INFLUENCE, AUTHORITY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
IN THE CHANGING SCALE OF SOCIETY; A STUDY OF
RURAL URBAN RELATIONS IN A MODERN WEST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

by

J.R. Follock, M.A.

15th May, 1970.

Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Edinburgh in the Faculty of Social Sciences.
SUMMARY

The thesis presents a case study of social change of a socio-economic area in the Northern Province of Sierra Leone, an area centred on the town of Makeni (pop. 14,000 approx.).

In the first section the conceptual framework and theoretical orientation is expounded and a two-level concept of social structure is defined and described. The relationship of the two levels, described in the thesis as being social structures of low and high stability, to other theories of structure, in particular those of F. Barth and F.G. Bailey is delineated.

The second section is devoted to an analysis of the geographical background, the technical environment and the high stability structures found in the area. The high stability structures established are those of Village, Town and Administration and the section ends with an account of the few high stability links between them.

The third section deals with low stability structures, in particular those that concern the relationship between the high stability structures. A fairly detailed analysis is made of entrepreneurial activities in which resources in one high stability structure are converted into capital in another. The analysis concentrates particularly on such activities which create a political profit for the actor. The section winds up by /
by arguing that the socio-economic area appears to be acquiring at least some of the attributes of a region, defined sociologically.

A short section IV concludes the thesis by describing some of the implications of the study to the selection of further areas of research and its implications to the theory of social change.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was only made possible by the financial backing of a three year Studentship Grant from the Social Sciences Research Council and by the help of my Supervisors Dr. M.J. Ruel of the Social Anthropology Department of Edinburgh University and J. Pilgrim of Njala College, University of Sierra Leone. Njala College helped me in many ways in the course of my fieldwork and I hope that this study can be of some use to them.

It would be inaccurate and unfair to pick out any individuals but I would like to acknowledge and thank the people of Mabaibunda, Magbaikoli and Makeni. In some ways I took advantage of them and many of them never could really understand what I was trying to do and yet they made me welcome, gave me hospitality, explained and demonstrated with incredible patience.
# LIST OF CONTENTS

## SECTION I

**FIELDWORK, METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTS**

(1) **INTRODUCTION**  
Fieldwork techniques; Initial definition of the problem.  

(2) **THEORETICAL ORIENTATION**  
Introduction; Structure and Stability; Structure and recognition; Structure and system; Low stability structures; R. Firth’s concept of structure; Leach, Levi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown and Fortes; Barth and Bailey.

(3) **KEY CONCEPTS**  
Entrepreneurs; Influence and security; Patronage.

(4) **LAYOUT**

## SECTION II

**HIGH STABILITY STRUCTURES**

**INTRODUCTION**  

(1) **HISTORY OF THE AREA**  
The Temne people; History of Bombali area and chiefdom administration; Economic and administrative development of Makeni; The mechanical ploughing scheme and the co-operative societies.

(2) /
(2) ECOLOGY OF THE BOLILANDS

Physical geography of the bolilands; Human geography of the bolilands and Makeni area; Boliland farming; The mechanical ploughing scheme; Yields and rewards; The Boliland farmers; Rice marketing.

(3) THE VILLAGE

Descent and kinship; Local kin groups; The local groups; Household and domestic organisation; Land tenure; Marriage, divorce and the affinal relationship; The village unit and composition; Village institutions; Citizens and strangers; The village as a community; Chiefship.

(4) THE TOWN

The market town; Market institutions; Wealth and stratification; Political institutions; Islam in Makeni; The urban way of life.

(5) THE ADMINISTRATION

The concept of raputu; The administrative bureaucracy; The administrators; The administrator's way of life; Christianity and administration; Attitudes to administration; Attitudes from administration.

SECTION III
LOW STABILITY STRUCTURES

(1) INTRODUCTION

(2) /
(2) THE MOVERS  ............................................. 184

Migration; Village to town; Town to administration; Migrants and politics; Seasonal migrants; Movement of women.

(3) THE ENTREPRENEURS  ...................................... 196

The role of traders; Local traders; Scale of operations; Traders and influence; Trader's farms; The role of Big Men; Big Men and help; Big Men and gifts; Information and secrecy; Recruitment of Big Men Chiefs and Traders; Big Men as articulators of national issues; The organisation of support; Big Men as innovators; A typology of enterprises.

(4) STRUCTURES GENERATED WITHIN STRUCTURES  .................................. 244

Village work organisation; Work gangs organisation; Young men's farms; Farming women; Economic fragmentation of the local group; The household head as Patron; Economic stratification within the village; Credit and the strategy of economic differentiation; Wealth and authority in the village; Farmers and rice-marketing; Changes in land tenure; The nature of chieftainship; Farmers from town; The town household; Citizens and strangers; Capital and credit; Modified administrative task execution.

(5) A SUMMING UP ............................................. 289

The changing household and developing region; The universality of patronage; Islamisation and patronage in the developing region.

SECTION /
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section/Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. FARM MANAGEMENT DATA</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. KINSHIP, DESCENT AND LOCAL GROUP TERMINOLOGY</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FARMING DATA FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN MABAIBUNDA. 1967.</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN MAKENI</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A MAKENI HOUSEHOLD</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES IN TEXT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Co-operative Societies by type and sex of members and by size of holding</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Farm ownership of handworked farms by number of holdings and size</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Users of Mabaibunda ploughing site by residence, sex and occupation</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Ego-focused kinship grid</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mabaibunda households and domestic groups</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Temne houseplan</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Occupational structure of Makeni</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Length of residence in Makeni of adult members of household</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Enterprises linking high stability structures</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ratio of Male and Female to total population of the villages studies</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Handworked rice farms for Mabaibunda and Magbaikoli</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Household composition. Affines and other irregular residences in households for Mabaibunda</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Fragmentation in Town and Village</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Joint family households in Town and Village</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND MAPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagram/Map Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Map of Sierra Leone showing drainage and main physical features</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Map of Sierra Leone showing communications, settlement patterns and research locations</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Socio-economic area of study. Main human and physical features</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cycle of agricultural operations in bolilands swamp farming</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Co-operative Societies in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Family of origin and of procreation. Kin terms</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Street, House and household plan of Mabaibunda village</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Village composition and kin ties between villages</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Kinship and household composition of Mabaibunda</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mabaibunda settlement and farmlands</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Economic stratification in Mabaibunda</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Farm allocation in Bolilands</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Household sizes in Makeni and Mabaibunda/Magbaikoli</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Entrepreneurs and Patrons; a conceptual representation</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The harvesting gang, the am bira</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Transporting fertiliser out to the farms by bicycle and headloading</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Aerial photograph of Mabaibunda and its surrounds</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A Temne cooking yard</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A typical household</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. A cooking yard at one of Mabaibunda's outlying hamlets</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Aerial photograph of Makeni</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. A stranger farmer visiting his farm in the bolilands</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. A trader Big Man threshing his rice, Mabaibunda in the background</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Two trader Big Men in Town</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(1) Introduction

Fieldwork techniques

I arrived in Sierra Leone in November 1966, with the intention of examining the social background of the development of mechanised rice cultivation and Rice Marketing Co-operative Societies in the Northern Province. Having talked briefly with officials in the area and acting on the assumption that a Marketing Co-operative Society with a membership made up of farmers could only be effectively based in a village I duly selected a village where these developments were occurring and moved in. This village was called Mabaibunda and there I resided until January 1968. For the last four months of this period I started visiting regularly another and contrasting village about nine miles away called Magbaikoli. In January 1968 I moved into the local town, Makeni, which is about twenty-five miles away from the two farming villages and stayed there for six months although I continued visiting the two villages and other villages in the same Chiefdom quite often.

The basic fieldwork technique employed was the traditional anthropological technique of participant or neutral observation but I used a variety of other techniques with varying success. In both /
both villages I conducted a household and domestic organisation census of a relatively simple kind. In Mabaibunda I followed up every farmer in 1967 and measured his or her farms and asked a number of questions concerning the farm management. Farm measurement was difficult because of the highly irregular shapes and dispersed patterns of the farm holdings but was aided by the fact that they were all situated in open swampland permitting a compass cross bearing survey technique. I also managed a four acre mechanically ploughed farm of my own and joined the Co-operative Society. I also carried out a weekly household budget survey of three households but this proved a failure because of the obvious unreliability of the data thus collected and difficulty experienced in questioning every member of the household who might have bought or sold an item. During March, 1968, with the help of seven undergraduates of Njala College I carried out a 10% sample survey of ratepayers concerning household composition, economic arrangements of the household and involvement in rural areas. A number of direct measurements were made concerning labour inputs, efficiency in various farming operations and yields from different types of farms.

Fieldwork was carried out in Krio or Temne although proper fluency in this last language was never attained. I engaged a young villager in Mabaibunda to do my chores and he interpreted for /
for me when necessary but I had no other assistance.

Fieldwork conditions were generally good, the main complicating factor being the several changes in National regime the country underwent while I was there which made certain activities difficult but which also created a number of interesting situations for the observer.

**Initial definition of the problem**

The problem as initially conceived was a simple one. The question to be answered was, at its simplest; what in fact was the Rice Marketing Co-operative Society as a social institution in this village? How did it function and how did it relate to whole of the local social life and the social change that was occurring there? The question thus put was seen initially in fairly orthodox structural-functional terms. I supposed initially, and reasonably, that a farmers' Co-operative Society could only function if it was locally based, that is to say in a village or a number of nearby villages. The first and obvious course to take was that of a community study where the Co-operative Society was operating, followed up probably with a wider ranging sample survey in order to place the one community in a better perspective.

After a month in Mabaibunda I realised that although the village was discretely defined territorially, in terms of historical settlement /
settlement, land tenure and Administration there were severe limitations to regarding it as an ongoing functioning systematic structure. This was revealed initially when I began investigating the membership of the Co-operative Society. The only person who could tell me the membership was the Secretary and he did not live in the village, in fact he maintained several domestic units in town and village. Going through the books of the Society with him it became apparent that membership of the Society was spread over many villages and included many people from town. Furthermore the President of the Society was a man who lived forty miles away and was never seen to take part in the Society's activities any longer. Enquiring as to how this could be, revealed that originally the Society had been centred in that village but on the instigation of an influential farmer from Makeni had transferred to Mabaibunda. Clearly this was not the picture of a Co-operative Society that I had been expecting and could not be dealt with in terms of a village community study. It also became apparent that there were quite a number of farms in the village that were managed by non-residents of the village, that there was a shifting population of dependants in and out of the village in an apparently haphazard fashion and a somewhat shadowy interest taken by various influential individuals in the wellbeing of the community who had no formal position in the Chiefdom Administration.
Administration, National Administration or Kinship network. While investigating in Makeni town into the Co-operative Organisation and the Mechanical Ploughing Scheme I was normally introduced to a local individual who told me how he could help me, tell me about the farmers, their problems and how he was concerned to help them and what they had already done for them. These persons were very helpful, introducing me to local farmers, supplying me with lucid information and the history of local development, etc. Thus, it became obvious that in order to understand the dynamics of social change in Mabaibunda it was no good to look solely at a village and how the village was changing. It appeared that in some way the nature of the relationship between the village and other social units was crucial. I realised that by confining myself to the village and how it was changing I could only bring in the town insofar as the market economy, centred in the town was stimulating cash cropping. I would have ended up with a study of the effects of the introduction of cash cropping and a Co-operative Society on a Temne village. This I saw as inadequate; far more valuable would be a study of the nature of the relationships between village and town since it seemed to be this area that was determining the actual form of the Co-operative Society and many other changes taking place in the village.

The question that then presented itself was what should be done about the structural functionalist frame of reference I started off with? Either the town and the village must be seen as /
as part of the same social structure, the same system, or they must be seen as belonging to different structures. Furthermore, since part of the whole relationship between the town and the village lies in the aspect of the town as an administrative centre administering the local villages, the question is raised as to what extent can the Administrative structure be regarded as belonging to the same structure as the village. It would, of course, make nonsense of the concept of social structure as a system for village, town and Administration to belonging to the same structure, all the world would then constitute one structure. I could have reverted to the 'external effects' type of explanation but the particular situation in the Makeni region revealed the paucity of this approach since the town had arisen and grown in response to mainly local events and could not be considered as an example of external Western Urban Society with an 'external influence'. Thus, having realised that the Co-operative Society and Mechanical Ploughing Scheme could only be investigated within the general context of rural urban-relations there then arose the problem of how /

---

1 In this it contrasts with many of the larger settlements of Africa with a high proportion of wage-earners. It is in precisely these latter towns that most studies of 'urbanisation' have been carried out rather to the neglect of the smaller but far more numerous urban settlements of the Makeni type.
how to deal with these relations within the structuralist frame of reference. This of course is not a new problem, it is one that has run through most studies of social change of the structural-functionalist school. In many of these studies the rural-urban situation has been describable in terms of migrancy, from village to town and back again, the focus here being upon the individual moving from one structure to another, either as a permanent move (the detribalisation model) or as a temporary or situational choice (the alternation model). In fact, it should be made quite clear that there are two problems associated with these studies. Firstly, there is the problem of how to describe the social phenomena observed in the non-homogenous Makeni region, in particular the nature of rural-urban relations. Secondly, the problem of how to identify and view social change occurring within the region without abandoning the essentially synchronic structuralist viewpoint. It is the former problem I wish to deal with in this thesis although its solution is of great interest to the latter one as well.

From the observations I was making at the time it was clear to me that crucial to the nature of rural-urban relations were the activities of a certain category of individuals whom I saw as manipulators, persons who were exploiting the social structure and its
its rules to their own ends. This appeared a fruitful theme to concentrate upon. This theme, however, did not emerge fully until I was in a position to look back over the data that I started collecting in this somewhat ad hoc fashion. When I was in this position I elaborate a systematic set of concepts that I will now describe.

(2) The Theoretical Orientation

Introduction

Perhaps the best way to describe the concepts that I use in this thesis is to return to my conclusion that the village and the market town could not be considered as belonging to the same social system since one was 'traditional', self-sufficient and obviously different from the newer, more 'modern' town that depended on a wideflung market network among other things for its existence. Put simply, life in town is different from life in the village. However, since they have important interrelationships without which I cannot account for such institutions as the Co-operative Society then in one important sense at least they must be included in the same society.

Now, it has always been recognised that no society functions perfectly, that variations, departures, structural tensions and even /
even contradictions may exist in the most clean cut of social structures. It may be argued that the heterogenous situation that I found in the Makeni area is such a case. What are the grounds for saying that village and town do not belong to the same social system? The superficial statement that the apparent 'ways of life' in town and village are different is not adequate. A more rigorous examination of the problem goes to the root of what we mean by social structure as a whole functioning system and can best be dealt with I suggest in terms of the three analytic concepts of stability, recognition and coherence.

Structure and stability

Social structure, by any definition is a pattern, a pattern of social behaviour events. To say that it is a pattern is not to determine the level of abstraction, it could be the social structure of Radcliffe-Brown or that of Needham but it does imply a certain degree of stability. No pattern may be perceived and analysed unless it is around long enough for this to happen and pattern is by its very nature timeless.¹

Now /

¹ By time here I mean historical time. Social structure must always take account of 'mechanical reversible time' (Levi-Strauss, 1953). To say that a social structure allows for the replenishment of its members by biologically time consuming processes is to tell us nothing about the 'stability' of the social structure over generations.
Now to say that a structure is timeless is to say nothing of its stability since this may only be talked about after the time dimension has been introduced. To say, as is indeed often said, that a social structure is synchronic and cannot therefore be used in the study of social change must therefore be wrong. I would argue that it is not the synchronic nature of structural studies that renders them impervious to social change but the 'closed system' nature of them. There is no reason why any pattern should be thought of as a 'closed system' and a good number of reasons why it should not. It is the 'closed system' vision of social structure and not the inherent synchronism characteristic of any pattern that makes it difficult to deal with social change. No level of natural phenomena form a closed system, a little universe, with its own causes, effects and laws and to say that a particular phenomenon is social and therefore not psychological is wrong and dangerous. Nevertheless it is also quite clear that the best way to investigate phenomena is not necessarily to use a reductionist method. In saying that there are no closed systems I do not mean to imply there are no levels of phenomena (or rather levels of understanding phenomena). There are levels and the levels may be defined in terms of stability. Certain events form patterns that have a considerable degree of stability and these patterns may exhibit variations and interrelate /
relate with other patterns enabling us to build up a whole language of description for these patterns. It is the high stability of the patterns that enable us to do this and not the existence of a discrete type of reality. Take the analogy of the cell in Biology. The cell is a structure with a certain pattern. The pattern is built up on events that are observed and the cell is seen thus as having a stability so that a whole language of description may be built up called cytology. Cells are compared with each other in their similarities and differences and a cell is described as a system with maintenance mechanisms. All this is perfectly valid and remains valid despite the great developments of biochemistry such that we may describe all these patterns in terms of other smaller structures with an even greater degree of stability, namely organic molecules. This does not mean that cytology is no longer valid or useful it simply means that we should recognise that there are natural levels at which structures exist long enough to have a degree of stability that makes it worthwhile for us to develop a language and method about and that the cell lies at one such level and molecules making up the cell at another.  

How does all this apply to the study of social structures? Traditionally /

1 We may say that the concepts of cytology are merely 'shorthands' for those of molecular biology. This is true but is no criticism of the validity of the concepts since in this way we may see language itself as a shorthand, in other words, it is only the 'shorthands' that enable us to think and thereby gain understanding.
Traditionally social anthropologists have dealt with structures that we may describe as existing at a level of high stability, the 'ongoing structures', the inherited regularities in behaviour shared by a population, etc. It has been the great virtue of these structural studies that they have revealed a level of stability in phenomena where none was perceived before. Social structure at this level is to do with institutions, with regularities of social behaviour that are passed on from generation to generation and that are recognised as being 'normal' by the actors. Institutions are maintained and handed on by means of the norms and sentiments surrounding them and it is this that gives stability. It is important at this point to recognise that stability is distinct from duration because it implies resistance or resistance to change. Stability does not automatically imply statis, it implies an equilibrium.¹

This stability lies rather heavily on the inherited norms and symbols surrounding certain behaviour patterns rather than in the behaviour itself and this we recognise when we say that society is a moral thing. It is not simply that regularities in behaviour that have this moral element attached are thereby ensured a high degree of stability since it appears also true that /

¹ This point is well made by Leach (1969).
that regularities of behaviour that stick around long enough acquire this moral element as well.\(^1\) At this level of stability certain rules of description apply: we do not speak of individuals as entities but of institutions as entities that mould the individual.

**Structure and Recognition**

It is the moral element attached to (institutionalised) behaviour patterns that I refer to by the term recognition. All social events are recognised in the sense of perceived to some degree by some of the people but only those which have a high degree of stability become institutionalised receiving the moral recognition, the collective representations that only society in general can give. Recognition by members of a particular society for the institutions of their own society is high but such members are usually able to recognise institutions with which they are not directly involved. This recognition may take a different form from that of those who are involved but the recognition is there nevertheless.\(^2\)

---

1 The moral element does not always simply describe or echo a regularity of behaviour since, as Levi-Strauss says ... "For conscious models, which are usually known as 'norms', are by definition very poor ones, since they are not intended to explain the phenomena but to perpetuate them." Levi-Strauss, 1953.

2 An Englishman's recognition of a Communist political system will be different from that of an American and both will be different from that of a Russian.
What I have tried to build up so far is a theoretical framework that will enable us to deal with a somewhat complex non-homogenous social situation. Using the concepts as outlined above we may visualise a given population of persons who will exhibit various behaviour patterns some of which will be of a high stability and have a degree of recognition attached to them by the members making up the population. Not all institutions need be recognised in the same way by all members of the population and the boundaries of the selected population remain as arbitrary as they ever were. Recognition is a mental event and thus exists in the minds of individuals. Shelving for the purpose of my argument here the exact nature of this reality it is clear that the mental events recorded by the observer enabling him to identify an institution themselves are patterns. They form not patterns of social behaviour but patterns of belief and sentiment about social behaviour. In other words, by identifying certain mental events as normative we are not creating a separate and special kind of reality that distinguishes them from other aspects of mental activity.

Structure and system

So far, no mention has been made of the terms 'function', 'system' or a 'society'; the use of them has been deliberately avoided.
avoided. They are terms fraught with difficulties, and I have already blamed the inability of the traditional model of social structure to deal with social change at their feet rather than at the feet of synchronism.

The fact that social structures have a high degree of stability and are recognised tells us nothing about their functioning as a system or the degree to which they are independent of 'non-sociological' variables. It has been the properties of social structures as systems that has enabled social anthropologists to speak of them as 'wholes', so that a particular social group may be spoken of as possessing 'a social structure'. It is also the supposed systematic properties of a social structure seen as an organism that have led to this idea of structure as being 'closed' and self-sufficient, a viewpoint that I think we shall have to learn to discard. To discard it does not mean that we have to forget social structure as a most valuable concept nor does it mean that there is no element of truth or validity behind this vision.

1 I follow Nadel here, as in much else, when he writes:

"We are, it seems, between the devil and the deep sea. If we do not employ the function concept we cannot speak of adjustment; yet if we employ it, we must be prepared to judge by ultimate values. My point is that we always do judge cultures and societies in some such fashion; let us at least be clear that we philosophise and dabble in ethics, and admit where we do so."

(Nadel 1953) p.368.
vision of social structure as a 'system'. What is this truth?

The truth and validity of the supposed systematic organic qualities of social structure lie in the nature of human thought that constantly tends to build coherent models that enables communication to take place. It is the conscious native model that members of a society have of their own social environment that has the qualities of a system. It is the quality that social beings have of making sense, that is of interrelating all elements systematically, of their own social institutions. Social beings will not tolerate more than a small degree of contradiction between the moral elements entailed in the recognition of high stability behaviour patterns; to do so would be to devalue the symbolic equipment that enables social beings to communicate with each other and thus make social interaction possible. When anthropologists describe the neat interlocking of kinship, economic, legal and political systems in a society they are in fact describing the coherence of the moral elements associated with the various institutionalised behaviour patterns of a given population. They should not be surprised, as sometimes they appear to be, when the actual behaviour patterns fail to exhibit the coherence and 'fit' that the conscious model attempts to give them. It is my assumption, along with Durkheim, that those actors participating together in the same high-stability structures will share together a coherent model of their own /
own society. To do so merely means to share a set of common symbols and sentiments upon which social interaction can be based. It is also my assumption that persons who have a common participation in a set of high-stability structures are doing so because they share a common basis for the satisfaction of the primary needs of living, food, security, identity, etc. Thus high-stability structures whose moral elements are modelled into a system, by the actors, have what we might call a 'real basis', a common ecological framework. This means no more than the often repeated observation of a general unspecified and non-deterministic relationship between 'ways of life' and modes of exploitation of natural resources.

I seem to have gone a rather long way round to arrive at a position rather commonly held but I hope that this is not so and that there are certain advantages in looking at social structure in this way. Firstly, it helps one to visualise a situation wherein only certain kinds of social structure, that is, the persistent high stability structures are of a kind that may be looked upon as forming a system. There are other behaviour patterns that may arise and be significant but yet do not belong to such a system, these I will look at shortly. Secondly, by shifting /

1 Appreciation by the anthropologist-observer of what constitutes a coherence of the moral elements of recognition can only be as far as I can see on the basis of what is 'reasonable' and what 'makes sense' in terms of the common humanity he has with his informants.
shifting the origins of social structure as a system to the minds of the actors a greater flexibility in methodology is allowed. A high stability system may achieve a partial coherence with another such system if the actors of the respective systems have an area of common mutual understanding about society. ¹

This possibility is explored later in the thesis in the analysis of trader and patron role sets. Such a theoretical orientation would enable a structural analysis of these more complex forms. Thirdly, and I believe most importantly, since individuals vary in intelligence and experience so they differ in their appreciation and knowledge of the structural system in which they are involved and that of others with whom they may have some experience. Those who have a greater mental ability and experience to feed it with may be able to deal with more than one coherent system, to overcome the contradictions with which they are threatened /

¹ Barbara E. Ward (1965) develops what is basically this approach in an attempt to deal with 'variety in uniformity' of Chinese Social Structures.

² This point has been specifically dealt with theoretically only so far as I am aware by S.F. Nadel (1953) p.268, he writes:

"It would seem, therefore, that we must consider separately the knowledge available in each relevant class of people, so that we shall have to distinguish between the old and the young; between the social elite and the mass; between leaders and their followers; and perhaps between men (who mostly hold positions of influence) and women."
threatened and so have dealings in more than one structure. Finally this perspective recognises that there is no such thing as 'a society' within which social interaction is contained. Social interactions spread outwards in all directions and have no boundaries of this kind. This then is my justification for choosing a somewhat arbitrary socio-economic area for my study within which all patterns of behaviour are relevant.

Within the area in question I identify three sets of high-stability structures according to three criteria - that is, they persist, they are recognised and they make sense. Firstly there is the set I call the Village which actually includes the institutions associated with Chiefship and Chiefdom. This of course is based on a technologically simple subsistence farming and hunting economy with no market or money. Secondly, the set I call the Town with partial literacy a greater degree of stratification, and based on fairly simple market institutions. Thirdly, the Administration, again with its own 'way of life', a high degree of western literacy, a national bureaucracy with Governmental structures. Each of /

1 This is reminiscent of the situation which Bohannan describes for Tivland (1952) p.7
"Two fold systems operate in Tivland. There is the scheme of looking at institutions which characterise the tribal Africans and includes their views not merely of 'indigenous institutions' but also of European inspired and dominated institutions. There is also the scheme of looking at things which characterises a colonial administration ... ... the two systems are seldom congruous."
of these high stability structures is likely to continue and to be seen to continue for some generations.

**Low stability structures**

Stability over at least several generations may be contrasted with structures exhibiting a much lower degree of stability, that have characteristically a low degree of recognition and do not therefore form organic systems, that is, exhibit coherence. A behaviour pattern in a given population may be the result of many individuals choosing between alternatives without the actual choice being guided by moral elements. This may result in a frequentive behaviour pattern just as significant as the high stability behaviour pattern but differing from it in a number of ways. Looking at such behaviour patterns as a whole without reference to individual actor's motivations they are only describable in statistical terms. Adequate explanation of such structures must depend upon an action frame of reference that sees the actor faced with a certain number and type of constraints and choosing between alternatives open to him in a maximising sort of way. This does not necessarily mean that functional analysis is not possible but that it is really inappropriate since it adds very little to our understanding and is /
is liable to mislead because it tends to give the behaviour pattern the appearance of an institutionalised stability which in fact it does not possess.

Low stability structures require less explanation because the explanation is one we find it easy to slip into, it is the commonsense ethnocentric explanation of purposive action. However, it can only be validly indulged in after the high stability structures have been carefully delimited since it is these that constrain the actors choices among alternatives or rather that determine the alternatives that exist. In the non-homogenous society that I have been describing above where there are several high stability structures each with some degree of recognition over the whole population the choices that are perceived by an actor are considerably more varied and complex than in a supposedly homogenous society. Actors may choose to alter their commitment from one high stability structure to another, or they may make 'situational' choices between them, or finally they may adopt a position of mediation between them. A young farming male growing up in a village may decide to move out of the village if he is relatively uncommitted; if he moves into town to look for employment he will be freer in his behaviour than if he were in the village, he will roam around with similar groups of unemployed young men. When he /

1 in the sense that J.C. Mitchell (1966) uses this term.
he goes back to the village he will have to revert largely to
his old ways and submit to the authority of the elders but at
the same time he will tell of life in town with its hustle and
excitement and independence that gains him prestige among other
young men. These behaviour patterns are generated by individual
choice behaviour that may be highly significant from our point
of view and are best seen, I believe, from the point of view of
the actor and his perception of the situation. Analysing such
behaviour patterns from this standpoint we may call the resulting
behaviour pattern by the term 'generated' since it has resulted
from the putting into motion the model of a standard rational
individual confronted by a certain situation in which he sees
various openings and possible courses of action and with certain
goals motivating him. For the purpose of this thesis the two
goals that are seen to be the object of maximising choices are
those firstly of economic security and secondly positions of
political power and influence.

Since low stability structures are 'generated' and of low
recognition they do not exhibit any of the characters of systems,
they do not cohere with each other, nor do they conflict; they
are the result, they exist. This does not mean that they are
not amenable to functional analysis of a kind but it does mean
that they cannot 'belong' to 'a society', a 'tribe' or any other
community.

Low /
Low stability structures are contrasted with high stability structures in that they exhibit low recognition (as I have defined it). If, for example a small trader in the Makani region finds himself extending credit to too many clients not all of whom he can know personally then he is liable to lose money through bad debts, and yet if he restricts credit too rigidly he will lose customers. He will tend to assess and reassess his situation continually so that he achieves a balance and other traders will be doing this too. We may see that the number of clients that a trader can handle directly in this way will tend to be patterned according to these variables and could be expressed by the acute observer in statistical terms. This does not mean that the actors in this situation, the trader and clients are aware of this structure although they are certainly aware of their own trading relationship, and the constraints acting upon it. Similarly, the Administrator who has an informal arrangement with a local influential who supplies him with information and whom he helps (perhaps information, or a licence) thus making his job easier is perfectly aware of what he is doing but this relationship may be unknown outside the participants themselves. If it is known to happen it is not recognised as being a valid part of the institutional structure. Such behaviour forms part of 'the ropes' rather than the 'rights' of the Administrator's Office; in other words /
words, knowledge of the behaviour pattern is treated as information without the moral element of 'correctness' that would constitute recognition.

Theoretically there is no lower limit to stability of social behaviour patterns. The limit is the arbitrarily imposed criterion of significance that the anthropologist would wish to make. Thus the slight variations in the performance of a particular weekly ritual could be related to the desire of the priest to get through varying numbers of participants desiring confirmation before lunch, this may well be judged of little sociological importance; whereas a two per cent swing of voters because of a slight change in taxation may make for far-reaching constitutional changes in the Government of a country and be judged of considerable sociological import.

As mentioned above though, and this a tricky point, stability and duration are not the same. To take my first two examples, the trader with his clients and the Administrator with his slight bending of the correct bureaucratic procedure. Now both of these behaviour patterns may endure for several generations. However, the trader has only to observe a change in his chances of recovering loans from relative strangers or the Administrator to observe that an increasing number of his colleagues were being sacked for maladministration for these behaviour patterns to change/
change. The institutionally defined positions of trader and administrator cannot change so easily though. For them to change, a whole system is liable to be affected along with a shift in the meaning of collective representations in general. Low stability structures may endure as long as the factors influencing the actors generating them do not vary, but when these factors change the generated structure changes without much delay. Unfortunately this does not introduce an element of guesswork into the analysis since during the period of fieldwork some things changed, others do not, the situation does not always arise where such stability may be empirically verified. This difficulty remains though I would point out that since this particular distinction is the same one encountered by other sociologists when dealing with 'informal' versus 'formal' structure, or social 'dynamics' as opposed to 'statics', thus it is hardly a new one.

It might appear that the distinction between these two types of structure I am trying to establish is simply to do with the scale of social behaviour patterns that is to say, the details that /

---

1 One obvious consequence of this approach to the conduct of fieldwork would be a much greater emphasis on the knowledge and interpretation by the actor of his own social situation for it is only thus that a firm empirical basis for a proposed explanation for a low stability structure may be established.
that the high stability structure is simply behaviour described
crudely and low stability behaviour described minutely, or more so. The element of recognition would then be explained simply
because actors have no cause to moralise about details or need stereotypes that can hardly ever be used. Fortunately, this
argument founders quickly on what can be demonstrated ethno-
:graphically. The optimum size of a lineage at which fusion
is liable to occur with entailing rearrangements of behaviour
is hardly small scale and on the other hand the exact manner by
which a mother-in-law is addressed is hardly large-scale.

Ultimately the difference rests with the observer-analyst. Low stability structures are those describable with an actor
frame of reference, they appear to be chosen rather than adhered
to and are liable to rapid modification as perceived constraints
and goals vary. High stability structures are to do with
behaviour patterns where actor choice is largely irrelevant
(living in a household means supporting the household head) and
which have been culturally recognised and legitimated and thus
given coherence at the level of ideas enabling the Anthropologist
to describe in terms of system. One cannot say that the Tonga
practice 46% polygamy.

It will be seen that the analysis of low stability structures
implies the use of strategy and transaction as guiding principles.
The actor is seen as possessing resources, knowledge and goals and his manipulation of his social environment is directed towards finding the path of greater efficiency in their use (strategy). Consistent with this 'economic' viewpoint, it also sees the actor as engaging in exchange relations of a contractual type with individuals (transaction) which provide the social organisation necessary for an actor's enterprises.

R. Firth's concept of structure

This simple typology which I have somewhat longwindedly established is, of course, hardly a new one, I merely hope that I have elaborated it more systematically. A major classification of the grand theories of sociology would probably distinguish between those with an action frame of reference from those with an organic-functionalist frame of reference. Much of what is important here derives from an essay by Firth\(^1\) in which he comments on the disenchantment with pure structuralism.

"Now that this is so, the basic value of the concept of social structure, as a heuristic tool rather than a substantial social entity has come to be more clearly recognised."\(^2\)

He then goes on to distinguish between social structure and social organisation listing the main characteristics of social organisation:

"From /

\(^{1}\) R. Firth (1955).
\(^{2}\) Ibid. p. 1.
"From different angles, social organisation is to be regarded as:

a) Adjustment of behaviour of individuals consequent on the selection they make from among alternative courses of action in reference to their social goals.

b) Selection of roles and consequent adjustments in terms of responsibility and co-ordination.

c) Arrangement of elements of action into a system by limitation of their social relations in reference to their given ends as conceived by the actors."[1]

In the way that he actually employs his concept of social organisation Firth appears to distinguish two levels of organisation one of which he would probably call the 'informal structure' now, the other level being the less rigid frequencies of behaviour resulting from actors choices. He sees organisation as being the result of actors resolving certain difficulties of application and process of structural rules, thus making them viable. According to this usage then 'social organisation' clearly belongs to structure and it belongs to a social structure because it is subsequent to his 'structural rules'. The main deficiencies I see in this important statement are:

1) It is not rigorous enough. Heuristic tools to be successful must be simple and clearcut.

2) Social organisation is still attached to a social structure and therefore to a particular 'way of life' which restricts its usage to a homogenous social situation.

3) /

1 Ibid. p.2-3.
3) Despite his use of economic concepts, he does not take up the implication of his approach, that is the value of looking at organisation in terms of strategy, enterprise and transaction. He sees the individual actor as solving problems posed by rules rather than as an intelligent enterprising individual. All these rather detract from the effectiveness of Firth's distinction between structure and organisation.

**Leach, Levi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown, and Fortes**

Elsewhere one finds, among the confusion of manifestoes on the nature of social reality and social structure a recognition, sometimes brief of the dichotomy between low and high stability structures. Leach writes

"Social structures are sometimes best regarded as the statistical outcome of many individual choices rather than the direct reflection of juridical rules."\(^1\)

The dialectical relationship Levi-Strauss prosits between what he calls **communication structures** (e.g. kinship terminology i.e. categories) and **subordination structures** (e.g. kinship behaviour) appears to deal with structures of different recognition by the actors.\(^2\) With Radcliffe-Brown the position is unclear since on the whole he does not distinguish between social structure and social relations and yet at one point he elaborates a concept of structural form that appears to be related to the dichotomy that

\(^1\) Leach, 1960. p.

I have tried to establish and which he distinguishes from social structure. ¹ This concept remains undeveloped by him however and appears to have been an attempt to deal with the pattern of time in a version in which actually existing dyadic relations were the same as social structure. Fortes it seems, follows Radcliffe-Brown in his failure to distinguish clearly between the 'ideal' components of social action and the behavioural aspects of social action and criticises Radcliffe-Brown's distinction between structural form and actual structure. ² He writes:—

"The application of statistical concepts will show that the concept of 'structure' is most appropriately used for the kind of abstract or generalised description which Radcliffe-Brown calls 'structural form'."³

For him 'form' appears as an aspect of structure, and for Fortes all structures form systematic wholes. Fortes does, however, distinguish between 'culture' and 'structure', the crucial difference being that the first deals with qualitative data and the second with quantitative.

"The constant elements most usually recognised in any social event by ethnographers are its cultural components; its structural aspect, being variable, is often overlooked."⁴

Structural analysis, at present (then 1949) he says is necessarily hybrid involving both. I presume it is the 'cultural aspect' that /

¹ Radcliffe-Brown (1940)
² M. Fortes (1949). p.84 where it appears that 'norm' and 'principles of social organisation' are interchangeable.
³ Ibid. p.59.
⁴ Ibid. p.57.
that he is referring to when he talks of the identical principles of social organisation which have general validity in a particular society and which he sees as generating different structural arrangements. Writing of the rules of matrilineal descent and paternity among the Ashanti he says "How these factors interact depends, among other things, on local social conditions and historical circumstances." Fortes clearly recognises and uses analytically (although somewhat confusingly) a distinction between structures existing at different levels of stability but does his best to cover up the distinction at other times by his variable use of the word 'form'. This tacit or unconscious and implicit use of a two-level concept of structure that characterises Fortes is responsible for much of the confusion of orthodox /

---

1 As for example in 'Time and Social Structure: an Ashanti case-study', he defines structure as a 'distinguishable whole which is susceptible of analysis ... into parts that have an ordered arrangement in space and time.' (p. 56). He then identifies form with structure when he writes: '... these uses of the term "form" suggest that it might be restricted to refer to those characteristics of an arrangement of parts that distinguish it in its totality.' (p. 59, op. cit.) Form has become something else again when he writes 'Our investigation shows that elementary statistical procedures reduce apparently discrete "types" or "forms" of domestic organisation in Ashanti to the differential effects of identical principles in varying local, social contexts.' (p. 84, op. cit.) Elsewhere it is clear that domestic organisation and structure are at the same level: 'It is of great significance that there is not a single case, in either township of a man and his wife's brother sharing a dwelling. This structural arrangement prevents intolerable conflicts of loyalties.' (p. 76, op. cit.)
orthodox structuralism and one that Firth was obviously trying to do something about. It is the continual substitution of the terms such as social structure, form, organisation, principles of organisation, structural arrangement, structural principles, etc., that enables authors of this style to mix and manipulate the action frame of reference with the functional frame to provide anthropological 'explanation' to order.

Barth and Bailey

As I have described, it was Firth who first attempted a way out of this confusion and I want now to deal briefly with the work of two later authors whom I see as having carried this clarification a good deal further; Barth and F.G. Bailey. Barth's 'transactional' approach disregards the properties of structures as systems as a starting point. The starting point for him is one in which two or more individuals face each other with the intention of co-operating in some fashion (using co-operating in its wider sense; even competitors co-operate). In analysing patterns of behaviour Barth distinguishes clearly between a set of high-stability structures that for him are givens and the low-stability patterns of generated behaviour, although he does not use my language here. The givens firstly belong to what he calls the technical/ ecological characteristics of the /

---

1 Barth (1966) uses the precise phrase '... some non-random frequency distributions in actions'. p.1.
the situation and secondly to the **minimal status sets** which define the basic transactional relations. The question of how many of the cultural givens one includes and any systematic, that is, integrative relationship between these givens that one includes in any account of the limiting constraints or available techniques surrounding the actors is left open to the anthropologist-analyst and is perhaps a weak point in his approach. In practice, he and his colleagues define the situation and the associated 'givens' facing the actors in terms of 'enterprises'.

The concept of 'enterprise' is central to Barth's approach and is an orientation that with hindsight I can now wish would have influenced me in the actual course of fieldwork. An enterprise is the result of strategic decisions and choices made in reference to a particular objective and is clearly action oriented.

Barth writes:

"The view we adopt is that all social activity may be analysed as the result of constrained choices, and thereby connected with the variables of 'value' and 'purpose'. Statistical regularities or patterns in the behaviour of a population, as well as institutionalised patterns (i.e. the general acceptance of the expected patterns), may be expected to result where a set of external factors limit choice and in conjunction with a certain set of evaluations define clear strategic optima." 

---

1 Barth (1963) p.7.
While I wish to deal more closely with the concepts of enterprise and entrepreneur later I believe this suffices to show in the simplest terms the two kinds of patterned behaviour that Barth uses, that is the 'statistical regularities' and the 'institutionalised patterns'. I have implied that perhaps Barth does not deal satisfactorily with the number and integration of values and status sets that face the choosing actor as a whole and presumably it is this that lies behind Gluckman's criticism of Barth where he writes:

"... I consider that in taking Barth's 'Theory of transactions' as all-explanatory, its members may be closing their eyes to many systematic inter-connexion that have been demonstrated to be important. Transactions between individual persons cannot explain institutional structures..."

This may be contrasted with Barth's view ...

"Such a description of process explains form in a way which cannot be achieved by a meticulous enumeration and comparison of the formal features of a body of data."

Part of what is at stake here are different notions on the adequacy of explanation. For the point of view of my dichotomy of structure I regard coherence, that is 'systematic inter-connexion' in Gluckman's phrase, as a characteristic of high-stability institutional structures. These systematic inter-connexion are useful to the anthropologist because it helps in

2 Barth (1966) p.11.
the identification of these structures and it also throws light on the sociology of thought (which must use a set of coherent symbols) but that to demonstrate the coherence of such structures in no way explains them. Explanation is always more adequate at the level of social action.

F.G. Bailey started publishing work about the same time as Barth and with his latest work has both crystallized his theoretical thinking and aligned himself clearly with Barth and the 'transactional approach'. In his book 'Tribe, Caste, and Nation' Bailey moves progressively from what he terms 'static' analysis, through 'dynamic' analysis to a study of what he calls bridge-head actions in which he uses an action frame of reference and analysis of decision making activity by individual prestige seekers. 'Static' analysis is to do with social structures which he sees as 'a system of logically consistent regularities of behaviour' and again 'a structure of social relations is in the end a statement of the absence of contradiction between different ways of behaving'. Thus for Bailey coherence is an important characteristic of structure. Moving on to 'dynamic' analysis it is at this level that conflict within the structure is seen and conflict must be resolved by some self-regulating means 'and which tend to keep behaviour in conformity with the logical model'. Thus, for Bailey, dynamic analysis employs structural /

1 Bailey (1969).
3 Ibid. p.244.
4 Ibid. p.239-240.
structural time in which conflicts will arise and processual events take place and it is characteristic of structures that they persist through these events, thus the quality of 'high-stability' is present for Bailey as well. So far, this is quite straightforward and orthodox but then Bailey goes on to establish three separate structures operating and competing in the Kond hills area, the Tribal structure, the caste structure and the National structure. He then asks the question:

"At the broadest level the question is what relations exist between these different structures. This question is not unlimited for one possibility has been ruled out, there are between these structures irresolvable contradictions, so that, whatever else is the relationship between the different structures, it is not itself a structure."2

It is not a structure in Bailey's terms but such relations do clearly consist of patterned behaviour and by my definition constitute low-stability structures:

"... in the third part of the analysis I have tried to show that some of the "outside" factors are themselves part of other systems of relationships, and that in order to describe adequately any field of social relationships we need to describe not only the structures which are found in that field, but also what might be called the 'bridge-actions' between those structures."3

Bridge /

1 It may well be of significance to the study of social change generally that the three structures I isolate of village, town and Administration has the same general form as Baileys. Bailey - Tribal : Caste : Nation Pollock - Village : Town : Administration Type of structure - Segmentary : Stratified : Bureaucratic. One of the main differences between Baileys 'structures' and my 'high stability structures' is that the latter have a relatively discrete geographical segregation as well.

3 Ibid. p.248.
Bridge-actions are particularly manifest in the process of disputes and conflicts. It is in Bailey's concentration on disputes and conflicts that we see the operational similarity with Barth's emphasis on enterprise because both sets of activities involve clear instances of competition and manipulation of social ties by individual actors. It is in Bailey's more recent work that the theme of competition in the political field is fully treated and the full economic analogy and the mini-max principle of game theory is employed. In this book Bailey presents us with a stimulating chapter on what he calls 'Encapsulated Political Structures'. Here, he is referring not only to the presence of two or more structures within one 'field' but also to their different scales. He writes

"It will be convenient if we refer consistently to the smaller enclosed structure as "Structure A" and the larger encapsulating structure as "Structure B"."

Later in the Chapter he deals with the position of middlemen who operate between Structures A and B and who play a crucial part in the process of social change. Bailey's middlemen are clearly very similar in conception to the entrepreneurs of Barth in Northern Norway

"who /

---

2 Ibid. p.146.
"who are to be found in mediating roles, where new links are being created between local communi-
ties and control or national organisations - i.e., the entrepreneur becomes a broker.""}

(3) Key Concepts

Entrepreneurs

Barth defines the entrepreneurs as

"Someone who takes the initiative in administering resources, and pursues an expansive economic policy. ... The point at which an entrepreneur seeks to exploit the environment may be described as his niche: the position which he occupies in relation to resources, competitors and clients." 2

Entrepreneurs initiate activity and frequently initiate new kinds of activity, they are innovators and it is my assumption that it is in exploiting relationships or creating new relationships between high-stability structures that particularly fruitful entrepreneurial niches are to be found. 3 The agent who exchanges mirrors /

1 F. Barth (1963) p.16.
2 Ibid. p. 5 and p.8.
3 This is somewhat reminiscent of the concept of the marginal man as innovator, or creator. The difference is that associated with the concept of the marginal man is the notion that he is incompletely socialised or deprived which is in no way true of the cultural broker.
mirrors for furs, or old rifles and ammunition for gold is liable to make a very handsome profit for himself. Not all enterprises are of this kind obviously. The man who uses hired labour on his farm for the first time is setting up a new channel of conversion purely within the village structure. Nevertheless it appears that in practice, and one could elaborate on the reasons for this, the entrepreneurs who do act as agents of social change are not those operating within one structure but those 'bridging' between two. The activities of such entrepreneurs are I believe, along with Barth and Bailey best described in terms of actors generating structures by the rational use of resources and information.¹

**Influence and Security**

Such persons are assumed to be motivated by a desire for influence and prestige and obviously not every individual has this desire. I do assume however that every individual does have a desire to maximise his security. The ecology of the area does not provide security for every individual without any effort on his or her part. Security is seen as the assurance of a continued condition of well-being generally. The actual degree /

---

¹ This view is also taken by another author of the Bailey, Barth tradition although with his own distinctive orientation, that is Boissevain who writes in 1968: "Individuals manipulating their networks for their own interest play an important part in generating social forms that are one step further along the continuum. These are the quasi-groups."
degree of security obtained is not so important but rather the choices oriented towards this ideal state. Except possibly for the topclass civil servants the major source of security in Sierra Leone depends upon kin ties, but support by kin is neither automatic nor freely given, it has to be sought and invested in by the individual. Influence is sought after by some individuals and is secondary to security (except in very rare cases). Influence is the same as Weber's concept of power:

"... the possibility that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."

Operationally, a person who has influence is seen to have the ability to help people or hinder them, to initiate enterprises and projects or to destroy them. In the non-homogenous society of the Makoni area the dynamics of influence seeking has little to do with the formal structure of authority and there are men of great influence who have no or little formal authority. In the section of the thesis dealing with the low-stability structures I use these two concepts of security and influence as being general goals motivating individuals.

**Patronage**

A person who acquires a degree of influence among a population is to that degree an influential and as elaborated in Section 1

---

1 Weber (1947) p.152.
Section III
Chapter IV is also a patron since it is in the ideals and values of patronage that secular power or influence relations between people are seen and understood in Sierra Leone. I would follow the definition of patronage adopted by Boisserain which runs as follows:

"Patronage is founded on the reciprocal relations between patron and client. By patron I mean a person who uses his influence to assist and protect some other person, who then becomes his 'client', and in return provides certain services to his patron. The relationship is asymmetrical, for the nature of the services exchanged may differ considerably."

Thus defined it would automatically mean that all influentials are patrons by definition since those who assist and protect someone have also the power to refuse the same, and thus hinder. It would thus include bureaucrats, who in the performance of their office help members of the public and this would constitute a misuse of the term I think. Thus in addition to the above definition of Boisserain I would add that the relationship between patron and client is a dyadic and contractual (if implicit) relationship that makes no formal contribution to institutionalised social organisation. Thus kinship relations and patronage may overlap but are analytically distinct. As several writers have observed patronage ties generate a low-stability structure that may be seen as a vine growing intertwined up the trunk /

trunk of legitimated authority relations and it appears that Boisserain's definition taken by itself does not distinguish rigorously these parallel but distinct low and high stability structures.

Having said this however it should be pointed out that with respect to the particular area under study, that is the Makeni area, political organisation is dominated by relations of patronage. At the national level legitimate authority relations and bureaucratic structures play their part but even then are clearly not dominant.

Patronage ties then, in Sierra Leone, are reciprocating ties between individuals that are contracted outside or in addition to kin ties and that are distinguished from 'friendship' ties by virtue of their asymmetry. Some cultures have patronage ties based on a formal recognition of the contractual element (as in the jajmani relationships between caste members in India) but in Sierra Leone as in the Mediterranean area this is not so.

Influentials are patrons in the Makeni area then, and as I pointed out there are particularly favourable niches to be found for them in mediating between high-stability structures. In terms of patronage what this means is that a patron will assist his clients in any of his client's dealings with other structures.
structures and likewise protect his clients from the effects of the other structures if this should be desirable. This is a political enterprise for the patron demands political support services from his clients. As I hope to establish not all entrepreneurial activities mediating between structures are political enterprises, but economic entrepreneurs who are looking for influence as well as security are in a particularly good position to do so by means of political entrepreneurship.

(4) Layout

In this thesis I describe firstly the high-stability structures (Section II) and then move onto the low-stability structures (Section III). The description of low-stability structures is inevitably selective in that theoretically there are an infinite number of such structures. In this case I have selected those structures that appear to be most significant to the general elaboration of what we normally mean by social change. Having completed this description of the low-stability structures one has then reached the position where one can re-analyse them not in terms of system but in terms of a general simplifying theme. This theme could be one of modernisation, of structural differentiation but in this case the theme that appears /
appears to me to be greatest value is that of a developing regionalism. The concept of the region, which is seen as developing out of the area can only be brought in at this stage, that is very near the end of the thesis since the methodology described above must deal with it in terms of structures that are generated. Finally, in the conclusion (Section IV) the implication of this approach to the theory of social change is examined.
SECTION II

HIGH STABILITY STRUCTURES

Introduction

This study is not of an ethnic group, a political unit, nor of a community in any obvious sense of the word; it is about the patterning of social relationships to be found within a certain area of land defined by reference to certain geographical features. This socio-economic area may be seen as a sort of segment aligned vis-a-vis like segments of different absolute sizes in a geographical relationship that extends over the whole country.

Within this area are found members of several ethnic groupings, although the landowners are all Temne. Within it are found the social structures of differing stability that are to be described in this section and the next with most of the factors bearing on the persistence and generation of these structures. The socio-economic area is firstly the arena, the setting for these varying structures, and it is the burden of this section to describe the setting in geographical and historical terms and the high-stability social structures found in it.

The general nature of these structures has been given in Section I and may be summarised here. High stability structures have /
have their chief characteristic in the high degree of recognition accrued to them by the actors, and the main aim of this section is to establish these recognitions empirically. Such recognitions consist naturally of a set of symbols coherently related to each other and in common use by the actors. In addition to establishing the recognitions, the pattern referred to by these symbols must be described systematically at the level of action. This section will seek also to establish the nature of the patterns of action which relate directly to the symbolic structures held in common. This process I take to be a fairly orthodox descriptive method except that within the area there are three sets of institutional complexes that form discreet social systems. They are the Village, the Town, and the Administration. As I have already shown, these structures are not territorially distinct from one another, neither can all persons be unambiguously ascribed to one or the other, nor is movement by individuals between them impossible (although certainly difficult).

The justification for the somewhat arbitrary socio-economic area will, I hope, become clearer as the argument builds up to show how a region is developing out of this area. The developing region is a far more satisfactory unit of delimitation than that of an artificially conceived 'tribe' or 'nation' or an inadequately conceived 'village' or 'chiefdom community' which would /
would exclude many important social interactions.

In that this thesis consists of more than a theoretical exposition on social change but also contributes to our knowledge of West Africa some description of the historical and geographical context beyond that strictly relevant to the establishment of environmental constraints on actors has been included here.

(1) History of the Area

The Temne People

The main divisions of the Temne speaking peoples, distinguished by dialect, seem to be as follows:-

a. An Temne a-t r - the Eastern Temnes
b. An Temne a-til - the Western Temnes
c. An Temne a Mabantha - northern banks of Rokel and Eastwards
d. An Temne a Koia - on the lower banks of Rokel
e. The Bagar or Fugitive Temnes - driven from the sources of the Port Loko river
f. The Landumas - upper banks of the Rio Nunes

There is considerable dispute and confusion over the origins of the Temne people. As Ade Ijagbemi writes, their origins are /

---

1 Esu B'yI writes that the name Temne might be derived from the Temne language words meaning 'the old gentleman himself' - This is grammatically dubious and I prefer the explanation I heard that it is derived from an teiman - meaning 'they became separated' (from some original tribe).
are almost certainly extremely varied and perplexing with any sense of tribal or even linguistic unity being of recent develop-
ment. However...

"we know that the Temne, whatever might have been the course of their early history and movements finally settled at Futa (Futa Jallon in what is now French Guinea) perhaps in the 14th century or earlier, but certainly before the 15th century. And it was from Futa that they, alongside the Bagar, Landumans, and the Sapis migrated into Sierra Leone in the middle of the 15th century, fleeing from the Islamic Empire of Gao, Mali's successor ... The flight from Futa was not an organised mass movement; on the contrary, the tribe migrated in small bands, settling in different parts of the land under different war leaders."

Those Temne who knew anything of these early days that I talked with seemed fairly clear that it was from the North that they originated although they were generally well aware of their polyglot heterogeneous composition. The Temne, like many African peoples, were subject to a series of invasions some of which established a certain unity over people speaking the same language but of diverse origins themselves. Most of these invasions came from the North and the legendary Bai Farma, who established many chiefdoms, was of Fula tribe origin (who now live to the North) although he was supposed to have come from the East. The subject peoples then, tended to absorb their conquerors and derive their 'Temne' identity from the mystic origins /

\[1 \text{Op.cit. p. 4-5}\]
origins of the stranger chief. Furthermore, the system of chiefs and sub-chiefs thus established seems to have united peoples and settlements of diverse origins until it has become impossible to find any ethnical or political history behind the term 'Temne'. In the chiefdom I was resident in (Makari-Gbanti) there were Temnes and Lokkos permanently established under a Temne chief speaking Temne. 'We are Temnified' the Lokkos told me. Mabaibunda itself was founded by Limba people and the neighbouring village of Mabuya by Koranko. The Eastern Temnes believe themselves to once have been Koranko although the Koranko language belongs to a completely different sub-group and the Port Loko area in the West is full of the descendants of Susus and Bullom who no longer speak those languages. Even the Yoni Temne who reputedly speak the purest forms of the language begin their oral history with a Fula warrior. I would contend therefore that to be Temne is in the last resort to speak Temne fluently.

This approach is further justified by the diversity of custom within Temne country. The Temne of Bombali seem to identify their origins with Futa Jalon after they had become dominated by a southerly migration following the establishment of a Fula moslem 'theocracy' in those mountains. 'Ro Futa' is still a place in every Temne village where chiefs meet. It was /
was the principles of social stratification associated with Islam that imposed a sort of political unity over positions of considerable power at times and may have been addressed as chiefs but who did so in the context of fluid power structure and they had not the ritual authority (called maban) of the Paramount Chief. These warrior chiefs were overlooked by the District Commissioners in their attempts to stabilise the political situation because the Commissioners were looking for a proper 'chief' with all the trappings of constitutional authority to which they added the Staff on behalf of The British Monarch. This hypothesis has some backing from Dorjan's study of the changing political structures of chiefs among the Temne where he stresses the role of the feud and lineage structure and the basis of appeal to warrior chiefs in former times. At that time according to Dorjahn the Paramount Chief acted as an arbitrator in a feud and homicide constituted an offence against his maban.

All this discussion has relevance to my main argument because it appears that relations of patronage have been a longstanding feature of the area. In some senses then, as will become clearer, the modern local politician is the warrior of yore; he is the patron, the political protector, the mobiliser of contingent corporate action by large groups of farmers. The differences, however /

1 Dorjahn. (1960).
however, are probably more important than the similarities.

This account of the nature of Temne shows, I think, that these 'people' have few cultural characteristics that may be said to distinguish them from other 'peoples' in the area and nearby; that people of diverse tribal origins will not have to be treated in a distinct manner or given special account of and that such institutions as the village and market town are likely to be very similar over a much wider area. There are, however, a number of characteristics that are commonly believed to distinguish Temnes from other tribes. They are supposed to be distinguished from the Mende (called Mendi in Temne) by the ritual powers of their Paramount Chiefs who are selected ideally in rotation from a number of ruling houses and who are always male. There are also some minor distinctions such as the degree of incest prohibition and nature of the avunculate. The Temne have the reputation amongst Europeans for a general cockiness, upstart nature, and are known generally for a strong sense of honour as regards adultery. The Temne themselves look down on most other peoples, especially the Mende who, they say, eat snakes and monkeys. They would rank the Susu, Mandings and possibly Fula above themselves.  

Apart from the particular nature of Temne chiefship and this varies considerably from one area /

---

1 See M. Banton (1957) on tribal ranking in Sierra Leone, particularly Freetown.
area to the next and such stereotypes as described above, the
social organisation is not a distinctive feature. At its
simplest, there is no corporate lineage organisation but an
organisation of patrilineally based families with important
kinship ties extending bilaterally; the village is organised
on territorial principles around a core of descendants of first
settlers; secret and open associations of various kinds, the
majority organised into lodges on a village basis and the
institutions of chiefship.

History of Bombali area and Chiefdom Administration

Almost all oral history amongst the Temne refers to the
origins and movements of the crowns in the chiefdoms. The
legendary chief Bai Farma was credited with bringing the sacred
crowning caps and establishing chiefdoms among the Bombali Temne
but this did not happen until the last half of the 18th century.
Despite the isolation of the Bombali Temne there were some
external conflicts in the area. After this and before the Hut
Tax (Bai Bureh's) war of 1898 the oral history of the Bombali
accounts for the movements of various crowns and a struggle
between Temnes and Lokkos in the area. Naturally, in 1898 many
Bombali warriors joined Bai Bureh's army to fight the British,
but the fighting did not take place in Bombali region; it was
only /

1 Various writers, especially M. Cullock (1950) have made much
of the clan organisation which does not operate now.
only afterwards that the whitemen came in any numbers to Bombali. At this time the Southern Bombali area consisted of a number of chiefdoms loosely thought of as being related and giving each other ritual support as seen most clearly in the ceremonial installation of a Paramount Chief.

In 1896 the Protectorate was created and the British Government established its suzerainty over all the 'natives' living outside the colony. The first action of the new government was to end tribal warfare and introduce a system of indirect rule and establish and demark territorial boundaries between recognised Paramount Chiefs who were then awarded a staff to be handed down the line of successors. In the 1920's the customs of allowing Chiefs to exact tribute and 'forced labour' were supposedly replaced by regularised taxation and in the 1930's Chiefdom Treasuries were initiated. Until 1921, only five Administrators were in the Protectorate and one court circuit judge. After the second world war arose a direct concern to encourage greater local participation by citizens and a more progressive looking local Administration. This led to the creation of District Councils in 1946. In the 1950's the powers of the council were expanded to include more social services and its revenue was increased by a precept on Chiefdom taxes. In 1961, the Year of Independence, Town Councils were added to the already /

already existing local governments. From 1937 onwards chiefdoms were steadily incorporated within the new Native Administration which was supposed to be accompanied by 'reforms' in the powers of the chief and the taxation system. By 1947 over 50% of the chiefdoms had been incorporated.

Within the chiefdom, in the late 19th century in Makari Gbanti (chiefdom) the new positions of Muslim origin known as Alimami and Santigi chiefships had been introduced as a local innovation spreading from the North. The Santigi chief is thought of as being the dependant inferior and appointed by patronage of the senior Alimami of the chiefdom, a position inaugurated by award of the Paramount Chief at the time. These institutions existed to serve the Paramount Chief but were more hierarchically organised and bureaucratic in nature than the more traditional Pa Kapr chiefs selected by every new Paramount Chief to see that his will and position were respected. Alimami and Santigi chiefs are not bound in mystic union with the Paramount Chiefs as are the Pa Kapr chiefs and are 'open' in character and thus it was natural that they became incorporated into the Native Administration as section and village chiefs under the general rubric of the protectorate colonial Administration.

The reformed chiefdom Administration specifically provided for a chiefdom council made up of:

a) /
a) the Paramount Chief
b) an Elected President
c) the Headmen of towns with twenty or more taxpayers
d) One representative for every twenty taxpayers of any town containing above 20 taxpayers
e) One representative for every 20 taxpayers for neighbouring villages agreeing to unite for this purpose into large enough units.

At the same time provision was made for greatly increased supervision of the native Administration by the District and Provincial Commissioners. In practice, it appears that the chiefdom councillors are very rarely elected, have little power and are not organised along the democratic lines that were hoped for. The individual councillors in Makari-Gbanti were selected by the influentials of the villages they came from and not by ballot and acted in council in a manner dictated by their general position in the structure of political influence rather than as a representative empowered to speak freely on the issues confronting the chiefdom Council. At times the Paramount Chief found it quite possible to have individual councillors suspended and this was regarded as being in no way unusual.

The National Administrative Structure with its continuing policy of indirect rule was reluctant to intervene in such matters as /
as a suspended Chiefdom Councillor and would only do so on appeal by a local petitioner. Thus, in the early 1950's the stability and power of the Paramount Chief was considerable, particularly, his tax collecting powers. This was reduced after the tax riots of 1955-56 after which proper salaries were introduced for Paramount Chiefs. The major constitutional change that has affected local politics since then has been the Provinces Act of 1965 which removed the Paramount Chief as judge in the Chiefdom Court and replaced him with a Court President, elected by chiefdom council (although in 1968 a large number of Court Presidents were re-appointed by a travelling commission from Freetown due to the political exploitation of this post). The provinces Act also created a chiefdom committee composed of the Paramount Chief, Chiefdom Speaker, a literate councillor nominated by the Minister of Local Government and two members elected by the chiefdom councillors of each ward within the chiefdom. If one adds to these constitutional or bureaucratic changes the proliferation of various Settlement, Watch or Entertainment Committees and various other ad hoc committees and the Secret Societies of the chiefdom one can see clearly the apparently increasing differentiation of local administration. However, one should remember that almost all these structures were imposed from above and need not, and frequently do not, have /
have much significance in practice. Two points can be made here. Firstly, the factors that actually operate in the chiefdom politics are not reflected in the constitutional framework of the chiefdom. The most important factors that affect decision making are membership of political party, the relationship between strangers and citizens, membership of ruling houses, relationships of patronage and certain acquired characteristics of individuals such as education, wealth, etc. Secondly, in Chiefdom Administration there is an underdeveloped correspondence between the formal structure with its books, records, memorandums, etc. and the actual structure of interaction which often follows traditional lines. Thus, what is called the Cattle Settlement Committee in the records refers in the minds of the majority of the people of the chiefdom to a particular group of influential who attended a meeting with the Paramount Chief and the spokesman for the Fulani Cattleherders resident in the chiefdom at which certain agreements about settlement and movement of cattle, etc. were discussed and realised. The important event here for those taking part was the fact that a meeting took place at which speeches were made, gifts given and a consensus arrived at. What will happen in the future to those present has little relevance. Here we see operating the characteristic feature of almost all groupings in the Temne chiefdom.

---

1 Such a meeting for such a purpose is a traditional feature of chiefdom Administration and the gifts which would be given to the Chief by those seeking an agreement in their favour are called collectively an lambs.
chiefdom, that they are egocentric rather than bureaucratic. This should become clearer in subsequent chapters.

The position of the Paramount Chief and his power will be dealt with more fully later. Suffice it here to say that despite the various constitutional checks to despotism, these are only partially successful, that the power and influence of a Paramount Chief depends to a great extent on his personality and ambitions and a determined despot will be able to overcome constitutional barriers without too much difficulty.

Economic and administrative development of Makeni

The history of Makeni Town is first and foremost the history of its economic development. For several hundred years there had been a considerable volume of trade passing through the Bombali South Area, it being one of the main routes from Port Loko on the coast to a large hinterland in the Sudan region. The usual precolonial trade items of slaves, arms and ammunition, iron, etc. were traded and salt made into large cakes on the coast was also headloaded, or carried in special baskets to the trading towns on the edge of the Savannah. However, in the Bombali area itself little was produced that was itself used in trade, but the expertise and knowledge of market institutions must have been present and contributed to the development of the local markets when these were established at the beginning of this century.

Towards /
Towards the end of the 19th century a small market for rice had developed at the town of Bathkanu which was then transported by river to the coast. This can only have affected a few villages, however, because of the problems of transportation of bulky items in the absence of beasts of burden. In the Makeni Area the building of a railway which terminated at Makeni in 1916 created a market for palm oil, but this did not affect the boliland areas except probably making it harder for boliland farmers to get palm oil for themselves. Several trading companies with their own network of locally recruited agents were set up in Makeni. These companies played an important part in the development of the area and it is noticeable how many of the older influential gained valuable experience necessary for their success from their positions as agents for these firms at some time (the other obviously important experience being the education provided by the Bo school for Boys set up in 1906).

Unfortunately, I have no statistics for the economic growth of the area but the pattern of growth has remained substantially the same with the dominance of expatriate trading companies (Lebanese, Indian, French and English) and large numbers of very small traders with very little in between.

The major recent developments have been a number of attempts by the National Government to enter into the economic life of the /
the region through the Rice Corporation and the Produce Marketing Board. As semi-autonomous profit-making business corporations these have failed so far and the present marketing structure is poor. It is in this context that the Co-operative Movement was launched that had been envisaged long ago as one possible solution to the maldistributed marketing structure of the area.

Until 1962 there was no town council in Makeni, the Administration of the town being left to the colonial system of Provincial and District Administration, the semi-independent Electricity and Water Corporation and the local Chiefdom Council all of which are very centralised in nature. The urban area of Makeni is now subjected to a number of Administrative structures that do not extent outside the town. Those living within the area (which has a consistent tendency to expand its territorial jurisdiction) pay rates and come under the Town Council rather than the District Council.

The Town Council, although set up quite recently and beset by difficulties does have charge of a considerable budget and functions reasonably well, whereas this may hardly be said of the unwieldy and unrealistic District Council also centred on Makeni. The town itself is divided into three wards, each electing two town councillors to which are added two appointees of the Ministry of the Interior, two by the Chiefdom Committee and three /
three Officials (Paramount Chief, Area Engineer, and Medical Officer) to make up the Town Council.

The Mechanical Ploughing Scheme and the Co-operative Societies

In 1928, ox ploughing had been introduced near Makeni, mostly to the North of Makeni in a number of inland swamps and before 1939 there had been a brief experiment with a government sponsored group of local farmers organised on a co-operative basis in the Rokupr area of the Lower Scarcies rivers on the coast. These beginnings had lapsed during the war, however. In 1947 and 1948, 22 and 48 acres respectively were mechanically ploughed in the Rokupr area and by 1951 trials were under way at Mangeh boli near Bathkanu in the Bolilands.

After the war, a scheme for encouraging farmers co-operative societies was revived and by 1950 there were 29 such, by 1957 there were 283. In 1955 the Mechanical Ploughing Scheme was well under way in the bolilands (4,800 acres approximately were ploughed in that year), being organised by the Agriculture Division of the Ministry of Forestry and Natural Resources. The Agriculture Division organised the ploughing sites and payment of fees through local Paramount Chiefs and District Councils up to this point but this proved unsatisfactory and thereafter the Division dealt directly with groups of farmers organised into unofficial (i.e. unregistered) 'Co-operative Societies'. In 1958 /
1958, some of these 'Co-operative' Societies in the bolilands area acquired tractors of their own but despite great hopes these schemes all failed after a few years, the Societies finding themselves unable to supply the mechanical and bureaucratic expertise necessary. Thus it was in the late 1950's that prototype Co-operative Societies organised with the help of, and around, local politicians or 'bigmen' contracted as corporate bodies with the Ploughing Agents. These Societies, or some of them, came under the supervision of the Co-operative Department and were receiving loans from the Government in 1960. In 1962, the first of these Societies was officially registered as a Rice Marketing Society. Subsequently, five more such Societies were officially registered and received more loans and a Co-operative Union was set up in Makeni to handle the movement of rice. As has been explained, the Administration's conception of these developments was to set up a native marketing organisation that would supplant the Lebanese traders who were banned from trading in rice in 1963, and also to cut out middlemen and moneylenders.¹ It was for these reasons that they were designated as Marketing Societies which is at odds with the local and more accurate understanding which saw them as /

¹ According to personal communication with Dr. Karr of Njala College relating to recent investigations of rural indebtedness, the extent of such indebtedness is not great in Sierra Leone compared with many peasant Societies. This supports my view expressed later that the trader middleman should not be blamed as much as he has been in the past.
as Mechanical Ploughing-Site organising Societies. By 1965 a peak of nearly 7,000 acres were ploughed from Makeni and the Scheme was transferred to the newly established Rice Corporation, a semi-autonomous body. By 1967, however, many farmers had fallen seriously into arrears and Government loans were drying up and very little rice was being marketed through the Co-operative Union which had not succeeded in accumulating any funds of its own.

The development of the Co-operative Societies and of the Mechanical Ploughing Scheme were not synonymous since there exist many other groups of farmers which organise ploughing sites but which have not become registered Societies and while these Societies have had no access to loans they have continued to function well. There are also many Co-operative Societies that exist for completely different purposes although only very rarely in farming villages.

FIGURE 1. Co-operative Societies by type and sex of members and by size of holding

Figures for the Northern Province - 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Number of Societies</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Marketing</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrift and Credit</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages /
Percentages by farmers participating in Co-operative Societies in 1965 by size of holding (Agriculture census).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1 acre</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 acres</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 acres</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 acres</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;15 acres</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average for Northern Province 4.2%

Most of these are thrift and credit societies operating in market towns serving small groups of urban residents. This indicates both that the Co-operative Societies have become an established feature in Northern Sierra Leone performing various different functions and that as a social institution it does not need the Government Stamp of official registration for it to exist. Much of what follows is the result of an attempt to describe and account more accurately for the groups of farmers who organise themselves in this way, some of which groups are called Co-operative Societies.

(2) Ecology of the Bolilands

Physical Geography of the Bolilands

The Socio-economic area as a whole I refer to as the Makeni Area. Since the area is defined as Makeni town and its hinterland it is assumed to be, broadly speaking radically symmetrical.
Map of Sierra Leone Showing Drainage and Main Physical Features. Diagram I

- Bollands.
- Tidal swamp-lands.
- Seasonal swamp-lands.
- Land over 1,000 ft.

Approximate area of study.
The radial segment within which field work was concentrated includes all of Makeni town and extends westwards into the swamp region known as the bolilands. Within this segment (see diagram 3 p. 69) it is postulated that the basic nature of the relationships between Village, Town and Administration are to be found and I begin with a description of the physical geography of the bolilands.

There are several kinds of swamps to be found in Sierra Leone. The broad divisions distinguish the tidal swamps to be found in the north-west coastal area; the seasonally deep flooding swamps as found in the estuaries along the southern coastline; the seasonally flooded inland swamps found in all areas of the country and the boliland swamps found within a fairly compact region in the shape of a wedge of territory running north-south in the Northern Province. The Boliland Swamps are comparable in size with the tidal swamps in the north-west and stretch for miles in places and are much larger than the normal inland swamps found elsewhere. This comparability in size reflects the probable origin of the boliland swamps. These were thought to have been formed at a period of higher sea level, when the waters of the Mabole, Rokel and Pampana Rivers merged in a delta similar to that found in the present tidal swamp area around Kambia. The term 'boli' itself is derived from the Temne language root 'bol' /
Map of Sierra Leone Showing Communications, Settlement Patterns and Research Locations.

- Research Location
- Towns over 12,000
- Boundary of Temne speaking peoples
- Unsurfaced main roads
- Surfaced main roads
- Railways

Scale in Miles
'bol' meaning long or far.

The boliland area is characterised by these large, seasonally flooded, treeless swamps forming an intricate and poorly drained network. The swamps themselves are separated by areas of low, peneplain capped uplands of lateritic soils covered by characteristically derived savannah. This contrasts with the uplands outside of the bolilands which are much more densely forested. This derived savannah is known as lophira bush and it contains much grassy cover and is apparently associated with low population densities in Sierra Leone. The bolilands are often spoken of as rolal in Temne 'the place of tall grass'. It was formerly well stocked with the larger game associated with savannah country, including bush-cows and elephants, and many settlements were established as the end result of a successful hunt. The swamps themselves also have a natural grassy cover, very numerous termite mounds and patches of hard laterite which makes the initial clearing and working of land very hard on labour and iron. These swamps are the least fertile to be found in Sierra Leone but have advantages in size, accessibility and flatness that balance this to some extent. The climate of the bolilands is not significantly different from the rest of Northern Sierra Leone except that it tends to be hotter at midday, in the dry season, due to the lack of tree cover. The dry season extends /

1 A.R. Stobbs and Dr. T.S. Bakshi - 1963.
Socio-economic Area of Study. Main Human and Physical Features.
extends from December to April and the rainy season has about 110" of rainfall, on average.

In general the bolilands present a difficult environment to both farmer and traveller and there are no towns larger than one thousand inhabitants to be found within the bolilands proper. The bolilands are frequently crossed, however, because they are bordered by areas of relatively high density and straddle several routes from Freetown to the inland areas.

**Human Geography of the Bolilands and Makeni Area**

The population density of the bolilands is about 50-60 per square mile and that of most of the surrounding areas, excepting the north-east is around 200 per square mile. This pattern is changing, however, as young farmers are moving out of the surrounding areas to look for work and farmers are moving into the bolilands to exploit their rice growing potential. The Makeni area was a major exporter of youth labour to the diamond area in the boom years. This contributed considerably to the development of the town because of money sent and spent back home or on returning home.

The bolilands have been traditionally exploited for hunting and rice-farming by members of the large and permanent settlements along its flanks, the area itself being unattractive to reside in.

Thus the pattern of settlement in the bolilands has traditionally contained a high proportion of temporary farm settlements strongly /

---

1 Figures according at 10% ratepayers survey carried out in 1967.
strongly bound to parent villages at its margins. These parent villages were responsible for the politico-jural protection of the small farm settlements. This traditional relationship probably explains the noticeable lack of settlements above thirty-six houses in size compared with the surrounding areas. Now, however, this pattern is changing with the increasing size and independence of such villages. Also found in the bolilands are a number of villages formed more recently by stranger immigrant groups who found plentiful, and upheld, land to settle in. These villages have subsequently become, to a very large degree, incorporated into the local Chiefdom Organisation.

Each of the urban centres nearby extends its sphere of influence into the adjoining area of the bolilands in many ways. For example, in this way, by attracting the surplus of rice grown there into its flourishing market, we see the basic structure of the Makeni area emerging. It is an area centred on the market town, held together by the communications network that radiates from these towns, and bordered at its outer limits by the economic pull of other such towns each with their own hinterland. The Makeni area thus defined extends from Makeni, westwards, into the bolilands for about 25 miles bordered by the two rivers, the Rokel (sometimes called Seli) and the Mabole. Its principle communication network is the main Makeni-Lunsar tracks and footpaths leading /
leading off these roads. To the North and South of Makeni runs the road which travels parallel to the bolilands, through the well populated and overcrowded (in terms of land use) upland areas adjacent to the bolilands. Branching off this, to the North-East, is the Kabala road which serves the entire North-East of Sierra Leone. The hinterland thus defined is seen as the area supplying and buying regularly in Makeni market, and the volume of local traffic along these routes is a measure of this. Transport prices are related to distance. The volume of traffic and the extent of the hinterland is well represented, in practice, by the distance along these routes that a sum of 40 cents will carry one person, on average.

The population of Makeni is now around 14,000\(^1\) and the population of its hinterland may be estimated at approximately 90,000. This ratio of urban to rural residents of 1 : 7 is significant to an understanding of the actions of influentials seeking support. The average ratio in the protectorate for urban to rural residents is about 1 : 6.\(^2\) The Makeni area as a whole has a surplus of women over men. In Bombali District, according to the 1963 census, males aged 15-54 formed only 19.3% of the total population. This migration of young males in search of work in Freetown and the diamond areas has had major effects /

---

1 Figures according at 10% ratepayers survey carried out in 1968.
2 This is counting towns as being of 3,000 upwards in population.
effects on social organisation that will be discussed in subsequent sections.

Rural settlement takes the form of compact villages. In the bolilands these appear to be increasingly nuclear as access to communications becomes more important. Each village possesses a well-defined boundary and is a basic social unit. The village is very cohesive, so that a traveller thinks in terms of moving from one village segment to the next. There is only one Temne word for the village (Ka peth) which applies to the inhabitants as well as to the settlement itself (wuni Ka peth means a normal adult human) and is a term that refers to all nuclear settlements, including towns. Each village would normally have a number of outlying hamlets of a few huts. These hamlets are totally dependant on the village and often consist of a segment of a village household sent there to look after the household's farms, and thus they tend to be referred to by the name of the household. They are often temporary, but sometimes grow and become villages in their own right. Almost all villages in the bolilands are situated on the 'islands' of permanently dry land. However, there is often a secondary and sparsely inhabited zone of hamlet settlement along old river levees, near the streams, by those who take to an independent and fishing way of life. In many ways the village, with its lands, may be considered as a basic economic unit that is largely self-sufficient, but this will be more /
more fully established as a social structure in the next section.

In certain drylands areas of the bolilands quite large (but uncounted) number of Fula herdsmen have settled in their characteristic dispersed 'war' pattern of settlement. These immigrants are of fairly recent arrival and there is considerable conflict over the use of land between them and the farmers as to the proper allocation of rights in land. Due to the traditional system of land tenure it is difficult for the local farmers to prevent the settlement of little-used uplands, by these herding peoples, but the cattle tend to wander at large and damage crops, etc.

Another and more important series of changes in the pattern of settlement recently is the growth of urban centres. The most important criteria in the siting of towns has been the structure of communications and the availability of water supply. Formerly, river transport was of considerable importance, despite the difficulties of navigation, and urban centres grew up in the late 19th century along river banks. The town of Bathkanu on the Mabole River is an example, and was for some time the Administrative centre for the North. It has since declined steadily as the railways and direct lorry routes developed. By 1920, when the population of the original Makeni settlement /
settlement was about 200, the railway connecting Freetown with Makeni at its terminal (except for a short-lived extension a few miles further on) was completed. This followed the route around the Southern edge of the bolilands. In 1956 the road connecting Makeni with the developing town of Lunsar was opened, and with the bridge across the Rokel this completed a fast route directly across the bolilands into Freetown. This route enormously stimulated the development of the area and Makeni grew rapidly to become the major town in the North. This was a result of its importance as an administrative centre, and its locational advantage, although the railway has now declined and is liable to closure. ¹ The town will almost certainly continue growing, and the importance of the boliland increase, since, with the opening of the new tarmacked road from Makali to Jaiama it has become the shortest route from Freetown to much of the prosperous Eastern region. With the completion of surfacing of the present Lunsar-Makali road the old up-country route, south of the bolilands, will be cut out and Makeni will become an even busier cross routes centre than it is at present.

The bolilands are basically inhospitable, the only natural resource being their extensive swamplands. The dry uplands of the bolilands are not generally suitable for upland rice or even tree crops. The area has few oil palms or timber trees. It's only /

¹ M.E. Harvey, 1967.
only cash earning export (apart from cattle) is the rice. This is largely grown in the swamps by a method of extensive cultivation peculiar to the bolilands. The growing of rice in the bolilands if profitable, not because of the fertility of the land (1,000 lbs per acre is considered a good yield in many swamps) but because of the good communications that are now developing in the area, and of its proximity to the major markets in the East and the Freetown urban complex. The growing of rice as a major cash crop is a characteristic feature of Northern Sierra Leone and may be profitable contrasted with the South where the major cash crops are the tree crops. Communications are so important because the major limiting factor in the development of rice farming for cash is the expense of road transport. Rice farming can only develop in this way where it can pay the farmer or trader to transport his rice to the market; a 150 lb sack of rice may cost 50c. (10 per cent. of its value unlanded) to transport 25 miles into Makeni, but if it cannot be prepared and filled next to a road or motorable track, then the cost of headloading it to the nearest lorry quickly becomes prohibitive.

In the forested belt of land adjacent to the bolilands (within the /

1 There may be an important distinction to be made between subsistence economies that are developing cash cropping of consumption staples as opposed to those which are introducing a new crop which they do not consume themselves. This has been discussed by Sutti Ortiz, 1967.
the Makeni area) there are more opportunities for varied cash cropping and garden crops, timber, sand, firewood, palm products, groundnuts, etc., to come into Makeni. Some of these are subsequently transported into Freetown. Some of these products are absorbed by residents of the bolilands, particularly timber, palm oil and groundnuts. This zone, however, is absorbing more rice than it can produce for itself since it has not developed the more productive methods of rice cultivation, and thus there does exist an economic interdependence between the two zones of boliland and forested uplands.

Within the Makeni area there are no industries and no state plantations (the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board oil palm plantation is now closed down) although tobacco is being introduced as a commercial crop which has to be dried and cured locally. So in general, the bolilands and the Makeni area are characterised by a lack of variety of natural resources. The bolilands are under-populated with large areas of unused swamp, (Stobb estimated 200,000 acres available for farming altogether) and overcrowding in the forested area. This overcrowding has reached the stage where the fallow for the shift and burn cultivation has been reduced to 4-5 years.¹ In the Southern part of this zone this has led to serious disputes over land holdings and this has been another factor in the move towards swamp farming.

¹ Agricultural Statistical Survey of Sierra Leone 1965/66 - Table 19.
Boliland Farming

Rice farming is the major pre-occupation of boliland residents, and a good number of non-residents, and it is impossible to understand the social structures without a knowledge of the farming cycle, system of tenure, possible variations and points of choice in rice farming.\(^1\) The boliland swamp itself is a relatively flat, treeless expanse with minor changes in relief near the main drainage channels. Cement-like termite heaps are common and the whole area is normally covered by a tall species of elephant grass. The initial clearing can present quite a problem in places because of patches of laterite near the surface and a peculiar formation known locally as tukus. These tukus are flat surfaces of 1-5 sq. yards divided by channels 1-2 feet wide and deep. This tends to discourage the local farmer armed only with a simple hoe.

As the rains begin to fall in May and April, the water table slowly rises until sometime in June, when most of the boli will have several inches of water and a soft muddy surface underfoot. The depth of water, however, varies considerably from one part of the boli to another and this may well affect the growing of rice. The water remains at the same level then for several months and goes down around November to December in which month /

\(^1\) For a more detailed account of swamp rice farming see Appendix I.
month harvesting begins. During the rainy season all the un-
cultivated areas of the bolis grow once again a thick cover of
glass. This dries towards the end of the dry season when wind
spread fires sweep for miles, burning all the grass down in late
January, February and March.

The soils of the bolis are very poor, the parent rock being
known as the Hkel river series. The local farmers distinguish
between black and white soils (antofa li and antof na ka sēnt),
the latter being favoured for most varieties of rice.

Farming in the bolis is extensive and involves no water
control. Great thought is given, however, to the choice of site
each year and the decision is affected by the tenure of the land,
the nature of the soil, the depth of water likely, proximity to
other farms or to the village, and the number of years it has
been farmed on previously. The techniques developed are geared
to the prime concern of the extensive type farmer operating in
the tropics, that of minimising the growth of grasses that can so
quickly smother rice seedlings and inhibit later growth. For
them, the easiest way to do this is to break new ground every
year in the manner of the shifting cultivation of the uplands,
but this proves uneconomic unless machinery can be brought in to
do this at subsidised rates of hire. This had led, therefore,
to the unexpected situation whereby sophisticated tractor machin-
ery, designed for continuous cultivation of land, is used on a
shifting /
shifting basis for the 'breaking in' of virgin ground subsequently used for continuous hand cultivation. This virgin land, when first farmed, produces a grass-free crop with little further attention, but in the third and fourth year of continuous cultivation weed growth can become a very serious problem. Once the land has been cleared and worked once it is easy to work subsequently having particularly fine grain structure which permits the use of an unusually broad-bladed hoe (up to 12 inches in width) not to be found in other areas of the country.

The main initial farming operations for the boli swamp farm are as follows and are geared to giving the rice seedlings a head start over weeds which constantly threaten them. Around the months of March and April all those intending to farm have to negotiate their lease (if necessary) on the land they desire and establish the approximate boundaries for that year. When the rains begin to fall, the ground with its post-burn growth of weeds is turned over and piled into flat heaps so that no greenery is left showing, using the broadbladed hoe (see photograph opposite). The timing of this initial digging is important because its purpose is to kill all the weeds by allowing them to rot, which depends on the arrival of sufficient rains to soak the heaps with enough water. The second operation is to spread the heaps out using the same hoe. Again, the timing of this is crucial /

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rainfall in inches</th>
<th>Handworked Farm</th>
<th>Mechanically Ploughed Farm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 0.15</td>
<td>Harvesting</td>
<td>Threshing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 0.25</td>
<td>Burning</td>
<td>Farm debt settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1.05</td>
<td>Threshing</td>
<td>Ploughing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3.24</td>
<td>Housebuilding</td>
<td>Ploughing fees collected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8.83</td>
<td>Land Allocation</td>
<td>Harrowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15.61</td>
<td>Kabbo getting org.</td>
<td>Farm Allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17.10</td>
<td>Digging</td>
<td>Seed harrowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 19.47</td>
<td>Transplanting</td>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17.98</td>
<td>Scattering</td>
<td>Fertiliser application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18.96</td>
<td>Kabbo breaks up</td>
<td>Weeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 5.93</td>
<td>Rice scarce</td>
<td>Birdscaring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 0.70</td>
<td>Cassava farm digging</td>
<td>Harvesting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
crucial since it must be carried out before the regrowth of new grass on top of the heaps is too great and yet late enough to permit a maximum area to be dug. All this work is extremely laborious and carried out only by male youths and adults. This work is regarded in much the same light as the initial clearing of upland bush with the same sentiments of prowess and prestige being expressed. The work gang which performs this work is called ka bɔtɔ. In areas outside the bolilands the term ka bɔtɔ can never refer to swamp farming (this is indicative of some of the changes that will be examined in more detail later on) because swamp farming is generally feminine in association whereas upland farming, with its all male ka bɔtɔ, is masculine. There are in fact two words in Temne for 'farm'; a kɔr and am pon. A kɔr is traditionally an upland farm, large and belonging to the head of the household, on behalf of the household, and worked by the ka bɔtɔ. Am pon is a much smaller farm, situated in the swamp, usually individually owned by dependants, that is wives or young sons and not cleared or dug by the ka bɔtɔ. In the boliland the terms Ka bɔtɔ and a kɔr have undergone a semantic shift that reflects the acceptance of swamp farming as a major activity and also a re-organisation of the farming household.

The second operation of flattening the heaps is carried out about one month later than the digging of the heaps, and again /
again buries the grass under mud so that its growth is suppressed or stopped. This must be carried out with care, which means that the work must be supervised by the farm holder if it is going to be effective. The rice must be transplanted or broadcast onto this prepared surface soon afterwards, before the weeds have a chance to re-establish themselves. It is obvious that these operations will be spread over a certain time period, the continuation of which must be balanced by the farmer against the drop in yield sustained when the optimum planting date is passed. This difficulty may be overcome to a certain extent by the judicious choice of different areas of the swamp at different depths of water, and by the use of different varieties of rice.¹

Most farmers broadcast their rice seed after soaking it for a day to initiate germination, but this has to be done onto relatively dry land otherwise the seed will simply rot. There are occasions when only transplanting is practical, since this can be done onto very wet or underwater ground. Transplanting is more reliable but considerably more time consuming.² However, a farmer who transplants will have more time during the digging period because of the later date for the transplanting operation itself /

¹ Having several plots in different areas means that leases for each site will have to be arranged for them, perhaps with several different landowners. This is liable to create a web of tenancy relations within the village.
² For figures on labour inputs for the various methods see Appendix I.
itself and thus be able to prepare a larger area. Thus most farmers do a certain amount of transplanting. It is a simple case of an innovation in technique giving the subsistence or peasant farmer more room to manoeuvre (i.e. increase his available choices) and thereby spread his labour input more equally through the year and increase per capita production. Approximately one quarter of the farmland in Mabaitunda was transplanted in 1967 (not counting the mechanically ploughed areas which are all broadcast).

While a man is digging he has to decide whether, and how much he intends to transplant, as opposed to broadcast. Making and maintaining a nursery for transplanting is work carried out by women with their young children and the nursery is situated normally near, or behind, the houses of the village or in the outlying hamlets. The young children are employed both in the hoeing of the nursery and also in the scaring off of the birds for about two weeks. If a man intends to transplant he will have to see that a nursery of the right size is prepared at least a month before he reckons to be ready in the swamp for the transplanted seedlings. Now, to go into all the factors involved in determining the optimum sequence of actions by any particular farmer for these initial farming operations would be quite complex. But it is clear that transplanting requires the control of a domestic unit near the farm site, and this is obviously not practicable /
practicable for stranger farmers.

Having planted or broadcast the rice the farmer will have to secure the farm against attacks of various kinds (supernatural and natural) using the charm known as an kantha (the closed space), and wait for harvest time. The farm may need weeding which is a laborious operation, but the boliland farmer thinks that if the ground has been properly selected and prepared then weeding should not be necessary. He can afford to carry out a certain amount of weeding but not much. The period between planting and harvesting (about 3 months) during the heaviest rains is generally a time of rest, although a number of cassava farms are dug in this time, especially in November. During this rainy period there is little movement of population apart from those farmers who have managed to save a surplus of rice. They go on 'rainy season patrol' to sell it in towns at the high rainy season prices.

By late November some of the early varieties of rice are ready for harvesting and the large work gangs known as ambira are formed for this purpose. Harvesting is carried out by means of a small knife which cuts the handful of rice held by the other hand near the ground. The sheaves are bound tightly and left for about a week on the ground to dry. They are then collected together and formed into a stack on the farm itself, normally where a threshing ground of smooth and hardened mud has been prepared. From the time when the rice has ripened small amounts will /

1. 'Given birth' as they say in Temne. In many ways they talk of the rice plant as if were a woman who matures, becomes pregnant and produces offspring.
I. The Harvesting Gang, the am bira.

2. Transporting Fertiliser out to the Farms by Bicycle and Headloading.
will have been cut by the women of the household and threshed for the daily food needs before the main threshing has taken place. Once the rice has been stacked, each variety having its own stack¹, it may remain there for several months even up to the beginning of the next rainy season. At some time, the head of the household will organise a working party of family and friends to help thresh the rice in one great effort. The men use staves to beat the rice laid in piles and the women longer and lighter sticks for the rice spread thinly on the threshing ground. There is no autonomous work gang for threshing and it is carried out over a long time period for the whole village.

The rice is winnowed immediately by the women with their large fanning baskets and measured by volume. It then goes into the store-room which is sometimes a special separate hut or room(s) back in the village, or into the personal bedroom of the owner. Rice is stored in sacks, which hold about 160 lbs, or in large freshly woven storage baskets sealed with a special mixture of dung and kola leaves. At this stage the seed rice for the next year is set aside and kept separately in the owner's bedroom box under lock and key. From February onwards fires may sweep across the countryside and rice stacks have to be protected by /

¹ About 20 varieties were known of in the bolilands of which I was familiar with about ten which were used quite regularly. New varieties are quite frequently tried out on a small scale.
by brushing and burning carefully around them.

The dry season is a time of ceremonies, debt settlements, capital expenditures (building of houses, arranging of marriages, initiation into societies) and efforts to secure repayments of past loans. The longer a man can hold out threshing and selling his rice the better off he is liable to be the following year. This is due to the seasonal rises in the price of rice and the fact that a debt repayment put off until the end of the dry season is normally put off until next harvest time.

The actual work of harvesting is laborious but the timing of the operation is not so crucial although the rice tends to become too brittle after a few weeks of ripeness. There is a peak demand for labour at harvest time but it is easier to obtain than for the digging period. This is because the harvesters, who probably have gone nearly two months with very little rice to eat, are paid in kind with opportunities for semi-legitimate 'stealing' as well and this attracts people from other areas.

Although the main effort of the boliland farmer is directed towards rice, most households have a cassava plot or two. This is not a cash crop, more an insurance crop, a hungry season crop, and it can be planted and harvested at almost any time of the year. Cassava tubers do not have to be collected every year but simply left to grow. It is the flexibility of cassava that makes /
makes it so popular as a second staple. The garden crops, of which there are many, are cultivated in plots behind the houses by the women of the household and the produce is their own property. The bolilands are too far from the market for these to provide a source of cash in general. Various fruit trees are planted by individuals who have the inclination but no systematic care is taken of them. If they survive - well and good, if they don't - never mind.

Livestock are very few in number and are used for ceremonies and prestations, as are chickens. A few sheep and goats are kept around the village and the inevitable chickens, but not much interest is taken in them. A number of rice farmers own cattle which are cared for by the Fula herdsmen and may be sold for meat, given in marriage payment or used in other ceremonies. A cow is a fairly good investment (although they may die of disease) and worth from £20 - £30 each. Unfortunately I have no figures for cattle ownership but it is certainly small.

It is this almost complete dependence on rice as the ultimate source of income in villages like Mabaibunda, in the bolilands, that has enabled me to estimate fairly accurately the per capita and per household income. This information is very hard to come by using direct questioning. Measurements of farms and /
and yields show\(^1\) that the average per capita cash income in Mabaibunda per year is around £23.0.0. (Le. 46.00) assuming that one-third of the staple starch requirements are met by cassava. This gives an average of Le 700.00 per house which is quite a reasonable figure for Sierra Leone and it also puts them above the 400 wheat grain equivalents per year that Clark and Haswell consider significant as a 'take off' point in Agriculture development.\(^2\) The general picture for boliland agriculture in such villages as Mabaibunda is one of development and change, but this cannot be appreciated without an assessment of the Mechanical Ploughing Scheme.

**The Mechanical Ploughing Scheme**

Within the last ten years considerable amounts of boliland swamps have been ploughed by tractors operated by the Agriculture Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources or by the Rice Corporation. There have been a few experiments by private individuals and autonomous Co-operative Societies to run their own tractors all of which have failed, except one. Over the past six years the average acreage ploughed from Makeni has been around 5,000 acres. The organisation of the ploughing will be described in some detail since it is now an important part of the economic relationship between Makeni and its hinterland, but also /

---

1 See Appendix I.
2 Clark and Haswell (1967).
also because of the importance of patronage in the basic organisation of the operations.

The machines are stored and administered from the large towns outside the bolilands area and the sites to be ploughed are designated every year. The ploughing itself has to be carried out at the end of the dry season because of the weight of the machines which would otherwise bog down. It should ideally commence in February, but for various reasons this is rare. Areas upwards of 100 acres are ploughed once after burning and then disc-harrowed about one month later to turn the growth of grass under. The land is then allocated, usually in 5 acre plots and then seed rice is lightly harrowed either by machine or by hand. Thus large areas of land are treated uniformly by contract with the groups of farmers who then take over the subsequent operations, each one farming individually. The quality of ploughing is low, the tractor operators having little or no formal training and the quality of the work depends heavily upon good supervisors and 'encouragement' (a term that will be explained later in connection with patronage). There is a major difficulty in weed control on the mechanically ploughed areas and land which is ploughed for more than three consecutive years tends to become choked with grass very quickly. The local farmers regard the shifting principle of traditional agriculture as the best way of combating this and try to stipulate that the machines /
machines plough a certain amount of virgin swampland every year. This also is of great advantage for the local farmer in that the initial clearance of these areas is accomplished for them at a very low cost. The areas vacated by the ploughing scheme may then be very profitably dug and used by farmers with the heap-rotting method. Many thousands of acres of swampland must have been opened up in this manner, encouraging even those farmers who do not use the ploughing scheme to come and farm the swamplands in the bolilands area. One important consequence of this form of mechanised ploughing scheme is that there is no permanent use of any single site and allotments have to be re-allocated every year. The allocation, carried out directly after harrowing, involves the construction of a grid of stakes set at five chain intervals over the area, with the irregularities at the peripheries being approximately marked off. The group of farmers who have paid for their acres then follow the Site Supervisor and Clerk around while he allocates the various areas which may then be subdivided. This conflicts very considerably with the traditional method of land allocation, suffice it here to say that very considerable power lies ultimately in the hands of the clerk and that farmers cannot know for sure where their allocation will be made. Every farmer has an idea of where he or she wants their allocation to be made but it is impossible for everyone to be satisfied /
satisfied. There exist considerable real and imagined differences within the area to be ploughed due to type of soil, depth of water and previous land use. It is within this ecological and technical context that the competition of farmers to get the best for themselves, within the scheme, may be seen. Almost all ways of maximising their farming operation on the mechanically ploughed land involve methods of organisation and skills with which they are not familiar. In every case we find mediating individuals who help them deal with this situation, individuals who expect to get influence in return. Farmers do not understand, for instance, the book-keeping methods that are used in the organisation of the ploughing site or the payment of fees, with interest on loans, etc., nor do they understand the geometrical division of land surface areas assumed by site supervisors.

Another activity to do with boliland farming that involves soliciting the favourable services of an unfamiliar bureaucracy, is the buying and application of superphosphate fertilizer which is supplied by the Agriculture Division in Makeni. Large quantities of this fertilizer, known as antol (usually translated as 'medicine') is sold. The limiting factor is the ability of the Government Agencies to supply the demand efficiently and the availability of local transport. The variation in amount sold is /

1 See J. Littlejohn, (1963).
is due more to the efficiency of the Agriculture Division and the Sierra Leone railways than to the response of the Farmers. Thus the obtaining and transporting of fertiliser is difficult for anyone and especially difficult for the village based farmer living at some distance from the distribution centres, although some minor centres have been set up. Again the mediating influential has a crucial part to play in helping the local farmer here.

Yields and Rewards

I have described the main variations in farming techniques and organisation in the bolilands. What is the nature of the rewards to be expected? It is difficult to estimate average yields for the bolilands with any accuracy and this is just as difficult for the local farmer as it is for the observer. What is quite obvious, however, is the variability of yields, especially in those areas ploughed mechanically. Morgan estimates an average yield at a little over 1,000 lbs of paddy per acre with occasional reports of 2,000 lbs when farmers have been using superphosphate.¹ My own estimates would give a lower average figure, due largely to a number of complete crop failures. Also, all /

¹ H.E.G. Morgan, 1965. The method I used for estimating yields was by sample frames at an approximate density of twelve per acre (1 yd. square) harvested just before the actual farm harvest. This rice was then threshed and its volume accurately measured and converted into volume per acre figure. This method was double checked on my own farm where the actual yield was known and proved to be accurate. A conversion factor of 10 c.c. of dry threshed rice per frame = 1/3 bushel (32 lbs.) per acre was used. This does vary slightly from one rice species to the next.
all the measurements were made in the Mabaibunda swamp which, being an inland boli, is considered less fertile than most. My estimate for average yield would be around 750 lbs. per acre. Now this is a low figure and very considerably lower than the figures given by the agricultural census of 1965 would allow. These census figures, however, must be considered suspect since they are so much higher than any other estimate and would certainly indicate no shortage of rice. My low figure is, however, confirmed by what farmers say when they claim that boli swamp farming does not yield more per unit area than the upland farm. It would appear that it is not yield per acre that is important in the change to the boliland swamp.

If we look at the labour input per unit yield we see the advantage in swamp farming, for 2.7 to 3.2 man/days are required to produce one bushel of upland rice compared to 2.5 to 2.7 for handworked boliland rice (broadcast, that is) and 2.3 to 2.5 (equivalent to cash) for the mechanically ploughed land. There are organisational advantages as well to swamp farming, some of which have been dealt with.

In considering yields it is the reliability of yields that may be more important to the farmer than the highest potential yield. Traditional farming methods have a high degree of security and this is important in conditions of low surplus and difficulties in rice storage. The mechanically ploughed farms are /
are a gamble, they sometimes yield very well and pay handsomely, at other times and not infrequently yields may be down to 300 lbs acre due to excessive weed growth or flooding of rice. In this kind of farming real rewards are to be gained but farmers are continually combating factors very difficult for them to control, i.e. the quality and timing of the ploughing carried out by the Government Agency and the farming history of the land being ploughed. The break-even point for the mechanically farmed land lies where a yield of around 10 bushels per acre is obtained, assuming the sale of rice at harvest time. The Mechanical Ploughing Scheme is characterised by uncertainty and low average profit margins. The risks and advantages are different for the different types of farmer. The local farmer can use his local household labour which might otherwise remain unoccupied for certain operations and the stranger farmer has better chances for exploiting seasonal and geographical variation in the price of rice. Both types of farmer need help from persons with more skills and influential contacts in order to maximise their chances of their mechanically worked land paying off.

The Boliland Farmers

I have already mentioned the traditional exploitation of the bolilands by farmers resident on its borders and the fact that at present strangers from urban centres are also involved in /
in farming activities there. To some extent this is a natural move by farmers because of the overcrowding of these adjacent upland areas, but there are several features of this exploitation that are not characteristic of a simple movement of population due to demographic pressures. It is difficult to estimate the volume of this interaction but according to the sample survey I made in March, 1968, at least one household in six in Makeni was engaged in rice production of some kind. Now not all of this farming was in the bolilands, although it was almost entirely swamp farming but one household in five had used the mechanical ploughing scheme administered from Makeni at some time. Over the years it appears that persons resident in market-administrative centres make up about one-third of the active membership of the societies responsible for organising the mechanical ploughing sites, taking approximately 50% of the acreage. In Mabaibunda itself strangers took about 5/6ths of the mechanically ploughed area and there were at least 19 other strangers digging traditional farms. Most of these farmers were from areas outside the bolilands but a number of those buying the mechanically prepared acres at Mabaibunda were from boliland villages in the neighbourhood who did not have any ploughing sites of their own.

In the villages which do not have lorry access, or only rudimentary access, stranger farmers are rare and thus this consider-
considerable involvement of stranger farmers in the bolilands region follows closely the lines of communication.

Within Mabaibunda itself the breakdown of farm ownership was as follows.

FIGURE 2. Farm ownership of handworked farms by number of holdings and size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Acreage</th>
<th>% acreage of total</th>
<th>Average size of holding</th>
<th>Number of holdings measured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heads of households</td>
<td>189.1</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wives</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from these figures that to think of all farms as belonging to local heads of domestic groups is misleading. It is when we consider the jural importance of land holding that the heads of the local domestic groups become dominant in boliland farming as will be shown.

For the mechanical ploughing scheme I have only quantative records /

---

1 This data was obtained from the 100% farm survey, that I carried out in 1967, involving direct measurement of farm sizes. The definition of farmholding used in this survey was that a holding consisted of all those plots farmed by an individual who was independently responsible for management (but not necessarily the legal tenure) decisions of these plots.
records of the type of farmer using the mechanically farmed areas for one site. For Mabaibunda site the breakdown over six years is as follows:-

FIGURE 3. Users of Mabaibunda ploughing site by residence, sex and occupation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence of Farmers</th>
<th>Numbers - male by occupation</th>
<th>Numbers - female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Makeni</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Housewives 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government employed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading authorities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boliland villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Housewives 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefdom officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other villages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Housewives 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefdom officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We may estimate the total acreage paid for by Makeni residents using the mechanical ploughing scheme at 2-3,000 acres per annum, according to the Rice Corporation records. If we compare this figure with the number of individuals paying for acres and the number of acres they say they have bought we find a large discrepancy which reflects the activity known as 'going behind'. 'Going behind' is when a person, who is not a member of a farmers' co-operative society and who wishes to use the facilities of the Society, goes to a member and uses him as a front to get the mechanically ploughed acres. This is a common practice and may even take place between members, because some sites are known to be better ploughed and organised (often because of the greater influence of the mediating patrons of the Society) than others. Thus considerably greater numbers of Makeni residents use the scheme than appears on the records.

In Makeni there is quite a diversity of people engaged in farming including a significant number of women, whereas in the boliland villages very few women are shown as using the Mechanical Ploughing Scheme. The stranger farmers who come into the area do not normally bring many of their dependants with them although there is an influx of labour at harvest time when people are more easily persuaded (the attraction being the good food and chance to be paid off in rice). The stranger farmer will normally make two visits, one at the beginning of the /
the farming season to arrange the tenure of his holding, to dig and plant the land (this visit may be a short one of a few days for those taking mechanically ploughed areas only) and a second visit at the end of the season for harvesting, threshing and processing the crop. The stranger farmer has to pay for transport and arrange accommodation for himself and anyone he may bring with him and for someone to keep an eye on his farm and send word if it is in danger while he is away in the rainy season, etc. The stranger farmer thus has to establish some contact within the local village and this is normally done by establishing a special friendship relationship with a particular head of household whom he will be able, in turn, to help in certain ways. Establishing a good contact in the boliland village is essential for the stranger farmer, especially when it comes to arranging and securing rights in land and finding out about the agricultural characteristics of the various areas of the swamp about which he himself is bound to be in ignorance. The stranger farmer who is successful must have built up a good friendship relationship of this kind with the local farmers. He cannot afford to move more than a few of his household dependants from his permanent residence and the difficulties in finding accommodation and food for them also prevent this from happening.

To understand fully the motivations and constraints acting on /
on both local and urban rice farmers a basic account of the rice
marketing situation as it existed in 1967 must be given.

**Rice Marketing**

With the drift to the towns and mining areas the price of rice has risen very fast over the past twenty years. The price varies from area to area, it varies seasonally and it varies with the stage reached in the processing. The rice market is thus already complex enough without the discrepancies and local variations in the units of measurement used. As far as the boliland farmers are concerned, the important factors are the time of year and the stage in the processing reached.

The whole area is characterised by a very rudimentary marketing organisation. The official Government buying agent, the Rice Corporation, has the money to buy rice but has a centrally controlled and inflexible pricing policy and therefore tend to find themselves offering a lower price than independent traders. The Co-operative Union organisation has been buying rice from farmers at their own price and this has worked quite well. The Union was in fact encouraged and set up in order to protect farmers from what was thought to be unfair exploitation from rice traders,¹ and Government funds have generally provided capital.

---

¹ This laudable intention was virtually doomed from the start because all too often these rice traders and the local men who organised the Societies and the Union were one and the same. Whether this proves the value of anthropological investigation rather than normally intelligent enlightened enquiry is debatable.
capital for the buying of rice each year. Unfortunately the Union has not been able to achieve financial independence on the basis of its rice trading and the organisers think of it as a means of paying for their rice store and offices, etc., rather than in providing a service to farmers.

The majority of rice marketing is in fact carried out by large and small scale private traders who, coming out of Makeni or the rice deficient areas of the South and East, travel around the villages buying milled or half-milled rice in small lots. These small scale travelling traders, perhaps acting as agents for larger traders who remain in Makeni, supply a service that the Government or Co-operative Agents, with their over-centralised structure entirely based in Makeni cannot.

Not all rice surplus is sold for cash as most farmers find themselves in debt at the end of the rainy season. Frequently these debts have been the result of purchases made on credit during the previous rainy season. Such credit is often repaid at the price of 100 cents per bushel, that is half the harvest time /

1 Milling reduces weight by nearly half and the final milling is more cheaply done by machine in town.
2 It has frequently been stated that these debts are due to pernicious traders who buy rice off farmers and then sell it back to them in the hungry rainy season at double the price, but I saw no evidence for this in the boilands. In the hungry season farmers who run out of rice simply do without. But they do still need such small items as paraffin, matches, palm oil, etc.
Co-operatives Societies in Sierra Leone.

Diagram 5

- Rice marketing cooperative society
time price. This does not represent the equivalent of 100% interest on loan, however, because firstly the price of rice at the time of loan was probably the equivalent of 150 cents per bushel and, secondly, because if the debtor is unable to pay back the following harvest, his debt may well be deferred for a year without any increase in the amount owed. The point I am trying to make here is that the farmers regard the trader as someone who is providing a service. A person who has the cash to hand over in return for rice and will make credit arrangements at times is valuable to a farmer and provides a service that the Co-operative Societies have been unable to supplant. The urban influential who can perform these services, or arrange for them to be performed by someone else is regarded with increased respect.

In conclusion, the marketing arrangements in the bolilands are rudimentary and inefficient. They are characterised by a lack of capital and widespread credit arrangements which limits the scale upon which traders can operate. The Government Agencies and Co-operative Union buy rice but are very centralised in /

---

1 The government loans, at a compound rate of interest at 15% have been a constant source of misunderstanding.
2 See B. Ward, 1960 'Cash or credit crops' who writes that the giving of credit by traders depends on the personal knowledge and relationship of the two parties and this must limit the number of persons with whom a trader can have this relationship.
in Makeni and only pay for the rice after it has arrived on their doorstep. This is something most farmers cannot do. There is great scope for the entrepreneur with some capital and 'know-how' both as private trader and as government agent in local Rice Marketing and it is these entrepreneurs who are extending the economic (and as I hope to show - the political) relationship of Makeni with its rice growing hinterland.

(3). The Village

Descent and Kinship

In the area the patrilineal descent ties function as pedigrees; that is, they provide a linear connection with certain crucial ancestors. Patrilineal descent ties do not create a systematic segmentary framework of corporate lineages, indeed it is doubtful in what sense the Temne can be said to have lineages at all excepting the royal houses. Patrilineal ties are important in that they are used to establish the individual at a certain position in the local community and also as an idiom of recruitment to households and groups of followers as will be seen. In keeping with this the ancestors themselves are not often invoked referred to. The term *afam a baki* (literally - the old men) refers both to the village elders and to the ancestors in general who are thought to inhabit another and hidden /
hidden world (Rokrifi). Individuals do have, or may have, relationships with particular ancestors and sacrifice to them but this is a private affair. Misfortunes may be identified as being due to the neglect of the ancestors but more usually to the actions of witches, spirits or evil magic. The only ancestors one hears mentioned normally are certain key figures in the history of the village and who are represented by stones placed in a very small hut situated on the outskirts of all villages (am boromosar). It is only the founders of the village and the persons in the village selected to Kapr Chiefship by the Paramount Chief who are remembered and represented in this way. Very few people can actually name their great-grandfather and agnatic ties tend to lapse rather quickly when the relatives are not living near each other. A person may be classified as tik, as a stranger, if he originates from another village even when a genealogical tie between the two can be established. The first question strangers ask on meeting each other is, 'where do you come from?', 'which village?' and 'which house?'. Genealogical ties are mostly important in that they establish connections with a place, that is the rules of descent have to be seen in combination with the rules of territorial connection.

At one time there may have been a segmentary lineage system which has survived in the form of a loose framework of patronyms which /

Family of Procreation and Affines. Kin Terms.
which create an obligation of the weakest kind between persons.

This system of patronyms spreads, especially through the device of patronym equivalents (e.g. Bangura with Konteh) over a wide area of Africa. This has misled some authors into thinking of the Temne as having a series of organised clans but although some individuals can identify what is supposed to be a totem it is of no importance.

Inheritance of immoveable property and of certain status positions (called mataema) is patrilineal but such rights may be, and quite frequently are, established on the mother's side from her father or elder brother especially when the inheritor has committed himself in some way to them.

The kinship terminology reveals the bilaterality of kinship organisation, the importance of seniority and of the affinal relationship and the pragmatic nature of recruitment. ²

Some of these terms are not pure kin terms but nevertheless are very commonly used in a kin context, e.g., afo - meaning literally 'people'. A number of such terms covers the general class concept of 'relatives' which, as in our own society, has no strict limit in extension (e.g., rakomra, bonso) but depends on context and extends to both mother and father's side. This somewhat loose usage of descent and kin terms reflects the manner in

---

1 As for instances in M. McCullough, 1950.
2 See Appendix II for list of kinship terms.
in which local corporate groups are formed and are built up from kin ties which will be described shortly. This contrasts with the considerable rigidity and formality attached to the affinal link which does not build groups but defines relations between individuals. The affinal relationship, which within the prevailing pattern of settlement and patrilocal marriage means a relationship between non-neighbours, is expressed by the term Komané. This term implies a decidedly unequal balance between father and son-in-law. More accurately, one should say that the giving of a woman by one side is balanced by eternal deference, respect and material help from the other side; the woman is never fully transferred.

The kinship and descent system do not generate a structure of corporate groups but place the individual at the centre of a number of intersecting links with other individuals that may be simply represented:

FIGURE 4 The Ego-focused kinship Grid
As I hope will later become clearer the ego-centred kinship grid may be used by ego in various ways in order to join or recruit the local groups which I will now describe.

The Local Groups

The important local groups that are corporate but not necessarily enduring are the household, the wider kin group, the village and the village associations both secret and open. Here I will deal with the first three since they are built up out of kinship ties whereas the last category is built up out of specifically non-kinship ties and will be described under village institutions. There are in addition non-corporate groups formed on a contingent basis for certain work purposes such as happens when three or four women come together every morning for a week to pool their activities in the parboiling and milling of rice.

The household is a clearly defined group that may be defined as the largest group sharing a cooking yard and frontage on the village street and which takes its identity from a single male (very occasionally female person). In Temne it is referred to as a sīth (a house literally) and this unit is represented by its head in the internal political system of the village. A household head, 2 bomp (a head literally) is responsible for the conduct of the members of his household and also speaks on their behalf in the village court. The household is also a recognised /
recognised administrative unit for certain tax and tribute purposes. The household is filled with people (*a fam ka a sith*) many of whom are members of the same nuclear or extended family but there always are a certain number of other persons in it and often a stranger guest as well. The household usually has a farm which is used to feed its members but this is not a defining characteristic.

Households may be grouped together into landholding units held together by real or putative sibling ties. Such groups were formally of considerably greater significance than now and in some villages it is hardly found although in others it forms a large part of the settlement. This group holds jointly an area of land and decisions about its use by themselves or any other farmers must be arrived at by consultation. The heads of the households may also meet to settle disputes between its members and for certain important ceremonial purposes, particularly rites of passage of its members. There may be effective economic co-operation between the households of such a group but since this co-operation may exist between any households who decide to establish it this may hardly be said to constitute a characteristic. Such a group is usually referred to specifically by the patronym that they share and in general by the term /
term am bonso or kukuru'kin or again afam. Formerly this group farmed and fought in common but even where it continues to exist these activities have become identified with the household. This local kin group only continues to retain a corporate identity as long as it functions as a land-holding unit. If the inheritance is for some reason lost or split up or its members dispersed so that the land is not used then the members of the group cease to function together in any way although they may continue to demand reciprocal help from individual siblings.

The local group with the clearest and most obvious corporate identity is the village itself. Its principal activities, and internal differentiation will be the subject of much of what follows. Suffice it here to establish that each village is thought to have been founded by one man, who defines the agnatic core of the village. A has a definite compact area of land with a well defined boundary and its members have many expectations of each other as neighbours rather than just kinsmen. Some villages, particularly the smaller ones consist almost entirely of the agnatic core but more commonly this group constitute a minority. Descendants of persons who settled in the village subsequent to the founding settler are liable to be tightly bound to core members by affinal ties which may repeat over the generations. In this way, the whole village constitutes a corporate and enduring unit of a very high stability with a definite /
definite kin structure. Because of the nature of the affinal relationship and the system of land tenure which gives descendants of first settlers a dominant position in the community a village may be spoken of as 'being' or belonging to that inner core. People tend to say 'Mabaibunda, that is the Turay family' as if it were a local descent group whereas in fact the land-owning Turays form only a small percentage of the population over which they exercise a sort of patronage.

**Household and domestic organisation**

The household is not necessarily a single domestic group although all the adult males will normally eat together even when their women have cooked separately. The head of the household has the public responsibility for the members of his household and he must also adjudicate fairly in the many small disputes that arise within the household, a duty which no one else has
the right to perform unless specifically delegated by the head in the head's absence.

Each household occupies a certain allotment with its own frontage on the village street where the main building stands, and running back from this through the cooking yard, subsidiary houses some of them purely dormitory, through the yard, garden area, chicken house, lavatory and washplace to the area of fruit growing trees behind. Along with this movement from front to back is an associated movement across other dichotomies, from open to closed, public to private, male to female and dry season to rainy season. As Dr. Littlejohn has pointed out\(^1\) the Temne house and its surrounds may be seen as a sort of symbolic workshop as well as a domestic construction.

As a politico-jural unit the household is quite discreet although individuals may visit and leave and the household expand and diminish with considerable rapidity. The village can be thought of as being made of a number of such units accounting for everybody in the village, however temporary.

Many households are split into a number of domestic units each with economic independence. Such households are spoken of as having separate 'pots' which implies that the domestic unit has an independent farm as well. The household may in fact be residentially fragmented when one or more domestic groups of a

\(^1\) Dr. J. Littlejohn, 1960.
Aerial Photograph of Mabaibunda and its Surrounds. Taken at 20,000ft. 1958.
a household are sent by the household head to live in a small hamlet near the household's farms. The domestic group consists often of married sons with children of reasonable age, younger brothers of the head with their own wife, or stranger units. They may or may not combine their activities and cook and provide for the whole household in a strict rotation (an wuthane in Temne) and this may be mirrored in an organised rotation in the farmwork among the farms of the domestic groups. The local name for this subdivision of the household is a taren which refers literally to the 'cooking place', the three or five stones grouped together which belong to the women of the domestic group (each responsible and childbearing wife owns her own set). These stones, actually lumps of laterite conglomeration, are very important in the symbolic expression of household organisation. Males must not sit on them and it is a very grave offence for them to be borrowed without getting full permission of the owner. These stones have little or no economic value of their own.

The crucial defining feature of the domestic group is the independent management of the group's farm under the head of the domestic group. The rice from this group's farm is used to feed the members of the domestic group or to be used as their rotating contribution to the feeding of the household. The direct corollary to the independence of the farm is the separate working /
A Temne Cooking Yard.
working arrangements of the group and the contribution made by every member of the domestic group to labour on its farm.

FIGURE 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of domestic groups/Household</th>
<th>Mabaibunda, No. of Households</th>
<th>Nagbaikoli, No. of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No domestic group is viable without a complement of women and children because of the way work is divided between men, women and children and it is the ambition of every young man who commits himself to a farming way of life (as the majority do) to build up this balanced complement by whatever means and acquire his own pot. This is not easy and permission from the head of the household is required even after acquiring the means. It is well recognised that pot ownership for a young man carries with it a number of other freedoms. In particular it makes it much more difficult for the head to make specific demands from members /
members of a domestic group of which he is not the head since he is no longer feeding them. The head of a domestic group is still dependant on the head of the household for the tenure of land however.

The Temne are polygamous and any household or domestic group is likely to have a number of wives to one man. Each wife with her young children form a matrisegment which in view of the instability of marriage with a high rate of divorce may be of considerable significance as an ongoing structure. The matrisegment is also important in the organisation of any household however stable. While the children are young, the matrisegment is recognised as a working unit in many farming and gardening operations. At this stage fathers do not take great interest in their children. A wife who has young children will often exert her prerogative to have a farm of her own, worked by herself and her children. She may cook special food for her own children and take all responsibility for their clothing, even education. Wives must also be careful about disciplining children of co-wives as this might increase friction in an already difficult relationship. Persons born of the same mother are regarded as being especially close (afam a kor kin - people of one belly) and a widowed woman past child-bearing age is quite often to be found living in the household of one of her children. Furthermore, there is the general custom that a woman retires to her father's /
father's or brother's home to give birth or shortly after birth and remain there for a period up to two years until the child is weaned. Some men who become rich and influential in the Chiefdom or between town and farming villages may in fact separate their household into the separate matrisesegments and lodge them in separate households or houses completely independent economically from each other.

Any rice or other crops a woman grows for herself is completely her own property and some woman manage to become quite well-off especially when they engage in petty trading at which they are adept and have the right to do by tradition. This further subdivision of the domestic group is recognised and strengthened in the arrangement of the Temne house. This house has a central room opening by doors to the outside at the back and front in which grown children and childless wives sleep. To each side off this room are a number of smaller rooms each one occupied by a wife with her children or grown sons or younger brothers.

FIGURE /
It is in fact said in Temne 'mɔ bɛmpa a sith ṭɔbap a kunku, mɔ baf akɔr kɔ buth ampon' - As a man builds a house so he divides up the rooms, when he brushed a farm so he allocates the pon (the pon are subdivisions of farming area managed separately by members of the household). Formerly, the pon farm was a swamp farm and the Kor (or family farm) an upland farm. This was so for several reasons one of which was the obligation of the young members of a household or domestic group to work first on the family farm supplying the basic food needs of the group and subsequently being free to work for their mother and/or themselves. By this time the rains would probably have begun and it /
5. A Typical Household.

6. A Cooking Yard at one of Mabaibunda's Outlying Hamlets.
it would be too late to work the upland areas for ecological reasons.

Into this basic pattern of the farming household strangers can fit quite easily attaching themselves to a domestic group, using the simple and basic formula that if you eat with a group you must work the communal farm and help that group in other ways. If you do not have your own pot you remain subservient in many ways to the head of the household. Some strangers come alone, some with their domestic groups. It is rare for a whole household of any size to move, because to survive as an independent household it must invest in and become embedded in the village community and this takes years. Strangers are normally welcome and fit fairly smoothly into the domestic and jural organisations of the local household.

**Land Tenure**

There is no general shortage of land in the area in the sense that there is not enough land for farming needs in any one year, but naturally individuals are in opposition to each other and must seek to establish as wide a claim to land as possible, because such a claim is associated with more than just farming. Land tenure operates according to the principle of prior settlement and land is thought to 'belong' ultimately to the putative descendants of the first individual to settle in the area. The area /
area covered by this tenure is normally all the land of one village and is known as Ka bomp. Secondary rights will have been acquired by later arrivals, rights which cannot in practice be removed from their descendants, and the most recent arrivals might be having to 'beg' from those with security of tenure, the use of an area sufficient to their needs. In sum, the types of tenure are:

1. Direct ownership, of large areas of land, by historical rights of prior settlement. Allocation by consultation with 'brothers'.

2. Long lease, a secure form of inheritable tenure granted by a landowner, this may be a large area of land. Allocation by holder of lease or with his brothers.

3. Short lease, on an annual basis from a landowner. Only so much land as is covered by his farm, allocation by landowner.

4. Dependants tenure, a subdivision of land, held in one of the above ways, by a household head for one of his dependants.

5. By pledge. Land may be pledged as security for a loan (usually of cash) indefinitely but must be returned on repayment of original sum no matter how delayed the payment. May be quite large areas.

Around /
Around the months of March and April all those intending to farm who are not landowners have to negotiate their leases and establish their approximate boundaries for that year. It is only the landowners who have the right to allocate land (an fosa - the legal power) and these men are kept busy at this time. Those with long leases will not have much to do as they have security of tenure but any application to farm on 'their' land must be referred to the true landowners. Any assumptions by non-landowners of such rights to allocate is a very serious matter and would be taken to constitute a direct challenge to the established political structure of the village. So every household head arranges for tenure according to his households requirements for that year and he will then subdivide it according to those in his household who have the right or his permission to farm for themselves. There are basically two levels at which he may do this. He may allocate a completely separate area for one of the domestic groups in his household, semi-independent young sons or elder wives; or he may choose and mark a large plot which is divided later into contiguous areas which younger sons or wives may work for themselves.

March and April is a time of considerable competition between households and individuals to get the best land for themselves. For a man intending to settle in a village it is fairly /
fairly essential for him to negotiate a long lease of some kind and it is here that the importance of kinship or affinal ties that the settler will seek to establish in the village become significant.

To the village farmer, land, its use and ownership are of central importance and in the rules of tenure can best be seen the basis of the two levels of corporate grouping, the household and the village. It is membership of these bodies that gives a man, or woman, access to land and not the mere or formal possession of certain kinship connections.¹

Marriage, divorce and the affinal Relationship

Marriage in the farming village is of three basic types characterised by:
a) High bride price, a young bride and virilocal residence;
b) Low bride price, a young bride and uxorilocal residence;
c) Low bride price, an older bride and virilocal residence.

The first type of marriage is the ideal, although the second and third also have a high degree of recognition. There are two forms of the first type of marriage which differ in protocol but are sufficiently similar to be grouped together. The first form of

¹ This qualified position of the kinship sub-system is also mentioned by R. Finnegan of the Limba who obviously share many similarities in village organisation to their close neighbours, the Temne, even some kin terms are the same. She writes (1965, p.61) 'The Limba, then, think of themselves and their relations with each other not purely in kinship or personal terms, but partly also by reference to the territory in which they are settled, whether at the level of household, compound, farm settlement, village, main town or chiefdom'.

of marriage should be made by arrangement between two men of
good standing (wuni lompi - in Temne), one of them often being
the father of the prospective husband. The girl should be a
virgin and this requires a special additional marriage payment.
Such a marriage may well be arranged while the child is very young
or even before birth and is seen as creating a strong alliance
between males. It is natural in these circumstances for the
future husband to pay for initiation into the Bundu Society and
to take charge of the girl's training in her domestic duties
which are, as for all wives, to cook and wash for her husband,
sweep the house and yard, to sleep with her husband and to bear
and bring up his children when young. The final bride price
for such a marriage may be around the equivalent of £50 these
days, much of it to be given in cash form.

The second type of marriage in which the husband goes to
live in the household, or nearby his in-laws, is not uncommon.
It is one of the standard methods by which a man can marry off
his daughter, acquire a supporter and an extra pair of hands at
times and increase the size of the village. Many strangers
have been induced (as I nearly was) by the offer of a wife and
farming land if they would build a house and promise to settle
with the father-in-law.

It is, of course, common for middle-aged and old men who
have /
have been successful in life to marry very young women. Such women are very liable to be widowed on the death of their older husband. It is recognised that younger brothers of the deceased may 'inherit' such a widow but this is not prescribed or in practice preferred and can only be carried out with the full consent of the widow. A widow or divorcee usually has achieved a considerable independence and children of her own and her subsequent marriages do not involve the same high brideprice and alliance between in-laws. By the time a woman is 35-40 the brideprice involved may be quite low and if she has accumulated any wealth she might well conduct the negotiations herself. Since marriage is contracted between individuals, each trying to build up their own ego-based household rather than between groups of agnates, non-inheritance of widows is not surprising.

Considering the relatively high bride-price, the equivalent of £30 being an average figure, it is slightly puzzling to find a very high rate of divorce. Divorce is easy, even incompatibility provides legal ground providing the woman makes enough fuss about it. No serious explanation is offered here though it is possible that this is a fairly recent development.

High bride-price may be a function of the important and formal relationship between affines that, as I have shown is recognised in the kinship terminology of the area. The affinal relationship /
relationship, which when combined with the general pattern of residence and settlement means a relationship with non-neighbours, is expressed by the term Komane and this term implies an inequality between the two affines. Or more accurately, the giving of a woman by one side is balanced by eternal deference, respect and material help on the other side. The term Komane means literally 'born together' or 'giving birth together', but although the reflexive suffix -ant is used this does not mean that there is equality of status between affines. The father or brother-in-law whose daughter or sister is married is in a definitely superior position and must be treated with great respect by his son or brother-in-law.

If a man is seen working on the farm with his Komane on a reciprocal basis, as in kabozi he is liable to be ridiculed. Men who are Komane do not eat from the same plate. Some sons-in-law leave their shoes outside the house of their father-in-law and would not address him or the mother-in-law by their personal names. He must not speak loudly in their presence or show any familiarity to his wife when they are around, at the risk of incurring great shame. It is said that they are frightened of their in-laws because at 'any time they may take back your woman from you'. Again, if a man wants to build a home on the frontage allocated to his father-in-law he will have to make a special gift to /
to him to demonstrate his inferior position.

Similarly, the wife's mother is subject to various stringent avoidance rules. A husband should be continually bringing his affines presents or helping in their farm work (prestations known as *aber*). In addition he has already paid the bride price (*a tens*) and probably some additional gifts necessary to 'get back his wife' who has gone on a visit to her peoples' household (prestation called *Kagrans*). All this tends to be thought of in terms of a check on the exploitation and maltreatment of a wife by her husband.

The principles and groupings that have been described above as operating in the farming villages allow for considerable mobility of individuals and flexibility of alliance. Groupings are ego-centred with a strong contractual element or they are explicitly associational. Kinship ties operate to provide a number of strong linkings patrilineal ties being associated with rights in land and affinal ties with a variety of rights in people. These ties constitute a network that is constantly changing as individuals create and break links in their movement through the life cycle, but also by conscious manipulation as shall be seen. Firstly, however, the above principles and groupings have to be integrated with the enduring and corporate village community as part of the same set of coherent structures.
The village Unit and Composition

The farming village is a cohesive local group which, surviving many generations, provides an identity for its members at least as important as that of descent although it is difficult to separate those two principles. An ordinary human being is called wuni Ka peth meaning 'man of the village'.

The farming village is compact and has well known and marked boundaries. It consists of a number of houses arranged along a street or occasionally a circular space. Each village settlement has its surrounds of fruit bearing trees, cottonwood and mango trees and an area of dense and untouched bush (known as am gbonko masam) where the secret societies meet. Villages also have a communal burial ground and a meeting place in the open (called Rofuta when a chief is present) and often situated under the mango trees which belong to the village collectively. Each village also has a village ancestor shrine (am boramasar), a well or watering place and either a mosque or a muslim prayer ground.

In Mabaibunda the first settler built a hut having tracked an elephant to the spot and killed it there. He then founded the settlement by 'carrying the fire' (ɔ kera a ɳant) from his village of origin. This man, the story runs, gave land and women to three subsequent settlers and the descendants of these four are known as an gboli or an lasar which might be translated as the 'citizens' /
Street, House and Household Plan of Mabaibunda Village.

Diagram 7

- Uninhabited House.
- Two huts of one household.
- Household identification for reference in text and diag.
'citizens' or the 'landowners' - they have the *bomp* of the village.

The composition of the village may be represented as a series of concentric circles with the outermost households being the most recently arrived. These subsequent settlers tend to establish themselves in the village using type (b) uxorilocal marriage. This combined with the norms and expectations of the Komang relationship creates a typical pattern of women moving outwards from the centre along lines that correspond with the internal power structure of the village. It is in the intermeshing of kin, affinal and territorial ties that the full significance of the important citizen-stranger dichotomy can be seen. The kin tie is only important when it is strategically placed within this stranger-citizen-village relationship.

Over time, marriage prohibitions prevent any further alliances between members of the same village (unless it has grown very large) and women tend to be exchanged between landowning cores of nearby villages and increased efforts made to attract new prospective husbands to settle in the village. Nearby villages will thus tend to be connected by affinal links between cores and distant villages by agnatic links made by those who have moved from one village to another. This pattern is naturally modified by circumstances. While the newly settling stranger may have high prestige in certain respects he will not be willing to subject himself /
Diagram 8. Village Composition.

Kin Ties between Villages.
Kinship and Household Composition of Mabaibunda.

Diagram 9

- Household
- Dead or absent kin.
- Disputed kin (absent or dead)
- Father-in-law to son-in-law
himself to a locally inferior Komang relationship. An example of this may be seen in the head of household 'L' (Diagram p. ) who is an exceptionally able Muslim and who has exploited certain relationships with the market-town acquiring considerable wealth and has supplied two wives to landowners in the village.

Village Institutions

Villages nowadays have two or three formal offices apart from the Kapr Chiefs (individuals within villages who may be selected to associate with a new Paramount Chief and whose duties are almost exclusively ritual). The nature of these other village institutions has been obscured because the protectorate and national administration have insisted on each village having a headman whose prime duty is to collect the annual tax from each male adult. The man who usually fills this colonially defined role is the most senior elder of the village, the 'primus inter pares' that the Temne refer to loosely as Ḟ bai. Ḟ bai in fact may refer to anyone who hears and adjudicates in a dispute settlement and is also the term used for the Paramount Chief.

Occasionally some other person in the village fulfills the headman role in which case he will be simply referred to as Ḟ headman, a title of low prestige; no more than a tax-collector.

The British also use the term Town-Chief, meaning the man responsible for the village to the Administration. Again this would /
would normally be the senior elder or 2 bai, although not necessarily. Thus the Headmanship and the Town-Chiefship may be occupied by different persons or may be synonomous.

The only remaining function is that of representation to the Chiefdom and this is fulfilled by the Santigi or Alimami. Again this title is normally held by the senior elder or 2 bai. Not all villages have a Santigi or an Alimami because they represent areas rather than villages. If the senior elder is not the Town-Chief, the Santigi may be the Town-Chief.

The village also has a town-crier who is normally a poor man who does the work as a form of charity acceptance since there is a slight income attached to it. It is his business to walk through the village making public any announcements. Any person may command his services along with a small payment but it has to be arranged through the Town-Chief. Announcements are usually to call a meeting of elders (ka gban3) and tell of decisions taken by the elder or of some event such as a theft and the measures liable to be taken against the thief if the goods are not returned, etc.

Within the village there are a number of secular societies which have an authority structure different from that of the village. Of these, the most important are the Compin the communal work groups formed for certain economic activities. 1

1 These traditional societies found in the Temne farming village are almost certainly related to the young men's companies found among the Freetown Temne as M. Banton describes (1957, p. 164).
Of these the Ka bɔtɔ is the most important and is made up of males for the digging and (scattering') of the heaps in rice farming. The village has several Ka bɔtɔ differing in size and age of its members. The largest Ka bɔtɔ in the village is made up of the young and supposedly strongest males and it works in turn on the farms of the members or of their fathers. Each farming compin has a chief (2 bai) and a number of other important offices. This office may rotate between heads of subdivisions of the group and no landowner is allowed to be chief of a Ka bɔtɔ. In fact membership of such a group is opposed in nature to membership of a village or household since it is thought of in strictly egalitarian terms where every member is equal to all others, and great organisational pains are taken to ensure equal rewards for equal effort. These work groups do have a certain continuity from one year to the next being on a peer group basis and some of them have recreational functions as well.

Temporary work groups based on some kind of rotating activity are quite commonly formed to accomplish some onerous task or to provide a rotating credit fund. These may be seen as variations on the basic theme of reciprocal help between pairs of people, neighbours or brothers that is commonly found in the village.

Citizens and Strangers

The important stranger-citizen relationship, found not only in the village but in larger scale structures has been briefly described /
Citizens have an ambiguous relationship towards strangers which is visible in the text on the coming of Islam to Mabaibunda (p. 297). Strangers are to be welcomed and provided for since they may bring goods, news, skills and possibly added manpower to add to the village community, and their strangeness and supernatural power are often feared. Such strangers, however, must be incorporated into the existing village structure, and thus dominated so that they accept their position as the latest arrivals in a community. This is because land tenure and political power depend firstly on longevity of settlement. Strangers should show full respect (Kas\textsubscript{©}\textsubscript{y\textsubscript{n}}\textsubscript{a} Kola - means to give this respect, since the gift of Kola nuts is a sign of respect and one expected of strangers) and not try to take an active part in public affairs except to show support for the landowners. The ability to speak well and independently is highly thought of and expected of chiefs and elders (\textit{\textsuperscript{o} tara\textsubscript{f\textsubscript{of}}} - 'he can speak' is high praise), but strangers should not do so and this is particularly true in the matter of the allocation of land or lodging rights. If a stranger pretends to have or exercise this right and make, for example, arrangements to take new arrivals under his wing in this manner he is heavily censored.

Strangers are not only those who have arrived within living memory.

---

1 Dorjahn and Fyfe, (1962).
memory but includes many who were actually born in the village, even some whose parents, or father, were born in the village. The important criteria for being categorised as a stranger is whether the individual can, or cannot, trace and produce evidence for a direct genealogical connection with an ancestor who was allocated land by the original landowner. A stranger will never move towards citizenship unless he commits himself to the village, that is, have all his dependants there and if possible build a house there. A non-stranger, of the *dure* and *lasare* categories will not have to beg for land every year since part of becoming a citizen is to make some kind of permanent arrangement for the tenure of farmland.

In fact the stranger-citizen dichotomy is never completely clear when it comes to labelling individuals, since they may succeed in moving along it especially if they are able to produce witnesses, by whatever means, to testify on their behalf in court. At a conceptual level, however, the dichotomy is clear.

The village as a community

The Temne concept of the village *Ka_peth* refers not only to an aggregate of persons but also the order inherent in what we mean by 'community'. The phrase *bumpa ka_peth* meaning literally to 'make or mend the village' refers to the establishing or re-establishing of harmony in the community after any serious internal dispute. Sacrifices to God or to the village ancestors may be made by the town-chief and elders on behalf of the whole village and some powerful swear medicines (e.g. a *gbaya of yabai*) can /
can 'catch' the whole village if one member has committed an offence. Thefts within the village are rare and it is not usual to find factions within the village.

Those villagers who are responsible for the maintenance of this moral order are the core members, the gboli or lasare. They may be compared with the household heads who are similarly responsible for the moral order of their households. The moral order, or harmony, of the village corresponds to the moral order of the universe and of the supernatural. The ingredients for this order, at least for the non-muslim, are all found within the village and its bush. The village has ancestors, local spirits and witches which may be approached with tools of swears, medicines and sacrifices all fashioned from materials available locally, many within the secret bush of the village. Together, all these elements make up a coherent structure which is not to be described here, but certain aspects are worth mentioning. Firstly, an important part is played by skilled practitioners that we would describe as 'witch-doctors' in English, man in Temne. Also it appears in fact that the group of landowners have special access to many of the weapons needed for the struggle in /

1 In one short walk through the Gbanj bush of Mabaibunda forty-two species of trees and shrubs were identified by one informant, each with some 'medicinal' use.
2 Some small parts of this structure have been described by J. Littlejohn (1960 a, 1960 b, 1967).
in the supernatural world in which every individual is engaged. The individuals who have access to many of the powerful medicines, particularly those owned by the secret societies, are the descendants of the first settlers, or are long settled in the village. Many of these medicines are made from leaves of plants found only in the sacred bush of the village to which access is denied to non-members. These higher ranked members of the secret societies are known collectively in Mabaibunda as a gbene and are all citizens of the village. Thus it is that those individuals with the highest degree of involvement in secular rights in land have the highest degree of involvement in the supernatural world involving the manipulation of local forces and agents. These are also associated with the bush and approached through the bush. Both activities are to do with the maintenance of the moral order and harmony of the village. Here we see most clearly the high degree of recognition given to the local segmentary village and household structure. Strangers and persons outside their home locality are obviously vulnerable to these forces and would be even more so were it not for the influence of Islam with its more direct and personal access to the interested supernatural power that is Allah.

The

1 This is it at some variance to descriptions by Dorjan (1959) and Dalby and Kamara (1964) but has been thoroughly checked in the Makeni area.
The village as a community may also be seen in two other areas of social action, the judicial and the economic. Briefly, traditional legal processes, still the most important in the farming village (excepting certain serious and rare offences which must be taken to a Government court) deal with two kinds of cases. Firstly, there are offences which are understood to be disturbing the peace of the village as a whole, which are liable to fine by the town-chief. If, for example, a man hits another man in public then any person may take him and his report of the action to the Chief and he will be fined. Such offences are called kasi and cover certain transgressions such as insulting behaviour, or cursing. Secondly, and quite separately, although the same action may be involved, there are cases in which one person brings an action against another for some harm he, or one of his household, have suffered. This dispute is known as amborana and the most commonly heard cases are to do with disputed rights over women and land. The action brought is heard first by a chief or senior elder of the village who is called bai and who, often in consultation with other elders decides on a suitable compensation to be paid. There are other disputes that are heard and decided within the household, it is said an butas am pa ka tonkla - 'they settle the case between [themselves]'. Breaches of the first kind are seen as a threat to the /
the village and if serious, say involving landowners, may have to be dealt with by an influential outsider who thus 'mends the village'. Proportionately very few cases originating in the village go outside the village but the Government courts are kept well filled because of the very litiginous nature of the people. Thus the authority structure of the village is in practice very important despite its strict illegality.

Within the village certain sentiments are considered ideal. Persons should help one another in economic activities and also provide food for any villager who happens to be in the house. There is also an ideal that frowns on villagers hiring labour from each other and there is in fact a high degree of non-monetary exchange within the village. Elders may take collective decisions concerning various farming activities that are binding on the whole village, such as, the initiation of the digging season using Ka b2t2 labour, the tethering of goats, the eating of the town mangoes, the cleaning of the well or the clearing of bush paths. It may well also decide that the price of rice being accepted by some farmers from visiting traders is too low and should be raised; or that every household should provide one pair of hands to clean up the paths on village land. There are not many cases of the control of market prices but it can happen.
The unity and prestige of the village is expressed vis-à-vis other villages at certain ceremonial occasions and at football matches, which last tend to be taken rather seriously. Village unity is likely to be expressed on the occasion of the installation of certain chiefdom officials when it is customary for a money collection to be given as prestation to the new official and a dancing and music team of entertainers to be sent to perform. Great pride is lavished on this team of performers, they may have special uniforms made for them and their performance is carefully compared with that of other villages. This also happens on the final day of Ramadan when a lantern building competition may be held and dancing teams compete. Football matches have less ceremonial although here again the players' uniforms are taken very seriously, but of course competition between villages is complicated by such strictly irrelevant matters as goal scoring and it is not uncommon for a chief to walk off the ground, with his players, in a huff.

Chiefship.

The ambiguous position of the Paramount Chiefs in Africa has been well documented. In terms of the high stability elements in chiefship this ambiguity derives from two popular views of the chief as the traditional representative of his people and, secondly, as a local administrator. The traditional structure /
structure will be described first.

Many farmers say that the institution of Paramount Chiefship will never die out because without such a chief people would not be frightened of anything (wuni o woni / amisam a tie o tie) and also that they would have no means of establishing subchiefs because access to the supernatural would be cut off (an lasar a masem). Despite their frequent complaints or accusations against the Chief they feel that the local moral order of the chiefdom would be disrupted. The traditional Paramount Chief is basically a ritual figure, a repository of supernaturally acquired power who opposes the forces that threaten to disrupt the chiefdom. The supernatural power enables him to dispense justice in secular disputes. He is rather a remote figure and maintains a distance from ordinary persons by various behavioural prohibitions and by surrounding himself with officials who mediate information flowing in and out of his office. The official known as Pa kapar masem, he who guards over the chief's supernatural activities is one of these. The Paramount chief is the guardian of rabai which means literally chiefship, and by extension, chiefdom. Rabai is invested symbolically in a number of objects, the sacred regalia which were kept in a special box by Pa Kapar Kuma, in particular the crown of chiefship which is a special head-dress placed on the chief's head at his investiture, but at no time seen by the chief himself. The /
The chiefship crown is supposed to rotate between the ruling houses, which are segments of the chiefly lineage of the chiefdom, in a set order on the death of each chief. In this succession the order of rotation follows the chronology of the splitting up of the original chiefs descendants, but a high degree of fiction is involved here. This may be seen simply in the preponderance of chiefdoms of four or eight chiefly lines which could hardly have come about by accident. Each line is associated with a different village and the lineage as a whole is sometimes said to be the landowners of the whole chiefdom, but in practice this is no more than a symbolic statement. The chiefly lineage and lines are different from the normal kinship structure of the rest of the population in that a corporate lineage does exist, genealogies often being traceable for six generations or more.

The individual who becomes Paramount Chief is supposed to sever most of his kinship obligations and assume the new title, office and personality of the chief, he becomes the 'father to all' in his chiefdom. He is talked of literally as being a completely changed person with the identity, name and powers of all his successors, of whom he is merely the latest incarnation.

On the death of each chief there is a period of interregnum during /

1 Apparently in former times when the Chief became old and sick his people would decapitate him. Now the head is not cut off until the chief is dead after which he is buried with the head of the previous chief which has been carefully kept by Pa Kapar Masam.
during which the selection process takes place. Although theoretically it is merely a question of deciding who has the right, in practice each line puts up a candidate and there is intense competition for the title, with the decision being made by the assembled Kapr chiefs of the chiefdom. The strict order of rotation is not adhered to. The ceremonies and prohibitions surrounding the selection and installation of the new Chief are lengthy and intricate,¹ but two main features may be mentioned here. Firstly, the installation of a Paramount Chief involves pressures and persons from outside the chiefdom, from the secret societies possibly from the area associated with the historical origin of the crown² and from nearby ritual experts, often Paramount Chiefs from neighbouring chiefdoms who supervise much of the ceremonial. Secondly, the chief to be undergoes a period of rigid seclusion, in Kantha (meaning a closed off space) in the bush, during which he is instructed in his duties and the law of the land. Here he is joined by a whole series of new Kapr Chiefs selected by him from all parts of his chiefdom and who become bound to him unto death by the powerful ritual association acquired in Kantha. These traditional Kapr chiefs, each one of which is associated with a particular ritual service to the Paramount, act for the rest of their lives as informers and messengers to maintain chiefly power in the area.

They /

¹ These have been adequately described by Turay (1939).
² All crowns in Temneland are of foreign, that is, stranger origin. Most of them as in Makeni-Gbanti are ascribed to Bai Farma the legendary Fula warrior.
They serve him in secrecy and the group of Kapr Chiefs elected together function in many ways as a secret society headed by the Paramount Chief.¹

This secrecy contrasts with the Alimami chiefs with their subordinate Santigi Chiefs who are to an extent independent from the Paramount Chief, in fact the senior Alimami Chief may become more influential at times than the Paramount Chief. Santigi Chiefs are like the Kapr Chiefs in that they are personally appointed by their new Alimami Chief, a title that is inherited (plus selection); but unlike Kapr Chiefs in that they are not bound in secret association with their Alimami, that their general activities are 'open', associated with Islam and that their office is more bureaucratically organised. It is probably for these reasons that the Protectorate Administration has incorporated the Alimami and Santigi Chiefs into the structure of local administration as Section and Town-Chiefs respectively.

The Paramount Chief is a 'father to his people' and in fact one can see many connections between the two institutions. All fathers are responsible for the order within their family and this involves them in the manipulation of supernatural powers just as the Chief is on behalf of his chiefdom. The Chief is a rather aloof and remote person and is not to be approached directly /

¹ Some Paramount Chief's even have their own secret spirit (krifi) which may 'come out' on occasion.
directly. The Chief must be concerned for his people, help them materially in times of need, dispense hospitality and sympathy (and money) to the bereaved. Since he 'feeds' them in this way he also has the right to ask them to work on his farm, so most adult males in the Chiefdom put in a day's work per year. A chief must be aware of most significant events in his chiefdom and be able to speak persuasively in reconciling disputants who bring their cases to him.

The most important activity and duty of the chief lies in his power to adjudicate and to do so in a gentle way, by bringing the disputants to a common agreement. Another part of the chief's regalia is the elephant tail whisk called amposse which symbolises his power to adjudicate. The chief acts as an appeal court or as an arbitrator generally, although there are a few offences that directly concern his mosem and which he will punish, such as being bitten by a snake. The Chief has little direct power and resources of force with which to impose his rule. In fact in times of warfare, the fighting was often carried out under the command of a special 'war chief' while the Paramount Chief, or rather the 2Bai stayed at home. The Chief must also be very wary of the direct use of the little bureaucratically organised sanction he possesses. He must gain the respect of his people but he must do so by 'encouraging' them so that he and his people are in the ideal state which is known as /
As sa ba ampanin - 'we have one word'.

As well as his prime importance as judge and father to his people the Paramount Chief has to deal with outsiders, new arrivals and resident strangers in the chiefdom. Strangers who wish to have dealings in the Chiefdom must petition the chief (with the prestation known as ka lambe). This petition might be from a Fulani herdsman wanting grazing rights in the chiefdom or from a visiting trader. Important visitors are housed, fed and entertained by the Paramount Chief and he must be informed of all movements of such people into his area.

The Paramount Chief does not belong to a class apart from his people. Although he should maintain his ritual separation he should not, for example, accumulate wealth. Although he receives tribute, and sums of money, etc., this should be redistributed in his help to his people and hospitality to visitors. He should certainly not demonstrate his position by signs of affluence or conspicuous consumption. He should accept advice from those around him and be willing, especially initially, to be instructed in the true qualities of chiefship.

(4) The Town

The Market Town

Many of the high stability structures in the market town are the /
the same as those in the village. The household and kin structures for instance have obviously derived from them, although when we come to examine the low stability structures many differences will be seen. Some institutions, however, are quite different and relate to the market nature of the town, and these will be described here.

Makeni is 116 miles, most of it hard-surfaced, from Freetown. It occupies a central position in the Northern Province on the border between the hilly uplands and the flatter lowlands. It is these factors which have created the trade on which most small African towns have been built. There is no word in Temne for the 'market' and it is the trade of Makeni that carries with it a complex of institutions that justifies regarding it as a high stability structure in its own right.

An idea of the nature of the market town can be gained from the figures for occupational structure.¹

---

¹ From the 1963 population census of Sierra Leone.
7. Aerial Photograph of Makeni. Taken at 20,000ft.

1958.
FIGURE 7

Occupational structure of Makeni

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Nos. employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (crafts)</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, water</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Storage</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,920 = 23.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of total population of Makeni</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show the importance of commerce, craftsmanship, services and farming that are characteristic of very many towns of this size that correspond to G. Sjoberg's 'pre-industrial city'.¹ Such towns are a long-established feature of West Africa, but not found generally in the inland forest zone until more recently. In 1924 Migeod wrote:

³Makeni /

¹G. Sjoberg (1955).
Makeni is a busy place with large trade but it seemed ... regrettable that a new place like this should not have been laid out more systematically ....

The Makeni market is increasingly important now with its central position in a growing network of roads. Trade in Makeni is basically of two kinds. Firstly there are the major cash crops, of which the marketing of rice has already been described; secondly, a whole host of local products bought and/or consumed in the town from hinterland villages. There tends to be a clear distinction between trading with the outside area which is handled almost exclusively by the large expatriate or government organisations and the local trading which is handled on a much smaller scale by the local traders. As R.G. Saylor writes:

"African traders constitute an important link within the distributive chain, but they act primarily as agents of expatriate firms or sellers of local produce."^2

There is, in consequence very little trade between one area and the next within Sierra Leone (the exception is Freetown which is supplied by a very large hinterland).

Unfortunately the volume of the total trade and of the various kinds of trade is impossible to estimate.

**Market Institutions**

In Kenema town it is reported that one in thirteen inhabitants /

---

inhabitants are licensed hawkers or traders and the impression in Makeni is that the situation is the same there. Makeni has a large central covered market, run by the town council, a number of other small nuclei along the main roads where temporary stalls are set up, as well as the large number of hawkers who go tramping from door to door or out into the farming villages. It has been customary for traders to pay a tax to the local chiefs but this function has now been assumed by the town council which organises the market-place, its hygiene and allocation of stalls, etc. The market-place traders are mostly women and they occupy different areas of the market according to what they are selling. It is characteristic for these women to co-operate together in savings clubs and in purchasing from other traders or producers. All around the central area are the small stalls of the African storekeepers mostly selling goods bought from the Lebanese and Indians who have much larger shops in the central area. Further out are the work-places of the artisans, shoemakers, bakers, goldsmiths, carpenters, etc., and also the vehicle service and petrol stations - these are run by the large oil companies of which there are five in Makeni.

Essential to the operation of the modern African market is the fleet of local lorries, small buses and taxis which are based in the town and bring produce, goods and customers in and out.
out. This activity centres around the lorry park which was recently completed and the lorry drivers, owners and their apprentices have a loose organisation which centres on the lorry drivers' union which leads a spasmodic existence. The market and the lorry park are very important in the political organisation because this is where people meet, exchange news, rumours and plans. It is also important because it enables news to travel much faster within the area as farmers return to their village and are immediately asked 'what news at Makeni'. Political news from all areas of the country, particularly Freetown arrives first at the market-place, this is all very important in the absence of other national news media. It is thus essential for any man of influence in the area to live near, or have contacts in the market.

In addition to the traders making up the bulk of the market there are a number of persons whom I call specialists. This is because they can only operate where there are large concentrations of people as they are not needed very often. Any market is likely to attract a number of these ritual specialists, healers, entertainers, radio repair men, sword makers, ivory carvers, owners of tipper lorries for hire and Arabic teachers, etc.

The Makeni market is highly personalised; the operations of the trader are based on personal face-to-face contacts rather than on book-keeping bureaucratic methods. In fact very few local /
local traders keep books of any description. The efficiency with which a trader can operate and the ability of potential clients to get the most for their money is highly dependant on their knowledge of the market and its traders and the quality of their network of relationship with the market. Given this context it is easier to understand why the illiterate farmers coming into Makeni to make purchases, or find a specialist, need someone who can help them in town and preferably somebody with knowledge and influence.

There are three other organisations which use Makeni as a centre for the buying of primary products. These are the Rice Corporation, the Produce Marketing Board and the Tobacco Company. The Produce Marketing Board buys some palm kernel but its marketing operations are very limited in the Makeni area, there being no cocoa and little coffee there. The tobacco Company is, as yet, operating on a small scale with a small number of individual producers, the crop is a new one to the area and is too recent to have had much effect on the economy of the area. The Rice Corporation both sells and buys rice in the Makeni area but is hampered by a very inflexible buying price and does not usually buy much. Individuals may apply to the /

---

Since leaving, however, I have heard that with the rising prices of rice on the world market the importing of rice is no longer profitable. This would almost certainly restrict the Corporations operations in Makeni to the selling of a certain amount of rice, grown elsewhere in the country, at the beginning of the rainy season.
the Rice Corporation to become their official selling agents and this is a very profitable operation during the rainy season. Usually some 'pull' is needed to be given a quota of the imported rice to sell at this time.

Wealth and Stratification

One would expect an increasing degree of stratification in the market-town structure. Certainly it appears to be true that in the market-town we find a new category of wealthy individuals who acquire influence and accumulate wealth in new ways. However it is not clear that these persons are any more than a category in the sense that there is restricted mobility at the boundaries.

Wealth is highly regarded in Makeni and it is also recognised and visible. In a study of influentials and influence in Makeni, Simpson found that the criterion of wealth ranked above that of occupation, chiefly family and travel abroad as a measure of influence, by a very large margin. The new stratification based on wealth is different from the stratification in the farming village based on land ownership and successfully claimed descent. Almost all wealth in the market-town (ignoring the administrators and wage earners) is gained by trading, few craftsmen become wealthy. A Makeni trader who is successful is likely to have a large, well-built house of painted cement, a large compound, his own /

1 Simpson, 1969.
own transport and to take considerable pride in his wealth. It is said such a man has money, he is wuni bana Ka ajkalaka - 'a big man of money' - and he is liable to have, and exercise, considerable political influence although this does not come automatically. Thus one can usually identify wealthy persons of high prestige who are not landowners, but in what sense do they form a social class or stratum?

Firstly, although they are visible they do not cut themselves off socially. In fact the wealthy trader takes care to maintain his popularity. Although they build fine houses, these houses are found dispersed over the whole town, near their kinfolk rather than another wealthy trader. As I have said the wealthy trader does not cut himself off from poorer people but attempts to become their personal benefactor. He is usually saddled with helping many of his 'brothers' who come to live with him and his neighbours are always asking him to help them. A wealthy man's origins are not important, nor how he acquired his money; the category of wealthy traders is openly recruited and acts as a lure to many men to come to town and make their own fortune.

The successful traders may be seen as a new local elite - that set a certain style of life based on achievement and that are imitable and of high prestige.

Political /
Political Institutions

With rapid expansion of the local market and the urban settlement since the war, the town has developed certain political institutions to control these aspects. The town councils, which have already been discussed (p. 60) are primarily concerned with the building and maintaining of various market facilities, the market itself, the slaughterhouse, the lorry part, secondary streets and street lighting, licensing of various kinds and with activities to do with additions to the settlement, rates, planning permission, land purchase, etc. The Town Council handles substantial amounts of money and receives a good proportion of its revenue from government grants-in-aid. The Town Council has 13 members (with a majority of elected members) and it meets once a month. The Town Council has political power in that members can use their influence in council to benefit their clients. Councillors are elected from among the urban non-traditional elite described above and it is thus a new political institution associated with the market-town.

Also closely associated with the market town are the local branches of the National political parties, each of which maintain offices in the town. The local branches have at times become very important in the local political structure, mainly because of their connections with National influentials. Membership of the /
the local party executive carries with it power in the selection of official party candidates to the town council and House of Representatives.

In the market-town are found a great variety of associations, far more than in the rural areas, almost every social division within the town having an association of some kind. What societies have in common are, firstly, social gatherings which are at least partly recreational and, secondly, a regular or contingent fund by subscription or contribution by members. Now, few of these associations have overtly formal political functions but nearly all of them carry some political weight and are made use of by local influential. The political 'function' of voluntary associations has been well documented for West Africa and the use of them by local influential will be seen in subsequent sections.

**Islam in Makeni**

It is in the market-town that the centres of Islamic teaching and learning are situated. Islam and trade have, of course, long been associated in West Africa and certain aspects of Moslem beliefs and way of life are intimately bound up with the urban situation. Proselytizing activities by Moslems in the Makeni area have often been initiated by 'pure' Moslems living in the town.

---

1 The complete list of Associations found in Makeni are to be found in Appendix III
2 K. Little - 1965.
town and there are several Al-Hajis (those who have demonstrated their faith by undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca) with houses there also. This process is still going on as literate Moslems in town carry the faith, called an dina into the rural hinterland, set up groups of Karande in the villages and talk against the power of the secret societies, etc.

Islam has been associated with the increased stratification of Society and the ideals of patronage may well be seen as reflected in the relationship between the individual and Allah in Islamic thought. Islamic culture in fact provides what may be seen as the 'High' culture (associated with the urban elite) that is characteristically opposed to the 'low' pagan culture.

A number of crafts found in the market-town are associated with Moslems; tailoring, metal-working (except iron) and cloth dyeing. There is a Moslem School which has recently been approved by the Government, other non-recognised 'schools' and many informal groups of karande learning from Arabic scholars.

The concepts embodied in even the local form of Islamic doctrine provide for situations in town where strangers meet strangers. It is said that 'If one is a Moslem one may travel anywhere without fear' and in the context of trade and traders this is obviously quite important.

The town expresses its unity at the supernatural level in the /

1 See H.H. Miner.
the single, rather fine mosque that has recently been built with funds collected from all members of the congregation. On the eve of Ramadam it is filled, and the streets around it, with townspeople, whether citizens or strangers, rich or poor, pledging themselves to the month long sacrifice. The town also has members and organisers of the National Muslim Congress and the Muslim Brotherhood in it, which are concerned with the promotion of Islam. In the market one often meets wealthy traders from Guinea who regard themselves as being devout and pure Moslems surrounded by Pagan Southerners.

**The Urban way of life**

The general recognition of the market-town structure is manifest most clearly in a generally found conception of town life compared to rural life as expressed in the somewhat perjorative concept of 'bush'. Farmers talk of the town as a place where there is no moral order, where people are unscrupulous, where one is liable to be attacked and robbed in the streets and the forces of law and order are unlikely to respond to normal humanitarian appeals. It is a place where one does not let one's wife go out in the evening 'collecting debts' since she will almost certainly be visiting a lover with influential friends. Few farmers wish to spend the night in town unless they have a good contact who will protect them in the complexity of town life.
life. At the same time, and particularly among the younger ones, the town is looked up to as an exciting place where great entertainment may be had and expensive goods stared at, where learned Arabic Scholars live and teach and the great diesel lorries from Freetown come to a halt and passengers, cloths, fine goods and news are unloaded. For them, it is a place where skills and friends may be acquired which will be a passport to the good life of wealth and power. It is a dangerous place.

The townspeople, on the other hand are aware of their own way of life in contrast to the boredom and poverty they see in the farming village. They may well visit the village but will not want to stay there for long and few of them think in terms of returning to a village in their dotage; 'we can't live there for very long' they say in sympathy with my one year stay in a small farming village. They are aware that they have grown out of the bush way of life and look down on the credulous farmer who cannot sign his name.

The majority of town residents send their children to school for at least some of their childhood and place great emphasis on education, regarding it as natural. Whereas the farmer, although he may send some of his children to school, regards it as exceptional and is aware that even a few years' education is liable to mean that his son will not return to work in the village, but go and live in the Town.
The Concept of raputu

There is a conception of the white man and his works embodied in the Temne term *raputu* (literally - 'things of the white man') which corresponds approximately to our term civilisation and which for the Temne is located in the somewhat remote, yet all important, Freetown Government with its local agencies. The Administration I am concerned with here is a complex of institutions to which individuals become committed, as with the other two structures I have been describing, but it does differ from them in that it is not territorially discreet, it is dispersed, intermingled. There is no reason why a complex of high stability structures should have its 'members' living and working next to each other. The Administrators have the power and organisation to maintain a separate way of life in Sierra Leone although they represent around 0.4% of the population (compared to approximately 15% for townspeople). The economic basis of the market town is obvious, but that of the Administrators is the National Revenue of the Government based on taxation, duties and aid, so that Administrators are earning from £800 per annum upwards. The difference between this secure salary and the average income of the non-administrators lies behind the whole of the Administration complex of institution.
In this section I can only draw from my experience of the Administrators in Makeni when describing their way of life, but since Administrators are very mobile I assume it to be fairly representative, although even if it were not, it would not affect my formal analysis of the Makeni area.

**The Administrative Bureaucracy**

The National Government administrators by means of a network of Administrators, offices and employees in the major market towns. Makeni, the Provincial Headquarters has about 200 administrators of Grade I upwards (including their dependants) which form a floating population of well-educated and segregated persons with a primary allegiance to Freetown. The Government controls, through these people, funds, power and employment opportunities that are very important in the town. This contrasts with a comparative paucity of a local 'grass roots' network of agents and law enforcement bodies which could carry out every policy decision emanating from Freetown.

The Administration consists of a number of interlocking bureaucracies which possess the same form as the Protectorate Administration of the 50's. This bureaucracy is the single largest employer of educated persons in Makeni and in the country generally. I can think of only one individual in Makeni with university education, a doctor, who was not in government employ.
The majority of secondary school leavers also look to the Administration for employment, and 60% of wage earners are thus employed. Furthermore, the vast majority of building capital expenditure projects in the country are Government financed.

In Makeni are found the Provincial and District offices for the Northern Province and Bombali District. Associated with the Provincial Office headquarters is the Police Headquarters for the North. The Public Works Department, the Health Service, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Co-operative Department, the Library, Veterinary Department, Prison, Judiciary, Water and Electricity Corporation, Rice Corporation, Produce Marketing Board and Barclays Banks all maintain offices and establishments in Makeni and in other towns in the North. As soon as one leaves the town, however, there is no sign of their activities or pressure except for the Produce Marketing Board plantations along some of the main roads, a very few forestry plantations and one veterinary post.

The Administrative structure then is highly centralised in the area and the Administrators themselves are rarely to be seen outside the town; thus those who have dealings in any way with the Administration must either live in Makeni or visit it. Again the police are very few in number (about 140 in Makeni which is the headquarters and main force) and they have relatively meagre/
meagre transport resources.

The Bureaucracy is more than a set of rules, procedures and symbols in Sierra Leone for it is closely identified with the concept of Nation and it is obviously incoherent with the town and village institutional complexes. In many senses the National State of Sierra Leone is the Administrative bureaucracy, it has little reality outside of this. In the Makeni area, when non-administrators use the term Sierra Leone it means Freetown, as Conakry means Guinea, and the term Freetown means the 'Government', 'them' as opposed to the Temne name for the settlement Rookiamp (the place of the camp).

The Administrators

The crucial criterion for recruitment to Administration is an advanced level of education. Education is a weapon in the hands of the elite and is seen as such, both by them and aspirants. The education system is geared to producing small numbers of well-trained persons, and there are signs that incipient overproduction of potential members to the Administrative elite will result in a cutting back on education expenditure. The high levels of income, the methods of recruitment, scale of operation (i.e. at National level) and power of the civil servants mark them and their dependants off as a very distinct group both in the country as a whole and in the town of Makeni.
Administrators look to Freetown as their source of security and all recruitment and placement is handled from Freetown. Freetown is the place where Administrators want to be and many of them have houses there even when not resident in the capital. Administrators tend to be moved around every few years and to do a lot of travelling. They normally live in definite and discreet settlement areas; in Makeni along Teko road and on the north side of Masum Hill on the south side, in Government housing and this means that relative to the local town they are strangers.

Thus, although, by the very 'raison d'etre' of his job and social identity the Administrators have to have, and develop, contacts with the townspeople and villagers, they have little incentive to invest more permanently in Makeni social relationships. Their source of security lies in Freetown, it is from there that their authority emanates and it matters relatively little which particular up-country town they work in, the main criterion of a good post being the distance by road from Freetown.

Part of the process of recruitment to the Administration involves at least a period of stay in Freetown where the higher education or training should take place and many contacts and friendships are made. Along with the important ties established at secondary school, each Administrator has a network of personal national friends which enables the class of Administrators to maintain cohesiveness. In addition to the ramifying personal ties /
ties of this kind, that cut across boundaries of ethnic origin, there is the particular style of living shared by Administrators that is identified with them.

The Administrator's way of life

Administrators are committed to a certain style of living. This style renders them immediately recognisable in that they wear Western style clothing (although the native gara shirt, which has become a sort of national costume, is acceptable) often suits, and invariably travel by car, either their own or a Government vehicle with a driver. The favourite pose is outside the office, or their home, talking seriously through a car window and a frequent conversation opener is a reference to the state of the car.

They live in Makeni, as in all up-country towns, in civil service housing, European style, and their households are conspicuously small and empty looking. Their wives are mostly educated and dispense hospitality of an official kind. Administrators' houses are open to everyone but they tend to stick to their own kind for recreation and social gatherings. Administrators in fact foster a degree of social distance from non-Administrators, they act exclusively.

Administrators have their own associations. In Makeni the Tennis Club and the Red Cross are the most typical. The Red Cross
Cross, which tends to be run by the wives of Administrators, is overtly paternalistic in nature and its functions (such as bazaars) are exclusive affairs. The Tennis Club uses the court built on the hill beside the Provincial Commissioner's house, and is frequented most afternoons outside working hours.

Administrators place a very high value on educating their children and make considerable sacrifices to send them to the best schools in Freetown. They tend to express attitudes toward family and marriage that have been described for African elites in general, that of marriage for love and mutual support with a greater emphasis on personal relationship, etc. Marriages are also monogamous and with a fair degree of inter-ethnic unions. Makeni Administrators, with their greater cultural sophistication and sets of loyalties, express a great deal of interest in the state of the Nation but tend to be publicly neutral to party political activity.

In short the style of life is such that its 'modern' and 'civilised' character is made plain to all along with the concomitant attitudes towards marriage and nation.

Christianity and Administration

Strongly associated with their education and way of life is the Administrators' commitment to the Christian religion. While a number of individuals in Makeni who are not Administrators are in /

in fact Christian, the Christian Church and congregation is strongly associated with the imitable group of administrators and their Western way of life. Christianity is normally acquired at school and to have an education is to have also accepted, even if temporarily, the Christian faith. Attendance at Sunday School is for sons and daughters of Administrators in Makeni and it is perhaps significant that there are no breakaway sects such as are commonly found among non-elite Christians in Freetown and other towns of littoral West Africa. The connection between education, Administration and Christianity originated of course in the conditions of Imperialism, but has been strongly maintained by the Creoles who until recently comprised the majority of Administrators.

Christianity appears not only to be the group religion of the Administrators, but the values encouraged in a bureaucratic organisation are, if we follow Weber, to be reinforced by the Christian ethic of work, the nature of individual salvation and of duty. However, it would be dangerous to reason too far along these lines because in other towns in Sierra Leone, particularly in the South, the cleavages in religious allegiance do not follow the cleavages between the Administration and the Town and Village. There, to be a Christian is not necessarily to aspire to become a white man.

Attitudes /
Attitudes to Administration

I have already shown how townspeople and villagers recognise each other's way of life as being radically different from their own. This is a characteristic of high stability structures in contact and may be seen in attitudes to and from Administrators as well.

At one level the village farmers accept political domination by some kind of elite. The traditional concept of the overlord is a benign yet stern protector who will give them strength in their enterprises, adjudicate their civil disputes and exact tribute from them. Very many of the farmers still see the Administration as a body of rulers who should conform to this ideal but who in fact have 'gone wrong'. Particularly important here is the wealth and social distance maintained by Administrators. Literacy and book-keeping skills must have its rewards, the farmers admit, but the Administrators are thought to have gone too far and have not only got themselves rich at the farmers' expense, but are no longer approachable by personal petition.

While the farmers are not generally aware at all of the complexity and structural differentiation of the Administration they recognise the completely different way of life associated with it. In fact the farmers treat and regard Administrators as they do Europeans, that is with respect and wariness for the strange and deference for the powerful. Administrators are thought /
thought to be very clever and with access to the special power that comes with 'book learning'. They realise that it would be possible for one of their sons to become a respected Administrator and that this would help them, but also that if this took place they would have lost that son to an alien culture.

Farmers, have no, or very little, direct contact with the Administrators; occasionally an agricultural officer might visit a village or a health inspector pass through, but they are more normally seen flashing past inside a shiny car. However, the poorest farmer is fully aware of the possible efficacy of petition to Administrators, usually the District Officer or his Assistant. These people are seen as a check on the power of Chiefs or on victimisation by local politicians and this may be effective because of the relative independence and authority of the Administrators. Such appeals, however, can only be effective through the right kind of intermediary, somebody to 'carry the reason' (ye ansabo). Administrators cannot be approached directly by someone of non-influence and are best approached by somebody with knowledge and experience of the Administration. Direct contact is thus rare, and although farmers are aware of the power and importance of the Administration they are relatively ignorant of the nature of the bureaucracy and its functionings.

Many of these attitudes obtain also between the townspeople and /
and the Administrators although there is considerably less uniformity in town. Many of the townspeople have had experience of employment and contact with members of the Administration. Town influentials may well be considerably involved with local Administrators. Townspeople generally have a very much better understanding of the workings of the Administration, conditions of employment, etc. They tend to see the Administration as a source of labour opportunities and amenities. Even if not employed by the State anyone wishing to build a house in town, open a stall in the market or run a local taxi will come up against the formalised sets of rules and regulations that are absent in the villages. Townspeople also pay rates and receive piped water and electricity supplies, if they can afford it.

At the same time, because of the much greater degree of contact and interdependence between Townspeople and Administrators, the disparity in income and social segregation, maintained by the Administrators, is far more important to the townspeople than to the villagers. The levels of aspiration and recognition of social strata are much higher in town and are manifested in the way almost all children of Townspeople are sent to school at some stage. The Administrators are a visible representation to the townspeople of the greater opportunities to be found in urban settlements as opposed to the 'bush'.

In /
In most other ways the Townspeople share the villager's attitudes towards the Administration. The town, founded on trade, must have a political and military stability over a wide area to be successful and this is what the Freetown Government and its personnel provide. So they are seen also as protectors and overlords. However, whereas to the farmer, the administrators are a patronising group who have 'gone wrong', not fulfilling all the ideals of patronage, to the town person they are also employers who are liable to be unfair in the distribution of opportunity and wages.

**Attitudes from Administrators**

The Administrators have a generally paternal attitude to both town and village although they distinguish fairly rigidly between the two, on the 'bush' - 'not bush' dichotomy. Administrators see themselves as proponents of progress, pointing the way and being the means. They not only represent modernity and progress but know themselves to be the instruments by which it will come about. Townspeople and farmers are seen as being the chief obstacles to progress because of their narrow-minded visions and customs. 'These people spend all their energies in fighting each other' is the sort of criticism they voice.

Despite this attitude, the Administrators do have a respect for certain aspects of village life, not only because many of them come originally from villages, but because the village represents all /
all that is 'African'. Although Administrators practice and aspire towards Western styles and customs they realise that they are not in fact Europeans. Thus the 'good' folk aspects of the village tend to be admired. The attitude is ambiguous, farmers are also ... 'too suspicious: if you try to help them whatever you set up is liable to fail because they would rather quarrel with themselves than co-operate over it'. Townspeople are less bush, therefore less suspicious and secretive, but associated with the town are the evils associated with the breakdown of village morality; immorality, rowdyism among the young, crime and mob politics.

Attitudes between pious Muslims and Administrators I know less about, but they do not have much to do with each other in Makeni, each has their own concepts of progress that have little to do with the other. Building a mosque and building a church in a town may appear to be similar undertakings, but the different procedures illustrate the differences between the Town and Administration. When a Muslim congregation decides to build a mosque, and every congregation is judged by the quality of its mosque, it is seen and organised as an effort to which every member should contribute. The dignitaries of the congregation, headed by the Al Hadjis open a fund, with Arabic book-keeping, and the mosque is started. It will probably take some years to complete and members of the congregation contribute labour and materials.

There /
There may be some particular Muslim influentials who will contribute large amounts of money and they are remembered and praised for this. The collection of funds proceeds in a rather traditional way so that at special meetings money is handed over with speeches and blessings by all present to the benefactor. Just as a sum of money might be collected in this manner to be presented to a person undergoing 'rites de passage', so God is honoured likewise. The churches, on the other hand, are built by the corporation of local Christians with an established church or missionary society. The organised churches have connections and therefore funds from their parent bodies outside the country. The churches are built, usually very early on in the life of the congregation, with these funds and are usually associated with a school run by the Church. People would not collect amongst themselves to build a prestigious shrine for their congregation, it is rather that the shrine is built by prestigious people and in so doing, a congregation is created. The building of the church is not an honour paid to God but rather a symbol of an elite way of life to come.

It is in these complexes of attitudes as well as the visible symbols of dress and the verbal symbols of terms that the degree of mutual recognition of the high stability structure of Administration, Town and Village may be seen.
1. Introduction

The high-stability structures are constructed on the status positions, and provide the institutional basis of constraints and incentives acting on the individual. In this section I wish to examine the patterns of behaviour that result from choices made by individuals, acting within these constraints and incentives, and which I have considered to be crucial to what we call social change. These generated patterns are obviously very many in number, and thus only a very few are actually presented here.

It has been assumed that it is in the nature of the relationship between these structures that the most rapid social change processes are likely to be seen. The generated patterns I am particularly interested in are those arising out of action oriented to the attainment of security, wealth and political power for individuals in so far as the behaviour is involved in the relationship between the three high stability structures. Those generated patterns which cannot be related to the relationship between high-stability structures (for example the generated structures of lineage group fission due to sibling rivalry in the traditional /
traditional farming village, or the particular expectations of both sides within an employer-employee relationship of the Administration) tend to be consistent with, or irrelevant to, the integrated complexes of high-stability institutions.

**Generated patterns**

The relationships between these structures are divided into three types. Firstly, the relationship due to the movement, or attempted movement, of individuals from one of the three structures to another. Secondly, there is the behaviour patterns of individuals who exploit intermediary positions between structures in an entrepreneurial fashion. Thirdly, the direct effects of one structure on another due to the action of members of one structure acting on constraints and incentives originating in another structure but which involves no movement by him across structural boundaries.

Entrepreneurs are seen as having two sub-types, the purely economic entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs who deal in influence and power and often economic goods and services as well. Finally, the generated structures thus presented will be shown as giving rise to the general development of rural-urban institutions. This development is seen as the most significant political change taking place involving the growth of regionalism, intermediate scale political units and structures within the nation.
2. The Movers

Migration

There is an enormous amount of population movement in Sierra Leone, quite apart from the visits that relatives and friends make to each other, and the patterns of these movements are considerably more complex than the simple rural to urban pattern that arouses so much comment. Migration to the Diamond Area is much less frequent than it was in the late 50's and it also has a seasonal character, but there is also a considerable movement into local towns, from one town to another and from one rural area to another. Here I am concerned with the movement between high-stability structures and here there is a constant tendency for an upward movement from village to town and town to Administration. Movement in this sense means or includes a social mobility as well as a geographical movement. An adequate description of movement across structural boundaries must cover the conditions of departure and arrival since these inevitably accompany the movement itself.

Village to Town

Young men undoubtedly emigrate from farming villages all over this area as can be seen from the 1963 census figures for the District but by and large only a few of them try their luck in Makeni, they go mostly to areas where there are better work opportunities /
opportunities. Nevertheless, they leave with the intention of living and working in the town, with the goal eventually of earning enough money to build a house and trade. Many move to a place such as the Diamond Area with the intention of making good and building a house and raising a family in Makeni. Many have indeed succeeded in doing so, many of the new houses in Makeni having been 'built on diamonds' as they say. This attraction of the town to young men often starts from contact with the young 'lorry boys' they see riding cockily on the backs of lorries through the villages and who are serving as driving apprentices to the driver. The free, exciting and remunerative life of these lorry boys makes them an idol for many village lads. Young men also desire to escape the strict parental control, to escape from trouble in the village - often disputes over women - and also desire to see the world and experience the town with cash in the pocket. Even if they fail in their ambitions they can almost certainly return to the village with some money and use this and their broader knowledge and experience to re-establish themselves there.

It is easy enough for a young man to leave the village to seek wage labour; but even granted that he finds a job (the competition is tough - urban unemployment running very high) he has by no means succeeded in joining the urban structure that he /
he aspires to. To achieve security in town means building a house and a family and this may be very difficult indeed. Makeni, as with other towns, is full of half and quarter built houses and large numbers of people are living in the town who are still trying to establish themselves there. A typical case was of one lad in Mabaibunda who was a farmer when I met him with a wife and two children. He had originally come from a farming village and spent some years in the Diamond Area and married a town-woman. However, he had never succeeded in accumulating enough capital and his woman turned out, as with many town women, to be lazy and disobedient so he returned to live with his uncle in a farming village leaving his first wife behind.

These returned labourers come back to the farming villages with a broadened outlook, a knowledge of Krio (the lingua franca), and experience of quite different social organisations than the older farmers who have not travelled at all.

As I have outlined above, the wage labourer who has managed to accumulate some money then faces the next hurdle of establishing himself with some security in town in order to complete his movement from Village to Town. This is obviously quite difficult to /

1 This type of migration obviously contrasts with much of the labour migration in, say, East Africa where the migrant has a clear intention of returning to the village. Migrants from boliland villages have no intention of returning if they can help it.
to do although one is always meeting those attempting to do so. If we look at the origins of house-owners in Makeni we find the majority of them were either born or raised in town as against the rest of the population of which the opposite is true. An examination of the length of stay of Makeni residents shows that about 43% of adults have been there five years or less although over this period the population has risen by only 5 - 6%. This would indicate a considerable floating population of immigrant-emigrants many of whom apparently come from other towns. This large proportion reflects the difficulty experienced in successfully joining the urban structure. Many of the floating population are persons and families who have no house of their own and who are struggling to make good in Town. They have high unemployment, they tend to live off relatives and friends and some of them simply do not have the ability to accumulate the wealth necessary to arrive in Town. They are therefore liable to be highly mobile when compared to the rest of the population and may well return to the Village from whence they came originally.

FIGURE /

1 My figures show - Born in town 37% ) houseowners
Raised in town 20% )
FIGURE 8

Length of Residence in Makeni of Adult members of Household

February 1968

For those born in Town, increased security is often seen to be within an administrative position, or as an office worker or Secondary School teacher. All these jobs require at least secondary education and education is seen as the way to get on and earn a really good salary. Education and mobility from Town to Administration go together. Just as every villager sees the lorry drivers with their boys leading an attractive life and handling good money, so the lorry driver sees the bank clerk or District /
District Officer handling a European style wage and acquiring enormous prestige. In the towns upwards mobility begins with entrance into a secondary school and this involves years of study and battling with relatives to pay school fees before this can happen. Since they have no means of earning money to pay for their school fees schoolboys have no security and many fail to complete their studies. However, because of the decreasing opportunities for the ever larger numbers of school leavers, unless they can continue at University they face great difficulties in finding a job in which they can use their literacy. One of the less favoured positions a school leaver might be forced to take is that of primary school teacher.

The moves from Town to Administration thus has considerable problems both in departing and in arriving.

Migrants and Politics

It is postulated that these two categories of persons, the young men trying to join the town and the young men and women trying to join the Administration (that is, those people who are searching for social security through mobility) are particularly susceptible to political appeal by opposition influentials. Both of these groups are partially organised, the teachers and other junior workers, such as technicians, plantation overseers, etc., in their unions and the young migrants and seasonal movers in the /
the semi-secret associations to be found in the town. These
associations, such as the Mambo or the Dje appear to have degrees
of membership with some of the inner and older members acting as
patrons to the ranks of lower grade members. The Mambo, for
example, at the lower grades is chiefly recreational in character
and parades with dancers, musicians and its 'devils' around the
town on important occasions. Those who parade are the 'young
men' and as such are associated with certain political sentiments
and activities. Any parade tends to be interpreted on both
sides as a show of force and the Mambo carries with it a power
and authority over the street down which it passes. Everyone
else gets out of the way, the parading members act as if they
had found some special authority and license, which in face they
have. It was these same individuals who after one change in
Government paraded in joy through the streets, laying bedraggled
palm trees (the defeated party symbol) under the paths of oncoming
cars. Later, it was the same persons who in Makeni formed a mob
that attacked various local 'big men' who were supposed to have
treated the young men badly in the past. The names of various
local /

1 See Appendix IV for a complete list of voluntary associations
found in Makeni.
2 The political role of 'young men' has been briefly described
by M. Kilson in his section which deals with 'populist'
political movements often referred to by Administrators as
'disorders'. In this chapter M. Kilson sees a radical opposi-
tion between 'mass' populism and the political elite. In
terms of attitudes prevalent in the Makeni area I feel that
this is a distortion. As explained previously, farmers and
townspeople generally do not object to an elite as such; they
do object to an elite whose members do not fulfil the ideals
of the patron-client relationship.
local influentials were connected with these groupings of young men, both inside and outside the secret society itself. These young men not only have these formal and semi-formal institutions in the town, but because of the seasonal or intermittent movers among them and the connections many have with their kin recently left behind, their influence extends well into the hinterland of Makeni. These contacts and influences were used by political campaigners in the 1907 general elections. The young men, the uncommitted and those who have the desire to achieve security in town but don't succeed, are among the most mobile of persons and moving between town and country they are an effective element in the co-ordination of political activity and sentiment.

Those involved in moving from Town to Administration are, of course, much less numerous in Makeni than the young men and are also more restricted politically being in Government employ. This category of social migrant has two basic paths of opportunity, he may use the path of higher education, or as will become clearer in later sections, he may choose to attempt a political career. Because of the difficulties of entering the Administration through education (described above) this category as a whole tend to be discontented with the status quo, the power of the establishment, etc. These persons tend to be most active in the local political party organisation and the voluntary associations to which /
which they belong tend to be involved in party politics also. Such persons, in trying to join the Administration are not operating in local terms, the Administration is a National body. They, having had at least some education, have some understanding of bureaucratic methods and this together with their nationalist orientation makes them natural party organisers, a position which might also provide them with the opportunity they need in the form of a political career. The most coherent association of such persons in Makeni is the Teacher's Union which has many members who are active politically and which as a body tends to support opposition policies.

Both categories of social migrants tend to be manipulated by Politicians and Influentials who organise them as local pressure groups. It is especially the social migrant, in his transitory state of insecurity, who is most susceptible to promises of change, favour and security from those who offer it.

Seasonal Migrants

Not reflected in my own Makeni survey figures at all is a section of migrant youths who oscillate locally between town and village, often on a seasonal basis. This category is really a sub-division of the Village to Town migrants since their aspirations rest firmly on the Town. Included in the seasonal migrants /

1 M.P.s have prestige and a salary that with allowances amounts to around £1,200 per annum.
migrants are the petty traders who, having supplied themselves in Town with a tray of small necessities work from village to village in the Towns hinterland. Some seasonal migrants also work in the villages during the dry season doing harvesting, threshing and farm digging (when the village is a lively place with ceremonies, dances, etc.) and move back into Town during the monotonous rainy season. Here they hope to pick up some temporary employment and take advantage of the stocks of rice that their wage-earning or salaried 'friends' can buy throughout the rainy season. These youths carry the nickname 'feti' and move quite freely between the town, which they prefer, and the village where they are more welcome. Since they are not permanently resident in one place for any length of time they do not figure in my sample survey of Makeni residents. This seasonal movement is a temporary solution to the difficulty of achieving security in the Town combined with its attraction as an exciting, free and easy place to live with opportunities, albeit small ones, of great rewards.

Movement of Women

There is a very large movement of women generally in Sierra Leone and in The Northern Province there are more women there who have moved from their chiefdom of birth than men. This is probably /

1 Probably derived from the English 'fighter', such is their reputation.
probably a reflection of what emerges from other statistics available, namely, that more men than women migrate but men migrate much further than women.¹ Much of this more localised movement of women must be the outcome of a virilocal marriage rule. From the point of view of moving from one structure to another then the question becomes one of the degree of endogamy within the three complexes.

In Mabaibunda I collected data on the place of origin of all married women and it was clear that women who were married to richer and more influential farmers were more likely to have come from a greater distance, although this distance was rarely more than fifteen miles and only two were actually towns-women. These two women, however, had considerable importance and significance within the village. They tended to speak for all women and act in the organisation of the women's society. The Town woman is highly regarded in the village with her skills and her emancipation which may well benefit the household within which she lives.

Administrators tend to marry strictly within their group and although they maintain quasi-marital unions outside, this does not involve the movement of these women.

I have no figures for village women marrying towns- men. There are indications from other studies that suggest that concomitant and/or contributory to the greater freedom that women possess /

¹ Census of Sierra Leone 1966.
possess to-day there has been a movement of women into local town especially by those who get into some kind of trouble in the village.¹

The two main causes of movement of women thus appear to be movement at time of marriage, and this is usually an upward movement (hypergamous marriage) or as a result of the unattractiveness of the Village and the greater freedom to be found in Town.

The general picture of migration that emerges is one of high mobility and considerable movements of people especially the young and uncommitted. There is a considerable movement of these persons from village to village which I have not touched upon. This high level of mobility is reflected in the movements I have not here considered, because they are statistically much less important, such as the movement of men from town to villages in order to obtain special medicinal cures or to escape prosecution or the movement of women running away from unsatisfactory husbands.

I have suggested that those moving from one complex to another are motivated by a search for a greater security and many of them fail to achieve this and have to return, and others again spend many years in the attempt. Such persons, of which there are two main groups, are especially susceptible to political manipulators through the associations to which these social migrants belong.

¹ Ref. K. Little 1965.
Movement from one structure to another inevitably generates patterns of behaviour within the structures. The wage-worker who returns to the Village, the Townsman who joins the Administrative elite inevitably bring certain ideas and skills with them and some of these will be described later in this section.

3. The Entrepreneurs

I now pass from patterns of behaviour generated by individuals moving or attempting to move from one high stability structure to another to patterns generated by individuals exploiting intermediary positions between these structures. This latter category has a quite distinct recruitment from the former being all townsmen and quite successful ones, at that. These entrepreneurs do not operate in a moral vacuum. Their activities may be described as belonging to two role sets that I term 'Trader' and 'Big Man' according to whether their enterprises are basically economic or political. The situation as I analyse it may be represented by the following diagram:

DIAGRAM/
This diagram illustrates the terms and categories used in the analysis. Lower terms are common members of the class denoted by the term at the apex of triangle that contains them both.
As may be seen from this diagram the Big Men are one kind of patron, the kind that operate between high stability structures and may be further divided according to whether they are also traders or chiefs. In the following account the activities of the 'pure' trader entrepreneur is first described and then the activities of the two types of Big Man. It is characteristic of all these role sets that they are loosely defined and leave room for considerable variation of activity. Whether, or not, any entrepreneur actually occupies a particular intermediary position depends solely on its profitability for him individually. Entrepreneurs are most likely to operate across structural boundaries where most opportunity is presented and they thus appear to operate most successfully between Village and Town and Village and Administration.

The Role of Traders

There is no ancient Temne word for trader but the term has become incorporated as a loan word so that 'ɔ trɛda' is everywhere understood. Thus, although traders as intermediary entrepreneurs are best analysed as a low stability behaviour pattern it has to be recognised that entrepreneurs cannot act in a moral vacuum. Traders are highly variable in their modes, scales and positions of enterprise but nevertheless have to fulfil certain expectations in order to operate at all.

Firstly, traders are persons with whom one may have relations /
relations of material exchange outside the domestic or community sphere. Such relations of exchange differ from those occurring in other spheres in that they are of relatively short duration, secular in nature and normally involve a monetary assessment of value. In return for this detached contractual relationship expected of traders and clients the trader is expected to be relatively neutral in domestic and community affairs. In other words, material exchange with traders has few of the characteristics of gift exchange found in small scale societies. He is generally treated as a stranger by his clients, given the hospitality and respect accorded to strangers but expected to assume the subservient politico-jural status of the stranger. A man who is a trader is not prevented from adopting other roles but as a trader there are the expectations attached to him.

Traders are recognised in other ways. In many areas an incoming trader has to get permission from the Chief to trade and the Chief may exact some kind of a tax or levy on him. Similarly the Administration requires certain kinds of traders to buy licences before they may operate. Other expectations of traders are perhaps too familiar to us to require statement here. They have an obligation to exchange with all people who have the material means but no obligation to those without these means.
Local Traders

The local traders that operate between Makeni and its hinterland villages follow the same general pattern in that they act as local agents (in the distributive chain) for the larger traders of the town. These local traders are of two types. Firstly, there are the petty traders who move around within roughly the same area with a large box of small household items on their head, secondly, there are those who keep permanent stores within the villages where they reside. The former are supplied by large stores, usually Lebanese owned, in Makeni and they often acquire these trade items on a credit basis. The latter are often owned by larger traders who live in town and supply their local agents themselves. Characteristically, all these local enterprises are on a small scale.

The petty trader tends to confine himself to villages without motorable access, the storekeepers to villages on roads or tracks. Storekeepers usually buy local produce which they transport to town, whereas the petty trader cannot do this.

In more recent years a new type of professional trader has taken advantage of a gap in the market structure created by the legislated exclusion of non-nationals from the rice market. These new traders come after harvest time, not from the local town /

1 This apparently is true for African middlemen generally in West Africa according to Bauer (p.202) \[1954\].
town but from further afield. They come to the boliland villages to buy milled rice. These traders are the only example of an exchange mechanism in the country that does not operate through institutions maintained in the local towns and they are heavily resented by the local traders who see them as intruders.

There were several cases of these traders being forced by the District Authorities to stop buying rice after reports had been made against them by the local traders on the basis of irregularities in their trading licences.

Traders establish themselves, or their agents, in particular areas each of which would typically cover several villages, and then 'cultivate' these areas commercially. Traders need good local contacts, not only to command custom loyalty but because they do much of their business in terms of credit rather than cash. Credit operations require personal knowledge of debtors and good relations with village authorities to ease the collection of debts. Traders could not possibly sue all the customers to whom he has lent goods or money and he must rely on the traditional figures of authority in the village and chiefdom to help him. Local communities may also act as economic units at times and control trade within the community thus forcing a trader to raise his prices. For these reasons, traders are forced to modify the strictly segregated exchange behaviour of the trader's role.
role and to become involved in the villages and will be expected to contribute to communal funds, e.g., for building a mosque or a better access road.

**Scale of operations**

Trading enterprises set up between Town and Village are all small scale and admit relatively easily of new competition. They are small scale for two reasons, the one internal the other external to the enterprise.

Firstly, trading institutions in Village and Town can only survive a very limited delegation and division of labour. A trader and his agents in Town and Village structures can only be organised on non-bureaucratic lines; any operation that has too many people in it faces great difficulties through lack of supervision and contact. A trader, in other words, can only run a profit making business if he restricts his organisation to that which is viable on non-bureaucratic lines. The bigger traders are always having problems with their agents complaining of the minor fiddling and fraud that goes on behind their backs. The absence of book-keeping skills has much to do with this situation. Every institution in Town and Village with overt economic functions that involves more than half a dozen organisation personnel is very wasteful of time and money.¹

Secondly /

¹ e.g. The Native Administration, which has a number of independent economic functions of which the most important is tax-collection, regularly spend over 50% of their budget in paying their own salaries and maintenance expenses M. Kilson (p.198-200).
Secondly, traders who deal extensively in credit have a natural limit on the number of clients with whom they can enter into economic relations. Credit ties, even if fairly temporary necessitate a degree of knowledge between debtor and creditor. A trader with too large a clientele is very likely to lose out through default in debt repayment. The fact that some traders operate on a wider scale and are willing to put up with a loss indicates that they are not trading solely for pecuniary profit.

Traders between town and village then are small scale and this restricts the influence that they may command purely on the basis of their being traders. The restrictions in scale means that the market relationship between Makeni and the hinterland has generated large numbers of competing traders, rather than becoming dominated by any one trader who would thus gain enormous power on this basis alone. Those seeking power have to do more than trade.

**Traders and Influence**

Although trade itself does not create a position of power for the trader he is in an especially good position to become a Big Man. Firstly, he has already had to establish harmonious relationships with a community or area of people who must be kept in a state of good disposition towards himself. He has made /

---

1 This same situation has been observed for Chinese traders by Barbara Ward, 1960.
made available to them something which they could only get for themselves at considerable cost. Secondly, he is in good contact with the Town even if not actually living there and he may use these contacts for the benefit of his clients, or anyone in the villages he may wish to influence. Thirdly, to become a trader he must have had experience of the Town, be knowledgable in its ways, and be constantly receiving information from the Town. These social skills and knowledge may give him an edge over rival power seekers within his area of operation.

In fact a good many of the present influentials in the Makeni area are, or have been, traders and draw most of their rural support from areas that they are or were trading in. Conversely, an influential who wishes to extend his influence may find it profitable to do so initially as an economic entrepreneur.

We have the case of a man who lived in Makeni most of his life and became influential there. As his influence grew he decided to set up a small shop in the village in which he was born. Later he planted and cultivated a citrus plantation there, the produce of which he sold in Makeni. To show the good position of the trader in the initial stages of the competition for power does not mean to say that all traders are influentials. Many simply do not have this ambition, furthermore to become an influential one must do considerably more than trade. It is no more than a good starting point.
Traders' farms

This last example illustrates another feature of the local traders, many of whom exploit their involvement with a village or villages to do farming. A local trader who is living in a village, or in town, and maintaining a store in the village is in a very good position to engage in cash cropping himself. He has credit with the community to secure a good tenure and increase his chances of a steady supply of labour. He has the contacts in town, a place to store rice in the village, and above all an independent source of cash with which to hire labour. In short, he can integrate such cash farming easily with his other activities. In the bolilands this means rice farming, of course, and the trader in Mabaibunda has always run a considerable farm using hired labour, and a certain amount of free labour, because of his prestige and influence in the village. Being traders, they regard farming as a commercial activity and are more able to think in terms of cash input and output.

All this has had an influence in the village some of which has been described above. The effect of town based outsiders making farms, hiring labour and setting an example of a better life to young aspiring men has forced the ordinary village household head to change his domestic strategy in ways that will be described.¹

¹ The trader-farmer is, of course, not the only factor in this process.
The role of 'Big Men'

I now pass onto the second category of entrepreneurs, that is, those who deal in political enterprises between high stability structures. As I have explained such persons may well also have economic enterprises but not necessarily so. Big Men who also have economic enterprises I call Trader Big Men and those who do not I call Chiefly Big Men since the great majority of Big Men are one or the other. This distinction I take up later when describing the political enterprises in greater detail.

Big Men fulfil certain expectations, like the trader they do not operate in a moral vacuum. The Big Man is firstly a political patron and as an entrepreneur he sets up enterprises across structural boundaries that bring in political profit. Like the trader he has a degree of recognition, he is called in Temne '0 wunibana' (Lit, The Big Man). The following brief descriptions were made by different persons:

'A big man, he has women, he has children, he has clothes, and he is known.'

'I will show what a big man is. Look at our kinsman who is in Kantha [referring to a retired Chief of Police in Freetown who was going through the installation ceremonies for Alimami Chiefship]. If he were not a big man they could not put him there. But they bring him much rice, they bring him many cows, ... goats, ... firewood. Many people come.'

'A big man, they crown him, he gets money, he has his own lappa [cloth]. A big man, he has standing, he has his house. Everybody will go out and greet you. If I am tired, and I have no clothing, I will go /
go to a big man and say to him "Give me clothing. I have nothing, my back is hurting me." I go to a big man, he gives me rice, I eat, I am satisfied.'

Big Men are accorded special treatment and paid deference in many small ways. There are special ways of approaching a Big Man when wishing to establish deference. A Big Man should be approached with a slightly bent back and greeted with a two-handed handshake and a soft voice. Big Men should receive the best chair on veranda, the best seat in a lorry or car and generally given prior treatment. Just as Big Men are under an obligation to receive all visitors to their homes and to dispense hospitality to them so are his followers under an obligation to visit them and pay their respects. Big Men do not normally visit those with less influence in their homes as a matter of courtesy, but may do so to conduct business or make arrangements.

Big Men are not only called 'big' but do tend to be large and heavy. Body size and solidity are indications of success and patrons cultivate a ponderous and even heavy manner. They are often distinguishable in their bearing and deportment and walk slowly with a slight swinging motion of the shoulders. Big Men dress well either in western style, long trousers and white collared shirt or muslim style with long embroidered cloaks and cap.

The Big Man is recognised as one who protects and encourages individuals /
individuals, or groups of individuals, by the exercise of influence. Like the trader there is a recognised set of expectations within which the Big Man operates.

**Big Men and Help**

Big Men help their supporters in various ways. Not only is help expected from them but any help is associated with patronage, it is the currency of patronage. Thus, local handouts from foreign aid programmes are inevitably associated by the recipients with the concept of whitemen as Big Men. The fact that the behaviour of some of the local whitemen, such as the Peace Corps volunteers, is not that of Big Men is very puzzling.

Help (Kamar) does not refer to a transitory action by one person, it refers to a service relationship that is extended over many individual helping events. It refers to not only economic activity, advice and intercession but also to what can only be described as a more 'spiritual' service implicit perhaps in the term 'support'. A Big Man is expected to support his followers generally, not only helping them materially but also by giving them encouragement, confidence, and moral backing. None of this can be established without generosity, and a Big Man must not only be generous but be seen to be generous. He must give or freely spend a large portion of what comes to him. It is difficult for a Big Man to accumulate any personal wealth without incurring /
incurring the rancour of his followers. 'It is not possible to be both influential and wealthy without trouble' is said. Associated with the help relationship is that of the begging (Ka nemthene). Followers beg Big Men by going to them in a respectful manner and saying 'I am begging you, I beg you, give me something.' A successful request is followed by effusive thanking and a blessing. 'I thank you' in this context is 'I ruba mu' in Temne and a Big Man who has given and helped his people well is said to 'have a great blessing' - '2 ba a ruba ruba a bana'. This is a spiritual recognition of the Big Man's help bestowed on him by God which will enable him to prosper on this earth and go to heaven in the next.

Help takes the form of direct gifts, sometimes loans of consumption items, gifts of capital items or contributions to a group (e.g. one Big Man in Makeni gave an oil palm kernel crusher to a village), advice and support in legal cases, intercession with the authorities or other influentials, providing employment and attracting development projects to a particular group. The contexts of help are very many and mostly derive from the entrepreneur's ability to convert political resources in one high stability structure to effective action in another. The following example may illustrate how it works.

One year, as the swamps were drying out at the end of the rainy /
rainy season and the rice was nearing harvest, some cows belonging to Fula herdsmen wandered into the rice fields and were seen to be eating the rice stalks. A Makeni based Big Man who had rice fields in the swamp supplied his local agent with a gun and cartridges and told him to shoot any cows that he saw on his land. Shortly afterwards, a Fula complained through his Big Man, the Fulani headman for the Chiefdom, to the Paramount Chief that one of his cows was missing and had been killed by the farmers. The chief, who had the support of the Fulas as a group because he gave them permission to be within the chiefdom, promised to secure justice and sent word to the village chief to find who had shot the cow. This was done, but when the Chief found out that it was the influential who was behind the affair, nothing ever came of it. The Big Man's clients, the villagers, were not troubled by cows again that year.

Help is expected of Big Man and promises of help are necessary in order to secure followers. Here is part of a campaign speech made in a village near Magburaka:

'I come to you to be your candidate. I want you to support me. I try my level best to fight for you in the government to give you all satisfaction. When I was coming to your village, I noticed that your road was very poor and I had to cross so many streams without bridges. I had to take off my shoes and pull off my socks.' If you agree with me and support /

1 He is here emphasising both his modernity, by referring to his European dress, and the fact that he had not been accorded the respect that patrons deserve and which he would restore the ability of the village to provide.
support me, and if I get into the House through your votes, I am sure I will make these roads for you completely.'

Similarly, when the S.L.P.P. agents came to Mabaibunda to campaign for the 1967 elections they stressed over the loudspeaker, fitted to a land-rover, that the villagers were under obligation to vote for them. They were held to be under obligation to them because it had been the S.L.P.P. government which was responsible for bringing the Mechanical Ploughing Scheme and economic progress to the village. Many politicians in the North were quoted as having said that the reason why the area had not had many development projects compared to the South was because the North had not voted strongly enough for the party in power.

Converse to the power of Big Men to help is their power to make trouble. They are dangerous and feared, even by their own supporters. Big Men may well have the ear of someone in authority who can make trouble, have one arrested, etc. The Administration of local justice is also frequently in the hands of Big Men and this increases their power to make trouble; and to give help. Big Men are continually involved in economic transactions and compromising activities with their followers and these relationships often form grounds for a Big Man to use if he wants to make trouble. Big Men rarely lose a legal case in public, they have the means and the contacts to make sure they win.
Another way by which a Big Man can harm someone is to publicly denounce him. The Big Man's clients are then obliged to support the denunciation. The only problem left for the Big Man then is to decide whether he had profoundly influenced his followers or whether they are simply treating him politely and correctly by agreeing with him. Big Men may, at this stage and if the matter is important enough, resort to the extraction of a pledge, backed by some supernatural sanction, to ensure the support of these followers. ¹ This is supposedly efficacious and horrible stories are told of those who dared transgress. Big Men are tough and more outspoken than most men, they have a strong 'heart' (ka bunth ka baki) and are therefore less susceptible to natural and supernatural pressures.²

Big Men and Gifts

Big Men receive gifts from followers and those seeking help. Such gift-giving may be distinguished from bribery which is a matter /

¹ It is here that the role of the secret Society medicine is of importance although to what extent is very difficult for the outsider to estimate. The phrase to 'make a Poro' 'ka bëmpa am pëm' refers not to establishing a local lodge of the Society but to the pledge making process described. In the Makeni area, supernatural sanctions of Muslim origin are very, if not more, common.

² Khuri (1965) reports interestingly that it is advantageous for an influential to have red eyes. He attributes this to the local belief that a red-eyed man is sincere and sympathetic. However, there may well be the association of Red-Danger-Power-Blood that Turner (1965) described for Africa generally.
matter for secrecy and is non-ceremonial and also from help in
the form of goods that followers receive from Big Men from time
to time. It is distinguishable from the latter in the manner
of giving. A Big Man who decides to give something to a follower
will simply tell him to take it or instruct one of his dependants
to hand it over. A follower who brings a gift for a Big Man will
make sure that there are others present who will note the occasion.
He makes a small speech thanking the Big Man for his interest in
him, help received, etc. He will also 'call down a blessing'
from God to give the Big Man a good life, prosperity, etc. He
will then hand the gift to the least senior person present who
will make a similar speech and so on until the Big Man himself
is reached.

Gift giving is not reciprocated in a like manner but the
Big Man is instead put under a direct obligation to the gift-
giver. In the terminology that I have adopted, gifts go up
the ladder of influence and help comes down.

Information and Secrecy

It is generally accepted in Sierra Leone that there is a
division between public or open politics and private or closed
politics.¹ This area, is of course, particularly difficult for
the foreign observer to enter into. One cannot help being
struck /

¹ This has been called 'the politics of arrangement' whereby the
process of decision making is at least partly closed to public
knowledge and as such has naturally been contrasted to the
struck, fairly early on in fieldwork, by the discrepancy between sentiments expressed at times of public gatherings where ideals of consensus and community hold, and private statements that appear to operate on quite the reverse principle. Most Big Men in fact are continually involved in confidential or semi-confidential meetings with individuals or groups and have a special room in their house for such meetings. They naturally suspect that their opponents do likewise. A Big Man is someone who should be able to keep confidences and behave in a generally discreet manner. It is particularly at times of political crises that secret meetings and arrangements are feared and often methods are used to prevent them occurring. In the chiefdom, such meetings may well take place in the bush away from any village. Secrecy, of course, plays a part in any political process but it not only seems to be of especial importance to the Big Men of the Makeni region, but it also appears to be recognised by most as the natural way to do things.

In this general atmosphere information is valuable property and it is property that Big Men must be affluent in. Big Men are 'people who are in the know' (afëm an tara) and they need a constant supply of information. The general absence of written records and reliable reports not only adds to the value of secrecy, but forces the Big Man to depend almost wholly on personal contacts for information. Big Men obviously use their clients as /
as one source of information, but they also cultivate secret informants to gather information about the doings of others, etc. Another way of obtaining information is by the enticement of someone to change sides bringing much information with him. Such switches in allegiance are regarded as being particularly dangerous in that any supernatural agents associated with certain items of knowledge are liable to attack the traitor.

Part of the knowledge that is part of the essential working capital of the entrepreneur is the history of kinship connections and movements of ancestors and their relationship to each other. A judge, for instance, or someone involved in supporting a particular candidate for election to chiefship could not operate without this knowledge. Such information is always hard to come by; what is valuable is never freely given. All this is one important reason why Big Men generally need to be long-standingly involved in an area before they can be successful. A Paramount Chief is in a good position in some respects since he not only has his Kapr chiefs under his ritual control, who are bound to act as his informants, but he also goes through a period of intense instruction in local affairs during his installation period. The Administrator, on the other hand, because he is continually moved around and has less contact with the local populace is in a very bad position. This means not /
not only that it is difficult for him to compete with the entre-
preneurial patron on his own ground, but that in the execution
of local policy he is likely to need the help and co-operation
of at least some Big Men.

I have described in some detail the role of the Big Men
partly because the role is less familiar to us than that of
trader but also to establish that as for the trader, the expec-
tations are not restrictive. The expectations say nothing
about whom the Big Man deals with, at what level or where he
operates; it lays down a set of rules which he uses. I want
now to pass onto the structures of patronage generated by Big
Men as they set up enterprises following and using the expec-
tations described above.

Recruitment of Big Men

All Big Men even when they maintain households out of the
town are skilled in the Town way of life. They tend to be well
educated, to have travelled, to have lived outside the area at
times and to be wealthy. They obviously tend to have a greater
drive and intelligence than most although no systematic infor-
mation was collected on personality characteristics. They are
all experienced in dealing with a wider scale of society than
their clients.

Big Men tend to have had some experience in entrepreneurial
enterprises /
enterprises before they set out to become influential. This may have been small scale help, as exercised by the urban farmers described later in this section (p. 276) or perhaps purely economic enterprises characteristic of the trader or the trader's local agent. Big Men must also have been around for some considerable time in the area and invested in a wide range of social relationships there. The kind of knowledge and contacts needed to establish any enterprise can only be built up over a considerable period of time.

Theoretically, anyone may become a Big Man entrepreneur; in practice the phenomenon tends to be closely linked with certain positions and routes. Big Men tend to be traders, or chiefs. Each of these positions are already very liable to be marginal or intercalary as I have already described. There are a few Big Men who have no particular position or who are full time elected politicians but these are very rare. Individual Big Men may change from Trader to Chief and sometimes back again but it is very difficult for these positions to be combined within one person.

I have already described the favourable position of the trader who wishes to become a Big Man. To be a trader is to have a sort of passport. A trader has a freedom of movement and a choice of scale and he is already involved in enterprises that /
that cross structural boundaries. Being traders they have better opportunities for offering economic 'help' to their clients although they have less influence with Administrators. As traders they are inevitably involved in the Town market and know all the gossip and personalities of the Town. They are used to taking risks and trying out innovations. As an example of such a man I take the case of one man I knew who used to trade in dried fish from the coast. This fish used to arrive off a lorry in Makeni and he would sell it in the marketplace there but also take a basket of it out to Mabaibunda and other villages nearby. While he was in the village he used to buy back rice from the farmers and do some farming of his own. He became more wealthy and used to spend quite a lot of time out in the villages although both his wives were resident in Makeni. He became the agent for a larger scale Big Man and persuaded many of the local farmers to vote in support of this Big Man and his party. He also helped many of his Town friends both in farming and in buying rice from the villagers. Eventually, when the co-operative society was organised he became one of its minor organisers.

Another man entered trading in the bolilands when the road between Lunsar and Makeni was being built. He, acting as an agent for a Lebanese trader used to travel along this road buying rice at various villages. He became known to the villagers and he
he eventually started trading rice on his own. It was while acting as the agent to another, this time Creole, trader that he became secretary to the Co-operative Society and Court President of the Chiefdom. He now wields considerable influence in the Chiefdom.

The other category from which Big Men tend to be recruited are Chiefs and his immediate titular associates such as Pa Kapr M s m, and his wife Ya P ss and his senior section chief Pa Alimami. In many ways those occupying these positions are the least susceptible to generalised description of all. The incumbents are already occupying a high stability position that connects high stability structures and this immediately creates conflicting loyalties and expectations but they are also in a very good position to undertake certain kinds of low stability enterprise. What is important to this study is to maintain a distinction between Chiefs who construct enterprises between high stability structures and those who do not generate such structures. Chiefs, in fact, vary very much in this respect, some are eager to do so, others not. Some are content with the power that accrues naturally to his status others desire to acquire a lot more. This is not a simple question of education or modern versus traditional individuals. In Makari-Gbanti the Paramount Chief and his brother had both been to Bo school for boys and worked in Town but one of them had systematically set out to construct Big Man enterprises /
enterprises between structures of the kind that I have been describing whereas the other had become influential purely by the accumulation of power within the Chiefdom.

A chief can become a Big Man because he already has access to Administrators, to various bodies of knowledge in the Chiefdom and to the traditional loyalty of many of his subjects. To convert his subjects into clients he must 'help' them especially in some way. He may give them particular help in dealing with Administrators, in speaking on their behalf in directing services available in Town to his clients in the Villages. He may campaign on their behalf to get developments to his Chiefdom or particular parts of the Chiefdom. It is noticeable that Chiefs, as entrepreneurs are more restricted in the kind of enterprise they can set up. Firstly, he must spend most of his time in the Chiefdom. A Chief that does not reside and spend most of his time in the Chiefdom could not continue to be regarded as Chief by his people. Furthermore, this means that Chiefs cannot base themselves in the Town if the Town is outside their Chiefdom, they may only visit it frequently. Being in Town where the Administration is also, is so crucial to an entrepreneur's operations that this acts as a considerable limitation. Associated with this territorial restriction is the rule that Chiefs may only operate freely within his own Chiefdom. If he attempts too /
too strongly, to patronise persons outside his Chiefdom he is liable to incur the wrath of another Paramount Chief, who is bound to be backed by the Administration which imposed and maintained the territorial boundaries between Chiefs.

Another constraint concerns the economic position of the Chief. Traditionally, the Paramount Chief has a certain economic position as a redistributor of tribute in the form of hospitality. He should be receiving gifts and giving them out again in the form of encouragement and help. To this end he would farm a large area to which everyone in the Chiefdom would contribute some labour. He is thus at the node in a series of gift-giving and receiving cycles that extend equally over the whole Chiefdom. Such a position is not compatible with that of the commercial entrepreneur operating in terms of a market exchange with a manageable number of persons. The Chief has to be very careful in his economic transactions and keep them quite separate from these traditional spheres of exchange. A Chief could not go to a meeting of local rice farmers and persuade them all to club together under him to jointly buy a tractor. Farmers would be most suspicious of such a proposal coming from a Chief who would be likely, in their eyes, to use his position to do them out of some money. This has been seen clearly in the development of the M.P.S.

When /
When the M.P.S. was first introduced into the area, the local Agricultural Officer tried to administer the scheme through the local chiefs for a number of years. At first this was taken up by the chiefs, in some cases quite enthusiastically, but it was not long before there were too many disputes, mumblings against the Chiefs and accusations of corruption. Chiefs were suspected of showing favouritism in order to make money out of stranger farmers, etc. Since then the scheme has continued but Chiefs are relatively unimportant in it. Only one of the Paramount Chiefs around Makeni even uses the scheme, although most other influentials do. This particular Chief pays for quite a number of acres every year but does not figure in the Co-operative Society administering the ploughing site. He said that he preferred not to get mixed up in all the local disputes and rivalries that the 'big men' of the Co-operative Society have to deal with. He said that he could do better by acting as a disinterested outsider who may be called in to arbitrate a dispute. Chiefs in general, as traditional arbiters may be called in to settle disputes between farmers engaged in commercial enterprises and therefore it does not pay for them to become too closely involved.

A constraint associated with the Paramount Chief's position is that he must be very careful about any form of opposition to Government /
Government Policy or the decisions of local administrators. The Administration pay him and can banish him. Farmers, on the whole, regard their Chief as being aligned with the Administration and do not expect help from him in ways which obviously oppose the Administration. If some kind of a diffuse discontent with the Administration (tax collection has been the most frequent cause in the past) arises in the Chiefdom, the Paramount Chief cannot afford to identify with the movement although he may desire to do so. All the Chief may do in such a case is to go to the District Commissioner and use the troubles as a lever to get some kind of special treatment for his people. He can act as a mediator but not as a leader of disputes.

The exact position that any Chief can take in his intermediary activity varies, of course, with his personal inclinations and abilities but also with the policy adopted by successive Governments towards their Chiefs. Some Governments back them very strongly, others more weakly.

Chiefs, restricted as they inevitably are in their entrepreneurial activities take less part in the sort of economic activity associated with an expanding market and cash cropping. However, it is in the ways that we may call the Chief 'progressive' that they are restricted, not in their 'progressiveness'. It is not true to say that they are any more 'traditional' than anyone /
anyone else, indeed the reverse is nearer the case. It is the paths open to the Chief that limit him as long as he remains Chief.

These then are the two main categories of Big Men entrepreneurs. There are a few others around but they do not appear to be very significant, thus in Makeni there was one schoolmaster and one local man who was employed as a Temporary District Engineer who were both entrepreneurs.

Chiefly and Trader Big Men

It can be seen that Chiefs and Traders are likely to oppose each other but at the same time complement each other's activities. I have earlier hinted (p. 49) that this is not an entirely new situation in the area as Chiefs and Warriors formerly had much the same relationship to each other.

A Chief does not generally like to see Traders operating too freely in his Chiefdom and drawing support away from him. Sometimes they may work together in a complementary sort of way but in general they compete for power. The Chiefs tend to regard the Traders as wheeler-dealers who will unscrupulously make wild promises to his followers in order to gain their support and votes. Chiefs say that Traders do not really care for their followers, that they have no commitment to them, no common identity, etc. The Traders in their turn frequently see the Chiefs as ineffective, exploiting their people, not really working for /
for them and too conservative in nature.

Associated with this opposition is the difference in the type of support they tend to get in Village and Town. Traders tend to gain the support of those who do not have the favour of the Chief or who actually oppose him. The Traders tend to appeal to the smaller men, to the populist forces that have a tendency to spring up periodically in rural Sierra Leone. There is thus a tendency for the natural tension in any Chiefdom between the Chief and anti-Chief factions to become aligned to the Chiefs and Traders in that Chiefdom.

**Big Men as articulators of national issues**

The tendency just described for the internal forces in a Chiefdom to be differentially exploited by the two types of Big Men has resulted in this tension being aligned with the National party political structure. The Big Men are active members or have active connections with these parties and they use these connections to manoeuvre for their clients and in this way local issues have become 'matched up' with national issues. The actual alignment is liable to vary from year to year and from region to region. In the Makeni area while I was there the A.P.C. party had become aligned against the Chiefs, for the Temne against the Mendes, for the young against the old, the Teachers against /

---

1 See M. Kilson (1968) in his chapter on 'Populist Forces'.

against the Administrators and for citizens against strangers. These oppositions have little to do with official party policies, they are to do with the nature of support that the Big Men draw upon.

When I was first working in Sierra Leone, the A.P.C. party was in opposition and strongly oriented locally against Chiefs. When I left, it was in power but there was no question of getting rid of the Chiefs.

'They've said we are against Chiefs just because our boys have shown their resentment at the political partisanship of some of them. But that's the men, not the institution. Only the other day I was telling an audience in the North "There will be Chiefs wherever you end up, whether in heaven or hell"',

the Prime Minister said recently. 1 There have been many ways in which the local conflicts which had been aligned nationally by the Big Men for their own ends, were not seen as valid conflicts by top party members, who were nevertheless happy to get the votes on the basis of these conflicts. When the A.P.C. party came to power after the return to civilian rule in 1968, this was interpreted by many in the Makeni area as a victory for the citizens over the strangers, of commoners against bad chiefs, etc. The resulting activities in which old scores were paid off and the new balance of power made clear were regarded as disruptive and uncalled for by the top A.P.C. politicians in Freetown /

Freetown who, in the end, had to make several personal visits and take stern action in the area to calm things down.

The local Big Man operates by gaining the support of certain groups of persons within the local area by promising to represent their interests and helping them directly in many small ways. He can then use the position thus created to gain the patronage of a larger scale Big Man, within the party organisation, by promising the support of his own clients. This step may be repeated up the scale of influence before it reaches the National Politicians operating on a much wider scale and within a set of issues and conflicts that are completely different. It is the local political entrepreneur setting up an enterprise to his own advantage who succeeds in aligning conflicts together that have very little to do with each other in terms of issue content and which often belong to different high stability structures.¹

The organisation of support

I have established two main categories of persons who are likely to choose to be Big Men entrepreneurs. These two categories have different opportunities and restrictions as I have shown and they also tend to organise their support in rather different /

¹ It is clear from the history of the development of political parties in Sierra Leone that they arose as pressure groups associated with particular elite groups in the colonial times. It was only later that they developed grass roots, although it has never proceeded very far. Only 150,000 party members out of one million votes were reported in 1961. This gap has been bridged effectively by the Patron Big Man so that now-a-days party politics is important at most of the local levels.
different ways. The Trader Big Man entrepreneurs tend to organise their followers into voluntary associations and Chiefly Big Men entrepreneurs do not. Again, this is an outcome of the restrictions limiting the enterprises of those who are also Chiefs. Chiefs cannot afford to show overt support to any group other than their Chiefdom and the following account applies to those Big Men without a Chiefdom loyalty which they may use in this way. Every co-operative society, local benefit society, union branch and local political party has a Big Man at its centre who is able to dominate effectively the running of the association. In fact, an association is best seen, from the sociologist's point of view, as a follower group behind a patron. Many associations are founded by Big Men who then exercise control of them as a political enterprise. Often the formal aspect of the association is inextricably confused with the informal group of follower-clients of the Big Man. This may be related to one of the key characteristics of Big Men which is that they represent a group of persons 'behind them'. They act characteristically as intermediaries in this respect. Big Men are said to 'gather people' (Ka Kuft afam) and to 'speak for people' (Ka fafa ta: a afam).

In examining closely the local associations I observed that individual membership and participation were subject to considerable...
considerable fluctuations which vary with the successes and failures of the associations. These successes and failures usually depend very closely on the quality of patronage within the society.

Just as the member-followers 'use' their Big Men to help them, so the Big Men 'use' the associations as convenient political support groups. This has been commented on by other scholars in slightly different contexts.¹ In the Makeni area it may be seen very clearly in the associations known as co-operative societies. These were set up initially when local Big Men gathered groups of followers and explained to them the potentialities and advantages in setting up such a society, how it would help them to improve their living standards, give them increases in security and make government loans possible. Having set up the basic structure and having elected a secretary and President (who was not necessarily the initiating Big Man), the Society would negotiate, through the Big Man, for Government loans. If the Society became registered then it stood a better chance of success. The process of registration itself depended considerably on the skills of the Big Man and his network of contacts within other high stability structures. The members themselves, realistically place the co-operative society, as I have tried to do here, within the general context of the operation of /

of influence and patronage and within the particular context of the Big Man who is helping them. They do not see the society as a corporate group bound by explicitly democratic rules involving group sacrifice that dominate the western concept of the term co-operative society. That the 'Principles of Co-operation' are unimportant to the members does not mean that these associations are not involved in progressive social changes.

These same principles apply to any of the many types of associations to be found in Sierra Leone Society. One might say that the association, with the entrepreneurial Big Man at its centre is very commonly found where high stability structures impinge upon each other.¹ The association, or 'compin' (derived from the English 'company') as it is known locally, is a common feature of Sierra Leone society ranging from the local group of youths in town who have a 'devil' and dance their way round town, to the occupational associations found at a national level. The formal structure of these associations, if it exists at all, is far less important than the informal Big Man or Men of the society who speak for their clients and effectively organise the internal activities of the compin, even when they are not office holders themselves.

Chiefly Big Men do not become the patrons of such associations although /

¹ This viewpoint has been expressed in somewhat different language by K. Little, 1965.
although they may help their clients in similar ways. Chiefs do occasionally, for instance, get the use of the tractors to plough some land for themselves and some clients in a spasmodic way by using their influence with the Administration. The Chief may walk through his Town followed by his Big Men in a way very similar to the parades of the associations without actually being one.

Both categories of Big Men tend particularly to exploit the social migrants described above as active elements on their behalf, to campaign for them, to act as their henchmen and local organisers.

'Big Men' as innovators

I have already established that political entrepreneurs are of a type of patron, that they are of two kinds and that chiefs have many constraints limiting them in the economic sphere of activity. Entrepreneurs typically innovate risking enterprises and in the Makeni area it is the Big Men who are responsible for most technological innovations. Indeed it was this innovating activity combined, as it was, with the Big Man ethic of 'help' that led my study out of the village. Take this statement from a Big Man:

'I got the Pa Loi (a new variety of rice) from Taiama for chop but some grains fell in my yard in Makeni and so I got my children to keep the birds off it and got a small amount. I cut it and got one small bundle, this was in 1964, and this /
8. A Stranger Farmer visiting his farm in the Bolilands

9. A Trader Big Man threshing his rice. Mabaibunda in the background
this I sowed in a small plot near Roward and I got two threepenny pans full. Next year I scattered (broadcast) and got a half box (½ bushel) back and in 1966 I transplanted it to see if it yielded better. I am just trying it out to see if it is worth it. I have tried Pa Nachin on the acres (the Mechanically Ploughed Land) but got no profit."

It is only the more wealthy Big Men who can afford to indulge in risky enterprises. One such Big Man I knew was in 1967 planning to use the M.P.S. to prepare his land but then rework it by hand, rather quickly, and transplant into it. This had never been tried before and involved a more intensive farming of a small area which was contrary to the general view of how to farm mechanically ploughed land.

Individual Big Men who successfully introduce some innovation are remembered and talked about for many years. The man called Pa Thomson who was supposed to have introduced swamp farming (using the heaps method) into the bolilands from 'Rowalla' (Kambia District) is still talked about. Again it was the Big Men entrepreneurs who were the successful initiators of the farming 'compins' that hired tractors from the Government and which eventually developed into the Co-operative Societies. I believe that the development and continued existence of these Co-operative Societies can only be understood if they are seen in these terms of Big Men enterprises involving both social and technological /
technological innovation.¹

Not only are Big Men more liable to accept and initiate innovations but they are also much more likely to actively search for new methods and possibilities from external sources. Those Administrators in development work usually find themselves involved quite rapidly with the Big Men on whose entrepreneurial ability the success and failure of the project usually rests.

A typology of enterprises

Enterprises are most successful and significant when set up to span gaps between high stability structures. They are found where the high stability links themselves are few. One such group of enterprises spans the gap between Village and Town and seek to make available aspects of the Town to Villagers and vice versa. The Big Man seeks to provide help to his village clients from town. This help may take many forms. The Big Man may arrange for the marketing of farmers’ produce, bring influence to bear on the District Council to initiate a project in the village /

¹ There are two points that ought to be made here:
(a) My conclusion about the nature of the Rice Marketing Co-operative Societies in the Bombali area do not necessarily apply to Co-operative Societies elsewhere; and
(b) The search for innovators has been of central concern to sociologists in developing countries. The innovating Big Men arise as a response to a particular gap in the social structure and their innovating activity is generated; they are not (as has often been assumed) a particular type of individual, one cannot predict who will be the innovator.
10. Two Trader Big Men in Town.
village, support the village in a land dispute that has been taken to a town court, help farmers to buy fertiliser in short supply, etc. Characteristic of such Big Men is the multiplicity of enterprises that they engage in. They seem to be continually aiming at diversification. One such man in Makeni ran a store in Makeni town, another in a village, organised a wood cutting team, sold the wood and also dealt in rice and palm oil. Another managed a citrus plantation in a village, and a lorry, dealt in sand and other building materials and also traded in rice. The former man had persuaded or influenced the District Council to build a local road into the area where he was interested in gaining clients.

A Paramount Chief had, by virtue of his contacts with the Area Organiser for the Peace Corps in Makeni acquired a volunteer and a number of projects for his home village and Chiefdom. He had, in co-operation with the volunteer set up an experimental farm in the village where his brother was living.

Some Big Men help their rural clients by introducing specialists that they have need of, perhaps a Moslem diviner from town, a tailor or some other craftsman. He will also help them get transport. He may well introduce townsmen to the village, townsmen who are seeking a wife or a place to farm. In this way he invests in an area of the town's hinterland until he becomes /
becomes a patron to the people in that area in addition to any-
thing else he might be.

In return for these services he expects his clients to support
him in his political activities to vote for him or his candidate
at election time, to speak favourably of him, help him establish
his reputation of a good Big Man. Villagers and townsmen vote
at national elections, District Council elections and for Chiefly
representatives to go to Freetown. They also have a local say
in the selection of their Chiefs and court Presidents and can
exert political pressure through their associations both secret
and open.

There are a number of likely positions for entrepreneurial
activities between village and Administration. The most
important appear to be those that lie between villages and the
local Administrators in Makeni who are responsible for executing
policy decisions emanating from Freetown and those that lie
between villages and the policy maker Administrators (usually at
around Ministerial level) in Freetown. This last position
spans a rather large gap and as I hope to show involves a number
of entrepreneurs operating at different levels connected in a
ladder of influence or patronage.

Between the local Administration, completely centralised in
Makeni /

---

1 One is tempted here to use the ecological term of 'environ-
mental niche', as Frederick Barth (1963) does but I feel
that too great a rigidity is implied by the use of this term.
Makeni with few personnel and few direct sanctions of force, and the mass of the population living in the villages there is a wide gap which has to be bridged somehow if the Administrators are to administer and the villagers to 'progress'. The Administration controls a number of important local projects that villagers are keen to receive the benefit from. There are and have been various grant schemes for economic enterprises, other development projects which can bring a considerable amount of wealth to a Chiefdom, a road building and education project, a health programme, a Co-operative Society programme (administered by the Department of Co-operation in Freetown and its local Administrators). In addition to these economic and social programmes there are the political activities of Administrators in the maintenance of law and order, supervision of local elections, etc. On the other side are the villagers who are continually trying to enlist the resources and protection of the Administration to their side in their continual conflicts with each other. I can give some examples to illustrate how the entrepreneur fills this gap.

In the 1950s the Ministry of Agriculture Office in Makeni was trying to set up an organisation that would promote the ploughing of large areas of the bolilands by machine. At the same time groups of farmers in certain villages had witnessed some /
some of the trials and were anxious to get the machines to work for them. They went to their local politician who listened to their entreaties and set about organising them into a sort of club. He then went to the Agriculture Officer whom he already knew and petitioned him to send some of his tractors to work for the club. The Agriculture Officer wanted to know whether there was suitable land available and whether they would have no trouble with the land owners. The Big Man was able to reassure him on these points. The Agriculture Officer then wanted to know how the work would be paid for and it was arranged that the Big Man would collect the money himself and hand it over in a lump sum. The Agriculture Officer found that by working through such Big Men the organisation of the ploughing sites could be effectively handled and later some of these groups of farmers, after periods of fairly intensive bargaining by the entrepreneurs became re- cognised as Co-operative Societies. These Societies still rely very heavily on their Big Men for successful functioning. As should have been clear from the description of farming techniques given in Section II, in the operation of their mechanically ploughed lands there are many factors which can only be controlled by persons with knowledge and influence in the Town. In fact, in the example just given the Big Man involved had to give up his involvement in the enterprise for some other reason and since then the 'compin' (as it is called) has slowly faded out of existence. Another /
Another example was that of an unpopular appointment to the position of Court President in one of the Chiefdoms. For reasons which are irrelevant here there was a large group of farmers in the Chiefdom who wanted to get rid of the man. A Big Man entrepreneur took advantage of the situation and organised a petition which had been signed by as many as possible. This petition was couched in legalistic language and was properly typewritten and gave grounds to the Administration why the Court President had not been appointed by the correct procedure and how he was indulging in unfitting and corrupt practices. This petition was then presented to the District Officer who passed it onto a committee of enquiry which duly visited the Chiefdom. Eventually the Court President lost his post.

Chiefly Big Men cannot be said to construct enterprises at this level since they occupy already an institutionalised position between Village and local Administrators. These Big Men are particularly active in the next level of enterprise, that is between Village and Freetown Administrators and Town and Freetown Administrators which I will now describe.

Enterprises set up between Village and Freetown Administrators operate across a wide gap and usually involve more than one level of entrepreneurship.

The following example illustrates an enterprise initiated from /
from below which developed into this type. In early 1968, shortly before Mechanised Ploughing was due to start for the year, the Rice Corporation, in an effort to relieve their financial difficulties, issued an order to the effect that the prices charged (which had been set at a special subsidized rate) to farmers should be increased from Le. 7.00 per acre to Le. 9.00 per acre. This increase was announced by the Rice Corporation Production Officer in Makeni, and the news spread quickly around Town and out to the villages participating in the Scheme. Meetings of participants in the scheme were being organised by the Big Men at this time for the collection of ploughing fees and a very strong line was taken by all farmers against accepting the announced increase. The Big Men involved went to see the Production Officer to appeal to him but later he had no choice but to refuse their requests. Then two meetings were held in Makeni involving an other and more influential Big Man and as a result a delegation was sent to Freetown. Exactly what happened in Freetown I do not know but some ten days later the head of Rice Corporation came to Makeni and had a meeting with the delegates. At this meeting he announced the revision of the price increases back to their former level, saying that the decision to raise them had been forced upon the R.C. by foreign experts and that he and the Rice Corporation were all trying /
trying to help the farmers. One of the most interesting aspects of this affair was that two of the Big Men told me privately that they were not entirely unsympathetic to the price increases (they had not been increased for ten years) but they would certainly not say so openly as it had become a political issue.

It is enterprises of this kind that involve the political parties of the country and Freetown politicians.

For instance there is the now famous example of the siting of oil palm plantations by the Produce Marketing Board. These plantations, most of which have now been closed down because of their failure, required to be very carefully sited according to the type of soil and general facilities. In fact, what happened was that they were used by the Freetown Government as a way of gaining the support of local Big Men. By letting it be known that it was they acquired the development for the area, such Big Men reaped a handsome political profit from the enterprise.

Another, perhaps more trivial, example of this type of enterprise in action was when the delivery of fertiliser from Freetown was very badly delayed. A foreign 'expert' who was trying to promote sales of fertiliser in the area was trying to secure its shipment in time for the planting season but was having no /

---

1 This was not true.
no success. Eventually, he went to a Big Man who had recently acquired some contacts in Freetown. Again I don't know exactly whom he saw in Freetown but whoever it was contacted the head of the railways. The fertiliser arrived very speedily afterwards.

Another example of this kind of enterprise is afforded by the example of a former police officer who had had quite a successful career in the Freetown force for most of his life. On retirement he returned to his home Chiefdom and it was not long before he became crowned as the Senior Alimami Chief and he built a fine house in the Chiefdom capital. He was obviously turning his metropolitan experience into political capital and had persuaded the District Authorities to resurface part of the road between his village and the town. It was said that he was probably already of greater influence than the Paramount Chief of the Chiefdom, a man who spoke no English and with little experience outside the Chiefdom.

In summary then the main kinds of enterprises may be represented by the following figure:

/
4. Structures generated within Structures

The third type of low-stability structure I wish to examine is that generated by individuals who neither move nor mediate between high stability structures but who remain firmly committed and bounded within one. Although individuals within a high-stability structure have no experience of living outside of it they do have some perception, some relationships with members of it /
it and some awareness of actions originating from it that in turn modify their own behaviour.

The weight of my evidence here concerns the village since it was there that I spent longest and am most interested in understanding.

Following the sequence of description already employed above I seek to describe in turn those structures that I consider of significance as they occurred in village, Town and Administration within the area of study.

Village Work Organisation

I have already described the movement of youths between structures and this has had important consequences on work organisation as farmers attempt to deal with the problem that for many is their loudest complaint.

With the high mobility of youths, economic opportunities in town and greater freedom under the law of the land the organisation of farming in the bolilands has changed considerably. Farmers who are heads of households now have to compete with each other in attracting the labour they need and they end up paying for a considerable proportion of their requirements. In order to maintain a complement of dependant young males upon whom they can rely, heads of households now offer considerable independence to their members; the opportunity for members of the household to
to farm for themselves; and help for the young men who wish to marry. If a young man decides that he is not getting a good enough deal in the household of which he is a member he may well move out, either to Town or to another farming household. There were numerous cases of this in the villages I knew well. If they move to another farming household it is most likely to be to another village, especially to one involved in successful cash cropping (which implies being a village on an all weather road which is an added attraction to a young man). Thus young men to-day have better chances of independence and an earlier marriage than formerly. In the old days a man would be called \textit{\textit{langba}} up until nearly our middle age, nowadays both initiation, marriage and the dropping of that title occur much earlier.

\textbf{Work Gang organisation}

As was explained in the previous section the heartiest and most intensive work is carried out by gangs of young men and it is the 'family' farms, supervised by the heads of domestic units, that are dug first as the rains begin by this gang. As this time approaches the gangs are formed and negotiations as to their work sites begin. These young men's gangs are strongly competed for and, with the contacts many of its members have had with the towns, some of them being seasonal movers, these gangs wield considerable economic power. Although they work in the first place /
place for the members, or fathers of members of the group, for free, they must be fed well and tipped by the owner of the farm if they are going to work well and fast. After they have worked on their own farms, or even between times, they may hire themselves out as a work gang at a fixed rate and they are eagerly sought after.

There are two other factors in the nature of this work group that makes them interesting to the anthropologist. Firstly, in their contractual cash earning characteristic they have obvious similarities with life in town rather than the village; secondly, the complexities in combining the demands of optimum time of digging operations in different parts of the swamp, with complete equity in the equal share staked by each member (with provisions for illness and substitution) means that they have developed a system of rules and administrative procedures that is decidedly non-traditional and is seen as such by the other farmers.

The work gang is made up of small groups of men who come together under a commonly recognised head and then the separate groups then coalesce to make up the gang. Each sub-gang or group remains distinct and its head is responsible for much of the conduct of its members. The heads of the sub-gangs, sometimes called chiefs, between them elect a man who has the responsibility for deciding where to work next, but he only holds /
holds this position for three days when another is elected. Two such periods, with the Friday rest-day, make up one working week. This man is called **owe² buth a muth** (he who puts the shares). None of these positions may be filled by a man who holds a title in the village. In addition, a person who will allocate work boundaries on the ground is selected for the whole group, and called **gabe**, and also another to keep discipline, a sort of policeman called **profo¹** is chosen. Some gangs also have **doktor** whose duty it is to examine the food and bring some medicine to apply to any injuries (feet cut by hoes are common-place). When the gang members meet in the evening to sing and dance, their songs are often Krio songs learnt from townspeople and the whistle (like our referees whistle) is used as a musical instrument on these occasions. The work gang of young men has a non-local, non-village flavour, uses methods of administration that are associated with the town and in its general behaviour exposes the increased independence of young men.

When /

---

1 A term which according to Dawson (1963) is derived from the English 'Provost'.
2 The resemblance between these work gangs and with the 'compins' described by M. Banton (1957) is not coincidental and the connection is mentioned by him in pages 193-4. The specific societies, the Alimani and the Nurujanati did spread in rural areas, but now have disappeared everywhere as a specifically named association. Their style has not disappeared, however, though it survives in a simplified form. As Banton writes, these work gangs are not found amongst Mende rice farmers.
When the rainy season is properly established (around June), the large work gangs break up into smaller ones, more easily manipulated and administered, for working on the individual farms (of young men or women) that are being prepared at this time. As already described, the jural responsibility for these farms, protection against neighbours' encroachments, etc., rests with the head of the domestic unit, but all the rice belongs to the young man or wife who plans the farm. Most of the rice from these farms then goes straight into the market economy and young men in the villages rely on these farms to get themselves wives, clothing and generally their increasing material desires.

Young men's gangs also form at harvest time and operate in an essentially similar manner although they are called am bira. Both types of gangs are sought after by the town farmers already described and one of the services a Big Man may provide for his town clients is to help them negotiate for the hiring of these gangs which are in such demand.

Young Men's farms

In the old days the elder men kept a much stricter control on their sons and few would get a chance to make a farm of any size. Since very little rice was exported from the bolilands until quite recently and there is now a considerable surplus, this increase in young men's farms has been associated with an increase /
increase in per capita productivity. It would be reasonable to suppose that the direct incentive, that is cash return, and the independent control over both farm and money has contributed to this rise in production, although direct evidence is lacking. Young men's farms in Mabaibunda accounted for 20 per cent. of the acreage farmed. In Magbaikoli about the same proportion of farms are run by these semi-independent young men, but they are on average smaller than those in Mabaibunda, giving a lower figure for the percentage acreage farmed. In Magbaikoli there is relatively little cash cropping of rice and there is considerably less cash around. Household heads are not able to pay for the services of the young men's work gangs. Furthermore, in Magbaikoli the village still farms upland farms which means that the young men do not have the time to work the swamp farms they are entitled to any degree¹. To offer young men greater inducements in the form of freedom to farm, would in fact involve a considerable re-arrangement of upland farming organisation and the alternative, of increasing the amount of payment for labour, is very difficult because of the trouble in selling /

¹ The different work organisation of upland with respect to swamp rice farming is of great interest but cannot form part of this thesis. Suffice it here to say that upland farming, the 'proper' farming according to the Temne, is organised by large groups of households and the planning of it is not regarded as fit work for the young. The switch to 'all swamp' farming is associated with a far greater emphasis on individually planned and cash farming.
selling rice at such a distance from the road. This position is reflected in the male-female ratios for the two villages:

FIGURE 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio of Male and Female to total population of the villages studied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magbaikoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabaibunda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where it can be seen that there is a comparative absence of men in Magbaikoli and a surplus in Mabaibunda.

Farming Women

Arising out of the activities of traders is the general increase in cash cropping and in the numbers of women farming their own farms. This has considerably modified the economic aspects of the conjugal tie with a corresponding effect on other aspects as well.

Men, in Temne society have always competed amongst themselves for wives, and not only for acquiring them but for keeping them as /
as, such is the instability of marriage. Now that women are no longer suspended between two kin groups but have an alternative course of action of moving into town, and now that they are exposed to much larger market, a farming husband must allow and help his wife to have a considerable degree of economic independence if she wants it. It is harder to keep a woman and greater inducements to her have to be given. Men are quite aware that their authority over their women has declined, but feel that there is relatively little they can do to rectify it.

It is fairly common nowadays for a man to borrow money from his wife and the increased economic independence of women is evident in the somewhat strained economic aspect of the conjugal role relationship. There is a good deal of antagonism in the husband-wife relationship and much of it focuses on the economic and domestic duties expected of a wife. Formerly these duties were onerous and strictly disciplined. Nowadays women have considerably more time to themselves and often refuse to do some of the work, such as weeding on the rice farm, that formerly they would have been obliged to do. Also, women have acquired new rights over their own young children, so that if they leave their husbands, or decide not to remarry after his death, they can keep the child providing he or she is young enough.

Wives /

---

1 This situation appears very similar to that described by Nadel of the Nupe. (Nadel, 1954).
Wives who farm rice are usually able to command some labour from their younger sons, if they have any, otherwise they have to pay for their labour. Many wives simply do not have the resources to initiate independent economic activity, but enough do for this to be an important element in the economic life of Mabaibunda, as may be seen from the following figures:

FIGURE 11

Handworked rice farms for Mabaibunda and Magbaikoli

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Heads of Households</th>
<th>Young Men</th>
<th>Wives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magbaikoli - % of total number of farmers</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabaibunda - do -</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabaibunda - % of tot. acreage</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabaibunda - average cents/acre spent on farm</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic fragmentation of the local group

The break-up of the larger local group the kuru kuru kin is now history, but the further breakdown of the local kin group and of the household is a continuing process generated by the social /

1 See Appendix 3 for data on farm management by wives and how this differs from that of their husbands
social behaviour described above. In Mabaibunda and Magbaikoli there were only two cases of brothers with their own households living together out of the total of 42 households. Such brothers co-operate together in much economic activity but it is dubious to regard this co-operation as showing the continued existence of the wider local kin group since it is a contractual arranged that may well exist between households not connected by ties of descent.

In this situation, seen clearly in Mabaibunda but not so clearly in Magbaikoli (only recently exposed to full market incentives), we can identify three types of independent farmers who in their independence naturally undermine the basic unity of the local group. Firstly, there is the household head who mostly employs the labour of dependants, spending relatively little money on the traditional farm (although quite possibly a considerable sum, relatively, on mechanically ploughed land). Secondly, the young man, without his own domestic unit, who may have quite a good size farm (average size a little over three acres) work on it himself and spend little money on it. Thirdly, the wives who have a smaller farm spending a considerable amount of money per acre.\footnote{The actual figures for these three categories of farmers may be seen in Appendix 3, p. , and in Figure 11.} The general use of paid labour, which again I see as having been generated from the basic Village-Town relationship as /
as it has affected young men, is regretted by some of the older inhabitants of the village who dislike to see cash being used as a medium of exchange between members of the same moral-community. Villagers according to them, should help one another as friends.¹

The Household head as Patron

Household heads, trying to maintain a household of a viable size and composition have now to deal with a larger number of factors than were present when they themselves were young. They have to hold together an increasingly fragmented group, deal with the newly important labour gangs, keep their wives and young sons from leaving home. Conversely they have the opportunity, if they are successful in their household management of attracting persons from other households into their own. The kinship structure as described in Section II is sufficiently flexible for this to happen to quite a degree.

I once asked a friend what he would do with a hundred pounds and the reply was that he would build a house with it because a house soon collects a household of persons who enhance your position in the community and who are bound to work for you.

¹ This situation carried two obvious points of interest to those concerned with development. Firstly, in Mabaibunda household heads, those with a right to the title 'farmer' in Temne, are in fact in a slight minority in the total number of those farming by my definition, i.e., those planning, responsible and the crop-owners of a particular piece of land. Secondly, that it is the women who are more involved in farming on business like lines than the men as far as the handworked farms are concerned. These facts obviously affect the direction of extension programmes which tend only to be aimed at household heads.
The head of a household is responsible for protecting his 'house' (an sith). He should also help his people to get tenure of farmland and time to farm it.

The composition of the household, although normally expressed in the idiom of kinship is variable and pragmatic and may vary according to the strategy of the head who is continually wishing to expand his household and increase his wealth and status. In Mabaibunda the number of irregular residences and residence of affines in the households were counted with reference to the household head. The following figures were obtained.

FIGURE 12

Household composition. Affines and other irregular residences in households for Mabaibunda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Mabaibunda Residents</th>
<th>Affines</th>
<th>Other Irr. Residences of population</th>
<th>Total Irregular Residences % of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>314</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just /

1 The figures for irregular residence would be higher if the degree of fictitious kinship ties reported as non-fictitious could be reduced, on the other hand the figures are perhaps a slight distortion in that a household in which say a maternal uncle has taken the place of a dead father will have nearly 100% irregular residence.
Just as the household may grow with irregular additions so it may lose members. A son may leave his father's household in search of a better life and may forfeit his inheritance if he is too long absent without sending gifts. It is said of such a person ɔbara muth Kon ɔ Kas Kon - 'he turned his back on his father'. Conversely, longstanding members of a household have a tendency to become absorbed into the kinship structure of the ideal household.

In attempting to deal with these variables the household has nowadays to act as a patron himself, to bind his household members to him by 'helping' them. Much of his ability to do this depends upon his connections with those more influential than himself, particularly with the Big Men already described. The ability of the household head, for instance, to obtain the use of the best farming land, to get cheap building materials from town and the best protection in legal disputes depends upon his position with respect to Big Men or their agents. In turn, to be influential himself he must be able to command a large household by attracting as many affines, distant kin and indeed non kin into it.

**Economic Stratification within the Village**

Traditionally the Temne recognise degrees of economic differentiation. The afəm a monə are those who have very little /
little, the *afəm a rata* are average, and the *afəm a yola*, sometimes translated as 'gentlemen', are men of substance. These terms refer to categories of people rather than economic strata and it is clear that traditionally chiefs and other influentials were never in fact very wealthy and a village such as Manaibunda would not have any men of substance in it. These categories of individuals did not constitute a socially significant division of society.

Now it was found very difficult to measure economic differentiation between households where money transactions are not recorded and form only a small part of the total system of reciprocating exchanges of all kinds of goods and service. Therefore, the index I took as being the most important single criterion was that of the total area of rice farmed by a household, divided by the number of persons in the household. This calculation rests on the basic assumption of rice farming being the only significant farming activity and that all households derive their income from farming. The first assumption is correct and the second one almost so, since there are small amounts of money made from other local products (oranges for instance), in wage labour and by the craftsmen in the village. Money gained from prestation (a marriage payment for example) or payment for occasional services or fines all tends to be invested /
invested in making a larger farm. To be reliable such assessment should extend over a several year period so that crisis events (legal fees) or special expenditures (building a house) should not distort the figures. The per capita average output reflects not only the ability of the household head to mobilise labour (which in turn is a measure of his social 'wealth') but also of surplus rice produced over and above subsistence needs and which will be sold on the market (money wealth).

From the survey data it appears that the highest score for a household is a little over two acres per member and the lowest about $\frac{1}{2}$ acre per member. Half an acre per person on the Mabaibunda swamp would produce an average six bushels of clean rice which is the annual average estimated consumption per person. There are five households in Mabaibunda near this level but two of them are households which do not rely primarily on farming. None of the remaining three households spent any money on hiring labour in 1967 nor are they landowners or strangers.

The highest acreage/member obviously produces a substantial surplus and two households have this standard although the figures are suspect for one of them. Between these two figures the other households are evenly distributed. Size of household, number of children or landownership are determinants of wealth measured in this way. So at the lower scale there were three households /
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Acres/Member</th>
<th>Farming expenses/Member</th>
<th>Mechanically ploughed acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1422</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
households existing at the subsistence level and from my personal knowledge I can say that two of them were virtually dependant on other larger households, (namely households O and H in Diagram 11) and occupied the only houses without corrugated iron roofs in the village. Since even these households need some money for tax payment, cloth and small items they are both in fact borrowing money and continually having to work for others in order to try to pay back the debt. It is fairly accepted in the village that these men will never be successful. The wealthiest households have radios, cement facing on the front walls and veranda, good corrugated tin roofing and complete economic independence.

Thus, the majority of households in Mabaibunda have responded to its exposure to the market by producing a considerable surplus of rice, but some households have not managed to achieve this and have become dependant and remained at the same level of income. Some households have achieved economic independence by skill in the management of their human resources only, so that the household has managed to maintain a healthy complement of stalwart young men (such is the case with households B and C. Diagram 11), and some by also becoming involved in trading or with some additional activity so that they can hire more labour (such is the case with households L and /
and J. Diagram 11).

Looking at Ilagbaikoli in the absence of similar statistics, I can only observe that there is very little apparent economic differentiation in comparison; the houses there look very similar on the whole and there is no radio in the village.

Farmers in Mabaibunda talk of the new wealth that has come about since the road was opened and the price of rice rose and it is reasonable to conclude that the economic differentiation has increased in recent years.

Credit and the Strategy of Economic Differentiation

While I have been able to demonstrate to some degree the pattern of economic differentiation within the farming village, it was found to be extremely difficult to collect information on the inter-relationships between richer and poorer farmers. While it was admitted that some poorer farmers were heavily in debt to the richer farmers, all farmers were very reticent indeed about these transactions.

In general, there seemed relatively little exploitation of this kind. One heard no complaints about ruthless debt-collecting and there were very few cases of default between villages in the Chiefdom. Thus the major cause of economic differentiation is not simply due to increasing exploitation by the slightly richer of the slightly poorer within the village but /
but may I believe be directly related to differing patterns of involvement by a household in economic relations outside the village.

At the beginning of the season some farmers find themselves without money so that they are unable to invest in the mechanically ploughed land. They also will need some money for small necessities and therefore are forced to hire out their labour to those farmers who do have money at this crucial farm preparation period. Each day that they hire themselves out (either to local farmers, or more likely to stranger farmers, see below) will earn them the equivalent of 80-90 cents. However, since they have missed a potential day's work on their own farm at a peak labour period they will lose the equivalent of about 250 cents, from the tenth of an acre that they could have added to their own farm. They end up with a smaller farm, less surplus and are therefore more likely to find themselves in the same position the following years. They may also have to borrow money during the rainy season, when all the local rice has been eaten, in order to pay for salt, tobacco, medicines, etc., at the local store and this credit doubles in value during the rainy season. Much of this credit comes from townspeople.

Again, it is possible that economic differentiation is due to the size of the household or, and this may amount to much the /
the same thing, to the stage reached in the domestic cycle of the household. I have measured wealth, however, and there appears to be no correlation here. There does appear to be a significant correlation between the amount of money spent on farming per member of a household and wealth, which of course is not surprising considering my definition of wealth and the criteria for its assessment. There are exceptions to this, however.

For the five poorest households a pattern is definable. They have an irregular age structure with few males of the right age, too many non-working dependants. The rest of the households vary in composition and size. Probably what varies is the individual ability of the household to exploit the market for cash cropping and use the money gained to its best advantage. I knew of two cases of household heads who had built houses in the village during the dry season and found themselves with no money, or even rice for seed left when the time came to work on the farm. This severely restricted their farming activity for the year. I have already mentioned the dubious economic wisdom of those who hire themselves out during the digging season and I believe that fiscal skills have much to do with a very different pattern of involvement in the market structure for rice and labour that one sees between the top and the bottom of the scale. Economic differentiation does not appear to be due to the generation /
generation of a category of property or capital owners who succeed in dominating the rest. Property and capital within the village continues to be organised according to diffuse and reciprocating social ties rather than the focused economic relationships of the open market.

**Wealth and Authority in the Village**

Changes in the pattern of economic differentiation have generated a number of conflicts and new structures. I may begin by looking at the figures for contributions solicited from the various households on the occasion of the annual holy day of Ramadan. It had been decided by the group of village elders that the normal contributions by each house should be two leones (one pound) but allowances were made for smaller contributions from 'poor' households. As is normal in fund-raising in such a manner it is expected that the most influential men should be given a chance to display their generosity and thus larger amounts were expected from these persons. Thus, the shopkeeper who was the local agent of a very well-off town trader, was asked for 4.00 and the village chief for 8.00. Now normally, with the traditional authority structure within the village, the 'big men' would be the persons of authority, that is the landowning citizens, the oldest male descendants of the founding settlers. In the absence of a market for cash cropping and in the context of much stronger /
stronger unity of the joint family household, economics and kinship go hand in hand. With the new opportunities for making money, however, some men without large households or positions of authority within the village have succeeded in making farming a profitable business. But wealth of this sort, in the village at least, does not bring authority with it. So, we have C, J and K households (Diagram 11); one of them is also a tailor and head of the village mosque; and the other two who are involved in the trading activities outside of the village are the only households that have succeeded in marketing some of their own rice in the towns. None of these three men have any position of authority within the village apart from their position as household heads, in fact two of them are strangers and the third a relatively young man.

We have also the case of household G headed by a man who by rights should be the village chief and have most authority in the village according to traditional usage. This man has been an economic failure, as is well known, and although he still commands some respect he has lost most of his influence and authority to the head of L, a man conspicuously successful in cash cropping and other marketing activities although he was not born in the village.¹ The head of L succeeded in translating his /

¹ The actual position of this man in the genealogical structure of the village is in dispute and his own version is represented as a dotted line in Diagram 9
his influence into a position of authority in 1958 when he was designated a Pa Santigi, that is a chief at the village level, and he is respected as being a clever and astute individual who is particularly good at dealing with outsiders. These two men and their followers were in a position of considerable conflict in the village, which became expressed in a number of instances of rivalry and accusation which threatened to cause a split in the unity of the village. The head of G is an old man now with few kin and when he dies it is quite possible that the head of L will succeed in creating a general acceptance for his claim to full citizenship to which end he has prepared all the evidence. This evidence consists of genealogical verification of his descent from a first settler with supporting witnesses suitably primed to support the oral record. That he is keen to do it, and to do it in this way, demonstrates the continued dominance of the traditional system of values. However, the new means of gaining wealth and prestige have created this new avenue to authority (even within the village) which has resulted in conflicts and tensions in the political stability of the community. The pragmatic validity of the old stratification of political power according to the stranger-citizen-landowner trichotomy has thus been called into question now that money wealth has created a new source of influence.
It was conspicuous in Mabaibunda and other villages along the Mabaibunda road that the cases of persons like the head of household L who had created positions of influence for themselves were almost all cases of individuals who had established effective clientship ties with Big Men. They acted as local agents for the Big Men and negotiated with the Big Men on behalf of the villagers who needed 'help'.

The head of L himself had been a sort of protégé of a Big Man of Makeni who had exerted influence on him through the process of Islamisation and the organisation of a Muslim congregation. When this Big Man became the Senior Section Chief of the Chiefdom he had this man crowned under him as a Santigi Chief in Mabaibunda and shortly afterwards he was chosen as 'spokesman' to deal with outsiders who wanted to farm on village land and eventually to organise the Mechanical ploughing site there.

This state of affairs contrasts with that which I found in Magbaikoli where there is considerably less money around and considerably less economic differentiation. In this village, the chief, the eldest landowner and the wealthiest individual were all the same individual. It was a village where one heard little of rivalries for power, a village which was described by various strangers as truly 'having one word'. It was a village much easier to collect information in and the people were much more /
more open. This, in an oral society, is indicative of greater harmony within the community.

The conclusion is then that in villages where cash cropping has become established it is difficult for a man to maintain a position of influence and authority unless he can also accumulate the new forms of wealth. A wealthy farmer is not necessarily powerful because of it but stands a good chance of using this wealth to gain such a position. In general the kinship system seems sufficiently flexible to accommodate these generated structures.

**Farmers and Rice Marketing**

We have seen the different farming patterns that have been generated in the three categories of farmers; the household heads, the wives and the semi-independent young men. These groups are differentially involved in the rice market and this has implications in the nature of the relationship between village and town. In 1967 the household heads were directly in control of 300 acres of rice farm in Mabaibunda but of this area about 150 acres were required for the feeding of their households for which they are solely responsible. Thus only about 1,800 bushels rice surplus was left for sale. The wives and sons had total control of 140 acres, but almost all of the rice produced on this land went straight onto the market, and this must have been around /
around 1,700 bushels. Thus there is an approximately equal value of involvement by these two groups in cash cropping.

There are two outlets for rice from Mabaibunda. There are the government agents, the Rice Corporation and the Co-operative Union which buy husk rice only; and the individual private traders who come to the village from Makeni and the South and East, who buy only parboiled and milled rice because of the bulk and weight of unprocessed rice. Parboiling and milling rice is very laborious work which is carried out solely by women and they are simply not capable of processing all the surplus rice produced themselves. All farmers prefer to sell to traders as they get a better price and cash-down payment. Thus, when the rice has been harvested and threshed there is competition for women's labour for the processing work and a husband will generally succeed in getting only a portion of all his rice parboiled and milled by the women of his household. Wives, however, are in a better position, granted their relative independence and they have less rice to mill anyway. Thus the tendency is for women sometimes also working for their son in opposition to their husband, to market their milled rice through the traders and for household heads to market the husk rice they are left with through the Government Agents. This means that household heads are involved in rather different sets of relationship.
relationship with townspeople than their wives and sons. Thus household heads are already likely to be involved in marketing relationships that are different from those of their wives and dependent sons and brothers. Household heads who are forced to sell their rice to these large organisations need help in transporting rice into Makeni or an intermediary who will buy the husk rice off them in the village and here it is that the Trader Big Men tend to step in. Household heads are also liable to use their surplus rice in investing in social relationships themselves, indeed they often see selling their husk rice at a relatively low price to government agents as a form of this.

Wives and young men however have a greater freedom to act in what we might call a purely economic way, accepting cash on the spot (government agents are frequently late in paying or are involved in repayment of loans to farmers in the form of husk rice) and open market competition from beginning to end. The wives in particular who are often hiring a considerable amount of labour as I have shown above are in the best position of all to 'balance their books' in financial terms as they know what they put in and what they got out. This may well be the reason for their shrewdness in trading and cash cropping enterprises.

**Changes in land tenure**

None of the formal rules governing tenure of land have changed, but the outcome and actual practice of tenure is being modified /
modified. Such a village as Mabaibunda which has expanded its population enormously and is attracting commercial rice farmers from outside is beginning to experience a shortage of land and this alone has affected the conditions of tenure. Firstly, good land is already scarce. Formerly, and especially with upland farming, the best land was always the oldest bush and there was a constant tendency to shift the farming site. When the swamp was first opened up the same rule applied initially, but now the more clever farmers are realising that with large numbers of farmers using the swamp and with the improved techniques of farming which allow for continuous cultivation, it pays to try to develop the securest possible tenure in a single piece of good land and to keep it for as long as possible. Also with the increasing economic fragmentation of the house and household there is something nearer to individual tenure, albeit on a shifting basis, than existed previously.

In the parts of the swamp where the competition for land is most intensive the methods of allocation of land has changed. Whereas formerly farms would have been separated from each other by an area of unused land, now many of these farms have continuous boundaries. Formerly, when a man was negotiating for an allocation of land he accompanied the landowner out on the path into the /

---

1 Soil, drainage, depth of water and distance from track all vary considerably within the Mabaibunda swamp.
Diagram 12. Farm Allocation in the Bolilands.

Traditional Method.

\[\times \quad \text{Landowner's mark to land-user, denotes centre of farm.}\]

\[\rightarrow \quad \text{Direction of farmwork.}\]

Method Employed in Crowded Areas of Swamp.

\[\triangle \quad \text{Landowner's stake to land-user, denotes boundary of farm.}\]

\[\quad \text{Boundary ridge.}\]
the land and dug a small patch to indicate where his farm would be centred. The boundaries of the farm would not be marked; indeed, they would not and need not be known exactly. Nowadays, when the farm is allocated the boundary is often dug and sticks planted into the soil to mark the corners. These sticks often stay in position for several years.

Strangers find it increasingly difficult to get the use of land in these areas and in fact in 1967 the Santigi of the village informed or persuaded the village elders that strangers should be given land only in the more distant parts of the swamp. Thus it is that in certain favoured areas of the swamp a somewhat different practice of tenure has arisen and the size of these favoured areas is growing. Whereas formerly a newly arrived settler to the village would have found it quite easy to acquire the usufruct of quite a large area of land for a long lease (within which he might move around from year to year) nowadays this is very difficult. The village has divided rather more sharply into those with a high degree of security of tenure and those who have to negotiate every year for their next year's farm.

The nature of Chiefship

Temne Chiefship ideally rotates in succession between a number, usually four, of 'noble houses' within a particular lineage associated with a Chiefdom. The title is supposed to rotate, according /
according to a set order, from the eldest representative of each house in turn. Nowadays however one hears repeatedly of Chiefships being bought by the candidates who often invest very large sums of money in their campaign to become the next Paramount Chief. Just as the village household head has, because of the new opportunities open to him, found new avenues to power through the money wealth he can accumulate so have new avenues to Paramount Chiefship been created. The rules state that each branch of the noble lineage put up a candidate to fight for the position. The outcome is determined by a meeting of Chiefdom councillors who select their choice, sometimes using a ballot box, and then the candidate has to be approved by the District Officer. As long as a candidate can establish his line of descent adequately, which in effect means obtaining the support of a noble house, the Chiefship becomes a matter of his personal qualifications. Increasingly, Chiefdoms tend to select candidates who are already Big Men and who have already 'helped' them more than any other candidate.

Once a man has acquired a Chieftaincy it is up to him to make what he can out of it. There is a definite tendency for Chiefs who have been used to a considerable income and who have spent a considerable amount of money to obtain the position, to attempt /

---

1 This rotating Chieftaincy is not found among all Temne speaking peoples, those in the North do not rotate.
attempt to recoup their 'losses' in the only way a Chief can, by taxation, tribute exaction, and fines. This often creates bad feelings with his subjects and has been a source of conflict at times. In the Makeni area where there are many Fula cattle-herders in the rural areas, and other stranger groups as well, this poses special problems. Such stranger groups are liable to be favoured especially by the Chief because they have to get his permission and pay him some money before they may be allowed to settle anywhere in the Chiefdom. Chiefs are sometimes tempted to favour strangers who have money rather than their subjects who do not have money and again this has been a source of conflict at times in the past. Chiefs are also tempted to manipulate Chiefdom funds and impose exorbitant fines on legal cases that are brought to him or his court. Strictly speaking, this is corrupt but the farmers do not object in principle to these practices which they regard as normal.

Farmers from Town

I have already shown how Traders and Trader Big Men frequently farm in the villages of their clients. They are also often joined in this activity by other non-entrepreneurial clients of theirs from Town. In Makeni about 25% of all households are engaged in some kind of rice farming the majority of them beyond a /

---

1 Chiefs are paid a salary but it is rather low and depends on the number of taxpayers the Chief can prove he has.
a day's walking distance from town. I use the terms 'stranger farmers' and 'resident farmers' to distinguish those from town and those from the village.

In Makeni about 18 per cent., of all households have members engaged in the Government Sponsored Mechanical Ploughing Scheme (the M.P.S.) accounting along with farmers from other towns, for about 50 per cent. of the acreage ploughed every year. The stranger farmers from Makeni are persons who have the opportunity to exploit the high prices paid for rice in recent years and in particular the rainy season prices in town.

The most likely persons to be farming in this way are traders and semi-retired men who have built a house in Makeni and have large numbers of dependants there. There is also the smaller group of influentials who become involved in farming for rather different reasons and whom I have described above. The farming activity itself is hardly entrepreneurial since it is of low risk and does not involve the creation of new links since stranger farmers use the already existing organisation of the ploughing 'compins' set up by the above mentioned Big Men farmers.

Farming, particularly using the M.P.S. can be carried out from town by making only two visits of about a fortnight each and without the necessity of shifting a large body of dependants to work /

1 Both of these figures are derived from my own 10% sample survey carried out in 1968.
work on the farm. An urban farmer can engage in a commercially profitable farming business if he is able to sell his rice at the highest prices which are found around July and August. By growing his own rice and using it for his own households subsistence needs a townsman is saving himself a considerable amount of outlay.

One third of all the traders in Makeni were engaged in these farming activities and in many ways the involvement in farming is for them an extension of commercial operation towards their source of trade goods. The stranger farmers think of their farming involvement as a commercial operation rather than a farming operation and are far more conscious of balancing pure economic input and output than the resident farmers. Stranger farmers from town generally hire a considerable amount of labour for the harvesting and threshing operations which are not carried out mechanically. It is these farms who are constantly asking that the Government Ploughing Agencies should find and use a suitable harvesting machine. The number of acres taken in the M.P.S. by a Makeni resident at the Mabaibunda site averaged, for a two year period, 15.3 acres compared with an overall figure of 5.6 acres per man for the total of those farming during the same /

1 See Appendix 2.
2 Combine harvesters have been tried but they have a tendency to become bogged in the swamp.
same period at the same place. This figure is probably artificially high since some Makeni people go against the rules of the Co-operative Society and club together to pay for membership of the compin and the ploughing fees under one name. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable difference in the average sizes of farms farmed by stranger and resident farmers within the M.P.S.

Obviously, 15.3 acres produces considerably more rice than the average household would consume in the year. Having harvested, threshed and transported his rice into town, a man is in a very good position to store, parboil and mill it (using the milling machines only to be found in town which are cheap and very quick) and then sell the surplus to the local wage earning rice eaters who are able to buy right through the rainy season. To do this, is simply not possible for the village farmer. So although both stranger and resident farmers use the same scheme both benefit from it in different ways.

 Stranger farmers are often introduced to a village and subsequently organised by the Big Men and it is through the Big Man's enterprises that a greatly increased contact between ordinary Town and Village household heads has come about. The town-based stranger farmers need the help and co-operation of the land-owning villagers for hiring labour, board and lodging when visiting, supporting their interests when they are not there, etc.

1 The average Makeni household has 12.3/ which requires about 6-7 acres to produce its subsistence needs.
village farmers benefit from the spending of the strangers in their village, the added status, the contacts, advice and influence the town residents can help them with and especially the organisational skills necessary to the successful running of an M.P.S. site.

On the basis of these mutual needs a series of friendship links have grown up between the two categories that have considerably greater social substance than the spirit of co-operation that is supposed to attend the Co-operative Society as a unit.

The friendship link (yatigi in Temne) is an interpersonal tie that is generated out of the above conditions and which means that in practice each stranger farmer has someone or some persons in the farming village who are tied to him in this way and vice versa. This friend will lodge him and feed him when he is on a visit and look after his farm when he is not there, etc. Stranger farmers bring gifts from town, can arrange for fertilisers to be bought and a lorry to transport it for his village friend.

The Town Household

Most means of livelihood in town do not depend on the maintenance of a large domestic group, indeed in many ways a large group of dependants is a disadvantage since they are not usually helping the household head in his work. This I see as the main reason for the smaller domestic group found in town.
If the degree of fragmentation of the household is expressed in terms of the average number of dependants per income earner we get:

**FIGURE 13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of fragmentation for Mabaibunda/Magbaikoli</th>
<th>5.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makeni</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also a much higher number of households in the 6-10 persons range as diagram 13 shows. In Mabaibunda there was only one two-person household to be found (in fact a young couple from town temporarily resident during the harvesting season).

Although the domestic unit is smaller in Makeni the average number of people living under the same roof, the household, is not very different. It is still advantageous for a man to have a large household under him as long as he can make sure they are not all his dependants. The larger town household tends to be built up from ties of tenancy and affinal and friendship links rather than agnatic links. The following table shows the percentage of joint families forming households in the three communities /
communities:

FIGURE 14

Joint Family Households in Town and Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Joint Family Households</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of households in sample</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makeni</td>
<td>4 out of 94</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabaibunda/</td>
<td>12 out of 37</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magbaikoli</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tenancy is not found in the villages but in Makeni twenty-five per cent. of all households have tenants which make up fifteen per cent. of the population.²

The Town household is approximately as large as the village household but somewhat differently constructed. The townsman who is making money has small need of a large local kin group to help /

1 Joint family household is defined as a household made up of two or more brothers with their own independent domestic unit or units.

2 According to Gamble (1967) tenancy in Lunsar accounts for 75 per cent. of ties within the household and affinal ties for 10 per cent. He also writes ... 'One also finds two brothers living together under the same roof less frequently than in the villages, though they may sometimes occupy neighbouring houses.' See Appendix 5 for a typical example of a Makeni household.
Diagram 13: Household Sizes in Makeni and Mabaibunda/Margbaikoli

Makeni survey

Household Sizes

Size of Household

Mabaibunda & Margbaikoli survey

Size of Household
help him in his work. It is simply not that kind of work. On the other hand it is advantageous for him to be the head of a large and subordinate household as long as they can support themselves. He is still responsible for them jurally and likewise they should support and help him in the running of the household but otherwise the town household is run on much more business lines. To have a large household is still a necessary part of prestige and status, but because the domestic units are necessarily much smaller in town the ideal of the joint family household is no longer attained.

To achieve this household composition is, however, not possible without a new conflict being set up. Many heads of large households complained to me how they were forced to feed strangers who contributed nothing to the household because otherwise they would incur a bad reputation and loss of prestige. In the village this is not really a problem because the strangers can always be asked to work in the fields, but this is not so in the town. There is thus a conflict between the desire to maintain a reputation for hospitality and a desire to achieve economic independence.

Citizens and Strangers

The changing relationship between citizen and stranger generated in the village has been described. In Makeni there are /
are many more strangers and some of them have succeeded in becoming wealthy traders and craftsmen. There are some groups of strangers particularly the Fulas, the Mandinkas and the Mendes who have succeeded in dominating certain aspects of the marketing, craftsmanship or services in the Town. It seems that it is often the strangers who have succeeded in exploiting the commercial aspects of the town when the local landowning citizens have relied on their steady income in their capacity as landlords, traditional administrators and judges. For many of the young men and other immigrants from nearby areas these positions have not been open to them and this has created a considerable, if variable, tension between those locals (who regard the town as theirs) and the successful strangers in the town. The citizen-stranger antagonism has become considerably more acute in recent years with the rapid increase in the size of Makeni and the political instability of recent years. There have been a number of near-riots focused against strangers in the Town and it is mostly the young men already described who have been involved. This stranger-citizen tension tends to be expressed in terms of tribal membership and also in terms of the political parties which are aligned tribally.

**Capital and Credit**

In Town, as I have described there is a greater degree of stratification /
stratification than in the village. At the same time the acquisition of capital for trading or regular employment both of which are in very scarce supply is of great importance in the search for security. With capital one can become a trader, with employment one has a year-round income.

This has generated two patterns of behaviour. Firstly, there tend to exist informal links that cut across the economically differentiated strata linking rich to poor. These are ties of patronage that do not cut across boundaries between high-stability structures. Patrons help their clients obtain capital or employment who in turn support them. Secondly, a valuable source of capital is the Administration and here again groups of townsmen who club together may use Big Men to negotiate loans to them as Thrift and Credit Co-operative Societies. Big Men may also have a great opportunity for obtaining employment through their influence with the Administration or their involvement in the actual execution of a local project for their clients. Neither of these phenomena were investigated systematically in the fieldwork unfortunately so I can only record them here as a generated structure within the Town.

**Modified Administrative task execution**

Administrators in Makeni have one over-riding problem in the execution of their job. As explained, the Administrator derives his security from the performances of his job within a social /
social structure that is centred in Freetown, 125 miles away, a town which he also looks to as his 'home'. However, in order to execute orders, that come from above, he is in fact forced to deal with locals and he is forced to deal with them in an essentially non-coercive manner. He is heavily restricted both in the means he may employ to enforce any policy and by his inadequate knowledge of the local situation. Very often he is not a Temne-speaker and the information he is receiving is likely to be highly selective because of this. In order to be at all effective he is forced to modify both his strict adherence to the particular order and the strictly bureaucratic procedure laid down for him. To give a few examples as to how this may work. It is the policy of the Rice Corporation, which is the ploughing agent handling the M.P.S., not to plough for any farmer who has not paid the Corporation in advance the full ploughing fees. Now the local Production Officer has to rely on the secretaries of the Co-operative Societies that organise the ploughing sites to collect the money and pay it to him - he has neither the knowledge of the farmers nor the time to do it himself. The secretaries, or other 'big men' of the society are concerned to get the tractors to the site as early as possible and want to be sure that they are going to be given as good a treatment as possible by the Corporation (which has a varied /
varied record in the quality of its work) before they hand over the money. What happens in the end is that the Production Officer in Makeni sends his men and machines out to the ploughing site after a certain amount (around one half) of the money has been received. This little game is played every year and sometimes it fails to work and the Production Officer is left with ploughed land for which he has received no money. If all goes well nobody in Freetown need know that he has had to bend the rules a little and been forced to rely in the execution of his job on his trust in persons who are not members of the Corporation.

The District Commissioners who overlook the irregular exercise of judicial authority by a Paramount Chief does so because he relies heavily on that Paramount Chief, as a civil servant, to act in a way that is not going to make his own job too difficult. A Paramount Chief should support the Government in such matters as maintaining public peace, executing all sorts of local decisions organising support and hospitality for visiting politicians, collecting taxes, etc. If violence occurs in any area of a chiefdom, outside a town, it is up to the Paramount Chief with his chiefdom police, councillors and knowledge of the trouble and the personalities involved, to deal with. This is so that the matter does not get out of hand and thereby reflect back /
back on the ability of the Commissioner to administer his area. In return for doing this the Commissioner might overlook the use of the district jail for irregular purposes by the Paramount Chief.

Similarly, a District Commissioner simply does not have the resources to compile a report on the activities of a certain person or situation which his superior might be interested in by using the bureaucratically defined means of collecting information. In practice, the only way for him to get this information is for him to develop or use a contact, maybe a chief, maybe a town councillor or trader who will supply the information gathered in turn through that contact's life-time network of clients, informants and friends. The Commissioner cannot force the information, nor will his contact give it for nothing; at some stage the Commissioner will have to reciprocate and repay his contact with some favour that he is in a position to bestow.

5. A Summing Up

The changing household and developing region

I am now in a position to summarise the generated structures that I have selected to describe. Briefly they add up to two significant processes of change. Firstly, the organisation of the household is changing in both village and town and this is likely /
likely to have far reaching consequences. Secondly, there is growing out of what I could only describe initially as a socio-economic area, defined geographically, the sociological phenomenon of a region. The first is largely being a consequence of migration and the growth of the market and trading activities. The second is the result of both the growth of the market but also the activities of individual influentials, the Big Men who act as mediators binding together the local elements of Village, Town and Administration. Along with and forming part of the growth of the region as a political phenomenon have been changes in avenues to authority in the Village.

The behaviour patterns of social migrants has consequences for both these developments. In their attempts to move there has resulted the generation of two groups of persons who are politically exploitable by the Big Men. There has resulted an inbalance in the demography of the villages with important consequences and the migrants also constitute a large 'floating population' in the Town. This has affected the composition of many Town households which are made up of many small domestic groups standing in a semi-formalised contractual and non kin relationship to each other. Again many of these would be migrants end up back in the villages and bring ideas and experiences back with them. The movement of women and the seasonal movement /
movement of young men has also involved a reorganisation of the Village households and of the conjugal relationship.

Next I described the activities of the entrepreneurs, the traders and the Big Men, the latter category again dividing into two sub-types. What emerges immediately is that such entrepreneurs are successful Townsmen, strategically they must be heavily invested in social relationships in the Town. Next, it is striking just how these influentials have taken advantages of the differences between the high stability structures. The vast majority of the population live in villages and these influentials (the Big Men) have moved out into the villages setting up economic and political enterprises. Their modes of operation and the kinds of enterprises they set up have been described.

Lastly I have described the actions of individuals within high stability structures reacting to the migrants and entrepreneurs showing what behaviour patterns the development of the region and the nature of the relationships between high stability structures have been generated from them.

The single most important factor in the genesis of the region is the activity of the Big Men who act as links between the diverse parts of it. As I have shown they act as patrons and by means of other patrons. When introducing my account of the entrepreneurs I showed (Diagram 14) that there are patrons who /
who are not entrepreneurs, that is who operate as patrons purely within high stability structures. My account has talked little of such patrons in general but it may now be seen that all patrons are in fact connected in a ladder of influence that reaches from the household head (who is forced to be increasingly patronising) up to the highest levels of the Administration. This ladder at certain crucial points crosses boundaries between high-stability structures. Certain rungs in this ladder are occupied by the Big Men, the cultural brokers and the whole structure, as I have tried to show, converges naturally at the top so that only a few Big Men connect up the Makeni regional ladders with the Freetown patrons. It is the structure of the ladder that one may see the meaning of the 'region'. It is the pyramidal shape of the ladder of influence within the area that makes it into a region. The few Big Men who connect the region with nation act, as I have shown, as articulators of issues so that, for instance, the citizen stranger conflict in Makeni becomes aligned to a National political party conflict. The structure is, as yet of low stability and of low recognition. 'Help' passes down the ladder and support passes up.

The Universality of Patronage

The importance of patrons and patronage in my argument

is /
is obvious. Big Men are kinds of patrons and they have patrons above and below them in the ladder of influence.

After the new President Siaka Stevens, resumed office in 1968 he received numerous visits from the delegates of most of the very many voluntary associations of standing in the country. These visits he received in his office where speeches pledging support and loyalty to him were made and photographs taken. He could not turn them away despite the fact that his duties were being severely disrupted. In the end, it had to be announced over the radio that much as he regretted doing so he would not be free to receive any more delegations, as his work on their behalf was suffering. This is typical patron-client deference behaviour and very little different from that of a newly arrived stranger in a village who makes a formal visit (with his local sponsoring elders) to the head of the village in order to regularise his presence and state his reason for coming to the village.

It is patronage that creates the ties that extend thus from the top to the bottom of Sierra Leone society and it is in this context that I think the process of Islamisation must be seen. The values and practices of Islam seem to relate closely to the ideals /

1 M. Kilson (1966) incorporates the existence of patronage into what he calls a reciprocity model (p.267) of Sierra Leone politics. However, he fails to distinguish reciprocity between persons of equal status involving exchanges of like for like and reciprocity between persons of unequal status involving exchanges of different classes of goods and services with very different consequences. The former cannot cross boundaries between high stability structures.
ideals and dynamics of patronage, and it is on this functional relationship that I want to end this Section of my thesis.

Islamisation and Patronage in the Developing Region

Within the region it is the patron entrepreneurs who are crucial in binding together the diverse elements, but it is the values, symbols and organisation of Islam and to a lesser extent Christianity that provide the best supernatural rubric and moral backing for these local changes. Islam not only organises and spreads from Town, as the Patrons do, but is specifically associated with trade, craftsmanship and a more modern way of life.

If we take a Weberian view of religious values and social action it may be seen how Islam places the individual in a new relationship to supernatural forces, rather than the individual as a member of a group; how it introduces certain universalistic concepts that are more appropriate to the larger scale of the developing region; and how it mirrors the institution of patronage in its concept of 'degrees' of purity with a specialised priesthood. To farmers increasingly caught up in the economic and political life of a region, Islam, is a much more suitable and appropriate set of beliefs than the traditional Temne beliefs in the supernatural. Just as Patrons help their clients, so the Moslem God responds to prayers, etc. It is the Town-learnt social skills that enable the entrepreneur patron to act as cultural /
cultural broker and it is Islam that is the 'Town religion' as opposed to the pagan bush. The Islam found in villages may be regarded as a low version of Islam, incorporating many of the older beliefs. It is only in the Town that one finds Moslems truly literate in Arabic, running small schools and possessing small libraries.

The very method by which Islam has spread mirrors, and indeed often accompanies, the spread of the growing Town's influence over its hinterland by the activities of traders, Big Men and chiefs.

The main elements in the grass roots conversion to Islam may be seen in the following accounts of the coming of Islam in the Makeni area:

'The Temne, they used to say about where the Moslems came from; they used to say, they used to say that those people came from Mauritania. Well, people went on saying, the Moslems way, but this teaching, it was not bringing people sense i.e. knowledge and understanding exactly like teaching as it is today but at that time those people had a great blessing, anything they said so it would be, until they became feared in these lands. ... Well, these people, they were in the land until they had settled in many villages and had introduced religion to the villagers, until a time when the Susu came also and swelled their numbers, then the Fula came. But those who initiated religion in the land, the Mandinkas, they eventually taught reading and writing well. When they began teaching their Koran pronunciation was like the way the Fulas do it because when the Mandinkas first began, their reading was rudimentary in Temne only but they had a great blessing on them.'

This /
This is a reasonably verbatim translation of an interview. The reference to Mauritaina and the concept of baraka identify the main doctrinal source of Islam in Sierra Leone, that is from the Maghreb of North Africa.

Chiefs and men of influence were often keen to attract such men into their households and provide them with a daughter to marry and land to farm so that they might have access to their (the Mandinkas) services, both secular and sacred.

The main impetus to the process of Islamisation now comes from the Market-Administrative centres and is spreading outwards to the hinterland villages. The National Administration is prepared to recognise schools set up by local Muslim organisations and provide teachers for such subjects as English and Mathematics.

Elsewhere, one meets learned, or not so learned, Moslem venerables taking a regular group of children every evening around a special fire and teaching them the Arabic alphabet and Koranic phrases by vote.

To become a Muslim requires no elaborate ceremony, no particular knowledge of doctrine, this contrasts strongly with Christianity

---

1 This fire is called Karande (in Mandinka, a group of stranger traders and craftsmen) and this term also applies to the pupils who sit around it for light. This fire is always in front of houses which separates it semantically from the strictly secular cooking fires which are always behind.
Christianity in Sierra Leone. A prospective Moslem arranges to be officially accepted by the leader of a congregation and this leader will see to his instruction in the protocol and note of daily prayer. The convert would probably adopt certain characteristic styles of dress. Thereafter the general conception appears to be that of a man moving gradually towards a greater purity of Islamisation and piety and this will become manifest in his position within the congregation of his mosque. Muslim prayers, whenever they involve more than one person are led by a man who sits in front of the congregation with his back to his followers. A pious man who reads and speaks Arabic, who dresses in the characteristically 'pure' manner of the good Muslim will seldom 'pray behind' a man he considers lower than him in the scale of purity. In this informal hierarchy of piety the pilgrimage to Mecca ranks high but ranks lower than being responsible for building any but the smallest of mosques. Building a new mosque implies the establishing of a new congregation and this implies a considerable following for the man responsible.

Here is how the villagers express the coming of Islam to their own village:

"You see how our people first began here. Our people when they were journeying, they came here. Pa Kapër Moi, the elder, well his child bore Pa Mamu and at that time there was no religion here. This must have been about fifty years ago as Pa Mamu died in 1968."
Our father, our grandfather bore Pa Mamu. Cherno, of the people of Kaloko [a Mandinka patronym], came from inland: well, he came by himself. When he arrived he met a middle-aged woman (in the village) and she said 'the big moslem has come'. He said to lodge him with her. They called him Cherno, his real name was Lamina Sanda, though at that time he was called Cherno. Then the woman went to Pa Kapar Mbi, her elder brother and said 'I have guests but they are Muslim? This woman was called Ya Nandina, she said 'but he is not my guest, I am not able to lodge him, so I am here since I am a woman I cannot lodge him'. Pa Kapar Mbi said 'The word is good. If you have a guest, he is my guest. Go and bring him to my house I will lodge him for you.' You realise he was lodging him for some time when they went to Pa Kapar Mbi and said 'let us bring pupils so that he may teach them to read so that the dina may come here at Mabaibunda.' Kapar Mbi agreed. Having agreed, they gathered together some children among them Santigi Conteh [the present town chief of Mabaibunda] to learn to read, also they brought he who is now an Al Haji in Freetown, and Brima Koroma, and they brought Sadu and Namudu Konteh, they were six. So they gathered them for the class, he taught them, and at that time vagbens (a secret society) was powerful in the village. Then he said 'Pa Kapar Mbi, he wants to move me out of the village, the society is powerful in the village, it does not agree with religion? Furthermore, he [the Muslim] was wont to tell his beads [Muslim prayer beads], to tell them all night [in order to invoke protective forces against the power of the secret society]. He said 'I will have to move you from the village here, your idea is good. I will take you to a place, the farm huts I will show you are at some distance, I will take you there.' So he took him there RoMoria, it was not far. So there he was until he had taught his pupils, they were completely instructed. They brought some others and he taught them there, and so on right up to the year before last, [1965] when he died. So that religion should be introduced then Pa Santigi, when they had finished learning, made them construct a praying ground [called a wasj] here. That praying ground, you know /

1 See Diagram 10, p.137.
know how it is, it is not fine. Since it was not fine that is why they said to build a mosque. Let us make a mosque, they said, so that the religion may grow. When they built the mosque (this was around 1963 with the help of stranger patrons) the  

vagberry  

which was there then, lay down, it was wrong, there was just the religion. They brought the tabule (the ritual drum found in all mosques) to hand there. Some Muslims then brought the English Mats, they gave respect to the congregation. That Mosque, when we first laid the foundations, at first it was not fine, it was made with sticks only, it was about to fall down, so they set to again. They said 'let us not sit down quietly, let us set to it again'. So they made bricks (mud bricks), they said 'let us hire workmen', everyone said to take workmen. These men, when they had built the walls completely, were paid, but not the full amount, they left the arrangement to God (implying that it was partly a labour of love since the workmen agreed to work for less than full pay). They called a carpenter to cover the house with a tin roof.

Here we see the main elements in the grass roots conversion to Islam in the farming villages. There is a lack of emphasis on doctrine, rather an emphasis in terms of a commitment to change with education and mosque building; opposition between religion (andina) and the Secret Societies and the theme of the individual Muslim, highly respected, establishing a congregation through his pupils and the interesting and to the Temne novel concept of degrees of purity expressed here in the standard of building construction of the mosque.

Islam has brought with it (to use an inadequate metaphor) not only the beliefs and practices of the Muslims in the field of religion, but a total change in world view that I see as being particularly /
particularly relevant to the changing relationship between the urban and rural cultures. The changes in world view are, to put it most simply, towards a wider scale view of society and humanity, towards an openness in relations, a degree of social stratification and bureaucratisation and emphasis on an individual's personal relationship with God. These views free the individual from the segmented village as the only meaningful world, into a world where trade can flourish and large numbers, even categories of people, can engage in joint action.
SECTION IV

CONCLUSIONS

The Empirical Conclusions

In the study of social change, the phenomenon of the small 'pre-industrial' town based primarily on marketing with strong administrative and servicing facilities has neglected in favour of studies of urbanisation, national elites and migrants. A number of useful studies have been made of the 'impact' of the cash economy and the 'impact' of emigration on village life\(^1\) and also of certain specific phenomena associated with social change such as millennial cult movements or voluntary associations but the major effect has been located in the large towns.

This emphasis is not justified in demographic terms for these urban studies have been concerned largely with towns of about 100,000 and upwards in population and there are only sixteen of these in the whole African continent. Against these large towns, most of which have manufacturing and mining industries, must be balanced the towns of 5,000 and upwards in population of which there were estimated to be about 450 in 1955.

Broadly /

\(^1\) For example Dalton, G. (1967). A notable exception to the trend of 'impact' studies in Africa has been Polly Hill (1963 and 1970).
Broadly, the studies of elites in Africa have been closely aligned with studies made by anthropologists in Europe using concepts of role, network and recruitment and seemed to be fundamentally concerned with finding out whether these small groups of individuals are becoming westernized or not.

The studies of social change in rural areas is almost entirely concerned with the breakdown or occasionally the maintenance of a community structure under the impact of new cash, market or labour opportunities. It is very difficult to relate these two kinds of studies although some useful suggestions have been made in the studies of the urbanisation process. These studies have been empirically and theoretically fruitful but the leads suggested by these studies have not applied to the smaller non or pre-industrial towns which have sprung up all over Africa.

In Sierra Leone itself only geographers and a few American political scientists have concerned themselves with towns outside of Freetown. Only Gamble has published a sociological study of a small town and this itself was the result of fieldwork carried out as part of a study of urbanisation.

This /

1 e.g. Simpson, D. (1968) and Harvey, M. (1967).
2 Gamble (1967).
This thesis has attempted to establish the value and importance of the small non-industrial town and to outline a particular case where the structures being generated may be considered of considerable importance. With such a town as Makeni I have tried to show that it has inevitably an important political and economic relationship with an immediate hinterland and that this relationship is a changing one. I have tried to establish that the relationship between the town and its hinterland is generating a new regionalism that is of considerable political significance. I have tried to show what this means in terms of actually perceived opportunities and actions to the majority of people in the area, that is, the rice farmers. What emerges is that with the developing region there are associated a large number of changes in the internal structure of domestic units and avenues to authority in the village and the spread of Islam.

Thus one conclusion that may be drawn from the analysis of the developing region and its growing importance is that there are good possibilities for more work to be done in this area. One of the most important questions suggested in this thesis is the nature of the relationship between the region and the nation, it is here that the greater opportunities of all lie for the entrepreneur and such a perspective may well throw light /
light on some of the more obvious political phenomena such as 'tribalism' that I have not really considered. At present it is very difficult to see whether the local Big Man is going to become more important by controlling more local sources of support, that is by emphasizing his 'regionality', or whether he is likely to become less important through some form of incorporation into a National Structure.

The conclusion for our understanding of Sierra Leone and Makeni Society thus ends, as I suppose it should do by suggesting further areas of ignorance and future topics of research.

Theoretical Conclusions

In this thesis, I have tried to develop and use a descriptive framework to delineate a particular situation in a way that could be applied on a wide front. This framework, I see as being especially valuable in that it attempts, at least to deal with social change without abandoning totally an organic model of social structure.

There are two main views as to what constitutes social change but whichever is adopted it is the interplay between the low and stability structures and the transformation of one to the other is important. If one understands social change to be the equivalent of cultural change, changes in the institutions of /
of a people then the key process is that in which a structure changes from a low to a high stability, a process of institutionalisation, of routinisation. If social change is seen to be any change in patterns of social behaviour, then such changes must be seen against a background of constraints and opportunities provided by the high stability structures available to the actor in any situation. In either case, the change itself is seen as being generated out of individual choices made by reasonable persons. A large selection of these generated patterns, taken together may be usefully described as part of a 'trend', a general movement in a certain direction.

The emphasis however, in this thesis, lies on the empirical demonstration of the structures of behaviour that may be covered by such a term.

This conceptual framework which I see as being particularly valuable in the study of social change may be related the framework constructed by F.G. Bailey.

In his book 'Tribe, Caste and Nation', he describes these three structures in terms that obviously relate closely with that used in this thesis. It does provide an interesting contrast however in that in this study the village of Baderi acts merely as a convenient political arena within which the mutually incompatible languages of caste, tribe and nation that provide
provide the three scripts used to construct the play of social life. In other words, geographical and social structures of high stability cut across each other and yet remain identifiable in essentially the same ways as in the analysis I have used. In order to describe and account for social change Bailey describes in considerable detail the 'bridgehead' actions that sometimes operate in disputes and their resolution in which allegiances in one of the three structures is aligned or opposed to allegiances in an other. This is a subtle approach that could no doubt also be applied in the developing Makeni region but I have chosen instead to consider a somewhat cruder low stability structure, that is the activities of the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are likely to be crucial in the process of change since they by definition, operate in areas of low moral or institutional density where greater freedom is available and they set up enterprises that are uncertain because they are new. They take risks that most cannot. One must be careful not to identify social change generally with the activities of entrepreneurs however, they are not the elusive 'innovators' of cultural anthropology. One may well find that there are far more numerous /

1 Barth, who also sees the entrepreneur as crucial to social change in such a situation of changing scale uses the term 'prognostic' to describe the entrepreneur's outlook.
numerous if smaller scale 'innovators' that never move out of a high stability structure, who occupy no mediating role at all. One may find that a person of exceptional innovatory ability does not see any opportunity of profitable enterprise outside of the structure of his birth so stays and leaves his mark on it there. Moreover, in a situation such as the Makeni region, such clear opportunities exist in mediating between structures that the resulting low stability structures are best seen as being generated out of the relationship between the high stability structures rather than being due to the existence of a certain type of individual, the 'innovator'.

The actual process by which a low stability becomes one of high stability is not directly observable unfortunately since it is made up of mental events. If, however it does happen then the structure will acquire stability, a characteristic different from that of duration as described in Section I. The concept of social change applies to changing patterns of behaviour and by itself this does not imply whether the patterns have duration or stability. They could fall into either category.

1 Such was Bai Bureh, the Temne warrior whom British Army officers came to respect as a military commander of great cunning and invention.
What high stability does imply, however, is that it enables us to make statements about the future since stability implies a resistance to disequilibrium. I would disagree, therefore with Bailey's statement that 'we can only identify change retrospectively'.

Using the perspective as developed in this thesis change may be identified, even predicted sometimes in two ways.

Firstly, by describing the high stability structures and other techno-economic features of the environment we may be able to postulate the possibilities for profitable enterprises, their location and scale. Such is the case with the political entrepreneurs in Makeni exploiting a gap in high-stability structure in which large numbers (six farmers to every townsman) of potential supporters may be sought within a convenient distance from a local centre of power. Secondly, by examining a range of low-stability structures in a given area one may be able to hypothesize that certain institutions are likely to grow out of or upon them. Thus we may suppose that as the farmers increase the production of rice to supply the local market, so will the opportunities for entrepreneurs operating between village and town increase. Even where the framework of concepts cannot provide much insight into the future it nevertheless /

---

1 Bailey, F. (1964) p.255.
nevertheless may be used to locate the most crucial areas in the confusion of structure that has come to characterise the Third world countries of today.

The framework for the study of social change, used in this study, grew out of a concern with the nature of social structure. While not denying the existence of forces of change coming from within a high stability structure it sees social change as primarily a phenomenon of marginality and intermarginality.
On my own four acre mechanically ploughed farm the following data was collected. The area of the farm was 3.8 acres.

Expenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share capital in Co-operative Society</td>
<td>Le. 4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration fee</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to make Society 'known' to the chief</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughing fees</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertiliser</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport for fertiliser</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for labourers</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrowing and harvesting</td>
<td>46.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Le. 91.35</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Labour:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Man/days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harrowing and sowing</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total yield was 48 bushels, worth about Le. 100. if sold immediately.
A Stranger's farm.

This was a 22.2 acre farm.

Expenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost/acre</th>
<th>Le.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securing tenure and digging</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>177.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seedling nursing</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>84.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transplanting</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>40.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrowing</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>85.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>61.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting and threshing</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>125.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: Le. 574.30

Expenditure per acre Le 27.00 approx. His yield was 15 bu/acre which at Le 2.00/bu. would bring him Le. 668.00.

The same year he took a 10 acre mechanically ploughed farm in the same swamp.

Expenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Le.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ploughing fees</td>
<td>60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed harrowing</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed - 8 bushels</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertiliser</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour costs</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for labourers</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting</td>
<td>90.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: Le. 220.00

Expenditure per acre Le.22.00. Yield not recorded.
A handworked farm of 2.3 acres supplied the following data.

**Labour input:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Man/days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Digging (many were very young boys)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scattering heaps and planting (young boys)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birdscaring (young boys)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>125</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 2

**KINSHIP, DESCENT AND LOCAL GROUP TERMINOLOGY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kas</td>
<td>father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kas feth</td>
<td>stepfather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kara</td>
<td>mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ya feth</td>
<td>stepmother or father's wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wunt</td>
<td>brother, sister; suffixed by descriptive term for male-female and older-younger characteristics - also cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kasmgbom</td>
<td>mother's father, father's father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>karagbobm</td>
<td>mother's mother, father's mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>koto</td>
<td>elder brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tara</td>
<td>elder sister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rani</td>
<td>wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>res</td>
<td>co wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bate</td>
<td>favourite wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barin</td>
<td>mother's brother, father's brother (relations generally through mother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ajtum</td>
<td>mother's sister, father's sister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>komang</td>
<td>wife's older brother (sometimes sister), wife's father, daughter's husband (rarely used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nasin</td>
<td>wife's younger brother, or sister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wos</td>
<td>husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wan</td>
<td>child, son, daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rok</td>
<td>son's son, son's daughter, daughter's son, daughter's daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ninkara</td>
<td>mother-in-law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


am buna - patronym group

am bonso - wide group bearing same patronym, tribe, any broad ethnic group. Can refer to scattered kindred or lineage

a bimba - forefathers

afəm a baki - ancestors, elder's of the village

kuru kin or kukuru kin - the compound, the large group centered on the core of persons descended from a common grandfather, now defunct

an sith - the household

an kunthi - independant household, not common

afəm - family, any local group of people

ankunte - royal lineage, royal house

makas - father's people

makara - mother's people refers to direction rather than group

rakomra -

sathkom - both refer to a general concept of 'relatives'

rawankom - position of birth, referring to criteria of seniority

a wuth - descendants

kirdi - old person without relatives around to care for them

an Turay ṣa - the group of persons known and defined by reference to Turay

a karaṣa -

Kaifus - domestic unit, (literally - a hearth)
### APPENDIX 3

#### FARMING DATA FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN MABAIBUNDA 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Total Cash expenses in farm operations in cents.</th>
<th>No. acres farmed mechanically</th>
<th>No. acres farmed traditionally</th>
<th>Tot. acres in household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5,420</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2,060</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>7,760</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The /
The following data excludes mechanically ploughed land of which there was 139 acres held in all by Mabaibunda residents in 1967.

Mabaibunda farms 1967
(excluding mechanically ploughed farms)
Total area farmed 292.5 acres
Average acreage of holding 3.5 acres

Farms by heads of domestic units 1967
Total area farmed 189.1 acres
Average area of holding 5.1 acres
Farms by wives 1967
Total area farmed 46.1 acres
Average area of holding 1.8 acres

Farms by young men 1967
Total area farmed 60.6 acres
Average area per holding 3.1 acres
Seed sown and transplanted, by bushel for Mabaibunda 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Broadcast</th>
<th>Transplanted</th>
<th>Broadcast on mechanically ploughed land</th>
<th>Total sown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household heads</td>
<td>95.25</td>
<td>41.10</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>256.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wives and sons</td>
<td>53.35</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>190.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total seed for Mabaibunda 446.45
APPENDIX 4.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN MAKENI

1. All Peoples Congress Party
3. Bombali women’s progressive society
4. Red Cross
5. Teachers salary earners Co-operative society
6. Catholic congregation
7. Sierra Leone Church congregation
8. Muslim congregation
9. Sanda Muslim jamaat
10. Rogban T.& C. society
11. The labourers union
12. The lorry drivers union, associated with the Zorro boys
13. Makeni women’s T. & C. society
14. Bombali Tennis Club
15. Boy Scouts
16. Various savings clubs centred on market and commonly referred to as Esuso
17. Die society
18. Ragbenu society
19. Pas society
20 /
20. **Sabano society**
21. **Ranbo society**
22. **Mambo society**
23. **An joli society**
24. The Turntable young stars
25. The Rolling Stones
26. Red Army football club
27. The Shadows football club.
APPENDIX 5

A MAKENI HOUSEHOLD

This table was taken from the 10% survey of ratepayers in Makeni town and represents a typical town household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to head of household</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Stay in Makeni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Yamba Taraweli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Market Asst. and trader</td>
<td>28 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kadiatu Kargbo</td>
<td>wife of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Nafat Koroma</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Hawa Sesay</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Shaku Tarawali</td>
<td>brother of 1</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>19 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Abdulai</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>Pupil</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>Pupil</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Titi Bangura</td>
<td>sister of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>19 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>mother of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>40 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Pa Thompson</td>
<td>tenant of 1</td>
<td>Clerk (P.W.D.)</td>
<td>7 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Mr. Brima</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>C.I.D.</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Yanch Kargbo</td>
<td>stepmother of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Yamba Kamara</td>
<td>brother of 12</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Kadiatu Soukoh</td>
<td>wife of 13</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Relationship to head of household</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Stay in Makeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Ahmed Kamara</td>
<td>son of 13 x 14</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Borbor</td>
<td>son of 13 x 14</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Sallay</td>
<td>daughter of 13 x 14</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Ali Bangura</td>
<td>Tenant of 1</td>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Gbenki Conteh</td>
<td>Stepmother of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Rukol Kamara</td>
<td>Stepmother of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Nandanra Kaboko</td>
<td>Aunt of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Age Tarawali</td>
<td>sister of 1</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


DALTON /


IJAGBEMI /


LITTLEJOHN, J. (1960)a: The Temne house. Sierra Leone Studies. No.XIV.

LITTLEJOHN, J. (1960)b: The Temne an sasa. Sierra Leone Studies. No.XV.


MITCHELL /


