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Chapter I.

The "Sentiment" in Psychology.

Group Sentiment.

The sentiment, as a definite psychological conception, in its present form, dates from the publication in Mind Vol. V., N.S. 1896 of Mr A. F. Shand's article "Character and the Emotions"; although Malebranche, Spinoza and Hume appear in various degrees to have anticipated it. The article was a contribution to the study of 'character' from the point of view, first, of different types of character in individuals and, secondly, of the "Emotions and sentiments which in their difference among different men, account for "character" as a general psychological fact"; and it is in the course of a search for that "central point of view" in the psychology of the feelings upon the absence of which James had commented that Shand advances a "great and important distinction" between the emotions and the sentiments not hitherto recognised. The difference, he says, "lies in the different growth of their organisation." Emotions, while they "may subsist at a stage of relative isolation and simplicity" tend in the course of life, "always to build themselves into more

1 See Dr Drever's "Instinct in Man" pp. 29, 31, 34, 37 & 44.
2 Principles of Psychology II. 448
3 Mind 1896 p. 217.
stable and complex feelings, and these are the sentiments which in their turn become the centres of attachment of the organised emotions." Such emotions as hope, despondency, elation, envy, "always imply," he points out "some pre-formed sentiment to which they are attached"; in the life history of which they "occur as modes or phases." They are in a sense, the adjectives of which the sentiments are the "substantives" blending "as temporary qualifications of those more complex and persistent feelings which they both serve to develop and into which they are absorbed", and which "in each particular case suffuse with something of their own flavour the emotion that happens to be excited in them."

"As interpreted from the outside," the sentiment is "the thought of an object as a permanent thing or quality", having a feeling tone and conative tendency which persist through the emotional changes excited by the circumstances in which it comes before the mind. And, because the experiences which have formed them have been different, the sentiments of different people can never be precisely similar; each must have "a qualitative flavour of its own."  

The view implied rather than quite definitely expressed.

1. Mind 1896 p. 222
2. Mind 1896 p. 224
3. Mind 1896 p. 226
4. Dr Shand's Article on "Dr Rööô's Theory of the Passions" Mind N.S. Vol. 16 the importance of the cognitive aspect of sentiment formation is more clearly recognised. See p. 505.
in this article, that all the systems of 'ideas' we build up in the course of life have, also, their affective and conative aspects, which enter with them into the structure of the mind, has been accepted by most later psychologists.\(^1\) Stout\(^2\) recognises the importance of the distinction, which is he says, "to a large extent a distinction between dispositions and actual states of consciousness," the sentiment being something which "cannot be experienced in its totality at any one moment," but "is felt only in the special phase which is determined by the circumstances of the moment". Dr McDougall\(^3\) refers to the conception as "very important" and "of great service to psychology"; and it occupies a prominent place in his exposition of emotional life in relation to innate or instinctive endowment.

Dr Rivers\(^4\) says that we all now recognise that "the instincts, the affective states associated with them, and the sentiments of which they form the basis, are all factors of the greatest importance in the determination of human behaviour."

A somewhat similar conception to that of Shand was independently developed in the course of those studies of the "unconscious" which have their philosophic origin in Leibnitz, Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, and others, and are represented in more

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1. See Drever "Instinct in Man" p. 269.
4. Psychology & Politics pp. 4/5.
strictly psychological literature by Janet Ribot Carpenter, Freud, Adler, Jung, Sidis and Morton Prince. The "complex" as defined by Prince is "a system of ideas, linked with emotions, so that when one of the ideas feelings, or other innate dispositions, belonging to an experience comes to mind, the experience as a whole is recalled." Such an association he points out implies "some unconscious dynamic relation" in a process - "which does not appear in consciousness and which is essential for organisation into a complex."² A complex, he says, may include a "sentiment" which he regards as "the idea of an object with which one or more emotions are organised" or "the linking of an affect to an idea."³ MCDougall however thinks that the best usage "restricts the term complex to acquired conative settings which are in some degree morbid, by reason of their lack of harmony with the rest of the character, and suggests that "sentiment" be used "as the most general term to denote all acquired conative trends." In the recent symposium of British psychologists on the subject majority opinion inclined to a similar view; the features of the sentiment which received emphasis being:

1. Its gradual formation in association with some object of cognition

(Rivers and Shand.)

1. 1. The Unconscious. p. 265.
2. The Unconscious. p. 266
3. 448/9
2. Its persistence, as a relatively permanent fact of mental structure; yet subject to gradual variation or modification through growth of experience. (Rivers and Shand.)

3. Its 'Normality'. It is a necessary and constant feature of the normal mental life. Most of our sentiments come into action daily, and influence the behaviour of every moment of the life of every day. (Rivers.)

4. Its "organic" character:— as being not a mere "aggregation" of chance associations, but a "system", functioning with reference to an end which may be indefinitely comprehensive. It lends therefore a stability to human emotional life (Shand) which makes behaviour "relatively predictable by others possessing similar sentiments or of sufficient insight and sympathy to understand the quality of the sentiment." (T. H. Pear.)

For the subject of this essay the mode of acquirement of the sentiment is of importance, and in regard to this a difference of view appears to exist between Shand and other psychologists. In his article on M. Ribot’s Theory of the Passions Shand expresses the opinion that there exists "a bond between the emotions which is innate in us and part of the very constitution of the mind"; and in the Foundations of Character while he refers to the sentiments as "formed" or "developed" in the course of life, and as differing greatly, between different individuals, in degree of organisation, he appears, in the case at least of the sentiment of "love," to consider that there is "an innate system" which impels to its formation.

1. Mind N.S. Vol 18 1907.
2. Chap. V.
3. page 56.
McDougall definitely dissents from this view, and regards the "linking" or "conjoining" of emotional dispositions into the structure of one system as brought about entirely "through the association of each with the particular object." The sentiment" he says "is a growth in the structure of the mind that is not naturally given in the inherited constitution." Dr Drever agrees. "The organization of emotional tendencies in the sentiment can only mean" he says "the association through experience of certain emotional tendencies with an object or rather idea. The organization... must be looked for in the idea, not in the emotional tendencies themselves."

From the comparative or evolutionary standpoint it is now a commonplace of psychological thought, although as Rivers reminds us, one of very recent standing, that throughout the whole scale of life, every individual organism "begins its active career either with some considerable part of its full mental structure already perfected, or, if with but little perfected structure, still with much in the way of innate tendencies to the development of structure." Mental process has at all its levels the three fundamental aspects or modes termed "cognition" "affection" and "conation"; and among the lower animals structure, summarising, it is believed, the past experience of the species, is inherited in forms which closely define or limit both the objects.

1. Introduction to Social Psychology 14th Edition 1919 p. XI.
2. Ibid p. 159.
4. Psychology and Politics.
5. McDougall "Psychology" (Hume University Library p. 156.
to which they are capable of attending and the lines along which their responses can issue. At that stage instinct largely, although probably not wholly, determines reaction. But with evolutionary development response becomes increasingly variable upon the basis of the experience of the individual; the "meaning" which objects and situations have come to be in a growing degree "acquired:" and behaviour to be to that degree "intelligent."

"Intelligence" thus implies and rests upon a modification of structure effected through experience; and where this experience has a strongly emotional content the resulting disposition, should it would seem, possess the characteristics of a simple or rudimentary sentiment. It would be innate to the extent that it has, as its necessary basis the (modifiable, plastic or not fully defined) instinctive disposition, but acquired to the extent that an emotional association, foreign perhaps, as so associated, to the experience of the race, has become linked with the object in the New percept. McDougall\(^3\) gives as an instance of such modification the case of birds on an uninhabited island who learn or acquire fear at the sight of man; and concludes after considering the various possible psychological interpretations that an acquired tendency of this kind must apparently be classed as a "very simple perceptual sentiment.\(^4\)" Dr Drever\(^5\), however, prefers

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3. Introduction p. 55/7
5. Instinct in Man p. 208, 210 & 279.
to restrict the term "sentiment" to modifications arising through processes involving ideation, and to regard those on the purely perceptual level as still within the category of "instinct - dispositions."

It seems clear that among those at least of the higher animals, whose "intelligence" shows signs of "suffusion" with reason, there may emerge "attitudes" - of attachment, dislike and so forth to which it is difficult to refuse the term sentiment. Westermarck\(^1\) appears to recognise the existence of a simple family sentiment as a feature of the lives of some animals; and Rivers,\(^2\) discussing the animal group which possesses a leader says that in the attitude of the followers "there is at least the root of the process we call reverence --- or --- the process which gives to reverence its distinguishing character", as well as "the factor which is also at the root of obedience". But while therefore we can hardly say that the sentiment is a distinctively human characteristic, there is no question that it is in the human mind that all its important developments occur. Here, as we know, the innate or inherited structure, while still as in the animal, the source of all that motive force or driving power by which life's activities are sustained\(^3\) is so constituted that the particular forms of those activities are left indefinite.\(^4\) "Meaning" is still originally and primarily affective\(^5\) and cognition occurs always in relation to one

\(^1\) Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas II. 191 and Human Marriage Chaps. I. & III.
\(^2\) Psychology & Politics. p. 45.46
\(^3\) Introduction to Social Psychology. p. 44.
\(^4\) Hobhouse Mind in Evolution Cap. 4.
\(^5\) See Dreyer. Instinct in Man p. 140. 257 & 206.
or more of those great instinct-dispositions which constitute
the "Native basis of the mind" and (with perhaps some differences
in relative strength as between different races) are probably
the common inheritance of mankind. But cognition has reached
the plane of the "concept" or "free idea"; and, wherever the
affect-content of such an idea is sufficiently high, "fusion"
"blending or "organisation" of emotion must necessarily occur.
Thus McDougall gives the instance of a child tormented by a
bully and shews how the thought of the bully will tend to bring
into conjunction the (innately separated) dispositions of fear
and anger and so to give rise to a new disposition or system
which as a whole constitutes a sentiment of hatred. This
system, "built up through repeated experiences of fear and anger
evoked by this one object," becomes, when formed, a fact of
mental structure, the "enduring condition of a considerable
range of emotions and desires", dependent in the form they take
in future experience upon the "particular situation of the
object (presumed or imagined) in relation to the subject."
In human life, it is probably not too much to say, "every idea
belongs, not merely to a 'knowledge' system, but also to an
interest or sentiment system." And even where a single emotion
is associated with an idea, considerable complication of emo-
tional structure must follow since the idea will have its own

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1. Introduction to Social Psychology. p. 19
2. Morgan "Comparative Psychology. Ch. XV.
   Hobhouse "Mind in Evolution" p. 322.
5. Ibid p. 209.
The extent to which 'complication' of this kind may occur in human life and the range of the processes through which it is brought about has been made abundantly clear by the psychoanalysts and others whose investigations have revealed the importance of "the unconscious" as a factor in mental activity. "Freud\(^1\), as is well known, regards the dream as the direct expression of the unconscious, which, accordingly, is for him no mere 'storehouse' of experiences, but a process through which conserved experiences may undergo such 'fabrication' or "elaboration" that when they reappear they may not be recognisable without extensive analysis. Morton Prince\(^2\) views memory as a process, made up of three factors - "registration" "conservation" and "reproduction" and shews that vast numbers of "experience residua" not only persist without ever coming into normal waking consciousness,\(^3\) but function unconsciously in a great variety of ways affecting conscious life. "Association" of ideas he points out, implies some unconscious factor. "We cannot conceive of any conscious relation between ideas that can possibly induce" - - "the linking of neural dispositions" through which ideas are dynamically associated" (p. 266.) It is probable, he says, that "every mental process is part of a larger mechanism in which unconscious brain processes not correlated with the specifically conscious processes are integral factors" (p. 118).

Most of our common-sense judgments, he points out, rest upon such
1. Dreams. The Interpretation of Dreams.
2. The Unconscious. pp. 3-4.
3. Cp. p. 144 "Recollection is only a more perfect kind of conscious memory"
unconscious memories (p. 309) which (p 332) form a "context" or "setting" for the events of conscious life, and, in this way help to determine our "points of view", our attitudes of mind, the meanings of our ideas and the traits of our characters" (p. 263) It is in fact "the unconscious rather than the conscious which is the important factor in personality and intelligence", and "furnishes the formative material out of which our judgments, our beliefs, our ideals, and our characters are shaped" (p. 262) It is in constant interaction with the conscious; but although referred to by reason of its greater relative stability as 'structure' it undergoes, in actual fact considerable variation from moment to moment." (p. 419.) Hobhouse also emphasises the range and complexity of the processes which underlie the formation of the acquired dispositions of the human mind. "On all sides," he says, "experience leaves results on the mind - structure which function as inferences but are not inferences." "An object is charged with emotional suggestions. A scent or a colour pattern stirs our liking or disliking, and we can find in the recesses of memory no experience to account for it." (p. 34) "We are to conceive" he adds (p.92) "the great forces of the human mind as still operating from the background in the dark. The light of consciousness ---- stirs forces that ---- determine the movements and re-arrangements within the lighted area, but without themselves emerging into the light."

1 Development and Purpose.
The "concept" or the "idea" is thus not to be regarded as a fixed or definite cognitive 'unit' or 'element' with which particular 'emotions' are or may be 'associated': we have to think rather of both as aspects, separable only in thought, of dispositions framed in the course of individual experience. The 'word', the written or spoken expression of the 'concept' is "not a mere mark or symbol" bringing into consciousness a ready-made idea. It is 'a stimulus which provokes an unconscious reaction' and 'conscious and unconscious are vitally continuous.'

The concept itself is thus, in a sense, a process, or rather a 'side' or 'aspect' of a process; and in speaking of sentiment-formation through the 'agency' of 'ideas' it is important to remember that in so 'reifying' our terms we are to a large extent simplifying facts for the purpose of description. Even as so simplified, however, sentiment formation in the human mind is a process of almost indefinite complexity. It may proceed as Dreyer points out in two principal ways. On the one hand "the fact that an idea already carries with it an emotion tends to cause other emotions to be easily aroused in connection with it" and in that way we may develop a sentiment of 'love' or 'hatred' for some particular person, as described by Shand and McDougall. On the other hand 'the emotionally tinged idea carries its emotional accompaniment with it, so to speak, into the various ideational complexes into which it

3. See McDougall Psychology. p. 50/1.
5. Foundations of Character p. 58.
enters”, and in that way particular sentiments may, with development of conceptual organisation in course of life, become generalised. Classification or analysis of sentiments may therefore proceed by reference primarily either to their emotional constituents and to the types of emotional reaction to which they dispose the individuals who 'possess' them, or to the range of the ideational system with which they are associated. Shand1 distinguishes self-love (or the self-regarding sentiment) parental or conjugal love, with filial affection, friendship, and 'in the higher characters' one or other of the great impersonal sentiments, patriotism or the love for some science or art; 'respect for conscience'; self-respect and respect for others; and finally 'hatred' the opposite of love, evoking, (he says) the 'same four emotional dispositions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow", but in opposite situations. McDougall2 distinguishes three principal varieties of sentiment, love and hatred, each with various degrees or grades of liking and dislike, affection and aversion, and the self-regarding sentiment, or self-respect; but he recognises also the existence of a number of others, less fully developed, which have to be named according to the principal emotional disposition entering into their composition. Classified according to the nature of 'their objects', or the range of the ideational systems in which they are centred, the sentiments fall, he says,3 into three main classes, the concrete particular, as

1. Foundations of Character Chap. V.
2. Introduction Chaps. V. & Vi.
3. Introduction p. 162.
love of an individual child; concrete general, or love of children as a class; and abstract, as love of justice or virtue; the order of development in the individual being of course from those of the first type to those of the last.

Drever suggests a classification into 'simple' and 'complex' on the emotional side and then into 'sentiments of love and hatred' and 'sentiments of value' under each heading. Such sentiments as 'the religious sentiment, the national sentiment and the personal or self-sentiment' would then be complex sentiments of value, being 'in the highest degree' complex both on the emotion side and on the idea side."

McDougall and Drever are both in agreement with Shand as to the cardinal importance of the part played by the sentiments in individual life. Without them, McDougall says 'our social relations and conduct would be chaotic, unpredictable, and unstable' and we should be incapable of judgments of value and void of moral principles; and in Drever's view the complex sentiments of value 'constitute the most important group of all in the normal developed character.' But while Shand says that 'our personality does not seem to be the sum of the dispositions of our emotions and sentiments' and considers that there lies behind them the 'mystery' of 'our one self' the more thorough-going analysis of McDougall makes the self-regarding

1 Instinct in Man pp. 215/7
2 Also Morton Prince. See above and page 307.
3 Introduction p. 160.
5 Foundations p. 66/7
6 Prince 'The Unconscious' p. 458 refers to this conception as an 'ingenious theory' which, if maintainable 'would give a satisfactory solution' of the difficult problem of volition.
sentiment the central fact in volition, which he regards as the supporting or reinforcing of a desire or conation by the operation of an impulse excited within "the self-regarding system. Whenever, he says, the "idea of the self rises to the focus of consciousness" there is brought into play the "system of emotional and conative dispositions that is organised about it" and it is to the "conations, the desires and aversions" arising within this system that the victory of the will in cases of moral effort, is to be attributed. Darre2 agrees that the self-sentiment "must be regarded as occupying an unique position among the sentiments... in virtue of which it is an organising force of the first importance". All sentiments he points out, at least in so far as they are sentiments of value, are integral parts of the self and wherever aroused tend to involve the self-sentiment; as in the case for example of the resentment excited by disparagement of a religious belief.

The idea or concept of the self around which this dominant or 'master' sentiment is organised is of course the socially conditioned, empirical self, the "self-in-relation-to-others" of Baldwin and Royce4. It is developed, as they have shewn, through a process of constant and continuous interplay between the individual and the others by whom (in early life) his needs are satisfied and through whose behaviour he learns to
direct and control his own activities and to realise the meaning

1. Introduction p. 249. 247/8
It is an idea which as Baldwin points out has from the outset an extremely high affect-content, it being 'impossible to think of self however vaguely and fugitively without inducing positive emotional excitement'; indeed as the centre of reference, conscious or unconscious, of all emotional experience it must, it seems, be regarded as the central factor in all sentiment organisation. From this point of view sentiments of every kind become, in the last analysis, self-sentiments; phases or aspects of the great life-process of character - or personality-formation. The attitude of the child towards the bully in McDougall's instance quoted above is not merely a sentiment of hate. The total experience of the child through which the affect-organisation occurs is not that of the bully only but of the I-in-relation-to-the-bully; even the initial fear-emotion may be qualified from the outset by other emotions arising within the self-sentiment; and in the fact that his thoughts will afterwards tend strongly to dwell upon the bully and his fear to become gradually suffused by anger the reaction of the 'self' is clearly shown. The whole process in fact seems capable of description as a specific 'extension' or 'development' of the idea and sentiment of the self, arising through a series of experiences which, in that they involve relationship with another 'self', are social.

1. Mental Development in the Child and the Race, p. 139.
These two conceptions, (1) of the self-disposition in its cognitive aspect, as not only the 'product' of social intercourse but as defined and determined in its whole content by the experiences arising through that intercourse, and (2) of the sentiment organised about the self (or the affect-aspect of the self-disposition) as the dominant influence in the control of conduct, are of fundamental importance in the psychological interpretation of social life. "Socialisation", or the adaptation of the individual to the life of his society, is from the standpoint they provide, a vast process of 'self-extension'; in the course of which there is brought about not only an 'enlargement' or 'enrichment' of the self-disposition as the individual develops in powers and experiences, but something which can only be described as an identification by the individual of himself with various kinds of social groups. "A man realises", as McDougall expresses it, that the family of which he is a part has a capacity for collective suffering and collective prosperity, that it is --- the collective object of the judgments, emotions and sentiments of other men; he recognises that he, being a member of the whole, is in part the object of all these regards. In so far as he does this all these attitudes of other men appeal to his self-regarding sentiment." It is, he points out, an almost necessary feature of this process of extension that the group itself, as a

1. Either self-control or control by outside influences See McDougall Introduction p. 181
2. McDougall Outlines p. 428/9
   Dreyer. Instinct in Man p. 218
whole, must be thought of as 'one object among other similar objects, having to those others relations similar to the relations between persons.'\(^1\) But where this condition is satisfied, where each individual has in his mind 'a clear knowledge or idea' of the group\(^2\), "of his place in it and of his part in its life, accompanied by a sentiment of devotion to it' there will emerge the social motive in conduct; the 'group spirit,' which, in the degree in which it is operative, disposes the individual to lines of action that may involve sacrifice of the narrower self and must involve its redirection or harmonisation with the interests of the whole. Baldwin\(^3\), developing a similar view, illustrates from a frequently arising situation in family life the process by what he calls the 'social self' determines conduct in a line opposed to that prompted by the 'personal or habitual self', and points out that in a properly regulated life the result of such a 'conflict' should be the reinforcement of the former as against the latter.

In speaking, however, in this way of a 'narrower' or personal and a wider, or 'social' self, it is important to remember that we are not dealing with two entities which can properly be regarded as separable, and subject to different kinds of influence. We all, in a sense, lead, as Morton Prince points out 'double lives'\(^4\). "Everyone's mental life may fairly be said to be divided between those ideas, thoughts, and feelings

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1. Introduction p. 207.
2. Psychology. p. 244/5.
which he receives from and gives out to his social world — — and those which belong more properly to his inner life. There is no adequate ground for regarding 'consciousness' or even 'the mind' as a fully unified or organised system. But on the other hand it is equally wrong as McDougall points out to regard the two as standing in more or less permanent opposition. It is true, as Freud and the psychoanalysts have demonstrated, that the development of the individual is accompanied, and in a sense conditional, by conflict between the (predominantly egoistic) impulses arising from inherited structure and the (partially repressive) forces of the social environment. But as Freud himself says, 'in the process of a child's development into a mature adult there is a more and more extensive integration of its personality.' To have the (self) sentiment in any form is to be sensitive to public opinion, for the two fundamental impulses of the sentiment (self-assertion and self-abasement) are evoked not merely by the contemplation of the self but by the attitudes of other men toward oneself. The developed or socialised self, in other words, is a disposition enormously complex, but in a real sense unitary, the content of which has been determined, which has been characterized by a building-up, through processes partly conscious and partly unconscious of experience-residua derived from the

1. The Unconscious p. 538 and cp. McDougall "Sociology" p. 224
2. Outlines p. 431/2
5. The Unconscious. p. 4.
interactions of social life.

The importance of this analysis from the point of view of social phenomena lies in the fact that it seems to impart increased definition to a conception which has, under one form or another, for long figured prominently in social and political thought. Social life at all its levels and in all its forms is characterised by a kind of unity which has led to its conception in such terms as the 'real personality' (of the group) of Gierke and Maitland, the 'Sittlichkeit' of Hegel, the 'general will' of Rousseau or the 'social mind' of Lewes. Hobhouse, setting aside the implications, on the one hand of a 'mystical psychic unity' and on the other of a fully achieved consciousness of the social life on the part of the component members of society' regards the latter term as 'simply an expression for the mass of ideas operative in a society --- and serving to direct the thoughts and actions of individuals.' Barker says that 'We are all conscious of such a mind as something that exists in and along with the separate minds of the members, and over and above any sum of those minds created by mere addition'. In 'The Group Mind,' McDougall develops the conception briefly referred to in his 'Psychology' of this group or collective mind as 'an organised system of mental or purposive forces --- or relations obtaining between the individual minds.' He specifically sets aside as 'a

1. Social Evolution' and 'Political Theory' p. 96/7
4. The Group Mind, Chap. II. p. 39 & Introduction p. 13. He notices, however; (p.35) that the doctrine of the 'Collective Consciousness of societies' as understood in this sense is one that 'cannot be lightly put aside; it demands serious consideration from anyone who seeks the general principles of Collective Psychology.'
hypothesis to be held in reserve until the study of group life reveals phenomena that cannot be explained without its aid; the view of a 'collective consciousness' as something existing beside, or over and above, the minds of individuals, and finds that the group mind as a psychological fact is constituted by, and conditional upon the existence, in the minds of individual members of, "some adequate idea of the group, of its nature, composition, functions and capacities, and of the relations of the individuals to the group." The 'diffusion of the group' constitutes the 'group self-consciousness.' Such an idea, so held and so diffused, will form the centre or nucleus of a group sentiment. This, viewed collectively, is the 'group spirit'; that active loyalty to the group on the part of all the individual members which is the distinguishing feature of the organised social group - as opposed to the merely fortuitously gathered crowd - and which, through its influence in disposing them to common action or to the voluntary acceptance of common leadership, renders possible truly collective volition. The conditions favouring the growth of the group mind, in this sense, are continuity of existence as a group, with resulting growth of a body of group customs, traditions and habits; a group organization, consisting in the differentiation and specialisation of individual functions; and interaction, especially in the forms of conflict and rivalry.

1. The Group Mind Chap. III. pp. 49/50 & 62
2. The Group Mind. p. 62
3. " " " Chapter III.
with other groups.

The most perfect type of such an organised psychological group, McDougall considers, is the patriot army, animated as it is by a single and definitely visualised purpose, and in complete voluntary subordination to its leaders. In its organisation and in the sentiment of loyalty or devotion to the whole which pervades all its members, it presents the extreme antithesis to the crowd; and it is from precisely these two qualities that its enormously superior efficiency derives. Here deliberately imposed or fostered, they may be observed in various phases of 'natural' development throughout the whole course of social evolution. In animal societies, McDougall thinks, the existence of 'the group spirit' must be regarded as doubtful; but in the primitive human group it is present in a very marked degree, one of its chief manifestations being the almost universally diffused principle of communal responsibility. It is always a source and a means of peculiar satisfaction to the individual members, since (a) it brings to them a sense of power, security, and support, and (b) it indulges the gregarious impulse; and it is also the in such societies the principal source of moral conduct.

The immersion of the individual in the group is most complete in the nomadic patriarchal stage of culture, where the factors or forces of kinship, territorial, traditional and

1. i.e. the Crowd of Le Bon. Sir Martin Conway in "The Crowd in Peace and War" gives a much extended meaning to the term.
2. The Group Mind pp. 62/7
3. pp. 68/9
occupational association reinforce each other\(^1\). In the course of later social evolution these 'natural groupings and - - involuntary developments of group self-consciousness have been much weakened\(^2\); but the impulse towards group life has continued to manifest itself, and to constitute the 'principal, if not the sole factor which raises a man's conduct above the plane of pure egoism', extending the self-regarding sentiment of the individual to the group 'so that he is moved to desire and to work for its welfare'. Breaking down in this manner "the opposition between the crudely individualistic and the primitive altruistic tendencies of our nature\(^3\)" the group spirit provides the means by which conduct is lifted to the higher levels of deliberate self-sacrifice. One of its most important features is that although it may and frequently does, lead to antagonism towards other similar groups, it is capable also, under appropriate conditions, of harmonisation with other group attachments; so that 'the family, the village, the county, the country as a whole' may come to form "the objects of a harmonious hierarchy of sentiments of this sort, each of which strengthens rather than weakens the others and yields motives for action which on the whole co-operate and harmonise rather than conflict."\(^4\)

Although in this last passage, as well as occasionally elsewhere there appears a tendency almost to 'objectivise'

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1. The Group Mind p. 76  
2. " " p. 77.  
3. " " p. 78/9  
4. " " p. 81.  
5. e.g. p. 87 where there is a reference to 'the main differences between the self-regarding sentiment and the developed group - sentiment.'
the group sentiment and to regard it as something, in a sense, apart from the sentiment of the self, it seems clear from the references quoted, and from McDougall's works, that the group sentiment as he conceives it, consists essentially in an 'extension' of the self-sentiment to a social group. Such an 'extension' is of course a fact of individual psychology; it occurs in the mind of the individual, and consists as we have seen in an alteration or modification of his mental structure deriving from his experiences in social life. As between different individuals the facts of social experience are, obviously, in detail, infinitely diverse; and in the life-history of any single individual they do not, in any kind of social existence with which we are yet acquainted, come to him in forms which are, themselves, harmonised. They develop, or more correctly, they provide the means through which he develops, his 'self-disposition' in relation now to one mode of social grouping, now to another; and motives which arise within any two such 'extensions' may according to circumstances and situation, either conflict or co-operate. Full integration of the self is seldom if ever achieved. But the important point is - and this appears to be the essential contribution of the 'Group Mind' - that because of this extension of the self to the group, this identification of group interest with self-interest, and in the degree in which it occurs, the self-motive will tend to operate in all situations in which the group is

1. See e.g. Outlines pp. 428.
thought to be involved. In other words, the developed or socialised self-disposition is not only responsive to group opinion, and group sentiment, but it operates actively and spontaneously to constitute group sentiment. From this point of view conduct which subordinates the interests of the narrower self to those of the group is not, subjectively considered, "self-sacrifice" but "self-fulfilment" or "satisfaction". The innate impulses or tendencies of the individual mind, reorganised and redirected through the extended self-sentiment, operate no less powerfully than in their more "natural" forms; indeed, reinforced as they commonly are by impulses deriving from the gregarious disposition their power is not infrequently heightened, and the individual becomes capable of efforts much exceeding in intensity and duration those to which he could otherwise have been aroused.

The importance of this view as applied to the interpretation of social behaviour may be illustrated by reference to certain psychological studies in which the place and function of the sentiment in the life of the individual do not appear to be adequately recognised. Trotter, influenced perhaps unduly by the psycho-analytic school, regards the dominant relationship of individual and group or 'society' as one of conflict; and considers that society, "by providing its members with a herd tradition which is constantly at war with feeling and experience, - drives them inevitably into resistiveness on the one hand or into mental instability on the other." This conflict occurs, he recognises, in the Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.

1. See p. 71.
2. p. 62/3 Also p. 79.
4. p. 81/2.
mind of the individual himself, and is essentially "the antagonism of two impulses which both have instinct behind them"; the repressive force exercised by "the herd" being derived from the "herd instinct" which "introduces a mechanism by which the sanctions of instinct are conferred upon acts by no means necessarily acceptable to the body or mind". Although defining instincts as "inherited modes of reaction to bodily need or external stimulus" he retains the term "herd instinct" to denote a "tie" or "link" with society which he obviously regards as deriving, in part at any rate, from conscious self-direction; and it is perhaps his failure to reconcile these points of view which leads him for example to formulate the scarcely defensible opinion that amongst the impulses which are "baulked at every turn by herd suggestion" are to be included "altruism, the ideal of rationality, the desire for power -- and other feelings which have acquired instinctive force" from group life.

It is impossible of course to summarise in a phrase the content of a book which in many respects is a valuable contribution to the psychology of social life; but it seems a not unfair criticism to say that Trotter has been led, through failure adequately to analyse the conception of the "group sentiment" (or, as he calls it, the "herd instinct") almost to regard the individual as possessing an inherent tendency to self development which would fulfil itself in ways beneficial to society were it not, unhappily, repressed or restrained by

1. p. 48
2. p. 94
3. See page 146
4. p. 50.
the "herd" of which he forms part.

In Martin Conway, in his important study of the part played by "crowd" influences in social life, gives to the crowd, where "extended in space,"¹ and "time"² the attributes of the organised group; and points out the importance in its formation of that element of "tradition" through which alone ideals are created and preserved.³ Yet in part perhaps because of the not fully analysed extension of the terms he uses, his presentation of social life is distorted by the same over-emphasis of the antithesis between the individual and the group exemplified in Trotter's book. Thus he says that "The instinct of every crowd is to dominate, to capture and overwhelm the individual, to make him its slave, to absorb all his life for its service⁴"; regards marriage as a "bargain between individuals" the "admission of the crowd as party "to which is "a great danger"⁵, and the relationship of parents and children, master and servant, buyer and seller as "individual relations over which the crowd only by usurpation obtains any control."⁶

1. The Crowd in Peace and War p. 5.
2. p. 57
3. pp. 63/4
4. Thus on p. 197 the crowd is referred to as a "kind of beast". Trotter's "Pack" and "Herd."
5. p. 171
Pillsbury, although he treats of the Nation as an ideal and specifically says that it is a concept which forms "an ideal centre of reference for emotions" and therefore "is or has a self in much the same sense that the man is or has a self", does not appear to recognise the "structural" aspect of this "centre" or to view it, as the source or determinant of social reactions. Thus he is led to assign to "Hate" (to which he refers variously as an emotion, an instinct and a sentiment) the position of almost a "prime cause" in the creation and maintenance of group/unity.

"Society develops not from a liking for society but from a dislike of the surrounding medium. That which drives the individuals together is the dislike of the outside forces rather than any fondness for the company of which they are members; and "hate of the opposing groups rather than affection for the principles and love for the persons of the groups accepted is an important element in the development of the religious sect or community." It is of course true, and can be abundantly illustrated from history that in the course of group conflict emotions which may perhaps be summarily designated as "hate" do arise in all the members of the group, and intensified as

1. The Psychology of Nationality & Internationalism.
2. Chapter VII.
3. P. 222/3
4. Chapter III. "Hate as a Social Force."
5. pp. 64 & 66
6. pp. 65/6
7. p. 76
they usually are by "crowd" influences, discharge themselves in violent ways. But the very fact to which Pillsbury himself refers\(^1\) that (with change of circumstances or situation) "realignments of the basis of hates can be traced in national as in intra-national groups" should suggest that the "hate" is a manifestation of some more deeply-lying psychological condition. The "common hate" that is "one of the most frequently effective factors in making or uniting a nation,\(^2\) is "common" because, in the minds of the members of the nation-group there exists a self-sentiment so developed or extended that a threat, an insult, or an injury to the group is not merely thought of, but felt as, a threat, insult or injury to themselves; and the socialist "can arouse people by appealing to hate and anger"\(^3\) because, in part at least, "the need of something which one may love and for which one may work has created for thousands of working men a personified "Socialism", a winged goddess with stern eyes and a drawn sword to be the hope of the world and the protector of those that suffer"\(^4\). Or in other words because the "self-sentiment" of the worker has become extended to an idealised social group.

We may say then that the group-sentiment is a fact in the mental structure of the individual members of that group;

that it is formed in the course of participation in group

1. p. 85
2. p. 83
3. p. 80
life; consists essentially in such an extension of the self-sentiment that it becomes involved whenever group interests are thought or felt to be affected; and provides the individual therefore with a range of motives which while they cannot always be said to lift conduct to higher levels, have at least the effect of making it in some degree corporate in its aims. The nature of this self-extension will, however, it is clear, vary greatly according to the character of the group itself and the type of need or interest it subserves; and while all group sentiments may be said to function in ways that are genericall similar, each will occupy its special place in the life-economy of the individual. Moreover, since they may obviously give rise to motives that can be divergent if not actually conflicting, it seems hardly possible that any one of them can be usefully studied apart from the others; that we can for instance profitably examine the sentiment for the nation without also, and even perhaps as a preliminary, tracing the growth of that for the family. Leaving, however, this question aside for the present, we may enquire first what are the characteristics of the nation, considered as a psychological group; and how they have, evolutionarily and historically, been derived.

II. /
II. The Nation Group.

"Nationality" Professor Ramsay Muir says, "is an elusive idea, difficult to define" ¹; and it certainly appears to be true that to any list of criteria by which we might seek to impart definition to our conception of a nation we have to admit many exceptions. This is due in part to the fact that a different point of view is applied according to the context or "setting" in which the term is used: to the economist trade "international" when certain special conditions such as language - differences or difficulties of communication, impose barriers upon free competition ²; to the jurist the possession of "independence" in the sense of entire freedom from External Control and the attainment, by the governing classes at least, of certain standards of right and obligation are uppermost ³; while to the historian, as to the psychologist, various elements of community in life and thought are dominant. Thus we find occasionally a definite variance of statement in regard to what might be supposed to be a simple matter of fact; as when Hall says

1. Nationalism & Internationalism p 51.
2. Bastable "International Trade" Chap I.
3. See Hall "International Law p. 17."
says that only after 1871 had all Germans "a common nationality" while Bryce dates the "first conscious feeling of German nationality" from about 1600. But even if we make our point of view definitely historical, or definitely psychological, our difficulties are not removed; indeed they appear at first sight rather to increase.

The "English Dictionary" defines a nation as "an extensive aggregate of persons so closely associated with each other by common descent, language, or history as to form a distinct race or people, usually organised as a separate, political state and occupying a definite territory". In early examples" it adds, "the racial idea is usually stronger than the political; in recent use the notion of political unity and independence is more prominent."

Baldwin says "It is not easy to say what constitutes a nation, although a common language, and the belief at least in a common origin seem to be the most essential elements in nationality. To occupy, or rather to have occupied at some period of history a common territory seems only a less important requisite.--- Some of the best known nations fulfil very imperfectly these conditions --- The Scottish nation is made up of two peoples, very different in their origin which down to quite recent times spoke totally distinct languages and "the Swiss nation is made up out of fragments of the German nation of the Italian nation, and"

1. International Law pp 25/6
2. Holy Roman Empire p. 304.
and of a Romance population akin to the French, each
speaking its own language and notoriously of different
origins." In the case of Belgium "unity of political institu-
tions and -- patriotic feeling serve to constitute" what is
rather curiously called an "artificial nationality" The
Jews " who for many centuries past have not inhabited the
same territory or been subject to the same government and
who have learnt to speak many alien tongues" are nevertheless
regarded as still constituting a nation.1 "On the whole"
it is concluded "we cannot say that either political unity
and independence or even the conscious wish for them is
essential to nationality."

Professor Ramsay Muir, on the other hand2 says that
a nation "may be provisionally defined as a body of people
who feel themselves to be naturally linked together by certain
affinities which are so strong and real for them that they can
live happily together, are dissatisfied when disunited and cannot
tolerate subjection to peoples who do not share these ties." The
most prominent of the ties he gives are

1. The occupation of a definite geographical area, with,
frequently but not invariably, well-defined natural
boundaries.
2. Some degree of racial unity, in the sense not of
purity of racial origin but of absence of racial conflict.

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1. McDougall "The Group Mind" p. 60 also refers to the Jews
as a nation but Bryce "International Relations" p. 120/1
definitely excludes them.

2. "Nationalism and Internationalism" p. 38.
3. Unity of language, with in consequence common modes and forms of thought, "a common literature a common inspiration of great ideas, -- embodying and impressing upon each successive generation the national point of view."

4. Religious unity - to the extent at least that "the fundamental moral conceptions of the people" must not be in violent conflict.

5. "Common subjection during a long stretch of time to a firm and systematic government" especially one which is "able to establish a system of just and equal laws which its subjects can fully accept as part of their mode of life."

6. A common tradition, "a memory of sufferings endured and victories won in common"; probably "the most potent of all nation-moulding factors."

Even if this list of criteria were condensed into three principal headings, as it might be by giving to the term "tradition" the wide significance it has in Sociology[1] it is obvious that it would still admit of criticism; and Ramsay Muir himself goes on to say that "nationality" in its essence "is a sentiment; and in the last resort we can only say that a nation is a nation because its members passionately and unanimously believe it to be so."

It certainly seems best\(^1\) to leave aside the factor of race altogether; and this would bring Ramsay Muir's view into substantial accord with those of Zimmern\(^2\) who defines nationality as "a form of corporate consciousness of peculiar intensity intimacy and dignity related to a definite home country" and Pillsbury\(^3\) who says that "if you are to know to what national group an individual belongs, the simplest way is to ask him, and, while his answer cannot always be trusted --- it is, if he speaks the truth, a better criterion than history, or racial descent, or physical measurements."

McDougall however dissents from the view that nationality can be defined in terms of mere belief or conviction and considers that an essential condition of nationhood is the possession of "such mental organisation as will render the group capable of effective group life" "A nation" he says "is a people or population enjoying some degree of political independence and possessed of a national mind and character and therefore capable of national deliberation and national volition" A close comparison of this definition with that of Ramsay Muir\(^5\) seems to shew however that the difference between them is

1. In the light of such examples as England, Scotland, The United States, Switzerland.
2. Nationality and Government p. 96
3. Psychology of Nationality p. 20
4. The Group Mind p 100
5. Whom McDougall criticises for failing to provide criteria by which claims to separate nationhood could be objectively determined. See "Group Mind" p 98/9.
is one mainly of emphasis. The "passionate and unanimous belief" of Ramsay Muir must, it would seem, imply the existence of a strongly organised "sentiment," and this could hardly arise without some kind of "mental organisation," some idea or thought of themselves as a whole, existing in the minds of the people, and either prominent, or capable of readily coming into prominence in their lives. Thus as Seeley notes, in regard to the peoples of Germany, "their common language, their common property in Luther's Bible, their common triumph at Rosbach, their common pride in the new German learning -- literature -- philosophy; all this had no effect -- in the (earlier stages of the) war with Napoleon"; and the cause of this lack of effective unity might be stated with equal truth to be either that they had no really integrated political or social organisation or that, until Fichte, Stein, Arndt and others awakened it, they had not a sufficiently vivid belief in themselves forming as one people.

Neither Ramsay Muir nor McDougall appears to notice a distinction between the terms nationality and nation to which the English Dictionary refers. One of the meanings given to the former term is "frequently a people potentially but not actually a nation." More strictly perhaps, we might apply it to denote a thought or idea, with or course the

1. Life of Stein II 20.
the associated sentiment, existing in the minds of certain large groups of people, and regard these groups in as standing in two main "situations"; (a) that which they have achieved nationhood and are recognised by all other communities as nations and (b) that in which they either assert a claim to independent nationhood for which they have not yet secured effective recognition, or have willingly acquiesced in some more or less close political union with another people. In this last situation the very fact that the right or claim to self determination, in the sense of entire freedom from outside control, has been waived, proves in itself the existence of an idea of and a sentiment for the wider union, to which therefore the term "nation" may also with varying degrees of truth be applied. Norway and Sweden provide an illustration of a case in which such a wider union proved to be only temporary.

Bryce uses the terms "nation" and "nationality" in approximately this sense. He says "Let us begin by regarding a nationality as an aggregate of men drawn together by certain sentiments". He refers to these as based upon race, religion, and common language, literature, history, customs and habits, ideals and aspirations. "The more of these links that exist in any given case" he adds, "the stronger is the sentiment of unity ---and no

1. International Relations p 116/9.
no two cases are quite alike —— Often it is hard to say whether what I have called the aggregate united by sentiment is sufficiently marked off from other parts of a nation to be deemed a nationality, as in Spain some may and some may not consider the Catalans and the Basques to be each a nationality within the greater nationality of Spain itself —— The peoples of Spain Italy and Germany are both nations and nationalities, thought in the last mentioned case there are Germans outside Germany —— who deem themselves to be members of a German nationality in its wider sense." Upon the basis of this review of the facts he "hazards" a definition of the sentiment of nationality as "that feeling or group of feelings which makes an aggregate of men conscious of ties, not being wholly either political or religious, which unite them in a community which is, either actually or potentially a nation."

From these difficulties of definition it would seem at least to emerge that "nationality" is primarily and essentially a mental fact, a felt and recognised relationship existing between a number of people who are thereby constituted a nation-group. Historians, who are of course less concerned with the precise definition of nationality as a general term than with marking its emergence in varying degrees and in many different circumstances amongst particular peoples have not failed to emphasise this as its principal aspect. Thus Fletcher1 says

says, referring to John's submission to the Pope in 1213, that "the nation as a whole suddenly seemed to wake to the consciousness that it was a nation, an entity capable of suffering a grievous wrong;" Sir R. Lodge\(^1\) that, at the time of the Treaty of Troyes "there was hardly a French nation as yet, but there was certainly a sentiment of nationality --- which later was "kindled into a blaze by Jeanne D'Arc;" and Holland Rose\(^2\) that the march of the Russians in 1828 to Adrianople awoke the Bulgarians to a "passing thrill of national consciousness." The Cambridge National History\(^3\) after a review of events in Italy concludes that by 1846. "Italy was something more than a word written upon a map, - it was a nation conscious of its rights, rich, if not in material strength, in the fervour of self-sacrifice"; and Bryce\(^4\) reviewing the growth of Germany after 1814 refers to "what we call the instinct or passion of nationality, the desire of a people, already conscious of a moral and social unity, to see such unity expressed and realised under a single government." Hume Brown\(^5\) considers that Scotland, although it became under Bruce a united people cannot be strictly described as a nation until, through the Reformation struggle "A Scottish nation --- became a real entity, conscious of itself and

\[\text{References:}\]
1. Close of the Middle Ages p 334.
2. The European Nations p 251.
3. Volume X page 130
4. Holy Roman Empire p 489
5. Surveys of Scottish History pp 17, 16. 30.
and with a "destiny to fulfil"; and Sidgwick finds in this "consciousness of belonging to one another, of being members of one body, over and above what they derive from the mere fact of being under one government" the essential distinction between a political society which is merely a "state" and one which is "also a nation".

These references show that the nation is, by common consent a "psychological unit" and that moreover nationality is to be viewed not as a static but as a dynamic or "emergent" fact; it "awakens" "is kindled," or "is born" in particular groups of people under stress of various kinds of social interaction.

The problem of definition therefore involves some examination of the factors which have, in their operations throughout the various stages of social development contributed to determine what one might call the existing "areas" of group demarkation of this character. As Westermarck expresses it "Among men the members of the same social unit are tied to each other with various bonds -- customs, laws, institutions, -- ceremonies and beliefs, or notions of a common descent. As men generally are fond of that to which they are used or which is their own, they are also naturally apt to have likings for other

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2. Compare Seeley "Life of Stein II 24 on Spain.
other individuals whose habits or ideas are similar to theirs. The intensity and extensiveness of social affection thus in the first place depend upon the coherence and size of the social aggregate, and its development must consequently be studied in connection with the evolution of such aggregates. 1 The "tie" or "bond" of nationality cannot, in other words, be understood unless it is viewed as a product, or rather as one of the products, of developing social life.

It is probable, although not quite certain, that human group life derives ultimately from the family; 2 in essence a "natural" or biologic union, although capable as sociological research has shewn, of very wide diversity of form 3. It gives rise to the tie of "kinship," which, under one or other of its two principal aspects, forms the basis of all association amongst primitive peoples and produces the "clan," maternal or paternal, according as descent is traced through mother or father. As we know it, this is itself a mode of union which presents an almost endless variation in its particular forms; 4 but for the purpose of this essay it is perhaps only necessary to notice, firstly that while the bond is almost everywhere one of

2. See Rivers "Psychology & Politics" p 47/9 for a summary of the views on this point.
3. See generally Westermarck Human Marriage Hobhouse Morals in Evolution Morgan Ancient Society Bosanquet The Family Chapter I - III
4. Indicating e.g. Morgan thought a general transition from maternal to paternal type.
of a force which to us appears extraordinarily strong it
does not of necessity and in itself involve the tie
of "locality", but secondly that amongst the peoples organised
upon the "paternal" basis the "blood" and the "local" ties
reinforce each other. It is from these peoples, and
very possibly in part by reason of the greater social
coherence which this reinforcement yields, that all the
more stable forms of wider social union, and indeed of
civilisation have derived. Kinship, either actual or as a
social conception, and territorial or local association,
are therefore, we may say, the joint bases of all higher
developments of social grouping.

The "clan" - group itself has shewn, it appears, a general
tendency to expand into\(^2\) and often to merge itself in\(^3\) some
form of wider union in which, while kinship as a social
conception remains, the more consciously purposeful tie of
"defence" is visible in varying degree of prominence\(^4\); and
as defence passed into aggression, conquering tribes or
groups of tribes have at different times established those
still more extensive social areas known as the early Empires.

1. See for example Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg "The
Maternal Culture of the Simpler Peoples and Westmarck
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas II (p. 204)
2. See Morgan "The League of the Iroquois."
3. See Westmarck II 221.
These present very different degrees of coherence; sometimes as in the case of Persia, where the binding tie was almost wholly military, the life of the contained groups persisted, apart from tribute and allegiance, practically undisturbed; at others, as in Egypt, where the tie of religion came into very powerful operation, a real social entity was formed; and rulers occasionally arose who regarded themselves as trustees of interests we are almost tempted to describe as national. Indeed amongst the Hebrews, Lord Acton considers, an actual national consciousness came to centre in the religious conception of a personal and moral Deity with this exception however, early forms of extra-tribal unity, were very different in their essential content from the national type as we now conceive it. They were "mechanical" rather than "organic"; they contained no actively self-conscious group or groups of which the governing institutions were the expression; and when from external aggression or internal decay their government broke down, no source existed from which it could be reconstituted or revived.

The first known social groupings to exhibit any real promise of the development of conscious nationality were the

1. Such as Ikhnaton whose reforms 1378 - 5 B.C., broke down under opposition of the priesthood and for lack of popular support. See Breasted History of Egypt Chaps XIX - XX.
2. McDougall (Group Mind, p 129) does call Egypt "one of the most stable and enduring of nations."
the Greek cities. They represent evolutionarily the products of tribal fusion or conquest\(^1\) and were of course, territorially, closely compacted.\(^2\) Even the most democratic of them contained a large slave population who were entirely excluded from political rights and their social history fore-shadows to some extent that of the medieval cities in its record of acute internal conflict.\(^3\)

From the point of view of this essay however they are important as exhibiting perhaps the most striking example of that fully conscious self-devotion on the part of their members to the social whole which, as we have noticed, is the developing characteristic of the nation of later times; a devotion which as Sidgwick\(^4\) and Wallas\(^5\) both observe, appears to be closely associated with the fact that they were of limited size. Ties wider than the city were not wholly lacking; the Greek "had indeed a sentiment of nationality" binding him "as a Dorian, say to other Dorians, as a Hellenic to other Hellenes," but these sentiments were usually feeble in comparison with the patriotism which

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1. Sidgwick Development of European Polity p. 61/2 regards Athens and Sparta respectively as examples of these processes.
2. See Harrison Meaning of History Chap. VIII.
3. See generally La Cité Antique (Coulanges) and Lord Acton History of Freedom pp. 8 - 11. The Development of European Polity, Sidgwick.
4. Development of European Polity pp. 69/70 Sidgwick remarks that "civilisation has all the world over developed in towns; the peculiarity of Greece is that they were independent towns with vigorous and intense national life."
which glowed in a good citizen for his own city." They failed, as we know, to form any really effective union even under the stimulus of Macedonian aggression. But as civic organisations they developed a type of group life which profoundly influenced all later social development in to the idealistic conceptions which it gave rise. For the Greeks were vividly aware of the superior nature of the type of social unity they had achieved, as well as its bearing upon the life of the individual, and in such examples as the funeral oration of Pericles or the speeches of Demosthenes we see the intensity of devotional feeling with which it was fused.

If Greece provides an example of a form of social organisation which might have extended into nationality by expansion, Rome, itself the centre of a highly developed ideal of civic patriotism and duty, imparted a new content to the method of absorption. The principle of "colonisation" contributed, while the Roman power was still confined to Italy, a tie which, as Sidgwick notices, "proved

1. Athens and Sparta stood aloof from the Achaean League
2. See for Example Gierke "Political Records of the Middle Age" (Maitland's translation) pp 96/7 for the influence of Aristotle on Political Thought after the "Reception"
"proved sufficiently strong to stand - in the main - the strain put upon it" by Hannibal's invasion; and although under the Empire the dominant characteristic of Roman rule was the suppression of the free life of the absorbed groups, Rome was always more than a mere empire in any sense in which that term could hitherto have been applied. It was a civilising force which attracted to itself definite sentiments of loyalty, so that the inhabitants of the conquered provinces came "after four or five generations to begin to think of themselves as being all Romans" and became "what would be called today -- a kind of collective nationality." In its administrative and even more in its legal systems it contributed perhaps the most powerful of all the historical or traditional influences to the formation of the nation - state. Sidgwick regards as the chief cause of the development of kingship in medieval Europe the "pre existence of the Roman Empire, operating, as he says, partly through the persistence of ideas which "keep before the minds of men a monarchy of ancient prestige as the generally

1. See for example Bryce, Holy Roman Empire p 18/9 for a remarkable expression of this by Alhunif (a West Goth)
2. Bryce International Relations p 9. Cp. Holy Roman Empire p 9 where Rome is called "that imperial nationality." Harrison "Meaning of History" pp 51/2 regards the characteristic mark of the Romans as "devotion to country." Rome he considers "founded the nation" and "bound" its subject peoples into "the same service of their common country."
generally accepted highest form of government; and partly (after the twelfth century) through the influence of jurists, whose views of the "relation of law to government" were based upon those of Rome; and Bryce says that "through all the Dark and Middle Ages" the principal force resisting social disorder was "that passionate longing of the better minds for a formal unity of government which had its historical basis in the memories of the old Roman Empire";

Between the fall of Rome and the close of the twelfth century Western Europe was unified in thought if not in fact by the medieval Empire and the Papacy, both essentially anti-national in conception. A single religion and a uniform type of social structure overlay and obscured those "natural" or voluntary groupings, which arise from racial or linguistic affinities or from local ties. In feudalism "we see a society of which the members are bound together in a scale of different ranks, fixed and kept stable by a scale of relations to land"; and while in Europe these class distinctions never hardened, as they did in the East, to distinctions of caste, the knight

1. Holy Roman Empire p. 50.
2. Sidgwick. Developments of European Polity p205. As Harrison (Meaning of History) (p.68) notices however, the feudal system developed the "closest bond which has ever bound man to man -- the ideal of personal loyalty -- which bound the warrior to his captain, the vassal to his lord, the squire to his knight."
or the baron of one country was often, under the conception
of 'chivalry,' more closely united, in sympathy and in senti-
ment of his fellow elsewhere than to his own social inferiors.
"Nobility and more particularly Knighthood centred in the
Empire" and to a man of the Middle Ages "his country,
meant little more than the neighbourhood in which he lived."
Throughout the whole of this long period there went on a
conflict which assumed any different forms, but in which
there stand out the two principal "Antitheses" or oppo-
tions of centralisation versus disruption and temporal
power versus spiritual; a conflict of which the final is-
sue was the fall of both Empire and Papacy, and the rise,
under strong monarchs, of unified states.

It is out of the "context" or "setting" provided by
these great movements that the "nation-idea" is born; and
while as already indicated its growth has to be regarded as
essentially a fact of mind and perhaps in a sense en-
visaged in terms of some such single or universal process,
as conceived by Vico, Herder, Hegel, or Conte, it is in his-
tory that its proximate causes must be sought. Geo-
ographical and racial factors have, it must be recognised,
played their parts, never easy to assign or evaluate, but
always, it may be premised, relative, in the mode and extent

2. Westermanck II. 180
3. Lord Acton History of Freedom p. 34/5 refers to various
phases of this long struggle and regards the Church as supply-
ing a restraining force upon feudal power and privilege which
contributed importantly to the growth of a civil liberty, in
which (p.291) men could "live together under the same author-
ity without necessarily losing their cherished habits, their
customs, or their laws." Sidgwick p. 193 notices that the
Church, while it often came into conflict with monarchical
governments "normally exercised an influence on the side of
order and therefore of monarchy."
of their influence, to the prevailing level of social and mental development\(^1\). Even in history the assignment of "Causes" is subject to the important qualification that a very large sphere of doubt remains in regard to the part attributable in any "point of departure" to the influence of personality\(^2\); and it is perhaps safest either to avoid the term or to say, with Holland Rose, that they have been, in relation to the awakening of nationality, "infinitely various\(^3\).\n
We may, however, notice briefly certain broadly favourable conjunctures of circumstances which have influenced at least the order of emergence\(^4\) of the nation groups.

Thus it is probably more than coincidence that England, the country most remote from the centres of Papal and Imperial influence, and geographically, the most isolated, was as Ramsay Muir notices, the one which evidences of the existence of conscious nationhood first appear\(^5\). It was, however, in all probability conditioned even more by the fact (or accident) that under the Norman and Angevin kings there was established, by force, a strong and centralised government which yet succeeded in conciliating, or reconciling itself with, the pre-existing tradition and sentiments of the English people\(^6\); and finally in "welding" conquerors and

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1. E.g. In regard to race, the rapid assimilation (in respect of nationality) by the United States of its various immigrant peoples is a "new" fact in history.
2. See e.g. for views on this point Bryce International Relations p.29. Rivers Psychology "Politics" pp. 51/2. Both agree that this factor is of considerable importance. Bryce says that the coming of the "individual great man" may make all the difference.
4. Itself of course as important influence in their subsequent history.
6. Themselves of course only partially united previously.
conquered into a single whole. Outstanding features in this process were the famous "invention" of William I. in exacting a direct oath of personal allegiance from all holders of land; the stimulation of local interest in Government through the shire-court and later the jury; and the early establishment of "the vital principle of the Rule of the Law". The Charter of Henry I. was read to the people in every Shire Court in England; his Curia Regis covered all classes, even the villein, and "gained steadily in bulk and consistency through the accumulation of precedents"; and in spite of provincial jealousies, "which can be traced for three or four centuries after 1135", "the common respect of North and South for the King's Writ, their submission and increasing attachment to the same principles of law, their interest in the monarchy as a bulwark against robbery, and oppression had (by the close of the reign) made them one people." In the later development of this process of consolidation by enlightened leadership, the most important single features are perhaps the firm establishment under Henry III. of the recognition that crime is

1. And therefore excluding what Sir R. Lodge calls "the essential vice of the feudal system"—(Middle Ages p. 57)—the disruptive influence of the tie of loyalty as between vassal and lord.
2. Ramsay Muir p. 31.
3. Davis Normans and Angevins p. 119
4. Davis. England under the Normans and Angevins pp. 137/8
is primarily an offence against the State, and the attachment (through, at first, the medium of local administration) to the institutions of government of a "middle class of landowner" who accordingly became in England, as they did not in France, the willing guardians and the visible representatives of justice and order. Significant evidences of the growth of a feeling of national unity which could, when occasion arose, find definite expression, are to be seen in the events leading up to the Parliaments of Oxford (1258) and Westminster (1265) as well as in the character of the army which destroyed the military prestige of France. at Crecy and the enthusiastic support accorded to the policy of aggression embarked upon by Henry V. It was to the fact that they had re-established that freedom from social disturbance which the nation had come to recognise as the most important attribute of government that the earlier Tudors owed, in large part, that intense, almost passionate loyalty of which their reigns afford so many examples. None

1. By the reforms of Hubert Walter. See Davis p. 325.
2. See (J.R. Green pp. 152/60)
3. It was the coherence of the English Army, based upon national coherence, as opposed to the feudal indiscipline of the French, that was the decisive factor. Green (p. 227) considers that Crecy destroyed "a system of Warfare and the political and social fabric which rested on it."
4. As Henry VIII. at least was well aware. See H. A. L. Fisher. Political History of England V. p. 281, quoting from Hall's "Chronicles."
5. See for instance Fisher pp. 294/5 and 324/5 on the quarrel with Rome; and pp. 349, 352 & 387 for expressions of loyalty by various victims of regal tyranny.
the less, however, it remains true, as is clearly shown for instance by the ideas of the leaders of the rebellions of 1496\(^1\) and 1536,\(^2\) that in at any rate the remoter parts of the kingdom this personal loyalty was not as yet associated with that widely diffused sense of community in aim and interest which are the marks of a fully developed national consciousness.

The same process of establishment of a strong rule as providing a basis for the development of a nation may be illustrated also from French history; commencing perhaps with Philip IV,\(^3\) reviving under Charles V,\(^4\) extending, after the awakening of national feeling through the English invasion, under Charles VII,\(^5\) and reaching, in its territorial aspect, virtual completion under Louis XI,\(^5\). But while in England, this consolidation was associated with, on the whole, and allowing of course for the inevitable vicissitudes of history, a steady fusion of various classes in respect at least of civil and political rights, in France the dominant feature was the growth of the power of the crown.\(^6\) De Tocqueville\(^7\)

1. See Fisher, pp. 69/70.
2. See Fisher 395. Henry's reply (p. 403) to the petition of the Lincolnshire rebels terms them "the rude commons of a county, and that one of the most brute and beastly in the whole realm."
3. Sir R. Lodge "Close of the Middle Ages pp. 50. 574
4. Whose rule was approved perhaps even welcomed by the people on the same grounds as, and with more reason than. Tudor rule was welcomed in England a century later. Sir R. Lodge "Close of the Middle Ages pp. 91/2.
6. Sir R. Lodge, p. 60/1.
7. L' Ancien Régime p. 66.
shews how in the course of this growth the central government had "laissez aux anciens pouvoirs leurs noms antiques et leurs honneurs, mais leur avait peu à peu sous trait leur autorite", and how "profitant de l'inertie de celui-ci, de/égolsme de celui-la pour prendre sa place, s'aidant de tous leurs vices --- il avait fini par les remplacer presque tous," The result as he points out was the maintenance of deep class distinctions through which the sentiment of community, unconsciously developing in similarities of thought and essential culture, had, as it were by to burst into expression/the violent method of Revolution.

The examples of England and France in respect of this point of consolidation under a firm rule find an eloquent commentary in the contrasting conditions of Germany and Italy; where in circumstances hardly less favourable1 in outward appearance to the growth of strongly organised nations, history exhibits a record of strife and disunity extending down to the 18th and 19th centuries. The outstanding fact in regard to both is perhaps their close connection with the Empire and the Papacy; the Imperial claim to temporal domination in Italy for example, never made good and finally abandoned2 reactting adversely upon the course of development in both countries. The office of Emperor was also, as Sir R. Lodge notes, elective4 a principle fatal, in the circumstances of the times to the growth of a strong

1. Sir R. Lodge notes that the geographical conditions of Italy were not in the Middle Ages favourable to close union.
2. Sir R. Lodge p. 114/8
3. Sidgwick "Development of European Polity" says p. 196 that apart from this factor he sees "No clear reason why Germany should not have attained national unity under a king, like France & Spain, at the close of the Middle Ages."
4. Middle Ages. pp. 1/2
strong central power; and although under Charles IV "the greatest ruler whom Europe produced in the 14th century"¹ important steps towards consolidation were taken, they proved unfruitful. During the 14th century there was little or no central authority²; the towns, whose active support the Emperors had neglected or failed to enlist, and the numerous spiritual or temporal rulers, enjoyed practically complete independence²; and it was chiefly if not entirely the territorial power of the House of Hapsburg which provided the bond that held Germany together, politically, until the 18th century³. The formation of the Hanseatic League is perhaps noteworthy as showing the extent to which, even in the face of foreign aggression, the towns were obliged to rely upon themselves for protection⁴ and how far it was possible, while a stimulus of sufficient power remained operative, for local sentiment of great intensity to find a basis of common action. In Italy, the entire absence of any effective central authority⁵ allowed the

1. Sir R. Lodge p 112. His measures were stimulated, in part at least, by French aggression. See pp 114/8
2. Thus in the "Tower War" 1378/9 between the Swabian League and the Nobility, monarchy remained in the position of a practically helpless spectator. Sir R. Lodge p 188/90.
4. Sir R. Lodge notices (p 430) that in 1307 Lubeck threatened by the Count of Holstein appealed to Denmark for protection and actually acknowledged Danish suzerainty showing "how little any sentiment of nationality existed among the citizens."
5. Sir R. Lodge pp 200/300. See also Sidgwick pp 271-

A fact to which the influence of the Pope and the nominal overlordship of the Emperor were both contributory. Sir R. Lodge pp 20/3
the growth both of the intense party feuds and factions of which the Guelphs and the Ghibellines are the outstanding example and of the development "as the normal unit of political life" of the municipalities or communes; the conflict and rivalries between and within which came to assume such bitterness that not only was union against Turkish or French aggression impossible, but foreign support was frequently sought by one or other of the combatants. Yet even here, amidst conditions which must, it would seem, have rapidly extinguished all hope of future unity, there persisted, on the basis of racial, traditional, and linguistic affinities, a vague awareness of community, finding occasional expression in the leaders of thought,¹ and "awaiting," as it were, the appropriate circumstances to awaken into conscious life. In Germany also, beneath political disruption at times hardly less complete, there may be traced the development of a vigorous corporate life, in which thought and sentiment were gradually fashioned into forms compatible with, and preparatory for, communal life of a wider range.²

Resistance against external aggression has received passing allusion, in the cases of Scotland and France, as a factor in the formation of conscious nationality; and the

¹. Notably of course in Dante's "De Monarchia" which Bryce (Holy Roman Empire p 276) described as "a passionate cry for some power -- to restore unity and peace to hapless Italy."
the rise of the Swiss confederation may also be mentioned as illustrating the extent to which, "common interests and dangers"\(^1\) can bind and hold people into communities even when they may be "not only of different origin and institutions but also of differing race and language"\(^1\) In Scotland it has been noticed also that the full attainment of national self consciousness required the presence, before the mind of the people as a whole, of a single great question of first-rate importance engaging alike public opinion and public feeling.\(^2\) The most striking illustrations of these types of formative influence derive however from the circumstances attending the advent of Spain, as a force of first rank, into European affairs.

Spain herself, as Professor Muir points out\(^3\) was unified very largely through the agency of the long struggle against the Moors; and this unity was further developed in the minds of the people "under --- despot rulers, who filled them with pride by leading them forth to foreign conquests." as well as by the deeds of the conquistadores of the New World. In Portugal also, he notices, the national spirit had been fired by the great achievements of her navigators; which arose, out of the maritime

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See Sir R. Lodge pp 407/408 for a summary of the events leading up to the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon.
maritime struggles of the Mediterranean. The results revealed by Portuguese explorations in Africa had "wrought like a ferment in the minds of European observers"; and when to these there was added the further discoveries of Vasco da Gama and Columbus, it was everywhere recognised that a new "world-situation" had been created; The wide extension of the field of opportunity which these discoveries effected, must in any event have broadened the basis and heightened the intensity of international rivalry; but when to this factor there was added the aggressive and intolerant Catholicism of Spain, there came into existence what might almost be described as a new nation-making force; a force which served at least to unite unto a people who were for a time the most flourishing in Europe the jealous and contentious provinces of the Netherlands; and in England to develop a national consciousness distinguishable in its new and vivid intensity from the loyalty which had

1. See Cambridge National History I p 94
   Religious, trading, and national motives appear to have underlain the "Greater Portugal" project of Prince Henry the navigator.

2. Cambridge History I.6 refers to these discoveries as the most conspicuous of the landmarks which "divide the Middle Ages from modern times."


4. See Rogers pp 26, 35.

had surrounded the earlier Tudors.\textsuperscript{1} It was this national reaction against Spain which in England decisively determined the issue against Catholicism in that great Counter-Reformation struggle which engaged Europe during the latter half of the 16th century; and out of which France, consolidated afresh through the efforts of Henry IV, Sully, and Richelieu, emerged as the dominant power and the central figure in a rivalry in which, and under Colbert and Louis XIV, the motive of commercial/territorial expansion had definitely superseded that of religion.\textsuperscript{2} The same motive - centering in their case upon the possession of the Baltic, was influencing the growth of the four northern States - Sweden, Poland, Denmark and Russia; and from about the close of the 17th century it must be assigned a place of the first importance in the process of nation formation, as an illustration of the intensity of national feeling which such rivalry could arouse, probably no better example exists than that of England and Holland in the later part of the 17th century.\textsuperscript{3}

Important as this influence has been however, in stimulating the sense of national unity it is the growth of thought, and especially of political thought that finally shapes nation-group into the form in which we now know it. The consciousness

\textsuperscript{1} H.A.L. Fisher p 483 says that under Henry VIII "the patriotism of England mounted high under the proudest ruler in Europe" and that "he left behind him a body of patriotic sentiment so wholesome and buoyant that vanquishing after a brief struggle the poison of religious discord it attained the magnificent development of the Elizabethan age."

\textsuperscript{2} See generally Sir R. Lodge "Modern Europe pp126/9 156/9 and 216/8.

\textsuperscript{3} See eg. Sir R. Lodge "History of England" 1660 - 1702. p. 70.
consciousness of nationhood which was developed in England through the struggle against Spain led under the rule of the Stuarts to what may be termed the definite repudiation of the loyalty tie, as being in and of itself the determining principle of social unity; and out of the contests which followed there emerged national speculations upon the nature and justification of government which found their most famous expressions in the writings of Hobbes and Locke. ¹ It would of course be incorrect to regard these writers as having originated what may be called the modern doctrine of sovereignty²: their importance lies rather in the wide attention their views received. In England as we know, after the events of 1688 the course of political development worked itself out with, on the whole, little social disturbance of an acute character; but in France, where the political thought of Montesquieu—and especially of Rousseau, ³—found ready acceptance, "Au dessus de la société

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1. On the Dependence of social thought upon existing social conditions generally see e.g. Sidgwick, "Development of European Polity" pp 345 † and on the association of Hobbes and Locke with national self-consciousness see Bosanguet, Philosophical Theory of the State, pp 10/11.

2. See for example Sir F. Pollock "History of the Science of Politics" on the views of Bodin; also Gierke pp 79.

3. For an estimate of the position of Rousseau in relation to the earlier thought of Hobbes, Locke and the later views of Kant and Hegel see Bosanguet, Philosophical Theory of the State, pp 12/3; and for his influence on the Revolution see Sidgwick "European Polity" pp 379 †
société réelle dont la constitution était encore traditionnelle confuse et irrégulière, où les lois demeuraient diverses et contradictoires—il se bâtissait—peu à peu une société imaginaire, dans laquelle tout paraissait simple et co-ordonné, uniforme, équitable, et conforme à la raison."¹ The conception of this "imaginary society," fused with the two great "passions"² which the conditions of France in the 18th century had generated²—those of "equality"² and "liberty,"² was the force of which the Revolution was the inevitable expression; and from this great historical event there dates, in Europe at least, the association in the common thought of peoples of all races, of those two main aims or ideals which are generally recognised as characterising and dominating nineteenth century history; "that great impulse towards individual liberty which we name democracy"³ and "that impulse scarcely less mighty and elemental that prompts men to effect a close union with their kith and kin"—which "we may term nationality."³ Historically of course the Revolution quickly became an event of international importance in ways more direct than that of social imitation. The social and political principles which it carried to violent triumph aroused against it forces that drew their support from outside.

¹ L'ancien Régime p. 152.
³ Holland Rose "The European Nations" p. 2.
Cp. Cambridge History p. 3.
outside the French boundaries; and these rapidly gave it a definitely nationalistic character. The revolutionists "no longer satisfied to defend their frontiers -- determined to spread the revolutionary dogmas by force and to excite a general rising of peoples against their kings"\(^1\). The change of attitude is clearly illustrated in its early stages in the relations of the Republic with Avignon, Savoy, Nice, and the Belgian Communes\(^2\); and with the advent of Napoleon the principle of nationality again assumed the ancient characteristics of aggression and conquest on the one side and ardent resistance on the other. It was Spain, held together as Seeley\(^3\) says, in spite of the "worst government then existing" by its ancient traditions and the "two supreme ties" of "religion and nationality," that first awoke in Europe any real hope of deliverance from French domination; and Stein, watching from conquered Prussia, who began to organise against Napoleon that latent force of German nationality which had hitherto remained ineffective. "It was" to summarise the movement in Seeley's words: the idea of the nation as distinguished from the state; the union by blood as distinguished from union by interest; the idea of the strength and stubborn solidity of that

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that society which, while it has the form of a state is a nation also"; that was the new and fatal force against Napoleon.

The Congress of Vienna however virtually restored in Europe the ancient dynastic principles and endeavoured through the "Concert" and the "Holy Alliance" to secure their permanence and inviolability. It is accordingly with the contest between the conservative force, represented by this attitude and the revolutionary forces of nationality and constitutional liberty that the political history of the nineteenth century is mainly concerned;¹ a contest of which it may suffice here to say that essentially it appears to constitute a single great process of which the outstanding feature is the steadily increasing strength, based of course in large part upon material and intellectual progress, of the liberative movement. Its greatest success was, as is well known, achieved in Italy, where an oppressive foreign rule, the memory of an ancient and glorious tradition, the psychological insight of Mazzini, and the patience, restraint and foresight of Cavour combined with the general trend of European events to bring about the triumphs of 1860 and 1870.

In northern Europe however Bismarck consolidated Germany upon lines and through methods in which the national principle came to manifest itself under a different aspect.²

2. See Chapter 5.
Processes essentially similar have underlain the growth of nationality in America. Thus in the history of what is now the United States, the motive of defence against external danger had led, in 1642, to the Federal Union of the New England Colonies, and from the time of the Restoration onwards there existed between the Colonies and the home country a perennial controversy the real basis of which was the conflict of principle, as yet unexpressed, of imperial rule versus local self-government. So long as the menace of French aggression remained it served both to repress this separatist tendency and to develop in the various colonies a sense of solidarity; and "down to the time of the Seven Years War the feelings of the colonists towards England were curiously compounded of loyalty and disaffection." They were proud of her greatness but in a vague and perhaps largely unconscious way they had "long been preparing themselves for the coming rupture." Vergennes was not the only European observer to foresee that the presence of the French in North America was the only effective barrier withholding from expression this "nascent sentiment of national unity" and when after that influence was

1. The United States, Hudson and Guernsey p 85/6. The expressed ground of the Federation was that "we live encompassed with people of several nations and strange tongues" and that "the savages have of late combined themselves against us."
2. The United States pp. 119/124.
3. The United States, p. 167.
4. See the letter of the Swedish Traveller Kalin 1748 quoted "United States" pp 169/70.
5. Howard "Tliminaries of the Revolution" p. 44.
was removed the British Government entered upon a policy which, to the colonists appeared deliberately aggressive, there arose that conflict of principle to which, in the circumstances of the times, there was probably no solution other than separation. In Canada again, beneath the conflicting tendencies of two sets of group-sentiment of a national type there is to be seen on the whole, the same steady development of a conscious community of essential aims and interests. It has been furthered as Jebb notices,² by the growth of a distinctive historical tradition, particularly in relation to the United States³ as well as by the emergence, with economic and social progress, of distinctively Canadian problems, of which not the least have been those arising from the conflict of interest and feeling between the two constituent races.

The effect both of the South African and the recent European Wars⁵ has been to heighten still further this consciousness of nationhood; and the "problem of her position within the Empire" to which Grant and Egerton

1. See Egerton "Causes and Character of the American Revolution." On the strength of the loyalist sentiment however even after the Stamp Act see Hudson and Guernsey pp. 180 and 197/8.
2. "Studies in Colonial Nationalism" pp. 5 ²
3. Jebb p. 6 See also Egerton & Grant pp. 269, 352 for the evidence of the debates in the Canadian House of Parliament on Federation. See Jebb p. 25/60 for the "Alaska Boundary question.
6. See e.g. an article by J.A.R. Marriott "Fortnightly Review" July 1923 p. 65.
Egerton allude\(^1\) as awaiting solution appears now to be in process of settlement, with that of other "self governing colonies", on lines indicated by the term "the British Commonwealth of Nations."

"Nationality" then, we must recognise, is necessarily difficult to define because it has grown up as a social fact, under a wide variety of influences, operating under widely different circumstances. While in one sense its most significant feature is that it is the product of a single great movement or tendency, the "peculiarities in the process"\(^2\) are sufficiently pronounced to make it impossible to bring it within the application of any general set of criteria, racial, geographical or other.

Like "individuality" it is always unique. The consciousness of unity, more or less highly developed, by which it is invariably characterised, rests upon traditions which are inevitably special: and the interests, aims, or purposes, in regard to which it binds are never merely economic or religious, or other "partial" or "sectional"; they are, or tend to be, co-ordinate with all the activities of life; "self" interests in the widest sense of the term. Once formed, moreover, unions which have their basis in

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1. Selected Speeches and Despatches p. 472.
2. which "constitute the essential difference between the national history of one country and another" (Hume Brown p. 15)
in "Nationality" have shewn themselves to be perhaps the most permanent and imperishable facts in history; surviving oppression and misgovernment, resisting aggression, establishing themselves more strongly with conflict of every kind, maintaining at all costs and against all opposition their right to full and free "self-determination." The motive-principle in all this can be, it would seem, nothing other than the self-sentiment of the individual members. Viewed in this way the nation-group is the corresponding fact, at the present stage of civilised culture, to the primitive independent or "natural" community; and if we assume that native human tendencies are not affected by social development, the sentiment of nationality is the primitive group-sentiment, more highly organised. By what means and through the operation of what processes we may next ask, is this powerful sentiment built up in the minds of the successive generations by which the life of the nation is constituted.

1. For a reference to the importance of this question see Rivers "Psychology and Politics" pp. 35/6 and "Instinct and the Unconscious" p 260 †
III. The Sentiment of Nationality and the Individual.

The nation, like all other social groups is for the newly-born individual an "external" fact; a fact of the environment to which as he grows up his capacities and dispositions have to be adjusted. This adjustment is a part, and an important part of his "education"—in such definitions of that term as for instance a process "by which human beings so acquire the knowledge and habits which constitute civilisation as to be fitted to live well, both individually and in co-operation"1 or "in which and by which the knowledge, character, and behaviour of the young are shaped and moulded—in such a way as to produce a certain type of individual, consciously or unconsciously, regarded as the normal type"2 by the community of which he is a member. In both these definitions and in many others that could be cited there is present the dual thought of the self and the society, and to Baldwin3 the "most remarkable outcome of modern social theory" is "the recognition of the fact that the individual's normal growth lands him in essential solidarity with his fellows, while on the other hand the existence of his social duties and privileges advances his highest and purest individuality."

There is indeed perhaps no point upon which there is a wider consensus of agreement in social thought than that of

3. The Individual & Society Chap. I.
the extent to which the individual is dependent for his development, upon formative influences which come to bear upon him, in the course of his growth, from the social "milieu" or environment into which he is born. In the famous passage of Bradley\(^1\) he is "penetrated - infected - characterised" by them; for Durkheim the very definition of a social fact lies in its "puissance de coercition externe en vertu duquel il s'impose à lui"\(^2\); for Tarde" l'imitation -- est l'élément unique et nécessaire de la vie sociale"\(^3\); and for Hobhouse "the vital factor" in the development of everyone is "that from infancy upwards the social milieu into which he is born interpenetrates his thought and will, and turns his individuality into a creation of the time and place of his life"\(^4\).

The processes through which this interpenetration takes place have been analysed by many writers upon social psychology. McDougall\(^5\), after a reference to the inadequate character of the earlier intellectualist and hedonist theories, and a summary of the problem of education as that of "directing the impulses towards appropriate objects" classes "the processes by which society works upon the growing mind at every moment of the waking life" as falling under the "three great heads".

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1. By Station and its Duties (Ethical Studies) p. 155 (1876 Edition.)
2. Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique p. 8
3. Les Lois Sociales p. 36. Both Tarde and Baldwin (Mental Development in the Child and the Race" and "Social and Ethical Interpretations") give to the term "imitation" a much wider sense than most other writers accept.
5. Psychology (Home University Library) p. 233 and Social Psychology p. 90.
of "suggestion", "sympathy" and "imitation". He views all three as "general or non-specific innate tendencies" (as opposed to the "instinct" proper, which "no matter how profoundly modified it may be in the developed human mind as regards the conditions of its excitement and the actions in which it manifests itself, always retains unchanged its essential and permanent nucleus" determining "a native impulse towards some specific end." ) and gives to them the following definitions or interpretations. "Suggestion" is "a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate ground for its acceptance"; it is influential in inverse proportion to the range of knowledge of the person affected, and comes into specially powerful operation where that person stands in relation to the suggestive source, in an attitude of "self-subjection" or "submission". By sympathy"¹ is meant "the tendency to experience in face of the same objects the same emotions and impulses that are revealed by the behaviour of our fellows"; it is clearly visible in the group life of gregarious animals and explains the rapid communication of emotional excitement throughout all the members of a flock or herd. "Imitation", McDougall is inclined to confine² to the process of attending to and "copying" the particular actions, or, at more advanced levels, the general behaviour or conduct, of other persons; it is partly involuntary and unconscious, partly, and perhaps more importantly, deliberate or conscious.

¹. In the sense of "primitive" sympathy.
². In opposition to Tarde and Baldwin.
These processes are in many respects clearly interconnected; imitation for example being from one point of view a proof and an expression of suggestibility; but while their precise delimitation is still uncertain, all psychologists are agreed as to the enormous range and potency of their influence in social life, and particularly in the sphere of "education". Dr Dreyer for instance considers that "we must, in sympathy, recognise one of the most profoundly significant of the agencies by which the individuality of the human being is shaped, more particularly in its inner affective aspects, and shaped independently of voluntary effort - it may be in spite of voluntary effort - on the part of parent or teacher". The parent or teacher's emotional attitudes, his interests, his enthusiasms, may mean a great deal more for the development of the children under his charge than anything he deliberately tries to do to educate them, and the effect is produced for the most part by what the teacher really is in his own inner nature, rather than by what he pretends to be."

From the point of view of this chapter, which is concerned chiefly with the processes by which there is developed in the mind of the child a sentiment for, or an organised emotional system about, a concept which, by its nature, can come only gradually into his consciousness, it is important

1. Compare for instance the above view of "suggestion" with that of Rivers "Instinct and the Unconscious" p. 91.
2. The Psychology of Education p. 86/7 and "Instinct in Man" p. 239/40. The "sympathy" here referred to is "primitive" sympathy reinforced by active sympathy arising within e.g. a sentiment of affection.
to emphasize again two aspects of sentiment formation referred to in Chapter I., - the persistence of "Experience residua" and the tendency for those possessing an affect-content to organize themselves into systems which are, in the last analysis, 'manifestations' or 'extensions' of a sentiment of 'self.' We have to think of the 'self' indeed as consisting from the first in some innately organized system of tendencies indirective or indefinite in their original lines of response; as actively functioning even before the self-idea or self-sentiment is formed and continuing to function largely below consciousness after or in the course of its formation.

The moulding processes through which the content of the social environment is "impressed upon" the individual consist, subjectively regarded, in the expansion of this active system; they are the means by which it develops or 'realises' itself in a form adapted to its surroundings. Baldwin, tracing the development of the self in its more "conscious" aspects says:

1. Dr Dreyer says (Psychology of Education p. 112) that "it is not legitimate to derive the self-complex and the later self-sentiment wholly from the relation to others --- the self --- must be regarded from the start as a psychological entity, the nucleus of personality which the psychologist is seeking." On the "organizing" function of the self-sentiment see pp. 77/80. "The only possible way of accounting for a hierarchy is by showing how all the sentiments can be caught up into a larger comprehensive system. The development of the self in relation to other selves --- and the rise of a self-sentiment is the one indispensable condition."

2. Social and Ethical Interpretations p. 10.
that the "child's sense of himself" tends to pass, in proportion as he "masters" his environment from the "projective" or submissive stage, in which he recognises in others "elements which he is only trying to assimilate and incorporate in the conception of himself" to the "ejective" or assertive stage in which he is conscious of possessing them;" and if we extend this to include the unconscious factor in self-development we see that the whole "personality" of the adult self must be regarded as mainly if not entirely the result of a progress of gradual assimilation. It is in this manner that "the external conditions of life" which, as Barker notes can have no meaning so long as they remain external, are brought, not so much into his "consciousness," as into the structural organisation of the mind that determines the content of consciousness; and that the child of a particular community is in the fullest sense of the word "constituted" a member of that community.

Self development occurs, as it now generally recognised, not in relation to a vague and undifferentiated "society" but to a "community" consisting of a great hierarchy or system of groups. Thus to M'Iver community is "nothing but wills in relation if we understand by will no abstract faculty but mind as active" and the more definite and permanent types of relationship are co-ordinated into associations which are in this

2. Community II. 3.
this sense, "organs" of community. Findlay\textsuperscript{1} regards "the central theme of Sociology" as "the definition of social groups, their classification and their relations to each other" and views the developed "person" as forming, so to speak the "point of intersection" of a larger or smaller number of them. He gives a suggested classification, based upon the order of our acquaintance with them in course of life, and therefore, (as he says) to some extent the order of their social emergence, as

1. Primary  
   (a) The Family  
   (b) Friendship  
   (c) Locality

2. Universal  
   Class or Caste,  
   Spiritual or Religious  
   State or Political.

3. Self-regarding  
   Occupation or Leisure.

Bosanquet,\textsuperscript{2} regarding them as "institutions" gives a classification into Family, Locality, Class and Nation-State; McDougall\textsuperscript{3} divides them into (1) "natural" which are based upon either (a) kinship or (b) geographical conditions and (2) "Artificial" which are either (a) purposive (b) traditional or (c) mixed; and Dr Dreyer\textsuperscript{4} prefers an arrangement in terms of the kind of mental process of which the group as a group

\textsuperscript{1} Introduction to Sociology Preface Chap. I and Chap. VI.  
\textsuperscript{2} Philosophical Theory of the State.  
\textsuperscript{3} The Group Mind p. 89.  
\textsuperscript{4} The Psychology of Education p. 213.
group is capable, into groups at the perceptual, the ideational and the rational levels respectively. These classifications emphasise aspects of such groups which are of great importance in their study. Dr Dreyer notes for instance that the three levels given have all been represented in "the nation-group in the course of its evolution from the primitive horde to the highly developed nations of the modern world; and viewing this in conjunction with the fact that in the child, as Professor M. V. O'Shea says1 "An appreciation of community opinion, in the generally accepted sense, is developed only very gradually, following upon extensive and intimate experience with persons", it is clear that the "recapitulatory2 aspect enters into individual development to at least the extent that the relationships through which the line of his self-formation is determined are, to begin with, those deriving from groups which, because of their narrower range and their lesser degree of dependence upon abstract thought, extend the furthest backward into our social history."

It must be added, however, that the "recapitulatory" view of this development is subject to very important qualifications. Each of the older "selves" that make up the mental
1. Social Development and Education p. 51
2. See e.g. Stanley Hall "Adolescence" preface p. VIII. Clarapécé "Psychology of the Child," p. 184/5 Baldwin "Mental Development" p. 15 22/7 32 for various views on this point.
environment is a "socialised" self - a self which has been formed, or is in process of formation, by reference to a wider community than that which the child has as yet actualised in its experience; and the influences which come to bear upon him through them are in that way governed, from a very early point, by forms of social life which he could not as such comprehend. The "family" for instance in which the child of civilised parents grows up is very different, from the "family" of a primitive people; it has of necessity been to some extent harmonised, in its thought-and-feeling content, with the wider community of which it is a part or "organ"; and it is the family sentiment as so qualified that the child will from the first begin to absorb. Differing possibly but little in his innate characteristics from the child of his very remote ancestors, he begins a process of self-differentiation from the earliest stage of his conscious experiences, and indeed when we consider for example the range of operation of the "sympathetic induction of emotion" to which reference has been made it is not easy to say at how early a point in his development there are established at least the negative conditions of such a sentiment as that of nationality. For the family sentiment, as he acquires it, derives little or nothing of its content from such emotional expressions on the part of his elders as would be present if for example each separate family lived in a state of more or less uncontrolled feud with its neighbours - a condition which, while tending to intensify the family sentiment as such, would rapidly make the attainment of a community sentiment difficult if not
impossible. The same is true of the other groups into which the child enters; their content is "informed" by their existence within a pre-established social order; and through them all we must recognise, the great process of self-expansion occurs in ways which are continuously influenced by that order in whatever degree of unity, stability, and coherence it has achieved. Only through groups as so 'informed' can there occur that "socialisation" of the self in thought and feeling which conditions the growth of a sentiment for the wider nation-group; the "clansman's group loyalty" which Stanley Hall refers as "the first step in overcoming individual isolation" will lead him no further if his clan is an independent social unit. In speaking therefore of self-development as though it occurred through a succession of groups, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are, for convenience of description immensely simplifying the real character of the process; that the various group influences, each of which may in itself be indefinitely complex, interact in highly intricate ways; and that it is indeed the very

1. McDougall (the Group Mind p. 82 and 165) in discussing the relation of the family sentiment to the nation sentiment does not appear to take quite sufficient account of this aspect of the connection.
3. Thus Stanley Hall (Adolescence II. 375) refers to love of home as "a very complex feeling made up of many ties, hard to dissect or even to enumerate - parents, scenery, house, familiar ways, freedom of opinion and conduct, relatives and friends --- --- ---"; and Urwick (Philosophy of Social Progress Chap. V.) notices the growth in equality of status of the mother as an influence making for self-development by increasing the child's field of selective imitation.
fact of this interaction which accounts perhaps more than anything else for the vastly greater degree of development which the 'self' receives in an advanced - as compared with a primitive - society. We must in fine regard the "self" in all its extensions as built up through relations of gradually widening range\(^1\), endlessly subtle and involved in their modes of influence; and while at first "the home with its immediate surroundings and branches forms the utmost extent of the emotional impulses"\(^2\), these impulses receive definition even at that early point from the character of the society within which the home is situated. There is indeed we might almost say no aspect of self-development which has not its bearing, at some remove upon the sentiment which in later life becomes that of nationality. Just as in speech and various behaviour habits, so in all the thought - and feeling dispositions which come to constitute personality, there are developed aspects which tend to assimilate the child to his own nation group and differentiate him from others; and while it is probably true, as McDougall\(^1\) Or as Bradley (Ethical Studies 156) says, the child "grows up in an atmosphere of example and general custom, his life widens out from one little world to other and higher worlds, and he apprehends through successive stations the whole in which he lives". 

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McDougall says, that a group consciousness or group sentiment could not arise except in relation to the idea of another similar group, it would appear that all their conditioning factors would exist even in a group completely isolated. The "self" of each member of such a group would be developed that is to say, in ways which would ensure, immediately contact with another group arose, that "polarization" - (by reference to strangeness or unfamiliarity) - which, as Dr Drever notes, is one of the outstanding characteristics of the sentiment.

We must however be content here to notice some of the more conspicuous ways in which as he enters into these widening circles of relationship the child receives experiences which fashion in his mind, or more strictly perhaps, leave in his mind "residua" which tend slowly to organize themselves into, a nation-sentiment. The family, as has already been noticed is the medium through which the child derives, in large part through "suggestion" and "sympathy" his earliest moral self-direction. McDougall points out that children

1. The Group Mind p. 165 and C. p. 300 (Japan)
3. Instinct in Man p. 218.
4. See Dr. Drever Psychology of Education. p. 86/7 quoted above.
will in these ways absorb, as it were, ready-made, various moral propositions and sentiments before they can understand the ground of them and may for example "pass the judgment" "You are very naughty to put your elbows on the table" with some indignation. In much the same way, and long before he can form anything approaching an idea, however vague, of a "nation", there are often preformed in the mind emotional associations with the name of his own nation group - and perhaps of others. These constitute a setting or "matrix" which is stimulated as a whole by later experiences into which that name enters and helps to determine their character. As his powers of thought develop and he comes to understand, still of course in only a very vague and indefinite way, the conceptual significance of the word, he will, while his actual group experiences remain wholly or almost wholly those of the family circle, continue to absorb, or unconsciously acquire in relation to it, attitudes which may in certain circumstances be very highly emotional. These will all form parts of, or become integrated with his "family" self-extension and it is here accordingly that we find one of the most important of the sources of that persistence of the national sentiment to which reference was made in the last chapter. As Wallas expresses it "The boy in Lombardy or Galicia saw the soldiers and the schoolmaster salute the

1. T. P. Nunn. Education. Data & First Principles p. 46.
Austrian flag, but the real thrill came when he heard his father or mother whisper the name of Italy or Poland - not it must be supposed because of any inherited disposition but because already, in his family life there had been built up a sentiment through which he could be, by the sound of that name, emotionally stirred.

As the family associations slowly widen into those of the neighbourhood the child comes to live consciously in a perceptual community which not only introduces him to group relationships of a new character but constitutes for "his mind" the frame into which its further vista of society as a whole must be fitted. Its relations, as Bosanquet expresses it, are "as natural" as those of the family, but "in a different way; not through blood but through contact"; and it is "not a selection, but rather a specimen of life as a whole". In psychological language, it is a medium through which the child has brought before his mind in a great variety of new aspects the nation idea and sentiment; a context which is and partly local/"partly personal in its mode of influence. It may at best be "set in a background splendidly rich in noble, unselfish, and patriotic endeavour" and at worst will include some features through which an added definition and an increased emotional colouring will gather about his thought in certain social conditions of the nation. They may come as Findlay says they came

1. Bosanquet. Philosophical Theory of the State p. 286
3. They are, it must be admitted, difficult to discover in such a neighbourhood as Graham Wallas describes in "Great Society" p 65/8.
to the English children of Elizabethan days, who are
"found imbibing a national sentiment in advance of anything
to be witnessed on the continent of Europe" - - becoming
"proud of their strength at sea, proud of their conquests
over Frenchmen, proud of their knights and burgesses who
bargain with their king"; and acquiring this pride"not in
the schools" which "were in the hands of men whose calling
tempted them to divide their loyalty between Rome and Winds-
sor" but partly from "the pageants and stage plays where the
common sentiment was uttered without prescription" partly
from those who "returned as seasoned campaigners" from
abroad, and partly from "the wayfarers who provided a uni-
versal code of ideas and sentiments." And everywhere, whatever
may be their content and quality, these rich and intimate
associations which gather about the "home" - the family in
its local setting, will become part of the nation - senti-
ment in another and perhaps even more important manner;
they are the perceptual, or "experienced" bases, upon which
the idea of the nation is built up, and as the earlier con-
cepts enter into the later and wider "thought" system, they
"carry with them," as was noticed in chapter I. 1 their affect-
- content. The "home" and the "nation" sentiments are
through this mainly unconscious process deeply integrated in
the structure of the mind; two closely cognate extensions of
the "self" disposition. Regarded as idea-systems, that of

1. See Dr Dreyer "Instinct in Man" p. 209.
the nation is the later and more generalized, so that a stimulation of the family idea will not necessarily arouse the nation sentiment; but it is impossible, it would seem, for any stimulation of the "Nation" idea to occur without the family sentiment being to some degree affected. Such terms as "homeland" "father-land" "mother-country" have thus a profound psychological significance; they connote not merely conscious associations, nor even such unconscious associations as those which Graham Wallas\(^1\) describes as arising through the deliberate co-presentation, for social or anti-social purposes, of two logically separable ideas. They may be, and of course frequently are, employed in times of national danger, with a view to the purposive stimulation of patriotic response; but their connection is in a real sense "inherent". From this point of view a strongly developed family sentiment is not only preparatory for\(^2\), but actually is an essential constituent in, an ardent patriotism, and conversely, where for any reason the sentiment which surrounds the idea of "home" is weakened\(^3\) so must be that for the nation. If, as Pearson in his rather pessimistic forecast\(^4\) concludes, the family is tending, in our changing social conditions, to "lose its importance as the clan and city have done" it seems vain to expect or hope that its associated feelings "will be transmuted into love for the father-land".

2. See McDougall The Group Mind p. 163.
3. As for instance in the migratory conditions of modern industrial society. Many writers have noticed the deleterious effects of this upon individual development; and if the view taken here is correct the nation sentiment is a part, and an important part, of the fully developed individuality. Of course in modern life the idea of the nation is brought much more frequently before the mind in other ways than through the home-by-books, papers, pictures
Foot note — continued.

pictures and so forth; and by the various "contacts" of city life. Still, it seems to be true that the nation—"sentiment must lose in depth of content if the "home" element is weakened. O'Shea for example (Social Development and Education p. 306/7) considers that this has actually occurred in Italy — "particularly the Neapolitan section."

In the school the child comes into a fresh sphere of influence which has of course its very important "neighbourhood" and "group" aspects; but from the point of view of the development of the "nation-idea" we have to notice principally its directly cultural function, particularly in relation to the subjects of geography, history, and literature. Through geography the idea is extended and defined in its spatial or territorial aspects; the home country is compared in size, configuration, economic and cultural features, with others; it becomes visualised as an entity of definite shape_1 with a "capital" about which its life in a manner centres_2; and in an endless variety of ways as this conceptual enlargement progresses there are gathered about it emotional associations of admiration, pride, affection - and in relation to other countries it may be, envy or resentment. Through history, the "memory of the human race," this territorially defined entity receives ideational enrichment in a direction most comprehensively described perhaps as "personification;" the nation group is thought of as a living whole entering as such into active relations with others; the child hears

1. Graham Wallas "Human Nature in Politics" pp. 67/72, illustrates very eloquently the importance of the part played by "imagery" in the development of the idea of the nation.

2. Hume Brown surveys of Scottish History p. 25/6 refers to the importance of the "capital" in the development of a national consciousness.
of "England", "France", "Spain", "Prussia", "Austria", and always with a rich accompaniment of emotional association. Sometimes his home country is triumphant, sometimes defeated; it acts wisely, foolishly, rightly, or - occasionally perhaps, wrongly. Much history is of course markedly and designedly nationalistic in its content; Prussian\(^1\) perhaps most notably so; but our own school history at its worst is, or has until recently been, capable of description as "a jingo perversion of history in which England is always right, doing battle with featureless and unintelligible powers of evil called now France, now Spain, now Germany, but all presented merely as "not - Britain" or "anti-Britain"\(^2\). Apart from this, however, as Professor Hearnshaw notices\(^3\) there is an "unconscious prejudice" or "bias" in much historical teaching; indeed it seems not too much to say that there must necessarily be, so far at least as the child is concerned, a markedly nationalistic colouring in all his understanding and interpretations of the events of history; his own country occupies a central place in his interests, and studies, his mind has already a patriotic "setting", and there will be, in the attitude of those from whom he learns, a similar bias, which, perhaps quite unconsciously on both sides, will be transmitted

\(^1\) See e.g. O'Shea p. 118/9.
\(^2\) Article "The Teaching of History" New Statesman 8 September, 1923.
\(^3\) See also J.C.C. Report on The Teaching of History 1911. Fortnightly Review August 1923 "History as a Means of Propaganda."
and acquired; and as he approaches adolescence, that period of life which, as Hall notices, is characterised at once by a marked development of self-consciousness and a great and rapid growth of sentiment-formation, this tendency becomes especially pronounced. History here comes into alliance, so to speak, with literature; and if history is "social memory," literature is "memory organised and active, an ever-present consciousness not only of great deeds in the national life, but a consciousness cognisant of its inmost sources, the sentiments that have inspired it and the ideas that have directed it." It is in this national and historical literature that the growing boy or girl will find many of those 'ideals' which, to quote again from Hall, "work deeply and unconsciously to form 'the great lines of cleavage between right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, truth and falsehood.' Here are renewed also, through for example the literature of chivalry, those ideals of honour and loyalty which we noticed in Chapter 2 as a preparatory influence in the development of a sentiment of nationality; and various enquiries have shown that at these ages the "characters" or "persons" that children "would most wish to be" or "most admire" are predominantly those drawn from the historical literature of their own nations. These of course are not "ideals" in the full psychological sense of reflectively organised sentiments; they are rather

1. Adolescence II. 364/5.
2. " 373. The two are of course closely connected.
3. Fouillée (Translated Green Street) "Education from a National Standpoint." P. 110.
4. " Adolescence p. 442/3
5. " p. 433.
6. See e.g. Adolescence 390/1 for Germany and America and for France Clarapède "Psychology of the Child." pp.192/3
and Middle, J. Abrahamson "Recherches sur les Fonctions Mentales de l'enfant a l'age scolaire" referred to in L'Année Psychologique XXII. 1920/1 Hall Preface XVI, comments on the adverse effects of the fact that in American historical tradition "our gallery of heroes is largely composed not of glorious youth, but of sages advanced in years."
the more advanced forms of that "experimental self-building" which Dr T.P. Nunn describes as operative in the earlier years of child-life; but their importance as giving to the "epic" tendencies of that great period of self development a direction which strengthens the nation-sentiment is difficult to exaggerate in its bearing upon the "affect" content of the matured ideal which underlies all expressions of the "higher patriotism" of later life.²

Through such influences as these, varying of course to an almost indefinite extent in the particular forms they assume and the ways in which they interact, there are imparted into those "individualities" which home and school life combine in shaping, a content which for all the coming members of the nation embodies sufficient of the 'common' or 'collective' in consciousness and sentiment to constitute them a psychological group. But of course there are also to be considered those other aspects of development which the word "individuality" implies. Seldom if ever in actual life are motives arising within the "nation" extension of the self-sentiment the unopposed determinants of behaviour; only too frequently they have, for the average citizen, even in times of national emergency, to be reinforced by some form of

1. Education Data and First Principles, Chap. XII p. 140/1  
2. The failure of many attempts to develop patriotism through "civic" teaching may be due, in large part, to the fact that such teaching is not linked up with this personifying, hero-worshipping tendency.
of social compulsion.¹ From the point of view of this essay we may notice first that not only do the various "group-extensions" of the "self" come to stand in greatly varying degrees of strength with different individuals but that with everyone an increase in the range or size of the group tends to diminish, other considerations apart, the strength of the sentiment attaching to it. As Graham Wallas points out, there are definite numerical limits to the group which can be united by ties of personal affection.² And the connection of the intense patriotism of the early cities with the intimacy of their personal associations has been frequently noticed.³ We have all experienced that pleasurable stimulation of the "locality" or "neighbourhood" sentiment which arises when we meet in some distant place a fellow-townsman even although he may be, in regard to purely personal ties, almost a "stranger"; and the "fraternity" bonds of school or college are proverbial. We all retain in other words a "hierarchy" of allegiances, between almost any two of which there may arise a conflict, the issue of which will depend upon the more permanent relations of the groups themselves, the particular situation

¹ If illustration is needed, reference may be made for instance to F.S. Oliver's "Ordeal by Battle" written in 1916. See e.g. pp. 297/60.
² Great Society pp. 354 ¹ (From 20 or 30 to 80)
³ See e.g. Harrison "Meaning of History" referred to in Chapter 2.
situations in which they stand, and the content of the experiences which have gone to the formation of the respective sentiment "extensions" of our total "selves." An extreme example of this type of conflict forms an aspect of the problems of "assimilation" with which the United States is at present wrestling. Here, as both Pillsbury and Ross notice, the child of immigrant parents comes in the school, under "nationalizing influences of a most powerful nature, which are often in direct opposition to the influences of the home, and may leave him in the result "without feeling for place, community, or nationality" and with, as the necessary consequence, a gravely impaired moral development.

Of more general importance however are the separative influences which may be summed up under the heading of "class." Baldwin defines "class" as either (1) "a group distinguished...

1. Thus in the case of the "Young Welsh professor at Cardiff" instanced by Graham Wallas ("Our Social Heritage" p. 208/9) any "national choice" which he might appear to exercise as to whether he should "feel and act primarily as a Welshman or --- as a citizen of the British Empire" would be seriously diminished by such a fact for instance as that there had been shortly before, an attempt by the British Government to suppress some Welsh custom or institution.
distinguished from other groups by personal or social differences of a permanent sort which produce variations in social intercourse, e.g., the working, leisure, or professional classes" or (2) "social distinctions of higher and lower, the differences being those of colour, birth, wealth, education or other quality which is recognised as socially desirable." Of these differences as O'Shea points out,¹ the child of school age is at first largely unconscious, although even then they will have begun to affect his self-development by determining the lines of his associations, outside the school. But wherever they come, in the life of the community of which he is a member, to gather about them strong sentiments, they will tend of necessity to become embodied in the family influences, and will therefore even from an early age qualify his attitude to the nation group. In the social life of today the importance of these early influences in relation to the national life is fully recognised by leaders of thought on both sides—in such institutions for example as "Empire Day"² and the Socialist Sunday Schools.³ A little later, as O'Shea notices⁴ the line of cleavage is deepened by the fact that

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1. Social Development and Education page 15/6. He says that (in America) until adolescence class differences do not appear to play a direct part in the groupings of children at schools.

2. See Jebb "Studies in Colonial Nationalism" pp. 299 for a summary of the origins of this movement, defined as he says "to make Canadian patriotism intelligent, comprehensive, and strong."

3. See the debates in the House of Commons on Sir J. Butchers' Bill for opinions upon the subversive influences of these schools in reference to the patriotic sentiment.

4. Education and Social Development pp. 20/2.
that the child of the working classes leaves school earlier than others; and the self-expansion which occurs during adolescence is orientated in directions which often come to include elements of envy, resentment, or dislike in relation to the companions of his earlier years. Through the workshop, union, or club, and in the continuous experiences of his daily life, he will build up a group sentiment which may be, in many of its aspects directly opposed to the nation sentiment, which he must also, consciously or unconsciously have acquired; and this class-sentiment, of later origin, may become so charged with emotional feeling and so influence the direction of his thoughts, that he may regard himself first as a "worker" a "socialist" or a "syndicalist" and only secondly as an Englishman, a Frenchman or a German.

Another example of a type of sentiment which may come, in adult life, into rivalry with the sentiment for the nation group is that of "cosmopolitanism" in its various forms; that sense of and feeling for the "universal" in human relationships which for instance allowed Goethe to meet Napoleon without any consciousness of "national" hostility\(^1\) or led Lessing at the time he was doing perhaps more than anyone else to create a distinctively German literary spirit, to say "Of the

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\(^1\) Seeley Stein II 386.
the love of country I have no conception; it appears to me at best a heroic weakness which I am right glad to be without. It was, in the Germany of the time, associated of course with a national sentiment so far removed from conscious realisation that as yet no common move has been made against French domination, and it has frequently been attributed to a weak development of the home and locality tie. But it derives from many sources; religious and ethical motives enter variously into it; and as is well known the international extensions of the socialist and communist movements, have, since the days of Marx and Engels given it a militant or revolutionary aspect. A familiar instance of its operation, in a different form, in relation to the national sentiment, was the case of the "conscientious objector" in Great Britain, where the social value of such a sentiment was recognised in the exemption allowed to its possessors from Military Service; and the task of the tribunals, psychologically regarded, became that of distinguishing, by evidence or through "duress", motives arising within such a sentiment from those, socially less valuable, attributable to the narrower or "personal self."

The operation of such sentiments as these, in their collective or group aspects will receive further notice in later chapters; they are referred to here merely as examples of ways in which, in the self-development of individual members

1. Quoted Bryce Holy Roman Empire p. 402.
2. See for instance MacCunn "Ethics of Citizenship" He quotes (p. 29) Carlyle's remark regarding Mirabeau "This Friend of Man was the enemy of almost every man he had to do with; beginning at his own hearth, ending at the utmost circle of his acquaintances, and only beyond that feeling himself free to love men".

of the nations of to-day, the sentiment for the "country", deeply rooted though it must of necessity be in the earliest levels of the mind-structure, can yet be so thwarted, obstructed or obscured that at times it may cease, to all appearance, to function as a source of motives in the daily conduct of life. We all of course must and do effect some measure of practical reconciliation between the claims of the various groups to which we "belong"; but within even the most advanced of nations we must recognise with Hobhouse that the group sentiment in all its forms is an important separative factor.

"The average man cannot genuinely feel that an inferior class deserves or even really desires the kind of treatment which he expects for himself and recognises as due from him to others of his own order"; and, in varying degrees, we are all guilty of an unreasonable preference for our own family, our own village, - - our own trade, our own class", as well as "our own country". All such groups draw our allegiance because they "subtend", if one may so express it, sentiments which, like all our acquired dispositions, have been slowly and in large part unconsciously built up through experiences which, in their particulars, have been mostly forgotten. These sentiments are forms or features of the structural organization of our minds; alter, once acquired, relatively slowly, and are probably never altogether lost. It is

3. Fouillé. "Education from a National Standpoint" p. 17. Ideas, he says are easily revised, but "to modify a sentiment, tendency, or habit, is a matter of months or years".
through their operation that we respond at once, emotionally or "instinctively" as it is sometimes called, and without any necessity for calculation\(^1\), to situations in which the interests of such groups are involved. They are all "extensions" of the sentiment of the self; if we become "affected" through any of them, the response we make is one in which there may become engaged any or all of the conative forces of our minds. But while they are all to that extent integrated, and while in any situation we may be led, or may be able, through associations of a rational character, to bring two or more of such sentiment systems into harmonious action, there remains in the normal conduct of life, a large measure of practical "dissociation"; and we frequently act, while the sentiment organized about a narrower group extension is operative, in ways which seem to negative the existence of a nation-self.

If, however, the view here taken is correct this does not follow. Just as the family sentiment may persist, it seems, through almost any degree of family dissension\(^2\), so beneath all our various group extensions, however largely these may come to dominate our conscious thoughts, there remains "the

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1. The famous passage on p. 112/3 of Burke's "Reflections on the Revolution in France" begins: "It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France——exactly expresses this characteristic of the sentiment. "The age of chivalry" it concludes "is gone. That of sophists, economists and calculators has succeeded——"

2. And lead to those "reconciliations" in later years which are a familiar theme of the novelist.
deposited impression of the national evolution of which we are the individual products'\(^1\); and it is this that not only enables us to interpret, as it were, intuitively "the events and the characters of the nation to which we each belong'\(^1\), but provides us with that deep and latent basis of national unity which may, when the appropriate stimulus arrives, find an intensely emotional expression. At the very time when Lessing was unaware, in his own conscious thought, of the existence in his mind of national feeling, such a stimulus was producing, for many of his countrymen, precisely this awakening of a sentiment which had lain dormant in the minds of a long succession of generations; and both the process and the result are perhaps most effectively illustrated by the impassioned words of Arndt. "Not Napoleon only" he says — "— did I hate most or with such rage, but them, the French, the false, haughty, rapacious, crafty, and faithless enemies of the Empire for centuries past, then I hated with all my heart, and recognised and loved with all my heart my true fatherland. Even my Swedish particularism died away in me, the heroes of Sweden in my heart became now mere echoes of the past; when Germany through her discord had ceased to exist, my heart

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recognised her as one and united. In Italy also many observers felt in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century the presence of a similar latent sentiment awaiting, as it was expressed by Mrs Browning, the coming of a leader who should "strike fire into the masses; and insphere these wills into a unity of will," and while it was of course Cavour and Garibaldi who supplied the political and military elements of that leadership it was chiefly through the efforts of Mazzini that the national idea and sentiment were aroused. To Mazzini the problem of a free and united Italy was, indeed, first and last a psychological one; it was "above all things a problem of national education." "We will only use bayonets" he says "on condition that they have ideas on their points -- What we have to do is to create a nation." The "propagandism" to which he devoted his life with this aim in view provides endless illustrations of the conscious use of the self-motive, in all its various extensions, as means of heightening the emotional significance of the "nation" idea. The adherent to the Association of Young Italy, for instance, swore

"By the love, innate in all men, I bear to the country that gave my mother birth and will be the

home of my children -- -- -- --

1. Quoted Seeley "Life of Stein" II. p. 494.
3. Cambridge History X, 121.
4. Mazzini "Life and Writings" (Smith Elder & Coy. 1890) II. p. 121.
By the blush that rises to my brow when I stand before the citizens of other lands to know that I have no rights of citizenship, no country and no national flag.

By the memory of our former greatness and the sense of our present degradation to dedicate himself wholly and for ever to the endeavour to constitute Italy a free nation. "Your country" Mazzini says "is the land where your parents sleep --- the home that God has given you --- it is your name, your glory, your sign among the people." And in the passionate open letter to the Home Secretary which followed his discovery of the censorship by the British Postal Authorities of his correspondence he sums up the claim to nationality of men "speaking the same language, treading the same earth, cradled in their infancy with the same maternal songs, --- inspired by the same memories, the same sources of literary genius." as one involving the issues of liberty or slavery, "not only national slavery -- but moral slavery."

It is of course needless to multiply quotations: similar expressions, illustrating the presence, under all its many different associations, of the "self" aspect of the national sentiment can be endlessly drawn from the boundless literature of patriotism, and it is interesting to see how.

1. Address delivered at Milan 25th July 1848. \[156\]
2. See Vol III p. 197.
how, in the particular forms they take, they are related to the "situation" in which the stimulation occurs - a situation which is sometimes that of the country, as in the speeches of John of Gaunt or Falconbridge; sometimes that of the individual, as when Borrow, after his wanderings in Spain, heard in the dusk of a summer evening the music of a military band at Gibraltar. Messrs Stewart and Desjardins for example trace in this manner from French texts the origin of "that outburst of patriotism which for 1914 to 1918 was the wonder of the world and indeed of France herself." But from the standpoint here adopted we must proceed to consider the sentiment in some of its more general manifestations; its expressions, that is to say, in collective behaviour.

1. King Richard II. 2. I.
2. King John V. 7.
3. The Bible in Spain (World's Classics) p 540.
5. Preface V.
IV. The Sentiment of Nationality as a Separative Factor in Social Life.

In passing from a consideration of the "Individual" to the "collective" aspects of the national sentiment, it is important in view of the tendency of much that has been written upon psychology, to remind ourselves, with Graham Wallas, that it is "useless" to speak of the "mentality" of the group or crowd in any sense which dissociates that mentality from the mentality of the individual human beings by whom those groups are composed. Yet, as we have seen, the thoughts and feelings of the individuals who make up a nation have, viewed collectively, that "organic", continuous, self-expressive unity, which allows us to say, with Barker that "there is a national soul self-conscious in its citizens"; formed in them as individuals, by the influences of the social milieu in which they have grown up, and deriving, as a social fact, from processes which can be traced, in outline, in the history of their group. A nation, like the "corporation" of

1. By e.g. Le Bon.
2. Great Society (p. 139.)
3. Political Thought in England p. 64.
of which it is in some sense the enlargement\textsuperscript{1} possesses, we must recognise, a "personality," the "sign and expression" of which is "the consent of the inhabitants, their conscious will to live together and form a political community" which accordingly becomes "a reality by the same claim as an individual consciousness, for it is nothing more than a conscious and deliberate agreement or harmony of individual consciousnesses."\textsuperscript{2} Or as Maitland expresses it, "it is a group person and its will is a group will."\textsuperscript{3}

It is of course clear from what has been said in the previous chapters that the "sentiment" is a fact of individual psychology; the affective side or aspect of a structural disposition centred in an "idea"; and that also, since no two individuals build up the idea of the nation in exactly the same manner it would be quite incorrect to think of the "national sentiment" as though it were something of the nature of a "common factor" in any quasi-mathematical sense.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Maitland Introduction to Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Ages says p. XXV, that "When all is said there seems to be a genus, of which state and "corporation are species."
\item Boutroux "The French Conception of Nationality" in "Philosophy and War" p. 161.
\item M. Introduction to Gierke p. XXV.
\item Any more of course than there is a common idea. But since "most of us tend to assume that there exists an objective reality corresponding exactly to those of our ideas which are accompanied by strong feelings" --- we are ready to "vote or fight or agitate on the subconscious and unexamined assumption "that such an idea is "a trustworthy equivalent for" the real whole which our action will affect ("Our Social Heritage" 80/1).
\end{enumerate}
Every individual sentiment it may be said is unique; and even when it centres in such an idea as the "nation" it might quite conceivably determine, in relation to the same situation, widely different individual responses as between persons of different "educational" development. We cannot therefore ascribe the unity of national action connoted by the term "group-will" entirely to the existence of a "common" sentiment; "The startling truth that the war is bringing home to many of us" as Miss Follett says "is that unity must be something more than a sentiment, it must be an actual system of organisation--- a psychological process, produced by interaction."¹ It seems however too much to say, as Miss Follett does, that "the power of history and tradition in giving unity to a community or nation - has been over-emphasized."² If the view here taken is correct the "sentiment" which the individual members form in relation to the nation, is a social fact precisely in the sense that it draws most, if not the whole, of its content from history and tradition; and that while not of itself constituting national unity, it is an essential condition of unity of that type, the indispensable unifying force or principle. For as we have seen,

2. The New State p. 160. She adds "If this were the only way of getting unity there would be little hope for America, where we have to make a unity of people with widely differing traditions." The answer might be that there is "hope for America" only in so far as she can supply a new tradition to coming generations.
seen, in individual life, it is through the operation of these sentiment-dispositions, working deeply below the level of consciousness, that not only attitude but "meaning" is determined; and once an individual has acquired such a sentiment towards a whole of which he conceives himself to form a part, his thought of that whole, or group, of other similar groups, and of the relations into which they may come, are in virtue of that fact altered. The sentiment will constitute a "context" or "setting" which will "give meaning to" any situation in which the group may be thought of as standing; will indeed be itself an important element or factor in the total situation; and it is to that "meaning" and not to any mere intellectual "consciousness" that he will respond. Unless therefore all the individuals who form a "society" are so far alike, in the basic conditions of their "Nurture" that this "meaning" would be, upon important occasions, broadly similar for them, there could not exist that spontaneity of collective behaviour which as we have noticed is one of the outstanding characteristics of the nation group.

We saw in the last chapter that the "education" in its broadest sense, of the child of any social group amounted

1. See generally Morton Prince "The unconscious" especially pp. 329, 330/1 381/2 and 469, and Chapter I.
amounted to his progressive differentiation from the child of another group in regard to many of those characteristics which will come later to constitute "individuality." James in his famous chapter on Habit points out how deeply and irrevocably, even within a single area of culture, this process of differentiation operates; how it "dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our early choice because---it is too late to begin again," fixes our "personal habits --- such as vocalisation and pronunciation, gesture, motion and address"; and "keeps different social strata from mixing." We saw too that where this differentiation took place along "lines of cleavage" which were so definite as to produce easily distinguishable social groups, there were provided the conditions of the "group sentiment"; the "we and they" attitude, with its "polarizing" influences on thought and feeling. Wherever in social life such groups come into frequent contact separative tendencies of great strength and intensity may grow up; and if, even within a nation, with all its community of tradition in respect of language, manners, and modes of thought, a state of affairs arises in which, for instance "le pauvre et le riche n'ont presque plus d'intêrets communs, de communs griefs, ni d'affaires communes, cette obscurité qui cache l'esprit de l'un à l'esprit de l'autre

1. See Psychology Briefer Course 1893 pp. 142 +
l'autre devient insondable"\textsuperscript{1} and the social organisation may provide no solvent short of revolution. In France of course oppressive differences of social privilege took the place of a severance upon the basis of "nationality" in the constant stimulus they applied to group sentiment; but in Canada, where British policy has been upon the whole conciliatory towards the French Canadians, there had arisen by 1838 a situation scarcely less charged with threatening possibilities. Lord Durham's report\textsuperscript{2} describes "the existence of a most bitter animosity between the Canadians\textsuperscript{3} and the British, not as two parties holding different objects in respect to government, but as different races engaged in a national contest." The "national" character of the separation he says is shewn by the fact that whenever a subject of dispute arises "the great bulk of the Canadians and the great bulk of the British appear ranged against each other.

"Even the children when they quarrel divide themselves into French and English like their parents---- The station in life of an individual of either race seems to have no influence in his real disposition towards the other race; high and low, rich and poor on both sides----exhibit the very same feeling of national jealousy and hatred." The real issue throughout, he finds, was "simply such institutions, laws,\textsuperscript{4}"

\begin{enumerate}
\item De Tocqueville L'Ancien Régime p. 141.
\item Quoted Egerton and Grant "Selected Speeches and Despatches" p. 150/1.
\item i.e. the French Canadians as they are now called. The change of term is interesting in the growth of Canadian nationality it implies.
\end{enumerate}
laws and customs as are of French origin which the British have sought to overthrow and the Canadians have struggled to preserve." It would be difficult to find a better illustration than this of the separative influence of group sentiment or of its ultimate dependence upon the deeper and less "conscious" factors of tradition; prior to contact with the British there had been in Canada, to use again the vivid phrases of De Tocqueville, "pas l'ombre d'institutions municipales ou provinciales, aucune force collective autorisée, aucune initiative individuelle permise." 1

The extent to which these oppositions may depend upon the mere existence of the sentiment irrespective of any "objective" ground of conflict, has been illustrated by Pillsbury. 2 "As a boy visiting a New England factory town" he says, he was "repeatedly told of the disagreeable qualities" of the French Canadians. "They were dirty, were given to drink, constituted for some not well defined reason a danger that made it necessary to shun them for one's moral and physical salvation. They were represented as coming in swarms to this country where large families all worked together in the mills, lived in squalor and saved money

1. L'Ancien Régime p. 259. Or as Egerton and Grant express it (Preface VIII) The French Canadians who had under French absolutism remained "politically apathetic" grew "more aggressively French through contact with the English emigrants."

2. The Psychology of Nationality p. 131
money enough to go back home and buy a farm." But twenty years later, and without so far as could be discovered, any change in the real characteristics of the French, "they were a sober, clean, and industrious people ---- and the natives were mixing with them on terms of equality and with no repugnance towards their manners or morals." They had in fact become "altogether American." In Canada too, as we know, the divisions based upon differences of sentiment have, with the emergence of common national interests, ¹ gradually died away; although how slowly we are reminded by Sir Wilfred Laurier's appeal to the French Canadians, during the South African War, to "do from a sense of duty what the English Canadians were doing from enthusiasm."² But frequently in history, and especially where one such group stands in a relation of political subjection to another, the tendency of the sentiment to "include in its system all the emotions, thoughts, volitional processes, and qualities of character which are of advantage to it for the attainment of its ends, and to reject all such constituents as are antagonistic"³ has given to events a different issue.

"From the moment" as Alison Phillips says\(^1\) the Austrian Government began their attempt to "Germanise Italy" there was, "for self-respecting Italians no resource left but in revolutionary agitation, and no possibility for this save by means of secret societies. These in their turn necessitated, from the Austrian point of view, the secret police and the whole social structure of the Austrian provinces in Italy was soon rotten with suspicion and honeycombed with plots and counterplots." And as the Italian movement gathered force "there was circulated throughout the peninsula a literature of revolt, the sole aim of which was to inspire men with patriotic feeling and to instigate rebellion - lyric poems, which were really hymns of war; stories which incited men to deeds of vengeance; reviews and journals which were in fact the organs of the revolutionary spirit";\(^2\) indeed philosophy and science, as well as painting and sculpture, came by their choice of subjects, to take rank amongst the insurgent forces.

In such movements as these, to which illustrations drawn for example from Poland Ireland or Alsace-Lorraine would be but further commentary, it is impossible not to recognise the prominence of the "self" motive in its extended form. The Canadians in Lord Durham's account "struggled to preserve"

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1. Modern Europe pp. 102/3.
2. Cambridge History X. 124/129.
preserve" their distinctive culture; in Pillsbury's instance the ground of the "prejudice" is stated to be a belief in the "inferiority of the race of the new and unaccepted group"; and in Italy the attempt of the Austrians to impose their own language and institutions upon a subject people left "self-respecting" Italians no choice but to combine in the struggle "of a race with a great tradition, for its very existence." It is notoriously easy, in applying psychological conceptions to social phenomena, to adopt uncritically the individual analogy; but it seems at least more adequately descriptive of the course of events both in Canada and Italy to say that in each case the struggle represents the "assertion" of a more or less fully integrated "group self" than to account for it in terms of "constraint" "imitation" "contagion" "Suggestibility" or other attributes of a merely "crowd" mind. Processes of these kinds were no doubt actively operative, but the persistence of the movements, their gathering force under opposition, and their cessation or satisfaction only with the attainment of "liberty" cannot it would seem be expressed psychologically otherwise

1. p. 133.
3. See Ginsberg, "Psychology of Society," Rivers, "Psychology & Politics Chap.III. discusses Ginsberg's views and is inclined to consider (p. 62.), that the various resemblances he indicates amount to more than mere analogy. Freud (Group Psychology p. 32) approves Trotter's view that "the tendency towards the formation of groups is biologically a continuation of the multicellular character of all the higher organisms."
4. Which as Wallas notes ("Our Social Heritage" pp 156/7) is always the absence of constraint from other "selves" - as opposed to restrictions due to impersonal agencies. It involves therefore as a conception the thought or "idea" of other entities conceived as "selves."
otherwise than in terms of collective self-consciousness and self-sentiment. They stand in these respects in complete antithesis to those types of collective behaviour that are to be seen where individuals "have but a dim consciousness of the crowd, as a whole, with but very little knowledge of its tendencies and capacities, and no sentiment of love, respect, or regard of any kind for it and its reputation in the eyes of men." Essentially the same features characterise the relations of such groups in their more normal situations of mutual independence. The social fact of differentiation of this kind has apparently, as its necessary psychological accompaniment, the development of an attitude which can only be described as "self-regarding pride" in relation to the group of which the individual is a member, and of fear, dislike or hostility in relation to others. All over the world, as Westermarck shews, patriotism "is apt to over-estimate the qualities of the object for which it is felt;" and it does so, he notices, "all the more readily as love of one's country is almost inseparably intermingled with love of oneself."  

1. McDougall, The Group Mind p. 43 (describing "The mental life of the crowd") He notes (page 45) that the characteristics of the behaviour of crowds - their fickleness and inconsistency, derive from the fact that such behaviour issues from collective impulse, as opposed to collective sentiment. 


3. II 171
of instances proving the existence amongst primitive peoples of this self-appreciation, and ascribes the customs of "hospitality" prevalent amongst them, in large part, to fear, expressing itself in superstitious beliefs, regarding "strangers." These attitudes are continued in more advanced social conditions; they manifest themselves in such word-pairs as Jews and Gentiles, Greeks and Barbarians; and, as Conway notes, the Roman term for foreigner was "hostis." It is probably too much to say as Conway does that "all similar independent crowds are mutually hostile" - the "instinct of pugnacity" being as McDougall remarks apparently almost absent among some peoples; but it certainly appears to be almost universally true that upon the basis of this differentiation there tend to arise, through the mere fact of contact, relationships of a hostile character; and these, intensified by physical, biological, or psychological influences to issue in the constant and continuous conflicts which the "dawn of history reveals in process amongst all the progressive races." Thus when the nation group emerges there is frequently already present in the tradition of every such

1. I 570/596.
3. Ditto p. 266. As noted in Chap. I the term "crowd" in this book is given an extension which covers groups of every kind.
5. i.e. such as desiccation, population pressure, and conscious desire for wealth.
such group an attitude of positive hostility in relation at any rate to its neighbours; and this, as we saw in Chapter 2, is continued and developed in their subsequent interactions. Ramsay Muir\(^1\) shews how the relatively early establishment of national unity in England led to the aggressive wars against Wales, Scotland and France, and reference has already been made\(^2\) to the fact that in both the latter countries\(^3\) the reaction came to assume a national character. From this time onwards specific attitudes of great persistence - the "enduring conative attitudes"\(^4\) that is to say, which characterise the sentiment in the individual - are to be found in the popular mind amongst these peoples in relation to the others; and these tended to gather in intensity with the growth of national self-consciousness. Thus for example H.A. Fisher\(^5\) describes "the English nation" under Henry VII as "moved by two great political passions or prejudices, hatred of the French and hatred of the Scots . . . ." "Every occasion of embarrassment to the French Government" he adds "seemed to the ordinary Englishman to give a legitimate opening for

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1. Nationalism and Internationalism. p. 58.
2. See Chapter 2. Jules Michelet (quoted Stewart and Desjardins p. 315 fixes 1359 as the date of "le premier signe peut-être de ce nouvel esprit" (of nationality) in France.
3. As also, but less noticeably, in Wales.
4. McDougall "Outline" p. 419.
for interference in France; every increase in French power seemed to him to be a direct menace to England." Pollard
notices that under Elizabeth when the trend of current
commercial and political interests lay, rationally, in the
direction of alliance with France against Spain "it was
still a saying in England that only when the Ethiopian
became white would Frenchmen love the English" and Pepys,²
a hundred years later remarks that "we do naturally all love
the Spanish and hate the French." It is obvious of course,
without further illustration, that "attitudes" or "dispositions" of
this character, tending as they necessarily do to produce
events by which they are constantly being confirmed and
heightened, may easily come to shew an historical stability
which suggests the existence of antipathies based directly
upon instinct; and Conway³ does regard "such independent crowds
as nations" as being "instinctively hostile to one another."
But the course of events in Scotland during this period seems
to indicate that whether or not the factor of "instinct" can
be wholly excluded, an international "attitude" of considerable
intensity may shew itself capable of precisely that gradual


Graham Wallas (Human Nature in Politics pp. 56/7) doubts
the existence of such instinctive antipathies and
emphasises rather the importance of facts of "habit and
association."
gradual modification with altered circumstances which marks the "sentiment" in the individual. Here, as in France, hostility to England remained the guiding factor in national policy down to about the middle of the 16th century. Then however "a popular link began to be forged" between the two countries, based in part upon the removal of religious differences, partly upon the growth of a feeling of resentment - or "self assertion" - against French domination, and partly, again, upon the gradual emergence of a recognised community of commercial and political interests; so that when, under Elizabeth, English assistance in ridding Scotland of the French "earned Scottish gratitude", it "laid surer foundations than conquest" for an ultimate union.

In the earlier stages of national development it is of course not to be expected that we should find in these popular attitudes the determining causes of those organised international antagonisms of which the extreme and outstanding form is war. As Fisher says it is inevitable that, in an age when "printed books were still extremely rare, newspapers non-existent, parliaments brief and intermittent, and the boundaries


between class, trade, and locality sharply defined, foreign policy must be left largely in the hands of the Crown; and it is perhaps hardly necessary to refer to such instances as Louis XIV. of France or Frederick the Great of Prussia in illustration of the fact that this personal leadership, motivated not infrequently by considerations other than "national", has all along played a very prominent part in the initiation of wars. But while perhaps it is only since the French revolution that "the public opinion of civilized peoples in general has become a powerful factor in international politics" it seems clear that national sentiment must always have been of importance if only in its influence upon the strength of the loyalty - response. Wars which accorded with traditional altitude have been popular.; and rulers have played upon this feeling from motives relating either to their domestic or their foreign interests; foreign policy, where repugnant to the nation, has been conducted secretly - or abandoned; and with the broadening of the basis of intercourse noticed in Chapter 2 popular passion has broken through into the domains of diplomacy with increasing frequency. Under Elizabeth for example, the

2. For the personal initiative of Frederick in regard to the seven years war see Sir R. Lodge "Great Britain and Prussia in the 18th Century" pp. 90/5
4. Henry V's. war of aggression against France is referred to by Fletcher (p. 316) as being "acclaimed by the whole nation, which was desirous of avenging the reverses of the last forty years"
3. Charles II. in 1671 to gain the support of public opinion "paraded all the stock grievances against the Dutch; the disputes about the flag, the injuries done to English traders in the East Indies, and the "abusive pictures and false historical medals and pillars "with which the Dutch had celebrated their successes."


page 108/9.
the intense national feeling against Spain was for some time a source of trouble to the Government who wished to defer formal hostilities from motives of prudence; and in the unjustified and impolitic war to which Walpole was forced to consent in 1739 the popular initiative was even more clearly marked.

Lord Bryce and Professor Paterson have given general summaries of the particular "forces or influences" which have led in the "modern age" to War between civilised nations. Bryce gives them as :

(1) Lust for territory "arising sometimes from a belief that the larger a State's area the greater is likely to be its military power and general prosperity". "The old unreasoning aggression" he says "may blaze up as hotly in popularly governed nations as it did in savage tribes."

(2) Religious hatred.

(3) Injuries inflicted on citizens of a State by the government or citizens of another.

(4) Commercial or financial interests creating ill-will or distrust.

(5) Sympathy with the oppressed subjects of an alien government, especially where there is racial kinship.

(6) Wars due to fear - preventive wars.

1. J.R. Green p. 413/4 says "The control of events was passing from the hands of statesmen and diplomats -- If Elizabeth was resolute for peace, England was resolute for War".


3. International Relations pp. 112 and 114/5.

4. Article "War" in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
Professor Paterson in the course of a somewhat similar account says that "during the last four hundred years --- --- the outstanding fact in the political history of Europe", has been - that one great power after another has "sought to become the master of the continent, while at each stage the nations which felt themselves threatened formed combinations which should be strong enough to frustrate, and which also deemed it prudent to anticipate, the development of ambitions and aggressive schemes". The actual motive forces which have operated, he gives, extending those of Hobbes, as

1. The desire for gain, which "has doubtless supplied the principal impulse to warlike aggression. Territory with the attendant booty of various kinds has been the usual stake in war, coveted alike by peoples and by dynasties - but account has justly to be taken for the frequent play of fairly reputable reasons" including "the defence and development of trading interests, as vital to the subsistence of a commercial nation."

2. The fear of injury as well as the resentment due to actual injury" - whether to "their territory, their jurisdiction, or their honour" and "it has been commonly accepted that a palpable and growing threat to these interests justifies a nation in seizing a propitious opportunity for an anticipatory or preventive war."

3. "The desire for glory" has also occasionally "taken possession of peoples" and conversely "indignation at a
national insult has proved to be capable of evoking the utmost effort and self-sacrifice.

(4) "The desire of power is an additional motive which cannot be entirely resolved into cupidity - - - Nations as well as individuals find satisfaction in the exercise of power as an end in itself"

(5) "The passions of hatred and revenge have also furnished a relatively independent motive" whether "engendered by centuries of conflict or oppression" or arising from "deepseated differences of racial character and culture".

(6) Finally "a religious zeal which can no more be resolved into self-interest than hatred" has been a frequent cause of war.

From the standpoint of this essay the most noteworthy feature of both these accounts is of course their attribution to the group as such of motives which imply the existence of a self sentiment. This is especially clear in that of Professor Paterson. So far as nations, and not merely their rulers, "covet gain" "fear injury" "desire glory" and "find satisfaction in the exercise of power", it can only be because in the minds of all or most of their individual members the idea of the group has become a "centre of emotional reference" - "an extension of the self", capable in certain situations of being, emotionally affected. And if in so complex a sphere we may venture, upon the basis of these surveys and of the historical illustrations so far given, to generalise a little further, it would appear to be a broadly correct descrip-
tion of the normal attitude of the nation-group towards others to say that it is one of "self-regard", exhibited in rivalry, suspicion and hostility; an attitude which, always more or less consciously present in the minds of leaders, came to express itself, from the time perhaps of Elizabeth, in "balance of power" as the prevailing conception of international policy; and, latent in the minds of the people, provided the means through which they could readily be aroused, either by the initiative of their rulers or by events and situations arising in international intercourse, to open enmity. So far as the nation itself, considered as a group, is concerned, it is probably rather in this general attitude, varying of course from time to time in its particular content in relation to other groups, than in the motives assigned by Professor Paterson, that the real roots of war are to be found. Dr Morton Prince in his study of the Unconscious gives two instances - one drawn from the life of Voltaire, of the manner in which the past experiences of an individual in relation to another may organise themselves into "contexts" or "settings", with the result that an apparently trivial incident may produce an effect or provoke a response astonishing to the bystander. Such an emotional "setting" or "complex" he describes in the expressive phrase "A psychological torch".

1. With its attendant characteristics of fear, watchfulness and enmity, as brought out in Shand's analysis in British Journal of Psychology XIII. part 2.

2. See Pollard p. 333. He says that Balance of Power though not an expressed theory of diplomaties was under Elizabeth a definite political aim.

3. See pages 270/1 & 332/3.
standing ready to be "set ablaze by the first touch of a match". Exactly in this way did the arrival of Captain Jenkins in England in 1738 with his story of mutilation at the hands of the Spaniards ignite the "torch" prepared by the quarrels over trading rights; and Rose in summarising the cause of a much more momentous struggle uses almost parallel language when he says that "the story of the Franco-German dispute is one of national jealousy carefully fanned for four years by newspaper editors and public speakers, until a spark sufficed to set Western Europe in a blaze." But while wars have commonly been preceded by such gradual development of attitude between particular nations, the collective self-sentiment constitutes of itself a general "context" through which events, greatly varying in their particular forms, but possessing the common characteristic that they are capable of being regarded as offensive to "national pride" or as involving "national honour," or "interest," may provoke outbursts of war-emotion.

2. European Nations p. 48. The recent episode between Italy and Greece presented somewhat similar features; and Bryce (International Relationship pp. 36 and p. 211) instances the same process in relation to the world war.
3. See Perla "What is National Honor?" Chap. III for a long list of instances. He regards "national honor" which he appears to identify fairly closely with what is called here the sentiment of nationality (See e.g. Chap. VII. "Dissecting the Honor Complex") as having been (Preface XXVII) "the cause of almost every war in history."
The general relations of France and the newly formed United States at the close of the 18th century for example were not unfriendly - yet the refusal of the Directory to receive the American Minister at Paris produced such intensity of feeling in America that war appeared for some time inevitable. Probably no better examples exist of the way in which national feeling can become attached to a conception of national interest and by doing so give it all its real significance, than the various episodes which have arisen in connection with the Monroe Doctrine. We can in fine, never interpret international relations in terms merely of "motive". The really important factor is always the sentiment, determined ultimately of course in regard to its nature and content by the ideas which the individual members of the nation hold regarding its position, rights, powers, or duties in relation to others. It is within such sentiments, and conditioned and characterised by them, that particular motives always arise; and it is of course precisely because of this fact that they have, almost if not quite invariably, for the individual members, something of the force of moral imperatives. Upon all occasions of international disagreement each side is, or speedily comes to be, genuinely convinced of the rightness of its "cause";

1 The United States p. 261.
2 See e.g. The United States pp. 432, 499, 519.
for that cause and the circumstances attending its assertion or maintenance are alike coloured or transfigured by the operation of the sentiment. One of the most conspicuous examples of this is perhaps the American Civil War, where as Norman Angell for instance notices, it would be quite an inadequate view that regarded the South as fighting for "slavery"; they fought for "their rights, for their country --- their honour"; and the real conflict lay between "two rival ideals and systems", around each of which there gathered passionate convictions and genuine loyalties. And to-day as we most of us recognise, if it is still true that the "vast majority of Frenchmen" are unable to comprehend our "obstinacy in not going with them in requiring the unconditional surrender of Germany," it is to the content of French national sentiment that their difficulty is in large part to be ascribed.

In war as an existing relationship between nations we have for each of the conflicting parties a "situation" in which the national sentiment might be expected to find unmistakably clear expression; and there can be little doubt that its operation is to be seen in such familiar facts. — general in some degree to all warring nations.

1. This is of course quite a familiar fact in individual psychology, and rests upon the same ground of determination of "meaning" by the self sentiment.
2. Introduction to Perla "What is National Honor" p. XV.
whether the part they are playing is that of defence or
aggression - as the cessation or suspension of internal
group dissensions\(^1\); the 'impulses' of friendliness, tolerance
and goodwill towards - fellow citizens", noted by Trotter\(^2\)
as conspicuous in England in 1915; and the readiness of
all members of the community to devote themselves to the
common service of which Sir M. Conway speaks\(^3\). It finds
expression also of course in a marked intensification of
hostility towards the opposing group; not merely, or even
perhaps mainly, such conscious hostility as that of Pills-
bury's "distinguished scientist\(^4\) who had "never before
known the joys of unrestrained hate, particularly of un-
restrained hate in unison with others"\(^4\) but of a deep and
pervasive redirection of 'attitude' which affects thought
and colours belief in all departments of life. Its work-
ings are visible, again, in the revival in national con-
sciousness of the past achievements and glories of the
nation - the outstanding facts of its 'epic tradition':
for while this is produced in part as the result of the
"crowd" or "public" influences which Sir Martin Conway

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1. Boutoux for instance writing in 1915 says (p. 141/2)
"How abstract and superficial now appear those political
religious and social divisions which but recently we
regarded as irremediable" ----

2. pp. 146/7

3. The Crowd in Peace and War pp. 301/6. He says however
that a "universal passion of self-sacrificing unity"
will not arise of itself, but "must be artfully kindled
by immense and increasing organised work."

4. The Psychology of Nationality p. 66. This is perhaps a
case of the release of "baulked disposition" (Graham
Wallas Great Society p. 70) of which war psychology
affords many examples.

5. See for example in Psychology Freud's mild remonstrance
with Trotter in his "Group Psychology" p. 83; and
McDougall's "Group Mind" has been criticised (Bartlett.
British /
Journal of Psychology 1920/1 p. 344.) on the same ground, see for example of the attitude of the Churches, Graham Wallas ("Our Social Heritage" pp. 256).

6. The Crowd in War & Peace Chap. IX.
and Ross describe, the predisposing conditions which favour the operation of these influences are to be sought, it seems clear, in that spontaneous awakening, in the minds of many of the individual members, of these same thoughts and attitudes, which, according to the account given in Chapter 3 of the building up of the sentiment for the nation, have in their past lives entered into its structure. In this awakening of the "nation sentiment" also, we must regard each of the contained groups as to some extent sharing; for on the one hand the attitude of each member has become such as to dispose him towards patriotic action; and on the other - the group becomes as a collective entity more vividly and consciously aware of the identity of its interests with those of the nation. Thus we find that while war usually arouses group sentiments of every kind, - since all groups are directly affected by it - they tend all to operate in ways which are, so to speak, "contributory to" the wider sentiment. It is therefore misleading to say as Sir M. Conway does that "the war-crowd reduces to insignificance all the subordinate crowds."

1. Social Psychology Chap. IV.
2. McDougall The Group Mind p. 23. points out that community of sentiment is an important, if not a necessary factor in the formation of the psychological crowd. The higher the degree of this mental homogeneity of any gathering of men, the more readily" he says "do they form a psychological crowd and the more striking and intense are the manifestations of collective life."
3. Or, in other words, the reaction to stimulation of the self in its national extension will tend to express itself through all the groups to which the individual belongs.
4. p. 305. The stimulation of family, school, and locality sentiments was a familiar fact of the recent war.
within the nation"; indeed the very example he gives provides one of the clearest possible illustrations of the way in which the sentiment for a "contained" group may be, in McDougall's words "perfectly compatible with and probably conducive to a sentiment for the still wider group".

We are of course concerned here with collective war-emotion only so far as it illustrates the existence and the nature of the collective sentiment. In its actual manifestations it varies, according to "situation" almost indefinitely, both as between different nations and for the same nation in different conflicts. Trotter for example contrasts the collective response of the British people in the recent war with that in the South African War of 1899/1901, and finds that in the latter case, because as he says "the war was not, and was not regarded as capable of becoming, a direct threat to the life of the nation" there was no "marked moral concentration of the people"; and McDougall, points out, in explanation of the different effects of the Russo-Japanese war on the national life of the two combatants, that to the Russians "national existence was 1. Of universit"es being "just as soon as war broke out---deserted by practically every undergraduate capable of bearing arms."

2. The Group Mind p. 82. McDougall's instance of the sentiment for Scotland in relation to that for Great Britain or the British Empire; and this also of course was very strikingly manifested in the recent war.


Some of the phenomena he notices - the "Excessive satisfaction in good news" for instance - were perhaps examples of a collective "defence-mechanism" arising from a lack of complete conviction regarding the justice of the British cause.

not endangered" and "the objects of the war were too remote from the interests of the mass of the people to appeal to them strongly." Even in the most "national" of Wars there remain also, individual and group exceptions to the collective unity. But from the standpoint of this essay the important fact is that war not only brings into evidence, but tends also in some degree to develop the national consciousness and the national sentiment; partly by the added contribution its events make to the national tradition, becoming perhaps as they sometimes have "the materials of an epopée through which historic personages pass into the popular imagination;" and partly, and more immediately because the war itself, in the degree in which it is national, comes always to involve a "cause" or "principle" accepted by the people generally as theirs and thus uniting them in a common aim or purpose. War is always in this sense a war of ideals; and its psychological consequence is inevitably an intensification of national "self-feeling" which outlasts the actual state of war and is evidenced in many ways in the national life. Sometimes it may be directly seen - as for instance in the effects, both of the South African2 and the recent3 war on "nationalism" in our self-governing colonies; sometimes it is manifested in such great outbursts of national energy as perhaps the remarkable

2. Jebb pp. 76, 114, 120. He quotes Sir W. Laurier as saying (p. 124/5 that the achievements of Canadian regiments had "filled every Canadian heart with pride --- the pride of consciousness ---- that a new power had arisen in the West". For a similar influence upon another young nation see Hudson & Guernsey p. 282.
3. /
See e.g. J.A.R. Marriott in *Fortnightly Review* July 1923, p. 65. He refers to the "increasingly acute apprehension of the possibilities of self-realisation" on the part of the Colonies.
literary activity in England after the defeat of Spain or the imperialistic aggression of France after the repulse of the monarchic invasion; sometimes again under defeat it expresses itself in apparent disunity which is actually the search, more or less vague, for a more efficient "organisation" or leadership; although where defeat or rather conquest is accepted, and self-feeling is thus thwarted or given a retrospective trend, as J.V. Morgan says it was in Wales, there may follow "a serious arrest of social and moral progress." But in the political conditions of today, exhibiting as Bryce says the "unprecedented feature, painful in the prospect it opens" that "the victors bear as much resentment against the vanquished as the vanquished do against the victors" as well as "national rivalries and ambitions" which "threaten to bring fresh strife upon us", we have perhaps the most conspicuous example in history of this persistence, after the conclusion of formal hostilities, of intense national self-feeling.

It appears then that the sentiment of nationality in those of its collective manifestations which arise in the

"The end of the fierce grapple with Spain - raised to its height the pride in the feeling of national unity and prowess and made them objects to reverence, to exalt, and above all, to work for."

2. This, it may be suggested is why the War of 1871 "led to a further integration of the national life" of France "in spite" as McDougall rather curiously says, (The Group Mind p. 143) of her defeat. The recent war of course provides many instances; and the political revolution in Spain has been ascribed in part (see Contemporary Review November 1923) to the particularly galling effect on Spanish self-feeling, of her reverses at the hands of a Moorish people

4. International Relations p. 43 & 255.
course of relationship with other nation-groups operates in a manner which seems to be progressively separative. Peoples whom it divides tend to be either actively or latent-ly hostile to each other; this hostility has not only, as a matter of historical fact, led to an unbroken succession of wars, but constitutes, it seems, a psychological condition out of which war inevitably grows; alliances, it may be added are stable only so long as they conform to national self-interest; and war of necessity develops that self-feeling in which it has its source. If this is the whole story, it follows inescapably that unless there can be devised some system of external constraint, the motive force of which it is not in these conditions easy to see, war must remain, as many have thought it will, a permanent feature of the life of independent nations. But we have first to look at the national sentiment in another aspect; in its content, that is, as affected or determined by relations within the nation-group itself.


These opinions are frequently based upon the somewhat crude view that the "combative instinct of man" must find expression in war. It is doubtful, as Graham Wallas (Great Society p. 171) and Miss Follett (New State p. 194) point out, whether war, as now conducted, does satisfy this instinct; but in any event it appears to have been more or less effectively sublimated, for most civilised people, in all social relationships except those into which it enters through its organisation within the national sentiment. McDougall Outlines p. 175/6 refers to this view of international warfare as an "illegitimate deduction from the theory of human instincts."
CHAPTER V.

THE SENTIMENT OF NATIONALITY AS A SOCIALISING FORCE.

If we turn from the external to the internal relationships of the nation group, the fact which perhaps most of all strikes the attention, is that of the orderliness, peace, and security of the life it maintains. "It is a wonderful thing", says Sutherland, "incomprehensible to a savage, how millions of people can dwell together without fighting, knit in hundreds of useful co-operations, and forming cities of myriad dwellings with never a weapon seen or a midnight summons heard calling to arms". This is, of course, in part a consequence of social regulation and control acting through various "institutions". But only in part, as Sir Henry Jones eloquently reminds us, in the contrast he draws between the comparatively limited area in a large city of the centres of social disorder and the vast extent of respectable/

(1) Origin & Growth of the Moral Instinct p.10.
(2) Working Faith of the Social Reformer pp.24/5.
respectable, decent, common-place but well-doing life, which, during the obscure hours when wickedness is awake lies resting all around through the quiet miles of streets, recuperating its strength for the duties of the morrow. What then, is the connection or the distinction between this type of loyalty and the sentiment of nationality? To FICHTE, in the circumstances in which he wrote, they were clearly different. "The mere maintenance of the traditional constitution, of the law, of civil well-being", requires, he says "no life properly so-called, no original act of the will. But when this uniform course is exposed to danger - - - then there must be a self-acting principle of life. What then is the spirit that can be put at the helm in such a case - - - that can have an unquestioned right to demand of everyone it meets - - and if necessary to compel him to put everything, life included, to hazard? Not the spirit of quiet, civic loyalty to the constitution and the laws; no, but the consuming flame of the higher patriotism". But, while, of course, the state and the nation are distinct terms and the "civic bond as such" can never be "the same thing as the link of - nationality" FICHTE himself notes that a patriotic response will be aroused if it is endangered, and in conditions of political/

(1) Addresses to the German Nation quoted: Seeley-Stein II 33.
(2) Hobhouse Social Evolution. p.140.
political development more advanced than those with which he was familiar, there is a sense in which "the people or at any rate the citizens are the state" and "law is an expression of the will of those who will obey it". The established conditions of social order appear in effect, whether they are more or less passively accepted or consciously willed or "embraced", to rest upon a sentiment which, while it cannot be identified with that of "nationality" may be said, in BARKER'S words, to "overlap" or 'blend' with it. They form, like language, an element in that broad community of thought and feeling upon which national consciousness is based, and which not only ensures a spontaneous collective response to any threat or injury to the nation from an outside quarter, but constitutes within it that public opinion which, as MACDOUGALL notes, is capable because it issues from an organization, of arriving at judgments "far superior to those of the average of individuals, and superior probably in many cases to those which even the best individuals could form for themselves".

There are in point of fact these two aspects to be seen in adherence or attachment to group life of every kind:

(1) Hobhouse Social Evolution p.139
(2) Political Thought in England p.67.
(3) The Group Mind. pp.193 +
it separates, distinguishes or marks off the individual from other groups, but at the same time it provides him with ties or obligations that necessarily tend to raise the level of his conduct. Group life, as Stanley Hall remarks, affords the first training in morality, "the first subordination and renunciation of the self that is free, and not enforced by others" and this, not because, or at anyrate not entirely because "the moral sentiments are essentially altruistic" but because the extension of the 'self' and the self-sentiment to the group is a source of new motives. Loyalty, which might perhaps be defined as the group sentiment in operation, is always, as Miss Follett says, "loyalty to a group idea, and not to the group personnel" and "when one thinks of one's self as part of a group it means keener moral perceptions, greater strength of will, more enthusiasm and zest in life". It always involves also a surrender of what Royce calls the "private self-will" - a surrender which as he shews is, or may be, just as much present in the ordinary conduct of daily social

(1) Adolescence. p. 430
(2) McDougall The Group Mind. p.194.
(3) We may of course believe ourselves to be loyal to 'abstract' ideals but these, as McDougall has pointed out probably involve reference to a 'select' or imaginary group. (Social Psychology p.255)
Royce "Philosophy of Loyalty" p.52 says "You cannot be loyal to a merely impersonal abstraction".
(5) The New State. pp. 31/2
(6) "The Philosophy of Loyalty" p.23 Loyalty is there defined as "a personal attitude which is good for the loyal man himself"
(7)
social life as in those more obvious manifestations which arise when group safety or integrity are in any way menaced. (1)

As ROYCE points out, however, it is not, or not so much, this conflict between the 'private' and the 'group' self which has given rise to social disunion as the oppositions which have arisen between different 'loyalties'; and he finds, therefore, that the test of value of loyalty lies always in the nature of the cause, the ultimate ideal being "loyalty to loyalty" - that is to say a tie or bond which in its nature, or its internal content, is "not destructive of loyalty in the world of my fellows". Or, as HOBHOUSE expresses it "A great part of the comparative study of ethics consists in tracing the forms assumed by group morality and its modification by wider ideas of obligation; and much of ethical evolution is constituted by the interaction between the two principles".

From this evolutionary standpoint it is within the nation-group that the synthesis or harmonisation of these divergent 'loyalties' has been most widely and most permanently effected. (3) In the primitive independent group the 'polarizing' influence of the group sentiment is at its height./

(1) pp. 114/5 + 220 +
(2) Morals in Evolution I.p.241
(3) C.p.M.Iver "Community" Book II. Chap.IV.
height; an almost entire absence of regard for outsiders is associated with the most intense solidarity as between the members; the principle of collective responsibility alike in its social and its religious aspects ensuring the complex predominance of the 'group' motive in all individual conduct. In the much wider unions of the authority type this free group life was, in its more acutely separative aspects, largely suppressed; but these unions failed on the whole to attract to themselves any strong sentiment of active loyalty and were, therefore, in their nature impermanent. The city-state of early Greece and Italy developed forms of social union in which the conscious devotion of the individual to the whole "thrilled through every fibre of moral and intellectual life"; yet in Greece the content of the group sentiment was not such as either to restrain the most acute internal dissensions or to provide a basis of stable unity between the cities themselves. The Roman Empire established order over a wide area and gave/  

(1) But not quite. See e.g. Westermarck as noted next chapter.  
(2) See e.g. Bagehot "Physics & Politics"  
(3) Hobhouse Morals in Evolution I. pp.48/77  
(4) Lecky "European Morals" I. 200.  
(5) F. de Coulanges "La Cité Antique" & See Chapter 2.
gave to European tradition a sentiment for law and justice which was never lost; but while the attitude of civic pride expressed in the phrase "Civis Romanus Sum" must often have been a powerful motive in conduct it was not sustained by that active participation in Imperial service which a system of representation, however rudimentary, might have afforded; and the social tie remained throughout predominantly authoritative. The ties provided by the Medieval Empire and the Church were unable, as we saw, to withstand the growth of kingly power; a growth which while it "meant in the first instance a period of Absolutism" appears also to have been sustained from the outset by a strong sentiment of personal loyalty: rooted, perhaps, as FREUD and RIVERS suggest, in an instinctive 'wish' or 'desire', on the part of the human group for definite leadership, and reinforced as FRAZER has shown by powerful sanctions deriving from very early phases of social development. Through such periods of despotic monarchy two principal types of separative influence were gradually extinguished. It constituted in the first/

(1) Hobhouse. Morals in Evolution. I. 75
(2) Group Psychology. pp. 85, 89, 92.
(3) Psychology & Politics. p. 52
(4) "Early History of Kingship".
first place an "organised force outside the contending families or clans" (1) which was able to secure the substitution of public justice for that "most sacred of primitive principles. . . the duty of avenging the injured kinsman" and so to play a large part in effecting what Hobhouse considers "one of the greatest social revolutions": and secondly it broke up, or prevented the formation of, such petty "States" as those of the Imperial Knights of Germany, which "combined in the most invidious manner the characters of proprietor and ruler" (3) and made further development impossible. It is perhaps in the second of these ways that the contribution of the King to later social advancement is most conspicuous; since the sentiment of loyalty became greatly and as it were consciously strengthened with the growth of the recognition, made clearer by every lapse into feudal disunion, that the royal power was the source and guardian of social order. From this point of view we may say, it would seem, that the initial 'function' of the Crown as a factor in social progress was the establishment over/

(2) The Church was also influential. See e.g. "Kindred & Clan in the Middle Ages and After" by Bertha Phillipotts.
(3) Seeley Stein I.13.
(4) e.g. the reign of Stephen in England.
(5) e.g. Henry I & II in England.
over a wide territorial area of a rudimentary psychological group: a large body of people, not as yet united by any real consciousness of their place in, or their relations to, a structuralised whole, divided in fact into many local groups with few, if any mutual ties, but still aware of themselves as standing in common subjection to a single definite leader to whom they were bound by extension of the self sentiment which finds its expression in 'loyalty'. Endless illustrations could be drawn from English history perhaps in particular, to shew that at periods of crisis it was this sentiment, rallying the people to the support of the King against forces making for disorder, that preserved the social union which was to become the self-conscious nation.

While, however, this tie of loyalty to the ruler or leader, drawing its allegiance from an area wide enough to exempt it from the disturbing influences of local contacts and to render it in that way a source of motives making for generalised social conduct, has proved itself able historically to sustain organisations national in their range, its rôle in later development is intermediary rather than/

(1) e.g. In the 13th century the members of different towns in England still spoke of each other as 'foreigners'. There was, however, the distinguishing term 'alien' for members of a different country. See Fletcher "Introductory History of England" p.224.
(2) The history of Denmark furnishes perhaps the most striking of all such instances in the case of Frederick III who, in this way 'from being one of the most powerless sovereigns in Europe suddenly became one of the most despotic" Sir R. Lodge, "Modern Europe" p.196.
than constitutive. It has provided, broadly speaking, the framework within which the real forces of social progress - that wide totality of intellectual and moral 'discovery' which comes to make up the social tradition - have been able to organise themselves without subversive interruption, but it is not of itself progressive - has been indeed in many instances reactionary in its influence. "For a long time inseparably confounded", as Westermarck expresses it, with real patriotism, it could lead, "a loyalist like Strafford" to employ "half-savage Irish troops against his own countrymen" or the Jacobites to invite a French invasion; and in Spain, where as BUCKLE shows it attained a development unparalleled in Europe, it led to a state of affairs in which "directly the Government" with the advent of an incapable ruler "slackened its hold, the nation went to pieces". In France also, BUCKLE notices, there grew up, under the influence of what he terms the "protective spirit" a strong sentiment of

(1) Trotter "Instincts of the Herd in Peace & War" p.247. "Leadership... is essentially a limited & therefore an exhaustible force... If society... can find no more satisfactory source of moral power it is... highly probable that civilisations will continue to rise and fall." He notes p.248 in this connection the great susceptibility of the Germans to leadership. In England, however, personal loyalty to the monarch is still an active social force. See e.g. Bagehot "English Constitution" p.38/9.

(2) Origin & Development of the Moral Ideas II.182

(3) History of Civilisation II 455+. Buckle gives the causes of this exceptional loyalty as the 'great Arab invasion' and the intensity of the religious sentiment.

(4) II 467

(5) II 249/50 & Chap.II.
of conscious loyalty to the sovereign; but while here, (1) as recently in Russia, the formal or final severance of this as a social tie was catastrophic, there can be traced over a period of perhaps 100 years, the gradual emergence of a sentiment for 'la patrie' that became, (2) for various reasons, more reflective, or in other words, more highly idealised, than anywhere else. It expresses itself, as STEWART & DESJARDINS notice, in literature, in the "sullen opposition" of the country to the imperialistic policy of Louis XIV., in the economics of the "Physiocrats", in self-criticism in the light of growing knowledge of other nations, as well, of course, as in the great development of political speculation which preceded the Revolution; until at last the Federation of /

(1) Bryce International Relations p. 57 notes with surprise the apparently complete disappearance within a few years of that loyalty to the Czar which, it had been supposed, was a strongly uniting force in Russia. In 1913 he says "Everybody believed that the Tsar occupied a semi-divine position in Russia & that the Empire . . was based & solidly based upon that feeling of religious devotion to his person; But all vanished & not even the Russian Church was able to avert it".

(2) The influence of the revived Greek & Roman traditions is mentioned (by Stewart & Desjardins "French Patriotism" Preface XVII.) as one; but the dissociation of this growing body of thought & feeling from all practical interest in government, noticed in Chapter 2, was probably more directly contributory. In Russia there arose through a similar repression, a 'philosophic anarchy' & other 'affective associations of sociological theorising' (Hecker. 'Russian Sociology' quoted Williams 'Social Psychology' p. 416.)

(3) "French Patriotism" pp. XVII + XXXIII.
of July 14 1790 "marks . . . the coming to life of the statue fashioned through long centuries, but henceforth animated by a will and conscience of its own". In England where the loyalty-tie was qualified from a very early period by sturdy sentiments of local patriotism centralisation never attained a very high development; and as was noticed in Chapter 2 the growth in national self-consciousness which occurred under the Tudors had expressed itself by the end of the Stuart period in a form of monarchy then had become 'limited' or 'constitutional'.

This "substitution of attachment to the State, the country, the fatherland, for the feeling of personal loyalty (1) must be regarded, as PEARSON says "as a distinct gain". It amounts, in fact, to the attainment of a real group-consciousness; the recognition by all the members that they belong to a wide community with the welfare of which their own interests are bound up and for which they have, as a whole, a sentiment of devotion. The 'substitution', however as PEARSON calls it, is not a mere transference of loyalty; the new tie is immensely more charged with possibilities of development precisely because the self-sentiment becomes, (3) as it were, more actively involved. Patriotism becomes

(1) "French Patriotism" pp.XVII + XXXIII.
(2) National Life & Character. p. 200
(3) This is clearly shewn, e.g. in the quotations from various French writers given by Stewart & Desjardins Preface pp.xxxviii etc.
a force which "seeks within the country to procure the establishment of the best possible order"; it implies no longer a mere unquestioning adherence to an accepted ruler, but a critical interest in social conditions. And this, of course has been stimulated principally by motives arising out of those lesser, more specialised interests of which national life, as it progresses, increasingly comes to consist. For everyone, as Miss Follett says, "society" is a "number of groups . . . ever widening, ever unifying, (1) but always groups", and it is always through them that the "vital relation of the individual" to the social whole lies. It is these group interests that, apart from the conserving, regulating influence of the state - the governing institution of the nation-group, - would break up the social union as we now know it. "Abolish the state" says Professor Ritchie, "and we should have, not individualism, but, after a period of anarchy, the patriarchal stage, or some other "natural" grouping of a more rudimentary kind". But given this controlling organisation, external, in a sense, to any of the lesser groupings, local or sectional, which make up the total communal life, yet able, because it is based upon a real consciousness of community, to arouse and call to its assistance/

(2) Studies in Political & Social Ethics. p.56.
(3) National life and character. P. 197.
assistance the motive forces of a sentiment - given these conditions the oppositions, rivalries and conflicts to which the self-feeling of these lesser groups inevitably gives rise, are themselves in their ultimate issue, agencies of progress.

The organisation, however, must be sustained by the sentiment. "The interests with which the state is concerned" are always "of a much wider, more permanent and (1) more complex character" than the interests of any contained group, and precisely for this reason they will not suffice to maintain unity, - will not indeed retain or win conscious recognition unless there exists the possibility that any separative tendency may come sooner or later to assume that 'meaning' or 'significance' which only the national sentiment can give. Lord ACTON saw - and from the intellectualist standpoint correctly saw, that there existed in the highly diversified group life of Austria "the conditions necessary for the very highest degree of organisation which government is capable of receiving" and in which, therefore "liberty would achieve its most glorious results". He saw too, that differentiation under the same sovereignty "promotes independence by forming definite groups of public opinion and by affording a great source and centre of political sentiments"; leading in that way to a patriotism which /

(1) Ritchie. "Political & Social Ethics" p.50
(2) History of Freedom. essay on 'Nationality'. p.296
(3) p.289.
which is a 'moral duty', developing "selfishness into sacrifice". But in regarding nationality as "derived from the State", he appears to have underrated, if not to have lost sight of the 'sentiment'; and the importance of the omission may be gauged when we read, in the light of to-day his conclusion that from the point of view of "the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties" the states which are "substantially the most perfect" are "the British and Austrian Empires".

To us, on the contrary, it seems clear that it is only in the state which is also a nation that there can exist that continuous coherence of free groups upon which social harmony and social development depend; and it is because the deeply separative character of the national 'sentiment' will tend almost inevitably to give rise, under repression, to situations in which the government may come to stand "in bitter and cruel hostility to whatever... really lives and moves and forms the mainspring of practical progress and improvement," that the claims of nationality have come to be regarded.

(2) p.291
(3) p.298
(4) As noticed in Chapter IV.
(5) Gladstone to Lord Aberdeen quoted Orsi 'Life of Cavour' p.176
regarded as substantially justified. Professor ZIMMERN
(1) argues that as a political principle 'nationality'
is unsound, and 'one of the obstacles to human progress
at the present time'. The fact, he says, "that the Poles
feel themselves to be a nation" does not mean that there
"necessarily ought to be an independent Poland", and the
union of the various peoples of Italy into one Italian
State was justified he thinks "not because they were Ita-
lian in speech and culture but because they deliberately
desired thus to dispose of their destiny". It seems im-
possible, however, to draw this sharp distinction between
national sentiment and 'collective consent' or 'deliberate
desire'; it is, if the view here taken is correct, out of
the sentiment that the desire and the consent will arise -
and because of the self-motives involved, will arise in
forms so persistent and so irreconcileable that the prac-
tical alternatives are, on the one hand, the concession of
autonomy, or, on the other, conflict and suppression with
all its latent dangers to social unity.

There appear, in fact, to exist, from the point
of view of state organisation, two limiting conditions of
social progress - using that term in the sense of the
harmonious/

(1) Nationality & Government p.46/8. agreeing with Lord
Acton.

(2) Statesmen have always realised this. HOLLAND ROSE (p. 104
quotes) BISMARCK as having said, with regard to the an-
nexation of Alsace Lorraine "I do not like so many
Frenchmen being in our house against their will".
harmonious development both of individuals themselves and of the 'society' they constitute. It must not forcibly include a group which is so far differentiated in sentiment from the remainder of the community that - however 'irrational' that sentiment may appear to be, and however far attempts to conciliate it may, short of severance, be carried. there remains necessary a degree of constraint which tends constantly, on both sides to bring in the 'self' element: where these situations exist, historical experience and psychological theory agree, the oppositions excited are likely to be insoluble. But neither on the other hand must the state organisation be such as to thwart the activities of groups potentially capable of playing a part in the life of the whole: for then either the group-energies will expend themselves in ways directly harmful, or the course of later development, lacking the corrective, balancing, influences which these groups might have supplied, will become distorted, exaggerated, and a source of danger both to the community itself and to others. Thus, to take the most familiar/

(1) See Hobhouse "Social Evolution" Chapter 5. (Social Harmony and the Social Mind)

(2) See for instance Lecky "Historical & Political Essays" p.86/7 for the case of Ireland.

(3) As in the case of Russia noted above.
familiar instance, while it may be true, as HEADLAM thinks, that the action of BISMARCK in the constitutional conflict of 1860/2, is justifiable on the ground that efficient leadership was essential to Prussian existence. There can be little doubt of the soundness of the general opinion that this was a decisive 'moment' in German - and European - history. Accepting a leadership to the trend and direction of which they abandoned the attempt to supply the animating force, the people accepted also, of necessity, the narrowly self-regarding type of patriotism by which it was inspired; and when, as HEADLAM expresses it, Bismarck's disclosures after his retirement destroyed the popular belief in the righteously defensive character of the War of 1870 "almost the last barrier was broken down which stood between the nation and moral scepticism".

It is, therefore, too much to say that between "nationality" and "statehood" there is a "fundamental difference" - except, perhaps of definition: nationality is 'educative' not merely in the sense that it is a "safe-guard/"

(1) J.W. Headlam - Life of Bismarck pp.188/9.
(2) E.g. (Headlam p.123 ""I cannot justify sympathies and antipathies as regards foreign Powers & persons before my feelings of duty in the foreign service of my country... As soon as it was proved to me that it was in the interests of a sound & well-matured Prussian policy I would let our troops fire on French, English, Russians or Austrians with the same satisfaction".
(3) Headlam p.460
(4) Nationality & Government p.59.
"safeguard of self-respect against the insidious onslaughts of a materialistic cosmopolitanism" (1), but as providing, when it coexists as a conscious tie with that of civic obligation, the conditions of that "moving balance" of forces in which organic and moral life consist. No one, of course, now regards the 'society' as being an 'organism' in anything more than a metaphorical sense; but, as Hobhouse says, we may "help ourselves with the metaphor without allowing it to dominate us" (2); and when we consider the binding force of the idea and sentiment of nationality, as we have noticed in relation to other national groups, it seems safe to say that it is within the nation-state that social life comes most into accord with the 'organic' principle. "Imagine", as Dr. McDougall says, "a people in whom anti-nationalism... had spread, until this attitude towards the nation state as such had become adopted by half its members while the other half remained patriotic." There would, he says "be acute conflict and discussion, and the idea of the nation would be vividly present to all minds; but the nature of the sentiment attached to it would be different and opposite in the two halves:... and even though all might be well-meaning people, desiring the good of mankind, the nation would be very greatly weakened and probably would soon cease to exist as such". This

(1) Nationality & Government. p. 53
(2) Social Evolution, p. 90
(3) The Group Mind p. 171
of course is an imaginary case only, the national sentiment, if the line of analysis here followed is sound, is much too deeply based in social and individual development for such a position ever actually to arise - but it exactly illustrates the case of conflicting nationalities within a 'state' and shews why 'state' and 'nation' organisation must as a condition of progress tend towards coincidance.

It is, of course, impossible to trace or even to enumerate the ways in which the national sentiment, reinforcing by its tie of 'loyalty' the claims of civic obligation, may come, in individual lives to operate as a source of motives disposing them to lines of conduct for the good of the nation - the widest effective 'society' of everyone. Based upon what COMPATIE (2) has called "un fonds de pensées communes, un ensemble d'aspirations" which constitute "les principes essentielles de la vie intellectuelle et morale", it enters deeply into most of the daily relationships of life, and in BRADLEY'S term "qualifies" them in endless indefinite ways: but always, because of the width of range of the interests that the national life must comprehend and reconcile, in ways which tend towards 'harmony'.

(1) Chapters 2 & 3.
(2) COMPATIE "L'education intellectuelle et morale". pp.5 & 6.
(3) My Station and its Duties.
'harmony'. "I must find" as Miss FOLLETT says, speaking of the various group allegiances, "how I can by being loyal to each, be loyal to all: . . . . the true state must gather up every interest within itself" and "it has my devotion because it gathers up into myself the various sides of me". "Just as all duty in the eyes of the believer", says FOULLE, in an almost parallel expression, "is a duty towards God, so to one who loves his country all duty becomes a duty to it". It is probably only amongst a very few of the members of the nation that the national sentiment ever reaches the highly idealised level which led BURKE, in the social conditions of his time, to speak of the 'state' as "a partnership in all science . . . in all art . . . in every virtue and in all perfection"; but it is exactly in the degree to which we are able, as Professor MacCunn points out to attain the position in which love of country is consciously "wedded to" civic gratitude, that national unity is realised.

Returning then to the collective or group standpoint, we must ask whether it is possible to see, amidst the complexities that national life reveals, any actual tendencies towards these ideal conditions. In 'The Group Mind'/

(2) "Education from a National Standpoint" (translated Green Street) p.215.
(3) Quoted MacCunn's Political Philosophy of Burke, p.23.
Mind'. Dr. McDougall regards "continuity of existence" as the basic condition of the development of the national mind. "On it depends", he says, "the strength of custom and tradition, and to a very great extent the strength of national sentiment ... . It is owing to the unbroken continuity of the English nation through so long a period that its organisation is so stable ... its national sentiment so strong - its ... law so nearly in harmony with popular feeling". In what sense can it be said that continuity of this kind conditions the "strength" of the national sentiment? Not it seems clear, in the sense that it necessarily and at all times, and more than any other factor brings the "nation-disposition" with its thought-and-affect content vividly and continuously before the minds of the members; as Dr. McDougall himself remarks; the oppression of the Poles in Germany - which was of course a feature of an interruption in Polish national life by inflaming the passions which have their root in the national sentiment, strengthened that sentiment". It seems/ 

(1) who agrees (p. 175) that the nation-state in the ideal form of social organisation. 

(2) P. 145. It is clear of course that with equal or almost equal force it could be argued - by reference for example to the national circumstances in the Tudor period - that this "unbroken continuity" has been due to the strength of national sentiment, & in fact Dr. McDougall appears to be guilty of a "non-sequitor" in going on to say that "national organisation resting upon this basis is the only kind ... that is not liable to be suddenly overthrown by internal upheavals or impacts from without". (p. 145). 

seems doubtful also whether from this point of view it would be possible to speak of the "national sentiment" either of pre-war Germany or Italy of today as "weaker" than that of Britain. Adopting, however, the standpoint of the analogy of the individual mind which Dr. McDOUGALL goes on to apply and which he regards as "so much closer and more illuminating than that of the bodily organism", it becomes apparent that it means range and degree of organisation; the extent of the ability to supply by reference to some accepted aim or ideal "a determining motive for every possible situation". In the individual mind through the growth of powers of thought, coming to bear especially upon conflicts of motive arising in life-experience, there is established an "habitual dominance of this master-sentiment", and the self "comes to rule supreme over conduct"; so in the nation the growth of deliberative organisations, formal and informal, summing up in their tradition all that is best in the ideas and tendencies of the past, gives to the national mind a "tone or attitude" which "enables it to arrive at just judgments on questions of right/
right and wrong, of duty and honour and public desert". (1) There is established in other words a national "character" which is not simply an "average" of individual characters, but a true group constituent, and which "resumes the physical and social actions which have been taking place through centuries. . . . and imposes itself — — through all the national ideas, the national sentiments and national institutions". Just as in the individual we have to distinguish between the "ruling passion", or the dominance of a master-sentiment other than that of an ideal of the self, and true strength of character so/

(2) Fouillée quoted The Group Mind, p. 107.  
(3) Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 259.  
(4) Do. pp. 259/61. Dr. McDougall seems quite clearly to distinguish the self-sentiment or as he terms it, the 'self-regarding sentiment' from such a 'ruling passion' as 'love of money'. He says (P. 261) that "there is only one sentiment which by becoming the master sentiment can generate strong character in the fullest sense and that is the self regarding sentiment". It seems more correct, however, to speak of all sentiments as aspects or phases of the self-sentiment, which as between different people attains different levels of integration. Cp. Chapter I. Dr. Drever (Psychology of Education(pp. 77) regards the self-sentiment as 'not merely' a sentiment among sentiments' but "a synthesis of all the sentiments" and emphasises (pp. 112/3/4) the integrative function of the idea of the self. Cp. also Dr. T.P. Nunn 'Education 'Data and 1st Principles' pp. 136, 138.
so we find, in national life that "the dominant sentiment -- is very different in the various nations, it may be chiefly pride in the nation's past history, as in Spain: or hope for its future, as in Japan; or the need of self-assertion in the present, as in pre-war Germany" . In the nation, as in the individual, we can, therefore, with strict adherence to the psychological sense of the terms speak of different orders or levels of volition: in fact nations, like men, have 'personality' not only in the sense that "in the highest, most perfectly organised and effective nation -- -- the self-consciousness and initiative and volition of individuals -- -- are developed to the highest degree", but also in the sense that they have as groups, in varying degrees, a clear self-consciousness, a consistent ideal of conduct and a strong sentiment for the self and for that ideal".

(1) 'The Group Mind' p.160.
(2) " " 176
(3) "Social Psychology" p.253.
(4) Dr Drever "Psychology of Education" pp.215/6 accepts it. "We can," he says "beyond question speak of a group mind" . . . That a nation has a mind, in the sense in which we are understanding mind, does not admit of a doubt". Its "traditions sentiments and ideals . . manifest themselves . . as influences in the individual mind but they are not of the individual mind" and "the consciousness of the nation, though in the individual, is quite distinct from the individual consciousness".
quite clear that continuity of existence as a nation-state is an essential condition of a high development of national standards of conduct, since, as we know, in the individual "character is something built up in course of life" and depends for its stability upon "habitual action on the motives supplied by the systematised sentiments". We may say, in fact, that in every true psychological group there exists a principle of organisation which tends, like the "self-nucleus" of the individual, to express itself in a progressively "coherent and definitely shaped structure", and that this issues in forms of conduct which are more and more self-consistent, because more widely co-ordinated, more closely in accordance with the permanent requirements of this structure. But the nation differs from all other social groups in its complexity; it embodies or 'sub-tends', not merely a single phase or aspect of the individual self-activity, but the whole or almost the whole of life; it "contains" these other groups and must in the course of its development reconcile their growing or changing self-tendencies. Into the vast province of social or national development it is, of course, impossible here to enter.

Its/

(1) Social Psychology p. 258.
(2) " p. 260
(3) Data and First Principles p. 142.
Its main factors' or 'elements' have been generally conceived as consisting in -

(1) The growth of thought, with consequent development of material culture and moral or ethical conceptions.

(2) An advancement or 'Evolution' in the established modes or forms of social relationship, and

(3) The development of human character or 'personality':

all being more or less closely bound together in a "rough and irregular correspondence", and in highly complex interaction. It has been frequently noticed also, that these factors are of unequal 'mobility'; that thought or intellectual development normally tends to advance more rapidly than moral development and still more rapidly than social organisation; and that there arise some of the conditions of conflict within the social group; disturbances, so to speak, of the social 'equilibrium' which, if they cannot be resolved, will lead inevitably to disruption/

(1) Mackenzie: "Introduction to Social Philosophy" Chap VI.
Urwick: "Philosophy of Social Progress" Chap VI. & Hobhouse: "Morals in Evolution" II. VIII. are all in fairly close accord as to this.

(2) Hobhouse II. VIII.

(3) Either by advance in the other factors or, as most frequently in past history, by 'suppression' of the 'spirit of inquiry'. The lives of the Russian novelists are familiar instances; and e.g. Dicey, Law of the Constitution p.185/6 on France in the 18th Century.
disruption. Another main source of conflict has been emphasised by Professor CARVER in "economic scarcity in one form or another" which leads to "periods of readjustment" that are "always periods of irritation because of the simple fact that the strain is very unequally distributed throughout the social structure. From the point of view here taken, however, it may suffice to note, that such conflict tends to find - in fact must find, if it is to influence social organisation, a 'group' expression: either by creating new groups or, and perhaps more frequently, by awakening "self-feeling" within already existing groups or classes/

(1) As Dr McDougall "The Group Mind" p.275 notices, occurred in the Greek City State.

(2) "Essays in Social Justice" p.35.

(3) Do. p.233. In saying (p.35) that this is the 'ultimate basis of all social conflict' Professor Carver undoubtedly greatly overstates the importance of the economic factor - due perhaps to his impatience with the psychological analysis of motives (see p.61). That it is important, however, apart from the general growth of thought, is clear, e.g. from the consequences of the Black Death in English social history.

(4) Cp. Dicey Law & Opinion Chap.II. Conway (The Crowd in peace & War p.63) says "An individual may invent an ideal but unless he can get it incorporated in a crowd it is barren of effect and dies with him".
classes. Mere social inequalities, as such, and of themselves do not necessarily lead to conflict: they may be acquiesced in, as the caste system has been in many places, and will then make for great social stability. So soon, however, as such a group becomes, whether through economic changes or through growth of thought, aware of itself as standing in a situation which is offensive to its self-

(1) sentiment, its 'attitude' to the existing social order begins inevitably to assume an aspect of opposition; and this historically has frequently deepened into hostility and conflict. It is clear that the actual course of events will depend upon a great variety of circumstances: the time and place, the strength of the group sentiment, range of group organisation, the character of the response made by the 'state' to the group claims, and others: also that 'suppression'

(1) Many writers have noticed that in the 'labour' or 'socialist' movement of to-day the real motives are not merely economic. i.e. claims to better conditions of life and higher wages; but a desire, not at first fully conscious, for a share in the direction and control of industry. Sydney & Beatrice Webb in saying that the essential contribution of Karl Marx to these movements was that he "called the moral bluff of capitalism" ("The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation" p.166) exactly express this emergence of a group self-sentiment and its embodiment in a new group ideal - whatever the value of that ideal may prove to be.

(2) As De Tocqueville says (L'Ancien Régime p.23) "le même brandon qui a enflammé l'Europe au XVIIIe siècle a été facilement éteint au XVe."
'suppression' unless it can be carried so far as to destroy the group organisation, will tend merely to intensify the group self-sentiment", and, therefore, to accentuate the element of social discord, expressed or latent. De Tocqueville in his study, already drawn upon for various illustrations, of what is perhaps the extreme instance in history of such group conflict within a highly organised state which was also, at least potentially, a nation, traces the growth amongst the peasantry of an 'attitude' of hostility towards the nobles and priests, almost unparalleled in its intensity; shews how amongst the bourgeoisie there existed acute lines of division into innumer able little groups each of which "ne vit que pour soi, ne s'occupe que de soi, n'a d'affaires que celles qui la touchent"; and notes the issue in a passion for 'equality' which "poussait les Français avec une force continue et irresistible, à vouloir détruire jusque dans leurs fondements tout ce qui restait des institutions du moyen âge". But the Revolution while/ 

(1) L'Ancien Régime p. 41. "Figurez-vous la condition, les besoins, le caractère, les passions de cet homme et calculez, si vous le pouvez, les trésors de haine et d'envie qui se sont amassés dans son coeur". 

(2) p. 102/4 

(3) p. 212. 

while demonstrating, it might have been supposed, beyond question that "les institutions libres ne sont pas moins nécessaires aux principaux citoyens pour leur apprendre leurs périls qu'aux moindres pour assurer leurs droits" (1) did nothing to extinguish or even to diminish French national sentiment; on the contrary, as subsequent events (2) quickly shewed, it stimulated and strengthened it; and it would appear to be true generally that wherever group conflict arises within a nation-state, the national sentiment, in the degree of its development, must from the outset supply important motives in the new relationships. These, of course, may be highly various; there may for instance, sometimes be an actual intensification of hostile feeling because each group identifies itself with the true national interest and regards the attitude of the opposing group as "traitorous"; civil, like family dissensions may derive added bitterness from the very fact that they arise, so to speak, within a sentiment. On the other hand the sentiment for the larger group may operate, as it does for example on the whole in the relationships of the political parties in Britain, to restrain or modify action on both sides; disposing/

(1) De Tocqueville p. 149.
(2) As noted in Chapter 2. The attacks upon France by foreign Powers were, of course, an important additional stimulus.
(3) e.g. Washington called the "loyalists" "detestable parricides" (Hudson & Guernsey p. 199).
(4) cpw Helen Bosanquet. The Family Chapter X.
disposing "majorities" to refrain from pressing their opportunities to the full, and minorities not only to accept, but often to co-operate in the working of measures they have in principle opposed. In either event, it is clearly wrong to regard progress, at any rate within the nation, as the product or "resultant" of a "struggle" or "contest" of groups; all such groups are actually or potentially "united above their subdivisions by the possession of a common passion, called patriotism"; every one of their individual members has a "multiple group consciousness" and every social "movement" brings into operation a highly complex interplay of "correcting cross-connections" which tend, either immediately or ultimately to mitigate oppositions and compose the issues. In the degree in which national - or social - consciousness is developed, the claims of the weaker group will arouse sympathy, expressing itself through leaders of thought or practical reformers; while conversely/

(1) As noticed by McDougall, "The Group Mind" p. 173.
(2) As some writers of the "biological" school in sociology for instance have argued. See e.g. Gumplovicz "Der Rassenkampf" S. 172.
(3) Conway "The Crowd in Peace & War" p. 246.
(5) So that as McDougall notices ("The Group Mind" p. 294/5) the social reforms of the nineteenth century on Britain were partly of the nature of a voluntary abdication of power on the part of the classes in possession. It seems too much to say, however, that "if the ruling classes had consistently sought to maintain their power and exclusive privileges . . . there is little doubt that they could have done so".
conversely extreme action on the part of a powerful group (1) will tend to awaken a patriotic reaction; and by whatever paths the ultimate adjustment is reached, it constitutes - in so far as it effects a real reconciliation of the conflicting claims and excludes mere "suppression" - a gain to the national organisation. After every such adjustment it "means more" to be a member of the nation, in just the same way as, and in perhaps an even deeper sense than, it "meant more to be a Canadian after Ypres". The social structure is one stage more fully integrated; the content of every social group is qualified in a direction which makes for social harmony, and the individual "personality" both in its conscious relationships and in the character of the sentiments that underlie and sustain them, is more fully socialised. And while it is no doubt true, as WILLIAMS says, that the adjustment of one ground of conflict seems only to make room for the emergence of others, the important point is that in the social history of the nation group there is, it seems clear, a change in the character of the conflict. Civil strife in the more advanced nations has ceased not only because,

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(1) As recently in Italy (see e.g. "Mussolini as revealed in his Political Speeches", Baron di San Severino, and in such movements in our own country as the "National Citizen's Union").
(3) Zimmern Nationality & Government p. 54.
because, as ROSE thinks, the means of suppression which have become available to governments make it hopeless, but because as WALLAS notices, we have ceased to believe in "force" or "Fear" as means of Government. We are disposed, in other words, through the operation of sentiments we derive from life in a community which has behind it a long history of political and social compromises, - towards "reconciliation" of interests, instead of towards violent assertion or unsympathetic suppression of group claims; and these sentiments at once sustain, and express themselves through an "organisation" of which they are, in a sense, the affective aspects.

To sum up, then, the inevitably diverse topics of this Chapter, we may say that with the establishment of the nation-state, there comes into being a mode of group-life in which the ties of political obligation and patriotism actively reinforce each other; providing, therefore, a "social field" within which many more specialised groups, each enjoying a large measure of that "liberty" or "freedom" upon which development depends, are held together in a continuous unity.

It is a field of such range that for each individual member the sentiments which gather about the nation itself and many of

(2) Great Society. Chap. VI.
(3) Or as Miss Follett would prefer to call them "syntheses". (New State p. 34.)
(4) MacCunn "Political Philosophy of Burke". p. 224.
of the "contained" groups are highly generalised; - they centre, that is to say, in ideas which, while built up of necessity upon the basis of concrete personal relationships become indefinitely "abstract" in their final content; evoking, therefore, a form of loyalty which is "higher" or more "universalised", if in ordinary life less intense, than the loyalties which can surround the narrower groupings of clan or city. Historically this form of unity has "succeeded"; has proved its ability to resist pressure from without and disruptive tendencies from within; and in the development to which both kinds of resistance have contributed there has been fashioned, - in degrees which differ of course widely as between different nations, something we can only describe as national "character", or "will". It expresses itself in a "spirit and habit of life", which, whether we call it "sittlichkeit" or "higher patriotism" represents for the average individual the highest development of practical moral conduct yet achieved, and reflects in the nation the existence of a "self-sentiment" so far "unified" or "integrated" through "experience" that it can, in some degree harmonise both its "inner" and its "outer" life.

(1) Barker "Political Thought in England". p. 61.
(2) McDougall "Social Psychology". p. 263.
VI. The Sentiment of Nationality and Internationalism.

If the civilised world consisted of a number of nation-states amongst whom this process of self-development had occurred evenly and equally, and if also there had existed between them a prolonged period of uninterrupted peace, it is probable that the development of stable international institutions would present no difficulty. World conditions being as they are, the future of Internationalism is, it is clear, not deducible from any analysis of national sentiment as a general psychological fact. It is, as everyone realises, a problem primarily of practical statesmanship in circumstances of great complexity, and its solution immediately, and perhaps ultimately, is so obviously bound up with the success or failure of the League of Nations that any attempt to forecast it which did not enter into a wide discussion of particular circumstances would inevitably take on an air of unreality. Fundamentally, it is, perhaps, almost a truism to say, the success of the League must depend upon the degree to which the national self-sentiment, in those of its aspects which have been called here "separative," can be either

1. Professor Pillsbury, for instance, (Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism Chap.II, starting from the position that "the development of the national spirit has come about by a restriction of the natural range of the social instincts by training rather than by any unnatural extension of them," reaches the conclusion that "so long as disputes are being settled every day within the nations -- there is no occasion for regarding the solution of the problem of practical organisation of international judicial machinery as impossible."
qualified or (b) controlled: all its problems, including those of its own complete establishment, centre around divergencies of view and interest which issue from, and are in their force and direction determined by, sentiments of this character. Equally clearly again, this must depend upon the extent to which it comes itself, as a social institution, to be supported and sustained by a body of sentiment which can only derive from, and will in some degree reflect, the "character development" of the more advanced and more powerful of the nation states; but on the other hand it is perhaps no less true to say that this in turn will be largely conditioned by the extent to which the League is able through its own constructive efforts to lead world opinion in that direction. And as it is not part of the purpose of this essay to enter into so wide a question as the probable future of the League, it is perhaps best to conclude by noticing very briefly one or two of the general ways in which that "enrichment" or "enlargement," as it has been called, of the national sentiment which we saw to be associated with social progress within the nation, has been accompanied by movements which appear directly to favour the development of the international spirit.

Taking note first, however, of tendencies - evolutionary and historical - we find in existence among primitive peoples, motives and influences which tend to qualify even at that early stage the absolute character of the "severance"
imposed by the group sentiment. Thus for example, while "savages carefully distinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger"¹ the one being disapproved and the other "in most cases allowed and often regarded as praiseworthy"² yet there is sometimes to be seen a tendency to apply in external relationships the rule of "equivalence" or "lex talionis" which developed originally within the group: and "the reason for this may be sought partly in the strong hold which that principle has taken of their minds and partly in the dangers accompanying intertribal revenge"². The same admixture of influences - the extension, largely unconscious and always considerably qualified, of group standards of morality towards outsiders, combined with a wholesome fear of consequences - has led, it appears, in some cases, to various other forms of restraint in intertribal relations - the recognition of certain rights in time of peace³ and certain customary mitigations of warfare which it is instructive to compare with the growth of similar conventions between nations⁴ while in totemism, in at any rate one of its

1. Westermarck I. 331.
2. Westermarck I. 179
3. Westermarck I. 3343.
4. See Hall "International Law" These conventions as he points out (pp.5 and 13 and 14) have only in very recent time found expression in formal codes. Their existence was evidenced by authoritative usage and by the disapprobation which conduct in violation of them excited.

Thus for instance, until 1914 it was a generally accepted principle that "In warfare the measure of permissible violence is furnished by the reasonable necessities of war" (p. 410.)
aspects, there are to be seen the beginnings of an "occupational" tie cutting across that of the "kin"1, and exercising an influence which affords an interesting anticipation of one of the features of modern internationalism. And following the course of such expressions, in social and individual behaviour, of modifications of the group sentiment downwards to present times, we might conclude upon so broad a review that "the idea is gaining ground that the aims of a nation must not conflict with the interests of humanity at large"2; that conduct in violation of this principle is coming to be regarded as "inconsistent with the aspirations of a good man"2; and that "when the present high tide of nationalism has subsided - - the objections which are now raised against arbitration will appear almost as futile as any argument in favour of private war or blood revenge"3.

Historically regarded, however, it must be admitted the position does not seem so clear. Professor Ramsay Muir, for instance, sees, it is true, the nineteenth century as a period in which "despite the strength of the national idea and the increased definition it obtained"4 the spirit of internationalism - outside the "three linked predatory powers Germany Austria and Turkey"5 made "steady if slow progress",6 and concludes that civilisation is destined to pass "out of the age of the emergence of the nation-states - - into a new age, world-embracing in its scope"7. But

1. Haddon "Head Hunters" ch. II.
2. Westermarck 2. 185.
4. Nationalism and Internationalism p. 190
5. p. 199.
7. p. 224.
But Professor Muir wrote in 1916; today the truth seems rather to lie with Bryce, who, remarking that "seventy years ago -- it was assumed that every nationality, when it had secured its own freedom would sympathise with every other nationality, and be guided in all its actions by the love of freedom", notes regretfully the tendency for post-war national sentiment to "become infected by national vanity, which disregarding the sentiments of others, thinks only of itself."

Let us notice however that the development of thought in which, in part, national development has consisted, is not a national but an international fact. As Merz says "we can speak now of European thought when at one time we should have had to distinguish between French, German, and English thought." The nineteenth century he considers has developed a deeper conception of the unity of human interests - a development exhibited by individuals and peoples "in their combined international life!" And while we are now fully aware, as Buckle was not, that the issues of war or peace depend upon the growth of attitudes which cannot be fully expressed in terms of "love" of either, we must recognise, as he did, the force and bearing of this upon the national sentiment. It may of course operate, as it has done frequently in history, to supply new motives.

1. International Relations, p. 123.
2. History of European Thought in the 19th Century I pp 16/34.
motives to rivalry by widening the field of opportunity: may "intensify the difficulties of ethics" by "bringing into closer juxtaposition races -- not prepared by their previous history to live harmoniously together"\(^1\); or again it may "feed political passions and national hatred" by "massing mankind in great cities where thought is superficial and feelings can quickly be stirred by a sensation-mongering Press"\(^2\). But on the whole it is profoundly true that "of all the causes of national hatred ignorance is the most powerful"\(^3\) and that "the better one civilised country is acquainted with another the more it will find to respect and imitate"\(^3\). The mere growth of material culture and increased intercourse imply at least "relationships"; they mean of necessity that an always growing proportion of the people of any one nation are free, on the basis of experiences which, - through travel, sport, literary or artistic sympathies, or any of the innumerable other forms which intercourse may take -- are increasingly "individualised", to form so to speak their own "self-extensions" in relation to the members of another. Much of this is of course informal and indefinite, and amounts perhaps to little as against the "press-formed" opinions and attitudes which make

3. History of Civilisation I. 222.
make up the international education of the average citizen; but there is also the tendency, very rapidly growing, for "groups" of many kinds, which, because of the fact that the nature of the interests they "subtend" is specialised or partial, have been called here the "contained" groups, to extend beyond the national boundaries. Of these "group-extensions", each of them implying of necessity a marked modification of the national sentiment through the new and quite possibly "competing" allegiances it provides - incomparably the most important are the international developments of the labour and socialist movements, in which for instance Masaryk¹ sees a "natural antithesis to and corrective of national egoism and Chauvinism." Deriving as they do much of their unity from common sentiments of hostility to the existing social and political order it is impossible to foresee how far, in the processes through which they may come to "make their peace with patriotism," they will prove to be coherent; but it seems safe to say that because of them it will always be less possible than before for the workers of any country to think of international questions without something of that "dispassionate sympathy" which follows from "the limitation and suppression of counteacting emotions, and the extension of the imaginative realisation."

¹ The Philosophical and Sociological Basis of Marxism.
realisation of the life of others." From this point of view in fact all such group extensions are special phases or aspects of the growth of this "sympathy" which, furthered as it now is by many lines of deliberate or purposive effort may well come to create a group sentiment for civilised humanity as a whole.

Another main line of movement in which a development of internationalism seems to be inherently implied lies in forms of social organisation. To Green for instance "the source of war between states" lay in "their incomplete fulfilment of their function: in the fact that there is some defect in the maintenance or reconciliation of rights among their subjects". "The more complete that organisation (of state-life) becomes, the more the motives and occasions of international conflict tend to disappear." While we cannot quite echo Green's view that as governments become representative they are likely to "arrive at a passionless impartiality in dealing with each other," it is clearly hard to exaggerate the potential effects upon international relations of the fact that it is no longer possible within

1. Hobhouse "Development & Purpose" 178.
2. Of which by reason of its influence upon the minds of the coming generation the International Confederation of Students, with its aim of "developing and utilising the community of academic interests which ignore political and racial antipathies, and attract and bind students of all races" is one of the most noteworthy.
3. Principles of Political Obligation Lecture K.
4. p. 172
5. p. 179.
within the nation-state, for "the glory of its ruler or head -- to consist in the fact that -- many thousands stand ready to be sacrificed at his command for a cause which may be no concern of theirs"\(^1\); or of the allied fact that it is at least less easy for any individual statesman or dominant class to embark irresponsibly upon courses of action in regard to which, however little they might at the outset have expressed the popular will, national self-sentiment tends speedily to become involved. It is true of course that this may have the effect of lowering, in special instances, the ethical level of national conduct\(^2\); but on the whole it must be accounted a distinct source of gain that decisions affecting international relations are coming increasingly to be the "group-decisions" of really representative "cabinets." Not only will they as such tend to embody and harmonise a wider range of knowledge and interest and therefore to gain in restraint and stability, but the mere fact that international issues come to be recognised as so regulated must become, it seems probable, a factor in promoting confidence between peoples.

Of probably even greater importance however is the fact that national self-knowledge, increased as we have seen by the emergence and, in some degree, the adjustment, of group-contests within the nation, as well as by every

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2. See Sidgwick Practical Ethics, Chap. III.
every kind of international intercourse, may come in the future to be rendered vastly more extensive and coherent by the application of scientific thought to the problems of social life. Many of the more pressing of these problems are, as Wallas notices, universal in their range; and if, as seems assured, "the desire to comprehend the laws of the order of civilised society and of directing and controlling to some extent the forces that struggle and combine within it is destined to deepen and to spread," it can be realised only through attempts "in many countries and by many thinkers to see our socially inherited ways of living and thinking as a whole." All such problems in other words are not only common in many of their essentials to all nations, but, because of the deep interconnections of all aspects of social life, they all involve in different degrees the international factor; and as the need for their solution presses increasingly upon public attention we may hope to see amongst each of the separate peoples a growing identification of its self-interest with that of civilisation as a whole.

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All these lines of movement will it may be expected contribute to the growth of that world-opinion, already a recognised force in international politics, to the judgment of which each nation, regarded as a group-whole,

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1. "Our Social Heritage" pp. 24/5
3. Bryce "International Relationships" p. 21 calls the propagandism of the recent war "a war on opinion by opinion."
is subject, and to which, as its own self-consciousness and its consciousness of the deeper aspects of its relationships with other nations develop, it must become increasingly sensitive. From the standpoint of the individual this means and implies of course the emergence of many new problems of self-adjustment: there is a new with and wider "extension"/which conduct has to some extent to be brought into accord: and from one point of view the future of internationalism may be said to depend upon the degree in which this can be consciously and deliberately effected. But it will depend even more, if the account of sentiment-formation as given here is correct, upon "unconscious" self-integration; upon the tendency, that is to say, for experience, as it were, to "organise itself" and therefore for influences coming to bear upon the individual in one department of life to affect, by "summation", or rather by "fabrication", of their results in the self-sentiment, the quality of his relations in all others. Within the nation-group as we saw, the development of standards of conduct upon the existence and maintenance of which that type of group life depended, came it appeared inevitably to qualify the content of family life and the relations between the different classes; and while here there has all along existed the controlling, sustaining, influence of law and public opinion, it was not, we found, directly or entirely from these that the altered content arose. If, within the modern state, family life now stands upon a higher level than ever before - if the parents, - co-equal members in an ethical partner -
ship, now sacrifice their "personal" interests more constantly and more deliberately for the welfare of their children, it is because there have been developed, within the type of life which the nation-state has achieved, ideals which have become constitutive factors in the family "self." So far also, it may perhaps be said, as the conflicts and oppositions of classes tend to diminish in duration and intensity, it is because the sentiment for groups of these kinds have been similarly qualified. And in the same manner, and through essentially the same process the enlargement or enrichment of the sentiment for the nation-group must involve, it would seem, a tendency towards the emergence of new attitudes in regard to what Wallas\(^1\) calls "world-policy."

If then the efforts now being made, on a larger scale, and in the light of a more fully informed body of social knowledge, than ever before, can succeed in imposing effective institutional restraints upon the more extreme expressions of the national sentiment in what have been called its "separative" aspects, there are, it would seem, good grounds for hoping that there will follow a rapid growth in that "general will to peace" upon which, as Brailsford agrees\(^2\), the future of internationalism and the hope of the world are dependent. If the nation-states, in their various degrees

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1. Our Social Heritage p. 203.
of self-development can be withdrawn, even if only for a
time, from that vicious circle in which the "attitudes" which
lead to war are themselves intensified and developed by war:
if relationships on the basis of the "old diplomacy" with
its essentially separative conception of the "balance of
power" can be replaced by others based upon open treaties,
effective guarantees, and powers of arbitration which have
become virtually compulsory\(^2\) - given these conditions it
seems likely that the national sentiment, "self" sentiment
though it is, will become rapidly qualified in the direction
of a more highly formed national character. It is in the
continuous possibility of conflict which makes readiness for
self-defence the first of the moral obligations of the nation-
group that lie the grounds of that "paradox of the moral
consciousness" of which Hobhouse speaks;\(^3\) and if the "hind-
rances" to this hindrance devised in the "almost incredibly
favourable opportunity" of 1918\(^4\) prove effective, we may

1. See Chapter 4.
2. Professor Borchard, writing on "Permanent Court of
"International Justice" in the "Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science" (New York) July 1923
considers that "the court in fact is barred from obtaining
jurisdiction of those questions which commonly lead to a
disturbance of the peace, for the existing order of
international life is conditioned upon a continued struggle-
- for economic and political advantage which - - defies
judicial settlement."
3. As "nowhere more conspicuous than in the relations upon
which it insists within a well-ordered society and those
which it tolerates or encourages towards the foreigner".
(Mind in Evolution p. 382.)
4. Our Social Heritage" p. 200. Temperley (quoted Gooch History
of Modern Europe p. 677) considers that "so many vested
interests were challenged by the League and so many new
forces had been liberated in Europe which were
Note 4. continued.

were antagonistic to it that unless it had been made part of the Peace it might have been postponed for a generation."

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expect, it seems not too much to say, a substantial extension into international affairs of the standards of relationship which have been developed within at any rate most of the nation-groups themselves. Furthered and assisted it may be hoped, by that constructive internationalism of which the League can already point to a substantial record, and no longer impeded perhaps by the appeals of party or press to the motives of a narrower patriotism it might well come to establish a real super-national group.

In such a wider group the national self-consciousness and self-sentiment would not, it may be quite confidently stated suffer diminution or loss. No such group could indeed continue in existence if it were not sustained, as in fact the nation-group itself now is, by the contributory self-sentiments of many smaller groups, whose life would be at once harmonised within it, and enriched and extended through its organising influence. We should have in fact no empty or motionless cosmopolitanism but a living whole, an "association of nationalities" coming progressively to realise that high ideal of Mazzini's in which "Every people has its special mission which will co-operate towards the fulfilment of the general mission of humanity." Nationality would remain

1. Which may in a few weeks -- divert to world destruction national energies, which might have been used for world co-operation" (Our Social Heritage p.207.) Brailsford (A League of Nations.) says (p.27) that "on the outbreak of the war every expression of jealousy was culled from the British press, and every German knew by heart that monstrous leading article in which the Saturday Review called -- for a war with Germany" on economic grounds.

2. Life and Writings III. 33.
remain as "the conscience of the peoples - which, by assigning to them their part in the work of association, their functions in humanity, constitutes their mission upon earth, that is to say their individuality".¹ Or in the more commonplace language of psychology we should have a new group-self, wider than that of the nation, within which the older "separative" tendencies of the nations would come to find their moral equivalents, and conduct to be guided by a consciousness of, and a sentiment for the human race as whole.

¹. Life and Writings III. 129.