The psychological analysis of social structure

by

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It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world,...
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Notes and references
Summary of the argument

Chapter VI The study of the small group

183 Theories of the structure of the small group have been based upon an insufficient study of actual examples, and this defect has not yet been adequately supplied by social psychology.

184 The problem is initially one of method: the methods of study applied to the twofold relation can in part be applied to the small group.

185 The difficulties of these methods are partly those of introspection as a psychological method.

186 In social psychology, as in other sciences, practice and training result in increased power of observation.

187 Study of a relation through the observation of one's own mental states as a partner to it involves a special difficulty.

188 Study of a relation involves an attempt to apprehend separately and in relation to one another eleven distinct series of facts.

189 The attempt itself involves a further degree of complication.

190 (a) Study of a relation by a partner to it results in a change in the relation; but this may be regarded as an opportunity rather than an obstacle.

191 Such study requires happy opportunities and also a continuous preoccupation with the theoretical aspects of one's own social life.

192 (b) The one-sided view so obtained may be corrected by the study of a relation in which one is at the complementary point of view.

193 Such study is limited to the general aspects of each type of relation.
194. (c) The social experience of the observer may not be typical because of peculiarities.

195 (i) in the social responses of the observer himself,

196 (ii) in his social experience,

197 (iii) in the responses of others to him.

198 A threefold relation may afford one partner to it an opportunity of studying the relation between the other two.

199 Use may be made of written records of an actual relation;

200 but relations described in works of imagination cannot be used;

201 except as themselves raw materials of social psychology or for purposes of illustration.

202 A threefold relation implies three twofold relations, each based upon a twofold common mental frame,

203 but it cannot be fully described in these terms, since

204 (a) some elements in the twofold relations do not properly belong to the threefold relation at all,

205 (b) some elements in the threefold relation cannot be shown as elements in the twofold relations,

206 and (c) the same is true of the other-conscious processes involved;

207 therefore it is necessary to recognise its structure as involving one threefold and three twofold common mental frames.

208 These are not distinct and separate systems but aspects of personalities each of which is a unity.

209 If we try to separate them in thought, we must still think of them as closely interwoven.

210 In a fourfold relation there is a possibility of the
development of twofold, and threefold relations in addition to one fourfold relation.

211 Large groups admit of further subgroupings, not all of which are likely to develop separate common mental frames.

212 The proportion of the possible common mental frames which is actually developed depends upon the intensity and duration of life of the group.

213 Larger groups come into existence in two ways:

214 (a) Groups of more than two persons may (as in the case of the twofold relation) arise from similar or complementary responses to a common situation: but as the numbers increase this principle is limited in two ways:

215 (i) in most large assemblies a common mental frame of preformed elements already exists,

216 and (ii) in a large fortuitous assembly similar responses are practically limited to the primitive emotional tendencies.

217 (b) Groups may develop by aggregation:

218 (i) through the establishment of a link between a group and a person or another group outside it,

219 which may be temporary, or permanent, or may lead to the incorporation of one group in the other;

220 (ii) through the incorporation singly of further individuals in consequence of their similar or complementary responses,

221 the group which grows up around one central personality being a special case of this;

222 and (iii) through the transmission to individuals of essential elements in its common mental frame so that these become organised as elements in his mind.

223 Relevant mental structures, resulting from participation in the life of other groups, are already organised in the mind of a new member joining any group.
Membership of a group is frequently begun or continued as a result of external constraining circumstances.

The deductive line of argument so far pursued requires to be supplemented by an inductive argument based on an analysis of observed phenomena of group life.

Chapter VII  The mental structure of groups

The structure of the large group can be described as a common mental frame; and it results from similar and complementary responses to a common frame of circumstances.

There are two topics - the evidence for this view and its relation to other theories.

The phenomena involved are difficult to describe adequately, especially in restricted space.

The common mental frame of a group is the determinant of what we call its "atmosphere".

To join a group is to influence it as well as to be influenced by it.

Individuals differ in their social sensitiveness.

The process of the formation of a common mental frame may sometimes be observed.

Through the operation of the common mental frame a man may be adjusted to his company without the intervention of conscious processes.

The aspect of a man's personality organised in a common mental frame is called by William James a "social self".

Among the different types of group, the crowd has attracted particular attention.

McDougall's account of the crowd shows it as a special case of the operation of the principle of similar responses to a common frame of external circumstances.

The tendencies stimulated are necessarily of a
primitive character,

238 and involve some intensity of emotion,

239 and a crowd is necessarily unstable and fickle,

240 since in a random assembly of men there is no greater tendency to one direction of response than another.

241 The crowd is therefore not typical of social life; but McDougall's account of its genesis can be widened so as to fit other groups.

242 In ordinary speech the term crowd is applied to assemblies with a greater community of experience, sentiment, knowledge, interest and will.

243 A section of the community with such a degree of mental homogeneity, but without organisation, may be called a public.

244 These may be related in different ways to an exploiting organisation.

245 The procedure of the propagandist is an example of the exploitation of similar responses.

246 The army as a group of long standing and high organisation should afford decisive evidence for or against the principles here under discussion.

247 It will be sought to show that the cohesion of a military force depends upon its common mental frame (rather than upon other bonds which can be more easily observed), and that its common mental frame results from the similar and complementary responses of its members.

248 The success of an army depends upon its aim being strongly willed by all its members.

249 In the late war troops responded to authority differently at a base and with a unit in the line.

250 The same principle is shown in the behaviour of troops before and after the armistice.

251 The inhibition of fear responses is an example of the working of a common mental frame,
which may be introspectively detected.

The experiences of transition to and from active service conditions show the existence of a massive psychical structure related to these conditions.

It is possible to understand how the self instincts come to be organised as part of the common mental frame of the unit.

The sentiment of esprit de corps is the consequence, rather than the cause, of the group's cohesion.

Esprit de corps is developed as a part of the common mental frame of a group, and in consequence of the similar and complementary responses of its members.

The relative importance of the different elements in the mental structure of an infantry platoon will be illustrated by the detailed examination of a single incident.

An infantry platoon was successfully set to work under difficult circumstances.

The platoon had lost its cohesion as a result of the relative exhaustion of the impulses which had brought men into the army and the temporary development of negative impulses, especially towards authority in the person of the officer.

It regained its cohesion through a series of similar responses to the officer, in consequence of which it became again suggestible towards him, and was set to work by him.

This process, inexplicable in terms of authority, discipline, habit or esprit de corps, is easily explained in terms of the conception of a common mental frame, and a series of similar and complementary responses, involving a redirection of emotion and the establishment of a series of new habits, with a consequent period of vigorous activity and the recovery of its morale.

The army is the supreme example of anticipatory organisation combined with initiative; but because of its special character it does not afford good examples
Chap VII Sect 263

of the development of organisation and leadership from within a group itself.

Chapter VIII The deliberate adjustments of a relation and the development of institutions

264 Deliberate adjustments of one partner to the other made in the course of a relation will be made in terms of its common mental frame or in terms of its common form of expression.

265 Relations do not arise out of other-conscious processes, but vice versa.

266 though it is possible, if unusual, for a relation to be preceded by some degree of other-consciousness, usually on one side only, and usually more or less illusory.

267 A relation implies some degree of awareness of one's partner's mental structures and mental states as such.

268 Such awareness will fall far short of a full understanding of the relation and the sphere of adjustments based upon it is therefore a limited one.

269 An opposition is not only an occasion when an adjustment is required but also an occasion leading to increased other-consciousness.

270 An adjustment (and the other-conscious processes on which it is based) may be clearly expressed in conversation.

271 Allusions to another's mental structures and processes may not be well received, especially in circumstances of opposition.

272 Colloquially "I like this" and "This is good" are near to being equivalent phrases.

273 Adjustments can therefore be more profitably discussed and made in terms of a common form of expression than in terms of the common mental frame.

274 An adjustment of a common form of expression is necessarily an adjustment of the common mental frame to which it is related.
275 Collaboration in writing is a process of building up a common form of expression related to a common mental frame of which it is the expression.

276 The processes of agreement may be analysed in terms of the mental structures and processes of the collaborators.

277 An opposition may lead to increased self-knowledge as well as increased other-consciousness.

278 Since no such increase of self-knowledge or other-consciousness accompanies a concord the essential elements in a common mental frame, being based upon concords, may be entirely recognised.

279 This has important consequences for practice and theory.

280 The principle that adjustments are made in terms of the form of expression rather than in terms of its determinants is true not only of two persons and of large groups but of individual behaviour.

281 It applies in particular to the procedure of a committee.

282 Such procedure conduces to the formation of relations of the cooperative complementary type, or relations based on common or complementary ends.

283 These involve multi-determination.

284 The determinants involved may be classified as (a) expressed determinants,

285 (b) unexpressed determinants,

286 which may be related to the formation of parties,

287 and (c) unwitting determinants.

288 Oppositions arising out of the mental heterogeneity of a group may lead to deliberation,

289 during which the group will fall into parties with different plans,
290 and each plan related to a diversity of determinants
291 and possibly regression.
292 The breaking of a group into parties does not imply the complete disintegration of its common mental frame.
293 Discussion issues in a verbal formula,
294 which is an incomplete representation of the common form of expression to which it relates and consequently capable of a greater degree of multi-determination.
295 Such formulae, when related not to a single occasion of action but to actions of a particular type are called institutions.
296 An institution is related to determinants which may become more complex and of greater vigour while it remains unchanged
297 or which may lose their vigour so that it is abandoned.
298 An institution is relatively fixed, its determinants are continuously subject to growth and decay; its development (or its obsolescence) takes place by multi-determination and displacement.
299 The continued power of an institution to produce social results shows it to be still related to active determinants.
300 The principle implied in any institution is usually formulated in such a way as to imply an independence of subjective conditions which it does not possess.
301 Presumably some of the principles implied in institutions have such an independence and some have not.
302 Ethics may inquire which are morally obligatory and in what sense: psychology and social psychology may discuss their relations to other mental structures and the processes by which they come to be socially recognised.
303 An impulsion may (apparently for no reason but its intensity) generate a feeling that it is an obligation or a "right".
The principles implied in institutions may be classified according to their ethical and psychological status.

Those principles which are "felt" as obligatory are not first discovered to be so by philosophic reflection and then imposed from without but are developed by the group from within.

They are afterwards systematised by trial and error and by reflection.

Social interaction implies a further degree of systematisation and an increased feeling of obligation.

Institutions develop as a result of changes in the common mental frames to which they are related and as a result of reflection, not upon first principles, but upon the particular principles implied in the institution.

Common forms of expression which are the objects of explicit group discussion may be divided into three classes,

of which the first two are distinguished by ethics but not by social psychology whereas the third, the regulative form of expression, is marked off by a distinction of a different kind, the type of function it performs.

The common forms of expression to the achievement of which the activities of the group may be directed cannot be exhaustively anticipated but the institutional structure of the group may prescribe the order in accordance with which such expression shall be pursued.

Such a principle of order may be implied in the activities of a group without being formulated, and may be formulated as such ab extra.

Its formulation within the group may result in a similar manner from its being already implied in social behaviour,
318 and when formulated it is determined by the same dispositions which as elements in the common mental frame of the group already determine that behaviour.

319 Further examination of this process belongs to the field of historical jurisprudence, the procedure of which is an extension of the same social process.

320 The subject is also related to the topic of social transmission.

Chapter IX Group structure in relation to initiative

321 The phenomena of leadership in unorganised groups are related to (a) individual differences (b) similar and complementary responses.

322 Initiative may depend upon the priority, vigour and appropriateness of a response; it may be related to primitive passive sympathy and the self tendencies.

323 The individual who takes the initiative effectively on one occasion will in consequence do so more easily on subsequent occasions.

324 In cases in which there is hesitation between two patterns of action in each of the members of the group, decisive action on the part of one may determine the action of the others.

325 Such determination of the action of the group may be facilitated in some degree by the prestige of the person who seeks to give a lead.

326 but the importance of this factor should not be overestimated.

327 A more important factor is that he be recognised as having special knowledge or experience:

328 but the acceptability of the pattern of action which he supplied is related also to other factors.

329 In an unorganised group initiative may pass freely from one member of the group to another,

330 and facilitations of the initiative of this person
and that in relation to special types of situation may become organised as parts of the common mental frame of the group.

331 Initiative in different types of situation may come to be recognised as belonging respectively to different members.

332 A member prominent in more than one branch of the group's activities may come to dominate the group entirely.

333 The continuance of his power depends largely upon other-conscious processes.

334 It is likely to lead to some degree of opposition and perhaps to its organisation.

335 The case of the wiring party discussed in Chapter VII further illustrates these principles.

336 The continuance of the life of a group depends upon the adjustment of its responses to external circumstances; we have, therefore, to consider forms of expression originating with a leader (or would-be leader) from the point of view of their effectiveness as well as from that of their acceptability.

337 Routine responses may be based upon (a) innate tendencies, (b) acquired tendencies

338 and (c), in the case of group routine responses, principles belonging to the institutional structure of the group,

339 but a relatively novel situation may require that (a) someone devise an effective pattern of action, and that (b) it be adopted by the group.

340 In the case of individual action in a novel situation an effective response may result from processes of trial and error.

341 In the case of the group there is little possibility of the discovery of an effective response by trial and error.

342 In the case of individual action an effective response may result from reflection.
343 In the case of group action an effective response to a novel situation depends upon (a) the conceptual processes of individuals, (b) cooperation in conceptual processes, and (c) the acceptance by the group of a plan so devised.

344 The discovery of an effective response to a novel situation depends upon both acquired knowledge and innate ability.

345 Such knowledge and ability are differently distributed in different groups, and in the case of 'intelligence' these distributions can be studied.

346 A group will respond differently according as relevant knowledge and ability are relatively evenly or unevenly distributed.

347 The ability of a group to make effective responses to novel situations may be called the intelligence of the group.

348 Returning to a consideration of the twofold relation, we see that two persons may be relatively equal or relatively unequal in knowledge, experience, special capacity or general ability relevant to a common situation.

349 If they be relatively equal, a common plan, arrived at separately by each, may have similar conceptual determinants in both minds.

350 If they be unequal, the plan of the better equipped may be adopted by the other,

351 (a) because it is adequately explained to him;

352 (b) because he makes a rational judgement that the other is likely to devise a superior plan;

353 (c) because for inadequate reasons it appears to him to be a good plan,

354 probably in consequence of a process of suggestion,

355 but without an effective grasp of it;

356 (d) because of some degree of coercion.

357 All these modes of acceptance may be reproduced in a
large group on a single occasion,

358 each mode being characteristic of a sub-group, such groupings being subordinate to party groupings.

359 This principle applies in different degrees to different groups.

360 Procedure by similar conceptual processes or by conceptual cooperation is possible only in small groups of specialists.

361 The latter is the more usual process.

362 The methods of practical and theoretical corporate decision differ on account of their differing urgency.

363 The decisions of the deliberating and directing body may be accepted by the group in consequence of its organisation and discipline or through a party structure.

364 All the modes of acceptance described may be involved on a single occasion,

365 and the effectiveness of the group's action depends upon the extent to which it is based on the conceptual processes of those of its members who are fitted to arrive at a decision,

366 but whether these modes of acceptance result in the adoption of the best decision depends upon the structure of the group.

Chapter X  The transmission of forms of expression

367 In social psychology the term social transmission is to be preferred to the term imitation.

368 The term social transmission may be used to cover all cases in which two forms of expression, which are products of different minds, are so related that the second would have been in any way different if the first had not occurred.

369 There may of course be resemblance without causal relation and therefore without transmission.
370 The distinction is in psychological terms,

371 in terms, that is, either of (a) the determinants of the form on the two occasions of its occurrence or in terms of (b) the mental processes by which it has been attained.

372 Instances of transmission may therefore be classified according to the degree of likeness between these determinants and processes. Where these are perfectly similar, we have a case of production by similar responses to similar situations (a).

373 The example of another may result in a reinforcement of motives (β).

374 An example may show how conative states already actively seeking expression may be integrated; and an integration reached in this way may be one which (in the absence of the example) would presently have been discovered or it may be one which would not have been discovered without the help of the example, or it may be an improvement upon the example (γ).

375 The conative states themselves may be aroused for the first time by the sight of the example - the problem and the answer to it are presented together (ζ).

376 Such cases do not justify the assumption of an instinct of imitation and the process involved may be called reproduction by similar determinants.

377 Such reproduction results from similar processes of analysis and synthesis, which may be perceptual or conceptual, and which may be directed to the inter-relations of elements in the form of expression, to relations between the latter and some of its determinants, or to the inter-relations of the determinants.

378 When there are differences in the situations or in the mental structures of the two persons, a form reproduced in this way will be reproduced with some degree of change and adaptation; i.e., it will be reproduced by similar and dissimilar determinants.

379 Reproduction by similar determinants implies analysis where before there was synthesis.

380 Effective transmission requires a shortening of the
process by which similar determinants become focussed upon the transmitted form of expression.

381 The transmission of a form of expression implies understanding of the inter-relations of its elements, of the relations of these elements to their determinants and of the relations of these determinants to one another: in so far as there is a failure of such understanding there will be deterioration in the form or in its expressiveness.

382 A form of expression may be transmitted with substitute determinants and with a decrease or an increase of expressiveness; i.e. by multidetermination and displacement.

384 A form may be reproduced with inappropriate determinants and consequent deterioration.

385 Reproduction by inappropriate determinants is important because of its frequency rather than because of the value of the results to which it leads.

386 Deterioration in a form of expression may be due either to external circumstances or to mental factors.

387 In the former case recovery may be rapid, in the latter impossible. The maintenance, improvement or decay of a culture may therefore be related to the distribution in a population of innate special and general abilities.

388 An emotional state is normally accompanied by an expression which is immediately intelligible to an observer.

389 This implies an innate common mental frame in consequence of which the observed expression is immediately intelligible in terms of the observer's own organic sensations and emotional states.

390 Some instances of this process suggest that its communicative aspect is secondary, others that it is primary,

391 and that, as in the case of articulate speech, the medium of communication and the processes by which it is interpreted have been developed together.
392 This process of communication is usually called *sympathy*; and it can be brought under the general formula of reproduction by similar determinants.

393 It can communicate an infinite variety of shades of emotion but it cannot communicate any perceptual or conceptual material.

394 It is of social importance in three ways:

395 (1) It may lead directly to the transmission of emotional elements in the organisation of sentiments;

396 and this is of particular importance in the case of the mother and the child,

397 with important results socially and politically,

398 and sometimes with pathological consequences.

399 The process is also exploited by the advertiser and the propagandist.

400 (2) It may lead to imposing consequences by altering the balance between tendencies which are in equilibrium,

401 particularly in the education of taste.

402 In consequence of it political or religious conversion may turn upon apparently trivial incidents.

403 (3) It may be the occasion of trains of thought or imagery which are really the products of the mind influenced by it.

404 The transmission of a culture is nevertheless dependent upon processes of reproduction by similar conceptual determinants and therefore upon minds capable of such transmission.

405 The continuance of the advance in science and in economic and social developments has frequently been taken for granted.

406 Such a view is characteristic only of recent times,

407 and it ignores the conditions, external and internal, upon which the continued life of a society depends.

408 (a) The principal biological condition is not the
birth of a sufficient number of outstanding persons but the birth of such persons conjoined with a sufficiently high standard in the general population.

409 (b) The principal psychological condition of the transmission of a culture is its transmission by reproduction by similar conceptual determinants and therefore with unimpaired expressiveness.

410 Forms transmitted with impaired expressiveness may be socially useful and may regain their expressiveness.

411 (c) To be socially effective in the fullest sense a form must have full expressiveness for at least some minds and, except in the case of those simple elements of culture which are transmitted to all the members of a community, it cannot have full expressiveness for all the members of a community.

412 In respect of every form there will therefore be concentric circles of the community for whom it has degrees of expressiveness varying from full expressiveness at the centre and corresponding to the modes of its acceptance (sections 350-366).

413 Each member of a community occupies a different position relatively to such a centre in respect of each important part of a social tradition.

414 A social tradition is continuously renewed in the processes of development of young minds.
Chapter VI

The study of the small group

...the frame of social life...

But of this frame the bearings and the ties,
The strong connections, nice dependencies,
Gradations just, has thy pervading soul
Look'd through? or can a part contain the whole?
Chapter VI

The study of the small group

183 A number of theories have been put forward to explain the structure of the social group and the processes by which it comes into existence. These theories are all in different degrees psychological, though they have been more frequently developed by writers primarily interested in political science than by psychologists. In consequence of this, interest has been directed mainly to some problem of political organisation to which the treatment of the psychological problems involved has been subordinated; and, in hurrying on to these engrossing and in some cases urgent practical questions, the preliminary psychological inquiry has been scamped. The employment of a naive psychological account of social relations has also been rendered inevitable by the slowness of the development of psychology itself, which has not been until recently in a position to provide the political scientist, or the writer on jurisprudence, with concepts adequate to the psychological analysis of his data. Such criticism may be directed not only to such older writers as Hobbes
(who sought to explain human associations in terms of one natural tendency, fear) but also to much contemporary work in political science and in economics, work which in many cases has none the less a high value.

This defect has begun to be supplied by the writers on social psychology, but there has perhaps scarcely been time for results of permanent value to be achieved, and still less for them to win general acceptance with workers in other fields of social science. What has been achieved is a point of view the value of which is evident enough. What has been lacking has been a method of inquiry by means of which the study can be carried on in a vigorous and systematic way, and a sufficient basis of fact discovered. Given such a basis it should be possible to reach generalisations which will be more than acute but unsystematised observations of social life presented in a semi-psychological terminology, or interesting speculations which captivate the intelligence but do not put one's feet on the road to a progressive understanding.

In social psychology as in other branches of science the discovery of a sufficient basis of fact will require time, and the cooperation of many workers: and the development of the science will require the cooperation not only of psychologists but of specialists in the various branches of social science (section 21).
In the last chapter an attempt has been made to apply psychological methods of study to the relations which may exist between two persons. We may now seek to discover how these methods can be applied to the investigation of the small group and whether any of the concepts used for the description of the structure of a dual relation are of use in the study of a more complex system of relations. There is the possibility that an understanding of the small group may be a step on the way to the understanding of larger associations, that the understanding of the small group may prove to be the key to unlock some of the problems of human society. In any case there is here for social psychology the advantage that it is possible to apply to the small group some of the methods of psychological inquiry which we have already used in discussing the twofold relation.

Before attempting to do so it is desirable to review this procedure and to note the particular difficulties in the way of it. As it is the projection into a new field of the procedure of psychological inquiry, and its peculiar difficulties, we may begin by considering these shortly in so far as they are relevant.

As the observation and study of one's own mental states occupies a central position in psychology so it
must also occupy a central position in social psychology, for the relations which are most open to study are those in which one is a partner, and the groups which are most open to study are those of which one is a member: and in either case the psychological processes must easily observed and studied are one's own. The difficulties and paradoxes of a mind which is its own object of study - which is at once the observed and the observer - have been discussed at great length. They are projected - and with new complications - into the further field of social psychology. In either case such observation is a matter of everyday occurrence: before we become psychologists we are already amateur observers and students of our mental states, including our mental states in relation to our fellows.

186 The field of such amateur observation is greatly widened by psychological training, in the course of which appropriate concepts and principles are acquired." Otherwise unnoted incidents of psychical life attract attention and acquire significance. The process is parallel to that in any of the sciences - the process for example by which in geology a fragment of stone, without interest or meaning for the casual observer, becomes for the student of geology the topic of a lengthy argument reaching far
back in time, and far outwards to surrounding geological formations. It is also possible that the field of introspection is widened in consequence of practice; or at any rate that a new mental agility is acquired by which the attention alternates rapidly between a normal and a psychological point of view. In any case it is quite certain that, as in other branches of science, "A fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees"; and in consequence the psychologist is able by such means to extend the effective area of his self-consciousness, so as to become aware of tendencies of which he would otherwise know nothing, and to detect otherwise unsuspected relations between conscious states in themselves easily observed, or between such conscious states and external events or past experiences. This can again be still further extended by the technique of following up lines of association from easily observed mental events suspected to have special significance.

187 These methods of study may be applied to one's own experience as a partner to a dual relation or as a member of a group; and no new principle is involved in such an application of them. If they are regarded as valid for other psychological purposes they must be regarded as valid for this: if their validity elsewhere
is questioned, their validity here will not be allowed. But in making such an application of them one has not so far passed from the territory of psychology (which includes the study of the individual against the background of his social environment) to that of social psychology, which is concerned with the structure and processes of a relation, or of a group, in a way that transcends the point of view of an individual partner or member (section 119), and seeks to apprehend the mental processes and evaluations of each of the persons concerned as equally parts of one sociological situation which comprehends the relevant states and processes of both or all of them. In other words I have made no progress towards a sociological view of the phenomena until in my study of a relation to which I am a partner I have escaped from my personal point of view as a partner to it; so that we have the paradox of social psychology (somewhat similar to the paradox of psychological inquiry mentioned in the preceding section) that I cannot know directly the mental processes involved in a relation except in so far as they are my mental processes as partner to it, and that I cannot understand the relation except in so far as I can view with detachment the mental processes of the partners to it of

\[\text{For example, by the behaviourists.}\]
whom I am one. Otherwise my report is not an account of the processes of the relation but is itself a part of the processes of the relation, not a scientific description of the relation but material, useful in combination with other such material, in working up a description of the relation which may have scientific value. Whoever goes astray through not heeding this may comfort himself with the thought that he *errs in good company*; for the rejection of all the so-called sociological treatises in which it is conspicuous would considerably lighten our shelves. But we ought not to reject them; we ought to retain them for use in building up our picture of the society of which their authors and readers were members. They are at least raw material for a history of movements of opinion and social aspiration. As for the error itself, though it is a dangerous trap for the unsuspecting, there is a way round it which is possible, if a little difficult and troublesome, and the most well-beaten part of it is the road which every psychologist has to tread in learning to regard his own mental states with a detachment which is necessary for the pursuit of his science, and which is hardly to be learned from any other line of study.

138 Before proceeding to indicate by what measures we may safeguard ourselves against this pitfall it is desirable to define more exactly the difficulties that
are involved. When as a partner to a relation I set out to study the relation as such I am attempting to apprehend the following groups of facts separately and in relation to one another:

(a) A particular group of facts or circumstances external to myself and to the relation - the frame of external circumstances of the relation.

(b) My own understanding of these circumstances, i.e. my sensations, perceptions, affective and conative experience, judgements and processes of self-criticism and volition as related to these; or, shortly, my response to the circumstances.

(c) The corresponding mental processes which make up my partner's valuation of the circumstances; that is, my partner's response to the circumstances.

(d) My cognitive, affective and conative experience in relation to my partner, the perceptions and feelings and impulses with which I react to him, and to what he says and does; that is, my response to my partner.

(e) My partner's corresponding mental states with regard to myself, and my actions and words; that is, the response of my partner to me.

(f) The background of past experience which shares in determining my response to the circumstances and my response to my partner: shortly, my relevant past experiences.

(g) My partner's corresponding mental structures; that is, my partner's relevant past experiences.

(h) My understanding of my partner's mental processes, that is, of his response to the circumstances, his response to me and his relevant past experiences (c, e, and g, above); that is, my other-conscious processes.

(i) My partner's corresponding understanding of my mental processes (b, d, and f, above); that is,
my partner's other-conscious processes.

(j) The modifications of my response to the circumstances (b), and of my response to my partner (d), which result from my other-conscious processes.

(k) The modifications of my partner's response to the circumstances (c), and of his response to me (e), which result from his other-conscious processes.

189 All these are distinguishable aspects of a normal relation, a relation between two persons engaged in some process of common living, neither of whom has sought to pervert or complicate it for purposes of psychological or sociological study. When one of them is a psychologist, interested in the theoretical aspects of human relations and using his experience as the material of his study, there is added to all of these items a twelfth - the mental processes in which the psychological observer endeavours to become aware of each of these eleven aspects of the relation. And if he becomes critical of his own attempt to do so and endeavours a critical assessment of it, I suppose we must add an unlucky thirteenth - the processes which make up such a discussion as we are engaged upon in this section. It will however be sufficient to limit our consideration to the first eleven categories without going on to describe the mental interactions of a pair of social psychologists, each, by a superhuman division of attention, engaged in
processes of the twelfth and thirteenth types, while they jointly decide upon bacon and eggs or finnan haddock for breakfast.

The reader may also be spared an extension of the above table to the case of a relation between three (even non-psychological) persons; for it is evident enough in what way the further complications come in. A mathematician would easily ascertain the increase in the number of categories for larger numbers up to that of a meeting of the British Association, or, indeed, the population of these islands: but such a calculation would be entirely fallacious, since it is obvious that as the size of the group increases many of the logically possible categories are eliminated, since only a small proportion of the members of a group of any size secure such prominence that all the others have any clear awareness of them as individuals, and these in their turn have a clear apprehension of only a small number of their fellows; and the larger the group the more true this is.

190 How far may a partner to a relation apprehend separately, for purposes of psychological study, the eleven aspects of it which can be distinguished? Of the psychical structures and processes involved in the relations between two persons, the only ones which are
open to easy observation are those which are lighted up by self-consciousness and other-consciousness. An account of relations limited to these would as we have seen be a very imperfect account of the structures and processes involved. We have therefore to consider what means there are of pushing observation further.

(a) The first difficulty that will occur to the reader is that the relation which is being studied is itself altered when a new aspect of it is apprehended. A corresponding difficulty is a commonplace of psychological study: how can a mental state be studied when it is altered by the mere fact of being observed? And to this there are at least two practical answers: (i) that it may be observed and studied during its process of alteration; and, (ii) that it may be studied in retrospect. Whatever difficulties these answers may have to meet in general psychology, there is a rough satisfactoriness about them for our present purpose. Thus, in the course of a discussion of plans with my friend, I may be annoyed by his apparent wrong-headedness; this annoyance may not however prevent the development of an other-conscious process by which I become aware of his point of view; my anger undergoes a consequent modification, and I proceed to attempt in a more intelligent way to make him see the situation as I do. There seems to be no reason why I should not note,
if not that I am annoyed, at least that I have been, and also the relation of the subsidence of my annoyance to my increase in understanding of its occasion; and I ought to be able to observe directly the process of subsidence itself.

If, instead of altering his point of view, I make some change in my own in consequence of my becoming aware from his remarks of some element in the external circumstances which he has noted and I have not, some interpretation of them which I have missed, or some other possibility arising out of them, then I may well be able to observe this process of modification of my own views as it takes place; and I should be able to distinguish my own original response to the circumstances (b), from this further light upon them which brings me nearer to an adequate view of them (a), and some elements in my partner's response to the situation (c), which his remarks have thus revealed to me; with a little care I may notice also the part played by my first annoyance, an element in my response to my partner (d), his patience with me or his similar annoyance (with which I have had to deal tactfully), elements in his response to me (e); I should be able to trace out in my past experience some of the determinants of my own responses (f), and, if I am intimately acquainted with my partner, some of the
determinants of his \( g \); I should be able to see what part has been played by other-consciousness on both sides, \( h \) and \( i \), and to form some estimate of the modifications of our responses which have resulted, \( j \) and \( k \). Thus the change in the relation consequent upon the attempt to study it is not so much a difficulty as an opportunity; and it should be possible, in consequence of it, to see something of the relation as it would have been in its absence as well as the mode of its actual development.

191 It is true that to carry out this requires happy opportunities of observation which must be waited for.

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\(^1\) So far as concerns the distinction between the external frame of circumstances \( a \), and the response which the observing partner makes to it \( b \), we may note that it is a normal part of psychological procedure to distinguish between a relatively objective and a relatively subjective valuation of a situation, as when in the laboratory we study the valuation of two lines as differing in length when the measurement shows them to be actually equal; and this attitude is readily carried over into normal life as when we find a dish at table unappetising and explain this response in terms of our physiological state instead of in terms of a misjudgement of the cook's. The making of such distinctions between an objective and a subjective judgement of an external fact may be facilitated by the circumstance of a social relation as when one partner finding a room chilly ascertains that his companion finds it comfortable and an appeal to the thermometer leads to a comparison of its verdict with the sensory experience of each.
It requires also a strong interest in the problems of relations, if such opportunities are to be recognised and used, such a division of attitude maintained, and one's observations made as full as possible. It is necessary indeed that throughout the course of one's social living one should be continually interested in the theoretical problems of relations as well as occupied with the interests which make up the relations themselves. No doubt this has its disadvantages, but here as in other fields of observation increasing insight comes with practice; and this is its reward.

192 (b) Although it is possible in this way to see something of each aspect of a relation in which one is concerned, it remains true that only a very one-sided view of the relation is obtained. This one-sided view may however be corrected by a parallel study of two or more relations so chosen that the observer occupies a different viewpoint in each. Thus I may set beside the relation between myself as a subordinate and my official superior, another relation in which someone else is subordinate to me; I may study a relation in which I am receiving instruction, or advice, or material help, along with one in which I am giving instructions, or advice, or material help; and so on, with an inexhaustible
number of applications of the same principle.

It should be noted that I do not merely add to-
gether the knowledge obtained from an experience of each
side of the relation. Rather an experience of one side
of it lights up in an entirely new way the experience
which I have of the other side of it. To have acted as
a teacher, is to understand in an entirely new way the
attitude to me of my teacher in any relation in which I
have been a pupil. Such understanding has not only
theoretical but very great practical value. I may re-
call here a remark made to me by a Company Commander
with whom I served in France. He had been acting as
Battalion Commander during a morning's manoeuvres and,
impressed by the experience, he said: "to be able to
perform the duties of any command efficiently you should
have some practice in the duties of the command immediately
above you". One does not always find arrangements
made to secure this advantage; but there is a general
recognition of the advantage of experience in the whole
succession of posts subordinate to that which a man is
himself finally to occupy; and the value in either case
lies in the increased power of seeing a situation from
the point of view of your subordinate or your superior,
as the case may be, as well as from the point of view
which you yourself occupy.
193 It is of course true that only general aspects of each type of relation can be elucidated in this way. A circumstance peculiar to a particular given relation which eludes my understanding will not necessarily occur at all in another relation of the same general type in which I happen to occupy the complementary position to that which I occupy in the first. This limitation is however an advantage rather than a disadvantage of the method so long as it is the general and typical structure of each relation that we are trying to make out; that is, so long as we are interested in the theoretical aims of a social psychology. If our aim is practical - for example the adjustment of a particular relation which has gone wrong, as in the practice of psychotherapy - then it is quite another matter; and though such generalisations as we are concerned here to establish may be of value in such a case, it is the relation in its concrete detail that we must have revealed to us. And this seems to require an observer external to the relation with access to the minds of both the partners to it.

194 (c) The only person whom the investigator has an opportunity of studying in a large number of relations is himself. There is the obvious possibility that his social responses may not be typical, and that generalisations
based upon them may not be of wide application. There is the further possibility that individual differences in respect of social responses may require the recognition from this point of view of a number of character types, and a corresponding number of types of relation; and such discrimination will be possible only on the basis of an intimate study of a large number of individuals, and by means of a method admitting of the study of individuals of varied endowments and experience.

So far as error due to peculiarities of the character and circumstances of the observer are concerned there are three main possibilities:—

(i) Peculiarities in the character of the observer himself of such a nature as to render his social relations non-typical.

(ii) Peculiarities or limitations of his social experience.

(iii) Peculiarities in the responses which he evokes in others.

195 (i) In the meantime, since we do not know at all accurately what constitutes a normal social response, it is impossible for the observer to know whether his case is typical or not. But we cannot arrive at any such concept of normality of social response until we have the reports upon their own social responses of many competent observers. Such a concept is also itself open
to suspicion since we may expect to find here as else-
where, not two classes of normal and abnormal, but a
normal distribution of individual differences in respect
of each of a number of factors; and we should regard
such differences as important and valuable data, not as
an unfortunate obstacle in the way of a theory which seeks
to ignore them. If then the relations that an observer
describes are typical of social relations in general,
the observer has performed a valuable social service in
the development or a general sociological theory: if they
are not typical he has still performed a valuable service
in revealing to us a social experience different from
that of most of the rest of us. But if he doubts the
normality of his own social experience because he cannot
find in it the processes recognised by some writers on
the subject, he may yet be quite right in rejecting their
theories rather than his experience.

196 (ii) Much the same must be said of the observer's
social experience. There is the possibility that this
may be insufficiently wide, or not typical, or peculiar
in some way. But such as it is, it is the social ex-
perience of an actual member of the community to which
we belong, it is an actual fragment of the living tissue
of our society; and the mistake would be to refuse it,
not to accept it for what it is. But once again we should not generalise from this fragment taken by itself as to the nature of all the rest.

197 (iii) An observer's social experience is just as likely to be abnormal on account of peculiarities in the ways in which people react to him. There is a story of a king who suffered from the illusion that all his subjects were permanently bent forward at the waist, because he never saw them in any other position. A somewhat similar misunderstanding must arise in the case of individuals of unusual physique or physiognomy. I remember meeting on a social occasion a gentleman in a high position who is of exceptionally imposing personal appearance and authoritative manner and noting with some amusement the deference paid to him, and to his most commonplace remarks, by persons some of whom were certainly much abler than himself. To be met continually by such automatic deference must result in important modifications of character, so that a man's social relations become non-typical in consequence of unusual factors on both sides of the relation.

Exactly the same is true of other physical peculiarities. Thus an individual's appearance may be such as to evoke a domineering or a protective response. Just as
the man of large physique and impressive countenance is immediately listened to, so a man of insignificant appearance has difficulty in attracting attention. He may make up for his unimpressive appearance by some exaggeration of emphasis or gesture in order to call attention to himself. Unless he does this very skillfully, he is likely to be reacted to, not only as unimportant, but also as unpleasantly assertive. And so his social relations become doubly non-typical.

These are extreme and obvious cases that lie open to observation from outside; but they may serve to suggest that we shall not have an adequate light upon this question until we have analyses of their social experience from a sufficiently large number of observers.

198 It is to some extent possible to study relations to which one is not a party by observing both the partners to the relation. Such observation must necessarily be interpreted very largely in terms of the results of the observer's study of his own social relations. It is therefore not an independent source of knowledge in such a degree as it at first appears. Here also insight increases with practice. But there is another difficulty. Prolonged and intimate observation of a relation from outside is only possible when the observer has a high
degree of intimacy with the partners to it; and such an intimacy renders him in fact a party to a threefold relation of himself and the two persons whose relation to one another he is seeking to study. What we should say therefore is perhaps that a threefold relation sometimes affords one partner to it a good opportunity of observing the relation between the other two partners.

It is unnecessary to enumerate the different difficulties that lie in the way of this kind of observation. It may however be pointed out that the interpretation of such observations will be liable to error in so far as the observer interprets them in terms of his own social experience, if his own social responses are different in type from those of the subjects of his observation. There is in such cases a possibility of error, but there is of course also an opportunity - the opportunity of comparing two types of social experience and of ascertaining how far his own responses are typical.

There is of course the possibility of submitting both partners to a relation to a process of analysis and there can be no doubt of the interest and value of such a double analysis.

One has frequent opportunities of studying a relation on the basis of a description of it by one of the partners to it. This is most likely to occur when the relation
involves some intensity of feeling for that partner, as for instance when the partners are at cross purposes. The view of a relation so obtained is usually in need of correction in the light of other observations. What is given in the story of the partner to the relation is not an objective account of it but a picture of one side of one of its processes of dislocation or readjustment, it is a part of the communicative partner's response to the other and, as such, is a picture of the other as he appears to the communicative partner and not as he is. Its value therefore depends upon the extent to which it can be set against and compared with a more detached view of the relation, which includes its other aspects.

199 Use may be made of written records of an actual relation. These may include letters written during the course of it, a journal kept at the time, or a written record of it made by one of the partners to it at a subsequent time, or literary works related to it produced by one of the partners and expressing part of his attitude in it. Such material may be available in cases in which the inquirer is a partner to the relation, in cases in which one or both of the partners to it can be further studied, and in cases in which no evidence other
than documentary is obtainable.

Written material may also take the form of written records made by someone else, as in biography and history. Such records will usually include or be based upon letters or documents coming from the partners to the relation, or reports of their spoken words, or the observations of those in personal contact with them. The intervention of the mind of a recorder or a biographer or historian obviously imposes caution in using such material, and necessitates an attempt to separate record from interpretation. Psychological considerations may also require to be preceded by the application to the material of scholarly criticism, for instance of the technique of the historian.

200 Descriptions of relations are to found in literature, particularly in drama and the novel. Such material may certainly embody the results of very acute observation, but it cannot be immediately used for psychological purposes. There is no doubt that it includes many accurate observations of relations which the author has observed or to which he has been a partner; it is also quite obvious that dramatists and novelists have very much the advantage of psychologists in their ability to represent the features of a relation in the medium of
words; and it is certain that many of them have shown very great ability as observers of the mental processes both of themselves and of others. But the results of their observations are recorded, not for a scientific, but for an artistic purpose. It is an artist's business to set out his matter so as to appeal to the emotions of his reader; and to this artistic purpose distortions and heightenings of his actual observations are not merely permissible but are actually obligatory. Such distortions and heightenings render his work in the main useless for our purpose.

Furthermore there is no means to hand of distinguishing passages of works which are relatively accurate records of observed relations from passages and works which are purely imaginary, and as such belong to the category of reverie and phantasy, a record not of the world as it is but of the world as the writer would have it - at least in imagination, and in the mood of the moment. Though certainly not lacking in psychological interest from a different point of view, such writing is as little useful for our present purpose as is a poet's description of the phoenix or the unicorn for zoology.

Again, painstaking "psychological" studies of relations, particularly in contemporary fiction, despite their careful assumption of a guise of objectivity, may
be no more than elaborations of phantasies arising out of the writer's own social experience and portraying a relation as it appeared to himself as a partner to it. As such it is of course not an account of a relation at all but an elaboration of a part of what we have distinguished as the fourth aspect of a relation (section 188) - the response of one partner to the other. Since to such distortions and elaborations are added the distortions and elaborations legitimate in an artistic work it is difficult to find any firm ground here for the study of relations.

201 All this is not to exclude literature from psychological consideration - or even from consideration within the field of social psychology. It is merely to refuse to accept the dramatist and novelist as observers whose records of social process may be taken at their face value and put in evidence in the court of science. Literary works are themselves social facts, resultants of social process, and therefore primary objects of psychological study and analysis. But when I read one of the war novels the vogue for which is happily passing I must read it not as an authority for the relations between soldiers on active service, but as evidence of a curious phase of public literary taste during recent years, a phenomenon of which I should be glad to have a
fuller understanding.

Novel and drama have however one legitimate use. If it is desired to illustrate a conclusion which has been reached from direct observation of relations, it may be possible to find in a work of imagination a case sufficiently close to the observed processes to serve as an illustration in the expository phase of an argument. It may at least, if it is a well-known work, save a long description of an actual incident. It is also likely to be much better done: and that is surely an advantage as legitimate as if a zoologist who could not draw very well availed himself for purposes of illustration of a painting of an animal done without a zoological motive but faithfully portraying the features to which he wished to draw attention. Perhaps even this is better avoided: but if literary work is used at all it should certainly be used for purposes of illustration only, and not ad dogmata confirmanda.

202 We may now consider how we may apply to the three-fold relation the methods just described, and how far we may explain it in terms of the concepts developed in the previous chapter.

Let us suppose three persons to be on terms of intimacy, and, while following their separate vocations,
to live together from choice. There is then established a threefold relation which may be an object of study to any one of them, if he happens to be interested in such problems as we are concerned with. The threefold relation might immediately resolve itself for his consideration into three twofold relations, each of which could be described in terms of its own common mental frame - his own relation with each of his partners taken separately, and the relation between his two partners, which he could observe from the outside. The study of each of these three relations might follow the lines already indicated in our discussion of methods. Thus his own relation to each of his partners is a relation which can be studied in the same way as any twofold relation to which the observer is a partner; and the relation between his partners is a relation to be studied by observation from outside - a study which their common life should give him sufficient opportunity to carry on.

Let us suppose that we have in front of us a description of these three twofold relations made in terms of the concepts we have used in describing the twofold relation and as full as these terms will allow. We should then have for each pair an account of the following factors:-
(a) The appetitive responses of each to the other, whether positive or negative; and assertive, submissive and protective tendencies.

(b) Cooperative relations, whether based on similar or complementary responses, or on common or interdependent ends.

(c) Regulative secondary structures superimposed upon the common mental frames in which the responses of the appetitive and cooperative types are organised.

(d) Other-conscious processes, and elements in the common mental frame of the two partners resulting from the other-consciousness of one or both of them.

We should thus have a system of such structures, that is, a common mental frame, for each twofold relation. What we have to inquire is: How far is the sum of these three accounts from being a complete account of the threefold relation? Or in other terms: Can the threefold relation be fully described in terms of the three common mental frames of the three twofold relations?

204 (a) First we may note that some elements in their separate twofold relations are not truly part of the threefold relation at all. If A and B are in the habit of going for a swim before breakfast while C sleeps on, or if B and C are accustomed to play a game of patience for half an hour after A has gone to bed with a novel, or if C and A occasionally indulge in a mild gamble with-
out paining B by allowing their naughtiness to come to his attention, then each of these activities belongs to one of the twofold relations and constitutes part of its common mental frame, but it does not enter into the threefold relation at all. Of course if A and B are in the habit of teasing C at breakfast about his lie-abled habits, or if A, B and C discuss at intervals the ethics of betting, the teasing and the discussions belong to the threefold relation although the swimming and the betting do not.

Secondly, the three separate accounts of the three twofold relations taken together would in some cases fall short of an adequate account of the threefold relation. Let us suppose a situation to which each of the three makes a like response, let us say the arrival of a wine-merchant's letter informing them that a further supply of a wine with which they would like to stock their cellar is available at a favourable price. To represent their common pleasure in terms of three twofold relations involving three pairs of similar responses is certainly a clumsy, and perhaps an inaccurate, description, - clumsy, because it appears to indicate three pairs of responses when there are only three responses, that is three hearts beating a little faster, and three slightly heightened blood pressures; inaccurate, be-
cause it suggests that the responses are made in pairs whereas each responds separately to the news, and the concord of the responses is at once a concord of three. We should therefore describe it as a threefold cooperative relation based on like responses to a common situation.

205 (b) We may take an example in which a description in terms of three twofold relations would fall short even more seriously of an adequate description. Let us suppose the three persons to be in the habit of playing trios after dinner. This activity is obviously an example of cooperative behaviour involving complementary responses. But it would be impossible to describe it in terms of three twofold relations. There is for example one form of expression for all three - the piece of music which at any time they are engaged in performing - and that form of expression involves a programme of activities any part of which implies for its completion the activities of all three players. Such a relation is then an example of a threefold cooperative relation based on complementary responses (section 131).

Instances of threefold cooperative behaviour of the third and fourth types (sections 132 & 134) would certainly be present in the threefold relation which we have been considering. It is however unnecessary to set out
examples of them here. Enough has been said to make clear that cooperative, if not appetitive, relations may exist between three persons in such a way that the structure of the threefold relation requires to be described in terms of a threefold common mental frame, a mental organisation involving structures in all three minds which together constitute one functional unit.

206 (c) We may, thirdly, illustrate still further the inadequacy of an analysis of the threefold relation into three twofold relations by considering the part played by other-conscious processes. There are of course other-conscious processes directed to the regulation of each of the three twofold relations; but each of the partners to the relation may have developed other-conscious processes related to the common mental frame of the threefold relation, as for example when he considers a possible item of the common menu or a topic of conversation or a musical work for performance after dinner in relation to the taste or digestion or interests or prejudices or musical skill of one or both of his partners; and similarly for any other rearrangement of the habits and ways of living of the three of them.

207 The conclusions of this argument may be summed up
by saying that in analysing a relation involving three persons it is necessary to distinguish:

(i) (a) The common mental frames which form the basis of the three twofold relations and which include in their organisations dispositional structures regulating in each case the twofold relation but not extending to the threefold relation; and (b) the other-conscious processes belonging thereto.

(ii) (a) The common mental frame which forms the basis of the threefold relation, and which cannot be analysed into parts which can then be exhibited as structural elements of the twofold common mental frames; and (b) other-conscious processes directed to adjustments of the threefold common mental frame.

The methods of such an analysis will obviously be similar to the methods described for the analysis of a twofold relation. But their employment will be more complicated in consequence of the greater complication of the threefold relation as just described. A partner to the relation will be able to analyse the threefold common mental frame, and the processes related to it, by the same methods that he would use in studying a twofold relation to which he is a partner; but there is the difference that, in this case, two minds instead of one are in interaction with his own, and are consequently known only through inference and not directly.
degree we misrepresent when we distinguish different aspects of them as expressed in different activities. John eating his dinner and John saying his prayers are both the same John; and the two activities are not referable to two distinct organs or faculties of John's mind which exist separately and independently, as a carburettor and a magneto exist separately in a car. What is true of John's individual activities is equally true of John's social activities. It follows, then, that, if John is one of the three persons in our last example, the twofold common mental frames and the threefold common mental frame of which his mental organisation is a part, and which are a part of his mental organisation, should not be thought of as distinct and separable systems. Thus we have here a repetition on the social level of the difficulty which we have already discussed with reference to a single mind taken by itself - the difficulty of finding language which will allow of the discrimination of different aspects of mental unity which are expressed in different activities, without letting that unity disappear into the background of our thought. While we cannot wholly avoid the difficulty - except by pulling ourselves up at intervals and reminding ourselves of it - we can go some way towards doing so by showing how mental structures, even in our abstract and unsatisfact-
ory way of representing them to ourselves, are inter-

twoven with one another.

209 The twofold common mental frames and the three-
fold common mental frame just described are closely inter-
woven in this way. We may see this by taking any element
in any one of them and tracing out its ramifications.
Let us begin with A's and B's morning swim. The habits
and sentiments concerned with it are part of their two-
fold common mental frame which is related to all the
activities they share together. The threefold con-
versations at the breakfast table are similarly related
to the threefold common mental frame of A, B and C. But
these conversations will presumably include references to
A's and B's early morning expeditions. We may imagine
C to make kindly inquiries as to the temperature of the
water or the condition of the weather, and also to take
the opportunity of a chilly morning to make some kind of
a counter-offensive against his teasing as a lie-abed.
These breakfast table conversations are related to the
threelfold common mental frame, both as determined by it,
and as determining it in turn: but they are also very
clearly related to the twofold common mental frame of
which the habits and sentiments related to the morning
swim are a part. Now these are certainly stimulated by
and share in determining the part played by A and B in these conversations. This is best described by saying that the twofold common mental frame and the threefold common mental frame are closely interwoven with one another although they are distinguishable structures, composed, so far as concerns the main outline of each, out of different elements.

We may make our explanation in another way. A is in some degree a different person as a result of his morning exercise - just as he is some degree a different person as a result of any other of his activities. He is a man in a different physiological condition, with a different muscular tone, a different endocrine balance and the like; he is similarly a man in a different psychological condition. But it is this so conditioned A who is present on each of the occasions of interaction of the group of three. It is an A so conditioned who expresses, and expresses differently in some degree on account of this conditioning, his pleasure in the wine-merchant's letter; and his expression of pleasure is again a factor in the building up of the threefold common mental frame. Or we may express the same truth with greater accuracy and generality by saying that the systems of dispositions which constitute the common mental frame of either of A's twofold relations are parts of his personality at all
times, including those times when he is active as a member of the threefold relation, and all his responses then, as at all times, are responses of a personality of which they are parts. It is therefore desirable to remember that the distinction we have made between the twofold and the threefold common mental frames, though legitimate for its purpose, is one which is easily capable of misconstruction.

210 With this caution we may now proceed to extend our analysis to relations of four or more persons. Let us suppose a partnership of four in place of the partnership of three which we have just been considering. It is a mere matter of arithmetic to see that if we take the partners in pairs we may now have six twofold relations, the common mental frames of which will be closely interwoven with the common mental frame of the fourfold relation in the way described in the last section. There is now, however a further possibility. Let us suppose one of the partners, A, to dine from home every Monday. On that evening there will usually be a party of the other three, the conversation and behaviour of whom will be in some degree different from that of the other evenings as lacking A's contribution to its wit or learning, its seriousness or its levity, and also as lacking what-
ever inhibitions his presence imposes. There will thus come into existence a common mental frame involving the three minds of B, C and D; and arithmetic shows a possibility of the emergence of three other threefold common mental frames in a group of four persons, combinations which will come into existence either (a) through the pressure of external circumstances as in the instance we have just considered or (b) through the arising of threefold cooperative responses out of their similar or complementary dispositions or common or interdependent ends. It is certain that each of these possible common mental frames will develop in some degree: but it is not unlikely that they will develop unequally, external circumstances favouring some of these combinations more than others, and some of them involving fortuitous concords of dispositions and others a less fortunate concordance or even some degree of opposition. The mental organisation of a group of four persons therefore involves a hierarchy of common mental frames, twofold, threefold and fourfold, all interwoven with one another, all developed in some degree, though not perhaps equally.

211 As the number of persons in the group is increased there is an increase in the number of possible sub-groupings. But with this increase comes also a
sudden increase in the disparity of their importance. A group of six persons will give us, according to the arithmetic of combinations, the possibility of fifteen twofold combinations, twenty threefold combinations, fifteen fourfold combinations, six fivefold combinations and one sixfold combination - a total of fifty-seven possible combinations. How many of these give rise to separate functional mental structures, so as to be actually distinguishable in terms of the responses organised in them, depends upon the nature of the group, the degree of intimacy involved, and the intensity, continuity and duration of its life.

This may easily be illustrated by examples. Let us first suppose six persons not previously acquainted to travel together in the same railway carriage for a couple of hours by previous arrangement and under circumstances conducive to general conversation - let us say they are invited to the same week-end party or attending the same conference. Such a group would have some homogeneity of manners and tastes, but perhaps little intensity of common interest; and it would be of short duration. It is highly improbable that the fifty-seven arithmetically possible combinations of the six persons would each result in the organisation of a recognisable common mental frame. An observer so placed so as to overhear all their
conversation might however readily detect the development of a common mental frame of the whole party, representing concords and compromises of their interests in the programme of the immediate future, politenesses appropriate to the situation of the moment, and responses arising out of the existing common situation. There may be no further development, but it is of course quite possible that more engrossing topics may be started. These may interest the whole party and hold it together, in which case, as agreements and differences of view occur, possibilities of the development of twofold, threefold and fourfold common mental frames may begin to appear. More probably the topics started will interest different persons in different degrees and they will presently be conversing in small groups, four and two, or three and three or even three pairs. This will involve some development of the corresponding mental frames; and since the groups may form and dissolve again, giving place to other groupings, there may be a beginning of other common mental frames also, corresponding to other combinations. It is however quite evident that only a very few of the fifty-seven possible combinations will give rise to any specialised mental organisation.

212 We may contrast with such an example a group with
greater intensity and longer duration of common life. The best example is that of a family held together by strong ties of intimacy, and not broken up by circumstances, or forced to endure very lengthy separations. In the case of a family of six persons there will certainly be a rich development of the sixfold frame on the one hand and of all the twofold relations on the other; and it may well be that a common mental frame corresponding to each of the fifty-seven possible combinations will develop in some degree.¹

Other kinds of groups are likely to be intermediate in intensity and duration of life between these two examples and in consequence intermediate in their degree of

¹Consideration of the family of which I am a member leads to the conclusion that of the fifty-seven theoretically possible common mental frames of the group (which comprised father, mother, son and three daughters) eleven may be regarded as having had no reality as separate working psychological structures; and of the remaining forty-six (all of which could be recognised) twenty-nine had a very strongly marked development and a vigorous life.

In the case of the staff of an university department, including the professor and five lecturers, that is six persons in all, I reckon twenty-four of the possible combinations to have developed some degree of common mental life including (a) the whole group (b) the five lecturers taken together (c) two groups of four (d) five groups of three (e) the twofold combinations, which must all be included since in a group of this size meeting continually each member must necessarily have some minimum degree of relation with every other, a relation which in particular cases extends to important official relations, cooperation in routine duties and voluntary intimacy.
development. In the case of groups with larger numbers of members the development of separate common mental frames will of course fall short of the increase in the number of possible combinations. Indeed as we come to the consideration of large groups we should expect to find that the proportion of possible combinations which actually develop common mental frames will become smaller, being limited to the common mental frame of the whole group, those of a proportion of the possible twofold relations, a much smaller proportion of the threefold and fourfold etc. and a few well-marked large intermediate groups or parties.

213 How do such large groups come into existence? Since we regard the common mental frame as the mental structure of the group we may put this question in the form: How do common mental frames involving such a number of persons come into existence? Consideration of this process as we can observe it in the course of everyday life shows that we must distinguish at least two modes (a) the formation of a group in consequence of the similar or complementary responses of a number of persons to a common situation; and (b) the increase in size of a group by a process of aggregation.

214 (a) In the case of the twofold relation we saw
that some common mental frames arise immediately out of the innately determined patterns of instinctive dispositions, and some out of situations leading to cooperative behaviour. In either case the initiation of the relation is in a situation in which similar or complementary dispositions are stimulated in both minds and express themselves in a unified pattern of activity, becoming in the course of that activity in some degree specialised to the relation, so that they work as a unified system or common mental frame, the unity and strength of which is increased with the increasing specialisation of the dispositions composing it.

Common mental frames involving more than two minds may come into existence in the same way. If two boys catching sight of an animal may be stimulated to chase it in concert, so may three, or four or a larger number. But there is an obvious limit, in the limitation of the human senses, to the size of the group that can be formed in this way - the limitation in the number of persons who can be simultaneously in touch through the senses with one situation, and also in touch with one another, so that their responses are made in awareness of the responses of their fellows.

215 The operation of this principle is in some degree
limited in another way. (i) Assemblies of persons in contiguity are either fortuitous or organised. In the case of assemblies resulting from some degree of organisation there is already present some kind of common mental frame in some degree regulating (except in the extreme case of its breakdown under such circumstances as those of panic) the response of the assembly to an unanticipated situation. In such cases therefore we do not have the birth of a new common mental frame but the rapid modification in new circumstances of one which already exists.

In the case of a fortuitous assembly which meets with a new or striking situation we may have a comparative absence of any such already formed common mental frame, though there are likely to be some preformed elements of one in any assembly of adult persons with experience of social life. Let us suppose the possibility of such a case. It is clear that, in accordance with the law of chance, the larger the assembly the smaller is likely to be the number of similar or complementary dispositions out of the stimulation of which a cooperative response of the whole assembly may arise. In other words, the smaller will be the number of situations which can lead to a response of the assembly as a whole and the consequent development of a common mental frame. Dispositions common to all human beings and therefore to all members of such
a fortuitous assembly include the innate dispositions and a few universal sentiments. A few further sentiments are very common. Such instincts and sentiments may form the basis of unified responses in even very large assemblies (the phenomena of crowds which we shall consider in greater detail later); but not even the instinctive tendencies can be regarded as absolutely similar and common factors, since they are built up into the developed character in a variety of ways, and are in consequence subject to all kinds of checks and controls.

216 If therefore we wish to find examples of unified responses on the part of comparatively large fortuitous assemblies, responses which result in the coming into existence of common mental frames, we must seek our examples in assemblies of the comparatively unsophisticated whose responses are relatively primitive; or, in the case of a more mixed assembly, we must exclude from our view those more sophisticated persons present who do not become one with the assembly in spirit, because their responses are of a less primitive character; or we must look for assemblies meeting in circumstances conducive to the breaking down of inhibitions due to education and maturity of character, and favouring a degree of re-
gression which causes primitive responses to be readily evoked in all, as happens for example in danger situations provocative of panic. Large groups with some degree of psychological unity formed in consequence of the similar or complementary responses of their members to a common situation are therefore phenomena which can be exhibited as instances of the same principle as small groups; but they may be regarded as abnormal rather than as normal manifestations of the principles which underlie man's social life.

217 (b) Groups may also develop by aggregation. This is a much more usual and familiar process. A common mental frame can develop in two directions. Already existing between two persons it can develop in the number and complexity of the dispositional systems it comprises as the relation extends to wider and more varied interests and activities (sections 139 - 141): it can also develop by extension to the mind of a third person; and as to a third so to a fourth, a fifth, and so on. The second of these two modes of development covers all cases of increase in the size of a group by aggregation.

We may distinguish three types of process by which aggregation takes place: (i) By the establishment through similar or complementary responses of a link between the
group as it exists and a person or group outside it. (ii) By the incorporation of an individual within a group through a process of similar or complementary responses so that his responses become organised in its common mental frame. (iii) By the communication to an individual outside the group of some habit, sentiment, belief or other mental structure forming part of the group's common mental frame, so that his mind comes to be organised as part of its common mental frame.

218 (i) We have seen that a twofold relation may arise in a situation which evokes similar or complementary responses in two persons. We can find a close parallel in a situation in which two or more persons, on one side, come into relation with one or more persons on another. Let us suppose two persons to be becalmed in a sailing boat. Desiring to return to harbour they begin to row. A third person approaches with a motor boat, perceives their difficulty and volunteers to tow them in — an offer which they accept. There is thus formed a threefold cooperative relation based on complementary responses; but it has this peculiarity that it is formed, not by the coming together of three hitherto separate persons, but by the development of a twofold relation into a threefold relation, by the addition of a third person.
There is first a well developed common mental frame of the two persons in the sailing boat - we need not ask what common interests, common sentiments or common experience already united them before they set sail a few hours before: we need only consider such a structure as would grow up out of the circumstances of the cruise itself, the purposes of the little expedition, their fulfilment or frustration, the failing wind, the need or desire to return to the shore, the labour at the oars. There is, secondly, the perception of their situation by a third person and his response to it. If we suppose him an entire stranger to the others, his response is not a response to this person or to that person: it is a response to two persons in a particular difficulty; it is a response to a group. Out of this response is formed a second relation superimposed on the first, when his offer is accepted. As A and B are already bound to one another, so is he, C, bound not to A or to B but to A and B as a group. Or we may express it thus: A and B are joined by their common mental frame to which C does not become a party; C is joined to A and B and they to him by a common mental frame comprising the dispositions active in the offer of a tow, its acceptance and the activities of carrying it out; the second common mental frame is, so far as A and B are concerned, closely interwoven with the
Now it is clear that there would be no difference in principle if we supposed three or more persons instead of two to occupy the sailing boat. If however we suppose two or three or more persons to occupy the motor boat there is a small difference to be noted. We have now two common mental frames which pre-exist the offer of a tow - the common mental frame of each boat's company - and there results a third, that which arises out of the responses to one another of the two groups; and this third is interwoven with both of the others, which however do not otherwise come into contact. We may then think of the two boats' companies as composing one group with two centres of mental organisation, with two well-developed and mutually exclusive common mental frames and a common mental frame of a less permanent character interwoven with and joining both of them.

219 In the example chosen the circumstances are such that the secondary or bridge common mental frame is outlived by the primary ones and discarded (a). It would not be difficult to find examples in which (β) the secondary common mental frame becomes a permanent bond, absorbs the more important energies of both groups and leads to the disappearance of the primary common mental
frames as separate and distinguishable organisations, (as when two business organisations or two political units begin to cooperate in a limited sphere, retaining at first their separate identities, and finally become merged in one another); or in which (γ) one of the primary common mental frames is subordinated to the other, and gradually absorbed by it, so that no trace remains of the earlier stage by which this process of development has taken place. And we should not omit the fourth possibility (δ), the continuance of a relation between a group and a person outside it who does not become a member of it, but maintains a continuous relation to it, as for example a patron of a society, a tradesman whom it employs, a subscriber to its funds who takes no other share in its activities and the like. A similar relation may be maintained in the case of a group.

220 (ii) The second type of aggregation is that by which an individual is incorporated into a group through the evocation in him by the situation to which it is reacting, of responses similar or complementary to those of the members of the group. If the appearance of an animal calls out the hunting impulse in three boys who catch sight of it simultaneously, that is a case of a
common mental frame arising out of similar responses. If, when the hunt is up, a fourth boy, perceiving the animal, joins in with them, he does so in virtue of a similar response in consequence of which he becomes a fourth member of the group: and we have an instance of aggregation by a similar response. We may call it an instance of aggregation by complementary response if we think of the boys as in some degree differently employed in seeking the common end, as when one pursues, one heads off and so on: and equally simple examples of aggregation by the other types of complementary response, common and interdependent ends, could easily be found.

It is more important to note that the same principle is at work in the case of larger groups. A number of persons with a common desire to play badminton have established a club: I, desiring to play badminton, seek them out and associate myself with them for that purpose. The same process may be observed in other types of association, and also in groupings based on interdependent ends. Thus, feeling hungry, I seek a restaurant - that is, a place for the satisfaction of this appetite provided by its proprietor with a view to pecuniary gain, on the basis of his knowledge that the occurrence of such impulses in the neighbourhood of his establishment will secure the creation of a network of relations such as that which I
establish with him by eating a meal at his table, and paying for it; and through him I also establish relations with his other customers, without whom, and their support of this restaurant by entering into similar relations with its proprietor (and through him with me), it would not be there to save me (and them) the trouble of carrying a packet of sandwiches, and eating them in the nearest public garden.

In the case of most associations this is disguised to some extent by advertising, proselytising and propagandist activities. It seems at first sight rather as if the association sought me out, and assimilated me. So far as this process is taking place it affords an example of the third type of growth by aggregation, the type which we are to consider next. But even where such processes are at work they are successful, partly, if not wholly, on account of the type of process just described. It is because I have already some desire to play badminton that a member of a badminton club will easily persuade me to join his organisation. And in the same way it is because I desire to insure my life that an insurance company's agent will succeed in persuading me to insure with his firm. Not even the assistance of the slickest of American publicity agents will enable a restaurant proprietor to hypnotise me into increasing
his turnover apart from some impulse of hunger arising out of my private physiological and psychological processes; though, by good cooking and service, and by tactfully drawing my attention to both, he may certainly induce me to go to his shop instead of to the one next door, or to spend more money than I should otherwise have done.

221 One special type of group requires mention in this connection. That is the group which grows up round one central personality. It is a group the firm part of the structure of which is the series of twofold relations to which this central person is a partner. Such a group will grow as further persons establish similar relations with its leader. The group has a second, but less important structure in the relations of the subordinate members with one another; and the neophyte, when smiled upon by the leader, will be received by them also - as Miss Mackenzie was received by the Stumfoldians when she had submitted herself with the required degree of respect to the object of their admiration and worship.

222 (iii) The increase in the size of a group through the communication to new individuals of the essential
elements of its common mental frame, the habits, sentiments, beliefs or other mental structures which give it its character and its existence as a group, is a topic which can only be glanced at here. It is a particular case of the transmission to new minds of common forms of expression, and it is the process sometimes spoken of as imitation but better termed social transmission. In a later chapter it will be dealt with at greater length.

The point with regard to it which has importance here, is the point already made (section 220) - that processes of propaganda, proselytising and advertising are scarcely to be regarded as a separate type of process by which groups attract new members, but rather as the facilitation of the relevant similar and complementary responses. What the propagandist, proselytiser, missionary or advertiser does may be better described as follows:- First, he discovers, by attacking all and sundry which individuals are automatically selected from the mass by their responses to the stimuli he uses, because they are actuated by dispositions which can be excited to cooperative responses in relation to his organisation; secondly, he makes his organisation known to such persons and, if possible, represents it as more attractive or satisfying to their relevant dispositions, or to other
related sentiments, than competing organisations; thirdly, by some degree of "education", he seeks to organise existing tendencies which are otherwise insufficient to lead to participation in his organisation, as when a new product of industry, not yet consciously desired, is given away in samples, or a new piece of apparatus is offered on trial, or demonstrations are given of its use, or information, or misinformation, is supplied which will make some kind of link between the individual's existing impulses and the beliefs or aims of the organisation; and, lastly, he may aim at some real process of education which results in the communication of forms of expression through which existing dispositions are more fully expressed and the personality reaches a fuller development, as in the training of a craftsman or a soldier, or the communication to fresh minds of the forms of expression of religion or art or science.

The last case is at once the most important and the most interesting. It is through these processes that the great religious organisations have grown up, usually founded upon the teaching of one man and practising and teaching forms of expression of which he was the originator. In the case of art and science the domination of the process by single highly originative minds is equally obvious though a different and usually narrower
or looser kind of organisation has resulted for their maintenance and transmission. This process has already been examined from the point of view of the individual (sections 104-110) and it will afford the subject of a later chapter.

223 Mention has been made (section ) of the pre-existence of appropriate mental organisation which forms an immediate link between a new member and a group with which he comes in contact and which he joins. Such structures are analogous in their nature, origin and function to the generalised common mental frames which were described in reference to twofold relations (sections 145-147). In general it may be said that each experience of participation in the life of a group will influence initial responses to a new group, and later responses as a member of it.

In some cases these influences will smooth the path of the new member; in others they will be unfavourable to it. Whether the influence of one group is related to another favourably or unfavourably depends upon whether the two groups are alike in their general sentiments, manners and standards. Membership of a golf-club is not necessarily a favourable preparation for membership of a musical society, so far as the technical elements of its
common mental frame are concerned; but there are
generalised elements which are common, and so far as these
are concerned the one is in some degree a preparation for
the other. The newcomer to the musical society must not
enter upon conversation on the assumption that golf is the
one sure conversational entry: but he will do well to
assume that an excessive self-assertiveness will be as
unfortunate in its consequences in the one group as in
the other. The separation of the generalised elements
from the specialised elements will be greatly facilitated
by a wide experience of membership of groups of different
types.

224 As in the case of the twofold relation, so in the
case of the larger group, membership is frequently begun
or continued as a result of external constraining circum-
stances. Such constraints on the free impulses of the
individual are more open to observation - and in particular
are more under the individual's own notice - than the
other bonds of the group. If I am compelled by some ex-
ternal authority to become a member of a particular
association, or to maintain my membership of it, I am
not unlikely to be more sharply aware of this compulsion
than of any of the other ways in which I am related to it.
It is, however, a great mistake to exaggerate the import-
ance of such constraints as social bonds. By themselves they would do little to hold social groups together, though they are important both because, properly exercised, they bring in the unwilling conformist, and because, improperly exercised, they excite the opposition of the unwilling conformist to a degree that may result in the collapse of the real structure of the group.

The limitations set by enforced contiguity constitute the simplest type of external constraining circumstances. Three persons in a railway compartment must come to some agreement about the window since it cannot at the same moment be shut up, in order that one of them may not get a chill, and wide open in order that another may not catch cold by infection. Dwellers by the same stream must seek new homes in the wilderness, or come to some agreement about water rights. We all of us find ourselves born into and growing up in a society which we must accept as it is, or, with great difficulty, exchange for another which we prefer.

The constraining force may be that of an authority external to the individual, and to the group of which he is forced to become a member. Thus a student may find himself compelled to join, or at least to pay a subscription to, an undergraduate society. In war the citizen may find himself compelled to join the army. The
constraining force may be that of the group itself, as when a trade or professional association enforces membership of itself upon all persons wishing to practice that trade or profession. Or the conditions under which I may become a member of a group may be previously laid down by the group, so that only by accepting them can I become a member of it, and some of these conditions may be such that, though I strongly desire to join the group, I may feel the imposition of them upon me as a limitation of my freedom.

The argument with regard to the structure of relations has so far been mainly deductive. Beginning with an account of the individual, we proceeded to inquire what consequences would follow from the bringing of two such individuals together. The deductive argument which followed was at every point checked against actual cases of twofold relations. Indeed it was deductive in form rather than in reality, since the conclusions so set out were ones which observation of actual twofold relations forces upon us. But a deductive order is a convenient one for setting out such conclusions in an orderly manner. The procedure in treating of larger groups has also been deductive in form. But it has come much nearer to being deductive in fact
also. It has been less an answer to the question: If we examine larger groups, what mental structures do we find? than an answer to the question: If larger groups are similar in structure to the twofold relation, and if the concepts we have used in describing the twofold relation are adequate to describe the structure of larger groups also, what do we expect to find when we examine the larger group? Certainly we have checked up the answer so obtained in terms of examples of group life as realistic as possible, but it is necessary that this mainly deductive argument should now be balanced by one mainly inductive, that we should now turn to an examination of some of the more easily observed phenomena of group life in order to study them in the light of the principles at which our discussion has arrived.
Chapter VII

The mental structure of groups

A true community - a genuine frame
Of many into one incorporate.
Chapter VII

The mental structure of groups

226 It has been said that such an account of group structure as has been given must remain unsatisfactory until it is given the support of an inductive argument based on actual observations of the phenomena of group life. The aim of this chapter is to show that the structure of the group as known from such observations may be described in terms of a common mental frame, and that, as in the case of the twofold relation, the common mental frame of the larger group results, in the main, from similar and complementary responses to a common frame of circumstances. If it can be shown that the phenomena of larger groups can be described and explained in these terms, and that these terms describe it more satisfactorily than those hitherto in use, it is perhaps unnecessary to apply to it seriatim the other concepts developed in Chapter V, in order to show that these apply to it equally. This would be to go outside of the scope of this work, the intention of which is to
study in detail small scale social structure, and to establish in principle the possibility of using the concepts derived from such a study for the analysis of larger social units: its intention is not to make a formal analysis of the group - a task requiring the devotion to it of a complete work, and quite impossible as a subordinate theme in a thesis centred upon another topic.

227 The aim of this chapter so defined implies two closely related topics. (a) It must consider some sufficiently obvious phenomena of group life, and show that they afford support to the account of group structure which is being argued for: and (b) it must consider these phenomena in relation to some of the theories of group structure which have already met with acceptance. It must show, either that the hypothetical structures and processes assumed by these theories are only special cases of the hypothesis to be preferred to them, as of wider application (α); or that they are subordinate to the main framework of the group (β); or that they are unnecessary assumptions (γ). Thus Professor McDougall's account of the crowd will be regarded as in the first of these categories (α); his concepts of the idea of the group and the group spirit will be regarded as falling
into the second \((\beta)^{1/8}\), as also the more familiar phenomena of habit, discipline and authority; while it will be obvious that such a hypothesis as that of a specific inherited social or herd instinct is unnecessary if the cohesion of the group can be explained without it \((\gamma)^{1/7}\). With this purpose in view a number of different examples of group activity will be considered.

223 It is perhaps desirable to preface this consideration by confessing that such fragmentary descriptions of group phenomena as can be brought in for illustrative purposes are a poor substitute for first hand observation of group life. They must therefore be much less convincing than if a demonstration could be based upon some concrete example of group life, with which both writer and reader were intimately acquainted as participants in it. To represent the complex and subtle phenomena of the group in a verbal description, and to attempt to represent them in restricted space, are tasks the results of which are at best poor substitutes indeed for the proper basis of such an argument. Since they are phenomena which cannot be mechanically or statistically recorded, or brought into the laboratory for study, it is necessary that the investigator of them should continually observe and analyse these groups of
which he is a member — that he should sit on a committee, frequent the ball room, romp with the children less intent upon committee business, the pleasure of the dance or the fun of hide and seek than upon the psychological processes which underlie what is immediately heard or seen. If he can then make clear to another in abstract terms (with such concrete illustration as the circumstances admit of) the results of such studies, it is possible for the other to check up these conclusions in terms of his own experience of group life. Such a procedure is strictly parallel to that of analytic psychology which is in a similar difficulty — the impossibility of two observers studying the same mental process, and the consequent necessity of a procedure in which each studies his own mental life and they compare their observations, each returning to an examination of his own experience in the light of the recorded introspections of the other and the principles which they appear to him to exemplify.

229 If we inquire whether in our experience of social life we find any immediate evidence of the existence of a common mental frame, the answer is that the term may be a novel one but the phenomena to which it refers are familiar enough. We are aware of something which we call
the "atmosphere" of any group of which we become members. To enter a new group — it may be a committee, or a club, or a family, or a tea party, or a political meeting, or a city, or a university, or a profession, or a nation — is to be at once conscious of feeling "strange" or feeling "at home". Analysis of these states will very quickly show that they are related to the extent to which one can express oneself freely in the unfamiliar group. My feeling of "strangeness" is a result of the series of restraints which the group puts on my natural way of expressing myself until I have found my place in it. My sentiments, my manners, my modes of speech, my dress, my opinions may be sufficiently different from those common to the group to make me aware, not perhaps of the actual process of adjustment which takes place, but of the difficulties and restraints which it involves. Similarly, if I at once feel "at home", that feeling can easily be shown to be due to the fact that some part of my personality at once finds free expression in the group in question. In the one case my feeling "strange" is my awareness that my mental structures and processes do not immediately fit into those of the members of the group, that is into the common mental frame of the group; in the other case I have been so fortunate as to bring with me mental organisation — acquired in a similar
group, or through experiences similar to those common to the members of the group - which does immediately fit into the common mental frame of the group I am joining. It is possible that I may feel "strange" in a particular company and accordingly not seek that company again. It is also possible that I may feel "strange" at first, and succeed later in adapting myself, by assimilating the particular modes of response common to the group in question, as a school boy does in going to a new school, or a recruit on joining his regiment: that is, I may make myself a part of the group by assimilating the necessary elements in its common mental frame.

230 It is again possible that the processes of adjustment may be less onesided. I enter the group with manners or opinions or standards of value which are strange to it. Some of these I may impose upon the group so that they become part of its common mental frame, part of the system of ideas and standards which it takes for granted, or which it at least tolerates. The group is not something fixed to which I must conform; it is something to the making of which I contribute, as well as suffering its influence. In fact there is no group which receives or rejects me; instead there are some persons in intimate interaction with one another, of
whom I am one. This is quite clear in the case of joining a casual group of persons - for example three or four persons of one's own age or class already engaged in conversation in a railway carriage or a smoking room; or in joining a small formally organised group, such as the staff of a university department: where the numbers are larger it is not so evident, but not the less true.

231 All this assumes a normal degree of sensitiveness on the part of the individual taken as an example. It is quite possible for the person we describe as "thick-skinned" to feel comfortably "at home" in a group which regards him as an "outsider" and to which he is unable to assimilate himself. The other members of the group will, in such a case, probably take steps to make him aware of the difference between their view of the situation and his.

232 We may on some occasions watch a gathering of people become a psychological group as they discover a common mental frame through which they may express their impulses concordantly. A dance-room may sometimes afford an example.

If people meet for dancing who are in the habit of dancing, there is no evidence of the kind we are seeking.
The ballroom etiquette of the period is known to each of them, and also the dancing steps in fashion, and the normal programme of such an entertainment. That is to say, those who are assembled together bring with them (although they have never met before) the same standards of behaviour, etiquette and fashion, the same expectations of the events of the evening, the same motor habits, the same readiness to be pleasantly titillated, or unpleasantly bored, by the dance-tunes the band will play, (since in different ballrooms they have listened to the same tunes during the season), the same habits of emotional response, emotional expression or emotional restraint. Thus the responses of all these individuals are so moulded on the same pattern by their similar experience as habitual attenders at the ballroom that they do not need to create a common mental frame: they bring it with them ready-made.

We may find the example which we are in search of in an assembly, met together to dance, which has not such a ready-made common mental frame. Let the assembly be, not a meeting of dancers to dance, but a social function held by some group not primarily concerned with dancing - an old students association, the staff of a business undertaking or the like. Even here we must avoid as our example an assembly in which the atmosphere
will be determined by the section of it who are habitual
dance-goers. We may then find that there are several
well-marked stages in the process of "warming up", that
is, in the process whereby a common mental frame of the
assembly appropriate to its circumstances is created.

In a good example of such an assembly, people will
begin by talking to one another in small groups of more
or less intimate friends, each group eyeing the other with
a mixture of curiosity and the feeling states of super-
iority or inferiority. The newcomer finds - or thinks
he finds - all eyes focussed upon him as he walks across
the floor. He hastily attaches himself to the first
friend he sees, or, if he does not see a friend, to some
mere acquaintance, like a drowning man catching at a
straw. Thus, at this stage, there is gathered in one
place a company which is so completely without a common
mental frame that no one can behave naturally, and every-
one is conscious of an atmosphere of restraint or "stiff-
ness". Presently, when the band begins to play, there
will begin the process known as "breaking the ice". A
few of the bolder couples will timidly venture upon the
floor. Their action is to the others like a symbol
which says: "This is quite proper; you see, we can do
it with impunity". The ice being broken, the floor
presently becomes crowded, as other couples follow their
example, and the ordinary manners and etiquette of the ballroom become the established common mental frame of the company, and continue to regulate its behaviour throughout the evening. A third stage may follow when, towards the end of the evening, some of the more lively spirits throw off the restraints which the common mental frame has imposed upon them, and behave in a way rather less decorous than it would admit. This is, as it were, an attempt to break through the existing frame and substitute a new one, and it may or may not be successful.

233 A very interesting example of the common mental frame of a casual group, and the unconscious way in which it functions to control the individual's speech and behaviour, is quoted by Dr. Freud from Dr. Ferenczi:

At a social gathering some one quoted, Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner, to which I remarked that the first part of the sentence should suffice, as 'pardonning' is an exemption which must be left to God and the priest. One of the guests thought this observation very good, which in turn emboldened me to remark — probably to ensure myself of the good opinion of the well-disposed critic — that some time ago I thought of something still better. But when I was about to repeat this clever idea I was unable to recall it. Thereupon I immediately withdrew from the company and wrote my concealing thoughts. I first recalled the name of the friend who had witnessed the birth of this (desired) thought, and of the street in Budapest where it took place, and then the name of another friend, whose name was Max, whom we usually called Maxie. That led me to the word
'maxim', and to the thought that at that time, as
in the present case, it was a question of varying
a well-known maxim. Strangely enough, I did not
recall any maxim but the following sentence: 'God
created man in His own image', and its changed
conception, 'Man created God in his own image'.
Immediately I recalled the sought-for recollection.

My friend said to me at that time in Andrassy
Street, 'Nothing human is foreign to me'. To
which I remarked, basing it on psycho-analytic
experience, "You should go further and acknowledge
that nothing animal is foreign to you".

But after I had finally found the desired re-
collection I was even then prevented from tell-
ing it in this social gathering. The young wife
of the friend whom I had reminded of the animality
of the unconscious was also among those present,
and I was perforce reminded that she was not at all
prepared for the reception of such unsympathetic
views. The forgetting spared me a number of un-
pleasant questions from her and a hopeless dis-
cussion, and just that must have been the motive
of the 'temporary amnesia'...

That the desired thought so rapidly appeared
may be also due to the fact that I withdrew into
a vacant room, away from the society in which it
was censored.

We may note the following points in this example. A
group of tendencies, including the memory of the incident
in question, functioning in a perfectly normal manner
brought Dr. Ferenczi to the point of telling his story.
But presence in the group imposed a temporary censorship
upon it. The process being entirely unconscious, and
the repressive forces not coming into consciousness at
all, the result was an apparently unaccountable lapse of
memory. Dr. Ferenczi proceeded to recover by analysis
the lost memory, and with its recovery discovered also
the nature of the forces repressing it. Thus there was
laid bare a system of forces such as operates in all of
us in any group into which we come, but of which we are
not normally aware. When a man passes from one group
to another to which he is socially adjusted, there comes
into play the appropriate system of tendencies and in-
hibitions, which is the organisation of his mind as a
part of the common mental frame of the group into which
he has come, and a different aspect of his personality is
in readiness to be revealed in speech, gesture and action.

234 This process is very beautifully described by
William James in different language to that just made use
of. Every aspect of a man's personality which is re-
vealed in this way in one or other of the groups to which
he belongs, James calls a social self. Each of us, as he
points out is one man in one group, another in another.

Properly speaking, a man has as many social
selves as there are individuals who recognize him
and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound
any one of these his images is to wound him. But
as the individuals who carry the images fall natur-
ally into classes, we may practically say that he
has as many different social selves as there are
distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he
cares. He generally shows a different side of
himself to each of these different groups. Many
a youth who is demure enough before his parents and
teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among
his 'tough' young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command.

The advantage of our terminology over that which James uses lies in the fact that it emphasises and explains the relation of the social self to the group of which it forms a part. The activities of Jones's club social self are not merely the activities of Jones. They are, looked at from another point of view, a part of the activities of the club. The club, with its customs, standards, manners and the rest, has no existence except in the social selves of its members. The term common mental frame defined as we have defined it and used as we are using it, has the double advantage, that, when we are thinking of Jones it keeps present to our minds the relation to the group of this one of his social selves and the mode of its origin, and also that, when we are thinking of the group, it reminds us that the group has no other existence than as a series of mental structures in the minds of its members. As we have said before of the individual and the society of which he is a member, he is
a part of it and it is a part of him.

235 Consideration may now be given to the large, casual and temporary associations properly spoken of as crowds. The crowd has had much attention directed to it and the fundamental forms of human association have been sought in its phenomena. These phenomena attract attention and interest: they are at once imposing and bizarre. But they are also abnormal: we live our lives as members of social groups but we do not live our lives as members of crowds. A crowd is not so much an example of the normal forms of human association as an example of the temporary breakdown of the common mental frames in accordance with which the actions of its members would have been regulated had not circumstances led to its formation.

The aim of the following argument is to show that the crowd is in its structure and in the processes of its formation an example of the principle in terms of which we are seeking to describe all social groups.

236 In his discussion of the crowd Professor McDougall denies the application of the term in its psychological sense to "a mass of human being gathered together into one place within sight and sound of one an-
other" unless "the attention of all is directed to the same object". Any event capable of attracting the simultaneous attention of a casual concourse of persons may therefore be the occasion of their taking the first step to becoming a crowd. This must be followed by their experiencing "in some degree the same emotion", and "the state of mind of each person is in some degree affected by the mental processes of all those about him". "Those", he says "are the fundamental conditions of collective mental life".

It is quite clear that this account of the genesis of a crowd is simply a special example of the general principle which we are here concerned to apply to groups of all types - it is a case of a common mental frame arising out of similar responses to a common situation. A number of individuals respond in a similar way to a common situation, and their similar responses to that situation, together with their responses to one another's excitement, constitute a common mental frame remarkable in that it comes suddenly and unexpectedly into existence, that it is a common mental frame of a relatively large number of persons, and that it is of extreme shallowness, extending perhaps only to a single common element in the responses of a large number of minds.
Such similar responses must result from the stimulation of similar dispositions. Where the number of persons is large and their juxtaposition is the result of chance (and not of any process of selection according to the possession of this or that interest) the number of dispositions common to nearly all of them must necessarily be at a minimum - they must have in common no more than those innate tendencies which are universal and those sentiments which are formed in the mind of every or almost every member of their community.

One touch of nature makes the whole world kin,...

The touch of nature which will turns a casual concourse into a psychological crowd must therefore come from a common object of attention which will appeal to the primary emotions either directly, as the object of an instinctive tendency, or through a sentiment which is the product of some well nigh universal experience of the excitement of such a tendency; and it is an obvious corollary that a common mental frame produced in this way must be peculiarly shallow and peculiarly incapable of enrichment.

It is an equally obvious corollary that it must involve some intensity of emotion: for those dispositions
which are common to all the members of such an assembly and which are consequently the only dispositions from which similar responses of its members can be derived are dispositions which lead to emotional states of some intensity; also, since individuals differ in the degree of excitability of their emotional tendencies, the situation sufficiently striking to attract the attention of all, even the less excitable, members of a random sample of humanity, will be to the more excitable an occasion of proportionately more intense degrees of emotion; and, finally, the circumstances are such as conduce to the further intensification of these emotional states through the operation of primitive passive sympathy.

239 Thus if we define the crowd in this way - that is, as a relatively large number of persons, casually collected together, and similarly excited by an object or situation capable of attracting and holding the attention of all of them - and then apply to it the theory of a common mental frame arising out of similar responses, it is clear that the well known characteristics of crowds can readily be deduced from that theory. Crowds are without organisation, since they are born of the circumstances of the moment, and have no previous history as groups; they manifest emotions of primitive types, since only objects and situ-
ations capable of producing such emotional states can attract the attention of all members of an assembly selected by chance; they are unstable, since a common mental frame originating in this way has little depth or permanence - first, because similar responses link persons together much less strongly than complementary responses which render them interdependent; and, secondly, because (since we have seen the persons concerned will differ in their excitability) some persons will cool off more rapidly than others, and so the temporary homogeneity of experience and response will quickly be lost; they are fickle, since, being random samples of humanity, they have all the normal human tendencies in a normal distribution of excitability and persistence, and just as, to begin with, one emotional pattern would have been as easily excited as another, so when one has been excited, and the excitement has subsided, another, and perhaps an opposite one, is as easily excitable.

240 This last point is so important as the reason for this characteristic of crowds - a characteristic frequently commented upon, and familiar to everyone in consequence of its dramatic exploitation in imaginative literature - that it should perhaps be stated in more detail. In a fortuitous assembly each universal tendency
or sentiment will be present in all persons. But the excitability and persistence of each tendency will vary from person to person - thus one person will be readily moved to anger, another less so, a third only on extreme provocation, and so on. Could we assign a quantitative value to the degree of excitability in each case, we should no doubt find, when we assembled all these quantities, that they exhibited a particular statistical pattern, not improbably that of a curve of normal distribution. In a similar way one person would be found to differ from another in the persistence or transience of such an emotion when excited, and these facts might be exhibited quantitatively also. Since the man most easily aroused to anger is also, not infrequently, the man most easily appeased, and vice versa; while the contrary is also true in some cases, the same person would occupy in many instances very different positions on these scales relative to his fellows. Now exactly the same line of argument can be applied to other tendencies such as those of fear, wonder, elation, submission and tender feeling; and, if we made similar estimates in the case of each of these tendencies, we should presumably find that the individual who had a high value for one, either in respect of excitability or persistence, had frequently a low value for another in the same respect. Let us suppose
it possible to dress every member of a chance assembly in brightly coloured garments made of a striped material in which each emotional tendency is represented by a stripe of a particular colour, the intensity of the hue corresponding to the excitability of that tendency in that individual, and the breadth of the stripe to the persistence which that tendency usually exhibits in him. The assembly would then present to the eye the pattern of its possibilities of emotional excitement - and this pattern would be simply that of average human nature - the drab of everyday life, if viewed from far enough off to allow the colours to blend with the distance. Interpreted in terms of emotional excitability it would be, similarly, the emotional excitability of average humanity; and the assembly would appear as no more irascible than kindly, no more destructive than easily moved to awe and wonder, no more fearful than courageous, no more rebellious than amenable to leadership.

Let us now suppose each person's countenance on the excitement of any emotion in him to become at once coloured with the hue corresponding to it with a brightness corresponding to the degree of his excitement. An object or situation which excited any one emotional tendency in the assembly would then be visible as a sudden predominance of one colour, but individuals would
contribute to the predominance in very varying degrees according to the progress, intensity and duration of their excitement. As by hypothesis the exciting object or situation is capable of moving every member of the assembly in some degree, the crowd, for it would now be a crowd, would at once have a predominant colour. This colour would begin to fade out again with the passing of the excitement of those members of the crowd in whom it was least intense, or of least persistence.

If the situation and the excitement are such that the crowd begins to act as a corporate body, then that action depends upon the members' entering upon relations with one another involving complementary responses; these imply some degree of organisation and the crowd is therefore ceasing to be a crowd and becoming an organised body. If the crowd does not undergo such a transformation, then each of its members has experienced a response to some object or situation such as he might have experienced if he had been in the company of a few persons instead of a large number; the experience has been intensified by the presence of his fellows, and he has shouted or wept or shaken his fist along with them; and the emotional excitement has passed, leaving possibly a temporarily heightened degree of excitability, or perhaps a degree of excitability lessened on account of fatigue, but no other
result, and certainly no resultant structure capable of uniting him to his fellows for a longer period of time. The crowd as a psychological group has therefore come to an end (although the same persons are still present in the same place); and it has resumed the drab colour of everyday life which indicates a readiness to be stimulated in any of the tendencies, in the colours of which we have supposed it to be painted: and what we have seen is only one more example of the imposing result of the social organisation of a familiar tendency. Had the countenance of one member of the crowd been coloured with one emotion, another with another, so that the different kinds of emotional excitement were about equally distributed, its general appearance would have been as drab as before. But one kind of excitement was aroused in all, or aroused so as to predominate over all others, and its social organisation gives it this impressive character (section 70). It has passed and the assembly is once again no more irascible than kindly, no more destructive than easily moved to wonder and awe, no more timid than brave, no more seditious than loyal - as ready to be stimulated in a new way as to a repetition of the kind of excitement which it has just experienced.

241 The principal conclusion which I wish to draw from
this analysis of the structure and processes of the crowd is that the circumstances under which the true psychological crowd is formed are peculiarly unsuitable to the development of any but the most rudimentary social life and organisation. The crowd is therefore not typical of social life either among civilised or among primitive peoples, and the amount of attention given to it has, I think, given to social psychology a bias which has hindered the development of an adequate understanding of social life in psychological terms. In disentangling his own account of the crowd from some of the misconceptions which have resulted, Professor McDougall has correctly described its genesis and structure. He has done more than this. In the following sentence quoted from the pages in which he discusses the mental life of the crowd, he has stated the fundamental principle of human social aggregation in so far as this is not instinctive, that is, based on common mental frames which are innate; and his statement of the principle could be easily amended so as to cover them also: 129

The essential conditions of collective mental action are... a common object of mental activity, a common mode of feeling in regard to it, and some degree of reciprocal influence between the members of the group.

The principle seems to be unduly narrowed by two
terms which he uses. For, in the case of such instinctive relations as those of nursing and sexual union there is no common object, each partner to the relation having the other partner as the object to which his impulses are directed. Also, in the case of some activities based mainly on acquired tendencies, the mental processes and behaviour of the partners is related not to a common object but to a common form of expression, as when two or more persons sing or play together, act together on the stage, hunt together, fight as a body, work in cooperation and so on.

The definition is also unnecessarily narrowed by the use of the phrase a common mode of feeling, if this is to be understood as referring to the experience of similar mental states and similar impulses. In the case of the nursing instinct and the sexual instinct it is impossible for any one to make an introspective comparison of the related experiences, but there is no reason to suppose them entirely similar, and the impulses are certainly not so. In the case of the self tendencies it is possible to make such a comparison, and to see that the emotional states and impulses of a relation of assertion and submission possess elements which are not similar but complementary, and this even when the relation is for both partners suffused with tender feeling.
in the highest degree, and each in turn plays the assertive part in reference to the other. And we may assume that in other cases there is a similar combination of like and complementary factors, tender feeling being, for example, beyond reasonable doubt a normal element in the experience of both partners to the nursing and sexual relations, and in a very high degree.

I should therefore prefer a statement of this important principle in the following form:-

The essential conditions of collective mental action are, then, a common form of expression related to a common frame of circumstances, the experience of common or complementary modes of feeling and impulses, and some degree of reciprocal influence between the members of the group.

When amended in this way the statement covers all the types of relation which it has been found necessary to distinguish in the case of relations between two persons and, I believe, all the types of relation that it is necessary to make use of in the analysis of larger groups.

I could also wish that Professor McDougall had developed this conception with reference to some more normal type of human aggregation than the crowd. Its general application to all social groups would then have been more easily seen. To take the crowd as the starting point for studies in social psychology is to be in danger of being
deceived by a false perspective: but, if one first sees this principle exemplified in the processes of groups of a more normal character, there is no difficulty in seeing the crowd as another example of it.

242 So far I have used the term crowd in a strict sense which it has acquired in psychological discussion. In ordinary speech - and in some psychological writing - it has a rather different sense. It is used to refer to a large body of persons present in one place, assembled in a more or less casual manner and without explicit organisation but not necessarily without a much greater community of experience, sentiment, knowledge, interest and will than the universal instincts and sentiments which are the only common mental factors in an assembly of persons who have come together entirely at random. If the term crowd is used in this second and less technical sense, it refers to assemblies which have a greater degree of mental homogeneity, and, in consequence, exhibit a different level of corporate behaviour. Thus in a football crowd there is in each member some degree of interest in football, there are in different members sentiments of loyalty to the two opposing teams, there is past experience of attendance at such matches, knowledge of rules of the game and its etiquette, and so on. Such
an assembly may have no explicit organisation but it has already a high degree of implicit mental organisation which sets it far apart from the purely random assembly in which a common object of attention leads to a momentary common feeling.

243 This implicit mental organisation is independent of the possibility that the individuals involved have ever before been spectators at the same match. We may express this by saying that it is due to their being members of the football public, that is to their being persons each of whom has separately gone through experiences similar to the others - in watching matches, in discussing them, in reading newspaper reports of them. We may then define a public as a section of a community consisting of persons who share some more or less specialised interest or experience, but who are not explicitly organised in pursuit or expression of it. Thus there is the motoring public, the novel reading public, the theatre-going public, the sporting public, and so on indefinitely. The members of such a public are linked together in two ways. First, though they are never gathered into one place or organised from one central office, A knows B and C, B knows D and E, C knows F and G and so on in an unbroken series of personal relations in which
all of them are linked up. Secondly, their interests are usually exploited by an organisation which seeks its own ends with regard to them - the newspapers which publish the news this or that public desires, the business undertakings which supply the commodities or entertainments desired by others. These organisations will seek to strengthen and extend the implicit mental organisation of the public with which they are concerned.

244 A community consists therefore of a great variety of publics and any individual belongs to a considerable number of them. These publics differ widely in the extent to which they are organised by an exploiting body of some kind. They also differ equally in the extent to which they are spontaneous movements in the minds of their members, or social artefacts created by interested persons under cover of giving a spontaneous social movement a voice and an organisation. Underlying these differences is the general principle upon which all publics rest - the simultaneous responses of their members to similar circumstances. These circumstances are of two kinds - (a) those which give rise to the fundamental similar responses upon which the whole structure rests, and (b) those which are contrived by the exploiting organisation, its advertisements, displays, propaganda and
other means of social stimulation. On the other hand the relation of the exploiting organisation to the public exemplifies the fourth type of cooperative relation, the relation of interdependent ends, or sometimes (notably in the case of political agitation) a pseudo-cooperative relation.

245 The procedure of the propagandist exemplifies these principles. His typical procedure is to assemble a group of persons by some relatively crude initial appeal, the purpose of which is to bring them together to listen to him. He then proceeds to stimulate in them common sentiments and to make them mutually aware of their common modes of response to situations which are common to them - aware for example of a common grievance and a common irritation - and upon that basis he seeks to organise them as a group to pursue the particular object for which he is working.

Such a procedure, even if it leads to no explicit organisation, results in some modification of the mental organisation of the persons addressed. Sentiments of a particular character are impressed upon them; they are led to put certain interpretations upon their experience, to respond emotionally to certain catch-words, to nurse such and such hopes or expectations. Should this be
done on a large scale and such persons brought together in large numbers, either drawn by some public event or by the conscious contrivance of the exploiting organisation, there is an assembly of a very different character from the innocent chance assembly which we began by considering. The crowds and mobs of insurrections are of this type, not of the former one. They are possessed of this greater mental homogeneity, and there is in their minds some kind of aim or plan of action, some kind of common form of expression.

Thus the crowd (in the strict sense), the public and assemblies of members of a public constituting crowds or mobs in the ordinary senses of these words, can all be understood in terms of the principles here made use of.

246 It is now time to turn to an example of another kind. The social groupings which we have so far considered have been of a casual or loosely organised type: it is now necessary to consider the application of the concepts we are using to groups of long standing and a high degree of implicit and explicit organisation. There is no better example of such a group than a military force. Its purpose demands unified action, and unified action of a highly technical kind; and that action is taken in circumstances which put the very greatest strain
upon its cohesion. If the bonds of social groups are in their common mental frames, we should here find the strongest evidence in favour of this principle of explanation. On the other hand, the army, more than perhaps any other group, presents to the observation bonds of a different kind - a formal organisation of authority exercised through a hierarchy in which every man has his place from the commander-in-chief down to the latest recruit, a system of regulations in which the duties and obligations of each are exactly defined, supplemented at every point - by customs scarcely less rigid, a system of discipline whereby an individual who fails in the performance of his duties, or in maintaining the standards of conduct assigned to him by regulation or custom, is visited by penalties, ranging in severity from a trifling fine to sentence of death, a system of habits resulting from a severe process of formal training and ranging from the semi-automatic motor habits of handling arms, drilling or manoeuvring, to responses to a uniform or a badge of rank coloured by a specific emotional tone, a hierarchical system of sentiments of the kind usually referred to by the phrase esprit de corps, the sentiment for the section or platoon of which a man is a member, that for the company of which it is a part, for the battalion, for the brigade, for the
division, for the whole force, for the army in general. These are the bonds of unity of such a body that are most readily observed.

247 The positions now to be argued are two. In the first place, an attempt will be made to show that a description of a fighting force in these terms omits the principal condition of its cohesion, and that, in the absence of that condition, the structures just enumerated are insufficient to hold it together and maintain its power of unified action. It will be sought to show that this principal condition is a common mental frame which underlies these structures, and upon which they are built as a foundation, and of which they may therefore be shown to be in fact differentiations and elaborations. Secondly, it will be shown that the processes by which the more readily observable structures are developed are analogous to the processes we have already distinguished in describing the development of common mental frames in smaller groups, or in groups less highly integrated.

248 In support of the first of these positions I can quote again from Professor McDougall. Writing on this subject, he says:
That the success of its undertaking shall be strongly willed by all is perhaps the most important factor contributing to the success of an army;...

and he speaks of the practical recognition which this opinion has received from experienced officers, quoting a little later from Sir Ian Hamilton the striking remark:

...the army that will not surrender under any circumstances will always vanquish the army whose units are prepared to do so under sufficient pressure.

To add further quotations from distinguished general officers, ancient and modern, who have expressed the same opinion would not be difficult but might yet fall short of being conclusive. To report one's own similar opinion formed in the course of an experience of active service is only to add an inconsiderable item to the mass. Actual examples of the relation of military cohesion to this principle may be more to the point.

249 At one period during the war a large body of troops at one of the bases got very much out of hand. Disciplinary measures were taken which resulted, not in the restoration of order, but in what was practically a state of mutiny. Orders were disobeyed, troops refused to parade or to perform any normal duties, and, all other
means of dealing with the situation having failed, it was resolved to send them up the line to their units in the trenches as quickly as possible. The present writer had the duty of conducting a large party of these men, and the opportunity of observing their behaviour on the journey, and when they were absorbed in their units. No special supervision was exercised, no disciplinary difficulties occurred, there were no desertions, and the same men who had been the source of trouble a few days before, faced with willingness the labours and dangers of the fierce fighting which followed.

The explanation would appear to be in terms of some group of motives which were in operation in one situation and not in the other. Men had come into the army for a variety of motives, varying from a desire for adventure to a conscious resolution to take a share in beating the enemy, a resolution arising out of a sense of their duty as citizens. At the base the motives which brought the men into the army had no expression. Discipline at the base therefore depended upon authority, regulations, discipline, esprit de corps, tradition and habit. In the absence of other more fundamental motives these were insufficiently strong to secure the degree of order necessary to the carrying out of the normal programme of
When the men rejoined their units, the more fundamental motives again came into play and were expressed in each man's daily activities. They were sufficiently strong, in concert with the habits and sentiments derived from training, to make him face the hardships, labours and dangers of the front line.

It may, of course, be argued that the man who is at the base is not actuated by the sentiments for his regiment in the same way as when he is with his battalion, and that this sentiment is the strongest of those which we would include in the term esprit de corps. The reply is that the change from a mutinous attitude to a disciplined one was already evident as soon as the men were paraded to go up the line, and, secondly, that most of them were joining battalions of which they had not previously been members, and for which, therefore, they could not have any developed sentiment.

But a second example is even more conclusive. It was commonly observed in the armies that an extreme relaxation of discipline followed immediately upon the armistice, that is, upon the achievement of the end for which all were fighting. There were many cases in which units refused to obey orders, and very difficult problems of control arose.
A particular incident may be related. The writer has had described to him by an eye-witness the behaviour of a large number of men who had fought in Mesopotamia and who were collected in India to wait for transport to take them home. These men had entered the army for the duration of the war. Frontier trouble in India led the authorities to organise them as a force for frontier fighting. The troops immediately mutinied and maintained an orderly, passive resistance to their officers under leaders whom they had chosen for themselves. This resistance was so strong that it was quite impossible for the higher command to impose its will upon them, and they were shortly afterwards sent home and disbanded.

The deduction from this would appear to be as follows: Armies either in France or in Mesopotamia were willing to undergo the extremities of labour, danger and privation as a result of the separate desire of each man to take his share in beating the enemy, reinforced by esprit de corps, and such sanctions as the fear of disgrace and punishment, tradition and habit. The armistice made an end of the first of these as a motive, but the others remained. By themselves they were not strong enough to keep men to the performance of the normal duties of a soldier's life. It seems then a fair inference that the strength and cohesion of the
army was in these common purposes shared by every member of it, and that it was these motives which enabled a man to endure the much heavier burdens of the years of fighting: that is, the strength and cohesion of the army as a military force depended upon its common mental frame, the strongest element in which was the common purpose of its members.

251 I shall next consider the same principle in relation to the working of the common mental frame of a military unit which has come under fire. The problem here is how those tendencies are inhibited which, in such circumstances, we might expect to be not only strongly excited but violently expressed. Under fire a formation may maintain its unity (and, if making an assault, continue to advance, or, if withstanding an assault, hold its group); or it may disintegrate. That it shall be brought to do the latter is the aim of the enemy action directed to it, the infliction of casualties being a means to that end rather than an end in itself. And the excitement of fear and its expression, are, it will be agreed, the immediate causes of such disintegration when it occurs. The explanation of such phenomena is therefore bound up with the study of the factors which are related to the non-occurrence of fear responses in
such circumstances, the inhibition of them when they are incipiently active and the breakdown of the inhibitory forces which results in their being expressed with the consequent disintegration of the group.

I have never, I am happy to say, had an opportunity of observing troops under circumstances in any degree approaching panic; but no one of a psychological turn of mind could take part in operations under fire without reflecting on the factors which keep men to the performance of their duties unheedful of dangers which would be strongly reacted to in other circumstances; nor could one be unheedful of those small indications, either in one's own experience or in the behaviour of others, from which the nature of such factors may be inferred. Of the elements organised in the common mental frame of a military force, and active in determining its behaviour during an action, I am confident that the most important is the will to inflict defeat upon the enemy which has already been spoken of. Such a disposition, especially when reinforced as a result of the knowledge that it is strongly shared by one's comrades, is of course of itself a powerful inhibitor of competing negative tendencies such as fear. As to how far it is a sufficient one those with experience of active service will, I imagine,
differ quite markedly: for I have among my friends a former fellow student, with a brilliant record as an infantry officer, who, when I referred in conversation to the strain of active service as largely due to the almost uninterrupted conflict between fear and opposing tendencies which it involved, assured me that he had no such experience whatsoever. The personnel of any unit under fire may be presumed to vary, in the extent to which they undergo such a conflict, from the practical immunity from it of my friend at one extreme to a shrinking timidity at the other, prevented from passing into a complete state of terror only by all the inhibitory forces which can be brought against it, including the powerful exercise of active volition.

One among these inhibitory forces organised in the common mental frame of the group is that which on all occasions forbids to the soldier the expression of fear in speech or gesture. An obligation to control the outward manifestations of fear is part of the male tradition (civilian as well as military) in contrast with the female traditions; and it has no doubt a military origin. Among soldiers there is a perfectly clear distinction: no expression may be given to the emotion of fear under circumstances of danger, but on other occasions it may be freely recognised and discussed; and in fact a
special slang is developed for the purpose with a rich allusiveness to the concomitant visceral processes of the experience. This inhibition of the expression of fear is thus organised in the common mental frame of a military unit, and we may compare with it the inhibition of a certain range of conversational topics by a similar group structure in the incident quoted from Dr. Ferenczi and already discussed (section 233).

252 Its actual working may be introspectively detected. Let us suppose a subaltern to find himself in command of a section of the front line for the first time in his life. The circumstances are sufficiently strange and terrifying to waken in him the impulse of fear as he listens to the usual noises of a battle front and watches the enemy’s Very lights falling near, or passing overhead as enemy patrols creep nearer in the darkness. As his fear awakens he glances at a group of three of his men calmly keeping a look out and apparently untroubled. Because they apparently take the situation calmly, he does so too. Now it is quite possible that the men in question are going through an experience exactly similar to his own. The noise, the approaching enemy and the feeling of isolation of a modern battlefield give rise in them also to the impulse of fear; but they are con-
scious of the presence of the subaltern, not only as a representative of authority, but as a fellow human being in the same situation as themselves and apparently taking it calmly. The manifestation of fear by either party would thus destroy one of the inhibitory forces controlling it in the other; that is, a part of the common mental frame, and might result in the free expression of the spontaneous impulse of flight.

This example shows the working of one element in the very complex mental organisation which is built up in consequence of training and an experience of active service; and it is this mental organisation which enables men to undergo privations and dangers together which many of them would be unable to face separately. Panic and riot result from the failure of such mental structures under excessive strain. Thus we say of men who advance together, come under heavy fire and are dispersed, that they break. They do not attack as a group and run away as a group: they attack as a group, its psychological bonds are broken, each man finds himself as it were a solitary individual in extreme bodily danger and his impulse of flight overcomes him. It is quite unnecessary to appeal to primitive passive sympathy as an explanation of this sudden access of terror, though no doubt the intensity of the emotion may be in some degree increased
by this process: let the inhibitory forces break down under heavy fire and intense terror will spring full grown from the situation itself without such reinforcement.

253 The same principle may be illustrated by the phenomena of transition from a situation in which the inhibitory structures in the common mental frame operate to one in which they do not and vice versa. To proceed on leave from a combatant unit on active service and to return to it is to pass from the one situation to the other and back again. I can remember quite clearly with what trepidation on a particular occasion I walked down from the front line on my way to the leave train, although I had made my way over the same route and under similar conditions many times in the previous weeks without special tremors: but on these occasions I did so as a member of an organised group and under the control of its common mental frame, whereas now, proceeding upon a personal errand, I did so almost as a private person.

An equally uncomfortable period was the hour or so that preceded boarding the train to return, a period in which the conditions of life to which one was returning seemed sufficiently forbidding. To take a seat in the train and to be in company with other returning officers
was to be at once back again in the atmosphere of the expeditionary force, to be under the control of its common mental frame and to contemplate active service conditions in a professional frame of mind which accepted them as a matter of course. It is of course impossible to explain this in terms of primitive passive sympathy, since I have good reason to believe that my own experience was typical, in which case primitive passive sympathy could only have reinforced the avoidance responses of all concerned.

The general principle involved in such a transition may perhaps be described at greater length. Given two massive psychical organisations, to act energetically and decisively in expression of one of them may involve no feeling of mental discomfort. If, however, they involve strongly conflicting aims and standards, and if it is not possible to act immediately and decisively in favour of one of them, the period of indecisive action may be highly unpleasant: there is conflict, and, until a train of action begins in which one or other is being expressed, there is mental discomfort. This will be particularly so when the act contemplated is in violent contrast to one's everyday behaviour: one stands upon the brink waiting uncomfortably for the moment to take the plunge; and Shakespeare's Brutus in just such a situation says,
Since Cassius first did what me against Caesar, I have not slept.
Between the acting of a dreadful thing
And the first motion, all the interim is
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream:
The genius and the mortal instruments
Are then in council; and the state of man,
Like to a little kingdom, suffers then
The nature of an insurrection.

This is the mental discomfort of a change-over from one political (and moral) orientation to another. The case we have been considering involved the mental discomfort of the change-over from the older habits of a former civilian life to the attitudes of mind of a soldier on active service. This discomfort was not wholly, or even principally, that of negative responses to the forbidding prospect of a return to the field. It was rather the discomfort of the temporary conflict between the two massive psychical organisations, one of which was that part of the personality organised as a part of the common mental frame of the army. One's mental life could run quite comfortably on the lines of either of these psychical systems:

How happy could I be with either...

And so Brutus might envy Cassius his singleness of outlook and consequent mental comfort.

254 The process whereby the emotions of the self enter
into the common mental frame of the group is interesting. We may illustrate this also by considering the experience of the individual soldier. However he may separate his self-respect from the credit of his regiment, he is treated by others as its representative. He wears its uniform, and wherever he goes, it evokes in others responses which are not responses to his personality but responses to the regiment of which he is a member. Thus, even if he be sufficiently self-conscious and of a sufficiently unsocial disposition to endeavour to keep his self-respect separate from the honour of his unit, he will find respect paid to him as a member of it and experience positive self-feeling in consequence, dislike and contempt of him implied in the speech of its rivals, or those who have an ancient feud with it, and experience balked positive self-feeling and anger. It is largely in consequence of such experiences that the traditions of his regiment and the stories of its exploits come to have high emotional value for him, and its credit becomes his credit and his credit becomes its credit. Out of the ordinary motives of self-assertion and rivalry A seeks to "put down" B in a public bar. Out of the same motives a private of the Xshire Regiment sneers at a private of the Yshire, who in reply quotes some common gibe not at the individual but at his regiment. The retort is a comparison of what the Xshires
and the Yshires did in Egypt, or on the Marne; and presently both are deep in regimental history as it is known in the barrack-room, with the support of the other soldiers of both regiments who happen to be present; and in this way the sentiment for the self and the sentiment for the regiment becomes inextricably interwoven as parts of its common mental frame. The same emotions are excited in reference to self and in reference to the regiment; and the man feels himself a part of it, and it a part of himself.

We may note here a very common mistake made with regard to the sentiment called esprit de corps. It is frequently assumed that it is the basis of the mental organisation of the group and therefore the ground of the common responses of its members. Accordingly the leader may attempt to strengthen his group by fostering esprit de corps, by making formal appeals to group sentiment. Everyone can probably remember occasions upon which such appeals have been made to him and the rather uncomfortable feeling which they can produce. On the view argued for in this chapter esprit de corps is not the cause but the consequence of the group's cohesion. The group has esprit de corps because it is a group; it would be untrue to say that it is a group because it has esprit de corps.
corps. The problem for the leader of a disintegrated group is the problem of securing identities of response from its members, and the consequent formation, or strengthening, of its common frame of expression. If he can get that, *esprit de corps* (consciousness of the group as such, a sentiment of attachment to it and identification of one's self with it) will come of itself. But it must obviously be consequence and not cause of the group's existence as such. The group as a working psychological structure must exist first. You cannot be conscious of, or feel attached to, or identify yourself with, what does not exist. *Esprit de corps*, a conscious sentiment of attachment to a group, is a further reinforcement of its common mental frame. In the absence of a common mental frame the cohesion of the group cannot be maintained by it, for in the absence of a common mental frame it cannot come into existence at all.

256 Army training affords an interesting example since both processes can be observed side by side. On the one hand there is a deliberate attempt to foster the sentiment for the regiment. The recruit is for example taught something of its history; its prestige and the honour of being a member of it are impressed upon him. On the other hand, from the moment of their enlistment, a
body of recruits pass through a series of situations of a kind which inevitably produce identities of response and result in the formation of a common mental frame. They suffer the same disciplinary regulations, they parade together, they are drilled, instructed, disciplined by the same N.C.O.s; they undergo together the physical hardships of training and share the alleviations of military life. They get wet together, fall out or are dismissed together, respond together with identical feelings of tension or release to the command to march at attention or march at ease, or the permission to smoke or to use their water-bottles. They experience together cancellation of leave, variations of duty, orders for active service. They suffer as one man the fatigues of a tour of duty in the line, the expectation of relief, the dangers of an assault.

One may contrast here the very different feelings of a soldier for a depot battalion and for a combatant unit. The first formations of the New Army during the war consisted of men who enlisted together, underwent training together, went abroad together and fought together. Thus every man's personal fate - his hope of active service and his actual experience of it - was bound up with that of his unit. These battalions showed very strong individuality, very strong cohesion and very
strong *esprit de corps*. It happened in the case of some of the later formations that, having undergone training, they were retained in this country to supply drafts for the reinforcement of the units already in France. As a member of such a battalion a man's hopes and fears of being sent abroad were personal. They were not part of a common frame of expression based upon identities of response on the part of his fellows. There was not one situation for all the members of the battalion, since one man expected to go in the next draft, another believed that his turn would not come so soon, another was unfit and unlikely to be sent at all, while many had more or less permanent positions on the administrative or training staffs of the depot, and yet others were overseas officers who had been evacuated from one of the expeditionary forces on account of wounds or sickness incurred on active service, and who were attached by strong sentiments to the units as members of which they had trained and fought. Under these circumstances a battalion which had originally had a strong *esprit de corps* lost it almost completely with the break up in these circumstances of the common mental frame upon which its *esprit de corps* depended.

257 I shall now examine in detail a single incident which illustrates the relative importance of the different
elements in the mental structure of an infantry platoon. It is an obvious deduction from the theory of the common mental frame that, if the motives composing it cease to operate, the group will disintegrate, and that, in the case of such a disintegration, the group may be reconstituted by a series of similar responses of its members to a common object of attention. That this is so may be shown by the following example, the particular value of which is that it shows the comparative importance of various aspects of the structure of an infantry unit - esprit de corps, habit, fear of punishment, submissiveness to authority. All of these are important reinforcements of its structure, but no one of them, it will be argued, can be regarded as its essential framework.

253 A line battalion had just left the trenches after a strenuous tour of duty. On the following evening it was ordered to go out as a working party instead of enjoying the expected night's sleep. The men were to carry up supplies of wiring material and to erect wire entanglements in front of the support line. Usually men either acted as a carrying party or else, having walked up unburdened, erected the wire which others had brought for them. On this occasion the same men were to perform both duties. In addition, it was a very dark night, and,
in consequence of frost, the ground was very hard. As it happened, the wiring material and the method of its erection were both strange to the men who were to put it up. The result of all these circumstances was a high degree of recalcitrance.

Consider now the problem from the point of view of a platoon commander when his men had dumped the supplies of wire and stakes and the moment had arrived to set them to work. The men, being extremely weary and in a state of extreme irritation, disappeared into the darkness leaving the platoon commander and his sergeant with the heaps of material.

As the officer had just come to the battalion he did not have the advantage of knowing his men personally. It was clear that habit had broken down as a structure securing the cohesion and cooperation of the group. If we next consider authority and discipline we must note that the officer had over these men the greatest disciplinary power which it was possible for the army to give him. A refusal to obey his orders would presumably have been disobedience in the face of the enemy and punishable by death. If the reader will consider the situation, he may ask himself what the probable consequence would have been of endeavouring to set twenty men to work in the darkness and under fire, and in the mood which we
have described, by an appeal to a sanction of this kind. On the other hand an appeal might have been made to esprit de corps, to such sentiments as the credit of the platoon or of the battalion. The reader's sense of humour will probably, as the subaltern's did, prevent him from thinking this a very happy way out of the difficulty.

The problem solved itself simply enough. The officer, instead of proceeding to curse his men, proceeded as dramatically as he could to curse for them. In conversation with his platoon sergeant he audibly damned the war, the enemy, the conditions of the night's work and the strange wiring material. The result was that he secured the instant and undivided attention of every man in the platoon. Taking a stake, he then proceeded to give similar expression to the difficulties of the job in hand, the darkness, the cold and the hardness of the ground. But at each step, as he cursed a particular difficulty, he dramatised in speech and action the way of dealing with it. Thus, having "discovered" that the iron stake could not be screwed into the frost-bound ground, and having given full vent to his feelings, he borrowed his sergeant's entrenching tool and triumphantly broke the frozen surface. Similarly having attempted to screw in the stake, he "discovered" that the ground was too hard and that he could not turn it, and, after being
nonplussed and expressing his disgust, had the brilliant idea of using an entrenching tool handle as a lever. In this way he held the attention of the men and at the same time made clear the nature of each difficulty which they had to meet and the appropriate method of surmounting it. The method of erecting the strange wire was explained in the same way, with the cooperation of the sergeant in handling it: and, by the time the first section of it was erected, the platoon had not only gathered round to listen and grasped every detail of the work but every man was ready to set about it. The first indication of this had been when one of the men offered him an entrenching tool handle in reply to a request for one directed to the universe in general. It was now an easy matter to divide the platoon into two parties working outwards in opposite directions; and from then the men worked steadily throughout the night without need for further instructions, prompting or oversight. This result was not limited to one night's work; for the platoon worked throughout a succession of nights with extraordinary industry and willingness and a minimum of supervision, and so distinguished itself by the amount of wire it erected that it received special commendation.

259 We have in this incident an example of a group
which had become disintegrated, which had for the time ceased to be capable of effective cooperative action, and which completely recovered itself as a result of this incident. The explanation appears to be somewhat as follows. The impulses which had brought each man into the army, and which may be grouped together under the general title of a desire to carry the war to a victorious end, had been more or less exhausted by a long experience of the labours, hardships and monotony of a winter campaign. Also, since the soldier sees little of the relation of the work which he does, digging a trench or scraping a road or sitting all day in the mud, to the campaign as a whole, these tasks do not evoke in him the energy of his original motives in joining the army to the same extent as an order to take part in an assault. Such an order would doubtless have pulled the platoon together at once and made it a strong group. In the second place, negative tendencies, fears and avoidances, tend to disintegrate a group in so far as they appear in its members. In the instance that we have taken the disintegrating forces present were the strong avoidance reactions excited in a condition of weariness and disgust to an unpleasant and unfamiliar piece of work.

A third factor present was the effect of the machinery of discipline. In the circumstances of the case, the
motives which had made each man fall in in his place, pick up his bundle and carry it through the darkness over a duckboard track slippery with frost and broken with shell fire, were those aroused within the sentiment for the authority of the army with its sanctions of disgrace and punishment. These necessarily involved a high degree of conflict and repression. Of these repressive forces the platoon officer as the immediate representative of authority necessarily became the symbol, and the men were therefore not suggestible towards him. That is to say the mechanism of authority had broken down at this critical point, the relation of the soldier to the officer immediately superior to him.

260 The first problem for the officer was therefore to find a way out of the impasse by releasing the repressions to which it was due. This was effected by giving expression to all the repressed irritation of the situation. When the officer began to do this, he immediately became an object of attention and, by doing it, he became the symbol not of the repressive forces but of those forces which were in conflict with them. When therefore he began single-handed to erect the wire, the men were already suggestible to his every word and action. At this point it would probably have been possible to have
assembled them and to have given directions in the ordinary way for the carrying out of the night's work with good hope of securing attention. But the continued dramatisation of the process had two results of value. In the first place, it was more carefully listened to than formal directions would have been, for the man's attention was involuntary, and therefore every point was permanently impressed upon their minds. Secondly, each man was led by primitive passive sympathy to make a suitable emotional response to each of the difficulties at which he might have boggled. No small point of difficulty was slurred over: every difficulty was reacted to strongly. It was wholeheartedly faced and then triumphantly overcome. That is to say each man was shown not only the way round the physical difficulty, but the way round the psychological one also.

261 Any mental structure - a habit or a sentiment or a belief - will lose its power of influencing and controlling conduct if an excessive strain be put upon it. There is a degree of fatigue under which a man will relinquish any activity, even that which has the most powerful motives behind it. There is a pitch of anger beyond which even the most iron self control will not preserve a suavity of manner. And in the same way, if
the mental structures in question are not those of an individual mind considered by itself but those in a number of minds upon which their cohesion and corporate action depend, there is a point at which they will break down.

In the instance just described this point seemed to have been approached. Yet a breakdown was successfully avoided. If we approach the incident with a theory that such a group is held together by the bond of authority or habit, by regulations or discipline, or by esprit de corps, then we must suppose a failure of whichever one of these structures is held to be the explanation of its cohesion: and we must suppose the recovery of the group to be due to the reconstitution of that structure - authority, habit, regulations, discipline, esprit de corps, whichever it is taken to be, or all together if all are regarded as playing some part. In that case the incident must be regarded as the success for some obscure reason of a dodge which proved effective in a way that the theory cannot make plain. If on the other hand we approach it in the light of the theory of a common mental frame, the devices used appear as a series of simple and obvious deductions from that conception of the mental structure of a group.

On that view the cohesion of the group rested ultimately on the common purposes of officer, non-commissioned
officers and men as members of the field force, but the circumstances were not such as to call out these motives strongly. In such circumstances - the circumstances of the daily round of military duties - reliance is normally upon secondary elements in the common mental frame of a unit which derive their strength as motives from these underlying purposes. Among these elements are the habits and sentiments acquired in the process of training, habits and sentiments which are derived from the underlying purposes through the general recognition of the need to undergo that training as a means to the furtherance of these purposes. Such habits and sentiments are therefore outgrowths of the main structure of common purposes, a further differentiation and development of the primary structure of the common mental frame. They have their origin in the more specialised similar and complementary responses of men undergoing training together, just as the elements in the primary structure have their origin in the less specialised similar responses of citizens of the same nation in the circumstances of war. Among these elements in the secondary structure of the common mental frame we may place the organisation of each of these minds with reference to each of the others with whom it came normally into relations in the course of the everyday round of duties - relations of interdependent activities and re-
lations of authority and subordination.

When all these structures are working healthily the activities of the group are carried on with little reference to either the system of regulations as imposed from outside or the system of discipline with its penalties. The regulations define the duties and obligations of each; on the basis of these regulations each man has been trained in the performance of these duties; but when these duties have been learned, when they have become a part of the men, as habit and acquired impulse, and a part of the expectation of his fellows with regard to him, they are part of the common mental frame of the group; and it is only by being incorporated in this way in the living structure of the group that the regulations have any power at all. It is not a printed instruction but an acquired psycho-physical disposition that makes a man automatically take cover, or spring to attention, or handle rifle or bomb, or conform to a signal or to the movements of his fellows in an advance. As for the system of discipline (with its penalties of the actual punishment it may inflict and the loss of the good opinion of those in authority, of one's fellows and of one's self) when the group is vigorous such sanctions have little to do with its vigour; when its cohesion begins to fail, they are felt as an obscure constraining force in the background, a force constraining to modes of behaviour which
have their origin and form from outside the self and the group. The case of esprit de corps seems to be similar. Formed as a result of the group's corporate vigour it is a reinforcement of its corporate motives in circumstances of strain.

When under circumstances of strain all the elements in the common mental frame have exhausted their vigour, so long as the circumstances are such that discipline may be exercised by those in authority, its exercise will preserve an appearance of cohesion, and men will be kept to their duties. When the enforcement of discipline becomes difficult, the failure of cohesion at once becomes evident: orders are slackly obeyed, or not obeyed at all. In the circumstances of the case under consideration the performance of the work could not be secured by the exercise of discipline but only by the willing cooperation of the men. The common mental frame of the platoon having broken down, it was necessary to reconstitute it out of similar and complementary responses.

262 The first difficulty to be overcome was that the

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1 Its exercise always depends upon the cooperation of the majority of the group in which it is exercised. It can therefore be used only against minor seditions - a man or a couple of men in a platoon, a company in a battalion, a battalion in a division and so on.
men were already responding similarly (but individually, and without cohesion in this direction) to the subaltern as the embodiment of that authority and discipline which had so far imposed upon them an unwilling compliance. He must therefore first free himself from this, and his little piece of acting exactly reversed the psychological situation in this respect. In doing so he secured that his score or so of men, in an enforced attention to his words and actions, went each through the same processes of surprise, sympathetic response and release from their accumulated inhibitions. The group was being reconstituted out of the similar responses of its members, and presently each man was making positive instead of negative responses in concord with his fellows. When these responses led to active movements of cooperation in erecting the wire, each man came into cooperation with his fellows, the subaltern standing as the intermediary. The men came one at a time. In helping the officer they presently found themselves helping one another. As the mode of erection had been effectively explained, each man's action was at once met by the appropriate action from the man nearest him, and, when all the men were drawn in in this way, the platoon went ahead as a working group without his further intervention or guidance.

The reconstitution of the group was therefore a
consequence of the similar and complementary responses of its members. It involved a redirection of emotional responses and the initiation and establishment of a series of new habits, the complementary responses made in the erection of the wire. From these there followed a period of vigorous corporate work. And from this resulted a return to good discipline and a very great strengthening of the sentiment of the group, its esprit de corps. These were again reinforced when it became evident that the platoon had distinguished itself by its good night's work. It was now on its mettle. And when the battalion went into support a few days later, mainly to wire the battle line, it worked during successive nights with a minimum of supervision and with great heartiness. When the results of its work received special commendation it may be supposed that its esprit de corps was still further strengthened.

263 The most striking characteristic of the organisation of an army is the extent to which the forms of

\[i\]Having made considerable use of this example (which is again referred to in Chapter IX), I should like to say that, in the mutual interdependence of officer and platoon, the subaltern was probably as often indebted to his non-commissioned officers and men for their example in times of difficulty, as they to him for a lead when his determination had outlasted theirs.
expression of its subordinate groups are devised outside of these groups, either before they are formed, so that they are formed on a model already determined, or after they are in being, so that modes of behaviour are communicated to them and assimilated as parts of their structure. Thus, before a unit is recruited, each position in it is already defined; and the relations one to another of the officers and other ranks who are to occupy these positions are fixed. Training is a process by which each man learns the duties and obligations, the powers and privileges of the position he is to occupy. In the same way the forms of expression of individual action are laid down, and the necessary habits and skills are acquired in formal courses of instruction. Thus for the infantry soldier every detail of drill, of the handling and care of arms, and of their offensive use, is laid down in the drill book and in musketry regulations; and so for all other arms, and for every aspect of soldiering. The circumstances of battle require that the highest degree of preparation and of formal organisation shall be combined with the highest degree of flexibility and capacity for individual initiative. Because of the greatness of the issues at stake in an action, and the rapidity with which an opportunity must be seized or a threatening situation met, an army spends the greater
part of its time in preparation and training for such moments of crisis. 

It is thus - unless the navy may claim precedence in this respect also, a point on which I cannot speak from experience - the supreme example of this type of anticipatory organisation based upon forms of expression communicated to subordinate groups ab extra. It is in this respect sharply contrasted with other striking examples of groups of some size and an organisation involving a comparable degree of integration of many minds. An example of modern industrial organisation would show a similar combination of differentiation and integration in its common mental frame; but it is a combination of differentiation and integration which continually grows out of the process of production to which it is related and so lacks this special character.

Because it differs in this way from the greater number of human groups, the army is an unsuitable illustration to use in studying the processes by which groups develop, in the course of their lives, organisation suitable to the purposes for which they exist. Thus the army affords striking examples of formal organisation and initiative in combination: but to understand the way in

Hence the gibe that a soldier spends his time in rehearsing for a performance which never comes off, or which, if it does come off, is quite different from the rehearsals.
which such a combination grows up it is necessary to turn to examples of a different type. Two aspects of this combination are now to be considered - in the next chapter, the development of forms of expression, and in the succeeding one the psychological processes and structures of leadership; and in both cases it will be best to base the argument upon a consideration of further aspects of the twofold relation.
Chapter VIII

The deliberate adjustments of a relation and the development of institutions

The solid rules of Civil Government...

...institutions are forms, established forms of relation between social beings.

"There are principles which civilised men must contend for. Our social fabric is based on them. As my word stands for me, I hold others to theirs. Not only for what I lose by it, but in the abstract, judicially... I abhor a breach of faith"...

"And I... personally, and presently, abhor a breach of faith. Judicially? Judicially to examine, judicially to condemn: but does the judicial mind detest? I think, sir, we are not on the Bench when we say that we abhor: we have unseated ourselves. Yet our abhorrence of bad conduct is very certain..."
Chapter VIII

The deliberate adjustments of a relation and the development of institutions

In the analysis and discussion of the working of a relation between two persons it was found necessary to distinguish different aspects of the phenomena under consideration by using the terms common mental frame and common form of expression. We also saw that a relation may be in part regulated by the application of intelligence and will to the problems of the relation itself and we called this process other-consciousness. A social psychologist acquainted with the concepts common mental frame and common form of expression and concerned to analyse and readjust a relation to which he was a partner might presumably make use of these for this purpose and might make use of all the psychological concepts relevant to his inquiry which refer to aspects of each of them.

Someone with no knowledge of psychology would be unacquainted with such terms; but, in considering a relation to which he was a partner with a view to its readjustment, he would have to examine it, and he would do so in terms
of concepts familiar in ordinary speech. The terms the psychologist would use would some of them refer to the aspects of the relation we have summed up under the term common mental frame, and some to aspects summed up under the term common form of expression. Exactly the same would be true of the terms taken by the other from common speech. Some of them would refer to the external aspect of actions and to external objects, and others to modes of thought, feeling and desire, or to the sentiments, habits and temperamental factors which determine them.

265 In considering the ways in which two persons may enter upon a relation with one another we have already seen that these processes of interaction do not depend upon other-consciousness. Relations do not usually arise out of other-conscious processes: a relation begins in one of the ways which we have described and, after it has already proceeded some length, one or other or both of the partners to the relation may develop other-conscious processes with regard to it; and these processes may result in further changes in its structure such as otherwise might not have taken place at all, or might have taken place less quickly and smoothly after some degree of cross purposes and an adjustment of the relation brought about by a process of trial and error.
It has been said that relations do not usually arise out of other-conscious processes but that the establishment of some degree of relation precedes the development of other-consciousness. There is one type of relation of which this is not true. It sometimes happens that one person (usually the elder and almost certainly the more socially experienced of the two) may have his or her attention drawn to another person under circumstances that scarcely amount to the existence of a relation between them (they may be for example members of the same social group but under such circumstances that the second person scarcely knows the first by sight or by name) but which permit of some degree of observation of the second person and perhaps of learning something of his or her character, tastes and circumstances. Having obtained some knowledge of him or her in this way, the first person may resolve to initiate a relation of a certain type—let us say a relation in which the elder person becomes the patron or adviser of the younger one—and, if such a relation is established, it will be a relation in which other-consciousness, on one side at least, has preceded the initiation of the relation. Such a relation is of course quite likely to take a course very different from that which was planned (as in the story of Lewis Seymour and Mrs. Bentham in Mr. George Moore's novel): and this may be because the elder person's judgement of the younger
person's character has gone somewhat astray, or because the elder person has somewhat mistaken his or her own motives; that is, the process has not been a genuine other-conscious process at all.

There is also the very occasional possibility of two persons getting to know of one another without ever having met - they may, for example, have read one another's books - and each resolving that a relation with the other would be pleasant, and the formation of the relation following on a suitable opportunity. In this case the formation of the relation would be preceded by some degree of other-consciousness on each side.

It is quite clear that both these types of relation in which some degree of other-consciousness precedes the very beginning of a common mental frame may be regarded as very exceptional indeed. We are therefore left with the general conclusion that, with some paltry exceptions, the development of other-conscious processes follows the formation of a common mental frame.

267 We may now consider other-conscious processes directed towards elements in a common mental frame - that is towards mental structures and processes as such. The circumstances of the relation give to each partner to it - in fact force upon him - the opportunity of observing
the other in all the situations which occur in the course of it— that is, of observing his words and actions. And we are so constituted that to observe some one's words and actions objectively, and as such, is possible to us only as a result of prolonged self-training: our minds pass immediately from the observed word or action to an interpretation of it—sometimes correct, sometimes mistaken—in terms of mental structures and processes, in terms of the doer's or speaker's sentiments and prejudices, or his thoughts and feelings and desires. It is with the correct rather than the mistaken interpretations that we are at present concerned.

268 We have then, first, a relation involving a series of interactions between two minds and therefore some degree of adjustment of them in a common mental frame, the elements in which and their relations to one another are not cognized by either partner; and, secondly, the development of cognitive processes directed to it on the part of either or both of the partners, these cognitions arising out of instances of maladjustment of the relation, or out of a desire to enrich and promote it further. It follows that these cognitive processes will, at least to begin with, fall very far short indeed of a full understanding of the relation: and it should also be clear that even in their
fullest development they are unlikely to reach anything like such an understanding. A's understanding of his relation with B is limited by the incompleteness of his understanding of himself and the still more marked inadequacy of his understanding of B; and similarly in the case of B: and the poorer the understanding is in either case the more likely it is to be further impoverished by a mistaken belief that it is entirely adequate.

It follows that the sphere of such adjustments is a limited one, though it is none the less important. It will never extend to an understanding of the relation as a whole: it may however be developed in reference to particular aspects of the relation, especially points of opposition.

The occurrence of an opposition may be related to mental structures in each partner which are known to the other: or it may be related to structures of which he has previously been unaware and which are now for the first time brought to his notice. A proceeds to act in such and such a manner, or proposes such action. To his surprise B, usually so ready to fall in with his suggestions for joint action, is on this occasion sharply opposed. There is thus revealed to him a motive or disposition in B - a purpose or taste or sentiment or prejudice - of which
nothing in their previous intercourse has made him aware. The intended course of action must be modified in such a way as not to stimulate this opposition, and it is now an aspect of B's character which, having been brought so sharply to A's notice, is not likely to be forgotten by him on future occasions to which it is relevant. In the course of the relation A and B will each acquire in this way some knowledge of the character of the other, and this knowledge will be made use of in the other-conscious processes of each directed to the regulation and adjustment of the relation.

270 It is also possible that it may appear explicitly in conversation between them. "We can go by bus as I know that you do not like the tube." "I have ordered China tea for myself but Indian for you as I know that you prefer it." "Let us go round by X: it is only ten minutes longer and I know you want to ask about the fishing prospects and I want to go into L's for a book." It is with the more obvious interests and preferences that such processes are concerned - with tastes and sentiments and habits which are clearly enough defined to be comprehensible even when not shared.

271 Adjustments made as a result of explicit dis-
cussions in terms of the common mental frame are subject to two difficulties. Direct allusions to mental structures and processes have in such instances as we have in view two clear disadvantages. The relation is already undergoing some degree of strain great or small as a result of the opposition, explicit or potential, which is in need of adjustment. (a) In such circumstances direct allusions by another person to one's mental structures and processes, slightly embarrassing at any time, are likely to be somewhat uncomfortable. (b) Any relation is likely to be given a jolt by any admission of a divergence of beliefs, tastes or standards, and, in circumstances of opposition, a joint recognition of such divergences is particularly difficult. Even when a relation between A and B is working quite smoothly the rejection of one of A's preferences by B may be taken in very bad part. Thus if they be sharing a meal and if B dislikes one of A's favourite dishes, it may be exceedingly difficult for him to refuse it without giving offence to A. Tolerance of differences of taste and opinion is curiously difficult to most people, and tact and good manners aim not at making such differences clear in order that they may be allowed for, but at minimising them and if possible pretending that they do not exist. Thus if I go with a friend to a restaurant and he proposes such and such a dish, I must
not say that, because I dislike it, I shall choose something else: I must profess a mild enthusiasm for it and a still greater enthusiasm for something else, and order the something else — and all this pother is quite illogical as there is no real opposition involved, since each of us can be happy with his own preference without interfering with the other. Similarly if he praises Keats I must not say what I think of Keats's diction, though I may damn him with faint praise and then become lyrical about Shelley. Only if we know one another pretty well and are both capable of a more than average degree of detachment, can we start from the fact of our contrasted preferences and proceed to try to discover the reasons for them.

272 The statements "I like this" and "This is good" are philosophically and psychologically distinct propositions, but in colloquial speech they approximate to being equivalent phrases. Thus it may be a toss up whether I express my meaning on a particular occasion by saying "I like these grapes" or "These grapes are good". Now, apart from the sophistication of some degree of philosophical reflection, each of us will assume that the things he likes are the things which are good in an absolute sense, and therefore that they are the things
which someone else ought to like. To refuse or dispraise the dish that my companion likes, and would have me enjoy also, is to frustrate his intentions for my pleasure, but it is also to impugn the goodness of his judgement; and to say outright "I do not like it" is very nearly the equivalent of saying "I do not like it; that is, it is not good; that is, your taste for it is a mistaken one".

However far this may be the explanation, it is quite clear what tact and good manners require of us in such cases - and also that there are consequent difficulties in making adjustments of a relation in terms of explicit references to elements in its common mental frame.

273 Such adjustments are therefore much more likely to be discussed and made in terms of the common frame of expression than in terms of the common mental frame. By doing so we avoid statements of a quasi-psychological character, and this is why, when my friend suggests X as an item in a joint plan, I (if I dislike it) praise it mildly and counter with a suggestion of Y. I do not then, as might have happened had I professed an aversion to X, receive an impassioned harangue - "My dear Sir, not like X!!! Why, X is...". Instead I get some criticism such as the mention of an advantage which belongs to X but not to Y. I can then think of and suggest an alternative to
Y, such as Z, which will suit me equally and has for my partner the same advantage as X, perhaps making both these points clear. If Z is still unacceptable to my companion, he will make a further suggestion, and in this way agreement may finally be reached: and this procedure, and not that of the discussion of elements in the common mental frame, is the usual method of bringing about such adjustments.

274 When an adjustment of the relation is made by such a discussion of a common form of expression instead of by direct reference to elements in the common mental frame of the relation, the difficulties we have noticed are avoided. Nevertheless the adjustment is an adjustment of elements in the common mental frame. If, feeling the wind a little chilly while my partner points out to me the places in which some of his favourite bulbs are beginning to put up shoots, I say, "It is pleasant in the garden: now let us go in and play these new gramaphone records", my remark may lead to a concordant adjustment of my desire for the fireside and my partner's interests in gardening and in music, an adjustment of mental structures, an adjustment of the common mental frame of the relation. An adjustment of a common form of expression is necessarily an adjustment of the common mental frame to which it is re-
lated.

275 As an example the cooperation of two minds in producing a work of literature may be considered. Such cooperation may take place, no doubt, in a number of ways but all of them will, I think, exemplify the same principle. The analysis of an actual experience of cooperation in writing a play may be briefly summarised as follows: The two writers were very much in one another's company and, in the course of varied and lively conversations (often during a meal and usually on questions of literature and scholarship) many literary schemes were projected, some more or less fantastic and some of a practical kind, one or two of which were actually worked out and completed. Such a discussion would begin with a suggestion for a poem or a play or some other type of work from one partner, followed by a suggestion from the other amplifying it, and this suggestion would then immediately be modified or amplified by the first: and so the game would go on until the initial conception was elaborated into something like a working plan.

It should be noted that at this stage two minds were working together in a very intimate way, and that their common activity involved this continuous adjustment of each to the other. Every suggestion was either a concord
(that is, it was, first, the expression of a group of A's dispositions and, when apprehended by B, became immediately the expression of a group of B's dispositions) or an opposition, and as such a challenge either to maintain in face of it the suggestion previously agreed to (the status quo ante of the opposed suggestion) or to overwhelm it with one which would be accepted by both as superior to it (that is, either to secure the dominance of those dispositions which determined B's prior suggestion ($\alpha$) over those dispositions which determined A's new suggestion ($\beta$) which was not acceptable to A, or to put forward a third suggestion ($\gamma$) which was superior to, or at least as good as, the first suggestion ($\alpha$) as an expression of the relevant dispositions in B, and which was superior to the second suggestion ($\beta$) as an expression of the relevant dispositions in A, thus making an end of the opposition by resolving it in a concord backed by stronger motives in the minds of both). Throughout the whole of this procedure (a) mental structures and processes in both minds were in continual and lively interaction; (b) a common mental frame which was of an elaborate, subtle, and highly integrated and highly individualised character was being constructed in the course of these concords and oppositions; and (c) most important of all, there was no reference to these processes as such
in any of the conversational interchanges, and very little consciousness of them on the part of either partner: but every remark was a remark about the imagined characters and situations, and the imagined characters and situations were for both the central object of attention throughout.

When the actual writing of a scene was proceeding the same principle held true. It would be preceded by the joint planning of the action in outline by a process of cooperation similar to that already described. Then the composition of the dialogue would begin, one of the partners writing it down. One would suggest a sentence or two of a speech. The other would propose a modification; and this would bring about a situation of concord, or a situation of opposition presently resolved as before; and so the work would proceed. In this way every speech and every sentence, and sometimes every phrase, would be amended and re-amended until its final form was the concordant expression of determinants in both minds.

276 The processes of agreement may be analysed as follows. (a) A suggestion of A's might be immediately accepted by B as the expression of his view as to what the character would say at that moment (and vice versa for B's suggestions); (b) a suggestion of A's might be immediately amended by B so as to express more fully in
the amended form B's ideas as to what the character would say, and this amendment immediately accepted by A as more fully expressing his view than his own first suggestion (and vice versa for B's suggestions); (c) a suggestion of A's might be opposed by B and this opposition followed by some explanation from A of its relation to the character or to the rest of the play, or a defence of its diction if that was challenged, and this explanation or defence might result in B's accepting it (and vice versa for B's suggestions); (d) a suggestion of A's might be immediately amended by B and A might oppose the amendment until B's explanation or defence of it led him to accept it (and vice versa for B). As a rule no speech would be adopted until in this way both partners were satisfied with it.

Occasionally, however, an opposition would not be resolved and (to prevent the occurrence of a deadlock) one or other partner would give way, the form pressed for by the other would be adopted; then, later on, possibly a day or two later, the partner who disliked the form adopted would raise the question again, and a form satisfactory to both would be found. This would be done in one of two ways: (a) the partner who desired an alteration would state what he thought was at fault in the form adopted, asking the other for suggestions for its amendment. The success of this method depended on his making the criticism
completely clear, for probably what the composer of the speech wanted, and thought he had secured in it, was not incompatible with the acceptance of the criticism when what the critic was aiming at was properly understood - that is, the speech as he put it forward embodied something which he thought of value, he was really defending not the speech as such but this element of value in it, and once he grasped the criticism he could suggest a modification which would retain the element of value and meet the criticism; or (b) his partner who desired the alteration would now make a suggestion so much better than the speech as it stood, that this suggestion would be immediately accepted by the other as superior to his own contribution, and adopted by both as the expression of what they both had in mind.

Thus throughout the whole process of cooperation every word spoken referred to elements in the common form of expression which was being constructed, and there was seldom any object of attention before either mind but elements in that form: yet the process of constructing it was a process of the intimate interaction of two minds, a series of similar and complementary responses, and as a result of these responses an elaborate and highly specialised common mental frame was being constructed of which the text of the play was the expression.
It has been said that, when a movement of A's is met by an opposition on the part of B, the disposition in B's mind which determines that opposition is brought sharply to A's notice; and this principle was assigned as an important cause of the development of A's other-consciousness with regard to B. It must be noted that it leads also to an increase of self-knowledge on the part of B. Thus B at all times, let us say, likes X. Hitherto he has, so far as X is concerned, had relations only with persons who like X. Accordingly he does not frame to himself any such proposition as "I am one of those persons who like X", or "A liking for X is one of my characteristics", anymore than he does so in the case of breathing or having two legs. The proposition in which his liking for X is framed for him is "X is good". If he by chance discovers that someone not an intimate - say an old person if he is young, a working man if he is of the middle class, a middle class man if he is a class-conscious proletarian, or someone of another nationality - dislikes X, then he adds to the proposition "X is good" another one "but such and such a person has the peculiarity of not liking X". If, however, A, a person to whom he has a developed relation, makes a movement implying a dislike of X - implying in fact the proposition "X is bad" - then his own liking for X is sharply brought to his mind as a character-
eristic of his own. It is to a considerable extent out of such situations that our self-knowledge develops. It is, for example, when a Scot crosses the border that he becomes aware of his national peculiarities of pronunciation, idiom and vocabulary. Until he speaks to a Sassenach of a "dub" or proposes to "snack" a door or make a ball "stot", he may be innocently unaware that he is not using expressions familiar from the Shakespeare Cliff northwards to Cape Wrath.

278 It is very important to notice that no such development of other-consciousness or of self-knowledge follows upon a movement of A's which is met by a concordant movement on the part of B. A proposes joint action with regard to X which implies the proposition "X is good": B concurs, with the same implication that "X is good", that is, that a particular quality is possessed by a particular object: there is no reference at all to any characteristic of either A or B, and therefore no hint of any increase of either other-consciousness or self-knowledge. Thus the concords which form the very essentials of the common mental frame of a relation may go entirely unrecognised - unless they are tastes or sentiments of an uncommon kind, in which case A and B will frequently have them brought to their self-knowledge in the course of relations with C, D,
E,... who do not share them, or unless there is present an interest of a directly psychological kind. Otherwise they remain in the words already quoted from Professor Lévy-Bruhl, things plutôt vécues que pensées.

The obvious corollary is that the elements in those common mental frames which are most general are not readily or usually recognised - and that not only in the world of everyday life, or in the work of those who as directors or administrators, teachers or pastors, are concerned with the adjustment of social relations, but in the sciences concerned to find an explanation of social bonds - the sciences which have gone astray after theories based on fear, or habit, or self-interest, or herd-instinct or some other special piece of mechanism stuck onto human beings to fasten them together into a society, as couplings are stuck onto railway coaches to fasten them into a train. And, I suppose, it is also the reason why in those writers to whom the real relation of man to society - his complete oneness with it - has been perfectly clear, there has been lacking any very determined attempt to show this in concrete terms, instead of being content with a very abstract demonstration of it, which, while quite convincing to some minds, seems to have failed in the case of others to make it even intelligible.
Such is the normal process by which minds work in cooperation - the object of attention and of explicit reference is, in the overwhelmingly preponderant number of common or complementary responses, some element in the common frame of expression. And this is true whether we have two people ordering a meal, choosing a piece of furniture, discussing a poem or a picture, making rules for their behaviour of someone else's, planning or arranging anything whatsoever. Still more so is it true of larger groups such as committees.

This principle is not surprising when we see that it is the principle of individual as well as social behaviour. In composing a letter one does not first examine oneself in terms of one's mental structures and then devise a verbal formula which will adequately express them: but, on the contrary, verbal forms appear in one's consciousness and are accepted or rejected; or alternative forms occur to the mind, and one is chosen as the more suitable; or a form of words is written down, and its inadequacy or unsuitability appears, is considered and a more adequate or suitable form is adopted in its place when it occurs to the mind. The object in the focus of attention is throughout some part of the form of expression which is being worked out, and seldom or never the mental determinants of it, the mental structures or mental processes of which it
is the expression.

281 In exactly the same way a committee may discuss and amend phrase by phrase the wording of a resolution. In the course of the discussion constant reference will be made to other external facts to which the resolution has reference: but the members of the committee do not discuss their own or their fellow members' mental structures and processes, that is, they do not discuss their common mental frame. If two different and partly or wholly conflicting mental structures or processes are determining the attitudes of the members to a particular clause or phrase, each party, in endeavoring to persuade members of the other to vote with it, will speak in terms of ends to be realised by the form of words in question or results which it is feared will follow from it; that is a mental structure or process is referred to or named by the end to which it is related.

282 There appear to be several reasons for this. In the first place it is, as we have seen, the way in which our minds work, as much when we are making up our own minds as when we are seeking to integrate them with those of others. Whether the individual mode of thought conditions the social or is conditioned by it may be regarded
as doubtful: both have probably grown up together. But so far as social integration is concerned such a procedure has two clear advantages.

First, it conduces to the formation of relations of the cooperative complementary type (section 13). We have seen already what difficulties there are, even in the case of a relation of friendly intimacy, between two persons in recognising differences of experience or motive: and such difficulties are much increased with the increase of numbers and the circumstances of debate, and are consequently fruitful in misunderstandings. Secondly, it still more facilitates the formation or relations of common or complementary ends (sections 132-4): and political action, whether on the smallest or on the largest scale, is to a large extent based on such relations. In either of these cases a discussion of the elements in the common mental frame which is being formed would separate instead of bringing together. Indeed it is only a common mental frame based on similar determinants that could be strengthened by such a discussion: and such a discussion in usually unnecessary, for those members of a committee who are already responding in concord are as a rule already working together for a common object, the next step to which is the attraction to themselves of someone who is not making such a response but who can be brought in in a
relation of one of the other types. And thus it easily comes about that elements in a common form of expression - for example, the adoption of a resolution by a committee - are determined by different beliefs and motives in the minds of different members who have cooperated in securing its adoption by the group. 

282 In cases in which a product of an individual mind is related to a series of systems of determinants it is usually described as over-determined. This term applies, for instance, to a dream in which a single element may be determined by more than one system of dispositions, each of which sets upon it a different meaning or value. In cases in which a social product is related to dissimilar determinants in the minds of the different persons concerned, I propose to describe it as multi-determined. This term will then apply to the resolution of a committee which is supported by different members of the committee in consequence of dissimilar beliefs and motives, and to analogous social acts and products.

284 The determinants involved may be roughly classified in three groups:-

(a) There are first those which are openly expressed; and which are therefore consciously apprehended by those
who give them expression, and by those to whom they speak. They include all the beliefs and motives openly alleged in the course of debate which are actual beliefs and motives of those who express them.

I should not include motives and beliefs which are merely alleged for tactical purposes. Such pretended mental structures and processes have no existence as determinants, though they may be related to actual determinants in two ways: (i) they are themselves determined by the motives and beliefs in consequence of which they are put forward as stalking horses, the motives and beliefs with actual psychical existence which they are intended to disguise; (ii) they may operate upon the actual beliefs and motives of those to whom they are addressed so as to turn these, as springs of action, towards the policy which is really aimed at by those who are engaged in this little game of deceit. Such tactics may be well-intentioned and altruistic, as when used in the guidance of children, or in seeking to influence foolish persons for their good. Or they may be self-seeking and corrupt. It is perhaps easy to exaggerate the frequency of such tactics; and occasions on which they are suspected or alleged are certainly more frequent than occasions on which they are actually followed. Thus the perfectly honest profession of a sentiment shared with one's opponents is frequently
met by them with suspicion and a charge of hypocrisy. It is however necessary to distinguish alleged beliefs and motives actually operative from beliefs and motives asserted but with no psychical existence.

Determinants openly expressed and therefore consciously apprehended by those who held them and by those who do not, may be called **expressed determinants**.

285 (b) A man may support or oppose a resolution as a result of beliefs or motives which have weight with himself but which he does not think it politic to express, as he thinks they will not have weight with others. They may be beliefs which the others do not share, and to which they are not likely to be persuaded. This may be because they are too well-informed or too intelligent to entertain such beliefs. It may also be because they are too ignorant or too stupid to understand them. They may be motives which the others do not share because they are less well-intentioned and public-spirited, or because they are more public-spirited and of better intentions. Such determinants may be called **unexpressed determinants**. The man in whose mind they operate may know quite well what they are but they are not "before the meeting".

286 **Unexpressed determinants** are known to the man in whose mind they operate. Even though unexpressed they may be known to others who may in consequence regard him
as unpractical, or as a man moved by interests other than those they stand for, or seeking a personal and corrupt advantage.

The same unexpressed determinants may operate in the minds of some other members of the group. These members will readily understand, from slight indications in one another's attitudes as expressed, that there is community of belief and motive between them. They will therefore readily come together in a common policy. It is frequently the aim of the "hypocritical" tactics described above (section 284) to mimic such a situation by throwing out hints of a community of belief and motive which does not really exist. Where there is genuine community of belief and motive, the body of members who actually share such unexpressed beliefs and motives will readily come together as a sub-group. Meeting as such informally, they will express these beliefs and motives to one another with a greater degree of freedom, varying from the explicit avowal of them to hints and nods and ambiguous phrases which are well understood but commit no one.

When such a sub-group reaches some degree of organisation and is recognised as such by other members of the group it constitutes a party.

287 (c) Thirdly, psychical determinants may operate
without open expression, and without coming to the consciousness of the minds in which they operate. The thoughts and beliefs of these minds, and the verbal forms in which they are expressed, either publicly or privately, may be, and almost certainly are, related to endo-psychic processes (sections 111-115). These processes, and the mental structures related to them, may be called the 

unwitting determinants of social acts and products.

In calling a social act or product multi-determined it is then meant that it is related to (a) expressed determinants, (b) unexpressed determinants and (c) unwitting determinants; and that the determinants in one mind which are expressed through it may not be similar to those in another mind which are also expressed through it.

288 The processes of multi-determination and the development of parties out of partial oppositions may be illustrated by an example. Oppositions arise out of the mental heterogeneity of a group. If a group is mentally homogeneous in relation to a situation which it has to meet, the relevant determinants in the minds of its members will be similar, and each member will make a similar response to that situation. If there is not such mental homogeneity the relevant dispositions will be dissimilar, the responses will be dissimilar, some degree of
opposition will result, and there will probably be an endeavour to reach agreement through discussion and deliberation.

The process of deliberation involves the expression of some of the determinants related to the opposition. As we have seen, not all the determinants so related will be expressed but each member who takes part in the discussion will seek to communicate to his fellows some part of his understanding of the situation and his plan for dealing with it.

If we could have a knowledge of the structure of the relevant determinants in the mind of each person concerned we should see that these persons fell naturally into groups. Thus, if there are ten individuals concerned, there will not be ten entirely different readings of the situation, or ten distinct plans to meet it. Rather, if we examined each of the individual responses by itself, before the individual has a chance to be influenced by his fellows, we should find that they could readily be classified under a smaller number of types. The determinants in each might be different, but some would be, let us say, timid (with different degrees of timidity), some rash and impetuous, and some wise and prudent. Similarly some would represent different balances of the purposes
involved, one being willing to sacrifice one aim, and another a different aim common to all, for the assured attainment of a third purpose which he held to be more important. Differences of intelligence and relevant knowledge and experience would also result in different individuals favouring different plans. Thus immediately discussion begins in such a group, in such a situation there appear parties within the group favouring different plans.

290 A group of walkers, on meeting with unexpected difficulties on the mountains from a threatened change in weather, might break into three parties, each with a different plan. Of these, one party might favour an immediate return. It might consist, let us say, of one weather-wise climber who read the signs of the sky from long experience, of one timid member of the party ready to beat a retreat at any hint of danger, and of another member in whom a former unpleasant experience on the hills, determined, perhaps unconsciously, a preference for the prudent course in all cases.

Thus the same plan (form of expression) would be accepted by three persons for very different motives. It would have determinants in all three minds; but these would be far from identical. Similarly, a second party
might contain a man experienced and prudent who believed (perhaps with good reason) that the weather signs were less threatening than was alleged, and who, from his knowledge of the particular walk in view, was confident that the party might safely proceed upon the next stage of their adventure and then either retreat in safety, if the storm still threatened, or proceed to the summit, if the sky had (as he expected) by that time cleared. Someone as prudent, but inexperienced in mountaineering might back him up upon a judgement that his sagacity and experience would lead him to a wise decision. Two others might back him up, one out of eagerness and the courage that enjoys danger and habitually defies it successfully; and the other because he was a fool and ready to face a danger which he was too stupid to understand, although he would be the first to fail in courage and determination upon actually meeting it.

291 So far we have considered conflicts involving no diversity of ultimate purpose. All the seven men whom we have described share the aim of climbing a particular summit, though they pursue that aim with different degrees of determination (i.e. the shared tendency has different degrees of strength in them and other considerations compete with it with different degrees of relative strength).
Let us now suppose that three other members of the party originally advocated a different plan, the less ambitious project of climbing to a less difficult shoulder of the mountain. In the discussion of plans on the previous evening, they yielded to the other seven and agreed to unite with them in the more arduous and enterprising undertaking. Let us further suppose that their original plan has in the interval been put out of their minds entirely. Now, however, when they stand at the parting of the ways, the more ambitious project hangs in the balance and their former project revives in their minds. They urge it again with new weight, as involving less risk than an attack upon the summit and less disappointment than a retreat. There is here something like regression, the process whereby, when in the individual mind some tendency is balked and defeated, an older and long repressed tendency re-asserts itself and begins again to determine thoughts and action.

292 There are several points to be made in reference to this example. In the first place, we may note the complexity of the determinants which, in even a very small group pursuing a very simple project, lie behind its plan of action. John Smith wants to spend his fortnight's holiday at Zermatt. That statement is clear and short
and accurate. But if we ask why - that is, if we ask for an account of the determinants of this resolution - we may cover pages with an analysis of the motives leading to it. The group intends to climb a certain peak tomorrow. If there are ten members in it we may have to give an account of its motives ten times as complex as that of the motives of John Smith's holiday plans.

In the second place, we may note that, although there is a common form of expression, there may be a considerable variety of motive, and, as a result, we may have in response to changes in the frame of external circumstances very great changes in the groupings of the mental dispositions involved. Thus, thirdly, there are formed within it parties, sub-groups with a common loyalty (that is, with a common mental frame) which none will break, though there may be very pronounced conflict between them. Thus, if our walkers are divided so that one party wishes the group to proceed and the other wishes the group to retreat, we have one psychological group with two parties within it. There is conflict within the group as to what the group's plan, or common form of expression, is to be; but there is no disintegration of the group, if either will accept the other's plan rather than secede. There may be very acute conflict of parties without disintegration of the group - conflict which may even in a nation go the length
of civil war. In Great Britain there was in 1914 party conflict so acute that intelligent foreigners reckoned upon disintegration of the body politic in face of the European crisis. Yet no such disintegration occurred, for the common mental frame of all parties was (except in the case of some negligible minorities) stronger than the disintegrating forces. Where this is the case we may properly speak of such sub-groups as parties, implying by that term a common mental frame which, while admitting of serious conflict of aim or belief, secures the group from disintegration. If, on the other hand, our mountaineers are divided so that one sub-group says: "We shall go on whether you come or not", and the other: "We shall go back whether you go on or not", then we have, not a group with two parties, but two separate groups.

293 Such processes of deliberation and discussion as we have been considering are necessarily carried on verbally. Agreement is reached when a verbal description is made of a form of expression acceptable to all. This verbal description is not itself a form of expression, or it is a form of expression of a special and limited kind. The real form of expression is the pattern of the action to be taken, and it is of this pattern that the verbal form adopted is a description. The verbal form is then not the
form of expression but an instrument by means of which the form of expression may be better realised - it is intermediary between the common mental frame and the common form in which it is to express itself. Such a form of words I shall call a verbal formula.

294 A verbal formula is necessarily an imperfect representation of an actual form of expression to which it is related. It cannot anticipate every future circumstance to which it may be related. It almost inevitably involves some degree of ambiguity. It cannot excite in anticipation the determinants which would be excited by the actual circumstances it contemplates. It is the letter and not the spirit.

It can however be so contrived as to admit of a high degree of multi-determination. Agreement of a kind may be reached by the adoption of a form of words to which two opposed parties agree, each privately putting its own interpretation upon it. Such are the devices of statesmen met in conferences to explore avenues until they "find a formula".

A verbal formula is clear-cut; its definiteness is in sharp contrast to the shifting variety of its determinants, expressed, unexpressed and unwitting, which change in some degree with every phase of experience. In com-
parison with the mental structures out of which it arises, it is relatively simple, relatively known, and relatively fixed.

295 Some such formulae are, like the plan of the walking party, related to a special occasion which is not recurrent. Some are intended to regulate a relation throughout an undetermined period of time, and therefore to be related to a number of occasions of a particular type. Such formulae are usually called institutions, and they have the same characters of definiteness and fixity in contrast to their mental determinants which can never be more than partially known, and which show the continuous growth and change characteristic of living things.

296 The relation between an institution and its determinants may now be considered. Let us suppose two persons to decide to dine together every Saturday evening. That decision follows, let us say, upon a sudden discovery of a common interest in literature or philosophy and a consequent enthusiasm for one another's company.

The weekly dinner is a common plan instituted by their common decision. It is an institution. It should be noted that it is the verbal formula to which both persons agree which is the real institution. This term
does not refer to the recurrent occasions of dining. Meeting and eating and talking are actions, and we may refer to the sequence of actions on any one Saturday evening as the act of dining together. The mental determinants in either person may be loosely called a habit of dining with the other; or the determinants in both minds the custom of dining together. The institution is the verbal formula to which act, habit and custom are related. Its purpose is to give definiteness to the whole procedure, to let each partner know where he stands with the other and perhaps to make this evident to other persons also.

The decision, having been made, is acted upon and continues to be acted upon. Until it is reconsidered, it remains a definite and unchanging factor in the relation between the diners. But the mental processes and structures out of which this institution arose have no such fixity. They remain fluid under the rigidity of the institution which has crystallised out of their flux, and which brings into it elements of greater stability. Thus no sooner has the institution of dining together on Saturdays been set up than the interests which have led to it begin to change. It may be that the common topic of interest which brought the diners together has such possibilities of growth that its exploration engages their con-
versation throughout their meetings for many months, leads to other relations between them relative to it, and possibly to some piece of research or writing undertaken in common. On the other hand it may occupy only a part of the time they are together; other and more absorbing common topics may be discovered, and these may oust it entirely. The original common interest may have been some aspect of literature or history; the final one may be philosophy or religion. Again, many other currents of interest may be drawn into the main stream. The institution no sooner exists than it gives rise to a whole series of sentiments which owe their existence largely to it. Thus it determines very largely the nature of the sentiments of the diners for one another. The sharing of pleasurable experience, good food and good wine, the intimacies and confidences that result from such circumstances, the exploration of one another's characters and interests — all these foster the growth of sentiments which would otherwise remain relatively undeveloped. Further, sentiments grow up for the place of meeting, for particular foods or wines, for the etiquette or order of the meeting and so on, and for the institution itself, the weekly dinner. Thus if we were to analyse in one of the diners the mental determinants of the dinner as an institution, first, at the moment of its inception, and, second, after
a year of its history, we should find a very great difference indeed; whereas the institution itself might present little, if any, appearance of change. It was an agreement to dine together on Saturday nights: it remains an agreement to dine together on Saturday nights.

297 On the other hand, changes in the determinants of the dinner as an institution might just as well have gone in the opposite direction. The diners might not have discovered in one another a series of developing common interests. Having agreed to dine, they might have gone on dining, having nothing better to do, and no one more interesting to meet; but the institution might be gradually deserted by the active interests that led to its inception. It might linger as a mutual regular engagement of two persons who, having nothing else to do, have no pressing reason for breaking it until finally it lapses painlessly, or, giving rise to boredom and irritation, is finally dropped and abandoned by one of the partners to it.

298 The more vigorous is the life of a group or a society the more numerous, and the more clear-cut, will be the institutions which it establishes for the furtherance of its life. Because of the fixity of such institutions, and the continuous processes of organic change of their
determinants, they will of necessity become rapidly multi-determined. An institution may therefore be unchanging in the sense that there is no change in its verbal form, while in another sense it is changing rapidly - in the sense that it is related to ever changing determinants capable of rapid growth and delicate adjustment to ever varying circumstances material or mental. It is in this way that institutional development normally takes place. Some determinants of an existing institution cease to have any vitality; other determinants which have become focussed upon it express themselves through it. The emphasis has changed from the old determinants to the new. This process is somewhat similar to the process in individual minds which is called displacement, and that term may therefore be used for it. We may say then that institutional development takes place by multi-determination and displacement.

299 Since an institution has no power to produce social results apart from such determinants, its existence as a factor in the life of a group, so long as it continues to have such an existence, shows that it continues to be related to living determinants in the minds of the members of the group. A mere verbal formula has no power. It has in fact no existence, except as an object of thought.
As an object of thought it may or may not be a focus of determinants which express themselves vigorously through it. If it is not a focus of such determinants in my mind, it will have no effect upon my behaviour, however clearly I may apprehend it. If it is the focus of such determinants, I shall no doubt behave in accordance with it — a situation described by saying that I believe it, or that I accept it, the belief or acceptance being the relation to it of the determinants which express themselves through it. Apart from such belief or acceptance, it is for me an object of thought in the same sense as the proposition that seven times eight is sixty four or that I should rub my nose against that of a colleague when I meet him. I can apprehend it with perfect clearness, and also with complete disbelief and refusal to act upon it.

What is true of one person is true also of the group. An institution has no influence upon the activities of the group apart from determinants in the minds of members of the group, determinants which express themselves through it: or, in other words, the strength and stability of an institution are the strength and stability of elements in a common mental frame to which it is related.

300 It is perhaps partly because a principle can be apprehended apart from acceptance or belief that it may be
felt as having an existence independent of the mind or minds that apprehend it. Whatever the reason may be it is certain that the principles implied in verbal formulae related to forms of expression are "felt" as having such existence. "I like this" and "This is good" may be used as equivalent expressions; but the second is, as we saw (section 272) "felt" as having wider application than the first. In the same way "We always drink coffee at breakfast" and "Coffee is the thing to drink at breakfast" are very near to being equivalent expressions, and they may be used as such; but the second carries with it a vague implication that (a) it is a principle, independent of my or my partners' tastes, choice or experience, that coffee should be drunk in the morning, a principle which would be true if no one of us had ever tasted coffee in his life, (b) that I and my partners have become aware of this principle, and (c) that we have conformed our habits to it. Whereas, I suppose, on reflection we should all say that coffee having such and such effects upon human sense organs and physiological processes, and I and my partners having such and such native and acquired responses to it, the dispositions out of which these responses arise have become organised in a common mental frame of similar responses, related to the common form of expression of coffee for breakfast, reached through the verbal formula
"Let us have coffee at breakfast", and maintained through the acceptance of that formula, and through the continued vigour of the native and acquired dispositions related to it — an order of events almost exactly the opposite of that which we have seen to be vaguely implied in the usual manner of formulating the principle implied in any institution.

301 That human reason can apprehend principles the truth and value of which is independent of the characters of the minds apprehending them, I have no desire to question. It is however necessary to see that the principles implied in institutions do not necessarily have this independence: some may have, some certainly do not. If two civilisations arising independently out of barbarism adopt the principles of the bath, that may be due to the similar mental and physical constitutions of both races. If two civilisations arising out of barbarism discover independently the theorem of Pythagoras, or the theorem in which physics formulates the phenomena of gravitation, that seems to be due not merely to their mental similarity but principally to the fact that the universe is of such a nature that these theorems are true of it. In the same way, of the principles implied in institutions some seem to be dependent upon subjective conditions, and some independent of them; but the "feeling" on the part of its upholders that an institution implies a principle independent of their tastes, habits, sentiments
and interests may be entirely deceptive, and admit of a complete explanation in psychological terms. Whereas, if it had such an independence, its explanation would lie mainly outside the field of psychology and within that of metaphysics. It is clear that all of the principles implied in institutions cannot be objectively valid, since contradictions can be found among them. Thus if in another circle the accepted principle is "Tea is the thing to drink at breakfast", either the tea principle or the coffee principle must be without such objective validity.

302 The principles implied in institutions are moral principles. As such they must come for judgement before the court of ethics not that of psychology. It is possible that ethics may show some of them to be morally true principles, which are, furthermore, as independent of the psychological structure of individual minds as the principles of geometry and logic, and which carry with them also an obligation or duty to act in accordance with them. It may show others to be dependent on the particular structure of particular minds, and so "true" and obligatory of these minds only. It may show others to be dependent on particular minds and morally indifferent — *de gustibus non est disputandum*. And yet others it may show to be dependent upon the structure of particular minds,
and to be "false", either in the sense that there is for these minds a moral obligation to act contrary to these principles, or that such a moral obligation is universal. These distinctions are not for psychology: nor for social psychology. For psychology there is however the problem: In consequence of what mental processes does the impulsion of an appetite, an instinct, a sentiment, a taste, a habit or any other psychical structure come to be apprehended as a principle independent of the mind which apprehends it; and how does such a principle come to be apprehended as also an obligation upon the apprehending mind or upon others? And for social psychology there is the corresponding problem: How do principles apprehended by individual minds as obligatory come to be socially recognised as obligatory, and embodied in institutions which regulate social activities in accordance with them. These are much easier problems, and one to which observational and descriptive studies should in time afford adequate answers.

303 On the first of these questions I have no more to say here than that, as a simple matter of observation, an impulsion when it reaches a certain intensity may be observed to acquire, quite irrationally, an accompanying "feeling" of obligation and, on rarer occasions, an
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additional "feeling" that the obligation extends to others, or to the universe in general; and finally to the Deity, who will be "blamed" or "cursed" if the impulsion in question is balked or defeated; and these "feelings", which are intense and unmistakeable as experienced, have no necessary correspondence to the duties which ethical theory, or the moral tradition, would recognise, and no necessary correspondence to the duties and obligations recognised by the individual himself on other occasions.

My own ethical views are perhaps irrelevant to this argument but I do happen to hold (perhaps on inadequate grounds, as I cannot claim an expert knowledge of ethical theory) that the mind can reach a knowledge of moral principles which are independent of the accidents of its own structure, and that it reaches them through the rational systematisation of its own immediate moral judgements in particular situations. I hold, that is, that in a particular situation an immediate judgement, of the form This is right or This is a duty, may be an immediate apprehension of moral truth, in the same sense that I hold that in a particular situation the judgement This is beautiful may be an immediate apprehension of aesthetic truth. False moral judgements, and false aesthetic judgements, may, I think, at least in some cases, be detected as false on purely psychological grounds. Thus, in either
case, I may be the sport of my instincts or emotions, and my judgement may not be a moral or aesthetic one at all:
I am self-cheated. This poem or this picture gives me a thrill which I mistake for an aesthetic experience, and which results merely from my physiological condition, or from some unusual state of excitement of some instinct or sentiment: I return to normal and see it for what it is. In the course of my aesthetic experience I sort out my true and enduring aesthetic judgements from the false judgements which have mimicked them; and in this way original aesthetic judgements and reflection together reach aesthetic principles in the validity of which I can have confidence. In a similar way some moral judgements are immediate apprehensions of moral truth, and some are the result of psychological processes which can be analysed so as to show that they are not processes of moral judgement at all, and experience and reflection enable us to distinguish between the true and the counterfeit. False or inadequate moral principles may then successfully mimic true ones, but they may be of such an origin that a purely psychological criticism will display the processes of their genesis and demonstrate their falsity. Claims to "rights" are frequently of this kind; and imagined duties may be equally illusory: and a process of psycho-analysis (or simple self examination) may dissolve either of them. But
to detect a forged five pound note is not to deny the existence and solvency of the Bank of England; and I do not wish the opening sentences of this section to be interpreted in the sense that all moral judgements are the self-deceptions which some pseudo-moral judgements can easily be shown to be.

304 Forged bank notes are happily much more rare than genuine ones. Pseudo-moral judgements seem to me on the contrary to be more common than true ones, and the same assertion may be made of the principles implied in institutions. The principles implied in institutions will therefore in different instances have a different ethical and psychological status according to the nature of their determinants. There are three possibilities:

(a) An institution may be related to determinants which involve no principle at all since they are the accidents of the personalities concerned. Thus in the example used above (section 296), the engagement of two persons to dine together on Saturdays is determined by their sentiments, habits and tastes and no principle is involved.

(b) An institution may be related to determinants which are equally the accidents of the personalities concerned; but these determinants may be "rationalised" in the form of a principle which is "felt" as having obligatory force.

(c) An institution may imply a principle the observance of which is a necessary condition of social life, or of the realisation of moral values, and therefore a duty.
The first type of institution can then be explained entirely in the terms of psychology and social psychology. The same is true of institutions of the second type: but the help of ethical theory may be necessary in order to detect them as suitable objects of psychological reduction. The principles involved in institutions of the third type are primarily objects for the normative sciences.

305 In the case of some institutions there is felt to be an obligation to maintain them, to conform to them and to enforce such conformity upon others. Such an obligation will not be felt with regard to the first of the above classes of institutions: it is felt with regard to the other two; and felt as strongly in the case of principles of the second kind as in the case of principles of the third kind. Now it is clear that such principles, even when they are principles which ethical criticism would regard as obligatory, are not first arrived at by any of the procedures of ethics and then enshrined in institutions. By what psychological and social processes do they come to be accepted?

306 It is clear that the process by which a principle becomes embodied in an institution is not one in which it is first arrived at by processes of philosophic reflection,
then communicated to others and accepted by them, and finally given legal or social sanctions which secure conformity to it. The error of looking at institutions in this way led to the quite unreal problem: By what means is an institution (for example, political sovereignty) imposed upon a community? and to such answers as that it is imposed by fear in the first instance, and afterwards obeyed from habit. Institutions are not imposed upon a group from outside but developed from within. Doubtless an institution developed by one group or sub-group may be imposed upon another: but this is a secondary process, and it is not the origin of the institution so imposed. And the revolt against an institution which has been so imposed (or, which is more frequent, against an institution which has in consequence of social and psychological changes ceased to be related to and supported by the determinants to express which it came into existence and, in ceasing to be so related, has come to be "felt" as if it were imposed) has as its aim not merely the abolition of this institution but the setting up of another in its place which has its origin in the mental structures of the group and is an instrument of its common mental frame.

307 The "principles" which an individual "feels" as obligatory may, as we have seen, be rationalisations of his
impulses. A number of such rationalisations arising on separate occasions are not likely to constitute a self-consistent system. He is therefore compelled to subject them to some degree of criticism, in proportion as he is self-conscious and self-critical enough to suffer discomfort from inconsistencies of belief or conduct. A self-consistent system of principles is not necessarily a morally valid system: but, since some of his principles are likely to be morally valid, there is the probability that his system may come nearer to being morally valid as it comes nearer to being consistent - provided he does not throw overboard the moral principles in favour of the immoral ones, or try them all on the Procrustes bed of a premature generalisation, and provided his system is a working system related to his everyday conduct. Valid or not, his system will bear a very different appearance from that of a series of particular, and inconsistent, rationalisations of momentary impulses.

308 When a similar process takes place, not in a single mind, but in a number of minds in interaction with one another, there are further factors at work which make for consistency. The degree of consistency reached will of course be related to the powers of reflection possessed by the members of the group, the extent to which they can free-
ly express their criticisms to their fellows and the extent to which such criticisms result in modifications of the institutions which are accepted. But a greater degree of consistency is likely to be reached by the group than by the individual, since the inconsistency to which one mind would turn a blind eye may be a glaring error to another: a greater consistency is the almost inevitable result of a variety of points of view.

309 Principles implied in institutions accepted by a group will have a greater feeling of obligation attached to them in consequence of that acceptance. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, they are possessed as we have seen of this greater consistency. Secondly, they are probably as a result more in accordance with valid moral judgements. Thirdly, they derive a prestige from their social acceptance. As we have seen (section 277) a judgement, really valid for an individual only, is easily supposed by him to be of universal application: the fallacy is one still easier to fall into if the judgement is concurred in by his fellows and elevated into a principle jointly with them.

310 Institutions, as the instruments of common mental frames, are, as we have seen, possessed of some of the
characters of organic life - they grow or develop, they are not fabricated. They have this character in two ways. Firstly, the changes they undergo are the resultants of changes in the common mental frame of which they are the instruments - and these changes are organic changes, processes of mental growth and mental adjustment and readjustment. Secondly, they change in consequence of processes of reflection. These processes are not processes of reflection which begin with the first principles of the scientist and the philosopher - they are processes of reflection which begin with the principles already implied in institutions, and which have as their starting points either a problem in the application of one of these principles or (less frequently) some inconsistency between these principles as accepted. The result is minor modifications - changes in interpretation or increased multi-determination. The cumulative effect may be very great but the process is one of gradual development. It is a process which may be observed equally in the nursery and in the history of jurisprudence or constitutional law.

311 The common forms of expression which are the objects of explicit group discussion may be classified as (a) those which are relatively ends in themselves, (b) those which are the means to the realisation of further
forms of expression, and (c) those which have as their aim the regulation of the activities of the group in pursuit of (a) and (b). Forms of expression of the first two classes (a) and (b), have already been discussed. Forms of expression of the third class (c), I shall call regulative forms of expression, and I shall discuss them shortly.

312 Ethics may classify ends as mediate and final: and for the purposes of ethics I am quite prepared to regard such a classification as possible and necessary. I do not think that such a distinction can be maintained in social psychology. For social psychology ends are not separate achievements of assignable value: they are merely events in an endless causal sequence which social psychology seeks to disentangle, and in which the sequence passes continually from mental structures to mental processes, from mental processes to forms of expression imaged or externally realised, and back again to mental processes and structures. To trace out these causal sequences is not to attempt to reach absolute or relative value judgements with regard to any of them, and an event which is for ethics an event the value of which may be at least discussed, is for social psychology a form of expression mentally represented and thought of as having value, or a form of expression realised in action; and
such an event is causally related to succeeding events which are its consequents as well as to preceding events which are its causes.

The different points of view may be illustrated from the parallel aesthetic case. A picture (or a poem) is for the critic an object to be judged relatively or absolutely: for aesthetics it is one of a class of objects which may or may not possess a certain kind of value, aesthetic value; and aesthetic theory seeks to discover the meaning (in conceptual terms) of this statement. But for social psychology, it is a form of expression which has during a period of time developed in the mind of the artist (or poet), being determined in the course of that development by certain mental structures and modes of experience in the mind of that person, and in the minds of other persons; and which has in consequence of its embodiment in paint and canvas (or in words) a further life in the mind of its creator, and in the minds of all other persons who look at it. The picture (or poem) is therefore for its creator an end striven for, and (more or less perfectly) attained; for ethics it is, like any other end, an object for valuation, in moral terms; for aesthetics it is, again, an end for valuation, but in aesthetic terms: but for social psychology it is a starting point for a positive inquiry which moves both backwards and forwards in
time from the act in which it was created.

313 For social psychology therefore a form of expression is not an end, although it may be necessary to note that it is, or has been, cognised as such by the agent or agents seeking it. The first two classes into which forms of expression may be divided may then be differentiated as (a) forms of expression which are regarded as ends by the agent or agents seeking them, and which are so regarded in consequence of their being felt to have value in themselves; (b) forms of expression which are regarded as means to such ends and pursued upon this account only. It should be noted that this distinction has no reference to the characters of the forms of expression so distinguished: it refers solely to the attitude towards a form of expression of the agent from whose action it results. The same form of expression may thus on different occasions fall into either of these classes. Thus a ploughman ploughs a field as a means to a crop of wheat or as a means to a wage: but he may take a pride in ploughing a straight furrow, and as he holds the stilts he may be thinking of the ploughing and not of the wheat or the wage. The same form of expression may indeed fall into both classes at once, if it is related to both attitudes of mind. Thus a picture may be to the artist
who is painting it both an end in itself as the expression in form and colour of an aesthetic impulsion and also a means to a whole series of further ends as something to be made and sold.

It has been necessary to make this clear, because the distinction which marks off the third class of forms of expression from the first two is not (like the distinction which marks off the first from the second) in subjective terms. The first and second are distinguished as being thought about in a different way by the participants in the processes which determine them: the regulative form of expression is distinguished by the fact that it performs a function of a particular kind in reference to the regulation of such processes.

314 The common forms of expression to which the activities of a group are or may be directed are of indefinite number and variety. They are as inexhaustible as are life and mind themselves for they are the expression of a continuous process of living and thinking. As such they cannot be anticipated any more than the picture can be known (even to the artist) before it is painted or the poem repeated to an inquirer before it is composed. Each is therefore related to an act which brings it into being as a unique pattern presented to external observation and
which is determined by a unique pattern of psychical determinants; and the total event is unique in the history of the universe, such that it can neither be anticipated nor repeated.

There is therefore in the institutional structure of the group no prescription of the forms of activity in which its common mental frame shall be expressed. We have seen that in the army anticipatory organisation is carried as far as it can be carried in any group. But no company commander whether in a home station or on active service can predict in what activities his company may be engaged when the ordinary course of routine is broken through in consequence of some unexpected emergency; no committee can know beforehand what manner of scheme will be the outcome of its deliberations.

There is however in the institutional structure of the group a prescription of the order in accordance with which the common mental frame shall find expression in activity. The company may be doing police work during a riot or helping to get in a belated harvest or conducting salvage operations after an earthquake or a fire, but the relations of subordination between its commander and its officers and other ranks will be the same as if it were on the parade ground; it will have the same discipline, it will be subject to the same code of regulations. Whatever
deliberated upon and consciously and voluntarily adopted. These are processes readily observed and studied.

Such explicit awareness is however by no means an essential concomitant of the operation of such a regulative principle. Such a principle may be operative in regulating the activities of the group without being formulated in the minds of the members of the group.

316 The last sentence employs a common mode of speech which is capable of leading to a serious misunderstanding. In what sense is there a principle at all if that principle is not apprehended? What existence can a principle have except as a conceptual object cognised by a mind or minds? And if it is not cognised by some of the members of the group (but only by some person or persons outside it) in what sense can it be said to be operative in the group? The common locution which was used must be translated into more realistic terms. Its meaning may be expressed more accurately by saying: The activities of the group are of a form or pattern in accordance with such a principle, although no such principle has been apprehended by any of the members of the group.

We are all quite clear that in response to external circumstances an individual may modify his activities on a pattern which is adapted to those circumstances, that he
may do this without first formulating to himself the principle involved, and that, after experience of the effectiveness of the pattern, he may state to himself the principle involved in it. In a way exactly parallel the responses of the members of a group to one another may come to be modified on patterns which facilitate the pursuit of ends which they have in common. Such modifications are elements in the common mental frame and they may be modifications which have resulted from the interactions of its members without the intervention of their conscious processes. As such they are regulative mental structures (section 155); they are not apprehended, and, as they are not formulated in conceptual terms, they cannot be cognised in such terms. Such regulative mental structures modify the activities of the members of the group relative to one another, and modify them in accordance with a form or pattern which is not necessarily cognised by them though it might presumably be cognised by someone ab extra (for example, by a social psychologist engaged in the study of the group). On the basis of such observations such a person might seek a conceptual formula to describe these observed modifications of the behaviour of the members of the group; and such a formula if he stated it would be his (not the group’s) formula. It would be his way of ordering or summing up his observations,
not a principle of action regulating the activities of the members of the group in consequence of their cognising it and conforming their acts to it. He would not be justified in saying "The group acts upon this principle". He would be speaking accurately if he said: "This principle sums up my observations of past occasions of such action, and it enables me to make predictions about future ones". He would be speaking ambiguously as between these two meanings if he said "The group acts as if in accordance with this principle".

317 Now just such observations may be made from inside the group. One or more members may formulate a principle related in this way to occasions of the operation of a regulative form of expression. This is most likely to happen when one of the members of the group anticipates from another a response in accordance with the regulative form of expression and is disappointed in his expectation. On such an occasion of apprehending for the first time the principle involved in a regulative form of expression he not only apprehends the principle involved but experiences strong conative states with regard to it. His apprehension of the principle is in fact only the conceptual aspect of a frame of mind in which the central factor is a powerful conation directed to the end of securing from the other the
desired response. The principle is therefore not first a conceptual process, and, secondly, the same conceptual process supported by a conative disposition which has become attached to it for some further reason still to be explained. It is a conative state first; and a conative state accompanied by a conceptual formulation of its end in a generalised form, only at a later stage. As we have seen, all conative states of sufficient intensity will tend to express themselves in such generalisations (section 303). In most cases they cannot readily do so because such a generalisation will not be socially accepted\(^1\); but, in this case, because of the existence of the regulative mental structure (which has given rise to this situation) in the minds of other members of the group, these other members may share in putting pressure upon the innovator, and, in doing so, they express a conation arising out of the regulative mental structure as a part of the organisation of their own minds. In the discussion which is inevitably involved, that conation expresses itself in their minds in the same or in similar conceptual terms. Thus the principle, as apprehended by the group in consequence of such occasions, is not a conceptual object to

\(^1\)We may observe its social acceptance on the part of an indulgent mother and a spoiled child and the consequent erection of appetites and desires into principles within the system of this twofold relation.
which somehow conative support must come to be attached before it can be effective in determining group action. The apprehension of the principle is rather the conceptual aspect of a predominantly conative frame of mind; and the conative dispositions involved are conative dispositions directed to the achievement of forms of expression of which the observance of the principle is a condition, not to the assertion of the principle for its own sake. The principle is thus from the beginning the expression of powerful conative dispositions.

318 The statement and criticism of a principle of action in consequence of conative states which seek expression through it is the social process out of which all statement and recognition of conceptual rules governing social conduct arise. It is to be noted that, in the simplest and primary case, the principle involved is acted upon before it is stated or socially recognised. When so stated it is from the first a focus of conative dispositions and its social discussion is not an "academic" proceeding (that is, it is not a scientific or philosophic inquiry directed to the discovery of truth for its own sake); it is a process directed to the social adjustment of powerful dispositions. It is for these a necessity that, if the principle hitherto implied in social action is impugned,
it shall be defined and imposed upon the delinquent. Out of such a necessity develop systems of law whether in small groups or in great associations or in a community which develops a political structure. The political structure has from this point of view a double aspect. It is primarily a means to the construction, maintenance and administration of such systems; but it is itself a form of order of exactly similar origin and nature. The group legislates in order to regulate the relations of its members to one another: it also legislates to set up a constitution to regulate the procedure of its members as legislators to that end.

319 This argument has now been pursued far enough for the present purpose. Pushed beyond this point it would become an examination of the development of institutions which belongs properly to historical jurisprudence not to the present inquiry. Such studies have of course a psychological aspect, and the examination of that aspect is a part of the whole field of social psychology (section 21); but it is a part of that field in which the primary equipment of the worker must be the techniques of history and of jurisprudence, a part of the field in which the worker must be a specialist in jurisprudence using the technique of psychology as an ancillary method of study.
It is enough to say that the development of his science has its origin in this social process which we have been describing. It is essentially the discrimination and formulation of principles implied in the common regulative mental structures of a society, the detection of their implications, the systematisation of them in codes as free from ambiguity and inconsistency as may be, and their harmonisation with the accepted moral principles of the community. The pursuit of jurisprudence is a science, but it is also a social process. No social science can be detached from its object as is a physical science or a biological science. Every social science is itself a social process and its formulations are at once social products and operative social principles. This is perhaps clearer in the case of jurisprudence than elsewhere.

320 In the study of the small group the principles worked out in this chapter with regard to institutional structure are obscured by the fact that such a group takes most of its institutional structures from outside. The rules of procedure are similar in every public meeting, and in every committee: they do not require to be invented again in the course of the life of every group.
al forms are transmitted from group to group, and are therefore a part of the subject matter of Chapter X. In watching a group at work in adapting regulative forms of expression for its purposes, we are usually watching a combination of the process of transmission and the processes here studied. Whatever be the share of each process in the result, the regulative form of expression adopted has social existence and social efficacy only in so far as it is determined by elements in the common mental frame of the group. In so far as these elements are perceptions of moral principles of absolute validity (if there are such) the group approximates to "the Heavenly City". But the discussion of such principles belongs to philosophy and not to either social psychology or jurisprudence.
Chapter IX

Group structure in relation to initiative

...Will and reason (Reason also is choice)...

Nowe there are diversities of gifts,...

The best is he who of himself doth know;
Good too is he who listens to the wise;
But he who neither knows himself nor heeds
The words of others is a useless man.

However this may be it is certainly true that
small-scale phenomena can be found in small groups of equal-
ness persons which can be explained in this way. Two or
three or four persons are in one another's company walking
or travelling or climbing: there is no recognised leader;
there is no explicit organisation; but this person takes on
behalf of the group this function and another takes
this function too in turn, that advantage in
the sense from one to another and each member of the group
contributes some element to its common life - some element
of skill or knowledge or talent - which the others do not
possess. In this way there results a high degree of in-

Chapter IX

Group structure in relation to initiative

321 In some primitive groups corporate action appears to be possible without formal organisation and without leadership. Its basis seems to be in similar and complementary responses of the members of the group arising out of a common mental frame, without debate, and without the intervention in the process of regulative forms of expression previously arrived at as a result of debate.

However this may be it is certainly true that analogous phenomena can be found in small groups of civilised persons which can be explained in that way. Two or three or four persons are in one another's company walking or travelling or climbing; there is no recognised leader, there is no explicit organisation; but this person undertakes on behalf of the group this function and another that; this burdensome task is taken in turns, that advantage is passed from one to another; and each member of the group contributes some element to its common life - some element of skill or knowledge or talent - which the others do not command. In this way there results a high degree of in-
tegration of responses; but it all happens "naturally", that is, without discussion or consideration, without conscious adjustment. It results from a series of complementary responses and a consequent organisation of them in a common mental frame as they issue in action. There is no discussion, and the adjustments of one to another are things plutôt vécues que pensées.

It is in such groups that the simplest phenomena of leadership may be observed and studied. They may be seen to be related on the one hand to individual differences and on the other to the similar and complementary responses out of which a common mental frame is built up.

322 In any situation to which two or more persons are in a condition to make similar responses, these responses are likely to differ from person to person, (a) in the quickness with which they follow upon the event the perception of which initiates them (and there may also be differences in the quickness of the perception), (b) in their vigour or persistence, and (c) in the degree to which they are nicely differentiated and adjusted to the particular facts of the situation.

The simplest case is that in which in a common situation an event takes place which is of such a kind that on being perceived it will be responded to similarly by two
or more persons. If one of them perceives it before the others, his response may direct their attention to it, and the kind of response which he makes may influence them to respond in the same way. If these persons are walking together and one of them sees a bird rise from the water and cries in excitement, "There's a heron!" the attention of the others will be directed to it. The response of the first shares therefore in determining the responses of the others. In consequence of it their responses may be made sooner; or they may be made in cases in which they would not otherwise have been made at all; or they may be made with different degrees of intensity. Furthermore the whole situation to which their responses are actually made is a situation in which the response of the first is an important element, and is to that extent different from a situation in which the bird is noticed independently of such prompting. The nature of their responses will undoubtedly be affected by this. Exactly in what way they are affected is a question of a highly specialised kind and the subject of highly specialised inquiry, and I shall not pursue it. It is enough to suggest that it may involve the excitement of feeling through the operation of primitive passive sympathy; that it may be related to the excitement of the self-tendencies and coloured by a wave
of negative self feeling followed by a quick return to equilibrium by the way of the emotion of opposite polarity; that the first person as an element in the situation as presented to the other persons is related to the central element in that situation as an associated stimulus. I believe that all three processes may be detected.

323 The last of these is probably of more importance than the others in leading to a permanent modification of the relation to the first person of the others. It is easy to see that by becoming in this way an element in the situation that stimulates a certain tendency or range of tendencies these tendencies may come to be more readily stimulated in connection with him on future occasions; and possibly also less easily stimulated apart from him.

A little consideration will show that an exactly parallel argument could be set out in reference to cases in which an event in a common situation is perceived simultaneously by all the members of a group but one of them responds to it more quickly than the others (a), or more vigourously and persistently than the others (b), or with a response more nicely differentiated and adjusted to the circumstances than that of which they would have been capable in the absence of his response as a cue (c). Should
one member of a group on any occasion in any one of these ways determine or share in determining the responses of the other members of the group, he will, in consequence, when a similar situation occurs again be more likely to determine, or share in determining, the responses of his fellows; and this likelihood will be again increased on each such occasion. This facilitation of initiative is a result of the modification on each such occasion of the mental organisation of each person concerned, these modifications forming part of the common mental frame of the group on subsequent occasions.

324 Let us now suppose a common situation to which two or more responses may be made and two or more persons on the point of responding to it, one in one way and another in another. One for example may be about to retreat from motives of caution, another to advance from motives of curiosity. It may, for example, be three persons walking in the country who see some living thing move under a tree, approach it and, when it instead of fleeing approaches, perceive it to have the appearance of a stray ferret. The situation may then become one of conflict between the impulse to a further approach and the impulse to retreat. Let us suppose this conflict to be in the case of two of
the persons an unstable equilibrium of impulses and let the third respond strongly in the direction of retreat, giving ground and saying, "It's a nasty, biting thing: don't go near it", or in the direction of advance, approaching and allowing it to rub itself against his legs, while saying "Look, it is quite a friendly little thing", then his words and action will probably determine the solution of the conflict in the minds of the others in the direction of his own response. It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply a relation of primitive passive sympathy whereby the mode of feeling of the third person evokes a similar mode of feeling in the others: in each of them two groups of dispositions are seeking expression in incompatible patterns of activity, one of these patterns is seen to be embodied in the action of another, and the sight of it gives that pattern an emphasis which settles the conflict in its favour. Such an influence of the mind of the one on the other may however be reinforced by primitive passive sympathy as a result of which a primary emotion of fear or tenderness may be induced in the others, the impulse of which shares in determining the conflict. And if there is considerable rashness or timidity on the part of one or both a tone of voice strongly coloured with fear or implying confidence and tenderness may be the most
effective means of determining their responses in one's own direction. Also a confident approach on the part of the third person upsets the equilibrium of the self tendencies in the minds of the hesitant: if the fear is strong enough, negative self feeling, and the self seen as lacking the courage of another may, of course, simply be accepted; but if the issue between advance and retreat is in the balance, the momentary loss of equilibrium of the self tendencies may issue in an impulse of assertion which, by reinforcing the motives of advance, effectively determines the conflict in the other direction. I have purposely chosen an example which permits of the illustration of such intervention of primitive passive sympathy and the self-tendencies. I believe them however to play the part of accessories merely, to the more fundamental process by which, when an individual hesitates between two patterns of activity, the exhibition of one of them in the response of another person may result in his conflict being decided in favour of that pattern.

325 The effectiveness of these processes whereby the response of a member of a group determines the responses of the others (whether this determination turns upon priority, vigour, persistence, appropriateness, the em-
phasis given by example to one pattern of activity over another, primitive passive sympathy, the appeal to the assertive tendency, or any combination of them) depends upon that member's becoming at the critical moment an object of the attention of the others: for upon such an attention each of these processes depends. It may therefore be of decisive importance that he should act and speak,

\textit{con atto e voce d'espedito duce...}^{157}

Such action and speech must above all convey no suggestion of doubt or hesitation; and if they are marked by grace of body and beauty of voice so much the better. A certain emphasis of gesture or tone may also attract and hold the attention; but mere intensity or excessive emphasis may defeat their purpose. In some cases mere bodily size may be of value.

326 The influence and value of such factors in attracting and holding the attention are easily observed. We

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1}Thus at Gallipoli when a body of troops seemed to hesitate a gallant officer led their advance with a cane in his hand; and on more than one occasion a piper has acted in a similar way in the case of Scottish troops. In either case cane or pipes presumably played a part in causing the officer or the piper to be imitated, because they helped to attract attention to him. A single rifleman advancing would presumably not have attracted the same attention.}
should not allow this to blind us to the fact that they are only accessories to the more important processes which were first described. Thus, if, in a group of five persons one, in a situation in which three tend to respond in one way, responds quickly, emphatically and with such advantages as we have just enumerated, but in another and incompatible way; and if the fifth with equal readiness and emphasis but without such advantages responds in the direction to which the other three are tending; it cannot be doubted that their responses will be determined rather by the fifth than by the first. A cumbersome object in movement may be given a very effective push in the direction in which it is already going when all the force of one's body, exerted upon it in the other direction, is without any result.

327 Let us now return to the example of the stray ferret and let us suppose that there is a fourth person present with the party who has some knowledge of this animal. Let us suppose him to give no sign so that a course of events follows upon the sight of the beast such as we have already described and leading either to advance or retreat. Let him then intervene by saying: "It's a stray ferret. There'll be trouble if it gets among the
pheasants. We must catch it and give it over to the game keeper. Be careful: they bite." and with the assistance of the others proceed to catch it and pick it up in an expert manner. Is there any doubt that his lead will be accepted as soon as it is realised that he has special knowledge and experience? Or that this acceptance will be dependent upon this realisation?

Let us now suppose the first determination of the group's action whether in the direction of retreat or foolhardy approach to have had all the accessory advantages which have been noticed; will not the realisation of the fourth man's special knowledge and experience outweigh these altogether, and as immediately as decisively? Let us even suppose him to be not really a member of the group at all but in the position of a servant, let us say the chauffeur carrying the picnic basket; or, to go a step further let him be not only a servant but a boy and the others adults; the result will still be the same - knowledge and experience, recognised as such, will in a situation of doubt outweigh the advantages of age and prestige.

323 In so far as we judge this to be generally true we must say that the principal factor in enabling one
member of a group to give a lead which will be accepted by the others is his ability to provide an acceptable pattern of action, a form of expression upon which the dispositions of the other members of the group readily focus themselves. The emphasis must be upon the acceptability of the form of expression which he offers. Its acceptability will depend upon (a) its relation to the tendencies in them which are active or can be readily stimulated to activity, (b) upon its being made at a favourable moment in relation to these factors, and (c) upon its appropriateness to the external factors of the situation. The appropriateness of a plan of action is not however a guarantee of its being accepted, since its acceptability is not proportionate to its effectiveness or probable effectiveness, but to the degree in which it appears to the other members of the group as likely to be effective. The acceptability of the plan which is in fact the appropriate response to a particular situation depends therefore on the ability of the other members of the group to judge it as such; and this depends upon their intelligence and relevant knowledge. This aspect of the question will be discussed presently (sections 348-359). The principle is further limited in the case of organised groups by the fact that their organisation puts certain persons, the recognised leaders, in a specially
favourable position to give a lead. The value of such organisation is that, if the persons placed in such positions are wisely chosen, they are the persons most capable, in most of the situations that will arise, of giving an effective lead. In so far as this can be achieved, and in so far as their special relations with the other members of the group as its recognised leaders give an added acceptability to their proposals (even, in the case of a disciplined body, to the extent of their being accepted without question), their leadership is rendered independent of the limitations of intelligence and relevant knowledge of the other members of the group.

329 Where there is no such organisation, implicit or explicit, initiative may pass readily from one member of the group to another to the advantage of all. A pretty example may be quoted from Major A.J. Evans's account of his escape from Germany where he had been a prisoner of war. Initiative seems to have been very evenly divided between him and his companion, between whom there was an agreement that they "would always take the counsel of the more cautious of the two at any moment". He records his indebtedness to the latter, during a period of extreme bodily and mental strain, in respect of "these little
extra exertions which mean so much - such as climbing a few yards down a river bank to get water for both, and being the first to suggest starting again after a rest" (my italics). The second of these quotations may also be considered in relation to a principle, noticed above but not illustrated (section 318), the relation of effective initiative to the vigour and persistence of impulses.

330 In an unorganised group in which the members regard themselves as being on a footing of equality initiative may in different situations pass to different members of the group and in each case exert its influence and pass. This may be seen also among animals. The pack is at fault: one dog picks up the scent, gives the appropriate cry and is followed by the others. And on another occasion it may be a different dog that gives a lead in this way. In the case of human groups situations are more varied, and, when similar situations recur, there will accordingly be some degree of increased power of initiative on the part of the member who has previously given an effective lead in a situation of that particular kind. Such facilitations of initiative - an increased readiness on the part of some individuals to give a lead
in particular situations and an increased readiness on
the part of the others to follow him - come to be organ-
ised as part of the group's common mental frame.

Analogous phenomena may be observed in the working
of committees. Initiative may lie for the most part with
the chairman, but it may pass, as different problems arise,
from one member of the committee to another who is recog-
nised as having special knowledge or experience, or who
displays at the moment special gifts of persuasiveness.
The formal organisation of the group gives to the chairman
special powers with regard to the ordering of the pro-
cesses of debate; it cannot give him special powers of
initiative with regard to the matter of the debate, but
he has probably been chosen for the power of initiative
which he has already shown as a member of committee, and
so combines in his person both of these conditions of
effective leadership.

331 In groups without explicit organisation there may
be a beginning of implicit organisation when different
members of the group come to possess a special power of
initiative in different types of situation - a special
power of initiative based primarily upon the process by
which they have become specially associated with the
central elements in such situations, and secondarily upon their being recognised by their fellows as possessing special ability, knowledge or experience in respect to such situations. This recognition may be in different degrees a conscious process in the minds of individuals: when there is conscious recognition by one or more of them, it may be expressed in conversation so that conscious recognition on the part of the others follows. And in this way the group approaches the condition of explicit organisation - the formal recognition of specific relations between individuals and the rest of the group.

Thus in an unorganised group one member may quickly come to be recognised as the leader in sing-songs, another in sports and a third in mischief. Now the leader in one type of activity has in consequence a certain prominence in other activities, so that the acknowledged leader in musical activities will, on account of his consequent "popularity", take, if he wishes, a more prominent place in athletic activities than would otherwise have been open to him; and the leader in athletics will have an influence with the group through which he can set limits to the activities of the mischief maker. Quite parallel is the influence of the novelist's, the sportsman's or the scientist's reputation if he enters politics or the scientist's if he makes public his views on philosophy.
or religion.

332 In an unorganised group of moderate size it is sometimes possible to observe a further development of leadership. One member begins to have a general predominance over the others. His predominance begins, through the processes we have discussed, first in one field and then in another in which he is able to provide acceptable patterns of action. In other fields he attains an equal prominence, which is partly dependent upon the prominence he has attained elsewhere, and partly on the absence of a competitor with powers of initiative in these fields sufficiently greater than his own to counterbalance the advantage that he has from his leadership elsewhere. And now in connection with yet other matters - matters in respect to which he has no special qualifications - there will be a willingness to hear what he has to say, or he will be loudly called upon. Conjoined with this will be a tendency on the part of members of the group who do not have, and do not hope to have, its ear but who would like to see the action of the group guided in this direction or that, to put their knowledge and their suggestions at his disposal. And, if he judges well in choosing this or that pattern of action which they suggest to him, he
may make his leadership effective in these matters also. We have then a group with a single leader.

333 As such his power may quickly become very much greater than the sum of the powers of the leaders of a similar group each of whom has a sphere of influence limited to one aspect of his group's activities. For his prestige becomes so great that his pronouncements have in consequence a very great suggestive power. The beginning of this we have already noticed in speaking of the development of his influence in fields in which he has no special knowledge or ability. It is enormously enhanced when he has come to be recognised as a leader in all sections of the group's activities. Accordingly, whenever he takes the initiative, the patterns of activity which he suggests are rendered acceptable, not merely by the extent to which they focus tendencies specific to that activity or their apparent appropriateness to the situation and the purpose in view, but by the mere fact that they emanate from him, that each of them is his in se dixit. If his predominance is to continue, it must rest upon a nice adjustment of the patterns of activity he puts forward to the tendencies of some members of the group; and this adjustment may result in part from a fortunate coincidence
of his mental processes and theirs, but, although it may have begun in this way, such good fortune is not likely to last indefinitely, and, if such an adjustment is to be maintained, it must be done through processes of other-consciousness - through an awareness on the part of the leader of the movements of the minds of others and of a judgement as to which patterns of activity will in consequence be acceptable, accompanied by a judgement as to which movements of opinion, which sub-groups, it is necessary to conciliate in this way.¹ He cannot rule by prestige and consequent power of suggestion alone: but these relations may go a long way to make his leadership absolute so long as it has its main support in the solider foundation of relations of the kind out of which we have seen that it grows in the first instance. When he fails to do this his prestige rapidly falls and a little revolution follows.

334 So long as he maintains his position, members of the group will in each new situation tend to look to him for a lead, some on account of the mental structures just described, and some because they know his leadership will

¹The dictum of Lord Fisher, in which this principle is given a wider application, may be quoted here: "The art of government lies in the intelligent anticipation of agitation."
carry the majority. The pattern of activity which emanates from him will be generally adopted and harmoniously acted upon. But the spontaneous responses of the members of the group to the situation will be released and expressed only in so far as this pattern of activity allows of their expression, and they will be denied expression in so far as it does not do so. Considering the variety of response of which a human being is capable it is clear that there will be some degree of suppression in the case of every, or nearly every, member of the group; and in the case of some there will be what appears to the man himself as a greater degree of suppression than release. What we have said so far implies that there is no active sedition in the group. Should someone seek to displace the leader it is by offering patterns of activity which focus these suppressed tendencies that he may hope to do so. By offering such patterns he organises these tendencies as the common mental frame of a party within the group (section 292).

335 The case of the wiring party (sections 257-262) may be considered again in the light of these principles. A platoon is of course different from the groups which we have been mainly engaged in considering, in that it has a
formal organisation, and consequently a leader with a defined relation to its other members. The circumstances were however such that this structure had practically broken down, or at least was in abeyance to such a degree that the group was approximating to one without formal organisation. In consequence there was a complete dissimilarity in the responses of the leader to the situation and those of the men, the attitude of the leader being marked by a firm intention to get the wire up by one means or another, a considerable grasp, through other-conscious processes, of the movements of the minds of the men, and the knowledge that it was best for all concerned that they should be led to make a start with the work.

It was a situation in which it was necessary to revert to leadership of the simplest kind - leadership based upon a response in anticipation of the responses of the members of the group, in this case a hearty "grouse" at the night's task. The choice of a response for this purpose depended on an appreciation of the trend of thought and feeling in the group, that is, on other-consciousness. Foremost among the advantages of the response chosen was its effect in compelling attention. When attention was secured use was made of it to transmit to the men's minds the patterns on which it was desired that they should act.
This also was done with the same appearance of simple leadership by proceeding as a member of the group to set about the work, the only difference from such simple leadership (so far as appearance went) being in the rather dramatic way in which it was done. The outward form of the behaviour, the appearance it bore to the men, was that of simple leadership, of giving a lead, of going in front or setting about the work first; in other words initiative based on similarity and priority of response. Actually this appearance covered motives and processes not at work in the platoon at all, including the other-conscious processes.

336 The continuance of the life of a group, like the continuance of the life of an organism depends upon a continuous process of adjustment to an ever-changing environment. In the words of Samuel Butler, "Nothing will ever die so long as it knows what to do under the circumstances," In the case of the group the patterns of activity by which such an adjustment is reached must come from individuals - from all of the members of the group, or from some of them. We have hitherto distinguished patterns originating with different members of the group in terms of their acceptability, that is, in terms of
their relation to those conditions within the group itself which are relevant to their acceptance. We must now consider them from the point of view of their effectiveness, that is, in terms of their relation to those conditions both within and without the group which are relevant to the attainment (with a reasonable economy of effort or of the sacrifice of other ends) of the ends to which the activity is directed; in other words, in terms of their fitness to secure an adjustment of the group to its environment so as to secure the ends which it is seeking. It is obviously of the greatest importance to the group, as well as usually to its members as individuals, that the pattern with greatest effectiveness should be adopted.

337 Every situation is a new situation and therefore every response perfectly adapted to a situation must have some degree of novelty. If, however, situations never repeat themselves absolutely, types of situations recur to which routine responses are, with a little adjustment, the sufficient answers. In the case of the group the same structures that determine effective individual responses may determine effective group responses. One individual perceives an enemy and takes to flight; a number of such individuals perceive such an enemy and fly
together; it is in either case a routine response based upon innate tendencies, or if the enemy is one the fear of which has been learned, upon a combination of innate and acquired tendencies. It is a simple case of similar responses to a similar situation. In the case of the group we must add a third type of routine response - that which is based upon principles which have come to be recognised by the group as a whole.

338 We may distinguish these from the routine responses which operate in individuals singly by calling them group routine responses. We may then distinguish two classes of group routine responses. First there are those based upon innate and acquired dispositions which are organised as parts of the common mental frame of the group so that they function in response to the situation to which they are relevant as immediately as do the routine responses of the individual. Secondly, there are those each of which depends upon the mediation of some principle recognised by the group and organised as a part of its common mental frame in the form of an element of the institutional structure based upon it.

339 In cases in which a situation is such that a routine response is an effective answer to it, no more is
required of the leader than that he should give the signal for the appropriate response, and that in doing so he should act quickly, vigorously and with persistence. In cases in which a situation is such that a relatively novel response (or a relatively novel combination of accustomed responses) must be devised in order to meet it effectively, effective action requires that the leader should devise an effective response and that it should be accepted and acted upon by the group. Effective action in novel situations depends therefore upon two factors, (a) the ability of someone to devise an effective pattern of action and (b) its adoption by his fellows. We have now to consider the conditions of effective group action from this point of view.

340 Effective responses to novel situations may be the result of "trial and error" or of processes of rational thought. In the first case the organism, animal or man, having made one ineffective response, makes another response and another at random, until the desired end is achieved, or fatigue or the distraction of another purpose brings his attempts to an end. In this way a dog, locked up in the garden shed, when he wishes to accompany the family on a walk, barks, jumps and scratches at the door, sniffs round it, whines, jumps at the window, squeezing himself against the glass and moving excitedly back and forward. If no result follows, these responses will recur
in irregular order until he is tired and lies down: but it is possible that one of them will be effective. His barking may be such a nuisance that someone will come and let him out; the door may be insecurely fastened and his jumping against it may burst it open; or an open window may have been forgotten and he may leap through it. Such is the procedure of "trial and error". It consists of a series of random endeavours unrelated to any reflection issuing in a considered judgement as to their probable success. If an effective response is made it is hit upon by chance.\(^{162}\)

\[\text{341 There is little possibility of the discovery by}\]
\[\text{"trial and error" of an effective response by a group to a novel situation, if we think of the group as going through a series of random responses to the novel situation until by good luck one of them fits it. There are, however, two kinds of group behaviour which are in some degree analogous. In the first case, a group faced with a novel situation may as a group be unable to respond to it effectively; but, if it be a situation of a kind which constitutes a problem for an individual as well as for a group, the group may in effect resolve itself into a number of individuals each attacking the problem by the method of}\]
trial and error. It is easy to see that in such a case, by the operation of the law of chance, a solution, if it can be reached by this method, is likely to be reached sooner because there are more persons engaged upon it: and, if it is of such a nature that its effectiveness is readily demonstrated, it will be rapidly adopted by the other members of the group, who, in applying it, will reconstitute the group as a corporate body.

In a case of the second kind, a series of patterns of group activity originating with the same member, or with different members in turn, may be tried out in succession by the group acting as a body; and this may continue until an effective response is found. But processes of thought and judgement are likely to have a part in both the devising and the acceptance of such patterns so that the process is not entirely one of trial and error.

342 Let us now consider the behaviour of an intelligent boy in similar circumstances - let us suppose him locked up in a room and wanting to get out. There are two possibilities; to begin with he may behave very much as the dog does - he may shout, throw himself against the door and behave in a way commonly described as "unreasonable". But, sooner or later, he is likely to do something that the dog is incapable of - he will sit down and think. If
he is very reasonable and self controlled, he will do this at the beginning, without behaving at all as the dog does. When he begins to think, he directs his attention in turn to each of the factors of his problem. He examines the door, considers its strength, the possibility of breaking it, the possibility of picking the lock, the possibility of getting someone to open it for him. He considers in the same way the window, or any other means of getting out. As he thinks about each of these, he forms in his mind a plan of escape, considering different possibilities and rejecting one plan after another as he sees it to be impracticable, until he has made up his mind which course of action will give him the best chance of success. For example, he may decide that it is just possible to escape through the window, by waiting until it is dark, breaking the catch and making a rope of his clothes. He tests each step of his plan in his imagination, and, when he has thought the whole thing out as exhaustively as he can, he waits calmly until the time comes to put it into action.

This is very different from the behaviour of the dog. The solution is reached, not by action at random, but by an act of thought, in the course of which every relevant aspect of the situation is considered, and a plan is made on the basis of these considerations. If this has been done successfully, when action is taken, each phase of it,
from the first movement to the last, forms a part of an integrated and unified pattern of movements, adjusted to the purpose in view, adjusted to the outer circumstances of the action and adjusted to the bodily strength or skill, and the capacities and moral qualities, of the agent. If on the contrary the plan has been the result of inadequate processes of thought, it will break down at some point when an attempt is made to put it into action. The particular difficulty met with will then have to be considered and a new plan made to meet it: or there may be recourse to random attempts in this direction and that. The superiority of an effective plan to the procedure of "trial and error" is clear enough. It is also clear that the effectiveness of a plan depends upon its being thought out in reference to all the factors of the situation, inner and outer.

343 When a group has to meet a novel situation, effective action depends upon a suitable response being devised by processes of reflection. Such processes are essentially the processes of individual minds, so that we may say that, in such situations, an effective response depends upon processes of reflection in the mind of an individual (or, in some cases, in the minds of individuals) leading to the discovery of a pattern of action suitably related
to the circumstances, and upon its adoption by the group. This topic involves the consideration of three principles:

(a) Individuals differ in their ability to devise effective novel patterns of action. (b) The special knowledge or capacities of one may be used in cooperation with the special knowledge or capacities of others. (c) The adoption by the group of a pattern of action so devised may take place in a number of ways.

344 The discovery of an effective response to a novel situation depends upon factors of two kinds. It depends in the first instance upon the possession of relevant knowledge or skill - in more general terms upon the possession of responses relevant to the situation although not completely adequate to it. Thus to solve a rider in geometry which is new to me I must be acquainted with the theorems most relevant to it. The same is true of the development of a new element of manipulative skill: if I am to devise a new way of putting screw on a tennis ball, or a new shot on the billiard table, I must already have some skill with the tennis racquet and the billiard cue; and the same would be true of the manipulative skill of the surgeon or the dentist. New knowledge or skill grows out of what is possessed already.

The second factor is the individual's power of in-
vention. To some extent this may, if it be great enough make up for lack of knowledge. A mathematical genius, ignorant of the theorem from which a rider can easily be deduced, might invent the theorem on his way to solving the rider. Someone else with a knowledge of the theorem might solve the rider with lesser powers of invention. The greater the relevant knowledge the less the powers of invention required, and vice versa.

In any actual situation the ability of a particular individual to devise an effective response will depend upon both these factors.

345 The members of a group will differ in respect both of their knowledge and their powers of invention: they will consequently differ in their abilities to discover effective responses to novel situations. These abilities will be differently distributed in different groups.

This is, in the case of knowledge, sufficiently obvious to ordinary observation. Six persons in a railway carriage, one of whom happens to be a dental surgeon, and six dental surgeons dining together, would obviously exhibit highly contrasted distributions of dental knowledge and manipulative skill. The six dental surgeons might
again show very great differences in respect of knowledge of other subjects - let us say horse racing or music. Whatever kind of knowledge or skill we consider, it will be found to be very unevenly divided throughout the community, to be unequally possessed by the different members of any group whatsoever, and least unequally possessed, though never equally, by the members of some group the formation of which is relevant to that particular kind of knowledge and skill. Thus dental knowledge and skill will be unevenly distributed in a gathering of dental surgeons, but the variations in dental knowledge and skill will be very much greater in, let us say, an assembly of golfers of whom a few happen to be dental surgeons.

Apart from the possession of special knowledge or skill it is popularly held that individuals differ in their ability to devise new and effective responses: and this ability is usually called intelligence, though a less ambiguous term is general ability. This view has been given a basis of scientific observation and measurement with the invention of intelligence tests, and their application to problems of the distribution of intelligence. Such evidence supports the view that individuals differ in this way, and that these differences are independent of their experience. It shows that the distribution of intelligence in a community is (like the distribution of
height and other biological measurements) in accordance with the normal curve of distribution. It also shows that the distribution of intelligence in smaller groups varies from group to group. It may vary in range, all the members of one group being near to the average of the community, all the members of another being above it, all the members of another well below it. It may vary in the position of the median or average value for the group - thus a group might contain values ranging from very low in the scale to very high up upon it but, if the greater number of values were very low or very high, the median value for the group would be low or high accordingly.

Since relevant knowledge and intelligence may be distributed in these various ways, it is clear that groups will differ markedly in the processes by which they may make effective responses to novel situations, and also in the extent to which they are capable of such responses. In so far as knowledge and intelligence are evenly distributed, a novel response may approximate to a response of the group based upon the similar responses of its members: in so far as they are unevenly distributed, the members of the group will respond dissimilarly, and, if the group is to be guided by the responses of the member or members capable of devising the most effective response,
it is necessary that the pattern of action which they have devised should be in some way or other adopted by the group.

347 If by the intelligence of an individual we mean his ability to make effective responses to situations to meet which he is unprovided with a routine response, we require a term by which to refer to the power of a group to make effective responses to situations to meet which it is unprovided with a routine response. This power may be called (not very happily) the intelligence of the group or group intelligence. It is at once evident that it is related to the degree of intelligence possessed by those members of the group who can take the initiative effectively in it. Or we may say that it is limited by the intelligence of the most intelligent members of the group and also conditioned by the mental structure of the group. Since the minds possessed of the greatest degree of intelligence represented in the group are likely to be in a minority, the plan of action which they devise is not likely to be immediately acceptable to a large proportion of the members of the group. Yet it is clearly a condition of the effectiveness of the group's responses that plans which come from such a minority should be accepted and acted upon. Group intelligence is thus related not only to the degree of intelligence possessed by the most
intelligent members of the group but also to the extent to which patterns of action of their devising are accepted by it and acted upon; and this possibility depends upon the mental structure of the group.

348 At this point we must return again to a consideration of the twofold relation. What has just been said is as true of the group of two as of larger groups, and by taking the group of two as the example for consideration it is easy to see what possible situations may arise.

There are two main possibilities. If two persons are presented with a common problem they may be more or less equally equipped for discovering a solution to it; or they may be relatively unequal in special knowledge or special experience, special capacity or general ability.

349 If they be relatively equal in these respects their separate consideration of their common problem may lead them to conclusions so similar that harmonious and concordant action easily follows. Either each will see for himself what should be done; or, if there are differences in their view each is able to explain to the other his reading of the situation in such a way that the points which each has missed and the other has appreciated become intelligible to both. Thus a common plan may have been
arrived at by each separately; or it may be one to which each has contributed. Such a cooperation requires such qualities in each as enable him to follow the processes of thought by which the other has arrived at his view. In either case a common problem has been followed by an equal understanding of it (reached separately or conjointly), a common solution, and concordant action; and the conceptual determinants of this action in the two minds are similar.

350 It is otherwise if two persons are unequally equipped in respect of knowledge, experience, special capacity or general ability. Where there is such inequality a concordant solution may be reached in a number of different ways according to the degree of inequality and according to the nature of other factors in the structure of the relation between them. We have now to examine a series of such cases.

In each case let us suppose A to be the better equipped for the discovery of an effective plan of action for the attainment of an end which they are both bent upon achieving. It must also be assumed that the problem is one which admits of rational analysis. This is not true of every practical problem of everyday life, since in many cases a decision has to be made in the absence of knowledge that makes possible an assessment of the consequences of the various possible lines of action. In few cases, if
in any, is it possible to predict with absolute certainty the result of choosing this line or that, so that all cases of practical decision involve an element of the in-
calculable. Nevertheless there are few practical situations in which the intelligent application of know-
ledge will not exclude some suggestions as unpromising and bring to light others which open up a better prospect of success, distinguishing the likely from the unlikely, and weighing and calculating the advantages of each. That such rational analysis yields probabilities rather than certainties, and accordingly results in errors as well as successes, disguises its value in the eyes of those who cannot follow its processes in detail and who therefore put all fallibles upon a level, the fallible but right nine times out of ten on a level with the fallible and right once in fifty times. This increases the difficulty of inducing a person to fall in with a plan when the reasons for preferring it are a little beyond his powers of understanding.

351 (a) The first case for consideration is that in which B's equipment for understanding the problem is not very far behind A's. In such a case A may be able to explain to B his solution and the considerations which have led him to it; and, in consequence of noting his observa-
tions and following the steps of his reasoning, B may be ready to adopt it. If the explanation and consequent understanding are complete, there is, as a result of this process, a common plan the determinants of which in the two minds are exactly similar, so far as the structures and processes relevant to this argument are concerned. But B's mind could not by itself have reached a formulation of this plan by an independent integration of these structures and processes. It may be compared to a question of arithmetical calculation: two people have got different answers to the same problem, and the one whose answer is correct can discover and point out the error which the other has made, so as to convince him that he has gone wrong, and bring him to an acceptance of the proper arithmetical process and the true result.

The superiority of A's solution to B's may rest upon some piece of knowledge relevant to the problem and possessed by A but not by B. In such a case the acceptance of A's solution by B, with full understanding of the reasons for preferring it, may turn upon the communication to him of this piece of information. In actual cases in everyday life the superiority of one solution to another is likely to turn upon factors of both kinds: it may take account of a greater number of factors in the situation or
relevant to it; and it may integrate them more successfully with reference to the end in view. This is as true in petty instances as in ones in which interests of the highest importance are at stake. A husband and a wife who differ as to the advisability of certain expenditure may by such processes come to an agreement that they can, or cannot, afford something that they both desire to possess. Or two general officers, with alternative plans of campaign, may argue each for his own plan as the one more likely to attain the result aimed at by both of them, and one may finally, through these perfectly rational processes, convince the other of error and persuade him to the adoption of the alternative plan.

It is of course unfortunately true that such a happy result does not always follow upon such a consultation: but, when that is the case, either there is not such a rational superiority of the one plan over the other as we are here supposing, or there is too great a difference in knowledge or insight, or there are other factors at work — such, for example, as a sentiment for the less effective plan at work in the mind of its maker, a preference for it not on rational grounds but simply because it is his own.

In a true case of the resolution of an opposition in the way considered in this section — that is by the
communication to B of A's special knowledge or the steps of his reasoning - the concordant action which follows is directed to the achievement of a common form of expression the determinants of which in the two minds are, as a result of the process of communication, identical so far as these determinants are conceptual.

352 (b) A concordance may be arrived at in a second way. A's decision may be accepted by B even although he does not appreciate the steps by which it has been reached, and accepted on rational grounds: he may accept it on the basis of a judgement that A is in this matter more likely than himself to reach a just decision. In a prolonged relation between two people each may learn to rely in this way upon the judgement of the other in some matters, while relying on his own in others. We commonly adopt this attitude of submission to someone else's judgement when seeking professional advice. Thus a doctor and a lawyer of equal ability and prestige might seek one another's professional advice and in turn submit to one another's judgements.

In cases of this kind B accepts A's judgement, and is willing to act upon it as if it were his own, not because he understands the processes by which it has been
reached, but because of his own judgement, based upon a rational appreciation of their comparative knowledge, experience and qualities of mind, that A's solution of the problem is likely to be more effective than an attempted solution of his own. Concordant action follows; but the conceptual determinants in the two minds, though they may include some common elements, are different at least in part.

353 (c) There is a third possibility. If B is incapable of seeing the problem as A sees it and grasping A's reasons for the decision to which he has come, and if he does not appreciate A's superiority to him in such matters he may be brought to accept A's decision for reasons which appear adequate to him but which would not have seemed adequate to A. In such a case A and B are agreed as to what they shall do - they have adopted a common plan, a common form of expression; but the determinants of it in their two minds are partly similar and partly different. They may desire the realisation of the same end (being determined in this by similar or complementary dispositions as we have seen before); but the conceptual processes by which they assess the relevant factors in the situation are different, and in the case of B less adequate than in the case of A.
354 This may come about in a number of ways. Each of these ways probably involves an element of suggestion. In the simplest case the simple announcement of A's decision may, in consequence of his tone of assurance, or because of the prestige which he has in B's eyes, result in the appearance in B's mind of conceptual processes of a specious character supporting it. He thinks he understands, but he does not; he thinks he shares A's processes of thought, but essential factors in these processes are unknown to him; he may even imagine that A's answer to the problem is the very one he himself was about to offer, that A has taken the very words out of his mouth.

At the other extreme is the case in which A, aware not only of the conceptual processes by which his decision has been reached but aware also of the way in which B's mind is moving, leads him tactfully to his own conclusion by another path than that by which he has himself reached it, giving him reasons which will appeal to him in place of the real ones which he cannot appreciate. The dependence of this process upon some degree of other-consciousness is sufficiently obvious.

Between these limiting cases there is a range of possibilities in which various degrees of suggestibility
on the part of B are combined with various degrees of other-consciousness on the part of A. In all of them B is unaware of what is really happening. He is quite likely to think that the decision is as much his own as A's. He is quite unaware how he has come to accept it, and it will have for him the emotional value of a decision made by himself.

335 In cases in which a relation depends for its success upon this one sided intellectual initiative there will be effective concordant action so long as both partners are in contact, so that the more able may supply the necessary guidance on each occasion which requires a novel response; and the less able will be in fact a useful subordinate. But they will be less successful in cases in which independent action on the part of each of them is called for, and the less able is called upon to make decisions on his own behalf, or on behalf of both, when his partner is not present to suggest to him what to do. The subordinate partner will in fact be, in consequence of the relation, less capable of independent action than if he had not been a partner to it: for, all decisions having really been made over his head, he has lacked the training and discipline of responsible decision followed by an experience of the re-
sult, and he is accordingly less capable of decision than he would otherwise have been; and, at the same time, he is likely to have an excessive confidence in his own judgement, in consequence of the frequent success of decisions which he believed to be his own.

356 (d) If it should be of importance that joint action should be taken in accordance with the superior plan of action and if concordant action on these lines cannot be secured in any one of these three ways, there is a fourth possibility: A's decision may be forced upon B in spite of B's unwillingness to accept it.

Here again we have a range of varying possibilities. The relation between A and B may be one in which A is generally the dominant partner (section 152). In such a case B will accept A's intellectually superior decisions for the same reason that he accepts all A's decisions, including those in which there is no such rational superiority - those, for example, which are mere matters of taste or personal preference: the determinants in B's mind of the superior plan which he has accepted are then entirely unrelated to its superiority.

On the other hand, if such a submissive attitude to A is not a factor in the situation there is the possibility
of bringing some degree of coercion to bear upon him. Such coercion may vary from brute force or the threat of bodily pain to the most delicate and subtle suggestion of a slight disharmony in an otherwise, pleasantly toned intercourse. Or it may take the form of playing upon other motives and other aims for the attainment of which B is dependent upon A. Or it may take the form of a bargain by which B gives way on this question in return for concession by A with regard to some other matter.

357 We may not turn from the twofold relation to a consideration of larger groups. Here the same problem is repeated but in a more complicated form - if one member of the group has reached by processes of reflection a better understanding of the situation than the other members, and if he has reached it in consequence of mental equipment which they do not share, how can that understanding, and the plan of action devised in consequence of it, become the common form of expression of the group?

The modes in which such a plan of action can be accepted have been considered in the preceding sections in terms of the twofold relation. All these modes of acceptance may be reproduced in a larger group: there is no difference in principle, but there is the difference that all these modes of acceptance may be present on the same
occasion, one in the case of one member or sub-group of members, and each of the others in the case of another individual or sub-group. This is both a matter of observation and a simple deduction from the principle that in any group special knowledge, special experience, and special and general abilities are unevenly distributed (section 345).

358 When a plan of action devised by the highest degrees of relevant knowledge and ability represented in the group is accepted by the group there may therefore be distinguishable sub-groups, in each of which the conceptual determinants of its acceptance are different, and different according to the modes distinguished in sections 348 - 356. Such groupings are subordinate to groupings according to the aims which are pursued, or the forms of expression which are accepted, the groupings which were designated parties (sections 289 and 292). In the case of the group, as well as in the case of the individual, the ends to which effort is directed are of primary importance, and "tendencies are... more important than... capacities, however important the latter may be". These groupings will appear within each party. That is, the supporters of a common form of expression are likely to differ in the conceptual determinants operative in their minds according to
their degree of understanding of it.

This relation of the groupings according to forms of expression to the groupings according to modes of conceptual processes is so important that it should perhaps be stated more precisely. The primary mental structure of the party is the common mental frame in which the dispositions of its members are organised in reference to its common form of expression. It is upon this that its cohesion as a party depends. It is in this that it has its existence. But, in the case of each member, the conceptual processes by which his dispositions have come to be organised as determinants of its common form of expression are, in different degrees, the active rational processes of their own minds, or processes to which they have been led by other minds; and these conceptual processes are in different minds of different degrees of adequacy.

359 This principle will apply to different groups in different degrees according to their degree of mental homogeneity. In highly selected groups it will be least apparent, whether the selection be in the direction of a high or a low degree of relevant knowledge and ability. In large groups it will usually be more evident than in small ones.
The very exceptional group - the small group of persons of high intelligence and similar experience may solve its problems of conceptual adjustment by similar conceptual processes, or by conceptual cooperation (section 349). Assuming that its members are agreed as to the aim which they have in view, continuous debate as to the steps which it is necessary to take to secure it may result in the acceptance by everyone of a plan which is a synthesis of the conceptual processes of all the members of the group - an acceptance which is consequent upon an understanding by each of the processes of reasoning by which this plan has been formulated. Either each mind has separately worked out the steps of that reasoning, or each mind has made some contribution to it and has understood the contributions which have been made by the others.

This is completely possible only in the case of a small group of specialists, in, for example, a group of scientists engaged upon some problem of applied science, or a group of general officers working out detailed plans for a military operation. In such cases the result of a process of deliberation may be a common plan which is related to similar conceptual determinants in the minds of all members of the group.

Closely allied is the case of a group of specialists
each of whom is equipped for some part of the common intellectual task, but not necessarily possessed of the ability to appreciate fully or critically the contribution of the others. The cooperation of a group of scientists may also be of this kind. A dental surgeon, a specialist in endocrinology and specialists in other departments of medicine might together decide upon the treatment required by a particular patient; but in doing so each need not master the specialisms of the others. In the planning of a military operation a similar intellectual cooperation is more likely than a procedure by common and equal understanding. Thus a general officer of artillery must explain what it is possible and what it is impossible for the gunners to do. An officer of supplies must express his judgement as to the possibility of providing material, and an officer of transport must express his judgement as to whether it is possible to maintain a stream of reinforcements, ammunition and food under the conditions contemplated by the officers controlling operations. And all plans must be worked out in the light of the information as to the enemy's position, strength, munitionment, defenses, morale and probable movements, which will be supplied by the various specialist branches of intelligence. On each technical question as it arises there is a member of the group to whom the attitude of the others is that of acceptance.
ance of his view as a contribution to the process of co-operative thought which he is there to make on behalf of the group - just as, if two persons have a piece of arithmetical work to do, they may divide it, each sum the columns of figures allocated to him and check them, and each accept the results obtained by the other without doing the addition of the figures over again for himself. When each specialist has carried his own argument a certain length there is the problem of integrating into one scheme the results so obtained and this is the main task of the group when it meets to deliberate.

362 A common plan with similar conceptual determinants in all minds can be reached only slowly and with difficulty. Agreement based on the acceptance of the judgement of the man whose business it is to know, can be reached much more quickly. Hence, where rapid decisions are necessary, as in the case of military operations, and indeed in all cases of practical decision, this is the method which must be used. In cases of theoretical decision it is otherwise. In the field it may be more important to act promptly than to wait for the working out of the best plan which military knowledge could supply in conditions of leisure. In the study there is no such urgency, and, in the case of the
problems of pure science and of philosophy, the debate may
go on for unlimited time, until agreement is reached on the
basis of the complete thrashing out of the problem by
everyone concerned with it. In the case of a particular
cancer patient a decision must be made within a certain
limit of time as to the treatment to be prescribed. In
the case of inquiry into the aetiology of cancer, an ex-
haustive examination and discussion of all relevant
phenomena cannot usefully be cut short in favour of a
premature decision in favour of one theory or another.

363 The decisions of a group of general officers in
the field are made on behalf of and for the direction of
a larger body, the military force of which they are the
executive. These decisions are acted upon by that body
without further question in consequence of its organisation
and discipline. In case of large bodies a similar
function of deliberation and decision is performed by a
small executive group on behalf of the whole body but the
results of these processes are not accepted automatically.
The deliberations of the executive may exemplify the same
processes of intellectual cooperation: the acceptance of
the results of them may be a very complex process according
to the extent to which the deliberative body exercises a
recognised authority, or the organisation of the whole is
Where the organisation of the whole is democratic there is likely to be, in any body the life of which is of any length, a development of parties in consequence of differences of aim or interest, and in consequence of rivalry among those who are ambitious to exercise initiative and executive power (section 334). The most evident sub-groups are therefore parties. Within each party we find a structure which results from the necessity of securing the acceptance of executive decisions by methods appropriate to varying degrees of knowledge and ability: and that structure will reproduce each of the modes of acceptance distinguished in sections 348 - 356.

364 The most obvious case is that of a political issue. The government of a modern state involves decision and action related to problems of a very complex and highly technical kind. If we consider any one such problem, it is at once clear that there are only a few people who are in a position to know the facts upon which a rational judgement can be based. This is partly because some of the facts involved are of a confidential character, partly because the appreciation of others demands a degree of impartiality impossible in the greater number of the citizens,
because their interests are to be affected in one way or another by any action that is taken, and partly, and principally, because the facts themselves are of a character which requires a special training for their appreciation, and their complexity requires prolonged study before they can be grasped at all. Thus the question may be an intricate economic problem, the complete study and understanding of which (in so far as the limitations of economic science permit such understanding) is possible only to a very small number of expert economists and civil servants who have been in touch with it throughout the greater part of their lives. The discussion of it has been carried on in technical monographs and in special reports, made for or by the officials of the government department concerned. It has perhaps been summed up in a blue book, and in this way made available to a larger public. A member of the public cannot hope to obtain an acquaintance with the facts comparable with that of the officials and experts who are in immediate touch with them; but a certain number of citizens will attempt to reach such a knowledge as is obtainable from such publications. This is at best an acquaintance at second-hand: it is a knowledge which is already coloured by the views and conclusions of those who have done the preliminary work. The number of citizens
who attempt as much as this is a very small proportion of an electorate. Although their number is small their influence may be considerable. Many of them are in a position to influence considerable numbers of their fellows, through processes which are partly rational and partly based upon the other rational and non-rational modes of influence distinguished.

A still larger group, with less leisure for study, less ability to grasp the problem at issue and less interest in it, studies the question at third hand, through the medium of articles of a more popular character written by the expert or the semi-expert. Here we are more in the region of opinion and less in that of reasoned conclusions, and the acceptance of this view or that depends very largely upon the respect which the individual attaches to the name of a particular writer, or upon the prestige of the newspaper or journal in which his article is printed.

The largest body of voters will however be persuaded by processes which are rational only in a very small degree, or not rational at all. They are persuaded by specious appeals, which may be rational in form, but which advocate a sound policy with inadequate, or even with discreditable reasons; or which advocate an undesirable policy by an appeal to respectable and creditable motives. And this
may be inevitable because the real reasons are beyond their grasp, or because they make no appeal to them. It is a case of a public organised by an exploiting body (sections 243-245).

365 If the deliberating and directing group is well equipped for its tasks, it is possible for the group to act effectively. The best plans which the intelligence of the group is capable of devising are then formulated, and their acceptance depends upon each of the processes distinguished in sections 348 - 356, so far as a section of the group is concerned. There is first of all a sub-group which has formulated them by cooperative conceptual processes. This group may or may not be identical with the official directing body: most probably some of its members are within that body and some outside it. There is next a group which is capable of following critically the conceptual processes by which a decision has been arrived at, though its members have not contributed actively to that discussion: and members of this group will have made a critical study of the question in various degrees. Next there is a larger group who accept the decision on the basis of rational judgements as to the ability and good faith of those who have contributed to it. Beyond are the
larger groups who must be persuaded by such an explanation of the decision as they can grasp, and by an appeal to sentiments which will supply a sufficient motive in support of it. Finally, there are the very stupid, and those not of a good will in the matter, who can be brought in only by the methods described in section 366.

366 Because such a social structure of support for the decision of a directing group depends so largely upon non-rational processes, it is clear then it may be constructed in support of decisions which are made in consequence of inadequate conceptual processes, or in pursuit of aims which are undesirable. The best intentioned and most intelligent members of the group may be neither members of the directing body nor in a position to influence it effectively. In such a case the group will show a low degree of group intelligence in consequence of its organisation, and in spite of the fact that high degrees of knowledge and ability are to be found in some members of it. The problem is an old one.

Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils, - no, nor the human race, as I believe, - and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.
Chapter X

The transmission of forms of expression

A wise man's words are like goads, and his collected sayings are like nails driven home; they put the mind of one man into many a life.

The moral of the tale is the power of reason, its decisive influence on the life of humanity. The great conquerors, from Alexander to Caesar, and from Caesar to Napoleon, influenced profoundly the lives of subsequent generations. But the total effect of this influence shrinks to insignificance, if compared to the entire transformation of human habits and human mentality produced by the long line of men of thought from Thales to the present day, men individually powerless, but ultimately the rulers of the world.
Chapter X

The transmission of forms of expression

367 The term imitation is used in both psychological and sociological senses with a considerable resulting confusion. Used in a sociological sense it refers to a certain range of phenomena. When these are examined from a psychological point of view they are immediately seen to be related to mental processes so different as to require different names by which they may be distinguished. Used in a psychological sense the term imitation may be applied to any or to all of these processes. In order to avoid this confusion I shall speak of the transmission of social forms of expression or, more shortly, of social transmission; and I shall distinguish by the use of different terms the different psychological processes by which it can take place.

There is an additional reason for doing this. It is desirable to use a general term to cover all forms of social transmission including the transmission of literary and artistic forms of expression. In literary criticism and aesthetic theory the term imitation has a long and complex history from the μιμησις of Plato and Aristotle to
the complete confusion of thought in Pope's line

To copy Nature is to copy them.

In general psychology there is little danger of misunderstanding from this cause; in social psychology the possibility of it ought to be avoided.

368 The immediate object of sociological observation is a form of expression — the pattern of an action or of the product of an action — a pattern, that is, of bodily movements, a pattern of words, or a pattern of material objects shaped or arranged so as to embody a desired system of relations. Now two such forms of expression produced by different persons may resemble one another and the second of the two (in order of production) may be like the first, because its producer has had knowledge of the first and has consciously or unconsciously adopted some feature of it. I shall apply the term social transmission to all instances in which two forms of expression, which are products of different minds, are so related that the second would have been in any way different if the first had not occurred.

369 It is, I suppose, obvious that two forms of expression may resemble one another and that there may be no causal relation between them — that, to take an actual instance,
a man may playfully christen a sporting car Tarquin (on the
grounds that it is a super-bus) and he may afterwards find
a popular writer doing the same in a novel, and yet have no
reason to suppose the two incidents to be causally connected.
What one man's mind has done another's may do also; though
the more highly individualised the form of expression the
smaller, we imagine, will be the possibility of its re-
production apart from such a connection. So that we do
not suppose it possible that two men wishing to call up a
picture of the dusk should write independently,

Light thickens, and the crow
Makes wing to the rocky wood;... 176

or,

Vesper adest,... 177

or,

Now came still Evning on,... 178

370 Cases in which there is no such causal relation are
not cases of imitation. Theoretically the line can be
drawn quite clearly. In practice it can be drawn only
with difficulty. In a particular case it may be shown
that B could or could not have know of the form of expression
produced by A at an earlier time, or that he actually
did or did not know of it: and either of these negatives would make the instance clearly not one of imitation. To show that he could have known of it, i.e. that the evidence is indecisive as to whether he did or not, is inconclusive; to show that he did know of it is still not absolutely conclusive though it supports a higher degree of probability in some cases than in others. Thus if John Smith inscribed his initials on a school desk with the date 1900, and James Brown his with the date 1910 we cannot be sure whether James Brown would have raised himself this monument less enduring than brass in the absence of John Smith's example, the desire for immortality, even in such a temporary form, being apparently a birth of the mind itself; whereas, when brass is mentioned in such a connection, exegi monumentum is the indubitable fons et origo.

Thus the line cannot be drawn with absolute certainty unless we have access to the mental processes of the person concerned: and we cannot assign a similarity between two forms of expression to social transmission without first making an inquiry which is concerned at least in part with psychological processes.

If we now consider all the phenomena which we are to call instances of social transmission it is easy to see that they result from mental processes of a number of differ-
ent types to which no one name would be appropriate.

In any case of social transmission we have two minds A and B and two forms of expression a and b which resemble one another and of which b is the chronologically later; but which are produced in circumstances differing in that B, in producing b, has some acquaintance with a (whereas A in producing a could have no knowledge of b), and possibly some acquaintance with A.

Granted that A and a may be similarly related to a chronologically earlier A' and a', these to a yet earlier A'' and a'', and then to an A''' and a''', and so on, so that a knowledge of a' was one of the conditions of the production of a, a knowledge of a'' one of the conditions of the production of a', and so on, sooner or later we must come to the true originator of the form, and the first case of its occurrence, and this would be without such a condition. It is this that we wish to compare with the subsequent occasions of the occurrence of the form, so we may assume a to be the form in the first occasion of its occurrence, and A to be its originator. On this assumption the mental conditions of the production of b differ from the mental conditions of the production of a in that one of these conditions is a knowledge of a (and similarly, it may be, in that one of them is a knowledge of A).

The conditions of the production of b may differ from
the conditions of the production of \( a \) (a) in that the determinants of the form (outwardly the same in both cases) may be different - and this difference in the determinants of the form may be no more than the difference we have just noticed as a necessary condition, or it may extend to an entire difference of the determinants of \( b \) and \( a \); and (b) they may differ in that, even when the determinants in the two cases are as like as may be, \( A \) and \( B \) may have arrived by different processes at a similar integration.

372 It is clear that, from a psychological point of view, we may classify instances of social transmission according to the degree of likeness between the determinants of \( a \) and \( b \), and the degree of likeness between the mental processes whereby the minds of \( A \) and \( B \) reach such an integration as determines that pattern. It will be best to begin with instances in which the determinants are as like as may be.

While I sat contriving a shade for my lamp (section 80) it is quite possible that, in another room not far away, a man in a similar situation was contriving from similar materials a shade exactly similar. No one who has watched a succession of subjects attempting the same intelligence test will regard it as at all inconceivable. Let us then
suppose that similar determinants become by similar mental processes integrated with reference to the same form of expression; since this happens independently in the two rooms, it is not a case of transmission, but a case of the production of two similar forms of expression by similar responses to similar situations (α).

373 Let us now suppose that, after conceiving the idea of making a lampshade but before taking any steps to carry it out, I go round to his room to smoke a pipe with him, see his improvised lampshade, and say to myself "That's just what I was going to do: I must do it when I go back." If I do so, there is nothing in the form of my action to suggest that this is not a case of imitation, but the course taken by my mental processes has been such that it cannot be so regarded, unless indeed there is a possibility that the sight of his lampshade has strengthened the motives leading me to make one, so that I make it whereas I might have just failed to do so without this encouragement, or so that I make it to-day instead of postponing it until to-morrow. On such considerations, such a case may just be brought under the definition of imitation. (β).

374 We may next suppose that, having conceived the idea
of improvising a lampshade, I have proceeded some way, either in thought or in action, to its realisation, but have been held up by some difficulty. I cannot think what to make it out of, or I cannot think how to shape it, or I cannot think how to support it; or I have carried the making of it so far, but failed to complete it so that it will be effective. I now go round to his room, see his lampshade, understand what I must do, and, when I return, complete my work in accordance with the hints derived from his model. This is certainly a case of transmission. My form of expression is what it is, because of my knowledge of his. It must however be noted that, if I had not happened to pay him a visit, I might perhaps have discovered in course of time an effective plan for myself, either that which he has discovered before me, or an alternative as effective, or less or more so. It is also possible that, having the advantage of seeing his plan worked out and in action, and so being saved the mental processes from which it has resulted, I may improve upon it (γ).

375 Lastly we may consider the case in which I am troubled by the uncomfortable lighting of my room, but have taken no steps, even in thought, to remedy it. I notice my friend's lampshade. I immediately understand it in terms of my own discomfort. That is, I experience a greater
comfort while sitting at his fireside, and while glancing at a book which he desires me to look at; I direct my attention to this increased comfort, and refer it to the lighting and to the shade; I note the materials of the shade and how they are put together. I resolve to make a similar shade and do so when I return to my room (3).

376 In each of these four cases the processes by which the appropriate form of expression is reached are in some degree different. In each of the cases the determinants of the form of expression when it is achieved are similar—except for the possibility, indicated in the third case, of my making some improvements upon my friend's design. The processes by which the form is reached differ in that the effective solution may, in different degrees, be the products of my own mind, or a suggestion received from another mind: but the processes which make it acceptable as a suggestion from outside, the determinants which fasten upon it and make it their expression, are the same processes and determinants which might have reached it without any external suggestion. There is thus no need to assume any tendency or process specific to such cases, to which the name instinct or imitation might be given. The connection between the example (a) and the imitation (b) is not a
specific tendency to imitate stimulated by the former. In two cases, $\beta$ and $\gamma$, a consideration of the example facilitates an integration of determinants upon it as a form of expression, that is, it brings quickly to a conclusion a programme of mental processes which has already begun; and in the fourth case, $\delta$, the same programme of mental processes is similarly facilitated, but from a much earlier stage.

When two acts result in forms of expression which have similar elements, when their similarity is the result of a causal connection, and the result of such mental processes as we have just analysed, I shall call it a case of reproduction by similar determinants.

377 It is clear that reproduction by parallel invention, if we exclude the possibility of a lucky accident, results from similar understanding, that is from similar processes of analysis and synthesis. It is also clear that in the cases we have considered reproduction with reference to a model results from similar processes. In the three cases the model serves in different degrees to suggest a solution, of a problem of which there is awareness in different degrees. It does so in so far as the problem and the model are analysed, and this analysis may be either in perceptual or in conceptual terms, or partly in each. A poem may be
for example imitated because the imitator's "ear" has caught its rhythm, and because he "feels" its emotional and aesthetic values: or he may make a highly technical analysis of its form and content, which plays a part in determining his imitation of it. I suppose Scott's imitation of the traditional ballad is an example of the first process. Swinburne's imitations of Greek tragedy, or the late Mr. Bridges' metrical inventions - English quantitative verse based upon the study of the classical poets, and syllabic verse based upon the study of Milton - would be an example of the second kind. Instances of reproduction based on processes almost entirely perceptual may be found in the copying of a pattern of movements of the limbs in acquiring some bodily dexterity, or in the catching of a pose, or a composition, or a pattern of colour or form or lighting, in the case of drawing or painting.

In either case understanding may be directed to the form of expression itself and to the inter-relations of its parts or aspects - for example to the relation of the paper shade to the position of the flame of the lamp; to the relation of the form to its determinants - for example to the relation of the height of the shade to the desire to have the page of a book properly illuminated or the eyes in shadow; or to the relations between the determinants - for example, to the relation between the desires just mentioned,
or between them and the desire to assume a comfortable attitude in the chair.

378 Reproduction by similar determinants does not necessarily follow with mechanical accuracy the details of the form of expression which is imitated. The example of the lampshades was chosen to suggest two men as like one another as might be in situations as like one another as might be. Such general similarity of character and situation is not however a necessary condition of the process. What is necessary is two situations similar in some relevant particulars and two characters similar in some relevant elements so that the second may, in examining a mental product of the first, discover in it a form of expression related to some determinants in the mind which produced it which are similar to some determinants active in his own mind in pursuit of expression.

Situations differ, men's characters differ, even when there are important similar elements. Reproduction by similar determinants will therefore result in the transmission of forms of expression with change and adaptation to new circumstances inner and outer. The analysis of the model, whether this analysis is perceptual, will separate out elements which, by perceptual or conceptual synthesis, are combined with other elements to form new unified wholes. It is of the very essence of reproduction of similar de-
terminants that it should be reproduction by similar combined with dissimilar determinants.

Thus the original design of the lampshade is related in this way to lampshades previously seen, to other uses of paper or paper fasteners or wire, and to other occasions on which a lamp, a chair and a fire have been arranged on a pattern conducive to comfort. Each of these relations involves the reproduction in the present form of expression of an element in a former form of expression, and a combination of some determinants related to that element with others related to the present form of expression, but not to the former one.

379 It is equally evident that reproduction by similar determinants does not imply an exact similarity of mental processes. It implies in fact analysis where there was previously synthesis. I find it awkward to use my typewriter on my desk, which is too high and upon which it gets in the way of my papers. Of the small tables in my room, one is too low, and one too unstable. I also suffer discomfort from being unable to fix the book or manuscript from which I am copying so that I can read it easily while I type. Conscious of these and other difficulties I plan a special table for my typewriter, of the right height to suit the chair in which I sit at my desk; on castors so
that I can readily pull it towards me when I want it, or push it into a corner out of the way; provided with a support for the book or manuscript from which I am working; and in other ways suitable to my purposes. I think out all the details of its construction. I consider what it may cost and discover how I may have it made most cheaply.

When it has been made, and is in use, it is a form of expression which is the focus of all the determinants in my mind related to the act of type-writing. If now my friend comes into my room while I am at work, and if he also uses a typewriter, and has experience of the discomforts to avoid which my table has been made, the table will attract his attention. It is for him a form of expression upon which come to be focussed all the determinants connected with his experience of using a typewriter on an ordinary desk or table. He may of course at once see how he thinks this or that feature of it could be improved, or on the other hand he may miss the point of this or that device incorporated in it. Let us however suppose that there are no such complications; that his attitude to the problem of typing in comfort is similar to mine a week before when I first began to think about it; that, point by point, the different aspects of the table become the focus of determinants similar to those in my mind which have led me to design it and use it; and that he resolves to have a
similar one made for himself. We should then have a case of reproduction by similar determinants: in two minds similar dispositions have come to be organised in similar systems with reference to the same form of expression. But the two minds have reached this similarity of organisation by different routes and from different starting points - his by working back from the completed form of expression to its determinants, mine by working forward from the determinants to the invention of a form of expression with reference to which they can be integrated.

The effective transmission of a form of expression from one person to another requires that, as a result of the process of transmission, it shall be in the second mind the focus of similar determinants in so far as it is to be reproduced in a similar situation (similar and dissimilar determinants in so far as the situation has points of dissimilarity as well as similarity), but not that this result shall be reached by a similar programme of mental processes. Indeed it is desirable that that programme should be abbreviated in every possible way, so only that there is no detriment to the final result. To find the shortest route to the desired final result in the case of any branch or knowledge is the business of pedagogy, the department of applied psychology concerned with education.
381 The transmission of a form of expression in the ways described implies understanding — a grasp (perceptual or conceptual according to the nature of the case) of the inter-relations of the elements in the form itself, and of their relations to their determinants. This understanding may be complete, or, in various degrees, incomplete. When it is incomplete, the incompleteness may be some degree of failure to grasp the inter-relations of the elements in the form of expression, or the relations of these to their determinants, or the relations of the determinants to one another. It is perhaps unnecessary to illustrate these three possibilities with examples, and it may be sufficient to point out that the result will be some degree of deterioration of the form or, when the form is perfectly reproduced, of its expressiveness.

382 It sometimes happens that a form of expression becomes the focus of an additional determinant or group of determinants, that the determinants of which it was originally the focus cease to require expression, and that the form continues to serve as the expression of the additional determinant or determinants. This possibility requires to be distinguished from that of reproduction with incomplete understanding and consequent deterioration. Examples involving only two persons are in this case more difficult to
find, as the process usually requires the passage of time in order that the earlier group of determinants may cease to require expression. An example involving a longer chain of transmission may therefore be used. In the days when the pound Scots and the pound sterling were different in value, it was necessary, when a value in sterling was intended, to write that word after the sum of money. This is no longer necessary, but it is still customary in Scotland to write the abbreviation sig. on a cheque after the statement in words of the sum to be paid; and this serves to prevent a fraudulent alteration of the cheque by the addition of a further amount in shillings and pence. Both dress and architecture show numerous examples of forms, once essential elements of structure, which have been retained as elements in a visual pattern after their original function has been lost. In these cases it can however, usually be maintained that this relation is a case of the deterioration of the form.

333 An opposite process is possible. During the years before the war in the ordinary course of changes in women's fashions of dress a short skirt came to be worn in place of one sweeping the ground. Its retention (with minor variations) for day time wear seems to have been the result of motives of hygiene and convenience which had possibly
little to do with its original adoption. It is probable that many other changes in feminine dress during the same period are similarly examples of the focussing upon a form of expression of more stable determinants that those of which it was at first the expression. The process is one of multi-determination and displacement analogous as already described (section 293).

If a form is reproduced with incomplete understanding and consequent deterioration it is likely to disappear on account of the disappearance of its appropriate motives. In some such cases forms will be kept alive by a substitute group of determinants. There is therefore a combination of deterioration due to incomplete understanding and reproduction with substitute determinants.

384 A special type of transmission with substitute determinants is that in which a form is reproduced with inappropriate determinants. This almost certainly involves a deterioration of the form in respect of the inter-relations of its elements, as well as a deterioration of its other relations.

Thus a young boy having seen his father go through the process of shaving himself, may collect a piece of soap and a brush and a blunt penknife, and go through the motions of shaving himself, although he has no beard to remove, and
although his instruments would be entirely inadequate to its removal if he had. In such a case, the form of an action is imitated, although none of the original determinants of it are present - no one of the motives present in the case of the father can be operative in the case of the boy. Nevertheless there must be determinants in operation capable of bringing it about. The most obvious are the boy's memory images of the procedure of shaving as he has observed it. It is from these that the pattern of his action is derived. Yet why should he have observed just this particular action with this degree of accuracy? Because as a mysterious and complicated procedure it excites his curiosity: because as an act of a more powerful being it excites his submissiveness: because of the sensual attractiveness of a thick lather, and the perpetual fascination of the cutting instrument. Let us suppose it to be so: why then, having observed it, should he reproduce it? Whether or not it is necessary to bring in an instinct of imitation, it is clear that each of the motives which fastens his attention upon the action is also a motive supporting his carrying out of his own version of it. To go through the motions is to obtain a fuller understanding of the operation, and it is therefore a further expression of his curiosity: to perform in his own person the act which has excited his awe is to readjust the balance
between submission and assertion, and it is therefore an expression of the latter instinct also: to cover his face with lather and scrape it with a knife is to enjoy a new range of sensory experience, and a new way of using that dangerous instrument. Thus it is easy to find a rich group of substitute determinants, adequate to account for the performance of the action, but entirely inappropriate to its purpose in the case of the model imitated. If we have to add to this a further motive derived from an instinct of imitation, this would be, from the point of view of the classification of modes of reproduction, an additional substitute determinant.

Reproduction with inappropriate determinants is important, rather because it is a frequent process than because it leads to results of social or individual value. The most frequent substitute motives seem to come from the self-tendencies. A person or a class possessed of some degree of power or prestige becomes an object of imitation through this process. The results may be of the most ridiculous kind, since it may lead even to the imitation of disabilities: the prince has a badly developed leg, and the courtier limps. Or it may lead to the imitation of a form of behaviour in circumstances in which it is inappropriate or unnecessary. When this happens it results
in a reaction, healthy in itself but unfortunate in that it
gives to such words as "form", "formal", and "convention" a
bad odour which interferes with their proper use.

386 Deterioration in a form of expression in consequence
of its transmission may be due to either external or in-
ternal factors in the situation. It may be difficult
to achieve a form of expression completely in adverse
circumstances. A Dickensian Christmas cannot be
celebrated at the Antipodes. The ministration of baptism
at sea, or the order of confirmation under shell-fire at
Gallipoli, is a ceremonial conducted as circumstances per-
mit. A will made by a dying soldier upon the sole of a
boot with a piece of chalk has, I believe, been granted
probate: but it probably lacked the niceties of profession-
al legal terminology.

387 Deterioration due to temporarily adverse circum-
stances may be followed by complete recovery when circum-
stances are again favourable. It is otherwise when de-
terioration is due to internal factors. The most usual
cause in this case is inadequate understanding due to in-
adequate experience or ability. In the case of any form
of expression, a certain degree of knowledge, experience,
special ability or general ability is necessary, if it is
to be grasped or transmitted. There is therefore a limit to the extent to which a form of expression can be transmitted throughout a community at any moment of time. Only a small proportion of the members of a community can master the mathematical technique of modern physics: a larger proportion can learn to use the calculus, a still larger proportion the multiplication table; but not all can get even so far as simple addition. And the case is similar with music or letters, with science or philosophy, with religion and morals, with professional and craft skill, with manners, and with cookery.

Professor M. Rostovtzeff suggests that the decay of ancient civilisation was due to

...the gradual absorption of the educated classes by the masses and the consequent simplification of all the functions of political, social, economic, and intellectual life,...

and the series of works in which he examines the social history of the ancient world concludes with the question,

Is it possible to extend a higher civilization to the lower classes without debasing its standard and diluting its quality to the vanishing point? Is not every civilization bound to decay as soon as it begins to penetrate the masses?

Whatever the answer to this question may be, it would seem that it depends on the principles just stated.
determination of the standards in different specialisms, upon the maintenance of which a community depends in modern times, are capable of determination. The distribution of the corresponding innate aptitudes and abilities is also discoverable. The study of the relation of the one set of values to the other is the only means, either to an answer to this question, or to an effective determination of public policy. Underlying these questions is the further one - whether the distribution of innate aptitudes and abilities is remaining constant or tending to a higher or a lower median value. A movement in either direction would have obvious consequences for the maintenance, the improvement or the decay of a culture.

388 We may now turn to a range of phenomena closely allied to those we have been considering, but marked also by features of their own. Each of the more primitive emotional experiences is accompanied by deep-seated physiological changes of a relatively specific pattern: it is also accompanied by changes easily visible to an observer - changes in the expression of the face, in the tones of the voice, in the posture of the body, and in the form and emphasis of the gestures. These visible changes, which constitute the expression of the emotion, have a double reference. Not only are they related in the closest possible
way to the subject's inner experience, and to the general pattern of the organic changes which are taking place in his body, but they are immediate objects of attention - and, if the emotion expressed be of any degree of intensity, of an enforced attention - to anyone within sound or sight of them; and they are charged with meaning for him. Laughter and the smiling face of pleasure, the cry of fear and the pallor and trembling which may accompany it, the characteristic tones of anger, or of disgust, of wonder or of tenderness, the accent and carriage of elation, the posture of submission - these, and a few other types of emotional expression, are, I suppose, more immediately and universally intelligible to humanity than any other aspect of the universe whatsoever. Moreover this intelligibility extends not merely to some nine or ten distinguishable emotions but to the discrimination of their finest shades, as between this occasion and that of their occurrence, and every variation, every come and go, on any particular occasion. It goes even further, for we may distinguish them not only when they appear separately but when they appear in combination, or in conflict with one another. What infinite meaning may reside in lips and eyes, the tension of the facial muscles or the carriage of the head, we may see in the works of the artist and the sculptor; the resources of the voice are exploited by the actor and the orator, and
verse and prose find in the rhythm of speech, even when, upon a printed page, it is divorced from its accompanying variations of pitch and loudness, the most delicately responsive and the most inexhaustible of all artistic mediums.

389 In so far as the expression of emotional states is innately determined and understood in terms of innate determinants, the relation between one person, who is experiencing an emotion, and another, who responds to it, is based upon an innate common mental frame, the essential element in which seems to be the evocation in the observer of the organic changes typical of the emotion, and also the evocation of their introspectable concomitants. We have then, on the part of the first person, a perceptual process (for example the perception of something threatening, something mysterious, something disgusting, or something evocative of some other emotional state), followed by the experience of the appropriate emotional state, and the occurrence of its concomitant organic changes (with which the observable events which we call the expression of the emotion may be classed). What the causal relation may be in the case of the perception, the emotion, and the organic changes, is unknown. When his attention is drawn to the expression, we have, on the part of the second person,
similar organic changes, and similar emotional experience. What is of more importance is that the second person seems to experience the organic changes and the emotional state in the very moment of observing the expression of them in the other. His experience of these changes as they occur is the basis of his understanding of the facial expression, tone of voice, posture and gestures of the other; it is the meaning which he reads into them.

If we confined our consideration to one group of emotions to the exclusion of another it would be easy to suggest a biological explanation of the origin of the whole process. Fear and anger are the clearest instances of this. It is of the greatest value to the flock or herd, in the case of gregarious birds and animals, that the perception by one individual of a potential enemy should, by that individual's expression of fear or anger, arouse these emotions, and their accompanying impulses, in all the members of the group. It is easy to see that, on a rather higher mental level, the experience of fear following upon the fear cry of another, and the experience of fear accompanying a fear cry in oneself, must lead to the attribution to the other of the experience of fear: and similarly in the case of anger. And so the expression of these emotions on the part of another would acquire the
meaning which they certainly have. On such a view the communicative aspect of the process is secondary; and, in the first instance, the cry of fear was merely one among the signs of danger which aroused fear directly.

But, in the case of some of the other emotions, such an explanation is difficult, or impossible. In the case of the cry of the infant, the primitive response which has biological value is the act of protecting or the act of feeding - that is, a complementary not a similar response. There seems to be no biological value, primitive or other, in the spread of sorrow, yet an attitude of dejection, tears and tones of despair are as immediately understood as the signs of any other emotion. There is at least no such obvious biological utility in the spread of disgust or wonder as in the case of fear or anger. It is difficult, then, to see in these cases a secondary communicative function developed out of a primary function of stimulating a similar response of biological value.

391 Such a line of argument would seem to suggest that the communicative function of the bodily expression of an emotion is much less of an afterthought than seems usually to be implied - that, just as, in the case of articulate speech, the vehicle of communication and the meanings it
conveys have developed *pari passu*, so here all the fine shades of facial expression, gesture and tone of voice have become differentiated as a language of emotion step by step as they have been discriminated in being observed and reacted to in terms of similar organic changes and psychical states. The starting points of such a development would of course be movements with a value which preceded their communicative value - the sucking movements, for example, from which the smile has developed.

392. The term *sympathy* has come to be used in a technical sense for the process whereby the experience of an emotion follows upon a perception of the signs of it in someone else. If it is possible to take such a view of it as has just been suggested, sympathy may be described in similar terms to the processes of transmission already discussed. In a case of reproduction by similar determinants, we have, first, the perception of a form of expression, secondly, the focussing upon it of determinants similar to those of which it is the expression, and, thirdly, the expression of them in a similar form. In the case of sympathetic interaction, we have, first, perception of a particular bodily pattern, secondly, the activity of dispositions similar to those expressed in it, and, thirdly, the occurrence in some degree of the same bodily pattern; which
last may be, from the external point of view, the starting point of a similar process, but is, from the internal point of view, a complex of organic sensation and conative experience, which gives meaning to the perceived bodily pattern. Thus, in both cases, the same form is the expression of determinants in one mind and the occasion of the activity of similar determinants in an observer of it.

393 The process of sympathy is, as we have seen, capable of conveying an infinite gradation of shades of emotion - a variety of experience as inexhaustible as our experience of colour, which, like it, may be described in terms of a small number of primaries, their gradations and combinations. It is however sharply limited, in that it cannot convey any perceptual or conceptual content - it can convey only the particular type of subjective experience of which it is the proper vehicle.

394 This distinction is important in considering the part played by sympathy as a mode of social transmission. That part is a very important one. There are three ways in which it operates. (1) It leads directly to the transmission of emotional elements in the organisation of sentiments. (2) It may lead indirectly to imposing consequences by altering the balance between tendencies which
are in equilibrium. (3) It may suggest trains of thought and imagery for which it gets the credit but which are really the product of the mind which it is influencing.

395 (1) Through sympathy an emotion felt for a particular object or situation may certainly be conveyed from one person to another. From the emotional state so induced a sentiment structure may result, so related to that object or situation that its recurrence involves the recurrence of the emotional state. One person, A, experiences fear or disgust when in the presence of a certain object. He gives expression to this emotion on one occasion in the presence of the object, and of another person, B, who has no such tendency. B through sympathy shares his emotion on this occasion, and as a result the object in future calls out this emotion whenever he sees or thinks about it.

396 This is the origin of many of our sentiments. The most beautiful examples of it are to be seen in the relation between the mother and the young child. The mother may be observed to talk to the child about what it sees and hears and tastes and touches in language which it is quite incapable of understanding. But while the words mean nothing to it, the tones of her voice are conveying to it
every shade of the emotions which she experiences and inducing the same emotions in the child, so that it experiences tender feeling for this, disgust for that, wonder at the other, elation on this occasion and submissiveness on that, and so that sentiments are built up which will determine its attitude to these objects and situations when it meets with them again.

397 Such sentiments may be very enduring and of very great social importance. Very valuable moral sentiments may be transmitted in this way, as well as elements of more doubtful value. In either case, the result is a powerful reinforcement of conservative social processes. A beautiful example of the strength and permanence of a sentiment formed in this way, and of the importance of the social results which may follow upon such a process, is to be found in the debate in the House of Lords on the proposed revision of the Book of Common Prayer. A powerful appeal against the introduction of change was made by a peer who told how, in his childhood, his mother had impressed upon him the fear that the Protestant establishment would be in danger when an Anglican congregation turned to the east to say the creed. It is unnecessary to comment upon the non-rational basis of this appeal to the House of Lords to accept, as the speaker apparently did, the judgement of his
mother as superior to that of the speaker himself, to that of the assembly which he was addressing, and to that of scholarship and ecclesiastical authority. It was interesting to notice it as the conscious and public statement of a type of motive which must have much to do with shaping the views of public men and ordinary citizens on a great variety of questions, though usually without such explicit consciousness and avowal.

398 By the same process but with less fortunate results the mother's emotions are induced in the child on occasions when they are evoked in reference to some other relation to which the child is not by intention a partner. It seems to be an important part of the female tradition to control the expression of fear in the presence of a child (cf. section 251). The value of such a tradition is not only in the prevention of the immediate shock to the child but in the avoidance of enduring consequences of an undesirable kind. In the view of the psycho-analysts very unfortunate consequences may follow upon an incident in which the child is present during manifestations of sexual feeling between its parents and this process would seem to be a factor in the aetiology of such consequences.

399 The same process is made use of, with results
fortunate and unfortunate, by the advertiser and the political propagandist to induce positive or negative attitudes to this or that commodity, or to this or that person or policy, without attempting to show that there are rational grounds for such attitudes.

400 (2) The way in which a process of sympathy may lead to impressive consequences by altering the balance between tendencies which are in equilibrium may be illustrated by a rather dramatic incident which I once witnessed. Three persons were concerned. Earlier in the day, A, who was strongly prejudiced against the teaching of the psycho-analysts, had been telling B how ridiculous it was to suppose that dreams had any reference to sexual matters; and he had related in confirmation of his view a striking dream of his own, of which he alleged that it was at once evident that it could have no sexual meaning whatsoever. B, much impressed by this argument, was now recapitulating it to C, and presently he began to relate the dream itself in order to clinch the matter. The dream was (in terms of the Freudian symbols) a rather elaborate dramatisation of the act of sexual union. The opening stage of it was sufficient to show this to C, who was familiar with Freudian theory. Having listened patiently to what promised to be an unprofitable argument, being now
gratuitously presented with the material for its refutation, and contrasting the incongruous content of the dream with the serious character of the dreamer, he could not forbear to smile. The effect was surprising. B at once said: "I see what you mean. I'll finish telling the dream and then I'll interpret it; and you can tell me whether I am right." And he did, symbol by symbol, as if he had the book in his hand, to his own intense amusement.

B had thus considered the same dream on two occasions. On the first, A's attitude - his resistance to a recognition of the latent content of his own dream - had presumably done something to strengthen in B's mind the inhibitory forces which, in any normal person unacquainted with psychoanalytic teaching, would operate to prevent the appearance in consciousness of the meaning of the dream symbols. On the second occasion, C's attitude, although expressed in nothing more than a slight change in the tension of the facial muscles, was sufficient to make an end of these inhibitions. The revelation of the meaning of the dream on the second occasion was not due to the transmission from C to B of any knowledge of the meanings attributed by psychoanalysts to the dream symbols, or even of specific feeling attitudes to them. All that could possibly be communicated was amusement, with the implication of an attitude of scepticism. This was sufficient to set free active process-
es in B's mind, as a result of which the determinants of the dream in his own mind revealed themselves to his own consciousness. B's own mind thus did the work of interpretation, upon the slightest of cues afforded by C's facial expression, and quite a striking change of attitude to psycho-analytic theory resulted.

401 Similar illustrations might be drawn from the education of taste. One man has looked at a particular poet but has not been sufficiently attracted by his work to give him further attention. Some element in his style - a peculiarity of his diction or his metrical form - is repellant, or perhaps merely without meaning.

Some people admire the work of a Fool,  
For it's sure to keep your judgment cool;  
It does not reproach you with want of wit;  
It is not like a lawyer serving a writ.  

To meet with new work of any aesthetic value is like meeting "a lawyer serving a writ": it makes a demand upon the powers of the mind. Suppose another man, who has a fuller understanding of the poet in question, to quote him in a tone of voice implying appreciation, and so as to convey the appropriate feeling of the lines he speaks, and this may be sufficient to made a bridge between the poet and the other, so that the latter may freely enter upon an
understanding and enjoyment of him. His own mind is then active in interpreting the printed words which before were without aesthetic significance for him.

402 Political or religious conversion may appear to turn upon incidents as trivial. Actually it has probably been preceded by some process of mental reorganisation. Movements of the mind which have not come clearly to consciousness, or to the determination of action, have been shaping themselves in response to this incident and that, to this idea and that, and, at last, upon the cue of some apparently inadequate remark or manifestation of feeling, a very striking change of mental orientation takes place.

403 (3) Sympathetically induced states of emotion may be of importance in a third way. They may be starting-points for trains of thought and imagery in the mind in which they have been induced; these trains of thought and imagery may be very much richer than, or largely independent of those, the expression of which has given rise to them; and the mind in which they rise may be itself unaware how much has come to it from outside, and how much it has itself contributed.

This principle may be observed in a variety of phenomena some of them grotesque. It is difficult to
illustrate from everyday experience since the points on which it turns are not easily recorded. A very beautiful example is however available in the famous passage in which Walter Pater described Leonardo da Vinci's La Gioconda.

All the thoughts and experience of the world have etched and moulded there, in that which they have of power to refine and make expressive the outward form, the animalism of Greece, the lust of Rome, the mysticism of the middle age with its spiritual ambition and imaginative loves, the return of the Pagan world, the sins of the Borgias. She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants: and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands.

How much of this is communicated by "the unfathomable smile", how much merely suggested? How impossible it is to draw the line between that which has come from Leonardo, and that which has its origin in the mind of the writer. How certain that in another mind the trains of thought and imagery suggested might have a very different colouring.
404 We may sum up the argument about sympathy by saying that, as a process of social transmission, it is of very great importance but that it is subject to very narrow limits. The transmission of a culture is therefore dependent on the process of reproduction by similar determinants, and that in turn is dependent upon the special and general abilities of the minds through which the transmission takes place. When these minds are inadequate a form of expression transmitted by their agency will deteriorate, either in the inter-relations of its elements, or in its relation to its determinants; that is, it will deteriorate, either as a form, or in its expressiveness. And, although transmission with substitute or inadequate determinants may preserve the form for a time, it is likely to result ultimately in its deterioration. On the other hand, if a form be transmitted without a deterioration in its expressiveness, it is almost certain to be subject to improvement, unless it has already been brought to such a pitch that further improvement in it is not required; for the minds through which it is transmitted, being capable of an adequate grasp of it in all its relations, are of the same quality as the minds which produced it and may therefore be expected to prove capable of a further advance.

405 The modern world has seen in the march of science,
and in the economic and social developments which have followed from it, a striking example of such advance. Its inevitable continuance has only recently ceased to be generally taken for granted. The doctrine of progress is supported not only by this very impressive social experience but by a fallacy, obvious enough once one’s attention is drawn to it: If an age transforms its traditions in ways which seem good to it, it will necessarily appear to itself to be achieving improvements, even in cases in which the changes it makes are not advantageous; if it rejects elements which are good, it does so in ignorance of their value, if it introduces innovations of less value, they will still appear to it as achievements. By the time the evil results of the loss and the false gain are experienced, their origin will be forgotten, or these results will be ascribed to other causes.

406 Nevertheless humanity seems to have been much more frequently impressed with the doctrine of inevitable deterioration.

Damnosa quid non imminuit dies?
Aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit
nos nequiores, mox daturos
progeniem vitiosiorem.

Comparatively rare are such expressions of a different view
as that of Lucretius,

In quantum spatio mutantur saecla animantum,
Et, quasi cursores, vital lampada tradunt.

or that of Dante in the prooemium of the De Monarchia,

Omnium hominum quos ad amorem veritatis
natura superior impressit, hoc maxime interesse
videtur, ut quemadmodum de labore antiquorum
ditati sunt, ita et ipsi posteris prolaborent,
quatenus ab eis posteritas habeat quo ditetur.

or, after a long interval, Pascal,

Toute la suite des hommes, pendant le cours
de tant de siècles, doit être considérée
comme un même homme qui subsiste
toujours et qui apprend continuellement.

According to Lord Acton, it was from Turgot that our fathers
began to learn a more optimistic view of human destinies;

Whilst Montesquieu, at the height of his fame
as the foremost of living writers, was content to
contemplate the past, there was a student in the
Paris seminary who taught men to fix hope and en-
deavour on the future, and led the world at twenty-
three... From Lucretius and Seneca to Pascal and
Leibniz we encounter a few dispersed and unsupport-
ed passages, suggesting advance towards perfection,
and the flame that brightens as it moves from hand
to hand; but they were without mastery or radiance.
Turgot at once made the idea habitual and familiar,
and it became a pervading force in thoughtful minds,
whilst the new sciences arose to confirm it. He im-
parted a deeper significance to history, giving it
unity of tendency and direction, constancy where
there had been motion, and development instead of
change.
407 It may be supposed that external accident can destroy a society as external accident can destroy a single organism. But, though a tree may die of drought or lightning or volcanic eruption, we regard its continuing life, if it is not subject to such a catastrophe, as dependent on the continuous fulfilment of a series of inner conditions, and the same may be thought to be true of societies. Of the continued life of a society the principal condition is the effective transmission of its culture and the conditions of such transmission are therefore conditions of its life. These conditions are (a) biological, (b) psychological, (c) social.

408 (a) The principal biological condition relevant to this question is the maintenance of a population in which the innate special and general abilities upon which transmission depends are found in a sufficient degree. This principle is usually stated in a form which emphasises the need for the birth in each generation of a sufficient number of outstanding individuals. Such a statement is inadequate, unless it be taken to mean that, since the distribution of such qualities may be expected to be in accordance with the normal curve of distribution, the birth of a sufficient number of outstanding individuals will imply also a sufficiently high position of the median values
for the group in respect of these qualities. The transmission of any higher element in the culture of a society is dependent upon the existence of such outstanding individuals, but it is also, as will be shown, dependent upon some degree of appreciation by others, and therefore upon the general level of the group.

409 (b) The principal psychological condition is the transmission of forms with appropriate determinants and therefore with the retention of their full degree of expressiveness. The higher elements in a culture can of course only have their full expressiveness for exceptional minds. This is equally true in science, in philosophy, in religion, in literature, in art, in music, in engineering, in medicine, in agriculture, in craftsmanship, in any department of life.

410 It is, however, obscured by the fact that forms may be transmitted with lessened degrees of expressiveness and with lessened degrees of adequacy and usefulness. Thus forms may be transmitted without understanding and still with a high degree of social usefulness. The right thing is done, not because its rightness is understood, but because it has been done before. A form so transmitted is liable to deterioration. This is especially so if there
are alterations in the frame of external circumstances which require the alteration and re-adaptation of the form. Such alteration and re-adaptation will obviously be impossible. A form transmitted in this manner may however preserve valuable elements which, when they meet again with capable minds, regain their expressiveness in these minds with the consequence that their development and re-adaptation become again possible.

411 (c) To be socially effective in the fullest sense a transmitted form must have its fullest expressiveness at least for some minds. It cannot have such expressiveness for all the members of a community and it is not necessary for its preservation or its social effectiveness that it should e.g. it is not necessary that every surgeon should have a command of the technique of law nor that lawyers should have a command of the technique of surgery. The social tradition implies specialisation. Each specialisation implies a succession of specialists for whom its transmitted forms have full expressiveness. It requires also a series of circles within the community for each of which its forms have a different degree of expressiveness. A highly specialised surgical technique may be fully grasped by only a few specialists. It is necessary that a larger number of specialists should have a theor-
ethical understanding of it and an appreciation of the special command of it possessed by the smaller number who actually apply it. It is also necessary that the general practitioner should have a knowledge, though it must necessarily be a much less complete knowledge, of this and of other similarly specialised techniques. Beyond them a series of publics will possess in lessened degrees an appreciation of the possibilities of this and other surgical and medical techniques and theories, an appreciation fading out towards the periphery.

412 Such related groups of specialists and publics are to be observed in the case of every department of knowledge upon which a modern community depends. Similar relations are to be observed also on a small scale in the primitive group or in the small group within a civilised community. Upon such a social structure effective transmission depends in all cases except those of simple elements of culture which can be transmitted with full expressiveness to all members of a community. Such a structure is psychologically a parallel to that already described in Chapter IX (sections 350-366). What have here been called degrees of expressiveness of a transmitted form, correspond psychologically to what in chapter IX were termed modes of acceptance. The essential social condition of the trans-
mission of forms of expression with unimpaired effectiveness and expressiveness is therefore a social structure which makes possible for each circle of the community the mode of acceptance of which it is capable, and which gives the necessary social prestige to the right persons and institutions to secure acceptance of valuable and effective forms.

413 Each of us occupies a position somewhere between the centre and the periphery with regard to each part of the tradition of our society. If it is a question of the aesthetic value of a poem or the scientific value of a theory in social psychology, I believe myself capable of arriving at an original appreciation and an original judgment in consequence of my own mental processes. If it is a question of the Socratic problem, I am glad to read John Burnet or Professor A.E. Taylor or listen to Professor W.D. Ross. If I require medical assistance, I shall not argue with my physician as to the form of treatment which I am to adopt: but I shall in the first place choose him in the light of such intelligence and such relevant knowledge as I possess and I shall be similarly guided in the continuance of my adherence to him. How far, in fields in which I have no special competence, I may be bamboozled by processes of suggestion and persuaded by inadequate reasons,
I cannot say. But I modestly hope that I may have reached such a maturity as not to require coercion for my own good and that of others. Each of us is therefore related to socially transmitted forms of expression through more than one of these modes of acceptance. The position of the more able and the better educated (and, unless we identify education with schooling, these two classes are not very different in their personnel) will, however, be nearer the centre in the case of a larger number of departments of the social traditions.

414 Since men are born and die, every element in a social tradition must be continually transmitted to new young minds and this transmission is the primary condition of its maintenance. This process is, from the point of view of these minds, a development through the processes described above (sections 94-107) a development which has the society in which the elements of that tradition are being thought and felt and acted upon as its environment. These minds, in their innate tendencies and capacities and developmental forces are the correlates of that tradition. Its elements have been formed (though perhaps in somewhat different circumstances) by minds innately similar to them and tendencies and capacities which

...all antiquity and no decay...
come into the world afresh with each new generation.
Notes and references

A bibliography should show a writer's indebtedness. I have found it very difficult to preserve a due proportion in this matter, partly because of the nature of my subject which is related to so many fields of study, and partly because much of the reading out of which the work has grown necessarily preceded the first conception of it. Where I am basing on psychological positions which are accepted, I have not always thought it necessary to quote an authority. Where I have judged it desirable to do so I have confined my references to a comparatively small number of books. Quotations are in many cases intended to supplement statements in the text. Circumstances have made it difficult to show my debt to periodical literature. When writing I tried throughout to keep my attention primarily on social processes of everyday life which I could observe and formulate and observe again. As one grateful for a training in English Scholarship I have tried to be punctilious in my treatment of literary quotations.

(The numbers attached to the notes are inserted in the text in red ink)

The motto at the beginning of the book is taken from Bosanquet - The Philosophical Theory of the State (London 1923), p.x.

The sources of the mottoes to chapter I are:
(a) W.H.R.Rivers - Psychology and Ethnology (1926), p.5.
(b) C.G.Crump, Esq., in private correspondence.

1 This double aspect of society, its presentation to us as social facts and as social experience, is well described
What outer experience teaches us is confirmed by inner experience, because the reality of the social life of the community exists also in our consciousness. It is an inner experience for us to find the place for our Ego in a highly developed social life. We feel ourselves to be self-contained units, but we also feel that we are part of a whole which lives and acts within us. Take away our relation to nation and State, to religious bodies or churches, to profession and family and all kinds of unions and guilds, and we should not know ourselves in the miserable remnant that would remain. When we realize this, we understand that all these things do not mean mere chains and bonds for us, but that they represent a psychic chain of experiences affecting our innermost life and forming an integral part of our being. We become conscious of the fact that part of the impulses directing our actions emanates from the sense of community in us, and that we are living the life of social beings.

2 Cf. James Ward - *Psychological Principles* (Cambridge 1920), I, 7. The conclusion is with regard to the standpoint of psychology:

...by whatever methods, from whatever sources its facts are ascertained, they must - to have a psychological import - be regarded as having a place in, or as being a constituent of, someone's experience... Psychology we may then define as the science of individual experience...

3 The most recent definition of the scope of social psychology is that of F.C. Bartlett in *Remembering, A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge 1932). He defines social psychology as:

...the systematic study of the modifications of individual experience and response due directly to membership of a group. (p. 239)

This definition appears to conflict with the view expressed in the text. The writer however goes on to state a position
similar to that in the text:

We seem forced to say that conduct springing directly from beliefs, conventions, customs, traditions and institutions characteristic of a group is material for social psychology. This is, theoretically speaking, rather troublesome, because it seems to mean that everything in psychology belongs to social psychology, except idiosyncracies and such forms of reaction as are immediately and dominantly determined by physical stimuli. (pp. 242-243)

Cf. section 22 of this work.

4 Cf. H.W.B. Joseph - An Introduction to Logic (Oxford 1916), pp. 77-78 on the difference between science and history.

But history is interested in individuals in whose total being we find characters coincident, the conjunction whereof we can never wholly see to be necessary.

...the historian attempts to trace connexions among the events that make the history of individuals, or groups of individuals, and so far to be scientific.

The following quotation is from Vinogradoff - Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford 1923), p.72,

Natural science has been contrasted by modern thinkers with cultural science based on history. The aim of natural science is to discover laws, that is, abstract principles to which the actual facts may be subordinated without residuum. The aim of cultural science is to ascertain what is important in the concrete and the individual. The standard in this case is not the standard of recurrence, but the standard of value.

5 The argument can be carried a stage further. cf. R.G. Collingwood - Speculum Mentis or the Map of Knowledge (Cambridge 1924), pp.186-187.

Science is the question whose answer is history.
To ask that question implies that history is already in existence; and thus we get a process of history — science — history. But history on its first appearance is implicit; it is not known for what it is, and is indeed despised as the mere world of empirical or sensuous reality. It is only when it has been distilled into terms of science and then restored to itself in the form of concepts or laws that it is recognised for what it really is.

6 Cf. Bernard Bosanquet - _op. cit._, pp. 39-40

As every serious student of social matters knows by his own experience, it is impossible to touch a physical fact, or a statistical datum, or a legal enactment, in reference to its social bearing, without its at once, so to speak, coming alive in his hands, and attaching itself to an underlying relation of mind as the only unity which will make it intelligible, and correlate it with other experiences, by themselves no less fragmentary. In statistics, for example, you touch a moving creature, as if through the holes in a wall, at this point and the other, and write down where you have touched him. But to see the creature as he is, and combine your information of all kinds in a just and complete idea, you must get him into the open. And that, when the question is of a life, you can only do by reconstructing his mind, for even to see a social unit with your eyes gives you a fragment only, and not a whole.

7 The desirability of preserving a clear distinction between these two stages of a sociological argument is well exemplified in W.H.R. Rivers's _Kinship and Social Organisation_ (London 1914), in which the terminology of relationship is discussed. His conclusion with regard to the methodological point is:

In social, as in all other kinds of human activity, psychological factors must have an essential part... These psychological elements are, however, only concomitants of social processes with which it is possible to deal apart.
from their psychological aspect. It has been the task of these lectures to refer the social facts of relationship to antecedent social conditions, and I believe that this is the proper method of sociology. Even at the present time, however, it is possible to support sociological arguments by means of considerations provided by psychological motives, and the assistance thus rendered to sociology will become far greater as the science of social psychology advances.

I am not in agreement, however, with the implied definition of the scope of sociology (V. section 15 of this work).

8 Alfred Marshall - Principles of Economics, p.169,

The marginal utility of a commodity to anyone diminishes with every increase in the amount of it he already has.

and on a later page,

...the only universal law as to a person's desire for a commodity is that it diminishes, other things being equal, with every increase in his supply of that commodity.

The subject is sufficiently important to be given separate treatment: here it is possible to give only a few points. (1) The statistical statement of the law of demand is independent of such translation into psychological terms. (2) This psychological interpretation of it is false, because the psychological processes involved are much more complex than it indicates. (3) Except in the case of such desires as those for food, drink, sleep and warmth there is no such regular decrease in the intensity of a conative state as it attains its satisfaction. (4) On the contrary a desire may "grow with what it feeds on"; and
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some desires are therefore in a sense insatiable, e.g. those related to ostentation. (5) Most economic desires require just so much, and neither more nor less, e.g. I desire one copy of Marshall's book, for a second copy I have no shelf-room; a girl requires just this belt or piece of lace to complete a costume, and has no use for two of either; i.e. what is required in such cases is an element for the completion of a pattern. (6) Expenditure of money is related, not directly to the strengths of desires but to self-consciousness, other-consciousness (section 160), reason and will. Later writers on economics have given some attention to these problems but my knowledge of the literature of the question is not sufficient to permit me to form a judgement how far it has been worked out to adequate conclusions. I am content here to use this statement of a classical writer on the subject as an illustration of the methodological point under discussion.

9 On this question see F.C. Bartlett - Psychology and Primitive Culture (Cambridge 1923), Chap I, especially pp. 8-11. Professor Bartlett emphasises in particular the neglect by some writers of the group itself and its mental structure in relation to such responses.

10 We may no doubt except from this statement the patellar and pupillary reflexes et hoc genus. As to how far social conditionings may extend to physiological processes, see notes and infra.
In saying that psychology is a positive science, we mean that it investigates matter of fact, instead of laying down canons of criticism. Ethics lays down canons of conduct, aesthetics aims at establishing canons of taste, and logic prescribes canons of reasoning. Among the sciences which inquire into matter of fact are to be ranked mathematics and all the physical sciences, together with certain moral sciences — theory of knowledge, sociology, political economy and psychology. Psychology, like chemistry or physics, is directly concerned with what is: it does not like ethics or logic treat of what ought to be.

Its essential forms have been shaped by men's purposes, and its development is wholly dependent on the development of these purposes. These purposes have all an ethical character. The very existence of society means ethical purpose in its members. The sociologist who has no ethical interest, no interest in social conditions as relative to values, is a dilettante. He is like a grammarian who studies the letters and syllables of words but never thinks of the words themselves as meanings.

The characteristic embodiment of concrete ethics is law. Law is nothing but the structure of society regarded as the source of an obligation on the individual to act in certain determinate ways.

On non-rational factors which have influenced the development of the social sciences see J.A. Hobson — Free Thought in the Social Sciences (London 1926).
Chap II

The sources of the mottoes of chapter II are:
(a) The Note-Books of Samuel Butler (London 1918), p.88
(b) Entia non multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. An attempted rendering of 'the invincible Doctor' by a schoolboy.

15 Cf. G.P. Thompson - The Atom (London), Chap. XV:
Most of the laws of atomic physics are expressed as probabilities, which, of course, become certainties when a sufficient number of independent events are concerned to make statistics apply... There is an inherent uncertainty or power of choice in the world, but with this proviso, that the power of choice is exercised in such a way that, in the bulk, average laws are obeyed.

16 W. Flinders Petrie - The Revolutions of Civilisation (London 1912).

17 Robert Byron - The Byzantine Achievement (London 1929). Cf. also Herbert Read - The Meaning of Art (London 1931), pp. 66-69, whose conclusion is:

...we surrender to this art with that immediate joy-in-perception which is the first and final sanction of aesthetic experience.

Personally I find that a keen delight in the work of El Greco and William Blake is not incompatible with a belief that Greek sculpture and the carvings of XIII century Europe bear the characters of a greater mental and spiritual maturity.


19 H.G. Wells - The First Men in the Moon.


21 The following sections apply to the problem of a group
mind a number of concepts derived from the discussion of
the relation between the mind and the body and are indebted
to a number of loci classici from Descartes onwards.
Among recent writers to whom I am indebted here, I may
mention G.F. Stout (A Manual of Psychology, 3rd. ed., 1915,
and 4th. ed., revised by C.A. Mace, 1929), William Mc-
Dougall (Body and Mind, London 1911) and C.D. Broad (op. cit.).

22 Cf. William McDougall - The Group Mind (Cambridge
1920) p. 30 et. seq.

23 Cf. James Ward - op. cit., p. 97,

The word disposition means primarily an arrange-
ment, as when we talk of the disposition of troops
in a battle or of cards in a game; the disposita,
that is to say, are always something actual.

24 G.F. Stout - Analytic Psychology, Vol. I, p. 21,

…it is implied in the very conception of an
individual mind that present conscious process is
throughout conditioned by prior conscious process,
and this is only intelligible if we suppose that
past experience leaves persistent after-effects,
which continue when the corresponding modes of
consciousness have ceased.

25 The following definition of a group mind appears to
be of this type:

We may fairly define a mind as an organized
system of mental or purposive forces; and, in
the sense so defined, every highly organized human
society may properly be said to possess a collect-
ive mind. (William McDougall - Psychology, London
1912, p. 229; also q. in the same writer's The
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Group Mind, p. 9)

This statement turns on the definition of mind employed, and this definition is unsatisfactory (sections 55 and 89) as not turning upon an adequate criterion of mind. I find it difficult to judge whether McDougall means in this statement any more than a system of minds in relation to one another (V. Section 174 infra) or a system of social forces (V. sections 57-59 infra). Thus a few lines further on we find,

...the society is rather constituted by the system of relations obtaining between the individual minds which are its units of composition. (ibid)

- a statement of absolute clarity, which I find entirely acceptable but not entirely consistent with that previously quoted from the same passage. An unfortunate ambiguity, resulting from the employment of metaphorical literary expressions, seems to afflict writers upon this topic, for when R.M. Maciver (Community, London, 1917) criticises McDougall for entertaining the hypothesis of a supra-personal mind, the latter easily convicts him of using language which bears the same implication.
Chapter III


26 A.V.Dicey - Lectures on the relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the nineteenth century (London 1914), pp.9-10,

In England,... the beliefs or sentiments which, during the nineteenth century, have governed the development of the law have in strictness been public opinion, for they have been the wishes and ideas as to legislation held by the people of England, or, to speak with more precision, by the majority of those citizens who have at a given moment taken an effective part in public life.

27 Ibid. pp.363-364

...whilst our tribunals, or the judges of whom they are composed, are swayed by the prevailing beliefs of a particular time, they are also guided by professional opinions and ways of thinking...

28 I am indebted to Charles Clay,Esq., Librarian, the House of Lords for the following information:

"All bills are in print. But they are not sent to the King for his assent. The assent is given by Royal Commission. The King signs the appointment of the Commission, the terms of which include a list of bills for which the Royal assent is asked."

I was desirous of knowing what was the actual operative document.

29 A.V.Dicey - op.cit., p.363

"The Courts or the judges when acting as legislators, are of course influenced by the
beliefs and feelings of their time, and are guided to a considerable extent by the dominant current of public opinion; Eldon and Kenyon belonged to the era of old Toryism as distinctly as Denman, Campbell, Erle and Bramwell belonged to the age of Benthamite liberalism".

30 Vinogradoff - op.cit., p.119-120

Laws are formulated in order to be enforced: so much is perfectly true. But is the sanction of law to be always sought in coercion by the Sovereign? We have seen that such coercion is in any case not the ultimate guarantee of legal order: it requires to be supplemented by the express or tacit acceptance and assistance of society at large, because, as has been said long ago, one can conquer by bayonets but one cannot sit on them. The hangman, the policeman and the soldier would not be strong enough to ensure social order and obedience to law for any length of time if the people at large were not disposed to back them.


"True indeed it is that the existence and alteration of human institutions must, in a sense, always and everywhere depend upon the beliefs or feelings, or, in other words, upon the opinion of the society in which such institutions flourish".

Cf. also David Hume - Essays, IV:

As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and popular. The Soldan of Egypt, or the Emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination; but he must, at least, have led his mamelukes, or praetorian bands, like men, by their opinion.
It is pleasant to quote Hobbes:

The value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors,...

(Leviathan, Part I, 75)
Chapter IV

The sources of the mottoes are:

(a) Plato - Phaedrus, 246. Tr. B. Jowett.
(b) J.H.Newman - Apologia pro Vita Sua, Chapter V.
(c) James Drever - An Introduction to Educational Psychology, p.44.

32 Cf. R.G.Collingwood, op.cit., p.218

The motives of historical personages are not psychical forces brooding above the flow of historical events; they are elements in these events, or rather, they are simply these events themselves...

33 Romanes - Fortnightly Review, Dec., 1881:

Environment - or the sum total of the external conditions of life...

q. N.E.D. under 'environment'.


Thus we may define a volition as a desire qualified and defined by the judgement that so far as in us lies we shall bring about the attainment of the desired end because we desire it.

and William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology, p.240,

The essential mark of volition - that which distinguishes it from simple desire, or simple conflict of desires - is that the personality as a whole, or the central feature or nucleus of the personality, the man himself, is thrown upon the side of the weaker motive; whereas a mere desire may be felt to be something that, in comparison with this most intimate nucleus of the personality, is foreign to the self, a force that we do not
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acknowledge as our own, and which we, or the intimate self, may look upon with horror and detestation.


"In so far as a conation is satisfied or fulfilled, it disappears in its own satisfaction or fulfilment.


37 Cf. G.F. Stout, q. supra, n.24.

38 Sigmund Freud - Psychopathology of Everyday Life, (London 1914).

39 F.C. Bartlett, op. cit., p.?

"...the root tendencies remain. Only their inter-relations vary, together with the constantly changing environment. Students who have their eyes fixed upon the fundamental tendencies say that human nature never changes; those who concentrate upon the ways in which the tendencies are related to one another, and upon the ever-shifting play of external nature, assert that man moves endlessly towards the novel. Both views are in fact true".

40 William McDougall - op. cit., chapter III; James Drever - Instinct in Man (Cambridge 1921), chapter VIII.

41 William McDougall - op. cit., p.120.

42 op. cit., p.44.

43 Sigmund Freud - Introductory Lectures of Psychoanalysis.
... neither can we distinguish precisely at any link in the chain of life what is old and inherited, original in the sense of Locke and Leibniz, from what is new or acquired, original in the modern sense.

Cf. also Kurt Koffka - *The Growth of the Mind* (London 1925), Chapter II.

The following passage is from W. Stern - *Psychologie der frühen Kindheit*, p. 18:

Mental development is not a mere passive unfolding of inborn traits, neither is it a mere reception of external influences; instead it is a result of the convergence of both the internal opportunities and the external conditions of development. One should not ask, concerning any function or trait, whether it originates from within or from without; but rather, what part of it is derived from within and what part from without; for both are constantly co-operating in the work, though at times in varying degrees.

(q. in Koffka - *op.cit.*


47 Robert R. Rusk - *op.cit.*, chapters III-IX. Useful bibliographies are appended to these chapters. In the case of intelligence, the literature is considerable in amount: see especially the work of Binet and Simon, William Stern, Terman, Yerkes, Bridges and Hardwick, and Cyril Burt.

48 On this subject see Kurt Koffka, *op.cit.*, p. 249. et.seq.
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49 Ibid., chapter II, section 1. The following sentences may be quoted:

We speak of development whenever an organism or any special organ becomes larger, heavier, more finely structured, or more capable of functioning. One must, however, differentiate two types of development: development as growth or maturation, and development as learning. (p.38)


...one may well be tempted to make a prediction about the human child, and say that if a baby were kept from getting on his feet for two or three weeks after the first impulse to walk had shown itself in him,... he might then be expected to walk about as well, through the mere ripening of his nerve-centres, as if the ordinary process of learning had been allowed to occur...

but cf. also Kurt Koffka, op.cit., p.250 (in which the evidence from an experiment of Breed's on chickens is discussed), especially his conclusion:

...Maturation without stimulation can accomplish very little; yet I believe that a large part of the improvement must still be attributed to this source,... Maturation requires stimulation through the functioning of the act itself.

51 V. e.g. P.B.Ballard - 'The limit of the Growth of Intelligence', British Journal of Psychology, Vol.XII.

52 The average mental age of recruits in the American army during the war was said to be thirteen years. V. Clarence S.Yoakum and Robert M.Yerkes - Mental Tests in the American Army (London 1920).

53 Cf. James Drever - An Introduction to the Psychology of Education, pp.9-10,

It is easy to see that the normal growth and
development of an organism is determined from within, takes place, that is, in accordance with the laws of its own nature. The acorn does not grow into a fir-tree, nor is an eagle hatched from a turkey's egg. No matter what influences may be exerted from without, the tree that grows from an acorn is an oak, and the bird that comes from a turkey's egg is a turkey. So far it is clear and unmistakable that a living organism is determined by the laws of its own inner nature. But it is by no means equally clear as regards its reactions to external things. How far is the principle of self-determination valid as regards, let us say, the behaviour of a living organism with respect to some object in its environment by which it is disagreeably affected? On the long view the principle is also valid in such a case, though perhaps not so obviously as in the case of normal growth and development.


When we set out to explain human behaviour of any kind we must be prepared to take into account facts of the external world and facts of social structure.


56 Of the autonomy of even the lowest organisms see H.S. Jennings - *The Behaviour of Lower Organisms* (London 1906). For the purposive character of behaviour and the variability and adaptiveness of instinctive responses in the lower animals, see William McDougall - *An Outline of Psychology* (London 1923), chapters II and III.

57 Cf. James Drever - *op.cit.*, p. 78:
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Reason is not a new force entering into mental life from without at the higher levels. At the lowest levels the life and behaviour of the organism is co-ordinated, but the co-ordinating factor is not conscious of itself. When the ideational level emerges, however, the possibility of a conscious co-ordinating factor is present,...

Cf. also L.M.Terman, The Journal of Educational Psychology, 1921,

An individual is intelligent in proportion as he is able to carry on abstract thinking.

q. in C.Spearman - The Abilities of Man, (London 1927).


60 On the morning after I wrote this, I read in The Times a letter in which a well known psychologist explained that he had so dealt with his desire to smoke tobacco.

61 John Milton - op.cit., l. 741.

62 Lucretius - De rerum natura, I, 102.


64 F.C.Bartlett - op.cit., p.4.

How great a variety of individual differences thus have their parts to play from the dawn of life, and by what subtleties they are distinguished from one another, we cannot yet with certainty
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say.

65 Cf. J.B. Yeats's account of his experience as a schoolboy: Passages from the Letters of John Butler Yeats, selected by Ezra Pound, Cuala Press, MCM XVII. See note 20 infra.


67 I have in the following sections avoided the use of the term 'the unconscious'. On this subject see Stout and Mace - A Manual of Psychology, pp. 20-29 and C.D. Broad, op. cit., Section C, 'The Unconscious'.

68 On the non-mechanical nature of retention as experimentally demonstrated see P.B. Ballard, 'Obliviscence and Reminiscence', Monograph Supplement No. 2., British Journal of Psychology.

69 See Sigmund Freud - Psychopathology of Everyday Life.

70 The story of the composition of S.T. Coleridge's 'Kubla Khan' is well known. The following sentences from a letter of R.L. Stevenson's to W. Graibe Angus is quoted in the Editorial Note to Weir of Hermiston:

I am still 'a slow study', and sit for a long while silent on my eggs. Unconscious thought, there is the only method: macerate your subject, let it boil slow, then take the lid off and look in - and there your stuff is. - good or bad.

There is an interesting passage in a letter of W.A. Mozart's...
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in which he describes his method of composing as depending upon similar processes. V. Holmes - Life of Mozart (1845), p.317. The passage is quoted in V. de S.Pinto and G.G. Neill Wright's The Tree of Life (London 1929), No. 252.

71 Sigmund Freud - The Interpretation of Dreams (London).
72 W.H.R.Rivers - Conflict and Dream (London 1923).

His starting-point is nine alack, but our roads lead in different directions.
Chapter V

The sources of the mottoes are:
(a) Ecclesiastes, IV, 9, Authorised version, 1611.
(b) Amos, III, 3, op. cit.,
(c) George Meredith - The Egoist, chapter XIII.

74 The following passage may be quoted from G. Tarde - Social Laws (New York 1899),

...the feeling has existed that we must look to psychology for any general explanation of the laws and pseudo-laws of economics, language, mythology, etc... But it is not alone, nor chiefly to this intra-cerebral psychology that we must look for the fundamental fact of sociology,... it is rather in an inter-cerebral psychology, which studies the rise of conscious relations between two or more individuals, that we must seek it.

His starting-point is mine also; but our roads lead in different directions.

75 F.C. Bartlett - op. cit., p. 28.

If we consider those forms of human response which are generally classed as instinctive, we find that some of them are immediately social, whereas others are not. For example, in McDougall's list the directly social forms are gregariousness, self-assertion, self-abasement; in a narrow sense the sexual and parental instincts; and perhaps pugnacity, and a social form of constructiveness.

These ideas are developed in Chapter II, of which these sentences occur in the summary.

Mukerjee and Sen-Gupta - Introduction to social Psychology,
Chap V

(London 1928), p. 49.

In fact there exist instincts, or motor patterns determined by heredity, that have for their object a human personality. Sex responses, parental responses, aggressive actions, etc., are of this type.

On the view stated later (sections 388-392 of this work) all innate expressive movements and the innate bases of the responses to them (see Charles Darwin - The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London 1872) should be added to the above list.

76 For an examination of the actual documents see Carl Becker - The Declaration of Independence (New York 1922).

77 Franklyn Henry Giddings - The Elements of Sociology (New York 1898), p. 126 et. seq. The following passages may be quoted:

When, then, two or more individuals at the same moment are receiving like sensations, perceiving the same relations, experiencing the same kind of emotion, thinking the same thoughts, arriving in their judgments at the same conclusion, - a state of facts exists in the population which evidently must be classed among facts of mind, and yet must be distinguished from the mental activity of an individual who, absolutely alone, completely cut off from communication with his fellow-men, thinks solely about himself and his immediate material surroundings. In the one case there exists a concert of the emotions and thoughts of two or more individuals; in the other case, the thought of the individual is peculiar to himself and his isolated condition.

In its Simplest Form, the social mind is nothing more or less than that simultaneous like-responsive-ness of like minds to the same stimulus which was described in Chapter V. When two or more individuals
receive similar sensations, or perceive the same object or event and react upon it in like ways, there is an agreement of concert of their mental processes than which no simpler mode of the social mind is known.

See also the same writer's *Inductive Sociology* (New York 1901), p. 63 and p. 91 *et. seq."

78 Cf Mukerjee and Sen-Gupta - *op.cit.*, p. 82,

Adaptation of one person to others, then, consists primarily in making the responses coterminous in their pursuit of the same object.

79 William McDougall - *An Outline of Psychology* (London 1923) p. 42,

In speaking of mental structure and likening it, as I did just now, to the structure of a machine, we must not be misled into taking the word "structure" in the sense of a material structure or any spatial arrangement of parts. We commonly and properly speak of the structure of a poem or of a musical composition, meaning a whole consisting of parts in orderly functional relations with one another; and, though the structure of the mind is not of the same order as these structures, yet these, rather than the material structure of a machine, should be thought of as offering the closer analogy.

80 William Wordsworth - *The Recluse*, p. 40. W.W. has also "...the frame of social life..."

The *Prelude* XIII, 35.

81 Cf. A *New English Dictionary* (Oxford 1884-1928). From this final authority I may quote:

4. An established order, plan, scheme, system, esp. of government...
b. a form or arrangement of words...

6. Mental or emotional disposition or state (frame of mind, soul etc.)
a. Natural or habitual disposition, temper, turn of thought etc. b. Temporary posture of mind, state of feeling, mood, condition of temper... Frames and feelings often used in 18th & 19th c. as disparaging term for emotional states... 1719 De Foe - Robinson Crusoe I. XV "In this thankful frame I continued".

82 Instinctive responses are also emotional responses. (McDougall - An Introduction to Social Psychology, Chapter III). Emotional responses involve widespread physiological changes (V. eg. James - Principles of Psychology, Chapter XXV and W.B. Cannon - Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage, New York, 1913) including changes in endocrine activity. It may be presumed that each occasion of social interaction involves modifications of such activity on a pattern specific to that occasion; and that each social relation of any individual involves a more generalised pattern of endocrine activity, or a tendency to such a pattern. V. note 95 infra.

83 William McDougall - An Outline of Psychology, p.95 et seq.

84 Ibid. p. 163,

The young of many mammals instinctively utter a cry of peculiar quality, when they are unable by their own efforts to attain some instinctive end. This cry is the master-key to the parental instinct and brings the parent promptly to the
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aid of the young.


88 Such cooperative relations based on similar responses would include all cases of social interaction which can properly be brought under Giddings' concept of 'likemindedness'. There are however three other types of cooperative relation which cannot be brought under that principle.

89 The following quotation from Mukerjee and Sen-Gupta, op.cit., p.82, employs a similar conception,

The increase of the structural complexity of the organism brings with it a complexity and variability of responses. Thus, the stimulus-object may be common to all individuals; and the consummatory response also may be similar; but the preparatory responses would vary in different individuals because of differences in their bodily conditions, their relative position in space, and the character of other objects which may operate also as stimuli.


91 Plato - Republic, 517 b.

92 J.G.Lockhart - Narrative of the Life of Sir Walter
Such an event may notoriously result in serious consequences to the bodily health. This may be interpreted as a confirmation of the suggestion made (supra note 82) with regard to the physiological organisation involved in a social relation - the endocrine organisation has come to be organised in relation to the partner so as to depend for its healthy functioning upon the stimulation coming from the partner in the course of social interaction. I have had described to me, by the physician who treated it, a case in which a break-down following upon a break of an engagement to marry was successfully treated on these lines. The physician agreed with me that in such a case a similar result might, at least in theory, have been achieved by psychological treatment instead of by the use of drugs.


97 William Blake - Jerusalem, f. 96, l. 27. ed. Geoffrey Keynes.

98 Ibid. l. 28.
Ibid. 'Proverbs of Hell', The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.

Thomas Traherne - Centuries of Meditations, ed. Bertram Dobell (London 1908), I, 52.


The consciousness of the social environment or of its influence, however, does not always appear on the level of introspection.

Cf. note 25 supra.

See note 119 infra.

Cf. note 3 and note 10 supra.

Cf. in this connection the myth, at once grotesque and beautiful, of the primeval four armed, two faced men, whom, because they attacked the gods, Zeus split in two, so that the separate parts wander about longing after one another. (Plato - Symposium, 191-193).

Cf. T. Peisker - 'The Asiatic Background', Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. I, chapter XII,

Six to ten blood-related tents - on the average, families of five to six heads - form a camp which wanders together.

James Ward - op.cit., p.76.

The process [of mental development] resembles a partial segmentation of what is originally continuous rather than an aggregation of elements at first in-
dependent and distinct.


109 James Ward - *op. cit.*, p. 26,

...Analytic Psychology starting from human experience should precede any attempt to treat of the genesis of experience as a whole,


...if we are to set about the task of tracing the evolution of conscious life, we must begin by determining with the utmost accuracy the position from which we start. We must at the outset ascertain the number and nature and mutual connection of those ultimate contents of consciousness and modes of being conscious which do not admit of generic derivation, but at the most only of definition and description. This department of psychology is purely analytical...

See also *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 20, note.

110 Aristotle - *The Politics*, I, 2,

And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the [completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family.

Tr. B. Jowett (Oxford 1885), p. 3.
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Chapter VI

The sources of the mottoes are:
(a) William Wordsworth - *op. cit.*, XIII, 35.
(b) Alexander Pope - *An Essay on Man*, addressed to a Friend, 11. 29-32.


...in future introspection we shall be able to detect those components where they would otherwise have escaped our notice, just as one who has made a machine possesses, on that account, a better eye for machinery, or as a portrait painter has a better eye for faces than one who has never been compelled to attend separately to the individual features.

and *ibid.*, p. 17,

Definite details can only be reached as the cumulative results of a long course of systematic introspection, carried on from generation to generation, and constantly tested by an appeal to the consensus of experts.

Professor Stout goes on to speak of the premature generalisations of "the infancy of introspection". I believe the introspective study of social experience to be at a similar-
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ly immature stage of its development and similarly engaged in making "broad and sweeping divisions instead of definite attempts to give detailed explanations of particular phenomena", but to be capable of rapid growth as a result of systematic observation.


113 O.W. Holmes in The Autocrat of the Breakfast-table, remarks that, when James and John fall out, we need not be surprised at the occurrence of some degree of misunderstanding among the six of them and goes on to explain that the six are: the real James, as known only to his Maker, James as he appears to himself, James as known to John - and similarly for John. The passage in the text which this note is appended, and other portions of this work, owe much to this remark, first met in my early youth.


115 St. Jerome, in reference to the permissible use of the Apocrypha.

116 Antony Trollope - Miss Mackenzie (London 1865) chapters III and IV.
Chapter VII

The motto is taken from William Wordsworth - *The Recluse*, p. 40.


118 *op.cit.*, p. 62

The idea of the whole thus operates to create the group, to bring it into existence; and then, as the idea is realised, it becomes more definite, of richer and more exact meaning; the collective sentiment grows up about it, and habit and formal organisation begin to aid in holding the group together; yet still the idea of the whole remains constitutive of the whole.

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There is no such thing as direct observation of other minds; all that is immediately perceptible consists of sensible signs and tokens of inward events; and these signs and tokens are interpretable only through knowledge obtained by introspection or retrospection.

and ibid. pp. 13-14,

This kind of intercourse is of the greatest service to the introspective psychologist; it enables him to check his results by comparing them with those of others, and so to ascertain whether they are due to idiosyncracy or mal-observation, or, on the contrary, are valid for all consciousness in certain phases of development. In physical science an observation made by one person and unconfirmed by others is regarded as valueless. I have no hesitation in saying that in psychology we ought to be no less rigid.

121 Mukerjee and Sen-Gupta, op.cit., p. 65,

The responses of the group, if they do not operate affirmatively, that is, if they do not point to the end sought by the instinctive movement [I should have said incipient impulses] of the individual, serve to inhibit or modify the original response. The romping of the child, if it does not elicit a smile or some other sign of approval, ceases or becomes less boisterous. The same holds true of the adult individual. The signs of social approval which are the more stable and developed forms of reciprocal response set the limits within which the instinctive-emotive pattern runs its course.

122 Cf. ibid., p. 58.

The intrusion of a stranger may reduce a group of merry-making friends to silence. The
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sullen face of a single individual may damp the rejoicing of a score. The sudden loss of temper of an individual may upset the harmony of a social gathering for a whole evening. These and many other examples show how highly strung a human group may be, how slight a maladjustment may alter the character, not only in degree but also in quality, of a human group.

123 Sigmund Freud - Psychopathology of Everyday Life, pp. 34-36.


126 William McDougall - The Group Mind. The quotations in the text are from pp. 22-23.

It is interesting to speculate on the degree of influence which the crowd scenes in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* may have had not only on subsequent literary treatment of the subject but upon the thinking of most of us when we reflect upon the subject. This remark implies no stricture upon the justness of his observation of "the tag-rag people".

**op.cit.**, p. 23.


The Public may be described as an unorganised and amorphous aggregation of individuals who are bound together by common opinions and desires, but are too numerous for each to maintain personal relations with the others.

A public differs from a crowd in that (1) it rests not on personal contact but "communication by means of the Press, correspondence etc." (2) "There is also absent the heightening of social feelings,..." (3) "...one often belongs to several publics at the same time". (4) "...there is not the same simultaneity of stimulation..." (5) the public "does generate organizations..."

**op.cit.**, p. 58.

**ibid.** p. 59.

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134 John Gay - Poetical Works ed. John Underhill (London 1893), Songs from "The Beggar's Opera" (1728), Air XVII.

135 V. William McDougall - op. cit., pp. 80-82. The account of "the formation of a hierarchy of group sentiments for a system of groups in which each larger group includes the lesser" describes an extension of these processes.

136 V. William McDougall - op. cit., chapter IV, especially the following:

The idea of the whole thus operates to create the group, to bring it into existence; and then, as the idea is realised, it becomes more definite, of richer and more exact meaning; the collective sentiment grows up about it, and habit and formal organisation begin to aid in holding the group together; yet still the idea of the whole remains constitutive of the whole.

I cannot arrive at any certainty as to the meaning of this sentence and the passage of which it forms part. If by "the idea of the whole" is meant such an apprehension of a particular army as I may have now in my study, then the statement seems to me obviously untrue. Each soldier forms such an "idea", presently he forms a sentiment which "grows up about it", finally such an idea forms the "constitutive" bonds which make the army a unity. This does not seem to me a true description of my experience in becoming a member of a military force, or a member of any
other body; and it also seems logically unsound to make the "constitutive" process a consequent of a process which assumes the "constitutive" process to be complete. If, on the other hand, we are to understand by the "idea of the whole" not only a cognitive process but the reorganisation of the recruit's emotional and conative life (an interpretation which would make redundant the words which follow, "a collective sentiment grows up about it") then the phraseology adopted seems unfortunate, and the meaning is better expressed by speaking of the organisation of the recruit's dispositions as part of the common mental frame of his unit. I can attach no meaning to the word collective in the phrase collective sentiment; and in the same passage the term group self-consciousness suggests not (what I suppose is intended) the individual's apprehension of the group but some kind of hypothetical collective consciousness.

137 The Wittiest expression of this truth is, I suppose, Talleyrand's remark that the only thing a government cannot do with bayonets is to sit on them.
Chapter VIII

The sources of the mottoes are:
(b) R.M. Maciver - *op.cit.*, p. 155.
(c) George Meredith - *op.cit.*, chapter XLI.


139 Such statements may be, nevertheless, in the truest sense psychological propositions. cf. G.F. Stout - *op.cit.*, Vol.I, p. 12,

When we experiment with the stereoscope, the question we put to the person who looks at the dissimilar perspective is not, "What process do you, by introspection, find to be going on in your mind?" but simply, "What do you see?"

140 The collaborators were Professor V. de S. Pinto and myself. Professor Pinto has read the account of the collaboration given in the text and, after accepting it as a correct account of "the dialectic between the two partners", he continues:

...is not literary tradition formed by a similar process of dialectic extending over several generations? For instance Wordsworth's *The Prelude* might be said to be the final outcome of the efforts of a number of eighteenth century writers to achieve a long philosophic nature poem in blank verse, and the Shakespearian drama is similarly the culmination not only of Shakespeare's efforts but of those of a number of his pre-
decessors. The error of the modernists, the futurists and hoc genus omne is to think that a great work of art is the production of one mind working in a spiritual vacuum, instead of a collaboration between a number of predecessors, the man of genius and possibly the audience.

In my own intellectual history, I had to learn these truths elsewhere before I could begin to appreciate T.H. Green, or F.H. Bradley or Bernard Bosanquet. There is however, no more admirable statement of the individual's relation to the society of which he is a member than that of F.H. Bradley in 'My Station and its Duties' (Ethical Studies, 2nd. ed. Oxford 1927) from which the following may be quoted:

Let us take a man, an Englishman as he is now, and try to point out that, apart from what he has in common with others, apart from his sameness with others, he is not an Englishman — nor a man at all; that if you take him as something by himself, he is not what he is. Of course we do not mean to say that he can not go out of England without disappearing, nor, even if all the rest of the nation perished, that he would not survive. What we mean to say is, that he is what he is because he is a born and educated social being, and a member of an individual social organism; that if you make abstraction of all this, which is the same in him and in others, what you have left is not an Englishman, nor a man, but some I know not what residuum, which never has existed by itself, and does not so exist. If we suppose the world of relations, in which he was born and bred, never to have been, then we suppose the very essence of him not to be; if we take that away, we have taken him away; and hence he now is not an individual, in the sense of owing nothing to the sphere of relations in which he finds himself,
but does contain those relations within himself as belonging to his very being; he is what he is, in brief, so far as he is what others also are. (pp. 166-167)

But cf. also note 146 infra.


...a group of individuals may unite in common or harmonious behaviour, although the attitudes of the individuals concerned may vary very considerably... The investigator who wishes to show how the group custom grows out of the individual belief simply takes some outstanding belief as typical, and assumes that everybody in the group experiences this. His explanation is pure fiction. At no stage are human beings as unanimous in their ideas, beliefs and attitudes as he supposes.


Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars.

144 Cf. R.M. Maciver - *op.cit.*, pp. 155-156,

Community is any area of common life; an association is a definite organisation pursuing some specific interest or pursuing general interests in some specific way. The distinction of association from institution should now be obvious. For institutions are forms, established forms of relation between social beings in respect either simply of one another (as in the institution of rank) or of some external object (as in the institution of property). An association is more than a form, it is the creator as well as the created, it is a source of institutions. An association has a subjective as
well as an objective aspect, it too is created by common will, but it consists in wills as organised in respect of some common interest. An institution has an objective aspect alone, it is a means alone. The association may modify its institutions, may dissolve some and create others, as the State for instance is constantly doing. So the association outlives its institutions. Therefore if we are to be strict in our thinking, we should speak of the family as an association and of marriage as an institution, of the State as an association and of representative government as an institution, of the church as an association and of baptism as an institution. The association is a living thing, the institution is but a form, a means.

145 Cf. A.V. Dicey - op.cit., p.1,

True it is that the existence... of institutions must, in a sense, always and everywhere depend upon the beliefs or feelings, or, in other words, upon the opinion of the society in which such institutions flourish.

146 Thus the consideration of such principles and their validity takes us outside of the field of social psychology altogether. Cf. The following passage from Ernest Barker - Political Thought in England, from Herbert Spencer to the present day (London 1917) which describes the metaphysical basis of the views on political obligation of T.H. Green:

But it must be remembered that behind his conception of the State lies the idea of an eternal self-consciousness, which communicates to human consciousness the idea of the social good, and to whose perfection, in turn, human consciousness is ever seeking to attain, and, in the higher forms of human society, has al-
ready partially attained. In the light of such an idea citizenship becomes Christian citizenship, and the State a c/\textit{vitas Dei}. p. 32.

It is however true that the processes whereby a system of principles embodied in institutions is at a later stage rendered self-consistent (section 307) may owe much to processes of philosophic reflection.

The Roman legislation was in a twofold manner the child of philosophy. It was in the first place formed upon the philosophical model, for, instead of being a mere empirical system adjusted to the existing requirements of society, it laid down abstract principles of right to which it endeavoured to conform; and, in the next place, these principles were borrowed directly from Stoicism.

The quotation is from Lecky's History of European Morals, q. in Whitehead - Science and the Modern World (Cambridge 1926), pp. 16-17.

The widest extension of these principles is of course to be found when the most imposing and authoritative systems of principles are subjected by the highest scholarship to processes of comparison and criticism. This happens when the science of comparative jurisprudence brings into one universe of discourse legal systems which have grown up independently in different countries. This is well expressed in \textit{L'oeuvre juridique de R.Saleilles} (Thaller, Gény and others), p. 108:

"In short, it\textit{[comparative jurisprudence]} will provide the jurisconsult with an entirely new field of observation, which will permit him to prove the
value and the solidity of national constructions, to modify them, and even to make innovations among them, provided that the latter are in harmony with the body of internal law and do not interfere with its economy. If the result of the teaching of comparative law is that the same idea explains the juridical regulation of an institution in many legislations, will not this conception be singularly fortified?"

q. in Vinogradoff - *op.cit.*, p.138.

This quotation also illustrates the contention in section 318 that jurisprudence is in its development a social process as well as a science viewing social processes with detachment.

149 Vinogradoff - *op.cit.*, p. 142,

...in early periods legal rules grow more or less organically, like language and myth, later stages are characterized by universal and, as it were, impersonal conceptions, which, like coins of standard value, circulate without difficulty right through the world.

150 A.V.Dicey - *op.cit.*, p. 363,

New combinations of circumstances - that is, new cases - constantly call for the application, which means in truth the extension, of old principles; or, it may be, even for the thinking out of some new principle, in harmony with the general spirit of the law, fitted to meet the novel requirements of the time.

151 Cf. Sir Percy Nunn - *Education, its Data and First Principles* (London 1920),

The statement that a man's will is free is ridiculous if understood as a claim that he can escape from the laws of his own nature; but it is sound sense when understood as extending
to the whole of life the obvious truth that it is impossible to invent a machine before it is invented or to compose a sonata before it is composed.

152 These conative states may lead him to take the matter before a Court, whereupon if the regulative form of expression, though action is usually guided by it, has not been defined as a principle it becomes the business of the Court so to define it. Cf. A.V. Dicey, op.cit., p. 483.

... every Court in deciding a case must tacitly, or expressly, apply to it some definite principle which is often indeed so clearly known that no special mention need be made of it, but which may be difficult to discover; and when this is so the Court must lay down the rule which guides its decision. Whereupon the principle so defined guides future action within the jurisdiction of that Court. Cf. A.V. Dicey - op.cit., pp. 483-484.

... a Court or a judge must follow precedents, by which expression is really meant that a Court having once decided a particular case on a given principle... must decide all really similar cases in accordance with the same principle, or, to put the same thing in other words, that a Court is bound, as the expression goes, by its own judgements.

153 Landsberg - Geschichte der Rechtswissenschaft, III, 816,

A juridical institution stands and falls with the achievement of its aim. It arises for the sake of aims, in the consciousness of aims, and in the struggle between aims. This is the reason why law cannot be explained either by mechanical processes or by blind
growth. Its justification lies in its ends, as a means for their realization.

q. in Vinogradoff, op.cit., p. 143, n.

Vinogradoff - op.cit., p. 142,

...he [Ihering] insisted energetically on the social aims of juridical activity, attacked with bitter scorn the tendency towards the self-satisfied exercise of juridical logic divorced from practical needs, and represented the process of legal formation as a "struggle for right" among contending individual and social claims.

154 Cf. sections 28, 119 and 187 of the present work.

The relation between the lawyer as a participant in a social process to the lawyer as a scientific thinker is described by A.V.Dicey (op.cit., pp. 364-365) in the following passage:

"The main employment of a Court is the application of well-known legal principles to the solution of given cases, and the deduction from these principles of their fair logical result. Men trained in and for this kind of employment acquire a logical conscience; they come to care greatly - in some cases excessively - for consistency. A Court, even when it really legislates, does so indirectly. Its immediate object is to apply a given principle to a particular case, or to determine under which of two or more principles a particular case really falls. The duty of a Court, in short, is not to remedy a particular grievance, but to determine whether an alleged grievance is one for which the law supplies a remedy. Hence the further result that Courts are affected, as Parliament never is, by the ideas and theories of writers on law. A Court, when called upon
Chap VIII

to decide cases which present some legal difficulty, is often engaged—unconsciously it may be—in the search for principles. If an author of ingenuity has reduced some branch of the law to a consistent scheme of logically coherent rules, he supplies exactly the principles of which a Court is in need. Hence the development of English law has depended, more than many students perceive, on the writings of the authors who have produced the best text-books."
Chapter IX

The sources of the mottoes are:
(b) I Corinthians, XII, 4. Authorised version, 1611.
(c) Hesiod - *Works and Days*, 291-295.

155 Mukerjee and Sen-Gupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85,

Normally, the processes of adaptation to a situation do not begin simultaneously in all the individuals concerned. An individual, or a set of individuals, first responds to the stimulus situation and the others follow suit. This is as true of man as it is of most of the sub-human organisms living a group life. Throw a stone at a flock of birds, and some will fly at once but the others take more time. A flock of sheep sights a dog at a distance; when one or two from the middle begin to run, the movement spreads.

156 The example used here was an actual incident in East Lothian. Whether or not the animal was a ferret I do not know; but, whatever it was, it behaved as described. The further elaboration of the incident in section 327 is imaginary.


159 Some amusing examples of the consequences of
Tennyson's great reputation as a poet are quoted in
Harold Nicolson - Tennyson, Aspects of his Life, Character
and Poetry (London 1925) pp. 197-199; for example,
Tennyson was publicly appealed to to decide upon Colonel
Richards' claim to be considered the chief originator of
the Volunteer Movement of 1859.

160 Admiral Sir R.H.Bacon - The Life of Lord Fisher of

161 Samuel Butler - Notebooks, p. 206

See also the work of E.L.Thorndike and J.B.Watson.

163 Münsterberg initiated the study of special abilities
in relation to vocational activities with his investigation
of the capacities of tram drivers.

164 Robert H.Thouless - Social Psychology (London 1925),
p. 302,

The meaning of intelligence in comparative
psychology is the plasticity of behaviour
which contrasts with the mechanical behaviour
of pure instinct. Its meaning in the history
of mental tests is the general capacity which
varies from individual to individual, and is
measured in intelligence tests. It would
probably, therefore, be better to avoid the
use of the word intelligence in speaking of
what is measured by these tests and to sub-
stitute some such term as "general ability".

165 Works dealing with the investigation of general


167 James Drever - op. cit., p.44.

168 On the relation of "intelligence" or general ability to conceptual processes see C. Spearman - The Nature of 'Intelligence' and the Principles of Cognition (London 1923) and the same author's The Abilities of Man (London 1927). He approves of the description of "intelligence" as,

...the operation of thinking in abstract or universal terms...

The Abilities of Man, p.21.

169 Cf. Graham Wallas - Our Social Heritage, (London 1921), chapter III.
Chap IX


Chapter A.

The sources of the noted arcs:

(a) Eschylus, XI, 11, tr. James Moffatt - A New Translation of the Bible (London 8°.).

(b) A.M. Thurnwald - da, cit., pp. 293-303.

171 As by H.Tarde and J.M.Baldwin.


...thorough consideration of imitative actions shows that they are of many kinds, that they issue from mental processes of a number of different types, and that many are attributable to a specific instinct of imitation,...


174 Alexander Pope - An Essay on Criticism, l. 160. on the confusion of thought alluded to see George Saintsbury - A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe.

175 See Ronald Knox - The Via Dolorosa Murder.


E.J. Craig.

177 Carulli - XII, 1. ed. F.W.Cornish.

The sources of the mottoes are:
(b) A.N. Whitehead - op.cit., pp. 299–300.

171 As by M. Tarde and J.M. Baldwin.

172 William McDougall - An Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 91.

...careful consideration of imitative actions shows that they are of many kinds, that they issue from mental processes of a number of different types, and that none are attributable to a specific instinct of imitation,...


174 Alexander Pope - An Essay on Criticism, 1. 140. on the confusion of thought alluded to see George Saintsbury - A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe.

175 See Ronald Knox - The Viaduct Murder.


177 Catullus - LXII, 1. ed. F.W. Cornish.

179 Robert Bridges - Poetical Works excluding the eight dramas (Oxford 1914) p. 410; Milton's Prosody (Oxford 1921); New Verse (Oxford 1926).

180 Striking examples are to be found in case of language. Phenomenon and idea have altered their meanings both by deterioration resulting from failure to grasp the concepts for which they stood and by becoming the terms for new conceptions. Complex has had a sufficient variety of determinants as a term of psychology (V. note 55 supra) and it has also deteriorated as a term of journalism and popular speech.

181 V. J.C.Flügel - The Psychology of Clothes (London 1930).

182 E.g. the use of pilasters in neo-classical architecture.

183 The Cockney tourist in a kilt and the Austrian holiday-maker in Tyrolese costume are obvious examples.

184 Cf. Anthony Trollope - Framley Parsonage, chapter XVII, 'Mrs. Proudie's Conversazione'. The imitation of the manner of entertainment of the Duke of Omnium and Lady Hartletop by their less opulent neighbours who cannot afford the same number of servants is discussed and criticised.

186 Ibid. p. 487.

187 Charles Darwin - *op. cit.*

188 For the James-Lange theory, see William James - *op. cit.*, Vol. II, chapter XXV. For William McDougall's views on the relation of emotion to instinct see his *Social Psychology* and *Outline of Psychology*. For experimental evidence not wholly favourable to James's view see Cannon - *Bodily Changes* (cited above). See also James Drever - *An Introduction to the Psychology of Education*, pp. 51-57.

189 William McDougall - *op. cit.*, p. 92,

The fundamental and primitive form of sympathy is exactly what the word implies, a suffering with, the experiencing of any feeling or emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion.

The process is recognised by Herbert Spencer (*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II p. 563). It is described in terms similar to McDougall's by James Drever (*Introduction to the Psychology of Education*, p. 83). It is discussed in James Drever's *Instinct in Man*, pp. 235-240, from which the following sentence may be quoted:

...emotion which is pretended,... rarely, if ever, establishes itself through sympathetic induction...

190 In this connection the views of the 'gestalt' school are interesting; but I do not at present care to "found" on them. V. e.g. K. Koffka - *op. cit.*, pp. 115-118 from which the following may be quoted:
...every form of behaviour has a certain articulation or phrasing. This articulation issues from a similar articulation of the nervous processes of the acting individual. This central articulation in turn corresponds to the individual's "experience" which is articulated in a like manner. Thus the perception in the mind of an onlooker, if it be so constituted as to embrace what is going on in the reagent, must itself possess a similar articulation. And hence the experience of the reagent A, and of the observant B must resemble each other.


192 James Drever - op. cit., p. 240,

...it is perhaps in the sphere of the moral sentiments that sympathy is most important.

193 The Times, December, 1927.


195 In my own experience I can recall a number of incidents of this kind. In the case of Robert Bridges' experimental metres (particularly his quantitative hexameters) I have produced the same result designedly. In this case however there was obviously more involved than a sympathetic reaction, viz. the ability to produce from the printed page the spoken rhythm intended by the writer.
By a deterioration in expressiveness, I mean that, though the form may be preserved, it is no longer the focus of appropriate determinants, or of all the determinants for the expression of which it came into existence, nor has it become in process of transmission a focus of other determinants of equivalent value.


Blaise Pascal - q. Ward, op.cit., p. 75.


Cf. the striking passage on this subject in Graham Wallas's Our Social Heritage, pp. 17-19.
Addenda

205 Cf. J.C.Flügel - *op.cit.*.

206 The following is the passage from John Butler Yeats which is referred to in note 65 and the source of which is there given wrongly,

...the boy with the eyes of a painter... will know the shape and surface of every object in his schoolroom, and how light falls on desk and table; he will know among his schoolfellows all the profiles and all the front faces, what colour the eyes are and how they are shaped; every detail of form and colour will be familiar to him, since to watch these things and to draw from them a continuous, intellectual intoxication is the very purpose for which he has been created;...


207 Coventry Patmore - *To the Unknown Eros*, 'Arbor Vitae', 1. 16.


...Gladstone from peculiarities of character and education was able to unite, whether consistently or not, the sentiment of liberalism with the ecclesiastical sentiment belonging to a High Churchman. In the sphere of economics, and even of politics, he to a great extent accepted the doctrines of Benthamite individualism as represented by the Manchester school, In the ecclesiastical sphere he accepted, it would seem, High Church principles as represented by Archdeacon Manning, until the Archdeacon was transformed into a Roman Catholic ecclesiastic. This singular combination of sentiments or
principles, which are rarely united in the mind of one man, contributed greatly to Gladstone's influence. The capacity for honestly sharing the varying, and even the inconsistent, sentiments of his age augments the influence of a statesman.