Pathways to genocide: the process of ideological radicalisation

Elisabeth Hope Murray
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This dissertation is dedicated to Archie Guy Murray, Helen Agnes Murray, Robert Morgan Yoder and Mackie Wilkes Yoder. Thank you for all you have given to us.
Declaration

I hereby declare that, except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is entirely my own work, and that no part of it has been submitted for any other degree or qualification.
Abstract

This thesis examines the process of ideological evolution in the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and Serbian aggression against Bosniaks during the break-up of Yugoslavia. It notes that, as a key element of power in the twentieth century, the role of ideology in genocidal states has been under-acknowledged, particularly in comparative studies. Making use of Mommsen’s theory of cumulative radicalisation, I look at key themes important in nationalist movements: extreme otherness, the nation and homeland. Following a discussion of methods and literature, I propose a new perspective on addressing otherness in genocidal states, identifying the extreme other-group as ‘anti-nation’ and go on to discuss the role of the anti-nation, nation and homeland in radicalising ideology. In doing so, I show that ideology is both a form of structure and of agency and thus provides unique insight into how institutions participate in radicalising states. Looking at the evolution of ideology allows me to test Mahoney’s theory of path dependency by taking an episodic approach to research and applying it to these radicalising states. My conclusion discusses the complexities of the thematic cumulative radicalisation of ideology, ideology as structure and agency and whether or not path dependency is applicable to studying ideology in radicalising states.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Armenian Dashnak Revolutionary Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARK</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Krajina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUP</td>
<td>Committee of Union and Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DutchBat</td>
<td>the Dutch battalion in UNPROFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical Institutionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJ</td>
<td>Hitler Youth</td>
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<td>HS</td>
<td>Historical Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>Communist Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCY</td>
<td>League of Communists of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>National Socialist German Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDStB</td>
<td>National Socialist German Students League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Storm Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAOs</td>
<td>Serbian autonomous districts/Serbian autonomous region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Soviet Federal Republics of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SiPo</td>
<td>Special Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>League of Communists of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRNJ</td>
<td>Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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Introduction

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think that it would have been possible to carry out the extermination of 6 million Jews in 1921? Do you think the German people would have stood for it? Do you think it would have been possible under any regime in 1921 to have carried out the murder of 6 million men, women, and children of the Jewish race?

STREICHER: Whether that would have been possible with the knowledge of the people – no, it would not have been possible...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was it possible to exterminate people in that way only after some 20 years of incitement and propaganda by you and other Nazis? Is that what made that possible?

STREICHER: I deny that the population was incited. It was enlightened, and sometimes a harsh word may have been directed against the other side as an answer. It was enlightenment, not incitement.

(Lieutenant Colonel Mervyn Griffith-Jones of the British Prosecutorial Delegation to Julius Streicher at the Nuremberg Tribunals 29.04.1946)

Research questions and purpose

In this thesis, I analyse the way ideology evolves by evaluating the radicalisation process in genocidal states. The changing nature of ideology in states radicalising toward genocide strikes at the centre of discussions on power in twentieth century Europe. Ideology is not the only source of power (Mann 1986) nor is it the only reason why people become willing participants in genocidal activity (Mann 2005; Goldhagen 1996). However, it is a key aspect in movements of extreme nationalism in twentieth century Europe. The three primary questions I seek to answer in the course of my research are as follows:

1. Does radicalising ideology evolve in a similar way in cases of modern genocide? Using the theatre of modern Europe, I take a macro-approach to looking at radicalising ideology. Though I am interested in the detail of individual state approaches to ideology, my research interests centre around radicalising ideology generally. I aim to research various cases of radicalising ideology in order to establish whether or not a pattern exists in how states adopt genocidal ideologies.

2. What are the thematic similarities and differences in this evolution? If the first question is a macro-question, this question seeks to assess the micro-
level case-specific aspects of ideological shift. Ideology is extremely complex and, though I am looking for patterns, I want to examine various aspects of its thematic complexity by looking for variations within each case.

3. Lastly, why does that evolution occur? or What happens to further the radicalisation process? Here, I am hoping to address whether or not there is a relationship between ideology and events and, if a relationship between ideology and events does exist, then I am interested in which is more important to the radicalisation process. In other words, which is the independent variable and which is the dependent variable?

The intended outcome of this PhD is that, through the analysis and discussion of the questions posed above, discussions of genocidal ideology can be brought into the dialogue of comparative genocide studies. Ideology is generally viewed as either constant, inflexible political and cultural platform established early in the life of a political regime and providing a rationale for most policy decisions or ideology is dismissed as the deluded justifications expressed by elite individuals when it suits their desires, shifting and changing with little regard to the geo-political minutiae present at the time of conflict. Equally, while there is a substantial amount of literature written regarding the ideology of some genocides, there is relatively little in the field of comparative genocide studies. This PhD will evaluate ideology through the lens of structure and agency. Through the analysis of the evolution of radicalising ideology, this thesis will show that ideology provides both structure and agency in radicalising states depending on the status of the relationship between ideology and policy. Ideology legitimates policy; state-driven policies provide sanction and justification for action. Policy, then, is a normative outcome of the inductive relationship between structure and agency in radicalising states.

**Identifying ideology**

The process of evaluating ideology begins with a brief explanation of the term itself. At its most base level, ideology is a set of closely held beliefs characteristic of a group or a community (Plamenatz 1979: 15); in other words, ideology is a cohesive, non-contradictory set of commonly held beliefs. Within the social sciences, secular forms of ideology have been thoroughly researched, particularly within the
economic-political model of Marxism (Apter 1964; Blackburn 1972; Sayer 1991; Schwarzmantel 1998). My interest, however, has been political, rather than economic, forms of ideology and tends to side with Eccleshall’s summary of the role of ideology in society, that people need ‘both to feel at home in the world and to act with good conscience: to make sense of everyday reality as well as to clothe their interests and aspirations in the finery of moral principle. The powerful have to reassure themselves as well as convince others of the rightness of their might: that power is a trust held for the common good rather than self advantage’ (1984: 23).

This allusion to power taps into Mann’s assertion that, as the social organisation of meaning is necessary to societal life, power is gained by those who can monopolise ideological norms (1986: 22) and aims at something more specific than ideology as a cultural system, as expressed by Geertz (1964: 49). Equally, ideology is primarily a mobiliser across class delineation (unlike economic power) and across gender delineation (unlike military power). Eric Wolf introduces ideology as being ‘unified schemes or configurations developed to underwrite or manifest power’ since ‘ideas and idea-systems [such as the state] are often monopolized by power groups and rendered self-enclosed and self-referential’ (2002 [1999]: 4, 7). This characterization alludes to the monopolisation of norms from above; in modern Europe, the monopolisation of norms is most often found through control of the state. Therefore, though ideology can be conveyed through various different institutions and be held by individuals and groups alike, ideology in this case should be taken to be linked with the state. Thus, for the purpose of this PhD, I mean ideology to be the state-led expression of commonly-held belief. In other words, the term ideology refers to a certain set of ideals, symbols, myths, principles, and values maintained by the state, outlining a distinct political and cultural order which may not be adhered to by all citizens of that state.

This delineation of ideology is in line with Hall’s identification of institutions more generally, that ‘institutions are instruments the actors use to negotiate the complexity of the world’ (1997: 217). Ideologies contain the ideals of the regime which implements them; therefore, ideologies represent the ideals of power elites within
political sphere in the nation. Interestingly, however, ideology constrains power as well. In his discussion on institutional creativity, Sheingate reflects that 'even where they are ambiguous, rules still set parameters on the permissible range of action; they establish what can and cannot happen' (2010: 181). Ideology expresses the rules by which elites can implement policy. In this role, ideology can be positive or negative; ideologies of multi-culturalism and public freedom are as much ideologies as ideologies of discrimination and slavery. Such clarification begins to illuminate the iterative nature of ideology as both structure and agency. Ideology in this case provides the structure in which agents act and also stands as agency influencing changing constraints.

Even with this delineation of terms, it remains that even though these ideologies exist, the fact of their existence does not explain the rationale behind their implementation, particularly regarding the implementation of genocidal ideologies. The intention of my research is to explain how and why this implementation occurs through an exploration of the relationship between ideology and events. Many ideologies are infused with ideas of political superiority which takes on the role of religion and moral supremacy, seeking salvation through the defeat of national enemies. It is these ideas which lead to 'organised social action' which has, so often, been detrimental to the lives of many others. Thus, in the course of this PhD, I am concerned with analysing the changing nature of elite-expressed social beliefs in states where the beliefs expressed attempt to legitimise action.

In undertaking this research project, I do not intend to concern myself with the spread or comprehensiveness of ideology; I focus on what elites tell people to believe, rather than the extent to which the citizens of the state believe it. Neither do I mean to claim that ideologies expressed by national elites are universally held. Indeed, genocidal ideology is, in every case researched here, always partial, even within the persecuting group, hence strong resistance movements and assassination attempts, such as the 'Valkyrie Level II' assassination attempt on Hitler's life on 20
July 1944. Mann expresses this well, noting that ‘whole nation groups never act collectively. The perpetrators are some Germans, some Serbs, some Hutus…Ethnonationalists must first overcome dissidents in their own ethnic community, and in fact they often kill more people from their own ethnic group than from the out-group’ (Mann 2005: 20-21). Equally, ideological goals are sometimes sacrificed in order to achieve other aims. For example, many Jews under the Nazi state were kept alive as slave labourers rather than being immediately exterminated upon their arrival at extermination camps. This free labour was vital to the Nazi war effort and became more important as the war continued — so much so that the numbers of Jews ‘saved’ from immediate extermination from 1944 through the end of the war increased significantly; many of these Jews were even imported to the Reich proper after it had been declared ‘Jew-free’ (Bloxham 2009a: 253).

Thus, the purpose of this PhD is not to claim that ideology is the only source of power in radicalising states, nor the only rationale leaders have in making policy decisions. Nonetheless, ideology is one of various reasons why people participate in mass killing which provides us with an impetus to further seek out the relationship between ideology and policy, particularly because ideological organisation is sociospatially transcendent. Thus, while being a power source on its own, ideology is especially geared to generate a ‘sacred’ form of authority (Mann 2005: 27, 1986: 23) which is vested in the state.

**Thesis outline**

This thesis proceeds in *Chapter Two* where I discuss my methods of research gathering and my methodological approach more generally. I begin by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of historical sociology as a macro-approach to comparative research. Historical Institutionalism (HI) and path dependency will be introduced as approaches favoured in this thesis. The following chapters will gauge

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1 For information on assassination attempts in Nazi Germany, see Moorhouse (2007), Thomsett (1997: Ch. 13) and Burleigh (2001: Ch. 9). For reading on resistance movements in genocidal states, see Phayer (1993) and Gaut (2006).
whether or not path dependency is an appropriate means for looking at the evolution of radicalising ideologies. The chapter continues on to provide the rationale for the choice of cases and to address the unique research challenges facing each case in the research-gathering process; I finish by addressing these challenges and situating them within the context of HI.

Chapter Three provides a review of the literature pertinent to this research project. I focus primarily on the primordialist/modernist/ethnosymbolist debate. This is critical, as it provides the rationale for the macro-structure of the thematic approach to the thesis. I then go on to discuss genocide literature more particularly, refining the definition of genocide amongst a broader perception of mass murder and death before going on to address the secondary literature applicable to my three case studies.

I use these case studies to transition into Chapter Four, which provides the historical background for each case, focusing particularly on the historical events used to structure my episodic approach to comparative research. Here, I discuss the geopolitical background of each case and then identify and justify the critical events I use to structure future chapters.

Chapters Five and Six begin the qualitative analysis of my research. Introducing the term ‘anti-nation’ as a more appropriate way to discuss otherness in genocidal states, Chapter Five traces the persecution of this group, both in policy and in ideology in the years preceding the Committee of Union and Progress, Nazi and Serbian Democratic Party’s assumption of power. Chapter Six goes on to discuss the role of the anti-nation in radicalising ideology. I address perceptions of dehumanisation, the effect of the anti-nation on the nation and other influential themes as they arise through an individual assessment of each case.

In contrast to the anti-nation, Chapter Seven discusses the ideological role of the nation in the radicalisation process. I begin by addressing how an ethnic perception of ‘us versus them’ exists in nationalising states more generally and then go on to
compare this with a more extreme sense of ‘nation’ present in radicalising states. I look particularly at how a sanctified portrayal of the nation serves to legitimise extreme policies by rationalising extremism through the language of protection.

*Chapter Eight* is my final thematic chapter in which I address the role of the homeland in radicalising ideology. Unlike in the previous three chapters, I open this chapter with a discussion on the difference between the Nazi perception of Lebensraum and the idea of homeland. Then I move on to address whether or not radicalising ideology intimates that the continued existence of the homeland is predicated on the eradication of the anti-nation from the nation, thereby completing the triangular relationship between the three themes used to structure this PhD. Each of my thematic chapters looks at each of my three cases individually before addressing the themes comparatively in the analysis section of each chapter.

In my final chapter, *Chapter Nine*, I conclude that there are three main stages of ideological evolution in states radicalising toward genocide. This chapter follows the themes as they progress through each stage and I discuss how ideology both effects and is effected by events against particular geo-political backdrops. I then move on to address the way ideology evolves, looking particularly to see if the radicalisation process can be properly placed within a path-dependency model. I conclude by suggesting a more nuanced way this research approach can be applied in order to widen the results I have found and presented in this dissertation.
Problems and challenges in genocidal research

"God forbid that we should give out a dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world" – Francis Bacon (1910 [1620])

Introduction

As with any social science research project, seeking to answer the questions set out in Chapter One leads to particular problems, some being general challenges faced by many comparative analysts and others unique to the research questions themselves. The main point of this chapter is to provide a review of the problems necessary to consider when addressing the research questions at hand and to discuss how the methods I employed whilst conducting my research allowed me to solve or circumvent many of these problems.

Specifically, my research questions present two overarching problems I address in this chapter. The first challenge is to find an approach effectively allowing me to research radicalising ideology as structure and agency; the second challenge is how to appropriately compare three cases across space and time. Though many types of research would have allowed me to study genocidal ideology at some level, it was clear to me early on in the data-gathering process that a comparative historical analysis would be necessary to focus on the evolution of ideology across various cases throughout the twentieth century.

Thus, I decided to structure this chapter around the challenges arising from this type of research project. To achieve this aim, this chapter is broken down into four main sections. The first section addresses the method and rationale behind my choice of cases. I discuss the benefits and complexities of comparison as well as the relationship between the three case studies. The following two sections seek to explain how my methodological approach fulfils the demands of a complex comparative research model. Here I introduce historical sociology (HS); since much
of my topic deals with causation and with structure and agency, I also look at the ties HS has with historical institutionalism (HI) and, through HI, path dependency. I then move on to my final section, which outlines my research strategy as structured by the relics of ideology. Here I introduce the various types of sources available for each case and the problems of comparing these sources before concluding.

**Case Selection**

As discussed in Chapter One, this dissertation deals with three connected questions, all of which evolve from the first question, namely ‘does radicalising ideology evolve in a similar way in cases of modern genocide?’ From this question, two intriguing secondary questions arise: firstly, ‘what are the thematic similarities and differences in this evolution?’ and secondly, ‘what happens to further the radicalisation process?’

Aside from the emotional challenges faced by every genocide scholar, I was immediately aware of some substantial challenges to embarking on a research project with this type of scope and objective. The first problem I encountered when faced with these questions was that of choosing my case studies. My primary research question deals directly with modern genocide; it is also inherently a question necessitating some sort of comparison of cases in order to properly assess the past century of modernity. Thus, I knew I would need multiple ideologies to compare. Bryman sums up the problems inherent in doing so when he says:

> Not all writers are convinced about the merits of multiple-case study research. Dyer and Wilkins (1991), for example, argue that a multiple case study approach tends to mean that the researcher pays less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in which the cases can be contrasted. Moreover the need to forge comparisons tends to mean that the researcher needs to develop an explicit focus at the onset.

> (Bryman 2004: 55)

To make matters worse, an ideal research project on my topic would incorporate every instance of genocide occurring in the 20th and 21st centuries; however, within
the scope of the timeframe provided, I knew I would have to limit the number of cases. Based on previous work I undertook through my MSc, I decided that three would be the maximum number of cases I would be able to effectively research. This is, of course, typical of the comparative method in that ‘it resembles the statistical method in all respects except one. The crucial difference is that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic control of partial correlations’ (Lijphart 1971: 684; see also Skocpol and Somers 1980: 182, 193).

This lack of systematic control made me realise that in order to make my research outputs acceptable to my audience and possibly applicable to other cases outside of the three cases selected for this project, I would need to ensure that these cases covered a wide variety of critical elements, including sociological, geographical, technological, historical and political factors. At this point, I was also looking forward to the research gathering aspects of this type of project and knew it would be vital to be aware of various types of documents available for research. While I was drawn to Rwanda and Cambodia, I knew language barriers would prevent me from accessing primary research materials. I decided early on I would not consider work in Darfur as the state is still embroiled in conflict and I did not want to put myself in a possibly dangerous situation. Therefore, I began to consider Turkey and the Armenian genocide during the First World War, Germany and the Holocaust during the Second World War, and Serbian aggression against Bosniaks as my three case studies.

There are strong ties between the three cases that provide equivalence and connectivity. It was these links and similarities that brought me to decide on these three instances of genocide as being strong choices for this type of research project. The first of these links is geographical. Using these three cases gives me an empirical link bridging East and West against the background of changing Europe through the twentieth century. Much of the geographic space creating the homeland or the theatres of war in each case is also somehow involved in the other cases as well. This shared European geography goes on to provide a historical link between cases. As Figure 2.1 shows, each case is strongly influenced by a historical
relationship with the other two cases, which has effected the nature of aggression in each state and has established a circular relationship between the three.

As I show in more depth in Chapters Four and Five, the Balkan peninsula was at the outer edges of the Ottoman Empire; the Balkan wars of independence in the early 20th century left a substantial number of Muslims in the region, but encouraged a mass movement of people to the Ottoman Empire. Many of these individuals suffered great cruelty at the hands of Christian groups which fomented a sense of distrust towards the Christian Armenian population. Equally, the German alliance with the Ottomans in WWI provided infrastructure, technological advances and eyewitness accounts to the genocidal acts perpetrated against the Armenians. Based on this history, the Nazis put significant pressure on neutral Turkey to form an alliance with them during WWII. The Nazis successfully allied with the Croatian Ustasha regime which carried out savage attacks against the Serbs, providing the modern Milosevic regime a historical platform from which to foment fear against ‘others’ during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Among many other complex factors, German recognition of an independent Croatia provided a spark for war in the region, leading to genocidal aggression carried out against the descendants of those Muslims remaining in the Balkans after the Balkan wars.

This triangulation between the three cases also helps make my fieldwork possible linguistically, namely the alliance between Germany and the Ottomans in WWI, German aggression against the Serbs through during WWII, and Turkish-Serbian relations during the break-up of the Soviet Union. As I speak German, these relationships allow me access to certain historical information unavailable in English. Chapter Four seeks to largely expand Figure 2.1, looking at the links between cases in greater detail. In seeking three cases representative of genocidal aggression in the 20th century, I would have been remiss to dismiss the strong sense of interconnectedness provided by the Ottoman Empire, the Nazi state and the Balkan Peninsula.
Table 2.1 gives a broad explanation of the types of questions I raised regarding which cases to select. Many of these questions will be addressed through the upcoming chapters; for now, I want to draw attention to a few immediate areas. First, I want to draw attention to the fact that every case of genocide is unique and distinct. In fact, as a qualitative researcher, it is vastly important to view each individual case as unique, but also to view it as what Stake refers to as ‘common’ – assessable to and comparable with other cases: ‘Understanding each [event] requires as understanding of other cases, activities and events, but also an understanding of each one’s uniqueness’ (1995: 39, 44). Nonetheless, in the last quarter of the 20th century, scholars have emphasized – to varying degrees and often to their own detriment – the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust above all others (Schapiro 1972; Poulantzas 1974; Conway 1980; Katz 1982; Katz 1981; Payne 1995; Braun 1994).
The Holocaust is indeed a distinctive case. This is not to say that no connections or links exist between the Holocaust and any other distinctive case of genocide. Indeed, I will make a strong show of the relationships between the Holocaust and my other case studies. Regardless, it does not stand representative of any other cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing which has yet occurred.

Thus, though the Nazi genocide against the Jews is unique, the same measure should and must be extended outward to each case of genocide. I find it important to stress that Cambodia is no better or worse a comparison for Rwanda or Armenia than Germany is; this is one of the reasons why comparative studies are challenging to carry out. To underestimate the differences between cases immediately sets up research for failure as it leads to misrepresentations and misunderstandings of extremely complex circumstances. I expect these differences will help shape the characteristics of the ideology I am going to be explaining. They will show how different themes of genocidal ideology take precedent, while other themes continue to be in support, depending on outside sources, such as the type of war, the time period, the geography of the genocidal state and the technological advancement of that state.
Table 2.1 Case Selection Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of war involved</td>
<td>international with history of civil unrest</td>
<td>international</td>
<td>civil/international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary perpetrators</td>
<td>military, civilian</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>police/military, civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central leader present?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes: Hitler</td>
<td>moderate: Milosevic, Mladic and Karadzic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary types of killing</td>
<td>deportation, starvation/disease, massacres</td>
<td>ghettos, deportations, massacres, starvation/disease, death camps</td>
<td>deportations, massacres, starvation, detention camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of other past/current ethnic conflicts?</td>
<td>moderate: Rwanda, Sudan, pre-modern ethnic conflicts</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>moderate: Cambodia, Ustasha, China, Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influencing instability</td>
<td>crumbling Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>loss of WW1, economic depression</td>
<td>crumbling empire, Tito's death and fall of communism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention occurring due to aggression?</td>
<td>no, cessation of conflict ended with Axis loss of WWI</td>
<td>no, cessation of conflict ended with Axis loss of WWII though camp liberation was a part of Allied intervention</td>
<td>yes, direct NATO and UN involvement, led by US negotiators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resulting in war crimes tribunals?</td>
<td>yes, but incomplete</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes, ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular notes of interest</td>
<td>contested in Turkey though only rarely in western academic scholarship</td>
<td>substantial amount of primary and secondary literature</td>
<td>continued aggression and independence movements in the region from 1999 to the present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, choosing these three cases within the context of answering my research questions throws some considerable challenges in my path. The main difficulties are brought about through the historical spread of cases. Throughout the twentieth century, there have been vast shifts in technology, education, political systems,
scientific discovery, et cetera. These changes, and most particularly changes in technology and changes in literacy rates, mean that different kinds of sources are available in each case and different sources remain in each case. Some primary case material has been lost or destroyed over time. Some material, particularly in the Ottoman case, is inaccessible to Western scholars. To compound the problem, even when primary sources are available, there are significant linguistic challenges. None of my cases have a shared spoken language; all three cases have produced significant primary material in multiple languages. My own language ability is limited to English and German, which hampers my ability to work with these documents. As section three of this chapter will show, I have attempted to work through these challenges as best as possible whilst still remaining sensitive to the differences in each case. However, doing so has necessitated using varying types of sources in order to get a valid picture of ideology over the course of each case.

**Methodological Approaches to Mapping Ideology**

This led me to the next major challenge of this research project, namely, how I was going to manoeuvre through historical research while maintaining a strong sense of political analysis. Though by conducting research on this topic, I was inherently going to be conducting a historical project, it was important that it continue to be a project focused on the study of state-sponsored ideology. My research questions are less concerned with individual experiences of ideology and more concerned with how ideologies evolve at state level. This research deals less with the relationship between the macro- and micro-level structures within a state than with comparing macro-level structures and macro-level evolution between states across time.

Through such critical assessment of the interaction between theoretical perspective, methodology and methods, a more specific approach thus begins to emerge from my own research assumptions. Firstly, in accordance with Crotty, I approach methodology as ‘the nature of knowledge’, or how we know about what we can know (1998: 8). Theoretical perspective entails the more specific connections between epistemology and theory. Methodology is not necessarily based in ontology; it is not a belief, but a tool used to shape and refine research.
As regards my own epistemological perspective, I do not deny the existence and importance of certain patterns and repeated sequences occurring throughout modern history and, specific to my own research, in nationalist states. I also believe causation occurs in the social world, a belief necessarily reflected in my methodology. Hence, like Mann (1994), I draw from early philosophy and describe myself as an ‘as if’ positivist; facts – once discerned – are interpretable, but only reflect meaning when drawn into significant categories and analysed. As will be discussed later at length, historical sociologists draw heavily upon historian’s data and treat their findings as true; from this we are able to generate larger analytical theories.

However, I must concede that I also have certain ontological reasons for claiming that I am also ‘minimally’ a constructionist: (i) I do not believe that only one single actor can entirely influence the path of a social structure. Instead, I believe that an ‘intervening possibility’ can exert more power over the acts of a mass group. If, for example, a state’s ideology is moving along the path to becoming genocidal, one would hope there could be intervening factors changing the course of that ideology. This could be anything from political intervention from a neighbouring state, to sanctions or perhaps a natural disaster. Part of this research project assesses to what extent this is true, if at all.

Equally, I assume that (ii) if constructionism finds that meaning is not discovered, but constructed, then any study in ideology is constructionist, especially if Abrams is right in his projection that human agency ‘is the problem of finding a way of accounting for human experience which recognizes simultaneously and in equal measure that history and society are made by constant, more or less purposeful, individual action and that individual action, however purposeful, is made by history and society’ (Abrams 1980: 7). Ideological manipulation in these cases is the manipulation of the culturally constructed belief of the individual by state elites. *Ideological beliefs are not facts, but often people, on an individual and a collective level, act as if they were facts* – a point arguably much more important than any factual evidence. Thus, I classify myself as ‘minimally’ constructionist. Presented in
this manner, my choice for taking a theoretical approach as opposed to a quantitative
one becomes clear. These types of studies differ from the later in that they entail a
shift in orientation which involves a greater degree of abstraction (Gottschalk 1945:
201).

In order to continue on through a methodological analysis of ideology, it is important
to remember, as set forth in Chapter One, that ideology is both structure and agency
and, through its iterative nature, plays a ‘crucial and autonomous role in shaping
political behaviour’ (Lecours 2000: 511). As such, we can identify ideology as an
institution. This understanding was critical in deciding on my methodological
choice, as it allowed me to focus on the work of historical institutionalists in order to
constrain the methodological approach to my analysis. Historical institutionalism
(HI) is generally categorised into ‘new’ and ‘old’ institutionalism. Old
institutionalists are generally credited with a strong sense of the importance of
historical context and the autonomous nature of institutions as well as evolutionary
and holistic economics. Hira and Hira describe old institutionalists as being
‘whimsical advocates of an unrealistic and basically empirical research programme’
whose focus lies overmuch on the socio-economic relationship of modern states

Nonetheless, over the past twenty years through the emergence of new
institutionalism, institutionalism has changed from is traditional restriction to the
economic paradigm. Most key institutionalist theorists do have backgrounds in
economics (Immergut 2002; Rothstein 2002; Thelen 2002); therefore they rightly use
institutionalism as a theory in their own models and theories. However, new
institutionalism loosens the theory from the bonds of economics and freely applies it
in other areas of social science. Political science in particular has found much use of
institutionalism in scholars such as Theda Skocpol (1979; 1995; 2003).

Thus, my use of HI helps place my work firmly within a political framework; this is
particularly helpful as ‘Genocide Studies’ is a multi-disciplinary field. As an
approach to politics, the strengths of historical institutionalism are varied. The most
important is its ‘ability to explain variation and irregularities in political outcomes’ (Lecours 2000: 521). New institutionalisms conclude primarily that political institutions affect both structure and outcomes of competition between groups in all social strata. These institutions are often unbalanced, profiting some groups and excluding others, particularly with regards to ethnical and historical variants (Lecours 2000: 510, 513, 514). This definition forms the ‘theoretical core’ of historical institutionalism.

HI also has an interesting relationship with the ideas of power which play a key role in any society, but are critical in radicalising states. According to historical institutionalists, ‘institutional factors can shape both the objectives of political actors and the distribution of power among them in a given polity’ (Thelen 2002: 6). Identities, such as ethnicity, religion and culture, are not classified as given, but as constructed. This construction occurs when political actors exert power over cultural practices and symbolic content, thereby producing and reproducing a number of symbolic codes which have a great influence on social and political actions (Lecours 2000: 512).

Understanding institutions in this light sheds understanding on the role of institutions in genocidal situations. As we will see in Chapter Nine, legitimising ideology as a means to power has a linked relationship with legitimising genocidal policy; understanding connections between powerful institutions and between the individuals these institutions vest with power is key to understanding the consequences of behaviour radicalising towards genocide. According to historical institutionalism, these affiliations ‘are structured by institutions, and that, therefore, struggles for power follow different patterns and produce different outcomes partly as a result of institutional factors’ (Lecours 2000: 514; see also Skocpol 1995: 105).

As mentioned above, an institution is not merely a corporation or academic organisation. To most historical institutionalists, an ‘institution’ can be a formal organisation, but it also includes ‘informal rules and procedures that structure conduct’ (Thelen 2002: 2). As historical institutionalism is most concerned with
politics, institutions included voting procedures, political party structures, relations among governmental branches, economic structures, and so forth. One of the strengths of institutionalism as an approach is that it highlights the fact that some of these institutions usually remain constant amidst turmoil in other areas; they are highly resistant to change even though they themselves cause change to occur in a subtle way over long periods of time (Thelen 2002: 18). When dealing with genocidal institutions this version of institutions does not always hold true. As will be shown in Chapters Five through Nine, ideology itself is a highly volatile institution; thus, I propose that when state institutions are in a period of crisis and rapid change over a short period of time, opportunities for new social contracts are established and thus, ideological radicalisation is likely to occur.

Understanding institutions as being the primary source of influence in political spheres allows scholars to analyse change, particularly as the power distribution available within those spheres strongly influences other aspects of society. With change comes conflict and institutions define terms of conflict, thereby shaping ideology and creating foundations for political manoeuvring, military function and the roles of others within the realm of the state (Immergut 2002: 85). Thus, HI is particularly useful to comparative historical sociologists as it ‘explains the causes for cross-national differences and similarities of particular phenomena. This method consists of analysing ‘slices of history’ from different social systems and focusing on the effect of political institutions’ (Lecours 2000: 515).

In seeking to comply with this aim, I then turned to Charles Tilly who identifies the use of historical analysis in social science across four main veins. The first approach is *metahistorical*, in which one attempts to identify temporal patterns across all human history; the second he calls *world-systemic*, in which one traces the shifts and changes in world systems such as states; the third approach is *macrohistorical* which examines large-scale structures – such as state-led institutions – within these world systems; finally, the fourth approach is *microhistorical*, where one would study the experiences of individuals and smaller groups within the limits of world- and sub-world systems (Tilly 1988: 706). Naturally, choosing to participate in research in
any one of these four approaches to incorporating history into social science results in a more selective approach methodologically (Gottschalk 1945: 201). As my project pertains to the study of modern state institutions, it comfortably fits into the third macrohistorical category. Thus, macro-historical sociology (HS) began to emerge as a valuable methodological approach applicable to my research. As Tilly himself expounds, HS can ‘draw in important problems that are prominent in historical analysis and in lived history, but somehow remain neglected in sociology’ (1988: 710).

Though it seems to be in the midst of a recent renaissance, HS is, of course, one of the oldest methodological approaches in modern academia. Weber himself, though a sociologist, was a historical sociologist, investigating ‘the past by developing abstract categories and typologies for identifying generalisable and recurring patterns’ (Lustick 1996: 610). The term ‘historical sociology’ leads some to believe that this is a union between history and sociology in which the two fields meld into one (Burke 1980: 30). Like Abrams, I believe this claim is ‘too simple and too bland to do justice to a tangled, difficult relationship which is actually productive just because it is tense, distanced and complicated, because it is built on antithesis as well as on community of interest’; there is however a relationship between the two fields in which they can be viewed as distinct ventures with their own characteristic ‘discourse of proof’ (1980: 4, 5).

Indeed, sociologists can never truly produce theories entirely devoid of history, but the intentions of both fields differ. Historians, claims Goldthorpe, are concerned with discovering evidence from relics; in contrast sociologists ‘invent evidence’ which constitutes the foundations of modern sociology (Goldthorpe 1991: 212). I find this to be harsh and side with Mann who defines sociology as the ‘science of society’ which uses systematic methods to generate generalized forms of knowledge; most of history does not participate in this way with its data. The other difference here is that macro-sociologists sometimes have a broader understanding of social theory than historians, again allowing for meta-theoretical outcomes. ‘Thus, the
methodology of macro-sociologists differs considerably from that of most historians today, but it differs little from that of other sociologists’ (Mann 1994: 42).

HS is defined as discovering and testing hypotheses by ‘engaging theory with history’ which inspires new theoretical insights and interpretations of social happenings, both historically and in the present day (Mahoney 2001: xi). Indeed, as we have already seen, HS is theoretically based. While it is true that I will become a specialist in genocidal states, I have broader theoretical agendas than becoming a specialist in any one particular conflict. Instead, HS allows me to focus a ‘narrow but powerful searchlight’ on genocidal ideology, ‘finding patterns in the data to which historians had not been sensitive and finding inconsistencies or implausibilities in the accounts’ (Mann 1994: 43). HS’ particular strength in this area, providing it is used well, is the use of general theory (Kaiser and Hechter 1991), rather than focusing on one specific methodological approach. Thus, it allows me the flexibility needed in order to subsume my quasi-positivist cum constructionist perspective described earlier in this chapter. As Dannreuther and Kennedy so aptly describe it, ‘HS has rightly viewed itself as a broad church, which is agnostic towards and willing to borrow from any potentially useful theoretical approach or methodological tool’ (Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 7).

Secondly, HS is not bound by time, per se. It uses history because it addresses large themes which stretch across time. Skocpol and Somers classify this type of research as macro-causal analysis as it is particularly focused towards producing new historical generalisations by ‘selecting or referring to aspects of historical cases in order to set up approximations to controlled comparisons’ (1980: 182). As Abrams critically suggests, HS allows for time to be considered as a means for social structuring (1980: 12). Vesting itself thus allows for the accomplishment of a number of things, namely the analysis of major transitions in the twentieth century, the construction of the modern world system, revolution and now, in this work, genocide.
Chapter 2: Problems and challenges

Naturally, sociologists are drawn to this sort of work, as it allows them to extend theories to see how widely over time and space they apply. Perhaps even more importantly, it can draw on important themes which have been overlooked in sociology, politics, anthropology and history (Mann 1994: 50 - 51; Tilly 1988: 710). In many ways, History and Sociology are a matched pair, even if a bit unevenly matched at times.

Such a sense of what the study of the social world is about is thoroughly serious, penetrating and fully justified by the past practice of both historians and sociologists. And from such a point of view history and sociology are effectively the same enterprise...sociology must be concerned with eventuation because that is how structuring happens. History must be theoretical because that is how structuring is apprehended. History has no privileged access to the empirical evidence relevant to the common explanatory project. And sociology has no privileged theoretical access.

(Abrams 1980: 5)

Sometimes sociologists tend to take this interpretive approach too far; as Tilly has suggested, sometimes it is as if sociologists have ‘built a discipline in which time and place served merely as convenient markers, not as systematic objects of analysis or ever-present bases of variation’ (Tilly 1988: 704). In order to be efficient scholars of genocide, it is vital that HS scholars continue to consider the context of history, something that will be discussed at greater length in the upcoming Chapter Four.

There is, however, one obvious disassociation between HS and studies in modern genocide. Most projects engaging HS deal with ‘big issues’ such as revolution, power and rebellion; generally these are considered macro-issues, issues which supersede a specific time period or geographical place. These research projects strive to discover generalized causation (Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 7; Mahoney 2000: 508). Again, this is not to say that every case presented by historical sociology is ‘the same’, nor is it to say that there will never be instances where the theory ceases hold. My work again shows the difference between more metahistorical approaches and macrohistorical approaches; in my case, I am trying to
generally say something about the evolution of ideology in modern states radicalising toward genocide. It is much more specific. Thus, I will use historical sociology primarily as a means of what Mann calls historical-causal analysis, which considers the conditions under which modern institutions, such as ideology, evolve to a place of power (Mann 1994: 39) rather than an attempt to test more abstract theories of human experience.

Dannreuther and Kennedy aptly sum up the key strengths and themes of HS, the first of which being this very open willingness to focus on the larger picture of history, and thus ‘challenge received wisdoms, and to de-naturalize social givens and reified conceptualizations’ (2007: 7). In dealing with questions of genocide, assumptions are rife and varied, both from scholars and non-scholars alike. Throughout the course of my work, I hope to unravel some of the more accepted stereotypes regarding radicalising ideology and ascertain which of these are earned and which are unearned.

HS is also a methodological approach specifically dealing with causation and rejects the separation of events from their rightful historical placement. Thus, though being a proponent of general theory, HS does separate itself from certain post-modern theories, particularly interpretivism and other anti-positivist accounts that have a more ‘arbitrary’ approach to selecting evidence that is outside historical accounts. ‘This is not to say that HS does not fruitfully include quantitative data...or even elements of rational choice theory...but only in ways that support, rather than violate, the four main principles of research in HS’ (Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 9 see also 7 - 8) as articulated by Tilly above. In this project, both in its aims and in its outcomes, causation is of key concern. In looking at the shifts in ideology and asking how those shifts occur and the events they are connected with, I am inherently addressing issues of causation and, critically, I am testing causal propositions. In doing so, the work of John Mahoney is of particular interest to me. Mahoney is one of the leading scholars in an approach close to HS: path dependency.
HI suggests that institutions have an enduring nature (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Price and Romantan 2004; Rahm, Brehm, and Carson 1999); Mahoney and Thelen (2010) go on to point out that this makes HI an appropriate method when explaining continuity rather than change. Path dependency offers an approach within HI to track changes in institutions. I am interested in path dependency because the research questions I propose inherently hypothesize whether or not a pattern of ideological progression exists. If it does exist, how is this progression expressed? If indeed genocide is a path dependent process and the creation of genocidal ideology is a significant and contingent part of that process, then the probability of preventing genocide is greater than if it were otherwise. This is true because ‘final outcomes cannot necessarily be predicted on the basis of early events in a sequence, even if the sequence is governed by rigid mathematical laws’ (Mahoney 2000: 529 - 530).

Indeed, possible interferences may occur to change or influence the sequences; these interferences can be natural disasters, political, military or economic intervention, a change in power or a change in stability. Therefore, a greater understanding of the path dependent nature of genocidal ideology could provide the political community a stronger foundation upon which to implement interventionary measures, providing the set of conditions identified as the ‘reversal’ of path dependence is applicable. Reversals can occur because political decisions in any institution are not independent, but are created based on a sequence of events involving different actors at different times (Mahoney 2000: 511; Immergut 2002: 630). Chapter Nine readdresses these questions through the lens of my research analysis.

One cannot assume that because terms such as ‘paths of development’ and ‘pathways to change’ are used, that study is one examining path dependence (Mahoney 2000: 507, 532). Instead, as Lecours suggests, path dependency is the idea that ‘institutions, once created, take a ‘life of their own’ and may generate processes not intended, nor foreseen, by their creators’ (2000: 517). Similarly, Sewell defines path dependency as ‘that what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (in Mahoney 2000: 510). Path dependency asserts that certain events are necessary in order for
other events to follow; the link between early events and final outcomes are causal mechanisms, which generally follow a clear order and process within a sequence.

Thus, within path dependency, causal processes ‘are highly sensitive to events that take place in the early stages of an overall historical sequence’ (Mahoney 2000: 510). Mahoney is supported in this claim by Paul Pierson who finds early events of much higher value to sequential outcomes than events which appear later. In fact, the same event occurring later in the sequence may have little or no effect, while occurring early in the event may be one of the most influential factors in the outcome (in Mahoney 2000: 510). Critically, Mahoney also claims that path dependent process tend to follow a deterministic, causal pattern, similar to inertia – ‘i.e., once processes are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend to stay in motion and continue to track this outcome’ (Mahoney 2000: 511). This is due to path dependency’s characterisation of historical sequences as having deterministic properties, particularly in relation to institutional patterns and designs. In short, we find that Arthur’s assertion is Mahoney’s basis, that ‘when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen’ (in Mahoney 2000: 511).

Mahoney helpfully breaks down path dependency into two different fields, self-reinforcing sequences and reactive sequences. Most studies of path dependency, particularly in the field of economics, focus on self-reinforcing sequences. These are characterised by institutional reproduction mirroring early events and by the formation of institutional patterns (2001: xi); within a self-reinforcing sequence, we find increasing benefits for the institution over a long-term period, making the institution particularly resistant to change (2000: 508). Self-reinforcing sequences are circular, as opposed to linear, lending themselves to the age-old adage that ‘history repeats itself’.

In contrast, reactive sequences can and often do transform, reverse, or even negate early events. This type of sequence is not a reproduction of past events, but is generated by an event which sets in motion a set of linked reactions and counterreactions. Here, each following event is reactive and is causal, reacting to the
previous event and causing the following event. As each event is causal and caused, they are ‘reactive’ and therefore they are ‘dependent’ (Mahoney 2000: 508, 526, 527, 2001: 6); this is more than a representation of connected events influencing institutions and, in conducting path dependent research, it is important to show clear evidence of contingency. In *Dark Side of Democracy*, Mann (2005) does this to great effect, showing his readers clear proceedings from the state’s political ‘Plan A’, caused the shift to ‘Plan B’, then ‘Plan C’ and so on, until culminating in ethnic cleansing. He is able to show the ‘inertia’ Mahoney relies so heavily on, creating the reactions and counter-reactions creating the ‘inherent logic’ of path-dependency.

There is a singular way in which using reactive sequencing can be problematic. As noted above, it requires there be a primary event starting the sequence. As a historical sociologist, it is easy to continue to regress into history looking to find ‘one more causal event’ and therefore never actually begin the sequence. To lapse into this type of historical mongering is to merely say again that ‘history is important’ which, as we have already seen, is not the purpose of path dependency. Mahoney goes on to explain that path dependent sequences begin with a ‘critical juncture’. The critical juncture in any sequence is what Mahoney describes as the ‘key actor choice point’ (Mahoney 2001: 6), is characterised by the selection of a particular option from among multiple alternatives and is often of ‘great historical significance’ (Onoma 2010: 89). The critical juncture then shapes institutions in such a way as to trigger one of the two sequences above. The idea of ‘critical juncture’ adds significantly to the deterministic properties of Mahoney’s explanation of path dependency as, after the occurrence of a critical juncture, the interferences expressed above are less likely to be significantly influential and giving states fewer options for change. Mahoney expresses this well, saying

> once an option is selected, it becomes increasingly difficult to return to the initial point where multiple alternatives [are] still

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2 We see this often in biographies of important political figures, such as Adolf Hitler. The Holocaust is claimed to have occurred because Hitler was denied a place in art school, because his sickly mother was doctored by a Jew, because he was born in Austria and so on.
available...Not all choice points represent critical junctures. Critical junctures are specifically those choice points that put countries (or other units) onto paths of development that cannot be easily broken or reversed.

(Mahoney 2001: 7)

There is a certain amount of tension between HI and path dependency because of the necessary balance in path dependency of maintaining conditions in sequence. As most historical sociologists are focused on grand theory, they can easily make the mistake of explaining the outcomes of their case studies without appealing to any contingent events. As mentioned above, this is not path dependency. This is not to say that this work is not profitable or that it does not broaden the realm of knowledge and understanding in any way; it is simply not path dependency.

We then find ourselves faced with a particularly interesting set of questions: As ideology is an institution and the process of change in some institutions is path dependent, is the process of evolution in radicalising ideology path dependent? Do we find critical junctures quite early on in the process of radicalisation as Mahoney suggests? Thus, one of the more abstract purposes of this project is to test Mahoney’s theory of path dependency in states which become genocidal. As discussed in Chapter 3, Mommsen’s theory of cumulative radicalisation suggests that genocidal processes are reactive, pointing towards the applicability of the reactive sequence to the radicalisation process. Based on the significance Mahoney places on the linked, sequential nature of events in path dependent cases, I have chosen to shape my research around an episodic approach which forms a story-board for each case against which we can trace ideological evolution.

This episodic approach provides the structure for my research project, allowing me to fully examine both the relationship between ideology and the event at each episode and to test Mahoney’s theories of the importance of a critical juncture and the formulation of the reactive sequence in the ideological radicalisation process. I will be discussing whether or not it is necessary for radicalising ideology to adopt particular characteristics at certain points in the sequence in order for the next level of ideological radicalisation to occur. This approach considerably strengthens the
output of my research as I am not only going to be examining a descriptive process, but also endeavouring to contextualize the relationship between ideology and events within the context of the causal reactive sequence. Of equal importance, due to Mahoney’s focus on the role of institutions as actors in the path dependent process, adopting this approach also addresses the challenge presented in the introduction of this chapter, allowing me to research ideological shifts across time and space within the context of ideology as both structure and agency.

Thus, path dependency within historical institutionalism brings conceptual and methodological tools to this type of research initiative, not in the least because path dependency characterizes specific instances in history where incidents occur in multiple cases. As contingency without theory is completely invalid, researchers using path dependency must be aware that it is primarily a ‘theory-laden process’ (Mahoney 2000: 508, 536); historical sociology provides the theoretical substance for the path dependent framework. HI serves as the connection between the conceptualization of ideology as expressed in Chapter One and path dependency and, through path dependency, links to the episodic approach expressed in each of my thematic chapters in the PhD.

**Conducting HS Research**

As do most historical sociologists, I am taking certain historical events as given; it is not my purpose or intention to prove that the Warsaw ghetto did exist, that there were death camps in Yugoslavia or that there was intentional, ethnic killing on a genocidal scale in Turkey during the First World War. I am taking it for granted that these events did occur based on what is generally understood by the historical community to be true\(^3\) and am moving forward from there. To attempt, in this dissertation, to prove again the occurrence of the Holocaust would be disastrous; frankly, other scholars have committed generous amounts of time and energy

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\(^3\) The most arguable case is, of course, the Armenian one as the Turkish state denies genocide ever occurring within its borders. However, based on the sources I am using and on my definition of what genocide entails, the Armenian case rests firmly within this comparative study as a case of genocide.
elsewhere to make that very argument. For me to use their impressive work in another way does, I hope, no disservice to them. I mean it to have the opposite effect entirely. Most of the sources I use throughout the body of my work are secondary. So it is with many historical sociologists. This I see as not a weakness, but as a strength, of this approach. HS puts the facts and circumstances gathered by historians to use in a larger picture, thus deriving macro-and mid-level theories that can be applied across socio-spatial spheres. Historical events are not the outcome of historical sociological research; historical events are instead the foundation of historical sociological research.

In Goldthorpe’s famous ‘Uses of History in Sociology: A Reply’ (1994), he claims that ‘it is relics, and only relics, that can provide our knowledge of the past’ (69). This, however, depends entirely on the past itself and on the kind of research you want to derive from the past. Relics may indeed help one very much in proving the existence of events. For instance, relics such as Auschwitz-Birkenau and the various paraphernalia left after the fall of the Nazi regime will certainly help historians prove the camps existed and will help identify what the camps were used for; however, the ovens will not tell us why Hitler came to power nor why he found it necessary to kill millions of German citizens whilst fighting an international war. For that, a one must expand ‘relics’ to documents, ideological references and historical analysis, as Goldthorpe allows. In all three of my cases, this type of historical analysis has been done. ‘If a topic is too big for purely primary research and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion – secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study’ (Skocpol 1984: 382). The trick, of course, is to establish which studies can be classified as ‘excellent’ enough to provide the range of knowledge, understanding and data necessary for a seemingly ‘excellent’ piece of historical sociological work. That is not to say that none of the criticisms Goldthorpe raises are worth considering.

‘Where a recourse to history is made...it must then be accepted that certain, and perhaps quite crucial, questions may have to be left without any adequate answer, simply on account of the limitations of the relics available’ (Goldthorpe 1994: 63).
Here, Goldthorpe does indeed point to a fact important to both historians and historical sociologists, though perhaps for different reasons. If there is a lack of relics on a particular historical event, then it can be assumed that there will also be a lack of historical analysis. Where there is a lack of historical analysis, then competent HS cannot occur. This limitation, however, does not necessarily apply in my case. Genocide leaves tell-tale signs of occurring; these signs are ever more prevalent in the twentieth-century as the amount of news media and technology increases on a daily basis.

Chapter Three provides an overview of the literature for each of my three cases, providing a brief historiography and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the literature in general. It is from these secondary sources, based firmly in primary research, that I am basing much of my theoretical supposition. I am certainly not, as Goldthorpe claims, assembling the past ‘willy-nilly’ and ‘then, in ‘scissors-and paste fashion,’ selecting items to be combined, reordered and marshalled’ in order to create a new, fictional version of the past based solely on these secondary sources (1994: 65). In order to sidestep this very issue and to fill in the gaps left in the literature as discussed in Chapter Three, I have pursued primary documentary analysis in the course of this research project. Documentary research is not a clear-cut, organised category. It is usually laborious, even with helpful research tools like indexing and the internet. However, accessing these documents was worthwhile as they offer theoretical analysis, verification of fact and illustration of hypotheses and possibilities (Gottschalk 1945: 202, 231; see also Platt 1981: 31).

Truthfully, as a comparative historical sociologist, it is impossible for me to conduct the amount of primary research necessary to complete this project were primary research the only recourse left to me. In her innovative work on revolution, Theda Skocpol asserts that ‘redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research’ (Skocpol 1984: 382). I must rely on historical sources. Acknowledging this helps my efforts ‘to find opportunities for study in which cases outnumber variables’ by paying attention to
historiography in my selection of source material and ‘in the construction of stylized background narratives’ (Lustick 1996: 605, 614).

Nevertheless, there is one significant problem which surfaces and resurfaces when participating in HS-led research: selection bias. In order to keep my analysis from devolving into ‘loose interpretations of a second order kind’ (Goldthorpe 1991: 223) it is absolutely necessary that I address this problem. As both Goldthorpe (1991) and Schwartz (1987) warn, when social scientists study history, they tend to develop and use methods which end up distorting history instead of enlightening history almost solely due to selection bias. Thus, it is particularly vital to comply with Stinchcombe’s imperative, that a social scientist ‘does not apply history to theory; rather one uses history to develop theory’ (1978: 1).

Historical sociology is not the only methodology which finds bias problematic. Often research is biased on terms of gender, race, political influence, availability of data or even within quantitative analysis itself. In fact, selection bias can be evident in any analysis which draws upon one-dimensional work to produce background narratives and assumptions, even more so when a vast number of documents exist in relation to one topic (Mann 1994: 38; Lustick 1996: 606; Platt 1981: 37).

Nonetheless, bias is a serious and problematic issue which has plagued historical sociology since its origins, particularly as it is much more than distinguishing ‘true’ accounts of history from ‘false’ ones. Not even Weber (1948) attempted to address the problems of bias and data-gathering. Ian Lustick is one of the only theorists grappling with this problem who has actually attempted to offer an answer.

In other words, searching for ‘facts’ which may be necessary to test a theory of interest to an historically minded social scientist may mean, as Skocpol indicates, searching high and low for monographic work containing the kinds of information and narratives needed, organized in roughly the necessary ways, or even constructing the work oneself, with one’s own theory as a guide for data collection. But here is the nub of the issue. Such a search may well entail, and can logically be supposed to entail, a heavy selection bias toward works by historians using implicit
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theories about how events unfold and how people behave very similar to the theory under consideration by the social scientist.

(Lustick 1996: 607)

For my own work, context is vital: not leaning on snippets of what one or another theorist has said, but checking and cross-checking that information within the greater body of literature in order to ensure a true representation of historical fact and interpretive analysis (Lustick 1996: 605, 606). Though, as Lustick reminds us, I may never be able to provide a theory capable of encompassing the approach of every historian who works in my field, this type of triangulation does significantly improve the confidence with which HS and path dependency may be effectively used (Lustick 1996: 616).

Lustick suggests three ways applicable to approach historiography in order to avoid selection bias, the first being a forthright discussion of historiographical debates within the context of the research. In doing this, historical discrepancy becomes transparent and can even illumine analysis (1996: 614). As it is such a contested case in modern dialogue, I will undoubtedly use this technique when dealing with Turkish aggression against the Armenians, particularly as there will be problems of access it will help me address. Similarly, this approach will also be helpful when dealing with the Holocaust. However, the vast amount of literature produced on WWII serves as entirely different situation, and is problematic in its own way. I will here attempt to follow the second strategy Lustick suggests, that is to ‘grant explicit consideration to the historiographical terrain at the outset of the study, identify the particular approach or school of historiography whose work is most convincing, and indicate its distinctive...theoretic commitments and biases’ (1996: 615). This restricts my focus to a manageable amount of information, and will help to construct a plausible narrative as required for this analysis. The last approach I plan to implement is to presume, especially in the case of Yugoslavia, that the narratives of historiography comprise a normal distribution of theoretical commitments. ‘[The] more powerful the theory, the more about historiographical patterns could be explained, despite the influence of sociology of knowledge factors on the
orientations and conclusions of historians working in relevant and proximate fields’ (Lustick 1996: 615).

This again reflects the theoretical basis from which I am working, emphasising once more the theoretical approach to historical sociology as a grand-theory methodology. Nonetheless, it is unusual to find any piece of historical sociology totally devoid of what is generally known as ‘primary’ sources. John Mahoney (2001), Michael Mann (2005) and Ian Lustick (1996) all use some primary data to formulate their theories, chiefly because primary data can help support links between cases and sustain broader applications of their theories to various other situations.

‘Thus between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ research lies borderline territory where we may derive original data from ‘secondary ‘ sources’ (Mann 1994: 44). Herein lies the key to historical sociology: the things over which many historians debate are not necessarily pertinent to historical sociologists. Though certain historians, such as Bloxham, Kallis and Ramet, situate their work in a broader context of history, much information is presented in secondary sources which other historians of one particular period or occurrence fail to see in a larger picture. This does not take away from the necessity of historical research; indeed, without historical analysis, historical sociology would cease to exist. As Lustick suggests, the historian provides the data, or ‘the depiction of past events ready to be coded’ (Lustick 1996: 605). This is the work of the historical sociologist within secondary sources – to analyse or ‘code’ data to shed light on a particular generalization or theory.

Fulfilling the brief of this research, however limited in its scope, was still challenging and, at times, problematic. As Robert Stake so aptly notes, in doing qualitative analysis, one finds that ‘the ethical risks are substantial. And the cost in time and money is high, very high’ (1995: 45). In order to attempt to constrain these costs, to any extent, I became increasingly aware that a viable research strategy was critical; in order to find the key to effective research for this project, it was necessary that I go back to the heart of my research questions.
Chapter 2: Problems and challenges

Research through the HS lens

The final significant problem my research questions raise is the problem of researching ideology. Every researcher faces problems in dealing with particular methodological approaches and with the difficulties raised by looking at multiple cases. Bringing ideology into the equation, however, adds another level of complexity. Ideology, or the common understanding of what the nation should believe as expressed by the state through elites, is made manifest in various different ways. It was these paths of expression I wanted to explore in order to consider the multidimensional aspect of ideology. As discussed in Chapter One, ideology is a breathing, variable and changing thing, rather than a static entity with easily identifiable descriptors. Thus, when mapping out the evolution of these ideologies, I am tracing ideologies that become, but were not always, genocidal; they are all ideologies radicalising toward genocide. It is necessary to research the patterns of process while continuing to be sensitive to the geo-political shifts unique to each case.

Thus, the first question raised here is ‘What are the ways in which ideology is expressed at an elite level?’ Mann provides a helpful answer: ‘Ideologies are carried by communications networks in which some possess greater resources of knowledge and persuasion than others. They mobilize social movements and mass media – mass marches and meetings, the printed word, and the airwaves – all of which may acquire power over people’ (Mann 2005: 30). This being the case, the second question, dependent on the first, and pertaining directly to this research project asks ‘What relics of these ideologies remain for social historians to access in the three cases I have chosen?’ In answering this second question, it was essential that I consider the constraints inherent in my own project. Ideology is expressed mainly through official documents deriving from elites published through mass media outputs. However, historical sociologists can also avail themselves of personal documents and communiqués of state elites instrumental in creating ideology and policy; all three of these avenues are bolstered by the personal statements and
material presented during the course of both the Nuremberg and ICTY trials in the German and Balkan cases.

At this point in my research project, when I realised I was going to be looking at the evolution of ideology across a long-range time period within a large geographic space, I knew it was important to consider the problems and challenges this added to my research project. Hakim points out that considerations of time and space tend to be overlooked when participating in comparative studies (2000: 157; see also Barraclough 1965); for my research, however, I knew these considerations would be critical as both can effect the sequencing model of path dependency.

Phillips points out that studies within the same space and time are working within an ‘ordered framework for description and argument’ providing a common background that research projects comparing across time are not able to access (Phillips 1994: 261). Comparability across periodisation, or the compartmentalisation of various stages in history, is important in my project as historians tend to focus on one stage, or period, in history; my project looks at three different generally accepted stages of periodisation: WWI, WWII and the break-up of the Communist block. Comparing cases across the lines of periodisation means that not only am I constrained by space in language, but it is also imperative that I assess the constraints placed upon my project across time. Phillips’ own work (2002; 1994), along with that of other social scientists such as Mann (1986; 1993; 2004; 2005), Greenfeld (1992) and Shaw (2007; 2003) amongst others, show us that this type of comparison is possible; nonetheless, the problems of analysing cases across time and space are significant.

The problems of analysing cases in this way can largely be summed up in the problem of the comparability of empirical sources. Differences in time mean that in each case, I am dealing with varying levels of technological development. This variance means that each case used slightly different means to communicate ideology and that, of those means, varying types of ideological remnants remain. I express the problems faced in each case more specifically below, but overall, I became
increasingly aware that this problem of comparability meant that my analysis and the presentation of my case study data would be based on multiple data sources.

One of the greatest helps in overcoming the problem of comparability is that, regardless of the varying types of data source, each source is a means through which ideology is expressed; thus, on that basis, the sources are comparable. Equally, using a mixed source base does help solve the problem of selection bias. As my research analysis has come out of a variety of sources across a significant amount of time, there is less of a chance of having a skewed outcome due to over-reliance on certain secondary sources.

Before going on, a brief note on my use of tribunals in only two of my cases is important. ‘Of course, international tribunals are not the only legal venues in which cases of crimes against humanity can be heard; they tend to function poorly in practice, being susceptible to pressures from powerful states and the prejudices of the nation-states involved’ (Akçam 2006: 292); equally, the documents used in these tribunals is biased, allowing a certain level of ‘victors justice’ in the courtroom. I have done my best to avoid bias within the PhD by triangulating the information found therein with secondary sources when available. Nonetheless, these two infamous examples of international tribunals have provided lucrative information spanning the course of the conflict in both cases as will be seen in the upcoming chapters. Early on, I decided against attempting to incorporate information from the Istanbul trials into the research process for this project 4. Firstly, though there are various copies of certain cases in various libraries and collections around the world, we are still unsure as to whether or not the complete court records still exist; the records that do exist are hailed by sceptics of the genocide as fictitious accounts of ‘victor’s justice’ (Akçam 2006: 4-5). Secondly, I was aware that in Berlin I would be able to access a collection of a workable number of primary documents in a

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4 For more information on the trials themselves, see Dawidowicz (1976); during these trials we see the introduction of the term ‘crime against humanity’, a significant contribution to international law used throughout the twentieth century in the prosecution of war criminals (Akçam 2006: 368), including those used in this research in the ICTY trials.
language I understand pertaining to the Armenian case which would offer sufficient insights into the ideology of the regime.

To start looking at my research-gathering in depth, a brief overview of the seven months spent doing field work is helpful. I began fieldwork with the Balkan case, accessing documents from the ICTY online database. After finalising the initial stages of my research gathering on this case, I gained access to the Zentrum für Berlin Studien at the Haus Berliner Stadtbibliothek and began my work on the Holocaust. Soon after, I began research on the Armenian genocide in the Amerika-Gedenkbibliothek, in the collections of ‘Die armenische Frage und der Genozid an den Armeniern in der Türkei (1913 - 1919): Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amts’ compiled by Wardges Mikaeljan of the Institute of History in the Armenian Academy of Science. Though the original Altdeutsch remains in place, compiling copies of the documents involved setting them to modern typeface; thus, I was enviably saved from suffering through Altdeutsch penmanship and was able to focus on content. With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter looks specifically at the official resources, mass media publications, personal documents and communiqués used from each case.

**Official state publications and media sources**

**Turkey:** I have used only a limited amount of official state publications and media sources in this research project; most of the information that would fall under this category was originally found either within the personal communiqués described below or in a secondary source. The reasons for this are numerous, but most importantly, the availability of official Turkish documents relating directly to the Armenian atrocities is still limited and they are in a language I am not fluent in. Thus, I have effectively relied more heavily on pre-existing secondary literature to fill these gaps.

**Germany:** An unparalleled amount of information is available on the Holocaust and on the Nazis’ propaganda machine in particular. However, as my work looks at the evolution of ideology, the intricacies of the vast Nazi bureaucratic regime have little
scope to be explored here. Though I was able to garnish some information from some of these works, it was easy and helpful for me to expand this knowledge with newspaper articles based around particular events crucial in the expansion and shift of ideology at the time.

Naturally, as I am using a media source, there is much historical information given to me through the newspaper articles I have analysed in my German case. However, the type of document influences the way that information is presented. In many of these papers, just as much space is given to printing a poem as to describing the German invasion of Poland. It lacks the balance found in my other cases. But again, that is to be expected. I have also restricted the amount of historical framing I would get from my field documents by limiting myself to only looking at newspapers published by the Nazi regime and, specifically in Der Völkischer Beobachter. Der Völkischer Beobachter was one of the regime’s most widely read and influential media outlets (Kallis 2008: 119). Unlike more discriminatory papers, such as Der Stuermer which was contested even within the Nazi party (Tribunals 12.07.1946), Der Völkischer Beobachter provides a tool of propaganda accepted by both extremists and conservatives. Its wide acceptance has given me a much clearer and nuanced view of how mainstream ideology was actually portrayed. Even within the context of this more mainstream newspaper, internal news and ‘true’ historical events regarding Jews are simply not discussed. In fact, almost all non-biased reporting is eliminated; every article I have read is influenced by and biased in favour of Vaterland and Führer. Thus, any historical information provided herein has been cross-referenced and double-checked for validity before using it as a historical reference. Nonetheless, the insight these texts have given me regarding ideology has been invaluable.

In order to effectively limit my research base and test Mahoney’s theory of path dependency with an episodic approach, I decided to focus my research on editions of Der Völkischer Beobachter published around certain key events occurring after the
Nazis assumed state power\textsuperscript{5}. In an attempt to keep this section from degenerating into a mere list of dates and events, I have decided to present the information regarding the dates of newspapers I have used listed in Table 2.2. I have endeavoured to use six newspaper articles per key event, one from each of the two weeks preceding the event, the day the event occurred, the day after the event occurred and one from each of the two weeks prior to the event. Unfortunately, no papers were available the day after Kristallnacht or for the day after Auschwitz became an extermination camp. The paper published immediately preceding Kristallnacht on 10 November 1938 was not available in Berlin and had not been put onto microfiche. As regards 4 September 1941, the next paper printed by the NSDAP was five days after the event; thus, I decided to continue with my established pattern and wait until the full week had passed before including the next paper.

Table 2.2: Issues of *Der Völkischer Beobachter*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Book burning at Opemplatz</th>
<th>Nuremberg Laws</th>
<th>Kristallnacht</th>
<th>Auschwitz becomes an extermination camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>two weeks before event</td>
<td>26 April 1933</td>
<td>1 September 1935</td>
<td>26 October 1938</td>
<td>20 August 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one week before event</td>
<td>3 May 1933</td>
<td>8 September 1935</td>
<td>2 November 1938</td>
<td>27 August 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>date of event</td>
<td>10 May 1933</td>
<td>15 September 1935*</td>
<td>9 November 1938</td>
<td>3 September 1941*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one day after event</td>
<td>11 May 1933</td>
<td>16 September 1935*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{5} A discussion on why these events were chosen and their importance in context is found in Chapter Four.
The Balkans: My reliance on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is heavily influenced by their extensive archival achievements and the translation of most of their documents into English. Using these documents allows me to both track the permeation of ideology by seeing how it effects the testimonies of those on trial and to use the prosecution’s accounts in a similar way as in the Nuremberg trials (see below). However, using the ICTY trials is not without its problems. Not only are the trials still going on, but some of the key criminals charged with genocide have not been apprehended. I am hoping this changes sometime in the very near future. At this juncture, however, I proceed with the cases made available; that is, the ones which show most strongly the influence of ideology.

The ICTY has an extensive and thorough online database; my first challenge was to narrow down the available documents in order to better focus on the information pertaining to my question. Thus, I limit my research to those trials of individuals who have been indicted for genocide and/or extermination. Thus, the pertinent trials are those of Biljana Plavsic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Slobodan Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, Sasa Stanisic, Momcilo Persic, Sdravko Tolimir, Milomir Stakic, Radislav Krstic, Stojan Zupljanin, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, Vinko Pandurevic.
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The majority of those listed above still have ongoing court cases. The exceptions are Biljana Plavsic who was convicted of persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds and cut a deal with the prosecution, pleading guilty to the above charges and thus had the genocide and extermination charges dropped. Milomir Stakic did not plead guilty, but evaded the genocide charges he was indicted with and was found guilty of extermination, murder and persecutions. Perhaps the most interesting is Radislav Krstic who was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide, murders, extermination and persecutions, though was not prosecuted for genocide itself. Recently arrested, the prosecution is in the early stages of proceedings against Radovan Karadzic, whose trial is of continuing interest to genocide scholars and the general public alike. Lastly, is the late Slobodan Milosevic, indicted on a lengthy list of counts including genocide, complicity in genocide, deportation, extermination and persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds. Milosevic was not found guilty, but died before the end of legal proceedings on 11 March 2006.

As regards ideological information found in official sources, the majority of this type of information found in the Balkan case is found in three different types of documents gathered from the prosecution of these war criminals, written for two different audiences. The first are Case Information Sheets (CIS). The purpose of a CIS is to inform a very broad audience about the perpetrator, their backgrounds and their involvement in the Yugoslavian conflict. While they do not go into great depth, they offer useful information not easily available in other documents. They also include maps, tables, data and information about the trials themselves as well as an overview of the historical settings in which the events take place. Every person indicted by the ICTY has a CIS available online.

The second type of document are the prosecutorial indictments. I have used nine different types of indictments: Initial Indictments, Amended Indictments, Revised Amended Indictments, Amended Consolidated Indictments, Second Amended Indictments, Second Consolidated Amended Indictments, Third Amended Indictments, Fourth Amended Indictments and, in the case of Biljana Plavsic, Guilty Pleas. The purpose of these indictments are to incriminate. Thus, they show the war
criminal in the worst light, attempting to prove guilt. There are two reasons for the large amount of categories; first is that certain changes have had to be made to satisfy the defence. Some cases, for instance, have been severed and others have been joined. Secondly, and more importantly for my research, is the added admission of evidence and information. Naturally, as a certain amount of time goes on, more evidence for certain allegations is discovered and needs therefore to be brought before council. For instance, the Initial Indictment against Karadzic and Mladic was brought forward in July 1995. By October 2002, the date of the Amended Indictment against Mladic, the two cases had not only been severed into two disassociated trials, but substantial information added to the Mladic case, including an increased number of statistics and tables.

I am counting these tables as the third type of document used in this case. Not only those presented in the Mladic case, but of the eighteen defendants included in this section of my fieldwork, six of these cases included extensive lists of information, usually appended in tables. Naturally, as the indictments have grown and changed, so too have the tables. Much of the information provided therein was largely repetitious, but with small important changes. Thus, I have compiled all of the information on each topic from all of the indictments into one table on each topic. The information I am using is pertinent to detention facilities, killings related to detention camps, killings not related to detention camps, sacked towns and villages, destruction of sacred sites, the takeover of power in certain municipalities and towns and municipality populations broken down, where possible into Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat percentages. Though this information was not made public to the Balkan press, this type of information gives valuable insight into various different areas, particularly relating to the differences in ‘otherness’ as discussed in Chapters Five and Six.

**Personal documents and communiqués**

Gottschalk *et al* suggest that two of the uses of personal documents are for the development of the theoretical elements of research and for the illustration of various hypothesis and possibilities (Gottschalk 1945: 202). In my work, these documents
serve to do both. The personal documents and communiqués used in my research were written for an exceptionally informed audience, usually to a consular employee, other government official or for their own personal use. Thus, there was no need to offer historical information per se, nor was it always necessary or even possible to be constantly referring to other communications received in order to hold an intercommunicative dialogue. Nonetheless, in the rarer circumstances when historical events are described, they are done so in exceptional depth, often being very explicit as to what numerous people said, how people were treated, times of day, specific numbers and so on. There are, naturally, challenges to working with eye-witness accounts as fact (Bryman 2004: 381 - 384). However, by cross-referencing the information found in these reports from other accounts by different sources, I am confident in my ability to present the information found therein in a fluid, unbiased manner.

Turkey: Of all three of my cases, my use of personal documents is strongest in the Turkish case. My first step was to narrow down the number of documents from over six hundred to a more workable number of two hundred and sixty three. This was accomplished firstly by a relatively swift perusal of the catalogue index, dismissing documents relating to German troop movements, German and Turkish business relations and documents relating to more general news on WWI. Then, I quickly read a large number of documents relating to the Armenians, but many were tales of suffering and, whilst interesting and heart-wrenching, offered no direct information concerning genocidal ideology. From the remaining two hundred and sixty three, I identified fifty seven most pertinent to my research by re-reading each text with great care. These remaining fifty seven documents are focused in the years 1913 to 1916, though a few documents stretch into 1917 and 1918.

My fieldwork focused around five types of documents found in the Amerika-Gedenkbibliothek’s collection. The first are field reports from missionaries and civilian personnel, particularly Johannes Lepsius, a German missionary contracted by the German government early on as a field informer and eye-witness to the Armenian atrocities. Whilst interesting and helpful information is offered in the other reports I
have used, Lepsius’ information is certainly the most thorough and is also the most widely referenced of any German informer in academic work relating to this case. His political aspirations caused him, if anything, to guard against over-antagonising the Turks. In fact, some scholars have proposed that he refrained from divulging some of the most damning evidence against the Turks until quite late in his life in order to maintain the alliance between the Germans and the Turks (Akçam 2006). This increased trust between himself and the Turks in power; thus, his understanding of the genocidal aims of the Young Turk regime was certainly of a higher level than some of the other reports I examined.

The second type of document proving invaluable to my research are reports from various German diplomats and military officers. These reports, often coming from high level officials are highly nuanced but brutally honest about the purpose and intent of policies initiated throughout the CUP’s time in power. Many of the authors of these reports were more than aware of the atrocities being committed; some even signed deportation orders themselves. As time went on and the scale of the aggression grew, their missives and personal writings express more disapproval and, in certain cases, disbelief (Akçam 2006: 7, 6; R14098/Ab.4215 24.01.1918; R14098/Ab.10208 17.02.1918; R14099/Ab.15733 12.04.1918). Many of these documents were listed at the time as Top Secret status and have now been released to the public. Much of the information on regional insecurity and its relation to the homeland, as will be seen in more detail below, is presented through these channels.

Similar in style are documents sent by the German consulate in Turkey to the German State Department, most often in the form of telegrams and short letters with attached reports. As with the diplomatic and military reports, a few of these documents have been declassified over the last century. The fourth type of document I am working with are international consulate messages to the German State Department and consulates in Turkey. Primarily coming from French and Belgium diplomatic missions, these reports, though few in number, usually relate to information not reported by German diplomats for reasons of political nicety. They
provide information from a different ideological perspective, but maintain the high style and information found in the documents noted above.

In total contrast to the previous categories, my fifth type of document, letters from Ottoman citizens to the German consular missions in Turkey, lacks diplomatic restraint in favour of providing critical eye-witness testimony. Usually these accounts come in the form of letters begging for German intercession into the atrocities. While most of these letters come from Armenians, a small number were written by sympathetic Turks and other minorities, usually Christian.

Germany: To support the various media sources used in my German case, I chose to use a variety of personal documents and statements. The most famous of these printed sources are both Goebbels’ diaries and Mein Kampf. I recognise that Mein Kampf is in a bit of a grey category, being both personal writing and state-sponsored publication; however, I have chosen to put it in this category as it reflects the personal view of one individual at its time of writing. Only later in the Nazi reign did it come to be considered of vital literary importance.

Of equal, if not greater, interest are the personal statements made by key Nazi leaders in the Nuremberg Trials. These I accessed through Yale Law School’s Avalon Project, which houses the widest number of legal documents pertaining to the Nazi regime and still seeks to expand it’s library. I focused my reading on the twenty-two volumes of the ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Proceedings Volumes’. These include personal statements from all of the major war criminals, though I focused my research on the cases of Doenitz, Frank, Frick, Fritzsche, Funk, Goering, Hess, Sauckel, Speer, Kaltenbrunner, Keitel, Jodl, von Neurath, Raeder, von Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Schacht, von Schirach and Streicher. The statements these men made whilst in court are of great testament to the depth of their belief in a fully fledged ideology.

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6 For more information on the history of Mein Kampf (Hitler 2009 [1925]), see D.C. Watt’s introduction to the text.
Balkans: As regards this case, I have used only a limited number of personal communiqués. A majority of these are to be found in the ICTY trial documents, in particular, the statements that the above-listed defendants made in their own defence. Unfortunately, language barriers inhibited my ability to access phone transcripts, wires and letters as relates to this case. Luckily, many of the secondary sources I’ve used for this case do provide substantial amounts of text from these types of documents already translated into English.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the questions, problems and challenges arising from my research questions and to discuss the ways in which I have dealt with them whilst carrying out research. The first section focused on the problems of case study selection. The second section addressed my choice of HI as an approach and suggested that this research project may be able to test Mahoney’s theories of path dependency in the context of radicalisation. It also contextualised ideology as an institution, identifying HI as the connection between ideology and the episodic approach I take throughout the substantive chapters of the PhD. The third section, conducting HS research, discussed some of the weaknesses of HS and how other scholars have sought to deal with these weaknesses. Lastly, I have outlined how ideology structured not only my research questions, but also my research strategy. Using the way ideology is conveyed in order to provide a skeleton for my research method has been invaluable in the context of HS and HI.

‘Comparative-historical analysis is designed to discover and test hypotheses by engaging theory with history; when successfully employed, it can both inspire new theoretical formulations and stimulate new interpretations of historical cases’ (Mahoney 2001: xi). This assertion applies to my work in that herein I am seeking to ‘inspire new theoretical formulations’ regarding genocide analysis. Much has been written on the ideologies of particular genocidal regimes, but how that ideology is formed and whether or not there is any similar pattern of formation is still yet to be established. Whether or not genocidal ideology evolves in a similar fashion is,
however, a vital question which must be asked if prevention is ever to be attained. This is what I seek to add to theories of genocide and hope, as well, to add to the greater body of work in historical sociology.

Of course, HS is not a perfect approach and my interpretation of it as a method is far from flawless. As Goldthorpe points out, ‘in some respects data created on the basis of field work will indeed offer advantages over evidence derived from relics…in other respects just the reverse will hold’ (Goldthorpe 1994: 63). The difference lies in what is desired from the data. It is not my intention to merely ‘interpret historical cases’, as Mahoney suggests, though I will offer some interpretations; my hope is that these interpretations will be applicable to present and future cases of radicalising states as well as adding to the literature on HI and path dependency through my analysis of ideology as structure and agency.

In his noted essay From Exchange to Structure, Michael Hechter describes the relationship between methodological holists, those who find that when individuals act, they do not do so as individual actors, but as member of a bigger societal structure and methodological individualists, those who argue that the ‘dynamic force’ of societal structures is purely in the hands of individual agents acting for individual gains. At the heart of this relationship is, he argues, power. The ‘root of power – its internal source – lies in the subjective value that agents place on given goods and events’ (Hechter 1991: 49), or, in other words, structure. My research deals with the power of ideology in a similar fashion. There can be no denying the role of the individual in genocidal action. However, when attempting to describe any grand theory of genocidal analysis, I focus not on the individual and the direct action of an individual. Instead, I am looking at the kind of power state-led ideology has over an individual. Herein, for purpose of this project, lies the relationship of macro- and micro-structure and agency.
A survey of scholarly approaches to genocide

Introduction

As was noted in the introduction, this thesis is about the evolution of ideology as it radicalises in states that become genocidal. By comparing three cases in which genocide did occur, I am seeking to establish whether or not there is a common pattern of evolution and what key themes arise within the ideological shifts. The purpose of this section is to develop the backdrop of this investigation into what is commonly considered to be one of the vilest instances in modern history. In doing so I will trace my own path down the literature of nationalism and genocide while also giving a broader sense of the general literature on the subjects and their interactions with each other.

I begin, as mentioned above, by accounting for the influence nationalism scholars have had on issues of race and ethnicity. This sections focuses primarily on the varying approaches to nationalism studies, in particular those taken by primordialists, modernists and ethnosymbolists. This discussion is of particular import as it allows me to situate genocide studies within the greater scholarship of social and political studies. This is then followed on a section detailing the transition from nationalism literature to the more focused literature of genocide studies. This section is dominated by a review of the definition of genocide, and expands only to include a broad introduction to the typologies of genocidal literature. I limit this discussion to works that have taken a more theoretical or macro approach to genocide studies, leaving the laudable and, particularly regarding my Holocaust case, almost indefatigable literature of each of my case studies until the final section. With this groundwork established, this Chapter concludes by posing certain questions raised by the literature which help guide the reader through the upcoming chapters of the thesis.
Chapter Three: Survey of approaches

Nationalism

The academic foundations of genocidal literature are found not in accounts of broad history nor in critical studies of war and justice; these types of analysis provide accounts of important events of conflict, but offer little by way of a macro approach to genocide. For that, we must begin by looking to nationalism theory. Nationalists of all sorts, look to their movements to provide them with a different and better society wherein the rights and freedoms of the ethnic groups can come to full realisation. Nationalism scholarship is broken up into two very distinct categories: scholars who advocate primordialism, and its counterpart, perennialism, and those who support a more modernist, or ethno-symbolist, approach to the nation. In the forthcoming section, I am going to discuss both types of nationalism, but the discussion on modernism and the various theories of modernist nationalism will take up the majority of the discussion.

Perhaps it would be wise for me to quickly justify this choice. The primary argument between modernists and primordialists is what constitutes a nation and its ties to ethnicity, when 'the nation' begins and the possible equivalence of comparison between modern and ancient history. Nonetheless, even the most ardent primordialists/perennialists, would acknowledge the differences between ancient and modern nations. Similarly, there is an argument to be made for the antiquity of genocide; Ben Kiernan’s *Blood and Soil* (2007), Michael Freeman’s *Genocide, Civilization and Modernity* (1995) and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s *History and Sociology of Genocide* (1990), as well as more specific works such as Ward Churchill’s *A Little Matter of Genocide* (1997) and Richard Bauman’s *Human Rights in Ancient Rome* (2000) all serve as examples of arguments where genocide is perceived as an historic event. Nonetheless, that modern genocide differs from conflicts in pre-history, Biblical times, the Middle Ages and even through colonial times has also been well established (see Bauman 2002 [1989]; Mann 2001; Weitz 2003; Valentino 2004 for examples). In the later sections of this chapter, I will develop this to a greater extent; for now, however, let it be justification for my choice.
of focus re nationalism. The modernity of nations leads to a context and framework for my analysis of genocide literature more generally; thus, I have chosen to focus on modern nationalism more than that of primordialism or perennialism.

Umut Özkirimli reminds his readers that there are few scholars today who ardently advocate a determined view that nations are completely natural (2000: 69), though it is Clifford Geertz (1993 [1973]) who has gone to the greatest lengths to explain the basic tenets of primordialism and vitally acknowledged the role of ethnicity in antiquity. However, Anthony Smith is attributed with introducing perennialism to nationalist dialogue, an approach seemingly more accessible to current trends in nationalism as it is less radical, by bridging primordialism’s antiquated ethnicity with the ethnic groups of today’s societies and nations. Indeed, the most important element for Smith seems to be perennialism’s concern with ‘underlining the power, longevity and ubiquity of ethnicity/nationality, to trace its roots in both history and the human psyche and to vindicate the importance of seeing ethnicity empathetically and not to judge it by some externalist criterion of ‘objective reality’’ (Smith 1998: 160). Smith goes on to distinguish between sociobiologists such as Joshua Fishman (1972; 1999) who promote the idea of direct kinship and ethnic continuity and the type of work done by scholars such as Walker Connor (1984; 1987; 1994). In fact, even Fishman, a proponent of theories supporting the biological role of kinship ties, hesitates to explicitly claim that the nation has been created from nothing at all and that nothing existed prior to the nation – very few theorists would, even the most staunch supporters of perennialism. The same can be said for the ethnosymbolists such as Connor, Anderson (1983), Hobsbawm (1994; 1990) Hutchinson (2001; 1999) and Smith himself who, through extended fieldwork done on modern national movements, find that it is merely a shared belief in ancestry that serves to bind individuals to a nationalistic ideal.

This leads us to modern nationalism scholarship and the pertinent civic/ethnic divide.
Chapter Three: Survey of approaches

Scholars of modern nationalism, unlike perennialists and primordialists, focus on nationalism during the advent of the modern political state. Uneven development, modernisation, economic division and political displacement feature highly within modern nationalist discourse (Nairn 1977; Gellner 1983; Breuilly 1993; McCrone 1998). Modern nationalism sees a shift through the introduction of mass participation of the *demos* into the political realm (Mann 1990, 1993; Snyder 2000).

Nationality, for the modern society, is based around the search for expression through ‘the highest form of organised activity, a sovereign state...[the masses] identified themselves with the nation, civilisation with national civilisation, their life and survival with the life and survival of the nationality’ (Kohn 1945: 18, 19). Though since the American Revolution, the definition of *demos* has shifted to include women and minorities, the basic tenants of Kohn’s statement remains the same throughout modern/post-modern society. Much of these modern nationalist movements fall into Seton-Watson’s classification, ‘official nationalism’ where nationalism was imposed from the top down, out of the crumbling empire-states (1977: 148). Anderson capitalises on this idea, describing official nationalism as ‘a major effort to stretch the short, tight skin of the nation over the vast body of the old empire’ (Anderson 2001: 35).

Often, the institutionalisation of popular nationalist movements by the state resulted in ethnically-based exclusionist policies; other times, such as in France and Italy, a more citizen-based approach to the nation arose (Mann 2005: 181). The ethnic/civic divide amongst nationalism scholars is right at the heart of the literature pertaining to this project. Indeed, most modern nationalist scholars note the Janus-like distinction visible in national movements. Modern nationalism is credited with state-building, enhanced levels of cosmopolitanism, high levels of civic participation and inclusiveness; equally, modern nationalism is blamed for civil war, separatist movements, exclusionist politics and extreme mass conflict. This seeming juxtaposition within the character of nationalism has been generally agreed to come out of two types nationalism: civic and ethnic. Naturally, because of the problematic
nature of terminology in academic study, most scholars tend to ascribe different terms to the two phenomenon; however, a general understanding exists that these two typologies of nationalism describe the variable political outcomes of nationalist movements.

Hans Kohn is attributed with introducing this split into the academic dialogue, associating the divide between civic and ethnic nationalisms with Eastern and Western communities. The rise of nationalism in the West, Kohn attributes with being typically a political occurrence, associated with the concepts of individual liberty and cosmopolitanism popular in the eighteenth century (Kohn 1945: 329-330). We must take note of the regional bias present in Kohn’s theories; this ‘ages’ Kohn’s proposals in that it is, as Brubaker (2004: 133), resonant of a neo-orientalist perspective. It is much more common in today’s academic sphere to note differences between individual states or national groups, rather than continents or large regional swathes.

Nonetheless, Kohn’s theories have allowed for much scholarship discussing strengths and limitations of civic nationalism. Brown (1999) discusses civic nationalism at length, pointing out that it refers to a sense of community based on residence within a common territory: ‘involvement in the state and civil society institutions of that homeland, generate a distinctive national character and civic culture, such that all citizens, irrespective of their diverse ancestry, comprise a community in progress, with a common destiny’ (Brown 1999: 283).

Brown also suggests that civic nationalisms appeal to a common institutional past while remaining ‘forward looking’ (1999: 283); this, according to Billig, occurs through the micro-level inclusion of nationalist symbols into communities resulting in a type of ‘banal nationalism’ present in everyday societies. The common usage of stamps, currency, driving licenses and other societal symbols of nationhood become the ‘ideological habits’ of nationhood (Billig 1995: 8, 41).
The seemingly beneficial banality of civic nationalism is countermanded by the negative associations attributed to ethnic nationalism. As Brubaker reminds us, nationalism can be dissimilationist and exclusory, directing policies of nationalisation towards spheres of practice rather than groups confined by geographic boundaries; this has historically resulted in what he terms the ‘large-scale migration of ethnic unmixing’ (1996: 90). Kohn discusses ethnic, or Eastern, nationalism as occurring after Western nationalism,

but also generally at a more backward stage of social and political development: the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided; nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern- not primarily to transform it into a people’s state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands... nationalism in Germany did not find its justification in a rational societal conception, it found it in the ‘natural’ fact of a community, held together, not by the will of its members nor by any obligations of contract, but by traditional ties of kinship and status. German nationalism substituted for the legal and rational concept of ‘citizenship’ the infinitely vaguer concept of ‘folk’, which, first discovered by the German humanists, was later fully developed by Herder and the German romanticists

(Kohn 1945: 329 - 331)

In fact, Kohn’s descriptions of ethnic nationalism as being ‘backward’ and ‘natural’ hint that there is something in these nationalist movements that stem from perceived historical attachments perfected in some future utopia. In other words, ethnic nationalisms are typically built on ideas of myths of common ancestry and thus, seek to ‘establish the authentic continuity of their community by proclaiming visions of common destiny located in the future’ (Brown 1999: 283).

This belief in a mythic past, found in each of my three case studies to varying degrees (see Chapters Six and Seven), is typical of ‘new’ states which Geertz credits as being abnormally susceptible to perceiving the ‘congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on [...] as having] an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves’ (1963: 109). Thus, ethnic nationalist movements
tend to portray the individual as intrinsically bound to other members of the nation not through individual choice or need, ‘but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself’ (Geertz 1963: 110).

Mann takes the idea of ethnic nationalism one step farther when addressing nationalism resulting in ethnic conflict. Using the term ‘organic nationalism’, Mann describes this type of nationalism as being one where the nation is represented by one political movement with a professed belief in ‘an enduring national character... distinguishable from other nations’ which would thus give them the right to exclude minorities who ‘would only weaken the nation’. These beliefs are expressed through the political platform of the nationalist group, reflected in their ideology and resonate predominantly in Europe where the relationship of ethnicity-to-state was disputed (Mann 2004: 34, 84).

Mann’s perspective here is critical because it places the role of ideology into modern nationalist discourse. Nationalism as an ideology makes a key difference to the ‘quality and content of nations’(Smith 2003: 360). Nationalist ideology deals directly with the relationship between state and society, synchronising the relationship between state and ethnie, tying the utopian idea of the ancestral homeland with modern policy and political power (Breuilly 1994: 112; Smith 2001: 19). Claire Sutherland points out that ideology is a particularly useful concept to use in analysing both civic and ethnic nationalism because of this relationship, combining principle and practise (2005: 188).

This dovetails with Fred Halliday’s argument that nationalist movements inherently follow a moral agenda centred around state authority. This authority is manifested over the individual which manifests itself through seven different tenets, five of which are contingent upon the foundation of any nationalist movement, two of which are less foundational but are common nonetheless (Halliday 2000: 163 - 164). The first five of these tenets include: 1) all individuals belong to a nation; 2) all individuals of a nation owe primary loyalty to the nation to which they adhere and
thus, 3) commands the loyalty of all others within the nation; 4) nationalism ‘allows’ nothing, neither individual nor state, to infringe upon its authority in the name of any other sub-groups present within the nation; 5) it is impossible for any individual to attain ‘freedom and self-realisation if they are deemed...to belong to a group into which they are born’ (2000: 164). These precepts being true, says Halliday, one can then infer that the following two statements are also true of nationalism: 1) one’s nation is superior to others’ nations and 2) that too much influence from the greater world poses a determined threat to the nation (2000: 165 - 167).

The primary problem with this approach is Halliday’s lack of subscription to the nuanced but vital difference between nation and ethnic group, a distinction made by the ethnosymbolists above. This balance between ethnicity, nation and state creeps up numerous times throughout any discussion of nationalist literature and is particularly important for establishing the link between nationalism and genocide as we will see more clearly in Chapter Five. I cannot disregard the vital importance ‘the political’ plays in modern genocide in which elites become political power brokers and cultural symbols become rallying points for discrimination, exclusion, partition and death. The critical point to remember here is that while nationalism can be separate from violent patriotism, in the genocidal cases presented such separation does not occur. There is a direct link between the state and the genocide. While this point may seem to be obvious in light of the discussion above, it does limit the breadth of nationalism and genocide; these genocidal nationalisms require the state and are therefore inherently modern in nature.

Thus, we see that this dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalisms has presented itself consistently throughout nationalism scholarship. However, some scholars note that the delineation between these categories may not be as extreme as can be perceived. Both Brown (1998; 1999) and Brubaker (1996; 2004) serve as representatives of a growing number of nationalism scholars who note that this dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism is problematic and is an overly simplistic explanation of a complex relationship between nation and state.
Nonetheless, as regards the position of my work within the nationalist discourse, some acknowledged difference is helpful.

First, as we will see throughout the course of this project, the type of nationalism which radicalises to genocide does tend to be based on ethnic division, which then allows for the definition of both nation and other-groups. Similarly, attachment to the homeland and the ‘ethnic’ homeland mentality is not based on current state lines, but is instead based around historical, often changeable, claims as seen particularly in Chapter Eight. This is where the majority of nationalism scholars place work on genocide studies; equally, most genocide scholars borrow from the principles of ethnic nationalism when describing the radicalisation process of genocidal states.

However, it is important not to forget the civic elements of radicalising states. For instance, as we see in Chapter Seven, though these states become increasingly exclusionist, members of the nation are ideologically encouraged to engage highly in civil society, participating in civic groups, performing community service, supporting the national political system, etc. These elements of exclusionary civicness hearken back to Arendt’s perspective on the modernity of genocide as reliant on bureaucracy and Goldhagen’s theories of ‘ordinary’ participation in genocidal goals (Arendt 1958; Goldhagen 1996).

Unfortunately, while there are many other scholars of nationalism whose work has been highly influential to shaping this field of study, few of their theories stand up to the types of nationalism found in genocidal states. For instance, Gellner, considered by some to be the father of nationalism studies, suggests that conflict evolves out of uneven growth within societies; friction is caused by the shifting dynamic between varying sectors of society and the division of labour (1983: 11 - 15, 24). However, twentieth-century genocide has occurred outside of industrialisation. It was not industrialisation which caused the Turks to attempt the destruction of Armenians, but

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7 with varying degrees of otherness depending on case. I discuss this further in Chapters Five and Six.
a finely tuned, shifting ideology paired with a dynamic and unstable geopolitical atmosphere.

Similarly, Tom Nairn presents the nation as a circle at whose core is intelligentsia and elites and whose periphery is compiled of peasants reticently on their way to modernity, looking ‘backwards as much as forwards, and pass from the remembrance to the often elaborate reinvention of the worlds they have lost’ (1997: 91; see also Nairn 1994). However, if this were true in the cases of genocide presented, one could argue that the Holocaust should have occurred before the First World War instead of during the Second and that ethnic cleansing in the Balkan peninsula was more likely to occur during the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century. Thus, based on the literature, a highly state-centric ethnosymbolism is where we find the theoretical foundation for the remainder of the literature in this project as it relates to genocide and ideology more generally and to each of my cases specifically.

**From Nationalism to Genocide**

As established in the earlier sections of this thesis, the focus of this research is on states in transition from nationalism to genocidal nationalism. Tracing this type of change places me within a dynamic, young and growing field of scholarship that attempts to explain why nationalism is so easily linked with conflict. Many nationalist movements exist and thrive without taking up arms against an ethnic enemy. Nonetheless, while every nationalist conflict is not genocidal, every case of genocide studied in this work is linked to a case of nationalism. This is a critical link, not only because it opens up the vast literature discussed above and provides theoretical framing for this project, but more importantly it suggests that key themes

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in cases of ethnic nationalism will also be critical to any study of cases of genocidal nationalism, including the three cases presented here. Thus, if assumed kinship, homeland, distinct awareness of otherness, religion, language and cultural markers are all important in cases of nationalism, then they will remain important themes in cases of genocidal nationalism. The link between nationalism and genocide, revisited later in this chapter, also gives us cause to look again at the literature to see which other scholars have attempted to explain the links between the two.

As regards the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, Jack Snyder’s work stands out. In *From Voting to Violence*, he asserts that democratization is the recurring factor in cases where ethnic violence occurs. When a state lacks a democratising populace, Snyder argues, it also lacks a strong nationalist movement. As democratic ideas grow in popularity, elites establish a stronger element of nationalist rhetoric in their ideology in order to elicit power from the masses (Snyder 2000: 32). Unrest also gives the majority bureaucratic control over minority factions through governmental power (Snyder 2000: 27 - 33). Snyder’s other strength is his definition of nationalism, which describes nationalism as being ‘the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics’ (2000: 23). Thus, in nationalist movements where geographical boundaries already exist, nationalist ideals can be applied in order to result in the ‘purification’ or ‘true establishment’ of a state system controlled by a particular ethnic group. The benefit of this definition is that, like Weber’s, it allows for the importance of history, symbols, et cetera championed by ethnosymbolists without ignoring Heywood’s *national chauvinism* where nationalist movements purposefully incorporate ideologies of ethnic superiority into their policies (Heywood 1992: 156 - 157)

Though these are admirable strengths and Snyder’s work on the whole offers much insight into the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, his work is not without flaws. What Snyder fails to point out is that, while transitional democracies
are often involved in conflict, a genocidal democracy has yet to be established. None of my three cases are cases of democracy – instead, they are cases where democratic rhetoric was used in order for elites to establish legitimacy and was then discarded in favour of a type of government ensuring continued power would remain in the hands of the nation. A more appropriate accounting for the relationship between democracy and nationalism is found in Mark Mazower's work. He reminds his readers that though democracy is not necessarily ethnic, in Europe, the shift to democracy occurred with the goal to create national states. This was, in turn, inherently dangerous for minorities and transnational people-groups like the Ukrainians and the Jews (Mazower 1999: 53 - 60). Nonetheless, this only moderately clarifies the relationship between nationalism and genocide. In order to find an appropriate means of deciphering the conundrums of this relationship, we must turn to another scholar who attempts to answer a very similar question.

Due to the breadth and depth of the body of his work, one could safely say that Michael Mann is one of today's foremost scholars of historical sociology; his recent work, including The Dark Side of Democracy (2005) and Fascists (2004) places his work firmly within the remit of genocide scholarship. In one of his first and broadest works, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I identifies four sources of power, ideological, economic, military and political (IEMP), identified as ‘overlapping networks of social interactions’ (Mann 1986: 2). Originally conceived as three volumes, this book and The Sources of Social Power, Volume II, trace the growth and shifts of these four networks until the beginning of the First World War. He posits here that ‘political power means state power’ (Mann 1993: 9; see also 2001: 235), an idea that supporting the fact that the role of the state and political ideology in genocide is so strong that genocide is often excused to the international community as an ‘act of state’ in which any intervention is an infringement of state sovereignty (par in parem imperium non habet); the people involved in the implementation of this ideology are, by the laws of the state, required to obey and are thereby released from personal obligation to consequences (Arendt 2002 [1963]: 91). Helen Fein finds that virtually ‘everyone acknowledges that genocide is primarily a crime of
[the] state' because bureaucracy established the state as the modern power source and continues to encourage the growth of national states (Fein 2002 [1993]: 79; Mann 1993: 445, 734; see also Bauman 2002 [1989]: 111). This is supported by Mann's work, particularly the findings in Volume II, in which he discusses the West's rise to modernity in light of the IEMP model.

While this might, at first, seem an interesting approach to studying the genocidal events of the twentieth century, Mann changes tactics with *Dark Side of Democracy* in order to attempt to explain why people become perpetrators of 'murderous ethnic cleansing'. His analysis is based around eight points: 1) that murderous cleansing is modern because the rise of democracy pits the *demos* against the *ethnos*; 2) that ethnic tension occurs when ethnicity trumps class as the primary form of social categorisation; 3) that seemingly legitimate homeland claims are made by multiple ethnic groups; 4) that ethnic cleansing occurs when ethnic states believe that either help with come from outside allies or that their own military power is dominant enough to cause little moral risk to itself; 5) that murderous cleansing occurs in factionalised and radicalised states which often leads to war; 6) that murderous ethnic cleansing is rarely the initial intent of the perpetrators; 7) that radical elites, bands of militants and core constituencies are the three main levels of perpetrator; and 8) that normal social institutions bring ordinary people to murderous ethnic cleansing (Mann 2005: 2-10).

These eight points are founded on Mann's assertion that these radicalising nationalisms are based in something he terms *organic* nationalism. In an organic nationalist movement, the nation would be represented by one political movement with a professed belief in 'an enduring national character...distinguishable from other nations' which would thus give them the right to exclude minorities who 'would only weaken the nation'. These beliefs would be expressed through the political platform of the nationalist group and resonated predominantly in Europe where the relationship of ethnicity to state was disputed (Mann 2004: 34, 84). To better explain the possible outcomes of violence emerging from this type of
nationalism, Mann went on to explain that when 'compromising or repressive state institutions collapse, or when borders shift or geopolitical balance ends, escalation towards murderous cleansing is most likely. War itself is the most serious escalator. It normalises and legitimises killing' (2001: 237). In support of this point, Mann categorises types of violence and cleansing as seen in Table One:

**Table 3.1: The extent of cleansing and violence in inter-group relations**

(Mann 2001: 210; 2005: 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent of Violence</th>
<th>Extent of Cleansing</th>
<th>B: Partial</th>
<th>C: Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| None               | 1. Multi-culturalism and toleration  
2. Consociational and confederalism | Partial abandoning of identity e.g. through voluntary official language adoption | Voluntary assimilation |
| Institutional coercion | Discrimination | 1. Official language restrictions  
2. Segregation | Cultural suppression |
| Policed Repression | Policed repression of protesters | 1. Policed partial suppression of out-group language and culture  
2. Policed out-group settlement and displacement | 1. Policed total suppression of language and culture  
2. Population exchanges  
3. Policed deportations and pressured emigration |
| Violent Repression | Policed violence | 1. 'Pogroms', communal riots, some forms of rape  
2. Violent settlement and displacement | 1. Violent deportations and pressured emigration  
2. Biological: sterilization, forced marriage, some forms of rape |
| Unpremeditated mass deaths | 'Mistaken' war, civil war and revolutionary crisis policies | 'Callous' war, civil war and revolutionary crisis policies | Ethnocide |
| Premeditated mass killing | Exemplary and civil war repression, systematic reprisals | 1. Forced conversion  
2. Politicide  
3. Classicide | Genocide |

Darker shading indicates the core of the zone of murderous cleansing; lighter shading indicates a borderline zone in which it may occasionally occur.

As the majority of Mann’s work is founded in this table, brief analysis of its contents, particularly in the darker highlighted areas, is helpful. The first thing that comes to
notice is the two types of categorical progression presented in this table, progressive violence and progressive cleansing. While I support the idea that there is a progression to cleansing and also to violence, it would be easy to suppose that Mann has gone too far in these clear-cut categorical assumptions, particularly regarding the differentiation between policed repression and violent repression, as if policed repression is not often quite violent indeed. However, Mann himself notes that these two types are ‘rather unstable’ as ‘further violence does typically break out amid such practices…Nonetheless, the policies discussed so far try to keep violence under disciplined control to achieve specific, limited goals. This normally involves the state’ (2001: 213). Similarly, the three categories regarding the progression of cleansing can be easily mistaken. Realistically, all three of these categories could be termed as ‘partial’ and not merely the middle category. Consociational states can have short-term policies of cultural suppression, discrimination or segregation just as none of even the most extreme cases of genocide were completely successful in eliminating each and every one from their target populations.

Thus, let us turn our attention to more specific quandaries presented in this categorisation, particularly Mann’s final three categories of forced conversion/politicide/classicide, ethnocide and genocide. To begin, it must first be said that segregating these types of killing from genocide as separate categories is highly contentious. Though, thanks to a strong argument by the Soviet delegation prior to the signing of the document (Shaw 2003: 34 - 35), the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (also called the Genocide Convention) does indeed omit classes and political groups, many genocide scholars have made conscious decisions to include both groups into their definitions, arguing that the loss of life and detriment to humanity necessitates the recognition of these atrocities as genocide (Nersessian 2007; Staub 2000, 1989; Shaw 2007, 2003; Charny 1999, 1988; Wood 2001). And here begins the discussion necessary in almost all critical pieces of genocidal scholarship – the problem of definition.
In the academy of social and political research, it is nigh impossible to avoid defining the terms of key words, theories, trends and socio-political phenomenon. Most of the time, while this can lead to certain quantitative or qualitative problems in research, this type of definition help establish the parameters of a project and help the reader understand the platform from which the author is speaking. To talk about genocide is first to discuss it in the greater context of violence, as Mann does above and as other scholars such as Bloxham (2008; 2009a; 2009b) do throughout their work.

There are, of course, many different types of violence. In his *Nazi Party and Its Violence against the Jews*, Nolzen outlines violence as not merely physical violence, but any type of persecution at all – including riots, boycotts and exclusion from cultural events. Nolzen’s terminology is based off of Popitz, who defines violence as actions that are physically harmful, that cause economic damage and that ‘lead to a decreased social participation’ (in Nolzen 2002: 248). This type of language is inherently problematic as it projects the image 1) that there was something singular about the exclusion of the Jews in the early days of the Nazi regime, 2) that all violence is equal and 3) that does not allow for the reader to discern the change and the radicalisation of violence. For instance, he posits that ‘from 1936/37, there was not longer any difference between harming Jews physically and the ‘legal’ destruction of Jewish businesses’ (2002: 264) as if the shift between the destruction of objects and the destruction of humans occurred naturally and suddenly and not as part of a process of radicalisation that had been taking place for years before 1936.

For the purpose of this analysis, however, violence is used to indicate only the first of Popitz’s three points – personal individual physical harm – as this aspect of violence is the lynch pin at the very heart of genocide.

Defining genocide, however, is not so simple. The problem is greatly exacerbated by the legal and moral imperatives entailed upon the definition itself. The key role of the Genocide Convention, passed in 1948, was to ensure that in the event of genocide occuring again, states would be bound by international law to intervene on behalf of the persecuted ethnie (UN Convention 2002 [1948]; Shaw 2003: 34 - 35). However,
the Convention’s definition itself is highly contentious and quite vague in parts. The critical section offering its definition of genocide is Article II which reads:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

a) killing members of the group;

b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’

d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

e) Forcibly transferring children on the group to another group

Article III follows, augmenting the already indistinct language of Article II, suggesting the punishable crimes include not only genocide, but also conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempting to commit genocide and complicity in genocide (UN Convention 2002 [1948]). It is Article I that holds the 142 signatories of the Convention, reading that ‘the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish’ (2002 [1948] emphasis mine); it is this article, perhaps more than any other, which causes debate for non-genocidal states regarding the definition of genocide.

Contention transpires because, according to this document, when genocide occurs, a moral imperative is placed upon states who are otherwise non-participatory, incurring action and sacrifice of individual security, financial obligation, time commitment and military commitment. Thus, states have a reason to use the vague nature of Article II so as to find that genocide is not occurring and that they are thus relieved from their legal and moral obligation to intervene (for examples see Holbrooke 1999; Neuffer 2001; Power 2002; Gourevitch 1998). Generally, states tend to use the most narrow definition of genocide and apply it to only the most
extreme cases; if a case of ethnic conflict is not comparable to the Holocaust, then politicians are ‘excused’ from taking action (Shaw 2003: 35).

Scholars, however, are not limited by such realist restraints. One would then expect to find wider parameters, greater variance and a large quantity of opinions. In truth, there are almost as many definitions of genocide as there are scholars of genocide; some, however, are more noteworthy than others and this synopsis attempts to analyse only a few of the more critical definitions. Most reviews of the literature attempt to ‘start at the very beginning’, introducing the term as envisioned by Raphael Lemkin and go from there. Indeed, Lemkin’s creation of and definition of the term genocide, written in response to his own personal horrors and experiences of the Holocaust and his determination for there to be legal ramifications as a consequence of this ‘crime of crimes,’ serves as the basis for Article II of the Genocide Convention. From the Greek geno, meaning ‘tribe’, and the Latin –cide, from caedere, meaning ‘killing,’ Lemkin established a term that could describe ‘the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group...[Genocide] is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves’ (Lemkin 2002 [1944]: 27).

There are some critical points of note about Lemkin’s definition of his laudable term to discuss before moving on to others’ definitions. Firstly, one must keep in mind that when Lemkin was defining genocide, it was in a time where state sovereignty was even more paramount than into today’s climate, where genocide was a crime of the state against the citizens of another state. Guerrilla movements and non-state actors were not inherent players in Lemkin’s definition; neither were instances where a state would seek to destroy members of their own citizenry residing only within the bounds of their state (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 9). Of course, as established above in the discussion on nationalism, the state is critical to genocide. Perhaps no scholar has made that clearer than Louis Rene Beres when he avers that ‘the state is now a providence of which everything is accepted and nothing expected...A sanctified
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killer, the state that accepts genocide generates an incessant search for the products of disassimilation: castoffs, minorities, the wretched. Though mired in blood, the search in tranquil and self-assured, born of the knowledge that its deeds are neither infamous nor shameful, but heroic’ (1985: 396, 398).

This leads us to another point in Lemkin’s understanding of genocide: he envisioned it as being able to take place in a variety of different political climates and through various different ways, not only gas chambers, but also through deportation or starvation – in short, any possible way to ensure the eradication of Beres’ ‘products of disassimilation’. For Lemkin, genocide ‘was a comprehensive concept of the social destruction of national groups’ (Shaw 2007: 21; see also Levene 2005: 43). Samantha Power claims that Lemkin believed the acceptance of the term meant an acceptance of responsibility for the term, that since there was recognition of the formalisation of vocabulary, states would equally embrace the moral condemnation adhering to the definition (2002: 45). Unfortunately, even in light of the above-mentioned Genocide Convention, this has not been the case as states will sometimes spend precious time squabbling over determining whether or not something fits the Convention’s definition of genocide rather than taking action to hinder aggression (see Carroll 2004).

Scholars as well have sometimes fallen into the same trap; their rationale, however, has little to do with resources and international power but instead with their general recognition of the weaknesses of the Genocide Convention and the limitations of Lemkin’s original definition. For instance, Helen Fein’s earliest definition of genocide is ‘the calculated murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside the universe of the perpetrator, by a government, elite, staff or crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused by or impeded by the victim’ (in Levene 2005: 78). A laudable definition, but, as Mark Levene points out, Fein baulks at noting a direct relationship with the state and has an unclear idea of the nature of ‘group’. Melson’s definition, ‘a kind of massacre which seeks physically to eliminate or extirpate a communal group from the social
structure’ (Melson 1982: 483) shows similar flaws. Certain aspects of these definitions are filled by Chalk and Jonassohn who have been defining genocide as a ‘form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator’ (1990: 23) for more than twenty years. They make particular note of the state, but do allow for the influence of non-state actors. The key contribution in both of these definitions is the recognition that it is the perpetrator who defines the group and not the victim. However, even Chalk and Jonassohn struggle to avoid the problem of ‘group’.

Levene does well in discussing this weakness, present in far more definitions than those two noted above. The problem lies inherent in Lemkin’s choice of using geno- as his Latin premise; the term ‘tribe’ indicates socio-biological ties between members (Levene 2005: 78 - 79), something echoing the perennialist debate discussed above. However, as we have already seen, such biological ties are not frequently seen in cases of nationalism and thus are equally rare in cases of genocide. Thus, scholars and judiciaries alike have struggled with determining the remits of ‘group-ness’; even the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) struggled with this distinction, as ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were not terms easily categorised into national, ethnic or racial groups accepted under the Convention. The eventual decision was to allow for ‘emic distinctions’ thus allowing prosecution to go forth (Hinton 2002: 5).

Levene himself hesitates to give a clear and distinct definition for genocide in Volume One of his Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, though he does describe the common attributes of genocide which include control of the state and with the logistics and resources to undertake ‘direct physical extermination’ on occasions with minimal interference from without, a heightened sense of threat and victimisation on the side of the perpetrator, a prolonged sequence of killing over time, pursued regardless of age or gender, the employment of ‘state-organised’

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9 Nor is Chalk and Jonassohn’s definition flawless. For further debates see Fein (2002 [1993]: 80 -
military and paramilitary force to carry out the majority of the killings, the inability of the persecuted group to noticeably defend themselves and, finally, that ‘the targeted group is the product of the perpetrator’s assemblage of social reality’ (Levene 2005: 76 - 77, 88).

These attributes are generally lauded by, amongst others, Martin Shaw; however, Shaw criticises Levene and others very harshly against their more limited approach to defining the term genocide. His two recent books, War and Genocide (2003) and particularly What is Genocide? (2007), provide scholars with the most recent in-depth historiography of modern genocide. Though restricted by a self-noted lack of case studies, Shaw reviews the work of almost all key authors in the field who write from a more sociological perspective and does so succinctly – an impressive feat considering the width and breadth of genocidal literature thus far. At the end of What is Genocide?, Shaw provides us with his own definition of genocide which attempts to incorporate what he calls the ‘missing concept’: the nature of the relationship between the civilian and non-civilian actor in genocidal states (Shaw 2007: 113 - 130). The definition he offers finds that genocide is ‘a form of violent social conflict, or war, between armed power organisations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction’ (2007: 154).

Though I contend that Shaw fulfils his goal of classifying the victim group as a civilian social group, there are other scholars who would contend that victim groups can also be combatants, at least on a minor scale, or had, at one time, been combatants (Dadrian 2004; Lampe 1996; Mirkovic 1996; Suny 1996). However, though this is a critical issue now open for further debate, it is not of utmost importance to my particular argument. Shaw’s work serves as representative for a large group of scholars, who, unlike Fein, Levene, Weitz, Mann and, to a lesser extent, Chalk and Jonassohn, argue strongly that the first step to reforming the term

'genocide' is to extend it. Scholars have yet to agree on how far this extension needs to go, but it is a key trend in theoretical genocidal scholarship. Academics of this field include not only Shaw, but also Benjamin Valentino (2004) and Leo Kuper (1981).

The problem with this approach is that a wider definition of genocide is ineffective at both academic and policy levels. In order to watch for markers of genocide, to attempt to implement policies at the earliest stages of genocide, there has to be a definitive understanding of what that actually is. Genocide occurs for different reasons than politicide or classicide; it looks different on the ground and the markers leading up to the killings, at some level, vary. When a people group is killed because of ethnicity or race, the rationale behind the killings is a different one than if a people group is killed because of their political affiliation or their class or their religion. This is, as I will discuss later in greater detail, mostly because these other non-ethnic categories are changeable. While it is possible to change your political affiliation, it is impossible to change your blood.

The reason why scholars are so quick to demand expansion of the term genocide, and why Shaw has berated Mann’s choice to segregate these terms from one another in Table One, is based in a moral belief that mass killing of this nature deserves equal consequence, retribution and justice with genocide. This is a belief that I share. But the problem here is not with the definition of genocide *per se*, though I do support changes in the Convention’s definition, but with the judicial weight Lemkin’s definition and the Genocide Convention give to genocide that is lacking in other cases of mass killing. Instead of attempting to change international law, as Lemkin did, most scholars have attempted to morph genocide into something it was never

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10 Though, of course, religion has played a large part in the three cases of genocide I present, it is only here ever a secondary actor to ethnicity – which will be made clear in the upcoming chapters. For more information on mass killing based primarily on religious affiliation see Fox (2004a; 2004b), Levine (1986) and Frisch and Sandler (2004).
intended to be – a phrase to cover all levels of mass killing anywhere in the world at any time. This is a critical problem in the literature of genocide studies.

This being the case, I use a restrictive definition of genocide, not out of a choice to exclude any group from the justice their suffering has earned them, but instead because examples of mass killing that fit this definition have similarities and differences of particular import separate from examples of mass killing that do not fit within its remit. The definition I use is loosely based on a later definition of genocide offered by Fein (2002 [1993]), though I have changed some elements in order to include vital points established in others’ definitions. I define genocide thus: the premeditated, intentional action by a nation with control of the institutions of the state to physically destroy a perpetrator-defined ethnic group, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.

Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide and Nationalism

In order to positively answer the questions posed in Chapter One, it is important to clarify that of the three cases of genocide I have selected for this project, two are cases of total genocide, while my Yugoslav case is more complex (see Scherrer 2003: 74 - 75). It has elements of genocide, but is widely acknowledged as a case of ethnic conflict. However, as I show in Chapter Four and in upcoming chapters, there are events which are explicitly genocidal, conforming exactly to the definition above. This is a very interesting and helpful case when attempting to identify the key ideological shifts occurring during the process of radicalisation towards genocide. Many scholars make aggressive arguments that genocide and ethnic conflict are, in fact, the same thing. However, particularly since so much of my primary literature is based in international law and legally there is an important distinction between the two occurrences, I do discriminate between the two terms.

In this case, the United Nations provides the definition of ethnic cleansing I use throughout this thesis; it reads that ethnic cleansing can be defined as 'rendering an
area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group' (S/1994/555 1994). The focus here is on the physical displacement or removal of an ethnic group, rather than on intentional killing. This then allows Article II to focus on what they term the intentional physical destruction of the group, rather than muddying anti-genocidal policy with other types of conflict (Schabas 2008).

By this definition, most cases of genocide would be considered acts of ethnic cleansing. Genocide is, in fact, a subsidiary of ethnic cleansing as successful cases of genocide do indeed ‘remove from a given area persons of another ethnic group’. However, ethnic cleansing need not be genocidal; the key difference is in the intentionality of the killing. By allowing the pure definition of ethnic cleansing to stand, no one necessarily needs to be killed in order for ethnic cleansing to be carried out effectively. Though disastrously high numbers of people do generally die as a result of forced migration, these deaths are the by-product of ethnic displacement rather than the direct intent of that policy.

In order to commit genocide, however, intention to destroy a national group by putting them to death is necessary. The by-product of genocide, then, is often an ethnically homogenous, or predominantly homogenous, region. Thus, though cases of genocide are almost always cases of ethnic cleansing, ethnic cleansing need not necessarily be genocidal. My three case studies allow us to assess the difference between the ideology of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and the ideology of total genocide in Turkey and Germany. Chapters Five and Six particularly illuminate key differences in this area, when discussing the role of the anti-nation in the process of radicalisation. This difference allows me to identify the ideological themes unique to the development of a genocidal ideology.

Let me be clear: I do not perceive of ethnic cleansing as being a ‘lesser’ crime than genocide. Just as I believe classicide, ethnocide and gendercide to be heinous and vile, I believe ethnic cleansing and genocide to be equally so. I believe the moral
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consequences of all of these crimes should be prosecuted with equal fervour; however, from an academic and a policy perspective, it is necessary to acknowledge and understand the differences between these crimes. Though the number of deaths resulting from these events can be and are historically similar, it is critical to acknowledge that the rationale initiating such persecutions can differ. It is possible that they will have a different radicalisation process from that presented here and, thus, the way-markers, intervention strategies and post-conflict reconstruction policies should differ. Nonetheless, this research project is attempting to identify a particular pattern of ideological radicalisation towards genocide by looking at two cases of total genocide in Turkey and Germany and one case of ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes as seen in my Yugoslav case and I must leave other radicalisation processes to other scholars.

Within this context, further discussion relating to the relationship between genocide and nationalism is also possible. There are substantial overlaps between the two movements; in fact, as I suggested earlier in this chapter, each case presented in this study involves a case of nationalism. However, nationalism and genocide are not the same thing and only rarely occur concurrently. Unlike the subsidiary relationship between ethnic cleansing and genocide, genocide is not a sub-type of nationalism.

Nationalism is a social movement whose purpose is to attain legitimacy for a national group through gaining control of or within the political machinations of the state. Genocide, as described above, is intentional action by a nation with control of the institutions of the state to physically destroy a perpetrator-defined ethnic group. Thus, we see that the persecutor group has already established political legitimacy. Equally, there is already a substantial amount of political power claimed by perpetrator elites as they have control of state institutions. In short, in my cases of genocide and, to a large extent, in my case of ethnic cleansing, nationalist goals have been greatly achieved before genocide occurs. Extreme national sentiment, identification and fear of the anti-nation and expansive homeland claims are not
necessarily nationalism but are certainly prevalent in genocidal ideology as I clearly show in the upcoming chapters. Before going directly on to this analysis, it is helpful to have a better understanding of the secondary literature in each of my three cases.

**Germany**

Literature on WWII and the Holocaust dwarfs literature on almost any other subject in modern history. A chronicled assessment of the entire body of this literature in all the various languages research is being carried out in is a nigh impossible task and one clearly outside the bounds of this project. Nonetheless, there are some critical themes and varying approaches in the literature generally that that are key when approaching any historiography of the Holocaust.

To start, there is a general split among scholars of the Holocaust, between what Moses terms ideological-intentionalists and structural-functionalists (1998: 199 - 209). Intentionalists tend to focus on the role of leaders and parties in genocidal states, that without Hitler and his strong anti-Semitic rhetoric the Holocaust would never had occurred (Gellately and Kiernan 2003: 10 - 12; Kershaw 1989: 69; Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 64, 67). It is Ian Kershaw, who perhaps describes the ideological/intentionalist stance best, saying that, very roughly, for a intentionalist ‘the reason why the Jews of Europe were murdered in their millions was because Hitler, the dictator of Germany, wanted it – and had done since he entered politics over two decades earlier’ (1989: 85). At the helm of the most ardent intentionalists is Daniel Goldhagen. His dynamic and debatable work, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* (1996), claims that Germany had, even before the Nazis came to power, a strong ideology of what Ian Waller calls eliminationist antisemitism, which Goldhagen argues is different from any other kind of anti-Semitic ideology (Goldhagen 1996: 80 - 83, 444; see also Waller 2002: 37). Goldhagen argues that ‘ideas about Jews ... were pervasive in Germany, and had been for decades, induced ordinary Germans to kill unarmed, defenceless Jewish men, women and children by the thousands, systematically and without pity’ (Goldhagen 1996: 9). In short, it was
the hatefulness of a pervasive ideology accepted by a general populace that lead directly to the Holocaust. Goldhagen, though his work is sometimes considered revisionist and is quite contentious (Gregor 2003; Wehler 1997; Aschheim 1997), is far from alone in his acceptance of an intentional foundation and is joined by the work of such other noted scholars as Edward Kissi (2003), Barraclough (in Moses 1998), Lucy Dawidowicz (1975; 1981), Wolfgang Benz (Benz 1995, 1999; Benz and Dunlap 2006) and Raul Hilberg (1961).

Intentionalists tend to focus on the role of the Nazi state outside of the context of the Great War, by which I mean that instead of focusing on the events of an international war and on the greater geopolitical atmosphere, intentionalists, particularly the ones noted above, focus on the way the Nazi state interacted with their own anti-Semitic policies, the top-down influence of media and in-depth studies of role of particular Nazis, not only Hitler (Roberts 2001; Kershaw 1987, 1991, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2008; Heiden 1980; Manvell and Fraenkel 1978; Sigmund 2006), but also such key figures as Goebbels (Moeller 2000; Hachmeister and Kloth 2005; Michels 1992; Héuver 1992; Barth 1999), Goering (Over 1984; Gritzbach 1973; Butler and Young 1989; Mosley 1974), Himmler (Breitman 1991; Ackermann and Himmler 1970; Manvell and Fraenkel 1965) and Streicher (Bytw 1983; Ehlers 1976) just to name a few. In intentionalist writings, as Moses suggests, it is that action follows intent, as intent clearly laid out for all to see very early in the process (Moses 1998: 201).

The scholarly achievements of intentionalists are numerous; it is they who have given us insights into the personal and political lives of key Nazis (see above biographies), how the Nazi state worked (Stachura 1978; Mitchell 1988; Aly 2007) and, in particular, how the personal ideas and convictions influenced policy over the course of their time in power (Bankier 1988; Ryback 2008; Kershaw 2008). Kershaw perhaps describes it best: ‘That the quest for Lebensraum and the extermination of the Jews, far from remaining the wild ravings of a lunatic-fringe beer-hall rabble-rousers, became horrific reality and were implemented as government policy by a regime led by Hitler, seems to point conclusively to the validity of the ‘intentionalist’
argument” (Kershaw 1989: 69). However, this type of analysis leaves certain aspects of the Holocaust unexplained, in particular the role of the masses in the implementation of the Holocaust. Intentionalists also tend to struggle when historical documents tend to express anything other than the implementation of genocidal policy; for instance, the fact that both the RSHA and Hitler were advocates of bringing Jews back into Germany to increase the amount of slave labour is often overlooked as it does not sit comfortably with the ideology at the time (Browning and Matthäus 2004; Bloxham 2001: 172, 178) or Hitler’s decision to reduce the power and influence of the more radical elements of the SA in 1934 (Mommsen 2003a: 26). There also tends to be a trend in intentionalist work to overlook the intentional murder of millions ‘others’ not classified as Jewish (Waller 2002: 45). Finally, too often, the intentionalists tend to focus overmuch on the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust, an emphasis occurring, as Bloxham and Kushner remind us, in the late nineteen sixties and seventies (Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 67 - 74).

There is a second category of Holocaust scholars whose work offers another position, that of the structural-functionalists. While the intentionalists tend the view the Holocaust as the fulfilment of goals established in the earliest expressions of party platform and ideology, the structural-functionalist approach attempts to explain changes that happened enabling these goals to be fulfilled; their work tends to focus on the structure of Nazi rule, the particular nature of policy choices and the tendency to shift focus from the intentionalists’ emphasis on Hitler’s role, both in shaping policy and in Holocaust historiography itself (Kershaw 1989: 65; Lee 2003: 247). Key functionalists are Raul Hilberg (1961), Hans Mommsen (2001; 2003a; 2009) and Martin Broszat (1987; 1989).

Let me be clear, it is not that structural-functionalists ignore or dispute the importance and roles of the figures in power, but that they tend to view them as propagandists, rather than leaders with a clear and definite plan of action established before or during the earliest years of Nazi political power. Mommsen, for instance, describes the Nazi regime of 1943 and its leaders as weak, uncoordinated and
rudimentary (2003b: 111) but never dismisses the importance of the symbol they represented for the German people and, in particular, the German war effort. Similarly, Hilberg introduced the ever-popular focus on the bureaucratic nature of the Holocaust (1961), supported later by Arendt’s thesis on the ‘banality’ of the Holocaust (2002 [1963]). Christian Gerlach suggests that Arendt’s work portrayed Eichmann as a ‘diligent bureaucrat, an administrator who did his job unaware that he was a participant in a crime, who had not hated those whose death he facilitated’ (2001: 438). It is this trend of emotional disassociation that is most pervasive in functionalist work; the portrayal of the German populace and perpetrator as one moved by non-ideological goals who would fit into Mann’s suggested categories of bureaucratic killers, materialist killers and careerist killers (2005: 28, 29).

Out of the work offered by these scholars, Mommsen’s theory of cumulative radicalisation emerges as particularly interesting in light of the discussion in Chapter Two on path dependency and the sequential processes of evolution. Mommsen strongly refutes the intentionalist claim that there was an overarching intention based on Hitler’s early writings or his directives while in power. Instead, the genocide was a development of sometimes spontaneous, sometimes erratic bureaucratic initiatives (1983: 399, 412 - 415) and stipulates that the basic premise of cumulative radicalisation is the Holocaust as the end-point of a long-term process of slowly changing institutions and events which ended in genocide (Mommsen 1976).

Bloxham and Kushner further refine the term, encouraging their readers to ‘think of it as describing the momentum built up in a partly self-selecting, partly self-driven Jewish policy underpinned by a general racist consensus…’ (2008: 137). Though some scholars have applied the theory of cumulative radicalisation to their work (Bloxham 2003; Kallis 2000; Hay 1999; Levene 2005) and though Kershaw notes that ideology is being increasingly seen as a key element in the process of cumulative radicalisation (2000: 264), there has yet been a comparative model expanding the idea of cumulative radicalisation to ideology in genocidal states. By evaluating Mahoney’s theory of path dependency through three cases of genocidal progression, this analysis will be able to fill that gap.
Let me be clear: unlike path dependency, I do not perceive Mommsen’s idea of cumulative radicalisation as a theory in need of testing. In fact, I place myself within the functionalist camp by accepting the idea of cumulative radicalisation as a more applicable representation of the complexities present in the Holocaust than those suggestions put forth by most intentionalists. Testing path dependency though an episodic approach as expressed in Chapter Two, allows us to look at the relationship between ideology and events and thus to assess not only how the cumulative radicalisation process occurs, but why it occurs in such a fashion.

This is not to say that the functionalist argument is always the correct one in respects outside cumulative radicalisation. Functionalists do tend to overlook the fact that people do kill for various reasons; Mann notes that perpetrators of the Holocaust can be categorised as violent killers, bigoted killers and even ideological killers (2005: 27 - 28). Functionalists tend to allow for the influence of Hitler’s charisma but not for his policies nor his directives; equally, despite recent scholarship as noted above, there has been a tendency to overlook the influence ideology had on the Nazi regime. Even Mommsen himself fell into this trap on certain occasions (1976: 66 - 70; 1983: 381 - 420). Like Mann, there are other scholars who try and synthesize the relational gaps left by the structural-functionalist/ideological-intentionalist debate. Though they do not always agree with how this should be done, their work provides another interesting dynamic within Holocaust literature. First among these is Kershaw himself. Though he boarders more closely with the ideological-intentionalists than with structural-functionalists, he is very clear, particularly in his later work, that Hitler, both as an individual and as a key member in the Nazi political system, was heavily influenced by geo-political events (Kershaw 2001b: ch. 9, 10, 15).

Nonetheless, he also reminds his readers that the articles of Hitler’s personal worldview played ‘a functional role. They had so little to do with divisive day-to-day social and political issues that they could be resorted to as ‘directions for action’ (Aktionsrichtungen) and advanced as ultimate, long-range goals...Hitler’s fixations with anti-Semitism, anti-bolshevism, and with Lebensraum might be said to have
had, at least in the early years of the Third Reich, a largely symbolic function’ (Kershaw 1989: 67).

Kershaw is a strong component in Holocaust historiography because, amongst other things, of his biographic work on Hitler (2001b; 1999). In laying the groundwork for these books, he stresses that

the significance of [Hitler’s] role can only be assessed by relating his input to the conditions which produced and shaped him, and which he could not autonomously control even at the height of his power...So singular was Hitler’s ideological and political contribution to the shaping and direction of the Nazi movement and then the Nazi State that any attempt to label National Socialism as fascism’, thus placing it in comparison with other ‘similar’ movements, is meaningless and implies, moreover, the ‘trivialization’ of Hitler and Nazism. Rather, so completely interwoven with National Socialism with the rise, fall, political aims, and destructive ideology of the is unique personality, that it is legitimate to speak of Nazism as ‘Hitlerism’.

(Kershaw 1989: 41, 20)

It is this type of control, ideological, symbolic and political, that inclines Kershaw towards accepting claims of Holocaust ‘uniqueness’. Yehuda Bauer (1979; 1989; 1994; 1990; 2001) is perhaps the most popular proponent of Holocaust ‘uniqueness’; for Bauer, ‘Hitler’ almost becomes synonymous for ‘Nazi Germany’, particularly in his discussions on war (see 1990: 334 for examples); however, his assumptions are founded on the machinations of the interworkings of a multi-level system of governance, administrating wartime policies, one of which was an intensive relationship with the Jewish population at the time (1989: 56 - 66).

This sits counter to the strong argument made by Bloxham (2009a: 1 - 14) and Bloxham and Kushner (2008: 66 - 71) on the comparability of the Holocaust. In The Holocaust: Critical Historical Approaches (2008) Bloxham and Kushner are particularly adamant about what the dialogue of ‘uniqueness’ has done for studies of the Holocaust: ‘The Holocaust metanarrative has developed as part of
‘consciousness’ of ‘the Holocaust’ and is an obstacle to historical understanding of the destruction of the Jews because of its tendency to view those events from the latter-day perspective of the accomplished fact’ (Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 66).

As Alice and Roy Eckardt first pointed out thirty years ago, describing the Holocaust as completely unique is to classify it as unexplainable and mystical; this does little for further development of historical analysis and can equally take away from the event itself. Ideas of Holocaust uniqueness are generated more from survivors’ experience and from the ‘special relationship’ that many peers and descendants have with that event than from any historical event or scholarly rationale (Eckardt and Eckardt 1980: 166, 178).

In truth, the Holocaust is ‘unique’. However, so is every case of mass killing unique; there is something special, unsettling, indescribable about them all. This does not make all genocides equal, but instead makes them dynamic. Neither should it limit comparison; indeed, the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide are often compared, though the differences between the cases are notable. Staub posits that the Nazis used ‘bureaucratic management and advanced technology in the framework of a totalitarian system. The genocide of the Armenians was less planned, with limited bureaucratic organization and very little advanced technology in its execution’ (Staub 1989: 7). More of these distinctions come to light as we move into the literature of the Armenian genocide.

**Turkey**

To start with Turkey, the literature can roughly be categorised into two main approaches supported by an ever-increasing amalgam of other literature particularly work on gender (Derderian 2005; Sanasarian 1989; Tachjian 2009), media (Kirakossian 2004, 2007; Torchin 2006) and works addressing other instances of Turkish persecutions of Armenians, primarily during the late 1800s, and Greeks,
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primarily after WWI (Melson 1982; Naimark 2001). The two primary veins of literature on this case, however, are historical narratives and comparative accounts. To borrow from the Holocaust dialogue, both of these approaches fall into the functionalist-structuralist category. Though scholars in the field widely acknowledge the responsibility held by the CUP for the atrocities committed against the Armenians, aggressive acts committed against the Armenians on order of the Sultan and then later aggression against the Greeks under Atatürk, have encouraged scholars to cast their blame on a wider set of circumstances, rather than on the Young Turk triumvirate.

Beginning with the historical narratives, the first point of note is that much of this work is comparatively new; the four keystone historians in the field, Vahakn Dadrian, Taner Akçam, Donald Bloxham and Jay Winter, have only recently begun publishing work on the subject. A critical point of note on literature and the Armenian genocide, unlike the research in the Nazi case, most of the historical assumptions made by these historians are done so from a functionalist perspective and thus their explanations and analyses are generally ‘made without reference to the intentions of individuals’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 218). The literature rarely focuses on biographies of the key ideologues11; equally, there is a tendency to overlook the role of ideology in the conflict, due perhaps to the lack of literature previously written on the subject.

Though Winter’s first book was printed in the mid-eighties (1985), it is not until the early twenty-first century that he begins to focus on substantial historical narrative and theoretical explanation (Winter 2003a, 2003b; Canning, Lehmann, and Winter 2004). Like some Holocaust scholars, Winter points to the possibility of mass mobilisation in industrial societies to explain the Ottoman Empire’s role in WWI, creating what he terms a situation of ‘total war’ in which genocide can be hidden.

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11 There are very few in English, the most important being The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp (Parla 1985).
‘Genocide,’ he claims, ‘helped form total war, and total war helped launch genocide’ (Winter 2003b: 213). Unfortunately, Winter is not entirely explicit in linking the Ottoman Empire to the ‘mobilised, industrial countries’ responsible for the context of total war.

Özmucur and Pamuk, in their discussion of the shifts in the standard of living from the late nineteenth century until the beginning of WWI make it quite plain that though the Ottoman Empire was changing, it could hardly be counted among one of the great industrialised European states (2002: 293, 312 - 313, 321). Winter does try to address this, but his statement ‘that Turkey was not among the leading industrial nations is neither here nor there; the war Turkey joined on the side of the Central Powers soon became a new kind of war, to whose radical character Turkey contributed through carrying to the Armenian genocide’ (Winter 2003b: 191) seems to fall flat when compared to the more substantive arguments of Dadrian and Akçam.

Because of his extensive knowledge of language, Vahakn Dadrian has established himself as one of the premier scholars of genocide in the modern era. His first book on the subject, *The History of the Armenian Genocide* (2004), originally published in 1995, ostensibly changed scholarship on the Armenian genocide, making the topic much more accessible to academics heretofore stumped by language and a lack of primary materials. This book is extensive, ranging from a treatise on Islamic Law in Ottoman society and its impact on a non-Islamic sense of other-ness to the effects of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust and the Nuremberg trials. Dadrian’s primary concern is on intervention; the lessons coming out of the Armenian genocide as presented in this work are three-fold: 1) that states are not able to justly police themselves or hold themselves accountable in a court of law, 2) in order for genocidal crimes to come to justice, that international actors must be indelibly committed to the task and 3) if international actors do intervene without whole-hearted commitment, their actions can and often do aggravate the situation rather than alleviate suffering (Dadrian 2004: xx - xxiii), all tenets addressed in the Responsibility to Protect (International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty 2001). What is most laudable about Dadrian’s work, however, is the amount of information from primary sources he has made available to the greater community of genocide scholars. It is his extensive notation as much as his critical analysis that makes him a critical source for every other scholar of the Armenian genocide (Melson 1997; Suny 1996).

Taner Akçam certainly builds upon Dadrian’s work in both his From Empire to Republic (2004) and Shameful Act (2006). However, instead of focusing as Dadrian does, on aspects of intervention, Akçam’s Empire attempts to bring together the narrative of a collapsing empire, portioned between European powers, and that of the terror and sorrow of genocide, of atrocity piled upon atrocity. In order to tackle this challenge, Akçam assumes the voice of the perpetrator – not in that he defends or speaks positively about the CUP and the Turkish regime, but that he begins by a thorough discussion of Turkish national identity which sets the tone for further discussions on religion, Turkification and the economic and political plans made by the regime. This type of approach has been picked up by other scholars, most notably Boris Isyar, who discusses the (re)construction of Ottoman identity into Turkish identity through the lens of changing notions of modernity in Europe at the time (2005).

A Shameful Act has similar themes to Empire, and expands the ideas offered by Isyar to great extent. Akçam’s purpose here is to show that the claim of the modern Turkish state that no Turkish sources can be used to prove Turkish responsibility for the Armenian genocide (Akçam 2006: xii) – which Akçam does to great extent; however, the final chapters of the book focusing on the war trials, and instead of focusing on the original outcome of document analysis, leaves the reader with a similar outcome to that posed by Dadrian, that intervention of any kind, military, political or legal, is ‘extremely problematic’ and have the capacity to ‘produce results that are more detrimental than advantageous’ (Akçam 2006: 423).
Rounding out the historical literature of the field is the work of Donald Bloxham in his *Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (2005). Though providing a concrete historical narrative, Bloxham’s work stands out due to his successful endeavour to reinterpret the Armenian genocide within the context of external intervention in late Ottoman/early Turkish minority relations. Much of Bloxham’s later work presents the Armenian genocide in the context of the shifts occurring in the European power dynamic, linking it strongly with the Holocaust, but also civil unrest and cleansing in the USSR and in the Balkans (Bloxham 2009a, 2009b, 2008, 2001). Unlike the other authors above, Bloxham is reticent to embrace the idea of wholesale acknowledgement for the Armenian genocide, asking

what would recognition mean for Armenians? On one level the answer is straightforward: a certain closure on an agonizing past. But other answers remain to be provided. How would Armenian historians and politicians exploit the situation; to what uses would the history of the genocide be put?

(Bloxham 2005: 229)

Certainly, these are important questions, particularly understanding both the way historians, journalists and politicians use ‘genocidal history’ in order to attain individual aims and goals, as seen in the Holocaust, and understanding the legacy of enmity that can result in further aggression, as seen in the Balkan case.

**The Balkans**

Of all the literature with which this research engages, the literature on the break-up of Yugoslavia and the atrocities carried out against the Bosniaks is the most limited. Though in the upcoming section I will talk a few more specific problems in certain examples of literature on Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is a general theme worth noting before proceeding any further: the Balkan case, though fitting within the bounds of
my definition of genocide as presented above, does not fit into the generally accepted category of total genocide. Thus, many genocide scholars avoid this case, opting instead for a less complex comparison. However, as discussed above, I consider this case to be classified as partial genocide or, more rightly, as a case of ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes.

Of the literature that has been produced, we can detect two main categories. Of first note are those authors somehow involved with the media presence in the Balkans at the time of the conflict, either in Bosnia-Herzegovina or later in Kosovo. Though there is not room in this PhD to discuss the role of the media in the Balkan conflict, Keith Doubt aptly describes the journalist’s role as one of great import: ‘It has become the responsibility of journalists to articulate the moral imperatives through which to view events’ (Doubt 1999) which builds on the work of Mitchell and Richards who posit that journalists have become the martyr of modern conflict (Mitchell and Richards 2010). The literature I use in my work includes projects undertaken by authors who were themselves journalists during the course of the conflict such as Misha Glenny, whose Fall of Yugoslavia (1999) is a cornice piece of Yugoslavian genocidal literature, and Elizabeth Neuffer (2001). However, it extends to the extensive body of work done on the role of the media in the Yugoslav conflict (Gow et al. 1996; Cohen 2001; Sofos 1999; Sadkovich 1998).

A good example of the literature coming from this category of authorship is the work of Laura Silber and Allan Little in their book, Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation (1997). Silber and Little take a functionalist approach to the creation of modern Serbian/Croat/Bosnia national identity, beginning with a brief discussion of Yugoslavia during WWII and through Tito’s reign. It was here, they claim, that nationalist idealism came into its own as nationalists were often jailed or forced into exile, residing in ex-pat communities which so often form the basis for extreme nationalist adherence. Thus, Silber and Little focus their attention to the rise and fall of Milosevic and other Serbian leaders; they do not fall into the trap of many other functional-structuralists who underestimate the role of national leaders in the radicalisation process (Kershaw 2008: 245 - 247). Naturally, for any comparative
Chapter Three: Survey of approaches

study on nationalism, addressing the question of national leadership is inevitable. The insights they provide into the complex and shifting power relations between Yugoslav leaders are keen and purposeful. When comparing their constructions of these power relations with those in Germany and Turkey, much can be better understood about the role of a national leader in genocidal conflicts.

Similarly to the German case, much of the initial literature in the Yugoslav case, written in the wake of the conflict, is presented from both a structural-functionalist perspective where Milosevic is presented as a figure with little function except as a symbol having rather less than more control over the ideological changes occurring under his guard (Cohen 2001), and from an intentionalist perspective where he is cast as being a key influence in both ideology and the progressional evolution of radicalisation (Holbrooke 1999; Power 2002). Too often, the conflict is oversimplified by seeking to establish an age-old hatred driven to extremes by religion and the remnants of WWII ideology (Judah 1997; Fox 2004b). Equally, though journalists attempt to be objective, at some point most apply more normative perspectives and opinions on the conflict, in particular relating to the role of external actors in intervention (Doubt 1999: 91).

On the other side of Bosnian literature are works which, like the authors of the Turkish atrocities, attempt a historical overview of the history of the Balkans in an attempt to explain why the break-up of Yugoslavia occurred in historical context. This category consists of work by authors such as Sabrina Ramet (2001; 1999), Vesna Drapac (2010), John Fine (1983; 1987; 2006), Stanford J. Shaw (1976) Tim Judah (1997; 2000), Peter Balakian (1997), John Lampe (1996), Leslie Benson (2001) and Noel Malcolm (1996; 1998). Of these authors, it is Judah, Lampe, Fine and Malcolm whose work has been well received and influential.

Both Judah and Malcolm spend significant amounts of time presenting the historical and geographical claims of the various groups present as early as the first century in order to attempt to rectify the oversimplification sometimes found in those works produced by media-based authors. Both point to the role of religion and its
importance in the establishment of boundaries in the early history of the groups present in the region (Malcolm 1996: Ch 5; Judah 1997: Chs 2, 3). Judah’s sardonic tone, however, reminds us of the mythic status much of this history has taken on in modern nationalist ideology, as we will see in the upcoming chapters (see also Drapac 2010: 23, 37 - 38). Fine builds on this, stating that politicised ethnic boundaries were not ascribed to religious identities until the nineteenth century when Croat identity began being associated strictly with the Catholic church and Serb identity with the Orthodox church.

Fine goes on to note ‘Muslim’ remained a non-ethnic identity for long after the other two groups and when the identity was given political weight, it was no longer a religious association, but a cultural one (see also Bougarel 2003: 104; Pavkovic 2000: 157); he goes on to say of Bosniaks ‘all that remains of their faith is their ethnonym ‘Muslim’’ (Fine 2002: 11). Lampe (1996) takes a more specific approach, directing his energies at the changing nature of the Balkan region primarily in the twentieth century against a backdrop of geo-political shift. Instead of looking at the historical segregation of people groups over the course of the region’s history, Lampe limits his perspective to the rise in ethno-politics after 1968.

Spanning this schism is the work of Keith Doubt, whose work is unique in the context of literature on the Balkan case. Doubt’s work bridges the gap between media and historians by providing a critical analysis of events, actors and literature through the lens of sociology. Hailed as a sociological ‘pioneer’, Doubt uses Chomsky, Weber, Marx, Lorde and various others to relate the Balkan case to social scientists and thus relieve historians and journalists both from their heretofore necessary burden of responsibility for analysis.

Doubt’s work introduces us to a more up-to-date vein of scholars whose analyses attempts a more macro-approach. These scholars attempt to show the upheaval Yugoslavia experiences during this time period as occurring against the backdrop of social, historical, cultural, economic and ideological change rather than, as we see above, others who attempt to attribute the collapse of Yugoslavia to age-old hatreds.
'merely' the break-up of the Soviet Union. As a comparative historical
sociologist, I am particularly sympathetic to this approach; in order to accomplish the
goals set forth in Chapter One, I naturally focus on works focusing significantly on
the ideological impact of and on change. The most successful scholars of note in this
field are Dejan Jovic and Sinisa Malesevic.

Malesevic's recent work, Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and
Nationalism (2006), is an HS approach to re-evaluating identity as an ideological
expression of race, national character and social consciousness in the context of a
changing Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In doing so, he argues that ideas of ethnicity and
nationhood are more properly understood as elements of ideology rather than of
identity as they serve as 'politically motivated forms of social action' (2006: 157).
Unlike my own work in this thesis, Malesevic's book does not trace the
radicalisation of ideological evolution, but does instead apply these theories to the
changes occurring in both cases in order to identify shifting mechanisms of ethnic
group mobilisation through the process and ideology of democratisation (2006: 204-
205).

Similarly, Jovic's Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away (2009) assesses ideology
as one critical aspect among many in the process of state disintegration in the
Balkans. Ideology for Jovic serves as 'political concepts and ideas that influenced
participants' surrounding the debates and events preceding the collapse (2009: 33).
His analysis asserts that elite perceptions of reality and their desire for a beneficial
future affected the political compromises made prior to Milosevic's rise to power and
helps explain the rationale behind the schism in the ideological and political
consensus in the late 1980s. For Jovic, nationalism and communism are not two
different ideologies which, in Yugoslavia, merge from one (communism) into the
other (nationalism); instead, both doctrines contain elements of the other, allowing
the transition from Tito's regime to Milosevic's regime to occur within a specific
context (2009: 1, 5). Though his analysis ends in 1990, Jovic's analysis provides key
insight into the role ideology plays in this case, particularly in the early stages of
ideological radicalisation.
There is another divide in the literature which spans both historians and the media alike: that is, the historical nature of aggression between groups. A number of authors have established a historical enmity between Serbs, Croats, Muslims and other minorities which then culminated in the tragic events at the close of the twentieth century (for examples, see Cousens and Cater 2001; Balakian 1997; Gunther 1937). On the other hand are those who see the times of conflict as outliers within a relatively content multi-ethnic community. Take Fine, for example, who posits that Bosnia-Herzegovina has always been peacefully multi-ethnic 'except when foreigners or locals stirred up by foreign governments or foreign movements have incited Bosnians to other paths' (Fine 2002: 4; see also Fine 2006; Mahmutcehajic 2003).

There is a middle way, to which I am sympathetic. Following the works of Bringa (1995; 2002) and Aitchinson (2008), I find that though there is a sense of historical otherness established between groups and that though there has been conflict between these groups, it was the realignment of these groups along ethnic lines in the late nineteenth century and, in the Muslim context, in the 1960s which allowed for conflict to occur in quite the way it has done over the course of the twentieth century. Certainly, aggression in WWII caused a major shift in the perception of identity, just as has conflict in the 1990s. As Bringa suggests, 'war changes people...as a reaction to and part of the process of war and the politics behind it, Bosnian Muslims are redefining both the content and function of their collective identities and identifying with a wider community of Muslims' (Bringa 1995: 197 - 198).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to provide an analytical overview pertinent to the research questions posed in Chapter One. Beginning with substantial contributions by scholars of nationalism, I have shown the role that nationalist movements have played in constructing the forum for genocide. This first section also showed the
gaps in nationalist literature in relating particularly to genocidal cases, that there is a disjoin between growing nationalism and genocidal policy. In an attempt to explain this relationship, I turned to genocide scholarship. Here, I reviewed the growing literature relating to the controversy surrounding the definition of genocide and clarified how it was to be used in the context of this dissertation. The weaknesses of this category of literature, however, was role of macro-level institutions of power, such as ideology, in the various cases, stemming, as explained above, from a lack of comparative work and an focus on single-case study historical analysis. The strengths were found particularly within the functionalist perspective of cumulative radicalisation, but only when opened up to include the effects of ideology within the radicalisation process. I then went on to discuss the types of secondary literature available in each of my three cases.

It is now possible to situate my own work within the greater context of literature. In brief, this dissertation seeks to address the gaps in nationalist literature regarding the process of radicalisation and in genocidal literature regarding the role of ideology through comparative analysis. I would contend that though I see across the ideological-intentionalist/functional-structuralist debate and find myself more-or-less within the functionalist camp, I am less concerned with the ‘moment’ that policies of persecution and extermination became genocidal and more focused on the process of change. As discussed in the upcoming chapters, the literature suggests that the road to genocide is not one fixed thing, but instead is a growing, evolving process.
Historical context and the episodic approach

Introduction

In order to understand and analyse the strength of a shifting ideology, we must first view that ideology in historical context. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical narrative for my Turkish, German and Balkan cases through a discussion of the events used to form the episodic approach to my research and analysis. As suggested in Chapter Two, this approach allows us to ascertain whether or not path dependency is applicable when studying the evolution of radicalising ideologies.

Naturally, as Chapter Three pointed out, this sort of research mirrors the work of Mommsen (1976; 1983; 2001; 2003a), Kershaw (1989; 2000; 2002) and Bloxham (2003; 2009b) all of whom note the importance of cumulative radicalisation in genocidal states. However, the difference here is that the focus of these scholars’ work is the cumulative radicalisation of events. My questions have to do with whether or not there exists a cumulative radicalisation of ideology; I use events to provide a backdrop against which to map out ideological shifts, but we must keep the difference between events and ideology clear in order to efficiently answer the research questions set forth in the earlier chapters.

Therefore, this chapter serves to introduce not only the geo-political background of each case, but also the events around which my research is structured. Each section begins by providing a short background narrative of each case. I then go on to an in depth discussion of each of my key events providing the story-board for each case. Like Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight, this chapter begins with Turkey and moves chronologically through each of my three cases. The main events I discuss in the Turkish case are: 1) the CUP’s assumption of power, 2) the beginning of the Balkan Wars, 3) Russia’s declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire and 4) the massacre and arrests at Van. The German case focuses on: 1) the book burning at Opernplatz, 2) the institution of the Nuremberg Laws, 3) Kristallnacht and 4)
Auschwitz-Birkenau’s transition from a work camp to an extermination camp.

Lastly, the Balkan case focuses on the following four events: 1) Milosevic’s speech to Kosovar Serbs, 2) Slovenia and Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, 3) the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo and 4) the massacre at Srebrenica.

In choosing which events I was going to use, I looked for events that were generally characterised by four different criteria. Firstly, as we have seen in Chapter Two, Mahoney’s theory of path dependency is heavily bounded by the critical juncture, or the event during which traditional institutional constraints are in flux. In order to seek to identify this critical juncture and to evaluate its ideological impact, it was imperative that the events I analyse be somehow unique, a key event early on in the radicalisation process. Thus, I began looking for events that marked structural, institutional changes, were unique at the point at which they occurred and particularly events which set a precedent for other types of similar events to occur in the future.

Secondly, as my research questions inherently address a process which occurs over time, I limited my events to those occurring relatively equidistant apart in the radicalisation process. While I did not want to contain my events to an extreme extent by saying that each had to be a certain length of time apart, I was cognisant of how close each event was to the institutionalisation of genocidal policy. Mommsen’s theory identifies these events as becoming significantly more radicalised; by ensuring my events occur at various stages of radicalisation, we are able to ascertain whether or not ideologies are also progressing in this way.

This leads into my third criteria for choosing the events in my episodic approach, that being I was looking to analyse events of ideological import. In other words, I wanted to incorporate events acknowledged by that ideology to be important. Usually, this happened in retrospect, though not always, as the upcoming chapters show. Lastly, I limited my choices to events which were significantly applicable to the genocide.
Chapter Four: Context and approach

itself. As I mention throughout this dissertation, genocide in each case was occurring within the context of greater conflict of some kind (see Table 2.1); I was keen to ensure that the events I chose effected the conflict between the perpetrators and the inner, rather than the outer, enemies. By limiting the events in this manner, I was left with the events above.

Let me be clear, throughout the course of the entire PhD, I reference many other historical events, such as the Anschluss, the tension between Greece and Turkey, the death of Tito and the dissolution of the Ottoman parliament, and point to their importance within the process of radicalisation. That they did not fit the criteria outlined above and thus are not used to provide structure for my project is meant in no way to detract from their importance in the process of ideological shift. Instead, it is a reflection on my own inability as a researcher to incorporate every important event into a research project of this nature. That being said, the events that I have chosen provide an invaluable perspective on the ideologies they represent.

An episodic approach to historical analysis provides a ‘snapshot’ of history at various points of ideological progression. Rather than seeing the history of these cases through the lens of genocide, it is vital to view them, as much as is possible, as they were at the time. This episodic approach to research and to writing allows us to compare not only case with case, but snapshot with snapshot – the way ideology is shaped around one event versus the way ideology is shaped around another event. Thus, we are able to trace the radicalisation process of ideology in each case, but also on a macro-scale, establishing sequential patterns and pattern-processes more generally in genocidal states.

Turkey

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was in crisis. A bloodless coup occurring on the 24 of July, forced the Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, to acquiesce to Young Turk demands including the reinstitution of the Constitution of 1876 and the
recall of the Parliament, originally disbanded in 1878. As is usually the case, the
Ottoman empire, even under this particularly weak sultan, did not crumble over
night.

Established in approximately 1301, the Ottoman Empire of the mid-nineteenth
century stretched from South Eastern Europe to North Africa. Its geographical
context means that it contained various different people groups from various
different religions and practices, from Bedouin tribes to urban Armenian city
councils. Though only a nominally theocratic state\textsuperscript{12}, Ottoman law was based in a
combination of Sharia law and ‘customary law’, with no codified document to detail
which was to be used in what situation (Toledano 1993; Shaw and Shaw 1976).

Generally, as I will discuss in Chapter Five in greater detail, Sharia law was applied
to minority religious groups in order to dictate the way in which they would exist in
the Empire. The resulting structure was called the millet system. Though considered
rather forward-thinking in the time of medieval Europe, the American and French
Revolutions had changed the way European states viewed their citizens. In a bid to
modernize in a similar way, non-Muslim groups began to vie for political and
cultural equality. A typical situation, such as the Serb rebellion of 1804, begins with
a small armed insurrection, resulting in at first in suppression and terror, followed by
Treaties and promises of reform, followed by a negation of reform, followed by
further rebellion (Malcolm 1996: 88; Akçam 2006: 11 - 12). Note that the focus
here, though resulting in the deaths of millions, was not genocidal; its purpose was to
encourage its citizens to be obedient to the state. As Michael Mann reminds us, ‘the
Ottoman Empire – like other historic empires – wanted compliant, not dead,
subjects’ (Mann 2005: 114 see also 113, 115). Nonetheless, this perpetual position
of in-fighting weakened the state, particularly in the eyes of the Russian and other
European Empires who coveted Ottoman lands. Akçam describes it very well:

\textsuperscript{12}The theocratic nature of the Ottoman state is under heavy debate. For an interesting discussion, see
The non-Muslim communities were involved in a tireless struggle for basic rights and freedoms, and the Great Powers repeatedly used this as a pretext for interfering in domestic Ottoman affairs. Considered the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ since the 1830s, the state was on the verge of collapse; the Great Powers were conveniently able to present their ambitions to partition the empire as “humanitarian interventions”

(Akçam 2006: 13)

Thus, in the Turkish case, the desire for minority rights is directly linked to the lack of a strong, secure state, particularly in the border areas of the Caucasus and the Balkans (Mann 2005: 112; Bloxham 2010). The integration of the 1876 Constitution in the 1880s was an attempt at true reform, with the term ‘Ottoman’ used for the first time in reference to all imperial subjects regardless of minority status. Instead of deflating the situation, however, it enhanced it by continuing to acknowledge certain rights and structures based in the old millet system; what emerged then was two separate legal systems, one based on individual rights and one based on group rights, making complete implementation of the Constitution all but impossible (Akçam 2006: 17 - 18).

By the end of the nineteenth century, substantial military mutinies had been occurring across the Empire; civilians were beginning to rise up against discordant government officials (Balakian 2003: 143). Whilst these events were occurring from Syria, Smyrna, Constantinople, Erzerum and Bitlis, the heart of the uprisings was to be found in Macedonia. Bloxham identifies the primary instigator of the coup as being concerns held by Salonika-based revolutionaries that foreign powers would intervene in the unrest in Macedonia, thereby giving Western Europe and Russia a desired foothold in the Ottoman state (2005: 59; see also Dannreuther 2001: 14).

This weakening of power provided the opportunity for other political groups to establish themselves in the Ottoman political arena, most notably CUP under the
Chapter Four: Context and approach

Young Turks. At the time of its establishment, the CUP was neither radical nor ethnocentric. Instead, it was a modern, secular political movement whose political foundations were based firmly on European ideals of the modern nationalist state. Their key focus was on the full integration of the 1876 Constitution into Ottoman society and a severe restriction of Sultan Hamid II’s powers (Shaw and Shaw 1976: 262 - 267). Though only one of several such groups, their focus on pro-Ottoman liberalism, commitment to modern Europeanism and determination to see the Ottoman Empire sustain its power through reform enabled their movement to achieve enough political clout to manoeuvre into the schisms opened by a weakened Ottoman state.

24 July 1908 – The CUP takeover of power

The Sultan’s vast espionage system allowed him, for the most part, to remain aware of the situation and quell much anti-Sultanic movements during the early years of the twentieth century through the judicious use of police, local forces and the judicial system (Ahmad 1969: 4). However, as discord spread, the courts were not always able to condemn every revolutionary; such a situation occurred with Adjutant-Major Niyazi. Niyazi was a strong constitutional supporter who, after being acquitted on account of lack of evidence, called for a secret meeting of the CUP on 28 June 1908 and instigated the first of many minor insurrections taking place over the following month. The key element of Niyazi’s movement is that it moved the anti-Sultanic, pro-Constitution Young Turk movement outside the realm of conspiracy and into the realm of insurrection. Outright rebellion necessitated action by the Sultan. However, as the situation began to spiral out of the Sultan’s control, military troops began to refuse to obey orders to engage in open battle against their countrymen (Ahmad 1969: 8 - 11).

By 20 July, Muslim populations across the Ottoman Empire had risen up against the Sultan, swearing to restore the constitution. Two days later, after the Ittihadist CUP had announced the restoration of the constitution in Macedonia, the Sultan bowed to CUP demands for power, replacing key politicians with members of the CUP.
Chapter Four: Context and approach

Further to discussions over the next day, the Sultan acquiesced to the reformers’ demands, enabling him to keep his title as Sultan and his role as caliph. However, under the new constitutional monarchy, he would be little more than a figurehead, being stripped of political power and role as head of state (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 257; Balakian 2003: 143 - 144; Ahmad 1969: 12 - 13).

Scholars of the Armenian genocide traditionally make much of this event as it occurred through support of many ethnic groups, including Armenians and Greeks. Going back as early as 1902 at the first Ottoman conference in Paris, these groups affirmed their support of the Constitution and the rights provided to minority groups under its basic tenets. The relationship between the Armenian Dashnak Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was further reinforced in 1907 during the Second Unionist Congress, again in Paris, when both the ARF and the CUP formalised their agreement to participate in alliance with each other against the Sultan. These events are cited by some scholars as being a moment when the Armenian Dashnak community and the CUP formalised their budding relationship, deep-seated in the foundational Young Turk ideals of liberalism focused on new, Europeanised political reforms, noting that ‘many Armenians cheered the revolution’ (Valentino 2004: 160; see also Waller 2002). However, most scholars give a strong argument that this alliance was a reticent one, made by the CUP for political gain and by the ARE in hopes of securing the reforms promised under the original Constitution. Even when policy and action, such as this, was agreed upon by the two parties, ‘the façade of unity concealed the assumption that accounts would some day be settled with the Armenians’ (Akçam 2006: 51, 58 - 64; Hanioglu 2006; Dadrian 2004).

Indeed, it was only months after the 1908 takeover that the Ittihadists began preparing for the institution of bloodier policies, primarily through the creation of the secret organisation called the fedâiin; this was a precursor of the Special Organisation, described by Akçam as a group of ‘brave, self-sacrificing, obedient young men, who would undertake ‘special operations’ – usually the murder of political opponents – on orders. membership was entirely voluntary, but once one
Chapter Four: Context and approach

entered, there was no going back’ (2006: 59). Two things are worthy of note here: The first is noted by Akçam who points out that the *fedâiin* was directed by the Central Committee; thus we can assume that the unionist murders that were carried out against Turks of differing political orientations – primarily supporters of the Sultan – were directed kills by those in control of state power. Before their political ascendancy, such directives were much harder to order. Secondly, one seemingly overlooked by Akçam and most other scholars is that these first victims of the CUP regime were *ethnically Turkish* and killed by those claiming to uphold nationality as sacrosanct. This leads one to remember that while ideology is often shaped by events, the reality of gaining and retaining political legitimacy sometimes requires political leaders to both move outside of the ideological platform they themselves create and also to bend and change that ideology to fit their immediate need.

Whilst the Ittihadist regime was swift in eliminating political enemies, they were seemingly at a lack to know what to do with the rest of their power once the Sultan had been forced to fulfil their primary requirement. This provided a power vacuum the European powers were eager to fill. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, Bulgaria gained independence and Crete left the Empire and united instead with Greece. Fearing a Christian Armenian/Christian European alliance, and following rumours the Turkish Ittihadists had been overthrown, Turkish nationalists massacred over 20,000 Armenians at Adana in April of 1909 (Mann 2005: 129; Akçam 2006: 54 - 55, 59 - 62; Balakian 2003: ch. 12).

8 October 1912 – Balkan Wars begin

Perhaps, then, it is easy to see why Turkish nationalists were so distressed by the outbreak and subsequent loss of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Indeed, in ideological terms, loosing this conflict struck a blow to the Turkish ideal of national superiority guaranteed by restoration of the Constitution. In practical terms, defeat in
the Balkan Wars saw the loss of sixty per cent of Turkish territory, reducing the Empire to the approximate size of modern-day Turkey (Isyar 2005: 345). Poor results in the conflict were blamed further on the Sultan and resulted in his complete overthrow on the 23 January 1913, followed by an immediate shift in policy, institutionalising the nationalism that had been thematically present for some time. This formalised the triumvirate of power shared between Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, Cemal Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, and Talat Pasha, the Minister of the Interior and the man now largely credited with instituting the policies necessary for genocide. They oversaw the establishment of such societies as the Society for National Defence whose aim was to establish unity and social mobilisation, thus ‘curing’ the ills of the nation, and the National Independence Society which aimed to create a thriving Turkish middle and upper class, replacing all Christians in traditional economic roles. Christians were not allowed to join any of the established societies sponsored by the ‘new’ Turkish state as propaganda at the time allied the Armenians with the Christian Europeans of the Balkan region (Akçam 2006: 87 - 90; Derderian 2005: 2).

Institution of these and similar policies coincided with the mass migration of Muslims from the Balkan states to Turkey who feared for their own safety. Many of these had faced terror and pain at the hands of Christians during the Balkan Wars and were adamant that the state provide them protection from the Christian Armenian enemy (Judah 1997: 79); this movement of peoples will have long-lasting effects, resurfacing again in my Bosnian case. For now, suffice it to say that the loss of the Balkan War, minority unrest, not only from Armenians but from Kurds as well (R14079/Ab.12669 25.06.1913), and the tie between Christian Armenia siding with Christian Europe laid the ground work for the next event critical to Turkey’s procession to genocide. The Balkan wars ended with established peace in February

13 This massacre also resulted in the death of approximately 1000 Muslims who would not join with the attackers.
1914, terms of which were decided by the European powers and were viewed as degrading to the Turks (Mann 2005: 131).

2 November 1914 – Russia declares war on the Ottoman Empire

As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the territorial losses of the Balkan Wars were detrimental to the Ottoman Ittihadist state, not in the least because of the loss of Rumelia which was the birthplace of a majority of CUP leaders and, at the time, considered the heart of Turan. Amongst other shifts discussed throughout the empirical chapters, the key outcome of this loss was a shift in the importance of Eastern Anatolia to the Turks, not only ideologically, but geo-politically as well.

Described by Mann as ‘backward’ (2005: 112), Eastern Anatolia was composed of the majority of Armenians in the Ittihadist state. Erzerum and Van, two key provinces in the region, were of particular concern as they shared a border with Russia. Russian influence in the region was recognised as a key area of concern for the Turks; the primary fear was that Russia would attempt to seize the region based on a shared sense of ethnicity between Armenians living in the Ottoman state and Armenians living in the Russian state. This also served as a concern that if this conflict were to take place, Armenians would side with the Russians in any conflict (R14078/Ab.2888 8.02.1913).

Regardless of the fact that the Armenians emphatically denied any alliance other than that to their own Ottoman state (R14077/Ab.1987 29.01.1913), the Russian declaration of war against the Ottomans seemed to justify fears of foreign intervention by an enemy Christian state supported by Armenians. Once war was declared, the Turks presented the conflict as a ‘holy war’ of supremacy against the heathen ‘infidels’ in order to ‘include and unite all branches of our [Turkish] race’ (Enver Pasha in Astourian 1990: 136; see also Dadrian 2004: 203). Unsurprisingly, however, the ‘Christian infidel’ was not to include the CUP’s greatest ally, Germany.
The alliance was established in August of 1914 in secret with hopes to wage off the military and political threat provided by the European powers. In doing so, the Turks secured German agreement for economic assistance to rebuild its military and infrastructure; this was shortly followed by a similar agreement with the Austrian-Hungary Empire (Dadrian 2004: 203 - 205). These agreements, however, remained secret and informal until the Russian Empire declared war in November. It was at this time when German influence in the regime moved from a casual relationship established by party leaders Enver Pasha and Dr. Nazim to a formal military alliance.

The outbreak of war caused significant ideological changes discussed in detail in coming chapters; these shifts were reflected by policy shifts which were, at first, not necessarily overly detrimental for the Armenians. Though they were required to submit themselves to conscription, something not granted to Armenians under the millet system of the Sultan, the first month of the war reflected no immediate anti-Armenian policy changes. A startling defeat at the Russian border close to Kars, where many Turkish Armenians fought Russian Armenians, caused Enver Pasha to suggest to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, editor of Tanin, the main CUP newspaper, and the Vice-President of the Parliament, that it was Armenian sedition that brought down the Turks so low. He suggested then that it was the time to be certain that the Armenians were ‘settling in locations that could do no harm’ (Astourian 1990: 137).

17 April 1915 – Persecutions in Van

The Triumvirs acted quickly in response to Yalçın’s idea, closing Armenian schools, shutting down the Armenian press and prohibiting Armenian international correspondence through all but the consulates. Whilst aware that there would be some political ramifications for these actions, the Porte, as the diplomatic state was addressed, relied on the critical emergency of war and the necessity to continue formal alliances for military gain to override the humanitarian claims these policies would normally cause (R14086/Ab.17493 1915).
Chapter Four: Context and approach

The massacres at Van, however, were a new level of persecution organised by the CUP. Anonymous ministers at the Russian consul sent a telegram to the German embassy in Copenhagen, describing it thus:

...Entire Kylikien Armenian massacres were carried out in hundreds of towns around Van where total populations have faced utter destruction. In Van itself, Kurdish bands besieged the Armenian city quarter; these new crimes of the Turks against humanity and civilisation were undertaken in a coordinated manner under orders by the Turkish regime in Constantinople.

The alliance of the Russian, French and English regimes must herewith explain to the Porte that the personal responsibility for this crime rests entirely on the shoulders of the Turkish regime, just as the representatives of the regime who participated in the massacres will [be personally] held to account...

(R14086/Ab.17667 1915)

Unlike the mass killing in Adana, this was clearly not the work of an incensed mob, but a coordinated attack set out to ensure the entire destruction of a people living in a certain area. Akçam recounts the experience of American missionary Stanley E. Kerr who collected eye-witness accounts of the Van massacres. Kerr claims that ‘more than fifty-five thousand Armenians had been killed...before the uprising had even started’ in Van (2006: 201). While Bloxham estimates the number of killings from mid-December to mid-April at a more conservative figure of 10,000 (2005: 76), we can assume that there were Special Organisation attacks on the ethnic Armenian minority paving the way for this large anti-Armenian push.

The massacres at Van were swiftly followed by the systematic arrest, torture and killing of approximately 600 Armenian cultural leaders, political leaders and intellectuals on 24 April 1915, a date that stands as the generally accepted date for the ‘beginning’ of the Armenian genocide (Staub 1989: 10; Akçam 2006: 129;
Astourian 1990: 137). This was followed throughout Eastern Anatolia as the war progressed through 1915. Though the Armenians attempted some resistance to the aggression, including raids on Muslim towns and interference with CUP communications (R14086/Ab.23244 31.07.1915), they had little defence against the combined strength of the Ittihadist state and the complacency of a world otherwise engaged in war.

By 1916 attacks and sustained policies of destruction were being implemented against the Armenians. In the year following the massacres at Van, eleven of the fifteen Armenian diocese had been wiped out with no longer enough members remaining alive to continue ministry; the diocese of Adana and Marasch had been completely destroyed (R14090/Ab.5914 3.03.1916). Just over two years later when the Turks began their evacuations from the battlements of WWI, approximately half of the pre-WWI Ottoman Armenians had been killed outright, sent into where they died of persecution, disease or other malady or had been forced out into the Syrian desert where hundreds of thousands perished of exposure, thirst and starvation14.

Germany

When did the path toward the Holocaust begin? Where did it branch off from the shared roots of European history to devolve into some of the worst atrocities history has known? Historians tend to answer this question with great variance; Evans begins The Coming of the Third Reich (2004) with Bismarck; the entire basis of Abel’s Roots of Anti-Semitism (1975) is that Jewish persecution begins in Biblical times under Ptolemaic Egypt; Dawidowicz, in her Holocaust Reader (1976), and Niewyk and Nicosia, in The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust (2000), claim the split to have come with the rise of Adolf Hitler.

14 The actual number of deaths remains uncertain, though most scholars estimate between 800,000 and 1.5 million deaths of a pre-war population of just 2 million (Mann 2005: 140; Levene 2005: 70 - 73; Valentino 2004: 157; Winter 2003b: 193). These numbers, of course, do not cover such atrocities as the rape of women and children or those sold into slavery – again, a crime occurring mostly to women and children.
Whilst I agree that Hitler’s ascension to power and Nazi control of state organisations and institutions was a key point on the ‘road to Auschwitz’, I fervently acknowledge that without the anti-Semitism rife in the Western world at the time and without the extraordinary economic, historical and geo-political situation Germany found itself in during the late 1920s, this rise to power and the fundamental ideologies and policies of the party would have been radically different, if indeed the Nazis had been able to take power at all. In order to maintain balance in each of my cases and to allow this case study to fit into the scope of my PhD, I have chosen to limit myself to tracing German ideology under the NSDAP, thus restricting my research to events occurring after the Nazis came to power. Nonetheless, understanding Germany in the greater context of political shift is vital to understanding how they were able to come to power in the first place.

Mann reminds us that, when discussing Germany in the early 20th century, we must rely on both geopolitical relations and transnational relations because, prior to WWI, there were two main ‘German’ states, Prussia and Hapsburg Austria, and millions of people who considered themselves German who lived outside of those boundaries (Mann 2005: 181). He goes on to claim that German nationalism at the turn of the century already focused around mistrust of Jews and of Soviets, a tendency only heightened by the devastation of WWI where both Empires lost not only political power, but also substantial amounts of land where Germans were discriminated against by new political systems (Mann 2005: 183).

The Weimar Republic, another consequence of WWI, was almost immediately fraught with institutional problems. Social Democratic functionary, Friedrich Ebert, stepped into the breach to become the Republic’s first Reich’s President. His abuse of the ability to rule by decree did nothing to endear him to a fledgling legislative branch and little to uphold the Weimar Constitution of 1919. Also problematic was the Social Democratic party itself; founded on Marxist principles, they could not move away from these ideals without loosing significant numbers of their working-class adherents. However, attempting to employ more radical policies would see
them alienated entirely as they were far from attaining an electoral majority at any
time after 1920 (Evans 2004: 80, 88 - 89). Neither the executive nor the legislative
branch could control the military who, during the 1920s, attempted to circumvent the
restrictions of the Versailles treaty as often as possible (Crozier 1997: 100 - 105;
Gatzke 1954); rearmament and military training began again, often in the Soviet
Union.

The last straw, however, aside from political discontent, ideological disappointment
and shame and lack of military support resulting from the Treaty of Versailles, was
the effect of the Great Depression on Germany. Most scholars (Aly 2007; Barnett
1998; Benz 1995; Broszat 1987; Broszat, Schwabe, and Herbst 1989; Evans 2004;
Fischer 1986; Gatzke 1954; Mommsen 2001) recognise the importance this event
had on the destabilisation of the Weimar Republic. Burleigh reminds his readers that
the number of unemployed in 1932 had risen to as many as 7.6 million individuals,
almost 34% of the workforce. These numbers are even more startling when
compared to the only 1.6 million unemployed in October 1929 (Burleigh 2001: 122).
Indeed, many people voted for the NSDAP not because of an ideological tendency
towards ethnocentrism or because of a sense of Hitler worship, but instead because
the NSDAP campaigned on an open commitment to ease the unemployment burden
and offered positive answers to the dire economic and financial questions raised by
the extremity of the time (Mann 2005: 183 - 184). Thus, here again, we see a weak
state institution leads to geopolitical shift, creating power gaps into which growing,
radicalising actors can manoeuvre.

10 May 1933 – Book burning at Opernplatz

Evans selects the resignation of the Social Democrat government from power on the
27 of March 1930 as marking ‘the beginning of the end of Weimar democracy’
(2004: 247); without a parliamentary majority, power began to shift towards the
army which had been illegally rebuilding its stockpiles and holdings since the end of
the First World War. Though some members of the army were acknowledged Nazis
at the time, the army generally kept its distance and pressured Hitler and his
comrades to quell their extremism, thus becoming 'strictly legal' (Goebbels in Evans
2005: 249). The government was reshuffled with Heinrich Brüning as Chancellor
who began the practice of restricting democratic processes of government. However,
government support continued to wane as seen in the September 1930 elections. As
a reflection of the popular demands for political change, the Nazis gained an
astounding total of 95 seats in the Reichstag. With Hitler gaining more personal
popularity in the 1932 election run-offs against Thälmann, leader of the Communist
party, and the current Chancellor, Hindenburg, the Nazis were indeed gaining
popular support very quickly. However, most of their political campaigning during
this time was focused, unsurprisingly, on the weaknesses of the other parties, the
mistakes made by the Weimar Republic, the beauty and unity that would occur if
Germany was once more united and Hindenburg himself, who was portrayed as an
elderly, if honourable, politician who needed to step aside to make room for newer,
younger blood (Evans 2004: 277 - 283).

Though the early 1930s showed massive gains in political support for the Nazis.
Goering sums up the rationale for this quite well in one of his statements before the
Nuremberg Tribunal, saying:

One must not forget that at this moment Germany had arrived at
the lowest point of her downward trend. There were 8 million
unemployed; all programs had failed; confidence in the parties
existed no more; there was a very strong rise on the part of the
revolutionary Leftist side; and political insecurity.

(Tribunals 13.03.1946)

Mann (2005) reflects this by reminding his readers that the people voting in support
of the NSDAP were not voting for genocidal aggression; they were instead voting for
a strong economic policy in an economic crisis and for renewed national pride in the
wake of Versailles. Though the Nazis downplayed their anti-Semitic notions around
election times, some type of ‘pressure’ on the Jews was approved of by many (Mann 2005: 183). What that pressure would be and what form it would take, however, remained a mystery to the greater populace of voters and — as I will argue in later chapters — in many ways to the regime itself.

The book burning at Opembratz is an early answer to how the regime viewed types of radicalised action in its earliest form. The event itself was a few days in the making. Staged on 6 May 1933 outside the Institute for Sexual Science in Berlin, home to an approximate 18,000 books and more manuscripts and photographs, students vandalized the Institute’s vast library whilst listening to their colleagues play patriotic songs. On 10 May 1933, the SA joined the students, pulling thousands of literary and photographic subjects out into the square, covering them with gasoline and setting them alight. Two days later, the Völkischer Beobachter published an article acclimating the ‘symbolic act’ in which ‘un-German writings were set alight on piles of logs’. In the same article is reported Goebbels’ speech on the night in which the Reichsminister pronounced ‘Revolutions that are authentic do not stop anywhere. No area can stay untouched. As men are revolutionised, so too are things revolutionised;’ the fact that the ‘trash and dirt’ of Jewish literature was exuberantly praised, a reflection of the joyous feeling of the night (NSDAP 1933e).

Hill argues as a key point of note that the actions at Opembratz were instigated, not through the state, but through civil action by the National Socialist German Students League (NSDStB). He points to the ambiguous ‘world reaction’ of indignation and excuse of student pranks as making the new Nazi regime ‘temporarily cautious’ about supporting the book burning (2001: 8 - 10). Unfortunately, Hill overlooks two aspects of the inner workings of the Nazi Party at the time. Firstly, much of NSDAP support and popularity was gained via grass roots approaches. That the book burnings were not decreed by the party before hand is unsurprising when one looks at the way they unfolded, beginning as what could be termed patriotic vandalism and only days later, supported by leading members of the Party. Secondly, Hill ignores the fact that, at the time, the NSDStB was already playing a role in the Hitler Youth.
(HJ) under von Schirach as Oberführer. Though still in its infancy, the inner workings of the HJ were both overseen and supported by the greater Party and was already the largest youth organisation in the Reich (Tribunals 23.05.1946). Rather than being an embarrassing mistake for the Nazis, the book burning at Opernplatz gives us an early insight into how the NSDAP worked, and serves as an early picture of radicalised aggression against ideas and attitudes outside the state-led platform.

15 September 1935 – passing of the Nuremberg Laws

Actions such as book burnings were not long remaining informal. The passing of the Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935 was not only the legalisation of persecution already present in the Party in events like the book burning, but was also a formal statement of acknowledgement of the radicalising anti-Semitic feelings in the party. Between the book burnings and the institution of the Nuremberg Laws, however, there was a general hiatus of specifically anti-Jewish policies; instead the Nazis had picked up on another theme of purification suggested in Mein Kampf – anti-Bolshevik policy. In truth, many Jews of the time were indeed members of the Communist Party (KPD) and also of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), coming second and third in party power after the Nazis in the 1933 elections. However, the Germans were not prepared at the time to attempt outright politicide when political power could be gained by more familiar routs. The Enabling Act, passed in late March 1933, effectively legalised Hitler’s dictatorship and allowed him, in July, to disband and make all political parties other than the NSDAP illegal. The power of the communists, then, was tightly monitored after this point and was, by 1935, seen as a conquered threat (Mann 2005: 193; Tribunals 08.01.1946, 10.01.1946b).

This introduces a trend, expounded upon in Chapter Six, in which the Nazis used the legal system to legitimise radical shifts in policy, thus giving further legitimacy to their own institutions of power. Thus, precedent was set to deal with the problem of ‘un-German’ political ideals. This stands as a perfect example of cumulative radicalisation in which aggressive radicalise through a graduated process step at a
time. In this way, precedent was set to deal with the problem of ‘un-German’ political ideals. Years later, following a wave of vandalism assaults and boycotts organised by the NSDAP against the Jews, the Nazis once again signalled a political and ideological shift with the passing of the Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935; this time, however, the ‘problem’ was not a political group, but a racial group.

The Nuremberg Laws, introduced as a last-minute addition to a September Nazi Party Rally (Burleigh 2001: 543), are broken down into two articles of legislation. The first, Laws for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour (*Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre*)\(^\text{15}\), set out to ensure the purity of German blood in order to establish a pure folk for the future of Germany. In doing so, this law made marriages and sexual relationships between Jews and Aryans illegal, both within and out with the Reich; it also prohibited Aryans from employing Jews to work in their homes as house or garden staff in order to further restrict the effects Jews might have on Aryans if they remained in close proximity. It restricts Jews from flying German flags, but allows them to show Jewish colours, promising that in so doing they will be protected by the state.

The second law, the Reich Citizenship Law (*Verordnung zum Reichsbuergergesetz*), relieved non-Aryans of their citizenship, drawing a distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘national’; it also clearly delineates what constitutes a Jew and lays out provisions for *Mischlinge*, or those who are part-Jew. It also stipulates that those who are citizens of the Nazi state were specifically obligated to support it. For the Jew, the immediate outcome of that they had to provide their local government branch with the birth or baptismal statements of themselves, their parents and all four grandparents in order to prove their blood-status.

Bearing this in mind, let us return to the comparison of the Nuremberg Laws with the Law prohibiting the continuance of other political parties. The key difference

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\(^{15}\) For full text of the Nuremberg Laws, see (Nuremberg Laws 1935).
between the Jewish problem and the Bolshevik problem is that because of the ethnic affiliation of the Jews as a group, they could not simply change their allegiance. A communist could conceivably change their political orientation; a Jew would never be able to change their blood. While I go into greater detail on this in the next chapter, it is worth noting here; otherwise, one could argue that the passing of the Nuremberg Laws, would have effectively made being Jewish illegal, thus many people would have changed their religious orientation and Jews would have no longer been problematic. Taking Judaism out of the realm of religious orientation, placing it firmly in the realm of race and pairing this notion with ideals of Social Darwinism so integral to the Nazis and other parts of the West at the time, proved to be part of the rationale behind more radical events, such as the Night of Broken Glass.

9 - 10 November 1938 - Kristallnacht

One cannot, however, simply jump from 1935 to 1938 without a brief look at events occurring in and because of Germany during this critical time. Whilst not technically at war until the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, two key military and political victories were ‘won’ by the Reich in early 1938; the first was the Austrian Anschluss on 12 March 1938, the second was the signing of the Munich Agreement signed on 30 September 1938 when Germany assumed control of the Sudetenland. The expansion of German borders and the beginning the attainment of greater Lebensraum did more than fulfil promises made in the early campaigns of the Nazi party in the late 1920s and 1930s. The assumption of more land meant that there were also a much greater number of Jews living under the auspices of the Reich.

16 The tenets of Social Darwinism were influential in both the Armenian and Jewish genocides; they involve the application of Darwinist premises of eugenics not to individual species, but to individual people groups who were considered to be in a life-or-death struggle for supremacy. For works addressing the application of Social Darwinist principles to the Holocaust see Evans (2004). Though there are fewer works addressing the application of Social Darwinist principles to the Armenian
This being the case, it is hardly surprising, but nonetheless noteworthy that following on from the Nuremberg Laws there were further restrictions placed on Jews, all coming from the legal, statutory policies of the Reich. Two weeks after the Anschluss, the NSDAP published a decree under the auspices of the Four Year Plan\textsuperscript{17} that all acts of disposal of Jewish enterprise necessitated permission of the local Nazi government branch. Twelve days after the signing of the Munich Agreement and only two days after Kristallnacht, there was another decree published fining all Jews a billion Reichmarks in order to ‘atone’ for the economic crisis; also published this day was a second decree citing that Jews were no longer allowed to legitimately own retail stores, offer their goods at market, act as economic leaders or be members of any co-operative (Tribunals 20.03.1946). The way in which these events mirror each other is not merely a point of interest, but also a case-in-point example that Nazi policy regarding the Jews grew out of geo-political events as much as out of an ideological compulsion.

Nonetheless, as I argue throughout the empirical chapters of the PhD, ideology also pivots around events; in the case of Kristallnacht, or \textit{Reichskristallnacht}, the weeks preceding the event showed a dramatic upturn in the frequency and ferocity of anti-Semitic articles and inferences in propaganda sources throughout the Reich, primarily because Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish Jew, had shot Ernst vom Rath in the German Embassy (Tribunals 10.01.1946c; NSDAP 1938a, 1938b, 1938c). As usual, a NSDAP meeting had already been scheduled in Munich on 9 November in order to commemorate those who died during the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. However, once Hitler and Goebbels had been alerted to the young diplomat’s death, Hitler ordered a ‘massive, co-ordinated, physical assault’ on Jews (Evans 2005: 581; Tribunals 24.05.1946). Goebbels responded by deploying some of the most radical elements of the Nazi party including the \textit{Sicherheitspolizei} (SiPo) and the \textit{Sturmabteilung} (SA).

\textsuperscript{123} genocide, some good examples can be found in Bloxham (2003; 2005), Al-Azmeh (1991) and Koch (1984).
Their actions developed into what Rubenstein and Roth quantify as a ‘multiple disaster’ (1987: 117); firstly, it resulted in the destruction and looting of thousands of Jewish shops, the arson of hundreds of synagogues, the abuse of unknown numbers of Jews, the death of ninety-one Jews and the arrest and consequent incarceration of over 30,000 Jews in concentration camps. The second ‘disaster’ was done to the Nazi leadership. Generally, the population did not react supportively of the riots and vandalism. Himmler and Heydrich were caught unawares by the action and, in an attempt to win further favour from the Führer, argued strongly that the event was mishandled by Goebbels (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 352 - 353; Coppa 2006: 174 - 175; Kallis 2008: 45).

Eventually, their arguments succeeded and it because quickly obvious that in order to reign in any further ‘mistakes’ a new way of answering the ‘Jewish Question’ was necessary. For instance, a look at the 1946 Military Tribunals reveals that Walther Funk, the NSDAP Minister for Economic Affairs, testified to shock and outrage at the events of Kristallnacht; five days later, once a new approach to these and other anti-Semitic events was formulated, he made a speech characterising them as a ‘violent explosion of the disgust of the German people, because of a criminal Jewish attack against the German people,’ and saying that the elimination of the Jews from economic life followed logically their elimination from political life’ (Tribunals 01.10.1946h).

Nonetheless, there was still a certain progression of other events necessary for policy to change from this dynamic persecution to genocide – though the end point was considerably closer than five years previously. The idea that Jews would be deported and forced to migrate elsewhere was still strongly popular within the regime and understood to be Hitler’s wish for the remainder of Jews in Germany (Tribunals 29.04.1946). Bloxham and Kushner remind their readers that even up to 1940, the

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17 The Four Year Plan was published in November 1936; drafted by Hitler himself in a memorandum in August of that year, it outlined certain economic policies to be put in place in hopes to bring Germany out of economic crisis. For more information see Kershaw (2001b) and Evans (2005).
ghettos constructed were to be temporary collections points for Jews leaving the Fatherland rather than the extermination camps we so frequently equate them with today (2008: 135).

3 September 1941 – Auschwitz receives first import of Jews for extermination

It took less than three years after Kristallnacht for the Nazi regime to shift into genocidal action, made possible by many things, though most scholars agree that the crisis of ‘global war’ found in WWII was the key instigator of the genocide (Gellately 2003: 245 - 246; Winter 2003b). After the outbreak of war in Europe, the key historical events of the time unsurprisingly centre around military events. After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, Germany invaded (amongst others) Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg on 10 May 1940 and Greece on 6 April 1941. The military coup in Belgrade during the night of the 26 – 27 March 1941 saw the overthrow of a government ‘less than forty-eight hours after they had succumbed to Hitler’s threats and signed up to the Axis Tripartite Pact’ (Judah 1997: 113).

During the course of these events circumstances for the Jews had continued to deteriorate; the first ghetto was established in December 1939 in Łódź, Poland (Litzmannstadt), after the invasion; though Łódź was the first, the Warsaw ghetto was the largest and arguably most famous (Adelson, Lapides, and Web 1989; Roland 1992). However, there were numerous ghettos established, mostly along the Eastern Front after the Nazis had established a military victory in an area; these ghettos were varied and had different purposes and roles within the Nazi state (Trunk 1972). Chalk and Jonassohn note that there was ambiguity in the formation of these ghettos in that there was no distinct outcome recognised for the Jews living inside (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 362). Nonetheless, as a critical development in the ratchet-effect of radicalisation, the establishment of these ghettos continued the legitimisation of the ideological necessity of the physical separation of Jews from ‘real’ Germans. It was from these ghettos that most of the workers in the
concentration camps were chosen (Mostowicz 2005), resulting in some of the most foul living conditions known to the twentieth century.

However, an argument can be made that this move from limiting rights and freedoms to ‘ghettoisation’ to concentration was not genocide but extreme persecution, that there was as yet, no deliberate attempt to completely exterminate any nation, only to enslave them. While the argument would be weak and the distinction slight, the argument would be silenced entirely after the events of 3 September 1941 in which Auschwitz received the first intake of Jews for the sole purpose of extermination. Prior to the arrival of this train into the station, Auschwitz had still been one of the most extreme concentration camps. The largest camp established by the Germans, it was housed near Krakow, Poland and dates back to May 1940. Initially, the Auschwitz compound was formed of three camps, Auschwitz I, Auschwitz II (Auschwitz-Birkenau) and Auschwitz III (Auschwitz-Monowitz), led by Rudolf Höss until 1943. Though terrible human rights violations occurred at all three camps, including the spine-chilling medical experiments carried out by the infamous Dr. Mengele at Auschwitz I (Nyiszli 1993: 17 - 18, 63 - 65; Bloxham 2009a: 181) and workings at I. G. Farben by the workers in Auschwitz III (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: 153 - 154, 241 - 243), arguably the worst conditions and largest number of killings were found at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Initially provisioned with two gas chambers, four complete crematorium chambers were erected in 1943 including changing rooms, gas chambers and crematorium ovens (USHMM 2010)\textsuperscript{18}.

After the establishment of Auschwitz as an extermination camp, the progression towards genocide was complete. While overlooked by many scholars, it is important to remember that the next four years of war were not as straight-forward as is sometimes thought, either on the military or the genocidal fronts. Other policy initiatives, such as the \textit{Nacht und Nebel Erlass} of December 1941 and Seyss-

\textsuperscript{18} Unfortunately, there is not room within the bounds of the PhD to expound on the injustices and terrors taking place at Auschwitz or at any other camp, either in the Holocaust or in either of the other two case studies. For more information about the camps see Dawidowicz (1975; 1976).
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Inquart’s decree institutionalising compulsory labour service which resulted in over 500,000 people being sent from the Netherlands to the Reich as interned labourers, attempted to ensure that the anti-Semitic policies were at once legal and, to a great extent, clandestine (Tribunals 30.09.1946j, 01.10.1946m; see also Kallis 2008). This is not to uphold claims made by much of the German populace and Nazi leaders that they were not aware of the tragedy of the Holocaust (Goldhagen 1996; Tribunals 23.01.1946a, 07.02.1946, 10.01.1946a, 10.01.1946c), but to say that the state often did hide the inner workings and directives about the answer to the Jewish Question behind legalities and bureaucratic speak, particularly in their propaganda and within the social spheres of the state.

Nor was the German propaganda machine impervious to attack; until the military losses of late 1942 and particularly the loss of the battle of Stalingrad 2 February 1943, the Nazis were able to claim unilaterally to be ‘the’ authority on truth, giving them a necessary standard of power through legitimacy of the press and media. However, the long duration of war coupled with military losses and repeated attacks by anti-Nazi propaganda from within Germany (Kallis 2008: ch. 6) meant that the strength of state-led propaganda was less reliable and thus, state inspired ideology was, to an extent beginning to wane. Hitler’s withdrawal from the public sphere did little to restore the faith of a weary people. Nonetheless, the Nazi regime was still far from collapse: as Kershaw notes, as the war in the eastern front became more intense with greater losses for Germany, the ‘level of brutality towards its own population was about to rise sharply’ (2001b: 552). The way to recover from these losses then was to ‘eliminate Jewry not only from Reich territory but from the whole of Europe’ (Goebbels in Kershaw 1989: 555); the threat of the Jews, as I will show in Chapter Five were becoming increasingly tied to the ‘menace’ of the Soviet east.

By the time of German surrender in May 1945, approximately six million Jews had been killed in the gas chambers, starved to death, died in medical experiments, executed, died camp-induced illnesses, drowned, beaten to death and their bodies fed to the fires. On top of this number are the millions who were enslaved and suffered
many of the same maladies, including rape, slavery and abject debasement and survived. It is thanks to the work of many other scholars that we are unable to forget the other groups of ethnically and racially ‘lesser’ humans - many of them German - the other approximate seven million who were killed in the Nazi reign of terror, reminding us that it is rarely only the anti-nation who suffer at the hands of their national persecutors. It is theme reflected, as already shown in my Turkish case, in many cases of genocide. Yugoslavia is no exception to this abhorrent rule.

The Balkans

My third case is an outlier in comparison to my other two cases of ‘total’ genocide (Melson 1992: 26 - 29, 1996: 28). The critical difference separating the crisis in Yugoslavia from those in Germany and Turkey is, as discussed previously in Chapter Three, that here we have a case of what is frequently referred to as ‘ethnic cleansing followed by genocidal episodes in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995’(Malesevic 2006: 209). It is important to remember, however, that the distinction between these two events are often blurry, particularly in the academic, rather than the legal, realm; using the definitions I suggest in the previous chapter and keeping in mind the relationship between genocide and ethnic conflict help clarify certain complexities. As the upcoming chapters will show, total genocide – the attempted complete and absolute destruction of one people group from the entire earth – was only ever discussed in my German case in the very latest stages of the conflict on policy and ideological levels and even then only seen as a last resort. More similarly to the Armenian case (Melson 1996), the conflict in the Balkans radicalises to an ideology focused on the destruction of one (and occasionally two) people group(s) from the homeland. Unlike my two other cases, a more complex system of aggression exists wherein each of the three primary groups (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) committed crimes against humanity (Dijilas 2003: 318; Ron 2003: Ch. 3; Weitz 2005: 214 - 219). However, the Serbs tended to act first and most aggressively, seeking out avenues for political gain through nationalist rhetoric and following through with extreme military tactics unused by Croats or Bosniaks to the same degree mostly due
to their military prowess. Nonetheless, the persecutions were less controlled than in my other two cases, less centralised and less systematic; this is indicative of the way in which the Yugoslav state dissolved. As Malesevic suggests, we find an ‘unprecedented institutionalisation of cultural difference had a decisive role to play in the eventual disintegration of the federal state… the roots of the collapse [of the Yugoslav state] are to be found in the very ideas, structures and processes that were created by the state and its political system’ (2006: 162) Mann describes these massacres and desecrations by mostly Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims (herein termed ‘Bosniaks’) as ‘wild’ in a way unfound in the other two cases (2005: 358). Nonetheless, it is the ideology that is so fascinating as it is still an ideology radicalising towards genocide policy and towards genocidal aggression. As discussed in Chapter Two, the process of the radicalisation of ideology in this case completes the spectrum of genocidal ideology in Europe in the 20th century.

The Serbs consider themselves to be one of the ‘true’ modern nations, with kinship and cultural claims going back well into the 1st century AD (Judah 1997: ch 1). However, the conflict in the Balkans is not a history of the Serbs; it is instead a Yugoslav history with roots in a Yugoslav problem. Thus, when recounting the history of the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, we must go back to just before the dawn of Yugoslavia. In 1918, the region’s population was broken down into approximately 39% Serbs (including Slavs), 23.8% Croat (including Montenegrins) and 36% ‘Other’ which included Muslims, Macedonians and Albanians (Judah 1997: 106). This ‘Greater Serbia’ restricted minority rights, causing suffering in particular to the Macedonians and Albanians, though Croats were more vocal about their position as second class citizens. This partially explains Croatian alliance with the Nazis (Fine 2002: 11).

As we have seen in the section above, the Second World War brought sorrow and suffering to many. However, as certain scholars have emphasised (Bloxham 2010), that suffering was in no way limited to the Jews – though my own work focuses on that aspect of Nazism. Nazi support of the Croatian Ustasha government established
in a military coup on 26 – 27 March 1941 sanctioned mass killings of Serbs and sparked a civil war amounting to all but 10 to 15% of deaths from 1941 – 1954, resulting in the deaths of over 500,000 Serbs (Burleigh 2001: 410; Valentino 2004: 77). Before this tragedy occurred, Serbs and Croats had been living under a policy of ‘national unity’ established in 1905 with the Croatian-Serbian Coalition; Nazi support of the Croat surge for power under the Ustasha state destroyed the fragile trust this agreement founded (Judah 1997: 93). At the end of the war, after implementing a certain level of strong-arm tactics against opponents, Yugoslavia was established, formally dissolving the monarchy and vesting power into the hands of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito (Lampe 1996: 226 - 233).

The establishment of a Yugoslav state did not mean immediate establishment of a Yugoslav identity; it took rather a significant amount of Stalinesque-type rule to quell ethnically-driven political dissent (Lampe 1996: 252 - 253). Nonetheless, with the reminders of WWII and Nazi rule still present in memory, fear of Soviet invasion arguably did more to create the ‘us vs. them’ mentality necessary in constructing a new identity, where ‘us’ meant Yugoslavia and ‘them’ meant the USSR. Yugoslavia was never intended to be a fluid entity, more of a salad-bowl approach to government in which each group was represented to create a whole entity. Indeed, Judah remarks that this post-1945 Yugoslavia was strong, ‘not because its peoples were one, but because they were many, and that strength was born of unity...While it sought to accommodate the national interests of most of Yugoslavia’s peoples in a federal system, it also assumed an unchanging unity of interests’ (Judah 1997: 136; see also Neuffer 2001: 5). By the time the 1981 census was taken, 20 – 25% of the population in Bosnia’s largest cities identified themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ rather than as ‘Muslim’, ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’ (Weitz 2005: 203). Yugoslavia at this time was

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19 This is not to say that there were not strong nationalists emerging at this time with pointedly nationalist ideas such as streamlining the alphabet or arguing that one language was distinct from another (Rusinow 2003: 19); however, most of these leaders were exiled or thrown into prison, many...
constructed of six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia, and two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Bosnia-Herzegovina was given its status to keep it from being a region of contention between Serbia and Croatia; indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered to have been the most severe, least democratic of all the republics (Malesevic 2006: 217). Macedonia was given its status to keep it from being a region of contention between Serbia and Bulgaria. Kosovo’s autonomy was granted as a nod to its Albanian population; Vojvodina’s autonomy was granted on the more historical claim that it had never been a part of Serbia, regardless of its 50% Serb post-war population (Judah 1997: 137 - 138).

By the 1970s, some scholars posit that much of Yugoslavia’s initial growing pains had been worked through; decentralisation had picked up momentum, establishing what Ramet terms ‘a network of quasi-feudal national oligarchies’ whose power was entrenched in each republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (2001: 5). This balancing act was only made possible by attempting to limit Serbian bureaucracy to a certain extent; in an attempt to fulfil this need, the 1974 Constitution provided structure through ethnic quotas in multiethnic areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the right of the republics to veto; the Yugoslav economy was booming. As Ramet notes, many Yugoslavs considered the last years of Tito’s reign as a ‘golden age’ in the region’s history (2001: 5).

However, with Tito’s death came confusion. Yugoslavia was largely held together by Tito’s approach to multicultural governance. There was little guidance for what was to be done after the event of his death and, as will be discussed further in upcoming chapters, there was much power mongering as the institutional threads of governance began to unravel. This was paired with rising rates of unemployment and a faltering economic system (Lampe 2003). Here again we see the same sort of power gap emerging as is found in the previous two cases; Tito’s death, economic without trial or cause. This led to an extreme sense of national sentiment when the exiles were able to
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decline and the lack of institutional power independent of his person provided the opportunity for a more radical approach to politics in the Balkans. Though Tito’s death is only one of many early occurrences, institutional and otherwise (Jovic 2009: Ch. 5), adding to the foundations of radicalisation, ideologically it plays a particularly important role.

By the mid-1980s, the nationalism underlying the regional system instituted by the past and present Yugoslav Constitutions began to reassert itself, often, as seen in Chapters Six and Seven, recalling the nationalist sentiment and fervour of WWI. Thus, we see introduced what Oberschall terms ‘the crisis frame’ wherein ‘ordinary people were held collectively responsible for their nationality...[elite] ethno-nationalists did not invent the crisis frame. They activated and amplified it with ‘our nation is threatened discourse’ (Oberschall 2007: 101 - 102). As with the other two cases, this growing radicalisation revolved around certain events, the first of which is Milosevic’s infamous speech to Serbian Kosovars in 1987.

24 April 1987 – Milosevic’s speech at Kosovo Polje

The period of Yugoslavian history between 1987 and 1991 is dominated by political struggles between rising Serbian nationalism promoted by Milosevic and the Serb elite and levels of rising nationalisms in other republics (Malesevic 2006: 177). Rising nationalism coupled with the delegitimisation of Communism ‘set the stage’ for what Pavkovic terms ‘the generation of fears of domination’, fears felt by each nation against other, if not every other, nation (Pavkovic 2000: 98). This was the stage against which Milosevic was to solidify his leadership as a nationalistic figure. With a background in banking and leader of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), Milosevic’s rise to leadership is peppered with back-stabbing and favour-mongering, including the orchestration of his friend and mentor, Ivan Stambolic, the then leader of Yugoslavia (Silber and Little 1997: 40; Ramet 2001:

\[\text{return (Judah 1997: 145; Silber and Little 1997: 29).}\]
Before Stambolic was forced out, however, Milosevic had already made a name for himself as a nationalistic leader, keen on appealing to Serbian masses—though he found little support outside Serbia itself (Lampe 1996: 346 - 349). He did so almost by accident, in an impromptu series of speeches and meetings held over a twelve hour period after a crowd of Serbs attempted to break through police lines and into the building where Milosevic and local communist leaders were meeting.

After the resulting beatings, clubbings and arrests, mostly by Albanian (and a few Serb) police forces in an attempt to stop the mob, led to Milosevic being informed. Cohen describes what occurred next:

> When a dialogue ensured between the demonstrators and Milosevic, they implored him to protect them from the police violence. Acting on a journalist's suggestion, Milosevic re-entered the hall, and proceeded to a second-floor window. From that vantage point he nervously addressed the frenzied demonstrators, and uttered his soon-to-be legendary remarks: 'No one will be allowed to beat you! No one will be allowed to beat you!' Milosevic also invited the demonstrators to send a delegation into the hall to discuss their grievances.

(Cohen 2001: 107)

Cohen goes on to suggest that it was these series of meetings that established in Milosevic's mind the seriousness of the Serbian 'plight'—though, in truth, they had considerably more power and influence than any other national group at the time (Judah 2000: 50 - 55). Certainly, before this series of discussions, he had only refrained from discussing Serb dominance or from using nationalist rhetoric to any great effect (Cohen 2001: 107). Afterwards, however, such language became more frequent, as we will see in forthcoming chapters. Again, perhaps because of the role of Kosovo and the context of this encounter, Milosevic focused on the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia and particularly on Serbians living in Kosovo.
Stambolic’s defeat in December 1987, making room for Milosevic, like many Communist leaders of the time, to enhance the power of his position and party (Weitz 2005: 209). Unlike other Communist leaders, however, Milosevic’s rationale for many of his policy initiatives had an obviously pro-Serb intent. Soon after his takeover of power, Milosevic’s government began allowing media outlets to publicise stories on the corruption of Tito’s regime, thus separating himself from the former regime (Pavkovic 2000: 105). His visit and discussions at Kosovo Polje cleverly revived the Kosovo myth, the idea that Serbs were significantly at risk outside of Serbia proper and had established himself as the leader of a movement bringing them back into the greater Serbian republic; this was followed in 1989 by the passing of Constitutional Amendments allowing Serbia to reintegrate Kosovo and Vojvodina and new legislation enabling Serb deputies in the federal parliament to outvote their Croatian and Slovenian counterparts (Pavkovic 2000: 107-108). Thus, Serbian leadership began to be institutionalised and the idea of ‘Greater Serbia’ began quickly to spread to Serbs in other republics; Borisav Jovic, key aide to Milosevic through the late 1980s and President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia from May 1990, showed in his diaries that by late June 1990, Milosevic was already considering ways in which the areas of Croatia with majority-Serb populations could be subsumed by Serb-led Yugoslavia (Cohen 2001: 147; Jovic 2009: Ch. 7).

June 1991 – Slovenia and Croatia declare independence

In the early years of his presidency, Milosevic remained a strongly centralised leader with a firm grip on the power his position allowed him to maintain. Though much of Milosevic’s support was ostensibly based on his representation of Serbian needs, Serbia resisted democracy within their own republic. However, as post-Communist states began being successfully established across Eastern Europe, Serbia’s non-party pluralism was replaced by a more multi-party approach. Thus, ‘authoritarianism was given democratic legitimation, but in a plebiscitarian manner, in which citizens were presented with a ‘take it or leave it’ choice, designed by a leader…who had emerged during the pre-pluralist one-party system’ (Cohen 2001: 165). With the creation of
the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) in 1990, Milosevic was able to distance himself from the ‘old’ Yugoslavia and claim the establishment of a modern political party. However, with Milosevic at the helm and with his increasing influence over the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), the economy, the increasingly pro-Serb education system, the police and the media, there was little to differentiate the SPS from the former League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) or from the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ), its two father organisations (Lampe 1996: 262 - 263; Cohen 2001: 165, 166). Indeed, as Malesevic reminds us, the only functioning federal institutions were the office of the Prime Minister and the army, neither of which were strong enough to support a faltering state (2006: 178).

The nationalist ideals and policies espoused by the Serbian republic were beginning to chafe other non-Serb ethnic groups. By 1990, most of the six republic presidents were in favour of Yugoslavia’s governance system moving towards a loose federation of sovereign regional states; this would necessarily significantly reduce the amount of power and influence held by both Serbian-led Yugoslavia and the JNA, and it would mean giving up the idea of all Serbs in one state, the foremost component of ‘Greater Serbia’ (Glenny 1996: 37). As we will see in Chapter Seven, Serb leadership incensed nationalist sentiment by staging pro-Serb rallies, aggrandising the dangers faced by Serbs living outside Serbia and using the Serb-led JNA to threaten military intervention if independence were attempted or if Serbian authority was limited within the federation (Weitz 2005: 209).

Unsurprisingly then, institutional changes did little to endear Slovenia and Croatia, the leaders of the independence movement for the six Yugoslav republics, to a Serb-led Yugoslavia. The two republics had been vying for increased powers within the state system since the mid-1980s; thus, after attaining a positive result for independence in the December 1990 elections in both Croatia and Slovenia, a break up of Yugoslavia proper loomed. After increased violence in Croatia’s Krajina region throughout the spring of 1991 and after Germany declared their support, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence after an almost unanimous vote in
their respective parliaments (Weitz 2005: 211; Ron 2003: ch 2). Though upcoming chapters discuss the ideological shifts this event highlights, let it suffice that the ease with which the Serb leadership let Slovenia break off from Yugoslavia and the conflict with Croatia, not over independence but over the right of some areas rather than others to belong to Croatia or Serbia, signalled a shifting commitment away from Serb-led Yugoslavia, to ‘Greater Serbia’.

The immediate outcome of Slovenia’s declaration of independence was a ten day sham invasion by the JNA. The immediate outcome of Croatia’s declaration of independence was outright war, with Bosnia caught in the middle. Bosnia, with its ethnically mixed population, could exist as a state within Yugoslavia; however, with Serb – and to a slightly lesser extent, Croat – policies of ‘all Serbs in one state’, Bosnia was merely a chew toy between the dogs of Serbia and Croatia. Croatian paramilitary forces in Bosnia were arming their supporters, Serb media propagated the idea that Serbs could not exist within an independent Bosnia and the JNA was transferring significant amounts of arms and supplies to Bosnian Serbs to the tune of almost $1 billion (Weitz 2005: 213; Ramet 2001: 158). Ethnic conflict had begun, though the outcome and Bosnia’s role within it, were still uncertain.

1 March 1992 – Bosnian referendum for independence

Bosnia’s road to independence was more of a forced march: either remain a truncated version of itself as a puppet state of Greater Serbia (Bougarel 2003: 113) or declare independence and hope the international community would protect it, as they had promised to do with Croatia – who was receiving arms from the European Community (EC) – and Slovenia (Holbrooke 1999: 31 - 41; Ron 2003: 40 - 41). If independence was declared, Karadzic had already threatened that it would not survive even one day of freedom from Yugoslavia and would ‘lead the Muslim people into annihilation’ (Weitz 2005: 214). In the event that a referendum take place, Karadzic had encouraged Bosnian Serbs to abstain from voting; the Serb-led Yugoslav air force helped spread the word by dropping leaflets encouraging Bosnian
Serbs to boycott the referendum. Nonetheless, on 1 March 1992, over 63% of Bosnian voted, and of those who participated 99% voted pro-independence (Ramet 2001: 205). Almost immediately upon this announcement, and irregardless of EC recognition on 6 April, Serbian troops barricaded Sarajevo and commenced one of the twentieth century’s most infamous sieges.

Boasting one of the richest cultural histories of all cities in the Balkans, Sarajevo has hosted the Winter Olympics in 1984, is home to numerous university students and serves as a base for art, poetry and music. Cosmopolitanism in Sarajevo was a matter of course until the Bosnian declaration of independence. Though Sarajevo had a Muslim majority, the Serbs were better organised (Mann 2005: 385; see also Ramet 2001: 264). Karadzic then announced a plan to separate the city into three main sectors, the largest for Serbs and the smallest for Bosniaks, though the Croats would also have a sector. The Bosniaks’ sector was essentially a ghetto; though the Serbs never did manage to hold onto control over the entire city, a quasi-partition did hold, defined by a line Serb forces had reached while commanding the hills around the city (Oberschall 2007: 106 - 107; Weitz 2005: 215 - 216).

By the time Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic declared independence on 3 March 1992, Karadzic was openly discussing plans of war in order to keep Bosnian regions of Greater Serbia attached to SFRY (Ramet 2001: 205). Thus, concurrent to the siege of Sarajevo, Milosevic ordered attacks on Prijedor, Omarska, Bijeljina, Zvornik and Kozarac, all cities and towns along the so-called ‘Corridor of Life’ across the northern boarder of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Krajina, a Serb-dominated area of Croatia where fighting had been taking place since the Croatian declaration of independence. In contrast to the Croatian conflict, the JNA was not immediately directly engaged on behalf of the Bosnian Serb forces, though Bosnian Serb paramilitaries had been receiving weaponry and tactical officers since early 1991 (Pavkovic 2000: 163); eventually, as we will see later in the PhD, the JNA did openly side with Bosnian Serb militia groups (Malesevic 2006: 182 - 183). Battles for control of the Corridor, or the Posavina valley, were sometimes costly for the
Serbs, but vital in the fulfilment of the idea of Greater Serbia, as it provided the link between SFRY, Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs (Judah 1997: 207 - 209). It was along this corridor where some of the worst camps were established and where some of the greatest crimes against humanity occurred, including the Prijedor massacres and the Omarska, Bosanski Novi and Tmopolje camps, many of which were established, in a macabre turn of events, on the sites of primary and secondary schools (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-99-36-1 2004).

11 – 13 July 1995 – Massacre at Srebrenica

At its height, Serbian forces came to control close to 70 per cent of territory claimed by Bosnia-Herzegovina; most of this territory was secured and stabilised in 1992 and held until the NATO offensive in autumn 1995 (Pavkovic 2000: 164). However, this is not to say that the relations between Serbia and Bosnian Serbs were equally stable. Significant disagreements between Karadzic and Milosevic had driven a wedge between the two leaders personally; politically, Serbia succumbed to (largely economic) pressure through the UN and the international community and imposed an internationally monitored blockade on Republika Srpska, restricting the flow of military supplies to the Bosnian Serb military (Pavkovic 2000: 166). Nonetheless, this did not stop the humanitarian crisis in the region. It did, however, change and modify the projection of ideology in the region. Thus, the last key event my research focuses on is the massacre at Srebrenica which will give us the opportunity to see how these political changes effect the way ideology shifts around this genocidal episode.

Code-name ‘Krivaja 95’, the massacre at Srebrenica began being planned months in advance after an increase in military aggression against the Bosnian Serbs by the UN and NATO (IT-98-33 2008; Silber and Little 1997: 360). The killing of Muslims had already begun, particularly the killing of those in camps, by Bosnian Serb military personnel. Bodies would be scattered around fields and buildings where the killings had taken place, frequently within sight of other prisoners and
Bosniak civilians. Often these killings inspired such terror among remaining Bosniaks that suicides were rife and many fled *en masse* in an attempt to escape further persecution (IT-95-18 1995). Nonetheless, the massacre at Srebrenica was different; not only was Srebrenica a UN-declared safe area, but the massacres themselves also established a new, heightened level of killing.

Once the Bosnian Serbs began to attack the town in early July 1995, the majority of the population sought one of two courses: thousands of elderly men, women, children and some able bodied men sought shelter at the UN compound in Potocari, seeking aid from the Dutch UN troops (DutchBat) stationed there. They remained at the compound until 11 – 13 July when they were forcibly removed by busses and trucks operated by Bosnian Serb militia, a decision made by Ratko Mladic at the time of the attack, the evening of the 11th after famously announcing that the Bosniaks could either ‘survive or disappear’ at a meeting with the DutchBat and Bosniak representatives (IT-04-80-1 2005). The majority of the men who had sought refuge here were then identified and summarily executed (Weitz 2005: 217; Pavkovic 2000: 166; IT-95-18 1995; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006).

A second group of Bosniak men and some women and children numbering around 15,000 sought refuge in the woods towards Tuzla; the majority of this group went unarmed and were civilians or unarmed military personnel. The same night the forced transfer of group A began, the decision was made to destroy those attempting to flee through the woods. Thus, as many as 7,000 to 8,000 men were executed in the immediate days following the massacre within Srebrenica itself. (IT-95-18 1995; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006; IT-98-33 2008).

Thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were executed. Some were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers who captured them and some were killed in the places where they were temporarily detained. Most, however, were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July 1995, in the
region just north of Srebrenica. Prisoners not killed on 13 July 1995 were subsequently bussed to execution sites further north of Bratunac, within the zone of responsibility of the VRS Zvornik Brigade. The large-scale executions in the north took place between 14 and 17 July 1995.

(IT-98-33 2008)

These few days of intensive killing sparked mass killings of a similar nature throughout other places in Serb-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, near the village of Meces, Bosniaks successfully fleeing Srebrenica were encouraged to surrender and guaranteed their safety by Bosnian Serb military personnel. Approximately 350 Bosniak men summarily surrendered. The soldiers then took over one third of them, forced them to dig their own graves and executed them (IT-95-18 1995). Bosniaks in Zepa were given the choice to either be ‘evacuated’ as the Bosniaks in Srebrenica were evacuated or to be overrun by the Bosnian Serb forces (IT-04-80-1 2005; IT-95-5/18-1 2002). As Doubt explains, the latent function of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to significantly change the

normative orientation to which Bosnian Serbs were both dependent and subject as members of the Bosnian community. The objective consequence was to maim the collective sentiments that integrated Bosnian Serbs into their society...the result was to detach Bosnian Serbs from the value elements that they use to make judgement not only about other but also about themselves.

(Doubt 1999: 21)

Conclusion

In many ways, the above Doubt quote can be extended to each case when applied to the disassociation of the persecutor from their moral obligation. Throughout the
differences discussed in each case, this is one of the truths shared between them.

This chapter, however, has attempted to show not only the similarities, but also the complexities and the differences in all three cases. Thus, we see that indeed, each of these three cases are unique. As Dannreuther suggests, ‘each of these wars developed their own dynamic and had their specific causes and origins’ (2001: 17). There are distinct differences, not only in the events themselves, but also in the way these events effected the radicalisation of both state and ideological institutions, something that will be discussed at length in the upcoming chapters.

Nonetheless, there is one significant way in which all three of these cases are similar: in each case, weak government systems led to a power gap into which three ‘new’ regimes were able to insert themselves. In the Balkans, the death of Tito and the lack of continuing multi-ethnic power balance provided the opportunity for leaders to assert the Serbs’ right of dominance throughout the region and the need for the protection of Serb rights above those of other minorities (Judah 1997: 309). This led to a quasi-seesaw aggression, during which the Bosniaks drew the shortest straw. The Weimar Republic crumbled under the weight of the Great Depression and the strictures of the Treaty of Versailles. By the late 1920’s, the party was essentially picked away by the Communists and the National Socialists, with the Nazis finally winning the bones. As we will see, much of their anti-Semitic sentiment present in the early days of the party was founded on policies established by the Weimar state and earlier institutions. The Ottoman state had been struck by the misfortunes of empire – a weak sultan, a failing economy and a loss of geo-political territory. As we will explore more fully in the upcoming chapters, the movement to ‘modernise’ in this case included a more centralised approach to government whose focus on establishing a Turkish identity led to more ethnocentric policy implementation and ideological radicalisation where Christian minorities, and Armenians in particular, were associated with the ‘old’ Empire.

These regimes were then able to acquire a strong foothold, asserting influence and eventually gaining substantial control of political, military, economic and ideological
power through the institutions of the state. Though the focus of the rest of this PhD
is on the path of radicalisation of only one of these four ‘sources of social power’
(Mann 1986), it is critical to remember that within the greater picture of social
conflict, each of these four areas are vulnerable to corruption and to chauvinistic
radicalisation. ‘As each side has gained the upper hand, it has exacted revenge for
past wrongs, forgetting that, in choosing innocent members of the ‘enemy nation’ for
punishment, it creates new wrongs to be avenged and thereby perpetuates the cycle’
(Ramet 2001: 33).
The anti-nation: re-evaluating otherness in the process of radicalisation

Introduction

A basic premise of genocidal ideology is that if national decline is not due to any inherent quality born of the nation, then the current state of affairs must be due to an outside source causing extreme detriment to the national consciousness. The progressive steps toward genocidal action, then, is viewed as ‘preventative murder,’ (Koch and Kershaw in Kershaw 1989: 172) born out of geopolitical instability and shifts in power dynamics. But the question of who is at fault for this national decline must first be answered and certain in the national eye before steps toward national salvation can be taken. While multiple non-national groups exist in radicalising states, one group is most often identified as the ultimate enemy, the absolute antithesis of the national self.

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a new and more targeted way of approaching ideas of otherness in genocidal states. I argue that in these states it is necessary to identify an extreme other-group that goes beyond the bounds of ordinary ‘otherness’. In contrast to the idea that, in genocidal states, the nation is supreme, I call this extreme other the ‘anti-nation’. This chapter goes on to suggest that the process of distinguishing the anti-nation from various other-groups is a critical step in the cumulative radicalisation process of ideology, but does not always occur in the same way. There is a particular difference between my first two cases of Turkey and

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30 As ideas of otherness are not limited to national groups, I have opted to use the term ‘other-groups’ rather than ‘other nations’, ‘non-anti-nation others’ or merely ‘nations’ or ‘others’ to represent them on a macro group level. This then includes not only national groups, such as Kurds and Bulgarians, but also groups classified and persecuted by non-ethnical or racial standards such as the German categorisation of ‘useless eaters’ including homosexuals, mentally unwell and the aged, as well as those classified as political and national enemies. However, the ideological rationale for these killings are, for the most part, outside the scope of this analysis (for further information see: Tribunals)
Chapter Five: Re-evaluating otherness

Germany and my third case of Yugoslavia that suggests that there may be a difference between how different genocides identify the anti-nation.

I begin this chapter by defining the anti-nation, a critical step in furthering the dialogue of genocide studies. I then address the role of other-groups in genocidal states, not merely identifying the anti-nation, but more generally. I do this by looking at otherness as a whole in each of my three cases, identifying key other-groups and only then going on to distinguish the anti-nation from these other-groups historically, culturally and politically.

**Defining the Anti-Nation**

One of the basic tenants of nationalism and genocide studies is that a sense of nationhood establishes an awareness of other-groups outside the nation. Many genocide scholars use this sense of otherness to explain why certain groups are selected to play the scapegoat victim role: because they are unlike the nation, a particular group instils a sense of fear and uncertainty in the nation (for more on otherness and fear see Gagnon 1995; Melson 1996; Young 2001). In this respect, however, I contest the simplicity of the explanation; though the idea that otherness leads to fear and uncertainty is not incorrect, it simply does not go far enough for proper analysis, particularly on an ideological level.

Instead, I propose to begin with a clearer discussion on other-groups in radicalising states. In order to do this properly, however, a brief discussion on victim groups is helpful. As I will discuss at greater length below, victimhood in genocidal states is not linked to only one group; multiple victim-groups occur in almost any state at war and most particularly in cases of states in total war. Mere otherness does not explain the necessity for genocidal levels of action, nor does it help identify, ideologically or otherwise, groups that may be selected in the future for this particular kind of
destruction. In fact, there are varying levels of other-groups, some being allies of the nation, some being enemies of the nation. However, ideologically, the groups that I am particularly concerned with are not merely enemies of the nation, but are instead portrayed as extreme perpetrators themselves, set out to completely undermine the nation. They are shown to be the absolute antithesis of the nation in almost every way; they are represented as the perverse mirror image to the nation’s sanctification. They are what I call the anti-nation.

In their expression of the anti-nation, radicalising ideologies generally associate the anti-nation with the regimes of previous political leadership. They become, in the first instance, stereotypes of negative political and cultural practise. By ideologically rejecting the anti-nation, national elites are rejecting the ‘old’ state and are thereby increasing the legitimacy of their own rule. How this rejection is expressed, however, varies from case to case. Whether or not there are any patterns in how this comes about is a critical aspect of this chapter.

Other-groups in Genocidal States

Each of my three cases have strong ethnic divisions between other-groups on an ideological level; ideas of election imply that the nation is above all other-groups, particularly those within the boundaries of the homeland. Not all of these other-groups, however, experience the same level of ideological animosity during the escalation to genocide. From an analytical perspective understanding the differences between other-groups is vital. Most cases of genocide occur within the greater context of mass death and include multiple victim-groups. However, as we shall see further in Chapters Six and Nine, the identification of the anti-nation in radicalising ideology is critical to legitimising the policy and practice of the genocidal state in such a way as to place the anti-nation outside the bounds of mere otherness. This section seeks to identify the varying levels of other-groups in my three cases of
radicalising states and briefly assess the role otherness plays in the ideology of those states.

Turkey

In Turkey, as the shift from Ottomanism to Turkism occurred under the CUP, the identification of other-groups breaks down roughly into Kurds, Nomads, Arabs, Christians, Greeks and Armenians. The relationship Turkey’s leaders cultivate with each group is unique and tends to shift in order to accord political gain to these elites. For the most part, however, Kurds, nomad tribes and Arabs were ideologically considered different to Turks, but were cast as the ‘closest’ other-groups due to their Islamic heritage and their military alliances under the Ottoman Empire, during the Balkan wars, an alliance that continued in the First World War. Kurdish bands in particular were charged with some of the greatest Armenian massacres recorded by the Germans during WWI (R14078/Ab.9798 10.05.1913; R14079/Ab.12669 25.06.1913; R14086/Ab.23244 31.07.1915; R14090/Ab.5914 3.03.1916).

For the CUP, the term ‘Christian’ is a sort of middle category, though in earlier times this micro-type categorisation was not present. When the millet system was fully implemented, non-Muslim monotheistic believers were categorised as ‘Peoples of the Book’ under Islamic law, and granted dhimmi status. While this was ‘tolerant by the standards of the late Middle Ages and the early modern era, it was nonetheless defined by many discriminatory measures that indicated the inferior position of the non-Muslim monotheistic subjects of the empire’ (Astourian 1990: 117; see also Fine 2002: 7). Under the millet system, dhimmi were divided into groups under Patriarchs based around religious affiliation, such as the Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Jew or Armenian. By the late nineteenth century, however, though the structure of these groups remained, there were varying levels of acceptance per group. The term ‘Christian’ had come to delineate non-Armenian Christians from Armenians. It could include Greeks, which will be discussed momentarily, but was mostly restricted to other Europeans or those of European descent. This distinction is very
important for the CUP; ‘the disciplinary and political measures taken against Armenians should absolutely not be extended to the Christians. Any measures threatening the lives of local [non-Armenian] Christians are to end immediately and should be reported’ (Talat Pasha in Akçam 2006: 187; see also R14078/Ab.4311 1913).

This leads inherently to the role of Armenians and Greeks in Turkish ‘otherness’. Neither enjoyed the same level of ambivalence as the others. Policy dialogue often used similar, derogatory terms in reference to both groups (Toynbee in Staub 1989: 175 - 176). Young Turk animosity toward Greeks living under the crumbling Ottoman empire began before WWI and continued to grow to its zenith after its conclusion. Of most interesting note is the economic policy established 1913 – 1914, redistributing wealth and jobs from the Greek and Armenian communities to Muslims in order to attempt the establishment of what Bloxham describes as ‘a centrally controlled and independent economic system [where] the key positions in the economy [would] be occupied by ‘reliable’ citizens whose interests coincided with those of the state’ (Bloxham 2005: 64). These years proved to be critical for anti-Greek policy, particularly for those living in the Aegean, as they suffered harassment, displacement and expulsion under the CUP. However, the succession of the Balkan Wars saw a postponement of anti-Greek ideology until after the establishment of a Turkish state under Atatürk after WWI21. There was also a certain rationale behind Turkish policy here where, after the Balkan Wars particularly, there was significant reticence at killing any group of European Christians for fear it would incite European animosity against the CUP. National elites were keen to avoid this type of friction, as they were already under significant pressure by the European powers to put an end to Armenian suffering by the implementation of certain reforms (R14078/Ab.9798 10.05.1913; R14078/Ab.4311 1913).

21 For more information on the Greek/Turkish conflict see (Carlson 2001: Part III; Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994; Yildirim 2006)
As we have seen in previous chapters, the Armenian–Turkish conflict had no relapse after the end of the Balkan Wars. In fact, there were significant consequences borne by the Armenians as outcomes of this war, as will be discussed in the upcoming sections. These policies were backed by a radicalising ideology built on a history of Armenian discrimination accepted under the Ottoman Empire, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. At the heart of these problems is, once again, the shifting nature of Europe at the time and a growing mistrust of the Russian empire, an ideological remnant from the influx of Muslim refugees after the Ghazawat uprisings in the northern Caucasus region. After the loss of territory suffered by the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan wars, fears that Russia would seek to enlarge their own empire at Turkish expense began to take hold; this was largely due to the extreme conditions suffered by Muslims meted out by Russians during the Ghazawat uprisings and the Crimean War (King 2008: 95, 97).

At the same time, there was a strong association of the Armenian population with Russians, both because of their religious affiliation and because of the trans-border nature of the Armenian population. There were, in fact, a substantial number of Armenians living in Russia, approximately 1,783,000 in the border region of the Caucasus alone and these Armenians had made certain bids for sovereignty over the region since the early 1830’s (Suny 2004: 121; Staub 1989: 178). Certainly, there were movements during the nineteenth century for greater devolved powers to regions in which Armenians held a majority, both in Russia and in the Ottoman Empire; however, my research suggests that after the CUP took power, there was little desire for Ottoman Armenians to ally themselves with these Russian Armenians in order to found their own state, as Turkish propaganda averred (R14077/Ab.1987 29.01.1913; R14078/Ab.2888 8.02.1913; R14080/Ab.13152 30.06.1913; R1480/Ab.14922 14.07.1913). Though there are events of Turkish Armenian attacks on Turks, the Armenians gave only limited help to Russia and that only occurred

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22 For more information on the Caucasus wars and their consequences, see Hunter (2004: 10 - 20) and King (2008: Ch. 2)
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after some of the most severe action began against them (Staub 1989: 180). In fact, many Armenians openly denied any affiliation with their Russian compatriots, vowing loyalty only to the Turkish state under CUP control. Nonetheless, these realities did little to lessen the perception of threat and the engenderment of fear spawned by elites and ideologues of the time, as we shall see in the upcoming sections.

Certain political outcomes of the Ottoman millet system also did little to help the Armenians during this critical stage. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the millet system was founded under Sharia law. Sharia was not only focused on religious dictates, but also on individual and institutional duties and, in particular, political and judicial dictates, whose regulation was to be carried out by the Ottoman state. ‘The Ottoman system was not merely a theocracy, but a subjugative political organisation based on the principle of fixed superordination and subordination governing the legal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and entailing social and political disabilities for the latter’ (Dadrian 2004: 4). One of the key ‘disabilities’ was an non-Muslim’s inability to become part of the warrior class; instead, they were required to pay a substantial tax to help fund the military. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, this came to be viewed as a positive outcome of their ‘infidel’ status: pay a tax and become exempt from the five years of military service usually expected of Muslim youths. This was a right Armenians were loath to give up, even under the Constitution, as it kept them from having to fight in Ottoman conflicts (Akçam 2006: 33). In short, the Turks ‘were witnessing, on the one hand, the political decline and dismemberment of their empire, and, on the other hand, the theoretical loss of their centuries-old superior status within it, they viewed the Armenians as the allies of the much-hated West and, in the cities, as a cipher for modernity’ (Astourian 1990: 125).

Thus, we see that the Armenians developed the key traits of the anti-nation through the radicalisation of ideological structure: there was a history of homeland claims being made in Anatolia and the Caucasus. This was compounded by the trans-state
nature of the Armenian people as Russia was perceived as a key threat, particularly after the Balkan Wars, and had a similar religious affiliation as the Armenians. The millet system provided a sense of long-standing friction between Muslim and Armenian, aggregated by a loss of national pride due to the loss of wars and territory.

**Germany**

German ideas of ethnic otherness were deeper and more intransigent than those in the Armenian case as the Germans had a clear sense of racial hierarchy distinctive of the Nazi state at this time. While there were certain ideological provisions made toward the rest of the world and their ethnic standing as compared to Germans, the majority of Nazi ideological focus was geared toward Europe and has something of an East-West divide. Those from Northern/Western Europe, countries such as Denmark and Great Britain were of similar blood to the Germans and were considered to be of heightened ‘racial value’ to the Reich; thus, they would stand at the zenith of the racial pecking order. In order to establish this premise as ‘true’, German elites reached back as far as the Holy Roman Empire, or the First German Reich (Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation) and carried on through the glorified mythic histories of the Teutonic Knights to Bismark (Cecil 1972: 65 - 70; Mann 2005: 181 - 182; Hitler 1969 [1925]).

This stands in contrast against German policies regarding Southern and Eastern Europe. Southern Europe, such as Italy and Greece, was to be pitied as they had fallen from their former glory due to racial ‘contamination’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 512). The Czechs and Russians were of some racial ‘value’; that value tended to shift, however, depending on what stage of WWII Germany was in. Whilst regarded with general ambivalence in the thirties, by the later stages of the war, particularly after German occupation of Bulgaria, it was generally asserted that ‘in so far as we do not need them, they may die’ and ‘what these nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me.
only in so far as we need them as slaves for our *Kultur*, otherwise it is of no interest' (Bormann 1942 and Himmler 1943 in Tribunals 30.09.1946j; see also Tribunals 23.01.1946a; Goebbels 1982 [1939 - 1941]: 122, 255; Kershaw 2001b: 276).

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these ideals were occasionally neglected in light of furthering the interests of the *Vaterland*; principles were constantly changed as strategy changed, particularly in light of WWII, where Italians and Japanese were welcomed as allies regardless of their ‘lesser’ status as non-Aryans (Jick 1998: 158).

This leaves us, amongst a barrage of other-groups suffering at Nazi hands, with predominantly Roma, Sinti, Ukrainians, Poles and Jews. The Roma and Sinti people lost somewhere between 200,000 – 500,000 during the Nazi purge; a number mainly lost to most academic scholarship, making it what Bloxham and Kushner call the ‘least abhorred of all Germany’s genocidal operations’ (2008: 85). Perhaps the reason for this oversight and the rationale for the lack of space given them in this analysis is the lack of ideological space given to this particular group in NSDAP rhetoric – in direct contrast to the remaining other-groups. Though, as Milton points out, the so-called gypsies, blacks and handicapped were often discussed in the press, they were not often referred to on a racial, biological or scientific level, but instead on a criminal level; when they were discussed as having the same ‘alien blood’ as Jews, it was generally done in the context of Jewish derogation (Milton 1990: 269 - 271). Ukrainians, while suffering terrible losses at the hands of Germans, never faced the same virulent spite shown to Poles, whose ethnic standing gave them the hope of offering only one thing to the Reich – their work. ‘The standard of living in the country is to remain low; we want only to draw labour forces from there’ and later ‘the Pole must feel...there is only one duty, namely, to work and to behave himself” (Frank 1940 and 1939 in Tribunals 10.01.1946b). However, though the Nazis did eliminate a vast portion of educated, non-Jewish Poles, German ideology was explicit in that they were to remain alive under the NSDAP after the war and might be able to govern themselves at a local administrative level after some time (Tribunals 10.01.1946b; Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 86; Mann 2005: 186).

Nonetheless, to ignore the policies of violence against these groups is to ignore the
greater context of violence present in the Third Reich which suggests that it was more than ‘mere’ antisemitism that provided the primary motivation for Nazi aggression against their own peoples (Milton 1990; Nolzen 2002).23

Rubenstein and Roth pick up on this same phenomenon, pointing to a distinction made here between ‘subhuman’ and ‘nonhuman’ other-groups, stating that this distinction was made to advance Nazism’s ideological and political aims (1987: 5). This approach, however, overlooks a deep-seated anti-Semitism prevalent throughout Europe for, in some areas, thousands of years. Events of Jewish hatred are rife throughout the ancient world. Even such thinkers as Horace, Caesar Augustus, Cicero and St. Augustus openly decry the Jews for their various ‘crimes’ through the centuries (Feldman 1986: 17, 18 - 19; Abel 1975: Ch. 9; Littell 2000). Europe in the Middle Ages is pock-marked with instances of anti-Semitic myth, from blaming the Jews for the maliciousness of the Black Death to the popular belief that Jews killed and ate children, particularly at Passover, by mixing their blood into the unleavened bread (Coppa 2006: 17, 20).

By the 19th century, politicised antisemitism stemmed primarily from the economic privation of the 1870s and 1880s and, later, an increase in Jewish population due to immigration after the Russian pogroms of the 1880s and 1890s (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: 97). German antisemitism was led in part by extremists Ernst Herici and author Hermann Ahlwardt, who suggested that Jews had an all-powerful hold over German society and thus was to blame for the economic failures of the times.

Richard Evans credits Wilhelm Marr’s pamphlet, The Victory of Jewdom over Germandom Viewed from a Non-confessional Standpoint, 1873, with the disassociation of Jewishness from religion; Marr insisted on separating the Jews as a racial minority, rather than as a religious minority. Using this mentality, some enclaves of German society, mostly lower-middle-class writers, began promoting total Jewish exclusion from German society and culture. Though visible, however,

23 More on this topic will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
this viewpoint was hardly popular ideology. The SDP stood in resolute opposition to any such movements, regarding them as ‘backward and undemocratic’ (Evans 2004: 29; see also 24 - 30).

Nonetheless, the nineteenth century set a terrible model for state sanctioned treatment of ‘lesser peoples’. Colonisation provided ample opportunities for the trampling of indigenous societies for the betterment of the colonising state (Moses 2004: 49 - 50; Bloxham 2009a: 37). This phenomenon is hardly limited to Germany – indeed, some of the greatest atrocities were committed by Belgium in the Congo, the United States in the Philippines and the United Kingdom in India. However, a precedent is set here for the treatment of ‘subhuman’ groups in order to produce a certain outcome for the betterment of the state; Germany, particularly after the Berlin Conference of 1884, was a vital part of those shifts in state policy, where nationalism, and the provisions it provides regarding the elements of racial hierarchy, became an invaluable metre against which to measure the worth of other-groups.

Moving into the twentieth century, the First World War, not only served as the cover for the Armenian genocide, but also provided a theatre of change regarding German policy and the Jews\textsuperscript{24}. Throughout the nineteenth century, Germany refrained from initiating extreme anti-Jewish policies, such as pogroms, unlike many of their neighbours. However, the pro-German nationalism inspired by WWI led to a heightened level of antisemitic propaganda in which Jews were labelled as ‘draft dodgers’ (Bajohr 2006: 185). After the implementation of the Weimar constitution in which Jews were granted full and equal citizenship rights, this restraint began to change and Jews began to face significant societal violence and discrimination, including exclusionary policies and sporadic burning of synagogues (Burleigh 2001: 329; Bajohr 2006: 185; Borut 2000).

\textsuperscript{24} For an interesting perspective on German policy towards Jews during WWI, see Fischer’s (1962) Griff nach der Weltmacht which credits many Nazi antisemitic decisions to policies implemented during the Weimar Republic. His claims that there is a direct continuum between the two policies are carried through his later works, particularly Bündnis der Eliten translated as From Kaiserreich to Third Reich (1986) and Hitler war kein Betriebsunfall (1992).
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Massive economic shifts, a result of both the Great Depression and the loss of WWI, are one of the key reasons behind this change in society’s acceptance of a trend toward an antisemitic political culture (Aly 1999, 2007; Benz and Dunlap 2006; Browning and Matthäus 2004; Burleigh 2001; Dawidowicz 1975; Evans 2004; Stachura 1978). This served to fuel belief in the Jewish conspiracy to bankrupt the German state. This sort of conspiracy-theorist thinking harks back to the medieval stereotype of the Jewish money lender, gleaning money off the poor, and the association of Jews with Judas, the betrayer of Jesus, popularised during the Dreyfus scandal (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: Ch. 4; Chapman 1972). It was in this Zeitgeist that Hitler and the NSDAP began their ascent to power and allowed the antisemitism of the Nazi elite to flourish.

Now is perhaps the moment to discuss another key aspect of the Holocaust and Germany’s relationship to the Jewish anti-nation. More than in either of my other two cases, the biological connotations of race are vital to understanding Nazi ideology. In fact, the biological language of NSDAP propaganda went a long way in making a case for the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust, popularized in the 1960’s and 1970’s by scholars such as Nolte (1969) and Winkler (1978). Similar to the Turkish case, ideas of Social Darwinism provided the foundation for much of Nazi ideology and policy. However, the manifestation of the biological aspect of Social Darwinism had grown and radicalised since the First World War and the fall of the Weimar Republic. As mentioned above, racism was a predominant feature of colonialism from most Western states; however, the manifestation of the biological language of racism to such a great extent is unusual, both for the time and also in comparison to other cases of genocide. For instance, examples exist in the Turkish and Serbian cases in which ideological leaders have intimated that members of the anti-nation were less than human (Glenny 1996: 57). However, this type of biological language, while present, was rarely used in popular dialogue; instead the focus tends to be on the ‘infidel’ or ‘traitor’ rather than on the ‘cancerous microbe’ or the ‘pungent mucus’ found in the German case; it is important to bear in mind that this is both a reflection of and reflected by the Germans’ dedication to the growing interest in
science and scientific breakthroughs occurring throughout the West during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As we will see more specifically in the next chapter, for the Nazis, the biological focus on the detrimental of the Jewish other group on the German nation is clear and present throughout their rise to power and the course of their regime.

Thus, we see the prime ideological elements of the anti-nation projected onto the Jews. Though there were no homeland claims made by the Jews on German territory, there was a distinct religious separation at the heart of a history of European antisemitism. The Jews were indeed a transnational group, with a history of persecution without political retribution in many European states, including Germany itself under the Weimar Republic and beyond. This resulted in the lethal combination of the collapse of empire with an increased Jewish population due predominantly to Russian pogroms of the late 1800s, a sense of national shame and a perceived financial imbalance between Jew and German.

**The Balkans**

When looking at this as an example of ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes, we see that of all the three cases, the Balkan case seems to have the least variance between non-Serb other-groups, particularly as the conflict progresses through the 1990s into the twenty-first century. Jacques Semelin notes that ‘new [Serb] power fed itself on aggressiveness: the destruction of whatever was not Serb’ (2003: 361) and points to the utopian notion of ‘Greater Serbia’ predominant in Serbian ideology until the mid-nineties. Nonetheless, analysing the shifting relationship between Serbs and non-Serb other-groups, and particularly the complex links between Kosovar and Bosniak, is enlightening when considering the way in which a particular other-group is singled out in a more radical way that all others. This also directly relates to the variation of the path of ideological radicalisation within the case and particularly how the agency of ideology is restricted and constrained by structure ideology establishes.
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It is helpful to remember that though Yugoslavia is dealing with internal collapse, as are the other two cases, the geographical boundaries and homeland claims are smaller than in either Germany or Turkey, a trait typical of cases of ethnic cleansing and partial genocide\(^{25}\). Instead of homeland claims leading to or justifying external wars of aggression, Yugoslavia in the early 1990s is a case of disputed borders and mixed nationalities within these contested areas; though this creates a number of complexities and differences when compared to the other two cases, a limited geographical space inherently limits the number of other-groups present. The primary groups of the region during the conflict are Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Kosovars, Croatian Serbs, Kosovar Serbs and Bosniaks.

Both Serbs and Croats make nationalist claims that go back as far as the seventh and sixth centuries, when Slavonic speakers moved into the Balkan region. Croatian tribes moved south, down the coast and soon found themselves subject to the Roman Catholic Church, while Serbs and Slavs remained in the north and were under pressure from the Orthodox communities popular in that region. This provides the basis for the popular understanding that these two communities are of the same blood, but are of different religions, thus opening up the possibility of becoming, through changes in language and religion, Croat or Serb.

Perhaps surprisingly, the same claim was sometimes made about Muslims in the region as well. The Ottoman Empire invaded the Balkan peninsula in 1459, conquered Bosnia in 1463 and Herzegovina in 1483; Turkish invasion signaled the end of independent rule in the entire region until the early nineteenth century (Judah 1997: 17) and was a time where the Christian heritage of Yugoslavians came under threat. Nonetheless, until the time of the Balkan wars only two main people groups converted \textit{en mass}, the Albanians and the Bosnians. Malcolm is quick to emphasise that this was hardly the first encounter Yugoslavia would have had with Islam, due to its key geography on the Dalmatian coast (1996: 51). However, it is frivolous to

\(^{25}\) This will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Eight.
overlook the importance of this early ‘colonisation’ and conversion. It is perhaps the ‘most distinctive and important feature of modern Bosnian history’ (ibid). Turkish rule saw the implementation of the millet system explained earlier, harvest and livestock taxation, all of which became gradually more exploitative as the Ottoman Empire declined in power through the early twentieth century (Lampe 1996: 19 - 21; Fine 2002: 7).

As in Turkey and Germany, the mid-nineteenth century was a critical time for the Balkan region and the establishment of national identities beyond allegiance to a state or religious leader. It was during this time that Ilija Garasanin (1812-1874) first articulated a Serb national identity and began circulating in secret his Nacertanije, or draft plan, for South Slav unity under Serb leadership (Judah 1997: 56; Drapac 2010: Ch. 1). By 1905 and the founding of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition it seemed that the fulfilment of this dream was within reach, particularly after winning the Croatia-Slovenian elections of 1906. Central to its platform is the idea of national unity, a precursor to Yugoslavism (Judah 1997: 93).

These national alliances, however, were for the most part utterly destroyed during WWII. Malcolm describes the state of Yugoslavia in the Second World War aptly as ‘the story of many wars piled one on top of another’ (Malcolm 1996: 174). The initial conflict was the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy; then was the resulting annexation of Yugoslavia followed by its resulting action in the war against the Allied forces and the continued aggression of Axis power holders against Yugoslav resistance fighters. Most pertinent to this analysis, and this chapter on the anti-nation in particular is the aggression of the Croatian Ustasha against the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, in which over 1 million deaths occurred (Carmichael 2010: 7)26. This aggression and the tragedies occurring during this time period were, as we shall see in Chapters Six and Seven, crucial in stirring

26 For more information on the role of Yugoslavia in WWII, see Chapter Two, Four, Schöpflin (1993), Mann (2005: 294 - 298), Malcolm (1996: Ch. 13; 1998: Ch. 15), Glenny (1999: Ch. 7) and Lampe (1996: Ch. 7).
up mistrust and animosity within Serbian propaganda. During this time period we see a reinforced system of ethnic aggression, primarily between the Ustaša and the Serbs, though there were substantial killings of Jews and Gypsies as well, through mistreatment, executions and internment (Drapac 2010: Ch 4).

Tito attempted to recreate Yugoslavia by removing the animosity left in the wake of WWII; ideology at the time attempted to smooth over national differences by focusing instead on a multinational Yugoslavism governed by socialist democracy based on ‘the cornerstone’ of self-management (Tito 1978 in Jovic 2009: 73). The expressed hope was that nationalist tendencies would eventually fade from memory; however, as happens so often, these restrained national freedoms led to heightened tensions because Communist Yugoslavia instituted policies of regional and national decentralisation which reified national identities in a different peace-time frame, resulting in an early but key contradiction present in Tito’s government (Malesevic 2006: 211; Oberschall 2007: 100) A result of these tensions is the acknowledgement of ‘Muslim’ as a national identity in 1971 with hopes that doing so would lessen tensions between Croat and Serb identities. Less a religious movement, leaders such as Izetbegovic were keen to see a more secular involvement of Muslims into the political scope of the Yugoslav government. Nonetheless, there was also a revival of Islamic dedication to the faith which no doubt bolstered the secular political movement by legitimising the augmentation of power (Malcolm 1996: 200 - 201; Carmichael 2010: 1); official ideology of the time asserted that Muslims expressed their identity through ‘the creation of a synthesis of spiritual traditions and new spiritual, literary, political and cultural features’ (in Pavkovic 2000: 94 - 95). Tito’s government had the tricky job of holding together various national groups, some with ever radicalising individuals at their heads. Many nationalist movements were dealt with by exiling nationalist radicals, or, as with Tudjman, they were sentenced to prison (Silber and Little 1997: 29). Part of this radicalisation came as a consequence of the exertion of political power by Muslims under Tito, both Bosnian and Kosovar, and the rewriting of the Yugoslav Constitution in 1974, though the primary national identity at the time was still that of pan-Yugoslavism.
Nonetheless, throughout the sixties and seventies, the differences in national orientation begin to become more entrenched. Not only was a Muslim identity given national political status, but rifts between Serbs and Croats began to deepen as well. The first strong blow to strike against pan-Yugoslavism occurred in 1967 when Croat intellectuals declared that the Croatian language and alphabet were entirely separate from Serbian. This in turn, led to Serbian insistence that schools in Croatia teach Serbian children in Serbian and that they use the Cyrillic alphabet rather than the Latin alphabet used in Croatian (Lampe 1996: 305; Judah 1997: 145). This is a critical shift in a community where language, rather than race, is a key element to national identity (Banac 1994: 144; Pavkovic 1994: 444). Many Serbs professed fear over any growth in power for non-Serbs due to the Croatian Ustasha violence in WWII. This fear and the legacy of ethnic conflict established during WWII was to become a key element of ideology in the break-up of Yugoslavia as will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. In short, we see that Malesevic is right; the fear of humiliation and status degradation plays a significant role in accounting for popular support of rising Serb nationalism (Malesevic 2006: 182).

Changes implemented in the 1974 Constitution helped further this sort of fear for Serbs, particularly as Serb dominion over the region was distinctly lessened (Banac 1994: 148 - 149). Previous federal constitutions had not granted Kosovo or Vojvodina, the two autonomous provinces in the region, legal status. They were instead granted legal status only by the republic in which they resided – Serbia; this changed under the 1974 Constitution. Similarly, the other five regions of Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted equal rights to Serbia under federal Yugoslav law. At the time, this sort of political balance provided stability amidst political change and economic boom (Ramet 2001: 5). Indeed, the late seventies did see a lessening of nationalist discourse; however, Tito’s death in 1980 provided a political vacuum which once again reignited nationalist claims and ideological themes of entrenched otherness.
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Here is where we begin to see a disassociation of the ‘Muslim’ identity. Again, based in the 1974 Constitution, any of the six republics could legally withdraw from the Yugoslav confederation; the two provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo could not do so. Thus, the idea of the ‘enemy within’ expressed so obviously in both of my other cases shifts in Yugoslavia depending on the immediate threat to Serbs in the greater Yugoslav arena and on the changing political aims of those in power; we will see this in more detail in Chapters Six and Seven. The first enemy of the nation expressed in national Serbian ideology is not merely Muslims, but Kosovars. Through the eighties we see heightened anti-Kosovar rhetoric and propaganda specifically focused on the cultural and ethnic differences established in a Muslim community.

Also of interest during this time period is the shift away from the idea of ‘brotherhood and unity’ towards an ideology of ‘togetherness’; where ‘brotherhood and unity’ represented a Yugoslav identity, ‘togetherness’ implied a state of ‘separate but equal’ existing among the different national groups. As Pavkovic remarks, during this time of ‘togetherness,’ ‘all citizens were assumed to belong to a recognised nation or nationality of their birth (or were of mixed nationality) but no one could legally be a Yugoslav, as this was not a recognised national group’ (2003: 253).

However, fears of loss of political control through the independence movement changed this ideological focus from Kosovo, an autonomous region intrinsically tied to Serbia through the 1974 Constitution and strong historical claims, to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a province with supposedly equal rights and the ability to legally opt out of the confederation. Bosnia at the time held a Bosniak majority, but a very strong Serbian minority of 42% (Carmichael 2010: 7). This independence movement changed not only geographic homeland claims, but also refocused the idea of the national enemy from Kosovar to Muslim, and, at the time, specifically to Bosniak. In short, the build-up to Croatian secession and Germany’s acceptance and support of Croatian independence provided Milosevic and other Serbian ideologues a rationale
to use Kosovo as justification to legitimise attacks on the Bosniak anti-nation (Malcolm 1998: 349 - 351; Glenny 1996: Ch 3), linking the two groups together through religion while separating them ethnically. Thus, again we see an ideologically constructed structure constraining the way ideology acts as agency through this shifting relationship. In order to fulfill the pre-established structure, ideologically shifts had to be legitimised in manner connecting one enemy to another.

From both a policy and an ideological standpoint, the Serbian elite’s initiative for a pure homeland under the auspices of Greater Serbia sets them apart from the other groups, not only as aggressors, but as a radicalising body focused on ethnically-led atrocities regardless of actual national threat. As Malesevic suggests,

because the communist regime had not allowed subtle discussion on the Second World War massacres and genocide committed by the Ustasha regime against the Serbian population in the Nazi-sponsored Independent State of Croatia, nor the crimes committed by the Serbian Chetnik paramilitaries against Bosnian Muslim and Croatian civilians, this space was also open for the new elites...With the help of ethnosymbolism, new enemies replaced old ones. Instead of the ‘capitalists’, ‘fascists’ and ‘Western imperialists’, the new sources of fear because the revamped Ustashas/Croats, Chetniks/Serbs and Islamic Fundamentalists/Bosnian Muslims (Malesevic 2006: 181)

By the early nineties, Serb ideologues began to insist that the only way to achieve complete Serb autonomy in conclaves where Serbs were in a majority was to implement policies of deportation, banishment and liquidation of the non-Serbs present; no more than 2% of the population could be non-Serb (Radoslav Brdjanin in IT-99-36-1 1999). Thus, as we will visit further in the next chapter, the ideological focus is divided: firstly, there is the impetus to cleanse all of greater Serbia from non-

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27 This ideological equation of Bosniak to Kosovar also completely overlooks the fact that Islam played a relatively minor role in the politicalisation of Kosovo, even if it did produce a more unifying factor in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Malcolm 1998: 351)
Serbs; secondly, there is the drive to eliminate all Muslims from particular geographical conclaves.

It is important to take note that in this case in particular, atrocities were committed by each group, including the Bosniaks, to some level. There are cases of Croats acting without remorse, killing both Serbs and Bosniaks just as there are cases of Serbs massacring both Croats and Bosniaks. There is also the most unusual and oft overlooked Muslim uprising in the Bihac pocket from 1993 to early 1995, provoking the exodus of approximately 20,000 Muslim refugees fleeing from members of their own ethnic group sent from Sarajevo to quell a threat to their own power (Glenny 1996: 288; Judah 1997: 244 - 245). In fact, most UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force [in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina]) troops killed between 1991 and 1995 were killed by Muslims, a fact often overlooked in Yugoslav scholarship (Bethlehem and Weller 1997: 598 - 599). Another illuminating point is that the charges of genocide against Karadzic, Mladic, Tolimir, Persic, Milosevic and others are only for crimes against Muslims; different charges, namely those of persecution, murder, and extermination, are used to legally prosecute the persecutors of the remaining other-groups. It is, in short, a matter of an organised force whose command structure is statist (IT-02-04-19 2002). It is the Serbs within Bosnia-Herzegovina who are charged with committing the worst crimes against Bosniaks (IT-95-5/18 2008a; IT-95-18 1995; IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-95-5/18 2008b). Serb and Bosnian-Serb ideology itself also provides substantial support for the identification of the Bosniaks as the anti-nation as will be discussed in the following chapter.

Thus, as the Bosniaks are a substantially large ethnic group, identified by the nation, they are then comparable to Jews and Armenians – victims of total genocide – though the identification of their ‘otherness’ has come about in a more complex and perhaps more modern way; these differences might help us understand why total genocide did not occur in the Yugoslav case. As Bringa reminds her readers, the religious aspect of the Bosniak identity was, though greatly emphasised by the press and the greater Muslim community, largely created by Serb and Croat propaganda
Chapter Five: Re-evaluating otherness

(Bringa 1995: 25). In truth, regional and national party leaderships were forced, over the years, to institutionalise cultural and ethnic difference in order to secure legitimisation for state control. On a national level, ‘once this political door was prised open there was no turning back’ (Malesevic 2006: 180). Critically, it is the Bosniak’s homeland claims that lead them to this position; the breakup of Yugoslavia is not a war fought over national existence, but over the mismatch of claims to historical homelands and modern national borders.

Analysis

Broadly, there are five characteristics of the anti-nation found in the cases I use in the course of this project; the level and extent to which these characteristics are present do vary from case to case, something that I would equally expect in other cases of genocide, particularly in cases of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial genocides, regional genocides or partial genocides. For instance, as regards 1) homeland claims, some scholars suggest that in Turkey and in Yugoslavia, it was claims of land that separated the anti-nation from the nation and put these particular other-groups at maximum risk as they were claiming Anatolia and Bosnia, respectively, for their own when these lands were also being claimed by the nation as critical to national progression (Melson 1996: 166). However, as analysis of the Holocaust shows us, this is not a necessity for a victim group; the Jews were not generally portrayed as seeking to annex parts of the Vaterland for their own particular national goals in the same way that the Armenians were believed to do and the Bosniaks actually did do. Thus, it is important to remember that, while contestable homeland claims can be points of contention between nation and anti-nation, fear of a loss of homeland need not be at the forefront of ideology in radicalising states.

Similarly, the use of 2) religion in genocidal states, both on an institutional and symbolic level, has been addressed at great length and with good reason (Dietrich
1994; Fox 2004a, 2004b; Frisch and Sandler 2004; Kershaw 2002; Gagnon 1995: 141; Peterson J. B. 2002: 455; Banac 1994: 161; Streng 1974: 57). Nation formation is the way in which ethnic elites ‘select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups’ (Brass in Robinson 1994: 218). Religion inherently helps elites accomplish this by being a primary provider of myths and symbols for genocidal states. Religion streamlines customs, provides the structure for a belief in common descent and unifies historical perceptions, thereby becoming one of the primary culture bearers – even in seemingly secular states. Perceived religious marginalisation offers elites a foundation to build upon the fear of the nation against the anti-nation. Accordingly, radicalising states use religion not only to gather support for their political agenda, but also as a way to set in opposition nation and anti-nation.

Nonetheless, the way in which this is accomplished varies in each of my three cases. Religion for the Southern Slavs was always a force of identification and, as we will see in Chapter Six, became even more important in the establishment of both the Serbian nation and the Muslim anti-nation. The role of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox church was vital on an institutional level and also for the symbolic, historic ties they offered to their respective audience, thus legitimising relations between other-groups (Levine 1986: 431; Sells 1998). In the Turkish case, we see that the CUP was secular in the earliest days of their rule, but as ideology radicalised there is a distinct turn towards Islam to provide further legitimacy for the institution of extremist policies and to provide a further element of structure for the ideology itself. Thus, though the nation and anti-nation are generally associated with different religious groups, that association had to be cultivated by national elites over the course of the conflict, as will be seen further in the next chapter. The German case is perhaps the most complex in its relationship with religion. From a policy perspective, the enmity between the Nazi state and both the Lutheran and, more emphatically, the Catholic church grew over the course of Nazi reign.
Religion can also be one of the factors influencing the alliances of the anti-nation with surrounding states. The anti-nation is often allied, either realistically or fictionally, with other national enemies; when these enemies are perceived as directly threatening the nation, particularly during times of war, the threat of the 'enemy within' is exponentially increased. This serves to be particularly true regarding the Armenians in Turkey and their perceived alliance with Russia. Nonetheless, illusory political and ethnical alliances can be of equal weight regarding the importance of alliances in distinguishing the anti-nation from the remaining other-groups; for example, the perceived association between Jews and Bolsheviks was critical for the radicalisation of anti-Jewish policy (Kallis 2008: Ch. 3).

To say that the anti-nation usually includes individuals from a range of economic and social backgrounds is merely to imply that the anti-nation is not restricted to a class or political group. Unlike cases of politicide, classicide and gendercide (Mann 2001: 210; Jones 2004) where the victims are members of one particular political, class or gender group, the anti-nation usually has victims from a large range and variety of groups – the one exception, as discussed above, usually being religion.

Lastly, in each of my three cases, there is a strong perception of historical animosity between the nation and anti-nation; to what extent this perception is ‘true’ rather than another ideologically constructed myth will vary. For instance, there is a long-standing history of anti-Semitism throughout Europe predating the medieval period and continued through the Russian pogroms of the late 19th century; the Nazis were able to build on this animosity to further assure the German public of the ‘rightness’ of Nazi policy regarding the Jews. This can be contrasted with the more constructed history of violence between Muslims and Serbs in Yugoslavia where the two groups had lived in relative peace since Ottoman rule. Nonetheless, the perception of historical violence allowed national elites to drive a further wedge.

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between the nation and this particular other-group, further singling out the anti-
nation from the remaining other-groups.

**Conclusion**

This first chapter on the anti-nation has set out to introduce the idea of the anti-nation to the dialogue of genocide studies and to emphasise the difference between the anti-
nation and mere otherness. Each of my cases suggests that the identification of other-groups is not enough to fulfill the ideological goals of the nation. Even in cases where an enemy is not historically identified, such as in Yugoslavia, one is likely to appear in order to achieve legitimacy for other national goals (Staub 1989: 17). Robert Lifton argues that in situations of extreme trauma, regimes promising revitalization and renewal of the nation culminate in genocidal ideologies bent on destroying a ‘designated victim’ who appears to threaten the nation (in McCormack 2003: 282). In societies where ethnicity is foundational to nationality, ethnicity is also used to justify the identification of this designated victim. Often, these are cases where ethnic labels are transformed to serve new frameworks of identity, returning to their ‘ethnic past’ in order to fulfill the quest for authenticity (Appadurai 2002 [1998]: 287; Smith 1998: 194).

While the nation is regarded as the pinnacle of the ethnic and racial order, the anti-
nation is portrayed as a malevolent disease, infecting the Volk, particularly in cases with a tangible racial order, such as the Holocaust and, to a lesser extent, the Armenian genocide. For example, a letter published in the Armenian press at the start of the first world war expresses this policy with distressing clarity, reading that the “Turkish sword to date has cut down millions of gâvurs [infidels], nor has it lost its intention to cut down millions more hereafter. Know this: that the Turks have committed themselves, and have vowed to subdue and to clean up the Armenian gâvurs who have become tubercular microbes for us” (Balakian 2003: 173).
In this chapter, we have seen that ideology serves to provide a structure in which anti-nation identities develop. As that structure is forced to shift due to varying geopolitical changes, ideology as agency is constrained though at varying levels between cases. If it is true that there is a variance in the level of otherness present in radicalising states, then further analysis is necessary into how the idea of the anti-nation affects the cumulative radicalisation process of ideology. The next chapter leaves this discussion on otherness and focuses instead on what role the anti-nation plays in radicalisation, determining the ways in which it remains static and how increasingly extreme policies bring about increasingly extreme ideological change.
The anti-nation: ideological development

Introduction

The previous chapter introduced and defined the concept of the anti-nation; next, in order to explore the validity of the concept, I propose to explore the presence of the anti-nation in radicalising ideologies by focusing on two questions: 1) Are there any recurring themes or patterns in ideology as it relates to the anti-nation? and 2) What are the key elements of the relationship between anti-nation ideology and policy? In short, referring back to the discussion in Chapter Two regarding structure and agency, my goal here is to further discover the ways in which the structure of radicalising ideology reflects, projects, absorbs and disseminates patterns and themes relating to the anti-nation; equally, I am interested in addressing the ways in which the agency of state elites both effects and is effected by structural shifts that pertain to the anti-nation.

The purpose of this second anti-nation chapter is to discover the main themes regarding the anti-nation in each time period of each of my three case studies. I am seeking to ascertain whether or not ideology is a vehicle for dehumanisation and if my cases demonstrate the ideological objectification of the anti-nation as a threat whose elimination will allow the nation to flourish. This analysis becomes even more critical when viewed in light of radicalising policies and events in each case.

Building on the last chapter that established the anti-nation as different from various other-groups central to the regions involved, I move on to each of my three cases, using time periods demarcated by key developments in the ideological dynamisation process set out in Chapters Two and Four. The analysis section focuses on the key themes arising in each case in comparative perspective, discussing the similarities and differences thematically in light of geopolitical change before drawing out key conclusions in my final section.
Chapter Six: Ideological development of the anti-nation

Turkey

‘How will these weak people undertake this three-month long trip through rain and heat, without money, without a guide, without wagons? Are we to go without a word? In Europe, we are nothing. Food of the Volk disbursed’

(Joseph Melchisedekian, Bishop of the Catholic Armenians in R14088/Ab.28584 14.06.1915)

Armenians under the late Ottoman State

As mentioned in Chapter Five, under the Ottoman Empire, the acceptance of Christian peoples in a Muslim state was considered routine, provided the non-Muslims were fully cognisant of their unequal status. Classified as gâvur (infidel) and rajah (cattle), Armenians were not allowed to own weapons, were legally required to allow Turks and Kurds house and quarter for as long as necessary, for themselves and for any livestock; Armenians were also expected to be deferential in public, pay higher taxes than Turks or Kurds and have no legal standing under the law when their case was put against a Muslim (Bryce, Toynbee, and Sarafian 2000: 617; Astourian 1990: 117 - 120). Nonetheless, the Ottomans, with policies of taking Armenian women as wives or otherwise into their households, had engineered a system through which Armenians could be Ottomanised, particularly if taught to be so at an early age. ‘Boy collection’, or the abduction of Armenian boys by Ottoman officials became ever more popular throughout the Empire. Young children would be taken from their families, forced to convert to Islam, reared in Ottoman households and put to work in the Ottoman military or civil service. Massacres, particularly in the mid and late 1890s, were used to force the Armenians into continued submission, regardless of European pressure to institute reforms promised in the Berlin Treaty, repealing many of these policies (Isyar 2005: 354; Akçam 2006: 47; Balakian 2003: ch. 4; Bloxham 2005: ch. 1). Thus, a practise of what Table 3.1 classifies as partial violent repression was carried out through the early twentieth century.

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Even the abjection of the Armenians was a reason for further spite: ‘Armenians are a degenerate community...always servile,’ cast Abdul Hamid II in 1896. Around this time period he also began claiming that Armenians were wealthier and better educated than their Turkish compatriots; note that, as we will see in the German case, this perception of wealth does not diminish perceptions of inequality, but rather enhances it. In this case, education and wealth were claimed to have been obtained at the expense of the Turkish nation, else such a ‘degenerate community’ would not be able to rise to such an elevated lifestyle (Akçam 2006: 43; Melson 1996: 159). Both Christians and Armenians were seen as having a stronger hold over land and goods than the Turks and Kurds, the Turks because of national conscription into the army and the Kurds because they were typically nomadic. Note again that these claims portrayed the Armenians as having secured wealth in a time when the Ottoman state was in economic disrepair, particularly when compared against the growing European market; in 1913, real wages of workers in London were 2.7 times higher than workers in Istanbul (Özmucur and Pamuk 2002: 312 - 313). This suggests that these early characterisations of a thriving Armenian community later provided the CUP with an excuse to institute anti-scapegoat policies, regardless of the ‘real’ state of the Armenians who were suffering the same economic limitations as their Muslim neighbours.

Economic instability throughout the Ottoman Empire and claims of Armenian wealth made anti-Armenian antagonism easier to foster. This was helped by Armenian uprisings in the late nineteenth century in certain geographical enclaves. Most of these uprisings were bids for regional security against marauding bands of Kurds and Circassians, easily quelled by Ottoman forces; these skirmishes, however, often resulted in Armenian massacres29 during which the Armenians were criticised for acting in their own defence, calling such actions bids for complete self-rule. This idea was consistently supported by Tanin, the first “Turkish” newspaper run under the

CUP, claiming that Armenians had one goal, to destroy the country. At their first organised public action held in Istanbul in 1895, the CUP flew flyers reading ‘Muslims and our most beloved Turkish compatriots! The Armenians have become so bold as to assault the Sublime Porte, which is our country’s greatest place and which is respected and recognised by all Europeans’ (in Akçam 2006: 27, 33, 50, 60 - 61). Through these uprisings, the anti-nation is portrayed as being directly aggressive and malevolent in its action towards the nation.

Thus, even before the CUP had taken power the groundwork for genocide had already been established in the faltering Ottoman Empire. Already present was the portrayal of the Armenians as a degenerate and faulted peoples, hoarding their ill-gotten wealth from their Ottoman betters. Incensed by a loss of territory throughout the nineteenth century, Turks mistrusted Armenians and feared they would make a bid for their own independence. This would in turn reduce Ottoman power and sovereignty on the international stage as well as damage the ideals of Ottomanism prominent at the time.

1908 – 1912

As described in Chapter Three, the CUP took control of the government in July 1908. This resulted in some significant changes in both policy and ideology in the Ottoman Empire. As mentioned earlier, the CUP had come to power through the support of other non-Turkish groups, including the main Armenian political party, the Armenian Dashnak Revolutionary Federation. The key issue at hand was to restrain the power of the Sultan, ensure the reinstatement of the Parliament which had been disbanded after the Treaty of Berlin and to enforce the Constitution; this included measures of equality and the extension of civil rights and liberties to groups such as Jews, the Orthodox and the Armenians. Some of these measures were acted upon, as will be discussed in this section, but as the nationalism fostered by the Social Darwinist machinations of the CUP began to expand, most of the promised reforms and liberalisations for other-groups faltered and floundered.
Chapter Six: Ideological development of the anti-nation

Shortly after the Young Turks’ ascension to power, Bulgaria declared independence from the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, further weakening the Empire and strengthening the Turkish desire to strengthen their own borders and sovereignty. Due to the common association of Armenians being in league with the Christian European community, these independence movements resulted in the expression of stronger nationalistic aims, finally provoke a counterrevolution on 12 April 1909, supported by the Mohammedan Union and various Islamic seminary students, calling for the implementation of Islamic law (Balakian 2003: 145 - 149; Akçam 2006: 61 - 64). The counterrevolution was quelled a mere eleven days later and relative peace ensued. However, the counterrevolution was to have ramifications felt throughout the empire; one of these is in the massacre at Adana in April 1909.

A result of developments at national and local levels and miscommunications from Istanbul, the massacre in Adana stands as the first massacre where the rationale for killing is revenge. In this case, when news of a counterrevolution reached Adana, Islamic religious authorities led the massacre to gain revenge for the rights given to Christians under the 1908 Constitution. These rights, it was argued, led to the deterioration of Turkish rights as they were Muslims, a trait inherently tied to their ethnicity by this point in the eyes of the CUP. Based on the understanding that Armenians had a higher standard of life than Turks, the massacre gave the perpetrators an opportunity to act on their jealousy and ‘taking revenge’ for these ‘crimes’ during a time of immense uncertainty and change in a border region of the Turkish homeland. The claim of Armenian provocation was not used until after the first round of the massacre had taken place when the CUP sent their troops in to ‘quell’ the killing – resulting in the deaths of some 15-20,000 Armenians (Balakian 2003: ch. 12; see also Akçam 2006: 69).

What we see here is direct interaction between ideology and events. In this case, the CUP sacrificed an ideological platform of Constitutional reform and minority rights on the altar of an organic nationalist movement sparked by a loss of territory. Here,
events have directly influenced the way ideology has radicalised. The massacre of Adana occurred in the wake of Bulgarian independence and Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, Young Turk nationalists feared a further loss of empire in Anatolia, where the Armenians might secede and create an independent state if the rights allocated Christians in the 1908 Constitution were granted (Staub 1989: 182).

The majority of Anatolia’s wealth was in the hands of the Armenians; nor was it limited to Armenian regions. Most of Istanbul’s international commerce was completed by Christians (Mann 2005: 115, 123 - 124, 127). This situation led to the popular perception that Armenians were rich with wealth made from Turkish labour, giving Armenians the power and the (unearned) ability to become independent. The CUP then began crafting an economic plan ‘freeing’ the Armenians from their wealth, which would in turn ‘liberate the Turkish nation’; reform was based around state spending and taxation (Astourian 1990: 127; Ahmad 1969: 118 - 122) and would further inhibit the Armenians from seeking independence. Thus, we see the early steps of the ideological dehumanisation process arising out of a fear for economic collapse.

As a consequence of this fear and the need for further legitimacy, the CUP tightened its reign on the Armenians, suppressing all hopes of equality. In 1909, a consequence of the counterrevolution, a series of laws were passed, ‘The Law of Associations’, the ‘Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition’, and the ‘Law on the Conscription of non-Muslims’. These laws restricted the formation of political associations using nationality or ethnicity, formed special units ensuring the disarmament of Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians and ensured Christians were drafted into the army; as they were generally disarmed (‘Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition’) most Armenian men were used for hard labour (Ahmad 1969: 23, 62; Isyar 2005: 346 - 347). These laws are critical steps in the relationship between ideology and policy as these legal restrictions of rights and freedoms were newly institutionalised reflections of radicalising anti-Armenian ideology. The
institution of these legal changes is also one of the early anti-Armenian policy shifts effected under CUP leadership. While these laws are clearly a part of the radicalisation process of events, they also play a role in the radicalisation process of ideology: state elites radicalise propaganda which encourages policy changes; in order to add legitimacy to the policy changes, these new laws ensue. The resulting legalisation of anti-Armenian policy legitimises the ideological structure.

The introduction of these sorts of policies and increased violence against Armenians is a reflection of an ideological change occurring within the CUP. This change had to do with a move away from Ottomanism to the more Social Darwinist-driven Turkism. Historian Yusuf Akcura asks the key question of the time: Within the broad expanses of the Ottoman realm, there are two civilisations, two ways of looking at life and the world, two very different philosophies colliding. Is their coexistence at all possible?’ (in Akçam 2006: 71 - 72). Within Ottomanism, there were institutionalised ways to ‘become’ Turkish, but with Turkism, those policies were dismissed. Ethnicity can not be changed (Isyar 2005: 354). Though the Armenians pleaded with European powers to force the Turkish hand, by 1912 any shared mandate between the Young Turks and Armenians had disintegrated (R14077/Ab.257 1913); all Armenian schools and societies were closed, anyone who had ‘worked against the Government at any time’ were to be arrested and sent out of Turkey proper and ‘into the provinces such as Baghdad or Mosul’ before being killed ‘either on the road or there’ (in Balakian 2003: 189 - 190).

1912 – 1914

After the loss of the Balkan wars, Arab influence in the CUP expanded (Ahmad 1969: 135; Carmichael 2010: 1 - 2), helped by the CUP’s desire to distance themselves from the bitterness of defeat represented by a Christianised Europe. While there were some practical elements to this shift, such as the use of Arabic in schools, the critical element is that it marks the shift from Ottomanism to Islamic Turkism:
Chapter Six: Ideological development of the anti-nation

How could it be that Turkey, a Muslim state, ever had an aversion to Arabic, its religious language? Was it not realised that hostility to Arabic meant hostility to Islam? We love Arabic as the language of the Quran and of the Prophet. We love it because Muslim civilisation and Arabic are inseparable, and to turn away from Arabic is to turn away from thirteen hundred years of learning and civilisation. One thing is clear: Arabic is more widespread and has more vitality than any other Islamic language. In denying this claim a Turk...wipes out his own civilisation and his own past...The Ottoman Government has taken a step in the right direction, but this step must be followed by others. Greater attention must be paid to Arabic not only in Arab-speaking areas but everywhere else. The Government should do this, not as the rule of a few million Arabs, but as a Muslim state.

(Babanzade Ismail Hakki in Tanin 21 April 1913 in Ahmad 1969: 136)

This Islamic focus seated itself nicely in the ideas of Pan-Turanism, mostly because both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism were expansionist ideologies, focused on ensuring the aggrandisement of the homeland (Ahmad 1969: 154). This brought about further emphasis on the idea that the anti-nation sought rebellion which would destroy the homeland necessary for the secure establishment of a Turkish state.

Thus, despite continual pleas that the Armenians wanted to remain under Turkish control and despite sustained, if mild, pressure from Europe to reform its Armenian policies (R14077/Ab.2888 8.02.1913; R 14077 1913), the entrance and subsequent loss of the Balkan wars only served to radicalise anti-Armenian ideology, particularly emphasising the need to separate the anti-nation from the nation in order to maintain national culture. This encouraged regiments, particularly Kurds who had stayed behind from the front, to continue Armenian persecutions (R14079/Ab. 12669 25.06.1913). Whilst certain Western individuals did act in favour of the Armenians, the effect of European and American pressure on Turkey to reform sparked a battle over sovereignty. Europeans began to demand the implementation of certain rights granted under the Berlin Treaty and discussed again at the London Conference of 25 April 1913. These included the installation of an European over-commissioner, who would report not to the Turks but directly to the European powers, local reforms
Chapter Six: Ideological development of the anti-nation

dealing with justice and finances as well as reprimands for the compensation of robbed and looted land- and property-owners (R14078/Ab.9798 10.05.1913).

Naturally, reform was expressed in such a way as to restrict Turk sovereignty. Thus, claims that ‘no one has the right to combine the name of the Armenian race in the internal affairs of Turkey,’ became the rationale for continuous disregard for Armenian life (Nr.1939/B.223-225 1913). The Young Turks continued linking the Armenian anti-nation with these external enemies and began using the Armenian massacres as a way to assure sovereignty in their new state. The Armenians were blamed for the increase in international pressure, claiming that their ‘religious and ethnographic ties’ gave them the foundational elements to ‘build an enigmatic political propaganda in greater Asia’ based particularly off of a Russian alliance (R14078/Ab.4311 1913). Melson notes that some scholars, basing their evidence on these demands for Armenian self-administration and the pro-Russian sympathies of some political voices, conclude that the Ottoman decision to attack was a direct result of provocation (Melson 1982: 485; see also Lewis 1961; Shaw and Shaw 1976).

In fact, official Turkish history claims that the deportations of Armenians beginning in late 1913 – early 1914 were prompted by Armenians volunteering to fight with Russian gangs who had supposedly been staging uprisings around the country, thus sparking the claim that Armenians were outlaws and not ‘true Ottomans’ (Akçam 2006: 140, 196). Thus, Armenians continued to be portrayed as a national threat, attempting at every turn to undermine CUP sovereignty and the establishment of a secure state which would, in the fulfilment of Turkish propaganda, usher in a new utopia.

In order to secure Turkey from the anti-nation, dehumanising measures were further being instituted against the Armenians. Numerous Armenian women were tattooed as proof of their Armenian status and were sent into slavery; members of the military and police force increased their incomes by selling Armenian women as slaves in
markets across the Ottoman Empire (Derderian 2005: 11). In order to deal with ‘that pack of dog lice’ (demonstrator, 1912, in Dadrian 2004: 189), the Special Organisation (SO) was instructed to assault and massacre border villages, particularly in Anatolia; the systemic deportation of Armenians from ‘problem’ regions began, resulting in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands into the desert (Tachjian 2009: 65; Akçam 2006: 140, 147; Balakian 2003: 258).

Thus, as November 1914 approached and Russia began to move to declare war on the Young Turk state, the Armenians found themselves cast as enemies, siding with the Russians regardless of the fact that most Armenians declared they had no intention of doing so (R14077/Ab.1987 29.01.1913). Stories of Christian terrors against Muslims were brought down from the Balkans by Muslim refugees after the loss of the Balkan Wars. The only way to solve the ‘Armenian threat’ then was to ‘remove them…and send them somewhere else’ (Enver Pasha in Akçam 2006: 152). Through their lack of allegiance and allies, the anti-nation were portrayed as having brought their fate upon themselves (R14084/Ab.5647 15.03.1914; see also Mann 2005: 114); thus, at the dawn of the First World War, the ideological foundations have radicalised to such an extent as to make the leap to genocide ideologically feasible.

1914 – 1915

Though certain anti-Armenian policies had begun being institutionalised before the onset of WWI, the war provided greater legitimacy for further radicalisation of anti-nation policy. The CUP leadership looked upon the war as an opportunity to rid itself of its internal enemies whilst eradicating international pressure: ‘the Porte [wants] to take advantage of the World War to thoroughly get rid of its internal enemies, the indigenous Christians, without being disturbed by foreign diplomatic intervention; that is also in the interest of the allies of Turkey, the Germans, because Turkey would in this way be strengthened’ (Talat Pasha in Astourian 1990: 116). Again, as we see in the section above, the intention here is to remove the anti-nation
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from the nation, using any and all means possible, but has not yet moved from an ideology of sustained persecution genocide to one of total genocide.

The move to total genocide, did drastically increase with the onset of WWI, partially due to the perceived alliance between Russia and Armenia. Just as in the Balkan Wars, proportional number of Armenians did fight alongside the Russians; most of these Armenians were Russian Armenians, but some Ottoman Armenians did participate in the war on the side of the Allied forces (New York Times 1915; Bloxham 2005: 73, 84 - 85; Astourian 1990: 133). This, even today, has become a rationalising factor for Turkish atrocities. However, the total number of Armenian volunteers was minimal, somewhere in the range of 4,000 – 8,000, a number dwarfed by over 200,000+ conscripts and volunteers present in the Turkish army (Mann 2005: 136; Akgam 2006: 196). Regardless of the actual number of Armenians fighting on either side, the mere fact that any Armenians were fighting against the Turks provided a rationale to continue persecutions by linking the internal enemy of the anti-nation with the external enemy of the aggressor state and repeatedly expressing the key fear of Armenian insurrection and independence.

The war also hampered European pressure on Turkish reform; the Entente powers needed the Ottoman alliance and the Allies no longer had the influence to voice their complaints on the Armenian Question. Again, the idea that the Armenians would have to persevere through the hardships they had brought upon themselves by posing as a threat surfaced and is peppered throughout Turkish and European writings at the time (R14084/Ab.5647 15.03.1914; R14086/Ab.12110 16.07.1915; Bloxham 2005: 95). By mid-1915, Armenian deportation was openly discussed, being victoriously announced in May 1915 by Enver Pasha (R14086/Ab.17493 31.05.1915); while it became seemingly necessary to rid the homeland of the anti-nation, that deportation was synonymous with annihilation was never openly admitted in Turk propaganda. In their official documents, the Germans tellingly referred to the deportations and massacres as ‘wiping out’ (ausrottung), suggesting that the Armenian genocide was
generally accepted as an open secret (R14086/Ab.17667 6.06.1915; see also Akçam 2006: 9)

‘Armenians in Turkey must and were going to be killed. They had grown...in wealth and numbers until they had become a menace to the ruling Turkish race; extermination [is] the only remedy,’ as the Governor of Harput explained to German vice-consul in Erzerum, Max Scheubner-Richter (in Akçam 2006: 150). This is an obvious difference to the language used in previous sections; the focus has shifted from one of distancing the anti-nation from the nation, to a focus on the destruction of the anti-nation. The military losses of the first few months of WWI was propagated as being due to ‘a treacherous deception, to a conspiracy of murderous criminals, to our fighting units being stabbed in the back by the traitors among us’ (in reports and leaflets distributed by Ministry of War in Akçam 2006: 125), leading to a standard of ‘Repressing and Revenge!’ justified by Armenian action in the war (Konst./Ankara.l71/Ab.6381 09.1915). Claiming that all Armenian officials were spies, the 10 Commandments called for the Armenians to be ‘driven out absolutely’ from government jobs and enjoining Turks in the military to ‘kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army’ (in Balakian 2003: 189 - 190). This was made easier by the continued dehumanisation of Armenians. Not only classed as spies, traitors, cowards and outlaws, the anti-nation was now regularly termed as ‘things’ rather than ‘humans’. This is of particular note in relation to women and young girls because of their lesser status as female and their role as symbols of the future of Armenian life (Konst./Ankara.170 19.08.1915; Tachjian 2009).

By February 1915, the two hundred thousand Armenian men conscripted into the army had been turned into forced labourers or had been murdered. This continued through to the deportations in early April and further to the ‘official’ starting point of the genocide when, on 24 and 25 April, several hundred Armenian societal leaders and intellectuals were deported from Constantinople and summarily killed (Astourian 1990: 113). Those Armenians being deported were often attacked by the killing
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squad organised by the SO, the *Teshkilat-I Makhsusiye*. The 10 Commandments, the centrepiece of a secret CUP meeting held in December 1914 or January 1915 had explicitly stated that Turks were to ‘apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers; leave girls and children to be Islamised’ and to ‘Carry away the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off from all connection with their native place’ (in Balakian 2003: 189 - 190; see also Melson 1996: 160). The women left behind were often forced to convert and marry their aggressors, or, at the very least become their slaves or concubines; this trend, however, was openly criticised only months later at the height of the genocide by the CUP leadership who had ‘decided to exterminate entirely all the Armenians living in Turkey...without regard for women, children [or] the infirm’ (Talaat Pasha, 15 September 1915 in Derderian 2005: 4). They then went on to ‘strictly forbid this and enjoin the dispatch of women of this kind into the desert, after they have been separated from their husbands’ (Talaat Pasha, 29 September 1915 in Derderian 2005: 4). Rape and group rape was prolific and often public (Bryce, Toynbee, and Sarafian 2000: 128, 196, 551, 583), also adding to the dehumanised nature of the archetype Armenian. These types of public pronouncements and policies made the secret of genocide harder to keep; indeed, plans to hide the genocide were slowly falling away as ideology and policy was reaching its radicalised zenith.

post - 1915

Throughout the conflict, like the Jews and Bosniaks of my other two cases, the Armenians plead with Europe to intercede for them, a plea unanswered in the Turkish case even after the open realisation that this was not mere civil unrest, but that what was occurring amounted instead to ‘the elimination of Armenians’(Konst./B.191 30.06.1915; R14092/Ab.18623 7.07.1916). Deportees were denied any help offered ‘in money, food or any other form’ (R14086/Ab.12110 16.07.1915; R14090 27.12.1915). Turkish sovereignty had been solidified; Armenians were now portrayed as ‘their ‘herd’, to be exploited or slaughtered, according to their good pleasure. No system of foreign control or supervision, single
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or joint, will serve’ (Price 1918). This language of dehumanisation was reinforced and radicalised by the treatment of deportees. Generally sent into the desert without food or water, the impression of the deportees was of inhuman corpses, rather than that of the healthy, hearty Turkish men and women portrayed as members of the nation (see Ch Seven). This was further reinforced during the later years of killing when particularly women and children, were subject to medical ‘experiments’ and atrocities. The writings of Dr. Mehmed Resid, Ittihadist and governor of Diyarbekir, reflect this very well; he himself was charged with war crimes after the conflict:

Even though I am a physician, I cannot ignore my nationhood. I came into this world a Turk. My national identification takes precedence over everything else... Armenian traitors had found a niche for themselves in the bosom of the fatherland; they were dangerous microbes. Isn’t it the duty of a doctor to destroy these microbes?

(Resid, January 1919 in Dadrian 1986: 175).

Thus, we are presented with a self-reinforcing dehumanisation where policies of dehumanisation act in such a way as to fulfil the ideological perspective. In this case, similar to the Holocaust and to the Balkan case, CUP ideology expressed Armenians as sick, crippled beings often in a worse state than death; the resultant policies of ‘cleansing’ enacted because of this assessment then went on to fulfil these perceptions by forcing the anti-nation to crippling illness and death. Though no longer attempting to show Armenians as thriving during times of national decline, Turks continued to link Armenians with the persecuting Russian troops, who were attempting to ‘wipe out man for man’(R14099/Ab.15733 12.04.1918). The Turks alleged that the establishment of an Armenian national council suggested by its European allies akin to the foundation of a fully recognised independent state, serving to further legitimate their actions as they ‘could not allow their [Turkish] rights to be tested’ (R11053/Ab.31351 5.07.1918). In short, like my other two cases, the extermination of the Armenians ‘was not merely being carried out with an eye toward military considerations’ (R14087 27.07.1915), but also toward the ethnic ideological considerations of a genocidal state.
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Germany

‘One single cohabitation of a Jew with an Aryan woman is sufficient to poison her blood forever. Together with the ‘alien albumen’ she has absorbed the alien soul. Never again will she be able to bear purely Aryan children, even when married to an Aryan. They will all be bastards, with a dual soul and a body of a mixed breed’

(Streicher 1934, 'German People's Health Through Blood and Soil' in Tribunals 10.01.1946c)

1918 – 1933

As discussed in Chapters Two and Five, the problem of the Jewish Question was established in German ideology and culture well before any genocidal policies were actually implemented. Before Hitler became Chancellor, however, the only strategy for approaching the subject was to restrict Jewish legal and civil rights. In a similar style to the Turkish case, regarding Jews through the lens of Social Darwinism was established on a policy level in the late 1800s when Jews were publicly deprived of full citizenship and began being regarded as a racial, rather than a religious, group (Mann 2005: 65).

The Weimar Republic, already perceived as a weak political institution due to its inability to win the support of the military and civil service branches (Evans 2004: 97, 102), did little to dissuade the German populace from the anti-Semitism rife throughout Europe at the time and much study has been done regarding the question of continuity from this time period through WWII. Most notable, of course, is Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht (1962) followed more recently by his From Kaiserreich to Third Reich (1986) in which he posits that the policy platforms and

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30 This is not to say, however, that all politicians in the Weimar state system supported these policies or were acceptable under the NSDAP. Of the members of the Weimar Reichstag, approximately eighty were persecuted and summarily killed by the Nazi regime; well over one hundred and fifty were exiled from the Reich (Burleigh 2001: 155).
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policies of pre-WWI Germany were not so radically different as those established in the pre-WWII years of the NSDAP. Though met with indignation in the early days of its publication, the continuity of certain ideological aspects are hard to ignore; more recently, other key scholars such as Dirk Walter (1999) have built Fischer’s work, pointing out that in a post-WWI Germany, Jewish violence and persecution was widespread. Media discourse, policies present in cultural activities such as recreation spots and the lack of persecution towards antisemitic crimes all helped foster an attitude of derogation under the Weimar Regime. More radical activists burned synagogues and some vacation resorts began excluding Jewish guests (Borut 2000; Burleigh 2001: 329). Panayi suggests that much of this persecution was due to a perception of Jewish wealth in a time of dire economic need and to their prominent position in the arts sector of German society (2001: 220 - 221).

As we will see further in Chapter Seven, the NSDAP used these stereotypes to build up the idea of the German Volk ‘revamping the sagging morale of the lower middle class’ (Kershaw 1989: 93). One of the ways the Nazis went about establishing this change was to cast the anti-nation as national traitors, profiteering from German defeat in the First World War (Staub 1989: 92; Cecil 1972: 70 - 75). Thus, the Jews, in a similar situation as the Armenians after the Balkan Wars, were perceived as ‘picking a fight’ against Germany. Identifying Jews as blood-suckers and extortionists, and building on the perception of the lesser status of members of the anti-nation, Julius Streicher and Alfred Rosenberg set to work the propaganda machine, assuring both Jews and Germans that

Jewry wanted this battle. It shall have it until it realises that the Germany of the brown battalions is not a country of cowardice and surrender. Jewry will have to fight until we have won victory...National Socialists! Defeat the enemy of the world. Even if the world is full of devils, we shall succeed in the end.

(Streicher 30 March 1933 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c)

Along with Hitler’s inflammatory messages in speeches and in Mein Kampf, these two men were primarily responsible for the further popularisation of anti-Semitism in
the founding years of Nazi ideology, promising German freedom would only come about when ‘the Jew has been excluded from the life of the German people’ (Streicher 1922 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c); if this exclusion did not occur ‘the Jew would really devour the peoples of the earth’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 411). All German devastation was attached somehow to Jewish ‘contamination’: ‘The Jew today is the great agitator for the complete destruction of Germany. Wherever in the world we read of attacks against Germany, Jews are their fabricators, just as in peacetime and Marxists systematically stirred up hatred against Germany’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 568, 512; see also Cecil 1972: 72). Thus, we see Nazi elites serving as instruments for ideology as agency, moving within a structure partly of their own making, partly inherited from ideologies of previous regimes as discussed in earlier chapters.

This trend of associating Communism, Marxism and Judaism is typical of early German ideology, as the early years of Nazism focused primarily on defeating political opponents; this is also the reason Goering gives for the establishment of concentration camps. The camps were not necessarily a place to hold Jews, but instead ‘a lightning measure against the functionaries of the Communist Party who were attacking [Germans] in the thousands, and who, since they were taken into protective custody, were not put in prison. But it was necessary, as I said, to erect a camp for them -- one, two, or three camps’ (in Tribunals 18.03.1946; see also Mann 2005: 185). Nonetheless, the Nazis were not necessarily understated in their dehumanisation of Jews in the early stages of their ideology. Mein Kampf again provides numerous examples where Hitler has equated Jews with poisoners, the plague, tuberculosis, putrefaction, maggots and parasites (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 38, 211 - 212, 276, 307, 506).

1933 – 1935

After Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship, little changed in the first few years that had not been established ideologically in the early years of the NSDAP; equally noteworthy is that antisemitism had played a rather subdued role in Hitler’s quasi-
election (Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 114). Bloxham and Kushner summarise this well, saying ‘in no way was the murder of the Jews a necessary outcome of Nazi (or German or occidental) antisemitism as of the year 1933... The logic of the view to which Hitler and many of his coterie subscribed, of Jews as a defiling and subversive ‘racial’ element, was always their exclusion from the ‘Aryan’, and particularly German community, but exclusion did not instantly equate to murder’ (2008: 71).

In fact, it is interesting to note that during this time period, the Nazis did relatively little to implement policies dealing with the ‘Jewish Question’. Though there was still an ideological assumption of the ‘badness’ of the Jews and an increase in stereotypical propaganda, the only attempts to change policy were discussions on restricting Jewish civil rights and liberties (Kershaw 2000: 101). While the earliest period of NSDAP power was peppered with antisemitic actions such as riots, boycotts and the exclusion of Jews and other-groups from cultural activities, actual killings were few and these were often persecuted in the courts (Nolzen 2002: 250 - 251, 254 - 255; Evans 2004: Ch. 6). Again, the focus on the time was on implementing policies and focusing on the aspects of ideology that would ensure the political and social consolidation of power under the NSDAP (Jick 1998: 158 - 159; Kallis 2008: 16; Nolzen 2002: 248).

Ideologically, much antisemitic discourse remained the same. Der Völkischer Beobachter continued to link Jews to Marxism and portray them as rich money-wasters, seeking to disrupt the struggling German economy; they were explicitly blamed for mobbings and murders both in Germany and abroad (Völkischer Beobachter 1933b, 1933c). Streicher, in speeches and articles represented the Jews as forcing anti-Semitic policies into action, as they did not recognise the strength of the anti-nation (Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Propaganda avers that Jews would attempt to poison the Volk with their ‘alien albumen’ by raping German women who would then never be able to bear ‘pure’ German children, thus endangering the heart of the culture-bearing aspect of the nation (Deutsche Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden in Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Though this type of dehumanising language is present in
corner-stone texts such as *Mein Kampf*, there is a change in the frequency and popularity of using scientific language to describe Jews. While previous to the Nazis’ ascension to power much of this sort of language was kept out of the mainstream press, this changes soon after Hitler comes to office (NSDAP 1933a, 1933d, 1933g, 1933e).

1935 – 1938

As discussed in Chapter Four, the Nuremberg Laws are exceptional due to the fact that this is the first time under the NSDAP where the ideology of antisemitism is expressed through policy changes and, thus, becomes institutionalised as legal practise in a way reminiscent of the series of laws passed under the Turks in 1909. Until the passing of the Nuremberg Laws, direct physical assaults were seemingly regionally variable, occurring via pressure from the SA or from particular Nazi party members seeking to radicalise anti-Jewish policy within their sphere of influence (Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 116). The Laws themselves, while restricting the liberties and freedoms of Jews, were another step towards dehumanising the anti­nation altogether. As with so much of Nazi policy, the institution of the Nuremberg Laws was not the result of a long, drawn out policy plan, but was instead the outcome of hasty, last-minute decision making. Though there had been discussions of dealing legally with the ‘Jewish Problem’, little evidence suggests any policies had been thoroughly debated (Burleigh 2001: 294).

Making Jewish-German marriages illegal, stripping Jews of the right to fly the Reich flag and of their German citizenship were all policy initiatives following from ideological precepts. This was rationalised as protection against the anti-nation who would otherwise persecute the nation to an heretofore unknown degree (Völkischer Beobachter 1935c, 1935e, 1935f). Goering rationalises this radicalisation thus:

31 See Mazower (1999) for further insights into the Nazi’s use of the legal system and its role in a genocidal state.
I believe that if, in this connection, many a hard word which was said by us against Jews and Jewry were to be brought up, I should still be in a position to produce magazines, books, newspapers, and speeches in which the expressions and insults coming from the other side were far in excess. All that obviously was bound to lead to an intensification.

(Tribunals 14.03.1946)

In short, the Jews had brought this upon themselves; if they had not been attacking the Volk then they would not themselves have been attacked.

Books with titles like Don’t Trust the Fox in the Green Meadow Nor the Jew on His Oath, (Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jüd auf seinem Eid) were funded by Streicher’s propaganda machine and pitched to children because ‘no one should be allowed to grow up in the midst of our people without this knowledge of the frightfulness and dangerousness of the Jew’ (1937 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c).

Another new trend in the evolution of this ideology is the portrayal of the anti-nation as ritualistic killers of Germans, particularly of German children, who had been killed by Jews in the most gruesome ways imaginable (Tribunals 10.01.1946c).

Portrayed thus, Jews were not only persecuting the current generation of Germans, but were directly, purposefully attacking future generations of the Reich. This desecration could not be allowed to occur.

How to go about preventing these occurrences, however, was still not fully formed in either ideology or policy at the time. The HJ (Hitlerjugend) slowly began incorporating anti-Jewish action into their activities and teachings, including the vandalisation of Jewish graveyards and other properties (Nolzen 2002: 269; Burleigh 2001: 237) The most popular policy idea was of forced Jewish immigration ‘to countries where the Jews wanted to go’ (von Schirach in Tribunals 24.05.1946).

This then inspired policies encouraging Jews to emigrate from Germany; ghettos and concentration camps were built as ‘holding camps’ for Jews waiting to be exported from the Reich (as in Bergen-Belsen, erected as late as 1943) and to provide slave labour for rebuilding the Reich and its war machine, thus ‘removing the most
dangerous element of disorder directed against [the Reich]’ (Goering in Tribunals 13.03.1946; Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 9, 135; Evans 2005: 81 - 90).

1938 – 1941

The effects of Kristallnacht on the Jewish community were immediate and striking. Nolzen sums it up well: ‘more than 680 Jews were killed or committed suicide; nearly 30,000 were interned in concentration camps. Nearly 200 synagogues were set on fire or devastated; and more than 7,500 Jewish-owned enterprises were destroyed. This had all happened within hours’ (2002: 271). Though still an outcome of a policy focused on getting Jews to remove themselves from Germany, Kristallnacht saw the beginning of large-scale state-empowered violence against the Jews in such as way as had not occurred before under the Nazis. Much of this violence occurred concurrently with an increased level of media focus on the certainty of Germany going to war, which in turn led to an increased level of fear

Similarly, expulsions of Russian, Hungarian, Romany and Polish Jews during this time period show the coordination of the branches of the Nazi state in their ability to pursue policies resulting in mass murder (Milton 1990: 274). Here we see again this relationship between ideology and events. In this case, it is the ideological belief in the necessity of separating the anti-nation from the nation that spurs policy changes regarding these expulsionary measures taken against the Jews.

The inverse relationship is seen upon German entry into WWII. Being blamed for forcing Germany’s hand to war, the Jews were seen as profiting from the deaths of Germans on the battlefield, and thus having brought their own destruction down upon their heads (Hitler in Time Magazine 1939), just as the Armenians had been blamed upon Turkish entrance into WWI. Der Stürmer articles between 1938 and 1940 urged that only when world Jewry had been annihilated would the Jewish problem have been solved, and predicted that fifty years hence the Jewish graves

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32 Much writing has been done on the relationship between fear and mass death. Some of the best examples on this topic are found in Shaw (2003), Snyder (2000), Winter (2003a; 2003b) and Mann (2001; 1993; 2005).
Chapter Six: Ideological development of the anti-nation

‘will proclaim that this people of murderers and criminals has after all met its deserved fate’; Der Völkischer Beobachter began to openly discuss ‘a neat separation of Germans and Jews’ as a solution to the Jewish Question. All avenues of the press were personally encouraged by Hitler to publish more ‘enlightening articles on the Jewish question’ in order to ‘educate’ Germans about the risk posed by Jews (Tribunals 29.04.1946, 01.10.1946g; Völkischer Beobachter 1938e).

Nonetheless, until approximately 1940 – early 1941, there was still a possibility of some Jews could avoid extermination by forced migration. ‘The forced emigrations of 1938 and 1939 from Germany and Austria, which seemed so cruel at the time, saved Jewish lives. ‘Exterminationist anti-Semitism,’ if one could use such a term, then meant forced emigration, not mass murder’ (Jick 1998: 160). Between late 1940 and mid-1941, however, the institutionalisation of policy for the concentration of all Jews in ghettos became rote; by this time Jewish registration, economic discriminations and decrees compelling Jews to wear the Star of David, sporadic arrests and detention in camps was de rigueur (Tribunals 01.10.1946m; Völkischer Beobachter 1938f; Tribunals 02.01.1946; Kershaw 1989: 97).

The implementation of these policies would inherently benefit the Reich as they would then come into control of the wealth of the Jews and take revenge on them for the perceived advances Jews had made in times of national decline. This would result in ‘healing this sickness among the people’ and the ‘joining together of Greater Germany in defiance of the world’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1938e, 1938f; Tribunals 30.09.1946j, 30.09.1946l). Separating the anti-nation from the nation would also rescue the nation from the persecution of the enemy within in this time of war. The state of war initiated a shift in ideology wherein the fear of the outer enemy, the Allied forces fighting against the Germans, was linked directly with the fear towards the inner enemy, the Jews. The media began to preach that the Jews’ desire was to ‘kill all Hitlerites’ and that ‘the Jews of all the world hate [Germans] because we are a stronger state with a stronger army’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1938f; Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Not only did Streicher continue printing articles of Jewish murder around the world as in earlier time periods, but in 1938 Der Völkischer Beobachter
began to focus on malcontent in Palestine, claiming that ‘Concentration camps in Palestine are full! The blood price of four months [of war]: 1,089 Arabs slain [by Jews]… in hand-to-hand combat’, and other articles written in such a way to suggest that it was the Germans who would next fall to Jewish retaliation (Völkischer Beobachter 1938e; see also Völkischer Beobachter 1938b, 1938d; Tribunals 15.01.1946a).

These suggestions were paired with increased radicalisation of propaganda which continued to strip away the human nature of the Jews. Der Stürmer went so far as to associate the anti-nation with ‘a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind,’ and, in February 1940, published a letter from one of its readers comparing Jews with swarms of locusts (Tribunals 01.10.1946g, 10.01.1946c). Der Völkischer Beobachter ‘educated’ their readers about Jews’ inability to ‘keep their sicknesses out of the air’ and the danger of the Jewish bacillus (Völkischer Beobachter 1938b, 1938g).

By this time the difference between the other-groups presented in Chapter Five is becoming quite clear: the Nazis were beginning to outline brutal policies for groups they labelled subhuman, particularly during this time the mentally ill, incurably sick and handicapped; but, in order to fulfil their ideological platform, they were consistently downgrading Jews to ‘nonhuman’ status, not only in ideological terms, but in policy terms as well (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: 5). As discussed in the above section, integrating the Nuremberg laws into state and cultural practice, Jews were excluded from normal German day-to-day activities; after the outbreak of war, the rounding up of Jews into ghettos and camps further entrenched ideas of the Jew as something non-human. In fact, the conditions within both camps and ghettos were contributing factors furthering the dehumanisation of the anti-nation. Illness and death were rife, poor living conditions meant that it was indeed hard to keep ‘sickness out of the air’; levels of contagion from disease were high and cleanliness,
due to the depraved living conditions, was devastatingly low. All of these things went on to reinforce the ideologically presupposed idea that it was necessary that Jews be separate, apart from the German nation.

This exclusion is part of the dynamic process of the radicalisation of state policy and ideology in which the ‘state is both instrument of genocide through its administrative and executive organs and instrumentaliser of its citizens and other resources towards genocide’ (Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 63). The work of the Einsatzgruppen in late spring of 1941, the first institutionalised measure of mass murder, is without doubt an outcome of this instrumentalisation as well as a visible outcome of the centralised power of the state (as an instrument) predicated on and encouraged by radicalising ideology. By late summer 1941, Nazi ideology had shifted to such a degree that mere separation was no longer enough to secure the further existence of the nation.

post – 1941

Mid – late 1941 saw a shift in many types of policy, from the end of the Sino-German cooperation to the invasion of the Soviet Union and the declaration of war on Germany by the United States. Equally, there is a mirrored shift in anti-nation ideology. No longer was it enough to simply remove the anti-nation from the homeland; forced emigration was not ‘safe’ enough. ‘Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps’ (Ribbentrop in Tribunals 01.10.1946c; see also Tribunals 01.10.1946g). Thus, the extermination of the Jews by extreme murder began being implemented as the answer to the Jewish Question with the transition of Auschwitz-Birkenau from concentration camp to extermination camp in 1941. 1942 thus became the beginning of the ‘final solution’ of the Jewish Question and, though it was far from static, continuing throughout the end of the Second World War (Kallis 2008: Ch. 7; Tribunals 02.01.1946).

Reaching the peak of anti-Semitic ideology and policy, however, did little to stem the propagandised belief that Jews were still thriving in times of national struggle. In a January 1944 radio broadcast, Fritzsche declared that

it is revealed clearly once more that not a new system of government, not a young nationalism, and not a new and well-applied socialism brought about this war. The guilty ones are exclusively the Jews and the plutocrats...This clique of Jews and plutocrats have invested their money in armaments and they had to see to it that they would get their interests and sinking funds; hence they unleashed this war.

(Tribunals 23.01.1946b)

Statements like this one point not only to Jewish wealth, but again to the idea that the Jews were at fault for the war, thus bringing the idea that the anti-nation deserves to be condemned once again to the forefront of Nazi ideology.

This was made easier by the continued idea that Jews were tormenting the Germans and posed an immediate threat from the Soviet Union, Poland, the United States and the United Kingdom; thus, the elimination of Jews from Europe was seen, as von Schirach neatly puts it, as 'an active contribution to European culture' (15 September 1942 in Tribunals 24.05.1946; see also Tribunals 15.01.1946b; Völkischer Beobachter 1941c). Just as the Turks associated the Armenians with their Russian enemies, through the end of the war the Nazis persisted in equating the Jews as the internal enemy with the Marxist/Bolshevik/Communist external enemy of the Soviet Union, making such claims as that ‘Jewry...has by now placed itself unreservedly on the side of Bolshevism’ and that the ‘international Jewish-Democratic-Bolshevistic campaign of incitement against Germany still finds cover in this or that fox's lair or rat hole’ (Fritzsche 1941 and 1945 in Tribunals 23.01.1946b); Goering also played on this theme, famously stating: ‘If we lose the war, you [Germans] will be annihilated...This is not the Second World War. This is a great race war. It is about whether the German and Aryan will survive or if the Jew will rule the world, and that is why we are fighting abroad’ (4 October 1942 in Herf 2005: 57). In fact, there was a tangible sense through Nazi propaganda that WWII was being fought between Germany and an actual Jewish conspiracy (Herf 2005: 52).
Associations such as this with scheming foxes and disease-bearing rats were, as in previous times, popular in propaganda throughout the end of the war. In a series of speeches in 1943, Himmler applauded the Germans for their ruthlessness in the extermination of the anti-nation, describing it as ‘delousing’; this process ‘was not cruel – if one remembers that even innocent creatures of nature, such as hares and deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by them’ (Hitler in Tribunals 21.03.1946; Himmler in Tribunals 30.09.1946). Like in the Turkish case, even after the end of the war, key Nazi ideologues such as Streicher and Fritzsche persisted in their anti-Semitic diatribes throughout the course of the Tribunals, rarely expressing remorse. In his work on the Holocaust, Jeffrey Herf points out that ‘two key verbs and nouns were the core of this language of mass murder...they were the verbs *vernichten* and *aussrotten*, which are synonyms for ‘annihilate’, ‘exterminate’, ‘totally destroy’ and ‘kill”’ (2005: 55). These two words also pepper documents relating to the Armenian genocide and give us a very clear picture of the intention of policy makers in the latter stages of radicalisation. This stands in contrast to the Yugoslav case which, as a case of partial genocide, is arguably more dynamic in the complexity of its anti-nation ideology. Nonetheless, further examination of Yugoslavia in light of the other two cases brings some interesting points to light.

**The Balkans**

*’We are witnessing the birth of a Muslim bastard on the territory of the land of our grandfathers’*

(Serb deputy in Silber and Little 1997: 220)

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34 Though *aussrotten* and *vernichten* are both used circumspectly to discuss the killing of the Jews, Herf goes on to mention that when used in the context of propaganda, they are usually in terms of something the Jews will do or are currently doing to the German nation (2005: 55); this, of course, further instilled fear of the Jews into the greater German society.
Unlike the Turks and the Nazis, the Serbs took longer to identify an anti-nation; the polyethnic status of Yugoslavia under Tito was generally more effective than that of the Ottoman Empire. There were some inequalities between national and non-national groups as the communists were hesitant to give any other-group the same status as Slovenes, Serbs or Croats, claiming that doing so would create problems on the regional level in the republics and provinces arising out of the right to self-determination provided in the Constitution. As described in Chapter Five, however, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina became more active in governmental administration in the 1960s; this was noted with a certain degree of negativity from Serbs at the time, though these nay-sayers were generally quieted through pressure from above (Judah 1997: 150 - 156). It was not until the new 1974 Constitution was written and more rights were granted to other-groups that things began to change in some sectors of the Serbian and Croatian nationalist wings.

Tito’s death proved catastrophic for Yugoslavia; no longer having the ideological tie to a strong leader, national factions began to take a stronger line, particularly in Serbia. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the 1974 Constitution gave Kosovo (amongst others) greater autonomy; this caused Serbian nationalists grave concern. In a way that is reminiscent of Nazi claims against Jews in the early stages of ideological development, Serbs in Serbia began to claim that Serbs in Kosovo were being subject to genocide, that Serbian women were being raped at the hands of Kosovar men and that the entire non-Muslim community in Kosovo was being repressed and intimidated; these claims were then upheld by the state, the press and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Carmichael 2010: 8; IT-00-39&40/1 2008). One of the various outcomes of these claims was the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (SANU) Memorandum of 1986.

The Memorandum’s primary focus was to assure its readers that under Tito’s governance, Serbia and the Serbian people were discriminated against time and time
again (Banac 1994: 150). It was Kosovo, rather than Bosnia, who was at fault for taunting Serbia; the document largely overlooks the role Bosnia-Herzegovina and its resident Bosniaks played in national decline. Quite a lot of this has to do with the fact that at the time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was still considered politically cowed under the thumb of Serbian influence. Serbs still held a majority in many areas across Bosnia-Herzegovina, though in states on the Bosnia-Herzegovina/Croatia border this was beginning to shift. The Memorandum itself, disturbing, but quite innocuous on its own as merely one draft memorandum, was not originally intended for popular use. It was instead a calling to return to the original Communist principles and intended for its readership to be the supreme political bodies of Yugoslavia and Serbia. It was, however, leaked relatively soon after its release and was met with vehement aggression in the pro-Yugoslav press, particularly in Belgrade. It was only when Milosevic took power a year later in 1987 that the ideological ideals expressed in this document became the foundation for a political policy platform (Pavkovic 1994: 445, 446).

1987 – 1991

As discussed in Chapters Two and Seven and in a similar way to the Turkish case, one of the key metres of national distinction in Yugoslavia is religion. After being mildly repressed by Tito’s communist regime, the late 1980s saw a renewed interest in using religion to further nationalist goals posited by nationalist leaders, Milosevic in particular. ‘Milosevic who was first to realise that Tito was dead, was also the first communist leader since the Croatian Spring to break the taboo of speaking to an audience consisting solely of one ethnic group (Serbs) and openly using ethnonational rhetoric’ (Malesevic 2006: 177). 1987 and 1988 were years of aggression against the Catholic Church and the Islamic community (Banac 1994: 161; Mirkovic 1996: 194). In fact, these religious identities, and in particular the Islamic identity, was critical in identifying the anti-nation. As Carmichael explains, ‘a rise in religious consciousness may not wholly explain the occurrence of violence in these regions, secessionists and politicians eager to redraw boundaries cynically
exploited the idea of a ideological purpose and traditional identities under threat to motivate and legitimise armed resistance’ (2010: 16).

Unlike in my other two cases, there is no clear identification of the anti-nation at the earlier stages of ideological progression; the focus is instead largely based around a religious identity\(^\text{35}\). In the 1960s and 1970s, the focus was on obtaining equal civil rights and liberties for Muslims in Yugoslavia; by the late 1980s, the primary professed ideological ‘enemy’ to Serbs had shifted away from ‘Muslims’ as a whole to ‘Kosovars’ as a group. On one hand, there is no real ideological distinction between Muslims; the Muslims were the ideological enemy, regardless of whether they came from Albania, Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, however, there is a crucial distinction between Kosovar and Bosniak based in geography, history and, to a large extent, geo-political importance. Scholars have claimed that the Serbs had a particular tendency to react to ideologically inspired fears due to years of Ottoman rule and the genocidal action they suffered under the Ustashas during WWII, particularly when fear was couched in terms of Islamic encroachment (Carmichael 2010: 9). Nonetheless, it was not until Croatian independence seemed imminent that relations between the nation and Bosniaks came to a head.

The election of the HDZ in April 1990 convinced many Serbs living in Croatia that Tudjman would soon begin to install the institutions of fascism if and when Croatia became independent of Yugoslavia; particularly Serbs in border areas like Krajina, ‘understood fascism above all to be a state system promoting virulent Croatian nationalism, and the revival of Croat national sentiment in any form was *ipso facto* interpreted by them as the return of fascism’ (Glenny 1996: 11). In the spring of 1991, when conflict in the border regions of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia had already begun, the JNA issued mobilisation orders to the men of Bosnia-

\(^{35}\) As explained in Chapters Four and Five, religious identity here does not mean to entail any amount of faith, but was used as a marker distinguishing one group from another. It is a cultural marker which maintained an ethnic connection. For more information, see Bringa (1995).
Herzegovina. The regional government issued orders alerting the population to ignore this call, as the non-Serbs in the administration almost unanimously opposed it. Thus, very few Bosniaks or Croats entered the JNA; Bosnian Serbs, however, responded *en masse*, once again solidifying the differences between Serbs, Muslims and Croats (IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-99-36-1 1999). The Bosnian Serb alliance with the JNA became further enmeshed after the student riots of 9 and 10 March 1991, when the JNA was called on to halt the rioting which had started in protest to the Serbian regime’s increasingly extremist rhetoric (Ramet 2001: 154). Milosevic responded soon after, saying

> Serbia and the Serbian people are faced with one of the greatest evils of their history: the challenge of disunity and internal conflict. This evil, which as more than once caused so much damage and claimed so many victims, more than once sapped our strength, has always come hand in hand with those who would take away out freedom and dignity...All who love Serbia dare not ignore this fact, especially at a time when we are confronted by the vampiroid, fascistoid forces of the Ustaša, Albanian secessionists and all other forces in the anti-Serbian coalition which threaten the people’s rights and freedoms.

(Milosevic, March 1991, in Glenny 1996: 57)

This was spoken amidst Milosevic’s political offensive, in which he sent out orders to party units urging them to take action against internal and external enemies and highlighting the need to separate the anti-nation from the nation due to fears that the anti-nation would continue persecuting the nation; a feat made easier through the ‘demo network’ Milosevic established in the early years of his presidency. These ‘networks’ were made of previously unemployed male youths, paid to travel, attend pro-Serb rallies and generally encourage hysteria. These demonstrations were generally instituted in order to convey the idea among Serbs that Serbs outside Serbia proper were being persecuted and that it was necessary to reunite ‘the People, the State Authorities and the Church’ (Pavkovic 2000: 89 - 90; see also Gagnon 1995: 146 - 147; Banac 1994: 153). Note also that, regardless of the fact that multiple Serb nationalist ideologies were beginning to be established, the SDS begins speaking on behalf of all Serb groups, including Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Serbs and Kosovar Serbs (Brubaker 1996: 73, 74 - 75).
In these early stages then, the Balkan path to anti-nation identification radicalises in a different way from the Turkish and German case, a key difference between a case of ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes and cases of total genocide. Nonetheless, certain aspects of the iterative nature of ideology reveals itself in a similar way to that of my other two cases. Here, the ideological structure preceding Milosevic’s rise allowed and supported a mistrust of Muslims, centred in the late 1980s around the Kosovars. As the geopolitical theatre shifted, ideology was constrained within that established structure; this necessitated the ideological identification of an exaggerated link between Kosovar and Bosniak in history and religion the two regional groups previously only tenuously shared.

1991 – 1992

By 1991, the shifting political atmosphere begins to have direct ramifications on anti-nation ideology in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite calls to abstain from doing so, Germany was adamant in its decision to recognise Croatia if they announced independence (Malcolm 1996: 223), causing Serbian fear of a new Ustasha-like regime to become even further entrenched and encouraged the growth of what Michael Mann calls ‘defensive ethnic nationalism’ (2005: 375). For many, including radical leaders such as Mladic, the creation of a newly independent Croatia was perceived as being synonymous with the ‘establishment of an ultranationalist regime that threatened the liberties, livelihoods and …the lives of Croatian Serbs’ (Brubaker 1996: 71 - 72).

Furthermore, a population census taken and published in 1991 in the Bosanska Krajina region showed that Serbs outnumbered Bosniaks by only 127,358 and that Serbs had lost the majority in certain key towns in this region (in IT-99-36-1 1999). The implication of such publications was to rouse Bosnian Serbs into the belief that Muslims were taking over, undermining the nation and forcing them out of their national homeland; in short, the claim was that Serbs were being bred out, a similar claim to that of the Nazis about the Jews in the latter years of their ideological
radicalisation. Biljana Plavsic, in the newspaper Borba, ardently claimed that ‘rape is the war strategy of Muslims and Croats against Serbs. Islam considers this something normal’ (in Oberschall 2007: 102). Beginning in 1991, the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) and other Serb nationalist leaders in the ARK region (Autonomous Region of Krajina), called the SAO (Serbian Autonomous Region) Krajina by the Bosnian Serbs, began disseminating propaganda portraying Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats as fanatics intending to commit genocide on the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to gain control of the region (IT-99-36-1 1999). This lead directly to a heightened sense of fear, particularly for Bosnian Serbs, and began cementing the idea that the Serbs were in fear of national desecration into Serb ideology at the time. As the majority of the non-Serb citizens in most of the ARK areas were Muslim, a majority of this propaganda related directly to them; Serbs were particularly quick to use their Muslim identities as a rational behind the killings). The municipality of Prijedor, for instance, out of the total population of 112,543, 43.9% of the population were Bosniaks and only 5.6% were Croats. The 42% of Serbs, already in the minority, began to fear for their lives (IT-97-24-PT 2002a; IT-97-24-PT 2002b). As the war with Croatia went into 1992, pro-Serb propaganda became ever more visible as they were continually reminded of Serb massacres in WWII. The threat was that if they allowed the Muslims to remain, the same thing would occur again (IT-97-24 2008). Karadzic openly warned Muslims that they would be ‘destroyed’ if they sought independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IT-00-39&40/1 2002b).

The beginning of the Croatian conflict also saw the opening of camps across the Serb-controlled regions, particularly in the ARK region. Most camps followed the routine established in the Omarska and Keraterm camps where the inmates were categorised into three groups. The ‘A’ group consisted of people considered to be leaders of the Muslim community or volunteers for a Bosnian militia or territorial defence group. Generally, these inmates were executed soon after their arrival to the camps. Group ‘B’ consisted of people drafted into military defence; Group ‘C’ was everyone else. Often, members of both groups B and C were exchanged for Serbs,
either those taken prisoner or those living on Bosnian-held territory who wanted to relocate to Serbia (Silber and Little 1997: 251; Wood 2001: 68). This population exchange is mildly reminiscent of the Turkish and Nazi immigration and exile policies against the Armenians and Jews respectively; it again points to the fact that though ideology necessitated the separation of the anti-nation from the nation, inherently genocidal policies of total extermination were not the primary resort of these states.

Nonetheless, this process of internment served, as in the German Holocaust, to dehumanise the Bosniaks to an extreme degree, holding them in terrible conditions, subjecting them to untold horror, until their visage became a justification for Serb claims that Bosniaks were not ‘real men’ like Serbs. Often, at the executions occurring after the categorisations described above, Bosniaks were made to dig their own graves (Judah 1997: 240). Again, the point of these atrocities was not necessarily to rid the world of Bosniaks. Instead, the point was to ethnically cleanse the homeland; again, as discussed in Chapter Two, this is ethnic cleansing, not genocide (IT-99-36-1 1999; see also Melson 1996). In short, it mattered less to the Bosnian Serbs that the Muslims were allowed to exist, so long as they did not exist in Greater Serbia.

1992 – 1995

After the siege of Sarajevo began, non-Serbs in Bosnia reluctantly held an independence referendum that Bosnian Serbs were encouraged to boycott and thus undermine any legitimacy for independence claims. Thus, when the majority voted in favour of independence, the Serbs were able to claim the Muslim majority and Croat minority were destroying the Yugoslavia Serbs were attempting to preserve (IT-02-54-T 2002). The Serb propaganda machine continued to build on this foundation. ‘Muslim fundamentalists’ were charged with allying themselves with ‘Croat fascists’ to wage a war of aggression against Bosnian Serbs, making it easy to exaggerate feelings of revenge in light of the WWII Ustasha massacres (Malesevic
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2006: 226). Attempts of defence or retaliation on the Bosnian side resulted only in a greater radicalisation of anti-nation policy, as seen in the attempt to retake Prijedor in May 1992. The Serb authorities used this to legitimise and accelerate the campaign to cleanse the area (IT-97-24-PT 2001).

Similarly to Germany in the mid-1930s, Serb-governments in Bosnia-Herzegovinian towns began to institute various restrictions upon Muslims and Croats. In Celinac, for instance, Muslims could not swim or fish, gather in groups of more than three, drive cars, make phone calls in public places other than at their local post offices or leave without permission (Judah 1997: 204; Silber and Little 1997: 246). Between April and December 1992, a campaign to collect ‘illegally held weapons’ from ‘Muslim and Croat extremists’ was instituted; many massacres and other atrocities occurred during these raids (IT-04-79-PTb 2005); ‘The Turks are going to be like walnuts in a Serbo-Croat nut-cracker’ (Bosnian Serb in Silber and Little 1997: 303).

During this time period, another ideological twist creeps into popular propaganda. In October 1992, a document was published, signed by SANU, the SPS and the Serbian Orthodox church claiming that Muslims (both Kosovar and Bosniak), Albanians and ‘Romans’ (Croats) were reproducing at an unprecedented rate and that their intent was to outgrow Serbs in order to force them out of the geographical homeland of the Serbian nation (Salzman 1998: 350, 351). The ideological ramifications this had on the nation will be discussed further in Chapter Seven; for the anti-nation, however, the results were catastrophic. This sort of fear resulted in the excessive use of rape as a tool of war in the Bosnian tragedy36. Roy Gutman recounts the popular belief that Muslim men would attempt to ‘remove [a Serbian woman] from her own family, to impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take even him away from her’ in order to raise a ‘generation of janissaries’, or Christians raised by Muslims (1993: x), as we saw in the Armenian case. ‘To be successful

36 An encouraging amount of work has been done in this field, by scholars of politics, war and gender alike. For more information see Hayden (2000), Campbell (1998), Nikolić-Ristanović (2000), Fletcher (1993) and Engle (2005).
[Serbian nationalism] had to depict Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats as bloodthirsty Ustaschas and Ottoman-era janissaries, hell bent on recreating a fascist era ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (NDH) or an Islamic state’ (Malesevic 2006: 212).

This, then, added to the sense of justification for Serbian crimes of mass rape and ethnic cleansing, particularly when viewed against a backdrop, found in both of my other two cases, of ‘we are only doing to them what they have done to us.’ Thus, as mentioned in Chapters Two and Three, there are radicalising shifts in the evolution of ideology occurring in the Balkan case, though these shifts do differ somewhat as ethnic cleansing and genocide have different aims and perceived outcomes.

**Analysis**

*The moment has finally come for us to take revenge upon the Turks here!*  

(Ratkо Mladic 1995 in IT-04-80-1 2005)

The considerations set forth in the previous sections provide a vantage point to accomplish the two primary goals of this chapter, namely to analyse the role of the anti-nation in the development of ideology and, thus, allow us to identify any key themes perpetuated throughout all three cases when discussed in comparative form.

In order to fulfil these goals, let us return to the Turkish case. Immediately some interesting points come to light, the first of which is the established perspective of the Armenians as having unequal status, both culturally and legally. By the beginning of the Balkan Wars, the idea of the dehumanised anti-nation has already been normalised within the language of CUP ideology. This becomes the foundation for further perceptions and policies of dehumanisation to be implemented over the course of the conflict.

This idea of the dehumanised Armenian is further exacerbated by the popular perception of the Armenian as wealthy during a time of economic hardship, something that is particularly effective in the early stages of ideological
radicalisation in this case. The portrayal of Armenian success in the European trade area as a direct threat to Ottoman/Islamist influence in the area was critical to amassing popular support for increasingly aggressive anti-Armenian policies. As anti-nation aggression is formalised, this aspect of ideology in the Turkish case diminishes, suggesting that there is an inverse relationship between ideology and policy regarding this particular theme. Certainly this relationship is reflective of the growing perception that the Armenians should be entirely removed from Turkish society. Due primarily to the multi-ethnic nature of the Ottoman state, this theme is slow to emerge, but is strong in the latter years of escalation. Note, however, that the focus was generally on the total removal of the Armenians from the homeland, rather than their complete eradication (Cohen 2001: 190 - 191; R14086/Ab.23244 31.07.1915).

The third point of interest in the Turkish case is the perceived relationship between the Armenian anti-nation and external states. Beginning with the uprisings in the late 1800s, the Armenians are persistently identified as an internal enemy, damaging the nation, throughout the time period covered by my analysis; it is worth noting, however, that there are specific spikes of ideological emphasis placed on this point, first upon the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and secondly during the early years of WWI. During these times, the Armenians are directly associated with external enemies due to their perceived religious ties. Much of this perception of the Armenians as the national persecutor is founded on the early uprisings as described in Chapters Four and Five. These uprisings, when paired with the significant reduction in territory which will be further discussed in Chapter Eight, helped establish a fear for the further reduction of empire through the loss of Anatolia.

Unlike the Armenians in Turkey, the Zionist movement for an independent Jewish homeland played practically no role in German propaganda relating to the anti-nation. Nonetheless, there is still a growing perception of the necessity to remove all aspects of Jewry from the German nation. Early on in the Nazi’s reign, there are hints that Jews and Germans should not exist in the same place; ultimately, until the
armament and build-up to WWII begins in earnest between 1935 and 1938, the only clear idea regarding the separation of Jews from Germans is the physical separation of the two entities. This means roughly the separation of Jews within Germany and the separation of Jews from Germany (Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 72). Once armament begins and war looms, the shift away from territorial segregation in Germany to extermination begins to make itself felt in Nazi ideology. By 1942 – 1943, the height of German ideological radicalisation, it became ideologically clear that Jews must not only live apart from Germans, but that they must be entirely eradicated. This is the only case where the ideology regarding separation goes to such an extreme.

The need for such extreme separation is presented as being due to the damage the Jews have done through their persecution of the German nation. Similar to the Turkish case, the Jews are supposed to have committed egregious acts demeaning the German state and the German Volk through their association with external and other internal enemies, specifically, Communists and Marxists. In Germany, 1938 serves as the apex of radicalisation on this theme. From this height, it does decrease as Germany gets embroiled in war, but I would suggest this is due to the fact that it was very important to Germany to show they were winning the ‘war’ against the Jewish ‘opponents’ (Tribunals 18.03.1946; Dawidowicz 1975).

Nazi ideology was particularly clear of the self-fulfilling nature of anti-Semitic policy. By this I mean that anti-Jewish policies were implemented in such a way as to suggest that the Jews brought the action on themselves by acting in a certain way, in particular was the perception that, like Armenians in the Turkish case, the Jews were thriving during the economic depression Germany suffered in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Regardless of the fact that Jews represented only 2% of German bankers and stockbrokers, Jews ‘had become entangled in popular [German] consciousness with both nationalism and class conflict’ (Mann 2004: 141, 228). This idea increases in popularity until the Anschluss; upon entrance in WWII, this theme
declines, only to be resurrected again at the end of the war when the Jews were once again linked with Germany’s external enemies.

The final point, resurfacing time and again in the German case, is the Nazi’s extreme dehumanisation of the Jews. Though in each of my three cases, the anti-nation is compared to non-human elements, be they cattle, aliens, vampires or rats; the Nazis, along with these affiliations, had a particular focus on associating Jews with scientific and medical terminology – growths, parasites, microbes, germs. I suggest this has to do with recent breakthroughs in scientific knowledge, something which most of the Western world was taken with at the time, paired with the extreme Social Darwinist tendencies of the organic Nazi movement. Equally, it is interesting that the language of dehumanisation begins at an extremely high level and remains throughout the conflict.

This is different than in the Balkan case where the dehumanisation of the anti-nation begins quite slowly, but continues to swell in importance at each different period addressed in my analysis; thus, it is similar to the association of the Bosniaks as the persecutor of the nation. Similarly to each of the other two cases, it was Serbian entrance into war with Croatia that served as the primary radicaliser for this theme, as there is a large rise in anti-Bosniak propaganda, mirroring a shift occurring in Bosnian-Serb propaganda. Crucial here was the role of the religious myth, drawn upon by elites quite selectively, demonising Muslims as attempting to destroy the persecuted Serb (Gagnon 1995: 141). Thus, more than in either of my other two cases, is the perception of the Bosniaks as being a historical enemy, as well as having external links. This ties into the fact that, as we saw above, though there is a late identification of the Bosniaks as the anti-nation, this identification is preceded by an early mistrust of other Muslim groups due mostly to unrest in other parts of the region. Seamless ideological affiliation of Kosovar to Bosniak mirrors the internal enemy/external enemy relationships found in my other two cases. More similarly, Bosniaks had begun accepting help from the greater Muslim community (Bringa
1995), largely based on their affiliation with a religious identity which had become more of an ethnic marker than an indicator of faith.

Secondly, the Serbs also, as do the Turks and Germans, portray the Bosniak anti-nation as thriving during a time of national struggle. Unlike other aspects of ideology in this case, this point is particularly strong in the early years of radicalisation declines over the course of the conflict. Bosniak encroachment on governmental administration is established early in the radicalisation period as Muslims were thriving politically in a time where Serbian influence was waning; there is also a spike in this trend late 1991 and early 1992 during the independence movements when Serbs were watching the breakdown of their political sphere of power. After this point, however, the theme of national decline decreases throughout the course of the conflict.

Lastly, there is the fact that throughout the Balkan conflict, the drive to separate the nation from the anti-nation is paramount. It should be noted, however, that unlike in my other two cases, this goal was shared across Serbs and Croats alike, with Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining the only region committed to the multi-cultural idealism established under Tito. Their own goal of establishing a Bosniak region evolved only after years of persecution at the hands of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats alike. Equally, Serb ideology was less specific about the eradication of Bosniaks from the homeland and more conscious of the eradication of all other-groups from the homeland. Keep in mind, however, that in real terms this meant a significantly higher number of deaths and persecution against Bosniaks than against other groups, as shown in Chapters Four and Five. Equally, this homeland-driven approach to anti-nation policy mirrors that of the Turks rather than the Nazis in that the ideological focus was on the eradication of peoples from the homeland rather than the complete destruction of the anti-nation from the entire earth.
Conclusion

This chapter and the previous chapter have shown that the identification of an extreme out-group beyond the bounds of ordinary other-groups is present in all three cases of genocide; this identification has come about mainly through political elites building on beliefs of historical claims of difference and injustice. In order to rectify these ‘wrong doings’ and to justify the elimination of the anti-nation, national elites seek to ideologically strip the anti-nation of attributes that would elicit a merciful response from the nation.

On a more micro-level, however, evidence from each of my three case studies demonstrates that the ideological progression of radicalisation occurs primarily in four ways: 1) a persistent perception of the anti-nation thriving in times of national decline; it is here where we see the economic tension of nation vs. anti-nation come into play. These stereotypes were critical to amassing popular aggression against the anti-nation. In each of these cases, the idea of the anti-nation thriving during times of national decline is established before ideology becomes genocidal. What is also noteworthy is that upon entrance into war in each case, there is a notable shift between how much emphasis is placed on this theme.

We then move on to 2) the reinforced dehumanisation of the anti-nation through propaganda as well as through policy. Reinforced dehumanisation, paired with the chaos ensuing from war, is the theme Kershaw identifies as providing the context in which mass killing develops (1989: 106; see also Astourian 1990: 125); theft, rape, slave labour, unmitigated abuse and the societal restrictions of the anti-nation present in each of my cases provide reinforced policies of dehumanisation which, paired with the language of dehumanisation present in propaganda fulfils Kershaw’s criteria. This theme, perhaps more than any other, provides a picture for the ‘ratchet – effect’ relationship between ideology and policy in increasingly genocidal states. Though the use of dehumanised language is present in each of my three cases in the early stages of ideological development, the radicalisation of policy allows for a greater,
and, especially in the Yugoslav case, faster radicalisation ideology. Thus, we see that it is not merely a rhetorical radicalisation, but is radicalisation based on the effects of previous policies of restriction and degradation in society.

Thirdly, we see radicalising states 3) project the anti-nation as an historical, present and future national persecutor. Of all the themes discussed in this chapter, this is perhaps the strongest and most influential. This incorporates Staub’s idea that ‘perpetrators come to believe either that the victims have something they want or...stand in the way of something they want’ (1989: 23) and Kaufmann’s idea that invented tales of aggression planned by the anti-nation or occurring against the nation provide national hard-liners with an ‘unanswerable argument’ (1996: 142) regarding the necessity for increased persecution. This can be manifested in a variety of different ways including military persecution, political persecution and cultural persecution. I want to note, however, that again the anti-nation is cast as something more than a mere enemy. An enemy can be a passive thing, but radicalising ideology in these three cases presents the anti-nation as an active immediate threat. The anti-nation is actively acting contrary to, undermining and traitorously persecuting the nation. In short, casting the anti-nation as both historical and future persecutor provides the nation with justification for revenge and protection. Rebecca West sums up the radicalised ideology well saying, ‘having seen what Turkish conquest means to the Slav, it is certain they were justified in their crime. A man is not a man if he will not save his seed’ (in Judah 1997: 78).

Propaganda regarding this theme shifts similarly in each case: each time the nation prepares to enter war, the association of the anti-nation as the national persecutor rises.

The last main theme regarding the anti-nation arising from my research is 4) the perceived necessity of physically separating the anti-nation from the nation. By casting members of the anti-nation as a festering sore or as a disease, the political elite instituting genocidal ideology gathers support from the members of their nation. In this way, genocidal ideology both defines and justifies the need for the elimination
of its chosen victims; the anti-nation is cast as an invader of the national homeland and as such, they are denied the rights of citizens of the state and placed outside the realm of the nation’s moral obligation. As Mosse finds, “...a person doomed to a life of criminality must be killed as this [is] the only way to protect society. Capital punishment would therefore by part of a process of ‘deliberate selection,’ which might serve supplement and strengthen natural selection” (1985: 84; see also Snyder 2000: 67; Waller 2002: 237; Breuilly 2001: 103). In this light, mere coexistence is not enough to save the homeland from destruction by the anti-nation. By identifying the anti-nation in such a way, it allows the nation to easily justify the implementation of genocidal policy on multiple levels, varying at the different stages established in this analysis.

Anti-nation ideology then is at once a believable structural framework and a ‘cynical, utilitarian political instrument’ (Herf 2005: 54) of agency. It is also flexible, dynamic and at times at odds with policy initiatives. It also, as suggested in Chapter Two, is a key participant in the dynamicisation process of policy – an ideological belief instils fear demanding that policies be put in place to secure the nation from the anti-nation; this then further segregates the anti-nation and restricts civil rights and human liberties, leading to a life regarded as less valuable than a ‘normal’ life; this then leads to strife, poverty, persecution and acts of dehumanisation which then reinforce the language of dehumanisation present in the original ideology. Encouraging an ideological state of fear of the anti-nation then provided these radicalising states with the moral responsibility to act aggressively against the anti-nation. by committing genocidal aggression, these perpetrator states were able to present themselves to their constituencies as fulfilling their moral obligation; through that fulfilment they hoped to achieve legitimacy and further secure their power base. To what extent this same cyclical relationship between policy and ideology exists in the other two primary themes of ideology is of keen interest and will be discussed in the next two chapters.