A THEORY OF TRANSITION:
Latency and Adolescence from an Object-Relations Viewpoint

by

JAMES INNES SMITH, M.A., B.Ed.

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INTRODUCTION

When a child is born a new person comes within the range of our perceptions who by his potentiality for human action demands from us a different kind of consideration from that which we might give to an amoeba or a foetus. The situation which exists between observer and observed is made significant by their histories: we bring to the study of development our knowledge of growth and our own experiences of birth and life which may sometimes obscure and complicate rather than illuminate and simplify but which cannot be laid aside. We are the products of our histories and it is in our traffic with others that our own humanity is manifested. The uniqueness of the human species is reflected in the way man has transcended general rules relating to particular aspects of his functioning, and at the same time created needs which are just as urgent and compelling arising not from the exercise of animal functions but from the operation of thought. The psycho-social level of human existence precludes an adequate description of man's behaviour in terms of biological adaptation, but the incontrovertible fact of his position upon a continuum of biological evolution demands its place in any explanatory system of human personality. Each child is born with a history which forms part of the history of the species which in turn merges into the history of life itself to form a matrix of causation which we cannot afford to neglect in our efforts to define the unmistakable otherness which separates
man so decisively from all other species on earth. The apparent duality of man's nature, on the one hand subject to biological conditions of survival while on the other in control of many aspects of a complex socio-physical environment, has proved a major source of difficulty in previous attempts to arrive at a comprehensive account of his personality. The uniqueness of man may not be explained either in terms of what he has in common with animals nor solely in terms of human thought, but through consideration of the processes by which mind has arisen out of the profusion of specialised adaptation which marks the course of evolution and by demonstrating how its functions are married to the mechanisms of biological survival in the production of human behaviour.

Growth is an observable phenomenon which man shares with all other organisms, and from the study of these we can often gain information relevant to an understanding of human beings. An interpretation of human behaviour which claimed to be psychological only, which failed to take into account maturation and adaptation and which ignored the neurophysiological, endocrinological and metabolic aspects of behaviour would be incomplete, though neuro-humoral and other structures can only be regarded as prerequisites for the further realisation of general phylogenetic or specific individual functional possibilities. Study of a simple organism like a plant shows the difference which lies between the capacities of its meagre
neural equipment and the infinity of patterns made possible by the multitude of interacting cortical cells. The difference is more than quantitative however, for the variety of man's mental life includes qualities beyond the mere fact of his social organisation. The ants and the bees have a social organisation, but only man has a culture, made possible by his highly developed powers of communication which have their expression in language and symbolism. Increased power of control over the features of his physical environment has resulted in the enlargement and complication of his systems of relationships. In human ontogenesis we see more than an increase in physical size and the capacity for finer and more flexible adaptations through neurophysiological evolution, but also extension of the powers of communication and widening of the range and type of human interaction. Growth is a unifying concept, bringing both differentiation and integration and for human beings means participation in more complex and more numerous groups from the composition of which much can be learned of individuals. The primary inquiry for psychology, however, is the effect of the group on the individual rather than the nature of the group itself. Psychology is concerned with individuals, with real existents, actual persons living in these complex relationships with other persons each of which is himself a member of various groups in an environment which is at one and the same time
common to all and yet specific for each individual. (Brierley, 1951, p. 126)(Freud, 1921). This environment is the concern of sociologists rather than psychologists, but as the groups are of individuals and it is individuals who comprise the group, the two approaches are complementary and indispensable to each other.

Studies of the behaviour of animals are informative pointers to the composition and operation of the instinctive endowment of human beings and may be aided by types of experiment which for various reasons are impossible with human subjects. To avoid assuming the human being as given in propositions concerning his nature, which is a fruitful source of error in personality study, a consideration of the processes which have produced him is a useful corrective. The study of organisms less far along the path of evolution and particularly comparisons with the higher primates serve to demonstrate at one and the same time man's dependence upon his biological heritage and the methods he has devised to overcome its limitations. Medical research and allied disciplines have gained much benefit from work in this field, and Fairbairn (1956) considers that neglect of what we know of animal behaviour has tended to obscure psychoanalytical thinking which, so far as instinct theory is concerned, may be a valid criticism. Yet it is of first importance to remember that the study of animals can yield information only
on the qualities which man shares with them and can take no account of the qualities which demonstrate his difference. "Because we are reflective," says de Chardin (1959, p. 166), "we are not only different but quite other." Those parts of the human personality which are concerned with the regulations of instinct are no less constant than instinct itself, since some form of morality exists in all human groups known to history or cultural anthropology, and although these regulating parts may be variable and to some extent modifiable, they cannot be extinguished in the individual or the race.

Our conception of development and evolution must be related not only to information regarding the original state but also to our assumptions concerning the end to which all processes are directed. It is not enough to say that all processes of functional and structural modification during the entire life span result from the interaction of an individual's genetic constellation and his environment (Luthe, 1957, p.122). Man has the power to vary his own environment and may have the means to vary both his functional and structural modifications. Thus the area of study must include not only the genetic constellation and the environment, but also the means of transaction between them and the goal towards which the transactions are directed. Not only personality but also the nature of reality and consciousness must be considered in the attempt to arrive at principles by which what is known about life, of phylogenesis, ontogenesis and the growth of
reflection may be related to our present observation and experience in a coherent system.

In modern psychology, attempts to solve these problems seem to have branched out along two main lines. The first of these is broadly based upon the Lockean view of the intellect as a passive receptor of sense impressions which it receives from a world of external things in which it exists. (nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu). The emphasis is strongly on stimulus-response and learning and the view is implicit that what is external and visible is more fundamental than what is not. Such presuppositions are congenial to modern psychological positivism and to atomistic and molecular explanations of human personality. Inevitably those features of human beings which are most characteristic tend to be disregarded in favour of those which support the hypothesis of species equivalence. The second line follows Leibnitz, who appended to Locke's proposition (excipe: nisi ipse intellectus). The conception of a purposive organism which is the source of acts is in the direct descent from Aristotle's teleological doctrines, and a similar view underlies Acquinas' doctrine of 'intention' and Spinoza's 'conatus' principle. In the tradition of Leibnitz, Kant evolved a philosophy in which the principle governing conduct was the formulation of universal laws and the criterion of social behaviour was the treatment of other human beings as ends in
themselves. This way of regarding human social organisation has important implications for later psychosocial theories of development.

In the general tradition of Leibnitz both in psychology and philosophy there have been many different accounts of the participation of the person in the moulding and arrangement of sensory data in ways which are not allowed for in the systems which derive from the elementarist theories of Hume and Locke. Stuart Hampshire (1959) presents a view of man as an object moving his own position in relation to other objects like himself in a world of persisting objects to which he can refer by means of language. Unlike animals he can communicate with others and gain knowledge of his own situation by observing the results of his own manipulations and interferences. This is in accordance with de Chardin's position that the quality which separates man from animals is the power of consciousness to turn inward upon itself: "Non plus seulement connaître, mais se connaître; non plus seulement savoir, mais savoir que l'on sait." An animal may know, but it does not know that it knows. (1955, p. 165).

In the same way as the human species has progressed from its animal origins through the natural progress of biological evolution, passing through a series of transformations all in the direction of greater complexity, the individual passes through a continuous series of states from a fertilised ovum
to an adult. The beginning of reflection, that minute alteration to a complex pattern which upset the whole equilibrium and added a new dimension to the evolution of species, could not have been seen through an outward and visible sign, even had there been an observer there to see it. In the same way we cannot discern at what precise moment the child may be said to achieve intelligence, the adolescent become adult, nor can we isolate the instant at which the individual comes ultimately to die. Unlike a phyletic embryogenesis in which each step or stage is represented by a different being, the same individual passes through continuous changes of state, each of which it has either not yet reached or gone beyond. Such continuous process makes it impossible for us to express the difference between child and adult in quantitative terms: we cannot dismiss the experience of a child as merely a prelude to complete living as an adult in an adult world, nor can we deny to that experience significance and meaning for the adult who is yet to come. Both child and adult are persons within a situation: the child is more than its promise of maturity. It is existing now, perceiving and acting upon its perceptions like other observers although it is still limited in its faculty of controlling and manipulating its environment. These limitations are imposed not only by physical and physiological factors, but by psychic factors also and there is no certainty in what way these two groups
may be connected. Until more is known of this it is unwise to ascribe causality to one set or the other. Phylogenesis is often considered in terms of the development of differentiated characteristics as adaptations to a particular environment or the result of the survival of the fittest, but such an explanation may be inadequate to explain the course of evolution which is more than a simple advance towards greater complexity (de Chardin, 1955, p. 147 et seq.) As man is the most highly developed of all species and the quality which distinguishes him is psychological, perhaps the development of characters in evolution should properly be considered not as the effect of external forces but as an expression of inner forces which have reached their highest present form in human psychology. Such a view of evolution would reinforce the necessity for us to consider individual human development as a psychic process with concurrent physical and physiological features. The dualism which results from an attempt to postulate two forms of energy, psychic and physical, and the atomism which sees the organism as a conglomeration of separately functioning parts which reach some measure of integration through development are both alien to a scientific account of human behaviour. Evolution of the species and the mental and physical development of the individual are both characterised by the gradual differentiation of unified functioning structures, not by the
organisation of separately functioning parts (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 53). Parts of an organism may be considered as functioning separately for the purposes of scientific analysis, but in fact such separate functioning only happens as the result of a pathological process. Consideration of these relations between the child and the adult and comparisons between phylogenesis and ontogenesis are a corrective to the neglect of the child and the primitive in both psychology and philosophy, which obscures the operation of continuous processes which give coherence to the whole.

Such neglect was not apparent in the thought of Freud whose attention to the interaction of mental and physical in hysteria led him to the discovery that adult sexuality is not the result of physiological changes at a certain stage of physical growth, but rather a part of something present from infancy. His views were grounded in psychopathology and the development of theory, technique of investigation and practice of therapy were intricately related. An important initial result of his discoveries was the direction of attention to the early years of life: it became more difficult to sustain a view of children as defective or imperfectly functioning adults. Preoccupation with adolescence as a time of sudden change, an approach congenial to those who sought direct physical or physiological correlates of behaviour, gave way to a more balanced view of development. The marked bodily
changes together with the alteration in status and in society's demands which makes adolescence so patently a period of readjustment were not obviously paralleled in infancy: changes were more subtle and less subject to comparisons between individuals, so that individual differences were obscured. Investigation became directed further and further back in infancy and child analysts such as Melanie Klein often quote material relative to the first months of life although the objection has been offered that this is merely a reconstruction from inference from conditions observed at later ages. This continuity of developmental processes was further emphasised when Freud in his later works saw the prototype of all anxiety experience in the birth trauma, (Freud, 1926), a view which formed the basis of a deviant system in the work of Otto Rank (1924). Jung, (1928), went even further back beyond the origins of the individual, tracing the roots of behaviour to certain 'archetypes' or primitive inherited predispositions to action. His concept of the collective unconscious was the vehicle for these archetypes which was the archaic part of humanity and a link with primitive organisations which extended far back in the history of the race and was reflected in its mythology.

"One of the modern fruits of Nietzschean thought is Freudian pessimism", writes Reinhold Niebuhr (1941 p. 26), and it is not hard to understand how Freud's view of instinct
and the libido theory led to determinist views of human development and a negative view of human achievement, though this is by no means inevitable. By providing a reconstruction of individual motivation, psychoanalysis throws light on the individual's attitude towards society in terms of protection from external threats but perhaps does not do full justice to the satisfactions gained from moving along constructive social avenues (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1957, p. 166). The same underlying motivation may lead to a wide range of behaviour, the further specification of which may hinge upon other than dynamic factors. Psychoanalytical explanations of 'higher' values in terms of subliminations of primitive libidinal values, particularly those determined by the aims of the erotogenic zones, do little to explain what determines the aesthetic value of a work of art, for instance, and reductive explanations in art, religion, morals and philosophy have drawn the criticism that while psychoanalysis threw a great deal of light upon psychopathology and anthropology, it accentuated the negative rather than the positive aspects of human nature and said little about the characteristic group of activities so appropriately entitled 'the Humanities', (Fairbairn, 1954). It is clear that some explanation must be attempted in any system which claimed to be comprehensive, and historically it has been the function of philosophy to offer such embracing accounts of the nature and meaning of
the universe. The rival claim of psychoanalysis to provide an explanation of the motivation of all human activities, however, included philosophy itself, as was made clear by Freud when he wrote, "We venture ............. to transform metaphysics into metapsychology." (Freud, 1914, p. 39). From the classic psycho-analytic standpoint of course all 'higher' values are derived values as has been demonstrated in many essays in the field of art and philosophy (Wisdom, 1953). It is useful to note in passing that while Freud related cultural phenomena to the sublimation of libidinal impulses, he sought an explanation of religion and morals in terms of the Oedipus situation mediated by the super-ego. Two explanatory principles, one involving the sublimation of instinct and the other in terms of relationships within the psyche were therefore required for explanation of the most characteristic human activities.

Reaction against the determinism of Freud's theory of instinct and reluctance to concede to the unconscious power which would challenge the supremacy of the will have always been sources of resistance to the acceptance of his view of development and this was demonstrated in Freud's own lifetime by the divergence of Adler, whose 'psychology of totality' (1935) viewed the organic and psychic functions of the individual as constituting an original unity which is in turn but a part of the higher unity constituted by society. This
recognition of the Aristotelian view of man as a social animal is a factor of great importance in the psychology of the person and it would only obscure the value of Freud's theoretical contribution in his discovery of motivational dynamics if it were not to be openly accepted that the reductive method may explain away rather than explain and that perhaps the conceptual tools of classical psychoanalysis have been up to the present time at least insufficient to offer a full explanation of rational and social behaviour, yet alone the more complex kinds of human activity shown in the creative arts.

The material which Freud drew upon for the purpose of his theory construction and the method of investigation which he discovered placed little emphasis upon the direct observation of external behaviour, which had the result of making clear how inadequate were physical models for arriving at a theoretical system of psychic growth. Freud's own neurological training and his early attempts to find a neurophysiological explanation of psychology had a formative influence upon his concept of unconscious mental activity and may explain his use of topographical description when speaking of the mind. As a result of his use of associative material, Freud discovered an important principle which he stated aphoristically in one of his earliest papers (Freud & Breuer, 1893), "hysterical patients suffer mainly from reminiscences". He noted a
compulsion to repetition of painful situations in children's play, in the anxiety dreams of traumatic neuroses and in the transference revivals of painful situations in patients' lives. The conclusion which he drew from this was of great importance for the development of his theory of instinct. It was that there was a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition (1920, p. 44) but discussion of this, which was the genesis of his view of the death instinct belongs properly to a later chapter (chapter 6). What is important to note here is that Freud had demonstrated the apparently reversible nature of psychic process, which removed it at one stroke from the limitations of theoretical systems tied to physical or physiological events. The balance between psyche and soma is a delicate one, nowhere better shown than in Freud's original field of investigation, hysterical paralysis and hysterical conversion. In normal life and in the records of primitive societies the interaction of mind and body may be seen: hysterical conversion mechanisms and psychosomatic disorders in modern life have their parallel in the death of a primitive tribesman who has broken a taboo. As in phylogensis, the controlled complication by which life advances in the evolution of species, so in human ontogenesis, if we disregard the psychic factor, the changes which take place are irreversible and a condition which has once been
passed in the course of development cannot be reinstated. But psycho-analytical material in dreams, associations and particularly in the phenomenon of regression seemed to demonstrate that psychic growth was reversible and that under various pressures or in pathological conditions a subject might return to an earlier state of development either temporarily or permanently.

The emphasis which Freud placed upon the sexual life of infancy and the Oedipus conflict resulted in a view of psycho-sexual development which, as revised by Abraham, involved a progression through a number of stages in which particular zones of the body were the medium of sexual gratification until genital maturity was attained (Abraham, 1927). The Oedipus complex was regarded as the prime source of neurosis, and the developmental phases of childhood were dependent upon the maturational stages of instinct-development. Such an emphasis was perhaps a direct consequence of the discovery of the place of the unconscious in human motivation, and Freud himself moved further and further away from the consideration of innate instinctive factors as it became clinically necessary to devote more and more time to the analysis of the ego. Abraham also soon recognised that libidinal development implied parallel development of object relations (1927 p. 480 et seq.) The concept of the super-ego arose out of this necessity: it is concerned with the relationship between the individual and the outer world rather than with the
instinctive endowment and its developmental vicissitudes. Freud retained a framework of psychological instinct theory by the adoption of Groddeck's term 'id' to denote an unorganised reservoir of instinctive drives and many later problems of theory arise in this area.

In the same way as the school of Adler could not accept the determinism of Freudian theory, there have been movements in which the ego has been given much greater prominence than the id and the influence of cultural and social factors has been assigned greater importance: a movement particularly marked in the United States at the present day, where the neo-Freudians emphasise the environment much more than is the case in Europe. Workers such as Horney, Fromm, Erikson and Sullivan have drawn upon detailed cultural and sociological studies and while their emphasis upon human relations and studies of 'culture-patterns' in neurosis have considerable descriptive importance, these are lacking in aetiological depth due to the lack of attention given to the basic dynamic factors. Their approach to the analysis of the ego in terms of inferiority feelings and compensatory power drives constitutes an investigation of Freud's 'reality-ego' rather than the total psyche of which the unconscious is such an important part and against which the 'reality-ego' acts as a defensive barrier.

Assessment of the relative significance of the groups of
factors operating in the development of the ego affects our view of the precedence given to successive stages of development. An adherent of the classical Freudian school will place the greatest emphasis upon the early years of life, while the educational process bulks large in the opinion of the culture-pattern group. Such an assessment, as a result of a theoretical position is of great practical importance in bridging the gap between theory and practice in education, sociology and clinical practice. There is a further result arising from the differing emphasis upon cultural and instinctive factors which is of first importance for the progress of scientific investigation: the theoretical standpoint of the investigator determines not only the method of investigation but also to a large extent the definition of what properly constitutes the data. For certain experimental purposes a psychologist studying the reactions of a young child to a ball might choose to isolate him in a room away from his mother, free from distracting stimuli. An investigator with a different theoretical orientation might feel that data obtained under such conditions were rendered useless by an environment so abnormal that the child no longer qualified as a normally functioning individual. Surveying the field of psychology at the present day, it would seem that there are three main approaches to the study of personality: first, philosophical and phenomenological, second, psychoanalytic
and clinical, and third, experimental and psychometric. These are general lines of approach rather than exclusive divisions, as in the work of most researchers there are usually elements of more than one. They have a common element, however, in that they are concerned with the person, and although definitions of personality vary, most would agree that the individual is the unit of investigation. It is suggested, therefore, that not only must the study of development begin with a clear definition of the nature of the person, but also the value of a particular approach may be judged by the comprehensiveness of that definition.

It is easy to see how a term such as 'adolescence' is tied to the events of physical and physiological maturation, or how a relatively modern term such as 'teenager' is determined not so much by chronological age as by certain social customs heavily reinforced by commercial forms of persuasion directed at habits of spending. Perhaps it is less easy to see that atomism of any kind, which may be implicit in trait theories or studies of particular functions, have within them a tendency to deny the child as a person. Freud's account of the growth of the super-ego, with its dependence upon the resolution of the Oedipus phase and its coincidence with the onset of the latency period, has on the other hand tended to an undervaluation of processes of socialisation and learning which are characteristic of this
period. Object-relations theory is not open to this objection and takes a view of development which allows for the social nature of man and is "a process whereby infantile dependence upon the object gradually gives place to mature dependence on the object" (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 34). What lies between these states is a transitional stage, characterised by a number of movements in the same direction, concurrent, interlinked, interdependent and interacting, but capable of being traced separately for purposes of scientific analysis. These threads converge upon the same end which is the emergence of a differentiated individual capable of relationships with other differentiated individuals who are mutually dependent and between whom there is no disparity of dependence (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 145).

Each social man emerges from an ego-centric child and thus re-enacts the process by which the human species arose from the mass of differentiating and multiplying species. Man at the stage of reflection is the culmination of a process or series of processes and although the change which took place on the replacement of instinct by thought as the main principle of action in the human species altered the whole meaning of evolution, it was not that something alien had been added, but that something new had emerged through the operation of natural forces. In the onward movement of life a number of separate factors in an intricate interdependence had been simultaneously
in operation. The development of the brain is of course paramount, and there is evidence that many species became extinct through inadequate brain capacity. Yet if the creature from which man issued had not been a biped, his hands would not have been free in time to release the jaws from their prehensile function and the thick band of maxillary muscles which had imprisoned his cranium could not have been relaxed (de Chardin, 1959, p. 170). To ascribe causality to any one of these factors is to deny the evidence which is around us everywhere that the whole network of related threads which comprises life pushes forward at one and the same time, though the changes which are taking place are imperceptible and spurts or sudden activations such as apparently take place in the mitotic division of single cells are no proof of the abruptness of growth. When physicists first postulated the atomic structure of matter they conceived atoms as indivisible units and the superseding of this idea was the result of abstract processes of thought leading to experiments which did in fact lead to the splitting of the atom. As a result, the structure of matter came to be considered in the kind of terms used by Russell, who speaks of "a wave of probability undulating in nothingness" (Russell, 1951). Physics is the most advanced of the natural sciences and there is every reason for relating psychology to the movement of modern scientific thought by assuming that the ultimate
analysis of psychological functioning will be in terms of
process rather than in terms of things (Waddington, 1944, p. 48). At the level of the human organism the process of
development is perceptible as a series of homogeneous physical
patterns of growth which are related and continuous but the
overemphasis upon critical phases of growth, biologically or
psychologically, may obscure the operation of the general
simple underlying processes which it is the ultimate purpose
of science to discover.

A clinical view of child development demands a theory
of personality which makes it possible to consider the
individual at every stage as complete and unique. Psychopathology rightly emphasises that the genesis of most
disturbances of mental health is in early infancy and rigorist
schools of psychology insist upon the prediction of behaviour
as the criterion of hypothesis testing, yet the therapist is
not immediately concerned with past or future except
secondarily, as far as these may assist his understanding of
actions in the present. Whether the patient is child or
adult, he is here and now in a situation which is acting upon
him and to which he is reacting and which may or may not be
modified. Development is a continuous process and we may
point only to an individual who has not yet reached or already
passed a division between any two of the stages which have
been arbitrarily defined for the purposes of analysis, but
these stages are artificial constructs to assist an understanding of the nature of processes. There are differences in the stages themselves, however: the term 'infantile dependence', for instance, refers to a state which has not yet been abandoned, and to which a return may be made either temporarily or permanently, while 'mature dependence' or 'mature sociality' is a state which has been already achieved, although in fact the relationships involved in the latter state are possible only in theory, and in practice all that can be attained is an approximation to it. The first stage may be observed in animals, but they cannot progress with human beings to more advanced sorts of behaviour or to relationships more complicated than can be explained in terms of Innate Releasing Mechanisms and Imprinting because of the limitations imposed upon them by the position of their species upon the evolutionary continuum. Mature dependence is therefore theoretically possible in the human species only, not in any other. This does not preclude a consideration of all development throughout the course of evolution in terms of relationship and to consider it in this way makes it possible to place the complex human systems and powers of organisation at one end of a continuum which extends from the simplest unicellular organisms through to mammals, the primates and man. Such a continuum has besides this extension in biological time another lateral dimension in ontogenetic
space in that at any given instant of biological time a single species is composed of a multitude of individuals each in his own position upon the continuum determined by the quality of his relationships. The existence of the reflective qualities of man alters the nature and significance of relationship and transforms the whole balance and perspective of the evolutionary pattern, making it impossible to survey it under a single principle unless it is in terms of the human end of the continuum, a truly psychic principle. To do this is not to disregard the biological history of man but to recognise that the emergence of self-consciousness added another dimension to life (de Chardin, 1959, p. 180).

In individual development it is more useful to consider adolescence, for instance, as part of a general process of continuous transition in which different types of relationship are rapidly becoming possible through the simultaneous convergence of a number of separate threads of maturation than as a state to be arrived at or entered into. Life does not proceed by fits and starts, and a view which sees the onset of menstruation or spermato genesis as a traumatic event to which conscious adjustments must be made is not in harmony with what we know of the way in which life moves forward. We avoid false ascriptions of causality when we give primacy to neither physiological nor psychic factors, but we must go one step further. Because the uniqueness of man lies in his
powers of reflection on his own nature and his ability to communicate with other reflecting men, it is therefore suggested that an adequate study of that uniqueness must be psychological and a sufficient explanation of the nature of his communication must be in terms of relationship. It is further maintained that an account of the changes which take place in these qualities through the processes of development must be in terms of a dynamic theory of transition.

In this study, the uniqueness of reflective man expressed in a variety of separate persons, each with his own expanding system of relationships the separate elements of which overlap and form parts of the systems of others provides our definition of personality which is that specially human quality by which a person manifests his individuality in relationships with objects. The person who forms the unit is the product of processes of biological evolution and the force which is activating these processes is taken to be ultimately the same as that which energises systems of physical matter. The study of interchange of energy between physical structures and the psychic apparatus of individuals is within the field of metapsychology in which the unit is a mental process. Metapsychologically, persons are themselves systems. Recent developments in ego psychology indicate that the time has now come to attempt a synthesis of Freudian and later theoretical contributions to personality study, clinical
findings in both adult and child analysis, philosophical considerations of the nature of reality and consciousness and some recent advances in the natural sciences. Such a large aim is beyond the scope of this work which is confined to an attempt to reformulate the Freudian theory of latency and adolescence within a comprehensive theory of transition.

Ultimately speculation by man on the nature of his being must be directed to the task of closing the gap between his technical mastery of his physical environment and his ability to enjoy his relationships. To understand better what we are, we must study what we have been: within the adult is the child that was and within the human species are the inchoate forces of the pre-human world. In the processes by which these transformations were accomplished may lie the key to the capacity of the individual for a life of more consistent satisfaction and to the avoidance by the species of its own destruction through its failure to strike a favourable balance between love and hate in the management of its relationships. In the life of children we can watch the balance being struck and perhaps, if we are fortunate, weigh our experience a little on the side of love.
PART I

THE STUDY OF THE PERSON.
CHAPTER 1.

The Self, Consciousness and Reality.

The nature of the relationships between different organisms or members of non-human species can be expressed in terms of biological needs and adaptations, but relationships between men and the other objects in their environments are subject to continual reflection and scrutiny which modifies and complicates them. The great leap forward in evolution which resulted in the sudden appearance in man of the power to direct his attention to his own mental processes meant that human ontogeny could no longer be considered as a matter of individuals but must be thought of in terms of persons. Animals, unable to refer to themselves or their own experience in language and whose lives are in all essential particulars regulated by their membership in a species, do not possess identity in the same way as human beings: all the animals in the world are psychologically less distinct from one another than one man is from other men. Persons choose: their choices are influenced by their past experience and by their hopes of the future. The appearance of this reflective quality which de Chardin calls "hominisation", not only has increased man's power of action, but at the same time it has increased the nature and the extent of his environment. The description of the things that are is inexhaustible. But
men not only look outwards to other subjects, they also look inwards to themselves and from the beginning of recorded thought they have been concerned to discover what they are, what is the nature of the things around them and what is the nature of their transactions with these things. The difficulties which man encounters when he enquires into the nature of things are multiplied when it is himself he considers. We have come to accept that our own conscious experience is the only reality of which we have direct, first-hand awareness but our own unavoidable participation in the events which we are seeking to describe and analyse is an obstacle to their objective examination. "The application of cognition to the scientific study of mental life is the one of the most recent and most difficult forms of mental activity to which man has directed his intelligence." (Brierley, 1951, p. 98). In a scientific study of any human activity it is important that we make no sort of initial assumption which is not logically justified and the preliminary to such a study should be an examination of what we mean when we use the pronoun "I". This is a task for philosophy, and leads to the discussion of the concepts of the self, consciousness and reality. To trace the development of philosophical thought in this area perhaps the best starting point is from our previous division of philosophical thinking into the two branches represented by
Locke on the one hand and Leibnitz on the other.

Locke can be said to have taken an analytical view of the philosopher's task, defining knowledge, classifying propositions and displaying the nature of material things.

Berkeley, however, noted that Locke's analysis of the concept of material things was false, in that to say of various 'ideas of sensation' that they belonged to a single material thing was not to say that they were related to an unobserved material substratum, but that they stood in certain relations to each other. He did not deny the existence of material things, as is often held, but stated that material things must be definable in terms of sense-contents. Unless an object is a metaphysical object, there can be no logical proof of its existence, only an empirical one. A self, then, if it is not to be a metaphysical entity, must be a logical construction of sense experiences (Ayer, 1958, p. 125). The considerations which compelled Berkeley to give a phenomenalist account of material things made it also necessary, as he failed to see, to give a phenomenalist account of the self. Following in this empirical tradition, Hume rejected the substantive underlying ego on the grounds that no such thing was observable: there was only 'a bundle of perceptions'. Whenever he looked for evidence of the self he failed to find it, always ending up with some particular perception. He saw that while self-consciousness
can be regarded as the production of memory, self-identity can never be. He was thus obliged to confess that he did not know what was the connection between perceptions in virtue of which they formed a single self.

Ayer rejects the view that this means that it is thus impossible for a consistent empiricist to give a satisfactory account of the self and defines personal identity in terms of bodily identity which in turn is defined in terms of resemblance and continuity of sense-contents. It is self-contradictory to speak of a man surviving the annihilation of his own body just as it is nonsensical to envisage an experience which could exist entirely on its own, but must entail the existence of a person, so a perception must have a percipient. He himself says his proposition concerning bodily identification is not self-contradictory if one adopts a psychological criterion of personal identity (Ayer, 1958, p. 127 note). For while it is true to say that those who look forward to a 'life after death' are postulating a metaphysical soul which has no logical connection with the self, it may still be possible to define identity in psychological terms without resort to metaphysics.

The empiricism exemplified by Hume and Locke paved the way for Hamilton, Mill and later for objectivism. In psychology the central objection to 'self' or 'soul' as a concept since the time of Wundt has been the extreme difficulty
of subjecting it to the stringent requirements of modern positivism, which holds that the devices employed in experimentation or measurement shall be specified in the definitions of every concept. Wundt declared definitely for "a psychology without a soul" as did Ladd and James whereas up till the publication of the 'Principles' in 1890, American writers such as Dewey, Royce and James had continued to regard the self as a necessary concept.

The theoretical account of mental organisation developed by Freud is determinist in character, but it helped to preserve the concept of the self in a way which is contrary to its general direction. The concept of the ego remained intact despite the attacks of the positivists and this provided a foundation upon which the neo-Freudians and other dynamically inclined schools of psychology built new systems in which it became a more important and active agent than Freud had envisaged. The implications of this will be more fully considered when we come to look at instinct theory, but it is important to note here that Freud did use the word 'ego' himself in a way which suggested that it was denoting at one and the same time the whole person and also a psychical organisation. In 1921, he wrote that the nucleus of the ego, which comprises the 'archaic inheritance' of the human mind, was unconscious, (1921, p. 10 note), but two years later he expressly repudiated this view, relegating the total self
to an impersonal id, while the ego represents only an adaptation to outer reality mediated by anxiety – a superficial entity (1923, p. 34-5, note 2). In the tradition of Adler, who considered that what is frequently referred to as the ego is what he called the "life style" of the individual, there followed writers who looked to cultural and social phenomena rather than instinct for an explanation of our ways of dealing with the human environment, and who recognised that individuals under various pressures may create a false, superficial self beneath which their real nature and potentialities are concealed. A more profound view still is expressed by Winnicot, who equates what he describes as the 'psyche-soma' with the primary, natural self, and this is by no means impersonal (Winnicot, 1955, p. 16-26).

The development of Object-Relations theory had an important effect upon the concept of the self. Although Melanie Klein did not attempt a complete revision of Freud's psychodynamic theory, her work clearly implied that the infant was a whole true self from the beginning. Fairbairn's theory of endopsychic structure adopts the position that a unitary dynamic ego is the basis for ego-development through object-relations and that this constitutes the 'pristine personality' of the child (Fairbairn, 1955, p. 107). The danger in all this is the invocation of the self or ego as an external integrating agency for the repair of the ravages following
upon the fragmentation of positivistic analysis, which was
the situation Wundt was trying to avoid when he declared for
"a psychology without a soul".

The Leibnitzian tradition of the self-active monad is
the original of a line of thinking in which instincts or
drives are the main instigators of behaviour, while the
Kantian view of all practical thought issuing in an imperative
addressed to the will allows not only for a 'personal' view of
the organism, but also takes into account the preoccupations
of other persons within the environment. Thus there is room
within the one broad stream of tradition for many different
psychological schools in which varying degrees of importance
are attributed to the participation of the intellect in the
interpretation and arrangement of sensory data. In the field
of cognitive psychology this led to the phenomenological
approaches of Brentano, Husserl, Scheler and others, and less
directly to the Gestalt school which was at the same time
firmly attached to a tradition of experimental psychology.

It can be seen that while acceptance or non-acceptance
of some notion of the self varies in different schools of
psychology, there is no single clear-cut definition of the
concept which would serve as a principle of division into two
groups. In dealing with the question of the self, Locke and
Berkeley were first concerned with the nature of material
things, while Descartes had begun with thought in the search
for an initial proposition which it would be self-contradictory to deny, and upon which he could base a deductive system. Hampshire points out that the sense of the Cogito lies in its reference to the speaker as a source of action, the reference in itself involving an act of intention (Hampshire, 1959, p. 82.) Ayer's contention that the Cogito must be understood in terms of "there is a thought now", rather than "I think", and that "I exist" does not necessarily follow from this is difficult to sustain. Just as a perception cannot exist without a percipient, so a thought cannot occur without a thinker, whose intention it is to make this movement outward from himself or inward again to himself in the form of directed thought. It is equally true of the statement "there is a thought now" that a thinker is responsible for the statement, which is his own thought expressed in the form of language and addressed to other thinkers like himself. If then we search for the true self in sense-experiences, perhaps then it might be fruitful to examine the nature of a person's traffic with his sense-experiences, which has been traditionally approached by considering the nature of consciousness.

The distinction between a conscious man and an unconscious machine always can be resolved into differences in perceptible behaviour and one of the reasons which we adduce for the absence of the same sort of consciousness in animals as in ourselves lies in the complete lack of any ostensible signs of
it in their outward behaviour. The first difficulty which arises is what sort of behaviour should come under review and often in deciding this question other considerations arise, and there have been some notable changes in the attitude of psychologists to this question in less than a century. Physiological and scientific psychologists in the latter part of the nineteenth century, although they rejected the personal self or soul, did define psychology as the "science of consciousness", but the rise of behaviourism and the development of reactology in the work of Pavlov at the turn of the century brought about a reaction against the use of the data of consciousness or experience. This trend was recognised by Buhler in 1927, when he drew attention to the "three aspects of psychology" which included both introspection and the "new" aspect of behaviour, (Buhler, 1929). Psychoanalytic thought also played a part in these changes of emphasis. Freud pointed out the importance of unconscious motivation and drew attention in his instinct theory to the capacity of instincts to act vicariously for one another and to change their objects. Although psychoanalysis was concerned more with verbal and symbolic behaviour rather than overt motor behaviour, it did not encourage an 'introspectionistic' view of psychology, but had rather the opposite effect of casting doubts upon the face value of introspection. Hull expressed a behaviourist view of what matters were properly the concern
of psychological study when he wrote:

"Humans have the added capacity of speech, symbolic behaviour, with the accompanying advantages of the higher mental processes. Whether this introduces any primary behavioural laws remains to be determined." (Hull, 1952, p. 4).

He leaves the question open, though it is clear in his work that the doctrine of species equivalence is implied. The difficulty is, of course, that it is only through these same 'capacities' and 'accompanying advantages' that behaviour of any sort may be studied at all. A similar type of criticism is expressed by Skinner (1953) to the effect that looking inside the organism for an explanation of external behaviour can easily lead to neglect of some of the environmental factors, and this is of course the case though it is not an argument for a complete disregard of motivational dynamics. The view which Eysenck takes of objective and subjective description, however, leads to a much more extreme position and there is no suggestion of leaving the question open as Hull does. Eysenck says:

"If we are really concerned with 'understanding' human beings rather than explaining their behaviour, then we might very well concentrate on introspection, poetry, drama and the other arts. This is not a scientific aim, and it does not call for a scientific method." (Eysenck, 1954).

This characteristic comment is open to rather more serious objections, and it is not merely a matter of semantics to draw attention to the difficulty of arriving at an adequate explanation without being concerned with understanding. The
sort of distinction which Eysenck is trying to make arises from the mistaken impression that an empirical proposition may have the same sort of validity as an "a priori" proposition, which, as Ayer points out, always owes its certainty to the fact that it is a tautology and cannot be confuted by experience (Ayer, 1958, p. 79). The objections to this view of science will be discussed in Chapter 3, but it is necessary to note here the arguments which support a view that the study of human behaviour is in fact a study of consciousness, and which tend to a rejection of rigorist interpretations such as we have quoted.

Poetry and drama are occurrences like any other phenomena, and they have the added quality of taking place only within a limited context, as indeed does introspection which Eysenck unaccountably lists among the arts. It is the function of science to attempt to ascribe all happenings to the operation of a few simple laws and it is a useful matter of technique in formulating hypotheses that the repetition of phenomena in certain given circumstances and not in any others should lead us to examine these surrounding circumstances in a search for causes. There can be no justification for disregarding the phenomena because they present initial obstacles to a particular type of analysis. The justification for equating the study of behaviour with the study of consciousness must therefore lie in the definition we have adopted of personality as a specially human quality. Man
unlike animals, "knows that he knows", he is not only experiencing, but conscious of his experience. It is in the nature of his thought that the essential difference lies. Men may think with a view to knowledge or they may think with a view to action and there would be nothing properly called thought unless there were words and language which could be employed to refer to the recurrent elements in men's experience and which form the medium by which they communicate with other men. This is the starting point from which Hampshire has developed his view of the person in his situation. He sees the necessity of singling out constant objects of reference to give sense to every other type of description. Each speaker or thinker carries with him the idea of himself as a persisting body among others, changing his standpoint in relation to constant objects around him and to objects changing in relation to himself. He believes that philosophers in the tradition of Hume failed to make a clear distinction between the object perceived and the perceiver, by omitting to take into account the individual's capacity to act upon the objects around him. Coenesthesis is not the only basis of awareness of one's own body, one also controls it and moves it about and observes the result of intentional movement. In the same way external objects which may be pointed at intentionally and referred to by means of language can also be manipulated and the observer may increase his knowledge of
the environment by calculated interference. Below the level of communication in language and the making of statements there is the act of intentional pointing, away from oneself and towards an object. This act of pointing is performed from a point of view and a standpoint which is the present situation of the observer as a persisting object placed among other objects. In order to refer to his own feelings and sensations, the subject has to fit them into a framework of a narrative of his own life which must cross the narrative and history of other things and persons at many points and this necessity is not merely a requirement of language and description, but arises from the necessity of relating his sensations and perceptions to the possibility of action and to the experience of others. This view of the person is in accordance with the aim expressed in the introduction to consider the uniqueness of man in terms of his power of reflection on his own nature and his ability to communicate with other men, which is an essentially relational view of the human personality. Consideration of the nature of these other objects which comprise the environment and investigation of the nature of man's transaction with them must however involve us ultimately in speculation concerning the nature of reality.

Ayer holds that it must be possible to define material things in terms of sense-contents because it is only by the
occurrence of certain sense-contents that the existence of any material thing can ever be in the least degree verified. The reason for believing in the existence of physical objects is simply that sentences which are taken to refer to physical objects are used in such a way that our having the appropriate experiences counts in favour of their truth. He is prepared to concede that if the personality of others were something we could not observe, then we could have no reason for believing in the existence of anyone else. He believes that the way of refuting this is not to argue from analogy of one's own experience based on the fact that there is a perceptible resemblance between the behaviour of other bodies and that of one's own. This is an unverifiable hypothesis, as I can legitimately use the argument from analogy to establish the probable existence of an object which has never in fact manifested itself in my experience only if the object is such that it could conceivably be so manifested. If it cannot, then it is a metaphysical object. The conclusion to be drawn is that I have as good reason to believe in the existence of other people as I have to believe in the existence of material things. In each case the hypothesis is verified by the occurrence in my sense history of the appropriate series of sense contents. Hampshire points out that while Descartes could assume that a thinking being could be conceived as existing at no particular place or time
alone and disembodied, the individual's reference to himself in his own thought is a reference to something which is capable of shifting its attention and changing its perceptions by its own actions. To say 'I doubt whether anything else exists besides myself' is intelligible if by that I mean that I cannot describe any other thing the existence of which I can be so directly sure as I can of this meaningfully pointing, doubting being that is myself. However, to say that I cannot doubt that I exist, but I cannot be sure in the same way and to the same degree that I am not the only existing thing in the world, is unintelligible, as when I make reference to myself as doing something, active even if the activity is only directed thought, I make a contrast between that which I do myself and that which happens to me, a contrast which I could not understand unless something external to myself does sometimes impinge on me. There is a body of clinical evidence that the localisation of the self in one's own body is a gradual process and that in psychosis this is often not achieved or only imperfectly so. Winnicott (1958) quotes the case of a psychotic patient who in analysis came to recognise that as a baby she thought her twin at the other end of the pram was herself. She even felt surprised when her twin was picked up and she remained where she was. Her sense of self and other-than-self was undeveloped.

Among the results of Freud's theory of the unconscious
was that it brought a need to re-examine previous views of reality and consciousness. It is, however, possible to maintain as part of a rigorist position that psychology should be wholly concerned with observable changes in behaviour and thus avoid the necessity for this re-examination. Not only psychoanalysis took the view, however, that re-examination was necessary as Hampshire's discussion of unconscious motives in intention and action shows (1958, p. 132-135). For Freud's theory of mind lies between those who would exhibit behaviour as a series of responses to external stimuli determined by predisposing causal factors and those like Sartre and the French existentialists of the present day who see all important behaviour as the fruit of human decision with no relation to antecedent conditions or physical causality of any kind. In giving a place to unconscious factors in human motivation it is thereby made more difficult to arrive at a definition of reality in terms of sense contents as the person may be unaware of these, might possibly be mistaken about their nature in some important way or may ascribe them wrongly to a particular source. Hampshire (1958, p. 133) however, holds that there is no contradiction in the term 'unconscious purposes' and that confusion arises only when intention is separated from consciousness. There is nothing in the Freudian system which Hampshire finds incompatible with his view of the person in his situation, nor does his
reconciliation of the two approaches involve the separation of the knowing, intentional agent from his own unconscious mind. There is no need to assume that what I knowingly do constitutes what I really do.

Perception, Freud noted, was connected not only with the response to stimuli but also with the rejection of stimuli. This, together with the revision of his original instinct theory in 1915 and his formulation of the principles of introjection and projection, paved the way for Melanie Klein's views on internalised objects and Fairbairn's thoroughgoing revision of Freudian psychodynamic theory. As a result of these developments which will form the substance of later chapters some examination of our conception of external and psychological reality is required. The perceptions of the individual are seen to play a much larger part in determining the nature of the environment in which he is functioning and Fairbairn believes that Freud's original distinction between conscious and unconscious now becomes less important than the distinction between the two worlds of inner and outer reality (1952b, p. 124). Psychological reality is not vested either in the instinct stimulus nor in the sensory stimulus, but in the responses to combinations of these stimuli and their endopsychic determinants. In these terms we can made no distinction between an hallucination and a veridical perception, yet there is a sense in which
perception is more real than hallucination, and it has been suggested that the criterion to which we might appeal is that of biological or psycho-biological adaptation. Without anticipating discussion of Object-Relations theory, it can be said that perhaps a better criterion might be successful object-seeking, which resolved itself into purposive action in the environment. In the case of hallucination, the intention is directed to an inappropriate object and action will not result in a satisfactory end.

These are the considerations preliminary to an examination of the Freudian theory of mind and the concept of the unconscious. They have been set down in detail because it is difficult to arrive at a fair assessment of these controversial concepts without a knowledge of the background in the history of psychology and philosophy of the related concepts of the self, reality and consciousness. In this connection it is useful to recall that Einstein prepared his great early discoveries not by experiments but from a careful study of Hume and Mach. There is so much disagreement about terminology common to psychoanalysis, academic psychology, behaviourism and other sciences that an analysis of concepts and an examination of the logical basis of theory can hardly fail to help the progress of the scientific study of personality. To confine study to overt motor behaviour is restricting and out of tune with modern scientific philosophy:
there is the parallel in physics where the earlier ultra-
positivistic requirement that only observable qualities may
be used in formulating principles has been relaxed to include
indirection. Freud recognised clearly the necessity for
modifications in theory and was not unaware of movements in
other sciences, and most of the important modifications in
fact originated in his own lifetime from Freud himself.
Since his death there have been others, notably in the work
of Melanie Klein, who did not make her important descriptions
of internalised object-relations the basis of any radical
re-thinking of Freudian psycho-dynamic theory. Fairbairn
has begun this, however, and perhaps the time has come for
the adoption of his suggestion that a complete revision is
required in the light of later clinical findings and the
changing climate of scientific thought.
CHAPTER 2.

The Concept of the Unconscious.

There are many different directions from which consideration of Freud's theory of mind can be approached for, as he said himself, the theme of mental processes beneath the surface appearance of things, or to use the words of Herbart 'behind the curtains' was a familiar one in poetry, philosophy and literature before Freud's time. This is particularly true in the case of the more sensitive novelists such as Henry James and in pre-Freudian usages of 'unconscious' there seem to be two main categories of meaning. There is first the sense of not having consciousness, used of things rather than people, or of people in a state which is being deliberately differentiated from the normal waking condition, as for instance a trance or a coma. Second, there is the adverbial use, most commonly occurring when an activity or piece of behaviour is described. From a study of these usages it can be seen that there are further subdivisions of meaning, some relatively unambiguous and others of shades of difference which are difficult to distinguish. One of the first difficulties encountered in searching for the roots of the concept is that there is nothing in the everyday phenomena of consciousness, it could be argued, which would necessarily lead us to assume unconscious activity, and William James
dealt with this as early as 1890. When the solution to a problem appears as a sudden illumination at a time when we had abandoned all hope of reaching success, and had ceased to concentrate upon it, is it necessary to make the assumption that this is evidence of a process at a level outside our awareness? Even if we do accept this evidence is it necessary to assume that this points to the existence of an unconscious mind? We cannot assume that things should have turned out otherwise, as this may be the way in which things do happen in consciousness and if we wish to seek some background to the mental activity of which we are aware, then it is only necessary to look at the mechanics of the brain and the central nervous system. This is indeed where Freud first directed his attention (1954), but apart from what he was writing we can deduce a great deal from what he was doing and from what he wrote at a later date. As is the case with psychoanalysis at the present day, theory and therapy were closely linked so that in Freud's early years both were developing together and it can be seen how he was moving towards what were to be his central concepts from a number of different directions simultaneously. It is because of this, perhaps, that while Freud has in formulating the concept of the unconscious left us with new insight and an instrument of great potency for investigating human conduct, he has also left us with many theoretical difficulties which have been
only partly solved since his original discoveries began to receive attention.

The first difficulty which emerges is that because Freud was engaged upon the treatment of patients by revolutionary methods which were in an evolving state, he did not leave a clear-cut or systematic account of his own system. As time went on he introduced changes and modifications which he did not always relate expressly to his previous views so that the development of his thought could be clearly traced. In addition to this, his doctrine of the mind depends upon a number of key concepts which are mutually dependent and which can only be understood in terms of each other. A further problem lies in the fact that he did not always make a clear distinction between that usage of the word 'unconscious' which signifies that the activity is unknown to the agent and that which signifies that it is performed automatically. Sometimes both are suggested at the one time, but the distinction is an important one as each requires a separate justification. The final difficulty which we note is that later psychoanalysts like Jung or the neo-Freudians seem to have concepts of the unconscious which differ not only from one another but also from Freud's original. When Freud used the words 'unconscious' or 'unconsciously' his meaning may be related to earlier usages of which it is very often an extension, but when he used the definite article and introduced
the term "the unconscious", this is a new term for which he must prescribe a meaning and a use (MacIntyre, 1958, p. 44). The first published occurrence of this term (das Unbewusste) in the psychoanalytical sense occurs in Joseph Breuer's case history of Anna O. in 1893, and he quotes it in inverted commas, which may mean that he is attributing it to Freud (Freud & Breuer, 1893-95, p. 45). Freud himself uses the term in his history of Frau Emmy von N. (Ibid, p. 76) in the same year. This serves as a direction to the investigator where first to look for the origins of Freud's concepts. Anna O. fell ill in 1880 and Breuer's treatment of her case lasted until 1882. Freud was so impressed by the history which he heard from Breuer in November of that year that he attempted to interest Charcot in it while he was studying under him in 1885, but without success. It is easy to see, however, that this was the beginning of the process of speculation which was to lead to the discovery of new methods of treatment, to observance of unexplained resistances to the treatment and through the investigation of these to the devising of new theoretical concepts in an attempt to reach an exhaustive account of the nature of mental function.

Despite the variety of directions from which Freud approached the solution of his problem, the origins of his system lie clearly in the field of psychopathology and his independent researches into the nature of hysteria were the
direct result of his inability to account for the reactions of hysterical patients in his practice at Vienna within the limitations of the existing frame of reference. His background as a medical neurologist led him first to an attempt to explain mental functioning on a neurophysiological basis in an unpublished essay which has only recently come to light, in which he defines a scientific psychology as one which conceives mental phenomena in terms of material states of affairs whose changes are susceptible of measurement and subject to laws of motion. He soon abandoned this attempt at a reconciliation of contemporary discoveries in neurophysiology and the schematisation of Newtonian mechanics. The reasons for its non-publication may be conjectured when the date of writing is seen to be close to that of the "Studien über Hysterie" in which all recorded four case-histories in which Freud used the cathartic method. All of these had been published along with that of Fraulein Anna O. two years before and had received extensive discussion since. The changes which were taking place in his thought may be seen through the fact that while in 1895 he had used the word "Nervensystem" (nervous system) throughout, in 1925 he replaced it by "Seelenleben" (mental life) in the last sentence of the book. James Strachey points out that this does not change the meaning of the sentence in the least: "the old neurological vocabulary had already been no more than
a husk at the time when Freud penned the words." (Freud & Breuer, 1893-5, p. XXV). His clinical experience was compelling him to reject the possibility of the simple synthesis which he had at first envisaged but his neurological training made him reluctant to accept purely psychological explanations as ultimate and to the end of his life he believed that a physical basis for all mental phenomena might in the end be found. Both Breuer and Freud were considerably influenced by the school of Helmholtz, of which their teacher, Ernst Brücke, was a prominent member. According to their views all natural phenomena are ultimately explicable in terms of physical and chemical forces. On the other hand, Freud's truly scientific approach to his data led him more and more to abandon his neurological bias. In the "Studies on Hysteria" it is Breuer who professes that "Psychical processes will be dealt with in the language of psychology" (Freud & Breuer, 1893-95, p. 185), but his whole theoretical chapter draws parallels between the nervous system and electrical installations. We know that the treatment of Anna O. was terminated abruptly because as later emerged she had a positive transference of a sexual nature to Breuer. He considered this irrelevant to her treatment and it is not reported in her history. Around the same time, however, Freud was noting patients' resistance to treatment but making the critical decision to consider this not as irrelevant nor
merely as an obstacle to be overcome but as a further important source of data for his researches. Breuer preferred existing models, Freud was prepared to abandon these if they did not fulfil his purposes. That he was aware of this direction in his work is clear from the beginning:

"I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuropathologists, I was trained to employ local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own." (Freud & Breuer, 1893-95, p. 160).

This quotation is interesting as it shows Freud ranging himself with the imaginative describers of human behaviour, a position which he reached not from choice but through the inadequacy of the existing models. He was concerned to account for all the data, not just those parts which could be dealt with under a particular method of classification. His thinking, however, continued to bear traces of his earlier preoccupations and in the seventh chapter of "The Interpretation of Dreams", published in 1898, three years after the "Studies on Hysteria", he retained a great part of the theoretical structure used in his neurological writing. Increasingly the nature of the material with which he was dealing compelled him to explanation in purely psychological terms. We have already noted that therapy and theory were closely related, but now we can see that theory arose out of
therapeutic experience and that the formulation of new concepts was always based upon the inadequacy of the old in the face of clinical evidence. Investigation of the sources of his terminology and of the nature of his scientific orientation is useful and informative but for a balanced picture must be related to the events which unfold themselves in the early case histories. At the present day, psychoanalysis depends largely upon clinical verification and it is as a therapeutic method that its existence is justified. Further than this, it is only through the therapeutic setting that investigation can be made and it is the self-transcendant interaction between patient and therapist in the transference which tests and exemplifies the principles upon which it is based. The understanding of normal processes which psychoanalysis has brought originated in the study of the abnormal, and in Freud's day some of the abnormal states which are now familiar were only beginning to be clinically described. Psychoanalysis originated not as a philosophical speculation but as a psychopathology of hysteria.

When Freud qualified in medicine, physical methods of treatment of mental disorders enjoyed little success and such successes as there were were largely unexplained. In no case was this more marked than in hysterical paralysis and the lesser symptoms of the same kind which were named for the first time "conversion" in Breuer's theoretical chapter of the
"Studies on Hysteria" (Freud & Breuer, 1893-95, p. 206). Freud paid an extensive visit to the Salpetriere where Charcot, whose pupil, Janet, was the first to describe hysteria as a recognisable clinical entity, was directing work to which Freud and Breuer made frequent reference in their Preliminary Communication which was to form the basis of the "Studies on Hysteria". The majority of Freud's researches were, however, independently conducted in the course of his practice in Vienna. He had a large proportion of hysterical patients whom he treated by a variety of the currently recommended and generally unsatisfactory ways until he tried for the first time the cathartic method in the case of Emmy van N. whom he began to treat in 1889. His use of this method stems from his reflection on Breuer's account of the treatment of Fraulein Anna O., which had impressed him so much that he had tried without success to bring it to the attention of Charcot while he was in Paris. The empirical or neurological approach to psychoneurosis or the neurological, classificatory or philosophic approach to psychosis which was characteristic of the period did not provide an explanation of why in hysterical paralysis the areas affected did not correspond with definite anatomical or physiological boundaries but rather with the patient's subjective and usually quite erroneous notions. Janet attempted to provide a scientific explanation of the genesis of the phenomena displayed
by the hysteric in the concept of dissociation, which was described as a failure of the ego to exercise its usual cohesive function, resulting in disintegration so that certain functions of the personality became separated from it and began to operate independently. This is a purely passive process, unlike Freud's later concept of repression, and so it was inadequate fully to account for the range of phenomena which Freud had observed in his own patients. Particularly it could not account for resistance to therapy. He noted again and again in patient's histories the appearance of 'traumatic events' or incidents charged with such painful emotional significance that the emotion aroused could not find expression. Patients who were treated by hypnotic suggestion were able to relive the traumatic experiences the repression of which had resulted in emotional tension, by this process "abreacted" or discharged within the therapeutic situation, the original repressed emotion. In order to relate these two observations to the aetiology of hysteria Freud and Breuer postulated the concept of repression which Freud was to make his own and which was decisive for the emergence of the concept of the unconscious. It is true that a dynamic hypothesis underlay the theory of trauma and abreaction but the dynamic view of the whole working of the mind was only attained when Freud shifted his attention from infantile trauma to infantile fantasies. He himself holds
that the theory of repression is the foundation stone upon which the structure of psychoanalysis rests, but it must be taken in conjunction with the other phenomenon he observed in hysterical patients, the active resistance they made to his therapeutic efforts, particularly as he noted that this was encountered despite the strongest evidence of motives towards the restoration of mental health and the fullest conscious co-operation on the patient's part. This was analogous to the situation of the sufferer from hysterical paralysis, for just as this appeared to be the result of the operation of subjective factors of which the patient was unaware, so in therapy resistance meant the presence of some kind of motivation not obviously related to the person's declared wishes or intentions. The introduction of the concept of the unconscious as a means to explaining these phenomena came from Freud rather than Breuer, although as we have noted the first published use of the term in the psychoanalytical sense was Breuer's in the case history of Anna O.

Now that we have traced the progress of concept-formation which kept pace with Freud's growing clinical insight, it is useful to see the sources from which the concept of the unconscious derived as these had some influence in determining how the concept was used and how Freud visualised the workings of the mind. He probably acquired the term from his own teacher in philosophy, Brentano, who was a follower of the
Herbalian "psychology of ideas". The resemblance between Freud's concept and Herbart's is at a first examination striking but it does not stand up to further scrutiny as for Herbart unconscious mental activity was a simple inference from conscious states. The matter of derivation is not, however, of first importance. What is of greater interest is the nature of the concept itself and the reasons why Freud had thought it necessary to introduce it in explanation of the particular phenomena which he had been observing. For 'the unconscious' first emerges as the realm of repressed memories and emotions which were of such importance in the aetiology of hysteria. Without understanding of the nature of repression, an active process quite unlike Janet's dissociation, there can be no understanding of the unconscious. This shows the close interdependence of concepts which is characteristic of Freudian theory. He was engaged not only in establishing a correlation between the occurrence of certain childhood traumatic experiences and adult psychoneurosis, but was concerned with a more general type of explanation in which a variety of normal and abnormal behaviour could be related to a number of antecedent conditions by means of a few simple theoretical concepts of which the unconscious was to be the central one. Such a close interdependence of concepts within the framework of a general theory is familiar in the history of science and the example of 'mass', 'velocity'
and 'force' in Newtonian mechanics is a close parallel.

These explanatory concepts underwent development and modification as the clinical material accumulated and Freud became more interested in first one then another aspect of the complex of behaviour. In the first instance he had been concerned with dissociation phenomena and with the reformulation of Janet's conception into his own view of dynamic repression. Then he investigated the nature of the repressed and made the important discovery of its predominantly sexual character, which was to provide a basis for development of instinct theory. The sexual life of infancy gives rise to a number of situations in which needs of a sexual nature are unsatisfied or come into conflict with the conventions of the environment and these are then pushed down into the unconscious and kept there by the process of repression. The unconscious is therefore a place, the repository of what is repressed and of what is kept dynamically repressed and it is only by postulating its existence that there is a direct causal effect of the infantile on the adult. In making this existential claim, however, Freud is passing from the extension of existing forms of usage of words to the creation of a new explanatory concept and moving from the describing of behaviour to explaining it. He is bringing to our attention a new entity which must be justified by logical means.

He gives his own metapsychological account of the
unconscious (Freud, 1915B) when he says it is "the name of a system of mental acts". The justification for belief in such a system is two-fold: first, we are able to account for behaviour which cannot be accounted for in terms of conscious intentions; secondly, if we assume in psychoanalytic practice the existence of the unconscious we are able to bring into consciousness contents of which the patient was unaware and in so doing we help to bring about the healing of his mental disorder. He goes on to describe what is in the unconscious. There are instincts and emotions, though the first are unconscious only in a very loose sense, as they could become conscious only in the form of something not themselves, that is in the form of ideas or emotions. The whole concept of unconscious ideas is closely linked with Herbartian psychology and underlies a good deal of Freud's thought, particularly in earlier years. The objection that wishes, motives and fears must be conscious because in ordinary language they describe inner mental events cannot be sustained, for it presupposes a dichotomy of mind and body which is unjustifiable on philosophic grounds and clinically is disproved by the kinds of material which had led Freud to these formulations in the first place. It is only in pathological conditions that the mind can be conceived as functioning separately and distinctly from the body. Winnicott (1954) expresses this succinctly when he states
that if development is satisfactory the "mind is no more than a special case of the functioning of the psyche-soma." The view of the mind as a separate entity was derived from Descartes and has been dubbed by Ryle "the ghost in the machine". Freud rejected this sort of view, but it is still clear that he retained sufficient of the Cartesian way of thought to envisage it as a place apart which could be inhabited by ideas.

A decisive step in the development of Freudian theory was taken when he turned from consideration of the mechanisms of repression and the nature of the repressed to consider the agency responsible for the repression. This involved more than a change of direction, it involved also a change of emphasis: instead of considering repression purely in functional terms, he began to take into account what he called "the mental apparatus", and distinguished three separate structures, the id, the ego and the super-ego. The id was conceived as representing the source of instinctive impulse, while the ego was concerned with the regulation of these impulses in a way compatible with the situation in outer reality. The super-ego, however, was described as "deposit left by the earliest object-choices of the Id" (Freud, 1923, p. 44). As the earliest object-choices of the child are the parents and as they at the same time constitute the main way in which the infant meets outer reality, they present as
authoritative figures who control his activities and who frustrate many of his instinctive impulses. The super-ego arises within the psyche as an internal representative of these figures and the instigator of repression. The super-ego therefore emerges as having the status of an internal object which has been incorporated within the psyche as the result of a need. Later work has shown that fantasies of incorporating loved and hated objects, persons and parts of persons into ourselves are among the earliest and most deeply unconscious fantasies, and to this process the term introjection has been given (Isaacs, 1943, p. 98). Because this internal representative of parental figures has an active relationship with the ego, Freud's theory of mental constitution implies that object-relationships exist within the personality itself as well as between the personality and external objects. The introjection of objects formed the basis of Melanie Klein's view on the structuring of a world of inner reality in which the ego participates in a multiplicity of relationships with internal objects and part-objects. As a result of this very important theoretical step, the original distinction which Freud pointed out between the conscious and unconscious now becomes less important than the distinction between the two worlds of inner and outer reality.

The original definition of personality which we adopted
took a view of the person as manifesting his individuality in his relations with other objects. As a result of the concept of the unconscious we now see that these other objects include not only those within the material environment which can be pointed at, described or manipulated, but also those which belong to inner reality of which the person may be wholly unaware. Situations in outer reality will be met by the individual in ways which are influenced by the internal situation obtaining between the ego and its internal objects. The resistance which Freud noted in the therapeutic situation can be seen not as a defence against the revival of memories of traumatic experiences in the past but as part of an unconscious aim to prevent the emergence of situations in inner reality in the present. The apparent reversibility of psychic growth in which a person appears to be reverting to an earlier state is now seen in terms of an adaptation to outer reality of a temporary or permanent nature mediated by unconscious situations and relationships which, although they have their roots in past experience, belong to the world of inner reality in the present. This finally is in accordance with de Chardin's view that the evolution of species must be considered not only in terms of the "without" but also of the "within". Man's world of inner reality is another way of expressing the quality which separates him from other species.

The Freudian concept of the unconscious has undergone
changes and elaboration as the result of later clinical findings, particularly in the field of child analysis, and through the theoretical revisions and gradual changes in emphasis which have followed upon these. This is in accordance with Freud's own view of scientific advance and some of the greater steps forward are partly due to the emancipation of scientific thought from the atomistic outlook of Helmholtz which dominated the physics and science of his day. The important theoretical concepts which Freud formulated were repression and the unconscious, which are unobservables like the electron or the gene, but on the basis of which assumptions may be formulated from which observation statements can be deduced which are true and which could not be deduced from the theory unless such assumptions were included. Explanatory concepts of this sort have a legitimate function to perform and are a necessary and familiar part of modern scientific progress.
Acceptance of the broad principles of the mind's structure and function which Freud outlined would seem at first sight to increase the difficulties rather than clarify the issues. For now not only have we abandoned the hope of establishing a simple cause-and-effect relationship between stimulus and response and at the same time the expectation of an explanation in mechanical terms of the basis of human action, but also we are compelled to reconsider whether there is in fact any simple correspondence between an internal situation and particular external behaviour. The data of our investigation must relate not only to surface behaviour and external stimuli, both of which are observables and may be controlled to some extent by the classical forms of experimental design but also to the underlying processes by which the one is transformed into the other. The explanations which may be formulated must take into account different kinds of stimuli which arise within the organism itself and must allow for the fact that similar external behaviour may arise from a multitude of combinations of external and internal factors. Objections to the psychoanalytical approach may be made on the grounds that this is not a legitimate field of scientific enquiry, that it is impossible to be investigated by a
scientific method or that the techniques of psychoanalysis do not in themselves constitute a scientific method. It is, however, possible to refute these objections on the grounds of logic and in order to do this it is necessary first to recapitulate the premises which we have adopted as a result of the arguments of the first two chapters.

The initial postulate is that we exist, both in a world of persisting material things which we can point to and refer to by means of language and of other persons like ourselves who have the same power of purposeful action as we have and with whom we are in communication. This social nature of man is taken to be evidence of his unique power of reflection which is not a mystical quality but the result of a natural process of evolution. It is the most important fact about man's behaviour and makes the explanatory terminology of mechanics or animal behaviour inadequate in an application to human acts. Consciousness rather than behaviour might then be the proper field for a study of personality, were it not for the fact that Freud has presented convincing evidence for the view that the data of consciousness are themselves defective and that not all human motives are available to the process of introspection. We therefore accept the explanatory concept of the unconscious and the associated concepts of repression and resistance which serve as the foundations of the Freudian theory of the mind. This leads us to extend the
range of our definition of personality in terms of relationship with other objects to include a system of internal relationships with introjected objects comprising an inner reality which is part of each individual and which modifies his way of dealing with outer reality.

Freud claimed to have transformed metaphysics into metapsychology and in the same way as early behaviourists believed that all human actions could be reduced to the effects of the operation of a limited number of variables, psychoanalysis has lodged a rival claim to provide an explanation of all human activities in terms of the unconscious. To attempt a justification of psychoanalytical method and its approach to human experience upon the basis of any lesser claim is not only to evade a difficult task of logical analysis but also to neglect one of the most important sources of demonstration of the comprehensive explanatory power of its conceptual tools.

The rigorist school of behaviourists would not only object to the definition of personality which we have adopted but also to the view that the specifically human behaviour we have outlined is a legitimate objective of scientific enquiry. Eysenck holds that the aim of scientific psychology is to "explain behaviours in terms of general laws, preferably stated in mathematical terms, and to control behaviour by varying the conditions which determine it." (Eysenck, 1954).
In the passage already quoted in Chapter 1, he maintains that "understanding" human beings is not a scientific aim nor does it call for scientific method, nor does he believe that it has any connection with psychology. Here it is the definition of behaviour which is the difficulty as Eysenck seems to be adopting a narrow and exclusive definition while the dynamic schools offer no objection to describing psychology as a science of human behaviour provided behaviour is understood to include mental or endopsychic as well as motor activity. Indeed, such a comprehensive definition of behaviour is part of the dynamic approach and from the classical psychoanalytic viewpoint there can be no doubt that it was not only metaphysics that became transformed into metapsychology but also religion, morals, art and all human activities which embody the so-called 'higher' values (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 50).

In view of our initial definition of personality, we must take the wider view, though at the same time fully recognising the usefulness of the other type of approach in its correct applications. The way towards the universality of science lies through eclecticism, the toleration of open questions and efforts to understanding other people's ideas on their own premises. There are psychologists who make a comparison between the present state of their science and the condition of pre-Newtonian physics where a great many correlations had been established between diverse physical phenomena (MacIntyre,
1958, p. 2) without a unifying principle having been discovered, while there are others who maintain that psychology's need is a raison d'etre more than a series of objective descriptions. There are yet others who hold that both unifying description and raison d'etre are provided in the complex theoretical formulations of Freud and Jung and that in a sense psychology's Newton has already arrived. There does seem to be one premise which all these varied shades of opinion hold in common with one another and with the other sciences which is a starting point for a consideration of what is the proper matter for scientific enquiry. It is worth quoting a passage from Whitehead (1926, p. 5):

"There can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an Order of Things and in particular of an Order of Nature."

Whitehead believes that this is an article of faith rather than of logic, that the justification of scientific procedure lies in its success in operation, and that the chief safeguard against the retention of unsound hypotheses lies in the scientist's experimental habit of mind. It is not enough, however, that the scientist should assume the intelligibility of the existent world: two further conditions must be fulfilled before he can assume that his search for order is likely to be successful, first, that the laws which operate in nature are not too complex for us to unravel, and second that they are accessible to our investigations (Broad,
1949, p. 509-10). These three postulates are essentially operational hypotheses, useful and adequate for any scientific enquiry, as there could be no science of any kind if everything was chaos. It is more difficult, however, to state a logical basis for such postulates. The uniformity of nature cannot justify induction, nor can invoking a principle of "limited independent variety" (Keynes, 1929, part III). As will be discussed in connection with the problem of induction, such arguments are circular. Ayer feels that the justification of scientific procedures lies in the success of the predictions to which they give rise, but holds philosophy and science to be in a special and interdependent relationship which ensures the constant examination of scientific procedure by the work of clarification and analysis which it is the function of philosophy to discharge. He writes of this relationship:

"In saying that philosophy is concerned with each of the sciences in a manner which we shall indicate, we mean also to rule out the supposition that philosophy can be ranged alongside the existing sciences as a special department of speculative knowledge. Those who make this supposition cherish the belief that there are some things in the world which are possible objects of speculative knowledge and yet lie beyond the scope of empirical science. But this belief is a delusion. There is no field of experience which cannot, in principle, be brought under some form of scientific law and no type of speculative knowledge about the world which it is, in principle, beyond the power of science to give." (Ayer, 1958, p. 48).

This view is opposed, as can be seen from the quotation already made, to that of Eysenck, who speaks elsewhere of
"the agreement of logicians and philosophers of scientific methodology concerning the definitions and standards of science" (1953). Here it emerges that he is basing his definition of science not upon the type of data with which it is concerned but rather upon the method which is used to investigate the data and the attitude of the observer towards them. The difference which at first sight appeared to be in the definition of behaviour now emerges as a more fundamental and important disagreement concerning the definition of science and the nature of the scientific method. The empirical sciences differ from pure sciences both in the nature of their subject matter and in their method. Nevertheless, both alike are sciences, by which we seek to order experience so as to render it intelligible. In all sciences there are two characteristics: the selection of a certain kind of fact and the use of a certain kind of method (Stebbing, 1946, p. 231). It is the facts which we require to investigate, however, which must determine the means which we adopt towards this end. It is implicit in all Eysenck's work, however, and he has on occasion made it explicit that he in fact defines behaviour as those aspects of experience which are amenable to a particular kind of mathematical analysis. Further than this, by reason of his generalisations from his own system to the field of all science, he defines all science in terms of methodology, which
is a logically untenable position. "Scientific truths", he says, "tend to be correct because they have been arrived at by a particular method", (1953). His argument therefore turns out to be that the data of experience which are ordered according to a particular method can therefore by that criterion be judged as true, while at the same time amenability to ordering by this method determines the selection of the data. This is circular and also contradicts the basic scientific postulate that everything that exists is discoverable and capable of ordering. It is a logically unsound view of science and more in accordance with 19th century mechanistic materialism than with modern scientific thought. Compare such a viewpoint with that of Julian Huxley and Waddington (1947, 1941) who look to the natural course of human evolution to find a guiding line for all human conduct. Waddington sees in the adoption of the scientific attitude towards human problems the best hope for modern man and in the development of this view a possible alternative to religion. Psychoanalysis has drawn upon philosophy for some of its concepts and its methods of evaluating them, but the traffic has not been in the one direction only. Scientific investigation of the unconscious has contributed to the sum of information at the disposal of philosophy and has offered direct help in the solving of problems once belonging to the speculative fields of ethics and
religion. We therefore reject a narrow or rigorist view of science and accept the wider one which Ayer has stated.

The confusion between the standards of pure and empirical science which underlies many rigorist views of the study of human personality and behaviour has been dealt with at some length as it often presents considerable difficulties in the defence of propositions based upon one view of scientific enquiry against objections raised upon premises of quite another sort. This has resulted upon rather a detailed examination and criticism of the views of one author, which is the result more of the number of his publications and the range of his generalisations than of intrinsic objection to his methods. It is not the use of mathematical or statistical analysis to which objections are raised, but the restrictive selection of data on the grounds of quantifiability and the making of empirical generalisations from analytical propositions. It is also important to resist the view that only those sorts of enquiry which may be expressed in the form of mathematical terms are scientific in character. It does not follow from this, however, that the accumulation of a certain class of data without attempt at order or without reference to logic would satisfy a definition of science (Stebbing, 1946, p. 23). There must of course be a certain attitude towards the data and a certain kind of method.
Objectivity is invariably quoted as a prerequisite of scientific method yet there is a sense in which all forms of scientific enquiry are subjective in that they must ultimately be submitted to the evaluation of human intelligence. Each of the sciences has arisen from the study of a particular range of sense-perceptions, although in the highly technical language of the natural sciences, definitions are no longer related to immediate sense perceptions. The most highly advanced science of theoretical physics bears little apparent relationship to the facts of everyday experience and it makes the least possible reference to human interests and the standpoint of the observer. Einstein has been able to show physicists in their own mathematical language that physical phenomena are relative to the observer. The nature of the relationship between them forms the matter of psychological investigation, though the techniques of investigation may vary. Material things remain a logical construction out of sense-contents and even the sophisticated bodies singled out by scientific description owe their status as bodies to their relationship with other bodies, by their powers, in Locke's terminology, or by their reaction to the manipulation of the observer (Hampshire, 1959, p. 49). This remains the basis of all the natural sciences, however much we are aware of the gap between observation and basic concepts or laws, which Einstein maintains is increasing (Einstein, 1944).
Anthropomorphic tendencies and the remains of teleological interpretations of events are evidence in science of its ultimate dependence upon the sense-contents of observers and it is only through examination of descriptions and propositions in the light of this knowledge that understanding of the meaning of scientific propositions may be reached. Scientific descriptions of a certain sort are the least anthropocentric of all descriptions and the natural trend of science is towards objectivity and abstract thinking. It is easy, however, to fall into the error of reifying abstractions or to be misled by what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (1929). Objectivity is a personal commitment, an attempt to make all statements independent of the preoccupations or the momentary interests of individual persons. There can be no sense in which objectivity is synonymous with quantification nor can we define objectivity in terms of a particular methodology. To do this is to confuse again the nature of analytic and synthetic propositions and to mistake the functions of inductive and deductive reasoning. We cannot reduce human experience to mathematical terms as mathematical propositions differ from those of the natural sciences in that they are wholly independent of what actually exists in the world. Mathematics is a deductive, formal science capable of exact demonstration. Ayer refutes Mill's view that the truths of logic and mathematics are merely
inductive generalisations based upon an extremely large number of cases and adduces that logical and mathematical principles are universal simply because we never allow them to be anything else (1958, p. 77). If we come across an instance in which it would appear that a case has been encountered which confuted one of these principles, then we should take that not as an evidence of the invalidation of the proposition, but seek other explanations of the occurrence in faulty definitions, or in errors of the application of the principle as an empirical generalisation. Mill was thus wrong in supposing that a situation could arise which would overthrow such a principle, for the truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions, which is another way of saying that they are tautologies (Ayer - 1958, p. 74-77). We cannot, as Leibnitz attempted, put all true statements on a level with those of formal logic or pure mathematics, nor was the Cartesian attempt to base all knowledge upon analytic propositions a successful one, as the denial that nature is uniform is not self-contradictory in logic. This leads us to consider the status of induction and ways of assessing the probability of hypotheses.

Mill defined induction as "the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true in similar circumstances at all times."
This covers all the cases in which we pass from a particular statement of fact to a factual conclusion which is not formally entailed. The problem of induction is that of finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalisations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future. Appeal to mathematical principles means falling into the error of supposing that from a tautology it is possible to deduce a proposition about a matter of fact, while appeal to an empirical principle means assuming what one is setting out to prove (Ayer, 1958, p. 49). This is why the postulate of the uniformity of nature is an act of faith rather than logic and Ayer believes that we must be willing to let inductive reasoning be the judge in its own case, as logically there can be no court of superior jurisdiction. An attempt to take as premises a set of \textit{a priori} truths would not solve the problem as these are tautologies from which only other tautologies may be derived and to base all knowledge upon a set of tautologies would clearly be absurd. Also, attempts to base assessments of the probability of hypotheses upon an \textit{a priori} theory of probability leads to circular argument. Any such theory is in fact a mathematical calculus of chances from which it is impossible to derive conclusions about what is likely to happen without empirical premises in justification of which there are the same difficulties which the \textit{a priori} calculus
was designed to avoid. If empirical statements had the same certainty as a _priori_ have, they would cease to be the description of anything that happens.

These arguments are relevant to the opinion that in the behavioural sciences the criterion of successful theory is the ability to predict behaviour. The view is clearly implied in Eysenck's work that the sort of prediction which is based upon mathematical procedures has a particular sort of probability which other sorts of prediction do not, but that hypotheses may be established by speculation (Eysenck, 1957, p. 323). Ayer, however, rejects the view that scientists are concerned only with testing the worth of hypotheses which may or may not be arrived at by inductive means by a process which is wholly deductive. There would be no reason for discarding a hypothesis which failed the test except on the grounds that having failed once it would be likely to fail again, which is once more a resort to inductive reasoning. In the field of human behaviour it can be held that in the same way as an empirical proposition can never have the same certainty as an _a priori_, the theoretical certainty of prediction which is implicit in behaviourism is logically impossible. To maintain that if all the antecedent circumstances of an act were known, then the nature of the act would be determined is to say that the act is not a human act, as it is of the nature of human acts
that they are modified by processes of thought and reflection which are continuous and which express themselves in a series of choices, all of which is part of our introductory definition of personality.

It is misleading to make too sharp a distinction between philosophy and science: the crucial difference lies between the speculative and logical aspects of science (Ayer, 1958, p. 153). There is no qualitative difference between scientific thinking and that which reasonable men apply in their approach to their everyday affairs. Scientific thought is a refinement of everyday thought processes, a sophisticated form of cognitive reality-testing. The concept of science is a changing one and it is a task for the philosophy of science to examine how far dynamic psychology and psycho-analysis require new criteria for the evaluation of results and observations and in what way these ought to be related to the overall structure of science (Foulkes, 1957, p. 328). Psychoanalytical theory is particularly full of metaphysical elements which philosophical elucidation of their symbols might go some way towards removing. Freud saw quite early that definitions had often to be operative ones which might require modification in the interests of practical application or logical consistency. Nowhere is the changing nature of science more clearly seen than in a comparison between Newtonian physics, which could be so easily verified by
observation and Einstein's general theory of relativity in which the description of the operations by which the quantities involved could be measured becomes such a serious and complex task that it becomes an essential part of the theory. It is not an accident that theoretical psychoanalysis has not taken the standard form of an experimental natural science, and it might even have been seen that this would have to be so, as the knowledge we may have of our own mental powers is reflexive in that the object of knowledge and the knowing subject change and extend their range together. Our original postulate was that the course of evolution should be considered in terms of relationship and our definition of personality was in terms of human relationship. Human relationship is in its essence in continual expansion, each moment of transaction between a person and another object gaining from the cumulative experience of past transactions and in a situation between two persons this process is two-fold. Thus it follows that instead of trying to contract the realities of experience within a confining methodology devised for static data, it is our task to find ways of devising methods to fit the dynamic and continuously multiplying data of relationship. It will be held that the psycho-analytic technique investigating as it does a particular type of interpersonal situation in a therapeutic setting is the genesis of such a method, and that in the
analysis of the transference are the beginnings of a scientific investigation of relationship.
PART II

THE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT.
CHAPTER 4.

Birth Experience and Early Infancy.

In the same way as the hominisation of the species is the result of a culmination of a number of separate but interrelated threads of evolution, the hominisation of the individual proceeds by a series of regular waves of activity in a variety of different spheres of physical, physiological and psychological functioning. The observable nature of physical changes and the easily-drawn parallels with animals and other organisms make it difficult to avoid the error of neglecting the psychic factors which are themselves unobservables and which can be studied only by means of inference from observables. While we must single out particular changes of state for the purposes of study, it is essential to remember that individual growth is part of a continuous process from the fertilisation of the ovum through many different sorts of environment down to the dissolution of the body, and that this individual progress is part of the greater progress of life itself in which other individuals and other species are taking part. The essence of this progress is its continuity and its totality, to which the parts which are isolated for study play only a contributory part. For convenience the origin of the individual life is considered to be at birth, yet the child which emerges from
the womb continues to follow regular curves of growth which began in the foetal stage. If electroencephalograms are examined of children of different ages, the waves become larger and slower the younger the child, while records taken from the belly of a pregnant woman bear out the extrapolated child data in every way (Hill, 1950. Walter, 1953). There is nevertheless an important and obvious difference between the situation of the foetus and the new-born child, a difference marked by the cutting of the umbilical cord. The term symbiosis is often used to describe the relationship of mother and child and thus the relationship is compared with other examples in animal and plant life and reference is made to the fact that the mother is biologically conditioned for her special function of providing for the needs of her dependent child. But the application of purely biological terminology to this relationship even in the intra-uterine period obscures the two-way psychological factor, which is the mother's identification with the infant and the infant's dependence on the mother. It has not been generally accepted that the psychology of an individual exists before he is born and that his experiences at birth have any significance for his later emotional development, but some of the major difficulties in this area arise from a false antithesis of mind and body. It is permissible to oppose the terms mental and physical in ordinary usage, but in scientific discussion
it is a different matter, as the study of psychosomatic disorders and the histories of depressive psychotics go some way to establish. Freud recognised that the ego was first and foremost a body ego (1923, p. 33) and the narcissistic character of the baby's first few weeks has been described as a stage of primary identification in which painful stimuli from within and without are recorded in the psyche alongside the more continuous experience of satisfaction. The psyche and the soma are not to be distinguished except according to the way in which we look at the individual from outside: for him there is a long process of development in which those aspects of his person become interrelated and he gains a sense of self, localised in a body which has an inside and an outside. Birth does not signify the time when what has been considered physiologically can be considered psychologically.

The head end of the foetus develops in general quicker than the tail end, and although there is little available information on the growth of various parts of the brain, particularly the subcortical structures and the various nuclei and tracts, it is reasonable to suppose that this follows a regular pattern comparable with that of the ossification centres. By three intra-uterine months the cells become organised into the layers of the cortex and about six intra-uterine months the layering and appearance
characteristic of the adult brain is present. The same individual differences in rates of maturation are seen in the intra-uterine state as can be seen post-natally, but the general regularity of the process is clearly discernible through these. At nine months gestation the infant is not only physically and physiologically ready for a change in environment and radical changes in body functioning, it is also prepared for emotional experience. It would, however, be contrary to all we know of natural processes of growth if this started up suddenly in response to an external stimulus. In fact the physical aliveness of the foetus developing inside the womb may be seen as a developing body or a developing psyche and the psyche may be defined as an imaginative elaboration of somatic parts, feelings and functions (Winnicott, 1954, p. 244). Its existence is dependent upon the degree of growth and the healthy functioning of the brain, which is subject to individual differences the same as those which may be seen in the state of all the other organs. When birth takes place, it is an intimate experience which involves for the mother a transformation of part of herself and for the child the possibility of a relationship with objects. In modern obstetrics the importance of promoting successful labour has caused more and more attention to be paid to the psychology of the mother and as a result some obstetricians are coming to the view that the psychology
of the child should be taken into account also. This is in accordance with the clinical findings of psychoanalysts who often find that material relative to the events of birth is significant and held as memory material, appearing in regression during analysis or in the play of child patients. This is perhaps most commonly found among psychotics where things are remembered which in more normal states are overlaid and unavailable to consciousness. Winnicott sums up this clinical experience by saying: "the feeling one gets is, however, that the child's body knows about being born." (1949, p. 177). Readiness for being born involves not only physical preparedness for existence outside the womb, but also a state of receptiveness to emotional experience. This would seem to be established by observations of the newborn and by material arising from analysis of older patients. It is necessary as a result that birth should take place at the right moment both for the psyche and the soma, and complications which lead to post-maturity may have the effect that the infant has already reached the stage of maturation necessary for emotional experience before it is born. If, on the other hand, the infant is premature, then it may not experience much that is important until after it has been born for a few weeks and reaches the maturational age at which birth should in fact have taken place.

The obstetric hazards of post-maturity are considerable,
as in addition to the increased size and weight of the baby, ossification of the head has progressed sufficiently to make delivery more difficult. The stillbirth rate in post-maturity is nearly twice that of babies born at term and this is partly due to the difficulties of delivery and partly to the risk of intra-partum asphyxia. Labour is likely to be prolonged and the operative delivery rate is very much increased to something in the region of 29% of all births. Maternal mortality is practically trebled. In addition to this hidden factor an indeterminate number of children are born with varying degrees of cerebral impairment due to hypoxia in labour. (Donald, 1959, p. 642). It can be seen therefore that in the post-mature child we have not only the conditions most likely to result in prolonged, difficult labour and the use of instruments, but also a state of maturation sufficiently far advanced for these to be experienced as traumatic by the infant.

The difficulties of pre-maturity on the other hand lie more in the inadequacy of the infant to meet the requirements of separate existence: more than 50% of neo-natal deaths are due to pre-maturity, but when the infant survives, the birth is less likely to have been experienced traumatically because of the immaturity of the infant's nervous system. The hazards of the treatment of the premature neonate include many physical dangers such as those attendant upon the
administration of oxygen or vitamin K, but special arrangements for the care of premature babies may also result in disturbance of emotional development. This may arise through defective early object-relations originating in deficiencies in good mothering or prolonged separations due to hospital routines of various kinds.

Freud recognised the importance of the birth trauma, but he held that it could not be experienced as a separation from the mother since the foetus is completely narcissistic and unaware of her existence as an object (1926), but Otto Rank came to regard the processes of development as a series of ways of overcoming the original birth anxiety or dyspnoea (Rank, 1924). The relationship between the mother and child, however, begins before the infant is born and continues through the birth process and after, and it is against this background that the importance of the birth experience in emotional development must be assessed. It is primarily a change in the quality of relationships, a time when the infant exchanges a physiological environment in which his needs are met by automatic processes for a world in which his needs are met by interaction with objects. Up to this time foetal movement has brought about a sense of the environment through the opposition it presents to movement, a beginning of the sense of the not-me world. The natural birth experience is therefore in the pattern of something already
experienced, an intercourse with the environment in which it is sometimes the environment which is dominant and sometimes the infant. During birth the infant plays the minor part and immediately after there is a return to the state in which he is important. In prolonged labour the child's relating with the environment in this rhythm of impulse and reaction is uneven and made significant for him by prolonged impingements which interrupt the even flow and which will have a varied effect upon later emotional development depending upon the way the impingements are sensed and the degree of trauma (Winnicott, 1949, p. 189). In a situation where there is established a pattern of reaction instead of impulse, owing to the prolonged impingement of the environment which is likely to occur in post-maturity, the sense of the 'me' is impaired and may in extreme cases never be established. It would seem that birth experience must be smooth, occurring at the right stage of maturation of the psyche-soma and following upon a history of impulsive foetal movement for the optimum conditions for healthy emotional development in later life to be attained. The child arrives in the external world of objects with a primitive experience of relationship, a predisposition towards a certain way of relating and perhaps an emotional or traumatic experience of the birth itself.

In infancy and childhood the regular processes of growth
continue, with variations in the growth rate of different organs and parts and the usual evidence of individual variations. Although the anatomical development of the human brain is a subject about which little is known, its external growth approaches completion earlier than any other bodily organ. By nine months after birth it is 50% of its adult weight and by two years it is 75%. Immediately after birth, the legs, which were less advanced in intra-uterine growth, begin to catch up as the infant gets ready to walk about.

In animals these differences in growth rates in normal conditions have been studied along with the effect of special circumstances such as malnutrition, and there have been a number of experiments on localisation and maturational levels of a kind which it would be impossible to conduct with human beings. A young goose in the middle stage of growth slows down its general rate of growth if malnourished, and when it is fed again it grows fast and develops into a normal bird. The wings of waterfowl grow quite slowly until suddenly there is a spurt and they catch up with the rest of the bird. Malnutrition during this period of accelerated growth has the effect that the wing goes on growing while the bird gets thinner and thinner and usually dies of tuberculosis. Some similar examples may be found among human beings, for instance among concentration camp inmates who had been for
long periods subjected to malnutrition, inanition and stress. In them the association, temporal and frontal regions retained most of their normal structure, while the primary motor and sensory regions tended to be relatively under-nourished and dystrophic (Tanner and Inhelder, 1956, p. 49). It seems that those characters which are phylogenetically most recently acquired are the most favoured in time of stress or emergency, but this is descriptive rather than explanatory. In terms of relationship, all these phenomena can be accommodated under the single principle that when an animal or person is in the process of or in preparation for a change in their system of relationships, those organs which are required to facilitate the new system will receive precedence. Evolution has meant the development of more elaborate nervous systems, culminating in the human cerebral cortex. It may be true to say that the most recently acquired characters are favoured, but it is more in accordance with the view of evolution set down in the introduction to see this as an expression of the forward movement of life which progresses by evolving more and more complex systems of relationship. The concentration camp victims required the higher centres of the cortex for memory, association and fantasy which were required to preserve their human personality in circumstances of gross physical and mental stress. The patterns of relationship required in these circumstances were largely of a passive kind
and were heavily dependent upon the inner world. At a much simpler level, the young goose in the mid period of growth is not approaching any major change, while the fledgling waterfowl is about to leave the nest and needs his wings to do it.

In the light of this single principle the growth curves of human infants may be seen as a series of preparations for and realisations of different sorts of relationship within the framework of a general phylogenetic pattern with wide individual differences. The nearer the environment is to the optimum the more each dimension will follow a completely regular rate-of-growth curve without breaks or spurts, but malnutrition, environmental influences or interferences may disturb their regularity. The development of the foetus brings the head to such a state of growth in the intra-uterine state that it makes the time of delivery critical and the delay of onset of labour by even one week may mean that ossification of the head will have advanced so far as to make it impossible to deliver the child normally. There would be no object in the head reaching this advanced state of development and complicating the process of birth were it not that the cranial capacity was needed to deal with the change in the infant's system of relationships brought about by the movement from narcissistic self-sufficiency of the womb to the world of objects. Once it is there it needs its legs and motor organs and so they begin to catch up in speed of growth.
The development of the brain seems to bear out the hypothesis that there is a regular development of parts in a sequence connected with the child's relationship to objects. Conel (1952) has noted that post-natally up to six months of age the primary motor area is the most advanced, the primary sensory areas next and the primary auditory and visual areas follow them. This is at a time when the child is most concerned with the formation of motor habits and his perceptions are directed towards displacement of objects in space. It is only towards the end of this period that there is a gradual extension and increasing mobility of what Piaget calls the 'schemata' of behaviour. Receptive areas are more advanced than association areas in the case of each sensation and the cingulate gyrus, the hippocampus and the insula, which are thought to be concerned in circuits which include subcortical structures, are developmentally behind at that time. Conel takes nine points as the criteria of advance and notes that any particular part of the cortex changes in several ways as time goes on. When he says that one area is more advanced than another, he means that the changes are further along in time. The information which is available about the way in which the brain and central nervous system operates and how functions are localised is however scanty. For this reason the findings of studies such as Conel's are best seen in conjunction with information from other sources which are
more concerned with the operation of structures as a whole and the development of organised functions. One such source is electroencephalography, which in spite of the technical imperfections in the methods used, has yielded a great deal of valuable data about the brain's electrical activity at various ages.

The slow, irregular and poorly synchronised rhythms characteristic of the foetal brain persist into infancy, where they seem to be associated with repose and inactivity. These delta waves decline and become more intermittent as the child spends more time awake and becomes more active in the exploration of its environment. Between the second and the tenth year delta activity becomes scarcely perceptible. Exceptionally it may persist until the age of eighteen or twenty and work has been done which suggests a connection between this factor and certain personality patterns in adolescent delinquents, to which later reference will be made. (Hodge, Walter & Walter, 1953). With the decline of delta rhythms, there is a sharp increase in theta activity which climbs very steeply in the infant population and then declines at much the same rate as the delta waves, which it also resembles in that it can be evoked and repressed by external stimuli. There is a correspondence between the frequency of temper outbursts in children and the appearance of theta activity. According to Goodenough (1931) the frequency of
temper outbursts per hour of observation rises to a peak about two years of age and then declines in a regular curve with a slight increase again after five. A record from a child of two or three showing little or no theta activity will usually show a burst of it when the child is annoyed, and the theta rhythm may persist for hours or even days after the disagreeable stimulus has been withdrawn. In older children and adults, theta activity may be invoked by the same means, though it may often be inhibited by conscious effort shortly after it makes its appearance. Theta rhythms seem to be associated with frustrating situations, although the period of the most likely temper outbursts is not the period of maximum height of theta activity, but the time of maximum change when the theta rhythms are dominant over the declining delta waves and the beginnings of the more adult patterns are not yet clearly marked. These adult patterns take the form of alpha waves which are more complex and difficult to study as they are completely absent from the records of some people, while in others they are persistent in all their waking activities. These rhythms may make their appearance as early as the first year of life, but it is not until about the age of nine to eleven that distribution in an adult pattern is first seen. They become more prominent as delta and theta activity decline.

Information from various sources thus coincides to present
a consistent view of development in terms of relationships. After nine months of rapid intra-uterine growth in which the head is developed more rapidly than the rest of the body, the infant is born into a world of objects and the rate of growth slows down. The curves of growth do not all slow down to the same extent for as we have seen other parts and organs begin to catch up with the brain as they are now required for the exploration and manipulation through which the child will experience his environment and enlarge it. Piaget has studied the evolving of different sorts of behaviour and types of thinking in infancy and childhood and he describes three stages in terms of structural wholes rather than isolated pieces of behaviour. The first stage, extending from birth to about 1½ years of age is characterised by a system or group of reversible actions such as displacement in space. These pass from the formation of motor habits and perceptions to the formation of intentional acts and prehensions, the co-ordination of ends and means, the investigation of new means and the achievement of ends by detours and displacements. These take place against the background of the more numerous bursts of rage and the accompanying theta activity which was noted in the encephalograms. The growth pattern at this time shows that the general body dimensions, the genitals and the lymphoid structures have a much higher velocity than the neural structures. The infant is becoming bigger, more
powerful and more able to make use of the intricate sensory-motor system which has developed so early. He evolves ways of manipulating the environment much more quickly than he evolves ways of dealing with his frustration as his association areas are still behind in development and his constant experiments and increased motor activity bring him more and more into conflict with objects in outer reality. He is longer awake each day and kept much more in contact with objects by the increasing continuity of his waking self and his sleeping self: he does not so often relapse into the state of passive 'going along' characteristic of much of his foetal life and of long periods of his early infancy, and the slow, irregular rhythms become rarer and rarer on the encephalograms. His ways of relating to objects still have the primitive, predatory and devouring quality which characterised his early approaches to the breast. His reaction to frustration is primitive rage, and frustration is most often felt through the denial of a needed object or the interruption of a relationship with a satisfying object. In studying theta activity in both children and adults it was found experimentally that the surest way of reproducing annoyance was to deprive the subject suddenly of an object with which they had formed a satisfying relationship. The child has by this time experienced the prototype of all these frustrating situations in the privation and disillusion experienced at weaning when
he loses his first satisfying object, the breast.

These experiences with objects and persons help to establish the 'me' and the 'not me' by a range of active experiments and by a variety of reactions to what is happening round about, and they are multiplied by the increasing capacities and powers of the psyche-soma through the processes of normal growth.
CHAPTER 5.

Childhood and Adolescence.

In ordinary usage it is said of a child that he is 'growing up' when his systems of relationships are in process of change, and the reference is always more to behaviour than to physical maturation. The process of growing up involves abandoning the state of infantile dependence and through a process of continuous transition arriving at an adult system of relationships based upon mutual giving and taking, a genital attitude and an appropriate place in the social system in which the individual lives. The goal of successful development through childhood and adolescence is the emergence of a person with a sense of self and reality which results in a satisfactory system of relationships at the personal level. This is affected by a number of interconnected factors, some of which are physical and some emotional and in developmental studies it is common to consider certain parts of an individual history in terms of the one or the other. The opposition of psyche and soma in this way is permissible for purposes of scientific analysis but health and development are in fact based upon integrated psyche-soma growth. It is less satisfactory to oppose mind and body, as acceptance of the concept of the unconscious leads to the suggestion that the mind does not in fact exist as an entity and "when we talk of
the mind influencing the body or the body influencing the mind, we are merely using a convenient shorthand for a more cumbrous phrase" (Scott, 1949). Consideration of the mind of an individual involves consideration of the whole individual and development of the mind as a separately functioning entity is a pathological condition. Intact brain and other bodily functions are a prerequisite for the health of the psyche as well as for the health of the body, and unless the psyche is in a healthy relationship with the soma, bodily functions may be affected. These considerations are particularly important in childhood and adolescence as it is in the years before puberty that the functions of the mind become developed and its systems of relationships within the psyche-soma are established.

Physical growth decreases in velocity after infancy and this decrease is constant except for two periods of accelerated growth, one of which is not fully established and the other of which is quite definite. Tanner (1947) found evidence of a growth spurt between 5½ and 7½ years although this was confined to females and was in breadth dimensions only, the leg, trunk and arm lengths remaining unaffected. It is likely that this is not of great significance and may in fact be caused by a sampling error. The second growth spurt is well documented, is associated with the onset of puberty and seems to be in some way initiated by the hypothalamus or the higher
centres in the brain. It may be that this hypothalamic centre is the very last part of the brain to become mature and functional or that the beginning of adolescence depends upon the whole brain reaching a certain stage of maturation over all, but little is known about this. The electroencephalograms of children show that there is a general change in the patterns of brain activity somewhere between the ages of nine and twelve, when the delta rhythms are no longer of significant incidence, the theta rhythms are no longer dominant and the alpha rhythms are on the increase. These alpha rhythms seem to be associated with vivid imagery and are present in those children who are visualisers. It is about nine or ten that the adult patterns of alpha activity are becoming clearly distinguishable and it becomes possible to divide the juvenile population into two groups on the basis of the appearance of this visualising quality. This is also the age at which there is an increase in reading ability and the gap between good and bad readers becomes much wider.

The work of Piaget shows that after early infancy there is a stage from two to eleven years marked by the formation and equilibration of representative intelligence. The change from sensory-motor function in the infant to mental representation in the child is due to the symbolic function which is expressed first in play and then in the more sophisticated forms of
language and drawing. Up to eleven years there develops a system of concrete operations which will later serve as the basis for formal operations and this is facilitated by the discovery of the reversibility of mental actions which may take place somewhere around six years. Up till then the whole intellectual behaviour of the child is determined by the irreversibility of mental actions, and it is only about eleven years old that reasoning frees itself from the concrete.

In almost every country there is a pre-school stage in the years from three to six, then from six to twelve there is primary schooling in which the basis automatisms are learned. At twelve the child passes to secondary schooling by which all the fundamental perceptive-intellectual mechanisms have been acquired. Thus in most educational systems the ages of three, six and twelve are marked out as the beginning or end of stages, with small variations within a year or so. These stages are reproduced with minor variations in all cultures and ethnic groups and appear to be related to other than purely social factors. For instance, drawing tests applied to children up to ten years of age of different ethnic groups show the same stages present in the same chronological order (Prudhommeau, 1947).

The most diverse psychological methods combine to the conclusion that the age of twelve marks a culmination of a
certain kind of development and from this year onwards individual and cultural factors play a much larger part than before in the determination of the pattern of intellectual activity and behaviour. The child passes from close dependence upon the mother to the development of relationships of his own with objects and people in his environment. First these are confined to his home and the people he lives with, where he has to learn to share his mother first with his father and then with siblings or even with a new, very demanding baby. All these persons have needs and preoccupations of their own by which their actions with reference to him will be partly determined. In his explorations he learns what can and what cannot be controlled and manipulated by him, against the background of a situation in which his powers are changing every day and he is experiencing what other people want him to do and will not allow him to do. These processes may be described as the 'socialisation' of the child, and cover the consolidation of the 'me' and 'not me', the exploration of the possibilities and limitations of reality and the beginnings of application of intellect to the problems which the child encounters. These changes are reflected in the electroencephalogram as the delta and theta activity declines and the alpha rhythms become more frequent and regular.

The culmination of this phase comes when he goes to school
and, if his development has been normal, experiences for the first time the certainty of acceptance on the basis of intellectual performance. At the same time new sorts of relationship are possible with others like himself and the result is that after an initial short period of frequent frustration at which infantile temper tantrums may reappear, there begins a period of behavioural stability in which his interests become more objective and the alpha waves in the electroencephalograms become dominant. He begins to function simultaneously in two different environments, the school and the home, and if the values and standards of behaviour in both happen to coincide, his learning is facilitated and the progress of development is smooth. Where the two are in opposition the child is in conflict from the beginning and as he becomes stronger and more individual this opposition may interfere with his learning and make it difficult for him to arrive at standards of conduct for himself. Conflicts between home and school may arise when the child transfers to the teachers conscious attitudes towards his parents and ways of relating to other children which are the result of experiences with brothers and sisters. These superficial aspects of behaviour may be brief and changeable and in a direction possibly contrary to his general unconscious trends. They are in the nature of experimental reality-testing.

The impact of the child's going to school is also felt
by the parents, whose relationship with him is affected by what they see happening to him and by reactions to the changes in his behaviour. All these external aspects of behaviour are determined to a large extent by the already existing inner world of unconscious object-relations, but the way in which these alter his perception of outer reality and evolve into a system of action is affected by his early experiences. The child is exposed to a series of situations from which he learns how his view of things fits in with the society in which he lives and he finds out the limitations which it will place upon his activities. In school the child feels the pressure of group demands, learns the possibilities of identification with the group and of participation in group action. The 'culture pattern' school of social psychology emphasises this aspect of child development while underestimating the importance of the basic unconscious situation, upon which the external relationships are superimposed. Erich Fromm regards human relationships as arising out of "the specific kind of relatedness of the individual towards the world and to himself" (Mullahy, 1948, p. 241). Sullivan confines himself solely to what goes on between people in his "theory of interpersonal relations", holding that the human being is the product of personal and social forces acting upon the individual from the day of his birth (Sullivan, 1947, 1953). The sociological aspects of character formation
are seen by Karen Horney as the most important factors in a process by which trends in parent-child relationships are consolidated under social pressures. The culture-pattern school are in the tradition of Adler in that they confine themselves to the everyday ego, the outside appearance of the individual, which Freud calls the "reality ego" and Winnicott the "false self". Their emphasis upon human relations rather than innate determining factors was an important one, but their neglect of the deeper relationships in the inner world confined them to the description of the impact of social forces upon the superficial self rather than led them to an investigation of the total psyche. The limitations of this approach are perhaps most clearly seen when the changes which take place at adolescence are considered.

The years of puberty and adolescence are notable for the growth of external dimensions and some striking changes in internal organisation. The growth spurt is liable to the usual individual variations but the velocity curves show an increase in body weight beginning about eight years and reaching a peak around eleven to thirteen years. The growth of the testes increases much more rapidly from about eight years to a period of very rapid growth at twelve but the high velocity is maintained over a longer interval until somewhere between sixteen and twenty years. Some parts of the pituitary and the adrenal cortex begin to function for the first time.
The gonads come into action and other hormones seem to be secreted in proportion to the size of the growing child. As well as the individual variations, there is evidence that malnutrition can postpone puberty but there are few differences due to environmental factors such as climate or social class as was once thought to be the case. The course of puberty in girls is well documented: first an increase in growth velocity for all external dimensions, then as this slackens to zero, first menstruation occurs. It is not easy to make a similar comparison for boys as in their case there exists no single easily identifiable event comparable to first menstruation, but it is clearly established that girls enter the period of accelerated growth on the average about two years earlier than boys, though despite the uterus beginning to bleed, the earlier cycles may be anovulatory and this may go on for up to two years before the regular cycle is established and full reproductive maturity attained. The delay of puberty is found only in primates and such comparative studies as have been done for example with rats shows the whole sequence, timing and effect to be quite different.

Studies of adolescence have emphasised the stresses and upheavals and the difficult social adjustments of this stage of development and there can be no doubt that the physiological and intellectual changes are accompanied by shifts in attitudes and in status. It is not permissible to assume, however,
that because the physiological events are so marked and so important it follows that they are causal. Development continues beyond puberty, and although it may be considered as the culmination of a certain stage, it is at the same time the beginnings of another. An approach which places too much emphasis upon one particular aspect of the child's changing situation at puberty, such as his physical growth, the physiological changes or the changes in his intellectual powers is likely to fail to obtain a balanced picture. From the viewpoint of relationship, however, these changes may be seen in perspective.

The association of accelerated growth with sexual maturity has perhaps caused too little attention to be paid to the fact that the increasing growth and strength of the pubescent child is first demonstrated by rapid changes in his relationships with objects and with other persons. He can manipulate more things and is more able to play an adult part in purely physical activities. In dealings with other people he is less liable to physical coercion or force and the consequences of his own destructive acts are much more considerable. Needs are multiplied: both boys and girls need more room, more food and more clothes. These are the direct consequence of getting bigger and stronger and they bring changes in the attitudes and relations of those around them before any further facts are taken into consideration.
Girls reach maturity before boys and changes in their appearance make apparent to others their potentiality for adult-genital relationships which makes it necessary for them to make their own readjustments not only to the changes within themselves but to the changed attitudes of others. It is not the fact of growth or change which produces stress, but attitudes towards it of the child or others. Growth in itself is a familiar experience to children and they have been accustomed since infancy to comments by adults upon their increasing size. Individual differences have also been marked in the early years but accepted with much less anxiety than is usually the case in adolescence. The difference must lie in the social significance which is attached to these factors at puberty, and this seems to be borne out by studies such as those carried out by Margaret Mead within different cultures (1928, 1930). Adolescents may be recognisably different from their own contemporaries and this may generate or intensify anxieties arising from feelings of insecurity or inadequacy. It is at this time also that children are exposed to heavy pressures in competition with contemporaries in educational fields and to demands from parents and friends who want them to excel. This may occur at a time when the individual is turning away from his home or school and create further conflicts and difficulties.

Increased physical capacities are matched by similar
extensions of intellectual activity. The reasoning of the pre-adolescent has already begun to free itself from the concrete, and intelligence is in the process of attaining a balanced structure of deduction by means of hypotheses and governed by what Piaget calls "groups and lattices of formal thought". By this means kinds of relationship are made possible through new kinds of intellectual exploration which parallel the sensory-motor explorations of the earlier years. This also leads to changes in relationships with adults, particularly parents and teachers. The child has not only the means to resist being forced by physical sanctions but may be able to detect logical inconsistencies in the behaviour and attitudes of adults. His own powers of argument may not always gain him what he wants, however, as they are still developing and may be erratic, or he may successfully prove his point only to have authoritarian figures refuse to be bound by logic. It is the application of mind to these problems of transition more than the appearance of new problems which makes adolescence a time of stress.

Melanie Klein (1932, p. 122) holds that the age of puberty has more in common with infancy than with the latency period in that there is a greater dominance of the emotions and the unconscious and a much richer life of the imagination together with increased manifestations of anxiety and affect. It would seem, however, that it is the changes in the
relationships between reality and the person which bring about these features, rather than changes in the person himself. At puberty and after, fantasy is much less able to supply substitute satisfactions or always to satisfy the demands of intellectual reality-testing and magic thinking is less able to rationalise conflicts between inner and outer worlds. Where adequate techniques of relating the two worlds have evolved in the latency period, adolescence should proceed as a smooth transition continuous with the earlier stages. Sexual maturation does bring problems through the anxiety aroused by the revival of conflicts still unresolved since infancy and by the possibility of relationships previously possible only in fantasy. The test is of the ways of relating which have already been evolved, just as the possibility of satisfying sexual acts is a test for the ways of expression already established. The adolescent may be unsuccessful in modifying his systems and techniques and continue to employ patterns of relationship appropriate to earlier stages of development, a fact which is often strikingly illustrated in the brain's electrical activity. An electroencephalogram of a schoolgirl of sixteen presented with a frustrating task shows the interruption of alpha waves as she applies herself to manipulation, the appearance of theta waves as the frustrating nature of the task is comprehended, then their subsidence under the pressure of her own persistence
and perseverance towards a solution. This may be compared with the record of a juvenile delinquent of the same age who was two years later convicted of a capital offence (Walter, 1956). Although he was normal in neurological terms, a simple stimulus such as a flickering light was sufficient to excite the whole brain into an almost convulsive state similar to the activity of very young children. In the first case the temporary impulsive reaction is inhibited by conscious effort as the girl employs more mature technique for solving her difficulty. In the second, however, the disordered activity is not inhibited in any way. This kind of record seems to be associated with emotional instability and is found in only 3% of the normal population, occurring often in persons who are guilty of crimes of impulsive violence for trivial reasons. This backward movement to an earlier mode of behaviour is really a return to earlier relationship systems, or rather to still existent inner relationship systems which were dominant at an earlier period of development. Freud showed that it was frustration which initiated this 'regression' and he classed it as a defence. The function of regression in the aetiology of nervous disorders has been widely discussed and Winnicot has pointed out that it may be a healing mechanism, allowing a return to a situation for the correction of an original adaptive failure (Winnicot, 1955, p. 293). In the normal course of development the opposing tendencies of
regression and progression are at work all the time. The various stresses of puberty make the swings between them more marked than at other ages and this goes a long way to explain the inconsistencies and mood swings of adolescent behaviour. Social demands may check the regressive tendencies which are necessary for healthy development and adult demands upon immature adolescents may at times be impossible to meet.

Adolescence is a time at which the adequacy of methods of dealing with persons and objects in a limited environment is tested in the whole adult world and various degrees of modification are required so that conflicts vary in intensity between individuals. The important feature of adolescent development is that the personal reactions of young people and the difficulties they experience in adaptation are directly related to the treatment they have received in earlier years. The changes which take place are changes in ways of relating and the events of physical and physiological maturation have importance only as factors in the changing of relationships.

Sexual maturity is an important factor in the change and has had a disproportionately large share of attention in studies of adolescent problems and conflicts. This may result from the influence of Stanley Hall's study (1904), which was for a long time the accepted authority and which provided a comprehensive review of 19th Century research findings on adolescence in many diverse fields. Freud's
discoveries concerning the sexual life of infancy, however, have tended to restore a more even balance between sexual maturation and other factors in adolescent development.

"That children should have no sexual life - sexual excitement, needs and gratifications of a sort - but that they suddenly acquire these things in the years between 12 and 14 would be, apart from any observation at all, biologically just as improbable, indeed, nonsensical, as to suppose that they are born without genital organs which first begin to sprout at the age of puberty." (Freud, 1922)

Evidence has shown that there is an intensification of sexual activity at puberty leading to auto-erotic activities and homosexual and heterosexual experimentations (Kinsey, 1951). An important feature of this is that the occurrence of the first ejaculation in the boy usually begins a history of regular sexual outlet conforming to a particular individual pattern. Autoerotic activities are by no means confined to adolescence and it is now known that masturbation occurs in general in the sucking stage and it is very commonly prolonged up to the latency period. During the latency period, Freud held that the energies of the child seem to be mainly taken up with the task of resisting the temptation to masturbate (Freud, 1926). This relating of masturbation to the state of infantile dependence is of importance for an understanding of the changes at adolescence, as it can then be seen to represent a form of behaviour originating in an earlier phase of development to which a return is made when a genital relationship cannot be established.
In earlier and simpler societies in Europe increase in physical strength and powers meant an immediate absorption of the individual within the adult group and adult status brought adult sexual relationships. Life was short and early marriage was the custom (Landis, 1945). Ethnological studies such as those by Margaret Mead have shown that the storm, stress and conflict of adolescence are closely associated with the sort of society in which the young person is growing up. They are not the result of the operation of a specific factor such as delay in obtaining sexual gratification. Cultural factors producing stress may be subsumed under the single heading of postponement of adult status and consequent lengthening of the period of dependence, which are not exclusive to present-day societies but are nevertheless an inevitable concomitant of the extended programmes of education which form part of the complexities of modern civilisation. This is borne out by the fact that there is a difference between the attitudes of boys and girls who stay at school till eighteen and those who go to work early: the important difference between these groups seems to lie in the fact of earning money rather than the possession of it. Schoolboys tend to develop a hostile attitude towards the family while a young worker does not, a fact which is not affected in the many cases in which the schoolboy may have more money to spend than the young worker. In terms of status and
relationships the schoolboy is still being kept in the intermediate, partially dependent stage while the young worker has already entered a social life and is relating in an adult way.

These group problems which are over and above the individual problems attending the passage to adult life, vary between societies and with socio-economic status. The intermediate stage of development is always characterised, however, by the emergence of ways of facilitating this transition. Development is a continuous process and the earlier phases of any particular stage are always marked by the persistence of features inherited from the previous stage, in a way which is analogous to Piaget's description of processes of formation or genesis in intellectual function which pass into the complete form or final equilibrium which is, however, the formation or genesis of the next stage. Anna Freud (1945) states a similar view when she notes that the latency period is usually in existence for one or two years before the tendencies of the first infantile period fade into the background. The importance of the intermediate transitional stage of development lies in the transformation of early object-relations into patterns of transaction between inner and outer reality which are in adolescence tested by their ability to withstand the pressures encountered in that period of development and the conflicts resulting from the
prolongation of the state of dependence which is a purely cultural and variable phenomenon.
CHAPTER 6.

The Theory of Instinct.

The newly born child stands in the same relation to the mature adult as primitive peoples stand in relation to modern man. The reflective quality of man forms as much a part of the biological heritage of the human infant as his primitive behaviour. The development of an animal involves participation in a limited number of relationships determined by the pattern of its species, but the development of a person is through a series of changes which increase his difference from other persons while at the same time multiplying his systems of relationship with them. No other species follows this pattern, and because of this direct comparisons between animal and human behaviour are never legitimate unless they are seen as ways of throwing light upon a single component of a complex whole in the same way as neurology, physiology or experimental studies of behaviour may do. Fairbairn holds that it is legitimate to draw an analogy between the behaviour of animals because "social (viz. object-seeking) behaviour is in general exhibited from birth" (1956, p. 52) but he recognises that the behaviour of animals may become completely unrealistic in the face of changes in the environmental conditions to which they have become adapted. To illustrate his point, he has mentioned the phenomenon of 'imprinting' in
young animals, which would seem to imply an inherent orientation towards objects of a certain sort. Biologically the bird is oriented towards these objects because it is through them that its needs are satisfied. The evidence of ethnologists is, however, that the orientation towards these objects may persist although the need is no longer satisfied or is being satisfied more fully in another fashion (Tanner & Inhelder, 1956, p. 130). They have also found that a particular reaction such as the begging reaction in young birds may actually prevent them from feeding themselves even when food is available and they have learned to feed on their own. Human infants quickly develop adaptibility, the ability to vary their behaviour or to seek alternative routes to the same goal. Piaget has demonstrated that this may begin to show itself in the first year of infancy. Because this important difference shows so early it is perhaps more useful to consider those primitive forms of behaviour which are common to animals and men as relationship seeking rather than object seeking. For the animal it is the relationship with the object, not the object itself which is sought, and this is on the basis of a direct satisfaction of a biological need arising from membership of a particular species. The object sought is more a key-stimulus to a relationship than an object in the way that a human being conceives it. There is a sense in which certain forms of infant behaviour may be
considered in the same way, but the infant has within him the potentiality to vary his needs and to choose his relationships. Fairbairn is correct in his view that the basic behaviour of human beings and animals is fundamentally alike, in much the same way as certain of their organs and functions are alike, but he has failed to emphasise that it is the higher centres of the human cortex which make man's objects, his object-seeking and his object-relations into concepts outwith the possible experience of animals. Both human beings and animals can be said to have the same basic orientation towards relationships, but only man has objects. Fairbairn does say that the appreciation of reality of animals may be limited: this might be even more strongly stated, that in a sense animals have no sense of reality at all, only a system of relationships based upon needs, which is maintained by responses to certain combinations of stimuli which may be simple or complex, depending upon the position of the animal on the evolutionary ladder. Such combinations may take the form of an object as we know it, but for the animal it can have no significance of this sort, as it cannot consider such a combination in terms of its possibilities for satisfaction or its amenability to manipulation: it cannot refer to it, remember it in its absence or hallucinate it. Nevertheless, infants do share with animals certain innate qualities which are as important for their development as those more complex
forms of behaviour which more clearly differentiate between man and animal.

In the intra-uterine life needs are supplied by the operation of automatic physiological processes, and there is a state of even flow of impulse and reaction maintaining a balance between the relative importance of the individual and the environment which undergoes a number of changes at the time of birth. The child is born with certain attributes into a particular setting which Winnicott has related to the very special psychiatric condition of the mother, a state which he calls "primary maternal preoccupation" (Winnicott, 1956). These attributes are listed as his constitution, his innate developmental tendencies, his mobility and sensitivity and the instincts, which are themselves involved in the developmental tendency. At birth a number of adjustments are required for successful functioning under the new conditions. Breathing starts, cries are uttered, movements are made. Observation has shown that in addition to automatic adaptations on the part of certain organs, there exist from the beginning a number of complete patterns of behaviour directed to specific ends similar to those seen in young animals of other species. There is within the infant something which impels him to take the breast, a movement towards feeding which is there from the start. These patterns vary very little between individuals and between
cultures, though individual and cultural differences soon make their appearance. In animals, all behaviour largely depends on these instincts which rest upon a specific neurological structure and are set in motion by particular stimuli. The pecking of new-born chicks or the nest-building of birds are examples of this sort of behaviour, which show how these may be elaborate and well-co-ordinated sequences of movements well adapted to the purposes which they are intended to serve and may be distinguished from purely reflex action or autorhythmic, both of which are simpler types of central nervous activity. Pure reflexes are rare in the animal kingdom and have in many cases superseded autorhythmic which is the incessant generation of complicated and highly co-ordinated rhythmical series of motor impulses such as are concerned in locomotion. It seems clear that this kind of activity is behind the typical spontaneity of all instinctive activity and that an explanation on this basis explains much that is unintelligible when considered in terms of reflexes. As yet no complex instinctive activity has been analysed into its neurological components, but as long as it was regarded as a chain of reflexes the question of how it began did not present a problem. When the autorhythmic basis of spontaneous instinctive activity became apparent, however, the problem did emerge of what inhibits the behaviour and in turn removes the inhibition in the biologically adequate situation and at the right moment. Studies have been
made of this 'innate releasing mechanism' (I.R.M.) which have yielded considerable information about its operation, though its exact nature still remains in doubt.

An autorhythmic activity common to young mammals and human babies is the movement to and fro of the head in search of the nipple. This is inhibited by the I.R.M. responding to the nipple, which puts a block on the autorhythmic movement when it is found. It has been demonstrated that the 'prehensile reflex' in the human baby has developed ontogenetically out of this 'search mechanism'. This demonstrates very effectively how there are operating in the human being innate patterns of behaviour as in other species. It is, however, impossible to base a psychological theory of human behaviour entirely on such patterns as it can be seen even in this example that however the I.R.M. which responds to the nipple operated in the first instance, for a human child the second occasion cannot be a repetition of the first, as his experience of the first situation is now a part of his approach to the second, and this faculty of associating and remembering makes the forces which modify pure instinctive reaction in human beings more important than the instincts themselves. McDougall ultimately replaced the concept of instinct in his psychological theory by the more general term of 'propensity', and academic psychologists now prefer to accept some framework of innate motivational factors rather
than a simple instinct theory. Thouless (1951, p. 41) doubts whether the concept of instinct or propensity is of much use in explaining differences between individuals or societies, though he believes that some innate forces behind behaviour must exist. In the opinion of Allport (1949, p. 194-5), the original drives become transformed in the course of growth into what we understand as 'motives' and psychology should be concerned with the study of post-instinctive behaviour. The views of both these writers perhaps incline too much in the opposite direction from those who regard instinct as the basis of all behaviour. The aim of a study of the psyche must be to strike a balance between the various contributory factors which comprise the complex of behaviour, neither confining attention to the somatic aspects nor taking an existentialist standpoint. Thouless perhaps fails to allow enough weight to the presence of individual differences in the 'innate forces behind behaviour' and Allport places too much emphasis upon the process of transformation into motives, which has the effect of attaching undue importance to intellectual functions. Post-instinctive behaviour in human beings is, however, marked by the increasing participation of the intellect and concentration upon this aspect of the personality at the expense of other aspects may cause a false division of mental and the physical, or to use Winnicott's terms, mind and psyche-soma (Winnicott, 1954).
Freud used the term 'reality ego', Jung 'persona' and Winnicott 'false self' to describe the external presentment of the personality which is the result of post-instinctive behaviour modified by the pressures of society. These are descriptions of pathological entities, evolved as defences against failures in development. For the study of the total personality, full weight must be given to both innate and acquired factors, the ways in which the two are connected and their relative importance at various stages of growth.

In his studies of the nature of the repressed Freud borrowed the concept of instinct which was familiar in both biological and general thought before his time, and which McDougall had already made the basis of a psychological theory. Freud's view of instincts, however, underwent a number of changes as his scientific viewpoints altered and his clinical experience became more extensive. The "Interpretation of Dreams" was published at a time when he was still seeking an explanation of behaviour on an organic basis and he describes the psyche in that work as "an apparatus for the regulation of instinct tension" (Freud, 1932, p. 520). The tension produced by need of instinctive origin is felt by the psyche as pain or unpleasure (Unlust) and it must be reduced by gratification or 'bound' by intrapsychic mechanisms directed to the avoidance of pain (1899, p. 520). Fairbairn has drawn a parallel between the
progress in Mill's thought from the psychological principle of pleasure-seeking to the ethical principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" and the transition in Freud's system from libido theory to super-ego theory, which is designed to explain how pleasure-seeking becomes a principle of action under the pressure of object-relationships. (Fairbairn, 1949). Libido theory was developed to explain Freud's findings of conflict between the ego and psychic sexual drives from the material of dreams and the analysis of psychoneurotics and arose from his studies of the nature of the repressed material. His classification of ego instincts and sex instincts (Freud, 1915) was an adaptation of the current biological distinction between self-preservation and race-preservation. In his early papers 'instinct' is a concept with both a physio-chemical aspect and a mental aspect. He conceived it as having a source in somatic process, an impetus or force, an aim, that of "abolishing the condition of stimulation in the source of the instinct" and an object "that in and through which it can achieve its aim." (Freud, 1915).

The investigation of the source of instinct tension led to the formulation of a theory of infantile sexuality composed of a number of relatively independent components or partial impulses, related to particular erotogenic zones which passed through periods of dominance related to stages in the
development of the individual. Impulses first centred in the mouth interests, giving rise to oral primacy and later in the anus and excretory processes giving rise to an anal-sadistic primacy (Freud, 1905). These primacies were subdivided and elaborated by Abraham into a system in which each zone was allotted a special place in psychogenetic development, dominating in turn successive phases (Abraham, 1924a, 1924b). Fairbairn has pointed out, however, that erotogenic zones are simply channels through which libido flows and that a zone is only erotogenic when libido flows through it. He holds that in infancy the path of least resistance to the object happens to be through the mouth, hence the mouth becomes the dominant libidinal organ. In the mature adult, however, the genital organs provide a path of least resistance to the object, but Fairbairn makes the very important point that this is only one of a number of parallel paths. In the infant the path to the object is necessarily oral, but in the mature individual the path to the object is not necessarily genital. His view is that it is not the libidinal attitude which determines the object-relationship but the object-relationship which determines the libidinal attitude (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 34). This has the virtue of simplicity, for while Freud soon abandoned his initial conception of an objectless or auto-erotic chaos of infantile impulses of a 'polymorphous perverse'
character, it was still necessary to invoke two principles of explanation, psychological and physiological, in order to explain the pleasure-seeking aim of libido. Fairbairn's view gets round the difficulty that the ego as a psychic structure should be thought of as arising from the mutual friction of two different sets of energy, biochemical energies arising within the organism and environmental energies arising without (Fairbairn, 1957b).

The theory of narcissism was an important step forward in the development of Freud's views on instinct. Study of the loss of interest in the outside world characteristic of paraphrenics led him to the view that "the libido drawn from the outer world has been directed on to the ego, giving rise to a state which we may call narcissism" (Freud, 1914b). This recognised the existence of libidinal or sexual instincts in the ego and with this recognition the simple antithesis between ego instincts and libidinal instincts was abandoned. Further than this, as it was possible for the ego to be itself cathected with libido, a state is conceived in which the ego could be identified with objects. Freud also thought that infantile narcissism or self-love was later transmuted by the formation of an ego-ideal into love of this ideal and in this conception the possibility of a differentiating grade in the ego is suggested, a view which was to be developed into the later concept of the super-ego.
"The super-ego, however, is not merely a deposit left by the earliest object choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction-formation against these choices." (Freud, 1923, p. 44-5).

The super-ego was not only concerned with object-seeking, but also with repression and this is a process which involves the direction of aggression inwards. At first hatred and aggression were considered secondary phenomena, the result of infantile frustrations, but in time Freud came to relate them to the compulsion to repetition which he had noted was a tendency older and more fundamental than either the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain and which he considered to be an expression of a 'conservative' character of instinct, "a tendency innate in every living organic matter impelling it towards a reinstatement of an earlier condition, the inorganic or death." (Freud, 1920, p. 44). This last development of Freud's instinct theory therefore places in opposition libido and aggression in the form of Eros and Thanatos, the life and death instincts, and aggression is the manifestation of the death impulses which have become externalised. Melanie Klein holds that the main source of anxiety lies in the threatened danger to the organism which arises from the destructive impulses which are the external results of the death instinct and she describes development in terms of the fluctuating amounts of anxiety which are generated by the interplay of the primary life and death instincts (Klein, 1952, Ch. VIII, p. 183-4). Fairbairn
prefers to interpret aggression as the counterpart of libido and to see the death-seeking tendency as a manifestation of inturned aggression (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 56).

In his early paper, "Civilised sexual morality and modern nervousness", (1908), Freud takes a view of biochemically determined drives which exist prior to experience and which it is the task of the human being to try to master through sublimation. Civilisation is founded upon the success of this process. He takes the pessimistic view that only a few individuals succeed in achieving this sublimation, the rest being likely to become neurotic or at least failing to lead satisfactory lives. This basic pattern from which he never really departed despite the changes of emphasis and the development of so many of his other views presents the difficulty that it at one and the same time states that culture and civilisation rest upon the mastery of instinct, and also that the gratification of instinct is necessary for the maintenance of mental health. He did go some way towards resolving this apparent contradiction as he devoted more and more time to the analysis of the ego and the development of his theory of psychic structure, but this did not lead him to a revision of his instinct theory which remained greatly influenced by 'impulse' psychology, retaining a view of culture which was negative, and of a 'state of nature' more brutish than that which Hobbes described.
In his theory of Object-relations, Fairbairn has stated a view of instinct in terms of a single principle.

"The ultimate goal of libido is the object; and in its search for the object libido is determined by similar laws which determine the flow of electrical energy: i.e. it seeks the path of least resistance." (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 31).

It can be held that this marks the final step in the transition of psychoanalysis from a theory of the organism to a theory of the person, and makes it possible to consider the unconscious itself as fully personal, an inner world in which ego-object relations formed early in development are in the present the foundations of the emotional and dynamic life of the whole person. The philosophic conceptions of the life and death instincts Fairbairn would replace by the libidinal and anti-libidinal factors in the psyche. In order to avoid hypostasising instincts, Fairbairn refers to 'libido' and not 'the libido' as if it had a separate psychic existence. The basic libidinal strivings of the infant which he considers as strivings for good object relations are the expression of the primary nature of the human being without which no true development as a person is possible.

The chief disadvantage of the term 'instinct' in psychoanalytical theory has been its use to denote not only predispositions or tendencies but also the biological constructs of unlearned total action patterns. It has already been demonstrated that an attempt to explain all human action
in terms of such biological constructs is bound to fail, and yet man takes his place at the end of the evolutionary continuum and all that he possesses as attributes are transformations of what has gone before. It is in man that biogenesis became psychogenesis and this means that the energy which provided the means for the advancement of biological evolution must either still be supplying the means of psychic progress or must itself have undergone a transformation into a new form of energy suitable to its new purpose. Whichever of these may be correct, it is apparent that the forces of evolution and of individual development must be in some way related if a consistent scheme is to be presented. It is as well initially to recall that there are in reality no instincts or drives as immediate observables: they are in fact hypothetico-deductive constructs to aid understanding of certain observables (Colby, 1955, p. 38). In the diversity of animal behaviour, de Chardin suggests there is evidence that instinct is not an epiphenomenon, but translates by its different expressions the central phenomenon of life, and that it consequently represents a variable dimension (de Chardin, 1955, p. 167). Viewing the course of evolution as a psychical phenomenon it can be seen that the instincts create a growing system: the 'psychical' make up of a dog would be more complicated than that of a mole or fish. Man represents for a variety of reasons the culmination of the
132.
evolutionary process, in whom the transformation of instinct into thought has been accomplished. There still remain at various points along the continuum a variety of rudimentary systems of consciousness which are difficult to comprehend because they work so differently from our own. De Chardin considers the threshold of reflection represents a critical phase in the transformation of varied instincts into a whole which is very much greater than the sum of its parts.

"In man, considered as a zoological group, everything is extended simultaneously - sexual attraction, with the laws of reproduction; the inclination to struggle for survival, with the competition it involves; the need for nourishment, with the accompanying taste for seizing and devouring; curiosity to see, with its delight in investigation; the attraction for joining others to live in society. Each of these fibres traverses each one of us, coming up from far below and stretching beyond and above us. And each one of them has its story (no less true than any other) to tell of the whole course of evolution - evolution of love, evolution of war, evolution of research, evolution of social sense. But each one, just because it is evolutionary, undergoes a metamorphosis as it crosses the threshold of reflection. Beyond this point it is enriched by new possibilities, new colours, new fecundation. It is the same thing, if you like, but it is something quite different also - a figure that has become transformed by a change of space and dimension, discontinuity superimposed upon continuity, mutation upon evolution." (de Chardin, 1955, p. 180).

Colby holds that to postulate a single drive only is to over-simplify the problem of instinct to a grotesque extent, and he suggests two broad categories of drive which he calls Maintenance and Reproductive 'drive schemas', (Colby, 1955, Ch. 3). It can be seen that these formulations while they are useful classifications referring to purpose viewed from
the standpoint of the individual, they resolve themselves into two separate expressions of the drive towards relationship viewed from the standpoint of evolution. Colby's position is weakened by an atomistic view of child development which is exemplified by his explanation of the connection between infantile thumb sucking and adult genital union in terms of the drive maturation of fractional aims into full aims. He continues to support the Freudian view of erotogenic zones and holds that drives may be classified in terms of consummatory actions in the environment which fulfill physiological requirements of the organism. Such consummatory actions in fact involve the establishment of relationship systems, and transition theory postulates that life goes forward under the single principle of a drive towards the establishment and maintenance of such systems.

The replacement of instinct by thought as the main principle of action in human behaviour does not mean that instinct ceases to be a factor in human action. The course of evolution itself may be considered as a successive elaboration of relationship systems from the simple unicellular organism to the complexities of human individuals and societies. The principle which regulates the onward movement of life is the establishment of relationships without which organisms cannot survive. In the most basic form of life these take the form of simple systems for the fulfilment
of biological necessities. As more complex forms of life emerge, systems become more complex and more dependent upon elaborate patterns of behaviour initiated only by a special stimulus or group of stimuli which become differentiated into the specific instincts upon which all animal behaviour rests. The higher the animal on the scale of evolution, the more complicated the relationships upon which the satisfaction of its biological needs depend, until in reflective man there exists systems so complex that they create their own needs. The onward movement of life is not only by the differentiation of species but also by the continuous reproduction of individuals, which also becomes a process of greater complication in the course of evolution. In this way the functions of reproduction come to be closely associated with the basic drive to relationship which is the movement of life itself. The hominisation of the species means that the human infant is born not only with certain innate schemas of behaviour by which its actions in the environment are facilitated, but also with potentialities for mental acts which make it possible for it to develop in terms of relationships with objects. These objects are remembered, they can be hallucinated and they will be described and referred to when language is acquired. Before even language, the infant can make an act of intentional pointing towards them. These objects are not only the basis
of a structure of outer reality but also of an unconscious inner reality in terms of which the outer world comes to be perceived. In time the perception of the self as an object completes the process by which the child passes into the phase of personal object-relations which is the basis of the social nature of man.

This view of instinct is similar to that which Fairbairn has adopted and is closer to Freud's original formulation in which hatred and aggression are secondary phenomena resulting from infantile frustrations. Sexual functions are part of the human expression of the forward movement of life, while the death instinct is not the internal instigator of aggression but rather an internalisation of aggression itself, arising from frustrations in early object-relations.

Winnicott notes:

".......that confusion exists through our using the term aggression sometimes when we mean spontaneity. The impulsive gesture reaches out and becomes aggressive when opposition is reached. There is reality in this experience and it very easily fuses into the erotic experiences that await the new-born infant. I am suggesting: it is this impulsiveness, and the aggression that develops out of it, that makes the infant need an external object, and not merely a satisfying object." (Winnicott, 1955, p. 217).

This account of infant behaviour against the background of extensive clinical observation serves to confirm the presence from the beginning of actions directed outwards towards the environment. From early in its life the child reaches out and the need for relationships is manifested in
every aspect of its behaviour. It is a postulate of transition theory that this represents the expression of the only innate human drive which is towards relationships with objects. This is the transformation of the animal instinct towards the completion of relationships on the basis of specific biological needs and both of these are specialised forms of the movement of all matter towards connection into systems which is the way in which life advances.
PART III

A THEORY OF TRANSITION.
CHAPTER 7.

Outlines of a Transitional Theory of Development.

Everything is ultimately in relationship with everything else and the course of evolution has been marked by the ramification and transmutation of systems of relationship. Only man has objects and lives in a self-constructed world of object-relationships: he is the result but not the termination of an evolutionary process and as life goes on he continues to evolve with it. There is no reason for thinking that biological and social concepts are incompatible or that the explanation of behaviour in psychological terms precludes taking account of the origins of species. "What is valid in one frame of reference does not become invalid and useless with the introduction of a new or different frame of reference." (Szasz, 1955). One cannot draw a sharp dividing line between instinct and thought as it must be the ultimate aim of science to resolve both into the same terms. The driving force behind the onward movement of life is towards multiplication through the formation of systems and in the most highly developed species this takes the form of a drive towards relationships, which man's highly sophisticated powers of perception, communication and symbolic behaviour transform into systems of relationships with objects. It is through relationships that the propagation of the species is achieved
by the fusion of the basic drive with the bio-physical mechanisms of reproduction and it is through highly abstract relationship systems that man has transcended so many of the limitations of his physical situation and extended the dimensions of his environment. Fairbairn emphasises that it is the inherent aim of psychology to explain human behaviour and experience in strictly mental terms and holds that it must be assumed that psychical energy is inherent in the psyche if psychology is to be taken seriously as an explanatory system (Fairbairn, 1957b). A metapsychological explanation of human behaviour systems must go further than this, however, to demonstrate how human behaviour issued from animal behaviour and from what ultimate source psychic energy is derived. The proper field of psychological investigation includes more than the person: it is the origins of the personal system and the nature of the processes by which the organismic becomes the personal. Perhaps also it must concern itself with the ultimate destination of the personal system, for the self is a construct and it is illogical to assert that this may survive the annihilation of the body (Ayer, 1958, p. 127). De Chardin has proposed that man may be on the verge of a new era of psychical expansion in which a new organisation will arise which transcends the ego-centric personal systems in the same way as the open object-systems of human beings superseded the closed instinct-
systems of animals. This 'mega-synthesis', as he calls it, involves a rejection of doctrines of isolation and of psychological or social theories centred in the person and requires the hypothesis of a state of hyper-personality. (de Chardin, 1959 Bk. IV). Some such solution must ultimately be found, as the destination of the expanding object-system is at present obscured by the fact of individual death. In animals, where each can more or less take the place of any of the others, the movement forward of the species is unaffected by the dissolution of individuals, but this is not so in man, where the uniqueness of individuals is the outward sign of the expansion of the object-system. In the same way as the onward movement of life may be seen as an ascent of consciousness which could not indefinitely pursue a linear course without transforming itself in depth, the development of the person is a process in which each step forward is a transformation of what has gone before as successive systems become incorporated in the individual system. This ability to assimilate other systems was the means by which the primates escaped the specialisation which paralyses or the ultra-specialisation which kills and avoided ending up in the evolutionary dead-ends of monstrosity or fragility, (de Chardin, 1959, p. 159). While the nervous system and behaviour patterns of other mammals became highly developed and diffused into diverse channels of accessory differentiation, in primates
the work of evolution took place almost exclusively in the brain.

"In this singular and privileged case, the particular orthogenesis of the phylum happened to coincide exactly with the principal orthogenesis of life itself" (de Chardin, 1959, p. 159).

Evolution is a psychic process having its culmination in the imaginatively-perceived object-world of persons, and in personal development there are transformations which are analogous to those which occurred during the course of evolution. There are differences also, however, for the emergence of the human psyche has altered the significance and perspective of all the preceding stages of evolution, and all successive changes are three-dimensional. While each individual moves along the separate pathway of his own psychical relationship system, the general stream of life is still moving forward. Transition theory suggests that both processes are energised by the same force and that their movements are of the same sort, always in the same direction and through a process of controlled complication of relationship systems which may be simplified into successive waves of transformation. Thus the development of the individual is seen not as a series of parallel nor of converging lines but as a series of expanding circles, the circumferences of which form the loci of an infinite number of points of radiation outwards from the previous system. The radiations are the aspects of the
positive relationship-seeking drive of the individual system in which the basic force of evolution is expressed. Psychic factors have long outweighed or rather embraced and incorporated the physiological and biological factors in the onward movement. With the advent of man, psychogenesis supplanted biogenesis which had in its turn supplanted geogenesis as the framework within which life advanced. Biology sees man at the end of a continuum which extends to the simplest uni-cellular form of life: psychology has the task of presenting a view of man not only in human and personal terms but also in terms of that continuum to which the emergence of the psyche added another dimension in depth.

The Initial Situation: The non-significant state.

The initial situation for the human individual is not non-existence but non-significance. The elements of personal existence are all present and active but still proceeding towards what will be a sudden emergence of significance, which will alter not only everything which is to come but also what has gone before. In the course of evolution there must have been an instant of transformation in which man crossed the threshold of reflection and self-consciousness but had there been an observer present there would have been nothing to isolate this instant other than his perception that a new state was in existence: the perception does not coincide with
the instant of change. De Chardin has used a geometrical example to illustrate this: a series of sections made of a cone would show a succession of diminishing areas of surface until there was no longer a surface, but a point. It is only in retrospect that the significant instant may be seen and perhaps not even then. The important thing is that it has a theoretical existence: all we can say is that the initial state has been replaced by a different one in our perception.

The beginnings of the human individual lie in the relationship systems of others, for first there is a state in which no individual may be referred to or named or can provide the basis of a relationship system. There is only a situation in which the basic instinct brings two human beings into a relationship which is sexual because they are human and adult and this is the appropriate way in which their drive is translated into behaviour. The area formed by the intersection of the circumferences of their personal relationship systems contains the elements of a new individual system which coalesce to form a nucleus only when the various elements have combined to form their own relationships under the ordering of biological laws. The changes which are taking place in the situation are within the mother's body and at first outwith her conscious perception, yet they are none the less changes in her systems of relationship which bring about alterations in the balance of her transactions.
with internal and external objects.

In geometrical terms, the nucleus of an individual system lies within the area of intersection of the circumference of two circles which form the boundaries of two relationship systems which are objectively perceived as two separate persons, a man and a woman. Relationship systems have a third dimension, however, and may be seen as expanding cones originating in a theoretical fixed point. The dimensions of these circumferences are infinity, as human relationship systems are limited only by the description of the things which exist, which is theoretically limitless. As a result, each system contains the other, when the area of intersection is replaced by a point of contact of the circumferences which represents the theoretical origin of the individual relationship system.

This scheme, which is a representation of processes and has no fixed space-time dimensions, may go some way towards explaining the difficulty which Fairbairn mentions in the simultaneity of the processes of identification and incorporation so that "the object in which the individual is incorporated is incorporated in the individual" (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 43) and the dream material which he quotes to show many examples of equivalence between being inside an object and having an object inside. From the beginning, the individual system is simultaneously inside a multiplicity of
systems and the course of development is marked by the incorporation of other systems within his own.

1st Relationship System. The non-individual focus.

The imperceptible changes which took place when the nucleus was formed have significance only when something emerges which can be perceived and referred to, but emergence and the perception by others which is necessary for significance are not necessarily simultaneous. The transformation of the initial state into a significant situation is achieved not through the appearance of anything new but through the direction of exploratory communications in the direction of a hypothetical individual; a situation which has been called the non-individual focus. Awareness of the possibility of an individual initiates a process of relating to him on the part of the mother and through her of other people which results in the rearrangement of their systems in anticipation of his existence and the making of a niche for him which will be filled only when he can be perceived as a part of objective reality. This is taken arbitrarily to mark the beginnings of the individual system, though this is in fact continuous with all other systems and becomes differentiated from them initially through their readjustments and re-orientations.

Before there is an individual which can be perceived there develops an undifferentiated individual-environment unit
in which relationship systems are based upon physiological needs. There is nothing yet in this situation which is specifically human except that the potentiality of the situation for the production of a human individual creates this anticipatory re-alignment in the systems of others which is possible only in the human species. At the same time there is a growing significance of the situation for others which antedates the individual's first transactions with other systems and which will modify these when in fact they do begin. The culmination of this process is the existence of a rudimentary individual, still poorly and impermanently differentiated from the environment, but having not only the elements of a relationship system with others through their awareness of his potentialities as an individual, but also the beginnings of his own systems of transaction in his increasing movement towards the environment. As yet these do not coincide.

2nd Relationship System. The embryonic system.

In the motility of the foetus begins the first sensing of the 'me' and 'not-me' worlds through the resistance of the environment to movement and the reaction of the foetus to impingement. This initiates a process of personalisation in which the psyche-soma begins to lay the foundations for the construction of reality and the self which is important
to later development but may not affect the embryonic system except in its later stages. The experience of birth is an important event in the process of personalisation, but it does not mark a further system change as the processes of personalisation are continuous within the embryonic system and early object-relations are extensions of the primitive explorations of the intra-uterine life and the birth experience. Thus the embryonic system and the object-system alternate until the third system change is complete. In premature babies the embryonic system may continue for a long period, and in all babies there are long periods of regression in sleep. The birth experience is thus important only as a factor in a system change: it does not initiate a process nor put an end to one. The child's appearance as an individual within the range of perception of others may modify their relationships towards him but it does not issue in a new system as from the beginnings of significance he has had such a place in anticipation of his being able to fill it. Similarly, from the foetal viewpoint, the embryonic system is maintained although the physiological needs which require to be satisfied have altered. In his rudimentary perception, it is the mother who moves, and although he has not yet constructed the mother, there has been substituted for the confining but holding environment in which his needs are supplied instantly and automatically a
wider and expanding environment which is still sensitively oriented towards the satisfaction of the infant's needs by reason of the mother's special condition which exists for the protective perpetuation of the embryonic system. There is now the possibility of a mother, and this represents the culmination of the process of personalisation in which all the elements are present for relating in uniquely human fashion. The infant is now able to transact with objects and through his perception can begin the construction of the inner and outer worlds in relationship with which his personality will be dynamically maintained.

The state of the individual on the threshold of the object-system may be compared with the state of the human species on the eve of the emergence of reflective man. A number of threads of maturation have come together and the critical transformation which follows is in the nature of a metamorphosis which affects the whole being. Once it has been effected the human infant moves outside the phyletic boundaries and enters into the heritage of personality.

3rd Relationship System. The Object-System.

Early infancy is marked by oscillations between the lingering embryonic system and the growing object-system and the stage during which there is still a predominance of the embryonic system affecting the nature of early object-relations
corresponds to Fairbairn's "Stage of Infantile Dependence". (Fairbairn, 1941). In this period the child constructs the inner and outer worlds in the way which is more fully described in Chapter 8. As the infant in the course of normal development builds the object-system for himself around the nucleus of the preceding systems, there succeeds a prolonged stage of development which Fairbairn has described as "The Stage of Transition or Quasi-Independence". In order to avoid confusion with the view of development and evolution presented here which sees all progress in terms of transition from one system to another, this stage is described as "the stage of transactional patterns" as it is in this period that ways of transaction between systems in the inner and outer worlds are established. These modify the individual's way of thinking and acting and are the basis of his external character. The dichotomy and exteriorisation of the incorporated object which Fairbairn describes as characterising the stage of transition is an example of such a transactional pattern. In transition theory this is the first stage of development which can be considered in terms of object-relations, as although the processes of relationship are in genetic continuity with earlier and more primitive systems it is only with the successful completion of personalisation that the individual has the means to structure objects and to develop systems of relationship based upon his perception of them. The
development of transactional patterns is marked by an increasing exercise of powers of choice which may be made consciously or unconsciously: the child acquires the means of varying his relationships to satisfy his needs in alternative ways. The transactional patterns may themselves generate needs. The participation of mind becomes the dominant feature and this makes possible even greater expansion of the personal system through the movement from affective to cognitive discrimination. Abstraction and highly sophisticated symbolic processes widen the relationship systems still further but there may be contraction here and there or the development of special transactional patterns as a result of unsatisfying relationships with objects. There may also be temporary or permanent reversion to earlier systems in order to protect the precariously maintained ego from threatening objects in the inner and outer worlds.

Successful development of the object system through the stage of transactional patterns leads to a theoretically perfect state in which systems of relationship are established between mature persons based upon a perfect balance of mutual participation in giving and taking. Such a state is never reached in practice as no one passes through all system changes under optimum conditions. This final state corresponds to Fairbairn's "Stage of Mature Dependence" and in transition theory is called the "state of mature sociality". The
nearness or otherwise of the individual to the theoretical goal of perfection is determined by the efficiency or otherwise of the transactional patterns which he has developed in the enlargement of his object system and which may go some considerable way towards overcoming deficiencies in earlier systems. One of the most important of these groups of transactional patterns is concerned with the ways in which his reproductive powers are employed in a sexual relationship through which new personal systems are formed and life is again carried forward through the multiplication of individuals.
Summary of the Transitional Theory of Development.

The Initial Situation: Non-significance.

1st Relationship System. The Non-individual Focus.

Differentiation.

2nd Relationship System. The Embryonic System.

Personalisation.

3rd Relationship System. The Object System.

Transactional Patterns.

State of Mature Sociality.

Dissolution of the Soma.

Concentric Expansion.

In normal processes of development relationship systems will evolve in an expanding pattern of concentric circles in which the centre is formed by the unconscious inner world surrounded by the objects in the environment which the
individual has constructed. Somewhere between the two, maintained by the continuous interaction of transactional patterns, the self is supported. Systems of relationship which become transformed in the course of development are not discarded but become encircled and transformed by the systems which succeed them. In the intra-uterine life, the foetus is surrounded by a tiny environment and has limited relationship systems. With the experience of birth this expands outwards to include the possibility of relations with objects, though at first the patterns of transaction are similar to the early ones. As a result of the first transaction with objects, however, there is a triple expansion which should again be concentric in form. Around the nipple the breast is structured, then the mother, the family and the world. At the same time the inner world is expanding and the inside and outside boundaries of the self are becoming clearly established through the operation of reality-testing and the growth of experience. At first the sense of self is inconstant and variable but it becomes more permanent as an increasing number of satisfactory transactions take place. It is only theoretically possible by postulating a non-existent perfect environment and unattainable optimum conditions for development that such concentric expansion could in fact take place.
Tangential Expansion.

Early Object-relations and continuous interaction between processes of introjection and projection form the foundations of the ego-system of the developing person. The need for a perfect environment which is absolute at first rapidly becomes relative and in reality not all objects provide the means for the completion of satisfactory relationships. From the beginning there is a sharp contrast between situations in which the infant is enjoying satisfying relations of a positive kind, the forerunners of love relations with objects, and situations in which he is frustrated or deprived of such satisfactions, which are the forerunners of hate relationships with objects. The infant constructs inner and outer reality at one and the same time, but it does not follow that an unsatisfying situation will result in the simultaneous construction of unsatisfying objects in inner and outer reality. What does in fact take place is the splitting of the object into its satisfying and unsatisfying aspects, and this conception is of first importance for the theory of psychic development. In transition theory, there is no qualitative difference between a constructed internal object and a constructed external object in terms of transactional patterns. The object which is split may therefore form a part of objective reality or part of the inner world, or it may be an endopsychic structure
Freud pointed out that perception was connected with the rejection as well as the acceptance of stimuli and that when the ego receives stimuli from outside it absorbs them and makes them part of itself through introjection, but that when it rejects them it must project them as the judgment of their quality can be based only upon a trial introjection (Freud, 1925b). Melanie Klein further developed this view, linking the mechanisms of introjection and projection with the splitting of the ego by means of its identification with objects which are split through the ego's efforts to deal with anxiety (1946, p. 298). Ferenczi suggests that most likely every living organism reacts to unpleasant stimuli by fragmentation, and in human experience such processes are familiar in the symptomatology of schizophrenia. Fairbairn in turn has described the basic position in the psyche as a "schizoid position" which occurs after the unitary ego is split through the experience of unsatisfying early object-relations (1946, p. 147). In her later work, Melanie Klein combined Fairbairn's views and her own, using the term "paranoid-schizoid position" which precedes the "depressive position", both of which are considered as part of normal development. Winnicot describes a similar process in the basic split in the undifferentiated environment-individual unit which may result in the development of the mind as a separate entity and the individual's becoming
seduced into a false life and the development of a false self. (1952, p. 224).

These views will receive fuller consideration later, but it is important for transition theory to note that they may all be subsumed under the principle of departures from the theoretical optimum of development through expanding concentric systems. They are tangential deviations thrown off from the original dynamic ego-object nucleus through the failure of a transaction. Thus two or more systems may grow up side by side, each concentric and with a separate nucleus. The division of energy which results in this situation is important for psychopathology and the application of the intellect to the task of forming links between tangential systems is an important task in individual development.
CHAPTER 8.

The Beginnings of the Object System.

In discussing the nature of reality it has been shown that belief in the existence of the self and the not-self is based upon the nature of the transactions between them. (Chapter 1). The individual's capacity to act with reference to the things around him is the means by which the initial distinction between the perceiver and the perceived is maintained. This interaction precedes consciousness and the form of conscious transactions may be modified by the nature of preconscious experience. Similarly the preconscious experience may achieve its significance only in the light of consciousness.

"The property of consciousness itself does not require word meanings, but a consciousness of consciousness requires linguistic thoughts." (Colby, 1955, p. 117).

The processes of psychic growth bring about the incorporation of early systems in the systems which succeed them and these processes are energised by the drive towards relationships which is organised only in the human species into the drive towards objects. It is thus not until the object system that development reaches the level of humanity for the individual, though in fact all the earlier stages have been informed by the anticipation of this one.

The simplest organism, the amoeba, maintains life through
the intake of foreign useful matter and the discharge of its own superfluous matter. Such taking in and expelling is the prototype of all relationship, and on this primordial pattern rests all the complicated structure of transactions between subject and object no matter how sophisticated they may on the surface appear to be. These basic processes are essential not only for maintaining life as in physical metabolism, but also for all differentiations or modifications of a living organism (Heimann, 1952, p. 129). The suggestion that these processes were also operative in mental life and that the human being achieves adaptation and progress by similar means came early in the history of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi introduced the concept of introjection in 1908, describing this as the way in which the child made mental progress by taking within himself more and more from his surroundings (Ferenczi, 1909). Freud, although he traced judgement "in the oldest, that is, the oral language" to introjection and projection, explicitly acknowledged the influence of introjection on the personality only after the decline of the Oedipus complex, when aspects of the parents were internalised. This assignment of introjection and projection to such a late stage of development was probably due to Freud's conception of primary narcissism, an autoerotic, objectless state of unintegrated instincts which Melanie Klein's work has done much to show does not exist in
the form which Freud postulated. It may be that Freud's views took this form because they arose from the analysis of adult patients whose ego-systems were already formed, whereas Melanie Klein was compelled to revision by her clinical experience with the very young. Freud argued backwards from the adult to the child, whereas in later years the tendency has been reversed in that discoveries from child analysis are being applied to the problems of adult psychoneuroses and psychoses. The Klein school have through their studies of primitive emotional development shown that the processes of introjection and projection are of much greater significance than was originally appreciated and that they are in operation much earlier than the classical Oedipus phase. It is through these processes that the ego develops through contacts with the physical systems which form the basis of objective reality.

Freud described the original state as narcissistic, based on sensations and ruled by feelings, entirely autistic, not only lacking in objectivity but at the very first without awareness of external objects. This state he described as one of 'hallucination': painful stimuli either from within or without impinge upon the primitive body ego and all causal relations proceed from within the self. In object-relations theory this state is described as a lack of differentiation from the object, a complete absence of the
sense of self. This is in transition theory the embryonic relationship-system, before the processes of personalisation begin. The individual is not yet the unit, which is from the outside an undifferentiated individual-environment unit. The state of infantile dependence which Fairbairn describes is a continuation of this situation in some degree, but Winnicott has shown how the special state of the mother in this period facilitates not only the satisfaction of physiological needs but also the need for objects. In transitional terminology the transition from the embryonic system to the object system is achieved through the growth of transactions and the construction of objects. The establishment of the predominance of the object system requires a movement outwards from the infant towards things which are not of itself. There exists from the beginning a foundation for objectivity in experience, and in accordance with his hedonistic principle, Freud held that the psyche responds to the reality of its experiences by interpreting them in a subjective manner which increases its pleasure and preserves it from pain. This process, which is carried on by means of introjection and projection, forms the foundation of the fantasy-life. The final establishment of the object system in transition theory involves the replacement of a closed system of relationships by an open one. In the embryonic system, the environment-individual circle is complete and
must remain perfect for survival. There is no opportunity for alternative adaptations. The development of animals continues within such a closed system in which the whole field of relationships available to them is bounded by specialised instinct patterns.

The growing foetus has motility and a basic drive towards the environment by the formations of systems of relationships which are potentially limitless and the nature of which is determined by the state of maturation which it has reached. The infant when it is born already has a predisposition towards a certain way of relating which is the result of a summation of motility experiences in which the beginnings of the 'not me' world have already been established through the opposition to movement. The quantity of energy initially in each foetus is presumably about the same but the amount of aggressive potential an infant carries when it is born may depend upon the amount of opposition to movement which has been encountered in the intra-uterine life. The response of the psyche to experience is therefore partially determined by the aggressive potential of the infant and by the degree of differentiation of the 'me' and 'not me' already reached.

It is with this background that the child approaches perception of the outer world and achieves consciousness and awareness. He is biologically oriented to make relationships through his mouth and he is also ready to hallucinate. He
comes to the breast, therefore, hungry and devouring, ready not only for food but also for the relationships out of which the object system will arise. "He is ready to attach and also to hallucinate something fit to be attacked" (Winnicott, 1945, p. 152). The mother's heightened sensitivity and adaptation to her infant's needs results in the actual nipple being presented at exactly the right moment for the infant's need to feed and readiness to hallucinate. This convergence of separate streams of process upon a central event is a familiar feature of evolution and development, and it is always in such a culmination that the beginnings of a transition are found. In this case the movement is from the state of primary identification with the object to a simple contact with external or shared reality in which he can take the bit of experience as either his hallucination or a piece of reality, and moments of illusion in which he believes both are the same. Even in the first feed there are associations of sight, sound, feel and smell which form part of his experience and help him on the next occasion to hallucinate what is really available.

Freud held that it was the pleasure-pain principle which operated in the introjection and projection of objects. The subjective interpretation of experience was a defence against pain, hallucinatory gratification a substitute for real deprivation. Fairbairn argues against the pleasure-pain
principle on the grounds that Freud's psychological hedonism encounters exactly the same difficulties as those which confronted J. S. Mill when he attempted to pass from psychological to philosophical hedonism. The change in Freud's thinking which arose from his clinical discovery of the oedipal situation involves a change from behaviour determined by pleasure-seeking to behaviour determined by object-seeking (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 55). In transition theory it is more correct to say that it is not the object which is sought but the establishment of a relationship system which is organised into an object by the whole individual. This is fully in accordance with Fairbairn's later view that it is preferable to say that "it is the individual in his libidinal capacity (and not libido) which is object-seeking," (Fairbairn, 1957b, p. 335). The individual in his libidinal capacity can be taken as the person who has successfully passed from the embryonic system and is beginning to develop his object system, for in transition theory libido is one particular form of the relationship drive the outward expression of which is always dependent upon states of maturation.

The concept of inner reality was developed by Melanie Klein through the elaboration of Freud's concept of an internal psychic object, the super-ego, into a system based upon the multiplicity of ways in which infants internalise their
emotionally significant objects, good and bad. The process of introjection and projection in early infancy is motivated partly by satisfactions and the love of the mother, which may be seen as good external and internal conditions, and partly by frustrations and deprivations which are bad external and internal conditions. The introjection of these many objects is regarded by Melanie Klein as resulting from fantasies of oral incorporation occurring characteristically and primarily during the oral phase of infancy. In accordance with the postulate of one basic drive in transition theory, it is held that incorporation is not the result of a specific oral instinct but arises from the fact that at this stage of development the infant is biologically oriented to extend its object system through the medium of its mouth. Fairbairn holds that "the first social relationship established by the individual is that between himself and his mother in the suckling situation, in which his mother's breast provides the focal point of his libidinal object, and the mouth the focal point of his own libidinal attitude" (Fairbairn, 1940, p. 11). This view seems to assume too great a degree of organisation in the early oral phase where the initial relationship is not between child and mother, but between a sucking mouth and a satisfying nipple. The child is as yet at the very threshold of the object system with large segments of his experience still under the influence of the transactional patterns of the
embryonic system. For the construction of the breast and then the mother, the infant needs experience of separation and then reunion against the background of support provided by good mothering. Even then it is not until the relationship system of mouth and nipple widens outwards in a concentric expansion which includes the whole baby and the whole mother that a social relationship can be said to exist. To argue for a social situation in the period before a reasonable predominance of the object system is perhaps to create the same difficulty which arises through talking of a social situation among animals, which Fairbairn does in another context (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 52).

In the early stages of the object system experience of good and bad objects is in terms of what tastes good and feels good in his mouth and is swallowed and what tastes bad and feels nasty and gets spat out. Initially what is experienced is the perception of a number of separate sensations associated with situations which through the use of illusion the child rapidly organises. When he hallucinates the breast in his first feed he not only establishes a system of relationships in the inner world and a similar system in the outer world, all closely bound up with his sensations, he also takes an important step towards singling himself out as an object among the objects around him and establishing patterns of his transactions with
There are obvious differences between the objects which comprise the world of objective reality and the objects which comprise the inner world of individuals. The systems of relationship in the outer world are between differentiated objects which play different parts in the systems of different people. Although perceived differently, there is a core of reality which is reflected in the actions of people with reference to them and the habit of people in referring to them as persisting elements in their experience. The components of fantasy on the other hand differ from those of external reality in that they cannot be touched or pointed at and form no part of common experience although they may depend upon the common experience of the past. The difficulty which arises here is to discover in what way the mechanism of introjection is connected with the fantasy of incorporation, and how a concrete body can be taken inside the self. Fairbairn believes (1949) that Melanie Klein has never satisfactorily explained how fantasies of incorporating objects orally can give rise to the establishment of internal objects at all. The difficulty is not apparent if the basic drive towards relationship is assumed. Freud described instincts as having a source, an object and an aim. The source lay in biological processes, the aim describes the behaviour to which an instinct compels and an object comprises
the elements in reality which embody the means for the fulfilment of the aim. In transition theory the aim is always the establishment of a relationship but the quality of this is modified by the biological state of the organism. This drive towards relationship is constantly active, and does not require a specific stimulus to initiate it, although a specific stimulus may modify it. It represents the endowed energy of the individual. The end is always the completion of a relationship system appropriate to the satisfaction of the biological need, when the basic drive energises the search for other relationships through which development and evolution may go forward. It requires an organising act of perception to create an object out of the data of sense impressions and such a mental act may be expressed as a relationship system between the individual and the external world. This relationship is mediated as are all relationship systems by transactions between physical systems and psychic forces within the psychic apparatus. The organising act may take place in response to messages which come from without or within or most usually from a mixture of both. Hence the act of organisation required for the organisation of a percept must closely resemble those at work in the production of fantasy, and it is only because no psychic event takes place within a vacuum, but always within a framework of other percepts,
memories, associations and purposive actions that the distinction can be made between internal and external constructs. In the same way as the drive to relationship expresses itself in the movement outwards from the person towards objective reality, it expresses itself in a movement towards inner reality which is still, as it were, directed outwards from the person: the movement is always in the same direction. Through this new relationship systems may be organised into fantasies of internal objects. The act of introjection therefore consists in setting up new or modifying old systems of relationship by permitting interaction with them within the psychic apparatus of systems established through acts of perception in outer reality. At the same time, systems of relationship which have been established between the individual and objective reality are themselves continuously modified by the internal systems which are in operation, which is how the complementary process of projection takes place. There is a sense in which the outer world is more real than the inner world and the situation of the individual in his environment more clearly apprehended by perception than by fantasy. This cannot be explained in terms of innate qualities, but only with reference to actions. The ultimate dependence of man upon his biological heritage is made manifest when it is realised that the criterion by which perception is judged to
be more valid than hallucination is a criterion of psycho-biological adaptation. The psyche, which forms the meeting place of the inner and outer worlds, is unequivocably the product of biological evolution.

Freud held that in the beginning of mental life "whatever was thought of (desired) was simply imagined in hallucinatory form as still happens in our dream thoughts every night" (Freud, 1911). This he called the child's "attempt at satisfaction by hallucination". The readiness to hallucinate is part of the approach to the breast and the experience of being mothered determines the way in which the infant's fragmentary hallucinations will be organised into objects. The type of relationship is modified by the stage of the child's maturation which is closely connected with his power of organising his systems of relationships with the environment into a coherent system of objects sufficiently like the systems of other people for action in the common world to be possible. At first all transactions between the inner world and objective reality are conducted by the primitive mechanisms of introjection and projection, unmodified by the intervention of mind and in classic Freudian theory the infant passes from actions dictated by the pleasure principle to actions at the agency of the reality principle. For Freud the disappointing nature of hallucinatory satisfaction was the beginning of adaptation to reality:
because hunger is not satisfied by hallucinating the breast, the infant is forced to turn to the external world. This means taking a negative view of the approach to reality as it is through frustration that the infant comes to make his adaptive acceptance of it. The approach to reality in transition theory is a positive one, in search of the real relief and satisfaction provided by the completion of systems of relationship appropriate to the infant's needs. Real milk is more satisfying than hallucinated milk. It is equally true that fantasy is initially positive, not an escape from the frustrations of reality, though it may later form part of a defence against objects. Relationship systems consist of a multitude of units of relationship at various levels of organisation extending from the single cell or single mental process to the whole person or beyond. Each of these elements has to establish its own system for the larger unit to expand and not all of them are successful as no individual in fact attains the perfect concentric expansion of systems. At the level of the person, unsatisfactory relationships are the cause of anxiety, but they are the result of failures at different levels of adaptation which may be persisting from the embryonic system or even from the non-individual focus. Thus the expansion of systems is achieved by successive advance and retreat of elements of relationship depending upon whether or not they are
successful in establishing their own new systems and this emerges at the level of the person as a mixture of positive and negative approaches to relationships within the object-system. Sometimes a relationship system which cannot be established without may be established within, and both reality thinking and fantasy represent different ways in which the drive to relationship becomes transformed into a system of human relationships in which both sorts of thinking play an indispensable part.

In their primitive form, fantasies are experienced as sensations but in their developed form they represent a way of expanding relationships which differs from that employed in reality thinking. Early fantasies are of bodily sensations because at this time the relationship systems for which the infant is adapted are all based upon the satisfaction of simple physical needs, but as the process of personalisation takes place the drive to relationships becomes more and more expressed through the medium of the establishment of elaborate systems in the outer world arising from experience and learning of physical things. This is facilitated by the development of the powers of the mind and the increasing use of symbols. Under this explanatory scheme it is unnecessary to invoke the two principles of operation, the pleasure principle and the reality principle, as the basic drive to relationships is fundamental to all fantasy and
all reality thinking and manifests itself in object seeking on the part of the whole individual. The nature of the objects which comprise the adult object-system becomes more elaborate with the growth of individual experience. The basis of reality-testing is not the sublimation of instinctual drives but the evolution of more distinctively human relationship systems by the recruitment of the specially human powers and faculties to the expansion of systems.

Inner and outer worlds are structured simultaneously by the operation of mental processes which constantly blend and are interdependent. Reality thinking cannot operate without the support of concurrent unconscious fantasies, but at the same time the development of fantasy without the parallel development of a sense of objective reality is intolerable, as there are no limits to its magic, its power to hurt and to annihilate. Development is marked by the emergence of systems of relationship between the individual and objects in the world of reality and similar systems between the individual and objects in the inner world. Transactions take place through the medium of the psychic apparatus between the object-systems of the inner and those of the outer world. As this bridge of transactional patterns begins to be built in childhood, unconscious fantasies are primarily about bodies and very primitive functions and display systems of
relationship and transactional patterns based upon the very earliest experience. Through the enlargement of the external world they become more elaborate and capable of expression, but they do not depend upon such expression for their existence.
CHAPTER 9.

Metapsychological Aspects of a Theory of Transition.

The word 'metapsychology' was first used by Freud in order to express the fact that he was concerned with data which went beyond conscious awareness and belonged to the realm of the unconscious which his new method of scientific investigation had caused him to hypothesise.

"A presentation which seeks to estimate, not only the topographical and dynamic, but also the economic element is the most complete that we can at present imagine, and deserves to be distinguished by the term metapsychological." (Freud, 1920, p. 1).

Psychoanalysis, however, developed as an empirical historical science and the practice of therapy, the construction of theory and the accumulation of research data proceeded simultaneously. As a result the distinction between the pure and applied aspects of psychoanalysis was not always clearly made in Freud's writings. Psychoanalytic research continues to be conducted almost exclusively through therapeutic practice, and as a result there is still perhaps too great an emphasis upon applied aspects and the retention of outmoded theoretical concepts owing to their simplicity and convenience in the therapeutic situation. Psychoanalysis has now perhaps reached the point which has been passed in many other sciences, at which two sets of constructs must be devised and two languages used for the differentiation
between its pure and applied aspects. (Colby, 1955, p. 146). The use of such a double set of concepts is familiar in the physical sciences, and in any attempt to classify scientific data it is usually possible to use alternative explanations in quite different terms. In physics, for instance, the phenomena of light may be considered in terms of wave or photon theories, and it is important to be clear within which framework of constructs a given event is being considered at a particular moment. It is a feature of the advance of science, also, that the devising of new constructs follows upon the discovery of new data and may form an integral part of new theories.

The position of physics as the most advanced natural science has had the effect that in modern times thought is always dominated by the current conceptions of the physical universe and this had an undoubted effect upon Freud when he came to seek a theoretical model for an explanation of the nature of the psychic apparatus. The result was a system of 'impulse' psychology in accordance with the atomistic theories of the school of Helmholtz. This was facilitated by Freud's initial preoccupation with the nature of the repressed which resulted in his formulation of a system in which the controlling ego mastered instinct derivatives in deference to the pressures of outer reality. When he turned his attention to depression and obsessional neurosis, he
became more concerned with the instigator of repression, which he conceived as a kind of moral reinforcement of the controlling ego which he called the super-ego. Repression had been considered mostly in terms of function up till then, but with this formulation Freud began to take into account considerations of structure and evolved a model of the whole psyche in these terms. The result was very like the classical tripartite division of body, mind and spirit, with the id representing the base of instinct derivatives, the ego that part of the primary self which evolves through adaptation to the conditions of the environment and the super-ego over all as the instigator of repression and the internal representatives of authoritative parent figures introjected as part of the resolution of the Oedipus complex. He described repression as an activity carried out by the ego "in the service of and at the behest of the super-ego" and the repressed consisted of wishes arising from an instinctive source which conflicted with the demands imposed by the super-ego upon the ego. This scheme has the disadvantage of resting upon a mixed classification as the id is a concept energised by biological forces while ego and super-ego are dependent upon psychic energy. Freud held that the ego had its origins in the id and was "a part of the id which has been specially modified" (Freud, 1923, p. 51-2). "Originally, of course, everything was id, the ego was
developed out of the id by the continual influence of the external world" (Freud, 1940, p. 43). He speaks of a gradual differentiation of the ego from the id, and the process is seen to end in the opposition of the highly organised structure of the ego and the unorganised, inherited mass of instinctive drives which is the id. Alexander finds this unsatisfactory, as "learning starts immediately at birth and it is therefore difficult to see at what period the sharp distinction between an unorganised id and an organised ego obtains" (Alexander, 1949). Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein suggest that there is an undifferentiated phase during which both the id and the ego are formed and that differentiation takes place through the alternate experience of deprivation and gratification in the infant's early life. (1946, p. 19-20). This is in close accordance with Winnicott's views on early mother-child relations.

Freud's use of the term 'ego' is ambiguous, as sometimes in his writings it denotes a psychical organisation and sometimes a whole person. (Hartmann, 1946, p. 16). In addition to this, his conception of the ego underwent change and development. Freud's ego is an organ of adaptation, that part of the primary self which meets the demands of the environment by modifications of itself. Before the publication of "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), it was
mainly a repressive, censoring agency, but with the development of his theory of narcissism, it became more comprehensive, in fact constituting "the whole person, the unitary total psychic self, the primary reservoir of libidinal and aggressive energies." In "The Ego and the Id" (1923) he again restricts the ego to an anxiety-motivated adaptation to the demands of outer reality while the rest of the total self is relegated to the impersonal id, and he ascribes to perception the processes by which the ego becomes differentiated from the id. "In the ego perception plays the part which in the id devolves upon instinct" (Freud, 1923, p. 30). The id is not, however, a passive receptor of stimuli, but has a searching quality, meeting stimuli halfway and accepting or rejecting them in terms of the oral instinctive impulses.

Consideration of the nature of repression led Freud to postulate a structure capable of instigating it, and the tripartite theory of the psychic organisation was completed by the concept of the super-ego. This, he considered, was formed roughly about the fifth year of life. It occurred at the time of the decline of the Oedipus complex and it was largely a moral phenomenon. The association of the super-ego with the decline of the Oedipus complex meant that its emergence was much later than the formation of the ego. Melanie Klein believes as a result of her clinical findings
that the processes of introjection and projection which are at work from earliest infancy bring about the internalisation of the parent figures much earlier than the classical Oedipus phase. This has led her to develop a view of the unconscious as an inner world in which complex relationships of the ego with internal objects are actively maintained. She has not proceeded from this to a revision of Freud's psychodynamic theory, but has accepted the existing id, ego and super-ego analysis of structure and the Freudian duality of instinct, fitting her own discoveries into this existing framework. Fairbairn, however, has made Melanie Klein's work the basis of a thorough revision of the Freudian system and has developed a complete new formulation of dynamic endopsychic structure.

A brief summary of Fairbairn's view of ego development would begin with an infant who is a whole ego from the beginning, seeking good, satisfying relations with the natural objects of his needs. Ego development is determined by the kind of object-relations he experiences and particularly by the degree of frustration of natural libidinal needs which is imposed on him by the environment. As a result of the ego's efforts to deal with the experience of rejecting objects, processes of splitting of both ego and object take place, resulting in the emergence of two factors in the personality, the libidinal and the anti-libidinal factor. The first of
these is primary, based upon instinct, while the second is secondary and is based upon an identification with rejecting parent figures. Fairbairn's theory is throughout in personal terms, and he envisages a "basic endopsychic situation" in which there is a system of three endopsychic structures, the libidinal and antilibidinal egos and the central ego, which are in a dynamic relationship. The libidinal and anti-libidinal egos are repressed by the central ego, a situation which corresponds to Freud's description of the repression of the id impulses by the ego at the instigation of the super-ego. At a deeper level, however, Fairbairn holds that the libidinal ego is itself repressed by the anti-libidinal ego. This conception, which has the advantage of being in terms of personal relationships and dynamic ego structure, provides an alternative to Freud's tripartite model of the psyche which was conceived in terms of biological instincts and moral inhibitions.

The basis of Fairbairn's theory is that 'impulses' are the dynamic aspect of endopsychic structures and cannot be said to exist in the absence of such structures, however immature these may turn out to be. This is contrary to the Freudian theory that the id is a source of energy without structure, and that the ego is wholly energised by the id: it involves the conclusion that while Freud's view of the
function of the ego in regulating the discharge of instinct tension is relatively unaffected, the ego must be considered as itself a source of instinct tension from the beginning. Fairbairn's theory repudiates the pleasure principle except as a secondary principle of behaviour coming into operation in proportion as the reality principle fails to operate. Fairbairn's position not only makes it impossible further to maintain the distinction between the id and the ego, but also has important effects upon the concept of the ego itself.

Freud's definition of the ego makes it dependent upon its primary function of perception, a fact which is of central importance for a transitional theory of personality, since perception is itself a system of relationships of a highly sophisticated kind which are successors to the simple relationship systems of the embryonic system. The movement from such simple systems based upon purely biological needs to complex systems based upon perception and symbol formation is part of the transition from infantile dependence and is concurrent with the development of the individual from the undifferentiated state through the process of personalisation to the beginnings of the object system. One of the crucial questions for psychology is how the transition is made from biological to personal or social concepts which need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. In Freud's tripartite model of the psychic apparatus this transition took the form
of the development of the ego out of the unorganised id, which suffers from the disadvantage of postulating two different orders of concept and two different sources of energy, within and without.

Winnicott describes the beginnings of development in terms of a state of unintegration from which emergence is gradual, through an increasing number of transactions between the psyche and soma aspects of the growing person, until the live body "is felt by the individual to form the core for the imaginative self". (Winnicott, 1954, p. 244). In some cases the mind will be found to develop a false entity and a false localisation, but in satisfactory development "mind is no more than a special case of the functioning of the psyche-soma." (Winnicott, 1954, p. 244). This seems to be a more profound reassessment of the Freudian position than can be explained in terms of "equating body and id, mind and ego" (Guntrip, 1956, p. 90). Winnicott recognises that the mind-psyche is pathological and in a further paper he describes a patient who had developed such dissociated function of intellect. Under a deep regression in analysis "the false self gradually became a 'caretaker self' and only after some years could the caretaker self become handed over to the analyst, and the self surrender to the ego" (Winnicott, 1955, p. 281)(My underlining). It seems that what Winnicott describes as the 'true self' is neither id nor ego in Freud's
sense, and that the psyche-soma represents the primary, natural self which in normal development would form the basis of the ego. Although Winnicott himself has not suggested that his views require a revision of the Freudian model, these descriptions seem to be closely in accord with the concentric scheme of normal development, a fact which seems to emerge clearly from Winnicott's view of regression which the two following extracts describe.

"We can build theories of instinct development and agree to leave out the environment, but there is no possibility of doing this in regard to formulation of early ego development. We must always remember, I suggest, that the end result of our thinking about ego development is primary narcissism. In primary narcissism the environment is holding the individual and at the same time, the individual knows of no environment and is at one with it" (Winnicot, 1954, p. 283).

"For me the word regression simply means the reverse of progress. This progress itself is the evolution of the individual, psyche-soma, personality and mind with (eventually) character formation and socialisation. Progress starts from a date certainly prior to birth. There is a biological drive behind progress." (Winnicot, 1954, p. 280).

The individual's origins in an individual-environment unit makes more cogent Alexander's objection (1949, p. 83) that it is difficult to see when the change takes place from an unorganised id to an organised ego, for the interaction between the individual and the environment began in the intra-uterine state. A consideration of the nature of psychic energy may help to elucidate how this takes place and may offer some explanation of how the interaction between
physical and psychical forces is possible.

Fairbairn holds that Freud approached psychological problems from the a priori standpoint that psychical energy is essentially distinct from psychic structure, but it is doubtful whether this was indeed the case. Freud did define libidinal aims in terms of erotogenic zones, while Fairbairn says:

"The real libidinal aim is the establishment of satisfactory relationships with objects, and it is accordingly the object that constitutes the libidinal goal. At the same time the form assumed by the libidinal approach is determined by the nature of the object." (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 138).

It can be seen that Fairbairn considers the goal of the object and the aim of relationship to be equivalent. Transition theory prefers to make a distinction, however, for this seems to be of some importance in a theory of ego development where the existence of an object demands the participation of the intellect. The form of the libidinal approach, it is suggested, is not determined by the nature of the object: rather it is the object which is determined by the nature of the approach. The nature of the object is dependent upon the nature of the relationship, as it is through the experience of similar relations and past transactions that the object has been structured in this particular way. Thus while Fairbairn correctly associates energy and structure and is also correct in following this to the conclusion that the only changes which are intelligible
are changes in structural relationships and relationships between structures (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 150), he fails to place enough emphasis upon the fact that an object is itself a structure, though he does on one occasion acknowledge that this is the case (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 132). As a result, he perpetuates the separation of mental and physical aspects of functioning which stands in the way of establishing a satisfactory genetic continuity between the behaviour of men and of animals on the one hand, and between social man and between the rudimentary environment-individual unit on the other.

Freud was undoubtedly hampered in his theoretical formulations by the contemporary mechanist and associationist climate of thought, yet it is difficult to read him without gaining the impression that for him the theoretical unit of psychic life was always a complete, dynamic process. It is the case that he considered energy apart from structure, but concepts such as fixation, displacement, sublimation or withdrawal of libido are permissible theoretical abstractions. Fairbairn has assumed an implied conflict between structure and energy in Freud's writings which did not in fact exist. The difficulty is once more of levels of abstraction, and of relating pure theory to working clinical hypotheses. Fairbairn claims that his "basic endopsychic situation" provides an explanation of the structure of the psyche in terms of personal
relationships, and in particular with conflicts between love and hate relationships. He has demonstrated that his views have a direct relevance to therapy (Fairbairn, 1958), and it is suggested that it is at the clinical level that the personal object-relations frame of reference is most useful while questions of energy and structure are best considered at a level of abstraction beyond the personal.

Brierley has suggested that the term 'personology' might be used to distinguish between the science of personality and metapsychology, thus making the distinction between the pure and applied aspects of the study of mental life. Psychoanalytic personology studies the person as a unity, living as a psycho-physical organism in reciprocal relationships with a psycho-physical or socio-physical environment. (Brierley, 1951, p. 124-5). Metapsychology on the other hand follows the natural trend of science towards depersonalisation and assumes that the mental process, which is a wave or current of activity, is the hypothetical unit. Thus a dynamic person-object relationship in personology becomes an ego-object system in metapsychology.

Metapsychology has come to have a more precise meaning than Freud gave it, referring to dynamic genetic, structural and economic aspects of psychic processes which are themselves considered as of a unitary nature. Behind this is the basic scientific assumption of an ordered organisation
subject to laws which may be discovered. The dynamic-genetic approach is an attempt to investigate the laws which regulate how enregistered experience becomes integrated with maturational growth processes to govern personality and behaviour. Structural or topographic terminology is used to hypothesise the type of organisation within which this integration takes place while economic constructs are concerned with the quantities and distribution of energy within this structure. Postulating the existence of an order of psychic activity of course produces the logical difficulty that the discovery of such an order indicates only that the psychic apparatus itself must be an organisation. It represents an element in reality and is organised because reality is organised. The apparent circularity cannot be avoided, but interdependent definitions such as time and motion are quite commonly found in the physical sciences. These logical problems have been more fully discussed, however, in Chapter 1, though it should be emphasised that the metapsychologist's approach to psychological data is not the approach of a philosopher but rather resembles the physicist's approach to the study of the structure of the atom.

The dynamic aspect or drive of a process may be distinguished from the quantity of excitation or mental energy involved. In Fenichel's view the concept of a 'quantity' of
mental energy is justifiable as a scientific working hypothesis (Fenichel, 1946). The cathexis energy of ideas and other mental processes in the psychic apparatus has been related to the frequency period, synchrony and dysynchrony of pulsations, and a cyclic-circular model of psychic structure has been suggested which successfully demonstrates the integration of two sets of conditions, internal biological factors and external environmental factors (Colby 1955). This formulation overcomes some of the main objections to Freud's tripartite model and is more in accordance with modern advances in the physical sciences. The hydraulic metaphor employed in the neuronal model, the picket model and finally the tripartite model, Freud's three successive attempts at a description of the psychic apparatus, postulated a fixed amount of energy throughout the apparatus. Increase of energy in one area was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in another, like water in a system of pipes. Colby's model, however, postulates schemas of structural organisation which have an autonomous activity which is modified, not given, by the nature of the signals they receive. The activity of these schemas is pulsatile and discontinuous, and particular schemas have particular frequencies. By the modification of these frequencies physical energy which originates outside the organism sets off cathexis energy processes in a chain
reaction manner. In this cyclic model consciousness and unconsciousness are properties of systems and not the names of spatial areas. (Colby 1955).

Transition theory does not hold, as Brierley does, that instinct is the stimulus to psychic activity (Brierley, 1951, p. 106), but that psychical activity is continuous and similar in form to the autorhythmic activity to which reference is made in Chapter 6, or the continuous background activity recorded in an electroencephalogram. It is an expression of the same form of energy which is the force behind instinct and it is therefore equally true to say that psychical activity is a transformation of instinct or that all instinctive activity is psychic in nature. There is a continuity of process between simple cell division and the diversity of human relationships. The cyclic-circular model for the translation of physical into psychic energy which has been suggested by Colby is a reasonable hypothesis of the apparatus which will perform this function. Instinct throughout the evolutionary continuum may be seen as a variable dimension and similarly the apparatus for the conversion of physical energy into psychic process must undergo changes throughout the course of the individual's development which can be seen only at the personal level as successive relationship systems. Development is transitional in that it involves the substitution of new systems in which
the old are caught up and transformed. Glover concluded that the strength or weakness of the ego arose from the degree of integration of various early nuclear components. If these early nuclei retained autonomic functions they used up energy and prevented it from being distributed among more integrated layers (Glover, 1943). This is close to the position of transition theory in which successful development depends upon concentric expansion in which each new system encircles those which have gone before and the energy which activated the old system continues to play its part in activating the new. The strength or weakness of the ego depends upon the relative success and permanence of these transitions. Where earlier relationship-systems remain energised, these prevent the successful development of later systems. The important difference which lies between transition theory and Glover's nuclear theory is that Glover speaks of the integration of various primitive but relatively independent ego-systems, but transition theory holds that there is a unit from the beginning which emerges from the non-individual focus a complete but not necessarily permanent whole, fluctuating and liable to fragmentation from the first through failures in transactions with the environment.
CHAPTER 10.

A Transitional Theory of Childhood.

The period between the individual's passage from the embryonic system to arrival at his own personal approximation to the state of mature sociality is described by Fairbairn as marked by conflict between the progressive urge to surrender the infantile attitude of identification with the object and a regressive urge to maintain that attitude. In transition theory this period can be divided into two parts, the first of which is characterised by oscillations between the lingering embryonic system and the establishment of the early object system, while the second is characterised by conflicts between transactional patterns appropriate to the early object system and those appropriate to a state of mature sociality. Fairbairn's theory of instinct results in his holding the view that the 'transitional stage' is accompanied by a gradual change in libidinal aim, whereby the original oral, sucking, biting, incorporative or predominantly 'taking' aim comes to be replaced by a mature, non-incorporating and predominantly 'giving' aim, comparable with developed genital sexuality. In transition theory, the aim of the basic drive, which is the establishment of a system of relationships appropriate to the stage of development which the individual has reached, accords with Fairbairn's view that "it is
axiomatic that no scheme of libidinal development can be satisfactory unless it is based upon a consideration of the natural and biological objects of the developing individual at various stages." (1946, p. 144). In the early stages of the object-system, the breast is the appropriate biological object, which should be replaced in the natural course of development by the genital organs of the chosen partner. The stage which intervenes, however, is one in which no appropriate biological object may be distinguished and thus it must despite its length and complexity be considered purely as an intermediate stage. The process of development is marked at the same time, however, by the expansion of the closed mouth-breast circle of the embryonic system into a complex open system of personal relationships of great variety and subtle shades of difference. As a result, passage from the dominance of the embryonic system makes it no longer possible to consider relationships purely in terms of the appropriate biological object and while this first transition may be expressed as a change of system, the second is expressed in terms of modification of transactional patterns. This is because while failure to achieve successful passage through the first transition is immediately obvious as a gross developmental defect, there are a variety of techniques and individual differences in the transactional patterns adopted. It is
only in the most extreme cases that these patterns are so deviant that they result in pathology. It can be seen that transition to the early object system depends upon the experience of good early object-relations, while transition to mature sociality depends upon a combination of this factor with the transactional patterns developed in the intermediate stage. Often the attainment of an acceptable predominance of patterns of mature sociality may be hampered by developmental failures from earlier stages, which may remain undisclosed until environmental demands at puberty or adolescence, or perhaps not until adult life, demonstrate their presence through their inability to provide a basis for effective transactional patterns. The early object-system is formed in the period between infancy and five or six years of age, while the later object-system is concurrent with the emergence of transactional patterns and being an open system has no finite boundary in space or terminus in time. The adult transactional patterns, however, are largely established by late adolescence, although there are considerable individual variations in this. That part of the early object-system in which the embryonic system still predominates corresponds to the early and late oral passes of Abraham's revision (1924). The establishment of transactional patterns in transition theory overlaps the late oral phase and includes his two anal phases and the early
genital (phallic) phase. The majority of transactional patterns are established in the stage which Freud described as the 'latency period', following upon the development of the super-ego.

With the transition to the object-system it becomes possible to consider development in terms of object-relations and the inner world, which begin with the infant's first transactions with objective reality. Classical Freudian theory describes object-relations as taking place only after the passing of the Oedipus complex, somewhere between the ages of three and five, and as a result of the consequent internalisation of aspects of the parents the psychic structure of the super-ego emerges. In Freud's theory, the emergence of the super-ego makes a decisive change from the determination of behaviour by the pleasure principle to the regulation of conduct with reference to object-relations. Although he came to attribute great importance to pre-Oedipal fixation on the mother, particularly in women (1932) and recognised that the true Oedipus complex might appear prematurely, he continued to hold the apparently conflicting views that the super-ego arises from the ruins of the Oedipus complex and yet that it contributes to its decline. The only consistent explanation of this is that the formation of the super-ego represents the culmination of a long process of introjection and projection which began early in infancy
(Heimann, 1952, p. 134). The establishment of the super-ego can therefore be considered as the attainment of a new level of structural organisation, under which the old level persists. (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 93). This is in accordance with the view of transition theory that the transactional patterns of the object-system are developments of those of the embryonic system, but that the increasing participation of the intellect brings about their organisation and increased complexity.

Freud's concept of the super-ego as a moral factor in which conscience reinforced the controlling ego was a considerable theoretic advance, and meant that a change from a scheme of development in terms of the increasing mastery of instinct derivatives to consideration of conflict between psychic structures as theoretical wholes within the larger unit of the total psyche. (Guntrip, 1956, p. 88). The development of this concept goes some way towards explaining the specially human quality of conscience and of effecting the important transition from biologically determined behaviour to actions controlled by thought.

The origins of the Oedipus complex lie in the developing functions of the ego, which Freud described as the "surface part of the id" (1923). It serves as the mediator between inside and outside occurrences and it discharges this function through the medium of perception; in this way it becomes aware of the outer world and emerges as the seat of
consciousness. The increasing differentiation between ego and id is accomplished through perception which is concerned not only with admitting suitable stimuli, but also with rejecting those which are dangerous. The ego is directed by the instincts because it forms part of the id and must express the needs of the id. Transition theory, however, does not have the problem of accounting for the differentiation of the organised ego from the unorganised id, as through its postulate of a single drive towards relationships the concept of the id is no longer required. The ego arises with the personalisation of the child and theoretically the ego-object system is the concentric expansion of the preceding non-differentiated embryonic system. Perception is closely bound up with the processes of introjection and projection and is a variable function, depending upon the degree of maturation of the organism. It requires participation of the intellect and cannot at any stage be divorced from object-relations. Under oral primacy, perceptions are confined to sensations received by mouth and this gradually becomes organised together with memory, association and selective attention into consciousness and rationality. Thus while introjection and projection are the characteristic transactional patterns of the embryonic system, perception, which transforms and embodies these functions becomes the characteristic transactional pattern of the early object-system.
The system of relationship appropriate to the embryonic system is based upon primary identification, which Fairbairn has described as the cathexis of an object which has not yet been differentiated from the cathecting subject (1941, p. 34, note). Freud held that this state of narcissism was replaced by "the anaclitic choice of objects" which Fairbairn prefers to call "relationships with differentiated objects". This transition involves not only the development of intellectual functions but also the abandonment of relationships based upon an attitude of oral incorporation. Thus ego development may be seen as involving at one and the same time a movement away from primary identification, the establishment of a vehicle other than the mouth through which relationships may be established and an increase in the intellectual components of perception. In transition theory it is of first importance that differentiation involves not only the object but also the subject and that the increasing clarity of perception of objects means the increasing clarity of the self as perceiver. The successful establishment of the object-system as a successor to the embryonic system depends upon the organised participation of mind which plays an increasingly important part as the embryonic system becomes more completely absorbed within the growing object system.

When the child passes successfully through the stage of personalisation and begins to integrate previously dissociated
and isolated aspects of relationship into the concept of a person it is not one person he meets, but many, and his own relationship systems have to be extended not only to include their systems but also the systems of relationship between them. Initially, he meets two persons, his father and his mother, and enters upon a triangular type of object-relation, which Foulkes calls "the model of three" (1957, p. 327) and which has a special significance as it represents the origins of the Oedipus complex. This situation is at one level the prototype of all the group situations which he will meet throughout life. At another level it is complicated by the persistence of elements which are left over from the early object system. In Freudian terms these are the Oedipal wishes directed towards the parent of the opposite sex, which are expressed through the "polymorphously perverse" nature of the infant's instinctive strivings, so that oral, urethral, anal and genital impulses are united in a chaotic mass and the child interprets the facts of the parent's relationship in terms of his own impulses. With the establishment of a genital primacy, realistic perception develops along with a greater knowledge of the different bodily parts and functions. There is then a crystallisation of the child's heterosexual object-choice and the limitation of rivalry and hatred for the parent of the same sex to the genital sphere. Freud advanced several reasons for the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex, including the biologically determined decline of the libidinal urges and the persistent frustration of Oedipal wishes which lead to their abandonment through the operation of the pleasure principle. The loss involved in giving up the parents as sexual objects is so great that the mechanisms of introjection and projection come into play with the result that the super-ego, formed by the internalised parents, replaces the former Oedipus constellation. Thus identification with the parents and acceptance of their standards of behaviour takes the place of the Oedipal wishes. The balance between father and mother identifications depends upon the preponderance of positive or negative aspects of the complex, but its outcome is "the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications in some way combined together". (Freud, 1923, p. 44). Melanie Klein retains the framework of instinctive primacies but believes that the rudimentary stages of the super-ego are established in early infancy, when primitive fantasy determines the infant's relations with his objects. Splitting of objects into good and bad aspects leads to splits within the ego itself and the simultaneous establishment of good and bad internal and external objects. Frustration in the child's early relations with the breast stimulates sadism which is at first directed against the mother's breast in reality and which is heightened by oral frustration,
particularly at the time of weaning. These first introjected objects form the core of the super-ego (Klein, 1952, p. 200, note), and the processes of super-ego formation, object-relations and adaptation to reality can be seen to be the result of an interaction between the projection of the individual's sadistic impulses and the introjection of his objects (Klein, 1932, p. 209).

Fairbairn's position is that the ego structures he envisages, the central, libidinal and anti-libidinal egos, are inherently dynamic structures resulting from the splitting of the original and single dynamic ego-structure present at the beginning. (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 148). Repression implies, in his view, a splitting of the ego, originating primarily as a defence against internalised bad-objects, and the super-ego represents an additional and later defence, which he calls the "moral defence". The significance of the Oedipus situation lies in the fact that it represents the differentiation of the single object of the ambivalent (late oral) phase into two objects, one being an accepted object and the other a rejected object, each of which is identified with one of the parents. (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 37). The unsatisfying object is internalised in an attempt to solve the problem which it presents, which in turn initiates a functional and structural splitting of the ego. The moral component of the super-ego is the 'ideal object' which is all
that remains of the internalised object after its exciting and rejecting aspects have been split off in an attempt to deal with the inner conflict arising from their simultaneous presence and the resultant anxiety. (Guntrip, 1956, p. 96). Fairbairn agrees with the Freudian view that the introjection of the parents is a selective process and that projection plays a part in the formation of psychic structures. Freud had emphasised the selective process when he noted that the super-ego was not only a deposit left by the earliest object-choices of the id, but also represented an energetic reaction-formation against these choices (1923, p. 44-5).

In transition theory, the participation of the person in the act of perception makes the conception of the splitting of objects an easy one to accommodate, since if the object is an intellectual construct it follows that in the act of introjection the individual will construct only the inner object which he wishes, embodying only those aspects of the external object which he himself has chosen consciously or unconsciously to incorporate.

The view which is taken of the developmental process determines the view which is taken of the concept of ego-strength, which in transition theory is reflected in the inability to balance the objective and subjective elements of experience and to discriminate between the affective and cognitive aspects of functioning sufficiently to achieve
effective action in the environment. All transition is continuous but there is a critical stage in the development of the ego when the individual passes from the closed system to the open system and begins to develop his own ways of transacting with objects. A strong ego requires the energy which arises from a foundation of concentric relationship systems, while weakness of the ego results from dissipation of energy in tangential systems. The strengthening of the ego is the main developmental task of childhood and is achieved only through the emergence of transactional patterns which ensure maximum deployment of energy towards the maintenance of concentric systems. The drive towards relationships which was manifest in early infancy through transactions by means of the mouth, anus and genitals becomes now expressed in the development of personal relationships, the idea and practice of which is initially tinged by these earlier transactional patterns. The Oedipal situation arises from the child's efforts to deal with personal relationships which have newly become possible through his ability at last to perceive a person where there was first a relationship exclusively in terms of oral, sadistic and genital fantasies. Thus the successive primacy of erotogenic zones form steps towards personal relations and the apparent weakening of the infantile sex drives after the passing of the Oedipal phase are due not to a predestined
biological diminution of libido but come about through the redistribution of psychic energy in the establishment of personal relationship systems. These systems in reality replace the Oedipal fantasies.

Frustration may occur through the direction of the relationship drive to the biologically inappropriate object, a situation which in childhood is most likely to arise through the persistence of tangential systems surviving from early object-relations. In a theoretically perfect concentric development, the super-ego would not take the form of a separate internal object, but would form a series of transactional patterns by which the ego was related to objective reality. In fact the super-ego invariably forms a separate object by virtue of the frustrations which reality does impose upon every individual during his development through the object-system. The result is a tangential development in which the power of the super-ego is dependent upon the size of the system of which it forms the centre and thus the amount of energy absorbed by it.

Freud called the stage of development which succeeds the passing of the Oedipus complex the "latency period" to indicate the termination of the first period of sexual development and the beginning of a time of relative stability in which there was less need for defence against the instincts. It is primarily characterised by the strengthening of the
defences, a process in which growing powers of cognitive reality-testing play an important part. The child is helped by going to school, where he learns basic automatisms and begins a system of intellectual relationships so that he is able to maintain his fantasy life safely separate from the pressures of reality: at home the two are often too closely bound up with one another. Freud held that it was the task of education "to enable the individual to take part in culture and to achieve this with the smallest loss of original energy." (1909). In libido theory this was achieved by the process of sublimation, which formed the basis of all cultural activities. In transition theory, however, it is held that the school performs the function of facilitating transition to mature sociality by a number of related processes, the most important of which is providing, like the adult world, a framework of reality to which the individual must adapt or against which he must rebel. Unlike the adult world, however, the school is flexible and allows for second attempts, providing a background of comparative security against which techniques of dealing with reality may be tried out. The most obvious result of passing from the home situation to the home and school situation is that the child is now subject to the influence of larger groups. In association with older and younger children of different combinations of age and sex from those whom he may have
encountered within his own family, he has the opportunity for stable identifications and a much wider personal object-choice. Love for and identification with teachers within the convention of the school situation, which should permit a close attachment without the intimacy of the home, are an invaluable experience for a child in the latency years who is trying to free his relationships from the complications of Oedipal entanglements. The school's function in this area may be summed up by saying that whatever the child's inner world may contain, or the systems of relationship he may have developed, it provides him with an opportunity of making conscious readjustments in his transactional patterns as well as helping him to develop new patterns to fit his changing situation.

The diminution of libido which Freud considered to be concurrent with the passing of the Oedipus conflict was relative, a view which is supported by his opinion that during the latency period the energies of the child seem to be taken up with the task of resisting the temptation to masturbate. It is the case that the child's sexual activities are much less pronounced in the latency period than they are either before or after, but Melanie Klein has indicated that mutual sexual activities of various kinds are common in children during the latency period, while a moderate amount of masturbation of a non-obsessive kind is a normal occurrence
at all stages of the child's life. Such sexual activities, which are the rule in infancy, are much more frequent in latency and puberty than is usually supposed. This view is supported by Edith Buxbaum (1950) who considers that oedipal feelings do not always recede or fade out so that there are children who appear not to have a latency period. Buxbaum holds that she has not seen in clinical practice a complete latency of sexual feelings. Generally, it seems that children show "an approximation to the sexual quiescence supposedly characteristic of the latency period" (Alpert, 1941). Prolongation of infantile sexual activities into the latency period may be due to the excessive pressure of the super-ego which may be partially successful in the complete suppression of sexual activities but which may at the same time arouse the compulsion to indulge in such activities. (Klein, 1932, p. 170).

The view of transition theory is that the establishment of relationships on the basis of bodily sensations is a part of the embryonic system which will not normally be fully incorporated within genital systems until the attainment of some measure of mature sociality. This does not mean that libido has been withdrawn from one area in order to be employed in another, but that the earlier system has been expanded into the new. In such expansion, dangers to the ego inevitably arise. As a result, the latency period is not
only concerned with the establishment of relationships of an intellectual kind but is also characterised by defensive techniques which are designed to strengthen the ego by holding fast to reality and by placing all its energies at the service of repressive and anti-libidinal tendencies. At the same time the ego gains a great deal of support from the acceptance of group standards of behaviour and from the submergence of individual aims in group motivation. The absence of expression of fantasy which is in such a marked contrast to the earlier years does not mean that fantasy life is in abeyance, but that the tendency of the early object-system is towards de-personalisation and the development of cognitive reality-testing as part of a "flight to reality" (Searl, 1929) in which the problems of the inner world which are still unsolved tend to be translated into situations in the outer world in the attempt to deal with anxiety.
CHAPTER 11.

The Establishment of Transactional Patterns.

The personal object-system is expressed through the interaction between the psychic apparatus and the physical world, and while in the embryonic system the need for a perfect environment specifies in detail the nature of that interaction, the course of development may be traced through the emergence of increasingly varied and individual patterns of transaction. The growing participation of the intellect progressively reduces the importance of what is specified and places greater emphasis upon what is chosen. All relationships may be expressed in terms of transactions in which there is an exchange of energy between the systems which are the units of relationships, and the individual's origin is in such an interchange. In the same way as systems of relationship become through the organisation of the intellect relationships with objects, transactions become organised into patterns which are the basis of external behaviour and all functions of a person within a situation may ultimately be resolved into patterns of transaction. The development of the ego is dependent upon the emergence of successful patterns which are appropriate not only to the situation in outer reality in which the person has to live but also to the state of development which he has reached,
each successive stage having its own characteristic patterns. The primitive processes of introjection and projection which are the characteristic patterns of the embryonic system become transformed into techniques of object-relations through the growth of the object system. At the same time the ego system itself is maintained and elaborated by the multiplication of transactions. It is a postulate of transition theory that the self and reality are intellectual constructs based upon sense impressions which are themselves transactions. Consciousness is an awareness of transactions, but acceptance of the unconscious means that transactional patterns are not dependent upon consciousness, for unconscious transactions may modify conscious patterns or even in certain circumstances wholly determine them. As transactions precede the emergence of patterns, all transactions are at first unconscious and the operation of the intellect is required for the organisation of a transactional pattern. It therefore follows that while at the conscious level it is one of the main tasks of development to arrive at a sense of self and reality, part of the same process involves arriving at an idea of relationship.

In the last resort, an individual's efficiency in life is determined by the quality of his ego functions, which Anna Freud lists as "the testing of inner and outer reality, the building up of memory, the synthetic function of the ego
and the ego-control of motility" (1945, p. 86). Assessment of the strength of the ego is based not upon any quantitative measurement of ego-forces but upon a qualitative evaluation of its relative efficiency in dealing with the situations which the individual meets in the course of his life. The variables in the ego-strength equation are thus the contents of the inner and outer worlds and in addition the ways the ego has developed of transacting between them. The strength of the ego therefore must be defined not only in terms of object-relationships, but also in terms of transactional patterns. The functions of the mind are fundamental also to its development, providing the means by which the transactional patterns are developed through which transitions are effected. Although man constructs his objects for himself and may be said to be the only creature who inhabits his own reality, this is structured around a core of objectively-perceived reality which may be observed to be a part of the experience of other men. Reality-testing, or the establishment of transactional patterns which result in effective actions, is thus one of the most important functions which the ego is required to develop. Efficient reality adaptation is consonant with both objective and subjective reality and represents in the majority of instances a compromise between the demands of primitive aspects of the personality, of the environment and of conscience.
The changes in transactional patterns which accompany the development of the ego were explained by Freud in terms of the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle. This was facilitated by the use of intelligence in the replacement of affective by cognitive discrimination. In transition theory, the individual is considered as arriving at his own solution of the conflicting demands of instinct, environment and conscience, and the strength of the ego is dependent upon this. Anna Freud holds a similar view:

"Whether the ego will be strong or weak is determined by the type of life experiences it encounters. Obviously frequent integrating experiences will help the child to build a strong ego, and, conversely, repeated indiscriminate exposure to traumatic experiences will hinder ego development." (1945).

This allows due weight to be given to the part played by the development of transactional patterns and points to the importance of the latency period which in Freud's libido theory tended to be underemphasised owing to his hypothesis of a lessening of biological drives with the passing of the Oedipal phase. On the other hand it does not disregard the basic endopsychic situation which is the product of early object-relations and the innate constitution of the child.

Early transactional patterns have been described by Winnicot in his paper on "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena" (1951). He uses these terms to describe an intermediate area of experience between the baby's
inability to recognise reality and his growing ability to accept it. The clinical observations which give rise to his theoretical formulations are all concerned with children's experience of the first 'not-me' possessions. He notes that in children's development a tendency arises early in infancy to weave other-than-me objects into the personal pattern of activity, and that from this situation there usually emerges some thing or phenomenon, a doll, corner of a blanket or even a word or tune, which becomes of special importance as a defence against anxiety, especially just before going to sleep. This may be symbolic of some libidinal object such as the breast or the mother, but Winnicot believes that its importance lies equally in its not being the breast or mother, as it represents an intermediate area of experience, between oral erotism and true object-relationship, between subjective and objective, between inner and outer objects. He notes that its use antedates established reality-testing and that in time it becomes gradually decathected, as if the transitional phenomena have become diffused and spread out over the whole intermediate territory between inner 'psychic reality' and objective reality. The appearance of these phenomena is usually in the first year of the infant's life. It can be seen that these phenomena represent attempts to establish patterns of transaction with reality in the movement from the embryonic system to the early object system. It is
particularly significant that the transitional object assumes such importance when the child is going to sleep, for it is then that there is a partial regression to the embryonic system. Freud held that sleep represented the return to a state of narcissism, a temporary withdrawal from the world of objects which we discover at birth and "with this is associated the fact that we cannot endure the new state of things for long and that we periodically revert from it in our sleep to our former condition of absence of stimulation and avoidance of objects." (1921). While there is no simple correspondence between sleep and the intra-uterine state, sleep does involve regression with an accompanying loss of identity which are situations full of anxiety for the infant who is only at the beginning of relationships with objects and possesses only an insecure sense of self. These early transactional patterns to which Winnicott has drawn attention are the prototype of later ways of relating to objects in which the intellect has a special part to play. At first intelligence has the task of supplying the deficiencies of the ordinary 'good' mother, releasing her from the necessity of providing the near-perfect environment which existed in the intra-uterine state. The mind of every individual, Winnicott believes, is rooted in this need for a perfect environment, providing the means for turning a relative failure of adaptation into an adaptive success. This function
of mind is closely associated with its important task in transition theory of effecting a link between tangential relationship systems. In Winnicott's view, a failure on the part of the mother, especially erratic behaviour, may result in an over-activity of mental functioning which may in extreme cases result in a tangential development of the mental function itself which he describes as the "mind-psyche", which may have a false localisation in the body and is a pathological phenomenon. (Winnicott, 1954).

This is an important and fundamental example of the establishment of a relationship system which is separate from the main system and is based upon a de-personalised nucleus, resulting in faulty ego development. The functions of the mind develop with such rapidity in the early stages of the object-system and the tendency towards de-personalisation is so strong in the educational systems of our present civilisation that this situation is a commonplace feature of present-day child development. It represents a particular hazard at the latency period when there may be considerable guilt attached to aspects of affective functioning and over-employment of repressive mechanisms. A split in the ego on this basis may be successfully concealed throughout childhood owing to super-ego control and the development of transactional patterns on a purely intellectual foundation. By these means difficulties may be postponed until the
necessity of reconciling affective and cognitive aspects of functioning at puberty or adolescence exposes the defect. In normal development the mind should not be a separate entity but merely a specialisation of the psyche-soma. (Winnicot, 1949, p. 244). In this way it contributes to the expansion of personal relationship systems in a concentric fashion and facilitates the emergence of transactional patterns which serve as a link between previous tangential deviations.

The expansion of relationship systems requires the deployment of energy in new ways, the rearrangement of existing object-systems and the loss of objects in the elevation of new structures. These transitional processes are accomplished through patterns of transaction already established, by modification of existing patterns or by the evolving of new patterns if required. Such changes are not without danger to the developing ego, but transition theory does not hold that because of this ego-development should be considered thereafter only in terms of defences. Freud's description of the ego as "a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three several dangers" (1932, p. 82) seems to emphasise this purely negative aspect. Melanie Klein considers that this description applies particularly to the immature ego of the small child, and maintains that anxiety has a positive as well as a negative part to play in promoting the growth of
the ego. (1932, pp. 200-245). Anna Freud holds that as the ego assumes superiority through development the position between ego and id is reversed while the sex drives are becoming latent and the reality principle becoming established. This is not a permanent ego-superiority and is likely to be overthrown through the biological increase in libido at puberty, and the personality of the child continues developing so long as the relationship between ego and id remains fluid and changeable. Normally, in every childhood, a number of methods are used in a moderate degree to defend the ego against anxiety, but this does not do more than create a certain amount of subjective and faulty functioning which is overcome as the position of the ego is strengthened and anxiety lessens in the course of normal progress through the latency period. In the face of excessive anxiety, however, the ego makes excessive and more lasting use of the defence mechanisms at its disposal and the harm done to the ego functions becomes considerably greater and of more permanent importance. Normally, the mechanisms of introjection and projection may be employed, the child appropriating from others what seems admirable and attributing to them the qualities which seem to him undesirable in himself. He may substitute pleasurable fantasies for painful facts by various mechanisms of escape, or refuse to see reality as it really is, by denial. In reaction-formation he hides unwelcome urges by a profusion
of their opposites, while by repression he may refuse to admit their existence by denying them consciousness. These defence mechanisms are all acceptable within the framework of transition theory, but are considered not so much processes of normal development as transactional patterns evolved for dealing with unsatisfactory relationship-systems.

Transition theory follows closely the view of ego-development held by Fairbairn, which is based upon his conception of the schizoid and depressive states. He believes that the schizoid state involves the loss of the ego, while the depressive state involves the loss of the object. (1941, p. 53-54). The schizoid state involves such a massive withdrawal of libido from surrounding objects that the ego loses the very form of energy which holds it together. This is equivalent to the position of the ego described in transition theory, where it is maintained by relationships which are the result of the basic biological drive through which the whole system is organised. If the energy which maintains this ego-object system is weakened by the enlargement of a tangential system or through regression, the system is threatened with annihilation. Fairbairn makes the important observation that the depressive state arises from the fact that any frustration in object-relationships is functionally equivalent to the loss of the object, whether partial or complete. The task of the intermediate period
between infantile and mature dependence in his theory therefore resolves itself into different methods of controlling underlying schizoid or depressive tendencies, which may be resolved even further into ways of dealing with incorporated objects. Thus the transition has both positive and negative aspects, requiring not only the establishment of relationships with differentiated external objects, but also the giving up of relationships established during the first stage of infantile dependence. The ambivalence of the late oral phase gives way to an attitude based upon the dichotomy of the object, and the original object towards which both love and hate are directed is divided into two objects, an accepted object, towards which love is directed, and a rejected object towards which hate is directed. The association of love with the oral technique of incorporating and hate with the anal technique of expelling is an essential part of Fairbairn's system. Love involves a relationship with an accepted object which the child wishes to take in, and hate involves the desire to get rid of an unsatisfying object. The operation of rejective techniques is therefore a characteristic feature of the intermediate stage, and Fairbairn believes it was the recognition of this which caused Abraham to introduce the two additional anal phases in his revised scheme of development (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 35). The conflict of this period resolves itself into a
conflict between an urge to expel and an urge to retain contents. Two different methods therefore emerge of dealing with what is essentially the same basic conflict and these arise out of two different ways of considering the object. The first is the phobic technique, where there is in the main a passive attitude in which the conflict lies between a flight to and a flight from the object. Contrasted to this is the obsessional technique, which is active and more aggressive in quality: here the conflict lies between the expulsion or the retention of the object. In the phobic technique, both the accepted and rejected objects are treated as external, but in the obsessional technique both the accepted and the rejected objects are treated as internal.

Applying the same method of examination to the dissociative phenomena of the hysterical state, it can be seen that acceptance of the object is clearly implied by the over-valuation of objects characteristic of this condition, but this very exaggeration of emotional relationships suggests an over-compensation for rejection. Fairbairn suggests that what is characteristically dissociated by the hysteric is something within himself with which a part of himself is identified and this can only be the rejected object. The hysterical technique thus involves the externalisation of the accepted object and the internalisation of the rejected object, which gives rise to the painful physical symptoms so
often associated with this state.

The paranoid state is in direct contrast to this, in that the paranoid individual regards objects in the outer world as persecutors, which means the externalisation of the rejected object, and while the hysterical over-valuation of the love-object is a form of self-depreciation, the paranoid individual's suspicion of outer objects is matched by an attitude which is grandiose and lacking in self criticism. This arises from the internalisation of the accepted object.

These "techniques of transition", as Fairbairn calls them, may be considered as characteristic transactional patterns in transition theory, with a single reservation concerning the rejection of objects and the abandonment of relationships. In transition theory relationships cannot be given up, only transformed into something different through redistribution of their elements among different systems. Thus, Fairbairn's phrase "coming to terms with objects that have already been internalised" or "trying to get rid of early objects which have been internalised, without losing them" (1946, p. 146) are considered to be more useful formulations than the simple concept of getting rid of objects or giving up relationships. Transition theory takes the view that while an individual may try to get rid of a relationship or may fantasy the rejection of an object, both are in fact impossible, except through the formation of new
relationships.

In Fairbairn's view, ego-development consists in the employment of these varied defensive techniques, often more than one simultaneously, for the purpose of averting on the one hand "the ultimate psychopathological disaster which follows from the loss of the ego" and on the other "the ultimate psychopathological disaster which follows from the loss of the object". (1941, p.53-4). This is a valuable contribution to the theory of development, but it is necessary to emphasise that the dangers to the ego arise from the transitional nature of this stage of development. If the ego remained static, or did not attempt to enter into new relationships, these dangers would not arise. It is the positive drive towards relationships which causes energy to be directed outwards to the objects in the environment and to expose itself to the frustrations which the environment may impose.

The transitional theory of childhood considers that broad general stages of development may be discerned, but processes of transition are continuous and there are considerable individual differences in the way in which the processes of transition take place. The essential structures of the personality appear to be established in children of our present civilisation by the end of the pre-school years, yet there are considerable differences in the behaviour
resulting from the presence of similar structures in different individuals, owing to the necessity of allowing for other determining factors. Transition theory does not hold that human personality is biologically determined, unless determinism is taken to mean the limitation of choice rather than the elimination of choice.

Hartmann, Kris & Loewenstein also consider that the culmination of the formation of the main structures of the personality takes place about five or six years of age, and write:

"Developmental processes occurring after that age can be described as modification, enrichment, or, in pathological cases, as restriction of the then existing structure." (Hartmann et al. 1946).

They make the important suggestion that the ego does not, however, develop from this time onwards only by establishing defensive mechanisms for the purpose of maintaining its existing structure, but that "the human personality is formed by psychic mechanisms which serve, also, the purpose of defence." (Ibid). This also argues against the negative view of the latency period which is so difficult to avoid within the framework of libido theory. The essential feature of all stages of childhood is expansion and forward movement, and the task of the childish ego in the latency period is the facilitation of the emergence of transactional patterns, which are the means by which the newly completed structures become active, and in this task all the child's free energies
are employed. (Bornstein, 1951, p. 285). It is in pathology that the earlier transitions assume primary importance: in normal development it is in the latency period that the foundations of character and temperament are laid.
CHAPTER 12.

The Transition to Mature Sociality.

The state of mature sociality involves a relationship between numbers of separate persons who are completely differentiated from one another as individual ego-object systems. The outstanding difference between this theoretical final state and infantile dependence is that dependence is initially absolute and the course of development through various stages of transition is marked by its becoming increasingly conditional. Since man is a social being, the criteria of personal normality and adjustment are not purely psychological but psycho-social, yet adjustment or social adaptation on the other hand cannot be the sole criteria of the maturity of an adult. Society is in a state of change which is effected through the development of new systems of relationship by various individuals, and if man is to develop better societies it must be through the active manipulation of the objects in his environment and not only through passive acceptance of the things which happen to him. The philosophical climate of a particular time or the ethical standards of a particular group are the measures by which an individual is assessed, yet it would not be in accordance with the uniqueness of the qualities inherent in the reflective nature of man if the goal of his development took no account
of his personal potential for changing for the better the society in which he lives. Mature sociality is defined, therefore, not only with reference to adaptation and adjustment, but also with reference to personal integration, and evidence of successful development is found not only in the absence of signs of stress, which may be achieved through a purely negative and defensive organisation of the personality, but in the individual's active participation in life and positive acceptance of new relationships. Ernest Jones writes:

"We surmise that the psychological problem of normality must ultimately reside in the capacity to endure - in the ability to hold wishes in suspension without either renouncing them or 'reacting' to them in defensive ways. Freedom and self-control are thus seen to be really the same thing although both are badly misused concepts. We reach the conclusion that the nearest attainable criterion of normality is fearlessness. The most normal person is, like Siegfried "angst-frei", but we must be clear that we mean by this not merely manifest courage, but the absence of all the deep reactions that mask unconscious apprehensiveness. Where these are absent we have the willing and even joyful acceptance of life, with all its visitations and chances, that distinguishes the free personality of one who is master of himself." (Jones, 1946, p. 7).

Normality, however, is often itself a purely negative term, describing a state of absence of pathology, while mature sociality is a state to which each individual can only approximate but towards which the aspirations of all may be consciously directed.

Recognition of puberty and adolescence as a time of
transition to adult status is marked in primitive early societies by rituals of initiation which rest upon an assumption of uniform and sudden maturing which influences thought about this period of development even in more advanced social groups. Recognition of individual and social problems specific to adolescence appears to be of relatively recent growth. (Fleming, 1955), and is related to the fact that the process of growing up has undoubtedly in the twentieth century been accompanied in many parts of the world by conditions of considerable stress, which has been reflected in the behaviour both of adolescents and their parents (Horney, 1937). The difficulties which young people encounter are related partly to the social traditions which demand an ever-increasing period of education before they are permitted to exercise the privileges and enjoy the responsibilities of adult life, while there is a corresponding and incompatible pressure upon them from commercial and other quarters to develop adult habits of behaviour and a competitive sense of values resulting in earlier and larger consumption of consumer goods and services. The difficulties are also related, however, to the emotional state and the unsatisfied personal needs of the parents, a fact which is sometimes given too little weight in discussions of the adolescent years. Where distress and conflict do arise, they can be partly attributed to the nature of the individual's
past history and the character of the home in which he was reared, both of which are reflected in his systems of relationship and the nature of his transactional patterns. Puberty and adolescence, however, do have difficulties which are biological or developmental in origin, and these usually resolve themselves into the necessity of modifying transactional patterns in the service of new relationship systems or the development of fresh patterns towards the same end. These changes in systems of relationship, however, are first felt within the family group, which means that not only are the nature of the object systems and transactional patterns of the individual of first importance, but also the personalities of the parents and the family, together with the idea of relationship which is consciously held by all of them.

Acceptance of the individual's growth and aspirations is directly related to the parents' own degree of maturity, and parents who appear to have been successful with little children do not always mature into parents who can deal wisely with young boys and girls on the threshold of adult life. This may be due to the fact that there are features of the changing situation which threaten them or revive latent conflicts through identification with or reaction-formation against the sexual aspects of the growing child's behaviour or appearance. It also may be due to the fact that
unsatisfactory parents have been able to maintain an outward appearance of successful family life through the relatively easily controlled crises of the latency years and their unwise courses of action do not reveal the full consequences until adolescence is reached. The idea of relationship held by the adolescent is influenced not only by the system of relationship which he has already established among members of his family, school friends and so on, but by his unconscious fantasies reinforced by the nature of his life experiences. The search for a heterosexual love-object and the desire for a home, children and a career are not only affected by his inner world, but also by the conscious idea he has formed of what these things are, resulting from the transactional patterns he has evolved in dealing with similar situations and the systems of relationship within which he has structured them. These ideas are not in a simple correspondence with an unconscious situation, but involve personal combinations of various unconscious factors and special ways of bringing them to consciousness.

The similarities between infancy and adolescence which were noted in Chapter 5 extend over a wider area than physical growth or the extension of functions. In the transitional stage between embryonic and early object systems the infant was supported by the particular care of the mother in the accomplishment of a concentric expansion of his relationship
systems in which the quality of his relationship with her became transformed. Similarly the adolescent requires the support of both father and mother, the other members of his family and society in general for a successful transition from which they should all emerge in a new relationship with him, as part of his expanding circle of mature love-objects. The degree of this support varies a great deal in various cultures and Margaret Mead's studies in Samoa (1928) showed very little difference in behaviour between the group which is experiencing puberty and the groups which are two or three years younger or older, a fact which seems to arise from the lack of emphasis placed upon jealousy, rivalry, emulation or individual differences generally. In New Guinea, (1930) she found that although the social organisation was completely different, the period of adolescence has no special significance for the community, and as a result there is no special concern with problems specific to sexual adjustments, nor is the behaviour of children in any way modified as a result. In modern western societies emphasis upon competition and individual enterprise often leads to the withdrawal of support, which may arise through the view that 'independence' constitutes the goal of development. Fairbairn considers this goal mistaken because the capacity for relationships in itself implies some degree of dependence, and he prefers the term
'mature dependence'. (1941, p. 34). Transition theory carries this further, maintaining that man not only has the capacity for relationships but that he in fact exists through relationships, so that it prefers the term 'mature sociality' for the theoretical final state. A state of independence is anti-relational, involving mechanisms of regression towards a closed system; successful attainment of this state at the personal level can be achieved only through the reinstatement of the closed circle of the embryonic system, which would in fact substitute another and more complete dependence for that which forms a part of social inter-relationships. Mature sociality is reached, on the other hand, through a continuous forward movement in which the personal systems of others can be included within the personal system of the individual, leaving sufficient energy available for the expansion to continue.

Melanie Klein has also suggested an affinity between early infancy and adolescence, which she associates with the fact that libidinal impulses are at their height at both these stages, while in the latency period they are much less intense. She notes that at puberty, besides the more powerful impulses, there is a greater activity of fantasy and the child's ego has other aims and another relation to reality (Klein, 1932, p. 122). The biological accession of libido at puberty was held by Freud to create an imbalance
within the psyche and to result in intolerable stress:

"As a result of reaching a certain period in life and in accordance with regular biological processes, the quantity of libido in the mental economy has increased to an extent which by itself suffices to upset the balance of health and establish the conditions for neurosis. As is well known, such rather sudden intensifications in libido are regularly connected with puberty and the menopause, with the reaching of a certain age in women; in many people they may in addition manifest themselves in periodicities as yet unrecognised." (Freud, 1912b, p. 118).

This view of the nature of libido is not in accordance with the theory of instinct which has been stated in Chapter 6, and progress by sudden movements does not accord with the view of evolution and development as a process of gradual and continuous transition. The parallel between infancy and adolescence can, however, be extended for different reasons which are fully in accordance with the postulates of transition theory. In early infancy the infantile ego is precariously maintained between the oscillating embryonic and growing object systems, while in adolescence it is similarly insecurely balanced between the transactional patterns of the latency period and the emerging transactional patterns of mature sociality. Optimum conditions of development should require no major revision of the already established patterns, but if development in the latency period has been on the basis of inadequate patterns or through the emergence of patterns covering a transitional defect, the choice may lie between a radical change or a complete breakdown. In the
latency period there is a very slow process of maturation analogous to the long preparations of the intra-uterine life. Early infancy represents a culmination of the transitional process in which there is a maximum conflict between the claims of the departing embryonic system and those of the developing object system. Puberty represents a similar culmination of the transition from the transactional patterns of the early object system and those of the state of mature sociality.

Physiological maturation at puberty does not mean an access of sexual impulses causing stress in the personality through pressure upon defences and the testing of controls, but a positive step towards mature sociality, making possible the expression in an adult genital way of the drive towards relationships which has never ceased to operate. This is in accordance with Fairbairn's view that in the mature individual it is not that the libidinal attitude is essentially genital, but that the genital attitude is essentially libidinal. (1941, p. 32). There is an important difference between the oral attitude of the infant in which the mouth was the only vehicle by which relationships could be made and the genital attitude of the mature adult, who has a choice of ways by which he can approach his object, of which the genital is only one. Thus it is not that object-relations are satisfactory because the genital level has been reached,
but rather that true genital sexuality can only be obtained upon a basis of satisfactory object-relationships. To define mature sociality otherwise than in terms of the object system would in transition theory discount the essential nature of an approximation to concentric development and attach too much weight to the functions of genital sexuality. These difficulties attach to impulse psychology and libido theory. Conflicts occurring in adolescence cannot by their very nature form part of a process of normal development, but must arise through failures in relationships. Anxiety is generated not through internal stresses set up by physiological changes but through the individual's difficulties in adapting his transactional patterns to the changing conditions.

It has already been noted that the transition from the embryonic system is facilitated on many occasions by the use of a transitional object, and a further parallel between infancy and adolescence arises through the employment in the latter period of a similar technique. This transitional phenomenon forms a familiar feature of adolescent behaviour and has many variations, but mostly it involves a form of experimental renunciation of the family for a group situation, a temporary use of adult transactional patterns in a limited environment. This group behaviour is a notable feature of adolescence and when the group is associated in
anti-social activities a source of considerable disturbance in most urban societies.

Statistical observations show that children under five years of age may associate in groups of two or three for periods of between ten and forty minutes. A definite change can be noticed in the size and stability of groups in the ages between five and seven, when four to ten children can be associated for one to three hours. After the age of seven, spontaneous interest in groups does not increase and may even decrease slightly, until another peak of group development is reached in pre-adolescence and adolescence. According to Thrasher (1927), 51% of youth between eleven and seventeen belong to groups of various kinds. Buhler (1933) places the figure even higher, finding that 67% of boys and 59% of girls between ten and fifteen belong to groups. The incidence of group behaviour in puberty and adolescence and the course of development of group interests establishes this form of activity unequivocally as a transitional phenomenon. Freud writes:

"A group impresses the individual with a sense of unlimited power and of insurmountable peril. For the moment it replaces the whole of human society which is the wielder of authority, whose punishments the individual fears and for whose sake he has submitted to so many inhibitions. It is clearly perilous for him to put himself in opposition to it, and it will be safer to follow the example of those around him and perhaps even to 'hunt with the pack'. In obedience to the new authority he may put his former 'conscience' out of action, and so surrender to the attractions of the increased pleasure that is certainly obtained from the removal of inhibitions." (Freud, 1921).
Adolescent groups may be classified into two large divisions, those which are described by Anna Freud (1936, p. 41) as "artificial groups, requiring an external force to keep them together", and those which form themselves around a central person spontaneously. (Redl, 1942, p. 573ff). The group which is maintained by an external force is for the adolescent who is dealing with the conflicts of transition equivalent to the school situation for a child who is dealing with the residues of the conflicts of the Oedipal phase. Thrasher (1927) holds that the group has a part to play in the life of adolescents which cannot be taken by any other individual relationship, but that this reflects needs within the child which force him into a group independent of educational aims, a fact which is reflected in so many societies setting the beginning of schooling between the ages of six and seven. In those groups which are held together by a leader, there are opportunities for identification and for rebellion, which are often worked out in the school situation also. Adolescents breaking away from the leader attract more attention from observers than the same adolescents when they submit to him, but both processes are of equal importance for their development. This alternation between submission and opposition towards the leader of a group shows a pattern, a swing between activity and passivity which is reminiscent of the repetitive character
of children's dramatic play. (Waelder, 1953).

In addition to the positive aspects of adolescent group formation, there may be negative aspects when the group is allied with a tangential ego-deviation and becomes a gang, a substitute for, rather than an intermediate step towards, mature sociality. The psychology of the gang enables the child to enjoy guilt-charged or dangerous gratifications without the expense of guilt feeling and fear. Within its conventions and limited code it can offer him the gratification of 'morality' and at the same time pride, moral indignation, the feeling of 'being on the right side'. The leader and group who help the child in his revolutionary tendencies are abandoned as soon as they become identified with parental attitudes and authority, which is one of the main reasons why social work with members of delinquent gangs is a difficult and sometimes impossible task. (Buxbaum, 1945, p. 359). Redl (1942) noted that delinquency-identified youngsters in a camp situation react automatically with avoidance and suspicion of an adult group leader representing to them a member of the 'outside' adult world. When the adult is able to break through, they enter strong personal affectionate relationships. Sooner or later the adult is compelled to act as an authority, and when this happens he is 'depersonalised', becoming nothing more than a symbolic representative of the hostile code. These negative aspects
of group behaviour arise not from any special factor operating within adolescent groups as a whole, but rather from the fact that the group represents the opportunity, like other transitional phenomena, for the development of particular transactional patterns which are specially adapted to the individual's needs. Most adolescent group members do not become delinquent and most adolescent delinquents mature into acceptable citizens (Glueck, 1942). There is overwhelming evidence from the many surveys of the social background of delinquency that emotionally unstable parents or foster-parents tend to have emotionally unstable children, and delinquent behaviour is associated less directly with the inheritance of anti-social attitudes than with their cultivation through the treatment which children have received. (Landis, 1945).

In concentric development, the adolescent does not have to reject the parents and the family in order to effect the realignment of his relationship systems. In practice, however, he turns away from them at least temporarily, a process which is full of danger where there are lingering transactional patterns of the early object system. In the group he finds a defence against this fear, and by the repeated experience of breaking away from the leader and being allowed to resume his place, a process analogous to the strengthening of the infantile ego by the repeated
experience of bearable separation and reunion, he is less afraid to be fully an adult himself (Redl, 1945, p. 371). Part of the process of turning away from the parents involves the attempt to establish a love object and to have sexual relations outside his own home. It is a feature of group behaviour that overt sexual relations are forbidden and members who do find a heterosexual partner outside leave the group either temporarily or permanently. (Bauxbaum 1945). By turning away from the family and finding a heterosexual love object he takes the first step in finding a new family of his own and the final step in identification with his father.

The group phase therefore forms part of the process of normal development, playing an essential part in the expansion of the object system and the establishment of adult transactional patterns upon which the state of mature sociality is based. Thrasher writes:

"The gang is largely an adolescent phenomenon. It occupies a period in the life of the boy between childhood, when he is usually incorporated into a family structure, and marriage, when he is reincorporated within a family and other orderly relations of work, religion and pleasure. The gang appears to be an interstitial group, a manifestation of readjustment between childhood and maturity." (1927, p. 37).

Such groups are the sum of the individuals who compose them, and if they constitute in any society an undesirable feature requiring to be modified it is to the transactional patterns of the pre-adolescent child that attention must be
The group provides a vehicle for the conscious and unconscious aspirations of its members and if it is an anti-social group it is either in the attitudes of these members or the nature of the society itself that the causes should be sought.
CHAPTER 13.

Psychopathology.

It is axiomatic that conceptions of normality in behaviour must be related not only to the individual's subjective impressions of his experiences, but also to the consensus of other individuals' estimates of what in fact are the realities of his situation. Glover (1932 a) has pointed out that among a number of privileges conferred upon a medical practitioner by Act of Parliament, that of establishing a standard of normality for his patient is one of the most important. Had this remained restricted to the task of distinguishing between physiological and pathological function in organic medicine, the privilege might have gone unchallenged, he believes, but one of the results of the recognition of the existence of the unconscious has been that the old organic standards of normality have gone by the board. The psycho-analyst is compelled to define his standards of normality not only with reference to bodily symptoms and the absence of psychic mechanisms of a grossly aberrant type, but also with reference to social adjustment and the capacity for satisfying relationships. Glover (op. cit.) considers "a normal individual is anyone who is free from symptoms, unhampered by mental conflict and who shows satisfactory working capacity." He makes the important addition, later
"and who is able to love someone apart from himself." In the same essay, he goes on to discuss the impossibility of establishing a standard of absolute normality, and suggests rather a criterion of a "social standard of adequate adaptation", adding the suggestion that "normality may be a form of 'madness' which goes unrecognised because it happens to be a good adaptation to reality". In transition theory, a theoretical optimum of concentric development has been proposed, which is unattainable in practice because no individual can pass through the early object-system without experiencing frustrations, producing tangential deviations. The effects of these are minimised by the transactional patterns which have been devised, resulting in forms of behaviour of various degrees of appropriateness to the situation in which the individual finds himself. This does not mean, however, that standards of normality may therefore be resolved into statistical norms of adaptation to a particular social setting at a given period in time. (Hollitscher, 1943). If it is naive to assume that there are absolute standards of normality, it is equally naive to assume that in the present state of Western civilisation normality and complete reality adaptation are identical. Adaptation to a sick society may comply with a statistical standard, but it would be unsatisfactory to accept such a criterion in a world which is changing so rapidly. The
factor of personal integrity cannot be disregarded, and the important feature of a scientific explanation of human behaviour which attempts to reconcile the facts of evolution and individual development is that it accepts from the beginning that both man and society are in a continuous state of transition.

Freud stated: "It is impossible to define mental health except in terms of metapsychology." (1937, p. 382, note), and the classical Freudian view of integration involves the reduction of tension between id and super-ego through the agency of creative libido. The outlook adopted by Freud was inevitably affected by his stoical philosophy and is tinged with the pessimism which is inseparable from it. There is always a tendency for each person to describe integration in terms of the conceptions which he himself prefers. What Jung, for instance, would describe as "finding the self" analysts of other schools would refer to as "the integration of the total personality". In many cases the difference is in effect very slight, but may be of importance in relation to the theoretical background of the statement. Thus, Fairbairn in one of his most recent papers (1958) states that the chief aim of psycho-analytical treatment is to achieve the maximum synthesis of the structures into which the original ego has been split, making breaches in the closed system of the patient's inner world, so that it becomes
accessible to the influence of outer reality. From this it follows that normal development must result in an open system in which the inner world may be influenced by the events which take place outside. Such an open system also forms the goal of the transitional theory of development. Truly concentric development is not, however, attainable, so the most which can be achieved is the maximum practicable co-ordination of separately-functioning tangential systems. It can be seen from this that there are a variety of degrees of integration and that the concept of normality must be related not only to the theoretical view of the nature of this process, but also to the opinion of what constitutes an acceptable degree of its achievement, which is usually expressed with reference to the person's external behaviour.

In psychopathology it is customary to use the term 'abnormal' in a number of different senses, all of which may be related to the criterion of adaptation. Thus, mental activity or behaviour may be described as abnormal if it does not conform to an accepted theory. Suicide could be held to fit this category, involving the denial of the theory that survival has precedence over all other motives. A change in accustomed patterns of conduct in an individual may cause him or those near him to describe his behaviour as abnormal. The transformation of a usually open and generous person into a quarrelsome and suspicious one is a common
example in clinical practice. Where behaviour deviates from the standards of conduct prevailing in a particular society or social group to which the patient belongs, it may also be described as abnormal, as, for instance, when a person steals without motive or exposes himself indecently. Most of these symptoms are also abnormal in the sense that they are atypical or uncommon, and this introduces a statistical consideration. A person may properly be described as abnormal if his intelligence is inferior to say 98% of his fellows of similar age. The fallacy lies in holding that the converse is true, and that each individual must approximate to a particular average in order to be classified as normal, and that the greater the deviation from this average, the greater the degree of abnormality. In most cases, the qualities which are the basis of judgment are not amenable to quantification in this way. These generally accepted psychopathological definitions of abnormality (Davis, 1957) are all concerned with the way in which the individual deals now, at the present time, with situations in which he finds himself and which may occur in the life-histories of others, with whom his behaviour in similar circumstances may be compared. It is with reference to the quality of his response to them or the way in which he evaluates them that the individual's normality is judged. In transition theory, it is upon the nature of transactional patterns that all
hypotheses concerning pathological functioning must initially be based. A categorical distinction between normal and disordered behaviour cannot be made; the psychoneuroses and psychoses must be assumed to be special examples of normal activity, to be explained by the extension of the theories pertaining to normal behaviour. Psychopathology must therefore always rest upon an underlying theory of normal development, and in psycho-analytical thought it must be closely linked with the views which are held of the functions of the ego.

As a result of experience, the developing child learns to estimate the nature of persons and things with some degree of accuracy, but the degree, range and reliability of reality-testing vary widely from person to person and in the same person in different situations. (Brierley, 1951). The emergence of successful reality-testing thus becomes one of the most important ways in which assessment of the quality of ego-development may be carried out and the failure of reality-testing in borderline or psychotic patients is one of the most frequent causes of distress and social maladjustment and a valuable diagnostic indicator. Glover (1932a) points out that the nature of the reality-sense has been investigated from three different points of view. Ferenczi (1916) made an attempt to correlate certain stages of development with adult psycho-pathological phenomena. He described a series of relations to the object-world, but gave no corresponding
description of the nature of the instinctive objects concerned, an omission which was rectified by Abraham (1924). A second approach was that made by Federn (1926), who attempted to delimit the narcissistic ego-boundaries, regarding variations in corporeal ego-feeling as an ascertainable symptom of ego-regression. By attempting a detailed study of these ego-boundaries and regressions he considers the reality-system in operation at different stages of development may be discovered. The third approach is made by Melanie Klein (1932) in her work on child analysis, which has already been fully discussed in earlier chapters. It emerges clearly from her work that the reality-systems of infants and children are predominantly fantastic, of a different quality from those of adults owing to the importance of the mental mechanisms of introjection and projection. Glover himself defines the reality-sense and reality-testing in three tentative statements. Firstly, reality-sense is a faculty the existence of which is inferred by an examination of the processes of reality-testing. Secondly, efficient reality-testing, for any person who has passed the age of puberty, is the capacity to retain psychic contact with the objects that promote gratification of instinct, including both modified and residual infantile impulse. Thirdly, objectivity is the capacity to assess correctly the relation of instinctive impulse to instinctive object, whether or not the aims of the
impulse are, can be or will be gratified. (1932b).

It can be seen from this that the system proposed in transition theory may be applied to each of these statements. Reality-testing is the system of transactional patterns which the individual has evolved, while the reality-sense is determined by the nature of his object-system, which, of course, has its expression only through the transactional patterns. In his second statement, Glover is using the language of libido theory, but it is suggested that "psychic contact with the objects that promote gratification of instinct" may be described in another way as the expansion of the object-system in a concentric development. Lastly, the capacity for assessing the relationship between instinctive impulse and instinctive object describes the function of intellect in creating transactional patterns, particularly those linking tangential object-systems, a function which develops concurrently with the object-system. Federn's investigation of the narcissistic ego-boundaries represents an attempt to go directly to the nature of the object-system, while his study of the reality-systems is concerned with transactional patterns. Reality-testing emerges as a variable function from these speculations, and is dependent not only upon the nature of the object-system of the individual at any given moment in his development, but also upon the form of the transactional patterns which he has
evolved throughout the preceding stages. As Glover suggests, "adult 'morality' is a state in which infantile psychotic views concerning the external world have been so reduced that they do not interfere with possibilities of adult gratification: in other words it is a state in which the psychotic estimate of the object-world coincides with an objective estimate in two main respects (a) the amount of love that can be satisfied and (b) the amount of danger to the ego that is present." (Glover, 1932 a).

'Psychosis', like 'ego', 'reality', 'consciousness' and so forth, is a concept which is relative to the stage of development of the personal object-system. Glover writes: "every child in the first year of life is from the adult psychiatric point of view in a state of panpsychosis always acute and very largely hallucinatory" (Glover, 1932 a). Such a statement, however, is of the same limited application as one to the effect that from the adult physical point of view the child is in a state of underdevelopment. It may be a useful aid to an understanding of adult psychoses to relate these to failures at particular stages of transition, but the recognition that infantile behaviour in an adult would be indicative of a disordered personality does not lead to the assumption that a disordered phase is part of the normal processes of development. There are degrees of order appropriate to various stages and various situations. Psychiatric classifications imply dysfunction, and while infantile ways of functioning are replaced by techniques more appropriate to later more complex reality-systems, they are while they exist normally adequate for the limited systems of
reality which the infant has up to that time constructed. At any stage of development, different grades of adequacy of function may be discerned, but these are assessed with reference to a changing standard which is connected with the present state of the individual's relationship systems. There are psychotic children as well as psychotic adults, and their classification and treatment must be on the basis of the object-systems and transactional patterns of childhood.

Melanie Klein holds that early infantile anxieties characteristic of psychosis arise which drive the ego to develop specific defence-mechanisms, and in this period the fixation-points for all later psychotic disorders are to be found. (Klein, 1946, p. 292). She has emphasised, however, that this does not mean that she regards all infants as psychotic, but that the psychotic anxieties, mechanisms and ego-defences have an important part to play in all aspects of development, including the development of the ego, the super-ego and object-relations. In normal development the child passes through a "paranoid-scizoid position" (Klein, 1946, p. 293, note) and then a "depressive position". The early ego splits its object and the relation to it in an active way and this brings about a corresponding splitting of the ego. While the splitting is in fantasy, the process leads in fact to feelings and relations and later to
thought-processes, being cut off from one another. Later, when the child is able to construct a complete object against whom the aggressive impulses may be directed, guilt and the fear of loss bring about the depressive position with its associated states akin to mourning. (Klein, 1946, p. 308). The importance of this mechanism of splitting recalls the preliminary investigation of hysterical states upon which modern psychopathology was founded and which so greatly stimulated Freud at the beginning of his researches.

Janet, in his attempt to devise a scientific explanation of the genesis of the phenomena displayed by the hysterics, formulated the explanatory concept of "dissociation", a state in which there was a failure on the part of the ego to exercise its normal cohesive function with the result that certain parts of the personality became separated from the rest and passed out of the control of the ego to function independently. The weakness of the ego might arise from external traumatic situations, it might be inherent, or it might result from situations which imposed too great a strain upon the individual's capacity for adaptation. The connection of the dissociative process underlying hysteria with the weakness of the ego meant that Janet implicitly linked psychopathology and ego-development, as no distinction can be made functionally between an ego which has been weakened by any of the factors mentioned and an ego which had
not yet reached full strength through the normal processes of development. When Freud came to formulate libido theory and Abraham to elaborate his formulation in terms of the successive primacy of erotogenic zones, the psychoneuroses and psychoses were attributed to fixations at one or other of these particular phases. Schizoid conditions were related to a fixation in the early oral stage, characterised by the dominance of sucking, while manic-depressive states were attributed to a fixation at the late oral stage which was characterised by the emergence of biting. Paranoid and obsessive states were related to anal techniques for the retention and rejection of objects, while hysterical conditions represented attempts to manage relationships through the renunciation of the genital organs. Fairbairn believes that the conferring of the status of libidinal phases upon what are in fact techniques employed by the individual in his relationships with objects is a fundamental error; a fuller discussion of his point of view and his system of transitional techniques has been given in Chapter 11. In transition theory, of course, a similar view of libidinal development is held, and the mechanisms of splitting which Melanie Klein has described are considered to be the basis of tangential object-systems which may become pathological if the intellect is unable to effect some measure of reconciliation between them.
Fairbairn's view is that some measure of splitting of the ego is invariably present at the deepest mental level, or, to adapt Melanie Klein's phrase, the basic position in the psyche is a schizoid position. (Fairbairn, 1940). The majority of 'normal' individuals have experience of schizoid phenomena in dreams, in the déjà-vu experience and in feelings of calm and detachment in the face of crises. The important factor is the depth at which the splitting takes place, for splits in the ego have the effect of compromising its most important functions. Such splits may interfere with the integration of perceptions of reality, the integration of behaviour and discrimination between outer and inner reality. The extent to which these functions are affected determines the degree of importance of the schizoid phenomena, which are taken in this theoretical setting to range from a transient schizoid episode to schizophrenia proper.

Winnicott has suggested that psychosis may be regarded as an "environmental deficiency disease" (1954, p. 246), holding that a psychotic illness is a defensive organisation designed to protect the "true self".

"In consideration of a group of mad people there is a big distinction to be drawn between those whose defences are in a chaotic state, and those who have been able to organise an illness." (Winnicott, 1955, p. 287).

In some cases a psychotic illness, particularly of a paranoid type, may involve a high level of organisation and
a marked activity of intellectual functioning. The alternative to a complete breakdown may be a "flight to sanity", a condition comparable to the manic defence against depression. (Searl, 1929).

In transition theory, pathological conditions may be seen to fall into different groups, of varying degrees of severity and requiring a different sort of treatment. In the first group the transactional patterns are faulty and the underlying ego development is fairly sound. Secondly, there are cases in which there has been a fairly marked tangential deviation, with varying degrees of adequacy of transactional patterns, ranging from those which fully compensate for the original deficiency, to those which are inadequate for adaptation. Lastly, there are those situations in which the ego has failed to make a successful transition from an early system, or has reverted to it. Very broadly speaking, the psychoneuroses are the result of faulty transactional patterns, the organised psychoses to the development of divergent tangential object-systems, each with its own transactional patterns, and the chaotic states to functioning in terms of the patterns of the embryonic or early object-systems.
CHAPTER 14.

Psychotherapy.

The method which Freud devised for the investigation of the unconscious differed from previous medical therapeutic methods in a number of ways of which perhaps the most striking was the relative amount of activity on the part of the patient on the one hand and the therapist on the other. In most forms of medical treatment the patient is passive, and has things done to him by the doctor. The success or otherwise of the treatment is measured by the effect of the things that the doctor does. The psycho-analytic method, however, consists in free association on the part of the patient and interpretation on the part of the analyst, the interpretations being offered at moments considered by the analyst to be important and it is the patient who initiates and is responsible for most of the activity. Freud emphasised a number of points of technique which were designed to reduce the complications arising from the interaction of the personalities of the psychotherapist and the patient and Winnicot (1960) points out that these recognise that the analyst is under a strain in maintaining a professional attitude. This is why it is considered that the maturity of the personality of the worker is necessary and the quality of his own analysis becomes important. Winnicot (op. cit.) agrees with the
majority of analysts that the special relationship which exists between the patient and the therapist, which Freud called the "transference" is not just a matter of rapport or of personal relations, but concerns the way in which a highly subjective phenomenon repeatedly turns up in an analysis.

The analyst's ability to remain objective, consistent, powerful and indestructible within the hour is directly related to the degree to which his own ego has become strengthened so that he can remain professionally involved and yet maintain a distance between himself and the patient. The neurotic features which may impair this professional attitude and disturb the course of the analytic process are described by the term "counter-transference". It is through the analysis of the transference that access to the patient's inner world is obtained, and while a professional attitude may be built up on the basis of defences, inhibitions and obsessive procedures, it is only through the ability to understand and to handle counter-transference phenomena that good analytical work can be done.

Research into the nature of personality on the basis of a psycho-analytical theory is dependent upon the analysis of the transference, but, as has already been shown, this is complicated by the fact that the aims of therapy and of research are not the same. Both require an understanding of the patient, but the level at which this takes place is in
each case different. It may be said that research proceeds from the particular to the general, while therapy proceeds from the general to the particular. Therapy demands a deeper understanding of the patient based not only upon the principles of a theory of the personality, but also upon the ability of the therapist to think and feel sufficiently with the patient to enter voluntarily into and identify partially with his emotional attitudes. At first sight this would seem to make the aims of research and therapy wholly incompatible, intellectual study acting in a direction contrary to empathy, scientific analysis opposing therapeutic synthesis, objectivity against subjectivity. This does not necessarily follow, for the ultimate goal of analysis as a therapeutic process must be to enable the individual patient to live more satisfactorily, and the establishment of general laws is necessary for the exercise of individual conscious choice of the ways in which this can be done, which would otherwise be dependent upon a process of individual trial and error. Scientific analysis may be a prelude to or a means towards therapeutic synthesis, and accurate observation of data is a necessary foundation to any theoretical scheme. There is good reason to believe that in psycho-analysis accurate observation is not so much an intellectual activity as a matter of correct empathy. On the other hand it is hardly tenable to maintain that analysis is not an intellectual
but an affective process. The work which the analyst does with his mind is the means by which he maintains the distance between the patient and himself, ensuring that this is not enlarged by the resistance of the patient nor narrowed by features of the counter-transference. This does not alter the fact that the analyst is dealing with affect, with manifestations of living energy expressed in active relationships, and that although this may afterwards be reduced to structural terms, these relationships are changing throughout each therapeutic hour as a result of the interpretations which the analyst gives. 'Transference' has come to be understood in two different senses. In one sense it includes all that goes on in the relationship between patient and analyst; in the narrower sense it is confined to certain emotional attitudes of the patient determined by the nature of his ego-object system. It seems that there are good reasons for the maintenance of this distinction, since there exist in the analytic relationship at one and the same time two different levels of organisation. There is first the total interpersonal situation, including all those aspects of management and professional transaction which come outside the analytic work itself, and second, there is the transference proper, which includes only certain features of the unconscious relationship between patient and analyst. The distinction which is important enough in a general application, becomes
an essential one in two types of case to Winnicott (1960) has referred: the patient who has an anti-social tendency and the patient who needs a regression. There are also very powerful reasons for maintaining this distinction in considering questions relating to the technique of analysis of children. Bornstein (1945) believes that there is a good reason why the child in general does not develop a transference neurosis in the strict sense; there is no need for him to repeat his reaction vicariously since he still possesses his original love-objects - his parents - in reality. Nevertheless, Melanie Klein emphasises the child's capacity for making a spontaneous transference owing to the much more acute anxiety which it feels in comparison with an adult, and consequently its interest in objects is in terms of their ability to arouse anxiety or to allay it: according to the therapist's ability to do one or the other of these things the child will rapidly develop a positive or negative transference towards him. (Klein, 1932, p. 50).

It has come about that in recent years, particularly in the Kleinian school, the tendency has been to concentrate upon the interpretation of the transference. This has been in some instances carried to the extent of abandoning any historical and genetic approach to the patient's problems in the conviction that the 'here and now' phenomena of the analytic session provide sufficient material for the purposes
of interpretation (Ezriel, 1951). Fairbairn has pointed out, however, that it is more in keeping with the Freudian tradition to interpret transference phenomena neither in terms of 'here and now' situations in the analytic sessions, nor exclusively in terms of the historical situations of childhood, but in terms of present situations in internal reality (1957a, p. 58). Transference phenomena in the present result from unconscious situations and relationships, which, although they have their roots in past experience, are in fact transactional patterns which provide information concerning the nature of the object system as it exists in the present. Such interpretations, made in terms of present inner reality, tend as a result to be in terms of fantasy rather than in terms of actual situations experienced in the past, which is again characteristic of the Kleinian school. The analyst is, however, not merely a screen upon which the patient may project his fantasies, nor even a detached interpreter of fantasy, but an active participant in a relationship, and this relationship is in itself more important than details of technique.

In the treatment of children, there are a number of features of this relationship which make it different from the relationship between an adult and his analyst in the setting of which the transference neurosis occurs. In the first place the child is usually brought by its parents,
while the adult most often seeks treatment in fulfilment of some conscious purpose of his own. Secondly there are the obvious obstacles to adult empathy with children which arise through the great differences in the ego-object systems of the two generations. On the one hand is the adult ego which functions with consistency within the pattern of its neurotic and normal limitations. On the other is the growing ego of the child, maintained by a constantly shifting system, progressing and regressing in the processes of transition and continuously in a state of transformation. (Bornstein, 1945). The technique which is needed varies not so much with the age of the child as with the degree of development of its object-system. Melanie Klein believes that the small child is still under the immediate and powerful influence of his instinctive fantasies, so that in the very first hours of analysis interpretations of its play in terms of coitus and sadistic fantasies are possible. In the latency period, on the other hand, the child has de-sexualised these experiences and fantasies, and in consonance with the intensity of repression which characterises this period, its games are more adapted to reality. Representations of primitive relationship-systems tend to take on rationalised forms. At puberty, however, the fuller development of the ego and its more grown-up interests demand a technique approximating to that of adult analysis, relying
chiefly on verbal associations.

The theoretical standpoint of the analyst must affect his approach to the therapeutic situation as Fairbairn illustrates by the modifications which he has felt necessary to introduce into his technique in accordance with the logical implications of his Object-Relations theory. (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 5). Fairbairn's view is that since it is on the basis of the relationships existing between the individual and his parents in childhood that his personality develops and assumes its particular form, it is reasonable to infer that a personal relationship is the medium through which changes in his personality may be effected. Winnicott believes that in the treatment of psychotic patients the concept of the transference must be extended to cover the analysis of these phases in which the ego of the patient cannot be assumed as an established entity and there can be no transference neurosis, for which an intact ego is a pre-requisite (Winnicott, 1955-6). This applies also in the case of children, whose ego is in process of formation. Glover, in accordance with the Freudian view of the mental constitution, sees the aims of analytical treatment in terms of the modification of ego-defences and the mitigation of the severity of the super-ego. (Glover, 1953). This, however, implies a certain measure of integration. Such assumptions are even more extremely stated by Szasz and Hollender (1956), who hold the
view that psycho-analysis is not so much a form of treatment as a form of scientific education; Szasz making the further requirement in a later paper (1957) that "the analysand should possess a relatively mature, strong and unmodified ego."
The patients whom Freud treated were in this category, whole persons whose difficulties were largely in the field of inter-personal relations. It is possible to consider their treatment in terms of the "scientific education" which Szasz mentions, and they are also within the range of the personal relationship through which Fairbairn holds that changes may be effected. Patients in whom the integrity of the personality is only precariously maintained - and these include all children in the early stages of development - might lie within range of the definition of treatment which Fairbairn and Glover mention, but they are without doubt outside the limits of "scientific education" which Szasz proposes. Those patients, however, whose problems relate to the very early stages of emotional development before the establishment of personality, among whom are the psychotic, the borderline psychotic and the very young transitional defective, form a different group and in their treatment, Winnicott believes that the accent is for long periods on management while ordinary analytic work has to be in abeyance. (Winnicott, 1955, p. 279).

In numerous publications children have been described
who have been diagnosed as psychotic or schizophrenic. It is Geleerd's experience (1945) that when such children are treated by giving them an opportunity to establish a completely dependent relationship with one adult who will treat them with as much indulgence as possible, they respond favourably. Federn (1943) also stresses the inability of the psychotic patient to sustain his hold on reality in the absence of the psychotherapist. In the case of adults the development of the ability to extend better reality-testing to situations outside the therapeutic hour is found in only a few cases. With psychotic children the picture also does not often change fundamentally, the psychotic patterns remaining the same outside the dependent therapeutic relationship. This recalls the situation in early development in which the environment must provide not only an active adaptation to the present needs of the child, but also the conditions in which personal growth may take place. (Winnicott, 1955, p. 291). The children in Geleerd's paper may be understood as having failed to outgrow the state of infantile dependence. The reinstatement of a condition of adaptation to dependency needs through an organised clinical regression produced an improvement, in that so long as these children felt satisfied, they were bright, alert and interested. When the relationship was interfered with, they reacted with an outbreak of rage in which they were completely
out of touch with reality. Their illness was marked by an inability to give up the fantasy of omnipotence with a resultant failure in reality-testing. This suggests that Winnicott's view of psychosis as an environmental deficiency disease may be correct. A transitional defect results in a situation in which it is impossible for further transition to take place, while a tangential development with resulting object-system growth upon this basis involves the possibility of a return to the original situation in which the developmental failure occurred in an organised regression. Re-growth can then take place on the basis of a better integration of the ego, resulting in a more concentric development of the object-system. Perhaps the difficulty in the treatment of the psychotic lies in the inability of the therapist actively to present good mothering, (Winnicott, 1955, p. 282), to re-create the condition of primary maternal pre-occupation in which the transitional failure is likely to have arisen.

One conclusion which follows from acceptance of the principles of the theory of transition is that the majority of clinical work is in terms of transactional patterns. Where the transition to the early object-system has been achieved with any measure of success, no matter how deviant the object-systems which have developed, it may lie within the power of the therapist to provide a situation in which it
is safe for the patient to regress to the state of dependence and to build, with the help of the relationship with the therapist, an open object-system which is able to expand, in place of a closed system which is self-perpetuating and static. Fairbairn holds that the greatest of all sources of resistance in therapy lies in the tendency of closed systems to maintain at all costs the prevailing situation between the ego structures and their internal objects (1958). Such closed systems have their own transactional patterns which may be modified in many cases to a limited degree without making any real impact upon the closed system itself. This accounts for the superficial changes in behaviour which may result from techniques of management or manipulation of the environment and the apparently dramatic results of limited therapy in selected cases. It also indicates the ease with which changes in children's external behaviour may be effected by modification of transactional patterns. The substitution of a new symptom for a more socially unacceptable one, or the development of a different neurosis are often the results of work with children which is not directed towards the improvement of the child's situation, but the improvement of his external behaviour. Therapy must always be directed if it is to be in any degree successful, towards some measure of integration of the tangential systems and not to the superficial alteration of the transactional patterns.
An adult usually comes to treatment because there are aspects of his situation which are causing him dissatisfaction, rarely because other people are complaining of his behaviour. On the other hand, it is the child's external behaviour which is nearly always the reason behind the parents' decision to bring him for treatment. The result is that children are more often brought because of transactional patterns which cause problems for the adults in their environment than because of patterns which are indicative of the child's distress. This may arise from views of development which consider personality as something which is achieved along with adult status, rather than as a wholly transitional concept undergoing a succession of changes concurrent with the changes in the child's ego-object system. There are many more fully-adjusted children than adults, if their adjustment is measured against the standards of the reality-system within which they are at a given time functioning. It might be considered one of the major tasks of education to disseminate a better way of thinking about childhood and adolescence so that the process of development is seen as a continuous one and the child always considered as a person within a situation with a particular pattern of relationships of his own. While an improvement has undoubtedly taken place since the nineteenth century, it is with particular reference to the young adolescent that the
present systems within society and education seem to fail. Adolescents, as has been discussed in previous chapters, are under a number of pressures from a variety of directions to develop transactional patterns of a certain kind and sometimes these cannot be supported by the object-systems which some children have developed since infancy. Therapeutic work with adolescents is very often mainly concerned with the necessity of evolving adequate transactional patterns on the basis of the ego-object system which actually does exist, and helping the patient to abandon unrealistic goals.

The therapeutic technique adopted is dependent not only upon the theoretical background of the analyst, but also upon the particular needs of the patient. Psychotherapy is not so much a course of specific treatment as the provision of a suitable medium within which the processes of transition may be facilitated. It therefore follows that the medium must be adapted to the stage of transition at which the patient finds himself at the time when treatment is first sought. In the case of children, who are already in the most active phase of transition, the therapist has the task of helping the child by his power and his reliability and all the other qualities which the transference situation demands to return to the situation of original developmental failure in order to make a better attempt at a concentric system. The changes which take place will be reflected in the
relationship which the child has with the analyst, and also in the relationships he has with others outside the therapeutic hour. It follows from this not only that the transference is a variable phenomenon, itself liable to the transitional processes which it is the purpose of therapy to facilitate, but that the therapist requires actively to support the child through the period of change. The new transactional patterns which he develops must be appropriate not only to his present situation but also capable of adaptation as his object-system expands through the freeing of the drive towards relationships from the confines of inhibitory closed systems.
APPENDIX I.

Illustrative Case Notes.

In this section some notes of cases are given which briefly illustrate certain points dealt with in the text. The cases recorded were encountered in the course of routine clinical work at the Mental Health Clinic at the Union Hospital, Moose Jaw, in the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, and in the Davidson Clinic, 58 Dalkeith Road, Edinburgh. In all cases the author was the psychotherapist, and he is indebted to the Psychiatric Services Branch, Provincial Department of Public Health, Saskatchewan, for permission to use the Canadian material, to Dr M. W. Rushforth, Medical Director, and to Dr Jean Biggar, in charge of the Children's Department, the Davidson Clinic, for similar permission with respect to the Scottish cases. The author has had considerable personal guidance and help from Dr W. R. D. Fairbairn, whose Object-Relations theory forms the basis of the views which have been developed here: this is very gratefully acknowledged. Many discussions of case material with Dr Biggar and the psychotherapists at the Davidson Clinic have proved a valuable and stimulating experience, their extensive knowledge of work with children making these discussions fruitful and of immense interest. A particular debt of thanks is also owing to Dr Jessie Sym, of Edinburgh, whose
illuminating and special insight into the child's world, informed by long clinical experience, has over a long period been for the author the chief source of those constructive speculations which have led to advances in his own thought.

The cases included and the notes accompanying them are very short, and are intended to provide an indication only of how the theoretical system which has been outlined may help in the understanding and treatment of different kinds of cases. The names of the children are fictitious, other details are as they appear in the files.

**Transitional Defect.**

**Alison, (Canada), a psychotic child.**

*Age, 9 years when first seen. Born, 23rd October 1948.*

This child was certified as a mentally defective person on June 16th, 1956. She was reported to be unable to go to school or to respond to social training. Her speech was reported as being limited both in vocabulary and coherence and she was unable to make any approach to other children except an aggressive one. Psychological testing at this time gave her an I.Q. of 67. At the Training School for Mental Defectives she was a behaviour problem, aggressive, overactive and mischievous, tearing her clothes and smashing successive pairs of spectacles. Her teacher, however, established a good rapport with her and felt that her
intelligence was normal. She was referred to the Clinic for psychiatric examination on April 7th, 1958.

**Brief Social History.**

She is the only child in the family. The mother was 33 years old at time of delivery and stated that pregnancy was normal. Labour, however, was prolonged and was completed by the use of instruments. The baby was normal but had marks of the instrument on one eye. Physical results of this were inconspicuous, but the mother noticed from the beginning that the child did not show any affection and she maintains that right from the start "she pushed the mother's breast away with her little hands." She learned to walk at the age of one year and started baby talk at about two years. She was toilet trained at $2\frac{1}{2}$ years. The mother left her much alone when she was a small child in her crib and later in her play pen and the child used to roll her head a great deal. When she was $2\frac{1}{2}$ years old, she had a chronic infection of the tonsils and later on pneumonia, spending eleven days in hospital. The mother said that she was able to feed herself and to dress and undress. As she grew older, she became a severe behaviour problem. She refused to pay attention to her parents and never showed any affection. She could not play with other children, pushing and biting them, and on occasions threw them down stairs. At six years of age she began school but her behaviour was too aggressive and
uncontrolled and she had to be withdrawn.

**Brief Family History.**

The father, aged 39 years, worked in a semi-skilled job and had both legs amputated in the war. He is a heavy drinker and has difficulties with his artificial legs when he is drunk. The mother, aged 40 years at the time of interview, felt completely rejected by the child and had never been able to establish normal mother-child relations. She had twice attempted suicide by running the car in the closed garage, taking the child with her and lying on the floor. On each occasion neighbours had intervened before either lost consciousness. The age of the child at these attempts was not established.

**Psychiatric Interview.**

Alison was over-active, restless and unable to concentrate. She could not sit still and it was difficult to get her attention for long enough to get her to reply to a question. She was, however, able to answer simple questions and in the playroom seemed to be able to name objects and to be aware of their uses. She was inclined to throw things around and, on a few occasions, became quite aggressive. The psychiatrist formed the impression that she was of average intelligence but suffering from a psychotic illness, probably schizophrenic in character.
Notes.

This child was seen for a period of fourteen weekly sessions, during which she was able to form a relationship on the basis of complete dependence on the therapist similar to that described by Geleerd (1945) in psychotic children. The traumatic experiences which punctuated her entire early history resulted in her passage from the embryonic system into a rudimentary object-system in which all the objects were threatening and persecuting, so that the transactional patterns she evolved were aggressive and destructive. She could have no relationship with an object, since all objects were attacking her. The result of this was a fragmented ego, a series of dissociated and undeveloped ego-object contacts which hardly qualify for the description of ego-object systems. In the Training School for Defectives, however, some development had taken place through the relationship with her understanding teacher, but as a result the transactional patterns she was developing were on the basis of mental defect, and such elementary relationships which emerged were on the model of the relationships she saw around her. Where she became organised at all, it was the organisation of a mentally defective person. Periodically, however, she was overcome by her fear of the object-world, and the anti-relational nature of her aggression was frequently symbolised by smashing her spectacles, without
which the perceptive relationship with the terrifying world was impossible.

Winnicott notes; "the coincidence of love and hate is something that characteristically occurs in the analysis of psychotics, giving rise to problems of management which can easily take the analyst beyond his resources." (1955, p. 196).

In Alison's case, in the first few minutes of the first session she said, "I love you," and only a few minutes later, "I hate you". The course of therapy was marked by the alternation of murderous attacks with child-like dependence, of attempts at seduction with destruction of the therapist's toys and the playroom furniture.

Although therapy had the effect of releasing the child from some of her more pressing fears, and the destructiveness ceased, it was felt that the problems presented by her continued residence in an Institution were too great to be dealt with in therapy sessions on an out-patient basis and arrangements were made to have her admitted to a residential centre for psychotic children where, after a year, she was doing very well.
Tangential Development.

Gordon, (Canada).

Aged 8 years, 11 months.

Consultation Note.

The mother feels that Gordon is a tense, anxious child who becomes over-excited and distractible. He makes poor progress at school due to his distractibility and nervousness. He is afraid of other children, especially children older than himself but extremely good and kind to very young children. When he is in company he is reserved, nervous and tense and has a habit when he feels like this of covering his genitals with his hands. The mother finds this habit very embarrassing and is somewhat disgusted by it. She also reports that he has "a terrible fascination" for telephone posts, chickens and ducks. When out walking or out for a drive he keeps staring at the telephone poles, goes over and pats them and has a name for each one in the vicinity. These names are usually girls' names or names which he makes up and which his mother has never heard before. When he is out walking with her he will leave her and go into someone's yard to look at the chickens. He usually throws something at them when he sees them and his mother feels that he likes to see them fly away. For days afterwards he will make chuckling noises like a chicken. She has invited boys of his own age to the house to play with him but Gordon orders them out after a
little while and prefers to play alone with his trains. When playing alone he talks to himself, often laughs and sometimes even cries. His conversation when he is alone is not always rational and she feels that he is living in a world of his own and is unhappy with other people. She states that these symptoms were present since he was two years old but that she thought he would grow out of them but instead of that he seems to be getting worse.

Previous History.

The patient was born in Canada, and birth was normal in every way. The mother's health was reported to be poor during pregnancy. She complained of being nervous and high-strung and the doctor had given her special tablets for her 'nerves'. He was not breast fed as the mother felt "she couldn't be bothered". Until four years of age he refused solid food. He commenced to walk at the age of one but talking did not commence until he was four. About one year old he was toilet trained. As a baby he was both a feeding and sleeping problem. When she attempted to give him solid food he would gag and vomit. He was restless at night and cried for hours on end. The mother says that she was up every night with him and she feels that this contributed to her nervous breakdown. He commenced school at the age of five; did fairly well in grade 1, but repeated grade 2. The mother thinks the teacher felt she might have
allowed him to go on to grade 3, but that it was better for him to repeat grade 2 now rather than to have to repeat a grade later on in his school life. This year he passed into grade 3.

**Previous Medical History.**

When he was one year old he had measles and chicken-pox. At the age of five he was treated for nervousness, while at the age of seven he was hospitalised for bronchitis and inflammation of the bladder. As far as his mother knows, he has suffered no injuries.

**Family History.**

The father works as an accountant and was hospitalised a short time ago for a psychosis due to thyrotoxicosis. He had a thyroidectomy a short time ago and has made a very good recovery both mentally and physically. He has now returned to work. The mother states that she has always been nervous and highly-strung. Her first attack of 'nerves' occurred during her pregnancy with Gordon. She has been treated on and off for a nervous condition but has never been hospitalised as a psychiatric patient. She gave the impression during interview of being a withdrawn, self-absorbed person who showed very little affect. She described the child's symptoms in a detached way and at times laughed inappropriately. There is one other child in the family, a girl of eleven years of age, who is attending school and in good health. The
patient's maternal grand-uncle was hospitalised as a mental patient for 15 years. He died in hospital about two years ago.

Interview with Patient.

Gordon is a blonde, good-looking boy who during interview was very inhibited and reserved. He spoke in a quiet voice and answered questions intelligently though he was very timid and tentative and gave the impression of being under fairly severe tension. Psychological testing and assessment were carried out. He scored an I.Q. on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children of 65. The psychologist felt that this was not an accurate estimate of his intelligence and that other factors should be taken into consideration. There is some scatter in the test scores which may mean that the chances of emotional interference with intellectual function are high. He was observed in the play room for a length of time and it was noticed that he became more open and uninhibited and less reserved in his relationship with the psychologist.

Impressions and Recommendations.

It was felt that Gordon is a withdrawn, inhibited child who has difficulty in making friends and withdraws into a life of fantasy. It is impossible at this stage to decide whether his withdrawal is at a pathological degree or not. It was decided that he should be interviewed a number of
times at the Clinic and observed in the play room with a view to making a better assessment of his condition. It is also felt that the mother unconsciously rejects the child and that her personality is of a schizoid type so that she is unable to give Gordon the warmth, affection and understanding that he needs. When he has attended once or twice it may be necessary to arrange regular appointments for therapy.

Notes.

This boy was seen on the basis of once-a-week sessions for 36 weeks. He made an immediate and good relationship with the therapist but after four sessions he was admitted to the Union Hospital for appendectomy. This meant he was hospitalised in the same building in which he had his therapy sessions. It appeared after some eight sessions that he was under pressure of strong castration anxiety and a split in the ego-system was present based upon his masculine-feminine identification. His father, who had a great deal to do with mentally defective persons in his work, had a great fear that Gordon was "defective", that is, mentally retarded, but the boy had sensed his father's anxiety and this had reinforced his fear that he was in fact "damaged" and unable to fill a boy's role. The appendectomy was a further castration, though he emerged from this with very positive feelings towards the therapist on the basis of his feminine position. When some release of the castration
anxiety was obtained through therapy, his obsessional interests were seen to be related to sexual curiosity. It was cocks and hens and the differences between them in which he was interested, the various methods of coupling railway wagons, and the phallic significance of telegraph poles, snakes and horned animals which interested him. Soon after his curiosity was partly satisfied, he began to allow himself to be aggressive and started coming to the Clinic by himself dressed in his play clothes instead of being brought by his mother dressed in his best suit. The initiation in the playroom of the development of his masculine ego-object system was continued in his outside activities and the corresponding improvement of his parents' attitude towards him facilitated progress. Towards the end of treatment, he himself asked for enlightenment about some of his sexual fantasies, by which time he was 9 years, 9 months old. The relief of anxiety which resulted produced an improvement in his school work, he was successful in his grade examinations and intelligence tests at the end of treatment showed an increment of fifteen points and much less scatter.

This case, unlike that of Alison, showed a definite structure of the ego-object system, but the split between the masculine and feminine components of the personality which was so closely connected with his castration anxiety brought inhibition of aggression, over-employment of fantasy, "magic"
thinking and the crushing of libidinal relationships with objects. When it became less dangerous to be a boy and the fear of castration by his mother as a punishment for his masturbatory activities was lifted a little, development continued on the basis of a more concentric pattern through some measure of reconciliation of the tangential ego-object systems.

**Tangential Development on the Basis of a Shared Ego-Object System.**

*Helena, (Scotland).*

*Age when First Seen: 7 Years, 10 Months.*

The family consists of two older sisters, 17 and 13 respectively, then the twins, of whom Helena is one. She was referred to the Clinic for stealing money from her mother persistently for over a year. Her mother felt that: "There's no rhyme nor reason behind it", and that it was different from the sort of stealing the other children had done, but grew out of. Her mother dates this behaviour from the time when her twin sister, who is very clever at school, passed the examination for entry to a good school and was separated from Helena. They are not identical twins and the other has always been physically and mentally "ahead".

**Developmental History.**

Birth was normal, the other twin was a breech presentation.
The twins were not premature and weighed equally, about $6\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. They were breast fed, but Helena had to have supplementary feeds, as "the other took all the cream". Both walked around fifteen months, they twin-talked for six-months. The mother waited about one year before attempting toilet training, then she said "It was all over in a couple of months. They were quick, easy babies." There is no history of bedwetting.

Helena has had measles and chickenpox, but no serious illness or accident. She has had no operations and there is no history of convulsions. She has not been separated from her mother at any time for any period.

The impression gained at the interview was that the mother was very anxious and identifying with the child to a very great extent. She said that she feared that there was something physically wrong with the child "Something glandular". She also said that Helena shows "no overt resentment" of her twin, but "she is bound to feel inferior".

**Psychological Testing.**

The psychologist's report records an I.Q. of 94 on the Stanford-Binet Form L. During testing she was not noticeably nervous, but she gave up tasks easily. Her most frequent error in reading was omitting the final "s" in words, and she did not know how to spell her own name.
Psychiatric Interview.

She was not shy at the interview, drew a house with crayons, said it was nice to have a twin, but didn't mind her going to another school. She would like to get married when she grew up, and have two babies: "twin girls, or maybe one a boy". She doesn't dream and isn't scared of anything. "My sister is scared after a play, and wants me to get into her bed".

Notes.

After a very few sessions, it was clear that the mother was being very good with the twins, but that her over-meticulous emphasis upon treating them exactly equally had brought about a situation in which Helena was developing transactional patterns on the basis of her being half a twin rather than a whole person, which was shown from the very first by her difficulties about plurals in the psychological examination, and her inability to spell her own name. As a result she could not directly express jealousy of her sister. On the other hand, the repressed tangential system which was quite strong and which quickly became stronger in therapy caused her to react so much against her dependence on her sister that it sought an extreme demonstration of her difference by adopting a masculine position. This was shown by the remark she made about the kind of family she wanted in the psychiatric interview. It also emerged after a very few
sessions that while Helena was very dependent upon her sister, in moments of crisis it was Helena who played the masculine role, taking a calm command of the situation. When her sister was scared, she was expected to climb into bed and comfort her, and when the elder sister put her hand through a glass door and was bleeding very badly, it was Helena who took control, fetching her mother, calming those who were weeping and generally playing the father’s part. In therapy, when her own feminine ego-system began to develop, there was the further complication that Oedipal conflicts in the transference made her guilty about aspects of her relationship with the therapist. As a result for a long period she alternated between being very seductive on the one hand and trying to involve him in boyish games like cricket on the other, which had the effect of keeping him at a safe distance.

The stealing stopped after she had been in treatment a couple of months, but it was not until she had been in treatment for over twenty sessions that she began to feel that she could have a loving relationship as a little girl with the therapist without too much anxiety. Development then became based upon a firm feminine identification and she was able to be aggressive to her sister. Treatment still continues at the time of writing, but her improvement in fifty sessions has been very marked.

In this case, transition to the object-system had been
successful, but transactional patterns were developing along the lines of a perfectly-shared ego-system, belonging to both twins. Helena felt deprived because although the parents took care to emphasise that everything was carefully and exactly shared out, the other twin had developed her own object-system far more successfully than Helena, and the parents also made it quite clear by their anxiety that Helena was "lacking" in the brains which her sister had. As a result the stealing became a way of evening things up, Helena taking from her mother in order to remedy her own deficiency. When she stole from her Daddy, as she did twice just before she began treatment, she was trying to get something from him which would make it possible for her to become a boy and thus have a real ego all to herself.

Tangential Development on the Basis of Over-Activity of Intellectual Function.

Hugh, (Scotland).

Age when First Seen: 12 Years, 6 Months.

This boy is the youngest of a family of four, which comprises three girls of 22, 19 and 16 besides himself. He was referred for stuttering, which manifested itself as quite a severe block, mostly occurring in class when he was asked a question by the master. He knew the answer but
could not say it.

Developmental History.

Labour was normal and he was breast fed for six months. He vomited after each feed due to pyloric stenosis, but he gained weight all right. He had no feeding difficulties beyond a generally poor appetite. He was habit trained from the beginning without fuss, and was dry by day at 14 months, though he relapsed at 18 months while on holiday. He was dry by night at 2 ½ years. He was circumcised at birth and his questions about sex have been answered freely by both parents as they arose. He had no trouble with his bowels and seemed a normal toddler.

At age 4 ½ he was on holiday at a children's home without the parents and he contracted tuberculosis of the lungs. He was kept in bed at home for six months. After the illness he had no interest in other children for a time and he took a long time to run again after his illness. Weakness in the legs persisted even after he went to school. At 5 ½ he went abroad with his parents and went to school at 5 years 8 months. Since that time he has been a very conscientious scholar and has always been top of his class.

Psychiatric Interview.

Hugh is small for his age, looks about ten years old, bespectacled and unsure of himself. Does not remember his illness or being abroad, nor being weak in the legs when he
first went to school, but he does remember feeling he had no friends in his first school. He does not know what he wants to be and he does not like any of his lessons at school. He is very inhibited and is holding back all his aggression. It seems likely that his severe illness was felt by him as an injury leaving him permanently damaged. He avoided all spontaneous competition with boys, rough games and so on, and denied his feelings of inferiority by saying he did not share their tastes: he had other tastes. He is conscientious and thorough and his mother indicates he is always inclined to be negative about anything new. 

Psychological Test.

He is reported to have an I.Q. of 154 on the Wechsler Verbal Scale.

Notes.

This very intelligent boy from a highly intellectual family is suffering from anxiety and depression due to conflicts arising from the repression of feelings and the attempt to deal with emotions on a purely intellectual basis, which is the family as well as his individual pattern. The presenting symptom of stuttering, which had never been severe, cleared up after eight sessions, and the underlying anxiety is obtaining some relief from therapy. The use of intellectual defences was demonstrated in the first few sessions by his involving the therapist in long verbal
arguments in which he tried to prove the therapist wrong or inconsistent, thus rendering him "impotent". This intense resistance was felt to arise from his fear of seduction and the ambivalence which attaches to his passive feminine position. He has identified very strongly with his eldest sister, and the increased stresses which have resulted from her marriage coinciding with his own puberty have made his defensive system show signs of breakdown.

The theoretical problem, which could be solved perhaps only through extended analysis, is whether the intellectual 'false self' arose from the early breast-feeding difficulties or whether it is the result of transactional patterns established in later infancy and childhood to deal with the anxieties and traumatic situations which form part of the history at that time. From the standpoint of therapy, the important thing is that there are tremendous anti-libidinal forces at work and almost all feelings, positive and negative, are repressed. All relationships are on an intellectual basis. What suggests some measure of original concentric development is his love of animals and the happy relationship he formed with a young baby while on holiday. Treatment continues, but as this boy has never played since infancy, it is difficult to avoid allowing therapeutic sessions to become structured according to his own defensive closed system, and to consist in detached intellectual
discussion of his situation. He has formed a good relationship with the therapist after successful passage through the initial period of intellectual "testing". It is hoped that in the analysis of the transference the way to a breach of the closed system may ultimately be found, but the degree of relief achieved through some measure of abreaction is meanwhile improving his personal relationships and taking some of the pressure off him.
APPENDIX II.

Bibliography.

(Abbreviations throughout are in accordance with the World List of Scientific Periodicals, 1950.)

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