"STUDIES IN THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF
BERNARDINO OCHINO"

A contribution to the study of the later development
of Medieval Dogma.

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Thesis for the Degree of D. Litt.

by

G.K. BROWN,
M.A. (Cantab.), Ph.D. (Edin),
F.R.Hist.S.

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June, 1934.
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Chapter I.

Italian Trinitarian Heresy before the XV century.

In the course of "The Meeting of the Commission of the Anglican Communion and the Old Catholic Churches held at Bonn" on July 2nd, 1931, Mgr. Berends, Bishop of Deventer, is reported to have said, in reply to a question of Dr. Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester, that the Old Catholics considered the Fourth Lateran Council as a local Council 'whose decrees were not binding'. There will be by no means cordial agreement among historians on this matter, and less among the theologians, but our primary interest here is in the emphasis placed on 'local' as against ecumenical. It suggests at the least that the greatest of the Popes was, in the greatest medieval Council, largely if not chiefly concerned with setting his own house, the Italian, in order. And the importance of a certain factor, heresy, as revealed in the order of procedure of the Council, is sufficiently great to merit our closest attention.

In April, 1213, Innocent III issued his famous circular which called upon ecclesiastics and lay dignitaries to appear at Rome, where, on All Saints' Day, 1215, a Council was to begin.

I. The "Report" was published by the S.P.C.K. in 1931. p. 23.
A discussion of this Council at any length would be largely irrelevant: reference, however, to its confession of faith, with which the Council opened, is of considerable importance. For, not only is it a crystallization of orthodox faith in the West, far more lengthy than the Nicene, or indeed, any early Creed but also, it is a thunderbolt hurled at medieval Italian heretics in particular. The statement is as follows:

"We firmly believe and confess, that there is one and only true God, eternal, without measure and unchangeable, incomprehensible, omnipotent and ineffable, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: three persons indeed, but one simple essence, substance or nature altogether; the Father of none, the Son of the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit of both alike, without beginning, always and without end; the Father begetting, the Son being born, and the Holy Spirit proceeding, consubstantial and co-equal, and co-omnipotent and co-eternal; one principal of all things; the creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporal; who by his omnipotent virtue at once from the beginning of time established out of nothing both forms of creation, spiritual and corporal, that is the angelic and the mundane, and afterwards


"We believe - in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, only begotten, that is of the substance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made, both those in heaven and those on earth. Who for us men and for our salvation came down and was made flesh, and lived as man among men, Suffered, and rose the third day. Ascended into heaven. Is coming to judge the quick and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost."

On the relativity of Credal symbols v.d. Aquinas' "Summa Theol." II, i, Q. xxxvi, Art. ii; "In every Council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the Council at that time."


The above translation is from the C. Med. R. Vol. VI, pp. 634-635.
the human creature, composed as it were of spirit and body in common. For the devil and other demons were created by God; but they became evil by their own doing. But man sinned by the suggestion of the devil.

This Holy Trinity, undivided as regards common essence, and distinct as in respect of proper qualities and person, at first, according to the perfectly ordered plan of the ages, gave the teaching of salvation to the human race by means of Moses and the holy prophets and others His servants.

And at length the only begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, incarnate of the whole Trinity in common, being conceived of Mary ever Virgin by the cooperation of the Holy Spirit, made very man, compounded of a reasonable soul and human flesh, one person in two natures, showed the way of life in all its clearness. He, while as regards His divinity is immortal and incapable of suffering, nevertheless, as regards His humanity, was made capable of suffering and mortal. He also, having suffered for the salvation of the human race upon the wood of the cross and died, descended to hell, rose again from the dead, and ascended into heaven; but descended in spirit and rose again in flesh, and ascended to come in both alike at the end of the world, to judge the quick and the dead, and to render to every man according to his works, both to the reprobate and to the elect, who all shall rise again with their own bodies which they now wear, that they may receive according to their works, whether they be good or bad, these perpetual punishment with the devil, and those everlasting glory with Christ.

There is moreover one universal Church of the faithful, outside which no man at all is saved, in which the same Jesus Christ is both the priest and the sacrifice, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine, the bread being transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood by the divine power; in order that, to accomplish the mystery of unity, we ourselves may receive of His that which He received of ours. And this thing, the sacrament to wit, no man can make but a priest, who has been duly ordained, according to the keys of the Church, which Jesus Christ Himself granted to the apostles and their successors.

But the sacrament of baptism, which is consecrated in water at the invocation of God and of the undivided Trinity, that is of the Father, and of the Son and Holy Spirit, being duly conferred in the form of the Church by any person, whether upon children or adults, is profitable to salvation. And if any one, after receiving baptism, has fallen into sin, he can always be restored by true penitence.
"Not only virgins and the continent, but also married persons, deserve, by right faith and good works pleasing God, to come to eternal blessedness."

Let us examine briefly the Cathari doctrines so widespread in medieval Italy.

The proximity of Italy to the Dalmatian coast and the Slav lands is a factor of considerable importance: those who have made a special study of relations between Venice and the near East will readily recognise that. But we must also remember that the Roman Church's hold east of Italy was light in the Middle Ages, and especially so in Dalmatia.

There has been considerable discussion about the origin of the Cathari. Schmidt would place it in these Slav

I. Dr. F. C. Conybeare said, in his edition and translation of "The Key of Truth", a manual of the Paulician Church of Armenia (Oxford, 1898, pp. cl-clii): — "It is... a promising field of research to inquire whether the Paulicians were not partially responsible for many sects which at the Reformation make their appearance and exhibit, some more, some less, an affinity to Paulician tenets as set out in the Key. This is not the place to set out on such an inquiry, which would require a separate work. Perhaps the data no longer exist which would enable one to trace the channels of communication. To do so would in any case require a vast amount of research; but it would seem probable that in at least two of the sects of the age of the Reformation we have a survival of the same ancient form of the Catholic Church which the pages of the Key reveal to us. These two sects are the Anabaptists and the Unitarians, afterwards called Socinians from their great teacher Socinus. The arguments of the sixteenth-century Baptists against Paedo-baptism are the same as we have in the Key, and what we might expect - an Adoptianist view of Christ as a rule went with them in the past; .......

From the first ages Adoptianist tenets have as naturally and indissolubly associated with adult baptism as has infant baptism with the pneumatic Christology, according to which Jesus was from his mother's womb and in his cradle filled with the Holy Spirit, a pre-existent Divine being, creator, and controller of the universe."

A pertinent question would be, what part did the Italian Cathari play as one of the "channels of communication"?
lands, and repudiates the suggestion of old Catholic writers (whose trustworthiness would have been greater had they sought to depict objectively, instead of to malign, the victims of religious persecution) who would see in them simply a revived heresy - the Manishee - in the early Church. Conybeare also holds that the Cathari were not mere Manichees, and bases his argument partly on the difference of attitude towards the Old Testament. The Manichees of early times rejected the Old Testament in its entirety, whereas the medieval Lyons MS quoted Solomon with approval. Lea decided against the origination of the sect amongst the Bulgars, that is, in the near East, and takes into consideration certain customs in dress common to the early and medieval heretics. Zöckler implies in the title of his article in the "Realencyklopädie" on the Cathari that here we are concerned primarily with a revived heresy: the article is called "Neumannischaer", and the German scholar develops therein his reasons for connecting the later sect with a Bulgar community. The contemporary evidence, however, small as it is and considerably biased, may never be increased in quantity, hence a final pronouncement may for ever be out of the question. Two things, however, may be asserted. First, that Cathari specula-

5. Zöckler also contributes the article "Socin" in the RE.
lation was as anti-Trinitarian as any speculation could be: and secondly, the Catholic Church found itself confronted with an enormous problem when it undertook to uproot a heresy which fell on exceptionally favourable ground in Italy.

The Cathari theology cannot be called Christian, simply because it concerned itself with two irreconcilable principles, as had the older Manichean speculation. In the mitigated dualism, to which Schmidt gave the designation Bulgar, the evil principle was an inferior god who, by the exercise of his own free will decided to leave the good and right. A primeval goodness, however, the rigorists - Albanians, as Schmidt called them - do not seem to have allowed to this evil principle. There is, however, an approximation of views on the visible creation. The creator is evil, and, revealed as he is in the pages of the Old Testament, he is also variable, wrathful, cruel, and inconsistent. The world was, logically enough, conceived of as evil, and man as the handiwork of this same creator could be no other than evil also: we might say, human life was believed to be an opportunity for wicked experiences. Needless to say, this pessimistic outlook, consequent in the long run upon a reductio ad absurdum of the antithesis in the Johannine and certain Pauline writings, coloured the most important human relationships, and, more important for our purpose, Christology.

Over against this evil principle there was an all-good

God - or rather, Absolute, as he was utterly transcendent - who, far above an evil creation, was revealed in the New Testament. The superiority of this good God was a conception responsible for an optimistic view - strangely contrasting with much pessimism in the medieval Church - which advocated the ultimate salvation of all men, for in the end the stronger God's victory would bring with it the victory of good. Unfortunately, this particular merit is largely counterbalanced on other points. The emphasis on the New Testament and certain Aprocryphal writings, and the renunciation of the greatest part of the Old Testament, was responsible for the rejection of much of that record of supremely valuable experience of pre-Christian ages which the Church had long treasured, and did not contribute to a better appreciation of the New Testament. The absolute transcendence of the good God is fatal to the Christian religion in the end, for the Divine in any age must be something not wholly other than ourselves. There must be immanence as well as transcendence: there must be incarnation in the Christian faith. But the good God immanent in this world there could not be for the Cathari with their dualistic belief, and for this same reason their Christ could only be a figure unrecognisable.

1. Berthold of Regensburg (Predigten, I862, II, I70) talked of the ten rebellious tribes of Israel and the two faithful. Anything like Origen's universalism in the medieval Church was heresy. Vd. Aquinas 'Summa', I, i, Q. xxxiii, Art. vii.

by the Catholic Church.

The force of the considerable amplification at the Lateran Council of the early Credal definition is now seen to be full of significance. There is "one only true God, eternal, without measure and unchangeable, the creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporal", and the utter dethronement of the evil principle is completed, first, by the assertion that the Holy Trinity "gave the teaching to the human race by means of Moses and the holy prophets and others his servants", and second, by the conception of Jesus Christ "incarnate of the whole Trinity in common", and His birth of Mary. Christ, the Cathari believed, had abolished the Mosaic Law. Now, what of the view of Christ - the Catholic teaching concerning whom the Cathari rejected - asserted at length in orthodox the Lateran confession? The pneumatic teaching gives us a pneumatic Christology; God incarnate, the Christ-child, born in miraculous fashion, is, throughout His earthly life, unique, but withal 'very man'. This unity of two natures in one person is irreconcilable with a belief in two mutually irreconcilable principles. True, these medieval heretics called Him the Son of God, but so did they talk of adoring Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, without ever arriving at a consubstantial Trinity. The mitigated dualists believed in a non-eternal

("The Apocryphal New Testament", pp. 187-193), says that in its Latin form this production is not later than the XII century, though the original may belong to the VI or VII century.

I. Pauline quotations - e.g. Rom.V,20, XIV,23, II Cor.III,7 - were used as proof of this contention.
Trinity, whose end would be coincident with that of evil, but here was implied the same subordination of the Son to the Father as appears to have been held by rigorists as well as by moderates. Certain texts, in addition to those in Proverbs and in Corinthians, were cited, from Paul and John: God was the sender and Christ the sent, etc.

Christ's introduction on the human plane was, however, made no less complex by the avoidance of that which, in common with orthodox theologians, the Cathari in theory loathed—normal sexual reproduction. Born of a Virgin complicated matters again: it did not get rid of the difficulty—why born at all? In one instance, we have an insistence on a difference of natures, with the necessary implication that Mary was, if not absolutely mortal, then, at least, considerably inferior to Christ. Elsewhere, we find Mary considered to have been not really Christ's mother, but the channel, her ear having received Him—the Word incarnate—and sent Him forth again by the same means. Generally she was considered a heavenly spirit—a docetic conception.

Let us turn to their view of other aspects of Christ's

5. Some, it is of interest to note believed in an "immaculate conception". Schmidt, II, p. 42. Moneta, 225, 248.
life. Adoptionism, to which at any rate, some of the Cathari approximated, suggests God's sending His Son on a certain mission. The Son is given that commission at His Baptism - which event is recorded in Mark 1:9. There is an interesting connection between the Adoptionism - subordinationist as it must be - and the equivalent of adult baptism among these medieval heretics. The Lateran Council's confession explicitly stated that baptism "is consecrated in water", but the Cathari rejected the use of water as they did Pae-
do-baptism. Water was a creation of the evil God, hence they made their principal rite the "consolamentum" a baptism with spirit and fire. This spirit was the Paraclete, which, sent to us by Christ, was received by Him in turn from the good God. If, however, the Scriptural narrative, of Mark in this instance, was used to clinch the argument to some extent for adult baptism and to secure the rejection of infant baptism, it was not followed in the record of the Passion. The fundamental dualism asserted itself strongly here. The Lateran confession insisted on the reality of Christ's suffering, and death "upon the wood of the cross". But, for the Cathari, wood, like water, was a natural creation: the good God's emissary could not thus fall into the hands of His opponent.

I. "St. Mark" (The Clarendon Bible, 1929), p. 77. "Mark...... begins at Jesus' baptism by the Baptist; and, whether Mark deserves the treatment or not, it is a fact that among... early heretics... are some who consider Mark's Christology to be Adoptionist......"

Christ's death was, therefore, only apparent, and the Passion itself was not an earthly drama at all. Naturally enough, Christ's resurrection bodily was not accepted; at death the spirit was liberated and returned not after that happy event to inhabit the "bodies which they now wear", for that would have been a return to an evil state. Nor could the death of Christ, being unreal, benefit us in the matter of good works.

Thus, possessing no philosophy of incarnation, the Cathari, having accommodated Christ in their system, viewed Him as had ancient Docetism. And, since neither His death could help us nor could our own isolated good works, we see the rejection of the Second Person of the Catholic Trinity together with the whole penitential system of the Catholic Church. Needless to say, the "one universal Church, outside which no man at all is saved" was not for the Cathari the Catholic one, ranking as it did among created things. But, like all other medieval heretics, they protested against the then modern perversion of the ancient Catholic Church, as they conceived it. And the strength of that criticism of that medieval Church is evidenced by the reaction of the other heresies abounding in Italy.

3. Cantù ("Gli Eretici d'Italia", Vol. I, p. 80 ff.), ignores the variety of heretical opinions although he gives a list of names of the varieties. He says the heretics held a number of beliefs in common: true, but certainly not all those mentioned by him. Alongside the Bulgars he places the "Circoncisi". About this latter sect we know scarcely anything. Called "Circoncisi" by Frederick II in 1224 (Mansi, "Collection", XXII, 477, calls them "Pasagii"),
As important as the Cathari, and far more durable, were the Vauclus. They were not so radical in their theological metaphysics as were the former, and since they were not anti-Trinitarian, it is not necessary for us to take particular notice of them. They were, like the Cathari, a lay movement, but the laity were not the only ones who regarded severely medieval ecclesiastical aberrations. Some forty years after the Lateran Council opened, a work known as "The Everlasting Gospel" appeared. It was composed of the works and exegetical notes of the mystic Gioacchino da Fiore, a Calabrese abbot, who died in 1302. This remarkable person became interested in speculations on the Apocalypse and received encouragement in his labours from Clement III. This speculating, coupled with a deep sense of the abuses in the Corazzo monastery where he was abbot, drove him to seek a more congenial

these heretics, Bonacursus tells us (Vd. Muratori, "Antiquitt. Itali medii aevi", V, 152) taught "that the Mosaic law is to be observed to the letter, and that the Saturday and the circumcision and other observances of the Law ought to be accorded their place. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, these three similar persons are not one God and one substance; all the doctors of the Church and the whole Roman Church everywhere they judge and condemn". Girolamo da Bergamo (about 1230), says they considered Christ "to be the first but a simple creature, and (held) that the Old Testament must be observed in its rites, in circumcision, and in its view of foods, and in almost all things, sacrifices excepted". (Quoted by Muratori, op. cit.) Vd. also, Lea's "Inquisition", Vol. I, p. 88. It will be readily noticed that in this exaltation of the Mosaic law these medieval Judaizers differed completely from the Cathari. In view of the later anti-Trinitarian insistence on the Old Testament, it is unfortunate that we know so little of this earlier sect in Italy.

1. Their heresy was not of the Paulician type, as was the Cathari, but rather, if we select early Church analogies, Donatist. Vd. C. Med. H., Vol. VI, p. 707.
environment for thought and ascetic labours in La Sia. After the split in the Franciscan ranks, his criticism of existing abuses, and the belief that they were called upon to play an important part in the coming third and last age, caused the "Spiritual" Franciscans to treasure Gioacchino's work. Gioacchino took the view that history was the record of three ages: the first is the age of Law, that of the Father; the second is that of the Crucifixion, or of the Son; and the third, that of the Holy Spirit, which would begin—according to a fantastic computation—\( mI260 \). This hearty destation and forecasted doom of the existing order of things was not, however, that which attracted the unwelcome attention of the Church. In his curious speculations on the Trinity, Gioacchino had accused Peter Lombard of holding a belief, not in a Trinity, but in a quaternity composed of the separate unity of the Godhead and, in addition, the three Persons, the first begetting, the second begotten, and the third proceeding. This attack on the Lombard was not to be countenanced, and a rider to the confession of


2. Hefele, op.cit., p.785. "We in the sacred and universal Council...believe and acknowledge with Peter (Lombard)...that incomprehensible indeed and ineffable which truly is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, at once three persons, and singularly without distinction of the same. And therefore there is only in God a Trinity and not a Quaternity, because that thing is, without distinction of the three persons, evidently the substance, essence or divine nature, which is alone the beginning of worlds, besides which another cannot be found. And that thing is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, so that there may be distinctions in the persons and unity in the nature..." Lea, Vol.ill, p.552. Aquinas, "Summa Theol." II, i, Q.xxxix, Art. v. "...the abbot Gioacchino erred in asserting that as we can say that God begat God, so we can say, Essence begat Essence..."
faith, the Lateran Council refuted at length this slur on a favourite theologian and the dogmatic precision which Scholastic temper had exalted to a virtue.

This condemnation of the anti-Lombard view of the Trinity, and the denunciation of Cathari anti-Trinitarianism is of signal importance. On the one side we see evidence of the remarkable advance of Scholasticism, and on the other that variety of anti-Trinitarianism in Italy in the Middle Ages. Scholastics, with their dogmatic precision and complicated metaphysics, were as heartily detested by medieval heretics as by Erasmus and the Reformers. They were, moreover, regarded as the prop of an evil order of things. That is not to say that the Cathari were poles apart in their speculation from orthodoxy: their close approximation in some instances was, as is noticeable in every age in history, that which made them so dangerous.

The belief in Transubstantiation which was defined at the Lateran Council was in its own way as subversive of the view that Christ was truly human as was the heretical docetism in another. The fact that some heretics also tended to believe in Mary's immaculate conception, a belief struggling to the fore in the Middle Ages in orthodox circles, cannot escape us. On Christ's death and its consequences, however, as interpreted by the more authoritative Schoolmen, heretics generally did not agree with the Church. Why? Primarily because


2. Some Cathari believed that the object of Christ's death was to deceive the Devil (Schmidt, Vol. II, p. 89.). This crude theory had been on the decline before Peter Lombard, but was reiterated by him (Sermo cxxx, 2).
such consequences as had been deduced had opened the way for the most chronic abuses in practice. Anselm, the founder of Scholastic theology, insisted as strongly as any later heretic that the sins of the world must be punished — or made "satisfaction" for, added Anselm — by an infinitive payment to an outraged God. Christ alone could have made the payment required to cancel the enormous debt of sin. How do we obtain individually the beneficent effects of Christ's great work? Aquinas, living in the XIII century, elaborated the theory of those sacraments by which the divine grace should come to us in a largely mechanical way. The supreme sacrament of the seven, the number now definitely fixed, was Penance, and the absolving priest was regarded as the "instrument" of the Divine. Of the other six sacraments the Mass had, in the definition of Transubstantiation, recently received additional emphasis. But what of the moral character of the absolving priests or celebrant? It is upon this point that heresy in all its varieties in the Middle Ages hangs: the one thing common to all alike is the

3. "Summa", III, Q. lxxxii, Art. vi, "...As to the Sacrament, the Mass of an evil priest is worth no less than that of a good priest; for in either case the same sacrament is performed. The prayer which is made in the Mass may be considered in two ways; first, in so far as it has efficacy from the devotion of the praying priest, where in there is no doubt that the Mass of the better priest is the more fruitful. Secondly, we may consider it in so far as the prayer in the Mass is uttered by the priest in the person of the whole Church, whereof he is the minister; which ministry remaineth even in sinners, as we have said above concerning the ministry of Christ; whereof, in so far as this concerned, not only is the priest's prayer fruitful in the Mass, but also his prayers in divine service, even though his private prayers be unfruitful."
criticism of ecclesiastical morals and can be summed in the one word - antisacerdotal. Here we have the 'revival' of the Donatist tenet that the sacraments are polluted in polluted hands'.

The hatred among the Cathari for any moral impurity is well known. So considerable was the fear of contamination that the chief rite of the sect, the 'Consolamentum', whose efficacy was quite destroyed if performed by one in sin, was performed repeatedly by different 'Perfecti' for the benefit of the believers in order to secure some measure of safety. This same emphasis was placed by the Vaudois on their Eucharistic celebration, with similar consequences - namely, a deviation from orthodox dogmatic teaching. Believing at the beginning in the doctrine of Transubstantiation, they attacked first the morally evil celebrant and then the doctrine itself. They did not, as we remarked, go in for a thorough criticism of Trinitarianism, but that development would seem to have been perfectly logical as we hope to show later in our study of the XVI century. Before the XIII century, Arnaldo da Brescia, the great opponent of ecclesiastical immorality, was suspected of entertaining unsound views on the Eucharist and infant baptism. This rumour may have been unsound, but in Italy at any rate ecclesiastical abuses have always been, as Bernardino da

   Vd. Müller, "Waldesier", p. 93 ff. French Vaudois did not contest the validity of the sacraments of evil celebrants.
   The Italian Vaudois did so.
Siena pointed out in the XV century, the very thing that caused many 'to fail in the faith, believing in nothing higher than their own roofs'. Hence we come to the conclusion that it was primarily the moral question with which Italian heresy in general was concerned. The Cathari system, which we discussed at some length, was not so much concerned with Trinitarian metaphysics as were the early Paulicians from whom that system seems to have been largely derived. This superstructure was, for those medieval heretics, secondary to their criticism of only too obvious evils which can be regarded as the incarnation of that evil god over against whom their own good God, in carnate in the Cathari Church, was striving.

Innocent III recognised from the first the magnitude of his task in resisting heresy. His investigations began in 1199, and his letters abound with references to heretical propaganda in Italy. To his repressive measures, even the Albigensian crusade, it is unnecessary here to devote our particular attention. In the long run the great medieval Pontiff failed to uproot heresy in Italy, although the exaggerated Cathari dualism may be said to have expired as a force to be reckoned with by the beginning of the XV century. On the other hand, however, there was even imitation by the Church of much that the heretics insisted upon. We have already noticed the approximation

2. Lagarde, "The Latin Church in the Middle Ages", p. 446.
3. Innocent III's works: lib. xii, ep. xvii, lib. ix, ep. vii, ep. xviii, lib. vii, ep. xxxvii etc..
in the matter of the immaculate conception. The Franciscans supported the same doctrine, but above all, by their insistence on following no 'way of form and life except this which the Lord in his mercy has shown and given me' and rejecting the Benedictine Rule or any other, they not only gave an impetus to simple living in imitation of Jesus, but also tacitly passed a vote of censure on the vast monastic system of their day. The Third Order had lay teachers as had the heretics, and orthodox Vaudois joined the Order of Austin Canons founded in 1256. And there is also another way of regarding these efforts at assimilating the moral contribution of contemporary heresy.

The Cathari, when they appeared in the south of France, were held to be descendants of Arian Visigoths of Aquitaine, and Catholic critics were, as we have hitherto noticed, only too eager to see a resuscitation of early heresies in those movements in the Middle Ages. All this constitutes an appeal to conditions obtaining in the early Church. St. Francis appealed to Christ Himself, but he was not alone in it. The truth is probably that the heretics, with their hostility to the then modern perversions and appeal to the standards of the earlier Christian ages, taught orthodoxy to measure its own standard

1. Ch. lxviii of the "Speculum".
accordingly. One thing is absolutely certain: in both orthodox and heretic the appeal, as is evidenced by its very universality, to the early Church, if to different elements, was paramount. But the heretics, whilst almost equalled by orthodox saints in the protest against ecclesiastical immorality, were not imitated in other directions. The record, as they saw it, of Christ's life and the nascent Church was withheld, doubtless for good as well as bad reasons. The Cathari had made use of the Bible in their own peculiar way to prop up the dualism they advocated. But they had also proved to their own satisfaction both the unscriptural nature of infant baptism and the scriptural nature of subordinationism. The Vaudois too, if less radical, insisted just as strongly on having access to the Bible. Certain it is that versions made and popularised in Italy in the XIII century have been used in subsequent translations of Holy Writ.

This is not meant to urge that anti-Trinitarianism is a necessary consequence of the open Bible: in this XIII century that has principally occupied thus far our attention, it was, as to a more marked degree in the Reformation period, a perfectly logical deduction. And in that later age, when the one great dominant Church of the West was no more

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2. Vd. Deanesly, "The Lollard Bible", p. 27. Innocent III wrote to the diocese of Metz, 12th July, 1199; "...let not any simple and instructed presume to touch the sublimity of Holy Writ, or to preach it to others." Vd. also Mirbt, p. 173.
4. The word "anti-Trinitarian" I write so chiefly to insist on the negative element in various systems of thought antagonistic to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. The word is not therefore appropriated simply and solely to the later thought of Servetus and the Sozzini.
and profound alterations had taken place in the sphere of human thought, that deduction was far more easy. The factors producing that change must be left for further treatment. What we have sought to maintain is, that in the age when these assumed a really popular character the greatest medieval Pope had to give himself to a mighty combat with opponents who coupled institutionalism with dogma. The moral problem became a theological one, and Innocent died long before either was solved.

The investigation of problems of both types continued profitable for the later Schoolmen who, in their concern for the doctrine of atonement where moral and theological meet, were compelled to examine and debate about that Trinity which they, more than all others, subjected to speculation. Their labours in this matter will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter II.

The Scholastics' Reply to Heresy.

(i) The Dominican.

The struggle with heresy which, beginning with anti-sacerdotalism and issuing almost inevitably in theological aberrations, dominated interest in Italy, we have already touched upon. Scotus Erigena had long before been right when he said; "Many men are roused from slumber by heretics, that they may see the day of the Lord and rejoice". For it seems to have dawned upon the ecclesiastical mind that there must be a going forth into the highways and byways if the world were not to be lost. The two great Orders of Friars to whom the magnificent task of redeeming the medieval world for the Church was delegated were of course the Franciscans and the Dominicans. As the Franciscans were in the beginning primarily con-

2. Dante's lines on the original objects of the Orders are well known. On St. Dominic, v.d. Parad. xii, 97 ff., "Poi con dottrina e con volere insieme Con l'offizio apostolico si mosse, quasi torrente ch'alta vena prense", etc.; etc.
On the characteristics of both, and their common object, v.d. Parad. xi, 37 ff., "L'un fu tutto serafico in ardore, L'altro per sapienza in terra fue Di cherubica luce uno splendore. Dell'un dirò, però che d'amendue Si dice l'un preglando, qual ch' uom prende, Perché ad un fine fùl'opere sue." Harnack, "History of Dogma", VI, 107 ff. The mendicants and their theologians, he says, were the first to give a conspicuous place to "Love thy neighbour as thyself".

The Dominicans' concern for heresy is fully illustrated by the notice in the "Vita Fratrum", pt. v, p.i, Eng. translation. Vd. (Mann, "Lives of the Popes in the Middle Ages", Vol. XIII, pp. 435-436, 1925.) "The order of Preachers having been founded by St. Dominic in Toulouse for the main end of combating heresy and schism, after the brethren had now for forty years waged incessant war against the like, and manfully battled with tyrants who befriended the teachers of heresy.... at last Pope Gregory XI entrusted the office of the inquisition to them for the suppression of heresy and its abettors,..."
cerned with the moral, so were the Dominicans with the intellectual well-being, although it must be remembered that concern for the whole man was not altogether absent from either view. It was inevitable, therefore, that at the outset the Dominicans should set out to capture the Universities in the interests of orthodoxy. Nor, as we shall see, was it very long before the Franciscans followed their companions in that direction with the most profound consequences for medieval theology. With the Franciscan Order we shall deal later, and at greater length in view of its greater importance in this context. Let us turn first, therefore, to the Dominicans, whose Spanish origin and consequent zeal for rigid intellectual orthodoxy are sufficient to account both for their prominence as Inquisitors and for their borrowing of the Aristotelian weapons newly found and sharpened by the Spanish Moors.

With consequences of the greatest importance, the Papacy encouraged the theological faculties of such as Paris and Oxford to the exclusion of Italian universities. Paris had Masters in the faculty of theology from the beginning of the XIII century, and the University's first corporate act of which we know is that of the transference of rights over the Place St. Jacques in 1221 to Dominicans who, just arrived, were seeking a site for their Convent. These were not the first Dominican

1. Art., "Dominicans", in the "Realeencyklopädie.
2. Rashdall, "The Universities in the Middle Ages", Vol. I.
Grützmacher says that the first Dominican magister, Roland, began to lecture in Paris in 1229. The Order appeared in Oxford somewhat later than the first appearance at Paris, in 1221, not long after their arrival in this country. With their early days in these two centres and the record of the rising tide of opposition to them, especially in Paris, we are not primarily concerned here. It is sufficient at this point to say that dislike of them was substituted for esteem within thirty years of their arrival at Paris, and at Oxford during the pontificate of Clement IV. At the former University their numbers, influence, and learning, and, to a great extent, the arrogance begotten of success, combined to irritate their older companions. One report has it that they refused to be bound by University decrees, and, ignoring the Chancellor's rights in the matter, took the examination of professors into their own hands and the privilege of lecturing without official license. The secular masters in 1252, therefore, launched an attack especially on the Dominicans though not neglecting other kindred Orders in the onslaught.

Whatever the merits of the contesting parties, there can be no doubt that among the greatest glories in and after this period at Paris were the intellectual princes of the Dominican Order. For about ten years, until 1257, Albertus and Aquinas

2. Little, "Grey Friars in Oxford".
taught successively in the Parisian Convent. This was not a long period, but, as the late Dean Rashdall notes, it was long enough to make their Convent at Paris "the most influential centre from which their teaching diffused itself through Europe". This diffusion was effected in a most interesting way.

By adopting, or better, Christianizing, Aristotle, who was in 1215 condemned by Statute at Paris, entered the service of the Church with Alexander of Hales, and became with the great Dominicans the dominant force in XIII century theology of the most orthodox type. There is indeed much truth in the opinion that, zeal for systematization, now in theology as formerly in law, encouraged the substitution of intellectual gymnastics for the earlier original endeavours of an Abélard or a Berengar. Nevertheless, it is only fair to point out that the evolution of this vast apologetic was far more than a mere craze of superior dilettantes. The Dominicans had been brought into being for a highly important purpose. It was not to St. Bernard, but to the Abélard the Cistercian so strongly condemned that they succeeded in their claim to an intellectual statement of religion.

I. Rashdall, "Universities", I, 363. "It was Paris that made the Theology of S. Thomas the Theology of the Catholic Church."

2. Matthew Paris tells an interesting story illustrative at once of the audacity in theological disputation at Paris at the beginning of the XIII century consequent on the recent introduction of the Aristotelian system, and also of the nature of some of this speculation. The Parisian Doctor, Simon de Tournai, in a perfectly orthodox manner and with all the dialectical subtlety had defended the doctrine of the Trinity. His work was so greatly applauded that, rejoicing in his prowess, the scholar declared that he could as easily demolish the very doctrine he had just defended. This was promptly rewarded by a stroke of paralysis and the loss of speech and memory. (Chron. Maj. ed. Luard, II, pp. 476 f.)
A large part of medieval heresy had entertained, as we saw in the first chapter, an idea of God which, judged from any point of view, was incompatible with the Christian revelation. With a view both to confuting this heresy and to presenting the Christian doctrine of the Godhead, the Trinity, etc., the great "Summas" were written. Obviously these Summas of various writers were concerned also with numerous other matters, but, because of the danger of irrelevance in any long reference to all this, and especially because Aquinas' system is the greatest of them all, we will confine ourselves to what can be no more than a brief statement of Thomistic Trinitarianism.

At the very beginning it is necessary to note carefully the difference St. Thomas emphasised between the two realms of the rational and the supra-rational. As is well known, it was ultimately the exaggeration of this difference and the transformation of the supra-rational into the irrational in later times which broke up medieval Scholasticism.

That God exists is accessible to reason, and therefore is not an article of faith - i.e., is demonstrable. God's existence is provable, according to St. Thomas, in five ways. In

I. There are three principal parts in Aquinas' Summa, and these again are further subdivided. In the first part is the discussion of the nature of God, the Trinity, and God's relation to the world. In the second, Man and such matters relevant thereunto as Sin and the Law, Virtues and Man's end, are discussed. As he begins with God, so to Him does he come in the end, hence the third part is concerned with the "Way", or Christ, His Person and Work, the Sacraments and Eschatology.

2. Summa T., I, Q. ii, Art. ii. "...quod Deum esse, et alia Mijusmodi, quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo......non sunt articuli fidei,..."

3. Summa T., ibid., Art. iii. "...quod Deus esse, quinque viis probari potest."
the same article (the third) he touches on theodicy: evil in
the world is not proof of the non-existence of the Deity. Fol-
lowing St. Augustine, he considers that evil is not produced by
God but is for Him an opportunity for bringing forth good. God's
omnipotence and omniscience, in the availing Himself of this
opportunity, is thus presupposed, but in Aquinas' system God is
held to be never outrageously arbitrary. All things are sub-
ject to His providence, "even in their own individual selves;"
by reason of a divine teleology. It is fitting therefore that
God should predestine man. This suggests the question as to
whether God reprobates any man. The objection that God by rea-
son of His Love cannot do this is met by Aquinas with "God
does reprobate some," and to these the denial of a "particular
good - namely, eternal life" is held to constitute reprobation.
Nor can that reprobation, or predestination, be altered by any
secondary causes such as the intervention of prayers of the
saints. The divine Will is immutable and it can never accom-
plish the contradictory.

Of the truths that are not accessible to the human rea-
son, the Trinity is the most important, for the expenditure of
thought among the Scholastics on this matter was considerable.
To know something about Aquinas' teaching is particularly im-
portant, primarily because in the main his conceptions "ruled

2. Summa T., I, q. xxiii, Art. i.
3. Summa T., I, q. xxiii, Art. iii.
5. Summa T., I, q. xxiii, Art. viii.
6. Summa T., I, q. xxv, Art. iii.
Aquinas recognised to some extent the difficulties in interpreting 'procession' - i.e. diversity in God as against simplicity, and gives the views of Arius and Sabellius, both of whom he confutes to his own satisfaction by quoting Scripture. The question of the amenability of the problem to solution by the human reason he touches on in a later Quaestio, and here it is categorically affirmed that "It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason". Attempts to prove the existence of the Trinity are, furthermore, derogatory to faith, and, he says, "what is of faith can be proved by authority alone, to those who receive the authority". The more he enters into a metaphysical discussion of the three Persons the more does this reliance upon authority manifest itself. In his discussion of the Holy Spirit from the Son, which recalls the controversy between eastern and western Christendom on the "filioque", there is no attempt to make an ultimate appeal to the reason. St. Thomas argues that "In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time", and the filioque clause which was introduced was a mere rendering explicit of what was from the beginning implicit. He admits that there is no verbal expression in the Scriptures of a "procession", although he holds that the "sense of Scripture" contains such a view, and that clearly enough expressed in John.xvi,14.

2. Summa T., I, Q.32, Art.i.
We are simply told in this same article that, "It is a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son... except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other".

Elsewhere, in the question as to whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness, the Scriptural texts (John xiv, 28, I, Cor. xv, 28) adduced in favour of "subordinationism" are not confronted by others at all, but are simply subjected to the exegesis prescribed by authority. St. Thomas, however, does not always find himself unable to cite appropriate Scripture. In the discussion as to whether the power of the Son is equal to that of the Father, the first objection is refuted by pointing out that only a partial quotation had been made.

Yet in spite of such an appeal to the Scriptural text as this last, doubtless convincing to the medieval mind, there can be no doubt that Aquinas relies primarily on ecclesiastical authority to avoid subordinationism. It cannot of course be said that the Scholastic was responsible for thus attracting attention to subordinationism. The Athanasian symbol, in its treatment of Christ's humanity, suggested possible developments.

2. Summa T., ibid., Art. vi. Jn. v, 19; "The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing". The second part of this same verse runs; "whatever things the Father doth, the Son doeth in like manner".

The number of quotations from the Johannine Gospel and Epistles, both in the objections and replies, in the discussion of the Trinity is interesting. In that Treatise there are 96 quotations from Scripture - 32 from the Johannine Gospel and Epistles, and 64 from the remainder and Apocrypha.

As the doctrine of reconciliation must, according to Ritschl, be referred in the instance of Aquinas, to his doctrine of God, so too must his theory of Christ's Person and Work. His idea of God we have already briefly touched upon: the Diety is not able to accomplish the contradictory is a point we noticed. But we must draw attention to two things, the first of which involves the second. God is subject to little limitation on the whole, and Scholastic opinions about what falls into the category of the contradictory are sufficiently diverse to allow of a considerable difference of opinion on the metaphysical aspect of the Incarnation between St. Anselm and the Dominican Doctor. The fact that for Aquinas God is His own ultimate end, and all else is means only to that end is pregnant with important consequences. To God's perfection the world, which is simply means, is quite unnecessary, and its non-existence would detract neither jot nor tittle from His perfection. This estimate of the world involves a view of the Incarnation of the Word that is profoundly interesting and important. St. Thomas' idea, that God cannot be restricted to any one means such as the present existing order of things, suggests that as there is no necessity to Him of the present order, so also, because it is a figure on this earthly stage, the Incarnation with regard to this world is not absolutely but only relatively necessary.

Again, in the general contingency, sin is contingent: the means

1. Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation", 1872, p. 47.
2. Summa T., I, q. xxv, Art. v., "His will is the cause of all things; nor is that Will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. .......The Divine Goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created". etc., etc.
being proportionate to the particular end, i.e., the removal of sin, the purpose of the Incarnation is limited. This sense of the limitation of the Incarnation is reinforced by the assertion of the possibility to God of means for man's redemption different from those actually adopted.

It is precisely at this point that the Thomistic conception comes into collision with that of the earlier Scholastic, St. Anselm. The latter saint would allow God to be exempt from control by any law, but he would take as contradiction, and therefore as impossible of performance even by God, the arbitrary forgiveness of sins, for the purpose of which forgiveness the Incarnation took place. This not only helped to emphasise the need for adequate "satisfaction" - so famous a theory in St. Anselm - but also it obviously allowed no room for a Diety who

1. Summa T.,III,4.i,Art.ii. St.Thomas draws attention to two forms of necessity; (1) The necessity of food to the maintenance of Life; (2) The necessity of a horse to the traveller on a journey. The Incarnation is placed not in the first but in the second category. The actual text is: "Respondeo dicendum quod ad finem aliquem dicitur aliquid esse necessarium dupliciter. Uno modo, sine quo aliquid esse non potest; sicut cibus est necessarius ad conversationem humanae vitae; alio modo, per quod melius et convenientius pervenitur ad finem; sicut equus necessarius est ad iter. Primo modo Deum incarnari non fuit necessarium ad reparationem humanae naturae. Deus enim per suam omnipotentem virtutem poterat humanam naturam multis aliis modis reparare. Secundo autem modo necessarium fuit Deum incarnari ad humanae naturae reparationem". Although St.Thomas goes on to cite St.Augustine as lending support to his own view, reference to Augustine's language (De Trin.lib.xiii,cap.x) will show that the African Doctor is far less outspoken. He says; "Verum etiam ostendamus, non alium modum possibilem Deo defuisse, ejus potestati omnia aequaliter subjacent; sed sanitae miserae nostrae convenientiorem alium modum nonuisse".

was as arbitrary as that envisaged by St. Thomas. The fact that emphasis on the Incarnation's ultimate importance leads to limitation of God's power and will may appear to be fairly plain, but it must be constantly kept in mind: the process of minimizing the absolute necessity of the Incarnation which seems for the first time to be in Aquinas a most striking feature, ultimately led in a certain quarter to the denial of that which was, by becoming incarnate, to redeem mankind - the Second Person of the Trinity and with that a Trinitarian theology.

The divergence from St. Anselm is, however, not maintained. There is an insistence upon Christ's Passion as being "not only a sufficient but even a superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the human race". The view that unto His voluntary death is attached a superabundant merit is, of course, quite Anselmian. But from such considerations we must pass on.

As his philosophy of Incarnation seems to help towards a lessening of emphasis on the necessity of the Incarnation of the Second Person in view of God's arbitrary will, so too does Aquinas' theory about the entry of the Logos into humanity. This relation might have been with more than one man: one might suggest that this does not help insistence upon the uniqueness of the inner essential nature of Christ on earth. On this side the God-man is "primus inter pares", and, although there is far...

I. Summa T., III, Q. iii, Art. vii. "Quoniam potestia divinae personae infinita est, potest persona divina praeter humanam naturam, quam assumpsit, aliam numero humanam naturam assumere".

more in Aquinas' teaching which has to be missed in such a survey as this, such a conception is of the greatest importance. The divine nature did not become man, as this would involve the incarnation of the other Persons of the Trinity, and thus we come to the interesting view which would hold that the divine nature itself was not connected with the incarnation. As Dorner says; "The significance of the incarnation is, in his view, therefore, limited to the fact, that the divine Person of the Son — not, however, His divine nature — was inserted in the human nature". The divine nature's close connection with this Personality is confined within the limits of conferring the graces which the finite human nature is capable of receiving. Since grace is created, and Christ's soul is also created, we are face to face with a Christ who is a limited personality upon are bestowed finite gifts.

The hypothetical objection against Christ's being regarded as Head of the Church by reason of the finitude both of Christ and of His capacity Aquinas meets with what appears to be a none too satisfactory defence. Is it really possible to argue that it was impossible to imagine a greater though created grace than that which was in the historic Christ?

In order chiefly to avoid carrying to an exorbitant length Aquinas' discussion of the Incarnation, it would be well to con-

1. Vd.Summa T., I, q.iii.
3. Vd.Summa T., III, q.xiv, Art. i. "...conveniens fuis-(p.331.) se corpus assumpta a Filio Dei humanis infirmitatibus et defectibus subjacere;...."
4. Vd.Summa T., III, q.viii, Art. i. "Ut Ecclesia per similitudinem corpus, ita Christus hujus corporis caput recte dicitur, tum propter gratiae quam habuit sublimitatem ac perfectam plen-itudinem,..."
tent ourselves with a brief summary of his examination of Adoption, Predestination, and Adoration. (Pars III, Q.Q. 23-25.)

In the beginning of his treatment of Adoption, he points out that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity in the sense that we are sons, and in a later Article approaches the question of Christ's adoption with regard to His manhood. His line is far less bold than, and may seem to be somewhat inconsistent with, his discussion of the bestowal on Christ of finite grace. The proposition that Christ is the adoptive Son meets with a strenuous denial: such a proposition is reasonable only with those who would "place in Christ two persons or hypostases". It is because of this singular relation of Christ to God that He can be predestined in a singular manner, whereby, though predestined as we are He does not share our adoption which has as its object predestination. Predestination is of the nature, and not of the person, in Christ's instance. Once again occurs the idea that, even had there been no Incarnation, God would have adopted another means to achieve His ends.

In that question which considerably agitated the later Socinians - namely, the adoration of Christ - it is not surprising that Aquinas' view is the strictly traditional one. He quotes the anathema of the second Council of Constantinople against the use of a "double" devotion, and declares the worship of Christ of one kind only. In the following Article Aquinas

2. Ibid. Q. xxiv, Art. i. "Sicut autem Christus singularem modo prae alis est Dei Filius naturalis, ita quodam singulari modo est praedestinatus".
emphasises, in refuting the charge that "latria" can be given to no other than the Creator, the necessity of adoring with latria not only the Word Incarnate, but also, by virtue of that, Christ's humanity. Further development of his thesis is, however, particularly interesting, for he goes on to assert that adoration of Christ's humanity can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, adoration paid to a person's possession may be adoration paid to the person himself: so, he says, might one, by adoring the king's dress be adoring "the king dressed" (regem vestitutum). In this case the adoration of Christ's humanity is the payment of latria. On the other hand, adoration of Christ's humanity may be that which is given to an Object regarded as possessed of every endowment of grace; such adoration would be "dulia". To one and the same Person, therefore, "it is not imfitting" (nec hoc est inconveniens) to offer latria by reason of the indwelling Divinity, and dulia by reason of the perfection of His humanity.

2. Summa T., III, Q. xxv, Art. ii. "... honor adorationis proprie debetur hypostasi subsistenti; tamen ratio honoris potest esse aliquid non subsistens propter quod honosatur persona cui illud inest. Adoratio igitur Humanitatis Christi dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ut sit ejus sicut rei adoratae; et sic adorare carnem Christi nihil est aliud quam adorare regem vestitutum. Et secundum hoc regem Dei incarnatum; sicut adorare vestem regis nihil est aliud quam adorare regem vestitutum. Et secundum hoc adoratio humanitatis Christi est adoratio latriae. Alio modo potest intelligi adoratio humanitatis Christi quae fit ratione humanitatis Christi perfectae omni munere gratiarum; et sic adoratio humanitatis Christi non est adoratio latriae, sed adoratio duliae: ita scilicet quod una et eadem persona Christi adoratur adoratone latriae propter suam divinitatem, et adoratione duliae propter perfectionem humanitatis. Nec hoc est inconveniens: quia ipsi Deo Patri debetur honor latriae propter Deitatem, et honor duliae propter Deitatem, et Honor duliae propter dominium quo gubernat creaturam".
The point at which we have arrived is important, and this for the following reasons.

It was under Albertus Magnus, and especially St. Thomas Aquinas, that the "great system of Aristotelian Philosophy and Theology" was built up. The Saint's doctrine of God is often a re-echo of earlier teaching, but there was a definite Aristotelian colouring which, before Aquinas' day, would have been impossible. Yet Aristotle's Deity is very much other than the Christian God, for he is not only separate but remote from mankind. God is throughout Aquinas' scheme arbitrary, and was, as we saw, bound by nothing but the law of contradiction. Such may have been no absolutely new postulate among earlier Christian thinkers, but certainly none seems to have been so considerably affected by it as was Thomas in the discussion of the need for an Incarnation. The subjection of this by him to acute analysis is probably the beginning of a long speculative process at the end of which came the Socinians' denial not only of the need but also of the fact of the Incarnation. For the limitation of the Incarnation to the removal of sin, but especially the possibility of other means to God whereby man might have been redeemed, are conceptions amounting at least to a marked departure from the earlier Anselmian idea of God, and, at most, to the fore-runner of that XVI century thought we are in these pages most concerned with.

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The difference of function of the two greatest Medieval Orders, immortalized in the lines of Dante above quoted, was thrown into greater relief by the distribution of their respective theologians. The intellectual centre of the Dominicans was Paris, and when the Franciscans entered in hot pursuit the paths of learning, persistence at Paris meant for them the dimming of their lights by the great Dominican luminaries. Thus, whilst in 1231 Alexander of Hales became a Franciscan at Paris, Grosseteste began to lecture to Franciscans at Oxford. Freedom from Dominican domination at Paris, and the mighty scholarship of Grosseteste, conspired to make Oxford the training ground for scholars who were to scatter in Italy itself where the Order originated the seeds of this English theological instruction.

Neither was this development mere imitation or refusal to take marching orders from Paris as it might at first sight appear. Too strong emphasis cannot be placed on that. For the Umbrian founder of the Order, simplicity and poverty were the distinguishing features of Franciscan piety, and the fact that theological speculation he considered destructive of both was sufficient for him. Brother Giles could complain; "Paris, Paris, thou that destroyest Assisi", but this attitude was relegated to a less enlightened age when Oxford loomed large in later Franciscanism. But in spite of all change, the Franciscans remained Franciscans. From the earliest days of

I. C. med. H., Vol. VI, p. 743 ff..
Franciscan intellectual activity the text of Scripture was preferable to Lombard’s "Sentences", and such an attitude was maintained in the preference of the older as against the newer schools. Whereas for Aquinas the intellect was superior to the will—a view maintained by Aristotle and his Arab commentators, i.e. the newer school—the older school, which includes Augustine, and, in the XI and XII centuries, Anselm, Alexander of Hales, and Roger Bacon, was voluntaristic. Intellectualism’s devotees have ever been the more orthodox. Voluntarism goes with a more independent judgment, and the Franciscans remained both voluntaristic and more independent in speculation than their Dominican rivals. As they were always more in touch with popular religion, their eventual support of such a doctrine as that of the "Immaculate Conception" becomes intelligible.

I Cf., Summa T., I, Q.xix, Art. i, and especially Q.lxxxii, Art. iii.


3. Rashdall, "Universities", Vol. II, ii, pp 534-535, seems to be somewhat inaccurate when he says, "the theological energies of the 'Subtle Doctor' and of the Order of which he was the ornament were devoted to fastening on the medieval Church, in the teeth of patristic authority and Dominican orthodoxy, the baseless fancy of the Immaculate Conception of Christ’s
Oxford Franciscanism reached its intellectual height in Duns Scotus, "Doctor Subtilis", who has been in the past most unfairly misrepresented. With the exception of but a few years at Paris at the end of a short life, he taught generally at Oxford.

It cannot be emphasised too much that Duns is nearer to Aquinas than has generally been thought, especially in his doctrine of God. What has recently happened in all probability is that Aquinas has been recognised as almost if not quite as responsible as the Franciscan for the idea of God as possessed of an arbitrary absolute will. The advance made on Scotus' predecessors by himself can be over-emphasised. The necessity of a thing's dependence upon God's will is a conception familiar to the reader of Anselm, and the possibility to God of the creation of a world other than this was an opinion maintained by

Mother". W. Walker, "History of the Christian Church", is inaccurate in making Duns' position the model for that assumed at the definition of this dogma in the XIX century.

Lénifie-Chatelain, "Chartularium", tom. ii, sect i, p. 117, show that Scotus did not defend this particular doctrine. As Seeberg says ("Die Theologie des J. Duns Scotus", Ed. V, p. 248 of "Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche", 1901), for Duns the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was little more than hypothetical.

But Duns' own treatment of the question in his Commentary on the Sentences, lib. III, dist. iii, q. i, 3, nobody could exempt the Franciscans from the charge of encouraging the belief in the Immaculate Conception, but to accuse Duns, who can be shown to stand even here nearer to Aquinas, is unfair.

I. Harris, "Duns Scotus", Vol. I, p. 86 ff. This writer says, "It is in Scotus rather than in Thomas that Scholasticism reaches its natural development".

Cf. Seeberg (Art. in the Realencyklopädie on Scotus). "Duns hat die scholastische Methode auf ihren Höhepunkt geführt."
Richard of Middleton. Again, Scotus, as well as Aquinas, would believe possible the demonstrability of God's existence by reasoning processes. But such agreement as there is—and to it again we shall have cause to refer—cannot be made to conceal the differences that exist. Theology was for Duns, as for Richard of Middleton before him, practical rather than speculative knowledge. This insistence was calculated to make speculation subsidiary, and to elevate will above intellect in both human and Divine. The fact that the world depended wholly on the free act of God's will, without the latter's having to conform to any predetermined law, was of itself sufficient to prove ultimately futile such speculation. God can think even of the opposite process to the actual world process as a possibility in the working out of His purposes.

True to the teaching of Aquinas, and naturally reinforced by his own view of theology, it is not surprising that implicit faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is demanded by Scotus. Scotus' treatment of the subject of the Trinity, however, marks

1. Anselm, "Cur Deus Homo?" II, i. 17. "Nihil est necessarium aut impossibile nisi quia ipse ita vult.
2. Loofs, "Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte" p. 536.
3. Loofs, ibid. p. 531. "... die Theologie ist ihm (i.e. Scotus) nicht eine spekulative Wissenschaft, weil alle Erkenntnis in ihr nur Mittel zum Verständnis und zur Erreichung des Zieles des Menschen ist.


a very significant step in the development of the doctrine. St. Augustine's teaching was both simple and profound: in Him there is a notable insistence upon the Divine Unity. Constant emphasis upon the one-ness of essence leads easily to a conception of the three Persons which limits their distinction to the relation of one to the other. This threefold relation constituting a threefold hypostasis had persisted until Aquinas, who staunchly maintained the Augustinian view. On the other hand, the Cappadocian Fathers — who did much in their day to further the Nicene Creed's theology — emphasised a more complete distinction: for them 'hypostasis' was a personal subject, hence in Eastern theology the relation of the Three became analogous rather to the relationship of three men to their common humanity.


A little later he seems to suggest the adequacy of one Person, i.e. God, to be the desired End: then he criticizes that love having as its object one Person only. "Licet enim tres personarum non ostendat finem appetibiliorem quam si esset non Triunus, quia est finis inquantum est unus Deus, non inquantum Triunus, tamen voluntatem ignorantem Trinitatem contingit errare in amando vel desiderando finem, desiderando frui una persona sola." (Op. Ox. Prol. n. 23.)

2. De Trinitate, V, ch. 8. "...there are not three omnipotents." Ibid. ch. 9. "Certainly there are three omnipotents...... Yet......what Three, human speech is in difficulties through great lack of words."

3. Summa Theol., Pars I, q. 40, Art. i. "......relation must be of necessity the same as person." Ibid. Art. ii. "The Persons are the subsisting relations themselves".

4. Of the three chief Cappadocians, Gregory of Nyssa believed in a Platonic theory of the essential unity of human nature. For such as he it is therefore not difficult to maintain a firm belief in the one-ness of God. According to Harnack ("History of Dogma", Vol. VI, p. 183 ff.), the Scotists sharply separated the Persons, and could, at a later time, have defended any doctrine of God.
It was to this conception in Eastern Theology that, as against the Western-Augustinian tradition, Scotus seems to have turned. The relations are now regarded as something absolute, and fresh problems and difficulties are raised. Not only does this mean that this way lies a sheer tritheism, but also it means, that such questions as that of the Incarnation and of the Second Person of the Trinity, will call for a particular treatment. The second of these two questions is the more important for us here, and it is to it that we shall therefore devote our chief attention in what must necessarily be a limited survey.

The peculiar emphasis in the Cappadocians and Scotus suggests that the independence of the Persons should be subjected to a closer scrutiny. Full personality is the negation of dependence for the Franciscan Doctor, hence we find a strong insistence in him on independence. He does so with regard to Christ in the following way.

In the beginning of his discussion about the Incarnation he treats of the possibility of human nature's allying itself with the Logos. It is, however, in Distinction V that he comes to the important question as to whether the Divine Nature assumed or could assume human nature. Scotus allows the assumption by the Person of the Logos of human nature, but not of the
I

Not only does Scotus regard the human element in Christ as that of an actual, rather than as of a simply ideal or potential, being, but he also - like Aquinas on this point (vd. Sum. Theol. III, Q. xiv, Art. i.) - allows His body to have been subject both to human infirmities and defects. Subsequent speculation is, however, more daring than that of either his predecessors or Aquinas.

The Adoption of Christ is discussed in general in an orthodox manner, and that means as it meant for Aquinas, that in accordance with the dictates of ecclesiastical authority, Adoptionism must be repudiated. The Predestination of Christ is in the same case. There are, none the less, significant admissions.

I. Scotus' idea of what constitutes personality is not easy to understand. There are two processes: by one an individual is constituted and by the other a person. Individuality is the condition of personality. This latter can be thought of positively: it is added to the individuality, human nature. Imagine it so; then a union with Christ's human nature had been impossible, since a person is an incommunicable existence. Yet, dispense with that personality, and not only is Christ's human nature different from, but it is also not equal to our own. But regard personality 'negatively' - that is to say, as producible by negation, and we see that that is inadequate. This is partly because negation in respect of personality means negation of dependence on another personality, and partly because a positive must be presupposed by a negative. Every negation, however, is communicable; but personality is not, and hence must be something positive. Vd. Op. Ox. III, Dist. V, Q. I, 2; also ibid. Q. II, 4.

According to Seeberg ("Die Theologie des J. D. S." p. 240f.) Abelard had emphasized the same idea of the Logos Person's assuming impersonal human nature.


Christ is the adoptive Son of God as touching His human nature, and further attention to the anthropological as against these more purely theological elements shows that Duns is prepared to develop the logical implications.

There are two points in Duns' theory of particular importance here. In the first place, he maintains that, even had the Logos not assumed Christ's nature, that nature could have attained to personality none the less. In the second place, he firmly maintains that Christ's soul was less perfect than the nature of the angels. For if an angel had been 'assumed', it would have possessed a greater capacity, and could therefore have been endowed with more grace than Christ was endowed with. The reason for the strong emphasis upon the inferiority of Christ's soul to the angelic nature is not far to seek. Christ's soul could not have had the highest inclination towards

predestinatus fuerit esse Filius Dei? Et arguitur quod non; quia non secundum quod Filius Dei predestinatus est esse Filius Dei, quia non praecessit ipsum esse Filius Dei. ....si secundum quod homo predestinatus est esse Filius Dei, sequitur quod secundum quod homo, est Filius Dei, quod est falsum." For Scriptural support he appeals to Romans I, 3, which speaks of Christ as of the seed of David according to the flesh.

I. Op. Ox. III, Dist. XIII, Q. iv, 10. "....quia circa istam naturam nihil ponitur absolutum novum per istam unionem, quia ipsam uniri Verbo, non dicit nisi specialem dependentiam uniri Verbo, non dicit nisi specialem dependentiam eius ad Verbum; si-cut ergo manet naturam quantum ad omnia absoluta, ita et eandem habens capacitatem."

"Praeterea, si Angelus fuisset assumptus, habuisset ex vi assumptionis maiorem capacitatem naturalem, quam nunc habet, per te, et ita tantum aucta fuisset ultra capacitatem naturalem eius natura per assumptionem, quantum modo natura assumpta aucta est per unionem ex parte animae ultra suam capacitatem naturallem, vel plus, et ita natura posset capere plus de gratia, quam modo anima Christi."

A fellow-Franciscan, St. Bonaventura, had taught before Duns the superiority of the angelic nature. Vd. his Commentary on the Sentences, Lib. III, Dist. I, Q. ii.
grace, simply because such inclination was relative to the human nature. Why then does God make the highest grace and not the highest nature, for Christ's soul is clearly not so high as the angelic nature? The answer is: to create a higher nature would have been tantamount to setting up an unbridgeable gulf between the Incarnate One and human kind. Here then we see again that vigorous insistence upon Christ's humanity which so characterizes the 'Doctor Subtilis'.

The bestowal upon Christ's soul of grace, i.e., of a finite gift upon a limited personality, was maintained by Aquinas (v.d. supra), but the Dominican nowhere equals in intensity the language of Scotus. The latter can assert the possibility of another's being endowed by God with a grace equal to that actually bestowed upon Christ's soul. Another blow at absolute uniqueness is struck by the ascription to Him not only of a free
will with the accompanying freedom of choice, but also at the possibility of His sinning. This latter possibility is almost at once carefully whittled down, but there is never so much as a hint of it in Aquinas. Scotus goes so far by reason of his consistent refusal to allow the superaddition of blessedness accruing simply from the union of divine and human in Christ. It is not therefore surprising that with Scotus Christ's death should be much more real than it is with St. Bonaventura in his own Order or Aquinas.

Christ's death is not consequent upon sin, for sin He did not share with us along with other defects. He was willing that His body should die, and that it should be subject to the same laws of decomposition that govern our own mortal frame. The main thing here is his maintenance of the belief that Christ's body could possibly have seen corruption. St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas Aquinas held a quite different view. The Dominican maintained that, as Christ had never been in sin, the dissolution of the Union was impossible even after Christ's death.

1. Op. Ox. III, Dist. XII, q. unio. Here he rejects the possibility of sinning because it involves the possibility of damnation: "si potuit peccare, ergo potuit damnari. Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens." Like Aquinas he argues 'non posse peccare' as against 'posse non peccare!' He admits the possibility of sinning in Op. Ox. ibid. Schol. 2: "...natura, quam assumpsit, erat de se possibilis peccare, quia non erat beata ex vi unionis, et habuit liberum arbitrium et ita vertibile ad utrumlibet; sed per beatitudinem est confirmatum a primo instanti, ut sit impecceables, sicut Beati sunt impecceables."


3. Op. Ox. III, Dist. XVI, A. "...Christus in se nostros defectos suscepit, praeter peccatum. ...dici potest, Christum voluntate, non necessitate suae naturae hos defectus, sicut alios suscepisse, scilicet necessitatem patiendi in anima, simul autem patiendi, et moriendi in carne." (2) "...cum igitur corpus Christi fuerit compositum, tandem corrumpetur naturaliter."
Scotus envisages a special miracle whereby the glory of His soul should be prevented from affecting the human body. Deprived of this reanimating glory His humanity, earthly as ours, could have come to the same end, and he even cites St. Augustine to prove his contention.

Since Christ's human nature receives such emphasis in Scotus, it is not surprising that he treats such adoration as is paid to Him in a most interesting fashion.

Should Christ's 'flesh and soul' receive the adoration known as 'latria' which is rendered to God? Aquinas had faced


2. Op. Ox. Dist. III, q. ii, s. (Cf. also F. C. Baur, "Die Christliche Lehre der Dreieinigkeit," II, p. 850.) "Dico ergo ad propositum quod comparando Verbum ad naturam gloriosam assumptam sine redundantia gloriae animae in corpus, necesse fuit corpus suum esse mortale; licet hoc fuerit speciale, et novum miraculum quod gloria animae non redundavit in corpus. Facto tamen miraculo isto, corpus illud habuit necessitatem mortiendi: sine redundantia gloriae animae in corpus, nec secundum corpus habuit justitiam originalem praeservantem a corruptione. Hoc confirmatur per Augustinum de Baptismo parvulorum.... corpus sibi dimissum per privationem redundantium gloriae, fuit animale,...."

the same question (vd. supra) and had taught, in accordance with the decree of the Council of Ephesus, that adoration of Christ's humanity regarded as 'perfect with every gift of grace' was not 'latria' but 'dulia'. Scotus even borrows, with acknowledging it, the imagery of the king's dress from Aquinas. His final pronouncement is, none the less, far more bold. On the side of His human nature Christ is a creature, and the adoration due to Him is on that account no higher than it would be to any other created being. 'Hyperdulia', something higher than 'dulia' but lower than 'latria', and "not a higher adoration", is due to the humanity of Christ, although regarding Him as 'Deus creans' we must pay Him 'latria'.

In thinking of Him as 'Deus creans' we are then obviously thinking of Him as the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity. To assume that Scotus is not prepared to defend the orthodox Trinitarian position is, of course, a fallacy. But just as his concern for the human factor in Christ is what has hitherto constituted his principal claim to originality, so when His mediatorial work is considered it is the emphasis on the dignity of Christ's manhood (and of general humanity, as we shall see) that is so striking. The scaling down, if such it can be called, of the conception of a Christ who had been almost "theologised to a selfless husk" was paralleled in Scotus by his scaling down of the conception of the absolute necessity of Christ's Incarnation for the forgiveness of sin, against which idea so prominent in St. Anselm Aquinas himself (vd supra) had

1. "Resoluit humanitati Christi deberei hyperduliam, non maiorem adorantiam: ...." (Ibid. Schol. v.)
protested. The idea of the Incarnation as a thought in the Divine counsel from eternity was not new to western Theology in either Aquinas or Scotus, but it was the latter who pushed it further than any of his predecessors had done. Whereas these latter seem generally to have been half inclined to regard it as a possible hypothesis, and half inclined to grudge the possibility, not so Scotus. For him, God at the beginning of a sequence of thoughts predestined Christ's human nature. Moreover, there is the insistence upon the point, that God's greatest work, the Incarnation, contingent only and not absolute if the Fall occasioned it. This belief is, as we saw, to be found in Aquinas,

1. With Anselm cf. also St. Augustine (De Trin. XIII, 10), "Si homo non pecasset, filius Dei non esset incarnatus."

2. Rashdall ("The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology," pg. 384) says, "It is a great improvement upon the general Western tradition that the incarnation is represented as part of the eternal purpose of God, which would have occurred whether there had been a fall or not." Towards the beginning of the XII century, mention of it, though tentative, is to be found in Ruprecht von Deutz (Migne, "Pat. Lat." Vol. clxviii, pg. 1628). Alexander of Hales, over a hundred years later, supported more strongly, with four reasons in its favour, the Incarnation's absolute motive. (Sum. Theol. III, Q. i, Q. mem. 13) Also in the Franciscan Order, St. Bonaventura, in the middle of the XIII century, inclined in the same direction. (In Sent. III, Dist. I, Q. ii.) There is even more emphasis on the same side in the Dominican, Albertus Magnus (In Sent. III, Dist. XX, Art. 4). For some excellent translations and general discussion, vd. Westcott, "The Epistles of St. John," pg. 290ff. 1909.

3. Op. Ox. III, Dist. XIX, Q. uninc. 6. "Dico quod Incarnation Christi non fuit occasionaliter praesidio, sed sicut finis immediate videbatur a Deo ab aeterno, ita Christus in natura humana, cum sit proponueri fini, caeteris prius praeestinabatur, loquendo de his, quae praeestinantur. ... praevideretur pas- sic Christi, ut medicina contra lapsum, sicut medicus prius vult sanitatem hominis, quam ordinet de medicina ad sanandum."

and so too is the possibility to God of other means than Christ's suffering for man's redemption. Much further discus-
sion of those means possible to God, however, we do not find in
Aquinas: we do find such in Scotus, and this is the precursor
of much extraordinary speculation in the later Nominalistic
theology. Like St. Thomas and the earlier St. Augustine, he holds
that for 'curing our misery' no means could be more fitting
than those actually adopted. Yet, and here is the novelty, just
as one in no sense a debtor can make payment for another, so
like Christ could a good angel have done so. Even a 'pure man'
could make satisfaction for all in Christ's stead. It is only
fair to point out that nobody other than a Christ could, in the
long run, render the appropriate satisfaction, for Scotus goes
on to describe his 'purus homo' as required to be conceived
without sin through the operation of the Holy Spirit and a hu-
man mother. The whole hypothesis, however, is not only in perfect

1. Op.Ox.III,Dist.XX,Q.unic.9."... unus, qui non est debitor, po-
test satisfacere pro alio, sicut pro alio orare. Unde, sicut
Christus homo innocens, non debitor, satisfacit, sic si placu-
isset Deo, potuit unus bonus Angelus satisfacisset, offerendo
aliquid placitum Deo pro nobis, quod ipse acceptasset pro om-
nibus peccatis: quia tantum valet omne creatum oblatum, pro
quanto Deus acceptat illud, et non plus...."

2. Op.Ox.ibid."Praeterea unus purus homo potuisset satisfacere
pro omnibus, si fuisset conceptus sine peccato, operatione Spiri-
tus Sancti, et matris, sicut fuit Christus. Et Deus sibi sum-
man gratiam, quam potuisset recipere, sicut dedit Christo sine
meritis praedidentibus ex liberalitate sua: tali enim potui-
isset mereri deletionem peccati, sicut et beatitudinem. Et cum
dicit, quod tunc obligaremur ei tantum, quantum Deo; falsum est:
imo simpliciter Deo, quia totum quod ille haberet, esset a Deo:
obligaremur tamen multum sibi, sicut obligaremur Beatæ Vir-
gini, et aliis Sanctis, qui meruerant pro nobis; semper tamen
finaliter, et summa Deo tanquam ei a quo aliorum bona procedunt.
Praeterea, videtur (de possibili dico) quod quilibet potest
satisfacere pro se, quia si data fuisset cui libet homini prima
gratia sine meritis propris: et tunc meretur beatitudinem
igitur potuit etiam meruisse deletionem culpae."
harmony with, but is also the logical deduction from, the pre-
supposition that God could have saved man by any other means.

It is quite clear that such satisfaction as is actually, or can possibly be, made can only be counted such in so far as 2 God 'accepts' it. The will of that arbitrary Diety, unhampered by the trammels of a St. Anselm's law of contradiction, it is that allows Christ's work to be efficacious. If Christ's body was subject to limitations, so too were His merits finite, benefiting only the elect. How numerous these were Scotus, like Aquinas, does not say, but the fact is that they were predestined to glory before Christ's Passion was foreseen. Duns does make a distinction between the 'sufficiency' and the 'efficacy' of Christ's merit. Christ did acquire sufficient merit for the deletion of sin and the bestowal of grace and glory, but as not all were called to redemption, other than the elect could receive no benefit. The break here with Anselm on the theory of

I. Op. Ox. III, Dist. XX, A. "Dicimus et alium modum fuisset possibili Deo, cujus potestati cuncta subjacent; ...."  
2. Op. Ox. III, Dist. XIX, Q. unic. 7. "Dico, quod sicut omne aliud a Deo est bonum, quia a Deo voluitum et non e converso, sic meritum illud tantum bonum erat pro quanto acceptatum, non autem e converso quia meritum est et bonum ideo acceptatum, et tantum potuit acceptari passivè, quantum tota Trinitas potuit et voluit acceptare activè."  
4. Op. Ox. III, Dist. XIX, Q. unic. 9ff. The elect are predestined to glory not from Christ's merits, and election itself springs not from Christ's human will, but from the Divine. Ibid. I4 - 'Bonum velle Christi', or the 'passio' is 'pro electis et praedestinatis tantum, et non pro aliis.' Vd. also Seeberg's "Die Theologie des J. D. Scotus", pg. 285ff.
'Satisfaction' is obvious, and is made complete by his expression of the view that God could by His absolute power have dispensed with any Incarnation whatsoever.

On the one hand it may appear that, as for Duns God was so absolute as to be able to dispense with the very core of the traditional scheme of redemption, so might man's dignity have been conceived of as no higher than it was in the worst type of Augustinianism.

On the other hand, man's inherent dignity might have been conceived of almost in terms of Pelagianism. The Pelagianist position he does explicitly pronounce against, and he is sufficiently guarded throughout to refute the charge of preaching such tenets as St. Augustine had vehemently condemned. But if


But, he goes on to say, God, by 'potentia ordinata' was disposed to accept only Christ's merits. "De potentia tamen ordinata Deus non disposuit alicui peccatori dare primum gratiam nisi in virtute meriti illius, qui erat sine peccato, scilicet Christi: quia sicut tactum est supra, non disposuit sibi reconciliare inimicum, nisi per obsequium magis gratum, quam offensa eius erat sibi displicens: et tale obsequium eius est passio Christi, vel meritum eius, et sicut non disposuit dare gratiam peccatorii sine passione, sine qua gratia nulla potest esse satisfactionis omnino, quia nec aequivalens modo, nec simpliciter, nec in divina acceptione; ideo multo magis de potentia ordinata non est possibile satisfieri Deo de peccato, nisi in virtute passionis.

2. Op. OX. I, Dist. XVII, Q. iiii, 29. "... sed non creditur ita (Christi) disposuisse, quod naturam puram vel actum eius sic acceptet, quia acceptum est puris naturalibus esse meritorium, appropin-quat errori Pelagii, ideo verisimilis creditur, quod acceptet naturam et actum eius tanquam meritorium per habitum supernaturalem."

Vd. also, Loofs, "Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengesichte," p. 597.
dispensing with an incarnation be in deference to God's 'absolute' power, it is viewed from the other end, in deference to human dignity which is very near the Pelagian view and far removed from either Augustinianism or Thomism.

Scotus' treatment of the effects of the Fall, reminiscent to a considerable extent of the noble ethical teaching of Abelard, is remarkable. It is out of accord with the Thomistic, Anselmian, and above all, the Augustinian, teaching on the subject. That Christ merits as man and not as God, that a good man could have been 'accepted,' all point the way to a view of the Fall as something which would far less seriously impair the heirs of Adam than theologians almost universally had believed since St. Augustine.

There is the basis in Aquinas for the view that Original Sin is 'formally' 'the lack of original justice,' and 'naturally' is 'concupiscence,' but farther than that Duns does not go in company with the Dominican. Adam's sin was committed not against the natural law, but against the positive - that of temperance or obedience. The rule "thou shalt love the Lord thy


"God" was not infringed: love there was, but it was in excess and was misdirected. This conception together with that of concupiscence as the "aptitude in the rational appetite, that is in the will, for desiring pleasures in immoderate fashion" lead easily to the view of Original Sin as original guilt only. Sin can be only in the will, and of the natural good things man was not deprived at the Fall.


2. Vd. Seeberg's monograph (p. 221), on the strong criticism of St. Augustine's 'hamartiology': this German scholar draws attention to the lack of positive treatment of Sin in Scotus: "er hat keine Sündenlehre zu geben vermocht." Vd. also, p. 229: "die komplizierte Aufgabe ist gelöst, dass dieselbe Sünde, die zunächst nichts anderes ist als die von Gott verhängte Karenz der Gerechtigkeit, doch wieder Schuld des Menschen, weil lediglich durch seinem Willen veranlasst, seine soll."


The repeated insistence upon the necessity of the co-operation of grace, and the avoidance thereby of the Pelagian position, will be clear in the above pronouncement. Duns held that nobody was ever actually in a pure state of nature. The performance of good acts from charity requires grace, although here again absence of that charity does not involve mortal sin. Op. Ox. II, Dist. XXXIII, Q. i, and Q. V. Vd. also, Rashdall, "Idea of Atonement", pp. 385-386. On Original Sin 'formaliter' and 'naturaliter', vd. Op. Ox. II, Dist. XXXII, Q. unic. 7. 'Formaliter' it is "carentia iustitiae originalis". (Cf. Seeberg, op. cit. Note 1). 'Naturaliter' it is "concupiscencia" - "pronitas in appetita rationali, id est in voluntate, ad concupiscendum delectabilia."

Op. Ox. II, Dist. XXV, E. "Unde manifestum (immoderate.) est, quod praeter alias poenitentiales pro peccato illo, incurrit homo poenam in corruptione et depressione liberi arbitrii. Per illud namque peccatum naturalia bona in ipso homine corrupta sunt et gratuita abstracta. .......Vulneratus quidem in
This optimistic view of human nature enables him to assert that the human will had not lost the power of co-operating with the Spirit in the work of redemption. So far a Henry of Ghent might have gone, but the generality of theologians would not have been likely to go thus far, and still less the whole distance with Scotus. For the latter maintained that not only can man in mortal sin obey divine precept and prepare himself to receive grace, but also that God could, of His 'absolute power', let man's satisfaction be adequate without any addition.

It is true that Scotus condemned the Pelagian position, but the very fact that here we have such a hypothesis is illuminating. There is no exaggeration, in the face of such speculation as the foregoing, in the assertion that this particular

naturalibus bonis, quibus non est privatus, alioquin non posset fieri reparatio: Spoliat us vero gratuis, cuae per gratiam naturalibus addita fuerant. Faec sunt data optima et dona perfecta: quorum alia sunt corrupta per peccatum, id est, naturalia: ut ingenium, memoria, intellectus: alia subtrahita, id est, gratuia, quanquam et naturalia ex gratia sint. Ad generallem Dei quippe gratiam pertinent, Sed tamen huinsmodi sit distinctio, cum gratiae vocabulum ad speciem, non ad genus refertur. Corrupta est ergo libertas arbitrii per peccatum: et ex parte perdita. Unde Augustinus in Euch. Libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se perdidi et Ipsum. Cum enim libero arbitrio peccaretur, victore peccatum amissum est et liberum arbitrium. A quo enim quis devictus est, hunc servus addictus est. Ecce liberum arbitrium dicit hominem amississe: non quia post peccatum habuit liberum arbitrium, sed quia libertatem arbitrii perdidit: non quidem omnem, sed libertatem a miseria et a peccato."

1. Henry of Ghent died in 1293. Vd. the article by Schulz in the "Kendleyklopadie".

2. Op. Ox. II, Dist. XXVIII, c. iii. "Respondetur quod existenti in peccato mortali possibile est servare praeceptum, non autem ut manet in peccato; sed possibile est preparare et dispropere se ad gratiam, quia data potest servare praeceptum."

On the sufficiency of man's satisfaction without Christ's sacrifice, vd. Op. Ox. IV, Dist. XV, c. i, i. "Satisfactionem hominis posse esse aequalam peccato, secluso Christo, de potentia Dei absoluta."
hypothesis of man's sufficiency apart from Christ is a parent of the later intellectual reconstruction of the sixteenth century.

This line of theorizing was to be surprisingly fruitful, and Harnack has so well pointed out the possibilities that a fairly full quotation from him is not out of place here.

"...the course of scientific development came to be helpful to the Church, and we may almost say that the Church here gathered figs of thistles. The assiduous study of Aristotle, and the keener perception gained through philosophy and observation, weakened the confidence of the theologians regarding the rationality and strict necessity of the revealed articles of faith. They began to forego revising them by means of reason and subordinating them as component parts of a system to a uniform thought. Their scientific sense was strengthened, and when they now turned to the revealed tenets, they found in them not necessity, but arbitrariness. Moreover, the further they advanced in psychology and secular science and discovered what cognition really is, the more sceptical they became towards the "general": ......They began to part with their inward interest in the general, and their faith in it. The "idea", which is to be regarded as "substance", and the "necessity" of the general, disappeared for them; they lost confidence in the knowledge that knows everything. The particular, in its concrete expression, acquired interest for them: will rules the world, the will of God and the will of the individual, not an incomprehensible

substance, or a universal intellect that is the product of construction. This immense revolution is represented in medieval science by Duns Scotus, the acutest scholastic thinker; but only with Occam did it attain completion."

"We should expect that the result of this revolution would have been either a protest against the Church doctrine, or an attempt to test it by its foundations, and to subject it to critical reconstruction. But it was 200 years before these results followed, in Socinianism on the one hand, and in the Reformation theology on the other. What happened at first was quite different: there was a strengthening of the authority of the Church, and along with full submission to it, a laying to its account of the responsibility for the articles of faith and for the principles of its practice. What was once supported by reason in league with authority must now be supported by the latter alone."

As Harnack, and Baur before him, pointed out, therefore, the

1. Baur, "Vorlesungen über die Christliche Dogmengeschichte", Vol. II, p. 235. "The thorough reasonableness of the ecclesiastical faith, or the conviction that for all doctrines of the ecclesiastical system some kind of rationes can be discovered, by which they are established even for the thinking reason, was the fundamental presupposition of Scholasticism. But after Scholasticism had risen to its highest point in Thomas and Bonaventura, it became itself again doubtful of this proposition. This very important turning point in the history of Scholasticism, after which it tended increasingly to fall to pieces, is represented by Duns Scotus."

(This excellent translation is that given in the footnote of Harnack, Vol. VI, p. 161.)

2. Fock, "Der Socinianismus", 1847, p. 64, says, on the weight of ecclesiastical authority, when speaking of Scotus' denial of "necessity" (as against St. Anselm), "Die Notwendigkeit ist nur eine äusserliche, weil die Kirche ihrer Zeit verstanden werden."

A salutary warning against 'reading backwards' later opinions into Scotus - i.e., those of the Reformation period - has been uttered by R. Seeberg, "Die Theologie des J. D. S.", p. 142. "Aber was er will, kann doch nur in Rahmen der Kirche seiner Zeit verstanden werden."
logical consequence of regarding theology as a "praktische" rather than a "spekulative Wissenschaft" - to use Loofs' language above quoted - was to throw more weight on ecclesiastical authority regarded as the conserver of correct dogma. The Socinians unanimously repudiated any such ecclesiastical authority, and yet, strange as it may appear, repudiated neither the Scotist conception of faith, nor the method peculiar to that form of Scholasticism of regarding that in which faith rested - Holy Writ.

Hence, before leaving behind this brief sketch of the Scotist theology in so far as we are concerned with it here, the attitude of Duns towards faith and the Scriptures alone remains to be touched upon.

The Scotist emphasis upon theology's being a "practical science", rather than a "speculative" one such as Aquinas maintained, quite naturally led to a greater insistence upon the need for faith in the things we could not know. Earlier Scholasticism had always maintained the existence of revealed knowledge - a "datum" and never an "acquisitum" - but Scotus came, chiefly through his view of God as the Dominium Absolutum, to throw the revealed into such prominence that faith, if never really more than antithetic to sight in his system, came in Nominalism to be antithetic to knowledge. This is well illustrated by Duns' treatment of immortality, for he opposes Aquinas by denying the possibility of reason's establishing the immortality of the soul.

This antithesis of the "natural" and the "revealed" is perpetuated in the conception of faith as two-fold. A certain type of faith is universal. In conformity with the high valuation placed on man, this "fides acquisita", as it is called, is regarded as no mean thing. It is by "acquired faith" that man can believe that God is true, greater than all men, and indeed, by it he may, without any other type of faith, submit to everything revealed by God. The other type of faith is not, however, reduced to uselessness by reason of this insistence upon "fides acquisita", even though this latter receives such emphasis and is made by Scotus the prerequisite of the second type. For all practical purposes, the difference between "fides acquisita" and "fides infusa", as this second type is called, is seen to be of degree and not of kind. For "fides infusa" is 'more certain than acquired (faith)', and whereas in the initial stage one could believe in the oneness of God, on being infused with faith, one could believe in both the Oneness and the Trinity.


"Praeterea fides infusa si ponitur, est certior (Fides..." quan acquisita...... huic, Deum esse trimum et unum, assentio fide infusa (si ponitur) quia hoc revelatum est a Deo: sed hoc esse revelatum credo, quia Ioannes, vel alius Apostolus di- xit hoc revelatum est a Deo: sed si audivissem eum asserentem hoc sibi esse revelatum, credidissem sibi fide acquisita, cre- dendo scilicet, ipsum esse veracem et nihil falsum velle asse- rere: igitur et modo credo fide acquisita ex auditu Scriptu- rarum, vel lectione, esse revelatum Apostolo, Deum esse trimum et unum: igitur tota firmitas, quam ponis in hoc modo in Fide infusa, est a fide acquisita: ergo non videtur ponenda Fides infusa modo supra posito."
Once again we seem to be on the threshold of a theological revolution. By "fides acquisita" we can arrive at belief in the oneness of God, and "fides acquisita" can of itself suffice. Why introduce then a "fides infusa", different in degree only, and belief in the Trinity which this latter faith type of faith enables us to reach? Because, in the first place, Duns would hold


Op. Ox. III, Dist. XXIII, c. un. 5. "Praeterea, ad Roman IO (note again the predilection for Pauline support), quomodo credunt ei, quem non audiverunt? quomodo audient sine praedicante? quomodo praedicabant, nisi mittantur? Igitur secundum Apostolum, fides est ex auditu; auditus autem est ex praedicante: praedicare autem nullus potest, nisi mittantur: igitur secundum Apostolum, non potest homo credere, nisi audiat aliquem praedicantem sibi credibilita. Hoc argumentum non valet, nisi locueretur de fide acquisita: quia haec fides generatur in homine, ex hoc quod audit verba praedicantis, achingendo fidem dictis suis, cuia non oportet quemlibet talem esse bonum moraliter per charitatem infusum, sed potest esse in peccato mortali: et audiendo praedicantem, et videndi miracula fieri, credit ei, et hoc, cuia distat sibi naturaliter ratio, quod Deus non assistit falsitatis alculius, operando miracula ad falsa alculius praedicata, vel dicta: igitur fides illa praesedit charitatem, et per consequens est acquisita, quia infusa non infunditur, nisi cum charitate."

Op. Ox. III, Dist. XXIII, c. un. 6. "Secundo de fide infusa, quomodo sit ponenda in nobis, tamen potest dici, quod fides infusa similis est in aliquo fidei acquisitae, immo in multis. Non sicut fides acquisita assentit, vel credit dicto alculius, quia credit veracitati assentientes illud. Et quia quod Deus asservat, supernaturaliter revelet, ideo fides assentiens tali revelato, quia assentit veracitati revelantis, est habitus supernaturale: revelat autem credibili, quando infundit habitum. Et hoc modo dicendo, fides non habet certitudinem ex objecto, sed ex veracitati testis, scil. Dei. Et hoc modo facile est videre, quomodo fides est cum aemginitate, et obscuritate; quia habens fidem non credit articulis esse verum ex evidentia objecti, sed propter hoc, quod assentit veracitati infundentis habitum, et in hoc revelantis credibilita."


"esse verum, sic fides infusa assentit alculius revelato, quia credit Deo, vel veracitati assentientes illud."
that, even though its presence in anyone is not demonstrable, "fides infusa" is taught by both the Scriptures and the Fathers. In the second place, since faith of either type is "assen-sus" to the precepts either of Scripture or of the Church, this biblical or ecclesiastical positivism is regulative of both types of faith, and cannot be questioned. If this Scotist conception of such a dominant ecclesiastical authority was repudiated in the later intellectual revolution, the Scotist conception of faith and the Bible was not.

It is as an armoury of texts that the Bible is primarily regarded, but whereas that attitude persisted, all the eight principal ways of establishing Scripture to the confutation of heretics did not. The fifth of these eight ways is, however, interesting

2. Op.Ox.III,Dist.XXIII,G. "Ut enim Augustinus alibi ait, (Credi-mus ut cognoscamus, non cognoscimus ut credamus. Quid enim est fides, nisi credere quod non vides? Fides ergo est, quod non vides credere, veritas quod credidisti videre.)
Ibid.,6.un. "...certum est, quod in nobis est fides revelatorum credibilitum acquisitata. Quod patet per Augustinum in epistola contra fundamentum manichaei, cui dicit, quod non credidit Evangelica, sed dominabitur metas. Scaredissa semper concursius, nisi credunt Ecclesiae Catholicae. ... Credo igitur fide acquisitata Evangelica, quia Ecclesia tenet Scripturam veracem; quod ego audiens acquiri nihii habitum credendi dictis illorum."
3. For the antithesis between faith and sight he falls back on the authority of St. Paul, and for the category of those things in which we must have faith, on the authority of St. Augustine. To the teaching of Bible or Church we must give our assent. This conception of faith as assent to certain propositions it is particularly necessary to notice because it was to persist among later Reformers.
Op.Ox.III,Dist.XXIII,B. "Fides est virtus, qua creduntur quae non videntur." (One should hardly need to suggest that in the whole period before us the Pauline authorship of Hebrews could not be questioned.) "Quod tamen non de omnibus, quae non videntur, accipiendum est: sed de his tantum quae credere, ut ait Augustinus, ad Religionem pertinent. Multa enim sunt, quae si Christianus ignoret, nihil metuendum est; quia non a Religione deviat." Cf. also ibid., H. Luther (In Gal. xii, Weimar ed.xi, pp.223-229) "Fides est quaedam cognitio quae nihil videt."
Seeberg, op.cit., p.138. Belief as "intellektive Assensus zur Lehre der Schrift...."
because it did survive and reappeared strongly among the Socinians. This was the accordance of the Scriptures with reason.

In his discussion of the seventh "way" he introduces the conception of the stability of the Church, and notwithstanding the plea for reasonableness above mentioned, clearly it is ecclesiasticism that matters most for Scotus. In making the Scriptures appear at the bar of reason he foreshadowed the Socinians and alienated the Reformers: by his exaltation of the visible Church he alienated both. For not only was the Church docens a parallel authority with Scripture, but also, as the

I. These eight ways ('viae') are given in ProL Cp. Ox. II, ii.

i. Prophetic pronouncement. "... solus Deus potest naturaliter, non at alio, futura contingentia certitudinaliter praevericere; ergo solus ille, vel at ii loc instructus, potest ex certitudinaliter praedicere."

ii. Concordance of Scripture. "In non evidentibus ex terminis, nec ex principiis evidentium habentibus, non consonant firmiter et infallibiliter multi diversimodis disposita, nisi a causa superiori ipsorum intellectus inclinatur ad assensum: sed Scriptores sacri Canonis variè dispositi, et diversis temporibus existentes, in talibus non evidentes omni consonant. Hanc viam pertractat Aug. I8. de Civil., c. 41...." He goes on to maintain that the reason for agreement is non-existent without revelation.

iii. Authority of the writers unimpeachable.

iv. Acceptance of those books alone in the Canon written by Prophets and not men.

v. Reasonability. "Ex istis quasi ex principiis practicis, alia practica consequuntur in Scriptura tradita, honesta, et rationi consone, sicut de eorum rationabilitate potere potest singillatim pertractanti de Praeceptis, Consiliis, et Sacramentis: quia in omnibus videtur esse quasi quaedam explicatio legis naturae, quae secundum Apostolum ad Roman. 2. scripta est in cordibus vostris."

vi. Christ's coming as the fulfilment of prophecy. "Christum etiam advenisse, et ita novum Testamentum ab eo principaliter promulgatum siquit authenticum fere recipiendum,..." Lychetus (the Commentator on Scotus in Wadding's edition) says that such arguments could be used against the "irrationabilia, contra lumen naturale," e.g. that God is the author of sin. Vd. Calvin, Institutes, XVIII, §§ 3 & 4.

vii. The stability of the Church.

viii. Proof from miracles. "Deus invocatus a praedicante Scripturam, ut ostenderet doctrinam eius esse veram, fuit alliquidopus sibi proprium, utpote miracula, ac per hoc testificatus est illud esse verum, cuoc iste praeedavit."
definer of the Canon and guardian of the interpretation of Scripture, that authority soon became the sole one. How that vast ecclesiastical system, at its height when Scotus was born, continued ominously to crack in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is a long story and has an interest for us necessarily one-sided. The heretical speculation of the Cathari was driven underground by the agents of the medieval Church, among whom were Scotus' own Order. But speculation different from, and far more dangerous potentially than that of earlier defeated heresy, originated within the Church, and in the very Order created to weaken heresy by regulating life under ecclesiastical surveillance. Our tracing of the later speculation will therefore be concerned largely with the liberation of the Scotist germs down to the Reformation.


Rashdall, "Idea of Atonement", p. 388, in his discussion of Nominalism says, "Authority completely took the place alike of reason and of morality."
Chapter III.

Subsequent medieval Speculation, with especial Reference to Hamartiology:

In the course of one of his works composing his well-known trilogy, Dr. F.R. Tennant, the pioneer in the twentieth century study of the doctrine of Original Sin and problems connected therewith, says;

"...the idea of moral personality, in terms of which theology has been wont exclusively to formulate its doctrine of the origin of sin, emerged extremely late in human thought. May we not almost say indeed that it appeared with Christianity, to be lost again, to a large extent, for centuries; and its partial rediscovery from the partial oblivion into which it had fallen during the middle ages was one of the mainsprings of the Reformation movement?"

It is primarily with such a rediscovery that we are here concerned, and that chiefly because it is with Scotus that Scholastic speculation of a type only too much abused hitherto, but certainly most fruitful, can be said to begin. On no side is the contribution of later Scholastics more considerable than on that of anthropology, as against the dominant theology of earlier Scholasticism, and on no side is it more revolutionary than on that of hamartiology. Partly because of this; partly because analysis now generally superseded those earlier attempts at synthesis witnessed from Lombard to Scotus; and partly because of its vast importance in the education and theology of the later Luther, it would appear best to begin with some outline of hamartiological and kindred speculation down to, and including especially, Ochino.

Ficker has very aptly suggested that Scotus was a medieval Janus: how he faced towards the future has already been
pointed out in our indication of his deviation from Aquinas, Anselm, and Augustine. (The further and highly significant extension of the anti-Augustinian drive by the University of Paris on the ground of the Immaculate Conception hypothesis must be dealt with later and more fully.) If St. Paul made much of the necessity for repair by the second Adam of the deprivations wrought by the fall of the first Adam, and the Church's Office for Holy Saturday made much, and illuminating, use of this piece of theology, Duns and his successors made very light of the first Adam. The acute criticism which made man's sinlessness in Eden simply a potentiality obtained in Scotus a prospect of survival. There was not, however, in subsequent Scotist-Nominalist speculation on this subject much more than tentative, albeit highly dangerous, suggestion: a direct accusation of Pelagianism was naturally to be avoided, as is sufficiently clear from reference to Mayronis (d. 1325), and even to Occam (d. ?1349).

Beyond a verbal repudiation of Pelagianism, however, one will look in vain for any alliance with either Augustinianism or Thomism in this matter. Those for whom Augustine was supreme would place the origin of human sinfulness in a first sin having devastating effect and bearing the traditional label - 'mortal'. But not so Scotus: for him, Adam committed lighter or venial offences before committing the great sin with which a traditional theology ever connects his name. Reference has already been made in the last chapter to Duns' insistence on Adam's sin being other than an offence against the natural law, and it remains here merely to supplement this by emphasis on Scotus'
treatment of 'the power of fallen man's free will, grace having been circumscribed.' Once again, the verbal repudiation of Pelagianism, accompanied by the quoting of Augustine, to all appearances save a desperate situation: this desperate position is only further redeemed by his abandonment of his own independent speculation in such a context as that supplied by his treatment of the matter in relation to an ecclesiastical ordinance - Baptism.

The attack by Scotus on a venerable theory of original sin - which sin, Aquinas believed, corrupted the human nature itself - was carried on boldly by Scotus, and continued by his successors. Scotus himself maintained that original sin was not a necessity, otherwise avoidance of it would never have been possible. But, just as he sails nearer the wind in the matter of Baptism, so he seeks by a skillful use of simile to retain a Pauline argument together with something reminiscent of Thomism to avoid a dangerous situation in the matter of the transmission of sin from Adam to his successors. In this place there is a marked inclination to subordinate corruption of nature to corruption of soul in that which is transmitted.

Italian Franciscans quickly followed Duns, not only in the matter of philosophical method, but also by commenting on their eminent predecessor - that characteristically medieval method of canonizing in academic circles a pioneer in religious thought.

The first - da Alessandria - was a Scholastic who embarked on what is for us of the first importance, and what will be treated shortly at more considerable length, namely, speculation on Mariology. The second, Landulfo Caracciolo, taught at Paris, and he
is referred to as 'Scoti auditor' (Wadding, p. 235.).

However, just as Italian theological schools were ever subordinate in the Middle Ages to Paris and Oxford, so too, Italians generally followed the lead of English or French pioneers. Far above the two Italians above mentioned stand Scotus, and his mighty successor in the sphere of hamartiology — the Englishman, William of Occam, who died probably a year before Caracciolo.

The weight placed by Occam on the independence and isolation of the individual surpassed Scotus', and never was exceeded by any standing within the remarkably broad lines of medieval orthodoxy. Augustine, with his particular philosophical background, contributed greatly to that theory of a bond between Adam and the succeeding race which made the race participate in Adam's sin. Alexander of Hales probably began the Scholastic deviation from Augustine, but it was reserved for Occam to begin the shattering of the theory of a "great world-suffering imposed on us for our purification and punishment", as Tröltzsch called it, the presupposition of the Church's ordinances of redemption. Occam threw Pelagianism out of the window of orthodoxy's room, and then re-introduced it at the door. For although, like Scotus in the matter of Baptism as elsewhere, he repudiated Pelagianism, Occam went beyond the Scotist position in reinstating the ejected. Even verbally, the parallel with Pelagius is striking, as was pointed out by Loofs.

The extension of the boundaries consequent upon the minimizing of original sin, and the ascription to man 'ex puris na-
turalibus' - an abstraction assisting one to discriminate sharply between the spheres of nature and grace - of remarkable potentialities, was the work of the Nominalists, and of men other than Occam, and even of Orders other than the Franciscan. Hence, the voluminous Carmelite writer, Baconsthorp (d. 1346), states the "more common view of original sin," but places that sin simply in an aversion from God. The consequences of the growth of this Nominalist supremacy have been pointed out by Harnack, as well as by other scholars of repute. It remains for us to point out the further development on a wide scale of the theory of exception to the Augustinian all-embracing condemnation. The medieval "anthropologists" began by minimizing effects of the fall with the aid of a philosophy elevating voluntarism. Occam furthered Scotus by maintaining that the faculty of the will was less prejudiced by the fall than even Scotus had held, and that man "ex puris naturalibus" was consequently capable of action unprejudiced by an Adamic sin. Even fomes, or concupiscence, is for Occam a mere bodily defect, and to fomes' account he puts such normal phenomena as sleeping, etc. This does not mean that these stages were strictly chronological: a date does not fix the origin of an idea, and subsequent development is an obscure and frequently highly complex process defying accurate tracing. Nowhere is this more clear than in the instance of the third stage where that abstraction, man "ex puris naturalibus," gives place to a specific historical personage.

The philosophical background of the last change was well prepared in the first quarter of the fourteenth century for this
transition from theory to fact. Jean de Jandun (d. 1328), whether or not closely connected with the University of Paris, is of primary interest here as an ardent advocate of the theory which maintains the identity of possibility and reality. Such a theory de Jandun derived from the Arabian commentator on Aristotle - Averroes - and it is of the utmost importance to notice the persistence in the north of Italy of that same Averroism which maintained this particular theory of identity. Petrus Aureolus (d. 1345) exhibited the tendency to synthesize Scotism and Averroism, and a veritable Averroist school sprang up at Padua. There, Pietro d'Abano taught, and, in the fifteenth century, Urbano da Bologna (d. 1405), and Paolo da Venezia (1429). The Averroistic teaching was given down to Reformation times in this part of Italy, and Italian commentators appeared in the seventeenth century.

Another who apparently maintained this theory of identity, and who belonged to that vast Order of Italian origin to which both Scotus and Occam belonged, was Mayronis. This Franciscan was not, however, as unfortunate as the Averroists in being condemned, nor were his theories so reprehensible as the Occamist teaching which his Alma Mater so roundly condemned in 1339 and 1340. For Mayronis' theory appears in the one instance where popular superstition, on the one hand, had desired it, and where, on the other, the growing anti-Augusto-Thomist tide of Paris reached its height.

The Augustinian position, stated briefly at the beginning of the present chapter, which maintained the contingency of the Incarnation on the Fall, gave way, at an increasing rate from Abelard's
time, to the idea of the historic Incarnation as a necessary event foreseen from eternity. And yet, in those circles where this occurred, the idea of a balance, or compensation, reappeared with great effects. Only the instance was different. As Benrath and Harnack have very pertinently pointed out, the Virgin Mary early came into prominence in religious devotion, and she "obtained her chief, her positively dogmatic significance, from the fact that the dogma of the Incarnation became the central dogma of the Church." Medieval superstition could here exercise itself upon ground possessed of a weighty tradition. But neither it, nor the practical monk's religion, kept Mary on earth: mental processes on this level did as they did with Jesus, and the object was theologized into a part of the popular pantheon. Among the theologians, Scotus continued the paving of St. Ambrose's way for greater things: having rejected the idea of balance or compensation in the instance of the first Adam and the second, he made the sin of Eve greater than that of the first Adam, and thus cunningly suggested the possibility of compensation through Mary. She thus became officially recognized as an absolute intermediary. But here Scotus' theological background is definitely not that behind the ideas of popular religion of his time; nor is his motive that of later ages. As he himself did not arrive at a full statement of belief in Mary's "greatest dignity" - the "Immaculate Conception" - so too he only went so far as he did in this direction because of the need for Biblical support of his theory of (1) God's absolute power, and (2) the minimization of the effects of Original Sin.
These two primary considerations are the context: as context conditions content, it will become clearer that, among the later Scotists in particular, the immaculate conception theory is seen from the end of anthropology, and not of theology. Indeed, it is true to say that, outside the Franciscan Order, in the most influential schools of medieval Western Christendom, statements in favour of this doctrine were rightly considered by the Augustinians to be the thin and venerable end of a larger and much less respectable wedge. Hence, it is not so much devotion to Mary as it is these other considerations which make it possible for Mayronis to say that God "made worthy" Mary, and therefore, "made" Mary's immaculate conception a reality.

Notwithstanding plausible arguments in favour of this transition from possibility to reality in the instance of the immaculate conception of Mary, representatives of the Dominican Order were not disposed to accept the theology which found its major contention propped up by the doctrine of Mary's especial privilege. The opportunity for driving out these obnoxious Dominicans, for elevating the seculars above the regulars - and the University of Paris with its official theology above all rivals - presented itself at the end of the fourteenth century in the trial of de Montesano.

Members of the Dominican Order had already made themselves objectionable to the University. Feret records the names of those who, in the dominant theological school of Western Europe, wrote at length on Mary's privilege. Their speculations, giving wider currency to the theory making original sin to consist simply of a lack of supernatural graces in all but one historic creature
Mary were as highly esteemed in Paris as the Dominican views, with the refusal of such honour to Mary and the love of Augusto-Thomism, were detested. In 1362, Eschacier and Bosco were tried by Inquisitors for having preached that those erred "who held that the Virgin Mary was conceived without original sin", and that, had she died before Christ's Passion, she would have descended to Hell.

However strongly these unfortunate Dominicans propounded their unpopular view, they cannot have surpassed in intensity the language Paris used in condemning it, and the enthusiasm of that Theological Faculty in advocating the opposite opinion. The Dominicans were accused of having erred "in the faith, both against the faith and against Holy Scripture". But it was reserved for de Monteseno to fight the last great rearguard action of the Dominicans in 1367; says Denifle, "That age to which we have come, was the saddest for the Dominican teachers of Paris."

There were, according to the Theological Faculty, fourteen propositions maintained by de Monteseno calling for revocation under pain of excommunication. Those particularly relevant to the present discussion are (IO-I2). De Monteseno would maintain (IO) that Christ alone was exempt from the taint of original sin, and brings Mary down to that anthropological level (II) where the main battle was to be fought. It is of the highest significance to note that, on the one hand, de Monteseno insists upon the possibility of finding ten exceptions, if one is allowed, from the taint of original sin, and asserts this opinion's consonance with Scripture (I2). On the other hand, the University
investigators exhibit a tendency to meet the major objection by citing from Scripture a second historic instance of exception from the taint - i.e. Eve. Whatever Scotus, or some of his successors, who rated her sin as worse than that of Adam, would have thought of this pairing of Eve and Mary, it would be interesting to know. Clearly, the aim of official theologians here is to give further scope to a 'law of exception': the primary concern is only too obviously not mario-latry.

It is of the greatest importance to notice also another point which appears strongly in the subsequent revocations imposed on mendicants by the University of Paris. Scripture was less emphasized by the Paris judges than by the successors of Aquinas who always knew their ground so well. Further reference must be made to the use of Scripture; it is here sufficient to suggest that the appeal to tradition is as striking in this de Monteseno case as it is weighty. Nor is it that dead weight which Loisy knew so well how to describe. Tradition held an authority from accumulated experience of the past, but further experience was providing the opportunity for further speculation. Not only did Paris Doctors acquire sufficient importance to make room for their modernism in medieval Catholicism, but they also did what no other University has done since: in Fashdall's words,

"Again and again Paris led the way and Rome followed."

There can be no doubt, in the face of the documentary evidence, that not only Aquinas' views, but those of general tradition, on Mary's infection with original sin, were repudiated. The University repudiated the charge of its ignorance of Aquinas, but
its official acts show a repudiation both of Aquinas and of his Augustinian theories in this matter. The Nominalists, the advocates of the 'via moderna', were on top at the turn of the century: one of the greatest of them, the Chancellor of the University, Pierre d'Ailli (d. 1420) who was, according to Perret, "charged by it to defend the cause of the great privilege of the Mother of God", only too significantly throws on one side the subject of original sin in his very full Commentary on the Sentences. It is in such as he that we find that tacit repudiation of Papal correction of theological aberrations, as we find also a harsher repudiation of Papal control in the period of the Conciliar movement. And notwithstanding the progress of a return to Thomism in the later XV century, Seeberg rightly refers to the history of the University of Paris in that century as the record of a struggle between Nominalists and Realists. Hence, in 1474, whilst among the proscribed writers d'Ailli and Occam stand together, the same royal decree authorizes Averroes alongside Aquinas. A royal edict of 1481 allowed the Nominalist stream to flow unchecked again.

Although this academic battle went on to the knife between two schools of thought in the University, the uninitiated only had an insight into it when the pet academic theory of the dominant party bore a superficial resemblance to medieval superstition about Mary. This partial view helped forward the idea of the University as the one stable factor in a political situation where more than one Pope claimed the allegiance of a distracted Continent and, in so doing, proclaimed from the house-tops the shattering of the terrestrial Ptolemaic system - the
medieval Church. The university may have borne a resemblance to one of the contending Popes: it may, in other words, have worn the aspect of an appendage of a rising and powerful state instead of that of an impartial tribunal. But there were in the later Middle Ages no migrations from Paris such as there were from Rome, and Gerson was a superior man to any of the rivals for the See of Peter. Moreover, it was not only the rôle played by the University in the Conciliar Movement that reminded men of her supremacy. She expelled Dominicans and restored them on her own terms: within her walls, officials used extravagant language about the preceptor of the Church which sounds almost like academic couesism. And other Universities (numbers of which sprang up in the Europe of the XV century), other men than French, did not question her supremacy but did her homage: from her in particular Nominalism ran round Europe. From other Universities Paris stood out in dignified isolation. She even appeared to consider herself responsible for the purity of the faith in the matter of de Montesoso at Toulouse, whilst at the same time punishing appeals to the Pope from the Dominican Order.

It is, therefore, on the one hand of interest to note that Crevier records the great joy in the German nation at Paris at the change of mind in favour of Nominalism on the part of the king in 1481: on the other, it is interesting to see in the German, Biel of Tübingen (d. 1495), who was hailed as the "last of the scholastics", the explicit desire to perpetuate the theories of d'Ailly. Whereas Paris assumed, in the case of Bishop de Volan, the
correctness of her own interpretation, Biel went further along the same road and made Aquinas say the opposite in this matter of hamartiology to what the great Dominican actually maintained. It is true that deliberate misrepresentation of earlier Scholastic teaching in this manner merits all the hard things Denifle said of it, but there are some extenuating circumstances. Consistency was not the highest virtue in Occam, nor among subsequent exponents of the 'via moderna', if even less so in the Biel where pulpit and academic theology mix as well as oil and water. The most extenuating circumstance is, however, provided by the body which maintained its own infallibility almost five hundred years before the time of Pius IX, and did, with more right than that Pope urge that she was tradition — "La tradizione son io". Hence, whilst it is against Biel and Occamist teachers that Luther directed his 1517 "Disputatio" — this Nominalist environment being Luther's own educational one in Germany — the Reformer's protest is equally against the accusers of de Montesono, and therefore, against the dominant Parisian theology for over a century before Luther raised his voice.

If, however, as Grisar maintains in his work on Luther, "The teaching of the school of Occam deserves more careful examination than has hitherto been bestowed on it", it is only too certain that the influence of this teaching, and the persistence of Scotist elements, in other places merit equal examination. This applies only too obviously in the present context to northern Italy where, in that same fifteenth century, Bernardino da Siena, the central figure in this thesis, was born.
We have already commented on the enthusiasm for Averroism in those parts: we must now pass on to the remarkable influence exercised by Scotism in the fifteenth century, and perhaps of something even more striking than the Parisian theology. Italy may have lacked a Tübingen as a centre of Parisian theology, but the characteristic of that theology—Mary's especial privilege—had its chief support in theologians of Paris belonging to the very Order which was so strikingly Italian—the Franciscan.

Italian Franciscans included so many schoolmen attached to Scotism and the "via moderna" that we can almost say that, in an age when Italy appeared to have everything to teach the remainder of Europe, and nothing to learn therefrom, the fact of Italians learning from the northern barbarians is somewhat startling. It is, however, less so when proper attention is paid to the Italian Renaissance environment, an environment in which the cry of 'back to the sources' compelled attention to the study of all origins, and the consequent distrust of second-hand knowledge masquerading as commentaries such as Peter Lombard's. But is not this antagonistic to the life of the numerous Commentaries that Italians continued to produce right through the period comprising the rise and decline of the Italian Renaissance? Surely not: there must be discrimination between the form of, and deductions from, the material provided by previous systems. The Commentaries produced in the days after Scotus were, as has already been suggested, of no great merit: the powers of synthesis, at their best in the earlier Middle Ages, decreased, whilst
the powers of analysis exhibited by such as Occam and Valla rose, and that to the detriment of the whole medieval political and religious framework. Thus the academic theologians of far-away Paris, haughtily rejecting the Spanish Augustinianism of de Montesomo and his supporters, and proving by their own acts the fact of man 'ex puris naturalibus', aspire to fight the battle in heaven which the Italian Humanists fight on earth. Thus it is in congenial circumstances that the Protagorean dictum - "man is the measure of all things" - could gain wide currency in Italy, and the Humanist in that country could more easily conform yet disbelieve. The truth is that the sombre-coloured Augustinian-Scholastic bottle became increasingly weak in the long period of time through which it served, and the new wine poured in was of such strength as to precipitate the well-known fate. Some reference must, however, be made to the individual theologians of the dawning who constituted such wine as was later spilled in the unfortunate Ochino and the Socinian theologians generally.

Among the Franciscan Scholastics who witnessed the struggle leading to the exile from the University of Paris of the sister Order of Dominic were Massimiliano da Volterra (d.1405), and Guglielmo da Cantuaria (d. circa 1410). The former published "Lecturum doctam in Scriptura Oxoniense". Another Franciscan writer was Pietro Aquilano, who was sufficiently imbued with Scotism to be styled "Scotellus". It is interesting to notice the publication at Paris a century afterwards, in 1585, of a work by this writer bearing that name. At Padua in 1480, and at Venice
in 1484, his work, "QUESTIONES IN QUATTUOR SENTENTIARUM LIBROS, IUXTA EISDEM SCOTI DOCTRINA", appeared. He was as voluminous a writer as Stephen Boulever, whose works were published some years later at Basel and at Venice. This writer is of no little interest in view of Ochino's own subsequent development, for he produced a "LIBRUM DE SANCTA TRINITATE" which, according to Wadding, took due cognizance of mistaken ideas of the Trinity encouraged by the work of artists. He was a contemporary of Ochino (who was born in 1487), and not only delighted in Scotist approximations, but also interested himself in Scotist philosophy over a number of years. Another Italian Scotist was Samuele di Cassini, who produced "LIBRUM ISAGOGICUM IN APICES SEXTI AD INVESTIGANDA ARISTOTELIS PRINCIPIA" (Venice, 1493). He directed some of his attention to the Aristotelian philosophy, a point of considerable interest. For, although Aquinas may be said to have Christianized Aristotle in the interests of orthodoxy, the Aristotelian philosophers of Ochino's age at Padua and Bologna were often not of an orthodox turn of mind. If Nominalism helped on the conception of two sharply differentiated spheres of faith and reason, together with the dangerous doctrine that what is true for the one need not be so for the other, these Italian Aristotelians went to the lengths of claiming for philosophy an equal authority with theology. When it is recalled that these thinkers denied the existence of the Deity as conceived by Christian Theists, as well as the immortality of the soul, one need not be surprised that one of their number, Pomponazzi (d. 1525), was almost murdered.
An attempt at synthesis, or rather, at reconciliation of such antagonistic elements as existed in this period, was carried a step further by one who, unlike Cassini, sought to shew the fundamental resemblance between the Aquinas and the Scotus whom time had harshly severed. This academic feat was attempted by Francesco della Rovere, who died as Pope Sixtus IV three years before Ochino was born. Born, therefore, into an Italian world wherein questions of the synthesis of theological systems were being raised in the University and Papal palace alike, Bernardino grew within an environment where Scotus and Scotism continued to be the common ingredients of his intellectual food. The late Alexander Gordon summed up most aptly Ochino's relationship with this environment when he said that he "threw off his Capuchin's garb, but never doffed the Scotist vesture of his thought."

In the early years of the sixteenth century attempts at synthesizing, carried on largely by Scotists who were only too conscious of the return of Thomism, were continued by Porcuzio da Bagnacavallo (d. 1511). His studies resulted in commentaries on Scotus and on Aristotle. At the same time, Maurice of Ophibilla (d. circa 1514) was occupying himself advantageously with the study of theology at Padua. This interesting character was from beyond the Alps: an Irishman, whose very presence in northern Italy would appear to add additional testimony to the extent of Scotism in those parts, he devoted his attention to both the life and writings of the great Franciscan Scholastic. His works were published in both Italy and France. Yet another friar of foreign origin who concerned himself with Scotus in the same
period was Pelbart Oswald of Temesvar. Like the 'Synthetists', however, he looked beyond Scotus, but in particular to Bonaventura. His line of study is of considerable interest to us in this respect, namely, that he became Bonaventura eventually became the favourite theologian of the Cappuccini. In this Order, unto which Ochino passed over from the Observants and wherein he rose to the rank of General in 1538, the theology of the earlier Franciscan theologian was such as to commend itself to the less subtle but more evangelical adherents constituting the Capuchin Reform. Those who came into the Order in its earlier days were men whose theological studies had been pursued in their Franciscan period. But such eventually died, and the reception of novices into the Order demanded for the continuing stream of these an adequate training in the theological schools. Such training, partaking of the nature of a "praeparatio evangelica" rather than that of the general substance of all theological study, was carried on by the first Praelector, or master, of the Order's theological school—established naturally enough in Rome (and not northern Italy, or, as it would in an earlier age have been, in Paris) in 1567. This Praelector was Girolamo da Pistoia. Although Fr. Cuthbert may be correct in his assertion that in him there was a return to the long-neglected Bonaventura, it is of interest to note that if not on a wide scale in general Franciscanism of the early sixteenth century, nevertheless, in Pelbart Oswald there was a definite movement in that direction. It would seem, therefore, to be possible that Ochino had some acquaintance, if not with this Slav Franciscan himself,
at least with one of the principal objects of his speculation. The preference for Scotus, however, apart from these early isolated efforts at returning to his mystical predecessor, persisted among the Franciscan Observants and Conventuals. In 1517, Cardinal Grimani appeared in the dedication of "In 4 libros Sententiarum", a recension of de Busolius, who is described by Wadding as "Scoti Auditor". At the same time as this recension there appeared at Brescia "Commentaria in primum, secundum Scriptum Oxoniense Jo. Scoti" from the pen of a voluminous writer, Lychetus. This Lychetus became Minister General of the Franciscan Order in 1518, but seems to have come to the notice of Pope Leo X before the conferment of this high dignity. (It is interesting to notice that Uchino reached the corresponding dignity in the Capuchin Order, was known to a future Pope - Clement VII - and was also saturated in Scotism.) He also commented at length on the "Quodlibeta", and wrote on the fourth book of Lombard as well as on Aristotle's metaphysics. Notwithstanding the presence in the intellectual environment of elements conducive to a modification of Scotus' views - at least in the sphere of hamartiology - Lychetus exhibits no inclination to whittle down the doctrine of the Doctor Subtilis. There appeared also in the year 1517 the Commentary "In 4 Libros Sententiarum ad mentem Scoti" from the pen of a Frenchman, Giraldus of Aquitaine. The first edition of this work had been published in 1512.

It has already been suggested, in the references to connections subsisting between Franciscans and those in the highest ecclesiastical circles like Leo X and Cardinal Grimani, that the
Scotist doctrines were peculiarly welcome in such circles. Beginning, indeed, with Sixtus IV, it is of the highest importance to notice both this and the partiality among well-known Italian humanists for a medieval representation which could so well accord with their own Renaissance views. Hence, in Antonio Trombeta of Padua (d. 1519) we have a highly distinguished north Italian Scotist who attained to the Bishopric of Urbino, was called to the Lateran Council by Julius II, and was closely connected with that same Renaissance Cardinal, Pietro Bembo, who was a friend in turn of Bernardino Ochino. His interests were largely philosophical as is indicated by his list of works, which includes, "Quaestiones in metaphysicam", "De Futuris Contingentibus", and "Expositiones ad Formalitates Scoti ab Antonio Syrrecto editas". The "Syrrectus" upon whose edition Trombeta based his expositions was more concerned with the Scotist theology, and published "Isagogicas formalitates ad Scoti Theologiam". The oscillation between the philosophical and theological interests is visible elsewhere. The Slav, Bencovič, published at Pavia in 1520 his work on the "Logicalia Scoti": on the other hand, the theological interest is uppermost in Giovanni Vigerio, whose "Lecturam in librum primum Scripti Oxoniensis Scoti" was published at Venice in 1577. Exactly the same theological ground was covered in a work published by Rheginus (d. 1536), as it was by Lorenzo Spatta at the Order's College at Bologna. Wadding (p. 236) draws attention to this latter's close following of Scotus - "cuius doctrinam egregie callebat" - as he does to Antonio Santis', likewise an enthusiast for Scotist doctrine.
Just after the time of Ochino's apostasy, another enthusiastic expositor of Scotus rose to the exalted position of Minister General of the Conventuals. The Franciscan to be so promoted in 1543 was Bonaventura Pio, who produced the "Opuscula quaedam in Scoti doctrinam". A contemporary of this same Bonaventura Pio was de Grassi; he taught in this same area which Ochino knew so well, and brought out a shorter work which enjoyed sufficient popularity to run through two editions. The first edition of this work, the "Enchiridion scholasticum contradictionem Quodlibetalium Doctoris Subtilis", appeared in 1544, three years before the author's death, and the second in 1583.

The appearance at that later date of such a work would appear to suggest that the interest in Scotus survived to the end of the sixteenth century; the examination of Wadding's list reveals the fact that this interest among Italians prevailed until well on into the seventeenth century. For, the Conventual, Matteo Forchio, a master of Theology, exercised the professorial office at Padua, and published in that city and Bologna the results of an exhaustive study of the Scotist theology; such interest was manifested outside Italy, since Luís Rodriguez - albeit a philosopher - published in 1624 at Salamanca his Commentary on Scotus' system of Logic. Similar tendencies appeared in France and other countries. A parallel interest among members of the Franciscan Order in the philosophy of Averroes was also maintained in the later sixteenth century in northern Italy: here occur the names of Grillo (d. 1573), who taught at Padua, Poscio (d. 1580), and Marcorcio (d. circa 1592).
These names, together with several others supplied in Wadding's lists, are not of equal importance with those to which somewhat detailed reference has been made above. Reference has been made to these later tendencies in Scotist and Averroistic study, primarily in order that it may be abundantly clear that the environment in which Ochino studied and thought in his Italian days suffered no considerable alteration, notwithstanding that return of Thomism so largely encouraged by the Council of Trent, and the use to which Ochino subjected the Scotist theology. Of course, "abusus non tollit usum", and even Lutheran developments and distortions of later Scholasticism do not constitute a case for wholesale denunciation of the system wherein the German was trained. There is, however, in the matter of Ochino a highly important point to consider, and that is, his development of a heritage whose value he explicitly maintained.

Therefore, in view of such characteristics of the Parisian theology as we have noticed, it will be well to proceed with the study of Ochino's hamartiology, and his teaching on the place of the will. Such a study may indicate, not only his use of that Parisian theology and the anthropological basis derivable and much derived by him from, but also the largely consequent gap separating him from the general position of the Reformers.
Chapter IV.

Ochino's Hamartiology.

It is in the IVth part of the "Prediche" (that collection wherein the greater part of Ochino's systematic teaching is to be found) that Ochino comes to the discussion of the end for which God created man, and also of the Fall. The first predica begins in a way which will occasion no surprise: one who has seen the lofty towers of S. Gemignano, or contemplated a distant campanile standing out against a background of Italian countryside, will readily appreciate the Capuchin's description of the difficulty in the mind of the man who is to select the right path through the countryside to his objective, the tower.

Together with this Italian Renaissance characteristic there is present an appreciation for that revival of the 'humanities' ever associated with that Renaissance. Hence, the opportunity is not lost for a reference to Varro, who is quoted as saying that there were 288 different, and more or less erroneous, opinions as to the end for which God created man. Limiting his choice to a small area, Ochino chooses one theory of man's place in the Universe, states this, and then rejects it. For, in this particular rejected theory, man is regarded as the knot binding together two different worlds. He is, indeed, the third world whose non-existence would impair the reality and condue to the destruction of the whole. Man is thus of Protagorean stature: he is the measure, even the life, of all things. Interestingly enough, this theory is rejected because Ochino holds that the
world was created for man, and not man for the world. This same emphasis on anthropology appears in his rejection of two other explanations, the one maintaining that man might be a little mirror of the angels, and the other the totality in man of that universe to which God desired to unite Himself. Neither for angels nor for creatures was man created, but they for him. There follows what Ochino calls the "usual explanation" — actually Peter Lombard's — of man's end: he was created to know God, and, knowing Him, to love Him; thus loving Him, he might enjoy, possess, and take pleasure in Him, and thus might he be happy. But even this magnificent picture does not satisfy Ochino: God did not create man for himself, or for his own ultimate felicity, but for God, so that he with the angels might know, praise, thank, honour, and serve Him.

This rejection of the earlier Scholasticism, as represented by Lombard, in favour of that conception of God which was an important feature in the later Scholasticism of St. Thomas, is interesting. The "potentia Dei absoluta" received an emphasis in Scotus, in the Parisian theology, and therefore in the schools wherein Ochino was taught, which helped forward the conception of God as simply "Dominius Absolutum". Ochino, reinforced by the mysticism with which later Scholasticism was frequently dyed, as well as by the mysticism of the Valdesian party to which he belonged in Italy, exhibits this tendency towards such an emphasis: there is the one great Entity, God — Ens Realissimum — on the one hand; and on the other, the entity, man. The ellipse of doctrines centring in these two foci contains features which, at first sight, ill consort, and yet which exhibit some harmony.
when the foci are properly emphasized.

The same inclination towards mysticism, and towards that respect for intelligence - which remained respect notwithstanding variation in emphasis - common to all Scholasticism, appears again unmistakably in the second predica. Loss of intelligence constitutes the decline to bestiality, and such bestiality alone can be satisfied with earthly things. This satisfaction with earthly things occurs in this predica together with an exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, and the discourse ends on a note exceedingly reminiscent of Franciscan mystical piety: true felicity is to be experienced in self-humiliation and in recognizing every good thing to be of God. Love compels man to weep, and, so weeping, he finds himself happy. It is not surprising that a consideration of that blessing of which the mystic is capable leads, in the 3rd. predica of this series, to a discourse on the "dignity and excellence of the soul". "Creaturely glory" receives a tribute at the beginning of this predica which is as much a product of the Parisian theology as it is dissimilar to anything in the major Protestant Reformation systems. For, "with the light of the sun" i.e., with Christ on the Cross - the Christian "knows what the soul is much more perfectly", and moreover, such a death on the Cross has a purpose whose scope is concentrated, to the exclusion of all other objects, on the salvation of that soul. Two implications here are of no little importance: first of all, the Christian revelation on the Cross is of such a kind as to render the Christian better able to comprehend the soul - a more difficult, but not insuperable, task to others not using such a revelation.
The difference between those who make use of this additional device and those who do not is one of degree, and not of kind.

Secondly, there is less emphasis on Universalism than upon a mystical theology of signal value to such isolated individual reformers as Ochino himself eventually became in his flight beyond the Alps. There is absolutely no mention of an organized religious community, or Church, in these pages before us. It was for the individual soul that God created the world; for it that he planned the Incarnation, the life and death of Jesus, sent the Holy Ghost; and for it He will in the end judge the world. In the Ochian theology at this point, there is the simple statement that Jesus' death saved the soul, and thereby conferred upon it that immortality which the Paduan philosopher, Pomponazzi, would deny to it.

Equal emphasis on the soul's dignity is clear in an expression at the close of this predica which raises Ochino to the rank of one of the exponents of what Westcott called the "Eternal Gospel". Says Ochino, there would have been no Incarnation had not the soul been worthy of such an expression on the part of God as the most valuable life of Jesus.

The brief outline of important features in these first 3 prediche should serve to indicate the probability of a highly interesting development by Ochino of the problems associated with hamartiology and the freedom of the will. He begins his main discussion of these problems in the 4th predica, which bears the title—"How it is true that man was created in the image of God, how he lost it, and how he recovers it."
This predic is begins in a manner well known to Scholastics generally: a theory is cited as propounded by him, or those from whom the writer next proceeds to express his disagreement. Ochino supplies no names, but makes only too obvious a reference to that theory of a "vulneratio naturae" which puts Aquinas into one camp, and suggests that he himself is in another. It is not necessary here, in view of discussion in the earlier chapters, to make a large digression into an examination of the Augusto-Thomist position; it only remains to point out that Ochino mentions primeval man's actual ability to know, to be able to do good, and to will, in the sight of God, as contained in that position's thesis. Another theory is cited. Just as the Father generates the Word by means other than that traditionally known as the will of the flesh, so man before the Fall turned his back on the creaturely and his face towards God. In this theory there is enunciated clearly that doctrine so reminiscent of Abelard, which is in sharp conflict with the idea of Christ's death as an expiatory sacrifice: "Man is reformed through Christ crucified, who, when perceived by us through faith, draws our thoughts and live towards God."

The third theory to which reference is made would hold that man was made in the image of God on the rational, "concupiscible," and "irascible" sides; so equipped, man originally loved his Master wisely as the one reality in the Universe. On the "concupiscible" side, man loved his Creator to the exclusion of all others, and on the "irascible" side in such a way that his separation from the love of God was impossible, there being in
him that divine light and power favour. This primitive rationality collapsed at the instance of the serpent's temptation; ordered desire ended with the beauty and sweetness of the apple, and the "irascible", being mal-directed, was crushed in sensuality. The wisdom of God, being communicated to us through His Son, restores the rational, the Holy Spirit's sweetness readjusts the "concupiscible", and God's power manifested through the sweetness of the Incarnation restores the third element's direction. Before his fall, just as everything is subject to God, so self and all created things were subject to man. "Christ on the Cross" effects that restoration in which are restored the two sides and their mutual relationship destroyed by the rebellion of man and creatures: man returns to God's subjection, and all below man returns once more unto its original lord.

Yet another view maintained that God impressed Himself upon the face and upon the upper portions of the soul, by means of the great light radiating from Himself. This image was "deformed" when eyes were lowered to the things of earth, and the reformation took the form of a re-raising of the eyes through Christ to the Father.

Yet another view. This same philosophy and a kindred symbolism, offering a marked contrast between the things of earth and those of heaven, appear in the fifth proposition. Here the symbol is a mirror, and the development of the picture is something of an echo of the St. Paul of I Corinthians 13. When the mirror is polished, all reflected in it is lit up: thus does the image of God shine in every purged (purgata) soul. Before the Fall, souls
were not thoroughly purged (non purgatissime) and were neither
turned to God nor impressed with His image. "Deformation" re-
sulted when souls were turned to the world, and reformation when
they returned through Christ to God.

As though to complete his survey, Chino goes on to a sixth
theory - "Truuo anco chi dice". God created the soul in excep-
tional love, and therefore, in His own image: being deformed in sin-
ning, the soul fell from divine love into self-love, and reformation
through Christ, whose love was such as to cause Him to give Him-
self up for His neighbour, took place.

The interest in Paulinism which is manifest in his statement
of the positive content of his belief is that of an expositor ut-
terly different in kind from Luther. The exegetist appearing here
is one brought up in the sweet reasonableness of Valdés and Vi-
terbo, and possibly, of the lectures given before members of his
Order before his flight from Italy: he is far removed from nor-
thern harshness. But he also differs from Scotus and the Parisian
theologians in favour of the Apostle, who, he claims, would support
his contention that man participated in the divine wisdom, truth,
beauty, justice, innocence, power, goodness, charity, pity, "impassibi-
licity", immortality, "and thus in all other divine virtues and per-
fections". Before sinning, man was full of God through grace, so
that, in seeing man, one could almost claim to have seen God upon
earth. In his sinning, God went away with His light and grace; re-
generated through Christ, God dwells in him again as in a spirit-
ual temple.

In order further to emphasize this need and the possibility
of putting on the "new man" and the divesting oneself of the "old man", there are two references to Pauline writings, the first to Ephesians and the second to Colossians. And, consistently enough, the predica closes on a Pauline note, this time a thought expressed in 1 Corinthians 15. The reader - always addressed in these predicche in the second person singular - is exhorted to bear the image of the heavenly just as he has borne that of the earthly.

In the fifth predica, Ochino comes at length to "the sin of the first parents". The method adopted is that of the last predica, which has already been commented upon: as before, however, he cites no names of supporters of the respective theories which he rejects. Such theories he does not give in detail, but, beginning with a brief summary of them, he soon passes to his own positive treatment of the matter. The predica begins thus; - "Many urged that the first sin of the first parents was envy; others that it was pride and presumption, and many that it was love of self and a certain complacency which they preserved towards one another." (Is it quite without significance that, whereas in the title of the predica "sin" stands alone unqualified, the first sentence qualifies it by introducing the word "first" - "il primo peccato de primi parenti"? Scotus maintained the possibility of Adam's first sin being venial instead of mortal. - vd. supra.)

Ochino's positive treatment of the matter begins on a note slightly different from that struck at the beginning of a much shorter discussion of the positive content in the 4th predica. There he begins - "Ma Paulo con piu alto lume dichiarando..."
questo dubbio". Here, the second sentence of the predica begins in the fashion of an academic or Scholastic debate: the Scriptural reference is dropped, and the rejected view is dismissed as mistaken—"Ma si sono tutti ingannati......"

The subsequent development of his theory reflects the Scholastic background, as well as something of the divergent tendencies and efforts at synthesis by such as Sixtus IV, to which attention was drawn in the last chapter. There seems to be an oscillation between various points in the theological compass, and the needle seems to leave Scotus with his location of sin formally in the will. For here, in the first place, voluntarism is dropped in favour of intellectualism in the process of emphasizing sin as the ignorance of God, this ignorance in turn being the fons et origo of all the other vices. There is, however, that tendency, previously indicated, to throw doubt on the actual perfection of the first man. The return to the Scotist position seems to appear at this point: "Had they (i.e. the first parents) been actually possessed of the true light, spiritual light and love of God, they would have been neither proud, nor have envied anyone, nor have loved each other wrongly, nor have disobeyed God."

Once more, there is a return to the consideration of theories presented by others. "Et in prima sonno molti li quali dicano"—these here referred to maintain that the race's first ancestors were proud without knowing it. God commanded that they should abstain from eating of one of the many trees in the garden—the consequence of transgression of His law being death—as He both wished to open their eyes and to cure them of their
base pride and ingratitude. God knew that transgression would take place, but He none the less prohibited such action on the part of those in the garden. These, however, disobeyed this little precept (facile e piccolo precetto) in spite of the great blessings received from God. In this scheme, the serpent was God's physician and the apple the medicine. Thus fruit hurt, not because it was sour, but because it was prohibited: through eating this, man knew evil, in addition to what he would otherwise have always known alone, - i.e., good.

In another theory, there is a reference suggesting a Themist to the relationship between the two component parts of man as being analogous to that of a man and his clothing: the clothing is the earthy, and the body the heavenly made by God. This clothing was created for the last and lowest of the "intelligences", and this because the soul is the lowest of the "intelligences". The prohibition occurs in this theory under a symbol: man was not to stuff himself with the things of earth - which latter is a little, vain, and dry, apple in comparison with things celestial. Eating of this forbidden fruit, however, man was threatened suddenly with death - this a privation of spiritual life. This mystical exposition teaches that the soul placed in a fleshly abode busies itself in such surroundings and, paying consequently too little attention to divine things, is overcome by sensuality personified - Eve. Human desire, personified as the serpent, persuades Eve to enjoy the things of earth; she in turn contaminates Adam - reason personified. In his fall the first sin is consummated. Human desire is cursed by God with having to remain close to earth, that is, content with earthy and futile things. Sensuality
is punished by being subordinated to reason, and in having her misery intensified. Adam is punished by having his reason (earth) rendered such as to produce thorns - doubts, errors, and falsehoods. Return to the paradise which Adam lost thus, and to the pleasure in God, is found only by regeneration through Christ, together with the power preventing the return to our former vain imaginations. Man's liberation is effected when the virgin - pure intelligence - gives birth to the clear word of God, not through blood (vain imaginings), but through God. This clear knowledge frees man from every ignorance and ill, and, in this freedom we are rendered dwelling places of that Holy Spirit which makes us glow with divine love.

Ochino gives so much space to this theory that, in the summary of theories with which he prefaces his own particular hypothesis, it seems to be clear that this has a special place. It is difficult to believe that the Ochino of the Valdesian period is not predominant here, for there are clear glimpses of a mystical teaching such as ran through certain Oxford circles, as through Naples and Viterbo in this period, and also there is at least one glimpse of Aquinas.

The next theory quoted by Ochino reflects something of that medieval speculation deriving some support from the 'balance hypothesis' hitherto mentioned, here in the instance of Eve and Mary. The serpent tempted Eve so that she coveted the dignity of giving birth to that Christ who would be able to discern good and evil - a piece of exegesis of Isaiah. This takes its place among the theories mentioned at much shorter length, and is followed by
another containing likewise an echo of the 'balance hypothesis', wherein Adam is represented as coveting that rôle in soteriology rightly belonging to Christ. Again, others maintain that the first man, on coming with his wonderful equipment down to the contemplation of nature, believed that God had indeed made all things good. Consideration of all these things with the eye of carnal prudence led him to eat of the tree of carnal wisdom, and so he became anxious, blind, stupid, frenzied, proud, wicked, and miserable. Another view, stated at greater length, maintains that man was quite lost in God "through the great light which he had in him". In that time all the earth was good for him - "without discord or any occasion of offence" - and sensuality was subject to reason. Man's self-government began in his tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge; here occurs the simile of the child happy in its receptive age. "But then we begin to have discretion"; at this point we begin our course through innumerable anxieties, sins, and miseries. Against man in revolt, created things in turn rebel. "Thus drawing away from God, man fell into ignorance of God, and unbridled love of the world; proudly desiring to be free from God, he irritated Him most of all. No other need be said; man became so blind and wicked that, under the appearance of good he crucified Christ. There is no other remedy remaining unto us save that of despairing of our own strength, wisdom, and goodness. By being reborn through Christ, as little children, we commit ourselves entirely unto God's rule, praying Him to take full care of us, so that through Jesus Christ our Lord we may render unto Him all praise, honour, and glory, Amen."
Thus ends the predica. Both this and the preceding one seem to exhibit a man who is quite alive to various aspects of traditional teaching. Two words in his vocabulary which illustrate something of his familiarity with Scholasticism are "notitia" — "cosi l'huomo hauendo in se quella notitia di Dio" — and "deformarsi". In the instance of the word "deformarsi" we are confronted with an idea which is not that of a "vulneratio naturae". There does appear, however, to be some difference between the statements of the positive contents of the two prediche. One cannot escape the obvious reference to, and exaltation of, Paul, which begins his own positive content in the 4th predica; and still less the guarded beginning in the 5th predica, for here, Ochino makes his theory to be one held by others, and introduces it unobtrusively at the end of a little catena of theories from none of which he expresses any considerable disagreement. Some explanation of this lack of certainty would appear to be due to Ochino's reaction to an environment made up of a flux of opinions. The Protestant Reformers generally had gone a long way in developing Augustinianism, and insulting in this process God as well as the human reason, but their bad habits were less condemned by redoubtable opponents than emulated. Zwingli, whose views in this matter were analogous to those of Scotus, was severely handled by Eck for doing no more than re-issue in the XVI century an opinion that was no more than a commonplace in the schools of the XV. There is little wonder that Melancthon could write to Luther on this matter of original sin at the Diet of Worms with great jubilation, or that at the Colloquy of Regensburg,
Gropper's "Book" should provide the material not unacceptable to both parties. These two prediche seem to reveal the Ochino of Italian days, before his departure beyond the Alps following upon the breakdown of the last of the Colloquies, that of Regensburg. In a southern sky, the small black clouds 'no bigger than a man's hand' have appeared, to be blown by the wind across the Alps. Of what future were they to be the fore-runners?

In view of these considerations it is of no little interest to note the introduction, in the 7th predica of the series, of elements suggesting the growth in him of influence of the Reformation as against the Parisian theology, possibly consequent upon such a change of environment as migration to Geneva could produce. The refined Platonism of his old haunts at Naples and Viterbo seems to have gone temporarily: gone too very largely is that characteristic 'finesse d'esprit' which, says Renan, consists in withholding from dogmatic pronouncements. It is a new Ochino who now breaks out with - 'One can do no other than sin, if we are not possessed of a most singular privilege and grace' - and he introduces words which were agitated to a far more considerable extent in transalpine theological circles than they were nearer Rome. In us are 'groveling concupiscence and the evil roots of sin': there is almost an anxiety to dwell on the 'wholly other' of God's grace, for, in us reign sin and death, and 'we are their slaves'. The harsher Augustinianism of Geneva and Wittenberg is the atmosphere of the opening of the predica, and contains sufficient to suggest that this part is largely the product of the first few months Ochino spent in Geneva.
Expressions of this spirit are also visible in such sayings as "we being in Adam all corrupted". It is, in consequence, this crude hamartiology, rather than an acute psychological perception, which prompts him to warn us against committing the first sin, as such a fall will bring us to worse sins. With this gloomy hamartiology there is a corresponding philosophy enunciated. The resuscitated medieval gloom in certain Reformers, in which we find the theory of a world wholly damned, is striking in these passages. With it there is the obvious impress of a belief in the necessity of a flight from such a world, but this is as reminiscent of his earlier period in Valdesian mysticism as much as it is of Calvin. In this particular world the quest for honour is consuming; and yet all this avails little, it being in the face of eternity a temporary state characterized by perishing. (Is this an echo of the great heights to which Ochino actually climbed in his Order, and, if we believe Sleidan, of the greater and certain heights beyond in the shape of a Cardinal's hat?)

Notwithstanding the all-too-obvious reflections of the northern Reformation, the humanist-mystic element is not suppressed, even in this predica. Should the soul contemplate itself with the eyes of faith, and thus appreciate its correct position with regard to God and the world, the breaking of faith by sin will be impossible. It is in this portion of the predica that we come upon that type of mysticism characteristic of much Italian philosophical theology on Platonist and neo-Plotinian lines as well as of the Valdesian circle. So marked is the difference between the first and second portions of the predica that we can almost
say that we have here in epitome the not uncommon oscillation between a harsher Augustinianism and a superior Scholasticism, between the Oehino of Geneva, and that of the north Italian schools wherein he was educated. Hence, the best remedy against sinning is envisaged in a quite different way from that which a Calvin would have: it lies in "persevering, and establishing oneself to an ever greater degree, in the faith." This is the solution of one in whom the southern humanist is more pronounced than the northern theologian, and there is a sufficient ethical ring in the conclusion to suggest that individual responsibility for actual sins before God is the primary requirement. There is no theory of the transmission of an Adamic sin to posterity, but the sign of a philosophy produced by one standing ecclesiastically in an independent position among his contemporaries, and of one who stands theologically nearer to the Parisians with their theory of a specific historic exception from the all-embracing damnation.

The individual, in that strict isolation where the Nominalists would put him, is contemplated in the 11th and 12th prediche. In this context "first sin" or any of the implications of the theory of inherited guilt are simply not considered. It is simply stated that Adam, had his enemy not been within his own bosom, would not have succumbed to any promptings from without. And then, with that characteristic touch in Oehino which makes Adam on the whole merely a representative of his fellows and him the object rather of psychological than of theological interest, attention is drawn to ourselves. For our sins complete responsi-
bility is ours - an opinion previously expressed.

In the 13th predica, the question is under consideration as to whether it is possible for man to conquer himself and in what way. The quotation of theories is the method again resorted to, and the first theory quoted is that of those maintaining the impossibility to man of self-conquest. This permits him to work out the Pauline emphasis on the "old" and the "new" man, the old being he in whom the carnal triumphs at the expense of the rational, and the new, vice versa. Man is spiritual in so far as he seeks the glory of God, and without God's help, self-conquest is impossible.

Although there appears to be here an incipient theory of "imputation" of merit to man, reminiscent of that teaching of Nominalism which so much influenced Luther, there is, on the other hand, both in this and the following predica, an overwhelming anthropological interest. The experiential element provided by the medieval cloister wherein Ochino lived and learned seems to overwhelm even the belief - albeit little emphasized - mentioned above, of man's inability without God. Man is envisaged as the battle-ground whereupon the contending armies of flesh and spirit wage war. There are occasional flashes providing all to little indication of the background from which they come. Probably, the truth is that a formulated theory does not get beyond the embryo stage in Ochino's mind, evidence of which occurs in such an expression as that wherein he says that the "disorder of appetites" is present in the regenerate as much as in the carnal - an expression with implications which he never worked out.
In any event, there is no doubt about the priority of the anthropological and ethical aspects of the human struggle, and in this same predicament, additional weight is given to these aspects in the assertion by "many" to the effect that the theory of transmission of sin from Adam is not supported from the side of everyday experience. To this theory Ochino gives no little space. "Many say that our appetites are thus disordered, not through Adam's sin, but by nature." Whilst the theory is akin to that of Zwingli hitherto repudiated by him, it bears also a close relationship to the medieval schools already discussed whence the Swiss Reformer and Ochino had alike learnt it. Here is a 'pre-established harmony', incapable of our adjustment, belonging to that metaphysical order wherein God's eternal decree rides superior to considerations of purely human sin. Dogs, say these advocates, are unaffected by an Adamic sin, yet even they exhibit characteristics of which one obviously cannot find a theological origin. Moreover, if human appetites were unbridled through an Adamic sin, all mammals would be corrupted in their appetites just as we are: experience points to the contrary. The reference to the isolation of the individual, and that 'idea of moral personality' of which Dr. Tennant speaks, come in again at this point. Ochino is on the verge of completing the process begun by Scotus, and carried on at Paris, of humanizing Adam.

There is no comment on this theory, but a rapid passage to another theory not very far removed from the last. In this the body and soul are created separately, each being sinless: the infusion of the soul into the body is the contact producing sin
as a necessary consequence. Hence, God is regarded as the creator of sin. The fundamental point is as in the former theory: sin is an attribute of created matter. All that Ochino has to say on such an important theory is such as to suggest that, among the imagined advocates of the theory, is a real successor to the Occam who placed sin alongside sleep, etc., as belonging to fomes. Ochino does say explicitly, however, that he proposes to raise the matter elsewhere, and he concludes the predica with a definitely practical piece of homiletic, at the end of which is the re-iteration of the Augustinian position hitherto indicated: "we cannot in the slightest degree do anything of ourselves, divine grace being necessary to us."

Such a passage as this last, whilst exhibiting the obvious influences of the Augustinian element in the theological environment of the time, never overcame for long the anthropological and ethical sides of Ochino's gospel. The Augustinianism was bound up with a theory of election, exhibiting Valdés' and Viterbo's influence almost as much as Geneva's, but even this had a marked moral fibre. In the 16th predica, this appears in a passage where the supremacy of the conscience and the Holy Spirit is held to be moral, rational, and spiritual, and not the consequence of a capricious arbitrary decree, such as all-too-often an immoral predestination theory would have it. This appears even more strongly in the 18th predica: in this present life the greatest contentment lies in the possession of a good conscience, and the quieting of that conscience is placed on exactly the same level as the placation of God's wrath, and the satisfaction for sins. In such
a discussion reference to the use made by those seeking to flee from conscience to the theory denying the existence of a future life is quite relevant, and it is of no little interest to observe that Ochino again follows Scotist teaching in implicitly denying reason's ability to establish immortality. It is our 'notitia', the intuitive rather than the intellectual, that convinces us of the existence of a new world to balance the old.

The theological balance so well exhibited in Augustine's working out of the Pauline theory of the first Adam and the second is used on interesting ground in the 20th predica of this series. Christ's work as a restorer is of such a kind as to allow of man's entry into the terrestrial paradise where, before his sin, Adam had been. Although, to all appearances, this is a logical inference from a traditional theology, the anthropological interest is responsible for a curious turn in the argument. The opening of heaven, a greater task, was effected by Christ: must He not, therefore, have performed the lesser and closely related task of opening the terrestrial paradise? In that possibility to man of a return to the original Adamic position, it is clear that the 'levelling' process is being used again as elsewhere. The principle of uniqueness consisting essentially of difference in kind was precisely that, in this matter of hamartiology, against which the Parisian theologians and their successors directed their attacks.

It is here that we must give some consideration to the way in which Ochino develops with perfect consistency the most famous contention of these Parisian theologians as it appeared in the instance of the trial of de Montesono. We have already pointed
out that Scotus adduced the immaculate conception theory primarily because of the need for Biblical demonstration of the absolute power of God. In Ochino, we find the only too obvious impress of the Scotist-Parisian environment wherein he was educated; but nowhere do we find his earlier theological education emerging in more startling form than at this point. Even the second objective of the Parisian theologians - that minimization (against which de Montesono so vehemently protested) of the effects of Original Sin - was not jettisoned by Ochino, as one might expect of a man who could often appear to be a pronounced Protestant traditionalist. For, although 'levelling' of Mary, and denial to her of exemption from the Adamic taint, by the Dominican in his theory of 'if one exception, why not ten?' would seem to be more like Ochino's own attitude towards Mary, it must not be forgotten that the Parisians, if for different reasons, no more advocated Mary's uniqueness than did de Montesono: they themselves destroyed it, when facing de Montesono, by coupling Eve with Mary. Careful attention to the 36th and 37th prediche, wherein Mary is considered, is therefore imperative: how does Ochino utilize the teaching of the medieval schools in which this matter had been much agitated?

The introduction to this subject is, not surprisingly, concerned with ethical considerations: the particular virtue of humility appears prominently in the whole discussion extending from the 33rd to the 37th prediche. There is, in the 33rd, not only an echo of the early Franciscan environment, but also an echo of the gospel of de Cesena, Cocam, and the 'Spirituali', which became such a menace to the temporal power of the Papacy. Ochino
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says that the humility of Christ is incomprehensible, yet none
the less real. In the following predicca, pursuing his usual meth-
од of humanizing the divine characteristics, he talks "of the ex-
cellent and noble qualities of humility". Here, humility is de-
cribed as the highest virtue: "there is no virtue which offers to
God such heartfelt thanks for all His benefits, like humility; it
recognizes all good to be of God." True Christian humility is
discussed also in the 35th predicca, and this train of thought is
continued in the next two.

The 36th predicca begins in the well-known Scholastic style
which Ochino uses quite commonly in his works: the Latin word,
"utrum", indicative of the propounding of a theological question,
appears in Italian dress as "se", and the first question is -
"whether consenting to be the mother of the Son of God was
an act of the highest virtue and perfection in the Virgin Mary."

Once more, the review of various theories is undertaken.

In the first of these theories it is suggested that the diffi-
culty of consenting to be the mother of Christ simply does not
exist. Mary possessed just those qualities that any woman, equally
fortified, would find adequate for the purpose of bearing such a
Son. To such a task, therefore, the title cannot be rightly attach-
ed. Ochino rejects this theory: "I say that it was an act of the
greatest virtue and difficulty, and I believe there never was a
saint who performed a work, in itself, of so much difficulty."

Whereas this may appear to be an obvious piece of popular devo-
tion, Ochino's background is moral theology. There are those, the
proud, who find supreme difficulty in descending, and others, the
humble, who find the heights difficult of access. Having pointed out the difficulty on the part of the humble, and the compelling force of the divine decree upon them to accept a divine dignity, it is easy to point to Mary's fulfilment of the great divine enterprise because of her initial humility. It is not only this humility, but also the possession of a remarkable power of will that Ochino attributes to her, that render her a very human figure endowed with a real moral personality. The predicate continues in a very devotional spirit, with a tendency to make so much of Mary's intrinsic moral and religious worth as to cause a close approximation to the theory he began by repudiating: "And thus it was easy for the Virgin Mary to consent to be the mother of Christ because of her great virtue, although that consent was in itself supremely difficult." The difficulty is present because she contrasted her Son's superiority with her own inferiority and adequacy: "she knew that angels were not able to serve Him". And yet, like Peter and the centurion through their very humility, so Mary herself, by the like virtue but in superior degree, was the recipient of the greatest blessing in the world. The sacrifice of will, beginning in consent to the act, was to be continued, because the act of union indicated a marriage which suffered no dissolution. Here the mystic triumphs again: she became the bride of the Holy Spirit. In addition to this, she was to be satisfied with all her Son worked and suffered whilst here on earth. But as the mystic appears, so too does the man influenced by the predestination theories so frequently in the air he breathed. Her "consent" to this was "I doubt not" foreseen.
At the close of this predica, Cehino says that the abundance of perfect virtues in her rendering a difficult task an easy one did not displease the Almighty: it was precisely that superabundance of virtue, and not the easy accomplishment of the task, which pleased Him. As before, the sermon closes on the plea for the prayers of men to be addressed to God that He may implant in them the like perfect virtues.

This Mary of superabundant merit is the thought with which the 37th predica begins. "There never was a creature who merited so great a present and gift, that is, the incarnation of the Son of God." But alongside this there is another thought, although its appearance in the earlier predica is sufficiently noticeable to enable us to say that it is nothing absolutely new. The absoluteness of God is a thing to which there is constant reference, but here the context in which this reference occurs is of more than usual interest. Before this Absolute the Mary of singular merit fades, and we are told that creaturely merit is insufficient to receive God's greatest gift: Cehino makes the Divine fiat, irrespective of human merit, the reason for the Incarnation. He never lost that thought already mentioned of Aquinas, that man, being created last, ruled all created before him; but the Sabbath, being instituted after man's creation, for it symbolizing God man himself was created. If there should appear to be alongside this a reflection of the familiar tirade of Luther against human merit, we must not attribute to Luther the origin of somewhat kindred ideas in Cehino. The resemblance is between two redactions of the same Nominalist source. But even more
striking is the influence on Ochino at this point of the Parisian theology whose primary tenet was the specific historic manifestation of the absoluteness of God. Whereas those theologians denounced the Dominicans, Ochino attacks without discrimination what he considers to be the whole medieval position: "Nevertheless, the papists say, that although Mary did not merit de condigno and absolutely the incarnation of the Son of God, none the less did she merit de congruo - that is, God, having determined of His own goodness to send His Son into the world and that He should be born of a woman, she merited that gift." Some would assert, Ochino goes on to say, that such virtue lies in the virginity peculiarly appreciated by Jesus. Therefore the angels, seeing how God held her of such worth, took every care of her. Behind this is a Biblical support from Isaiah, wherein virginity, in addition to humility and obedience, is essential to the conception of God's Son. Others resort to the 'balance hypothesis': humility in Mary was of such a high order as to commend her in particular to the notice of God, and this humility was the channel of grace just as Eve's pride was the channel of sin. The emphasis others place on that same virtue of humility which has so conspicuous a place in this portion of the Prediche would seem to be that of Ochino also, but Ochino proceeds quickly to another theory. The advocates of this theory place the virtue in a supreme obedience, and here again one might expect to find Ochino himself with his great emphasis on that absoluteness of God to whose command Mary bowed gladly. But no; he passes on to those who regard her faith as her greatest virtue. By that faith others
were moved in Old Testament as well as in New Testament times, and by that faith Mary conceived in her heart. Others using the simile of musical harmony, say that in Mary were no wrong notes destroying the beauty of the chords, hence no particular virtue but virtues' collective superiority was that wherein her merit lay.

In his rejection of such human merit, together with all those theories which presuppose it - and notwithstanding the emphasis he himself laid on the various virtues elsewhere - Ochino reveals here the triumph in him of the Parisian theology over the Franciscan friar. The Genevan atmosphere no doubt further stimulated the Parisian growth, but in this particular matter the theology is that of those who condemned de Montesano. In the face of the "potentia Dei absoluta", the theologians of this school sndered human merit from divine prescriptions. "But I hold that the Virgin Mary in no way merited to be the mother of the Son of God; so that, not because of her humility, virginity, obedience, plenitude of faith, love, and other virtues did God choose her to be the mother of Christ. He determined through His own pure goodness that she should be the mother of His Son, therefore He determined and willed that she should have those virtues such as were found and fitting in one who was to be the mother of the Son of God. Thus Paul wrote, that as He predestined us, so He calls, justifies, and glorifies us: it is not because we are just, for He of His grace elects us."

This application of a Pauline text to the particular instance of Mary is a sufficient reminder of that Ochinian characteristic
which consists in "levelling" all under heaven. It is on this note that this remarkable predica closes. "Our good news comes from above, from God, through grace, and it does not begin in us but in God. We are good therefore, because God makes us good. Mary in her corner, recognizing her every good as of God, to Him alone gives every honour and glory. To this she excites all, shewing that God, in choosing her as mother, and looking on her, did not see that she had within her any virtue, but simply humility. It was not the virtue of humility, but vileness, lowliness, grovelling, and misery. He therefore chose her to be the mother of His Son, through His pure goodness: and thus, through pure grace, He enriched her with all those virtues and gifts which were found in such and so great a mother. And this is in the great glory of God. Not then having wherewith to glorify ourselves, if not in God, let us pray the Lord that He give us such light, that we may render unto Him every praise, honour, and glory, through Jesus Christ our Lord, Amen."

The treatment meted out by Chino to one of the two upon whom medieval popular devotion, and much XVI century devotion, imagined human salvation to rest is of profound importance. Mary in those circles was possessed of an inherent absolute dignity, and such merit as she possessed was definitely "meritum de condigno". Over the greater stretch of the best medieval theology, Mary's absoluteness was proclaimed with less brazen trumpets: whatever type of merit is ascribed unto her in certain theologians, general official theological opinion allowed unto her only a relative dignity. She derived her significance from a certain context,
the rigidity of which allowed no more than her title to a relative merit - a "meritum de congruo". The work of the Parisian theologians in connection with the Montesonian affair has already been mentioned at some length: Ochino's treatment of Mary is the same in its essential as theirs. Where he differs from these theologians is at most in degree: for him, Mary's congruous merit tends to become non-existent, and, on the whole, he magnifies original sin more than an Occam or a d'Ailli would have done. Reference to his later work - the "XXX Dialogi" - will reveal a ready knowledge of two contrasted views, one of which is reminiscent of the best Nominalist performances in this matter. For, in the 11th Dialogue, there is a very obvious connection between "Jacobus Judaeus" and such as Occam with the theory of the varied constitution of Fomes. "Ochinos" in this same Dialogue refers to the existence of suffering in the world, notwithstanding original sin. This view is maintained by Jacobus, who would have it that the sin commonly described as "original" has no reality. His hypothesis is the naturalistic one quite well known to the later Scholastics: the various desires and appetites are improperly called sin. Ochinos denounces Jacobus' theory as foolishness, but by so doing he does not help us to recognize more distinctly what is Ochino's general position. Neither in the prediche nor in the Dialogues is there a thoroughly consistent regard for Augustinianism, and the acuteness of Jacobus' criticism seems to betray in Ochino some relish for the theory Ochinos denounces. Here we have a parallel instance to that mentioned in the last chapter, wherein a belief is thrown out of the window and re-introduced at the door.
The continuation of the discussion on the application of the "levelling" device, so conspicuous in the instance of Mary, must be left over until we come to the last chapter on Christology. So too must the work of Christ be left until that discussion. It suffices here to point out one side of the situation which does emerge, and which will be developed in the next chapter. Moral personality, not unduly shackled with inherited sin, is clearly an important point with Ochino, and notwithstanding the danger of resting moral order on divine caprice, this feature is not submerged. May, rather, in Mary, the "prima inter pares" of the Parisian theologians, an efficient power of will is held to be present to a surprising degree. It is to the further discussion of this moral personality and general Ochiniian philosophy that we now come.
Appendix to Chapter IV.

"Dialogo di Bernardino Ochino del Peccato".

This work figures apart from the preceding chapter because it remains an undeveloped fragment. Benrath assigns the work to the year 1563, and, it being incomplete, it is not unlikely that death was the most potent factor preventing its completion. The work exists in MS. at Florence (Guicciardini Collection in the Regia Biblioteca Nazionale centrale), although Bertrand-Barraud has given it in his 4th Appendix ("Les Idées philosophiques de Bernardino d'Ochin", 1924.).

The interlocutors in the Dialogo are the Soul, Moral Philosophy, Scholastic Theology, and Divine Theology, and the first speaker is the Soul. Notwithstanding the tendency, previously indicated, in Ochino to treat favourably "Jacobus Judaeus", his inconstant genius to the end of his life caused him to suspend judgment in the matter of the origin and propagation of sin. The strength of the medicine — the blood of Christ which God had to use — amply testifies to the magnitude of the moral disease. From that disease the soul seeks deliverance, and turns for help to Moral Philosophy standing by. The reply of Moral Philosophy to her plea for the necessary "notitia" is that of the exponent of the Aristotelian Ethics: to sin is to transgress in little or in excess, and to pass willingly beyond the limits and ends of the mean in which virtue consists. This is reinforced, after the soul's wish, by a concrete example. In the subsequent discussion, the soul
shews an obvious distrust of the place assigned to the reason in the system advocated by Moral Philosophy. This latter repeats his trust in that same reason by asserting simply that, "vice is vice in so far as it passes the limits imposed by the reason": over against this the soul sets up the standard of honesty, and holds that deviation from that constitutes defect or sin. The feebleness of reason is that upon which Moral Philosophy's argument breaks down. The soul goes on to produce an argument which will readily be recognized as constituting a favourite theme with Ochino. The doctrine of the mean appears to the soul to suggest that in one, and that the greatest, instance, that of thorough submission to the Divine, limitation to avoid excess - i.e., sin - is wrong. "If man is without God", says the soul, "then in all things he is necessarily disordered."

It is not surprising that Moral Philosophy should take up in the matter of sin the attitude closely resembling that of Jacobus Judaeus in the Dialogue hitherto mentioned. The soul deduces from experience that men have a natural inclination towards sin. Against this, Moral Philosophy would hold that these inclinations are neutral: it is their fruit, produced by a wrong exercise of will, that is evil - "they are natural, therefore neither vicious nor to be condemned". It is for this reason that Moral Philosophy brings forward the familiar Scholastic contention that sin is in the will. There is at this point an echo of the position Ochino maintained in the 2nd of the IVth book of prediche, where loss of intelligence is said to constitute the decline to bestiality. In this present Dialogo, the taking of the sceptre from reason to hand
it over to the senses is the act producing the frightful condition brought about by sin. In the soul's view this lacks intensity, giving as it does little idea of a God whose justice is the most terrible of all things. Therefore, turning away from Moral Philosophy, the soul seeks advice from Scholastic Theology.

The historian of the Cappuccini has, in his Annals of the Order, left a remarkable story which belongs to the realm of pure legend. In §§ 46-65, Boverio says that Ochino abjured his errors and went back on all his post-conversion teaching. Accusation having been brought against him before the Genevan magistrates, the ex-Capuchin was executed, he then being "constant in his confession of the Catholic faith." One piece of evidence which might be added to the accumulation responsible for the explosion of Boverio's theory is this unpublished Dialogo. The last interlocutor in the fragment is "Scholastic Theology," whom the soul invokes with language hardly typical of a man on the point of conversion to the faith he once professed: "Tell me then, thou papistical one, if Scholastic Theology is able to tell us what sin is."

First of all, the soul desires to know what actual sin is, then it might be possible to proceed with discussion of original sin. The soul objects almost at once to the familiar Scholastic distinction, introduced by "Scholastic Theology" into the discussion, between mortal and venial sins. The soul contends that this is unscriptural, and she introduces another element, less Scriptural, but said, than Nominalist. "For Christ they (sins) are venial, as are all the sins of the elect. These sins, although in themselves they are worthy eternal death, are none the less, through Christ
worthy of pardon." The theory of the 'imputation' of sin appears momentarily at this point. The soul concludes what remains to us of a Dialogo giving promise of a highly interesting development by viewing the whole matter in the light of Ochino's characteristic theory of God as 'Dominium Absolutum'. "Whenever man sins, he always does so against the divine precept which commanded that we should honour Him supremely. It is therefore necessary to say against you (Scholastic Theology) that every one who sins sins mortally."

The city of these three prelates of the Church is:- "Now the day of judgment must not be considered as a day of joy, but rather as the day of witnesses. When the souls of those not numbered with the elect, who have lived and done good, are not to exist."

In the first of these (preached, intro.) may have deceased the day of judgment, in the middle of the second, and in the last of the third. Corinthians IV, Ochino says that they who love Him with immaterial and glorious bodies of men of ignorance will be lifted up, and with their bodies, we shall behold God, face to face.
The IVth volume of prediche, which appeared to be the best suited to provide a starting-point for discussion of the Ochinnian hamartiology in relation to the medieval position, supplied us with ample indication of Ochino's intellectual vigour. Lack of consistency there may be, but we have here a man a little uncertain of traditional conceptions professing to offer the real solution. This appears in the last three prediche, wherein eschatology and its problematical relationship to human conduct is touched upon, with remarkable force and decisiveness.

The titles of these three prediche of the IVth volume are,

- "How the day of judgment must not be feared but desired by the elect";
- "How that hell which sinners love in the present life is more miserable than that of the damned"; and,
- "If the pains of hell are so great that the damned, in order to flee them, would choose not to exist."

In the first of these (Prediche, IV, 49), Ochino says that many have dressed the judgment-day in the most drab colours possible - a very exact picture of the real thing, he believed, for those not numbered with the elect. For the elect that day presents joy, not terror, because in it, following the Pauline theory of I Corinthians xv, Ochino says that they will rise changed in a twinkling with immutable and glorious bodies. At that moment the veil of ignorance will be lifted, and with our "sweet brother" Christ, we shall behold God, from whom, through that same Christ, we received...
benefits. It is interesting to notice in the course of his nar-
native the great emphasis laid upon good works; he imagines that
the words spoken at the reception of the elect are such as - "I
was hungry, and ye fed me", etc. - and there is much of that gospel
appearing in the Epistle of St. James. At* the judgment-day such
good works will be patent unto the world. This predica closes on
a curious note, coming as it does from a man who had sacrificed
much in his flight from Italy. For, although he says, "Dirai", etc.,
thereby suggesting that he is voicing another's doubts, the whole
passage seems to indicate that Ochino himself is wondering whether
he is of the elect; he does associate himself definitely with
those who pray that they may have the light necessary for know-
ledge of their election. There is no emulating those medieval
theologians who would make the saved to derive additional plea-
sure from contemplation of the damned in hell. The title of that
predica would almost lead one to believe that some reference at
least to such a point, or anything relevant thereto, would be quite
natural. But Ochino says nothing about it, and in the following
predica (50) there seems to be some indication why in the concep-

The 50th predica begins in an unusual way. It begins with
the first person pronoun, and this would give added point to the
categorical denial of an opinion one could possibly impute to
him. He says that he does not assert that the punishment of sin-
ers here is greater than the punishment inflicted on the damned
hereafter. After some little explanation, however, he says of sin-
ers in this world that "they are more miserable than the damned,
because they do not feel their evil in the time when they can be cured and freed from sin: they will feel the anguish when there is no longer any remedy." In this same predica, Ochino acknowledges a quotation from the Scholastics ("se è vero quello che dicano li dottori scolastici") to the effect that the damned sin no more, and therefore receive punishment alone. The reprobate, on the other hand, so long as they remain in this present life receive not only punishment but added ills. Says Ochino, "God frequently punishes one sin by letting us fall into another"; sinners can leave their hell in this life, but they will not. This interesting predica ends with an expression of hope that we pray to avoid both hells.

The last of these three prediche opens with the observation that description by those experienced in the hereafter of the blessed or the damned would be unintelligible to us here in this life. Sin is infinitely worse than that non-existence which the damned would prefer, because sin is definitely evil, and non-existence obviously is not.

Although Ochino seems to retain much of the general medieval outlook on heaven and hell, it is observable that ethical considerations loom larger than does eschatology. In the fragment remaining to us of the Dialogue on original sin, there is an apparent distaste for that Aristotelian tradition in ethics which holds so conspicuous a place in the "Divina Commedia" of Dante; but there is in Ochino, as evidenced by these three prediche, as lofty a conception of the ethical as there is anywhere in the Middle Ages. His observations on sin are very acute. If there
is in the present life an opportunity for committing and multiplying sin, there is none the less an opportunity for remedying it. The scope for moral development in the present life undergoes surprising extension. As his psychological knowledge manifests itself at this point, so too it does in making of inferior importance the geographical hell of medieval cosmology. The worse hell appears definitely on the psychological plane, and the emphasis on it is therefore stronger than it is even in the Dante whose moral system is the loftiest in the whole Middle Ages. In this matter, Ochino is a pioneer, facing forwards whereas before he seemed to face chiefly backwards. He is even more a pioneer in his work, "Prediche... nomate Laberinthi del libero o ver serva arbitrio, Prescienza Predestinatione Libertà divina, e del modo per uscirne."

This work is dedicated to Queen Elizabeth, who (much to her credit if it is so) is said to have been exceedingly well disposed towards the ex-Capuchin. Ochino was, from 1547 to 1553, in England. But if she was well disposed towards Ochino, there is no doubt that the Swiss leaders, among whom he was unfortunate enough to reside, were of sufficiently limited outlook to be not so. The one well-disposed Swiss was the equally suspected Sebastian Castellio. This kindred spirit boldly denounced, in the teeth of persecution, the Calvinistic rigorists by means of dialogues on Predestination, etc. It is not surprising that he was interested enough to translate Ochino's work into Latin, although Ochino less openly than he attacked the contrary opinions.

These contrary opinions provide the environment explaining...
the origin, and largely the particular form, of the Laberinthi. It was in 1561 that the Zürich theologians, considerably influenced by Vermigli (the ex-Augustinian in whose company Ochino had fled from Italy), drew up a judgment on 12 theses of the Italian latitudinarian, Zanchi, touching predestination, etc. Vermigli was a pronounced advocate of the theory of unconditional predestination, and his importance in Zürich was considerable. Ochino was not as amenable to the ex-Augustinian's influence as were the Zürichers, and although he at times expressed himself as though he were of this party, he was too good an Italian humanist to like the idea of the complete servitude of the will. As, however, his own personal experience was one in which obedience, and therefore the practical surrender of the will, played so large a part in his cloister days, he was inclined to retain in some measure a belief in the servitude of the will. Moreover, this was reinforced by his own experience of this doctrine and that of predestination in the Valdesian circle, as well as at Geneva.

The reflection of this contemporary flux of opinions is seen in the Laberinthi themselves, and these reveal his lively awareness to problems that have ever excited the thought of man. Others more talented than the Queen to whom he dedicated his pre-diche could be well satisfied with both Ochino's presentation of the problem and his manner of treating it. In this dedication the importance is emphasized of knowing "whether man is free or not. If he is free, then let us know wherein he is free, and wherein he is not. .... if man is not free, but behaves always by external compulsion, then will he be able to say to God; - I do
nothing save in the manner in which Thou wouldst have it done and as Thou hast ordered me to do it. I can do no other; consequently, if there is a mistake, it is not mine; it is Thine because Thou hast given me this existence, this power, and this manner of behaving under external compulsion." As Ochino points out, the punishments of hell would be in these circumstances a highly immoral infliction. At the other extreme, however, the problem is not less, for, if we allow freedom to man, "how would it be true that God had certain and infallible knowledge of human actions; that in His divine mind he had irrevocably resolved on what he wishes to do with man, and that, in spite of all this, man's will is supremely free?" Ochino claims to do what many have attempted and signally failed in: he claims to have found a solution to these and cognate problems. He recalls the interviews that he had had in England with Queen Elizabeth on the subject of his work on predestination, and also the desire expressed by the Queen for further enlightenment on this subject.

The Laborintlii occupy 19 prediche, the first 4 of which are devoted to an examination of the labyrinths in which those stand who believe themselves to be free. The second series, also containing 4 prediche, is devoted to an examination of the position of those who believe themselves to be "unfree". In the two following prediche, he treats the view of those who maintain that one must not enter the labyrinths. Prediche II-18 deal with means to be adopted in getting clear of the labyrinths, and predica is devoted to the "way of learned ignorance", by which path all the labyrinths can be escaped.
It is in the first predica, according to Bertrand-Barraud, that, from the purely philosophical point of view, we come upon the best and most interesting part of his work. This French authority is undoubtedly right in drawing attention to this occasion, a very rare one, when the theologian leaves his theology on one side and embarks on a critical investigation of a subject almost lost under the theological undergrowth of the Reformation period. Indeed, it is this particular critical investigation which permits us to speak of Ochino's "moral philosophy" as something apart from his theology.

At the beginning of his enterprise, Ochino limits the area by re-introducing a point he made in the 60th predica of the IIIrd series. It appears in various places in Ochino's discourses, and has its venerable origin in Aquinas: God Himself cannot violate the will. An illustration is provided wherein it is pointed out that it is possible to make a man's hand do what its owner does not wish to do, but it is impossible to make that man wish against his will. For this reason, the question of whether man is free or not with regard to his will does not arise. Within the category of the manifestly absurd, he would place a man's wishing and simultaneously not wishing to do a thing. Neither is a man free in the sense that he does all he wishes to do, and does nothing that he does not want to do. Nevertheless, he is not as an inanimate object. Occam envisaged the possibility of the Incarnation's taking place in a stone, the "potentia Dei absoluta" being of such a kind as to be able to utilize anything as a medium for His self-revelation. For Ochino, whatever the Incarnate one could
be, man himself is not like a stone; he can behave on one day differently from what he does on another.

As he himself says, this is the first principle of moral philosophy: this assertion is merely the explicit statement of what is more or less implicit in Ochino's philosophy throughout all the prediche. Elsewhere we have referred to one of the two foci of the ellipse of his doctrines as the individual, the moral personality. In the face of the Zürischers he consistently affirms that the free will of man is a necessity of common sense, and, in the face of their rigid deterministic philosophy, he humorously suggests that those who doubt him should be birched "to make them admit that he who thrashes them is free to continue or to suspend the birching."

Within that confined area indicated by him Ochino sets himself to consider whether, in the circumstances where man appears to be free, man's actions are really determined. To make more clear his position he provides an illustration. A sheep would reply, on being questioned about its movements, that it moves in its own way: its mistake would, however, be patent, for the environment and its own instinct are the dynamic. Men have a wider range of thought than have animals (here occurs the characteristic word "light" - men have more light than have animals), and the objects may be, some invisible as well as others visible. Men's honour and honesty are factors influencing action, and for this reason men may, whilst having a greater area of actual and potential experience, be quite as incorrect in asserting their freedom.

This position may seem to be somewhat inconsistent in view
of his earlier defence of the freedom of the will: the insistence on determinism is as striking as the earlier affirmation of freedom, although it is a **psychological** determinism. And indeed, it is true that on this hypothesis the maximum of freedom that can be claimed is that for human action leading to a prescribed divine object: the end is God's, even if the means are human and freely selected. One can, however, probably say in extenuation that, in conformity with a plan only too clearly manifest in the various volumes of prediche, Ochino does not seek a final flawless solution. Much of the material for such a solution he doubtless does supply, and this appears, as his supple mind and peculiar genius would have it, in the various objections to orthodox theory which he cites. The objection that a man may move his hand without any external circumstance compelling him to move it is met with a reply in keeping with this theory of psychological determinism. For instance, the external circumstance may be food of which the possessor of the hand desires to partake. Abstention from such food does not indicate freedom of will, but indicates its slavery to another object: voluntary abstention from one thing becomes, therefore, merely the negative side of that one and the same process whose positive side is the will to do something else.

An attempted solution of this problem - exit from the labyrinth - is dismissed by Ochino as impossible by reference to experience: it is not possible for us to love a thing if we are not moved towards it and if it does not appear to us to be loveable. In this connection, he asserts the well-known Scholastic view of God as the "First mover": "God alone moves all creatures,
without in any way being moved by them; but the creature cannot move if it is not moved. ....To say that the will of man moves itself is to make of him a God on earth." Moreover, says Ochino, the compulsion is necessary to the will which, otherwise, would simply be "blind and arbitrary". Here is the apparent inconsistency, hitherto noticed, between the one theory asserting the reality of the freedom of the will and the other a psychological determinism finds additional emphasis: it is, however, an emphasis in this particular place parallel with that on the other focus of the Ochinian ellipse - God as "Dominium Absolutum".

Again, in his placing true liberty in the will "to do something" rather than in the "will to do anything", he introduces the sound moral principle differentiating liberty from license. The purely Christian theologian would simply use different language, talking of the true bondage in which men are really free, but he would equally emphasize the sound morality, the substance of the ethical position. To assert, says Ochino, that a child is free because he has not arrived at the age of reason is wrong: the will to do anything does not constitute freedom. This seems to point to the fact that the Italian placed, for his day, a high value on moral personality.

That "honesty" which man has is a "rational desire": this, along with his intelligence, make up the two superior determinants by which man is exalted above all other creatures, amongst which is a hierarchy of perfections. In ancient Carthage, lions were crucified in order to warn off their fellows from the haunts of men, but with that Carthaginian imputation of knowledge of
human moral code to animals Ochino would have nothing to do. To hang a man, the Italian maintains, is of value, whereas that treatment of an animal is definitely not, because of the disparity existing in the hierarchy of perfections. Whether the example cited is fortunate or otherwise, the fact remains that Ochino resembles the earlier Dante in making punishment remedial. (It will be recalled that the great Italian poet in his Divina Commedia far surpasses the St. Peter Damian of the gloomy 'equivalents table', and in his Purgatorio enunciates the lofty theory of punishment as an educative discipline. It is well to take Ochino's discussion here with the subject of Prediche IV, 50 [op. cit. p. 119]. In these two places the light thrown on much of Ochino's ethics and theology is considerable.)

Ochino comes next to the argument which would urge that in virginity, for instance, there is no virtue if the person practising this virtue is unable to sin. In replying to this, Ochino leaves ground, which no doubt bristled with thorny questions for him with his cloister training, and argues thus. Provided that liberality, "for example", is a virtue in the individual, it is not necessary that the individual be free in the sense that he does nothing of necessity. All that can be urged is that he has the power not to be liberal, but avaricious or prodigal: "it suffices that he does not go beyond the boundaries and limits of liberality......which he would do if objects sufficiently strong presented themselves to make him go beyond those boundaries." Ochino would make the man without faith to be the more unhappy the further he advances in knowledge, this
not because of his acquisition of freedom but, because the widening orbit of good things revealing themselves to him becomes more impossible of attainment the more it grows. In failure of attainment of what is presented as desirable to the mind does unhappiness consist.

This last observation but emphasizes the prevailing determinism maintained throughout the whole predica, and it also serves to transform the psychological determinism of the beginning of the predica to a determinism differing little from that rigid hardy plant grown in the Zürich climate. Higher or lower forms of willing are decided by higher or lower orders of external objects, and, in such a place as his remarks on liberality, it is quite clear that belief in the compelling force of a certain external object quickly leads to a denial of the real freedom of the will. As Bertrand-Barraud says, the break with the psychology of Aquinas is very noticeable.

We should probably appreciate Ochino less in this deviation from some of the best Scholastic thought as represented by Aquinas, if he did not, in the following predica, imagine that someone had contrived successfully to get clear of the first labyrinth. This successful fugitive (is it Ochino himself?) believes that, notwithstanding the attraction of external objects and the urge of affections, his will can resist, move itself, and go withersoever it wishes. But the course of this fugitive is that, in vulgar parlance, from the frying-pan into the fire, for in the second labyrinth there is greater intricacy. Here, "If I am free in that my will, without being moved by any creature,
can move itself; and moreover, when it is moved, to resist. Neverthe-
less, as my will depends on God,... one must say that it is not free to will and not to will this or that according to its whim:... the divine will being irresistible, (my will) is compelled to wish and to do what God wishes that it should wish and do. Then is the will not free". The position is quite clear: like a train on a track, we are running between divine decrees.

He follows the characteristic method hitherto noticed of posing an objection, and then offering a reply. (Indeed, in the 4th objection he appears to have Aquinas definitely in mind.)

In the first objection and reply, it is only too clear that the theological equipment, largely dropped in the first predilection of this series, returns. Hence, to the curious objection that, for God all being present and nothing past or future, the postulation of our predestination or election in the past is wrong, Ochino replies that the Scriptures use the past tense, and we cannot be wiser than the Holy Spirit responsible for them. Moreover, divine decrees share eternity with the immutability of God.

In the second objection there is a glimpse of that theory which holds a prominent position in Occam and d'Ailli: all divine decrees have simply a derivative and not an independent value. God's decrees are always in His power, and consequently, as He could negative the existence of the world, so could He His decrees. Ochino's reply is even more definitely that of the medieval Schoolmen. The objection asserts that God could have decreed the non-existence of the world: as, however, it has existed from the beginning, it is impossible that the world has not existed.
Here in the reply, logical impossibility appears as distinct from and superior to the divine will.

In the third objection, after a considerable amount of subtle discussion, Ochino emphasizes, as in replying to the second objection, the supremacy of logical necessity. God "can do all possible things, as He always has done them; but it is quite true that.....for example.....the world was not and has not existed, is not possible, for it both is and was." For this reason, human resolutions determined by God are realized, and, if He had not resolved that they be taken, they would not have been taken.

The fourth objection has little relation to reality, but does at least suggest once more a Scholastic background, a Thomistic one. It is unnecessary to dwell upon it, both by reason of its abstruseness and because of the re-affirmation of the belief that "man executes necessarily the works which God has determined: equally necessarily, he will never do what God has determined that he shall not do." Those who think to escape the labyrinth would say that it is as though God gave us more than sufficient strength to accomplish a task, but its use depends on ourselves. Ochino suggests, however, a more rigid determinism: the gifts of will and its use are alike God's, and likewise is the withholding of these gifts a divine and not a human action.

The conception of the "potentia Dei absoluta" is one which Ochino ever emphasizes, and in these pages much of the medieval speculation on that subject and its ramifications only too obviously appears. In the third labyrinth, the one escaping the first and second finds himself faced with this problem: if man
is free, one must say that God neither knows man's actions nor human works, save after their execution. It is in the first objection that we find again concisely stated the doctrine of logical impossibility: God is therefore not all-powerful because He can do impossible things, but because He does all that is possible. Similarly, God is said to be omniscient because He knows all that can be known, but not the things which cannot be known; such are false and impossible things."

It is perhaps unfortunate that Ochino resorts entirely to the theological argument for the purpose of refuting this objection; it must, however, be said in extenuation that the theological obtrudes itself everywhere in Ochino's work, and also that the particular here is one of considerable interest. Reference to the Old Testament illustrates the fact that divine prophecies embrace many different things, and these prophecies must be fulfilled. In the refutation of the first objection, an example from which is the foreseeing of Abel's sacrifice from eternity, Ochino says that Abel's sacrifice was not present to God from eternity, neither did God know it from eternity. God foresees our course, just as a man equipped with knowledge of the wind which the steersman could not resist would from a tower foresee that of a ship.

How far this prescience goes in the direction of becoming definitely predestination is clear in this same third predica, and becomes even more definite in the 4th predica. The denial by Peter of his Master is treated in both these predicae: in the 3rd it is asserted that the revocation of that divine for
foreknowledge which of Peter's denial of Christ would imply the possibility of change in the immutable God. For this reason, the assertion of God's prescience constitutes the denial of man's freedom. In the 4th predica, there appears equally sharply, but quite consistently in the present context, the supremacy of divine predestination carried to the Nominalist point where the divine decree can be imagined to run contrary to present moral law. We have noticed this point already (p.130), and the fact of its occurrence again must be emphasized because, in the first place, it represents the emergence of the primary focus of his ellipse in startling fashion - the Dominium Absolutum - and, in the second, it is at this point with conspicuous vigour that the Parisian theology reaches its logical goal in the subordination of Christ and the undermining of Trinitarianism. On this second point, the crucial one in this thesis, more must be said later. Here it is sufficient to say, in the matter of the first point, that the "potentia Dei absoluta" of the Parisians appears in precisely that instance where Luther, equally with Ochino, manifested so clearly the influence of the dominant theology of the later XV century. For, it is in this predica that we find the logical implications of the heavy emphasis on the "potentia Dei absoluta"; here occur the necessity of Peter's denial, the necessity of Judas' betrayal even had his treachery not taken place, and the utter futility of Jesus' petition to God that the crucifiers (crucifying in obedience to divine decree) should be pardoned. Yet another indication for Ochino of God's absolutism appears in His lack of fear or hope: it is with accurate mechanical calculation, and not
with moral freedom or restraint, that God disposes completely of men.

In predica 5 the second series of Laberinthi is arrived at, in the first of which he places those who hold that man is not free. The points touched upon in the last predica occur again; Ochino recognizes the use by critics of this a-moral Deity which he himself seems to postulate, but he attacks less that theory than an implication of it discovered by his imagined critics. God is by His nature insensible to human sin, say they; against it Ochino argues, as a theologian, that God hates sin enough to have His Son crucified for it, and then he says, as a philosopher, that sin is the grit affecting the smooth running of the Universe. The subject of the Crucifixion appears again, and with further development. Christ's death in itself has been evil, good, or neither the one nor the other: "...if in itself it has been bad, it must be said that in wishing it God has sinned; if it has been good, the Jews did not sin in wishing it; ...one must say that, as God wished that the Jews should assassinate Jesus, since they were deprived of divine light and grace, they had to murder of necessity. Therefore, they did not commit sin, nor did they sin against the law, for they acted according to the will of Him whence comes every just law." This concurrence of divine and Jewish intention breaks only, according to Ochino, at the point where the question of ultimate motive emerges: the Jews did not wish it for the glory of God who (and here emerges the rigid predestinarianism again) did not vouchsafe unto them the necessary grace.
As before in the series of the Laberinthi, Ochino assumes that one escapes from this labyrinth, but the interest stimulated in the discussion of predestination suffers no break but stands at the beginning of a line of development continued in this predica with further theological apparatus. It is but logical that interest in predestination should broaden into interest in that whereunto we are predestined, and that, consequently, he should have something to say on that tremendous medieval dynamic and deterrent—the belief in the fate of the damned. Attention has already been drawn to the importance of the moral considerations over the eschatological in the last three prediche of the IVth series (op. cit., pp. 120-121), and here we see further suggestion of the inadequacy of the eschatological thought so familiar in the later medieval environment. In this predica he says; "God could without injury deprive us of our gifts and past benefits . . . . but that He torments a man forever with the greatest punishments, so that the reason would choose annihilation rather than such sufferings, I cannot believe. In that case He would certainly not punish man so because He had merited it, and because he had only sinned by necessity and not wilfully (poiche non può mai se non di necessità, e senza sua colpa). Nor would God punish man so in order that others, seeing him suffer thus, would abstain from sinning: this because we do not see the ills of the damned as we see criminals in this life whom justice punishes."

"Moreover, it is more than certain that, after the judgment-day, all that the damned would have suffered would be fruitless and
would profit neither themselves nor the blessed. Hence I think that the works of God are not only just in themselves....but I also believe that they are just in that it is possible to justify them...by reasons in conformity with the intelligence, with the comprehension, and right judgment of man. This will be clear at the day of judgment, when we shall render an account not only for our own works but for those of God also. It is because of this that Paul calls the day of judgment the day of the revelation of the just judgment of God."

It is here that the secondary focus of the Ochinian ellipse comes into striking prominence: there is a remarkable assertion in this predica of the best Scholastic position which would allow so large a place to the reason, that, whilst it elevates faith above reason, boldly maintains that it is not contrary to it. The shadow of the Thomistic Scholasticism falls across the Parisian; divine and moral moderation across divine arbitrariness and caprice. It is interesting to notice at this point how, in conformity with his characteristic process of 'levelling' Adam, he says that he cannot see how our first parents were free, and not ourselves - especially because of a regeneration through Christ which we enjoy but which they did not. The paragraph ends significantly enough on the well-known note in Ezekiel to the effect that God would not have the iniquity of the father visited upon the son; he who will suffer punishment is he who sinned. The moral personality is obviously an object of growing interest in these pages, and it is not surprising that we come here upon an idea which quite a number held in the Veneto of that time.
There, in 1550, at an Anabaptist Council, the theory of hell defined was fundamentally different from that held in orthodox circles. It was there maintained that hell was simply the tomb, but this moralizing of the inferno was neither there nor in those to whom Ochino refers the new theory: for those thinkers, far ahead of their time, privation of Paradise, not a positive but a negative quantity, constitutes hell. Against this view Ochino quotes Matthew XXV, wherein Jesus talks of hell-fire, but as to the material constitution of that fire Ochino is almost as doubtful as the venturesome Venetians. The spiritual fire consisting of a consuming desire for salvation, the theory held by some, seems to find distinct favour in his eyes, and, whilst urging the need for correction, he returns to a point previously made to the fact that the damned would be saved but cannot.

The juxtaposition of the various theories, the reappearance of points noticed hitherto in the predicaca, and especially the random quotation of Scriptural passages, seem to indicate a profound struggle in the mind of Ochino. At the close of the predicaca, a characteristic way of setting out his own positive teaching appears in one of the theories to which he apparently objects:

"...they say, it is well that one should believe in hell and heaven, since men, partly by fear of punishment and partly through hope of reward, may leave vices and embrace virtues." The method of Cardinal Pole, suggesting reminiscences of the Viterbo days when Ochino was a Valdesian, seems to be this same one, although the present context reflects a rather poor negative motive for virtue. Not surprisingly, therefore, Ochino dismisses the objection
sharply, but with an unfortunate repetition of the Matthean text. In the final passages of the predica, following on this quotation from Matthew XXV, he strikes the usual homiletic note: without God's word we are in the darkness, therefore let us seek His guidance.

He who does not understand why God has created us and put us into this world is the one escaping from the first two labyrinths of this series. The believer in freedom can imagine that the experience of adversity is a proof of election. There are other conjectures, the first of which would maintain that God has put those believing in liberty in this world, not for their own instruction, but in order that they may know themselves better and recognize their own inadequacy without God. According to the second conjecture, God has placed them here as an example to others, or, He had in view a superabundance of felicity for those employing free will well and misery for those employing it ill. Yet another conjecture is that God placed the elect in the world in order that their salvation would add lustre unto Himself. All these conjectures are, however, impossible to the one who disbelieves in the freedom of the will.

In this predica there is further reference to the subject apparently intriguing him more and more, that of hell; and in this context the subject of predestination likewise appears prominently. There is ample evidence also in the following passage of a struggle between various ideas imbibed from a traditional theology and ethical considerations. "But I say, if those who will be in hell had been free in this life, their punishment
would be more just....and that because they would be punished justly, not only because God would wish it so (and what He wishes is necessarily just), but also because they would have deserved it; not having been free, they cannot be justly punished, save in so far as God wishes it. And, moreover, in the blessed the divine pity would disclose itself with more superabundance if they had been free on earth. Had they been free they could have sinned and been damned because of their own fault, whereas God has saved them although they resisted His grace."

Moreover, if God has placed the reprobate in this world in order to manifest in them His power in damning them without fault on their part, it looks as though He must also have been well aware of the need for giving no offence to His justice, and even more, to His pity and His love. I cannot see how to believe that a God damning men according to His whim can be useful to us and help us to love Him or help us to put our hopes in Him. Again, if, after the judgment, He keeps the damned in hell for, let us say, a hundred years, in order to shew that He can punish as He will, with what object will He leave them there for eternity?"

It may appear that here Ochino is running against the view, taken over and developed from the Parisian theology, of God as the Dominium Absolutum. Whilst there is undoubtedly a break with much in his earlier theology, what he has in mind is rather the travesty of God that passed widely in Swiss circles for the Christian view of Him. This passage is quoted, therefore, because it is of first-rate importance as illustrating something of Ochino at
his best, and also because his break with an immoral in favour of an ethical theology is most striking at this point. This appears all the more clearly in the closing lines of this predicca, where the conception of an arbitrary Deity is thrown into sharp contrast with that type of Deity called for by severely ethical considerations. God would have shewn still more power, observes Ochino, if He had damned the Apostles: if man were not free, then Judas would no more merit hell than Peter. The Italian sees little evidence of power in a God who has no opposition to overcome, such opposition being assumed to be absent because of the absence of freedom in the human will.

The break with earlier lines of thought which has been briefly indicated in the matter of ethical theology in the last predicca now appears to undergo enlargement, if on different ground. The Scholastic view of God as the first cause and the last end, re-echoed in the 8th predicca, appears again, but there is also an echo of Origen. It is in strict conformity with a growing interest in ethical considerations, so manifest in the last predicca, that Ochino urges here the creation of all men with a view to their ultimate salvation: his approach to Origenistic universalism, such as the Italian contemporary and exile, Curione, once cherished at Basel in his "De Amplitudine Regni Dei", seems to suggest that even the frequent reference to harsh predestination theory does not constitute that theory's complete finality with him. Quoting from Scripture, Ochino says that God calls all men, elect and damned unto Himself: it is the exercise of the faculty of choosing that decides whether they shall or shall not...
obey God's call. How exactly this vehement assertion of human liberty can be reconciled with other of his expressions it is not easy to see. "God would certainly not be wise", says Ochino, "if He called to heaven the elect, when He knows that they are deaf, dumb, and blind, with regard to divine things, and that they are so bound to the world that they cannot go to God."

There is much material capable of an analogous development in earlier prediche hitherto touched upon, and certainly so in the attack on the eschatological in the last few prediche of the IVth series; but whereas there we had glimpses, here we have a much fuller vision.

In view of this bold speculation, it is not surprising to find an explicit rejection of the opinion of St. John Chrysostom to the effect that God does all He can to save us. Ochino vehemently asserts that he himself will never say that, because he believes that the damned have certainly not received all the advantages which God could give them. This significant use of the theory of "potentia Dei absoluta" is highly important, for he suggests that the withholding of God's power is tantamount to immorality. The damned are entitled to consideration on moral grounds, and Ochino maintains that God has not accorded such consideration to them. Whatever Castellio said never outdid this strong repudiation of current theological barbarism and perversion on this matter: in this predica we find such an expression as this: - "If man is free, he cannot be so impious and impervious to God that his salvation is impossible."

Ochino provides various biblical supports in favour of
his arguments, one of which is, that in the Genesis III account of the fall, our first parents did not claim that man was in bondage: this would have aided their defence against ejection from Eden, but, says Ochino, they behaved as though recognizing that the fault was their own and the punishment therefore moral. With no little boldness he continues to inveigh against unrighteous condemnation in his picture of the final assize; says he, "I shall not excuse myself, like the others.... but assert that an external determinism negatived his own free will, hence his complete lack of responsibility.

The most conspicuous enunciation of a theory certainly not incompatible with much in his earlier opinions and with the logical development of the Parisian theology appears in this predica but, in the present context, his strong assertion of man's freedom leads him to demonstrate the flaw in that theory. "It seems to me that if we are not free, God could create us all, suddenly save us and damn all he wishes without giving to the world another law: this even without making Christ die on the cross, saying, thus I will it, therefore it is just."

The argument from the significance and reality of God's actual dealings with men, and of the abiding worth of human endeavour, is the high note upon which this predica, one of the most remarkable passages in XVI century theological literature, closes. Were men to believe themselves not free, Ochino holds, then gone would be the rendering of honour to God, love for one's neighbour, and good action. An unproductive and dangerous passivity would be the logical result. In the subsequent discussion of the texts
from the dominant figures of the early Church in the eyes of
the northern Reformers - that is, from Paul and Augustine - Ochino falls back on Paul's suggestion that God wishes to save all
men (I Timothy ii). (The argument here to the effect that God
chooses the elect from all sorts and conditions of men is, at any
rate, not new in Ochino, for in Prediche II, 35, he maintains this
in discussing the reason for God's election.) At this point he
cleverly utilizes the authority of Augustine (In Euch. cap. IO8),
but strongly objects to what he considers to be the implication
of the Origenistic position which would have it that God can
save us in spite of ourselves. This would apparently be the lod-
ging in another instance of that determinism to which, throughout
the predica, he has objected, and which he denies at the end of
the predica by asserting that God would have us pray for all men.

In the 9th predica the interest is probably less, but it pro-
vides equal illustration of mental uneasiness in the face of cur-
rent theological opinion. This and the 10th prediche are de-
voted to stating and refuting the opinion maintaining that entry
into these labyrinths is unnecessary. Even more distasteful to
Ochino is a vain Scholasticism, explicitly attacked as the fount
of errors concerning predestination. It is interesting to
notice here the hint at a belief that the process of 'clouding
wisdom' on this subject has been coterminous with the Scholastic
period which Augustine inaugurated: before the Pelagian dispute,
says the Italian, the Church was doing important things without
the aid of Scholastic subtleties. The charge of getting into a
maze of subtleties may be levelled against Ochino himself who,
the more charitable critic would hold, was, in the interplay of question and answer, trying to conceal in those dangerous XVI century circumstances his own true inclinations. Therefore, when we remember his moralizing of future punishment, it seems to be Ochino himself, and not another, who is fearful in the contemplation of the horror of predestination and unending tortures.

In the course of this present discussion, he urges that "it can be proved with divine and incontrovertible arguments that our election hangs completely on God." He largely follows the Scholastic method again of supplying a catena of texts in support of this argument, and there is a very definite echo of Scholastic teaching in the assertion that "the end is the first in intention, if it is the last in execution." Predestination of the elect is therefore, on this hypothesis, the determinant of good works in the elect. Although evidence of oscillation once more in the direction of his earlier theories seems to be clear in the course of this argument, it were well to remember that there is not a great lack of conformity with the ethical considerations Ochino so much respected. For, an important point is raised in the refusal to make our salvation depend on our own good works, the lack of which works in those dying as infants would cause them to be consigned to the hell which Ochino has so much difficulty in envisaging.

In the 10th predica, however, the "Dominium Absolutum" is returning, although the awakened interest in the ethical cannot but play some part in the subsequent discussion. Now we read that God has no obligations towards His creatures; but at the same
time we read that His righteousness exceeds all others' righteousness. Unfortunately, in the course of further discussion this high note seems to receive less emphasis, and eventually the worst aspects of the Absolute of the Parisian theology come so clearly to the fore as to reflect a serious decline from the position maintained in the celebrated 8th predica. God could damn or save at will, apparently without any concern for human merit - then comes the characteristic Scoto-Parisian transition from "potentia Dei absoluta" to "potentia Dei ordinata" - but God does not so actually. He has never damned the innocent or the just, nor will He ever do so. Together with this Parisian Scholastic position maintained in his earlier prediche, another Scholastic theory, appearing not for the first time, but Augustinian and not Parisian, appears in the emphasis on Adam's sin as the channel of death. This well-known piece of hamartiology is brought into contact with the question of damnation in a surprising manner which illustrates admirably, in the first place, that oscillation in Chino between one view at the beginning of a predica and another at the end. This is the point. God cannot wish death because He cannot wish sin; even more clearly, therefore, He cannot wish damnation. Conditional damnation, to which view he here inclines, does what an absolute one could not, allowing as it does importance in human merit and action: Judas therefore committed a sin and reaped the reward thereof, an impossibility in a rigidly prescribed determinism. (This treatment of Judas is hardly consistent with that mentioned in the 4th predica [8.133].)

In the second place, the justification of God's ways to man
is conceived to be a necessary procedure, even though Ochino confidently believes that all the divine decrees are perfect. An imaginary inquirer would say to him: "It is true that they will cannot err in its actions; it would also be evident to me that there is no error in thy works, although it would at first appear to me that there was so. But I know thee only by results, and I can only judge by them... tell me then unto what end thou hast damned the reprobate." Ochino does not doubt God's ability to furnish a reason, and that reason, he believes, will have connection with the fact of sin. Although this belief, together with a belief that all will be made clear at the day of judgment, constitute an act of faith, the ethical considerations at this point have clearly not been obliterated by the compromising beginning of the predica.

Ochino now devotes himself still further to the difficulties hitherto raised by the emphasis on the cleavage between the elect and the damned. Unfortunately, he makes little contribution to the study of morals when he makes Esau incur divine displeasure as a consequence of the divine prescience of his offence. Neither can it be said that the hardening of the damned, who receive no divine grace, is soundly ethical; nor is that well-known Scholastic opinion which Ochino reproduces in consigning infants who die to the ante-chambers of hell because of Adamic sin. (The interesting point in Ochino is that he says nothing of the ecclesiastical ordinance, Baptism, but describes infants dying "before the age of reason" as not saved. This last clause can only mean that such infants may be among the damned
before attaining the age of reason; if this is so, then the attainment of the age of reason would have profited them nothing.) This rigid predestinarianism is the prologue to Ochino's return to an assertion of that psychological determinism which he had at the beginning advanced. God is now represented as being able to damn at the beginning, but, before acting, He awaits the performance of the reprobate in this life. In the closing stages of the predica we find ourselves in the same highly unfortunate position as we were in at the beginning. Not only is the life of the reprobate but a piece of play-acting, ghastly before infernal reality, but also the grim late-medieval spectre of the futility of human works darkens the closing words on election: "Heaven would be a wretched place if we could gain it by human works: but it is a filial heritage and not a slave's wages. ....... wherefore, in not wishing to make it depend on us, (God) has shewn us remarkable affection."

In the IIth predica he begins his discussion of the way in which it is possible to get out of the first labyrinth.

At the beginning of the predica, he says, "There is no doubt that in creatures inferior to men, and in angels, there is no liberty, for they all act by necessity." It is here that he discusses those labyrinths wherein are led those believing in the liberty of the will. Not only does the theory of psychological determinism appear again, but also does that position, maintained in the earlier prediche and suggesting the Valdesian background, where the carnal and spiritual types are sharply differentiated. But besides the Valdesian background there is the contemporary
one of northern Protestantism, and the traditional one of Aquinas, both of which last are clear in this portion of the Leberinthi.

With regard to the Protestant environment supplied by Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, and Melanchthon, it must first be pointed out that even in them there was no homogeneity of predestination doctrine. In Zwingli the divine is absolute: it is in this theory of the complete dependence of all on the Dominium Absolutum that Ochino seems to be much more close to Zwingli than he is to Luther. The latter and Melanchthon seek their explanation in the anthropological, rather than in the theological of Zwingli, and, with their reductio ad absurdum of the medieval theory of a vulneratio naturae produced by the fall, render man absolutely incapable of achieving anything good. Melanchthon, however, was too much of a humanist and, probably consequently, too much acquainted with the Greek Fathers to refrain from toning down the Lutheran vehemence: he does allow to man the faculty of "applying himself to grace". On the other hand, the repudiation of the part played by the Church in the matter of furnishing the means of grace is not Lutheran but Swiss. Zwingli was too much concerned with asserting the "potentia Dei absoluta" to make the Church an intermediary of that sort. Calvin and Beza were also supporters of "the alienable rights of God", and that characteristic Italian tendency to exalt the individual above the Church, manifest in Ochino and in the Socinians generally, found there that ground for the subordination of the Church which constitutes the levelling of another medieval landmark.
To the individual, Ochino, generally consistently, allows a freedom to do good or evil, little or much, notwithstanding natural inclinations and carnal wisdom. But there is a rapid transition to consideration of the spiritual man; in this consideration there occurs the bald statement that "the will is not free to act... to the glory of God". Both here, and in the assertion that man liberated by Christ and capable as our first parents of acting spiritually for God's glory, the approximation to Swiss orthodoxy is clear.

The traditional Thomistic background above referred to as visible at this point appears with that of Calvin and Luther in the instance of this assertion of the liberty of the Christian, although it is less conspicuous than the Melanchthonian expression on the subject of the continuance of sin in the elect. The Thomistic background is, however, more clear in Ochino's subsequent examination of objections. Against those maintaining the contrary, he argues that good feelings for everybody are a selection possible for us. To hate our neighbour is likewise open to us. But our will can also be moved from the side of God, who can change or annihilate, but cannot violate it (vd. p.124 op.cit.)—this last because contradiction would be implied in the notion of a will acting involuntarily. From this, Ochino goes on to assert human freedom in things extrinsically human, civil, and moral. As an example of human initiative testifying to the equal reality of internal motivation with external compulsion, he points to the exercise of choice in the matter of ten identical objects. One object unsuspectedly contains hidden treasure, but obviously,
selection of that object in which the worthy prize lies is not
governed by knowledge of the existence of that prize. This does
not represent the whole distance covered by Ochino in this matter
of freedom of choice, for he asserts that, presented with two ob-
jects of equal powers of attraction, the will has within itself
the power of selecting between these two objects. It is for this
reason that the will can in every respect choose a bad and sin-
ful alternative.

It is quite clear that there is not here a simple reaffirm-
of psychological determinism, but rather something in the nature
of important qualification of that particular determinism. With
regard to the things of this world Ochino conceives man to be
free; it is in the things of the eternal world, those in the or-
der of grace, that he is not free. The psychological problem re-
ceives in Ochino sufficient consideration apart from the speci-
fically theological one to constitute him a pioneer in the realm of psycho-
logy. (There is only one misfortune in this matter, and that lies
in the lack of consistency which causes us, here as in many other
places, to wonder whether the opinion was any more abiding than
the seed cast on stony ground. In the first predica of this ser-
ies he definitely denied that freedom was a necessary element in
the worth of an action, but there is a marked change of view at
this present stage.) There is, however, even here something of the
influence of Augustine, who would refuse to man freedom in res-
pect of supernatural objects - Faith and Love. And, notwithstand-
ing the allowance to us of freedom in respect of earthly objects,
and the "general influence" alone of God's will upon our own in
that sphere, this is merely the insidious prologue to the assertion that we are simply free to sin. None the less, the tendency in Ochino to increase the value of the human plane, even if it is only most strikingly manifest at great intervals, causes us to forget the man for the crabbed theologian. For, the development of the discourse reveals one who begins as a logician, then turns moralist: to the Scholastic dialectician succeeds the man who, mirroring the Renaissance, appeals to the human experience.

On Ochino as a 'pioneer in the realm of psychology' further comment is certainly necessary, if only because there appears to be not only a connection between Paris and the ex-Capuchin, but also a connection between a particular rector of Paris and Ochino. Buridanus (d. circa 1358) studied under Occam and continued his master's teaching, so that his works stand condemned with other Nominalist productions, in the adverse ordinance of Louis XI dated 1473. This Parisian turned his attention to logic, metaphysics, and ethics, and left specifically theological problems on one side. Whilst there is something in Ochino at times suggesting a parallel with Buridanus' contemporary, the Dominican Robert Holcot who sundered philosophy and theology to a remarkable degree, it is Buridanus' teaching on the will that is so interesting here. In his work on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics (III, q.i seq.), this Scholastic maintains that, when the will is influenced by equally balanced motives, it is impossible to decide whether it can with equal facility decide in favour of this or in favour of that alternative. An affirmative answer
would make one and the same result alone possible when certain conditions necessitating a decision are present: the negative answer would, on the other hand, run counter to the moral consciousness of personality. It is of importance, both to notice the reappearance of Buridanus' problem in a later product of the Parisian theology, Ochino, and also the latter's inheritance from chiefly the first half of the XIV century - anti-theologism.

The 12th predica is devoted to the question of getting out of the labyrinth caused by the impossibility of conciliating the changelessness of divine decrees with human freedom. That well-known Scotist conception, reproduced in Ochino's contemporary, Zwingli, of sin as transgression of a particular divine precept, is the background of the assertion that God cannot sin, there being no law above Him which can be transgressed by Him. Moreover, sin is slavery, and such, God, being free, cannot know. Once more, the things God cannot do because of logical necessity (p.130-131) are gone over. From this point he passes on to assert again the freedom both of the will and its use.

The third labyrinth, that of the divine prescience, is that which is considered in the following predica. The conception of God as all-seeing and endowed with the fullest knowledge of all our works past and future is no new feature in the prediche. But he does emphasize anew what is frequently in no small danger of being lost to sight in the prediche. Ochino refuses to believe that God wills our sins, or that they are a necessity. God knows sin in virtue of its own intrinsic worth - or lack of it - and He foresaw it: for this reason, God is in
the position of one seeing a man fall from a tower. That fall
the observer is clearly not responsible for, although the inci-
dent creates an impression upon him who sees it.

Ochino urges, therefore, at this point, that God's foreknow-
ledge of human sins does not constitute what a rigid predestin-
rian or determinist would desire, namely, the necessity of those
sins. Though known by God from eternity, sins do not partake of
that particular quality but have a beginning in time - "although
they were from eternity, since eternity co-exists with them."
This leads him to a disavowal of the position he attributes to
the Stoics who, to preserve human liberty denied divine interest
in human affairs. But it also, most unfortunately, leads him fur-
ther than that: once again he exhibits that characteristic in-
decision which causes him to assert that, if presented with the
problem of choosing between human liberty and divine foreknow-
ledge, he would sacrifice the former.

The divine foreknowledge, in the shape of Biblical prophecies,
occupies his attention in the following predica. He makes what
would be for us an artificial distinction between conditional
promises, such as are those of God in the Old Testament, and uncondi-
tional ones, such as are those in the New Testament. But it is
necessary for us to recognize also that, for Ochino at this stage,
moral considerations play in the instance of Christ's work of
redemption a very large part: indeed, such considerations play
a part sufficiently large to suggest that there is a very con-
siderable advance upon the point of view in the 4th predica
where Jesus vainly petitioned God to pardon the crucifiers (p.
who acted under compulsion of a divine decree. In this predica the necessary fulfilment of the Scriptures in Christ's death does not destroy the concurrence of Christ's own will with the performance of that act: He died voluntarily and necessarily. Similarly, Peter's denial was foreknown by Christ but not rendered thereby an absolute necessity: the unfortunate disciple sinned morally and then, being thereby put in a position whose consequence could be foreseen, the logical conclusion was in accordance with Christ's forecast.

In the 15th predica, Ochino comes to the treatment of difficulties in connection with the theory of the enslaved will. In attempting to exonerate God from responsibility for sin he shows some consistency with his earlier position: sin does not exist because God wishes it so. Such a wish on God's part, in the first place would be a sin in itself, and, in the second place, God would violate in so doing His own will - which is an impossibility. Because of our lack of faith sin came, and God simply hardened our hearts by depriving us of a grace which He is not obliged to give us. Of this grace we possess just enough to ensure that punishment meted out to us will have within it an element of justice. (The spectre of the arbitrary Deity is again visible here, notwithstanding an attempt to moralize His infliction of punishment.)

The idea of a divine concurrence in human action, asserted in the last predica in the instance of Peter's denial, reappears in the present one, and does suggest, notwithstanding the not altogether favourable context, the return of the better moral tone in these theological considerations. God is represented as endowing man
with existence, and retaining to him continuously that endowment. It is not direct intervention in human affairs on God's part that we have here, a single act once and for all, but a continuous divine effusion 'compatible with human initiatives'. Misuse of divine power manifest in the blasphemer is the latter's own act: God hates that misuse but does not prevent it, neither can He be held responsible for that misuse. So too, we can distinguish between good and evil when we come to the age of reason where we can make use of God-given lights. A fool never makes use of these lights, nor does he abuse them; for this reason he never sins. The predica ends, therefore, on a much higher note than earlier discussion in the predica would lead us to believe was possible. Without any talk about original sin or similar theological impedimenta, Ochino seems to recognize quite clearly here the fact that personal offence is indispensable to the infliction of punishment. A man living his whole life as a sage, without being endowed with the necessary faith to act in view of God's glory, and not personally offending, would receive no punishment. Exit from the labyrinth is thus achieved in the final assertion that sinners have enough light to avoid sin.

It remains now, after having demonstrated the responsibility of the sinner, to justify the punishment of individual sins. The 16th predica begins with an almost violent assertion, reproduced elsewhere on various occasions, of the "potentia Dei absoluta": God could save all the damned, and damn all the elect, merit being not inherent but imputed. Again as before, there is modification of this extreme position by the return to the assertion of the
"potentia Dei ordinata": God only acts in accordance with his decrees. There is no fundamental change in this predica from the position maintained in the last, notwithstanding the early promise of something; retribution is occasioned solely by human sin.

In the 17th predica, the question is touched upon as to the end for which man was created if, being without freedom, he could not profit by experience. The manifest inconsistency with the position maintained in the immediately preceding prediche is striking, although the violent re-assertion of the "potentia Dei absoluta" in the last predica may be regarded as the prologue to a return to that conception of determinism which almost continually haunted him. The superfluity of human works is obvious if we consider that God is immutable, distributing as He does graces foreknown and fore-ordained. Ochino develops this argument thus. Grace is more powerful than sin, hence, endowed with it, the elect can never sin mortally. Life, the opportunity for experience, is well used by the elect in the process of their salvation; by the damned it is used otherwise in the process of their damnation. Although these two lines of conduct and the consequences are divinely decreed, it is difficult to see how liberty gets as much of a place as it actually does in this predica. The fact remains that medieval immoral theology is not avoided by the slight concession in favour of liberty, or by the suggestion that the elect learn from the opportunity for experience the futility of resisting sin without the endowment of grace.
This decline from independence of thought and a more moral theology, with little that is new to relieve its monotoný, in the 18th predica. man, Ochino allows here, has the power to do, or refrain from doing, moral actions from which, he adds, he derives no merit. But although he derives no merit from such actions, man is certainly responsible for sin, and consequently receives punishment. The intrinsic worth of elect and damned is at this point reduced to such a minor degree as to become non-existent. Moreover, the reduction of the elect to the level of the damned in this matter, whilst it may appear to be humane, is at the same time not prompted by moral considerations. The divine will is irresistible - an assertion resembling that of an earlier position, but plainly inconsistent with some of his best arguments in favour of a measure of a human independence that have gone before. Even faith and election, though deemed to supply an added freedom, are, after all, mere gratuitous gifts: the added freedom that faith and election supply is therefore no more than a fiction. In view of all this, it is all the more interesting to find evidence of a clutch at the last straw of his greater utterances which testify so well to an inclination to moralize so much in his theological inheritance. For he now says that God calls (and that often) the reprobate to a lively faith. To find room for this, and also to make their condemnation depend on their own deserts, Ochino seeks to emphasize the resistance of the damned to efforts at saving them. That resistance was foreseen from eternity, but it is that resistance, and not the prescience become predestination, that occasions their loss.
The last predica, the 19th, is less an original contribution to moral and philosophical theology than an excellent mirror reflecting the theological environment of Ochino. It is here that he talks about "the way in which we can come out of all the labyrinths at one stroke; the way of learned ignorance." Dealing with Socrates, Ochino says of him that he knew one thing only, and that was to the effect that he knew nothing. The point of view in this predica is that of the 9th of the 1539 series which was addressed to the scholars of the College at Perugia. That 9th predica shows some knowledge of the ancient Greek philosophical systems of Aristotle and Plato, which were discussed at that time with remarkable enthusiasm in the north of Italy. But what strikes him is not the particular systems or parts thereof, but the inadequacy of the whole in the field of practical religion. The parallel depreciation of philosophy and theology in the Perugia address is very strikingly with the Erasmus of the "Encomium moriae" with his strong words on the medieval theologians: most probably, Ochino was not influenced by Erasmus directly, but rather through Valdés, who came to have a great influence on the ex-Capuchin in the Neapolitan period. But, in any case, he exhibited the influence which, largely through the Erasmians, came to affect so much Protestant Reformers with that marked detestation of medieval theologians and theologies. In this Perugia address, Ochino draws attention to the characteristic urge of the time in the direction of learning and investigation. The interest of the investigators in Plato and Aristotle is commented upon, but he draws the conclusion, after a sketch of
Aristotle's doctrine of perception and of Plato's ideal theories, that human wisdom and perception are nothing without Christ. This anti-philosophical drive is harnessed with another against 'human' theology and - significantly enough in view of medieval legal studies - 'human' law. Having attacked the medieval system of education, he proceeds in the Erasmian spirit to what he considers the medieval perversion of the pure fount of the gospel: the Scotus from whom Ochino learnt so much is the one whom Erasmus explicitly denounced, but the north Italian tradition is explicitly rejected by Ochino at this point, and Ochino follows Erasmus in his denunciations. The bread of Christ, says Ochino, is haughtily rejected, and Scotist metaphysics interlard the gospel. May, moreover, the Averroist Aristotle has assumed such proportions that Christ falls beneath its feet. Having thrown out the medieval trivium, Ochino proceeds to the repudiation of the quadrivium of liberal arts for precisely the same reason: without Christ they are mere shadows.

It is in what Luther would have regarded as the sphere of grace, exalted above and sundered from the natural world, that Ochino exhibits most clearly in the Perugian and 19th prediche the influence of the northern Reformation. But the extent of that influence is not confined to that place. The cloister life of Ochino merits as close a study as has been in recent years devoted to Luther's cloister life, especially so because, in the XXX Dialogi (Vol. II, p. 376), he says - "admitting that errors do abound in the Scholastic teaching, and that the pupils waste a great deal of time in things not leading to salvation, many of
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truth's seeds are planted. "Although he goes further than Luther in explicitly allowing a value to Scholastic theology here, the truth is that this value is purely relative and in no sense absolute. This appears in many other places in Ochino's works with the very logical corollary wherein the system of revealed truths in Scripture is the constant and ultimate bar of appeal.

In the whole range of his works, the third predica of the second series stands out in this matter most strikingly: in the subject under discussion there, namely, the service to be rendered by philosophy to theology (the medieval idea of theology as "regina scientiarum" is probably implicit), speculation is condemned in no uncertain terms. Ochino says that Jerome called the leaders of philosophy heretics and first-born of Egypt, and he even inclines in the direction of making it a sub-human occupation.

This depreciation of philosophical speculation is, however, not unrelieved, even in these circumstances provided by the 19th predica. To claim to judge things of the eternal world is a considerable pretension when we do not even know the thoughts of our own intimates. Even greater emphasis is thrown upon the practical which, with the aid of a characteristic scepticism about the supernatural world, assumes an almost independent importance.

The day of judgment has not been revealed to us because such revelation would be useless. (This is consonant with a sound ethical theory, touched upon elsewhere in his works, which would make moral action to be independent of prompting by hope of reward or fear of punishment.) And likewise, God has not revealed unto us in what we are free, because salvation is possible for us
without our knowing what we are free: such revelations have not appeared in the Scriptures, and it is in them that we find all that is necessary to salvation. There is an interesting parallel between Ochino here and the advice given by Cardinal Pole to Vittoria Colonna. Faced with the two alternatives of belief in freedom of the will and servitude of the will, he counsels us "on the one hand to strive with all our power after good, as though certain of our freedom, and on the other to give glory to God only, as though certain of our bondage." Ochino continues, "This is the one sure way of coming to God, the way which the saints also in their simplicity have entered, not ruminating as to whether or no they were free. .... Would it not be foolish to ask ourselves if we are free or not before obeying God? Besides this, if we think we are free, we must accuse Augustine of heresy, and if we are not free, then we must accuse Chrysostom and the Greeks. I assert that we are not constrained to believe the one or the other. Life is so short that, unless we neglect our own salvation and the great merits of Christ, we cannot occupy ourselves with such matters. These do not contribute to our edification, but only provoke strife, hatred, and division. So easily corrupted is the spirit which the gospel must sustain, that erroneous opinions can greatly harm it. Whoever prefers such things shews that he has never tasted the gospel perfectly. For God has revealed Himself in creatures, in works natural, and even more in works supernatural, but in a singular and pre-eminent way in Christ crucified."
Some indication was given at the beginning of the chapter on Ochino's hamartiology as to reason for beginning an interpretation of his work at such a point whilst leaving on one side the first three volumes of prediche. The latter prediche of the IVth series, involving as they did discussion of Ochino's attitude towards the subject so prominent in medieval theology - eschatology - still further emphasized the possibility of an emancipation from much medieval theological immorality in theories of reward and punishment suggested by the awful realities of heaven and hell. Further possible steps in the process of the emancipation and conception of the moral personality were indicated in the Laterinti in particular, albeit on numerous occasions, a sharp recoil in one matter or another, indicative of unforgettable moments in his Italian theological education or in contemporary Swiss theology, is to be noted. Bearing, as they do to a far greater extent than the earlier prediche, a higher importance relative to Ochino's moral philosophy and philosophical theology, and to his latest opinions, the final volumes of prediche have been regarded as of primary importance. The various recoils, however, and the occurrence of interesting features elsewhere in the prediche, compel us to turn our attention to such features in the first three volumes of the prediche.

The theological discussion in the first twenty prediche of the first series need not detain us in the present context, treating as do these prediche that well-known doctrine reflecting so admirably the Reformation background, justification by
faith. Probably consequent to a great degree upon this Reformation background, and greatly influenced by it, Ochino pushes forward the characteristic harsh Augustinian doctrine which involves all humanity in Adam's sin, and makes the restoration of the human merit lost in that sin possible only through Christ's work. The deep distrust of speculation in these matters, doubtless the product of the Nominalism so prevalent in later medieval theological schools, forced him to a denunciation, resembling Luther's, of the philosophers claiming the adequacy of 'natural light'.

An even more familiar medieval picture is presented in the 10th predica: the imagery of the two ladders, at the top of one of which is Christ and at the top of the other Mary, appears in Ochino as that of the two tribunals. Just as one ladder was hard to ascend, so was the tribunal of justice fearful to approach: but the other ladder was easy, and so too was Christ's mercy at the other tribunal where the sinner could be saved. The difference between the two pictures is simply in the presiding figures: Jesus and Mary in the popular medieval religion exhibit the characteristics of the Father and the Son in the Ochinian system, a substitution pointing to the influence of the Reformation. Unfortunately, that latter influence appears at another point which the later Ochino of Unitarian inclinations shows a tendency to leave behind. Far too much traditional atonement doctrine has a bitheistic, and emphatically not a trinitarian, background: the theory of the two ladders is immoral and bad Christian theology, and it is significant that Ochino's passage from bitheism is also that to the loftier moral considerations, already alluded
to and appearing at the end of the IVth series of prediche. Here we have a movement illustrating the fact that immoral theories of atonement in so-called orthodox circles have produced what we call to-day, most unfortunately, Unitarianism.

The passage from bitheism appears in the IIth predica alongside a strong emphasis on predestination which appears elsewhere in the highly important instance of Christ's work. How Oehino's transition to what, for want of a better term, we call Unitarianism is achieved, is material for discussion in the next chapter. Here attention is drawn to one of the principal factors achieving the transition, the power of predestinating possessed by the Dominium Absolutum. The Scholastic influence of Paris is abundantly clear at this point in the assertion that "God could, by His absolute and free power, save us without any satisfaction, for God's justice finds pleasure in all that pleases His will; but it was in the eternal counsel of His divine mind to save no sinner before the rendering of satisfaction. Seeing us incapable of this task, He decided to send into the world to satisfy for us His own Son." (It will be recognized here that the latter part of the quotation suggests more than the "potentia Dei ordinata". The satisfaction theory is not clearly worked out in Oehino, but constitutes another point where he exhibits the characteristic oscillation. In this context, the Abelardian theory of atonement appears to be dropped.)

In the 23rd predica there is further discussion of the absolute power of God. The treatment here is of no little interest, both in view of the isolation of the one God from all else,
I preclude the possibility of a sober, still less a constructive, contribution, and it may therefore be left out of consideration.

In the following volume of Prediche, having shaken off the dead weight of the offending Church, he embarks upon an examination of what God is and of the way to know Him. The first predica is that in which the question of what God is is discussed, and that with considerable interest. Ochino recognizes the possibility of knowing something about the one reality, and he also recognizes the element of permanent agnosticism, as Archdeacon Rawlinson calls it, in our religion. But this is of slight interest and significance compared with the Janus-faced contention on behalf of the unending activity of God. God is Creator, but He is also Sustainer: He is not only miracle-worker, but He is also active in continuous natural processes. This idea of the work of creation as co-existental with and eternal as reality admirably illustrates both the influence of Aquinas and also the fact that we have here the fore-runner of Descartes. Says Ochino, with something reminiscent of the poetic interpreter of Aquinas, Dante, "This lower world is ruled by the heavens, and... the heavens move with a uniform and continuous movement... since one cannot continue to infinity, one must arrive at a first and supreme intelligence which moves without being moved, that is to say, at a first independent cause." But the cosmological argument, either in its Thomistic, or, as we may well suspect in view of the characteristic Reformation aversion to philosophical theology, any other form, was not the final convincing one. Here we find the statement to the effect that by our natural light we may attain unto the height
of "natural metaphysicians and theologians, but not thus divine and supernatural ones." This particular discussion does not end at this point but, in the following predica, is continued in the matter of the service rendered by philosophy to the true theology. Reference to this predica has, however, already been made elsewhere (p. 160), and it is simply necessary here to add that his attack is explicitly directed against Scholastic speculation.

This serious inadequacy of the light with which we are endowed is still further emphasized in the following four prediche. Correct interpretation of the Scriptures, which are possessed with high educational value, is impossible to those availing themselves of purely human methods. It is at this point that we recognize that, whilst there is apparently such a whole-hearted repudiation of medieval Scholasticism, the whole of that very mixed body contained a very considerable number of heterogeneous elements among which choice was quite easy. For this reason, it is not difficult to understand the supplanting of Aquinas by Bonaventura, which latter saint, as we have already noticed, became popular among the Cappuccini. Ochino reveals himself a true Franciscan and true Capuchin at this point where he exalts faith and religious feeling to far greater heights than those attained by the wisdom of the theologians. Quite clearly, Ochino is here the staunch advocate of the doctrine, "pectus facit theologum".

The subject of what should be studied to obtain quickly and readily all things useful and necessary to salvation is pursued in the 8th predica. Here the hearty denunciation of Scholasticism and Schoolmen is particularly vehement: they say, "....to become
wise, it is necessary to be apt and inclined to wisdom, persevering, and to have good books and good instructors, and it is particularly necessary to study the great book of natural things. Especially must one study grammar, dialectic, philosophy, metaphysics, and the other sciences which serve as steps, according to these (Schoolmen), by which to rise to Theology. In addition, one must study Lombard, with Alexander of Hals, Aquinas, Scotus, Henry (of Ghent), .... Also one must study the Decretum, Decretals, and Clementines.... to be a good Canonist and have a knowledge of all the Councils. Then comes the study of the Bible, the Old Testament and the New, together with the exposition of Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory, Basil, Origen, and others; the originals or faithful translations. Others even prescribed a knowledge of the Talmud and Cabala, and others maintained that the mystical theology of Dionysius and others was necessary. Thus you can see in what great confusion he will become a theologian, and also when he will become so." The one needful book, according to Cochino, to achieve results surpassing those achieved by that other arduous and unsatisfactory way is "Christ on the cross, in whom, as in a compendium, are all the useful virtues necessary unto salvation. ...."

In the prediche 10 to 26 he continues this discussion on the subject of Christ's function thus conceived, but this particular discussion must be continued in the next chapter. The more important aspects of the belief in self-salvation, and the like, have already been touched upon in the last chapter, for his discussion in the Labyrinth is more full. For this reason, further
reference to the next eleven predica (up to and including the 37th) is not particularly necessary.

His exaltation of God as Dominium Absolutum is in conformity with this exaltation of theology far above the natural level, as it is also further evidence of the influence of the teaching he received in early years. We now meet with assertions like this: "For reasons which please Him" we are of the elect, "consequently, he loves us gratuitously" - additional testimony to the tendency, noticed hitherto, among the Parisians and Nominalists to subordinate the moral values to divine caprice. Cehino's faith in God is, however, for him the most important thing, and, like Melancthon in the matter of the Trinity, he believes that a blind adoration is preferable to investigation. It is for this reason, his general character and moral and spiritual fibre, as well as because of assertions on the other side elsewhere, that we can pardon such a serious deviation as we find in the 37th predica; here it is asserted that God desired damnation for the wicked, and created them to help render the world more glorious and more illustrious by giving, through their sins, "occasion to Christ and to the elect to honour God." Exactly how the wicked sin voluntarily, thereby meriting damnation, is in these circumstances a problem not adequately faced in this predica, but it certainly finds an admirable reply in some of Cehino's own arguments elsewhere. He also supplies his own answer to the immoral argument maintaining that the damned in hell praise God: Cehino has little to say on the hereafter, and what he does say ill accords with this expression.
The tendency strongly to emphasize the "potentia Dei absoluta" reappears in the 33th predica, where it is maintained that God was neither obliged to create the world, nor is He obliged to conserve it. His will is primary, even in contingent things, and man is not therefore an inspiring figure, bereft as he is of 'light'. The same inconsistency with statements in the more ethical portion of the prediche, and the same immoral determinism, are clear in the same predica. The difference from the position in the 7th and 8th prediche of the Labyrinth is surprising, for in the position in the present context he opposes the view which maintains that God offers to all the means of salvation. Although the Apostle Paul says that God wishes to save all, Chino maintains - like the later Jansenius of Ypres - that the Apostle meant people of all types only.

After this compromising prologue, we turn to the 40th predica, wherein conscious of the uncertainty his preceding prediche would provoke, Chino comes to discuss what man is capable of, and where his realm and that of God can be separated the one from the other. It will occasion no surprise that the same theory of psychological determinism occurs again in this predica, although the tedious commentary on the effects of Christ's intercession suggests the possibility that he is seeking to conciliate Swiss orthodoxy. There is also a suggestion of the influence of his earlier theological training in an almost literal translation of an apparently favourite passage from Aquinas. "The will of carnal man is not contrary to willing evil, nor that of the spiritual man to willing good, and that because the will cannot
operate save in that it is will (then voluntarily). If it was possible for it to be violated by some external power, because of this violence itself it would not act voluntarily...... Thus simultaneously it would act voluntarily and not voluntarily, which is impossible, it being contradictory."

Unfortunately, the closing prediche of the series exhibit that little regard for moral considerations which presents such a striking contrast with the high regard for those considerations in the 4th series. The hardening of the damned against eternal punishment, and the ruining of the originally perfect world by a first sin, are themes which appear in the prediche at present under notice. We also find such other discussions as that on the perfection of God's government of the world.

The fact that the 3rd volume of prediche is one containing what amount to homilies on devotion and practical religion calls for no more than a cursory glance at this collection. Naturally, much of the philosophical and theological background is clearly such as has received fuller consideration hitherto.

The three graces, Faith, Hope, and Charity, form the subject which he treats at some length. In the 1st predica, real felicity is made, in conformity with much in the Valdesian theology, to consist in the enjoyment of the after-life. The 2nd predica likewise bears the unmistakable impress of a tradition wherein the author has been well schooled: the reference to 'lume' (light) has been noticed earlier in the present chapter, and it is not surprising to find so marked an insistence in this predica on the certainty accruing from walking by that light in the soul.
To possess that light is to possess something higher than reason. The depreciation of the reason is strong enough here, and in the following prediche, to suggest the possibility of influence by the Luther of the "De Servo Arbitrio". The faculty of faith is one so much higher than that of reason, limited as this last is by the world of sense which intervenes between us and reality.

If occasional passages remind one of the Scholastic background, there is an excellent example of Scholastic influence in the 16th predica, wherein the conception of truth is expressed as "adaequatio rei et intellectus". The loftier Scholastic valuation of the intellect appearing in such a statement as this in the 16th predica soon gives place, however, in this same treatise, to the dominant anti-intellectualism of the 3rd volume. The return thereunto is not impetuous; and one of the points dear to the Erasmian theologians with whom he was well acquainted stands out fairly strongly in this environment. Like the Butzer whom Teichmann described as an 'interim Reformer' ("Zeitschrift f. Kulturgeschichte", XXVI, 1905, p. 381), Cohino envisages in this 16th predica the possibility of the ultimate reconciliation of Protestant and Roman Churchmen in one true religion. His belief here expressed in a God who is the one truth satisfying our reason is evidently that rendering such an optimistic theory tenable: one God and Father of all is the conception necessary to universal brotherhood.

The anti-intellectualism of the 3rd volume gains added force in the prediche 17-21, and the wisdom of the world there is the victim of severe censures. That great belief in a God uniting
the widely sundered religious communions stands over against the belief in a Deity who is the production of heterogeneous elements whose very diversity prejudices their conception of the Deity. Hence, in the obvious diversity of religions, not only Christians of doubtful moral worth admit God, but even the Turk is ready with his admission. Such admission as the Turk is capable of, however, is no worse than that of the philosopher: indeed the two believe equally. Not satisfied with this hearty depreciation of the philosopher, Ochino goes on to inveigh against attempts at religious re-union wherein the organization of the visible Church occupies men's attention at the expense of their cultivation of the knowledge of, and faith in, Christ.

The Scholastic differentiation between fides acquisita and fides infusa appears in the following predica, and once more the Turk is introduced to emphasize the poor type of faith that fides acquisita represents. The Turk is, however, not the only individual endowed therewith. Such others are those baptized and reared in circumstances where the force of example has contrived, together with the whole environment, to produce that type of faith which may be regarded as part of the evolving personality. Contrasted with this, fides infusa is produced by the 'wholly other' and acts with an immediacy markedly different from the gradualness of the method of trial and experiment characterizing purely human faith. So strongly marked is his revolt from the sceptre of reason in religion in the 20th predica that he makes human prudence to be utterly diabolical: in the 22nd, he describes it as "the greatest fool that there is in the world". This kind
of talk is somewhat unfortunate because, whilst circumscribing reason, he does allow to it sufficient power to assist man in his belief in immortality. It is the willingness of men to give up this belief, together with that in God and in the eternal realities generally, which rouses the ire of the ex-friar.

It is in the 36th predica that another echo of Scholasticism, this time of Aquinas, occurs in his definition of love towards God. This love is a particular inclination which we possess towards certain things. "Just as natural love is only an inclination which all creatures have for their existence, from which it happens that the things which conserve it naturally provoke their appetite, their desires, and their movements towards them, so sensual love is this inclination which animals have towards pleasure, and which rouses in them feelings of concupiscence, thus making them move towards the objects which they seek. So human and rational love is an inclination of men towards honesty, whence it happens that they desire virtue, are borne towards it, take pleasure and delight therein."

The 43rd predica is of some interest in that a feeling, conspicuous elsewhere and echoing another side of Scholasticism - the Bonaventuran - is manifest. Love of God does not come, as some foolishly think, at the end as the conclusion of a process of speculation: here is the well-known anti-theologism together with, on the positive side, that belief that "pectus facit theologum."

But if these two prediche suggest the backward glance, or at least the influence of environment, the 51st suggests the forward glance, or the prophetic endeavour of the pioneer in a way
eventually trodden by Leibniz. In discussing, in terms reminiscent of Scholastic disputation on 'potentia Dei absoluta' and 'potentia Dei ordinata', the possibility of God's loving us more than he has done, Ochino says that He could not bestow more than an infinite and supremely pure love upon His creatures. Such love is also eternal, unending, omnipotent, unchanging, favourable, and most divine. As greater than this cannot be imagined, neither can a superior state to that of creation in His image be imagined. Moreover, constituted by Him as we are, lords of all, greater supremacy than that actually enjoyed by us can no more be imagined than an abode more happy than paradise, or an end more exalted than God Himself. Lastly, as the recipient of all graces from the beginning, man is so amply blessed as to be incapable of receiving greater blessing than that already received. It is for this reason that Ochino replies to an imaginary critic that greater benefits would not be consonant with this life. The absoluteness of God is here defended, as is also the necessity for human experience: belief in the eternity of the world would, if true, conduce to the belief that God created the world necessarily instead of by His own free will. He also says that sin is the consequence of liberty, and location in the most wonderful garden without the concurrence of our will would not conduce to our own happiness.

The backward glance re-appears in the 60th predica, once more in the instance hitherto noticed: God Himself cannot violate the human will, as this latter's being constrained would involve a contradiction. This is a thought taken over frequently by
Ochino from the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas (cf. p. I49). At the end of this same predica, that antithesis between God's power and His love is presented again (cf. p. I39) which enables Ochino to assert that God's love can affect the human will where His omnipotence can not. The reason for this lies in the fact that love is an "internal violence," and not an "external" one as is the force of divine omnipotence.

Christian theologians have not always been happy in their resolution of what have all too often appeared as two irreconcilables - justice and love in God. In Ochino's time, theological barbarism readily concentrated on the first, although Christ as 'judex' - the fearful judge - was not the discovery of Germans or Swiss in the XVI century. To the Middle Ages such a conception was equally native, and this fact is of no little importance. The general relationship of the Christ to God on the one hand, and to man on the other was, as it always will be, an object for ever attracting theological speculation in the widest sense of that term. The amount of heresy in the popular devotion of the orthodox is generally, and certainly was in the Middle Ages, a matter for no little amazement, but such is none the less true of theology itself. Under- or over-statement of established truths among Christian theologians produce more dangerous heresies than any movement unconnected with the visible Church can ever produce. These "Studies" began with reference to the theological system of the Manichees. It is of primary importance to remember that their Eastern dualism, in the form attaining among these medieval heretics, disappeared as a force to be reckoned
with it was in the Scholastic systems aiming at preserving the Church from such schismatics that the seeds of greater schisms were nourished and grew to a remarkable degree. It was in Scotism and the Parisian theology that the process of over-estimating the "potentia Dei absoluta" was begun and continued; the parallel process of under-estimating the "potentia Dei ordinata" likewise began and continued in the same places. In the next chapter, we shall see how that "potentia Dei absoluta" is so envisaged as to cut at the roots of a theology of the Incarnation; even more important in the present context is that increased emphasis on the two foci of the Ochianian ellipse produced by the consistent development of Ochino's moral theology.
The Ochiniian Christology.

In the Confession or Catechism, first published as that of Rakow in 1605, we find the profession of faith of those with whom Ochino has been traditionally identified. As Professor Curtis pointed out some years ago, the supernaturalism of this statement of belief, as against the naturalism of modern Unitarians, is an interesting feature; but it is also a feature differentiating Ochino from others of the Polish Brethren.

Ochino uses language throughout the prediche which is very similar to much in the Racovian Catechism, and this is very conspicuous in his handling of Scripture in reference to Christ. In Chapter I, Section IV, of the Catechism, in the discussion of the Person of Christ, Scripture appears as an armoury of texts, an idea which had received such wide currency in the whole Scholastic field. The equal value of all portions of Scripture is the tacit assumption of the theologians from whom Ochino learnt, and to whom the Racovian Catechism owes the essentials of its theology. Whilst the Catechism, therefore, emphasizes at the beginning the human element in Christ, reinforced as its formulators were by quotations from the Pauline Epistles, the method of handling Scripture is characteristic of the Parisian theologians. Even more reminiscent of them is the retention of the Virgin Birth, for, whilst the Montesonian triumph enabled the Parisians further to develop that venerable opinion to the undermining of the 'fall' theology, the Racovians contributed to a further undermining of the religion of the Incarnation by elevating the
Virgin Birth.

Ochino is, equally with the Pacovians whom he precedes in time, a good medievalist in his regard for supernaturalism in two important spheres. The Virgin Birth he holds to with tenacity. Likewise the regard for Scripture leaves nothing to be desired; although at one point there appears to be a likelihood of his adopting a belief in that inequality in value of various portions of Scripture which Luther felt when he called St. James' Epistle one of "straw". This comes out strongly in the 9th Dialogue wherein the subject discussed is the placation of the anger of God and the reconciliation of men to God: but by his skilful use of dialogue, Ochino makes "Jacobus Judaeus" and not the other interlocutor, "Ochinos", express disagreement from St. Paul.

The logical development of that Lutheran germ of modern criticism of the Bible was not destined, apart from this slight hint in Ochino's 9th Dialogue, to be helped by the Ochinos. There is, of course, with John Colet that portrayal of St. Paul which reveals the Apostle as a man rather than the mechanical multiplier of texts in such an armory as the Scriptures were held to be in the schools wherein Ochino was taught. And it is in the Colets rather than in Luther that one is to see the beginning of the Renaissance in the sphere of Biblical studies. It would, however, be unjust to maintain that the supernaturalized Christ of Scriptural texts is such a conception in Ochino as to blot out altogether, not only the Jesus of history, but also that exemplarist doctrine of atonement ever associated with theological liberalism.
And yet, it is purely medieval theology which provides Ochino with the ideas, neither of which are essentially ethical, of the absolute power of God and of the rigid fore-ordination by that arbitrary Deity of the elect.

There are in Ochino occasional references, both in the Labyrinthi and in the Dialogi, wherein we find an assertion of that universalism which, when associated with Origen, he explicitly denied. These assertions would, however, appear to imply that their author is alive to other possibilities whilst being unable to give up a certain Scotist element. The enunciation of a theory of election is one of the few consistent thoughts in Ochino's writings, and this is doubly emphasized by its appearance in the two contexts offered by the Labyrinthi on the one hand, and the treatment of the subject of the Messiah on the other. The Scotist doctrine, and that of much contemporary Protestant theology, provide abundant material for that denial of the need for an Incarnation which is put into the mouth of Jacobus. If the elect were predestined to eternal life before the world began, then, Jacobus urges, the intervention of the Messiah is quite unnecessary. To effect a change in God's attitude towards man in the sphere of human history, the theory of expiatory sacrifice; or to effect a change in man, the theory behind the exemplarist doctrine, are alike impossible in view of the absolute rigidity of eternal divine decrees. Ochinnus, in a later passage, attempts to meet this by placing the Incarnation among these eternal divine decrees. The cogency of this latter argument is not striking, however, and it cannot be said that the objection of the moralist, Jacobus, is
adequately met by Cchinos. The truth is that Cchino had not fully worked out this theory, for in the Laterinthe (IV,30), he puts forward that view of the contingency of the Incarnation upon the fall which suggests the well-known Augustinian background - "if man had not sinned, the Son of God had not been incarnate." For, in this last passage, he says that, on the appearance of sin in the world God decided that only one remedy was open to Him - the sending of His Son in the likeness of man. Nor is the advocacy of the Augustinian view of the contingency of the Incarnation confined to this isolated passage in the predicthe. In the first predica of the IV series, there is the assertion that God allowed man to fall to provide the opportunity for Him to send His Son. In the 20th predica, we are told that, had Adam not sinned, we should all be in the terrestrial paradise still.

The weight thrown on Christ's work for the elect who alone share His benefits is continued in this same theological atmosphere. To the elect Christ gave by His death the gift of life. But alongside this piece of a traditional theology he preserves something of a dangerous inclination towards a doctrine of Christ in full conformity with that 'levelling' process observable throughout a certain stretch of later medieval theology. The imputation of sin to the elect is avoided by the imputation of their sins to Christ. In rendering satisfaction for the sins of the elect, He likewise renders satisfaction for His own. Quite clearly there is an inclination in the direction of humanizing
radically the Messiah, but here it suffices to emphasize that theologizing by which Ochino is able to raise the elect to a remarkable level. It is not surprising that Jacobus is only encouraged, in his reply, to press for the futility of what appears to be no more than a piece of play-acting. There is more consistency in Jacobus' objections than there is in Ochino's attempts at demonstrating the necessity of Christ's work, especially so when the somewhat abstruse metaphysics touching the 'imputation' of sins is apparently abandoned by Ochino at a later stage in favour of a more ethical doctrine. "There is no doubt," says Ochino in the 16th Dialogue, "that all the elect are liberated from sins" — a theory which, enunciated in that particular context, savours more of a belief in moral regeneration than in the heavenly law-court. The latter artificial aspect recedes even further into the background in the later part of his first book of Dialogues. In the 17th Dialogue, Christ is said to "serve" all the elect of God, but the word "serve" is as wide as the word "washed", which last word occurs a few pages further on (p.383, Bk.1), where Ochino says that Christ "washed His elect with His blood". The closing Dialogue is of interest in many ways, and not least because it makes the elect into moral beings. It is here that the interlocutor, Philantus, broods over the frightful possibility of his being among the damned predestined from the beginning. Against this, Paracletus argues that the dying thief had committed sins, but his ultimate salvation reveals only too obviously the undeniable fact that the elect themselves can sin. The reality of this sinning, and the moral fibre of redemption, receive added
emphasis in the assertion that a lively faith in Christ is what constitutes proof of our election. Paracletus further widens the circle of the elect by including Scribes and Pharisees in their number; he asserts that demoniac possession prompted them to take steps which their moral conscience would not approve.

He also maintains that those who stoned Stephen were not of the damned: Stephen prayed for his persecutors, a futile proceeding if the divine decree were immutable and irrevocable. (The conflict with a previous assertion (p.133 op.cit.) to the effect that Christ's prayer for His executioners was futile in view of the divine decree is very striking at this point.)

The work of Christ for His elect is not clearly treated in the Dialogues or elsewhere in Ochino's works, but the general tendency in the direction of the humanization of Christ, and the increased sense of ethical import, lead to a characteristic oscillation between two different views of the Atonement. Some of the expressions above referred to make of him an Augustinian in his insistency on the contingency of the Incarnation, whilst others make him a true disciple of Scotus, or even of Abelard. The theory of the Atonement as an expiatory sacrifice appears in places other than those wherein he is concerned with the elect: probably it is most unblushing in the 18th predica of the IVth series. Here it is stated bluntly that Christ has taken all our sins upon Himself, and, rendering unto God satisfaction thereby, has left us innocent and pleasing to the Almighty. The well-known talk about the efficacy of Christ's blood is, however, in striking contrast with much of the immoral theology of his day,
never indulged in by Ochino in these, his major works. He comes nearest to it in his 1st Dialogue, where Ochinus says that the Messiah was sent to free the Church from the devil; this work was done - "sins having been submerged in His (Christ's) blood". Although a cursory glance at the predica IV,30 would lead one to believe that there also this particular view of the atonement is maintained, a closer scrutiny will reveal that it is equally capable of a different interpretation. The "pretioso sangue" is such an expression as that in both the 27th and 30th prediche of the IVth series - "with the precious blood of the immaculate lamb Jesus Christ" - may be just as symbólica as the "immacolato agnello".

The supervention of more ethical considerations is comparable with that noticed in his treatment of the elect, and the exemplarist theory of the atonement appears to be that to which he was chiefly inclined. It is a theme constantly resorted to by him, so that its constant re-appearance would incline us to accept this view of his thought. In the closing words of the predica IV,1, we find an expression of the purely Abelardian view with a strange Augustinian dash. "God therefore created man in order to reveal unto him His goodness. He let him fall, to take from his sin the opportunity of sending the Son, and making Him die on the cross. Through this, God more clearly revealed His goodness, so that man, enjoying it much more in spirit, was compelled to set it forth more brightly". Similar expressions, setting forth ethical religion together with Incarnation theology, appear in the 13th and 16th prediche. In the 13th predica, we come upon
an expression whose background would appear to be the Johannine theology: God's goodness and charity are "found and shine in every creature, but supremely in Christ on the cross". And, in the 10th predica, probably with that Valdésian mystical theology in mind which produced the "Benefizio di Cristo", he speaks of the "great benefit of Christ" which is to be felt. The quickening of the moral pulse as an effect of Christ's death is his exegesis in the 19th predica of a Pauline thought. He calls upon his readers in the 23rd to produce good works springing from a lively faith in the Christ who was crucified for us. In the 30th predica, the characteristic note of much Reformation theology appears less with the object of commending the expiatory theory than with the intention of providing in the efficacy of Christ's work a reason for getting rid of the doctrine of Purgatory. Better exposition of the Incarnation appears in the 32nd predica: here Christ is made out to be the one mediator between God and man because He rendered a 'satisfaction' that lay in "experiencing all our misfortunes, the better to have compassion upon us". Nevertheless, the superfluity of dogmatic and ecclesiastical accretions is a subject to which he returns again and again with results which, as among many of his fellow-Italians, are well known: the individual remained in isolation, and the visible Church itself, partaking of the nature of accretions, almost fell out of the system as an important factor. Jacobus bases his claim to have proved this superfluity (in the 1st Dialogue) on an interpretation of Hosea wherein he argues that, if the true Messiah had indeed come, the whole fabric of king, prince (is this an
allusion to the Reformation in England and Germany?); sacrifices, priesthood, and even Church statuary, would have been no more. That Messiah who had come, however, Ochino remarks a little before this, was not blessed with such endowments as moved Him to a place different in kind from that of His fellows in the world. Our "sweet Brother", as Ochino calls Him in the 49th predica of BK. I, appears most markedly in the 1st Dialogue as one sent to ignite in us that love prompting to imitation which Abelard so worthily described. It is in this way that Ochino can proceed to describe that differentiation between the period before and that after the coming of Christ as one of degree and not of kind: "the gospel was manifest to the world before the coming of Christ: but after His coming, it was manifest with an even greater splendour" (Dial., p. 381). The greatest degree, innocence, love, power, authority, and also This obviously implies that the very fact of the persistence of the moral and spiritual elements in man, both before and after the occurrence of the greatest event in history, is testimony to their permanence in man. It also testifies to the inclination in Ochino to find in the supremacy of the distinctively moral and spiritual over His fellows that which constituted the uniqueness of Jesus. For Ochino, as one would readily gather from what has already been said, the Jesus of history is certainly a reality, and several references to Him in this respect occur in the Dialogues. In the Laberinthi we meet with a Figure who, to use the language of Dante in his "Vita Nuova", "looks into the face of Him who is blessed
throughout all ages". In the ordinary circumstances of human life Jesus is regarded as exhibiting that obedience which is as much a model as is His looking unto God. On this matter, Oehino says (Pred., I, 23) that Jesus alone ever completely obeyed that natural law which is indelibly impressed on the human heart. The emphasis in this place upon the fact that there is only one moral law calling for our obedience tends to illustrate even more Jesus' moral superiority over men. A characteristic expression, reminding one of the Jesus of Erasmus' "Enchiridion", appears in the preface to the 1st Dialogue. Just as that law which Jesus so well observed was attributed to Moses, so that Old Testament prophet possessed something that was common to the two great Hebrews. He who believes that Jesus is the true Messiah sees in Him "in the greatest degree, innocence, love, power, authority, and also most supremely, the zeal and spirit of religion, together with all universal and excellent virtues, ...." In the first Dialogue itself (ibid., p. 19), so important are these virtues and the observance of the natural law made to be that great emphasis is thrown upon the humility of Jesus in contrast with the pride of those whom He came to redeem. By the sheer weight of his moral personality (ibid., p. 41), Jesus exercised an influence upon His disciples which turned them into conquerors of the world: such was not the work of the materialistic Christ of Daniel or Enoch. That same emphasis on the moral personality of Jesus appears also in an assertion which conflicts with that thoroughgoing predestinarianism noticed hitherto. In the latter
theory, Jesus suffered because of an irrevocable divine decree: the emphasis on His moral personality prompts us to say that He suffered because He wished to do so (ibid., p.78). But not only does Ochino ascribe to Jesus a real will; he also cleverly suggests through the mouth of Jacobus the reality in Him of a great moral struggle. These "vehement and intemperate" instincts were in Jesus which are in us, but they do not constitute sin (ibid., p.285). There is a trace here of that theory of the content of "fomes" which Occam held. The moralist and psychologist speak here: misuse of in themselves neutral instincts constitutes sin, and this misuse Jesus avoided. Another important feature in the life of this Jesus of history is His ascension. Whilst Ochino no doubt believed in the historicity of the event, as Fe did in that of the Virgin Birth, he very significantly moralizes the event, and seems to incline towards a mystical, as against a materialistic, view. With this attempt at moralization in our minds, it is not surprising to find a suggestion of heterodoxy in his assertion that, after the Resurrection, Jesus' members "must no more sin". Even Occam is outstripped at this point, but the whole theology behind this opinion is forced into the mould provided by the mystical and the moral.

Although Ochino goes in this detail beyond the Scotist line of thought, it is not without significance that the discussion of Christ of a traditional theology retains obvious marks of Scotus, and even of Bonaventura. This appears clearly in Jacobus' making Christ to be of the seed of Abraham, rather than of that superior angelic nature which would have made unreal the historic
Incarnation. With this Christ of theology, however, Ochino appears to be less happy than he is with the moral personality of Jesus. Playing His part in the scheme of redemption as understood by the Church, Jesus is one in whom the two elements of divinity and humanity are necessary. Such is the belief of Ochino, who says that we do not wish to separate His divinity from His humanity. Against this, Jacobus urges that the humanity disappears so much as to destroy the true Incarnation significance of "He was made man" (ibid., pp. 186, 187). Jacobus also objects to such language as "communication idiomatum": his general pre-occupation with the rational and moral leaves little room for medieval theology, and he asserts quite bluntly - "these are nothing but words". In view of this insistence of Jacobus on the creatureliness of Jesus, it is interesting to notice that he offers little opposition to the evidence from miracles adduced elsewhere by Ochino in support of the latter's contention that Jesus is the Messiah (ibid., pp. 382, 383). Is it that here we have evidence of a view of Jesus as a man only, stripped of what Ochino would regard as theological accretions? - if so, then the evidence of the Virgin Birth and the miracles is less evidence in Ochino than useless pieces salvaged from the medieval wreck. Jesus, therefore, appears in the prediche (IV, 2) as supreme as a teacher, one in whom are "all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge".

The reason for the lack of ease before the Christ of theology is one which, in the first place, is quite intelligible when one considers the general anti-theological bias which we have
already noticed in the Ochino of the Laberinthi. This bias may take an ecclesiastico-theological form, as when Jacobus urges the futility of trying to compress the whole of the Body of Christ into a wafer at the Mass (ibid., p.9). But both in the Dialogues and in the more homiletic teaching of the Prediche, there is evidence of a purely an-theological bias, quite apart from that against individual dogmas. He asserts, for example (pred., IV, 26), that the man would insult Christ and His grace who would discuss whether he is saved through Christ or by God's grace. Even more strongly does this come out in that last Dialogue of Bk. I, which is so very significant in that it is a prologue to the first two Dialogues of Bk. II which deal with the Trinity. Paracletus, in that particular Dialogue, begins the discussion of what the sin against the Holy Ghost actually is: he begins by pointing out the grievous lack of unanimity on the subject among the Fathers of the Church. He is of the opinion that the real meaning of that sin is still not clear to us, and a little later (Dial., i, p.432) he says that knowledge of what it is is not necessary to salvation. In this same Dialogue, he interprets such offence as the sin against the Holy Ghost may be in terms of morals rather than in those of theology (ibid., p.438). It is equivalent to an offence against the truth, but such truth must be known by the offender before he can commit the sin.

In the second place, therefore, it is the pre-occupation with the secondary focus of the Ochinnian ellipses, the moral personality, which not only makes the discussion of the Christ of
theology uncongenial, but also, especially in the 18th Dialogue, is the major foundation of his unitarian tendency. The anti-Trinitarian ochino of general misunderstanding is a moralist in his own writings, and his theology is such in its essentials as to suggest that its proper systematization would have left us with a moral theology only. The moralist appears at several points in the course of his most important works: to some expressions betokening this, reference has already been made, and it remains to look at the Dialogues only. Both the statement of Ochinus to the effect that man is not free, and the refutation by Jacobus of the related opinion maintaining the arbitrary division of men into elect and damned, are an echo of teaching found elsewhere. Jacobus would hold that Christ's coming were futile if He finds men deprived of the exercise of will by immutable divine decree. Ochinus naturally hesitates to follow Jacobus thus far, but he is evidently prepared to allow to the saints a striking independence: he says that even before the Messiah's coming they had a "lively and supernatural faith" (Dial., i, p.157).

The importance of moral personality also looms sufficiently large to cause Ochinus to allow that even in the elect are the appetites and inclinations allowing to them a moral struggle which their election would seem to reduce to play-acting (ibid., p.277). The minimization of hell, which appeared most markedly in the concluding stages of the IVth book of prediche, is part of this same process. Instead of highly coloured pictures of the sufferings of the damned and of the joys of the elect, he proceeds with great skill in his discussion of the sin against
the Holy Ghost to prune away both the eschatological and the theological. To Philantus' assertion that others have perished whose sin is simply a thousandth part of his own, Paracletus replies by saying (ibid. i, p. 397f.) that not all the sins of the reprobate are against the Holy Ghost. In many respects this Dialogue is the most important in the whole series, and it is far more important than either the 19th or 20th on the Trinity. Whilst these two last discuss earlier heresies on the Trinity, it is interesting to notice that the two references to earlier heresies in the 18th Dialogue are prompted by purely moral considerations: one of the heresies is, indeed, devoid of any theological importance in the context wherein it occurs, and against the heresy itself Paracletus speaks with no little warmth. Novatianism, says he, wrongfully taught that those who fall cannot rise again. The second heresy is particularly interesting, and likewise is the use made of it in this same Dialogue. The Arians, says Paracletus, believed in the inferiority to God of both the Son and the Holy Ghost; yet, notwithstanding the theological aberration, many of them were saved. This is a most important matter, the succinct statement of which only too obviously overrides the contention in the following book of Dialogues to the effect that belief in the Trinity is necessary to salvation. There is noticeable throughout Ochino's works a tendency to economy in theological essentials, like unto that in the late Alfred Fawkes which manifested itself in the assertion that the essentials in religion are few. If Arians could be saved without believing in a traditional doctrine, then the logical deduction is that such belief
is in the orthodox a theological superfluity.

The primary concern with the rational and moral in this particular Dialogue had thus brought him to a point where theological heresy is reached; but this nemesis is not in his moral system of any marked significance. It is, moreover, doubtful whether his theological heresy is much more considerable than that of the Parisian theologians who rejected earlier Scholastic teaching in the instance of Mary, in order to minimize the dead weight of original sin obstructing the freer development of the moral personality.

Whilst the consistency of the argument of Paracletus in this Dialogue cannot be denied, the conflict between the position in this Dialogue and that of many of Ochino's earlier statements is most marked. An instance of this appears very shortly after he has stated his views on the salvation of the Arians. Notwithstanding his general adherence to the theory of election, and his explicit repudiation on a former occasion of Origenistic universalism, we know that he did talk, inconsistently, of the calling of all to God, reprobate as well as elect. Fere in this Dialogue is another such suggestion (ibid., i, p. 407). Christ renders satisfaction "not only for thy sins, but also for the sins of the whole human race".

The fullness and sufficiency of Christ's work is, on this side, a development which is arrived at by regard for ethical considerations: the reprobate appear in this connection endowed with the opportunity and privilege vouchsafed to the elect. But if such is the consideration shewn by Ochino for all men, the
secondary focus of his ellipse, the consideration for the primary focus is sufficiently impresive. The emphasis on the moral is clearly consistent with a theory of Incarnation, as anybody familiar with the Abelardian view knows: such emphasis is also consonant with a semi-Sabellian interpretation of the Trinity. It is not so much moral theory which led Ochino to anti-Trinitarianism as development of a piece of medieval theology which can ill accord with that same moral theory.

The Jesus of history appears generally in Ochino's major works as a being endowed with moral personality to such an extent as to be liable as we are to sinning. Nevertheless, Ochino maintained that His doctrine was His Father's and not His own. This statement is by no means so open to dangerous development as an assertion in the Prediche (V,12) to the effect that Jesus died young because the Father had irrevocably ordained it so. Naturally, Ochino is well aware of that very text, allowing so much opportunity for an Arian interpretation, wherein the St. Paul of the Epistle to the Corinthians speaks of a time when all will be subject to Christ, and Christ to the Father (IV,49).

This subordinationism stands with a view of the predestination of Christ which together serve to shew how the elevation and isolation of the primary focus of the Ochimian ellipse is chiefly responsible for the anti-Trinitarian tendency in the ex-Capuchin.

The attempts to moralize the necessity for Peter's denial, and the necessity for Christ's death, have already been noticed
in the discussion of the Laberinthi (pp. 153, 134 of this study).

But notwithstanding such an attempt, Chino could assert that
Christ's prayers for His executioners were futile on account
of the immutable and eternal divine decree compelling His death.
It is now suggested by Ochinos in the 4th Dialogue that the work
of Christ is dependent on an external, absolute, and divine decree:
the nature of human needs is simply swept out of the question.
The whole passage, together with the following one, is cast in the
mould of the Parisian theology: at first we are introduced to
the 'potentia Dei absoluta' acting 'mero suo beneficio', and then
sharply to the actual scheme of redemption in which operates
the 'potentia Dei ordinata'. Just as it is highly important to
notice that Parisian mould, so too is it equally important and
necessary to notice the perfect Scotism in Ochinos' assertion
that Christ as man could confer nothing on us save by God's agen-
cy (Diá. 1, p. 348). This same statement occurs elsewhere (ibid.,
p. 87): Ochinos there asserts the possibility of bringing all
the elect to heaven without the use of any intermediary. (Quite
clearly, in this last expression in the 3rd Dialogue, the moral
considerations revolving round the secondary focus of the ellipse
suffer a considerable decline. For here, salvation of the elect
is made a purely arbitrary proceeding conditioned by nothing hu-
man or moral.) That intermediary appears as a fortuitous selec-
tion, analogous to that of Occam, in the 15th Dialogue: in the dra-
ma of salvation prescribed by divine whim, one creature was se-
lected from all the others to be the vehicle of the divine plea-
sure. Once again, the moral simply does not come into this matter, such moral side having no more than the dependent and derivative value allowed to it by the medieval Parisian theology. It is not surprising that Jacobus, in these circumstances, sees in the Incarnation nothing more than a theological superfluity. Ochino himself stated the Scotist and Parisian position in such definite terms as to bring Jacobus to this point. Not only Jacobus, however, but also his creator, Ochino, as well as ourselves, are brought face to face in this system with the two indubitable verities, the two foci, which stand out like great pillars in a barren waste.

Ochino continued the Parisian tradition in two important respects. He made the visible Church, the mystical body of Christ on earth, unnecessary, it being simply one channel through which God's grace could flow to men. The northern Reformation went thus far, but it went no further. It did not develop all the material provided by medieval Parisian theology: Ochino, with more logic, did develop a good deal more. Christ's work, as well as the visible Church, became a superfluity when the Dominium Absolutum loomed so large in the system that it engulfed or overwhelmed all else. And yet, not all fell: the secondary focus did survive. If Ochino failed, as indeed he did, to adjust the respective spheres of the divine Absolute and the moral human, he nevertheless stated problems to whose propounder ignorance and odium theologicum have alone prevented the rendering of long-overdue honour.
NOTES.

Chapter III: "Subsequent medieval Speculation, with especial Reference to Hamartiology."


2. Grisar seems to have felt this bitterly when he wrote ("Luther", Eng. trans., 1914, Vol. I, pp. 130-131), "the critical acumen demonstrated by John Duns Scotus...the late-comers would fain have further emphasized. Incapable as they were of producing anything great themselves, they exerted their wits in criticizing every insignificant proposition which could possibly be questioned in philosophy and theology."


4. "O certe necessarium Adae peccatum quod Christi morte delendum est! O felix culpa quae talem meruit habere redemptorem."


8. Op. Par. II, Dist. XXVIII, Q. unica, 4-5. "Item, si vincit una tentationem, efficitur fortior, quam prius; igitur magis potest vivere primum. Item primum peccatum mortale non corruptit statum habitum et bene operandum, quia non unico actu indueit habitus contrarius; igitur qui semel peecavit, si prius habuit habitum acquisitionem ad bonum operandum,... Non igitur ex uno peccato trahitur ad primum peccatum."
It is interesting to note that, according to Augustine (de Civitate Dei, XIV, II), Adam believed his sin was venial. But this argument is far removed from the speculation at present occupying our attention. Cf. Tennant, op. cit. p. 29: "... it is essential to the Augustinian theory of the origin of sin, or, more correctly, of human sinfulness, that the peccatum originans was in the strict sense a first sin. Writers such as Duns Scotus, who regarded Adam as having committed lighter offences before the mortal sin which decided the fate of the race, rendering that great transgression possible: or Rupert of Deutz, who considered that Eve was morally infected when she lent an ear to the serpent, ... are generally regarded by those who came under the mighty influence of St. Augustine to have been guilty of a tendency towards Pelagianizing."

8. Op. Ox. II, Dist. XXVII, A. Ibid., unica, Schol, 3 - "Respondetur, quod existent in peccato mortale possibile est servare preceptum, non autem ut manet in peccato: sed possibile est ipsum praeparare, et disponere se ad gratiam, cuja data potest servare preceptum: et ita si non praepararet, se illa impraeparatio imputaretur sibi in peccato, sicut exemplificat Anselmus de proliiciente se imputum."

9. The constant fluttering round a light on the borders created by general orthodoxy, and yet illuminating dangerous territory beyond, is never more clear than in such instances as these. In his reference to Baptism here given, Scotus, faced by general tradition, appears to beat a retreat into orthodox interpretation and talks about the penalty and fault in the baptized before the performance of the ecclesiastical rite. Op. Ox. II, Dist. XXXII, A. "... vel peccatum originale non est concupiscientiam, vel non remitti in Baptismo. ... licet remanet concupiscientia post baptismum, non tamen dominatur et regres sicut ante: imo per gratiam Baptismi mitigatur et minuitur, ut post dominari non valeat, nisi quis reddet vires hosti, eundo post concupiscientias. Nec post Baptismum ad reatum, quia non imputatur in peccatum, sed tantum poena peccatum est, ante Baptismum vero poena est et culpa."


The cited G. "Quid ergo originale peccatum dicitur? Fomes peccatum, scilicet concupiscens, vel concupiscibilitas... His verbis satis ostenditur fomitem peccati esse concupiscentiam."


Isteque sicut de corrupta carne, caro corrupta serminatur, ita etiam de anima peccatrix, anima peccatrix corruptione originali infecta, ab illis traduci diicitur."


13. Augustine: "De Civitate Dei", XIII, 14. "Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui feminar lapsum est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum. Nondum erat nobis singillatim creatae et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed jam natura erat seminalis, ex qua propagaremur;..." Martineau ("Seat of Authority in Religion", 1890, p. 386) would absolve St. Paul from responsibility from an unfortunate theory. "These ideas (of universal sinfulness, and of Adam as the representative example of all) the one Jewish, the other Augustinian, are quite foreign to the Pauline anthropology, and are only futile apologies for the paradoxical but actual conception of sin as an attribute of organized matter."

14. Alexander allows to the will the possibility, through nature, of inclining towards the good. "...Omnis voluntas creatae per naturam, potest tendere in bonum apparent, et per consequens poterit deficere, deuiare."

15. "Dico, quod nunquam salvabitur homo nec salvari poterit nec unquam eliciet nec elicere poterit actum meritorium secundum leges a deo ordinatas sine gratia creatae, et hoc teneo propter scripturam et dicta sanctorum." This is preceded by a passage apparently damaging the consistency of Oecumen's argument. "Dico primo, quod homo potest salvari sine gratia creatae de potentia dei absoluta". This occurs in the Appendix, the "Quodlibeta", vi, art. i. Loofs ("Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte", 1906, p. 614) quotes a closely parallel passage from Pelagius (d. circa 418) - "aliquis ex puris naturalibus potest vitare omne peccatum... et mereri vitam aeternam de condigno."
The same scholar also points out (p. 613) the supremacy in the Nominalist teaching of "pelagianische Gedanken", illustrating this by reference to Occam's teaching, in Sent. II, XIX, A. "... naturalia inclinant ad actum bonum (moralem) post peccatum sicut ante."

The minimization of the effects of mortal sin (such as Adam's first sin was generally conceived to be) is particularly striking in the Commentary, IV, VIII, ix, D. "per peccatum mortale nihil corrumpitur nec tollitur in anima, quia licet tunc peccans careat aliquo actu, qui debet sibi inesse et ad quem obligatur, tamen ille actus non corrumpitur, quia non inest nec aliud tollitur ab anima, quia non substantia nec accidentis, certum est."

This minimization of the great obstacle gives opportunity for the extension of the boundaries within which, without grace, man "ex puris naturalibus" can achieve the greatest works - in Sent. I, XVII, II, E. "omnis actus caritatis, quem secundum cursum habemus in via, est ejusdem rationis cum actu ex puris naturalibus possibilis, et ideo ille actus non excedit facultatem naturae humanae." The complete supersession of the supernatural by the natural is envisaged in a later part of the Commentary, III, iii, B. "... operationes omnes, quas experimur mediantibus istis habitibus supernaturalibus, possimus experiri mediantibus habitibus naturalibus, ... quia unus paganus nutritus inter Christianos potest omnes articulos fidei credere et de quom super omnia diligere." The latter part of this extract illustrates again that wealth of emphasis, increasingly common after Scotus in his school, on obedience to positive law - love of God + ecclesiastical positivism. It also points to the desire, in producing such an adequate hypothetical instance as will pave the way for the assertion of a specific historic fact - Mary and her particular conception.

16. Baconthorp was considered by Sixtus da Siena to be the first theologian of the age. According to Werner ("Die nachscot. Scholastik", 1883, p. 14), he was "der letzte Vertreter des Christlich-theologische Averroismus".

Baconthorp, in Sent. II, Dist. XXX, q. iii, n. 14. "Communior opinio est, quod peccatum originale est carentia justitiae originalis cum debito habendi eam, et dignitate carendi ea; quae dignitate alii nominant reatum, concordantes in re significata, sed differentes in nominatione."

Ibid., II, Dist. XXXI, Art. iv. "... aversionem a Deo, et constitutum sumus originaliter peccatorum per habitualem aversionem!"

17. Harnack: "History of Dogma", Vol. VI, pp. 151-162. "... When Nominalism obtained supremacy in theology and in the Church, the ground was prepared for the three-fold development of doctrine in the future: post-Tridentine, Catholic, Protestant, and Socinian, are to be understood from this point of view."

Cf. Ritschl: "Justification and Reconciliation", 1872, p. 118. "... the Nominalist school, throughout an entire century and
a half, had maintained Pelagian doctrine in connection with merits of concurrence. The Reformers, as a whole, charged the charge of Pelagianism, which are in reality true of the Nominalist doctrine only.


21. Paolo da Venezia produced a work entitled, "Summulae Logicae", which remained the chief text-book of the Paduan school down to the Reformation. Da Bologna was a Servite.


23. V.d. Mayronis: In Sent. Dist. III, Q. ii, Venice edition, 1520, p. 115. Later Scotists argued thus - God "decuit" - ergo "facit". Mary was fitted to be the recipient of a privilege, therefore, she was the recipient.


25. Ample indication of the development of the cult of Mary in early times is forthcoming in e.g. Migne, Patrologie, XXII, 1147; XXIII, 495-590. V.d. also Bethune-Baker: "Nestorius and his Teaching", 1908, pp. 55-68. Even then, however, the status of Mary was, as at this period under notice, not the ground on which the battle was fought. Harnack (op. cit. IV, p. 317) says that in Greek dogmatics, "There is not a word of her having been free from the stain of original sin."
26. Op. ox. II, Dist. XXII, q. ii, Scholium. "..... peccatum Evae fuit gravior quam peccatum Adae, pro eo, quod voluit sibi usurpare aequalitatem divinitatis,....."

27. Vd. for an example of XVI century devotional language, "Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu: Pibasianera, Confessiones," Vol. I, pp. 3-4. Even the extravagant language of this Spanish extract is outrun in the well-known work of the Italian Alfonso Maria di Liguori - "Le Glorie di Maria Vergine". Nielsen calls this "a full-voiced utterance of the most modern cultus of Mary". (Vd. the Milan edition, bk. I, pp. 161, 176, 179f., bk. II, pp. 293f., and 376f.) Pere, Jesus is almighty by nature, and Mary by grace: she is God's daughter, the Son's mother, and the Holy Spirit's bride. Old-Catholic criticism severely handled this book, which had an amazing popularity, and that criticism demonstrated the colossal ignorance of Liguori and his twisting of medieval texts by which he sought to support his arguments.

The failure to point out the real significance of this doctrine of Mary must, however, also lie at the doors of others better equipped than was Liguori. Feret says ("La Faculté de Théologie de l'Université de Paris", 1896, pp. 151-162) that the official theology of Paris made of it a "vérité inattaquable", and Martigne ("La Philosophie Scolastique et l'Ordre franciscaine", 1588, p. 255) says that "the Immaculate Conception is naturally the great triumph of Scotus". The latter does reject (p. 273) the ridiculous idea of Mary's appearance to Scotus to reveal her privilege, and rightly draws attention to the fact that Scotus' educational environment would lead him in this direction, but neither he nor Feret suggest that such theological environment is utterly remote from that of the Bull Ineffabilis Deus of 1854.

The life in this new, and later, body is so different as to indicate that it is the second of two different bodies, the first having been certified dead by the time of the Reformation.

28. Professor N. P. Williams ("The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin", 1927, p. 417) says that both Aquinas and Scotus admitted Mary's exemption from original sin after her birth. (Incidentally, this same writer appears to be, like Rashdall, mistaken in making Scotus a teacher of the Immaculate Conception doctrine.) It must not, however, be assumed that there was as much unanimity among the Dominicans on this matter as Professor Williams' statement (p. 413) would seem to indicate, for, in Eschatier's and Adam of Soissons' cases, the defendants maintained that this liability of Mary to the effects of original sin persisted long after her birth. Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 99ff. Art. IV. "Quod beata Virgo fuit concepta in peccato originali, ..... adroganter et temperatice addidit in eodem sermone quod fuit ordo en pechf origi-"
decessisset ante passionem Christi, descendisset ad inferos puissetque damnata." For the revocation of Adam de Soissons, vd. Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 521. "... j'aye presché au diocese de Nevers en plein sermon au peuple que se la Virge Marie fut trepasse devant la mort et passion de son glorieux fils nostre Sauveur Jhesu Christ, elle fust descendue en enfer pour ce qu'elle avoit este conceue en peché originel. ...


"Revocanda est et tanquam falsa, scandalosa, et piam aurum offensiva et presumptuose asserta, non constante probabilitate questionis, utrum beata Virgo fuerit in peccato originali concepta. Item quia Eva non contraxit peccatum originale ab Adam.

"(II) Beatae Virginem Mariam et Dei Genitricem non contraxit peccatum originale, est expresse contra fidem.

"Revocanda est tanquam falsa, scandalosa, presumptuose asserta et piam aurum offensiva

"(II) Tantum est contra sacram scripturam, unum hominem esse exemptum a peccato originali praeter Christum, sicut si decem homines de facto ponerentur exempti.

"Revocanda est tanquam falsa, scandalosa, presumptuose asserta et piam aurum offensiva."


32. Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 515ff. The following confession occurs in the revocation of the Bishop de Volan "in presenia regis et plurium dominorum ad instantiam Universitatis" - "Item addidi et dixi quod magistri Universitatis Parisnon intelligebant doctrinam sancti Thome".


34. Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 588. Reference here is to the reproof administered to the University in 1346 by Clement VI. Even at that time, most theologians were accused of letting Scriptural and Patristic exposition drop in favour of entanglements involving them in dangerous doctrines and doubtful interpretations. It is not only in the Montesano case where we detect a considerable neglect of this good advice in the XV century. Grisar ("Luther", Vol. I, p. 134) says, "there is no dearth of statements by the very highest authorities urging a remedy, though it is true more should have been done."


37. Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 488. 1387-1391. "Actio Universitatis Paris. contra Praedicatores". Here the fact emerges quite clearly: the Dominicans' offence was against the Bishop of Paris, but more important, it was against a theological faculty "which more than at any previous time, believed itself to be the supreme tribunal of the Church in the matter of both faith and morals."

"...in hac alma facultate tanquam sede sua catholicam veritatem reponit, nec ab ea unquam avelli potuisse commendat". Glachard, Dean of the faculty, asserted (ibid. p. 489) without opposition in the presence of theologians, that the faculty was above the Church and above the Pope. It assumed an ecumenical authority (Feret, Vol. III, p. 155) when calling upon "all the faithful to regard as erroneous the propositions it had condemned, unless the Holy rather judges otherwise; this is believed to be not possible". In the abject confessions extracted from repenting Mendicants remarkable testimony is forthcoming. The earlier Guidon, in 1354, described it as the "most holy Faculty" (Feret, Vol. III, p. 183). The Dominican Master of Theology, Thomas, made Paris in his retraction not only absolute but for ever infallible (Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 515ff) - "dico, quod mater mea Universitas Paris. nunquam erravit in fide nec contra bonus mores, nec revocaverit, sed semper futur luminare et defensatrix fidei." In the revocation of Adam de Soissons, the defendant is to assert by the command and authority of Paris that the University is "mère et fontaine de toute science, et par espécial lumière de la foi". (Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 521.)

Notwithstanding the rise of other Universities, and largely changed conditions generally, Erasmus could write to Campeggio in 1526: "Expectabatur sententia Parisiensis Academiae, quae semper in re theologica non aliter principem tenuit locum, quem Romana sedes Christianae religionis principatum". (quoted in Feret: "Vol. II, p. 7, "Époque Moderne").


Biel, in Sent. III, Dist. XXVII, art. iii, dub. 2 to Q. Here are enunciated five propositions "post Dominum Petrum de Aliaco".


41. Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. III, p. 494ff. Here is the repudiation of the two propositions of de Montesono (op. cit.) - props. (9) and (14), wherein the Dominican asserted the complete sufficiency
of Scripture as the basis of doctrine, and the need for a full exegesis of Scripture, which would throw into prominent relief later deviations from it.

42. "M. Lutheri Opera latina varii argumenti ad reformationis historiam imprimit pertinenteria" ("Luthers sämtliche Werke", Erlangen, 1825-1868, 67 volumes), Vol. I, 1865, p. 315 ff. Vd. also "Zeitschrift f. Kirchengeschichte", Vol. 26, 1905, p. 104 ff. (Piebig's "Ergänzende Bemerkungen zu Stange, Die altesten ethischen Disputationen Luthers, Quellenschriften zur Geschichte des Protestantismus, ed. Kunze u. Stange, I Heft, Leipzig, Beichert, 1904") Those for whom Luther intended his arrows were named - Scotus, Occam, d'Ailli, and Biel. As is well known now, Luther made his great mistake in imagining that his condemnation of these four scholars in particular was sufficient to demolish the whole race of Scholastics whom he identified with Scotists and Parisians.

43. This occurs in his interesting chapter, "Luther the Monk", Vol. I, p. 140.


Although theology was studied in early times in Bologna, there is no trace of the continuity of such a school in a later age at the great Italian University.


Wadding says of Boulever (p. 320) "Librum de sancta Trinitate ... ubi multa habet contra Pictores variis et impropris modis hanc sacram Triadem personarum depingentis". Two other works of his are, "Declarationem identitatum et distinctionum rerum secundum Scotum" (Basel, 1507), and, "Tertium de formalitatis ad mentem Scoti" (Venice, 1516).

48. Vd. my "Italy and the Reformation", 1933, p. 195.


The works indicated by Wadding are, - "Theoremata de mente Scoti", Venice, 1514. His works on Scotus' Commentary on the Sentences - i.e. the Opus Oxoniense, appeared at Lyons in 1520, and that on the Reportata at Paris in 1518.

53. This transition Ochino described later in his life to Muzio. (Benrath: "Bernardino Ochino", Eng. trans. 1876, pp. 9-10. Also my "Italy and the Reformation to 1550", pp. 184-185.)

54. Martigné ("La Scolastique et les Traditions franciscaines", 1888) is proud of his Order's devotion to St. Bonaventura in the period, 1525-1578.


- (Girolamo) "thirsting for deeper and more practical knowledge, his mind found no satisfaction in the ordinary studies of the schools, and he was led to the study of St. Bonaventura whose works had long ceased to be read in the schools. From St. Bonaventura he had gained more than knowledge; he had learned that training of the will in knowledge which was the purpose of the Platonic philosophy and of that theological tradition in Christendom of which St. Bonaventura is a type."

The same authority describes the origin of theological study in the Capuchin Order thus; - "For some years after the Council of Trent the Capuchins had no theological schools or classes; they studied individually and privately under the guidance of some experienced teacher. Such teachers were not hard to find; for many of them who joined the Reformation had taught theology before they came; ..... Later, when novices came direct from the world and were unversed in theology, it was decided that no novices should be received as clerics destined for the priesthood unless they had received an education which fitted them for the study of theology."Vol. I, p. 154. Vd. on this point, "Soverii Annales", 1632-1639: the 1549 General Chapter Decree.


55. According to Wadding (p. 122), Leo X gave permission for Lychnetus' work to be printed, but because of the death of the printer, political disturbance, or some such misfortune, it did not appear.

Wadding makes use of his commentary on Scotus in that edition of the Doctor Subtilis which has been used in the present thesis.

56. A typical passage on this subject, taken from Wadding's edition of Scotus runs: - "Eis Doctor intendit probe
contra istos, quod liberum arbitrium existens in puris naturalibus possit cavere omne peccatum mortale: patet, quia potest observare omnia praecepta Dei, quia Deus non praeceptum impossibilitatem observare secunda Hieronymum: sed peccatum mortale non commititur nisi transgressiendo praeceptum Dei.

A footnote to the same passage runs, "Si anim observando praeceptum non peccat, et potest sine gratia illud observare, ergo ut sic, potest evitare peccatum mortale." Vol. VI, p. 913.

57. The text of this same Sireventus was used a hundred years afterwards by a Cardinal. Another work with Scotus as the basis was the "Informalitates Scotti" of Giovanni Vallo of Naples, a contemporary of Trombeta. Wadding, p. 228: "Quod opus Florentie.... A Constantino Sarzano S. R. E. Cardinale auctum una cum texta Antonij Syrecti. Prodiit Parisiis an. 1585 Venetiis autem an. 1588 apud Fran Senensem."

58. Porchian's works are, "Apologie pro Joanne Duns Scotio" etc. Bologna, 1620 and 1623; "Vitam eiusdem Scoti"; "Discussiones Scoticas de comm. Autaph., et Reportatis Parisiensibus adscriptis eisdem Scoti", Padua, 1635; "Epitomen in 4 libros Sententiarum Scoti".

59. The preference for Scotus was characteristic both of the Observants and of the Conventuals (vd. Martigne, p. 14ff.). On this point, attention is drawn to the recommendations of the Chapters General at Aia Coeli in 1645 and 1651: "Imponitur Patribus Lectoribus Theologiae, ut declarato breviter textu Scoti, facuta electione aliquis doctoris Scotistae, quantum expediens fuerit, in utilitatem studentium illius doctrinan explicant, et sequantur."

60. The training of the will in knowledge is clearly associated in the Renaissance period with the Platonic philosophy whose renaissance at Florence, and in Tuscany generally, is well known. Vd. 3. Spaventa: "Carattere e Sviluppo della Filosofia Italiana dal Secolo 14°...", 1860. In the mystic, Bonaventura, this same training is manifest.
Chapter IV: "Chino's Hamartiology".

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1. Vd. also XXX Dialogi, Sk. i, p. 327ff. Dial. XI: "Utrum Jesus nos ab originali peccato liberauerit, necne."

2. "Prediche", IV, I. There is implicit a theory of election, and, on the other hand, a return to the earlier and superior Scholastic position. To the selection of the right means and human endeavour grace must be added.

3. It is an ancient theory that all created before man was created for him: the Sabbath being instituted after the creation of man, for it, symbolizing God, man was created.

4. Cf. his "Catechismo ciò è Formulario per amaestrate i fanciulli ne la religion christiana fatto in modo di dialogo", Basel, 1562, p. 3.

Also the XXX Dialogi, Sk. i, p. 232: "Et septimo die quievit, hoc est non creavit novas creaturarum species:

Ochino appears to have taken the theory from Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Pars I, Q. LXXIII, Art. ii, Conclusio; "Requievit Deus die septima ab omni opere, inquantum cessavit a novis creaturis condendis, et quia post opera in seipso beatus,

...Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicuit Deus in solo requiescis, et se fruendo est; ita et nos per solam Dei fruitionem beati efficimus."

5. "Prediche", IV, 2. "Però se l'huomo non diventa una bestia, con perdere l'intelletto, non potrà mai satiarsi nelle cose sensibili:" Cf. Dante, "Inferno", XXVI, 118-120.


7. "Prediche", IV, 3. "Ma il Christiano col lume del sole, ciò è, di Christo crocifisso, conosce l'anima essere, molto più perfettamente. ...Christo è morto....per salvare (solamente) l'anima, ...."

8. Scotus: Rep. Par. IV, Dist. XLIII, Q. ii, 24. The Franciscan Scholastic maintained the inability of the reason to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. The "lume di candele" mentioned in the predic is the "lumen naturale" of Scotus.

9. "Non pensare che havesse spesa si pretiosa vita, se l'anima non fusse cosa eccellente e degna: et noi l'appraziamo."

10. "Sonno alcuni li quali hanno detto.....per il peccato cadde l'intelletto in ignorantia, la volontà in malitia, e le facoltà in impotentia:....."

With Ochino here, contrast Melancthon as an exponent of the effects of original sin. (Opera, Pars I, p. 310, Wittenb. 1562).
II. This optimistic valuation appears with unusual emphasis in the agreement of the interlocutors in the XXX Dialogi, Bk.i,p.231.

12. Cf. this method of referring to "irsicible", and "concupiscible" with Aquinas, Summa T., Pars I, ii, Q.xxv. "Deinde considerandum est de ordine passionum ad invicem; .... I De ordine passionum irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis."

13. Rep.Par.IV,Dist.I,q.v,Schol.ii,4. Here occurs a comment on grace as a "donum superadditum". Scotus' view of grace as something detachable is important in this connection.

14. Lämmcr: "Die vortridentisch-katholische Theologie", 1868, pp.101-102. Erasmus held that in Adam, only the will was involved, but in Eve both will and intellect. There are, however, interesting points of contact between Erasmus and Ochino at this point.

15. Cf.Erasmus (op.cit.) - "...intellectus, unde scatent fontes omnium bonorum ac malorum" with Ochino - "ignorantia di Dio, nacqueno tutti gli altri loro peccati." Yet vd. XXX Dialogi,Bk.i,p.239: Ochinos; "Quia non credo ego, ....... originale peccatum ignorantiam esse Dei."

16. Vd. however,XXX Dialogi,Bk.i,p.57. "Adamum a se creatum maniera, ecclesiastico paradiso collocavit. Qui quamvis ibi sum- Deus in caelesti paradiso collocavit. Qui quamvis ibi summa libertate,dominatu,felicitate frueretur,tamen non ita tunc bonum cognovit quod habebat, ...."

Also,cf. Prediche IV,20. "Dipoi,se Adam non peccava, tutti saramo stati nel terrestre paradiso."

On the liberation from original sin by Jesus' work, vd. XXX Dialogi,Bk.i.p.226. Doubts about the constitution of that sin are there put into the mouth of Jacobus.

17. Ochinos says there are 15 theories of the constitution of original sin. XXX Dialogi,Bk.i,p.228.

18. Cf. Eck,(Lämmcr,op.cit.,p.103) - "Privatus ille (homo) est dono maximo, ........ quoque animalium,quorum regimen et un- iversale dominium simul amisit,........"


23. It must, in justice to the Protestant Reformers, be pointed out that both Bonaventura and Aquinas held that mortality was consequent upon sin, and it is from these and similar Scholastics that Ochino drew this teaching. The theory that before the entry of death into the world men were "translated," and would have continued to be so had the fall not occurred, appears in the Dialogi XXX, Bk. i, p. 261. This view set forth is similar to that of Scotus: Rep. Par. II, Dist. XIX, c. i, Schol. i, 6. In this place in the dialogues, Jacobus actually sets forth something of the anti-theologism of Ochino: "Isti verò sunt alius nihil hominum opiniones, in aere, non in divina doctrina fundatae."

24. "Però essendo in Adam tutti corrotti...." Cf. also XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 12: v.d. also, ibid., p. 229-230; Jacobus, "Mihi non placet ista opinio (i.e. the Augustinian)."

25. The eminent Cardinals, Contarini and Sadoleto - with the first of whom especially Ochino was acquainted - exhibit precisely this same characteristic of oscillation. V.d. my "Italy and the Reformation," p. 261.

26. V.d., however, the 10th predica, where the effects of the fall are said to be seen in the sphere of the will.

27. "Se Adam non fosse stato inimico di se stesso, non gl'harebbe nociuto, me Eva, ne il serpente."

28. "In tanto adunque l'huomo si chiama spirituale, in quanto che cerca la gloria di Dio:....."


30. Once again, the inclination, already noted, of making Adam simply one of the human race, and not an unique specimen, appears here. "Adam, essendo huomo di carne come noi,..."

31. Cf. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 240ff. "... neque in eo originale esse peccatum dici potest:....." Cf. ibid., p. 264.

32. "Però doveremo cercar di essere buoni, non di esser tenuti."

33. Cf. Scotus: Rep. Par. II, Dist. XXXIX, c. ii, Schol. II. The parallel is particularly close between the Scholastic and Ochino.

34. "Però doveremo cercar di essere buoni, non di esser tenuti." V.d. also, ibid., p. 229-230; Jacobus, "Mihi non placet ista opinio (i.e. the Augustinian)."

35. "Prediche", IV, 35. "....haviano da credere non solamente che non ripugnava al divin volere,...."
36. "Dio mandò il suo figliuolo, non per meriti nostri, ma per sua mera bontà, pura gratia, e eccessiva carità."

37. Cf. "Prediche", V, 4. Here the absolutism of the divine goodness appears unrestricted. (With the Vth volume there is no need to be particularly concerned here, containing as it does little more than fragments of discussions previously entered into in the other volumes of Prediche.)

38. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 257.

39. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 294.


41. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 228ff. Here Ochius asserts that he has discovered 15 theories of the origin and the propagation of sin.

42. "la ragion humana è si ceca,..."

43. There is interesting testimony, some of it apparently unknown to Benrath, both to the possibility of change in Ochino's opinions, and also to the regard in certain Catholic circles for the ex-Capuchin. A remarkable letter of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, is such as to render intelligible to some extent the story supplied by Boverio. (Monumenta Ignatiana, I. Ser. Tom. I, Fasc. i, 1903, pp. 343-344.) The comment of some later editor is added in Italian to Loyola's letter (which letter is dated December 12th, 1545). "The business undoubtedly is that of the reduction of Fra Bernardino Ochino to the faith, and is a letter of the Blessed Father."
I. Cf. "Prediche", III, 22. "Dopo, che cosa è questo mondo, se non un inferno?"


3. Vd. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 132. "I am supposed to have said that man can be saved whether he is free or not. What I really said was .... I am supposed to have said .... What I really said was ......


5. Summa Theologica, Pars I, ii, q. vi, Art. 4. "Deus, qui est potenter quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere .... Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, jam non esset cum actu voluntatis, nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem."

6. The passage is in the Summa Theol., Pars I, ii, q. 10, Art. 2: "Si autem proponatur ei aliquod objectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas fieratur in illud."


7. Occam: In Sent. II, q. XIX, litt. 0; "odium Dei, furari, adulterari .... quantum ad esse absolute in illis acris .... etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viator si caderunt sub precepto divino, sicut nunc de facto eorum cadunt sub precepto divino."

Luther, influenced no doubt by such theories as Occam's, in his celebrated Commentary on the Romans also exhibits a tendency to deprive the moral law of objective foundation: vd. Denifle, "Luther u. Luthertum", Bd. ii, p. 305, fn. 4.

8. Ochino's discussion is on different "signe" in God. Cf. Summa Theologica, Pars I, q. XIII; "... procedendum est ad considerationis divinorum nominum."


11. Cf. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 132; "Verum non credo illos aeterno
Objection to the popular idea which maintained that everlasting punishments were visited upon sinners is again expressed by Jacobus (XXX Dialogi, Sk.i, p.186): "Ne mihi quidem placet ista opinio, itaque alien narrare volo ocurrundam, qui dixere peccata nostrae infinitae esse praeventis, tantam anim esse peccati praeventem, cuanta est bonitas et maiestas infinitas, readerendum esse peccatorum praeventem esse infinitam."

12. The break here with medieval tradition is clear in, e.g., the rejection of the theory of hell as a place where there was no physical torture, a theory explicitly condemned at Paris in 1270 by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, and appearing in the heresies of Siger of Brabant. Vd. Denifle-Chatelain, Vol. I, pp. 486, 543ff.

13. Vd. XXX Dialogi, Sk.i, p.359. Uchinus; "tu in opinione es Cri-genis, qui dixit omnes ad extremum fore salvos". Jacobus; "Ego in eius opinione non sum, videlicet omnes fore salvos."

This agreement between the interlocutors in rejecting Origenism is capable of at least one interpretation. Ochino's fellow-countryman, Curione, had suffered in another part of Switzerland for his inclinations towards universalism. Sheltering behind a Scholastic interpretation which avoids Origenism by making the redeemed to come from every class or nation, this passage would reveal Ochino's to avoid charges against his orthodoxy in this matter. The above passage in the 15th Dialogue may, indeed, in Ochino belong to the period of Curione's disgrace.

14. Cf. XXX Dialogi, Sk.i, p.328. This point is made by Jacobus in the 13th Dialogue ("in Christi opera aditus homo iustus fiat obediendo legis"): "Sed ipse (Deus) meru suo beneficio non nos proimpijs habet aut ponit, si eum supra omnia diligimus, quinimo remuneratur, suo ille quidem beneficiu." 

15. Cf. XXX Dialogi, Sk.i, p.73. "Equivem creo pueros ante adiatam aetatem mortuas, si erant ex electorum numero, pervenisse ad eum felicitatis gradum, ad quem erant divinitus electi, sive altum, sive humilem:......."

16. Cf. "Prediche", IV, 26. "Dio creado l'huomo solamente per se:....." In this same predica, the question of moral worth in the elect is simply not discussed, although moral qualities are supposed to exist in the Godhead.
17. Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, ii, Q. vi, Art. 4. (Quoted on p. 124 of this study).


19. Cf. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 407. "Si posnentiam non ages, tua, non Dei, culpa erit". This occurs in the interesting Dialogue against the Holy Ghost.

20. Cf. words put into the mouth of Jacobus: XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 117; "Omnibus Christum misit, omnes vocat,....." Also ibid., p. 407; (Paracletus is the interlocutor replying to Philantus) "Sed quia Christus omnes ad se vocat, neminem excludens,....."

21. Cf. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 133, "si enim id voluisset, datarum fuisse nobis eius quoque rei, sicut et caeterarum ad salutem necessariarum, cognitionem sermone suo: dicunt me dixisse, noluisse Deum ut sciamus utrum liberi simus necne."

22. It is probable that a certain amount of anti-theologism appears in Cardinal Pole, a point which, if fully established, would suggest that Uchino learnt much more from members of the Viterbo circle than has generally been suspected. Vd. the opinion of Carnesacchi on the relationships between Cardinal Pole and Vittoria Colonna: "she acted on the one hand as though faith alone could save her, on the other hand as though her salvation depended solely on works." (Quoted in my "Italy and the Reformation", p. 237.)

23. Vd. Leibniti Opera Theologica, 1768, (Vol. I, Opera Omnia), p. 53, §3f. "...Deus mundum omnium perfectissimum elegerit,...." Latta: "Leibniz; the Monadology", etc. 1925, p. 66. "...the actual universe is 'the best of all possible worlds'...God makes this choice because, being omnipotent, His choice is unlimited...being omniscient, He contains all possible worlds in His understanding and perceives that which is best; and, being perfect in goodness of will, He chooses the best." Also, Latta, pp. 347, 417.

24. Cf. XXX Dialogi, Bk. i, p. 84: "igitur sic sentio, omnium quae a Deo accipimus beneficiorum et primum et maximum illud esse, quod nos amavit."
Leibniti Opera Omnia, Vol. I, p. 58, §35. "...divinam Sapientiam non potuisse non habere maximas, aut potius invictissimas, rationes, quibus adductas... nihil enim a Deo proficiisci potest, nisi quod benomtati, justitiae, ae sanctitati,....conmuat."

25. Cf. S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, To. III, (Quaracchi, 1837): In Sent. III, Dist. XXXIV, Q. ii, Concl. 2. "Et propter hoc dicit quaedam Glossa, quod donum sapientiae donum intellectus habet dirigere; quod ideo dicitum est, quia cognitio experimentalis
de divina suavitate amplificat cognitionem speculativam de
divina veritate; secreta enim Dei amicis et familiaribus
consueverunt revelari."
Ibid.,Tom.V,1891. Prologus in Breviloquium, §3. "De
sublimitate sacræ Scripturæ". "....philosophia quid-
em agit de rebus, ut in natura, .... sed theologìa, tam-
quæm scientia supra fidem fundata et per Spiritum sanctum
revelata, agit et de eis quæ spectant ad gratiam et gloriam
et etiam ad Sapientiam æternam."

Petrus Damiani also was little inclined to exalt specu-
lative theology. Vd. Gilson: "Etudes de Philosophie Médié-
vale", 1921, p. 31. "Le représentant le plus typique de ces
théologiens stricts est assurément Saint Pierre Damiani
et c'est dans ces écrits que nous trouverons l'expression
la plus nette de cette hostilité foncière à l'égard de
toute spéculation purement rationnelle. La seule question
qui se pose, pour un esprit de ce genre, est celle de savoir
si la religion chrétienne est ou n'est pas toute la veri-
té."  

26. Cardinal Sadoleto (d. 1547), a type different from Ochino
with strong inclinations towards Humanism, was a member of
the famous "Consilium de Emendanda Ecclesia". In a letter
to Francesco Bini in 1535, he used language closely re-
sembling Ochino's on the love for Scholastic theologians
among those from he differed. "....sebben non ho studiato
Durandi, Capreolo, Ochan (Occam), ho studiato la Bibbia, San
Paolo, Agostino, Ambrogio, Crisostomo, e quei degnissimi Dottor-
tori, che sono le colonne della vera sciæntia." Sadoleto
Epistolæ, Tom.II, 1740, p. 360.</p>

27. Cf. Leibniz (Opera Omnia, Vol. I, 1768, p. 151, §43) on the poss-
ibility of choosing. "Certum est, hanc a voluntate partem
electum iri, sed necesse non est, ut eligatur."

Christi Salvatoris", p. 282, §3-C. "...Christum dicere de-
disse redemptionem pro omnibus, hoc est, pro universa sua
Ecclesia tota orce dispersa, et consequenter pro omnibus
homini generibus, regionibus, privatis, nobilibus, ignobilibus,
etc. .... pro hominibus omnium nationum, linguarum et gen-
tium.... ex quibus congregatur universus populus Dei,..."

29. In "Prediche", III, 42, Ochino holds that carnal man cannot
love God unless he has received from God the requisite
'talent' or gift. These two predicē should be studied
together.

30. There is a remarkable parallel between Ochino in this
predica, and Pascal in the 233rd fragment of his "Pensées":
the risking of an eternity, though doubtful, for temporal
advantages occupies them both.
Chapter VI: "The Ochinnian Christology".

1. The edition of the Pacovian Catechism used here is the English one of Fees; London, 1818. Vd. also, Curtis, "History of Creeds", etc., p. 1911, p. 357ff.

2. Vd. Occam: In Sent. III, Q. A. The discussion, "De necessitate habitum supernaturalem". Ibid. T. Here it is asserted that the supernatural 'habits' might appear absolutely superfluous, if Biblical authority could not be adduced. It will be recognized that the implications of such a position are considerable. Cf. also, on the supremacy of Scripture, Gerson: "Opera" (Antwerp, 1706), p. 457.


3. Cf. the preface to the XXX Dialogi (this work is dedicated to the Duke of Bedford) where the Scriptures are described as containing among the truths necessary to salvation the knowledge of Jesus as the Messiah.

4. XXX Dialogi, Bk. I, p. 205. It is from the passage quoted by Ochinus (II Cor. v) that Jacobus expresses his disagreement. "Sed ego primum Paulo fidem non adhibeo: ..."

     In the last Dialogue of the book, where it is important to notice that the interlocutors, Ochinus and Jacobus, give place to others, occurs the most significant passage on difficulties in the Pauline theology. "Dicam Pauli verba (i.e. Heb. vi) esse omnium quae usquam extant in sacris litteris obscurissima intellectuque difficillima, ac eiusmodi, ut nulla magis homines perterreant, nisi rite intelligantur."


7. Cf. also, p. 190. "Errarunt ergo qui dixere mortem Christi eam fuisse quae satis facere posset pro infinitis peccatis, licet vim suam duntaxat in electorum peccatis exercuit: ..." Ochinus: "Ita est."

8. The same artificial theory reappears in the 12th Dialogue, but in a place where the absoluteness of God is the main consideration. P. 288.

     Vd. also, Jacobus' argument against 'imputation' (p. 295)
- "verò tu erras qui putas Christum venisse ad efficiendum ut nobis peccata non imputentur. Veniet enim ut tantam Dei cognitionem nobis conferat, ut Dei legi obediamus, atque ita non peccemus."

9. There is a striking reference to what, for any of the Biblical positivists in whose line Ochino generally stands, is of first importance in adding further support to the belief that Ochino himself was really averse to the expiatory theory. In the mouth of Jacobus are put the words, - "Sed ego primum Paulo fidem num achibeo: et ipse quamvis dicat a Jesu placatam esse iram Dei, et ex eo contendat esse Messian, non tamen planum facit authoritate sacrarum litterarum, a Jesu placatam esse iram." (p.205)

Also, cf. p.206. "Patendum igitur est, Messiam placaturn esse iram Dei, non quia sit eum mutaturus.... sed quia sit nos mutatur." Also, cf. p.165. "Venit igitur Jesus ut nos mutaret, quibus id opus est: non Deum, qui nos aternum vitam amare nunquam intermisit."

10. "Prediche", IV, 26. "Hor cosi li suoi membri (i.e. Jesus') i quali sono morti e sepolti al mondo, e resuscitati a Dio, non debbono piu peccare, ne morire spiritualmente:...."

11. P.403. "Plerique omnes antiqui, tum Graeci tum Latini, de hoc peccato locuti sunt, ut non solum diversas, sed etiam saepe contrarias habuerint opiniones. Et quoniam cum sint errores innumeris, veritas unica, coactus sunt dicere aut omnes illas erasse, aut certe non plus uno verum vidisse ac dixisse. Et quia veritas, praesertim si detecta est et efficax, ut nos sibi cogat assentire, cum videam nostri cuoque temporis homines fuisse non in nobis quidem dicendis, sed in dictis repetendis vario, ego in eam veni opinionem, ut huius rei veritatem nondum planè in lucem venisse putem."

On the divergent opinions, vd. also, p.419. "Cum sint enim peccatum in spiritum sanctum ego circiter 22 inventi patrum opiniones, quid sit id peccatum. Quod si id doctores ipsi non comperuint, quanta minus illiterati?"

12. The unhistorical view, still found in polemical writings, would make the XVI century anti-Trinitarianism to be simply duplicates of early heretics. Cf. Zanchi: "De Tribus Elohim", 1589, Pars I. (This work was dedicated to Grinckal, Archbishop of York.) There are various references to Ochino in this work. On p.175, he, together with Biandrata, Gentile, and the Sozzini, appear with the heretics of the early Church as enemies of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

13. P.405. "Fuit icta quandam opinion Hieronymi quae si vera foret, nullus Arrianorum ad frugem redire ac servari potuisset, quippe qui non solum filium, sed etiam spiritum sanctum inferioram esse patri crederent. Emiserò salvi multi, qui non solum non crediderunt aequala esse patri et filio,
verum etiam ne quidem sciebant esse sciebant esse non
esse spiritus,... ego vero hoc dico, si perieuntum est omnibus qui
prima tabula praeceptis non obedient, cum nemo sit qui Deum
toto corde amet, idque illis obediat, est nobis omnibus de
salute nostra desperandum."

14. P.348. "Praeterea Christus ut homo non tantulum
quidem beneficium in nos conferre potuisset, nisi Deus mero suo
beneficio ei et esse dedisset, et virtutes doctesque omnes
ipsi ad nos servandos necessarias."
Cf. Scotus: Pep.Par.IV,Dist.XV,Q.i,Schol.i,9. Here the
absoluteness of God is exaggerated to the point where it
is asserted that God could have saved mankind without an
Incarnation. Vd. the outline of Scotus's teaching in Chap-
ter II of this thesis.

15. P.347. "Si voluit Deus mero suo beneficio, nullius adhibita
opera ante orbus conditum electis suis regnum caeleste, faten-
dum omnino est, cum gratis, et nullius adhibita opera voluer-
it eis aeternam vitam; voluisse ea cuoque per quae eas ad
illum perducet, idque mera benignitate, nullo Messiae res-
p ectu."

16. There is an interesting parallel to Ochino in the instance
of Nicholas of Ultricuria. Vd. Rashdall, "Universities," etc.
Vol.I, p.538. His condemnation in 1346 followed on the pro-
hibition of Occamism in 1339 at Paris. "Nicholas de Ul-
tricuria, ... with a more brilliant metaphysical genius than
Occam, anticipated the system of Berkeley, was compelled
to retract his extremely enlightened errors." Ibid., footnote.
"It is a notable instance of the success of persecution
that the name of this brilliant metaphysical genius is not
mentioned in histories of Philosophy or even in works es-
specially devoted to the Scholastic Philosophy."
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