SMUTS'S THEORY OF HOLISM: (Sub-title) A STUDY OF THE
IDEA OF HOLISM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOME OF
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR A THEORY OF PERSONALITY,
NORMAL AND PATHOLOGICAL

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I wish to acknowledge the assistance of several persons who have been instrumental in facilitating the research connected with this paper. I would like to mention the helpfulness of the correspondence with Karl Manninger, Rollo May, William Sadler, C.G. Jung, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, T.M. Forsyth, J.A. Hadfield, Fritz Kunkel, John Rosen, Clara Thompson, Donald Snygg and Robert Creagan. I want to thank Professors Manfred Bleuler, Arnold Toynbee, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner for their correspondence and personal conferences which have brought to light certain problems I might have otherwise failed to consider. I am, indeed, grateful to Dr. of Med. Alphonse Maeder of Zurich for his kindness in making available to me frequent discussions and clarifying many difficult and perplexing problems.

The treatment of the dynamic structuring of personal fields and personal wholes was measurably aided, I feel, by the author's training analysis with Dr. K.W. Baeh at Rheinau Hospital, Rheinau, Switzerland and with Dr. P.H. Scott of Edinburgh. I want to express my appreciation to them for their patience and genuine interest. To the patients under my jurisdiction, the consultants and colleagues of the Psychological Clinic in Los Angeles goes my gratitude for their understanding and assistance.

I also want to express my appreciation to the Ph.D. Committee, University of Edinburgh, for making possible a leave of residency to pursue further work at Cambridge University. To Dr. Russell Davis, Head of the Psychology and Philosophy Department at Cambridge University and Consultant for Addenbrooks and Fulbourn Hospitals of Cambridge, I extend my gratitude for the opportunity of observation and discussion of clinical work under his jurisdiction. For the supervision of my work at Cambridge, I am particularly indebted to Dr. W.H. Theule. His criticism, resting on extensive research in experimental psychology, demanded considerable revaluation of material and extension of critical thought concerning some phases of our work.

To the Departments of Philosophy and Psychology and the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Edinburgh, the Departments of Metaphysics and Logic of Oxford University, and the Moral Philosophy and Psychiatry Departments of the University of Cambridge, I express my appreciation for the privilege of auditing classes.

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INTRODUCTION
One of the important trends embedded in the philosophical and scientific thought of this century has been the development, articulation and application of the concept of wholes. This is particularly evidenced in Gestalt or configuration theories of perception, the whole-organism approach of biologists, neurologists, neurosurgeons, psychiatrists, psychologists and social scientists, the philosophical inquiries, primarily of the Organicist and Idealist schools of philosophy and in the explication of the principle of organic evolution expressed in theory of Evolutionary Holism. Some ideas involved in the concept of wholes, however rudimentary and at times superficial, have been resident in intellectual thought from the very origins of philosophy in which certain Pre-socratics and early Greeks envisaged the universe as a process and as a unity, with life conceived as being a part of its essential nature. Though many scholarly systems through two and a half millennia have employed some aspect of the concept of wholes, it can be said that one of the fullest and most extensive attempts to utilize and develop these principles with reference to the theory of organic evolution is Jan Christian Smuts's Holism and Evolution.

Smuts's theory of Holism is a system of thought which attempts to understand the whole of Nature, beginning with space-time, and proceeding through the actual gradations of inorganic and organic existence, life, mind, personality, values, the universe and the Good, in terms of the whole-making principle, 'Holism'. It is an evolutionary philosophy and, as we shall see, its occurrence came as an attempt to deal with some problems of the origin, emergence and inter-relatedness of matter, life and mind confronting current investigation hard on the heels of the challenge presented by Darwinian evolution and relativity physics. The growing dissatisfaction with mechanism, materialism, and elementalism as interpretations of life and experience gave an impetus to renewed inquiry into some approach which would be more useful in discovering and understanding the nature of things. Smuts's theory was one of the attempts to investigate both of these problems.

The introduction to Smuts's study closes on a rather plaintive note of hope wondering 'Whether my partiality for the idea (Doctrine of Holism) which has been my companion throughout a crowded life, will be shared by others, time alone will show'. It seems quite strange that no major inquiry has been made, as far as the author's research has disclosed, which makes Smuts's theory and his dominant concern, i.e. the holistic interpretation of evolution, the basis for further and more advanced inquiry. The fact that his work has received considerable commendation only increases our perplexity. Yet, it seems, few have really taken his work as a whole seriously and one wonders if this points to a judgment of the value and nature of his contribution. When seeking out critical material concerning Smuts's study, one can readily be caught up in an attitude which resigns itself to thinking that Holism and Evolution has evidently not been sufficiently great to challenge philosophical and scientific inquiry. One purpose of this study is to show what his thesis is about and indicate the valuable suggestions residing in it which are subtle to the point of obscurity and, consequently, often overlooked.
Actually, one can only speculate concerning the reasons for this. Possibly, as the study attempts to indicate, the basic ideas on which Holism rests were not new, though certainly the formulation, synthesis and application of them were. Possibly the changing, shifting philosophical and scientific scene in the last two decades, with its steadily diminishing interest in the problem of evolution, even though literature in various fields seems, in recurring occasions, to be fascinated by it, has been partially responsible. Possibly the overshadowing of Smuts’s theory by Lloyd Morgan’s Emergent Evolution, a theory which in many respects is similar to his, has contributed to this problem. Possibly the emphasis on wholes developed around the turn of the century by the Gestalt schools of psychology lessened the impact of Holism as a creative contribution. We may ask, ‘If Smuts had expounded his views some two decades earlier when he first came to recognize this fundamental principle on which his study is based, would his theory have found greater acclaim?’ Possibly his naivete in some of his scientific explanations, for which he has received, at times, criticism, and the superlative optimism with which he ends his effort may have been contributive factors. Or, finally, the lack of greater acceptance could conceivably be the result of ignorance or prejudice in which Smuts is not remembered as a well read student of scientific research and philosophical inquiry, but only as a military and political figure which might preclude, for some, the reception of any of his contributions in the field of science and philosophy.

Whatever the reasons for the lack of greater acclaim and greater elaboration of Smuts’s Evolutionary Holism, it would be unjust to conclude an introduction at this point. Smuts hoped that the problem of evolution would be greatly elucidated in terms of Holism, possibly his greatest hope, but he also looked forward to the employment of the doctrine in the ‘problems of science and philosophy, ethics, art and allied subjects’. Here, too, as in the case of evolution, no effort has been made to apply Smuts’s theory to these subjects. There have been, however, some writers who employ ideas and concepts derived from Smuts’s theory, such as Toynbee’s, A Study of History, Bews’ Life as a Whole, Angyal’s Foundations for a Science of Personality and they acknowledge their indebtedness to his provocative study. Kurt Goldstein’s The Organism, is an ‘Holistic Approach’, as he calls it, dealing with problems in Neurology. He nowhere mentions, however, Smuts, his doctrine or his terminology. It can be said, however, that by such references and the employment of the popular terms ‘holism and holistic’ in investigations far distant from his, Smuts has exercised a significant influence, even though he is not often given the credit he deserves. The eminent physician-psychiatrists, Karl Menninger, William Sadler, F.S. Perls, Helen Flanders Dunbar, Leon Saul, Norman Cameron and others use the term ‘holistic’ to characterize and represent their approach. This implies an influence, partly instrumental at least, in determining a new awareness concerning man and the problems of his existence. It is believed that this new awareness concerning wholes and the need for holistic interpretations (to which, we believe, Smuts’s work makes a notable contribution), though very

1. Holism and Evolution, Introduction, vi
simply stated, provides the difference that effects a profound determinative influence in understanding the characteristic features of reality, the intrinsic meaning of the universe, and to man as a personal whole in his quest for knowledge concerning experience and reality and those factors of normality and disease, one or both of which make his life appear to him understandable or terrifying.

**Terminology**

One of the major objections to the current use of the term 'holism' is that it confusingly includes too many different ideas. This criticism seems justified. For example, consider Smuts's use of the term. First, he says, it (Holism) comprises all wholes in the universe; second, it is a concept in that it stands for or represents all wholes; third, it is a factor 'because the wholes it denotes are the real factors in the universe'; fourth, it is a tendency 'which is whole-making'; fifth, it is, in a wider sense, 'a theory of reality'; sixth, it seems to refer also to 'the creative whole' (individually given). The same word refers to a system of philosophical thought, (that system primarily concerned with the reality of the universe), a concept, an inclusive system (of all wholes in the universe), a factor as an element basic to the structure of the universe, a 'creative whole' and a dynamic tendency.

Smuts talks of the whole, for instance, 'as an operative factor' while saying that Holism is the 'fundamental factor making for wholes'. He speaks of wholes as 'a type of structure, not a general tendency' and their activity as due to the holistic-tendency. But he states that the whole can reproduce itself and is an active condition in the regrouping of parts. The statements are all true but unless taken in the full context of the study prove very confusing. He says that something (in this case a chemical compound) is a 'sort of whole' or that some things are not wholes but 'mechanical aggregates' while maintaining at other places that 'every object' has a measure of organization and thus a measure of holism so that everything is a whole of some kind, be it incipient or limited or ('really') a whole, and that some wholes are not wholes but holistic. Such statements (which are only examples) do not help to make clear and consistent his system - a requisite of any philosopher or scientist.

1. Ibid., p. 116, '... its primary and proper use is to denote the totality of wholes ...' p. 117
2. Ibid., p. 116
3. Ibid., p. 116
4. Ibid., Preface, p. 5
5. Ibid., p. 117
6. Ibid., p. 102. In each of the above cases, the emphasis is mine.
7. Ibid., pp. 100, 101, 106, 118 and elsewhere
8. Ibid., pp. 101-105 (emphasis mine)
9. Ibid., p. 118
10. Ibid., pp. 98, 104, 338ff, 150, 86, 322, etc.
Angyal suggests that there is a confusion in contemporary holistic theories between the object of organization, the organization itself and the organizing tendency. He proposes that the confusion of the object of organization and the organization itself be resolved by reserving the term 'whole' for the organized object and the term 'system' for the organization itself.1

Again, on the problem of the hierarchy of wholes, Perls suggests that the problem of 'lesser' wholes and 'greater' wholes or 'inferior' wholes and 'superior' wholes be resolved by calling the 'lesser' wholes 'holoids' (a term Smuts uses in his Encyclopedia Britannica article to designate 'social wholes') and the larger, more inclusive wholes, such as organisms, 'wholes'. But the author believes to introduce another term which lends little clarity to the problem only makes for more confusion.

For the moment, let us suggest that in this paper the term 'Holism' be reserved for the Philosophy of Holism - a general system of thought or doctrine. The dynamic 'whole-making tendency' (Smuts's 'Holism' at this point) will be termed the 'holistic-tendency' or 'holistic-principle'. The category of Wholeness will refer to the part-whole relationship. For practical purposes, this paper will use a contextual method to deal with the acquired object of organization and the organization itself. Such differentiations are, of course, logical abstractions.

Scope of the discussion

Selection of material has necessarily been made. To conform to the limitations imposed on the study, we have excluded any purposeful attempt to deal with the scientific validity of Smuts's system as a theory of organic evolution. We make an effort, however, to discuss his evolutionary system as a whole with reference to his concept of the essential nature, organization and behavior of personal wholes. This is formulated into an underlying question which runs through the entire study.

Section I seeks to clarify, at the beginning, some basic problems concerning wholes which hamper contemporary research; the discussion in the remainder of the Section sets forth Smuts's general philosophical position, indicates its dependence on the thought of Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, and criticizes it on some important issues which have to do with the attempt to formulate a theory of organic but especially personal wholes.

Based on the rather extended treatment of Smuts's system in Section I which forms the necessary background for the entire discussion, Section II is then able to proceed along a line of thought which deals more specifically with the psychological implications inherent in his theory. It is a discussion centered around

basic concepts concerning normal and deviated personality, self-
organization, behavior and inter-action. Some patients under
stress are cited from the author's own clinical experience to
support the central thesis. By a critical discussion of valuable
suggestions and severe inadequacies in the Philosophy of Holism,
a general frame of reference far different from Smuts's emerges
which, nevertheless, retains some important insights of his
thought.

Explanatory note

The spelling and terminology in this paper generally
follow the American spelling, usage and phrasing, although an
effort has been made to eliminate, as much as possible, the
'Americanisms' which might hinder the readibleness of the ma-
terial.
CHAPTER ONE

The Concept of Wholeness
I. Considering, primarily, the whole
   A 'definition' considered

   One of the difficulties not peculiar to Smuts's Holism but to
   every holistic approach to Nature and Personality, is to formulate a
   satisfactory definition of a whole qua whole. This leads one to ques-
   tion whether or not such a definition can be given. If one responds
   to a demand for a definition of a whole that it is more than the sum
   of its parts, one finds that this necessarily must be done in terms of
   a description of the properties of the whole. Most things which are
   perceptually intuited can be defined only by description and a whole
   is one of these. This, however, is no less conclusive validity of
   their existence or useableness. Whether or not John Stuart Mill was
   accurate in his representation, he did say of the Greek philosophers,
   'They thought that by determining the meaning of words they could be-
   come acquainted with facts'¹ and in this, we believe, he was affirming
   that words are not objects, questioning the 'magic' of mastering things
   by naming them² and declaring that facts often defy conceptualization.³
   Like many basic or ultimate factors in the universe which defy defini-
   tion because of the inadequacy of our logical and semantic tools, the
   whole as a logical and existential construct is known by insight, des-
   cription, comparison, demonstration and intuition. The whole as an
   abstract might be declared a symbol in the sense that it represents
   more than can be expressed by logic.⁴ The gradient abstractness of a
   symbol is proportionate (for the most part, at least) to the meaning-

¹. A System of Logic, Bk. V, Chapter III
². Marcel suggests that when realities are dwindling
words become all important, the words themselves suffering
an inflation which is just like the inflation of money when
 goods are scarce. The Mystery of Being, pp. 33-34
³. '... that the sentences of science incompletely
express facts (complete).' Wisdom, Mind and Matter, p. 29
⁴. Symbol (sinnbild) not sign. Cf. Jung, Contributions
   to Analytical Psychology, pp. 231-232, 52 and Whitehead,
   Process and Reality, Chapter 8.
qualities attached to it, which are unformulatable within our culture and within our own life-experience-meaning. Not only is this true of the more abstract 'objects' but is as true, as a basic principle, of commonly 'defined' things. For instance, if we say 'a person (psychosomatic being) is a whole' it must be apparent that these are semantic expressions referring to objects, 'person' and 'whole', which transcend definition, if for no other reason than the definition will never include all particulars (which is true of 'animate' and 'inanimate' objects). We cannot say 'a person is . . .', referring to a definition of the person. As Korzybski reiterates, 'when we say that it "is" well, it is not', and thus we pierce the difficulty of using the 'is' of identity and definition. In addition, there are some qualities about this 'whole-personal-being', designated by the word 'person', which defy definition; words are inadequate to account for this whole. Consider: An 'object' is explained and understood, according to our semantic and intuitional limitations, yet in conscious abstracting, as we have said, something will always be left out of definition. But this is not all, for the 'object-meaning' is something not reached by words alone, e.g. structural differential. While the task of all scientists in general and logicians in particular is to define the complex in simpler terms, yet the undefinable character of the object of final analysis is soon apparent for here we confront 'the element of the irreducible'. Our knowing (categorial frames of reference) cannot cover the meaning-qualities of an object since the object defined is not the object itself. Meaning-determinants stimulating meaning-reactions are produced in a dynamic field intra-intensity, a manifold. So two persons may see one phenomenal object, yet neither would have the same perceptions of that object and in that sense, the only way

1. Science and Sanity, p. 675
in which, for us, the objective world exists; they would be reacting to two different things. Actually, they would be experiencing two different things, since the object would be different things to each based on the meaning that object had to the percipient, e.g. the person 'allergic' to roses sneezing when paper roses are brought into the room. Moreover, each percipient would define the object differently, yet, even from their meaning-perspective, inadequately. Consider, for example, that when I say 'this person is', I am indicating both my conscious awareness of 'this' as an immediate event, i.e. an element in consciousness, and stating that 'this' exists. I may also say 'this person is a whole', thus describing a feature of the substantive by the use of the copula of judgment. When I say 'the person is . . . a whole', I am not talking now about a particular thing but about an abstract, a general concept and am stating something of its identity and 'defining' it in terms of its essence. When I say 'this person is . . . a whole', existence and essentiality are combined in a 'definition'. When we say, for instance, that existence is, for the Holistic Philosophy, both its concern and matrix, we are trying to indicate that both existence and essence of a thing enter into a 'definition' and study of it. We are now asserting that statements about essence and about existence are based on an abstraction of what is and what is not and, further, declare the confrontation of what is, as well, unspeakable or unformulatable, something intuitively prehended or empathetically felt but something no less real since it enters into experience as a real determinant. A definition is misleading for it claims an unjustifiable finality. A whole cannot be defined. When we say that 'a whole is . . . ', we are only attempting to describe some of its distinguishing characteristics and features.

1. For a more exact formulation, see Chpt. viii on Perception (hallucinated objects, perceptual experience of illusion, and behavioral determinants).

2. Suggested by Korzybski but other examples may be cited.
That the whole must be described means: (1) that wholes are always parts of wider reality, e.g. science never deals with anything in its wholeness, (2) that their relations are infinite so that what we think (presuming that we first 'know' it) is necessarily the result of restriction by personal factors and abstraction, (3) that absolute certainty (100% correctness) may be unattainable for any assertion about any thing (especially personal behavior), (4) that only a high degree of probability can be the nature of prediction, (5) that more enters into the construction and apprehension of wholes than can be known by sensory-perceptual 'facts' of the observer because of at least three main variables, viz the ingression of multitudinocial possible and actual entities, the observer being not merely recipient of sensory facts but agent in perception itself, and the inability to linguistically or semantically formulate his experience of perception-apprehension as the result of inferential facts because of the intervening variables that constitute decision, e.g. apperception, value, meaning, emotion, the inability to free oneself from self-protection and consequent subjectivity, anticipation of results, etc.

Smuts describes a whole as more than the sum of its parts.  

1. There are three major problems here, as I see it: (1) It would probably be more accurate to substitute another word for 'sum' for this connotes a mental activity of summing in which case the whole would be constructed by the mind adding parts together. One might rephrase the idea by saying, 'a whole is more than all its parts together'. While this suggestion may have its inadequacies, it is less misleading than the term 'sum'. (2) The deeper consequence is that when new elements enter into a whole it is not an additive or summing that takes place at all. To aggregates things are added, but in wholes new elements demand an entire reorganization of the parts-whole. This is as important to remember as problems of definition. (3) The mathematical interpretation, this paper contends, is inadequate and inappropriate for the study of the organic and personal since mathematics deals with material identities while the organic and organo-psychic wholes are the organization of differences and functions. Smuts attempts such a distinction in his consideration of mechanical, physical and organic wholes. But the consistency of his thesis first breaks down when the
in virtue of its fundamental holistic nature. The parts function toward the whole as the whole is in the parts and a merging of character results in reciprocal influence and determination of their structure and function, the reflection of which is apparent in the holistic character of the parts as well as the whole.

Sherrington has objected to such descriptions or 'definitions' by indicating that the real condition of the whole is not the sum of its parts nor merely 'more than' the sum of parts but is something 'other than' the sum of the parts. There is merit in this suggestion in that it emphasizes that the emergent quality resulting from the synthesis of parts is not only more of the same kind of elements but is something different from the parts in their summation (or as we would prefer to put it, 'all together'). Careful considerations must attend such a statement. For instance, in organisms, if an investigator cannot differentiate the functional (non-physical) qualities in a whole, then he will feel that relations are an addition to the whole, which, for him, is only made up of concrete elements or objects. This is obviously true in numerous theories of vitalism. In this perspective, the whole will have qualities which that investigator will assume are non-intrinsic (ab extra) to the whole, e.g. 'life' in an organism.

Definition of wholes is given in the term of 'sum'. The attempt to describe wholes as 'more than and different from the sum of their parts' (sequel above) is at once the awareness of the difficulty but a failure to fully comprehend the internal inconsistency by the continued use of mathematical terms in the treatment of the organic and personal.

1. Man on His Nature, p. 247
2. J.S. Haldane in The Philosophy of a Biologist, writes, 'and the whole is what we call the life of the organism' pp. 14-18. Aristotle says that a dead body is not a man, seeming to indicate that 'life' is only one part of the whole (man), Cf. De Partibus Animalium, 640b, 641a, tr. Ogle. Smuts writes, 'A living organism is not an organism plus life, as if life were something different and additional to it . . . .' op. cit., p. 110. While this study could not agree that 'life' is what we mean by 'whole', although the live organism is a unique whole, it does seem that these are all attempts to exclude commonly held 'plus' concepts such as 'the individual represents heredity plus environment' or 'the body plus the soul',

Cf. De Partibus Animalium, 640b, 641a, tr. Ogle. Smuts writes, 'A living organism is not an organism plus life, as if life were something different and additional to it . . . .' op. cit., p. 110. While this study could not agree that 'life' is what we mean by 'whole', although the live organism is a unique whole, it does seem that these are all attempts to exclude commonly held 'plus' concepts such as 'the individual represents heredity plus environment' or 'the body plus the soul',
If we ask what is the 'more' when we say the whole is more than all its parts together, we have failed to see that the 'more' is not something additional to the whole but is, according to Smuts, the 'inwardness of structure and function . . . specific relations . . . internality of character or nature'; it is the whole in definite activity. The 'more' is, at once, additional to and different from the parts but goes to make up the whole. Without this 'moreness' the whole could not be representative of wholes, i.e. of that which distinguishes wholes.

Along with Sherrington’s suggestion is Angyal’s, ‘The formation of wholes is therefore not additional to the aggregation of parts, but something of an entirely different order’. Concurring with them, Koffka asserts, ‘It would be more correct to say that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts, because summing is a meaningless procedure, whereas the whole-part relationship is meaningful’. The disposition is, then, that a description of the whole can be made and should include, by direct statement in the description or by previous indication, that the whole is more than and different from the parts all together as long as this does not assume intervening factors which are different from the parts-whole in shared expression.

The whole - as an organizing factor and the problem of relational and intrinsic quality and change

The whole, by reason of its holistic nature, is a determining condition in the organization and reorganization of the parts. But it can only integrate parts which have the capacity to contribute to the function of the whole. Parts which have been integrated may be 'repressed' (Smuts) or even eliminated because they can no longer enter

Cf. Korzybski, op. cit., passim.
into the function of the whole in its progressive phases and some factors (other parts or wholes) which have been unintegrable in the past may in some new realization (of various changes within the whole) become integrable. The parts, however, must have some intrinsic capacity to be related. Angyal asserts that a number of parts constituting a whole do not enter into this connection because of inherent qualities but only by their position in the system (the organization itself) and that only in summations do the parts have any inherent qualities.¹ This, it seems, does not fully represent the condition or nature of wholeness. It seems, rather, that whether one is referring to organic wholes or inorganic wholes or ideational systems of wholes, such as conceptual gestalts, there must be some basic intrinsic capacity of the parts or elements by which they become related since wholeness is more than relationships. Otherwise, there would be no distinction of things that properly go together, that is, those things which are compatible or integrable since there are some entities which are contrary to each other making common entry impossible.² There is something inherent in an idea or an organism (or any part or whole which will become a part of a wider whole) which has a kinship with other ideas or organisms so that wholes can be formed by their holistic organization. The ideas may find lodging in the same 'event' (Whitehead) or the part may find togetherness in an organism and as a result each acquires a new character, but the basic presupposition is that of an intrinsic quality which gives a thing capacity to function in a particular whole (or in wholes of similar nature). The function of the whole is then an extension of

² Cf. Ibid., p. 279 in which Angyal seems to come to a similar position when he says, 'Intrinsic properties are relevant only in so far as they impart to the given constituent features which qualify the constituent to occupy a required position in the whole'. But this study proposes a 'meaning for its own sake' as well as relational qualities.
their mutual sharing.

Consider a somewhat abstract illustration - the problem of meaning and existence. When does something have 'meaning'? What does meaning have to do with existence (the condition of some thing)? Durant Drake, representing a critical realist position, says, 'For the very meaning of the term "relation" includes reference to something related; the very first relation could not come into existence until there were two entities to be related'.¹ (emphasis mine) For one thing to have 'meaning' to another thing is to have some kind of relationship with that thing. 'Relation' or 'meaning' is a term, we believe, which may legitimately apply to conditions other than those which have to do with two existing objects. Meaning, in one of its applications, may refer to the positional-reference of all actualities in reality so that in a sense a disorganization in one actual entity affects (reverberates to and into or on) all others gradiently, that is, through spacial near effect and hierarchical orders (and 'feeling', as to be later described) in non-personal wholes and psychological near effect in the personal. Meaning, here, does not refer to a personal investment on the basis of past experience, conditioning, learning, knowledge or anticipatory influences, as in a sound which, uttered by another human being, becomes or is 'taken' as signifying something (standing for something, a sign). This would connote that only that which has existence (actual entity) could have meaning (what Durant Drake somewhat similarly calls 'relation') and this in virtue of an 'interpreter' (percipient, or subject and, in some cases, organism, making it a sign) and puts the whole thing on an overt and conscious and, in the personal, even a self-conscious level.² Meaning, at this point, might have its analogy in

¹. Essays in Critical Realism, p. 19
². That a thing has meaning in the sense that it functions well, as in the functionalism of James, Dewey, Schiller and others, is not what is referred to here. Mill and Kant
the term 'feeling' (non-spacial relationship) so that a subject can be said to 'feel' objects, emotions, ideas and their fields, though often vaguely and unconsciously, just as things may be said to have 'feeling' (non-cognitive) or 'reactivity' or 'reaction-effect' capacities with reference to other things because of their inter-physical significance. Just so, personal action need not be dependent on the conscious awareness of existents or formal statements about either existence or essence but is fundamentally based on the presupposition of 'feeling' both, e.g. a person acting in a situation say, walking to the office, without being aware of all factors (people, things, objects, relations) upon which the action is dependent for its realization. These 'conditions' (experients, e.g. things, relations, emotions, vague senses of awareness) are objectified to the subject (enter into the field or 'life-space' of the subject) and in this way every one has 'relevance' or both reject intrinsic meaning. Cf. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, pp. 117-118; Lossky, op. cit., pp. 19-53; Heim, op. cit.; p. 50; Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 123, 212, 216, 268; Aveling, The Psychological Approach to Reality, passim; Sinclair, The Conditions of Knowing, passim; J.S. Haldane, The Philosophy of a Biologist, pp. 58-59, 65; Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, p. 16. Mill writes, '... These relations, though not, like other relations, grounded on states of consciousness, are themselves states of consciousness; resemblance is nothing but our feeling of resemblance; succession is nothing but our feeling of succession. ... though we ascribe resemblance or succession or simultaneity, to objects and to attributes, it is always in virtue of resemblance or succession or simultaneity in the sensations or states of consciousness which those objects excite, and on which those attributes are grounded'. op. cit., Bk. I, Ch. VI, Para. 14, p. 47.

1. This thought to which we have been led and the implicit one that all actualities have meaning to all others, resembles Whitehead's doctrines of 'prehension', 'interpenetration' and 'concern' as well as Leibniz's concept of the relatedness of all things (through Pre-established Harmony) and Smuts's similar view. I am not well enough acquainted with Heidegger's philosophy to say what exact parallels there may be between 'meaning' and his concept of 'care', the characteristic feature of all actual things. The point of difference I would make, I think, between the three, is that I should not lean so heavily on organic categories and suggest that this 'feeling' pervades throughout nature as they are inclined to do, so as to preclude a distinction of 'difference
'meaning' or is 'felt' in the unique 'relational pervading' ('participation mystique') or 'empathy' which binds them into a dynamic oneness which is most often characterized by the fact that it never rises to consciousness. Even exclusion and the excluded from immediate experience, a demand of objectified givenness, have, in this sense, meaning. It is the 'irreducible', the transcendent or beyond which gives a thing existence and makes a thing what it is. The problem is accentuated in the theory of non-being as an existent, a metaphysical and psychological (in psycho-pathology and ontological anxiety - Chapters IX and X) problem. Metaphysically, that which seems to give non-existence 'thingness' is its relation or (in this case) meaning to the existence of some thing in time. That which calls a 'non-being' into 'temporal' existence within space-time, is its potentiality to stand as an identity and its need to do so to make that which is identified more qualitative and meaningful. Non-being is necessary in a perceptual field because it enters into perceptual experience on the basis of meaning forming the identity of percept and perceptum although not-being is not a perceptum in the usual sense of the term but is, we maintain, the phenomenal ground for it. Psychologically, the basis for a thing being felt or apprehended or being a perceptual element is not that it exists or is unreal but that it is an element in the phenomenal system of meanings of the person even if, to an observer, it is only an appearance and not an existent or that it is not what it is taken to be. In kind' which exists between the organic and the personal (in the self-conscious experience). Viz, as Whitehead outspokenly does with his concept of dipolarity and 'mental poles', cf. Process and Reality, Part III, Chapter II

1. By this I mean that the object is what it is because it is a part of the wider field (universe) in which the intensive relatedness of all things enter by influence into it. What the object excludes is as necessary to it being what it is as what it includes. By exclusion I mean what is gradiently meaningful to it, some things having more near-value than others. I do not mean absolute exclusion which would be self-contradictory.

2. The idea of existence being relations is commented on by Haldane, Philosophy of a Biologist, p. 67.
The person believes whatever appears is real and exists even though it may be a private idea or illusion. Certainly the experience, even objectively judged, exists though an observer may not be able to say what the exact nature of the experience is. Thus we live by what is taken by us to be real and this is always considered, at least at the time of experiencing it, to be real, although the public, science, philosophy, or metaphysics may declare what we treat as real is unreal. To the unreal, which is a part of all our lives, we have a relationship. It is not by reality, however - and this is our point - that our living is primarily determined but by what we feel is real and this on the basis of what meaning, intrinsic and relational, the thing has for us (consciously and unconsciously). In a related metaphysical system, non-being is as important as being, for without one, the other ceases to be; this is another way of saying, for one thing, that the actual must be understood in terms of the potential, by which is meant, the actual must be understood in terms of what is potential or potentiality, not, however, a potential (such as an 'eternal object' or 'idea' waiting to be ingressed in a phenomenal entity or in a thing or organism - the eternal form awaiting existential expression). The existence of something which is nothing is unthinkable, but nothing which is something is experiential because it has meaning in existence. In addition, one could say, that it is experienced as meaning.¹ One could go further and say that non-being gives being meaning, while asserting that that which metaphysically is takes on existence on the basis of meaning and contribution. Again, one might say, in a very abstract way, non-being or being cannot be unless they have some reference to some experient or actuality (objectively, subjectively or unconsciously given). At least, most things only have existence (or exist) because of meaning and form a matter of fact relationship (overt standing-with-ness).

¹ Heim, op. cit., p. 58, The Transformation of the Scientific World View
upon or after the condition of existence has been secured. Psychologically, conscious and unconscious 'feeling-ness' or relationship is always given on the basis of what appears to the individual to be real (what he takes to be real), though it need not be real. Metaphysically, 'what-is' (Heidegger) is what it is because of what it is not and also because of what it could or might be, their relationship being a constant among all. Psychologically, the phenomenal relationship which enters into what is believed and taken to be real and in identification, based on what is known and not known, what has occurred and did not occur, etc., is so because of personal meanings of experiences, operating within and outside the immediate awareness of the agent.

Both negative and positive parts within the whole, beyond the meaning of their individual essence in and by themselves gain significant new meaning by reason of their togetherness in the function of the whole.¹ The organization-complex of a whole is a multiplicity of parts (and their relations) in which the parts still retain a sense of individuality (which is carried with them), since the new relationship within the whole respects individual identity.² This same idea is put forward by Whitehead with reference to the subjective process of conceptual feeling when he contends that, 'The many feelings, in any incomplete phase, are necessarily compatible with each other by reason of their individual conformity to the subjective and evolved for that phase'.³

The condition of the whole in which positive and negative factors operate may indicate, to some, rank disorder. Certainly, disorder may exist within a whole but it is contended that that disorder

¹. One might say there is intrinsic-meaning-quality in things for themselves and that primary-relational and secondary-relational meaning qualities result by integration in the holistic-organization (the complex itself) or as Angyal calls it, 'system'.
². See dependence and independence of parts, this Chpt.
³. Process and Reality, p. 316
is not chaos. Disorder is often necessary to reform a new whole out of the old one. New qualities emerge out of re-arrangement and interaction and assimilation of extrinsic factors, but this process of differentiation always tends toward the preservation and extended realizations of wholeness. In this sense, disorder is admitted but is understood not as chaos but as a necessary element in the purposeful attempt to realize the nature of the whole.¹ Much of this activity could be likened to the agonist-antagonist, sympathetic-parasympathetic activities of the nervous system, seemingly in mutual exclusion and opposition, yet both maintaining complementary relationship because they share the meaning (value-experience) of the whole in which they serve as parts. It will, hereafter, be needless to reiterate that the parts have intrinsic qualities (capacity to contribute to the function of the whole or 'compatibility') which make them integrable in such a system of being. They exist, not by reason of uniformity or equality, but by reason of their intrinsic and relational value, function and meaning. To restate an earlier assertion, it is not position which gives a thing meaning but meaning, intrinsic and relational, which gives a thing position.²

The whole, therefore, must be made up of parts which are able to stand in continuing meaningful and functional relation to each other by reason of an intrinsic quality of 'go-togetherness' and by reason of the organizing activity of the whole which gives each part its respective position within the whole. This dynamic whole, ever seeking to realize itself in its fuller nature (fuller expression of wholeness), is really not something different from the parts in the

¹. Cf. ibid., pp. 135, 157, 214, 480
². A similar idea is given by Scheerer and also Katz, Gestalt Psychology, p. 85, over against the one-sided emphasis by many Gestalt Psychologists that only position gives a thing meaning.
sense that they have nothing in common, but expresses itself in the parts and is the parts for they are one. Goldstein says, for instance, that an organism does not consist of members, it is the members;\(^1\) it is, however, the members (presupposing the whole since part and whole are correlative) in dynamic relation. Though the parts have the capacity for relational meaning, they assume their full meaning and actual functional participation only as parts integrated in the whole. It is the whole which gives this new meaning, a relational meaning and quality ('membership character', Gestalt) to the parts and is experienced in the parts. The whole is real or actual only in the parts; the parts exist as they are only because in them the whole is realizing itself in continuing differentiation and unity. Whitehead, speaking of subjective forms, says, 'These data in their own separate natures do not carry any regulative principle\(^2\) for their synthesis. The regulative principle is derived from the novel unity which is imposed on them by the novel creature in process of constitution.'\(^3\) Karl Heim, in a metaphysical assertion, speaks of self-contained wholeness over which, like a leading idea, there stands a characteristic form which builds itself up out of material from its environment and maintains itself against all threatening disturbances and continues to multiply itself indefinitely, if no limits are imposed on its increase. 'In front of each natural entity there stands "a picture of what it ought to be", a form for whose realization it strives with all its powers.'\(^4\) This 'end-form' is that drawing force, which, as Morgan says, gives direction to the organism\(^5\) and is what Whitehead might call the 'objective lure of

2. This does not contradict the principle of intrinsic quality of parts.
3. Adventures of Ideas, p. 328
5. Op. cit., p. 102. It should be explained that there need be no confusion here between the operation of the whole as a drawing force and the holistic-tendency making for new wholes as a dynamic, if we think of the closeness of inter-
wholeness', whose end or purpose, as Bosanquet indicates, is 'nothing but the nature of the whole'.

The whole - a unity in difference

The principle of meaning contains within it the idea that every variation of a part is in terms of its relation to the character (the complex structure and function) of the whole and that this variation is not 'spontaneity adapted to nothing' (Bosanquet) but a response of adjustment in terms of maintaining the whole. There is, then, no irrelevance. The relationship of part-whole is so interwoven and unified (correlative unity) that a slight movement in one part causes all the other parts, consequently the whole, to alter. That is, the dependence and independence of parts within a whole is gradely given, neither one given in its purity at any instant. This seems to mean, as Lewin points out, that part A, because of its independence, will not be affected by an alteration in part B if that alteration is given within certain limits under the demand of regularity of the whole. But if the change in B surpasses this limit, the condition or state of A will be affected. The author would restate this by saying that all parts are in constant regulation by the functioning of parts-whole and in this sense are dependent for their mode of functioning upon the existing condition of the whole. In this sense, regulation is a process of continuous change of parts within prescribed limits of functioning. Changes which extend beyond these limits (value-characteristics of the boundary strength of parts) occur only when there is action between push and pressure. Here action and reaction are complementary and that pressure is only possible where there is evidence of resistance and resistance only possible where it is confronted with pressure, but a simultaneous action-process - they do not exist separately, but are complementary.

1. Process and Reality, pp. 118, 120-121
2. The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 118
internal disorganization or deviation within the part or in such reorganization of another part that the rest of the parts are consequently altered in keeping with the demand for adjustment and reestablishment of equilibrium or closure commensurate with the economy principle and process of 'spreading' (next part, this chapter). The degree of dependence-independence and alteration or change is defined in terms of the interrelatedness of the parts and the state demanded of the whole. Although the organism does not respond to every stimulus, it can be said that each reaction or proaction demands a reorganization of the whole though the modifications are almost negligible and not commensurate with the degree of intensity of stimulus but are given the degree of intensity by the nature or meaning of the situation to it. Only in this special sense can we accept Whitehead's statement that a change in any part destroys that whole.\(^1\) Lewin, himself, says any part in a dynamic field (whole) 'depends on every other part of the field'.\(^2\) This relationship, the whole participating in each of its parts, is the meaning of 'unity'. This dynamic intra-action makes the mere addition of a new element an impossibility. While there is difference within the parts, there is still relevancy of all. While there is dissimilarity of parts, there is still unity.\(^3\) While the whole is a process, it retains unity.\(^4\) There is always a unity of the whole but the strength of the unity, that is, the holistic organization of the whole, must be determined by the degree of independence of neighboring parts, e.g. a paranoid system may maintain the whole in constancy through an independence of this part-system from the rest of the parts (Cf. Chapter IX, thesis on closure and pregnanz). The degree

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1. Process and Reality, p. 409
3. Cf. Discussion on unity of whole. James, Pragmatism.
of holistic organization is directly dependent on the degree of independence and rigidity of value boundaries of parts. Unity increases with dependence. 1 Unity is also dependent on the number of parts to be organized, the number of sub-systems, the tension capacity of parts, the mode of adaptation it, as a whole, must undergo to preserve itself. 'Uniformity, then, as a principle of science, is a uniformity not in the way of resemblance but in the way of identity; not a repetition of resembling elements but the coherence of differences in a whole.' 2

The whole - a dynamic becoming

A whole is not a static given but a dynamic becoming so that its existence is possible only as its character of wholeness is extended (by this we mean that the whole is 'realizing' itself in the progressive intensification of complexity of structure and function). Smuts describes wholes as 'dynamic, organic, evolutionary, creative'. 3 In contra-distinction to Plato's concept of ideas or forms as indestructible, unchangeable and measured by an absolute standard, 4 the whole as considered here is not absolute, nor does it possess a metaphysical perfection or completeness but is always dynamic, changing, and increasing its differentiation and complexity of structure. It is in dynamic tension because it is an existent. In organisms it is ever becoming, while retaining constancy; in inorganic existence, wholes are ever

1. Lewin, op. cit., p. 319
2. Bosanquet, op. cit., p. 93 and refer to his discussion on Mill's Uniformity of Nature.
4. Cf. Whitehead's interpretation and employment of this Platonic concept in Process and Reality, particularly the discussion of 'the ingression of actual entities', Part II, Ch. I. Cf. Shelling's Collected Works, vii, passim. Forsyth in God and the World says, 'No actual line is ever perfectly straight, and no two lines are ever precisely equal in length; a square or circular patch is never exactly square or circular; a human action or law is never wholly just; no picture or statue is ever absolutely beautiful'. p. 17
changing. It is seeking both to maintain itself and to realize a more complete expression of its functional nature, i.e. the whole intensifying its wholeness throughout. It is changing with new adaptations (every new, out of the ordinary, stimulus demands a total reorganization of the whole), but retains identity or 'continuing-status'. The whole 'is a continuant, yet a variant', to reframe Professor Laird's words. This identity of a functional-continuity (whole) is possible through conservation of energies (perpetuation of kind) sometimes called the 'economy principle'. In continuants (broadly speaking, wholes such as organisms, persons, perception, learning, sensori-motor responses, etc.), there is a tendency to maintain identity or form in their totality even in spite of the 'displacement of equilibrium'. Every new stimulus-condition (internal or external) incites a total reorganization (regulation, regrouping) of the functional-complex (whole) with the least possible expenditure of energy in the maintenance of itself with respect to the external situation. Most writers on Holism would assert, then, that the whole is a functional continuity which retains identity with the differentiation of successive structures and is characterized by its becoming-ness.

Because wholes are dynamic, they are *natura naturans*, in

1. Hans Driesch in *History of Biology* makes this distinction of becoming and changing of organic and inorganic existence. p. 191ff. I think we must qualify this by noting the theory of inorganic evolution (as in Whitehead, Morgan, Alexander, Smuts).

2. On organic dynamic qualities and equilibrium; Koehler, *op. cit.*, p. 102 says, 'A dynamical distribution will be rightly regarded as a functional whole'. Morgan refers to a baby as evidence of a whole 'but this infancy gives way to a more mature or better whole in the process of maturation', *op. cit.* p. 102; Ritchie writes, 'Nothing in the world can be dearer than a system in equilibrium', *Natural History of Mind*, p. 64; Ward in *The Realm of Ends* indicates that 'self conservation' would be nothing better than a static world in which there would be no new aspects and no history' and that there must be direction of behavior toward self-realization. pp. 52-53

3. Laird, *Idea of the Soul*. Referring to the soul, he says it is a 'continuant not an invariant', p. 152; cf. p. 150
that they are creating, and *natura naturata*, in that they are created. The distinguishing feature is that this 'creative' process is within the organism itself.¹ The organizing function of the holistic-tendency makes becoming possible as well as identity known. New emergents appear as the result of this nature of the parts and wholes to develop more complexly into more effective holistic structures.

The whole - and the problem of perfection

If, as it seems, the organism is a whole extending its wholeness and that personality is a whole which is never completely present in any one stage or phase of its actual history, since it progressively extends its ideal functioning capacity, then the question arises, 'Is perfection possible; is the whole anything more than an abstract idea?'

Consider several possibilities. If we say that a perfect whole does not exist, that it is nowhere an experienceable occasion or that it is never a 'given' and always and only an abstract ideal, we have assumed an abstract idealism. If the ultimate reality of existence is an ideal, not a 'being', then this existent whole can never be a realization of anything but imperfection, and our striving, effort, goal-directed activities are nothing but empty stimuli which lead nowhere.

One must consider what is meant by 'perfect'. It is possible to have at least three different concepts in mind with regard to perfection and existence. One could mean first, an absolute or ultimate perfection; second, perfection as a relative maximal quality such as function or beauty; third, perfection as characterizing a process, rather than an end or terminus. The first kind of perfection

¹. I believe I would qualify this statement by reference to the argument in Section II (passim) regarding the inter-dynamic-field-intensities or that the creative process is within the field (including the organism) although it is correct to say that it is within the organism in this sense (contra vitalism).
is an impossibility in an existential situation. The second and third kinds of perfection or meanings of perfection are experienceable. Translated into the terms of this paper, this would mean that, while the absolute perfection of the whole is never accomplished, yet perfection is accomplished in the whole when the parts are in such position as to make possible the whole’s fulfillment of its own nature in a maximum way under the circumstances. Leibniz emphasized this perfection in the organism. Goldstein indicates that 'every creature is, so to speak, simultaneously perfect and imperfect' so that within itself it is perfect, alive and well organized but with regard to the entirety of things must, of necessity, be in many ways imperfect. Whitehead refers to a 'perfection after its kind'. The Gestalt pregnanz type closure contains a similar idea. McKenzie suggests that, while perfection is realized, it is always in the process of realization.

Perfection within the whole, then, is that continuing condition in which harmony and maximal functioning are evidenced through the relatedness of all parts which are serving the good of the whole. It is a condition where the parts are in such complementary relatedness that none cancels out another. This, considering the implied nature of the organism and the circumstances under which it is obliged to operate, makes it possible to have a 'perfection after its kind'. In fact, every wholeness-tendency, in the sense of its separate activities in a variety of experiences, expresses itself in a manner directed toward the complete realization of wholeness.

The whole - a variety of types of wholes

Contemporary writers are less anxious than Smuts to make such a fine line of distinction between various types of wholes.

2. Adventures of Ideas, p. 329. Also contrast Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Tr. James Gutman, p. 82-83.
Consider some geometrical examples which are referred to by them as fulfilling the demands of 'definition' of wholes.

Two lines are drawn, a horizontal line A and an oblique line B which intersect. The properties of the lines A and B can be studied but knowledge of the whole resulting from the two converging to form an angle does not emerge from such a study. The angle is a new factor whose properties cannot be derived from the properties of the lines which constitute it. The lines could be measured in centimeters, but not the angle for it must be measured in entirely new units called degrees. It may be said, then, that the study of parts cannot explain the whole because the whole is something more and different from the summation of the parts.¹

Again, consider a spacial relation between a line and its points. No matter what the length of a line may be, it is infinitesimally complex because, through analysis of it, we can distinguish points in infinitude; and yet a line cannot be said to be the sum of its points. It would hardly be correct to say that by adding one point to another and this to another for a given length one could produce a line, not because of any time limitation involved, but because of logical impossibility. The sum of the points in extension could never give rise to the extended continuity of the line. This, then, is a whole, the line, which can be the ground of an infinite multiplicity of points, but cannot be said to rise out of it but is something in addition to and different from it.²

These figures are misleading at three main points:³ first, because mathematics deals with quantities and not with real things; second, because they do not deal with parts at all but with points or

1. Suggested by Angyal, op. cit., p. 3
2. Suggested by Lossky, op. cit., pp. 243
3. We are not suggested that Angyal, for instance, does not see the problem here (cf. his treatment of aggregation
points of reference or lengths or positions, definitions and illustrations are then mutually contradictory; third, they fail to fully fulfill the demands of 'definition', at least as given by Smuts, i.e. concerning not only inherent, intrinsic qualities but relational, functional qualities as well. For him, parts 'function toward the whole', the 'more' of the whole is not only something different from the parts in 'summation' but indicates an 'internality' of structure, function and relation. It is obvious that the above 'wholes' are not what Smuts means by wholes, according to his description of them and only comply with the first part of the definition. But to be more specific, Smuts has theorized a variety of 'wholes'. The usual definition he gives of wholes refers to 'natural' or 'biological' wholes, such as organisms (even micro-organisms) and plants in which the internality of function and relation are present. There are other composites which are mechanical, geometrical, chemical, artistic 'wholes', but they have no 'internal' relations. The parts cannot 'function' toward the whole but they are, he says, 'in a limited sense' wholes. Most limited wholes are dependent for unity upon exterior agents (in chemical wholes a greater measure of 'internality' exists), while natural wholes are their own source of activity.¹ Now when Smuts writes of wholes, he is usually referring to natural wholes, of which the earlier description is representative.

A natural whole can be illustrated by referring to a biological organism. The parts (conceived in relation to the whole) have active relations to each other and function toward the whole. The

¹ It would be intrinsically and objectively self-contradictory to treat a structure as one would a geometric grouping in which every element and its locus may be considered as independently variable factors.' Ellis, A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology, pp. 32-33
whole is self-acting. The natural whole consists of parts but is more than the parts all together. If the parts are taken to pieces, the organism is destroyed, while mechanical 'parts' can be reassembled again to form the mechanical 'whole' or aggregate, the organism cannot be reconstructed by putting together the severed parts. The organism, in this sense, is its relations.

We have here, then, an indication of difficulty in definition of terms among 'holistic' writers. If we merely say 'a whole is more than the sum of its parts', all the gradient wholes Smuts propounds would be unnecessary, the 'more' would be reduced to 'different from' and no considerations of the 'more' as relations and functions in a complex would be demanded of a definition. The definition, in this case, would do injustice to some of Holism's basic premises. At best, such definitions could only refer to non-organic 'wholes' and when this is done, the Smuts contention of types of wholes survives and vitiates the contrary argument. But there is a difficulty in Smuts's position as well. One might legitimately refer to atoms and amoeba as wholes but what of social groups and works of art or invention, for instance? Is a painting a whole? Is a machine a whole? By Smuts's definition, they could not properly be referred to as wholes (although he often does so). But Smuts recognizes part of the difficulty. He may dispose of the problem about a machine and say it is an aggregate or a 'mechanical whole' (which must mean that it is not really a whole though it may be a 'sort of' whole, to use his phrase) but he is even less convincing when social groups, works of art and literature are properly spoken of as wholes only because they are essentially organic. Although to deal with descriptive and evaluative problems concerning artistic and literary creations would take us beyond the scope of this study, we shall, at various points, deal with the underlying
difficulty which gives rise to the kind of interpretations Smuts sug-
gests and particularly note some of its implications for a theory of
personal and social wholes (normal and deviated).

So far, however, we have discussed Smuts's definition of
wholes which has limited us to a consideration of some characteristic
features of inorganic and organic wholes and may very well apply to
perceptual - and possibly conceptual - configurations, among others,
to be discussed later. For the moment we may say that for Smuts a
'real' whole is an organic structure from which other 'wholes', i.e.
inorganic and spiritual, shade off in both directions. The term 'whole'
may then apply to organic ('natural') wholes at the apex and, with
certain reservations, to the configurations which shade off from it.
What all wholes have in common, thus giving them a legitimate place
in the gradient order of wholes, is another problem and one on which
Smuts is vague. If one substitutes in his description of wholes the
term 'contributes' rather than 'function', i.e. the parts contribute
to the whole and the whole is more than the parts all together, the
difficulty of the description in somewhat lessened, although the pro-
blem of what shall be considered 'parts' is left open. While all
wholes are characterized by their organization, such a description is
hardly a predication which lends further knowledge since some organi-
zation is a characteristic of all that exists. Certainly wholes are
by their organization delineated from a field although they may and do
work in extensive combinations and become parts of wider wholes. But
wholes do refer not merely to loose combinations, groups or units but
have a characteristic holistic-organization which further sets them off
from other orders of things and in our own minds - the holistic-
organization also being determinant of structural wholeness. If one
could say, in order to suggest a descriptive frame of reference for
all wholes, that a whole is: (1) anything that cannot be reduced to a compilation of elements or (2) that which cannot be dis-assembled - the parts or elements as such not being destroyed - and then re-assembled and be what it was before or (3) that of which no quantity or quality can be removed or added without the intrinsic reorganization of all constituents, then some delineation on a basis other than necessarily organic has emerged. Such description would exclude mechanical objects, geometrical figures, paintings, a printed book or a pencil, for instance, and would include such things as a horse, man, flower, atom, chemical compound, distribution of electricity (electrostatic forms), perceptual, conceptual, emotional and reactional configurations. These are problems, however, to which we shall give more attention in the rest of this chapter and return after a fuller discussion of Smuts's theory and the thought of Aristotle and Leibniz.

II. Considering, primarily, the part-whole relationship

Wholeness is the concept or category of Whole and Part just as Causality is the concept of Cause and Effect. The Whole and Part are correlative terms. To distinguish them is purely a methodological device to facilitate logical procedure. Holist philosophies unleash their polemic when the logical procedure is transferred to the clinical experience so that there is little recognition that whole and parts are actually inseparable; they are treated as if they were 'naturally' separable, thus confusing separate and separable. Treating the part as an isolated thing or the whole as if it had no parts is to treat abstractions, not existents. To the organism, for instance, there are no parts, it is just the organism functioning in a variety of ways. Even on a wider philosophical perspective, asking whether parts really exist as things may be a meaningless question. In an axiomatic system, one can think of a thing either as a part, that is,
in its relations to anything else, e.g. the circulatory system can be considered as a 'whole' or a 'part' although it does not exist outside the organism. All things cannot exist as parts of wholes, as closely described earlier, but all things do exist in the broader description of 'wholes', i.e. various types of 'wholes', since all things exist in collections, units or aggregates of some sort (i.e. have organization). It is certain, however, that nothing exists without meaning. Parts in reality are only known in relation to the whole, although it is not necessary to know every detail of the whole before we can know the part, nor do we need to know all the parts before we can know the whole. In order to identify a thing, it is only necessary to have some image of the whole (the presupposition of the whole or closely similar wholes) which forms a frame of reference for determining such identity. In this case, both what we know and what is to be known constitute the complex of an identity. In the category of Wholeness, we can know about the whole by only knowing a part of it provided that part is essentially incomplete.¹

The most distinctive feature of the part in the part-whole relationship, as Professor Stout has suggested, is that it is 'essentially incomplete', 'unable to stand alone' and requires 'to be supplemented by something beyond itself'.² If we speak about the completeness of parts, we are thinking of that completeness which consists in their holistic relationship to the whole. It is only in this completeness that the true nature of the part is to be found. The whole is self-maintained, self-contained (in the sense of the organism-field or person-field whole as discussed in Section II) and self-composed. But it is not a whole apart from the parts 'but is just the parts in their synthesis'.³ The parts are elements in a changing configuration,

1. Stout, G.F., God and Nature, pp. 73-74
2. Ibid., p. 74
3. Smuts, op. cit., p. 87; note: In Holism and Evolution page 87 is misprinted as page 85.
to use a Gestalt term. In this part-whole relationship, the parts must be multiple, pliable and adjust themselves to the needs of the whole, as, for example, when a part of the brain takes over the function of some damaged part or when tactile and auditory sensations become more sensitive in a person who has been blinded. The needs of the whole, then, modify the parts in their intra-activity. The whole permeates every part but the part does not permeate the whole but only fulfills its own holistic function in relation to the interest of the whole. In other words, there can be no whole without parts and no parts which have no relationship to the whole. While the parts in an organic whole cease if the whole is abolished, the whole may still function even though some of the parts have become destroyed, however less efficient that functioning may be.¹

The 'system-whole' or 'part-whole' concept is worth noting, for it is by no means generally accepted. One major objection is raised by Kurt Goldstein who rejects the concept of part-wholes or sub-wholes, as he calls them, as compared to the organism which only is properly referred to as a whole.² He contends that because there are no processes within the organism that can be understood apart from the whole, and since the whole is inclusive of many parts, the category of the whole cannot in any way be applied to anything less in inclusiveness, autonomy or function. The major objection he raises is that to use sub-whole or system-whole or part-whole ideas would be to indicate antagonisms between these and the whole.³ However, it does not necessarily follow that if the term 'system-whole' is, for

¹. Whitehead even goes so far as to say, 'If you abolish the whole, you abolish its parts; and if you abolish any part, then that whole is abolished.' Cf. Process and Reality, p. 409.
³. Ibid., pp. 421-424
instance, ascribed to the circulatory system, it is implied that the system is in morbid tension or antagonism with the whole. In fact, as Goldstein so adequately has shown, what has been considered the 'inhibitory' and 'antagonistic' aspects of the central and autonomic nervous systems are really harmoniously maintaining equilibrium of the organism. In a healthy organism, he indicates, there are tensions but not antagonisms.

It can be said that while many parts of the organism could be excluded or could cease to exist and the organism continue, often with very little change, the abolition of a system-whole would mean death to the entire organism. That system-whole is made up of elements and units, it retains an imperative position in the whole but it is not independent or self-contained. It is still a part. To make this assertion does not, in any way, foster anything less than a holistic approach.1

The question has been asked, 'Can a part cease to cooperate and yet remain a part of the whole?' It seems this question must be answered in the affirmative for certain parts, especially in the psychophysical organism, have a relative autonomy (a quality demanded for givenness and identity). This is especially true when one considers aberrations of personality. In such a case, the entire organism reacts to the non-cooperative 'autonomous insurrection' of the part by total reorganization in an effort to maintain its equilibrium. It is worth noting here that there may be dissociated parts of the personality which are not only in 'autonomous insurrection' but are really fighting against the personality as a whole. Indeed, Allport's definition of a neurosis is that 'it represents a tendency disconnected

1. Interestingly enough, Goldstein subscribes to a 'super-ordinated whole' and also to 'higher wholes', *ibid.*, p. 495.
from the individual's socialized dispositions and warring with them'.

This problem of 'autonomous insurrection' or so-called 'warring' members, tensions and antagonisms as related to the holistic-principle is one of the considerations concerning psychopathology in Section II.

Let us then sum up the part-whole relationship as implied in the foregoing discussion. Haldane has suggested that 'the parts and activities of the organism are one, in the sense that though we can distinguish them, we cannot separate them unaltered, and consequently cannot understand or investigate one apart from the rest'.

Kant believed the organism is something in which whole and part are reciprocally determined. He says, '. . . every part is thought as owing its presence to the agency of all the remaining parts, and also as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole. . . .' Lossky posits that 'each member of a whole exists for the whole, the whole exists for each of the parts'. Angyal writes, 'Every organismic part process is a manifestation of this dynamism of the total organism'. In a related concern, Jennings says of the constituents of the emergent thing that they show the properties they had before becoming parts of the emergent 'but with additions and modifications' due to the alteration that results by their becoming part of the emergent unit. This happens only because the parts depend upon the whole as the whole depends upon and enters into the parts. On still another level of concern, Bosanquet asserts that 'our whole world is at work in every remodelling of itself'.

1. The Individual and His Religion, p. 61
2. Organism and Environment, p. 99
3. Critique of Judgment, 374
5. Op. cit., p. 21
7. Op. cit., p. 202, emphasis his. Along the same philosophical line, Whitehead writes, 'It follows that every item of the universe, including all the other actual entities
Thus the part-whole relationship means that the part has an essential meaning beyond its own individuality by reason of the fact that it subserves the whole which is not to be identified with any one of its parts. Because of the part-whole relationship, the part rises to the unique position where it participates in that which is beyond itself.

In the part-whole relationship, each part retains and encourages that quality which makes its contribution to the whole. That is to say, its completeness in significance, function and meaning is realized in the whole and due to the fact that the characteristic feature of the whole is its holistic-tendency.

are constituents in the constitution of any one actual entity'. Process and Reality, p. 205. Haldane concurs when he affirms that "From the standpoint of relativity physics every element in the universe of our experience has its existence in its relations to other elements'. Philosophy of a Biologist, p. 67. Cf. this chapter, thesis, on Intrinsic and Relational Meaning.
CHAPTER TWO

Holism and Evolution
The origin of Smuts's interest in Holism seems to date from his student days at Cambridge. Even amid the complexity of his public life, the idea preoccupied his mind, repeatedly demanding release from his private thoughts and exposing to public discussion and critical exchange. As he says, it was his companion throughout a crowded life. There seemed to be little in that life to give a hint of the philosophical theory stirring within until Holism and Evolution unexpectedly appeared to offer its challenge to contemporary thought. In that work, as Toynbee says, Smuts sets himself the prodigious task of attempting to give an explanation of the nature of the universe — a task which, incidentally, is subject to inherent limitations, inasmuch as any such extensive propositions about the whole universe may certainly be said to be incomplete, inadequate and, in some sense, false. Smuts's thesis, however, is remarkably practical and, we feel, offers a significant contribution to modern thought about reality and the physical, organic, personal wholes within it.

Holism, as Smuts propounds it, is a system of thought which attempts to understand things and events in terms of their inter-relatedness and essential unity by means of what he calls the holistic-principle. Whatever the ultimate nature of reality is, its characteristic feature is that of tending toward wholeness. When we observe the phenomena of the universe, whether physical, biological or mental, we always find that the phenomena are organized into wholes. In other words, space-time is configurated, matter organized into structural wholes, life is expressed in the intensification of organization and is an organizing process and mind and personality are engaged in making

1. Personal correspondence
2. Cf. Ritchie, Scientific Method, p. 7. For Hegelians, of course, nothing can be really true unless it is about Reality as a whole, a somewhat different but still related idea.
things into wholes. The wholeness characteristic of atoms, molecules and chemical elements is essentially the same as in life and mind, so that in everything from the uni-cellular animal to man including the whole of his psychological life, there is this all-pervasive phenomenon of whole-making. It is this indigenous structure of reality that the holistic concept attempts to explain. Smuts maintained it to be the genus of all those logical concepts whose function it is to help us understand the nature and structure of phenomena that we cannot actually observe but whose results form an ever-increasing challenge to continued inquiry.

It is apparent from this brief sketch of Holism and the more developed statement on the concept of wholeness in the last chapter that Smuts has several purposes in mind. Three of them are of particular interest to us at the moment. First, he presents a theory which will, he believes, shed light on the gaps between matter, life and mind which still resist scientific and philosophical inquiry. Second, he tries to formulate concepts which will apply in physics, chemistry, biology and psychology dealing equally well with electrons, amoeba, mind and personality and providing a solid basis for their understanding. Third, he argues on the strength of this that a new methodology for the study of wholes is urgently needed and makes his own proposals in this direction. The heart of the matter for Smuts is that if these three problems are to be met successfully, the sciences and philosophy must invoke the concept of the holistic-principle and a theory of wholes such as he propounds; otherwise, we have little hope of accounting for the existence and emergence of things or of studying what we call wholes. Much misunderstanding of Smuts is liable to result if his purpose and the two-fold nature of his theory are not kept securely

in mind.

To give a further idea of Smuts's position, we may contrast it briefly with that of Lloyd Morgan. In Emergent Evolution Morgan's theory of wholes is set forth with primary stress on the fact of emergence and the qualities of the emergent (which Smuts calls a whole). While also employing a theory of wholes and sharing Morgan's interest in emergence, Smuts does not make this his primary concern. His theory is not built on the concept of wholes primarily, but rather on the dynamic 'tendency to whole-making' which he chooses to call 'Holism'. Smuts refers to wholes in a very superficial and rhetorical way. That is one reason for beginning the discussion of this paper with a rather detailed treatment of the concept of wholeness and some questions left unanswered by Smuts's inquiry but which must, we believe, provide a foundation for understanding both his theory and this thesis. It is not, however, emergent wholes which interest Smuts most, but that which accounts for their emergence, namely the holistic-tendency.

In Smuts's theory, the universe is a process giving rise to new forms and structures, and inherently subject to principles of an organizing nature. The concrete particular structure is, of course, the object of scientific research, the tendency or principle is, the author believes, the basis of philosophical inquiry. The fact remains, however, that these forms and structures are wholes and that they are constantly renewing themselves as wholes out of the exigencies and resources of their environment; this is apparent from the inorganic to the highest manifestations of the human spirit. But that which gives rise to this obvious grouping and organization is the central issue of what may be referred to as Evolutionary Holism.

Now let us consider Smuts's system of thought in greater detail.
The order of Nature begins, in Smuts's theory, with Space and Time. The Newtonian concept of fixed space and time as absolute entities conforming to the axioms of Euclidean Geometry, has given way to a theory of Relativity in which Space and Time are inseparable and form a continuum, the integral basis of the real physical world. 'From this point of view bodies and things as merely spatial are not real but abstractions, while events, which involve both Space and Time, action in Space-Time, are real and form the units of reality.' Gravitation and acceleration become push and pull movements of masses charged with energy. This means that the idea of bodies 'floating in a medium of uniform homogeneous space' is replaced by the view of variable masses exerting influence on each other through 'fields' of Space-Time 'in which the curves of the lines can be calculated and the course of events happening in them can be predicted'. The tremendous interplay of masses and influencing fields invests the universe with a character of activity and process it had not previously been felt to possess. As Einstein tried to show, this appearance of process is not due to subjective interpretation only, nor is it objectively given without reference to the observer as Newton supposed; both factors are conjoined in experience, though their proper differentiation is necessary. Process involves structure and thus the very foundation for all things is structured-action and this activity is configurated.

1. Ibid., p. 22
2. Ibid., pp. 29-30
3. Ibid., p. 31. Einstein says that in 1926, the year, incidentally, of Holism and Evolution, de Broglie and Shrodingher introduced quantum mechanics which made the universe not a collection of particles moving in Space like aeroplanes in the atmosphere but 'a collection of waves'. Cited in Scientific Progress, Sir James Jeans, p. 27
4. Ibid., p. 31
5. Ibid., p. 317-318
6. Smuts's Presidential Address, British Association, 1931
Activity is the characteristic feature of matter. Chemistry and the New Physics have shown that matter is constituted of atoms or units which in turn are reducible to negative and positive electricity. In other words, matter is simply a form of energy or rather, in Smuts's view, Action.¹ The older mechanistic conception of nature as a field of fixed material particles mechanically interacting with each other in accordance with inertiae laws of motion has been modified by Relativity theories and quantum physics.² The conception of matter as consisting of inert, spatially definite particles exerting no relational influence on one another (the so-called 'billiard ball universe') is gone forever.

This has tremendous implications for all fields of thought. It means that the old unbridgeable distinction between matter and life has been discarded. With matter becoming a 'mass of seething, palpitating energies and activities', 'field' and functional theories have made their appearance and with them a recognition of the similarity between inorganic and organic existence. The impossible gulf disappears.³ One might suppose that Smuts would agree with Whitehead that

'science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical nor purely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of the small organisms.'⁴

Smuts is struck by the similarity between Radioactivity and Organic Descent, the Periodic Table of Chemistry and Systematic Botany and Zoology, inasmuch as 'The concepts of orders genera and species could be applied to both' their forms and geneses, suggesting in spite of their application in different kingdoms, an affinity of similar worlds.⁵ He believes all this gives matter a justifiable claim to

1. Ibid., pp. 37-41
2. Ibid., pp. 50-51
3. Ibid., p. 52
distant relationship with life.¹

Smuts also points out 'that matter in its colloidal state discloses properties and shows a behavior which seem in some way to anticipate the processes and activities of life in its most primitive forms'.² Examples of such substances are chlorophyll and haemoglobin which, as special mechanisms of life, are necessary to it,³ though themselves inorganic. The conversion of inorganic into organic substances required for the sustenance of life, through the colloidal states and surface transformations, leads up to the very threshold of life. Smuts points out that although a gap remains and a great mutation may have been needed, yet science is bringing matter and life together in such a way as to suggest their similarity and common heritage.⁴ By admitting, however, that gaps still remain between the various levels of evolution, he makes it clear that he is willing to acknowledge, for the moment, that all the answers to the emergence of different-level wholes are not available. One might be easily misled by some general remarks in the Preface to his book, into thinking that Smuts claims to dispose of that scientific bogey - the matter, life and mind problem and consequently will look in vain for confident reassurances of what was felt to be the author's intention. Closer examination indicates that the purpose of the book is to shed light on such thorny problems and present a new approach which, in the hands of more competent researchers, may prove helpful in these inquiries.⁵

In a more subtle way he brings to attention his own position when he says, 'For them (those of the modern viewpoint of evolution) in some way not yet fully understood but accepted (emphasis mine) as an undoubted fact, both life and mind have developed from matter or the

1. Ibid., p. 55
2. Ibid., p. 57
3. Ibid., p. 58
4. Ibid., p. 320
5. Cf. Ibid., p. 320
physical basis of existence'. The point is that there are 'gaps' still remaining and that even such interpretations as Smuts's must make certain presuppositions.

Smuts boldly asserts that matter, like life in a sense, is creative, not of its own stuff, but of the forms, arrangements, organization and patterns which constitute its structure. Inorganic wholes, e.g. atoms, persist in re-creating themselves to maintain their own form, thus manifesting a characteristic tendency inherent in organic life. Through structural groupings and combinations, matter takes on position, reference and value in the order of the universe. By interpreting matter from 'inside', from its own perspective, we see its inner creative processes. The universe could not exist against its own entropy without the structural condition of energy, action or matter.

'Once we come to look upon matter not only as active, but as self-active, as active with its own activities, as indeed nothing else but Action, our whole conception of the physical order is revolutionized, and the great barriers between the physical and the organic begin to shrink and to shrivel.'

Matter has become, fundamentally, in this system, a configuration of space-time. The universe as activity is organized. And the real stuff of the universe is 'events'. There is, then, in Space-Time, as well as in matter, an organizing factor (tendency) without which their respective values could not exist.

The cell and the organism

There are two fundamental structures of the universe, the atom, since it is the unit of the world of matter, and the cell, which is the unit of the world of life. After following the significant researchers on cells from Robert Hooke, to De Vries and the study of Genetics and summarizing 'general and outstanding' features of the cell

1. Cf. ibid., p. 8
2. Ibid., p. 56
3. Presidential Address, op. cit.
and its structure, Smuts then contends that the cell requires a new point of view which differentiates and studies it not as a mere arrangement of parts as in the inorganic body but having a new complexity and distinct function. The cell, being the 'real innovation' in the 'march of Evolution' is

'a new structure in which energy becomes or is transformed into a new form of activity . . . endowed with a power of self-help and self-control, with special characters of selectiveness and reproduction, which constitute a unique departure in the universe'.

The plant cell performs a number of functions, not unlike the higher level organic activities, among which are breathing, manipulating, digesting, assimilating its food, reproducing its kind and healing itself when injured. Its major function, however, is that process in which the cell effects, in the material it receives, a condition of metabolism, a factor which distinguishes the living and non-living worlds. This process is characteristic of the organic world which constantly shows itself as dynamic and changing. Through the action in complex chemical compounds of enzymes, colloidal catalysts, photo-synthesis and the processes of osmosis, there is evidence that this action is not altogether of a mechanical character nor can it be duplicated by synthetic laboratory methods.

Postulating that the cell-divisions in the simplest unicellular life (simpler forms than algae) have a remarkable resemblance to electrical situations in the structure of atoms and that the sun, millions of years ago, was much hotter and contained more chemically active rays to facilitate organic changes so that electrical changes may have been the starting point of life, Smuts theorizes that the bifurcation of plant and animal types may have originally occurred

1. Ibid., p. 65
2. Ibid., pp. 66-69
3. Plural 'algae'
due to the necessity of food substances in the plant for air and earth, in animal forms for organic foods. It is from the need for organic foods that animals came to require motility and thus to develop motor and nervous systems. He does not say, since it is 'outside the scope of our task', how the cells of common origin developed in such a way as for one type to become plant and the other animal and thus demand two different types of food substances; or again, how the demand for different food substance may have contributed to morphological differentiation.

These extraordinary functions of cells might lead one to believe that some kind of 'psychism' exists in them, Smuts opines, but while the 'cell has not yet mind', it can be said that 'The primitive cell of life is on the way to Mind' with Mind at this stage being far off.¹

The two functions of cells, Metabolism and Reproduction, form one of the most interesting subjects of Smuts's discussion at this point. In Metabolism the cells are not 'self-centered' or 'self-regarding'. 'The cell functions for the other cells and for the plant as a whole.'² This is an assertion that 'One element in the cell functions for other elements and for the whole cell organism'.³ Secretions, production of carbohydrates, even the aroma, which renders the plant attractive for preservation of its species, all function in terms of the plant as a whole, proving it to be the manifestation of 'one vast cooperative system'. This is true, as well, of organisms in which there is 'specific direction' towards fulfillment and maintenance of that particular type of organism. In fact, this indicates how 'the impress of the whole which forms the organism is clearly stamped on all

1. Ibid., pp. 70-77
2. Ibid., p. 78
3. Ibid., p. 78
the details'. It is not an 'artificial result of its parts' but an active factor like the parts, and it appears to be in definite relation with them, influenced by them and again influencing them, and through this continuous interaction of parts and whole maintaining the moving equilibrium which is the organism.'

Smuts deals rather well with regeneration-processes in plants and animals sharing the interest in such a phenomenon characteristic of the last part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the investigations of Stahl, Roux, Loeb, Driesch, Haldane, Ritter and E.S. Russell being particularly prominent. The part-whole relationship is the frame of reference in which he approaches the subject so that the regeneration (within plants and animals) of injured or missing members is accomplished by undamaged parts and the whole. Their restoration occurs through metamorphic and functional changes in such a way as to preserve the whole, maintain its natural functions and fulfill its natural needs. This 'tendency toward the whole' effectively responds to the stimulus of need (damage) and without previous 'education' (Smuts) the whole organism works together to restore itself as a whole. The cells look beyond themselves to restore the immediate organic whole and, as well, the 'transcendent whole' which is its particular organic species type.

The plant or animal organism may be thought of as a community, according to Smuts, or 'a little living world in which law and order reign' where the parts subserve the common purpose of the whole in harmony and cooperation of duty and loyalty of each of all in 'the most beautiful illustration of mutual help . . . the . . . cell'.

1. Ibid., p. 79, cf. Aristotle, Chpt. III and later in this chapter.
2. Ibid., p. 80
3. For a fuller discussion refer to Appendix I.
4. Ibid., pp. 80-81
5. Ibid., p. 82
6. Ibid., p. 82
7. Ibid., p. 83
The atom and the cell are not utterly different but are expressions of some 'inner progressive tendency' of a universal character which enables one to recognize the unity which underlies them and the common features of their origin.

**Mind**

Following the atom, the cell and the organism, Mind becomes 'the third great fundamental structure of Holism'. Beginning in the living organism as a compensation mechanism which resulted from disturbance of equilibrium, commonly referred to as a 'vague sense of irritation', Mind has emerged through subsequent developments from 'sporadic and uncertain variations in mere organic structural functioning', blind 'tropisms', reflexes and conditioned reflexes, to 'ad-tension' and its active relationship between subject and object, coordinated sensori-motor activity, conation, consciousness of objects, development of conscious activity to self-conscious understanding, endeavor, control and freedom.

Mind has a dual aspect which is indicative of its dual source. This duality is best expressed in the Subject-Object relationship in which the Subject is not before the Object nor the Object before the Subject but arise simultaneously in consciousness. Smuts contends that the world is not the result of Mind nor is Mind the result of external stimuli on the brain. The factor in which Subject and Object (e.g. organism and environment) meet is referred to as 'experience'. He reasons from this that the Mind and Body relationship is a particular form of the Subject-Object situation. He says, 'They (meaning, it is presumed, the subject and object) are not independents but interdependents ... poles in the field of Mind'.

1. Ibid., p. 224.
2. Ibid., pp. 226-238; cf. Chapter X, thesis.
3. Ibid., p. 239. The subject-object problem is of a
making up the essential elements of experience. He says later in his work that Mind and Body are of this same relationship in Personality. The science of Relativity has supplied ample evidence that the 'I' is the necessary center of reference in the universe so that space, time and experience, for instance, are 'my space, time and experience'. Smuts uses this in support of his system which is individualistic. Although he says the 'individualist Self' is an abstraction, he lays unwarranted stress on the individuality of the organism. He is constantly emphasizing that 'there must be more self-regulation and less external regulation', to replace mere 'organic regulation' and advocating, contrary to Haldane who views critically Smuts's position at this point, the organism's greater independence from the environment. But he seems forced into giving some sort of recognition to interaction among personal wholes. He states, 'Nay, my very self, so uniquely individual in appearance, is, as I have said, largely a social construction, and rounded out of the social intercourse and psychical interaction with my fellows'. The self, he says, rests not on its individual foundations but on the whole universe. The evolution of mind begins with selfish appetite, which is gradually inhibited and ends in the 'impersonal endeavor towards the Good'. In this isolated section, we have the apex of what Smuts has to say about the interaction of the person with the environment and others. This reflects different treatment from Whitehead's 'dipolarity', 'mental pole', 'physical feelings', etc., etc. Here Smuts is considering, I believe, stimulus and behavior. He is not referring, as I see it, to the same idea of 'inter-subjectivity' developed by Sartre. Such a theory would recognize the meaning of the other to the one and the individualism of Smuts's theory concerning the personal (and also the organic) would be measurably contradicted.

1. Ibid., p. 240
2. Ibid., p. 242
3. Ibid., p. 245
4. Ibid., p. 245
5. Ibid., pp. 242-243, emphasis mine
we believe, Smuts's ability to present an entire thesis in development and function of organic and personal wholes without recourse to the inter-relationship between the organism and environment or between persons.

Mind, in addition to its conative and purposive attributes tending toward more regulation, higher coordination and greater order, is rational and thus the 'basis of the Reason'. Its individualistic interest is only harmonized into higher ethical pursuits through struggle, but this Reason is more than individual for 'it is a part of that Order which regulates the universe...'. Smuts says it is 'Through our Reason we partake of universality and are members of the everlasting Order of the universal'. The 'individual Mind is... influenced by the universal Mind'.

This leads to the special concept of Mind Smuts is advocating. 'Mind qua Reason' is an organizing principle. Throughout 'sensation, perception, imagination, conception, and on to judgment or reasoning', there is a 'synthetic activity at work producing structural masses of experience on definite ascertainable principles of selection and grouping'. These 'psychological items' are not mere aggregates but synthetic unities, the result of 'Mind the organiser... the regulative coordinating principle in the universe'. Sensory perceptions are fused into unitary wholes, not because of an 'assumed attraction for each other on their part', but because Mind 'fuses and unites' them. 'From attention to judgment, volition, action and emotion' there is evidence of a synthetic character which results in 'association, syntheses, groups, things, bodies, and wholes', a concept essentially the

1. Ibid., p. 243
2. Ibid., p. 246; cf. Chapter V, thesis
3. Ibid., p. 244
4. Ibid., p. 247
5. Ibid., p. 256
same, he says, as Kant's 'synthetic unity of apperception'. While Mind is a factor initiating free choice and thus often disharmony and disruption, it is also an organizing or harmonizing factor in experience. It has freed itself from organic inheritance and by laying great importance on value creates its own environment in society, language, tradition, writing, literature, etc., all of which make up its experience. If it were not for Mind, holistic Evolution would have been 'a tame affair' with the universe moving on as if in a dream. 'For it neither the great lights or the deep shadows. (sic) Truth, Beauty and Goodness would have been there, but unknown, unseen, unloved.'

Mind has its psychological 'field'. In keeping with his individualism, Smuts suggests that this 'field' is produced by the subconscious mind with its forgotten experiences and physiological and racial inheritance. Forgotten experiences constantly influence consciousness for they are 'not dead, but alive and active'. Because the mind has no 'water-tight compartments' (a fact Smuts inconsistently maintains) the past is integral with its present action. In a very questionable assertion he states, 'The hereditary structure as modified by ancestral experience . . . gives us our fundamental bias, our points of view, our temperament, our instinctive reactions, and our particular ways of looking at persons and things'. In psychic Evolution, a 'general plasticity of reaction' was inherited so that the range of acquiring experience and the vast capacity of learning to react to

2. Ibid., p. 211
3. Ibid., p. 218. In this section one of Smuts's always interesting but all too frequent eloquent, poetic, 'purple' (A.K.Stout), mystical, rhetorical moods overwhelms him. The style is interesting, sometimes eloquent, sometimes moralizing (pp.315-316), sometimes resounding with the superficiality of an advice-giving psychologist (p.315) and given to a metaphorical and poetic style not unlike Boodin's Cosmic Evolution which Smuts asserts to have affinity to his own view, and Walt Whitman's Leaves of Grass. We cannot, in this study however, consider this aspect of his thought and personality.
4. Ibid., p. 255
various stimuli is present but indefinite waiting individual development and appropriation. On the basis of such 'fields', Smuts suggests there is 'the mother sense' behind the 'special senses and their evolution', continuing a silent growth and replenishment process. He affirms the possibilities of the sensus communis and telepathy.

Smuts does not seem to see the implications of his reference to 'mind as an organ of wholes'. He is not identifying mind with brain however much he ambiguously speaks of 'the brain with its correlate mind' and yet confidently opines that mind has risen above its physiological source even higher than life has risen above its inorganic beginnings. Smuts, I think, would agree, as we all do, with Gilbert Ryle that mind has no 'place', although one might be led, from Smuts's assertion, to interpret 'mind as an organ' (of Holism) in that way. The problem, however, is deeper. By 'organ of wholes' or 'organ of holism', is it meant that mind is an expression or realization or special case of holism (Smuts) and wholes? Is 'Holism' another name for mind? (See Morgan's criticism of Smuts on this point in Appendix V.) Is mind free to think as it will or does holism (Smuts) make it think what it thinks and decide what it decides? To put it a better way, 'do I think or does something inside me think?' or 'do I decide

1. Ibid., p. 274
2. Ibid., p. 257. The author is not sure what Smuts is really trying to say in his discussion of telepathy. He does not give a new interpretation. He explains what telepathy is and does so in the traditionally accepted manner. Possibly he feels bound to include all hypotheses about the mind which seems to be the homage he pays to such theories as 'the collective and racial unconscious'. Or possibly he had deep in his mind what Huxley has expressed: that the extra-sensory faculties (paranormal, super-normal, etc.) were the mathematical faculties during the first and second glaciations of the Ice Age and that as evolution continues this faculty will increasingly develop. Thus, as the position maintains, evolution is not finished. Cf. The Uniqueness of Man, p. 30
3. Ibid., p. 113
4. Ibid., p. 253
5. Ibid., The Concept of Mind, Chapters I, II
and act or does some ghostly "holism" (Smuts) do the deciding and acting in and through me? Smuts does not really consider this problem. His whole thesis is weak in giving us any answer to it.¹

In his theory of the future and immediate experience, he gives, he considers, real freedom to mind and establishes it as autonomous qua uninfluenced and self-directory. The future as an operative factor in the present is accomplished through purpose, Smuts says, a function in conscious and unconscious activity by which Mind 'contemplates some future desired end and makes the idea of this end exert its full force in the present'. Through purpose, the 'most complete proof of freedom and creative power', the mind 'becomes master in its own house with the power to carry out its own wishes and shape its own course uninfluenced by the conditions of the environment'.²

Since the purposive order is the realm of 'the creative spirit', Smuts is led to conceive Kant's 'Realm of Ends' or Values and Ideals as the ultimate 'destined home of Mind'.³

Surely the unique 'emergence' and development, the characteristics and functions of Mind have not arisen by chance. Possibly there has been a directing process or tendency from the beginning giving rise to what is now experienced as Mind in all its activities.

**Personality**

Personality has often been considered 'a unique and isolated phenomenon without any genetic relations to the rest of the universe.'⁴ Smuts treats it as the latest and supreme whole in the process of holistic Evolution. It is 'a new whole', 'the highest and completest of all wholes', 'the most recent conspicuous mutation in the evolution of all wholes'.

3. Ibid., p. 259
4. Ibid., p. 261
of Holism' and is a creative synthesis in which the earlier series of material, organic and psychical wholes are genetically incorporated in this culminative phase of a higher order.¹

Smuts does, in fact, talk about personality as the unique whole in which body and mind as parts are united and fused into a 'mutual transfigurement'. One without the other is unnatural and as such would not be what it is in a living organism, as we know it. Further, though they are united in an integral whole, to conceive of them as 'independently real substances' is most inadequate. The view put forward by Smuts is that it is not so much an 'inter-action' of body and mind but an 'intro-action' or 'peraction' in which there is a kind of penetration of the functions of one in the other.² But possibly it is more important to see that Mind and Body only function as elements in the whole of human personality, the whole being the synthesizing or mediating factor in action, along with a dynamic tendency which makes for the organization. The principle of wholes is applied here so that personality is more than the sum (Smuts) of its two major parts (functions) without which neither the whole nor parts would exist and all action is action-wholes (where no action occurs in body or mind alone but is the personality-whole acting as such). The something 'more' is reducible to a 'more refined and intimate structural relation of the elements themselves'.³

The personality is a blend of organic and psychic inheritance (capacities) yet this heritage, a racial one supported by the whole evolutionary process, is transfigured and raised to a new power in a unique development, the individual. Personality, then, as

¹. Ibid., pp. 263-264
². Ibid., pp. 267-273
³. Ibid., p. 273; Smuts is very weak all through his system in saying what the 'more' is; he uses the Aristotelian idea of form shaping the parts, a theory having close affinity to the Gestalt in Gestalt Psychology but here we have the 'more' represented as the intensity of relations and this is very near the old Gaza psychology idea. Cf. Chapter V on Gestalt and Appendix.
a unique whole, 'is not inherited, however much its constituent qualities and elements have been inherited'.¹ This implies that Personality is free and creative and indeed creativeness is more pronounced here than anywhere else in nature.² This would not mean, however, that it is fluctuating incoherently with no degree of certainty. Although it is an 'immature' development in the Evolutionary process and shows a great deal of variability, it 'may find its law in the end' with its mastery dominating the things of experience.³ Its 'synthetic relations' are indispensable for the explanation of man, his experience and his world.

At various points of Holism and Evolution, Psychology receives its share of eulogy and criticism. A reformed Psychology along the lines Smuts suggests can be the science of the future but as it stands it is wholly inadequate. Psychology, Smuts declared, has failed to appreciate the reality and unique significance of Personality. It deals with the analysis of the human mind in its general character and not in its individual uniqueness; to do this is to eliminate its very essence. It is concerned with the 'average individual', a creature of mental abstraction, not the 'real individual'. He maintains that the neglected individual differences of Personality are actually all-important. Furthermore, Psychology is not interested in Personality, but mind (mental activity) and has failed to appreciate the biological aspects which help from the Personality and relegated this to 'other branches of science'. According to Smuts, this limitation (failure to see the wholeness of Personality) has made it impossible to understand even this mental side of personality which also must

1. Ibid., p. 274
2. Ibid., p. 275; yet even 'our particular ways of looking at persons and things' (p. 255) is given by 'the hereditary structure'.
3. Ibid., p. 276
include the subconscious which, except for psycho-analysis, would have remained virtually unknown.

The Personality needs and deserves a science all its own. Such suggestions as 'Characterology' (James Ward) are too narrow. For a science that treats Personality as a whole, Smuts recommends the term 'Personology'. This Graeco-Latin hybrid word is not without significance, for the brilliance of Greek Philosophy is blended with the Roman idea of persona (the Greeks had no clear concept of personality) and the sacredness for personality developed in Christianity. It would not consider Personality as the sum of separate abstracted activities - a 'bundle of psychological abstractions' - but an organic-psychic whole. Analysis is important, but synthesis, unities, wholes of behavior, action, experience, the Persona, the life development become the subject matter for Personology pursued in biographical studies of people who best evidenced the wholeness of personality envisioned by the holistic 'Science of Personality'. It is not their 'outward' behavior, or their position in public life that is of greatest interest but the inward growth, development, dynamics of behavior, feelings, reactions, thought, the stages of personality expression, the conscious and unconscious life that interest this science. It is from this study and comparative studies of personalities which will reveal the 'law of Personality'. While this is a difficult task from which most have shied off, it provides the answer to some of man's oldest questions and in it lies 'the key to all the highest interests of the human race'.

As a whole, Personality 'is fundamentally an organ of self-realization'. One of Smuts's most interesting discussions with reference to Personality, is at the point where he postulates the whole

1. Ibid., pp. 263-289
organism striving to realize its end (its potential 'nature', Goldstein). Just as the organism in its growth and regeneration persists through all obstructions, overcoming all obstacles to 'realize and complete itself or its type in each individual case', 1 so Personality strives to eliminate all factors which seek to detour it from the attainment of its realization, that is, its 'spiritual structure or character'. In either case, the whole 'strives to realize its end, to eliminate what is alien and adventitious, to conserve and develop what is pure and relevant to its ideal, and so to reach perfection of visible, outward structure and function in the one case, of inward spiritual grace and unity in the other'. 2 'The ideal Personality is a whole' in the sense that its organization precludes disharmony or autonomy of parts. The 'immanent end' of personality 'is to realise and develop itself as a whole, to establish and secure its wholeness and to render itself proof against invasion and injury from all extraneous and hostile influences'. 3

The basis of the Personality-whole is activity, which is the dynamic 'self-maintaining' and 'self-realizing' power in it. Smuts believes that feelings give rise to activity which in turn gives rise to Intelligence so that action is primary and thinking and feeling are subsidiary to it; these are constitutive of Personality. 4 These dynamic factors, i.e. feeling, thinking and action, are held together, each entering into any one experience, by the whole called Personality and by a tendency within that Personality to realize itself through expression in whole-activity. Activity, then, seems to be a major means by which Personality tests whether it has moved

1. Ibid., p. 294
2. Ibid., p. 294
3. Ibid., p. 302
4. See Section II, Chapter VII on Person as Agent for some implications of Smuts's considerations here.
closer or farther from its goal of self-realization, or if one prefers, the realization of the Self. This activity is purposive in its direction toward preserving and realizing a greater amount of harmony, unity or wholeness. This is evidenced in its coordination, organization, and elimination of material which will hinder the accomplishment of its goal.

Smutz suggests that the control and direction of the will in its action, which is making for whole-experiences, is not primarily conscious but operates in what he calls 'the subconscious field of personal life'. It is only at sudden points of insight a person is aware that his conduct has emerged in response to this dynamic function which is seeking to maintain personality-balance. Now the ideal personality is one which has cultivated this inner activity and, together with deliberate choice, harmonizes the discordant elements of personality and experience into purposeful goal-directed, ideal-directed action. This harmonization (the character of wholeness) of person-elements (not so much the elements themselves) is the difference between the healthy and the disordered personality. Body and mind, intellect and heart, will and emotions must not be separately repressed but all developed and blended into the structure and function of Personality. These cannot act separately or some not function at all and health be maintained. Personality is the expression of their unity and in this they find their wholeness.

Smutz is caught up in the growing conviction in the early part of this century that there is a healing tendency in personality manifested in a tendency to completeness, a tendency to wholeness.

1. Ibid., p. 296
2. Ibid., pp. 296-297
3. Ibid., pp. 297-298
4. Ibid., pp. 298-299
We earlier mentioned that this thought grew with the interesting research in regeneration and constancy phenomena conducted by the biological and physiological sciences. The same thought displayed itself with confidence in the theories of psychologists, psychotherapists and psychoanalysts of the day and remains one of the major sources of interest and research in physiological 'homeostasis' and psychological constancy and 'self-healing'. One of the earliest advocates of the modern psychological emphasis was Alphonse Maeder whom we shall consider in Chapter IX of this paper. Actually, the present author is led to believe, the concept goes back as far as Hippocrates. The same insight concerning the healing tendencies of life is reflected in the vis medicatrix naturae of the Latin physicians, implied in Aristotle's doctrine of entelechy, Zeno's 'hor'me', Spinoza's 'conatus', Telesius' self-preservation theory, the vis medicatrix Dei of the medieval theologians and, though of lesser emphasis, may be seen in the equilibrative theories of Cuvier, von Baer, Bichat and Bernard. The biologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with depth psychologists such as Freud, Maeder, Jung, Hinkle, Hadfield, took up, in more direct expression, the ancient theme of self-healing set out by Hippocrates some twenty-five centuries earlier. ¹

Smuts interestingly contributes to this growing awareness of 'the tendency to wholeness' as a psychological phenomenon. He states that the nature of Personality is to maintain and realize itself as a whole. When disruption or mutilation occurs, it must heal itself, restore its balance and maintain its type (nature). Often it is overwhelmed in its task but its power is gradually rising as it gathers the centrifugal tendencies into an expression of wholeness. It 'saves and purifies the personal character often even by means of the sins

¹. For a more detailed historical study, see Appendix I, thesis.
and excess of which it has been guilty'. 1 Smuts seems to say that when a part of the character has become degraded, the rest of personality launches a course of conduct which seeks to rescue the rebel from its degradation even by means of a violent crisis in order to preserve the self and continue its path to wholeness. If Smuts had also said that personality 'denies the tendency its aspiration in order to preserve itself' he would have been psycho-dynamically sound as well as prophetic.

One of the contributions Smuts felt his system had made concerns the problem of causality. 2 When a stimulus comes to an organism or person, the whole integrates and synthesizes it through the parts so that the behavior appears as the 'free and almost original action' of the organism behaving as a whole. Mechanical causation in organic (and personal) wholes is replaced by a conception of the organism as 'the dominant element in the causal concept'. This, of course, is one way to handle the concept of the relationship between cause and effect, that is, by interjecting the organism in between cause and effect to make three elements in a sequence. In recasting the concept of causation in 'organic and psychical activities', he has insightfully brought to focus individual variables as determinants or shaping elements in what is done or what happens. He is attempting to show that in organic and psychical activity there is no cause. But he has not distinguished an event or happening from a deed done by intention which may be said to have no cause at all, in which case the activity of organisms, since they do not act by intention, may only be referred to some organic synthesizing process which by its synthesis alone changes a stimulus. In this way the organism is spoken of as being its own

1. Ibid., p. 299
2. Ibid., pp. 126-127, 135-139, 306-308
cause. Action done by intention and thus without a cause is the possession of the personal. It can be said that this part of Smuts's theory is based on his individualistic system which fails to comprehend the nature of the organism-environment relationship, overexaggerates the autonomy of the organism and reduces environmental pressure and influence to a matter of inconsequence. This, of course, is a mistake and need not logically follow even from his theory of causation. Concerning disintegrating forces, however, Smuts's theory is that environmental stimuli become so great, or are of a particularly penetrating kind to certain personalities, that the person succumbs to them. Some people can stand up to these environmental blasts and others can not; he cannot account for this, i.e. why one person is more vulnerable to certain blasts than others, as indeed, with any organic theory, he cannot. We are only led to believe that there are some people who are simply weak and they surrender to external pressures and in doing so become 'contemptible'.\(^1\) They cannot resist these temptations. If the Personality is to maintain its purity\(^2\) (Reinheit, meaning pure from

1. Ibid., p. 302
2. Harmony and purity, the aim of exclusion, is an integral concept of contemporary theories of evolution. Weiss writes, 'Lamarck's concept of adaptation through direct functional adaptation is absurd, not just wrong . . . The eye develops without seeing, digestive enzymes without food, feathers without flight, instincts without practise. They are all predesigned, prearranged, prefitted in forward reference to the needs of the mature body . . . Evolution, therefore, brings about adaptedness not by the purposeful construction of matching designs, but by the routing out from ever-changing assortment of designs of all but those that happen to match . . . (this is) based on the supreme rule of harmony as a prerequisite for continued survival . . . ' in Adaptation, (Romano, Editor) pp. 7-17. The Lamarckian view was given added support by McDougall's interesting but relatively unknown researches in which untrained rats made an average of 165 errors before learning to avoid a brightly-lit exit which gave them a shock, the offspring of twenty-three successively trained generations of rats made on average only 25 errors. Cf. Flugel, op. cit., p. 278. Whether or not the Lamarckian view is accepted or rejected (and we have presented the two views) is not our concern. We do stress that the idea of purity and harmony more recently advocated is a basic point in Smuts's evolutionary theory and is one of the characteristics of all wholes.
alien elements) or wholeness, it must reject all influences which would upset the continued effort toward this goal. In using the term 'reject' Smuts, once again, does not state how the rejection is accomplished.

Thus, Personality, pressing continuously for greater realization of itself, is essentially, 'a specialized form of Holism' as Smuts puts it. Its task is a synthetic process of 'the creative transmutation of the lower into the higher in the holistic series'.

Throughout Smuts's discussion on personality, there is an unmistakable demand for an inner tendency giving unity, relationship and intro-action to personality elements, a tendency making for wholes of behavior and action; a tendency seeking the maintenance and realization and perfection of the whole. To allow this tendency free control, he asserts, is to be led to Wholeness and Freedom and Purity; to reject it is to end in 'defeat, enslavement and death'. But what is this tendency seen in personality and all through the evolutionary process which is the result of its self-expression? It is with this question that our discussion is now concerned.

The holistic-tendency

According to Smuts's theory, this is a whole-making universe. Its fundamental character is to be active and its 'material stuff' is activity. Its primary function is the production of ever more complete and advanced wholes of which Evolution of the universe, both inorganic and organic, is 'nothing but the record of this whole-making activity in its progressive development'. This begins with 'scientific mass, gravitation, and energy' emerging as 'configurations of Space-Time'.

1. Ibid., p. 304
The 'curved structure of the real Space-Time' becomes the 'field' for all wholes progressively graded throughout nature. This progressive gradation extends from mere physical mixtures which preserve their separate characters and functions to chemical compounds where structure is more synthetic and activities more difficult to trace to individual parts; to organisms where a greater intensity of synthesis has been effected and self-regulation arises; to minds where conscious control, creative power, organization become more distinguishable and effective and finally to personality, which is the most evolved whole among the structures of the universe. A creative synthesis seems to give rise to new wholes of a higher degree of organization and freedom, so that wholeness extends with each successive realization. 'It is through a continuous and universal process of whole-making that reality rises step by step . . . ." The dynamic tendency which accounts for the emergence of wholes is what Smuts calls 'Holism'.

Holism (holistic-tendency) is the 'ultimate synthetic, ordering, organizing, regulative activity in the universe which accounts for all the structural groupings and synthesis in it'. There is, in fact, according to Heim, 'no greater law to which we can trace it back or from which we can infer it or give it a basis'.

In such a theory, matter, life, mind and personality are realizations of the holistic-tendency in progressive manifestation from which they are all constituted so that at one stage, writes Smuts, 'Holism is matter and energy'; at another, organism and life; at the latest, mind and personality. The multitudinuous forms of

1. Op. cit., p. 31
2. Ibid., p. 86
3. Ibid., p. 85
4. Ibid., p. 108
5. Ibid., p. 317
6. The Transformation of the Scientific World View, pp. 29-233
7. The passage to which we refer reads: 'Holism is matter and energy at one stage; it is organism and life at another stage; and it is mind and Personality at its latest stage', ibid., p. 320. Our criticism, cf. Chpts. V, X; cf. Appendix V.
this 'Holistic Universe'\(^1\) are the 'outcome of' the holistic-tendency. The relation of the four major areas (matter, life, mind and personality) to the holistic-tendency is described as the relationship of species to genus, declares Smuts. In fact, evolution is the manifestation of this fundamental, universal activity.\(^2\) The universe and evolution are a dynamic process in which, at the heart of them, there is a whole-ness tendency. Wholes, from inchoate inorganic wholes to micro-organisms and to personality (which make up nature) are the result of this internal effort toward complexity, differentiation, integration and completion. This striving toward greater complexity and unity and the emergence of creative expressions (wholes), are not due to some vague and indefinite 'force' in the universe but an 'inner urgency', a 'specific tendency' resident within these structures and their fields; it is the 'inherent character of the universe' to make wholes. It is working up the raw material or 'unorganized energy units of the world', utilizing, assimilating, organizing them and endowing them 'with specific structure and character and individuality, and finally with personality, and creates beauty and truth and value from them'.\(^3\)

A reader might be abruptly upset by Smuts's declaration, at one obscure point, that the holistic-tendency is 'practically universal'.\(^4\) All along we are led to believe that the holistic-tendency is universal, in fact, all that exists is the outcome of it.\(^5\) It might appear to be a contradiction with the main line of his argument. It seems to this author, however, that there are two possibilities

1. Ibid., p. 321
2. Ibid., p. 325
3. Ibid., p. 107
4. Ibid., p. 97
5. Ibid., p. 272 and numerous references to the universal Holism.
to consider: Smuts may be thinking of the distinctive features of human personality, i.e. decision, intention, reason, etc., which demand (although Smuts does not see or present this clearly) that the holistic-principle have their cooperation, or, if there is a tendency to the formation of wholes, he may be thinking there must be a prima materia in which this tendency operates; it not being itself a whole. Both of these considerations seem corroborated in the statements that personality must be 'an organ of Holism', in the fact that Smuts's concept of wholes has much in common with Aristotle's theory of form and matter, that Nature is not a closed system (whole) and that we cannot say what Nature is actually but only that its primary characteristic is whole-making.

The fact that parts get into relation with each other and on so doing form the existential whole is indicative of a tendency resident within the parts making for organization. An organism can be said to be a whole at each stage of its development even though the present whole is intensifying and increasing its differentiation and complexity of structure.¹ This intensification of 'the character of wholeness' (Smuts) is the tendency of the whole to rise either to a new order of wholes, as we see in evolution, or, in the individual history of an organism, to rise to the full meaning of its complete nature. It is to be noticed that the whole-making tendency is not something separate from the parts-whole but is their basic character, that is, the parts strengthening their relationship with other parts and the whole and the whole increasing its wholeness throughout. It also should be noticed, that it is not mere complexity of organization toward which the holistic-tendency is directed but to wholes and individual kinds of wholes; each whole has its end-form which,

¹. We shall consider Smuts's different point of view concerning personality in Chapter XI, thesis.
though not explicit from the beginning, draws, as it were, the developing organism through progressive phases to it. The process in which the organism realizes itself through progressive phases of differentiation and realization (of structure and function) is made possible only because its characteristic feature is its wholeness-tendency. The history of the evolution of wholes is but a record of the holistic-tendency in its various expressions.

Holism - a brief comparison

The old and the new theories of evolution

Smuts differentiates his position from other contemporary theories. He compares his theory to the 'old theory of evolution'. This view, Smuts says, maintains that the universe is dynamic and progressive. Nevertheless, this view held that everything was given at the beginning and whose appearance merely represented an unfolding of that which was contained in it. Progressive realization of new created forms is impossible. The new view, 'a new departure of the nineteenth century . . . and . . . perhaps one of the most significant departures in the whole range of human thought',¹ of which Holism is representative, puts a minimum of 'existence' (Smuts) in the beginning and maintains that through progressive creation new forms develop from those previously existing but with new qualities. The universe is not completed, ready to break forth or unfold, he says, but is a dynamic process giving rise to new groupings, new materials and new forms displaying novelties whose existence cannot be calculated on a regrouping of already existing forms but only upon the synthesis of old and new materials and functions.² In such a theory as 'Creative Holism'

1. Ibid., p. 89
2. The contrast is well seen by comparing Balfour, A.J., Theism and Humanism, passim, with Sellars, R., Evolutionary Naturalism, passim.
Morgan), Smuts maintains that creativeness becomes directly contingent upon the position of reference the existing wholes retain on the levels of Nature but, nevertheless, a measure of creativity is everywhere, so that in wholes the bondage of the past is broken, individuation and universality reside side by side as universal Holism (tendency) realizes itself in and through the individual existents. Evolution is, then, liberated from a view which considers it to be static, a view which is unreal in a universe of activity, action and creativity.¹

**Bergson**

Bergson explains reality on the basis of a kind of undifferentiated homogeneous, bare, flow or process, Duration. This principle, which is basic to our idea of time, is the creative process, the source of all the multiplicity of phenomena in the universe. Evolution, as Bergson sees it, is the expression of this fundamentum beginning as bare flow and building up the concrete forms of reality. The direction of this 'flow' is due to Intellect, which is the instrument of action, purposive, spatially converting pure Duration into impure Time, and into structures or forms.

In such a theory, Smuts believes error to have arisen where Bergson singles out a pure homogenous 'flow' of nothing, he says, to produce reality. To correct this by selecting Intellect to bear the load of differentiation, making of it what Kant made of Space and Time ('forms imposed ab extra on sensible reality by the activity of mind'), is not to solve the problems of appearance and reality or of its structure and function. This subjective factor in experience cannot account

¹. The eighteenth century controversy was between the believers in Preformation who maintained 'that the development of the animal germ resembled that of a bud' so that within the shell, the chicken, in all its parts, was already there and the Epigeneticists who said that the embryo chick consisted merely of uniform sheets of tissue which the form of the organs of the bird was gradually impressed. - Though improvement of theory is apparent, 'the epigeneticists were proved right'. MacBride, E.W., *Evolution*. 
for the objective order of Nature any more than the impoverished 'bare empty form of Duration' (elan vital) can be the source of creative emergence in multiplicity.\(^1\)

Smuts seems to summarize the doctrine well. The contrast with Holism, a specific tendency making for wholes, is immediately apparent.\(^2\)

**Vitalism**

The contrast between Vitalism and Holism is easily seen.\(^3\) Vitalism, Smuts contends, is right in that it considers physico-chemical agencies and categories as insufficient to explain the phenomena of living organisms. But when it conceives of the organism as merely a material system supplemented by a new 'life-force' which controls bodily movement, it is entirely wrong. Here, 'Life as Vitalism or vital force is considered a real entity', a 'non-material, spiritual character . . . reduced to the level of a force among other forces, different from them indeed, but not so different as not to influence them or to be influenced by them'.\(^4\) This kind of vitalism seems only to repeat the Cartesian fallacy (and the fallacy of science and common opinion)\(^5\) of the res cogitans in the res extensa, two separate, distinct entities dwelling side by side, the spiritual principle directing the inert material system.

Smuts contends, of course, that the organism is self-developing, self-regulating, and self-moving. The controlling principle is not external to the organism but internal. Behavior is of the

2. Smuts's effort is, he feels, more 'realistic' than Bergson's since it is supposedly free from the artistic language of philosophy, i.e. language of intuition and imagination. There is, possibly, an effort to be more specific and definite but his concept of the wholeness of the universe and its harmony may also be 'the work of art'.
3. Cf. good discussion in Heim, op. cit., pp. 207, 215ff
5. Ibid., p. 157
whole, not the effect of a force exterior to itself.¹

**Mechanism**

Smuts finds surprisingly little conflict between his theory and mechanism. This theory seems to be a compromise treatment which assimilates the major contentions of both Holism and mechanism. We have seen that the character of wholeness increases in the progressive grading up of forms; that each form of a more holistic nature builds on earlier forms so that it retains elements of its predecessors (wholes become parts in the new configuration because of complete re-organization due to new factors and relations). Remembering that mechanism represents structure as the working parts operating independently, the resultant effect being the summation of separate activities, one readily sees that this is true of a great many wholes of the universe. These 'incipient wholes' (physico-chemical structures) are early manifestations of reality on the 'scale of wholes', while Holism is increasingly realized the higher one goes on the evolutionary ladder. The point is that a measure of mechanism is everywhere present for the highest forms have had their source in these earlier manifestations of existence. Just so, a measure of 'Holism' is everywhere; that is, 'they (Holism and mechanism) vary in inverse proportions with the forward march of Evolution'.² In fact, Smuts makes it clear that mechanism is merely an early expression of Holism (Smuts) inasmuch as Holism (Smuts) is the genus from which all reality has its start. Holism (Smuts) is also the 'character'³ inherent in wholes.

1. Ibid., p. 101
2. Ibid., p. 180
3. The author feels that some explanation is needed at this point concerning terminology. We refer to the thought that Holism is genus and character (quality). Such statements may lead one to conclude that 'Holism is due to Holism', a seeming tautology, to say nothing of the fact that such statements appear to evidence an odd confusion of logical
which are the stuff of reality. The objection to mechanism is that since mind and personality are nearing the highest expression of the holistic-tendency and have divested themselves more and more of mechanistic influence in their emergence so that they now possess little that can be called mechanistic, it is a travesty when science treats them on an entirely mechanistic basis. Holism breaks with both naturalism and mechanism insofar as they are purely materialistic in their denial of the syntheses and creativity which give rise to the organism's self-direction, personality, and freedom. This is the result of a theory built on the assumption that elements in an organic structure are the same whether compounded or not, a theory generalized from physical aggregates. This theory does not deal with 'secondary qualities' since it has a faulty concept of function, relation and meaning, nor does it take into account the progressive development in wholes which form the basis for 'next order' wholes in the rise of higher orders of existence. Movements of some complex 'mechanical wholes' can be predicted on the basis of structure alone but not organic wholes. It is useless to study parts or elements in isolation for we learn nothing about their properties and functions in conjoint categories. Lloyd Morgan considers this problem in Smuts's work. Morgan suggests that 'de facto holism' which then 'is a "manifestation" of Holism' be employed to differentiate Holism as a universal tendency or genus from the holistic-character inherent in things. He goes on to explain that in this way, 'Holism "determines" that which is characterized by holism; that Holism is "at work as the fundamental synthetic, ordering, organizing, regulating, activity of the universe"; that it is "creative of evolution" . . . '. I take it that holism refers to an 'organizational structure-function', while Holism is the tendency in all things making the de facto holism (organization) possible. The problem may be stated rather like we did in Chapter One, in Spinoza's terms, i.e. the holistic-tendency is the natura naturans and natura naturata (what Morgan calls 'de facto holism') is the holistic-organizational complex'. Cf. Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1927, v. 11.

1. Cf. ibid., pp. 145-181
2. Ibid., pp. 177ff
3. Ibid., pp. 329, 292
activity (in which activity they change). Inadequate interpretation of organic behavior results from these assumptions. It is really at the level of bio-chemical and biological wholes that mechanism ceases to be an adequate interpretation, inasmuch as wholes at this point are not reducible in structure or function to a 'summation' of parts.¹

Mechanism cannot account for the activity of wholes. Naturalism makes little allowance for evolution which is, by nature, creative in the production of new types of entities. Idealism errs where it fails to see the spiritual as an emergent, not as indigenous from the beginning. The Panpsychism of James Ward is inconsistent with the epigenesis of creative Evolution since it attributes spiritual qualities to all forms of existence.²

The philosophy of Holism, Smuts believes, seeks to give a scientific view by asserting that the universe is creative, that mind and personality are essentially characteristic of the higher wholes on the evolutionary scale, that the gradient of wholes begins in realism and ends in idealism (both necessary for interpretation in their respective spheres), and that science, in its study of details, with philosophy, in its study of ultimate concepts, must meet in the synthesis of Holistic interpretation.³

**Darwinism**

Compared to Darwinism, Evolutionary Holism represents 'a new view of one of the Darwinian factors and extends the scope of Evolution beyond the purely organic "domain"'.⁴ Darwinism is built

1. Ibid., p. 103. There are numerous ways of expressing the same idea such as '...a state of greater perfection can never be understood from that of lesser perfection and that only the converse is true'. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 515; or 'The lower type of being cannot intrude itself into the higher realm as an active cause and can only effect it as a stimulus'. Lossky, op. cit., p. 152; or that the more complex cannot be interpreted by the less complex.
2. Ibid., pp. 317-336
3. Ibid., passim
4. Ibid., p. 182
on two major principles, Variation and Natural Selection. In its first phase, Natural Selection by survival of the fittest, an external process, was given priority and far outshone the principle of Variation. The second phase, due to the researches and writings of Weismann, DeVries and Mendel, has dwelt, rather, on the internal principle of modification (in the broadest sense), namely Variation. Smuts maintains that while the external factor is necessary for organic interpretation, it is this later emphasis which points to the real source of modification of structure and function within the cell itself. It is this later principle which Smuts seeks to expound and improve. He does so by maintaining that modification and selection are not due to individual or isolated variations but that morphological or functional change is a change of the organism as a whole. The variation is possibly the most conspicuous change but basically this change is one in which the preservation of the wholeness of the organism is involved in every minute modification or mutation. The whole is the active factor and does the selecting in terms of its own organization, preservation and development. The environment acts as a stimulus to internal activity but it is the organism which reacts, changes the stimulus and determines its own course of activity. On such a theory of the organism, the concept of internal and external as independent factors gives way to that of interaction. This internal factor of Variation has come, through its historical development, to be altogether too mechanical an operation. This, however, is resolved in the

1. According to MacBride, Lamarck and the 19th century transformisms indicated a long development of the organism through environmental demands (refer to Lamarck in this thesis) but this concept was not called evolution until the first half of the 19th century when Charles Lyell propounded it in The Principles of Geology, there referring to the gradual process in nature. It was Spencer in his Synthetic Philosophy who combines the view (Variation and Natural Selection) to account for everything, Evolution, pp. 6-8
concept of Holism which unites the two factors, Variation and Natural Selection, in the organism and its interacting field.

Another important fact is that Holism allows for the repression of variations as well as their creation. This is one of the most neglected areas of Darwinian thought. Smuts asserts that it is necessary for the organism to repress some features of its own striving in order to maintain both its equilibrium and its organic preservation. This feature is more fully developed in personality where discipline, repression and restraint help to adjust the organism to the demands of its environment and ideals.

Holism also maintains that it is not the strongest, most virile that survive but 'those variations which are along the road of its own development, efficiency and perfection'. It is not some part function or structure that is 'selected' for survival but the whole organism. It is always the whole (containing its variations) with the greatest character of wholeness which has the greatest survival value. For the universe is not basically a scene of antagonism and warfare but essentially friendly, seeking the creative unity of diverse elements of existence. Mutual adaptation rather than destruction, coordination rather than dissociation is the fundamental character of reality. There is in nature an 'overplus of the whole', an 'equilibrium-plus' given in order to extend the wholeness of the organism. 'Holism', subsuming Variation and Natural Selection in itself, is basic for the interpretation of a universe which goes beyond mere organic evolution and gives rise to a higher scale of wholes, a universe of value, art, literature, ideals, religion and meaning.

1. Ibid., p. 213
2. This whole positive approach is very different from the 'tooth and claw' Darwinian philosophy. Whitehead shares this idea with Smuts in Science and the Modern World, pp. 256-259. The whole Darwinian Idea of Selection and survival is a reductio ad absurdum.
The 'Holistic Universe'

This brings us to Smuts's 'Holistic Universe' and Weltanschauung and his discursive attempt to account for values on the basis of the wholeness-tendency, thereby including within its scope the already considered inorganic factors at one end of the scale and spiritual or moral ideals at the other.

Smuts is true to his position when he recognizes the universe, not as animistic or mechanistic, but as essentially whole-making. But this whole-making, he admits, is not an easy process, for it meets in the universe contradiction, unreason, sin and suffering, error and evil. But despite this resistance, the holistic process is not chaotic or involved in 'hopeless irreconcilable conflict'. The conflict is mitigated as Holism (Smuts) is ever being realized in new and higher wholes of greater harmony.

'Through the steadily rising series of wholes it is producing ever more highly organised centres whose inner freedom and creative metabolism transform the fetters of fate and the contingencies of circumstance into the freedom and harmony of a more profoundly cooperative universe. But though the crest of the spiritual wave is no doubt steadily rising, the ocean which supports it contains much more besides the Spirit. Enough for us to know that the lower is not in hopeless enmity to the higher, but its basis and support, a feeder to it, a source whence it mysteriously draws its creative strength for further effort, and hence the necessary pre-condition for all further advance. Thus beneath all logical or ethical disharmonies there exists the deeper creative; genetic harmony between the lower and the higher grades in the Holistic series.'

Characteristic of Nature of the Universe as a whole is that

'It is deepest tendencies are helpful to what is best in us, and our highest aspirations are but its inspiration. Thus behind our striving towards betterment are in the last resort the entire weight and momentum and the inmost nature and trend of the universe.'

1. Ibid., p. 338
2. Ibid., p. 343
Smuts reveals the influence of Greek thought in his optimis-
tic belief that beneath all our personal striving, in fact, beneath
the striving of the Universe, is the search for and tendency toward
the Good. This recalls the Platonic identification of the good with
the real, the good being the end of all striving. Smuts likewise
gives us a view of the universe and of all activity and decision within
it as directed toward a realization of the Good, as Supreme End.

He presents this view, expressing at the same time, the height of his
optimism in that passage which concludes his work,

'But everywhere too I have seen that it was at
bottom a struggle for the Good (referring to war
and conflict), a wild striving towards human
betterment; that blindly and through blinding
mists of passions and illusions, men are yet
sincerely, earnestly groping towards the light,
towards the ideal of a better, more secure life
for themselves and their fellows. Thus the
League of Nations, the chief constructive out-
come of the Great War, is but the expression of
the deeply felt aspiration towards a more stable
holistic human society. And the faith has been
strengthened in me that what has here been called
Holism is at work even in the conflicts and con-
fusions of men: that in spite of all appearances
to the contrary, eventual victory is serenely
and securely waiting, and that the immeasurable
sacrifices have not been in vain. The groaning
and travailing of the universe is never aimless
or resultless. Its profound labours mean new

1. The authenticity of The Letters of Plato has been
the subject of much inquiry, especially the Second Epistle
from which I draw my discussion in this footnote. Neverthe-
less, the Letters more openly present a Platonic view which
appears but in a more guarded way in the Republic VI and
Dialogues. I refer to Plato's scheme in which the form of
the Good, called, it is believed 'The King of All', is the
highest form on the hierarchical ladder of forms to which
all lesser level forms strive and contribute. (Cf. Letter
II, 312c,d,e, especially, 313a,b. Tr.'s by Harvard and also
Post) This suggestion in The Letter and Plato's general
idea of the Good, Aristotle's concept of the end as the
Good and Socrates' assertion that choices and action are
always in terms of the Good (seeing we never do wrong will-
ingly) provide, I think, one of Smuts's links, at this
point, with Greek thought.

2. In the more personal implications for human behavior,
normal and deviated, it strengthens what we feel is one of the
penetrating insights of Greek philosophy. As developed by
Smuts in a cosmological system and as a system of social pro-
gress and personal development, it assumes a more conclusive
creation, the slow, painful birth of wholes, of new and higher wholes, and the slow but steady realisation of the Good which all the wholes of the universe in their various grades dimly yearn and strive for. It is the nature of the universe to strive for and slowly, but in ever increasing measure, to attain wholeness, fullness, blessedness. The real defeat for men as for other grades of the universe would be to cease from striving towards the Good. The holistic nisus which rises like a living fountain from the very depths of the universe is the guarantee that failure does not await us, that the ideals of Well-being, of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are firmly grounded in the nature of things and will not eventually be endangered or lost. Wholeness, healing, holiness - all expressions and ideas springing from the same root in language as in experience - lie on the rugged upward path of the universe, and are secure of attainment - in part here and now, and eventually more fully and truly. The rise and self-perfection of wholes in the Whole is the slow but unerring process and goal of this Holistic Universe.¹

teleological position, which, with its adamant conviction, tends to rule out the ultimate end as anything but sure and inescapable and negates the significance of man's unique nature as personal. Cf. Chapters V, IX, Appendix IV.

¹ Ibid., pp. 344-345
CHAPTER THREE

Some Considerations, in terms of Holism, of Aristotle's Philosophy with Particular Reference to the Concept of Entelechy

'Thus Aristotle's remarkable doctrine of forms as the shaping element of matter is not far removed from the concept of the whole in relation to its parts'. J. C. Smuts

'The holistic approach, which in the final analysis is an Aristotelian one, is penetrating ever deeper into the biological sciences, especially those sciences which are concerned with the human organism.' Andras Angyal
Philosophy was founded on the desire to find unity and wholeness amid the diversity and variety of nature, developing from the question, 'How are the many one?'. It was an effort to find some principles which were dynamic yet stable, which guided change in meaningful realizations without themselves being subject to temporality. It became the continuing endeavor to find the relatedness of seemingly disparate and dissociated existence. Singer, in Greek Biology and Greek Medicine, suggests that the inductive method which had been used since the Alcmaeon of the sixth century B.C. and particularly in the Hippocratic School of Physicians (400 B.C.), paralleled the prevailing idea that all things were related, that there was harmony in organic life and in the universe.1 Although there had been many philosophical systems

1. Supra., pp. 91-97. Russell, in Form and Function, calls this inductive method Aristotle's 'Unity of Plan', p. 6ff. It might be said that all philosophy, whatever the school, is seeking the ultimate nature of reality. However, some schools do not accept the universe as united or related in what might be considered a 'harmony'. The Atomists and Pluralists expounded a unified universe (universe) and saw it as an interrelation of material elements. Democritus had fostered the idea that there is a tendency for atoms to combine; while at the same time indicating that there is really no guiding purpose in the universe but largely chance. The Ionic School with Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia the principal leaders, propounded that there was one basic substance, though it was conceived as a material one. The Pythagorean school sought unity in pure reason. They believed there was a basic unity in the universe and fostered the concept of mathematical and geometric forms which no doubt influenced Plato in his eternal forms and ideas. They also advocated belief in a principle of order which regulated life. The Eleatic School, principally Xenophanes and Parmenides, emphasized a basic unity in the universe which was a logical unity not like the Ionic physical unity. However, Heraclitus, while a member of this school, differed from the rest in that he regarded being and non-being as elements of one conception, viz., that of becoming. In fact, it is not being but becoming that is the real and in this respect Heraclitus presents a concept of a unified and dynamic universe rather than the partitive-static or unified-static positions of other thinkers. Process, for him, is the essence of reality. Everything is changing since 'all things come out of the one and the one out of all things' and 'all things are flowing' since 'nothing ever is, everything is becoming'. Unity is resulting from diversity, from the mingling of opposites. Process, then, is the nature of reality. Plotinus,
which pursued their true duty which, as Hegel says, is to seek the ultimate unity of the universe, their efforts to see beyond the superficial perspective that the universe was a whole, were inadequate. Aristotle's concept of the organism as a whole, the emphasis on the relation between the parts and whole, the principle of entelechy and the special sense in which he conceived development and progress in an order of nature were the first formulations, it is believed, of some of the basic concepts, though now greatly and often differently articulated, in the contemporary Holistic approach. Although an exhaustive consideration of these formulations would take us far afield of our main interest, a brief statement and later a more comparative study of them may prove helpful in understanding the background and thesis for the Philosophy of Holism.

The wholeness of the external world and natural process

One of Aristotle's basic concepts is that nature is made up of concrete wholes which are dynamic and 'becoming'. For the doctrines of the monists and pluralists, there was little place for the concept of life as a process in a natural order of things. The monists declared all reality was one and there could be no real 'coming-to-be' but only change and alteration or rearrangement of qualities already existent. Anaxagoras, with his pluralism, identified 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away' with mere alteration. This was true, as well, of the materialistic monists, Leucippus and Democritus, as they attributed this phenomenon to the 'association' and 'dissociation' of constituent elements which really never changed in their own intrinsic nature and structure.

In the Enneads, iii, maintains the same nature of contemplation in all plants and animals and Whitehead, in Process and Reality, says the Greeks did not separate φύσις from deity, p. 131. Professor J. Baillie sees this concept as well in the Old Testament. These all indicate the 'togetherness' and underlying basic nature common to all things. This is also stressed in Eastern philosophy according to M. H. Harrison, cf. Hindu Monism and Pluralism.
Aristotle was able to conceive of incorporeality without identifying it with matter and so followed Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato in like thought. One of the misfortunes of philosophical investigation is that immediately after Aristotle, regression to earlier patterns of materialistic thought became apparent in the writings of Zeno in which incorporeity tended to be identified with matter and substance. This misconception pervaded many centuries of inquiry and impeded more adequate philosophical investigation. E.S. Russell, referring to the 'classical doctrine of materialism with its absolute separation of matter and mind', asks the question:

'How did this doctrine arise? We do not find it in Aristotle. The dualism of matter and mind was foreign to his thought. A primitive form of materialism had been propounded by the Ionians, and Anaxagoras had added to their cosmology the conception of a universal reason or "Nous". But Aristotle accepted neither view . . . His view was not vitalistic in the modern sense; it did not imply a dualism of matter and entelechy . . .

'We do not find the clear cut dualism of matter as extended substance and mind as inextended thought fully expressed until we come to Descartes many centuries later.'2

For Aristotle, 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away' were genuine factors, not to be conceived as mere alterations, association and dissociation.3 'Aristotle thought of the world, not as something made out of something, but a great process, a process of change or development. Matter was just a relative term - the potency of something more real.'4

It can be said that Aristotle accepted neither the one substance idea of the monists nor the idea that there was one kind of substance in the sense propounded by the atomists,5 unless, of course, one agrees with Lossky that 'this is a monism, for in it, all being

1. And some believe, Heraclitus.
2. Russell, E.S., British Association, 1934, p. 64
The deeper or basic potency was, as Collingwood says, 'form' (its real nature), op. cit., p. 92.
5. Shute, op. cit., pp. 2-3
is throughout described as an indissoluble union of force and of the
spiritual form of its activity'. And yet, this would not have been
a traditional 'monism'. What we find naturally existing are concrete
wholes; and, by calling the concrete a 'whole', 'I mean that it em-
braces in a single complex a diversity of constituent elements, factors
or properties'. In such a concept, there is accepted the principle
of true coming-to-be which is natural to life-experience, to nature.

'For what we see are these concrete wholes which
are so diversified; and certain of the changes
which are presented to our observation cannot be
explained satisfactorily as other than the coming-
to-be and the passing-away of these things, as
distinct from mere alteration or association and
dissociation.'

Aristotle, then, had some basic concepts concerning the idea
of 'wholes'. He believed that 'concrete, particular, whole things are
the starting point for the investigations of the natural philosopher'.

He recognized that the 'whole' depends for its existence upon the ele-
ments into which it can be analyzed, but it cannot be understood in
terms of these elements alone. He conceived of it as not 'becoming
more of the same kind of material, but its becoming differentiated in
its organization'.

It was incorrect, then, according to Aristotle's position,
to assume that becoming and passing away were association and disso-
ciation, inasmuch as these are always in terms of the whole, not the
elements alone, as in the latter. Here is a refutation of the atomis-
tic doctrine that permanent elements persist in spite of outward
change and presented the idea that the whole changes through its dy-
namic relationship within itself and with change or stimuli exterior

2. Physica, 184a, W. & E. Trans; cf. Shute op. cit, p. 3
4. Ibid., p. 4
5. Ibid., p. 4
6. Ibid., p. 19
to it. 1 This concept of the whole, depending on the concepts of form and matter and natural process - 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away' - seems to be the basic presupposition of Aristotle's entire biological philosophy.

The wholeness of the organism

A major emphasis of the Aristotelian inquiry was that the organism was a whole. Earlier attempts had been made to so conceive the organism not as members or parts or made up of individual elements or independent functions. Haldane remarks that Hippocrates saw life as a whole. 2 Masserman indicates that a holistic perspective of life and behavior was seen in Hippocrates and Plato. 3 Concerning the ancients' effort to classify individuals as sanguine, melancholic, phlegmatic or choleric, based on the proportionate mixture of the 'four elements', McKenzie remarks that these were real attempts to 'understand the individual as a whole'. 4 These earlier attempts provided the basis for the more developed biological science evident in the writings of Aristotle. He conceived the organism 'as a system of organs mutually adjusted to the ends of the organism as a whole'. 5 Whatever analysis of the organism may be needed, it is recognized that this is only for the benefit of methodological convenience and are artificial attempts to understand its inner structure. While Aristotle 'laid the greatest stress on extensive investigations of the parts of the natural objects, it was because of his interest in their integration, rather than in the parts themselves'. 6

1. This is evident in De Motu Animalium, particularly Chpt. 5, trans. Forster, cf. Weldon, J.E.C., The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 14, 352. Aristotle's concept at this point is considered in chpt. 5.
2. Materialism, p. 80, cf. Sherrington, op. cit, pp.16ff
3. Principles of Dynamic Psychiatry, pp. 80, 86
6. De Partibus Animalium, Ogle, W., Tr. referred by Shute, op. cit., p. 5
emphasized in *Physica*, Bk. II, when he speaks of 'The distinctive form or quality of such things as have within themselves a principle of motion, such form or a characteristic property not being separable from the things themselves, save conceptually'. ¹ The definition of a part seems to demand its analysis in terms of the whole, the form, the function. He did not consider a part, an organ, or an animal in terms of itself.² This is particularly emphasized by Singer when he says:

'The man of science considers a part of the Universe where the philosopher makes it his business to regard the whole. With Aristotle this modern scientific process of taking a part of the sensible Universe, such as a particular group of animals or the particular action of a particular organ and considering it in and by and for itself without reference to other things, had not yet fully emerged.'³

The wholeness of the organism may be seen in the relation between body and soul in Aristotle's psychology. He spoke of the nutritive, sensitive and rational 'souls' which formed a hierarchy of functions. Except, however, for the rational soul which was in great part an investment of universal or cosmic reason, he did not think of them as separate from the body. 'His view was not vitalistic in the modern sense; it did not imply a dualism of matter and entelechy; for Aristotle, 'soul' was an expression for the total functional activity of the organic unit, for its activity as a whole'.⁴ 'Soul and body are not two substances but inseparable elements in a single substance'.⁵ Aristotle 'does not emphasize the notion of the self as a pure spiritual being to which its body is as much part of the outside world as other physical things'.⁶ The soul and the body form a union and are only distinguishable by rational analysis. 'A notion like that of Descartes, that

1. Supra., 193b, Wicksteed & Cornford
2. The whole-part relation is differently used in concept of prior & posterior attributes, Ross 1018b & 1019a
3. Singer, Greek Biology and Greek Medicine, p. 53
4. Russell, op. cit., Advancement, p. 64
5. Ross, Aristotle, p. 132
6. Ibid., p. 132
the existence of the soul is the first certainty and the existence of matter a later inference, would have struck Aristotle as absurd'.

He does not conceive of body and soul as anything else but the whole self.

The soul, then, is not something independent of the body. Although there is some question about Aristotle's meaning, which we shall discuss in this section, he seems to indicate that the soul cannot exist apart from the body and the body from the soul; in the latter case, the organism would be only substance but not person or organism.

The soul does not act, then, of itself.

'The soul, according to Aristotle, is not something which is and of itself acts. It is not something which acts upon the embryo. It is, however, something without which the embryo cannot act. But insofar as the embryo is potential animal, its soul is potential soul, the soul being actualized synchronously with the organism. Using the word in a sense analogous to its use in mathematics rather than in its biological sense, we see then that the soul is a function of the organism. When the organism is potential, the soul is potential; when the organism is fully actualized, the soul is fully actualized.

'So far, we cannot make any statement relative to the priority of soul or organism. The organism would not be were it not for the soul; but neither would the soul be, were it not for the organism.'

Aristotle 'rightly conceived of life as the function of the organism, not as a separate principle'. For him, the organism is a whole, interacting and self-directing.

It seems important to remember that Aristotle emphasized that all phenomena were natural, within nature. He rejected the Platonic dualism in which forms and their final causation were inadequately manifested in phenomena themselves (that is, that the things of sense

1. Ibid., p. 132
2. Cf. Cherniss, Harold, Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy, p. 259
3. A comment by Shute, op. cit., p. 33 on De Anima, 413a.
4. Osborn, H.F., From the Greeks to Darwin, p. 45
are merely 'imitating' the eternal essence and this always inadequately).

He concluded that reality is expressed or manifested in the phenomena themselves. The organism is fully-contained with no ab extra qualities about it which cannot be accounted for within the organism and the things around it except for a strange mystical investment of cosmic reason.¹

'He renounced the attempt to think out as the case of phenomena something different from them (a second World) and taught that the Being of things which is known in conception possess no other reality than the sum total of the phenomena in which it realizes itself.'²

This discussion has surely provoked some problematical concerns; first, concerning the body-soul relation. On the one hand, MacDougall is quick to point out that

'Aristotle's teaching in regard to the soul suffices to show that it has more affinity with the Hylczoism of the Ionian philosophy and the materialism of Democritus and his successors than the materialistic animism of popular thought or the spiritualistic animism of Plato.'³

Again, he asserts that Aristotle was just the opposite of a vitalist; in fact, he was a mechanist, believing reason an influx from a superior realm and that mental processes were essentially a function of the bodily organism.⁴ In an antithetical position, writers like Driesch, Singer and Wheeler point out, in accordance with their own belief, that 'Aristotle is, in the fullest sense, a vitalist'.⁵ Singer, who

1. 'Accidents' for Aristotle, as far as the author can ascertain, are elements not contained in the definition of a thing (or substance). These are results of some primary order of things, accrued or incidental attributes resulting without plan from the cause to effect seriation. Yet they occur within the same organism and its relations. It has been the challenge to science to pin down these variables.


3. Body and Mind, pp. 25-26

4. Outline of Psychology, p. 401

5. Cf. Driesch, Hans, The History and Theory of Vitalism and Science and Philosophy of the Organism, Wheeler, L. Richmond, Vitalism, Its History and Validity and Singer, op. cit, from which the quotation is made, p. 27. Also refer to his A Short Study of Medicine, p. 32.
proclaims Aristotle a 'vitalist' has come to this conclusion by feeling that Aristotle 'believes that the presence of a certain peculiar principle of a non-material character is essential for the exhibition of any phenomena of life. This principle we may call soul, translating his word ψυχή. 1 It is interesting to note that further in his book he says, 'It must be remembered that the cause or principle that leads to the development of living things is, in Aristotle's view, not external, but internal'. 2 It seems these writers have failed to gain a view in toto of Aristotle's philosophy which would certainly, as already indicated, rule out the possibility of an existential dualism and thus a vital force, ab extra, acting upon and in the body in the form of an autonomous soul. Nor would it logically follow that this concept of the organism-as-a-whole should demand such a designation as 'mechanist' or 'materialist'.

There is one questionable passage, especially, to which those of a vitalistic interpretation turn when claiming Aristotelian authority. If it is not seen in the perspective of the philosophy as a whole, it may seem convincing evidence for their claims. It is that passage in De Anima, Book ii, Chapter i, 413a, 8, 9 in which Aristotle writes: 'Again, it is not clear whether the soul may not be the actuality of the body as the sailor is of the ship'. 3 He seems to indicate, in this analogy, and as an analogy it may be, at this point, characteristic of the defective ultimate inconsistency true of all analogies, a separable relation. This 'separability' may be like the 'separability' of the more abstract concepts of form and matter. Form is a distinct quality and so is matter but they are not existent.

1. Ibid., p. 27, cf. Adolf Meyer's comment on Aristotle's concept of 'soul' in Chpt. v, thesis.
2. Ibid., p. 28, cf. pp. 41-42
3. ΕΚΔΙΚΗϹ ΣΟΜΑΤΟϹ ΝΑ ΨΥΧΗ ΆΠΟΤΕΛΕΙ ΠΛΟΥϹ ΕΝΤΑΛΗΧΗϹ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟϹ.
(having existence in the phenomenal world) without each other. To conceive, for instance, of matter without form would be most difficult but that is what Aristotle, and later the Scholastics, tried, in a metaphysical way, to do. Aristotle has other analogies similar to this, however, which may help to clarify this particular one in question. The soul is form or actuality (ἐντὸς τῆς ἐμπνείας) and body is matter. The living organism is the union of the two and as such is a new whole. This is likened to an axe in which there is distinguished its material and its axeness, its form-function.¹ It is likened to an eye where the pupil is matter and the power of sight is form. He says it is 'unnecessary to ask whether body and soul are one, as one should not ask whether wax and the figure are one, or in general, whether the matter of a particular thing and the thing composed of it are one'.² Concerning the living thing, 'it is his soul which constitutes his essential nature, and its analysis shows it to be the activity of the individual considered as an organic whole'.³

It must be admitted that part of the difficulty at this point is Aristotle's own inconsistency, as he tries to reconcile 'Plato and common sense' (B. Russell). In what we might call his metaphysical or ontological system, he separates form and matter so that pure form and pure matter can exist independently, e.g. God. And, as Professor Macmurray indicates, he believed the soul is immortal or at least that part of the soul that is called 'reason', which is of divine origin. The matter which is not 'informed' existed before and will exist after the object ceases to exist as an 'informed' thing. But this matter, though it can exist separately from this matter cannot exist separately from matter. For, in Aristotle's view, 'It is one form that is

1. Aristotle even calls the axeness of the axe its soul. cf. De Anima, Hicks tr. l.12b 10, see p. 16 this chpt.
2. De Anima, Hicks tr., l.12b 7; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, p. 193
3. Shute, op. cit., p. 131
embodied in all the members of a species, and it can exist independently of any one member, though not of all. It requires for its existence, therefore, not this matter, but this kind of matter.\(^1\) Whatever the difficulties in the metaphysical system, in existence, form and matter are inseparable and are realized together as a whole, e.g. existent organism. Form and matter, in an existent, are only logically separable.

Another question is concerned with the functions of the soul. Aristotle's concept of the organism as a whole 'was a repudiation of materialists' efforts to explain life completely in terms of the behavior of things as they act in non-living contexts'.\(^2\) However, in spite of mind-body inseparability, the inter-acting, inter-dependence of parts and whole, the inferred conception of the organism as something more than the 'sum' of its parts, its self-maintaining and reproductive aspects, and that the parts can only be identified and understood in terms of the whole (his principle of inductive method in biology which was re-echoed in 'Cuvier's Law' centuries later), Aristotle still held to his position of a faculty psychology\(^3\) in which various functions of the soul seem to work independently of one another. There seems to be little way of reconciling these ideas in his philosophy.

Another very obscure problem is that if the soul is the actuality of the organism (for clarity it might be better to use Aristotle's term 'body'), then it is difficult to resolve the idea of the rational soul of reason; for this is something altogether an element of cosmic origin.\(^4\) It alone is divine. This seems to be an attempt

1. Ross, op. cit., p. 132. 'Even where the specific form pre-exists actually (i.e. in natural generation) it does not exist apart from individual existence. Form is eternal only by virtue of the never-failing succession of its embodiments'. p. 175

2. Shute, op. cit., p. 17

3. This may be part of the attempt to formulate a more adequate system of the soul in which the irrational element is attributed to the soul, not the gods or physical disease. Plato had begun with a unity soul (Phaedo) and developed a tri-partite soul and thus sounder than Socratic & Hellenic intellectualism. Cf. Dodds, E.R. The Greeks and the Irrational, ch. III.

to remodel a non-philosophical tradition. However, that may be, what connection reason has with the other faculties is a problem left unsolved.

The concept of entelechy

The dominating concept in Aristotle's philosophy is the End or Final Cause. This notion of the End appears in Plato in his Idea of the Good toward which all things are moving and in that quest for Perfect Beauty. But it is not as clearly or comprehensively presented as it is in the Aristotelian system. As Pringle-Pattison notes, Plato had a tendency to lose himself in cosmological constructions concerning the beginning of things. This as we said earlier, may have been due to the popular writings which did not convey the more esoteric principles of his philosophy in which the real beginning is the end, the end as cause. Schelling, of course, forgot that the End cannot be separated from the beginning and failed to escape ambiguity and indefinability. The End is later developed along Platonic and Aristotelian lines of thought in Hegel's concept of the Absolute, the Absolute Idea and the Dialectic. Because Aristotle did more to give us the foundation for the doctrine of Final Cause, I must take this as one excuse, among others, for turning attention particularly to him.

To understand Aristotle's 'principle' of entelechy (understanding by the term 'entelechy', for the moment, 'complete realization'), it is necessary to have some general conception of his ideas on substance, matter, substance-form relation, matter-substance-form relation, potentiality and actuality and causes.

Substance

Substance, for Aristotle, is 'the essence . . . of each

1. Hegelianism and Personality, pp. 82-83
thing'\(^1\) and 'essence' is the form, for by form he means 'the essence of each thing and its primary substance'.\(^2\) Substance, then, seems to mean matter which has taken on form sufficient to gain identity. Hammond indicates that substance can mean, for Aristotle, matter having no definite identity, or as that which has taken on individuality; that is, a thing which is composite of matter and form. One should conclude from this that matter is likened to 'potentiality' and form to 'actuality' or 'realization'. He believes Aristotle uses 'substance' most often as that matter which has taken on form so that it gains identity.\(^3\) Armstrong remarks that substance 'is the thing as a whole, including its dimensions, qualities, relations, etc., which can only be separated from it by a process of mental abstraction but cannot actually exist apart from it'.\(^4\) He comments that it is always individual and never universal.

Substance and matter

The relation of matter to substance, then, is that (matter) \(\sigma\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\) is that which is the basic stuff from which \(\varphi\delta\omicron\omicron\) (substance) emerges after its impregnation with \(\varepsilon\iota\delta\omicron\omicron\) (form). Matter, to Aristotle, 'is purely negative and has no proper characteristics of its own'.\(^5\) If we search intently, Aristotle seems, at times, to imply a 'first matter' (\(\pi\rho\omega\tau\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\eta\)) like the Scholastics, which has no form. It is the Prima Materia, the Ultima Materia, undefined and unlimited possibility of becoming.\(^6\) This highly abstract idea is difficult to conceive, inasmuch as matter without form would never have actual existence. Ross comments on this in saying 'matter and form of physical things

1. Metaphysics, tr. Tredennick, 1031b, 9; 'essence and substance are one', 1032a
2. Ibid., 1032b
3. Aristotle's Psychology, p. 42
4. An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, p. 78
5. Ibid., p. 78
6. Cf. Ibid., p. 80
... are elements distinguishable by thought but inseparable in reality.
Matter never exists bare but always informed.1 And again, in Metaphysics, he says, for Aristotle, 'substance of a thing is the principle of structure, the presence of which in a collection of materials makes them not a mere collection but an organized whole'.2 Matter, then, in relation to substance is that which is the substratum of substance... substance being 'informed' matter.

Form

Form is that which gives a thing identity; it is a thing's essence. Armstrong suggests that ἐνδος be translated 'pattern' or that it means 'pattern'3 and Liddell and Scott translate it 'that which is seen, form, shape, figure, particular kind, a nature'.4 These refer, mostly, to one idea of form; namely, 'sensible shape'. Chernis favors, however, the wider idea of 'function' to represent a more accurate meaning.5 Ross seems to favor a similar rendering in such passages as 'The form or mode of structure of a thing - e.g., of an animal - is just that by virtue of which it moves, grows, alters, and comes to rest when it has reached the terminus of its movement. And conversely, the power to move, grow and alter in a certain definite way is just the form or character of each thing'.6 Again, form is that which indicates the nature of a thing, so that Ross refers to it on occasion as 'the nature-as-form'.7 This is the end toward which development moves. In this case, the form is identified as final and efficient cause. It seems that all these ideas are true, since Aristotle embraced a variety of meanings for 'form'. If Aristotle means by form

1. Aristotle, p. 66
3. Armstrong, op. cit.
4. Supra., Greek-English Lexicon
5. Op. cit., pp. 259-260; possibly 'organization-function' or 'Form-function' might be better.
7. Ibid., p. 71
a pattern in the sense of 'everything has a boundary', then we have the fallacy of his individualism and his subject-predicate logic recurring again. If form means a thing's essence, then it must be more than just shape; but neither could it mean overt function, though it closely approaches it. Somewhere between the two seems to be the real meaning, possibly best expressed in his reference to 'the axeness of the axehead'. To get some word that will convey this meaning, the term 'functional-form' has been suggested. This paper in this section uses the term 'form-function'.

Several things, we believe, are worth noting at this point. In the last analysis, matter and form are inseparable, in fact, only 'distinguishable by thought' (Ross). A thing's essence is its form. The form is present in every phase of development of a thing but there is a sense in which it has not been attained. It is the end, the nature of the thing, the unchanging essence, as such. It is a condition giving direction to development, but only fully realized at the consummation of the developmental process. Further, while the form of a man is not a special one, it is one of a species (not a transcendent form). This species-form is independent of individual matter, but not all matter; that is to say, it is independent of this matter, but not this kind of matter, for it must be informed in some matter somewhere or it would cease to exist. While this seems to make room for the individual to embellish the species-form with individually determined attributes, Aristotle's strict teleology precludes such a hopeful consideration, since he tends to regard what the organic (or personal) will be as substantially given.

1. Ross, op. cit., p. 132
Potentiality and actuality

Aristotle solves the baffling problem of the earlier philosophers concerning 'becoming' by the concepts of potentiality and actuality. Nothing, he indicates, can be said to exist as emerging from that which now exists and yet existence cannot have come out of nothing. For a thing to be, it must have been potentially; for it could not have come out of not-being or from 'bare privation' (Ross).

'It comes into being from that which incidentally is, but not from it as being, but as not being the particular thing that comes to be.'

In other words, a thing, then, 'comes from that which is it potentially but not actually'.

In De Anima and Metaphysics, potency (δύναμις) is the positive capacity to become, while actuality (ἐνέργεια) is the developing process which at any point in time (its history) indicates a condition nearer maturity, but one in which, necessarily, its final or formal cause is yet unattained. Peck, in his translation of Generation of Animals, cautions that δύναμις is not to be thought of as a substance having power in the sense of a power to produce a specific effect upon a body which was a later development in the history of thought. It is, rather, a substance which is a power which through asserting itself can make an influence. This is the typical Pythagorean use of the term which is characteristic of Aristotle's concept. For Aristotle, it can be translated 'potentiality', although it carries with it more than the idea of inert capacity to set up movement or to set in movement, for it is a dynamic conception. Peck says of all the mistranslations, 'force' is the most misleading. He regards Aristotle's

1. Ross, Aristotle, p. 66
2. Ibid., p. 66
4. Supra., p. 1 and li
5. Ibid., lli
concept of ἄναμμας as something natural, not 'enforced' and as associated with a material substance. All references to a vague and indefinite urge are precluded.1

The relation between potentiality, active operation and realization is explained by Hicks in his translation of De Anima. He translates ἐνεργεία as 'active operation'.2 It differs from ἄναμμα and ἐνεργεία. When opposed to ἐνεργεία, ἄναμμα denotes capacity of action, ἐνεργεία being actual operation. Opposed to ἄναμμα denotes a capacity of existence or development, the power of becoming something, ἐνεργεία being actual existence or realization.3

1. . . In 412a 22-26, τὸ ἀνεργείν is, more properly active operation, the exercise of knowledge, while ἐπιστήμη is knowledge which may be in abeyance, implicit actuality. But the proof of this actuality in existence is to be found in active operation. The proof that a fleet is in being is that it is doing its work. Hence ἐνεργεία will often do as well as ἐνεργεία and is constantly so used in the Metaphysics. One reason why ἐνεργεία is preferred in De A. (De Anima) probably is, that soul is made analogous to the first or implicit stage of actuality, τοιστήμη and not to ἀνεργείν, comatose body being itself alive and therefore endowed with soul, even though not actively operant. At this point (II, cc.1,2) A. (Aristotle) is not concerned whether soul is a distinct entity or a mere operation of the living body. He has framed a definition wide enough to include all operations of the animate being, whichever of these two alternatives he ultimately adopts. For this purpose as a rule he prefers the term ἐνεργεία, thus in 412a 22-24, where sleep is contrasted with waking and knowledge in abeyance4 with the application of knowledge, soul is put on a level with sleep and knowledge is abeyance, because life begins with its implicit presence: it need not at once be explicit. Sleep is analogous to ἐκείν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργείν that is, ἄναμμα exists before ἐνεργεία comes in. Here, however, in opposition to the mere ἄναμμα of ὅλης soul in sleep may be regarded as a sort of energy or activity.5

1. Ibid., liv and lv
2. Supra., 414 a9
3. Ibid., 414 a9
5. De Anima, tr. Hicks, 414 a9
Ross indicates that motion 'is the actualizing of the potential'.\(^1\) This may be easily confused with 'active operation' until one realizes that 'it is a part of the nature of movement that the potential has not yet completely lost its potentiality and become actual; that is the difference between movement and activity'.\(^2\) It is 'each moment of activity' that 'potentiality is completely cancelled and transformed into actuality; in movement, the transformation is not complete until the movement is over'.\(^3\) It is easily seen then that 'movement differs from activity as the incomplete from the complete; or more loosely, movement is incomplete activity and activity is completed movement'.\(^4\)

Actuality is before potentiality in formula and substantiality. It has the quality of existing before potentiality because it is that which gives the potential its potentiality so that it can become;\(^5\) and in substantiality as that which is posterior in becoming since it is the 'end toward which the thing moves for realization'.\(^6\) For instance, 'I am capable of knowing what I do not now know, just because there is something that I know already; all knowledge comes from pre-existing knowledge'.\(^7\) Actuality is that toward which the potentiality points. 'Animals do not see in order that they may have the faculty of sight, but have this in order that they may see'.\(^8\) The idea is expressed in the description of an acorn that it is 'the seed of an oak tree'. A thing must be described in terms of its end form.

In organisms, especially psycho-physical organisms, this hard and fast

1. Aristotle, p. 82, emphasis mine
2. Ibid., p. 82
3. Ibid., p. 82
4. Ibid., p. 82
5. Metaphysics, 1049b 4-23, Tredennick tr.
6. Ibid., 1050a, 310 Ross and Tredennick tr.
7. Aristotle, op. cit., p. 177; cf. Professor Macmurray's particularly interesting idea that 'It is not possible to think about something you do not already know'. Interpreting the Universe, p. 15
8. Ross, Aristotle, op. cit., p. 177
teleology in which potentiality means 'a potential' does not hold true in the same sense. While one speaks of a developing organism as having potentiality to become, one does not mean that it will inevitably 'fill out' to the detail some form which exists as a potential thing from the beginning; for this leaves no room for purposeful behavior (action). One means that with certain capacities and conditions, an organism can be described in terms of what it is to become. But we shall discuss this problem in chapters vi, viii, ix. It is interesting to note that Aristotle goes beyond the mechanist for he gives a reasonable explanation for the appearance of new things as not coming to exist from nothing, suddenly and without preparation, but from potentiality, a strong term in Aristotelian philosophy.

Causes

Although Aristotle suggests that there are four causes (ἀρχαί), two are considered ideas or reasons for a thing being and the other two are the formal cause, the thing which gives a being identity and the final cause, the end or purpose for which a thing comes into being.\(^1\) These two causes, formal and final, are usually referred to as one and refer to the end or purpose (form-function) for which a thing exists and toward which it moves. It is illustrated by the realization of a man, woman, tree, or horse, cum multis aliis. Thus an organism can only be described in terms of the goal to which it is moving. The interrelation of Aristotle's philosophy is again apparent as the material cause, the matter and the efficient cause,\(^2\) the agent or vehicle

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1. Aristotle, ibid., p. 74. This idea is carried in οὐσία γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ἐκ οὐσίας ὡς εἶδος (formness of the existing being) and τὸ πελώκειν εἶναι (axity and axehood) Ross compares τὸ τι τῆς ἐν και τὸ γόγον or synonymous with ἐνδος ('what was to be so and so-form' or 'the fact of being what it is') cf. De Anima, 412b 11, Hicks tr., p. 313

by which initiation and procedure are carried out, cannot be separated from the final or formal cause. Collingwood suggests that Aristotle arrives at his concept of efficient and final causes, which he says are one, by reflection on the fact of development:

"For development implies nisus, that is, a movement or process not merely orientated towards the realization in bodily form of something not yet so realized, but actually motivated by the tendency towards such realization. The seed only grows at all because it is working at becoming a plant; hence the form of a plant is the cause not only of its growing in that way but of its growing at all, and is therefore the efficient as well as the final cause of its growth. The seed grows only because it wants to become a plant. It desires to embody in itself in material shape, the form of a plant which otherwise has a merely ideal or immaterial existence... The form... is not itself in motion but it causes motion in other things by being an object of desire."\(^1\)

Without their relatedness, the final cause cannot be realized or the primary stuff informed.

The final cause is the most important for Aristotle, as it is this end-form (entelechy) which gives all life its orientation and value and alone accounts adequately for the existence, growth and function of the organism. Ross commenting on this part of Aristotle's philosophy concerning the psychophysical organism writes:

"The reason why this flesh and these bones make a man is that they are informed by the form of man, the human soul; but an answer that goes deeper is the answer "because they are organized in such a way as to subserve the ends for which man exists, intellectual and moral activity"."\(^2\)

The concept of entelechy (continued)

It is quite possible that the concept of entelechy may have been one of the first formulations - and certainly the most developed.

1. Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 84-85
2. Ross, Aristotle, p. 173
of that time - of what Smuts has articulated as the 'holistic-tendency',
and concept of wholeness. The word entelechy has been variously used
and translated. E. Wallace, in Aristotle's Psychology, generally trans-
lates it 'perfect realization' in such passages as ἐστὶν δὴ μὲν ὑπ' ἑν
σῶμασ ὁ ἐκδόχος ἐντελέχειαν and ὑ' δ' οὐσία ἐν τελέχειαν. He refers to the soul as being the 'perfect realization' of the body,
σῶματος ἐντελέχειαν. Hammond, in Aristotle's Psychology, asserts
that entelechy 'means the finished state of a thing or a state in which
a thing's potentiality finds its complete development'. It is neces-
sary to give careful attention to a comparative study already made be-
tween ἑνσῶμασ and ἐνέργεια. Hammond translates ἐνέργεια
'actualization'. This refers to the 'active process by which the po-
tential thing passes over into the completed state or it is the com-
pleted state in process'. This closeness of definition has been some-
what clarified by the earlier study in this paper. Spicer, in Aristo-
tle's Conception of the Soul, indicates that ἐντελέχεια means 'com-
plete reality'.

Aristotle's meaning of 'entelechy' (literally, 'in-it-and-
having-ness') cannot be fully defined in a word or shrugged off with
a casual phrase. Only as a dynamic process and, therefore, more pro-
perly referred to as a principle, can the concept of entelechy be
understood. The term 'entelechy' has boldly entered into many pages
of historical writing in various fields of thought. It has been the

1. 'Further, while matter is merely potential exis-
tence, the form is perfect realization'. Bk. II, Ch. 1,
412a, 9, 10
2. 'The reality of an object is contained in its
perfect realization'. Bk. II, Ch. 1, 412a, 9, 10
3. Ibid, 412a, 21, 22
4. Supra., p. 42-43
5. Ibid., pp. 42-43
6. This Chapter. Quotation from De Anima, Tr. Hicks,
414 a9
7. Supra., p. 50
focal point of laughter and ridicule and diligently studied. It has casually found its way into some hidden and unsuspecting areas of investigation and often occupied large portions of major scientific works. Its influence and its intrigue continues. Lovatt Evans, speaking of the influence of Bichat and his internal teleological principle, equates this with entelechy which, he says, 'runs through all biological writings back to Aristotle, with whom we believe it to have originated'.

Mogenes Laertius says entelechy is a 'philosophic word invented by Aristotle'.

Sherrington wrote that Jean Fernel, in contrast to Driesch, who had warped Aristotle's use of entelechy, left entelechy where he had found it as 'a perfection material in nature'. Windelband says that in Aristotle's entelechy the individual life-unity of the organism was the (being) which realized its form in association with matter.

Forsyth interprets the entelechy not as a vitalistic incursion of organic otherness but as a form of both actuality and potentiality in the organic life. He conveys the idea that the form is the thing which gives meaning to the parts, inasmuch as anything is definable by its end or completed nature, by what it is capable of becoming and not merely by what it has been or is.

1. D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson in On Growth and Form, refers to the fact that many people had never heard of 'entelechy' until Driesch used it so extensively. They had never 'learned it from Aristotle, nor studied it with Leibniz, nor laughed at it with Rabalais and Voltaire', p. 5. He opines that when Bacon states with disapproval that the soul 'has been regarded rather as a function than as a substance' he is referring to, according to Leslie Ellis, Melanchthon's exposition of the doctrine who affirmed that Aristotle conceived entelechy as the soul which was not substance but function. Fn. p. 5, p. 1020. Driesch in History & Theory of Vitalism indicates that 'entelechy' had been used by Liebmann, Goethe, and von Baer, p. 161.

2. Presidential address to the Physiological Society at Glasgow of the British Association, Advancement of Science, 1928, p. 164.


Surely Aristotle's concept of entelechy was an attempt, broadly speaking, to preclude any reduction of the qualitative to mere quantitative differences (as in Democritus). While a thing presupposes the lower processes, e.g. in the organism the presupposition of chemical and mechanical components, it is 'never merely a product of the lower, but something self-subsistent', ¹ and the lower are employed in the purposive activity of the higher, the whole organism.

It seems that the soul in its Aristotelian meaning is entelechy, for it is in the function (form) that the organism realizes its essential nature. The vegetative soul πρώτη ψυχή is the primary evidence of life. So there is a πρώτη ἐντελέχεια, first entelechy which is the earliest or most primary expression of life above matter and nearest to mere potentiality. It is like 'dormant motion', if that may indicate the dynamic quality or capacity to actuality (Σύναμος) while activity is ἐνεργεία. Soul as final cause is not something apart from the begetter but of that which constitutes the nature of the begetter.² Soul is, then, 'functional-form' (Macmurray) the realization, as Peck says, of the animal body.³ Ward remarks that '... we must hold firmly to the position that it is function that determines structure, not structure that determines function; that the soul is the entelechy of the body, not vice versa, to use the phrase of Aristotle's which Leibniz adopted'.⁴ Psychologically, the Jungian analyst, Gerhard Adler, uses it in the sense of a process in which the present conscious condition unfolds and emerges in individuation, 'the entelechy of the individual personality'.⁵

According to Aristotle's position of concrete ideal-realism⁶,

1. Windelband, op. cit., p. 148
2. Physics, 198a, Tr. Ross
3. Generation of Animals, lvii, Tr. Peck
4. The Realm of Ends, p. 397
5. Studies in Analytical Psychology, p. 96
6. Lossky, op. cit., p. 193
every particular thing and being in the world is the result of the combination of matter and form. Lossky makes a significant assertion. 'Form' is usually taken to mean, he says, the definite character of a thing as expressed by the content of an abstract idea;\textsuperscript{1} that is, by such ideas as roundness, the idea of such a combination of building materials as is necessary to produce a human dwelling (the idea of the house).\textsuperscript{2} Matter might then be conceived of as only 'possibility' or 'potentiality'. But, he opines, there is no more contentless and abstract idea than this. When the two ideas of form as an abstract concept and matter as only an abstract potential are combined, there seems to be in this unity very little similarity to reality or anything experienceable. In order to account for the appearance of anything new, it is necessary to add a new abstract form and quality, this being function and relatedness.\textsuperscript{3} That dynamic quality which gives this 'abstract' thing meaning and 'reality' is entelechy. The entelechy (the end) gives direction to the organism in the realization of its end-form.\textsuperscript{4} Entelechy, enfolding in itself form, which, as essence, is always prior to the parts, is the intrinsic factor which, from the beginning, is seeking its own realization and is the nature of the organism in its full reality; that is, what is becoming is really itself only when the becoming is complete. 'The form is the completed structure of the whole'.\textsuperscript{5} Entelechy is a descriptive effort referring to a process and a process, as Whitehead says, 'is the growth and attainment of a final end'.\textsuperscript{6} One could say, in a general way, that entelechy as a realizing process is the formal or final cause as efficient so

1. Ibid., p. 193
2. Ibid., pp. 193-194
3. Ibid., pp. 193-194
4. Chernis, op. cit., says, 'It is the soul as form and form as final cause, that moves the body, its material'. p. 303.
5. Ross, op. cit., p. 175
6. Process and Reality, p. 209, also Collingwood, op. cit., p. 84
that form is 'informed' in matter producing the unity and direction of the developing organism. In saying this, it is implied that the 'un-informed' is a potentiality and cannot be said to describe \( \Phi \nu \gamma \varsigma \), which, for Aristotle, is 'informed' actuality. Entelechy describes a function; the end which 'produces' a process, the striving of the whole organism to realize its end-form which is in it and 'stands before it like a picture', a drawing power like an ideal.\(^1\) Because it includes in itself

1. This paper finds it unnecessary to consider the old question of vitalism and mechanism but because Hans Driesch so popularly expounded the concept of 'entelechy', though, as this paper holds, incorrectly, the author wishes to add this extended footnote giving a very general idea and comments on the Driesch 'entelechy'. It is also to be noted that in those passages in which Smuts disparages the idea of entelechy, he is referring (though he does not say so) to Driesch's, not Aristotle's, concept of entelechy. The establishment of principles of regulation and organization, especially evident at the turn of this century as subjects of physiological investigation, gave rise to theories of vitalism, most notable of which was Driesch's reintroduction, or better, re-'vitalization' (and this is not a play on words, however meaningful it may be) of Aristotle's 'entelechy'. But what does he mean by 'entelechy'? He says 'Suspending possible change and relaxing suspension would then be the two modes of 'action' of the bearer of individualizing causality which we shall henceforth speak of as entelechy', History and Theory of Vitalism, p. 203. Driesch has many 'entelechies' including the non-organismic quality of the main entelechy. There is the entelechia morphogenetica, primordial entelechy, and entelechia psychoidea. (The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 21.5ff.) These entelechies suspend and regulate at will (ibid, p. 261-262). Entelechy here, is a 'suspending', activating force, an 'individualizing agent' which is 'non-material', 'non-spacial' but 'acting "into space"', an 'agent' which alters direction. (Cf. The History and Theory of Vitalism, p. 15, pp. 202ff.) Many writers have criticized Driesch and it seems regrettable that such an able scientist would follow the vitalistic philosophies of Stahl and Roux and so misconceive the Aristotelian doctrine, which surely has become apparent to the reader even in this paper's brief view of some relevant concepts held by the Stagirite. The author wishes only to quote four authorities who have commented on Driesch's 'entelechy'.

Henderson, in The Order of Nature, says, 'Driesch's effort to prove the existence of entelechy in the organism culminates in what he regards as a demonstration that mechanism is necessarily unable to determine some of the phenomena of organic regulation. In the absence of any clear understanding of the operation of cell mechanism, such an effort is, I think, clearly in vain. It may carry conviction
form, it may be said to refer to the dynamic tendency within the whole (organism) arranging the parts in terms of the end toward which all activity is directed. This necessarily means that the equilibrative functions of organic maintenance are also an expression of the function to which the concept of entelechy refers. It is the internal purposive principle governing the well being and development of the organism toward its final end, the end-form.

to those who are already predisposed in its favor, but no one else can accept the argument and an opponent will always regard it as worthless'. p. 88

C.W. Waddington, in How Animals Develop, says authors like Driesch must imagine a non-material agency which works like 'the man in the control tower'. This entelechy cannot be discovered by experiments and though not connected with a religious soul is a 'sort' of developmental soul'. A hypothesis like this is, in the first place, a confession that we do not understand how the harmony of development is brought about, but more than that, it denies that we shall ever find out' and 'is frankly defeatist'. pp. 98-99 (incidentally, MacDougall concurs with this thought in The Group Mind, p. 103).

Haldane, in The Philosophy of a Biologist, says Driesch 'failed to see that when a single cell, in the early stage of developing embryo, is separated from the other cells, there has been an alteration in its environment or the stimuli influencing it. It, therefore, behaves differently from a cell left in contact with other cells, and as a matter of fact, proceeds, or may proceed, to develop in the same way as the original individual ovum would have developed. The hypothesis of an 'entelechy' guiding development independently of the influence of environment is thus unjustified'. p. 99 (incidentally, Haldane's own position is best seen in one statement, 'It is impossible to distinguish within the organism any influence not dependent on that of environment, direct or indirect'. p. 111)

Bosanquet, in Principle of Individuality and Value, says, 'The attempt to treat entelechy as an element operating ab extra upon the normal function, must be held purely artificial and fictitious'. p. 195 (sic note: Sherrington, op. cit., p. 140, incorrectly quotes page number as 193 on this quotation).

A noble defense of Driesch's 'new vitalism' is found in the printed Ph.D. dissertation Vitalism by L. Richmond Wheeler (University of London).

1. 'Thus, at length, Aristotle's original view of the internal teleology of the living thing, which is nothing more than self-regulation, has completely established itself in physiology.' Henderson, The Order of Nature, p. 81.
Lossky opines that the entelechy concept is conceived by Aristotle on a world scale, in which the world as a living whole strives towards the highest form, God. This, of course, puts the concrete in harmony with the abstract.

Such a concept leads to the hypothesis of a scale of existence from matter to God which is called by Aristotle \( \Phi \u03c9\sigma\varsigma \) (nature). The world in its striving towards this supreme goal goes through a number of developing phases while all the time, assuming higher and higher expressions of itself and increasing its spirituality more and more. The first elements are the elements spoken of by the Pre-Socratics, summed up in Empedocles' four elements, earth, water, air and fire. Then higher forms of life arise while still retaining the earlier basic elements. These are plant, animal and human life. Thus man, for instance, still consists of the original four elements, but higher spiritual purposes so dominate the whole of his bodily structure that substantiality, earthiness and other similar qualities are to a great extent overcome and retreat into the background. This is a scale of existence grounded in a metamorphosis (within types), each level giving rise to a higher realization of form. This was accounted for in entities by an 'internal principle tending toward perfection' (entelechy).

Nature, then, is a 'connected system of living beings viewed as a unity in which matter developing ever higher, from form to form,

1. Op. cit., p. 195. An interesting application of Aristotle's entelechy and telos in terms of Christian experience is seen in Syndney G. Dimond's Heart and Mind, pp. 157-158. It is questionable whether Aristotle enlarges entelechy to a universal scale but it is quite certain that there is a developmental or progressive quality of the universe to higher form. Cf. Chpt. vi, thesis on the comparison of Holism and Entelechy at this very point.

2. Lossky, op. cit., pp. 195-196
through all the multitude of its particular shapes, approaches the resting Being of deity, and imitating this, potentially takes it up into itself'.

It is quite certain that Aristotle did not hold an evolutionary view of life or the universe. He maintained a dynamic concept of the development of the organism, asserted that existents were continuously striving to free themselves more and more from matter and realize pure form (God) and spoke optimistically of all things progressively acquiring something continually better than was before. But all this was a fluency or developing or processive transition within existents not from one generic particular to another. One could say that Aristotle believed in things 'evolving' (B. Russell) and yet not mean that they were evolving from one existent to another in that sense of transition. His teleological system with its concepts of potentiality, form, entelechy, cause and effect, his class distinctions, subject-predicate, substance-attribute logic, his 'inherited' Greek idea that the nature of individual life was cyclic from which Aristotle was never freed despite his attempts, like those of Heraclitus, to supercede the concept expostulated in the representative Anaximandian thought of 'return and perish' by a conceptual system which included 'becoming' (in the natural process of 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away' which was nevertheless individual and cyclic) and the special sense in which he thought of immortality which necessarily precluded a progressive system in which all life (including man) was thought of as biological links in the chain of evolution, rule out

1. Windelband, op. cit., p. 1146
2. The author would explain the Scala Naturae in this way, even though many writers, in fact most writers, consider Aristotle's theory a forerunner of organic evolution. It seems, as we are attempting to show, that Aristotle had no theory which approached such a view.
3. As in Nietzsche, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 92; cf. Rank, O., The Trauma of Birth, pp. 167-183.
the possibility of his system being termed 'evolutionary'.

We have attempted, in this chapter, to set forth as concisely as possible, four main aspects of Aristotle's philosophy: (1) the wholeness of the external world and natural process, (2) the wholeness of the organism, (3) the concept of entelechy and the doctrine of form and matter, (4) the nature of the relationship between things in what might be called 'The Scale of Existence'. It was felt that these four main points reflect best the influence of the Aristotelian thought on Smuts's philosophy of Holism. These considerations will be examined in Chapter V.
CHAPTER FOUR

Some Considerations of Leibniz's Philosophy, in Terms of Holism, with Particular Reference to the Concept of Monads

'The Monads of Leibniz, again, approached the central concept of holism, but the time was not ripe for a full recognition, and the theory remained a metaphysical speculation.'

'But for that ignorance (of creative evolution), who knows whether Leibniz might not have elaborated a far more adequate and suggestive Holistic conception than that contained in this poor effort!'

.... J. C. Smuts
The historical, philosophical and personal settings

It may be said that the German Enlightenment and modern philosophical inquiry in Germany began in the seventeenth century with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.\(^1\) He compares with those figures like Francis Bacon, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, Huyghens, Boyle, Newton, Locke and Spinoza who made that 'one century which consistently, and throughout the whole range of human activities, provided intellectual genius adequate for the greatness of its occasions'.\(^2\) He presented a system of thought 'which is equalled by none in the entire history of philosophy in all-sidedness of motives and in power of adjustment and combination'.\(^3\) Though not a philosopher by training or profession but a man of law, mathematics and public service, nevertheless, only he, through his deep and penetrating knowledge of ancient and medieval philosophy and his understanding of Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza, Thomas Acquinas and Duns Scotus, Bacon and Hobbes, could have presented, on the one hand, the differential calculus and on the other what, with pride, he called his 'Philosophy of Pre-established Harmony'.

Leibniz's philosophy, in John Merz's opinion, 'heralded a new era and a new culture, and has probably lived longer in its influence than any other except that of Aristotle'.\(^4\) It exhibited penetrating insight into the trend of human thought which, in Zeno, departed from the Platonic and Aristotelian ability to conceptualize and contemplate abstracts, forms and incorporeality and led to the idea of 'dead matter', a materialistic interpretation of the universe, vitalism (of which Paracelsus seems to be the leading and earliest

1. July, 1646-1716 (Spinoza then 13, Descartes 50)
3. Windelband, op. cit., p. 420
advocate of the modern emphasis) and dualism. Leibniz felt that apparent contradictions must be resolved in unification and a usable employment of observational, sense-knowledge of the Aristotelian inductive technique and the abstract, self-evident, Platonic deductive method engendered. His attempt was one of reconciling matter and mind, pluralism and monism, idealism and nominalism, the Particular and the Universal.

Whether the Monistic and Pluralistic emphases have met and been resolved in the Leibnizian philosophy is an open question. One can find in his Monadology a seeming pluralism, inasmuch as the monads are unique, independent, and completely self-contained with no interaction with anything outside themselves and therefore a reduction to a multiplicity of ultimates. However, one can find, as well, a monism in which the monads are inter-related in a harmonious system, each representing a rational picture of the universe and essentially sharing the same essence or nature. If one contends that the unity of this monadic universe is insufficiently expounded, a pluralistic emphasis results. Or if one contends that the universe is so inter-related as to depend on the compossibility of each monad to be, of itself, as an integral element, fully representative of the whole, then a monistic emphasis appears the certain result.

It has been said that 'the greatest representative of personalism in the history of philosophy is Leibniz'.¹ As a direct general statement, this is inaccurate. Leibniz certainly makes central in his monadic theory (the basic composition of the world) individuality, personality and self-determination. He propounds that each monad lives to itself and contains within itself a full representation of the universe so that they are little worlds or microcosms. However,

¹. Lossky and Marshall, Value and Existence, p. 95
there are some fine distinctions between the Leibnizian thought and traditional Personalism. Leibniz's position seems to hold to an individualism and is thus individualistic, while Personalism holds to individuality and is personal. He endeavors to make God personal and concerned with the world, but not in the sense advocated by the Personalist School which sees God striving and struggling with his creation to overcome evil and redeem it and thereby ultimately realizing Himself. This modern evolved form of Idealism, Theistic Idealism and Voluntaristic Idealism leans toward a pluralism and yet establishes God as the ground of all things. It is not a strict monism, however, since personality demands plurality. Leibniz emphasizes freedom and yet the problem of moral responsibility and the existence of evil as something which has been rationalized as concealed good, and not especially to be overcome, seem to be his weaker points which become in contemporary Personalism major points of positive concern. Leibniz shares agreement at those points where the external world is considered phenomenal but essentially grounded in spirit and the hierarchy of substantival personal-agents is accepted as indicative of purposeful arrangement. However, the 'best possible world' idea, the once-for-all creation necessitating a peculiar reconciliation of a static and dynamic universe, the optimistic assurance of perfection through 'necessity' are not generally acceptable to Personalists. It can be said that though Leibniz set the stage for the Personalist movements, his philosophy is more accurately described as Individual Idealism, or possibly, mutatis mutandis, Panpsychism.

Leibniz's position concerning the external world is interesting but at times difficult to assess. He does not question the existence of the external world about which he seems to adopt a physical realism¹ and yet the monads, without interaction with it

¹. Lovejoy, op. cit., pp. 181-182
perceive and apperceive it only in subjective representations. He thus opens the way for Kant's distinction of the phenomenal and noumenal worlds and later introspectionist and intuitionist epistemological theories.

Leibniz's philosophical system seems to have revolved around five cardinal ideas which seem to reflect certain subjective personal needs. These ideas were: (1) the subjective need to find meaning and harmony in all elements, (2) the need to preserve individuality, freedom, independence of all things, (3) the desire to reestablish the position of God as truly just, wise, and concerned, (4) to give a rationalistic, scientific account of the universe in which there is law, purpose and reason for it and each existent, (5) to present a universe that was dynamic rather than static, a purposeful organismic activity rather than a mechanistic, corpuscular arrangement.

Whether these attempts, beyond much contributive and new thought upon which subsequent generations have so confidently depended, were as successful as Leibniz would have liked to think will be questioned. For instance, how far was he able to rise above the spectre of Spinozan determinism? In his brilliant effort to preserve harmony, law, orderliness in the universe and to 'win back for the indifferent God of the geometrical method the rights of the Platonic άνα', did he ultimately abandon himself to a mechanistic system which he had tried so desperately to couch in the language of individualism?

It might be said that the basic problem around which Leibniz's whole system is centered is an attempt to answer one question. The philosophical inquiries of Descartes, Locke and Berkeley were concerned with the question, 'does an external world exist?' 2 Although

1. Windelband, op. cit., p. 420
2. Compare Sinclair, The Conditions of Knowledge, p. 84 and Russell, op. cit., p. 40
he addresses himself to this problem on occasion, his ontology is really based on the question, 'what is the nature of reality or the external world?'

The Leibnizian philosophy will only be discussed at those points which have reference to the subsequent discussion of Holism. The effort here is to present the material of Leibniz's philosophy which has most in common with Holistic concepts. Concerning these points, no claim is made for an exhaustive and thus fully representative treatment. This effort is to draw, by comparison, similarity and criticism, at this point and in later discussion, a finer line of focus for the Holistic theory which shares many common features with it and on which it considerably depends.

But before entering the direct discussion, it is well, very briefly, to refer at least to a factor emphasized by John Merz - that of the subjective element evident in Leibniz's philosophy.

Leibniz's system is more reasonable when one understands the thinker. The rationalistic philosophy is the product of a highly articulated reasoning mind which transforms everything into logical constructs and a logical process of thought. Contemplation of the geometric forms had added to that characteristic German idealistic thought-process an even higher grandeur of abstract thinking. This over-differentiated function, in spite of an unconscious effort to resolve the beautiful in the form of perfection which was, nevertheless, rationalistic, had left him emotionally impoverished and his system lacking even in an age not entirely devoid of its mythopoetic interests. As a man of affairs, a public servant, the receptor of a strange blend of qualities of an introvertive and extrovertive life, an eminently creative reckless thinker defying tradition and contemporaries, he would be most likely to seek for an individualistic representation of things
encouraging the right of all things with 'sufficient reason' and purpose to exist. The noble efforts to harmonize the tension of historic thought, to preserve the good and to embellish it with the new, to unite the mechanistic and teleological views, to resolve final and efficient causes, to absolve the schism between the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches are no less indicative of his nature than the harmonization and relatedness of all things in the universe in the 'Philosophy of Pre-established Harmony'. Merz says,

'Leibniz's love of regularity led him to the mechanical view of nature; his practical sense, his desire to see a purpose in everything, made him decide for the individualistic solution of the great problem. The former led him to assert the pre-establishment of the existing order and harmony, the maintenance of it according to mechanical law; the latter led him to the idea that God had created the existing world in preference to any other as the best - i.e., it led to his optimism.

And the spirit which lived in his philosophy dictated all the pursuits and endeavours of his life. Whenever he approaches a scientific problem, or grapples with a practical difficulty, it is with the desire of finding the law and governing principle of things, of penetrating to the root of every question; but at the same time, with the ultimate object of reconciling apparent contrasts, establishing order, and of resolving in a final chord the dissonances which grated upon his feelings.\(^1\)

Finally, his thought was optimistic, possibly unduly so. He posits a 'doctrine of the best world' and 'the city of God' and an almost inevitable progressive realization of the perfect and good, even in the midst of one of the gloomiest periods in his country's history.

The Individualism of Leibniz's Philosophy seen in the concept of the monad

The quest to find validity for the existence of individual

1. Op. cit., p. 179. Interesting aspects of Leibniz's life are reflected in his personal letters, especially note Sharp, Gregory, p. 111, letter to Mrs. Burnet, A Defense of the Late Dr. Samuel Clarke Against the Reply of Sieur Lewis-Thummig in Favor of Mr. Leibnitz with that Reply.
things found consummation in the concept of the monad. Addressing himself to the question, 'what is the nature of reality?', Leibniz could have followed one of two lines of thought - that of the atomists, Democritus and Hobbes, or the one universal substance idea of Spinoza and, in the sense in which God is the ultimate substance, Descartes. In an effort to preserve individuality and the indivisibility of reality, he had to reject the atomist view because atoms were infinitely divisible and the Spinozistic substance view because individuality was greatly lost in the abstract concept of unity. Rejecting the Cartesian pronouncement that extension is reality on the grounds that extension is divisible and the idea of a mathematical point as having no reality, he had to find some ultimate essence which was the irreducible stuff of the universe and life, something not a composite, not an aggregate, not made up of parts yet active, immaterial yet real, basic to all things yet unseen. This 'something' must be one being since if it is not one being, it is not truly a being. The only conceivable quality adequate for such demands, he believed, was 'force'. This primal essence or force-substance, without extension, shape, position or movement, though as a constituent making up each of these expressions, is what he called a 'monad'. It is individual (contra Spinoza) and it is dynamic and indivisible (contra Democritus). It is unextended, since extension cannot be an attribute of substance, for extension involves plurality.

This view of the monad as force should not be difficult to accept for if one begins with the aggregates or composite things and works back to the ultimate 'stuff' of the universe, he will come to what Leibniz anticipated, the 'new physics' position of 'energy' or

2. Monadology, Para. 1-3, Tr. Weiner
'energy-organization'. Whether that energy, as a basic factor, is a single unit without elements, such as a monad, is left to the physicist but the dynamic quality of the ultimate is evidenced in this ascription. Leibniz says no monad exists without what he calls, prima materia which seems to be what is left of a thing when all form, pattern, characteristics are taken from it. This prima materia seems to be simply, impenetrability or resistance, that which gives a thing the ability to exclude others, though this is not extension. But the monad is prima materia plus entelechy. This leads us to consider whether it is true that the monad is the basic reality of the universe or prima materia or entelechy and whether we have not come again to the disposition of Aristotle wherein form and matter are ultimately conceived as separable. Also, since the monad has no parts, the prima materia must be without constituent elements, else it would bring its elements with it in the monad. Professor Joseph writes that Leibniz does not consider prima materia to consist of mass or impenetrability and extension although it requires them and, he says, these must be only phenomenal of something in monads he calls, after Clifford, 'ejectiveness'. It cannot be said, or at least to my knowledge Leibniz does not say it, that the monad is pure activity, for only God is that. He did not say activity was essence although the monad is in constant activity. He did say extension was not essence. Extension is repetition, as substance is a succession of states. Somehow monads must be connected with prima materia, an ejectiveness or resistance, the identity of which, that is, the individuality of the monad, is given by form. What kind of form or entelechy force has, is difficult

2. This is not necessarily contradictory, i.e. if God is pure activity and activity is not essence God is not, for only of the monad did Leibniz not say activity was essence. He did say it was 'force'.
It is not too difficult to see how Leibniz may have derived his world view from the Cartesian. The Cartesian dualism is essentially based on active and passive substances. The passivity of matter rests on the belief that its essence is extension. But consider a cube of lead of 1" sides and a vacuum in the form of a cube with 1" sides. The two cubes are identical so far as their extensional properties are concerned. But in one case 'matter' is present and in the other absent. What can be said to determine the presence of matter? It must be an impenetrability or resistance, i.e. matter exerts pressure. Matter, then, has to be considered active substance. But active substance is mind. It is only one short step to eliminate the distinction between mind and matter and propound a panpsychism which is indistinguishable from panmaterialism. The difficulty arises, however, when, with the disappearance of the distinction, one is left with the problem of mind defined in terms of energy, e.g. the monad being psychic in functioning yet 'force'.

Consider that the monad is a qualitative unit of reality, thus reality is a qualitative system. Professor Macmurray suggests that a system of colors serves as a good example and at the same time assists us with the above difficulty. For (a) the distinction between two colors is purely qualitative and (b) all the colors are systematically related, e.g. orange is midway between red and yellow. One can arrange all the colors around the circumference of a circle and say, 'There are two and only two ways of going from red to green maintaining continuity - either via yellow or via blue'. Now notice that this example is given in spatial terms in order to express the system. The use of spatial (quantitative) terms to express a systematic relationship has been necessary to express what we know to be purely
qualitative. Leibniz's statement that 'space is a phenomenon like the rainbow' then becomes more readily understood. In like manner, Leibniz's metaphysical problem becomes more readily comprehended.

Monads, in assemblage or aggregations, constitute the real universe, for these monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in a word, the elements of all things; they are the bona fundatio of the universe. Though they are the essential structure of what we perceive in the universe, as extension, shape, position and movement, they are, in themselves, without these qualities. These attributes are really only appearances of a phenomenon bene fundatum, conceived by inaccurate perception. Just as extension is repetition and not the essence of reality, so space and time are not realities, in an ultimate sense. Space, for instance, though real, does not exist per se but is an assemblage of relations (distances, not lengths or points) admittedly Kantian in its subjectivity but objective, as well, since it is the collection of abstract possible relations. Time is dependent on 'before' and 'after'; that is, 'distances' between events and are not at certain, or in any absolute, times. Thus events do not last for a certain time since these really are not instants but are positions in relation to experiencing existents.

Force-substance is the nature of reality and subsequent manifestations are attributes. The real 'stuff', then, out of which all phenomena come is the monads.

This monadic theory seems to represent the focusing point of the Platonic eternal essence form and soul, an abstract but active 'fact', the influence of the Aristotelian entelechy and δύναμις; that

1. Carr, The Monadology of Leibniz, pp. 18-19
2. Monadology, para. 3, Tr. Wiener
3. Ibid., para. 3
5. Ibid., pp. 127-130
is, 'form-function' and potency, and the then contemporary scientific emphasis which by the help of the microscope was discovering a minute world of life which had been a dormant labyrinth. By reason of this combination, one often concurs with Professor Joseph when, on one occasion with typical British reserve, says, 'I confess there are passages which make me think that Leibniz has not made his thought very clear'. Nevertheless, let us look at these and other features of the monads.

The monad has its entelechy, its form-function in the sense that it is a dynamic form in constant activity in the maintenance of itself. As we shall see, however, it is not realizing itself, as is the process of entelechy, for it is created substantially (that is, structurally and in form potential - ability) as it always will be. It only preserves or persists in its own perceptual function. It is not an entelechy (perfection-form) in the proper sense and in the full meaning of the term, though often and confusingly, Leibniz speaks of it as a soul, the monad as an entelechy, and uses analogies that seem very much like Aristotle's. Professor Latta says that the difference between Leibniz and Aristotle, at that juncture where both use the term 'entelechy' is that Aristotle means a 'state' of perfection in which a process ends, whereas Leibniz means an individual force, containing within itself the principle of its own changes. Thus it is only 'entelechy' because it contains within itself a state of perfect realization which it tends to preserve. The Aristotelian concept of entelechy, as we saw earlier, is a dynamic realizing process of perfection and cannot be considered (understood) only as the end-perfection.

1. Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 127. Marx makes an interesting comment on Wulff's interpretation of Leibniz saying that for him (Wulff), 'Everything is to be clear, if not easy, and in consequence it (Leibniz's philosophy) becomes shallow and trivial'. p. 192, op. cit.
2. Especially Monadology, para. 63
which, at the consummation of the process, is realized. It is function and its direction and activity is by its own inner principle. One gathers that the Leibnizian concept seems less dynamic in that the monad has already achieved its completion, or better said, received its 'perfection' at its creation so that it only strives now to adjust and maintain its present condition or perfect its 'perfection'. Both are, one can say, dynamic and involve the form concept of perfection according to the nature of the monad or being possessing it. Actually, as Russell suggests, the entelechy is contained in the monad and represents its activity but is not the monad. Leibniz seems to use it to describe the monadic activity or characterize it when he says, 'the name of entelechies might be given to all simple substances or created monads, for they have within themselves a certain perfection (ἔχουν τὸ ἐντελέχεια)' Just as there is, for Aristotle, no matter without form and no being without entelechy, so for Leibniz there is no substance without monad.5

As it is not accurate to speak of entelechy as soul apart from the Greek thought, so is this true of the monad. The description, 'little souls', to represent monads is only accurate concerning some monads. Leibniz indicates that souls are those monads at the top of the hierarchical scale whose perception (a quality characteristic, as we shall see, of all monads) is clear, undefiled and distinct and accompanied by memory.6 It is true that Leibniz speaks of all monads as perceiving but in the lower area of the scale this function is very rudimentary (petites perceptiones) and has little affinity to what we

1. It is a kind of 'perfection' which the monad can possess without being perfect in the transcendent meaning, Carr, op. cit., p. 89
2. Latta, The Monadology, Tr. and notes, pp. 50-229
4. Monadology, para. 19, Wiener
5. Cf. Carr, op. cit., p. 159
6. Monadology, para. 19, Wiener
call representation. This, as well, removes the conception that each piece of matter has its own 'little mind'. While it is only on the higher scale that monads can be called souls, Leibniz has no compunctions about making the whole universe psychic in structure so that all monads can be said to be, if not souls, psychic entities or beings with a psychic nature.

The Platonic and Socratic idea of the soul is evidenced when Leibniz propounds that the monads are 'eternal' and have their beginning and ending only in the fiat of God. They do not come into being in the natural order of existence. Thus they do not evolve or grow. There is no concept of emergence. They are never 'becoming', only 'changing' and that only in their perceptions. Though not absolutely perfect, they are relatively the same because they were created complete so that Whitehead comments of the monad, 'Its birth is its end'.

It is well to indicate a point of confusion among thinkers on this question. Though the monad only changes, things and beings come into existence and are becoming and, therefore, Leibniz makes room in this sense for a dynamic universe and helps resolve the Spinozan doctrine of plenitude. Beings are becoming; monads only change.

The monads, according to the Identity of Indiscernibles, may seem to be the same but each one is infinitesimally different and unique. Each has a position of relativity but is not, properly

1. Collingwood, op. cit., p. 110
3. Monadology, para. 4,5,6. Wiener
4. Process and Reality, p. 111
5. Cf. Merz, op. cit., p. 149, Contrast Carr, p. 39
7. Monadology, para. 8 and 9, Wiener. The difficulty here is not in reconciling this principle with the law of continuity which would preserve unity in difference but with Leibniz's concept of order in which there are no 'leaps' in nature.
speaking, relative, for it is autonomously impenetrable - in the sense that 'the world of the monad is the range of its activity'; or has its own 'world' in that it is the representative of its universe and is the composite point of intersecting past and future.

One monad cannot take the place of another, or be self-contradictory according to the laws of sufficient reason and compossibility and non-contradictability, precisely because it is unique and necessary. The monad changes but it does so by its own internal principle.

This highly individualistic system is nowhere better evidenced than in the idea that monads have no relationship or interchange with anything outside themselves. They have 'no windows through which anything can enter or depart'. They exclude all influence from without and are powerless to act or react on each other. The point often overlooked is that though the monad is self-contained and while the connection between monads only exists in the mind of the Creator, monads make up aggregates and have a unique position to fill in composite things and beings but do so, not by exterior force, but by internal direction. Wundt, who was influenced considerably by Leibniz, said, 'every substance determines itself but this self-determination is determined by another substance'. Professor Carr seeks to make this part of Leibniz's doctrine more understandable by drawing an analogy with thinking in the sense that our thoughts and ideas are not like messengers running in and out of the mind but arise within us. It is only a 'contemplative', mirroring reflective kind of perception experience wherein the monad knows of other monads and acts appropriately and, since God has given it such a nature, spontaneously.

1. Carr, op. cit., p. 196
2. Monadology, para. 22; Carr, op. cit., pp. 196, 61, 66
3. Monadology, para. 11; cf. Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 178
4. Ibid., para. 7
5. Russell, op. cit., p. 98
6. Ibid., p. 40; cf. pp. 119, 200-202
If one sees this thesis as subjective, projected material of the thinker, one can understand how a geometrician contemplating mathematical forms, solving geometrical problems in his mind without ever seeing the 'forms', though having, it is true, experienced similar 'forms' before, or at least, having experienced, even in the case of some new creative formulation, some derivative factors, could gain knowledge about the ultimate psychic essence or reality, by the process of the highest method of thought, 'pure reason'. Add to this the influence of Plato and Plotinus and the concept is more appropriate than inappropriate to this seventeenth century thinker, though today being, at least, inadequate.

This effort to escape the Spinozan mechanistic-determinism produced a basic Leibnizian concept that the predicate is always included in the subject of a proposition. When this is generalized, it means that the monad always has within it its own attributes or functions and this is true of substance as well, so that a thing is what it does, though it should be remembered that a subject (or substance) is more than the sum of its predicates.1 Nothing can be done by a particular subject which was not contained in it from the beginning; they are pregnant with their own future. This implies a determinism which, unlike Spinoza's mechanistic necessity, is moral (that is, emphasizes value against Spinozistic amorality), but, nevertheless, of the same functional basis. It preserves individuality but possibly at the cost of producing a logical truth which could find validity as an ultimate or universal upon which reasoning can always depend.2

1. This seems to anticipate the general concept of the whole which is more than and different from the parts. Cf. discussion by Russell, op. cit., pp. 48-49, 103, 104.
2. Ibid., pp. 9-16
Two famous analogies, the monad as a mirror and the mind-body relationship as the working of two clocks represent, again, this individualistic and, in fact, mechanistic, system. The first, a most significant metaphor, represents the impenetrability of the monad. In this, Leibniz surreptitiously was advocating the dethronement of knowledge by the senses and the difficulties arising from assuming that something was transferred from the object to the subject when such sensations occur. Just as the mirror, as any study of optics indicated, receives and redirects rays of light without being influenced and just as the form of an image is not absorbed by the mirror, so, said Leibniz in this analogy, the monad, or in the case of the soul, the dominant monad, merely stands in reflecting relation to the external world, receiving nothing, or feeling no extrinsic influence or demand.

The two clocks, often discussed, represent the psychophysical parallel relationship. They can be made to agree perfectly in their activity in three different ways. First, by influence of one on the other, the way of mutual influence and expounded by seventeenth century contemporary philosophy; the second is that they are cared for or directed by some intelligent person - a theory often referred to as occasionalism in which God and the accompanying demands for His constant intervention becomes a Deus ex machina, and the third, Leibniz's own view, that of precision through pre-established harmony. Mind and body are separate, the dominant active monad, the soul, lives by its own laws and governs the passive body, which lives by its own laws as well. This relationship is not a real one but only

1. Monadology, para. 56, Tr. Weiner, para. 63
2. Nouveau Systeme, tr. Latta, pp. 331-334
3. Monadology, para. 71, 78, 52
Their union, far less a 'holistic' concept than Aristotle's, found in the unity of efficient (body) and final (soul) cause, and the Principle of Pre-established Harmony. Even in Leibniz's system of Pre-established Harmony, God is still Deus ex machina since instead of continuous miraculous intervention, there is one creative act in which the all-encompassing miracle takes place. In this way the clocks and the monads perform their functions because each is a perfectly accurate mechanism controlled by God (or, at least, given their nature and harmony by God).

The emphasis in these analogies is on the harmony of these two independent functions in which it is possible for mind and body to interact. One might consider that if they are so different and work harmoniously it is because of pre-established harmony which is both its evidence and its need. This is the only reason given to explain why, if the body and mind are independent, a pain in the body is in the mind as well. That interaction for Leibniz must have meant sense-perception or interchange, these analogies give evidence. But even the barest of 'standing over againstness' or 'meaning' as developed in chapter one, must depend on some subjective and unconscious pervasion or influence.

Leibniz bequeathed a great heritage to scientific thought by emphasizing the spontaneity of the soul, unity rather than the long standing faculty concepts, and conceiving mental activity as 'something more than a mere arranging, sorting, and associating of the given'; inasmuch as 'it was essentially productive, creative and freely active'.

1. Ibid., para. 61
2. Ibid., para. 79. Cf. Russell, op. cit., p. 147
3. Collingwood, op. cit., p. 110
4. Brett, History of Psychology, p. 391
5. Ibid., p. 391
In all of his arguments, however, Leibniz was maintaining the individuality and self-consistency of the monad.

The Great Chain of Being

One of the salient contributions of the Leibnizian Philosophy is what might be called 'A Great Chain of Being' (Lovejoy) the essential features of which are 'plenitude, continuity and linear gradation'.

This whole scale of nature consists of the lowest inorganic forms of existence and very lowest of sentient life to the highest forms of organic life and God so that men are linked to animals and these to plants and these with fossils and these to inanimate things.

Leibniz makes clear his concept in a personal letter in which he writes:

'All the different classes of beings which taken together make up the universe are, in the ideas of God who knows distinctly their essential gradations, only so many ordinates of a single curve so closely united that it would be impossible to place others between any two of them, since that would imply disorder and imperfection. Thus men are linked with the animals, these with the plants and these with the fossils, which in turn merge with those bodies which our senses and our imagination represent to us as absolutely inanimate. And, since the law of continuity requires that when the essential attributes of one being approximate those of another all the properties of the one must likewise gradually approximate those of the other, it is necessary that all the orders of natural beings form but a single chain, in which the various classes, like so many rings, are so closely linked one to another that it is impossible for the senses or the imagination to determine precisely the point at which one ends and the next begins . . . all the species which, so to say, lie near to or upon the borderlands being equivocal, and endowed with characters which might equally well be assigned to either of the neighboring species. Thus there is nothing monstrous in the existence of zoophytes, or plant-animals, as Budaeus calls them; on the contrary, it is wholly in keeping with the order of nature that they should exist. And so great is the force of the principle of continuity, to my thinking, that not only should I not be surprised to hear that such beings had been discovered . . . creatures which in some of their properties, such as . . .

1. Lovejoy, Arthur, The Great Chain of Being, p. 144
nutrition or reproduction, might pass equally well for animals or for plants, and which thus overturn the current laws based upon the supposition of a perfect and absolute separation of the different orders of coexistent beings which fill the universe;... not only, I say, should I not be surprised to hear that they had been discovered, but, in fact, I am convinced that there must be such creatures, and that natural history will perhaps some day become acquainted with them, when it has further studied that infinity of living things whose small size conceals them from ordinary observation and which are hidden in the bowels of the earth and the depths of the sea. 1

But this scale of being is only representative of the deeper and more significant hierarchical scale of monads to which the observable scale of nature belongs and is its exemplification. Because of their confused (unconscious or petite) perceptive, 'mirroring' activity, due to the hindrance of that most basic and passive matter in the universe to which they are attached, the materia prima, 2 some monads can only be 'animal' or 'plant' monads while others which are identified with human beings, are clear perceiving and apperceiving souls, soul monads. This makes possible the identification of one 'intrinsic' and the other 'extrinsic' scale, is, the basis for the gradation and secures that the monad determines the position of the organism on the scale of existence. It is representative of Leibniz's whole organic-spiritual world view.

This system seems to be the stepping-stone between the Greek concepts of the world as organic and progressively changing to the evolutionary theories of Hegel, Darwin, Bergson, Alexander, Morgan and Smuts. One could not say that this is a theory of 'creative evolution'. It is an abstract scale of being with no emergence at all. The monads do not pass from one monadic category to another, for instance, from one animal level to another so that the lower stages

1. Lovejoy, op. cit., pp. 144-145
are antecedents and conditions of the higher. It appears that he is maintaining, when he says, in this more recently discovered letter, that 'men are linked with animals' and reiterates the other links in the scale, that there has been a developmental process from the lowest to the highest. However, as the sequel will reiterate, there seems to be no genuine generic relationship among monads, and at that point fails as did the other current theories in accounting for what appears to be a generic relationship of all monads throughout Nature.

If the monad gives the organism position on the scale, and the monad is created especially to represent a phase of the universe that only it can through its own individual perception, and since it is created 'complete', it seems quite certain that Leibniz was not positing a biological evolutionary theory. The only possible 'developmental' aspect of the monad is the 'internal principle' called 'appetition'.¹ This is an important theory in that it seems to make an advance over the Spinozistic concept of conatus. Conatus, primarily, is the organism's dynamic tendency to persist in its own being. Leibniz employs this idea as well but the principle of appetition seems to go beyond that by emphasizing that the monad's perception can (to a point) be increasingly perfected (less confused). There is actually an 'uneasiness' of the monad in view of its possibility of perfection. The whole system seems to convey, however, that this function can only be perfected within the created nature of that particular monad, something determined before its 'birth'. That is, every 'possible' strives toward 'existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in the germ'.² When the monad passes to a more distinct perception and assumes dominance over more and more subordinate monads,

1. Monadology, para. 14,15; tr. Carr; cf. para. 11
2. Fragments, tr. Lovejoy, pp. 177ff.
a change takes place in the growth of the body and this is called evolution (the opposite is called involution). This is the natural growth and flux process of an organism and is not meant to be a passing of one organism to another of a different species and existence on the scale of being. The change, it could be said, is a becoming but only in the sense of something not losing its identity. It must be a persistence through change and a preserving enough of itself through becoming to retain identity. It is based on the theory of pre-formation (a subject-predicate generalization) current then and is a truly evolutionary scheme of an 'unfolding' process of what has been in the semina from the beginning. In view of the nature of the monad, this monadic scale is to be considered a psychological or spiritual rather than a morphological one.

There is a continuity in this phase of Leibniz's system which must be recognized. Although each monad is individual, unique, and self-contained, these differences are often only discernible to infinite knowledge. To finite observation they appear the same. This is true to the extent that they seem to merge into one another. According to the law of continuity, then, there are no 'leaps', breaks, contrasts or contradictions in nature. The doctrine of plenitude, at this point, simply means there are no vacuums. There is no area of experience or

1. One has to consider this when reading various writers represented in Collingwood when he says of Leibniz's system, 'it is a continuous scale from almost unmitigated mechanism at one end to the highest conscious developments of mental life at the other, with a constant drive or nisus working upwards along the scale'. p. 110 op. cit., Contrast Carr, pp. 120, 179, 76; Lovejoy, p. 114; Nellone, p. 107

2. Monadology, para. 69, tr. Wiener

3. Spinoza had believed that all existents in the universe are due to their possibility since all that is possible exists and all that is not possible does not exist. Leibniz held that 'not everything possible exists' and what is possible and does not exist is so because it would not be in keeping with the good, order and perfection of all things. It is not compossible. As much as possible exists under these laws. Cf. Fragment, 1671, First Principles, tr. Wiener
contemplation in which nothing exists, for 'there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe'.\(^1\) The universe, in its inner structure, is a plenum so that 'all matter is connected and every motion has some effect on distant bodies'.\(^2\) Each body feels all that happens in the universe'.\(^3\) There are living things in each particle of matter\(^4\) which is like 'a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fishes'.\(^5\) The air even contains tiny, imperceptible beings\(^6\) so we might conclude that the universe is teeming with life. It is certain that the purpose of this utilization, through the law of continuity of the universe, is not to present quantity but individuality, 'the multiplication of species and sub-species and differing individuals to the limit of logical possibility'.\(^7\)

Nature, then, is one great whole in which all things are related and connected, each having its own individuality but existing in harmony at every moment and at every point in the 'Great Chain of Being'.

This is only possible through the factors of Pre-established Harmony and Sufficient Reason.

Pre-established Harmony

As with other leading Leibnizian concepts, Pre-established Harmony is an account of the observed phenomenon of nature in which there is a principle making for unity and wholes. This highly ambiguous idea of Pre-established Harmony is often referred to as merely a symbol for nothing. Actually, it is invoked in an effort to understand such things as the universe as united, the monadic cohesion and

1. Ibid., para. 69
2. Ibid., para. 61
3. Ibid., para. 61
4. Ibid., para. 66
5. Ibid., para. 67
6. Ibid., para. 68
7. *Nouveaux Essais*, III, 6, 12, Tr. Lovejoy, p. 182
working relatedness, monadic perception, the synthetic nature of causal relations, the harmonious functioning of mind and body and the hierarchically ordered Chain of Being, in which, from the constitution of the monads in the beginning, each monad runs, without disharmony, parallel to the others. The fact that things do work in aggregates and wholes and are able to form the bona fide of the universe is indicative of a factor at work which this concept seeks to describe. So basic is this principle that the whole and part do not exist in a composite in reality any more than notes in a musical tune except by this Pre-established Harmony'. This seems to be a principle like a 'natural law' without and within the monad. In the sense that it is a directing principle from without as an expression of an 'agency' leading monads into relational harmony, it is an a priori quality not intrinsic to the monad (organism).

In its deeper significance, this idea would mean that apparent rearrangements of thought are never inevitably unresolvable. Disorders, no matter how great, are ultimately corrected and recompensed. Even the smallest of bodies do not escape meaning and are always fitted into the experience of the whole. 'Nothing is lost and everything which happens to us enters into what will happen'. All bodies are so related as to make one action felt throughout the entire universe. This is the result of Pre-established Harmony, a factor which is not of God's power but, in keeping with Leibniz's rationalistic system, his wisdom.

1. Elucidations (from the letters of Leibniz to Isaac Jacquelot) op. cit. tr. Carr, pp. 161-162
2. Ibid., p. 162 (emphasis mine) Whitehead in Process and Reality says '. . .the image under which this operative growth of God's nature is best conceived is that of a tender care that nothing be lost'. p. 490
3. Monadology, para. 61; one has to notice closely it is not the monads but 'bodies' to which he refers, else one could ask 'how can a reaction be felt if objects (monads) cannot be influenced or changed by any exterior cause?'.


Sufficient reason, existence and motivation

There are two propositions, the necessary and the existential, having a chiaroscuro quality interwoven into the motif of sufficient reason. The first aspect, a metaphysical necessity in Leibniz's philosophy, has to do with all possible worlds and reduces itself to a form of the law of causality. It does not posit existence nor is its subject matter 'given' in time. It asserts that all possible causes are desires and appetites. The second aspect, the primary interest of this investigation, is a principle concerning actual contingents and existents asserting that the determination of all actual causation is the desire for good.¹

According to Leibniz, there must be a sufficient reason for contingent truths of fact which represent the universe of things and beings;² that is, everything outside of God who is the only absolute-necessity whose essence implies existence while at the same time being free - in contra-distinction to contingents - from possibility. His question is why there is something rather than nothing when nothing is simpler than something and why this something is what it is.³ There must be a reason for everything that is, since nothing exists without a reason and in which that which exists finds the right to do so on the basis, not of contribution, but its own individual essence. It is essence which demands existence. Every possible within an existent is striving for existence and actualization.

There seem, then, to be four important concerns in this position. First, against prevalent seventeenth century philosophy which emphasized the lack of order and reason in the universe, Leibniz

1. This entire consideration is discussed adequately by Russell, op. cit., pp. 25-39
2. Monadology, para. 32, 33, 36, tr. Wiener
3. The Letters to Samuel Clarke are concerned with this problem and the law of Indiscernibles.
held that each existent exists for a reason and neither it nor the universe compossible with it are the result of chance, indifference or caprice. Second, that each thing and all things have meaning. Third, that each existent on the scale of being, from the highest to the lowest, has an equal right to exist (though the contribution of each may vary, as he emphasizes in the Theodicy); and that each finds validity for its existence simply in the fact of its individual essence. Fourth, that psychologically, all conscious choices must have motivations in an axiomatic system.

The major emphasis of this part of the study of Sufficient Reason has to do with causation in terms of the desire for the good. This reduces itself to the asseveration of final causes in which there is a striving towards that which appears best. Commenting on this highly significant Leibnizian contribution, Bertrand Russell declares, 'where the change depends only upon God, it really is for the best; where it depends upon a free creature, it is such as seems best to the creature, but is often, owing to confused perception, not really the best possible change'.¹ This can be expressed by a kind of uneasiness, a striving to 'span the gap' between what is and what might be through choice of the best.² When this concept is translated into organismic terms - striving for the best as a motivating source of behavior and the problem of the choice of self-defeating behavior - important ramifications are readily seen. It becomes one of the major emphases of Smuts's and the Holistic approach to an understanding of personality as we shall observe in Chapters VI, IX and Appendix II.

The 'best' toward which, in a contingent sense, being is striving is not, strictly speaking, a psychological or hedonistic

¹ Op. cit., p. 34
² Monadology, para. 15 tr. Wiener
utilitarian achievement. Rather than the acquisition of the convenient or that which brings happiness and pleasure for its own sake, Leibniz considered the 'best' or 'good' to have its reason in its essential grounding in the logically ultimate and choice in the ethical quality of the good, or 'best possible' effect or ethical end, even though this choice is often wrong, due to the blindness of our 'passions, habits, dispositions of the organs of thought, external impressions, greater or less attention, etc.'

However the 'best' was chosen, it was always attributed to the individual freedom of choice, although sufficient reason 'inclines' it. The 'best' may not be the perfect but it is the best possible in view of the conditio sine qua non. Perfection, a rationalistic concept, is the final end of being in which it finds true happiness and is, organically, the variety of function of the constituent cells and the harmony and unity of the whole.

Lovejoy indicates that the real meaning of sufficient reason reduces itself to a proposition in which existence is determined by necessary truths. This means that contingent truths are ultimately reducible to a priori or necessary (analytic) propositions (where the predicate is contained in the subject) so that their validity is comprehended only when the opposite is a self-contradiction. It follows from this that Leibniz's 'sufficient reason' is essentially the same as Spinoza's 'necessity'. Russell, however, says, 'The doctrines of final causes, of possible worlds of the synthetic nature of causal connections and of freedom ... everything, in fact, that is characteristic of Leibniz ... depends upon the ultimately irreducible

nature of the opposition between existential and necessary

1. Letter to Des Bosses, (undated) tr. Wiener, p. 96
2. Ibid., p. 96
4. op. cit., pp. 172-176
propositions'.

He seems to indicate that no resolution can be effected by saying that that which exists is necessary; for as Leibniz indicates, God alone sees how I and existence are joined. Russell comments that contingency is not that which precludes accessibility to human knowledge alone but also because God has similar limitations concerning it. Furthermore, God's essence is the only one which demands existence as an absolute-necessity and the truths about possible worlds seem to give weight to this position.

**The mechanistic emphasis in Leibniz's philosophy**

Lovejoy makes an important point of a sufficient reason which 'inclines' to decision and indicates that this is evidence of the strict determinism of Leibniz's system in addition to a contradiction in logic. It is supposed that the objection must center around a metaphysical or divine incursion which, by such an incursion, determines choice. Leibniz was guided here, evidently, by the prevalent idea that an effect demands a direct cause so that each behavioral effect is the result of some direct type of motivational cause. However, if Leibniz were really trying to interpret the conatus and appetite tendencies, without which no freedom would exist or biological existence be maintained, or trying to interpret the tendency to perfection inherent in all things by thinking of them in terms of 'inclination', this would necessitate a readjustment of some ideas of metaphysical incursion. Furthermore, if he were here referring to the psychological fact of past experiences or the anticipation of future ends entering into the present situation, even through his rudimentary concept of the 'unconscious', as in the interpretation of final causes.

2. Ibid., p. 61
3. Ibid., pp. 61-62
thus so 'inclining' decisions, or was saying that behavior always has a purpose or direction, then, acclamation of tremendous insight is deserved. Or, pertaining to biological behavior, if, because of the lack of more adequate knowledge of unconscious and autonomic functions intuitive insights concerning these were described in terms whose subjective meaning lent themselves to metaphysical over-tones and interpretation, then, at least, Leibniz would become more understandable at this point, even though his whole system still retains a quality of mechanistic determinism.

The stress Leibniz lays on the adequacy of the mechanistic interpretation is inadequate in an explanation of an organic universe because it is entirely too emphatic and all-encompassing. Nevertheless, in the Monadology, he makes the interesting statement that perception is inexplicable by mechanical causes,¹ giving the impression throughout his writing that all else is explicable by this approach. This is significant if one remembers that perception is an activity, a function of the monad which itself is a psychic unit with a kind of 'consciousness' even though at times very rudimentary. Possibly, in an effort to preserve the orderliness and design of the universe and the position of God as the sovereign and absolute rather than giving the world over to Caprice, he had to foster this concept. And the universe must have laws which maintain that order and dependability. But it is interesting that the psychological aspects of existence are not altogether mechanical, nor can they be fully interpreted mechanically and we presume, at this point, final causes and human action have their implications in his position. While this psychological truth is self-evident, the scientific studies in this century would indicate that even organically, while there is in such functions of the autonomic

¹. Ibid., para. 17
nervous system a preponderance of mechanical function-processes, there
is far too much intra-action of the organism as a whole to interpret
even these mechanistically.\textsuperscript{1} The distinction Leibniz makes, however,
between the perceptive activity and the rest of phenomena is noteworthy.

The tendency toward perfection and the city of God

The optimism of Leibniz’s system is striking. He maintains
that all things are striving to realize the greater perfection, and if
this is not too great a speculation, of their own natures. He says,

‘And it can be said that everything tends to
the perfection not only of the universe in general
but also of those creatures in particular who are
destined to such a measure of happiness that the
universe finds itself interested therein, by vir-
tue of the divine goodness which communicates it-
self to each one, according as sovereign wisdom
permits.’\textsuperscript{2}

When this concept is re-formed in psychological terms and
‘perfection’ is clarified accordingly, it serves as one of the major
drives of personality.

In its broader aspects, it is a world process as well as
individual and is in the moral realm of grace. God is not confined
to special acts of salvation but is redeeming the whole world in a
process of cosmic harmonization.\textsuperscript{3} It is not a process in which some
are saved and others condemned but one in which final causes are corre-
lated with efficient causes so that universal redemption is the aim
and process of grace.

An objection raised here is that in Leibniz’s system, as
has been apparent, there remains a mechanistic process which has a
quality of inevitability about it, a concept whose validity is to be

\textsuperscript{1} Leibniz seems to have a faint idea of this in his
attempt to differentiate machines of man and God. \textit{Monadology}, para. 64.
\textsuperscript{2} New Systems of Nature, tr. Duncan in \textit{Classical
Psychologists}, Benjamin Rand, p. 212
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Monadology}, para. 87, 88
openly questioned. If a mechanistic interpretation is not capable of fully understanding psychic activity, surely it is cut of place in the realm of grace and redemption.

This leads us to consider the metaphysical concept of the City of God which we shall have occasion to compare with Smuts's philosophy of Holism. Pre-established Harmony has made all existence, every monad and being, essential and related parts of the whole. The city of God is a universal process and is in this sense fundamentally contrary to the Augustinian idea of a 'City of God' being in antagonistic tension with the world and evil and out of which it shall emerge victorious.

The implication is here evident in that there is, for Leibniz, no dualism of eternal forces. Evil does not exist absolutely. The City of God transcends all experience and is that in which all tensions are reconciled. It is made up of those monads (rational minds) which have excelled the category of souls on the Scale of Being as they have perceptions like God's in their clarity and perfection. It involves a 'pre-formed' harmony which, like the monads in their creation, is complete in the ultimate sense, though appearing to our confused perception in the natural world as the final cause actualizing itself in the efficient cause. Here finality and efficiency are one and the world, though seen from various perspectives, is in reality one.

The Monadology 'begins with the concept of the monad as a simple substance and constituent unit of the universe' and 'closes with the concept of the City of God as the embodiment of the principle of the pre-established harmony'.

This study has presented a general outline of the Monadology in especially those points of affinity between Holism and Monads to

1. Carr, op. cit., p. 142
which attention has been drawn and which, by inference, many affinities have been seen. One might say that if only the monads had been genuinely interrelated, interacting, the related harmony of all monads coupled, i.e. correlated, with a more developed concept of the intrinsic tendency to perfection, an insightful concept of the whole and whole-part relationship, and the Chain of Being as one of generic relationship and emergence, Leibniz would have expounded almost the entire philosophy of Holism as propounded by Smuts in *Holism and Evolution*. Although these very factors omitted in Leibniz's conception of the world, however, are basic fundamentals in Smuts's system and in this sense the essence of the holistic view of reality, yet the entire system can be considered an anticipation of the latter theory. In considering the similarities and differences in the two systems, we shall be interested to note how and to what extent Smuts builds on the Leibnizian concept of monads to form his own view.
A Comparative and Critical Study of Some Important Aspects of the Philosophical Positions of Aristotle, Leibniz and Smuts

In order to maintain as clear a presentation as possible, our exposition has followed a rather dialectical course. In Chapter One we referred to a major difficulty in all holistic theories and attempted to give some working description of wholes, synthesizing much of the contemporary material relevant to the problem. In later chapters, we have sketched the philosophies of Smuts, Aristotle and Leibniz emphasizing, in the latter two, aspects which have particular reference to some of the basic principles upon which the Philosophy of Holism has been built. In this way the reader is given the larger frame of reference of the particular philosophical system under consideration so that the principles especially dealt with may be more easily understood. We come now to this chapter in which the major ideas of the previous chapters, and the respective philosophical systems, are compared, their influence considered, and the Holistic Theory of Smuts criticized in greater detail. In the chapter which follows this, a similar but more general treatment is given to the later philosophical theories of Kant and Hegel with particular reference to the Philosophy of Holism.
Entelech, monads and appetition, the whole and the holistic-principle

The Aristotelian concept of Entelechy refers to the dynamic process by which the form of a thing is realized. This statement needs some explaining. Entelechy is something unchanging which accounts for, organizes and directs a process of change, i.e. the grouping and synthesis of parts into a developing whole. The process is empirical and observable. The form, however, is only inferred, for it is not a process, strictly speaking, and thus not in process of change itself and not observable. What is observed is the progressive realization in time of the form inherent in a thing. What this form is can only be known fully when the existent has reached maturity. The entelechy, however, cannot be satisfactorily abstracted from the process of its realization (development) since only by this phenomenon seen as a whole can growth, complexity of organization and, indeed, identity, as well as the nature of form and matter, be understood and explained. The concept of entelechy helps, then, to describe that process of the potential becoming actual in gradational or progressive manifestations.

Leibniz approaches this idea of entelechy in ascribing to the monad a tendency to perfect its primary function, perception. While it is created perfect in organization, its perceptual functioning, which varies with each monad according to its individuality or position on the scale of existence, can be perfected to a higher degree. Although the monad's existence is due to the creative activity of God and governed by Pre-established Harmony, there is an 'internal principle', appetition, within the monad which underlies its changes in function, since no outside influence can cause it to act.

In spite of their evident similarity, the concepts of entelechy and Holism are not identical. Entelechy involves the
Aristotelian concept of potentiality which Smuts does not accept, since the emphatic notion of preformation is not compatible with the idea of emergence. The entelechy theory attributes growth and adaptation to an internal principle within the organism such that it responds to situations by actualizing its potential structure. This potential structure tends to be regarded as a potential. Aristotle held that all things must already exist in potentia, although he was not as rigid a pre-formist as some who have since adhered to the view. But he treats potentiality as an entity coming to actuality in a biological self-contained process. Entelechy and Holism seem to reach common ground when potentiality refers to the specific form of the organism which is actualized in its growth. But again, for Aristotle this is an unfolding of what was there from the beginning, the realization of a form that has never changed. For Smuts it is a case of new elements coming into being through the holistic synthesis and (as in Aristotle) in a self-contained manner.

Entelechy is essentially a biological concept which first began as a principle of botany. It is part of the Aristotelian teleological system with its necessary determinism. Emphasis is on individuality and its denial of influence to environmental forces, which leave no room for any 'indeterminacy awaiting decision' and render it ineffectual when applied to the interpretation of the psychophysical organism or whole.

When Aristotle attempted to generalize his teleological doctrine from descriptions of the development of plants and animals to ethics, the entire system broke down. Of course, for Aristotle the teleological position was necessary to describe development and process. Concerning man, however, he was confronted with the fact that

man acts purposely, and with an image of the end in mind. For plants and animals the teleological system seems to be more applicable, although biologists tend to speak in terms of 'direction' rather than 'purpose'. For plants and animals there is only one end - they can do nothing about it. For man, though we describe his action and behavior by such concepts as purpose, it is only because behavior is directional and because the end intended is a determinant in what is done. But this is entirely different from organic processes as we shall more fully discuss in Chapter X.

Smuts's theory in its origin is a biological one. But Smuts has gone further than Aristotle, for the doctrine of Holism is a generalizing without limits of a biological principle, and conceives whole-making, in more general terms, as a process which spans inorganic, organic and spiritual elements in Nature. It seems only a hypothetical inference when Aristotle and Leibniz appeal to entelechy and appetite to justify their belief in a realizing or developing process within the universe. In Smuts, however, the tendency toward wholeness purports to be that which also characterizes all wholes, evolution and reality itself. In fact, one of its claims to acceptance is that it

1. It is well to mention again that the evolutionary hypothesis in its more scientific aspects in Smuts's theory is not under discussion in this paper. It is only under discussion when we consider the general orientation of it and its ramifications for the study of personality. Some writers have considered Smuts's theory as an evolutionary hypothesis in its biological aspect. Cf. Morgan, T.H., The Scientific Basis of Evolution in which L. Morgan, Haldane and Smuts come under attack, especially Smuts for theorizing that life and mind are not the essence of reality but late-comers and for his 'rather naive ideas as to the life of the cell, chromosomes, Golgi bodies and the genes', pp. 243-249; Lancelot Hogben, The Nature of Living Matter, also his British Association report, 1929, both of which contain severe criticism of Haldane and Smuts. The counter-defense by Haldane is found in Philosophy of a Biologist, pp. 133-146.
proves applicable to all areas of existence. The psychophysical organism is one of its main concerns. But though Holism endeavors to account for freedom, human ideals, individual activity, it is manifestly inadequate to deal with the human organism as a purposeful personality shaping the course of its own personal and social development. This inadequacy seems to be common to organic philosophies which apply biologically oriented terms and principles to that area where personal action, ecological conditions and social progress form a dynamic whole. It may be said, however, that some methods for dealing with this problem are latent in Smuts's system, though they remain undeveloped.

It is to be noted further that Leibniz refers to an uneasiness or restlessness within the monad until it reaches a state of ideal perfection. Something of this same idea is apparent in Smuts's concept of the whole which is in constant tension and manifests an 'over-plus' of equilibrium. This 'over-plus' is directed toward something, a quality of wholeness yet unattained, an 'end-form' to which the whole organism strives. This tendency is a causal source of activity and desire within each thing, this being a concept inherent in the other two systems as well. Aristotle refers it to the ideal form of the organism, Leibniz to it as the end toward which the monad strives in seeking perfection; Smuts relates it to the final whole as the completion of the nature of the organism in question and in man of his true 'spiritual' personality. But while Aristotle maintains that the organism must be interpreted in terms of what it is to become, Smuts would assert that the interpretation must be on the basis of what the

also refer to the reviews by L. Morgan, Younghusband and Forsyth (bibliography). Since Holism and Gestalt Psychology have very much in common, consider two good articles on emergent evolution and Gestalt by Reiser, O.L., Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Nature, Philosophical Review, 1930, 39, 556-572 and The Logic of Gestalt Theory Psychological Review, 1931, 38, 359-368
organism is capable of becoming. Both agree that it is the aim toward which the organism is directed which makes it possible to interpret the thing in its various phases of development and further that this factor is all important in determining the organization of elements, relations and functions. The concept of final causes, basic to all three systems, is one which, according to Whitehead, has been unduly neglected in contemporary philosophy.

The end-form and the whole

Entelechy not only implies a dynamic process but refers to a potential end-form which is prior to the parts, though only realized actually in the existing object when it is fully or completely developed. This form, which is unchanging and existent from the beginning, is what gives the parts organization and function-structure (what Smuts calls 'the shaping element'). From this, one may infer how far the potential is realized and how far unfulfilled in any given stage of the organism, though the ultimate answer must await expression in the completed form.

In Smuts's theory, the whole is both logically prior to the parts and existentially present in them, progressively realizing its wholeness in the organized object and thereby arranging the parts. In one sense, however, the whole is never realized since it can always be different from what it is now, although it can only develop in terms of what is 'naturally' possible; thus the term 'holistic'. This presents the logical problem of explaining how a process can also be the nature of that for which it strives and of abstracting the process of organization from the organized product. The Gestalt psychologists, attempt to resolve this enigma by identifying form, process,

1. Ross, Aristotle, p. 175
organization and organized object in one term, 'Gestalt'. Although entelechy really attempts the same thing, its phases are broken down into form, potentiality, process and end-form. Nevertheless, the operation of the holistic-tendency is only possible because there is something to be realized. But it is only a progressive realization which can be achieved and experienced. The true nature of the whole is that it is always becoming, never complete; 'The phases are the process, the process is the thing'.

Do we not have to differentiate the 'whole' which is logically prior from the whole which is the existential unitas multiplex, and this again from the ideal-form to which the organism strives? If we do, then does not the organism seem to be something separate from the whole? If we do not, then the whole is only the organism at every stage of development and its end-form is but a part of it. When we

1. Cf. Koffka, op. cit., p. 683, also Appendix I, thesis. The difference on the concept of wholes between Holism (doctrine) and Gestalt Psychology seems to be slight. Both emphasize that the whole is more and different from the parts all together. Smuts has a tendency to say that the 'more than and different from' refers to the internality and inwardness of relations and functions. This sounds much like Gaza psychology which emphasizes production by 'and-connections' which are the 'more' of wholes. A Gestalt is a whole which is more than mere relations for relations and parts remain the same yet, to illustrate, a tune might be different, not merely by changing keys, but by a change of rhythm. The Gestalt has a form quality all its own, distinct from the parts and their relations. Possibly the difference can be accounted for by the material each considers, i.e. Gestalt dealing with perception and Holism with 'natural' wholes, although the new theory of 'isomorphism' developed by Koehler would rule out this suggestion. The answer is not to be found there but rather in the fact of emphasis. Smuts's thesis implies that the 'shape' or 'form' of a thing is something different from the parts and their relations altogether, but surely his position needs clarification and his emphasis made more positive. In other words, there seems to be little in Smuts which would really contradict Gestalt theory. Cf. Katz, David, Gestalt Psychology, passim, but esp. Ch. II; Koffka, op. cit., passim; Koehler, W., The Place of Value in a World of Facts, passim; Reiser, O.L., op. cit., (Bibliography).

say the whole is realized in the organism, and refer to an animal as a whole, are we saying anything more than that the organism and whole are one (though not necessarily perfect) and that the two are realized because they are one just as personality and the person are one? If so, it appears that in order to understand the organism, we have to postulate an anticipatory form containing in itself a goal or acquirable nature to be achieved through the 'filling out' of this 'form' by way of increasing organic complexity and functional adequacy. Does this involve a dualism between the anticipatory form and the complex? One of Aristotle's major difficulties, at this juncture, is that of reconciling the dualism of form and matter. Matter, for him, cannot exist without form; without form it is mere potentiality. However, when something is made or comes to exist, its existence is the result of bringing together form and matter, both of which must have existed already, since neither form nor matter are themselves made. Moreover, though matter cannot exist without being 'informed', there are eternal forms which exist apart from matter. Since the form of a thing is its primary substance, forms are substantial. In this case, Aristotle, though consistently maintaining that every observable thing represents an inseparable combination of form and matter, falls victim to his own metaphysical argument against Platonic forms. He attempts to solve the fundamental problem of Greek philosophy, how behind the changing multiplicity of phenomena a unitary and abiding Being is to be thought, and this he does by proposing an idea of development in which 'the essence exists only in the succession of its phenomenal manifestations by means of which it realizes its own possibility'. Being, then, is

1. Considering a biological problem, one could cite Aristotle's theory of procreation in which the passive material was given by the female and the form (life) by the male.

2. Windelband, op. cit., p. 140
that which comes into existence in the processes of nature (procrea-
tion, development, etc.) through the self-realization in phenomena of
the essence (form). But though Aristotle is anxious to avoid both
Democritus' concept of atoms in motion and Plato's concept of Ideas as
the cause of phenomena, he ends, metaphysically speaking at least, by
separating matter and form and therefore does not greatly help to solve
the basic problem. This is more painfully evident when potentiality
is considered not merely as the state of a raw material which by an
appropriate process can become a refined object (as the statue is
carved out of the marble block), but as a 'fundamental and irreducible
concept' (B. Russell) where the becoming of a thing can be nothing
other than what is already contained in it potentially ('accidents' or
chance variations excepted). It seems we are led to distinguish, on
the one hand, forms in the abstract which brings us back to the Pla-
tonic forms, and on the other, the existential form manifested in the
function-structure of the organism.

Piaget gives us a clue to the understanding of what has been
called here 'end-form' or 'ideal-whole'. His experiments in the struc-
ture of groupings lead him to postulate an 'anticipatory schema' which
is really 'the consciousness of an ordered series of potential opera-
tions, simply the direction imposed on the task by the structure of
this grouping', the 'filling out' which is 'nothing but the putting
into practice of these operations' and the organization itself which
is the complex of previous ideas obeying the actual laws of grouping. 1
The 'ideal-whole', an abstraction by inference from observation, is
simply the direction imposed on the parts. It is an individual order
or ideal, not a general one, dominant but not inevitable, providing
the goal toward which the tendency points, in which the parts and their

relations unify in the 'filling out' process. This 'filling out' is not an unfolding of what is there already, but a progression in which the increasing complexity of the whole gives rise to a new whole altogether characterized by a new quality not found in the preceding organization. In organisms, however, there is only one whole which changes but cannot be said to give rise to another whole except in the case of creative emergents in evolution.\(^1\) The ideal form which the whole may take is not a kind of entity in a dualism whereby form imposes itself on passive matter or can be separated from the organism or existent.\(^2\) The whole (the actual thing) is simply a product of its own holistic-tendency. The 'ideal-whole', like the 'anticipatory schema' is an ideal frame of reference which is related to the pattern of the complex only in the sense that all capacities or changes can be described in terms of the end-form as having a 'forward reference'. The end-form is an 'objective lure for completion' pointing to that deeper wholeness which is its essential 'subjective aim'. In the psychophysical being, it becomes what Hinkle and McKenzie have called 'the prospective aim of personality'.\(^3\) Thus, the existential whole

1. The whole has the ability to reproduce itself but in so doing it does not become a different kind of whole but the same kind of whole, though, it can be said to be a different whole than it was before reproduction occurred, e.g. regeneration (in which the same is true).

2. Lewes states, '... the causal link, the power which establishes the nexus between one event and another, is not anything over and above the action of the cooperating agents. The thing is what it does; its action is its existence. We abstract the action and personify the abstraction. Thus all the mystery needlessly thrown round the conception of Power disappears when we reduce it to its sensible concretes'. *op. cit.*, v. ii, p. 384

3. Smuts says that in the person the physical organism fully realizes its end when it reaches completion of structure while for Personality 'the end and object of the inner whole (Personality) is the realization of an invisible structure or character ...' but in both cases the shaping power of the inner whole strives to realize its end, to eliminate what is alien and so to reach perfection of visible outward structure and function in the one case, of inward spiritual grace and unity in the other'. *op. cit.*, p. 294
is what it is because of its past, the previous wholes from which it has emerged, forming an integral structural aspect of it; and it is also what it is in virtue of the ideal-form which is its 'objective lure'. Without both these 'dimensions', its essential nature cannot be understood, and even its identity would prove difficult to establish. Further, it is its parts, it is the relationship of the parts to each other and consequently to the whole as such. It is the close-knittedness of organizational structure and function. But it is also more than and different from and simpler than all this together. It is - and at this point Smuts is especially weak - Form, Gestalt-form, a natural-function-pattern.¹

Wholes and monads

Wholes and monads bear striking resemblances. They both have 'an innerness, in being little worlds of their own, with their own inner laws of development and with a certain measure of inner self-direction or self-conservation which makes them partial mirrors or expressions of the greater reality'.² Monads and wholes contain

¹. Metaphysically, the form, natural-function-pattern, ideal-form could be regarded in terms of the essential giving existence meaning or that the whole as form (metaphysically) is the fundamental universal of which roundness, say, is an instance. It is not, however, the metaphysical problem we are concerned with here. As far as we are here concerned, no form exists beyond the existential whole. We have noticed that Smuts, at one time, thinks of the end-form being present in the organism from the beginning, at another, as meaning only 'maximum holistic organization' (which varies with all wholes). Again when referring to personality, he considers the end-form an ideal and in this way does not put the end-form of an organism on the same footing as the end-form of a person. This is not consistently maintained, however, for he thinks of persons in organic terms and by doing so carries over his teleologically oriented conceptions to account for growth and function of personality. Nevertheless, we would point out that what we intuitively apprehend or empathetically 'know' about wholes has to do with the 'irreducible', which may refer to this end-form, the function-pattern, the complexity of intensive relations within the whole and what it is not but what in the universe it is dependent on for being what it is and what it may become.

². Smuts, op. cit., pp. 332-333
their own laws of change and are their own source of function. Leibniz's monads are graded on a scale of Nature from atoms to spiritual monads. The same is true of wholes. It is the many, not the One which is emphasized in these two schemata. In respect of their emphasis on individuality, the similarity between Leibniz and Smuts is vividly apparent. Wholes and monads also have other features in common: they vary among themselves according to the intensity of the organization-complex; they reflect the whole universe in themselves - the monads by virtue of the principle of Pre-established Harmony, the wholes by virtue of the internal relatedness of all things;¹ they form the basic 'stuff' of the universe.

Some major differences appear, however. Monads are by nature spiritual entities while it is only on the higher levels of existence that wholes emerge as spiritual.² Monads are closed units, windowless, with an unrelated individuality of their own, each reflecting in its own way the whole universe, whereas wholes operate in fields in which they 'influence each other'. While monads and wholes are both elements of highly individualistic systems, it may be granted, as we noted earlier, that Smuts attempts, by his field theory, to counter his traditional prejudice and would not go so far as to say, as Leibniz did of monads, that whatever happens to wholes is a part of their own notion. All three systems recognize a hierarchy of things in Nature according as they contain the element of rationality (Aristotle), perceptual perfection (Leibniz), or Holism (Smuts). But we have also been led to see a major difference between Smuts's view of Nature and that of Aristotle and Leibniz. Though the earlier writers

1. Whitehead maintains that the entire cosmos constitutes the environment of each actual thing. This relatedness, the concepts of concrescence, ingression and 'objectification' are similar to the above ideas.

2. It seems that the phrase 'It is only on the higher levels of existence that wholes emerge as spiritual' accurately represents Smuts's view. An alternative view might read 'It is only on the higher levels of existence that spiritual wholes emerge'.

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developed a view of Nature as progressive, alive, dynamic, it was not a view of the world as one unified whole with all actualities contribut-
ing to this interrelationship through their genetic evolutionary, or emergent interconnections. By basing his theory on the doctrine of organic evolution, Smuts can claim that the idea of Holism has the weight of science behind it, an advantage the other 'metaphysical' theories lacked,¹ (though, I should say, that theirs were the best science of their day) and at the same time provides a genuine basis for a comprehensive view of reality. Such unity is not, however, established merely by a genetic relationship but through the inter-
action of fields and the universal tendency to whole-making. Monads cannot be wholes by definition for they are without parts (though not without differentiation, e.g. mind) whereas wholes are unitas multi-
plex. The universe is conceived by Leibniz as an organism, according to Johnstone,² but his argument is not altogether convincing. It might be more accurate to say, both of Leibniz and Smuts, that they treat reality as if it were organic.³ While the monad, as the basic unit of reality, is continuously acting (but not upon anything), the basis of the wholes in the universe - the basic reality of things - is action itself. Some further similarity exists, if our interpreta-
tion is correct, in that, for both theories mechanism seems a useful interpretation of the lower orders of existence but an insufficient one at the higher levels of 'psychic' functioning. However, the me-

¹. Otherwise, as Smuts says, Holism would have been little more than a Monadology.
². Essentials of Biology, pp. 136-137
³. The universe is not an organism but organic, Smuts asserts. If this is a correct interpretation, Morgan's criticism of Smuts that Nature, for him, 'is a giant or-
ganism' is groundless. That Smuts has placed the whole universe in a position where it has no extrinsic relations, is a criticism well pointed out by Morgan. But part of this is, I think, due to the lack of clear descriptions of 'universe' and 'Nature' in Smuts's work. Cf. Forsyth (Review) British Association, report, 1929.
chanistic interpretation loses its usefulness as an explanatory concept earlier on the scale of wholes in the doctrine of Holism than in the Monadology. One might expect, however, just the opposite, since Leibniz generalizes on 'psychic' principles in order to account for reality while Smuts's view is essentially based on principles of biological growth. The two systems, of course, do not share the same dominant purpose, the Monadology being an ontology and Smuts's theory having to do with the question 'What is the predominant characteristic of reality?'

The organism and person as wholes

For Aristotle, the organism is a whole, form and matter being inseparable; only by virtue of its form does matter really exist. It can be said that all subsequent attempts to view the organism as a whole, including Smuts's own theory, are essentially based on this Aristotelian doctrine. In Leibniz's system, the organism acts as a whole, but it does so only because its otherwise unrelated constituents, the monads comprising mind and body, are united, inseparably, by Pre-established Harmony. Within the organism, as Aristotle conceived it, there are segmental actions and self-contained compartments. While the organism (or person) is a whole, it does not act as a whole. Its various functional capacities, e.g. the 'mental faculties' in a person, are categorically distinct. In Leibniz's system (and mutatis mutandis, Aristotle's) the human organism is made up of monads in such a way as to give a hierarchical order with one dominant monad to which all lesser monads are subordinate. That monad is the soul. All changes in the body are directed toward the preservation, function and purpose of the monad. Changes of posture, eating, etc., are all parts, as it were, which, in Smuts's terms, 'function toward' the dominant
Smuts's view of the part-whole relationship is superficially similar to this in emphasizing that all parts have their function in that they operate with reference to the needs of the whole. But his methodology is built on the idea that to understand a thing one must see how it functions within the total functioning of the organism (as a whole) and not for itself. His primary concern is to exhibit the close-knitness of part and whole, and to show that what we often conceive to be part-activity is really the whole organism cooperating and entering into the activity. The theory of Holism makes a worthwhile contribution in drawing our attention to these facts and represents an effort on the part of its author to challenge those atomistic views which dissect the whole. It is still faulty, however, in that by following Leibniz and Kant in its conception of Mind, it tends to overrate the role of thought and reason as synthesizing factors in accounting for the formation of wholes in conscious awareness. Smuts at times thinks of certain functions of the mind as being self-contained. Waiving these inadequacies, one can still see the advance Smuts represents. Aristotle with his faculty concepts, Leibniz with his psycho-physical parallelism are less convincing than Smuts's holistic theory of 'personality' as something which acts as a whole and must be studied as such.

Subject-predicate and the organism

The subject-predicate analysis of propositions referring to organisms seems to have caused difficulty in all three systems. It is not the well-worn logical difficulties involved that are to be considered here but implications of this analysis in dealing with the organism-environment problem and the application of causal concepts to behavior.

1. Cf. Russell, History of Western Philosophy
Both Aristotle and Leibniz adhered to the subject-predicate logic. It committed Aristotle to an explanation of events, biological development and behavior in terms of the individual substance and its inner motives and tendencies. The 'cause' of events is to be sought, not in the surroundings of the object but in the nature of the isolated thing. For Aristotle, the individual thing as determined by its form is the truly real. This follows naturally from the assumption that a substance possesses its own attributes so that the end-form already in the thing determines everything it is or does and cannot, therefore, be predicated of anything else. The development of this determinism reaches its consummation in Leibniz's notion 'That the individual notion of each person involves once for all everything that will ever happen to him'\(^1\) and in Descartes' idea 'And when we conceive of substance, we merely conceive an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist'.\(^2\) Aristotelian logic is founded on this basic assumption, that every proposition must affirm or deny a predicate of a subject (that properties of substances must be 'adjectives' predicated of subjects). From this formula, Aristotle devised the logic of classes and thereby greatly influenced the subsequent development of physics and psychology from Descartes and Newton to twentieth century behaviorism.\(^3\)

The emphasis on individuality in all three systems must considerably discount environment as a proper part-function in the whole and foster a deterministic tendency which runs counter to both Leibniz's and Smuts's preoccupation with freedom in their theories.

In their anxiousness to preserve the identity of the individual thing

1. Ibid., p. 616
2. Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 51
3. Cf. Reiser, Modes of Thinking, Psychological Review, 1939, v. 46
they neglect the importance of its relationship with other things; the nature of a thing is largely a matter of function and function is a process of interaction with the environment; it defies simple location and autonomy. Leibniz, however, argues that a monad in a state of activity cannot affect two different subjects - one that acts and another that is acted upon. 'Transitive' action is thus divided into two states belonging to two different subjects. Leibniz conceives of the monads as reflecting the universe in themselves but this is as far as his 'relativity' goes, and his individualism would allow him to go, since the monad has no relations outside itself, contains its own laws, cannot act upon or be acted upon by other monads, and is therefore its own source of change.

We have mentioned Smuts's 'field theory' as an attempt to take account of the contemporary ideas of relativity physics and so to correct the individualism of his theory, insofar as it omits certain factors in the organism's development. The 'field', for the organism or person, consists of those objects, ideas, beings, etc., which have conscious or unconscious meaning for it or are relevant to its existence. He gives a somewhat puzzling account of how organism and field interact: 'I must now add that by the whole I mean this whole plus its field, its field not as something different or additional to it, but as the continuation of it beyond the sensible contours of experience'. Yet, his theory of causation and insistence on the holistic-tendency in the individual make it plain that though a stimulus may come to the organism from the environment, it is so far changed by the subject that it can no longer be called a cause of the latter's behavior, the resultant action being due to the organism itself. This is an interesting view. Although the development of the organism's structure is due to interaction and, in a sense,

1. op. cit., p. 110
determined from without and within, the stress is on the organism, employing or using the environmental influences and changing them so completely as to make them serve the internal whole-making process of the organism itself. Smuts actually says that the organism can carry out its wishes 'uninfluenced by the conditions of the environment'. The realization of the whole is subjective and not a result of adjustment to external stimuli; it is a closed system. The Leibnizian monad, which has no relations outside itself, compels one to interpret it as a whole in terms of its constituent parts. This difficulty is not altogether avoided in the doctrine of Holism either.¹

Five problems

There are five things we want to emphasize here, their relatedness being my reason for treating them together. They are, first the significance of all things; second, the process of redemption; third, the concept of progress; fourth, the confrontation with evil and; fifth, the aim of choosing.

In the Monadology, because of the laws of continuity, sufficient reason and Pre-established Harmony, nothing is irrelevant, nothing unnecessary, nothing lost. It follows that if this is a whole-making universe organizing all things into wholes and all lesser wholes into greater expression of the character of wholeness, everything has significance and everything has its own individual position to fill within its particular sphere in The Whole, Nature. Nothing happens by chance for this is an ordered, friendly and conserving universe. Therefore, every single object, no matter how insignificant it may seem, is valuable and meaningful to the universe.

We have chosen the term, 'process of redemption' to

1. Section II will consider this problem especially in the light of the study of personality.
designate this concept shared by Leibniz and Smuts; it indicates the biological nature of their thought. For these two philosophies, redemption is an extension of biological theory in which the organism develops without any decisions of its own as to the nature of that development. It is 'putty in the potter's hands'. The entelechy is fulfilled existentially without necessitating anything but the organism's complete passivity. If Leibniz and Smuts do not make this theory so outspoken, it is only because logical analysis and common thought resist it. Their compromise retains, however, this basic frame of reference.

For Leibniz the aim of grace is redemption. Redemption is not a particular but a general one; it is not the salvation of some and the condemnation of others, nor does it refer primarily to man. For Leibniz the process of redemption is a process of the redemption of the universe; it is a cosmic redemption. Smuts's position holds the same view. The universe is not making for individual wholes, or special groups of wholes; its whole-making spans all forms of existence. He reiterates that this is not a soul-making but a whole-making universe. Redemption is a cosmic process. Further, since it is holistic, its aim is the redemption of wholes as such, not merely parts of wholes. Wholes, the whole-man and the universe as a 'whole' is Smuts's concept of the 'aim of grace'.

By reasoning in a biological frame of reference, Smuts overlooks or is driven to suppress the fact that even cosmic redemption may not be a matter given over entirely to the holistic-principle. As far as man is concerned, redemption depends on his alliance with this principle in the universe. In other words, the holistic-tendency is an instrument of but not agent in redemption. This limitation at once throws us back to the inadequate position of personality and action in his system, that redemption is not of souls (merely) but of
persons, and that cosmic redemption vitiates the impious, egoistic and effect-charged idea that man is the only object of divine grace, are valuable suggestions only lessened in their impact by the mechanistic twist of a biological redemptive process which fails to take into account personal intention and action.

The reader is not filled with confidence at the heights of optimism to which Smuts's theory leads. The words are interesting, the poetic style is almost compelling, but history and man's predicament confront the Idyllic scheme. Leibniz considers this to be the 'best possible world'; it is tending toward inevitable perfection. Because 'Well-being, Truth, Beauty and Goodness are firmly grounded in the nature of things', because men, though 'blindly, and through blinding mists of passions and illusions . . . are yet sincerely, earnestly groping towards the light', and because there is an 'Holistic nisis which rises like a living fountain from the very depths of the universe', we have, according to Smuts, the 'guarantee that failure does not await us'. Wholeness, he says, is 'secure' of attainment; it is 'secure' because it is the nature of the universe. But this optimism is not confined to just the two systems for Aristotle, too, believed 'the universe and everything in it is developing toward something continually better than what went before' and that while only God is pure form, 'the world is continually evolving towards a greater degree of form and thus becoming progressively more like God'. Although Aristotle found the biological concept of entelechy inadequate to account for personal activity and the search for happiness, he maintained his teleological and optimistic interpretation of the

1. A whole cannot be redeemed apart from the redemption of its parts, thus soul-making is not inconsistent with whole-making except where it is treated as the whole.  
2. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 189  
3. Ibid., p. 192
'redemptive process'. In this respect he joins Leibniz and Smuts in postulating a view which rests on biological and deterministic principles.

It can be said that progress, which is a social and moral concept, seems to have accompanied evolution but to say that one implies the other or that they are synonymous is to say that progress is the essence of reality and that it is inevitable - a theory which has not yet been justified. Certainly, progression or 'broadening out', as it often appears to be, has not been confined to a single generic line but it cannot be said that a 'social Darwinism' (Neibuhr) is an evidential fact. This, however, is the idea with which one is left in the Smuts's thesis. It seems that he never threw off the nineteenth century optimism or its idea of progress. He was seeing the principle as biological. Progress is not inevitable or biological but it is only possible through personal action. When the evolutionist expands his interest to include the moral as well as the biological fields carrying his biological armor with him, he changes the moral 'ought' to the physical 'must' and, in this way, vitiates the purpose and consequently the questions of moral philosophy altogether. The conviction that history evidences progress of moral ideals has received growing support. But if one follows MacBeath, for instance, in his conclusions drawn from anthropological study, it will be certain that the source of such progress does not lie in an analysis of biological trends or influences but in the growing awareness of the significance of personality - an awareness that changes moral rules and conduct. Evolution, then, is biological; progress (like history) is social and moral, the result of personal actions and enlightenment.

The identification of each as basically given in the other is a

failure to comprehend the nature of either; spiritual culture cannot be considered as a mere continuation of biological trends. Further, the permanency of progress is difficult to reconcile in a world so dependent on the choices of men with their accompanying transitory illusions, rationalized desires and motives and their attempts to save themselves. Entelechy and similarly oriented biological concepts are a process, not an action, and progress or the lack of it is nothing but the free actions of men.

Moreover, Smuts stops short with the social whole. Today social wholes are sovereign states. Should he not have gone on to say whether the holistic-principle carried further until it bound these sovereign states into a new whole? Or could he not do this because of the undeveloped idea he entertained of personality since he would no longer be dealing with mere organisms but states, which really are personal lives, the interspersing decisions and actions of people? There is a movement today, as Professor McKenzie reminds the author, for a World Federated State in which each one's sovereignty would be maintained but one in which the whole would possess holistic-unity.

In religious philosophy, Christianity has propounded a concept which is implicit in Smuts's holistic theory and one which, if pursued to its logical conclusion might concur, that 'the Kingdoms of this world have become the Kingdom of our God'. One sometimes feels this idea pressing for expression in Smuts's theory when he says, 'The rise and self-perfecting of wholes in the Whole is the slow but unerring process and goal of this Holistic universe'. However this would be a religious prophecy rather than a scientific or philosophic statement. At least in such views as the Christian millenialist, the progressivist, the evolutionist and even the advocates of social dialectic, a

1. Baillie, Belief in Progress, p. 159
common problem is shared by all, viz, the inevitability of the triumph of Good; the end is the same only the means is different. Whether the means rests in God, man's nature, biological variation and selection or the inevitable emergence of the suppressed side of the dialectic, the end is common and man's freedom, personality, action are discounted in favor of a 'higher' power over which no one has control - a power which will eventuate its realization in its own triumph.¹

One of the most unsatisfactory elements in all three systems is the treatment of inconsistency, regression, imperfection, disease, the existential situation, mental deviation, to say nothing of how the wholeness once achieved and disintegrated (if this happens) may be regained or how the gradational intensity of the holistic complex is accounted for. Further, the only redemptive factor in the universe to which we are admonished to look in hopeful anticipation of our own salvation is the faith in the inevitable triumph of a biological, evolutionary principle. That evil is one separate entity in a dualistic world or that evil and imperfection are the degradation of the good and perfect and not autonomous realities in themselves, is open to question. That, in accordance with the nexus of choices already made, this is the only kind of world that could have resulted is accepted. That it could have been different is considered a presupposition. If it can be nothing better than it is, the striving for new realizations of wholeness is an illusion. If the attainment of new realizations is inevitable, a contradiction of fact seems to ensue. To make such general statements as these (which represent the depth to which the philosophies go), to ask their correlate questions, to refer generally to the existence of evil, disease and distorted personalities does little good in advancing our understanding of the nature of wholes.

While such words somewhat describe what has happened to the holistic structure of a thing, while theories have been offered as to how the whole comes to exist, these have not told us why the whole often becomes aberrant and, in consequence, have not told us what it is, since deviant behavior or activity is no less a function of a thing and since order demands consideration of its correlate, disorder. Smuts recognizes good men striving towards the realization of the Good but he doesn't face the fact that there are 'bad' men striving for power and self-interest which is defeating to the holistic-society into which they have been thrust as well as to their own wholeness.  

Closely related to this problem is the concept of choice. In the Leibnizian thought, choice is based on the striving for the good. When choices are wrong, it is because of the blindness of our passions, habits or incorrect perceptions. Smuts asserts that all striving, even war, is a striving for the Good. It seems, then, that this striving is the basic motivation of behavior and its displacement and dissociation is due to illusions and wrong perspective. It seems to the author, that Smuts has not taken into account evil as a possible result of choice even though it is based on the desire for Good or the rationalization of evil so that it appears as the Good nor that he has considered man's prerogative to defy the holistic-principle and to refuse the Good. Man's collective neurosis, the immoral, neurotic and psychotic personalities of our society, the wars between states, are ample proof that man can choose, however inadvertently, to live his life contrary to the demands for wholeness and existence ('existence' as used in philosophical existentialism). Choice and action

1. He does infer that the person can cease to strive for the good, e.g. 'The real defeat... would be to cease from striving towards the Good'. But goodness is, to give the predominant side of Smuts dilemma, 'serenely and securely waiting' and 'failure does not await us', op. cit pp. 344-345.
must be the keynotes of the holistic approach on the human level. While the holistic-tendency can be said to give rise to adaptations which tend to preserve the organism and intensify its holistic structure and function, it must be made clear that this is not an abstract perfecting principle which, by its nature, demands progress but that progress is accomplished through purposive cooperation, intra-relationship, purposeful and voluntary action. It must be made clear that some men never realize wholeness because they do not cooperate with the holistic-principle; they do not choose, many because they are not free to choose due to the pathological state which demands an affect-laden defense system, their short-sighted aims, their inertia of satisfaction, and their lack of concern for man qua man. Action and existence are one and they are the right of man alone. Progress, regression, or the stunted growth of the phenomenon of umbilical attachment are dependent on whether the person acts — action being the purposeful whole of decision that makes a difference — or not and the inevitable submergence in the vegetative process. The holistic-principle offers to man wholeness. Not to decide for it is to decide against it and, as well, against one's life; for this vegetation is non-existence, it means inevitable submergence in the vegetative process. Existence, the Good, progress, personal wholeness are not biological, neither are they inevitable. Such a recognition of the person-as-a-whole and efforts to understand his unique functions are necessary in order to postulate the laws of wholeness.

We can sum up this last section of this chapter in a different way. The problem essentially arises when Smuts generalizes without limits his biological theory of Holism. He confronts, in so doing, personality. Smuts somehow realizes that his theory which may
have been useful for explaining organic life is, to say the least, inadequate in dealing with personality and society. He tries to remedy this by saying that in this new area personality must become 'an organ of Holism'.

Aside from the logical difficulty of using 'organ' which is a functional part of an organism to describe an activity of Holism (Smuts) which, as a tendency, is not a whole nor does it have parts, it seems that in this assertion is a realization that in personality, decision can thwart the holistic-principle. Cooperation is demanded while in animals, for instance, there is no decision open to them on which their existence depends. They are at the complete disposal of the holistic-tendency. Attempting, then, to account for this difference in wholes and desiring to escape a postulation of phenomenal and noumenal worlds, Smuts notes that personality must now take an active interest in whole-making, in fact, synthesis, grouping, organization and action on this level are dependent on its active cooperation. Professor Younghusband raises the problem as to why Smuts has not developed his theory more fully with regard to societal wholes. This problem emerges acutely in the Encyclopedia Britannica article on 'Holism' where, in order to account for the nature of society, politics, science, art, etc., as something different from organic wholes, Smuts posits the term 'holoids'. It is well to note that in this same work he nowhere mentions his theory, Personology, which, for many, might be considered his most significant contribution. It is as if he had reflected on Holism and Evolution and found that the biological Holism generalized to personality could no longer

1. Whether Smuts has in mind ὅγγαλας material structure or 'tool', the meaning remains, in this case, the same.

2. (Review) Hibbert Journal, 1926-27, XXV
remain in a consistent system. It is as if he had seen that his evolutionary theory is inadequate when applied to personality, society, social and moral progress and history and that it directly cuts across his Personology. This difficulty arises because Smuts fails to draw distinctions between teleological organic activity and intentional action, between what happens and what is done and between process and action.

In this chapter we have attempted to give some instances of similarities and differences in some important aspects of the philosophical thought of Aristotle, Leibniz and Smuts. In such a treatment, it is hoped that the historical foundation, the basic tenets and some implications of the Holistic theory will have become more clear.
CHAPTER SIX

A Comparative Study of Some Aspects of the Philosophical Positions of Kant, Hegel and Smuts
The object of this chapter is not to present an exposition of either the Critical Philosophy or Hegelian Idealism; this would be beyond both the needs of this thesis and my knowledge and ability. My purpose is not to draw comparisons and differences between Hegel and Kant nor to examine the truth or falsehood of their systems. It is not necessary for my purposes to discuss every point in Smuts's theory where it seems to me there is a reflection of Kant or Hegel. I shall confine myself to a discussion which focuses attention only on some areas of Smuts's doctrine which seem to me to indicate a particular influence of Kant and Hegel.

Smuts is reticent in ascribing to Kant and Hegel anything but a passing credit for influencing his thought and then only where it concerns some specific issues. He does not credit them, as he does Aristotle and Leibniz, for anticipating the general structure of his theory. Nevertheless, the diligent reader can see that he owes more to them than he has actually acknowledged. Kant's influence is particularly evident while an important similarity (the only major one we shall discuss here) exists between Smuts and Hegel. I wish also to compare, at a very general level, Smuts's theory as a whole with Kant's and Hegel's in order to determine its place in philosophical thought. My purpose, then, is two-fold; first, to compare the philosophical positions of Kant, Hegel and Smuts as general theories and, second, to discuss a few of the specific influences, similarities and differences of thought between Kant, Hegel and Smuts which seem to me to have been significant determinants in the development of the theory of Holism.

General philosophical positions

For Hegel, since the only reality is the Absolute, all
particular existences or universal concepts are appearances of the Absolute. The real is 'the self-actualization of an absolute idea in the movement of the system of thought'.\(^1\) In other words, there is no self-subsistence aside from the Absolute and the metaphysical character of reality is that it is spiritual. Hegel's theory is a metaphysical construction. Kant's theory is based on a different inquiry altogether. He is concerned with an analysis of human knowledge centered around the inquiry 'How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?\(^2\)

He finds that in order to avoid the antinomies into which human thought (dogmatism and scepticism) leads, he must postulate a two world system. This is the world of appearance and the world of reality. One is the sensible world, the other the supersensible; one of causality, the other of freedom; one phenomenal, the other noumenal. The phenomenal world is the appearance of the noumenal world. Kant speaks of appearances being due to the 'influence' of the noumenal world (the things in themselves) and he refers to things in themselves as 'affecting us' or 'affecting our sensibility' and so producing appearances or ideas. It would seem, at first glance, that some commentators are correct in referring to such a causal relationship between the two worlds, except that if one views Kant's doctrine as a whole, one better conceives the relationship between the two worlds by saying that the things in themselves are the condition or ground of appearances since, for one thing, the category of causality is of the faculty of Understanding and has to do only with the sensible world. We stated earlier - in a way which may be even more accurate - that the noumenal world is the reality which appears.\(^3\)

The Critiques make it clear,

1. Emment, op. cit., p. 74
2. This question is first given a leading position in the Prolegomena and was incorporated into the Second Edition (of the Critique)
however, that the phenomenal world is the world of physical science, and the only one of which we can have any knowledge. Things in themselves (i.e. the noumenal world) are never known although they may be thought of as being determinants (along with the forms of intuition and the categories) of the manifold of sense. That reality is a whole cannot be asserted; because Nature is not given to us as organized and because we can know nothing about reality in itself. We may think of the universe as a unity but this is a Transcendental Idea which has no cognitive reference to objects since it is not constitutive but merely regulative. By postulating this two-world scheme, Kant argues, the Idea of Freedom, for example, can be preserved without contradiction; the a priori concepts of the understanding are shown to be necessary for the apprehension of phenomena and the limits of reason are set.

Hegel's view is an objective, metaphysical Idealism. Kant's view holds that the world is an appearance to human minds and thus maintains, in this instance at least, one of the basic doctrines of the Idealist position but at the same time holds a Realist point of view - the second edition of the Critique is an attempt to refute the misconceptions which arose out of Fichte's treatment of his philosophy is a mere Idealism - in that Things-in-themselves are not the creation of human minds but are independently real. Kant recognizes that something in our experience of the world is given to us to which we can only be passive. Surely phenomena are appearances of something. It is not, however, a metaphysical system Kant sets out to provide as indeed it is impossible, in his system, to have one. He is prepared to argue that the Critique makes a great contribution to Metaphysics.

1. How we can think of them as plural when no knowledge of them is possible is one of the problems of Kant's philosophy.
without which Metaphysics is a 'bungling attempt' but this contribution depends upon the recognition that a critique of human knowledge must precede any Metaphysical postulation. Kant's system is an Epistemology. In contrast to these two views, we have presented evidence that Smuts's theory is a Philosophy of Nature (in which Nature is the Real).

Smuts drew a sharp distinction between his view of Nature and the view of the 'Absolutists' (who, he says, have made 'the only definite application of the idea' of the whole). They refer to the 'Absolute' as 'the all of existence', 'the cosmic whole', 'the tout ensemble of the universe'. The Absolute is regarded as a 'unity or a being'. Smuts indicates that 'The great whole may be the ultimate terminus, but is not the line which we are following (in this study)'. He says, 'It is the small natural centers of wholeness which we are going to study, and the principle of which they are the expression'.

He also contrasts his view with the 'philosophical conception' of the Absolutists, arguing that by postulating an Absolute Whole they negate the idea of evolution, rule out any possibility of organic development, and present a 'static absoluteness' all of which contradicts the idea of organic evolution which implies a universe which is progressive and creative.²

Smuts is not prepared to postulate such a concept as the Absolute. He refers to Nature as 'The Whole' but affirms and consistently maintains that this is not to be regarded as in any way a description of Nature as a being or organism or as a closed system. Like Hegel, however, he uses organic categories and generalizes the biological structure of an organism to describe the holistic-structure of Nature. But it is not his intention to deal with the problem of the

2. Bradley says we cannot attribute progress to the Absolute; it has no history, it is only a matter of revealing itself in appearance. Appearance and Reality, p. 501
As a matter of fact, he says, like Kant and contrary to Hegel, that the ultimate nature of reality is an open question (though, strictly speaking, Kant says we can never have knowledge of it). Smuts is interested in individual wholes though like Hegel finds an organic unity in all things. Kant, of course, cannot really be compared to Smuts and Hegel on this point because he is not trying to answer the same question. His real point about the *Critiques* is that they deal only with the *a priori* question and not at all with its applications. He does not offer an interpretation of Nature, is interested neither in the 'universe as a whole', nor in individual wholes but in the validity of the reflective processes through which we organize the data of sense.

Smuts is a disciple of the philosophy of process, believing himself to have found, in the idea of the holistic-tendency, a universal principle whose applications lend themselves to experimental verification. This principle can be applied in the investigation of the emergence of any whole within Nature, and provides the possibility of a scientific explanation of such phenomena as regeneration in plants and animals and the development of personality in man. As a philosopher, he wishes to unite idealism and realism in the interpretation of Nature; but also he sought an understanding of certain problems which remain obstinately floating in the limbo between science and philosophy. Like Aristotle and Leibniz, and in some respects Kant, he was a pluralist in that he accepted the reality of a multiplicity of entities. Like Hegel, he was a monist in expounding the idea that a single principle underlies the differentiation of the universal process. Smuts rightly, I think, criticizes Hegel (the Absolutists) on the basis that his view precludes an adequate account of individuality and differentiation. He wrongly, I think, interprets the Hegelian
view as a denial of the reality of all development by failing to consider the self-actualization of Ideas within the greater framework of the Absolute Being. The holistic-tendency, however, is basically - at least in Smuts account of it - a biological principle which may be said to supplant such ideas as the Hegelian 'concept', the union of Being and Essence, or the 'Absolute Idea' as a unification of subjective and objective concepts which through the categories form an 'organically' connected whole; and, of course, it runs contrary to Hegel's disparagement of anything other than an 'evolution' of concepts - a process of self-actualization in which the Idea objectifies itself in things and then returns in the shape of knowledge, back into itself enriched by its 'incarnation', the process by which Nature becomes Spirit. Hegel is a Monist and Idealist. Smuts, though constantly making an effort to propound a realist view and to conform to the scientific account of things, is enticed into speculations on the idea of the Whole as form; on the holistic-principle; on the emergence of Beauty, Love and Freedom. In the result, he finds himself committed, I think, to some of the central elements of the Idealist doctrine. He is both Idealist and Realist, Pluralist and Monist. But he is just and foremost an evolutionist who explains the genesis and development of all wholes through a generalization of organic theory.

Smuts preserves the individuality of wholes by treating them, wrongly, I think, as completely self-contained and autonomous. This involves disastrous and illegitimate exclusions. He shares with Hegel the weakness of regarding human history as continuous with the process of natural evolution, as the outcome of a determining principle which necessitates its own realization in time. History, however, is no natural process, but the result of the personal decisions of human beings. Its elements are acts, not events, and so far as it is
a whole, it is a whole of action. Smuts sees no need to postulate an Absolute or a Divine Mind since the universal holistic-tendency is sufficient to explain all wholes, their emergence, development and functioning; nor does he see the need for any other world than the single developing world process of Nature.

The appeal of synthetic unity

Smuts, I think, was impressed by the concept of the 'synthetic unity of apperception' postulated by Kant because it represented for him (1) the synthetic activities by which wholes are built up from the manifold of sense and (2) the subject (self-conscious subject) as the active, central determinant in the process by which knowledge of things is established. Kant seems convinced that the elements of human knowledge are different from one another but he attempts to show that they are interdependent. Knowledge is not a mere addition of separate elements of human understanding. In order to have knowledge, intuition presents us with a given manifold; understanding subjects the given manifold to the rules of synthesis and imagination relates understanding and intuition to one another. But this is a synthetic and immediate process; it is not a matter of the addition of elements. What is presented to us is a whole (a given whole of knowledge).¹

Often Kant's peculiar way of stating his theory draws the criticism, as James Ward puts it, that 'faculty psychology of the worst sort runs riot through the whole of it'.² There is, of course, considerable controversy whether one can legitimately deal with the Critical philosophy from a psychological point of view - a controversy I do not care to enter upon. It does seem to me, however, that it certainly was not Kant's intention to give a psychological treatise as he, in fact,

2. A Study of Kant, p. 98
stated in the Introduction to the Second Edition to the *Critique*. To give a psychological interpretation of his theory, he said, is to base it on the 'ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science'. His *Critique of Pure Reason* is a Transcendental Logic or Epistemology which deals with the form of thought in general. He is expounding *a priori* concepts about whose validity psychology can have nothing to say. It is not individual intuitions or individual differences, with which Kant is primarily concerned but the transcendental, i.e. that which is universal and necessary as a presupposition of all possible experience and therefore not given in empirical experience. The point I want to make is that for Kant the faculties of the mind and the faculties of knowledge are not self-contained and that what we know is not the product of a hierarchical progression in which the faculties heap their separate contributions one on top of the other. In fact, it is precisely this sort of thing Kant refutes in the *Prolegomena* when he says Rational Psychology commits the error of thinking it possible to separate thought from intuition. His analysis - which produces the architectonic - may have demanded this seeming compartmentalization but Kant's real meaning seems to be that the synthetic functions present us with wholes. Smuts tries to employ the idea of a synthetic unity of apperception without, he says, 'any cumbrous psychological or metaphysical apparatus'. While he uses it to explain 'psychological activities', he generally (if one considers his thesis as a whole) leaves himself open to the charge of implying a faculty psychology. However, Smuts does appreciate - and this is the point - that our perceptions are always given to us as wholes, that all our

1. How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible? is not concerned, according to Paton, with subjective possibility. It does not ask how we come to make such judgments which is a psychological problem but 'how such judgments can be truly made', op. cit., Kant's *Metaphysics of Experience*, p. 87.
Mental activity is creative of wholes; in other words, we are always thinking things together. This can only be true because, according to Kant and Smuts, the subject is active in the construction of its knowledge of things and the activities of the mind are synthetic.

These synthetic functions which characterize all our cognitive processes are given objective status by Smuts and used to explain the holistic structure of Nature. For Kant the synthetic activities, like regulative Ideas, categories or, for that matter, constitutive forms (space and time) are subjective. I mean by calling them 'subjective' that they have their origin in the Mind. They are, nevertheless, universally valid; they are not merely individual for through them (and the synthetic unity of apperception) we have a knowledge of the phenomenal world which is the same for all. I am aware that Kant speaks of the Ideas as merely subjective and heuristic and also refers to them as having 'objective but indeterminant validity'.

The term 'transcendental' ascribed to Ideas - and this holds true for categories of understanding - indicates, however, their trans-subjective reference. It is certain that for Kant the idea of the unity of a logical system, the synthetic functions of imagination, judgment, and apperception cannot be legitimately applied to reality. They do, however, apply, of necessity, to the phenomenal world and consequently to Nature; by them we are able to say that there is unity and synthesis in Nature; they assist us in our knowledge of the appearances of reality to which we give structure and meaning. Smuts, on the other hand, says of the holistic-principle that it is a dynamic principle operating in Nature itself, i.e. in all wholes. He tends to regard it not merely as a descriptive but an explanatory principle. For him

1. Critique of Pure Reason (B) 644.
2. Ibid., 691
the holistic-principle is objective, i.e. in nature. The synthetic functions and unity characteristic of our knowledge is made into that tendency to whole-making in reality itself which gives us the substantial forms we find there.

Unity and purpose

But to say that the Ideas we have, such as the Idea of the unity of a logical system - a whole - or the Ideas of the unity or purposiveness of the world (which in the Critique are not differentiated from Ideas of Reason) are true in fact of Nature is to fall into the very dangers the entire Critical philosophy is concerned to warn against. It is precisely, according to Kant, the belief that our Ideas of unity and purposiveness or the teleological principle (which are only regulative, i.e. have to do with the individual coherence of a logical system) can be regarded as constitutive of nature that gives rise to the dogmatism, contradictions, antinomies and disputes characteristic of ordinary thought. To use the principle of systematic unity (which necessarily underlies all Ideas of Reason) as constitutive is perversa ratio. Such an attempt would also lead us, Kant believes, to relinquish our inquiry into natural causes ('the universal laws of material mechanism') and speculate on supersensible causes about which we can have no knowledge at all. This is a grandiloquent attempt, Kant thinks, on the part of reason which has no foundation but its own indolence and vanity. But let us turn from the First to the Third Critique.

In the first Critique, Kant maintains we have neither a priori knowledge of particular laws of nature nor any a priori principle with regard to them. He realizes, however, that it is insufficient to regard nature merely as a system conforming to transcendental

1. Ibid., 718, 719
2. Ibid., 501
laws which constitute the universal conditions of experience; that nature is a system conforming to particular laws which it contains must be presupposed. This is the new point of view in the Critique of Judgment. The principle of systematic unity considered in the Critique of Pure Reason is an Idea of Reason. (Kant cannot assign this principle to Understanding since it is essentially different from the categories and principles of this faculty). Here, however, it is assigned to the faculty of Judgment. Judgment stands between Reason and Understanding and can employ the special principle of synthetic unity and establish systematic unity of experience based on the Idea of unity. The understanding presents us with a world determined by objective or universal rules. Judgment (in the Critique of Pure Reason) subsumes particulars under these universal laws and (in Critique of Judgment) relates empirical laws to each other and into a system, (the former is Determinant Judgment and the latter Reflective Judgment). In order to have a systematic unity of experience, we must presuppose a priori that empirical laws may be related into a system and that nature has a purpose. 'The human mind cannot allow that nature should be a chaotic aggregate of unrelated forms and therefore it has to adopt a special principle which makes it regard nature as a system according to particular laws'. It is important to note that for Kant this synthetic principle of Judgment is a subjective one. It is a priori, i.e. not derived from the observation of empirical experience, and serves only to order a logical system - it is entirely reflective. At this point, Kant's idea of teleology enters in. For Kant, purposiveness, contrary to the usual view, is the 'adaptation of nature to our cognitive faculties (which) is presupposed a priori by judgment on behalf of its reflection upon it according to empirical

1. Cassirer, H.W., A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment, p. 110
2. Ibid., p. 374
Thus, for Kant, purposiveness is a subjective principle, i.e. only purposive in relation to our knowledge of it, and in no way assumes that objects in nature are purposive. We may ascribe to nature this logical purposiveness, i.e. believe that it arranges itself to conform to the law of contingency (when it accords with our own subjective principle of reflection) and, in fact, we may consider Nature as an artist and attribute to Nature and to certain of its 'products' such as animals and plants, a purposiveness and systematic unity within themselves (absolute purposiveness). But why is Kant forced to take this position when in the Critique of Pure Reason he is satisfied to say that the laws of understanding (categories) are sufficient conditions of experience and he is there satisfied to explain nature on purely mechanical grounds (through the understanding) rejecting the teleological method of inquiry? In the Critique of Judgment, he evidently realizes that such mechanical explanations are insufficient to account for our experience and that we must exercise our ability to arrange the particular laws of nature according to the Idea of a system. Kant still maintains in the Critique of Judgment that the mechanical explanation of Nature is the only valid one (since even intellectual intuition would not require the notion of teleology) and it is only when this is found not fully to account for experience that we may then have recourse to a teleological inquiry. But the teleological account (since the concept of purpose is an Idea) is merely subjective - we have no right to assume that Nature possesses such principles. So long as we regard purposiveness as merely an aid to our thinking, i.e. for descriptive and reflective purposes, we do not

1. Critique of Judgment, 185, Meredith
2. Kant's basic preference for the mechanical interpretation seems to be that it enforces a more diligent attempt to explain things by laws of science (although the Idea of purpose 'helps us to extend physical science' he says) and precludes the speculation concerning supersensible causes about which we can know nothing - an inquiry which could
fall into the difficulties of a dogmatism which asserts that Nature is guided by an intrinsic teleological principle (supernatural cause). Such a belief as held by dogmatic philosophers contradicts the entire assumption of the Critical philosophy, i.e. that the human mind can have no knowledge of a Transcendent world (no interpretation of Reality is valid). This is one reason Kant assigns the teleological inquiry not to the understanding, since some natural objects cannot be accounted for by mechanical laws (in which case such objects could only be regarded as accidents) but to Judgment (which is also based on Reason's concept of a purpose) and asserts both the value of the teleological inquiry (as formal) and that it cannot be taken as an objective concept.

Smut's insists that his doctrine is not teleological. He can neither consider the universe to be designed by a Divine Mind nor believe that a specific end is set as the terminus of organic wholes in their development. In other words (to emphasize the last consideration) Smuts wants to consider the goal (end-form) - which he calls the whole - as phenomenally given. It cannot be regarded as specific or definite. The wholeness toward which all things strive is not 'adaptation to nothing' but merely a highly integrated state of the organism functioning at its maximum, natural level and it is toward this that all wholes strive (each in its own way). He specifically asserts that the end-form (what the organism will be when it matures in structure and function) cannot be said to be in the thing from the beginning and by this distinguishes his own view from pre-formation theories. But I have not been altogether satisfied with this, for Smuts gives, in his general writing, a substantiality to the end-form never advance our knowledge of things. Furthermore, the teleological principle is not necessary, as is the mechanical, for the possibility of experience. The mechanical, like the teleological principle, cannot, of course, give us information about things in themselves and in this sense they both are regulative, not constitutive.
which forces him to use it as an explanation of growth and behavior rather than as merely a descriptive aid. The constantly reiterated theme is that the 'whole is tending toward its wholeness'. These are poor terms and it sounds as if the whole is becoming a whole. One then asks, 'is it a whole or isn't it?' But they indicate Smuts's difficulty in another way - they show that he means by 'whole' both the holistic-organization (system) of a thing, the thing itself and the end toward which it strives. All through his work one gets the impression that the idea of purpose is given a deterministic status. The end toward which individual wholes (and Nature) strive is thought to be assured of fulfillment - surely this is not a scientific account, but a faith. Certainly if we grant Smuts his claim that the end-form (whole) toward which a thing is striving is not specific (although this need not mean that his view is not teleological) it does not alter the fact that his doctrine is built upon the belief that throughout nature (in all natural wholes) there is a purposive element - an element working up the raw material into wholes. All I need to show at this point is that while Kant assigned the Ideas of unity, purpose and system, which are simply regulative, to the faculty of reflective judgment, Smuts makes purpose a constitutive element in the creation of natural forms. For Kant this would be an involved procedure; a way of ascribing to Nature supernatural causes.\(^1\) Reason had been led astray. Such a theory as Smuts's makes it difficult to determine how we are to think of the end-form. But so far as I have been able to discover, he does not deal specifically with the problem. I cannot feel that his phenomenological position, useful as it may be in the interpretation of organic wholes (atoms, plants, animals), would be

\(^1\) Smuts believes 'Holism' is sufficient to make such an artificer unnecessary.
very convincing if applied to the present problem. It seems to me 
that the substantiality of the end-form which seems to underlie Smuts's 
thinking does not receive a happy fate when it is transferred from the 
organic field to the personal. But this problem we shall discuss 
more fully in Section II. The other difficulty to be noticed in Smuts's 
theory is his silence with regard to the problem of deterioration and 
dis-integration of wholes. If there is a tendency (purpose) in the 
universe making for wholes, how do we account for aberration and destruc-
tion? How is it that some things do not realize their end-form 
which Smuts tends to think is 'secure'? Is there another tendency of 
destructive nature which has as its intent the dis-organization of 
all systems? But surely this would be contrary to Smuts's entire 
theory. Smuts, in a section on psychopathology, is remarkably insight-
ful and we should hope for better things when he deals with organic 
wholes with which, it seems to me, he is even more competent to deal. 
The best he can do, however, is to say that sometimes the environment 
overwhelms the organism and it finds this too much to cope with. It 
gives us no clue to the dynamic features of dis-organization; this can 
only mean that dis-organization is an accident. Kant, of course, 
does not have to face the same sort of problem - the purpose of the 
Critical Philosophy is to avoid them (or make them unnecessary) 
though in our uncritical minds these questions still arise with fresh 
vigor in each succeeding generation.

The whole, mechanism and teleology

We have hinted above that for Kant some natural objects

1. It appears to me that the concept of purpose must 
occupy the same position in our thought as such necessary 
'fictions' as 'need', 'drive', and 'goal'. Cf. Chpts. VII, 
VIII.

2. This is true of personal wholes, according to Smuts.

3. I am considering here the Idea of God and the Idea 
of Immortality which are invoked by Kant to secure the 
righting of evil and destruction which seems to characterize much of our experience.
cannot be wholly accounted for on the basis of mechanical explanation. This is true, as we shall see, because Kant distinguishes between a system and an aggregate, in other words, between what is and what is not a whole. I must discuss this question briefly and also consider passages in the Critique of Judgment which bear a striking similarity to Smuts's conception of wholeness (the relation of parts to whole). Because these two items are interrelated, I shall discuss them in this part of the chapter.

Now we have established Kant's view that the only reason we introduce such ideas as purpose and ascribe them to nature is that there are certain objects of nature which cannot be sufficiently explained by mechanical principles. That is to say, because Nature is regarded as mechanical, we consider that the cause of these objects is super-natural. The Idea of purposiveness is the basis of reflective Judgment and as such must be treated as if it were an objective principle.\(^1\) By having to regard Nature as purposive in order to account for our experience, it is necessary that we should have an Idea of a Technique of nature; nature may be regarded as not merely mechanical but artistic in its activity.\(^2\) Kant obstinately maintains that organisms must be regarded as purposive throughout; 'We have no reason for assuming the form of such a thing to be still partly dependent on Blind mechanism'.\(^3\) Yet he yields to the point of view that the apparent antinomy this creates may be overcome, seeing that the two principles, i.e. mechanism and teleology, may be 'united in one principle even objectively, because they are concerned with appearances which presuppose a supersensible ground'.\(^4\) But because the human mind has

1. Critique of Judgment, 404
2. Ibid., 193, 233, 360
3. Ibid., 377
4. Ibid., 412, Meredith; also Cassirer Tr.
to do with appearance, both principles are necessary, the mechanical
being preferred because its source rises in the understanding and is
as an imperative condition of experience (and for other reasons men-
tioned earlier).

Before I compare Smuts and Kant on this point, I want to con-
consider Kant's description of a whole, i.e. an 'organized natural
product'. Already (in the previous sentence) I have indicated what
Kant considers to be a whole. He says of an organism (animal or plant)
that it 'is one in which every part is reciprocally both end and means'.
A tree is an instance of this sort in that it reproduces itself gene-
rically and, more important, preserves itself individually through
the contributions of all the parts to the whole, 'existing for the
sake of the others and the whole', e.g. the leaves protect the tree,
depend on the trunk and the trunk on the leaves. The preservation of
one part is dependent on the preservation of all other parts, resulting
in the preservation of the whole. The essential difference between
wholes, works of art, and mechanical things, is that wholes are the
only objects which are their own cause and effect. This means that
wholes are their own source of development and change—each part pro-
ducing the other parts. A machine (Kant uses the watch as an illus-
tration) is made up of parts constructed by an Agent exterior to it-
self; the parts effect other parts but cannot produce other parts. A
watch cannot repair itself like an organism (which is, writes Kant,
'among the most wonderful properties of the forms of organic life').
The primary 'single pattern' of a whole is that it adjusts itself
in such a way as to secure its own self-preservation. 'Nothing in
such forms of life is in vain'.  A watch does not have this capacity—

1. Ibid., 367
2. Ibid., 374
3. Ibid., 376
its power is 'motive' not 'formative'. A work of art is not in the same class with an organism for it requires an external agent to create and maintain its organization. But to conceive an end toward which the organism is striving must be a matter of reflective judgment, not a constitutive conception. Whatever the source of such things as we observe in Nature, the organization of things 'has nothing analogous to any causality known to us.'

Smuts's point is precisely to give an explanation of what Kant regarded as having no analogy to any causality we experience. The causal source of development and function is within the whole and springs from the characteristic feature of wholes to preserve and intensify their wholeness throughout. This is the holistic-tendency, the tendency toward whole-making. This is the fundamental tendency in the universe. Smuts describes the whole in terms of all parts interrelated and functioning for the sake of the others and toward the whole. The parts receive their full meaning only from the whole which they serve. The language Smuts uses to describe wholes is strikingly like Kant's. However, wholeness and the holistic-tendency are observable in nature and belong to nature for itself and in this Smuts differs markedly from Kant. Smuts believes his theory is open to scientific investigation. While the end-form may only be logically given (if we suppose this to be true of Smuts's theory), the holistic-organization is open to experimentation. He does not, as Kant does, take into account the aesthetic feeling which is entirely subjective and without concepts, for he feels that what he is talking about is matter of fact.

1. Ibid., 375
2. Kant, in a footnote to 375, refers to the organization of people in a state and asserts that their positions and functions should be defined by the idea of the whole, also on the same idea at other points in the Critique of Judgment.
Upon the description of wholes given by Smuts and Kant, it is certain that such objects cannot be fully accounted for by mechanical principles. Whereas the mechanical and purposive are, for Kant, sharply distinguished, it is somewhat different for Smuts. Smuts is willing to generalize his organic theory so that it applies to wholes of all types. This can only lead to contradictions in his definitions but, nevertheless, he considers all objects as having a certain 'organicity' - which is based on the intensity (close-knitness) of relationship between parts and whole. This reminds us of Kant's 'purposiveness without a purpose'. That is, just as Kant sees a work of art or a natural object to be beautiful and is impressed with the dependence of every part on the whole and every particular as dependent on the universal Idea of the whole and thus purposive ('purposiveness without a purpose'), so Smuts sees the interdependence of parts and whole in, say, a work of art, or the universe for that matter, as organic without constituting an organism.

Smuts suggests a classification of wholes - mechanical, artistic, social, chemical, etc. - in an effort to carry out his theme. He believes all wholes have elements of mechanism; even aggregates are not without an element of 'holism' (to use his term and meaning). In this way, both mechanism and 'holism' (Smuts) are reciprocally applicable in accounting for any one whole. Nature is a gradient of wholes extending from those characterized by mechanism and causality to 'holism' and freedom. Both mechanism and 'holism' have their legitimate place on the scale and each contributes its share (greater or less, depending on the whole) to the structure and function of wholes. Where Kant establishes freedom as given to self-conscious beings (since freedom is an Idea of Pure Reason) in order that they may fulfill the demands of the moral law and assigns
causality to the phenomenal world, Smuts acknowledges that freedom gains in its applicability to wholes the higher they are on the scale of wholes.¹ There is, he believes, simply because he identifies freedom and 'holism' (Smuts), a measure of freedom in all wholes from electrons, atoms, amoeba to man.²

There are other aspects of Smuts's thought which need only to be mentioned here. Smuts's concept of the Good shares certain interesting similarities with Kant's Summum Bonum. While Smuts endorses Kant's Kingdom of Ends, I think his theory is considerably different from Kant's. Smuts has the Romantic idea that freedom is self-determination. Kant introduces both autonomy and self-legislation into his theory, but also the requirement to serve others, treating them as ends not means and in this rises above the individualism to which Smuts resigns (unwittingly, I think) his theory (as we shall see in Section II). Kant is not an exponent of self-actualization. Smuts establishes his main thesis on this principle. Smuts points with considerable satisfaction to Kant's destruction of the classical proofs of God (although Kant did so, as we know, in order to leave room for faith).

Smuts has suggested a theory which regards God as unnecessary to the world;³ so leaving us with a philosophical naturalism. Like Whitehead who identifies God and the Principle of Concretion or Hegel's conception of the Absolute, one gets the feeling that for Smuts the

¹. Smuts does not tell us how he determines the 'higher' or 'lower' orders of wholes. He does say that there is more freedom in man than amoeba. Possibly this determines what one is on the scale.

². Though this has difficulty when applied to 'mechanical wholes or 'artistic wholes' (holoids), say.

³. Though he says there may be a God but this is not his problem — at least He is unnecessary. This is contrary to Kant's belief that the Idea of God is necessary and only on this Idea can we postulate a moral law.

holistic-principle is, for most purposes at least, his substitute for the theistic conception. I do not care to argue this point but only indicate that the generalization of organic principles without restraint has once again, at the highest level of human thought and affection, treated the significance and value of personality as if it made no difference in principle.¹

¹. I would like to acknowledge sources other than those directly quoted in the text from which I have drawn considerable help in writing this chapter: Smith, N.K., A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; McTaggart, J.M.E., Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic; Watson, J., The Philosophy of Kant Explained; Pritchard, K.A., Kant's Theory of Knowledge.
SOME OBSERVATIONS

on Section I
The discussion of this section began with an attempt to set out some of the problems involved in the relation between parts and whole - problems shared by Smuts and contemporary writers. We then turned our attention to a theoretical account of Smuts's philosophical thought, considered the only two philosophical 'systems' he expressly acknowledges as having genuinely anticipated his theory (his debt to Aristotle being admitted only in the Encyclopedia Britannica article), and criticized certain central implications to which these theories seem to lead. To clarify Smuts's theory and fix its position in the history of philosophical thought, we endeavored to compare it briefly on certain issues with the Critical philosophy of Kant and the Organic Idealism of Hegel and noted some features which it shares with them. Some rather interesting conclusions seem to have emerged from the discussion thus far. The Philosophy of Holism is an organic philosophy - the generalization without limits of the idea of organic growth - which finds satisfaction, evidently, in applying the pattern of developmental processes in the individual organism to other fields of experience; reality and personality, society and history, and moral progress are thereby construed as organic processes. This uncritical generalization and application of biological categories and metaphors in the attempt to create descriptive and explanatory concepts for the understanding of human activity, involves a serious depreciation of the essential qualities of the personal and represents an unwarranted abstraction imposed by the need to maintain consistency within a particular theoretical scheme. One may readily accept the evolutionary concept employed in Smuts's theory of Holism or, say, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, as an adequate interpretation of the universe and organic life. But
the further extension of this analogy involves serious conflict with what appear to be self-evident facts of human activity. The development of personal character and human society is not 'biological in type' nor is history the study of the evolution of organic species or processes. The generalization of biological principles theoretically implies that human existence can be adequately and correctly understood in these terms.\(^1\) This is where philosophies of the process or organic type (from the Romantics to Lessing, Herder and Hegel and represented by Smuts) tend to break down. Man cannot be reduced to a biological order, a primal herd or a naturalistic process without detracting from his essential nature and significance. Still resting securely on the individualism and optimism of Aristotle and Leibniz and nineteenth century Evolutionism, Smuts was never awakened from his slumber, even by relativity physics (which he patronizes), Gestalt theory, the remarkable work by Haldane in biology and physiology or the catastrophe of a world war. By his addiction to biological principle, he has failed to see that just as history, for instance, is made up of experiences of personal action, while the study of history consists in understanding and interpreting these actions and not merely in the recording of happenings or events, so personal and social development and moral progress are the result of what people have decided to do and have done, not merely what has happened to them. By this failure, we have, in effect, a discounting or ruling out of the uniqueness of the personal no less serious than that to be found in the logical and practical results of the Cartesian attempt to generalize upon mathematical categories. Biological principles cannot, it seems, be legitimately applied to or sufficiently

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account for human action, personal character or the development of social institutions without a deliberate suppression or distortion of the facts.

These points of criticism may seem to gain further validity from our discussion of critical issues pertaining to the nature of personal action and behavior (normal and pathological) in the next Section.
SECTION TWO

THE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO A THEORY OF PERSONALITY
Introduction

Smuts's original idea about Holism took root in his interest in Personality. First insight seems to have come to him through a study of the 'evolution of personality' of the poet and mystic, Walt Whitman. From this study, he says, gradually came the realization that Personality was only a special case of a universal phenomenon, i.e. the existence of wholes, the wholeness in nature and the tendency making for wholes. It would appear, from the various hints scattered throughout Holism and Evolution, that this work, for which he is best known, was to be a prelude or introduction to a much more detailed effort and a much more expanded doctrine. From the trend of Smuts's thought, one would suppose that it would be to personality, society and spiritual values that he would turn for a fuller development of his basic philosophy. It is interesting to note, however, that some years later in his reflective article in the Encyclopedia Britannica, he fails even to mention his Personology nor did the two decades of his life after the publication of Holism and Evolution produce a further elaboration of what was his primary interest.

Just so, it was out of the author's own clinical experience with personality problems that the interest in the Holistic Approach and Smuts's thesis in particular took root. While this area of Smuts's thought evidently remained undeveloped, it has, nevertheless, proven challenging to various researchers in the field. The contemporary Holistic Approach, however, is made up of many views and emphases. While it forms the background of our study here, it is Smuts's philosophy with specific reference to some of its most important implications for the understanding and study of normal and deviated personality with which we are immediately concerned.

1. Smuts makes no distinction between personality as a 'special case' of Holism, 'greatest expression' of Holism, 'latest phase' of Holism, 'supreme embodiment' of Holism, 'form of' Holism or that 'Holism is personality at its latest stage'. Distinctions drawn simply from these phrases might easily have upset his entire theory.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Personality: A Psychophysically Neutral Whole
The contemporary dissatisfaction with the basic orientation and employment of principles and terminology borrowed from other disciplines has increased the hope for a new perspective in those sciences which deal with personality. One of the early advocates of a new science of personality was General Smuts. The dissatisfaction felt by him is reflected in the contemporary attitude. Andras Angyal has summed it up in one succinct sentence. 'We have', he says, 'a number of sciences related to the person, but we do not have a science of the person'.

Smuts, while endeavoring to view man as an integral whole in the evolutionary process and not a strange 'unique and isolated phenomenon . . . a sort of Melchisedek of the universe without genetic connections or contacts with the rest' of Nature, considered personality the culminating phase of evolution, the supreme expression of the holistic tendency. Personality as a new whole with emergent properties of its own must, therefore, be studied for itself. Further, each personality is, in a real sense, unique. A mere consideration of an abstractly defined class as the essential nature of a particular thing by which one hopes to find an explanation of its behavior is an Aristotelian concept which is inadequate to deal with individual personality. Psychology, Smuts asserts, deals with the average or generalized individual and, consequently, considers an abstraction which does not exist. It further violates the true nature of personality by entertaining a mental point of view which is but one aspect of Personality'.

The belief seems to be that by the process of 'parenthetical exclusions' (Angyal), human physiology, psychology and sociology deal with artificially segmented aspects of the person, the sum of which, if the person

1. Angyal, A., op. cit., p. 4
2. Smuts, op. cit., p. 262. '...anymore than one could hope to learn and understand the game of chess through watching only the moves in one corner of the board the whole time'. Koehler, Gestalt Psychology, p. 207.
as a whole is more than all the attributes of parts together, cannot account for that totality of being which is so essential to an understanding of man and characteristic of his experience of living. The total personality, which cannot be ascertained from a mere combination of various perspectives, requires a new science. For that new holistic science of Personality, Smuts suggests the term Personology.¹

The holistic approach, in the study of personality, is personal rather than mechanically objective, synthetic rather than analytic, molar rather than segmental or specificistic, totalistic rather than partitive. Researchers of the holistic approach are endeavoring to build a nomenclature which is given in person-terms rather than bio-physical terms. The system of nomenclature is still in its early stage of development. Yet such terms as need-integrates, hierarchical systems, person-needs, wholeness, tension, system, motivation, molar action, reaction-continuum, person-pathology, trends, thema, self, phenomenal field, enhancement, craving, Gestalt, organization, intention, pattern, meaning, membership quality, etc., readily indicate the incursion of the holistic approach in our explanation and understanding of personality. It is not merely jargon; it represents a new significant attitude toward the personal. There is much research to be done in this field. Semantic difficulties arise with a tendency to create a highly technical and esoteric terminology and various principles are indeed tentative, yet a start has been made. Some problems which remained secluded from elementalist investigations lend themselves more readily to holistic explanations and interpretations. Some of these we shall discuss in this section.

While Smuts indicates that this is not merely a soul-making

¹ 'Psychology of personality' used by some writers is considered a tautology. I think personology, which is primarily a methodological procedure, should be distinguished from Smuts's theory of personality, if we take his system as a whole. We are generally concerned with his entire concept of personality. For methodological suggestions, see Ch. XI.
but a whole-making universe, yet it is soul or personality that occupies a unique place in his system. Therefore, this section deals with person-phenomena primarily through a study of Smuts's philosophical system as a whole, including personology. Those areas of this paper which seem to convey the idea of a new system or an effort to develop Smuts's thesis are only secondary results accruing through representation and criticism. A selection of material has been necessary, due to limitations, both of the author's present research and experiment and the space and demands of this thesis. The exclusion of material has, nevertheless, been the result of a care that the central principles of Smuts's position shall be carefully set forth with the least violence possible. Section I will be invaluable as the background giving more clarity to the abstractions treated here so that the total system will underlie the discussion in this section of the science of personality.1

Person - Wholeness: The part-whole relationship

The theory of personality as an alternative to the theory of Mind-Body Dualism

Brilliant modern attempts have been made to solve the problem of Mind-Body Dualism. And, indeed, the problem may just be our problem, that to which it refers not existing really. Nevertheless, the work of Stout with the 'embodied self',2 McDougall with his modified monadology,3 Morgan's concept of 'involution',4 the philosophies

1. No polemic on atomism and elementalism will be made directly in this study. The inadequacies of these points of view have been carefully dealt with on many occasions. Some of the best efforts have been made by Allport, G., Personality, Goldstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psycho-pathology, Ellis, Source Book of Gestalt Psychology, Koffka, op. cit., Kevin, K., A Dynamic Theory of Personality, Korzybski, op. cit.

3. Outline of Abnormal Psychology, pp. 545-549
4. Emergent Evolution, pp. 26 ff.
of Whitehead and Russell, and Broad and lately the Gestalt postulation of 'isomorphism' and physical Gestalten are among some of the outstanding efforts. Lovejoy seems to believe, however, that all the intricate systems have not convinced us of the resolvement of this problem. It is not our desire, even if we were capable, to present a critique of this difficult problem. It is necessary, we feel, to summarize briefly Smuts's unique attempt to overcome the bifurcation.

Leaving aside the 'organism-as-a-whole' concept, it can be readily seen that with the human being, Smuts deals with the problem of Dualism in two ways. First, by the evolutionary process with his theory of emergence and wholes; second, by the enlarged concept of Personality.

In Smuts's system, personality is a longitudinal or hierarchical system. 'It is not only mental or spiritual but also organic and material. It is a new whole of the prior wholes.' Personality is an ontogeny which representatively reproduces the phylogenetic phases of development. Mind, then, has a physical basis as the physical has the rudimentary elements of 'mind'. It is difficult to say where their boundaries begin and end. To abstract is to dichotomize. The abstraction is an illegitimate one if this reflective content is considered empirically real. Mind and body are elements of one whole. As one descends from the whole to the parts through the hierarchical stages, one finds that it is not mind influencing body or body influencing mind but rather there is 'action through and inside' ('per-action' or 'intro-action') in which each subserves the function of the

4. The Revolt Against Dualism.
It is impossible to say at what point of the evolutionary process what we call mind enters into wholes, just as such boundaries are non-existent in the person. This indicates that mind-body is really a gradient condition in which, as Dr. White says of the organism, involves not what (mind or body), but how much of each enters into an immediate function. This is based on progressive differentiation and integration of wholes which have emergent qualities ('the more'). This is ontogenetically and phylogenetically true.

It would seem that this explanation stands as one of the most fruitful (if there be any fruitful) positions. It seems impossible to deal with this problem with any degree of satisfaction by an immediate dichotomy of man into mind and matter, setting out, prima facie, the categories of matter and spirit or mind (Descartes) and then try to heal the breach by logical analysis, analogy or any such reflective attempt. Only can the similarity of mind and matter be seen by beginning at the lowest 'entity' in Nature and with some such theory as Holistic Evolution, postulate the rise of progressively new phases of holistic expression.

Smuts's other major effort in this direction is to redefine the concept, Personality. As hinted above, personality is that whole of which mind and body or predominantly mind or predominantly material conditions, are the expression. This means that the whole is functioning in various ways, i.e. self expressions. Personality can have several meanings: (1) That which distinguishes man as a genus ('Man is a personality'), (2) That which refers to individuality of action

1. White, W.A., Twentieth Century Psychiatry, pp. 65-75
Cf. Martin, W.W., Consciousness as Organismic Physiological Functioning, Psychological Review, 1947, v. 54
(a man's personality), (3) That which is a general reference ('man's personality') and (4) as Smuts seems to use the term, personality qua man, i.e. the person-as-a-whole. By declaring the whole to be Personality, mind and body are non-existent separate entities.

Dorothy Lee, in an interesting monograph, Notes on the Concept of the Self Among the Wintu Indians states that the Wintu has made no dichotomy of the self and not self, does not imply the separation of mind and matter as we do when we say, for instance, 'I fall in love', 'I control my will', 'I control my body', 'I control my emotions', the implication being that 'the self is in control of the other'. She states, 'In Wintu there is no fragmenting. When I asked my informant, Sadie Marsh, what the word for body was, she said Kot Wintu, the whole person'. She comments that 'To the Wintu, a person is holistic; he is psychosomatic, but without the suggestion of synthesis which this term holds. They have no word for body or corpse, and the so-called parts of the body are aspects or locations'.

Our grammatical expressions tend to separate the person from the verb. Thus, in 'I go', the ego is separated from its own activity. For the Wintu, the writer says, the 'I go' is one unanalyzed word such as 'I-go-weak-legs'. The Wintu self, unlike our abstractive thought, is identical with the parts of his body 'and is not related to them other, so long as they are physically part of him'. However, when, for instance, a hair falls from the head, it is his hair, or when the heart is plucked out of a man, it is his heart, or when a man's arm is cut off, it is his arm or when a woman is folding her dress it is her dress. It is only when these are physically separated from him does the Wintu then think of them as related to him.

1. Martin does the same thing in Some Basic Implications of a Concept of Organism for Psychology. Psychological Review, 1945, v. 52, 333-341
Personality, then, becomes for Smuts as it was for William Stern, a 'psychophysically neutral' system. To the person qua personality, there is no body and no mind, but personality functioning in a variety of ways.

This is Smuts's 'solution' to the Mind-Body Dualism problem. He and E.S. Russell approach the problem similarly in another sense, Smuts, at least, not doing so deliberately. That is, the dualism, they seem to say, is an abstraction from reflection which may have interesting ramifications in Smuts's and Russell's references to 'immediate experience' and Smuts's frequent recourse to action-terms to explain his position. Russell, however, does not pursue this line of approach but deals with the abstractions concerning primary and secondary qualities and epistemological inquiry. Smuts's position on this and possible logical consequences will be discussed later in this chapter when we consider the person as Agent.

Person-as-a-whole

The unity of personality

We have noticed Smuts's repeated injunction that the organism is and acts as a whole. Research, particularly of Sherrington, Cannon, W.E. Ritter, Haldane, Lashley, Coghill, von Weizsacker and Goldstein gives abundant evidence for this assertion.

On Kurt Goldstein, whose labors for over a quarter of a century have placed him in a position of leading authority in this field,

1. General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint.
2. Advancement of Science, especially pp. 86-87.
3. It is necessary, the author feels, to point out the need for a more careful use of the term 'organism' in contemporary literature. It seems inappropriate to refer to personality or the person as an 'organism'. This is consistent with the entire thesis of this paper. Huxley says, 'The fact remains that the pendulum is again on the swing, the man-animal gap is broadening'. op. cit., p. 3.
we shall rely heavily for this sectional discussion.

The part-whole relationship is so finely interwoven and complexly organized that a movement in one is an excitation of the other. This is true as well (as we noticed in Chapter 1) of part-part relationship. Any change in one locality, say within the central nervous system, is accompanied by a change in other localities. In fact, any reaction to a given stimulus involves the whole organism in its participation. Broadbent, concerning the nervous system, is reported as stating:

' (The student) should not forget the constant work that has been done by the nervous system, and especially how action at every part of the whole is affected by action at any and every part. To work, to carry out its function, is necessary to the health of a neurone; efferent neurones have to maintain the tonus of muscles; in order to do this they require their own stimulation by afferent neurones; and the cortex, besides its conscious functions, regulates the nutrition of the whole body. Experiments in reflex action and other facts concerning the summation of stimuli, show that the whole system is somehow affected by stimulation at any part. All parts of the nervous system hold each other in mutual tension, and the passage of an impulse, afferent or efferent, is better represented as a disturbance of equilibrium than as a transmission of energy.'

Goldstein goes further,

'With any change in one locality in the organism, simultaneous changes occur in other localities'.

In such a simple reaction as the response of the eye to light, the reactive phenomena are not localized merely to the contraction of

2. This quotation is cited by Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 202n. His reference to the source is '(Broadbent, Brain, xxvi, 324-5, cited by Mitchell, p. 452)'. This is not, however, a quotation from Broadbent in Brain; only the last sentence is a direct quotation. It must then have incorporated Mitchell's own material but Bosanquet, as far as I have been able to discover, nowhere gives us Mitchell's initials or his book or article. The idea of the quotation as it is, however, is sound and helps to illustrate the point we are trying to make.
3. Goldstein, The Organism, p. 213
A variety of phenomena occur throughout the body in which motor and sensory fields excitation takes place which may even be of more importance to the organism than the pupillary reflex to which our attention is usually drawn. Galvanometer investigations have shown that movement of one part is accompanied by electrical changes in analogous muscles of other parts of the body so that an action current in the foot flexors was found when the fingers were flexed. Goldstein asserts that 'we can actually observe simultaneous changes in whatever part of the organism we may test' whenever some change is induced in another region.¹

Constant reflexes are only constant when the entire organism is in its normal constant state. This is well seen in the patellar reflex, for example, which changes within the same individual with changes in the condition of the organism. It will vary, for instance, on the position of the limb, the behavioral situation of the rest of the organism and on whether or not attention is paid to it. 'Changes in the mode of attention will also change the reflex in a particular manner ... A certain kind of attention diminishes, another kind exaggerates, the response ... Furthermore, the response appears intensified in lesions of the pyramidal tract.'²

The attitudinal disposition of the organism or person at any given instant seems to be an important condition for 'constant' reflexes. The flexor and extensor performances actually do not depend wholly or even predominantly upon the activity of single muscle groups of the body but on the whole. In fact, one could say they are the manifestation of different attitudes of the organism to the world.³ This, of

¹ Cf. ibid., pp. 213-214
² Ibid., P. 69; Cf. Haldane, Sciences and Philosophy, p. 210
³ Cf. Ibid., pp. 482-488
course, makes constant reactions and conditioned reflexes rare indeed,\(^1\) for what is observed is a variety of reactions to the same stimulus. For instance, the knee jerk cited above can only be performed in a 'constant' way by artificially maintaining the rest of the organism in a definite, prescribed state and diverting the individual's attention from the event. Von Weizacker concurs on this point by asserting that the classical division of phenomena into sensory stimuli and motor responses (introduced by the reflex-arc schema) is just as fallacious, since it refers to laboratory products which are just as artificial, as the idea of the reflex-arc itself conceived in isolation.\(^2\) The reflex reaction is dependent, then, on the entire condition of the organism, its mental and bodily states. We can say that each reaction is the whole organism reacting in a given instant in a given way.

Consider what might appear a contradiction to this theory. Suppose if one jumps down a steep incline in such a way that one always touches the ground first with the heel, then muscles located on the anterior part of the lower segment of the leg and the quadriceps are first passively stretched and then contracted reflexively. We have now a reaction which does not apparently take place in response to voluntary innervation. It seems to be the consequence of a reflex process. It seems to have happened without any relation to the organism as a whole. But consider that under other conditions of the whole organism, we observe a totally different phenomenon during the same kind of abnormal tension of these muscles. Say one is walking through a forest and one's foot sticks fast behind a stone, the muscles mentioned before are stretched. They do not contract in response to that

\(^1\) Wordsworth writes rather sardonically, 'Perhaps our flight from danger is a "conditioned reflex"? You have recoiled so often after being mauled by tigers or bitten by rattlesnakes that the thing has become a habit and you now recoil at the mere sight of them'. *Pain and Other Problems*, p. 54.

\(^2\) *Der Gestaltkreis*, cited by Piaget, *op. cit.*, p. 87
tension. Rather they relax and the opposite muscles on the back of the leg contract so that the foot can be released and a fall averted. This, too, is not a voluntary innervation but is reflexive, yet not caused by the abnormal tension alone but determined by the condition and needs of the organism as a whole. The peripheral innervation in both cases must be the same and determined by the whole organism.

While reflexive reaction occurs usually when voluntary innervation would be too slow and jeopardize the organism, it is, nevertheless, in an attempt to maintain the organism and is given in terms of the organism as a whole.¹

Now with respect to injury to the organism, there occurs what Stern calls 'vicarious performance'. That is, a loss of function in one sector effects that field particularly and the whole organism as well. 'Spreading over' of functional performances occurs in an effort to maintain the performance level normal to the organism. In a brain injury, because of field-effect (considering spacial near effect) Goldstein has shown that specific, separate losses of individual performances cannot be maintained. A systematic 'dedifferentiation' results throughout the organism gradient to spacial near effect to the whole organism as it functions in the figure-ground constellation. Only in sub-cortical lesions can a loss in a circumscribed area be asserted and this because it interrupts a certain relationship between the organism and outside world. In these injuries, certain structural and functional changes occur. For instance, compensation for alexia occurs by outlining the letters seen with head movements and then they can be read by becoming aware of their kinesthetic sensations.

Functional changes occur with various types of injuries; taking things into the mouth may be the basis of perception, blind.

¹ Cf. Goldstein, Human Nature, etc., op. cit., pp. 120-142.
'see' by touch, the dumb 'speak' by gesture, the phenomena of first
trial writing in hemiplegia, etc. Innumerable examples of 'vicarious
performance' could be given as well as often enumerated examples of
regeneration in the organism. Autonomic functions and personality
changes in their relationship have been brilliantly developed by
W.B. Cannon, H.F. Dunbar, F. Alexander and others. By such research
efforts 'We know now that bodily changes may be brought about by men-
tal stimuli, by emotion, just as effectively as by bacteria and toxins,
and that physiological changes accompanying emotion may disturb the
function of any organ in the body.'¹ We shall have some occasion to
consider these researches later.

For now, let us note some theoretical results of the material
discussed here. (1) It seems that while organs of
the body and system-wholes (Cf. Chapter I, thesis) do function more
predominantly in certain situations in which they assume figure, one
cannot easily postulate a specificity of function. (2) There seem
to be no isolated parts or part-functions or strict localization of
function in exclusion of all other processes and functions within the
organism. (3) The usual concept of inhibition and antagonism as in
agonist-antagonist, flexor-extensor functioning is actually to be re-
considered in terms of cooperation of both functioning expressions in
maintenance of the organism through a particular response. (4) The
conditioned-reflex and the stimulus-response concepts as usually held
must be seen situationally and given, not in terms of segmented reflex
reactions or segmented units but as whole organism reactions.² (5) That

¹_Dunbar, Psychosomatic Diagnosis, p. 9
²_In a more causal sense; 'One does not find a single
event which can be conceived as the univocal effect of one
definite stimulus', Goldstein, ibid, p. 85; '. . . no single
act can point directly to a source in some one local and
circumscribed tissue situation', Murphy, op. cit., p. 90;
cf. Koehler, Gestalt Psychology, pp. 137-138. This is what
all parts function, as Smuts so often brought out, toward the whole.

(6) That all behavior is total response behavior and given in response-wholes.¹
(7) That a change in one part of the organism affects not only the whole but all the other parts ('members'; Goldstein) as well.
(8) That local injury unrelated to whole performance remains essentially unintelligible and (9) that in whatever reactions, reflexes, proactions, performances (normal and pathological), it is just the personality ('person-as-a-whole') or organism functioning in particular and varied ways. Such holistic-organization has called forth interesting comments such as Smuts's '... the human body, whose every organ and activity has a mind-ward aspect implies mental function',² Kempf's 'we think with our muscles',³ and even William James asserted that 'our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; and each morsel of it contributes its pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp, pleasant, painful or dubious, to that sense of personality that every one of us unfailingly carries with him'.⁴ And it is to that next level of person-functioning, instincts, traits, needs, that our study turns.

Smuts, for one thing, was trying to assert by his idea that freedom stands between stimulus and response.

Probably 'holistic dynamics' (Angyal) should resort to new terms rather than continue using 'reaction' or 'reflex' since that activity to which these terms refer is really situational, is a psychophysical involvement and includes in what it represents the pre-reaction as well as post-reaction states all of which influence 'immediate reaction-behavior'. Possibly 'reaction-continuum' or 'reaction complexity' is as near as we can get and still use as much of the old terms as possible. This, of course, is an innovation and does not directly enter into the purpose of this paper. Murray has suggested for these 'response trends' the term 'actoee', a new term altogether. Cf. Explorations in Personality, pp. 41-42.

¹ That is, that all responses such as movements (bodily positional changes) are molar. Bergson had the idea that movement was not the summation of an infinite number of positions the body displays at various instants but a united whole action. We have endeavored to sight several of the early writers who have emphasized this fact. Cf. Appendix I.
³ Psychopathology; cf. Gordon, R.G., Personality, Ch. XII
The unity of the personality (continued)

One of the weaker points in Smuts's system concerning the organism and person is that which deals with the inferred hypothetical process we call need. It is not that needs in the organism do not receive sufficient attention, in spite of the fact that his work is of broad perspective. And certainly the concept of the need to realize wholeness and integrity as the basic need of the organism and person remains one of his most significant contributions, one to which we shall recur especially in the next chapter. But it is the subordinate needs and their development within personality that concerns us here, with attendant correction of Smuts's weakness possibly existing within his own system.

Because Smuts's system is longitudinal and emphasizes autonomous, individual development, it faces the difficulty shared by psychoanalysis, for instance, concerning needs. Now the person is from the beginning a whole but it is 'deepening its wholeness' (holistic-character, integrity, close-knit-ness, good Gestalt, etc.) by progressive differentiation and integration which are always directional and purposive. The successive phases of development may be called temporary Gestalts or progressive integrates or wholes. The totality of the temporary Gestalts gives us a life-unit or life-history. It would seem reasonable to assume, if this be the case, that infantile needs cannot remain unchanged. That is, infantile needs cannot remain the same unaffected by the successive differentiation and intra-action and interaction (with others) of the person (or organism) so that they emerge in adulthood as they were in childhood. But this seems to be where Smuts leaves the problem. Needs or drives, as it were, can

1. Development arises from 'individuation within the total mass', Coghill's thesis maintained. (cf. Bibliography)
remain autonomous and go on unaffected by organismal and personal changes.

Now, certainly, this represents the idea held in the first quarter of the century by instinct-psychology. Merely because the term instinct has gone out of fashion (for, often, we change words but hold on to the same old meanings) has not changed the inadequacy. The fact is, as so many able writers have pointed out, that, first of all, there are no unlearned, ready-made abilities with which the person begins life. Certainly, as Piaget asserts, the individual only acts if he experiences a need in terms of maintaining equilibrium (between himself and his environment) or of relatively internal tensions.1 But this is far from postulating given instincts. Adaptability is the result, primarily, of learning, as Morgan, Thouless, Kochler, E.S. Russell, Suttie, Goldstein and others have pointed out. The learning is a process and in the process needs not only develop longitudinally but change and acquire new properties. Probably the best example of the influence (in fact, the result) of learning and acculturation is seen in 'motherhood attitudes'.

It will not further our purpose to cite a list of various chemical, visceral, etc. 'sub-needs' if we may call them that. We wish to represent here, the holistic approach to needs in its transformation of the idea of instinct, drive and need.

First of all, we note that there is a frame of reference in which all needs operate. This frame of reference is the whole person. All needs, then, are directional. They are given in terms of maintaining person-equilibrium. They are attempts to maintain the

personality (Smuts) as a whole and to establish the integrated complex in which all phases and functions of the human being are harmoniously expressed. This is one of Smuts's outstanding suggestions. Thus, as Maslow, Holt, Allport, Stern, McKenzie, Murphy, Stagner, and others point out, the individual drives lose restricted significance as signs for gratification of a specific need and become, instead, as Stagner asserts, 'signals of a general sort of good for the organism'. Hunger, thirst, escape are not specific motives but conditions of the whole in its effort of self-maintenance. It is only on this basis of non-discrete, non-independent motives that behavior such as substitute gratification can be explained.

Again, the effect of stimulus-need is not proportional to the initial source of reaction. 'If a boy in the audience runs a pin into his neighbor's thigh, the consequent commotion is nowise proportional to the size of the orifice'. Smuts's concept of freedom as that autonomous ability which lies between cause and effect is based on his definition of wholes as more than the parts altogether and the behavioral determinants entering into resultant action. This, one could say, is an attempt to do away with the one-to-one behaviorist formula and allow for phenomenal interjections and personal decision.

While somewhat out of line with Smuts's reductionist efforts regarding that is, in the final analysis, an evolutionary concept of progress, it is a part of his system which is attempting to deal with the unique features of personality, 'the organ of Holism', and it seems to offer

7. Psychology of Personality.
8. Ibid., p. 302
the other side to his ambivalence. What is said of stimulus-need and reaction-effect must hold in regard to needs. That is, that wholes, by definition, presuppose emergent qualities which change those needs in such a way that they no longer can be considered autonomous in development. Further, although Smuts has failed to account for person-environment (or organism) interaction, at least it remains latent in his system, on the basis of the interacting wholeness (part-whole relationship), that needs are not specific but serve the entire organism (or person). The holistic development and function of needs might be more appropriately designated 'need integrates' or 'need-systems' (fusion or compound of aspects of various needs together with the image of possible objects for satisfaction inseparably experienced as one - need-integrates, like intention, involve an object reference). 1

These need-systems are varied as they rise toward figure in the whole. They can, then, be said to be hierarchical if we keep in mind their fluctuating capacity which must be harmonized with the particular conditions of the organism at given instants of experience.

Now in personality, then, there is nothing that can be called rightly 'instinct'. All reactions, adaptability, adjustments, etc., are the result of interpersonal situations, learning, experience, psychophysical neutrality and meaning. Personality and personal relationships ascend into figure as the goal of all tensions, need-integrates, behavior and action so that 'the presence of the mother', for instance, as Stagner notes, 'will be in itself satisfying and will not depend upon inner tension' and is better than Freud's position, for instance, which would assert a view of innate sensitivity to adults as need-satisfying agencies, 2 in the sense of biological needs. This

has been well illustrated by I.N. Suttie.

With the interest in personality, one must assume the preclusion of the static nature of instincts and infantile complexes. Even in schizophrenic states, it seems incorrect to assume that infantile behavior or complexes have remained unchanged to finally overwhelm the adult and enforce their reign again. Schizophrenic states are not infantile regression states, as Cameron has well pointed out. Neither does this holistic view condone a theory which views all neurosis as being caused by infantile complexes still remaining in the Unconscious, although, of course, past experience influences present ways of dealing with life, as surely as our contentions assert that past experience or closure-efforts undergo significant changes through socialization and development. This concept, then, recognizes that there is some structuration to need-integrates with the sequence of continuous satisfaction, else they would remain indeterminate variables; that canalization or cathexes of needs, as the psychologists speak of them, do attain consistent-organization under rather constant conditions of the organism and environment. But the attitude of the Personality (Smuts), the availability of satisfaction resources in the environment, the developmental phases of the person (childhood, puberty, climacteric, etc.) are all factors in the ascendance and descendance of needs, what forms of expression they take and what functional changes they undergo in experience. All of this seems to lend evidence for the assertion that the holistic principle is an active factor in

1. A guilt-reaction arising out of resentment to the parent at a very early time hardly seems to be the source of motivation for all later feelings of guilt, or self-punishment, or efforts to consummate an act which one desired to do or a wish one desired fulfilled in such an early experience. The philosophers might find that such instances of feelings of guilt both early and later in life may be instances of and evidence for a continuing moral sense in the life of the personal. Cf. Wordsworth, Pain, p. 157.
maintenance and organization of wholes and their behavior-patterns.

As a matter of fact, drives or needs would be more correctly expressed in terms of readiness for certain types of inner tensional and behavioral, inter-environmental conditions. The readiness to behave in various ways for the maintenance of the person as a whole might be called 'attitude'. It seems more appropriate to say of personality that there are conditions of craving which characterize experience rather than postulating (illegitimately, we believe) specific drives, instincts, needs. When we speak of conditions of craving or need-integrates, we always mean tendencies to integrate and deal with personal and environmental situations. Such a holistic view, then asserts that personal (or personal-relationship) factors may be of more important concern than the satisfaction of hunger or expression of fear. Bare biological needs employed to account for man's behavior are possibly not wrong but surely inadequate. The discussion here is admittedly personalistic and holistic.

When Smuts rejected the psychology of his day, he did so on the basis that it segmentalized various functions of the person and made them separate entities to be studied for themselves, by themselves. While his consistency was not all one would desire, the idea was good and forward looking in the midst of much elementalist empiricism. The tendency to find security in the isolation of 'testable', 'individual', factors of personality remains in many circles of psychology today. The value and inadequacies of some such approaches as Factorial Analysis will be considered later. Personology, as Smuts developed it, would no doubt consider the historical trend, the continuities, character trends, and development, the emerging individuality, the progressive 'evolutionary' phases of the individual much more important. There are

1. Angyal, op. cit., p. 164
2. Cf. Sullivan, Modern Conceptions of Psychiatry, p. 31

Smuts's theory would maintain, I think, that needs can be understood merely in terms of development.
limitations and values to such an approach when considering traits.

Now Smuts does not talk about traits but he does talk about individual ways of acting and development. His undeveloped thought on traits is probably due to his failure to propose a person-environment theory which would, admittedly, contradict the individualism on which his system rests. Traits, i.e. person-systems of rather consistent action trends of a general objective nature, and attitudes, i.e. person-systems of rather consistent action when encountering more specific meaning situations\(^1\) are, from the holistic point of view, action-patterns, global (total) action systems, operational frames of reference, which are to be understood only in interpersonal situations. They are not merely 'influenced' by cultural standards,\(^2\) they are ways of acting in one's culture. Traits are not 'acquired', for all attitudes and traits are acquired in a popular sense. Actually, it seems that certain ways of acting in certain situations emerge from inter-personal living, not abstracted from experience in the sense of being 'acquired'. Consequently, traits have a certain consistency and cannot be said to be static. The usual way of reacting to authority which has been dominant for half a life time may, under a relearning process such as psychoanalysis, change or become virtually non-existent. Possibly it is more appropriate to speak of trends rather than traits.

At any rate, because of Smuts's individualistic theory, traits would not have the fluctuation and pliability of an approach which considered 'culture' as a more integral part of development.

Traits and attitudes are not parts of personality, as Murphy rightly argues, but aspects of the whole.\(^3\) Personality is not the

1. Cf. Allport, Personality, Chpt. xi
2. Cf. Stagner, op. cit., p. 308
sum total of habitual responses, as Watson contended. Smuts would probably accept what might be called a convergence theory in which dispositions (i.e. the 'implements and . . . directional determinants of personal functioning')

1, traits and attitudes are determined by the whole and its needs and function with reference to the person as a whole. But traits are longitudinally and immediately given in the history and immediate needs and circumstances of the individual in the interpersonal situation.

It has been sufficiently established that no pure reason exists detached from affective factors. Nor can we continue to think with Nietzsche of the mind as directing the instincts (as Smuts tended to do). Affective, structural and cognitive elements, as Piaget points out, enter into every response and action.

2 Sullivan has even asserted, 'I know of no evidence of a force or power that may be called a will, in contradistinction to the vector addition of integrating tendencies. We have vector additions or motivations but not interventions of some sort of person will-power'.

3 McKenzie, illustrating whole-functioning of the person, has finely stated, 'The organized intellect is no guarantee of character'.

4 And James Ward has said that sentiments do not influence the Self— they make up the Self.

5 The Psychoanalysts have tried, in theory at least, to make their trichotomy of 'mind' less obtrusive by saying the Id, Ego and Super-Ego are merely convenient abstractions which do not exist as 'real' compartments of the 'mind'. Yet their entire mechanistic

1. Stern, op. cit., p. 81
3. Quoted by Patrick, Mullahy, Modern Conceptions of Psychiatry, p. 122.
4. Souls in the Making, p. 80
5. Psychological Principles, pp. 453-461, especially; also Chpts. 16-18.
thinking is in terms of strict 'entities' and 'powers' and 'faculties' warring against each other. They also talk of the Unconscious (probably Freud's attempt to bridge the 'gap' between physical and mental processes) as if it were a place, the residual dump heap of all the beastliness accumulated through the evolutionary process and the cauldron which contains the fermenting potion of all repressed, unacceptable, evil, incestuous desires of man's nature. Now there is no real objection by most Holist writers to these terms and Smuts highly commended the Psychoanalysts for their research into unconscious processes, if these abstractions are treated as abstractions, seen to be functions of the personality and are not personified and anthropomorphized to what often appears absurdity. If the terms like ego-processes or figure-ground relationships are used, it often saves us from some such attendant difficulties. The same criticism holds for the overemphasis of the sex-drive, only one phase of personality, by which to account for the behavior of the whole person. The segmentalization fails to consider sufficiently that in all activity it is always the personality as a whole acting in various ways but is contending that the part usurps the functioning of the whole. Masserman is rather vehement on this question when he asserts that 'the dynamics of behavior are topologic and not topographic, functional rather than structural or mechanistic ... and in all events involve complex total adaptations rather than localized conflicts among artificially isolated segments of a tripartite "psyche".'

Id, Ego, Super-Ego, Conscious and Unconscious are useful terms when seen as topological functions of the person as a whole, functions which are changing with personality, which, as Nemminger says, is itself a process. The static categorization of

2. The Human Mind, p. 23
response reactions, traits, attitudes, dispositions, or tripartite structuration of mind cannot exist in a truly holistic concept of personality.

The holistic functioning of ego-processes

Ego-processes may be a useful term to designate that function of the Self through which Personality-synthesis predominantly takes place. Ego-processes, by means of selection, repression, \(^1\) supression, \(^2\) integration, synthesis, organization, etc. function in a holistic way to maintain the personality. All activities and functions of the personality are synthesizing material into wholes. Ego-functions are one expression of that characteristic feature in man and all of existence which has been termed the holistic-tendency. The ego-processes is the function of the self which brings attitudes, dispositions, cravings, need systems, into meaningful, personal organization and person-field experience. They are the equilibrative function which maintains adjustment and harmony of self and the world, a reality testing function seeking satisfaction of yearnings, urges, trends, avoiding inner and outer dangers. Ego-processes (in multiple functions) emerge from the 'crucible of experience', the intermingling of separate decisions, and inter-relationships, and inter-actions among agents. Its development begins, as Suttie and Macmurray\(^3\) have suggested, in the field of

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1. A term used to designate in some occasions an inhibition of 'unacceptable' tension-sources and also a 'shoving away' of tension-sources which are no longer needed in the person's adjustment to life. Cf. Goldstein, The Organism, p.320
2. Conscious counterpart of repression.
3. Macmurray suggests, like Freud, that the ego develops out of conflictful situations; thus the differentiation of the internal and external worlds takes place. Cf. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 448.

The difference, it seems to me, between the two writers at this point is this; for Freud, conflict is essentially endo-psychic, between good and bad impulses which are not satisfied. For Macmurray, the differentiation of external and internal spheres (and the emergence of the ego
personal mother-child association and from then on the ego-functions (as well as the self) in their fluctuations, changing concepts and axioms and maxims of behavior' (Angyal) emerge from (rather than the result of) personal situations.

The ego-functions are functions regarding person-other wholeness (person-other used here as correlative). It is the all important synthetic function of the person-ego-processes which possibly formed for Smuts, if the author understands him rightly, the orientation or basic frame of reference for his entire philosophy and culminates in this aspect of personality - so much so that personality and mind are actually, he says, the greatest expressions of the holistic principle, that toward which it has been working from the beginning. Because of the undeveloped state of psychology, psychoanalysis and especially personalistic psychology in that period in which his thought was taking shape, he evidently felt it necessary to embed his theory of ego-process in Kantian terms and ideas such as 'synthetic unity of apperception' or Reason but also refers often to synthesizing functions of the Personality. What he was basically expounding, we believe, is today usually referred to as 'the synthetic function of the Ego'. If this interpretation is correct, Smuts's system was indeed highly insightful and significant.

Consider what probably is one of the authoritative works on this particular aspect of ego-processes, the work of Herman Nunberg, The Synthetic Function of the Ego and Ego Strength and Ego Weakness.

which results) is between persons (child's desire for Mother's love and attention which the child feels has been insufficiently given, thus some desires are not satisfied by the mother and the two 'worlds' result.) In the former, impulses are predominant; in the latter, personal-relationship is primary.

1. John Rosen sees the mother-child love relationship as the basis of health or neurosis. Cf. Direct Psychoanalysis.
3. American Imago, 3:25-40, August 1942
Nunberg's thesis can readily be summed up in one sentence: 'The Ego tolerates no contradiction'.

Nunberg sees the synthetic function of ego in the drive or compelling motive to establish the causal relations of things, that is, in 'the need for causality'. This is not only the basic motive in all philosophical and scientific quests but is expressed early in the child's life in its continuous questions about the causality of things and causal relationships. Interestingly, he asserts that 'In the genesis of delusions, rationalization seems to play the same part as that played in other preconscious thought-processes by secondary elaboration, which reconciles such antitheses as are too abrupt and fills up gaps in our thinking'. This is the direct result of the fact that 'the ego has a tendency to unify and to connect and is obviously unable to tolerate very sharp contradictions'. Rationalization, then, is an attempt to establish a causal connection between certain antagonistic elements in our thinking, to fill up the gaps in it and so to give it the semblance of being subject to necessity and reason.

In schizophrenics, their bizarre ideas, irrelevant thoughts are intertwined into what for them is significant. In fact, it seems this type of expression is the only one that does 'make sense' of the world and experience. Nunberg believes this need to relate seemingly disparate and disconnected ideas into schizophrenic thought patterns (probably the entire delusional, hallucinatory, illusional system, neologisms, etc.) is the tendency to crystalize the chaotic thoughts

1. The term 'Ego' is ambiguous. The conception of Ego as used in this paper is indicated at the first of this part and more fully in the next chapter.
2. Cf. What we mean by 'contradiction', chpts. ix, x
3. p. 126 (all quotations are taken from the first article) Macmurray says 'We can never, it would seem, think that anything is unreal'. Freedom In the Modern World, p. 126. In other words, what is objectively unreal is always real for us.
and experiences into a unity which contains no contradiction, a manifestation of the synthetic function of the ego and the need for causality. This, of course, demands a great extension, an overcompensatory extension, of the synthetic function to areas not ordinarily required.

It is readily seen that the ego's function is to unite the conflicts between different parts of the personality. The increased synthetic activity makes an effort to bind all symptom-formations into the personality, to maintain 'ego-narcissim' (Nunberg) through 'epinosic gain' (narcissistic gratification from a symptom). One way of doing this is by identification; that is, to incorporate an enemy and destroy its threat.

When neurotic conflict first appears, the ego is taken back, Nunberg states, but then recoils in dealing with the new situation. The ego then rebounds, to reestablish 'psychic harmony' (Nunberg). The neurotic symptom is the result of such attempts at solution. The symptom represents a compromise between the conflicting impulses of the id and of the ego, and further, it is a new psychic creation.\(^1\) This is obvious in the obsessional neurotic where 'instincts are simultaneously gratified and repudiated'.\(^2\) Normally, there is an acceptance of neurotic tendencies and a 'voluntary' attempt to deal with them but in neurosis the ego is forced to deal with tendencies thrust on it. These demand of the ego, synthesis.\(^3\) It is only in the very gravest cases of psychosis that the synthetic function of the ego ceases altogether to function or abandons 'its role of intermediary'.\(^4\)

Freud had earlier made the occasional ambiguous but highly significant statement that 'all neurosis was 'an attempt at cure'. Nunberg boldly

1. Ibid., p. 132
2. Cf. Chapter 9, thesis
4. Ibid., p. 134
asserts that schizophrenic hypercathectic is an attempt to regain the lost world of reality, in actual fact, to reconstruct the world though it be but phantasy and 'corresponds to a spontaneous cure'.

The psychoanalytic treatment is no less a synthetic process. Its success is dependent on the cooperation of the synthetic function of the ego. It is an attempt to harmonize inner forces with reality.

In a summary statement, Nunberg definitely makes a contribution over earlier psychoanalytic writers and to our line of thought Smuts saw it, by asserting that 'the ego has command not only of destructive tendencies but also of capacities for construction and synthesis, which extends over the whole field of psychiatric activity and impels man to the harmonious unification of all his strivings and to simplification and productivity in the widest sense of the word'. He contends that man with his synthetic ego functions 'creates that which is socially valuable (science, art, etc.) as well as what is mortid and of no social value'.

The affinity of thought inherent in Nunberg's research and Smuts's thesis is readily apparent. It is the line of development implicit in Smuts's premises, as the writer understands them, and those fields of research directly connected with the problem. We believe this conviction will be strengthened as we see some of Smuts's references which apply, the author feels, to an explanation of aberrated person behavior.

1. Ibid., p. 139
2. Ibid., p. 140. Contrast Freud's thesis in Civilization and Its Discontents, Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism. It is only right to point out that Nunberg makes the source of energy of ego-functions the sexual libido or Eros and that the need for causality is a sublimated expression of this desire. Cf. p. 127.
Person-field whole: the 'phenomenal field'

In no better way does Smuts so significantly reflect his status in the contemporary thought of his day than in his nineteenth-century optimism and his glaring weakness concerning the relationship of the person (or organism) and the environment. There are at least two considerations involved here: (1) the person-environment and (2) the person-other relationship. We shall consider the second in chapter x. Our interest here is Smuts's theory or lack of it, of what we choose to call the 'person-field whole'.

We have already noticed (chapter v) how Smuts, Aristotle and Leibnitz expound a theory which is essentially individualistic. To qualify this position, it may be said that the individualism is not one which regards the person or organism completely detached from the environment (even Leibnitz's monads were involved in relationships). Aristotle made it clear that any explanation of man must consider his environment. But in such theories, and especially Smuts's with which we are primarily concerned, while the environment is necessary to explain man, it is necessary, in the same way, to explain anything. The environment is something to be tolerated, something to be dealt with and 'used' in one's urge to achieve wholeness or entelechy or to satisfy one's desires.

Younghusband points out Smuts's thesis as inadequate as a biological theory because of its emphasis on an internal source which accounts for all the activity of the organism. He asks, 'Is it (the organism) not continually adapting, adjusting itself to its surroundings, to the whole universe of which even the most perfect organism is only a part?' ¹ The point is well made, but the question seems rather naive. Smuts makes it clear that Natural Selection takes place, that there is

¹ Op. cit., p. 378
some kind of organism-environment interaction, that the Subject-Object
are two poles in experience, that the whole universe supports every
single whole (as Younghusband points out) and speaks, however ambi-
guously, about the organism and its field and social intercourse. The
author would think that Smuts would have felt, upon reading such a
review, that he had failed to get over his point satisfactorily. It
would seem better to say that Smuts stands, following Aristotle and
Leibnitz, between Descartes' impregnable autonomism and the positions
of Haldane, E.S. Russell, von Uexkill, Whitehead, Boodin with the field
theory of Lewin further yet along this line. One cannot read Holism
and Evolution or the Encyclopedia Britannica article and assert that
the person in Smuts's theory has nothing to do with the environment.
However, Younghusband is correct, we feel, in pointing out Smuts's
great limitations at this point.

Smuts's theory, to explain further, influenced possibly more
than he realized by the concept of entelechy, pictures the individual
developing rather autonomously by his own internal laws, pressing on
through all environmental hindrances something like a ship cutting its
way through swirling, but necessary, waters. The organism receives
the stimulus from its environment and through its own freedom changes
the stimulus in such a way so as to act autonomously; that is, as if
the stimulus had no causal effect on its action. There seems to be no
genuine inter-relationship which admittedly makes it difficult to under-
stand behavior, needs, satisfactions, goal changes, etc. It is as if
two objects bump each other as they go along and respond as if the
bump hadn't occurred at all.¹ The real inter-action is in the parts-
whole relationship, not in the organism-environment situation. And we

¹. Like Leibniz's idea which when monads find themselves
near other monads act of their own accord (and accordingly).
again assert, that Smuts's tendency to wholeness principle, as he formulated and developed it, finds itself in this kind of predicament; it is individualistic, its relationship to the environment is one of means to an end. Personality development is defined as a 'personal holistic evolution' rather than as an emergence from interpersonal relationships or as those characteristic ways of acting with others, as has been so ably championed by Royce, Sullivan, Mullahy, Fromm-Heichmann, Macmurray, Horney, Kunkel, Fromm, MacBeath and others.

Smuts's mention of 'fields' is sparse indeed. When he does refer to them, it seems to be an application of the idea of fields as developed in physics without the necessary change of thought when dealing with persons and person-situations. A field may be the unconscious (for Smuts) 'area' of one's conscious mind or it may be the area of 'influence', an extension of the 'structure' of the whole. In both cases, there is no allowance for genuine inter-organism-field or inter-person-field action. It would be unjust, the present writer feels, to postulate that Smuts had a concept here which anticipated such ideas as Lewin's field theory merely because he used the same words. As far as the author can say, this weakness in Smuts must remain as he left it; there is little way to resolve it or see in it any possibilities. It is embedded in his evolutionary individualism. The premises would not support any more positive conclusions.

The weakness of Smuts's view, however, is further heightened by the field theories of Lewin and Koehler, the biospheric dynamics.

of Angyal, the 'press' concept of Murray, the 'operational' viewpoint of Piaget and other similar hypotheses. We shall not have space, unfortunately, to consider these various theories. Only by secondary reference throughout the paper will implications be drawn for the holistic view. There is one point that we wish to emphasize here and one which Smuts had, we think, in the back of his mind. It is an aspect of the 'phenomenological field' theory chiefly expounded by Snygg and Bums.²

The phenomenal field is 'the entire universe' including the subject 'as it is experienced by the individual at the instant of action'. The phenomenal field is that universe each person takes to be reality. 'To each of us the phenomenal field of another person contains much error and illusion and seems an interpretation of reality rather than the reality itself; but to the individual himself, his phenomenal field is reality, the only reality he can know.' To say that 'reality' is only restricted to the science of physics is 'a complete abandonment of everything that we ordinarily recognize as real'.³ Only objects which have meaning to the individual are included in his phenomenal field.⁴ In other words, reality is for the individual what for the individual has meaning and thus for himself, as far as he is concerned, exists really. This field fluctuates, certain elements of ascend and descend in a figure-ground relationship. It is a personal field, in fact the world is a personal world, its richness varying from individual to individual due to selection processes. It is the only world the individual knows; for him, as we said, it is reality.

2. Supra., Individual Behavior.
3. Ibid., p. 15; cf. Chapter 1, thesis, on 'meaning' and intrinsic value of things and perception; also Chapter VIII on perception especially (thesis).
4. Ibid., p. 23
This 'personal field', as it may be called, is both more and less than the world of objective reality, more because it includes many things not physically present and less because it cannot include the vast detail of objects, nuances, 'feelings' in relationships which are present in the physical world and in the phenomenal fields of others which necessarily enter into the construction of the total field as it is objectively. What enters the phenomenal field, i.e. becomes a part or aspect of the phenomenal field, does so on the basis of significance and meaning to the individual (Self). It is from the entire objective field and the interrelational dynamics of things that any entity derives its properties. In consequence, if we are to predict behavior (in the sense of 'probability') or even understand behavior (as in psychosis) it is obvious that we shall have to see the world from the Agent's viewpoint. It is the individual's world we shall have to enter to understand him, his reactions, phantasy, delusions; in short, his entire behavior and action-system. This, in very general outline, is the phenomenological position.

Two main points in Smuts's work have some affinity to this most recent approach in understanding personality. He was able to explain some dynamic creative systems in physical wholes (which are much like physical gestalten and principle of isomorphism) by shifting his viewpoint. 'Matter is ... in a sense creative ... creative, that is to say, not of its own stuff, but of the forms, arrangements and patterns which constitute all its value in the physical sphere ... analogous to that which we call life or mind (in their creativeness) ... Remember that according to the new point of view we have not to judge of matter from the outside and as indifferent external spectators. We have to identify ourselves with the point of view of matter, so to speak. We have humbly to get into that closed cage ... . We have
to interpret matter from the inside, from a point of view which is that of matter and not remote from and indifferent to it.¹

In experience, with which, according to Smuts, psychology must deal, the world is really 'my reading of the world in which I am the centre of reference, where the system of co-ordinates of measurement is my private system; and the space, time and experience which go to the making of it are my space, time and experience. Objectivity and universality are indeed attainable, but only from a subjective and individual starting-point and centre of reference.' Smuts asserts that psychology's subjective standpoint which has often been reproached and 'the self which it discloses as central to all our experience of reality' is now the demand for the physical as well as the personal sciences. The self, then, stands 'central to all our knowledge' of reality.²

Certainly Smuts's view is highly significant as the phenomenological viewpoint, along with the emphasis on the self, enters more and more into psychology and psychotherapy. The person in Smuts's thesis, which is readily seen here, is central. The references indicate the phenomenological point of view Smuts had and championed which applied, he felt, to all of Nature and for all the sciences. His theory at this point remained undeveloped. We are suggesting, however, that his phenomenological approach, seen in just these brief references, indicates an anticipation of some of the foundations of the current

2. Ibid., pp. 239-240. A similar idea is 'my world' as presented in Stern, Heidegger, Waterhouse, Allport, Sartre and Macmurray who develops a closely related thought in Freedom In the Modern World. The present author believes that the first writer to build a psychological system on the self as the central point of reference and anticipating the phenomenological psychology was John Dewey, cf. Appendix I.

2. I am not saying that the essential nature of the problem is 'to resolve' the present...
phenomenological frame of reference in psychology.¹ We have noticed the negative aspect of his theory on fields and noted that a genuine interrelationship of person-environment is lacking. We have, by implication, indicated the line of approach which seems the most profitable corrective to such theses as Smuts presents. We have also presented a positive aspect of his theory, what contribution it makes to contemporary field theories, the development of which in personal experience has only asserted itself in the last two decades.

The person as Agent

Reason and immediate experience are the two aspects of personality between which Smuts consistently vascullates. Mind qua Reason is 'the link which binds the Self and the Not-self into a whole' but is, as well, the source of the dichotomy between the 'inner and outer worlds'. On the other hand, immediate experience is that nexus in which the 'dipolarity' (Whitehead) of Subject-Object, Mind-Body are unified into an inseparable whole. The seeming independence of these poles is 'given in solution in experience'. It is interesting how Smuts, with many other writers, seems compelled to deal with problems of personality, such as Mind-Body Dualism, in the terms and language of action and experience (verbs and verb forms) rather than in reflective, a priori terms (nouns).² We have noticed that Mind and Personality and Will have become 'organs of Holism' (tendency). Smuts is forced to assert that in these qualities of higher life there seems to be 'a break in the even and regular advance of Evolution and to mark a new departure of a very far reaching character'.³

1. For Smuts's inconsistency concerning this approach to personality, cf. Chpt. xl.
2. I am not saying that Smuts has comprehended the essential nature of the personal or its uniqueness. I am asserting that inadvertently he has resorted to action terms to 'resolve' the problem of Mind-Body Dualism without
tendency which accounted for the existence and order in the physical, chemical, organic, biological spheres now becomes, evidently, a different concept altogether in which Mind and Personality become the 'creators' of the 'new order of the universe'. Here, then, Smuts seems to attempt a resolvement of the inevitable impasse resulting from his postulation of an evolutionary concept of social and moral progress and applying biological thinking to personality function. The biological theories of entelechy and holism, as Smuts thought of them (from the point of view of his entire system) no longer hold for Personality. At least, they hold in a different sense altogether which we shall later discuss. At any rate, action and immediate experience have to be accounted for and in these, evidently, man's unity is established. That is, in action, the psycho-physical dualism is overcome, or better, is not discernible (for it does not exist except in our reflection).

The essence of man has been considered to rise out of his ability to think. That contemplation has been placed above the life of action, is a theme which runs all through the Hellenic philosophical tradition from Pythagoras to the Neoplatonists\(^1\) and probably finds its most explicit formulation in Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* (which presumes a difference between thought and action, mind and body, subject and predicate) and in Hegel's Idealism and the Enlightenment. Kierkegaard (influenced by Schelling) reacted against this trend, especially as seen in Hegel, and showed that thought, when abstracted from comprehending what exactly he was doing and some of its consequences which bring him into hopeless contradiction. It may be that by a conception of the person as Agent a more fruitful and consistent approach can be made toward such questions of psycho-physical dualism or parallelism or epiphemomenalism. This is the issue before us in this part of the ch. \(^3\) Cf. *Toynbee*, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-233; cf. discussion, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-260.

1. Cf. *Toynbee*, *op. cit.*, v. iii, pp. 252 ff
existence in a philosophy of history or in the 'incarnation' of absolute ideas and their return to the Universal Ego, is dealing not with existence and the essence of life but with itself. Man's nature is not realized in thought primarily, but in action. His essence is not primarily that he is Subject or Thinker but Agent, i.e. he exists only as Agent, as Macmurray and A.M. Ritchie and A.D. Ritchie among others have so faithfully expounded. And Whitehead has substituted 'experiencing' for 'thinking'. Now as L.C. Knight has said, it is not that we need to abandon reason 'but simply to recognize that reason . . . has worked within a field which is not the whole of experience, that it has mistaken the part for the whole and imposed arbitrary limits on its own working'.

Modern psychology has attempted to deal with the fact that in action there is no epistemological, inner-outer, mind-body, agent-other, freedom-determinism, phenomenal-noumenal dualisms. Various theories like 'global qualities in action' (Murphy), thema and actone (Murray), 'action systems' (Kardiner), 'phenomenal field' (Snygg and Combs), 'biosphere' (Angyal), 'dynamic field' (Lewin), 'semantic reactions' (Korzybski) are all attempts, in one way or another, to account for the unity of the person and the inseparability of person-environment.

In action there are no dichotomies. Cognition, conation and feeling 'are fused into a single whole in living experience'. Action is not merely 'the rush of immediate transition' (Whitehead) but personal, the ingression of all that we are. Action, which presupposes thought (since I know I am acting) reason, intention and

2. Interpreting the Universe, p. 22
will, is that experience of man which is his essential nature and represents his whole-being. Reason is not (contra Smuts) the Creator of a new order. Reason does nothing to anything. It is a private experience. It makes no difference except as it is expressed in action. Our belief is that our experience is ultimately consistent with itself, that what we take to be real is real indeed (reality). The test of the reality or validity of something is not merely the subjective abstractions which occur in efforts to follow the logical development of laws of non-contradiction but in the total experience of application and action. True, the entire field is the interacting complexity of dynamic forces and separate decisions and actions which support and influence immediate action, but essentially the Agent is figure and in his action the person as a whole, the whole person, is invested. Action is non-elementalistic. The act is the convergence of the past and the end toward which the person strives, the means and the end inseparably one. Dichotomies and antinomies arise not with the person as Agent but as Thinker or Subject, i.e. in reflection. It is toward the person as Agent that all tension gradients are directed. Here potentiality is realized in actuality. The qualities which arise, however, span the privacy of internal development. If the person is Subject merely, he lives in a private world. As Agent, the world he knows is the same one in which he acts. As Subject the Self cannot be part of the world and cannot act. If the Self is only Subject, then it cannot be Agent and therefore does not exist. As Agent a person has existence and therefore can know something.

1. Cf. Murphy, op. cit., p. 5; McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Religion.
2. Since it is necessary to know what we should do before doing it and since life has meaning only when it is seen in terms of its end as is true of any activity as well as action.
Sartre interestingly reports that the schizophrenic can only engage in his phantasy, hallucinated world when he is not acting. When acting, the absorption, that is, the entirety of the individual involved in an instant experience, is so great that the phantasy can no longer be maintained. Thinking is abnormal when dissociated from experience. It contrastingly sets various aspects of our conscious life at variance with each other. 'Thought can only complete itself when we cease to think ... Intellectualism is the neurosis which results from the desire to escape from the necessity of action by spinning out thought to infinity'.

Action makes a difference. It is social. It is personal. It saves one from subjectivity and egoism. It is totalistic. It involves the highest centers of what one calls himself as well as the lowest levels of physiological response. The ability to act means the ability to risk assault to one's own self-esteem, to risk one's whole mode of thought, to lay oneself open to the attacks of others and to be able to tolerate the anxiety which might be aroused when one's self-esteem and his personal status are threatened. The whole self is at stake. In action the decision as to whether a man has been thinking rightly is made. He reveals himself most fully when he is acting, whether rightly or wrongly. It is both the demand and risk of existence. It is both the demand and risk of wholeness. One's inner thought and motivations are externalized in action, else they remain always a


Psychologists suggest that the isolation occurring in more severe indulgence in abstractions for their own sake, i.e. philosophy, historical detail, laboratory experimentation may be a sign of depersonalization. Such thinking and the objects dealt with may become erotized, the libidinal cathexis of internalized objects, i.e. in this case thoughts and thought processes as in schizophrenia. Ideas are then substituted for exterior objects and also for feelings. The protection from responsibility of action is readily apparent.
private matter. When a person acts, he reveals himself for what he is. Whether or not his motives are fully communicated to the other person is only a secondary concern, the primary fact is that in his action others may see him for what he is, for all of him enters into the way he acts with others. He may reserve a part of himself, but by such reservation he is fully involved as surely as what one does not do is as indicative of what he is as what he does and is a determinant in the distortion of the action. However surreptitious a man's motives are, they are, nevertheless, expressed; they are now objectified and no longer his, they are for the world to see and judge. Not only are all his functional-abilities, i.e. the somatic and psychic variations of expression and performance, invested in an action but the person risks himself, his self-concept, his self-esteem, his 'I-persona' in that act. The anxiety is only lessened if he feels he has acted rightly, heightened when he fears someone will discover his 'hidden' motives. Action, as we saw in chapter v, can only be refrained from by regressing to a vegetative existence. So man must act, for being in becoming is insufficient. In so acting, the total person is given, exposed to valuation and acceptance or rejection and is the complex whole out of which one forges his own destiny in which he puts his wholeness at stake. He is forced to choose, since action is singular and selection is demanded.

Some implications of our discussion so far are these: (1) Smuts has not sufficiently dealt with the problem of action. Possibly he cannot do so because of his evolutionary hypothesis, the primary place to which he assigns reason, and his individualism (since action is between Agents or Agent-object and need-systems have an object-reference).

(2) While trying to overcome certain dualisms concerning the personal, he, nevertheless, resorts to the language and meanings of action and herein seems to lie the key to at least making questions of dualism
unnecessary. (3) That the person as a whole is fully invested in
the moment of action (cognitive, affective, conative). (4) That action
is the result of the total self, the indicator of one's thinking, of
what one is and is not and what one would like to be taken for. (5)
That in reflection arises unresolvable contradictions, in action the
person and the person-other are one whole. (6) That in action the
person-field whole is reorganized so that adaptation is an improper
term, adjustment being hardly better.¹ This leads to the awareness
that if personality is psychophysically neutral and is inter-personal
and postulates that the person is foremost an Agent, then the science
of personality should not borrow terms or principles from biology,
mathematics or physics or for that matter, of morality, from law. (7)
That the fear to act, or the desire to be free from acting (which is
not freedom at all) and the failure to act rightly and with integrity,
should be a major consideration in discussions of normal and deviated
personality, e.g. (a) Why does intention incur guilt feelings although
the intended is never fulfilled in action and (b) Why do some find
it easier to think than to act, others to act than to think and what
are the motivations and results of such 'action'? (c) When does an
action become activity, e.g. as in so-called 'compulsive-action' or
'manic-action' (a misnomer)? May it not be that the escape into action
is really only an escape into activity - an 'action' for action's sake?

¹. Animals adapt, persons purposely attempt to
reorganize the entire field (which includes the Agent).
CHAPTER EIGHT

The Tendency to Wholeness: A Study in Motivation
According to many Holist writers, there is only one need in Personality - all functions, i.e. need-integrates, trends, systems, tension-gradients, action-patterns, are subservient to it. It is the need to maintain and realize wholeness (Smuts); to maintain the present wholeness of personality relinquishing it (in healthy personality) only in favor of a deepening process which is the response to the lure for integrity and completeness. As we have seen, this tendency has been variously formulated. Some theories refer to the tendency of maintenance expressed in regeneration, i.e. healing processes within the organism. Others broaden the applicability of this tendency to include the 'psyche' thus the whole person. Others emphasize the closely related principle of constancy. Some of the outstanding contributions in the history of science and philosophy to this idea have been noted in Appendix I of this thesis. This emphasis, in a significant way, has markedly influenced Smuts's formulation of the holistic-tendency. The theory is by no means new. Some theories which postulate merely the tendency to organismic constancy are near an immanence theory which is essentially 'solipsistic' because of its failure to consider the environment as participant in the life process and for its failure to give adequate attention to long range ends in which directional processes are somehow given. A theory which emphasizes constancy merely is essentially incomplete, since the total directional pattern of the organism or person and the completeness for which the whole being strives with all its powers has been neglected and, according to most holist writers, involves an unwarranted abstraction.1 Smuts's theory admittedly excludes a view which conceptualizes life as an organism-environment field process, but convincingly provides ample suggestion that the

1. To be developed in Chpt. ix, thesis.
lesser strivings and tensions and behavior patterns are to be recognized as functions in a larger frame of reference in which the whole organism or person finds unique orientation and meaning.

Smut's difficulty when applying his biological theory to personality has been pointed out. An organism has no choice in living by the holistic-tendency; the person can only achieve wholeness by active cooperation with the holistic-principle. It would seem appropriate, at this point, to reformulate our terminology. Consider: holism, variously used by Smart, when it refers to the tendency making for wholes, could, in its manifestation in organisms, be termed the holistic-tendency and in man, the holistic-principle. One might say that in animals it is a tendency to wholeness, in man a need for wholeness; that is, not a demand but a lure for wholeness. But this is also superficial, for man is as good an example of the holistic-tendency in operation as the animal or the plant. As we shall see, there is every reason to believe that the autonomic functions of organismic personality and the automatic functions (or 'mechanisms' as they are often called) of defense, preservation and enhancement in psychological personality are the result of tendencies over which we have little control. If adjustmental modes of behavior did not occur, it is quite likely that personality would not be maintained at all. On the other hand, the completeness of being to which man strives is holistic, in that it involves an investment, maturity and expression of all man's powers integrated into a harmonious oneness. Consequently, the higher centers of personality must be actively engaged in the cooperative enterprise of achieving integrity or wholeness. The terms tendency and need and principle might be considered a gradient which rises from physiological processes through functions of synthesis and closure to man's search for and need of completeness and cosmic meaning.
The trend toward increased autonomy

The trend toward increased autonomy or 'freedom' as Smuts calls it, is the urge of organism and person alike. Through assimilation and production processes occurring within the person-field whole, there seems to be a continual effort to achieve freedom, that is, to become self-governing. Rightly, the position of the individual as a self-determining person cannot be violated either by environmental or societal heteronomy without incurring pathological results both for the individual and the society. The phenomenon of tropism in plants, regeneration, the active manner of dealing with stimuli and the changing of feeding grounds give some evidence of the organism's tendency toward such autonomy. Selection, choice, establishment and changes of goals, creativity, aggressiveness, the urge to dominate and master imply a relative (or 'practical': Smuts) self-government and responsibility in persons. The relative autonomy fluctuates when, at times, external control seems to stand out in relief and self-determination recedes and contrawise. But this is to be expected, inasmuch as personality is a process and since new methods with which to cope with new stimuli are having to be constantly devised as new levels of wholeness are sought and achieved. The dynamic nature of the person-field whole would lead one to expect such fluctuations and deviations from the usual behavior-trends. To account for them, the 'objective' approach (environmental pressure theory) would, by itself, be essentially inadequate.

The need to maintain and enhance the holistic self

The trend toward increased autonomy seems to have found sufficient support among writers to warrant its inclusion in any motivational theory in Biology or a science of personality. However,
it seems that a theory which concerned itself more intimately with unique personality strivings would be better able to explain action or behavior patterns, both normal and deviated. This is the central viewpoint of current studies in personality which emphasize the Self, self-concept, ego, I-persona, idealized self as the central motivation in thought, behavior and action.

Self-preservation is a very old theme. It usually refers to the attempt to preserve or save one's life. Probably if it were characterized as 'the attempt to save one's own skin' it would better portray the thought in mind. The self-preservation instinct, in this sense, seems to have gone out of fashion as many times over people are observed, for instance, to give up food in order to maintain self-esteem, or risk their lives for others or defy danger in order to maintain the concept of themselves or social status. 'When the captain of a sinking ship first saves the lives of all on board, and himself goes down with the ship, he proves that his conscience is a greater force than his fear of death'. The need for social and personal approval and acceptance seems more important than the satisfaction of hunger, sex, flight drives. A basic 'physiological need' like hunger may take on self-significance and become a need to master or a feeling of helplessness and self deprecation. More and more psychologists have become interested in this type of action and theories of maintenance and enhancement of the ego or self have subsequently arisen. While the initial work began with McDougall, and in a sense Freud, and was closely followed by Thouless, Dreyer, McKenzie and others, the latest developments have come from such people as J.D. Frank, L.K. Frank, Sherif and Cantril, Allport, Angyal, Maslow, Mittleman, Burrow, Masserman, Horney, Sullivan, Huckhohn, Bertocci, C. Rogers, Murphy, Murray, Snygg, Combs, Parsons.

1. Alexander, Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality p. 170
The Personality qua Person, according to Smuts, stands as the central frame of reference in which all things gain orientation. The Holistic Self, as one might call Personality, 'creates' its own phenomenal field or private world which to the person is the only reality he knows. The Self is that to which behavior and action must be referred in order to understand them. The question always arises, 'What is the Person attempting to do in this particular moment and what does the situation mean to him'. According to Smuts, .... Personality takes in and assimilates all the social and other influences which surround it, and makes them all contribute towards its holistic self-realization.¹ By this simple representation of Smuts, several things stand in relief, (1) The Self is the key for the understanding of all personal phenomena, (2) The Self 'creates' its own world, a world which is the same world in which he acts, for out of action or immediate experience is it created, even though that world is, in another sense, personal and unlike anyone else's world, (3) It is only by knowing how the world appears, or better, what the world means to the Self that the behavior of that person can be understood, (4) That the Self has a goal, one to which all its immediate strivings refer, the need for wholeness or 'self-realization', as Smuts calls it.

Smuts, we feel, made a great step forward in presenting such a thesis; it might even be considered a significant milestone in our knowledge of motivational sources of human behavior. But, for us today, it is not specific enough to form a theory of motivation. We all know now that there is a need for autonomy, that the person is constantly

¹. Op. cit., p. 291. This statement significantly represents what respective positions and what kind of relationship exists between the person and others in Smuts's theory.
seeking through its life greater freedom which, according to Smuts, is the measure of its development and self-realization.\(^1\) Smuts, on one occasion, comes near to the modern concept and a more specific view of self and 'I-persona' defense behavior when he says some people are 'too cautious and reserved to give their inner selves away and to afford the outside world glimpses into the world of real motives influencing and guiding them'.\(^2\) Such people live 'the external life of affairs'. In other words, some people try to maintain and protect this 'external life', this 'self' they want everyone to think they are really, or possibly the self they actually have come to believe they are. They are constantly protecting their 'idealized image' (Horney) and do not reveal to others their real selves. 'Their lives are . . . of incidents and achievements, sometimes of pomp and glory, but largely devoid of real deep personal interest.'\(^3\) They may have an inner life but 'it remains entirely private and personal' or they may be inwardly impoverished.

Now we have before us enough material to ask an important question. If all behavior is an attempt at maintenance and realization, to what does this refer, the Personality or Holistic Self, the self-concept, the I-persona, the Idealized self', the ego, the ego-ideal or ego image? If we say there is a tendency or need to maintain and realize the Holistic Self, not only do we ask what that Self is, but we also inquire towards what goal such protective behavior referred to above is to be oriented. Again, if there are unconscious 'mechanisms' or self-healing processes at work, what are they seeking to preserve, the Self, the self-concept or, say, the idealized self? For instance, are adjustmental functions of a paranoid type tending to preserve the

1. Ibid., p. 311
2. Ibid., p. 287
3. Ibid., p. 287
Self, self-concept, or idealized image? But are there not corrective functions which are tending to destroy the paranoid system and reestablish a reality relationship between the self and self-concept and person and field? To what are these processes oriented?

**General Theory**

The ego, the self, and the self-concept

Smuts has not differentiated, in a purposeful way, Personality, Self, and Ego. The self, for instance, is used when referring to the Personality and to 'self-consciousness' or what might be called the ego or ego-processes. There has been much confusion among writers as to what is meant by Self and Ego. We shall not have space to consider the controversies but shall have to state arbitrarily our position on these and related personality processes mentioned above and continue the main line of argument.

Some writers do not distinguish Self and ego which is particularly important in discussions of person-pathology. Carl Jung seems to have as good a position as any. He states that 'the Self is the subject of my totality' while the ego is 'only the subject of my consciousness'. The ego is, then, 'the centrum of my field of consciousness', while the Self is the I which includes the ego and the 'unconscious psyche'. The Self, by contrast, is, according to Koffka, a sub-system of the ego, the ego being the Known, the empirical me. We can state, on the basis of various ideas from many writers, that the ego-system can be regarded as a function of the Self, that function, partly unconscious but predominantly conscious, which mediates adjust-

1. Cf. Symonds, P.M., The Ego and the Self
2. Psychological Types, pp. 475-476, 540
mentally between the Self and the phenomenal field. Ego-functions are responsible for my awareness, knowledge and concept of myself and through the ego the Self is perceiving, thinking, and synthesizing, formulating the field of action and decision. The ego-system (ego-function) is abstracted from the Self or better, is the Self functioning in particular ways. It is not a separate entity, not a class name. It is a function. It is the center of self-values and esteem. It is my consciousness of my Self to which I ascribe the term 'me'.

The Self is the Holistic Self or Personality. The Self is an abstraction from the phenomenal field and is the I to which the philosophers often refer which is thinker, perceiver and Agent. As Person, it persists through time and is the source of continuing identity. The Self is not the sum of sensations or perceptions (Hume) but a continuant (Laird, Caulkins, Baldwin, Cooley, McDougall, Stout, Stern, McKenzie and others). 'My impulses are mine but they are not me; my emotions are mine but they are not me.'¹ As Ward has so well said, character can only be predicated of a Self.² The Self is what the person is, the ingression of past experience (what he has and has not dealt with) and hopes and anticipations which involve the future. The Self is a complex of all meanings and relations which pertain to him, objective and phenomenal. That is, it is both what is inferred by me to be I when I prehend my Self and when I see my Self as others see me. The Self has aspects of itself which I know but are often unthinkable. I assume certain aspects of it of which I am not even aware. The Self may include, by identification, persons and objects exterior to the physical self. Its boundaries are necessarily an abstraction; as we said, the Self is an abstraction from the field.

1. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Religion, p. 35
2. Psychological Principles, Chapter 18
The Self, like the phenomenal field, is never fully grasped in any given instant. It is not so much that the Self is Transcendental or Transcendent in the sense of standing above experience, but because it is involved in experience its continuity through time bears witness to its trans-situational meaning.

The self-concept is a further abstraction from the Holistic Self. It is a phenomenal concept like the phenomenal field and is built upon the individual's experiences, defeats, victories, the opinion of the primary and secondary groups and by the decision of the culture about the individual. The self-concept is how the individual sees himself. This self-concept is not given in any one instant and, therefore, cannot be thought about at any time in its full meaning. As Snygg assures the author, 'the individual may never experience the self-concept or the phenomenal self'. For one reason, this is true because the self-concept spans the immediate reflective moment just as the Self, to which it refers, is a continuant. It must be prehended (combinatively intuited, inferred and felt) and as such is necessarily aberrated and distorted, however slight that distortion may be, or in some cases, however great. The distortion is possible because of at least two limitations: (1) That subjective 'enhancement' or 'depreciation' factors will almost certainly be involved no matter how 'scientific' or 'objective' one may try to be; it is self-esteem involving our 'phyloneurosis' as Burrow calls it, (2) That, say, person A is a true representation of the self-system over a period of time. The self-concept is a picture of the 'real' self telescoped in time, in a way.

1. The 'phenomenal self' (Snygg and Combs) is a completely conscious differentiation from the phenomenal field. It is likely, according to a personal letter received from Snygg, that in the revised edition of Individual Behavior a new term will be used. The writers recognize that the Self and the self-concept can possibly never be fully in
given moment so that all characteristic features will show. Because a person perceives anything on the basis of the immediate phenomenal field at the time (a given situation), he necessarily omits some features of the self which under other conditions would emerge into figure. Something of the Self will always be left out. A second part, B, will see some features of the Self that possibly A will not see, so that A and B will not see A the same way. The concept of A will be different for each, simply because one is phenomenally given, the other objectively given and because personal feeling elements enter in from the two points of view. In that sense, then, the self-concept is not given in a moment and neither it nor the Self can ever be fully known. The Self and the self-concept involve the further limitation that while the individual may intuit and comprehend them in many essential features in a given instant of reflection, he may not be able to say what he means. In other words, there are 'unspeakable' elements about the Self which also form a background in the self-concept and defy conceptualization and formulation. This possibly includes that area of the Self to which is often ascribed the term 'Transcendental'. The self-concept is not to be limited to 'the self-regarding instinct' which refers more to self-status and self-esteem. Status maintenance is merely a means to an end to preserve the self-concept and is not the main need. The self-concept, generally, is what in my most honest and best reflective \(^1\) moments I know to be my Self.

Now let's get down to a deeper problem. The I-persona (Burrow) or 'Charakterpanzerung' (Reich), \textit{amour propre} which is a consciousness at any one time. The 'phenomenal self' as defined in \textit{Individual Behavior} contradicts this new point of view. The Holistic Self or Self is what I can be aware of and what may never be known even throughout a lifetime because its meanings are incomprehensible and span immediacy and the phenomenal field.

\(^{1}\) Objective
The self whose purpose is really not to deceive but to protect a self whose self-concept is depreciated, or an 'idealized self' which is really what we like to think we are, or the ego, the conscious personality, may ascend into figure to represent the whole, the Self. When this happens, we have the matrix of a neurotic conflict. The self-concept may become so aberrated by idealization - a function of defense - that such a severe psychosis as a multiple personality symptom formation, for instance, or ideas of reference or grandeur may result. All the forces of the personality seem canalized to maintain this aberrated, idealized self-concept. And yet, as we shall see, the unconscious 'mechanisms' are only directed to this end as a means of what amounts to a preservation of the real Self. Some 'mechanisms' 'fail' the neurotic at times, possibly in an effort to reestablish a self-concept based on reality. There seems to be a 'tendency to health' (Sullivan, Fromm-Reichmann) to which unconscious processes are oriented. It is the Holistic Self to which all processes are ultimately directed, though immediate functions are temporarily cathedect into adjustamental behavior. It seems that the person identifies the 'idealized self' or 'I-persona' with the real self (Holistic Self) and this is one major source of neurosis.

In what we call normal action-systems, however, the self-concept appears to be a major source of motivation for all person-

1. Kardiner speaks of '... our "class" system in which everyone is obliged to safeguard his self-esteem by having social relations only with those who can act as act as mirrors to his effective self. This seems to be the motive for exclusiveness, snobishness, cliques, clubs, neighborhoods, race hatreds and the like. It is a fear of contamination, a fear of having one's precious self-esteem injured by an unfavorable mirror reflection. This is all negative evidence of a strong need for emotional ties which are prevented expression in any other way. In the structure of the personality of modern man are very explosive elements which can lead to mutual destruction.' op. cit., p. 412
striving vectors (action-tendencies) and behavior. To 'preserve and enhance' (Snygg and Combs) the self-concept is to preserve and enhance the Self given, usually, in a kind of figure-ground relationship. The self-concept seems to have the most meaning to the individual because it refers to what he calls him-self. It is the focal center around which other personality systems are organized and, further, because, in a significant way, what one thinks of himself, consciously, determines his behavior to a proportionally great extent.

Smuts had a great deal to say about one's concept of the Self. He treated this consideration, however, in a rather abstract way. He condemns that 'morbid, diseased, religious spirit . . . which heaped contempt and degradation on the body' which had received such respect and reverence' in Greek literature. Even Christianity looked upon "the Temple of the Holy Spirit" . . . as a fitter tabernacle for the devil. The 'monastic ideal with its monkish practices and morbid selibacies' bear testimony to the concept placed on this aspect of man's being. One gets the opinion in reading Smuts that possibly it was an affective-reaction, in fact, a disowning 'mechanism', which helped account, at least, for theorizing the Mind-Body Dualism. But the body must be owned as a part of the Self (Personality), otherwise perversion results. Indeed, Smuts makes a purposeful attempt to present, in his theory, a high concept of Personality and emphasizes the need for maintaining a wholesome self-concept. Not only, according to Smuts, must we follow Christianity in 'investing the human being, as such, with a character of sacredness, of spiritual dignity and importance' and the Roman ideal of 'inalienable rights' to form the concept of 'human beings as children of God' but to see Personality as 'the

culminating phase in the synthetic creative Evolution of the universe'.
his crowns Personality, he feels, as the apex of all our highest
thoughts and the par excellence of the 'forward march of Holism'.
It is the 'wholesome' self-concept which determines in great part one's
personality structure as outstanding personalities throughout history
give evidence.

Indeed, the self-concept not only helps to determine Personality structure but has what Bingham Dai calls 'a social reference'.
The self-concept is actually emergent from interpersonal relationships. Role-taking is greatly determined by the social group of which one is a part at any given time. This means that the self-concept, the Self, the self-role are all markedly affected by personal development, shifts in the field-forces, personal relations so much so that the maintenance of the self-concept becomes the most important demand of personality since it is essentially socially-dependent.

The self-concept has another 'social reference'. Aristotle said, 'Friendly relations with one's neighbors, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself'. Fromm believes the self and community attitudes are parallel, that if a person loves or hates himself so he will love and hate his community. Sullivan has aptly stated 'as you judge yourself so shall you judge others ... and this is true with no exceptions'. Symonds writes, 'The more a person esteems himself, the more he tends to esteem others'. Kardiner, Fromm, Pfister, Jung, Bonthius have made

1. Ibid., p. 283
2. Personality, op. cit., pp. 54 ff (Edited by Kluckhohn and Murray).
3. Nichomachean Ethics, Tr. Ross, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Bk. IX, Chpt. IV; Plato conceived the notion of the ideal relations between men as based upon a conception of the intrinsic possibilities of human character, Cf. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 53
4. Fear of Freedom, p. 110
6. Ego and the Self, p. 112; Cf. Sheerer, E., Journal
much of this idea in dealing with the 'rejectionist' positions in the works of Augustine, Luther and Calvin in which man's nature is formulated as depraved, concupiscent, desperate, etc., contrasted with the Meliorist' (Pelagian) view held by Wesley and the Methodists to whom Whitehead ascribes that faithfulness in championing the dignity of man and anti-slavery from which no progressive people can ever retreat. Sado-masochistic and authoritarian characters are unable, most generally, to refrain from projecting their self-concepts onto others in unrestricted generalizations. And Freud's theory of man's nature is not far from the 'Rejectionist' view. These writers of the rejectionist view basically fall back on constitutional and hereditary factors with the religionists ('theological geneticists') resorting to a purely biological interpretation of inherited characteristics to make 'intelligible' their belief creating some impersonal force which makes man sinful and neurotic by inborn structure. How free Freud is from such projections of self-concept, we are not sure. Lewin has pointed out that the Jewish people feel a self-hatred individually and collectively which is characteristic of their self-system. Could Freud's 'death instinct', his concept of man's incestuous 'depraved' nature have been the projection of his own self-hate? Negroes in the United States, as Dasi has shown, have similar self-concept problems. It is tempting to stop and elaborate such projection techniques, as well as the disowning 'mechanisms' by which one's own 'sinful nature' is rationalized and developed through fantasies and folk lore of the Fall, inherited

of Consulting Psychology, 1949, 13, 169-175, Stock, E., ibid.
1. Adventures of Ideas, p. 28; Rousseau and Comte glorified man to the exclusion of God and Calvin did the opposite. Wesley seems to have struck middle ground.
2. For a good discussion of Freud's biological orientation see Thompson, C., Psychoanalysis, Its Evolution and Development, Chapter 2.
3. Resolving Social Conflict, pp. 185-198
depravity, the Devil, the reactions which resulted from the internalized conscience resulting from the Reformation, the in-group paranoid patterns projected in religious persecutions, autoillusion, and that all of these 'mechanisms' are possibly rooted in the lack of affirmation and love for the real self, but we must go on.

It is the task of psychotherapy to change the self-concept and integrate dissociated and repressed areas so that one can deal with all phases of reality. If the patient is under threat, invariably he defends his self-concept. Bonthius cites 'a prideful minister whose conviction of himself as an obedient servant of the Most High and a lover of all men' was so intense that an entire year of treatment was not sufficient to penetrate the rigid self-concept and make it possible for him to admit any hostility toward others. 'Yet he exercised it against the therapist all through the analysis.'\(^1\) The self-concept, creative or 'ditentive' (Burrow)\(^2\) and partitive conditions when made the whole or is aberrated (under or overvaluation, the former being more frequent in neurosis) must be reintegrated just as surely as dissociated tendencies in order to facilitate recovery and reestablishment and maintenance of wholesome social relationships.

Behind every act, task, reaction, there is self-involvement.\(^3\) True, there are some areas of the field which have little self-reference while others are highly charged with esteem-reference ('touchy' areas).

1. Christian Paths to Self-Acceptance, p. 163; The rise of non-directive counselling seems to be an effort to reduce the atmosphere or feelings of threat so that the self-concept needs no defense. Cf. last chpt., thesis, on 'Fear of Wholeness'.

2. 'Term used to indicate the intrusion of affect-elements or bias into ordinary attention. Ditention is a reaction that characterizes man's inter-relational behavior throughout.' (Contrasted with cotention). (Burrow, op. cit., p. 394)

3. We prefer to call this involvement 'self-involvement' rather than 'ego-involvement', a term often used by writers, the reason for this now having been made clear.
The fading in and out of figure-ground depends on one's personal encounters, moods and situations. It seems to be clear, from the vast amount of literature in this field, that perception, learning, selectivity, neurotic symptom-formation, social position, choice of vocation, competition, vicarious behavior, the nature of one's personal relationships with various 'types' of people (how, say, one gets on with 'authoritarian' or 'whining' characters), group feeling, are always given in terms of a reference to the self-concept. Remembering that the person identifies the self-concept with the Self (and in 'healthy minded' (James) people this is as close as possible to a one to one (ratio) relationship or to oneness), so to protect and enhance one is to protect and enhance the other, one can now say that the primary tendency in personality is to maintain and enhance the holistic-self, by way of the self-concept. It is around this focal point that all self-systems are built. Behavior seen from the Agent's point of view and as motivated by this basic need, becomes meaningful and brings us nearer to predictability of behavior.

**Formation, development and fluctuation of the self-concept**

More specifically, how does this self-concept arise, develop and change? We have mentioned that the self-concept is an emergent from the interpersonal situation. It can be said that the self-concept begins to form before the child is able to speak, even before it is able to think, even before things can be taken as signs. Approbation and disapprobation, mother love, contempt, 'disowning wishes' of the parent, are acquired through an empathetic, unconscious pervading,

1. Another way of stating it is that the person seeks to maintain and enhance the integrity of the kind of individual he conceives himself as being.
2. Sullivan, op. cit., p. 130
bare prehension and feeling. 1 The earliest attitudes one 'receives' about one's self are gotten unthinkingly and from others (parents). As the child grows, the expectations and valuations of others consistently form determinants for self valuation and the concept of the Self. He finds that in various groups he is expected to be various 'selves'. His role is altered by the group needs, demands and expectations. Feelings of resistance, aggression, hate begin to ferment within him as he begins striving for independence and individuality. If he is of a minority group, he feels the in-group and cultural positive and negative pressures. Upon these feelings, guilt reactions may occur which, if unexpressed or expressed, may create depreciation of the concept of the self. Expectations and abilities, positive and negative valence forces, opinions, criticism, ridicule, deprivation, 'organ inferiority', failures, successes, all buffet the child to and fro. Generally, however, he will reflect the appraisals of significant others (significant to him) and if the appraisal is derogatory, his self-concept will be like it. It seems that once the self-concept is organized, one makes an effort to preserve through life this childhood acquired self-concept (whether derogatory or overvaluated) with only gradual efforts to achieve a different concept in the most permissive atmosphere, in traumatic situations, or in an atmosphere which is so highly charged that reactive behavior may occur.

The child's growth, as well as his self-concept, depends on

1. This unconscious relational pervading may rise to a fleeting, momentary experience numerously occurring through life. This fact has been recognized by Buber when he notes 'In the darkened opera-house there can be established between two of the audience, who do not know one another, and who are listening in the same purity and with the same intensity to the music of Mozart, a relation which is scarcely perceptible and yet is one of elemental dialogue, and which has long vanished when the lights blaze up again'. Between Man and Man, p. 204.
his restriction, selectivity and anxiety. So much has been said about the repression of 'unacceptable' wishes or urges, let us consider the fact that very admirable urges (so judged by our western culture) may, as well, be dissociated. Suttie has made much of the fact that a child may wish to express love but is thwarted from doing so and his love turns to hate. A child may seek rational and moral unity, as McKenzie points out, yet the group will not allow this and to maintain status these tendencies are repressed, conscience is repressed. A child may find, as does a negativistic person, that it is better to be a problem child than a mere necessary evil. His 'better side' is repressed. The ordinary love a child would naturally express may be so repressed because of the parent's appraisal that he may feel his only security lies in being hostile, unfriendly, morose, forbidding and 'incorrigible' (Sullivan). Some people must preserve their low esteem of themselves. Whether they think of themselves as stupid, intellectual, inadequate, inferior, or no good, they seem to make a tenacious defense of this self-concept. Praise a person who feels inferior and he resents it. Some religious people take 'pride' in being humble. Some obsessional persons quietly enjoy their 'omniscience and omnipotence'. The masochistic person takes greatest pleasure in his defeats, these 'prove' he is what he thinks he is as is true of the paranoid individual who finds ample proof that he is being persecuted on every hand. Through an amazing restriction of perception, selective exclusions, taboos, rituals, symbolization and other 'mechanisms' we shall discuss, the self-concept is maintained and even strengthened. 1 Under stress people can overlook the most obvious

1. Brunswick-Frenkel, in a monumental article, considers distortion, omission, distortion into opposites, 'camouflage diminishing and justifying defect, guiding principles as compensatory, rather than the abstract possession of the virtue in question (reaction formation). *Mechanisms of Self*
features in the field and, as well, select the most meaningful items in terms of finding corroboration and rational causation and verification for what they take to be real and validating.

A self-concept is a reflection of what the individual feels to be the appraisal of the other. It may not be what the other really feels. The individual seems to respond in particular ways because of what he takes the other's feelings to mean. It is the meaning of the situation to the individual that determines what is included and excluded from the self-system. There is no other way to explain the various self-concepts of children in the same home, growing up under what is objectively considered the same situation, environment, love, etc. We react to meanings ('my' world), not things. This seems to be a basic principle of human behavior. One could almost say that the world of reality makes little difference. Environmental changes may serve to ease some external conflicts and tensions but deep-seated inner self-systems are not changed on that basis. One of the difficulties in psychotherapy, as numerous cases give evidence, seems to be to change the self-concept in a permanent way. Apparent rapid restructuring may only be characteristic of a particular situation such as the permissive one in analytical therapy. When out of this situation, the self-concept resumes its original structure. The restructuring is then only an objectively defined artifact when phenomenologically no such genuine reorganization has taken place. The same thing can be said for people under particular stress, e.g. hysteria.

Deception, Journal of Social Psychology, 1939, 10, pp. 409-420

1. Brill says, '... poor environment has nothing to do with the situation. On the contrary, my records show that perversions and inversions are more likely to happen in the very fine home environments'. Cited by Lorand, Sandor, Psychoanalysis Today, p. 116. Cf. Berg, Clinical Psychology, p. 30.
or the revival type religious conversion. It seems that the phenomena are to be explained according to Raimy,¹ by the usual principle of perceptual field as well. Deeper factors, however, seem involved than perceptual reorganization and one must consider the meaning of the situation at the time to the Agent, the nature of the transference, the techniques of self-maintenance among other components. At any rate, therapy seems to demand a restructuring of the self-concept on the basis of changing phenomenal meaning-reactions and thus selective functioning, since meanings and selection determine how and under what conditions we act, what the self-concept is, how it develops and how it will change.

Some functions of maintenance and enhancement

Aspects of the person-field whole may, under various conditions, become threatening to the Self in its actual organization, as well as the structure of the self-concept. To preserve the self-concept is, for the individual, a preservation of the self-organization. The recognition of this seems to be often neglected among writers. It is important to make this clear since some techniques of preservation are not directed toward preserving 'my concept of my Self' but, in fact, to the overthrow of that concept in favor of one based on objective reality. It can even be said that what appears threatening to the individual, since it is threatening to his self-concept, may be essentially working for the preservation of the real Self and thus for its good. (The opposite is, of course, true as well.) For instance, feelings of aggression may appear to be threatening to the 'prideful minister' we

mentioned earlier who conceived of himself as loving, tender, kind, 'Christian' but that aggression which he manifested to the therapist, which was a part of his personality structure, needed to be integrated into the self-concept and channeled to healthier ends so to create a more harmonious, well balanced Self. The person who conceives of himself as an intellectual may feel threatened by 'stupid' things he may do or feel threatened by 'undifferentiated functions' (Jung) such as emotion or 'irrationality' but, again, harmony or wholeness is being sought by the Self in its effort to restructure the self-concept and incorporate some repressed elements into a harmonious whole. The more deviated the self-concept from the actual self, the more threatening do things appear and the more frequent are the threats. When the self-concept, the individual feels, actually describes what the Self really is and not a self-image), the more frenzied are the attempts to preserve it for the death of one (the individual feels) is the death of the other.

There are many techniques by which the individual handles threat in an effort to preserve the Self. The psychoanalysts generally mention a long list of them which usually includes repression, resistance, symbolization, secondary elaboration, sublimation, suppression, rationalization, projection, identification, conversion (hysteria), introjection, internalization, introception, regression, substitution, reaction-formation, displacement, restriction, undoing, fixation, phantasy, dissociation, isolation. From these techniques, symptom-formation, with which we shall deal in the next chapter, results. From this they may formulate conflict mechanisms, defense mechanisms, adjustment mechanisms, compensation mechanisms and escape mechanisms which form the basis of a segmentalized, compartmentalized structure of personality
such as Sadler postulates with the person being the compilation of hunger, fear, personal-comfort, anger, power, pride, courage, hoarding, play, social, sex, worship, humor urges which amounts to a reformulated list of instincts.

Now, first of all, we cannot discuss all of these 'mechanisms', either would it greatly serve the immediate interests and central argument of this paper, but we shall discuss briefly, not so much mechanisms, with which we shall more specifically deal in another connection, but people and the more normal ways in which they deal with threat in illustration of the fundamental need to maintain the wholeness of the self. Second, we no longer feel obliged to follow the tradition of either seeing these functions of personality as 'mechanisms', autonomous-like, ends in themselves, entities working, so it is often believed, at random in the 'psyche' nor to follow the term or implications of mechanism as it was borrowed from physics and electro-dynamics. We are dealing here with functions and techniques of the Personality by which it seeks to maintain itself under threat.

The person who conceives of himself as a responsible, able, efficient individual may find difficulty in accepting the 'wear and tear' of age. A patient, sixty two years of age, recently presented himself for examination claiming a recurrence of gastro-intestinal disorders. While the patient some twenty years earlier, had had a gastrectomy and later the removal of a stoma ulcer, the examination pronounced the man fit. But the complaints continued. He was unable to do the work he used to do 'because of these ulcers' and more and more he was confined to the house and working in the garden. This man was a tenacious person, with, generally speaking, the aforementioned disorders being the sum of his sickness and having worked in the same

1. Cf. The Practice of Psychiatry, Chpt. iii
firm for nearly forty years. Here, we believe, was a person who, in
order to maintain the self-concept and stating that 'if it were not
for these ulcers I could keep up with these young fellas they're hiring
nowa days', was obliged to find this technique a serviceable tool for
self-maintenance. The self-concept could not be restructured on the
basis of changing abilities (memory, performance level, etc.) and
some phases of the Self were restricted from awareness.

If one has a concept of one's self as an intellectual, he
often finds himself facing the possibility of failure which under such
self-concept may be traumatic. 'Nervous breakdowns' at tripos time
are frequent indeed. Peculiarly enough, many of the people with such
breakdown, the author finds, are those who have a high concept of
themselves as brilliant and who, as a matter of fact, often show bril-
liant records. This is not always the case, however, since a person
may conceive of himself as brilliant when he has little proof of it.
However, examinations seem to offer to the people of high self-concept
a greater threat than to the person who knows he is a class two or
three person. The brilliant person has more at stake when he again
risks his reputation, his self-concept. The fact may be that he feels
'down deep' he is an average student who has been lucky. He must sup-
press the 'down deep' feeling and maintain the concept of the self he
is aware of. When the examination nears, he may panic, perspire exces-
sively, lack ability to concentrate, may be found in a dazed condition
or in a fugue, his heart beats rapidly and irregularly; he is suffering
from an anxiety attack. After he sits the examination or is given a
medical 'stay of execution' or is put into hospital for 'psychiatric
examination' and misses the tripos, he seems to respond in a remarkable
way. Often, afterwards, a sense of guilt may set in as he realized
he 'should' have sat the examination anyway. The self-concept in
both cases is a significant determinant of his feelings and behavior. But, he thinks, it was not merely what he thought of himself that was threatened but his life was at stake. However, his 'illness' preserved for the moment, his self-concept, indeed, possibly his entire self-structure.

One Clinic patient thirty eight years old was involved in various marital difficulties. He stuttered badly, suffered from masturbation and severe ejaculatio praecox among other things. He had worked at his job for ten years with little advancement and, seemingly, made no effort to improve his financial, vocational or social status. There were other problems, e.g. an unresolved oedipal situation, but it is the self-concept that we are interested in at this time. It seems that when a child of eight, he was called upon to make a recita-
tion at school. In his effort, he stumbled on some words whereupon the class and teacher (mother surrogate) laughed at him and he was thoroughly humiliated. This proved a traumatic experience definitely changing the self-concept and he continued stammering 'because I couldn't help myself', he said. He became more recluse and withdrawn from the students and became 'stupid'. They all laughed at him because he stammered and was stupid, he said. He lived up to that appraisal all his life. He felt inadequate, he was inadequate, he never tried to be anything else. His marriage proved this, as did his effort to achieve. His 'naivete' and 'stupidity' were blamed 'for not knowing how to have intercourse'. He was not without efforts to 'improve himself' as he joined some groups in which he felt 'accepted'. He entered the group's conversations, not by talking, but joining in by laughing frequently and was considered by the group as a 'jolly, good fellow'. But frequently he would be seen to laugh when no one else
as laughing, as if he had withdrawn from an active, talking group into a phantasy experience of his own and was enjoying himself in his reverie world. He lacked real contact with people and he lived as if nothing ever bothered him. Threats usually just couldn't 'get through' to him. He was always in a happy, carefree mood. A feeling of power, autonomy, narcissistic self-sufficiency, characterized his masturbatory fantasias and onanistic experiences. He shunned normal sexual intercourse because it threatened his self-concept (and self-organization) as would any attempts to rise above his ability level (as he saw it). He maintained this self-concept even through eight months of once-a-week personal therapy and once-a-week group therapy, in which his 'stupidity' conveniently protected him from 'understanding' various behaviors, the therapist's interpretations (which became more and more direct after five months of a non-directive approach) and, of course, his stuttering served to make him 'feel' he did not want to talk (free association) or just simply because he had nothing really to talk about. This self-concept evidently had been accepted as the most secure and 'accepted' valuation of what he was. It did not involve nearly as many threats as if he were to consider himself 'qualified', 'intelligent' and 'aggressive' (which made it unlikely that society would expect much from him since they would tend to agree with his own concept of himself). It was 'better' this way; this was his self-concept. It was just 'good sense' to keep it as it was. He did. He is now divorced and feels 'better than any time in my life', he recently asserted. Some threats were removed and dealt with. The self-organization and concept are thus maintained.

John Wesley, the famous clergyman, offers an interesting instance of how the self-concept is maintained against threat by various power methods and restriction techniques. One of the most significant
Interesting, autobiographical documents the author has ever seen is a letter written, it is believed, by John Wesley and published two years after his death. We quote it in its entirety.

'Dear Sir,

For your obliging letter, which I received this morning, I return you thanks.

Our opinions, for the most part, perfectly coincide respecting the stability of the connexion after my head is laid in the dust. This, however, is a subject about which I am not so anxious as you seem to imagine; on the contrary, it is a matter of the utmost indifference to me, as I have long foreseen that division must necessarily ensue, from causes so unavoidable, and certain, that I have long since given over all thoughts and hopes of settling it on a permanent foundation. You do not seem to be aware of the most effective cause that will bring about a division. You apprehend the most serious consequences from a struggle between the preachers for power and pre-eminence, and there being none among them of sufficient authority or abilities to support the dignity, or command the respect, and exact the implicit obedience, which is so necessary to uphold our Constitution on its present principles. This, most undoubtedly, is one thing that will operate very powerfully against unity in the connexion, and is, perhaps, what I might possibly have prevented, had not a still greater difficulty arisen in my mind. I have often wished for some person of abilities to succeed me as the head of the church I have with such indefatigable pains and astonishing success established; but, convinced that none but very superior abilities would be equal to the undertaking, was I to adopt a successor of this description, I fear he might gain so much influence among the people as to usurp a share, if not the whole of that absolute and uncontrollable power, which I have hitherto, and am determined I will maintain so long as I live; never will I bear a rival near my throne. You, no doubt, see the policy of continually changing the preachers from one circuit to another, at short periods; for should any of them become popular with their hearers, they might possibly obtain such influence as to establish themselves independently of me and the general connexion. Besides, the novelty of the continual change excites curiosity, and is the more necessary, as few of our preachers have abilities to render themselves in any degree tolerable any longer than they are new.

'The principal cause which will inevitably affect a diminution and division in the connexion after my death, will be the failure of subscriptions and contributions towards the support of the cause; for money is as much the sinews of religions as of military power. If it is with the greatest difficulty that even I can keep them together, for want of this very necessary article, I think no one else can. Another
cause, which with others will effect the division, is the disputes and contentions that will arise between the preachers and the parties that will espouse their several causes; by which means much truth will be brought to light, which will reflect so much to their disadvantage, that the eyes of the people will be opened to see their motives and principles; nor will they any longer contribute to their support, when they find all their pretensions to sanctity and love are founded on motives of interest and ambition. The consequence of which will be, a few of the most popular will establish themselves in respective places where they have gained sufficient influence over the minds of the people. The rest must revert to their original humble callings. But this in no way concerns me: I have attained the object of my views by establishing a name that will not soon perish from the face of the earth; I have founded a sect which will boast my name long after my discipline and doctrines are forgotten.

'My character and reputation for sanctity is now beyond the reach of calumny; nor will any thing that may hereafter come to light, or be said concerning me, to my prejudice, however true, gain credit.

'My unfoil'd name, th' austereness of my life, Will vouch against it, And so the accusation overweigh, That it will stifle in its own report, And smell of calumny.'

'Another cause that will operate more powerfully and effectually than any of the preceding is, the rays of Philosophy, which begin now to pervade all ranks, rapidly dispelling the mists of ignorance, which have been long, in a great degree, the mother of devotion, of slavish prejudice, and the enthusiastic bigotry of religious opinions. The decline of the Papal power is owing to the same irresistible cause; nor can it be supposed that Methodism can stand its ground when brought to the test of Truth, Reason, and Philosophy.'

J. W.

'City Road, Thursday Morn.'

The author will not make an effort to 'interpret' various interesting functions of self-maintenance seen in this letter which reflect something of John Wesley's 'life-plan', primarily because of not being a student of Methodism and because merely one letter would be insufficient material for such speculation. 1 John Wesley was a

1. This letter was brought to the attention of the author by a student of Methodist history. He seems to believe that the internal evidence points to the authorship
highly controversial figure. His loyalties to the Anglican Church are still debated. Possibly, like Pascal, his ambivalency toward the mother figure with its necessary instability of a mature self-concept increased what, for Pascal, was his dialectical method in philosophy and Wesley's attempt to maintain, outwardly, the visible signs of his own allegiance to the Church, while at the same time working against it. This is typical of the ambivalent authoritarian figure. Some interesting methods of self-maintenance of the man sent to be a local parish preacher, though a high churchman and who revolted to claim 'The world is my parish', i.e. projection, restriction, Papal and military power methods, etc. are, however, noticeable to anyone reading the letter, and serve to illustrate the argument of this paper.

A child may preserve his self-concept, his independence and integrity by bed wetting by which he 'gets back' at the parent for disciplining or humiliating or not loving him. A man who has been given a 'tongue lashing' by the employer in front of the other workers may bully his wife and children when he gets home. A mother who has a concept of her self as a 'good' mother may require severe restrictions on impulses to 'destroy' the child or 'wish he hadn't come along'. Some people who cannot incorporate their 'sinful' tendencies into their self-concept may deny or disown them by 'I'm only human' or 'anyone

of John Wesley although the letter is only signed 'J.W.' and is undated. The letter must have been written either before he designated John Fletcher as his successor or following his death. It is a portion of an article appearing on the divisions of Methodism following Wesley's death written by AN OLD MEMBER OF THE SOCIETY entitled 'A letter to the Rev. Thomas Coke, LL.D. and Mr. Henry Moore; occasioned by their Proposals to publish the Life of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M. in opposition to that advertised (under Sanction of the Executors) to be written by John Whitehead, M.D. Also, A letter from the Rev. Dr. Coke to the Author, on the same Subject, Together with the whole Correspondence, and the Circular Letters written on the Occasion, and a true and impartial Statement of Facts hitherto suppressed. To which is added, An Appeal and Remonstrance to the People called Methodists.' It appears in The Gentleman's Magazine: and Historical Chronicle, V. LXII, Part I, February, 1792, pp. 152-153. Emphasis mine.
would have done the same thing if they were in my place' techniques or blaming the whole thing on the Devil, on others or even on God's will. There seems to be a need for maintaining self-worth involved in such functions of maintenance. Researches on hypnosis reveal that in the post-hypnotic state a person carries out the command given under hypnosis and then rationalizes his activity by declaring it his own deliberate choice to do what he did. Resistance in therapy may often be the result of the patient feeling threatened and clinging to his self-concept, even though he has come because he is unsatisfied with that concept of himself. There are, of course, ideas of grandeur, phantasy, compensations of one sort and another which make it possible for the self-concept to be maintained, thus the threat to the self alleviated.

These few simple instances to show how people deal with threat in their effort to maintain the self-concept may cause one to ask (as some writers have) whether there is not a self-concept opposed to an unconscious self-concept. The term 'unconscious self-concept' is a questionable one but before discussing that aspect of the problem, let's consider the problem generally. For instance, a dare devil automobile stunt driver may be trying to prove to himself his self-worth, prove to himself that his self-concept is justified. In another sense, it can be said he is trying to prove to himself that what he thinks of himself unconsciously (say, a coward or inadequate - feeling of inferiority or guilt-reaction - or not taken seriously or unwanted) is not true and that he is powerful, courageous, a person of importance whom

1. Much, of course, depends on the fact that he has learned to deal with threats in this manner of resistance and is not merely hanging on to the neurosis. Cf. John Butler, The Interaction of Client and Therapist, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1952, v. 47.
2. The more severe disturbances and methods for coping with threat and their value will be discussed in the next chapter.
people cheer and love and admire. Can it be said that he has a 'deep down' feeling or unconscious feeling or concept of the self and a conscious self-concept, the two being out of harmony with each other? This is not an easy problem. If a successful business man who seems to have a high esteem self-concept suddenly 'makes foolish moves' on the stock exchange, something 'unheard of' for him and incurs great losses, can we say 'he is proving that his unconscious self-concept is right; he does think of himself as the peasant he was before he came into money and this proves it'. Or can we say 'he is punishing himself for his success because he knows he doesn't deserve it'? Does this imply an unconscious self-concept opposed to the self-concept? Or is it merely an effort to atone for guilt feelings of another sort, say, for gambling on the horses, which is less socially approved than gambling on the stock market, or say, for unfaithfulness to his wife? Or may he be proving to his family, by this 'unheard of' behavior, that they must be more frugal as he has so often warned them because 'you never know what may happen'? Or is this irrational action merely an attempt of the self to reintegrate the self-concept into the reality-self-system rather than postulating that unconscious self-concept is rising with the conscious self-concept neither one adjusted to reality, the real Self. This whole field is so tenuous at the moment that we can only speak hypothetically and that on our own very limited clinical experience.

Are we correct in referring to an 'unconscious self-concept'? If we say that a 'concept' cannot be unconscious (though psychoanalysts speak of unconscious ideas), is there any ground left for argument? If we follow this distinction, there could not be two self-concepts, one conscious, the other unconscious. Then may we speak of an 'unconscious self-attitude'? Or an 'unconscious self-feeling'? This certainly is
admissible. Without undue oversimplification, we may say that what
the question is concerned with is unconscious tendencies, wishes,
feelings, affective tensions, cravings, which are evidently working
against the established self-concept. This does not establish another
'self-concept' in opposition to the conscious self-concept which is
the self as perceived and conceived. There certainly are conflicts,
especially between the self-concept and the superego standards. The conscious
function (ego-processes) are constantly seeking to maintain and en-
force the self necessitating perceptual denial of internal and external
conditions. This would lead us to further assert that the unconscious
processes at work in the 'irrational' behavior of the dare devil and
the businessman are attempts to maintain the Self by adjusting the
self-concept closer to the one to one ratio (the union of the self and
self-concept); in the case of the driver to indicate that the under-
valuation may be inaccurate and to the stock exchange broker that the
overvaluation was threatening the self-organization. They seem to be
attempts at correction in order to maintain the self through a restruc-
turing of the self-concept.

It seems, then, that people 'employ' various techniques to
maintain and enhance the Self through maintenance and restructuring of
the self-concept. Suppression, projection, restriction, selection and
other functions of personality are evident in the foregoing discussion.
It seems that the need for maintenance of the wholeness of the Self
will not allow threatening conditions to exist without some kind of
solution; some kind of rational, causative unity is demanded of all
objects in the person-field whole. If the Self and the self-concept
are threatened and the threat is not dealt with on the basis of an
inclusion of the reality situation, more intense maintenance techniques
are invoked. This has such ramifications as these: (1) that the more systems working outside awareness, the more threatened the person will feel and the more likely is his breakdown, (2) that the more deviated (under or overvaluated) the self-concept the more likely is aberrated behavior, (3) that the whole field determines the person-action-systems (physical valences, parental, social, religious conditions, etc.) since needs, intentions, feelings are essentially social, (4) that all persons employ various techniques for self-maintenance and the intensity of the techniques is dependent on the ability to deal constructively (with integrity) with reality, (5) that threats have particular significance and intensity according to their meaning to the individual at the instant of his experiencing them, (6) that there are positive functions of the self working outside consciousness, and (7) that threats in the person-field whole cannot remain as they are but must be dealt with in some fashion which, to the individual, is, at least for the moment, satisfactory, and (8) that psychotherapy, as Raimy was first to express, is an attempt to change the self-concept.

Some further implications of the theory

Perception

Until comparatively recent times, perception had been treated as though the perceiver were entirely passive. The individual's tensions, need systems, fears, hopes, past experience, learning were considered to have little or nothing to do with what was perceived and what the nature of the percept was. Deviations were usually described as 'illusions' and that seemed to fill out the hypothesis on perception. The psychophysical theory of vision formed important beginnings, but only beginnings, for the superstructure which has emerged in the last
forty years. But an entirely new perspective guides the recent researches. Along with what might be called the autochthonous determinants (rather fixed characteristic electro-chemical properties of the nervous system involved in perception) are behavioral determinants (or individual differences) both of which enter into all perceptual experiences. It is perception seen as a function of the personality in its striving for maintenance and enhancement that we are interested in at this point.

There is little doubt that the phenomenological point of view (Katz, Wertheimer, Koehler, Koffka, etc.) which challenged the validity of the distinction between true perceptions and illusions made the first most significant start toward providing a more practical and accurate description and explanation of perceptual experience. With the phi-phenomenon principle, experimenters began to open their eyes to the percipient and his needs as a determinant in perceptual organization.

Bruner and Goodman, in an interesting article, survey the researches dealing with perception in which behavioral determinants are particularly emphasized. They refer to the work of Cason, Perky, Warner, Brown, Ellson, Coffin among others who have demonstrated that subjects may be conditioned to see and hear things much in the same way as other laboratory conditioned-reflex experiments have demonstrated eye blinking, salivating and so on. Reward and punishment seem to alter perceptual figure-ground organization as demonstrated by Haggard and Rose, Proshansky, Schafer and Murphy. Other experiments have demonstrated that practise and not solely laws of gestalt, determine complex configuration. R.H. Thouless' significant and dependable work through

the years has demonstrated how habit, judgment, personality syndromes, racial factors determine individual differences, variations and phenomenal regression (high or low) to the real object. He has indicated that some kind of correlation seems to exist between wider personality syndromes and perceptual organization. Haddon has shown how primitive island spear-fishers are less susceptible to the Muller-Lyer illusion because of their experience in this enterprise from childhood. Sherif's work with autokinetic phenomena is well known.

Bruner and Goodman themselves offer some valuable experimental material to this growing field. They show how poor children overestimate the size of coins because of the exaggerated value-meaning the coins have for them. When, both for rich and poor children, coins get over a certain amount, to the half dollar stage, for instance, the phantasy retarded somewhat because it was too far beyond their reach. In the case of the poor children, judging coin size from memory, a weakened phantasy is substituted for the compelling presence of a valued coin, while among rich children equivocality had the effect of liberating strong and active phantasy.' This was shown to be true, incidentally, of Dundee children. Those of unemployed parents were inhibited in their ambition-phantasies and when asked what they would do when adults they responded with occupations of lowly status traditional of their group. Children of employed parents replied that they would be cowboys or film stars. These writers indicate by their experiments that (1) The greater the social value of an object, the more is it susceptible to organization by behavioral determinants, (2) the

greater the individual need for a socially valued object, the more intense will be the operation of behavioral determinants, (3) perceptual ambiguity facilitates the operation of behavioral determinants since autochthonous determinants are less effective in the perceptual process; a condition which exists more frequently in every day life since perceptions are so fleeting and evanescent.

Self-involvement is particularly noticeable in perceptual defense, as we have seen in our earlier discussions. Ericksen significantly contends for this thesis. He shows that denial and repression techniques of dealing with threat usually produce avoidance, that is, the attempt to keep the stimulus from awareness. Other defense techniques may permit a ready recognition of the stimulus 'but self-esteem is preserved by rationalizing or explaining away the threat, or perhaps projecting it outward'. This seems to mean that in both cases the denial technique is significantly employed, on the one hand, to refuse recognition of external reality or internal threats and on the other, to refuse to see how reality situations apply to the individual. Higher thresholds (recognition thresholds), then, do not imply more intensive or extensive denial techniques but merely provide one way of meeting threat. If one postulates, as Ericksen does, that these are perceptual defenses of the ego, since the stimuli are ego-threatening, one should have to say that this is only one variable in perceptual defense. But in this thesis, which accepts the striving to maintain the self, all defenses are efforts of self-maintenance and enhancement, as Allport assures us.


3. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 1948,16, 57-68
self-concept defense are integral variables in efforts to understand perceptual phenomena, although it is the Self which is defended.

Various experiments show how depressed and fearful moods tend to cause us to think others less friendly or more aggressive.\(^1\) Bartlett, in his well known work on Remembering, has demonstrated how selection is influenced by the attitudes, temperament, interests of the observer.\(^2\) Self-involvement and personally significant material determine mnemonic structuring and fictional theme creation as seen in Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Test, Beta Ink Blot tests. Blueler, many years ago, in showing that we react on the basis of the meaning situations have for us, asserted that we react to concepts, not images, and this on the basis of, shall we call it, meaning-selection.\(^3\) Josiah Royce had said we really react more to persons than things.\(^4\) Thouless, and later Korzybski, suggested to us that words are reacted to on the basis of emotional or affect-meaning.\(^5\) And Angyal has reiterated that we really respond to symbols.\(^6\) To say we react to meanings rather than objects, as this thesis is led to assert, comes very near Lewin's concept of valences. All of this is true because the intervening variable between a stimulus situation and an action-system is the total apperceptive mass which defines and limits the perceptual situation. It is not the reality environment situation to which we react, as Kluckhohn

2. Supra: cf. on same subject, Sherif and Cantril, Ego-Involvements, pp. 33, 60 and on hysterical amnesia, Stekel, op. cit.
4. Outlines of Psychology
5. Straight and Crooked Thinking; Korzybski, op. cit.
asserts, but the situation as interpreted by the individual and seems
directed toward the maintenance and enhancement of the self (via cen-
tral issues concerning the self-concept).

In perception things are always taken to be real, even
though the experience of reality may be a distorted one. Some writers
deny such objects of perceptual experience to be real while others in-
sist that the contents of perceptual experience should be considered
real but subjective. The problem of reality or unreality - of being -
is not our problem here. It is our task, we believe, to inquire into
the basis of these assertions and to draw attention to the personal
determinants in perception.

The naive realist declares that what appears actually exists
in the objective world. Berkeley believed that objects were merely
ideas, since they did not exist if they were not perceived. He safe-
guarded himself, however, from a barren subjective idealism by postu-
lat ing that the ideas were real because they existed in the mind of
God. On the other hand, Plato argued in the Theaetetus that something
could exist which is not perceived at all by the senses. To the meta-
physician, reality is being. He looks for something that is not con-
tingent, necessary Being from which contingent Being is derived. Psy-
thologists, and some philosophers, tend to think that whatever is taken
to be real, must in some sense be real. When what is taken to be real
is not real in the ordinary sense, they say it is 'subjectively real',
I.e. 'He thinks the earth is flat' is transformed into 'The earth is
flat for him'. Jung speaks of an idea as being 'psychologically true
in as much as it exists' and speaks of 'psychological existence'.

Kardiner, op. cit., p. 10; Ogben and Richards, The Meaning
of Meaning, pp. 214ff.
2. Cf. Reiser, Philosophy and the Concepts of Modern
Science, pp. 70-74
take him to mean that the distinction between appearance and reality, based as it often is on whether something exists for one individual or for many, is an arbitrary, though necessary, one, and that what a person considers to exist is so meaningful to him that we must give it some greater significance than mere appearance. Part of the difficulty lies, I think, in the term 'true', so that what is taken to be real tends to be made fact. Erich Fromm is one among many psychologists who challenge Jung's idea that objective verification of a thing comes about through reliance on 'individual' or 'social' agreement.

Norman Kemp Smith attempts to clear up some of these difficulties by speaking of 'subjectively real and private' and 'subjectively real and public'. ¹ Allport, adopting a similar line, writes that it is odd to speak, as some do, of 'distortions of experience'. 'An experience', he says, 'is what you have'. To clarify his position further, he adds that 'While it (experience) may conceivably distort reality, it can scarcely distort itself'.² We disagree with Allport on this point and would argue that no one can distort reality. If, say, I see an object which I believe is a red hat, although it is accepted by everyone else as a lamp shade and is serving that purpose, I have not distorted reality; the lamp shade is still a lamp shade; it remains what it is no matter what I see and I do not change it by merely looking at it or misdescribing it (as indeed no displacement of mass in space may occur without being acted upon by an Agent). Allport is correct, I feel, in thinking it odd to speak of 'distortions of experience', for an experience is an experience and that is all there is to it. Similarly, an 'unreal' feeling is not a 'distortion of feeling'; it is simply a feeling. An experience or feeling may itself be distorted,

¹. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge
². The Individual and His Religion, p. 6
felt as such, but it is not a distortion of experience or feeling. Where, then, does the difficulty lie when I see a red hat, though it really is a lamp shade? It must lie in my interpretation of what I see (symbol of reference), in the meaning the thing has for me. I do not mean that sensations are added together and subjected to some process of judgment or attribution of meaning, but rather that meaning determinants enter into perceptual organization because perception is not an autonomous process but is the act of an Agent. The less the stimulus-intensity and the fewer the perceptual cues, the more past experience, proximal stimuli and phenomenal determinants enter in. In brightness-constancy, for instance, stimulus-information and perceptual cues may be plentiful, in which case (as is true of the perceptual experience of objects never before perceived) past experience cannot so readily enter as a significant determinant of the perceptual organization. But, to return to the red hat, the object which I designate as such is not real in fact (I could say it is an experience of a distorted experience or an experience of a distorted perception). Of course, I think it to be real. So far as my own feeling is concerned it really is a red hat that I see. But its status is that it is not real; that is, it is not what I take it to be nor does it have the capacity to occur objectively again. It must be regarded as not real, though it seems real to me because I (wrongly) think it is real. My experience of it, however, is an actual fact.

Consider the problem in relation to an hallucinatory experience. To be very strict, when I say I see a ghost, or have seen a flying horse in my dreams or a duck sitting in front of me on my desk,

2. Thouless, Phenomenal Regression to the Real Object
I am in fact not seeing something but experiencing something. The hallucinatory experience is a fact, but since the hallucinated object does not exist, I do not see a real object, or indeed anything. It is not merely an objectifying of my interpretations of an object, which is involved more readily in the case of illusions, nor is it merely that the phenomenal object differs from the real object owing to the influence of phenomenal determinants based on individual differences (intervening variables) or perceptual cues. In such a case, something is there to see. But since there are no light-waves or stimulus-intensity emanating from the hallucinated object (which is said to be there), I cannot be said to see it. Yet it seems accurate to say that I am experiencing something. I do not imagine it, merely, for I believe it to be real, i.e. I take it to be what I think it is.

In an auditory hallucination, a person believes, say, that in the next room people are talking about him, though no one is there at the time. From an external point of view, he does not hear objective voices, no sound-waves meet the ear. Phenomenologically, however, he believes he hears voices and we know that his experience is a fact. We also know it to be the result of his externalization of a psychological state in himself.

Hallucinated objects and happenings are not real, although the subject's belief in them is a fact. The psychologist must distinguish between what is real and unreal, what exists and does not exist, otherwise he will be unable to determine the nature of the content of perceptual experience. But his primary concern is with

1. The Gestalt Psychologists hold to this way of expression. Cf. Koehler
whatever is present to consciousness or may operate consciously or unconsciously, to determine behavior. Whatever a person takes to be real must, therefore, be dealt with. He cannot, however, treat imaginary and hallucinated objects as matter of fact or deliberately depreciate the distinction between image and reality by using such terms as 'subjectively real'. The image and the real object cannot be put on the same footing.

What we wrongly think to be real can and does make a difference in our behavior, since the experience is as real as anything could be and its object a real part of that experience.\(^1\) In this

1. The belief that one has murdered someone, the terror resulting from the belief that one's persecutors are about to slay one, the idea that one's head is full of snakes, or that one is eaten out inside, that one is King of the Earth, the thirst that one experiences (cf. Stout's questionable argument on the problem of thirst, God and Nature, pp. 22ff) or the treatment of the lamp shade as a red hat are all actual and the individual acts on the (false) assumption that they are real. The wish to murder is so strong an experience that it is often taken by patients to have really happened and is to be punished like the act itself by numerous 'redemptive', punitive, self-persecutions. The murder is believed to have been real and on this the person acts. As an experience it is a fact. We must deal with the individual in terms of what he considers to be real and thus what he lives by if we are to understand his behavior. 'Conscience', as F. Alexander opines (although the choice of terms is poor), 'is not distinguished by facts but only by psychic reality' (The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality, p. 148). And Stekel said, 'The neurotic is a criminal without the courage to commit a crime' (op. cit., pp. 8-9). What a thing or situation appears to be to the individual means what it does because it is taken to be real but if what he takes to be real is considered (objectively) real, we no longer have anything dependable and science would be truth or delusion without verification. In fact, truth and delusion would not exist.

phenomenal or personal field, the meaning of things to us is what
determines our perception. The meaningless is not amenable to per-
ceptual organization and however meaningful to others, can never be
taken by us to be real (thus there is no meaningless experience).
The unreal is not taken into account in action, and this is the
basis of the real-unreal distinction.

One might suggest that we have somehow to rely on the
'objective' point of view or consensus gentium in order to test
whether what we take to be real is more than a delusion or hallu-
sination. But this hardly seems reliable, since two subjective
opinions do not make an objective reality, e.g. folie a deux. Nor
can we verify the reality of a thing by merely looking at it. There
is another test, possibly the most reliable, which is dependent on
the action of the Agent. If the Agent can act upon the object, he
can verify that it exists and also is what he takes it to be; in
other words, verification is by tactual sense-perception and prac-
tical use involving both the action of the Agent and resistance
or reaction on the part of the object.

While the problem of reality and unreality is a ques-
tion for metaphysics and not for psychology, we may conclude,
therefore, that it is the person as Agent who is active in deter-
mining what is to be considered real in his perceptual experience.
What he takes to be real is also that upon which he acts; that
is, the real is what is taken into account in action. 'It is
not what is real but what we think is real, not reality but what
we take for reality, that directly determines our behavior and so
controls the current of our lives'.

It forms the personal field in which the Agent acts.

It will be apparent from this discussion that perceptual organization is dependent on phenomenal determinants. This can only mean that the perceptual threshold and the meaning things have for us is determined by the need for self-maintenance and enhancement; this is true of hallucinated objects, illusion and misrepresentation. The lowering of the recognition or duration threshold for an object or concept is possible when these are acceptable to the person and maintain his well-being as he conceives it. The raising of the threshold comes about in response to threat to the self; blocking and condensation then occur. Alexander Rosen conducted an experiment on this question and concluded that 'Behavior which leads to a reduction of disturbance and anxiety will be the preferred choice. In absence of such choice the organism will attempt to minimize felt, perceived or anticipated discomfort'.

Selectivity

The selection processes seen in perception have probably become sufficiently apparent. We only assert that organisms and persons live by selection. Von Uexklll has asserted that each species attends to, from its surroundings, what is biologically important for its maintenance.1 Our beliefs (learning) are built on the same principles; it is by parenthetical exclusions, by suppression of negative, doubt-provoking instances and bolstering by positive security-enforcing factors that systematization takes place. Selective inattention is a phenomenon well known. Anxiety seems to be one of the central factors in such selection. It seems rather likely that if one is given to phantasy he will not tend, as Mullahy says, to interpret the phantasy in a manner incongenial to the Self.2 It has been stated by the philosopher Whitehead that 'every actual entity . . . is finally its own reason for what it omits'.3

Goal achievement and level of aspiration

Learning, goal establishment, aspiration level, completed and uncompleted tasks seem to demonstrate self-involvement. Ellis has pointed out that unfinished tasks seem to be remembered almost twice as well as completed ones.4 Goldstein says this phenomenon is a special form of the tendency for self-actualization. The persistant walking of the child who continues walking until such action is of a satisfactory nature, is evidence for the urge to perfection in personality.5 Allport reminds us that completed tasks which involve self-

1. Cited by Alverdes, op. cit., p. 83
3. Process and Reality, p. 61
4. Op. cit., p. 313. In some cases the opposite is true, as we shall see. In both, the self-concept is involved.
feelings no longer hold a challenge for the individual and upon the completion of them which the individual deems successful, he moves on to new ones. Whether the task is successful or not is dependent on the meaning of the task to the individual. The observer may actually feel a task is completed though the Agent does not share that feeling and continues to deal with the problem. The contrary situation is also true. This, of course, all lessens the effectiveness of Thorn-dike's law of effect and establishes the self-feelings as important variables.

It seems that goals are established on the basis of the self-concept. The level of aspiration, apparently, depends on how one regards himself. One chooses goals he feels will maintain the Self and verify the self-concept. Significant work has been done on this by Rosalind Gould,2 who was one of the first to show that goals are not merely levels of aspiration for their own sake but that the maintenance and enhancement of the Self is the fundamental concern. In no situation which offers a threat of potential failure does one obtain a clear picture of the individual's aspiration level from his aspiration score. The score is always a combination of ambition and the necessity of self-protection. Testing, it would seem, from this statement, is only to be considered an indication of some potentialities and abilities the individual has, not as an infallible guide, since if this is true it makes a man a machine and not a person with feeling-variables.

Gould found in interviewing her subjects that there was a


variety of reactions to failure or possibility of failure which we shall only here summarize: (1) Some subjects were stimulated to do better next time; (2) some were discouraged and downhearted; (3) some became more disorganized and confused with regard to the task before them; (4) some attempted to overcome this discouragement by such devices as making excuses and rationalizing their poor performance or by thinking of other areas in which they had some degree of success or by thinking about possible future successes they would have; (5) some reacted by losing interest in the task and the experiment and wanted to quit so that the desire to succeed seemed to have faded; (6) some tried to dodge failure by concentrating on a minute aspect of the problem and (7) some compulsives made a game out of the accuracy of their estimates and general performance.

It is interesting how some people will continue to set high goals and fail rather than set lower goals and succeed primarily because they feel it is better to have a high or noble goal and fail than to have an average or mediocre goal and succeed. A professor, as Symonds points out, may rather be in a small college, a big fish in a little pond, than in a larger school of greater competition. This seems true of people who would rather be low in Class A tennis than high in Class B.

An interesting study in memory phenomena has been done by Minder. He finds that the non-paranoid person freely admits into memory both interrupted and completed tasks while the paranoid recalls more frequently the interrupted tasks while at the same time persisting in uncompleted tasks. It seems that the non-paranoid individual can admit such 'failures' into consciousness because he can deal with them.

The paranoid sees the interrupted tasks more often because these fit into his system and prove that that system is correct. The paranoid would project this onto others proving that he was a victim of growing persecution. But one can ask, why do they resume more frequently uncompleted tasks? And, why do some predictions misfire and the paranoid succeeds? Do they again want to prove to themselves that the original failure is because of deliberate intervention? Are the 'accidents' of success indication of some underlying urge to destroy the delusional system, in an effort to reintegrate a distorted self-concept into a reality system? Our next chapter considers such problems.

The tendency to realize wholeness: Considering wholeness, telos, self-actualization and the prospective aim of personality

Running through the whole of organic nature is the tendency for things to realize themselves as wholes (Smuts). In self-conscious individuals this tendency shows itself as a need to maintain and realize wholeness; that is, to maintain the character of holistic-organization now possessed and to realize itself as a whole. The circular equilibrium theory is inadequate. To insist on the preservation of the Self merely, would violate both the characteristic features of the organism (or person) as well as the character of time. However, the organism is not satisfied, it seems, with mere preservation but is seeking its wholeness, in which it finds unity with that which gives it the significance of its becoming. The valuable contribution which Smuts made to this thought by his emphasis on the tendency to realize the end-form or ideal of the whole is readily apparent.

1. I have found that the less secure a person feels, the less he recalls uncompleted tasks and the more rigid is his life-pattern, more authoritarian his value-system, and more optimistic his perspective tends to be (since any pessimism is a threat to the self-system).
Organisms realize their wholeness because of the inability to refute their own existence. In Personality the power of free choice is both the necessity and source of destruction of wholeness. Wholeness is not automatic, it is carved out of the crucible of experience by decision, dedication and action, the response to a challenge. Furthermore, the stages of wholeness lead progressively to increasing extension, since with the realization of one phase comes the establishment of a new tension which demands we go beyond ourselves. So man is a Self and he is not yet a self but endeavors to overcome all divisions and limitations in order to realize his self. Man is what he ought to be and what he always is becoming without ever being.' The need for wholeness remains as the indomitable quest of man's existence. His behavior, in fact the meaning of his life, his spirit of adventure and spontaneity, cannot be extricated from this, his most fundamental need. That quest is reasonable only because, as Jung says, life does not call for perfection but completion.  

Goldstein asserts '... We are in no way forced to assume the existence of special drives ... We assume only one drive, the drive of self-actualization.' Man's fundamental need, he says, is to realize his own nature. Freud has theorized a universal death instinct which directly contradicts the tendency to wholeness principle as outlined in this thesis. Adler, like Hobbes and Nietzsche, has said that man's primary drive is to secure power. Jung has propounded a theory of individuation which is essentially a mystical, religious wholeness. For all of the depth psychologists, psychic tension is between unresolvable opposites just as it was for Plato between Reason and Necessity; for Freud, between pleasure principle and reality.

2. Integration of Personality, p. 163
3. Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, pp. 144-145
principle, for Adler between dominance and submission, for Jung between nature and spirit, for Ferenczi between love and hate. For the physiological psychologists the central motivation is 'physiological quiescence' (Tolman, Hull, Freud). For those of the personalistic school (such as Allport, Stern, Lewin and Sullivan) personal motives, ideals, values striven for and achieved are central in personality motivation.

This thesis, dealing as it does with some implications of Smuts's thought, contends that there is one need, the need to realize the wholeness of personality. The personality must be able, in order to realize wholeness, to canalize its energy in worthful ways which bring about harmony of all vector tendencies. The Personality has a need for wholeness because there is somehow an ideal to lure the individual on. This may be called 'a prospective aim of personality' (Hinkle and McKenzie) or 'an urge to completeness' (Hadfield). The Personality seeks situations in which its own individual prospective aim can be more fully realized. There is an appropriate form for all things to which they strive, as Aristotle said. In fact, 'in every fundamental structure, everything possible happens in order to build up the form appropriate to the structure in question, to maintain it and to diversify it at a higher level'.

Romanticism conceived some paragon of human nature and found one of its best representations in Schleiermacher's statement 'Fulfil thyself, realize the end of thy being'. From Plato to Augustine to Aquinas and Bonaventura to the Enlightenment, man's end was to be a thinking, rational being. Some conceive man's end as utilitarian, others as aesthetic. Many of the philosophical and theological existentialists maintain that the first question about man concerns his existence, the fact of his being. They hasten,

1. Heim, op. cit., p. 229
however, to assure us that man's essence, or what he is, constitutes his value. The theologically oriented existentialists assert 'To live morally is to live as a man'. Goldstein refers to the basic need of the organism to realize its nature. Nature for him is 'the idea, the picture, or the concept of the organism' which refers to those 'essentials for the realization of an adequate relationship between the organism and its environment. These essentials are the nature of the organism and from these our picture of the nature of man or organism must be built.

What the nature of man is is not our primary interest, although a consideration of wholeness has ramifications as to the essence of a human being. The point is that throughout the history of thought, men have considered in some sense the end, rationally worthy, to which man's striving seems oriented.

Evolution, as Woodger and Hogben seem to feel, is not explicable merely on the grounds of adaptation or functionalism but on the demand for the internal harmony of organization. The elimination of extraneous material from the whole is a process of wholeness-making. Smuts calls that organization which has eliminated from itself such factors as would work against its well being, purity and declares it to be what he means by wholeness. He, as well, asserts that Freedom and Wholeness are correlative terms. Personality, like the organism which strives to complete itself as a type, has a central end toward which it strives, 'the straightening out of all difficulties and the elimination of all elements which militate against the attainment of its own immanent ideal'. While Smuts is led to state that the

1. Foulquie, Paul, Existentialism
2. Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, p. 25
organism strives to realize its 'mainly material' type in Personality. The striving is in terms of an inward ideal. But in both cases the shaping power of the inner whole strives to realize its end, to eliminate what is alien and adventitious, to conserve and develop what is pure and relevant to its ideal, and so to reach perfection, of visible outward structure and function in the one case, of inward spiritual grace and unity in the other. Wholeness is characterized by a continuous synthetic performance of creative transmutation in which segmentation is excluded and where thought, emotion, will and passion are harmonized into a fusion. For Smuts, freedom is the correlate of wholeness. It is inherent in the universe. It is that intermediate phenomenon between stimulus and response. Self-determination is freedom. One is holistic to the extent to which he is free. However, some of these notions appear, yet Smuts rises to a higher quality when in the section on freedom he speaks of 'sincere self-expression'. It seems close to saying that one is free to the extent that he is sincere in his personal relationships. Freedom, in this perspective, is only possible when men do not hide their inner selves from each other. This is 'the true ideal of human development and culture'. But Smuts's basic feeling is that freedom is self-determination, the ability to act autonomously. It is, however, not of any abstracted sort, i.e. will, but of Personality as a whole. With the resurgence of his individualism, Smuts concludes that 'The end of Personality does not lie outside it but is given inwardly ... the Whole knows no end beyond or outside itself. The object of the holistic movement is simply the Whole, the Self-realization and perfection of the Whole ... the

1. Ibid., p. 294; this contrast is interesting; the source of Smuts's ambivalence in his evolutionary theory as we have already noticed on other occasion.
2. Ibid., Chapter XI
same is true of Personality . . . Its object is to achieve self-realization . . . the suppression of harmful elements in the personal life. 1

In a consideration of the meaning of wholeness, especially from the point of view of normal and deviated personality structure and function, it seems certain that the ability to be loved and love in return is essential. The healing power of love has been central in the thought of Plato2 and Christianity and has formed the central thesis of Ferenczi and I.N. Suttie whose writings bear witness to the Hungarian physician's inspiration. Love is interpersonal. All needs for status, acceptance, the 'search for glory' and many of our techniques of defense and maintenance of the Self involve the need for love. The need for what McKenzie has called 'Moral and Rational Unity' has permeated thought particularly since Kant. We have noticed the synthetic functions of ego-processes and how one cannot live comfortably with intellectual contradiction. Professor McKenzie has found, in his thirty years of clinical experience, that no one can live at peace with moral contradiction. He follows Stekel who asserted that 'Every neurotic suffers from a bad conscience', 3 that 'All neurotics are at heart religious. Their ideal is "Pleasure without guilt"'.4 Like Bertocci and Allport and contrary to Freud's negativistic theory of super-ego oppression, McKenzie believes man's inability to live at peace with moral contradiction is due to man's essence as a moral being who conserves value, who can have religious experience, form character and essentially because the prospective aim of what man can be is the

1. Ibid., pp. 315-316. One who attains this wholeness is promised 'membership in the immortal order of the Whole', p. 316.
4. Ibid., p. 10
objective lure' for its fulfillment. In fact, this is the Imago Dei, as McKenzie asserts, 'the drive in us all towards completeness', the drive for the harmonization of all our impulses, the need for moral and rational unity all fitly framed together in serving the personality.\footnote{1} Professor Jung would insist that wholeness is individuation, the rebirth process which leads to the realization of the Self.\footnote{2} Man's wholeness is not an explicit 'end' toward which all his powers strive. Man brings into the world an implicit, logical end-form. It is not, however, predetermined that he shall realize that 'telos'.\footnote{3} One might say the plant will not miss its end, the bird newly hatched will not fail to fly but the same guarantee cannot be made for the child to realize his end, logically given. It is here a matter of achievement. \textquoteleft All animals have the instinctive\footnote{3} tendency to keep themselves clean; man keeps himself clean not because he has an instinctive tendency to do so, but because he learns to value the state of cleanliness which comes to him as a concept, not as a push from behind'.\footnote{4} This is not out of a compulsive 'ought' but by 'seeing' the rightness of it. It can be said, however, that the person we want to be is already implicit in what we are.

Each person's wholeness is of an individual character. At least, the person will find for himself in that wholeness he seeks the harmonization of his need-systems, his tensions, all his abilities.\footnote{5} Danger to the individual, as Goldstein says, is when 'his essential capacities cannot be carried out' and we would add, carried out in what, for the individual, is a meaningful and worthful way. When all

\begin{enumerate}
\item Cf. especially \textit{Nervous Disorders and Religion} and \textit{Souls in the Making}.
\item It is recognized, of course, that wholeness, individuation, rebirth and the Self are highly intricate, almost esoteric concepts in Analytical Psychology.
\item 'Instinctive' not 'instinct', following L. Morgan.
\item \textit{Nervous Disorders and Religion}, p. 160
\item \textit{Human Nature and Psychopathology}, p. 91
\end{enumerate}
the part-functions are existing together so that none cancels out
another, here is wholeness. The individual will find the unification
of the Holistic Self and the self-concept. He will find integrity,
giving and receiving love, freedom, since the barriers and compulsive
protections of deception both of himself, from himself, and others
no longer are needed. ¹ He is every whit himself. Wholeness is the
ability to accept one's limitations, possibilities and tendencies,
to integrate sacrifices and achievements into an 'approach to living
that is neither unrealistic nor hopeless'. ² It is the ability to
accept into one's self-awareness all phases of reality (Snygg and
Combs, C. Rodgers). Wholeness, is the ability, as Santayana said,
to see one's own equation written out.

1. For the development of this idea, See Chapter x, thesis.
2. Bonthius, op. cit., p. 165
CHAPTER NINE

The Tendency to Wholeness (Continued) in Person-Pathology: A Study of the Self, the Self-Concept, and Aberrated Behavioral Changes in Personal Relationships
This discussion centers around one general but important question: 'If we grant that there is a tendency to wholeness, how, then, do we account for Personality segmentation and deviation?'

Throughout this paper and particularly in the last two chapters, we have contended that the functions of the Personality do everything in their power to maintain and realize wholeness of the Self. We have intimated that, at times, the self-concept becomes aberrated or distorted and that there appears to be two tendencies at work; one to preserve the self-concept, the other to destroy, or better, restructure the self-concept in terms of an adequate acceptance of reality (the 'real' self). Now we take the next step. It seems, from clinical and research material, that the self-concept is distorted in an attempt to save the self-system from external destruction or internal disintegration. And, to take another step, the symptom-formation that result are, as well, an attempt to preserve the self; they are adjustmental modes of reaction; they are attempts at healing. If this thesis can be supported, then the holistic-principle is both the source of deviated patterns of thought and behavior, as well as healing. The 'cause' of disease seems to be found in that when the individual is presented with threat he is unable to respond to it in a mature way; that is, he is unable to deal with threat on a reality level, whereupon, disease symptoms result. Why cannot the person deal with reality on a level of integrity? Why does he, through denial, arbitrary restriction and selection, repression, etc. distort both the situation and his own position within it? Must he protect himself this way? Is this his only means of preservation? Or is it because of genetic, constitutional weaknesses or endocrinic imbalance? Certainly we should be ready, as Richter reminds us (following Stanley Cobb), to consider the multiple etiology of disease entities.1 But that phase of study must be left

1. Richter, Derek, Psychosomatic Aspects of Mental Health and Disease, British Medical Bulletin, 1949,6,1300
to more capable hands than mine. We cannot claim for the Holistic approach that it provides an ultimate, even a satisfactory, answer. Possibly our greatest hope is that it shall never be entirely satisfactory, then it will be useful. But we have been presenting this discussion so far on an interpersonal level. The self, self-concept, the functions of personality, action-systems, even so-called 'subjective' strivings such as intention, wish, desire, craving are essentially social and object-centered. Phantasmagoria and delusional systems are not private affairs, especially when the individual's behavior is distorted as a result of them and the community suffers. If any of this has a meaning, it is this: that in personality aberration we are dealing with social relationships and that since the growth and deviation of the self is a social-interaction phenomenon, our first concern is the person-other whole, the phenomenal field.

The Holistic account of person-pathology (disease and symptom-formation concept)

Constancy, homeostasis, autocorrectivism and selbstheilung

Some psychologists and psychoanalysts (medical and non-medical) are following of late a theory in which pathology is seen in terms of the principle of constancy. Fenichel, a leading analyst, questions whether or not such a theory might be better than employing Freud's death instinct to account, say, for masochistic behavior, compulsion neurosis, various regression and regression-reaction patterns, etc. Such a theory seems to accord with the view of this paper in at least one important respect. Freud's theory of the pleasure-pain principle (from Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, J.S. Mill, Spencer, Bain) has not proven very satisfactory in many areas of psychological interpretation, for we know that an organism or person may continue in a goal directed activity in spite of the fact that it is painful. Neither does it
assist us a great deal to say a masochist enjoys pain for its own sake and its own pleasure. The constancy theory accounts more satisfactorily, it seems, for such phenomena, especially when it is coupled with a theory of reinforcement and learning such as is propounded by Dollard. But the theory of constancy has its own limitations, more than its mere abstractness, when it is considered a fully interpretative guide to person-pathology. Probably it has arisen with the rather recent researches in what Cannon called 'homeostasis', the equilibrium activity of self-maintenance of the organism. If 'psychological constancy' is an anomaly, it bears rather serious criticism from the particular view of this thesis. First, homeostasis is really a biological theory dealing with organismic activity and as such is a highly useful tool, however 'fictional'\(^1\) it may be. It is derived by inference, an inferred principle. However that may be, it essentially deals with physiological and chemical changes, blood flow to muscles and viscera, 'emergency mobilization for fight or flight'. When this theory is applied to social and individual behavior and societies, it utterly fails to account for personal decision and action, since the individual and society are not organisms. Personality or society is not differentiated in function on the basis of anatomical differences, neither is their constancy automatic. In both cases, the freedom, intentions, goal selection and action of the individual and the voluntary cooperation or resistance of each human being in society determine the holistic balance or organization. However, we can say with Kardiner, who likewise criticizes such attempts to theorize a 'social homeostasis', that there is surely a 'pull in society . . . toward stability'.\(^2\)

1. Alverdes compares the theory of constancy as a fiction to theories of causality, freedom or non-freedom, vitalism and mechanism, op. cit.; the same is probably true of needs, purpose, etc.
homoconus applications of autonomic functions may be useful, in fact, highly useful, in some phases of automatic, unconscious phenomena, as we shall discuss, but it is merely one phase, we believe, in the motivation of human behavior. Second, such theories of constancy work on the thesis that change in excitability is only temporary and that re-establishment of equilibrium is the goal of all activity. This is self-limiting. Such a theory would not satisfactorily deal with biological regeneration or self-actualizing tendencies, since it is in a sense circular and does not consider the long range view of the organism or person seeking its unique wholeness and the actualization of all its powers. (It would also be essentially inadequate in theories of emergent evolution on the same basis.) A third limitation is that it tends to negate essential personal factors, i.e. self-concept involvement.

Consider, for instance, two articles. The first, written by Roseman, produces evidence for considering personality differences as determinants in closure behavioral differences. It is stated that closure experience is dependent on personality differences while the specific reference to self-concept maintenance is noticeably overlooked. Machover and Schwartz believe that any stimulus upsetting to the status mood of the patient at the time, whether depressed or elated, is met with agitation, increased incentive to respond in order to restore equilibrium and a decrease in reaction time. Such closure and homeostatic themes, seem to lack an adequate consideration of self-involvement, self-concept maintenance, values and reactions in terms of what stimulus-meaning the experience has to the individual and what affect-reactions occur due to the experimenter being a part of the situation.

1. Roseman, Morris, Closure Behavior and Levels of Personality Integration, Journal of Personality, 1952, 21, No. 1
Bare return to equilibrium or to form closure is not sufficient to account for the behavior of patients. The author, for instance, has observed patients who respond more readily and with 'better' responses on the same tests given by different experimenters with a time interval between tests not sufficient to account for such wide differences. Without considering some of these factors, it might appear that there is, on the part of some patients, no attempt at closure (as in a high percentage of Roseman's cases) and thus a quantitative assessment of personality structural organization is made with little consideration of the determinants of response to be found in the nature of the meaning of the interpersonal situation and the involvement of the self-concept.

The objection is that homeostasis, by itself, is an inadequate theory for person-pathology in aberrated social relationships. Our thesis attempts to account for the rise of functions and properties of the individual as well as their varied structure in equilibration. Possibly the reconstruction of the homeostasis theory along lines suggested by C.A. Mace may give us a new working tool. Goldstein's idea that the 'return' is not to equilibrium but to an 'ordered condition' is an attempt to alleviate one aspect of the difficulty. Murphy has suggested that constancy be given in terms of structural wholeness, not mere equilibrium. Ritchie, sometime ago, pointed out some of these problems, as has Koehler. When such theorizing and researches are pooled, we may have a broader theory which, when sufficiently reoriented, may prove helpful for personality interpretation.

The theory of 'autocorrectivism', expounded by V.E. Fisher,

5. The Place of Value in the World of Fact, pp. 317-328
6. Autocorrectivism and Introduction to Abnormal Psychology
is an attempt to conceive symptom-formation as an adjustmental mode of reaction in which the individual maintains internal and external balance and seems to be a broadened theory of homeostasis. This is one of the important steps which has attempted to recast the idea that symptoms or disease factors 'just happen' and understand these activities as the purposive attempt of the individual to make adjustment. This was not altogether new, however, for Freud had stated early in his psychoanalytic career that all neurosis was an attempt at cure. Maeder seems to have been the most faithful champion of a theme very similar to that of Freud's but with a more profound and developed theory. He emphasized the idea as early as 1912 that dreams, the 'night aspects' of self-maintenance of problem solving efforts, and symptom-formation were attempts at self-healing (selbstheilung).

Alphonse Maeder has faithfully adhered to this theory as one of his tenets through the years as his writings, books, unpublished material and articles bear witness. He feels that the same idea is finely reflected in E.S. Russell's work in biology. No doubt his friendship with Hans Driesch influenced his early formulations of the theory. But these two ideas, selbstheilung and autocorrectivism, have aspects that are different from and lacking in the constancy theories. They both have social-object references. Autocorrectivism because it deals not so much with internal adjustment, although this is very important in the theory, but emphasizes the maintenance of the individual in his community, in the person-field whole; selbstheilung, though in a major sense individualistic since it is self-healing and is the internal restitution of injured psychic components and functions, has,

1. Refer to Bibliography; Maeder was first, according to Blanchard in the preface to her translation of a public lecture (1918), to suggest the application of psychoanalysis to social pathology.
however, an important interpersonal factor. Maeder significantly sees this when he posits, *natura sanat medicus curat*. If our personal conversations have indicated anything, it is that Maeder sees the role of the physician in illness as essential, since, for him, man's deviated behavior is the result of interpersonal relationships and it is only at this level that they can be fully resolved. The self-healing can only operate around the key figure of the Other. Such theories of constancy are essentially an effort to regain the 'milieu interne'. When broadened, as Mace suggests concerning homeostasis, however, they may apply, at least more readily, to problems of adaptation and adjustment. This, the author presumes, would have to be restructured again if we were to employ the field theories of Lewin and Syng and Combs. It is not a matter of exclusion, really, but one of emphasis. But emphasis is important as contrasted in Aristotle's and Smuts's concepts of organism-environment and Lewin's dynamic field theory.

**Smuts's thesis on person-pathology**

Observations in biological regeneration, together with insight into the synthetic functions of ego-processes, formed much of the motivational center for Smuts's philosophy of Holism. Smuts, somewhat like Whitehead, generalized the equilibrative, regenerative tendency in organisms, animals and man and made it an integral aspect of his interpretation of the organization and function of all wholes throughout Nature. In a more limited way, Smuts has propounded certain principles of personality deviation which reflect, in the final analysis, the degree to which regeneration theories had influenced both his whole philosophical thought and his concept of 'psychogenic' disorders.

This is Smuts's thesis.1 Just as the organism heals itself

after mutilation, so the Personality is the self-healer restoring disturbed balance and impairment of character to integrity. Through all impediments and obstacles, the Personality endeavors to maintain and realize its own 'ideal'. The ethical ideal toward which Personality strives is the source of wrestling itself from defeat and disaster. The purification process leading to maturity and integrity may require moral and spiritual aberration to accomplish its end. When degradation of character and conduct occurs, we have before us a denial of the fundamental tendency and aspiration towards wholeness. Often the aim of personality (the ideal toward which it is striving) is sufficient to rescue the individual, heal itself, even though it may require violent crises, and restore to the person his 'sanity, self-respect and moral wholeness'. A significant insight is that people do not deliberately choose the wrong and evil but these are wild attempts to achieve the Good, to achieve wholeness. To the environmental threats, the Personality responds by shaping its own well being and changing these factors into useful metabolic implements.

Notice what Smuts has done: (1) he has propounded, not an instinct reductionism but character-analysis (as Stekel did), (2) he makes the tendency to wholeness an aspiration, not merely a pushing, driving, biological force, (3) he makes the self, self-worth, moral and rational unity, ideal wholeness, the central key in the interpretation of aberration, not mere constancy and mere preservation, (4) deviations, symptom-formations, violent crises, character aberrations are the result of the healing effort of the Personality, are, in fact, necessary to restore itself to wholeness, (5) such healing techniques are purposive, having as their aim the restoration of Personality, (6) that basically man is motivated by one desire: to achieve wholeness, integrity, the Good (Smuts), however much his aberrated activity
seems to contradict this. Admittedly, this interpretation is dependent on a phenomenological approach.

Now consider a difficulty: Personality, according to Smuts, is a function of Nature. The aberrations are because the holistic principle has not realized itself sufficiently in Personality. So far we are on safe ground. What results, however, is this: Personality is deviated because it is a new whole on the universal evolutionary scale. In other words, as evolution progresses, Personality will overcome its now weak condition and, subsequently, its aberrated behavior. The holistic-tendency has again become a biological, evolutionary principle. We recur to the same dilemma again, i.e. the holistic-tendency as an evolutionary theory and wholeness as an aspiration whose failure or achievement is a matter of active cooperation with the holistic-principle. While there are many functions of personality which are autocorrective and automatic, character, integrity, social progress and well being are not; they cannot be sufficiently explained on this basis. Only a very naive speculation would assert that evolution will automatically bring, in future generations, a rise in character and integrity nor is it the guarantee that man will be better equipped morally and psychologically to deal with threats both from within and without. In fact, if one follows Burrow's thesis, the ditentive treating, dissociated, 'I-persona' of man is due to the 'new brain' cortical discriminative functions, newly acquired through the evolutionary process, in consequence of which, neurosis, even phyloneurosis, is not likely to be assisted by the future course of evolution.

Pathology and person-pathology

To facilitate a clearer presentation, let us suppose, as was stated earlier, tendency, need, aspiration as a gradient in
Personality from physiological processes (homeostasis) to autoregressive activity to self-conscious decision and action of the Agent. If we can make this presupposition, what, then, is the Holistic interpretation of so-called 'mental disorders'? 

First of all, what do we mean by 'person-pathology'? This has two divisions, (1) pathology, (2) person-pathology. Space will not allow us to consider the many difficulties that attend the problem of abnormality-normality, sickness-health or psychiatric classification systems (nosological unity of syndromes). Cultural anthropology has discouraged efforts to create an absolute or ideal norm. Abnormality is always what is abnormal to a particular society or culture. The now recognized problem has resulted that whole societies may be abnormal. Deviation from a norm is not generally acceptable, for while deviation below the norm might be designated 'illness', a deviation above the norm would not be so designated. Creagan has stated it rather poetically, 'When madness is the norm, sanity is shocking'. Normality is dependent on the age, sex, status, 'type' of personality (that is, the dominant trends of personality). The lines between normal and abnormal are not clearly defined. And yet relativism lacks a sufficient specificity to make it a useful tool for diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. In an important sense, the term 


2. The Shock of Existence, Chapter XI
wholeness, as discussed in the last chapter, and health may be regarded as synonymous. There are two qualifications we wish to make, however. And it is at this point that the entire theory so far presented takes more concrete form. First, health or wholeness must be given in terms of the potential qualities of the individual in question. On this, Goldstein draws his theory of normality. That is, disease is that which endangers 'performance potentials'. This is given in terms of his theory of the individual's tendency toward self-actualization. Much like Goldstein is King who urges that normality should be defined in terms of the functional design and purpose of the individual. Second, such theories as 'psychological equilibrium' and Smuts's theory in which deviation or abnormality are given as strictly individual matter are inadequate. Angyal's 'bionegativity' has a string attached to it called the 'bionegative constellation' which in personality disorders arises at the level of social integration. Maslow and Mittleman give an elaborate list of 'manifestations of normality' rather than a limited definition and thereby eliminate some difficulties of abstraction necessarily inherent in definitions while presenting another difficulty in the economy and useableness of the material. Marzolf says that disease can only refer to lowered efficiency in the manner of functioning and suggests the designation 'symptoms of dysfunction'. One of the most satisfactory descriptions of pathology is Sullivan's in which personality disorders are disturbances of the interpersonal relations.

1. The Organism, Chapter X
2. Cited by Marzolf, op. cit.
4. Principles of Abnormal Psychology, Chapter IV
5. The Disease Concept in Psychology, The Psychological Review, 1947, v. 54
pathology', which is limited in its treatment of internal conflict, and Henderson and Gillespie who write 'pathology... is essentially pathology of interpersonal relationships, reflect their (Cameron and Henderson) training with Professor Adolf Meyer whose major emphasis was on people and personal situations. Clara Thompson, obviously close adherent to the Sullivan philosophy, succinctly states the thesis that 'A person is considered cured when he is capable of relating to other people with a minimum of parataxic distortion in his behavior and when he is free to develop his powers as far as his education and life circumstances permit. Having to rely wholly on interpersonal adjustment may be misleading since a person may be considered 'adjusted' when society declares him so but 'society cares little about what goes on inside him as long as he behaves well' write Maslow and Mittleman. The idea of self-actualization as in Thompson, Goldstein, King, Smuts, therefore, is a useful correlate. Pathology may be summed up as an internal inharmonization of part-whole relationship which reflects itself externally as 'an impaired ability for socialization' (Angyal) resulting from a failure to integrate relations and potentialities into a reality system.

This suggestion admittedly contradicts such beliefs as Freuds, that all neurosis is at bottom an unresolved oedipal situation which is no longer considered universally true, biologically (sexually) true or necessarily the basis of neurosis as such, however frequently it appears as an important phase of breakdown. The idea that zonal

1. A Text-Book of Psychiatry, p. 147
Attachment and gratification are the primary aim of libido, fulfilled unless hindered by repression, is, also, unacceptable. The same is true of Reich's theory that sexual energy not released through orgasmic channels is released in psychoneurotic symptoms.

It is possible that all of us have the seeds of breakdown within us. Furthermore, it is possible that our adjustive techniques are less exaggerated forms of psychotic and neurotic defence behavior.

It may be possible that disease and health are not a matter of different etiology but a gradient.

Pathology is always of the person as a whole. Jung, Adler, Meyer, Sullivan were early advocates of this view. This is inherent in Smuts's philosophy. Likewise, it is the person, not a disease, that must be treated. The disease is not isolated in some part of the individual. The whole individual is affected by it. In 'psychogenic' pathology, the individual is aberrated as a whole. It is not a matter of whether he is affected 'mentally' or 'physically' but how much of each, what are the predominant factors involved. Since the individual is Agent, his interpersonal impairment results in the disorder of the entire phenomenal field (Self included). This means symptoms or problems are merely guides to what the real illness is. Treating problems and symptoms in psychotherapy is like fighting shadows.


2. The implication would be that the same principles of motivation and maintenance employed in normal behavior are applicable here and that this chapter is justifiably an extension of the previous chapter.
is that the symptoms are often treated and the person remains as
diseased as ever. Unfortunately, many physicians untrained in psy-
chology, psychotherapy and psychosomatic medicine, as Allport says,
are bewildered by the irrational troubles of their patients and often
prefer treating ailing symptoms rather than ailing persons.1 Too many
instances of mistaken surgery recorded in literature prove such a fal-
lacy and has led Woodger to assert that we cannot treat people as phy-
dical objects.2 In fact, as with so-called 'divine healing' (religious
healing) the symptoms may only be displaced, the person remaining as
ill as ever. Likewise, the psychologist untrained in psychosomatic
medicine must safeguard his patients by demanding of them frequent
physical examinations by psychosomatic medical specialists.3 As
Sullivan writes concerning people under stress, we should no longer
feel happy because we have applied a label to them.4 One cannot, for
instance, treat certain symptoms as caused by schizophrenia for schizo-
phrenia does not cause a person to act in a certain way any more than
does character,5 but because the person acts in certain ways, he is
called schizophrenic. As Grensted asserts, we should no longer be
concerned with mental disorders but with persons.6 Pathology is per-
son-pathology. The concept is totalistic, personal and interpersonal.

Symptom-formation: a theoretical study of person-pathology with
supportive material from clinical study

What is the holistic interpretation of person-pathology and

1. Individual and His Religion, p. 86
2. Op. cit., see Appendix III
3. How intermingled are the personality functions is
shown by Richter who tells of a patient reported by Moody
undergoing an abreactive experience who developed, during the
session, rope marks on the skin of the wrists as the trauma-
ctic experience of being tied in this manner was relived.
British Medical Journal, 1949, 6, 44-48
5. Fromm is inclined to take the opposite view, Man For
6. Psychology and God, p. 122
symptom formation? A pathological condition exists when the individual is unable to accept into his self-organization those phases of reality which are demanded for socialization. Probably no one is able to accept all phases of reality. Some scotomization takes place with everyone. The condition is pathological when the individual is unable to live acceptably as a functioning member of his own society, particularly, that near-group upon which his security is first of all dependent. When such a pathological condition exists, the entire self is threatened. Existence itself is threatened. The self must be preserved.

When the pathological condition persists, the self must function in such a way that its wholeness may be preserved. Growth is virtually impossible for all the powers of the self are now channeled towards its own preservation. Likewise 'we-ness' (Shulte and Kunkel) of community can no longer be maintained. The individual is no longer free. He must preserve the Self at all costs. Protective (defence) functions operate to produce what is commonly called 'symptoms'. The symptom-formations (multiplicity of symptom-functions) are attempts to preserve the wholeness of the individual and to correct or heal the pathological condition. They represent attempts to regain wholeness, fellowship with significant others, and, consequently, freedom to be one's Self.

The inability to accept all phases of reality is due, it seems, to perceiving some of these phases as threatening to the Self. But why are they threatening? Is the fact that they are 'seen' as threatening itself a defense reaction? Has the pathology not already taken its hold? Certainly there may be genuine threats to the Self from within the field. The Self must handle these somehow. Defense reactions respond to this need. But there are many threats which

1. 'Safety devices' (Noyes), 'security operations' (Sullivan), 'defense mechanisms' (Freud, et. al.)
rise from a pathological condition already existent. In order to preserve the self at some earlier levels, certain security measures were developed. They were found to be reinforcing, as Dollard would say. Even if they have gained a 'functional autonomy' (Allport) they are only retained in the self-system because they are supplying a need and may result in a systematic 'life-trend' or 'life-style' (Adler). Whether they are painful or pleasurable is not the proper question, they may even be neither, but they are reinforcing and 'directive' (E.S. Russell), they are 'planned modes of adjustment' (Horney). One may learn that such techniques are the best, possibly the only way, to maintain the self. Let us illustrate; here was a Clinic patient who was regarded as unfriendly, reclusive even what some might call 'schizoid' or an 'apathic', 'hebephrenoid' personality.

After some analytical work, the patient came to believe that he did not want to be unfriendly at all. He really wanted to live at harmony with and love those on whom his security predominantly depended. Possibly he illustrates what Suttie means when he says all people are born with the capacity and desire to love but when that love is not received by the significant other, it turns to hate. This man's aloofness, reclusion, which were becoming so serious that hospitalization was contemplated, were attempts to maintain security against threat, against hurt; he could not love for fear that his love would go unnoticed. He felt his love was bad or destructive to those he wanted to love. His only position, he felt, was to be invulnerable and unloving in order to defend others against his love and himself from their love for him. But the defense itself became so severe as to be pathological. It was impossible to say whether or not the first traumatic thwarting of love was, in fact, an objective reality as the patient said it was. At any rate, it was real to him. His further failure to accept reality was seen in the fact that he no longer trusted others. The symptoms which precluded his socialization were attempts to preserve the Self. What would happen if they had not occurred? Would no pathological tendencies have resulted? But the Self could not continue to live at peace with threat or inharmony. The threat must be dealt with in a way which was amenable to security. That is what happened.

Pathology and symptom formations resulted because, to the Self, at the time, these were its only means of preservation. They were answers, attempted solutions, as Goldstein says, given by the modified individual
Unfortunately, such a traumatic experience which forces one to protect the self in a pathological way, also means that, for the time being at least, one refuses to develop, i.e., love, trust, etc. The earlier this happens, as Alexander says, the deeper will be the neurotic repression. But what of the holistic-principle? It seems that symptom-formation is both an attempt to maintain the self and security and a refusal to incorporate anything into itself that is contrary to its wholeness. The holistic function of personality, then, defends the wholeness of the self through symptom-formation. Symptoms may be the only way of preserving the self at the time but ultimately the holistic-principle of personality seems to work for their destruction in favor of a more realistic position. While the patient above could insulate himself against the 'outside' world, he could not insulate himself against his own anxiety which resulted from his symptoms and, by inference, his unconscious desire for completeness of self and wholeness in interpersonal relationships. Freud said anxiety often accompanied hallucinations representing the reappearance of parts of the reality repudiated. The symptoms actually evidence that the ego processes are attempting a synthesis of the situation in an attempt to preserve wholeness of the self.

Now all of these defense techniques and 'wholeness techniques' (functions of personality which work for health) are the result of unconscious, autocorrective processes. Strecker, long ago, talked of 'endowed resistance to psychopathic disorders'. Pfister had spoken of 'instinctive defenses of the soul'. Ferenczi made much of the

1. The Organism, pp. 17-18
2. The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality, p. 125
3. Collected Papers, II
4. Practical Clinical Psychiatry
5. The Psychoanalytic Method
idea of Eros counteracting the death instinct by erotization of biological processes and the role of the physician which was to love his patients back to health. Maeder and Fisher championed their selbsheilung and autocorrectivism; Alexander his 'secondary healing processes'; Rank developed his thesis of the Will along the same lines. Jung declared neurosis was a healing factor and that the 'inevitability of complementariness' was given as a healing function, the 'self-regulatory system' of the psyche. The historian Toynbee has asserted that challenge, even what might be called threat, is dealt with in a way which indicates an intrinsic drive for wholeness. Goldstein says neurosis is an attempt to protect the organism from demands too severe to cope with and is due to the intrinsic tendency to self-actualization. Hoyes has likened the tendency to wholeness to the biological phenomena of fever and inflammation, protective and reparative functions of maintenance. Kluckhohn, along the same line, says that abnormality is a spontaneous protective device of the personality... like a fever, an attempt by Nature at a cure. Murphy declares that the principle of maintenance and organization by which the personality works is responsible for both integration and disintegration. Sullivan, Fromm-Reichman and Thompson assert that a person seeks to correct personality deficiencies because of a tendency toward health. All of

1. Hysterie und Pathoneurosen
2. Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality, pp. 141-143
3. The Trauma of Birth, Psychology and the Soul
4. Search for a Soul, p. 20, Two Essays, pp. 62, 79
These writers agree that the functions of preservation are unconscious processes. They are automatic, autocorrective, thus are likened in a somewhat similar respect to the physiological equilibrative activity (homeostasis). What they are getting at seems to be that throughout the whole Personality there is a tendency toward wholeness.

This is a brief orientation. Let us consider some further problems of pathology and corrective measures of personality. It seems that while certain rather 'a priori' things can be said about wholeness, as we noticed in the last chapter, wholeness is indeed a continuum. Wholeness stages are not reversible. However, they may recur to earlier levels of organization, though duplication is impossible. The disorganization of wholes is a fact Smuts failed to adequately consider.

A series of dis-integration of need-systems, motive-blends, maturity levels, the ascendance into figure of a part-formation to usurp the authority of the whole and the fact that pathological conditions may be necessary as an immediate emergency measure in anticipation of more healthy restructuring at a later time demand recognition in such a discussion as this. The Personality as a whole, it seems, is always maintained. But anyone seeing a 'regressed', 'deteriorated' schizophrenic person living a vegetative existence would hardly say that his self-system as a whole has been preserved. Indeed, both conceptions are true as in keeping with their perspectives. From the person's own point of view, his life is the best under the circumstances. It would probably be improper to say a severely pathological person is 'satisfied' with himself. One wonders if even the person of hysterical phenomenon in his belle indifference is as unconcerned as he appears.

The distorted facial condition of the catatonic, the fret of the

1. By this we mean wholes may recur to earlier levels of organization and adaptation but with the influence of acculturation making exact duplication of earlier states impossible, e.g. schizophrenia, since 'life is an irreversible sequence of non-identical events', Murray, op. cit., p. 43.
paranoid, the cowering, cringing behavior of the delusional, the 'blackness' of the depressive must all surely speak of private worlds of threat, bizarre imaginations that are certainly terrifying to the patient, no less to the observer. But why do they continue in this 'private world'? Possibly it is because the internal world is even less threatening than the external one. Possibly the interiorization of external conflict may be felt to be better dealt with on a private internal 'controllable' battleground.¹ For some, the phantasy is less

¹. It seems the exterior battleground of person-other conflict or exterior object may be interiorized (through mentation of symbolization, abstraction, images, etc.) and made into an endo-psychic conflict just as an endo-psychic conflict can be projected or externalized. There may be situational, tangential adjustmental difficulties (behavior pathology) which are interiorized and dealt with in a pseudo-symbolic community of internal processes, i.e. in schizophrenic detachment. This may have internal ramifications for the seemingly antithetical positions of conflict as external or internal, Freudian and behavior pathology theories. Each theory here seems to loose a significant aspect of the other, i.e. Freudian with inadequate consideration of social conflict or Cameron's theory which lacks depth of understanding for interior strivings and conflicts. The 'primary conflict' of life probably arises as an exteriorized conflict with the differentiation of the ego which is interiorized and dealt with on a phantasy level. This process seems to be reenacted all through life again and again. All phantasy has its original setting in or reference to reality objects and experience and all repression has, as well, an object or other reference. Consequently, interiorization is the incorporation of the external field of action into a 'pseudo-community', symbolic conflict. This point of view generally agrees with Fairbairn's emphasis (not his whole theory) on object-relations (see bibliography) and the interpersonal constituent of behavior-thought pathology. It occurs to me that I should illustrate this tenet; thus, if I repress, say, a feeling of hatred (aggression) that feeling has an object reference to it, usually another person such as father or mother. This may be generalized to other persons or symbolic figures. Or, one might consider masochism is the aggression against an internalized object. Cf. Kyrle, M., The Development of the Sexual Impulses, Chapter 4. Repression then, is that act of repressing a feeling-object reference whole, in the same manner as intention has an object-reference. A somewhat similar attitude may be taken concerning changes of the self-concept in psychotherapy. Suppose a man, as Symonds reminds us, tends to be retiring, justifying this on the grounds of being busy and preferring that he do things alone when really he is failing to recognize that he fears competition and struggle lest others outsmart him or turn the fury of their rivalry upon him. The self-concept must
threatening (not necessarily more pleasant, although in some world-
reconstruction phantasies and delusions of grandeur they may be)¹ than
action. May it not be easier for some to withdraw into a private
world of thought, autism and phantasy than to have to enter into the
agony and frustration of making words express what they mean? Does a
person risk danger, self-devaluation, hurt, or put himself in responsi-

This, as well, seems to be true of all symptoms. They evi-
dently are compromise adjustments either because some tendency or urge,
i.e. love or hate, conditions of aggressive impulses, anxiety, frustra-
tion, cannot be directly expressed and must be displaced, an idea which
cannot be tolerated is repressed, or a challenge which cannot be accep-
ted so that denial takes place, or an action one believes he 'should'
undertake is too threatening to the self-concept and is suppressed as
'irrelevant' or 'unimportant' yet, like some obsessional rumination,
returns again and again until it is satisfactorily dealt with. Some
writers picturesquely say that the id overwhelms the ego (because of
an 'insufficiency of the normal control apparatus': Fenichel) so that
the ego has nothing left to do but defend itself with symptom-express-
sions. While 'overwhelming' may take place and ego-processes effect
symptoms as a regulative attempt, this 'overwhelming' is not given,
it would seem, at random and is thus demanded for personality adjust-
ment or actualization. For instance, sexual needs may be reacted to
change within the self as well as by coming to a more
objective position by which changed behavior can be per-

¹ Neurotic fantasies, writes Kardiner, 'are adaptive in that they seek a realization of the individual's goals without the attending risks', op. cit., p. 20
by severe defense repression but the personality cannot live harmoniously with a 'denied' aspect of itself. The sexual need-system is a function of personality. The same may be said of reaction depression (which is, say, a self-punishment - a redemptive effort - a response to guilt feelings) which 'overwhelms' the ego and cannot be fought off. As such, the personality may be trying to integrate it in a reality oriented holistic-organization. The methods by which this 'threat' is denied may demand severe pathological reactions.

It seems, then, that in a sense, every whole is a compromise situation. Every personality is a whole and reacts as a whole, though not always as an integrated whole and not always in a way perfectly adequate to the situation or challenge. The symptom-formations and defense functions produce just such effect. But here we have to employ Gestalt principles, the principles of closure and \textit{pregnanz}. It appears to this writer, that personality as a whole is always maintained. Closure may be good or bad Gestalt. Each whole is the best whole under the circumstances. This condition may be partly due to an economy aspect of personality in which one tends to employ previous techniques of maintenance which have proven in the past reinforcing and to do so whenever possible. This principle of \textit{pregnanz} would replace such ideas as 'A neurotic symptom is a form of reaction thrust upon the ego without the ego's enthusiastic assent' or 'Actually, many neurotic symptoms are condemned by the ego; the ego is puzzled by them and is somewhat ashamed of them' or 'The symptom, therefore, is admitted by one part of the ego and yet is rejected by another part'.\footnote{We would also prefer to replace 'the ego' with 'the conscious self' or 'ego-functions' in an effort to clarify a very ambiguous, dangerous and controversial problem of what is meant by 'Ego', i.e. class name, entity, ghost in the body, ideal, etc. The quotations are from Symonds, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 165. The difficulty is shared by most psychoanalysts.} It is always on this basis that personality functions. Most pathological
solutions, as Masslow and Mittleman assert, may be alternatives to worse alternatives such as catastrophic breakdown, psychosis, murder, etc. Possibly the cataclysmic, revivalist-type of religious conversion is of this type. Berg opines that defenses and symptoms are alternatives to insanity. Sullivan states that possibly it is only by dreams and visceral disturbances that some people are able to live at all. These adjustmental attempts (symptoms), as Noyes insists, 'represent the patient's attempt in the face of great difficulties to maintain his existence in the best possible way'. It is to be noted that each closure has an attendant urge toward improvement, a tendency toward more holistic completeness and integrity (what Smuts would call 'a deepening of wholeness').

Closely connected with this is Smuts's declaration that individuals are inherently good (which is Suttie's thesis) inevitably seeking the Good. This is a highly significant declaration. In our limited experience, we have never seen anyone who deliberately chose self-defeating behavior. The behavior may be self-defeating in the end but to the individual the behavior appears to be good and beneficial or at least 'not wrong' at the time the decision was exercised. Just as what a person takes to be real must be for him real indeed,

2. From the psychological and psychotherapeutic viewpoint, Horace Bushnell's theory of Christian Nurture is most consistent with mental health.
3. Clinical Psychology
5. Op. cit., p. 96; Alverdes seeks to show that in the case of a child learning to walk, the body operates as a whole but not in a manner perfectly adequate to the situation! op. cit., p. 20; cf. Paton, op. cit., pp. 337-338, E.S. Russell's theory of directive activities, op. cit.
6. This phenomenological viewpoint is maintained by T. M. Knox with regard to moral action. His interesting treatment is Action, Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1937. A fuller explanation of our view is considered in Appendix II, thesis.
The evil is rationalized sufficiently to become (for him) immediately valuable and necessary. The holistic-principle will not allow, it seems, a deliberate, willful choice against itself. Now we have said that man can choose against his own existence and he does but not with deliberate, unrationlized conviction. Take, for instance, the problem of suicide, for this may be one of the first contentions brought against the theory of Holism. Recently a young man was turned down by his sweetheart when he asked her to marry him, whereupon, he went to the county sheriff's office and, on the front steps, dramatically shot and killed himself. He had a note in his hand which read that this act would prove to this girl and everyone else that she had done wrong. He would make her pay for her deed for the rest of her life. In suicide, we conjecture, he did not think of it as extinction or self-defeat but as a victory; he had won out. Several patients at the Clinic had attempted suicide at various times. One might say, 'well they did not mean it or they would have made a good job of it'. Most people do mean it, at least consciously; it is serious business with them. But somehow they are not able to carry through the action at that time, at least. Most of them at the time, however, felt that they were not doing away with themselves but achieving something better. Another Clinic patient always punished herself with self-depreciatory

1. Erich Wellisch in his book Isaac and Oedipus surveys the anthropological studies on infanticide and concludes, Infanticide thus was not murder at all but holy sacrifice and a virtuous deed! p. 21
2. Suicide in Freudianism, for instance, is the turning upon oneself the destructive instinct which otherwise would be directed outward (agression, active algolagnia, etc.) Rank represents this thanatos as a supreme indication of man's freedom of will. This desire to destroy oneself is not a 'fate thrust upon the individual, but a destiny which the individual took it upon himself to effect'. Soul and Will, p. 144. Goldstein seems to feel that voluntary suicide is the last way out in the attempt to preserve the personality. In the same sense as self-sacrifice (martyrdom), it is often nothing more than an escape from the difficulties of normal self-actualization. Human Nature in the Light of
attitudes and reactive depression after a 'love' experience outside her marriage relationship. Her recorded clinical sessions invariably evidenced that, at the time of the experience, she felt fully justified for her action. The denial of threatening areas such as the consequences of her action on her husband, family, marriage, did not enter her mind, she said. All sorts of appropriate 'reasons' for her action, she asserted, 'suddenly popped into my mind'. At times, she reflectively rationalized her position and calculatingly entered into her tryst. But the personality refused to contend with this inconsistency and demanded a restructuralization of the self of which symptom-formations of a manic-depressive nature, hysterical and neurasthenic, apprehensive, reaction-conditions, were the beginning. Having seen a number of such cases, the author is led to believe that no one deliberately chooses self-defeating behavior and thus chooses deliberately against the holistic-principle.

Consider the holistic-principle and other symptomatic phenomena Amnesia may be a very necessary technique for wholeness maintenance. Mrs. Smith, shall we call her, was referred to the Clinic. Eight sessions had not penetrated her amnesia concerning her childhood. At first, it was thought that this might be the result of more than a dozen ECT (Electric Convulsion Therapy) treatments but this tended to be ruled out since the treatments had been suspended some ten years. 

Psychopathology, p. 229. This, of course, is not all there is to consider in such problems, but it brings to light a new facet, if not the primary motivational aspect of such behavior. * In Rank, Psychology and Will
weeks before. One day this lady frantically telephoned for an immediate appointment. Suddenly she had remembered a zoophilic experience in her very early childhood and with that her whole 'wretched' early life came back.

One might jump to a superficial conclusion that fainting is an obvious means of avoiding danger, possibly somewhat like a cataleptic seizure. One lady, Mrs. Wyman, was a singer in light opera and in a certain performance, during her solo part, fainted. This lady was a person disowned by the parents and reared in a foster home. In her late teens she was run over by an automobile and suffered a deformed leg and hip and walked with a decided limp. Her first marriage was tragically ended by the death of her husband, an officer, during the war. She began to feel that everything was against her, in fact, that there was something wrong with her. This feeling grew into severe depreciatory attacks on herself. She married again but this marriage was not successful for various reasons and a divorce ensued. Everything she did was wrong, she opined. The consummation came in an important role for her when she fainted on the stage. This really proved how right her parents were for abandoning her and how justified were all the trying circumstances life had brought her. But it further helped her to elicit all the sympathy of her friends. The faints became more frequent as did little mishaps, e.g. stumbling and falling (accident proneness). Hypochondriacal symptoms soon appeared. Her weakened condition proved an effective technique for insuring that her friends would not abandon her. Further, she could respect herself for having stood up so well under such trying experiences. There are many techniques of maintenance readily seen by the most superficial observer, but it is particularly the protective, in fact, enhancing role, fainting played in this self-system to which we draw attention.
Let us cite this puzzling case as another instance of the adjustmental nature of symptom-formation. It illustrates many interesting preservational phenomena. It makes no difference what 'type' this person was or how she would be 'classified'. This was a person under stress. She came to the Clinic because she was afraid she would try to commit suicide again.

She was a nice looking married woman, 26 years old, with one child by a previous marriage. She had been an alcoholic for eight years. She had 'nightmares' and would often be found running through the streets screaming and tearing off her night clothes. She was, for some time, a barmaid. She was very free with men and her greatest delight was, just before actual intercourse, to get out of bed, laugh in the man's face and walk out. She had often threatened men with knives and guns and on occasion inflicted knife wounds on them. She enjoyed slicing the tires and breaking the windows of men's cars. She flirted and tantalized. She conquered every man she set out for. She cared little for moral or religious or social standards. She hated women as well as men. She had never enjoyed intercourse and rarely, if ever, had orgasm. She was given to sudden hyperactive impulses (poriomania).

This lady, Mrs. Jordan, came to the Clinic for help, she said, but was not sure really why she came. The first thing she set out to do was to conquer the therapist. She would make a fool out of him. He would fall for her like all the rest of 'those damned fools'. If the therapist showed any signs of doing this, he recognized the patient would be through with the sessions, she would have accomplished her mission and the hope of finding someone dependable would possibly have vanished for all time. Who knows but what this was the last chance before total breakdown? After the patient's recovery over a year and a half later, she said, 'for the first year I thought you were made of stone' referring to the therapist. We cannot go into the detail of this aberrated personality nor the work of therapy but it seems this woman had lost her mother when she was a girl of three years. She did not know why but she blamed her mother's death on her father. A recurrent dream was that she was walking up the dark stairway from the cellar. Her mother was lying propped up in the corner of the basement, her head hanging by only a few tendon cords from her body with blood gushing out of her on to the dank floor. At the top of the stairs was just a man's face and two white bony, blanched hands reaching out for her. Another recurrent dream was one in which the patient was in a burning house and could not get out. The dream pattern changed through the analytical work to include the therapist and his wife who came into the house and rescued her. It seems that a traumatic experience occurred when just the father and daughter lived together in their house from the patient's tenth year and after an older sister had left home. On one occasion the father had attempted to
have intercourse with the girl but through the child's pleasings (then around thirteen) coitus did not take place. From that time on her difficulty began to mount. If she could not trust her father, she could trust no man. She hated her father, she hated all men. They were nothing but 'pretenders', 'liars', 'asses', etc. She would get even with them all for treating her this way and for, as well, treating women the way they do (as father had treated mother). An interesting slip of the tongue occurred one day in talking about the father's advances when she said, half under her breath 'and maybe I wanted him to... (have sexual relations with me)'. It was discussed that possibly one phase of her trouble was that she had wanted the father to have intercourse with her but he did not and so she 'showed them' (father surrogates or father figures) they they 'cannot lead me on'! The other phase being, 'I'll make fools out of them' or 'I'll prove that they really want me but I don't want them'. She never really gave herself to any man (as in intercourse she did not give herself to any in orgasm but retained the most vital part of herself which, too, we feel, as an autocorrective attempt to prove that this behavior was not approved of by the moral self). She was independent, termagant, smart, critical. This woman fell in love with another man, she said, and kept company with him, unknown to her husband. For the first time in her life, she said, she had frequent orgasm with him ('it was right because I really loved him') and conceived a child. It seemed that this woman would develop a full-blown psychosis or at least psychotic episode when she learned of her pregnancy. Three months later she had come to accept the pregnancy, told her husband everything received his forgiveness, settled down to be a good mother and nearly two years later she is happy in her home with two lovely children, her marital and sexual relationships with her husband being faithful and normal.

Mrs. Schiller was thirty-seven years old. She had been married eighteen years, the mother of three children. One of the psychiatrists had been called into consultation on the case during the woman's hospitalization. She had developed a paralysis of the entire right side of the body (hemiparesis). It appeared as if a complete regression had taken place as the patient refused to eat solid foods, would only take liquids from a baby bottle and gibbered like an infant.

The anamnesis was obtained from the family. It seems that this lady had married a strict Roman Catholic who refused to consent to the use of manufactured contraceptive methods. She had had three children and wanted no more. She suddenly lost the use of her right side, the side which was turned toward her husband when they retired at night. The left side was perfectly alright and this 'security side' (away from the husband) was the 'only safe place she could

1. Reported by one of the Clinic's consultants.
find'. The regression, (to an oral level) of course, freed her from all household duties and marital obligations and represented a denial of her mature womanhood with its attendant sexual abilities and responsibilities. Her condition had not yielded to continued (three months) somatic treatment. The psychiatrist could not make contact with the patient since 'perceptual defense' made more secure a position which was reinforcing and tenaciously held to against the threat of the alternative condition of health and responsibility. In desperation, one day, the therapist leaned over the patient's bed and whispered in her ear (to paraphrase), 'Alright, Mrs. Schiller, you've fooled all the rest of the Doctors and your family but you haven't fooled me. Your illness is just an attempt to evade your husband's sexual expectations and demands on you. Now I'll see that these difficulties you've been having are taken care of but I have your number so you had better get out of this bed and get well. You know you wouldn't want everyone to know what you and I know. I'll expect to see you up next time I come around.' This was, admittedly, a desperate attempt to lead this woman back to self-acceptance, and reality and would not be considered an ideal procedure in therapy. But strangely enough, the discovery of motive, bringing this into consciousness, evident acceptance of it, the threat and the promise of help and concern by the physician all fused into an insight and determination to attempt a better adjustment in terms of reality. Mrs. Schiller responded and within the week was out of the hospital and home and about her work. Conferences with the husband, instructions concerning sexual intercourse and the use of birth control methods seemed to facilitate what has been considered a complete recovery (of five years standing).

Mrs. Whitman was one of those moody persons who is up and down emotionally (cyclothymia). For a day or a week, she would report a highly elated, euphoric emotional condition but this was followed immediately or within a few weeks by a depressed mood in which she felt herself without hope, sinful, nothing to look forward to, no right to enjoy life, stating that 'the sooner it is over the better'.

This lady was 28 years of age with two children and divorced. It seems that loneliness during her husband's absence during the war led her into various 'love situations'. (Her sex needs led the therapist to consider her nymphomanic). This started various 'affairs' ultimately leading to divorce. This woman revealed the interesting, but unfortunately all too common, constellation of being an illegitimate child having never, to her knowledge, seen her mother or father. She was reared by foster parents and did not get on well with the foster mother. When she was six years old, she found a picture of herself when a baby with her first name on it followed by a surname which was not the one she had
known all her life. This seemed to be suppressed and repressed sufficiently well but on occasion, in a fit of anger (fear and anxiety) she would say, 'I'm not me, I'm not' and would call herself by a different name, for a reason, she said, unbeknown to herself. When she was eighteen she was told about her real mother, a woman of low reputation. At times when she had disobeyed or was 'running after the boys', her mother would say, 'see, you'll be just like your mother'.

Mrs. Whitman married at about nineteen, having one child before her husband left for the armed services. The next child was born while the husband was away 'and he did not even come to see how I was and he could have gotten leave' used to be repeated bitterly. The feeling that she was different, unwanted, alone, seemed to come into her thought more and more while her husband was away. She sought for someone who cared for her, she said. This led to various sexual experiences which her husband could not understand when he discovered such a situation upon his return home after discharge. He would never 'stick up for me or fight for me'. His love expressions were too infrequent and that was because 'he didn't really care for me'.

When this woman came for treatment, she presented a difficult case; divorced, indiscriminate in sexual relations, disliking her children who stood in her way for another marriage, and happiness, hating her former husband and step parents, constantly looking for attention, gratification, a 'clinging vine', whining type of person, forever (except in manic phases) fatigued and downhearted, continuously on the lookout for a man who would marry her. It seems, as was brought out by a year and a half of treatment, that her illegitimacy had forced an ambivalent condition on her in which she was trying to overcome this abandonment by ingratiating with others ('love addict': Fenichel) and prove she was worth having and prove that she was not like her mother while her social conduct and 'perverse' and self-repudiating reactions seemed to be validating her low concept of herself. She had seized on the sex-need and developed she said, a technique any woman would envy (in fact, made her superior to other women) and any man would crawl for. Her inferiority feelings seem to be bolstered by this ability and the lost self-worth was regained in euphoric activity. But guilt would set in and her masochistic trends would appear in her depression, self condemnation, constant colds, losing her job repeatedly, having accidents, losing friends, never meeting her budget, no matter how much money she made, etc., etc. Her sexual activity was to her a triumph, she felt. She had put the situation under her control through vaginal incorporation and in depressive phases by incorporation (identification) of the love object. She conquered men (father figures) and punished them for the desertion she and her mother had met at the hands of her real father. The men were all alike, selfish, cruel, irresponsible, conceited, playboys. Consequently, she could not keep a boy friend or hold her job because of difficulties with the boss. Her difficulties with women seemed to be
due to a feeling of hatred of her mother and the repressed feeling that her mother was really to blame for her abandon-ment, since she could have sacrificed somehow to keep her child. This was her aggressive, sadistic side which alternated with the narcissistic gratification, real-dependence, demand for immediate satisfaction (low frustration tolerance) which consequently meant that love could not be mature when the person was employing the symbolic oral techniques of early childhood coupled with hate which absorbs the supplies of love. She did not want responsibility, maturity, only affection, assurance, security, attention and love (as she described it). Another side of her sexual activity revealed that her affairs with men were attempts to make sure she was loved and meant for her a mother's reassuring hand to quiet the anxiety of a frightened, abandoned child. Bound energy, aggression, hate toward the children and death wishes concerning them, along with guilt helped to make the fatigue (neurasthenia) difficult to correct. At times there would be a 'suffocating' or 'incorporating' 'love' in which the children or a boy friend was smothered and absorbed and overpowered with usually the men taking to their heels in full flight. Obsessive ruminations about her condition, morbid dependence on the therapist, fear over every little thing that might be done incorrectly, i.e. doubts about decisions, how best to 'set my cap' for this fellow, etc., rapidly developed. The core of the self-concept being negative and the deep seated hate against everything and everyone were so all pervading unconsciously that it seemed resistance to health and reality could not be broken through. About 125 hours of treatment brought this woman to a healthier self-accep-tance, reintegration of the partitive pathology resulting from the dominance of one part-function, an understanding of the defensive life-trend and why she had developed this way, a more object-centered concern for her children, community, etc., the transference of the therapist who seemed to prove to her that he would not abandon her, however 'bad' she was and was someone who genuinely cared, greatly assisted a readjustment which probably will not develop further until a happy new marriage results, which, the writer understands, is to occur shortly.

1. I believe this 'smothering love' is an attempt to love genuinely (maturely). We have noted that loving and being loved are as important as physical needs, as a matter of fact, love possibly determines the child's response to food, objects, noises, waste products, etc. Love is so important in the first two or three years of life that Ribble has maintained that one can never make up for the love and mothering experience lacking during this period. Ribble, M.A., The Rights of Infants. I have more confidence in the tendency to health than to accept such generalizations. I do think the 'suffocating love' above was an attempt to love genuinely, although mature love was impossible for this person at this time because of the lack of the feeling of self-security and self-acceptance arising out of the earlier love-deprived period. Whether good closure can always be effected from poor gestalt is another intricate question.
These are some illustrations of the holistic-principle at work in the maintenance of the self. Let us note, briefly and generally, some questions the Holistic Approach would ask concerning other symptom-formation. Could it not be that the so-called regressive behavior of schizophrenics and compulsive-obsessive rituals and ruminations are attempts by the personality to deal with some unresolved experience? Stout believes there is a tendency of the conative 'mental disposition' to recur, at intervals, to baffling problems awake and in dreams. The unsatisfied striving may influence conscious life by giving rise to vague trouble or uneasiness. 'There is a burden on the mind'. The holistic-principle refuses to integrate, as far as possible, elements which upset the well being and threaten the growth of the personality. May not the phenomenon anorexia nervosa be of the same type, an attempt at riddance, a refusal to incorporate some element of experience? May this not be a factor to consider in gastrointestinal disorders? Is not such behavior as sublimation, reaction-formation, counter-cathexis, counter-phobia, attempts at maintaining the wholeness of the self, i.e. some anti-vivisectionists, surgeons, clergymen or, as in the Apostle Paul, who was converted to Christianity, according to Jung, before his persecution tirades which were an effort to convince himself that he was not. Is not multiple-personality phenomena an attempt to preserve the self, the self-concept even with threatening tendencies? Is the mother-figure theory sufficient to explain why one man experiences ejaculation praecox with prostitutes and not with his wife while another has the same experience contrariwise (with the 'good' mother)? What of the secondary gain of illness? Can we merely ascribe this to an attempt to get attention, or to evade

work or for the purposes of 'renumerative compensation'? And might not we reformulate ideas of 'compensitis' (Dunbar), i.e. where the patient overexaggerates the seriousness of his illness, in terms of the need to preserve the self-concept (and the valuation of others)? Cases have been reported in which hysterical blindness prevented children from reading, whereas their vision otherwise was entirely normal. It has been found that children who have been punished for aggressive impulses (e.g. the 'dirty look') or sexual longings (e.g. the desire to see genitalia or genital region of other children) may, in an hysterical condition, refuse to use the eyes at all. Other children forbidden to look at their parents or other children in the nude may grow up with intense curiosity which is only controlled by a religious puritanical experience. These symptoms have to be considered in terms of aggression and punishment certainly, but also as necessary techniques of self-maintenance and self-concept preservation. Why is it, as Dollard reports, pilots, during the last war, tended to develop night blindness and paratroopers paralysis of the legs? The purposive techniques of self-maintenance and insulation have been sighted by Snygg and Combs and Allport concerning Dachau prisoners who alienated body as not-self through denial and dissociation in order to endure punishment.

Is schizophrenia a deterioration? Is it not an adjutive technique, a security attempt, an attempt possibly, as Rosen and Battie are led to believe, to restructure the mother-child relationship? Manfred Bleuler seems to feel there are no ego-functions lost.
in schizophrenia, though there may be obvious curtailments and reduced functioning ability (note reality testing of schizophrenics below).

In 1924 Hadley demonstrated that even in chronic schizophrenia there is anything but deterioration and disintegration of personality. 1 Cameron's experiments concur with Goldstein and Bolles that 'since in these results the thinking of the schizophrenics turned out to be neither childish nor that of a common organic deterioration, the terms "deterioration" and "regression" should not be too uncritically applied to schizophrenia'. 2 Angyal says that often ideas on schizophrenia postulate that a dissociation of the ego has taken place, as if this were something that just happens to the person, rather than seeing it as a purposeful adjustmental reaction which is an attempt to preserve the self best under the circumstances and in a way proven in the past most successful. 3 Possibly, then, the schizophrenic only assumes childhood behavior in an attempt at resolution and adjustment. If schizophrenia, as Sullivan says, is not of an organic substrate, then is it a disorder of living? 4 Is this phenomenon an attempt to save the self? In the novel, I Am Jonathan Scrivener, a man retreats from the world ('I have disowned the world') but when the world suddenly offers him satisfaction, he responds to it in a normal fashion. 5 Secondary narcissim' seems to be almost a forced reaction since love

1. Cited by Sullivan, op. cit., p. 73
2. Schizophrenic Thinking in a Problem-solving Situation, Journal of Mental Science, 1939,95,1012,1035; Psychological Monograph, 1938,50,1-34; Goldstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, Chapter II, (Schizophrenia not like prelogical or primitive thinking).
5. Supra.
cannot be given and received in any other way at the time. Menninger reports that schizophrenics who have made very little contact with the 'outside' world have been known to test the faithfulness and concern of a therapist over a long period of time. When this faithfulness has been sufficiently tested, they seem to feel that someone is interested in them, that the therapist can be trusted, and they respond to treatment.¹ Malmo gives evidence of physiological responsiveness of schizophrenics to stimuli and objects in this field.² Jung, Kempf, Rosen, Fromm-Reichman, Fenichel, among others, have shown how the schizophrenic neologisms and phantastic expressions are not meaningless but highly symbolic and purposeful. In fact, to the individual, (normal or deviated), all behavior is lawful and meaningful. When one can enter that private world, one can possibly prove to them that their interpretations are out of touch with reality and that they are lovable, that they can love and thus, restructure the self-concept. The self-system can be reconstructed. The author was completely astonished by an incident during a demonstration of cases of schizophrenia by Professor Sir David Henderson. Six schizophrenic patients were brought into the room and seated before the group of students. Only one of them responded to the Professor's commands to stand up, go to the blackboard, etc., a 'simple schizophrenic' boy of about 14 years. After demonstrating two patients' catatonia (cereas flexibilitas) and threatening them with the puncturing of their eyes with a knife without any visible response whatsoever, the Professor turned his back to them and said, 'Alright, you can go now'. To our amazement, all six patients

¹. The Human Mind, p. 104
². Malmo, Shagass, and Smith find evidence that chronic schizophrenia is not generally characterized by low physiological responsiveness. They believe that there is a high degree of spontaneously occurring central nervous activity and that mechanisms of emotional arousal are relatively intact in chronic schizophrenia. Responsiveness in Chronic Schizophrenia, Journal of Personality, 1950-51,19,pp.359ff.
together suddenly stoop up and started toward the door. John Rosen seems to have had the outstanding single success with the treatment of schizophrenics. His view is that this disorder is not organic, but functional, purposive and adaptive.\footnote{The same thing may be done}

It would seem that the term 'schizophrenic surrender' (Campbell) does not fully represent this pathological condition. It would also appear that representing the condition as an overwhelming of the ego by the id or that such symptoms are 'ego failures'\footnote{Ego-failures', used by Alexander, Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis among others, is an objective viewpoint as well as an individualistic one and does not consider the value of symptoms as preservational, adjustmental and meaningful in terms of the self and the person-other relationshhips. The 'defenses' seem to work, in another point we are attempting to convey, not in terms of ego-functions only, or conscious processes or self-concept but in terms of the self. This contradicts, in great part, for instance, Anna Freud's thesis.} are suspect.

Rather, our observation and work with schizoid personalities and schizophrenics would convey the idea that the whole condition is a tiring persistent effort to save as much of self-wholeness as possible in anticipation of a better closure. We are led to believe that there is also a constant search for the reestablishment of a relationship with the object and the Other. It would seem that even on the lowest level of the gradient of normal-pathological there is retained an effort to maintain as much of the phenomenal field as is possible under the circumstances; that is, with the most tolerable threat. Reactive schizophrenia, from the point of view of this basic thesis, is an attempt at closure, though that closure is, at present, a poor one.

The hypochondriacal, as Sullivan reports, has abandoned the normal field of interpersonal relationships as a source of security but must somehow retain his hold on reality (what might be called 'object-cathexis'). The schizophrenic or obsessional may keep his

\begin{enumerate}
\item It is conceivable that the frame of reference discussed here would make the question of whether or not paranoia is schizophrenia unnecessary.
\end{enumerate}
won reality by counting, the counting being an attempt to retain
contact with the world as well as to keep threatening thoughts from
the mind, as Dollard asserts or, as Alexander puts it, to keep the
meaning of the system from consciousness. The same thing may be done
by collecting objects (to use Fenichel's term 'object addicts'). The
hypochondriacal does the same thing by constantly shifting the conver-
sation to his illness which seems to be the only topic in which he has
interest enough to sustain the effort of talking. We are led to be-
lieve that possibly this indicates an effort of adjustment and mainte-
nance of the self and its wholeness (which is dependent on relation-
ship with the Other and reality). Might it not be that the doubt seen
in paranoia and obsessional neurosis somehow is an effort toward
health? Possibly also hallucinations, delusions, phobias, war psycho-
sis, dreams, perservation, so-called 'traumatophilia' may have the
same adjustmental, preservational function.

It seems that one important consideration in regard to
person-pathology is that of self-maintenance and self-concept mainte-
nance. Often, people seem to evidence processes which are attempting
both to save and reconstruct the self-concept and save and destroy the
self-system as a whole. Pathology results, for one thing, when any
part or part-function assumes dominance of the whole. The psycho-
analysts have particularly demonstrated this by seeing sex-need-

2. Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality, p. 109
3. Emphasized by Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human, ii,
p. 27-28, Maeder and Jung (see bibliography) and Van der
4. This, of course, is antithetical to Freud's view
that repetition compulsion is an overwhelming of pleasure
by death instinct, the innate disintegrating process and is
seen here as an attempt at closure, integration of disso-
ciated material and, as far as possible, a refusal to incor-
porate material that is contrary to the tendency to complete-
ness and wholeness. It is not always possible to do that as
incorporation through primary and secondary identification
seen in the human growth and breakdown reveal.
integrates (psychosexual) in its distorted role (either repressed or over exaggerated). The search for power, religious submissiveness, attention-getting are all attempts to maintain wholeness and self-worth and may be necessary techniques, at the time, to stave off even deeper pathology but would destroy, if they remain, the self-system. Trigant Burrow has devoted himself for more than a quarter of a century to the study of what he calls the 'I-persona'. He feels that in any group, normal or deviated, there is a maladaptive element which hinders genuine interpersonal relationships. This constellation is designated 'organismic de-centration', 'attentional deviation' or 'disention' or 'adaptive deflection'. This, he considers, is our 'phyloneurosis'. We cannot consider the whole theory; we emphasize here, somewhat on the basis of the contributions of Burrow, Horney, Fromm, Macmurray and Buber, that the distortion of interpersonal relationships, as well as of the part-whole relationship, is very often due to the aberration, through processes of denial, projection, compensation, etc., of the self-concept so that it becomes an idealized image, a veneer, a facade that one protects with his life. This results in a 'partitive' condition which seems to be dealt with on the basis of a restructuring of the self-concept with the I-persona in figure. This affect-symbolic-reaction evidently satisfies a need which to the individual appears to be necessary for the survival of the self-system. But like all other symptoms of pathology, this does not necessarily indicate a healthy condition. In fact, it will finally destroy the self. If one can recognize an ego-ideal, say, as not the self, he can deal with reality. When, however, an individual

1. This seems to be the area which might properly be called 'disease' and yet this failure to deal with reality is a protective measure; therefore, is a reactive condition and not 'primary cause'. It is, however, a significant contributor to continued aberration.
identifies the self with the idealized self or a distorted, depreciated, undervalued self-image, then reality cannot be dealt with on the basis of integrity.

The condition from wholeness to pathological partitiveness seems to be a gradient of a centripetal nature moving from a position of communal fellowship with the Other to a slightly distorted self-concept to the I-persona to a fully aberrated idea of what one is, a 'pseudo-self', an 'impacted autopathic encyst' (Burrow). One paranoid patient told the author that when he was a college senior, he went to the blackboard and wrote before the class a statement of his own creation and signed to it the name 'Machiavelli' (such megalomania might be expected of a freshman but hardly of a senior). Another depressive patient said he was the ugliest, most worthless person that ever lived, deformed, contaminated, rotted out inside, guilty of heinous crimes, an animal. These people persisted in defending that concept of themselves. Through all of these manifestations, we have been discussing, we can see a definite attempt to save the self. It seems that one is forced to give up his interest in others as he frantically tries to save the self. The deeper this insidious centripetal convergence, the deeper and more severe the malady and contrawise. In our lesser deviated social roles, our attempts to preserve our status and esteem necessitates affect-reaction and, consequently, a restriction of freedom (a neurotic is no longer free) and a view of the Other as a means to an end. The I-persona is essentially a reaction-formation to the loss of self-respect which in turn, as we have seen, is projected onto others so that they are no longer people but manipulatable commodities in the market place. Evidently, the self-concept must be dealt with gently or breakdown ensues, while all the time there are efforts to restructure it closer to reality and thus oneness with the Other.
The tendency toward health and wholeness is actually illustrated in every case of recovery. Many people go through severe difficulties, even pre-psychotic episodes, without the assistance of any treatment. Sometimes this is done because of religious conversion or devotion to a worthwhile cause, another traumatic experience of a different counteracting kind, great repression which temporarily deals with threat, the development of lesser deviated 'neurotic trends' (Horney) or catharsis 'cures' such as was accomplished in the Corybantic and old Dionysiac rites of orgiastic dancing and trances (which probably lingers over today in certain very radical religious groups in Britain and America and in some types of modern dancing). The ability to make a healthy recovery from severe difficulties seems to be dependent, as is recovery through treatment, on many things; for instance, if one has learned healthy means of adjustment, if one feels that he is loved and that his love is acceptable, if one feels his life is worthwhile and contributory, if one is flexible, resilient, if one has not been greatly sheltered through one's early life, if one lives by a healthy moral standard (non-authoritarian) of belief and conduct (which Dr. R. Davis of Cambridge feels to be one of the most important aids to therapy) and a healthy concept of one's possibilities, what one could be, the prospective aim of person-wholeness. Possibly the importance of moral strength in one's life, something enduring and worthwhile with which one feels he cooperates, is important because conscious dedication is important in therapy. Countless therapists have emphasized that no ill person can fully recover if he does not want to. It seems, actually, that unless one comes to therapy out of a

I. Suttie, Op. cit., also Fairbairn, W.D., Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, Chapter II.
the sense of need, he cannot be greatly helped. Health is, then, not altogether an automatic thing and character certainly is not. The auto-corrective processes do an amazing job but they can be hindered effectively by conscious and unconscious determined refusal to cooperate with them, however much one feels such a thwarting is reinforcing and necessary.

In therapy one gets the opinion that the regulatory functions of personality seem somehow attuned to reality and to the needs of the real self. An interpretive suggestion by the therapist may at first be greatly reacted to or, through perceptual defense, denied, so that it just goes unnoticed. Then suddenly, weeks or even months later, the 'aha' experience is achieved and that suggestion now 'fits' into the system to produce a harmony. It is as if the self 'engineers' the right time for the insight to appear and the thought to break through (as in compulsive ritualistic behavior the person seems to arrange that the solution shall not be exposed to any very severe test). One patient, Mr. Johnson, an actor, twenty eight years of age asked for some counseling sessions.

He felt he would go into the ministry, possibly be a missionary. He felt this was 'God's will' because he had had difficulty in some attempts at sexual intercourse and this proved that he should live a celibate life. It seems this young fellow was not genitally large enough to produce a satisfactory experience in intercourse either for himself or his partner. The difficulty seemed to be, at least superficially, that his penis, he said, was so much smaller than other men's and beside that, the erection was not strong enough. When he was in the Army, during a physical examination and standing in line with a group of recruits, the medical officer and some attendants came to him and noticing his 'deformity' laughed at him to his ridicule and humiliation (even though he was six feet two inches tall and very handsome the inferiority for the penis remained). He would never, he thought, be able to have intercourse because of this condition. The patient was first sent to a Urologist for treatments which he shortly gave up saying they were not helping him. He asked for several sessions. At the third session the therapist joked about how the main
thing was not how large the penis was since, as a rule, this did not make any real difference to a woman anyway, but how strong it was and how the love making was carried on. Further, when he really found someone he loved and wanted to marry, he was told, it would be alright to have intercourse, he wouldn't have to feel ashamed or guilty and probably the erection would be satisfactory. Except for an occasional social call, the patient never returned for further help. He shortly married, has been married for some five years and has two lovely children and, incidentally, works in a beer manufacturing plant, otherwise known as a brewery.

Another patient was Mrs. George, thirty six years old, married and the mother of five children. When she came to the Clinic she was disheveled, unkempt, her thoughts and sentences didn't make sense (to the therapist), in a very anxious mood and unable to sleep or eat well.

She said she felt the muscles in her back were getting hard like a man's. She sometimes thought that she was actually turning into a man and sometimes into an animal. She even felt like crawling around on all four limbs. She said her hands were getting hard and calloused on top like an animals. That she had devils inside her was a frequent complaint. She could feel wolves and dogs after her and they were going to tear her apart. She said her jaw was getting heavier, squarer and stronger and she was getting a lot of energy. Delusions and hallucinations of other sorts were plentiful. It seems Mrs. George had had a difficult life. Her mother had died when she was five years old and she had been placed in an orphanage. Later, she was taken into a foster home where the foster mother died a few years later. This lady's husband was a man with great difficulty in sexual relationships (satiriasis). He also forced her into numerous perversions (cunnilingus, fellatio, annilingus, etc.). She had seemingly reacted to this demand by 'losing all interest in sex'. She said he was more tolerant when she was ill and did not expect so much from her. The hypochondriacal reactions she had developed for the previous year before initial Clinic examination had seemed to protect her against the attentions of the husband. She felt all of her difficulty was a punishment for a life in which she had been a heavy drinker and had to perform these perversions. We cannot go into all the difficulties but after a few sessions, going through interpretations, meanings, associations of the above material and other abrasive work, it appeared that one of the main difficulties was this woman's inability to accept her sex; that is, she seemed to have an uncertainty about her sex (uncertainty of body feelings, hypochondriacal delusional pattern and 'somatic' effects, 'Libido tunus'). A severe self-deprecation involved certain forms of punishment (masochistic tendencies) which had developed from early home difficulties and accentuated by
drinking and perversions, was dealt with. It seems significant that when this woman was able to accept herself as an attractive woman, she started fixing her hair, getting permanent waves, putting on makeup, buying new dresses, high-heeled shoes, the latest fashions in hats and suddenly became a new person. She was proud to be a woman. She began to enjoy sexual relationships (which were put on a normal basis), joined a church, several clubs, invested her interest in her family and others and what might have been a very severe psychosis turned into a new life maintained now for over two years.

It is important to see that this kind of recovery is another indication of the tendency to wholeness and evidently is that tendency with which one can only cooperate since neither the surgeon or therapist can effect healing but merely remove barriers, for its free activity (vis medicatrix naturae). Thus, every therapist (of 'somatogenic' or 'psychogenic' disorders) relies on the tendency to wholeness without which no recoveries would occur at all. It is a powerful ally of our healing arts. The cooperation of the individual and physician or psychologist and the interpersonal situation with its attendant restructuring of the person—other wholeness with its accompanying ramifications, seems, however, a necessary factor in the healing process. That cooperation must be full-hearted and honest because of the personality's refusal to integrate irrelevant or dissociating material.

Kempf says, 'I believe it is impossible for a patient to relieve a repression symptom by telling a lie or substituting an irrelevant experience'. The continuous activity of maintenance and restructuring would indicate that the consistency Lecky urges upon us, for instance, is not easily achieved. From this thesis so far, we gather that symptom-formation, the preserving functions of personality, progress, healing and wholeness are only understandable by a prospective aim of personality, a

1. Jung interestingly says that mere rehearsal of dream material is not enough for cure but demands a therapist to give the individual strength to accept it into consciousness and deal with it on a reality basis.
3. Self-Consistency, A Theory of Personality
for completeness and consistency and rational and moral unity.
Pathology results when one fails to cooperate with the holistic-principle, when the tendency to wholeness is blocked, when there has been failure to integrate one's own sub-need-systems, tensions, potentialities, cravings, personal relationships with the ends of personality. As there is for the State, as Macmurray has stated, the categorical imperative of justice, so the categorical imperative of personality is the demand to act and act holistically; that is, to cooperate with the holistic-principle. Failure to do so means that one or a combination of the following results will be affected: (1) Personality (completeness, integrity, wholeness) is never realized, (2) maladjustment in interpersonal relations occurs, (3) pathological breakdown ensues.

This discussion, by no means, is intended to be exhaustive nor final, not only because of the limitations of this paper, but because this entire field is so tenuous. It has only been recently that psychiatry, psychology and psychotherapy have moved from a descriptive to a dynamic level of interpretation of 'psychogenic'

2. This, of course, all presupposes thought impairment. Action-patterns may be substituted for the term 'interpersonal relations', if the connotation of this whole thesis is kept in mind. The role of the aberrated self-concept, we feel, is not distinguished in these broader distinctions but presupposed as an underlying causal dynamic. To sum it all up, disease is the failure to cooperate with the holistic-principle.
pathology. It does indicate, we believe, some implications of the principles of the Holistic Approach for person-pathology.¹

1. The people under stress, presented here, are from the author's own clinical work, except in the one cited. This is, also, true of the last chapter, except for the one cited. Physical examinations were required of all patients before therapy began and periodically throughout the length of treatment. The usual tests were, as well, given, such as Massachusetts Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Thematic Apperception Test, California Personality Test and Rorschach. The use of medicinal aids were, in some cases of depression and agitation, prescribed by the medical consultants with the consultation of the therapist. Many of the people cited were undergoing group analysis, as well as personal therapy.
CHAPTER TEN

The Concept of Wholeness: A Reformulation
In attempting a reformulation of the concept of wholeness, we are brought at once up against certain aspects of Smuts's organic theory of evolutionary Holism. With this theory Smuts had hoped to bridge the gap between idealist and realist philosophies and to account for the essential nature of personality. But Smuts, we feel, fails to deal with the problem satisfactorily, since his theory is individualistic, biologically oriented throughout and fails to grasp the uniqueness of the personal. The Doctrine of Holism, as Smuts propounded it, is in this respect, no better than the organic philosophies or Hegelian interpretations of reality. Pringle-Pattison and McTaggart labored to correct the panlogism of Hegel in which the categories are identified with forms of existent things and a world constructed out of pure thought. The Personalistic School of Idealism, led in the United States by Borden Parker Bowne, was similarly motivated especially after the neo-Hegelian absolutist systems of Bradley, Green, Bosanquet had been set forth. The identification of the organic with the personal, characteristic of most evolutionary theories, and the identification of human and divine consciousness in a single universal mind are both inadequate to account for the nature of the personal and indeed, as Kierkegaard would have it, of the existing individual. Nor can we think that the Kantian idealism is altogether satisfactory. Kant rejects organic categories, objective teleology (such as that of the Hegelian Dialectic) and attributes to the self a transcendental and, therefore, unknowable reality. His categories have to do with the phenomenal world, constituting its form and making it comprehensible, but his theory divides the person into two parts of which one, the transcendental self, can only be assumed and never
nown, while the other, the empirical self, can be dealt with only by mathematical science. This fails to account satisfactorily either for personality or existence.

Smuts has attempted to construct a theory in which the organic connection exists throughout Nature, although the interbalance is not as finely established as in McTaggert or Whitehead, for instance. It is out of this organic connection that man (the personal) arises and is not some Melchizedek of the universe but rooted in it. Smuts then seems to employ Hegelian ideas further when personality is seen as an 'organ of Holism' (universal tendency); that is, an organ of what has and is developing it, the instrument on this 'higher level' by which Nature, in turn, is given a new connectedness and meaning. Nature, for Smuts, is not the Absolute realizing itself in appearance and coming to consciousness of itself in Mind; it is Holism, the creator of wholes - including those personal wholes in which it finds its fullest expression; so that Nature, through the synthetic functions of personality, in turn, emerges with new significance. In both instances, personality and Nature are characterized by an organic connection. Man, then, is not really different from what is known (Nature) but both are one system. Any independence of the two is not, for Smuts, metaphysical but epistemological. The similarities between Smuts and Pringle-Pattison's Hegelianism and Personality, for example, are readily recognizable.

Now when one adds to such a theory the support of the evolutionary hypothesis and the individualism of Aristotle's system and Leibnitz's Monadology (or the individualism, say, of McTaggert's position), one has before him Holism and Evolution. The monadic influence has prevailed over any hesitation Smuts may have had about the interpersonal needs of personality. The self, the person, is a

1. Supra., passim.
unique individual, a world within himself. He is supported by the entire universe but he is an individual developing as a self-contained system, waiting a further advance of the evolutionary process so that his aberrations and weaknesses may be overcome. His being is becoming and the becoming is that Holism within him which is striving to raise him to a new pinnacle of evolutionary achievement, an achievement which, both for the individual and society, is necessary and certain. In this sense, man (unlike the theories of McTaggert, Pringle-Pattison or Rashdall, for instance) is both a shaper of his own destiny and a point of passage in the march of Holism; for Smuts, the primary emphasis is upon the latter.

This means, of course, that Smuts cannot deal adequately with the unique nature of man, which involves intentionality, and community; nor can he have a concept of the Other which is what we call personal. Most certainly, man, for Smuts, as with most Personalists, is the center of the universe, organically connected with all being; the universe is focussed in him. But this has not necessarily given us a theory of man as personal but only as individual. Man's personal-ness is only to be found in his mutuality or 'we-ness', a concept Smuts, as Younghusband has pointed out, obviously neglects. Man's uniqueness is also found in his intentionality so that he does things intentionally, not in consequence of a force within which is not himself. This is another characteristic of Personality which Smuts fails to consider.

This is the difficulty with all evolutionary theories: They include mind within the organic so that intentionality makes no difference in principle. There is, however, a vast difference in saying 'Y caused X effect' and 'Y caused X effect intentionally'. Is there
t a wider gap between physical events and consciousness than the evolu-

tionary, organic philosophies admit? In a criticism of White-

had's philosophy on this very issue, Dorothy Emmet states, 'But we have reason to believe that a break in kind occurs when physiological response becomes perceptual awareness, and still more when it becomes a deliberately directed judgment of meaning'.

Now, while Smuts does not assert that discriminatory judgment, rational thought and action are necessarily the result of physiological need, he does assert that mind has its substratum in the physiological aspect of personality. Still further, mind has, as it were, its earliest beginnings in the bare 'adience' and 'avoidance' tendencies and responses in physical properties. These responses, he would declare, are not to be considered 'mental' but are, so to speak, 'forerunners' of what is, in its higher stages, called mind. He does not posit that mind develops parallel to matter or that spirit or mind is in all wholes as pan-

psychism would have it or as Lloyd Morgan is inclined to maintain. The only way Smuts could possibly answer the criticism above is to recur to his definition of wholes in which the whole is more than and different from all the parts together. This would mean that physiological activity is just as much a part of reason as anything could be. The higher mental functions we call rationality is a whole which has emerged from other wholes which are retained as a foundation, yet is not fully explained thereby, since a new element has entered in; in fact, he might say that the new whole is of a different kind altogether from preceding wholes just as a cell is of a different nature from the electron, though presupposing its constituting structural nature, and as man, while he has risen out of the organic, is an emergent from it but of a different sort altogether. There is nothing in

1. The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, p. 234
Smuts, however, that says this or would indicate that this principle is employed to account for Personality as sui generis. Furthermore, Smuts cannot maintain any such scheme consistently even if we grant him such a premise; because evolutionary holism regards what man is, social progress, rationality and intentionality as not different in kind from lower order levels of organic equilibrative reactions or the purposeful activity of animals in efforts of instinctual preservation.

This leads us to ask of contemporary holist writers, 'Do I think and act or does something in me think and act?' Does the holistic-principle make me do things or do I do them? Possibly we have emphasized the contemporary position sufficiently in the arguments of Section II but we can state it more pointedly here. As Hegel envisioned the world-spirit impelling action so one feels the holistic-principle is both the condition and instrument of personality-functioning and action. In another sense, the Apostle Paul expressed it well, 'Work out your own salvation for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do'. In other words, the holistic principle is a guide, not a compulsion. On the other hand, there are many automatisms, habits, reactions in addition to feelings, need-systems, 1.

1. A further statement: The fallacy of Smuts's view, at this particular point, is not, it seems, that mind as we know it is the same 'mind' in the equilibrative activity of organisms or 'lower level' animals, but that human mental activity, i.e. reason, intention, are no different in kind from such organismic activity. Smuts tries to walk a tightrope when he posits that in the human being mind is not the same 'mind' of the lower order preservational activity but a development of equilibrative activity. Mind is different by development but not different in kind (sui generis). This, of course, is much like Liebniz's clear and distinct perception ascribed monads. (Cf. Ch. V, thesis). This statement (above) considers the definition of wholes as well as the problem of different in kind, the two concepts forming an interpretive background for Smut's statement that 'Mind is nothing but a development of prior organic regulation'. (op. cit., pp. 254, 260). The ambiguous and problematic
affect-uneasiness, unconscious defensive functions, which are the individual functioning but are not the result of deliberate effort. Yet, they are not capricious but are directional (as is true of the organic). Ideas 'come into my mind' (consciousness) which are not determined by my higher centers of mental activity (ego-functions). I cannot predict what my thoughts the next moment will be, neither do I deliberately choose what I will think. Yet, it is I who am thinking. The thoughts are mine, they are me functioning. Evidently, thoughts represent a conative activity which seeks the construction of wholes, consistency, the resolvement of moral and intellectual contradiction. I can only meet contradiction from others and this only when I feel secure in my system and that the contradiction is due to the other's failure to understand my intellectual assertions or only when I feel the contradiction will help me improve the consistency of my own thought. One cannot live healthfully with unresolved important moral and intellectual contradictions and issues, since we must find causality or necessity or reasonableness for things to our own satisfaction, although the latter qualification is by no means a guarantee of health or that unconscious functions will not attempt a better closure. I cannot maintain in myself inner harmony, confidence or integrity when there is the internal contradiction resulting from the antagonism of one dissociated compartment, idea, function, against all the other parts and whole (operating outside consciousness), e.g. repressed aggression or desire for adulterous experience over against the consciously moral, Christian life or demands of the community. This kind nature of the entire consideration, however, is incurred by a comparison of his whole thesis with its controversial and contradictory passages considered in Ch. vi of thesis.

1. I am here talking about relatively healthy people. There are those who not only can stand contradiction but who actually enjoy it, in fact, they create situations in which there is constant contradiction, antagonism, conflict. They
of contradiction is incompatible with health. Further, I cannot live comfortably if I am not accepted by the Other and taken for what I am. This, evidently, is what Otto Kant meant when he said 'Disharmony is for human beings unendurable'. Thus: it is I who do the thinking, yet I do not have complete control over what I will think nor how I will think about what I think. Our discussion so far would assert that this conational activity is directional and lawful, that its primary concern is to maintain and enhance wholeness of the self, it works in terms of and on the basis of the holistic-principle. Now what of deliberate discipline of thought which says I will consider for as long as possible in consistently prolonged intervals, a certain problem? What of action which we consider the free decision of the Agent to make an objective difference? My maintenance requires that I act in certain ways, yet it does not force me to do so except in cases of emergency where it is intolerant of deliberation. In another sense, I maintain myself because I want to, the preservation having to do with the Holistic-self and the self-concept. In this instance, while my action is characterized by a desire for consistency, which 'need' this kind of life. This, of course, is deviated behavior and that individual would be unaware of this need, how it arose, and what purposes it is serving; this, however, is no less the holistic-principle in the life, as we saw in last chapter. Healthy persons can tolerate contradiction from others as they can be pessimistic and recall interrupted tasks. But I am not referring here to irresistibility or problems of frustration tolerance; I am talking about unconscious systems working outside consciousness.

1. Personal conversation reported by de Forrest, Leaven of Love, p. 124.

2. The rationalization which makes suicide possible is an attempt to make the act reason-able. Rationalization, however, is predominantly motivated by irrational, unconscious needs and systems which, in this case, is not reason which is objective or normal. To the individual, as we indicated in the last chapter, it is, in fact, to him a preservation. There are anthropological studies which indicate customs far different from ours and must be taken in their natural setting. To illustrate the suggestion in text: the sudden reflexive behavior when I turn my car sharply to avoid an accident or suddenly running from a fire without thinking and realize
in a special sense 'governs what I do, I am not forced to do so. There is always open to me the possibility of deliberate, however rationalized, refutation of consistency and wholeness, the rationalization often being a safeguard of continued existence as well as a function by which I feel at the time that I am acting rightly under the circumstances. For me, my action is always free, and while what I do may and does have unconscious motivations, yet these are not 'not-me' but me. I may never act without desire, for then I would never act and never want to, however much desire, say for consistency and wholeness, may determine or tend to incline the direction of my action, I always act as if I did so by conscious decision and rational choice. The holistic-principle seems, then, not to force me to think all that I think or do all that I do but is the characteristic feature of all I think and all I do so that I create wholes consistent with reality. The cohesive principle and that making for holistic organization of all one's activities is the characteristic tendency of the personality itself, not acting on it ab extra. To illustrate, when one is devoted to a cause he deems worthy, this cause 'determines' perceptual experience, intention and action but all the time it is a cause the individual feels he has chosen freely to serve. As Agent, he always feels that he acts rightly and freely at the time and under the circumstances. In this sense, he is always responsible for his defense-system and action a half block away what I am doing. This reflexive behavior, in certain circumstances, gets us in trouble as in panic in a crowded theatre. It is a preservational attempt. Cf. Chpt. vii, thesis, on voluntary innervation in discussion of the unity of the action of the personal.

1. Nothing is 'developing' the personality but its own synthetic, holistic character.

2. Freedom, according to Stout, is when a man 'feels that if he had been more fully himself he would have acted otherwise'. Op. cit., p. 303. 'Freedom is the capacity to resist our past experience', suggests Professor McKenzie.
since he could live otherwise. Smuts's position would differ from this in that Holism (tendency) would be assigned a more dominant role in personal development and on the long range view, personality would be, in the final analysis, the vehicle (interspersing point of passage) of the 'forward marching' evolutionary holistic-tendency. This contradicts his personalism and the place he seeks to preserve for personality in the universe.\(^1\) Beyond this, into problems of free-will, we cannot go.

**The concept of community and the Other**

We challenge Smuts's concept of the personal on at least two major counts: (1) that by making no difference in kind between organic and personal, he cannot give an adequate account of what personality is and, consequently, fellowship, community, intention, love are substantially depreciated, (2) that because the tendency to wholeness is an individual internal becoming (a personal evolutionary development) the essential interpersonal nature of man is neglected and others, as well as the entire environment, become means to an end, thus objects not persons; consequently, there can be no fellowship and no community and this, not so much because there is little interaction, however important this may be, but because fellowship cannot be based on the concept of the Other as object.

Our contemporary Holistic Approach must consider, it seems to the author, the significance of interpersonal relationship and fellowship. This thesis has deliberately tried to hold to Smuts's view since a treatment of this system is its object. We have tried to push his system to what we believe are some of its logical conclusions. But we have been forced to depart, as has become apparent, from Smuts's

\(^1\) Thus the person, in both idealism and naturalism, becomes an object through which something else passes and thus negates infinite significance.
Individualism. We can now state our position thus: if it is true that the nature of man's strivings is rooted merely in the tendency to maintain and realize the Self, this is a tragedy, a tragedy of our time, and surely must, itself, indicate some kind of social pathology. Unfortunately, it is as often true as it is tragic. But let us qualify this statement. Karl Barth states that 'all man's will to live is from top to bottom, even if other elements seem also to play their part, an effort of some sort to magnify, to elevate, to extend our self, our little ego'.

While we cannot agree with Professor Barth's generalization and would see the same 'will to live' with Schweitzer as the basic factor in community well-being, yet we must somehow be ready to acknowledge with Brunner that 'To all of us, without exception, the command to "love one's neighbor as oneself" becomes a sentence of condemnation'.

Neither can we forget that however wrongly Hobbes, Freud and Adler generalized their theories of man's motives and the emotional basis of the rise of civilization, much of our life is rooted in seeking 'the advantage of the self'. The I-persona, morbid ambition and self-interest are deadly spectres in all our attempts to love.

But it is possible, as we have briefly mentioned previously, that the continuum from health to pathosis (Sadler) to psychosis, is really a continuum from community oneness to the narcissistic inversion in the wild strivings to save oneself. This is the continuum of centripetal convergence. A man's health is determined by his fellowship with others. By this we do not mean that superficial persona-mania which seeks immature ingratiation for the satisfaction of narcissistic love-needs or that saintliness which cannot look aggression in the face.

1. The Christian Life, p. 51
2. The Decay and Restoration of Civilization, pp. 1, 97-105
3. The Divine Imperative, p. 175
4. In such a theory the system of Individual Behavior as given by Snygg and Combs has a legitimate place.
tolerate the tension of being 'disliked' or those people who are so busy repressing their impulses in order to be nice that they have not learned to love, but a mature wholesome acceptance of the self and others and an openheartedness which makes defense, compulsive activity and intolerance unnecessary.

There seems to be, as Angyal indicates, a trend toward increased homonomy. In more personal terms, there is a need to be understood, accepted and loved. By being understood, we mean that feeling which results when another knows what I mean so that no questions separate me from myself and make me a stranger to myself; where I can be me and still be accepted. When in the company of those who do not understand me, although the group is one, it is only an organization, a unit, not a community. By 'accepted' we mean that feeling which comes when the other knows the worst in me and yet takes me and loves me for what I am. This acceptance demands first, my own acceptance of myself; that is, of the 'shadow' (Jung) part of my self, for if I have not accepted this, I shall never feel that others have accepted me nor understood me and I shall be under the tyranny of compulsive persona defense - acceptance, not on the basis of social standing, nor as an object to be manipulated for the satisfactory realization of someone's wholeness, nor as a commodity to be spent when that commodity buys an advancement to higher status, but because of my being a fellow human being, just because I, too, have existence. There is within man a longing for this acceptance. There is, as Fromm points out, 1 a need to avoidaloneness; what Stekel has called the fear of 'social death'. 2 Since our reactions, goals, hopes, hates, the very meaning of existence are given in terms, not so much of abstract environment

1. The Fear of Freedom, p. 289
pr impersonal 'fields' but persons; there is a craving for mature love. This love is described by Macmurray as 'a relationship which has no purpose beyond itself; in which we associate because it is natural for human beings to share their experience; to understand one another, to find joy and satisfaction in living together; in expressing and revealing themselves to one another'.

"The best way to win men to you", wrote Bentham, 'is to seem to love them; and the best way to seem to love them is to love them indeed.'

It seems significant that holist writers should emphasize the harmony between the tendency toward autonomy and homonomy. Wholeness seems to be a balance between the two. There is a sense in which one loses his life to find it; that is, in community, in the enrichment resulting from shared experience, the investment of the self in a worthy cause, the joy of giving and receiving, loving and being loved. On the other hand, nothing is more morbid than that 'phagocytic martyrdom' (if I may use the term) insidiously masquerading as 'kindness', a sort of neurotic masochistic submissiveness which is surreptitiously demanded for the megalomaniac enjoyment of being wanted and the feeling of being needed and necessary. Usually such a person is only necessary to somebody who is fixated at this primary omnipotence level. We cannot forget that a surrender of freedom to alleviate anxiety is possible in morbid submission (as in Fascism) as Fromm and Goldstein have well contended, and that the super-ego, as Flugel asserts, can be given up to the crowd so that one no longer has any beliefs of his own, no thought of his own, has refused to

1. Cited by Horney, Our Inner Conflicts, p. 242
2. Cited by Woodger, op. cit., p. 308
3. E.g. a person of morbid ambition or the authoritarian individual.
5. Public lecture, cf. his Man, Morals and Society.
thinj and to act as a person. Both isolation which is a withdrawal without a return, and 'collectivity' (Buber) or the 'crowd' (Kierkegaard) offer escapes from freedom, from wholeness, into a repressed partitiveness (Burrow) and pathological state. To surrender one's self to the whims of the obsessional needs, traditions, expectancies or obsessional massed productions of the crowd or to live to oneself is never to have lived at all. \(^2\) But this is not community. Community, or the we-ness of people together, makes no such demands. The only demand from the community is that its individuals be free; that is, openhearted, since what the individual is and what motivates him are laid bare in fellowship. \(^3\) Community demands this personal integrity, otherwise, there is nothing but a crowd. In this sense, community is to the individual what action is to thought - as action presupposes thought and takes it up into itself, so community presupposes the integrity and intrinsic meaning of the Single Person. \(^4\) In both action and community, thought and singularity find a new meaning, a relational meaning; in neither case is it an absorption which negates the intrinsic meaning of thought or the One so that the result is an activism or action for action's sake, thus a compulsive activity or an escape.

1. Toynbee, op. cit., V. II and III
2. Cf. Oakeley, op. cit., p. 104
3. Cf. Writings of Jaspers, Oman, Buber, Macmurray.
4. We are making a special emphasis here. Actually the position of this paper as a whole contends that action presupposes the whole (psychophysically neutral) being and takes it up into itself as community presupposes the integrity of the person as a whole and takes it up into itself. Action cannot be action (but lapses into activity or behaving); community cannot be community (but lapses into collectivity) if the person enters into each in a partial expression of himself or retaining (consciously or unconsciously) a part of himself both from himself and/or the other. I would not leave the impression that the boundaries are arbitrary; possibly activity to action, collectivity to community is a continuum based on the entering in of the wholeness of the person.
from oneself, a de-personalization in which one is no longer Agent but an object or thing in a crowd. The relational meaning is that without which the respective full value of thought and the Single Person and thus maturity would remain unknown. It is only in that togetherness which rises out of understanding, acceptance, trust, defenselessness, uniqueness of sharing pervading the relationship with the Other that man's essential being is exposed and known.

It would seem, at least on the basis of clinical observation, that the search for personal completeness or self-actualization, which Aristotle and Smuts contended for, is only one phase of man's striving. Deeply imbedded in man's nature, just because he is of the personal, is a basic need to enter into mature human relationship with the Other, which leads one to believe that the Other is the needed correlate in wholeness. Thus, it is this relationship in which one is accepted, understood and loved as a person that is a demand for completeness, the end toward which we, as human beings, strive. No one has been considered a great person of character and integrity who has not been social.

William Stern has shown that there is a vast difference between what he calls 'autotelic' (by which he describes behavior resulting from instincts and is characteristic of animals), heterotelic (self-development, tendency to enhance one's importance, to acquire power and to organize the self) and hypertelic (super-personal regions of existence). We can confine the argument to our main problem here, i.e. community. Stern believes that the autotelic behavior of animals as they congregate in 'herd societies' (we would prefer the term 'herd groups' or 'herd organizations') is essentially different from the hypertelic activity by which people associate in community. He recognizes, if I interpret him correctly, that it is not merely a case of the higher development of organic association that characterizes human
behavior with other people but a special kind of togetherness based on intention and personal decision to live in oneness. The superimposed legislation (by the demand of instincts) to congregate is not the same as the personal community in which people live together because they want to. Stern says of character that it is a man's own 'monumental achievement' (heterotelic). In the same sense, we can say that to live together in peace and love (community) because we decide to is the 'monumental achievement' of the personal.

Consequently, two things result from this discussion: (1) basic to the personal is the need to love and to be loved as a person; that is, to enter into mature relationship with the Other; (2) that wholeness cannot be defined merely in terms of self-actualization but must be reformulated in terms of the unique experience of fellowship and community. There is a need for autonomy which makes the community able to experience fellowship. Fellowship is not built on martyrs or objects or units or (as in religious or civic organizations) 'additions' or numbers but on persons, mature, free, spontaneous, resolute, hopeful. It is not built on calculated kindness; nor is community built on the biological idea of blood relationship (Aryanism or Judaism), it is built on the idea that somehow, we must accept a person as he is and on what he can be but not what we think he should be. We must accept a person as essentially human, whose human-ness is him even though the individual may conceivably exist apart from society, but that in community his human-ness is both challenged, clarified and developed. We must consider that the community is where two or more people live together so that none cancels out or diminishes

1. Nor on physical objects or merely psychological entities. Cf. last chapter on the approach of medicine and psychology and Appendix III. Berdyaev develops the idea that personality cannot be considered as mathematical or social units which he calls the category of number. Solitude and Society, pp. 171ff.

2. Weiss, Paul, Freedom, p. 38
The essential personal nature of the Other. There is something creative, as Marcel has often pointed out, which enters into interpersonal fellowship making it different from all other experiences in Nature.

The search for meaning: existential anxiety

The search for personal completeness, actualization and integrity, the need for moral and intellectual consistency, the longing for community oneness are all significant elements of wholeness in the personal. From the consideration, particularly of people under stress, another need not altogether unrelated to the preceding, forces itself upon our recognition. We must deal with the essential need of personality for meaning and the problem, possibly attendant to it, of anxiety.

First, let us describe our concept of meaning as a person-need. Allport writes of the universal intellectual quest for the answer to the 'why of things', what we have previously discussed as the ego-function need for causality and necessity (chapter vii). This is the search for intellectual meaning. Meaning as given in terms of part-whole relationship, being and not-being, interconnectedness of reality as discussed in chapter i is not what is considered here. Meaning, at this point, is a totalistic concept, a whole person-need. The need for meaning is the need to make significant difference in a way deemed worthwhile by the individual. It is a demand of personality to count for something. The failure to make a difference, to be significant to someone, as determined by the individual, results in a loss of self-respect, self-worth, which is the predominant characteristic of psychoneurosis. Evidently a person cannot endure himself, his existence, when he does not matter to a significant Other since this is a denial and contradiction of the essence of his personhood. There is a prevailing need to order one's life around someone, some cause, some ideal,

1. Individual and His Religion, pp. 22-23
some master-sentiment, without which the person is unoriented, confused, fragmented and aimless. As Murphy says, there is no point in living without a challenge. Professor Jung states that most of his patients are people whose problem was, in the last resort, one of finding a religious outlook on life. We cannot agree with Professor Jung if he means by this a religious creed or a search for what the theists call God. If, however, he is asserting that many of his patients are seeking a meaning to their lives, in the sense of finding a significant relationship beyond themselves, then our brief clinical experience can heartily concur. People seem to plunge themselves into all sorts of abnormal activity in a search for meaning. War, for many, is not reinforcing because of some sadistic, destructive instinct, but as Burrow and Berg have shown, may be a situation in which one finds, at last, that he matters. It seems tragic that our society, so often devoid of tenderness (Suttie) and fellowship and community, forces a person and itself into such extreme individual and social pathology as is evident in person-pathology, war, totalitarianism and exploitation. De-socialization arises in progressive ratio with the growing complexity, obsessonal productions and depreciation of the essential nature of the personal to the level of manipulatable objects, organisms or extensions of machines and has heightened the fear and the longing for communal wholeness. The wild strivings of our contemporary world scene and culture appear to be the illusory strivings for the good, attempts to secure oneness with the Other, efforts to find wholeness and completion and meaning, rising in response to that within man we call the most unique possession of the personal - the lure to transcend

1. Cf. The Individual and His Religion, p. 59
3. In Search of a Soul, chapter iii
the immediate and to establish a genuine relationship with the Other and with something or someone enduring and worthy. Such needs for wholeness become illusory, ambiguous, disseminated, sanguinary and pathological when separated from the person-other whole, when we regard the Other as less than personal and incapable of loving or being loved.

As wholeness cannot be achieved except in fellowship with the Other, so wholeness, evidently, cannot be achieved independent of a value-system which is related to the needs of the person and the Other and thus personal. ¹ It is plain that often the psychoanalytic procedure is unsuccessful in leading the analysand (patient) to a new social maturity because it fails to give a value-content-replacement after the evacuation of material which made for pathology. ² Anna Freud has recognized this difficulty, which long ago was seen by Maeder and Jung, when she says, 'Learning in analysis comes in the educational process of fortifying the patient against increasing pain after the excavations'.³ A philosophy of life devoid of moral contradiction (or, as some would have it, a 'master sentiment' organized around a leading and worthful idea) is, seemingly, a fundamental need of personal wholeness.

It is tempting to stop and consider the ramifications of this observation about personality but we must ask now what all of this means. First, such postulations run contrary to the Freudian position (as well as other biological theories of personality). When the psychoanalysts say that all illness is the attempt at gratification of forbidden tendencies and to satisfy the conscience anxiety (super-ego

1. Murphy describes personality as a personal value-system, op. cit., p. 270
2. Part of its failure, we believe, is due to its belief and approach to the personal as if it were biological.
3. The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, p. 69
anxiety) which stands over the person like some 'avenging deity', we can only assert that while such problems do enter into pathological conditions, they not only need to be reconsidered, according to this this, from a holistic point of view, but must be considered to be only one source of aberration; thus when considered an adequate interpretation of the behavior of the personal is essentially a wrong perspective. The universal assumption of incest desire (oedipus conflict) as the source of pathology is unwarranted. Neither can one's position on this be rationalized by saying the oedipus conflict is still there (universally) but now unconscious. This contention, however, is made by Alexander who illustrates his belief by referring to the Wall Street Banker. This 'classical representative of capitalistic morality', he says, 'may experience it (oedipus conflict) in the form of a harmless unintentional action when he unthinkingly pockets his business friend's pencil and demonstrates, thereby, that his super-ego still has to battle with this tendency'.

It is apparent that theories of mere instinct gratification or historical causation cannot account satisfactorily for person-pathology. It seems that the need for the actualization of all one's powers, the need, as Hinkle posits, to pass beyond oneself as one now is, the need for completeness, a prospective aim of personality, a desire to be whole, are integral conditions of motivation and pathology and must be considered by the psychotherapist. The future is even possibly more important than the past in neurotic conflict and certainly in everyday living. One's hopes, fears, desires, the lure of what one could be, the future with its challenge, the present with its point of interspersing tensions, are as important as

1. The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality, p. 20
past experience. In all of this there is a prospective reference, a faith in growth, realization, wholeness; that what now is only potential can become actual. If a person is conscious of his need for completeness, he has recognized the holistic-principle at work. Wholeness, then, awaits his personal decision and action in order to be fulfilled.

We are led, therefore, to a new position. There is a need for the person, just because he is personal, to transcend the painful boundaries of immediate existence and become what he might be. The wholeness which stands before him is a lure, a challenge, what Einstein (with regard to the quest for the basic nature of things) calls a 'hunger of the soul'. That need for wholeness is the source of much of man's anxiety. The failure to grow toward wholeness may result in morbid pathology. But the anxiety which we are discussing is not a morbid, pathological anxiety but what Tillich calls 'ontological anxiety' and is possibly very near to what Kierkegaard meant by 'the fear of nothing' or what we have preferred to call existential anxiety.

It is the condition of existence. Is it possible, we may ask, that some forms of uneasiness or vague depression or what we sometimes call 'guilt feelings' may be a reaction to our better selves when we live less than we could or when we fail to strive faithfully for the wholeness of what we might become? Plato, in the Symposium and Phaedrus, suggests that there is an impulse or aspiration residing in every individual soul, whatever its imperfection and shortcomings, towards the ideal that expresses the nature of true being. That restlessness of

1. Planck, Max, Where is Science Going?, preface by Albert Einstein, p. 13
2. The Courage to Be; Theology
3. The super-ego demand to be what we should be is altogether a different thing from this as is probably clear from the whole trend of this thesis. Cf. Schweitzer, op. cit., v. i, p. 94
which Leibniz spoke (as we saw earlier in the paper) and of which Augustine in the *Confessions* spoke in another context (according to the usual interpretation) are nothing but that existential anxiety, the possibility only of the personal which seeks that wholeness which finds its content in all those sub-needs of personal completeness, consistency, community-oneness and meaning. In fact, this wholeness might be regarded as religious experience, to live, as Santayana said, in the presence of an ideal, but we add, a shared ideal for it realizes itself in that uniqueness of mature living (unhealthy ideals do not result in this) when we have fellowship one with another. Thus, as we have been led to believe, personal wholeness, as Giddings and Macmurray have contended, is two people in community. It is toward this personal wholeness and search for meaning, since it is natural to the personal, that existential anxiety may be said to be directed.

The fear of wholeness

But how do we account for man's effort to escape from wholeness? Wholeness, i.e., meaning, fellowship, community, are not easy to achieve nor without attendant responsibility. Psychoanalysis

1. May speaks of this kind of anxiety as 'a stimulus for the solution of personal problems', *Man's Search for Himself*, also noted by Hanfmann, E., *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1951,46,265.

2. Fellowship which is built, as we have discussed before, out of integrity, open-heartedness, freedom, the wholeness of motivations, the concept of the Self and Other as personal and is not the result of anything evolutionary. It is personal decision in action and is not automatic. Wholeness cannot be achieved without this. It is a matter of dedication not the unfolding of a biological purpose (and in that sense causal or the cause of). Neither can we follow Thorpe's injunction 'teach a man to think and integration follows' or 'reasoning is the sine qua non of integration'. (This is the fallacy of considering man's essence to be in thought or as Thinker rather than as Agent; cf. Chapter vii, on Agent, thesis) Thorpe, op. cit., pp. 325-327.
(psychoanalytic treatment) may be the most terrifying experience a person may have, as may religious conversion, facing an ideal, comprehending a vision of what one could be, or as some might have it, facing God. Completeness and integrity of the person—other whole means responsibility, being oneself, facing up to oneself, dropping the pretence, the morbid concern for self-salvation and esteem. Wholeness, as Smuts rightly asserted, is painful. It involves all the attendant risks of action. It means having to decide, as Sartre has put it, for healing, wholeness (character and integrity) metanoia, community are not automatic or without their own demands. Passivity, return to the womb, a return to motheroneness, vegetative existing is easier for many than decision, action, striving for integrity, community, even though they suffer the agony of their own self-centered pathology and they want to say with Santayana, 'I would I might forget that I am I'. Wholeness means dealing with existence which involves the Other; it is, as Marcel opines, confronting the sting of the real. Many people, nearing the end of psychotherapy or psychoanalysis, actually seem to feel an uneasiness, not merely because of impending suspension of the relationship with the therapist (transference) but due, it seems, to the wholeness which demands to be acted upon. Others may dread the consequences of cure in a more direct expression to avoid the responsibility of being a person. Possibly, in similar thought, the instinctual, biological, deterministic theories

1. Suttie's thesis that there is a need to return to mother-oneness is applicable only to those who fear wholeness, i.e. neurotic personalities.
2. Sonnet VII
3. Cf. Ross, T.A., An Enquiry into Prognosis in the Neurosis, p. 4; Alexander, The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality, p. 88. Physical attacks on the therapist, resistance, suicidal attempts, fugues, depression, 're-lapses' should be considered in the light of such a possibility.
of Freud and the evolutionary hypotheses, such as Smuts's Holism, are motivated by an urge to be freed from freedom. 1 This is the fear of encounter, the fear of being, the fear of existence. But, alas, when great lives have finally approximated it, they say, as Macmurray says of love, it is only the natural way to live.

The tendency to wholeness, then, (as is true of personality) is not individualistic. Wholeness is achieved in the mature personal relationship with the Other when both persons find, in such community, the self-actualization of their essential being. Smuts stopped with personality as the highest expression of Holism and defined freedom as self-determination. We have tried to show that the holistic-principle finds its fullest revelation when people live together in community and that freedom is the ability to enter into community, indeed, its requisite and our desire. The tendency seems to be to maintain and enhance person-other wholeness (and the more inclusive person-field whole) in which complementariness of personal being and meaning is conjoined into one whole on which the essential humanity and very existence of the personal depend. This wholeness is the vision which determines action, a continuing quest, the integrating power of what is unseen but existentially real.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Personology: Considerations in the Methodological Study of Personality
In all probability, one of the main motives of Smuts's interest in the holistic-principle was his realization of the need for a science of personality. To Smuts, personality was not only the fullest expression of the holistic-principle but that toward which the holistic-principle was working from the beginning. It would not be difficult to show that his whole philosophy, in this special sense, is teleological. Unfortunately, most reviewers were attracted by the philosophical implications of his principle and said little about what Smuts felt he was leading up to; namely, the need for a science of the personal. To this urgent demand he suggests the term 'personology'.

At least four major considerations in Smuts's system as a whole seem to justify such a proposal, viz., (1) Since the person is a whole he should be studied as a whole (for Smuts, even Ward's Characterology represented too limited a phase of personality study). While various disciplines deal with certain phases of personality, no science deals specifically with personality as such. According to Smuts, Personality deserves a science of its own. This science would

1. H.A. Murray adopts the term 'personology'. Sadler, in Practise of Psychiatry, referring to the 'science of human behavior', writes, 'For about fifteen years I have designated it as "Personology". I coined this term to express my concept of the holistic character of the theory and practise of modern psychiatry'. (p. 13) In a personal letter, Dr. Sadler would not comment on Smuts's earlier use of the term and the possible influence it may have had on him. He would only state that the term 'personology' came to him during a lecture at an American university. Neither would he comment on his use of the term 'holistic'. Similar suggestions as Personology may be found in Korzybski's use of the term Anthropology or 'General Anthropology' op. cit. pp. 38-39 and in Stern's 'Personalistics' op. cit., although the term 'Personology' has come to indicate a much broader and more inclusive approach than Smuts envisioned for it. The author would consider the work of Andras Angyal, Gordon Allport and H.A. Murray the closest approximation, development and improvement yet written of a science of personality along the lines suggested and latent in Smuts's philosophy as a whole.
Consider intelligence, perception, sensation, memory, etc., as the personality functioning in certain ways rather than as separate, abstracted entities in themselves. \(^1\) Likewise, action or action-wholes would be studied rather than the so-called 'fractionated responses to isolated stimuli' (Martin); (2) Personality must be studied in individuals; that is, the science of personality must concern itself with the individual, not an abstract, general class. If our study of personality is on the basis of general psychology, we deal with a hypothetical entity which does not exist and thus fail to grasp those individual differences which constitute the salient features of the personal; (3) Personality, asserts Smuts, stands in the no-man's land between science and philosophy. As we noted in Chapter VII, the personal whole might be regarded as a psychophysically neutral entity. It is a personal whole in that sense of a new emergent by reason of its uniqueness and cannot be treated by dissecting it into parts or as the sum of a multiplicity of systems or as a mere physical object or machine; \(^2\) (4) Personality, since its predominant feature, according to Smuts, is its development \(^3\) toward wholeness, its 'personal evolution' must be studied in biography. Only in this way do we get a picture of the total 'life-style' (Adler), the successive phases of wholeness-development. On the basis of biographical studies of outstanding persons who best exemplify wholeness of personality, we can formulate general laws which seem to function for all persons. \(^4\)

1. I should prefer to follow Woodworth and Macmurray and use verbs and adverbs to describe personality functions rather than nouns. Allport speaks of such personality functions as 'attributes of personality'. We thus would speak of remembering, sensing, perceiving, etc. This conveys in a better way, that it is the Agent functioning in a variety of ways.

2. For a good discussion of this idea, see Macmurray, *Interpreting the Universe*, Chapters iv, v, vi.

3. This reflects Smuts's position. We should prefer the term 'intention' rather than 'development' as the predominant feature of the personal.

4. The laws of mental process are the same for all
Smuts does not greatly elaborate his idea of Personology. Although he was a very wise thinker, he was not a psychologist. Certainly, we are not suggesting that one need be a professional psychologist to understand personality. In fact, we have much to learn, even now when our interests in man, his thought and action and behavior are advancing so rapidly, from the early Greek philosophers and dramatists. However, when one considers that Smuts's suggestions were made without this knowledge and more than a quarter of a century ago when elementalism, segmentalism and atomism (all confusing the separable and the separate, Laing says1) pervaded so much of the contemporary science and thought, before the more developed disciplines of dynamic psychology and psychosomatic medicine2, before cultural anthropology had become articulated and before the more recent endeavors to diminish the hard and fast lines between the sciences and between science and philosophy, one must surely acknowledge the forward-looking attitude, insight and significant considerations Smuts's thesis presented to the world of thought, especially those interests concerning man, his inner life, behavior and action.

The lack of formal training in psychology and ignorance of recent developments in those disciplines which deal with man, do not constitute, however, the real source of Smuts's difficulties, which are, as well, reflected in his idea of Personology as at any point in his entire thesis.

In the last analysis, what is Personology? As Smuts outlined it, Personology is a science of biography. Its methodology (Kant, Giddings, etc.). McKenzie suggests that the different types of personality would be shown by the different master sentiments through which the holistic-principle works in each. They would, however, be the same laws.

2. Holism and Evolution, p. 279
follows the general lines of approach and inquiry employed in biographic study. Smuts suggests that this science, which he refers to as the Science of Biography, Science of Personality and Science of Human Nature, is a discipline set off by itself which, unlike the other sciences, will study a person as a whole. In Smuts own view, the only way to grasp what, in this connection, we mean by 'person as a whole' is to consider the life-trend as one unit. In this way, we see how a person's development occurred. As we shall discuss later, the methodological procedure is one which interprets all sub-phases, crises, conflicts, set-backs, achievements, character formation, developmental factors as parts of the whole - the life-unit. They will then not be regarded as wholes but parts or aspects of one continuous development, a unit in time. Such a science must deal, consequently, with a life already lived. It must be a research science. It must be an historical study. It is not composed of other sciences, does not synthesize them into itself in some hierarchical structure, but takes cognizance of all those disciplines which study human nature while itself being outside them, studying the person for himself as a totality. Smuts thinks so highly of this idea of biographical study, that, without hesitation, he confidently asserts the belief that it would be 'the crowning science of man'.

Actually, the most natural thing for an evolutionist to propound as a methodological procedure for the comprehension and study of personal wholes is the study of biographies and auto-biographical material. This method, an historical one, may be called longitudinal although longitudinal method is not always biographical in the sense in which Smuts uses the term or thinks of it. The two ideas (evolution and longitudinal study) are commensurately given in the fact that the primary emphasis of Smuts's Holistic Approach is the personal
of the individual, the historical life-trend; the biographical method consequently and logically follows.

But the longitudinal method of approach is not necessarily bound up with the evolutionary position. Rather, because personality as a continuant develops through time and is a succession of differentiating wholes and because man is a 'time-binder' whose immediate experience is the ingression of past and future in the present; it is only logical and, in fact, necessary to employ some kind of longitudinal approach to study him. The continuity of life, with each successive level of development (wholes) from embryo, foetus, infant, child, adolescent, adult, senescent being in its own right as well a whole, has been studied extensively, particularly by Gesell, Coghill and C.H. Buhler and, in a more limited way, by the psychoanalysts who emphasize the oral, anal, genital, 'quiescent period', puberty and the climacteric phasic development.

From the practical point of view there is much to be said for and much against the biographical method. Concerning the difficulties, one question immediately arises as to what one should consider relevant to personality study and assessment. How important is the past? What of the past should be investigated? What attention should be given to value-systems? How shall we think of the individual's concern for the future and the sense in which his anticipations were realized? What experiences shall be considered relevant for his development? What experiences, need-systems, tensions, problems were repressed or sublimated and how did they determine the person's reactions to threat, development, challenge? What personal needs helped to determine his beliefs, philosophy of life, academic and religious systems of thought?

Other practical difficulties have been cited by Woodworth.¹

¹ _Psychology_, Chapter 1
For instance, it would be impossible to record a person’s life in all its detail from birth to adulthood and old age. Probably such voluminous material, for the most part, would be useless. Only small samples of behavior can be recorded. What, then, shall constitute those samples? One, he says, could hardly submit a healthy child to an inadequate diet just to see what difference it would make in his physical and mental growth (this question does not arise for Smuts although it might, viz., such experiments might be performed and recorded and then when the life is finished a biographer might try to see how they affected the pattern of living as a whole - this would probably require two generations). Woodworth shares Smuts’s idea that our knowledge of personality is often based on the observations of deviant behavior and what we need is a study of healthy, outstanding, successful people to form from their development, principles of normal maturation.

There is much to be said for the idea of studying the biographies of people. If one is to study a life already lived, probably this is the only method open to an observer - certainly no tests can be undertaken. One could, of course, in some cases at least, obtain information about a person from those people who are still alive and who knew him. One could apply a psychoanalytic-type technique in order to give deeper interpretations of the ‘personal evolution’ from autobiographical and biographical materials. Such a study which deals with outstanding personalities, would give all the sciences of human nature and philosophy valuable information which would contribute to the construction of a theoretical system concerning the basic laws of personal wholeness.

I propose the criticism, however, that the study of the biographies of people reflects Smuts’s individualism, his tendency to
regard the person as Subject, organism and object, his mistaken idea
that the individual's history is an end in itself and, consequently,
that a science of biography is the only kind of study which may be
regarded as dealing with the person as a whole. This all leads, we
believe, to a failure to understand — and, consequently, to build a
science that will understand — the essential nature of the personal.
I am inclined to believe that if we take Smuts's philosophy as a whole,
we should find, although Smuts nowhere, at least to my knowledge, ex-
pressly discusses the question, a theoretical position which would
not only contend for the study of the longitudinal life-history of a
person no longer living, but would make his entire methodological pro-
cedure one which is longitudinal whether the whole studied is alive
or expired, personal or organic. I am inclined also to believe that
his suggestions of the study of biography would over-emphasize indi-
vidual development, i.e. internal processes of development, to the
exclusion of situational pressures and thus hinder the comprehension
of how that development actually occurred.

The long-time trajectory of personality examination provides
us with a most reliable tool for ascertaining the development of the
individual, alive or deceased. It explicates the growth, peculiarities
of traits, attitudes, character, value-systems, indicates something
of the emotional content, some unconscious differentiations and re-
pressions, the rise and frustration or fulfillment of ambition and the
general purposive behavior of the individual in his search for whole-
ess and the achievement of the good. But, it says virtually nothing
about cultural interaction, field dynamics, social relationships and
interpersonal situations of fellowship and conflict and cannot consider
reaction-trends. It defines personality longitudinally, not as a pro-
sess going on between people. One cannot know, in such an approach,
the process of conditioning, and learning in the development of life-
trends since the 'press' (Murray) is not considered. Intention, which is object-centered, is evidently not important to consider, actually cannot be considered in such an individualistic system which makes development all important. All that the longitudinal approach can give us, is that an individual developed in a certain way, as he progressively realized wholeness or individual self-actualization. We cannot say why he developed in a certain way. We can talk in terms of probability as based on a basic personality reaction-type in the particular culture of any one individual. But the individualistic orientation tends to preclude anything other than mere description.

I think this is a serious charge against Smuts because it reflects the deeper difficulty inherent in his whole theory. By saying that the best way to study personality as a whole is to study the biographies of outstanding people is to say that what we really want to do is to know a person as closely as possible without meeting him. He is really saying this person can be known and studied as a Subject who has not been influenced by anything or anyone outside himself or caught up in the encounter with the Other. He can be studied as an object and we can know as much about him from his biographies, diaries, writings, etc. as if we had known him personally or as if we were now engaged in personal relationship with him. He is saying that whether a person is dead or alive, the fact that he has acted as Agent, that he has found himself in situations, relationships with others and conflicts, and that he has intended to do certain things, make no difference in principle. With such a frame of reference, even the biographical studies, if accepted as the best way to study a person, would negate, make one-sided and thus ineffective the accurate representation of development itself. But the personal cannot be
considered apart from personal relationships. Without knowing how the Agent acted with others, what changes in personality resulted from such relationships and interaction, and that a person is his relationships with others, one is hopelessly thrust into a position which refuses to see what the personal actually is — his essential nature, in such a perspective, can never be known.

Smuts suggests that the well recorded diaries of people help us to understand their reactions and certainly this is helpful; in fact, personal reactions, subjective feelings are very important. But a recorded or conscious belief that in one's action certain things are involved, may or may not lead us to know the real field-dynamics or personal cravings to which the person is reacting or which determine, in part, his action. Not only is this true because we seldom obtain from such records the affect-meanings of things to the person, but because the individual's own perceptual defense and protective functions may hide this even from himself. Of course, the same difficulties attend the biographer. What shall we say concerning the fact that several biographies about one person are all different? Is not the biographer subject to personal, conscious and unconscious attitudes and feelings which tend to distort, by selection and interpretation, the material before him? Can any historical study be undertaken without interpretation and without the subjective factor entering in as a determinant in the selection, valuation, organization, assessment and understanding of the material? Pointing up this difficulty is not to rule out all value of the biographical science. We cannot say that all we finally get in such studies is an insight into the

1. The author is not convinced that Smuts appreciates this problem sufficiently. He does suggest that in a person's literary works, possibly he reveals himself more than in his diaries or correspondence. But his discussion of Shakespeare is wholly lacking in a dynamic understanding of the nature of drama and reflects his basic lack of comprehension of the problem. Cf. Chapter x, op. cit.
psychological structure of the biographer. A good biographer, we say, is one who most accurately or most objectively represents the facts, events, intentions and action of the person studied. This must somehow presuppose a knowledge of what those facts should be, just as to say a person acted rightly is to presume that we know what is the right way for a person to act but also to have valued the action as a right one. What we finally get in biographical studies is a perspective of what one personality has meant to those who have studied or met him and to all he is a different person.

Smuts's idea of personology (the methodological procedure for the study of personality) is seriously lacking in another respect hinted at above. It assumes that we can know a person merely by observing him. This is the so-called 'objective' viewpoint. It is supposed to be the scientific viewpoint, although since relativity physics this has been challenged. Unfortunately, in the social sciences we have not yet accepted the fact that when a person is observed (as in a testing situation) his behavior is changed. By this, I mean that every testing situation has the relationship between the person and psychometrist as an independent variable. In 'purely objective' tests, emotional factors may enter into the way the experimenter explains the test which may vary with respect to different subjects without his awareness. His intonations, authoritarian attitude, 'presence', the way he looks at the individual may alter with different persons. His own 'detached' position may be 'taken' differently by different persons. It may be considered, by some, threatening, by others tolerable, and yet by others, satisfying. And certainly the self-concept, as Benjamins has shown, is a primary determinant in how well one does on a test of any sort. But this interpersonal setting is itself an intervening variable which will make the personal factors
all the more important in performance tests (for example). Probably we shall never have a 'pure scientific method' (whatever that is) regarding the personal. But to fear this element of subjective factors and the personal situation is to fear what seems to be the only reliable way to assess personality, i.e. in its person to person setting. Even though a person acts differently when he is observed, this is his natural way of acting when he is in this kind of situation with the other. It is not the subjective elements that one must eschew (although with them the precision of testing is measurably effected) but the abnormal situation in which the person being tested is so isolated that he cannot be himself. Smuts evidently believes that the personal relationship with the other makes no difference. He seems to arrive finally at saying the person is merely Subject and thus Object, not Agent; consequently cannot act, i.e. (intentional) action, and therefore is not personal. He refuses to acknowledge, as seen in this idea of personology, that the person is first of all Agent.

Smuts has the peculiar idea that we can better understand the essential nature of the person when he is dead. He is saying that a person is a whole in time but not at any one time. The Greeks, Professor Macmurray reminds the author, had a saying, 'Call no man happy until he is dead'. Like Aristotle, Smuts is saying you cannot know what a life is until it is finished. Living is always in terms of planning. If this is so, we have the strange position that any one action in time and of itself has no meaning but is means to an end. One could not say whether any action was good or bad since it requires the total life-unit to give it significance and valuation. Morality and ethics, then, are individual affairs. Furthermore, one wonders whether we can say any life-unit is a whole. It seems fair to make
the suggestion that many great personalities (which Smuts would have to study) feel, as they are nearing death, that their life is only beginning, that up to this time it has been largely a matter of preparation. It may be only the Observer, the Biographer, who judges it to be a completed whole.

This necessarily has to do with Smuts’s insight concerning what is often called the ‘phenomenological’ approach. From Smuts’s point of view, the Observer is not involved (or he doesn’t believe he is) with the Other. Without this involvement, one can have no comprehension of the internal processes or meanings of situations, things, or people to the person studied. What, at times, approaches a phenomenological perspective is, for some reason, abandoned when he gets to personality. This approach which makes the person central in the interpretation of things is dependent, of course, on the personologist being a part of the inter-actional experience and that by inference, intuition, generalization and placing one’s self in the position of the Other (presuming we know him well enough to do that), we can contribute to an explanation of his behavior. By such a method, intention of the Agent, the meanings and unconscious feelings which cannot be given quantitatively or as matter of fact and thus cannot be treated objectively, may be somewhat understood. As Observer or Pure Subject, one cannot understand the personal or employ the phenomenological approach as a correlate of the external reference and situational analysis.

This individualistic frame of reference Smuts tenaciously maintains is one which has as its primary goal the understanding of development - individual development - through time. It is an effort to arrive at the laws governing such development. It is individualism par excellence, a biologically oriented, evolutionary approach. It
is more the approach of the nineteenth century biologist than a twentieth century specialist in a science of personality. Without ascertaining the person in relationships and action with others, without considering the field-processes, life-space, tensions of personal conflict and those remarkable changes which arise out of situations of fellowship and community, one cannot know the structure and function or self-actualization of personality — certainly not those essential qualities we have in mind when we speak of the personal.

For a moment, we may contrast and compare Smuts's view to some contemporary efforts to study personality. There is a modern attempt known as the cross-sectional approach which provides an interesting corrective to the longitudinal methods. It was initially championed by the Gestalt Psychologists, especially developed by Lewin in his topological theory of personality. It accepts the instant field as including the 'psychological past, psychological present and psychological future'. But its emphasis on the immediate seems at times to be so lop-sided as virtually to exclude the recognition that every occurrence and reaction has its own history. If, for instance, one has a battery of tests and proceeds to provide a personality profile, he would only be giving us some indications of a few trends of the personality at that instant and under certain testing conditions (with its affect-distortions due to the necessary self-involvement inherent in the situation, a fact the usual tests and experiments fail to consider). Any such scheme as factorial analysis has its attendant difficulties, however reluctant its adherents are to admit such a possibility. In spite of the effort to contrive, through such ideas as correlational coefficients (the measurement of the companionship of different variables), specific and general factors, and unity traits,
there seems to be a convincing lack when it comes to giving us a satisfactory disposition and understanding of the development and changes of the trait or factor and the nature of the interrelatedness of factors, how they 'shade over' into the entire personality constellation as elements determinant in the fluctuating and more stable trends in the personality. Further, such analysis does not give us an understanding of how the factors will change under varying circumstances. One might point out, as Stephenson does, that we are here correlating tests instead of persons. We might also be aware of the fact that the person, as Vernon ably notes, is divided up into many rather self-contained units or components and the personality is not dealt with as a whole. Factor analysis may be useful as one element in a personological method since it has value in assisting the assessment of abilities (not traits or emotional tendencies) and in giving very general variables (characteristics) of societies and populations. The gaps left by a factor-type analysis must be filled in if we are to predict with high probability behavior in its life-setting, not merely under the artificially stable conditions of laboratory and testing situations.

The longitudinal approach of Freud's philosophy, for instance, lays greater stress on frustrations of gratifications, defense attitudes, avoidance, substitutive and compensatory reactions, reaction-formations, etc., which determine the behavior of the individual at any given time. Here past experience and meaning-reactions enter as determinants of learning, perceiving, trait development, attitudinal systems, neurotic trends and multitudinal changes that characterize

1. Correlating Persons instead of Tests, Character and Personality, pp. 17ff (quarterly), v. iv
2. Can the Total Personality be studied Objectively?, ibid., p. 1ff; also see Spearman, C.E., The Old and the Young Science of Character, ibid., p. 11ff.
personality restructuring and growth. Determinants of action and behavior are not, however, to be found fully within the individual. But failing to comprehend this fact, there is, in Freud's system, a manifest suppression of social interaction, although such implications are latent in his theories of super-ego development, ego-establishment, transference therapy, oedipus problems and frustration. Like Psychoanalysis, Smuts's Personology shares this same perspective and difficulty. It is biological, evolutionary, individualistic and non-personal.

A person's present activity in which predominant feelings, such as hostility, hatred, suspicion, are recognized by the cross-section approach and partly understood through considerations of wishes, tendencies, habits, learning, valence elements in the field, but it is only when we invoke the longitudinal approach that we begin to understand something of the reason, cause and development of these feelings through a succession of events. We can illustrate our point by noting a problem in the classification of pathological conditions. It was at one time thought that war neurosis was of a different nosological classification form psychoneurosis. But during the war it became apparent that two things seemed to be true: (1) that war neurosis is a psychoneurosis (though not to be identified with traumatic neurosis); (2) and that the breakdown in war experience has a long anticipatory history. The American psychiatrists Henderson and Moore even stated (concerning American soldiers) that war neuroses were 'made in America'. This 'background' to breakdown in battle has been confirmed by Grinker and Spiegel, Jung and many others. The cross-sectional approach might be tempted to classify war neurosis as a

2. Collected Works, III, p. 129
different nosos from psychoneurosis arising out of the immediate traumatic situation and thus fail to understand the etiological factors involved. It is, really, only by seeing unresolved problems, latent tendencies, repressed material, partitive I-persona defense that one can understand in what sense what one takes to be action fully representative of conscious functioning is really distorted and possibly beyond the individual's conscious knowledge at the moment. It would appear, then, that it is only in a finely balanced longitudinal-cross-sectional system that we can best approach personality, normal and deviated, since personality is not merely development but organization.

Smuts's methodological suggestions provide an example of the part-whole relationship. The life-trend is the whole which interprets and gives significant meaning to the sub-wholes or phases of development. The whole is primary, the parts are explained only in reference to it. When we talk about a series of gestalts in a life-Gestalt, we are saying that there are separate phases possessing some individual, intrinsic meaning or individual theme of their own. But we are quick to point out that these successive wholes have new meaning when they are given in terms of their relational reference in the entire life-trend or the life-trend to that moment. Smuts shows, as E.S. Russell, followed by others later suggested, that analysis is necessary but that analysis must proceed, in any case, from the top down, not from the part to the whole. If we broaden this theory, every part, then, is not analyzed for itself but is always interpreted in terms of its functioning in the whole. This means that one would proceed, in an assessment of or therapeutic approach to personality, with immediate situational (interrelational and interactional) experience and interpret all the historical phases in the light of it. This seems to be the natural analytical procedure if elementalism is to be avoided and the abstract,

1. Advancement of Science, op. cit., cf. Appendix I
unnatural results accruing from such empiricism, corrected.

Here, then, the longitudinal approach is one in which the individual is a history of Gestalts (what Murray calls 'an historic route of themas') progressively differentiating and integrating in immediate circumstances (phases) which involve and employ all the actions, experiences, learning, affect reactions of the past. In this way, the past is not merely mnemonic traces but exerts an influence from a temporal distance on the present. It is worthwhile noting, however, that in spite of the hesitancy of emphasis about past experience, Lewin, Koehler and their followers deserve the credit for developing the significant idea that it is the meaning of the past to the individual ('psychological past') and the past which is integrated into the phenomenal self-system which is important. This meaning involves both memory traces as attached to an object just as repressed material has its object-reference. We may note that only experiences which have personal meaning are retained in a mnemonic system. On this basis, many experiences are not retained at all and many are also repressed or suppressed. Here, then, the individual's history is not an end in itself, as it is in Freudianism or in Smuts's thesis, but is a part of the whole, functions toward the whole, toward the life-trend and the successive gestalts, immediate experience and action. In this way, it is not fixed or stable but is changed and mediated, certain facets standing out in figure at one time, others at another time and the figure-ground fluctuation determining much of the interchange between past and present experience or situations and the constant

1. Morgan writes, 'For me the past is no more: the future is not yet; and their marks characterize now-events, ..., ' p. 145, Emergent Evolution. Note his revised idea on pp. 283-284. We suggest the past is an active factor in the present as is the future, i.e. Formula: a.b.c. (past experiences) plus x (present situation) plus f (future, i.e. anticipations, possibilities) equal y (present reaction or action). a.b.c. ≠ x ≠ f = y
Restructurations which continue to emerge through encounter. In this sense, wholes are not absolutely reversible, neither do need-systems remain unchanged (as in the Freudian theory of infantile sexuality and neurosis). The whole life-trend is a continuum, a life-Gestalt, a "temporally extended whole" (Angyal). It is an incorporation of three dimensions of the person: progression, depth and breadth.¹

Smuts suggests that Personology is a science standing in the 'no-man's land' between science and philosophy. This seems to reflect an entirely new attitude toward the personal. Personal wholes now appear to have assumed a role which is less open to organic interpretation. A new element, evidently, has entered in. We have criticized Smuts all through this paper because he does not consider the basic uniqueness of the personal or its difference in kind from the organic. (The uniqueness of personality to which Smuts often refers, I think, is a reference to the distinct individuality of each person.) He fails to present, thus, a convincing conception of personality as it is revealed in decision, intention, action, the activity of man's higher mental functions, the concept of dedication, value, meaning and community. But in this attitude, seen in the idea that personology should be separate from the sciences and philosophy, he seems to know something is wrong with his theory. He knows man is unique, in fact, a rebellious whole in the universe. Man, he seems to believe, consciously or unconsciously, is not a biological organism and this runs directly counter to his whole biological system. I think this incompatibility may provide one reason for the exclusion of all reference to personology in his article in the Encyclopedia Britannica. It is possible that he reflects this 'underneath' attitude in his idea of a separate science of personality. The personal is somehow subject to

¹ Cf. Angyal, op. cit., p. 373
principles, laws and investigations that come within the province of science, and yet, Smuts seems to be contending, there are functions of personality which are absolutely beyond the reach of empirical analysis or laboratory methods of investigation. And yet, science and philosophy cannot remain absolutely apart since the person is a whole and cannot be compartmentalized by separate inquiries which may easily result because of the maintenance of rigid academic distinctions. Therefore, Smuts is saying, we must have a science or study which treats the personal as such, which will take cognizance of all relevant aspects of a person's life, i.e. biological, physiological, sociological, philosophical, ethical and religious. By this unified, holistic perspective and approach, certain methods of investigation can be developed which will be able steadily to advance the understanding of those functions of the personal.

In what sense, then, is personology as a science standing between science and philosophy? The Biographer, or shall we say in this case, the Personologist, is one who studies the life-units of outstanding people. As we mentioned earlier, there are certain aspects of the person which are not open to objective analysis. This is a relatively small area of personality. Because most of our activity is habitual and compulsive, much of it is matter of fact and as matter of fact is open to experimental and empirical investigation. This seems to be the area which may provide general laws of human behavior. Certainly the quantitative assessment of physiological response and function are open to scientific analysis. Prediction, based on a probability curve, can be more accurate when dealing either with people of high intelligence who can be depended upon to act intelligently when given certain alternatives in a given situation and the
obsessional-compulsive psychoneurotic. But there is an area of man's personality which gives him his uniqueness as a person and is not open to scientific methods of experimentation and quantitative analysis. This is the most important aspect of his being. It resides in the functions of intention, decision, the motivational area behind matter of fact, action, the nature of love and community, his own Negation (transcendence), the problematic character of his existence, his hope, aspirations, his interpretations of things and his unquenchable quest for meaning and cosmic participation. This area of his being, rising out of conscious and unconscious function, goes beyond our scientific analysis and pleads for intuitive and shared understanding. Because man finds he cannot exclude these aspects of himself from consideration and still be himself, understand himself or be understood, he must look, therefore, to that perspective which is a blend of science and art. I think Smuts would assert that such a study would make its first imperative, the regard for the person as the center of inquiry, consequently, the approach would not be test-centered but person-centered and in this one is more likely to understand the person as personal. It should be precisely the uniqueness of the personal and the uniqueness of each individual that the student of personality must be primarily concerned. Smuts, as we said, cannot comprehend the uniqueness of the personal but his study of biography would be more useable in the analysis of individual differences. This science, as Smuts thought of it, would not carry out experimental analysis; it would not deal with the questions of ultimate truth, 'mediate judgments' (Aveling) or the validity of beliefs or categorical forms and ideas (the jurisdiction of philosophy proper), but would probably feel obliged to consider the person's psychological experience of belief and doubt,
the motivation involved in distorted perception, the choice of certain value-systems, thought-systems and master-sentiment, goals— in other words, all experience, thought and action which takes place in a psychological field (Laird). It might be said that the same relation political science, economics, anthropology, cultural anthropology, sociology and philosophy have to the science of history, so the various sciences which deal with man, e.g. physiology, biology, experimental psychology, Gestalt psychology, personality, sociology, etc. will have to personology. This must be a study of facts, events, actions, and their interpretation. This study, a blend of science and art, may be the position to which Smuts would assign Personology. Certainly, Smuts could not follow us when we assert that the student of personality must deal with the inter-actions of Agents. In this way, of course, one would have to regard himself as Agent and thus involved in experience, in which case, every situation with the Other is personal and a challenge to integrity.

The last criticism I have to make on the subject of personology is this: I doubt that by merely studying the lives of outstanding people who have realized a relatively high degree of wholeness, we can arrive at a knowledge of the laws of human nature and personal wholeness. Studies of personality, it seems to the author, must deal with normal and clinical phenomena since the difference between health and pathology is considered a gradient or continuum. Only by studying the principles of normal and aberrated persons and interpersonal situations can we proceed to clarify the laws of personality development.

1. Smuts would definitely be limited in understanding and interpreting the actions of Agents in the personal history of an individual since interpersonal relations and intention do not seem to be important considerations for him. As we have said, this is due to his failure to comprehend the nature of the personal.

2. Alternate reading: 'principles involved in the structuring of normal and aberrated person-phenomena and interpersonal situations.'
organization and function. The processes of dis-organization, too, follow laws of personality, as we noted in Chapter IX. Without this knowledge, we cannot really say what the structure and function of personality is and what within all personalities and inter-relational (social or interpersonal) systems may give rise to aberration.

Furthermore, 'outstanding' and 'successful' and 'noted' are not necessary qualities of the person of integrity. And, evidently, integrity is not necessarily a quality of those judged successful or outstanding or noted. Great personalities of integrity or wholeness are most often found in the ordinary way of life, 'walking among men', making the commonplace a challenge. It is not the development of personal greatness that will give us laws of personality by which the lives of succeeding generations may profit, but the person who is able to live confidently in personal relationship with the Other because he is free. But this is not Smuts's view.
CONCLUSION
Concerning the personal, Smuts does not ask, 'How can we understand that there is such a being as man?' but rather, 'How can we understand that such a being as man has emerged from lower order (inorganic and organic, i.e. animal) wholes?' Smuts does not want to consider man as anything but species, certainly not category. We conclude, however, that the essential nature of man is not fully understood by a frame of reference which is essentially an extension without limits of a biological principle, nor the mere recognition that the personal shares with all other wholes the characteristic features of the holistic-principle. Nor shall we know what the personal is (which is true of all wholes) if we consider it as self-contained, individualistic - a closed system. Man's essential nature is only expressed and realized in that (1) he is Agent making a difference in things because he has decided to do so - his existence, action in the world and his achievement of wholeness are dependent on his agency; (2) and in the uniqueness of that relationship with the Other we call community. Man's essence lies within the fact of his intention to do what he does, the integrity of which is confirmed in his relationship with the Other. Smuts has failed to grasp the significance of man and the significance of wholeness in the personal by failing to consider these two aspects of personal being. The tendency to confine man to the processes of a biological order and the vision of a naturalistic process realizing itself through manifestations of its own creation, encourage a point of view which cannot deal with or face up to the problematic nature of man's existence and negates the essential qualities of the personal. The individualistic and organic perspective divests personality, ethics, religion, and history of their most significant meaning. Such a position makes
his philosophical system, his theory of personality and the methodological procedure for its study, one-sided to the point of deliberate suppression and, consequently, less effective. The underlying quest of Smuts's study, i.e. the nature of personal wholes, the special sense in which the holistic-principle is to be regarded as integral to the structure and function of personality and the meaning of wholeness in the personal, altogether escape him.

Such criticisms must not allow us to forget or overlook Smuts's unique contributions to contemporary thought. Having observed that much of what Smuts said had been said before, one asks, 'What is the nature of his contribution?'. As Toynbee suggests, 'No new ideas are absolutely new in the sense of having no antecedents; if they were as new as that, they would hardly be intelligible. Newness perhaps consists in building something new out of materials which are mostly in the field already'.¹ Such a contribution, it seems, is characteristic of the main theme of Smuts's work. Much like Leibniz's system, it is an effort of synthesis by which some extraneous ideas in the history of thought and the segmented areas of scientific and philosophical thought are unified in a composite interpretation of reality. In its own unique way, it is a new approach to the understanding of the universe - a new point of view.²

Holism and Evolution, generally speaking, represents the scientific development of its time, though admittedly general in its treatment and, consequently, often obscure even to the point of its own protection. But it sets out to do what it promised and that

¹. Personal communication

². The contribution of Copernicus, Darwin and Einstein was not the revolution in the acquisition of new knowledge, Smuts remarks, but in offering to science 'a new viewpoint'. He implies his work shares this common fact.
is to sketch an outline of Holism as a doctrine and the Holistic Approach and indicate how this position may effectively consider some urgent problems bordering between science and philosophy.

It presents new useful terms, a facilitation of language difficulties which unnecessarily hinder understanding, though, as we have seen, still requiring further clarification and refinement. Dr. Thouless has drawn the author's attention to the fact that the Gestalt school made a contribution, not because it was right and the old association psychology wrong, but because it conveys a greater understanding of what happens, for instance, in perception. Gestalt Psychology, then, has given us a new way of talking about something so that a better understanding of a phenomenon is possible. Now it was not that mechanism or atomism were completely wrong, because they are still useful approaches in some areas of investigation, or that the non-elementalist, holistic approach is the only accurate way of looking at things but because here is a new way of talking about something which helps us understand in a better way the nature of reality. Therefore, Smuts has strengthened a new way of looking at things - to see things not as sums or compilations as the elementalist, materialist, and mechanist does, but as wholes. Some of his suggestions for the methodological analysis of wholes have been contributory.

Smuts has aided an understanding and approach, indispensable to the description and explanation of things, which places the whole in the position of interpretive reference - the phenomenological frame of reference. He has given us some further insight into the 'inner nature' of wholes, especially organic wholes, their structure, maintenance, preservation and tendency to completeness. The
significant conceptualization of the nature of reality in which there is a care for the preservation of all wholes within it and that all wholes share a characteristic feature - the effort to establish, preserve and intensify their wholeness (a generalization of organic ideas) - is indeed noteworthy. While, generally, he has not shown us how or why wholes become deviated, 'dis-organized' or less effective in dealing with reality situations, he has made an effort to grasp some of the dynamics of personal aberration, his suggestions being significant aids to our understanding of man's attempts to preserve himself in the midst of threat and has drawn our attention to the powers of nature, inherent in the universe itself, which are allied with him in his effort to realize integrity and meaning. His whole theory impresses us with the fact that all behavior is directional and lawful, serving the maintenance and realization of the whole. Allied with this is the concept that the end, the wholeness for which all wholes strive, is the most important aspect of motivation and a significant aid in understanding the development and function of wholes (although, we believe, the end-form for the personal must be thought of in a different way from the organic). While his concept of wholeness has been criticized, the attitude and direction of much of his thought is contributory and valuable. When the suggestions on psychopathology are emended and integrated into a different frame of reference, they prove useful in understanding personal behavior. It is possible that research in this field in the years to come, will especially acknowledge the contribution of Smuts's unique, insightful and 'remarkable' (Haldane) work or cast it aside as irrelevant to man's urgent needs.

There are many limitations of this present paper - semantic
procedural, style of writing, important questions left unanswered in order to give a wider coverage of the field of study concerning the personal, attendant difficulties inherent in any treatment which finds itself dealing with problems that belong to so many related fields, etc. We have selected certain aspects for study and at the same time realized that many problems too numerous to mention were not considered or only briefly outlined. It is to be noted, however, that there is a vast amount of unfinished business in the field of personal and inter-personal dynamics, function, relations, activity and action. The material presented in this paper, its questions, suggestions and conclusions remain an open matter for refutation; they 'are always on trial' (MacBeath) It is merely the beginning of an interesting research project. But certainly by this treatment of General Smuts's theory, the present study has tried to bring to light some postulates which might contribute to a general frame of reference for a theory of personality. These are based on the premise that the individual is personal and that he is Agent. From this starting point, personality and person-pathology are re-defined in terms of intra-actional and intra-relational conditions and dynamics within the person-other-field whole. Not only is the person-as-a-whole (physiologically, psychologically, socially, spiritually) invested in action, but action is the salient feature in the field and its constant restructuring. Analysis is of the field, including the Agent or plurality of Agents and objects not of the individual as subject, autonomous and secluded. Any action, reaction or activity, is dependent for its characteristics upon the meaning of the situation to the Agent (or Agents) at the time and the structure of the
situation at the moment of actional-experience. Meaning, at this point, is a cathedcted (object-or-Other-reference)-cognitive-evaluative-emotive perceptual organization determined by past experience, processes operating outside immediate awareness (e.g. fear, guilt, suspicion, anxiety, etc.), situational conditions, systems and cues, anticipations and hopes and the quest for maintenance and enhancement of the personal field (including the Self). This leads to the position that any study of the Agent (since he is personal and his essential nature is that he is an Agent) must be a study of his inter-actional system and his inter-relationships with the Other. The relation of normality to pathology is interpreted as a continuum and is based on the principle of centripetal convergence (moving from the action of the Agent in community to the narcissistic self-salvation and compulsive activity characteristic of pathological states). Therapeutically, transference analysis and group therapy are among important aids to the reorganization of the self-concept which can then readily admit, orient and organize those phases of reality into its personal field structure - a demand of socialization. Upon the restructuring of the self-concept, the Self then becomes capable and desirous of action whose very character is that it is no longer compulsive but free. Self-actualization of the Agent is accomplished only in the integrity which forms the basis and arises out of fellowship and community with the Other. This wholeness is the goal for which the personal strives, without which a man cannot be himself. It is based on the premise that human beings are not organisms or things, but persons.
Our own appreciation of Smuts's work has not been dimmed by what appears to us to be definite limitations and inadequacies of his theory. Surely one's own respect and honor for a man is to be found in accepting the best of his thought, but not in this alone — not in one's satisfaction to follow unquestioningly in his footsteps — but in the criticism which arises out of the sense of urgency experienced in confrontation and challenge. This wrestling surely is what we mean when we say we have taken a person and his thought seriously.

1. We have only included in the Bibliography those books and articles directly cited or referred to in the paper. By cited or referred to, we mean those directly quoted or paraphrased in the text or footnotes. Also, when we have represented the general line of thought of a writer, e.g., G. W. Russell, without quoting directly and have not footnoted each of his works, it is in the Bibliography that the books or articles we have in mind are cited. We have cited all the books and articles written by authors to whom this explanation applies, not their books and articles consulted but only those used to form the understanding of the particular position they maintain which we have represented by the references in the text or footnotes. It would serve no real purpose, we feel, to include in the Bibliography all the books and articles consulted in the course of research. (2) For the same reason, we have not included in the Bibliography the source-material consulted or referred to in the Appendices (in text or footnotes).
In an effort to reduce the size of the Bibliography, we have taken the liberty of doing two things: (1) We have only included in the Bibliography those books and articles directly cited or referred to in the paper. By 'cited or referred to', we mean those directly quoted or represented in the text or footnotes. Also, when we have represented the general line of thought of a writer, say, E.S. Russell, without quoting directly and have not footnoted each of his works, it is in the Bibliography that the books or articles we have in mind are cited. We have not cited all the books and articles written by authors to whom this explanation applies, nor their books and articles consulted but only those used to gain the understanding of the particular position they maintain which we have represented by the references in the text or footnotes. It would serve no real purpose, we feel, to include in the Bibliography all the books and articles consulted in the course of research. (2) For the same reason, we have not included in the Bibliography the source-material consulted or referred to in the Appendices (in text or footnotes).


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Trends of Thought Anticipating Holism
(1) The Tendency to Maintain the Organism

The discussion here is centered around the inquiry as to whether there were any trends in the history of thought which might have led to Holism's (Philosophy) emphasis on a tendency resident within the organism to realize its peculiar type of wholeness. There are, generally speaking, three interesting concepts which are subsumed here, for the purpose of simplicity and clarity, under one classification, 'the tendency to maintain the organism'. These concepts are: (1) that there is a tendency-activity that seeks for the equilibrium of the biological or the psychic 'organism', or the 'whole-organism', when brief flashes of insight overcome the physical and psychical bifurcation; (2) that there is a tendency for the organism to 'restore' itself to wholeness' in the sense of healing; (3) that there is a continuing tendency or striving within the organism to 'go beyond itself', to realize a fuller, more functionally efficient expression of its 'ideal' nature, the whole in progressive realization through intensified organization and development. Whether or not these ideas have proven sufficiently meaningful and germinative to form the culture for the Holistic emphasis at this point may become clearer in the development of this brief, and necessarily general, sketch.

The concept that there is within the organism a tendency to maintain itself seems to be an ancient one. Possibly its first formulation was by Hippocrates (460-370 B.C.) when the 'father of medicine' posited that in man there is a tendency to recover from illness ( kodeia, cecroio, aorheta). Disease was caused, he believed, by an imbalance of humours so that health is the reestablishment of balance or equilibrium. This theory conceived 'nature' as that intrinsic tendency bringing about the healing of disease (νοθετειν φυσικά). This later became, for the Latin physicians, vis medicatrix naturae and for later theologians the vis medicatrix Dei.

The essence of Aristotle's entelechy and doctrine of efficient and final causes is that an organism is constantly seeking to realize its true form or nature which is biological and functional. Although entelechy primarily tries to explain growth and form, it has within it the idea of a tendency to equilibrium (self-maintenance), and so carries the tradition from the Hippocratic school of physicians. Because of the Aristotelian perspective of a rigid teleology whose end is, generally speaking, fixed, the concept of the organism's tendency to equilibrium or preservation and the related concept of the organism seeking to add to itself or realize its nature, have formed the matrix for a development of thought which has carried through the centuries to our present day.

The early Greeks adhered to what they called 'norme', a concept formulated to describe the activity of the soul. This norme or impulse or inclination was a tendency of the soul to be drawn to or retreat from stimuli. It is particularly evidenced in the writings of Zeno and the Stoics (300 B.C.). There it includes the positive appetite (φασμα) and aversion (αφθονια). Zeno, as reported, said, '...

1. The author wishes to make it clear that 'organism' will be used in this discussion as it is used by the writers considered. Our own view concerning this question underlies the entire thesis of this paper.
2. Singer, Greek Biology and Greek Medicine, p. 97
3. Cf. Chapter 3, this paper.
4. Brett, op. cit., p. 116
Nature has bound the animal to itself by the greatest unanimity and affection; for by that means it repels all that is injurious, and attracts all that is akin to it and desirable.  Therefore, we may say that their inclinations are regulated by nature, which is, as it were, the artist who produces the inclination.  Proper inclinations and regulation may be perverted and upset and by error, there is produced a perversion which operates on the intellect, from which many perturbations arise, and many causes of inconstancy.  These perturbations are 'irrational and contrary to nature'.

Zeno's emphasis, according to Professor Baillie, is on homo in its instincual quality; first of all, as self-preservation, in the sense of guarding one's life. The aspect of organic equilibrium emphasized here, however, is so strong that it has, as well, a prophetic tone of the later developed perseverare in esse suo.

When this idea of 'inclinations' is moved to a plane of higher reason, its 'impulsive' quality is replaced by a 'conscious adoption of ends of action (δοξείς καί εκκλησίς.) but all phases of it are ultimately reduced to the workings of reason.

Continuing in the naturalistic school, which began with Aristotle's biological and psychological studies, but modifying the Aristotelianism with later activism, Teleius of Italy in the early part of the sixteenth century, laid great stress on the active tendencies of the organism. He makes two notable contributions for our concern. First, sensation is shown to be an active tendency toward the repetition of the same movement. In this way, a sense of perception is completed by the activity of the mind which invests certain qualities into the sensory material which are not, intrinsically, resident within them. Sense and reason are not disparate functions but are operationally united. They are not functions which operate outside the individual but are properly a part of him, within the organism, an ability of the organism. This complex activity of the organism in its unified functioning is subservient to a higher tendency which, secondly, is a natural process of the organism tending toward the preservation of the self. By including 'psychological' and 'biological' functions, he seems to unify the organism to the extent that the self-preservation tendency is not merely biological but involves the organism, as such.

The concept of the preservation of the organism is one of Spinoza's (born 1632) great emphases. This idea is known as 'conatus' and is prior, he says, to all virtues. It finds its cardinal expression in his Ethics in that ' Everything, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being' (in suo esse perseverare conatur!). Nothing contains in itself 'anything whereby it can be destroyed or which can take away its existence' and is opposed to all that could take away its existence. . . . Therefore, insofar as it can, and insofar as it is in itself, it endeavors to persist in its own . . .

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1. Diogenes Laertius, op. cit., p. 290
2. Ibid., p. 291
3. Ibid., p. 291
4. Ibid., p. 299, emphasis mine
5. Ibid., p. 299
6. Brett, op. cit., p. 146
7. Brett, op. cit., pp. 308-312
8. Ethics, in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza

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1. Ibid., iii, prop. vi and proof
2. Ibid., iii, prop. vii
3. Ibid., iii, passim
4. op. cit., p. 105-106
being'. This preserving principle is not something that acts upon the organism from without for it 'is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question'.

Conatus always functions in a unified organism which is not a dualism of body and mind but two aspects of a fundamental unity. This 'total' organism, then, acts on the basis of this 'drive'. Desire, Wonder, Love, Hate and all the emotions are really 'drives' to preserve the organism. Will is conatus in the conscious activity of mind. When it involves the whole being, it is called 'appetite' and when in consciousness is 'desire'. Joy and grief, pleasure and pain are responses to the thwarting or success of conatus (like Aristotle's idea that pleasure accompanies unimpeded activity).

The social implications of this need to preserve the organism are seen in a striving to get ahead of others (competition), in children desiring to have group acceptance, in envy and pride, in the identity of possessions with the self so that depreciation of the former is a personal affront on the latter ('Self' is here broadened almost in the sense of James's 'thought of the self' some two and one-half centuries later). It is expressed in the feeling of pain at the lost love of a lover to another (as really the feeling of a personal ego-loss) and in associations in which one thing recalls love or hate for that which is identified with it through past experiences. Conatus is the striving for the highest good which is to realize one's nature.

By this standard, all ethical action is, as well, judged.

Actually, there are no separate faculties advocated but the Self is expressed as a unified organism always tending toward its own preservation. The often hidden individuality of Spinozan doctrine, the teleology of his perspective, the essential nature of striving, finite things and the dynamics of individual and social behavior meet in the principle of Conatus.

Leibniz (born 1646) as we have seen, closely approximates to the Spinozistic conatus in his idea of 'appetition'. For him, the monad, or organism, is in constant synthetic activity in an effort to preserve its salient function, perception and so preserve itself. But appetition is a tendency which resides within the organism only not to preserve itself but to 'perfect its function'. Although the monad is created complete, it can be more perfect in terms of a higher perfection. It is this appetitive tendency to become the most of which it is capable that 'drives' the monad or organism to higher achievements toward the good - the greatest good being 'perfection'. While conatus is the tendency to reestablish equilibrium, appetition seems to be a positive tendency toward a dynamic whole which is both realized and unrealized - a constant desire for that which is not possessed in fullness.

This factor of a tendency to maintain equilibrium found added weight in Hume (1745). In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he commented on the 'economy of things' which preserve 'perpetual agitation' and yet manage to maintain 'constancy'. This, he says, is done only because 'all the parts of each form' have 'relation to each other and to the whole'. This necessitates, as well, that the whole 'have a relation to the other parts of the universe'. Interestingly, he bases the fact of 'constancy' on the dynamic inter-relationship within the organism (the part-whole relationship) and the whole within its universe (a kind of cosmic relationship).

1. ibid., iii, prop. vi and proof
2. ibid., iii, prop. vii
3. ibid., iii, passim
4. op. cit., p. 105-106
Herbert accepted experience as unified and synthetic but refuted Kant on what he felt to be Kant's idea of the synthetic unity as a function of consciousness. He believed that some ideas come from 'complications' and as we saw above, some are repulsed due to the very nature of the ideas themselves. These 'stimuli' or 'factors' are working themselves out in terms of acceptibility to consciousness and the problem of equilibrium and self-preservation. Obviously, the ego, then, is a product of them and not producing them. While, he believes, this is distinctly contrary to Kant's idea of the conscious unification of ideas, yet both retain the process in the person and in the 'mind' though Herbert has utilized and developed the subconscious and unconscious functions to explain this psychological activity and functioning.

William Hamilton (1836) conceived the idea of conation in his Lectures on Metaphysics as a tendency of the mind to take action. In this he sounded strangely reminiscent of the Stoics who said home was the tendency of the soul to move to or away from a thing. Much to the discontent of many, Hamilton seems not to have emphasized that element of purposefulness and direction of striving. Thus an aridness about the concept emerged with the added difficulty of its relegation to mental processes. In 1871, however, Brentano, like Beneke who intimated in 1824, a similar position, seems to have thought of conation as an 'organismic' response. In his Psychologie von Empirischen Standpunkte, he reminds his readers that conation is not to be differentiated into categories of feeling and willing but really issues in action as a single homogeneous whole. Unfortunately, Theodor Lipps, in his Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens (1883), did not follow good advice and lapsed into conceiving conation as analogous to the passive activity of sensation, although he declares it the starting point of activity.

In 1843 John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, produced the idea of a 'heteropathic causation' which was the source of synthetic activity. This concept with his more important contribution of the concept of the whole is treated under that section of this Appendix.

Darwin's influence in his researches into the theory of organic evolution and his publishing of the Origin of Species (1859) focused greater common attention on the concept of not mere equilibrium but a tendency to realize higher or more complex forms of life through adaptations, a formulation already made, in great part, by Lamarck in 1809. Through the inner creative and somewhat mysterious factor, Variation, and that factor of selectivity within the Universe, Natural Selection, there is presented a functional process beyond 'Survival Value' qualities, which preserves the organism. Though the place of adaptations through Natural Selection in the preservation of the organism has steadily waned, the idea of organisms tending by an inner tendency toward a goal, a higher realization of complexity, though itself, at least, as old as Aristotle, was revived and strengthened by Darwin and his successors.

Fechner in 1860 published his most famous work, Elemente der Psychophysik, in which he presented the concepts, among others, of stability and organization. There is an interesting correlation between outer and inner (physical and psychic) expressions of energy. The inner stability or disequilibrium, as the case may be, is not always the organism and...
due to an external causative stimulus. In either case, they may be
due to conscious functioning as a self-contained (self-preserved)
system of energies. Energy is always conserved in psychic life but at
times falls below the 'threshold of consciousness'. There are evidences,
according to the Weber-Fechner Law, that sensations do not follow the
sequence of stimuli nor in direct proportion to them. What this law,
with all its refinement, is really trying to express has been a question
of constant discussion. At least, it was Fechner's general concern to
deal with the constancy of 'energy' and organismic stability.

The organism cannot be said to contain life; its own organi-
ization is its life; and life is that form of mechanism which stands out
distinctly through its attributes.' It is '... "Natures mechanism"!
Therefore, 'organization and the presence of system... are the
ultimate terms'.

The 'father of experimental psychology', Wilhelm Wundt (1850,
first writings), has two major thoughts which are within the scope of
this historical sketch. First, his concept of the whole, which will be
discussed in greater detail under that head; second, his emphasis on
synthesis. Beginning within the framework of his voluntarism, Wundt
suggests that the principle of synthesis is all pervasive. He reasons
that volition (will) precedes all else so that sensation, reflex-actions
and ideas are really elementary volitions. The will, since it is basic
to all, is the essential factor in experience. These functions, then,
gain a synthetic quality, for they are all volitional in nature. Ex-
perience is a unified activity which has the character of being more
than the sum of its parts. It has an emergent quality which, to use
Tolman's suggestion, taken from Broad, is molar rather than molecular.
This is the result of a volitional activity called 'creative synthesis'
or 'the principle of creative resultants'. Consciousness or psychic
life (not, it is noticed, physical life) or volition, as well as ex-
perience, are not to be found in a summation of ideas, events and happen-
ings but are 'wholes' which are not reducible to constituent elements.
Brett says that when this is applied to the evolution of humanity, it
constitutes the principle of psychogenesis. In this idea, history is
the record of the progress of 'stages through which psychic activity
has continually summed up its own content and generated qualitatively
new products'.

Herbert Spencer in 1855 published his Principles of Psychology
and before 1874 had completed five of his ten volumes on a System
of Synthetic Philosophy (Biology, Psychology and Sociology). The major
import of his study here is his emphasis on the continual adjustment
of the organism to external relations. His famous phrase about life is
that it is 'a continuous adjustment of internal relations to external
relations'. In other words, the organism strives constantly to main-
tain itself in its environment - an idea which had now become quite
common and a source of much discussion and controversy in physics
(Kelvin, Maxwell, Tait, Gibbs) and chemistry (Lachaller) as well as
biology.

While Spencer had emphasized the idea of adaptation and
organism-environment interaction, Wilhelm Roux (1881) followed this
concept of equilibrium with an emphasis on the regenerative power of
the organism and, consequently, a more autonomous view of the tendency.
In Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus, he presents this tendency as a

2. Op. cit., p. 187; Wundt, An Introduction to Psycho-
ology, passim; especially p. 164.
self-maintaining factor although invoking, within that frame of reference, a form of vitalism, which was later developed by Hans Driesch. Driesch, in Die Organischen Regulationen (1901) and in The Science and Philosophy of the Organism (1908), makes the vitalistic concept of dynamic equilibrium (regeneration) the major tendency characteristic of the organism. This, he posits, is a directive, purposeful, teleological principle—a phenomenon of life.

R. Avenarius, in his Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung (1888-1890), championed the concept of an equilibrium tendency. He maintained that the biological organism is constantly endeavoring to regain its lost equilibrium which has resulted from an incurring stimulus. This 'vital series', as he calls the process, is the sequential change of the psychophysical organism from the time of its disturbance to the re-establishment of equilibrium. Within such a series, behavior is explained and scientifically measured.

As early as 1897, Lester Ward, in Dynamic Sociology, introduced the new idea of a tendency to organization (which, in a different sense, occupied Fechner's philosophy). He said that underlying all products and all dynamic tendencies such as action, opinion, progress, etc. is a process which 'it is proper to call...organization'.

This process represents conation and is called 'nisus' ('Horme', as used by Aristotle), and one which was to find greater enhancement in the later writings of Alexander and Morgan. In his Outlines of Sociology (1898), he calls it a 'dynamic agent' and a 'nisus of nature'. The idea of a tendency to organization and an organizing process inherent in the nature of the organism was to come into fashion and pervade scientific thought with adamant persistence even to the present.

With the first quarter of this century, a new trend seems to have emerged concerning the explication of this tendency to maintain the organism. The biologists and physiologists still emmeshed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century body-mind dichotomy emphasized anew the biological aspects of organismic equilibrium but aided by various fields of experimentation and a growing dissatisfaction in atomistic interpretations were gradually beginning to turn to a more complete concept of the organism as, not a unity of psycho-physical parts, but a functional whole. The new study of personality in the form of depth psychology emphasized the biological counterpart in the drive to maintain equilibrium of the psyche while purposive and personalistic approaches began emphasizing the tendency as one directed toward the realization, integration and actualization of the total personality.

With depth psychology, (that is, some form of psycho-analytical procedure) leavened so thoroughly by medical practice (Janet, Charcot, Breuer, Bleuler, Freud, Euhler, Adler, Jung, McDougall, Abraham, Stekel, Ferrenzi, Rank, Meader, Jones, Hinkle, Hadfield, to mention a few of the well known names) the tendency to maintain the self naturally began to have a connotation of wholeness in the sense of healing or restoring health and was a recreation of the Hippocratic theme. It is no less interesting that it was around this time of the century that the ideas of Stahl, Roux, Driesch, Haldane and Russell concerning the regenerative processes of the organism were very much in attention. Though the emphasis on wholeness as healing retained its rightful influence, the last quarter century has seen an effort to merge these concepts into a more genuine idea of the 'whole' self and the tendency to organismal (Ritter) wholeness.

1. Brett, op. cit., pp. 488-490
2. Supra., vol. II, p. 84; cf. p. 108
Based on the idea of a dynamic tension system constantly at work in the matrix of bi-polar forces, Sigmund Freud (1895 first writing) postulated two opposing instincts. One was the ego instinct, the other the sex instinct. These were later temporized and generalized through the influences of the dissenters, Jung and Adler, the emergence of a greater understanding of the transference motif, and his own constantly changing position and experimentations. This led to a more socialized perspective of the dynamic modifications of biological proclivities and became the Eros and Thanatos instincts. The earlier instincts had to do with hunger, fear of danger, self-assertion (ego-motives) and reproduction and pleasure seeking (sex motives) while the later instincts were, broadly, the motives of life and death, construction and destruction, love and hate. All behavior is the result of these two opposites simultaneously in interaction and in dynamic tension.

A further explication of the organism's tendency to maintain itself is to be found in the 'pleasure principle' (libido) and the 'reality principle' in their complementariness. What the reality principle is forced, through the action of the ego and the super-ego, to repress — that is, pleasures which are desired but not amenable to the ultimate goals and internalized demands of the self — the pleasure principle compensates for through fantasies, day-dreams, dreams and other 'unguarded expressions' and instinct reduction methods. By this means, only activities are followed which will seek the higher over-all preservation of the 'organismic' equilibrium. With the admittance or incursion of stimuli or 'needs', equilibrium is upset. It is this libidinal tendency (Eros and Pleasure Principles) that seeks and through reconciliation (reconciliatory mechanisms, compromise mechanisms, gratifications, and in a sense, all behavior) brings about the re-establishment of equilibrium or stability.

This entire Freudian idea (libido) emphasized at this point can be formulated in another way. Drawing analogous inferences from physics, one could make a comparison (as Freud no doubt did) of the first and second laws of thermodynamics and his dynamic and economic principles. Freud observed in hysteria that when emotion, as a dynamic quality, was prohibited from finding a healthy outlet in normal behavior but held back from expression by repression, it still continues to operate and will ultimately find another channel by which its energy can find release. The economic factor established that the quantity of emotional energy united to and expressed in the symptom would be equal to the original emotional impulse from which it first came. His major work was to trace this 'displaced' energy in its various expressions and through therapy redirect it from the symptom to the impulse which gave rise to it and through acceptance of the impulse, and expression through it or reorientation concerning the impulse, resolve the neurosis. This might be called the 'conservation of emotional energy'.

Whether it is necessary to counter this 'preservation' tendency with a destructive tendency, and whether the tripartite psyche (Ego, Super-ego and Id) along with the reductionist method of his psycho-analytical procedure are necessary to an understanding of the Self, much less their holistic implications, will be considered in subsequent discussion.

The purposive element of behavior and all conscious and unconscious activities are immediately associated with the hormic ('urge' or as Brett translates it 'will to live') school of William McDougall. In his first major psychological writing, and in many

respects his best, Introduction to Social Psychology (1908) McDougall
developed his scheme of instincts. The instincts and sentiments (emotionally colored attachments) account for all the behavior of the organism, inasmuch as they form the motivation for goal-directed and purposeful object-centered desires.1

Aside from the doctrine of instincts, as such, the concept of purpose and striving as the primary role in all behavior is significant. The organism's activity is not meaningless but is purposeful in seeking the realization of a goal. This tendency within the organism, which he called on one occasion 'conative persistence and unity',2 is not only that primary fact of organismic existence in which all 'propensities' and sentiments find their relational position and meaning—but is really the basic pillar in McDougall's entire system and was the fundamental cause he championed beyond all other hypotheses.3

Alfred Adler (dissented from Freud, 1911) possibly emphasized as much as anyone a tendency to self-maintenance. The basic motivation, tendency or striving in life is to obtain power with which to dominate one's social environment and balance psychic inferiority feelings or complexes. This is the central goal without which a person cannot think, feel, will or act. All behavior (style of life) then, can be understood in terms of the goal or the purpose to which all striving is directed and always in terms of the 'whole individual'. With this in mind, Individual Psychology is not worried about 'tendencies, milieu and experiences, for all psychical powers are under the control of a directive idea and all expressions of emotion, feeling, thinking, willing, acting, dreaming, as well as psycho-pathological phenomena, are permeated by one unified life plan'.4

Although the neurotic is driven on by a 'guiding fiction' of superiority, one gets the idea that this negative treatment of human drives is not fully representative of Adler—that it is a case of ego preservation only, where the child fights through life to maintain himself against a hostile world. Most generally, this negative compensatory reactive activity is true to the Adlerian position. But if one stops here, he misjudges Adler. He repeatedly emphasizes that the child has also (and develops, like Freud, two simultaneous drives or bi-polarities) an 'urge toward an integration of the personality',6 an active capacity to be loving, genuine and kind. In fact, it is this very tendency for integration which Adler indirectly presupposes in order to effect transformation of personality and re-centering of a 'feeling for the common weal and the conscious destruction of the will-to-power'.

Carl Gustav Jung (dissented from Freud in 1912) made a central aspect of his thought 'the tendency to individuation' and the law of the opposites (enantiodromia). The organism is constantly seeking to maintain equilibrium. In order to do this, a tension process must be effected. Although the tension system is on the basis of opposites, it is not really one which is in vociferous hostility as the Freudian battle of instincts. The law of the opposites is really one in which the psychic functions (unconscious sublimations, projections, dreams) which characterize man is 'the wish to pass beyond himself as he now is'—to attain a psychic integration because where is a new state of being in which that grows, and a psychic integration longed for, is an achievement.
provide expression for less-differentiated activities set in a life pattern and thus provide the necessary 'opposite' to maintain balance. By this process, as Tansley observes, Jung conceives one's own personality to be a firm and strong complex 'maintaining itself through all psychic storms'.

This balance, however, is not all that the organism seeks and to which its purposive activities are directed. Actually, there is a striving or tendency toward wholeness - toward a greater measure of self-realization. For all these activities, the libido is divested of its Freudian connotations, acquires a Bergsonian 'elan vital' quality and emerges as a psychic energy whose directive activity may be seen as a tendency to realize the self, its nature and its wholeness.

Alphonse Maeder (first major writings, 1917) followed along in the train of his professor's counsel (Jung). He added, however, in a thorough-going purposive system, two important factors. First, he said that dreams were altogether purposive. They revealed the source of a psycho-pathological symptom and the direction in which the problem should find solution. The dream was not merely a wish fulfillment or merely compensatory, but served as a therapeutic aid as well as an aid to discovering and treating a psychogenic illness. This fundamentally is to be regarded, however, in a greater frame of reference - that of the Selbstheilung tendency of the total organism. There is, then, Maeder propounded, a tendency within the organism for self-healing, just as there is within biological life for regeneration. It is definitely a positive and refreshing position over against the atomistic and reductionistic and death-instinct driven activities often assigned to the organism's striving to be whole.

Departing for a moment from the medical psychopathologists, we review A. G. Tansley in the New Psychology (1920) who presents, for our purpose, the interesting qualities of 'conations of the ego-complex' as 'self-maintenance' and 'self-advancement'. He builds the organism on Jung's concept of libido and psychic equilibrium and the self-assertion and self-abasement instincts from Freud and McDougall, and the integration or 'whole' aspect of behavior as seen in Holt. He then develops a concept of the 'wider ego' by a combination of James's 'hierarchy of the Me's' and McDougall's self-regarding and acquisition instincts. This 'wider ego' seeks to extend beyond its own limits inasmuch as it has a basic need for harmony, unification and objective truth (instincts of curiosity, acquisition and construction). Interestingly enough, he indicates that the magnification of the individual finds its highest form in Nietzsche's 'will to power'. An assortment of ideas in a new combination and, accordingly, a 'New Psychology' would not blind us to the contribution Tansley makes to the developing belief that the organism not only maintains itself but is constantly seeking a greater realization of itself.

Beatrice Hinkle, in the ReCreating of the Individual (1923), bases her positional frame of reference on the 'prospective aim of personality'. She said that the highest desire of the human being was to be an Individual, to attain individuation. This 'prospective aim' which characterizes man is 'the wish to pass beyond himself as he now is' - to attain a new consciousness where 'a new state of being in which greater unity and more harmonious psychic integration longed for, is an achieved reality'.

1. The New Psychology, p. 184
2. Supra., cf. especially III, VI, XVII
3. Supra., p. 283
4. Ibid., pp. 437-438
J.A. Hadfield, in 1923 in his book, Psychology and Morals, provided the concept that the direction of all activity, the end toward which the whole organism was directed was the 'urge to completeness'.

The law of completeness is in all organic existence so that broken trees or wounded bodies or uni-cellular organisms repair themselves and is no less in personality where all goals and all striving is governed by the urge to be whole and become means to this end. So fundamental is this belief in the order of nature that it has unconsciously or surreptitiously appeared as the tendency to 'health' in physiology, to 'perfection' in morality, to 'holiness' in religion, to 'self-realization' in psychology.

In keeping with this, Hadfield's Psychology makes the astounding assertion (one hinted at by Bosanquet) which will form part of the superstructure of the second section of this paper, that psycho-pathological behavior actually results from this urge to completeness.

William Stern in his book, Psychology of Early Childhood (1924) advocates a central theme in addition to the emphasis on individuality. This idea, continuously interwoven in this work, is that of entelechy which is the basic and thus general, source of behavior motivation. It is 'the entire sum', he says, 'of personal effort'; within it are several branch efforts 'each directed to a separate form or variety of aim'. He makes it clear that these are parts of a unified whole — a permanent whole and not compartments or in any way autonomous. These branch efforts are instincts or inclinations which, when united in a whole, form what is called character. All of these tendencies set the person in motion 'as a living whole'. This entire 'striving' and 'behavioral' process (entelechy) can be summed in the idea of a 'pressing urge to realization' or, restated, becomes the urge to the 'maintenance of the Self' and to self-development.

Deviating from both the physiologists and depth-psychologists for a moment, we consider here Bernard Bosanquet and Henri Bergson.

We have had ample occasion to see the extensive use Bernard Bosanquet makes of the principles of wholes in his Individuality and Value (Clifford Lectures, 1911). By reason of such amplification and general application any attempt at summarization here would involve both an injustice to his writings and require a restatement of much material already discussed. It is well to point out, however, that he makes little effort to devise a theory of wholes, as such. He rather, by discussing their properties, characteristics and by general use of analogy, presents an informal assessment of them and their validity as analogous material for philosophical inquiry. Wholes, in this Philosophical Idealism, are usually given with reference to universals, ultimates, abstracts, the Absolute, truth, the world, the universe and such objects which are not the immediate concern of this paper. However, Bosanquet must be given credit as lending much to the development of a theory (including dynamics, properties, etc.) of wholes.

Another major contribution is his emphatic references to a tendency in the universe making for wholes, the emphasis noted here. He says, for instance,

1. Supra., p. 450
2. Ibid., p. 450
3. Ibid., p. 451
4. Ibid., p. 453
5. Ibid., p. 493
6. Cf. Chapters 1 and 2, this study
7. Supra., whole more than the sum of its parts, p. 307
that there is an aspiration in all experience to be whole; that the
creative nius in the universe is a striving toward the whole (of
non-contradiction). Describing the whole in terms of non-contradic-
tion, he could then go on to say that the character of the universal
is the tendency of every datum to transcend itself as a fragment and
complete itself as a whole. He means, by logic, perfect determina-
tion as a supreme law or nature of experience which is an 'impulse
towards unity and coherence'; that is, 'the positive spirit of non-
contradiction'. Accordingly, he recognizes in every fragment a yearn-
ing towards the whole to which it belongs and every self to its com-
pleteness in the Absolute, and of which the Absolute itself is at once
an incarnation and a satisfaction. Less abstract is his reference to
the individual not as a fixed essence but a dynamic content which
strives after unity, completeness, 'because it has in it the active
spirit of non-contradiction, the form of the whole'. One of the most
interesting concepts of his Gifford Lectures is that finite conscious
beings actually suffer and go wrong because it is their nature to
complete themselves...!6 completeness being accomplished through
incompleteness. This very idea of a 'law of completeness' and the con-
cept of the 'deviated' behavior being the result of the organism's
attempt to complete itself is vividly re-echoed some decade later in
the work of Haldane. One can understand something of Bosanquet's
statement that the 'spirit of the whole... is the operative prin-
ciple of life... ', pervading all things, the Absolute, the universe,
the self, experience, ideas, desire, as the tendency toward the reali-
"zation of the whole; that is, according to his definition, the tendency
toward the whole of non-contradiction.

Three major concerns dominate in Henri Bergson's Creative
Evolution (first printed, 1911), the concepts of duration, creative
evolution and elan vital. The last two interest this historical
sketch. To Bergson usually goes the honor for the phrase 'creative
evolution' (used earlier by Lalande). It indicates his entire philo-
sophy. The concept of elan vital is a metaphysical one and, as such,
only indirectly enters into this study, more by the influence of the
idea of a tendency in the universe making for higher complex forms,
though it is an 'agent' entering ab extra into existence and not in-
trinsically in the structure of the organism as such, whereupon it deviates
from the position of Holism. At this point, it has great affinity with
Schopenhauer's 'Will' characterized in its entering into existence by
'a will to live' within all things by which there is a striving toward
existence (organized existence, if possible) and von Hartmann's 'Uncon-
scious' which 'creates' forms to its own liking. On this same
'grandeur metaphysicale' rests the universal power 'elan vital'. It
is viewed as a kind of primordial world principle, the fundamental fac-
tor in all being, that source from which the process of evolution comes
and on which it is to be explained. This vital impulse pervades all
matter, overcomes inertia, making inevitable change, not the product
of chance but a purposeful becoming (Heraclitus). It is a synthesizing
principle producing diversity and differentiation but ever progressive.
levels of higher development and unity. This, says Toynbee, was Bergson's effort to comprehend life as a whole'.

The work of Max Verworn represents the increased interest, during the first part of the century, in metabolic-catabolic processes. In his contribution Irritability written in 1912 as the summative result of a long career in physiological inquiries, he developed the emerging thought of what was called the 'biogen hypothesis'. This concept indicates that there is a continuous disintegration and rebuilding of the organism. Through disease and fatigue, there is constant effort to maintain equilibrium. This is accomplished by the formation of the mass equilibrium between the quantity of food material and the quantity of a hypothetical combination of living substance, the 'biogen'. This process is homologous with the chemical equilibrium of interacting masses in the non-living world. All of this, he says, is a process of 'self-regulation'.

James Johnstone, with his Philosophy of Biology (1913) and his Mechanism of Life (1921), allies himself with that particular thought which steers a straight course through the foils of vitalism and materialistic mechanism. In both books, he emphasizes the organism as a whole and thus forms the frame of reference for his inquiry. Further, he postulates an entelechy which, he claims, is not the same as that proposed by Hans Driesch. In fact, he decries Driesch's use of the term and all neo-vitalistic agencies that cannot be investigated.

His entelechy is 'not energy, but an arrangement and coordination of energetic processes, not something that is extended in space, but something which acts in space, not material but it manifests itself in material changes, a manifoldness, or organization, but the manifoldness is an intensive one'. He states that 'it is essentially arrangement, or order of happening, and it is therefore a non-energetic agency'. This entelechy is postulated in order to account for the fact that whenever we see the organism as a whole we seem to see a coordination, or a control or a direction of these physico-chemical processes. There is a sense of direction in growth and regeneration and equilibrium - a striving toward something - a kind of tendency to organization, the same order of which is manifested in inorganic and organic processes - a tendency that is fundamental.

With the advent of the Cartesian philosophy and, consequently, the advocacy of a mechanistic interpretation and methodology, subsequent thought found it difficult to escape a psycho-physical dualism or combinations of the double aspect or parallelistic theories of the organism. J.B. Haldane, some four centuries later, in an effort to resolve this embedded perspective of the divided organism, produced a momentous philosophy which has served to found later thought on surer foundations. Some of his most notable writings were: Mechanism, Life and Personality (1913), Organism and Environment (1917), The New Physiology (1919), Respiration (1922), The Sciences and Philosophy (1928), The Philosophy of a Biologist (1935). This historical sketch is interested in the earlier writings leading up to holism.

The two earliest books were written in the frame of reference of interpreting the organism as a self-contained, self-regulated, self-sufficient organism. It seems to have been an attempt to put the observed teleological or purposive activities of the organism on a basis but is, for example, all movements, attack or flight, acceptance or rejection, and other like activities.
maintaining whole. The whole, the organism, the personality, is made up of parts and environment, and through this interaction there is an 'unceasing maintenance, nutrition or metabolism'. The activities of the organism are expressions of this maintenance. In order that maintenance continue, not only is the organic-environment relationship necessary (which forms an 'organic whole') but an internal harmony and interrelationship must continue so that respiration, muscular and nutritional activities, etc. are in harmonious working together in terms of the whole. All activities are determined in relation to the life of the organism as a whole.

Personality is the key-note in understanding the person. There is not a mere blind, mechanical equilibrium of the organism but a purposeful directing activity into new creative achievements. Personality embraces all experience and there is nothing outside it. It is on the basis of personality that life must be explained.

This biological tendency making for unity, coordination and wholeness has its philosophical implication. Of his statements, this point is best illustrated in The Sciences and Philosophy where he says, "From the standpoint of biology, Nature is not merely a healing and beneficient influence within the living body, as Hippocrates first clearly pointed out and every educated doctor takes as axiomatic, but is a healing and beneficient influence in the whole of our environment to the farthest depths of space".

The continued explication of the equilibrium tendency is vivid in the major position of importance it possesses in L.T. Hobhouse's Mind in Evolution (1915). He emphasizes that there is in the organism a 'tendency to maintain itself through process and against change'.

In 1917, L.J. Henderson's The Order of Nature presented an 'organicism' view which seemed to claim direct descent from von Baer, Bichat and Bernard. At least three things characterize this study: first, the organism is an autonomous unit 'in which every part is functionally related to every other and exists as the servant of the whole'. Second, the principle of organization is the fundamental tendency of organisms and explains their dynamic equilibrium and all their activities. This 'regulation' is intrinsic to the organism. Third, all activities are to be described as teleological which is not an external 'metaphysical' concept but an internal biological one.

Richard Semon in The Mneme (1921) would replace final causes and entelechies with an enographic concept called 'mneme' - a concept originated by Hering in 1876 and further dealt with by Haeckel. This principle, though Semon cautions that it is not a universal principle for explaining all of life, is nevertheless all pervasive. Actually, it is best understood, aside from its implications in problems of heredity and memory, as a principle which makes understandable the regulatory function of the organism in maintaining its equilibrium against all external changes.

Rignano, with his Psychology of Reasoning written in 1923, made the concept of the organism tending to equilibrium a central one and developed it to a much fuller extent than most previous efforts. He presents 'affective tendencies' which are intrinsic to all human activities. It seems to be an attempt to put the observed teleological or purposive activities of the organism on a mechanistic explanatory basis but is, nevertheless, a physiological principle. For example, all movements of approach or withdrawal, attack or flight, acceptance

2. Supra., p. 35
3. Supra., p. 21, passim
or rejection, all desires and needs and appetites, volitional activities and aspirations are the result of this purposive tendency to maintain the equilibrium of the organism - to preserve the organism. This appears to be a better argument than it really is, however, as he indicates sexual hunger, for instance, 'to be nothing but the tendency of the organism to free itself of the physiological disturbance which the germinal substance ... produces'.

R. E. Raus in Complacency, the Foundation of Human Behavior (1925) offers a concept of the tendency to restore dynamic equilibrium which is little different from Haeckel's 'affective tendencies' function and so is included at this point. The organism's 'complacency tendency' is that persistence to return to its original condition before disequilibrium occurred (due to stimuli). Constant stimuli, constant unstable systems and the efforts to restore equilibrium result in new habits, growth, adaptations so that the evolutionary process is thus explained.

In 1924, E. R. Russell made an outstanding contribution to the problem of organismic equilibrium and provided an excellent basis for the approaching concept of Holism. Following investigation on the same problem of the regenerative processes of the organism that had occupied Stahl, Roux and Driesch, Jacques Loeb had in The Dynamics of Living Matter (1906) and in Regeneration (1924) maintained that regeneration could be understood on purely physico-chemical bases. Haldane had argued a different philosophy by including in the organism, personality and environment which could not be understood vitalistically or on the basis of mere physico-chemical causation. Russell concurred with Haldane, generally, or at least bent to that side of the argument and produced five outstanding works. In The Study of Living Things (1924), The Interpretation of Development and Heredity (1930), Form and Function, and The Directiveness of Organic Activities (1945), the Behavior of Animals (1934), he characterizes (summing it up especially well in The Directiveness of Organic Activities) his position, over against the 'machine theory', the 'physiological theory', the 'vitalistic theory' and the purely 'biological theory' and 'psychological theories' as the 'functional' or 'psycho-biological' method. This is the same position held in his address to the British Association (1934) and subsequent studies when it is called the 'organismal theory'. He contrasts the advantages of this approach and we find that it is, in the Haldane tradition, neither mechanistic, materialistic, or vitalistic, but considers the organism as a whole. It seeks to deal with 'all that is distinctive of life, the directiveness, orderliness and creativeness of organic activities'.

Briefly, his salient idea, which interests us here, is that there is a persistence of striving characteristic of living things - an effort toward the expression of deep-lying instinctive tendencies, which we know to be the inmost core of our own being'. This is the 'horme' concept which on the conscious level has been termed conation. This organic tendency has a teleological aspect about it wherein the organism is constantly realizing itself in purposeful activity - e.g. the directness of the organism. This end toward which it strives is the maintenance of itself and the realization of its nature. The emphasis placed on this tendency is a tending toward 'wholes' or 'whole-situations'. This 'whole' terminology is a later development in The Behavior of Animals and in his British Association address and may have arisen out of the pervading influence of Smuts and the Gestalt psychologists.

1. Supra., p. 4, cf. pp. 1-30, especially p. 28
2. The Study of Living Things, pp. 133-134
3. Ibid., p. 56
The emphasis on the organism's tendency to self-regulation is one of the main concerns of Edwin Goodrich, who in 1924 in his *Living Organisms*, wrote:  

"We must think, then, of living organisms as marvelously complex mechanisms, with their parts so adjusted as to set going, regulate, or restrict each other's action. A chain of such interactions forms the self-repairing, self-regulating mechanism so essential for the continuance of the process of life."

The tendency to maintain the organism finds its greatest triumph, biologically, in the monumental works of W.B. Cannon and the principle of 'homeostasis'. His most famous work embodying this concept is *The Wisdom of the Body* (1932), the roots of which we will have occasion to notice in his writing, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage* (1915). Since this concept forms one of the central concerns of Section II of this paper, it is only mentioned here to show what has been considered to be the epitome of this trend in historical thought to account for the biological preservation of the organism — its tendency to maintain itself in spite of disturbing stimuli and in the midst of change.

(2) The Organism as a Whole

There are many statements and intimations in historical thought referring to the organism as a whole. It hardly seems, however, that a theoretical concept was adequately formulated until the beginning of the twentieth century. Often, references to the organism as a whole really refer to the organism as a unity, in which case a double aspect theory, for instance, or a psycho-physical interactionism could comfortably underlie the entire concept. Such references to the 'whole' often mean a harmony between parts which still retain individuality and specific autonomy as well as representing an elementalist 'position'. A unitas multiplex, in this case, in itself is not sufficient evidence to prove convincingly the validity of the argument as holistic. The presupposition here is that there is an essential difference between the organism as a whole and the whole organism. Nevertheless, it is those incipient, yet relevant, trends leading to the contemporary concept that interests this study and with which this part of the Appendix is now concerned.

The part-whole relationship in the whole organism is interestingly referred to by Plato in his *Dialogue Charmides*. He writes:

"But our king Zamolxis being a god, says that, as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper to cure the body without the soul; and that this was the reason why many diseases escape the Greek physicians, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid; for when this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a part to be well."

As noted in Chapter Three, Aristotle formulates, through

1. Supra., p. 20; cf. pp. 25ff, p. 186 on 'emergence'
the concept of form and matter, his idea of the 'whole' organism. Aristotle's clear presentation is, in many respects, the envy of subsequent research. Moreover, the basic point of reference, that 'an organism is a system of organs mutually adjusted to the ends of the organism as a whole' was lost as a guide to scientific thought for some twenty centuries until it found recognition in the formulations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century investigators. The oneness of the organism, which was split by the seventeenth century Cartesian Dualism, was not really regained, however, until this century. That stigma of the Platonic-Aristotelian (and generally held) Greek faculty psychology, however, has challenged many who sought a more holistic view.

Blaise Pascal in the early seventeenth century, presented what might be considered one of the early attempts to perceive the organism as a whole. Reacting against the Cartesian psychology and theology and the traditional categorization of the 'mind', he built his philosophy, or as some might prefer, his 'system of thought', on the idea of a personal, active God, the doctrine of the heart and the demand for unity, in the sense of 'relatedness'. It is the last two factors which interest this part of the study.

Pascal believed that every part of the universe was related to every other part. Though this concept in Pascal is not as developed as it later became in the Leibnizian philosophy, a concept which, incidentally, is being revived in the contemporary panentheistic philosophies, there is much evidence to support it as a continuing frame of reference for Pascalian thought. His position is apparent when he says 'all the parts of the universe are so linked together that it seems to me impossible to know one apart from another or from the whole'.1 He draws man as an illustration in which, as a point of reference, space, time, motion to live, warmth, food, air, light, perception of bodies, have a relationship both to him and each other. He argues that one cannot be understood without the others and concludes that it is 'impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole, or to know the whole without knowing the parts in detail'.2 It is not the faulty concept of the part-whole relationship or the inaccurate suggestion of methodological investigation to which attention is drawn, but the fact of the inter-relatedness of all things (parts) in a whole and one of the first references to the fact that the parts are in the whole, just as the whole must be in each of its parts.

Pascal's psychology presents a problem. Does he really conceive of the organism as a whole or does he conclude on a Cartesian dualism? Is the self actually a whole? He presents, in his doctrine of the heart in the Pensees what Professor Duthie calls 'the self as a whole' (and is very much like the Hebraic idea of personality). The truth of this seems to be born out in various beliefs. For instance, in his demand for the religious dedication of the self (the heart), he gets away from the faculty categories of the 'mind' by invoking the emotional element. A decision, then, for Pascal, is not based merely on the rational element (Kant) in man - it is a response of the whole self. So dedication is not of the rational, or the volitional, or the emotional parts of man but is the self acting. The basic fact of Pascal's philosophy, the individual as a 'whole' to which he constantly appeals, forms the basis of experience and the challenge to which decision is directed.

It must be noticed, however, that Pascal insists on the mind and body being intrinsically different and independent.3 The 'self'

1. Pensees, p. 27, Tr. Stewart
2. Ibid. p. 27
3. Ibid. p. 27
to which he refers, seems to be what has been called 'personality' or 'mind' or 'mental activity' but not the person as an organism whole. One must also consider that his existential philosophy begins with man's need and condition (rather than like Kant, for instance, who begins with man's nature and the 'ought') and concludes (as did Kierkegaard two centuries later) than man is not only a dichotomy of soul and body but is, by nature, divided against itself. Rather than his 'sin' and consequent 'despair' being the result of a situational-reaction system, it is conceived as an innate tendency to evil (or as Freud called it 'destruction'). This presents an innate, intrinsic bi-polarity which wages constant war within the self. This is so much a structural part of man's nature that even religious experience never resolves it. The self is divided against itself but strangely enough, in a sense Pascal retains through it all the idea that it is a self. This factor of evil is not a reactive disease but an inborn split in the self. Whether or not this innate tendency to 'evil' indicates a divided self and admits of no resolvement in terms of a self as a whole is not an open question here. However we may conceiv both Pascal's 'self' and the problem of bi-polar tendencies and the fact that no concept of the organism as a whole is entertained, his thought on the 'self' (mental activity) and physical activity as one - the organism-as-a-whole.

David Hartley (born 1702) emphasized a different aspect of research from that of later physiologists but came to agreement with them on basic convictions concerning the organism. In presenting theories on vibrations and associations, he became the first to 'take serious account of the fact that mental and bodily processes are conjoined in the operations of the senses'. Differing from the 'accepted' associationist theories of Locke and Hume that ideas were arranging themselves into sequential 'hook-ups' in the brain which was really 'passive' in the entire procedure, he tried to show the constant activity of the organism to produce unity through integration or at least relational processes. Kant tried to remedy the passivity of the mind by making it active and followed the lesser developed theories of Leibniz on the synthesizing activity of consciousness. Hartley, however, differs from all these views and so in a vague way foreshadows the sensational and perceptual synthesis process of the Gestalt movement in declaring that sensations and the association of ideas are correlated so that a connection exists between sensation, ideation and motion. When one is excited, the other correlates are affected. It must be made clear that Hartley's associationism is an elementalist position in that ideas, which seem to be identical with sensations, formed the basic elements of mental life and thus are nothing more than an assemblage, or aggregation, built on already existing elements. The whole idea of associationism, as such, is inadequate, as the Gestalt emphasis pointed out; but it is the relationship Hartley was trying to see within the functions of the organism that is referred to here. Like many others studied in this paper, it is not only what he said but what he was trying to get at that interest us and thus allows us to indicate that the physiology and psychology meet in Hartley who, as Brett says, 'maintained the point of view of the organism as a whole'.

2. Ibid., p. 425. If the term 'organism as a whole' in this quotation is misleading, it might clarify the position taken by the author by restating Brett's conviction about Hartley by employing the phrase 'organism as interrelated'.
Comte de Buffon (1707-1788) provided, with his creative and provocative genius, not only the impetus and direction for the later trends of interest in biological evolution seen in Goethe, Lamarck and Darwin among others, but a milieu of continuing encouragement for later investigators to see life, the organism and the universe as harmonious and whole. Having been greatly impressed by Newton's discoveries and postulates in astronomy, Buffon went beyond him to see nature and life as well as the universe as one. It could be said that the effort of so many writers since the seventeenth century to do for the organism what Newton had done for the universe found its first contemplative form in Buffon and Hartley. As Singer says, 'Buffon was no mere physiologist mechanist...content to explain the more evident activities of the living body'. He was interested to see 'all parts and all activities of the world' as 'interrelated'.

The influence of Buffon's synthesizing perspective is well portrayed in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), the great biologist, poet and writer.

Goethe's primary interest, as Singer and Russell affirm, was to formulate a concept of the organism as a whole. His direct research was concerned with the structure of living things which he called 'morphology' (Greek, morphe meaning 'form'). This demanded that the organism be studied as a whole and alive so that its natural behavior and interrelated harmony might be observed. This is no better illustrated than by his 'yearning to comprehend living forms as such, to grasp the connexion of their external visible parts, to interpret them as indication of the inner activity, and so, in a certain sense, to master the whole conceptually'.

Against the background of Goethe's working hypothesis that 'all disputes of antiquity and modern times, up to the most recent time, are caused by the division of that which in its nature God has produced as one whole', one could certainly concur with Singer that from Goethe on, 'men began again to see life as a whole'.

While physiologists were working on the interrelatedness of the organs in the body, Hartley and Cabanis were contributing to efforts toward a more satisfactory concept of the organism than that demanded by the Cartesian dualism to which they had fallen heir.

The physiological-psychology seen in Hartley is evident in Pierre Cabanis (born 1757). Under the influence of D'Argens, Mesmer and Pina, he developed his first writing in 1795 on the problem of whether victims of the guillotine suffer any pains after decapitation. He argues that what signs of life remain in the body are explained as neural ganglia activities which are independent of the brain. From this point, he constructs an entire scale of 'psychical' functioning up to conscious processes. The brain is not the 'control tower' or seat of the soul but remains that indispensible part of the nervous system without which conscious life is impossible. Mental functions are not produced by the brain alone but are functions of the whole (bio-psychological) organism. Instincts and sensations are biological

While the former is a little gratuitous, yet the latter is unjustly weak. Hartley's position should, by this limitation, be clearer, however.

1. Singer, History of Biology, p. 289
2. Ibid., p. 289
3. Ibid., p. 223
4. Analyse und Synthese, cited by Goldstein, op. cit., p. 399
but must be seen in terms of their activity within the organism as only related parts of a greater whole and as parts of the total functioning.

Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) championed a developed Aristotelian principle of the correlation of parts, which was to be called 'Cuvier's Law'. This principle, fundamental to all Cuvier's work is, simply, 'the recognition of the functional unity of the organism'. Organs do not exist or function in nature as separate entities but as parts of organic living wholes, with relations peculiar to the activity of the whole itself. All parts have an integral meaning in the whole and each contributes to the nature of the organism as a whole. Cuvier affirms that 'It is on this mutual dependence of the functions and the assistance which they lend one to another that are founded the laws that determine the relations of their organs; . . . for it is evident that a proper harmony between organs that act one upon another is a necessary condition of the existence of the being to which they belong'. Cuvier was confident that the interrelation of parts (and structure and function) was so true that one part of a whole would provide a sufficient starting place from which to construct the whole. It was on this law that a classificatory system and thus the entire view of the animal kingdom was built.

Although Cuvier's Law is not considered to be inadequate as a universal concept and although he failed to see the philosophical implications for the continuity of historical development of life-forms, this great scientist receives the acclaim of succeeding generations for reemphasizing and thus bringing to conscious conviction again, the concept of the interrelatedness of all parts of the organism to each other and the whole (and the interrelatedness of structure and function), in terms of which they seem to find their functional meaning.

Karl von Baer (1792-1876) and Johannes Mueller (1801-1858) certainly deserve, not only recognition as great scientists, but as continuing the emphasis in studying the organism as a whole. They added their voices to the polemic against viewing the organism as a bundle of organs each with its separate and appropriate functions which was by this time reaching a resounding crescendo. One of the greatest debts science owes is to those who recognized the relationship of all parts of the organism to each other and the whole. No one, however, has contributed more to this than Claude Bernard.

Bernard (1813-1878) continues the emphasis which began some one hundred years earlier with Buffon, to see the living organism as a whole. His contribution is evident in several outstanding respects. This theory held that the various forms of functional activity are interrelated and subordinate to the physiological needs of the body as

2. Russell, Form and Function, p. 33
3. Singer, History of Biology, p. 224
4. Lecons d'Anatomie Comparee, 1, p. 47, cited by Russell, Form and Function, p. 33. In Researches on Fossil Fishes, Cuvier said, 'Every organized being forms a whole, a system unique and closed, of which the parts mutually correspond and concur in the same definitive action through a reciprocal reaction. No part may change without the others changing also; and consequently each of them taken separately serves as an index and an exposition of the others.' Cf. Ritter, p. 6
6. Henderson, op. cit., p. 74
7. Singer, History of Biology, pp. 223-233
a whole. He showed that the regulation of the blood supply to the body (the vaso-motor mechanism) was dependent on other organs and so stressed the interrelatedness of organ-body functions which we know now as indicative of the intrinsic nature of the organism. He showed that the organism is always directing its activities in terms of what von Baer called an 'end'. The object of all activity was to maintain constancy of the organism. Like Aristotle's 'indwelling purposiveness' (entelechy), Bernard's 'internal environment' principle demanded a preservation of internal conditions despite external change. This is the factor which makes it possible to declare the organism, 'qui generis'.

To the problem of method, George Henry Lewis addressed himself in that insightful contribution, a two volume work, Problems of Life and Mind, written in 1874–1875.

He propounds that it is an error to employ analysis without regard to its needful correction by synthesis. Further, if one takes the organism to pieces 'to understand its separate parts, we fall into the error of supposing that the organism is an assemblage of organs like a machine which is put together by juxtaposition of different parts'. In doing this, one finds it impossible to understand the essential nature of the organism and the 'solidarity of its parts', because...its organs are groups of minor organisms, all sharing a common life. Actually, this is true of the mind-body problem, for: We separate, for convenience, mental phenomena from other vital phenomena, and then again separate mental phenomena from neural phenomena; this done, we overlook the real identity, and do not see that every mental phenomenon has its corresponding neural phenomenon (the two being as a convex and concave surfaces of the same sphere, distinguishable yet identical), and that every neural phenomenon involves the whole organism, by which alone the influence of the body on the mind and of the mind on the body can be explained.

In a machine, the parts are all different and have a mechanical working only in relation to the whole. 'In a vital organism, every force is the resultant of all forces; it is a disturbance of equilibrium, and equilibrium is the equivalence of convergent forces.' Intelligence, then, is not a directing activity but an expression of the total organic interplay and cooperation. While advocating both analysis and synthesis (though not seeing that analysis should be in terms of the whole), he also maintained that physiological behavior (nervous system) could not adequately explain the subject matter of psychology although it was important and necessary in understanding various aspects of the organism.

He has a number of interesting comments which enter in at various phases of our study. He says 'perceptions are evolutions; and having necessarily a history at their backs, it is clear that all:

1. Singer, A Short History of Science, pp. 363–364;
2. Supra., vol. 1, p. 112
3. Ibid., p. 113
4. Ibid., p. 113
5. Ibid., pp. 113–114, 159ff.
6. Ibid., p. 112
7. Ibid., p. 114
8. Ibid., pp. 126–127; 151ff.
perceptions are modified by pre-perceptions, all conceptions by pre-conceptions. The subject and object are inseparable and inter-act so that perceptions are real because 'both the elements and the synthesis are the actual and direct product of the external and internal factors'. Conceptions, he says, are symbolic-meaning abstractions. It follows that the organism is the interaction between itself and its environment. The organism has instincts, which he would think of as 'tendencies'. He interestingly declares that 'the so-called instinct of self-preservation is a fiction. The only impulse at work is the shrinking from pain; and this in the matured experience leads to the intelligent act of self-preservation'.

He concludes his study with the idea that 'the unification of all modes of existence, by no means obliterates the distinction of modes, nor the necessity of understanding the special characters of each'. He believes that 'mind remains mind, and is essentially opposed to matter, in spite of their identity in the Absolute; just as Pain is not Pleasure...'. Both physical and psychical aspects, however, are resonant in all activity. He explains this whole concept by saying, 'The logical distinctions represent real differentiations, but not distinct existents. If we recognize the One in the Many, we do not thereby refuse to admit the Many in the One'.

Fechner had developed his psycho-physics with its emphasis on organization and a self-contained organism. The biological evolution theories of Lamarck, the Darwins, Wallace and Spencer with its emphasis on the function of the organism, not merely structure, led to an interest in the organism functioning as a whole. Possibly the emphasis of 'function' finds its greatest expression in John Dewey. Dewey stands out as one of the great philosophers-psychologists of modern times. His tremendous insight is reflected in the 1886 publication, Psychology. He makes two major contributions for this paper's interest. One concerns the concept of the whole and the synthetic activity of the self which is considered in that section. The other concerns the self and the motivational basis for behavioral manifestations, the concern here.

Dewey has to be considered in terms of his philosophical frame of reference - functionalism. Contrary to earlier functional emphases which started with a functional-product and asked how it came to be, Dewey asks to what purpose or use is this functional-activity directed. With the emphasis on an act or behavioral pattern, the tendency was to see the organism acting such and such as a whole. The self then became a functional unit. The emphasis seemed to be more on the unit action than on a system response or part-function. It was the self acting.

The self, Dewey declares, operates always in terms of an effort toward its own realization. The organism is constantly at attention (we might say 'ad-tension') 'until all objects, events and minor relations are 'in a final unity, and are recognized as members of one whole, the self'8. The self is that activity which 'unites into a whole all the various elements and members of our knowledge'. The
self...is not something which acts; it is activity'. The organism in a more holistic aspect is expounded when he says, 'If the eye sees, the whole organism feels the experience; if the hand is bruised, or if the digestive apparatus does not work normally, through feeling, the entire man is made conscious of it. Each action and reaction has a unique reference to the whole self'.

Why does the self act? What is the guiding factor or basic motivation in all activity? Dewey has indicated that as there is in art the desire for essential harmony, so the self constantly seeks its own harmony. But a deeper fact is still to be seen. All effort, all striving, desire, moral action, will, ideals, are directed toward an end; that is, they act in terms of a purpose. That purpose is to realize and fulfill the self in its needs and nature. The self becomes its own object, the basis and goal of all action.

In so positing this standard for understanding behavior, Dewey reflects the Aristotelian and Spinozistic positions and serves as the mediating agent for one of the latest psychological theories which emphasizes the 'phenomenological self' as an approach to the explication of personality structure and function, a major perspective of the holistic view of this paper and contemporary holistic concepts.

Many theories, schools, and dogmatic pronouncements about human personality and behavior 'inebriated with their own verbosity' have marched confidently onto the field of conflict to challenge all comers and to dethrone the 'tyranny' of veritable, time-honored institutions. On each succeeding occasion after the smoke of battle has cleared, there appears the courageous, omnipresent figure of the 'Dean of American Psychiatry', Adolf Meyer. And yet, he began where they all begin, as an insurrectionist. He said that the mind-body dichotomy inherited from Germany, 'that stronghold of misconceptions of the science of man' and all psycho-physical parallelisms would have to be replaced by a concept of the organism (person) as a whole. As early as 1897, in the American Journal of Insanity, he pleaded that mental 'disease' should not be considered in the light of biological disease, though they may follow laws of general pathology, but as disorders of the whole person. Mental symptoms, he said, were not constitutive of disease exclusively, so that all aspects of a man must be considered.

In 1908, he indicated that the contrast between mental and physical activity is merely artificial. Matter is possibly reducible, finally, to energies and mind is a sufficiently organized living being in action and not a peculiar form of mind stuff.

In a seminar in biology at Cornell University in 1904, Meyer presented an elucidation of his position when he defined Psychology as 'a study of the determining factors

1. Ibid., p. 247
2. Ibid., p. 250
3. Ibid., p. 316
5. It is not agreeable to all writers that Meyer is the 'Dean of American Psychiatry'. Roback in The History of American Psychology writes that Benjamin Rush (1745-1813) should be 'regarded as the father of American Psychiatry'. p. 44
6. Dispute arises if 'father' and 'dean' are regarded as both referring to the source of this medico-psychological art. At least Meyer did more to build a firm foundation and develop American psychiatry than any other single person.
7. The Commonsense Psychology of Adolf Meyer, p. 82
8. Ibid., p. 173
9. Ibid., p. 172
of the stream of mental life'.

Consciousness was a specific integrate of a functional kind - 'an integrate of the person and not only of the brain'.

Now an integrate was described as a set of facts forming a unit which cannot be completely expressed in terms of other sets of units since it is a product of integration.

In contradiction to Behaviorism which sought to eliminate subjective experience and mental aspects, Meyer maintained that 'The excessive fear of the personal equation is ridiculous', and propounded his 'psycho-biology' which 'sought to understand man as a whole'.

Meyer decried 'clinical psychologists', 'neurological tautology' and 'types'. Of them all, it seems he disliked 'typing' people most. He said Kraepelin, for instance, had replaced persons by types. He emphasized the person must be studied, not a disease or a type - people were the interest of the psychopathologist. Furthermore, within the frame of reference of making psychology a branch of biology, he suggested that the psychopathologist study, not the ego, but 'the mentally connected activities, the dynamic biological processes of the individual', and in this statement his condemnation of the three 'sins' aforementioned becomes clear.

Meyer had some new ideas about mental disease and how to study it in terms of the person as a whole. 'Modern pathologists', he said, 'sees in most "diseases" nature's way of righting inadequate balance. They are crude ways of repair, not the enemy itself; reactions to be guided, not to be suppressed.' In order to understand the entire process 'you can no longer get along by dreaming of lesions when your facts are too meager; but you can see the facts as they are, the reaction of the patient; and he is a psychopathologist who can help nature strike the balance with the least expense to the patient'.

What are psychopathological diseases? They are reactions which are a part of an effort of adjustment - a response to a demand. For instance, an hysterical fit must be understood in terms of 'a faulty response or substitution of an insufficient or protective or evasive or mutilated attempt at adjustment.'

Psychopathological disorders are abnormal reaction-types and are of the person as a whole, unlike the special somatic organ disorders. One might conclude that if these are reaction types of adjustmental modes of behavior, then they are not diseases so that the 'disease' is something else of a deeper causative nature.'

Standing on the common ground of dynamic psychopathology with Freud and Jung, Meyer, in this frame of reference, asked, however, not about 'complexes' but 'what is the meaning of the faulty reaction?'. He expressed preference for 'a broad formulation of the problem in terms of substitutive activity'.

Rather than

1. Ibid., pp. 151-152
2. Ibid., p. 152
3. Ibid., p. 152
4. Ibid., p. 199
5. Ibid., p. 517, cf. also 402-403 on Behaviorism.
6. Ibid., p. 83
7. Ibid., p. 369
8. Ibid., p. 379
9. Ibid., p. 176
10. Ibid., p. 176, 1915
11. Ibid., p. 198, 1908, 1912
12. Ibid., p. 199
13. Ibid., pp. 293-204
14. Ibid., p. 229
emphasizing, like Freud and Jung, the symbolic activity as representative of inner complexes, Meyer directly perceives abnormal mental activity as substitutive adjustmental functions.

This, of course, in his methodology and study of cases led him to conclude that pathological anatomy and autopsies were of little use in mental conditions and that the study was of the living person in his growth, education and other determinants of the individual life. He said, "we do well to look into the nature and extent of the development, the habits and the efficiency as the chief feature of the constitution of an organ or an entire person'.

One gets the impression that Meyer's effort to see the organism as a whole led him not only to plead for a new 'science of man' but to an unconscious or at least dim recognition of the inadequacy of either strictly biological or psychological 'laws' and terminology.

To explain a phenomenon entirely on the basis of another science which only was able to treat certain phases of that phenomenon was inadequate. Even though he decried 'types', he finally championed his own 'reaction-types', which acquired the connative meaning of person-types, to aid in this problem and better represent the behavior of the human organism. This system was called 'Ergasiology'.

He began with the root term 'ergasia' from the Greek word 'erg' meaning 'work' and used it to indicate 'mentally integrated activity'. From this starting point, he suggested the following reaction-types:

1. anergasia - organic reactive behavior modified by structural and functional defect.
2. dysergasia - functionally determined disturbance, e.g., deliriums.
3. thymergasia - affective depressive or overactive mood.
4. parergasia - delusional or paranoid distortion of content.
5. merergasia - partial loss of functions, e.g., dissociation.
6. kakergasia - poor functioning.
7. oligergasia - constitutional structural deficiency.

Meyer was first to advocate clinical research with mental patients, first to employ psychiatric social workers (Mrs. Meyer the first such person in the United States), first to emphasize a new and rigid means of obtaining case histories, really the father of the contemporary psychosomatic interest in America, and occupies many 'firsts' in mental hygiene reform and social reorientation methods in the United States. But whatever distinction he elsewhere occupies, he certainly deserves credit for being one of the earliest advocates and practitioners of the concept and study of the organism as a whole - this was the basis for his 'Science of Man'.

A tributary of the main stream of thought is considered by neurologists and the physiologists and psychologists in the early part of the twentieth century who emphasized the organism as a whole through the scientific investigations of the nervous system and behavior. It is at this point that we consider their contribution.

In such a study as this, one could not overlook the significant medical and physiological research of Sir Charles Sherrington. He sets the stage for later neural investigation with his work, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, written in 1906. In it, he shows

1. Ibid., pp. 97, 1902
2. Ibid., pp. 535ff.
3. I presume τούτος is what the author means here.
4. Roback, History of American Psychiatry, indicates that Friedrich Schiller's doctoral dissertation in 1780 gave the first compact treatise on psychosomatic medicine, p. 285
the coordination of the reflex actions or movements starting with the simplest receptor-conductor-effector responses. Reflex movements (the unit reaction in nervous integration) combine and form a resultant which is not reducible to a mere summation and which serves the functional needs of the organism in dealing with the stimulus (environment). Although there are other integrative aspects of the organism, such as the 'mechanical combination of the unit cells of the individual into a single mass' and the results of chemical agency, the nervous system is really the highest of the milieu interne. It shares with the musculature and skeletal systems, for instance, the direct maintenance of the organism as a whole in its reactions to environmental stimuli. It combines aggregations from the commensal organs and coordinates them into reflex arcs, units and action. By the nervous system's integrative function (conduction) inhibition, facilitation, shunting, sequences, interferences, etc maintain the adequacy and order of responses, reflex actions and reactions, each marked by lack of confusion. Sherrington maintains as his basic tenet that 'the central nervous system, though divisible into separate mechanisms is yet one single harmoniously acting, although complex, whole'.

He maintains his position is not teleological but insists that 'the reflex reaction cannot be really intelligible to the physiologist until he knows its aim' (its immediate, purpose as an adapted act!), and that 'the effort of any reflex is to enable the organism in some particular respect to better dominate the environment.'

Questions arise when Sherrington speaks of the creature (high or low) as a 'bundle of reflexes' and indicates that in the performances of some reflexes the rest of the organism remains completely unaffected, a concept severely criticized by Goldstein. To make matters more problematic, he concludes that 'In the analysis of the animal's life as a machine in action, there can be split off from its total behavior fractional pieces which may be treated conveniently, though artificially, apart, and among these are the reflexes we have been attempting to decipher'. Further, he seems to indicate that all activity is the response-reaction to environmental stimuli, the order of the organism being explained by effect of the external world.

Although there seem to some investigators limitations to Sherrington's study, nevertheless, his contribution is momentous. He maintained that the central nervous system functioned as a whole, that the nervous system has as its duty the perfecting of the organism's unity. Against this brief statement, one can better evaluate Ritchie's statement concerning Sherrington's belief that 'whatever stimuli are coming in the response is a co-ordinated whole'.

It has been suggested that Edwin Holt, in The Freudian Wish (1915), represents the concept that behav is always to be considered as a whole. Behavior in this perspective has surely contributed its part to the conception of the organism as a whole. Holt's

2. Ibid., p. 3
3. Ibid., p. 4
4. Ibid., p. 313
5. Ibid., p. 316
6. Ibid., p. 236, 237
7. Ibid., p. 238
8. Ibid., p. 237
9. Ibid., p. 238
10. Ibid., p. 238
11. Ibid., p. 235
12. Natural History of Mind, p. 97
13. Tolman, op. cit., pp. 8-9
emphasis must be seen primarily in terms of his theoretical concept of the whole, in which he presents this argument:

"While it is obvious that the whole is nothing more than the parts as thus organized, and that the properties of the whole are nothing more than the properties of the parts now acting in cooperation, it is nevertheless true that the whole now does things which the isolated parts never did or could do. New phenomena, new laws and functions have been developed."

This leads, in its application concerning behavior, to the position that the phenomena evinced by the integrated organism are no longer merely the excitation of nerve or the twitching of muscle, nor yet the play merely of reflexes touched off by stimuli. These are all present and essential to the phenomena in question, but they are merely components now, for they have been integrated. And this integration of reflex arcs, with all that they involve, into a state of systematic interdependence has produced something that is not merely reflex action. The biological sciences have long recognized this and further thing and called it "behavior."

He says: "My point is that the often too materialistically minded biologist is so fearful of meeting a certain body, the "psychic" that he hastens to analyze every case of behavior into its component reflexes without venturing first to observe it as a whole.

Professor Holt, in founding his concept of behavior on the theoretical frame of reference of the whole, at once posits that the organism adapts, not so much to individual physical or chemical stimuli, but to situations. Through a process of integration, behavioral wholes result from the simple motor responses merging into complex ones and thus functional organism-environmental adaptation results. In such a function (main action) the lesser mechanisms involved are only deducible on logical, deliberate attention. To illustrate, one may decide to go shopping for a gift. The main action is a whole, and only deductive logic will provide the single actions, such as walking down the street, looking in various store windows, gestures and postures of the whole action, etc., etc., involved in the behavioral whole.

Because Holt's entire behavioristic slant limits his positings the structure and function of the organism as a whole, and although he makes a case for 'behaviorism' (in the sense of an act) represented as a whole, he is not convincingly clear as to whether behavior is an adjustment of the whole organism so that the whole organism enters into all behavioral patterns. Nevertheless, he presents a contribution to understanding the organism's behavior in terms of whole-responses and

1. Ibid., p. 153-154
2. Ibid., p. 155; cf. pp. 156-157; 161; 161
3. Ibid., p. 78
4. Ibid., pp. 107-108
5. Ibid., pp. 76ff; passim
wholes. One of the characteristic features of Behaviorism and one to which the 'Neo-Behaviorists' are consistently loyal, is that the organism reacts to stimuli as a whole — an emphasis that the organism is an interrelated unity. This concept is well illustrated by John Watson in his 1919 publication Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. For instance, in explaining his meaning of 'situation', he says, 'It is convenient to speak of a total mass of stimulating factors which lead man to react as a whole, as a situation'. Again, 'The normal human organism functions as a whole always'. This is reiterated with the reservation that some activities demand more labor of one system or part than of others but, nevertheless, retaining this interrelated harmony and whole-response. New stimuli always offer new challenge to readjustment and this is always an integrating process. 'The behaviorist; consequently, 'is interested in integrations and total activities of the individual'.

Watson has propounded that the organism always acts as a whole. He seems to imply that personality is a whole and that behavior is holistic. Closer examination, however, shows that personality is a summative thing of 'total assets and liabilities', a unity or organization (sum) but not an absolute. Further, his definition of behavior is what Tolman calls 'molecular' rather than 'molar'. On the one hand, Watson defines behavior as 'muscle twitches' and glandular activity an interpretation in terms of receptor, conductor, effector-processes and has only dimly seen that behavior is more than the sum of processes, whatever they may be, and that it has an emergent quality, since it is a whole.

The wholly inadequate explanation Watson gives for aberrant activity ('mental deviations'), his concept of the organism as a 'reacting piece of unanalyzed protoplasm', the confusing ideas of the organism acting as a whole and yet behavior being molecular, are extremely inadequate; nevertheless, his attention to behavior and situations lead to the growing interest in behavior as a whole and behavior being accomplished by the whole-acting organism.

The organism as a whole is the basis for the theory of R.B. Perry on behavior (1921). He writes, 'In proportion as the organism is unified and functions as a whole, its behavior is incapable of being translated into simple reactions correlated severally with external events'.

The trend of thought continued to give rise to new and more general applications. J.R. Kantor, in his Principles of Psychology, written in 1921 (vol. i) characterized his position as 'organismic'. Several basic facts are to be considered in such a view. First, it must never admit anything into its 'scientific thinking but that which

1. Ibid., p. 11
2. Ibid., p. 377
3. Ibid., pp. 379-380
4. Ibid., p. 13
5. Ibid., pp. 40-41
6. Ibid., p. 427
7. Ibid., p. 10ff; cf. Tolman, op. cit., pp. 4-7
8. Ibid., p. 6
can be actually observed.\textsuperscript{1} Second, 'it shall never assume the part to be the whole!'\textsuperscript{2} Third, it will be based, as all psychology should, on concrete reactions to natural, social and human stimuli.\textsuperscript{3} Fourth, it declares no body-mind problem to exist except in metaphysical speculation.\textsuperscript{4} Fifth, it affirms the organism to be 'a complex psychological machine and not a union of discrete elements or stuffs',\textsuperscript{5} or a summation of a 'catalogue of traits'.\textsuperscript{6} Sixth, it finds the organisms behavior not caused by 'brain or mental conditions, but the needs of the organism as indicated by the surrounding objects and events' and in such adjustments 'the activities of the nervous system and integral factors of the total complex reactions.'\textsuperscript{7} He posits that for this view 'the explanatory features of the science consists for the most part in a detailed study of the reactional biographies of individuals throughout their various contacts with their actual surroundings.'\textsuperscript{8}

The particularly striking feature about his study as far as this paper is concerned, is that the organismic point of view has two further properties. One, to see the organism's reactive behavior as a 'unit operation'. This behavior is really more than a sum of reactions 'plus their various integrations'.\textsuperscript{10} Two, that while there seems to be segmental, isolated or partial reactions or component functions, actually the organism reacts as a whole, the former being merely 'scientific abstractions'.\textsuperscript{11} The organism always presents a unified front - it is always the whole person, for instance, who acts, though one part of the organism may be called on to bear most of the load.\textsuperscript{12} Just as the nervous system never functions in parts but always as a whole, so the parts of the whole organism are so related and inter-related that it always acts as a whole with each part participating in the reaction.\textsuperscript{13}

Although Kantor, like so many others we have studied, repeatedly emphasizes that the organism is a whole and that to segmentalize the parts is a superficial methodological abstraction, he proceeds to study the parts as self-contained units without understanding them in terms of the whole. Kantor often sounds like Watson in such definitions of 'stimulus' and 'situation' and his emphasis on behavioral 'objective' reactions as the only proper study for psychology. Actually, he disclaims categorization with the 'biological view' which 'does not take account of the essential psychological facts of human and infra-human conduct!',\textsuperscript{14} or those 'metaphysical theories which postulate a function known as the "unconscious"'.\textsuperscript{15} While admirably trying to fulfill his position as an experimental scientist and deal only with 'observed' phenomena and 'concrete reactions' which can be tested, he narrowly betrays himself when considering subreactional phenomena\textsuperscript{16} and

1. Ibid., p. 30
2. Ibid., p. 30
3. Ibid., p. 30
4. Ibid., p. 30
5. Ibid., p. 30
6. Ibid., p. 30
7. Ibid., p. 30
8. Ibid., p. 30
9. Ibid., p. 30
10. Ibid., p. 57
11. Ibid., p. 57
12. Ibid., pp. 62, 64
13. Ibid., pp. 62-64, 65
14. Ibid., p. 73
15. Ibid., p. 70
16. Ibid., pp. 103ff.
meaning reactions\(^1\) and memory\(^2\) in such a way as to make them explicable only by simulating an 'unconscious' function and even stating that some responses are not finally discoverable or explained by strict scientific analysis.\(^3\) Surmounting these difficulties, however, Kantor makes a determinative contribution to the emerging 'holistic' thought of the day.

We take up the main stream of thought again. Dewey would seem to have represented the last frontier of trends preparing the way for this emergent concept of the organism as a whole. Certain-\(^4\) ward (1886), with his interest in unity and synthesis of things (re-interpreted associationism under the influence of Brentano and later developed by Ehrenfels, Mach, Sidis and Gestaltists), James in the concept of the broader self (seen earlier in Spinoza and later in Haldane, Uexkull, Jones and Lewin) and his postulate that an atomistic approach is finally inadequate for a full interpretation of personality, are important indications. McDougall talks about the 'organism as a whole', but retains the atomistic instinctual theory, which however, in its deeper aspect was trying to account for the organism acting as a whole.\(^4\) Adolf Meyer and J.S. Haldane, even, so stand out as two of the early advocates who most convincingly and faithfully championed the cause of organic wholeness.

Inasmuch as this study has already referred to Haldane, the brief emphasis here will seek to indicate some of his typical thoughts in the earliest major work (1913) representing the concept of the organism.

On the interrelation of parts to the whole (organism), he shows that with every advance in physiology there is clearer evidence that the body cannot be separated into parts with specific and autonomous functions. In all responses, the whole organism and its environment are involved. A response is not merely the response of the brain or a definite part of it but the whole life of the organism is involved. Furthermore, when physiological responses are considered as a whole in this manner, 'we find that they are of such a nature as to contribute to the maintenance of the normal life of the organism as a whole'.\(^5\) The organism is so interrelated not organized that 'every part of it bears a definite relation to every other part'.\(^6\) And every organ or part fulfills its proper functions and adapts itself to every change of the wider organic whole.\(^7\) The living organism 'must be seen as a whole if it is to be seen at all'.\(^8\)

As the internal parts of the organism are so related, so the organism and environment are in constant interaction and exchange. Whether material is to be accepted or rejected, whether and to what extent the organism will respond to stimuli, is all determined by the life of the organism as a whole. 'The living body and its environment form an organic whole, the parts of which cannot be understood in separation from each other'.\(^9\)

In the 'wider spiritual unity' of the self, the past, present and future meet as constituent elements. This personality holds

1. Ibid., p. 386 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 67 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 388
5. Mechanism, Life & Personality, p. 117, f. 116-117
6. Ibid., p. 78
7. Ibid., pp. 93-94
8. Ibid., p. 92
9. Ibid., pp. 79-80
10. Ibid., p. 80
time-relations within itself. Other persons are not outside this self but are really part of it so that an individual feels, acts and perceives through his own organismic structure.1 And finally, this personality is not merely individual but is an integral part of that all-embracing personality we call God.2

One of the major contributions in modern thought to the integrational aspect of the organism is to be found in the researches of W.B. Cannon. In his Bodily Change in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage, written in 1915, he asserts the interconnection between emotion and bodily changes. In the autonomic-adrenal phenomena (autonomic secretion systems) and the cerebro-spinal system through the sensory nerves, this relationship is most conspicuously seen and in which the theoretical conviction finds particular evidential material.3 He shows that a strong excitation of the sensory nerves stimulates reflexly the adrenal glands and adrenalin is released into the blood stream. This is true of such emotional excitement as rage and fear.4 All such excitation-response activity increases the ability of the organism to cope with the struggle to which fear or rage or pain refer.5 The sympathetic and cerebro-spinal nervous systems, the secretory (endocrinal) system and the emotional (psychic) activity are immediately interwoven, from which further manifest changes, depending on the action, occur. This means that neither the visceral or any other group of organs can sufficiently account for any particular emotion. They merely contribute to an emotional complex (contra James-Lange theory); that is, a pattern reaction.6

The autonomic functions are especially directed to the preservation of the organism (sympathetic-autonomic) and preservation of the race (sacral autonomic).7 On this basis, these functions serve to inhibit or strengthen responses and assist in the maintenance of the balance (later called 'homeostasis') of the organism.8 This is illustrated particularly in the cases of adrenin and its function in fatigue9 and sugar and muscular demands.10 He indicates the severe results when an organism has been prepared to fight or is in constant rage and there is nothing to fight. The suggestion is a demand for substitutive action (which might be called 'sublimation'). The psychosomatic implications (emotion and bodily changes) of this study form an integral part of later medical and psychological research as well as implementing the conceptualization of the organism as a whole.

Hobhouse had presented the organism as a 'psycho-physical whole' and Henderson had emphasized a Haldanian influenced concept.

1. Ibid., pp. 122-128
2. Ibid., p. 135; a typical inadequate criticism of Haldane is given in Leslie Mackenzie's article in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, III, 1923. No attempt is here made to evaluate this, only indicate the source of a contrary argument.
4. Magda B. Arnold in Psychological Review, 1945, v. 52 reviews Cannon's work, 'Physiological Differentiation of Emotional States'. One thing emphasized is that recent research indicates that cortin, a cortical hormone, not the medullary hormone, adrenalin, is responsible for muscular strength and emergency-tension in conditions of fear and rage as well as influencing work capacity and thus fatigue-potential (or tolerance). pp. 35ff.
7. Ibid., p. 272
8. Ibid., p. 270
10. Ibid., pp. 66-79 and passim.
of the organism in its part-whole relationship, when 1917 offered another interesting bio-philosophy - that of d'Arcy Thompson.

Thompson's position is clear when he says, "we tend, as we analyse a thing into its parts or into properties, to exaggerate their apparent independence, and to hide from ourselves (at least for a time) the essential integrity and individuality of the composite whole!" He explains this convincingly by indicating that "even the bones themselves are only in a limited and even a deceptive sense, separate and individual things. The skeleton begins as a continuum and a continuum it remains all life long." One could say, in like manner, that muscle and bone are inseparably associated and connected; they are moulded one with another; they come into being together, and act and react together." This relationship is actually one which pervades 'the whole fabric of the body'. When we separate these factors (parts) within the body from their composite integrity, we do so at the expense of a whole which ceases to exist.

'The biologist, as well as the philosopher, learns to recognize that the whole is not merely the sum of its parts. It is this, and much more than this. For it is not a bundle of parts, but an organization of parts, of parts in their mutual arrangement, fitting one with another, in what Aristotle calls a single and indivisible principle of unity; and this is no merely metaphysical conception, but is in biology the fundamental truth which lies at the basis of Geoffroy's (or Goethe's) law of "compensation" or "balance of growth".'

On this basis, 'we may look upon the coordinated parts, now as related and fitted to the end or function of the whole, and now as related to or resulting from the physical causes inherent in the entire system of forces to which the whole has been exposed, and under whose influence it has come into being'.

The 'organismic theory', so efficiently expounded by W.E. Ritter in his 1919 two-volume work, The Unity of the Organism, is 'one of the milestones in the effort of scientific thought to develop a theory of the organism as a whole. He lays the foundation of the study upon the contrast between the 'organismalism' of Aristotle and the 'elementalism' of Lucretius. Aristotle is represented as always conceiving of, and studying, the organism as a whole with the parts in a unitary interrelatedness. Lucretius built his atomistic elementalism on the separate function and autonomy of the parts which had no interactive relationship. The comparative study of these respective approaches is maintained through the investigation of the organism's chemical-cell development, the analysis of protoplasmic construction, the production of individuals, considerations of the internal secretory system, the neural integration, tropistic theories and culminates with an investigation into the body-mind relation, psychical integration and consciousness.

Leaning heavily on the contributions of such researchers as Jacques Loeb, Charles Sherrington, W.B. Cannon, Josiah Royce and William James, Ritter convincingly and faultily expounds his primary

2. On Growth and Form, p. 712
3. Ibid., p. 712
4. Ibid., p. 713
5. Ibid., p. 713
6. Ibid., p. 713-714
7. Ibid., p. 714
8. Ibid., pp. 714-715
principle, formulating in his early assertion that 'the organism in its totality is as essential to an explanation of its elements as its elements are to an explanation of the organism'.

He indicates that the 'biological' organism is so interrelated as to demand both the definition of itself and its functions and the definition of its parts and their functions to be given in terms of the part-whole relationship and their mutual interacting dependency. On this basis, nothing adequately representative can be said about a part except in terms of its functional relatedness to all the other parts and its meaningful contribution to the whole in its respective significance and function.

The basic point of reference that parts are non-existent except in relation to the organism, is reflected in Ritter's physical-pyschical and organism-environment 'intra-dependency' thus stated:

'To be alive is to be an organic individual; to be an organic individual is to be an individual that perpetually synthesizes itself from substances extraneous to itself ... and to be a psychically endowed individual is to be an individual which in addition to synthesizing a physical nature from the substances mentioned, synthesizes a psychical nature from the substances mentioned, synthesizes a psychical nature from physical and chemical contacts and interactions between the individual and the external world, the physical contacts being called stimuli.

Viewing the matter thus, it is seen to be highly probable that in its ultimate essences the dependence of the psychical nature of the organism on stimuli is connected, directly and inseparably, with the dependence of its material nature on material nutriment.'

... in some way the psychic life is no less dependent on the nutritive substances and processes than is the physical life ... yet that "some way" appears to be ... remote and obscure ... 12

Just as the mind without the body cannot be called an organism nor the body without the mind, one without the other cannot produce an act. Acts, therefore, are not of any one function or part but of the whole organism. Every function subserves the needs of the organism as the act is the organism acting as a whole. One gathers it is not a question of what part is acting or what system is performing or what is functioning. The question as to whether the physical or the psychical is acting is an improper one. The first concern is to see the action as the organism acting, per se. The second, to ascertain 'how much of each function is involved in the acting'.

Consciousness arises due to the interaction of chemical and respiratory (oxygen) processes. In consciousness there is no content which is either subjective or objective, inner or outer but has an essential element of both members. Faculty concepts are discarded.

1. Supra., p. 24, v. i
2. Ibid., p. 237
3. In my own thinking, the body without mind is an organism but certainly not a person. I think this is what the above author is saying but uses the term 'organism' synonymously with 'person'.
4. Ibid., pp. 161-168
5. Ibid., pp. 300ff.
6. Ibid., pp. 292-298
In favor of organismic activity. Consciousness is viewed as an attribute of the organism as a whole and as such is not separable from the organism or restricted to the nervous system or brain. In view of this, the emotional and physical not only demand each other, but express together, a common act.

The organismic point of view in its analysis of the organism might be briefly stated in Rutter's own words:

'According to my hypothesis, the phases of the bio-chemical-physical sort and the phases of the psychical sort have common ground in the organism as a whole, the phases of intellect and reason corresponding to the cerebro-spinal nervous systems; the phase of instinct corresponding probably to the autonomic nervous system; the phases of feeling and emotion corresponding mainly to the glandular and visceral systems; those of the will to the body-muscular system; those of the tropisms and simple reflexes to the receptor-conductor-effector systems; and finally those of simple protoplasmic response to the fundamental protoplasmic mechanism of response, whatever its structure.'

It would not be gratuitous to characterize this approach as an effort to see, study and analyze the organism, not only in its unity or part organization, but also as a whole, a distinct entity with properties peculiar to itself alone.

Stewart Paton made some interesting observations on methodological study of organisms in his book, Human Behavior (1921). He says man has been studied as if he were some kind of detachable mechanism or assemblage of random parts. Some investigators think they can understand behavior, conduct, character and personality merely by piecing together, as it were, items of information just as the functions of the heart have been studied as if it bore no relation to the lungs or the rest of the organs or the brain, as if it functioned apart from the rest of the body. The bundle hypotheses of the organism and personality are wholly inadequate to understand life as a process and whole. Behavior is something more than the mere sum of the functions of the various parts of the body. There must be an analytical procedure of study but the more important is to see the organism as a whole, acting as a whole. This is the 'organismal' conception.

Neither the organism nor its behavior can be studied as if they were algebraic summations of parts nor mere aggregations of ideas or emotions satisfactorily account for adjustments occurring at the conscious level. Behavior is whole. The organism is a living unit - a whole. On this organismal approach are both normal and dysfunctioning processes to be understood.

The rise of emphasis on the organism as a whole is typically represented in J.G. McKenzie's first major publication, Modern Psychology and the Achievement of Christian Personality (1923). The continuously interwoven theme and actually the fundamental frame of

1. Ibid., p. 309
2. Ibid., pp. 320ff.
3. Ibid., p. 349
4. Ibid., p. 18, v. 1
5. Supra., cf. pp. 6, 103, 9, 21
6. Ibid., pp. 94, 161, 252
7. Ibid., p. 161
8. Ibid., pp. 161, 177, 20, 12, 19, 63 especially.
9. Ibid., p. 107
10. Ibid., cf. pp. 100, 76, 66, 91, 107, 108
reference for the work is that when a particular mode of behavior takes place it is not the result of segmental unit functions, but the person acting as a whole. It is not that the whole person enters into the act but rather that the action is the whole person. The self as a whole cannot be broken up into parts or realities which can be thought of as existing 'apart from the self' or as being able to 'act on the self'. In fact, 'Every activity of our being, be it of feeling, impulses, conscience, or reason, is an activity of the whole self'. He emphatically declares that 'The Self is always an organic whole'.

Professor McKenzie lays great stress on the fact that the organism is always striving in terms of some end. For instance, it is restless until it finds unity and harmony in the universe. In addition, the goal directed activities of the person are ultimately working for one purpose, one end, one ideal which is given in terms of the tendency to realize the self - the self as a whole. It must find unity, he says, within the interrelation of parts. His 'self-determination, self-direction, self-conscious' qualities are not only the expression of a self as a whole but are seeking the realization of the self. There is always a 'tendency to strive morally' and to live by ideals in an effort to fulfill the nature of the personality. An interesting point is that psychopathological conditions result with a repression of any part of the personality; that is, when personality ceases to operate normally, which is to operate as a whole. This includes the function of what we call the conscience. The personality's normality is actually found in its 'whole' functioning and in this it finds its fulfillment and natural self.

Although we have already had occasion to notice the work of E.S. Russell in its embodiment of the tendency to self-maintenance and development and also, by considerable references to his concept of the organism as a whole, it is well here to look at his emphasis on the behavioral expressions of the whole organism and methodology suggested for its study.

One should distinguish at least three levels of 'activities', he indicates, within the organism: (1) the responses or activities of the whole organism, (2) the functions or activities of the parts, (3) the material conditions of life, the physico-chemical properties of living matter. The important contribution to which this study draws attention is that no matter what the activity is, it really is always in terms of the whole organism. In fact, the smallest activity may be considered an activity of the whole organism. The raising of the arm, for instance, should be considered as a response of the whole organism. Even in the multicellular organism, what is described as cell-functions which are allotted to different organs, are 'so intimately controlled and regulated by the organism as a whole as almost to become responses of the whole'. All activity is always in terms of an end and in terms of the whole in which it finds its frame of reference as really the action of the organism as a whole.

1. Supra., pp. 18-19
2. Ibid., pp. 43-44
3. Ibid., p. 57
4. Ibid., p. 44; cf. 45
5. Ibid., p. 58
6. Ibid., p. 19
7. Ibid., p. 51
8. Earlier in this chapter; also cf. op. cit., The Study of Living Things, pp. 11, 12, 19, 63 especially.
9. Ibid., p. 107
10. Ibid., cf. pp. 100, 78, 86, 91, 107, 108
His methodology in the study of living things is to consider first, actions as responses of the organism as a whole which must take precedence over the study of partial activities. Second, to consider the organism in its natural environment. Third, in an experimental situation, one must attempt to investigate whether or not the behavior of the organism is a stimulus-element which is merely representing another complete situation. Fifth, the factor of meaning which enters into all situations must be understood in order to see what factor it plays in the shaping of stimuli and the activity concerning it. The organism, properly, reacts not entirely on the basis of the stimulus itself, but what significance that stimulus has for it. Sixth, the actions in terms of their aim or object must be considered so that one asks, 'what is the aim of this response in its relation to the whole situation as perceived by the organism?' It is on this basis that responses are to be classified. Seventh, the functions of the organism must be studied from responses downward through the more complex to the simpler formations to material conditions. In other words, the organism must be studied downwards, not upwards. Then parts would be studied in terms of the whole and their proper action and nature in this relationship for which they function can be adequately understood. The organism, he implies, cannot be explained by building it up from part studies but by beginning with the whole and thus interpreting the parts.2

Since the middle of the 1920's, a tremendous amount of literature has arisen emphasizing and developing the concept of the organism-as-a-whole. Hans Syz in an article, The Concept of the Organism as-a-Whole,3 gives an historical sketch of relevant research. Interestingly enough, very little material is recorded by him as having embodied the idea before 1926. A detailed historical study of this concept would probably be welcomed by contemporary workers in biology, physiology and psychology. It would indicate, as does this paper, that Smuts was a significant exponent of the growing belief in the organism-as-a-whole and an early contributor to the subsequent prodigious research and interest in the subject.

(3) The Basic Theory of Wholes

The concept of the whole in its most basic formulation, as something more and different from the parts in summation, is such an apparent fact that it seems highly improbable that it should be confined to the modern era. This, however, is evidently the case. It may have been possible that the idea is so obvious that it was not felt sufficiently valuable to expound theoretically but merely found its place in unconscious, or intuited, or presupposed thought. George Hartmann, in Gestalt Psychology, calls attention to a statement by the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tse (600 B.C.) who states in his Tao-te-Ching that 'the sum of the parts is not the whole'.4 Aristotle, as we have seen, had long talked about the form giving direction to the organization of parts, implying that the organized object possessed a 'nuance' or a quality which could not be found in the parts or their sum; it was an actuality - a whole. There is in Leibniz the intimation that

1. Ibid., pp. 78-80-84
2. Ibid., pp. 111, 112
3. Appearing in Human Biology, 1936
4. Supra., p. 168
5. Lectures 10, 37, 45, cf. Theodore, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, pp. 45-48
the subject is something more than the sum of its predicates, possessing a sense of particularity all its own. Possibly, the leading authority on Jean Fernel, the seventeenth century physician, Sir Charles Sherrington, writes the very interesting comment concerning Fernel's 'life principle'. For Fernel, 'The total life is seen as an additive result ... by co-organization of integrative kind. . .' He continues, 'There, as Fernel insisted, the harmony of the whole is not merely built out of its parts, but is impressed on the parts by the whole'.

Sherrington feels that this is a principle 'revived notably by Smuts as Holism'. If this opinion be granted, then Fernel, one can say, has an intimation of what is to come, though Sherrington's remark is entirely too general and brief to make it of major elucidation.

Within the framework of the new science of chemistry, there arose many interesting and new ideas. One of them was what might well be declared the earliest formulation of anything approaching a genuine theoretical concept of wholes. Though the idea was certainly an undeveloped one, a concept of wholes is to be found in Thomas Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, published in 1820. Appropriating some of the findings of this new science to the theory of association, he presented his 'chemistry of the mind' or what is often called 'mental chemistry'. Sensations, emotions and ideas form complex patterns or unit-formations which, though demanding analysis, yet have features about them which are not found in their elements. A good illustration of this is the taste of lemonade (an oft used example, since Brown, as we shall see), which is a blend and not merely a sum of elements. Just so, in the spontaneous chemistry of the mind the compound sentiment has little resemblance to its elements or constituents. In the case of objects, such as ideas or impressions, there is, in addition to a process of association, a process of comparison, relatedness, differentiation. It seems to be the 'relation' between elements as well as the elements themselves, which gives the whole-object existence, and which makes the whole irreducible to constituent parts.

John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic (1843), presents clearly and definitely the concept of wholes and his principle of 'heteropathic causation'. Beginning with the principles of chemical combination, he draws, by analogy, biological conclusions to account for 'the living body itself'. The heteropathic laws of combination anticipate the foundational basis of the important contributions made later in the field of biological (emergent) evolution. To make clear Mill's contribution, the author takes the liberty to quote extensively some direct and important passages. He writes:

'The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties different from those of either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together. Not a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is observable in those of their compound, water. The taste of sugar is not the sum of the tastes of its component elements, acetic acid and lead or its oxide; nor is the colour of blue vitriol a mixture of the colours

1. This paper, chapter 4; cf. B. Russell, op. cit., p. 49
2. Dialogues, 1656
3. Sherrington, Man and His Nature, p. 77
4. Ibid., p. 78
5. Lectures 10, 37, 45, cf. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, pp. 43-44
of sulphuric acid and copper. This explains why mechanics is a deductive or demonstrative science, and chemistry not. In the one, we can compute the effects of combinations of causes, whether real or hypothetical, from the laws which we know to govern those causes when acting separately, because they continue to observe the same laws when in combination which they observed when separate; whatever would have happened in consequence of each cause taken by itself, happens when they are together, and we have only to cast up the results. Not so in the phenomena which are the peculiar subject of the science of chemistry. There most of the uniformities to which the causes conformed when separate cease altogether when they are conjoined; and we are not, at least in the present state of our knowledge, able to foresee what result will follow from any new combination, until we have tried the specific experiment.

"If this be true of chemical combinations, it is still more true of those far more complex combinations of elements which constitute organised bodies and in which those extra-ordinary new uniformities arise which are called the laws of life. All organised bodies are composed of parts similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner bear no analogy to any of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself." 1

So, again, the component parts of a vegetable or animal substance do not lose their mechanical and chemical properties as separate agents, when by a peculiar mode of juxtaposition, they, as an aggregate whole, acquire physiological or vital properties in addition. Those bodies continue as before, to obey mechanical and chemical laws, insofar as the operation of those laws is not counteracted by the new laws which govern them as organised beings.

1. Supra., BK. III, Ch. vi, para. 1, p. 243
2. Ibid., p. 244.
The different actions of a chemical compound will never, undoubtedly, be found to be the sums of the actions of its separate elements; but there may exist, between the properties of the compound and those of its elements some constant relation, which, if discoverable by a sufficient induction, would enable us to foresee the sort of compound which will result from a new combination before we have actually tried it, and to judge of what sort of elements some new substance is compounded before we have analysed it.'1

'Thus, it appears that even heteropathic laws, such laws of combined agency as are not compounded of the laws of the separate agencies, are yet, at least in some cases, derived from them according to a fixed principle.'2

Wilhelm Wundt (1860), who was mentioned earlier in this Appendix with reference to the 'principle of creative resultants', is recognized here as positing a theory of wholes in which complex sensory qualities or complex presentations in psychological activity are not mere aggregates but wholes which are more than the summations of elements. For instance, when, say, three sounds were heard together, they would be perceived as a clang or chord. If these sounds were heard separately, one would hear a melody. This melody, in turn, is more than the sum of notes, it is a whole. This is true of words uttered so that not a mere succession of words is heard, but an intelligible sentence. The sentence with its own meaning is not the sum of words or sounds but a whole. Ideas and perceptions are all presented as wholes, not mere summations of individual parts. The process of formation, synthesis and formal relation between components and their resultants is 'the principle of creative resultants'. It is an attempt 'to state the fact that in all psychical combinations the product is not a mere sum of the separate elements that compose such combinations, but that it presents a new creation'.3

In expounding his concepts of 'Resultants and Emergents', G.H. Lewes in Problems of Life and Mind (1874-75), bequeathed a new term and a heightened awareness to biological thought. As contributory as Bergson's phrase 'creative evolution', Lewes's 'Emergence' and 'emergent' became central nomenclative pegs on which to hang evolutionary theories. The very term, 'emergent', suggests that it is something originating from the parts but different from them. Lewes says, 'The emergent is unlike its components in so far as these are incomparable, and it cannot be reduced either to their sum or their relation'.4 He makes clear that the 'emergent' is the components and emphatically asserts that 'nothing can be more like the coalescence of the components than the emergent which is their coalescence'.5

Let us frame John Dewey's theory of wholes in the larger nexus of his Psychology. Throughout this text he constantly refers to some aspect of 'wholes' and uses repeatedly 'whole' terminology. He refers to the mind as connecting 'all sensations as far as possible

1. Ibid., p. 245
2. Ibid., pp. 245-246
4. Suora., p. 113
5. Ibid., pp. 113-114, v. ii; this same idea applied to the whole organism, pp. 113-114, v. i; in cause and effect, ch. ii and iii, v. ii.

Psychological Review, 1897, v. 4, p. 113.
into one total maximum experience, 'making all things into wholes'. In fact, 'the fundamental law of mental action' is that there is a tendency to shun isolated elements and to force connection wherever possible. This is true of perception in which all percepts are synthesized into wholes. He defines attention, for instance, as 'that activity of the self which connects all elements presented to it into one whole...'.

Against this setting, one can better understand the theory of wholes intimated throughout his study. Now, on the subject of relations, he discusses the acquisition of the knowledge of an orange. After indicating that its constituent elements are the sensations of sight, touch, taste and smell, he states that these separately are meaningless. It is only when they are combined 'and made members of a whole... do they get meaning'. Then, he says significantly, 'but this combination does not give us knowledge of an orange'. On the basis of previous experience and comparison, do we ascertain the thing. The whole, then, is known on the basis of elements and 'apperception', shall we say, or more accurately perhaps, 'relation' (which, according to Dewey, is 'invested' by the mind in this aggregate of things to give them 'wholeness').

Again, discussing 'Fusion and Integration', he says, a 'Presentation is not a mechanical mosaic of independent sensations' but a dynamic, modifying, yet continuing unity; a whole in which separate elements lose independent existence. He recalls Professor James's illustration of the intimate taste of lemonade. 'This does not retain unchanged the tastes of sugar and of lemon, but is itself a new sensation into which the old ones have passed as elements.'

In other words, what we have here is not a loosely connected aggregate of separable parts, but a new total experience.

G.F. Stout, in Analytical Psychology published in 1896, enunciated pre-Gestalt theories about wholes in terms of the underlying unity of mental functioning and complex forms in perception and sensation. The interesting principle of 'noetic synthesis' is that factor which 'owes... its peculiarity to the introduction of a distinct kind of mental factor, the apprehension of the whole which determines the order and connection of the apprehension of the parts. This is illustrated in attention which is the ability (noetic and noetic) to pursue a thing to satisfactory levels of equilibria and is another expression of the organism seeking to maintain equilibrium or balance of function in unity.

This 'apprehension of the whole' connotes the idea that the whole is a distinct 'entity' (fact), for it is 'as much a distinct content of consciousness and a distinct factor in mental process, as is

1. Supra., pp. 92-93
2. Ibid., pp. 241-242
3. Ibid., p. 93
4. Ibid., pp. 88-89, 98-99, 100, 157
5. Ibid., p. 133
6. Ibid., p. 87
7. Ibid., p. 87
8. Ibid., pp. 86-88
9. Ibid., p. 94
10. Ibid., p. 95
11. Ibid., p. 95
12. Ehrenfels, 1890 but Gestalt (Berlin) usually referred to, formulated their theories in 1912.
13. Supra., p. 41, v. 11
the sensation of red or blue. He indicates that the 'perception of the part involves perception of the whole, as such.' Further, he states that 'It is certainly possible to think of a whole in its unity and distinctness without discerning all or even any of its component details'.

There is a general assumption of what a whole is, so that a clear definition, as such, is difficult to find. One must rely on contextual material and such statements as 'If the whole were nothing more than the summation of parts...,' to discover any theoretical declarative intimations.

William McDougall in *Body and Mind* (1911) presents a concept of wholes, generally only by implication, which cannot be considered novel in any sense, but merely supportive to the growing awareness of the implications of 'whole' theories. The illustration to which attention is drawn in the discussion of a melody which, he says, 'is due in chief part to the relating, synthetic activity by which the parts, the successive notes, are combined in one harmonious whole, the melody'. Through the 'synthetic psychical activity', sensory elements are combined into objects 'of a higher order' not merely a complex of sensations.

Reaction seems to be not merely a series of stimuli to which an organism responds or a compound reflex action appears but on the basis of meaning and synthetic action, it becomes a unitary experience.

The interesting philosophical works of N. O. Lossky, which are based on the theory of wholes, certainly form one of the earliest extensive applications of this theory in the field of philosophy and ethics. His writings have occupied our attention sufficiently to establish his position. Some terse statements may, however, refresh our memory. He says, for instance, that 'a line is not the sum of its points' but 'a whole... which can be the ground of an infinite multiplicity (of points) but cannot arise out of it'. Again, referring to the movement of a point, that movement 'is more than the sum of successive positions occupied by it; movement is a whole...'. He indicates that his theory of the 'organic whole' is like Koehler's later developed theory of physiologische Gestalten.

In the article 'Organic and Inorganic World-Concepts' published in 1912 in the *Filosofsky Sbornik v tochest L. M. Lopatina*,

1. Ibid., p. 42, v. 11
2. Ibid., p. 17, v. 11
3. Ibid., p. 17, v. 1
4. Ibid., pp. 65-66, v. 1; cf. 'fundamentum relations', ch. iii, v. 1; also pp. 1-42, v. 1
5. Supra., p. 315
6. Ibid., p. 315
7. Ibid., pp. 270-271; cf. 301ff; in *Psychology*, 1912, one gets the feeling that the outcry against 'mere aggregation' and 'mosaic theories' is not a conviction framed within a genuine theory of wholes where the whole is more than a summation of parts, but because the aggregates are unorganized, two entirely different motives. Compare p. 35 on the material for psychology, pp. 49-50 on 'parts of the mind with p. 44 on the biologist who studies 'the whole as the sum of parts', and pp. 69-70 on a definition of mind. Also see, for comparative reference, *Mind*, v. vii, 1897.

9. Ibid., p. 3
10. Ibid., p. 3
he maintained that in any philosophical theory, the idea of the whole is prior to its parts. In the 1919 work, he proposes this idea as basic to every judgement, '... the condition of the world being knowable'. On the basis of prior existing wholes, parts find existence, which seems to imply that meaning in the part-whole relationship is a determining factor.

The concept of wholes and principles of organization and grouping formed the basic tenets of the two schools of Gestalt psychology. Ehrenfels of the Austrian School, as early as 1890, formulated the 'Gestaltqualitat' with particular reference to the organization of stimuli anticipated by Hering and Ebbinghaus, but particularly stimulated by Ernst Mach's inquiries about composition in sensation. He illustrated the idea by reference to a melody (a Gestalt) which was inseparable from the various notes which constituted it and on whose arrangement it depended. The melody, however, could be played in another key and at the same time retain identity. This concept was popularly phrased 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts'. He suggested that the whole must be the result of the organization of interrelated parts. Sensory organization (Gestalt qualities) is the result of construction by the subject. This emphasis, still retaining connotations of earlier 'mental synthesis' ideas, was the cardinal problem differentiating the Austrian School from the Berlin School which maintained that the stimuli reaching the sense-organs were transformed by the nervous system and brain into gestalt patterns so that the organism is always presented with an organized perceptual whole (configuration).  

1. Ibid., p. 8

2. As a matter of fact, it is a difficult postulation to formulate as to whether there is or is not in Gestalt a process of synthesis, even though, in Sidis's phrase it may be a 'moment consciousness'. It might be thought that the difference between Smuts's Holism and Gestalt is that the first maintains a 'creative synthesis' which 'would be unacceptable to Gestalt psychology'. Such a statement, the present author feels, is not entirely correct. It is not that Smuts does not hold to an equivalent idea of synthesis and emergence, though this is not his main emphasis, but because Gestalt might well be reduced to this process in its basic concepts or perception. All that needs to be done is to prove that in Gestalt the sensory elements (responses to stimuli) were, in fact, synthesized by the nervous system and the brain and presented to awareness as a perception (a whole), and so designate such a process, as one of synthesis. Not only would the foregoing discussion imply such a process, but a quotation from one of the two leading Gestaltists might lend some clarification to this problem. Kohler says: '... when thinking of perceptual patterns we refer for the most part to configurations which are simultaneously given. In this case, it is a similarity among processes, which makes for the formation of specific groups. The present problem in the field of memory consists in the fact that a process becomes preferably related to similar rather than to entirely different traces ... The selective influence of similarity of grouping can be demonstrated just as well in the case of temporal or successive organization as in the case of simultaneous patterns. It operates in auditory, in visual and in other perceptual patterns. Under such circumstances perceptual organization
Wertheimer, Kohler and Koffka of the Berlin School, made their attack (1912) on the atomistic, elementalistic and associationistic emphases in theories of sensation and perception. The long accepted view of perception, retained from Hume, contended that a stimulus gives rise to its own special sensation and the integration or aggregation of the separate elements along with invested meaning from past experience presented a perception or perceptual experience. In movement, isolated elements were 'hooked up' and motion inferred. These Gestaltists or 'Configurationists', as they are often called, posited (with their phi-phenomenon theory) that a total, unified, whole (of sensory fields) was presented rather than isolated elements and by such organization, the organized 'object' (perception) possesses characteristics not reducible to a single or summated sensations. The totality of perception (the common sense view) was primary; only by analysis are its constituents discernible, i.e. entities are studied as entities and not as the summation of partial elements. Associationism and Gestalt begin at opposite ends.

The organized is dependent on principles of organization. There are several, such as the tendency for grouping of things similar, things near, etc., but one of the most used is called 'closure', referring to the tendency, primarily in visual perception, to group special objects. Closure, in other words, is a tendency to bring separate things into a relational perceptual whole. This is based on the important concept of good Gestalt or pregnancy, which means a grouping according to a 'best under the circumstances' provision. It is an effort always to maintain wholes (biologically it is like the organismic equilibrium theses we noted earlier).

Even the basic principles of Gestalt were not altogether new, as we have already seen. The effort to negate atomism, a

is a matter of 'young' traces, no less than of processes. Thus a practically continuous series of instances leads from strictly simultaneous organization in perception through successive organization (which every body will still regard as a perceptual fact) to the particular situation in memory with which we are not occupied'. It is maintained that the principle of synthesis and that of organization are, here, basically the same and that Smuts's position can be considered to be in sympathy with Gestalt and not in contradiction. The real difference seems to be in the fact that for Gestalt, the percepts are organized into wholes within the nervous system, while Smuts puts much greater emphasis, as did Kant, Ehrenfels, Stout and others, on the mind (some phase of conscious or unconscious mind) 'which fuses and unites' 'sensations and intuitions' into 'not mere aggregates' but wholes. Whether the Gestaltists and Smuts could agree that the organization process in the 'unconscious' and that in nervous system which presents perceptions to consciousness as wholes are really the same remains only speculative. It does seem that sensory organization in Gestalt has the same dominate ideas often given by Smuts in creative synthesis.

1. It might be well to mention that in addition to those referred to earlier, it should be remembered that Kant had spoken of a sensory manifold; Ward, following Brentano and Beneke, had talked about presentation, continuum and perceptual wholes and their description as being more than the sum of parts (1911); *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

3. Supra, pp. 185ff for the difference between 'parts' and 'qualities'.
Lloyd Morgan's Emergent Evolution (the first series of 1922 Gifford Lectures) is the culmination of divergent theories concerning emergence, resultant synthesis, which had followed a long line of distinguished investigators. This investigation, in a critical abstraction, is an attempt to form an evolutionary theory on the basis of a theory of wholes. Fundamental to the entire study is the ever present motif of wholes, their principles, structure, relations, qualities, properties, characteristics and from this an effort is made to devise a bio-philosophical theory of 'organic' evolution. With the rise and fall of this fundamentum principium goes the rise and fall of emergent evolution.

Since we have sufficiently referred to the now (by Morgan's time) accepted theory of wholes with their emergent qualities and individuality, the proper question seems to be 'In what sense did Morgan contribute to a further articulation of the theory of wholes?' To answer this is a demand to objectify such a theory in the light of the general theme, emergent evolution. Morgan's great contention here is that in the physical and psychical worlds, there is overwhelming evidence to support the theory that emergence, the rising of new qualities out of regrouping, is a scientific and observational fact. The 'emergents' with their 'more' which gives the whole (emergent) its

James (1890) talked all around the idea. Interestingly, Sjödén in Normal and Abnormal Psychology, 1914, whom we shall take this brief occasion to notice, followed more along the lines of Ehrenfels's Gestalt when he says 'a sum of sensations, of ideas, of images, of feelings, etc. at once brought in consciousness as a sum is by this very fact synthesized by thought into unity.'. (p. 111) By this process 'that man yonder is made up of many parts!' (p. 115). He further emulates that this is accomplished moment-consciousness . . . 'p. 117). He intimates not only in the illustration about 'John' but often that the whole is more than the sum of its elements and that the factor by which separate parts are formed to make a whole is 'mental synthesis', cf. ch. 18, pp. 151ff. Hering's theory (1905) of the reciprocal action of elements in the field of vision was a source upon which Gestalt theory was noticeably dependent. Cf. Katz, Gestalt Psychology, pp. 43, 53. For a fuller development of historical antecedents and development of Gestalt Psychology see Ellis; A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology and Hartman, Gestalt Psychology.

1. Supra., pp. 329, 332
2. Ibid., cf. pp. 191, 329, 214, 334
3. Supra., pp. 185ff for the difference between 'properties' and 'qualities'.
distinctiveness from the parts or the parts in summation, is a 'natural plan' of the universe. The emergent is a creative quality which gives rise to a new order of existence. A resultant, is not necessarily 'new' but a whole which possesses individual qualities not found in the parts or an aggregate but does not possess a creative quality marking such an advance to a 'new' form (novelty); it bears however, a quantitative position with reference to the emergent, for it underlies it. He remarks that 'through resultants there is continuity'. Emergents and resultants and the principle governing them form the natural quality of the universe and living forms along give sufficient explanation for the rise of all existence, of matter, life and mind.

Professor Alexander had already built in his *Space, Time and Deity* an 'order of nature', if it may be called that, in which space-time continuum forms the basic matrix out of which all configurations finally arise. In this scheme, the less complex configuration (whole) gives rise to a more complex configuration until one arrives at Deity. The compelling force or tendency in all this is Nisus (Aristotle). Lloyd Morgan foundations much of his theory on these two ideas in Alexander. However, it is to be noted with A.D. Ritchie that Alexander always credited Lloyd Morgan with originating the notion of emergence. From these concepts developed an Emergent Evolutionary system with its 'scale of being' leading from space-time, matter, life and mind to deity. In other words, there is a progressive development of stuff which becomes new stuff in virtue of the higher status to which it has been raised under some supervenient kind of substantial go-togetherness. The lower form always gives rise to the next higher form (complex) but in the more complex organization, a new quality takes place which is not a product of the lower form. In this way, emergent qualities appear and give rise to ever higher forms of existence so that from matter emerges the lowest possible forms of reflexive 'life'; from this point a more complex, organized form of life emerges and from here mind until, finally, there is the appearance of deity (spiritual qualities). In its final analysis, this gradational scale, throughout, from 'bottom to top ... from top to bottom' is a 'psychical system'. Though the lowest forms of organic existence possess a 'psychical' quality, yet the emergence of mind is only at a 'high level'. At this point, it bears great resemblance to Spinoza, Leibniz and Hobhouse.

To explain this gradational scale thus is not a contradiction of argument for emergence since the higher is never fully explained on the basis of the lower but herein actually finds its validation. The richer cannot be adequately interpreted in terms of the poorer. Life ... in terms of physico-chemical relatedness only ... While each kind of relatedness, chemical, vital and conscious are in turn subservient on those standing lower in the scale, that is, possessing residual qualities from the lower, 'they do not supersede them in the sense that, when some higher kind of relatedness comes - the lower kinds go'. Depending on the lower as foundation, it is precisely because the higher has a quality of 'more' and is thus

1. Supra., p. 112
2. Ibid., p. 67
3. Ibid., p. 97
4. Ibid., p. 197
5. Ibid., pp. 194, 111
6. Ibid., pp. 204-205
7. Ibid., p. 278
an emergent, not merely a resultant, \(^1\) that it cannot be explained in terms of the former which does not possess qualities of the higher. As well, it is precisely because the emergent-whole entertains a new relatedness to other things (a new 'contextual' position) \(^2\) and by such extrinsic tension between objects, so demanding intrinsic qualitative-relational changes of the parts to each other and to the whole (note the parts' dependency for status on the whole and the adjustment in terms of its needs) that the lower form in its less integrated relational nexus, cannot explain the higher, in either its structural properties or functional characteristics (qualities).

For a moment of departure, in interest of the first Section, one would have to answer a primary question, 'If it is true that things first of all, seem to group into wholes and secondly, give rise to resultant and emergent qualities, what causes them to do so?' Morgan here definitely affirms that the agency or power behind the whole process of evolution and emergence is what he calls 'Activity' or Nisus or God. This factor is the directive of the course of events upon which the whole natural world of events depends.\(^3\) This Activity, a 'drawing upwards' \(^4\) is not something foreign or really at extra but is 'shared by everything inasmuch as there is in all things, material as well as animal and human consciousness, a tendency striving for the unattained.'\(^5\)

It will be noted that three things result from this statement concerning Professor Morgan's work: first, his position on 'emergent evolution' has been stated; second, his position on a 'tendency to wholeness' is clarified and third, his theory of wholes emphasizing their emergent quality, when they are merely resultant or novel, their constructural and relational effect on each other, their respective positions in comparative study, the properties of parts and their dependence, function and dynamic adjustment in the whole, has been, through the presentation of his salient thesis, represented.

With the divergent concepts of Mechanism, Vitalism, Substantial Vitalism and Emergent Vitalism forming a framework for his discussion, C.H. Broad in Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925) brings to the forefront a penetrating and insightful theory of wholes. Formulating the basic idea of emergence on an employment of an analogous parallelism between the structural and emergent qualities of chemical compounds and 'vital behavior' and living bodies, he asserts that as chemical wholes are existents which cannot be reduced to their individual compounds but from which they have been compounded, so vital behavior and living bodies cannot be considered aggregates but emergents or wholes which, likewise, cannot be explained on the basis of constituent elements. Knowledge about the parts in their separate ness can only be valid as they are compounded in functional interdependency with other parts and the whole which is emergent from them, yet not constituted by them. The properties of the whole cannot be predicted on the basis of the knowledge of the parts in separation or treated isolatedly. If this seems invalid, it is due to a faulty or 'suppressed' premise, the generalization from past observations of wholes and their properties to the consideration of various presented wholes, failing to recognize differentia of structure and

1. Ibid., p. 205
2. Ibid., p. 77
3. Ibid., pp. 34-36, p. 61
4. Ibid., p. 208, cf. p. 209
5. Ibid., p. 30
dynamical transactions of individual compounds. He aptly designates 'properties' in two phases in which they are considered as the relational aspects observed in the combination of other compounds and those intrinsic (or 'structural') qualities attributed to elements which are viewed in isolation. These can be known. But this leads him to admit, then, that the nature of the laws governing the combination of elements into specific compounds cannot be ascertained. This chemical 'behavior' is therefore unpredictable, inasmuch as elements in isolation offer no basis for explication of organization and wholes.

Though the law of living wholes is different from non-living wholes, nevertheless, the analogy is carried to the organism from inorganic 'vital behavior'. The process of emergence and emergent qualities has evidenced itself in organic structure and function, that aggregates cannot be considered to constitute a whole, that the part in isolation can give little guidance in formulating and understanding itself or the whole and that wholes must be studied qua wholes i.e. the organism as a whole. It is, however, the theory of wholes implied and explicit throughout this discussion to which attention is here drawn and which is sufficiently apparent in this brief reference.

In the year before the publication of Holism and Evolution, Alfred North Whitehead delivered his Lowell Lectures. It would be beyond the scope of this study to even attempt a survey of his Philosophy of Organism which appeared at its next and more fully developed stage in Process and Reality. The debt this paper owes to Whitehead's writings has become apparent and through these various references to 'events', 'prehension', 'occasion', 'concrecence', 'ingression', 'subject', 'nature', 'enduring entities', 'actual entities', 'objectification', and a great many other ideas from this rather involved system, the reader, it is hoped, will draw, by inference, the commonality of thought between the Philosophy of Organism and the Philosophy of Holism however much the central interpretive frame of reference of this thesis may raise questions concerning important issues facing the understanding (and consequently our theories) of the personal.

1. For refutation of Broad's contention at this point as well as his general thesis refer to McDougall, Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution, pp. 125-126. Morgan, op.cit., seems to give an adequate answer to this problem on pg. 3.
APPENDIX II

The Problem of Choice and Self-Maintenance
The idea that people do not deliberately choose self-defeating behavior is a clinical observation. To the ethicist, it may prove highly ambiguous, if not strange. Socrates is reported to have said 'A man never does wrong willingly'. This is in accord with his definition of sin as ignorance. Kierkegaard critically treats this problem on the basis that sin lies in the will, the act of defiance. (Sickness Unto Death, pp. 111ff) We cannot fully consider this problem but a brief statement might prove helpful in conveying our meaning. We are asserting, on the basis of clinical experience, that it is apparent that people do not deliberately choose self-defeating behavior.¹ We come to this decision by observation and theorizing from the basic thesis that there is a tendency to maintain and enhance the Self. Socrates based his assertions on a theory of ignorance and dynamics of knowledge and learning. First of all it must be clear that evil, of course, may be the end-result of an individual's choice, maturation may be hindered, integrity may be ruptured; that a person does wrongly is accepted. Certainly it is not these end-results, however, that are deliberately chosen. Rather, not the evil but that which comes in 'angel's garments', a 'shining light' is that which is chosen, in fact, is the only way, it seems, evil can be chosen at all. To the individual his behavior is the best under the circumstances. To say he deliberately wills to do evil, or that evil lies in the conscious and purposeful attempt to deliberately defeat himself (without gain)--to choose self-defeating evil--is an observer's point of view (and this may ultimately be one of the essential or the essential problem) detached and uninvolved in the situation. It is a spectator role. To be sure, in reflection, a person may and does see that evil resulted from his choice. His freedom, thus his responsibility, lies in the fact that he can live differently in the future, in the dedicated attempt to eliminate the distorting 'split-off' part of himself which makes such defense necessary. In more theological terms, sin is a failure to dedicate oneself to being oneself (Kierkegaard puts the burden on the will in saying sin is 'not to will to be oneself'). It is the failure to strive toward wholeness and is not limited to the separate rationalized, conscious and unconscious, attempts to preserve the self. It is not to the past but to the future that sin refers. It has, as well, the horizontal or field aspect in which preservation of the self as an end in itself is a violation of the position and being of the Self and the Other and is, consequently, self-defeating although such action seems 'the only thing to do under the circumstances'.

A man may know what is right but cannot choose it (as in the case of St. Paul) since it appears as too great a threat to his existence as he sees it (which in the Socratic sense may mean the individual cannot understand what is the right thing to do and therefore cannot do it). The lesser good or evil is rationalized and raised to an autistic level and chosen since (the individual believes) 'everything considered' it is the best thing to do. Furthermore, he often cannot know (except in bare outline) what is good or evil until his action is culminated and differentiation, appearing in reflection over the consequences of what he did, is made clear. At other times, he is not in possession of all possible choices, nor does the ultimately good stand arbitrarily cut out before him in clear perspective. Of the available ends set before him in his vision, he chooses what is not self-defeating but self-maintaining and that which best maintains the field-situation at the time as he sees it.

¹. Sartre in Existentialism and Humanism, p. 29, writes, 'To choose this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always the better. . . .'
as he sees it. He may choose against the holistic-principle (seen in reflection) but he does not do so deliberately without (he feels) justification at the time, in fact, not without greater justification than to choose the alternative.

Now, the defense functions necessary for this aberrated behavior (pathognomic in themselves) indicates the seriousness of his plight. But none of us is altogether free from some elements of distortion and pathology since in all our behavior we are not characterized by a compulsion to choose what to us is personally defeating but what is necessary and best at the time. The myopia, seen reflectively, and the anxiety resident in the condition, serve as the two-pronged expression of the holistic-principle in which the best gestalt, at the time, is procured. This condition, however, may be corrected. Because this is always an open possibility, we are always responsible for what we do. It is up to the individual whether he chooses to make the 'ought' (holistic-principle) his own which is the position of his freedom. Therefore, I do not see that such an interpretation of motivation, behavior and action, rightly understood, vitiates the problems nor the claims of moral philosophy or ethics. It is left to the moral philosopher to say whether a man acted rightly or wrongly and it is to the psychologist to say what the motivational source of his choice was. In this, I believe, Smuts's contentions were insightful.

It occurs to me that the point may be raised that in my clinical work I do not see people who are free to choose. Their own pathological defense system precludes freedom, knowledge of what is right, inasmuch as the right may and does appear threatening. The ego-processes, through the self-concept, have distorted, confused, compartmentalized (dissociated) the self and its functions so that compulsive activity and rationalization are imperative. There is something to be said for this but certainly any person in public may, upon observation, become aware that so-called normal people invariably choose self-maintaining, not self-defeating, behavior and that their thought and action systems are constructed on this basic need. It is possible that without this function of the self, disintegration would be more frequent (indeed it is certain that it would be). To generalize, it would appear that maintenance of the self demands this defense technique and, at the same time, the anxiety attendant to it would indicate a need for a better closure or integrity and also that no one is completely free i.e. all of us are mostly governed in our behavior by habit and compulsive needs. Whether this is our phylo-neurosis, human depravity or the consequence of our position of finitude, I am not prepared to say. I do believe that when I have entered or am able to enter into genuine love and community with the Other, I can be free for no defenses are necessary. The possibility of such a relationship is only an opportunity, however, when I am free. Where the two meet i.e. 'have entered or am able to enter into' etc., might be considered a therapeutic situation. On the other hand, I am not altogether sure this solves the whole problem since my finite knowledge would not guarantee that I would always choose what is ultimately right, good or best. This handicap of finitude would possibly ruin me if no 'autocorrective' processes were available as a resourceful aid to preservation. But, we are sure, that wholeness (person-other whole) based as it is on my own integrity and ability to love and be loved, would make me able, at least to choose with greater freedom and ease, and thus bring me a greater possibility of choosing and acting rightly.

1. I shall not be able to deal with the problem of death in this discussion, though it has interesting ramifications in it.
APPENDIX III

People Treated as Physical Objects
Woodger makes the issue of persons being treated as objects central in his thesis. He sights the case of a girl who complained of abdominal pain and was subsequently operated on for appendicitis. But upon recovery she soon had the same complaints and was then referred to a psychiatrist who found that the girl had believed that pregnancy resulted from being kissed and she thought she was pregnant. It was noted that she had been kissed before the first operation and shortly after and the symptoms resulted. Subsequent enlightenment removed all symptoms.

Also a girl complained of dyspepsia the complaints of which were not removed even after surgery removed all her teeth. As the last resort she was sent to a psychiatrist who discovered the girl had fallen in love with the employer but marriage was impossible. This developed tremendous guilt feelings and also demanded she not recognize that she was in love at all. Treatment restored her to good health with the help of other employment.

So 'we have', writes Woodger, 'two examples of totally unnecessary surgery, involving the irrevocable loss of a harmless appendix and of a presumably good set of teeth, solely as the result of the prevailing doctrine that persons must be regarded first and foremost as physical objects'. Biology and Language, pp. 295-296

APPENDIX IV

Smuts's Failure to Utilize Gestalt Theory
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Smuts's Failure to Utilize Gestalt Theory
Smuts does not, with any depth, consider the problem of perception in his theory of wholes. It seems strange that he would not have found support for his concept of wholes 'pervading all of life' in the theory of perception set out by Gestalt Psychology more than a decade earlier than his own writing. He could very well have considered 'seeing things as wholes' as one of the characteristic features of the Paleolithic expressed in its eidetic type of vision and art. Gerald Heard does something like this in his theories of Wrong Perception and Wrong Attention in Is God in History? but fails to consider the real significance and nature of analysis and multiplicity, as has Gestalt in perception. Somewhat related to this is Smuts's failure to consider what Reiser calls 'pre-Aristotelian Logic' and the nature of the participation mystique experience at the primate phylogenetic level and in the first two years of a child's life and may be seen in various kinds of mysticism. The segmentation and partitiveness which resulted in the post-Paleolithic period and now so integrally affects our perception and conception of the world, may be considered in the light of the very early division of 'inner' and 'outer', man setting himself over-against and consequently opposed to Nature. The Gestalt concept of perceptual wholes arising first and analysis occurring secondarily together with a synthesis of our more advanced scientific knowledge and the pre-Aristotelian modes or patterns of thought could be constructed into a new methodological approach with interesting support for the holistic philosophy.
Morgan's Criticism: Whether Holism is not Another Term for Mind
Creative evolution is, according to Smuts, the 'outcome of' or is 'due to' the holistic-tendency. Lloyd Morgan, in a penetrating review asks, if this be the case, 'Is it itself in process of evolutionary development? Does Creative Holism, like the mind it has created, share with its creature the prospective and retrospective reference which seem so distinctive of that creature? Both these questions are crucial. To both, as I gather, the answer is 'yes'. Morgan, thereupon, argues on scientific grounds, that in the atom, molecule, and crystal there can be no such retrospective or prospective reference since there is no mind to which the past or the future can be referred. Smut's thesis, he declares, asserts that 'The living cell is not mind. Holism is not Mind. And yet in many passages the cell, on the one hand, and Holism, on the other hand, seem to envisage the past and the future in a fashion strongly suggestive of those modes of activity which are distinctive of mind.'

This criticism seems, in certain respects, to be well founded in that Smuts does not make clear the relation of Holism as a principle to mind, or what he means by 'enminded' or how, exactly, he uses the term 'mind'. There are confusing passages in Holism and Evolution which are a source of real difficulty to the reader. Smuts says that 'mind has its earliest beginnings in the inorganic structures of Nature already', though elsewhere, 'For Holism, Mind is but a phase, though a culminating phase, of its universal process'; elsewhere again he says that 'mind is reality' and Holism really an extension of the system of life and mind which underlies all the stages of Evolution. Professor Morgan localizes the problem in a discussion of cells and seems to imply that Mind and Holism are synonymous for Smuts, or at least that mind is not a latecomer in Evolution but pervades Nature throughout. This is not to say that he is trying to force Smuts into a crude panpsychism, for Smuts is not willing 'to admit that more than one of the parts knows itself for what it is'; his representation certainly lends itself to the kind of interpretation which Morgan is trying to elicit from it, but this, we believe, is primarily due to his ambiguity and does not represent his basic thesis. What he means by saying that the cell has a past and future - the point to which Morgan objects - is that it has a time-reference in terms of its position in the evolutionary scale, since it emerges from its past and anticipates a higher level of development. Again in its development, the cell can be said to have a past in the sense that it exhibits retention, though not recollection. The term 'retrospection' is a poor one here and 'retention' is more accurate. This would hold true for most organic as well as inorganic entities. In addition, however, the cells' activities are always given in terms of an end toward which it is striving, and in this sense, though Smuts's language is poorly chosen,

1. Journal of Philosophical Studies, v. 11, 1927
2. Cf. p. 3 Criticism on Smuts. A typical statement is that of Noyes 'This aspect of living beings that we know as mental was present from the first and not added somewhere in the process of evolution'. Modern Clinical Psychiatry, p. 2. On the other hand, Sherrington in Man On His Nature, p. 289 and Smith writing in Romano's Adaptation, p. 45, adopt the point of view that mind is apparently absent in molds, yeasts, fungi and the whole plant kingdom. It may appear in protozoa and lower metazoa and certainly in higher metazoa and from these on. In this opinion, Smith asserts that mind is regarded as 'phasic' or 'episodic'.
3. Marcel, The Mystery of Being, p. 105
does appear to refer to those functions of prespection and retrospection to which Professor Morgan would ascribe the term 'mind' or at least, 'mental'. But for Smuts, this activity is not rightly to be called 'mind' or 'mental', in the strict sense of the term. The regulative activity of the cell or organism is not 'mental', though the very rudimentary elements of what is later to become mind are evidenced in this directional behavior which seeks to maintain equilibrium and realize wholeness.\footnote{1} And this is due to the progressive character of the holistic tendency. This activity, Smuts would say, is not mind now, though it eventually will be. It is in this sense only, in our opinion, that he assigns rudimentary aspects of mind to inorganic structure, cells and animals.

The deeper question seems to be, 'Is this rudimentary aspect of mind to be identified with the holistic-tendency? Professor Morgan seems to imply that it is. I cannot see that this implication logically follows, for while 'mental activity' may emerge from this kind of purposeful activity, the latter is declared to be merely a 'fore-runner' of mind.\footnote{2} Holism is not to be identified with mind, but is that tendency of which all levels of mind-development, all Nature, indeed, are the outcome.

1. This is one of the significant questions about which Chapter X is concerned.

2. Whitehead says of adversion and aversion, they 'only have importance in the case of high-grade organisms. They constitute the first step towards intellectual mentality, though in themselves, they do not amount to consciousness'. Process and Reality, p. 359.