Pathways to genocide: the process of ideological radicalisation (part 2)

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The nation: Ideological radicalisation of the elect

Introduction

When reflecting on the ideological placement of the anti-nation in genocidal ideology, one can be forgiven for agreeing with Hitler when he averred that the nationalisation of the masses ‘can never be achieved by half-measures, by weakly emphasising a so-called objective standpoint, but only by a ruthless and fanatically one-sided orientation towards the goal to be achieved’ (1969 [1925]: 306). Though certain scholars of civic and civil nationalist movements would heartily disagree that such extremes are necessary to form national identity, even they would admit that the understanding of a national self is at the core of any nationalist movement. This chapter seeks to address whether or not there are shifts in the ideological perception of the nation in cases of radicalising ideology and, if ideology in this regard does change, whether or not there are any similarities of themes or patterns across my three cases.

The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain how extreme ideology of the national group radicalises in its evolution toward genocide with hopes to further the discussion regarding the appropriateness of path dependence to the cumulative radicalisation of ideology. In other words, does state-led ideology regarding the national self go beyond self awareness and even beyond traditional feelings of national pride? Is the ideological depiction of the nation used to legitimise policies portrayed as having the intent of protecting the nation?

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the nation and how the ‘us versus them’ mentality of ethnicity manifests itself generally in nationalising states. This moves toward a more focused discussion of the nation in radicalising states in which I begin discussing Turkey, Germany and the Balkans in detail, using the geopolitical
events discussed in Chapter Four to follow the dynamisation of ideological shifts. The analysis section is my last main element, during which I seek to answer the questions above in a comparative light, discussing the similarities and differences across each of my cases, focusing particularly on any present patterns and changes in ideology, in order to draw the final conclusions presented in my last few paragraphs.

The nation

Chapter Three shows how ideas of nationhood are expressed in academic scholarship; the work of theorists of nationalism has shown us that though ethnic and other types of conflict can arrive out of nationalist sentiment, it need not do so. Indeed, unlike Hitler's assertion above, their work goes so far as to describe the nation as 'a relative community of character' where the community is the 'totality of physical and mental characteristics that are peculiar to a nation, that unite its different members and divide them from other nations' (Bauer 1996: 51). In short, there is a perception that the nation is composed of a people group sharing a similar history and culture which includes religious/mythic symbols and language. The national idea 'is a general conception, arising in the course of an intellectual debate, which attempts to define the identity and historical goals of a nation' (Pavkovic 1994: 441) This, however, is contrasted with a more ethnocentric view of the nation in which the national self is perceived as 'a social entity rooted in space and time and characterized by an enduring inner essence, a spirit or Geist, a vital soul, which manifests itself in cultural expressions, language and art, social relations and legal codes, and even economic arrangements' (Wolf 2002 [1999]: 235). From this perspective, the nation is no longer a collective united by culture, religion, language or citizenship, but is instead a shared soul manifested in each individual which then results in these activities; this is a fine distinction in definition, but a vital one. Wolf's description points to the heart of ethnocentrism in organic nationalism: that man 'is before he acts; nothing he does may change what he is' (Bauman 2002

37 For theorists of civic and civil nationalism see Chapter Three.
Chapter Seven: Radicalising the elect

[1989]: 114). The nation, then, becomes the embodiment of what Lifton calls the 'racial-cultural substance' in political and apolitical spheres (in Staub 1989: 122).

Not all consequences of this fastidious belief in a collective are entirely malevolent all of the time. Waller, in *Becoming Evil*, reminds his readers of patriotism in war, bureaucratic support and civic activeness, all of which carry positive connotations in modern society and can be outcomes of collective national pride (2002: 33). In many cases, however, a belief in a chauvinistic ethnonational collective encompasses more than mere pride; as discussed in Chapter Three, organic nationalist movements result in a belief that one's nation is inherently elite to the extent that inclusion in the nation is hard to attain if one begins as an outsider.

As Wolf and Bauman infer, to be a part of the nation is believed to be an inherited quality, one typically based on an accepted belief of blood and generational ties. Organic nationalist movements are typically comparative doctrines where 'each nation's genealogy [is] inserted within a wider civilizational story,' one in which the nation is portrayed in an elite position (Mann 2004: 84). Within nationalist propaganda, these inherited rights and qualities of national inclusion are not presented as ideologically constructed myths; they are instead presented as 'natural', and, therefore unchosen, just as one's race and parentage are unchosen. Paired with this understanding, is the perceived need to transcend all things that puts the needs of the individual self before the needs of the nation (Anderson 1983: 143; Weber 1996: 37; Mosse 1985). These premises form the base of ethnocentrism, in which individual men and women are given a defined identity and role within society through a distinction of the 'good' and 'bad' in the world in which they live, thereby making it impossible to set one's identity aside (Barth 1996: 81; Mosse 1985: xxvii; Kaufmann 1996).

Ethnic identity established upon these lines is problematic. When state elites understand the national self in such way, an 'us versus them' relationship is established, resulting in situations where the identity of other-groups is not self-
subscribed, but is instead imposed by national elites in control of the state—particularly when the nation’s religion, culture, language or history is similar or closely linked with other-groups present in the geopolitical region (Kaufmann 1996: 144; Staub 1989: 253). National identity cannot be objectively measured, particularly if Kershaw is right in his claim that social groups exist ‘to serve in their different ways the political goal of the struggle for ‘national survival’...it was as parasitic as it was predatory’ (Kershaw 1989: 142; see also Mann 2005: 181).

In the three upcoming sections, I endeavour to show how this perception of the nation shifts and changes over the course of radicalisation, on a micro and a macro level. Through this analysis, I am also hoping to show how events and policies affect ideology and whether or not an inverse relationship exists, as we saw in Chapter Six.

**Turkey**

‘Let this be a warning...O Muslims, don’t get comfortable! Do not let your blood cool before taking revenge’ (from Tarih ve Toplum in Akçam 2006: 86)

1895 – 1908

In the mid-nineteenth century, a sense of a Turkish identity had not yet been manifested into state ideology. Instead, the focus was still on preserving faith in the Emperor and the Ottoman state through a reclaimed identity offered to a polyethnic citizenry. Though the Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, was technically the leader of the Islamic community under the Ottoman Empire, Ottomanism was generally disassociated with religion and was the claimed identity of individuals from a variety of other-groups (Mann 2005: 120).

The Turkish movement itself was in a very early stage. Mostly composed of a cosmopolitan intelligentsia, the early members of the CUP, though of Muslim background, were not religious. They chose instead to put their faith into a platform
of science and literature. Astourian points out that the ‘Young Turks were positivists influenced, on the one hand, by Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim and, on the other hand, by German nationalism’ (Astourian 1990: 133). They were focused on the necessity of social and cultural change through state-led policies; hence, Constitutional reform was high on their list of political priorities. Though they were drawn to power through the modern state, most of their early members were products of the state schools and had little political experience (Ahmad 1969: 16 - 17; see also Mann 2005: 116).

Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, the turn of the century saw Ottomanism re-establishing links with Islamism, drawing upon the richness of Muslim heritage in an attempt to stem the flow of decline occurring in the region due to the complex situation of change and shifts in international policy by the European powers (Akçam 2006: 43, 50; Balakian 2003: 61 - 62, 81 - 92; Dadrian 1996). Thus, it was Muslims who were portrayed as sacrificing for the good of the nation:

> We are being killed on Crete, slaughtered on Samos, massacred in Rumelia, cut into pieces in the Yemen, mown down in the Hauran, throttled in Basra. But it’s not the Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Jews, Arabs or Albanians who are sent there, it is? Let them sit in their houses...devoting themselves only to their own affairs. let them grow rich, marry, and have children.

(Berkir Sikti Baykal, Sark Buhran ve Sabah Gazetesi in Akçam 2006: 33)

These complaints were born from a legal loophole – Armenians could purchase their conscription, and therefore not have to join the Ottoman army. This led to a perception that only Ottomans and Muslims could ‘truly’ fight for the Empire and thus be full citizens (Mann 2005: 123 - 124). This sort of discourse is interesting because, as a consequence, we begin to see the open establishment of Turkish identity being ‘not Armenian’ and the encouragement of the perception that the Armenians were taking advantage of the Ottoman Turks: ‘the apparent aim of the Armenians is to incite the Turks, and then, after enough force has been used to suppress them, to cry of oppression and elicit the sympathies of Europe, especially of
Thus, by the early twentieth century, there is a clear idea of Ottomans, if not yet Turks, as elite and above other ethnic groups living in the empire; ideology at the time was founded on a basis of Ottomanist/Islamist superiority. In fact, it is the multi-ethnicity of the Ottoman Empire that Ziya Gökalp, a poet and lead ideologue, denounced as having ‘stifled the Turkish national spirit’ which directly led to the demise of the Ottoman state (in Mann 2005: 121; see also Akçam 2004: 134 - 140; Isyär 2005: 349). Though they had sacrificed on the battlefield, claims Gökalp, they have become victims of impurity.

This mentality begins to ease the shift of nationalisation from Ottomanism to Turkism as the nationalist arm of the CUP grew in power, making it easier to claim the Turks’ role as culture bearers. This was brought about mainly to Türk Yurdu, the first journal attached to the CUP; Türk Yurdu claimed to publish ‘scientific’ articles on the history of the Turks, proposed to serve the Turkish race in ‘anyway possible’ and reflected the ideals of social Darwinism so popular in Young Turk propaganda (Isyär 2005: 347). The Young Turks’ deification of the sciences and their focus on modernisation through the state enabled key ideologues such as Ziya Gökalp to merge ideas of ‘Sufism, which seeks the annihilation of free-will and the individual’s absorption in God, with Durkheim's deification of society or of the collectivity. The only difference he introduced, a fateful one to be sure, is that he replaced Durkheim's concept of society with that of nation’ (Astourian 1990: 133; see also Akçam 2006: 57). Thus, by the time the CUP came to power in 1908, a Turkish national identity had begun to be made manifest in political ideology. The Young Turks believed in and popularised a sense of national election which had come under threat by the ethnic minorities present in the Empire (Ahmad 1969: 6) and, as seen in Chapter Six, most especially by the Armenians.
This foundation, particularly the firm establishment of the idea of a Turkish nation, provides the CUP a prime base from which to operate upon their assumption of power on 24 July 1908 after overthrowing the sultan. There are some immediate shifts in ideology that take effect after their assumption, most notably the lack of focus on the nation in disgrace, as was present under the old regime. The Young Turks continued to appeal to a cosmopolitan, modern base. Nonetheless, they were driven by their ethnonationalism, particularly regarding language; they proclaimed the modernised Turkish language as the only language accepted in the Ottoman Empire and insisted that all political and academic teaching take place in Turkish (R14097/Ab.23000 9.07.1917; Mann 2005: 123; Ahmad 1969: 136). When paired with the loss of territory experienced in the early years of the twentieth century, the unfortunate consequence of these policies were the alienation of other-groups as expressed in Chapters Five and Six. Equally, wars in Europe encouraged further scepticism of Christian groups; this caused an ideological shift in which ‘Turkification’ came to mean a closer identification with Islam (Ahmad 1969: 40).

Thus, and particularly after the counterrevolution of 1909, the focus began to turn to the need to further establish the nation through purification. The elimination of impure elements, couched as unnatural and unclean, ideologically became necessary to protect the natural glory of the physical condition of every Turk. ‘The historico-biological discourse which analysed the condition of the Turks prepared the conditions of birth of a historico-medical discourse that outlined what was to be done to recover the glory of the Turks’ (Isyar 2005: 355, 356).

Tapping into the aforementioned military emphasis of Turkish identity, in the early years of CUP leadership military prowess became another foundational aspect of ideology. Calls for war were published in newspapers and journals, advocating military aggression in the Balkans to retake the ‘natural border’ of the river Danube (Bayar in Akçam 2006: 85; see also Mann 2005: 123 - 124). It was during this time
that the Ittihadist youth movement began receiving training from the national army (Mann 2005: 130), directly attaching the idea of the youth as carrying on the warrior traditions of their glorious national past as upheld by ancients. This made it ever easier to ensure the idea of national transcendence as Gökalp’s poetry was able to be institutionalised to a degree and more people were reading things like this 1911 excerpt: ‘Turks are the ‘supermen’ imagined by the German philosopher Nietzsche...New life will be born from Turkishness’ (Gökalp in Akçam 2006: 88). By 1911, a focus on ‘National Economics, the boycotting Armenian and Greek enterprises, and further endeavours to centralise power resulted in the final destruction of the liberal movement within the CUP (Astourian 1990: 130). Thus we see a growing perception of the nation as being superior, elite and a culture bearer.

1912 – 1914

The outbreak of the Balkan wars solidified Turkish national identity and ideas of Turkish election culturally and politically through Unionist propaganda. The war itself was hailed, amongst other things, as a ‘a stroke of good fortune upon the Turkish people who had been sure of their own decline’ (Hüseyin Cahit Yalçin in Akçam 2006: 117) and was seen as a possibility to ensure the unity of Ottoman lands and an attempt to restore the election of the Turks. This was to be accomplished through literary and governmental means. Firstly, soon after the outbreak of the war, the CUP established the Committee on National Defence (Muııdafaı-i Milliye), from which Armenians were barred, intended to actively encourage support for the role of Turks in the war effort. They easily substituted ‘Turkish’ terminology for what would have been ‘Ottoman’ or ‘Islamist’ before the new regime (Staub 1989: 181; R14078/Ab.2888 8.02.1913; Akçam 2004: 139, 143). The subsequent loss of territory in the Balkans only reified Gökalp’s assertion that ‘what needed to be done was to stop hiding behind the mask of Ottomanism’ and instead startle awake national consciousness by simply substituting one word for the other. ‘Turkism is simultaneously Islamism’ which was simultaneously ‘Ottomanism’ as they held the same ideological and religious basis (Akçam 2006: 79, 84 see also Ch 6)
The loss of the Balkan wars, then, served as proof that the remainder of the Empire should be left to the ‘real’ citizens, the Turks, who were being abjectly exploited by Armenians through their alliances with other Christian (i.e. Balkan, Russian and other European) powers (Isyari 2005: 347; R14077/Ab.257 10.01.1913). From a European perspective on the Armenian question, the concern was that ‘the Turks in their racist power could go forth and alone play the role of conquest as the lording nation’ (R14078/Ab.4311 24.02.1913). Russia quickly became of particular concern as, under Article 61 of the Berlin Agreement, Turks feared a Russian attempt at Armenian annexation (R14077/Ab.257 10.01.1913). The only way to ensure that this did not occur was to ensure the purity of their own nation as ‘only nations that belonged to and represented one people, one race, could succeed...others were destined to fail’ (Gökalp in Isyari 2005: 346).

One of the first steps taken by Turkish authorities in their attempt to purify the state was the ‘Turkification’ (verturken) of Armenian children (R14090/Ab.5914 3.03.1916). Policy dictated that these children be taken from their families and placed ‘in newly opened establishments where they received an education characterised by strict disciplinary codes that was aimed at ‘Turkifying’ them and converting them to Islam’ (Tachjian 2009: 65). Armenian women also were offered the possibility of life if they married a Turk, renounced their Christianity and became Muslim – though in reality many became sexual slaves, beaten and often thrown out or killed at the hands of their ‘husbands’ (Balakian 2003: 253 - 254, 258; Tachjian 2009). Men, however, were not offered this option. This gender/race discrepancy points toward the perception of how ethnicity was established at this moment in Turkish ideology. It suggests that ethnicity was perceived as being passed on through the male line and that, in these early days of conflict, Turkism was something that could be learned given the correct circumstance of marriage and age. It is, perhaps, a throw-back to Ottoman multiculturalism.

Nonetheless, this time period sees the ideological beginning of the end for Ottoman ‘equality’ set up under the very Constitution the CUP was dedicated to enforcing:
‘Down with equality...we don’t want equality!’ (Army commander Ahmed Muhtar Pasha in Dadrian 2004: 189). The state began to publicly assert their inclination to ‘pursue a utopian goal, and to halt, as never before, those who work with nihilistic ideals’ (R14078/Ab.4311 24.02.1913).

1914 – 1915

By the time Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire, the CUP was well established in power and had further radicalised their ideological agenda. The loss of the Balkan Wars had been contextualised as ‘Allah’s divine punishment for a society that did not know how to pull itself together’ (Mehmet Akif Ersoy in Akçam 2006: 84). The success of Serbia, Bulgaria and the other Balkan states in their bid for independence were classed in Turkish propaganda as being due to the ‘racial consciousness of their people’ (Isyar 2005: 346). WWI became an opportunity to pour out rage on the Christians who had ‘caused’ their defeat; ‘our anger is strengthening: revenge, revenge, revenge; there is no other word’ (Enver Pasha in Akçam 2006: 115).

Newspapers and journals repeatedly reminded readers of the ‘350,000 Muslims murdered during the Balkan War’ and that those responsible for those killings would revenge themselves on the Turks with further killings in WWI (Diplomat Galip Kemal Söylemezoglu in Akçam 2006: 117); this fear led to further ideological intensification of the need to purify the nation and further established the nation’s election through their sacrifices on the battlefield. Similar to what we will see in the German case, much of this election was made ideologically manifest through the idyllic representation of the strength and vigour of youth: ‘The function of an officer is not merely to wear a colourful uniform. Being a soldier means exercise and education, science and art, and above all bravery and hard-work. It is only the young who possess these virtues and are capable of learning and hard-work’ (Enver Pasha, 1914 in Ahmad 1969: 147). Spurred on through the focus on the sciences and ideas of natural selection, there was also an increased focus on the physical bodies of the
Turks in which ‘robustness, strength, vitality became the keywords of the [new ‘Turkish’] societies’; this physical perfection, for the CUP, was not the result of hard work or training, but was instead the by-product of the election of Turkish blood (Isyar 2005: 355 - 356).

As result of the growing need for purification, anti-Armenian policies ensued, one of the most extreme being the establishment of the Teshkilat-i Makhsusiye, or the killing squads organised by leading members of the Young Turks (Melson 1996: 160). This ostensibly was to protect the Turks from the Armenians living along the Russian border who ‘represented a great threat to the country’s future’. Doing so, says Dr. Behaettin Sakir, member of the CUP Central Committee and head of the SO, might necessitate members of the nation ‘to act contrary to the laws of nations and of humanity’ but it is a fundamental imperative; thus, ‘the Committee is ever ready to rescue the homeland from the blemish of this accursed nation [i.e. the Armenians]. It has been decided to wash our hands of the responsibility for this stain that has been smeared across Ottoman history’ (in Akçam 2006: 129).

post-1915

After the massacres at Van, and further losses on the battlefield in WWI, the intensification of anti-Armenian ideology and policy came into full swing; while a certain reticence remained for discussing the killings outright, the CUP openly admitted deportations and discussed candidly amongst themselves that deportations were the equivalent of massacres (Konst./Ankara.170 19.08.1915; Dadrian 2004: 233 - 234; Akçam 2004: 163 - 164). Only a few weeks after the massacres at Van the legal legitimisation of ideology was implemented as the CUP passed an emergency law, the Temporary Law of Deportation. This law gave the authorities permission to deport and massacre any group or individual they ‘sensed’ (hissetmek) posed a threat to the nation. While never citing the Armenians, this law could not be applied to Turks, Catholics (primarily Greeks and Russians), Protestants (Americans and
Europeans), the ill and elderly, soldiers and their families, officers and merchants – thus, exempting most notable other-groups except the Armenians.

This being the case, we see that there is a perception that the nation is under threat; any actions instituted due to the protection of the nation are then justified as being done in defence of the nation. ‘Turkey is set on fulfilling, in its own way, a policy that will solve the Armenian question by destroying the Armenian people. Neither our [German] intercession, nor the protests of the American ambassador, nor even the threat of enemy force...have succeeded in turning Turkey from this path and nor will they succeed at a later date’ (R14093 18.09.1916; see also Dadrian 2004: 221 -222; Balakian 2003: 187).

There was a sincere belief that in order for the true purification of the nation to be achieved, the Armenians had to be removed; once this had occurred the nation, and through the nation, the state would be able to reach its utopian aims. If this purification did not occur, the destruction of the Turkish nation was ensured (Enver Pasha in Isyar 2005: 357). All the while, in key speeches and debates from religious pulpits and political platforms, forceful nationalist addresses were made, hailing the Turk for his fearlessness in the face of death, assuring the people they would live eternally in the grace of god. ‘The Turk entered the world on the day it was created by God,’ says one CUP leader, ‘and he has made history; he has changed the map’ (in Akçam 2006: 299). This rhetoric continued throughout the end of WWI and even during the trials of those war criminals held at Malta.

Germany

‘All great cultures of the past perished only because the originally creative race died out from blood poisoning’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 262)
As discussed in Chapter Five and unlike the Turkish case, a sense of national identity had been established in Germany long before the Nazis came to power. An understanding of the German Volk became a tangible entity in the early- to mid-nineteenth century out of what Liah Greenfeld terms ‘the Wars of Liberation from Napoleonic domination’ (1992: 277). Much of the credit towards this idea of a national self is given again to strengths in literature and culture, based in Pietism and early Romanticism, both of which are products of the Reformation and the Enlightenment; these were then fortified under the geopolitical policies of statesman Otto von Bismarck and carried through the First World War. From its conception, the undertones of German nationalism were more racial than in either of my other two cases, which tend to focus more broadly on the other aspects of ethnicity (Mann 2005: 180; Mouton 2007: 47). In his book Myth of the Twentieth Century, published in 1930, Rosenberg describes what German nationalism hoped to bring about:

The essence of the contemporary world revolution lies in the awakening of the racial type; not in Europe alone but on the whole planet. This awakening is the organic counter movement against the last chaotic remnants of the liberal economic imperialism, whose objects of exploitation out of desperation have fallen into the snare of Bolshevik Marxism, in order to complete what democracy had begun, the extirpation of the racial and national consciousness.

(quoted in Tribunals 09.01.1946)

One of the ways in which the Nazi state is different from the Turkish state is that a key piece of German propaganda and a springboard from which much ideology was shaped was dictated from a prison cell from 1924 to 1925. Mein Kampf provides us with the primary basis of the pre-1933 Nazi ideological and policy platform; here, Hitler describes the German Volk as being ‘stricken with blindness’, living ‘by the side of a corpse’ with ‘the poisonings of blood’ that, since the Thirty Years’ War ‘have led not only to a decomposition of our blood, but also of our soul’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 15, 360 see also 209). Again we are presented, as in the Turkish case, with a
strong sense that though the nation is in need of purification, it does not deserve its fate; that it is only through some vast mistake that such a thing could come to pass. Much of this was built on the marginalisation of Germans throughout Eastern Europe, particularly in the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the Versailles Treaty (Riga and Kennedy 2009).

This undeserved catastrophe, Hitler goes on to say, was caused by directing foreign blood into the German nation, ‘catastrophic splintering of our inner being with is expressed in German super-individualism’ (1969 [1925]: 355 see also 297, 353 -354). This feeling was particularly identifiable for German refugees and those living in the border areas disputed after the end of WWI. This is primarily due to the fact that those Germans living in areas considered part of the Second Reich had been taken over by other European states; German propaganda, like Rosenberg’s 1922 assertion, began to describe the nation thus: ‘the entire German people would still be, just as before, the slave of other nations’ (Tribunals 09.01.1946). In short, Nazi ideology dictated that the only way to save the nation from their current state of disgrace is to purify national blood as the consequences of a weak ethnicity would damn future generations.

Thus, discontent coming from the shame of losing WWI and as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty begins to emerge as what Mann describes as ‘ethnic imperial revisionism’ (2005: 183) in which the purified blood of the nation would result in the restoration of national pride. The need for this ‘restoration’ then placed an imperative on women and children as symbols of the future of the nation. This ideological premise sparked the foundation of The National Socialist German Students League (NSDStB) in 1926; their platform was ‘the ideological and political conversion of students in universities and technical schools to National Socialism’ (Tribunals 15.01.1946b). The Hitler Youth (HJ) had over 18,000 members at the time of the Reichstag elections of 1930 (Kater 2004: 16). By 1932, the HJ was the largest youth movement in Germany; by 1937, there were over 6 million members (Tribunals 23.05.1946). In April 1933, less than a month after the Nazis seized
power, National Political Education Institutions (NPEA schools), providing a place where the NSDAP could teach and train those who ‘were to have some sort of leading position’ later in their professional lives. The establishment of these schools was built on an speech Streicher gave in June 1925, demanding the introduction of Nazi doctrine into German schooling (Tribunals 18.03.1946, 01.10.1946c; Stephenson 2001: 27 - 33; Cecil 1972: 151). This emphasis on youth and education points to the role of culture bearer established in these early years of the ideological representation of the nation.

Women also bear a noticeably prominent place in early Nazi ideology: ‘This work of care and education must begin with the young mother’; ‘Not in the respectable shopkeeper or virtuous old maid does it see its ideal of humanity, but in the defiant embodiment of manly strength and in women who are able to bring men into the world’; ‘The German girl is a subject and only becomes a citizen when she marries. But the right of citizenship can also be granted to female German subjects active in economic life’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 372, 373, 401). Hitler rationalises this emphasis by explaining that ‘human culture and civilisation on this continent are inseparably bound up with the presence of the Aryan. If he dies out or declines, the dark veils of an age without culture will again descend on this globe’ (1969 [1925]: 348). This type of discourse expresses the idea that the nation is superior to all and thus the needs and desires of the nation transcend those of the remaining other-groups. National honour, then, comes from being completely assured of the political renown of the Fatherland, an idea represented by the SS motto: ‘My honour is my loyalty’ (Staub 1989: 129). It should be noted, however, that in the sources used in my research there are fewer of these types of assertions in the early days of the Nazi reign than are found later in the radicalisation process.

1933 – 1935

After the Nazis take power, one begins to see interesting shifts as ideology begins to evolve. Days before the 5 May book burning at Opernplatz, the regular police are
awarded military standing. In and of itself, this does not necessarily speak of a massive change in policy; on an ideological level it speaks to the mindset of the German state as the rationale for this change is that it is necessary as Germany is being continually discriminated against by its external and internal enemies, both in Europe and in America (Völkischer Beobachter 1933b; 1933g).

In this time of the young Nazi state, workers took on an ideological role in which they were portrayed as combatants against Bolshevism; thus, they were portrayed as serving actively as culture-guardians (Richard Euringer in Völkischer Beobachter 1933d; see also 1933a; 1933b). This, by and large, is due to the assumption of state power by the Nazi regime. In assuming power, they also assumed responsibility for massive unemployment and economic depression. Though they attempted to stem the tide of financial collapse by overturning trade unions, regulating wages and supporting a new system of industrial-state relations (Evans 2005: 458 - 461), the purpose of this shift in ideology was to recreate the representation of the working man in the Nazi state as a figure of pride, rather than a figure of shame.

This is not to say that the roles of women and children were in any way diminished; on the contrary, this is when much of the German patriarchy noted by Mann is developed (2004: 148). Financial grants for child support were given for households with multiple children, ‘heroic’ stories were told of the widows and wives of German soldiers; in many ways, the role of the woman was the embodied return to the glorious past of Germany’s former glory as they were extolled to ‘be productive’ and imitate women of ‘the German renaissance’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1933e; 1933g, 1935f). Youth, it was promised, ‘will carry forth the inheritance of their fathers’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1933b) as they unite north and south as brothers (Nord und sued reicht sich bruederlich die haende) wearing the ‘flying flags of German honour’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1933b). Mother’s Day was made a national holiday almost immediately after the Nazis took power and pro-Nazi posters proclaimed that ‘the care of mothers and children is the holiest duty of the entire German Volk’ (Mouton 2007: 116).
This taps into the emerging idea that the ‘awakening of our Volk has come’ – an awakening that stands ‘not for a political party, but for Germany!’ (Tribunals 09.01.1946; Völkischer Beobachter 1933a; 1933b). Streicher, in his 22 June 1935 speech to the HJ reminded his listeners that Hitler ‘cried to the people to take courage again and to rise and join in liberating the German people from the Devil, so that mankind might again be free from that race which has roamed the globe for centuries and millennia, marked with the brand of Cain’ (in Tribunals 10.01.1946c), thus associating the nation with world liberators. This ‘awakening’ is due to the Nazis move to ‘to elevate the concept of race to the status of a legal term. The German Nation, unified racially and nationally, will in the future be legally protected against any further disintegration of the German race stock’ (Frank in a radio address 20.03.1934 in Tribunals 10.01.1946b). The passing of the Nuremberg Laws saw the legal institution of race move from intention to policy.

1935 – 1938

As Germany prepares to enter the Second World War, the German propaganda machine begins to shift gears away from tales of a nation that has been disgraced and victimised to one where, unless the state begins to take extreme measures, the nation will be victimised again. In short, ideas of looming fear begin to be infused into national ideology. Stories of German refugees fleeing Poland from persecution were described as ‘historical fact’ and an impending invasion of Germany by England and France was assumed at all but the highest level – even if there was not ‘sufficient proof for the outside world’ (Tribunals 23.05.1946, 16.03.1946). This was of a particular worry as the ‘spirit of Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war; and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning’ (Schacht July 1936 in Tribunals 10.01.1946a). Doing so would only condemn the next generation to a lifeless world without the Volk and overrun by the Jews:
'Der Stuermer is right in not carrying out its task in a purely aesthetic manner, for Jewry has shown no regard for the German people. We have, therefore, no reason for being considerate toward our worst enemy. What we fail to do today, the youth of tomorrow will have to suffer for bitterly.'

(von Schirach March 1938 in Tribunals 01.10.1946c)

Der Völkischer Beobachter ensured their readers that ‘the surest path to immortality in this world lies in the maintenance of nationality’ (1935c) and that this was the work of a nation charged with responsibility toward maintaining the goodness of the whole world.

While the men were to primarily perform this task in the workplace and, later, on the battlefield, the women and youth of Germany were still encouraged in their roles as culture-bearers on the home front. The NPEA schools were expanded in 1937 to include thirty-nine Adolf-Hitler Schools, two for girls and the rest for boys, to recognise those with particular leadership abilities (Cecil 1972: 151 - 152). While being influenced by far less than ‘every organisation’ as Goering claimed (Tribunals 18.03.1946), they were certainly influenced by state policy as membership in the HJ had become mandatory as of March 1939 in order to educate youth ‘physically, intellectually, and morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and the community’ (Tribunals 15.01.1946b; see also Tribunals 23.05.1946, 01.10.1946j; Kater 2004: 79). Women, for the most part, were encouraged to go on as before, though one starts to see glimmers of an ideological shift beginning through news stories with headlines such as: ‘The confident woman and the building of the Factory Workers Communal Responsibilities for a Dynamic and Willing People,’ ‘The workers front works for the working mother’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1935a) and ‘The Nazi Sisters – over the past years, there were 80,000 working women and mothers were given essential help’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1935c). In a word, a move is being made to support working women who, like women in Allied countries, had to go to work to take the place of men in the armed forces. However, this had yet to be developed to any noteworthy degree and is generally characterised as carrying on the ideal of the mother working in and for the home. The reawakening
of these ‘admirable’ national traits would, says Bormann on 16 January 1937, enable the rest of the nation to become conscious of their Germanity as they ‘to stand together in mutual esteem and [are] taught to place the German higher than any foreigner, irrespective of state or descent’ (Tribunals 07.02.1946) particularly, as Goering continues on 8 July 1938, ‘if Germany wins the war. Then she will be the greatest power in the world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be taken’ (Tribunals 08.01.1946).

1938 – 1941

‘By the time formal conscription [in the armed forces] was introduced in 1940, 97% of those eligible were already members’ in large part due to the emphasis on service and the greatness of the German military might perpetuating German society at the time (Tribunals 01.10.1946c). The key ideological shift here is that the idea of the nation in disgrace has largely disappeared from the sources used in my primary research. The need to establish the nation through purification, however, is more visible than ever before. National purification became the ideological key to defeating not only the inner enemies of the Reich, but also the outer enemies (Kershaw 1989: 126). For instance, a newspaper article called Die Republik – a work of Judas tells its readers German history was written by Jews, infused with their ideology and brought down through underhanded ways; in other words, traditionally learned German history is actually a perversion of Germany’s golden history.

The foundation, then, of our understanding of German politics has always been a democratic understanding, but not necessarily as the Volk meant it to be; many more thought about a constant concealment of the authorities and others whose purpose was to split the national Volk in all possible ways...Political parties, communities, groups, religious confessions, occupational unions were all subject to antagonism and conflict by Jews as they found their way into state power and law making in such a way as only they could.

(Völkischer Beobachter 1938f)
During this time Streicher funded the publication of many books aimed at children—most of which contained information about how Jews were to undermine the strength of the nation and to ruin the sanctity of their women and children. One such book, *The Poisoned Fungus*, published in 1938, contains this excerpt:

> Inge had already been waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals in an endeavour to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Horrified she jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this face is the face of the Devil. In the middle of this devil's face is a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles gleam two criminal eyes. Around the thick lips plays a grin, a grin that means, 'Now I have you at last, you little German girl!'

*(Tribunals 10.01.1946c)*

Streicher explains the rationale behind such publications in his book *The Jewish Question and School Instruction*, also published in 1938.

> Racial and Jewish questions are the fundamental problems of the National Socialist ideology. The solution of these problems will secure the existence of National Socialism and with this the existence of our nation for all time. The enormous significance of the racial question is recognized almost without exception today by all the German people. In order to come to this realization, our people had to travel through a long road of suffering.

*(Tribunals 10.01.1946c)*

The ideological rationale for national survival up to this point is due to the racial strength of Aryans in the first instance and because of the strong leadership of the Nazis in the next. This gave the current and future generations strength to continue fighting the inner and outer enemies ‘knowing that with their blood they will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams’; Gunter d’Alquen, a Storm trooper in the Wagon-SS, waxes poetic about this very thing, saying ‘They come to us to fight unconditionally as soldiers of the German Fuehrer for the new, great Germany. Every enemy of Germany is their enemy. The march to the East is for them one way to their final judgement’ *(Tribunals 15.01.1946a; Völkischer Beobachter 1941b).*
As the radicalisation of policy moves from violent oppression to premeditated mass killing, we once again see new extremes in anti-Jewish, pro-German propaganda. After the institutionalisation of genocidal policy, there was ‘no turning back’ ideologically, though there are some noteworthy changes in the way that ideology was manifested. Firstly, as the war continued, claims of the persecution of ‘racial Germans’ were popularised by *Der Völkischer Beobachter*, *Der Stuermer* and other media voices, thereby radicalising the state of fear established ideologically in the earlier time of war. While doubts that Germany would win the war were never publicly expressed, this looming fear provided a legitimate excuse to continue fighting internal enemies while external enemies remained (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1941d; 1941e; Tribunals 23.01.1946b). This intensified ideology of fear, strongly encouraged and inspired by Hitler personally, leads to an exaggerated need for national purification as protection: ‘Nations which do not rid themselves of Jews perish’ (Hitler April 1943 in Tribunals 21.03.1946; Evans 2005: 613 - 615).

Nor did ideals of the German Volk as a culture-bearer die out. By this time the idea that the Aryans were ‘a master race of which the lowliest German is racially and biologically one thousand times more valuable than the local population’ (Ernst Koch 1943 in Mann 2005: 245 - 246) was well established ideologically. For Stuckart, co-author of the Nuremberg Laws, the state needed people whose personal characteristics meant they would be a ‘promoter of culture, coloniser and economic organiser’, people who understood ‘the grand political, legal economic, cultural and social contexts’ of their work (in Bloxham 2009a: 261). Indeed, this sort of language continued to tie the fate of the German nation to the fate of the continent of Europe, asserting a ‘common destiny’ between Germany and the rest of the continent (Kallis 2008: 69).

German youth were consistently applauded for their frugality and their genetic superiority when compared to the youths of western and Russian societies (Kallis...
The HJ continued to grow and expand as the SS used their members as the first resource to replenish their numbers through the war (Burleigh 2001: 791; Tribunals 01.10.1946j). However, it should be noted that much of the propaganda concerning women and children died down as military victories began to overtake room in the media. What space newspapers did give women often extolled them for showing the brave face of the German Volk while their men were at the front, encouraging them in keeping the hearth warm whilst waiting for the certain return of their mates (Völkischer Beobachter 1941e; 1941d; see also Mouton 2007: Ch 1).

This, along with the German military advances reported in the media, imbued ideology with an extreme idea of the election of the Volk: ‘We saw the proof that no opponent can rival the courage, discipline, and readiness for sacrifice displayed by the German soldier, and we are particularly grateful for these lightning, incomparable victories’ (Fritzsche radio broadcast 9 October 1941 in Tribunals 23.01.1946b; see also Kallis 2008: 159 - 161).

The Balkans

_The present course which our society in Yugoslavia has taken is totally opposite from the one that has moved for decades and centuries until the formation of a unified state. This process is aimed at the total destruction of the national unity of the Serbian people_’ (SANU 1986)

1974 – 1987

Of all my three cases, the Serbian propaganda and western writers of Serb history make the strongest case for a Serb national identity stretching back as far as the fourteenth century and beyond. Constraining ourselves to more recent times, there are strong surges of national sentiment and national persecution throughout the twentieth century. The Balkan case is also the most geographically bound of all my cases, restricting itself to a smaller, more specific region as will be shown in Chapter Eight. The corner stones of Serbian nationalism are language and religion; their use
of the Cyrillic script and Orthodox Christianity are the two ethnic identifiers separating them from their Bosniak, Croatian, Slovenian, Albanian and Macedonian neighbours (Dannreuther 2001: 15-18). Also of note is the fact that Serbs particularly had a strong military and state apparatus at their disposal and used ideological radicalisation to justify the legitimacy of this control (Malesevic 2006: 212).

The idea of a disgraced Serbian nation, dying out under pan-Yugoslavism, is a theme that can be traced throughout the course of my research. Starting with the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, ‘proper’ forms of national analysis, such as censuses, are used to ascertain the health and vitality of the Volk. A 1948 census presented in SANU’s Memorandum taken in Croatia, in 1948 there were 543,795 Serbs in Croatia (14.48% of the total). In 1981, according to another census, that number decreased to 531,502, 11.5% of the total number of inhabitants in Croatia (1986). The lesson, then, is that the Serbian people are disappearing; their culture and beauty are being lost to the aggressive, perverse cultures of others within the Yugoslav state. This gives clemency and legitimacy to an ideology claiming that Serbia was the victim of Yugoslavia and that the Serb nation was at risk of becoming victimised again (see Gagnon 1995: 148).

Tales of Serb regions within Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo being left in poverty began being filtered through to the population. This, people were assured, was forcing Serbs to ‘other parts of Croatia where the Serbs, being newcomers, are a minority and socially inferior group, greatly exposed to...a sophisticated and quite effective policy of assimilation’ (SANU 1986). Through the early 1980’s there was also escalating rumours about Serbs fleeing persecution in Kosovo. Hailed as refugees, it was only rarely mentioned that many of these individuals had sold their homes and possessions for large profits due to a housing shortage (Mikelic, Schoen, and Benschop 2005: 120). These ‘lost’ portions of the Serbian nation ‘have never been as persecuted in the past as they are now’, infusing readers with a sense of urgency, demanding the immediate protection of their nation as indeed ‘the integrity of the
Serbian nation and its culture in Yugoslavia as a whole is an issue vital to its survival and progress’ and ‘the cultural and spiritual integrity of no other Yugoslav nation is so roughly challenged as that of the Serbian nation’ (SANU 1986).

The complete disintegration and consequent destruction of the Serbian nation could not be allowed to occur, as the Serbian nation had existed with similar goals, traits and aims since the kingdom of the Nemanja, established in the 1160s, which ‘transformed’ the Serbs into a people and thus establishing ‘an identity which would survive hundreds of years of Ottoman domination’ (Judah 1997: 17). Unfortunately, propagated the Serbian national media, Serbian election had been cast into shadow because of narrow-mindedness and lack of objectivity on the part of official historiography. This so impoverished and restricted the true picture of the contribution made by Serbian bourgeoisie society to law, culture, and statesmanship that, deformed in this manner, it could not provide mental or more support to anyone nor could it serve as a foothold for preserving or reviving historical self-confidence. The brave and honourable efforts at liberation exerted by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and by all Yugoslav youth, which included Young Bosnia, experienced a similar fate and were pushed into the historical background by the contributions of a class ideology. (SANU 1986)

Again, the particular role of youth in nationalist ideology resurfaces. Again, these members of the Volk are considered ‘brave and honourable’ and at the highest risk of destruction. In order to protect these bearers of the nation, the Serbian Volk needs an opportunity to ‘find itself again and become a historical agent’ with historical pride. To do so, it is necessary to ‘re-acquire an awareness of its historical and spiritual being, must look its economic and cultural interests square in the eyes, and must find a modern social and national program that will inspire this generation and generations to come.’ Complete assurance of Serbian national integrity is an inherent right based on their history and their democracy, ‘no matter in which republic or province they might find themselves living’ (SANU 1986).
As with my other two cases studies, the SDS’ rise to power in a post-Tito Yugoslavia is chronicled by increasing allegiance to more fundamentalist sectors of society (Cohen 2001: 120 - 143). Serbs throughout Yugoslavia feared a loss of freedom and rights. Milosevic promised to defend the rights of Serbs across the whole of Yugoslavia and allied himself with political nationalists who revived extreme plans for Serb security (Carmichael 2010: 8). The economic crisis, discussed in Chapter Four, heightened levels of insecurity. Milosevic used the resulting protests to further radicalise feelings of nationalist sentiment. As one observer noted, ‘the protestors came as workers, and went home as Serbs’ (in Bieber 2011: 161).

This is the period in which the Serbian media began to repeatedly show documentaries and publish articles about the aggression of the Croat Ustashas in WWII, comparing Serbian suffering to that of the Jews, swearing that ‘the Serbs were endangered again’ (Karadzic in Oberschall 2007: 102). The second shift seen during this period, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, was the recognition of the Bosniaks as that enemy. The Ottoman period was generally viewed as an age of occupation by Muslim blasphemers and, with looming independence in sight, Serbian political elites began to cite the early nineties as a time to ‘revenge themselves’ on the Bosniaks (Neuffer 2001: 11 - 13). Tales of the mass rape of Kosovar Serbs perpetrated at the hands of Muslim Kosovars were rife, regardless of the fact that the actual incidents of rape were significantly lower in Kosovo than in Serbia, and, among rapes which did occur, were usually perpetrated within national groups (Oberschall 2007: 102). These claims lead to an increased level of fear, shifting the ideological space in which policy-level decisions are being made. Here again, we see that ideology plays a significant role as an element of structure, as discussed in Chapter Three.

Politically, as military defeat was assumed, the only way to continue the fostering of the Serbian nation was to create a place where the true glory of Serbs could be shown

1987 - 1991
to light; this is where the idea of Greater Serbia was established and was openly circulated in SFRY during the late 1980s. Not doing so would establish instead a state with ‘insufficient political authority’ to keep their state together and ensure national protection (IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-02-54-T 2002). The election of the Serbian nation and their natural ability to excel in times of persecution would ensure their survival: ‘Gentlemen, you have forgotten one fact. Yes, it is nice to live well, to have good pay, to have good clothes, a good car. However, there is something which money cannot buy. What cannot be bought is our Serb dignity. We would rather go hungry, as long as we are together with our Serb people. We will eat potatoes and husks, but we will be on the side of our people. We will remain human’ (Martic 1990 in Bert 1997: 39).

1991 – 1992

Serbian reaction to the Bosnian declaration of independence intimates that Malesevic (2006: 186) is correct in his assessment that Yugoslavia during this time took its ideology more seriously on an individual level, in such a way as to acquire the preconditions necessary for ethnic cleansing in a way atypical within the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gagnon (1995: 138) points out that ‘the larger and more immediate the threat to the ruling elite, the more willing it is to take measures which, while preserving its position in the short term, may bring high costs in the longer term’.

This is certainly true of RS (Republika Srpska) elites during this critical time. Another census of the Bosanska Krajina region was circulated in 1991 with numbers detailing the fact that though Serbs maintained their overall majority within the municipality, they were not able to maintain a majority in Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kotor Varos and Bosanska Krupa (IT-00-40-I 2000). This was in line with the coalition’s goals to portray the Serbs as victims (IT-00-39&40-PT 2002a); Glenny provides the results of this fear very well:
Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foca... The Moslems, who made up half of the town’s population of 10,000 people, have fled or are in jail. Many of their houses have been destroyed or are in flames, Black smoke billows from two houses that belonged to Moslem residents. Entire streets have been destroyed, restaurants reduced to cinders and twisted metal, apartment blocks charred, the hospital hit by mortar fire. The Serbs say that despite the damage, only seven or eight of their own men and about twenty Moslems were killed in the fighting that began on 8 April [1992]. They say the Moslems began it. A feverish distrust of all that is not Serbian and a conviction that they have narrowly escaped genocide at the hand of Islamic fundamentalists has gripped Foca’s Serbs. ‘Do you see that field?’ asks a Serbian woman, pointing to a sloping meadow by the Drina River. ‘The jihad...was supposed to begin there. Foca was going to be the new Mecca. There were lists of Serbs who were marked for death,’ the woman says, repeating a belief held by townspeople and gunmen. ‘My two sons were down on the list to be slaughtered like pigs. I was listed under rape.’

(1996: 169 - 170)

Such a portrayal broadened the level of Serb domination out of Kosovo and Serbia and into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unless Serbian security was absolutely assured through control of state power, the Serbs would ‘once again be subjected to the laws of Muslim landlords, agas, begs and pashas’ and everything the Serbs had fought for since 1389 when St. Lazar fought the historic battle of Kosovo would be for naught (Mann 2001: 361 - 362). Thus, the need to expunge this fear by way of ideological focus on national purification starts to take place. Not all Serbs, however, willingly bought into this idea and found themselves the unfortunate victims of the very nationalism they were resisting: ‘A large number [of Serbs] took a weapon out of fear, not just of the Muslims and Croats but also of fellow Serbs who might cast aspersions on their loyalty to Serbdom. Increasingly, the terms ‘good Serbs’ and ‘Alija’s Serbs’ came to be heard’ (Gagnon 1995: 148).

After the Plebiscite of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been conducted on 24 October 1991 and a second time on 9 – 10 November 1991, propaganda of this nature was ever easier to dissimilate to the masses (IT-99-36-1 1999). What became increasingly clear during this time was that, like the Turkish
case, it was national purity and not racial purity, which was of vital importance to the Serbian state; in other words there was, ideologically at least, some opportunity for Bosniaks to ‘become’ Serbs. The perpetuation of national myths such as those of Jug Bogdan and St. Lazar, the continued use of Cyrillic as the national script and that Orthodoxy continue to be the cornerstone of faith and allegiance in Yugoslavia were key (Silber and Little 1997: 309 - 310; Judah 1997: 61 - 62). The belief, originally made popular during WWII, was that Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other regions were not Catholics at all, but Serbs who had fallen to the pressures of invaders to change their allegiance. Muslims were not necessarily Saracens, but were instead Serbs who had submitted to Muslim rule by changing their religious association to Islam from Orthodoxy; as Muslims, however, they were to be reviled and a target (Fine 2002: 11; Milic of Macva 1991 in Banac 1994: 168). Again, we will look at this in greater detail in the analysis and conclusion sections in comparison with the other two cases.

1992 – 1995

The ideology of fear established so early in this conflict continues and builds after the siege of Sarajevo begins; however, as mentioned in Chapter Four there is a power shift occurring in which a rift between Milosevic’s Serbia and Karadzic and Mladic’s RS are at loggerheads ever more frequently. Though Serbian elites in Serbia may have had almost complete control over propaganda, military and politics in 1992, much of that control had been lost by 1995 (Milanovic 2006: 600). This influences ideology significantly as they both become more significant ideological carriers as their power increases. By 1993 Karadzic had begun to circulate ideas of a ‘linguistic’ nationhood: that all Stovakian speakers were ‘really’ Serbs and only needed to be reminded of their true identity (Judah 1997: 199; Pavkovic 1994). This is a shift from the pre-modern ideal of national identification based on religion and provides the contextual markers for the debate on Serb national identity in which the martyr-nation is categorised as sacred (Banac 1994: 144). The only way to remind
these others of their true identities, however, was to fight for their own as they were constantly threatened with attack:

A Serb refugee couple [were asked] why they had fled their village. They had heard on the radio that the Serb military had uncovered a Muslim plot: Muslims planned to take over the district, a list of names had been drawn up, the Serb men were to be killed, and the women were to be assigned to Muslim harems for the purpose of breeding Muslim janissaries...And they believed this propaganda even though their Muslim neighbours 'were decent people' who had never harmed them.

(Oberschall 2007: 103)

Mladic's leadership made legitimising and justifying the ongoing perilous military action easier. Plavsic, who was made a member of Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska late November or early December in 1992, speaks to this in her guilty plea to the ICTY saying

At the time, I easily convinced myself that this was a matter of survival and self-defence. In fact, it was more...although I was repeatedly informed of allegations of cruel and inhuman conduct against non-Serbs, I refused to accept them or even to investigate. In fact, I immersed myself in addressing the suffering of the war's innocent Serb victims. This daily work confirmed in my mind that we were in a struggle for our very survival and that in this struggle, the international community was our enemy, and so I simply denied these charges, making no effort to investigate. I remained secure in my belief that Serbs were not capable of such acts. In this obsession of ours to never again become victims, we had allowed ourselves to become victimisers.

(IT-00-39&40/1 2008)

That Serbs would be incapable of violence at this level points again to the idea of Serbian election. Regarding the 'innocent Serbs' Plavsic notes above, Karadzic seems to go to great lengths to encourage and bolster pictures of Serb innocence. For instance on 5 February 1994 the Serbs bombed a bustling market square in Sarajevo; Karadzic later insisted that the bomb had been a ploy of 'the Muslim side,' fired by 'Muslim positions.' Later, and even more unbelievable, Karadzic suggested that the bodies pulled out of the wreckage were plants of the media (Silber and Little 1997:
These claims, though belated and false, encouraged the violence to a new degree. It became increasingly easier to make these claims through the arts as well as the media, for as well as shutting down most of the anti-Serbian and pro-other media outlets, Milosevic and Karadzic were able to corral the support of theatre to encourage youth and non-military personnel in this time of conflict (Jakovljevic 1999: 6; IT-04-81-PT 2008).

**Analysis**

'...a herd beast can be brewed from all sorts of ingredients, but a man who will be a culture-bearer, or even better, a culture-founder and culture-creator, never arises from such a mixture' (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 365)

Bearing the ideological progression in each case in mind, it is now time to move on to further analysis of what this information has to offer to comparative genocide study. This section returns to the basic question laid out in the introduction: Does state-led ideology regarding the national self go beyond self awareness and even beyond traditional feelings of national pride? Is the ideological depiction of the nation used to legitimise policies portrayed as having the intent of protecting the nation? In my endeavour to answer these questions, I want to further analyse the themes arising out of my research. I propose that a brief comparative analysis of all three cases suggests that there are certain themes present across all three cases, though the way they shift and change do sometimes vary from case to case. Before going on to directly address these themes, however, I want to briefly address some unique points arising in each of my three cases.

When addressing the Turkish case, the first interesting point of note is that, in the early years of the conflict, a deeper sense of nationhood is being established through the loss of empire. While, as I discuss further in the next chapter, loss of territory occurs in each state, the process is slower in the Turkish case and directly affects the way the establishment of the nation is perceived. By this I mean that losses on the battlefield reiterated the need to secure the nation through purification. As the loss of
empire occur more slowly in the Ottoman case, it’s effect on ideology is more entrenched and more important in the early stages of radicalisation.

Also in the early stages of the radicalisation process under the CUP we have a sense that the Turks’ cultural identity had been submerged by the multi-culturalism of the Ottoman state and that, as we saw in Chapters Five and Six, the inclusion of other groups had somehow weakened the nation. Throughout the conflict, Young Turk propaganda is always clear to state that this weakened state is in no way the fault of the Turks themselves and that they do not deserve to live in a state of fear. This encourages a reconnection with Turkish language and a re-establishment of the identification of Turkism with Islam. These cultural symbols reinforce the ideological portrayal of the nation as the culture-bearer.

Again, the primary symbols of culture were women and children. These groups are symbolically present in Young Turk ideology but not to such an extreme level as found in the Nazi case; soon after the CUP came to power in 1908, Young Turks began integrating the symbolic role of the glory of youth into ideology. This was quickly followed by policies supporting youth in military branches and incorporating ‘Turk’ into educational programs. It is worth noting that in the Turkish case there is more emphasis on youth than on women. This, I propose, has more to do with the role of women generally in the Ottoman Empire (see Özmucur and Pamuk 2002; Toledano 1993) and thus serves as a cultural difference between cases, rather than something specifically particular about the genocidal aspects of ideology.

Lastly, though the CUP based their perception of the nation in the Social Darwinist ideals of ethnicity, certain elements of the multiculturalism of the Ottomans remain. For examples instances of the ‘Turkification’ of Armenian children and the inclusion – voluntary or otherwise – of Armenian women into Turkish households persist throughout the conflict. This did not detract from the increasingly vehement claims that Turks were superior to every other-group and that the needs of the Turkish nation were paramount.
This recent history of multi-culturalism is something shared between the conflict in Turkey and the conflict in the Balkans. Like the Turks, the Serbian nation is consistently being portrayed as a victimised entity, suffering at the hands of it's neighbours over the years. Unlike the Turks, this portrayal continues over the course of the conflict with equal strength, though does shift a bit in the final genocidal stages of conflict to give space to military gains. As the conflict radicalises, this idea of a victimisation leads into the idea that purification is necessary if Greater Serbia is to be established and maintained. Note also that, as compared to the previous Chapter Six, there is a much more concrete understanding of the Serbian nation than of the anti-nation. This further illuminates Pavkovic's claim that in the Former Yugoslavia, each nation was more focused on 'their' ethnic group and on how the latter years of the Communist regime had failed 'their' nation. This again, points to a difference between the two cases of total genocide and this case, where genocidal episodes are present, but not total. Ideology as structure has established a backdrop where policy decisions are made with a focus on the protection of the nation rather that the complete eradication of the anti-nation from the earth.

A second interesting point arises in the Balkan case in the portrayal of the nation as a bearer of the cultural history of the region. In my other two cases, women and children are given special roles to symbolise their ideological status; in the Balkan case, however, there is little differentiation between the masculine and the feminine. Though some attention is paid to the role of youth, it is usually projected in reference to the military, where young Yugoslav men are cast as 'brave and honourable' and take the highest risks. Nonetheless, gender symbols are still important, as the growing literature on rape in the Balkan and Kosovar conflicts show.38

38 Because of the ideological focus of this dissertation, I have not wholly addressed the role of rape as a weapon of warfare in this case. For more on this subject and on the symbolic nature of gender in the Balkans expressed outside of ideology see Engle (2005), Fletcher (1993), Hayden (2000), Nikolić-Ristanović (2000), and Salzman (1998).
As we see in Chapter Five, multiculturalism was not an important foundation in the history of German ideology. Without doubt, the Nazis have the most defined, sustained delineation for the victimised nation across the entire course of my research. Take, for instance, Hitler’s assertion regarding the decline of the Second Reich, saying ‘whether we consider questions of general justice or cankers of economic life, symptoms of cultural decline or processes of political degeneration, questions of faulty schooling or the bad influence exerted on grown-ups by the press, etc., everywhere and always it is fundamentally the disregard of the racial needs of our own people or failure to see a foreign racial menace’ (1969 [1925]: 297) and later: ‘when a nation of a hundred million people, in order to preserve its state integrity, suffers the yoke of slavery in common, it is worse than if such a state and such a people had been shattered and only a part of them remained in possession of full freedom’ (1969 [1925]: 557), meaning that it would have been better for the German nation to have been entirely destroyed rather than leave itself to this abject level of national shame brought on by the ‘foreign racial menace’. This sort of language tends to promote feelings of individual helplessness paired with national elation – that the sort of revolution needed to shake off national humiliation is going to be brought about by the new national state (see Steiner in Staub 1989: 133; also Horowitz 1996; Mann 1990).

Equally, the importance of youth as a symbol of the vigour of the German nation and the role of women as symbols of the future of the German Volk is critical to address because of the ideological importance the Nazis place on the perpetual, immortal nation. Though the role of the woman as child-bearer and homemaker was elevated to an almost sanctified level in the earliest years of the Nazi regime, the key shift in this case is between 1938 and 1941 when the Nazi state was entering military conflict. Here, we see a shift in which the ideal of women solely responsible for work at home is replaced to a small degree by the idea of working for the home, thereby supporting working mothers filling roles left by men fighting at the front. Though their ideological importance declines slightly in the latter years of the war, the role of women and ideological symbols remains high throughout.
A final note about ideology as structure and agency and Mahoney’s theory of path dependency. In each case, though particularly in Turkey, we see the construction of national identity and the radicalisation of that process occurring, not out of one critical juncture, but out of a series of cumulative events. These events allow for the structure of ideology to shift and therefore accommodate and constrain varying degrees of identification of national election. Thus, when the next event occurs, national elites are working within an ideological structure presenting them with multiple, if restricted, choices regarding how the ideology of the nation should be used to interpret and respond to the event. This is key as we begin to see both strengths and weaknesses in Mahoney’s theory when applied to radicalising ideologies.

Conclusion

‘The judges of this state may go right ahead and convict us for our actions at that time, but History, acting as the goddess of a higher truth and a higher justice, will one day smilingly tear up this verdict, acquitting us of all guilt and blame’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 626)

Thus, four key themes arise out of my research, the first of which being that all three ideologies include terminology identifying 1) the nation as being victimised and in disgrace. It seems at first counter-intuitive that a foundational principle of national identity creation in genocidal states would be the reiterated idea that the nation is one of ignominy and dishonour. Indeed, one could say that, without exception, it is the most prominent theme in the early establishment of radicalising genocidal ideology. Through the course of radicalisation present in my cases, the pervading re-evaluation of past versus present is one that emphasises motifs of sacrifice on the battlefield in recent and historical battles, the collapse of empire and tales of subjugation and cultural suppression told by refugees. Also present in each case is a sense that the nation does not deserve the hand it has been dealt; some terrible omission or fault has occurred in order that such a thing should come to pass. This is generally coupled
with what Staub describes as an expressed belief, whether real or merely paranoid, that external states or internal other-groups are preventing the nation from receiving its just desserts, whether in ‘material possessions, prestige, or honour’ (1989: 55).

Though this is an exceptionally strong theme early on in the radicalisation process, the idea of a victimised, disgraced nation is generally unsustainable. I believe this occurs for a number of reasons; firstly, due to the emphasis propaganda places on it, the perception of the nation in disgrace quickly becomes such a vivid part of the national consciousness, it is no longer necessary to continue discussing it at such an exaggerated degree for it to be accepted as truth. Secondly, at different points in their radicalisation process, each of these states find themselves undertaking actions of war\(^{39}\). Therefore, at a time to bolster national consciousness, it becomes necessary to praise and assure the nation – as we will see below – rather than constantly remind the nation of past failures. As states begin to transition into war, focus shifts entirely away from the idea of the nation in disgrace, though, as we see particularly in Yugoslavia and Turkey, the perception of the nation as a victim may endure longer. This perceived victimisation inspires fear and with fear comes the idea that losses in war, both historical and present, are just punishment for a lack of ethnic purity.

Lastly, the weak, disgraced nation is generally associated with the ‘old’ political system, be it the corrupt Sultan, the weak Weimar system or the collapse of communism. This works well in early ideological stages, particularly as it separates the new political regime from the former political regime. However, once new political elites are firmly ensconced in their positions, encouraging the nation to blame the state system for national weakness is no longer expedient. Thus, the state begins to express the nation in a new light, with a new purpose, and thus a second theme comes to light.

\(^{39}\) For literature on the relationship between genocide, nationalism and war, see Chapter Three.
The next theme regarding the nation is that 2) the nation is portrayed as a culture bearer and has the greatest variance across my three cases. Primarily this is propagated through a discussion of the glorious past of the nation and how that is being re-established, generation to generation. This entails a special role for women and children, as they are the physical bearers of the next generation through whom will pass the re-established glory of the nation after it has shaken off its current shame as discussed above. Equally, the idea that cultural history and glorified modernity is irrevocably married within the nation is another aspect of this theme that is given importance over the course of each case. From the modern social Darwinism that aids the establishment of the Turkish nation before the Young Turks take power to the weight of historical glory established in the Serbian case from its earliest stages, this is just as important as the role of women and children – particularly in the Serbian case – and is a sustaining force throughout the radicalisation process. Thus, individual members of the nation take on the heroic giants of their past as well as the political leaders of the current state, an honour that has been bestowed upon them as culture bearers of the world.

The third theme is quite closely linked with the anti-nation as discussed in Chapters Five and Six; ideology in these three states radicalising toward genocide all include illusions to the idea that 3) the security of the nation can only be assured through the purification of the nation. The purification of the nation is not as simple as cleansing the ‘network of consanguinity’ Sondermann suggests ‘in which impure blood...can be joined in purity by an oath of loyalty’ (1997: 132). The Social Darwinist ideals of these modern genocidal states entail that the ethnic notions discussed in previous chapters necessitate radical social elevation of the nation out of the ‘ethnic mire’ produced by other-groups. This ‘necessary’ separation is done in the name of elevating the nation and, thus, eliminating ‘basic deficiencies’ in the national self.

This theme has an inverse relationship to that of the nation in disgrace; whilst one declines in importance, the other rises. However, while the transitions are sometimes of great variance in the first theme, there is a fairly steady increase throughout the
radicalisation process as regards purification. In each case, the focus begins on the nation itself as opposed to the anti-nation and steadily increases in its extremism throughout the course of my time periods. We find the idea that the nation can thrive only if national elites are in control of state power is present even in Yugoslavia, where the identification of the Bosniak anti-nation was not established until 1991.

The policies of cultural assimilation present in the Turkish and Yugoslav cases are consequences of the projected necessity of purifying the nation. In the Ottoman Empire, this idea grew in popularity particularly after the beginning of the Balkan wars, though transitioned into ethnic persecution after the outbreak of WWI. This is due primarily to a need to win the 'next' war; cultural purity was not enough to win the Balkan Wars and thus, ideology dictated that more radicalised policies were necessary in order to ensure national purity, and through purity, national strength.

All three of these previous themes point to the final ideological premise of the genocidal state: 4) the transcendence of the nation over all. It is here we see that it is the good of the nation, and not necessarily the individuals composing the nation, that is the focus of national protection and pride. This deadening of individual needs makes it easier to request that the masses make national martyrs of themselves in battle and easier to subjugate the anti-nation to its ultimate fate. In fact, as the genocidal state is portrayed as being just and good, 'victims will often be seen as deserving their fate' (Staub 1989: 57). In short, we may take Hans Frank's statement to the Academy for German Law to be the definitive explanation for this trend: 'For the maxim - that which serves the Nation is right, and that which harms it is wrong' (November 1939 in Tribunals 10.01.1946b).

Looking at how this theme is made manifest in ideology, it has a similar relationship to that of the purification of the nation. Though relatively unimportant in the very early establishment of the nation, it grows in importance at every step; in fact, without a strong sense of national election, the implementation of genocidal policies in these cases would cease to be sustainable. That the nation is transcendent is never
in question, but, as we shall see in Chapter Eight, it is seen as being under attack, which is why national election is, in every case, presented ideologically as established on the battlefield.

Through the identification of these themes, my research suggests that radicalising states produce a sense of extreme identity in order to legitimise both their ideology and their policies. Mere national awareness or a feeling of otherness is not enough to produce the type of allegiance necessary for a genocidal state. In creating the necessary type of national allegiance, genocidal states use a complex ideology, preaching that the survival of the nation is of utmost importance – even beyond the survival of any one individual.

Regardless of its complexity, we can trace four general themes through the course of each case in order to generate proof for the statements above. As we have seen in the previous section, these themes provide a framework for analysing the evolutionary nature of this aspect of ideology. By analysing the nation cast in disgrace and as victims, the idea of the nation as a culture bearer, the establishment of the nation through purification and the pre-eminence of the nation above all else, we can see some of the necessary shifts ideology makes in order to point the nation towards legitimising state policies on the path to genocide.
Introduction

Most nationalist movements integrate homeland claims into their ideological message (James 1996; Özkirimli 2000; Connor 1994; Smith 1999, 1998; Hutchinson 2001). My research suggests that genocidal states are no different in this regard, but we must ask whether these claims are manifested in a unique way; in this chapter, I seek to investigate the use of the idea of ‘homeland’ in radicalisation process of genocidal ideology. This type of analysis will hopefully allow us to draw certain conclusions that can be applied to other cases within the greater body of literature regarding genocide studies.

In this chapter, I want to discuss the definition of ‘homeland’, the role it plays in literature and what its relationship is to the idea of ‘Lebensraum’ present in the German case and found throughout Nazi literature. Additionally, this chapter will discuss whether or not radicalising ideology intimates that the continued existence of the homeland is predicated on the eradication of the anti-nation; in other words, does ideology regarding the salvation of the homeland attempt to justify policies of discrimination and attempted annihilation?

In order to complete these aims, this chapter begins with a discussion of the definition of ‘homeland’ in comparison with the term ‘Lebensraum’. In this section I discuss the ideological and, to a lesser extent, policy implications the two terms have in my cases. The second and largest section of this chapter is the case study analysis established in earlier chapters wherein I approach each case chronologically, looking to identify key ideological themes and shifts. My analysis section will revisit each case comparatively, in hopes to draw out the similarities and differences in each ideology before concluding.
Homeland or Lebensraum?

One of the most infamous themes of Nazi ideology is the idea of Lebensraum, or living space. The basic premise of the term is the belief that there was not enough geographical space for the Aryan race to properly flourish inside Germany; they needed the colonies stripped from them under the Versailles treaty and new colonies in Eastern Europe. Initially discussed in the early writings of the Nazi elite, Lebensraum ideology grew in importance through the preparation of German entrance into WWII and became expressed a key rationale for planning the eastern offensive, particularly into Poland and Russia (Kershaw 2001b: 100, 101). Kershaw goes on to describe Lebensraum as one of Hitler’s ‘twin obsessions’ along with the annihilation of the Jews by 1940 (2001b: 336). Generally considered a long-term vision, elites expected military victories to help garnish popular opinion for the idea over the course of German aggression against the allied powers (Kallis 2008: 101). There was no exact plan for how much Lebensraum the German people needed and thus no exact plan as to how far Germany’s arm would reach, though there is particular emphasis on Russia and African colonies (Hitler 2009 [1925]: 122 - 130).

Though I do not deny the role ‘Lebensraum’ ideology plays under the Nazi state, much scholarship has been done on it elsewhere and it is an aspect of ideology unique to the German case. This being the case, I want to clarify that ‘homeland’ is intrinsically different from ‘Lebensraum’; there is an actual geographical boundedness to ‘homeland’ which ‘Lebensraum’ does not include. The idea of homeland is based in nationalism scholarship and is critical to most, if not all, modern national movements and that is the reason why I am focusing one of my thematic chapters around this macro-theme. Indeed, the idea of homeland is well-established in all three of my cases, which will be discussed shortly in greater detail. While the Nazis included the Lebensraum into their ideology, the homeland is there as well and, as I will show in the upcoming sections, plays a separate role ideologically. In using the term homeland, I borrow a definition put forward by Anthony Smith when he describes ethnoscapes; a homeland is a geographical
territory claimed by an ethnic nationalist group through its links with the historic nation (1998: 63). Smith goes on to explain how these territories emerge:

The terrain in question is felt over time to provide the unique and indispensable setting for the events that shaped the community... Often the landscape is given a more active, positive role; no longer merely a natural setting, it is felt to influence events and contribute to the experiences and memories that moulded the community. This is especially true of ethnoscapes, where the landscape is invested with ethnic kin significance, and becomes an intrinsic element in the community’s myth of origins and shared memories (1999: 150)

Thus, through the ties of history, ethnicity and kinship, the homeland becomes a vital element of the nation; nationalist ideology then establishes the homeland by imbuing it with a sense of sacredness.

The definition of Lebensraum, unlike that of homeland, is harder to pin down. Firstly, let me begin by acknowledging Lebensraum as a unique element of the German case. Neither Ottoman Turkey nor Yugoslavia integrated ideals of ‘living space’ into their ideologies and policies. It is not a term that travels, per se. As far as a definition is concerned, the Germans themselves used the term to mean a variety of different things. This is largely explained by Ian Kershaw who says that ‘terms such as ‘Lebensraum’ served for a long time as propaganda slogans and ideological metaphors before appearing as attainable and concrete goals’ (Kershaw 1989: 107). While homeland is used as an ontological and analytical term by many scholars of nationalism, genocide and of social history more generally, Lebensraum is a term that is directed to and claimed by a particular time (the Nazi era) in one particular case (Germany) and is generally driven by the racial focus of that particular state’s ideology as discussed in Chapter Five. Within this context, Lebensraum is an expansive area of land claimed by the Nazi state, delineated by the presence of those considered to be German, whether in a minority or in a majority, for the purpose of allowing the nation space to grow and reign outside the bounds of the homeland.
Unsurprisingly, this definition necessitates a few key explanations. To begin with the first section, Lebensraum as ‘an expansive area of land claimed by the Nazi state’, is purposefully vague. Kershaw reminds us of the debate that exists between the ‘continentalists’ who classify Lebensraum as being limited to German interest in Eastern Europe and Russia in particular, and in the globalists, like himself, who believe that Hitler’s ultimate ideological aims ‘stopped at nothing short of German mastery of the entire globe, a goal to be achieved in stages and perhaps not accomplished until long after his death’ (Kershaw 1989: 125; see also 109). Lebensraum, unlike the homeland, cannot easily be delineated on a map unless one uses an entire globe.

The second section of this definition, ‘delineated by the presence of those considered to be German, whether in a minority or in a majority’, is a reflection upon a decisive set of questions asked of Goering during the Nuremberg Trials. When asked, he described Lebensraum thus: ‘where 144 people live in 1 square kilometre, the words ‘living space’ meant the proper relation between a population and its nourishment, its growth, and its standard of living’ (Tribunals 14.03.1946). While the definition of Lebensraum, like many other things in their ideology, did shift and evolve over their years of power, there remained a prevailing idea that the presence of Germans outside of the Reich empowered the Nazi state to claim that territory for its own.

Lastly, Lebensraum existing ‘for the purpose of allowing the nation space to grow and reign outside the bounds of the homeland’ is founded in the idea of Raumgewinn oder Vernichtung as presented in 1941 in Der Völkischer Beobachter (Völkischer Beobachter 1941a). The term directly translates into ‘Gain Space or Obliteration’ and implies that Deutschland, the homeland and heart of the German nation, is not

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40 Though it is not a primary focus of my research, I tend towards a globalist view myself, as the documents I have analysed through the course of my fieldwork have suggested other areas of German interest outside of Europe (see NSDAP 1935e, 1938d, 1938e, 1941a; Hitler 1969 [1925]: 588 - 589; Tribunals 09.01.1946; 30.09.1946 for examples)
large enough to accommodate the Volk. This is exemplified in a speech given by Schacht on 9 December 1936 when he states that ‘Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice’ (in Tribunals 10.01.1946a). The objective, then, of Lebensraum as a policy was to ensure the security of the nation through acquiring space for the German people and ‘providing a future for the surplus children’ (Streicher in Tribunals 10.01.1946c).

Obviously then, the terms ‘homeland’ and ‘Lebensraum’ have distinct meanings and roles within Nazi ideology. One final point that deserves mention is that the anti-nation, as we shall shortly see in the later parts of this chapter, plays a critical role in homeland mentality. This relationship is not present in Lebensraum. Lebensraum is concerned with the presence of the nation, regardless of which other-groups happen to be present. If any members of the anti-nation happen to exist within the bounds of geography claimed by Lebensraum policies, then they were to be taken care of if and when the nation came to power in that area (Hitler 2009 [1925]: 559 - 564, 586 - 609). The importance of ‘homeland’ in the evolution of genocidal ideology cannot be disassociated with either the nation or of the anti-nation. Lebensraum, however, is only dependent on the nation; the Jews could have theoretically been purged completely from the earth, but the need for Lebensraum would still exist. This stands in contrast with the immediate concern of purging the homeland from the anti-nation. These differences will become more apparent throughout the next section of this chapter as I turn to each case study to address the role of homeland in genocidal ideology.

**Turkey**

‘You are aware that the deportation matter was an event that has caused uproar in the world and all of us to be thought of as murderers...But why should we call
ourselves murderers? Why have we taken on this vast and difficult matter? These things were done to secure the future of our homeland, which we know is greater and holier than even our own lives’ (Hassam Feney Bey in Akçam 2006: 129)

1895 – 1908

One of the primary concerns for the failing Ottoman empire was loss of territory, particularly to European powers and explicitly to Russia. The Ottoman homeland, while not yet being out rightly claimed for the Turks, was clearly at risk through loss of territory and the ‘endless persecutions and hostilities of the Christian world’ (Abdul Hamid II in Akçam 2006: 43). In 1876, the Young Turks had sought a political alliance with the Armenians to press the sultanate for reform⁴¹; the Armenians rejected their offer, an action the Young Turks interpreted as evidence of Armenian aspirations towards independence (Staub 1989: 178). This political blow was quickly followed by the loss of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 – 1878 had forced the recognition of the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania; Cyprus was also ceded to British control in 1878 and independence movements began in Palestine, Egypt and Sudan. Thus, the homeland was portrayed as a man deprived of hands and feet by the European powers. A rising fear that Armenia would also declare independence fuelled animosity towards the anti-nation, claiming that anti-nation agitation was merely a way ‘to get at our most vital places and tear out our very guts. This would be the beginning of totally annihilating [Ottoman Islamists] and we must fight against it with all the strength we possess’ (Abdul Hamid II in Akçam 2006: 44). Note, however, that by this time, fear for the loss of homeland was already moderately established within the ideological structure of the time and was not the consequence of any one critical juncture. Instead, it was the cumulative loss of land due to the losses of war throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that brought about this particular insecurity.

⁴¹ This attempted political alliance should not detract from the fact that, as seen in Chapter Seven, the Young Turks were insistent on Muslim supremacy (see Staub 1989: 181). An offered alliance for political gain was not to be mistaken for a promise of equality on either a political or cultural level.
Therefore, as the pan-Turkish movement discussed in Chapters Six and Seven progressed, ideology began include express the idea that a new 'Turkish' empire extending from Anatolia to the edges of western China would re-establish Muslim superiority over Christians and reinstate much of the honour lost over the 19th century. The new state would be cleansed of its non-Turk elements by excluding minorities until they became 'Turks by nationality and Muslim by religion' (Melson 1996: 159).

1908 – 1912

After the CUP's ascension to power, ideological assurance that 'the country was only a 'homeland' for the Turks' was standardised as propagated by Hüseyin Cahit Yağvin, editor of Tanin, the official Unionist news journal. This being the case, 'it [is] essential that the right to steer and decide the fate of the country and make the essential decisions be in Turkish hands' (in Akçam 2006: 50). Gökalp supports this in his poetry with stanzas like 'For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey, nor Turkistan; /Fatherland is a large and eternal country – Turan! /The land of the enemy shall be devastated,/ Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan!' (in Mann 2005: 132). The idea of a shared national consciousness, so tenuously adhered to under Ottoman reign, was almost entirely eliminated during this time period; instead, Young Turk ideology begins shifting distinctly towards the idea that Turkey, and thus greater Turan, should be in the hands of Turks. Note that though these were expansionist homeland claims, they were never equivalent to the extent expressed in the Nazi idea of Lebensraum. Generally, expansionist homeland claims only applied to Ottoman territories lost in the late 19th century.

Events of late 1908 served only to spur on the nationalist rise in homeland propaganda as the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by Bulgarian independence and Crete's unification with Greece (Astourian 1990: 129). Armenians continued to demand the rights they were promised under the reinstated 1878 Constitution, but were repeatedly denied and criticised by nationalist
Unionists. The concern was that Armenians did not only want rights equal to those of Turks, but that they wanted ‘self-rule in an area they call Armenia. To demand this does not mean to bring about a revolution, it means making war against us’ (Kirakossian in Akçam 2006: 61). Here we see much more expressly the idea that the Armenians are actively seeking to destroy the homeland through a perceived independence movement and, thus, destroy the peace and prosperity that Young Turk propaganda promised would otherwise come with Turkish control.

These sort of ideas were further entrenched into CUP ideology when Italy declared war in September 1911. Though the war had severely detrimental consequences for the Turkish citizenry, for the Young Turks it was a ‘blessing in disguise and gave the Committee a new lease on life’ (Ahmad 1969: 91) as it provoked a reassertion of nationalist sentiment and dedication to the state. As such, more nationalist groups were established, such as that of Türk Ocağı, the Turkish Hearth Society, which became a key source for CUP propaganda founded in March of 1912. Much of the Türk Ocağı message promised that, under the CUP, Turan and the Turks would proceed to ‘cover the entire world with its raging torrents, ... leave no neck unbowed, no sword unbroken, no fortress not struck...The custodian of Turkish strength, the watchman of the Turkish hearth, the defender of the Turkish homeland – they shall be the vanguard of Turan’ (in Akçam 2006: 90). This sort of terminology is telling of the role of the homeland during this period of time: Turkey as both a fortress and a hearth, a watchman and defender. In short, CUP ideology is casting the homeland as the Turks’ primary defender in times of uncertainty. The geopolitical climate, instead of helping to assure national sentiment, reinforced for Young Turk elites that policies of decentralisation would not work and that a strong, centralised elite was absolutely necessary to secure their power (Astourian 1990: 129).
As mentioned in Chapter Six, the loss of the Balkan wars and subsequent momentary loss of power to the Sultan, meant that the CUP was forced to reapproach certain elements of their policies. First among these was the shift of focus away from the northern, European Provinces and instead toward the ‘Islamic’ provinces of Arabia; following Gökalp’s lead, Anatolia became a state of particular ideological import (see Ahmad 1969: 121 - 124, 153; Berkes 1959: Ch. 9). This shift of homeland perspective runs concurrently with the arrival of refugees into the area, primarily Muslims fleeing the Balkans for fear of retaliation or persecution in the former Ottoman territories. The danger this situation caused was aggravated by returning soldiers from the front at the end of the conflict (R14078/Ab.9798 1931). The influx of people, particularly into key towns and cities in Anatolia, put pressure on the economic market, most especially regarding housing and food.

Ideologically, however, the loss of the Balkan War was disastrous. The loss of the war meant Turkey had lost the Eastern province of Rumelia, the birthplace of most of the CUP leadership, the seat of Turkish pride and history. In this case, the homeland actually was ‘under attack’ just as Germany post-WWI was. Armenian provinces had been given a semblance of autonomy, particularly through the right to their own ground army corps and police for Anatolia (R1480/Ab.14922 14.07.1913); when the discussions began again regarding claims of Armenian rights, Turkish ire sparked, fearing the loss of Anatolia in a similar way. Thus, the Turks begin framing much of the anti-Armenian propaganda in terms of homeland loss, threatening that the goal of the Christian Europeans was ‘to swallow’ Turkey, piece by piece (Dadrian 2004: 185, 188; Akçam 2006: 81, 85). As Isyar points out, Young Turk elites were beginning to express the belief that Ottoman unity ‘served only to exploit the Turkish race and from now on the empire should be left to the real owners, the Turkish race. The Turkish race, apparently, was not only suffering from the losses of the empire more than any other race but also was being exploited by them’(2005: 347). In short, a loss of homeland provided an opportunity for Armenians to exploit the nation at a
vulnerable time. Thus, Turks not only associated the Christian Armenians with the European powers to whom they had lost the heart of their homeland, but they reaffirmed the importance of the homeland to Muslim Turks, warning the population repeatedly of Russian influence in Anatolia (R14080/Ab.13152 1913).

Thus, the quick shifts in population, paired with the shame of loss and increased fear of future homeland depletion set the stage for the deportation of Armenians. Not only did deportation solve the policy problem of housing Turks, but it also served as a preventative measure against future loss of the homeland (see R1480/Ab.14922 14.07.1913; R14084/Ab.9737 18.05.1914). Thus, the Young Turks were able to assure their people they were doing all possible to protect their homeland from inner, as well as outer, enemies.

1914 – 1915

As the deportations continued to grow in frequency and ferocity, so also did the resettlement of Muslims into what had been Armenian territory. In certain towns and villages, ‘reestablishment’ of Muslims began even before the general deportation order had been issued (Akçam 2006: 182). The Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire seemed to fulfil the doomsdays fears promised by CUP propaganda since the end of the Balkan Wars – the homeland was now not only at risk, but actually under attack from Russia, and through Russia, other European powers. It only made sense, said CUP propaganda, that the Armenians would side with the Russians and take up arms against the Turks. Germans, Austrians and Russians were, amongst themselves at least, talking of the partition of Armenia from the Ottoman Empire as a fait accompli (Mandelstam 1931: 31; see also Dadrian 2004: 191-192). The military attaché to the Austrian Embassy in Istanbul from 1909-1919 summed the situation up nicely, saying that

a great number of Turkish intellectuals have sincerely expressed the sentiment that the reason for the Ottoman Empire’s loss in recent years- and more generally, over the last two centuries – of
[many of] its provinces in Europe and Asia lies first and foremost in the excessively humanistic behaviour of the previous sultans. What should have been done was either the forcible conversion to Islam of the population in the provinces...or their utter and total extirpation.

(Joseph Pomiankowski in Akçam 2006: 120)

His advice was soon followed. Enver Pasha began to claim that the ‘only way out of the dismal position in which Turkey had found itself’ was to unify Turks and Islamists in one pure homeland; as non-Muslims had proven their traitorousness with their support of the Russians, the continued existence of the homeland was predicated on the need to radicalise measures against the anti-nation to ensure the continued security of the homeland (in Akçam 2006: 102).

Thus, it is in this time period where the key moral legitimation for radicalised approaches to dealing with the ‘Armenian Question’ were taken well in hand (Bloxham 2002: 106). While outright genocide had yet to be initiated, extreme population transfers and ethnic cleansing had moved from ideologically driven propaganda to initiated policy, particularly in certain geographic regions.

post - 1915

The massacres at Van and the concurrent arrests of leading Armenian thinkers led to very few changes in the homeland ideology of the CUP. Through the end of the First World War, the Turks associated the Armenians with the Russian enemy. They warned that Russia was the ear to Europe, ‘foundationally listening to the demands of the Armenians’, whose ‘cries of autonomy [would] only be answered by the Turks with the gallows’ (R14097/Ab.32245 26.09.1917; R14092/Ab.19095 12.07.1916). 1918 shows a re-established focus on securing Turkish borders and establishing Turkish influence in the area by whatever means possible to a state on the losing side of Great War. By the 1919, the assumption had shifted from one of Armenian independence to continued Turkish jurisdiction over the Armenian regions of Anatolia (R11053/Ab.31351 5.07.1918; R14105/Ab.10808 26.03.1919). In this regard, the aims of the Turkish genocide against the Armenians was fulfilled: the
homeland was kept in tact and under Turkish control, an outcome that was uncertain until the mass persecution, deportations and death of the Armenian population.

Germany

'Never regard the Reich as secure unless for centuries to come it can give every scion of our people his own parcel of soil. Never forget that the most sacred right on this earth is a man's right to have earth to till with his own hands, and the most sacred sacrifice the blood that a man sheds for this earth' (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 607)

1929 - 1933

The Nazi approach to homeland is somewhat different from that of the CUP. While the Young Turks were attempting to hold a homeland together, the Germans were trying to regain what had been lost. Aside from the multi-dimensional and rather unique ideological aspect of Lebensraum discussed earlier in this chapter, Nazi ideology, even in its earliest manifestations, was concerned with reuniting land lost since the late 19th century. As a result of WWI, Germany had lost both land and colonies since the Berlin Conference of 1885, both of which the Nazi state was determined to regain. Exactly which regions of Europe would be German colonies and how they would be governed vacillated over the course of the conflict from Poland and the Ukraine, which would be directly overseen by German administrators after being cleansed from their non-Germanic elements, or to Crimea, Yugoslavia, and other parts of the Soviet Union which would be governed in a more laissez-faire approach more popular by the 1940s (Lower 2005: 185 - 186; Tribunals 08.01.1946). Thus, we see that in this case, Mahoney's idea of critical juncture might be more applicable than in either of my other two cases as the loss of land occurred not as a result of crumbling empire, but instead as a result of one immediate event. However, it is important to remember that the loss of WWI is only one event effecting
Germany at this stage; I point out the role of that particular event to bring attention to the fact that this loss of the homeland is part of the inherited ideology the Nazis were working within once they gained power of the German state.

Thus, the idea of the homeland was at risk was already well established by 1929 – as evidenced by claims that the Versailles Treaty had not only stripped the nation of their German honour, but also of the very land that inherently belonged to them. Even the land remaining to them had to be defended from all enemies:

Today we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland, for the unity of our nation and the daily bread of our children...Never suffer the rise of two continental powers in Europe. Regard any attempt to organise a second military power on the German frontiers, even if only in the form of creating state capable of military strength, as an attack on Germany, and in it see not only the right but also the duty, to employ all means up to armed force to prevent the rise of such a state, or, if one has already arisen, to smash it again.

(Hitler 1969 [1925]: 565, 607)

Evidence seems to suggest that the primary reason for this incensed reaction to perceived aggression is that, for Germany, there is no distinction between blood and soil (Blut und Boden); the excellence of one entailed the excellence of the other. This also tapped into Social Darwinism: colonised regions and areas used for Lebensraum could be ‘Germanised’ but people living within their bounds were tied intrinsically to their race (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 353). Even the earliest expressions of the NSDAP movement claimed that its object was to unite Germans in the Fatherland 'under the guidance of the Fuehrer,' a thing to be achieved by renouncing Versailles and by the creation of 'a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers of 1914' ruled by the whole Volk, mobilised into an ethnonational political entity (Tribunals 30.11.46c; see also Mann 2005: 181). This idea is spurred further by, similarly to the Turkish case, the evidence given by refugees and soldiers returning from the front of WWI. Bloxham and Kushner claim that these refugees' accounts solidified popular stereotypes of Eastern Europe 'as a great space waiting to be properly exploited, the people as primitives whose lives were not only cheaper but who would benefit from
civilising German overlordship' (2004: 88). The assurance that the reestablishment of a strong German homeland would be advantageous for Germans living within and out with Germany was an assertion made over the course of much of the pre- and early war years.

1933 – 1935

By the mid 1930’s, as the prospect of Germanic expansion was firmly turned eastward, Russia was seen as the most threatening rival power, though what exactly was to be done in defence of this threat, was left relatively unestablished until c.1941 (Goebbels 1982 [1939 - 1941]: 191, 203, 284 - 286; Mann 2005: 182). Malcontent about the Treaty of Versailles had moved into what Michael Mann terms ‘ethnic imperial revisionism,’ meaning that the next stage of homeland establishment was to ‘revise the borders to incorporate the ‘lost territories’ and create an ethnic German Empire’ (Mann 2005: 183), thus explaining the integration of Austrians into the NSDAP, occurring directly after the book burning at Opernplatz (Völkischer Beobachter 1933f). While these were important shifts in policy further refining the homeland debate, during this time period, Nazi ideology was primarily concerned with the Führer Princip and on establishing the Jews as the anti-nation, as seen in Chapter Six, at the expense of homeland ideology. For instance, after the death of Reichspräsident von Hindenberg on 2 August 1934, soldiers in the German Navy no longer swore their service oaths to the German Fatherland, but directly to Hitler himself (Tribunals 15.01.1946a)42. Thus, though there were still tangible threads regarding the importance of the homeland, the early thirties is when this theme is at its lowest point. It would take the strengthening of the rumblings of war to spur on a shift in Nazi ideological focus, nudging the minds of the Volk back to the importance of homeland.

42 The revised service oath read: ‘I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath,’ replacing ‘his Fatherland’ with Hitler (Tribunals 15.01.1946a).
Indeed, a brief look at the primary sources used in my research shows a strong resurgence of the importance of the homeland in NSDAP ideology between 1935 and 1938, as the Nazi state prepared for war. In Der Völkischer Beobachter, much of the focus is phrased in terms of the persecution of members of the German Volk in ‘lost’ German lands, parts of the homeland now under the political jurisdiction of other states, such as Lithuania. The restriction of German rights, rigged, anti-German elections, the abolition of German status and threats against Germans were all reported as fact (Völkischer Beobachter 1935c, 1935e, 1935f). The received perception was that of immediate personal threat to Germans outside the homeland governed by the NSDAP. Also expressed was that these regions were direct geographical corridors through which enemies like Russia could attack the Fatherland (NSDAP 1935e).

If this was the case, then Nazi ideology dictated that it was the ‘Right and Duty’ of Germans to do something to prevent these atrocities from occurring on both individual and national levels (Völkischer Beobachter 1935f). Thus, German military aggression is justified as a necessity in order to save the homeland and, through the homeland, the nation itself (see Völkischer Beobachter 1935b; Tribunals 01.10.1946o). The annexation of Austria was cased in terms of the prodigal son returning home; growing pressure on Czechoslovakia to cede territory to the Reich was done so under the ideological guise of ‘an arrangement’ with ‘other minorities, peacefully and without oppression’ (Hitler in Tribunals 30.11.1946d).

Both Austria and Czechoslovakia were a vital part of the Greater Germany, a homeland ‘where all those can live and work together who speak German and have German blood’ (Streicher in Tribunals 29.04.1946; see also Völkischer Beobachter 1935f). As discussed above, Streicher makes clear that Greater Germany is not Lebensraum, but the fact that those living in these regions are racially German and their lands are historically German; thus, regardless of their current citizenship, these
people and these lands should belong to the Reich (Tribunals 29.04.1946). As we will see, this sort of justification is carried throughout the course of the conflict.

1938 – 1941

My sources for this time period show a distinct leaning towards a ‘if we don’t, then they will’ theme regarding the use of war and aggression, an idea popularised by *Der Völkischer Beobachter*, Goering and even Hitler himself (Tribunals 16.03.1946; Völkischer Beobachter 1938a, 1938c). Germans were alerted to the fact that German culture was being put directly under attack in homeland-claimed lands in Lithuania, that Germans were be forcibly expelled from the Sudetenland and that invasion was assured unless something was to be done (Völkischer Beobachter 1938a, 1938c). This is due perhaps to the recent socio-economic struggles Germany had experienced; since it was impossible to guarantee economic security, it became increasingly imperative to guarantee cultural security.

By 1938 – 1941, unlike in earlier years, Germany was ready not only to call for action, but to act. While Jews were being told of their possible relations to undivulged colonial outskirts (Kershaw 1989: 98), the finite boundaries of the German homeland were seemingly established:

In the discussion that took place in the night of 29-30 August [1939] between Dahlerus and me [Goering], I believe at the Fuehrer's, I tore a map from an atlas on the spur of the moment and outlined with a red pencil, and I believe a blue or green pencil, those regions—not the regions which we would demand, as declared here before by the Prosecution—but those regions of Poland in which Germans live. That the witness Dahlerus was also of this opinion can be seen most clearly from the fact that he repeated the same markings on another map and then wrote as follows, next to the marked section: ‘German population according to Goering’ and next to the dotted section: ‘Polish inhabitants according to Goering’

(Tribunals 19.03.1946)
Chapter Eight: Perceptions of Blut und Boden

Not only was the German homeland, as in my other two cases, geographically bounded, but their establishment and the fulfilment of bringing these lands back into the Reich were cause for celebration; poems were written acknowledging the might and sanctity of German lands, news stories were written telling of cheering and celebration across the contested lands as German influence became established in places like Hendekrug and the Sudetenland (Völkischer Beobachter 1938c). In short, what we see is a claim of responsibility politically, culturally, linguistically, militarly and racially over lands classified as part of Greater Germany.

post – 1941

By 1941, Germany was well into the Second World War and it was this that primarily shaped Nazi ideology of the homeland until the end of the war. Though much of this was no longer directly expressed in terms of the homeland being at risk of invasion – seeing as they were at war – there is a constant and expected theme of German soldiers fighting and dying ‘for the Fatherland’ (NSDAP 1941a, 1941c, 1941d, 1941e). This, however, is far from unique to the German case, as we find similar expressions in most modern wars; nonetheless, there are certain elements found in some of my primary and secondary sources worthy of note in this section. First is the influence America had on genocidal ideology regarding the homeland. After their entrance into the European theatre, Hitler began to express the idea that the ‘USA could only be defeated by a racially pure European state, and that it was the task of the Nazi movement to prepare ‘its own fatherland’ for the task’ (Kershaw 1989: 126). Though Hitler never attempted to claim the USA as part of the German homeland, their involvement in the war proved yet another justification for German aggression towards the anti-nation. Unless the homeland was purified of the inner enemy, the outer enemy could never be beaten.

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43 For more information on the use of nationalist discourse in warfare see (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Salter 1998; Young 2001; McGarry and O’Leary 1993)
Also of note is a particularly interesting suspicion rumoured in 1943 that Bavaria might secede from Greater Germany (Tribunals 13.03.1946); naturally, this was never incorporated into Nazi ideology and was quickly diffused as coming from the Jews. Nonetheless, it speaks to the depth to which ideology of the homeland filtered down into all aspects of society, reminding scholars of ideology and propaganda that simply because something is repeatedly said, one cannot assume it is a belief held by all individuals or of all regions within a state.

The Balkans

'It is the habit of the Muslims to live in this way...They like to live on top of one another. It's their culture. We Serbs need space' (Biljana Plavsic in Silber and Little 1997: 233).

1979 – 1987

Variations on homeland claims are one of the strongest themes of genocidal ideology redolent in my Yugoslav case. Unsurprisingly, as will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis section, there are some notable similarities to both the German and Turkish cases, but there are some particular issues that set the Serbs in their own category. The fall of the Iron Curtain, while generally regarded as a victory by western states, was also a sounding bell of nationalism, serving as the collapse of 'empire' bringing uncertainty and change to Yugoslavia; even the geographical space of Yugoslavia would be contested in the wave of rising Serb and Kosovar nationalism through the early 1980s. Rising propaganda began to describe the current 1974 Constitution as a direct hit against the Serbs by dividing them up regionally and thus reducing their power (Mirkovic 1996: 192; SANU 1986). The 'expulsion' of the Serbian nation from Kosovo, long considered to be the heart of Serbia, rankled, bearing 'spectacular witness to [Serbia’s] historic defeat'. Earlier media and political trends explaining the positives of the current Constitution were described as a war, one 'waged through the skilful application of various methods
and tactics, with a division of functions and with the active, not merely passive, and little concealed support of certain political centres within Yugoslavia...its present form, disguised with a new content, is proceeding more successfully and is moving towards a victorious outcome' (SANU 1986).

In short, my research provides ideological foundations being established suggesting that Serbs had been being attacked through trickery and deceit, loosing their land through legislation created by those who wished the Serbs harm. Here we see the homeland at risk from enemies within their very ranks. These ideas carried much weight in Serbia where tradition is 'to cherish one's own state as one's own home' (Pavkovic 1994: 452). This is reflected in a place where, similarly to Germany, 'Fatherland' terminology had been used by scholars and politicians since the nineteenth century. Similarly, support for the creation of Yugoslavia was much less popular with post-WWII Serbs; more dominant was instead the creation of a Greater Serbia that would include Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as some lands in Croatia, Slovenia and Dalmatia (Judah 1997: 60, 94). In order to restore certainty in a time of great change, the provinces given autonomy under the 1974 Constitution must again become 'true integral parts of the Republic of Serbia by granting them a degree of autonomy that would not destroy the integrity of the Republic and would make it possible to act in the common interests of the wider community' (SANU 1986). Once again we see this idea that national assumption of the homeland being portrayed not only as a right, but as something that is morally just.

1987 – 1991

The idea of entitlement established in the early- and mid-eighties is one of the strongest themes in this case. For the Serbs, the whole of the Yugoslav state, and not merely the Serbian region, was perceived as 'theirs'; most nationalist leaders regarded other internal boundaries as 'merely administrative' (Brubaker 1996: 73); however, once the communist ideal began to disintegrate, 'Yugoslavia' became a less useful vehicle for an ideology supportive of Serb unification (Pavkovic 2000: 90).
Post-1987, Serb leadership began setting the foundations for the creation of Serbian municipalities in non-Serb regions, such as Prijedor and Bosanska Gradiska, controlled at the time by Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to form part of a pure Serbian state (IT-97-24 2008).

Silber attests that Milosevic never disputed the right of Croatia and Slovenia to secede, claiming only that ‘the break-up of Yugoslavia would necessitate a redrawing of the boarders’ (Silber and Little 1997: 147). Out of this idea comes the well-known slogan of ‘All Serbs in One State’; even Cosic, soon to become President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and only a nominal supporter of the overall policy, believed it was important for Serbs to support ‘the realisation of their centuries-long national goal – the life of the whole of the Serb diaspora in a single state’ (in Pavkovic 2003: 266; see also Jovic 2009: 358 - 360). During this time, however, Serb elites radicalised this statement, determining that it should be interpreted to mean that if all Serbs were to be in one state, then only Serbs should be in that state – no other minorities were welcome (Judah 1997: 165). This points directly to the ethnocentric perspective on homeland popular at the time.

As noted in previous chapters, in the late 1980’s, Serbian ideology was less concerned with Croatia, Slovenia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Growing Serbian nationalist sentiment was mirrored by growing Kosovar nationalist sentiment throughout the early part of the decade. As part of the Yugoslav ethnoscape, Kosovo is critical to Serbian national myth and history. Thus, though Kosovo was approximately 90% Albanian, Serbs equated it with Jerusalem: it was their promised land and the heart of their civilisation (Silber and Little 1997: 34; Judah 1997: 29 - 30; see also Mann 2005; Dannreuther 2001). In his speech of 24 April 1987, Milosevic expressed this claim of Serbian-ness in Kosovo, saying

You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn’t abandon your land just because it’s difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. It was never part of the Serbian and Montenegrin character to give up in the face of
obstacles, to demobilize when it’s time to fight... You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don’t suggest that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you’re not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it...

(Pavkovic 2000: 104)

It was the 1990 election results, however, that saw a distinct shift in Serbian concern from Kosovo to Bosnia; what the election results showed was that the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) would be unable to use democratic means to prevent the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Yugoslav state currently under Serb control. However, the Serb leadership refused to allow the secession to occur, claiming that the loss of land would also entail the destruction of the nation, as Serbs would ‘not be compelled to leave Yugoslavia’ (in IT-97-24-PT 2001). In order to keep secession from occurring, the SDS began organising Bosnia-Herzegovina into more formalised regional structures, using the concept of ‘Associations of Municipalities’ used when writing the 1974 Constitution. The first of these regional associations, the Association of Bosanska Krajina Municipalities in Banja Luka, was established in April 1991 (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-99-36-1 2004). Although formed through claims of economic necessity, the municipality had a political agenda of homeland salvation, which ran contrary to the very Constitution justifying its establishment.

1991 – 1992

This ‘reorganisation’ of municipalities continued throughout the autumn of 1991 as the war with Croatia began and increased in severity. Serb political leadership, fearing that Bosnia-Herzegovina would follow in Slovenia and Croatia’s footsteps, transformed regional municipalities into Serbian autonomous districts and one Serbian autonomous region (both hereafter called SAOs). These were the foundation of the Serbian homeland: September 1991 saw the creation of the Autonomous
Region of Krajina (ARK)\textsuperscript{44}, the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established on 24 October 1991 and, by the end of November of that year, the SAO Romanija-Birac, the SAO Semberija, and SAO Northern Bosnia. The rationale behind the creation of the SAOs and the leadership claims held over them by the SDS was to increase Serb rights in the area and ensure the safety of Serbs throughout their land (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-02-54-T 2002; IT-99-36/2 2008). Here we see that the institutional structure of the state is redesigned to fit within the ideological structure established of an indirect territorial polity (Vladisavljevic 2011: 144); this is the agency of ideology coming in to play, where ideology itself causes and legitimates policy decisions. Thus, not only did the SDS claim these lands as sole possession of Serbs, the Serb leadership used maintaining their homeland as justification for aggressive political action.

In order to legitimise these homeland claims, the Serb authorities held a plebiscite deciding whether or not Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain in the Yugoslav state. Unlike the 14 – 15 October 1991 decision to create a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs flocked to participate in this decision, voting overwhelmingly in support of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining within SFRY (IT-00-39&40-PT 2002a; IT-00-39&40/1 2002b; IT-02-54-T 2002).

As viewed by the SDS political leadership, Bosniak and Bosnian Croat presence in Serb-claimed lands served as a major problem in the creation and control of Serbian territory (IT-95-5/18-1 2000). In order for Serbs to live safely, they needed a cleansed geographical homeland to thrive. Thus, in secret, the SDS authorised instructions for the ‘Organisation and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances’, a plan outlining complete Serb take-over in the claimed municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina (IT-99-36-1 2004). On 28 February 1992, the SDS-led Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a

\textsuperscript{44} The ARK eventually included: Banja Luka, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac Donji, Kofar Varos, Krupa, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Sipovo,
declaration on the Proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The region included the SAOs and ‘other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the genocide conducted against it in World War Two’, and was declared to be a part of the SFRY. A few months later, on 12 August 1992, the Bosnian Serb republic was renamed as ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS) (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-95-5/18-1 2000, 2002; IT-99-36-1 2004; IT-04-79-1 2005). Again here we see national claims being made on one specific geographical region. While there is less focus on revenge and fear, what primarily shines through is a sense of justification through the regained unity of the homeland.

It is important to note that, unlike in Germany, these homeland claims were not ideologically demarcated by majority populations, but were instead based on historical claims. It is in this way that ideology reacts against events, namely the independence of Slovenia and parts of Croatia. Ideology in this time period begins to stipulate that independence was acceptable as long as territorial independence did not involved the annexation of historically claimed ethnic Serb territories (Pavkovic 2003: 260) regardless of current population densities within regions. For example, in the Prijedor municipality (population: 112,543), Bosniaks constituted 43.9% (49,351) of the total population, whilst Serbs were only 42.3% (47,581)45. Bosniaks, then, were identified as the largest ethnic group in the municipality, and were categorised as the greatest threat to Serbs, ethnically, culturally and politically (IT-97-24 2008; IT-97-24-PT 2001; Mikelic, Schoen, and Benschop 2005). Here is where, as discussed in Chapter Three, we begin to see some of the key differences in the way ideology shifts in this case of ethnic cleansing. There is ideological space established early enough in the radicalisation process (the structure of ideology) to make future policy decisions resulting in an equally violent, if non-genocidal, action, but with less intent on absolute ethnic destruction.

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45 Prijedor’s population also included 5.6% (6,316) Croats, 5.7% (6,459) labelling themselves as Yugoslavs and 2.5% (2,836) who were classified as ‘other’ (IT-97-24-PT 2001)
The key policy shift established in light of growing discontent was initiated by Karadzic and executed by Momcilo Krajsnik, President of the RS National Assembly, on 12 May 1992, when he established six ‘strategic objectives’ for Bosnian Serbs: 1) *establishing distinct state borders* separating the Serbian people from other ethnic communities; 2) *create a corridor between Semberija in the north east and Krajina in the north west* of Bosnia-Herzegovina; 3) *establish a corridor in the Drina River valley*, thus eliminating the Drina River as a border breaking up Serbs; 4) *establish a Serbian boarder* on the Una and Neretva Rivers; 5) *divide the city of Sarajevo* into Serbian and Muslim parts, establishing effective state authorities in both parts; 6) *ensure access to the sea* for RS. Policies to achieve these objectives were immediately initiated, but the strategic objectives themselves not published publicly until 26 November 1993 (IT-99-36-1 2004; IT-00-39&40-PT 2002a; IT-04-81 2005; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006; IT-95-5/18 2008b). The purpose of these strategic goals was to seize and control the territory claimed as the Serbian homeland, ensuring that these regions were neither able to secede from SFRY nor would they be able to become usurped by the newly established Croatian state, who claimed the contested lands for political and regional clout (IT-04-79-PTb 2005). Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic stated ‘we have what we want. We control 70 per cent of the territory, but we claim only on 64 per cent’ (Oberschall 2007: 110)

The formalisation of ideology into policy in such a tactical way also enabled a more efficient approach to ethnic cleansing; in these Serb-claimed areas, protracted violence became rote as churches and mosques were destroyed. The indictments used in my primary research show a total of 304 religious institutions demolished after 1992, 30 Catholic Churches and a shocking total of 274 Mosques (see IT-99-36-1 2004; IT-97-24-PT 2001; IT-04-79-PT 2005; IT-04-79-PTb 2005; IT-02-54-T 2002). Medical supplies, food and water were also specifically restricted, particularly in the enclaves of Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, in order to create unbearable living conditions for those living in these areas, a large majority of
whom were Bosniaks (IT-02-54-T 2002; IT-97-24-PT 2002a; IT-99-36-1 2004).
Doing so served to cleanse the homeland of the anti-nation, thus ensuring continued national dominion. Also worth noting is that, in a similar way to Germany and to Turkey, the worst atrocities were committed in the contested areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina; though Bosniaks were in great peril in RS, Muslims living in Serbia proper were generally left alone. ‘Those atrocities that did take place were carried out to remove populations from land during a period of the breakdown of authority, not primarily because of ‘ancient hatreds’ (Carmichael 2010: 14).

The last events found in my research serving to alter the course of ideology through the massacres of Srebrenica were the passing of UN Resolution 819 on 16 April 1993 and the Vance-Owen plan of spring 1993. The UN Resolution classified the towns of Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo and their surrounding areas as the ‘safe areas’ free from attack or other type of hostility. The Vance-Owen Plan proposed to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten sections, distributed amongst Croatia, Serbia, and the Bosniaks. As it denied the Serbs the corridors Karadzic claimed in 1992, and thus disallowed the ability for a ‘whole’ homeland, Serbian leadership rejected the plan, arguing that Serbs would have to live in danger and isolation and doing so would amount to the ethnic cleansing of Serbs (IT-95-5/18-1 2002; Silber and Little 1997: 276 - 277, 282; Glenny 1996: 147). In this case, the UN action spurred the Serbs to act, as UN action was viewed as an attack on the homeland by an international (external) enemy which must not be able to be fully implemented if the health of the nation is tied to the sanctity of the homeland.

Analysis

The basic premise of this chapter is the question ‘what role does the homeland play in the evolution and radicalisation of ideology towards genocide?’ By assessing the manifestation of ideology regarding the homeland set out in the previous sections, I hope to answer this question by moving into the comparative evaluation of that information. Here I will revisit each section in comparative perspective, evaluating
any key themes arising out of each case study, comparing and contrasting their shifts and changes. As in other chapters, this is best accomplished through a chronological assessment of each case.

A quick recap of the Turkish case brings out a number of interesting points. To begin with, from very early on, the ideas that 1) the unification of Turkish homeland was in jeopardy and that 2) keeping this destruction from occurring is paramount to the creation and justification of ideology and policy at the time. The history of war and subsequent loss of territory from the mid-1800s meant not only a loss of political legitimisation and clout internationally, but, when paired with the Social Darwinist nationalism popular in the CUP, the idea of the failing homeland begins to associate itself with the idea of a failing nation. This then provides the opportunity for persecution to be legitimised as it is a cause to ‘save the homeland’, particularly when the reforms promised by the CUP failed to do so.

The third recurring theme of the Turkish case is the influence of international actors and the characterisation of these actors as national enemies. Arguably more than in any other theme in genocidal ideology presented in my three case, the role of outside actors is evident in shaping changes in policy. In the Turkish case, the primary outer enemy is, as mentioned in earlier chapters, Russia. Increased Russian dominion over territories in mid-Asia threatened Ottoman, and later, CUP power over their regional provinces and provided a rationale for the two points above, the homeland at risk and justification for aggression. The First World War disturbed what could have been a balanced compromise between Germany and Russia regarding the Armenians (R14083/Ab.25202 1913); as it is, however, homeland ideology continued to radicalise and justify anti-Armenian policies encouraging their expulsion from the homeland.

Also worth noting is the idea that the Ottoman homeland is the sole property and dominion of Turks. This idea is present in CUP ideology, but is instituted in whispers and suggestions, rather than the shouts and protestations of my other two
cases. My research intimates that this is primarily due to the latent remnants of attempted Ottoman multi-culturalism. Though the ethnocentric tendencies of the CUP cast multi-culturalism as the reason for Turkish decline, it still allowed for the existence of Jews, Kurds and other non-anti-nation other-groups to exist and even, in the Kurdish case, to flourish as they were not seen as being a direct threat to the existence of the homeland.

This is in direct contrast to the German case where claims of German-ness were directly tied, from a very early stage, to the homeland. Germans were very clear, and quite proud of the fact that their homeland was for the German Volk and that their nation would live or die by the prosperity of the homeland itself. The early establishment of this theme is unique to Germany and was absolutely vital in its influence regarding early military manoeuvres; not only did the Germans need Lebensraum, but their military attempts were to re-establish ‘Greater Germany’ – goals that could only be established by a ‘racially pure European state’ under Nazi control (Kershaw 1989: 126). Thus, the expulsion of Jews from the homeland was a necessity. Not only were the Jews national persecutors, but their very presence put the nation at risk to attack and victory by external enemies. This is well traced by Bloxham and Kushner who note the territorial nature of the shifting answer to the ‘Jewish Question’. The first step was the exclude Jews within Germany, the second to exclude Jews from Germany, the third was a spatial displacement, or the deportation to a specific destination far outside of Greater Germany, such as Madagascar or Argentina. Only after these three options had been dismissed was mass murder the decided campaign (2004: 72; see also Tribunals 09.01.1946 for Rosenberg’s instructions re homeland purification in the East). The first three options, then, are territorial, whereas the fourth is not. As the need to save the homeland from the risk of internal and external enemies increases, the move towards justifying radicalisation increases rapidly.

The relationship between the idea of the homeland at risk and using homeland protection as a rationalisation for aggression also establishes itself early on in the
Yugoslav case. However, the problem with Yugoslavia is who it needs to protect the homeland from. As we see in Chapter Five, Milosevic predicts in the nineteen eighties that ‘Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo’; however, Kosovo’s role in the creation and establishment of the homeland mentality is relatively minor through the early nineteen nineties, though ‘the fissures that spread from the unhappy province managed to splinter the rest of the country’ (Judah 1997: 30), shifting the focus away from Kosovo and firmly onto Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 1990 elections. Of course, the Serbs never gave up on their homeland claims in this region, a situation that would cause further unrest and great bloodshed in the mid- to late nineteen nineties and even into the twenty first century.

Once homeland claims began to be made, over Bosnia-Herzegovina however, they began being made exclusively for Serbs. My research shows that Bosnian Serbs made it very clear that if non-Serbs, particularly Croats, were to stay in their (Serbian) homeland, they would be expected to either live in severely limited situations with relatively no regard to their welfare, as seen by the lack of humanitarian aid during the crisis, or that they would have to adopt themselves to a Serbian way of life, thereby cleansing the homeland of all non-Serb elements. The bounteous destruction of Mosques and Catholic Churches serve to support these claims, as they are the policy consequences of an ideology sanctifying the homeland and using ethnic cleansing as a legitimation for what was predominantly anti-Bosniak action. Thus, we see that genocide in the Balkans, like in Germany and the Ottoman Empire, was not built on the ideological expressions of historical ethnic hatred, but is expressed by ‘calculated means to expand the parameters of an ethnically homogeneous territory’ (Wood 2001: 67 - 68).

Before moving on to conclude, I want to return again to the recurring variations on cumulative radicalisation and path dependency. In the chapters on the nation and anti-nation, we have seen some minor differences in each case regarding the way ideology is manifest as structure and agency, but, for the most part, the radicalisation process is similar. As we will see below, the thematic progression is comparable and
provides us with keen insight as to how ideology evolves; nonetheless, this does not detract from the fact the structure of ideology and its flexibility is most visible in this theme due to its variance from case to case.

Due predominantly to a long history of loss of empire, the CUP inherited a long-standing perception of the homeland under threat. In contrast, the Germans experienced a swift loss of empire and colonies after the First World War. The ideological structure within which the Nazis were working was one where the early focus was on regaining what had been lost rather than protecting what remained. The third approach is exhibited in the Balkan case where, more than in any other case, the goal posts keep moving from a Serb-led Yugoslavia to Greater Serbia to All Serbs in One State to a pure Serbia. While in the other two cases, ideological structure shifts and radicalises in a more cumulatively progressive way, the Balkan case shows an ideological structure that shifts in extremes in order to keep up with a swiftly changing geo-political atmosphere. I would suggest that regarding the homeland in the Balkan case, ideology has less agency and is used less as an incitement to action and more as a tool of legitimising state policy in reaction to events. Categorising these three cases in such a way offers interesting insight into how the institution of ideology works in radicalising states, and will be returned to in greater detail in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

Thus, evidence from each of my cases demonstrates that there are three main themes in genocidal ideology regarding the homeland, two that are interlinked and one that is moderately independent of the other two. In short, my analysis shows that genocidal ideology regarding the homeland manifests itself in three main ways: 1) *the homeland as the sole property of the nation*, 2) *the homeland at risk* and 3) *salvation of the homeland as justification for inner and outer aggression*. The independent theme is that of *the homeland as the sole property of the nation*. In the Turkish case, this idea takes longer to establish itself because of its recent history of
attempted multi-culturalism. The German case, in contrast, begins with a firm belief in *Blut und Boden* predating anti-Semitic policy initiatives, and being instrumental in early military decisions, but becoming less influential as other themes of leadership and Volkishness take prominence. The Serbian case research provides evidence that Serb interest in Bosnia-Herzegovina were present but not powerful until after the 1990 elections, growing in importance throughout the end of the conflict in the region, particularly as external actors become involved. Critically, all three of my cases seek to address ethnic boundaries in light of changing geopolitics.

The second two themes of *the homeland at risk* and the *salvation of the homeland as justification for inner and outer aggression* generally move in conjunction with each other. The homeland is shown as being at risk which results in aggressive radicalisation of policy shifts; this aggression is then justified as being carried out in order to save the homeland from internal and external enemies. This relationship is seen in each case and is particularly noteworthy as each case enters war. Accordingly, we see a rise in this theme in 1912 and in late 1914 in the Turkish case, for the Germans it occurs primarily between 1935 – 1938 and for the Yugoslav case my research indicates that the most noticeable rise is between 1990 and 1992.

Before concluding, it is important to note in all three cases the identification of the homeland happens against a backdrop of massive geopolitical shift. The way in which that change occurs is different in each case: the Ottoman Empire had experienced over a decade of slow disintegration as nationalist movements ate away at the empire. The German state was forced to renounce a considerable amount of its claimed homeland at the end of the Second World War. The Serbs were victims of the collapse of Communism which resulted in the swift, if democratic, dissolution of influence over important geographic regions. Thus, these are cases of conflict where geographical boundaries are new, in flux and at risk. Despite the difference in how the homeland had been lost, these regimes set out to redefine the boundaries of their homelands, claiming that the boundaries of the nation no longer fit the geographical parameters of the status quo.
Hence, in these three cases, the role of the homeland in genocidal ideology is threefold. Evidence of this nature, repeated in multiple cases, allows scholars to expect that similar findings may be present in other cases of genocide. If this is the case, than one might be able to infer that, for genocidal states, it is necessary to establish the homeland as geographically bounded, sanctified to such an extent as to legitimise the killing of its own citizenry and directly linked to the excellence of the nation itself.
Analysis and Conclusion: Mapping genocidal ideology

‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past’ (Marx 1978: 595)

Introduction

The previous chapters of this PhD can be divided into two categories, substantive and theoretical; this chapter is divided in a similar fashion. The first section of this chapter returns to the qualitative chapters presenting my research, Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight. My approach to these chapters in the body of the PhD is thematic, but here, the focus is on mapping ideology in a chronological way, comparing each of the three cases through the lens of the events used to structure my chapters.

The first section of this chapter looks at the qualitative analysis of my research. I discuss whether or not there are similar stages of radicalisation and how the themes presented in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight shift and change over the course of radicalisation. This approach allows me to answer the key questions posed in Chapter One: Does radicalising ideology evolve in a similar way in cases of modern genocide? How does that evolution occur? In my three cases, what are the thematic similarities and differences in this evolution?

The second section of this chapter deals with the methodological questions posed in Chapters Two, Three and Four: namely is the dual structure/agency role of ideology I propose fitting in a genocidal context? Does ideology shape events or do events shape ideology? and lastly, does the genocidal sequence follow a specifically path-dependent trajectory? Obviously, though I have grouped my analysis into these two different sections, they are strongly linked; answers to this group of secondary
questions are tightly linked with the analysis coming out of the discussion in the first section, particularly regarding the role of ideology in institutionalism, path dependency and the greater body of work regarding HS.

**Ideological stages of radicalisation**

In Chapter Four, I argue that one of the strengths of my episodic approach is the ability to compare event with event which thereby enables us to view an overall picture of ideology in situ. However, as each of the qualitative chapters has shown, the progression of these events is extremely complex and varies depending on the geopolitical context of the time. For instance, the second episode in both Germany and the Balkans occurs against a backdrop of establishing a new political regime; the CUP, however, is not only attempting to establish its power, but is also in a state of war in the Balkans. Thus, the progression of radicalisation is different. However, thanks to my episodic approach, this does not restrain comparative analysis so long as it occurs within a wider framework. Thus, first reflections on the issues raised in this PhD are that **there are core stages to the evolution of radicalising ideology**.

These stages are based around the geopolitical atmosphere occurring in each case. When approached in this manner, three levels of ideological radicalisation arise which allow for differences in the geopolitical context. Using these categories as an overall guide, it becomes possible to continue comparing event with event.

The section on the **early foundations** of radicalising ideology looks at ideology in the early stages of political ascendancy of the CUP, the NSDAP and the SDS/SPS, looking particularly at the transitions occurring as each regime comes into power and begins to establish political goals and objectives. The first event in all three of my cases is categorized at this level, as is the second event, the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws, in the German case.

The **mid level progression** of ideology focuses on these states as they begin to prepare for war, each in their own way. Here, though the carriers of radicalising
ideology are in power, each state is having to legitimize their rationale for participating in aggressive geopolitical events. This section will look at how this assertive focus affects ideology in Turkey from 1908 to 1914, encompassing two events, in Germany from 1935 to 1938 and in the Balkans from 1987 to 1991. The third level of radicalisation, the genocidal level of radicalising ideology, looks at ideology against a backdrop of genocidal aggression in war, focusing particularly on the transition into genocide in the latest stages of events discussed in this project.

The early foundations of radicalising ideology

'We educated no murderers. The contents of the articles which I wrote could not have educated murderers. No murders took place, and that is proof that we did not educate murderers' (Julius Streicher in Tribunals 29.04.1946).

In each of my three cases, these early years of ideological evolution suggest some interesting points. Let us then revisit the main themes, starting with the nation. As discussed in Chapter Three, a 'nation is a group of people characterized by a myth of common descent' (Connor 1987: 75, 1994: 202; Mosse 1985: xxviii), a classification I hold to be true for nationalism generally, and not just to genocidal nationalism. This classification dovetails neatly with Weber's work, finding an actual blood relationship irrelevant to ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit). The difference between a mere kinship group and an ethnically based Volk is the presumption of identity (Weber 1996: 35, 37). As we have seen through the previous chapters, whether or not there is a true historical basis for establishing ethnic differences is irrelevant; in truth, ethnic ideology rarely refers back to factual history. Instead it 'transforms a mythological national past into a hypothetical past in order to appeal to those men and women displaced or frightened by modernity'(Mosse 1985: xiii), suggesting that Orwell was right in his cynical assertion that 'who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past' (1950: 248). In this hypothetical past, the nation is shown as being golden, pure, and above reproach; its members are cast as heroic and chivalrous men and women who embody the ideals
set forth by the regime; the chauvinist nationalism which buffers these ideas exist in this modern age because it bridges the gap from state to society. The state elites in organic nationalist movements promise the nation that the glory of their past utopia can be rediscovered in the present under the ideology of the regime if the homeland can be cleansed of ‘impurities’ within (Schwarzmantel 1998: 144).

Beginning with this foundation, Chapter Seven went on to highlight some insights into the theme of the nation in cases of radicalising ideology. At this early stage, every case begins with a relatively strong emphasis on the nation in the roles of culture bearer and disgraced victim; even in the multiethnic states of Yugoslavia and the Ottoman Empire, the idea that Turkish – or, in the earliest stages of the CUP, Ottoman – and Serbian honour was carried by the nation and was being flouted is strong. This disgrace is portrayed ideologically as being highly problematic because the health of the nation is in the hands of a culture-bearing nation: If the nation continues in its disgrace, the glorious history of the nation will falter and fail. I suggest that the reason for this lies in a rather benign rationale: by undermining national pride through ideology, the Nazis, the Young Turks and the Serbian elite were attempting to throw doubt on the old system of governance, the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia and the Weimar Republic. A rising political party’s attempt to undermine the current party in power is in no way unusual nor need it result in anything like genocide. The important thing to note here is that the blame is cast not only on the system of governance, but on the nation itself; it is the German people, not the Weimar republic, who are portrayed as being in disgrace. This is, in short, an ethnic rationale for a political problem.

Even this early on, however, radicalising ideology is quite clear that the nation is not (solely) to blame for its calamitous state; the anti-nation is also at fault. ‘Hostility [toward a group] is especially likely to arise if people regard their suffering as unjust, as they often do, and especially if some others are not similarly affected’ (Staub 1989: 16). Propaganda claims it is the anti-nation that has driven the nation to collapse; Chapters Five and Six noted four main themes associated with this premise
even during the earliest stage of radicalisation. The anti-nation, the ethnic antithesis of the nation, is seen to be thriving in times of national decline and is the persecutor of the nation. This leads to the dehumanisation of the anti-nation and, to a lesser degree at this stage, a surety that there must be physical separation between the nation and the anti-nation.

Chapter Six clearly shows that the first of the two themes is strongest in the earliest stage of ideological radicalisation, particularly in the Jewish and Armenian cases; as both chapters suggest, however, these themes are almost non-existent in the Balkans where the establishment of the Bosniak anti-nation was slowest to manifest itself. At this time period, the enemy was instead seen as almost any non-Serb group, but especially Kosovars; there were enough links between the two groups, Bosniak and Kosovar, to make the shift almost seamless in a shifting geopolitical climate, as we will see in the next section. In the Turkish and German cases, the anti-nation is not perceived to be suffering the same economic and political straits as the nation, but is instead cast as thriving during a time of national decline. This is deemed a ‘rational’ occurrence as the anti-nation is also cast quite clearly in each of my three cases as a group persecuting the nation, a malevolent enemy, allied with the national enemies from without, undermining the nation from within.

The physical delineation of this sort of without/within thinking in radicalising states grows primarily from the role of the homeland in genocidal ideology. The homeland provides geographic delineation for the nation, giving a boundary for both dominance and purification. The points identified in Chapter Eight suggest that, within genocidal nationalism, belief in the homeland as the sole possession of the nation and that the homeland is at risk provides justification for further aggression against all enemies, both within and without. At the earliest stage of ideological radicalisation, there is particular emphasis on the nation as the sole possessor of the homeland as one of the strongest themes in two of my three cases. This sense of possession is used to legitimize claims to power by galvanizing the citizenry and imbuing a geographical space with an ethnic heritage. In Turkey, however, this idea
is almost invisible before 1908; however, it is vital to look just one step ahead to see this idea come to full fruition, becoming the strongest theme in Turkish ideology between 1908 and 1912. The reason for this almost certainly lies in the multiethnic status of the Ottoman state and the early intent of the CUP to reform the Ottoman governance system rather than to completely overhaul the state.

Note also that in each case identities are established at this early stage. Weitz (2003) points to the fixing of identities as being crucial to the progression of nationalism, but to find fixed identities at this stage in ideological progression is noteworthy. This harkens back to the type of nationalisms that these radicalising ideologies emerge from, to Mann’s organic nationalism where ‘in multiethnic circumstances, a majority ethnicity can rule through majoritarian democracy, as elections become ethnic censuses’ (Mann 2005: 69). This was certainly the path taken by the Serbs in the elections through the early 1990s and, as I shall show shortly, the key rationale behind the establishment of the Bosniak anti-nation – though it was not the tactic used by either the CUP or the Nazis, both of whom played down their ethnic leanings in favour of political alliances helping them to achieve political prominence (see Chapter Four). Though none of my three cases had yet definitively established how to categorically distinguish the nation from the anti-nation, that there was a difference between these groups had been established and that this difference was ethnic had also been established. This is critical because, as discussed in Chapter Three, unlike with political, religious or class associations, ethnicity itself is perceived as fixed and cannot be easily changed. Though decisions still had to be made regarding how ethnicity was manifested (Mann 2005: 181), an ideology of fixed ethnicity is already established in this early stage of radicalisation.

Regardless of a recognized sense of otherness, however, it is critical to point out that what form policy regarding the anti-nation should take had not been established. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, the CUP inherited a legacy of anti-Armenian discrimination demonstrated in a moderate level of civic persecution such as the limitation of judicial rights. At this early stage, this is the most advanced
implementation of institutionalised anti-nation policy existing in any of my three cases. Though there is an existing idea that something should be ‘done’ about the Armenians, Jews and Muslim non-Serbs, what exactly that should be is not explicit.

It is not enough to focus only on the strongest themes at this stage of radicalisation; looking at the weaker themes also sheds light on the process of ideological evolution. This allows us not only to ascertain what characteristics are present in the early stages of radicalisation, but what characteristics are absent; this provides us with both another level of analysis in my three cases and more markers for future policy initiatives and research initiatives. Regarding the nation, the need for national purification is the least important of all the identified themes. Nonetheless, it has manifested itself to a degree; Hitler’s writings in Mein Kampf in particular give reference to the need for the German people to purify themselves in order to establish a more perfect racial form (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 15, 297, 306). Nonetheless, the presence of these claims pale in comparison to the emphasis on the nation as a victim, as a culture bearer and, to a lesser extent, as being supreme.

This is directly tied to the fact that, when looking at Chapter Six, we see that the emphasis on separating the anti-nation and the nation has not ideologically manifested itself to any great degree. Separating the anti-nation from the nation is classed as a part of the purifying process for the nation; thus, in these early stages of radicalisation, the progress of national purification and the separation of the anti-nation from the nation go hand in hand. However, it is also worth noting that, while the idea of national purification was already established to a small degree, the idea of separation had not done so to any notable extent. My research showed very little of this theme brought up in the earliest stage of both the German and Yugoslav case and none in the earliest section of research done on Turkey. By the second timeframe, there are some scattered references to separation in Turkey (Anatolia particularly; see Ch. 6), but no reference to separating Bosniaks from Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina exists in my research at this stage. In short, in the early stages of ideological
radicalisation, suggestions that the nation should be separate from the anti-nation are very weak and made quite quietly through the ideological megaphone.

Homeland does not have the same kind of link as nation and anti-nation. As mentioned earlier in this section, the homeland provides the geographical boundaries for the nation; during the early manifestations of radicalising ideology, those boundaries are largely uncontested in my cases because of the state of the political process in those early stages. None of my three cases were openly preparing, politically or ideologically, for war at this point. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the weakest point in the early stage of ideological radicalisation has to do with using the homeland ideologically as a means for justifying aggression, both within and without. This changes drastically as war begins to loom on the horizon.

Thus, we can clearly see that these early stages of ideological foundation are vital. Not only can we see certain similarities that suggest a pattern regarding how ideology evolves, but we can also see that radicalising political parties are sometimes willing to sacrifice ideological ‘purity’ to acquire power. Three weak political institutions – the crumbling Ottoman Empire, the economically destitute Weimar Republic and the headless Yugoslavia - provide opportunities for ethnically driven movements to become established on the political spectrum. Associating the shame of the nation with the weak state, promising new glories based on the culture-bearing aspects inherent in the nation, claiming the geographical boundaries of the state for the nation form the ideological patchwork crafted to fill a power gap as the institutional threads of ‘old’ governance unravel. These power gaps allow for swifter geopolitical change than would be expected under stable political institutions.

The mid-level progression of radicalising ideology

'We never until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered because we are Muslims, things changed. The
After radicalising political parties gain power, certain aspects of ideology change to reflect the shift in focus from gaining access to the power institutions of the state to gaining control over those power institutions and retaining control over those power institutions. The speed at which this takes place varies from cases to case; hence, this mid-level category addresses the years between 1908 and 1914 in Turkey, 1935 to 1938 in Germany and 1987 – 1991 in Yugoslavia. Though the time discussed in Turkey is longer than in my other two cases, the effects of the Balkan wars fought during this time at once speed up and delay various aspects of ideological progression which need to be taken into account in order to properly understand why ideology evolves in this way in this particular case.

When we consider ideology during these time periods, some significant changes become apparent. The final macro-theme discussed in this PhD, that of homeland, offers perhaps the most interesting shifts between the earliest levels of ideological foundation and this mid-level radicalisation. Each of the sub-themes regarding homeland rises over the course of this stage, and some of them change quite dramatically. Take, for example, the theme of the homeland being the sole possession of the nation. Whilst in the early stages of ideology, it was comparatively one of the strongest overall themes regarding the homeland, though in Turkey it was weak. By the time we get to this stage of radicalisation, the idea that the homeland is the sole possession of the nation to the exclusion not only of the anti-nation but to other groups as well is one of the strongest ideological themes – not only regarding the homeland, but over all. This picks up on the idea expressed by Wood who notes that genocide is directed at groups living in the ‘wrong place’ (2001: 66). Equally, we also see a distinct rise in ideological focus regarding the homeland at risk, from inner and outer enemies – though more of the focus at this stage is on the level of threat from the outer enemy. This drastic rise in the ideological expression of threat
engenders the greater sense of fear within the nation so necessary for the 
radicalisation of policy to be accepted at legitimate (Green 2002 [19994]).

The reasoning behind the rises in these themes becomes clear when one looks at the 
final sub-theme regarding homeland, that of using the salvation of the homeland to 
justify aggression. For reasons largely outside the scope of this dissertation, by the 
end of this category, each of my three cases are on the brink of war and Turkey is 
fighting and loses a war during the events covered in this mid-level category.

That there is a relationship between war and genocide has been established and is 
well documented. As mentioned in Chapter Three, a wide variety of scholars from 
historians (Bergen 2003) to psychologists (Waller 2002) to sociologists (Mann 2001; 
Shaw 2003) have noted the influence war has on genocide. However, most of these 
accounts have focused on the physical accounts and the historical occurrences 
possible because of the state of war; few have looked to the ideological shifts 
occurring once radicalising states have entered a state of war. This project's scope 
allows us to look at these effects, as regards nation, anti-nation and homeland.

This progression towards war allows for and causes massive shifts in both policy and 
ideology. In this instance, by portraying the homeland at risk, national elites are then 
legitimizing actions and alliances leading them into WWI, WWII and civil war 
respectively. Equally, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, this transition into war sees 
another ideological shift away from the portrayal of the nation in disgrace. In the 
early foundations of ideological radicalisation, the disgrace of the nation was largely 
placed under the responsibility of the former party in state power; under the current 
power brokers, the CUP, Nazis and Serbs notably move away from discussing the 
disgrace of the nation. Instead, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the nation is 
portrayed as being constructed of honourable men willing to fight for their country if 
need be.
Thus, the message shifts to one of national supremacy where the nation is to be considered above all in an almost sanctified state. This legitimizes the nationalist policies of the state and, to some extent deifies state leaders and ideologues. For instance, this is the time when Hitler received a gain in popularity and was commended by some institutions, like the Catholic Church, with which he would soon be in conflict (Phayer 2000: Ch. 1; Evans 2005: Ch. 3). Nonetheless, whilst the theme of the nation in disgrace declines, the perception of the nation as a victim may endure, particularly in Yugoslavia and Turkey, though it does significantly decline. This perceived victimisation inspires fear and with fear comes the idea that losses in war, both historical and present, are just punishment for a lack of ethnic purity.

The way national purification is expressed in policy making at this mid-level radicalisation varies from state to state and between events. However, as I discussed in Chapters Four and Six, the institutionalization of persecution through the judicial system, principally under the CUP and the Nazis, is of significant importance. Looking particularly at the relationship between Reich Citizenship Law and the Enabling Act as well as the CUP’s Law of Associations and the Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition we see the state legitimizing the restriction of rights and formalizing ethnicity as separate from other types of identities.

A critical note here is to point out that during this mid-level radicalisation in the Balkans the Bosniak anti-nation is identified. As noted in Chapter Five and above, there is a pre-established ideological idea of the Muslims in the region as being of a lesser status than Serbs; however, this was significantly repressed during Tito’s rule and after his death was manifested through the 1980’s as a mistrust and fear of Kosovars rather than of Bosniaks. However, as Chapter Five showed, looming Bosnian independence changed both homeland claims and shifted the idea of the national enemy away from Kosovars and refocused it on the greater Muslim enemy and particularly the Bosniak enemy. In short, the build-up to Croatian secession and fears of further Bosnian independence provided Serbian ideologues the opportunity to use Kosovo as a means to legitimize attacks on the Bosniak anti-nation.
In all three cases, this goes one step beyond the ‘fixing’ of identities expressed in the above section. Instead there now exists a formal distinction between nation and anti-nation; as discussed in Chapter Five, the identification of the anti-nation in radicalising ideology is critical to legitimizing the policy and practice of the genocidal state in such a way as to place the anti-nation outside the bounds of mere otherness. This is part of the rationale behind the rise in dehumanizing language used to describe the anti-nation in this mid-level ideological radicalisation. This rise in persecution leads directly to the fact that it is during this time that the theme of the anti-nation thriving in times of national decline takes a significant downturn, particularly as the events considered within this period progress. As persecution increases on both political and cultural levels, it is no longer a viable option to continue to profess the thriving nature of the anti-nation.

The effect of war on radicalisation points not merely toward the time where enemies are engaged in battle, but when war-time policies are being established, when the decision for war is made and the early, non-genocidal stages of war commence. This is not to say, as Chapter Six and the earlier sections of this chapter made clear, that the anti-nation feel no sense of persecution, or that the regime in place is in any way benevolent, but only that this persecution, and the ideological expression of the need for genocidal persecution, has yet to reach genocidal levels. As Chapter Six showed, war becomes an opportunity for these radicalising states to express the need to remove the anti-nation from the nation, using any and all means possible, but has not yet evolved from an ideology of sustained persecution to one of total genocide.

The genocidal level of radicalising ideology

'I didn't know if I was alive or if I was dead' Jetti Rosenzweig, Holocaust survivor, Plaszow camp (Shoah Survivor's Institute, 1993)

It is, however, in this final section where we can view the evolution of ideological radicalisation shift into its final stage of genocidal ideology. In this genocidal level
of radicalising ideology, I aim to look at the events discussed in this dissertation in post-1914 Turkey, post-1938 Germany and the post-1991 Balkans. It is by following the course of these events that we can see ideology change from the mid-level radicalisation of anti-nation persecution and national fear for the homeland to what is one of the most extreme types of ideology regarding nation, anti-nation and homeland.

Many scholars, however, note this ‘extreme’ nature of genocidal ideology, but much of the work done in this research has taken place in order to go beyond a mere classification to look at how radicalising ideology evolves to genocide. This, then, is perhaps the most intriguing level of analysis as we see the kind of ideological shifts that take place between state-sponsored persecution and outright genocide.

The most obvious and perhaps most necessary ideological shift occurring at this point is the focus on the anti-nation as a national persecutor. At extreme levels in all three cases, the anti-nation is associated most importantly with an external enemy, either in the current crisis as seen in Turkey and Germany, or with an historic enemy, as seen in the Balkans where the Serbs persistently associate the Bosniaks with crimes committed against Serbs when the Balkans were part of the Ottoman state. This is a noteworthy difference because unlike in Turkey and Germany, Bosniaks did arm themselves and fight against the Serbs in community with other-groups as members of a sovereign state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, recognized by the international community. Though the conflict was in itself largely inspired by Bosnian independence, this evidence suggests that it was not enough to classify Bosniaks ideologically as ‘merely’ enemies; it was necessary to associate them with an historic enemy in order to fulfil the level radicalisation necessary in genocidal ideology, thus producing a similar outcome as in my other two cases, even if the approach in this area was different. Thus, we see again that as the need to save the homeland from the risk of internal and external enemies increases, the move towards justifying radicalisation increases (see Chapter Eight).
The second prominent theme radically changing between the mid-level and genocidal level of radicalisation is the dehumanisation of the anti-nation. Whether described as ‘cattle’, ‘vermin’ or ‘parasites’, members of the anti-nation at this stage of ideology are being consistently stripped of their humanity, thus relieving the nation of the moral obligations required by members of the nation and some non-anti-nation other groups. In fact, in each of my three cases, though most clearly in the Balkans and in Germany, the eradication of the anti-nation from the geographical boundaries of the homeland is expressed ideologically as being the fulfilment of a moral obligation to the nation and as the just and good choice for future members of the nation. Extreme persecution, slavery and eventually genocide serves ideologically as a preventative measure against the future destruction of the homeland, allowing national elites to assure the nation that all was being done to protect their homeland from inner, as well as outer, enemies (see Chapters Six and Eight).

Thus, with the rise in the dehumanized anti-nation, the need for a purified nation also significantly increases in this final stage of radicalisation. By purging the nation of this ‘inhuman’ anti-nation, the nation is assured through ideology to become a purified, stronger, more efficient entity. There is a critical link here between the dehumanized anti-nation, the need to separate the anti-nation from the nation and war at this stage in ideological radicalisation – in order to guarantee victory in war, it is necessary to purify the nation from its inhuman and weak elements. This then legitimizes not only the genocidal actions being committed against an ethnic anti-nation, but also expresses the need to commit egregious crimes against other peripheral societal groups, such as prisoners, the sick and the mentally ill ⁴⁶ all performed for the betterment of the nation. As expressed in Chapter Seven, this

⁴⁶ This occurred most commonly under the Nazi state, though internment and persecution of prisoners of war equal to that of the anti-nation occur in each case. For more in depth look at the treatment of prisoners in WWI, see Torchin (2006) and Akçam (2006), in WWII, see Dawidowicz (1975) and in the Balkans, see Drapac (2010). For more information on the T-4 killings and other aggression against the mentally ill, homosexuals and other out-groups during the Nazi reign, see Friedlander (1997).
reduction of individual needs and individual humanity makes it easier for the state elites to request that members of the nation sacrifice themselves on the battlefield as well as subjecting the anti-nation to death. As the genocidal state is portrayed as being just and good, victims are portrayed as being evil, and thus deserving of the crimes committed against them (Staub 1989: 57). This extreme portrayal of identity, both for the anti-nation and for the nation are, thus, necessary for elites in radicalising states in order to legitimize their aggressive policies and genocidal ideologies. The cases of genocide presented in this research project occur within a greater context of mass death and include multiple victim-groups; however, as expressed in Chapter Seven, mere self-awareness and a sense of otherness is not enough to produce the type of ideological allegiance necessary to instil trust in a state committing genocidal levels of aggression against any or multiple other-groups.

As in the mid-level stage of radicalisation, this final stage also shows a rise in the level of ideological focus given using the homeland as an excuse to justify aggression. By this stage, it is not only the homeland that is portrayed as being under attack, but the nation itself. This, of course, reflects the idea proposed in Chapter Eight that the homeland is ideologically linked to the nation in such a way as to entail the future of one on the other – when the sanctity of the nation is lost, so is the homeland lost and vice versa. That the nation is transcendent is never in question, but the fact that the nation is ideologically portrayed as being under attack explains why national election is, in each of my three cases, presented ideologically as established on the battlefield. This holds true even in the Serb case, where the relationship with the anti-nation is arguably the weakest. As seen in Chapter Eight, UN intervention spurred the Serbs to act, as UN action was portrayed by elites as an attack on the homeland by an external enemy which had to be deterred as the health of the nation was tied directly to the sanctity of the homeland.

When we look across all three macro themes of anti-nation, nation and homeland, one other interesting point arises in each case at this stage of ideological evolution. Over the course of the final events occurring during this genocidal level of
radicalisation, we can see a direct link between fear and revenge for past wrongs, whether real or imagined (see Naimark 2010: 53, 136). Fear of a weak nation leads to a need for revenge on a scapegoat for ‘causing’ that weakness; fear of a strong anti-nation leads to the nation’s need to revenge themselves upon the anti-nation in order to re-establish national purity and regain economic security; fear of loosing the homeland to either inner or outer enemies leads to an expressed need to commit offensive acts in revenge for what ‘might’ or ‘could’ have happened. The fears expressed might very well be false fears created by the very ideology supporting the need for revenge, but for ideologically inspired killers and for the bystanders who use ideology to justify inaction the relationship between fear and revenge is key to understanding why ideology evolves and to understanding the relationship between ideology and events expressed in the next section of this chapter.

Reflections on genocidal analysis in the context of HI

‘The periodic genocidal outburst of the nineteenth and twentieth century are not an aberrant exception to modernity’s rule of nation-state building – they are the very rule’ (Malesevic 2006: 206)

It is now possible to draw the various threads together and establish a number of conclusions arising from my research. In a very unique way, radicalising ideology is both modern and primordial; modern because it promises wealth and achievement through modern technological advances, and primordial because it seeks to gain this wealth through the perceived traditional culture of the nation and a distinct ethnic identity. This combination is tucked neatly into the ideals of utopianism under the regime in power (Schwarzmantel 1998: 134; Malesevic 2006: 226). Even if modernity is portrayed by the ideology as the ultimate evil, the promises of national glory and wealth are prominent within the ideology itself.
As I suggested in Chapter Six, ideology is a believable interpretive framework and a 'cynical, utilitarian political instrument' (Herf 2005: 54): it is flexible, dynamic and at times at odds with policy initiatives; lastly, it is a key participant in the dynamicisation process of policy – an ideological belief of the nation at risk instils fear demanding that policies be put in place to secure the nation, leading to the persecution of the anti-nation and the restriction of civil rights and human liberties in the name of national purification in order to save the homeland. This leads to a life regarded as less valuable than a ‘normal’ life; this then leads to strife, poverty, persecution and acts of dehumanisation against the anti-nation which then reinforces the language of dehumanisation present in the original ideology.

This raises one of the issues at the heart of this research project is the relationship between ideology and events: Does ideology shape events or do events shape ideology? The answer is not necessarily as clear as many scholars and policy makers would like for it to be. Events pivot around ideology when particular ideological beliefs are held by elites which then encourage them to act in certain way. Thus, policies are implemented or actions are carried out in such a way as to fulfil that ideology. Sometimes, this has unexpected consequences, producing events that necessitate a shift in ideology, which is then used to legitimize the further radicalisation of policy.

This cyclical relationship between ideology and events is only made possible through the flexible character of the institution of ideology itself. Therefore, when we reflect on the role of ideology in genocidal radicalisation, one of the first steps we need to take is to revisit the dual nature of ideology, the idea that it is an institution with the power of both structure and agency. In fact, Chapters Five through Eight show us that the iterative nature of ideology is the key to understanding why institutions can change in times of conflict. As an institution of structure, ideology serves as a long-term constraint, limiting the choices states can choose from when decisions are made. These limits affect the process of radicalisation, particularly regarding how swiftly or slowly that process occurs in reaction to external geo-political shifts.
I d e o lo g y  a s str u c t u r e p r o v id e s  a c o n te x t to u n d e r s t a n d  t h e s e s h if ts t h r o u g h  t h e l e n s o f r a d ic a l i sa t i o n , p r o v id in g  a  f r a m e w o r k  i n w h i c h  o n to log i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e s h a p e d , p a r a d ig m s a r e f o r m e d  a n d  m y th s a n d  h i s t o r i e s a r e c r e a t e d  o r r e c a s t i n  a n e w , i d e a l i z e d l i g h t. I d e o lo g y  t h u s  i s  a  s t r u c t u r e m a d e  s t r o n g e r  b y  i t s  f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  r e a d i n e s s  t o c h a n g e , h e r e i n  l i e s  i t s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  e v e n t s  a n d  i t s v o l a t i l e  s e n s i t i v i t i e s  t o  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  p o w e r  g a p s  i n  s u c h  a n  a g g r e s s i v e  w a y , a s d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e . A l l t h r e e  c a s e s  d e m o n s t r a t e s t a t e s  t h a t  d e c i d e d  t o  s a c r i f i c e  t h e i r o w n  p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  i n t e r e s t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e i r o w n  i d e o lo g i c a l  g o a l s . W h y ? B e c a u s e  i d e o lo g y  p r o v id e s  t h e  g r o u n d s  f o r  l e g i t i m a c y  ( S e l l s  1 9 9 8 : 5 7 ) . T h i s  c o n s t a n t  n a t u r e  o f  i d e o lo g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  i t s  r e s u l t i n g  a b i l i t y  t o  i n t e r p r e t e v e n t s  i s  p e r h a p s  i d e o lo g y ' s  g r e a t e s t  s t r e n g t h .

H o w e v e r , w e  m u s t  r e m e m b e r  t h a t  i n  t i m e s  o f  c o n f l i c t  s t r u c t u r e s  c h a n g e  a n d  t h u s  w e  s e e  t h a t  i d e o lo g y  a s  a  g e n c y  h a s  t h e  p o w e r  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  i n  w h i c h r a d ic a l i z i n g  s t a t e s  e x i s t . M y  w o r k  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  m a i n  r o l e  o f  s t a t e  e l i t e s  i n  s h a p i n g  i d e o lo g y  a n d  e n a c t i n g  t h e i r  p o w e r , a s  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  i d e o lo g i c a l  a g e n c y . W h e n  i d e o lo g y  i s  u s e d  t o  l e g i t i m i z e  p o l i c y , a s  a n  e x c u s e  o r  a s  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n , i d e o lo g y  b e c o m e s  n o t  o n l y  s t r u c t u r e , b u t  a n  a g e n t  o f  p o l i c y  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . A s  a g e n c y , i d e o lo g y  b e c o m e s  a  t o o l  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  p o l i c y  m a k e r s , p r o v i d i n g  t h e m  w i t h  a  f l e x i b l e  r a t i o n a l e  b e h i n d  p o l i c i e s  s h i f t i n g  b e y o n d  t h e  b o u n d s  o f  n o r m a l  m o r a l i t y  – w h e n  i d e o lo g y  p i v o t s  a r o u n d  e v e n t s . T h u s , t h i s  a n a l y s i s  h a s  s h o w n  t h a t  t h o u g h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  m y  t h r e e  g e n o c i d a l  s t a t e s  a r e  b o u n d e d  b y  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e , t h e  e m p h a s i s  o f  t h e s e  i d e o lo g i c a l  t r e n d s  a r e  n o t  f i x e d ; t h e  p o w e r  o f  i d e o lo g y  a s  a  g e n c y  a l l o w s  t h e s e  t h e m e s  t o  f l u c t u a t e  a n d  s h i f t  i n  o r d e r  t o  g u i d e  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  a n d  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  t h e  c h a n g i n g  g e o p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  f o u n d  i n  s t a t e s  i n  c o n f l i c t .

A s  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  a g e n c y , i d e o lo g y  i s  a  p l a y e r  i n  b o t h  m o t i v a t i o n  a n d  i n  ' t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y '  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  r a d i c a l i z a t i o n  t o w a r d s  g e n o c i d e . I  h a v e  s h o w n  t h a t  w h i l e  i d e o lo g y  i s  o f t e n  s h a p e d  b y  e v e n t s , t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  r e t a i n i n g  p o l i t i c a l  l e g i t i m a c y  i n  r a d i c a l i z i n g  s t a t e s  s o m e t i m e s  r e q u i r e s  n a t i o n a l  e l i t e s  t o  m o v e
outside the ideological platform they themselves helped to create and to bend and change that ideology to fit the need immediately before them. In Chapter Two, I proposed that in states radicalising toward genocide, institutions do not hold constant and are highly susceptible to change unlike in more balanced states. My research upholds this hypothesis as it applies to the radicalisation of ideology. As noted above, ideology changes with progressive swiftness in each of my three cases, both influencing events and as a consequence of events. In these cases, it is true that when state institutions are in a period of crisis and rapid change over a short period of time, ideological radicalisation has occurred equally quickly.

Ervin Staub posits, ‘earlier, less harmful acts cause changes in individual perpetrators, bystanders, and the whole group that make more harmful acts possible...the motivation and the psychological possibility evolve gradually’ (Staub 1989: 5). This leads into a final point about ideological structure and its influence in radicalising states. As mentioned in Chapter One, ideology is a cohesive set of beliefs and moral standards usually held over a long period of time, though in times of conflict we have seen that ideology can change very swiftly and tends to change at a faster rate as states travel farther along the radicalising process. I bring this up now because it is important to point out that certain ideological themes identified in this dissertation have their roots in the years prior to the persecutor-national elites coming into power. By this I do not mean that these genocides were in some way predestined, in fact, I mean just the opposite. Each of these political parties lead by national elites inherited an ideological structure that, under their care, evolved in such an extreme way so as to become genocidal. This suggests that though institutions do persevere and have self-reinforcing tendencies (Hall 2010; Immergut 2002; Rothstein 2002; Thelen 2002), institutions can be perverted and are subject to change by instruments of agency when under times of stress and external change.

Inherited ideological structure and the process of cumulative radicalisation we have seen throughout the course of my analysis throws new light on the effectiveness of Mahoney’s theory of path dependency to explain institutional change in radicalising
states. The episodic approach to studying the evolution of radicalising ideology has indeed proven an efficient mode in that we have been able to view not only the progression of each case, but it has also allowed us to compare ‘snapshot’ with ‘snapshot’. This allows us to get at the heart of HI, to follow appropriately the struggles for power through the varying and complex patterns present when comparing three different cases across the twentieth century (Lecours 2000: 514).

Taking an episodic approach then led me, in Chapter Three, to question the relationship between the events themselves when ideology is used as the framing lens. Do patterns of ideological progression exist? Yes, as I have shown in Chapters Five through Eight and in the early part of this analysis, patterns of ideological progression do exist. Are those patterns path dependent? Can the theories of path dependency so ardently supported by Mahoney be applied when mapping radicalising ideology?

Unfortunately, there is not a straightforward answer to this question. There are two interlinked problems with path dependency. The first, and the point from which the second arises, is the problem of the critical juncture, or a key actor choice point usually occurring in a time of crisis, as discussed in Chapter Two. The second problem is that Mahoney’s version of path dependency is one that is overly deterministic to be applied to cases of ideological radicalisation. Let us begin by briefly addressing the problem of the critical juncture.

Mahoney describes the critical juncture as being a choice point of significance outside of normal circumstance. Unfortunately, the elements of ideology, and particularly the structure radical regimes inherit when they come to power restricts the applicability of this idea to these cases. One of Mahoney’s reasons for the creation of the idea ‘critical juncture’ is to allow historians and historical sociologists alike to ‘avoid the problem of infinite explanatory regression into the past’ (Mahoney 2001: 7). I propose that this project has a sufficiently regressive historical perspective as to cover the amount of time allowed between critical juncture and genocide. If the critical juncture for these events lies even further back in the past,
then we merely find ourselves along this ‘infinite path of regression’ which Mahoney himself seeks to avoid.

Another problem with the idea of the critical juncture, and thus with path dependency itself, is that it is deterministic. Mahoney describes the difference between the critical juncture and other choice points as the fact critical junctures place states onto paths of development that ‘track certain outcomes’ and cannot be easily reversed. He then goes on to suggest that this sequence of events is ultimately linked to a critical juncture period which ‘lock[s] countries into particular paths of development’...‘Once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available’ (Mahoney 2001: 8, 7). This deterministic quality is closer in line with the ideological-intentionalist debate seen in Holocaust literature, but is not supported by the majority of ideological themes identified in my research. Instead, we see a progressively radicalising state in which each of the events I use to structure my work is a choice point along the process of radicalisation, but is not a critical juncture. None of these events alone would have been enough to influence ideology to become genocidal.

Mahoney suggests that without a critical juncture, a sequence of events cannot follow a path dependent process (Mahoney 2001: 5 - 10). Nonetheless, there are certain elements of path dependency which do help explain the sequential evolutionary process of ideological radicalisation which we see in my research. First, this research supports Mahoney’s claim that history strongly influences and shapes the choices made by elites (2001: 7). I equally agree that ‘the endurance of institutions and structures over time triggers a chain of causally linked events that, once itself in motion, unfolds independently of the institutional or strucctional factors that initially produced it’ (Mahoney 2001: 10). This research also supports Mahoney’s idea that the evolution of radicalising ideology is part of a reactive sequence in that it is part of a chain ‘of temporally ordered and causally connected events’ (ibid). When actors react to the vacuum created by power gaps, they are resisting the prevailing institutions existing within the case (ibid). Even if such resistance does not actually
transform these institutions and structures, it can set in motion an autonomous
process that encompasses events that lead, in my three cases, to the existence of a
genocidal ideology.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Mahoney’s theory does point out that the
consequences of previously made choices restrict the options available at the
following choice point (2001: 6 - 8). Though his discussion on this point is limited
to critical junctures, we see that each episode restricts, or at least *constrains*, the
available choices of the next episode to some extent. As we see most clearly in the
theme of homeland, ideological agency is not necessarily determined by prior
choices and is highly sensitive to external actors; nonetheless, there is an identifiable
amount of influence leading from one event to another, thus supporting the reactive
sequence Mahoney identifies as being limited to path dependency.

Thus, we see here the link to cumulative radicalisation and the evolution of ideology.
Ideology as agency and the sequential relationship between ideology and events as
constructed by elite state actors links the radicalisation process to the reactive
sequence. Thus, Mahoney himself limits the applicability of his own theory by
inferring that sequential events without a critical juncture are not involved in a path
dependent process (2001: 7); however, by broadening the boundaries of the theory to
include sequences like those shown in my analysis, path dependency could be used
to trace ideological evolution. In order to fully appreciate the applicability of the
theory, an episodic approach to comparative analysis is particularly effective as
it provides a story-board to be created in each case, allowing the path
of radicalisation to be seen as a whole, whilst still highlighting the reactive events
along the cumulative process of radicalisation.

This does not, however, negate the importance of intervention in states on a
radicalising path. In fact, I suggest that though the perspective of radicalising states
might be more immediately complex, intervention at any stage of radicalisation may
be more effective as states are not ‘locked’ into a genocidal path. Though it might be
necessary to implement varying types of interferences depending on the stage of radicalisation – again, another opportunity for further research – the burden of intervening might well be lighter without the weight of the critical juncture around the necks of policy makers, though more research should be done in order to know for certain.

Through the research undertaken in this PhD, I have produced a broad framework for comparative ideological analysis in states radicalising toward genocide through investigation into how ideology both effects and is effected by structural shifts that pertain to the anti-nation, nation and homeland. If we wish to conduct debate about issues fundamental to genocide certainly substantial discussion of ideology is desirable as understanding radicalising ideology is critical to understanding how elite actors compete for power and in preventing radicalisation from occurring at genocidal levels.

**Further research in ideological evolution**

Keith Doubt (1999: 18 - 19) suggests that, due to the normative orientations held by modern communities, ethnic cleansing has to occur in categorical, ruthless and absolute ways in order to permanently destroy the shared values between nation and anti-nation. In this PhD, I aimed to address the destruction of those shared values by tracing ideological shift in cases of genocide throughout the twentieth century against a backdrop of changing Europe. I have shown that historical sociology as expressed through historical institutionalism provide a broad framework to view ideology as both structure and agency in radicalising states. Further, I have shown that though there is a close relationship between HI and path dependency, path dependency as described by Mahoney lacks ability to explain the iterative nature of ideology due to the lack of one main critical juncture in the evolution of radicalising ideology in these states. An episodic approach provided the foundation to trace the evolution of ideology and to argue that, though ideological progression is extremely complex, there are critical similarities in the ideological evolution of anti-nation, nation and
homeland in cases of emerging genocides in Europe. By clarifying the role of ideology in radicalising states, by situating the genocidal state in time and place and by being sensitive to historical precedent, this thesis provides opportunities to establish further research.

New research fields are found in four areas. Firstly, further research and analysis regarding the role of the anti-nation in other types of nationalist movements and different forms of conflict would be very interesting. For instance, when different other-groups, such as class groups or political groups, are persecuted, do the qualities of the anti-nation travel to those other-groups? We could ask similar questions about the manifestation of anti-nation ideology in other genocides, such as the Stalin purges, where numerous other-groups were persecuted over extended periods of time in a very different geo-political and cultural atmosphere. Further research into the applicability of this term and its precepts is necessary and could help with the identification of at-risk groups before mass killing reaches a genocidal level.

Secondly, geographic theatres outside Europe might well produce different thematic shifts. Potential macro-cases could include Africa and Asia. Comparative African genocides could include states like Rwanda (1997), Namibia (1904 – 1911) and Burundi (1972). Questions immediately arise due to the disparate nature of the conflicts presented in these areas. In my PhD, the genocides themselves occur across roughly the same length of time; are there thematic differences in the way ideology changes if, as in the cases of Rwanda and Burundi, conflicts occur over a much shorter time period? How do colonial powers influence the evolution of radicalising ideologies, as one could see in Namibia and Burundi? Comparative Asian case studies raise similar, if not identical questions. Comparative Asian genocidal conflict could include Japan (1935 – 1945), Bangladesh (1971) and Cambodia (1974 – 1979). Do the vast cultural differences between these cases produce incongruent comparisons? Of particular interest here would be a cross-region comparison between the Nazis and the Japanese during the Second World War; what are the different thematic approaches to evolving ideologies in these two cases? If the
hypothesis expressed in this research is right, then we can expect to see equal levels of complexity matched with equal levels of similar comparison, pointing to the way otherness is expressed, the nation is exulted and the homeland sanctified though possibly modified through cultural expression.

A third way to advance this approach is to expand ‘radicalising ideology’ to cases outside genocide. Cases could include instances of classicide (Uganda, most of the Soviet killings, most of the Khmer Rouge killings), politicide (Nazi aggression against political groups, Chile, Iraq), and fundamentalist military conflicts such as that found in Israel/Palestine. How is otherness expressed in these cases? Which, if any, of the micro-themes discussed in this research project resurface in cases of non-genocidal radicalisation? Does a similar ‘ratchet – effect’ relationship exist within these cases as well?

Lastly, and perhaps most interestingly in light of the process of cumulative radicalisation expressed in my analysis, I am keen to research cases where ideology radicalised but did not reach the third genocidal level of ideological radicalisation before radicalisation began to decrease or shift away from genocidal intentions. Cases could include Sudan (2003 – present), East Timor (1975 - present), non-Hindu groups in India (2006 – present) and Chechnya (1991 – 1995). The reasons why genocide did not occur in these cases are varied, but I am curious about the ideological progression of radicalisation and de-radicalisation; was there some form of ideological agency which encouraged states to actively make other, non-genocidal choices? How were these choices reflected in the resulting ideological structure? In cases where complex varieties of war ensued (such as in Chechnya), how were those ideological shifts perceived by the other-group? Does the other group still possess the ideological characteristics of the anti-nation, even when radicalisation ceases or changes? Greater understanding into the way the institution of ideology changes in these types of cases could not only provide us with greater insight into the role of ideology as a form of power, but also further elucidate how institutions can and do change as well as why they change in the manner they do in times of conflict.
Studying genocide helps us understand the way ideology evolves, the factors that influence it and the type of geopolitical atmosphere necessary to foster particular types of changes. Studying ideological evolution comparatively by addressing the history of a case through socio-institutional frameworks provide a strong platform for achieving this intellectual agenda.


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