrate the indefatigable Tyrone in every possible manner, the English authorities both in London and in Ireland, seconded by Nicolson in Edinburgh, did not relax their attention to Scots-Irish affairs for a moment. Tyrone had become a cancer in the English system; he could not be eradicated, therefore he must be prevented from spreading his activities lest his power increase to such an extent that a united Ireland might dictate her own terms to the Queen.

Fenton, the trusted counsellor of the Queen in Ireland, supplied with information as he was by his own system of spies, sent warning after warning to Cecil of the dangers from Scotland. King James’s Proclamation of March, 1598 - no more than the earlier one - caused no falling off in Tyrone’s supplies of warlike materials from the Scottish lowlands. Tyrone had promise of more money from Spain, and Fenton knew very well how he would use it: in buying Scottish powder and in waging Scottish soldiers. “Between Spain and Scotland, the one for money and the other for men, this dangerous rebellion of Ireland is born up,” said he, and he saw proof of King James’s complicity in Tyrone’s designs, in Tyrone’s fresh confederation with MacSomhairle and in his lodging his two sons with the Antrim chieftain in Dunluce - ostensibly to pursue their education there, but really, so
Fenton suspected, as pledges to the King of Scots. 93

Concerning the letter which Tyrone had given to Ormonde as having emanated from King James, an unnamed spy of Fenton's gave further information on June 21st. This man said that the English Council had sent the copy forwarded by Ormonde to the King, and that this latter had returned it to Tyrone on June 15th. Tyrone was stated to have made the excuse to King James that the letter had been stolen from him.

This, however, was but the unsupported story of an unknown person and—particularly in the absence of any copy of the letter—we cannot but discount it as such. A straw, however, shows the way of the wind, and there were enough straws in the air at the time to cause a decided suspicion of the implication of the King of Scots' actions to be entertained in English circles. Fenton prayed that the patrol of the Ulster coast by the Queen's pinnaces be resumed, and after the display of much red tape on the part of the English Lord Treasurer's Establishment, the pinnaces Spy and Merlin arrived in Dublin.

93. Fenton to Cecil, May 7th, 1598, June 22nd, June 25th—C.S.F. Ireland, VII, 142, 190-191. Paul to Capt. Skipwith, May 24th, Id. 154. Fenton supposed the meaning of the dissimulation which he suspected in King James to be "to bear up the rebellion of Ireland and underhand to hold Her Majesty entangled here to the end to draw her to serve some turn of his, which he thinketh he cannot bring to pass by other means." (June 25th)

94. (June 25th) to Fenton, June 21st—Id. 191-192. A curious cross-current compels our attention here. Campbell, the Dean of Limerick (vide ante, pp. 272-3) delivered to Ormonde at some date previous to July 31st a letter from King James the purport of which was as follows: the King acknowledged the goodwill of Ormonde and offered him his attention when it was required; he referred him to the Dean of Limerick, whom he recommended to him. In forwarding this to Cecil (to be shown specifically to the Queen and to Burghley) Ormonde said—"the ground hereof was, for friending the said Gambell, being a Scot, recommended unto me long since by Mr. Secretary Walsingham." Ormonde to Cecil, July 31st; King James to Ormond, May 31st, from Holyroodhouse—Id., VII, 214, 215. Note that James says nothing of Tyrone or the letter—but, of course, this could be (according to the spy's story) before the date of the reported opening of the matter to the King by the English Privy Council.
for the northern service on July 17th. The Popinjay was appointed to follow them to Ulster waters, "as admiral" as soon as her fitting out had been completed.95

In Scotland at these dates a new volunteer for the English service had come forward in the person of the Laird of Glenurchy. He seems to have been one of those appointed to proclaim the King's Act of March against assisting the Irish, and directly, and through the mediation of his secretary, John Archibald - already a "Filius" or English secret agent - he made it known to Nicolson that he was willing personally to assist Elizabeth. Soon, under the cipher name of "Pater," he had been formally enlisted into that band the members of which seem to have been fated to exist on promises, the Queen's party in Scotland. The inevitable MacConnachie seems to have been the subject of a bargain of his with Cecil, for that worthy wrote to him on August 19th. to say that £1,000 should be placed at his disposal if he performed his promise in connection with this mercenary leader - undoubtedly to dissuade him from going to Ireland. If England's estimation of MacConnachie could be judged for a moment by the amounts of money mentioned in his connection, then he must have been a

95. The department of the Lord Treasurer wanted to know on May 28th "what number of ships, and of what quality, with the numbers of men to serve therein, may serve for defence of the sea coast against access of Scots and their galleys" - a matter with which, it should be expected, experience had already informed the London authorities without recourse to the Irish administration. (C.S.P. Ireld., VII, 161.) Fenton to Cecil, July 24th. Capt. George Thornton to the Earl of Nottingham, the Lord High Admiral of England, July 31st, (Id. 211-212; 215)
very valuable person indeed.96 Apart from his references to Glenurchy, Nicolson had to report on July 8th a conference which he held with King James on the Irish question. He said that the King promised him that trafficking on the part of Scottish subjects with the Irish rebels should be punished with death. It was undoubtedly as a result of the overtures made to him by Nicolson on this occasion that the King caused a third Proclamation against the sending of aid, either in men or munitions, to the Ulster chiefs to be made in the Privy Council on August 8th. This document varies little in tenor from that of March, save that James MacSomhairle is now mentioned as one of those to whom aid from the Highlands and Isles has been sent in despite of former prohibitions. King James, it appears, was not so friendly with MacSomhairle at this date as to omit specific mention of him.97

MacSomhairle himself was acting during the Irish offensive of the Summer of 1598 in conjunction with Tyrone.

On June 13th. he attacked Carrickfergus with 800 men and beat the garrison back into the town. At the same time he

96. For Glenurchy: Archebald to Nicolson, June. N.d; Nicolson to Cecil, July 25th; Glenurchy to Cecil, Aug. 1st, to Nicolson, Aug. 7th; Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 15th; Cecil to Glenurchy, Aug. 19th. - C.S.P. Scot (Thorpe), II, 751-754. Writing upon the confirmation of the report of MacLean's death, Nicolson said that Glenurchy was the only person then remaining to serve the Queen in Scotland. (Aug. 15th) Nicolson to Cecil, July 8th - Id. II, 752. For the Proclamation: S.P. Eliz. Scot., LXII, 61; Steele, Calendar of Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, II, 2, 264. It was printed in Edinburgh by Robert Waldegrave. Referring to the offers of the Islanders to serve Elizabeth, Cecil notes, on Aug. 10th that they are evidently greedy, and that the time of the year is at all events too late for their project. - to Nicolson: C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II, 754.
besieged Belfast Castle. Egerton was absent in England and for the moment there was no governor in Carrickfergus. Blackwater Fort still held out in the centre of Tyrone's major activity, but by July 24th, it had been besieged for more than a month and was not expected to stand for much longer. Then came catastrophe for the English. Marching northwards out of Armagh to victual the fort, Marshal Bagenall, Tyrone's inveterate enemy, was caught in a trap by the Irish at Beal an Atha Buiche or the Yellow Ford, on August 14th, killed fighting at the head of his troops, and totally defeated. Bagenall's column was in order of march when he was attacked, and so the foremost sections were defeated before the others could come to their aid, the fugitives from the van fell in upon the centre, a wagon load of gunpowder blew up in the midst of the ranks, the cannon became bogged in the line of retreat and impeded progress, and in a very short time all was confusion and rout.

It was the greatest battle won by the Irish for generations, and in the period immediately following it the power of the rebels reached peak. The Yellow Ford on the road out of Ulster to the south-east, the fight with Clifford for the fords of the Erne on the road to the south-west; the victory of the Irish in these two engagements laid the country open to them to go and come almost as they pleased. Munster and Connacht were stirring. It seemed as if the chances were with O'Neil and O'Donnell.
"I know that this proclamation (of King James VI.) will not stop other of my friends in Scotland to send me aid, though the King do fail me."

- Earl of Tyrone, as reported by a spy, 1598.

Having received from Sir Robert Cecil some copies of the King of Scots' Proclamation of August 8th, Fenton, the indefatigable Queen's secretary in Ireland, sought a secret method of bringing their contents to the notice of the Irish. If they were published openly as having come through Dublin, no chieftain would believe that the King of Scots had ever seen them, but would rather ignore them as so much underhand propaganda on the part of the English. Fenton therefore employed certain agents to circulate them secretly, and instructed them to say that they had come directly from Scotland through Carrickfergus. He hoped that they would have a restraining influence on those of the Irish who were "doubtful and ready to stagger" as a result of Tyrone's late success. If these people could be shown that the King of Scots favoured the Queen rather than Tyrone, and that promises of aid from Scotland for the latter were therefore not to be relied upon, they might think twice before embarking upon a rebellious course. The contents of the Scottish Proclamation were conveyed to Tyrone himself, apparently through these channels of Fenton's, and, if we are to credit the information of one of Fenton's spies, the Earl took little
notice of them, saying that, despite the King, he hoped for further aid from Scotland - "I know that this proclamation will not stop other of my friends in Scotland to send me aid, though the King do fail me," he is reported as having said, "and, if all Scotland will forsake me, I know I shall have Spain fast with me."

Meanwhile King James made an effort to explain himself to the English authorities in Ireland regarding the rumours of his intercourse with Tyrone. On August 17th, 1598, he wrote from Dalkeith to Lords Justices Loftus and Gardener in Dublin: "whereas we are credibly informed that there is a report spread in those parts of a favourable letter, which is said to have been sent from us to Tyrone, to the encouragement of the rebel, and offence of the good subject; although we will not be accountable to any persons for any our writings or actions, yet we are content freely to profess, that such hath been our love to our dearest sister, and great respect to all her good subjects, that we have carefully avoided the least means of any just offence that might be offered to them.

And therefore that letter which we wrote to Tyrone, in answer to another of his, we wish that it might come to her hands, or to the sight of her best affected subjects. Yet it may be

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I. Fenton to Cecil, Oct. 8th; and see same to same, Sept. 18th, Oct. 2nd - C.S.P. Ireld., VII, 265-266, 276, 283. On Sept. 18 Fenton requested Cecil to send ten or twelve more copies of the Proclamation; on Oct. 2nd he repeated his request.
Fenton himself doubted the King's sincerity. At these dates note that the King was at pains to convince Nicolson that he was playing fair. He protested loyalty to the Queen, allowed Aston to assert that the Proclamation was being enforced, and denied that he was negotiating with the Pope or the King of Spain. - Nicolson to Cecil, Sept. 10, another letter of Sept. N.d., Oct. 3rd; Aston to Cecil, Sept. 20: C.S.P. Scot, (Thorpe) II, 735, 756,757. For the standing of James with regard to the Spanish intrigues at this time vide Elder: Spanish Influences in Scottish History, 275. Vide also Tytler: Hist. Scotland, VII, 364-369; 377 seq.
that it is falsified. We therefore desire you, if there be any copy given out (as we are informed,) that it may be sent to us, for we cannot endure that abuse, as to be so traduced to our very friends." He went on to refer to the Proclamation of August 8th as proof of his sincerity, implying that it was made in reply to his critics, and said that he meant shortly so to deal with the Cantyre men who proposed to aid Tyrone that the English in Ireland need not in the future fear any danger from that quarter.

It is interesting to compare this with the report of Fenton's spy\(^2\) and to note how the latter is contradicted. One thing is certain: James had not been confronted with the copy of the letter sent by Tyrone to Ormonde and thence to London. He could not openly deny knowledge that the Queen had seen it if he had. It may also be said that the contents of this particular letter must have been quite trivial, for it does not seem like James to attempt to bluff out a matter which he knew to be serious by inviting the English to do their worst. Loftus and Gardener replied to the King on October 12th. We are almost led to wonder if there is irony in their statement that they are glad of an explanation "such as in congruent reason ought to satisfy the world!" They said that they would search for the elusive letter and meanwhile deny any imputations against the King of Scots. They were practical enough, however, to say that, the Proclamation notwithstanding, a cargo of powder and other munition had come of late to Tyrone from Glasgow, having been arranged for by Fleming, Tyrone's man there. Having posted off this reply, the Lords Justices sent a copy of it, together with

\(^2\) Vide ante p. (318.)
a copy of the King's letter, to Cecil on November 4th. 3
This last was now left to manage matters without his father's advice, the veteran Lord Burghley having died at the advanced age of seventy-eight on August 4th previous. 4

The results of Tyrone's victory at the Yellow Ford were swift to follow. On October 11th one, Donald O'Maille, (or O'Malley) a leader of the West Mayo seafaring clan with which we have earlier met in connection with the activities of the Scottish galley crews on that coast, 5 offered important service against Tyrone. He said that Tyrone had proposed to employ him to conduct a force of Redshanks into Munster, and that, O'Maille having for some reason refused, the Earl had now no person to take the enterprise in hand. Although O'Maille does not say so, it is evident that the proposed force was to have been conducted by sea in galleys which O'Maille should provide. It is a strange fact that the O'Maille's were the only clan to possess any sea power on the coasts either of Connacht or Ulster. Tyrone was absolutely powerless at sea: if the O'Maille's did not aid him, or if the Scots were not inclined or unable to use shipping of their own, he could not man or command a single galley. Donald, having left the service of Tyrone, now declared himself ready to enter that of the Queen with as many men as he could procure. If she wished to build for him,


5. Ante. p. (170)
either in Wexford or Carrickfergus, two galleys, the one of thirty oars, the other of twenty-four, he was confident enough in his own abilities to undertake "to keep from the north both the Highland and Lowland succour of Scotland." Perhaps because they did not wish to incur the expense of building the galleys, the authorities neglected the offer. One would think that they made a mistake in doing so, as an O'Maille sea captain could be of very considerable service to Tyrone, both as the pilot of a Scottish fleet which might throw a force into Munster and as the leader of such shipping as the Earl might feel inclined to fit out at his own expense.

The movement southward of the rebels was practically uninterrupted, now that the English had failed signally in their military efforts to break into Ulster. With 800 foot and 200 horse O'Donnell swept into Connacht, where Clifford, the governor, had only 120 English soldiers to oppose him. A MacWilliam, or leader of the Mayo Burkes, was set up in opposition to Theobald of the Ship, the government nominee, and he was soon reported to have 2,000 foot and 200 horse

Donald offered to put in his son as a pledge and requested the following - (1) a general pardon for his brother and himself and their men, as well as for all those in the Province of Connacht whom he can enlist to serve the Queen; (2) a reasonable time before paying for such spoils as they have taken in the wars; (3) that in such lands as belong to them (the clan country in Connacht) neither Burke nor O'Flaherty shall have anything to do with them, saving such as the Queen appoints in office; (4) 150 men in the Queen's pay during the occasion of service. The offer finishes on a peculiar note: is Donald to remain in Ulster until he receives an answer, or is he to go through Scotland to the Spanish court - "that I may advertise your Honours in time, if any succour come that it might be prevented?" In December 1599 it was said that the only galleys on the Irish coast were three owned by the O'Mailles. They were much feared everywhere and would each carry 300 men. The project to employ them for the Queen was being still spoken of at that date (Id.VIII,335). The galleys of the O'Mailles and O'Flaherties (a clan whose country lay adjacent) are mentioned in July, 1580, as serving to "bring in Scots" to the Irish - C.S.P. Carew, II, 285.
at his commandment. Thomond had revolted, and a new
O'Brien - an adherent of the rebels - was set up in the
present co. Clare. The rebels in Connacht were daily increas-
ing in force as a result of the resort thither of bands of
mercenary Scots, who came south through the Ballyshannon
passage. Galway city was threatened.7

§ II

In this extremity the project of employing the
Highland and Island Scots to aid the Queen against Tyrone was
once more taken up and extensively canvassed. Still fearful
of the results of bringing in such a force to Ireland, the
Irish Council evolved a scheme to have King James raise an
army of "inland Scots", that is, of Lowlanders, which might
aid the Queen in Ireland and be withdrawn absolutely from
the country at the king's commandment when the service was
concluded. In the drawing up of this plan, of course, two
things were forgotten: that King James could not without
the greatest trouble raise such a force, considering the dis-
trust of the Scots towards standing armies and the general
disinclination to answer to musters; and that Elizabeth could
never be expected to request regular military aid from James.8

7. Memo of the state of Connacht by Lady Clifford, the
Governor's wife, Oct. 31st; report of the Irish Council to
8. The report of the Council last quoted. The Councillors
seemed to think that the only difference between Highlanders
and Lowlanders lay in this, that the latter were subject to
the King. They seemingly did not know that it was the Scots-
Irish (Highlanders) alone of the Scots who were "inured to the
manner of the Irish war, and specially to tread the bog and
the bush."
Sir Richard Bingham approved of the general scheme to introduce Highlanders, saying that "Tyrone can no way be so easily chastised as by a more needy people than his own, which are next him, and which may be drawn over upon such assurance as they shall not fail in, if the King there be dealt withal accordingly." Sir Ralph Lane thought that a garrison at Coleraine and another at Belfast would cut Tyrone off from the Antrim Scots, who would not aid him if thus environed - "for fear of the loss of their cows, which they love as their lives, and far better than him." An anonymous person described as a Scot informed Cecil that there were but two remedies for Ireland, the employment of Scots' mercenaries by the Queen and the assassination of Tyrone by the Scots. In connection with the first, he said that it was well known how large was the population of Argyllshire and what great numbers went thence annually to aid Tyrone. He said that the Scots were like the Irish in their capacity for suffering cold, hunger, and long marches, but that they were a great deal more desperate, and he proposed the setting up of two regiments of Highlanders who, with English leaders, would serve against the Irish in all manner of desperate enterprises. In connection with his second project, reminiscent as it is of the days of the Great O'Neil, he explained that Tyrone kept constantly about him a guard of 200 musketeers, for the most part Argyll men, who could run beside him all

9. Bingham to Queen, Dublin, Nov. 6th; to Cecil, Jan 2nd, 1599 - Id. VII, 339. 447.
10. Lane to Cecil, Dec. 23rd, Dublin - Id. 421. Lane was one of those who thought that Tyrone might at will be reinforced with what numbers he wished, and at any time, from the Out Isles - "only with certain signals of fires by night upon the sea coasts, in certain places affronting the out Isles of Scotland, and of certain smacks by day." This idea was a relic of the days of Somhairle Buile - vide Norden's map, 1609, for 1611 - printed in State Papers, Henry VIII, II, 2; and see Map No. (4) facing page (146.)
day long with full equipment, as hard as he could ride. These he saw fit to describe as "naturally avaricious, bloody, and covetous; who for money will refuse to enterprise or perform no murder, without respect to father, brother, master, or friend whatsoever." Cecil had but to say "Amen, fiat" and Tyrone would be despatched in a trice by one of these. Such proposals must have sounded rather outlandish to Cecil. For the honour of Scotland, let us at least hope that their proposer is mistakenly described as a Scot. 11

In January, 1599, when the question of sending over an English cavalry reinforcement of 1,000 men with the Earl of Essex was being discussed, Sir Ralph Lane thought that 300 Scottish horse from the Border would be more valuable.12 It certainly appeared as if some entirely new method of countering the intentions of O'Neil and O'Donnell would have to be adopted, as the movements of the English against them had so far been futile. By February, Tyrone was marching south through Leix with a force of 3,000 foot and some 300 or 400 horse. James MacSomhairle and O'Cahane guarded the Ulster sea coast against any descent from the Queen's pinnaces in his rear, and Brian Mac Art Mac Baron and MacGuiness held the march lands from Newry to Carrickfergus.13 Rumours of Tyrone's correspondence with the King of Scots continued to circulate both in Ireland and Scotland. That letters did pass, particularly letters from Tyrone, was generally agreed upon

II. "Advertisements of Tyrone" to Cecil, 1598, N.d. - but evidently towards end of year. This entire document is an exaggerated recital of the villainy and recklessness of the Scots. The statement that, since Tyrone paid them nothing, those who were with him existed on what they could steal is simply not true.

12. Lane to Cecil, Jan, 20th - Id., VII, 467.
as a matter definitely established, but so far the nature of the contents upon either side was vague. On Oct. 3rd., 1598, after his conversation with the King, Nicolson announced that copies of any letters which James had sent to Tyrone had been promised to him by the King to be forwarded for the inspection of Elizabeth. No such copies, however, came to light. On the 6th Aston reported that a further missive had arrived for James from Tyrone. 14 Richard Weston, Fenton’s spy on Tyrone who was then in Newry, repeated on January 15th, 1599, the allegation that the Ormonde letter had been sent from London to the King, and he said that James had upbraided Tyrone for showing it to Ormonde. 15 Another spy had it that,


15. Weston to Fenton, C.S.P. Ireld. VII, 465. A direct communication from the Scottish Court to Ormonde also comes before our notice at this time. On Nov. 7th, 1598, Aston wrote from Edinburgh to the Earl recommending to him a certain James Tobin (the bearer of the letter) and four others, lately arrived from France. Aston said: “If your Lordship have any occasion to use the King my master in any thing that may concern Her Majesty’s service, your Lordship will find him most willing and ready, as by his proclamation and other his actions known to Her Majesty may appear. If anything pass from hence, that may either furnish or pleasure the enemy, it is rather for greediness of commodity than any allowance of the authorities.” (C.S.P. Ireld, VII, 422. Ormonde sent a copy of this to Elizabeth on December 27th from Kilkenny, saying that if the Queen bought her own munitions in Glasgow it would stop the illicit trade - Id.424.) Weston said that Tyrone’s man John Bathe (evidently the same as John Beagh, or John Ba-vide ante, p. 291 in Scotland had lately procured a warrant from the King (sic) to transport powder and munitions to Tyrone. The Tobin mentioned wrote from Edinburgh on Oct. 23rd, 1598, to Cecil informing him of such supplies received by Tyrone - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe) II, 758. Vide also Nicolson to Cecil, Jan. 20th, 1599. (Id.II, 764), who mentions aqua vitae among the commodities so transported. The Earl of Errol also comes into the intrigue at this time. As Great Constable of Scotland Fenton said that he was an instrument to support Tyrone. He seems to rely for his information on an unnamed Irish priest who, on passing through Scotland, received 40 shillings from Errol and £4 from King James - cipher information and Fenton to Cecil, Feb. 15th - C.S.P. Ireld, VII, 480.
although Tyrone continued to receive letters from Huntly and other noblemen in Scotland bidding him maintain a stout front and telling him that he should want for nothing that they could give, the King would not write to him because he had shown his last letter to the English.\textsuperscript{16}

\section*{III.}

By May 7th, 1599, Tyrone and O'Donnell had renewed their solicitations to the Islesmen for aid, and on this date O'Donnell's mother, the celebrated Inneen Dubh, was despatched to Scotland as their ambassador. The Islesmen had been preparing to go to Ireland in accordance with their annual custom for a month previous to this date.\textsuperscript{17} In so far as the Antrim Scots were concerned Tyrone was not as yet very sure of James MacSomhairle, yet in June when he divided the culivers and munitions which had come to him from Spain among his adherents, he gave MacSomhairle a share. In April, MacSomhairle was reported to be with O'Donnell on the occasion of a new raid into Connacht planned by that chieftain, but by May it was said that he was to join with Tyrone himself with 500 foot and 30 horse.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16.} News by a spy, May 23rd - C.S.P. Ireld., VIII, 44.
\textsuperscript{17.} Id. loc. cit. John Archebald to Nicolson, March 13th - dated as from "the Highlands" - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe)II, 767. Glenurchy (if he is the anonymous person who wrote to Nicolson in March) renewed his offer to serve the Queen. He said that, for payment, he could bring about a deadly feud between O'Neil and O'Donnell - Id., II, 767.

\textsuperscript{18.} Irish Council to English Privy Council, Apl. 28th; Notes concerning the Queen's service, April, N.d; news of the spy, May 23rd; further secret news, June 19th - C.S.P. Ireld., VIII, 18, 25-26, 44, 64.
In June, Captain James Carlile, a specially commissioned Government spy who seems to have done extensive work in Ulster in the sifting of the verities of the Scottish position, sent in a valuable report. In it several new points were brought to light and only by reference to it can we appreciate the realities of the position in so far as O'Neil and O'Donnell were concerned. Unlike the reports of some of the other spies, this document of Carlile's has the ring of truth. From information received generally in Ulster and in particular from a Redshank of the clan of the MacDonalds of Dunyveg, who was at mercenary service there, Carlile elicited the following statements. On May 15th previous O'Neil had sent a letter to Donald Gorm of Sleat requesting aid and saying that, if Sleat would give an estimate of what numbers he was prepared to send, he should be paid for their services beforehand. O'Donnell also had an agent in the Isles and, both on his behalf and on that of Tyrone, the sons of Lachlan MacLean had been approached. These latter had refused to serve on the side on which the MacDonalds were engaged.19 As for Angus MacDonald, his clansman assured Carlile that at that moment he had been taken in hand by King James, for justice, as was reported, on behalf of the MacLeans for the murder of their father. It was, however (said the Redshank), believed in Cantyre that the King had discountenanced Angus, not in the interest either of the MacLeans or of justice, but rather because of the special

19. Because, says Carlile, their father had been slain in the year previous by (sic) Angus MacDonald. This and the other references to Angus above, although they contradict much of what has been said by Highland historians, have so far been neglected in Scotland.
favour which he was said to bear to James MacSomhairle and his suit. The sons of Angus, Sir James, that is, and his brothers, were ready to serve with O'Donnell, because O'Donnell's mother was their father's sister, but Tyrone they would not serve. Their animosity to Tyrone was due in the first place to his countenancing James MacSomhairle and his withholding of the Glens of Antrim from Angus for which territory Angus held the Queen's patent of May, 1586, and, in the second, to the alleged fact that Tyrone had been betrothed to Angus's daughter and had broken off the engagement to marry MacGuinness's sister.

Carlile said that it was impossible to frustrate the Irish intentions of the Scots by the use of pinnaces or barks alone. These depended for their motive power on the vagaries of the wind, and were easily to be outwitted by oared galleys. To beat the Scots' galleys at their own game the Queen should see to it that two galleys manned for the Crown should be stationed at Rathlin Island. On June 15th Scottish shipping had passed with munitions and arms into

20. In so far as Tytler and Lang have confused MacSomhairle with James, the son of Angus (Sir James MacDonald of Knockrinsay), this matter has become, unfortunately, needlessly involved in Scottish History. Nicolson's report of the King's reply to Elizabeth in August, 1598 - "that if his convicted traitors, Bothwell and Colville, walked the streets of her capital, he was as free to entertain an island chief who owed her no allegiance, and whose assistance was useful to him in reducing the remote Highland districts which had insolently assumed independence" - as quoted in the pages of Tytler (Hist. Scotland, VII, 373), can, as it stands, refer either to MacSomhairle or to the son of Angus. Both, it will be noted, were Sir James MacDonald, having both been knighted at the hands of the King, the one of Dunluce (MacSomhairle) and the other of Knockrinsay.

* Vide ante, p. 136.
the river of Strangford and the Bay of Dundrum, it being quite impossible to keep it out unless with the galleys mentioned.21

Dealing with the mercenary forces, Carlile said that Tyrone dared not cess large bands of Scots on the land in Ulster, because he could not trust their leaders, and that therefore those who came were to be ordered and billeted at the direction of Hugh O'Donnell. The agents of both were to approach Argyll, who was said to have command of 12,000 men, and to engage all the mercenaries which he was willing to send to Ireland. These, upon arrival, were to be billeted in Connacht, Munster and Leinster. Now that the Ulster leaders had received fresh funds from Spain, it was very likely that they should succeed in hiring the Scots. The Queen must therefore look about for some means to prevent any mercenary incursion. This could only be done by the use of the galleys aforementioned and by the entertaining of Scots by the crown. As to this last, Donald Gorm, the sons of Angus MacDonald, and the sons of MacLean might be hired to come over with 4,000 men and to fall upon Tyrone from the rear, penetrating into his greatest fastness "by the ford of Tewme in Killewtre," seizing his cattle and supplies and permanently crippling him.

In August, 1597, said Carlile, to bear out his scheme, when Lord Burgh, the then Deputy, had sent his first message to the Isles to engage aid,22 they had mustered 3,800 men in one day and 1,200 in another, all of whom would have come over by

21. Carlile also said that munitions came "out of Dansk." Vide ante p.297. Here was a case where the service offered by Donald O'Neill (ante. p.325) would be useful.

22. There is no other reference to this. Vide ante. p. (290).
contract had not Lord Burgh fallen ill the same month and died at Newry on October 13th. Tyrone and O'Donnell had been so fearful of these proceedings that they had sent O'Donnell's mother to Angus desiring him not to come. Angus had replied that he wished nothing more than to be revenged on Tyrone for many injuries, the latest of which was his marriage with MacGuiness's sister. He said that if he came to Ireland on the English invitation he should spare O'Donnell but not Tyrone. If the Queen willed that the Scots come now, Carlile suggested that they might be billeted as follows: the Cantyre MacDonalds on the Route, Glens, and North Clandeboys where they should face their enemies the MacSomhairles, or Antrim Scots proper; the Sleat MacDonalds on Iveagh, MacGuiness's country, Killultagh Kilwarlin, and Killelerto; the MacLeans on South Clandeboys and the Dufferin. To the leaders of these forces Carlile suggested draft letters. James and Angus, the sons of Angus of Dunyveg were to be promised payment, the recovery of the Glens, and the despatch of a letter by the English Government to King James requesting the liberation from prison of their father, Angus.\(^{23}\) As to the forces: the sons of Angus were to bring 2,000 men, Donald Gorm, 2,000, and the MacLeans as many as they could raise. They were to be paid alike at the rate of £300 sterling per month for each 1,000 men, the victuals over and above being obtained from the districts on which they were cessed. After the first month their pay also was to be levied off these districts, and one half of all

\(^{23}\) The general supposition here, of course, is that Angus was held prisoner by his son Sir James, not by the King - ante. p. (315)
The year 1599 passed, however, without any attempt on the part of Cecil or the Queen to put Carlile's proposals into practice. They seemed to be hoping against hope that affairs in Ireland would take such a turn as to stave off the necessity for so dangerous an expedient as the countenancing of the mercenary system on a large scale and the introduction into Ireland of Scottish forces. Their administration in that country had already suffered quite enough as a result of their interlopings. King James remained as unaccountable a person as ever. He was that kind of actor in the drama who was neither definitely upon one side or the other. Nobody could be sure of him. Reports of Tyrone's dealings with him continued to come in. Tyrone sent him presents of horses and hawks, armed men were apprehended in suspicious circumstances in Ayr and later liberated, and, on July 20th, it was reported that a man purporting to be from the King of Scots had appeared in Tyrone's camp near Newry bearing a royal letter in which the King wished Tyrone well, told him that he should not want for anything which he could supply, and actually offered, if Tyrone wished it, to write to Queen Elizabeth arranging a peace between them! The authenticity of this last

24. Information of Captain J.C. June, 1599. This person is here for the first time identified with Captain James Carlile. The ground for this is that, on December 19th, following, an informant specified as Captain Carlile sent in similar information. It seems clear that they were one and the same. C.S.P. Ireld. (for above of June,) VII, 69-76; (for December letter,) Id. 330. Note that he refers to Donald Gorm as "Chief Lord of Jura and of the Out Isles of Scotland." Why Jura is mentioned we cannot say. Note also a quaint allusion that Sir Ralph Lane should act with Chichester (brother of the man slain in the affair with James MacSomhairle) in the matter, "as the McLanes will be readier to do Her Majesty's service upon Sir Ralph's motion, because of his name!"
missive, we are told, Tyrone doubted, as indeed he might well
do. He feared that it was but a "fetch" to make him write
something of an incriminating nature, and returned but
"slight answer."25

In August, Tyrone was mustering his forces once
more after the harvest. He did not send for James MacSomhairle
to attend the muster, because, as it was said, he was offended
with him for having caused Sén Mac Brien to surrender to
the Queen at Carrickfergus. The Earl of Essex, who came over
as Viceroy in April, 1599, had wasted time and money and had
frittered away his military power in manoeuvres against the
Munster rebels who had declared for Tyrone. The taking of
Cahir Castle, in Tipperary, was his only exploit. In Wicklow,
the O'Bairns had scattered an English force sent against them,
and in north Connacht O'Donnell had had considerable success.

In this last sphere of operations Sir Conyers Clifford, the
Governor, who was advancing to relieve O'Conor Sligo in
Collooney Castle and to take Sligo town, was caught by
O'Donnell's command under O'Rourke in a pass in the Curlew
Mountains in August and totally defeated. Clifford himself
was killed, and O'Donnell, having taken O'Conor Sligo prisoner,
countermanded in September an order for the hire of 1,000
Scots by his mother who had by this time been absent in
Scotland for the space of two months.26 In December, Captain

25. Nicolson to Cecil, March 28th, July 28th, Aug. 2nd - C.S.P.
Scot., (Thorpe) II, 768, 773. News from Richard Weston,
the spy, sent by the Earl of Essex to Tyrone (from the Bawn,
Co.Louth) July 28th, C.S.P. Ireland, VIII, 103-104. For
Nicolson's news of MacSomhairle on Aug 29th, and for a report
of the escape (whence?) of James MacDonald--Thorpe, II, 775.

26. Weston to Essex, Aug. 28th (still from "the Bawd") - C.S.P.,
Ireland, VIII, 136, and vide 159-160. This Sén Mac Brien, whose
wife was lately dead, sought a match with Angus MacDonald's
daughter in April, 1596 -- Egerton to C.S.P. Ir, V,
507. For Essex and the defeat of Clifford -- A.F.M. 1599;
Pacata Hibernia; Bagwell: Tudors, III, 318-338; Cox: Hibernia
Anglicana, 421.
Carlile was advocating the planting of garrisons on Loch Foyle and at Armagh. He said that "the garrison at Armagh will waste the gallowglass country, the county of Monaghan, and O'Hanlon's country, and draw from Tyrone McDonnell, the chief of the gallowglass, and his followers." We see by this that the MacDonald Gallóglaigh of Tyrone, the hereditary battle-axemen of the O'Neil's, were still organised at this date in the service of their traditional employers.  

27. Capt. Carlile to Dec. 19th - C.S.P. Ireld., VIII, 330. In June, 1596 "Mr. Baron John Elliott of the Exchequer" (Irish) reported a conversation of his with this MacDonald. MacDonald said that the chief cause of the Irish rebellion was religion, and alleged that he had heard much of "the Spaniards' cruelty and bloody disposition" - Id. V. 541-542. Among those revolted in Connacht and Thomond in August, 1599, were the Clan Donald Gallóglaigh of Mayo and the MacSweeneys - two more old Scots' Gallóglaigh clans - Id. VIII, 133.
CHAPTER NINE.


(1600 - 1601).

...
CHAPTER NINE:


(1600-1601)

"...a treassoun of so rare and dangerous a preparative as the lyke hes sendle bene hard of in any kingdome or aige."

- Scottish Privy Council enactment, referring to Tyrone's rebellion, June, 1601.

§ I.

By 1600 the rebellion in Ireland was entering upon its last phase. There was still plenty of fighting to be done, and some time had yet to elapse before Hugh O'Neill and Hugh O'Donnell - the famous "Two Hughs" of Irish tradition - were brought down from the high place to which their united arms had raised them, but the reliance which, now more than ever, they placed upon the expected military aid from Spain was in reality merely the beginning of the end. Queen Elizabeth, growing old in harness as Burghley had grown old, would not be fated to see it, but the turn of the century was to spell the end of the opposition of Ireland as a Gaelic nation in arms to the forceful introduction of Tudor Anglicisation. And the sands were running out for the
mercenary scheme also. Since 1595, the year of the first active stir in the Isles on behalf of England, it was becoming harder and harder for the Irish to introduce Scottish mercenaries. It was not entirely due to English intrigue that this was so - the downfall of the House of Dunyveg, the Islay feud, the independent movements of King James: all these had much also to do with it. In reality, England, because of the parsimony of the Queen, had bungled every enterprise which her agents took in hand in the Isles, but the extraordinary situation arose, from the combination of circumstances which we have so far been considering, that every loose end created by Cecil, Nicolson, Bowes and the others, every false move which they made, every wise move which they neglected to make - all these things had one result, a result not so much willed as inevitable, and that result was delay - a delay which the Irish wished above all things to avoid.

In keeping with former years, 1600 was largely a year of procrastination in Scottish affairs on the part of the English Government. Two matters were kept in hand, however, and the uncertainty which the entertaining of them kept alive, in so far as Tyrone's negotiations with the Scots were concerned, proved largely a point in favour of the English. In the first place, the Governmental scheme of employing mercenaries, introducing as it did the chance of rival bargaining in the Scottish market, was a curb to the possible employment of Scots by Tyrone. In the second, negotiations with the MacSomhairles in Antrim threatened to ex-
pose the Ulster Irish to a flank attack from that quarter. Two cross currents in the main stream of events were therefore taken advantage of, at least to some extent, by the English; the desire of the chieftains and broken men alike in the Isles and Highlands of free-lance employment for a reward and the desire of the MacSomhairles above all things to secure themselves in the possession of the entire MacDonald inheritance in Antrim. Now no less than formerly, however, the two were but phases of one movement: the slow and uneasy reorganisation of West Highland affairs following the downfall of the central authority of the Lordship of the Isles. That the breaking up of the House of Somerled which began in the fifteenth century had direct consequents re-echoing into the seventeenth is a point not always accorded its proper significance.

Lord Justice Loftus and Sir Ralph Lane were still hammering away at Cecil during the early months of 1600 in an effort to have him employ the Scots against Tyrone. Loftus admitted that it was a dangerous experiment, but he hoped that James MacSomhairle might be induced to leave Tyrone once the Queen's mercenaries landed. MacSomhairle had been appointed early in January to keep an eye on the Carrickfergus garrison in the rebel interest, and there was a fresh rumour that Tyrone had received a message from King James desiring him not to assist the sons of Angus MacDonald with whom James was at war and saying that if Tyrone aided the King in this, the King would aid him later. Loftus and Lane thought that, since James MacSomhairle was reported to be greatly at the Scottish King's devotion, he would be quick to throw in his lot against Tyrone with such Scots as might
be introduced for the Queen with the assistance and on the authority of King James. Loftus further desired Cecil to entertain the project of enlisting some four or five hundred Highlanders against the O'Beirns of Leinster who were the occasion of considerable disturbance in their Wicklow fastness. These Scots might, he said "be hired good cheap" and would be particularly suited for mountain warfare in the stronghold of the O'Beirns.

On February 26th., the new Lord Deputy Mountjoy, accompanied by Sir George Carew as President of Munster, landed in Ireland. Essex had completely disgraced himself in the office of Deputy, Tyrone having gained a great moral victory and having been enabled by the rash proceedings of the Queen's sometime favourite to assume for the moment almost royal power over the whole of Ireland. In the Spring of 1600 Tyrone made a progress into Munster where he received protestations of loyalty to his cause from Anglo-Irish lords and Gaelic chieftains alike, and by March he was able to return northwards to Ulster with a small force without the semblance of opposition, although the new Deputy had come accompanied by a fresh army from England.

At this point Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg again makes his appearance. It is of considerable importance to realise

1. Intelligence from Fenton's spies (the story of the King's communication with and promise to Tyrone is, to say the least of it, improbable), Jan.19; Loftus to Cecil, Jan.20; Lane to same, Feb.1 - C.S.P., Ireld., VIII, 405-406, 409-410, 450. For MacSomhairle, vide also, id., 389-390.
This to be inserted in text in reading:

subsequent to 1598. It must be clear, however, that Augus, although a prisoner for some time in the hands of his son,
that, in view of the part which Angus played in the Irish events of the next few years, we must, to some extent, reverse the general view of his supersession by his son, Sir James. At the present state of research, it is not possible exactly to assay the relative positions of father and son, and also, it may be, in those of King James, was not by any means totally superseded in the command of the Clan Iain Mhoir by Sir James. The latter ruled the destinies of his house for some temporary period, undoubtedly, but by March, 1600 Angus is to be found not only at liberty but also in considerable command over his own proceedings and those of his people.

In this month, Angus sent a messenger to Tyrone requesting a conference with him in the vicinity of Loch Foyle and saying that if they could reach an agreement Angus should do no hurt to the Earl. If, however, he could not "get right" of the Earl, Angus warned him that he would go to Carrickfergus and enter service against him. Such was the information given in by one of Fenton's active spies, who further said that, on receipt of Angus's message, Tyrone had written to the Earl of Argyll requesting this latter to discover if it were King James's will that Angus should serve the English. Fenton, in a marginal comment upon this information, as apparently credited by him and sent to London, said that Nicolson should be instructed to deal with the King so

2(a) See also references to Angus, hitherto apparently neglected, ante. P. 332. For the view that Angus was superseded by Sir James cf. Gregory: Highlands and Isles; MacDonals: Clannondald (II, 567 seq.); Mackenzie: Hist. of Macdonalds; Mitchell: Hist. Highlands.
that Angus be not prevented from coming to Carrickfergus and in such fashion that Argyll be restrained from giving ear or aid to Tyrone.

On May 27th Nicolson reported from Edinburgh the receipt by the King of a letter from Tyrone. Of this document - the only one in the entire reported series - a copy has been preserved. As stated to have emanated from Tyrone from his camp on April 10th, and as forwarded to Cecil by Nicolson, it is in the following strain. O'Neil thanked the King for his good will and said that his wishes should inviolably be fulfilled. He informed him of his late progress into Munster with a view to unite that part of Ireland against the English, and said that the latter now proposed the setting up of a garrison on Lough Foyle intending the utter extinction of the Ulster insurgents. This Tyrone trusted the Queen would find more difficult than anything which she had previously attempted.

That was all; how far it involved King James in the intrigue will perhaps be a matter of opinion. It may have been an answer to the reported letter of January from the King. Since it contains the doubtful phrase in which the Earl thanks

4. Nicolson to Cecil, May 27, enclosing Tyrone to King James, Apl. 10 - C.S.P. Scot (Thorpe), II. 782. Tyrone's letter is S.P. Eliz. Scot. LXVI, 28. For the connection of King James with the Essex conspiracy concerning the succession to Queen Elizabeth, see Bagwell: Tudors, III, 366-369. Note that Masson, in commenting on the rumours of intrigue between James and Tyrone (Reg. Privy Council, Scot., VI, 253, note) while not committing himself as to the truth or falsity of the rumours, mentions this letter. For Masson's further views, see note, p. 157.

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James for his goodwill - a matter which Elizabeth would undoubtedly think suspicious - we can only wonder how it was allowed to fall into Nicolson's hands. Perhaps it was merely a "fetch" on James's part to startle the Queen.

§ II.

In April also there was some indication of disaffection in the Earl of Tyrone's camp. The new Lord Deputy Mountjoy reported that Sir Arthur O'Neill, the son of the late Turlough Luineach, and one whose father had killed the Earl's elder brother, was willing to submit to the Queen and to bring in with him "the Clandonnells, Art McDonnell's sons, whose mother was Sir Arthur's sister" - apparently the ClannDonald Galloglaigh of Tyrone. In a project for the employment of Scots by the Queen in Ireland, addressed to Cecil on April 24th, and annotated by him, an attempt was made to take advantage of this and to combine a Scottish mercenary force with a faction among the O'Neils to the overthrow of the Earl and his rebellion. The anonymous compiler of the document stressed the fact that care

5. Mountjoy to English Privy Council - C.S.P. Ireld., IX, 92. Are these the MacDonnells mentioned by a spy on March 24th? - "McDonell did attempt the taking of the fort at the Blackwater, but missed of his purpose, and therefore now, for fear of Tyrone, he is drawn down towards the Newry with all his creaghts (plunder, etc.)" - Id. IX, 57. (or is MacSomhairle meant?) Another MacDonald is mentioned in a list of bonnaghts sent by Tyrone to Florence MacCarthy in Munster and slain in a skirmish with a nephew of Lord Barry's (March 17, 1600 - Id., IX, 52-53). This list is also illuminating in that it shows the type of Irish mercenary soldier sent by the Ulster leaders to aid rebellion in the south. Some mentioned are: "Richerd Bourke, Theobald Bourke, Teig O'Malley, Owen O'Malley, Donnell Oge McDonnell Gorme, a Scots captain and leader, McTheobald Bourke's two sons, Theobald McGaderug, the chiefest trainer of all the bonnaghts" etc. Connacht names, with the exception of MacDonald and MacGarderug. (Cf. Pacata Hibernia, passim). Note the position occupied by MacGaderug. MacDonald may possibly be a son of the Donald Gorm of the Islay family killed at Ardnarea in 1586.
should be exercised in picking any Scots who were to be enlisted in the crown forces. Of the "English Scots" suggested as suitable, the following were mentioned: the clan Stuart, with their friends, the MacFarlanes, MacGregors, Colquhouns, Buchanans and others - "men much experienced in the service of bogs, woods, and mountains"; and the Hamiltons, with the Cunninghams, Kennedys and others inhabiting the West Lowland coast. The Stuarts and the Lennoxmen might be approached through one, Colonel Stuart, and through the Prior of Blantyre. The Hamilton interest should also be able to "make many serviceable men out of the Irish parts, and specially out of the island of Arran, where the fosterers and friends of the McSorleys do dwell, and out of which there be many of the Clan Alisters and others, that are now hirelings under O'Donnell". Of the "Irish Scots", the only clans to be trusted in Ireland were the Campbells and the MacLeans. The second son of the late Lachlan MacLean, who "hateth Tyrone deadly for hanging of his cousin german, Hugh O'Neill" was the best of the MacLeans to deal with.

In connection with this old feud which had already been the cause of so much animosity between Tyrone and the MacLeans, the compiler of the document in question advised

6. Here the distinction between "English" and "Irish" Scots is somewhat different. The "Irish" Scots are those of the Isles (the Campbells are also included); the "English" Scots the Highlanders from the mainland and the Lowlanders. The more usual interpretation classes "Irish" Scots as Highlanders and Islanders, Lowland men as "English Scots". "In-country Scots" varies similarly, at times meaning Lowlanders, at times all outside the Islands. Although it is quite common to find non-Highlanders referring to the Scottish Gaels as "Irish" at this time, the only application of that term by a Highlander appears to occur in the letter sent by Sleat to the Queen in March, 1698 (ante, p.367): he calls himself "chieff off the haill cladonall Iriscumen quhairsoeure."

7. Vide, ante, pp.162 etc.
that the faction of the MacSeans be stirred up once more in Tyrone. Henry and Con MacSean O’Neill, who still remained prisoners in the hands of the Earl, might be freed. They were descended on their mother’s side from the Cantyre MacDonalda and, so thought the writer, there was some hope that the numerous mercenary soldiers of that clan then at service under O’Donnell might support them. James MacSomhairle and his brother Randal he works in in some way best known to himself as “the chief instruments in the execution of this action”, although it is not for a moment to be entertained that an alliance embracing Macleans, MacDonalda of Cantyre, and MacSomhairles could be effected. Sir Arthur O’Neill, the Tyrone malcontent, and O’Dogherty of Inishowen, who is described as depending entirely on the Scots of Argyll, together with the Captain of the Fews, would be further parties to a combined Irish and Scottish hosting of those who bore malice against the Earl. The Scottish assistance of the rebels would be cut off, and MacSomhairle, once his reluctance to come in to the English through the fear that he should be punished for the death of Sir John Chichester had been overcome, would fall upon and isolate MacQuillen and O’Cahane the two great east-Ulster adherents of the insurgents.

8. Discourse on the entertainment of Scots in Ireland, Ap1.24 C.S.P., Ireld.IX,117-119. Sir R. Cecil has added the following notes: “Sorley Boy was father to James and Randall. His brother, James McConnell, father to Angus, McConnell, prisoner in Scotland (Note this. Angus could not have been still in confinement when he wrote to Tyrone on March 21st. ante, p343, but apparently Cecil had not received any late news of him). Tirlough McHenry, brother to Tyrone by the mother, captain of the Fews, Sir Art O’Neill, the son of Tirlough (Luineach); his country between Tyrone and Tiresconnell. Shane O’Neill’s eldest son cousin to MacLean. These two (evidently Henry and Con MacShean) are cousins to Angus McConnell. James McConnell the son of Sorley Boy; Randall Arranough (i.e., of Arran - where he was fostered) is his brother. Argyle rights always O’Dogherty against O’Donnell, and so his Scots fittest there. Hamilton’s Scots fittest for Knockfergus with their followers out of the Isle of Arran.” For Randal’s connection with Arran, vide also, Hill: MacDonnells of Antrim, 195, and note. Mary, Queen of Scots, had granted part of Arran to James MacDonald of Dunyveg, uncle of Randal - Orig. Faroch.Scot., II.245.
That Cecil treated the project seriously as a feasible means of attacking the Earl of Tyrone from the rear, and one which held out the possibility of turning the Irish rebellion into a faction fight, is proved by the careful way in which he entered notes of all the parties concerned, and of their past alliances and connections, upon the margins of the anonymous contributor's sheets. Of the necessity for an attack from the rear, since it had proved impossible to turn either of the Ulster flanks, Cecil had now for some time been convinced. It had been merely a question of how to conduct such an attack: whether to land an English force on Loch Foyle from the Queen's ships - a business in which the English could never succeed if more of the Irish clans were like the seafaring O'Mailles - or, in place of temporising with the Scots, definitely to engage their services? Perhaps the two schemes could be combined - after all it was these same Scots who had killed the Great Seán O'Neil - but above all things it was to be remembered that the Scots were canny folk, hard to deal with and hard to hold, fierce in their alliances and in their feuds, and, when all was said, closer to the Irish than to the English.

In so far as James MacSomhairle and his neighbours were concerned, the proceedings of the summer seem like an echo of this project of April. O'Cahane and MacSomhairle were uneasy neighbours, as the O'Cahanes and the Scots beyond the Bann had always been. The main fear on both sides of that river was lest an English fortified post should be set up at the Bann-mouth, for a garrison here would annoy both
the Antrim Scots and O'Cahane. Sir Arthur Chichester, the late Governor's brother, who was now in command at Carrickfergus, seemed an unfortunate selection for that position, for it was felt that James MacSomhairle would submit once more to the Queen if he did not fear his vengeance for the death of Sir John. So noticeable did this attitude of Mac Somhairle's become, that Chichester had to apologise to Cecil for it, saying that, for his part, he was not one to allow ideas of private revenge to conflict with his service of the Queen.

Throughout the year Chichester continued to hope for MacSomhairle's submission, even though he still supported Tyrone with his forces. The negotiations with a view to have Sir Arthur O'Neil default from Tyrone were successful, but he could give little real aid to the English and he died at Dunalong on October 18th.

Meanwhile, on May 16th, an English expeditionary force under Sir Henry Doqwra had entered Éoch Foyle. A fortified post was set up at Derry, and the attack upon O'Neil and O'Donnell from the rear had begun. Doqwra's force was composed of the regulation English levies, however, no decision having as yet been reached about the employment of the Scots. Cecil was undoubtedly working on the reports of Carlile and others from Ireland, and in

9. In May, MacSomhairle fled his cattle over the Bann for fear of Chichester - C.S.P.Irel., IX, 122, 193, 209, 306. Chichester was at this time conducting some negotiations with Angus MacDonald - on May 22, he wrote to Fenton desiring a warrant for his proceedings therein (Id., IX, 193-194). These were perhaps the negotiations which Angus threatened in his message to Tyrone in March - ante, p. 343.
11. Capt. Willis to Cecil, Oct. 29 - Id., IX, 536, and see 403.
Edinburgh Nicolson kept in touch with suitable persons in the Isles. The atmosphere was worked up - with Derry as a base a mercenary force could raid with destructive consequences westwards into Donegal or southwards into the heart of Tyrone. News came that Tyrone had lately received a disappointing message of some kind from Scotland; the Dean of Limerick, who was once more in that country upon some business, forwarded offers from the Colonel Stuart already mentioned to serve the Queen; Achinross once more pleaded employment for the MacLeans; in Derry, Doëwra himself, having been made aware of an offer of 150 men to serve, requested the English Privy Council that they be not refused - if for nothing else, they might be scattered up and down the country among the Irish where they might act as spies.

During August and September Achinross seems to have devoted himself wholeheartedly towards the pushing forward of the project so strenuously canvassed during his lifetime by his late master, Lachlan MacLean. By August 10th, on

12. A spy to Fenton, July 21; unsigned letter concerning Scottish negotiations (evidently referring to Col. Stuart), August; Doëwra to Privy Council, Oct. 1 - C.S.P. Ireld., IX, 331, 403, 456. Aston to Mr. Hudson, from Linlithgow, July 6; Nicolson to Cecil, July 9, enclosing a note of the Dean of Limerick's conference with the King on Irish matters; Hudson to Cecil, July 18 (saying that the real reason for Col. Stuart's offer is that "he thinks the Earl of Gowry will remember his father's death") - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II, 784. It has been found impossible to trace the mysterious Dean's manoeuvres at this time. On May 22nd. his wife, Elizabeth Campbell, wrote to him from Limerick - "Mr. Dennis Cambell, Dean of the Cathedral Church of Limerick, in England or Scotland" (a family letter) - C.S.P., Ireld., IX, 194. For the landing at Derry, vide, A.F.M., sub. anno 1660; Doëwra's Narration (Miscel. Celt. Soc.); Moryson: Itinerary, II, lib. I, cap. 2: Bagwell: Tudors, III, 361-363. Mountjoy kept Tyrone from attacking Doëwra until his defences were ready by a show of force towards the Ulster border in May.
becoming aware of the success of Doëwra at Derry, he wrote to Nicolson offering the cooperation of a Scottish force with Doëwra, and dilating upon the murder of Lachlan - for the Macleans have always preferred to call the death of their chieftain at Lochgrainart a murder. On September 5th, Nicolson communicated the renewed offer to Cecil, saying that the only way to crush the Irish rebels was by such an enterprise on Loch Foyle as Achinross suggested. In later letters Achinross went into the details of the scheme and advised Nicolson to win over Argyll, who had extensive influence in the north of Ireland and without whose cooperation nothing could be done. It is to be noticed that the Mac Leans were never ready to embark upon any scheme which concerned Ireland without Argyll's approval.

§ III.

During the Summer of 1600 the course of the Irish fortunes changed. O'Donnell conducted a successful raid into Connacht and southwards into Clare, it is true, but Carew was slowly subduing the Munster Irish and Mountjoy quietened the Midlands after a successful campaign against the O'Connors and Tyrrell, Tyrone's leader of mercenaries. In the setting up of a fortified post at Mount-Norreys, midway between Newry and Armagh, by Mountjoy in November, Tyrone re-
ceived a severe blow. It was all-important now that Derry be held. Doewra, after some success in raiding expeditions into Donegal, had begun to suffer greatly from lack of provisions, and reinforcements and food were thrown in by sea only just in time on September 17th.

On November 5th, a decision was made in London—something more definite this time, and not just the usual attempt to keep the Islanders in hand by embarking upon a series of promises. On that day two letters were sent out, one to Nicolson to engage Achinross, and the other to Doewra. Nicholson was informed of the Queen's resolution to make use of the Scottish offers to serve against Tyrone, and authorised to set Achinross to work forthwith. Doewra was advised of the contract which was to be made with Achinross. He was to have the disposal of the Scottish force upon arrival, and, although only those Scots were to be employed who bore malice against Tyrone for private reasons, he was warned beforehand to exercise all caution in the distribution of them. He was to be careful not to let their force in any one place be superior to that of his own men.

While these negotiations on the part of the English Government were afoot, however, O'Donnell's recent overtures to the ClanDonald for aid had borne fruit. On October 20th, 1600, Randal MacDonald, a brother of Angus and of Inneen Dubh and an uncle of Hugh O'Donnell's landed in Inishowen with a small force of Redshanks. He went at once to O'Donnell to whom he brought messages from Scoot-

14. English Privy Council to Nicolson, Nov. 5 - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II, 769; same to Doewra, Nov. 5 - C.S.P. Ireld., X, 16-17. We cannot say when this letter reached Doewra, or whether it was sent direct or via Edinburgh. Doewra is told that he may use a post via Nicolson in the future if he wishes to do so.
land and the promise of 1,000 men to follow. Doğwra, who was informed of the arrival of Randal, instructed the sea captain, Thornton, to put out to intercept Randal on his return to Scotland and to prevent the passage of any further force of Scots to O’Donnell, but Thornton’s ship was in a bad state of repair and useless in stormy weather or in the pursuit of the swift galleys. According to an intercepted message from Hugh O’Donnell to O’Conor Sligo, dated November 16th, Randal had conveyed an offer from MacCailín Mór, the Earl of Argyll, of his sister’s hand in marriage to O’Donnell. This, O’Donnell said, would be advantageous, in that it would bring about an agreement between the ClanDonald and the MacLeans. The issue of such an agreement would be the combined help of both clans for O’Donnell. Why exactly it would bring about an agreement at all must be difficult to say, and the suspicion must remain that the information which the

15. Care should be taken not to confuse this Randal (he was Randal MacJames, Angus being Angus MacJames or Neice Mac James) with Randal MacSomhairle, brother of James MacSomhairle.

16. Capt. Willis to Cecil, Derry, Oct. 29; Doğwra to English Privy Council, Derry, Nov. 2 - C.S.P. Ireld. IX, 536, X, 12; Hugh Ruadh O’Donnell to O’Conor Sligo, copy sent to English Privy Council by Carew - Id., X, 71-72. Intercepted letters are always open to suspicion, and this one certainly seems to contain much that is far-fetched. We might perhaps discount it altogether were it not that the reference to Argyll is repeated by the Dean of Limerick (to Cecil, March, 1601, Edinburgh - Id., X, 255-256, and see below, p. 355) who said that O’Donnell’s messenger was with Argyll in March, 1601 in connection with an alliance which Argyll had refused in the Dean’s hearing, “and the divorce of Tyrone’s daughter, by Tyrone’s own consent, from O’Donnell was thought to be a policy purposed to bring (an) ally that way”. Note that MacAllen (MacCailín = Argyll) is printed in the Calendar as “Mr. Allen”, which makes no sense at all.
letter contains was set down of purpose to bewilder the English authorities - if the interception of the letter were not accidental - or perhaps to impress O'Conor Sligo with the power of O'Donnell. The Irish shores received another Scottish visitor in December. By the 16th of that month the policy of Chichester of conciliating the MacSomhairles had so far borne fruit that Randal MacSomhairle MacDonald had entered into articles for a truce to be maintained until May of the year following. James MacSomhairle was, however, still one to be doubted. In the second week of December, Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg, described by Chichester as one banished by his son, made an unexpected appearance in Ulster with some seventy or eighty men who arrived in three galleys. How far this move was connected with that of Angus's brother Randal we do not know, nor can we say why Angus, who, we are led to understand, hated the MacSomhairles, should now be disposed to visit them, but at all events he went to James MacSomhairle upon arrival, and James made a warlike show against Chichester in billeting upon his own country some 700 bonnaghts. While he was in Dunluce with James, Chichester wrote to Angus, evidently in connection with some negotiations which he had been carrying on with him in May, 1600, but for some reason Angus did not receive his letter. By January 12th., 1601, Angus had left Dunluce,

17. Chichester to Cecil, Dec. 16, 1600 - C.S.P. Ireld., X.85. In the articles signed by Randal MacSomhairle he promised to be a loyal subject in return for a pardon and confirmation in four "towes" of land in the Glens (tuagh = territory, or district) Chichester has an interesting comment on the mercenary system when he says that Neil MacHugh is to lead 200 of MacSomhairle's bonnaghts, and describes Neil as "a beggar who yesterday, being with us, was not able to eat without the Queen's entertainment." See below, Appdx. No. 1.
18. Chichester to the Lord of Cantire (Angus MacDonald), March 24, 1601 - Id., X.274.
having returned, apparently, to Scotland. James MacSomhairle, perhaps because he still distrusted Chichester, now began to make overtures to Doëwra in Derry, praying that either Captain Willis or Captain Thornton, both naval officers of the Queen, be sent to him. He said that he had important news to impart to them, and they were both accordingly dispatched by sea from Derry towards the Antrim coast. They were for some time held back by contrary winds, and Thornton died on the way. Willis, for his part, having conceived some suspicion of MacSomhairle's intention - spurred on by Tyrone - to murder him, refused to go ashore to a parley, and the important news, whatever it may have been, remained uncommunicated. In reporting the matter to Cecil, Willis said that Angus MacDonald had fallen out with his sons, and that these latter desired to displace him from his living. They had, he said, fully agreed to support O'Donnell, and had promised to come to him in the Spring with 1,000 mercenaries. This last statement would lead us to think that Randal, Angus's brother, was acting in the interests rather of Sir James of Dunyveg than of Angus.

Meanwhile, in Scotland, Achinross displayed great activity in raising a force for the Queen's Irish service.

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19. Doëwra to Cecil, Derry, Dec. 19, 1600; Chichester to same, Carrickfergus, Jan. 12, 1601; Willis to same, Dublin, Jan. 24 - C.S.P., Ireld., X, 91, 142, 159-161. Willis thought that Cecil should interfere in Scotland, through Argyll and the Macleans, to prevent any expedition to O'Donnell. He said that if any Scots did come, they must bring their own victuals with them or seek them in Connacht, for there was little food to be had in Tir Conaill. (re coerced)
He was busy with bows, broadswords, steel bonnets and the various accoutrements of war, with the question of security for the men to be engaged, and in insisting upon Cecil's agreeing to commence payment for the men on the moment they left Scotland. Cecil, who was watching the Irish rebellion slowly wearing itself out in Munster and the Midlands while Tyrone was being gradually squeezed in between Derry and the fort at Mount Norreys, was, however, in no great hurry. He noted the advice of the Dean of Limerick in March, 1701, concerning the best manner of engaging a Scottish mercenary force, and he listened to the explanations made by King James regarding certain complaints, including one that he had permitted Sir James of Dunyveg to go to Ireland to aid Tyrone, but he was still as slow as ever to adopt a vigorous policy in the Isles.

21. The Dean of Limerick to Cecil, March 27, Edinburgh, and March (no date) with statement on mercenary service - C.S.P.Irel., X, 242-243, 255-256. The Dean wanted to know if Cecil would write to Lord Deputy Mountjoy excusing his (the Dean's) delay in returning to his charge. The reason of his stay in Scotland was to settle his young nephew's affairs. Many obstacles were made for him in this by the Earl of Argyll who now, for some reason, held him in displeasure. His statement re employment of Scots is: only the English-Scots and the "civil Irish Scots" to be engaged; of the former, the Douglases and Hamiltons; of the latter, the Campbells (to be solicited through the Provost of Kilmum and the Laird of Lawers) and the MacLeans. The MacDonalds are "by nature treacherous and allied with the rebel". The rest of the Islanders are "perplexed by reason of the late conquest of the island called the Lewes by Colonel Stuard". Unless the King consents to the project, however, no man worthy of trust will undertake it. For the King's explanations, see King to Nicolson, Apr. 19, Huntingtower - C.S.P.Scot (Thorpe), II, 796. Another interesting, although private, letter of this time is that from Ludovic Stuart, the Duke of Lennox, to Sir James Mac Somhairle Buidhe "of the Route" (note this - the Glens not mentioned). The bearer of it, one Thomas Douglas, brother of Lord Whittingham, one of the King's Council, desired to see Ireland, and Lennox wished MacSomhairle to pass him on to the Earl of Tyrone, "and so from one noble to another" - C.S.P., Irel., X, 194-195.
The game played by the two Jameses in Antrim began at this time - James of Dunveg and James MacSomhairle. The relations of the former with his father seem to have undergone a change during 1601, and it will not perhaps be far wrong to say that the temporary overthrow of James of Dunveg by the MacSomhairles was responsible for the reassertion of power in Scotland by Angus. In the interests of clarity it will be as well to consider the matter strictly by date. On January 6th, Sir James MacSomhairle wrote to Sir Francis Stafford saying that he desired to submit to the Queen, but that he was still distrustful of Chichester's attitude towards him. Lord Deputy Mountjoy, who was then pursuing Captain Tyrrell in the Midlands, took the matter up and replied to MacSomhairle on January 31st. He considered the security which James offered in return for a truce until May as nothing, plainly told him that he doubted his intentions and accused him of temporising. His accusations against Chichester were not, he said, to be entertained, for if James was as loyal as his brother Randal, Chichester would treat him as fairly as he had treated Randal. Chichester, who still entertained hopes of the Scottish ClanDonald, wrote to Angus of Dunveg on March 24th, requesting an interview with him, or with his son or agent, at which they might treat concerning the Queen's service and also touching the "regaining of that which is in these parts wrong-
fully detained from you by the sons of Sorley." Angus having but lately returned to Scotland after having seen James MacSomhairle, it must be apparent that extensive negotiations were afoot on both side with reference to the disputed territory of the Glens. On April 5th, Chichester again turned to MacSomhairle and, protesting that he had forgiven him for his brother's death, sent Captain Willis by sea to confer with him. Willis was, however, detained by unfavourable weather, and he had not reached MacSomhairle when the latter agreed, on April 8th, to treat with Chichester and not to aid O'Neil before May 28th.

Meanwhile, as if further to complicate matters, Sir James MacDonald of Dunvegan had arrived in Ireland and had passed quietly inland with a small force to confer with Tyrone. Chichester said that his wish was to offer the services of 1,500 mercenaries to the Earl, and he reported to Cecil that Angus had offered a like number to the Queen, and that he (Chichester) had written to Angus principally to bide time in order that Tyrone should not have the option of engaging Angus's force.

By April 10th, Sir James MacAngus was on his way back from Tyrone, "disliking as should seem of his entertainment." From O'Cahane's country he wrote to Chichester offering service, and Chichester told him to come on to Carrickfergus intending to keep him in hands until he should have received instructions concerning him from Mountjoy. The time had come when the Scots could afford to bargain on the spot with two sets of prospective employers. At this
juncture the course of events was suddenly interfered with by the death of James Mac Somhairle and the return of his brother Randal from Scotland - probably from the Island of Arran. In James a subtle intriguer and one very capable in looking after his own interests was removed. During his lifetime Angus and MacQuillan had alike been overshadowed in the Glens and the Route, and the power of an Antrim branch of the ClanDonald as a separate entity greatly furthered.

Randal Mac Somhairle had no sooner returned to Ireland than he fell in with Sir James of Dunyveg coming from Tyrone. Sir James, although Chichester would have us believe that he had not agreed with Tyrone and that he was on his way to enlist, if he might, for the Queen, had with him Henry O'Hagan, one of Tyrone’s captains, and eighty of the Earl’s men - a matter which Chichester would have done well to consider decidedly suspicious. Both Randal and Sir James applied, when they found themselves facing each other, to Chichester - Randal for assistance, he being for the moment a loyal subject, and Sir James for a safe-conduct to Carrickfergus. Chichester could refuse neither without a rupture. The one matter of which he was sure was that the two branches of the MacDonalids would not combine against him. This being so, therefore, and not being ready to trust the protestations in other directions of either James or Randal, Chichester thought it proper to march out with his

22. For these events vide: James Mac Somhairle to Stafford, Jan.6; Mountjoy to Mac Somhairle, Jan.31; Chichester to Angus, March 24; same to Mac Somhairle, Apl.5; Mac Somhairle to Chichester, Apl.8; Chichester to Cecil, Apl.12 - C.S.P. Ireld., X, 271-277. For some suspicious circumstances connected with the death of James, vide, U.J.A., V, 207, 208; Hill: MacDonnells of Antrim, 192.
garrison to the place of meeting. What his intentions were as a third party we cannot know, for before he came up with the MacDonalds he was met by the news that the two chieftains had come to an open fight in which Randal had been successful, overthrowing the combined Cantyre and Tyrone force, killing O'Hagan and some forty or fifty men, and carrying off Sir James in triumph as a prisoner to Dunluce. This is the only recorded battle fought between the rival sections of the Clan Iain Mhoir in Ireland. It must have been of considerable importance in removing Sir James from the position which, either by fair means or foul, he had gained in the councils of his clan, and that at a moment when practically every hand in the Isles was against the ill-fated House of Dunyveg.

Three or four days after the date of the engagement Chichester met with Randal. As the defeat of Chichester's brother had altered the disposition of the late James Mac Somhairle, so now did this success alter the demeanour of Randal. Randal said that he desired a continuance of the truce with Chichester until he had answer to a certain petition which he claimed he had had exhibited to the Queen with the support of King James and his English ambassador, the Earl of Mar. Chichester granted him the truce and noted that his ultimate terms involved pardon for himself, his brothers and followers, a patent for the Route and Glens, and leave to keep four or five hundred men in pay to defend himself. In return, Randal flatly refused either to surrender Sir James as the Queen's prisoner or
to put in pledges for his own good behaviour.

Sir James was promptly clapped into Dunluce, that
fastness of the Scottish Gael in Ireland, where, we may
suppose, he had leisure during the enforced idleness of
the moment to look back upon the hurried course of events
which had during the last few years transformed him from a
courtier at Holyrood to a leader of mercenary Redshanks
in Antrim. If he looked forward also did he see the ruin
of his House, his own abortive descent upon Dunyveg, his
flight to Spain from Galway while the Campbell tartan darken-
ed amid the heather in Cantyre and Islay? There is reason
to suspect that the presence of Sir James in Ulster,
despite his offer to Chichester, boded ill for the Queen,
for the Earl of Argyll took occasion to send George Erskine
as a special messenger to Mountjoy to warn the Deputy of
the purpose of Tyrone to enter into a fresh alliance with
Dunyveg. Erskine describes Sir James as "my master his
24
greatest enemy".

Note the examination of a captive, Dermot McMorris, on Apr.
29th. He said that the MacSsomhairles had undertaken that
the Carrickfergus garrison should not hurt Tyrone. He also
stated that he had met certain English Scots with O'Donnell
who said that King James had forbidden anyone in Scotland
to assist Tyrone in any manner - Id., X, 298. The Earl of Mar
was sent with Edward Bruce, the Abbot of Kinloss, as Scottish
ambassador to England in February 1601 - Thomas; Historical
Notes - Scotland and Ireland, III, 1078.

24. Erskine was sent to Argyll with letters to O'Donnell and
to the Lord Deputy. Having been carried to Beaumaris in
Wales by a storm, he was seized by the local authorities
there and his letters sent to London. Thence he wrote on
May 9th, to a merchant named Hamilton"at his house in Dub-
lin, near the Merchants' Quay" desiring him to deliver an
enclosed letter to Mountjoy. In this last he complained of
his treatment in Beaumaris, and through the mediation of
Mountjoy he was released. He then came to Dublin. His
letter from Argyll to Mountjoy was as noted above;
that from Argyll to O'Donnell desired O'Donnell to be
guided by the Deputy's advice and direction (cf. this with
O'Donnell's letter to O'Conor Òige-ante, p. 353). On May
21st. Mountjoy and the Council wrote an explanatory letter
to Argyll. Concerning O'Donnell, they desired Argyll in
future to inform them of his dealings with him. On the
same date Erskine was given a safe-conduct to pass to
O'Donnell and to return. See the letters in C.S.P., Ireland,
x, 352-354.
Chichester, as events showed, had little reason to be satisfied with his partial conciliation of Randal. In July he said that the MacSomhairles were keeping quietly to the Route and the Glens. They were not over-energetic in the Queen's behalf, however, and Chichester took occasion to remind the English Privy Council that, before any grant was made absolute to Randal, it should not be forgotten that MacQuillin had a better right to part of the Route than had the Scots.

The struggle, however, was at last proving too much for the Irish. Tyrone was weakening. One of the Clan Donald Gàlaglaigh of the hereditary O'Neil sept defaulted from his allegiance in May and set up a rebellion against the Earl in the heart of his country. In the Summer, the rebellion having been all but crushed in Munster, by Carew, the Lord Deputy entered upon an extensive campaign in the Ulster marchlands. There was no sure manner of crushing an Irish revolt save by the planting of garrisons in the disaffected districts - just as it was found impossible at much later dates to subdue the Highland clans unless by military posts. Of this Mountjoy was fully aware. Not in

25. Chichester to Privy Council, July 8 - Id.X., 418.
26. Same to Mountjoy, May 14 - Id. X. 356.
the open field - where he and O'Donnell had been almost uniformly successful - but rather by reliance upon such strongholds as Derry and Mount-Norreys would the Earl be ultimately defeated. Therefore, Armagh was garrisoned afresh, Downpatrick was garrisoned, and Blackwater Fort was rebuilt and once more handed over to the command of Captain Williams. Tyrone, who was driven back on his own resources, and who had few or no mercenary Scots with him during this Summer, was powerless to resist. O'Donnell who was fighting a faction raised up by Dokwra in his own clan, could not aid him.

In September, the long expected Spanish aid came, Don Juan D'Aguila landing in Kinsale in Co.Cork with some 4,000 men on the 23rd. of the month. There were many reasons why it was of little avail to the Irish insurgents: it had come too late, the force was too small, and - greatest mistake of all - Don Juan had landed in the wrong place. Munster was subdued and like a desert; the rebellion had been beaten back into Ulster whence it had come, and there, if anywhere, the Spanish force should have landed. In a few months time the Gaelic system in Ireland, upon which the scheme of entertaining mercenaries from Scotland had its foundation, would have received a blow from which it was

27. For the Munster campaign: Pacata Hibernia, bk.II,cap.III. For that in Ulster: A.F.M.,1601; Moryson: itinerary, pt. II, bk.II,cap.I; Bagwell: Tudors,III,390-393. On August 9th, it was said that in Tyrone's whole force there were not above 200 strangers - C.S.P.Irel.,XI,15. See the list of his army in August - Appendix No. X p.453 below.

28. For the landing of the Spaniards and the operations in the south, vide Pacata Hibernia, caps. IX, seq.; Moryson: Itinerary; O'Sullivan: Hist.Cath.; A.F.M.,1601-1602; dispatches, etc. of Carew, Mountjoy, etc., in C.S.P.Varew,III.
never to recover. It is rather ironical that, at the
moment of defeat for the Irish, the protracted negotiations
on the Queen's part to secure the aid of a Highland force in
Ireland should at last have been pushed to a conclusion. On
June 11th, King James had brought out another of his Pro-
clamations against the giving of aid to Tyrone in a re-
bellion which the wording of the Privy Council enactment
describes as "a treassoun of sa rare and dangerous a pre-
parative as the lyke has sendle bene hard of in ony kingdome
or aige." In October Nicolson spoke of the Queen's
acceptance of King James's offer of assistance in the
raising of a Highland force, mentioning over again the per-
sons most suited to lead the mercenaries and including
Achinross. The latter, who seems to have cherished no
ill-will against Cecil for having sent him on a wild goose
chase from Edinburgh to the Highlands in the year previous,
thought that the dispute within the clan O'Donnell might
prove for the English the thin end of the wedge to be driven
into the Ulster confederacy from the North. He still re-
gretted the loss of Lachlan MacLean, but assured Cecil
of his own good will towards the Queen and said that the
only need was of money. Fenton pressed once more for the
employment of the Scots now that Tyrone would undoubtedly
wish to make a dash southwards to join the Spaniards. He

LXVII, 61; Steele: Calendar Tudor and Stuart Proclamations,
II, 2., 269. (No. 973).
30. Nicolson to Cecil, Oct. 28 - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), II, 804,
and see Id. Sept. 9, II, 803.
31. Achinross to Cecil, Aug. 29, Dumbarton - Id., II, 802. Note
that one Francis Mowbray in writing to Cecil on June 1
says that Sir James of Dunyveg is ready to take some
purposes in hand. The Earl of Huntly seems also to have
been mixed up in the plot. By this date, however, Sir
James was a prisoner in Dunluce - Id. II, 798. Another
Irish letter in the Scottish files at this time is that
from the King to the English Privy Council requesting
redress for spoils committed in the county of Mayo upon
some Scotsmen - Id., II, 799.

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said that a sudden diversion in Ulster would greatly upset the Earl's plans, and the Irish Council backed him by saying that the very rumour that a Scottish descent for the Queen was projected was a matter of considerable disquiet among the rebels. To these influential voices that of Doëwra was added. Writing on November 16th. from Derry, he advised the enlistment of the Cantyre MacDonals, saying that, although Angus was Hugh O'Donnell's uncle, his enmity towards the MacSomhairles would, if the Scots were carefully handled, paid a set wage and distributed among the English garrisons, insure his action against Tyrone. Before, however, the Queen had provisionally agreed to go ahead with the Scottish project, King James was, for the moment, in high favour because of his Proclamations, another of which had appeared on November 10th., and because of his offers of service, Nicolson was deep in the scheme, but he had found Argyll useless, and he reported in November that it would probably prove a complication that Argyll had entered into hostilities with Angus MacDonald. Although a passage in the Scottish Privy Council enactment of November 10th describing the Irish rebellion as a danger "als weill to the libertie of the trew religiou as of the crownis and estait of this haill Ile of Britane, quhairof Ireland is a proper dependance" made it abundantly clear in what direction James's fears lay, still Elizabeth wrote twice to him during December thanking him in a most friendly fashion for his good offices and assuring him that she expected hourly to hear of the overthrow of the Spanish and Irish forces in Ireland.
And it was indeed so. At the moment when the Queen and her advisers decided definitely to take up the Scottish mercenary project, Tyrone and the Irish were fighting their last fight. Although it may well be doubted if, even at this late date, Elizabeth had any real intention of actually placing a Scottish force in Ulster - that is, if her Scottish decision involved anything more than a more extended series of promises in the Highlands - it is quite clear that the Scottish principals, including the King, believed that her proposals were sincere. The deeper subtleties of the Elizabethan mind are not to be explained. For many years she had been content to dabble in Highland affairs; now that she appeared on the point of something definite the need for a strengthening of her military machine in Ireland by the introduction of Highland mercenary soldiers was removed. The question of what she would have done therein if the Irish rebellion had been prolonged must thus remain unanswered.

In October, 1601, Mountjoy and Carew commenced to lay siege to Kinsale, where the Spanish force under D'Aguila was shut up, and at the same time the Ulster chieftans made preparations to go southwards in the hope of effecting a junction with their foreign auxiliaries. In Antrim, Con O'Neill and Ustian MacDonald, the son of James MacSomhairle and the leader of 350 mercenaries, went into revolt against Chichester. Ustian was killed and the revolt put down, but Chichester was alarmed at the more serious relapse of Randal MacSomhairle, who, as he said, having been pardoned and having been at peace with the Queen during the Summer, now had the effrontery to write to him telling him that he felt com-
pelled to join the Earl of Tyrone. Niece (or Angus) a brother of Randal's, alone of the MacSomhairles remained loyal to the Queen.

In November, when Randal had gone off with most of the fighting men to join Tyrone who marched south in that month, Chichester invaded the Route. There were none to oppose him save Randal's nephew, very likely one of the nine sons of James MacSomhairle, and a small force left behind by Randal to guard his patrimony, and, although greatly hindered by heavy falls of snow, he plundered almost as far as Dunluce. Nbr was this the only misfortune suffered by Randal during his absence in the south. It will be remembered that Sir James of Dunyveg was still a prisoner in Dunluce. At some date subsequent to Randal's departure this worthy, chafing in his confinement, made representations to the constable of the Castle, who as it happened, was an Islander born and not a true Antrim Scot, and was by the latter released and put in possession of the Castle. Turfing out those of the garrison who remained loyal to Randal, Sir James, supported by the party who were in his favour, proceeded to fortify the place in his own interests and asserted once again his claim as the representative of the senior branch of the House of Islay to the MacDonald possessions in Antrim. He at once entered into communication with Chichester in an effort to enlist the Queen's support against

the MacSomhairles. Chichester, in reporting these occurrences to Cecil, said that Sir James had been in communication with him before his capture, but that he was not then willing to treat with him because of his suspicious dealings with Tyrone at the time and because he knew that any countenance which he showed to the claim of Sir James to the Glens would be construed by the MacSomhairles as having been actuated by a desire on Chichester's part to exact vengeance for the death of his brother. This last, Chichester said, he was bound to forget, as the MacSomhairles had been pardoned by the Queen, and the rival claims of Sir James were not to be entertained so long as they remained quiet. Now, however, that Randal had revolted, Chichester hoped that he might be excused by Cecil if he worked towards the banishment of Randal and his clan and the confirmation of Sir James in the Glens, provided he could show a claim to that territory. Worse subjects than Randal and his brothers could not, he stated "be found among those heathenish reed shanks". He would, he said, treat with Sir James, but without making any very definite offers until he had been advised by the Lord Deputy, his one desire being to get the Castle of Dunluce into his hands. "Could I get that castle into my fingers," he says, betraying, we are afraid, his animosity towards the MacSomhairles in the statement, "I would soon quiet or starve that people.

35. It would be hard to find more diversity of opinion than is expressed in the statements of Randal's force which served with the Earl. In the list of Oct 29th, it is placed at 400 foot, 40 horse (C.S.P.Irel., XI,148-149). Chichester estimated it on Nov 6, at 2,000 foot, 40 horse (Id.XI,152-153). When Tyrone was in Louth on Nov 19th, it had dropped to 300 foot, 60 horse (Id.XI,173) Stafford, on Dec 7th, placed it at 100 foot, 40 horse (to Cecil from Newry - Id.XI,203). For the operations against the MacSomhairles and the escape of Sir James: Chichester to Cecil, Nov 22 (where, incidentally, he contradicts himself by saying that Randal had with him 120 foot, 24 horse!); Sir Francis Stafford's letter of Dec 7th - Id.XI,174-175; 203-204. See also Capt. Willis to Cecil, Nov 15 - Id.165; and Hill: Macdonnells of Antrim, 194.
At this point Sir James commenced rather suddenly to play the part of the dutiful son to Angus of Dunyveg. It had almost appeared at the close of 1600 that Angus, dispossessed in Scotland by Sir James, had wished to set himself up in the Glens. If it really were so, the tables were turned now with a vengeance. But whether Angus was fighting for his own hand then or James solely on his own part now, we cannot tell since they appear to have been mutually abrupt in their quarrels and reconciliations. It seems at least clear that Angus had gathered about him whatever strength there remained to the ClanDonald South during the period of his son's confinement in Dunluce. At all events, Sir James now represented to Chichester that he could not surrender Dunluce into the Queen's hands without the permission of Angus, to whom he had written for advice. Confused by requests for aid on the one hand by Sir James against the MacSomhairles and on the other by Neice MacSomhairle against the Cantyremen, Chichester could rely only upon one thing; the animosity between the House of Dunyveg and Randal. Hearing that Angus was to come to Ireland to decide about the fate of Dunluce, Chichester intimated to him that unless he landed at Carrickfergus he should consider his intentions as underhand, and in the meantime he sent supplies and a force of eighty men to Sir James—a reinforcement which was not to be his, however, unless he surrendered Dunluce Castle to the Queen.

36. Chichester to English Privy Council, Dec. 9 - C.S.P. Ireld, XI, 206-207. The Carrickfergus Governor was suspicious even of Neice, the only loyal member of his house. In asking the Queen's assistance, he said that "he plays the part of Randal, living in that part of the Glyns in the lifetime of Sir James (MacSomhairle), his elder brother." Before joining Tyrone Randal had played a loyal part.— £.p. 354. —
By December 21st. Fenton said that Chichester was in treaty with Angus to get Dunluce, and Chichester himself, who expected Angus to come to Ireland, made use of the occasion to moralise to Cecil concerning the barbarous nature of the Scots. He thought that Angus would bring over a force and that their movements in the action which he believed to be impeding with the Mac Somhairles would be a kind of test of their usefulness or otherwise to the Queen in the projected employment of mercenaries on her behalf. The Scots, he said, are "a very savage and heathenish people, speaking Irish, wavering and uncertain, better affected to this nation than to us, liking their manners and dissolute living better than our justice and living under law; which makes me doubtful of them being in great numbers, and a few can do us no good. But were there an army in the field, or strong garrisons in Tyrone," he concludes, "good use might be made of them for a time."

While these events were happening in the northeastern corner of Ireland, the fate of the Gael was being decided in the south. O'Donnell, avoiding Carew, who had been detached from the siege of Kinsale to intercept him, by one of the most famous forced marches in history, was the first of the Ulster chieftains to arrive in Munster. Tyrone followed him, and by December the Irish army was in the

37. Fenton to Cecil - Id. XI. 224. Note that he calls Angus "Sir Agnus MacDonnell".
38. Chichester to Cecil, Dec. 29 - Id. XI, 244 - 245.
vicinity of Kinsale. Mountjoy, who lay under the walls, found himself cooped up between the Spaniards in the town and the encircling Irish force. Like Cromwell at Dunbar, his situation was critical, and the chances are that he should have been either starved out or forced to cut his way through at a loss if the Irish had maintained their position. Tyrone was for delay: O'Donnell and D'Aguila for a concerted onslaught upon the English. The more active spirits had their way, and a general attack by the Irish seconded by a sortie from the town was planned to take place upon the night of December 23rd. Forewarned of the resolutions of his opponents by an Irish traitor named Brian MacHugh Og MacMahon, Mountjoy was ready. O'Donnell's force, misled by their guides, spent the night in aimless wandering and both he and Tyrone found themselves by daybreak close to the vigilant and waiting ranks of the English.

Mistaking for a retreat a motion on Tyrone's part to reform his cavalry, the Irish foot fell back in some disorder. The English horse charged, and although O'Donnell did his best and Tyrrell and a band of detached Spaniards put up a stiff fight, the main body of the Irish was routed with considerable loss. "All," says O'Sullivan, "were seized with panic terror." The Spaniards in the town, owing to some fatal mistake, did not attack at all.

Thus was Kinsale lost and won. In so far as the history of Ireland is concerned, it is the decisive battle.

With the defeat of Tyrone and O'Donnell perished alike the organisation of Ireland as a Gaelic nation, the clan system, the mercenary scheme - the entire gamut of Gaelic social institutions. Henceforward mercenary military aid from the Highlands and Islands of Scotland could mean nothing to the Irish.
...that brethren affection quite his Diario carrys, and call with subjecte much to have to the furtherence of his diario saith Larchi pateralis handeconsent intentione for representing of these divinitye maritale, comman to God and traytorously to the liberte of their native countray'.


CHAPTER TEN:

It cannot be avered that any considerable force of Scots, save that of his immediate command of Randal Macdonald, was engaged upon the field of Minacluigh. Of Scots' Galligin O'Connel in Tyrone and a numerous following, thirteen of whom perishing in the battle. Randal's losses were equally great, one authority saying that not more than thirty of his seventeen returned out of a total force of four hundred. O'Hourke was said to have lost three hundred out of five hundred.

Tyrone returned as usual to his own country, and O'Connel went to Spain where he was assassinated in 1602.
CHAPTER TEN:

AFTERMATH. (1602-1603)

"...that brotherlie affectioun quhilk his Hienes caryis, and all guid subjectis aucht to have, to the furtherance of his Hienes said darest susteiris honorable intentioun for repressing of these disloyall subjectis, ennemeis to God and traytouris to the libertie of thair native cuntrey".

Scottish Privy Council enactment, January, 1602.

§ I.

It cannot be shown that any considerable force of Scots, save that under the immediate command of Randal Mac Somhairle MacDonald, was engaged upon the field of Kinsale. Of Scots' Gallóglaiigh, however, Tyrone had a numerous follow-
ing, thirteen of their captains perishing in the battle. Randal's losses were equally great, one authority saying that not more than thirty of his footmen returned out of a total force of four hundred. O'Rourke was said to have lost three hundred out of five hundred.

Tyrone returned at once to his own country, and O'Donnell went to Spain where he was assassinated in 1602.

1 Vide Appendix No.X for Tyrone's army list. Note Kedagh and Gilleduff MacDonald there, however. In a list of the Irish companies serving in the English army on Aug. 9, 1601, a certain Colla MacDonald is mentioned as the leader of seven men — C.S.P., Ireld., XI, 19
2 Id., XI, 283-284. Sir Francis Stafford says, however (Id. 285-6) that Randal lost only 70 men.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH GARRISONS IN IRELAND (FOOT COMPANIES) — 1595.

- The area of the Ulster Rebellion.
- The Scots in Antrim.
- The rebels tending south along these lines.
- The incoming mercenary forces from Scotland.
- English garrisoned posts — with numbers of forces.

The importance of the north-east marches (heavily garrisoned to protect Dublin and the Pale) and of the Ballyshannon gap, or passage, will clearly be seen.

Map No. 7. Facing page 374.

The information concerning the garrisons given in this map is extracted from C.S.P. Ireland, III, 128.
by one, John Blake of Galway, apparently at the instigation of Carew. Tyrone and those of the Ulster chieftains who remained loyal to him were relentlessly pursued on the one hand by Döwra from Derry and on the other by Mountjoy; O'Cahane's country was wasted in a savage manner by Doëwra; with the surrender of Sir Comer MacDermot and the retreat of O'Sullivan Bere to Ulster, Munster was quietened; Connacht was reduced by Sir Oliver Lambert. But the Queen did not live to see the submission of Tyrone. On March 24th, 1603, she died. On April 4th, Tyrone reached Dublin, having formally submitted to Mountjoy meanwhile, and on the day following King James I and VI was officially proclaimed King of England, Scotland and Ireland.

There remains but to sum up the position in Antrim and to examine into the final negotiations with Scotland for the enlisting of a Highland force to serve the Queen.

We have seen that, during the negotiations with Sir James of Donyveg in Dunluce Castle, Sir James desired Sir Arthur Chichester to influence his father Angus to come over from Scotland with some men to aid him in the winning back of the Glens from the MacSomhairles, and that he deferred a decision regarding the Castle until the arrival of Angus. Chichester, who was very anxious to get Dunluce into his own hands, sent a boat to Cantyre, where he found Angus ready with 500 men to come over. Angus, having conferred with the Governor's messenger, agreed to the surrender of Dunluce

2. Id., XI, 283-284. Sir Francis Stafford says, however (Id. 285-6) that Randal lost only 70 men.
to the Queen and disclosed his intention of attending himself in Antrim with a view to looking after his own interests there. The weather was unusually stormy during that winter, however, and Tyrone, accompanied by Randal MacSomhairle, had returned after the defeat at Kinsale before any further steps could be taken. This put an entirely new complexion on affairs, for Sir James at once quitted Dunluce and went to the Earl. Upon the order of the latter, Sir James meekly surrendered the Castle to Randal, and Chichester was placed in a more awkward position than ever by Randal's sending in his brother to Carrickfergus to sue once more for a pardon and to make Randal's excuses to the Governor for having been a party to Tyrone's actions in Munster! Randal, no less than his deceased brother James, was proving himself just as crafty as Somhairle Buidhe.

At the beginning of February, 1602, the Carrickfergus boat returned from Cantyre with two of Angus's messengers. These intimated Angus's decisions as already stated, and said that he should await their return with Chichester's reply before acting further. Not having been informed of his son's surrender of Dunluce, Angus still covered his real intention, which was to dispossess the MacSomhairles, by offers of service against Tyrone to the Queen. Chichester feared that if Angus came to Ireland his chief activities would be against the MacSomhairles, in which service he would require assistance from Carrickfergus. To aid him might involve the garrison in disaster; to refuse aid would be merely to throw him into the hands of Tyrone. Therefore
the astute Governor replied to Angus telling him to dissolve his forces and not to come to Ireland. This, he thought, would stay him until Mountjoy had sent advice as to whether he was willing to accept Randal's submission, bring in Angus to dispossess Randal and his brethren, or send into Antrim sufficient forces completely to expel the Scots. 4

Sir James, who, it was said, had "played the child", continued for the moment in friendship with Tyrone, He 6 promised him a force of 1,000 mercenaries, and he appears to have been sent with eighty men by the Earl to the support of O'Cahane against Doewra in February. O'Cahane had at this time also 200 of the MacSomhairles' men, who do not seem to have displayed any disinclination to fight alongside Sir James. 7

4. Chichester to Cecil, March 14, 1602 - C.S.P. Ireld., XI, 334-335. In this volume of the Irish Calendar there are filed among the undated papers at the end of the year (1603 - (1) Memorandum of Overtures of Sir James and Randell McConnellis; as their returning to the Queen's allegiance will leave them open to attack, they desire 600 foot and 100 horse in pay during the war and 100 f. and 50 horse thereafter. They desire a new grant, for rent, of the lands they possess (XI, 257-258 - S.P. Eliz. Ireld., coix, 278). (2) Petition of Sir James and Randell McConnell to the Queen; they are the born subjects of the Queen in Ireland. They regret having been misled by rebels and now submit. They have approached the King of Scots to use his influence for them. They desire a pardon and grant of their lands (XI, 259-260 - S.P. Eliz., Ireld., coix, 281). It is evident that the Sir James mentioned here is Sir James MacSomhairle. As he died on Easter Monday, 13 April, 1601, (ante, p.359) these two documents relate to a date prior to that - undoubtedly to the early months of the year when Randal was in favour and when both of the brothers were suing for pardon.


6. Chichester (letter of March 14, quoted above) said 1,500.

7. Memo by Doewra's officers, Feb. 27. - Id., XI, 324. With O'Cahane there were also 600 banished men from Eneshowe. Note throughout the period the number of broken men in Ireland as well as in Scotland.
There was this peculiarity about Sir James of Dunyveg: that wherever he went he managed to involve himself in a tangle of conspiracy and cross purposes. He was consistently true to type - the type of the Celtic chieftain's son who had been brought up in court. He was neither fish nor flesh, neither a true Gael nor a true Saxon: he lacked the Gaelic craftiness exhibited in his relations, the MacSomhairles, the Gaelic courage of his father or of his cousin, Hugh O'Donnell; but he lacked also the subtlety of his one time friend, King James, the plain Saxon courage of such an Englishman as Sir John Perrott. His likeness to the Irish chieftains' sons brought up in Elizabeth's court is very striking, to the Queen's Earl of Desmond, the Queen's O'Reilly and the like.

While with the O'Cahanes he played a stupid game of his own. At one moment it was reported that he was to marry the Earl of Tyrone's daughter, 'he having a married wife in Scotland', at the next he was leading Dowra to believe that he hated Tyrone. Again he would allege hatred between O'Cahane and Randal MacSomhairle and pretend to mediate between O'Cahane and Dowra, then beseech Dowra to give him a ship in which he might go to Carrickfergus. Upon more than one occasion he sought leave to submit with his immediate followers to the Queen in Derry, but when the time came actually to place himself in Dowra's hands he invariably temporised. His conduct led the Derry commander to reconsider his decision as to the engaging of Scots for the Queen. Sir James, he said, although he had tried to kill his father and had been banished from Scotland for

that and other crimes, was still heir to Cantyre and would undoubtedly exert a mischievous influence over any Cantyre mercenaries who were brought to Ireland.

By March, 1602, he had gone home to Cantyre—a fact which proves Dowra's tale of banishment to have been in error. Here Angus received him, if not into his paternal bosom, at least in so far as to believe the stories he told of Chichester's treachery in the matter of Dunluce—probably excuses for his having let the place slip back into Randal's hands at Tyrone's command. Chichester denied these allegations in a letter which he sent to Angus by one, John Lugg, but Angus replied to him on July 7th saying that when Sir James met the Governor, which would be soon, he would deny to Chichester's face that he had slandered him.

Chichester was somewhat fearful, as a result of information which he had received from the now loyal Randal, that Angus and Sir James were combining to send a force to Tyrone, the latter being then in desperate straits after his defeat, but the English authorities, if the truth were known, had nothing further to fear from the ClanDonald, for the Earl of Argyll had now come out into the open and was commencing his campaign of fire and sword against the House of Dunyeyg.

10. Chichester to Cecil, March 18; Angus to Chichester, July 7, "at the Logh"—C.S.P., Ireld., XI, 343-434.

* Is he the same as John Lege mentioned ante, p. 262?
Driven to extremities by the disastrous course of their fortunes during the last few years in Scotland, Angus and Sir James were now making a last despairing effort to wrest the Glens of Antrim from the usurping MacSomhairles. Achinross, who was informed of their purposes in Scotland in February, and who had cause to hate Sir James for the death of MacLean, told Nicolson that the English should rue the day they received Sir James to pardon and warned him that the Queen should not even contemplate a grant in his favour as against MacSomhairle. And Randal, by his prompt desertion of Tyrone after Kinsale, had indeed won the day. By July 19th, when they had received a letter from King James in favour of the claim of Angus and Sir James to the Glens, the Lord Deputy and the Irish Council were afraid to make any move which might alienate Randal, who was then described as rich, powerful, and loyal. He remained, therefore, in undisturbed possession of the Route and Glens and became later, at the hands of King James I, Earl of Antrim.

13. The King cannot very readily be accused of trickery towards the ClanDonald. He seems to have made a sincere effort to bring about a settlement in the South Isles. The Campbells were the mischief makers.
15. The later fortunes of Sir James of Dunyveg are recorded by the various writers on Highland history. In 1603, he was arrested, brought before the Privy Council, and imprisoned in the Blackness and afterwards in Edinburgh Castle. Here he languished until 1609 when he was tried for high treason and condemned to death (Pitcairn: Criminal Trials, III, 5-10) The sentence was not carried out, however, and in May 1615 he effected his escape. At this time Angus Og, his younger brother, was in rebellion against authority as represented by John Campbell of

(Continued..............)
Let us now see the effect of the Queen's countenancing of the policy of enlisting Highlanders against Tyrone. In January, 1602, when Tyrone was in retreat from Kinsale, the Irish Council regretted that the Scots had not been introduced into Ulster to waste the country in his absence. On January 7th., while the fate of Ireland was still in the balance in so far as those in Edinburgh were concerned, King James went so far as to nominate a special council to advise him as to how he might raise an army in Scotland to aid the Queen. On the 27th., when news of the success of Mountjoy at Kinsale had arrived, Nicholson reported the King's joy thereat, and said that it had been made the occasion of a public thanksgiving. Now indeed

(Note 15 continued...)

Calder. This latter, having been joined by Sir Oliver Lambert (whom we have seen, ante, p.374, engaged in subduing Connacht in 1602) and a force of soldiers from Ireland, had partly pacified the isles, Randal MacJames, brother of the older Angus of Dunyveg, and others coming in to him. In June, however, Sir James had reached the isles after his escape, and, gathering a band about him, he seized Dunyveg Castle by stratagem. Angus Og and others were at this time executed, and Argyll having been granted a commission of Lieutenancy Sir James was soon forced to abandon Dunyveg. Thence he fled to Ireland where he was befriended and conveyed through the agency of some Jesuits in Galway to Spain. Having been recalled from his exile in 1620, he received the King's pardon prior to his death in London in 1626. Angus, his father, died in Rothesay in 1614.

16. Irish Council to English Privy Council, Jan. 12 - C.S.P. Ireld., XI, 270. They thought that, being weak, he would now make renewed efforts to get them himself, and recommended that King James be approached to thwart him.


18. Nicholson to Cecil, Jan 27 - Id.,II, 808. See also same to same, Jan 23, wherein Nicholson reports the progress of the scheme to employ 2,000 Scots for the Queen (Id., II, 807.)
that the ultimate surrender of Tyrone could only be a
matter of time, King James devoted himself wholeheartedly
to the multiplication of Proclamations against him and to
the declaring of his loyalty to the Queen of England in
every possible manner. There were no half measures here;
Tyrone was defeated and useless - a dead horse in so far
as intrigue was concerned - and then the Queen would soon
die and what was left of the Irish insurgents would no
longer be his "darest suster's" traitors but James's own
rebels. On January 28th., accordingly, a new Proclamation
against "the reset of such as leaue their enseignes in
Ireland" was brought out - with the object of preventing
desertions to Scotland on the part of the Queen's soldiers
in Ireland. Three days later another Proclamation ap-
peared - this time for the raising of 2,000 men in the
Highlands to aid the Queen against the Irish. Argyll,
Glenmurchy, Lennox, Atholl, Huntly, MacGregor, MacIntosh,
Grant, Lovat, Caithness, MacKay, MacKenzie, Lochiel and
others were each ordered to levy so many men for the ser-
vice. Of the ClanDonald, Glengarry, Clanronald and
Keppoch were mentioned. On February 3rd., the Queen
again wrote to James to thank him for his offers of ser-
vice and for his warnings concerning the intentions of the
Spaniards with regard to Ireland, but even at this time
it had become apparent to Nicolson that the defeat at
Kinsale had considerably altered matters. Achinross still

LXVIII, 15 - I; (sent by Nicolson to Cecil on Feb. 6th);
Steele: Cal. Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, II. 2.
LXVIII, 15 - II; Steele: op. cit., 270; Collectanea de
Rebus Albanieq., 45-46; Appendix No. VI below.
21. Queen to King James - C.S.P. Scot. (Thorpe), I, 808 -
printed in Bruce: Letters of Queen Elizabeth and King
James, LXXVI, 142-143. Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 6 - C.S.P.
(Thorpe), II, 808.

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continued to press for employment, speaking of the ability of the Scots to "straight" O'Neill now that he had retreated into the famine-scarred wilderness which Dowra and Mountjoy had made of his once fair country of Tyrone.

When the matter of the contemplated general Highland levy came up for discussion before the assembled Estates in Scotland, however, there were many dissentient voices against the bearing of arms in the Queen of England's service. The Irish, said some, were closely related to the Highlanders and Islesmen by ties both of race-kinship and of friendliness, while the Saxons were nothing to them, and these latter had, furthermore, consistently oppressed the Irish. If this spirit had been general in the Isles at an earlier date Elizabeth should have found it hard to defeat the Earl of Tyrone, indeed, and we can well assume that, if the project of the present expedition had been pushed forward, James would have found it difficult in the extreme to put a force on foot in his "darest suster's" interest.

Kinsale had done its work. The Highland levies were never mustered; and Cecil, short of advising Nicolson to see to it that Tyrone was not aided in his final despairing efforts, washed his hands of the entire business. We

22. Achinross to Nicolson, Feb. 13. Feb 21 - C.S.P.Scot. (Thorpe), I1,808,809. He said that MacNeil and others had intentions of going to Ireland. Note that neither the MacLeans nor the MacNeils are mentioned in the Proclamation of January 31st.


24. Cecil to Nicolson, Apl.6; Nicolson to Cecil, Feb.16, April 25 - C.S.P.Scot. (Thorpe), I1,809,811.
are led to think that neither he nor the Queen came out of their period of Scottish intrigue with very shining laurels.

In a final burst of loyalty to the Queen, King James brought out two further Proclamations to the same effect as those previously issued, and in July he spoke at the Convention denouncing the traitorous attempts of the Irish. The conclusion of an age during which Scottish military aid had been at once the refuge and the inspiration of the Irish Gael was marked in 1612, when James, as King James as well I as VI., brought in an Irish Parliament "an Act for Repeale of one statute made against bringing in of Scotts, retayning of them, and marrying with them."


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APPENDICES.

Viz:

I. Mercenary Service in Ireland.

II. Cuid Gidche in Scotland, and Clan exactions in general.

III. The Territorial Distribution of the Scottish Galloglaigh Clans in Ireland (with a map)

IV. Military Proclamation of Hugh O'Neil, Earl of Tyrone, 1601.

V. Parallel Genealogies of the Hebridean and Ulster Irish Clans.

VI. List of Scottish Privy Council Enactments against the sending of aid to the Earl of Tyrone.

VII. The Scottish Mercenaries as Archers.

VIII. The Scottish Mercenaries in the service of the English Government.

IX. The Strategic Importance of the Ballyshannon Passage (reprint of an article from the Journal of the Galway Archaeological Society.)

AND

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

APPENDIX No. X - ARMY LIST OF HUGH O'NEIL, 1601, follows immediately after Bibliography.

No. IX is inset facing back cover.
APPENDIX NO. I:

Mercenary Service in Ireland in the Latter Half of the Sixteenth Century.

Note: In this and in the succeeding number of the Appendices an attempt is made—in conjunction with what has already been said in Chapter One—to work out a technical background for the scheme of employing Scottish free-lance soldiers in Ireland in the period under review.

(I) Mercenary Service in the Celtic System:

According to the Brehon Law, there was no such thing as land tenure by ordinary military service. The men of the tribe followed the chieftain in his hostings not because such service was part and parcel of their holding of the land, but because they were freemen. The ownership of the land of each tribe was vested, not in the chieftains, but in the men of the tribe.

No such military organisation as that existing under the feudal system in other lands was therefore evident in the traditional usages of Ireland. It is not, however, to be supposed from this that the idea of a military scheme of anything but the most ephemeral kind—i.e., service by the men of the clan upon occasion, entirely non-professional—was lacking in the country. On the contrary, many allusions to a central, permanent military force, or forces, are to be found even in the earliest records. At such early dates

2. U.J.A. VI, 169, 110. It should, however, be noted that this refers more to an earlier period, the system having undergone some changes in the sixteenth century. These changes will be noted below.
we are confronted with evidence of the extensive employment of mercenary forces by kings and chieftains - small standing armies of professional fighters, apart entirely from the men of the clan to which they are attached.° Such, indeed, were the Fianna of even earlier days, 5 and it may be noted that the name Fianna was not at all confined to such warriors as followed Fionn Mac Cumhaill, but that "Fianna" was used as the equivalent of "Buannadha," or "billeted soldiers." 6 A still further point to be made is in the evidently interchangeable meaning of "fianna" or "buannadha" and "amasanna," a term often used to designate these early Irish mercenaries. 7

4. Id., 389-392.
5. U.J.A. VI, 294, seq. It should be noted that military service was compulsory on the tributary states, where land was not held according to the usual system as applying to the "free" states - Book of Rights, quoted by Mac Neill: Celtic Ireland, 87-96.
6. Keating, quoted by O'Curry: Manners and Customs, II, 379. Cf. the Modern Irish buanna (pl. - adhna) - "a recruit, a conscript, a billeted soldier, a soldier, a mercenary - one having free quarter in a house" - Dinneen, Irish Dictionary. Dinneen goes on to note the transferred meaning of buanna in the sense of "one who assumes authority in a house... evidence of the attitude assumed by the military quartered in the houses of the people, which is in accord with our historical knowledge."
7. The Royal Guard of permanent soldiers of Raghallach, son of Uathach, King of Connacht in 645 A.D. is spoken of as: "Righ amhuis im Raghallach;
Dech céd scálcona scialthaighb"

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It is of value to note this owing to the complication which later arises in a consideration of the term galboglaigh. Such men appear to have been under regular pay, and to have fought under recognised conditions, as do the soldiers of a modern army, but they hired themselves where they could get the best pay, and were free to leave one chieftain for another.\(^5\)

Nor did the military tradition extend alone to organisation: in common with the Celtic race in general, the Irish Gael had always a reputation of high military quality.\(^9\) Even Spenser\(^10\) says of the Irish in his own time: "they are very valiaunt and hardie, for the most part great indurers of colde, labour, hunger and all hardnesse, very active and strong of hand, very swift of foot, very vigilant and circumspect in their enterprises, very present in perils, very great scorners of death."

That the employment of mercenary forces by the Irish chieftains, which became widespread, as we have noticed,\(^11\) from the thirteenth century onward, was not an abrupt change in system must be evident, in the first place, from these positive references to an earlier, if not so extensive, usage of the scheme. Negative proof to the same end is given by the Irish Annalists, who make no reference to a change, but refer extensively (after the thirteenth century) to galboglaigh and toamasanna as if they were bodies not

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Joyce, Social History, 1,93, 94.
Logan: Scottish Gael, I, 99, 100, 115, etc.
View of the State of Ireland, 119.
Vide ante, Chap. I.
entirely new, but not in widespread earlier usage.\textsuperscript{12}
There can be little reason to doubt, however, and this is
a point made earlier in the present work, that the continual
warfare of the period of 1300 to 1600 made it necessary for
Irish and Anglo-Irish lords alike extensively to employ mercenary
forces, and so to bring about a gradual revolution in Irish
military methods.

As it is at this period that the galloglach, or
"foreign young fighting men", which have come in for such
extensive mention in our pages, and who are already specifically
noticed above,\textsuperscript{13} come into evidence, some further explanatory
references to them will not be out of place. O'Rahilly says
of them: "Western Scotland was the home of those formidable
fighting men, the 'galloglach' or 'foreign soldiers,' who
were so called because, like the Gall-Gheadhail, they were
largely of Norse descent. These were first imported into
Ulster about the middle of the thirteenth century, and as their
military abilities became appreciated, they were eagerly sought
after, so that a century later we find a number of galloglach
families of Scoto-Norse descent, like Mac Domhnaill, Mac
Suibhne, and Mac Caba well established in the province.\textsuperscript{14}

Each of these families is referred to, at one time

\textsuperscript{12} The Annals of Ulster, in 1290, refer incidentally to
galloglach with no explanation thereof in the text. MacNeill
(Phases Irish Hist. 329) says that the mention in 1247 of a
chieftain named Mac Somairligh "is the first sign of the
Hebridean Galloglach element in Irish wars," but the A.F.M.
sub anno 1153, mention the death of Sitric MacDowell, by his
name the member of a galloglach family later (Mac Neill,
op. cit. 334-335), in service in Tyrone and elsewhere. Of
the other galloglach families MacCabe is first mentioned
(A.F.M) in 1358, Mac Sweeney (Annals Ulster and A.F.M.) in 1267,
and Mac Sheehy (A.F.M. in 1367.)

\textsuperscript{13} Ante, p.3,\textsuperscript{11}0

O'Rahilly: Irish Dialects, 161-163.
or other under the name of galloglaigh. The peculiar matter, as noted by MacNeill, is that galloglaigh service was, therefore, largely hereditary, being confined, to a great extent, to these Scoto-Norse clans mentioned. Mac Neill says: "...with one very doubtful exception every officer of galloglasses that I find named from the thirteenth century, when they are first heard of, until the seventeenth century, when they last heard of, bears a Hebridean surname."16

The non-native origin of the force is made very clear from contemporary authority. The Irish sources (taking the matter more or less for granted) refer here and there to the galloglaigh having come from Scotland, as does O'Clery

15. As, "Mac Dowell Galloglaigh" - A.F.M. 1377; "gallowglasses of the Mac Sheehys," Id. 1585, and elsewhere; MacSweeney galloglaigh on the map of Ireland made by John Goghe in 1567 printed in State Papers, Ireld., Henry VIII, III, 3, and see Map. No. 2 facing page 113. ; "McWynes who are all Galloglasses" - Hogan's Haines's Description of Ireld. in 1592; "MacDonnell Galloglaigh" - A.F.M., 1565, and as early as 1564; "the Clandonnells, all galloglas" - Bagensall: Description of Ulster in 1586, quoted Hogan, op.cit., 26 note.

16. Phases of Irish History, 326. He does not mention the instance in question. From an examination of the namementions in the Plants, however (see Appendix III), it must be clear that he is wrong, for there are more instances than one. See also non-Scot galloglaigh names in 1551 - Morrin: Cal. Pat & Close Rolls, 1, 275. (Pat., 5, Ed. VI., memb. 19, No. 171): "Pardon of James Egan of Straffan, in the county of Kildare, clerk; Hugh Dempsey, son of the Abbot of Cwswell, in the same county; Thomas O'Leyn alias Ecogge, of Grane, in the same county, galloglas; and Richard Saret of Phillipston, in the county of Carlow, galloglass." Again, among the Ordinances for Munster issued by Ferrott in 1571 is one: "The sons of all husbandmen and ploughmen shall follow the same occupation as their fathers. If the son of a husbandman or ploughman will become a kerne, galloglas, or horseboy, or will take any other idle 'thread' of life, he shall be imprisoned for a twelvemonth and fined" - C.S.P., Darew, I, 409, 410. If any man could "become a galloglach," then the theory of the entirely hereditary nature of the service goes by the board. But it should be noted that both these references are to Munster, where the organisation was never as strong as in its home provinces of Ulster and Connacht, (but vide infra, p. 1274). Against them are to be placed the numerous contemporary instances which bear out in an extraordinary manner the service for centuries of men of the same clan name as galloglaigh.
in connection with the Clan Sweeney. The English writers, if Spencer is to be taken as an example, attempt to explain the matter by holding that these families are of English origin. Spencer says that the MacSweeneys were ancienly the de Veres, and that "the very like is also reported of the... Mac-mahones (anciently Fitz Ursulas,) and Mac-Shehies of Mounster, how they likewise were ancienly English, and old followers to the Earl of Desmond, until the reign of King Edward the Fourth.

The main fact, at all events, to be noted is that, in the strict sense of the word, these gallboglaigh were not Irish soldiers at all, but hired Scots going about from place to place in Ireland, or settled on "galloglass land,"

18. Spencer: View of the State of Ireland, 108-109. Ware, in commenting on this, can do no more than say that "these families...are by others held to be of the ancient Irish" (Spencer, 107, note by Ware). O'Donovan, writing in U.J.A., VI, 142, is much more explicit: "From various notices of these families in the Irish annals, and from their pedigrees as given in Irish MSS., it would appear that the MacSweeneys, MacSheehys, and also MacDonnells Galloglach, who were the chief leaders of O'Neill's gallglaigh, emigrated together from Scotland about the year 1250, at the invitation of O'Neill, O'Donnell, and O'Conor; and that their descendants, afterwards settling in various parts of Ireland, carried the tradition of this emigration with them; and it is quite evident that it was from a vague report of this tradition that Spencer drew his account of their being originally from England." Joyce: Social Hist. Ireld., I, 146-147; however, says: "It is almost certain that the gallglaigh, and the mode of equipping them, were imitated from the English. So Spencer says - and O'Donovan agrees with him." But it should be noted that if Joyce understood the real significance of the gallowglaigh he omitted to state it. He (loc. cit.) takes "gall" to mean "an Englishman," omitting to notice that it may also refer to any other foreigner - a Scoto-Norseman, for example, or Gall-Gaedhal.
19. For the holding of the MacSheehys in co. Limerick in recompense for their service to the Earls of Desmond, vide O'Donovan's note to A.F.M. sub anno 1600. See Gallowglass. See: Ware, loc. cit.
and that the mercenary scheme, from being an extension of an early Irish usage, became a revolutionary force in the military history of the Irish post-1315 revival and in the sixteenth century struggle of the Irish and English systems.

II. Buannacht and Coinmed.

"The active cause of the great rise to power of the Earls of Kildare seems to have been their imitation of the custom by which the Irish kings imposed the maintenance of soldiers, called Bonuacha, on their people, under the usage called 'coigne and livery.' And as the Earls of Kildare became more powerful thereby, so did every Irish chieftain and Anglo-Irish lord who had the wherewithal to hire galloglaigh. Hire them a chieftain must, if he wished immunity from his warlike neighbours.

In the sixteenth century, and especially among the Anglo-Norman lords, where the checks of the Brehon Law had not sufficient force to make themselves felt against the will of the lord, the mercenary scheme thus embarked upon undoubtedly led to many evils. As Richey puts it: "Constant hostility rendered necessary an increased number of retainers; their maintenance wasted the substance of the tribe, which in its turn compelled the tribe to plunder the adjoining clans or the English Pale, and thus war begat war in endless succession, within the tribe itself every ambitious member of the tribal house sought the chieftainship, which tended to fall into the hands, not of the elected, but of the strongest and most

20. Journal Royal Soc. Antiq. Ireld., II - new series - 274-276. The eighth Earl of Kildare "was the first who imposed the quartering of galloglasses on the English Pale." Barrett, an exile from Connacht, with twenty-four spars, was thus quartered about the middle of the 15th cent. (cf. ante, p.396) Each galloglaich, from the axe, or sparth, which he carried, was known as a "spar" - 100 "sparres" made up a "batail of galoglis" - Journal, ut. sup., IV. 112, note.
unprincipled member of the house."\textsuperscript{21}

A system so widespread as this could never have grown up so rapidly if it had not had deep roots somewhere in the idea of social order of the Irish. The chieftain, in general, had very little power over his clansmen. Not even in the later period when the Tudor struggle forced matters upon all sides could he afford entirely to disregard their wishes. Nor were affairs to any great extent different among the Anglo-Irish lords, certainly not in Connacht.\textsuperscript{22} How was it then, it may very readily be asked, that both lords and chieftains could hire and pay bands of mercenary soldiers if they were not, at least to some extent, entitled to do so in virtue of their respective positions as semi-Irish or purely Irish chieftains? And the answer to this is that the upkeep of mercenary soldiers was allowed by, and indeed came in time to be part and parcel of, the clan system. We are referring now to the extensive upkeep of mercenaries, or galloglaigh, which characterised the 1300-1600 period, not to the earlier tradition of desultory employment. And, of course, the statement is also to be taken as being qualified with reference to the more arbitrary forms of coigne and livery as practised, principally, in Munster and Leinster.

In the clan system the original idea of buannacht, or the scheme whereby the hired soldiers of the clan were quartered on the men of the clan, was closely linked up with that of coinmed, or the refection upon visitation which the daer-tenants (not wholly freemen) were bound to give to

\textsuperscript{21} Richey: Lectures in Irish Hist. series 2, No, I, 11, 12.\textsuperscript{22} U.J.A., VI, 116 - the clansmen of de Burgo stood in the same relation to their leader as did the O'Flaherties to O'Flaherty. C.S.P. Carew, I, 5 - in 1515 the Burkes said to be as "Irish as O'Brien." cf. also Wilson: Beginnings of Modern Ireld, 37.
their chief. This latter was entitled to visit the house of the tenant at stated times and accompanied by a stated number of his followers, and to receive victuals and entertainment of a stated kind. The number of followers, the time, and the kind of food were carefully regulated by law, and varied in accordance with the amount of stock which the tenant borrowed from the chief.23 O'Donovan, in noting this system of "warlike reflections," says that "many instances are recorded in the Irish annals of chieftains having forced reflections from their subjects by the sword; but it must be acknowledged that in most of those instances the subjects had denied their claim on the grounds that they were not the rightful heirs."24

Indeed there was no rent for land other than this liability of the tenant for the support of his chieftain. The former supported the latter, and the latter, in return, defended the former - a manner of society which gave rise to the expression "spend me and defend me", supposed to make clear the position of the tenant.25 This liability to contribute to the support of the elected leader of the tribe could not be increased at his will, because (always excepting cases of resort to the strong hand) the men of the sept were freemen themselves, and heirs of the soil in the same patriarchal manner as was the chieftain.26 This was the basis of the matter, and that the system was distorted somewhat in the interests of the chieftain with the approach of such later days as those of the sixteenth century is not

23. Brehon Laws, II, 233, 237, etc. in the Cain Aigilline, or law of daer-stock tenure.

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denied. From coinmed came coigne, or coinary, associated in the phrase "coigne and livery" with the decadent period of Irish tribal economy. The particular exaction known as buannacht (bonaght) is explained by Ware as "an exaction imposed at the pleasure of the lord for the maintenance of his horsemen, his foot called Gallo-Glasses, and his other light-armed foot called kerns; and these soldiers, thus supported, were sometimes without distinction called Bonaghti, Bonaghs."27

Sufficient has been said of the meaning and extension of the system; references to the working of it are, however, few, and an insight into the actual manner of maintenance of the hired soldiers is only to be gained by a consideration, first of all, of the system of coigne and livery as practised by the Norman lords during the period. It is to be understood at the outset, however, that this was the mercenary system arbitrarily extended, and as practised by lords combining the feudal and tribal codes to their own personal advantage.

Coigne and livery is defined in 1579 as "an extortion and violent taking of meat, drink and money by the warlike retainers of such as pretend to have captainry, rule, or charge of defence of countries as well upon their own as upon their neighbours."28 Spencer says of it: "I know not whether the words bee English or Irish, but I suppose them to be rather auncient English... It is apparent that by the word Livery, is there meant horse-meate like as, by the word Coigny, is understood mans meate."29

27. Ware: Antiquities, II, 74-75.
29. Spencer: View of the State of Ireland, 52-53.
in Sir Thomas Smith's project for the colonisation of the Ardes, we are given a further sidelight on the system:-

"Coyne and liverie is this. There will come a kerne or galliglas, which be the Irish soulsidours, to lie in the churle's house; whiles he is there, hee will be maister of the house; hee will not onely have meate, but money also allowed him, and at his departur, the beste thing he shall see in the churle's house, be it linnen cloth, a shirte, mantil, or such like. Thus is the churle eaten up." 30

Davies, referring to it as "the most wicked and mischievous custom of all others," says that it was originally Irish, for they used to lay bonaght upon their people and never gave their soldiers any other pay. But when," he continues, "the English had learned it they used it with more insolency and made it more intolerable." 31 Ware repeats the assertion that it was Maurice Fitz Thomas, afterwards Earl of Desmond, who was the first among the English to impose coigne and livery (in the time of the invasion of Edward Bruce), having borrowed it from the Irish - "This extortion of Coin and Livery was originally an Irish Custom under the Name of Bonaght, which was imposed upon the People instead of pay for the soldiers." 32

30. PRINTED IN BLACK LETTER, 1572; QUOTED IN U.J.A. IX, 179, AND GIVEN ENTIRE IN HILL: MACDONNELLS OF ANTRIM, APPENDIX NO. 5.; 405 seq.


32. Ware: Antiquities, II, 76-77. If it be true that the system of bonaght among the Irish at the time of Edward Bruce was sufficiently well developed to suggest that of coigne and livery to the English, then there is additional ground for noticing the spreading mercenary system of 1300-1600 as not new, as is sometimes said, but rather an extension of something already in existence.
A concrete example, in this case of the right to levy an exaction as possessed by Queen Elizabeth in 1581-4, may serve further to illuminate the matter. It is from the Council Office Book for these dates in the Record Tower and reads as follows: "Whereas, over and besides the other rentes, duties and preheminences due to the Queen's highness, of the Morowghe's countrie, which you her majesty's farmer of ye same, have by lease for the yearly rent expressed in that leasse; there is, moreover, due to her Highness by the Morroughes, bonaght for a quarter of a yeare, everie yeare for fortie sparres of her galloglas, parte in money, and the rest in victuals, after the antient use and manner, that is to wite, for every sparr in monye, twentie shillings and tenne pence sterling; in bread, corne to the measure of three score and three half hoopes, or eight pecks, wanting (half) a hoope for 63 cakes, and thereunto nyne score and nyne quarters of butter."

It was on the occasion of an incursion into Decies (co. Waterford) by Desmond to demand payment of exactions such as these from Sir Maurice Fitzgerald that the celebrated battle of Affane was fought in 1565. Ormonde, his opponent, made an effort at about this time also to do away with coigne and livery in his territory, but the absolute necessity of his maintaining it as long as his neighbours continued to do so was sharply brought home to him by the depredations of Desmond upon his borders.

33. Morrin: Cal. Pat. and Close Rolls, I, 459 note. For a list of MacCarthy Mór's Cuttings, or rights to levy exactions on his clan, vide Journal R. Socy. Antiq. Irel., 1906, 354 et. seq. One of his military cuttings was "Gallogoloh" - a peculiar spelling - which is defined as "a certain company of foot charged on his country when the Earl would make war."

34. Bagwell: Tudors, II, 83-84.
For the reason, in the first place, that the central authority was not as yet able to protect its Irish subjects, and, in the second, that the suppression of the evil in any one territory left the inhabitants thereof open to attack by those of adjoining territories in the internecine strife of the period, it was found to be a work fraught with the greatest difficulty ultimately to stamp out the system of coigne and livery.

III. The Mode of Hiring and Quartering the Buannadha, and the Organisation of the Mercenary Service:

The relation which existed between this system as administered by the Anglo-Irish lords and the original system of bonaght, or buannacht, has already been noted. We can now enter, having observed so much, upon a consideration of the actual terms of hiring and the mode of quartering the buannadha proper, i.e., the mercenary soldiers of the long-settled Scots' galloglaigh clans and of the later Highland and Island Scots who sought service in Ireland. In the Ulster Journal of Archaeology appears a reprint of an interesting document of Hugh O'Neil's, Earl of Tyrone, dated from Dungannon in 1601, the first words of which - "Ag so mar fhostus O'Neill buannadha" (This is how O'Neil hires mercenaries) - declare its contents to bear vitally upon the subject in hand. It is, in fact, a complete statement of the terms of hiring mercenary forces, the manner of quartering them, and the duties imposed upon them, and, with some reservations to be noted later, it may be taken as bearing

35. Modern Irish - Buannacht: "military service, right or obligation of military service...free quartering for soldiers" - *vide* Dinneen, Irish Dictionary, under "buannacht." For the moment we have here adopted, in accordance with Ware, the term buanna as the equivalent of any mercenary, whether gallóglach, later Scot, or native Irishman. With the details of organisation and upkeep given above compare the numerous references to these and kindred points made in the course of the main part of this work. These it has been thought needless to repeat here. - e.g. Capt. Thomson's statement, p. 257, ante.
upon such matters in the ordinary manner of employing such forces as practised in Ulster, Connacht, and elsewhere during the latter half of the sixteenth century.36

First, as to the pay of the buanna: each hundred men, forming a company, receive £100 each quarter, and, over and above this, a bounty of £20 every half year. This is to be paid in the first quarter, and if, through fault of his own, the buanna does not remain for the second quarter, he forfeits the bounty; if the fault be the employer's, he keeps the bounty. But it is not to be expected that ready money will always be at hand, and so, when it is not, milch cows, according to the price at which they run in the territory in which the buannadha are, are to be accepted in lieu thereof. Over and above this pay, the buanna is entitled to a third part of the value of each prey which he assists in taking, a third part of any ransom paid for a prisoner which he makes, and an allowance for any prisoner who, though not carrying a ransom, is valuable to his employer for other reasons.

Then, as to the victualling and quartering of the mercenary forces so employed: for victuals the buanna is to have, quarterly, twenty-four meaders of butter and twenty meaders of meal, half of which is to be levied off the country and the other half arranged for between the marshal and the buanna by an increase in pay.

It is important to note that these particular buannadha were employed for the specific purpose of an expedition into Munster. They were therefore allowed a fortnight (to count towards the first quarter for payment) before commencing active service to victual themselves by

requisitions from the tenants upon whom they were cessed. Fines were imposed upon these latter for failure to feed the buannadha, and on the buannadha for remaining more than a fortnight before joining their colours.

It must be evident from this document that an elaborate scheme had at this date been worked out. We can scarcely be at liberty to suppose that the entire service in its various branches was so well regulated throughout the whole of our period. It can serve, however, as a basis in our investigations.

The mention of two distinct divisions or kinds of buannacht must be noted. There was, first of all, buannacht bun, the fundamental, or original, buannacht,\(^{37}\) also called "bonoghe bege,"\(^{38}\) or buannacht beag, which was fixed, or certain, being a fixed maintenance charge laid on every holding or ploughland. Then there was buannacht bar, called by English writers buannacht bur, which was uncertain — i.e. free quarter at discretion.\(^{39}\) It appears that this latter might also be commuted in specie,\(^{40}\) and from this, and from the significance of the words "bun," or basic, and "bar," literally, "on top," it might be inferred that the buannacht bar was an additional exaction which characterised the later spread of the mercenary system. Both classes of buannacht

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\(^{37}\) A.F.M. sub anno 1576, and O'Donovan's note.
\(^{38}\) C.S.F. Carew, I, 392-395. (A.D. 1569)
\(^{39}\) O'Donovan, loc. cit; Ware: Antiquities, II. 74-75.
\(^{40}\) Ware: op cit. In a note of the "bonoghe beges," that belonged to the Earl of Desmond in C.S.F. Carew, where already cited, there is no mention of the ability of the person upon whom the buana was cessed to save himself the presence of the buanna by paying a composition charge: "a bonogh burre, which is uncertain, to be cessed upon the country more or less, notwithstanding the bonogh beges, at the discretion of the captain or governor of the country, as well in other places as where the bonogh beges are due." O'Doovan, however, inclines to Ware's view.
existed in Co. Clare in 1576.41

We now come to a more careful consideration of the
wages paid to the mercenary. The passage of money in payment
of wages was, as we have seen, stipulated for in the terms of
hire promulgated by O'Neil in 1601, but even here provision
was made for a time when coin was not expected to be plentiful.
Money was also sent, as has been made clear earlier, by the
Irish into the Highlands in prepayment for forces. It is
likely, however, that in many cases actual coin seldom passed
between the employer and the buanna. In 1575 a statement of
the "wages of the Irish men of war"42 reviews the position as
follows: "The bonnaught or wages of a galloglasse for a
quarter of a year, when it is best cheap, is one beef for his
wages, and two beefs for his feeding and diet. The wages of
a Scot is like. The captain of galloglasse hath for a
quarter, one chief horse and a hackney, or for the hackney an
habergeon, and in a band of 100 he hath to advance his wages
13 dead pays out of the 100; so the band of 100 is but 87 men.
The captain is also allowed for his own victuals six men's
allowances. The captain of 100 Scots and the captain of 100

41. A.F.M. 1576. Ware's remarks on "sorohen" (loc. cit) as "a
charge of a certain quantity of oat-meal for the maintenance
of so many gallo-glasses as were stipulated for between
landlord and tenant" should be compared with the reference
to meaders of meal in O'Neil's proclamation (ante. p. 398)
and with the mention of corn and butter in the example given
on p. Cf. also the two Appendices following this.
With these also cf. S.P. Ireld. Henry VIII, II, 3, 502-505,
for "the first coin of gallowglasses, called coin bon,
that was cessed (in Kildare)" when Barret before mentioned,
was employed by the Earl.

42. C.S.F. Carew, II, 8-9.
gunners have the like." This was in Ulster.43 When the mercenary forces of Colla Dubh na gCapaill MacDonald were cessed upon what was then the MacQuillin country of the Route (c.1550), being under the maintenance of MacQuillin, they were quartered up and down the country, one Highlander and one of MacQuillin's galloglaigh (also hired) in each tenant's house. In this case the Highlanders quarrelled with the galloglaigh because each of the latter received a meather of milk over and above the amount allotted to the former.44 The inference is that the usual custom was to victual both alike, and there is no reason to believe that the scheme differed elsewhere.

Quarrelling was not, indeed, infrequent, either on matters of pay or questions of personal spite as between the buannadha and their employers. In 1598 O'Carroll of Ely massacred a company of the MacMahon axemen, having previously employed them, when the time came to pay their wages.45

Gwynn emphasises the view that the buannadha were paid for to some extent by the plunder of those against whom

43. The economy of O'Neil is pretty well summed up in another (1560) contemporary record: "The use of O'Neil is such that he never manures or tilleth any land for himself, but always hath victuals sent him by his tenants and underlings, (viz. certain cakes of oat bread and vessels of butter, being not good, but stinking and reeky from Tyrone, and from other lands hereunder written; as also beeves and other lordships; and he charges his tenants with bonneought, which is in keeping Scots and others in his country for his better defence and keeping..." (Here follows a list of O'Neil's cirriochtia, "urraghts," or sub chieftains). The connection which existed between coined and buanacht is very well brought out in this passage; note also the entire absence of monetary transactions in the clan dealings - C.S.F. Carew, I, 308.

44. The MacDonnell MS. printed entire in Hamilton: Letters concerning the Northern Coast of the Co. of Antrim, and quoted U.J.A. IX. 60-61.

45. A.F.M. sub anno 1598. He slew them "in their beds and in their lodging houses."
they were hired to fight. In general, the cost of upkeep of large bodies of them greatly wasted the country. In 1577 in Connacht the "extortions and ravine of Scots and mercenary hell-hounds kept by rebel lords" are said to have amounted to "more than double the composition for cess" (i.e. compounded rent to the Government). One part of Bingham's policy in the same province in 1586 was so to reduce the rebellious Burkes as to leave them unable to pay for Scots to aid them. That such cessing, or billeting, of soldiers on the people was nothing unusual in Ireland is fully recognised during the period. Spenser says: "for Ireland being a country of warre (as it is handled) and always full of soouldiers, they which have the government, whether they finds it the most ease to the Queense purse, or the most ready meanes at hand for victualling of the soouldior, or that necessity in-forceth them thereunto, do scatter the army abroad in the countrey, and place them in villages to take their victuals of them, at such vacant times as they lye not in campe, nor

46. Gwynn: Hist. Ireld, 213-214. An example of the defrauding of tenants with regard to galloglaigh maintenance is quoted in Hogan: Descript. of Ireld. in 1598 - the Baron of Brownesford in Kilkenny in 1537 is arraigned before a jury as having shown "the country that he hath VIIIxx Gallowglassies, and require wages of them therefor; where of truthe he hath not above the number of 100 Gallowglassies, and doth take and levye of the country wages for VIIIxx personnes." This was the evil of the unrestricted arrangement for "dead pays" known as "Black men," or, as Wilson: Beginnings Modern Ireld, 53, had it, "black beds."


48. C.S.P. Ireld, III, 133. It is interesting to note here that the sum total of buannacht(compounded for) which might be levied off Connacht for the queen stood, in 1562, at £3,400. Ulster, in the same year, is estimated as being able to maintain a galloglaich at eight pence per day. Going on these figures, we find that all Connacht might be made to support the queen 3,400 galloglaigh for one month each year, or a less number for a greater period. (C.S.P. Carew, I, 334.) But it should be remembered that, as Davies observed of the chieftain of Fermanagh, "in time of war"..."he made himself owner of all; taxing as he listed, and imposing as many bonaghts or hired soldiers as he had occasion to use." (Quoted U.J.A. IV. 277.)
are otherwise employed in service.49 And this, be it
noted, was the Queen's army—so far had all in Ireland fallen
in with the Irish system. It is difficult to deduce much
that may be considered reliable as to the food of the mercenary
thus quartered. From what has gone before we are aware of
the use of beef, oatmeal, milk, and butter. The Scots of
Somhairle Buidhe, in the Glens subsisted on oatmeal mixed
with water when driven to extremities in their campaigns against
the Government forces.50 But there is evidence to prove that
the victualling was not always as poor as this. For example,
Captain Thomas Lee, in his project for the occupation of
Fermanagh in 1594, provides for the victualling of the English
forces to be stationed there with butter, meal, and beef "in
such sort as the Irishry themselves shall set down, which will
be a greater proportion than your majesty would demand."51
Lee was in a position to know that the Irish were liberal.
In the same year Hugh O'Donnell entertained the Scots whom
he was about to hire under Donald Gorm MacDonald and MacLeod
of Harris "for three days and three nights with strong drink
and every sort of food that was best in the country."52

A short reference to the organisation of the
galloglaigh and Highland Scottish forces will complete this
part of our examination.

50. Hill: Macdonnells of Antrim, 123, note. This was usual
fare in the Highlands when nothing better was to be had.
It would be referred to by the Scottish Gael as 4ramnoch(?)
Sir Thomas Smith, in his project for the colonisation of the
Ardes in 1572, proposed to victual the English there in
the traditional galloglaigh manner, i.e. wheat and barley to
each man, with wages paid in kind — quoted Ibid. 410.
to Curry: Civil Wars in Ireland, II, 302.
52. O’Clery: Beatha Aodha Ruaidh (Life of Hugh O'Donnell,) 72-73.
Vide ante, p. 138.
In O'Neil's Proclamation, before mentioned, the marshal is referred to as the official responsible for the quartering and general overseeing of the buannadha. O'Donnell's marshal is mentioned in 1539 in an exactly similar capacity, and Sidney twice mentions "Shane Mac Rorye Reogh" as "marciall" to Rory Óg O'Moore in 1577. There seems no reason to believe, however, that the marshal was the same as the constable. He appears to have occupied a position which approximates to that held in a modern army by a quartermaster; the constable was undoubtedly the leader in the field. Both appear to have been peculiar to that part of the mercenary system which concerned the galloglaigh.

Frequent mention of the constable is found in the Irish annals. In 1503 Randal Mór Mac Donald, described as "consapal albanach erxann" (the Constable of the Scotsmen of Ireland) died. Similar entries as to the constables of the galloglaigh of territories are common. It is difficult to find any indication whether or no the constable was the leader of the battalion (c'orughadh, translated by O'Donovan "battalion", A.F.M., 1570, etc.) or force of one hundred galloglaigh; apparently he was the local leader of any homogeneous body, and there must have been a distinction in rank.

53. O'Conors of Connaught, 186.
54. Sidney's Memoir: U.J.A. IX, 185, 186. Note that this man bears a hereditary Hebridean galloglaigh name: Mac Rory or Mac Ruaidhri. (One of the Tyrone septs, according to MacNeill: Phases of Irish Hist. 334-335.) For the Clan Rory of the Siol Cuinn, vide Skene: Scottish Highlanders, 373, and ante p. 216ff.
55. For the Marshal, vide also U.J.A. VII, 274.
56. A.F.M. sub anno, 1503.
57. In 1424 MacLeaghlin MacGabe, constable of the two Breifnes, died. In 1542 Mac Rory, constable of O'Conor, was slain. Colla Macdonald Gallóglagh, constable of O'Neill, was killed in 1568. Edmond MacSweeney is mentioned as Chief Constable of Clanricarde in 1559 (all A.F.M. under dates given.) A peculiar mention of a non-Hebridean constable is made by the Four Masters in 1526 in the person of Conor Óg O'Donnell - "Conchobhar occ mac conchobhair chaioch ui domhnaill."
between the constable and chief constable. 58

In fine, we may say that the galloglaigh were organised in battalions, that they were led in battle by their constables, and that they were billeted or ceased upon the country under the directions of their lord's marshal.

That there was competition among the various septs of galloglaigh for hire is proved by a passage in the submission of MacDonald of the Tyrone branch in 1542. "I humbly desire his Majesty, in case any such need shall be, that mo (i.e. more) galloglasse shall be hired, that such galloglas as I shall bring above the said number (which he agrees to retain for the service of the crown) may be hired afore other strangers.

Our mention under the term buannadha of the Highland and Island Scots who came into Ireland, either directly or through the Antrim settlement, in such numbers in

58. Mac Neill: Celtic Ireld., 117, notes the succession from father to son of the hereditary galloglaigh constable-ship. He connects this with the scheme of succession in the Norse-Hebridean dynasty (1150-1499) and in the early Norse communities of Dublin, Argyll, and the Isle of Man. The term "consul" as applied to a leader of galloglaigh seems to have been a variant of constable. The MacSweeneys of Tir Conaill are described as consul to O'Donnell in 1560 - C.S.P., Carew, I, 308. In the same document MacDonald, consul of O'Neil's Scots and galloglaigh, is referred to. C.S.P., Carew, I, 187. Note also the consideration of a special season for mercenary service. Vide Irish Lords Justices to Walsingham, May 9th, 1563: "There is still notwithstandinge great talke of the coming over of many Scottes to Tyrlogh (Luineach O'Neil) which is yerely at this tyme of the year an ordinary Reporte. For that the Scottes are accustomed betwixt this nowe and Harveste to come ouf of their barrayne Ilandes into those partes. Yet for th' avoyding of any daunger that thereby may growe, we wilbe carefull to do our best endeavre to prevent the same." - S.F. Ireld., Eliz., CII, 21. That this (summer) period was the one in which the Redshank Scots, at least, were to be had is borne out by a reference in O'Clery: Beatha Aodh Ruaigh, 77 -- "(Hugh O'Donnell) was then at rest, after the departure of his mercenaries (emmsibh) until the middle month of spring." O'Donovan (cf. Book of Rights, Liii - here noted by Murphy) thinks that the last month of Foughmar, or Autumn, corresponding with our November, was also the last of the year to the ancient Irish. Accordingly, the middle month of spring here referred to would be our April.
the latter half of the sixteenth century - and with whom this work professes primarily to deal - now makes it necessary for us to justify such use in the light of Mac Neill's positive differentiation between Scots and galloglaigh, (which he classes together) and buannadha, or "buonies." He says: "a century or so after the introduction of the galloglasses, we find Irish troops established in imitation of them. These, however, bear a distinct name, buannadha, 'buonies,' meaning men on permanent service."^60 He does not at all call the galloglaigh buannadha. Now that bodies of Irish soldiers were set up and did hire themselves out as mercenaries in Ireland during our period (we have yet to see proof that they did so at as early a date as a century after the introduction of the galloglaigh from Scotland to Ireland), is beyond dispute.\(^{61}\) If they were maintained on the country, then they

^60. Mac Neill: Phases of Irish Hist., 326. Note, however, that when the attention of Professor MacNeill of University College, Dublin, was drawn to the point which is made against him in the above by the present writer, he agreed that it would scarcely be proper to confine the term buannadha to the purely Irish mercenaries.

^61. In 1580 Edward Butler, brother of the Earl of Ormonde, led a hundred swordsmen in Clanricarde in Connacht. He had been banished out of Ormonde - C.S.P., Carew, II, 311. While, however, it is not possible to determine whether Butler's force was hired by the sons of the Earl of Clanricarde, the facts are very clear concerning Connacht soldiers who fought with the rebels in Munster, in Tyrone's interest, circa 1600. Dermot O'Connor, "a poor man in the beginning of his fortune, and not owner of two plough lands in Connacht, his native country," led fourteen hundred Connacht mercenaries in Munster at this time. They are called throughout Pacata Hibernia "Bownoghs", and are distinguished from "Provincials," or Munster men. (Pacata Hibernia, I, 53-66, 69, 109, etc.) Note also the position of Captain Tyrrell, Tyrone's leader in the Midlands, whose forces seem to have consisted mainly of Irish mercenaries - men hired on terms, very likely, similar to those of the Proclamation of 1601.
must certainly be buannadha, and so thus far it is not difficult to follow Mac Neill. But the evidence scarcely seems to justify the confining of this name to these men. That the gallóglaiigh are referred to again and again as being at buannacht (and what is a buanna but a man at buannacht?) appears to justify the inclusion of their forces in a general treatment of mercenary troops under the generic name of buannadha. The later, or Redshank, Scots, who can no more, strictly speaking, be called gallóglaiigh (and they are not called galloglaigh in contemporary documents, although Irish historians, where they notice either of them, have almost consistently confused them,) than can the Connaught mercenaries serving in Munster, are also entitled to the name of buannadha.

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62. As one of many examples, the following is quoted; it also gives an insight into the fate of the galloglaigh with the changing system in Ireland: Queen Elizabeth to Sidney, Oct. 1577, in considering a petition of the Earl of Thomond—"He desires that the bonnought of galloglas that has been accustomedly paid out of his own lands may be reserved to himself now that the galloglas are discontinued. We conceive that the bonnought was a cease of victuals reared universally upon the whole country of Thomond for the wages of the galloglas, according to the number of the spears (recte, sparrs - vide ante, p392)... So much of that bonnought as has been leviable upon the Earl's own lands shall be remitted, whilst the service of our (sic) galloglas shall cease."—C.S.P., Carew, II, 116.
APPENDIX NO. TWO.

Guid Oidhche in Scotland, Ceatearn Tighe, etc:

The essentials of the system of reflections or exactions were to a large extent similar in Scotland and Ireland. Logan (Scottish Gael) is our informant for the following: "A laird in north Knapdale had a servitude of a night's lodging on one of his vassals, and in the proof taken of the value of his estate, there occurs 'Item, for cuidoich 20s'" (Vol.I., 212) Vide also U.J.A. IV, 247. Note, however, the complaint of the crown tenants of Isla in 1613 against Sir Ranald MacSomairle MacDonald for his impositions and exactions upon them after the Irish manner, and for cessing idle men upon them. An act was passed by the Privy Council of Scotland to restrain such practice. - Collect. de Rebus Albaniciis, 160-161. In a note to this (loc. cit.) is the following: "Without giving implicit credence to the statement that none of the predecessors of the Tenants of Isla (made in the text of the act) were acquainted with customs similar to those complained of, it is sufficiently evident that so early as 1613 there was a marked difference between some of the Irish customs and those of the Hebrides, arising doubtless from the feudal system having made greater progress in the Highlands and Isles than in Ireland."

The names of the various exactions referred to in general in the text are set out in particular here from a document entitled "Names of Rents, in money, victuals, and customs, which were due to the late Earl of Desmond" which is published in the Annuary of the Kilkenny and South-East of Ireland Archaeological Soc'y., 1868-'69. 266-267:-
Shralage - \( \text{wch} \) is a yearlie rent in sterlinge mony.

Marte - It is a yearelie rent of beofe.

Cheoffrey - It is a rent certaine uppone lande, paienge halfe face money, \( \text{wch} \) is the third pt better then sterlinge.

Choyney - A charge of meat & drincke for the time \( \text{sans nomb} \).

Lyvery - A charge of horse \( \text{wth} \) otes, corne, haie, and strawe, \( \text{sans nomb} \).

Kearney - A charge (of) \( \text{iii}^3 \) or \( \text{iii}^3 \) uppon a plowlande towards the maintenance of the Earle's kerne, c.ccc. or ccc. men, more or less.

Sorren - A charge set uppon the freeholders landes for a nomb. certaine for certaine daies in a qarter, of gallo-glasses.

Galloglas: A nomb, of soldiers, to put the contrie to charge, bearinge axes.

Kearne: A nomb. of soldiers to aide & assist the Justices, seneshalls, receavors, stewards of courtes, & sergeantes, in the execucon of the lawes and customs of the contries and territories of the said late Earles, for the rule and governement of his people and landes and the receavenge, leauinge, and gatheringe of his reveewes.

Bonnibag & Bonugbar: were soldiers kept in readines as well in peace as in warre, at the charges \( \text{wth} \) meate, drinke and wages.

Musteroon: A charge set uppon the contry to helpe the Earle in his workes, \( \text{wth} \) capells, garrons, & men at his owne will.
Taxe & Tallage als. Southe: A conuocacion of all tenantes freeholders and inhabitantes, to help to paie the Earles debtes or to help him to mony at his needs.

Reecton: Is ony repast and away.

Cosshery: is a chardge of the Erle's people for lodgings xl., lx. or o. together under one roofe.

Cuddy: Is a charge of meales meate and drinck, the time he hath his people in Cosshery.

Gillicree: is as muche to saie in Englishe, as a stoode-keep allowed to be maintained by his tenants.

Gillycon: is as much to saie as dogg-keep, or huntseman, in like manner allowed."

The exaction of coid ochide, or "cuddye," is more fully explained by Sir Warham St.Ledger in a State Paper quoted in the same place as the above: "Cuddye called a night supper, doth warrant the Lord with such company as pleaseth him to come to the lands charged with that tenure, and to take meat & drink for him and his company of the inhabts thereof the space of iiiij meales at iiiij tythes of the yere." The date of this is 1589, that of the preceding account of the rents, 1587. The Presentments of the juries of the towns and counties of the south-east of Ireland as given (with the valuable notes of Hore and Graves) in this Annuary throw much light on the exactions and the social life of the period.

Vide also art. "Ancient Irish Income" in U.J.A. IV. 247 et. seq. In 1450 was passed an Act (28 Henry VI. cap. I) entitled "An Act that no Marchour, nor other Man, shall keep more Horsemen or Footmen, than they shall answer for, and maintain upon their owne Charges and their Tenants: and for presenting the Names of their Men; and that none shall take Coynee, or Night-suppers, nor shall take no Pledges of them; the Offenders shall be Felons, etc." - Irish Statutes,1,1C-11.
APPENDIX NO. III.
The Distribution of the Scottish Galloglaigh Clans in Ireland as indicated by an examination of the Irish Fiants.

Up to the present moment knowledge of the localisation in Ireland of those early Scottish mercenaries known in Irish History as the Galloglaigh, of what exactly were the districts upon which they were settled, the Irish clan-areas in which they were collected, can only be spoken of as being very vague indeed. The sixteenth century - the period in which their scheme was dying out and in which we find them at the transitional period of being about to settle down definitely on the land - is the only time when we can at all attempt to examine them with a view to the throwing of some light on the question, the collections of the Irish Fiants the only general authorities to which we can have recourse.

The following Tables, accordingly, may be of some little value. The arrangement may be thought cumbersome, but a map is appended to present a general view of the matter, and it will be appreciated that the entire, being an entry into a totally new field of research, is merely to be taken as a series of notes to supplement the text of Chapter I ante and to indicate the lines of further work on this important phase of Scottish and Irish History. The Clans mentioned in Chapter I are treated of in order, the idea being to show the areas in which members of each clan-name are found in the period 1585-1592. This, in turn, will indicate the extent of the mercenary system at these dates.

(I) THE HEBRIDIAN CLANS.

There are five columns in each of the Tables. They are entirely made up from an examination of the Fiants,
Eliz., Ireld., 1585-1592, as calendared in the Reports of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records (Ireld.). Each time one of the clan-names in question is mentioned in the Fiants (generally in connection with a pardon for rebellion) a number is made in the first column - if there are five (say) separate men bearing a name in question mentioned in one Fiant, then the number 5 is entered in that column, and so on. The county in which the man (or men) is resident is entered in the second column, the townland in the third (where there is a case of doubt, it is shown.) In the fourth column the profession of the man in question, where this is indicated in the Fiant, is shown. Note that in very many cases the persons entered are not referred to as galloglaigh at all in the Fiants, but as husbandmen, gentlemen, etc. (and even in some cases as kern- ceatharnaigh, or lightly armed foot-soldiers, usually considered as of the native Irish, and the very opposite to the galloglaigh.) The name, however, is a clear guide to the fact that the men, however described, were formerly galloglaigh, having changed their profession to a more peaceful one in the period of compulsory change. In the fifth column the reference number of the Fiant is given. Reference to the Calendar will, in each case, disclose all available particulars.
The following system of contractions is adopted in the fourth (Professions stated) column:

- Gallóglach is contracted to Gal.
- Gentleman " " " Gent.
- Kern. " " " K.
- Cottier " " " C.
- Horseboy " " " H.
- Yeoman " " " Y.
- Labourer " " " L.
- Freeholder " " " F.

| TABLE ONE. |
| MacDon, MacDonnell, MacConnell, and variants. |

|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|------|

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>King's Co.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>K.</td>
<td>4887.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mayo.</td>
<td>Teagher.</td>
<td>Gala.</td>
<td>4872 &amp; 4890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mayo.</td>
<td>Molealaghe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Year 1587.

| 1. Queen's Co. | --- | K. | 5005. |
| 1. Roscommon | Clane | K. | 5009. |
| 1. Wexford | Ballecormoke | Y. | 5028. |
| 1. Wexford | Ballihanry. | F. | do |
| 3. Mayo or Sligo | ----- | - | 5058. |
| 1. Limerick | Clanbrien. | L. | 5069. |
| 2. Clare or Galway | Balle Irille. | - | 5083. |
| 1. Mayo or Galway | ----- | - | 5112. |

### Year 1588.

| 1. Limerick | Kilmallock. (landowner) |

### Year 1590.

| 1. Clare | Termon-O Grady | - | do |
| 1. Clare | Kilkye | - | do |
| 1. Limerick | - | - | 5418. |
| 1. Galway | Carroulene | - | 5421. |
| 1. Roscommon | Cregan sallaghin | - | 5430. |
| 1. Roscommon | Cowilnegeyer (female) | 5438. |
| 1. Limerick or Tipp | ----- | - | 5445. |
| 1. Galway | Clondawpen. | K. | do |
| 1. Galway | Torlavaghar | - | 5449. |
| 2. Galway or Mayo | Ballymacgibbon | - | 5451. |
| 1. Cork | Cartie. | - | 5456. |
| 1. Limerick | Gormaden. | - | 5458. |
3. Cork.  
1. Cavan.  
2. Mayo or Sligo.  
2. Carlow.  Kildesynce, etc.  
2. Roscommon.  Lochsellerym.  
2. King's Co.  Rally, etc.  
3. Kerry.  Rossenycarten  

Year 1591.

1. Galway.  
1. Cork or Limr.  Gortnehortne  
1. Mayo.  the Dogher.  
4. Mayo.  the Clonyne.  

36. Cavan or Fermanagh  

(Part of Fermanagh composition)

1. Cavan.  
1. Roscommon(?).  Inlagh.  
1. Roscommon.  
1. Cessary.  
2. Limerick (?).  
10. Galway or Ros.  
8. Galway or Ros.  
2. Mayo.  Matarke, etc.  
1. Mayo.  the Neile.  
1. Ros or Sligo.  

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<td>Rally, etc.</td>
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<td>the Neile</td>
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<td>do.</td>
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<td>Ros or Sligo.</td>
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-415-
2. Cork or Limk. Clancorberie, etc. ----- 5688.
3. Munster. --------------------- 5697.

Year 1592.
1. Galway or Ros. Lognegowne ----- 5712.
3. Mayo. the Clonine ----- do.
1. Monaghan.

TABLE TWO.
MacSweeney, MacSwiney, MacQueen, and variants.

Note: Under earlier dates (1548-1585) MacSweeney names are to be found in the following counties:

Ely. Sligo (10) Galway (3)
Cork (8) Clare Waterford.
Roscommon (?)

Year 1585.
1. Clare (?) Ballyvrislan ----- do.
2. Clare. Lysonavarny ----- do.
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<tr>
<td>1. Donegal.</td>
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<td>Year 1590.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Cork or Limk.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sligo. Ardnoglasse etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Cork.</td>
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<td>1. Kerry.</td>
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</table>
### Year 1591.

| 1. Roscommon. | 5533. |
| 1. Munster. | 5562. |
| 5. Roscommon | 5616. |
| 1. Galway (O'Madden's cty.) | 5685. |

### Year 1592.

| 3. Clare. | 5749. |

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### TABLE THREE.

Mac Sheehey, Mac Shee, and variants.

### Year 1585.

| 2. Cork (?) Carigonoure, etc. Gal. | 4752. |

### Year 1586.

| 1. Fermanagh. Inniskellen. | 4810. |

### Year 1587.

| 1. Mayo. | 5075. |

### Year 1588.


### Year 1589.

| 1. Limerick. | 5418. |
2. Cork or Limk. Listarnlie. Y. 5508.

1. Limerick (tenant of White Knight) 5517.

Year 1591.

3. Munster. ---------- ---------- 5612.

1. do. Kilkridane ---------- 5689.

1. do. Reneanyn. ---------- 5697.


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<tr>
<th>TABLE FOUR.</th>
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<td>4. Leitrim.</td>
<td>Lenenegon, etc. Gal. 4800.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4. Fermanagh.</td>
<td>Linmoune, etc. 4810.</td>
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<td>9. Cavan or Fermanagh.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Munster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Year 1592.

1. Clare (?) the Moy ----- 5712.
1. Connacht. ----- ----- 5747.

TABLE SIX.

Mac Dougal, Mac Dowall, and variants.

Year 1586.
2. Roscommon. Clonfree, etc. L. 4944.

Year 1587.

Year 1590.

Year 1591.
12. Roscommon. Choackruery, etc. ----- do.

Year 1592.
1. Roscommon. Imlaghe. ----- 5606.

TABLE SEVEN.

Other Hebridean Names.

It has been necessary to follow a different order in setting out these. As before, they are from the Fiants, Ireld. Eliz. period 1585-1592. In the first column is the surname, in the second the modern, or
usual spelling (Scottish style); in the third the county

in which it occurs (if more than once within one year,

indicated by bracketed number); in the fourth the year in which

mentioned, and in the fifth the reference number as before.

In cases of doubt as to interpretation a question mark is

inserted. Where either one of two counties may be meant, as

Dublin or Kildare, both are inserted - thus, Dublin/Kildare.

1583.


1588.

M'Neele MacNeil. Ulster (2) ----- 5136.

1590.

M'Neile MacNeil Roscommon ----- 5427.

M'Neale MacNeil. Munster ----- 5522.

1587.

M'Mahown MacMahon Limerick ----- 5002.

1591.

MacMahon ----- Ossory (3) ----- 5608.

M'Mahowne MacMahon. Munster (2) ----- 5689.

M'Mahowne do Munster. ----- 5697.

1587.

M'Alen Campbell (?) Mayo. ----- 5075.

1590.

M'Aline. Campbell (?) Galway. of Wurtz, Irish.

Surnames, under Campbell.

1591.

M'Ilean Campbell (?) Galway. Ros. 5614.

M'Glena. do do ----- 5615.

1587.

Albanaghe. (i.e. "the Scot.")- & Mayo/Galw. 5112.

1590.

Albanagh. do. Sligo (6) Gent. 5459.
1591.
Albanaughe. do. Waterford (3) --- 5531.
1588.
M'Evie. (vide ante, p.34) Munster. H. 5144.
1588.
M'Heligoide. MacLeod (?) Munster. --- 5176.
1590.
1590.
MacRannell (of Clan Donald?) Leitrim. (98) --- 5441/2.
1590.
M'Collo. MacColla. Sligo (2) ----- 5475.
M'Collo. do Connacht. H. 5476.
M'Colly. do. Galway (3) --- 5519.
1590.
M'Alistran MacAllister. Galway --- 5519.
(Besides various mentions of the name MacAllister in the Antrim area.)

II. Non-Hebridean Names.

TABLE EIGHT.

Non-Hebridean Names mentioned specifically as Gallógaigh.

(Where there is doubt if a name be Hebridean a question mark is inserted.)

1548.
Molmorye M'Edmond, of Castlereuse. (21 Feb iii. Ed.VI)
Brasse Macken (no place mentioned) 1550. (4 May)
Gerald Kynsalagh. ) " N
John Glas O'Berne ) Fr.N.C. 603.
1583.
John fitz william O’Growogane, No. 4257.

1584.
Connoghor m’Neale O’Begely.
Baneas m’Cwen O Daly.
Donell ny Brock m’Roary O’Donagh (?)
Leig m’ Daniell O Sheaghann.
John m’Teig m’Rory O’Donagh (?)
Cormuck m’Eaneas O Dali.
Dermot m’Donnell O Shiaghane (?)
Thady m’Shane O Daly.
John m’Eaneas O Daly.
Connoghor m’Donnell O Daly (?)
Leig m’Taeige O Moriertagh —
all of Cariglemylerey, co. Cork.
- F. No. 4444.

1585.
Tirrelagh m’Shane card O Donogho
— (in N. Connacht?) — 4699.
Conohor O’Feneghty.
M’Gillepatrick. (?)
M’Gilleconnye. (?) — 4747
Connoghor O’Morissy — 4752.
M’Cwen (?) — 4764.
M’Gillykeyrry, co Cork. (?) — 4781.
O’Morrisseye, Cork, — 4781.
O’Daalby, Cork, — 4781.

1586.
O’Kenegan, Limerick — 4907.
M’Kenegan, do — 4907.
O’Buill, do. — 4907.
O'Conie, Mosamglas, Cork. --- 4946.
M'Congaine (?) do --- 4946.

1591.
M'Kynyne (?) Cassory - 5608.

ADDENDUM:

(a) For pardons to a list of MacSweeneys serving in Connacht under the Clanricarde rebels, July, 1584 - Fiants, Nos, 4471-4474.

(b) Pardons to a list of MacSweeney galloglaigh in Co. Cork - Id., 4467 - 4469.

(c) On Feb. 4, 1593 a grant was made to Thomas Morrice, gent. of "two quarters of land called respectively Lisballinardan, and Balliboige, in the parish of Kiltrustann, in the Clonties in the said co. (i.e., county Roscommon), and in O'Conor Roe's country, parcel of the lands of Cuin M'Dowle late of Kiltrustan, attainted." - Id. No. 5777. The inference is that these lands were held by M'Dowle (Mac Dougal, a known galloglaigh name) in return for galloglaigh service rendered to O'Conor Roe.

Note: The map which accompanies this Appendix was compiled from the foregoing tables and from what has been said of the various galloglaigh clans in Chapter One, ante. No name is entered which cannot be proved from a contemporary document.
Map showing location of

Gallóghlaigh Clans in Ireland.
COUNTY NAMES AND BOUNDARIES IN RED.
GALLOGLACH NAMES WHERE THEY OCCUR (SEE TABLES IN APPENDIX B) IN PURPLE.

MAC DONALD.
MAC SWEENEY.
MAC CASE.
MAC RORY.
MAC SHEEHEY.

THESE ARE TO BE TAKEN AS THE CHIEF AREAS IN WHICH THE CLANS MENTIONED WERE SEATED.

MACSWEENEYS OF THE THREE SEPTS BANAGH, MA GUARDH, AND PANID.

MUNSTER SEPTS OF MACSHEEHEYS AND MAC SWEENEYS.
DISTRIBUTED
SCOTTISH
CLANS
IN
HALF OF THE SIX
PREPARED FROM THE IRISH ANNALS AND IN

G.A. HAYES-MCCOY,
EDIN., 1933.
PREPARED FROM THE PLANTS, ELIZ. (IRL.D.), AND FROM MENTIONS IN THE TRIBAL ANNALS AND IN THE STATE PAPERS.

G.A. HAYES-MCCOY, EDIN., 1933.

TO ACCOMPANY APPENDIX NO. II.
APPENDIX NO. FOUR.

Military Proclamation. Of Hugh O'Neill, 1601 - How Buannadha were hired at that date:

The following is the Proclamation referred to ante., p. 348 :

"A n-ainm Dia. Ag so mar fhostus O'Neill buannadha. Ar tuss do'n ched saighdiuir ced pont do thuarustal 'sa raithe, 7 fiche ponta d'uaisle leith-bhliadhna, acht in uaisle d'haghnail 'sa ched raithe; 7 da m-brisedh in buanna ar in tighearna fa ganaamhain aige in ath-raithe, aisseag ar in uaisle chom in tighearna: 7 madh e in tighearna dhiiultus do'n buanna fa gan a fhostadh in ath-raithe, in uaisle ag an buanna. Is amhlaidh dhioltar in tuarustal, gach meide nach ffuighther 'n a airged de do dhiol mar so: in loilghech no in mart ionlaigh do chor amach is na fiaachaibh a n-imocchaibh si odir iocadhaibh 7 sgogaloiph in tire; in t-arm7 in t-edach do chor amach a n-diol in tuarustail do rath na marusgal. Biadh in t-saighdiuir 'sa raithe xvii. meadar ime, do thomhus galuin na Loinne, 7 fiche medar mine; 7 d'fiaachaibh ar in tir leith in bhidh phaidhedh, ceithri agillingi 'sa meadar co n-a mhain; 7 breith in mhasragsail 7 in buanna do phaidhedh 'sa leith eile do'n bhiadh 'san ait nach ffuighther in biadh 'n a bhiaadh fein. Cead caicicnis, 0 lo a fhasta amach, ag an buanna chom a bhidh do thog-bhail, 7 e ag caithemh ar a aimsir in caicicnis sin; 7 da ffanadh se on caicicnis sin amach, leith choroin mar chain ag an tighearna air gach an la bhias se amoigh. "

"Muna diolaigh in t-iocaide in biadh leis in buanna fo chionn na caicicnis sin, d'fhiachaibh ar in iocaide in biadh d'imomchar gus in ait a m-biaigh in buanna a ffoes-longphor. D'fhiachaibh ar in constabla ced beith ceathrar is ceithri xx. ar a g-cossaiph 7 d'fholmhughadh se fir dec; 7 is e ceal.
a d-teidh in fhomhughadh sin, cuid fir ag galloglach
tighearna. D'fhíachaibh ar in tighearna fo bhriigh a choinsiais
7 a thighearnuis gach ni de so do chomail do'n bhuanna, 7 gach
maith is mo bhus eolair leiss do dhenamh do'n bhuanna in a
chailinchecht fein; 7 in ched oideachach rachus in buanna ar a
bhiadhn, e do bheith ag caiteamh ar fein in oideachais sin; 7 madh
e in h-iocaidh bhus ciontaigh fa gan diolaircheacht do dhenamh
leis in bhuanna 'sa ched lo go n-oidhchí, a bhíadh ar in
iocaidh in feasadh chuimhneochus se e; 7 a chuid fein ismla
leis in bhunanna ag imtheacht do, leth moigh do bhíadh in ched
laoi go n-oidhchí a ghephus in bhunanna a bhíadh. Gach ait a
ttiocfaidh cassaoid air òg aidhneacht no fa aindeoin,
galuin ime mar chain na n-oidhchí sin ar gach cuigir da t'uillf
lassaoid do dhenamh orra do na buannadhaibh.

Is ladh na fiacha ata ara m-buanna, as so. Ar tuss,
fo bhriigh a choinsiais 7 a anma a bheith diles, tairisi,
gradhach, umhal, urramach, d'a thighearna, 7 a shreagra
gach uile uair iarrfus se e, 7 dul leiss do lo 7 d'oidhchí
in gach air a n-iarrfaidh se e, acht nach g-cuirionn Ó Neill
d'fhíachaibh ar bhunanna baile d'innseigh acht do reir a thoile
fein: 7 in bhunanna do bheith a fhoslongphort gach fad iarrfus
a thighearna air e, leth moigh do'n chaoicís tugadh do
chom a bhidh do thogbhall; 7 da n-iarrfaidh in thighearna
taispeána da uair 'sa seontmain ar in m-buanna, sin do
thabhairt do, 7 leth-choroin mar chain ag in thighearna ar
gach fer nach fhuighther do lathair do na saighdiuribh gach
en la diop sin. D'fhíachaibh ar in m-buanna gan geall ar
bith do ghlapadh a fhoslongphort nó a tuir a thighearna, acht
re marasgal do bheith aige; 7 da n-dearnadh, tuitim ar in agrg
mar in g-cedna gan geall do dhénamh ar in m-buanna acht re marasagal do bheith do laithair; 7 da g-cuiredh buanna a n-aghaidh marasgail a thighearna, a bhreith fein do chair ag in thighearna air in m-buanna. Gach cuis ireasna no aimbreachtigh theigemhús eáidir thighearna in tire no in tir fein 7 buanna, breith in da mharasgal do bheith ann sin; d'fhiaachaidh ar in m-buanna gan urchoíd do dhénamh d'en duine ar gach taopha de gan chead specialta a thighearna.

Gach creach dhenus in thighearna 7 in buanna, trian na g-creach do na buannadhaibh 7 da d-trian ag an thighearna. Gach each maith 7 gach luirech bheannfaidh amach, do bheith ag an thighearna. Gach braighe eifechtach, asa fhuighther sìtchain no comb-aiseag braghda, do bheith ag an thighearna; 7 in thighearna do thabhacht luach saothair iomchubhaidh don bhuanna do laire toile in thighearna; 7 gach braighe ghebhús in buanna as a fhuighther fuaslugadadh, trian in fhuaitsicthe ag an bhuanna, 7 da trian ag an tug thighearna.

D'fhiaachaidh ar in m-buanna bardail laoi, 7 faire leaptha idhchí, 7 ceithernus aradna do thabhacht d'a thighear- na fo bhfhrigh cana.

Ata O'Neill ag fhogra do Thadhg O'Ruairc 7 do gach buannadhaibh rachus 'sa Mumhain, anmhain 'sa staid-si le maithb Mumphain, fa phéin gan en la do mhaith na d'fhogar I Neill no I Domhnaill d'fhaghaidh go brath; acht gach uile bhuanna do rachaidh tar in ffoirm-si do bheith fuagarth a Ua Neill 7 o Ua Domhnaill, iomchubhail 7 do bui Diarmeit O'Con- chubhair go ffaghtaoi a chenn re a bhusin de.

"A n-Dun-geanan, 2. Februarii, 1601."

"O'Neill."

Note to this document by the Editor of the U.J.A:-
"Thosus - The verb fosdah or fostadh, is still the common word employed throughout Ireland for "to hire" a servant. The Ulster pronunciation of the word, however, is fasta; which leads us at once to the root, viz., the Scandinavian and Gothic fast, "firm", the same as the English fast; so that the Irish fasta, or fostadh would literally mean "to fasten," to 'bind fast.' 'Hand-fasting is the old word for a peculiar marriage contract among the Danes.... in Scotch, 'to festyn' signifies 'to enter into a legal engagement that one person should work under another.'"

"It is likely, therefore, that the word fostadh or fasta is a word borrowed by the Irish from some other language, and most probably introduced by the Northmen. That it is not an original Gaelic root is proved by its standing alone in the language, without derivatives. Both the word, and the custom of hiring servants or soldiers for a fixed period may have been introduced together at the time of the Danish conquest. In the present document we have several examples of military terms, evidently borrowed, viz. constable, 'constable,' marusgal, 'marshal,' and paich, 'pay'..." (p.60, Vol.6. U.J.A.)

A contemporary translation of the document itself, as also appended in the U.J.A. is as follows:-


"In the name of God. This is the order and manner of O'Neill his interteyning of Ewonagh's. First, he allowith to the company of souldiers (Note: lit. 'to a hundred soldiers' - the translator regarded a hundred soldiers as forming a company) enterteynement quarterlie 100 pounds ster., and XX every halfe yeare by name of a rewarde, tearmed in Irish waaly: and the same rewarde to be payéd to the Ewonagh the first quarter;"
and if it chance the Bwonagh (wish) not to remayne and serve out his full quarter, then he is to make restitution (lit., 'should the Bwanna disappoint the lord by not remain-
ing with him the second quarter, the bounty is to be returned to the lord') of the rewards. But if the Lo. should refuse to contynne (i.e. - continue) the Bwonagh in his service during the full quarter, then the Bwonagh to enjoy the rewarde without restitution. (Note - recte. 'and if it be the lord that refuses the Bwanna with respect to not retaining him the second quarter the Bwanna is to have - keep - the bounty.') The enteretynement is thus payd: where money wanteth there the milche, or in-calfe cows to be receyved for payment according the price it bears betwixt the tennants and husbands of the country. The armes and clothes to run at such rates as the Marshall shall sett downe. The victuayles quarterly, to be XXIV, meaders of butter of Linster gallon measure (Note)- 'The translation is here decidedly incorrect. If it meant Leinster measure, it would be do thomus galuin na Laighneach. Galun na loinne was evidently some Ulster technical term' - O'Donovan). and... (a gap in the text here) skore meaders of meale; the country bound to pay the one halfe of the victuailes itself, and for the other halfe to deliver the Bownagh certain allowance of pay in lieu of every meader that shall be wanting of halfe the victuailes; the Bwonagh to receyve four shillings with the meale, and for the other halfe, where no victuayles is to be had, the allowance of payment for the same to be according as the Marshall and Bwonagh will consultingly agree upon. The Bwonagh to have a forteenight respite from the day of his entry to levie and collect his victuayles; that forteenight to be accompted of the quarter;
and if he should spend longer time in staying abroad,
then for every day of his absence he to be answerable in a
fyne of half crowne p' diem to his Lo. If within that
fortnights space the tennants or husbande on whom the
victuayles are allotted do not pay the same to the Bwonagh,
that then from hence forth that he be bound to bring the same
at his own cost and charge unto him wheresoever he lies in
campe. The captain of a hundreth is to have by the poll for
the hundreth four score and four, (Lit. - 'the constable of
one hundred men is bound to have eighty four men on their legs,
instead of the full hundred - in poll - and he is to have
sixteen pays: and the manner in which this allowance goes is,
ten to the constable of one hundred himself, five to the
marshal of the country, and one to the Lord's Gallowglass.')
and is allowed XVI. dead pays, whereof he himself is to
have ten, the Marshall of the country five, and the Lord's
gallowglass one. The Lord upon his conscience and honour not
to withhold anything of his due from the Bwonagh, according
his degree and qualitie to do the best he can for his good.
The first day the Bwonagh is entereteyned he is for that day
and night to live at his own charges; and if the tennant or
husband, on whom the victuailles are allotted, through their
default keep the Bwonagh from receyving his victuailles the
first day of service, then the Bwonagh during the tyme he is
so stayed to be at the tennant's own charges; and upon his
departure to receive the full allowance sett down for him
at first, except the first day and night's victuailles.

After the Bwonagh has receyved notice where he is
to receyve his victuailles, and is by delayes dryven to com-
playne for not having it, a fyne of a gallon of butter by the
night to be imposed upon every five, that by reason of delays gives the Bwonagh cause of complaint.

"The Bwonagh in consideration thereof, upon his conscience and soule, is to be faithfull, trustie, loving, humble and obedient to his Lo. and to be answerable and at his command at all times he doeth require him, and to go with him by day and by night into all places whereunto he will require him. O'Neill would not that the Bwonagh should give attempt or go to any towne without his Lord's direction, but lye still in camp so long as his Lord directs him so to do, except for the fortnight that he is to collect his victuaylls (Note - more correct trans:- 'But O'Neill does not impose it as an obligation upon any Bwonagh to attack any towne but according to his own will; and the Bwonagh is to be in the camp as long as his lord shall require it of him, except the fortnight given him to raise his food.') If the Lo. would twice every week take view or muster of the Bwonagh, he is to give him the same; and for every souldier deficient, or that shall not be present at the muster, halfe a crowne in name of a fyne. The Bwonagh not to distreyne in his Lord's country or camp without the Marshall; and if he should, his challenge to be void: and also no distresse to be taken of the Bwonagh except the Marshall be present to do it. If the Bwonagh should refuse or resist the Lord's Marshall, then he to be fined according to the Lord's discretion; and the Bwonagh to do no hurt or damage anywhere without special direction of his Lord.

"What preyes shall be taken by the Lord and the Bwonaghs the third part thereof to the Bwonagh, the rest to the Lo. Every good horse or shirte of mayle that shall be taken, to be the Lord's. Every prisoner by whom either peace
may be had or other prisoner delivered in exchange, to be the
Lord's and the Lord to give the Bwonaght a competent rewarde
in consideration thereof according to his discretion. Every
prisoner taken by the Bwonaght of whom ransom may be had
the third part of the ransom to the Bwonaght, the rest to the
Lord; to be given uppon payment of a fyne."

Two last paragraphs as follow - not appearing in the
contemporary translation, but as rendered by O'Donovan in the
U.J.A:- "The Bwonagh to be bound to ward by day and watch
the bed by night; and to afford the service of cethernus
aradhna to his Lord on pain of fine (i.e., to attend to the
horses, to clean, polish, and repair their bridles, trappings,
&c.)

"O'Neill is giving warning to Teige O'Rourke and to
all the Bwonaghs who will go into Munster, to remain in this
state with the chiefs of Munster, under penalty of never
having one day of the benefit of the favour of O'Neill or of
O'Donnell for ever; but every Bonagh who transgresses this
order shall be proclaimed by O'Neill and O'Donnell in like
manner as was Dermot O'Connor who had his head struck off.

"At Dungannon, 2 February, 1601.

"O'Neill."

Note:- This Dermot O'Connor was the leader of the Connacht
407 buannadha in Munster as already mentioned - P.A.ante. 85
He was beheaded in Oct. 1600 by Tibod na Long Burke, Vide.A.F.M.
and also Pacata Hibernia, vol. I., cap.17.

57-65.
APPENDIX NO. 5.

Parallel Genealogies of the Hebridean and Ulster Irish Clans, showing the relationships of the persons mentioned in the text.

The sources from which these Genealogies (inset, to face this page) are compiled are:-

MacDonalds:

Macdonalds: Clan Donald.
Hill: Macdonnells of Antrim.
Hugh MacDonald's MS. (apud MacPhail)
O'Donovan (note to A.F.M. 1590).
Keating: Forus Feasa.
Mac Firbis (apud Hill)

ULSTER CLANS.
refs. in C.S.P. Ireld.

OTHER SCOTTISH CLANS.

House of Argyll (vide Bibliog.)
MacNeil: Clan Mac Neil.
MacLeod: MacLeods of Dunvegan.
MacLean: Hist. Mull.

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GENEALOGIES:

with Appendix No. 5.
APPENDIX NO VI.

List of Scottish Privy Council Enactments against the sending of aid by the Highlanders to Tyrone.

1598, March 2 - S.P. Scot., Eliz. LXII, 8 (1)

(Deliberations concerning sending of Scots' force to aid Eliz. in Ireland.)

(Against receiving queen's deserters.)

(For the Highland levy)
1602, July 17 - S.P. Scot., Eliz. LXVIII, 85.
APPENDIX NO. VII.

The Scots Mercenaries as Archers.

It has already been said that the traditional weapon of the Galloglaigh was the battle axe, or Galloglach axe, and it has also been noted that the weapons and equipment of the later Scottish mercenary forces, or Red-shanks, differed considerably from those of the Galloglaigh. For examples of the Galloglaigh equipment and appearance, vide replica of the warriors from the tomb of Phelid O'Connor at Roscommon, given in Jour. R. Socy. Antiq. Ir. vol. I. fourth series, p. 252; and also the figures of the Clan Sweeney Galloglaigh from the map referred to on p. ante. Note the complete resemblance in appearance between the Roscommon warriors and the effigy in the south wall of Kildalton Church, Islay, Scotland. This last is undoubtedly of a Galloglaigh, and, as such, it is one of the very few references to the system from the Scottish side which we have.

It should be noted that the axe was not a traditional Irish weapon - Joyce, Socl. Hist., vol. I. pp. 105-106; O'Curry, Manners and Customs, I. 318, 348, 350. A replica of the Kidalton warrior is given in the Jour. R.S. Ant. Ir. p. 312, year 1899.

Scottish bowmen and Scottish arrows come up for very frequent mention in contemporary authorities, e.g. C.S.P., Carew, vol. I. p. 260: C.S.P. Ireld., Vol.I.p.442 &c. Spencer (View, pp. 103-104) mentions Scottish bowmen, and the historian John Major, writing in 1512, has the following concerning arms and armour: "They always carry a bow and arrows, a very broad sword with a small halbert, a large dagger, sharpened on one side only but very sharp, under the
In time of war they cover their whole body with a shirt of mail of iron rings, and fight in that" - quoted, Collectanea de Rebuse Albaniciis, p. 28. Spencer's account of the Scottish archers is as follows:- "...the Northerne Irish-Scots, whose Scottish bowes are not past three quarters of a yard long, with a string of wreathed hempe slackely bent, and whose arrowes are not much above halfe an ell long, tipped with steele heads, made like common broad arrow heads, but much more sharpe and slender, that they enter into a man or horse most cruelly, notwithstanding that they are shot forth weakely." Perrott, in one of his letters, says that the Scottish bowmen were more effective in the field than the English "shott" or harquebusiers.- quoted, Hill, MacDonnells of Antrim, cap. 4. p. 168. Vide also - Logan, Scottish Gael. Vol. I, pp. 333-335.

The following is from the notes of Sidney's Irish Memoir, as appearing in the U.J.A. - i.e. Vol. 3. p. 357:- "The Scottish arrow (Sidney notices the force behind the discharge of an arrow by one of the Ulster Scots) is noticed because it was driven with greater force than the Irish weapon, being sent from a long instead of a short bow (sic. but note that Spencer above, says that the peculiarity lay in the fact that the bows were short.) At the close of his Memoir, Sidney mentions having 'received four or fyve Irish arrowes in a frize jerkin' he wore over his armour. Using an inferior weapon, the Irish archer was less formidable than either the Scottish or the English." We may conclude then that the Scottish mercenaries of the sixteenth century although their weapons differed from those of their compatriots, the galloglaigh proper, were just as formidable by reason of their prowess as archers as the galloglaigh were, and earlier had been as axemen.
APPENDIX NO. VIII.

I. The Scottish Mercenaries in the Government Service:

The following notes may serve to throw some light on this matter:

1542 - Indenture of O'Byrnes of Co. Dublin with the King: they agree to support 120 Scots in the Government service. C.S.P. Carew, Vol. I, 194. (i.e., Lev.)

Indenture of O'More of Laoisé to the same end - 60 Scots - Ibid. p. 186.

1549. - McMahon and others bound to good behaviour for refusing to give buannacht to the King's Scots. - Ibid. p. 220.

1553. - Having Government galloglaigh at cess a mark of quietness with O'Kennedy, O'Dwire, O'Carroll, and others - Ibid. pp. 225-246; and Richey, Lects. Ir. Hist. II. series 2 p. 221.

1556 - "An act against bringyinge in of Scottes, retayninge of them, and Marrieng with theym" - such to be illegal. Note that a subsequent Act of 1560 specifically provides that the provisions of the 1556 Act do not extend to the Government. The 1560 Act is entitled: "An Act that the Acte of retayninge of Scotts shall not extende to the Governours of this Realme." This last Act refers to the earlier one and proceeds as follows: - "It was enacted, that yf any person or persons did procure the comynge of Scotts, beynge men of warre, into this realme, or brynge into this realm Scotts, beynge men of warre, or give any Scott or Scotts beynge within this realme, and men of warre, any wages, bónaghts, foreyre, or any outhier inter-
teynement or hire for their service in warre, that
then such offence or offences should be deemed and
judged highe treason, as by the same acte more at
lardge doeth appeare. Forasmouche as ther ys noo
excepcion made in the said acte of the lorde deputie
governour or governours of this realme for the time beyng;
Be it therefore enacted, ordeyned and established, That
the said acte, or any thinge therein conteyned, shall
not extende to the lord deputie governour or governours
of this realme for the tyme beyng, nor to such as he or
they shall lycence, but that the same, as on respecte of
theym, be made, pronounced, adjudged, and declared utter
frustrate, adnichillat, voide, and holden of none effecte."
II. Eliz., session I. cap. vii., 1560 - Irish Statutes,
Vol. I., pp. 359-360. The earlier Act is III & IV
preceding p. 275.

1558 - In an account of a "Journey made by the Earl of Sussex"
in O'Carroll of Ely's country, it is recorded that a
shot from a castle "hurt one of Mr. John Fitz William's
soldiers, captain of the Red Scots - C.S.P. Carew, Vol.I.,
p. 274.

1571. - The Munster loyalists entered into articles with
Perrott to employ Scots in Government service against
Fitzmaurice. Ibid. p. 413.

1579. - Mobilisation of Government Clan Donald (Leinster Sept)Nov.
"Commission to the Captaines of her Majesty's Gallow-
glasse: By your indenture dated 7 May 1578, you have
covenanted to serve with 90 spears of gallowglas.
These are to charge you to put that number in readiness
for war, to meet at Carrig by the 25th., and to serve
under the Earl of Ormond against the proclaimed traitors, the Earl of Desmond, his brethren and others, for 42 days. "Castle of Dublin, 19 November, 1579.


1581.- In this year Malbie "drew" 300 Scots from O'Rourke's employment and engaged them in Government service. C.S.P. Ireld. 307. This proves that the Government Scots were of the same class as, and very likely hired in the same way as, those who assisted the various rebels.

c.1596.- Spencer dislikes the proposed scheme of enlisting Scots against Hugh O'Neill. He says that, because "the O-Neales are nearly allied unto the Mac-Neiles of Scotland, and to the Earle of Argyle, from whence they use to have all succour of those Scottes and Redshankes," then such a policy "were but to leap out of the pan into the fire." - View, p.161.

1600.- Fynes Moryson (Itinerary, vol. II. p. 295) gives a further insight into this policy as revived in this year.

1618.- "An Act for Repeale of one Statute made against bringing in of Scotts, retayning of them, and marrying with them." The King of England was now King of Scotland as well.- XI, XII & XIII James I. cap. vi. Ir. Statutes, Vol.I. p. 443.

For the Clan Donald of Leinster, vide:- Hogan's Haines's Description of Ireland, pp. 43, 79-80, 84-85; Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, Vol.II. p. 230; O'Donovan, note to A.F.M. 157C. 

In 1541 it was laid down that no Scot or ceathernach (in Government service) should have "more than 16 cubits" of cloth in his shirt.- C.S.P. Carew, Vol.I. p. 182.
II. Hosting of Scots in Government service: and in private service under licence.

1521 - O'Donnell licensed by Surrey to employ three or four hundred Scots for his own defence. Rumour that he has hired 3,000 Scots in error—"The money that should wage 3,000 men for three months, I think would hardly be found in ten of the greatest Irish captains," says Surrey. C.S.P. Carew. Vol.1. pp. 21-22.

1536 - Indenture of O'Byrne of Leinster to support 120 "Irish, Scotch or galloglages" in Government service.—Ibid., p. 88.

.. - Ditto. McMurrogh Cavanagh.

1538 - Ditto. Burke of Clanwilliam — 80 Scots for 40 days.

1541 - Ditto. O'Donnell — 120 Scots and 120 céatharnaigh (The last rendered here as elsewhere, turbarii)

1542 - Mac-I-Brien agrees to provide victuals for Scots in hostings.

.. - Con O'Neill agrees to host Scots for the Government.

- All above from C.S.P. Carew, sub annis.

1557 or 1558 - O'Molloy of Fercall agrees to find buannacht for Scots; "Et predictus Theobaldus (O'Molloy) concessit et promisit daturum se quolibet anno bonnagium pro uno exercitu Scoticorum, vulgariter nuncupato a battayll of galloglasses, pro dimidio unius quarterii anni." (Note that here "Scot" is the equivalent of "galloglach.") — Halliday Mss. No. LXI. p. 48).

1555. - O'Donnell will not confederate with or hire for pay Scots or other strangers without licence. He will host 300 Scots for 40 days' service for the Queen - Morrin. Cal. Pat. and Close Rolls, Vol.1. pp. 495-496.

1566 - O'Donnell (evidently) confirms his Indenture of the preceding year.—C.S.P. Carew, I. 373-4; Halliday Mss. no. CXCIX. p. 185.
Note that Appendix No. IX - an article on the Strategic Importance of the Ballyshannon Passage into Connacht, reprinted from the Journal of the Galway Archaeological Society - is inset at the back of this work, following the Bibliography.
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NOTE: Contractions of the titles of reference books as used in the footnotes throughout this work are inserted in brackets following the titles at length as stated in the above lists.
APPENDIX No. X

List of Tyrone's Forces, 1601 - Enclosure with
August 16th, 1601 - C.S.P. Ireland, XI, 13-14.
- S.P. Eliz. 11, 105 (c).

Morison: Itinerary, II, 422, gives a slightly different
list
Not including O'Cahane, O'Donnell, and other Ulster
Lords, but only those attending directly on Tyrone.

Tyrone's Guard:

Horse:

Immediate Guarded
His son, Hugh O'Neill
His brother, Commac
Art Mac Barren
Sheelin O'Hanlon's son
Turlough Bricaseagh's sons
Son, his illegitimate son

Foot:

James Sheek, a Leinster man,
Jenkin Fitzsimon, El Zeeale

Tyrone's Army:

Cormack, his brother -
  Force commanded by Hugh
  Mac Canell, Rory and
  Gilleanbhui Mac Reavenin,
  "Sons of the person (sic)
  W. Reavenin"

Art Mac Barren -
  Commanded by his son, Ben,

Brian Mac Art -
  Commanded by Hugh and Neale
  Nenallaght ("na mallechtha,
  i.e., 'of the curses'), sons of
  Donald Nenallaght

Ben, Tyrone's illegitimate son,
  Mac Can, Owen O'Boira, Dowagh
  Bradagh O'Hagan, and Owen
  O'Hagen, each 100,

Donald Mac Neel Fitzowen, and
  Evale O'Neill, jointly

Gilleanbhui, Rory, and Randal
  Mac Owen, sons of Ferdinand
  Mac Owen, each 100

400

400

400
Kedagh MacDonald, Owen O'Gwyyn, and James O'Hagen, each 100
Phelim O'Neil
Son of Furlough Brasselagh
Henry Hovenden
Henry O'MacHenry MacStean;
Furlough, Con Mac Brean's son;
Art O'Hagan, Hugh O'Hagan's son;
Hugh Greome (i.e., Gurnamarch=
Surely, or ill-favoured?) O'Hagan
with his cousin; Donald Greome
Mac Kenne (? recte Mac Kenneth);
Patrick Mac Phelim; Gildeduff
MacDonald, who went from
Armagh and is a Connacht
man (i.e., Connacht MacDonald
Gallacleigh sept?), each 100

Total (foot) — 3,260.
Total (horse and foot) — 4,060.

"All of these have separate means of
support in Tyrone's lands; and many of
them have others besides which they
maintain on their own lands.

"This note was delivered by Shane
MacDonnell Greome, late Marshal to
Tyrone, who (by reason of this place)
tried the raising of all these companies."

REPORT by CAPTAIN FRANCIS STAFFORD of TYRONE'S
FORCE in 1598 (n.d.) :-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connacht Mac Baron, of Carig-Teage</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Mac Baron, in O'Neil's land</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Mac Shane, of the Tyman</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phelim O'Neil, of Dunavall</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neale O'Quin, of Carrick</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Con McFeleagh, of the Tyman</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John M'Donell Greome, of Benrimicbe</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edm. Gynelaugh, of Knock-la-Glinche</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Ke Quin (sic)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Mallow, of Ellis Toin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cormagh O'Hagan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O'Hagan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Carough</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Arthur O'Neale, of the O'Neale</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cormagh O'Neal, of Kenough</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Cane (i.e., O'Cahane)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tyron - under command of Nugent and Tyrrell, and besides a 100 naked Scots with bows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leon McHorse</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon O'Neale</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John O'Neale, of Carrick-Teall</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Hanlon, McGuiness, and</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian McArt</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W'Mahons (together)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turlough McHenry</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper and Lower Clandelroy</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James MacSomhaile, of the</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Donnell, with O'Dogherty</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the rest of Sir Conall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tyreconnell)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 1,043 3,540

— C.S.P., Cancers, III, 287.
NOTE OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MAPS:

**Province of Connaught**

- **Map No. 1**
  - Facing Page 61.
  - Hy. Finchmacht, edited O’Donovan - map;
  - Hy. Many, ditto;
  - Sars Connaught, edited Handinan - map;
  - Ordnance Survey Maps, Ireland;
  - Refs. in C.S.P., Dublin.

**Ulster,** by John Goghe, 1567


**Entry of Scots into Connaught,** 1586

- Original preserved in P.R.O., London.
- Drawing here reproduced by me from a photographically special, taken by Messrs. Monger & Marchant, London. The drawing has been carefully made, so that it may be taken as an exact reproduction of the original - some details have been omitted, but nothing essential, and care has been taken to add nothing. The original is Irish Maps, I, No. 4 (cf. C.S.P., 94, III, 253).
- Cf. also a printed line block of it below in the Foyle-Ioannis article - excerpted from Journal of the Archaeological Society.

**Antrim,** by John Norden, 1609-1611

- [Much detail has been here omitted in this and in No. 2 above].

**Maguire in Rebellion.**

- C.S.P., Ireland, V, 167, 169;
- O’Sullivan: Hist. Beth., III, 2, col. 7;
- A.F.M., 1593;
- Skeneley: Monaghan, 97-98;
- Baggot: Tudores, III, 234-235;
- Ordnance Survey sheets.
Western Highlands and Islands
of Scotland, 1593.

S.P. Scot. Eliz. - document as noted
(This document is also printed in
Appendix to Matthew: Celtic Peoples and
Renaissance Europe);
Innes, C.: Scotland in the Middle Ages - map;
Orig. Paroch. Scot. - map, Diocese of Argyll,
and part of Diocese of the Isles;
Hume Brown: Hist. Scot. - map, based on
that by Stewart of Gaith (and for
alignment compare 1570); 1593);
Hume Brown: Early Travelers in Scotland-
Mercator’s map, 1595.

The Expedition of 1595.

Authorities as for No. 6. The places mentioned
are those noted in the text.

North-East Ulster.

Map - “Antraym and Downe performed by
John Speede, London, 1610” (This is
reproduced in O.I.A., I, 120);
Ordnance Survey sheets;
mentions of places from contemporary
sources in text.

English Garrisons, 1595.

Garrisons from State document noted;
other details from sources noted in text.
Ballyshannon

Its Strategic Importance in the Wars in Connacht, 1550-1602

By G. A. HAYES-McCOY, M.A.

That astute and peculiar English soldier, Captain Thomas Lee, has left us, in addition to the record of a life of adventure which may be taken as typical of the Elizabethan soldier of fortune in this country, an interesting document or "Declaration" advocating a policy the adoption of which at the time would, he feels certain, save much trouble and expense to the English Government, and also, lead to the speedy conquest of Ireland.* Such "Declarations" were, of course, common at that period when the English mind was prolific of suggestion as far as Ireland was concerned, but Lee makes a new and important point which does not appear to have been accorded sufficient weight by historians of the period.

Speaking of the distribution of English garrisons over the country circa 1594, Lee advocates the reservation of the castle of Ballyshannon in the Queen's hands and the concentration of the English in the surrounding counties on this point as a garrisoned post. "This garrison," he goes on to say, "once settled in that place, will procure great quietness in your province of Connaught, and stop the only passage which they (the rebellious Irish) have to go to and fro to assist any traitor that may rebel there." Now why did Lee, a man who knew the country as few Englishmen did, select Ballyshannon? He did so because Ballyshannon commanded the natural entry to Connacht from the O'Donnell country, and was indeed a key point, though few but he realised it, throughout the warfare in Connacht from 1543 to 1602, and because he knew the futility of cutting off the Connacht rebels from the willing aid afforded them by the free-lance soldiers from the West High-

* "Declaration" by Capt. Thos. Lee, printed in Appendix of Curry: Civil Wars in Ireland, Vol. II.
lands and Out Islands of Scotland unless the line of the River Erne and its lakes were held.

Let us first consider the strategic position of the crossing of the River Erne at Ballyshannon; we may then go on to show from the facts of the matter how successfully the entry into Connacht thus afforded was used to outflank the English forces in that province, and how the ultimate settlement of Galway and Mayo was delayed by reason of the uncontrolled access of Ulstermen and Scots.

Connacht is effectively cut off from Ulster by the line of the Erne. From Belturbet to the sea there are only two points at which an easy crossing might be made. The first is at Enniskillen; the second between Belleek and Ballyshannon. For approximately sixty miles the two Lochs Erne and the River provide a considerable obstacle to the passage of forces coming from the north—that is, they supply a natural strategic line which might with ease have been held in Elizabeth's days by a few small garrisons and flying columns. No force would attempt an entry into Connacht from Ulster south of Belturbet—that is, through County Cavan—for two reasons, the first that such a movement would be exposed to intervention on the part of the Pale and Midland forces, the second that the traversing of much open country providing neither shelter nor maintenance would be necessitated. Similarly, it would be awkward to transport men and baggage trains across either Upper or Lower Loch Erne. Enniskillen between the lakes, therefore, and the Ballyshannon passage are the nodal points.

To understand the situation as it existed in the latter half of the sixteenth century, however, we must take into consideration the probable nature of a force of Gaelic soldiery on the march at that time. Such a body would be small, but it would scarcely have been well-contained. It would comprise a train of baggage, for plunder was the rule of the day; it would undoubtedly include a drove of cattle. To a force of this description a river to be crossed must have been an obstacle, a wide lake a problem indeed. Furthermore, we must remember that it is not merely the nature of the ground that matters in military operations, but also the fact that it may be strongly held by an enemy force. From this point of view, owing to the position of Ballyshannon commanding the main passage from Ulster into Connacht, a small garrison, if posted there, would have proved an exceedingly difficult obstacle to a hostile force attempting to cross at this point and would, with a supporting column at Enniskillen, have brought about the subjec-
tion of the province of Connacht some twenty years earlier than 1580, and most certainly have prevented the embroiling of that province in the campaign of the two Hughes which ended at Kinsale. For Ballyshannon was by far the more important strategic point on the line of the Erne. This becomes obvious especially when we consider whence the intruders to Connacht came. O'Donnell was interested directly in affairs in Lower Connacht—indeed the struggle of the O'Donnell family to obtain suzerainty over the territory of O'Conor Sligo complicated Connacht history for many generations previous to the period which we are now considering. O'Neill was but indirectly interested, and apart from plots and vague rumours of such, the O'Neills had little direct intercourse with Connacht. O'Rourke and Maguire, the two remaining great chieftains on the Connacht border, had, the one, a foothold in Connacht south of the Erne already, and the other, little concern in Connacht until the last years of the century when the northern alliance held Connacht to prevent an English flanking movement. O'Donnell, then, was the chief Connacht interloper. Forces from Ulster in general meant forces from Tir Conaill. How did these enter into Connacht? By Ballyshannon. Just as Port na d'Tri Námhaidh (at Lifford) was the key to Tir Conaill from the east, so was Ballyshannon the key from the south. It was, for instance, mainly through Ballyshannon and on by Donegal that the English finally penetrated into Tir Conaill in the seventeenth century. Conversely, the passages of the Erne at Ballyshannon and Belleek (strategically the passage is one, the mouth of Lower Loch Erne approaching within a few miles of the sea) were the natural inlet to Connacht for O'Donnell.

If we examine the maps of this territory as prepared in connection with the Ordnance Survey we shall find the road system from Ulster into Connacht converging on two points. The western roads running south from Donegal converge on Ballyshannon—Belleek: the Tyrone roads on Enniskillen. Further north we can trace the line from mid-Donegal right through the Barnesmore Gap and on through Ballintra. This last is the passage of greatest importance historically, and the fact that it is the route in every day use at the present time gives a practical demonstration of the accuracy of our thesis.

We have stated that intruders to Connacht came most of all from Donegal, but such invading forces were not, as a rule, natives of Donegal, but Highland and Island Scots' mercenary soldiers hired by the Connacht chieftains—or seeking hire in
Connacht—in the first place, to fight against the English Government, which at this period was engaged in a strong aggressive movement in that province, and in the second, to aid native and Anglo-Irish alike in their unending internecine contests. The effect of the presence of these forces in the province on the military history of Connacht during the period under review is a matter which, strangely enough, nearly every Irish historian has either completely lost sight of or entirely underestimated. Suffice it here to quote Malbie on the matter: "The Scots be the only hope that any evil-disposed Irishry have to sustain them in their enterprises, which being cut off from them, it is no great work to govern the Irish, neither any hard matter to expulse the Scots."* There can be little doubt that the backbone of every Connacht force which rose out against the English Government from circa 1550 to the end of the century was provided by the Scottish mercenaries.

As to the route that such forces would take on entering Connacht, we find from the actual facts of the incursion of these mercenaries in 1586,† that the intruders would land on the shores of Loch Foyle and strike south by west along the river-valley of the Foyle. Apparently at Port na d'Tri Námaidh they would turn due west and follow what is now the line of the Lifford-Donegal railway down the Finn valley to Stranorlar, and, turning south-west from here, would proceed by the Barnesmore Gap to Donegal Abbey, leaving the Bluestack Mountains on their right. Alternatively, they might keep south from Lifford to the Derg valley, and follow this upwards to Loch Derg. Either way leads to Ballyshannon.

Turning now to the history of Connacht from 1550-1602, we find events in that province bearing out the truth of Captain Lee's contention and bringing the facts of history to reinforce the arguments of geography.

Since the thirteenth century Scottish auxiliary forces had been coming into Connacht and they had a place in every engagement of note in that province down to the end of the sixteenth century. They were easily had from the Out Isles, and they proved splendid fighting material, readily adaptable as they were to the peculiarly desultory methods of Gaelic warfare. It is an acknowledged fact that, not in Connacht alone, but all over Ireland, they contributed much to the success

* Calendar of Carew MSS., II, 271-272.
† For details of this vide Calendar of State Papers a temp.; A.F.M., 1586; and Docwra Relation, printed in Miscellany of the Celtic Society, pp. 189-213 (1849).
of the Irish Revival after the fourteenth century,* which movement brought about the assimilation to the native stock of the Norman intruders and left Ireland in the sixteenth century a country still largely unconquered. But during this last century the character of these interloping fighting men underwent a change which at most has been merely hinted at by our writers. For one thing, they become much more numerous because of the constant arrival of new companies of their comrades from Scotland. This was due to the fact that in the sixteenth century considerable changes were taking place in Western Scotland, where the greater tribes or clan-bodies were splitting up subsequent to the fall of the Lordship of the Isles† and this event released large bodies of men for service in Ireland, a country daily offering a growing market for mercenary soldiers.

These "new Scots" made their first entry in force into Connacht in 1553.‡ In 1558 they came again—one thousand one hundred of them—and, although they were defeated by the second Earl of Clanricarde, we find something fresh in the *Four Masters' description of them: "They had been a long time before hired into the service of the Ultonians, but more particularly in the service of Tir Conaill. They had agreed among themselves (stimulated) by extraordinary vigour and bravery, to leave these districts, and to proceed through Connacht, to render their names famous." We also know that they entered Connacht by way of Ballyshannon, for they came through the territory of Carbry, which was situated between Loch Gill and the sea at Bundrowes.

From that time onwards we can safely say that scarcely a year elapsed without an incursion of these Scots into Connacht. Their practice was to serve for a "season" of so many months of the year, for which they were paid at an agreed rate.§ The entire business was well regulated, nor were their homes in the Isles unecared for meanwhile—"And in raising or furthering of their men any time of yeir to quhatsumevir cuntrie or weirs, na labourers of the ground are permittit to steir furth of the cuntrie quhatevir thair maister have ado, except only gentlemen quhilk labouris not, that the labour belonging to the teiling of the ground and wynning of thair corns may not

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* Vide MacNeill: Phases of Irish History.
† Vide Gregory: History of the Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland; also the MacDonal's Clan Donald.
‡ Vide Knox: History of County Mayo, p. 171.
be left undone, albeit thai byde furth ane haill zez, as oftentimes it happens quhen ony of their particular Ilands hes to do with Irdland."|| In 1572 the Scots moving southwards out of Connacht, the rebellion in Clanricarde having been put down for the time, were responsible for a considerable scare in Munster where Fitzmaurice was active, and in 1576 a further body of them was rounted near Castlebar.* Throughout the period of the second and third rebellions in Clanricarde, and during that of Richard an Iarainn in Mayo (1575–1581), the Scots had free entry into Connacht, and any reference, however casual, to the records of the period will show that little headway could have been made against the English Government on the part of the rebels without their aid. It does not at all appear that this Government ever realised that it might be possible to put a stop to their ingress by blocking their main passage. Time and again events proved it useless to resort to a patrol of the seas about the north and west coasts of Ireland—the heavy Queen’s ships were repeatedly out-sailed and outwitted by the incoming gallies.†

An event of 1581 shows the great importance of a river crossing in the military operations of the period. It was then the Moy which was in question, but the obstruction which it afforded to the English forces at once brings the parallel of the Erne to our minds. Malbie, Governor of Connacht, and Burke of Mayo were following a band of Scots northwards through County Mayo when they came to the Moy. Let us quote Malbie’s account of what happened:

"At last we came up with them at the Moy, where they had sent over a ford, up to the chin, their baggage and half their men of war. I was first up by goodness of my horse, and with twenty men charged them, but by their shot and arrows, they beat us back and got over the ford and over a piece of hard ground an arrowshot wide, to a great bog which they sought as their place of safety.

"As they left the river we entered the ford, and they came back and we retired, and they fired some arrows and shot. And then, espying MacWilliam, they rallied upon him and danced up and down, which was the thing I desired to continue until the loose footmen might come in. This occurred twice. Then they seemed to understand what I meant, and made off into the bog and thence to the great wood before my foot came up... The Scots thereafter marched clean out of the province."‡

† E.g.s. Irish Privy Council Enactments in Halliday MSS., No. 5, pp. 3-4, and No. 9, p. 6; Cal. St. Pap., I, 342, etc.
‡ State Papers, Eliz., Ireld., Vol. 81, No. 42 (1), Record Office, London.
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BALLYSHANNON.

The Scottish wife of Turlough Luineach O'Neill, said Malbie in 1580, "hath already planted a good foundation (for the Scots in Ireland), for she in Tyrone, her daughter in Tyreconnell (being O'Donnell's wife), and Sorleboy in Clondeboy, do carry all the way in the North, and do seek to creep into Connacht, but I will stay them from that."* It was perhaps not his own fault that he failed to make good his promise, for, even if he had realised the strategic importance of Ballyshannon in the matter, he would undoubtedly have had much trouble in convincing his Government of the fact.

In 1582 the Scots again crossed the Erne and "came boldly to the hard walls of Sligo Castle."† "If this great company of Scots be not broken in time," said a Government informant, "all Connaught will be lost." Malbie drove them out, but not before they had driven some two thousand of O'Connor Sligo's cattle across the Erne—and still Malbie made no attempt to provide against their return.

It is only natural to ask if no one but Lee had seen the real remedy for what was becoming yearly a more serious evil for English government in Connacht. Certainly there were others who had seen it but such strategists were, of course, few. For instance, as early as 1568 the Bishop of Limerick had sent in "Notes touching the propriety of placing garrisons at Ballyshannon, Beleec, Asherow, Innishowen, Enniskillen and other places."‡ When, however, Lord Deputy Sidney took possession of Donegal, Ballyshannon, Belleek, Bundrowes, and Sligo Castles in 1566 he promptly handed them back to O'Donnell in wardship again.§ In 1588 Bingham spoke of Sligo as being "the only strait through which the Scots accustom to annoy the province of (Connacht)."‖ and still in the same year the Lord Deputy mildly reported that Ballyshannon and Beleek Castles were held by "One Sir Owen O'Toole alias O'Gallogher, a principal man in that country, and a great favourer of the Scottish woman, O'Donnell's wife, her race, and children"¶—no effort whatever being made to garrison any of the places commanding the entry, although the Lord Deputy himself visited them!

Two years earlier the Scots had made their last great incur-

† Cal. State Papers, II, 384.
‡ Ibid., I, 399.
§ Ibid., I, 317.
‖ Ibid., II, 466.
¶ Ibid., IV, 93-94.
sion in force into Connacht. They came later by sea to Erris, but it was to a changed Connacht, for the effects of the Composition of 1585 had then largely destroyed the system under which the semi-independent lords and chieftains had previously hired them. On this occasion (1586) the Scots met with disaster at Ardnarea on the Moy where their force was annihilated by Bingham in a massacre the moving story of which finds unexpectedly little mention in our histories. A Government map reproduced on opposite page was made in 1587 to illustrate this event and contains very interesting features to which we must refer later.

Yet notwithstanding Bingham's success, the fact remains that he failed properly to take advantage of the lie of the land in North Connacht in this campaign, and his achievement in nullifying the effects of the inroad of the Scots must not blind us to his initial lack of foresight, for in the first place, he took a risk in letting them come in at all, and in the second, he wasted Government money in manœuvring for an alternative position after he had thrown away that of the Ballyshannon line.

In July, 1586, Bingham wrote as follows to Perrott concerning the Mayo rebellion:

"If they shall not yet submit themselves, I will presently go through them again, and as soon as their corn is ripe I will burn it all, save such as I shall reserve for our own people, for to be plain with your Lordship, I do and will make a sharp war upon them for three causes: the first to force them the sooner to submit themselves, the second to bring them so low that they shall not be able to entertain Scots, and the third to make all others of this province stand in fear to attempt the like actions... I do not now fear the repair of any Scots into these parts, nor yet into the province if O'Rourke stand fast, but I doubt him still. I cannot get the compensation rent of him, but if your Lordship will assent thereunto, I will soon fetch it from him, and make him as unable to entertain Scots as these men (the Mayo Burkes) are."

Two things are evident from this, the first, that Bingham did not contemplate the arrival of any considerable force of

*Calendar State Papers, Vol. III, p. 133. The Burkes of the sept of Thomas Roe of Cloonagashel, the followers of Walter, son of Edmund of Castlebar and others had been in rebellion since September, 1585, when they shut themselves up in a castle on an island in Loch Carra rather than come in to Bingham's sessions at Donamona. With regard to this castle, note that Knox (History of Mayo) regards it as that of Annagh, on Hag Island in Loch Carra, while Docwra mentions an island on Loch Mask, and says that it was within sight of Donamona (Relation: Misc. Celtic Socy., 1849). There are two Hag Islands, one in Loch Mask and one in Loch Carra, the latter being much closer to Donamona. O'Donovan (Note to A.F.M., 1586) says that the castle here in question was Caislean na Nenuighe, or Anchies Castle, situated opposite to Hag Castle, near Ballinrobe. The Four Masters call it "Caislean na Nenuighe on Finnloch-Ceara in Connacht,"
The Map executed in 1587, showing the importance of the Ballyshannon Passage to the Tudor mind and illustrating the campaign against the Scots in the Autumn of 1586—from the original in the Record Office, London.
mercenary Scots to assist the Burkes, the second, that he trusted in general to the method of making it impossible for the insurgents to support the mercenaries in their impoverished country, if they did arrive, rather than to a plan of positively preventing the ingress of such intruders. If he held Ballyshannon he could snap his fingers at O'Rourke.

In this same month of July Bingham received a commission to hunt down the Mayo rebels, negotiations for a truce, in which Ferrott, the Lord Deputy, had interested himself, having failed. He did this effectively enough, and by August all open opposition to his government had been cowed. Then came a diversion. Some time after the 15th of the month the Government in Dublin was informed that a force of Scots were on the march through Maguire of Fermanagh's country, and Bingham's surmise of July was proved incorrect, for they were obviously bound for Connacht. When exactly news of the Scots reached Bingham we cannot say; evidently it was before the 23rd, for by that date, if not indeed previous to it, the news was in Dublin. It seems proper to discount Docwra's statement that Bingham was not informed until the 26th.

Suffice it, however, that on this last date Bingham took his first step to counter the evident intention of the Scots with regard to Connacht. The game was now on, and from this date until the 22nd of September the military historian can follow quite an interesting series of movements and counter-movements in Counties Sligo and Mayo.

On August 26th, as we have said, Bingham took action. But what did he do? He sent the Earl of Clanricarde with a force to Sligo, where this worthy effected a junction with the Governor's brother's command. The combined force remained at Sligo to protect the province an employment which might fittingly be called the physical counterpart of a contradiction in terms. Why pick Sligo, when the Scots could—and did—get into Connacht, as it were, behind the backs of the Crown forces? Then, as in 1582, Ballyshannon was the place to guard. And, as if Bingham's eyes should not have been sufficiently open to this already, he wrote, without further comment on the matter, on August 30th, that the Scots were fortifying

* Calendar State Papers, Vol. III, p. 139. Sergeant John Price to Burghley. Vide also p. 146. It is difficult to say why Wallop, Treasurer of the Council in Dublin, in writing to Walsingham on the matter on the 23rd seeks to make light of the situation, considerably underestimating the number of the intruders. Perhaps Wallop's informant, the Earl of Tyrone, was deceiving him—for the Earl must have known the facts. Loc. cit., p. 144.
† Docwra: Relation (Misc. Celtic Socy., 1849).
themselves on the Erne passage.* He expressed himself as being at a loss to know what they meant by it. Although the Scots appear to have had merely a temporary fortified camp by the river, it must be clear that they did not share the English blindness with regard to the importance of the place.

Bingham himself soon arrived at Sligo, wrote to the Scots' leaders, Domhnall Gorm MacDonald and Alastair Cearbhach MacDonald, and received a curt reply to the effect that whoever in Connacht attempted to dispute their entry would do so at his own peril.† Bingham had lost the first move; he now lost the second one also. At Sligo he could do very little, but he had not sufficient force to risk an encounter in the field. He was, therefore, unable to prevent the Scots from marching south and then east into O'Rourke's country, plundering as they went.‡ Note the position at this point: Connacht is entered without opposition where such would be effective, and the Governor's flank is in danger of being turned by the Scots.

His duty is two-fold, above all to prevent a junction between the newcomers and the lately subdued Burkes, who may rise up behind him at any moment, and, as well, to preserve Connacht from plunder. Having failed in the first two moves,

* Cal. State Papers, Vol. III, p. 150. According to the Government Map of 1587, this fortification, or camp, must have been near Bundrowes, on the Connacht side, where the Scots remained for fourteen days.
† This document is preserved in the Record Office, London.—State Papers, Eliz., Ireld., Vol. 126, No. 17. As it is of undoubted interest in so far as the general history of Connacht at the period is concerned, I quote it here:—

"This is the answer of James his sons [i.e., the MacDonald leaders mentioned] to the Governor of Connaught, that they are come over the Erne with a great number of men, being drawn in by the Clanwilliams and the Clandonnells, who are their cousins, and that Shane Enlivie, son to MacWilliam, and Edmond Kykragh, son to Davie Bane, are with them, to draw them to MacWilliam's country, and they shall give them entertainment and the spoil of Connaught. And James his sons have no other shift, but to take an enterprise upon themselves for such as will give them most, as all other soldiers in the world do use. And whatsoever in Connaught shall forbid or let them thereof, they will not take it at their hands, except they be stronger than they, or of greater power. This is sufficient.

"I, Donell Gorme.

"I, Alexander Carragh."

The Clanwilliams mentioned are, of course, the Lower MacWilliam Burkes of Mayo; the Clandonnells are the sept of MacDonald Gallóglach settled in Mayo. The full history of this last-named interesting sept—as, of course, of every other Gallóglach family in Ireland—remains yet to be written. For their early history see the Macdonald's Clan Donald, Vol. II, p. 111, seq. Knox's references to contemporary documents as concerning them, while not exhaustive, are illuminating, for the period considered in this article. The two Burkes mentioned were the emissaries sent out before the date of the capitulation of the Mayo insurgents.

there is only one course open to him in order that he may effect these two ends—he must hold the river line of the Owenmore, Owenboy and Unshan, from Loch Arrow to the sea below Colomy, and he must keep moving his right flank southwards if the Scots march in that direction. If he holds this line the Scots cannot get into Mayo.

On the night of September 14th the Scots outwitted him for the third time, for, under cover of the darkness and inclemency of the weather, they cut right across his centre at the bridge at Colomy and, at a ford close by broke his line and got clear away into the Ox Mountains. After this it could be only a matter of time until they reached Mayo.*

Bingham's subsequent movement, the fourth phase in the series, certainly justified him—simply because it brought the campaign to a favourable conclusion. But it was a complete volte-face dictated by circumstances, and it must be evident that it had no place in whatever original plan the Governor had formed on the 26th. On September 16th he "gave it forth in polleeye that the enemye was marchinge vpp through Gallwayne, toarde the inner and civil countreyes, as the Lorde Bremingham's countrye, and the Countie of Roscommon,"† and knowing well, of course, that this was not so, he pretended to march south to intercept them. The Scots were easily hoodwinked by the supposed withdrawal and were without difficulty surprised and cut to pieces at Ardnarea on the Moy on the 22nd of the month.‡ One cannot examine the contemporary accounts of the expedition of the mercenaries, however, and fail to be impressed by the part which pure chance played in their overthrow. They had outwitted Bingham the moment they got across the Erne. From that date onwards the risk to English authority in Connacht was great, for the events of 1589 and subsequent years proved that there was plenty of vitality remaining among the Mayo Burkes. Bingham played on the chance that the Scots would be thrown off their guard by his feint southwards. If they had remained in their fortified positions in the Ox Mountains they might have provided the nucleus of a fresh uprising in Connacht—as it happened it was nobody's fault that the news of Bingham's success went far and wide, as far even as the Court of James VI

* Docwra, loc. cit., Cal. St. Pap. a temp.
† Ibid.
‡ A.F.M., sub anno 1586; Bingham's and Woodhouse's Accounts in the Record Office London., Docwra as noted. Note that Knox is at variance with Docwra as to the date of the final slaughter.
in Edinburgh whither it was conveyed along the efficient English secret service channels which Elizabeth maintained in Scotland.*

Throughout the nineties of the sixteenth century a new phase of the Tudor struggle was being enacted in Ireland. We have up to this been considering the warfare in Connacht as that chiefly of peoples isolated in the main issue for which they fought from those of the other provinces—except in so far as their struggle was prolonged by the assistance which they received from Ulster. Now the centre of what suddenly becomes an all-Ireland movement is in Ulster, and the warfare in Connacht becomes part of a greater struggle—becomes, in fact, a series of operations by the English to turn the flank of the Irish forces in Ulster, and on the part of these latter to gain Connacht, and mainly to throw the English back on Dublin and the Midlands, and to establish connection with Munster. We must always bear in mind, however, that matters are here again complicated by the renewed efforts of the Mayo Burkes and others to throw off the English yoke, to “have a Mac William,” and to revert to the Irish order of customs and land holding.

In this phase, no less than in the last, Ballyshannon and the district about it are of key importance. When we realise that the passage into Connacht was held by the Irish throughout, that by using it O'Donnell ranged at will as far south as Galway on predatory excursions, that in a few years he smashed at one blow the English work of nearly fifty years in Connacht, and that he so raised the country in his cause that great companies of Connacht men fell to imitating the Scots and served as mercenaries in Munster against the English†—when we realise these things we understand fully that Lee really appreciated matters in 1594.

In 1592 we begin to pick up the threads of a bit of private policy on the part of a certain Mr. Ralph Lane which certainly deserved a little better success in that it was as adroitly worked as might be. He desired the custodianship of Sligo and the fee farm of the Castle and lands of Ballyshannon and surrounding districts in order that he might, as a true Elizabethan adventurer, make some profit where the doing of such a thing seemed easy. He had picked upon a territory of great importance,

* Calendar State Papers relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots. (Boyd), Vol. IX, p. 92, No. 81.
and there can be no doubt that he knew how to turn his words in asking for it. If he had it and could hold it, it might prove the thin end of the wedge which could be driven into the Ulster confederacy. Although, however, he kept up his request until 1594, and urged that the English forces at Carrickfergus be transferred to Ballyshannon, he does not seem to have been satisfied. Bingham wrote on his behalf in 1593, but Bingham was after Sligo for himself.*

Let us now sum up events from 1593 until the end of the war at Kinsale in 1602. In the Autumn of the former year Maguire held Ballyshannon Castle and the fords of the Erne, and it is plain that O'Donnell realised what the passage meant to him when, in the February following, he was reported as being about to break down Donegal Castle and to trust to the Erneside fortification.† By the end of 1594 it had become necessary to relieve the English ward which had at last been placed in Enniskillen Castle, and, while Ballyshannon still remained secure to the Irish, it was remarked that Enniskillen was "most meet to be kept for Her Majesty to serve a turn to pierce further into the North, either to take Ballyshannon in Tirconnell, and Belleek and Bundrowes on Connacht side, or to answer any attempt to Tirone."‡ At the same time Bingham added his voice to those who advised the Government at all costs to take Ballyshannon, but by the middle of June it was not so much a matter of taking a new place as one of recovering Sligo.

At this point it is necessary to consider events in Scotland since they were such as to cause uneasiness to the English Government. The evil of the Scottish mercenaries affected Connacht more than any other province, for, although they were more numerous in Ulster, they came more into conflict with the Crown forces in Connacht than elsewhere. At this time O'Neill and O'Donnell were making every effort to enlist fresh forces in the West Highlands. If they were successful to any great extent there can be little doubt that a strong movement would be made across the Erne and into Connacht. We can see clearly from Elizabeth's letter to Bowes, her ambassador in Edinburgh in 1593, the way that the wind was blowing. She requires Bowes to bring the matter to the notice of James VI. An important excerpt reads as follows:—

* Calendar State Papers, IV, 596, V. 81, 91, 92, 202, 220.
† Ibid., V, 212.
‡ Ibid., V, 268.
"Whereas we have cause of late, through the defection of certain rebellious Irish subjects in the north, whereof the chief ring-leaders have been Maguire and his associates, to direct our Deputy to send some small numbers of our force against them, although we have already so weakened the said Maguire that he is now (reduced) from 1000 (to) not above 100, and is only preserved by entrenching himself in a fort called Enniskilfen, within a lough, which, because it cannot be approached but through bogs and marshes, we have appointed certain boats to be sent, and so make little question of his being taken or utterly extinguished, yet because we hear that O'Donnell, who is his kinsman, and ever parted with him (always confederated with him), has some purpose to call in certain Scots to assist him, whereby we shall haply be occasioned to send more people thither...we have thought good to require you to let the King understand that we expect that he shall command his subjects to forbear either entering or relieving by any means any of those worthless rebellious subjects of ours, and especially any of the Maguires or the O'Donnells, or their adherents."

* From MS. materials for *Cal. Scottish Papers* (in Record Office, London) being prepared in Register House, Edinburgh, Vo. 52, p. 7. It is quite evident, however, that James VI, if he did not connive at assistance to Ireland, at least winked at the practice. Note first the strict letter of the treaty between England and Scotland made in 1586:—

1. Item, Conventum concordatum et conclusum est, quod cum dictus Serenissimus Scotiae Rex, per Serenissimam Angliae Reginam certior fuerit factus de aliquo Invasione aut Infestatione quacunque in Regno Hiberniae facta, non solum Comitatus Argathelae Insularum locorumque eidem Comitatu ad adjacentium, aliarumque Regni Scotiae partium quarumcunque, Incolis et Subditis interdict ne in dictum Hiberniae Regnum ingrediantur, cosque ab Ingressu penitus arcebit, verumetiam impostorumque quacunque tempore contigent Subditos seu Incolas cujuscunque Partis seu Provinciae Regni Scotiae, contra Sententiam et Tenorem hujus Tractatus, cum aliqua extraordinaria Miliitum Manu et Numero more hostili in aliquam Hiberniae Regni Partem intrare, ideam Rex, per dictam Serenissimam Reginam de hujusmodi Ingressu certior factus, Edicto publico, dictos Infestatorem hostiliter in eo Regno grassantes, tanquam Rebelles publicae Pacis Perturbatores et Perduellionis roos denunciabit et persequetur."


This was the strict letter of the law in the matter, but note the following report of Fowler, an English agent in Scotland, to Walsingham, on January 4, 1589. Fowler says that Lord Thirlstane, the Chancellor of Scotland, let slip to him in a conversation concerning the death of Guise that King James could play the game of the Continental enemies of England without seeming to do so—

"'Nay,' sayeth he, 'there is ways I now (know) to worke and preserve the goodwill of the subjectes, for they in the sowth partes (of Scotland) take lytell care for them in the nothe part, and what if the Kinge will but wink at the putting over ten thousand men into Ireland, which may be done and cost him not a plate, and make your Queen (Elizabeth) spend a hundred thousand pound or she get them owt. What will that offend the subjectes of Ing-land?" I replied, 'Yes, they wold lynd the charge of the war in their pursess, which wold greve them.' 'All the better for us,' quoth he. 'I could prove to you.' At this point the conversation was unfortunately interrupted by a third party. (Boyd's *Calendar*, Vol. IX, p. 666). It is quite evident that James did not trouble himself very much over Elizabeth's repeated requests to him
This was in 1593. In the following year O'Donnell was offering double pay to any Islesman who came from Scotland to serve under him,* and "great gains and profit" were to be had by any Scot in his service.† Argyll, hitherto trusted by England, was suspect and the Queen's agents came soon to the conclusion that even the promises of the King of Scots could not be relied upon.‡ It is at this juncture that the ramifications of the English secret service in Scotland become apparent to the student of the contemporary State Papers. A fully organised system of agents centred on Edinburgh is disclosed, and we find an elaborate code in use between the units in the West Highlands and Isles and the ambassador in the capital. We can follow the repeated efforts made to enlist MacLean, the chieftain of Duart, on the English side, and it becomes gradually apparent that, by 1596, Elizabeth had at her service a carefully laid organisation which covertly overrode the Edinburgh Administration in those dealings with the West Highlands that had a connection with Ireland.

All this can only go to show that the English Government had at last become fully awake to the danger which threatened from Scotland. The descent in 1586, already referred to, could scarcely have taken place ten years later without Government knowledge of the preparations in Scotland, of the passage, and of the landing in Ulster. That such information alone was not all that was required—important as it was in itself—was, however, becoming increasingly apparent in Connacht, if only to some few of the English representatives there. Lee was one of these in 1594. Bingham, to his credit, was not so blinded by his luck at Ardnarea as 1586 as to be oblivious of the fact that he had made a mistake upon that occasion, and by 1595 he had become an enthusiast for the occupation of Bally-

to interfere with the mercenary trade until the closing years of the century. The change in his policy during the Queen's last years is easily to be accounted for when we bear in mind his anxiety as to the succession. A rebel Ireland would be of no advantage to him as part of his inheritance. (Vide Masson's Note, Register of Scottish Privy Council, Vol. VI, p. 253. For the change in policy see Privy Council enactments after c. 1596. See also the Proclamations in Steele: Calendar of Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, Scotland, Vol. II, Part II, and Acts of Scottish Parliament, IV, 172-3, etc.). In Elizabeth's Letter to Bowes above, note the manner in which she seeks to make light of the Irish campaign to the Scottish Court. This is characteristic of all her letters either to her own agents or to James or Argyll. The fact alone of the frequency of her addresses to Edinburgh in the matter, however, belies her own statements in this regard.

† Ibid., No. 89.
‡ Ibid., Vol. LV, Nos. 3, 12, 15.
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BALLYSHANNON.

shannon. Malbie in 1582, was content to drive the Scots over the Erne and to hope that they would not return. Although we cannot suppose that Bingham fully realised the emergency which had arisen in 1555,* we notice that he had come to see deeper into affairs than had his predecessors. He was definitely set upon capturing the Ulster-Connacht passage. To do so, he said, "would plague O'Donnell."

In August, 1595, he wrote to Burghley on the matters a follows: "In the judgment which I have of this service against Ulster I think (under correction), and so have ever said, that there is no better mean to conquer Ulster than by taking first Tyreconnell and placing garrisons at Ballyshannon and Belleek, for in so doing the Province of Connacht is assured wholly, and O'Donnell and his rabble beaten into Tyrone, which cannot long hold out."† This was sound sense from the English point of view, but it was not until 1599 that a direct movement was made by the Government. Even this proved abortive, for the Earl of Essex, with distinct orders to take Ballyshannon and to hold Loch Foyle and the Erne, tittered away his strength in Munster. Cahir Castle in Tipperary, which he took, was a sorry substitute for Ballyshannon, and the failure to cut off

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* In this year the agents of O'Neill and O'Donnell had become more active than ever in Western Scotland. Angus MacDonald, chieftain of the Clannaldon South, and Donald Gortm of Sleat were prepared to go to Ireland, and the Earl of Argyll was playing with both sides—receiving O'Neill's messengers, and assuring Elizabeth that he would not countenance aid to Ireland. In reality, MacLean of Duart, who was on the English side, was the one factor which prevented a descent in force upon Ireland in the interests of the Ulster insurgents. The letter of this last named chieftain (April 22, 1595) to Bowes is full of interest and deserves quotation:—

"This is to inform you that O'Donel has sent to the Earl of Argyll desiring that he assist them with force of men and has offered them (to him) largely for the same, and the Earl of Tyrone, with O'Donel, has sent to my neighbours desiring them to make haste in their passage to Ireland and has advancit them with silver touke (variant readin'=work'). This seems to fit better. "Silver work," having been receifed as an earnest of pay from O'Donnell by Sleat and Angus MacDonald is also mentioned on May 10, 1595, by Duart. State Pap Scotland, Record Office, London, Vol. LV, No. 101) for taking up of so many men as they may have. They are making great preparation and mind (=myndis= intend) to have 4,000 men with them to Ireland. O'Donel has written to me in like manner and offers me largely of his geir (goods) and my neighbours daily have their message at me for contracting of peace with them, for which they offer me largely of their own and also of that which they obtain from Ireland and other parts, seeing they cannot well leave this land without a further security of my peace than they have. I have continued ryn with them (put them off) all as yet, awaiting your Queen's mind to me hereament. If I see any doing with her (hope of reward from her) I will not yield to them and shall do her grace good service, occasion being offered." State Papers, Scotland, Record Office, London, Vol. LVX No. 88.

† Calendar State Papers, V, 356.
Ulster from Connacht cost England dear in the defeat of Sir Conyers Clifford in the Curlieu Mountains in the same year. In 1600 O'Neill could go undisturbed to Inniscarra in Cork, and it was Docwra, by way of Derry, who was the first to break into Ulster. With the failure of the final attempt to resist Tudor aggression at Kinsale in 1602 this province was at last laid bare to England, and Ballyshannon could be of no further importance as a gateway to an untamed Ireland. Thanks, therefore, to the display of no great foresight on the part of the central authorities, the evil of the open passages across the Erne had been remedied—England had failed to cut off Connacht from Ulster, but she had in a roundabout way, destroyed any advantage to Connachtmen which such a communication afforded. It remains for us merely to follow up one more matter which we have already noted.

There is preserved in the Record Office in London a Map of Connacht executed in 1587 to accompany the descriptions of Bingham’s overthrow of the Scots on the Moy in the Autumn of the previous year.* An examination of it reveals something peculiar. It is fairly well drawn and we must admit that it is a credit to the unknown artist responsible—for he was undoubtedly more of an artist than a cartographer. The careless observer of this relic is apt to smile at some things, for, although the coastline from Galway to Killala Bay is depicted with remarkable faithfulness and the chain of lakes from the Corrib to the Moy is no less generally accurate—more especially if we allow for the fact that this country had not yet been surveyed—the eastern and north-eastern parts of the Province are entirely unrecognisable. But we must be very careful in these matters to remember that the standard of geography of the sixteenth century is not that of the twentieth.

Examining the Map in that spirit we find that the northern trend of the land above Sligo has been neglected, and that the shore-line from Bundoran to Donegal runs in a uniformly eastern direction in direct continuation of the eastern trend of the coastline of North Mayo and Sligo. We also find that Loch Erne extends due south from Ballyshannon (Balshon) and that the head-waters of it are depicted as being almost in a straight line with Galway, i.e., as being somewhere in the neighbourhood of Athlone or Mullingar—that the expanse of its waters is shown as very great, and, most significant point.

* It is catalogued in the Shirley Catalogue as Vol. I, No. 4, and it accompanies the letter of Bingham to Burghley, Feb. 8, 1587. (Calendar State Papers, III, 253.)
of all, that any distinction whatever as between the Upper and Lower Lochs has been entirely neglected. It is Loch Erne that is shown, not two Lochs Erne—and there is no Enniskillen!

Now to suppose that this Map was drawn by a man who thought himself to be depicting anything which he knew to be incorrect is idle. He may have—must have—had doubts, but we are driven at least to suppose that he made his Map as correctly as he knew how. The omission to take notice of Enniskillen we may put down as an undoubted mistake on his part, because Enniskillen was well known, but this does not take away from our considering the general effect of the spacing on the Map as that reflected in the mind of this Elizabethan who must have had the pretensions to learning suited to his age and station.

We may advance it as a hypothesis, therefore, that the English authorities of the period supposed Connacht to be far more effectively cut off by the Lochs Erne from Ulster than it really is. Our present map-maker depicts Ballyshannon as the only practicable passage into Connacht north of the central midlands. Some few of the more intelligent of the English officers in Connacht might perhaps have been able to suggest improvements in the Map, but we cannot suppose for a moment that the London or even Dublin officials were in a position to correct it.

In fine, can we be wrong in saying that Ballyshannon as a strategic point should have stood for much more in the Tudor eye than it did? Its importance—and that it had considerable importance we have striven to show without reverting to a consideration of Tudor geographical knowledge—they exaggerated on a map which was undoubtedly used officially—there are several almost illegible notes written in on it in another hand in places—and yet the central authorities entirely neglected its military possibilities until it had been used against them for generations. Not until 1599, as we saw, did they make even the semblance of a move to occupy it, though their enemies had been astute enough to realise its possibilities more than fifty years previously when the reconquest of Connacht was being taken in hand by Henry VIII.

NOTE AS TO MAP.

The Map reproduced is an exact replica, as to outline, of the original in the Record Office. Much detail in the way of place-names and decoration has, however, been omitted, but care has been taken to add nothing. The space occupied by the compass pointer in the lower portion is taken up in the original by the ornamental title and descriptive wording which are, however, too detailed and indistinct to permit of successful reproduction in a line block. The Map has not previously been published.