The psychological analysis of social structure

by

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It is an unfortunate result of the semi-practical aims which naturally influence social philosophers, that they are apt throughout to take up an indifferent, if not a hostile, attitude to their given object. They hardly believe in actual society as a botanist believes in plants, or a biologist in vital processes. And hence, social theory comes off badly. No student can really appreciate an object for which he is always apologising... It is in no spirit of obscurantism ... that some take up a different position. They are convinced that an actual living society is an infinitely higher creature than a steam-engine, a plant, or an animal; and that the best of their ideas are not too good to be employed in analysing it.
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Summary of the argument

Chapter I  The social sciences

1. There is no one science of society which we can call sociology; but social phenomena are studied by a number of relatively independent disciplines.

2. Society may be studied through the medium of social facts from which an inferential knowledge of its structure and processes may be reached.

3. The data of history are documents which accident has spared: and the knowledge of past events derived from them is an inferential knowledge only.

4. In the case of contemporary society, data are in part casually available, in part specially collected, but still permitting only an inferential knowledge of social structure and processes.

5. Society may also be studied through the medium of social experience, i.e. through the experience of individual persons as members of it.

6. Methods appropriate to the study of such phenomena have already been developed by psychology.

7. The field of social experience is coincident with the experience which psychology studies; but it is approached from a different point of view, with an emphasis on different parts of the field, and, to some extent, social inquiry begins with data which psychology has already worked upon.

8. Social facts and social experience as objects of study are attended by difficulties and opportunities which are largely complementary; but there is some difficulty in bringing data of such diverse kinds into one universe of discourse.

9. A student of society who works from social facts to the processes which underly them, and another who works from social experience towards the social processes of which it is a part, are in fact working towards one another.

10. History makes use of generalisations limited in space
11 The social sciences seek to pass beyond such historical generalisations to the establishment of connections between universals.

12 The richness of the data necessitates a departmentalism of the social sciences, each of which studies one aspect of social structure and processes; but they are in some degree interdependent, and each is related to the more fundamental inquiry of social philosophy.

13 Each of the social sciences may be defined as studying social facts of a particular character: defined in this way their fields overlap, but each may further be distinguished by its special point of view and technique.

14 The social sciences are coordinate members of the group of inductive social inquiries: each of them has a similar relation to history which stands outside the group and is for each a source of primary data.

15 Such a group of sciences might be expected to reach in the course of parallel inquiries a group of concepts relevant to all social phenomena: these would be true sociological concepts.

16 Each of the social sciences is related in a similar way to social experience.

17 Some of the empirical laws formulated by the inductive social sciences are stated with some accompanying suggestion of an explanation in terms of social experience: this explanation is generally less securely based than the law itself.

18 The value of some empirical laws is independent of such explanation.

19 When such an explanation is sought, the cooperation of psychology is required.

20 With each advance of psychology, and with the fullest use of its resources, less inadequate interpretations can be reached.

21 Social psychology may be described as in the main the application of the principles of psychology, derived from
the study of the mental processes and behaviour of individuals, to the explanation of social phenomena known through the study of social facts.

22 In theory a complete account of society might be reached by deduction from a complete account of the individual - if we had such an account. Such a procedure, in so far as it is of value, constitutes another part of social psychology.

23 Psychological methods of study may be applied directly to small scale social phenomena (such as a relation between two persons); this is a third part of social psychology, and it may lead to the development of concepts which are sociological rather than psychological, and which may be of more service than the concepts of psychology in the analysis of social phenomena.

24 The inductive social sciences are dependent on the cooperation of ethics in their applied branches, as they are dependent on psychology on the explanatory side.

25 The phenomena studied by the social sciences are ethical in their very nature as the expression of men's purposes and judgements of value.

26 The social sciences, particularly political theory, have suffered from too close an association with practice.

27 A social science divorced from immediate practical interests would have as great a justification as any other branch of pure science: and it might in the end have more practical value on account of this divorce.

28 A social science is itself the expression of a social process and involves the paradox of one social process studying another social process.

29 The social sciences may, like other inductive sciences, formulate quasi-normative concepts within their own fields.

30 Because man's interest in society is one of his strong emotional interests (comparable in this respect to his interest in sex or in religion), it is desirable that every social scientist should be sufficiently trained in psychology to detect the influence upon his thinking of his own social experience and the sentiments which have resulted from it.
Chapter II  Social laws and the group mind theories

31 It has been assumed so far that social phenomena can be entirely explained in terms of the structures and processes of individual minds; before proceeding further upon this assumption it is necessary to examine two other views: (A) that social "laws" are in need of no further explanation, (B) that social phenomena require to be explained in terms of a supra-personal mind.

32 (A) Regularities may be discovered in social phenomena; and these regularities may be stated as social laws, without reference to psychological interpretation.

33 Such a procedure need not imply a mechanistic theory of social processes.

34 Biology may be expected to afford parallels and, whereas it is illogical to ask whether society is an organism, it is profitable to ask what biological concepts may be profitably applied to the study of it.

35 A statement of the laws of social development might be based on a comparative study of a sufficient number of cultures, but our knowledge is insufficient to afford a basis for such an induction.

36 It has been held that civilisation is inevitably a recurrent phenomenon.

37 Adjustment to environment is as much a condition of the life of societies as of organisms.

38 In both cases the living thing is active and the physical environment is passive in the process of adjustment.

39 The continued identity of a society like that of an organism is not in its material substance, the society and the organism being subject to continuous processes of self-renewal.

40 To some extent the differentiation of organs and types
of cell in the body is paralleled by the differentiation of social groups and specialist skills.

41 (B) The apparent unity of a social group has led to various conceptions of a group mind: such a conception may be an instance of non-rational anthropomorphism, a philosophical theory or a metaphorical expression.

42 If such a conception is put forward as a scientific hypothesis it may have any one of three forms according to the conception of an individual mind upon which it is based: these three forms require separate examination.

43 (I) Against the conception of a collective consciousness it may be argued (a) that if such a consciousness exists we cannot apparently never know anything about it, (b) that the conception rests upon a very doubtful analogy with the relation of the mind of the individual to the hypothetical "minds" of the cells of his body,

44 (c) that if such a collective consciousness be supposed to exist it must be either (i) epiphenomenal, or (ii) a series of conscious events causally related to one another but not causally related to the social events that we can observe (and there is little to be said for either of these hypotheses),

45 or (iii) events in it must be related to observable social events both as effects and as causes. For this hypothesis, if it is true, there should be empirical evidence: but there is in the meantime no evidence to justify us in assuming it to be true.

46 (II) A mind may be described as a system of dispositions of which we have an inferential knowledge derived from the study of experience and behaviour.

47 The term disposition may be used in a classificatory sense to refer to distinguishable recurrent phase of experience or behaviour (a);

48 or it may be used as the name of hypothetical entity to which we refer the observed recurrent phase of experience or behaviour as its cause.

49 If, using the term in this sense, we describe the mind as a system of dispositions, this description may not be an adequate definition of mind or afford a criterion of
the presence or absence of a mind, and its use may lead to a confusion of thought.

50 Furthermore, a disposition may be thought of either as a character of a hypothetical entity (usually of the self or ego) \( \beta \); or it may be regarded as itself an entity \( \gamma \);

51 There are therefore three possible forms \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \) of the hypothesis of a group mind defined as a system of dispositions, according to the ontological status given to the disposition.

52 The hypothesis, in any of its three forms, may be put forward on the grounds of the characteristic impress borne by group actions and products, and by the persistence of this character through long periods of time.

53 \( \alpha \) The first form of the hypothesis is unobjectionable but does not in fact assume the existence of a group mind at all.

54 \( \beta \) In the case of the individual mind the second conception of the term disposition is put forward mainly to account for the apparent unity of the self; and as no such necessity presents itself in the case of the group there are no grounds for the form of the hypothesis which uses this conception.

55 \( \gamma \) There are three arguments against the form of the hypothesis which uses the term disposition in the third sense.

56 (III) The student of behaviour may discover and state regularities of behaviour (in terms of situation and response) without assuming as the basis of his argument any hypothesis as to the nature of the entities or processes of which the behaviour is the expression.

57 Similarly the social scientist may assign particular regularities of social phenomena to particular social forces without committing himself to any hypothesis as to the terms in which these forces are to be explained.

58 We may then describe a society as a system of social forces of which we have an inferential knowledge derived from the study of social facts.

59 From this position we may set out to discover the
nature of these social forces, in particular whether they are of the nature of mind, and how they are related to the minds of individuals as known to psychology: and the most promising procedure seems from all points of view to be an examination of the hypothesis that social forces are no more than the manifestation on a large scale of the mental processes of individuals.

Chapter III  Social actions and social forces

60 Upon this assumption we may proceed to consider the relation to mental structures and processes in individual minds of the many, complex, varied and closely inter-related social forces which may be inferred from the study of social facts.

61 A mental product, for example a letter, may be shown to be related to a variety of mental structures and processes in the mind of its writer and these mental structures and processes may be called its determinants.

62 A similar examination might (in theory) be made in the case of any social fact or social product, but in such a case the determinants would have to be sought in many minds some or all of which would probably not be available for study,

63 as is true for example in the case of changes in architectural fashions,

64 or in the case of an examination of the determinants of an act of public justice.

65 Law is a system of principles related to these determinants as defined forms or patterns through which they may be expressed.

66 A social fact may be defined as any event or form the determinants of which are in two or more minds.

67 Price is a social fact related to determinants (a) in the minds of the immediate buyer(s) and seller(s) (b) in the minds of all possible buyers and sellers in the same market.

68 Primary and secondary determinants may be distinguish-
ed as those which operate directly upon an event and those which operate only through the agency of another mind.

69 There is a striking contrast in scale between microcosmic and macrocosmic social events.

70 Nevertheless the latter may be regarded as no more than the consequences of the social organisation of the latter.

71 To regard such social forces as impersonal instead of as derived from persons results in a loss of the sense of individual initiative and social responsibility.

Chapter IV Dispositions and tendencies

72 The primary data of the historian and the social scientist take their value from their relation to an event or a series of events.

73 This relation is their determination at that particular moment by actual concrete processes in a mind or minds; and we may use the word act for the sum of the relevant events mental and physical occurring at such a moment.

74 An act has two aspects, its outward form and the accompanying inner experience.

75 An individual's activity being continuous, an act is a train of activity with a certain degree of unity.

76 An act is related to a frame of external circumstances.

77 Every act seeks the actualisation of a form of expression (i.e. a pattern of bodily movements or of physical events or of material objects): this form can usually be apprehended by someone else; and such apprehension may be the end that is sought.

78 The apprehension of a form of expression may occur independently of its embodiment in a material medium, but both processes are usually closely interwoven.

79 By a form of expression may be meant (a) the form of
pattern of a physical event or of a material product, (b) such a form or pattern as apprehended in the mind of the agent, or in the mind of a spectator or auditor.

80 A form of expression is developed in relation to dispositions seeking expression, and the frame of external circumstances in which these dispositions are to have their expression.

81 This development is a mental process: three aspects of which may be distinguished under the terms cognition, affect and conation.

82 Conative states may be classified as impulses, desires, wishes and volitions.

83 All conative states are characterised by (a) a feeling of tension, (b) a relation to an end (c) their cessation on the attainment of this end.

84 There may be varying degrees of awareness of the end or of the steps by which it may be attained.

85 Psychology (like everyday speech) distinguishes mental facts of three kinds: (a) mental events, (b) dispositions, (c) capacities.

86 The mind may be studied through observations of experience or observations of behaviour.

87 From the study of a man's experience it is possible to reach an inferential knowledge of his dispositions, permitting in some degree predictions of his mental states.

88 From the study of his behaviour may be derived a knowledge of his personality, partly similar and partly complementary to the knowledge derived from the study of his experience.

89 To describe the mind as a system of dispositions is to abstract from the complete individual to the neglect of some elements in his personality.

90 Study of a number of individuals would reveal a group of innate dispositions (appetites and instincts) common to them.

91 An admission that instinctive tendencies common to all
men have been more or less correctly distinguished and described need not imply the acceptance of the more extreme doctrines with regard to instinct.

92 Every response is conditioned by both innate and acquired factors.

93 Conceptions of the "natural" man and the "natural" environment are of no value for social theory.

94 A knowledge of the innately determined pattern of interests can only be reached by inference from the study of the typical interest patterns of successive age groups.

95 We discover in this way (a) changes in the pattern of interests, (b) changes in capacity.

96 Such development is related to (a) the dispositional pattern and realised capacities at any moment, (b) the inner developmental tendencies, and (c) the relevant aspects of the environment.

97 The infant becomes capable of walking, partly as the result of a process of learning, but mainly in consequence of a process of maturation.

98 The process of learning to speak has the same two aspects.

99 There is little evidence as to the age at which processes of maturation cease to affect development.

100 Granted a certain dispositional pattern, certain capacities and a certain environment, certain dispositions will be expressed and certain capacities exercised, with consequent modifications of both.

101 As a result of such experience (1) dispositions may come to be (a) related to new stimuli, (b) organised in new patterns, (c) strengthened or weakened; and (2) capacities may be realised according to the extent to which they are practised.

102 The most characteristic aspect of mind is its power to make new combinations of movements, objects, images, words or concepts.
103 The dispositional pattern may be consciously modified through volitional processes.

104 The development of the dispositional pattern takes place in relation to the social tradition.

105 This may work in cooperation with the forces behind maturation.

106 Access to the appropriate element in the social tradition at the appropriate moment in the course of development is largely a matter of chance.

107 The use made of such access depends upon a man's native capacities and volition.

108 Individual adjustment involves a changing environment and also a continually changing individual.

109 The social tradition is the correlative of many minds with varying potentialities.

110 The differentiation of individual function corresponds, more or less, to the varieties of developmental possibilities.

111 Endo-psychic mental events and processes underly introspectible mental phenomena.

112 Memories may in consequence undergo alteration between occasions of recall.

113 The dream results from such processes.

114 Endo-psychic processes may be active in seeking the solution of problems of adjustment.

115 Thus not all adjustments and regroupings of dispositions take place consciously.

Chapter V The common mental frame in the twofold relation

116 The study, by psychological methods, of the twofold relation is related to the study of a society somewhat as in biology the study of minute structure and function
is related to that of the organism as a whole.

117 Two minds come into relation with one another when each seeks expression in a frame of external circumstances of which the other is a part.

118 Of the relations so arising the simplest is that in which one person becomes the object of an appetitive or instinctive tendency of another.

119 It is essential to a sociological view of such an event that we should apprehend at once the points of view of each person as equally parts of one sociological situation which comprehends the relevant mental states and behaviour of both persons.

120 When two persons respond to one another in this way the result may be a state of concord or a state of opposition: we may also speak of relations of amity and hostility.

121 The determinants of a relation of concord will probably include dissimilar elements in the two minds, the concordance being in the unity of the common action, not in the likeness of the determinants.

122 This point has both practical and theoretical importance.

123 Such a unity of common action is directed to the achievement of a common form of expression in relation to a common frame of external circumstances; and its determinants in the two minds together constitute one functional system of dispositions which may be called a common mental frame.

124 Frame has a long history as a term used in ordinary speech in reference to mental facts.

125 No common mental frame can function in any relation without undergoing modifications which are specific to that relation.

126 That the more general lines of the more primitive common mental frames are innately determined may be seen in the animal world.

127 In man parental and sexual relations have a similar innate basis.
128 The self tendencies afford an even clearer example.

129 In addition to the appetitive relations already described there are four types of cooperative relation.

130 (1) A cooperative relation may result from similar responses to a common situation.

131 (2) A cooperative relation may involve a common form of expression, a common programme of activity, and mental dispositions, mental states and behaviour, which are in part similar, in part complementary.

132 (3) A cooperative relation may involve a common end, and conative states and dispositions almost entirely dissimilar - a dissimilarity cloaked by the ambiguities of ordinary speech.

133 The real structure of such a relation is likely to be disguised by the over emphasis of any shared conative states which may be involved in the relation - an over emphasis which aims at making the relation work more smoothly.

134 (4) A cooperative relation may be based on the interdependence of the ends sought by two persons, and such a relation, though involving no common motives or feeling states may be a socially valuable and efficient one.

135 It should not be confused with the pseudo-cooperative type of relation in which the gratification sought on one side is illusory.

136 Cooperative relations involve the organisation of the tendencies expressed through them in common mental frames, the outline of which is not provided in the innate structure of the mind.

137 Conative states directed to the attainment of values which are not personal satisfactions lead to relations which are concordant of their own nature since they involve participation in supra-personal systems of value.

138 Actual relations are not relations between small systems of dispositions on either side but between whole personalities.

139 Any relation involves its partners in a series of co-
tacts: there are three ways in which the structure of the relation may extend to other dispositions in addition to the primary determinants of the relation.

140 (a) The relation may be complicated and reinforced by the stimulation of primitive instinctive tendencies.

141 (b) The contacts to which it leads may give rise to relatively unrelated similar and complementary responses.

142 (c) One partner to the relation may attempt a development of it unacceptable to the other.

143 Such complications may obscure the real structure of a relation.

144 Minds are not systems of dispositions merely, but rational selves.

145 To complete the picture of any relation it is also necessary to restore the social back ground of the two personalities.

146 (a) A relation begins from pre-formed mental frames of generalised character.

147 (b) Conventions of social behaviour constitute a preliminary understanding.

148 The origin or continuance of a relation may be related to constraining or limiting conditions which may be in part external.

149 The conditions may result from a contract voluntarily entered into.

150 The contract of marriage illustrates the principles involved.

151 Since human relations are not in the main series of fortuitous concords interspersed with fortuitous oppositions but have a continuity assured either by the common mental frame of the relation or by external constraining circumstances, (a) an opposition does not necessarily bring a relation to an end.

152 (b) oppositions when they occur may be decided on all occasions in favour of one partner who has a dominance over
action, and these processes are raised to a new plane.

165 Where an opposition is not solved in this way there may be an appeal to arbitration.

166 Because our knowledge of the processes of social interaction is in the main derived from other-consciousness, the area of other-consciousness is sometimes wrongly identified with the area of social process, just as the area of self-consciousness has sometimes been wrongly identified with the area of mental process.

167 The development of other-consciousness depends upon the development of self-consciousness.

168 A relation may be made concordant by the altruistic acceptance of the aim of another because it has felt value for that other.

169 Social psychology is concerned with the consequences, but not with the explanation, of altruistic action.

170 It is however necessary to distinguish its true character.

171 It results in relations of concord and in the furtherance in another of mental and spiritual development.

172 Since both parties to a relation are developing personalities, the relation itself must be a developing one, i.e. a common mental frame is continuously subject to growth and readjustment.

173 A relation involves processes which may be described as unwitting and endo-psychic.

174 The conception of a common mental frame is not a form of the hypothesis of a group mind.

175 The specific states experienced as a member of a group do not require for their explanation any additional assumption.

176 The expression of elements organised in a common mental frame depends upon peculiarly complex circumstances.

177 The twofold relation and not the family is the ultimate unit of psychological analysis of social structure.
178 The twofold relation is not detachable from the larger social structure but it is accessible for study.

179 The family is of unique importance in social theory.

180 The study of it is however beset with special difficulties.

181 Furthermore the more general problem of the possible forms of relation is logically prior to the special study of any one type of group.

182 Here as elsewhere analytic studies must precede a genetic interpretation of our data.
Chapter I

The social sciences

A science which described the nature and development of human society would properly be called sociology. At present such a science can scarcely be said to exist, although no science has become so important. It is true that we shall find difficulty in defining society as an object of study. For society is the most complex object that can be defined. In any case we shall now be able to study it profitably. Much of this knowledge has already been worked out, not by a science of sociology but by separate social sciences, each working upon data of a particular character, collecting and studying them by its particular methods—the diverse branches of archaeology and history, social sciences such as ethology, political science, jurisprudence, comparative religion and economics, the studies which examine particular social products such as language or architecture or literature, the social aspects of biology and medicine, practical disciplines such as theory of education and the art of war which are also of necessity partly empirical inquiries.
Chapter I

The Social Sciences

A science which described the nature and development of human society would properly be called sociology. At present such a science can scarcely be said to exist, although there have been notable attempts to lay the foundations of it. The difficulty is the complexity of society as an object of study - for society is the most complex object which science studies. This difficulty is not due to our lack of knowledge about it. In a sense we know too much about it, and know it with too great intimacy, to be able to study it profitably. Much of this knowledge has already been worked up, not by a science of sociology but by separate social sciences, each working upon data of a particular character, collecting and studying them by its particular methods - the diverse branches of archaeology and history, social sciences such as ethnology, political science, jurisprudence, comparative religion and economics, the studies which examine particular social products such as language or architecture or literature, the social aspects of biology and medicine, practical disciplines such as theory of education and the art of war which are also of necessity partly empirical inquiries,
and, in a category by itself, ethics.

2 The first difficulty in our way is to know where to find or how to approach society for the purpose of observing its processes; and if we enter upon the discussion of this question we may find ourselves debating (before we have made any observations upon which conclusions of any kind can be based) opposing views as to what kind of existence the society we wish to study actually has. If however we ask instead what kind of data the social sciences are engaged in studying the question is more easily answered. In the first place they have at their disposal facts of an entirely objective kind, which we may call social facts.¹ These constitute the material which the social sciences attempt to formulate - the archive material and contemporary sources which are the raw material of history, religious or political or aesthetic or economic or military; the discoveries of the archaeologist; the descriptions of the manners and customs of primitive peoples; all that men have created in literature, in art, in science and engineering; and

¹ A more exact definition of this term than is required for the purposes of this chapter will be found on p. 139.
most overwhelming of all - the detailed knowledge which we have at our disposal of the great societies in which we live.

When we are studying such facts we are not studying society itself directly. What we have before us are facts from which we seek to infer the social structure and social processes to which they are intimately related as consequents. Our knowledge of social structure and social processes is therefore inferential. No doubt a similar statement could be made with regard to the other sciences. The physiologist cannot bring the processes of life directly under his observation: he must be content with the patient study of physical and chemical events related to them, and more and more closely related to them as he slowly improves his technique of investigation.

The arcana of the physical universe are similarly out of reach of the senses or the instruments of the physicist: they are reached only over the bridge which reason builds from the relatively gross and therefore observable events to the recesses of the almost unthinkable minute.

3 The pursuit of the social sciences has an additional difficulty. Their data are as in the case of the other sciences the mere concomitants and consequences of the
processes which they are seeking to study: but the record of them lie much more open to chance and accident. The continuance of the geological process tears pages at random from the geological record as eruption and upheaval, or erosion and deposition, alter the existing configurations from which the events of previous geological ages may be inferred. But these transactions themselves are at once the continuation of the story which the rocks tell, and the faithful and minute recording of it for him who can bring an eye and a brain to decipher it. The documents upon which history depends are exposed to much greater and more fatal dangers. Phidias's Athene is gone from the Parthenon and our knowledge of the society that produced it is the poorer without a corresponding enrichment of our knowledge of the society that saw its disappearance. The fire in Sir Robert Cotton's library destroyed many pages in the record of our social past, and wrote no new ones: and such misfortunes in spite of modern care are unbanished from a world in which the disasters of Louvain and the Four Courts are memories of our own life time.

Furthermore the materials of history are at the best only accidentally surviving consequences of the acts and purposes which we seek to infer from them. The coin or
the broken potsherd which date for us a native settlement or a Roman camp have survived for our enlightenment not through the goodwill of their owners but the one because its owner lost it and the other because it was broken and thrown on the midden. It is scarcely untrue to say that it is in its rubbish heaps and its cast clothes that we study a society. In the fifteenth century the Paston family were busy about many worldly affairs in the pursuance of which they produced a mass of correspondence of momentary interest to writer and recipient, of none whatsoever to the remainder of the world: until this mass of rubbish having by chance survived four centuries and more, we learn from it what its writers had no intention of communicating, a wealth of information taken for granted by writer and reader but strange to us by the lapse of time. It is the same with Domesday Book or a Pipe Roll, with the Coram Rege Rolls or the archives of a military force. These documents had at one time an instrumental value in a social process - taxation and the levying of soldiers, the control of the national finances, the adjudication of suits at law in which men's strongest passions and most vital interests were involved, the movement and supply of an army in the field from day to day in winter quarters, on strategic marches or in the critical hours of battle: having served those purposes of which
they were the instruments, such documents have a secondary value, to serve which they were laid up in archives as I keep a receipt when I have paid a bill; and, when their secondary purpose is fulfilled, they are, apart from the inertia that lets them lie, as likely to go to the flames as a bundle of bills that I paid two years ago and turn up today when their settlement is no longer likely to be disputed. Having become rubbish they are one more stage on the way to becoming the data of the historian who will infer from them the extent of the tilth and pasture in the 11th century, the military forces of the Conqueror, the population and wealth of the country, the development of the nation's finances, innumerable facts about the changing social structure of England, the answers to the problems of military history. And where the historian finishes his account of the actual transactions of past time the social scientist begins his more abstract inquiry and his attempts to reach wider generalisations.

4 Much the same is true of the data afforded by contemporary social life. A multitude of provident citizens are desirous of investing their savings securely. A series of governments under pressure of a variety of social forces require to borrow money. An inconceivably
complex tangle of wills, of confidence and fear, of desires for this or that, of weighing of comparative advantages, of patriotic sentiment, of a thousand local and personal types of sentiment, determines the price of government stock and its daily variations. That price is printed from day to day in the newspapers and its publication in this way is itself a part of the process by which it is determined. There in the newspaper files it is also material for the social scientist. But it was not with his needs in view that it was printed there. And most statistical material becomes available in some such indirect way.

Some statistical material is however gathered with a more definitely scientific purpose. Agricultural or educational statistics may be collected with a practical administrative end in view. But their collection is regulated and determined by scientific as well as practical ends since they are sought by applied sciences in pursuit of the extension of their theoretical knowledge with a view to its practical application to social ends. And the taking of a census becomes in recent decades less a numbering of the people for immediate administrative convenience and more an ascertainment of the data required for a theory of population.

Such data may be supplemented in some degree by the
collection of information for a purely theoretical purpose - the method of the questionnaire. There are valid criticisms to be made of this mode of inquiry, or at any rate of the ways in which it has sometimes been used. It has certainly one great advantage: when it is used an attempt is being made to observe as directly as possible some of the elements in an actual social process and these elements have been chosen for their relevance to some theoretical problem on which further light is desired. How happy the historian would be if he could on occasion apply such methods to the societies of the past in cases in which some important question could be settled by a quite small allowance of facts of which time and accident have not spared him the record. The student of contemporary social processes suffers many disadvantages compared with the student of the past but in this respect at least he is more fortunately placed: he has some freedom to choose the direction in which he will make his observations, he is not limited to making the best of the data which chance has spared to him.

Nevertheless he is still a long way from the direct observation of social processes. To pass in thought from a series of historical documents or overt historical happenings to the social process which lies behind them - the actual movements of men's minds, the conflicts and concords
of will and purpose, the beliefs and hopes, the understandings and misunderstandings out of which they arise - may be no more difficult than to interpret in a similar way contemporary material. This difficulty is one which confronts us whenever we attempt to study social processes through the medium of social facts - and it meets us equally in the field of history, when we attempt to go beyond the establishment of a document or the chronicling or dating of individual overt facts or events, and in the field of contemporary social investigation, when we seek to pass beyond our immediate data in search of an understanding of the social structure and processes to which they are related.

5 Such data as we have been discussing are however supplemented by material of an entirely different order. To each of us the society in which he lives is known in another way as much narrower as it is more intimate. Each one of us knows a little bit of it as a part of his own experience. Our own lives are parts of the process by which it lives: and so a little bit of it - an inconsiderable fragment of the whole - is known to each of us with the greatest intimacy possible. It is the very stuff of our experience - not bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh merely, but literally knowledge of our knowledge, thought of our thought, feeling of our feeling and will of
our will - a texture woven of our emotion and desire and living with our life.

What were the thoughts and emotions of England on the 4th. of August 1914 is a secret hid in thirty million minds; but it is a secret some thirty millionth part of which lies open to every member of that population in so far as he is sufficiently self-conscious and self-critical to examine himself on the question. A defeated candidate studying the numbers of votes cast for and against him at an election may wonder idly why the result is what it is: every man or woman who voted could tell him a part of the answer, but so small a part that the individual voter understands the result still less than the candidate. A production manager studying the graphs of prices and sales may speculate vainly as to the expansions and shrinkages of his market: but each one of us who purchased or abstained from purchasing the commodity in question during the period under consideration knows, in knowing the relevant movements of his own mind, one little fragment of the answer.

The experience of each of us as a member of society is therefore material for study in an attempt to describe that society or to construct a social theory. To distinguish it from the material of the first kind which we described as consisting of social facts we may call this kind of material social experience. As known to us it is the experience of individuals, their mental processes in
relation to their fellows, in relation to the material world which their society has created and through which it impresses itself upon them, (the shape it has given to the landscape, its buildings, its books, pictures and the rest), their mental processes as determined by the ideas, the sentiments, the beliefs, the standards of value which they have derived from it, and their mental processes in turn determining in some degree these external material and spiritual worlds.

6 Such material of observation is essentially private material. A demand curve or an opened barrow are public objects of contemplation and study. My thoughts and emotions and acts of will are to be observed by my own introspection only. And my own mind is the only one to which I have access for this kind of study. The behaviour of others implies a similar inner experience which I cannot know directly but of which I can know something from their reports of it or by inference from their behaviour. The methods of this type of inquiry are therefore the methods of psychology - the method of direct introspective study of one's own mental processes; the method of the study of the mental processes of others through their introspective reports under conditions that have not been planned at all, that have been planned by the subject of the study, or that have been planned by the
experimenter; the method of the study of the subject's responses in a variety of situations casual or contrived; the method of the study of the products or records of mental processes. Such is the procedure of psychology, and there is no other procedure available for the study of what we have called social experience.

7 Furthermore, there is no line to be drawn between the data for this type of social inquiry and the data of psychology, between social experience and the experience which psychology studies. There is no part of the experience or behaviour which psychology studies which is not in part socially determined: there is no part of social experience or social behaviour which lies outside the field already claimed by psychology. The same material may however be approached from different points of view: and the point of view with which we are concerned is different from that from which the data of experience and behaviour are primarily regarded by psychology, which, pursuing its own programme, is concerned in a subordinate degree only with the social aspects of mental phenomena, just as it is concerned in a subordinate degree only with those aspects of its data which are of special interest to such closely related sciences as epistemology, ethics, logic, physiology, biology, pathology, each of which has its special problems and its special point of view, and
each of which is concerned with some aspects of mental processes. Thus the same data may be studied by two sciences from different points of view and with different purposes, just as the same literary work may be studied in one school as a document of social history and in another as a work of art. The psychologist is concerned to give an account of the individual, and in so doing he must look at the society to which that individual belongs as he looks at other parts of his environment: the social scientist is concerned to give an account of society, and in so doing he seeks to pass from this intimate view of the individual to an understanding of the multitudinous system of a society composed of many such individuals in relation to one another.

There is also a difference of selection or emphasis. The psychologist is more interested in one part of the field of experience, the social scientist in another. The social historian and the historian of literature may both make use of the novel: but out of all the novels written in the last two centuries they would make very different selections for their purposes – the one choosing what is of value as a social-historical document, the other what has aesthetic value, two classes which overlap but are by no means coincident. To approach the study of experience from the point of view of the social struct-
uren and processes which have their ultimate explanation in terms of it is to see it in a new perspective and to bring to the attention aspects of it which are not important from other points of view.

Two branches of science may be related in another way. The same material may constitute the data of both but it may be used by one after it has been worked up a certain length by the other. This is the kind of relation which is most relevant to the case we are considering. The study of the data of experience and behaviour must be carried a certain length before the social scientist can effectively begin his work. The methods by which such study is carried on must be perfected by the workers immediately concerned with the difficult problems they present before his further problems can be considered. The exploration of the individual mind considered by itself must be carried forward by specialists in psychology until the frontiers of his special territory are approached.

8 Social facts as data upon which to found a theory of society suffer the disadvantages which we have noted - they are wide-spread in time and space but we are confined to an arbitrary selection from overt past and present happenings and, more important, in studying them we are studying not social process itself but a fragmentary record of its
overt concomitants and products. Social experience presents us with the complementary difficulties and opportunities. What we have before us is an actual part of contemporary social process which, since it is nothing more nor less than our own mental processes, our own thoughts and emotions and acts of will, we know with such intimacy as we can know nothing else whatsoever. But it is restricted in space and time - the merest fragment of the whole social structure which we wish to understand. Such is the contrast between the two kinds of data of which the social sciences must make use. That they are connected in the most intimate way - that they are in fact aspects of the same process - does not admit of a doubt. But there is no bridge over which we may easily pass in thought from the one to the other.

They are separated in the first place by differences in the techniques by which they are approached - the scholarly techniques of the historian and the mathematical technique of the statistician on the one hand; and the introspective, experimental, behaviourist and psychopathological techniques of psychology on the other. The primary work of historical investigation itself requires in its different departments a great variety of technical and scholarly equipment - the equipments of the field worker in archaeology, of the palaeographer, of the linguist, of the textual critic. The initial work of
observation and description requires in each of many departments a high degree of specialisation. And all this precedes the first movements towards any interpretation of the data. They are separated in the second place by differences of outlook, temperament and natural talent as important as these differences of training. Thirdly, they are separated by the extent of the views they afford — a social science seeking to grasp in one view the whole extent of a great society, history seeking to present the life of a nation throughout an extended period of time, while on the other hand when I study my social experience as a member of such a society, as a citizen of such a nation, I can observe only some aspects of a part of one contributory life-time, I can have only an incomplete view of a section of one fibre in one thread of that vast texture. But such difficulties should not be insuperable: if we can make a photograph of a piece of tapestry to record the figures woven in it and at the same time carry off a few minute fragments of its substance in order to submit them to a microscopic and chemical examination, the essential data are in our hands.

9 Let us suppose the same social process to be studied by two observers, by one through the medium of social facts, by the other through the examination of social experience. As the one works from his immediate data towards a recon-
struction of the social processes which underlie them, and to which they are related as act to will or as word to thought, he is travelling in the direction of the social experience which affords the other his immediate data: and the other, as he pushes his way towards a reconstruction of the great texture of social experience from his minute sample of it, is coming to meet him. Let us now examine the stages of the journey on which each is setting out.

10 History, which treats of past societies, and the sciences which seek to describe contemporary society are as we have seen in a similar position in that the first stage of their tasks is the ascertainment of a large number of facts. They are alike also in that the next stage for each of them is the arrangement of these facts so as to lay the foundations of a superstructure of generalisations. These generalisations are in both cases of the same type; and it is convenient to call them, since they are typical of history, historical generalisations. Their distinguishing mark is that unlike the generalisations of the natural sciences they are narrowly restricted in space and time. They point to recurrences which are found in the historian's data but which cannot be stated as the minor premiss of a syllogism the major
premiss of which is the hypothesis of the uniformity of nature.

Thus a document, or a group of documents, might afford an understanding of the terms upon which a particular manor is held at a particular date. It is such particular statements that are the first fruits of the study of the historian's documents. Similar evidence might establish similar knowledge with regard to each of a number of other manors in the same tract of country and at about the same time. When all this evidence is put together the conclusion is reached that within certain limits of place and time some manors were held upon certain terms. Further evidence may in the same way afford grounds for extending this statement to greater areas and an increased period of time, each such extension of it following upon the discovery of further particular evidence of the same kind. Finally we have a much broader generalisation asserting that through such and such a period of time (perhaps some centuries) and over such and such an area (let us say a great part of western Europe) such and such a system of land tenure existed. This broader statement is however still limited in space and time, even though the limit be some hundreds of years and some thousands of miles. And this is as far as history carries the argument: it does not proceed be-
yond generalisations of this type.

Where history leaves off the social sciences begin. The division between their fields is marked by the fact that science seeks to pass beyond generalisations of the historical type in order to establish connexions between universals. Thus history may note that in a particular case an aristocratic state becomes democratic, declines and reverts to autocracy. It may note a similar sequence of events in other places and at other times. When however we inquire whether this sequence of aristocracy, democracy and tyranny is in each of these cases an instance of a "law" that an aristocratic state must presently pass through these phases we have left history behind and passed into the universe of discourse of the social sciences.

The work of these sciences depends upon and must be preceded by the work of the historian in the case of the past of human society and the work of description in the case of contemporary society. These two sources afford them a reservoir of material for the suggestion or testing of hypotheses. Since the Renaissance mankind has been amassing a knowledge of its own history and pre-history which promises to make intelligible for the first time the groupings of human beings in our own day. No previous age has had such a knowledge. We understand for example the history of Rome and her place in the world as no Roman
could do. And, in the same way the society of our own day, the forces at work in it, and its future possibilities, can be appraised in a way that was not possible in any earlier society. It is however to the social sciences that we must look for the first attempts to discover what society is and how it works, an account of it in general terms based upon the data which history and contemporary social observation and description supply.

12 The richness and variety of this material necessitates a departmentalism which has made the study of society which uses it not one science but a score of sciences working more or less in isolation from one another, speaking different languages and living in different worlds. There was a story in a nursery reading book of past days which told of five Indian sages who went to study and report upon the elephant. Being blind they were dependent on their tactual experience. One catching the beast by the tail reported that the elephant was very like a rope; the second who stumbled against its side compared it to a wall; to the third, who had embraced one of its legs, it resembled a tree; and the fourth and fifth, who respectively encountered its trunk and one of its tusks, expounded it, the one in terms of a serpent, and the other in terms of a pole. This parable of an excessive departmentalism of study is not without
application to the social sciences. Each out of the available data selects its own kind of material and applies to it a methodology devised to deal with material of that particular kind - political science, jurisprudence, comparative religion, economics, the comparative sciences of art and literature, each is engaged upon material of a particular type and each is moving towards an interpretation of its data in terms of general laws and also towards the interpretation of these laws in terms of social processes. Each is endeavouring to build up a picture of some one aspect of social processes or social structure. And although they live in different universes of discourse and speak different languages the social structure and processes which they study are at bottom one and the same.

If I pay a number of visits to York Minster with a different companion on each occasion, I may on each occasion have a different aspect of it brought to my notice. I go with an artist and I hear it analysed as a work of art is analysed: it is an aesthetic unity and every piece of it has meaning as a part of that unity just as every note has its place in the structure of a piece of music. I go next with an engineer and I learn that the building is an exemplification of the laws of mechanics - a system of forces, of loads and strains and stresses. If my next companion is an economic historian he will explain it in terms of wealth and labour, of the distance to the nearest
quarries, the kind of transport, the engines, and the mechanical devices available at the time of its building. If I am accompanied by a priest he may of course talk about it from any or all of these points of view but it is possible that his conversation may emphasise an entirely different aspect of it - it may be for him what it essentially is and was, a framework for the performance of a religious rite, adapted to that purpose in all the respects we have noted. To study the cathedral from any of these points of view is to reach a certain amount of truth about it. The account of it as an aesthetic structure is true as far as it goes; so is the engineer's analysis of it, or the treatment of it as a document of economic history. But no one of them, while it confines itself to its own universe of discourse, can be a complete account of the cathedral; nor can any one of them deal exhaustively with its own aspect of the building if it ignores the other accounts of it. Thus some aesthetic peculiarity may have its true explanation in terms of some requirement of building construction or vice versa; and some builder's device may be similarly related to economic circumstances: and the religious purpose of the building is a more fundamental principle of explanation than any of the three.

Now the case of the inductive social sciences appears
to be logically parallel. A society has a political structure studied by the science of politics. It has also— to go no further— an economic structure and a legal structure. Neither politics nor economics nor jurisprudence is the science of society; they are the sciences respectively of its political, its economic and its legal structures and processes. If we added to the list the other sciences which study in a parallel way other aspects of society the sum of their descriptions would still fall short of a complete inductive account of society, for they would not be exhaustive of the points of view from which it can be studied. Furthermore the programme of any one of them is closely related to the programme of the others since a fact of political structure may be partly dependent on an economic process, and so on; and they are therefore interdependent inquiries.

To complete the parallel, they are presumably related to some more fundamental category of explanation as the accounts of the cathedral are related to its primary purpose, the providing of a setting for a religious rite. In the case of the cathedral the terms of this final explanation cannot be reached by the methods or concepts of aesthetics or engineering or economics; and we do not in the case of society get nearer to it by following the procedure of politics or economics or jurisprudence, though
each of these disciplines, being in need of the support for its own structure of some such more fundamental explanation, will, incidentally to its proper argument, cobble up some kind of an ad hoc system of assumptions on which to base itself. The search for something more adequate must be pursued in a much wider universe of discourse, the field of social philosophy; and this, as the Republic of Plato clearly shows us, is nothing less than the whole field of philosophy. Since the final answers of philosophy are not likely to be soon available, it is necessary that the social sciences should proceed as best they may without them. The danger of coming to false or premature conclusions is lessened in so far as this is clearly recognised; it is greatest when one of the social sciences seeks to come to ultimate conclusions about the nature, structures or processes of society on the basis of its own data - either when it ignores the parallel work of other inductive social sciences or when it seeks to anticipate the more comprehensive view of philosophy.

We may therefore define the scope of each of the inductive social sciences as the study of social facts of a particular type in order to discover among them regularities which can be stated as general principles. Their separation into a number of disciplines separately pursued
is one of convenience only, and their separate fields may be roughly delimited in terms of the type of facts which each studies. Thus we may say that economics studies economic facts, political science political facts, philology the facts of language, and so on. There is an immediate difficulty. If, for instance, we say that economics studies economic facts, how are we to define an economic fact?

We can only say that some social facts belong together sufficiently to be studied together and to be studied by the particular methods which economics uses; and that every fact which is relevant to an economic argument is an economic fact. The consideration of some social facts which obviously belong together has led to the development of a body of principles which we call economic science and that science must add to its data all further social facts which, in the light of these principles themselves, are seen to be relevant to them - with a consequent modification of the body of principles and possibly a farther widening or narrowing of its scope in terms of factual data. The fields of the other social sciences, defined in terms of the social facts they study, are similarly determined. Thus it is not possible to begin by defining certain social facts as the data of comparative religion and then develop a science which corre-
lates them: it is only as a result of each stage in the
development of a science of comparative religion that we
get a progressive understanding of the inter-relations
and limits of the social facts that are its proper subject
matter.

It is possible that all the available data are not
exhausted by dividing them among the social sciences in
this way. It is certain that if the fields of these
sciences are defined in this way they overlap consider-
ably. If we consider a university, it is obvious that
its endowments, the fees it receives and the salaries it
pays, are economic phenomena; and that organisation,
curricula and the subject matter of the lectures are re-
spectively data for political science, philosophy of
education, and the special sciences concerned. But these
too may have an economic aspect. Organisation is related
to the administration of funds; the establishment of a
new chair or the building of new laboratories is obviously
an economic question as well as an educational one; and
the material of instruction is a commodity sold in the
educational market. We must therefore modify our defini-
tion of economics by saying that it studies social facts
in their economic aspect, some social facts (which we may
call economic facts) being of more importance from this
point of view than others; or that economics studies
social facts with a particular equipment, the methodology and principles of economic science. The same will be true of each of the social sciences. The group of social facts studied by each cannot be rigidly delimited. A particular social custom may have at once economic, religious, legal, medical and aesthetic significance - a marriage or a burial custom for example. Rigid definition may not be possible but we do know well enough for practical purposes what the data of the different social sciences are.

14 In dealing with such data the preliminary stage of ascertainment is followed by the establishment of generalisations of the historical type (section 10) - generalisations which state, for example, that a custom of such and such a type has such and such a distribution, that certain constitutions or legal codes have such and such features in common, that such and such economic events show such and such degrees of correlation. Frequently the same generalisation will be supported by data from both past and present societies and in all of these sciences there will be some dependence on data from the past. In so far as that is true each of these sciences is dependent on history; and history appears therefore not as a coordinate member of the group of social sciences
but in a position of its own, with a similar relation to each of them, being the source of a part of the data of each and therefore a propaedeutic to it. There is indeed a branch of history corresponding to each of them, as economic history to economics, constitutional history to political science. Economic history and economics are naturally closely associated, studied in the same school and pursued by the same investigators; but logically economic history is history, and economics is science; and, even when they meet in the pages of the same monograph or as stages in the same argument, they are distinguishable by their aims and methodology.

15 If we conceive of each of the social sciences as proceeding on the basis of a specially chosen group of social facts to an account of one aspect of the social structure that underlies them all, we might expect them to arrive in course of time at a group of principles common to all of them: for, when each has formulated its own principles, we should expect these principles to have a common basis in the more general principles exemplified in the social processes underlying the social facts which these sciences study. Such a group of principles transcending the universe of discourse of each and equally applicable in the field of each would be empirical sociological concepts. Their relation to the special social sciences would be similar to the relation of general
biological concepts to the separate biological sciences. That no such group of concepts has yet appeared with the parallel development of the social sciences may be an indication that this expectation and the assumptions upon which it is based are false: it may equally well be an indication that the sciences have not yet pushed their inquiries far enough, or on converging lines. Such eventual unifications of separate disciplines is a normal event of scientific history; and when it takes place in the case of the social sciences we shall see the birth of sociology. A general science of sociology would otherwise seem to be not only unattained but unattainable. There is no reason to suppose that this is so, or to doubt that the principles discovered by the special social sciences can be ultimately restated in terms of more general concepts as we now see that chemical processes can be described in the more general terms of physics. Economics would then continue to speak its own language in pursuing its particular problems, as chemistry still speaks in terms of the atomic theory. But its problems would have a new light thrown upon them. And the same would be true of its coordinate sciences.

16 We may now turn to another aspect of the sciences. They stand as a group of empirical studies each related in a similar way to history. They stand also as a group of
coordinate studies each related in a similar way to present social experience - and to past social experience when we have any record of it. Each of us, as we have seen, has his own narrow private experience of the political and economic, juristic and other processes with which we are concerned. Here we have at once a suggestion of their underlying unity. The multiplicity and diversity of social facts, the consequent departmentalism of the sciences which study them, and their diverse methods and terminologies suggest a high degree of difference and contrast between these studies, a degree of difference and contrast between, for example, economics, politics and jurisprudence that does not seem to exist between John Smith drawing a cheque, John Smith recording his vote and John Smith making his will. If the principles discovered by the social sciences from the study of social facts can be interpreted in terms of social experience then the principles of each will be translated from its own terminology into a common language. It appears probable that we should then be one step further on the way to the discovery of principles common to them.

17 In the meantime we can distinguish two stages in most social inquiries though sometimes it is a little difficult to disentangle them. It might sometimes be advantageous if in the course of a social scientific argument they were more clearly marked, just as in psy-
chology it has been found necessary to distinguish clearly an argument based upon introspective data from one based upon observations of behaviour.

The first stage is that at which an empirical law is reached as a result of the examination of a group of social facts. Such a law may be stated with certainty and exactitude as a result of an inductive inquiry; and it may be stated without any suggestion of a more general principle underlying the tendency which it formulates.

The second stage is that at which there is sought an explanation of this law in terms of the individual - in terms of his physiological processes (as when statistics of public health are related to clinical observations) or in terms of his social experience.

It is clear that this further explanation may be less securely based than the law itself. Thus, to take an example from economics, the law of demand has a secure basis in statistical observation and business experience, and it affords useful practical guidance in planning a programme of production. It states that the demand for an article varies, other factors remaining constant, with changes in its price - the article has a wider market as the price is lowered, a contracting market as the price rises. How far this generalisation is true and to what extent it may be used as a guide to practice are questions
which must be answered by economics as an observational and inductive science. It is however frequently accompa-
ied by a restatement of the law in a different form - a statement that a consumer will buy more of a particular commodity when the price falls and less when the price rises. This is in effect an attempted explanation of the statistical law in terms of individual behaviour. It is unsatisfactory as an explanation since a very little consideration shows that in such a situation the motives of the individual as a purchaser are much less simple than this statement would imply. Thus, to instance one complicating principle out of many, if the price of matches is halved I shall not use any more matches than I do now; similarly, when the price of cigarettes was doubled, I did not smoke any fewer.

It would be easy to point to other cases which show that the above restatement of the law of demand in terms of individual behaviour is fallacious. These cases would do nothing to discredit the initial statement of the law as an inductive generalisation from social facts; what they discredit is the attempted restatement or explanation of it in terms of the individual, an explanation, as has been said, less securely based than the law itself - less securely because it depends not only upon the acceptance of that law but upon something else which has been brought
into the argument, that something else being our experience of social life, our knowledge that in this case and in that a change in price has resulted in increased or decreased purchases. But when, as in this case, social experience is brought into the argument without sufficient analysis and criticism, instead of strengthening the inductive law it is brought in to buttress, it only casts doubt upon it (unless we see that the inductive law stands firmly without its support) when its own faulty assumptions become apparent.

18 Not only is the explanation in individual terms less securely based than the inductive generalisation itself but the former may in many cases have a merely speculative value. In some cases present knowledge scarcely permits speculative suggestion. Philology affords a very clear example. The history of language shows quite clearly that at certain times consonantal and vowel changes have taken place in a perfectly regular manner. Such changes are formulated as philological laws. Language is a product of social life, intimately related to all of its aspects and phases, not alive in itself but related to the living thoughts of men, clothing and expressing them, growing with them, constantly changing and developing. We naturally suppose that philological laws must have an explanation in terms of the minds, or the lips and tongues,
of men; but we can only speculate as to what that explanation is. These laws are not the less certain or the less useful on this account; and many generalisations concerning other aspects of society are of a similar nature.

19 When the second stage of such a double argument is reached something else is being used in addition to the primary data of the science, the group of social facts with which its inquiries begin. An attempt is being made to relate these to the data of another science with an entirely different starting point, different primary aims, a different terminology and different principles and concepts. To do this successfully requires a command of both disciplines. Neither is it possible at all until a happy moment has arrived when an advance in one or other of the two related sciences has resulted in the shortening of the gap between them at one or more points of possible contact and allows a spark of mutual illumination to light up a part of the field of each.

Such a relation between a social science and a science studying the individual may be illustrated from the case of comparative religion and psychology. The former science collects all the ascertainable facts of religious customs and observances past and present and attempts to classify them and to discover the general laws that underlie their
apparent diversity and incongruity. The result is an immense increase and clarification of our knowledge of the religious history of mankind. In a wide panorama we see unfolded all the cults of all the ages and we see them no longer as a confusion of details, absurd or horrible or sublime, but as an ordered series—a map with mountains and rivers and towns in which much is blurred and in which there are many blank spaces, but in which there begins to be visible the outline of an intelligible structure.

Nevertheless such a view lacks in intimacy what it affords in breadth. Confined to an objective view the student of comparative religion might arrive at the most accurate formulation of his material and the widest general laws without any comprehension of their significance—without attempting to understand the broken spear in the barrow as a warrior understood it who saw it put there, or the wreath of flowers on the war memorial as it is understood by a servant girl who has subscribed sixpence to the purchase of it. Such a detached view, such an objective formulation, is really the first business of the science. It must amass its observations, check them, classify them, generalise from them, before it begins to seek an explanation in terms of social experience. When that explanation is attempted the second stage in the argument is reached. There is at once a difficulty. How, for
example is a modern scholar to put himself in imagination in the place of a pagan warrior at the burial ceremony of a tribal chief? He may attempt to explain the ancient ceremony in terms of his own mental processes, to analyse motives discernible in his own mind which might have led him to actions of a similar kind. The very fact that he tries to do this implies that he possesses a degree of self-consciousness and a direction of interest which so differentiates his mind from that of the primitive warrior as possibly to invalidate his explanation altogether.

The scholar’s mental processes are rational, rational not only as compared with those of the primitive man but rational as compared with those of the majority of his contemporaries who have not been subjected to the particular kind of education of which his mind is the product. He is accordingly in danger of assuming too great a degree of rationality in others in attempting to explain their behaviour. Thus his argument may be of the form: "A did so and so. What mental processes would lead me to act in that way? I should do it if I believed this or aimed at that. Therefore A believed this or aimed at that." And so he attributes to A mental processes obvious enough to himself but perhaps entirely impossible to A. We can make the fallacy clear by taking a sufficiently fantastic example: "A left food on the dead man’s grave. I should
do that if I believed that the dead man could eat. Therefore A believed that the dead man could eat." Following a similar method a negro archaeologist of the distant future studying the dead civilisation of England might conclude that twentieth century Britons believed that the dead could smell: for they put flowers on their graves.

20 The way out of this difficulty is sufficiently obvious. The second stage of a sociological inquiry - that in which a psychological interpretation of a social law is sought - must be pursued not in dependence upon a few ad hoc conceptions uncritically adopted but with all the help which psychology can give. A completed science of psychology would describe the mental processes not of one mind, or of one type of mind, but of all minds. At present we are very far from having such a body of knowledge at our disposal but some progress has been made towards its discovery. Only when this has been fully achieved will it be possible to interpret completely the generalisations of the social sciences in terms of the mental processes of individuals; but enough progress has been made for the attempt to be begun in a scientific way instead of
by guess work and speculation. The advances in interpretation which are resulting, and which we may expect to see greatly amplified in the future, have followed upon recent advances in the field of psychology itself. Problems to which an older psychology confined almost entirely to the more ratiocinative processes of trained and logical minds had little relevance, are quickly seen to be very relevant indeed to the type of explanation suggested by a psychology which has laid bare those less conscious processes which are at work in all minds, and which are the dominant and characteristic processes of primitive minds at all times, and of educated minds engaged in modes of experience not primarily ratiocinative such as the modes of experience of religion and art.

21 It may be supposed that similar advances are possible in the case of the other social sciences in cooperation with psychology. It is clear that such advances must result in each case from the work of specialists in the social science itself who make use of the technique of psychology as an ancillary method of study. The principles furnished by psychology will undergo modification in being so applied, as always happens when concepts are applied in a field relevant to that in which they were originally developed. Thus in the
case of each of the social sciences there will be (or there already are) parallel applications of psychology; and these studies constitute the field of the very young science of social psychology. The scope of that science may therefore be defined as the application of the principles of psychology, derived from the study of the mental processes and behaviour of individuals, to the explanation of social phenomena known through the study of social facts. It is clear that such applications of psychology must come for the most part from specialists in the fields in which they are made. It is clear also, that, in the case of any inquiry which begins as an inductive study of social facts and continues as an attempt to give an interpretation in terms of social experience to the inductive generalisations so reached, these two stages of the argument can be distinguished by their contrasted characters: in the first stage psychological concepts have no place (and every term which has even a remote psychological implication should be carefully avoided) whereas, in the second, they are brought in deliberately, and the argument turns upon them.

Social psychology is therefore dependent upon the social sciences on the one hand, and, on the other, upon psychology as the science of the individual. It can make no claim to supersede the former. Rather it comes in-
to being whenever one of these, seeking to push its explanations further than its own observations and inductive methods can take it, avails itself of the concepts and laws of psychology instead of proceeding upon speculative assumptions of its own, which, however defective the psychology of the present day may be, are likely to be of inferior validity to those which psychology can provide. When this is done separately in the field of each of the social sciences we may expect to see the emergence of a number of general concepts and laws common to all of these disciplines; and such more general principles will belong to sociology proper and not to separate disciplines concerned with special aspects of social life. A similar group of sociological concepts may presumably result from the parallel application of the conclusions of other biological sciences which have their starting-points in the examination of the individual as such.

We have already seen (section 13) that when the muster of the inductive social sciences is complete their fields are exhaustive of all the varieties of social facts without leaving any special group of social facts for the consideration of social psychology as a social science coordinate with them. It has instead the special relation with each of them which we have sought
to describe, since it seeks to interpret in psychological terms the data which each of them studies, and it is therefore distinguished not by a special subject matter but by a special point of view and a special technique.

This, of course, is not to assert that all social phenomena have a psychological explanation but merely that it is the business of social psychology to push such explanations as far as they can usefully be pushed. Obviously in a particular case the explanation may be found in terms of the concepts of another science. Thus the philological laws referred to above may have a psychological explanation: but they may prove to have a physiological one, which might in turn be dependent on hereditary or dietetic or climatic factors.

22 Psychology in its own proper field studies the experience and behaviour of individuals but it must be remembered that (so far at least as human psychology is concerned) the individual whom psychology studies is always a social individual. He lives as a member of a society: he speaks its language, he has grown up under the influence of its traditions, he has acquired from it his stock of concepts and his system of moral values. It is very difficult (if it is even theoretically possible) to distinguish between innate and acquired factors in his personality; but it is quite certain that
his every thought and action is in part socially determined. Psychology as the study of the individual is therefore necessarily concerned with this social background in constructing its picture of the individual mind; and in the performance of that task it necessarily follows up for some distance these ramifications, these lines of social derivation of mental phenomena.

The uninterrupted pursuit of this line of investigation would lead to the unravelling of the whole complex of social processes past and present. Thus in theory (if not in practice) it would be possible (assuming that society is nothing more than the sum of its individuals) to start from a complete knowledge of the individual (if we had such knowledge) and to construct by a chain of deductive reasoning a complete account of the social processes which would result from the interaction of such individuals under different environmental conditions - to reach by deductive reasoning the formulation of those social laws of which in practice we acquire our knowledge by the shorter path, the inductive methods of the social sciences. Since our knowledge of society is actually being built up in both ways, we may regard these as complementary fields of study, each of which affords some opportunity of testing the conclusions of the other. It is at least evident that there is a place for a deductive social psychology of this kind.
Its formulation constitutes the second part of the programme of social psychology and the worker in this field is primarily a psychologist.

23 There is another task which belongs to the specialist in psychology. We have seen that the development of social psychology in relation to each of the social sciences must be, for the most part, the work of specialists in these sciences. Each, it has been argued, will apply in his own field the findings of psychology: but the contents of the existing psychological text book or monograph cannot be taken over and immediately used for purposes for which they were not designed. Is it possible for the psychologist to develop from our present knowledge of mind and behaviour principles adapted to the analysis of social phenomena, and so travel a part of the way to meet the social scientist on ground where cooperation may be fruitful?

Such a system of principles must be founded upon existing psychological knowledge. An attempt to elaborate them meets at once with the difficulty that there is no one system of psychology which can be made use of. Strictly speaking there are as many possible such systems of principles as there are systems of psycho-
logy upon which to base them. Psychology has of course much to gain by such testing of its findings in another field.

Such a system of principles may be further developed by applying psychological concepts and a psychological technique of investigation to small scale social phenomena. Between the fields worked by the social sciences and that worked by psychology, there is a hitherto little explored territory which marches with each of them, and, regarded as of little interest in itself, may yet have a strategic importance on account of its position. This is the study of the relations between two persons: and its importance comes from the possibility it affords of making a direct application of the principles and technique of psychology to structures and processes which are sociological - though they are sociological structures and processes on the smallest possible scale. Here it is possible to use psychological methods of inquiry almost as they are used in the study of the individual subject (section 6); and this cannot possibly be done with the large group.

Thus no one can examine exhaustively and in detail the motives determining a general election or a change in fashion or the appearance or disappearance of a powerful economic demand. One can at most indulge
in rather hazardous speculations based on a more or less casual and incomplete knowledge of the motives operating in a small chance selection of individuals. But the relation between two persons can be subjected to detailed study, and from it a group of concepts can be developed which refer not to individual experience and behaviour but to social relations; and these can again be tested by applying them to the phenomena of the small group under such conditions that their adequacy there may be tested. It may be possible in this way to develop a group of principles which are sociological rather than psychological, and which will be a useful equipment to offer to political scientist, ethnologist or economist for further trial. It is to this third division of social psychology that the following chapters seek to make a contribution.

24 The inductive social sciences have each a similar relation to history, as a source of knowledge of past societies. They have each a similar relation to psychology, or social psychology, as a necessary ancillary at the stage of an inquiry at which social phenomena are to be interpreted in terms of social experience. We have now to notice that they stand also as a coordinate group of studies each with a similar relation to ethics.

So long as an inquiry is being pursued with the single aim of increasing our knowledge and understanding
of some aspect of social structure or processes, the inquiry is unrelated to ethics, and can be carried on in complete independence of the findings of ethics. This is true even when moral experience and conduct are the subject of the inquiry. A history of morals (that is a history of what actions men have regarded as right and wrong and what moral beliefs they have entertained or acted upon) might be written without ever raising such questions as whether our supposed duties are real or illusory, what constitutes right action, or how the comparative values of ends may be estimated. The same is true of a psychological analysis or comparative study of the moral experience of peoples. It is quite clearly true of the descriptive and explanatory work of the special social sciences.

As soon as an inquiry in one of the social sciences passes from being an attempted description or explanation of some social structure or process to being an attempted solution of some practical problem, a recommendation that social structures and processes should be modified by conscious action in such and such directions, any conclusions that it offers are based, not only on its own observational data and inductive processes, but on assumptions, the examination and criticism of which belong to ethics. Such assumptions may be brought
in consciously, as conclusions which an ethical argument is held to have adequately established. They may be—and frequently are—positions which have been chosen, more or less consciously, because they point to those lines of action which the writer wishes to recommend: and in this case they may be accompanied by a fully developed ethical argument to show that they can be given a rational form, obligatory upon the as yet unconvinced reader, as well as upon the writer and those who think with him; or, as often as not, they may be brought in as assumptions so obvious to the writer that they seem to him to need no defence, or so natural to his sentiments that he is scarcely aware that any but a very stupid or misguided mind can question them.

Theoretically no applied social science is possible without the cooperation of ethics. Practically this would mean that no applied social science is possible; for in ethics there are no conclusions as to what constitutes the good, which can claim final validity, and find their claim accepted. Ethics cannot however be dismissed as an unpractical and useless study on the grounds that its programme has not yet been completed. A similar charge might be laid against any science, or any department of philosophy; and in the case of ethics, as in the case of the other sciences, an incomplete
programme is not incompatible with a considerable solid achievement.

In the case of ethics this achievement is largely negative. If it cannot pronounce a final answer to its problems it can at least show good reasons for rejecting many of the answers that have been suggested, including many of those which make the most specious appeal to common sense. Now it is unfortunately true that, when attempts have been made at applications of social theory, and a vigorous criticism of the normative assumptions imported into the argument has been scamped, these normative assumptions (adopted because they appeal either to the common sense or to the sentiments and prejudices of the writer) have frequently been ones which adequate ethical treatment can show to be completely unsound, or in the highest degree doubtful. The whole procedure is thus rendered invalid, since, in such an argument, the value of the conclusions is as much dependent on the truth of the ethical assumptions upon which it rests, as upon the generalisations which it draws from history, or from the inductive social sciences.

25 These considerations have an equal reference to all applied sciences, not to applications of the social sciences only; but, in the case of applications of physical and biological science, it may be of little
practical importance, because the ethical problem then involved is usually one of such simplicity that we are all agreed in giving one answer to it. Thus, in the case of medicine, we are all agreed that health is better than disease; and we may therefore discuss what procedures conduce to health without debating its desirability. In the case of the applied social sciences, it may be equally doubtful how a certain result is to be achieved, and whether it ought to be aimed at at all.

The applied social sciences are, however, related to ethics in another way, to which there is no parallel in the case of applications of the natural sciences. Every social fact is the outcome of men's purposes, of their judgements of value. Thus its primary data are shot through with ethical implications which cannot be separated from them because they are the very stuff of which they are made. Thus history is a record not only of men's acts but also of the ideals which have shaped them. The very existence of law and judicial procedure implies the idea of justice. A political theory which ignored men's political aspirations would be as futile as an astronomy which ignored the law of gravitation. And economics is concerned with value even when it limits its treatment of it to a consideration of
value in exchange. The social sciences and history are therefore necessarily concerned with the observation and description of the systems of value which have had, as parts of men's minds, casual efficacy in their various fields; and the special social sciences are necessarily concerned also to examine these systems critically and to attempt their development and logical ordering.

In so far as they do this without vitiating their results by the use of illicit or premature ethical assumptions they stand to ethics in a propaedeutic relation. For the procedure of ethics is itself a double one, and in one part it is an observational and descriptive account of the systems of value by which men's actions are actually influenced. For a knowledge of the systems of value which have been expressed in social structure and processes, political or legal or religious or economic, ethics is dependent on the special social sciences. This constitutes an additional reason for distinguishing clearly their descriptive and explanatory from their applied aspects, and for distinguishing concepts which arise out of their inductive inquiries from the ethical assumptions that are brought in when a application to a practical problem is intended.

26 The history of the social sciences shows that their
positive theories have frequently been developed in a close relation to practical needs. The first step in many of their inquiries has been taken under the pressure of an immediate political or juristic or economic problem; and only at a later stage has the positive understanding thereby achieved been separated out by other thinkers. The aims and ideals in pursuance of which the inquiry was undertaken have on the other hand often had a separate vigorous life in consequence of it although their examination and critical adoption have not been processes which formed part of it. And in retrospect it is usually the former and not the latter that win our respect, as possessing elements of permanent value.

The clearest example of this is probably politics. The history of its inquiries does not show that ordered progress which elsewhere we take so much for granted that we speak of the march of science. Its most important formulations have been made in the closest association with political situations of strain and difficulty. The theories of Locke may serve as a typical example. They are part of the history of English - and American - political change as well as part of the history of political science. His Second Treatise of Civil Government is not only a scientific
inquiry; it is the defence of a political party which had taken action in violation of sentiments which were real forces in the minds of its opponents, and even in the minds of its own members; it was part of the movement of the mind of England away from traditional sentiments and in the direction of new principles which would justify a public act performed under the pressure of circumstances and motives in acute conflict with these sentiments. In the individual life a deepened moral understanding may result from violent action in defiance of false principles under the pressure of circumstances which make continued adherence to them intolerable; and, in the calm that follows, reflection may heal the wounds of the mind by reaching new principles of conduct on which that action is justified. But such a process, though it affords data for ethical or psychological study, is not itself a model of scientific ethical inquiry. The field of political conflict is similarly defective as a nursery for political science, and the close association of this study with political parties and movements has probably been a principal cause of the comparative sterility of its results. The history of political theory affords data rather than conclusions to the social scientist, in so far as political theories have themselves been products of social processes rather
than detached scientific inquiries, and have been built into political structures rather than into intellectual systems. As a result political theorists have at times despaired of reaching conclusions of scientific worth and have themselves declared that the principles of political science must change with changing economic and political conditions - a scepticism which in effect denies the possibility of a science of political structure and processes.

27 The interest of the social scientist in social structure and processes has therefore seldom been a detached intellectual curiosity comparable to that with which, for example, the physicist approaches the study of the structures and processes of matter. When the distractions of personal and political sentiment, of immediate social needs and problems can be put aside, the field of the social scientist is one of no less intellectual and theoretical interest than the fields of other sciences. Society is the noblest of all objects of study to which an inductive approach is possible. Why then should not science here as elsewhere approach its data with a desire to reach some understanding of them in all their inexhaustible subtlety and complexity? Why should not even a little progress in the unravelling of such an intricate web be a reward
more worth seeking than the prestige of a dubious and finally disappointing application of a specious hypothesis to the recalcitrant facts of the social and political framework?

Even if theoretical understanding is to be held of little account, and only practical applications are to be valued, applications of value are more likely to result from the uncompromising pursuit of political inquiry as a pure science than from any other method. It is quite certain that elsewhere practical results of the highest value have followed upon the intellectual pursuit of theoretical problems, have been the gifts to applied science of pure science. It was a theoretical interest, not a desire to provide new methods of lighting, heating, transport and communication, which led to the investigation of electrical phenomena. The greatest achievements of agriculture and medical science have turned upon the discoveries of the pure biological sciences. A similarly detached pursuit of knowledge for its own sake may have comparable results in the case of sociological inquiries. Apart altogether from the hope of such results, it is a pursuit which has as great a justification in itself, and as great an attraction, as any other branch of pure science.
Such a detached pursuit of the intellectual ends of social investigation will still be itself a social process. It will be a social process in the same sense that the development of any science or of any department of philosophy is a social process, and its history a part of the history of society. But it will be a science in the same sense that they are sciences, and not a social or political movement concealing itself under that title: it will be the expression of the desire for knowledge and understanding which is the force behind all scholarly, scientific and philosophical pursuits, and of the human reason of which scholarly, scientific and philosophical methodologies are the tools; it will not be the expression of political and social movements or of the instincts and sentiments which are their driving forces.

Granted the acceptance of this distinction, can such a social science study social phenomena? In other words: Can one social process study other social processes? This is a question parallel to the question which may be asked with regard to psychology. Here mental processes are the object of study; and the observation and analysis of mental processes are themselves mental processes. Can one mental process study another? To these parallel questions some consideration
will be given later (sections 184 to 201 and 309).

Here it need only be said that an answer to the former of these questions can only be in terms of a theory of social processes themselves, just as in the case of the latter the answer can only be in terms of a theory of the nature of mind and of consciousness. The description of society which sociology gives must be the description of a society which is capable of studying and describing itself.

29 Ethics is not itself a member of the group of social sciences, its whole field of relevant phenomena being wider than and inclusive of their field. Ethics is however as we have seen a necessary partner of each of the social sciences when it attempts to apply its conclusions to the furtherance of practical ends. Furthermore each of the social sciences is a propaedeutic to it in so far as it discusses standards of value within its own universe of discourse.

To this there is one addition to be made. An empirical science may by its own methods, and independently of ethics, formulate a group of quasi-normative concepts. Thus, though the science of automobile engineering can throw no light for me on the question whether I ought to turn my car towards London or
towards Edinburgh, it can tell me very emphatically that, whatever my destination may be, I ought to have petrol in my tank and oil in my engine, and that I ought to employ the gear appropriate to the gradient and maintain the inflation of my tires at a certain pressure. It is quite true that each of these injunctions depends upon the conditional clause: "If you want to make use of the car for purposes of locomotion..." and it is from this fact that it derives its quasi character. It is however equally true that the substance of each of these injunctions has its origin in engineering science and not in ethics, in the observational and inductive study of physical phenomena and not in the intuitive evaluation of ends or the rational appraisement of such evaluations: and it is not less true that the substance of the conditional clause, the locomotory function and purpose of the car is implied in the car's structure, and in my being seated at the wheel of it - (that is unless I am in control of it for some very exceptional purpose such as driving it to destruction in a scientific test or playing the fool, in which case there would be a situation of a special kind in which the injunction to put oil in the engine or petrol in the tank as the case might be would be irrelevant and would not arise).
We may sum this up by saying that the quasi-normative concept of mechanical efficiency derives its meaning from engineering science. We may go on to say that in the same way the concept of bodily health derives its content from medical science which may inform me that whatever ends I pursue (choosing them in the light of ethical theory) I shall pursue them most effectively in a certain physiological condition which it, and not ethics, investigates and defines, and which may be secured by employing procedures which it, and not ethics, devises and commends. If I then reply to the doctors that, before I follow their course of treatment, I must obtain the verdict of ethics on the question whether a state of health is to be preferred to a state of sickness, they may logically and conclusively reply that by a state of health they mean a condition in which each of the bodily organs is performing efficiently a function the performance of which is implied in its existence and structure, in the same way that the locomotory function is implied in the existence and structure of the car; and that, consequently, the normative concept of bodily health has an adequate basis in medical science. And this I think must be admitted. It is of course true that my doctor may order me to spend the winter abroad and that this may conflict with other duties, involving an appeal
to ethics to decide between them; but a little consideration will show that this does not constitute an objection to the view under discussion: it is an instance of a conflict between two normative principles, and upon one of these, derived from medical science, ethics is not asked to pronounce - it is asked to pronounce upon the question of precedence between it and another principle of different origin.

What is true of medicine is equally true of psychology since, whatever ends I ought to pursue, I shall pursue them more effectively in a state of mental health than in a state of mental sickness; and these concepts depend for their content upon psychological medicine.

It would appear that the attainment of such quasi-normative concepts is equally possible in the fields of the inductive social sciences. It may be difficult to point to any such concepts which they have so far formulated with any degree of certainty or general assent. For this there are two reasons. First, since society has no apparent fixity of structure, the argument from structure to function and from function to a quasi-normative conclusion is not readily applicable in their field. We cannot argue from "is" to "ought" in cases in which the "is" depends
upon our own voluntary decision and the decision depends upon our conclusion about the "ought". Secondly, economics and politics at least among the inductive social sciences have never sufficiently freed themselves from ethical assumptions adopted uncritically or conveyed surreptitiously into their arguments; and these stand in the way of the emergence of quasi-normative concepts of purely observational and inductive origin. On the other hand it appears to be possible that we may see their emergence in the field of social psychology which strikes more deeply into underlying social processes than the inductive sciences can do. It is also true that psychology is in its traditions more nearly related to the philosophical disciplines and more conscious in particular of its relation to ethics. Moreover the proper business of psychology pursued as an inductive science requires and provides a discipline in self-consciousness and self-criticism which goes far to prevent the smuggling in of unrecognised ethical assumptions. In medical psychology use is already made of quasi-normative concepts of inductive origin and these already suggest interesting sociological parallels.

30 All the social sciences share a difficulty from
which the natural sciences are free. Man's interest in society is one of his great and dominating emotional interests, comparable in this respect to his interest in religion, in sex and in the family. It is therefore a study which it is difficult to pursue in a coldly rational frame of mind. We do not need to look far for the reason. Each of us lives as a member of a society and in accordance with the ways of life that society makes possible. Our fellowmen constitute the most important element in our environment and, whatever we want to do, their thoughts and feelings, their desires and wills, whether in harmony or in conflict with our own, are important conditions of our success or failure. The man who seems least interested in his social relations, is frequently the man who has successfully solved the problems which they have set.

Social adjustment is for everyone a fundamental problem of his life. Each of us is a bundle of impulses and appetites, desires and wishes, principles and ideals, which he seeks to realise, and the business of realising them is the business of living. In everything that we seek to do, we find ourselves hindered or helped by the presence of our fellows. We may be under their authority, or they under ours. They may be our models,
they may be our helpers, they may be our rivals. They may share in determining our feelings and beliefs, or we may be trying to determine theirs. Further, each of them is similarly a bundle of active purposes seeking expression, and we are parts of their environment as they are parts of ours. For the regulation of this otherwise intolerably confused tangle of purposes and cross-purposes, there exist codes of law, codes of morals, codes of manners, religious and political sanctions. Into such a framework of complex conditions the individual life must be fitted. To fit oneself into the circumstances of social life in a modern community is to adjust one's self to the most complex of all environments. You may do this or that or the other that you want to do, but only on such and such conditions, conditions which appear perhaps arbitrary, perhaps absurd. You would earn a living: you must work at this or that engrossing or ridiculous or uninteresting task. You would give expression to your sexual impulses: you must conform to the conventions of your time and country. You would play a game: you must obey the rules. You would dine or dance: you must dress in the appropriate manner.

Thus over and against the spontaneous impulses of an individual man lie the spontaneous impulses of his
fellows; and, regulating them both, a mass of customs and laws and conventions to which he must conform. He must prune his desires. He must bide his time. He must do this or that which he hates doing in order that later he may do that other that he wants to do. If he is able and adaptable he plays the game according to the rules. If for one reason or another he cannot adapt himself - and the reason may be either a good quality in him or a bad one - he becomes acutely conscious of the whole social structure as an obstacle to his will. The machine creaks audibly. It seems to hinder him when he would do well, to aid and abet him when he would do evil. What it permits to one it forbids to another. It offers him a dozen codes of morals, codes of manners, codes of religion - an inextricable tangle of conventions, obligations, permissions, restrictions. He contrasts with it - if he is sufficiently intelligent - his own straightforward, natural desires and (to him) apparently excellent intentions. He constructs in his imagination an ideal society in which men and women could lead the lives they want to live. It is a Utopia, and an Earthly Paradise, the country of a dream. There is behind it all the egoism of his own defeated hopes and unsatisfied desires; there is behind it all the altruism
of his pity and love for his fellows, who seem equally hindered. It may become the dominating force behind his political and social activities, his literary and artistic interests, or his scientific studies, making him a reformer and social philosopher.

The study of society is therefore in a very different position from sciences the subject matter of which is detached from men's normal interests and feelings. It is difficult to pursue it with a cold and critical scientific curiosity. It has led to debates that have had, not the atmosphere of scientific controversy but the atmosphere of ecclesiastical and political quarrels. Social theories have been linked both as cause and consequence to great political and social movements that have stirred men's passions and captured their imaginations and their wills. There are, therefore, as many psychological pitfalls in the way of a rational discussion as there are in the way of a rational discussion of religious doctrines or sexual ethics.

If the study of society is to make progress it must as we have seen be in an atmosphere more like that of the natural sciences and less like that of a political movement. Yet it can only be pursued by individual men whose own mental development has been subject in a greater or a lesser degree to such processes as we have
just been considering - and perhaps in a greater degree rather than a less, since these vicissitudes of social maladjustment and difficult readjustment are an essential part of that social experience of which an understanding is being sought; and they are scarcely to be understood unless they are first experienced. But they are experiences which must be outgrown and made the material of detached analysis before a scientific understanding of them can be reached. That analysis is a process which requires the training and technique of psychology. It seems therefore desirable that every social scientist should be enough of a psychologist to be able to understand the influence which his personal experience and the sentiments which have grown out of it are exercising upon his scientific thinking.
Chapter II

Social laws and the group mind theories

I cannot see things round about me without feeling that they are all parts of one whole which is trying to do something; it has not perhaps a perfectly clear idea of what it is trying after, but it is doing its best.

Don't hatch out more ducks than you need.
CHAPTER II

Social laws and the group mind theories.

31. In the last chapter it has been tacitly assumed that all social phenomena can ultimately be explained in terms of processes in individual minds as psychology knows and studies them. This is the primary assumption upon which the greater part of the argument of this book is founded, but, before proceeding to that argument, it is desirable to consider some alternative hypotheses, and to see what reasons can be put forward for preferring this one for our present purpose.

The alternative views which we need to examine are of two types. Views of the first type look upon social laws as ultimate in the sense that they are not capable of, or not in need of, further explanation. This attitude seems, in some cases, to derive from the older conception of a scientific "law" as an iron necessity laid upon the universe rather than as a convenient formulation of present human knowledge; and, in others, to represent little more than a lack of interest in possible further explanations. In both cases, when some wide inductive generalisation has been reached, there is more
interest in its practical applications or the deductions which can be made from it than in pushing investigation further, in order to discover the principles which may underlie it.

Views of the second type are those which seek an explanation of social phenomena in terms of the hypothesis of a supra-personal entity conceived of as possessing characteristics which we usually describe as mental and spoken of as a social mind or group mind. Such a hypothesis lies entirely outside the scope of social psychology as we have defined it - the application of the concepts of psychology to the explanation of social phenomena. Psychology is, by the derivation of its name, by all its traditions, and by its present methods of investigation, concerned with the study of the individual. A science which makes use of the group mind hypothesis in any but a metaphorical way (and to use the term in a merely metaphorical sense is only to darken counsel) must proceed to explain the phenomena of individual mental processes and behaviour in terms of the supra-personal entity which it posits; and a universe of discourse so distinct from that of psychology, and with scientific and philosophical implications of such interest and far reaching im-
importance, seems to deserve a name of its own. Its present submission to a purely negative treatment must not be taken as implying a failure to recognise that potential interest and importance.

32 (A) We have seen that the social sciences, independently of any explanation in psychological terms, are able to discover regularities among their data which can be formulated as general laws and made the basis of predictions after the manner of the exact sciences (although not with anything approaching the same degree of certainty or precision). In a similar way the chemist discovers laws exemplified in the combinations of chemical substances without enquiring into the details of the physical processes which he is manipulating in his laboratory. Such and such a weight of oxygen combines with such and such a weight of hydrogen to form water. Facts of this kind can be studied in the chemical laboratory, and the laws regulating them can be formulated, without reference to any theory of the nature and constitution of matter, or the forces that are at work when a mixture of these gases is ignited. The question of the ultimate nature of matter is a question for philosophy. The analysis of the atom is the business of physics. And indeed the
chemist can proceed quite comfortably with a theory of matter - the atomic theory - which for the purposes of physics is quite out of date. In a similar way we can study social facts, while leaving to philosophy the question of the nature of the individual or of the society, and to psychology the relation of social facts to the experience of men. The investigation of the relation of the scarcity of labour to a rise in wages, or of the annual statistics of suicides or marriages to some other series of statistical data, can be carried a certain length without any inquiry as to why that relation exists.

33 What then is the nature of such a social law? Is a society a great and complex piece of machinery in which events take place in regular and inevitable succession, so that, with a little more knowledge, we could predict wars and strikes, the rise and fall of civilisations, the ebb and flow of race and culture, as astronomers predict eclipses and the return of comets? Or is the life of a society what each of our lives appears to be - a succession of events representing the ebb and flow of the battle between inner life and outward circumstances, with what we call will, purpose or striving as its essential factor, and therefore beyond
such calculation?

We may say at once that a mechanistic theory of society which will enable us to make predictions on the basis of inductive generalisations does not seem to be possible. The social sciences can make a little progress in this way, but cannot give us a complete theory of society in terms of laws such as the chemist and the physicist formulate. If Bagehot were writing today he would call his book most probably "Psychology and Politics" instead of "Physics and Politics", for we can no longer hope that social science will develop on lines similar to those of the physical sciences.

This may be either because there is a fundamental difference between inorganic matter and living beings, so that atoms and molecules obey scientific "laws" such as Newton and Dalton formulated and human beings do not: or it may be that even the inorganic world is less dead and mechanical than we have supposed, and that scientific "laws" are only statistically true.

Thus, though it is sometimes said to be possible to predict that so many suicides will be committed next year, it is certainly impossible to say that this man or that will kill himself: and, similarly, though we know that oxygen and hydrogen combine in such and such
proportions, it is possible that every mating of electrons is seen from the point of view of an electron, as elaborate and uncertain a process as a human courtship and marriage. When you strike a match on the box it flames, and when a nation is threatened with invasion it springs to arms: but the individual electrons in the match head may be behaving less like billiard balls knocked about on the billiard table, and more like patriotic citizens, each making his personal decision to enlist or to stand out, than we, in our detachment from the politics of match heads, are usually inclined to suppose.

These sentences are written, not as impertinent, and quite unjustified, incursion into the field of physics, but to suggest that a social science such as economics may keep clear of psychological entanglements, and investigate and formulate economic "laws", without implying a mechanistic theory of social processes.

34 Closer analogies to social phenomena are to be found in the biological than in the physical sciences: and this is what we should expect, since a society consists not of inorganic matter but of living beings. The question has therefore been asked: Is a society an organism? A very attractive analogy can immediately
be proposed. The body of a man or an animal is built up out of tissues which, when examined under the microscope, are seen to consist of masses of cells, each cell being a small living being, comparable to the unicellular organisms which are found living independent lives. Can we then think of a society as related to its individual members as the organism is related to the cells which make up its body? The first criticism of this view which suggests itself, is that the analogy is not very helpful, since we do not know much about the relation between the body and the cells which compose it. In fact we know less about the way in which the activities of the cells are related to the activity of the whole organism than we know about the way in which the wills of the citizens are related to the public acts of the state. The analogy, therefore, is so far from helping us that it really attempts to explain what we understand a little in terms of what we do not understand at all.

The second criticism points to the meaninglessness of the question. A society is composed of organisms: a multicellular organism is composed of cells. If we are using the term organism in its usual sense, the question "Is society an organism?" is as illogical as the question
"Is the organism a cell?" If, however, we change the form of the question and ask "In what ways is a society like an organism?" we are at once set upon a profitable line of thought. A man is not a protozoon, but, like a protozoon, he lives, feeds, propagates and, when he fails to adjust himself to his environment, dies. A science which had thoroughly studied the protozoa, but knew nothing of multicellular organisms, would be armed with many useful concepts for the study and understanding of multicellular organisms when it extended its view to them. In the same way, a science which has studied organisms as individuals may be expected to have arrived at some conceptions which may be made use of in proceeding to the investigation of multi-organismal units. It therefore seems quite reasonable to ask how far biological concepts can be used to explain societies which are congregations of individual living beings to whom these concepts apply separately? We may now consider from this point of view the conceptions of development, adjustment to environment, self-renewal and differentiation.

35 In the first place, we commonly speak of societies in a way that implies that, like organisms and unlike rocks or crystals, they have a life history. We apply to them biological metaphors, as when we speak of the birth of a
nation, of its growth or development, and of its decline and death. These terms seem to apply much more fittingly to societies than terms drawn from the inorganic world. But we cannot take them quite literally. A society is not born as the fruit of a fertile union between two parent societies, nor does it terminate its history with any parallel to a death bed or a funeral. The Roman Empire declined and fell, but it did not suffer death and burial: it turned into something else, and something else very much alive, a group of states each living vigorously its own life. When, however, we speak of the growth or development of a society, we may be speaking more literally. The development of an organism takes place in a regular manner (if external circumstances permit) from fertilised ovum to the mature individual, and through maturity (if no accident intervene) to senility and natural death; and this sequence of bodily changes is apparently for the most part determined from within by the forces which are latent in the germ cell. We know nothing about these forces but we can study the processes of development in which they reveal themselves, and, as these take place in a regular manner, we can formulate what may be called the laws of its development. Thus we know that the bald and toothless infant will presently produce for itself hair and teeth, that it will proceed to speak, to walk, to grow in size and weight, to alter the proportions of its body. Statistics
of height, weight, intelligence and the like show that the process of development takes place in a regular manner. We cannot explain why: we can at the most formulate on an inductive basis what we call laws of organic development.

If there is a parallel to be drawn in this respect between organisms and societies, we might expect to find that societies, studied as the social sciences study them, give us examples of comparable laws of social development. The difficulty is that the life history of a society is so much longer than that of an organism that we cannot get a fair view of it. The schoolboy may study the life cycle of a frog or a butterfly in the course of a few months, and although the life time of an elephant or a parrot exceeds the possible term of human observation at least elephants and parrots are born and grow and die under our observation. It has been said that the only civilisation of which we know the whole history in any detail is the Graeco-Roman one. There is therefore a very small basis for generalisation, and the most we can assert is a probability that, if we knew a number of such social life histories, we might discover in them regularities analogous to the regularities between the lives of two individuals which are at the same time so different and so similar. If there are such regularities we should expect them to show themselves, not in an exact and
mechanical way, but with some degree of distortion - with accelerations, retardations and asymmetries of development, conditioned by variations in external circumstances. With our present poverty of data we are more or less in the position of a zoologist trying to make out the laws of the development of organisms on the basis of the observation of a single tadpole, and in the absence of any knowledge as to whether his specimen could be regarded as typical of organisms in general.

36 In spite of these difficulties many attempts have been made to discover the laws that regulate social development. We may here consider one such attempt, as an illustration of the difficulty of the problem.

Sir W. Flinders Petrie believes that civilisation is a recurrent phenomenon. We can trace the past of man for about ten thousand years and "over the whole of that time we know what were the products of every century". Reviewing his immense and detailed knowledge of human history and pre-history he comes to the conclusion that there have been in this great stretch of time eight periods of high civilisation. Since it is impossible to compare these in all their aspects, he chooses one group of facts for consideration - the sculpture that each period has produced: and he discovers that this art has reached a very high level
for short periods of time at intervals of over a thousand years. Civilisation, he concludes, has risen and declined in accordance with a general law and must continue to do so.

This is a very fascinating thesis. If we are convinced of its truth we immediately want to know why it should be so, and to this question also Sir W. Flinders Petrie has an answer which forms the second part of his argument — periods of high civilisation follow upon periods of racial mixture.

I am not here concerned to argue either for or against this theory, but merely to use it as an illustration of the incompleteness of our knowledge of past civilisations. If we agree to judge each of them by its sculpture, we have the advantage (since stone is durable) that we know something of each of them in this way; but it remains uncertain whether it is a sound criterion by which to judge a civilisation as a whole. Again, when we come to the question of assessing the sculptures it may be difficult to agree upon principles in the light of which to judge them. There seems to be no sufficiently objective standard; and Mr. Robert Byron praises as the highest achievement of the Greek genius the Byzantine art from which Sir W. Flinders Petrie deduces the decadence of the society which produced it. Thirdly, even if we accept the conclusions reached in this way, we can still think of innumerable explanations of "law" that we believe ourselves to have discovered. Recur-
-rent declines in civilisation may (to suggest only one possibility) be due to the failure of human intelligence to cope with the increasingly complex problems which civilisation itself raises. In that case collapse will follow, and a conquest by barbarians from outside must be regarded, not as a necessary process of reinvigoration, but merely as an incidental consequence of decline. We may go still further and argue that there may be no "law" at all, and, that the recurrence of such periods of rise and decline may not be inevitable. Thus we may watch a man attempting to roll a big stone up a slope. Again and again he may contrive to get it so far up and it may roll down again. But, just when we have concluded that there is a general law regulating the process and are ready to bet that his next attempt will fail as all his past attempts have failed, he may successfully push it over the crest and sit down upon it to wipe the sweat from his face and get his breath. In the same way man's attempts to create a civilisation may be subject to a series of collapses, and yet what has been gained and lost many times may at last be permanently secured. A child learning to walk takes a few steps and falls, and this happens over and over again. But we expect him to master the art of balancing himself on two legs and do not mistake the laws of the learning process for the laws of human locomotion.
Societies are like organisms in a second way. The life of an organism is a continuous process of adjustment to its environment. So long as it solves that problem it continues to live, to pass normally through the stages of its development. Its survival depends upon its ability to adapt itself to changes in surrounding conditions. A society also has to solve the problem of continuous adjustment to its environment, and its history is in part the story of such adaptations. These conditions are partly geographical and climatic. The plains of Central Asia produced a pastoral nomadic society, and the river valleys of the Nile and Euphrates an agricultural one, as inevitably as the Arctic regions produce a white furred fauna and the deserts the thick skinned, fleshy leaved xerophytes. That is, the people of the Steppes became herdsmen and nomads because that was - in the absence of modern agricultural machinery - the answer to the problem of life on the Steppes. The people of the river valleys became agricultural for the same reason that the people of the Steppes became pastoral - because by growing corn, each man on his little patch of alluvium, irrigated and preserved for him by a social, political and religious structure adapted for that purpose, he could live, marry, and beget and nourish a family. This is quite analogous to the bleaching of the polar bear's fur
and the thickening of the leaves of the cactus.

38 We have said that the plains of Central Asia produced a pastoral nomadic society and the river valleys of the Nile and Euphrates an agricultural one. This is to employ a common mode of speech, but one with implications against which we must be on our guard. Taken literally the words used would imply that the shaping and moulding forces at work lay in the geographical conditions and not in the social group. This of course is not the meaning intended, either by the biologist in speaking of the relation between organism and environment, or by the social scientist in speaking of the same relation in the case of the social group. The process of living implies an adjustment whereby the living thing and its external circumstances are fitted to one another as hand to glove; but the process of adjustment is one in which the living thing is active and the environment is passive. It is the organism which acts upon the environment. It seeks the ends set by its own inner organisation, mental, or physiological, and it attains them as best it may under the outer conditions of its life. It must cut its coat according to its cloth: and the cloth may not admit of being cut in many different ways. But the cloth does not cut itself out. Still less
does it shape the body to which it has to be fitted. As it is with the organism, so is it also with a society. Its life, its growth, its transformations, as we see them from the outside, are the expression of its inner organisation, processes directed to the attainment of its ends under the conditions of a particular environment.

This point is so important that it may be necessary to emphasise it still further. There is no way of controlling or manipulating the growth or behaviour of a living thing as one controls or manipulates dead matter, though one may of course manipulate its body by physical force or distort it by mechanical pressure. "One man may lead a horse to the water, but a thousand men cannot make him drink", is a popular saying which expresses the principle in a familiar way... The reaction of an organism to a stimulus is never the effect of the stimulus. On the contrary, so far as the reaction is the response of the organism, the stimulus is not its cause, but merely its occasion. The nature of the organism then and there determines the response of the organism." What we can control is not the growth or behaviour of a living thing but the conditions under which it grows or behaves, and so, indirectly, we secure what we want. We can to some extent set these conditions so that the plant or animal or man will prefer to do that which we would have done. Thus the teacher cannot "make" the boy
learn his multiplication table; but, if he is a very unwilling pupil, the teacher can make the consequences of not learning it so unpleasant that he prefers the boredom of his task to the consequences of idleness. The forces expressed in growth or in behaviour, in impulse or volition, whether in the individual or in the social group, are within it, not external to it.

39 We may point to a third resemblance between a society and an organism. The identity of a non-living thing is in its material substance. In the case of a living thing this is not so; for the substance of its body is continually wasting and being renewed. We laugh at the Irishman in the anecdote who declared that he had worn the same waistcoat for ten years and then explained that it had had three new backs and four new fronts during that period, so that (since it had no buttons) nothing remained of the original garment but the armholes. But we do not deny the continued identity of an old friend, human or animal, on the ground that during the period of our acquaintance with him the tissues of his body have been subject to a process of wastage and renewal which has perhaps left no particle of the material boy or puppy with which we were originally acquainted. The physical body has been replaced piecemeal but the identity is preserved. In a very similar way the
personnel of a society is subject to change and renewal. The citizens of a nation are constantly being removed by death and replaced by birth: but England is still England, whether we are thinking of the England of Chaucer or the England of to-day. An infantry battalion in the recent war might, by a continual succession of casualties and their replacement by drafts, suffer a process of complete renewal as to its officers and men, and yet remain recognisably the same battalion. The continuity of its existence, the identity of the battalion, appears therefore to be not in its members but in something of which they are the temporary vehicle. This raises the question which we must later try to answer: What is it that gives a society or an association this individuality or identity which is apparently independent of its constituent members? It is a question to which it is easier to suggest an answer than the corresponding one: What is it that gives the organism its continued identity in spite of its change of material substances? For we have the advantage of knowing the social group from inside in a way that we do not know the organism.

40 We must now note a fourth resemblance. The cells of the body (the somatic cells) are all descended from the same fertilised ovum. But they have been differentiated for the different parts they have to play in the bodily
A nerve cell and a liver cell and a blood cell fulfil very different functions, and are accordingly very different in structure. They are not interchangeable. They have lost one of the characteristics of independent unicellular organisms and have acquired other characteristics as parts of a multicellular body. There is something of a parallel to this in the division of labour which we find in all societies. Just as the organs of the body are interdependent so are the different organs of society, its governing class, its fighting services, its organisations for research and education and the control of opinion, its organisations for production and transport. And this division of labour involves differentiation, so that there is a difference in mind and body between let us say a scholar and a manual labourer: neither can immediately undertake the other's job. This differentiation is not, however, carried nearly so far in the social group as in the body. Thus, the son of a ploughman may become a university professor and, in time of war, lawyer, teacher, actor, farmer, smith, miner and clerk may alike become soldiers. More than this, our sense of human dignity is offended by the idea of specialisation carried to a point that entirely subordinates the individual to the group. Mr. H.G.Wells has in one of his romances imagined and described such a society in all its fantastic and horrible possibilities. There seems no reason to suppose that this represents an inevitable, a probable or even a
possible line of human development, though something like it exists in the insect world. In the most vigorous and healthy societies, and particularly in Western Europe, strong forces are arrayed against it—the religious emphasis on the infinite value of the individual, the military tradition with its emphasis on manhood or virtus, the legal tradition with its ideal of even-handed justice and equality before the law, and the unwritten code of manners and morals, which dictates an attitude of respect as between man and man irrespective of class and profession. Such ideas and sentiments seem to constitute powerful social forces arrayed against the possible subordination of the individual to the society of which he is a member as the cell is subordinated to the body of which it is a minute part.

41 (B) We have now to consider the second type of theory—that which seeks an explanation of social phenomena in terms of the hypothesis of a supra-personal entity, conceived of as possessing characteristics which we usually describe as mental, and spoken of as a social mind or group mind.

A social group of any kind, large or small, has for the observer an unmistakable appearance of unity. At the same time it is visibly composed of discrete individuals with no easily observed bonds uniting them. Now we have
in our acquaintance with the workings of our own minds a direct experience of an inner aspect of our own actions. A man is, or at least appears to himself to be, a single unified personality; and this, or so it appears to him, is what gives unity to his acts. It is an easy step from that view of himself to the interpretation in similar terms of the unified behaviour of another; and, having taken this step in the course of his infantile processes of adjustment to his surroundings, he finds that it bears the test of adult experience, and perhaps also of philosophic reflection. But when he has taken a similar step in the case of some other phenomena which at first sight present a similar appearance of unity, the resulting interpretation in terms of an underlying personality may not survive the test of everyday experience, not to say that of scientific or philosophic criticism. Thus the anthropomorphism of the child or of the primitive man gives way to explanations of a different kind in the case of natural phenomena. Nevertheless, where phenomena present a certain appearance of unified action, an anthropomorphic explanation is so natural to us that it is not unlikely to suggest itself even to the educated adult, and we attribute playfully some degree of personality even to such an assembly of discrete parts as a boat or a motor-car. It is therefore not at all surprising that a similar hypothesis should readily suggest itself to our minds in the case of the group.
Here is unified activity in a marked degree. Here are all the marks of life. Here are social products marked with the impress of individual character. And on the other hand, since the bonds of the group are hidden from us and its processes are mysterious, there is no clear conception of its structure and working to come into serious conflict with such a view of it.

The most evident difficulty of such a view is that the group appears to consist of separate individuals. A little reflection may however make this difficulty appear of small account. A man has an inner and outer appearance of unity, but his body is none the less composed of so many million cells, bound together no doubt in physical continuity and physiological interdependence, but nevertheless each individual living thing. The members of a group are not physically continuous but they are socially - and even in some degree physiologically - interdependent. Mental unity is not explicable in terms of physiological continuity; why should physiological continuity be a necessary condition of an accompanying or interacting unified mental process? Surely it is as easy to conceive of a national mind related to the bodies of so many millions of the citizens of a nation as to conceive of an individual mind related to the much larger number of neurons in the nervous system of a man. It is far from being self-evident that physical continuity is a necessary condition of such a
relation in either case.

Moreover we commonly speak as if a nation did have such a mind. We imply the possession of such a mind by a nation or a class when we say that it wills this and believes that, or when we attribute to it sentiments of love or pride and moral qualities such as courage or endurance. This may of course be only a metaphor - a convenient and more pointed way of saying that Englishmen will something, or love something, or are possessed of this or that quality of character. But it has frequently been held that it is more than a figure of speech and that the mind of England is something real in the same sense that the mind of an individual man is real - whatever that sense may be.

42 The word mind itself may be understood in several different senses. Three types of theory have been put forward at different times and in varying forms, each type giving a different ontological status to the conscious states which for naive speculation are the primary reality of mind. The first type of theory identifies mind with consciousness, the succession of mental states of which we are continuously aware during our waking life (I). The second type of theory regards such introspectible phenomena as expressions or manifestations of an entity (or entities) which is not itself an introspectible object (II). A third way of studying the phenomena of experience and behaviour
avoids both these conceptions of mind and confines itself to the inductive study of the available data (III). If it is suggested that a group has a mind, and if we wish to discuss this suggestion as something more than a figure of speech or an instance of unreflecting anthropomorphism, it is necessary to know in which of these three ways the term mind is being used. I shall therefore discuss in turn three conceptions of a group mind corresponding to these three conceptions of the mind of the individual.

43 (I) By my mind I may mean all the thoughts and feelings and impulses of which I am conscious when I turn my attention inwards to the world of my mental processes. These appear to me as a succession of events, closely related to the external world through the organs of sense and the processes of perception, and to the movements of the body through impulse and will. To define the mind in this way is to identify it with consciousness, the inner sequence of mental states and processes. Is there any mind of society in this sense? Is there any collective consciousness?

The parallel with the organism may be brought in here. It may be assumed that each cell of the body has a mental as well as a physical aspect, a minute psyche or mind. How are these cell minds related to the mind of the body?
It is possible to think of that mind as the collective consciousness of the little cell minds: and something can be said for this view. If, then, the cell minds somehow coalesce to form the personal consciousness of the man, may not the minds of men coalesce to form a collective consciousness of the group? In that case phrases such as "the soul of a nation", "the genius of a people" can be used in a literal sense as referring to this collective consciousness. In this way the idea can at any rate be made to look a reasonable one although at first sight it is rather startling and bizarre.

(a) The first argument against adopting such a collective consciousness as a hypothesis is that if such a collective consciousness exists we can apparently know nothing further about it. We know our own minds (defined in this sense as experience or consciousness) only by introspection: and we cannot introspect the collective consciousness. To appeal to it as an explanation is not to explain but to give up hope of explaining; and therefore to give up home of reaching through inquiry a further control over social processes. It is to take the attitude of the peasant who says of the lightning or the earthquake "It is the act of God" and leaves it at that, instead of the attitude of the physicist or the geologist who explains the strange and
grandiose in terms of what is familiar and controllable, and so gives us an intelligible theory and knowledge of practical value. The hypothesis of a collective consciousness would therefore seem to be one to fall back upon only when explanations of another type fail us.

(b) Secondly, the argument in its favour is one which may be suspected. The composite theory of the individual mind has many difficulties which we cannot enter into here. One of them is that, if consciousness is to be so accounted for, the consciousnesses of the body cells seem to be used twice over - once as the minds of the cells, and once as the constituents of the mind of the organism. Similarly, the minds of the members of the group would seem to be used twice over in the application of the analogy to the group, once as individual consciousnesses, and a second time as constituents of the collective consciousness of the group.44

44 (c) There is a third point of view from which this hypothesis may be considered. What function is a collective consciousness supposed to have? What is the relation of these supposed collective mental processes to the social structures and processes which we can observe? Thus we may ask whether the collective consciousness is the theatre in which the acts of the group are planned and decided upon, as the in-
Individual consciousness appears to be the theatre in which the acts of the individual are thought out and willed. Now two views may be held of the function of individual consciousness - the first, that it is (as it appears to be) the scene of the interplay of the mental dispositions that determine our thoughts, or that determine both our thoughts and our actions; and, secondly, that this is appearance merely, and mental processes are epiphenomena accompanying brain processes, but as unimportant as the shadow that accompanies a moving body and neither aids nor retards its progress. The collective consciousness may similarly be conceived of either as epiphenomenal (i), or as a series of conscious events related to one another in causal sequences but not so related to the social phenomena which we can observe (ii), or as so related to one another and also causally related to the social phenomena which we can observe (iii).

(i) On the first assumption, if a collective consciousness exists, it affects nothing; it is therefore of no importance and the speculation as to its existence may be dismissed as curious but of no practical interest whatsoever. The view that the consciousness of the individual is epiphenomenal has been advanced by those thinkers who, in putting forward a materialist account of the individual had to explain in some way the phenomena of consciousness which constitute one of
serious difficulties for their view. Their theory left them with these phenomena on their hands unaccounted for: to call them epiphenomena was, if not to explain them, at least to try to explain them away. In the case of the group we have no such spare phenomena to account for; and I do not suppose that anyone wishes to hold that a group has an epiphenomenal group consciousness. (ii) There is as little to be said for a hypothesis of the second type. On a parallel list theory of the relation between mind and body every mental process is accompanied by a neural process; but there is no causal interaction between the two, mental processes being determined by mental processes and neural processes by neural processes only. We might suppose a similar relation to exist between the processes of the group mind and the processes of government as we know them in the state. In that case the nervous system in the individual would correspond to the machinery of government in the state and the activities of brain cells to the speeches of members of parliament and the memoranda of civil servants; and the causal sequence would be complete on the side of these political and executive and administrative processes. But the hypothesis of a group mind would now be entirely superfluous; for, if we take such a view as this, it will be unnecessary ever to bring it into an argument: in the
first place, we shall never know anything about it; and, in the second, we shall in practice study the correlated process of government, and study them exactly as we do now, by the methods of history, political science and the rest of the special social sciences and social psychology, so that a hypothesis of a collective consciousness will again have a merely speculative interest.

45 (iii) There is however another possible view. On an interactionist theory of the relation between mind and body both mental and neural processes are *verae causae* and mental processes may be the causes of neural processes and *vice versa*: a neural process resulting from the stimulation of a sense organ may result in the experience of a perception which is an event in the mental world, and this may give rise to a series of mental processes of deliberation and volition which may again give rise to a neural process of the kind which is followed by a movement of the body. Thus, on this theory, causal sequences pass from the physical world to the mental and from the mental to the physical. If we conceive of the group mind as related in an analogous way to the social group as we know it through the channels of sense, then causal sequences will in a similar way pass from the world of social events as known to the social scientist into the world of the
unknown events in the mind of the group, and vice versa; for on this view the group mind determines the acts of the group. But the group, for example the state, has an elaborate machinery of inquiry, discussion, decision and executive action which appears to determine its corporate acts. What then can be the function of this machinery which appears to perform the function really performed by the group mind? There is no parallel to it in the body. There is no democracy of blood cells and liver cells and muscle cells discussing the question of lie still or get out of bed while the mind of the man hesitates between these two courses.

This objection is a strong one, but it does not appear to me to be decisive. If some of my actions are psychically determined, some at least may be held to be entirely explicable in neural terms; and even those in which a part of the causal sequence consists of psychical events are related to neural events on both the sensory and the motor sides. A similar relation may exist in the case of the group mind between events in the collective consciousness and observable social events which appear to share in determining group action. Let us suppose it to be so. On that supposition, the position of a social scientist exploring causal sequences in the social phenomena open to his observation will be favourable for the observation of
a causal sequence so long as its elements are the social structures and processes that come within his view, unfavourable so soon as its elements are structures and processes in the mind of the group. He will therefore find his efforts at explanation continually balked by the interference of an unknown factor, and he will be compelled finally to adopt a hypothesis of an interfering factor or factors of which he can give no account, but of the existence of which he will have an inferential knowledge from the effects which it produces upon those phenomena which come under his observation. And this unknown factor will in fact be the collective consciousness of the group.

Entia non multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. It is clear that such a step can be taken only after every other type of explanation has been tried and found to break down. If however, such gaps should be continually discovered in the causal sequences of social phenomena, and if all other means of bridging them should fail, it would seem to be necessary, as a last resort, to bring it in. Contrariwise, if it is desired to establish the hypothesis of an interacting social consciousness it would seem that the only possible method of doing so is to push as far as possible explanations in terms of the entities that are being used already - the minds and bodies of men - and to show that they are insufficient to explain the phenomena which can be observed. Since we are at present very far indeed
from having exhausted possible explanations in such terms the immediate programme, both for those who favour such a theory and for those for whom it has no attraction, would seem to be an inquiry how far an explanation of social phenomena in terms of the sciences of the individual will carry us.

46 (II) Mind may be thought of and defined in a second way. We may regard our thoughts, feelings and impulses as related to an entity or entities which we cannot know directly but of which they are states or manifestations. By the mind we then mean this entity or system of entities, and we know it only by inference from the phenomena of experience which we can observe introspectively, or from the phenomena of behaviour which are open to external observation. Although these phenomena present an appearance of continual movement or change, we can observe the recurrence of recognisable phases of experience or phases of behaviour - recurrent emotional states such as anger or wonder, recurrent impulses and desires such as those of hunger or fear, recurrent cognitive states such as those we assign to memory, recurrent patterns of activity such as the facial expression, gestures and movements of fear and flight, or of anger and attack, and the physiological
processes which accompany them. By the mind we mean that which gives rise to these states and processes which we can observe and study; and from our observations of them we seek to make what inferences we can as to its nature.

When regarded in this way the mind is usually described as a structure of dispositions — appetites, instincts, habits, sentiments, memory traces — which are thought of as the relatively permanent elements of personality; related to the ever changing phantasmagoria of our thoughts and feelings and desires as cause to effect; but just as distinct from them as the projector and film are distinct from the changing lights and shadows on the cinematograph screen. A mind then has a structure — a structure which changes, which develops and decays, which may show at different times different degrees of unity and disintegration, but which has permanence and stability when compared with the ever fleeting thoughts and feelings and impulses which make up our experience, and which will not stay till we examine them. This structure is the man himself — what we call his character or personality. Each element in it reveals itself in his thoughts and feelings and actions, and may be inferred from them, but it cannot be directly known either by himself or by an outside observer.
We may say of a door, which has opened once or twice without human intervention when we would have it shut, that it has a tendency to open. Using a less natural mode of speech, we might say that it has a disposition to open. And in using either of these phrases we may mean no more than that it has opened a number of times and may therefore be expected to open again in a similar manner. The terms disposition and tendency may be used in psychology in an exactly similar sense: and without any implication whatsoever as to the kind of relation which exists between recurrent phases of consciousness: that is, we may use these terms to imply (a) that a number of successive phases of experience which we have observed are similar to one another, and (b) that having observed them to occur on a number of occasions we may expect their recurrence; and we may use the terms without any implication whatsoever as to the kind of relation which exists between recurrent phases of consciousness, or what common causal factor may be assumed as the explanation of their similarity (x).

If we use the terms in this sense they imply no more than that we have, in naming a disposition or tendency, distinguished certain phases of experience or be-
behaviour as sufficiently similar to be classified in the same category. They are thus terms of classification, not names of entities assumed as explanatory hypotheses.

48 In the case of the door, although we may content ourselves with saying that it has a tendency or disposition to open, we may feel quite sure that, on a careful examination, we should discover some peculiarity in the door—as that it had a defective catch, that its woodwork had shrunk or its posts shifted—in terms of which we could explain its coming unfastened. So when we have stated of a mind that it has a tendency or disposition to certain modes of experience, we may infer that corresponding to each of these there is some persisting fact of mental structure in terms of which this tendency or disposition is to be explained. When we then speak of a hunger disposition, or a memory disposition, we may use the term disposition, not as a term of classification, but to refer to the persisting mental structure to which the recurrent hunger or memory experience is to be assigned. This in fact follows naturally from the derivation and associations of the term, the implication of which is an arrangement of something, or of its parts,
with reference to some purpose which it is to serve; as for example in the military use of the world for an arrangement of troops for the purpose of attack or defence. Thus the term quite naturally conveys the idea of some persisting mental structure (or arrangement of mind) related, as the principal condition of its occurrence, to some recurrent phase of experience or behaviour.

Used in this way the term disposition is not a class name for some phases of experience or behaviour which appear to our observation as sufficiently similar to be classified together and which we expect to observe again because we have observed them a number of times. It is the name of a particular hypothetical entity, or of a particular hypothetical character of a hypothetical entity, the existence of which is assumed in order to account for the recurrent phases of experience or behaviour which we are able to observe. As such its purpose is explanatory not classificatory, and when we use the term in this sense we have moved a long way from the simple meaning (x) defined at the conclusion of the preceding section.

Furthermore, the term, used in this sense, stands for an entity, (or character of an entity) of which we
can know nothing directly. Our only knowledge of it (if it has any existence) including our knowledge that it exists (if it does exist) is derived by inference from our observation of phases of experience and behaviour. As such it is a legitimate device of scientific thought; but we may well feel that our feet are on less sure ground the more we think of the disposition as an entity to which definite characters are to be assigned by inference, and the less we think of it as merely a convenient class name under which to place together a number of phases of experience or behaviour which are more or less similar.

49 Our position is still more insecure if we proceed to reach further conclusions by deduction from such an insecurely founded hypothesis. Thus by a mind, if we do not define it as the sum of the mental states of an individual (the definition examined in sections 41 to 43), I suppose we all mean the entity, or system of entities, which gives rise to these states, and to the individual's behaviour. If from the states and behaviour we infer a number of dispositions corresponding to their re-
current phases, then these dispositions are presumably parts of the structure of that mind; and, indistinguish-
ing them, we have presumably come one step nearer in thought to that mind, or at any rate to some of its aspects. It is conceivable that an exhaustive know-
ledge of such dispositions, reached by inference from the study of experience, might be a complete knowledge of the mind; that is, it is conceivable that a mind is nothing more than the sum of the dispositions which are known to us in this way. It is conceivable: but it is equally conceivable that the mind is more than, or other than, the sum of its dispositions as so known; and of these two views the second is certainly the one for which there is more to be said. It is clear then that, if we define a mind as such a system of dispositions, this definition may be very far from adequate; and consequently, that if we use that definition elsewhere as a criterion of the presence or absence of a mind there is considerable possibility of confusion of thought.

50 There is one further distinction to be made before
we look at the application of all this to the hypothesis of a group mind. The conception we have been discussing may be held in either of two forms. It has been said that a disposition may be regarded either as itself a hypothetical entity or as a character of such an entity. There are grounds for preferring a hypothesis of the second type. All the different phases of a man's experience appear to him to belong together as states of which he, a unitary and permanent self, is the subject. Dispositions may be thought of as structural characters of a hypothetical entity which we may identify with this permanent self, or of which we may regard this self as an important aspect (β).

If we do not attach so much importance to the apparent unity of mental life, or if we choose to think that unity explicable in terms of a multiplicity of entities so bound into one system that they have such an appearance of unity, then we may posit for each phase of behaviour which we choose to distinguish a disposition conceived of as a relatively independent entity and a component unit of the mental structure (γ).

In this case we conceive of the mind as a system of such
relatively independent entities; and dispositions are then little different from the "faculties" of an older psychology, the difficulties of which have led to its abandonment.

51 We may now consider the application of all this to the hypothesis of a group mind. It is clear that if the hypothesis of a group mind conceived of as a collective consciousness is rejected, the hypothesis of a group mind conceived of as a system of dispositions remains to be considered.

Our consideration of the conception of an individual mind as a system of dispositions has led us to distinguish three different possible uses of the principle term of that definition as follows:-

(a) By a disposition to a certain mode of experience or behaviour we may mean no more than that this mode has been observed to be, and may be expected to continue to be, recurrent, and that it requires a distinguishing name.

(β) By a disposition we may mean some aspect of the structure of a hypothetical entity which is the reality underlying all of an individual's experience and behaviour, and to some aspect of which each recurrent mode of that experience or behaviour must be assigned as its principal cause.

(γ) By a disposition we may mean an entity which is the principal cause of a recurrent mode of experience, or behaviour and which exists as a part of a system of similar entities, this system constituting a mind.
When the group mind is defined as a system of dispositions the principal term of the definition may have any one of these three senses. The hypothesis has therefore three forms corresponding to these three possible definitions of its principal term. These three forms require separate examination.

52 We may first state the general grounds upon which such a hypothesis may be put forward, since these are equally relevant to all of its three forms.

In the case of the mind of the individual the principal grounds for the hypothesis of psychical dispositions are observations of mental states. Since there is no possibility of setting out introspective observations of a collective consciousness, such grounds must be absent in the case of a hypothesis of a group mind as a system of dispositions. A similar inference may however be grounded on observations of behaviour; and here we would seem to have a parallel to the behaviour of an individual in the collective actions of groups. In the case of an individual we might also, if we had no account of his mental states, make use
instead of any products of his mind, his letters and other writings, any works of art he has produced, or any articles he has designed or made. Here there is a more satisfactory parallel in the case of society, since we may examine its products and distinguish their characteristics.

When we do so, we discover that, in the case of a nation, these products of its social life may bear a distinct and characteristic impress. Mr. G.K. Chesterton once said of nationality that it is as unmistakable as a smell and as indefinable. A nation has a character which reveals itself in a long history, as a man's character reveals itself in his life. There appears to be something specifically French, something we call the French genius, in French classical tragedy, in the straight streets of Paris, in French terms of speech or methods of government, as contrasted with the plays of Shakespeare or the streets of London, or our own idioms, or the public policy in which the English genius manifests itself. Furthermore, a nation's life at any moment seems more than the lives of its living citizens. There seem to be forces at work in
it which transcend the short lives of individuals, and bind together successive periods: and we may well speak of the traditions which mould its life from day to day as national memories, national beliefs and national aspirations. They are more enduring, and they seem at times more real, than the citizens who are moulded by them, and through whom they express themselves in political and social and military actions, in science and philosophy, in literature and the arts. To think of a society in this way is to attribute to it sentiments and habits of thought and belief; and sentiments and habits are mental structures or mental dispositions.

53 There is the less need to continue in this strain because many previous writers have allowed themselves a sufficient space in which to do it full justice. It is an attractive theme, and the conception which underlies it is one which makes a very strong appeal to the mind. It is, however, a conception which requires to be made very much more precise before it can be of any use for the purposes of scientific thought; and, to make it more precise, we require to know in exactly what sense the term disposition and its variants are being used. Let us therefore consider the consequences which follow when it is employed in each of the three senses which have been distinguished above.
(a) If, when we study the actions or the products of a group, we observe in them regularities, and if we then go on to express our conclusions in such terms as: This nation has a disposition to produce a body of literary work at intervals of two or three generations, a disposition to produce art of such character, a disposition to make war or to found colonies at such and such intervals, and so on; then, if we are using the term disposition in the first sense distinguished (section 45) there can be no harm whatsoever except indeed the possibility that the ambiguity of the term may lead to a misunderstanding on the part of the reader or even, (since this also is possible), on the part of the author, and to a consequent confusion of thought.

It will however be very much less than even the mildest form of group mind hypothesis, since it amounts to no more than a statement that certain modes or phases of national life, embodied in actions or in collective products, are recurrent and may be expected to continue to be so.

54 (β) We may now examine the second possibility. Is there any sufficient reason for assuming that there is a group mind which may be defined as a system of dispositions using the term disposition in the second sense which we have distinguished?

To show a need for such a hypothesis it would be necessary to start from an examination of group actions and group products. It is easy in this way to reach a
hypothesis of group dispositions conceived in accordance with our first definition ($\alpha$); there seem however to be no grounds for going beyond this to conceive of these group dispositions in terms of our second definition ($\beta$). When the second conception is advocated in the case of the individual mind, it is put forward mainly to account for certain aspects of individual experience - to account for my sense of continued identity, to account for the form of all mental states which appears to involve a subject or "pure ego", and to meet a number of other aspects of conscious mental life. In the case of the mental life of the individual, these reasons for the adoption of such a hypothesis are pressing ones: in the case of the group, we have no analogous phenomena, and these reasons therefore do not exist at all. In the case of a purely behaviouristic study of the individual, a hypothesis of this type is not necessary: there are no behaviour phenomena which demand it for their explanation, and behaviourists do not generally use it. In the case of the group our data are, we have seen, analogous to those which external observation gives us in the case of the individual, and the hypothesis is accordingly as little needed.

All this is not to argue that a group has not or cannot have as its essence a group soul substance, different aspects of the structure of which correspond to the dispositions we infer from the group's actions and pro-
ducts. It is merely to contend that there is no evidence which makes such a hypothesis necessary: and Ockham's razor may therefore be as fittingly employed upon it as upon the hypothesis of a collective consciousness.

55 (γ) Are there any reasons for adopting the hypothesis of a group mind, defining it as a system of dispositions, and conceiving of these dispositions in the third way which we saw to be possible? To this third type of hypothesis the objection which was urged against a hypothesis of the second type in the previous section does not apply. It is however attended by other difficulties.

(1) It has already been pointed out that this conception has disadvantages which are overwhelmingly against it as an explanation of the individual mind. There is therefore a prima facie case against it as an explanation of the group. Too much weight need not be given to this, since a moment's consideration will show that the entity or entities underlying group phenomena need not be similar in all respects to the entity or entities behind individual phenomena. The possibility may therefore be considered of rejecting the view that the individual mind is no more than a system of entities in interaction with one another, and adopting the view
that the reality behind the group is precisely such a system. Now by a mind we mean primarily the mind of an individual. To deny that the mind of the individual is merely such a system is equivalent to saying that such a system (if it could exist) would not be a mind, since it would be lacking in some essential character or characters of a mind. To assert then that the reality behind the group is such a system would not be to assert that it is a mind in the accepted sense of the world. But the whole attractiveness of the group mind theories lies in the possibility they seem to offer of conceiving of the reality behind the group in the same terms as the reality behind individual experience and behaviour. And this possibility will be lost altogether if they are to be conceived of differently.

(2) If such a conception of the group mind is to be held at all rigorously, or is to be anything more than an attractive metaphor, it would seem to imply, (a) that the dispositions posited are entities, (b) that they are organised in a system, (c) that they interact with one another, either so as to give rise to modifications in one another independently of any expression in action, or in the moment when they come into rivalry as the motive forces behind alternative and incompatible modes of behaviour which they dictate to the group, and (d) that as a result of such interaction they attain to new modes
of integration and new patterns of expression. When we describe the individual mind as a system of dispositions, we have to suppose these dispositions to be capable of interacting in such ways in order to account for the phenomena of intelligence and volition, the making of non-routine adaptive responses, and the appearance of non-routine products. When we transfer the conception (a mind as a system of dispositions) to the social field these are the implications which it brings with it (unless we carefully guard ourselves by excluding them). It is possible to write vaguely on the subject without either disavowing these implications or openly committing oneself to them. And this is what some writers on the subject seem to be doing. It is impossible to think about it clearly or usefully unless the two possibilities are carefully distinguished. If then these implications are rejected the group mind is a metaphorical expression rather than a scientific hypothesis; if they are accepted they have consequences which require examination.

(3) The most important consequence of accepting these implications is that we must suppose the active processes of such a group mind to be expressed in the actions and products of the group. The conception otherwise has no meaning at all. We have then two terms
of explanation for such actions and products, the group mind so conceived and the individual minds and individual activities which seem to determine them. This is the same problem which we have discussed before in reference to the conception of a collective consciousness; and it is unnecessary to repeat that discussion in reference to the group mind conceived of a system of dispositions. Its repetition would bring us to a parallel conclusion which may be stated at once, namely, (a) that it is possible to conceive of such a mind interacting with factors in the life of a group which can be directly observed, (b) that if there is such a mind the social sciences which seek to account for social phenomena in terms of observable factors will find gaps in the causal sequences which they study at these points at which it shares in determining these sequences, (c) that the demonstration of such gaps would afford the only possible evidence of its existence, (d) that their demonstration can be achieved only by pushing explanations in individual terms as far as possible, and (e) that in the present state of our knowledge such a hypothesis involves a quite unjustifiable multiplication of entities.

56 (III) Having examined two forms of the hypothesis of a group mind - the conception of it as a
collective consciousness and the conception of it as a system of dispositions - we come to a third type of hypothesis employed by psychology which may be carried over into the social field. This is the conception of mind which in one form or another is used in the study of behaviour, and particularly in animal psychology. Here there is no question of using terms which refer to or imply mental states: and here also, as has been noted, (section 54), the hypothesis of an entity which is the basis of mental unity is irrelevant as the phenomena of experience which seem to require such an assumption do not come into view at all.

The animal psychologist cannot know anything of the events in the consciousness (if it has a consciousness) of the cat or dog he is studying. He is confined to the observation of its behaviour in relation to the situations that evoke it. What he can attempt is to discover "connections" between certain situations and certain responses - as that the kitten will leap upon a ball of worsted, lap milk, fly from a dog, and so forth. When he has explored all the kitten's capabilities, when he knows all the strings that can be pulled and all the responses that will follow, he may set down each of these as a unit in the animal's connection system or mind. Such a simple list of re-
sponses will tell us a great deal about kittens but little about the nature of mind. What behaviour study does is to correlate two series of related facts — facts of the situation and facts of the response — and to establish the recurrence of correspondences between them. When such a correspondence is attributed to an appetite or instinct or purposive force in the kitten, and inference is being made from the observed facts. The student of behaviour knows nothing of the nature of the appetite or instinct or purposive force or whatever he chooses to call it except what he can infer from facts of these two kinds.

It is legitimate for animal psychology (at a later stage of the argument and much more precariously) to attempt to find among its data indications which seem to afford evidence for one hypothesis or another as to the nature of the processes behind the behaviour that is observed — indications that the animal's responses are (or are not) those of an automaton, that they involve (or do not involve) perceptual processes, that they imply (or do not imply) insight or volition. The attempt to answer such questions requires that there should first be a solid achievement of knowledge as a result of work which does not depend upon assumptions as to the nature of the processes which lie behind behaviour but is concerned to study their directions, their inter-
relations and their plasticity as revealed in behaviour.

57 The study of the group is, as has been said, more nearly parallel to behaviour study than to a psychology which studies experience, since its data are group actions and group products, and not states of consciousness. Just as there are two stages in an argument based on observed instances of behaviour, so there are two stages in an argument which begins with an examination of social facts and goes on to attempt to interpret them in terms of mental structures and processes (sections 17-21). The actions and products of social groups can be easily classified in such a way as to suggest that they are the resultants of distinguishable social processes or structures. Thus we speak of visible economic phenomena (let us say the number of tobacconists' shops or the activity or idleness of a factory or a coal mine) as related to a vaguely conceived force which we call demand. As we look at the different shops and the different commodities in them, and examine the figures which the statistical economist will give us, we can discover the existence of a large number of such social forces - we can find social appetites for houses, for clothes, for books, for amusement, for transport, for every kind of commodity and service. From the figures of election
results, and the party programmes to which they refer, we can see something of the direction and comparative strengths of the political forces in the community. In a similar way we may infer the existence in society of moral, aesthetic and religious forces. We refer some social phenomena to the gambling or drink habit and yet other conflicting processes to the Nonconformist conscience. It would be possible to build up in this way a picture of society in terms of such economic, political, moral, aesthetic and religious forces on the basis of a knowledge of these forces derived in this entirely objective way by inference from groups of social facts.

This is only to repeat a type of argument already considered in another connection (section 55). There we were concerned to see what where the consequences of regarding each such group of data as affording ground for the hypothesis of a disposition conceived after the manner of a psychology which uses that term in the course of its study of experience: and we discovered into how many blind alleys such a hypothesis led us on account of the implications it necessarily brought with it. These difficulties were consequent upon the borrowing from introspective psychology of a conception which proved inappropriate when applied to the group. They were not however necessary consequences of the first stage of the
argument which led to them - the arrangement of group actions and products in classes which appear to imply a particular type of social process underlying each such class. It would seem then to be possible to avoid these difficulties by adopting instead a term which does not bring with it such inappropriate implications. The phenomena with which we are concerned may or may not be the results of processes of the same nature as those which we describe as mental: but they are certainly social. Further these processes appear to produce results and to have each its particular direction: we may express these characters by calling them forces. This term has been used in relation to both physical and mental phenomena, and it is in regular use, as we have already used it in this paragraph, in relation to social phenomena. It may therefore be regarded as sufficiently colourless and free from specific implications. It seems therefore possible to speak of the processes underlying phenomena of the kind we have instanced as social forces.

58 This term can be applied as a general name to all such processes which can be inferred from their data by the sciences which study social actions and products. Taking their results together we have an account of a
number of social forces with some indication of their directions, their comparative strengths and their interrelations. We may then describe the society to which we have attributed them as a system of social forces. The detailed study of these social forces is then part of the task of the special social sciences.

In the case of psychology our immediate data are the facts of experience and behaviour: we seek to proceed from a study of these to an inferential knowledge of an unknown something which underlies them: and this unknown something we are accustomed to call society. These two unknowns may be of the same nature, they may be different in nature or the one may be but an aspect of the other - that is social forces may be the combined manifestations of the mental processes of many individual minds or individual minds may be so many aspects of the unknown unitary something we call society.

59 To begin a discussion of the nature of society by speaking of it as a group mind is to ignore three of these possible views; it is to assert that society is of the same nature as mind while we are still in ignorance what the nature of a mind is; it is to adopt a conception which is inevitably vague while we try to hold it and melts into nothing when we try to make it precise; since
a group mind, however conceived, seems to be peculiarly inaccessible to examination it is to choose out of the possible hypotheses the one least capable of suggesting useful directions of research; finally, if the unknown something behind social phenomena is in fact an entity which can only be described as a supra-personal mind, to begin with such vaguely conceived hypotheses is to hinder instead of helping the analysis of accessible facts which afford the only possible basis for the demonstration of the existence of such an entity.

To continue to call the unknown something behind observable social facts society, and to describe it as a system of social forces, is to continue to use terms to which we are accustomed; it is to avoid the difficulties in which all the group mind theories involve us; on the other hand it does not imply the exclusion of any one of them from consideration; it is in harmony with the continued prosecution of their accustomed lines of research by the social sciences; instead of forbidding us to hope for any further understanding of social phenomena by referring their processes for explanation to an unknown and apparently unknowable entity, it points to data which can be studied and lines of research which we may hope may be profitably pursued.

In particular it points clearly to the possible value
of the type of explanation which social psychology (as defined in sections 21 - 23) is concerned to put forward - the analysis of social forms in terms of the mental processes of individuals. For social psychology these social forces are the manifestation on the macrocosmic scala of microcosmic social processes - the appetites and desires, the wishes and volitions of individual men. It regards these processes as the determinants of all social phenomena; and any social fact, from the form of a cathedral to the price of a packet of pins, it regards as a focus of such determinants, and as being what it is on account of them. Thus, after a discussion the results of which have been almost entirely negative, we return to the position on the question reached in the first chapter. We may now proceed to elaborate it in the chapter which follows.
Chapter III

Social actions and social forces

There is
One great society alone on earth:
The noble Living and the noble Dead.
Chapter III

Social actions and social forces

In the last chapter we saw that we may infer from the study of social facts a system of social forces, and that this system is society as known to the social sciences. We have now to consider the relation of social forces known in this way to the social experience of which the experience which each of us has as a member of society is a part, and which is therefore accessible to psychological methods of examination.

Social forces are many, complex, varied and closely interrelated. They are economic, political, religious, moral, aesthetic - a list of categories capable of indefinite extension and subdivision. They are imposing in the results which they produce and from which we know them - a movement of peoples, a great defensive or offensive war, the transformation of a landscape when a virgin land is put under cultivation or an agricultural countryside is industrialised and urbanised, the development of an architecture, the making of bridges and roads, the invention and manufacture of machines large and small, simple or ingenious, the production and exchange on an enormous scale of useful commodities, the transmission of
a language and its continual growth in richness and subtlety, the similar growth and transmission of the knowledge and skill of the craftsman, of a body of poetic and prose literature, or of music and fine art, of religious and moral systems, of the intellectual systems of science and philosophy. We are to proceed on the assumption that such formidable achievements are to be explained in terms of processes such as each of us may observe in his own mind in the course of his daily life, that their determinants are not different in kind from the determinants of any everyday action such as writing a letter to a friend, or making a pudding or a sketch, or going to church, or coming to a decision between two lines of action.

Let us now examine the determinants of such an everyday action. Suppose a man to write the following letter:

My dear Charlie,

Of course I shall be very glad indeed. See you tomorrow to talk it over.

yours ever....

The letter itself, the product of the action, is the starting point of the inquiry. By the determinants of such a mental product we mean every factor in the mind or character of the man which has shared in making it
what it is. To discover these we may start with each of its discernible characters in turn. Having first discovered by what existing factor in the psycho-physical constitution of the writer a particular character is determined, we may next consider the history of the factor, and finally its origin in his past experience.

Thus in the first place, the document we are considering is a piece of writing. It implies therefore its producer's present ability to write; and that in turn implies those past experiences as a result of which that ability was established. The forms of the letters as they lie on the paper are further determined by the amount of practice which the writer has had in the intervening period of time, by interfering factors such as past or present physical disabilities, by the degree of maturity which his writing ability has reached if he is a young man, or the extent of the decay which it may have suffered if he is an old one. The emotion which he is experiencing, or the degree of fatigue which his immediate previous activities have induced in him, may also be reflected in it. The forms of the letters are again determined by elements in his character - their flourishes reflecting his flamboyance, or their plain clearness his precision in such matters. From calligraphy we may proceed to diction. The words used are determined by
the writer's present command of the English language. This goes back to the time when the writer learned to speak English, and it is related to all the mental traces left by all the occasions when he has listened to or expressed himself by means of English speech. Diction and style are similarly related to past experience; they are also closely related to the immediate circumstances in which the letter is written. The writer has in the course of his relations with his correspondent developed a specific attitude to him, involving a particular degree of affectionate familiarity which determines the mode of address which he uses, and the phraseology of the rest of the letter. Finally, the content of the letter is determined by the same specific attitude, and by the writer's attitude to the particular proposal which has been made to him. This in turn is probably a resultant of a number of sentiments, habits, views, tastes, standards of judgement, social, moral or aesthetic: and each of these as a present part of his personality has a history related to those past experiences in which it originated, by which it has been shaped, and in which it has previously expressed itself. In some cases all this might be usefully supplemented by the application to the document of the special technique of psycho-analysis in order to lay bare a still further group of determinants not accessible to ordinary introspection or memory.
Having proceeded so far we have given an account of the determinants of the letter which is very much longer than the letter itself. Yet this account is very far from exhaustive; and it is only in general terms: it does not go beyond distinguishing the different groups of determinants which we should have to consider if we set out to discover the specific factors which together make such a letter what it is. If the determinants of an actual letter were to be studied in concrete detail - as would be necessary if there were any practical purpose in view - those specific factors would have to be distinguished - as for example the specific tendencies determining the writer's attitude to his correspondent - and this would require the terminology and technique of psychology, whereas our account did not go beyond factors commonly distinguished and named in the speech of everyday life. It would also require that we should have access in some way, through some other channel, to the mind of the writer - that we should be able to talk to him and question him, or that we should have information about him from other sources, or other documents from his hand. Furthermore there is the possibility of applying to such a document the special technique of psycho-analysis and of laying bare, by following up its writer's trains of association, a still further group of determinants which are not ac-
cessible to his normal introspection or memory.

The determinants so distinguished are for the psychologist the terms in which an action or a mental product is to be explained. Because of them the action or product is what it is, and in the absence of any one of them it would be different at least in some degree. This is a necessary postulate of his science, as well as the main principle which his researches exemplify and substantiate. When however we consider the actual analyses and explanations which psychology can reach in specific cases there is no such assurance. That psychology is a science in infancy has become a platitude. Should it ever outgrow this stage of its development it is probable that the terminologies we now use will seem hopelessly clumsy and many of the distinctions we make false, while it may appear that we have failed to distinguish differences which are real and in our analysis of the determinants of any activity altogether missed the most important features. This is as it may be. The psychologist's contention is that factors of the kind we normally call mental are verae causae as the determinants of human acts and products.

62 A similar examination (if its writer were available for study) might be made of the determinants of a letter
which constituted one small incident in some large scale social transaction, economic or political, or in some vast process of economic or political or social or religious history. A similar examination of each minute incident of such a transaction would involve no new principle, though for contemporary social events it is almost as impractical as it is for past ones. Its impracticability is purely a matter of the inaccessability for study of the persons concerned and the excessive scale of any such inquiry. Its theoretical possibility is not in doubt; and it can sometimes be carried through easily enough in general terms.

Thus it is possible to start in imagination from such a social fact as the presence of a particular truck of coal on a railway siding. Looked at through the eyes of an engineer that truck of coal has come there through the application to it of a number of physical forces - the force of the pick or the dynamite, the forces which carried it along the gallery and up the shaft, that transferred it to the railway truck, that brought it to its present position. But, seen through the eyes of the social psychologist, it is the focus of a number of mental processes which can be inferred with just as great certainty as the physical ones and but for which it would still be in the bowels of the earth. These are, for example, the inter-
ests which bring into cooperation in its supply and consumption, miners, owners and shareholders, the distributors of coal, the owners, directors and operatives of transport, the consumers of coal and all those concerned with the production, distribution and consumption of the goods which are manufactured by means of it. Its presence there is the result of all this enormous organisation of the wants and desires of individual men and women. We have not completed our explanation of its presence on the railway siding until we have analysed all the motives related to it in all the persons who are in any of these ways concerned in its presence there. It is the focus of an unimaginably complex system of such determinants.

63 An example of a different type may now be considered. It is one to which numerous parallels could be found in the arts. There are two buildings which I frequently see - one built in the eighteenth century, and one in the twentieth. To my eyes the windows of the first are of pleasing proportions as regards the relation of their breadth and height, their relations to the wall space, and their relations to one another: and in general I find this to be so with eighteenth century buildings. In the case of the modern building the corresponding proportions are not actually displeasing but are cert
mainly not positively pleasing: and in general I find this to be true of modern buildings in this style. It seems a reasonable inference that to some persons who lived in the eighteenth century, and whose taste determined the proportions of eighteenth century windows, the prevailing eighteenth century proportions were pleasing. It seems an equally reasonable inference that to some persons who live in the twentieth century, and whose taste determines the proportions of neo-Georgian windows, the neo-Georgian proportions are pleasing. Which proportions have in fact the greater aesthetic value - if aesthetic values are more than a matter of taste - is a question for aesthetics. To what and to how many persons in the eighteenth century or today we are to attribute the shapes of windows, how far their shapes may be said to be determined by original aesthetic judgements, how far by routine judgements, how far by mere habit responses of architects and builders - these are questions which belong to social psychology in cooperation with social and architectural history.

64 When a man is sent to jail we say that it is society which condemns and punishes him. If we are not content with so general an answer we may seek to know in detail what the process is, who or what it is that sends him there. That is to say, we may ask: Where exactly
are the determinants of this social action, this act of public justice? We must answer that it is not the warder who puts him in jail; he is only obeying orders in return for a wage. It is not the jury; they are only giving their opinion whether or not the man has committed the particular act of which he stands accused. It is not the judge; he is administering the law, and it is at least conceivable that he may not personally approve of this particular application of it. It is not the Houses of Parliament; the law may be an old one upon which the sitting peers and commons have expressed no opinion. It is not the prisoner's fellow citizens; only a very few of these have even heard of his existence. It is not any of these, and yet it is all of them. For it is quite certain that if this particular application of the law were not more or less in accordance with the minds of all these people, the legal process would be interrupted at some point. The prosecution would not be initiated. The jury would turn a blind eye to the facts and find the man not guilty. The judge would cease to be a judge; or his opinion, privately expressed, would have weight with his fellow judges, and with the legislature and the executive, and there would be a change in the law or in its administration. Similarly, if the law were not in accordance with the general feeling of the
community, public opinion would be aroused by the press and the law would be changed. No doubt there is a certain lag in such adjustments. Diversities of opinion for example cannot simultaneously express themselves in public acts, and accordingly, when opinion is divided, a minority may feel very strongly and yet be unable to influence the executive or the legislature. But some measure of harmony between the law and the opinions of jury, judge, legislature and public there must be, or the machinery of public justice would not work at all.

Thus the mental determinants of an act of public justice are at once complex and of a vast extension. As we trace them out we may begin with the sentiments of obedience in the officers who carry out the orders of the court - already a very complex group of motives in a large number of persons and involving professional sentiments and standards, self-interest, and the common moral standards of the time and country. We have next the moral standards and sense of justice of the jury, and the very complex professional determinants in the mind of the judge - the elaborate systems of knowledge and professional and moral sentiments which are the result of a lifetime of highly specialised training and experience. Outside there is what we may call the unconscious acquiescence of the generality of men, of whom the jury are a chance
sample whose function is partly to represent in the court the larger jury of the prisoner's fellow citizens outside. The mass of men may know nothing of the particular case, but the machinery of justice depends upon some degree of harmony between the law and the opinions and sentiments of the general mass of citizens, and of the government and the Houses of Parliament. And behind all this are the minds of the men who first put on the statute-book the law under which the prisoner is condemned and of the citizens of their day. In a sense it is the men who made the law who send the man to jail and his punishment was decreed before he was born. This takes us still further back, for the minds of the legislators concerned were formed under the influence of a long tradition of morals and of law, a tradition built up by many minds in the long experience of humanity. So we have to go back to the very foundations of law and public justice in the minds of the earliest legislators, and behind these to the prophet or moral philosopher who first condemned the type of action of which the prisoner is guilty as reprehensible or anti-social, before our in-

1 Juridically the function of the jury is of course to give a verdict on the facts of the case.
quiry is concluded.

Every one of these determinants is as real as the beliefs and opinions and interests of which the reader is conscious when he considers the motives of his daily actions. And every one of them is a necessary part of the structure of public justice in as true a sense as every girder or steel plate or bolt or nut is a necessary part of some huge and intricate engineering structure.

65 We began with the question, who or what is it that sends the man to jail? We have reached an answer in terms of mental processes occurring in the minds of a large number of persons and taking place on different occasions through a long period of time. Each of these processes was thought of as a mental event localised as definitely in a personal mind and placed as precisely in time as any mental event can be - let us say such a mental event as that in which the reader is apprehending the meaning of this sentence. It is an answer in absolutely concrete terms.

We might however have given a much simpler answer which would none the less have been equally true: we might have said that it is the law that sends the man to jail. This answer is as true a one as the other because it is really the same answer.
translated into the notation in terms of which we are accustomed to think and speak of social processes (Chap VIII).

What then do we mean by the law in such a connection? In the first place we can point to the particular verbal formula which embodies the principle of which the condemnation of the criminal is an application. As it stands in print on the statute book, or in the opinions of the judges in the proceedings of the various courts, it is merely so much black ink and white paper. As it stands there it is however a formula related to mental determinants in exactly the same sense as any other document, and we might proceed to trace out these determinants exactly as we did those of the letter previously considered from this point of view (section 61).

We should immediately discover this difference: in the case of a judge's opinion we should at first be dealing, as in the case of the letter, with determinants in the mind of one man; but in the case of any part of the statute book we should immediately find ourselves concerned with determinants in the minds of a number of men - the members of a cabinet, the law officers of the Crown who drafted it, the members of both Houses who have amended it or voted for it; and in the case of a judge's opinion our inquiry would lead us very soon to
determinants in other minds than his - the minds of the counsel and witnesses to whom he has listened, the minds of his colleagues and predecessors who have influenced the development of his own professional equipment of knowledge and principles, and all the other minds which have influenced theirs or his.

We should next have to ask why such a statute or opinion is not merely recorded but is still operative and in fact enforced. This inquiry would lead to the tracing out of the relevant determinants in the minds of the public, of the journalists, of the politicians, of the lawyers and of the judges - of everyone whom we have already (in the previous section) seen to be concerned however remotely with the particular application of a law.

It is now evident that, beginning with the law as the answer to our question, and seeking to discover exactly what that answer means, we have discovered that it is in effect exactly the same answer that we gave before. From this point of view the operative clause of a statute is the focus of all the determinants which we previously explored; and when we refer to it as the agency which effects the social action, the condemnation and committal, we are using it as a convenient name or symbol for this complex system of determinants which are focussed upon it and apart from which it is merely an assembly of black
66 In the terminology which we have been using a law is a social fact. So is the presence of a truck of coal on a railway siding or the shape of a window. In passing from the determinants of a letter to the determinants of such social facts an important step was taken without special note being made of it. In the case of the letter the determinants of its form were all within one mind: in the other cases the determinants were in many minds. We may then distinguish between facts which, when we examine them from a psychological point of view lead us in the first instance to determinants in one mind only, and facts which lead us to determinants in more minds than one. This distinction affords a definition of the term social fact; we may define a social fact as any event or form the determinants of which are in two or more minds.

67 On this definition it is clear that price is a social fact. If Smith sells Jones his motor car, the most evident determinants of the price at which it changes hands are Smith's desire to realise its value in money and Jones's desire to possess it. If a price can be found which is the focus or expression of both these desires a bargain is struck. Of course, in each
mind there is not one simple desire, but a number of motives, some in conflict with others. Thus Smith's attitude to the transaction may include his desire for a better car, his annoyance at the trouble which the present one has been causing him, his shame at its shabbiness, his unwillingness to be at further expense, his desire for something else the purchase of which is only possible if he continues to run the old car, a sentimental attachment to a vehicle from which he has derived much pleasure, and so on. Jones's attitude will be equally complex.

In some cases we might stop here. Brown and Robinson seeking an afternoon's pleasure may make a plan which is satisfactory to them both. In so doing they make a plan which can be almost entirely explained in terms of their two minds. But the price of the car is determined, not only by the relative strengths of Smith's desire for cash and Jones's desire for motor rides, but by something which we call its market value. An estimate of the market value of an article is really the expression of a judgement as to the probable sum of money at which an alternative purchaser can be found, that is to say a judgement as to the strength of the desires to buy or sell articles of that kind in the minds of an indefinite number of persons. An estimate of the market value of the car is present in the minds of both
Smith and Jones, though they may differ as to how much money it represents. Smith will not sell much below, or Jones buy much above, his estimate of it. In discussing the price, each will try to alter in a direction favourable to himself the estimate of the car's market value, independent of their two minds, and determined actually by the strength of the desires to buy and sell in the minds of a very large number of would-be sellers or purchasers of cars. In this way the price at which this particular car changes hands is a social fact determined in the first instance by factors in the minds of two persons, the seller and the buyer, and, in the second by factors in the minds of countless other individuals.

68 We may call these two groups of determinants primary and secondary determinants. Secondary determinants we may define as those which operate upon the resultant event or form only through the agency of another mind, as when Robinson's willingness to offer a certain sum for the car being known to Jones, this induces him to buy at a figure higher than he might otherwise have offered in order to secure the car before Robinson comes into the market.

In the light of this conception of secondary de-
terminants, what is at first sight the product of an individual mind may be seen to be related to determinants in many minds. I find in an anthology a particular sonnet which appears to be, as nearly as anything can be, the product of an individual, the highly idiosyncratic expression of one man's experience. But its presence in the anthology is a social fact to be explained with reference to the anthologist's appreciation of it. So here already we have two minds. It is the result also of his judgement that the readers of his anthology will like it. So here comes in a multitude of minds. His judgement again is influenced by a whole tradition of criticism, which has formed in his mind the standards by which he judges, or perhaps even praised and explained to him this particular poem. If we go behind him to the poem itself, its publication and preservation are the results of the tastes of many men. A poem which no one understood or liked would not be published at all, or, if published by the poet at his own expense, would neither be read or remembered. Thus the mere survival of the poem is evidence that it has passed through a social filter, a complex process of appreciation in which many minds have shared.

Let us now go behind all this to the poem itself as it exists when its composer first puts it upon paper.
Let us suppose it to get no further: to be written and given forthwith to the flames. As such is it an absolutely individual product? We have supposed it to be a sonnet. Its form is then the product of the Italian inventors of the sonnet, of the writers who naturalised that prosodic form in English, and of a whole tradition of sonnet writers. Its diction is similarly determined — the product of many poets' minds, as well as the product of countless lips and minds which have shaped the vocabulary from which they select, and of the social filter through which the resulting selection has passed to survival. Furthermore its matter is the product of a mind the experiences of which are socially determined. It may, for example, be the expression of the writer's feelings in relation to another person or persons — a love sonnet for instance, or a political sonnet. These personal relations in their turn have elaborate social determinants. On the other hand it may express the writer's attitude to some aspect of nature. But here again social determinants come in, the whole mass of nature poetry which its author has read, or the social influences which have made him seek in solitude the influences of the skies or the mountains. Form, diction and matter may be determined in part by his estimate of the taste of his contemporaries and his judgement as to what they will care to read. Thus everything which a
man makes or does may be regarded as a social fact if we are concerned to study it in terms of its secondary as well as its primary determinants: and this conclusion is an obvious deduction from the principle already stated (section 22), that every moment of a man's experience is socially conditioned.

69 The chapter opened with the contrast between the microcosmic events of the mental life of an individual and the imposing macrocosmic actions and products which are determined by the social forces in which these are organised. It is this organisation into systems which gives to the wills of men, independently inconsiderable, such a power and impressiveness, so that social and historical movements are as imposing as the great forces of inorganic nature. But the overwhelming advance of an avalanche or the irresistible pressure of a flood are no more than the combined weights of particles of ice and water, inconsiderable apart from such accumulation; and the force behind them is the familiar force of gravity which brings down upon me the snowflake or the raindrop which I ward off with my umbrella. And the case of social forces, however impressive they may be, is similar. According to the view which has been developed in the preceding chapters society is a structure of living processes in the minds of its members, - a structure of
which in the ordinary course of our social living we are scarcely aware at all. When our attention is forcibly drawn to some of its more imposing manifestations it is difficult to remember that what we have before us is no more than an organisation on a great scale of mental processes such as our own.

70 This difficulty has important consequences. Thus when we become aware of some organised social force as an obstacle to our desires we tend to think of it not as a sum of thoughts and feelings and impulses in the minds of individual men, but as something impersonal which we call social pressure, or public opinion, or convention, or tradition, or custom. This impersonalisation of social force which derives from persons - or its personification in such a mythological figure as 'the man in the street' or Mrs. Grundy - is an error into which we fall the more readily because in many cases its strength is derived from some very small element in each of a very large number of minds. And this element may in each of these minds be in conflict with forces much stronger than itself. But it is socially organised and they are not, and so it produces social effects and they do not. Thus in the condemnation of a criminal, each individual concerned may pity him, and yet play his part in sending him
to prison. An electorate may vote taxes which no one personally desires to pay, or a conscription which no one personally desires to suffer. To the condemned criminal or the taxpayer or the conscript the social force that coerces him appears as something vast and impersonal, not as a cooperation of the minds of his fellow citizens, a cooperation including even his own mind in so far as he agrees to the general principles involved, however much he may dislike their application to himself. It is psychologically no paradox to say that he shares in condemning or taxing or conscripting himself, however much he may kick against the pricks. But his share is a small one. It is only a very small part of his mind that, in temporary opposition to the rest, shares in putting pressure on himself. But the sum of the similar, individually inconsiderable motives in the minds of his fellows is great enough to be far beyond his powers of resistance.

71 There are two important consequences of this apparent impersonality of social forces, one practical and one theoretical. In practice, the individual, feeling himself so dwarfed by the immensity of the forces that shape his life in a great modern society, loses all consciousness of his own contribution to them and falls back upon an attitude of helplessness and resignation, or isolation and opposition - an attitude which results in an increase of
that very impersonality of social forces, against which it is in revolt. In theory society comes to be regarded as a system of impersonal or supra-personal forces, the origin of which is shrouded in mystery. The hypothesis of a collective mind may be criticized and rejected on other grounds. We may notice here its unfortunate practical consequence in weakening the consciousness of social initiative in the individual, and, consequently, the feeling of social responsibility.
Chapter IV

Dispositions and tendencies

Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure.

...the raw material of human nature, so excellent, so dangerous, so capable of divine purposes.

...an individual's tendencies are educationally and socially more important than his capacities, however important the latter may be,...
Chapter IV

Dispositions and Tendencies

72 The history of a society is an account of a series of acts. Nevertheless the objects immediately presented to the senses of a social scientist in the pursuit of his investigations are usually of an inert character. Even if the object of his study is a battle or a revolution, the traces left by its happening from which he seeks to reconstruct it in his imagination abide his examination without dust or heat or change. The value of each such trace is however in its relation to a particular moment or period of time at which something happened to which it was related - the particular moment at which a certain letter was written, and perhaps also the particular moment at which it was read, the particular day on which this earthwork was thrown up or on which that fortification was battered down, the session or sessions during which this act was debated, the particular moments at which occurred the births and deaths recorded in these statistics. The moment of time which gives its evidential value to his data may not always be one of noise or excitement or viol-
ence; but it is always a moment of action, even if the action is an act of the mind only.

It is an extension of this principle, not an exception to it, that some documents are related to a number of such moments, as for example in the case of a statute which is related in this way not only to the process of its enactment but to each occasion of its enforcement, and indeed to each occasion of voluntary obedience to it. In the intervals it is merely so much paper and ink, or at most an object of thought in some persons' minds as a principle upon which action has been and may be taken, an object of thought in the same sense that any document and its ideational content may be an object of thought for the historian or the social scientist.

73 At the particular moment or period of time, however, when the event or events were happening, from its relation to which it has importance for the historian or the social scientist, it was being determined by an actual concrete mental process in the mind of a man (or a number of such processes in the minds of a number of men). When we proceed with any enquiry as to its determinants it is this moment or period of its active determination by a mind (or minds) which is the starting point of our exploration of processes in that mind (or in those minds). And from
that point onwards we are concerned with the exploration of the history of a mind (or minds) exactly as in any research into the determinants of the experience or actions of an individual.

It is necessary to have a term by which to refer to such vital moments, or periods, to which a social fact owes its existence and its form. We may use the word act for the sum of the relevant events mental and physical which occur at such a moment, or during such a period, in relation to a social fact, and share in determining its form. The first stage in the exploration of the determinants of a social fact is then the description of the act in which it originates. We have next to see what is involved in such an act.

74 It is at once clear that an act has two aspects - its outward form and the inner experience which accompanies it. We should not apply the word to movements of the body brought about by external physical agencies by which it is pulled or pushed; and we may exclude also simple reflex movements in the case of which accompanying mental states, if there are any, do not appear to our introspection as agents in bringing the movement about.

75 An individual's activity is more or less continuous,
at least while he is awake. One action passes into another or is interwoven with another continuously. While I am dictating the last sentence of a reply to one correspondent I am already slitting the envelope containing the next letter I am to deal with; and while my eyes are upon it, my fingers being meanwhile engaged in filling a pipe, a question from my secretary may bring me back to some point concerning the letter just dictated. It is necessary to divide this continuous activity into convenient sections for examination. Such a division is partly the disentangling of irrelevant threads of activity from the particular one which we wish to separate from the whole texture; partly it is the drawing of a more of less arbitrary line which will confine our attention to a convenient stretch of activity. A man's life is not a series of isolated individual units of activity: but certain parts of his activity have a sufficient unity to be considered by themselves and we may speak of such trains of activity as acts. Thus in the case of the example used already we speak of the train of activity as composed of three acts, the answering of one letter, the answering of another and the filling of a pipe; or we may break up one of these into a series of acts, the opening of a letter, the reading of it, the dictation of an answer.
76 It is clear that an act is related to circumstances external to the agent, to particular factors in his environment. If we define his environment as including every factor in the universe around him which is so related to him that his responses would be in any way different if it had never existed, then it seems to be necessary in the case of a particular act to distinguish from the whole environment those factors in it to which the act is particularly related. These factors may be either opportunities or obstacles so far as the purpose of the act is concerned. In order to emphasise this relation of the external world to the individual's conative states, the fact that it permits him to express some of them, makes difficult the expression of some and forbids the expression of others altogether, we may call these factors in the situation the frame of external circumstances. This term is intended to refer to those conditions relevant to a disposition or group of dispositions on a particular occasion and is therefore not a duplication of environment which includes all the conditions relevant to the organism as a whole. Thus, to make use again of the same example, the act of answering a letter has as the most evident factors in its frame of external circumstances the letter that is being answered and the secretary to whom the answer is being dictated. Of less im-
Importance but certainly relevant to the act are my chair and my desk, and the lighting, heating and ventilating of the room. A little consideration of the mental processes involved will show that there are also more remote factors in the environment which have a more immediate relevance - my correspondent, the committee under whose instructions I am acting, possibly a third party to whom the correspondence refers, and perhaps the regulations of my college, or of a government board. The further we extend our exploration of the mental processes relevant to the action, the greater will be the number of factors in the environment which will be seen to be relevant to the act we are considering; until, if we go far enough, our exploration will extend to the sum of the agent's mental processes past and present, and to the confines of the physical universe. A limit must therefore be set. It is not an arbitrary limit although it is an elastic one: we may stop sooner or go further, but we must always admit the more relevant and important before the less relevant or less important; and this must be determined in relation to the unity of the act so as to preserve the unity of the whole picture.

77 The frame of external circumstances of an act is
merely its setting: we must next consider the act itself, and we may look first at its external aspect. As such it consists of a series of bodily movements - movements of the limbs as in walking, in writing, in making a gesture, in moving something or shaping something, or movements of the speech organs in uttering sounds. It seems essential to the character of an act that it should have some external reference. We do not speak of a digestive process as an act: and I should say that falling asleep is not an act, whereas lying down upon a couch certainly is.

In some cases such a series of movements terminates in itself. This is the case in the movements of dancing, or in the movements made in performing gymnastic exercises. Such movements have very obviously a shape or pattern or form, a system of relations between the movements themselves.

In other cases the movement terminates in the achievement of a more or less definite pattern or form impressed upon some aspect of the external world. In such cases the movements made in achieving the form in material external to the body may themselves have a form or pattern closely corresponding to it (as the movements of the fingers correspond to the sounds produced in playing the piano or to the lines left on the paper in making
a sketch) but the form impressed on the material medium is the end in view not the movements by which it is produced; and, if the desired form can be achieved by either of two series of movements, it may be a matter of indifference which pattern of movement is actually followed; as, for example, in a game of golf, if I can lay my ball within putting distance of the hole, it is a matter of indifference whether I do so by tossing it into the air with a mashie or running it up with a cleek. The simplest case is that in which a movement of the body or a series of such movements results in an alteration of the spatial relations of the body to its surroundings — as when I turn over in bed or walk to the next village. In other cases the movement issues in some shaping or moulding, temporary or permanent, of some aspect of the external world itself. If I speak, the movements of my vocal organs result in the occurrence of a specific pattern of vibrations of the surrounding air, and, if I speak so as to be understood, in the apprehension of a specific pattern of ideas by my auditor. It is the same if I make a voluntary gesture with the intention of communicating my feeling or desire to some one else. If I move a material object or if I shape or construct something, my movements have their termination when a particular arrangement or shape is achieved. The at-
tainment of this form or pattern is the aim of my movements, for this form or pattern is the expression of what I want to do. It may therefore be called a form of expression. By a form of expression, then, is meant any pattern or configuration or shape or arrangement, temporary or permanent, of a material medium or of material objects which results from an act as defined above. If we take an act and its form of expression together the unity of the whole process is often more easily discerned in the form of expression than in the series of movements which create it.

This pattern or shape is usually of such a kind that it can be apprehended by someone else, as when I sharpen a pencil or draw up a chair to the fire or dig a flower bed or assemble the parts of a piece of mechanism; in some cases its function is neither more nor less than to induce such apprehension, as in the case of any sign or signal, or any spoken or written communication, any piece of literature or art. We may therefore classify forms of expression as those which although they may be intelligible to someone else have not such intelligibility as their primary purpose; and those the primary function of which is to lead to modifications of the mental states of someone else.

78 It is, I suppose, obvious enough that the form of
a thing is independent of its material substance. Melt up a wax figure and the form is gone but the wax remains. Cast it in plaster or bronze, copy it in marble or wood, or draw it with a pencil or a pen and the form is multiplied many times. Look at it and then shut your eyes: the form is retained in the mind as a mental object of contemplation more or less adequate according to the variations in individual power of visualising objects of this kind. The form of a material thing, of a movement, of a sequence of words or sounds can thus continue to be an object of mental representation after it has ceased to be actualised in a physical medium.

In the same way a form may be apprehended before it is embodied in a physical medium. The normal sequence is first the mental apprehension of the form which will fulfil a particular purpose, and then the act which embodies it in a physical medium. I first of all see the paperclip as a means of fastening my loose papers, and then employ it for that purpose. I first of all see the stool as a means of reaching the top shelf, and then set it below the shelf and climb on it. This sequence is obscured by the fact that, in many cases, a form is not completely apprehended before the process of embodying it in a physical medium begins. There is, first of all, a more or less general idea of what I want to do or to make:
there is then an attempt to realise it in action, or in a physical medium; and, with each stage of the process of so realising, it the idea is further clarified, until the idea and its physical embodiment both stand clear together. This may happen in writing a poem or making a sketch the process of making clear to the mind the content of the poem, or the system of colour and form relations which the sketch represents, being so interwoven with the process of expressing the one in words and metre and the other in painting material, that there are not two processes, but one continuous process in which both are so interwoven as to be separable only in thought. One does not know fully what the poem or the sketch is going to be until it is finished.

There is something similar in the case of mechanical invention. As I read or write I am troubled by the brightness of an unshaded lamp. I think of the materials which are available out of which a shade may be improvised. I have typewriting paper and pins. I look at the lamp and devise a plan, that is, I think of a pattern upon which I can arrange lamp, paper and pins so as to get a more comfortable light to work by. In carrying it out I find a difficulty which requires a modification of this pattern and, when this is overcome, I meet with another one. Finally, when the shade is in its place, the pattern it
embodies is different in many respects from my original conception. But it is probably that each element in that final form was mentally represented before it was physically embodied.

There is another type of relation between a form as expressed and as first apprehended by the mind. This is exemplified in the case of the relation of ideational content to the words in which it is expressed in speech or writing. Here word and thought are so closely connected that it may seem impossible to separate them. It may be said that I do not know my own thought until I have expressed it in words: and I do not suppose that anyone will deny that one's thoughts are much clarified by the exercise of expressing them with precision. On the other hand I may certainly know in some sense what I want to say and have difficulty in finding the words to express it; and this seems to show that the thought may exist in some degree before it is clothed in words.

79 These are minor points. Of the main principle which these examples illustrate there is no doubt at all: the form of an action may be, and usually is, represented not only by its embodiment in a physical medium but also by a mental process in which it is an object of thought; and the mental representation usually precedes the action, or accompanies it, developing step by step with it.
All this may be summed up by saying that the form of an act, or of the product of an act, is separable in thought from its material embodiment; and that the agent may so apprehend it in the course of the act, either before it is expressed in a movement or a material medium, or in the course of so expressing it. The term form of expression may therefore refer equally to the form of the movement or product on the one hand and to the form as represented by the agent in his own mind before it is so embodied or by a spectator or auditor afterwards: for the form is the same in both cases. It may be embodied in a material medium: it may be the form of a building, the shape of a tool or a machine, the pattern of a piece of lace or a piece of music or a series of dancing steps, the structure of a cathedral or an airship. In some of these cases the material element is not very evident. In the case of the structure of a novel or a constitution or an argument it is even less so. In the case of a reverie or a dream or a train of reasoning unexpressed in written or spoken words there is no material medium at all, but the form or pattern may be equally definite.

Forms of expression are then neither material objects nor states of mind but patterns or shapes or arrangements - in more abstract terms, systems of relations:
and the same form may be common to a mental state or process and a physical medium or a material object or an arrangement of material objects. Two aspects of an act have been distinguished, an outward and an inner. It is clear that the mental state or process in which a form of expression is apprehended belongs to the latter.

As such it is one of the mental processes determining the act. In a simple case it is the mental process which immediately precedes it: to see what to do is to be already in process of doing it. In other cases the apprehension of the form to be achieved may be followed by a search for the means for its achievement. Thus, to go back to the case of the improvised lampshade, there may be such a series of mental processes as this:- Being vaguely aware of a certain discomfort which I have suffered for some time, it occurs to me that it may be due to an unshaded lamp. As I glance at the lamp, I see that a certain arrangement of semi-transparent substance will allow the light to fall on my book while keeping it out of my eyes: that is, I apprehend a possible form of expression, the achievement of which is desirable, and the pattern of which is no doubt derived from my memories of lampshades which I have seen. This pattern, as apprehended in relation to this lamp and this situation,
is a pattern which satisfies my desire to continue my reading, my desire to continue my comfortable position in my chair, my desire to continue the present position of the chair with reference to the fire (but for which I might turn the chair so that the light came over my shoulder) and my desire to avoid present discomfort and the headache which is threatening if the light continues to shine in my eyes: it is an expression of all these desires, a pattern so devised as to admit of the satisfaction of all of them. There is however no apprehension of a path to its realisation. I cast about for a means to it and think of the typewriting paper and the paper fasteners. I now apprehend a new pattern — an arrangement of two sheets of this paper suitably folded and fastened to one another. This is a development of the former pattern, and one which retains all the relations of that pattern to the desires of which it was an expression; but it is now beginning to be so related to the external frame of circumstances that there is a way opening to its achievement, and action is about to be possible. If a shade is now formed, the problem arises of holding it in position — a problem which may lead to the recollection of a piece of wire which can be made use of, and the conception of a pattern on which it can be twisted together to serve this purpose, a conception which
leads to further action. Finally, perhaps after some further modification of the pattern in the course of a process of trial and error, the shade is in position and the reading is resumed. The act thus finishes with the achievement of a form of expression which is related, in the way we have seen, to the desires we mentioned on the one hand and to the external frame of circumstances on the other, including under the latter term the position of fire, chair and lamp, the absence of a lampshade and the accessibility of paper, pins and wire: and this form of expression has reached this embodiment as a result of a process of development in the early stages of which it is a mental representation of a possibly suitable pattern which has not yet any material embodiment.

An exactly similar analysis could be given of conscious actions of all types - the devising of a pattern of bodily movements, the composition of a letter or of a poem, the purchase of an article of furniture to occupy a particular place and fulfil a particular purpose, the building of a house, the ordering of a strategic movement, the carrying through of an administrative process.

81 All of the mental processes considered in the last section have this in common - they are private phenomena which can be observed by introspection and which cannot
be observed in any other way. An observer of my actions might infer with some accuracy what was going on in my mind, but only I myself could be immediately aware of these processes.

It is usual to say that mental processes have three introspectible aspects - cognitive, affective and conative. These are not terms for different processes: rather any process presents these three aspects to introspective observation. Thus awareness of the discomfort due to the unshaded lamp, the perception of the lamp, the apprehension of its lack of a shade and of the probable relation of this fact to the discomfort experienced, the thought of the typewriting paper and pins, and the ideational construction of a shade from these materials - all these are processes of which the cognitive aspect is the most prominent. The feeling of discomfort, the feelings of pleasure accompanying the appearance in the mind of likely devices and of displeasure accompanying the breakdown of impracticable ones are affective. Underlying both is the continuous ever varying flow of conative life - the desires and wishes and impulses and volitions related to them.

82 We must now look at these different varieties of conation. We may define an impulse as a conative process of which we become aware in the moment in which it is giv-
ing rise to, or is on the point of giving rise to, bodily movements directed to the realisation of its end. It is easy to distinguish introspectively an impulse which is checked at its birth by some other process - for example an impulse to touch checked immediately by the recollection that the object to which it is directed must not be touched. The greater number of our movements are however impulsive movements which do not come into conflict with other considerations, and so pass unchecked into action. Thus, when the glass at my elbow catches my eye and gives rise to the impulse to drink, the appropriate action follows naturally and without impediment - unless indeed, at the first moment of the innervation of my muscles, or as my hand closes on it, or as I raise it to my lips, I recollect that it is my neighbour's glass and forbear. On the other hand, an impulse may pass into action, before the considerations that would have checked it are awakened - as happened in the case of one of my friends who, having been provided with a glass of lemonade, just before a whisky and soda had been offered to, and accepted by, his neighbour and elder, discovered to his horror that he had unwittingly drunk the latter.

There are many cases in which an impulse cannot attain its end on account of either internal or external impediments. I may have an impulse to smoke which may
be forbidden expression, either by my belief that I have already smoked as much as I ought to, or by there being no tobacco within reach. In such a case the balked impulse may give rise to a feeling of being drawn or impelled to the action to which it is directed, and this feeling is likely to be accompanied by some kind of imagery or ideational process which is a representation of either (a) the form of expression to which the impulse is directed, or (b) the movements to be made in realising that form of expression, or (c) the sensory experiences which may be expected to result from it. The term desire may be used for conative processes so characterised.

It is obvious that some desires as so defined are in harmony with the main trend of conative processes. Thus an impulse of thirst may be prevented from expressing itself by the inaccessibility of drinking water and may pass into a desire for water with which no mental process is in conflict. Such a desire may be called a wish to distinguish it from desires which are in conflict with the main trend of conative processes. We commonly make the distinction in ordinary speech in terms of these two words as, for example: "I have a strong desire to smoke and I wish I had some tobacco." "I have a strong desire to smoke but I ought not to do so".

A wish may undergo a further development into a
volition. We have defined a wish as an impulse which is in harmony with the main trend of conative processes but is hindered by external obstacles. It may also be hindered by competing desires. Thus the "I ought not to do so" of the last example may represent a wish to attain a high degree of physical fitness with which the satisfaction of the desire to smoke is believed to be incompatible; and this wish is therefore in conflict with that desire. In circumstances in which a wish is opposed in this way by a desire there may be an explicit judgement that the end to which it is directed is good, a resolution to overcome the obstacles in the way of it including the opposing desire, and a summoning up of the powers of mind and body to the overcoming of them. Such a combination of conative and cognitive processes with their accompanying effective aspects is a volition.

83 All conative states have the following characteristics. First, the conative state involves a feeling of tension. This is a peculiarity of conative states in which they are unique. When, for example, we speak of the tension of a string or wire, we are speaking metaphorically in so far as we, in so doing, attribute to the string this quality of experience which is referred to directly when we speak of the tension of such experiences.
as expectancy or fear. On the other hand the word by its derivation refers to the stretching of such a structure as the string, that is to a purely physical process: and it is by metaphor also that we apply the word already used for the physical process in order to describe the mental processes. We first read our own experience into the physical process and then use the name of the physical process to denote that type of experience. All conative states are characterised by this feeling of tension - of unrest, of striving, of want, of desire, of dissatisfaction, of relation to an as yet unrealised end-state, a not yet embodied form of expression.

Secondly, a conative state is unique in that it is related to such an end-state, which has no existence at the time when the conation is experienced. The end-state may be a state of the body. Thus the conative state of hunger has for its end-state or satisfaction a state of bodily repletion. Generally, the appetites have as their end-states physiological conditions. Secondly, it may be some arrangement of external objects, what we have called a form of expression, as in the case of the conations which have as their aims the construction or rearrangements or organisation of something exterior to the body. Conations related to objects and persons are largely of this kind. They find their satisfaction in the con-
structuring or manipulating or possessing of external things. Thirdly, it may be a mental state as in the case of intellectual curiosity which is satisfied with certain states of knowing or understanding or believing. Thus a riddle, or a scientific problem, gives rise to conative states in the form of a wish to know the answer to it; the activity which follows may be a purely mental activity finishing with the discovery of the solution, an event in the mind itself.

In the third place, a conative state is related to what is called its satisfaction in a way which is also unique. The attainment of its satisfaction is its end in both senses of the word: the termination of its existence as well as its goal. The tension is, as it were, that of something incomplete and seeking its completion. The attainment of the necessary condition is the relief of the tension and the disappearance of the conative state.

84 Conative states may be accompanied by varying degrees of clearness of knowledge, either of the end or of the steps to be taken to attain it. They vary between vague states of unrest or longing or dissatisfaction unaccompanied by any clear idea of what it is that is wanted, and states in which the end is clearly apprehended.
Similarly, there may be an equal variation in the clearness with which the steps which lead to the desired attainment are understood. The individual may be directed forward without knowledge of the end which he is seeking or the means of attaining it, and yet is able to recognise the desired object or conditions when reached. A simple illustration is the state of mind of a spectator at a play when, after watching two acts, he is unable to predict what the next and final act will contain, and yet is in a state of expectancy of such a kind that the act, when it comes, exactly satisfies this system of conative states built up while he was watching the earlier part of the play. If the last act does not do this for him he will usually condemn the play.

The thought and speech of every day distinguish between mental facts of three kinds - mental processes which can be introspected, mental structures or traces and mental capacities. Frequently the distinction is made in thought but one word is used in three distinguishable senses to refer to mental facts of each of the three types. Thus in the sentence: "The smell of it brought back old memories", the word obviously refers to introspectible processes, mainly no doubt in the form of images. In the sentence; "The memory of it is indelibly impressed upon
my mind", it obviously refers not to an introspectible process but to traces or dispositions left by an introspectible process in virtue of which that process can be revived. And in the sentence: "He has a good memory", it refers to the capacity of a particular mind to form such traces and in consequence of them make such revivals. The three sentences obviously imply three distinct concepts though the same word is used in each of them.

Of mental processes we have direct introspective evidence: mental traces and capacities are hypothetical concepts which psychology shares with everyday thought and of which our only knowledge is an inferential knowledge derived from the observable facts of behaviour and introspectible mental processes. At this point psychology and everyday thought part company; the particular traces in terms of which everyday speech describes the life of the mind and the particular capacities which it recognises cannot be accepted as entities when the evidence is examined. Furthermore, for those who are agreed that we must make use of the concepts of mental traces and capacities, this agreement is only a prelude to differences of opinion as to (a) what specific traces or capacities may be inferred, and (b) what ontological status is to be assigned to these concepts.
The main types of answer to the second question have been discussed already, in reference to the possible conceptions of a group mind as a system of dispositions: and that discussion need not be repeated here. It seems to me quite conceivable that four psychologists might work in partnership on the problems raised by the first question, and achieve in concert results of unquestionable value, while each of them held an entirely different view of the ontological status of the principal concept they were using, the disposition - the first holding it to be no more than a class name for certain regularities of introspectible processes and behaviour, the second holding it to be an aspect of the structure of a non-material entity, the pure ego, the third regarding it as itself an entity, and the fourth identifying it with a physiological structure. In employing the term throughout the subsequent chapters I hope that I may have always used it in a way consistent with the first and second of these views, and that I may have been successful in avoiding uses of it which seem to imply theories of the third and fourth types to the exclusion of the first and second.

86 We cannot however dismiss so quickly the first of the two questions, the question what particular dispositions may be inferred from the experience and behaviour of
human beings. Here also there is a variety of views; and in order to obtain a description of the mind upon the basis of which we may proceed to the consideration of the problems of human relations it is necessary to ignore some of the subtler distinctions which psychology makes, to cut the Gordian knot of many controverted problems, by boldly adopting one side or the other as a provisional hypothesis. Until such questions receive final answers social psychology is necessarily built upon foundations which are themselves uncertain. For this there is no help; but there is a compensation for it in the fact that to attempt to build such a structure is to submit these foundations themselves to a test which may have its usefulness for general psychology.

Psychology has as its data two main series of facts, closely related to one another but of quite different kinds. On the one hand we have experience, defined as the succession of thoughts, feelings, hopes, fears, beliefs, impulses, wishes, desires, volitions of which the individual is aware as mental events taking place in his consciousness. In the ordinary course of life he is intermittently aware of this private world of conscious states and he can study it in detail when he pleases by turning his attention inward to his thoughts and feelings instead of outward to the world of things
and persons known through the senses. On the other hand, his friends, who have no access to this private world of experience, can study him by observing his **behaviour**, defined as the speech, actions and bodily processes in which his personality expresses itself. The man himself, his character or personality, is revealed in both these ways and psychology makes use of facts of both kinds in seeking to infer the structure of dispositions in terms of which they are to be explained.

87 If we wished to study a particular individual by the first of these methods we should get him to describe for us his thoughts and feelings, wishes and desires, and so on, a constantly changing phantasmagoria of mental states. From these we should very shortly infer a more or less stable underlying structure of interests or tendencies. Thus we should find that at intervals he was hungry and wanted to eat, grew tired and wanted to sleep, wished to do this or that, or to possess such and such things, that he sought such and such persons and places and aimed at such and such achievements. When we had made out a list of all such facts about him that we could discover, we should find that they fell readily into groups, and that we could infer from these a much shorter list of what we should call his appetites, his
passions, his sentiments, his interests, his aims. These, in contrast with the relatively fleeting mental states which he observed and described for us, we should regard as elements existing more or less permanently in the man's make-up; and an account of them would be a picture in outline of what we call his personality. Each of these elements is then spoken of as a disposition. The man himself is described from this point of view as a system of dispositions; and when we know to what ends, what modes of experience or what modes of behaviour these are directed, and something of their relative strengths, and how they are related to one another, we can to some extent predict how he will think and feel, what he will do, or what impulses he will experience under different circumstances.

It should be noted that the disposition cannot be known directly by the man himself and still less by someone else studying him. It is an inference from the occurrence of mental states experienced only by himself.

88 We may now turn to the second method of psychological inquiry. A man's personality is also revealed in his behaviour, and by studying his behaviour we might arrive at very similar conclusions as to the man himself. We should now infer his hunger instinct from observation of
the fact that he ate meals at regular intervals, and his other tendencies in a similar way from other phases of his behaviour. Much of the knowledge of him obtained in this way would correspond accurately to what we got to know by the other method; but there would be differences. Thus some of the dispositions readily inferred from his description of his mental states would be less easily discovered from his behaviour - some ambition which he cherished, or some taste which circumstances prevented him from indulging. On the other hand, we might have revealed to us in his actions facts about him less easily discoverable by the first method. In the laboratory we may detect with suitable instruments bodily disturbances relating to topics which no longer give rise to conscious emotional states and, as the psycho-analysts have shown, unconscious trends of thought and feeling may often be revealed in small errors of speech and action.

The real value of behaviour study is of course in its application to animals and children, from whom introspective reports are unobtainable. The tendencies which it reveals are, like the dispositions revealed by the study of mental states, known only by inference.

89 To describe the mind as a system of dispositions or a system of tendencies is to abstract from the complete
individual just as we are abstracting from a material object when we describe it merely in terms of its colour or its weight. To do so is to neglect for the time being other aspects of it which may also be important. There is no harm in this so long as we remember what we are doing and bring in the other aspects later in reference to the problems to which they are relevant. The most we need say is that we hope our description is true as far as it goes. With this caution we may proceed to inquire what are some of the most important dispositions which are found in man.

90 If we studied a number of individuals by the methods described, we should find that they had much in common, but that there were great differences between them. This might be the case even although their outward circumstances were very similar. Thus we might study in this way two teachers teaching similar classes in the same school. We should find in both the appetites\(^1\) of hunger and thirst and sleep and sex, the instincts\(^{ii}\) of fear, anger, disgust,

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i An appetite may be defined as an inherited tendency which can be stimulated only in certain physiological states of the organism and the end of which is a condition of the organism (satiety) in which it cannot be readily stimulated.

ii Instinct is defined by William James as "... the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends,
curiosity, self-assertion, submission and tender feeling. They would have in common many professional interests and habits of mind in consequence of their similar training and professional experience. We might amplify this description of such similarities at considerable length.

There would also be very great differences between them. Thus they might differ in the relative strengths of the tendencies and interests we have already mentioned, or in the extent to which they expressed them. One might show no signs of a sexual instinct in his behaviour, and there might be comparatively little direct evidence of it in his conscious states. The other might be passionately in love, or consciously directing all his activities towards marriage; or the deepest satisfactions of his life might be in his affectionate relations with his wife and


An instinct is defined by Professor McDougall as "...an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." An Introduction to Social Psychology (London 1920) p.29.
family. They might differ to a similar extent in the intensity of their religious lives. Or again, one might be jogging along satisfied with his professional position, and the other straining every nerve in the pursuit of some further ambition. We might amplify such differences to an almost unlimited extent.

In describing the instincts and appetites we should have to say that they are shared by all men and that they are innate, although it is probable that different individuals inherit them with different degrees of relative strength. We should have to say further that each of them urges its possessor to the attainment of an aim of a more or less specific kind - repletion, repose, escape from danger, the beating down of opposition, dominance and so on. Furthermore there is born with each of these tendencies an immediate power of bodily adaptation to the situation which arouses it (the readiness of the salivary and digestive glads to secrete in a state of hunger and the re-distribution of the blood throughout the body in the case of anger, may stand as examples) and some more or less appropriate, if primitive, plan of action for the attainment of its end - bodily retreat in the case of fear, the gestures of attack in the case of anger, and so on.
91 The appetites and instincts are frequently regarded as the foundation of mind and character. It is not always quite clear what is meant when a view of this kind is advanced. We may at any rate agree that all these tendencies are to be found in all human beings, and it is also easy to believe that they may be built up into the system of the adult personality in very different ways ($\alpha$). Thus the motive force of the sexual tendency may in one individual express itself freely in the natural manner through the behaviour appropriate to courtship and marriage. In another it may be refused such expression so that it manifests its presence only in indirect and more or less unhealthy ways. In the third it may seem to be deflected almost entirely to the service of ends of a quite different kind, such for example as those of an aesthetic character.

It may be held further that this group of tendencies constitutes the innate basis of the mind, in the sense of the equipment of motives with which the infant comes into the world ($\S$). This is the view of Professor McDougall who regards the instincts as "the prime movers of all human activity", the motive forces behind all our thoughts, feelings and actions. This is a more difficult thesis to sustain, and we might quite well accept Professor McDougall's description of the instinctive tendencies,
and acknowledge them to be very important elements in the dispositional patterns of all individuals, without committing ourselves to this position.

A still less acceptable view is that which holds that the instinctive tendencies are not only in some sense or in some degree the motives of all activities, but that they set the ends of all activities; that is, that every individual, however elaborately these tendencies may have become organised into complex systems, and however far their energies may have been diverted from primitive modes of expression, and however complex may be his activities, spends his life in securing the nourishment of his body, the preservation of his life, the attainment of the satisfaction of his instincts (γ). This would be a position much more difficult to accept. The reader may consider as an example of this view Freud's account of artistic creation. An individual, through inability to adapt himself to reality, takes refuge in dreaming. His dreams are disguised sexual phantasies derived from his repressed sexuality. If they happen to be interesting to other men he achieves fame, wealth and in consequence the normal satisfaction of his sexual instinct. That is to say, the process of artistic creation is explained as a round-about road to a primitive end. It is a long way from recognising the existence of certain primitive conative trends in all in-
individuals, (or even admitting them to be in the individual's early life the channels of all the motive forces of his nature), to asserting that all human activity is limited to the pursuit of the primitive ends they set, as these have been defined on the basis of a study of animals and children or the greatest common factor discovered in the varying interest patterns of adults of widely differing characters and pursuits.

92 This discussion is closely involved with the inquiry how far the dispositional pattern of the mind is innate and how far it is acquired in the course of experience. Psychology has passed a long way from the view that the mind begins as the mere blank possibility of sensory experience and is built up in consequence of that experience by accretion of sensations: but we do not seem to be near to any certainty as to how the innate constitution of the mind is to be described.

It is comparatively easy to show that certain dispositional patterns are in some sense and in some degree a part of the innate constitution of the mind, since they are of wide distribution among organisms, universal among human beings, and of early appearance in the life of the individual. But such dispositional patterns undergo rapid and marked alteration during even the
earliest period of life, and this alteration is related to a high degree of individual difference, which in turn it is not easy to assign with any certainty to an innate origin or to an origin in experience, or to one or other in any specific aspect or degree.

A consideration of these difficulties suggests that the distinction between innate and acquired responses is not one which can be maintained either as a practical device of classification or as a theoretical distinction. We must regard every experience and every response as conditioned both by innate factors and by earlier experiences. Every dispositional structure inferred from experience and behaviour must then be in its origin partly innate and partly acquired.

93 It sometimes seems to be implied in discussions of this topic that a description of the instincts and appetites affords a picture of the "natural" mind and that this is related to a "natural" environment as the appetites and instincts of wild animals are related to the conditions of the forest or the mountains. Both conceptions are for psychology entirely mythical. The innate structure of the mind (about which we know very little) is subject to very great transformations before we have an opportunity of studying it, and these transformations take place under
the pressure of social life. Even the most primitive man whom we can study is a member of a society - a tribe or a clan with a long history and possessed of ancient traditions - and the development of his mind from infancy to maturity is continuously subject to this social influence. Without social contact he would grow, not into a "natural" man living in the woods the life of a noble savage, but into a being unadapted to any environment whatsoever. The conceptions of the "natural" man and the "natural" environment are therefore of no value for a theory of society.

94 If we attempt to discover what the innate dispositional pattern is, and to what extent individual differences are to be found in it, our first difficulty is that we can construct it only by means of a long process of inference - a consideration which seems to indicate the imprudence of first making dogmatic statements about the nature of the mind prior to experience, and then deducing therefrom that the mature mind is, in its powers or in its developmental possibilities, subject to such and such limitations as a result of its innate constitution. Our data for such a construction of the innate dispositional pattern are the facts of experience in minds capable of introspective observation, and the
more cumbrosely studied facts of behaviour in the case of children. From such data we may proceed to an inferential knowledge of the functioning dispositional patterns of a number of individuals at different ages. Such knowledge will tend to be more incomplete for the more mature minds in proportion to their greater complexity; and on the other hand more unsatisfactory for the less mature minds in proportion to their smaller power of self-observation and the increasing difficulty of using a behaviourist technique as we come to deal with younger and younger subjects.

Some of the differences between the dispositional patterns so discovered must be regarded as individual differences which must be eliminated from our picture if we are in pursuit of the common innate dispositional pattern. If we can imagine this difficulty passed we should have as the result of the inquiry a series of dispositional patterns which could be regarded as typical of the series of ages to which they correspond, in the same way that a picture of the bodily constitution of any age group reached by examination and measurement, and by the elimination or averaging of individual differences, may be regarded as typical of that age group. And such a conception may be supposed to have the same value and to be attended by the same dangers in the one case as in
the other.

95. The exhibition of such a series of dispositional patterns in order from infancy to maturity would show a continuous process of change, of development in complexity and in inter-relatedness. The question of the form of the innate dispositional pattern is closely connected with the question what factors are at work in this process of development. If we knew exactly what the mind is at birth, that is the mind as prenatally determined, (which is not the same thing as a knowledge of the mind as innately determined), then we might presumably be very much nearer to an understanding of the process of development which that mind undergoes: if, on the other hand, we knew exactly what part is played in that development by factors in the environment, then we should know what characters of the mind are to be referred for their explanation to the mind as prenatally determined, and so be well advanced on the road to a knowledge of the prenatal mental constitution.

In the present state of our knowledge we can from inquiries of one type infer a development of the individual's pattern of interest, while from inquiries of another type we can infer a development of his capacities: and we can to some extent map out the normal course which
development takes in each case. Thus in the first case, to take the most obvious examples, an infant is not interested in locomotion whereas a child of a year or so is making strenuous endeavours to move about either on all fours or in the upright position; the child is interested in its contemporaries of the opposite sex, the adolescent is passionately so; tastes in food, in play, in reading all show a development which we must suppose to be related to inner as well as to environmental determining factors. In the second case we have more ample data, and data of a quantitative kind but there is a very great divergence of opinion as to how it should be interpreted. We have, for example, measurements of sensory acuity, of span of apprehension, of attention, of various aspects of memory, of intelligence and of other aspects of mental processes. Such measurements indicate with some certainty that in some of these cases development in normal subjects follows a regular and, within the limits of our present technique and knowledge, a predictable course.

96 We may therefore conceive such a series of dispositional patterns, accompanied by measurements of the various capacities corresponding to each, as a series of cross sections of a normal course of development which each in-
dividual follows in the course of his immature life - a course which he follows in so far as there are no external disturbing factors such as accident or disease - diverging only within the measurable limits of what we know as individual differences. We must regard this process of development as a resultant of factors of at least three kinds, (a) the dispositional pattern and realised capacities at any particular moment during the process of development, (b) the inner tendencies to a further development in either or both of these respects, (c) external factors in the shape of those aspects of the environment in relation to which the development takes place.

97 The part played by the inner developmental forces may be illustrated from the process whereby the infant becomes capable of walking. It is obvious that a child is born with a tendency to walk in a sense that it is not born with a tendency to make vocal sounds in a regular manner in response to the conventional black marks of the alphabet. Although we use the same word in both cases I do not suppose that anyone will suggest that a child learns to walk in the same sense that it learns to read. Yet it is probably that factors of all the three kinds just distinguished have a share in both processes.
Physiologically the newborn infant is incapable of walking. The bones and muscles of its legs are insufficiently strong to carry its weight and the nerve structures involved in the act of walking are unmedulated. Psychologically the infant is equally unready; it makes no movements indicative of an impulsion to walk, and, if it be held so that its toes touch the ground, it shows no tendency to place the soles of its feet upon it, or to take its weight upon its legs. Physiological development results in the anatomical structures becoming fit to fulfil their purpose, and functional: it appears as if a parallel psychological development takes place also, which results in the appearance of the corresponding appropriate impulses and interests, for the child presently manifests a desire to move about in pursuit of this and that; held within reach of the ground it places the soles of its feet upon it and takes its weight with its leg muscles; it makes on its own initiative attempts to stand, holding on to a hand or to a chair, and tries to take a few steps without such support; or it can be easily persuaded to make such attempts. In a remarkably short time it is able to coordinate its muscles in the acts of standing and walking, and to coordinate these acts with its visual experience and its sense of balance. We may speak of this preparatory development of muscles
bones and nerves for their function as maturation. And we may apply the same term to the parallel preparatory development of the psychical dispositions involved. In each case it is clear that we have a development resulting in the main from inner factors and that this development follows a regular and pre-determined programme to the realisation of patterns of physiological and dispositional structure which are pre-determined.

In the development of the child's vocal acts from its earliest cries to articulate speech we may distinguish the same three factors - (a) the dispositional pattern of any moment, (b) the continuous appearance of the results of processes of maturation and, (c) changes resulting from experience. In this case there is a dramatic moment when the last becomes of evident importance - the child discriminates heard vocal sounds and imitates them. From that moment the principal factor regulating its new acquisitions of vocal sounds and sound combinations is the language which it hears spoken. Up to this point the latter is clearly a minor factor; and the change from a dispositional pattern of a few emotional cries to a dispositional pattern of ba-ba-ing and ga-ga-ing, and then to one of ba-gá-ba-gá-ing may be supposed to be a result of maturation. It is possible that the influence of the environment has already specialised some of the
sounds so made - ma-ma and da-da- and ta-ta - in particular senses: it is probably also that the acquisition of some of the sounds of the language which is being acquired has to wait until the process of maturation makes their pronunciation possible, the child in the meantime substituting the nearest sound which he can produce, as th for s or w for r.

Thus in the case of speech the environment plays a part entirely different from that which it plays in walking. It is conceivable that a child left to itself and given no adult encouragement to locomotory triumphs would walk just as quickly. It is conceivable that a child which, during the period of the final maturation of the physiological and dispositional structures which function in walking, was prevented from making any attempts to walk, would when that maturation was complete, succeed in walking without a period of slow mastering of the action, or with a much shortened period of immature attempts to stand upright and to step out unsupported. It is much more probable that all three factors play interdependent parts in the process - that in the changed physiological conditions of the organism new organic sensations arise which play some part in arousing the maturing dispositions, that the impulses of these give rise to nervous processes and muscular movements which again stimulate further physiological developments which are taking place, while the
movements in which they are expressed attract the attention of the adult and stimulate his or her interest so as to result in attempts to encourage the child's efforts, attempts which result in the further awakening of the maturing psychical dispositions and a continuation of this circle of reciprocal influences - that is to say, it is probable that the influence of the environment plays some part in learning to walk, but not the predominant part played in the acquirement of language.

Nevertheless there is another side to that picture also. We may be sure that the infants put on the Bass Rock in charge of deaf and dumb nurses did not, as the result of a process of maturation, grow up to speak the language of the garden of Eden. We cannot be at all certain how far they may have developed a language of their own out of their ba-gá-ing and ga-bá-ing. Children in a normal contact with adult speech develop in different degrees their own nursery language. Furthermore each of us, though subject to the same or very much the same environmental influences as the rest, develops a vocabulary of his own, the idiosyncrasies of which may be in some degree innately determined.

99 Maturation is a conception of the need for which there can be no doubt. It is however exceedingly
difficult to disentangle the part which it plays in
development from that played by other factors, parti-
cularly the influences exercised by the environment,
and the activity of reason or intelligence.

It is also difficult to reach any conception of
the nature of the developmental tendencies which reveal
themselves in it. For example, they are obviously
not dispositions, in any of the senses of that term which
have been considered in Chapter II, since they stand be-
hind the dispositional pattern as Ouranos behind the
elder gods.

It is still more difficult to assign to it its upper
limit. There is a pleasing illusion of childhood and
adolescence that at some time in the early twenties a
fixed maturity will be reached which will put an end to
the painful process of growing up. It is true that
that process seems to come to an end in some persons at
a much earlier stage than in others. The age at which
the powers of growth seem to have exhausted themselves
vary from those cases in which an individual is carried
no further forward than to a stage corresponding roughly
to that normally reached in early childhood to those in
which a great genius seems to reveal new powers of mind
up to the verge of senility. When we speak of growing
up in this way - that is when we use the phrase to mean
both the processes of development of the child and the youth, to which it normally refers, and also later stages of mental development when a premature fixity of mind has not supervened - we are certainly confusing two aspects of development, processes of change due to maturation and processes of change resulting from experiences of interaction with the material and social environments. It is therefore necessary to state more precisely the problem under consideration in the form: At what age does the dispositional pattern cease to show changes which are part of a normal programme of development resulting from maturation, and at what age or ages do capacities cease to show increases which are not practice effects but results of maturation? We have certainly no data upon which upper limits may be fixed with any certainty; there is some reason for believing that there is very great individual variation even in the case of capacities which cannot increase greatly after adolescence: there is the possibility that a normal programme of maturation may underly those characteristic changes in the personality which continue throughout life and, which in simple people as well as in geniuses, may lead finally to the highly integrated and harmonious patterns attained in the mellowness of advanced years.
100 We may turn from this very obscure question to the more profitable examination of the parts played in mental development by experience, and by reason or volition.

The environment can produce no direct effects upon the dispositional pattern of the mind - so far as the mind is concerned the environment is primarily a series of frames of external circumstances, related to systems of dispositions, to which they stand as opportunities and obstacles to the realisation of the forms of expression in which these are seeking to express themselves. No doubt it may also be for the more highly developed mind, in moments when the primary needs of body and mind are satisfied, an object of aesthetic contemplation and an object of scientific interest: and no doubt these activities rather than more elementary and primitive ones are the appropriate expression of fully developed minds: but as soon as we have used the word "expression" in speaking of this we have taken a step which leads to their being formulated in the same terms as activities in which inner determinants express themselves in forms related also to external circumstances. And, whereas a proposition in pure mathematics is the expression of conative states directed to a purely mental end, not to a form of expression to be realised in relation to a frame of
external circumstances (section 83), a picture or a statue or a scientific theory is a form of expression related to both outer and inner factors in a way entirely similar to my improvised lampshade (section 78).

We should therefore, be careful to avoid speaking as if environmental circumstances could be the cause of changes in the dispositional pattern or abilities of the individual. What happens is that, granted a certain dispositional pattern and certain capacities, he will, if placed in an environment of one kind, express certain dispositions and exercise certain capacities, whereas, if placed in an environment of a different kind, he would have expressed different dispositions and exercised different capacities. Thus if we suppose two boys of exactly similar mental and physical constitution to be sent, the one to the life of a farmer in western Canada and the other to the education of a scholar, we may think of the divergences of their development in terms of the differential effects of the entirely different degree of expression reached by different aspects of their similar dispositional patterns, and the equally different degree of exercise given to different groups of abilities in their similar endowment of capacities, in the course of lives made up of such sharply contrasted activities.
When, by a loose usage of language, effects upon the mind are assigned to aspects of the environment as their causes, the processes alluded to are (1) those in which changes in dispositional patterns are the results of phases of experience, (2) those in which changes in capacities are similarly related. It may be said that every response of the organism leaves it in some degree changed in consequence of the persisting effects of the response upon the organism itself.

(1) Changes of dispositional pattern resulting from experiences, of which the dispositions to which the change is related have been determinants, are of three kinds:—

(a) dispositions may come to be related to new stimuli or to new situations so as to be in future active in response to these stimuli or situations; (b) dispositions may come to be related to one another in new ways so that new dispositional patterns come into existence which determine new forms of expression; (c) dispositions may increase or decrease in their power of determining experience and behaviour, the increase or decrease being shown by a corresponding change in the strength of the conations to which they give rise. We may now illustrate each of these principles by describing examples of it. (a) Any disposition is at any moment related to one type of stimulus or situation (or to a
number of types of stimulus and situation) in response to which it becomes active. Thus the pupillary reflex is active in response to changes in the intensity of illumination: the instinct of fear is active in response to a number of different situations, including those which are recognised as, or believed to be, situations of danger. In the case of the reflexes, the conditions under which the response may come to be made to an associated stimulus have been elaborately studied. Some other types of disposition can become active in response to new stimuli and situations under somewhat similar conditions. A man who has not previously been under fire may experience only a slight intensity of emotion, or possibly none at all, on first seeing and hearing a shell-burst - and this fact may have little relation to his susceptibility to danger situations of other kinds. The circumstances of battle may lead to his making strong fear responses in situations in which the rushing sounds made by shells passing through the air, the sounds and flashes of their bursts, and the smell of burnt explosives are prominent; and in consequence he may respond strongly to these stimuli, so that, when unapprehensive of danger, he will, if he should hear the hiss of a single shell about to fall in his neighbourhood, throw himself immediately upon his
face - a very valuable acquired response; and so that, in circumstances when there is no danger to be apprehended from hostile action, as for example when he has returned to civilian life, he may still experience a powerful impulse to the same response when a door bangs or when the sound of an approaching shell is mimicked in the theatre. We may describe this in general terms by saying that, in the circumstances of war, the man has found himself in a number of situations in which the end of self-preservation is not secured by the existing organisation of his dispositions, either from the point of view of the stimuli and situations in which they are awakened or the responses in which they express themselves, and that in these circumstances the appropriate dispositions have so altered the pattern of their organisation that, in response to stimuli and situations to which previously there was little if any response on the part of the organism, they are now immediately and strongly active on the patterns of new and appropriate forms of expression.

(b) If two or more groups of dispositions express themselves with reference to the same object or situation on one occasion, and still more if they do so on a number of occasions, they may become so organised with reference to one another that, when one of them is in process of
expressing itself with reference to that object or situation, the other, or others, may tend to become active in seeking simultaneous expression with regard to the object or situation, so supplementing or modifying or blending harmoniously with the tendency primarily stimulated. Such an organisation has been called a sentiment or a complex and a good example of the working of such a structure is to found in McDougall's account of reproach.

When two or more dispositional groups have been so related to one another in the case of one object or situation and when one of them is about to find expression with reference to another object or situation, the other or others are likely to have a larger share in determining the response actually made than if such a sentiment had not been formed.

(c) Dispositions which find expression in action may give rise to stronger conations in consequence, and vice versa. This may be best seen in the case of acquired appetites, such as that for tobacco, or acquired tastes for particular kinds of food. In the case of dispositions related to forms of expression involving complex inner and outer, and inner to outer, adjustments, the making of such adjustments successfully on one occasion may of course facilitate the making of them with
greater ease on subsequent occasions.

Paradoxically, the result of the expression of a tendency has been held to result in some instances in a diminution of its power to determine responses, as in the theory of Stanley Hall that a child plays in order to eliminate, by expressing them, innate tendencies which have no relevance to a civilised environment. The phenomena in question can be explained less paradoxically by saying that, in these cases, the tendency is expressed in the course of a phase of maturation as a result of which it is not eliminated but built up into a new pattern in relation to the rest of the personality.

That a disposition which is denied expression does not necessarily cease to exist even when there is no obvious sign of it in either consciousness or behaviour has been shown by the psycho-analysts.

Different aspects of the three types of change in the dispositional pattern arising in the course of experience have been formulated under such names as the law of facilitation, the law of association and the law of habit formation.

(1) The same underlying principle is exemplified also in the general tendency of capacities to be more fully realised as a result of practice.
We have still to describe the most characteristic aspect of mind, and that which is probably its essential aspect. Reflex responses have an appearance of being automatic or machine-like; the routine-responses of appetite and instinct and habit have in a lesser degree a similar character. The processes of maturation, if they have no analogies in the mechanical world, resemble closely the vegetative processes of physiological growth. But to the mind's power to make new combinations of movements, of objects which can be manipulated, of images, of words or concepts, there is no parallel elsewhere.

This power is to be seen in its most striking form in processes of conceptual analysis and synthesis. It is to be seen scarcely less clearly in all forms of artistic creation. Some measure of it is to be found in the limited power of the higher animals to devise effective responses to problem situations; and some trace of it is to be found much further down the animal scale in adaptive variations of instinctive responses to novel circumstances. It may be discerned also in the dream, and in other more or less abnormal products of non-introspectible processes. But it is found in its full development only in the conscious mental life of the mature and normal human being.

This power is more evident in some activities than
in others - more evident in writing a letter than in tying one's shoe laces, in solving riders in geometry than in striving to master the pons asinorum, in using one's wits on an object which excites curiosity than in gaping open-mouthed like a booby - but it is more or less continuously active throughout waking life. It therefore plays a part in shaping and coordinating most of our responses, and it is therefore (through the processes of facilitation and habit formation) an important agent in bringing about modifications in the dispositional pattern. A new situation has to be met, a situation to which there is no routine responses already provided in the individual's dispositional pattern, either as a result of his heredity or his previous experience. A new way to meet it has to be devised by the analysis of the problem and the discovery of the appropriate answer to it. If this is done successfully the response so discovered can be repeated on a future occasion, when the recurrence of this situation requires it again, as a routine response. Thus a new element has been added to the dispositional pattern.

One of the ways in which its activity leads to such modifications is through the process of volition already described (section 82). It is the origin of the judgments from which a volition results, and, as such, it is
the hinge upon which volitional processes turn. A volition is a direct interference with the course of action which would follow upon the direct expression of the existing dispositional pattern; and such interferences must result in some degree of modification of that pattern. For

..that which is not good,
or rather, that which is not approved as such by the judgement which guides a volition to its rejection, is not delicious

To a well-govern'd and wise appetite.

103 A volition may be directed to such a modification as its explicit end, not as an implicit consequence: it may aim directly at the strengthening of this tendency, or the elimination of that, and the cultivation of a personality in which those ideals are realised which the rational judgement discerns as worthy. It is possible for a desire against which the decision of the reason has been given to be at once annihilated: the fiat of the will is sent forth against it, the whole force of the man is drawn together into the resolution that this desire shall no longer have a share in determining his actions, and it disappears from consciousness, not to reappear. More frequently a powerful desire must be
dealt with by the tactics of attrition. The judgement has, let us say, pronounced against tobacco, and a strong resolution has been taken against it. Nevertheless the still active appetite will, in a moment of pre-occupation with something else, send the hand to the cigarette box: or, if there are no cigarettes so easily available, the idea of tobacco will haunt the mind with suggestions of places and times at which it may be obtained, producing at the same time a degree of discomfort in the lack of it which may possibly result in a failure of the resolution. This may easily happen on any occasion on which tobacco is available, unless, by a new volition on each such occasion, the appetite is prevented from realising itself in action. If, however, on each such occasion, it is prevented from reaching its expression in action, it may in course of time cease to manifest itself either in impulses or in desires. When this stage has been reached, we may say that a change has been effected in the dispositional pattern, as a result of the successive volitions.

Although a volition, so defined, is never determined by a conation of another type, it is limited by the dispositional system as expressed in conative states actually experienced. Volition has no content of its own— for, if it had, that content could be made the object of a
judgement as to its absolute value (or its value relative to that of the content of another conative state), and the judgement could be embodied in a resolution for or against it, as in the case of any other conative state; and this resolution would be a volition directed to action in accordance with the judgement. Volition has therefore no content of its own.

104 In addition to the factors already considered the social tradition in contact with which an individual grows up, exercises an important influence upon the development of his dispositional pattern. The view taken of the relative importance of the parts played in development by maturation, experience and volition will determine the view taken of some aspects of the relation between the individual and the social tradition in which he is educated. Two cases in point are that of sexual relations, and that of religious experience. Thus (a) we might look upon the individual as originally non-moral in sexual matters and ascribe the virtue of a faithful husband to the influence of social morality upon an originally non-moral being; (b) we might consider it to result from the growth of specific dispositional organisations which have come into existence as the result of the recurrent stimulation of the relevant dispositions in
the course of married life; or (c) we might regard such a character as the natural outcome of a normal process of maturation of the sexual and associated instincts. On the first view the form of relation specified in the marriage service is something imposed upon the individual from without. On the second view the marriage service describes the type of relation which, whether there were any such social institution or not, might be expected to result from the cohabitation of a normal man and a normal woman, reasonably well suited to one another in character and physique—which might be expected to result from their...mutual and partak’n bliss,...

in accordance with the process by which habits and sentiments are normally formed (section 101). On the third view, the form of relation there given social and religious sanction is something to which a man’s own nature tends, a pattern of reciprocal obligations and reciprocal sentiments in which, and in which alone, he finds the fulfilment of the dispositional patterns in which his sexual and parental tendencies become organised as a result of the process of maturation. On this view the institutional form it has been designed originally as the expression of the similar nature of other men who have preceded him, and it acts upon him as a guide or cue
to a process of development which is to be thought of, not as resulting from the imposition of the form from outside, but as originating within him.

A similar illustration may be taken from religious experience. It may be looked upon either as resulting from (a) a series of peculiar perversions of the natural instincts of men by a social institution:

[tantum religio potuit suadere malorum; 62]

or from (b) a series of chance conditionings of his instincts, more or less of the nature of perversions of them; or as being (c) the expression of his very nature in its fullest development, religious teaching stimulating and guiding a movement that arises spontaneously in his own mind, and religious tradition providing in its institutions forms of expression built up and maintained by many generations of men in the expression of the similar spontaneous movement of their minds.

On each of these views the part played by the traditions of mankind in the fulfilment of the individual life is different, and anyone of them could be applied to other aspects of the individual's life besides his sexual relations and his religious experience. On the first view, the patterns upon which the mind may be formed are supplied by tradition and by tradition only;
without the tradition development will not take place at all. On the second view, the patterns actually realised in the process of individual development result from the accidents of experience and, given a different experience, the personality might quite well have grown up in any one of a number of different ways. One of the factors determining the experience which has actually taken place in any individual case is tradition; and tradition is a jumble of transmitted patterns, all of these patterns owing their peculiarities to the changes of individual lives in the course of the vicissitudes of which they have arisen. Tradition is therefore regarded as valueless - as so much lumber from which we should do well to free ourselves; and it is believed to be possible to devise new and improved patterns upon which the personality may be modelled. Such patterns would presumably be worthy of preservation and they would therefore be transmitted consciously to successive generations; and in this way a tradition would be set up which would have elements of value, which would owe these to the intellectual processes which had devised them and which would be open to revision by conscious processes of the same character as those which created it.

105 On the third view the essential factor in the re-
lation between the individual and tradition is the process of maturation which the other two views ignore entirely. In a series of generations individuals have as a result of the forces of development within them moved along a path of development determined in broad outline by these developmental forces, but in individual cases only imperfectly realised. Along this path some individuals have moved further than others, and each step of such an achievement can facilitate its repetition in the course of other lives by the communication of its form or pattern to others at the appropriate stage of their development. Tradition as a system of such moral and religious patterns (mixed up no doubt with elements of lesser or doubtful value, and with much that is simply rubbish) thus works in cooperation with the forces behind maturation to make possible in successive generations still further achievements in development, or to enable the same degree of achieved development to be reached by larger numbers of individuals. Since the facilitation of development up to the stage represented by the moral tradition of his day allows an individual to pass through these stages more quickly (and with less exhaustion of conflict, either with his social environment or within himself) it may enable him to take a still further step, and in doing so to attain new forms in the organisation of
his own personality; and these new forms may in turn be assimilated by the tradition and may therefore, in being transmitted to later generations, provide them with a still more advanced jumping-off place. What looks very like an example of these processes can be detected in the religious development which lies behind the prophetic writings in the Old Testament.

The various factors which complicate such a process must be considered in a later chapter. We must however note here that, if we envisage such a process we should, on the basis of what little we can see of the working of the processes of maturation in the individual, expect that, after a period during which such a tradition has been built up, a period of equilibrium between conservation and further advance will follow. It is true as we have seen, that individuals begin their lives with very different possibilities of development. Even if we were to assume that the direction of development is the same in all cases (and this would be a quite unwarranted assumption) it seems unquestionable that different individuals start their lives with very different degrees of momentum along that road, so that (even granted equally favourable environments) they would travel very different distances along it. If this be so it is clear that in a society in which the distribution of innately determined
possibilities of development remains the same in successive generations, the proportion of the population to whom a developing tradition of moral growth could be communicated in its fullness would necessarily be smaller in each generation, just as we see is the case with a developing intellectual tradition such as that of mathematics. In the latter case if we assume (in correspondence with our assumption with regard to a constant distribution of innately determined developmental possibilities) the maintenance in successive generations of the original distribution of innate mathematical abilities, then a society which begins with the ability to count five on its fingers and develops for itself a system of mathematics as advanced as our own will in the early stages be able, so far as the distribution of mathematical abilities is concerned, to communicate the finest flowers of its mathematical achievement to its whole population within a short period from the making of these discoveries. A little later when it has, let us say, formulated the multiplication table or some part of it, this may be communicated in course of time to a preponderant proportion of individuals. But the higher the intellectual achievement which is reached, the smaller will be the number of individuals capable of assimilating it, until finally the mathematicians can be understood only by mathematicians.
The mathematical tradition, being carried on by a small number of persons of specialised interests and talents, who really constitute a society within a society, may continue to grow indefinitely. It may be otherwise with a moral tradition which cannot be carried out and developed by such a segregated group, and which therefore implies a different type of relation to and dependence upon the distribution of relevant developmental possibilities in the general population of a society; and it seems clear that, after a period of moral development, an equilibrium may be reached which is of such a nature that, if some part of the society passes the point which that equilibrium represents, the relation between the tradition embodying the highest moral achievement and the realised developmental possibilities of the preponderant mass of the population may become definitely unstable - a position which it is possible that our own society has reached.

106 The argument pursued in the last section depended upon the assumption of four positions - that the development of the personality up to the later years of age is still in part determined by the developmental forces that lie behind maturation, that some individuals in whom these forces are unusually strong achieve a degree of develop-
ment in advance of their fellows, that the forms of such achievements may through incorporation in the social tradition facilitate the realisation of these forms by members of later generations, that the extent to which such forms can become the common possessions of a whole society is limited by the distribution of developmental forces in varying degrees throughout the society. It is clear that in any society of which these assumptions were true the working of the principle deduced in the last section would be obscured by the fact that varying facilities for access to the best existing tradition at any moment result in gross variations in the extent to which individuals reach such a development as their innate developmental powers would permit of. In any conceivable society it would be largely a matter of accident whether, in the case of any phase of his development, an individual met with the appropriate transmitted form of expression, the proper element in tradition, at the very moment when it would best afford the cue to the next phase through which he must pass: the most perfect pedagogue must teach some things too soon, and other things too late; and, though giving an intelligent child freedom to follow its interests (as is being done in some modern educational experiments) will do much to avoid the first of these mistakes, it may easily fall still
more into the second of them. In any actual society only an imperfect adjustment can be reached, and in existing societies such as our own the adjustment falls far short of what even moderate educational opinion would regard as practical. However this may be, it is certain that, as things are, the accidents of life give a man access to the mass of transmitted developmental matters only in a haphazard fashion.

107 How far he makes use of these accidents depends in a large measure upon himself — upon his specific capacities, upon his general intelligence and upon his volition. Differences in specific capacity make the environment that is rich in opportunity for one individual a mere blank in the same respect for another. Thus a child with musical ability will assimilate a mass of musical material in an environment in which another without that ability fails to acquire the power of whistling the National Anthem recognisably. The child with an artist's eye will sit in the sunlit schoolroom entranced by the play of light and shadow, while his fellows suffer the morning's lessons in boredom; and every moment of such experience is preparing his mind to be discriminately receptive whenever chance puts a picture in his way. Differences in general intelligence will have similar re-
Volitional processes are of still more importance from this point of view. If native capacity makes this or that more interesting to one than it is to another, or reveals in it possibilities to be exploited, it is largely through voluntary application that that exploitation must take place. The lucky accident may reveal a direction in which an aesthetic, an intellectual or a moral end may be sought and achieved: but, in the achievement of it, judgement and volitional action must cooperate with native capacity.

108 The distribution of developmental possibilities, realised and unrealised, in any society is probably related to yet another variable of outstanding importance. The total of human achievement as gathered up in transmittable forms of expression is the sum of the achievements of many different types of developed personality. From the point of view of their innate developmental possibilities Shakespeare's achievement was probably impossible to Newton, and vice versa: and similarly in the case of St.Francis and St.Dominic. Such variations in the creators of elements in the social tradition are paralleled by a similar variation in the larger number to whom it is transmitted. One man has a good
eye for colour and an appreciation of poetry but so defective an ear that he can make little of music. Another seems to have a talent for mathematics and a natural incapacity for metaphysics, or vice versa. Granted such differences, we could imagine for any given mind which is reasonably at harmony with itself an environment in which it would express itself satisfactorily, an environment, that is to say, which provided the material conditions of living, the activities in pursuit of them which would suitably exercise both body and mind, the social relations which are the satisfaction of the individual's desire for companionship and affection and the stimulus to bodily and intellectual and mental processes. Such an adjustment, if reached at any one moment, cannot continue unchanged. Not only is the outward world subject to change, so that

No stat in Erd heir standis sicker...

but, even if the environment were constant, readjustment would be necessary because the individual himself is continuously changing from within, partly because of the process of maturation itself, and partly because every interaction with the environment leaves him in some degree changed as a result of it. Thus, when you have provided the boy with the books and toys which are the
exact answers to his interests and needs, he will presently, for this double reason, grow out of them, as surely he grows out of his clothes and his boots. This is not to be regretted. He has been given these toys and these books exactly in order that he may grow out of them, and so reach and reveal a further set of interests, which mark a further stage in his growth towards manhood.

109 As the individual develops he becomes ready to assimilate new parts of the social tradition. The social tradition as a whole is the correlative of his developmental possibilities as a whole, granted that he is, from this point of view, the perfect man, capable of physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious development up to the limits which humanity has so far reached. Each item in the social tradition is at the right moment the necessary cue to the unfolding of his personality or the answer to his needs. But there are, as we began by saying, no such perfect individuals. Every actual man is limited in his possibilities. His potentialities make possible for him a reincarnation, not of the whole achievement of the human race, but of some part of it. Each individual sets out with different possibilities of development, and individuals differ in
the readiness with which they assimilate different parts of the social tradition. Add to this the very great variations of opportunity of contact with the social tradition and we see the consequences in the very great variety of individual character.

110 Looking at the problem from the point of view of the individual, there is necessary at every stage of his life not only a relation of approximate adjustment between his tendencies and his environment at that moment, but a developing relation between two correlative groups of phenomena, those within and those external to him. The result of this process, if the conditions of it were ideally perfect for everyone, (which is not only impossible for everyone but impossible for anyone) would not be mental and moral equality, but quite probably a variety of knowledge and character wider than exists at present.

If we now consider the same problem from the point of view of society instead of from the point of view of the individual, we may start our argument from the dependence of society upon a high degree of differentiation of function. Employing an every-day metaphor, we may think of the individual members of society as pegs, and the positions which society offers them as holes into
which they are to be fitted. It is not a question of round and square pegs, and round and square holes, merely; but of pegs and holes of a bewildering variety of shapes and sizes. How far is there a correspondence which would admit a comfortable solution for all the pegs? The correspondence is probably not complete. There are certainly individuals of low grade mentality or criminal tendencies for whom society can have no place at all. This statement of course requires qualifications in so far as the anti-social tendencies of some of these are the results of faults of development for which the environment has to bear a share of the blame. As regards the bulk of humanity we can only say that society as it exists at present is far from having exhausted the possibilities of shuffling the pegs so as to produce a more comfortable arrangement of them.

It must also be remembered that the pegs are living personalities with powers of development in many diverse directions while, on the other hand, the holes for the most part admit of the realisation of some at least of these possibilities.

111 Mental events and processes are not confined to the theatre of consciousness and the dispositions which make up the structure of the personality are not active
only in determining conscious states and actions. Our memories for example are notoriously fallacious and a remembered event may be brought before consciousness in a form very different from the form of the original happening. If memory were merely mechanical retention, comparable to the retention by a photographic plate of the effects of exposure to light or the retention by a gramophone record of the effects upon it of sound vibrations, we should expect to find that memory either faithfully represented past experience or represented it defectively like a photographic record lacking definition through being out of focus or underexposed. We should no more expect changes which are of the nature of reconstructions to take place in memories recalled in a succession of occasions than we expect a photographic film to give a different version of the same scene in a succession of prints taken from it. We might expect the memories in a succession of occasions to be less clear than they were at first, and perhaps in the end to be entirely effaced like the letters on a much weathered tombstone. Memories do fade with the passage of time though not in such a regular and consistent manner as this comparison would indicate. There is an extreme contrast between the memories that are subject to this process of obliviscence - one's knowledge of a subject got up laboriously for an
examination would probably in the subsequent period, if not made use of, decay in this regular manner— and those which are either forgotten or remembered in a sense much more emphatic. Thus the memory which returns to haunt the mind with obsessional force makes us think, not of the mechanical retention of an impression by a gramophone record or a photographic plate, but of something alive, and actively thrusting itself forward. It appears to be possessed of a force of its own by which it obtrudes itself upon consciousness. Similarly, in some cases of forgetting, the physical parallel appears equally inappropriate. I try to recall a name or an address or a telephone number. It is one which I have used a score of times, which came to my mind yesterday without effort or seeking, which I shall, without effort or difficulty or uncertainty, recall and make use of to-morrow, but to-day I cannot bring it to mind by any effort whatsoever. A door is closed upon it. It is as if some other force has momentarily barred the way and forbidden it access to my consciousness. Thus forgetting is not merely a passive process of decay or obliviscence, as the physical parallel would suggest.

But we can go much further than this. Memories are notoriously subject to change during the period when
they are not being recalled; or at any rate on successive occasions of recall they appear in very changed forms. Sir Walter Scott is said to have remarked that he could not retell a story without "giving it a new hat and stick."

We are all familiar with this experience both in ourselves and others. I tell a story to one of my friends. A week later I hear him retell it to someone else, or perhaps to myself, if he has forgotten that it was from me that he originally heard it. Of course he may retell it badly, giving merely a weaker and inferior version of what he had from me. But, if he has imagination, and the story at the first telling made a strong impression upon him, it may, in his retelling, be heightened, and improved, and given new point. This is not because he has consciously altered or reconstructed it. It is because the memory dispositions, in terms of which his mind has apprehended and retained the form of the anecdote, have grown like living things, entering into new and richer relations with one another, and possibly into new relations with other memory traces, so that all this system of dispositions expresses itself in the form of expression of the heightened and improved version which comes spontaneously to his mind.

The ordinary night dream has been shown by Freud
to have a similar origin. It is not a casual and accidental formation, but is related to systems of dispositions which have been balked of their expression in action, and find an imaginary or phantasy satisfaction in the events and images of the dream life. Such imaginary satisfactions is of course less complete than the satisfactions of waking action. Accordingly the dispositions which lie behind and mould the dream are those which are temporarily or permanently forbidden their normal expression, either because they are not in harmony with social principles and standards, or because the proper occasion for their expression has not yet arisen, or because, on account of some weakness of character or intelligence, the dreamer is unable to find means of realising them under the conditions of everyday life. Thus the dream is related to systems of desires and fears, some of them conscious (in the sense that they are known to the dreamer during his waking life) and some of them unconscious (in the sense that the dreamer may in his waking life be quite unaware that there are any such tendencies in his nature); and it is related to these desires and fears in the same way in which a letter is, as we have seen before, related to what we have called its determinants in the writer's mind.

These forces must be thought of as competing with one
another to mould the symbols of the dream, each tendency striving to shape them as completely as it may into a satisfactory expression of itself. It is as if each tendency fastened upon the elements in the dream most relevant to itself, and expressed itself through them by charging them with the utmost of its meaning that they will bear. In this way the dream is related, not to one group of tendencies, but to the whole personality, and the analysis of the dream may lead to the exploration of all the tendencies of the dreamer's personality, one system underlying another, and giving to the dream entirely different meanings at the different levels to which analysis is pushed. Thus every item in the dream is over-determined; it is a focus not of one group of tendencies but of many different groups; it has not one meaning but several meanings; it dramatises not one problem of adjustment but many such problems. In this way the dream is a picture of the existing systems of mental forces and their interrelations. It is a pattern of symbols which reproduces the pattern of the mental forces underlying his conscious states and deliberate actions. It reveals these forces to us as active, striving and competing elements of mind.

114 We may regard these forces as actively seeking a
solution of the problem of their interrelation. On the view which we have just stated a dream is "the fulfilment of a wish" - a phantasy in which groups of tendencies seek the satisfaction which they cannot find in the real world. But we may regard the dream as an attempted solution of a problem. This is the view taken by Rivers. The problem is that of adjusting the defeated and balked tendencies to the conflicting tendencies which have resulted in their repression. In the dream there is an attempt to solve such a problem by the modes of thought which are still possible in sleep. The "solutions" will of course usually be inadequate ones, although they are by no means always so. The advice "to sleep over it" before committing oneself to a decision is frequently given. Psychologically this is the equivalent of saying: "Let the tendencies relevant to this problem have an opportunity of relating themselves to one another in new ways, during the temporary abdication of the self in sleep." The soundness of the advice is shown by the many occasions on which, when it is taken, an unsettled state of mind at might will be succeeded by a clear resolution in the morning, though no processes of conscious thought have intervened to bring it about. Everyone is familiar with an experience which is described by James. The mind is occupied with a problem to which it can find no solution - a problem of an intellectual kind
or perhaps merely one of remembering a particular fact or date or name - the problem is abandoned but presently, when the mind is otherwise engaged, (and very frequently on waking from sleep) the required solution or memory will, in the most casual way, "saunter into the mind". It is as if the mislaid memory had been searched for and found, or the answer to the problem discovered, by active processes taking place outside of consciousness.

115 All this can be summed up by saying that dispositions, whether emotional tendencies or memories, develop and group themselves, compete, or build themselves into complex patterns of thought or action. These developments and groupings, conflicts and intergrations, are what we call mental processes, and some of these take place in close relation to consciousness, so that we are aware of their successive stages and achievements. When they take place in the arena of consciousness, as upon a lighted stage, the self is more than an interested spectator. It intervenes as a nurse intervenes to bring harmony between quarelling children; it intervenes as a teacher intervenes to impose order and discipline; it intervenes as a chairman intervenes, presiding, and securing order, and harmonious thought and decision. But, behind the processes of discussion and decision which take place in the open meeting, and under
the chairman's eye, are many discussions and shapings of opinion, oppositions and concords and compromises, between the members, which take place behind the scenes, and which are at least equally important in determining the ultimate form of the resolutions which are passed. The corresponding processes in the individual mind - the processes which take place behind the scenes, below those levels of mental life which the light of consciousness normally illuminates - have a corresponding importance. It is only in recent times that they have been explored, and their share in normal mental life is not yet at all certainly determined. No theory of psychology can, however, ignore them. We may distinguish them from processes open to introspective observation by calling them endo-psychic processes.
Chapter V

The common mental frame in the twofold relation

116. As we have already seen (section 22), it is not necessary to pursue the term of discourse of individual psychological concepts in the field of large scale social phenomena, or even in that there is an intervening field of study and investigation in the simplest of social phenomena, those of relations between two persons. Here it is possible to do more than pursue more or less speculative interpretations in psychological terms of observed results of social processes; it is possible to observe and describe the processes of interaction themselves, to avail ourselves, within the confines of this borderland of sociological territory, of those methods of investigation which we are accustomed to use in a psychological inquiry.

In the course of such a study we are concerned, not so much with minds, as with the relations between minds. From a study of these inter-relations we may expect to derive at concepts which are more than psychological concepts; since they arise out of a consideration of such more complex phenomena, and it is in such concepts, rather than in the
The common mental frame in the twofold relation

116 As we have already seen (section 22), it is not necessary to proceed directly from the universe of discourse of individual psychology to the application of psychological concepts in the field of large scale social phenomena, or even in that of the relatively small group: there is an intervening field of study and investigation in the simplest of social phenomena, those of relations between two persons. Here it is possible to do more than propose more or less speculative interpretations in psychological terms of observed results of social processes: it is possible to observe and describe the processes of interaction themselves, to avail ourselves, within the confines of this borderland of sociological territory, of those methods of investigation which we are accustomed to use in a psychological inquiry.

In the course of such a study we are concerned, not so much with minds, as with the relations between minds. From a study of these inter-relations we may expect to arrive at concepts which are more than psychological concepts since they arise out of a consideration of such more complex phenomena: and it is in such concepts, rather than in the
concepts of individual psychology, that we may hope to find the keys to unlock the problems of the social group whether large or small. Thus such a study would be related to the study of a group or a society somewhat as in biology the study of minute structure and function is related to the study of the organism as a whole.

117 We have now to inquire how minds enter upon relations with one another, using as the basis of our inquiry the account of the mind given in the last chapter. Such a mind, seeking to realise its purposes, meets with its frame of external circumstances as a series of opportunities and obstacles to its expression. Success in attaining its ends depends upon the harmonious organisation of the mind itself - the aims which it pursues must be aims which are psychologically compatible with one another, since otherwise there is a state of conflict, a mind at cross purposes with itself, and consequently the failure to achieve the aims set by the dispositions engaged on either side. With these problems of inner adjustment we are not directly concerned here. Success however is related also to external circumstances, and among these are persons as well as things.

These persons are themselves minds and, from our present point of view, systems of dispositions. As such they differ from other elements in the frame of external
circumstances. They are quite peculiarly provocative of interest, attention, and intense states of feeling. They are, more than any other class of objects, the stimuli of the innate emotional tendencies - of fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, self assertion, submissiveness, tender feelings. They are, moreover, quite peculiarly resistant to our wills, since they are themselves actively seeking the realisation of their purposes in a frame of external circumstances of which we are ourselves a part. Furthermore, we are peculiarly inclined to demand from them a submission to our conventions - those of our purposes which we have elevated into general principles regulating our universe - which we do not dream of exacting from other obstacles to our wills. Finally, we cannot preserve towards them that attitude of detachment which we normally have towards physical objects which we manipulate in the service of our purposes. An individual sufficiently cold, or sufficiently self-controlled, may in some situations succeed in maintaining such an attitude to the thoughts and feelings and aims of others. This is of course the attitude of the psychologist to his subject in the laboratory. It may be at intervals the attitude of parent to child, or teacher to pupil, or governor to governed; but it is not an attitude which can be maintained for long in any living relation. There
is a certain type of character to whom this attitude is in a greater degree possible, who manipulates men on the basis of a quite objective view of them, quietly pursuing his own purposes and appearing to others possessed of a talent which they describe as tact and diplomatic genius on the one hand, or Machiavellian cunning on the other, according as they sympathise with the aims which he pursues, or with those which he so coldly sets aside.

118 Leaving this attitude aside, we have to ask what kinds of relation between two minds may result from contacts so conditioned. It is convenient to begin with the most primitive type of relation and to pass from this to those of a more developed kind. In the first place it is evident that one person may be the object of the other's instinctive impulse as simply and directly as the rabbit is the object of the dog's hunting instinct, or a beef steak the object of normal human hunger. That is to say, the person has a particular value, is felt about in a particular way, is acted to in a particular manner, because that kind of value, feeling or action seems to be implied in his very existence. There is no more consciousness of his personality, of his thoughts and feelings, of the transaction as it appears to him, than in the case of the rabbit or the beef steak. Relations of dominance and
submission, of anger and of fear, afford very clear examples of this. On first thoughts the most obvious example is perhaps the appetitive tenderness of the sexual and parental relations; but this example is obvious just because it almost inevitably involves a certain degree of self-consciousness and self criticism, and these make it less purely instinctive than many cases of dominance or fear. Nevertheless, when a young lady remarks to her sweetheart: "I wish you could be ill, so that I could nurse you", he may quite possibly think that she fails to appreciate the situation from his point of view, and that in the same way that the dog fails to appreciate the point of view of the hunted rabbit.

119 In considering a relation, it is essential to a psychological view of it that we should see it as it appears to one or other of the persons concerned, without being involved in his evaluation of it - that we should apprehend his perception of his object while remaining critically aloof from the evaluation which that perception implies. We may in turn look at such a relation from the point of view of each person in this psychological way. It is essential to a sociological view of a relation that we should at once apprehend both points of view as equally parts of one situation which comprehends the relevant mental
states and behaviour of both persons, including, in both cases, those in which the other is perceived or reacted to, and that we should preserve towards both the same critical aloofness. Failure to do this is the besetting fallacy of social inquiry. It is so much easier to let the facts be coloured by the feelings and valuations of one or other of the parties concerned - to see the King and Queen and Ophelia and Horatio through the eyes of Hamlet, to write economic history from the point of view of the working classes, to look upon the American War of Independence as the assertion of the principles of justice and liberty which it appeared to some Americans and some British statesmen, or as the unreasonableness and sedition which it appeared to others. Such a procedure is valid for literature but not for science; and literature does not go beyond it, though it may sometimes appear to do so when it swings us from one point of view to another; whether for a tragic purpose - as when we sympathise at once with two antagonists and, at war with ourselves, experience a conflict of which the only resolution is in tragic pity and terror; or for a comic purpose - as when we are beguiled into sympathy with one attitude only to be laughed out of it when it is turned upside down for us and we are forced into another.

In a sociological study we are seeking not an emotional resolution of a subjective conflict related to the situation
which we are examining but, first, an intellectual apprehension of all the elements in that situation, including the emotional states and the judgements of value which are factors in it; and, secondly, an intellectual resolution of the theoretical problems which the situation presents to us as scientists. This is easy in the case of such situations as we are about to consider in which we are not ourselves participants; it is difficult, if indeed it is possible at all, in considering situations in which we participate as citizens, however we may attempt to detach ourselves from them in imagination when we try to treat of them as scientists. Yet this is an attempt which sociology must make if it is ever to reach conclusions of scientific value, and it has seemed desirable to try to define the nature of the difficulty involved in a sociological procedure at the first point in our argument at which it could be made clear.

120 Returning to the consideration of a simple instinctive relation, we may now note that, when one instinctive tendency is involved on each side, there are two possibilities. A's impulse towards B may be met by B's impulse towards A, or by B's aversion. B may call forth A's tendency to dominance, mastery, leadership; but the satisfaction of that tendency depends upon whether a corresponding attitude
of submission, and desire for guidance, is evoked in B. If A wants to lead and B wants to follow, if A wants to advise and B wants to be advised, if A wants to be admired and B wants to worship, then a concordant relation is the result of this fortunate coincidence of dispositions. But B in turn may want to lead, to be admired and to give counsel, and A may not instinctively afford him the gratification of these impulses. In that case the relation is one of opposition, and it may quickly come to an end; or it may continue (if other circumstances which at present lie outside our consideration enforce a continued interaction) as a relation of alternate amity and hostility of the two personalities; or it may issue in the dominance of the one by the other, a situation in which the two individuals are obtaining very unequal degrees of satisfaction from the relation.

Where a fortunate coincidence of dispositions occurs we may speak of it as a relation of concord; and where there is no such coincidence we may speak of it as a relation of opposition. It should be noted that these terms are intended to refer to cases of coincidence or otherwise in which the dispositions concerned are elements in different minds. Where the dispositions are elements in the same mind we have already spoken of relations of harmony or conflict. It seems desirable to maintain the distinct-
ion between psychological and sociological phenomena by this distinction of terms. In such relations of concord we may find the very starting-point of the processes which sociology studies, the very basis of social life.

121 It will be noted that in the example which we have taken the determinants in the two minds are dissimilar - dominance in the one case and submission in the other. This would be true also of other primitive relations, for example, that of anger and fear, or a primitive parental relation involving fostering tendencies on the part of the parent and the instinct of appeal on the part of the offspring, or the activities of courtship and mating in which the bodily formations, the instinctive impulses and evaluations, and the physiological states and overt behaviour are different and complementary. Perhaps the most striking case of all is the relation of the nursing mother and her child - a relation which is appetitive on both sides, the appetitive impulses being conditioned by physiological processes in both cases, and the impulses and physiological processes being in all respects complementary. In such cases a unity of common action results from a concordance of very different determinants in the two minds concerned. The concordance is in the unity of the action not in the likeness of the determinants.
Such a concordance is like that of a duet played on two different instruments, not that of two similar instruments playing in unison. The two persons are "of one mind" in the sense that a harmonious programme of action has as its determinants a group of dispositions functioning as one unified system, although some of them are parts of one personality and some parts of another; they are not "of the same mind" in the sense that they have exactly similar thoughts, feelings and impulses. We shall see later that this distinction applies equally to relations on a higher psychological level, and to the structure of the group and the society.

122 This distinction has very great importance both for practice and theory. Its practical importance will become increasingly evident in the instances of social structure which will be examined, and especially in those cases which involve individual differences, the part played by which will be considered at length in a later chapter. Failure to recognise the difficulties and the opportunities which result from it is a constant source of trouble in personal relations, particularly between the sexes, and between the older and the younger.

It is of equal importance in theory. It is easier to see the explanation of a relation involving like determinants
on both sides, and such instances tend to be emphasised to the neglect of the other type. Thus we meet with explanations of social process in terms of similar determinants, or "like-mindedness". Such a theory, never capable of giving a complete explanation of any relation, must fail entirely to give a satisfactory account of these cases in which the dispositions on either side are complementary rather than similar.

123 The points made in the preceding sections are of such importance that it is desirable to pause here in order to state them again. Two minds come into relation with one another when each seeks to express itself in a frame of external circumstances of which the other is a part. In such a case each mind may be for the other the most important element in that other's frame of external circumstances. The result may be a relation of concord or a relation of opposition. When a concord occurs we have an example of the process of interaction between minds which is the starting point of the processes which social psychology studies, the very basis of social life. For a full understanding of such a situation it is necessary that we should at once apprehend the points of view of both persons as equally parts of one situation which comprehends the relevant mental states and behaviour of both persons,
including in both cases those in which the other is perceived and reacted to. When we do this we see (a) that a unity of common action may result from mental states that are dissimilar and complementary, and therefore from dispositions which are dissimilar and complementary; that is, that the two persons are, in every day speech "of one mind" rather than "of the same mind"; and (b) that the concordance of the relation is in its unity of action, and not in the likeness of its determinants.

This might be described rather clumsily in psychological terms by saying that two dispositional systems in two minds, each of which is an element in the frame of external circumstances of the other, are functioning in such a way as to achieve interdependent forms of expression. This statement is however seen to be unsatisfactory the moment that we notice that the form of expression of the one is meaningless apart from the form of expression of the other, just as offering the breast is meaningless without the movements of the infant to take it or the singing of the tenor part is meaningless without the singing of the soprano part in a duet, just as the bowler's part is meaningless without the batsman's, that of the server at tennis without that of the striker out, that of one actor without that of the other when they are speaking a piece of dialogue. We therefore require a description of the relation in terms which will emphasise the unity of
the common programme of activity of the partners instead of breaking it up in this unnatural way - the unity of the process of suckling, of the duet, of bowling and batting, of a rally between two tennis players, of a passage in a play as the dramatist conceived it and as the audience apprehend it.

As soon as we seek such a description we must pass beyond the point of view of psychology as the science which studies each mind by itself - which studies its mental states and its dispositional organisation in relation to its frame of external circumstances, regarding other minds as elements in that frame of external circumstances. We must pass beyond this point of view to one from which we see a unified programme of activity the determinants of which are in two minds - the impulse to give suck in one and the impulse to take it in the other, the knowledge of the tenor part and the ability to sing it in the one and the knowledge of the soprano part and the ability to sing it in the other, the skill of the bowler and the skill of the batsman, the reciprocal dexterities of the two tennis players, each actor's knowledge of his lines and his cues. We must then see that these determinants in the two minds may be regarded, not as two systems of interacting dispositions, but as two parts of one functional system related to one form of expression."
is for the study of relations a more useful point of view than that of the psychology of the individual, and it is the point of view which is essential to the construction of a social psychology as a science of the relations between minds.

A form of expression which is related in this way to two minds requires a distinguishing name. Since it is achieved by their concordant expression, and in that way only, it may be called a common form of expression. The unity of the common form of expression, of the common programme of activity and of the unified system of dispositions in the two minds requires that we should also recognise that those circumstances external to both minds which are relevant to their common activity constitute a common frame of circumstances.

A name is required also for the dispositions in two minds which constitute one functional system in the achievement of a common form of expression. I propose to call such a system a common mental frame, and to use this term later in the description of relations involving more than two persons. By a common mental frame I mean a system of dispositions which exists as a part of each of two or more minds, and which is so organised that it functions as one system with reference to a common frame of circumstances and achieves a common form of expression.
as a result of a unified mental and bodily activity. Defined in this way the term *common mental frame* stands for the central conception which social psychology requires. Social psychology is concerned with minds in relation to one another. Nothing can come out of a relation of opposition so long as it remains a relation of opposition simply. It is therefore to relations of concord that we must look when we seek to understand social life: and a relation of concord is a relation which is based upon dispositions in two minds which are organised with reference to one another, that is, a relation which is based upon a common mental frame.

124 It may be objected that "frame" is a term which has for psychological purposes the disadvantage that it may at first suggest something material. Terms of ordinary speech have for psychological purposes the continual disadvantage that, in their history, they so frequently pass back and forward between the mental and the material. We have already noted this in the case of "tension" (section 83); and psychology requires to use another term, "structure", which presents the same difficulty, since it is likely to bring to the mind a picture of a material structure of some kind - and this, although it applies equally to what is non-material, as when we speak of the structure
of a sentence, of a novel or a play, of an argument, of a piece of music or of a political constitution. Our true meaning when we speak of the "structure" of a building or of a range of mountains is not the stones and mortar or the rock and detritus but the form or pattern upon which these materials are arranged; and this form or pattern belongs as much to the mental state in which it is apprehended as to the materials in which it has been embodied (section 79); and it is for this reason that the term we use in order to refer to this form or pattern passes readily backward and forward between a mental and a material reference in everyday speech and writing.

In justification of a psychological use of "frame" it may be pointed out that everyday speech uses the phrase "a frame of mind" of which it is an adaptation. It should also bring to mind Wordsworth's use of it in reference to a pastoral community, "...a genuine frame Of many into one incorporate..." And, so far as its earlier history is concerned, there is in earlier usage an ample authority.

125 We must now bring in another principle. We have seen (section 101) that every response of the organism leaves it in some degree changed in consequence of the persisting effects of the response; and that, as a result,
there is a somewhat changed attitude to any object on each subsequent occasion of its presentation. This will apply equally to instances of concordant interaction, and will accordingly result in some degree of specialisation of the impulses concerned to later situations in which the partner of the first interaction is an element, and to later situations of a similar pattern in which another person plays a similar part. There is therefore no possibility (except in the case of the infant's first response to its mother or its nurse) of finding instinctive responses to persons unmodified by previous responses (section 92). That the general pattern of some common mental frames is innately determined does not admit of doubt, but no common mental frame can function in any relation without its constituent structures in the two minds undergoing modifications which are specific to that relation.

Human instincts are so subtly modifiable that it seems certain that all human relations will involve such specific modifications of already existing dispositions, however primitive these may be, or however brief may be the period of interaction. Thus even such a primitive example as the relation between the nursing mother and the child will involve modifications of the responses of each which originate in instinctive and physiological
peculiarities of the other; and even such a momentary interaction as occurs when a stranger stops me on the street to inquire the way, probably involves on both sides responses of the self tendencies, positive and negative, which are in some small degree unique in the experience of each.

Such facts are perhaps obvious enough, and in most relations they lie easily open to examination; but we should not let them obscure for us the extent to which the more general lines of the more primitive mental frames are already laid down in the innate organisation of the mind.

In the animal world relations seem to be almost entirely determined in this way. Among the most striking examples are the relations of mating, of parenthood, of common pursuit of prey, of the behaviour of play and of the elaborate "dances" of some birds. Professor McDougall has given us in a delightful passage some account of the elaboration of the instinctive tendencies involved in the mating of birds. The emphasis here is on the complex nature of the forms and colours of body and plumage, of the sequences of notes in mating songs and calls, of the display behaviour of the male and of the complementary coy or submissive behaviour of the female, and on the "syn-
thetic activity of perception", the relatively complex mental processes in which they are recognised and responded to in the mind to which they are addressed. The former are the keys which alone can unlock the latter, and we may judge of the complexity of the instinctive and perceptual processes involved, by the complexity of the forms and colours, the song and the behaviour, which are required to evoke them. Professor McDougall is mainly concerned to show that such phenomena can be only very imperfectly described in terms of stimulus (as the physiologist defines it) and reflex response. His argument seems however to illustrate another point with equal clearness — the long train of courship and mating acts constitutes a unified programme of activity, a common form of expression, the determinants of which are the innate tendencies of the male and the female, and these may be regarded as one interlocking system of tendencies, a common mental frame constituted of two inherited mental structures, neither of which is capable of functioning apart from the other. The extent to which this conception may be made use of in describing animal behaviour is a question for the specialist in that field and cannot be discussed at greater length here. It is sufficient for us to note that its introduction into social psychology does not make breach in the continuity of our accounts.
of the animal and the human mind.

127 It is closer to our purpose to note that human social behaviour has a basis in similar interlocking innate tendencies. Except in the case of the part played by the young child in the parental relation, this is overlaid and disguised by the abundant growth of acquired tendencies which result from the very great modifiability of human instincts. That it is present in the relation between mother and child is evident enough however much the relation is enriched on the side of the mother by knowledge and sentiments derived from the social tradition, and however far the innate tendencies involved may already have been awakened to activity, partially by doll-play or the temporary care of someone else's child, or fully by a previous child of her own. Both on the side of the mother and on the side of the child there are present as determinants of the relation the nursing instinct, the instinct of appeal, tender feeling responses, the interactions of primitive passive sympathy and the continual back and forward flow of the emotions of the self. On the side of the mother these tendencies are already woven into an idiosyncratic pattern before the birth of the child: on the side of the child they are rapidly woven into a pattern equally idiosyncratic: but the innate
determination of the principal elements in that pattern is clear enough, so that we may say that the most primitive of human relations, the first relation of which each of us has experience, and the only one which is universal, has an innate basis.

It is scarcely less evident in human mating. In this case also the full awakening of the instinct is preceded by an abundant growth of knowledge and sentiment derived from the social tradition, and by a great variety of anticipatory experience - the incipient stirrings of the instinct in response to a pretty face or a manly figure; phantasies varying from the most obscure of sexually conditioned dreams to the most explicit, or most romantic, of reveries; experience at second-hand in the conversation of one's fellows, or (with the greatest conceivable variety and richness) in literature and art and music; experimental behaviour of an explicitly sexual character, including both the conventional intercourse of the sexes (from the kissing games of children's parties to the intercourse of the adult ball-room), and a variety of degrees of actual flirtation. There is present also in the conventions regulating the converse of the sexes an elaborate setting of the stage for the great act to come, a setting to which there is no parallel in the animal world. And there is communicated from the
moral tradition a system of moral values assimilated as part of the self and consciously informing all volitional decisions. All this precedes the moment when, in the words of William James, "a particular maiden turns our wits upside down". If the interest is mutual, and the course of true love runs normally, there then begins a train of common activities which, however modified by the conventions of its social setting or enriched by the modifications of innate tendency which we have just described, is at bottom as instinctive as the behaviour of the birds, and equally dependent on the interlocking of two groups of innate dispositions which function as one system. Its initiation is in the human equivalent of the secondary sexual characters of animals and birds, in what Blake calls

...the lineaments of Gratified Desire...

and its development is dependent upon a slow or rapid unfolding of the instincts of each, a process in which, at each stage, the one supplies, in word or gesture or action, the key which unlocks in the other the group of dispositions the expression of which is in turn the cue for a reciprocal release.

128 The behaviour of mating is a relatively exceptional
phenomenon. Another instinct affords an equally clear example of a relation provided for in the innate structure of the mind, and it is an instinct which enters into all our daily intercourse with our fellows. This is the instinct with two opposite impulses which is named by Professor McDougall the instinct of self-assertion and self-abasement and of which the tendencies expressed in the behaviour of self-display are an important aspect. In defining the situation which evokes it Professor James Drever says

The perceptual situation, which originally determines the instinct of self-display, is the presence of another, and in some way inferior individual... while the perceptual situation, which determines the instinct of self-abasement, is the presence of another, and in some way superior individual. 87

He further remarks that,

The impulse attains its satisfaction, in each case, when the other shows the opposite impulse and behaviour. 87

The interlocking or social character of the two tendencies is sufficiently shown in these quotations. Their expression is not a solo activity, but a duet which for its performance requires two partners. It is however a duet which may involve a much more subtle interplay of the two tendencies than is suggested by this account of their
primitive evocation and satisfaction. Thus, to take an example which the reader may easily submit to the test of his own introspection, an hour's friendly intercourse with an intimate acquaintance may be an experience very subtly interwoven of strands from both tendencies and, like a shot silk, showing both colours in any part. Inter-course of a cruder kind may approximate more nearly to the primitive type, and be characterised by a tendency to dominance on the one side, and a tendency to accept or oppose it on the other. This may be true even when both tendencies are very subtly disguised under an appearance of good manners or consideration. The code of manners is in fact largely concerned to mitigate such situations - to restrain the too aggressive, to keep the contest within certain limits or to secure that it be conducted in accordance with certain conventions, to enable both champions to come off with equal honours, or on the other hand to reassure the self-effacing, to suggest to them that there is no contest at all or that they are already somehow the acknowledged victors in it: how many pages of the novel of manners are concerned with such problems! The need for the code is the best evidence of the readiness of the two tendencies to provoke one another to activity, and of their interlocking character.
The account given of the possible types of relation that may exist between two persons has been confined so far to relations involving primitive innate tendencies which have persons for their objects, and such modifications of these as may result from the relation itself. In any human relation much more will be involved than a single tendency on either side, and there are other types of relation to be considered, besides the simple appetitive ones which we have taken as our examples.

Of these the next that requires consideration is that in which the two persons concerned are not the objects of one another's appetitions and aversions but are impelled by conations which are related to objects external to both of them. Relations such as we have already considered, in which one individual is the immediate object of another's appetition, I shall call appetitive relations. Relations of the second kind in which the conative states which belong to the relation are directed primarily upon objects other than the partners themselves I shall call cooperative relations: and I shall now proceed to distinguish four types of cooperative relation.

The first of these is a cooperative relation based upon similar responses to a common frame of external circumstances. If there is only one apple, two children
may come into a relation of opposition with regard to it, as a result of their similar responses, if it excites in each the desire to eat it. But, on another occasion, they may be brought into a relation of concord as a result of their similar responses, if they both desire the achievement of an aim which will be satisfying to both of them at once - let us say the securing of strawberry jam for tea. Thus similarity of response (likemindedness) may lead to a relation of either opposition or concord according to the circumstances.

If only one is aware of the apple, or of the possibility of influencing the contents of the jampot, there is neither opposition nor concord: and, similarly, if only one wants the apple, or has a taste for the confection. When a cooperative relation results, it follows upon the excitement in each of similar conative states followed by similar behaviour - in this case a conation directed to the consumption of the jam, and an appeal to mamma with that end in view. The concordant relation is the consequence of this triple similarity of aim, conative state and behaviour, and the cooperative behaviour to which it leads facilitates the achievement of the aim.\textsuperscript{82} The relation may be further complicated by varying degrees of awareness of this facilitation. The shared conative experience can also be observed to be
more intense than it would be in either person if he made an independent response to the same object. It is also likely to be more vigourously expressed. This greater intensity of a shared response may be explained on a number of hypotheses of which the most useful is that of an instinctive tendency of primitive sympathy - a tendency to experience an emotion (or, if one is experiencing it already, to experience it more strongly,) on becoming aware of the characteristic signs of it in someone else.

131 (2) The second case is that in which, although there is a common aim, and cooperation in action, the acts of the two persons are complementary rather than similar. The differences may be related to differences of age or sex or strength or skill or experience or knowledge. Again, we may have various degrees of consciousness of the dependence of success upon cooperation, or upon these complementary factors; and the concord of impulse and action may be as spontaneous as in the first type, or it may be in varying degrees dependent upon this consciousness for its initiation and continuance.

Since the acts of the two persons are in some degree different, the conate states of each, and the dispositions determining them, must differ similarly. We may then describe this type of cooperative behaviour as characterised
by a common programme of activity related to a common form of expression, by some similarity of response, and by some determinants which are dissimilar and complementary. Two persons singing a duet, two actors speaking a piece of dialogue may serve as examples. The relation arises out of the similar responses which determine both persons towards the achievement of a common form of expression apprehended by both of them, and out of the complementary responses which arise in the course of their attempts to achieve it. Thus, if two persons desire the starting of the same car on a cold morning (common form of expression), they may in turn operate the self-starter (similar responses), the more muscular may then try the starting handle (dissimilar response) without result, whereupon, while the other operates the self-starter, he may turn the starting handle again (complementary responses) with the consequent achievement of the result aimed at by them both. The cooperation upon a common undertaking of two scholars with different and complementary equipments of knowledge would afford another example.

132 (3) The third case directs our attention to an ambiguity in ordinary speech which may be frequently de-
tested in sociological argument. Two persons may be directing their activities towards the realisation of the same end, and they may be doing so in conscious co-operation with one another; in ordinary language we may say that they "desire the same end"; but, when we take a psychological view of the situation, it may be evident that they are experiencing dissimilar conative states and are actuated by dissimilar dispositions. The expression "they desire the same end" is in fact tautological and no more is meant than that "they have the same end": they do not have the same "desire" in the sense that they have similar conative states arising out of similar mental structures - the normal implication of the term in a psychological context.

Thus we may say of three persons who are interested in the passing of an examination by an under-graduate - the student himself, his father and his tutor - that they have the same end: but the motives operating in them may be in different degrees dissimilar, and we may easily suppose a case in which there is no common element. Thus the student may be concerned to satisfy the examiners in order that he may be free from the tedium of an unloved subject of study, or that he may pass one more stage on the way to adult freedom and economic independence; the father may be concerned that the examination should be passed in
order that there may be an end of the drain on his pocket involved in supporting his son at college, or for the sake of the gratification of his paternal and self sentiments; the tutor may be enthusiastically interested in the subject of study, as well as concerned for his own professional reputation, credit, or for the credit of his college.

133 Such a case of diversity of motive combined with similarity of aim is frequently masked by the presence of some degree of common motive. In such cases it is the common element of motive which is most easily observed and this for the very obvious reason that it is the common element of motive that is most openly avowed. When two or more persons are acting together from motives partly similar and partly dissimilar, the similar motives are likely to be openly expressed and the dissimilar are frequently entirely concealed, simply because they are not shared. Throughout the intercourse involved, the shared motives will be over emphasised in all overt action and speech and will in consequence be much more open to observation. Thus, to take a trivial example, three men may be playing golf together in whom the determining motives are exercise for the sake of health in the case of the first, pleasure in the fresh air and scenery in the case
of the second, and avoidance of solitude at all costs in the case of the third. But these motives not being shared may not be revealed in their conversation which will be concerned with the events and technicalities and rivalries of the game, or with some other common interest. It is a first principle of social intercourse whether in the trivialities of social life or in the most important negotiations to emphasise as far as possible common motives and common interests and to keep divergencies of view or purpose as far as possible in the background. To bring these divergencies frankly to the light is usually a disastrous error of tactics however independent of them may be the real foundations of the bargain or contract which is being made. This results in the disguise to a considerable extent of the real structure of relations such as we are now considering, a disguise which, beginning by concealing A's unshared motive from B and B's unshared motive from A, goes on to conceal their real motives to a considerable extent from A and B themselves, and still more from a sociological inquirer, so that the real structure of relations of this type is not always readily detected. Nevertheless relations of this type are of very great frequency and importance. It is therefore desirable to distinguish them as a third type of co-operative behaviour in which a common end is sought by
two or more persons on account of motives relatively or entirely dissimilar. The cooperation is not the less real because the sympathetic interaction characteristic of the other two types is absent or is limited to some relatively superficial aspects of the relation and not to its main structure. Thus the student, parent and tutor of our example will share some gratification at successful progress or disappointment at failure, sympathetically intensified in either case; but the whole relation will have a very different colouring from one in which the main motive, let us say a passionate interest in the subject of study itself, is shared by all three persons, and the divergent motives involved (for some degree of divergence of motive characterises all relations) are relatively subordinate.

134 (4) In the first two types of cooperative behaviour our sympathetic interaction secures that the relation is marked by a high degree of emotional satisfaction to the participants. In the third type such sympathetic intensification of the emotional states involved is absent, or slight and probably in some degree factitious, or assiduously cultivated to oil the wheels of a relation which is felt to be in some degree a difficult one. From the fourth type it is likely to be entirely absent. In this case we have a relation in which two persons are
seeking different but interdependent aims. A comes in to relation with B because the aim which he is seeking, although unshared by B, can only be achieved through the fulfilment of an aim of B's which A does not share, and which cannot be attained otherwise than by the fulfilment of the aim which A is seeking. In a perfect example of this type it is clear that there may be no common motive or feeling states at all, and that the relation may nevertheless be a socially efficient and valuable one. It is obvious that most economic relations involve a structure of this type, A performing for B a service valuable to B, but of no direct felt value to A, in return for a money payment which is, psychologically considered, a blank cheque to be cashed in terms of any kind of gratification or satisfaction which A may choose for himself. Money, as a system of conventional values in terms of which a great variety of goods and services may be readily measured and interchanged, is its normal medium, and makes possible a network of relations of very great value and importance. The great extension of such relations in a modern society has no doubt disadvantages as well as advantages, and the "cash nexus" which gives its character to many of the institutions of a modern society, in contrast to the types of relation which they have superseded, may be criticised as lacking the warmth of feeling that characterises co-
operative relations of the first two types, and their extension to a rich growth of shared motives and shared experiences; but this seems to be more than compensated in the variety of experience and activity and satisfaction which it makes possible, in contrast with a greater intensity of less varied experience and satisfaction.

135 Before leaving this type of relation it is desirable to note that it resembles in some ways another type which may be easily confused with it. This may be defined as a relation in which one partner is making use of the other as the means to the attainment of his end under the appearance of establishing a relation of inter-dependent ends with him. The relation is parasitic and not truly cooperative; for the attainment of the satisfaction sought after is on one side only and the attainment of satisfaction on the other side, although the more spoken of, is illusory, so that it is only in irony that we say of it:—

Doubtless the pleasure is as great
Of being cheated, as to cheat;... 90

such a relation may be described as pseudo-cooperative. Consideration of it belongs to the abnormal or pathological side of social psychology and is therefore outside the limits of the present inquiry.
In discussing cooperative relations we have spoken of the **structure** of the relations under consideration. By this has been meant the pattern of the dispositions of the participants involved in the relation, and it is in terms of this pattern that an explanation of the functioning of the relation has been sought. It has been shown (section 125) that participation in any relation must involve some degree of specialisation to that relation of the dispositions expressed through it however short lived the relation may be; and, in the case of a relation existing for some length of time, their organisation into a relatively specialised system must be an inevitable consequence. Such an organisation will constitute a **common mental frame** in the sense already defined, but a common mental frame the outline of which is not provided in the innate structure of the mind but which is in the main an acquired structure built up in the course of experience and as a result of the interaction of the two personalities.

The conative states which we have had in mind so far in discussing common mental frames whether innate or acquired have been directed to personal satisfactions and the achievement of personal values. We have now to consider the case of participation in supra-personal systems of value. These constitute an exceedingly important
aspect of social life and a correspondingly important
topic for sociology. They afford very difficult and
thorny problems for psychology and philosophy, which have
at intervals attempted to reduce all apparent altruistic
behaviour to enlightened self-interest or to complex
systems of self-seeking tendencies. This is not the
place to enter upon the discussion of such views, nor to
assert the truth of metaphysical views or ethical theories
at variance with them for which a generally acceptable
scientific basis cannot be found. For the purposes of
social psychology it may be regarded as sufficient to
note that there is a great class of human activity which
is directed to ends the attainment of which is not a
personal satisfaction or enjoyment in the sense in which
the satisfaction of hunger, or the parental instinct or
self-assertion, or curiosity or possessiveness is personal.
The systems of value of religion and morals and art and
science are of this kind. From our present point of view
the distinguishing mark of such activity appears to be
that an end is sought, and perhaps sought with great
energy and devotion, the value of which is felt to be
entirely independent of its attainment or enjoyment by
the seeker, and independent of any gratification of his
self-tendencies or any social recognition of his bodily
or spiritual travail as an important contribution to its
achievement. This is the spirit of the soldier, whose life is given for the victory he does not live to see; of the scientist, for whom a new piece of knowledge is of equal value whether it be brought to light by himself, or his fellow worker, or his rival for academic prestige; of the artist, for whom his work exists in its own right, with its own beauty or expressiveness. The consideration of such cases seems to require the recognition of a separate class of relations distinguished in this way; and this recognition seems just as necessary, whether we regard these types of experience as reducible by some more or less complicated explanation to more primitive modes, or as not susceptible of such reduction. At this stage of our inquiry the importance for us of this class of relations is that from their very nature they involve no problem of adjustment of competing desires; for, to enter with another into the participation of such systems of value is to enter into a world where there is no possibility of conflict, but a natural harmony enhanced at every stage of achievement. We are not, as has been

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1 In the case of religion the most perfect expression of this conception is perhaps Seneca's Deo parere libertas est and the ...whose service is perfect freedom... of the Anglican Prayer Book (Morning Prayer, Second collect, for Peace).
said, concerned here with the explanation of this harmony, with metaphysical theories of the divine ordering of the world or the passage of the soul by the steep stairs of dialectic to the borderland of the νοητὸς τόπος.\textsuperscript{91} we have only to notice the existence of a third type of common mental frame to be distinguished from the appetitive and the cooperative by the fact that it has not, like the first, a basis in primitive innate tendencies, nor does it, like the second, grow up by a series of casual oppositions and concords.

138 In order to make clear the essential structure of the types of relation we have studied it has been necessary up to this point in the argument to neglect a number of complicating factors which obscure their main outline. The essential structure of a relation is its common mental frame; but this underlies a rich field of mental and social phenomena more open to observation, somewhat as the geological structure of a countryside underlies its more easily observable aspects, its flora and fauna, the aesthetic appeal of its landscape, its drainage and its communications, its agriculture and the positions of its towns.

We have therefore to return from the abstract point of view of the preceding sections to a more realistic
account of human intercourse. First, it is to be noted that actual relations are not relations between single dispositions on each side, or small groups of dispositions, but between whole personalities each of which is a system of interests and purposes of a complexity not easily represented to oneself in thought and still less easy to represent in language when describing a particular mind for psychological purposes. In the case of any twofold relation we have two such personalities to consider. It has already been pointed out that the conception of the mind as a system of dispositions is a highly abstract one, however great may be its usefulness for purposes of analysis and description. It is desirable here to emphasise its artificiality again, and to point out that the mind does not consist of a number of separately functioning units or faculties, as a machine may consist of separately functioning parts.

Normally every response of the personality is as far as the circumstances permit a response of the personality as a whole. In every act or decision of the mind all of the endowment of inherited tendencies, and all of the subject's previous experience, share in determining what he thinks and feels and wills. This is obviously as true of our social intercourse as of any part of our experience, and it follows that each incident of social interaction
is related to a rich background of determinants out of which, when we pursue an analysis in an argument of social psychology, we pick out as best we may one or two of the more important factors in each mind for attention and study.

139 Since a relation of any one of the types that we have distinguished involves its partners in a series of contacts with one another, there is the probability that each of them will as the result of such contacts become the object of further dispositions of the other than are involved in the primary relation. We may easily distinguish three possibilities: (a) Relatively primitive instinctive tendencies may be aroused in each which are more or less irrelevant to the primary common mental frame of the relation, but which may function more or less harmoniously with it. (b) A second common mental frame of any one of the cooperative types may grow up out of the contacts and may function harmoniously alongside the primary common mental frame. (c) One partner may attempt a development of either of these types which is unacceptable to the other and puts some degree of strain on the relation. We may now consider these in turn.

140 (a) Where there is interaction of any kind the
primitive instinctive tendencies are likely to be aroused in some degree. Thus the self-assertive and submissive tendencies are aroused on all occasions of giving or accepting a lead in the course of the relation: and these powerful tendencies are not unlikely to be aroused with a greater strength than is appropriate to the circumstances, so that one partner becomes the object of an appetitive dominance or submissiveness on the part of the other which may be an interference with the smooth working of the relation. Fear and disgust may also intervene in a similar manner, and either with justification or quite irrelevantly. Their irrelevant appearance belongs to the pathological side of the subject. The same may be said of curiosity. The most interesting complication is however that of tender feeling. This is likely to be a normal element in all relations which work at all smoothly. As such it will usually conduce to the smooth working of the relation, and add greatly to the feeling of satisfaction that goes along with it, increasing greatly the mutual confidence of the partners.

141 (b) A relation involves contacts. Some occasions of contact may also be situations giving rise to further similar or complementary responses and so to further relations, appetitive, cooperative or related to supra-personal aims. The development of a relation takes place normally
in this way by the interweaving of a second common mental frame with a primary one. The partners discover other interests that they have in common or other ways in which they can cooperate. This process is obviously capable of indefinite extension in accordance with the degree in which the partners are possessed of similar or complementary interests or ends and the extent to which circumstances bring them together. In such a case the primary common mental frame may lapse through the passing of the interests which are organised in it or in consequence of the complete achievement of the ends to which it is related and yet the relation between the two partners may continue in consequence of the new common mental frame: and this may happen a number of times. The transition may be effected smoothly through the survival of one cooperative relation during the period of formation of another, or by the coexistence of several: or it may be greatly facilitated by the continued existence throughout the whole period of a secondary common mental frame of an instinctive character in which tender feeling is a strong element. An assertive-submissive relation may have a similar result.

142 (c) Where one partner attempts a development of the relation unacceptable to the other we have a relation in-
volving at the same time a concord and an opposition. This is particularly likely to occur when the unaccept-
able development is one involving primitive instinctive tendencies, and the most obvious cases are those involving the parental and sexual tendencies. Thus a young man, having taken rooms, - a case of a relation of interdepend-
ent ends (section 134) - may find himself the object of an embarrassing maternal solicitude; or in the case of two persons of opposite sex one may seek to establish a love relation unwelcome to the other. As an example on a different scale we may take that of a man in a position of eminence and responsibility who finds it necessary to assume the trappings of authority however repugnant to his own simple tastes because they are demanded by his subordinates or his followers as the food of their assert-
ive or submissive tendencies.

143 In consequence of such complications of common mental frames (a, b and c) we may easily miss the under-
lying and all important concord upon which a successful relation reposes, mistaking for it some relatively un-

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1 There is an amusing example in A. Bennett's play The Title of a civil servant who finds himself obliged to accept a peerage, among other reasons because his indispensable secretary desires the double indulgence of humbling herself before a lord and boasting that she serves one.
important confluence of tastes or habits, or some super-
 imposed instinctive relation. On the other hand we may
fail to see in the break-down of a happy relation, or the
failure to establish one, the consequence of some com-
paratively trivial opposition easily capable of adjustment.

144 It is of equal importance for the study of re-
lations to remember that the minds concerned are not
merely systems of dispositions as we have so far taken them
to be, but also rational selves. As such they are possess-
ed of self-consciousness or awareness of their own tendencies
and mental processes. They are possessed also of the
power of rational thought and are in particular capable of
applying it to the consideration of these tendencies and
mental processes. As a result of such consideration they
are capable of volition, or conscious voluntary control
and direction of their impulses. All this aspect of the
subject requires mention here, and it will be more fully
discussed later.

145 In order to complete the picture of any relation
it is necessary to restore also the social background of
the two personalities. Any relation is a minute, and not
easily separable, fragment of social tissue interwoven
with the immensely larger system of society which is nothing
but the sum of such relations between its members. This larger system cannot in its turn be understood until these small units of social structure have given up some part of their secret in the form of concepts descriptive of their structure and processes. The biologist may attack the study of the plant or animal body armed with concepts derived from the previous examination of the single cell - for cells exist, not only as components of multicellular tissue, but also as independent individuals. Our position is rather like that of a biologist in a world devoid of unicellular organisms, who yet made use of such a conception in his description of the organisms he could observe.

146 (a) When we narrow our view to the study of a single relation in artificial isolation the social background is a constantly present factor in the form of already existing modifications of both personalities resulting from their social contacts during the whole period of their previous lives. In consequence it is seldom that a relation begins from similar or complementary responses to a common situation, without other and more readily observable processes accompanying or preceding it, which in a marked degree confuse our view of what is happening.

Each of us as a result of his previous social ex-
experience carries about with him the elements of a number of already formed common mental frames of a generalised character. To meet a stranger is not to wait patiently for some occasion of similar or complementary responses, or an opportunity of establishing a relation of complementary ends but to transfer to him instantly the most appropriate of these preformed mental frames of generalised character. If I go into a strange shop to buy tobacco I go with my normal attitude to a strange tobacconist – with my normal before-the-counter politeness, with a readiness to exchange a remark about the weather, and with the expectation of finding a normal behind-the-counter politeness and a readiness to supply my needs or advise me as to where they may be supplied. For my usual tobacconist I carry my part of a very much more developed common mental frame which has resulted from our happy, if somewhat restricted, intercourse over a period of years, and which comprises a partial understanding of one another's tastes and views. It has been developed from the generalised one which went into his shop with me when I first entered it. If I meet an elderly don it is with a different mode of address, derived in this case from my experience of elderly dons; but, though as completely generalised as my attitude to unfamiliar tobacconists, it is of much richer content and possibilities, and capable of a much more rapid special-
isation, and of specialisation in an incomparably higher degree, if it happens that we find topics of common interest out of which a lively conversational duet may arise.

Thus all intercourse with our fellows begins with our fitting upon them, and their fitting upon us, the generalised common mental frame that seems most appropriate. Sometimes we make mistakes, and a quick change of attitude becomes necessary. But the generalised frame is not of itself capable of forming the basis of a rich or satisfactory relation. It is rather a mere setting of the arena in which the action is to take place, the establishment of such a formal intercourse as will permit of the emergence of relations of the types which we have distinguished. This of course may or may not happen. Carrying my generalised frame of good manners with me, I pay a formal call; and everyone may behave prettily, and there may be nothing further. It is one of the uses of formal calls that they may help us to find out whether it is possible for there to be anything further or not: and the result of the experiment is sometimes negative.

147 (b) At the commencement of a new relation there is also a series of presumptions on the part of each as to the behaviour of the other, in the form of expectations that he will think, feel and act in certain ways. These
conventions of social behaviour constitute a preliminary understanding on the basis of which there can be a beginning of intercourse and a gradual exploration of one another's personalities; following upon which a more suitable and specialised adjustment may be made. Thus our behaviour to a stranger is more "conventional", that is more generalised, than our behaviour to our intimates. We have still to discover whether he will "fit in", that is whether he shares enough of our special views and habits, and is sufficiently free from peculiarities that are obnoxious to us, to get on with us, whether on points on which we differ he may convert us, or we make a convert of him in a sufficient degree to allow us to get on comfortably together. Such conventions of social behaviour are a necessary preliminary to more intimate relations, and sitting up nicely on one's chair to putting one's heels on one's host's mantelpiece - or on one's own in the presence of a guest. To behave as the Ettrick Shepherd did when he first called on Sir Walter Scott is not a likely path to a happy freedom of calling one's host and hostess by their Christian names.¹

¹ When Hogg entered the drawing-room, Mrs Scott, being at the time in a delicate state of health, was reclining on a sofa. The Shepherd, after being presented, and making his best bow, took possession of another sofa placed opposite to hers, and stretched himself thereupon at all
The origin or continuance of a relation may be related to elements in its common frame of external circumstances which have the effect of constraining or limiting conditions. Their apparent power to produce such effects is of course derived from determinants related to them in the minds concerned (section 38). My intercourse with another man may owe its origin, or its continuance, to the fact that we occupy opposite seats in the same railway carriage and are interested in the opening or closing of the same window, and I am the first man to turn up with a car on the lonely road where he is marooned with an empty petrol tank, that he shares my table at a boarding house, or sits at the next desk to mine in an office, or occupies the house next door, or is appointed to a lectureship in the same university department. In each case some degree of intercourse is made

his length; for, as he said afterwards, "I thought I could never do wrong to copy the lady of the house"... The Shepherd... dined heartily and drank freely, and, by jest, anecdote, and song, afforded plentiful merriment. As the liquor operated, his familiarity increased; from Mr. Scott, he advanced to "Sherra," and thence to "Scott," "Walter," and "Wattie," - until, at supper, he fairly convulsed the whole party by addressing Mrs. Scott as "Charlotte". 97

I am tempted to quote in this connection,

Great art thou, O Cupid, but greater is juxtaposition but I do so with some hesitation, being unable to give a proper reference. I owe my acquaintance with the line to the conversation of Mr. C.G. Crump who has referred me
inevitable; but there is some freedom of choice as to minimising or extending these contacts. Preliminary intercourse will, as we have seen, be based on appropriate generalised common frames; and psychical, not external, factors will determine whether richer and more specialised frames will be developed or the relation limited to the initial conventional type. But the external circumstances may in such a case necessitate its being maintained when it would otherwise be dropped. I must continue to bid my colleague good morning however unpleasant a person I may consider him and however little I may think of his scholarship or his morals; and we may even dine at one another's tables and exchange Christmas greetings.

External circumstances may exert an equally important negative influence. When I have met a new colleague on official terms, it may quickly appear that we have common interests and pursuits of the most engrossing kind; we may soon be in one another's company at every possible opportunity, and embarked together on some interesting piece of work; and, when another institution claims the services of one of us, we may, in

to Clough, in whom I cannot find it, though I do find,

Allah is great, no doubt, and Juxtaposition his prophet.

My real debt seems to be to an endo-psychic process of the kind described in section 112.
spite of the consequent geographical separation, maintain
the relation by the most strenuous efforts, overcoming
the now unfavourable external circumstances by correspond-
ence, and by meeting at every possible opportunity during
vacations.

Kinship affords a further very important example of
external constraining circumstances. The family system
usually brings us into close relations with our near
relatives during our impressionable years, with the result
that strong sentiments are formed which are relatively
independent of, and often in marked conflict with, the
innate and acquired directions of our tastes and interests.
These sentiments which are the strong bonds of family unity
are reinforced by a tradition which teaches the duty of
family loyalty. Thus common mental frames as developed
between near kinsmen may be of a type which combines all
the strength of common interests of the finest voluntary
friendship with the peculiar intensity of sentiments
formed in very early years, involving early memories and
common family loyalties and traditions, and reinforced by
the pietas of the code of kinship obligations; or, at the
other extreme they may be of the type which, with little
power of growth in it on account of the absence of strong
common interests or mental powers, is little more than
unwilling prolongation on account of the kinship tradition
of sentiments which have long lost their real vitality.

A particular class of external constraining conditions requires separate treatment. A relation arises as we have seen out of the stimulation of similar or complementary dispositions which function as parts of a common mental frame and are relatively incapable of functioning independently. It is of great importance to either partner to be assured of the continuance of the attitude of the other, which makes possible the continued satisfaction of the habits and sentiments which he is specialising for fulfilment in the intercourse which they contemplate. If I agree with my friend that we shall dine together weekly, there is a disturbance of my habits if he change his mind and partially or completely terminate the engagement into which he has entered with me. The habits and sentiments upon which the practice depends may, however, be more or less easily modified or reconstructed, when he has tired of my company. I may return to the habit of dining alone with a book, or I may find someone else with congenial tastes in food, wine, conversation and tobacco. It is another matter altogether if I enter into a business partnership in which I undertake to perform certain functions, and my fellow undertakes to fulfil others, so that the success of our under-
taking is dependent upon our complementary efforts. The failure of either of us to play his part is a serious infringement of the commitments and legitimate expectations of the other; and it is a normal procedure to invoke some external sanction to assure each of the other's good faith; and of such redress as may be possible in case of a breach of it. Such a sanction is secured in the form of a contract enforcible at law. It should be noted that such a contract has another equally important use. It secures that there is a clear understanding, on the part of each, of what he is himself undertaking, and what he is to expect of the other. It is in fact a formal definition of some important elements in the common mental frame which is the basis of the partnership.

150 The contract of marriage affords a still more striking illustration of the same principle. Psychologically its origin is in the formation of two powerful sentiments in the lovers who contemplate it; and these sentiments are of such a nature that (a) their normal fulfilment is of the most vital importance for mental health and happiness, (b) their frustration can cause the most acute misery and disaster, (c) their normal development and fruition require an assurance of
the fulfilment of their later programme (the principal condition of which for each is the stability of the sentiment of the other), since the early stages of their growth is usually accompanied by an acute awareness of the distress which will accompany a collapse of the relation through which that programme is to be realised, and (d) that programme necessarily occupies a life-time, or a large part of a life-time, during which it may be expected that maturation and experience will bring about great modifications of characters in both. A normal pair of lovers will therefore seek from one another the strongest assurances of a continuing affection, in order that, on the basis of that assurance, the whole force of the personality, with the full cooperation of the will, may be thrown vigorously and joyfully into the powerful sentiments that are growing up in them: and each will, with equal vehemence, seek to give such assurances to the other in order to further the reciprocal satisfaction of the growth of the other's sentiment. Thus lovers' vows have been from all time the first basis of the love-contract, and they pass naturally into the public plighting of troth in the marriage ceremony, through the desire of each to secure, and to give to the other, the assurance of an external sanction. By making the Church a partner to the contract, the mutual vows are given the most solemn
and sacred character possible; and by making the state a partner to it, it is rendered, so far as its nature permits, legally enforcible.

Furthermore, both these institutions are interested partners - the Church is concerned with its internal moral discipline, as a voluntary association of persons accepting a particular body of theological and moral principles; and the state is concerned with the series of economic and legal obligations which arise out of the sexual relation. As interested parties, they prescribe the form of the contract to which they lend their sanction. Here a new aspect of the contract appears. In the course of my life I enter into many understandings with my friends, some of which are fortunate, and some unfortunate, in their issue. I accordingly learn from my experience what understandings are reasonable, and what are inadvisable. This general experience may however be an insufficient guide in the case of an important contract of a type which is new to me. If, for example, I wish to enter into a business partnership, I consult a lawyer, who will advise me in drawing up a deed of partnership which will reflect his professional knowledge and caution as well as my intentions and desires. But the very nature of the marriage contract as a life-long partnership precludes the bringing to it of adequate previous
experience, and makes it one of more vital importance than any business contract can be; while the factors involved in it are infinitely more subtle and imponderable than the comparatively easily measurable economic factors in a business contract. Hence we have, in the case of the marriage contract, a prescription by the authority of the Church and the state of the obligations to be mutually undertaken, which is the result of generations of experience of the relation of marriage in all its infinitely varied possibilities.

From these examples we may see how the underlying psychological structure of a relation leads naturally to the invoking of external regulating conditions (a) which may give it such stability as renders its proper development possible (b) which may secure it against the temporary failure of its psychical foundations, and (c) which may secure its partners against some of the consequences of the subsidence of these foundations. We may see also how naturally they lead to the formation and maintenance of the institutional structure of a society in order that such sanctions may be secured, and that the forms of contracts entered into may embody a long and varied social experience.

151 We may sum up the conclusions of the last sections
(sections 145-150) by saying that human relations are not in the main series of fortuitous concords interspersed with fortuitous oppositions and consequent partings, although a part of our social intercourse is of this kind. They are rather continued processes of intercourse in which the continuity is assured either by the stability of a common mental frame which has arisen out of fortuitous concords; or by the external constraining circumstances of the relation, whether these are fortuitous, voluntarily undertaken in the form of a more or less explicit contract, or prescribed by authority.

(a) The first consequence which we have to notice here is that, where there are such bonds of unity, the occurrence of an opposition does not necessarily bring the relation to an end. For two occupants of the same nursery, the nursery walls and Nanny represent external constraining conditions which maintain a continuity of intercourse punctuated by alternations of amity and hostility according as fortuitous concords and oppositions arise out of the interplay of the two minds. But in the case of persons of maturer years (whom we nevertheless describe as 'childish') a relation, maintained not by external pressure but by the internal forces of their common mental frame, may run a course of similarly varied monotony for an exactly similar reason. No doubt a
naturally concordant relation may be found in the case of "two hearts that beat as one"; but such a providential pre-established harmony cannot be looked for as the normal basis of human relations - except at that advanced and mature stage of mental development at which as we have seen (section 137) there is a participation in supra-personal systems of value in which personal conflict of aims and purposes is impossible - and no human relation will ever be entirely on this level, though in any relation of relatively mature minds some instances of interaction will be of this kind.

152 (b) Of the more primitive ways in which such alternations of amity and hostility may be avoided the first which requires notice is that in which one personality more or less dominates the other. We have then a common mental frame in the growth of which one personality has determined in its favour all the incidents of opposition. So far as the second person is concerned satisfaction is attained only on these points of taste and interest which are coincident with the tastes and interests of the other. Should submissiveness be a powerful motive in this partner to the relation, the satisfaction of the submissive tendency may be the principal satisfaction sought and obtained. In this
case the main structure of the relation may be the innate structure of the two self tendencies (section 128), and concords and oppositions of other dispositions may be of only very subordinate importance.

153 (c) A more frequent type of relation is one in which both partners contribute positive elements to the common mental frame in addition to those which arise out of their fortuitous concords. It is a case of two complex personalities in interaction on equal terms. A harmonious relation can be reached only as a result of some degree of cross purposes, consequent opposition and mutual adjustment.

If we consider cases in which one relatively distinct motive is at work on each side, it is clear that there are eight possible situations according as the motives at work are relatively strong or weak and relatively concordant or opposed. Thus we may have a strong motive in A concordant with a strong motive in B (1) or with a weak motive in B (2); or a weak motive in A concordant with a strong motive in B (3) or with a weak motive in B (4); or a strong motive in A opposed to a strong motive in B (5) or opposed to a weak motive in B (6); or a weak motive in A opposed to a strong motive in B (7) or to a weak motive in B (8). This may be tabulated thus:-
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<th>A's motive</th>
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The first case obviously conduces to concordant action. In the second, third and fourth cases the situation is also favourable, unless the weak motive in A or B is in conflict with a strong motive directed to incompatible action, and this possibility is excluded from the present consideration by the assumption with which we began. In the fifth, sixth and seventh cases, a problem of mutual adjustment occurs in a more or less acute form. In the eighth case we should expect that either one partner will yield easily to the other or a third programme of action will be suggested and adopted. Let us now consider what is likely to happen in situations of the fifth, sixth and seventh types.

154 In such situations we have oppositions of impulses which are comparable to conflicts of impulses in a single mind in the absence of a rational self which harmonises by its volitions the impulses of appetite and instinct. In such a conflict in a single mind the issue appears to be
determined by the relative strengths of the impulses concerned. Of conflicts settled in this way we all have experience. There is an inclination in this direction and an inclination in that, but it is impossible to go east and west at the same time. The question at issue is not of sufficient importance to call forth the moral and rational self to issue a fiat which will settle it. It may be a question of "thick" or "clear", of the high road or the path by the river, of Virgil or Horace for the last ten minutes before going to sleep. There is no call for moral judgement or an exercise of will. There are but two impulses in conflict, and the stronger impulse wins.

A conflict between two persons may be settled in the same way: when A is sufficiently determined, B will yield; and, when B is sufficiently resolved, A will give way. It is not a question of strength of personalities but of strength of impulses. In a prolonged relation a great number of oppositions will be decided in this way. It is like a protracted battle on a wide front where there is intense activity now here and now there, with one side habitually victorious at this point and the other at that, until a more or less stable battlefront is reached: A no longer attacks positions that he has always failed to take, and B similarly abandons hope of exercising
pressure where A is habitually successful.

If we drop the metaphor, what we have to say amounts to this: the relations between A and B might appear to an outsider as if they were the result of an elaborate and detailed agreement of the form "I may do this, think that, refrain from the other, and you must not interfere: I acquiesce in your doing, thinking and refraining from this, that and the other". But there has of course been no such contract. In a series of more or less unconscious struggles (in some of which there was little or no awareness of the opposition and in others awareness on the part of one of the partners only) each has won in some cases, and lost in others. In this way there has emerged a "rough border law", never consciously stated to himself by either party, yet harmonising their relation and governing all their actions with reference to one another. It is as if there were a filter through which some of A's or B's impulses may pass to their expression in action and by which others are held back until the life seems to have left them entirely.

155 This partially conscious filter of A's and B's impulses, this modus vivendi, this series of restraints and encouragements resulting from the partial co-incidence and a partial opposition of their dispositions,
exists as a series of modifications of both personalities resulting from their impact upon one another. It has no other existence than as weakenings and strengthenings of A's and B's impulses in this direction and in that in situations in which they are partners. It is therefore a part of the common mental frame which has been developed in the course of their interaction. As such it is a secondary structure, mediating between the primary system of concordant dispositions upon which the relation is based, and the other (partially discordant) elements of the two personalities. It has therefore a regulative function. Yet it owes nothing to conscious volitional processes directed to dispositional elements as such. This secondary structure, with its regulative function, is a necessary part of the common mental frame of a relation whenever its continuance is related to constraining circumstances, whether these are external, implicit in the primary structure of the common mental frame or consciously and voluntarily accepted as part of a contract (sections 148-150). Thus all relations, except the most momentary or the most casual, will involve the development of such a secondary regulative structure in some degree.

156 In the case of minds characterised by a low degree of self-consciousness the growth of this secondary
regulative structure can be entirely explained in such terms. Even in the case of two highly intelligent and cultured and self-conscious individuals, their relation may be to a considerable extent regulated by such consequences of simple oppositions of impulses accompanied by a low degree of consciousness, and settled in accordance with the relative strengths of the impulses concerned. With two such persons awareness of the opposition as such on the part of both will mean conscious assessment of it and voluntary adjustment; but, where the matter is not of the kind that comes up for deliberate discussion, the opposition will be settled in the primitive manner. Their conscious relations have therefore a vast background of adjustments of this kind—questions of the pace at which they walk together, the topics which their discussions pass by, the items of a common menu. Coincidences and oppositions of impulse may on many occasions involve no high degree of emotion, the two persons falling into one another's ways or yielding easily to one another.

157 In the case of an opposition leading to more intense states of feeling there are two possibilities. If a high degree of self-consciousness is present we have a further problem which will be discussed presently—the problem of the intervention of volitions directed to the
maintenance and ordering of the relation itself. In the absence of such intervention of conscious acts of will, the opposition may result in a temporary regression to the alternation of amity and hostility which we noted as characteristic of the relations of children and 'childish' persons.

Coincidences of impulse, where the expression of the impulse involves some intensity of feeling, result in very much more intense and pleasureable states because the impulse is shared; on the other hand, in a case of opposition of impulses, there may be generated emotional states involving a considerable degree of internal conflict, and possibly coloured by anger as a strong reinforcement of the balked impulse. Every shared impulse, on account of its heightened feeling tone increases the harmony of the relation, and, in being strengthened itself, gives added strength to the common mental frame of which it is a part. It is easy to see that this is true in such cases as mutual pleasure in natural beauty, in poetry or in a game. There is therefore a strong bias in favour of impulses which are coincident with or complementary to those of a frequent companion; and this bias works strongly in favour of the formation between them of a working relation in consequence of the relative strengthening of these impulses, as compared with those which are not
shared, and therefore not so stimulated and reinforced. So much is this so, that, if A be possessed of two strong groups of interests, and if one of these, but not the other, be shared by his daily companion, B, the unshared interests (unless they be shared with another companion, C, or are sufficiently engrossing to be pursued in solitude), may lose strength pari passu with the increase in strength of the shared group of interests.

158 On the other hand, the generation of a state of anger resulting from an opposition of impulses dissociates the general system of the common mental frame partially or completely, temporarily or permanently. Anger, and its different derivatives, annoyance, indignation and the like, are the corrosives which damage or destroy the common mental frame upon which a relation is based. The greater the proportion of the personality that has become organised in it the more painful will the experience be; for the greater will be the proportion of the personality that is temporarily or permanently lost or destroyed. In the case of a permanent breach much more will have been lost than at first sight seems to belong strictly to the relation: for each partner loses the vigour not only of the impulses which are directly stimulated by the other but also in some degree, slight or important as the case
may be, the interests which he commonly shared with the other. These impulses, even if they had independent expression prior to their organisation in the common mental frame which is now dissociated, have lost their usual cues to activity and the usual circumstances of their expression; and each partner is at a loss until the old relation is restored, or until another such system (dependent perhaps upon a partial transference to another more or less appropriate person) has grown up, or the separate impulses have been disentangled from the now moribund dispositional system in which they had become organised, and reorganised on a new pattern.

159 When the anger generated is less strong, a merely temporary dissociation is succeeded by a renewal of amity, as the dissociating impulse loses its energy in the ordinary course of the ebb and flow of psychical life. More fortunately still it may appear, not as anger at all, but as the composite emotion of reproach. I should like to describe reproach as anger in conflict with, and modified in its expression by, a common mental frame within the sphere of which it is developed, and which prevents it from reaching its normal intensity, or expressing itself in its usual mental states or overt activities. If this is a true description of it, reproach is not always,
as McDougall describes it, anger qualified by tender feeling; though tender feeling is likely to be one of the tendencies organised in most common mental frames (section 140) and will therefore appear as a factor in such instances of opposition as we have been considering; but in most, or all, instances of reproach, other elements in addition to tender feeling will play a part in modifying the development of the anger.

160 In a normal mind conflicts of impulses are not generally decided in accordance with the relative strengths of the impulses but by an intervention of the will. This intervention implies a higher degree of consciousness - self-consciousness or awareness of the impulses concerned as such; and, as its consequences it implies also (a) some evaluation of the ends to which they are directed, (b) a decision in favour of one of them or (c) a cognitive process which issues in some adjustment of one of them to the other so as to permit of the satisfaction of both. The whole process constitutes a volition or conscious act of will (section 82).

There seems to be an exact parallel to this in the case of the relation between two persons. On the occurrence of an opposition it is possible for each to be not only (a) moved by his particular impulse but (b) aware
of his impulse as such (as in the case of a volition), and, (c) similarly aware of his partner's impulse as such and not as a mere obstacle to the fulfilment of his own. There follows naturally upon these processes an attempt at the adjustment of the opposing impulses entirely different from the blind oppositions which we have so far been considering - an attempt to evaluate the ends to which they are directed, to decide in favour of one or the other of them, or to discover a *via media* relatively satisfactory to both partners to the relation. This awareness of the scheme of values of another as such is a natural outgrowth of the critical awareness of one's own impulses and tendencies which is the basis of volition. As we call that *self-consciousness* so we may use the term *other-consciousness* for this socially important extension of it which makes possible the application of intelligence and will to the problems of relations.

161 Other-consciousness obviously makes possible mutual adjustments which render the relation more satisfactory to both partners than it would otherwise be. But it is not essentially altruistic. I shall not call an act *altruistic* unless it involves the voluntary acceptance by one partner of an aim of the other's which has no felt value for him and is accepted because it is recognised as having felt value for the other and for no other reason.
Such altruistic behaviour we shall have to consider later. The primary consequences of the appearance of other-consciousness are simpler and much more easily explained.

Let us first consider a case in which the impulses of one person meet with some material obstacle to their satisfaction. The most primitive response to such a situation is one of blind anger. A more effective response is the cognising of the obstacle and the application of intelligent consideration to the problem of overcoming it. Should the obstacle be of such a nature that it eludes observation, and so provides no material for the intelligence to work upon, there may be a relapse into anger.

We may now transfer these considerations to the case in which the impulse of one person is met by the opposition arising from the contrary impulse of another. The primitive response is a combination of anger and self-assertion which may bear down the other's impulse and issue in a temporary dominance of the one by the other; and this is the primitive solution of such oppositions. But, just as anger may be an ineffective response against a material obstacle, so it may be an ineffective response against a psychological one. Anger and self-assertion may be met by anger and self-assertion, and there results a deadlock. Thus primitive anger responses
are peculiarly ineffective in the oppositions arising out of social relations. But nevertheless they are peculiarly liable to occur.

The more effective type of response is as we have seen based on an examination of the obstacle which has to be dealt with and the discovery of a way round it. In this case the obstacle is difficult of observation. It can be known only (a) by some kind of amateur psychologising, or (b) by the direct avowal of his aims and purposes by the partner. An incipient anger response renders both these processes of social adjustment ineffective - it puts the first partner in a peculiarly unsuitable frame of mind for psychological observation of the other, or appreciation of any evaluation of the situation other than that strongly felt by himself at the moment; it puts the partner to the relation in a frame of mind equally undisposed to an effective explanation of his point of view. So far as opposition to our wills arising out of material circumstances is concerned, we learn early in life not to kick against the pricks; we learn that, in the words of the proverb, "facts are chieals that winna' ding". We are much less ready to recognise the invincible recalcitrance of psychological facts; and this for two reasons - (a) because we observe them less easily and have greater difficulty in representing them to ourselves ideally, unless indeed
we have either special gifts in that direction or psychological training - or both: and (b) because we have had frequent experience on previous occasions of bearing down such opposition by some demonstration of anger or self-assertion, (euphemistically "by showing a little determination"), and we have not accompanied these experiences by a careful examination of their remoter and less fortunate consequences on the future course of the relation of which they have formed a part.

162 When a psychological obstacle is recognised for what it is - a factor in the situation as real and as important as any material factor, and not to be swept aside as a cobweb of fancy or silliness, a mere foolish failure to recognise one's own superior commonsense, grasp of the situation and, from all points of view, excellent intentions - it becomes for the partner who so recognises it the object of rational consideration with reference to the aim which he is seeking to realise. It is a part of the whole situation to which his intelligence must devise a suitable response; and anger is as irrelevant to it as to a lost collar stud, a drawer that jams, or an airlock in the petrol pipe of a motor-car. This is the simplest way in which other-consciousness can appear as a factor in a relation. When it appears
there are obviously two possibilities - (a) that it may appear in one partner and not in the other; and (b) that it may appear simultaneously in both.

163 (a) In the first case it is obvious that the partner who possesses this superior appreciation of the situation is in the more favourable position. We are still supposing no element of altruism in his attitude - a further complication which, as we have said, we shall discuss presently. The first partner is concerned to secure the adoption of the plan of action which appears to him appropriate to the situation. Just because he has a superior grasp of all the factors in the situation he is in a more favourable position for "getting his way." He is in the position of a card player with a superior knowledge of the way in which the cards are distributed. Secondly, his other-consciousness is likely to be of service to his partner as well as to himself: because it prevents the occurrence of an anger dead-lock or breakdown of the relation; because it will lead him to

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1 I have on this and other occasions introduced into the text such familiar phrases, not from a desire to be colloquial but because such phrases discriminate in a useful, and frequently in an exact way, phases of social relations for which there are in existence no set scientific terms; and because such phrases are themselves appropriate objects of sociological study.
ascertain more exactly his partner's point of view by drawing him out, thereby making that point of view and its implications clearer to the partner himself; because, in the event of that point of view being based on a superior understanding of the situation (and the more irascible, or less other-conscious, partner is not necessarily the less intelligent, or the less informed) there is a possibility that when he understands it more fully he may prefer it to his own, whereupon a relation of similar or complementary responses to the common situation will follow automatically; because it will lead him to use patience with his partner in the explanation of his own point of view to his partner with the same possibility of a consequent automatic harmony.

164 (b) Where some degree of other-consciousness appears in both partners there is of course a facilitation of all the processes of interaction which we have just discriminated. But there is more than this. The interaction of the two minds is raised to an entirely

\[1\] It is of course true that a superior other-consciousness may enable one partner to get the better of another to the latter's disadvantage by playing suitably upon his fears, prejudices etc. Such a relation represents an example not of cooperative behaviour based on a common mental frame but of the pseudo-cooperative relation defined in section 135.
new plane since the partners to the relation are now engaged in considering together the adjustment of the psychological factors in the situation as well as the material ones. Further consideration will be given to this topic later. It is sufficient here to note the greatly increased possibility of concordant interaction in a relation in which there is a development of other-consciousness in both partners.

165 In cases in which the intervention of other-consciousness does not lead to a solution in one of these ways it may still greatly mitigate the difficulties of the opposition. One possibility of great social importance which arises out of a situation in which other-consciousness is present in some degree but does not lead to a successful adjustment of the relation is that of an appeal to a third mind to judge between the partners to the relation, the submitting of the difficulty to arbitration. The distinguishing mark of a process of arbitration is that either there is no sanction attached to the decision of the intervening party, or, if there is one, it is one which is invoked by the partners to the dispute: "compulsory" arbitration is a contradiction in terms. In the absence of a contractual agreement on the part of both parties to the relation, entered into before
the decision of the arbitrator is announced, and enabling either of the parties to appeal to some external authority to enforce that decision upon the other, the success of an arbitration must depend on a solution being discovered by the arbitrator which is acceptable to both parties, a decision involving a higher degree of mutual understanding than they have reached. Arbitration is therefore primarily an extension of the processes by which the adjustment of an opposition is reached through mutual other-consciousness. An appeal is made to the superior power of a third party to interpret the mind of each to the other, and to devise an acceptable adjustment of the relation; and his success will depend very largely upon his ability to read the mind of each.

166 It is obvious from what has been said that the extent to which adjustments involved in a relation are lighted up by other-consciousness is variable from one relation to another according as attention is directed to the relation itself instead of to the external circumstances with which it is concerned. Apart from such theoretical inquiry as we are concerned with in psychology and sociology it is chiefly from this intermittent and fluctuating other-consciousness that our knowledge of relations is drawn. It follows as a
natural consequence that those processes of adjustment which do not involve other-consciousness are likely to pass unnoticed, and to be ignored, when the theoretical discussion of relations is begun; and that to other-consciousness is assigned a more universal (though not a more important) role than really belongs to it. The real structure of the relation is not detected or understood, and inquiry ceases with the description of the part played by other-consciousness. The case is exactly parallel to that of "conscious" and "unconscious" states in individual psychology. Thus some states involve not only awareness of an object but awareness of that awareness, or self-consciousness. These are the more readily observed and described and the area of self-consciousness is held to be coincident with the area of mental process. Similarly, it sometimes seems to be implied that the area of other-consciousness is to be coincident with the area of social process.

167 A further topic relevant at this point, and tempting to a lengthy digression, is that of the way in which other-consciousness grows up. We may note only its dependence upon the growth of self-consciousness. In so far as I understand my own experience, and can review in a detached spirit, my own mental processes,
opinions, sentiments and habits, including those which I recall from earlier periods of my mental development, I am prepared for the understanding of the mental processes of someone else. Thus a mother will reach a much better understanding of her child, and establish much better and happier relations with it, if she is able to remember her own experiences as a child and interpret her child's behaviour in terms of them.

Attempts to understand the mind of another may obviously lead to failure and misconception. Such misconception can issue in further confusion and cross purposes - another aspect of the pathology of relations and one fruitfully exploited for the purposes of comedy by the dramatist and the novelist. \(^1\)

168 We have now to consider the harmonisation of a relation through the voluntary acceptance by one of the partners of an aim of the other which has no felt value for the other. This is a process of very great sociological importance and is fortunately one the occurrence of which we can accept in the absence of agreement as to its true explanation.

The type of relation which we are considering is one

\(^1\)It is for example a favourite device of Mr. George A. Birmingham's.
in which (a) B has an impulse or an aim which A does not share, (b) A is conscious of B's evaluation of the situation as such, (c) A accepts and cooperates in the achievement of B's aim because of B's evaluation of it and not because it has direct felt value for himself.

We may first note the dependence of the type of relation upon a sufficient development of other-consciousness on the part of A. A corresponding development on the part of B is not necessary to it.

Secondly, we may classify cases of it according as the aim set aside and that accepted in place of it are aims of comparable or differing value. Thus we have a threefold classification:

(a) The case in which the personalities concerned are of comparable maturity and the opposing aims are of comparable value.

(b) The case in which a more mature mind accepts the aim of one less developed - an interest, for example, which he has outgrown, if he has ever possessed it.

(c) The case in which the aim of a superior mind is accepted by an inferior one in spite of the fact that it is incompletely grasped.

It is necessary to exclude cases in which acceptance of the aim of another is due, not to processes of the kind under consideration, but to some process of suggest-
ion or sympathy. The two processes are readily distinguishable. If either suggestion or sympathy is at work in inducing B to seek to further an end which has felt value for A, then the consequence will be that the end in question will have felt value for B also, though perhaps in a spurious way: B at least will believe that he is sharing A's interest or understanding or appreciation, however completely he may have failed to do so. And a relation may very often owe its concordance to such processes; they are of particular importance in enabling one person to take the initiative effectively, whether in a small group or in a large one, in cases in which it is not possible for him to communicate to his fellows the grounds for the line of action which he judges to be necessary in the circumstances (section ). But such an instance is emphatically not a case of altruistic action. It is also necessary to exclude cases in which B gives way to A in any of the ways which have been already discussed - as because of A's general domination of the relation, because A's stronger impulse in a particular case bears his down, because he thinks it politic to yield now in order to get his own way on another occasion, because by yielding he hopes to bring about a better adjustment of the relation. In contrast with cases of these kinds, the processes here under con-
sideration are marked by a clear understanding on the part of B that the end in view has felt value for A and has no felt value for himself, that he is voluntarily furthering it in order to secure to A the satisfaction of its attainment, and that he has no ulterior motive. It is quite certain that social conduct frequently possesses these characters.

169 It is necessary for social psychology to recognise the possibility of such conduct, and to include it as a separate category in its account of the different modes of social interaction. To study the consequences of this human characteristic is part of the task of social psychology. To discover how such conduct is possible, to explain from what fundamental motives it springs, and to relate the genetic and phylogenetic history of these motives - these are tasks which belong, not to the field of social psychology, but to the field of psychology itself as the study of the individual man; for, as soon as we consider an instance of such conduct, and seek to analyse the motives which underlie it, we are thrown back upon an examination of one of the partners to the relation in question, an examination according to the procedures by which psychology studies the individual. It is therefore - most fortunately - unnecessary to attempt here a psy-
chorological account of altruistic action, and the following remarks upon the subject do not aim at being such an attempt. Social psychology must then recognise a class of actions determined by the acceptance on the part of one person of an aim of another because it is that other's: and that class of actions may be so recognised and so described without implying any type of explanation of such conduct.

170 If we ask; Why should A voluntarily accept an aim of B's which has no felt value for himself, but which he perceives to have felt value for B? We are likely to receive the answer: Because A loves B. And this answer must be regarded as satisfactory so far as it goes; but, as soon as we ask for a definition of its principal term, it appears that it does not go very far. For the best answer we are likely to get will be a description of altruism, as that to love another is to accept voluntarily his aims because they are his. And so we are back where we were.

A much less acceptable answer will seek to explain the facts in terms of tender feeling and the parental instinct. Introspection will of course show that tender feeling may be an element in such situations: but it will also show that tender feeling is present, not as
part of the essential structure of the relation, but as a consequent of that structure (section 140). If by love we mean an attitude of tender feeling, then in some cases it may be true that two people get on together because they love one another; but it will be more frequently true that they love one another because they get on well together. Introspection will also show instances of altruism in which tender feeling is not present, or not present in such a degree as to be easily mistaken for the determining motive. It will also show its appetitive character to be in sharp contrast with that of truly altruistic action.

The subject is too large a one for treatment here but it may be suggested that, when the word love is used of relations between persons, it may have reference to a variety of structures which have been distinguished in this chapter. It is a term, not of analytical psychology, but of everyday speech, of poetry and rhetoric, of religion and mysticism. In all these cases its use seems to imply (whatever it may imply in addition) a certain intensity of feeling accompanying a high valuation of its object. Such a description will fit an appetitive relation in which the partner is the object of the sexual or parental tendencies. It will fit a cooperative relation in which the conative states involved are capable
of giving rise to the necessary intensity of feeling and in which the dependence upon the partner of the attainment of their ends is realised so that feeling attaches to him as well as to the ends which are sought. It will fit relations in which supra-personal ends are pursued in concert with another, and because of the natural concord of minds engaged in such pursuits, the feeling states related to the partner will be of a peculiar degree of purity and serenity. Lastly, it will fit relations of the kind under consideration here, and in such cases a peculiar degree of exaltation is made possible by their peculiar circumstances for, in the circumstances of the other type of relation, the partner may fail to play the part allotted to him - a danger greatest in the appetitive relation, less in the cooperative relations, and less still when supra-personal values are sought in cooperation, but here, since the end proposed is the attainment of the purposes of his own being, this is a danger scarcely to be apprehended.

It should also be noted that it involves the paradox of self-sacrifice and self-realisation - that self-sacrifice may be self-realisation, a topic upon which philosophers and poets and religious teachers might all be quoted to the same purpose. Thus Blake says in one place:

...every kindness to another is a little Death...
meaning, I suppose, that death is the termination of the self as a system of conative dispositions seeking their fulfilment in the processes of living, and that, just as death is the destruction of all our purposes, so every sacrifice of an aim of one's own in favour of the attainment of the aim of another, is the voluntary abrogation of some element in the personality and so, in his emphatic words, "a little Death". But his comment is:

Nor can Man exist but by Brotherhood.

and in another place he says:

The most sublime act is to set another before you. To accept the purpose of another in place of one's own is to "die to one's self"; but it is also to live in the other. I may quote Traherne,

Love has a marvellous property of feeling in another. It can enjoy in another, as well as enjoy him.

This sentence distinguishes very accurately the appetitive and the altruistic attitudes.

171 Whatever may be the psychological explanation of altruistic action, its consequences are clear enough - in so far as it operates there is a further bond between the
persons concerned in its operation. For the one the other is his object, for the other the first is a condition of the achievement of his ends. There is therefore (unless there is a serious misunderstanding on one side or the other) a resultant concord.

Upon the altruistic attitude to another depends the intellectual and moral development of the members of a society in so far as that development requires the disinterested guidance and furtherance of those of greater age and experience. Such guidance cannot be assigned for its explanation to an instinctive pity, an impulse coloured by tender feeling and arising out of the parental instinct, though this explanation will fit well enough the supply of bodily needs, the feeding of the hungry and the clothing of the naked. But the other is too intellectual in its processes, too bound up with intellectual and moral conceptions to be explained in this way. Its basis seems to be not in instinct but in appreciation of these conceptions as such, and in appreciation of the achievement of values in the life of the other comparable to the values sought or achieved in one's own life - those, for example, of science or philosophy, of aesthetic or moral or religious experience, or those of good taste and good manners and the refinements of eating and drinking; or in supra-personal values achieved partly
in one's own life, and to be further achieved in the life of the other - the advance of knowledge or art or morals or religion, the maintenance and development of the traditions of a family or a class, an institution or a nation or a civilisation; or in a value set upon personality itself and its realisation in a good life.

172 Throughout all the discussion of relations in this chapter, it has hitherto been tacitly assumed that the personalities used as examples have remained unchanged except for those changes due to the intercourse of the relation itself. It is of course quite otherwise in the case of any actual relation. The personalities concerned are developing personalities (sections 94-108) continually subject to change in consequence of processes of maturation, processes of learning and the exercise of reason and choice. Every relation is therefore a relation between developing personalities and every relation must therefore be a developing relation, a relation in which the common mental frame upon which it is based is continuously subject to the processes of growth and re-adjustment. For as soon as a concordant system of interacting dispositions has been established it is liable to be upset by an advance of one mind or the other which outgrows some of the interests involved in it. Thus an intimate
relation itself must be alive and developing. Its con-
tinuance depends upon a parallelism of development or
upon a process of re-adjustment in which each forward
movement of one mind towards a richer and fuller ex-
perience acts as a cue to a parallel movement of the
other; or, if the second mind be incapable of such a
development, it must depend upon a re-adjustment which
maintains the concord of the two personalities while
they in some degree diverge. These processes of re-
adjustment, however, involve no new principle: they
take place in a similar manner to the processes of
adjustment already discussed.

173 Another aspect of social life may be here
emphasised. The different processes of adjustment
distinguished occur (except for those dependent upon other-
consciousness) independently of any awareness that they
are taking place at all. A process of adjustment, the
persisting mental structure which results from it, and
the processes in which that structure functions as an
element in the common mental frame to regulate the
relation - these are in the words of Lévy-Bruhl things
plutôt vécues que pensées. As such they constitute the
unconscious structure and functioning of the relation,
and upon such unrecognised structures and such unwitting
processes a relation largely depends. In the case of a relation these unwitting processes of adjustment correspond to the endo-psychic processes in the individual mind, and they include processes of the kind described in sections 111-115.

174 As the conception of a common mental frame has been made use of throughout this chapter in explanation of the twofold relation, and as it is intended to make use of it in the following chapters to describe the structures of larger groups, it may be desirable at this point to consider how far it can be regarded as a form of the hypothesis of a group mind. My position on the question is this; (a) There is little doubt that writers have meant by a group mind no more than such an organisation of minds in relation to one another as has been described here; (b) the use of the term group mind for such a conception appears to me to be entirely misleading.

If a group or a society consists of a number of minds organised on the basis of a common mental frame, it may quite well be described as a system of minds, or, better still, as a system of relations between minds. But a system of minds forming a group is not a group mind any more than a system of houses (arranged in the
form of a town) is a house; or (to parallel the verbal trick) a town house. These minds because of the interdependent and interlocking character of their responses form a unity; but this is a unity of pattern not a unity of substance. Five hundred fragments of tile piled together are five hundred fragments of tile. If each has a spot of bright colour burned upon it, they are five hundred fragments of tile which have undergone some degree of differentiation. If they be laid together so as to make a portrait in mosaic of Augustus Imperator, they are still five hundred fragments of tile. But the arrangement of their colours in the form of the emperor's face and features is an arrangement which has the unity of a pattern. This unity is the unity of the system of relations existing between the different pieces in respect of their positions, their shapes and their colours. And the unity of a group, the cohesion of which results from the organisation of the similar and complementary dispositions of its members in a common mental frame, is a similar unity of pattern. We should not speak of the mosaic portrait as a collective tile or a group tile, or a tile of any other kind; and there seems to be as little justification for speaking of such an organisation of minds as a collective mind or as a group-mind.
In order to emphasise the points of difference between the conception of a common mental frame and the hypothesis of a collective mind or soul, a mind or soul of the group as such, the following characters of the conception of a common mental frame may be set out as follows:—

(1) It implies no contact between the minds concerned except through the usual channels of sense.

(2) It implies the partial organisation of each mind with reference to the other. In the case of any one mind considered by itself, this is exactly analogous to its organisation with reference to any material aspect of its environment and no new hypothesis is implied.

(3) It implies a functional unity of the two minds in reference to their common activity; but this unity is not a unity of substance (or even, properly, the unity of a pattern woven in such mental substance), but a unity of the common form of expression achieved by a common activity - the unity of a duet or of a symphony or of the performance of a play, not a unity of the personalities of the performers or of any parts of these personalities.

(4) It implies that this unity of the form of expression rests upon the perception of the performance itself (or the relevant part of it) as an aesthetic or a pragmatic unity by each mind independently, and not upon some occult system of connections between the two performers, such as telepathy or a third mind controlling both.

It is desirable to make these distinctions as clear as possible; for, if we are ever to find any evidence of the existence of a group mind, it must be by showing that such conceptions are inadequate to explain the
phenomena of a group life. If on the other hand we are to show that that hypothesis is unnecessary, it must be by showing that these conceptions (or others used in place of them) are adequate to explain these phenomena and do not imply such a hypothesis.

175 Participation in group life yields at intervals a peculiar experience, which may be described as a vague awareness (or "feeling") that one is part of, or constrained by, or carried along by the current of a larger life. This experience is probably the origin of a belief in a supra-personal group mind in the case of at least some of the defenders of such a view. Whether or not this is so it is a phenomenon of sufficient importance to be examined at length. Such an examination of it cannot be made here. It may, however, be considered relevant, if I glance at its possible relation to the theory of group structure here put forward.

If there were sufficient evidence of telepathic interaction between minds, this hypothesis might be used to explain it. But there is insufficient evidence for telepathy to compel us to accept it of any phenomena; and such evidence as there is suggests that, if it does occur, it occurs in the case of exceptional persons and
under conditions which at present we cannot control: and there is little justification for appealing to it here if it be not first firmly established elsewhere.

An explanation in terms of primitive, passive sympathy has a greater weight of evidence in its favour. An interaction of this kind is at any rate commonly assumed in the case of other phenomena. But in these cases the mental states involved are primitive emotional states. And in this case the mental states involved are by no means all of that character.

Explanation of such experiences in terms of a social or gregarious instinct, is more plausible. Other evidence for the existence of such an innate tendency appears to me, however, quite insufficient. Anger, fear, disgust, curiosity, assertiveness, submission, and the impulses of tenderness are modes of experience and behaviour which I cannot help but recognise in myself and others: and, if I am not to call them instincts I must still recognise their specific characters and their common qualities under some other name (and I must probably give similar recognition to some other modes of impulsion which I can easily distinguish). I can discover in myself no similarly characteristic impulses or emotions of gregariousness. I can be angry with my fellows, afraid of them, disgusted with them, amazed at
them, superior to them, humble before them and moved to tenderness by them. I have no eighth mode of feeling about them, no eighth kind of impulse with regard to them, which justifies the addition of a gregarious tendency to the list - unless indeed these very experiences as a member of a group. But to explain these experiences in terms of gregarious instinct assumed for that purpose seems from the point of view of scientific method a sorry procedure.

Can such an additional assumption be dispensed with? I believe the phenomena in question to be easily explained in terms of the conceptions which have already been made use of. Our fellows are, as we have seen (section 117), of all the objects in our environment the most potent in attracting attention and interest and in exciting the powerful innate tendencies of our minds. They are also the necessary partners in almost all of our activities - for almost all of our activities are related to those of our fellows and most of them are obviously parts of common activities directed to the achievement of common forms of expression. Thus the organisation of our minds is an organisation of dispositional patterns, almost all of which are elements in common mental frames. Of dispositional patterns not so organised, we may point to some simple reflexes such as the knee-jerk and the pupillary reflex: but even reflex
actions - coughing, sneezing and yawning are obvious examples - do not all remain independent of the organisation of the mind with reference to the social environment. Considering, then, a mind apart from its social environment we see that its organisation in common mental frames is practically coextensive with its total organisation - it is a massive psychical organisation, functioning now to release and now to inhibit impulses. And the condition of its functioning is the presence of our fellows - this one or that, this group of them or that group, such and such numbers of them - or their presence accompanied by other specific external conditions. It does not seem surprising that phenomena of an imposing character - experiences of powerful constraint or of being carried away - should result: such phenomena in fact, as we are seeking to account for. Nor is it in the least degree surprising that such constraints and impulsions should bring with them a "feeling" of being checked or drawn along by forces outside of oneself.

176 It should be noted that the expression of elements organised in a common mental frame depends upon a peculiarly complex pattern of external circumstances. My habits with regard to tobacco require for their ex-
pression circumstances in which I am free to smoke, cigarettes, or tobacco of the kind I prefer and my pipe, a box of matches, and a mucous membrane in a normal condition. Should any of these conditions be unfulfilled I am debarred this expression. But it may be noted that most of these conditions are under my control - if I have left my pipe behind me, I have only myself to blame - and they are (except for the state of my mucous membrane) clearly defined, so that I know exactly when this expression is debarred, and when the path to it will be open again. So far as my mucous membrane is concerned, if I have a catarrh, my pleasure in tobacco may be interfered with, I am irritated and wonder whether there is something wrong with myself or something wrong with the tobacco. I try to smoke, and give it up, and try again, with a like disappointment. The cause of the trouble and the extent of its duration are not in this case clearly defined. In contrast with this simple case the expression of a disposition organised in a common mental frame depends upon conditions of three kinds (a) elements in a common frame of circumstances, analogous to my freedom to smoke and my being provided with the means, (b) conditions in myself, physiological and psychical, relevant to my playing my part (health, fatigue and conflicting interests are obvious examples) analogous to the state of my mucous
membrane, and (c) conditions not paralleled at all in the case of dispositions not organised in a common mental frame - my partner's fitness and willingness to play his part. These last conditions are - in contrast with material ones - beyond my control, and beyond my powers of analysis. They have also an element of capriciousness. If my pipe is in my pocket and I want to smoke, it can be depended upon to play its part. But if a friend, with whom I sometimes play chess, is with me, and I wish to play chess, it may happen that he wants to do something else. The intercourse of a social relation depends therefore upon happy moments of concord which are, even in the case of the most dependable of companions, in some degree fortuitous.

To this may be added a further consideration. Every relation is unique. No relation can remain permanently unchanged. Our minds involve therefore a mass of sentiments and other dispositional structures, which have once been functional, but have lost their objects, and are neither adequately stimulated, nor completely assimilated into the organisation of dispositional structures which are of later origin and still functional. Called into activity by occasional repetitions of something more or less like the situations to which they originally belonged they give
176 to social life a random and evanescent emotional colouring of a peculiar intensity, a bewildering joy of rare moments and happy concords, which are above the experience of every day, and not to be found with seeking, or repeated at will.

177 From the point of view of the psychological analysis of social structure a group of two persons is the smallest social unit. In sociology the smallest unit - the ultimate unit of sociological analysis - has frequently been taken to be the group of father, mother and child. From a psychological point of view this group is immediately seen to involve three twofold relations - father and mother, father and child, mother and child - each open to psychological observation and analysis. For psychology therefore the family is not the ultimate unit of psychological analysis of social structure.

To take this point of view is not to contend that larger groups can be completely described in terms of the twofold relations existing between their members taken in pairs. The family of father, mother and child comprises three persons, and it will be shown in the next chapter that the group of three may involve four common
mental frames - that of each of the three pairs and that of the three persons taken together. It is, however, maintained that the group of two is worthy of study for its own sake, that it is the group to which psychological methods of study can be most readily applied, and that the concepts derived from such a study can be usefully applied to larger groups. An attempt to show that they can be so applied will be made in the next chapter.

178 In any society relations are so intricately interwoven and so interdependent that it is impossible to find any relations or any group which is completely detachable from the larger social structure of which it forms a part. The advantage of the twofold relation as the starting point for psychological analysis is not that it is so detachable but that it can be submitted to psychological study - a psychological study which in process of making out the main structure of any such relation inevitably comes upon strands which connect up with the whole complex of relations which form its social background. When we turn our attention from the main structure of the relation, and focus it instead upon one of the other relations - twofold, threefold, fourfold or more complex still - to which it is so knit up, we discover that this other relation is of the same character,
describable in the same terms, as the first; and so is a third to which the second may lead, a fourth, a fifth and so on: and to follow up such threads unremittingly would be in the end to unravel the whole texture of the society of which they are a part.

The emphasis which in this chapter has been put on the twofold relation is therefore not to be understood as implying a belief that a society is a sum of such groups of two - that the group of two is the structural unit out of which it is built: it is intended to imply that the formal structure of personal relations can be most easily examined in the twofold relation, and that, because the same formal structure is to be found in larger groups which are less accessible to direct study, the description of the twofold relation is, as has been said, the key to unlock the problems of the larger social units.

179 Our argument has consequently sought to describe those forms of mental organisation which are common to all relations, and it has not distinguished types of relation classified according to the content of their common mental frames, the particular tendencies, innate or acquired, organised in them - such types for example as the sexual relation, the parental relation, friendship, economic partnership, the relation of superior and sub-
ordinate and so on. Relations exemplifying each of these types have of course been referred to in the course of the argument, whenever an example was used; and obviously so, since such a classification would be exhaustive of all relations, and all one’s examples must therefore fall within it. But classification of relations according to the nature of the tendencies organised in them, or the ends to which they are directed, has not been aimed at.

One such type of relation is however of such central importance in psychology, in social psychology, and in sociology, that it cannot be passed over without mention, and this is the family. The family is important for social theory in a number of ways. In some cases it has actually been something like the structural unit of a society: the society could be described as a number of family groups linked together. It is also true that the family is the smallest group capable of perpetuating itself: it is through the sexual and parental relations, and through them only, that a new generation can be begotten and reared, and the life of a society renewed and maintained.

It is however neither of these aspects of the family which is at present referred to. The family has an additional importance for psychology and for sociology
in that it is for everyone the first social group of which he is a member. In the history of every individual the relation to the mother (or to the nurse who takes her place) is the first relation to which he is a partner. Its particular history may therefore colour all of an individual's later social relations, since we have only to push the argument as to the growth of new relations out of old ones (section 146) far enough to see that all relations have grown out of this primary one.

Apart from such an a priori argument, it can be shown by the analysis of the minds of individuals, and beyond any question, that elements in the relation to the mother may become determinants of later relations, and that the relation to the father has a similar importance, the relation to the mother normally influencing all later relations in which an element of tender feeling is present, and the relation to the father being the first experience of submission to authority, and influencing in consequence the attitude to all authorities met with later on.

The family has also a peculiar psychological and sociological importance as the group in which the individual's training and education begin. It is through the family that the social tradition first reaches him, and it is through the family that its fundamental forms
of expression are learned.

180 On these grounds it might be urged that the family should, in such a study as this, be given the place that has in this chapter been given to the two-fold relation and there is much to be said for the propriety of such a view. In favour of the plan adopted must be urged its much greater convenience for the present purpose. The psychological structures and processes of the child’s relation to its mother are hidden in the mists and darkness of that shadowy region of which psycho-analysis paints for us such a picture as it can, from the equivocal symbolism of dreams, and from memories painfully recovered by the use of its special technique. The aims of the psycho-analyst

...has ire per umbras,
per loca senta siti cogunt noctemque profundam,...

but it is not necessary for the social psychologist to seek his first data in this region of dim uncertainties, since his own social experience provides a more useful starting point for his inquiries. Adult social relations are in contrast immediately accessible to study, and almost every point in the argument that has been set out in this chapter can be readily tested by application to the easily accessible phenomena of everyday life.
The family has a further disadvantage for our purpose in that the analytical study of it is peculiarly involved with questions of the content rather than the forms of family relations. Which tendencies in the child are stimulated by the mother, which tendencies in the mother are stimulated by the child, which tendencies are stimulated in and by a son, which in and by a daughter, which, in either case, are involved in the relation to which the father is a partner, and the reciprocal effects of these relations and that between the parents - these are topics on which sharply contrasted views are held: and the controversies with regard to these divergent views have little relevance to the problem of the forms which relations may take.

181 Furthermore, it may be urged that the more general problem of the possible forms of relation is logically prior to the discussion in detail of any one type of group (such as the family, the friendship group, employer and employees and so on) from the point of view of both the form and content of the relations in it. There is no doubt that the elucidation of either of these problems must throw light upon the other. It is equally clear that if we were able to describe in abstract terms every possible form of relation we should still have to study
actual relations of all types in concrete terms in order
to discover which of these forms are to be found in each
type, and the relative importance of each conceivable
form in the relations of living men and women. But a
study of any particular type of relation from the point
of view of its form and its content seems to presume the
employment of some already accepted terminology in which
that form and content can be described - in the case of
the content the terms in which we describe mental
structures and processes, and in the case of the form
such concepts as we have been endeavouring to work out
from the consideration of twofold relations of many
types and varied content.

182 We live in an age which has not yet exhausted its
first enthusiasm for a genetic or evolutionary approach
to all questions to which such an approach is possible.
In that enthusiasm it is still possible to forget that a
genetic, or a phylogenetic, picture must be painted in
colours derived from prior analytic studies, there being
no other colours in which it can be painted. Thus
descriptive anatomy is logically prior to an account of
the development of the body, whether in the life time of
the individual, or in the evolution of the race. In the
same way, analytic psychology is logically prior to an
account of the growth of the mind. And in the case of our present problem the distinguishing of the forms of relation which we can discern in our own social experience would seem to be logically prior to an account of our own social development as individuals, an account of the social relations of others, for example those of children, an account of the history of different types of social relation in the development of our own society (other, that is, than a descriptive account of the objective aspects of such relations such as is the normal business of social history), or an account of the relations underlying the structures of primitive societies. This is no doubt disguised by the reciprocal influences of such studies: the application of concepts of purely analytic origin to genetic problems, and to problems of social development, must result in their very great improvement; but if the prior analytic inquiry has not been so conducted as to reach valid conclusions, the genetic and evolutionary accounts based upon them must go still further wrong.

It is not possible to proceed as if the chronologically prior were also the logically prior - to look first at the scanty evidence available on the basis of which to reconstruct the experience of the infant or the social relations of our first human ancestors, to invent terms
for their description and, armed with these terms, to attack the problems of the mature mind and of the high civilisations. To do this is to be at once blinded to aspects of the mature mind and the high civilisation which would have been at once evident to a mind free from such preconceptions. It is true that the mature mind must be of such a kind as could develop from the infantile mind, and that the high civilisation must be of such a kind as could develop from the primitive prehistoric culture; and that a knowledge of the chronologically prior would therefore illuminate our studies of the chronologically later. But it is equally true that the infantile mind must have been such that the mature mind could develop from it, and that the primitive prehistoric society must have been such that the civilised society could develop from it; and that a knowledge of the chronologically later may therefore illuminate our studies of the chronologically earlier. The bridge which the reason may seek to build between the two is equally long, whether we start from the one end, or from the other: but the chronologically later is in both cases the more accessible, and beyond all comparison the richer in building materials. Having noted this we may remind ourselves that bridges are not in practice built from one end, but that, presumably, a rope will go across first, and then
a hawser, with a precarious structure of scaffolding to follow, before the steel girders span it, and a ferro-concrete roadway, on which he who will may cross in security, every advantage being taken of the foothold allowed by either bank throughout the whole process of construction.