The Ground of Speculative Politics
&
the Critique of the Moral Standpoint

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Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own, and that I am solely responsible for its composition.
Abstract

Speculative politics is a method of interaction based on Hegel's concept of Science (Wissenschaft), as explained primarily in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*. It is a method based on the *unity of opposites*, or the category of *becoming*, and is the only alternative to either modernism's 'politics of identity', or postmodernism's 'politics of difference'. Both of these latter forms of politics are in fact manifestations of 'abstract power', or its modern equivalent, 'the moral standpoint'. Abstract power is basically the result of the application of Aristotle's fundamental laws of thought, viz. *identity, non-contradiction* and *the excluded middle*, to humanity's social, political and economic life, with the ultimate consequence being an ever expanding cycle of *denial* and *annihilation*. The moral standpoint is simply abstract power with the addition of Cartesian subjectivity and dualism. By grounding itself upon the principle of *becoming* and recognizing the essentiality of logic in and to all fields of human endeavour, speculative politics offers the real possibility of overcoming the abstract power of the moral standpoint without simply denying, or annihilating the concept of power in itself. This is because the method of transcendence put forth by Hegel is actually one of 'overcoming through yielding', which, unlike the Aristotelian based moral standpoint, allows for the possibility of a *middle ground*. Aside from the philosophies of Aristotle, Descartes and Hegel then, the thesis also analyses the philosophy of Fichte. For Fichte's system occupies the dubious position of being both the formal origin of German Idealism's concept of Science, from which the method of transcendence emerges, and the highest theoretical development of the moral standpoint. In short, his philosophy represents the transition between the moral standpoint and speculative politics.
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Bibliography
Abbreviations

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Fichte, J.G.


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*In this work I rely primarily on the Johnston and Struthers translation of Hegel's Science of Logic. Although Miller's translation certainly makes up for some of the problems in the former, Johnston’s and Struther's language seems to better convey the concrete nature of Hegel's system. At times, however, I have felt it necessary to either refer to both translations, or to combine the two, in order to make the meaning of a particular passage, or concept clearer for both the reader and myself. Whenever this occurs, I have referenced both texts, and placed the one having priority first in the brackets. Also, 'MI' stands for 'My italics'.


Preface: Metaphysics, Logic & Politics

The Ground of Speculative Politics & the Critique of the Moral Standpoint is primarily a work on metaphysics. It is also, therefore, a work on logic and politics, or, so as not to overly offend those attached to the formal separation of the various academic disciplines, let us for the moment merely say, the possibility of politics.1 What, however, could these three disciplines, viz. metaphysics, logic and politics, possibly have in common to warrant the positing of such a seemingly immediate relationship between them? This is certainly a pertinent question given that we now live in a world that specifically defines itself as "post-metaphysical,"2 and regards a 'metaphysical orientation', as well as its consequent 'logocentrism', as the greatest sin one can commit when talking about or practicing politics. For, particularly as critics of modernity from Rousseau to Derrida have attempted to argue, such an orientation results in the indefinite reproduction of the seemingly double-sided phenomenon of violence and domination. For instance, as Derrida claims in his famous essay on Emmanuel Levinas, Violence & Metaphysics, the two constituent activities of traditional Western, i.e. Aristotelian, metaphysics, viz. ontology and theology, are not only implicated in the production of violence and domination, but are their necessary preconditions. Derrida, following Levinas' reasoning, argues that the basic category of ontology, viz. being, is a neutralization of "the Other as being: 'Ontology as first philosophy [therefore] is a philosophy of power',3 a philosophy of the neutral, the tyranny of the state as an anonymous and inhuman universality."4 Moreover, since the, i.e. infinite or absolute, Other of the world and humanity, viz. God, must nonetheless enter into dialogue with, and thus relation to, that world and humanity (both of which are finite) - even if it is only to have his being neutralized - "God ... is [also] implicated in war. His name too, like the name of peace, is a function within the system of war, the only system whose basis permits us to speak, the only system whose language may ever be spoken . ... We can have a relation to God only within such a system."5

We shall begin to see why this is the case in the Introduction to this work, specifically Section 3, dealing with pure, abstract or absolute being and the concept of abstract power. However, what matters for the moment is that: "Metaphysics is the essence of this language, [dialogue or speech (logos)] with God,"6 or the Other; and furthermore, that any language, like the beings that create and speak it, whether finite or infinite, the same or Other, ontological or theological, appears necessarily to imply violence. Metaphysics is the essence of the language with God or the Other, because, as we shall see shortly, it is what provides for the possibility of being related to what lies beyond oneself; and, therefore, what constitutes an or the Other for one. This language necessarily implies violence, because, as Derrida attempts to explain towards the end of Violence & Metaphysics: "A Being without violence would be a being which would occur outside the existent: nothing; non-history; non-occurrence; non-phenomenality. A speech produced without the least violence would determine nothing, would say nothing, would offer nothing to the other; it would not be history, and it would show nothing. ... In the last analysis, ... non-violent language would be a language which would do
without the verb *to be*, that is, without predication. Predication is the *first violence*. Since the verb *to be* and the predicative act are implied in *every other* verb, and in every common noun, nonviolent language, in the last analysis, would be a language of pure invocation, pure adoration, proffering only proper nouns in order to call the other from afar. In effect, such a language would be purified of all *rhetoric* ... that is, purified of *every verb*.7 Put differently, it would contain limits, i.e. nouns, but not the instruments or representations of the activity of limiting, i.e. verbs; and without even the formal possibility or presence of this activity in language, there would be no possibility of freedom, which, for the moment, we may simply describe as the ability to transcend limitations through the activity of self-limiting.

Thus, Derrida quite sensibly asks: "Would such a language still deserve its name? Is a language free from all rhetoric possible? The Greeks who taught us what Logos meant, would never have accepted this. Plato tells us in *Cratylus* (425a), the *Sophist* (262 a-d) and in Letter VII (342b), that there is no Logos which does not suppose the interlacing of nouns and verbs."8 Aristotle also tells us in the *Rhetoric* that: "Language is composed of nouns and verbs."9 "One [therefore] never escapes the economy of war" 10 - at least not where one is involved in, or circumscribed or determined by traditional ontology, theology and, apparently, language/logic (logos). What we shall see shortly Aristotle defines in the *Metaphysics* as 'first philosophy', 11 therefore, might just as well be defined as 'first power' and 'first violence'.

Now, even though this conclusion regarding Aristotelian 'first philosophy', or metaphysics will prove to be correct in the course of this work, I must emphasize that this work is not really about the postmodern view represented by the likes of Derrida and Levinas. Nor does it attempt to offer anything resembling what might be called a postmodern, or Derridean solution to this problem, especially since I am not at all sure that Derrida offers any solutions to this problem in his work, only observations and criticisms, many of which seem to be quite valid. Instead, this work is about the modern views represented by the systems of Descartes, Fichte and Hegel; and Derrida's view, like Levinas', although a product of these systems, merely appears here as contemporary illustration that it is not so outrageous as some might think to talk about metaphysics, logic and politics in the same breath - even if it is to condemn their association - or, for that matter, the connection between the concept of being and violence, which constitutes a major theme of this work. Furthermore, although Derrida's illustration is a good one, it does not provide a sufficient answer to the question posed above, viz. 'what relates metaphysics, logic and politics?'. To do this, we must proceed in what is no doubt a less fashionable manner than the philosophical 'impressionism' which has become all the rage with the likes of Derrida and other postmodernists, but what is definitely a more instructive method, i.e. we must proceed by means of systematic argumentation. We shall begin, therefore, with the definition of the essential terminology or concepts contained in the question, 'what relates metaphysics, logic and politics?'. From this process of definition, we shall then derive the relationship between these terms.
Thus, any critics of this argument, if they are to be taken at all seriously, will not only be expected, but are obliged, to provide their own counter definitions and derivations of these terms. For neither philosophy, nor science recognizes mere subjective assertion, or denial as legitimate arbiters of truth, regardless of the rank, position and authority of the asserting, or denying subject. Such assertion and denial, which are the fundamental activities of philosophy's and science's exact opposites, viz. philodoxia, 'the love of opinion', and nescience, ultimately lead to only one place; and it is a place I am fairly certain most 'intellectuals' are unwilling to venture, except perhaps in the relative safety of their own imaginations, or by proxy. What is this place? Quite simply, it is the place Hegel explains so well at the beginning of the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the field of life and death - literal life and literal death.

With that said, let us now turn to our main task and answer the following question: what are metaphysics, logic and politics?

As has already been indicated above, the idea of 'metaphysics' formally begins with Aristotle, although Aristotle does not explicitly use the term. It was originally a bibliothecal designation allegedly used by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century B.C. for those of Aristotle's "treatises located 'after' those on 'physics'"  

\[ \text{ta meta ta phusika: the work after the Physics.} \]

The formal bibliothecal designation, however, quickly became identified with the content of these treatises, which, as we shall see, appears to be different from the empirical content of physics to naive thought. Thus, "meta, instead of 'after', becomes 'beyond'," and the term 'metaphysics' can then be interpreted as referring to what lies beyond mere physical being, e.g. non-physical being, the Other, God, thought, the void, etc. Indeed, all of these connotations are somehow contained in the content of the work following Aristotle's works on physics, which has to do with the two branches of 'first philosophy', viz. ontology and theology.

Briefly, Aristotle defines 'first philosophy' as follows: "There is a definite science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to [being] as such." First philosophy, therefore, is the study, speech or reason (logos) of being (on) as such and God, or the highest being (theos), since, for Aristotle, "it is clear that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in this kind of entity." Thus, insofar as being as such and the highest being are 'beyond', and, therefore, different from mere physical being, which seems to be essentially particular, e.g. a stone, a tree, a dog, a body, etc., we may infer that the objects of first philosophy are purely universal. As such, first philosophy's realm of inquiry is what lies beyond the realm of sense-experience, i.e. the supersensible. Put differentially, whereas physics would seem to have to do with the real, i.e. what 'is', which is the content of sense-experience, metaphysics would seem to have to do with the ideal i.e. what 'ought to be', or the conditions of the possibility of the real, which is the content of pure thought.
However, taken immediately, or in terms of common sense, this might seem to imply that while the objects of metaphysics should exist, i.e. because they are purely universal or ideal, they in fact do not exist, and, therefore, must merely be sought after. Once again, however, the objects of metaphysics, as determined so far, are being as such and the highest, most perfect, supreme or absolute being, viz. God. To say that these objects do not exist, but merely ought to, therefore, is to say what we shall see in Chapter I the likes of Anselm and Descartes tell us cannot be said, viz. that being as such and the highest being, God, are not. In other words, it is to say that these beings lack being. It is to say that the essence and cause of the verb 'to be', or 'is', is to 'not-be', or 'is-not'. Now, although we shall see this to be partially true when we come to deal with Hegel's speculative metaphysics in the Introduction and Part III, it is clearly contradictory, and, therefore, impossible or false, especially for physical beings such as ourselves, who seem to depend primarily on sense-perception for our knowledge of self and others. Thus, as it is so far defined, the ideal must also exist, even though this existence must still be beyond or different from mere physical existence. In short, it too must be real, i.e. a real ideality.

However, if we are particular, physical beings, who depend on the faculty of sense-perception for our knowledge of self and others, how can we have access to what lies beyond us other than mere appearance? How can we develop and be certain of a science of being as such and of God? How are ontology and theology, or rather, first philosophy, and, therefore, metaphysics possible?

The answer lies in what constitutes 'real ideality' for us. As we can see in Aristotle's definition of first philosophy as 'science', and, as we can also see in the very terms 'onto-logy' and 'theo-logy', the faculty of thought, or 'word/speech/reason' (logos) is presupposed. Thus, what differentiates us from all other physical beings, animate and inanimate, and, therefore, supposedly gives us access to a realm of being beyond the physical, must be the faculty of thought. In other words, we are not only particular, physical beings with the ability to sense and perceive other physical beings, but also presumably thinking beings, who can abstract from all of the particular content of existence and experience and reflect upon the pure or universal forms supposedly left over. In fact, as we shall discover in a close analysis of the faculty of sense-perception in Chapter 4, even these 'physical' faculties are simply other modes or determinations of thought, the objects of which are abstract or universal in the extreme. However, that aside for now, that we are 'thinking beings', as well as 'physical beings', is implicit in Aristotle's famous definition of 'man' as a political animal. For the instrument or power that enables us to fulfill our political nature, and defines us - since, according to Aristotle, "things are defined by their function and power" - is the power of word/speech/reason (logos), i.e. language. As he says in the Politics: "that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. [For] ... man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure and pain, and is therefore found in other animals ... the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore
likewise the just and unjust. And it is characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like; and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state."20

No doubt, a cursory reading of this passage, along with a superficial understanding of Aristotle's philosophy, supports what Aristotle himself proposes at the beginning of the Politics, and what many contemporary dogmatic and positivist critics of the association of metaphysics and politics either latently, or explicitly believe, viz. that "it is evident that the state is a creation of nature,"21 and, therefore, an object, the preservation and study of which falls within the realm of physical science. For as a natural creation, the state, like anything else, is a particular, physical being. Thus, 'political science', on traditional Aristotelian grounds, seems to have everything to do with physics, and little or nothing to do with metaphysics. Indeed, Aristotle appears to confirm this view in a number of important ways which we should take into account here. First, he clearly regards 'practical wisdom' or 'prudence', of which 'political wisdom' is simply a subsidiary department,22 as the highest and most useful 'excellence' one can possess for life in the state,23 while he acknowledges that the 'wisdom' and 'knowledge' characteristic of first philosophy or metaphysics, although the 'highest', most 'difficult' and most 'divine', seems to be the most 'useless'.24 This is because the objects and aims of practical wisdom are human goods "and things about which it is possible to deliberate,"25 whereas the objects and aims of philosophical wisdom and knowledge are only things which are strictly 'necessary' and 'eternal', i.e. 'first principles' and 'universals'26 - and, although practical wisdom must be concerned with universals, "it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars."27 As such, practical wisdom is 'deliberative'. This means that it "involves reasoning (logos)," the essence of which, for Aristotle, is 'seeking' and 'calculation' (logosimos).28 Practical wisdom, therefore, is a process of demonstration and 'deduction', i.e. the derivation of particulars from universals, or simply, logic,29 which, for Aristotle, implies a mediation that supposedly places any of the sciences associated with practical wisdom under the rubric of 'physics', not 'metaphysics'. For the philosophical wisdom and knowledge which is the aim of metaphysics, although eminently concerned with 'necessity', one of the most important aims and objects of logic, only provides "the principles from which deduction, [or logic] proceeds, [but] which are not reached by deduction."30 Rather, they are reached by a combination of induction and immediate knowledge or intuition.31 Otherwise, they would not be 'first' principles, but instead principles based on some prior principles which would then be first. Needless to say then, practical wisdom, and, therefore, life in the state, may require logic, but they certainly do not appear to require metaphysics, which, at this point, seems to be something not only separate from politics, but logic as well - (though Aristotle does suggest that logic is the necessary propaedeutic for all of the sciences, especially first philosophy, making it difficult to imagine how a hard and fast separation between them can be maintained).32

Second, Aristotle seems to confirm the notion that politics is a physical, rather than a metaphysical,
science, with his view of 'the soul', which, according to both the medieval tradition and the modern Cartesian viewpoint, is an object of the study of which falls under metaphysics (LL 53:34). Even though Aristotle regards the state as being "clearly prior to the family and individual, since the whole is necessarily prior to the part,"33 in the Nicomachean Ethics he makes it clear that "the student of politics must know somehow the facts about [the] soul."34 This is because "happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with complete excellence,"35 and because 'human excellence' is the ultimate good at which the state 'aims'.36 Inquiry into the nature of human excellence and human happiness, therefore, definitely falls within the domain of 'political science'; and, since the soul, rather than the body, is what constitutes human excellence, the political scientist once again "must study the soul."37

Furthermore, since the soul is both 'essence' and 'actuality' in contrast to the body,38 (which, because it is material, is merely 'potential'),39 its constitution is 'universal', and, therefore, as Aristotle makes plain in the Politics, reflected in natural, physical creations or beings, such as the family and the state.40 The necessity of studying the soul in political science, then, would seem to give that discipline a necessarily metaphysical element. However, since Aristotle, contrary to Plato, regards the soul as "inseparable from its body,"41 and, therefore, itself a "substance in the sense which corresponds to the account of a thing,"42 "the study of the soul ... must [also] fall within the science of nature."43 In short, the study of the soul, like politics, is a branch of physics, not metaphysics. Thus, the basic presupposition of this work as explained so far, viz. that metaphysics, logic and politics are essentially related, would appear to be false, at least with regard to the traditional Aristotelian conception of these sciences.

Do we then merely turn to some other conception of these sciences, which is more compatible with our own view? Not necessarily. For this would make the beginning of the Science that will be outlined and grounded in this work something lacking in essential necessity, and, therefore, only relatively true, i.e. its ground would simply be a bare assertion, and, therefore, an opinion, which is no better than the ungrounded criticisms that have been made against it. In other words, it would be neither philosophical, nor scientific. Where then is the metaphysical element or content of the Aristotelian conception of politics and logic to be found?

As has already been indicated above in Derrida's account of the problem of metaphysics and being and in Aristotle's definition of 'man' as the 'political animal', it lies in that power which separates humanity from the rest of nature, and is the one truly necessary precondition or actual creator of 'the association of living beings' known as the state. In short, it lies in the power of speech or language. For Aristotle, speech or language is intimately connected with, if not identical to, human thought, since, as he explains in the Metaphysics, one who says nothing, does not reason, and, therefore, is "no better than a mere plant."44 However, "the intellect is in the soul,"45 and the soul, as we have already seen, is inseparable from the body, making it an object of physical, not metaphysical, science. Politics and the state, therefore, even as the product of human language and thought, would still seem
to rest on physical, rather than metaphysical, grounds.

As Aristotle makes clear in his treatise On The Soul, however, even though "thought or the power of reflexion" is part of the soul, it is as different from all the other parts of the soul, "as what is eternal [is] from what is perishable; it alone [therefore] is capable of being separated [from the body]."46 Indeed, this is why even Aristotle, for whom all thought is necessarily determinate, i.e. of something,47 must regard thought as "the most divine of phenomena."48 We can, therefore, infer that the investigation into thought is a task for the most divine science, i.e. metaphysics, and not mere physics, despite the fact that the intellect is part of the soul and that the study of much of the soul is a matter for physics. We do not need to infer anything here however. For Aristotle himself expressly states at the start of On The Soul, that where the attributes of the soul are "separate" from material existence, their investigation falls "to the First Philosopher,"49 i.e. to the metaphysician. Insofar as politics and the state are products of thought and language, therefore, political science must be a metaphysical enterprise, particularly insofar as it seeks to be more than just a descriptive exercise, i.e. insofar as it seeks to inquire into and explain the causes and principles of its object, which is the task of all authentic science, even or especially for Aristotle.50

Contrary to his previous observation that metaphysics appears to be the most 'useless' science for maintaining, developing and studying the state then, Aristotle makes it very clear not only that metaphysics is the highest and most important science, even in the state, but also that both practical wisdom and the state are in fact only means for facilitating the achievement of metaphysics' end, viz. wisdom or knowledge. Practical wisdom, as he says in the Nicomachean Ethics, "is not supreme over wisdom, i.e. over the superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health: for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its, [viz. practical wisdom's,] supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of state."51 Also, as Aristotle explains in the Metaphysics, whereas metaphysics is a science which is "capable of existing apart" from all of the other sciences, they are not capable of existing apart from it.52 This is because its content and object is universal and prior to all other contents and objects, making it the primary and universal science.53 In short, it is independent, whereas they are dependent. Metaphysics, therefore, is the whole, and all of the other sciences are merely "parts" in that whole.54 Finally, we may conclude that if both the state and practical wisdom truly have the achievement of the 'highest good' as their final aim or end, as Aristotle holds they do,55 then both, as well as being instruments in the realization of metaphysics' object, i.e. wisdom or knowledge, must always enlist the aid of metaphysics. For "the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good in each class, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. ... [T]his must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good ... is one of the [first] causes."56 Ultimately,
Let us then summarize the results of our inquiry regarding the relationship between metaphysics, logic and politics thus far. First, metaphysics literally means 'after' physics, and as such designates Aristotle's work on first philosophy, which is comprised of two intimately related disciplines, viz. ontology and theology. The content of the former has to do with the attributes and nature of being as such, and that of the former with the nature and attributes of the highest being, God. The content of both ontology and theology, therefore, is purely universal or pure universality, and as such, is separate from or 'beyond' physical being, which is essentially particular - hence the superseding definition of metaphysics. Second, thought is what separates human beings from the rest of nature, i.e. the realm of physical being, and is not only what gives us access to being as such and God, but also constitutes the metaphysical element in us. This thought is inseparable from, if not identical with, the power of word/reason/speech (logos), or language, and, therefore, essentially the same as logic, which is the art of 'correct thinking or reasoning'. The only problem here then would seem to be Aristotle's claim that: "Thought ... is not the starting point of thinking, nor deliberation of deliberation," nor 'reasoning of reasoning'; and, therefore, that the principles of deduction are arrived at through induction and intuition, rather than deduction. For when we inquire as to the starting point of thought, reason and deduction, Aristotle answers, "God," which seems to imply a separation between thought and at least half of the content of metaphysics, viz. the absolute being of theology. However, this proves to be less of separation and problem than it seems when we inquire into the nature of God as absolute being and into what constitutes the first principle of all human knowledge according to Aristotelian thought. In both cases, the answer is identity, which, as we shall see in the Introduction, Section 2 and Part II, Chapter 3, is also the first truth or law of logic. Last, thought or language/logic is the necessary precondition of the association of living beings, of which the state is the highest form; or rather, language/logic is the essence of politics. For it is the activity and means of establishing or determining relationships between living beings. Thus, to be truly effective or successful in or at politics, i.e. to succeed by means other than mere chance, accident and luck, one must know, or, at least, heed, metaphysics, which, as well as being the most authoritative form of knowledge or science, i.e. insofar as it deals with being as such, God and the fundamental laws of thought, has the reason and final aim of the state as its content, viz. the Good. We can begin to see then that there are very strong reasons for presupposing an essential relationship between metaphysics, logic and politics, even where such a relationship at first seemed to be discounted or utterly denied.

Critics might now attempt to argue, however, that, although this may have been true in and for the classical world of Aristotle, as well as the medieval world dominated by Aristotelian scholasticism, it has ceased to be true in and for our 'post-metaphysical' world. For the modern era was born, at least in and for thought, with what appeared to be the wholesale rejection of Aristotelianism in science.
philosophy and politics. The growing opposition of the Renaissance humanists to the methodology and cosmology of Aristotle, in favor of that of Plato and Pythagoras, more or less directly resulted in the birth of the Enlightenment during the seventeenth century, and this transition is well illustrated in the work of the primary founders of the Enlightenment, i.e. Galileo, Descartes and, especially, Hobbes. For instance, Galileo not only provided the definitive argument for Copernicus' heliocentrism, thus overturning Aristotle's geocentrism once and for all, he also overturned the Aristotelian conception both of motion as a phenomenon requiring an external but contiguous source, i.e. a motor or mover, and of physics as an essentially qualitative science, or rather, as a science having to do with essentially qualitative matter. Instead, with Galileo and, as we shall see in Part II, Chapter 1, Descartes, matter becomes something inherently quantitative, mathematical or "geometrical." As Descartes says so well: "I must make it clear that I recognize no kind of 'matter' in corporeal objects except that 'matter' susceptible of every sort of division, shape and motion, which geometers call 'quantity'." As we shall also see in Part II, Chapter 1, Descartes seems to further break with the Aristotelian tradition by allowing for the direct knowledge of a substance's essence without having to first abstract from the data given by the senses. Of course, if anything, this makes Descartes' standpoint more metaphysical than Aristotle's, and, indeed, Descartes, unlike Hobbes as we shall see shortly, does not reject the traditional role of metaphysics. Rather, as is made clear in Part II, Chapter 1, he sees metaphysics as the foundation for all human knowledge or science. This is why his most important work is the Meditations on First Philosophy, and why he proceeds to tell us, in the Preface to that work, that he "is going to deal with the foundations of First Philosophy in its entirety" (MFP 8).

Hobbes of course attempts to present an altogether different picture. According to him, Aristotelian metaphysics is the epitome of 'Vain Philosophy', which is one of the four causes of 'the Kingdome of Darknesse'. As Hobbes explains in the Leviathan, this kingdom is "nothing else but a Confederacy of Deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous Doctrines, to extinguish in them the Light, both of Nature and of the Gospell; and so to dis-prepare them for the Kingdom of God to come," which, as we shall see in the Introduction, Section 3, is in fact essentially identical with the real and true 'Common-wealth', or State. As such, 'the Kingdome of Darknesse' and its doctrinal supports, i.e. Aristotelianism, are the antitheses of enlightenment and legitimate 'Sovereigne Power', which, in the 'present', i.e. physical, world, is embodied generally in the 'Leviathan' or 'State' - the rights of which are derived from the 'Principles of Nature' - and particularly in the 'Christian Common-wealth' - which is based on 'divine revelation', and, therefore, 'Holy Scripture'. Hobbes' vehement opposition to Aristotelian metaphysics is a consequence of a number of presuppositions in his philosophy, which more or less underlie the modern materialistic, realistic and positivistic prejudice against metaphysics. First, he regards it as a logical impossibility for finite beings, such as ourselves, to have an "Idea or conception of anything we call Infinite." God, therefore, is completely "Incomprehensible" for human beings. Except for the
fact 'that he is' then, which for Hobbes, like most other philosophers, including Aristotle and Descartes, is a necessity born of the scientific search for causes and the need for a first principle,70 "we understand nothing of what he is." 71 In short, his 'Attributes' are "unconceivable." 72 This of course renders theology a completely absurd or 'vain' enterprise. 73 Second, for Hobbes, everything, by which he means "the Universe, ... is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, viz. Length, Breidth and Depth." 74 Furthermore, "what is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, what is no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently no where." 75 This means that there are no such things as what Hobbes refers to as, 'Abstract Essences', i.e. essences which are separate or can be separated from particular beings or bodies. 76 Thus, there is no being as such, and, therefore, no possibility of ontology. To drive this point home, he even argues that the word 'is' signifies nothing more than mere 'consequence' through the coupling of terms which 'name' something, e.g. 'Man' and 'Body'. In other words, the word 'is' does not name anything, and as such is a completely superfluous term. As he concludes in the Leviathan, therefore: "Whether all other Nations of the world have in their several languages a word that answereth to it, [viz. being,] or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have no need of it: For the placing of two names in order may serve to signify their Consequence, if it were the custome, (for Custome is it, that gives words their force,) as well as the words Is, or Bee, or Are, and the like. 77 "And if it were so, that there were a Language without any Verb answerable to Est, or Is, or Bee, yet the men that used it would bee not a jot less capable of Inferring, Concluding, and of all kind of Reasoning, than were the Greeks and Latines." 78 We can see then that, even though Hobbes might agree with Aristotle on both the intimate, if not identical, relationship between Logos, or language/speech/reason and human thought/knowledge, 79 and the fact that Logos, or language/speech/reason is the necessary condition for the State, 80 i.e. because without it "there had been amongst men neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears and Wolves," 81 he would not agree that the verb 'to be', or, for that matter, any other verb, is necessary for the existence of this Logos.

Finally, because Hobbes regards everything as 'body', i.e. because there are no 'abstract essences', there is no thought or mind that is separable from the body, which was the crux of his opposition to Descartes. As he says in his second objection to Descartes' Meditations: "The knowledge of the proposition 'I exist' ... depends on the knowledge of the proposition 'I am thinking'; and knowledge of the latter proposition depends on our inability to separate thought from the matter that is thinking. So it seems that the correct inference is that the thinking thing is material rather than immaterial" (MFP 3rd Obj. 123). All thought, therefore, is a product of sense-experience, 82 and all philosophy, including 'civil philosophy', a matter of physics, 83 which Hobbes confirms in his Elements of Philosophy Concerning the Body: "The subject of Philosophy, or the matter it treats of, is every body of which we can conceive any generation, and which we may, by any consideration thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is capable of composition and resolution; i.e. every body of whose generation and properties we can have any knowledge." 84 Hence, long before Hume declared that
metaphysics should be committed "to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."\(^{85}\) Hobbes had already completed its pyre, struck the match and lit the flames.

Hobbes' attitude towards metaphysics, however, is disingenuous to say the least. For, like Galileo, Descartes and almost every other mainstream Enlightenment thinker, he assumes the validity of Aristotle's fundamental laws of thought, which are the foundation, essence or substantive content of traditional metaphysics, i.e. identity, non-contradiction and the excluded middle. Although we shall expressly discuss these laws in the Introduction, Section 2, it is worth noting here that even in criticizing Aristotelianism for purveying a metaphysical standpoint in humanity, Hobbes explicitly affirms the Aristotelian laws of non-contradiction and identity, which incidentally is the reason the Hobbesian State must ultimately be held together by nothing other than brute force and terror (see Introduction, Section 3). As he says of these metaphysicians in Leviathan: "they will have us believe, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may at one and the same time bee in many places: and many bodies at one and the same time in one place; as if it were an acknowledgement of the Divine Power, to say, what 'is', 'is-not'; or what 'has been', has 'not-been'. And these are but a small part of the Incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing Philosophically, instead of admiring, and adoring of the Divine and Incomprehensible Nature, whose Attributes cannot signifie what he is, but ought to signifie our desire to honour him with the best Appellations we can think on. But they that venture to reason of his Nature, [i.e. through theology.] from these Attributes of Honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one Inconvenience into another, without end, and without number."\(^{86}\) However, these metaphysicians are not the only ones who indefinitely fall from one incongruity and inconvenience into another. For, as we shall see in the Introduction, Section 3, Hobbes' entire theory of 'Sovereigne Power', or what he calls, "the Soul of the Common-wealth,"\(^{87}\) is constituted by conceptions of 'Attributes' which are quintessentially metaphysical, and which, according to him, are supposed to be 'unconceivable', e.g. absoluteness, infinity, indivisibility, Oneness, identity, unconditional positing, pure indifference, etc.. For Hobbes, this power constitutes the Absolute ideal after which the State must eternally strive,\(^{88}\) and, therefore, as we shall see in Part II, Chapter 3, is what makes his philosophy, supposedly the ultimate in political objective realism, or materialism, more or less identical with the philosophy of the ultimate subjective idealist, Fichte, whose principle of identity, or the Absolute Ego, or 'I am' constitutes the absolute ideal of all 'practical activity', i.e. pure striving. Indeed, the State itself, by Hobbes' own admission is a metaphysical entity, or rather, the ultimate product of humanity's metaphysical inclination. For, as he says in the very Introduction to Leviathan: "the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique, [i.e. 'Leviathan', 'Common-wealth' or 'State',] were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation."\(^{89}\) In short, the State is the product of an absolute and immediate Act, viz. the 'I will', or 'I am',\(^{90}\) on the part of the human species.
However, despite his rather obvious use of metaphysical laws and concepts, Hobbes' hostility towards metaphysics still determined, or, at least, prophesied, its bleak future in science, philosophy and politics. Of course, there have been some noteworthy champions of metaphysics since his time, e.g. Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Wolff, Kant and Fichte, to name a few, but its general history to the present certainly has been one of radical decline. It would be interesting to survey this history from both sides. However, this would definitely put us in danger of, as one contemporary author on metaphysics ironically puts it, "get[ting] bogged down in history." Although I do not have what some might regard as a metaphysician's contempt for or fear of something as 'mundane' as history, I do not think a detailed historical analysis at this point would add much in the way of conceptual development to the problem as it has been addressed so far, i.e. the question of the relationship between metaphysics, logic and politics. Indeed, such a survey would only increase the danger of pushing this work, the particular nature of which still needs to be stated and expalined, far beyond its already barely tolerable length. Suffice to say then, that from Hobbes to the present, metaphysics has always been on the defensive, and, as a result, has become little more than a bibilopolical designation for popular works on 'the occult' and the occasional term of derision for philosophers, scientists and mathematicians to use against opponents they would rather not engage in substantial argument. As we shall see shortly, however, this does not mean that philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, politicians, indeed, all of us, do not continue to use metaphysics, just like Hobbes. Furthermore, although our lives are indeed completely structured by its categories, there are some good reasons for traditional and modern metaphysics' demise as a formal science, i.e. its inability or failure to explain, and, therefore, preserve and develop, the relationship between the physical world, or thing-in-itself and thought, which brings us back to the point of this work, as well as the philosopher whose system not only provides its inspiration and aim, but also the most important third of its content, viz. Hegel.

In truly modern spirit, Hegel acknowledges "the downfall of metaphysics" with the birth and coming of age of the Enlightenment in his system (SL 1 34). In fact, he begins the Preface to the first edition of the *Science of Logic* with what can only be described as a eulogy for metaphysics: "What before this period was called Metaphysics, has been, so to speak, extirpated root and branch, and has disappeared from the ranks of the sciences. Where could one now catch an echo - where would any echo venture to linger - of the ontology, the rational psychology, the cosmology or even the natural theology, of former times? Where, for instance, would investigations concerning the immateriality of the soul, or efficient and final causes ... now arouse any interest? Even the former proofs of the existence of God are now brought forward only from an historical standpoint, or for purposes of edification and spiritual uplifting" (SL 1 33 & HSL 25). Various reasons for this downfall are scattered throughout both of Hegel's works on logic, viz. the *Science* and the *Encyclopedia Logic*. What immediately strikes one, however, is the overwhelming impression that the death of metaphysics was more the result of a prolonged attack, than it was natural causes. Aside from the fact that being 'extirpated root and branch' suggests a policy of active extermination, Hegel briefly describes, in the
Encyclopedia, why thought, in its purest form as philosophy, and philosophy, in its purest form as metaphysics, inspired the wrath of those intellectual and emotional forces which crave certainty and security, no matter how restricting, right from the virtual birth of Western philosophy in ancient Greece. According to him, pure thought explicitly established itself as a 'real power' at this time, and this power began to undermine the very institutions that not only made human life more certain and secure (LL 28:19), but also made philosophy itself possible, for, like Aristotle, Hegel recognizes the necessity of freedom from the exigencies of natural, everyday life, i.e. leisure, in order to practice and develop the activities of abstraction and reflection, which are the pillars of 'pure thought' (SL I 42). In short, pure thought, as philosophy, began to "overthrow religion and the state" (LL 28:19), e.g. Socrates. As a consequence, the intellectual and emotional forces dependent upon these institutions initiated a counter-attack against philosophy, if not to punish it for its ingratitude, certainly to protect the existence of these institutions, e.g. the trial and execution of Socrates. The first and most obvious target for such a counter-attack naturally was that discipline which had set itself the most ambitious tasks, and thus the highest position within philosophy, viz. metaphysics. Thus, as Hegel concludes: "The matter ended by drawing attention to the influence of thought, and its claims were submitted to a more rigorous scrutiny, by which the world professed to find that thought had arrogated too much and was unable to perform what it had undertaken. It had not - people said - learned the real being of God, Nature and Mind. It had not learned what the truth was" (LL 29:19 [MI]). Long before Hobbes' modern attack on 'vain philosophy' then, metaphysics already found itself in need of defense, at least until the advent of Christianity and its demotion to the medieval handmaiden of religion.

Perceived ingratitude and a penchant for subversion, however, could hardly have been the only causes of the demise of metaphysics. For a power that had been able to threaten religion and the state once so effectively should surely have been able to repeat the feat a second time, and as many times as necessary thereafter. The anti-metaphysical activities of the conservative intellectual and emotional forces of the classical world, therefore, could only have been the external causes of metaphysics' ultimate demise, not the reason. What allegedly was so mighty a power, therefore, must have proved incapable of responding adequately to the attacks directed against it, so that the real weaknesses came from within, rather than without. According to Hegel, traditional metaphysics, or what he calls, 'the metaphysics of the past', in order to distinguish it from modern Cartesian/Kantian metaphysics, suffered from three fundamental weaknesses. Even though thought, as we saw with Aristotle's notion of metaphysics, was regarded as being ultimately separate from the world, Hegel claims that traditional metaphysics assumed an immediate identity between 'the laws and forms of thought' and 'the laws and forms of things or being'. In other words, it never really questioned whether or not one could know the real nature or essence of the world simply by thinking about it. For being as such and God were taken to constitute this nature or essence, and thought was not seen as being fundamentally different from, if not God, certainly being as such. Thought, therefore, had an immediate objective validity in and for the metaphysics of the past, which meant there was no real attempt to explain the relationship

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between thought and being. Now, although the assumption of thought's objective validity leads Hegel to conclude that traditional metaphysics "occupied a higher ground than Critical Philosophy" (LL 48:28), i.e. Kantian metaphysics, in which access to the real nature or essence of the world, i.e. the thing-in-itself, is forever denied to thought, it also meant the following: 1) the "terms of thought, [i.e. laws and forms,] were cut off from their connection" with one another, so that thought did not constitute a systematic unity or totality (LL 48:28); 2) metaphysics "adopted a wrong criterion," or method for determining the truth (LL 50:30); and 3) metaphysics "turned into Dogmatism" (LL 52:32).

The first two problems, as we shall see in the Introduction, are basically a consequence of the object of inquiry - whether it be a thought or thing - not being allowed, by thought, to yield up its own predicates to thought (LL 50:28); or, as Hegel puts it, to "freely and spontaneously expound its own characteristics" (LL 51:31). As a result, thought, without being aware of the fact, merely applies the predicates it already finds in its possession to the things it also simply finds in existence. Everything, therefore, is a given for it. Thus, it does not really discover or determine the actual relationships a) between the various terms of thought, b) between these terms and the things to which it applies, or from which it derives them, c) between the various things in general and d) between thought and being in general. This is because none of these terms or things are explicitly derived from one another. Instead, they are merely externally imposed upon one another, regardless of their mutual suitability. Their existence, therefore, is both finite and untrue, i.e. lacking in reason or necessary relations. It is arbitrary, irrational, etc.. Their existence is finite, because each, although a totality in itself (LL 51:30), limits the other through its separation and isolation from the other, and, therefore, is limited in return, i.e. together they do not appear to constitute a totality, only a plurality. This will become clear in Part III, Chapters 4 and 5 of this work. Their existence is untrue, because they are not only arbitrarily related, but also because, as Hegel explains in the Encyclopedia: "All finite things involve an untruth" (LL 41:24). They involve an untruth, because, insofar as finite things perish, they prove themselves, at least superficially, to be of only limited truth, i.e. they prove themselves to have contained negation, or contradiction, especially where being is considered to be the essence and absolute truth.

Of course, all of this will be explained in much greater detail throughout this work, particularly Part III, Chapter 4, Sections C and D, on finitude and infinity. In fact, we will even see how perishing is also an affirmation of the truth of finite things qua finitude, and, therefore, infinite and true. What matters most for the moment, however, is that a 'system' which assumes the existence and truth of its categories or objects from the start, i.e. does not question them, and, therefore, must impose all relationships upon these categories and objects from without, cannot help be anything but dogmatic. For what gives these categories, objects and relationships their validity and force at the end of the day is not self-conscious reason, but simply what we saw Hobbes believes gives words or languages their
force and legitimacy, i.e. habit or custom. Hence, traditional metaphysics, according to Hegel, was merely the habit or custom of using thought terms already in existence at the time of philosophy's formal appearance to think about the nature or essence of things, i.e. being, God and thought, and this custom changed very little from Aristotle to the Enlightenment (SL I 62). Indeed, as we shall see in Part I, Chapter 1, this is precisely the problem in Descartes philosophy which leads to his seemingly intractable dualism.

Be that as it may for the moment, traditional metaphysics is not the only habit or custom of using given thought terms to express the nature of things. As Hegel points out in the Science, ordinary human language presupposes the same immediate "affinity between" thought and things (SL I 55). For we use the forms of language, which are entirely "the work of thought," and, therefore, purely "universal" (LL 31:20), to express particular things all the time, without reminding ourselves of, or reflecting upon the difference that exists between words and things. We do this for a similar reason that Descartes, as we shall see in Part I, Chapter 1, claims that the scientific method of doubt is inappropriate for our everyday thinking, i.e. it would make our thinking so cumbersome and inefficient that the opportunity for action would be long gone before we were able to make a well reasoned decision as to how we should act. In the case of language, as we shall see in Part III, Chapter 4, Section A, Hegel points out that we would quickly realize that we could never adequately express what we wanted or meant to express, if we continually attempted to consider the gap between our thinking and the world, and, therefore, would see no reason to continue attempting to express anything (LL 31:20 & PhS 60:97, 66:110). For the words we use could stand for anything, and as such, are entirely universal; while what we wish to express is 'this particular thing', whatever that thing may be.

This gap between thought and the world, however, is precisely what must be reflected upon, explained and comprehended if we are to express, know, or do anything with true certainty. For otherwise there is no objectivity. There is only pure subjectivity in the form of either the 'natural belief' in the correspondence of thought and reality (as expressed through our past metaphysical and ordinary linguistic experience), or the Kantian doctrine that all knowledge is purely and necessarily phenomenal (LL 35:22). In other words, pure subjectivity eliminates or precludes the possibility of an objective standard by which the truth can be judged or determined; or rather, where pure subjectivity is the standard for judging or determining the truth, every conviction is equally valid, thus producing relativism; or, insofar as one conviction contradicts another, every conviction is equally invalid, in which case exclusion, domination and outright annihilation become the only sure methods of resolving conflict, which, as we shall see in the Introduction, Section 3, is the method and problem of abstract power.

Abstract power as such aside for the moment, pure subjectivity, according to Hegel, is not only the distinguishing characteristic of the modern age, but also proof of its essential deficiency. For, as he
says in the *Encyclopedia*: "It marks the diseased state of the age when we adopt the despairing creed that our knowledge is only subjective, and that beyond this subjective we cannot go... Whereas rightly understood, truth is objective... Modern views, on the contrary, put great value on the fact of conviction, and hold that to be convinced is good for its own sake, whatever be the burden of our conviction - there being no standard by which we can measure the truth" (LL 35:22 [MI]). This is one of the primary reasons that Fichte's system of philosophy, or *Wissenschaftslehre* is presented in this work. It is the conceptual apogee of what shall be defined in the Introduction, Section 6 as, the moral standpoint. The moral standpoint is simply the position of pure subjectivity. As we shall see clearly in Part II, Chapters 2 and 3, Fichte following on from his acknowledged master, Kant, demonstrates that conviction must be the ultimate arbiter of truth for the modern subject, and, consequently, that the modern condition is one of both infinite striving, which means chronic unfulfilment, and absolute opposition, which in theory means continuous contradiction and in practice, constant conflict.

The questions for us at this point, however, are the following: how can we reflect upon the gap or separation between thought and the world in an effective and efficient manner, and what does this have to do with our project in *The Concept of Speculative Politics & the Critique of the Moral Standpoint*?

The answer which Hegel provides, and which constitutes one of the main themes of this work as will become evident from the very start of the Introduction if it is not so already, is that the development, study and practice of logic enables us to reflect upon, explain and comprehend the apparent separation between thought and the world in an efficient and effective manner. Furthermore, logic grounds both thought and the world in such a way that true certainty becomes not only a real possibility, but an absolute necessity and actuality. Logic does this, as we shall see, particularly in Section 1 of the Introduction, because it is "the soul" or essence of knowledge, activity and existence (LL 39:24). It is important to realize here, however, that, by 'logic', Hegel does not really mean what we commonly assume to be logic, i.e. he does not mean traditional Aristotelian logic, which is the foundation of what we know today as 'symbolic' logic. For, even though the elements of these forms of logic can be accounted for and are contained in the system of speculative logic developed and advocated by Hegel (LL 13:9), generally speaking, these forms constitute a static science, devoid of all real or material content, making it, as we shall see with Fichte in Part I, Section 1 and Part II, Chapter 3, a purely 'formal', and, therefore, 'instrumental' pursuit that has changed very little from Aristotle's day and the superficial notion of logic as mere organon (SL I 62, 34 & LL 32:20). Indeed, this is what compelled Hegel to characterize formal logic in a way that will no doubt strike a familiar chord with many contemporary readers, i.e. as an 'empty', 'lifeless' science in need not just of 'resuscitation', or a 'revivification' of its "dead bones" (SL I 64), but radical structural change. As he says in the Introduction to the *Science*: "the need for a transformation of logic has long been felt. It may be said that, both in form and in content, as exhibited in textbooks, logic has become contemptible. It is still
trailed along with a feeling that one cannot do without logic altogether, and from a surviving adherence to tradition of its importance, [i.e. habit or custom.] rather than from any conviction that the familiar content, and occupation with those empty forms, can be valuable and useful” (SL I 62-63 [MI]).

That logic has become contemptible, however, is not simply a problem with logic per se. Rather, as Hegel explains earlier in the Introduction, it is as much a problem with "the way in which logic is conceived" (SL I 59 [MI]). For logic not only has a real content, despite the fact that it does not seem to have one, both it and this content pervade our lives to a far greater extent than is ordinarily believed. In short, "logic is not ... a mere formal science, destitute of significant truth" (SL I 58). On the contrary, logic, as we shall see, is a "living concrete unity" (SL I 58), i.e. a self-developing totality or system, the content of which, as is "universally agreed" (LL 27:19) when the issue is pursued to its extreme, is pure thought (SL I 54 & 60). This is why logic is generally defined as "the science of thinking in general" (SL I 53), or simply "the thinking of thinking" (LL 26:19).

However, this would seem to merely confirm that logic is indeed a purely formal science. Insofar as thought proves itself to exist, as for example in Descartes' cogito ergo sum, however, it is a being, and, therefore, related, in both essence and existence, to anything else that can either make the same claim for itself, or have this claim made for it, e.g. the world, the thing-in-itself, etc.. Logic, therefore, is a science that has a being as its content, and, insofar as it seeks to investigate this being as such, that content also includes both being in general and any other particular being that may be the same as, or different from thought, i.e. in order to determine what makes them the same or different. This is one of the main reasons that Hegel claims: "Logic coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things [or beings] set and held in thought" (LL 36:24), and, as we shall see shortly, the science of the thought in beings. More importantly for the moment however, it is why logic is not merely a formal science, but also a practical, and if you will, an empirical science (see LL 17:12).

As we began to see in our analysis of Aristotle, however, logic is also more than just a science, i.e. as a formal reflection upon or inquiry into an object, regardless of the nature or status of that object, e.g. as real or ideal. Put differently, logic is a science that is always present and that we are always engaging in, even though we might not be aware of it. For, as we have already seen, logic is derived from logos, i.e. word, dialogue, speech, reason, etc., in short, language; and logos, as Hegel points out, is not only the single most important object of "logical science" (SL I 48), it is the mark of the first skill necessary to become a thinking human being, viz. reflection. As he says in the Encyclopedia: "To reflect is a lesson even the child has to learn. One of his first lessons is to join adjectives with substantives. This obliges him to attend, [i.e. concentrate] and distinguish" (LL 33:21 [MI]). To approach the problem somewhat differently, if we should ask where to seek the thought which is the object or content of the science of logic, the answer, as Hegel points out in the Science, is obvious: "It is in human language that the forms of thought are manifested and laid down in the first
instance. In our day it cannot be too often recalled, that what distinguishes man from beasts is the faculty of thought. Language has penetrated into whatever becomes for man something inner - becomes, that is, an idea, something which he makes his very own; - and what man transforms to language contains - concealed, or mixed up with other things, or worked out to clearness - a category; so natural to man is logic - indeed, logic itself is just man's peculiar nature" (SL I 39-40), i.e. human beings are the thinking, speaking or logical animal.

As with the Greeks then, especially Aristotle, "language is the main depository" (LL 40:24), or expression of the logical forms constitutive of human thought and nature, and the more explicitly logical the language, the more advanced, comprehensive, and, therefore, self-conscious the human culture that speaks it (SL I 40). This is basically because language/logic is the all-important power of creating, discovering and determining the relations, both subjective and objective, within and between ourselves, as well as within and between everything in the universe, beginning with what is, for both Hegel and us, simultaneously the most trivial and most important relationship or thought determination in the world, viz. identity, e.g. 'What is it?', 'What am I?', 'What are you?', 'What are we?', 'What are they?', 'Who am I?', 'Who are you?', 'Who are we?', 'Who are they?', and so on, ad infinitum. Language/logic is the all-important power, because without it there would always be the presence and feeling of something completely alien to us, (even if this alien something, as we shall see, is simply nothing, or the void), and, therefore, the feeling of restriction, or not being free (LL 39:24), and, according to Hegel, to be a thinking being "is in fact ipso facto to be free" (LL 36:23). Clearly then the more obvious the means of exercising this power of relation, i.e. the more explicit the categories of logic, the more accessible they are to reflection and development. This is why, for Hegel, like Plato and Aristotle, it is so "important that in a language the determinations of thought should be manifested in Substantives and Verbs" (SL I 40 [MI]). For, even in a language that did not contain verbs, such as the one Hobbes imagines, the activity represented by verbs, e.g. being, would still occur and be present, meaning that the verbs themselves would be implied, but as such, far less accessible to reflective thought.* Such a language, therefore, would be, or, at least, would quickly become, an impediment to self-consciousness, rather than the means and expression of its progress and freedom.

However, the explicit presence of logical categories in everyday language, or, what Hegel also aptly refers to as, "natural logic" (SL I 45), is not necessarily sufficient for the continued progress of self-consciousness, and, therefore, human freedom. For, as he rightly points out, "what is familiar is not on that account necessarily understood" (SL I 41). In fact, as he explains in the Encyclopedia, things so familiar that "they are always on our lips," "are usually the greatest strangers" (LL 40:24). This is because we simply assume their existence and use, without continuing to think about them consciously, or rather, self-consciously. "Being, for example, is a category of pure thought; but to make 'is' an object of investigation never occurs to us. Common fancy puts the Absolute, [viz.
being,] far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly before us, so present that so long as we think [and speak], we must, though without express consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it" (LL 40:24). In fact, as if to further explain the popular hostility towards philosophy and logic, Hegel duly notes that: "It even rouses one's impatience to have to go on merely busying oneself about what is thus familiar" (SL I 41).

However, busy ourselves with such investigations we must. For such thought determinations, categories, or "forms are the absolutely real ground of everything" (LL 40:24 [MI]), and to not understand this ground is to risk not only indulging in "the uninstructed and barbarous procedure of taking a category which is under consideration for something else and not for what it is" (SL I 49), i.e. of being in error, but also utterly subjecting oneself to the sway of pure contingency, the will of others or both. To intentionally ignore, or deny this ground, on the other hand, is the epitome of irrationality, and, at the risk of sounding overly dramatic, evil. It is the epitome of irrationality, because to ignore or deny thought/logic is to deny not only that Reason is the 'immanent principle' in and of the world (LL 37:24), but to turn one's back on Reason altogether. For logic is the study and system, in a word, science, of Reason, or, what Hegel refers to as, "the pure Idea" (LL 25:19). Consequently, there would only be pure chance, contingency or chaos, which, although a necessity in the totality of the pure Idea, is an impossibility by itself (see Introduction, Sections 2 & 3 and Part III, Chapter 5). To intentionally ignore, or deny this ground is the epitome of evil, because to ignore or deny thought/logic/Reason is to turn completely inward, and, thereby, assert the claims of self-centered particularity over and against the universal, e.g. appetite over understanding, desire over Reason, feeling over thought, Nature over Spirit, the individual over the community, etc. As Hegel makes clear throughout his work, and as we shall see, particularly in Part III, Chapter 5, and Appendix 1, on being-for-self, this withdrawal into self is a necessary stage in the development of human self-consciousness and Spirit. In fact, even the practice and study of logic at first appears as such a withdrawal, since it demands a temporary departure from the external world of Nature and Mind (LL 28:19), in order to penetrate and know what is most inward, viz. their soul, or essence. Indeed, this is why Hegel, like Hobbes, characterizes logic's study, at one point in the Science, as a journey into the devil's lair: "The System of Logic is the realm of shades, a world of simple essentialities freed from all concretion of sense. To study this Science, to dwell and labour in this shadow-realm, is a perfect training and discipline of consciousness" (SL I 69-70). However, even though this journey inward may be the perfect training and discipline of consciousness, one cannot and should not attempt to remain in the shadow-realm of pure essence forever. For, as we shall see clearly in the Introduction, Part III and the Appendices, logic itself demands concretion. Thus, when an individual attempts to remain fixed in his or her withdrawal, seeking his or her self in the pursuit of their own particular ends, their withdrawal ceases to be a necessary stage in the development of self-consciousness, and they necessarily become evil. Their evil, as Hegel says in the Encyclopedia, is to be purely subjective (LL 44:24; see also PhS 467-70: 775-777 & Part III, Chapter 5, Section C. 3.). It is, as we shall see, to
occupy the moral standpoint.

As a thinking/speaking/reasoning/logical being then, it is humanity's nature and duty to be universal, and, according to Hegel, this nature and duty is expressed the moment an individual thinks, or says, T (LL 38:24). For, even though, as indicated above, "I mean myself, [viz.] a single and altogether determinate person ... I really utter nothing peculiar to myself, for every one else is an T or 'Ego', and when I call myself T ... I express a thorough universal ... [viz.] thought as a thinker" (LL 38:24). Indeed, one knows this both immediately and mediately. For, as we shall see, particularly in Part III, Chapter 6, the 'T' is a self-identity, or 'I=I'. This means that it is both immediately itself, e.g. the subject T, and an other (self), e.g. the predicate 'T', in itself, and mediately itself, i.e. through itself, e.g. 'T=I', and an other, e.g. the subject 'T' can only equal 'T' through the predicate 'T', which is equally capable of being the subject 'T', and, therefore, another self altogether, (which is why subjectivity is always also immanently objective). Of course, this is not to say that the claim of the universal must then be asserted over and against, or rather, at the expense of the particular, i.e. as its opposite. For, as we shall see in the Introduction, Section 2 and as should now be emerging, the essential principle of Hegel's speculative logic, unlike Aristotelian logic, is the unity of opposites. As he says in the Encyclopedia: "It will be shown in the Logic that thought (and the universal) is not a mere opposite of sense [and the particular]: it lets nothing escape it, but, outflanking its other, is at once that other and itself" (LL 31:20 [MI]). Thus, this is merely to say that "thought is everywhere present" (LL 31:20), even in the most seemingly thoughtless particulars, and that everything is somehow present in thought, e.g. "all the particulars have a latent existence [in it]" (LL 38:24). This is why thought is not a mere abstract, i.e. empty, universal, nor logic a merely formal, i.e. contentless, system and science, but rather a "self-actualizing universal" (LL 29:20 [MI]).

This self-actualizing universality brings us back to the issue of politics and its relationship to both logic and metaphysics, or rather, what we have now more or less seen to be the same science, viz. speculative metaphysics/logic, or simply, Science (Wissenschaft), the specific nature of which will begin to be more closely examined in the Introduction and Part III. This universality brings us back to the issue of politics not only because it generally constitutes the 'absolutely real ground of everything', including, therefore, politics and the State, but also because it constitutes the first explicitly political moment, or rather, the first explicit moment of politics as both a practice and a science, viz. Right. Right, as Hegel explains in the Philosophy of Right, "is by definition freedom as Idea" (PR 33:29), and "the free will itself is this Idea" (PR 30:22). Generally speaking then, Right is anything "embodies free will" (PR 33:29). The free will, or simply, will - since, according to Hegel, will is ipso facto free, and vice versa (PR 20:4 & 225-27-[A]:4) - is both the infinite self-identity of pure thought, viz. 'I=I', and the differentiated (and, therefore, finite) determinacy implied, as we shall see in the Introduction and Part III, by the reflection of such abstract, or infinite negativity (PR 21-24:5-7). In other words, the will is the same "self-mediating activity" as the thought or mind, which, as we saw
This is why Hegel says that: "In free will, the truly infinite becomes actual and present;" or that: "This - the concept of the free will - is the universal which overlaps its object, penetrates its particular determination through and through and therein remains identical with itself" (PR 31:24). For Hegel then, thought and the will "are not two faculties," as they are commonly regarded, but rather "one and the same" (PR 226-27:[A]4). For, in thinking, one cannot help but be active, and, in willing, acting upon some some idea, even if it is just the idea of the object of one's most animal desire (PR 227:[A]4). Furthermore, since this thought, mind or will is truly infinite, i.e. insofar as it unites the opposed moments of indeterminacy, or infinity as indefiniteness, and determinacy or finitude, in itself, it is not an abstract subjectivity, but a definite subject. In short, it is the subject as a person (PR 37:35); and personality of course is the first formal category of law in the modern state. For, as Hegel rightly points out: "Personality essentially involves the capacity for rights and constitutes the concept and the basis (itself abstract) of the system of abstract, and, therefore, formal right" (PR 37:36 [MI]).

However, all of this risks leading us away from our original point and what is most important for us to understand here, particularly with regard to this work, viz. that: "The science of right is [simply] a section of philosophy [in general]" (PR 14:2 [MI]). As such, politics, therefore, presupposes the scientific procedure "expounded in philosophical logic" (PR 15:2). This why Hegel tells readers of the Philosophy of Right at the very beginning of the Preface that the work which follows is simply "an enlarged and ... more systematic exposition of the same fundamental concepts ... already contained in ... the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences" (PR 1). Furthermore, it is why he explicitly warns his readers that the speculative method of philosophy or Science, "which is essentially distinct from any other way of knowing" (PR 2), is its "guiding principle" (PR 1); and, therefore, that one should already be 'acquainted' with the Science of Logic, before embarking on its study (PR 2). Thus, if one does not first understand the method of speculative logic, or Science one will not comprehend the Philosophy of Right, or Hegel's political philosophy in general. I cannot emphasize this point enough. For it is certainly the major cause of many of the fundamental problems and conflicts people have regarding Hegel's political thought, e.g. 'was he a subversive radical, or the arch conservative of the 19th century?'; 'how can one reconcile a revolutionary work like the Phenomenology of Spirit with apparent melancholy resignation of the Philosophy of Right?'; 'why does Hegel seem to fail to give "a genuine deduction of the state,"'95 in the Philosophy of Right?'; and so on. Many, if not most, questions like these would simply dissolve if philosophers, political theorists, and whoever else felt competent enough to pass judgement on Hegel's politics after perusing the Phenomenology, or the Philosophy of Right, or both, if people first resolved themselves to coming to grips with the nature and method of Hegel's speculative logic or Science. In fact, they would quickly realize that they did not even have to wait until they read the Philosophy of Right to begin to comprehend what either Hegel's politics, or politics in general are all about. For, although politics is merely a section of
Science in general, and, although logic is the ground of politics, and, therefore, apparently distinct from it, i.e. insofar as politics then is the grounded, speculative metaphysics/logic is also inherently, or essentially political. This is not simply because logos, or the self-conscious mind is identical with the free will, as we just saw above. It is also not simply because the ground and grounded in Hegel's system, unlike Fichte's as we shall see in Part II, Chapter 2 and Part III, Chapter 6, Section C., are ultimately identical. Rather, it is because speculative logic, as opposed to Aristotelian logic, immediately recognizes the presence and value of otherness, no matter how seemingly remote, as well the absolute necessity of, literally and figuratively, entering into a mutual and equal relationship with whatever, or whoever stands opposed to it as an, or the Other. Indeed, speculative logic's very categories, as we shall see, reach out for, embrace and ultimately interpenetrate each other in order to develop themselves and speculative logic as a whole, which is why the fundamental principle of speculative logic is not some abstract 'harmony', but a real 'unity', i.e. the unity of opposites. Although it will be said in the Introduction and Part III, it cannot be said enough, without this principle of the unity of opposites there is and can be no such thing as politics, only absolute exclusion, or annihilation, which for human beings are both ultimately the same thing. For what is politics at the end of the day, if not the relationship between, and, therefore, unity of, two or more beings, and, insofar as these beings are thinking beings, logic/metaphysics is the only means they have of creating this relationship/unity. All politics, therefore, insofar as it is successful in creating, preserving and developing relationships/unity, i.e. insofar as it is successful in being politics, is ipso facto speculative, and all speculative thinking/willing, insofar as it recognizes, and, more importantly, comprehends, the unity of opposites as its fundamental principle and aim, is likewise political - hence the term, tautological as it may be, 'speculative politics'.

It should now be quite clear why the phrase 'the ground of speculative politics' constitutes the first half of the title of this work and what it generally signifies. If not, let me just summarize, and perhaps add, a few things. The ground of speculative politics, like Aristotelian politics, even though the latter will ultimately prove itself to be, as it were, a non-concept, is first and foremost metaphysics, which, as we have seen, is identical with logic (Logos), both as language or natural logic and science. Thus, the ground of speculative politics is Science (Wissenschaft). This ground, as we have just begun to see, is not really distinct from politics, even though politics is formally defined as a section of Science, because, its principle, viz. the unity of opposites, and, therefore, method or interaction of categories, is itself inherently political. Furthermore, as Hegel explains in the Logic: "The ground and what is grounded are one and the same content: the difference between the two is the mere difference of form which separates simple self-relation, on the one hand, from mediation or derivativeness on the other" (LL 176:121). The ground, therefore, is a self-grounding ground, or the self-determining existence that "proceeds from the ground" (LL 179:122), viz. human thought/willing, which we have also seen is the ground of politics. Human thought/willing, as the self-actualizing universal or Idea, which is equivalent to the system of Reason, is also the ground of politics, even more so, if we
remember that to inquire as to the ground of something is the same as asking for its reason. As we shall see in the Introduction, Section 4, the first category of speculative logic, viz. *becoming*, insofar as it shall prove to be the first concrete, and, therefore, true category of human thought, may also be considered the ground of speculative politics. But then so too could all of the categories which follow 'becoming' in speculative logic be considered the ground of speculative politics, since these categories, as we shall see, are ultimately nothing more than products of the self-determination of becoming, and, therefore, becoming itself at a higher stage in its development. Thus, it here becomes necessary to follow the derivation of these categories to understand further what exactly constitutes 'the ground of speculative politics'.

Perhaps it is only a little less clear at this point why the phrase the 'critique of the moral standpoint' constitutes the second half of this work's title. But then this is only a Preface, the nature of which, as Hegel remarks in both the *Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right*, is to be no more than "an explanation of the author's aim" (*PhS* 1:1), and perhaps, a place to make "some external and subjective remarks about the standpoint of the book it introduces" (*PR* 13). Of course, as he then goes on to explain in both works, it is mere folly to hope to provide anything in the way of philosophical truth in a preface, and worse to hope to receive it. For: "If a topic is to be discussed philosophically, it spurns any but a scientific and objective treatment, and so too if criticisms of the author take any form other than a scientific discussion of the thing itself, they can count only as a personal epilogue and as a capricious assertion, and he must treat them with indifference" (*PR* 13: see also *PhS* 1-3:2 &3). In other words, a whole work follows which attempts to be rigorously scientific and objective, and explanation of the moral standpoint, which, as explained above, is the position of pure subjectivity, constitutes an entire third of that work, viz. Part II (see also Introduction, Section 6).

With this said, the work as a whole is divided into three main parts. Part I: 'The Concept of Speculative Politics', serves as the Introduction not because it gives a general overview of what is to follow, but also because it explicitly provides many of the fundamental concepts, contradictions and conflicts that are either important to, or present within the rest of the work. As can be seen from the table of contents, the Introduction begins with a brief analysis of the origin of German Idealism's concept of Science, or *Wissenschaft*, since the term 'speculative' in the concept of 'speculative politics' is meant to indicate this method and system. Section 2 then goes on to distinguish between what is considered authentic and inauthentic Science, so that there is no doubt which is appropriate to speculative politics and why. Section 3 introduces both the notion and some modern examples of 'abstract power', which is the essence of the problem speculative politics is meant to overcome, along with the concepts it necessarily implies or is a result of, viz. Aristotle's fundamental laws of thought. In true dialectical fashion, the Section 4 derives the fundamental concept of speculative politics, viz. *becoming*, from the basic concepts of abstract power, viz. *being* and *nothing*; after which Sections 5 reveals and explains the essential method or strategy of speculative politics, in its conflict with
abstract power, viz. 'overcoming through yielding'. Then, in the last section, I explain how and why abstract power, is carried over and fully realizes itself, insofar as this is a possibility, in the modern age as what I, following Hegel, call 'the moral standpoint'. Thus, although the Introduction does provide the overall schema for the rest of the work, it is also a whole in its own right, and, therefore, more a groundwork than what is normally expected as an introduction.

Part II takes up where the Introduction leaves off, i.e. with the analysis of the metaphysical foundations of the modern form of abstract power, i.e. the moral standpoint. I have chosen Descartes and Fichte as the representatives of this standpoint primarily because they constitute the two formal poles of its development. In other words, Cartesian subjectivity and dualism, although the necessary consequences of the development of abstract power, and, therefore, Aristotle's three laws of thought, especially the laws of identity and the excluded middle, mark the real appearance, or beginning of the moral standpoint in Western history; while Fichte's notions of the absolute self, or Ego and infinite striving after perfection constitute its height, or end. I would argue that everything after this in philosophy, science, politics, etc. which may be designated as falling within the confines of the moral standpoint is mere theoretical, or empirical refinement, or else, a more or less disingenuous rehashing of old ideas under the banner of 'new developments'. I should also mention here that, even though Kant is certainly one of the most important philosophers of the moral standpoint, I opted to investigate Fichte's philosophy instead. For, as Fichte himself claims, and, as is fairly well recognized, his system is Kant's system taken to its logical conclusion (SK 3). Furthermore, although both Kant and Fichte are pillars of the moral standpoint, they also prepared the way for, and, therefore, constitute the beginning of, the transition to the metaphysical standpoint of speculative politics, which begins with Hegel. Also, since Fichte is really the one responsible for formally introducing the idea of Wissenschaftslehre as the science of science as such (CCW 105), and, since the organization of his Science is closest to that of Hegel's, he seemed the most logical choice for study. Hence Part II is divided between Descartes and Fichte.

Chapter I deals with what I see as the three main areas of Descartes' philosophy, viz. A. the Cogito, B. God and C. negation as deficiency. In section A, I show how and why Descartes' dualism leads to an elevation of thought over being, and, therefore, of intuition over mediated, or rational knowledge, which is, as it were, perfected in Fichte's system. Then, in section B, I analyse his two cosmological proofs and his version of the ontological proof of God's existence, in order to show, on the one hand, how they posit the absolute ought of moral perfection in the Western metaphysical discourse that will eventually reach its climax with Fichte's notion of infinite striving, and, on the other, how they also lead to the abstract identity producing, or positivistic and ahistorical tendencies which all of the various theoretical and empirical manifestations of the moral standpoint ultimately seem to display. Finally in section C, I uncover and explain why this is necessary given Descartes' view, which incidentally is the traditional Western view, that negativity is not also positive, and, therefore, productive, but rather,
merely negative, i.e. absence. This, of course leads to a serious contradiction in Descartes' system between the will and the intellect, or in more general terms the infinite and the finite, which Fichte sees as the fundamental and irresolvable contradiction in all human thought, and also, therefore, the cause of humanity's being condemned to an eternity of striving, which, in fact, is an eternity of failure, i.e. the failure to ever fully realize its goal of self-unity, perfection, or whatever else we might think of to call it.

Fichte was originally allotted three chapters, one on the project of philosophy as envisioned primarily in his First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge (1797), another on his development of the concept of a Science, or Wissenschaftslehre, and finally, one on his actual Science, i.e. the Science of Knowledge (1794). The first and third chapters remain as Chapters 2 and 3. Unfortunately, however, the second had to be severely condensed and incorporated in Section 1 of the Introduction and the beginning of Chapter 3 because of the University of Edinburgh's formal requirements for the length of a thesis. Chapter 2 is extremely important, because, in the First Introduction, Fichte presents the final result of Cartesian dualism for the modern world, i.e. A. its division into what are still generally seen as, or rather, what still generally act as two great and absolutely opposed camps poised on the brink of reciprocal annihilation, viz. dogmatism, or realism and idealism. Furthermore, he explains how this division is actually the result of the two only possible forms of self-determination for individuals in the modern world, B. one based on the attachment to and acquisition of material thing, viz. egoism, and another based on the freedom from what he sees as this slavish dependence on things, viz. egotism. He then proceeds to explain why only the latter is the true form of self-determination, and C. how only it can provide for a true philosophy, or system of knowledge.

Chapter 3, even though it deals with a work produced three years before the First Introduction, viz. The Science of Knowledge, is Fichte's system itself. In this system, which is truly a remarkable achievement despite being the epitome of the moral standpoint, Fichte returns not only to the beginning of the Cartesian tradition of Western philosophy, but also its Aristotelian foundations, as is immediately evident from a look at his first three principles of all human knowledge, viz. A. identity, B. difference and C. ground. He then develops these principles as far as the logic which maintains them in their absolute immediacy, and, therefore, separation, will allow before beginning to completely collapse in on itself. The result of this development is ultimately D. a purely quantitative theory of the self, or Ego, and, therefore, E. an affirmation of what has certainly become the most important metaphysic of the modern age, viz. that of quantity, and of this metaphysic's most important, or highest concept, viz. quantitative infinity, or, what Descartes more correctly identified as, the indefinite (PP I 169:27).

Since it is not possible to go beyond this point without lapsing into mere theoretical or empirical illustration, or, as is shown at the end of Chapter 5, since it is the point of absolute indifference,
which negates itself as the 'indifference to indifference', it is the point at which the transition is and must be made to the truly speculative standpoint of Hegel. Hegel's Science, as developed primarily in the Phenomenology, Science of Logic and Encyclopedia, constitutes the subject matter of Part III, and marks the return to the metaphysical ground of speculative politics. Hegel's Science, as is evident from a glance at the table of contents, does not begin in exactly the same way as Fichte's. For he does not hold that the laws of thought, or, what he calls, the determinations, or essentialities of reflection are absolute and immediate in themselves. On the contrary, they are, as is shown in Chapter 6, the results of a highly mediated process of thought development, and, therefore, can themselves be abstracted from. Indeed, this is why the analysis and explanation of Hegel's Science in this work ends with his account of identity, difference and contradiction, or ground, and begins with either the concepts of being, nothing and becoming, which are treated in the Introduction, or, as we see in Chapter 4, the appearance of the categories of determinate being, which is the result of the self-determination and self-transcendence of becoming. Insofar as we can distinguish between the beginnings of Science, one beginning may be said to appear as strictly logical, i.e. the one from becoming, while the other is a real beginning, i.e. the one from determinate being.

Chapter 4 is important for many reasons that can only be properly accounted for therein. However, two immediately come to mind here. First, it contains the demonstration of the necessary relationship between something and other, which should put to rest the apparent issues of solipsism and absolute otherness in the Cartesian system of thought. It is also, therefore, the ground upon which the necessity of politics as a process and activity of interrelation becomes comprehensible. For it is the first time two somethings appear together, or simultaneously. Second, this is the section of Hegel's Science in which he provides C. the resolution to what Fichte claimed is the fundamental contradiction of all human thought, viz. that of the finite and the infinite.

This resolution produces the concept of true infinity, or, what Hegel calls, being-for-self, which constitutes the subject matter of Chapter 5. Being-for-self, as I argue at the beginning of the chapter, is one of the most important categories of Hegel's system in particular and modern Western thought in general. This is because it is the category with which determinate being becomes explicitly living, conscious, self-conscious, or, all of the above, being. It is, therefore, the fundamental category of selfhood as such, i.e. as more than a mere something. It is a thing that lives, senses, perceives, and even, thinks. As we shall see, this is also the section in which traditional problems, like the contradiction between 'the one and many', which have plagued modern philosophy and politics as B. atomism and C.2. the consequent Hobbesian State of Nature, or 'war of all against all', are resolved. Furthermore, this section also contains the analysis and logical development of the idea which Fichte introduced in his political philosophy, and which both Hegel and Marx turned into a philosophical and political revolution, i.e. C. that there is no such thing as pure exclusion, or rather, that even exclusion is a relationship, and, therefore, that categories like 'private property' are a result of recognition by
others. In short, it is a social category, or relation, and as such, enjoys no priority to society. In fact, quite the opposite, institutions like private property presuppose society. The remaining sections of Chapter 5 provide D. a logical analysis of the fundamental and reciprocal forces needed to produce and hold together the concept of community, E. a very brief synopsis of being-for-self's passage into quantity and the significance of this category, and F. the transition from the categories of being to essence, or reflection as such.

Although the emergence of the categories of essence, or reflection returns us to the point at which Fichte's Science begins, viz. identity, difference and ground, these categories constitute the beginning of the middle third of Hegel's Science. However, together they constitute the all important ground we are after in philosophy, science, politics, etc., and which all dominant thought in the West since Aristotle regards as an impossibility, i.e. the middle ground where contradictory terms, positions and beings can simultaneously subsist, or actually be united. It almost seems like a ridiculous statement of the obvious, but, as is made clear in the Introduction and Chapter 6, without the possibility of a middle ground, everything becomes impossible, especially politics, which more perhaps than any other discipline should know with complete certainty that without such a ground annihilation is the only law and truth. Sadly, however, this does not yet seem to be the case, and certainly if the opposition to the concept of speculative politics encountered thus far is any indication, it will not be for some time to come. But where there is still thought, there is hope. For, as Heraclitus says and Hegel would certainly concur: "Thinking is shared by all". Be that as it may for the moment, Hegel's reinterpretation of the principles of A. identity, B. difference and C. contradiction, or ground constitute the subject matter of the Chapter 6, which ends with the refutation of abstract power's and the moral standpoint's most heinous law, viz. the law of the excluded middle. For it is ultimately this law that prohibits the existence and creation of actual relations between contradictories, whether they be terms, positions, beings, or all of the above.

I must point out that, even though Chapter 6 logically follows on from Chapters 4 and 5, there is a tremendous gap between Chapter 5 on Being-for-Self and Chapter 6. Once again, formal requirements forced me to cut two chapters from the main body of the text, and the gap left by their absence is tremendous not so much for the loss of a considerable number of words and pages, but for the loss of the content of these pages. What were Chapters 7 and 8 in the original thesis dealt with being-for-self's phenomenological existence as self-consciousness and its transition to the essentialities of reflection which constitute the ground of Reason. In other words, these chapters contained my account of Hegel's section on 'Self-Consciousness' from the Phenomenology, which contains some of his most interesting and famous concepts and analyses, viz. desire, the fight for life and death, the master/slave dialectic, stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness, and how the last three in particular directly relate to what are often considered "the quite agonizing obscurities of the three types of reflection distinguished in the Science of Logic," viz. positing, external and determining
reflection. When I first encountered this section of Hegel's Science, I was inclined to agree with the prevalent opinion regarding its obscurity. However, after some careful study, it became clear that Hegel's analysis of these forms of reflection is quite important and accessible given the patience to closely follow their development. Furthermore, the section on these forms of reflection is quite easy to understand, if studied in conjunction with the relevant section from the Phenomenology on stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness. In fact, one could say that Hegel's explanation of the kinds of reflection is instrumental in helping one to figure out the agonisingly obscure reasons for the development of religion. Rather than condense, or cut these chapters out altogether, therefore, I have made them into appendices, which appear at the end of the work.

Finally, a brief Conclusion follows in which I return explicitly to the concept of speculative politics, though in a more concrete fashion than it is dealt with in the Introduction. I first provide A. a very brief analysis of three historical examples of the method of speculative politics in the world history of the twentieth century. I then go on to B. explain what this does and does not imply about the method of speculative politics, e.g. it is a form of 'radical historicism', but not a form of 'relativism'. Last, I C. provide what I see as one of the most promising practical applications of the method of speculative politics in the world today, viz. principled negotiation, which is one of the new non-adversarial, yet non-concessionary methods of negotiation from the field of conflict management and resolution.

Before closing this Preface, I must thank the following people. For no labour, regardless of how lonely at times, is ever possible without the direct and indirect interaction and support of other people. This one was definitely no exception: Richard Gunn, Caryl B. Mahoney-Smith, Helen Smith, Thomas R. Mahoney, Dave, Lilian and Frank Bryson, Ian Cameron, Marijan Despalatovic, Cheryl Foster, and finally, Salam Hawa, Jennifer L. Mahoney and Norah A. Martin.
Richardson begins his Preface to that work with the following statement: "It is not augmenting the sciences, but disfiguring them, when their boundaries are allowed to encroach on one another. For which reason, and as logic is a science, wherein nothing is fully shewn and strictly proved but the formal rules of all thinking, and as we by consequence abstract in it from all objects of knowledge, as well as from their difference, our author [Kant] has left us his logic free from every extraneous admixture of either ontological, or anthropological, or psychological, or metaphysical matter" (Emmanuel Kant, Logic, trans. John Richardson (London: W. Simpkin & R. Marshall, 1819), p. iii.). Although speculative philosophy does recognize the distinctions between the various sciences, by no means does it see these distinctions as hard and fast separations or differences. Indeed, this position, which is characteristic of Kantian philosophy, especially with regard to logic, is diametrically opposed to the speculative, Hegelian position argued for in this work. A speculative, Hegelian system, as we shall see in the Introduction when we look at the difference between Fichte’s essentially Kantian view of logic, i.e. as something purely instrumental, and, therefore, extrinsic to every other science, including the Science (Wissenschaftslehre) which grounds all others, and Hegel’s, must see logic as essential to all the sciences, especially the Science, and, therefore, as something that cuts across or transcends all such barriers - in fact, is also prior to them. Therefore, by saying ‘the possibility of politics’, which definitely smacks of transcendent, rather than transcendent, philosophy, I am merely temporarily appeasing those critics whose analytic prejudices will not let them get past the appearance of an unjustified disrespect for proper boundaries, so that I can at least begin to make a case for their dissolution.

Many critics of the idea of a transcendent, as opposed to a Kantian transcendental, metaphysics have had, and no doubt will continue to have, a similar reaction to the project of speculative metaphysics and politics as that expressed by John Richardson, who translated Kant’s Logic into English at the beginning of the 19th century.


Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *VI, Complete Works*, vol. II, pp. 1730-41, paras. 4-12; see also *Politics*, *I, Complete Works*, vol. II, p. 1986, para. 1, on how "the state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good."


63 (Find Ref. in Phil Writings, Anscombe & Geach, p.221)


73 In *The Elements of Philosophy Concerning the Body*, Hobbes does not declare explicitly against
theology. Instead, he does the next best thing for the time, i.e. he excludes it from the realm of philosophy (p.13).

74Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 463.
75Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 463.
76Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 463.
77Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 464.
80See Leviathan, pp. 23, 24, 27-31, 32 and 47-49.
82Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 13 and 23.
86Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 467; see also p. 233.
89Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 9-10.
90Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 251.
91Hamlyn, Metaphysics, p. 3.
92This is why, for Hegel, some languages, e.g. German, are more suitable for the expression of philosophical and scientific ideas than others, e.g. Chinese. Contrary to popular belief, however, he is not a linguistic chauvinist. For ultimately it is his position that all languages are essentially universal, and, therefore, strive more or less successfully for universal existence. This means that any language can become adequate to the expression of philosophical and scientific truth. Furthermore, Hegel holds that in philosophy "an affected purism would be least in place where it is the thing and not the word that is of capital importance" (SL I 40), the 'thing' being the truth, not the dogmatist's 'thing-in-itself'.

*We will begin to see just how impossible a language without either implicit or explicit verbs, especially the verb 'to be', is when we come to our analysis of being and nothing in the Introduction. For all nouns indicate a being, and, therefore, the activity of being. Furthermore, we will begin to see how appropriate, or rather, ironic it is that Hobbes should think that it is possible to have both language and reason with only nouns separated by empty spaces where the verbs would otherwise be, when we investigate the essential identity of being and nothing in the Introduction.

93Comment on the contradiction that the content of logic, viz. pure thought, is also, for Hegel, an even purer object than God (SL I 42), and that the content of logic "shows forth God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of Nature and of a Finite Spirit" (SL I 60).
94The fact that Hegel does not seek to deny the status, importance, indeed, necessity of the particular cannot be emphasized enough. For he is often accused of doing precisely this. As we shall see, particularly in Part
Part I: Introduction - The Concept of Speculative Politics
"The violent man's problem lies in his own logic - ... The premises of this logic contain a mistaken assumption..."

C. Wilson, *A Criminal History of Mankind*
Introduction: The Concept of Speculative Politics

In the Introduction to the Encyclopedia, Hegel claims that: "Every aspect of living culture, as well as philosophy, should have to seek antidotes both to Cartesian philosophy, which, in philosophical form, has given expression to the universal, rampant dualism in the culture of the recent world, and to the universal culture of which it is an expression. The noisy political and religious revolutions, as well as the quieter transformations of man's public life, are generally only variegated facades of this dualism, which is the demise of all the old ways of life" (LL 16). And, as we might add, the obstacle to any possible new ways. This, as we shall see, is because such a dualism, as well as the universal culture of which it is the expression and for which it is the conceptual ground, ultimately does not allow for the self-actualization of what is or may be something qualitatively other than it. Instead, it only allows for the denial and annihilation of such otherness wherever and whenever this otherness attempts to posit, or determine itself as something more than just a vague possibility, i.e. wherever and whenever this otherness attempts to either be, or become something or someone distinct in its or one's own right.

No doubt, one might claim that Hegel wrote these words over one hundred and seventy years ago, and, therefore, that both philosophy and the world have long since surpassed Descartes' philosophy and the culture of which it is an expression and for which it is ground. However, even a casual look at contemporary thought and life demonstrates that, if anything, the Cartesian philosophy, characterized on the one hand by extreme subjectivism, e.g. intuition, assertion, belief, feeling, etc., and on the other by extreme realism and 'detached' objectivism, is even more entrenched in the consciousness of humankind than at any previous time in modern history. Furthermore, the culture of 'universal', 'rampant' dualism has become, as it were, more universal and more rampant than even Hegel could have imagined. Our popular culture, for instance, commonly takes it for granted that a person's psyche can somehow be separated from their body, transferred to another body or object, or simply left to float in space without a body, etc. Our dominant forms of science, both hard and soft, have reduced every aspect of the natural and human world to an indefinite series of indifferent quanta and quantitative processes, constitutive of a vastly complex mechanism we call, 'the universe'. The fundamental and virtually unquestionable law of these sciences, despite increasingly powerful evidence to the contrary from empirically successful, but nonetheless 'deviant', 'fringe' or 'radical', movements, such as 'fuzzy logic' and 'chaos theory', is still 'A or not-A', which is the foundation of the dualistic or bivalent worldview. We automatically divide our lives with contrary categories such as, 'public' and 'private', 'outer' and 'inner', 'personal' and 'political', 'ethical' and 'material', 'ideal' and 'real', 'intellectual' and 'emotional', etc., and then grant priority to whichever happens to give us the most satisfaction, or least dissatisfaction, at any given time. Until 1991, we rigidly divided our world between 'East' and 'West', 'Communist' and 'Capitalist', 'totalitarian' and 'democratic', 'oppressed' and 'free', etc.; and now that Communism is supposedly 'dead', we are simply replacing these divisions with new ones, which, to a
large extent, more accurately reflect those that we are used to applying within societies rather than between them, categories such as, 'under or least developed' and 'advanced or developed', 'rich' and 'poor', 'extremist' and 'liberal', 'fundamentalist' and 'secular', and so on. The seemingly overwhelming force of international integration or 'globalization' characteristic of 'the new world order' is being countered by what seems to be an equally powerful tendency towards domestic fragmentation, i.e. serious regional, civil and ethnic tension and conflict has erupted or become exacerbated all over the world, e.g. Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, Yemen, Haiti, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Peru, etc.. Indeed, even life in the inner cities of the model state of this 'new world order', viz. the United States, is now commonly depicted as being "similar to that" in some of these war zones. For instance, due to the extreme social deprivation, as well as the economic and political disenfranchisement, of the young combatants in this urban American war, it is one in which pure subjective self-assertion, or simple self-identity is the overriding motivation for the most brutal forms of assault and murder. As one of the more notorious former combatants in this war matter of factly stated: "Respect is not negotiable." In other words, although it may be difficult for people who have not experienced this life firsthand to believe or imagine, you will be beaten, maimed or killed for what is perceived as the slightest 'disrespect' towards another person. What constitutes disrespect in this environment? Everything from the wrong look in the eye to the wrong word, the wrong gesture, the wrong color skin, the wrong color clothing, the wrong associates, the wrong proximity, the wrong being pure and simple.

Far from being surpassed then, it is my firm position that the world is still completely enthralled by some aspect of Cartesian philosophy or another, as well as the universal, rampant culture of dualism, both of which I categorize under the term, 'the moral standpoint', which is explicitly defined at the end of this Introduction. Thus, our task today remains essentially the same as it was in Hegel's day, viz. to seek the 'antidotes' to these phenomena. Once discovered or identified, it is then our duty as rational beings to develop, advertise and, where possible, administer these antidotes. I am certain that an important and powerful antidote to Cartesian thought and culture lies within Hegel's Science (Wissenschaft), particularly the Logic, which provides not only the ground of Hegel's entire system, but also the essence of all thought and being, and which has as its fundamental principle the inclusive proposition 'A and not-A', rather than the exclusive one, 'A or not-A'. In this work, therefore, I will attempt to extract this antidote, which I call, the concept of speculative politics, as well as begin the work of adapting it to our present needs, which are both theoretical and practical in nature.
1. The Formal Origin of Science, or Wissenschaftslehre

The concept of speculative politics is an express recognition of the essential and mutual relationship between logic and politics. For the term 'speculative' is taken from Hegel's concept of Wissenschaft, or Science, which, as we shall see throughout this Introduction and work as a whole, must be distinguished from our ordinary Aristotelian, Newtonian and Cartesian concepts of science. To properly explain Hegel's concept of Science, as well as begin to see why the concept of speculative politics is an express recognition of the relationship between logic and politics, it is necessary to first look briefly at its formal beginning. This will also be a great help in determining what Science is—not, which, as shall become clear, is essential to any properly speculative, or dialectical methodology and progression. The concept of Wissenschaft was formally introduced at the end of the 18th century by the German philosopher, J.G. Fichte, who, like Descartes over a century and a half before, realized that all human knowledge had to be founded upon an absolute and immediately certain first principle if it was to possess any certainty at all. According to Fichte: "Every possible science has one first principle" (CCW 105) from which every other proposition in that science is deduced, and, therefore, from which every other proposition derives its certainty. As he explains in his philosophy, however, these first principles "cannot be demonstrated within that science itself, but must be certain in advance" (CCW 107). Otherwise, every possible science would beg the question of its beginning, or assume precisely what needs to be proved. The prior certainty of these first principles, however, implies that there is a plurality of first principles, i.e. that there are as many first principles as sciences, which is clearly impossible, since such a plurality would require the existence of more than one absolute and immediately certain truth. In other words, for something to be either first, or absolute, it must be the only one. The question thus arises as to where these, so-called, first principles are "supposed to be proven" (CCW 107).

As Fichte says, once again assuming the mantle of Descartes, who, in his Rules for the Direction of Our Native Intelligence, posits the idea of a universal science, of which all the particular sciences are "interconnected and interdependent" parts (RD 1): "The answer is undoubtedly: in that science which has to establish the basis of all possible sciences" (CCW 107). Fichte calls this universal science, Wissenschaftslehre, or the science of science as such (CCW 105). Fichte's science of science as such is the immediate precursor of Hegel's Science. However, even though Fichte claims that it is a speculative system, his Science has three fundamental problems which prevent it from being truly speculative, and, therefore, which distinguish it from Hegel's. First, as Fichte himself explains in his prospectus, Concerning the Concept of Wissenschaftslehre (1794), since the science of science as such is also necessarily a particular science, it too must have a first principle. However, since this first principle cannot be deduced in any higher science, or, therefore, from any higher first principle, without causing the problem of infinite regression, in which nothing is ever really first, it "simply cannot be proven" (CCW 108). Its certainty, therefore, must be presupposed, which means that all
human knowledge, according to Fichte, is based on this necessary presupposition. Second, since the first principle of the science of science as such must simply be presupposed, rather than proven, Fichte does not regard logic as being essential to Science. On the contrary, although he sees logic as "a highly beneficial device for securing and facilitating scientific progress" (CCW 124), its existence is extrinsic to that of the science of science as such, as well, therefore, as every other possible science. As Fichte explicitly declares in Concerning the Concept of Wissenschaftslehre: "the entire science of logic is neither the Wissenschaftslehre itself nor a portion of this theory. No matter how odd this may sound, given the current state of philosophy, logic is not a philosophical science at all. It is instead a separate science in its own right" (CCW 123 [MI]). Logic, therefore, may enjoy the dignity of itself being a science, but, according to Fichte, it would make no difference for either the science of science as such, or the plurality of other particular sciences, if it had never come into existence at all. He thus concludes in the same work that: "without logic, all of the sciences could still have come into being, only somewhat later" (CCW 124).

The third problem with Fichte's concept of Science, and the one which, more than anything else, prevents it from being truly speculative, is that it is based on a complete degradation and denial of one of the two most basic determinations, or concepts of human thought, that is, it degrades and denies the concept of being's reality in itself, while it exalts the concept of thought. As we shall see in Chapters 2 and 3, for Fichte, everything must be the result of the self-positing of an absolute ego, which in itself is simply pure activity, or free thought. This includes, or is especially true of the world of objective being, which appears to stand opposed to and independent of the self, or subject for which it is an object, but which is, in fact, an opposition wholly present within, and, therefore, dependent upon, subjectivity. Briefly, this is because opposition is a counter-positing, and all positing, whether it be self-positing, or op-positing, is an activity. Mere beings, or objects, however, are not capable of acting. Only a self, or subject can act. Put differently, beings, or objects that are capable of acting, i.e. of positing themselves and other beings, or objects, are not mere beings, or objects. They are selves. Thus, there are no real beings, objects, or things-in-themselves, according to Fichte, only selves, or subjects, who posit the appearance of something other than thought, in order to determine, and, thereby, know themselves, as thought. For Fichte, whose standpoint is clearly that of subjective idealism, being, or "the thing-in-itself is a pure invention and has no reality whatever" (SK 10). In other words, being, or the thing-in-itself has no reality other than what thought grants it, and any system of science, or philosophy that does not recognize this, as we shall see in Chapter 2, is simply a form of dogmatism, which, no matter how seemingly complex and sophisticated, can never deduce, or rationally account for the existence of freedom, or thought. Thus, unlike the idealist, for whom freedom and thought, or rather, the freedom of thought is literally and figuratively everything, the dogmatist must either deny the existence of freedom and thought in favor of the existence of things, or continue to cherish some misguided, foundationless belief in freedom and thought, which he, or she then usually seeks to justify by positing some mysterious external source, e.g. the soul, God, the
Force, etc. The result in the first case, as Fichte is famous for proclaiming in the First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge (1797), is that: "Every consistent dogmatist is necessarily a fatalist" (SK 13). In the second case, the dogmatist merely proves what every idealist already supposedly knows, viz. that every dogmatist is simply a bad idealist. Be that as it may, what is important for us to know here, is that Fichte regards the concepts of free thought and real being, along with all of the philosophical and scientific systems based upon them, as absolutely incompatible, or irreconcilably opposed (SK 13), i.e. as true and false. Furthermore, any attempt at reconciling them "necessarily leads to inconsistency" (SK 13), or contradiction, and, therefore, to a violation of the oldest and most sacred rules of thought in the history of Western philosophy, viz. the laws of non-contradiction and the excluded middle. I shall explain these laws shortly, for they, more than anything else, are the source and highest theoretical expression of everything speculative politics seeks to overcome in the modern world, which has not only preserved these ancient laws, but realized the means of completely fulfilling them in practice, or politics. First, however, I shall finish with Fichte's concept of Science, and then explain the true ground of speculative politics, i.e. actual Wissenschaft, or Science.

Insofar as Fichte regards free thought and real being as irreconcilable opposites, there is no concrete unity in his science of science as such, i.e. his Science does not produce the living unity, or totality of the real differences immanent in logic and politics. On the contrary, insofar as there is any unity already present within, or produced by Fichte's Science, it is the abstract, or dead unity of absolute identity, for which differences are never actually real, but instead are merely continually vanishing appearances of something that can never be truly known in itself. This something can never be truly known in itself, simply because it has no real qualities that would make it knowable. This is why Fichte necessarily bases his system of Science upon, and ultimately resolves it in, the notion of intellectual intuition, or conviction, rather than Reason. In other words, for Fichte, whose standpoint represents one of the highest theoretical developments of what I shortly shall be explaining as abstract power, or its modern form, the moral standpoint, the truth is ultimately a matter of feeling and belief, not thought, demonstration, or knowledge. Fichte's Science, therefore, is anything but speculative. For what is truly speculative is, as we shall see, not only grounded in an actual unity of real differences, it leaves nothing to mere feeling, or faith, neither of which are, have been, or ever will be legitimate arbiters of truth for rational beings. Indeed, as Hegel makes clear in and through his Science, and as I hope to begin demonstrating in this work, there is no greater "outrage on Science" than the complacent acceptance, or rejection of something on the basis that it feels right, or wrong, and, therefore, that it should, or should not be believed to be true (PhS 142:235). It is an outrage on Science, because Science, if nothing else, even for Fichte, is supposed to be thought's thinking itself as thought. To then suddenly base this self-conscious, self-determination of thought upon feeling and faith, therefore, represents a complete surrender, or "retreat of thought," which, as Hegel, following Plato, correctly cautions, is the path to that "very uncalled for hatred of reason [known as] misology" (LL 16:11), and misology, from the standpoint of speculative politics, is the greatest danger to human
2. The Introduction of Actual Science, or Wissenschaft der Logik

What then constitutes actual, or truly speculative Science?

Like Descartes and Fichte, Hegel recognized the need for an absolute principle to serve as the beginning of all human knowledge, or thought, and that philosophy is the science which should account for, or provide this principle. He also recognized, however, that this principle can be neither mediated, nor immediate (SL I 79). For, as we have already seen, the former necessarily leads to the problem of infinite regression, and the latter to the problem of presupposition, or assumption. Thus, as Hegel explains at the very start of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817): "Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural admissions of consciousness, [in short, experience] nor can it assume that its method of cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted, [or proved in some other science] ... We can assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning; and a beginning, as primary and underived, [i.e. immediate] makes an assumption, or rather is an assumption. It seems, [therefore] as if it were impossible to make a beginning at all" (LL 3:1 [MI]).

How then does thought begin? Does thought begin? For, as Hegel notes, we seem to be faced with a contradiction which renders thought impossible, and thus leads to the absolute scepticism which, as we shall see in Chapter 1, provoked Descartes to hypothesize that everything, including our own thought, might be the deception of some malicious demon, or power.

Hegel's solution to this problem of beginning is what he somewhat ironically puts forth as the concept of absolute beginning (SL I 82). Briefly, an absolute beginning is one that is always somehow present, i.e. it is present in the beginning, the middle and the end of thought's process of development. This means a number of things which may seem contradictory at first sight, but which are proved in Hegel's Science. First, the beginning of thought is, at the same time, both immediate and mediated. As Hegel says in the Science of Logic: "there is nothing in heaven, nature, spirit, or anywhere else, which does not contain immediacy as well as mediacy, so that these two determinations are seen to be unseparated and inseparable, and the opposition between them null" (SL I 80). This can easily be seen, for instance, even in the idea of immediate knowledge, or intuition, which, although immediate, must also be mediated insofar as it is the knowledge, or intuition of something, e.g. itself, an activity, an object, etc. In short, what is known mediates even immediate knowledge, just as this knowledge in turn mediates what is known. The beginning of thought, therefore, may be, as Hegel affirms, "immediacy itself," or, what can just as easily be identified as simple, or pure being, but this
category of pure immediacy, or being *only* appears as the *result* of thought's process of abstraction *from* and reflection *upon* all particular determinate beings and qualities. It only appears, therefore, as a result of mediation (SL I 81-82).

This mediation, however, is also immediate. For, although abstraction and reflection are processes, they are also the first free acts which distinguish human thought, or the mind from nature, as well as the void that always seems to oppose and encroach upon both nature and mind, i.e. nothingness, or death. Mediacy, therefore, is present within immediacy, and vice versa. Consequently, the first principle, or beginning of all thought may at first appear at first to be immediate. However, it is in fact mediated. It is mediated by something *else*, which it contains within itself, but which has not yet appeared, or not yet appeared *as* part of itself. This mediation, however, is also immediate. It is immediate, a) insofar as it simply *appears* spontaneously out of the first immediacy, viz. as another distinct immediacy, and b) insofar as it is really just the *self-mediation* of the first immediacy, and, therefore, not really something else at all. This, as we shall see, becomes very clear at the start of Hegel's *Logic*, when he demonstrates how the apparently pure immediacies of absolute *being* and absolute *nothing* are actually present within and mediate each other, and, therefore, how they are simply just the first undeveloped moments of the single process of *becoming*.

The second seemingly contradictory consequence of the concept of an absolute beginning is that all progress in and of thought is just "a return to the foundation" (SL I 82) of thought, and equally that every return to the foundation of thought is also progress from it. It is a return to the foundation of thought insofar as it is a justification and explanation of the beginning, and it is progress from this foundation insofar as each new justification and explanation of the beginning is actually a new determination of it (SL I 82-83). This is why Hegel says that: "What is essential for Science, [or thought,]^8^ is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that itself, in its totality, forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last and the last first" (SL I 83). Although Science, or thought forms such a self-returning cycle, one should not assume that Science, or thought is *mere* repetition for Hegel. Rather, Science, or thought is a process of ever increasing complexity, or comprehensiveness. For new determinations of the absolute beginning are continually arising in this beginning's process of self-determination. Hegel, therefore, should not be mistakenly accused of *propounding* the idea of a 'closed system'. On the contrary, his standpoint is identical with that of contemporary *chaos theory*, which sees the universe as a *self-organizing* and *self-repeating*, yet *open system*, based on the concept of *becoming*, in which the closed, deterministic systems of Newtonian Science, based on the concept of simple *being*, merely play a part. As the Nobel Prize winning scientist Ilya Prigogine and his colleague Isabelle Stengers say, in the Preface to *Order Out of Chaos*: The reconceptualization of physics is far from being achieved. We have decided, however, to present the situation as it seems to us today. We have a feeling of great intellectual excitement: [for] we begin to have a glimpse of the road that leads from *being* to *becoming*.^9^
What then does all of this mean?

First, it means that the beginning of thought, although absolute, and, therefore, always somehow present, does not appear as such, i.e. it does not appear as either absolute, or present, until the end of thought's process of development. The absolute beginning, therefore, is merely a latent, or an immanent beginning at the apparent, or virtual beginning of this process. Second, the absolute knowledge, which, as Hegel points out, is identical with this absolute beginning, since the latter is simply defined at the moment as the beginning of all human knowledge, or thought, is the "inmost truth," or essence of thought's development (SL 1183). Absolute knowledge, therefore, is present at the virtual beginning of this development, but only in a completely undeveloped and abstract way, which means that absolute knowledge simply cannot be recognized as the true beginning, at the virtual beginning of this development. In short, the beginning of thought is unknown at the beginning of thought. Thought's beginning, therefore, at first sight, seems to be purely arbitrary, and, therefore, to contain no truth whatsoever, i.e. it does not even appear as thought, but merely something which is later seen to have contained the potential for thought (PM 21:385). Thought simply is, or is-not. If thought is, then there is also necessarily being, which is identical with thought, or vice versa; and if thought is-not, then there is nothing. There is nothing, simply because there is nothing to know whether, or not there is something, i.e. whether or not there is thought, or being.

If thought's beginning appears at first sight to be purely arbitrary, however, then why not simply presuppose, or assert a beginning, any beginning, or, for that matter, no beginning?

First, because we would immediately end up, once again, with all of the problems of Descartes and Fichte, i.e. a fundamental dualism, or subjective idealism, and second, because, as Hegel shows in the Science of Logic, a beginning is already made, even with the presupposition, or positing of no beginning, or rather, even with the presupposition, or positing of absolute nothing, as occurs in much Eastern thought, e.g. Taoism and Buddhism, or, perhaps, extreme forms of Western scepticism. This, as we shall see in the next section of this Introduction, is simply because absolute nothing must negate even itself if it is to be truly absolute, so that nothing immediately turns into, or posits something, i.e. anything, or something that is the negation of nothing, viz. pure being, or thought. The beginning that seemed to be purely arbitrary, and, therefore, no beginning at all, thus shows itself to be absolutely necessary, and, therefore, immanent, even where no beginning seems logically possible, i.e. in the void of absolute nothingness. What remains to be seen then, is just how this beginning develops, or determines itself.

Since the beginning is at first absolutely identical with pure thought or absolute knowledge, and since Science is, as we have seen, at first defined as nothing more than thought thinking itself as such, it
follows that this beginning develops itself in and through Science. Simply put, Science is the development and realization of thought's beginning, which is initially identical with the absolute beginning. Furthermore, since this beginning is absolutely necessary, the process through which it shows itself as such must also be absolutely necessary. In fact, as such, it must be the very process of necessity itself, or the process of determining necessity. In short, it must be logic. Logic, therefore, is the absolute beginning's absolutely necessary process of self-determination, or simply, self-determining necessity, and, as such, is essential to Science. Indeed, as Hegel explains in the Phenomenology, logic is the process, or method of Science's movement, or development, which means that logic and Science are in fact identical (PhS 22:37 & 34:56). "For the method is nothing but the structure, [i.e. of Science,] set forth in its pure essentiality" (PhS 28:48). In direct contrast to Fichte's purely instrumental standpoint then, logic is the essence not just of Science, or Wissenschaft, but also of every other possible science for which the Wissenschaft serves as ground. For Hegel, therefore, logic cannot simply be a highly beneficial, but unnecessary device for facilitating scientific progress. Rather, it must be both the beginning and the end of that progress. As he says in the Introduction to the Science of Logic: "the value of logic only receives due appreciation when it is seen to result from knowledge of the particular sciences; so regarded, it presents itself to the mind as universal truth, not as a particular department of knowledge, [or science,] alongside of other departments, [or sciences] and other realities, but as the very essence of all these other contents" (SL I 69 [MI]).

As the universal science, truth, or essence, then, logic can no longer be conceived of as "a merely formal science, destitute of significant truth" (SL I 58), as it has since the time of Aristotle. In other words, it cannot be understood as a system that depends on an independent source for its material, or object, nor, therefore, a system that rests solely on the separation of form and content (SL 54 & 58). Instead, logic must be understood as both the embodiment and the systematic development of the unity of these apparently separate phenomena. Once again, as Hegel says in the Introduction to the Science: "In it, [viz. logic,] we are not concerned with thinking about something lying outside [of] thought, as the basis of thought, nor with forms which serve merely as signs of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and characteristic determinations of thought are the content and the supreme truth itself" (SL 61). This is not because thought exists to the exclusion of being, the object, or thing-in-itself, as it does for Fichte. Rather, it is because thought is logic, logic is universal, or pure science, and: "Pure science includes thought insofar as it is just as much the thing-in-itself, [i.e. being,] as it is thought, or the thing-in-itself, [i.e. being,] insofar as it is just as much pure thought as it is the thing-in-itself, [i.e. being]" (SL I 60). Thus, logic, or more accurately, the Science of logic is the comprehension of the unity of opposites, as well as the dialectical movement that results from this unity, whereby, opposites spontaneously become one another, and thus transcend themselves in a new unity. For Hegel, this comprehension of the unity of opposites and dialectic is precisely what constitutes truly speculative knowledge (SL I 67 & 117), and, as I shall argue in this work, what
The unity of opposites and dialectic are hardly new, or modern concepts. The concept of the unity of opposites formally originated in the West around 500 B.C., with the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, whereas dialectic is a methodology which formally originated with the Greek philosopher, Zeno of Elea, around 460 B.C. Although it was not always apparent, as demonstrated by the profound opposition between the ideas of Heraclitus and the Eleatics, the unity of opposites and dialectic are necessarily related one another. In fact, they are ultimately indistinguishable. Briefly, the unity of opposites is merely a general term for speculative knowledge's absolute ground, the first determination of which is the concept of becoming, which Hegel, as we shall see in section 4. of this Introduction, properly regards as the first concrete concept, and, therefore, the first sufficient embodiment of truth (LL 132:88). Dialectic, on the other hand, "is the only true method" for speculative knowledge, and, indeed, all knowledge that would claim to be scientific (SL I 65). Contrary to all of our predominant conceptions of metaphysics and science, this, as Hegel explains, is basically because: "The one and only thing for securing scientific progress ... is knowledge of the logical precept that negation is just as much affirmation as negation, or that what is self-contradictory resolves itself not into nullity, [or rather,] into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular content, that such negation is not an all-embracing negation, but is the negation of a definite something which abolishes itself, and thus is a definite, [or determinate] negation; and therefore that the result contains in essence what it results from - which is indeed a tautology, for otherwise it would be something immediate and not a result. Since what results ... is a definite, [or determinate] negation, it has a content, [viz. what is negated]. It is a new concept, but a higher, richer concept than what preceded [it]; for it has been enriched by the negation or opposite of that preceding concept, and thus contains it, but also contains more than it, and is the unity of it and its opposite" (SL I 65 [MI]).

Here then, we have a fluid, progressive and non-exclusive form of knowledge, or science, which completely subverts some of the most basic tenets and tendencies of Western thought and practice, and as such, represents a truly scientific revolution. The realization that negation and affirmation are inherent in one another, and, therefore, that every new determination must contain the essence of what came before it, not only negates the Cartesian doctrine that negation is merely deficiency, and, therefore, the source of all human error (MFP 100), but also the Aristotelian foundation of the philosophic, scientific, social, political and economic establishment in the West, as well as the East.12 In the Metaphysics, for instance, Aristotle makes it clear that: "It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect .... This, then, is the most certain of all principles ... For no one can believe the same thing to be and not to be."13 This is the law of the non-contradiction, or 'A is not both A and not-A', which implies another of Aristotle's fundamental laws of thought, viz. the law of identity, or 'A is A'. For if the
same thing, at the same time, cannot both belong and not belong to the same thing in the same respect, or rather, if something can only either be, or not-be at any given moment, it follows that it can only be what it is at any given moment, even if what it is, is the fact that it is no longer. In short, it must always be identical with itself, and thus cannot contain contradictories. Both the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity necessarily lead to Aristotle's previously mentioned law of thought, viz. the law of the excluded middle, which asserts the impossibility of a middle ground between contradictories, i.e. 'A or not-A'. Once again, as Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics*: "the possibility of a middle between contradictories is excluded; for it is necessary either to assert or to deny one thing or another. This is clear from the definition of truth and falsity; for to deny what is or to affirm what is not is false, whereas to affirm what is and to deny what is not are true; so that any judgement that anything is or is not states either what is true or false. Hence, either what is, is affirmed or denied, or else what is not is affirmed or denied. *There can be no middle ground.*"¹⁴ As a consequence of the impossibility of a middle ground in Aristotelian logic, the resolution of contradiction, or conflict must inevitably lead to either the complete isolation of the terms, subjects, or parties in conflict, or, if this law is to be followed through to its logical conclusion, i.e. a condition, or state of absolute identity, to the annihilation of at least one of the terms, subjects, or parties in conflict.¹⁵ For the true must always ultimately be affirmed and the false denied. Aristotelian logic, therefore, and that means *any* system of thought and practice which either implicitly, or explicitly bases itself upon and uses these principles, is ultimately a logic of *denial* and *annihilation*, despite claims to positivity, and as such, is both the foundation and the primary means of abstract power.

3. Abstract Power

&

the Contradiction of Absolute Being and Nothing

What is abstract power?

Simply put, abstract power is a classification for any mode of organization which is based upon or aspires to domination and exploitation. It is abstract, a) because it is power that must deny the necessarily inclusive relationship between being and nothing, and, therefore, what we shall see in the next section, is the first *concrete* thought of all human knowledge, viz. *becoming*; and b) because it must inevitably seek to annihilate whatever stands opposed to this denial, thereby, establishing a condition of absolute abstraction. In other words, by annihilating its opposition, either in theory, or in practice, abstract power condemns the embodiment of this opposition to the ultimate state of abstraction, viz. the pure nothingness of the void. It also, therefore, sets itself up as, what we shall see, is that other equally abstract state, in which there is no real change, movement, or becoming, viz. pure or absolute being. Abstract power must do this, because it believes that it must *be everywhere,*
all the time, in order to preserve itself as the absolutely dominant force standing over and against everyone and everything. Indeed, this is the reason that all dominant, or rather, dominating systems throughout history have been either implicitly, or explicitly based upon religions, philosophies, or sciences of absolute being. Absolute being, as we shall see in the analysis of the various proofs of the existence of God in Part II, Chapter 1, and as is implied in the predominant tradition of Western metaphysics from the time of Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 580-470 B.C.), means absolute presence, i.e. omnipresence, and what is omnipresent must absolutely secure. It must be absolutely secure, because what is absolutely present can neither lose, nor have anything taken from it. It can neither lose, nor have anything taken from it, because there is absolutely no distinction between abstract power's fundamental concept or truth and every single being. Absolute being means or is all being. In it, as we shall see Hegel explains in his Science, there is supposedly no real difference (SL 194). It is, therefore, the condition or state of pure equality or absolute identity.

Abstract power is not a peculiarly modern phenomenon like its more developed form, the moral standpoint, however, one of the best examples of abstract power is Hobbes' theory of 'Soveraigne Power', or the State. Although Hobbes seems to dismiss the possibility of the concept of absolute being or God constituting a reasonable ground in or for political philosophy early in Leviathan, i.e. because of its incomprehensibility for finite beings, one soon discovers that such being is still, for Hobbes, the single most important category with regard to the creation, maintenance and understanding of the State. In fact, at the start of Part II of Leviathan, he explicitly characterizes the State as the "Mortall God." Despite this qualification of 'mortality', which is merely an 'accident' of the 'substance' from which the State is constituted, i.e. the 'grosse' and 'corruptible' bodies of 'men', when Hobbes begins to discuss the nature of the power which is the essence of the State, i.e. 'Soveraigne Power', it becomes evident that there is no real, qualitative distinction between the, i.e. true, State and God, only a phenomenal one. Indeed, this is why, according to Hobbes, the 'Kingdome of God' "is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome," and why, by this term, "is properly meant a Common-wealth." Furthermore, it is why, for Hobbes, there is and can be only a formal, and, therefore, unessential, difference between the various kinds of State, e.g. 'Monarchy', 'Democracy', 'Aristocracy', 'Christian', 'Infidel', etc., or, for that matter, between individual States, although Hobbes himself does not explicitly draw this last conclusion.

There are a number of important reasons for this essential qualitative identity between the State and God in Hobbes' philosophy. First, the State is a 'one' or 'unity'. For a) "the Right of bearing the Person of ... all is given to him they make Soveraigne by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them;" and b) a "Multitude of men are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented." Second, the power of the State is 'unconditional', which means that it is also 'self-legislating' and 'self-justifying'. This is because: "The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, i.e. on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie
Furthermore, "Power in all formes protect any man, power;"34 as we can have the power the State accepts the validity and truth of Aristotle's three what is identical Preface, 'indivisible'. For "Powers divided but what it has seen from the publique Sword."28 He that yields the sword, therefore, is the "Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies."29 Third, the power of the State is 'indivisible'. For "Powers divided mutually destroy each other," thereby dissolving the State.30 Furthermore, "Power in all formes ... is the same,"31 i.e. identical; and, as we have already seen in the Preface, what is identical for Hobbes cannot also be different, i.e. divided,32 since he completely accepts the validity and truth of Aristotle's three fundamental laws of thought. Finally, the power of the State is 'unlimited'. For "that King whose power is limited, is not superior to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superior, is not supreme; i.e. not Soveraign."33

As we can see then, the power of the modern State, or 'Soveraigne Power' is, for Hobbes, "absolute power;"34 and, even though all government "in this life [is] ... Temporal,"35 i.e. because of the finitude of human life, the State is nevertheless compelled by it nature to strive to establish and maintain itself as God on earth, right down to artificially reproducing God's eternity to as great an extent possible, through the institution of 'Succession'.36 In other words, God's sovereignty, as Hobbes makes clear, is an immediate consequence of his 'Irresistible Power' or 'Omnipotence',37 and, because "no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei gratia simply, i.e. from the favour of none but God,"38 so too is the State's sovereignty an immediate consequence and reflection of this omnipotence. This is why, for Hobbes, it is the duty of the people of any State, (though there should only be one State on his reasoning), to unquestioningly obey its laws and commands, regardless of how much these may conflict with their consciences.39 It is also why it is completely unreasonable for them to desire any change whatsoever in or of the State.40 As he says: "The desire of change is like the breach of the first of God's Commandments: For there God says,Non habebis Deos alienos: Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations,"41 or more accurately, Thou shall not worship false idols; and the 'true' God is absolute and eternal, i.e. changeless. One, therefore, should desire and worship only stasis, sameness, pure identity, the status quo of the Leviathan, the power of the modern State.

This power of the State, or 'Soveraigne Power', then, is also the same as what Hobbes defines as the 'Right of Nature', i.e. every ones' "Right to every thing; even to one another's body," in the condition of absolute war that is the 'State of Nature'.42 For, as he explains in Leviathan: "The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punish those that break his Lawes, is to be derived ... from his Irresistible Power, [or Omnipotence];" and, whereas all other individuals enter into a 'Pact' to give up this right for the sake of security, it "is never taken away" from the State or 'Soveraigne'.43 For the 'Soveraigne', we must remember, does not enter into, and, therefore, is not bound by, the 'Covenant' that every one else enters into. Thus, through either the default of every one else who enters into the 'Covenant', or positive demonstration, i.e. conquest and terror,44 the State or 'Soveraigne' is itself an 'Irresistible' or 'Omnipotent Power'. "To those therefore whose Power is
irresistible, the dominion of all men adheareth naturally by their excellence of Power.\textsuperscript{45} This is abstract power \textit{par excellence}.

The best empirical example of abstract power is somewhat more difficult to provide. This is not because of a dearth of such examples. Rather, it is because their over-abundance seems to reduce them all to a sort of dull, indifferent mass, which puts one at risk of appearing to trivialize what we can least afford to have trivialized. Be that as it may, I shall attempt to provide a few of the most obvious examples of the existence of modern abstract power in a descending order not so much of importance, but of immediate consequence to the human species. The first such example is the production and use, either direct or indirect, of nuclear weapons by the United States, former Soviet Union and other States of the world since 16 July 1945,\textsuperscript{46} in the attempts to impose their will, and, to some extent, image,\textsuperscript{47} upon one another, to prevent such an imposition, or both. For such weapons are 'annihilatory' in the fullest sense of the term, i.e. they are the means by which the modern State can conceivably commit \textit{omnicide}.

Furthermore, during the Cold War, these weapons were the primary means of creating and maintaining a real, global state of political \textit{bipolarity}, in which both sides considered themselves to be the embodiments of Aristotle's 'A', the true, and the other side, his 'not-A', the false.

The second set of examples of abstract power, therefore, are \textit{genocide} and \textit{war}. They are included here together, because, even though there are certain formal distinctions that can be made between them, (e.g. the latter explicitly implies violent action on the part all of those involved, whereas the former does not, the former necessarily implies the definite annihilation of one of the parties involved, whereas the latter does not, etc.), it has become increasingly difficult to tell the difference between the two phenomena. For instance, in the Second World War civilian deaths accounted for approximately sixty-three per cent of the total forty-eight million dead.\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, this is why it is now quite common to hear terms like, 'war of genocide', or 'genocidal warfare', to describe violent conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Rwanda, etc.. According to the original resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1946, based on Raphael Lemkin's coinage of the term: "Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups. ... Many instances of such crimes have occurred, when racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part."\textsuperscript{49} According to the actual 'Genocide Convention' adopted in 1948, the means of denying human groups their existence are: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."\textsuperscript{50} The definitive historical instance of genocide is of course the Holocaust, "the systematic mass murder" of approximately six million European Jews by the Nazis during World War II.\textsuperscript{51} However, even though the concentrated scale and bureaucratic/industrial nature of the extermination of the Jewish
people has no historical equivalents, "they were not alone in suffering these horrors." They were not alone during the Second World War, nor are they alone in modern history in general. For instance, another five million people, consisting of Nazi designated 'Untermensch' or 'sub-humans', such as Slavs, Poles, Gypsies, politically opposed, mentally ill, retarded and handicapped Germans were also targeted and exterminated by the Nazis. During World War I, the Turks killed approximately one million Armenians living under Ottoman rule. Under Stalin's regime, approximately twenty million people were killed and forty million 'repressed', e.g. imprisoned, forced into labour, exiled, etc. Between 1975 and 1974, after the Vietnam War, in which approximately two and a half million Vietnamese people were killed, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge killed approximately two million Cambodians. And finally, it has begun to be recognized that the "destruction of the Indians of the Americas" may have been "the most massive act of genocide in the history of the world." From Columbus's discovery of America in 1492 to the end of the nineteenth century, the native Indian population of the Americas suffered what historical demographers estimate to be an overall depopulation rate of approximately 95 percent as a direct result of European military conquest, expropriation, enforced labour, displacement and introduced diseases. As David E. Stannard notes in American Holocaust: "Just twenty-one years after Columbus's first landing in the Caribbean, the vastly populous island that the explorer had re-named Hispaniola was effectively desolate; nearly 8,000,000 people - those Columbus chose to call Indians - had been killed by violence, disease and despair." Nor has this destruction of the Indians of the Americas stopped. "As recently as 1986, the Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States observed that 40,000 people had simply 'disappeared' in Guatemala during the preceding fifteen years. Another 100,000 had been openly murdered." What these, and all other, acts of genocide have in common is that those with, on the side of, or seeking power identify those they kill as an obstacle, either real or abstract, to the perfection of that power. Consequently, the perpetrators identify their victims as others, whom they define themselves against and seek to prove as 'Other', i.e. absolutely other. Generally, they do this through a process of 'devaluation' or 'denial' of the Other as 'human', and, therefore, through an 'exclusion', either real, i.e. physical, or ideal, i.e. ideological, or both, from human society and the rights being part of that society entails. For example, the victims are usually characterized as being 'sub-human', or as being forms of life equivalent to a variety of 'animal' forms, (which incidentally presupposes a prior identification, devaluation and exclusion of Nature from the realm of human being), or even as being the equivalent inanimate objects, e.g. 'trash'. Finally, this devaluation and exclusion of the 'Other' eventually leads to an 'indifference' towards, or even pleasure in, the Other's suffering and ultimate destruction, which, in terms of human being, is the 'final', definitive proof of otherness, i.e. the reduction to nothing.

The third and next most logical set of examples of abstract power are bourgeois imperialism and capitalism. Although I do not intend here to enter the academic debate over the relationship between
these phenomena, modern history has shown that the two have marched hand in hand over virtually the entire globe in such a way that an essential relationship between them is virtually undeniable, despite the fact that bourgeois imperialism, or the modern 'age of empire' allegedly ended with the dismantling of Europe's "great colonial structures after World War Two,"\textsuperscript{62} while capitalism seems to have only just overcome the last great political obstacle to achieving universal hegemony and ever-lasting life on earth, viz. European Communism. Bourgeois imperialism and capitalism are instances of abstract power, because both are, first and foremost, reductionist or abstracting in the extreme. This is because both presuppose the reduction of, or abstraction from the indefinite manifold of \textit{qualities} comprising the whole natural, social and political world, to an indifferent substratum of \textit{pure quantity}, which may then be divided into discrete \textit{units} for measuring the exchange-value of \textit{commodities}, i.e. any object or activity, including, or especially, human labour,\textsuperscript{63} exchanged for an object or activity of equivalent value.\textsuperscript{64} As Marx explains in \textit{Capital}: "As use-values, commodities are, above all, of different \textit{qualities}, but as exchange-values they are merely different \textit{quantities}, and consequently do not contain an atom of use-value,"\textsuperscript{65} i.e. quality. Put somewhat differently: "The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition,"\textsuperscript{66} which is why "no chemist has ever discovered exchange-value either in a pearl or a diamond."\textsuperscript{67} The point at which this complete quantification of natural and human reality becomes a definite, i.e. real, physical, possibility, or rather, the point at which the commodity becomes the fundamental form and goal of all human production, marks the beginning of bourgeois production and society, and incidentally the appearance of the next most important indication or characteristic of the presence of abstract power, viz. a tendency towards or desire for infinite expansion. For: "The circulation of commodities is the starting-point of capital;"\textsuperscript{68} and: "The essential condition for the existence and ... sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and augmentation of capital".\textsuperscript{69} What is capital? It is simply "the sum of commodities,"\textsuperscript{70} or exchange-values, and, therefore, the perfect or complete commodity form. It is the commodity that has \textit{realized} the truth of its purely quantitative essence, which, as we shall see in Parts II and III, means to attempt to remain completely \textit{indifferent} to quality and to \textit{increase} itself \textit{indefinitely}.\textsuperscript{71} In short, capital is the absolute, i.e. \textit{self-determining}, Quantum, which, we shall also see in Parts II and III, is identical with absolute being. Put differently, capital is what Marx explained as the system of \textit{self-expanding} value, i.e. \textit{capitalism}.\textsuperscript{72}

This is why, according to Marx, as well as most other modern historians, political theorists and economists, the history of capitalism formally begins in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with the formal beginning of the scientific revolution and the age of modern European imperial expansion, i.e. "the discovery of America, [and] the rounding of the Cape, [both of which] opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie" and "paved the way" for the establishment of a "world-market" through modern 'trade' and 'industry'.\textsuperscript{73} The scientific revolution, as we have already seen to some extent in the Preface, provided the metaphysical reduction of the entire material universe to the quantitative form, which ultimately provided the concepts, techniques, tools and machines that made the development of
modern exploration, trade and industry, i.e. bourgeois society and production, possible. European imperial expansion, on the other hand, reduced every distinct geographical region, people, culture, nation and State to the possessions, or property of a handful of relatively homogeneous European nation-States,\textsuperscript{74} so that it seemed 'reasonable', even for bourgeois society's greatest critic, Marx, to conclude that these regions, peoples, cultures, nations and States of the world, no matter how ancient, e.g. India, had "no history at all, at least no known history,"\textsuperscript{75} until the arrival of the European bourgeoisie and the establishment of a 'world-commerce', 'world-market', 'world-industry', 'world-literature', etc.; in short, a 'world-history'.\textsuperscript{76} This is, what Marx infamously and ironically dubbed, "the great civilizing influence of capital."\textsuperscript{77} We may think of it as simply the great identity producing influence of abstract power.

Of course, no known, or knowable history of their own, meant no real differences of their own for those subject to European imperial power/capital, i.e. unless that difference was assumed to be so complete that it already excluded the indigenous peoples of these regions, cultures, nations and States from membership in human society, viz. 'civilization', or more specifically, 'Christian civilization', (which it did in the case of millions of Africans, American Indians, Asians, etc., forced into slavery by the modern imperial powers); or until that difference was eventually imposed upon these people as ideological justification for maintaining the mass of disposable, low wage-labourers, and, therefore, division of labour, so essential to the proper functioning and development of bourgeois society and production, e.g. the formal and informal institution of apartheid, or system of 'separation', which still exists everywhere in the modern world, despite its formal collapse and abolition in South Africa. No real differences of their own also meant, and continues to mean, no real identity of their own. For, as we shall see throughout this work, real, concrete or actual identity, (as opposed the the abstract and abstracting identity of abstract power and the moral standpoint), depends as much upon real, concrete or actual differences, as real differences do upon real identity (see Part III, Chapter 6). In terms of a distinct identity then, these regions, people, cultures, nations and States were judged to be, and treated as, non-regions, non-people, non-cultures, non-nations and non-States to the extent that they could not, did not, would not, or simply were not allowed to participate in the society, production and history of the bourgeoisie, which, as Marx explains with terrifying sublimity in the Communist Manifesto, "creates a world after its own image."\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, this remains true to this day, despite the observations and aspirations of even some of the most acute political theorists, such as Edward Said, who believe that: "Gone are the binary oppositions dear to the nationalist and imperial enterprise. Instead we begin to sense that old authority cannot simply be replaced by new authority, but that new alignments made across borders, types, nations, and essences are rapidly coming into view, and it is those new alignments that now provoke and challenge the fundamentally static notion of identity that has been at the core of cultural thought during the era of imperialism. Throughout the exchange between Europeans and their 'others' that began systematically half a millennium ago, the one idea that has scarcely varied is that there is an 'us' and a 'them', each quite settled, clear, unassailably self-
These binary oppositions and opposition producing notions, however, are not gone. For the bourgeois world is still with us; and if Marx was right about nothing else, he was right about the 'diametrical opposition', and, therefore, fundamental antagonism, at the heart of the one necessary and sufficient relationship in the bourgeois world, viz. the capital/labour relationship. For, despite the fact that capital appears to be, and, in fact, is, one the ultimate tautologies,\textsuperscript{80} i.e. insofar as it begins and ends with itself, e.g. M-C-M,\textsuperscript{81} and insofar as it appears to be indifferent to all quality, and, therefore, to contain no real differences, e.g. between M and M', it cannot exist without human labour, which is the creator of all value.\textsuperscript{82} Albeit this labour takes the form of 'wage-labour', i.e. "the condition for capital,"\textsuperscript{83} and wage-labour is a commodity just like any other, so that labour is in a sense identical with the quantitative essence of capital and that the tautology is preserved. However, there is no wage-labour without human labour, and, regardless of how homogeneous human labour is made by capitalism through commodification and the division of labour,\textsuperscript{84} i.e. its reduction to wage-labour, it is still inherently qualitative. In short, it must always create some use-value. As Marx himself notes in \textit{Capital}: "So far ... as labour is a creator of use-value, [i.e. quality, or] is useful labour, it is a necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life."\textsuperscript{85} Human labour, therefore, is opposed to and by capital, which, in order to be true to its purely quantitative essence, must indefinitely seek the indefinite production of exchange-value, or surplus-value, and, therefore, the indefinite reduction of use-value and necessary labour, i.e. labour necessary for the simple reproduction of labourers.\textsuperscript{86} In short, it must infinitely strive for the absolute quantification of all quality, which means quality's negation as quality. However, no quality, no human labour; no human labour, no human life; no human labour or life, no wage-labour; no wage-labour, no capital. As Marx says, therefore: "Capital is itself a contradiction in action ... [I]t diminishes labour time in its necessary form, in order to increase its superfluous form; therefore it increasingly establishes superfluous labour time as a condition (a question of life and death) for necessary labour time."\textsuperscript{87} Consequently, the bourgeois world of capitalism and wage-labour is a world necessarily divided against itself, a world \textit{forever} at war with itself, at least until the transcendence of its fundamental relationship, i.e. that between capital and labour.

The last empirical example of abstract power which I shall provide here, will no doubt seem to pale in comparison to those provided above. However, I cannot help but think that it is perhaps the most relevant and telling example one could provide at this moment in time. It has to do with the contemporary mathematical offspring of Science or speculative logic, viz. fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic was formally originated in 1964 by Lotfi Zadeh, chair in Electrical Engineering at University of California, Berkeley.\textsuperscript{88} Basically, Zadeh's work applied the multivalued logic of the Polish logician,
Jan Lukasiewicz, "to sets whose elements belong to it in different degrees."89 Fuzzy logic, therefore, rests on the basic proposition that: "everything is a matter of degree."90 As such, fuzzy logic had to reject, or rather, restrict* the dogmatism that sees all things as black or white, true or false, and embrace a world in which there are infinite 'shades of gray' between the black and white extremes.91 In other words, after 2, 300 years of "Aristotle's imperium in logic," it could no longer accept the immediate absolute truth of his fundamental laws of thought. Instead, it had to seek truth in the principle of the unity of opposites, i.e. a system in which A is both 'A and not-A', not simply 'A or not-A'.92 Although the consequences of the reaction to fuzzy logic were not as immediately brutal for Zadeh and his followers, as were those for speculative philosophers accused of atheism during the nineteenth century, e.g. the Young Hegelians, they were swift and severe.

Fuzzy logic was rejected and scorned by the establishment in the West. For instance, in 1970, the famous logician Willard V. O. Quine judged multivalued logics to be "deviant."93 Furthermore, insofar as they supersede Aristotle's basic laws, he said: "It is hard to face up to the rejection of anything so basic."94 In 1972, Professor Rudolph Kalman, who designed the 'Kalman filter', a device "used more than any other system in navigation, guidance, estimation and ... hundreds of other computer tasks," criticized Zadeh's work as being the product of a period of "unprecedented permissiveness" in "the prevailing political climate in the United States" during the 1960's.95 As Kalman went on to state: "'Fuzzification' is a kind of scientific permissiveness; it tends to result in socially appealing slogans unaccompanied by the discipline of hard scientific work and patient observation."96 In 1975, Professor William Kahan, a colleague of Zadeh's at Berkeley, went even further, declaring: "Fuzzy theory is wrong, wrong and pernicious. I cannot think of any problem that could not be solved better by ordinary, [i.e. Aristotelian,] logic. ... What we need is more logical thinking, not less. The danger of fuzzy logic is that it will encourage the sort of imprecise thinking that has brought us so much trouble."97 In 1989, at the height of America's 'War on Drugs', Kahan proved to be as condemnation and sarcastic regarding fuzzy logic as ever: "Logic isn't following the rules of Aristotle blindly. It takes the kind of pain known to the runner. He knows he is doing something. When you are thinking about something hard, you'll feel a similar sort of pain. Fuzzy logic is marvellous. It insulates you from pain. It is the cocaine of science."98 In 1981, fuzzy logic was assailed by "psychologists Daniel Osherson of MIT and Edward Smith of Stanford," for breaking Aristotle's laws, and, thereby, promoting a 'carnival of contradiction'.99 Indeed, a late as 1991, 'fuzzy scholar', Maria Zemankova, who "works for the National Science Foundation (NSF), one of the premier research funders in the United States,"100 reported that proposals involving fuzzy logic still encountered overt prejudice and were likely to be 'killed' by grant reviewers. Finally: "As late as mid-1992, there were no [introductory books on fuzzy logic for sale in popular bookstores] in the United States,"101 despite its growing economic success.
This success was by no means the result of fuzzy logic suddenly being taken up and applied by Western corporations and government agencies. For they proved as indifferent and hostile to fuzzy logic as their academic counterparts, so much so, in fact, that the field literally began to "fadeout" in the early 1980's. In Europe, Ebrahim Mamdani attributed the 'adverse reaction' to fuzzy logic to groups like "the control engineering community in the U.K." For instance, as Daniel McNeill and Paul Freiberger report in Fuzzy Logic: "He, [Mamdani,] felt he had discovered a promising technique [using fuzzy logic], so he applied for a grant from the Science Research Council (SRC), Britain's equivalent of the NSF. [As Mamdani said,] 'We simply asked to be allowed to do more work on this, to find out why it works so well, and what its characteristics were. We asked for about £10,000 to £15,000, which wasn't very much. They were not interested. They said it wasn't timely.' Although he did eventually receive some grants from the cement industry, and subsequently, the SRC as well, as he said: "Gradually it all petered out. The funding wasn't adequate. There was tremendous antagonism toward fuzzy logic in Europe." One of Mamdani's colleagues, engineer Richard Tong, made the same observation with regard to America. "Particularly in the States," he said, "there's been a significant amount of resistance to the technology and it was hard to get any money to continue the work, and it basically died out here until the last few years." This was especially true in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). In 1985, for instance, two researchers, Masaki Togai and Hiroyuke Watanbe, working for Bell Laboratories, "long America's premier research institute," designed a fuzzy computer chip which greatly and demonstrably outperformed conventional binary chips. Bell, however, rejected their request to commercialize the chip. The two then left Bell and went to work for Rockwell International, where they were also doing work for NASA, and produced a second fuzzy chip, which Rockwell then refused to produce or market. Why? As Bell researcher, Alan Huang, observed: "It was looked on as oddball. It was soft science, not quote traditional. You'll see that fuzzy logic also didn't take off in certain academic universities like Stanford and MIT. It's the same symptom. It's not just Bell Laboratories. If you're not part of the party line... Some things just get a bad rap and you're a heretic." In other words, fuzzy logic was seen as lacking "sufficient intellectual merit." "It, therefore, failed to engage the Western research ethos." Furthermore, "fuzziness simply went against the grain. Mainstream scientists could not accept it, and they ultimately controlled the funding." They could not accept it for the simple reason that Zadeh himself observed: "The concept of a fuzzy set has an upsetting effect on the established order; and, as we have already begun to see, that order is established on the dogmatic acceptance and enforcement of Aristotle's 'A or not-A', not 'A and not-A'. Thus, as McNeill and Freiberger rightly concluded, fuzzy logic came "before a tribunal prejudiced against it by the 2,300-year-old Aristotelian dichotomy... It could [only] expect dismissal, derision, and an apparently mulish inability to understand."

The only reason fuzzy logic has survived the judgement of this tribunal of what is essentially abstract power, is because the East, especially Japan, which has a religious and philosophical, (though not
necessarily social or political), history somewhat more attuned to the principle of the unity of opposites, saw the tremendous scientific and economic potential in fuzzy logic. As a result, Japanese corporations in particular poured their effort, time and resources into researching and developing fuzzy logic and its applications, so that economic necessity is now forcing the West to reconsider its position. For instance, in 1979, Hitachi researchers, "Shoji Miyamoto and Seiji Yasunobo, began studying how fuzzy logic might control the Sendai subway." In 1983, they became convinced that a "fuzzy subway would work," and managed to convince corporate and government officials to pursue the project. On July 15, 1987, the "Sendai system officially debuted," and is now the most advanced subway system in the world. In 1984, Omron Tateishi Electronics, "the hidden manufacturer which enables other Japanese manufacturing giants to function," began its research into fuzzy logic for a medical diagnostic system, "which it completed in 1986. By September 1990 ... Omron held 107 of the 389 fuzzy patents in Japan." Three days after the debut of the Sendai subway system in 1987, "the second annual International Fuzzy Systems Association (ISFA) Conference [opened] in Tokyo." At this conference, Professor Kaoru Hirota of Hosei University and Professor Takeshi Yamakawa of Kumamoto University demonstrated computer controlled robotics using fuzzy logic, and created nothing short of a sensation, which ignited the subsequent explosion of Japanese fuzzy consumer products from companies like Panasonic, Sanyo, Sharp, Toshiba, Nissan, Cannon, and so on. After the ISF Conference, fuzzy theorists like Professor Yamakawa literally became celebrities in Japan; and, in 1989, Lotfi Zadeh was awarded the Honda Prize, which was initiated in 1977 to "honor technology that fosters a 'humane civilization'" - an award the significance of which becomes all the more appropriate when one considers the utterly inhuman consequences which have and will continue to result from dogmatically pursuing Aristotelianism to its 'logical' conclusion, i.e. abstract power and, what shall be introduced later as, the moral standpoint.

These examples aside, we must return to uncovering and grasping the contradictions at the heart of abstract power, which, as should now be clear, is based on the notion of absolute being. Absolute being, as stated at the beginning of this section, is absolute identity. It is absolute identity, as Hegel explains in his Science, because it contains no qualities, or determinations, which would necessarily distinguish it from other beings with qualities. In short, it is absolutely indeterminate, or qualitiless. However, as Hegel explains, insofar as absolute being contains no real difference, or is the same as every single being, or is absolutely indeterminate, that is, qualitiless, it is also absolutely different from every single being (SL 94). This is because no other being, i.e. no other single being, can be said to be absolutely identical with all other beings. In short, no other beings can be said to be qualitiless. For all other beings, insofar as they are single beings, are determinate beings, which means they have qualities that define them both as what they are, and as what they are not, and, therefore, that distinguish them from each other, as well as from the absolute being. They are not absolute. They are limited, or finite. This grounding in absolute being definitely explains abstract power's pretentious belief in itself as something special, or unique. However, as we can see from what
has just been said, it is just that - a pure pretence. For if absolute being is absolutely different from everything else, what makes it different is its indeterminacy, or qualitilessness. Hence, indeterminacy, or qualitilessness is the quality of absolute being, which means that absolute being is not really absolute, but simply another being defined, or determined by its difference from and opposition to every other single being. To put it somewhat differently, absolute being immediately disappears and becomes finite being, that is, a finite being that only appears to be absolute. This is one of the fundamental contradictions of absolute being, and, therefore, one of the essential paradoxes of abstract power.

Where the concept of absolute being is concerned, Hegel is even less charitable than so far depicted, and for good reason. As he explains at the beginning of the Science, pure being, abstract being, absolute being - the foundation of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Greek philosophy, modern science, bourgeois political theory, State socialism, etc. - immediately vanishes, or "is nothing, neither more nor less" (SL I 95). Of course, he is not simply reveling in the irreverence of declaring that there is no absolute being - though we should all revel so irreverently and absolutely - for the immediate emergence and recognition of the category of absolute nothing from that of absolute being is, as has already been stated, essential to the ground, method and aim of speculative knowledge, all of which depend upon the unity of opposites and negation as affirmation. It is also essential, therefore, to the task of overcoming abstract power.

Absolute nothing spontaneously appears from, or with absolute being, because a) absolute being, as we saw, is absolutely self-contradictory, and b) what is completely indeterminate, or without qualities simply is nothing, i.e. it is void. "Pure being and pure nothing are, then, the same" (SL I 95). This means, however, that pure, or absolute nothing suffers the same absolute self-contradictoriness as absolute being. It too is absolutely identical with everything, since it has no qualities to distinguish it from anything else, and absolutely different from everything, since this absolute identity, or qualitilessness is precisely the quality that distinguishes it from everything else. Furthermore, as we saw earlier, absolute nothing must negate even itself, if it is to be truly absolute. Thus, absolute being must just as spontaneously appear from, or with absolute nothing, as vice versa. "Their truth therefore is this movement, this immediate disappearance of the one into the other, in a word, becoming" (SL I 95). In other words, absolute being immediately becomes nothing, and absolute nothing immediately becomes being. They do this, because there are no qualities, or determinations to separate them. They do this, because they are absolutely identical, or because they are both the condition of absolute identity.

However, just as this absolute indeterminacy, or identity is also the condition of absolute difference, i.e. from everything else, so too is it the condition of their absolute difference, not just from everything else, but also from each other. Indeterminacy, or qualitilessness is what determines
absolute being and absolute nothing as identical. It is their quality. Where there is determination, or quality, however, there is also necessarily difference. Hence, absolute being, in and by becoming absolute nothing, immediately becomes different from nothing, and absolute nothing, in and by becoming absolute being, immediately becomes different from being. This is why Hegel describes becoming as a movement in which both absolute being and absolute nothing are also immediately and "absolutely distinct," or different (SL I 95). Indeed, becoming depends on this difference (SL I 119).

For, although it can be said that 'being becomes nothing' and 'nothing becomes being', it cannot be said that 'being becomes being' and 'nothing becomes nothing', which we would have to if being and nothing were simply identical. To put it somewhat differently, something must become an other, not itself; or, more accurately, something can only become itself, if it first becomes an other in and for itself, which then immediately becomes it.

This is the great mystery of Hegelian dialectics, or Science, and what distinguishes speculative politics from all other forms of politics, particularly those of abstract power. For, whereas most predominant conceptual systems, or metaphysics, which serve as the theoretical ground of politics, are based upon the priority of the notion of something's simple, autonomous being-in-itself, speculative metaphysics demonstrates how something's real being-in-itself is actually only a result of its relationship to, and, therefore, being for, an other. For instance, insofar as something is distinct, or separate from nothing, it is thought to be a being-in-itself, and this being-in-itself is commonly thought of as being purely positive and primary. However, something at first manifests itself as what is opposed to nothing, which means by virtue of its relationship to, and, therefore, being for, nothing, which is something's absolute other. In short, something is nothing's other, or what is not-nothing. Something's being in itself, or quality, therefore, is both positive and negative. Indeed, it can easily be demonstrated that something's being-in-itself, or quality is at first purely negative, and, therefore, that it is the existence and result of the absolute otherness in and to something. This is because a) something is actually the result of the self-relation, and thus self-negation of absolute nothing, and b) something, insofar as it is a finite being, i.e. what has limits, is nothing in itself, i.e. it ends. In both cases, therefore, something is essentially nothing in itself, or rather, nothing is the essence, or being-in-itself of something, and this essence, or being-in-itself really only becomes something in relation to the other of something, that is, nothing. This is because this relationship, as we see, is the relationship of nothing to nothing, and, therefore, the negation of negation, which results from something being, becoming, or both, its absolute other in itself, or in essence, and this essence immediately constituting a relationship of self-identity between the otherness both inside and outside of something. It is a relationship of the other to the other, which, as Hegel explains in the Logic, immediately produces something, and so also a positive self identity, in which something now really does equal something in and for itself (SL I 131).

This idea of something only becoming itself for itself, through and for its other, is extremely
important for beginning to explain and understand the relationship of mutual necessity between ultimately and explicitly self-determining beings, i.e. for comprehending the fact that social being and individuality must presuppose each other equally and absolutely, in order to become real possibilities. As we shall see, therefore, it is also crucial to the theory/practice of speculative politics. However, it already assumes much of the logic of the concept of becoming itself, since it represents a somewhat higher stage in the development of speculative logic, or Science, than that of pure being, pure nothing and becoming, the last of which has yet to be fully explained. Thus, we must here explore becoming's nature further, and postpone the analysis of something and other until we come to Hegel's explanation of determinate being in Chapter 4. For not only is becoming the most important concept of speculative politics at this stage in its development, i.e. insofar as it constitutes the logical ground of speculative politics, it seems to suffer the same absolute self-contradictoriness as absolute being and nothing as it has so far been presented, in which case it does not offer a viable alternative, or more truthful conceptual ground to that of abstract power. In other words, we have seen that becoming depends upon and contains both the absolute identity and the absolute difference of pure being and pure nothing.

4. Becoming, or the Absolute Logical Ground of Science and Speculative Politics

Pure being and pure nothing, however, immediately disappeared in the process, or movement of becoming (one another). Therefore, they are no longer present in becoming. In fact, it cannot be said that they were ever really present in becoming, since their disappearance is immediate. However, if they were never really present in becoming, how can there be a process, or movement of becoming? What becomes? As we saw, pure being and pure nothing immediately disappeared into one another, or simply disappeared, because they were completely indeterminate. Their disappearance, therefore, is the disappearance of indeterminacy, or rather, indeterminacy's appearance as determinacy. Their disappearance, therefore, is also an immediate re-appearance, which is easily seen in the statements, 'being becomes nothing' and 'nothing becomes being'. They do not, however, re-appear as what they were supposed to be before their disappearance, i.e. they do not re-appear as pure indeterminacies, or simply indeterminacy as such. Rather, they re-appear as what they were not supposed to be, or as what they really are, viz. determinate. They are determinate indeterminacy, or rather, since determinacy necessarily implies difference, they are determinate indeterminacies, and as such, different determinations, or distinct moments of the same process, or movement of becoming (SL I 118). Becoming, therefore, is a "determinate unity" (SL I 118), not an abstract one, like absolute being, or nothing in which all things, qualities, determinations, etc., are simply annihilated. In becoming, nothing is ever annihilated, except perhaps the condition of annihilation, viz. absolute being, or nothing, and even these, as we see, are not really annihilated. They are merely negated in their absoluteness, purity, or indeterminacy, and, thereby, preserved as distinct moments in a determinate
unity. In short, they are transcended. As Hegel makes plain at the end of his analysis of becoming in the *Science of Logic*, transcendence is one of the "most important concepts of philosophy" (*SL I* 119), and, therefore, as we might add, the theory and practice of speculative politics, which, as we shall see shortly, implies a strategy of transcendence, without which nothing is possible, or everything is impossible. As Hegel explains: "To transcend (aufheben) has this double meaning, that it signifies to keep or to preserve and also to make to cease, to finish. To preserve includes this negative element, [viz.] that something is removed from its immediacy and therefore from a determinate being, [or existence] exposed to external influences, in order that it may be preserved. Thus, what is transcended is also preserved; it has only lost its immediacy, [or purity] and is not on that account annihilated. ... A thing is transcended only insofar as it has come into unity with its opposite; in this narrow, [or particular] determination, as something reflected, it may fittingly be called [a] moment" (*SL I* 119-20 [MI]).

Being and nothing become, or rather, are just such moments in the process, or movement of becoming, i.e. they are transcended immediacies, or immediacy, and as such, are not merely parts in a whole. Otherwise, they would not have been removed from their immediacy, or purity, and, thereby, preserved. For a part is at first something indifferent to its relationship to other parts, and, therefore, to the whole which the sum of these parts constitutes. In short, a part is immediate, and, therefore, not transcended (*SL II* 144-47). A moment, on the other hand, is, as Hegel said, something reflected. It is a reflection of its opposite determination, or other, and, therefore, of the unity formed by itself and its other. Thus, as moments of the unity of becoming, being and nothing are unities within the unity, i.e. "each ... is itself a unity of being and nothing" (*SL 118*), and, therefore, a becoming within becoming.

What then distinguishes these becomings, or rather, how are they distinct from one another?

Clearly, when absolute nothing negates itself, and, thereby, becomes being, being has primacy over nothing in this movement; and when absolute being negates itself, and, thereby, becomes nothing, nothing has primacy over being. This means two things. First, it means that the determination which has primacy in each moment does not and cannot simply cancel, or annihilate its opposite determination, i.e. the one that is supposed to disappear. For then there would be nothing to have primacy over, and these moments would not be reflections of the whole, or unities within the unity. Rather, they would simply be the pure immediacies which are supposed to disappear, or be transcended. Second, it means, as Hegel says: "The determinations are of unequal value in these unities" (*SL I* 118 [MI]). Indeed, the primacy of the determinations that result in each of these moments of becoming depends upon this inherent inequality. To illustrate this clearly, we may refer to the Tai Chi symbol, which evolved from the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate, composed by the Chinese philosopher Chou Tun-Yi (1017-1073 A.D.):
In this symbol (see fig. 1), we see that, although being, which is represented by greater yang (A), is equal to nothing, which is represented by greater yin (B), it has primacy over the nothingness, or secondary yin (C) contained in it. Likewise, nothing, which is represented by greater yin (B), has primacy over the being, or secondary yang (D) contained in it. Each moment, therefore, must always contain the seed of its opposite within itself, so that there is only ever a becoming of the one by the other, a becoming in which both are always determinate, and never really pure. In other words, there is always only arising, i.e. nothing becoming being, and passing away, i.e. being becoming nothing (SL I 118); or rather, there are always only the "different directions" of "the same thing, viz. becoming" (SL I 118 [MI]). This is why Hegel says in the Encyclopedia: "Becoming is the first concrete thought, and therefore the first concept; whereas being and nothing are empty abstractions. The notion of being, therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean becoming; not the mere point of being which is empty nothing, any more than nothing which is empty being. In being then we have nothing, and in nothing being; but this being which does not lose itself in nothing is becoming. Nor must we omit the distinction, while we emphasize the unity of becoming; without that distinction we should once more return to abstract being, [which is nothing]. Becoming is the only explicit statement of what being is in its truth, [and what nothing is in its truth.] ... As the first concrete thought-term, becoming is the first adequate vehicle of truth" (LL 132:88).

Becoming is, as it were, the first sufficient determination of the absolute beginning spoken of above, which is why it, unlike absolute, or pure being and nothing, can serve as the true ground, or first principle of all human knowledge, despite its self-contradictoriness, i.e. despite the fact that it contains both the absolute identity and absolute difference of being and nothing. To explain this somewhat differently, becoming is the absolute beginning, because it is absolute in its beginning. It is absolute in its beginning, because it is not limited by any opposite. It is not limited by any opposite, because it is, as we have already seen, the unity of opposites, or rather, it is the unity of opposites' first real appearance as such. Becoming, therefore, constitutes the beginning and ground of speculative politics, or rather, any politics is speculative that recognizes becoming as the absolute logical beginning and seeks to develop itself on this ground. Furthermore, it is this ground that enables speculative politics to repudiate once and for all the Aristotelian foundations of abstract power, especially the law of non-
contradiction. As Hegel declares in the Science of Logic: "it has been a fundamental prejudice of hitherto existing logic and of ordinary thinking that contradiction is a determination less essential and immanent than identity; but in fact, if there were any question of rank, and the two determinations had to be fixed as separate, then contradiction would have to be taken as the profounder and more essential of the two. For as opposed to contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, or of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and life; it is only insofar as it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has an impulse and activity ... Something therefore has life only insofar as it contains contradiction, and is that force which can both comprehend and endure contradiction ... [If an existent something cannot in its positive determination also encroach on its negative, cannot hold fast the one in the other and [thereby] contain contradiction within itself, then it is not living unity, or ground, but perishes in contradiction, or [simply] falls to the ground. [i.e. dead]. Speculative thinking consists only in this, that it holds fast contradiction, and, in contradiction, [holds fast] itself; ... [it] does not allow itself to be dominated by contradiction - as does ordinary thinking, whose determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other determinations, [which are not its own,] or into nothing" (SL II 66-68 [MI]).

All of this, however, does not mean that becoming is the ultimate truth for human knowledge. Science, politics, or anything else, at least not as mere logical becoming, or becoming as such. This is why Hegel immediately follows up his vindication of the concept of becoming, in the Encyclopedia, with the recognition that this concept must itself be transcended. As he says: "Even becoming, ... taken at its best, on its own ground, [viz. itself,] is an extremely poor term: it needs to grow in depth and weight of meaning. Such deepened force we find for example in life. Life is a becoming; but that is not enough to exhaust the concept of life. A still higher form is found in mind. Here too is becoming, but richer and more intensive than mere logical becoming. The elements whose unity constitutes mind are not the bare abstractions of being and nothing, but the system of the logical Idea, [i.e. manifested mind,] and Nature, [i.e. manifested life]" (LL 133:88). Becoming, as Hegel points out here, is in itself an impoverished concept, and, therefore, one that must be transcended in higher concepts, such as life and mind, because it must become these higher determinations by virtue of its own nature and logic, its own inner necessity. In short, even, or especially becoming must become. Concepts like life and mind, therefore, are simply the products of becoming's self-determination, i.e. becoming's becoming. Thus, becoming transcends itself by determining itself to be what it is supposed to be, viz. absolute becoming; and, since absolute becoming is the ground and beginning of all human knowledge, or Science, we can see why actual self-determination and self-transcendence always necessarily imply one another, or mean the same thing, particularly in and for truly speculative systems, like speculative politics. The only thing that remains to be seen with regard to the concept of becoming itself then, is how it transcends itself, and what it first determines itself to be.

Becoming has in fact already been transcended. For its disappearance, or becoming is, in an important
respect, as immediate as the disappearance, or becoming of pure being and pure nothing. Becoming's disappearance, or becoming's own becoming is immediate, because it is itself, as we saw, the immediate disappearance of pure being and pure nothing, both of which it depends upon for its existence (SL I 119). "Their disappearance therefore is the disappearance of becoming, or the disappearance of disappearance itself" (SL I 119 [MI]). Indeed, this term, 'the disappearance of disappearance', can be regarded as identical with the disappearance of pure being and pure nothing, insofar as the latter is the immediate disappearance of indeterminacy - indeterminacy being the absence of appearance - or, what has already been described above as, a definite appearance. What is a definite appearance? Simply put, a definite appearance is something that does not immediately disappear like pure being and pure nothing. It is, therefore, a being that does not immediately become, i.e. it does not instantaneously arise, or pass away. Rather, it is a being that has arisen and may pass away, but, for the moment, simply remains. In short, it has become. Hegel identifies what has become as determinate being (SL I 119), which, as we shall see clearly in Chapter 4, section A., is the beginning of reality as such, or the first moment of reality, that is, the first real moment (SL I 121-27).

This explanation of becoming's immediate disappearance, or becoming, however, does not seem to take into account the difference that immediately appeared in, and as a result of, becoming, or the immediate disappearance of pure being and pure nothing. It does not, therefore, seem to take into account either the mediation in becoming, or, therefore, how becoming's disappearance, or becoming is actually a result of becoming's own self-mediation, rather than its immediate dependence upon pure being and pure nothing. In short, it does not make explicit that becoming's transcendence is a self-transcendence, or rather, a result of its self-determination. This problem is easily remedied, however, by a further look at the concept of becoming, as well as its two determinations, or moments, viz. arising and passing away.

We have already seen that the absolute distinction, or difference between being and nothing is the result of their immediate disappearance into, or becoming one another, and that becoming depends upon this difference for its existence (SL I 119). This, as we have also seen, is because nothing, not even pure being and pure nothing, can simply become themselves, at least not without first becoming an other. There must be mediation. This mediation, however, is also immediately present, insofar as the immediate disappearance of pure being and nothing is also their spontaneous, or immediate re-appearance, i.e. from the other. It is present, because the being that re-appears from pure nothing and the nothing that re-appears from pure being are not and cannot be immediate. They are not and cannot be immediate, because they are results, i.e. results of the disappearance of pure being and pure nothing, or rather, the results of the movement of becoming. Each, therefore, is mediated by the other, i.e. the other which it appeared out of, and the other which now confronts it as a distinct determinacy. This distinct determinacy, however, need not necessarily be regarded as a determinate being. For, although it can be said that being and nothing have become in their disappearance and re-appearance, and,
therefore, that becoming as simple, or immediate becoming, i.e. the disappearance of pure being and pure nothing, has disappeared, or become, arising and passing away are also determinate processes, or movements. They are determinations of the movement of becoming, which, as we have already seen, is itself a determinate unity. Simple, or immediate becoming, therefore, may have very well disappeared, and, thereby, provided the first 'disappearance of disappearance', but becoming as a complex, or mediated process still appears to be present, or remains. It remains, because the difference between being and nothing, or now, arising and passing away, remains, and, as long as this difference remains, there is nothing but a continuous state of motion, an incessant process of arising and passing away, or simply, an absolute flux, or chaos, in which stable existence, or simply, existence as such - since existence is usually defined as the condition of being immediately present - is impossible.

This difference, however, disappears just as immediately as it appears from the disappearance of pure being and pure nothing. It disappears for a number of reasons. First, pure being and pure nothing only disappear into, or become one another in the first place, because they are absolutely identical with one another. In other words, 'being becomes nothing' can just as easily be said to be 'being becomes nothing becomes being', or simply, 'being becomes being'. Likewise, 'nothing becomes being' can be said to be 'nothing becomes being becomes nothing', or simply, 'nothing becomes nothing'. As we have already seen, however, the last proposition in each case is impossible, unless of course pure being and pure nothing really are the opposites, or others they also immediately became. The last proposition in each case, therefore, represents a collapse back into identity, and, therefore, not a becoming, or a not-becoming. Second, as can be seen from this explanation, passing away is as much an arising, as arising is a passing away. Thus, there is no difference between arising and passing away. They are and they become identical. Third, as moments of becoming, arising and passing away are movements that reflect, and are contained in, the movement of the whole, viz. becoming in general. As such they must also, therefore, reflect and contain the other. Once again, then, this means that each establishes, both within itself and between itself and its other, not only the self-identities of being and nothing, but also of themselves, and, therefore, of becoming in general. All of these self-identities, therefore, constitute a mediated disappearance, i.e. the disappearance of disappearance, becoming's becoming, or, as Hegel puts it, becoming's appearance as a "static unity" (SL I 118). This static unity represents a return to the principle of identity. However, it is not the same identity with which becoming supposedly began, that is, it is not the abstract identity of the void, which is not really a unity at all, static, or otherwise. Rather, it is the result and opposite of this abstract identity. As Hegel says: 'It is the union of being and nothing, which has become a static simplicity" (SL I 119 [MI]). It is, therefore, a determinate identity, or something, the self-identity of which enables it to resist disappearing. It is, as we have already seen, a determinate being.

The appearance of a determinate being, or determinate being in general, since there is no real distinction between the two at first, is an important event or stage for speculative politics. It is
important for many reasons. However, the most significant of these are as follows: a) determinate being, as already stated, is the first moment of reality as such, and, therefore, the first time a real beginning seems to be made by thought, i.e. as distinct from its object; b) determinate being marks the first real appearance of something and other, and, therefore, the possibility of politics, i.e. two beings appear which may manifest or develop the need for a mode of interaction or a strategy of relating to one another and to themselves; c) only a determinate being is capable of actual self-determination; and d) determinate being provides the basis of the conflict between speculative politics and the modern form of abstract power, or, what we shall see at the end of this Introduction is, the moral standpoint. It provides the basis of this conflict, because the modern form of abstract power, at least formally, begins with the appearance of the Cartesian cogito or modern subject, which, even from the standpoint of speculative politics, must be recognized as one of the most remarkable events in human history. It is remarkable, on the one hand, because every individual, for the first time in history, is shown that they possess the power within themselves to resist the "supreme power and cunning" of any malicious being or 'deceiver', who might seek to cast doubt upon their existence and importance. For instance, as Descartes declares of such a being, in the Meditations: "let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something" (MFP 2:80 [MI]). Such a deceiver will never deceive me into believing that I am nothing, for no matter how much I am deceived about or made to doubt my existence, there must be something that is deceived or made to doubt. Thus, I am something so long as I think, and I cannot help but think, since thinking or thought is the essence of this substance called T, or mind. I think, therefore I am. This event is also remarkable, on the other hand, because, without the corresponding recognition that this something which I am, is also simultaneously negative in itself, or essentially, every individual becomes an abstract power unto him or herself, that is, every individual becomes a being striving to be the absolute being by any and all possible means. Every individual becomes a being ultimately adept at only one thing, viz. the strategy of denial and annihilation, which, as we have already seen, is the strategy and position of abstract power.

5. 'Speculative Politics'
&
the Strategy of 'Overcoming through Yielding'

What then is the alternative to this strategy of denial and annihilation? Or rather, what is speculative politic's strategy for overcoming abstract power, and, therefore, the crisis of the modern world?

Just as Hegel claimed that all of the elements of his system are contained in the principles of Heraclitus, so too the elements of speculative politics and its strategy for overcoming the crisis of the modern world are all contained in Hegel's concept of Science, as it has so far been explained. These elements, however, constitute a specific method or way of knowing and relating to the world which
needs to be made explicit. First, it needs to be made explicit, because, by its very nature as rational, this method is the epitome of subtlety, and, therefore, easily missed by those both seeking and not seeking it. As Hegel says: "The rational is the high road where everyone travels, [but] where no one is conspicuous" (PR 230:15 [A]). Second, it needs to be made explicit, because it is the only way anything may ever be truly known in itself, or may be accomplished by determinate beings such as ourselves, without eventually becoming caught in abstract power's bombastic circle of denial and annihilation. This method, way, or rather, strategy, since its adoption by individuals and groups can be regarded as nothing less than a declaration of war by systems based on abstract power, possesses a logic of, what is best described as, *yielding and overcoming*, or rather, overcoming *through yielding*. Such a strategy has often be wrongly interpreted as the method of pacifism. However, even though it may have certain aims in common with pacifism, such as the transcendence of violence and the production of peace, it is not at all pacifist. This is basically because pacifism seeks to annihilate violence by attempting to deny the conditions and fact of violence, in short, the need for violence. In other words, it confronts the object to which it supposedly stands opposed in a purely external manner. Consequently, pacifism always ends up confirming precisely what it believes itself to be opposed to. It does this specifically through the martyrdom of its adherents, the reification of the opposition with what it perceives as the forces of violence, the nescient destruction of those forces wherever and whenever possible, or all of the above. In short, it confirms all of the relationships of abstract power in its apparent conflict with abstract power, and, in so doing, is merely another self-righteous expression of precisely that power. Indeed, this is why many of the self-proclaimed 'pacifists', whether secular or religious, one meets in life, are often some of the most belligerent and narrow-minded personalities one could imagine having to deal with, especially when it comes to the discussion of violence and violence related issues and instruments.

*The strategy of overcoming through yielding*, on the other hand, martyrs no one, reifies nothing and, above all, demands the comprehension of everything. Perhaps the best expression of this strategy is provided by Hegel in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, when he describes the difference between the formal understanding that never actually engages the immanent content of the thing to be understood, or rather, that never actually enters upon and into its object, and truly scientific or speculative thought, which first and foremost seeks to unobtrusively blend with the inner nature and 'rhythm' of its object (PhS 33:53). As Hegel says with regard to the formal understanding: "Instead of entering into the immanent content of the thing, it is forever surveying the whole and standing above the particular existence of which it is speaking [in theory], i.e. it does not see it at all" (PhS 32:53). This understanding, as Hegel explains at various points throughout his work, is the kind of 'lifeless', 'external cognition' (PhS 31:51) which, on the one hand, stands apart from and scans the entire world as an object, and as such, *invests* that object "with the form of universality" (LL 113:80 [MI]); and, on the other, sees in this universality a plurality of independent, particular objects, which, because of their particularity and its rigidity in maintaining sharp distinctions accidentally reduces all universality to a
particularity, i.e. because this universality is limited by something else, something particular. Thus, all universality, for the understanding, becomes, what Hegel calls, a merely "abstract universal" (LL 113:80). Consequently, the understanding's activity becomes the relative distinguishing and categorizing, i.e. schematizing, associated with the strictly analytic faculty of thought. Although Hegel recognizes the limited necessity of this attitude in disciplining thought, in order to prepare it for the project of Science (LL 115:80 [MI]), he also sees its tremendous capacity for violence against the object, even when that object happens to be itself, e.g. in psychology (PhS 30:51). For the understanding, by attempting to maintain its precise and rigid separations between things, ends up maintaining objects and predicates that should be conjoined as separate, and conjoining objects and predicates the natures of which may have nothing or very little to do with each other, except that their passivity in comparison to thought makes them more vulnerable to forced association by thought. Indeed, this violence is not even diminished by the fact that the objects and predicates associated may be perfectly compatible, since thought, by not deriving and expressing the inner necessity, or reason for their association, (a reason which lies in their particular natures or essences), is still only acting on whim or out of mere will, and not actual knowledge. Thus, as Hegel aptly concludes in the Phenomenology: "What results from this method of labelling all that is heaven and earth with the few determinations of the general schema [of the understanding], and pigeon-holing everything in this way, is nothing less than a 'report clear as noonday' on the universe as an organism, viz. a synoptic table, like a skeleton with scraps of paper stuck all over it, or like the rows of closed and labelled boxes in a grocer's stall. It is as easy to read off as either of these; and just as all the flesh and blood has been stripped from this skeleton, and the no longer living 'essence' has been packed away in the boxes, so in the report, the living essence of the matter has been stripped away or packed up dead" (PhS 31:51). This method of the formal understanding, as Hegel remarks in both the Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia, is regulated by the very same principle identity at the heart of abstract power, i.e. "its cannon is identity" (LL 114:80 & PhS 31:51). For, as we shall see in Part III, by maintaining things in their isolation, it asserts their own self-identity, and, by lumping them together in primarily external categories, it imposes its identity upon them.

The formal understanding aside for the moment: "Scientific cognition, [or speculative thinking], on the contrary, demands surrender to the life of the object, [in all of its particularity,] or, what amounts to the same thing, confronting and expressing its inner necessity, [i.e. its reason]. Thus, absorbed in its object, scientific cognition [momentarily] forgets about the general survey, which is merely the reflection of the cognitive process away from the content and back into itself" (PhS 32:53 [MI]). Scientific or speculative thinking must do this, because to ignore or deny its object's particularity, its immanent content, its inner necessity is to abstractly negate, i.e. destroy either theoretically, or practically, the very determinateness, quality, or whole wealth of properties which makes something what it 'is', or someone what they 'are', and thus eliminate the very substance from which any actual relationships can be made with that object. This is what Hegel means in the Philosophy of Right, for
instance, when he claims that: "To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason to bear on the object from outside, and so to tamper with it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account" (PR 35:31 [MI]). However, this is only the first part of speculative thinking's method and task. For as Hegel immediately goes on to say: "Yet, immersed in the material [of this object], and advancing with its movement, scientific cognition does come back, [or return] to itself, but not before its filling or content, [which it previously surrendered to the object,] is taken back into itself, is simplified into a determinateness, and has reduced itself to one aspect of its own existence and passed over into its higher truth. Through this process the simple, self-surveying whole itself emerges from the wealth [of particular existence,] in which its reflection seemed to be lost" (PhS 33-34:53 [MI]). We should note here that it does not matter, whether we interpret the term 'object' as referring to another subject, or another object, i.e. a thing. For all subjects at first appear to one another as objects, or things, e.g. beings, bodies, etc.. Furthermore: "Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness ... is the ground and soil of Science or knowledge in general" (PhS 14:26); and this means that the self must ultimately be able to recognize itself in the absolute otherness to subjectivity, qua pure objectivity, or thingness, as well as in the absolute otherness to subjectivity, qua another subjectivity.

Be that as it may, it should be clear from Hegel's description of the difference between the formal understanding and Science, that the scientific consciousness' surrender to the life of the object, or other, is not an absolute surrender, or a surrender as such. In other words, it is not the death of the surrendering consciousness, though it definitely contains the risk of death for this consciousness (PhS 113-14:187), which is why, according to Hegel, such surrender "requires the greatest strength" from consciousness, i.e. the ability to confront, endure and preserve itself in the face of death (PhS 19:32).

On the contrary, surrender to the life of the object, or other is, as it were, a tactical surrender, which contains the greatest possible reward for the surrendering consciousness, that reward being the wholeness of life, freedom and knowledge, or, what Hegel calls, the life of Spirit (PhS 19:32). This is why yielding is actually a better term than surrender for the process described by Hegel. Yielding does not have the same terminal connotations as surrender, although it certainly preserves the essence of what he wants to convey by the term surrender, viz. an active, or intentional passivity and openness, a willingness to instantly, but momentarily let go of the self, or, more accurately, those things that determine the self, in order to become one with the movement of another object, or self.122 This last point is very important for understanding the difference between yielding and surrender as such, and why only a scientific consciousness, or self is capable of yielding, not a Cartesian cogito. The cogito, as we shall see clearly in Chapter 1, is, or attempts to be a purely positive and fixed entity, which, for this reason, sees any letting go of its determinations, or determinateness as a loss of self, any surrender, or yielding as a passing away, ceasing to be, or death for the yielding self.

The scientific consciousness, on the other hand, knows itself to be both positive and negative in
essence, so that even when it surrenders all of its positive determinations, or self-determinateness, it does not vanish along with this determinateness, or positivity. It cannot vanish. For, as we have already seen, even absolute negativity, or pure nothingness is essentially determinate, i.e. it contains the determinateness of being in itself. Scientific consciousness, therefore, maintains its sense of self, even in the face of complete indeterminateness, or, as Hegel notes the *Phenomenology*, even "in utter dismemberment" (*PhS* 19:32). This is how the scientific consciousness is ultimately capable of being the most effective combatant in any struggle, including, as we shall see in Appendix 1, the struggle for life and death. Yielding gives this consciousness the ability to make the time and space, given any circumstances, to enter upon an enemy's ground, so that it may come to know that ground in all of its strengths and weaknesses. This scientific consciousness thus embodies one of the oldest, but least understood, or heeded maxims of the art of war, i.e. "Know the enemy and know yourself; [then] in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." By yielding to, and, thereby, knowing the enemy, victory is nearly accomplished for the scientific consciousness. For it has already included the enemy's ground within its own ground, and thus absorbed the opposed position, inner necessity, or concept, as part of its own position, inner necessity, or concept. All conflicts for the scientific consciousness, therefore, appear to occur on the ground of its enemy. For it is only on this ground that it can become one with the enemy, advance, or blend with that enemy's movement, and thus be in a position to truly defeat that enemy, i.e. to negate that enemy's opposition and otherness. As the, seventeenth century, Japanese swordsman and strategist, Miyamoto Musashi, explains in his Way of Strategy, there is no mystery to the application of this strategy: "To become the enemy means to think yourself into the enemy's position." No doubt, this may seem commonplace, even to the formal understanding which stands opposed to the scientific consciousness of speculative politics. However, speculative politics emphasizes the absolute importance of thought in this process of becoming, that is, thought as both theoretical and practical activity, or praxis, whereas the formal understanding only sees thought in its one-sided, theoretical capacity. This understanding's becoming, therefore, is always merely ideal, or a becoming in the imagination only. In other words, it always remains exactly the same understanding, even when it attempts to think itself into the enemy's position.

Once the scientific consciousness becomes the enemy by thinking itself into that enemy's position, however, it does not and cannot emerge as exactly the same consciousness it was upon entering the conflict. This is because it has synthesized two previously opposed positions into a new, more comprehensive position, of which the two previous positions are now merely moments. This more comprehensive position is precisely what Hegel means above by 'the higher truth' of the surrendering, scientific consciousness. It is also the actual meaning, or content of the famous assertion by the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tzu, that: 'To yield is to be preserved whole.' For what attempts to preserve itself as something strictly separate, or excluded from something else is never really whole, that is, never the whole, but merely a part that does not even reflect the whole of which it is a part, which is why it cannot make a claim to be whole in, or for itself. This idea of comprehensive self-
preservation is not confined to the strictly contentious systems of martial theory and speculative philosophy, East, or West, but is also the true essence of systems based on the idea of love. Christ, for instance, in contrast to the practice of the religions founded in his name, incisively commands his followers to: "love thy enemy" (Matthew 5:44). For if love is to be any more than the rationalization of the natural impulse for union between two subjects of desire, or the expression of an insipid comradeship between benighted consciousnesses of either the religious, or secular kind, it must, as Hegel makes clear in the Early Theological Writings, be the infinite activity of a consciousness that really seeks to transcend all barriers, overcome the most extreme opposition, and thus experience the fullness of life in a concrete unity with all other sentient, self-conscious beings (ETW 302-8). Love, therefore, must be the whole-hearted practice of the strategy of overcoming through yielding, especially with regard to one's enemies; or rather, if one honestly seeks to be victorious over one's enemies, one must first learn to love them.

Victories believed to be achieved in any other way, i.e. without the synthesis of the opposed positions, are not really victories at all, even though, or especially though there may appear to be a winner and a loser. This is because victories that have not been achieved through a synthesis of the conflicting positions are merely partial, or illusory victories. They are victories that have been achieved by avoiding the confrontation with the actual source of the conflict, viz. the limitedness of the positions in opposition. The consciousness, or understanding that believes it can decisively defeat its enemy without addressing the limitations of both positions will soon find that its victories, if and when they come, are fleeting, and that, although the particular appearance of the enemy may change, the battles all begin to look and feel the same. Sooner, or later, therefore, this formal understanding will either lose the will to fight, or the fight itself, both of which are essentially the same thing, since, in actual combat, the former leads inexorably to the latter. Of course, it is also possible that this understanding, having so exhausted itself in the tedious repetition of the same conflict with what appeared to be different enemies, will one day look into the face of some, as it were, new enemy, only to see itself glaring back, i.e. "we have met the enemy, and they is us."126 Regardless, speculative politics has only one maxim to offer with regard to the art of war: If you do not know the enemy, then you cannot know yourself, and if you do not know yourself, you are in peril in all of your battles, despite their immediate outcomes.

We can now begin to see why Hegel, who is perhaps the most strategically minded* thinker in the history of philosophy, steadfastly requires that all argumentation, or refutation, which is simply the abstract form of combat,127 be a process of derivation and development from what is refuted (PhS 13:24 & 36:59), and furthermore, that the scientific consciousness should never simply reject what is generally regarded as the 'false', nor embrace the 'true' (PhS 22-23:38 & 39, 48:76). For terms such as 'true' and 'false' become either impediments to a consciousness that depends upon being completely open to what stands opposed to it in order to determine itself, or meaningless designations to a
consciousness that has already synthesized two opposed positions into a more comprehensive one, i.e. positions that initially regard themselves as 'true' and their opposites as 'false'. Indeed, this is why Hegel claims that the dogmatic dichotomy between truth and falsity is something that must eventually become superfluous for the speculative, or truly scientific consciousness. As he explains in the *Preface to the Phenomenology*: "'True' and 'false' belong among those determinate notions which are held to be inert and wholly separate essences, one here and one there, each standing fixed and isolated from the other, with which it has nothing in common. Against this view it must be maintained that truth is not a minted coin, [or thing] that can be [simply] given and pocketed ready-made. Nor 'is' there such a thing as the false, any more than there 'is' something evil ... The false would be the [absolute] other, the negative of the substance, which, as the content of knowledge, is the true. But the substance is itself essentially the negative, [or other,] partly as a distinction and determination of the content, and partly as a simple distinguishing, i.e. as self and knowledge in general" (PhS 22:39 [MI]). This is not to say, as Hegel makes immediately clear in the same passage, that one cannot "know something falsely" (PhS 22-23:39). On the contrary, the very knowledge that divides itself and the world into 'true' and 'false' knows something falsely. Indeed, it knows *everything* falsely. For, as Hegel goes on to explain: "To know something falsely means that there is a disparity, [or separation] between knowledge and its substance" (PhS 23:39).

Even this condition of knowing everything falsely, however, is not or cannot be maintained as absolutely false. For "this very disparity, [or separation] is [itself] the process of distinguishing in general, which is an essential moment [in knowing]" (PhS 23:39), i.e. a subject must be distinguished from an object and vice versa, in and for knowledge. However, as Hegel says: "Out of this distinguishing, of course, comes their, [viz. knowledge's and substance's, or subject's and object's,] identity, and this resultant identity is the truth. But it is not truth as if the disparity had been thrown away, like dross from pure metal, not even like the tool which remains separate from the finished vessel; disparity rather, as the negative, [or] the self, is itself still directly present in the true as such" (PhS 23:39). In other words, the disparity must be transcended or overcome, which, as we have already seen, means *both* negated and preserved. It is, as it were, a real separation or difference that is made into or becomes an ideal distinction within an actual or concrete unity of what originally appeared to be the 'true' and the 'false'. Thus, the consciousness that does not seek such transcendence is indeed false consciousness, which is why Hegel, despite the recognition of the essentiality of disparity or negativity to knowledge, does not argue for the preservation of falsity. As he says: "we cannot therefore say that the false is a moment of the true, let alone a component part of it" (PhS 23:39). For this is precisely the separation that proves itself to have been something unreal or false. "To say that in every falsehood there is a grain of truth is to treat the two like oil and water, which cannot be mixed and are only externally combined" (PhS 23:39). Thus, if we were to say anything with regard to the 'true' and the 'false' as moments, it would have to be something along the lines of the following: the separation or difference between the 'true' and the 'false' is *a* moment of the truth.
but not the 'true' and the 'false' in and by themselves.

It is far more sensible, indeed, necessary, however, that thought or consciousness simply realize the essential meaninglessness of these terms, and allow them to vanish in the void of this meaninglessness. As Hegel himself concludes: "It is precisely on account of the importance of designating the moment of complete, [or absolute] otherness that the terms 'true' and 'false' must no longer be used where such otherness has been annulled" (PhS 23:39); and, as we have seen and shall continue to see, such otherness is always already annulled or negated. Indeed, this is why Hegel expressly rejects the possibility of the absolute other at the beginning of the Philosophy of Mind: "An out-and-out Other simply does not exist for mind" (PM 1:377). It does not exist, or is already annulled, because, as we shall see in Chapter 4, section B., what is absolutely other is an other even unto itself, and, therefore, the same as what it appeared or set itself up as an other to (SL I 130:31). Put differently, the moment I realize that there is something absolutely other than me, it cannot be absolutely other. For, despite this other's apparent opacity, or incomprehensibility, I have already appropriated its idea, concept, or inner necessity, as an other, and, therefore, commenced the process of becoming one with it. In short, I know the other 'is', and once I know this, its absoluteness is a mere vestige. It is then simply a matter of how far I am ready, willing and able to proceed in coming to know and be known by this other; or rather, how far I am ready, willing and able to let go of the idea of myself as a fixed being or other in relation to the rest of the world, and to thereby become an individual moment in that world's historical development. If I am not ready, willing, or able to do this, or if I attempt to deny the self-negation of absolute otherness, then I am indeed the false. I am the absolute otherness that must, and will be overcome, I am the 'I' of the moral standpoint.

6. The Moral Standpoint

The term, 'the moral standpoint', comes from Hegel's analysis of morality in the Philosophy of Right (PR 74:104), where he basically defines it as "the standpoint of the will which is infinite not merely in itself but for itself" (PR 75:105). This means that thought, the mind, the self, the will, or whatever we choose to call it at this stage, is no longer completely immersed in, and, therefore, indistinguishable from, the immediacy of being. In other words, it is no longer defined simply by the categories of determinate being, e.g. something. Thus, it no longer appears as a purely arbitrary existence or contingent being. Instead, as we shall see most clearly when we come to Hegel's treatment of the categories of the finite, the infinite and being-for-self, in Chapters 4 and 5, this being is reflected into itself, so that its apparent contingency or external dependence becomes "the inward infinite contingency of the will" (PR 74:104), i.e. something with freedom. As Hegel says: "this reflection of the will into itself, and, [therefore,] its explicit awareness of its identity makes the person into the subject" (PR 75:105 [MI]); i.e. it makes the person, who up until this point appears as no more than the extension of so many things, and, therefore, themselves a thing, into something
essentially different from a thing. It makes that person or thing into a 'thinking thing', or "consciousness" (PR 76:108).

Subjectivity is the most important principle of the moral standpoint; or, as Hegel puts it: "The moral standpoint ... takes shape as the right of the subjective will" (PR 76:107), which is defined as the will's recognition of, and being as, something "only insofar as the thing is its own, and [only insofar as] the will is present to itself there, [i.e. in that thing,] as something subjective" (PR 76:107 [MI]). This is why our analysis of the moral standpoint begins with the philosophy of Descartes and ends with that of Fichte. These are the philosophies, more than any other in the history of Western thought, in which subjectivity achieves its most complete development as pure subject, i.e. as the cogito and the absolute self or Ego respectively, and in which the distinguishing features and contradictions of the subjective world of the moral standpoint reveal themselves in their most essential, i.e. conceptual or logical, forms. Contrary to our ordinary thinking, therefore: "The moral standpoint is not characterized primarily by its having already been opposed to the immoral, nor is right directly characterized by its opposition to wrong. The point is rather that the general characteristics of morality and immorality alike rest on the subjectivity of the will" (PR 76:108). This means then that the most distinguishing feature of the world of the moral standpoint is its division into the opposed moments of subjectivity and objectivity, and that all of these other divisions and oppositions follow from this one, not vice versa.

Thus, instead of a peculiarly restricted idea of morality, as is sometimes implied by Hegel's commentators and critics, morality for him is an extremely broad, general or abstract notion, the only limits of which are those that reveal themselves as being inherent in it, i.e. in its development. As Hegel himself says: "At the standpoint of morality, subjectivity and objectivity are distinct from one another, or united only by their mutual contradiction; it is this fact more particularly which constitutes the finitude of this sphere, or its character as mere appearance, and the development of this standpoint is the development of these contradictions and their resolutions, resolutions, however, which within this field can be no more than relative" (PR 78:112 [MI]). They can be no more than relative resolutions, because an absolute resolution, as we shall see, would necessarily mean the end of all morality as such. This is because, insofar as subjectivity is opposed to and by objectivity, it is not yet the absolute truth. However, as the essential principle of the moral world, it should or ought to be absolute. However, if it were absolute, then subjectivity would no longer be distinct from or opposed by objectivity, and the ideality or ought which is its quality or immediate being, would be real. However, if the subject were no longer opposed by an object, it would no longer be a subject, and if ideality were real, it would no longer be ideal - in short, no subject, no ideality; no ideality, no morality. For morality, on Aristotelian reasoning, is by definition the state of affairs that should or ought to be. Thus, even though the existence of a fundamental division and opposition in the sphere of morality necessarily implies its own limitedness or finitude, it attempts to preserve itself by
hanging on to this principle or concept of ideality, and rendering it absolute, i.e. the absolute ought. "In morality, [therefore,] self-determination is to be thought of as the pure restlessness and activity, which can never arrive at anything that is" (PR 248:108 [A]). All of this will become very clear in our analysis of the philosophy of Fichte, for whom the absolute ought, and, therefore, a condition of abstract becoming, is the hallmark of the infinite in humanity, as well as the extent of its theoretical and practical reason. In the meantime, however, what is important to grasp is that in morality, even or especially though the most important principle is identity, i.e. the self-identity of subjectivity, the position of the subject vis a vis the object, and thus all other subjects, is still one of absolute difference (PR 249:108 [A]). Furthermore, if the subject is ultimately different and irreconcilable from the object and all other subjects, it is, as we shall see, untenable as a subject.
Notes

1This passage does not appear in either of the English translations of the Encyclopedia Logic. This translation, therefore, is taken from Lewis Hinchman’s, Hegel’s Critique of the Enlightenment (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984), p. 4.

2I am referring here to the plethora of popular films, books and television programs in which characters have ‘real’ out of body experiences, and which do not question, or draw critical’ attention to the philosophical presuppositions at work in such an event. Perhaps, one of the best examples of this is the television program, Star Trek: The Next Generation.


6Leon Bing, Do or Die, pp. 120-27; & 274.

7See Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Micheal Eldred (London: Verso Press, 1988), pp. 130-31 on the atomic bomb as the “last most energetic enlightener” and the means “to end and conquer all dualisms;” in short, the instrument of absolute identity.

*Objections have been raised about the immediate identification of Science and thought. For there is certainly evidence that Hegel makes a distinction between the two in his work. In the Preface to the Phenomenology, for instance, there are a number of passages in which Hegel seems to distinguish between the ‘unscientific consciousness’ of the formal understanding (PhS 7:13; 32:53), or self-consciousness that has yet to raise itself to the standpoint of Science, or rather, self-consciousness that “exists on its own account outside of Science” (PhS 14-15:26) and Science as such. Indeed, he even talks about the standpoint of consciousness being the antithesis of the standpoint of Science (PhS 15:26), which leads him to posit the idea of genuine knowledge’s, or Science’s coming-to-be from the standpoint of this ‘unscientific consciousness’ (PhS 15-16:27). No doubt, these are important distinctions for Hegel and in general. However, they only appear and remain important, as Hegel also makes clear in his work, insofar as thought does not realize, or is not true to its essence, viz. itself. For the unscientific consciousness of the formal “understanding is [also] thought, the pure T as such” (PhS 8:13), or the very absolute identity from which Science begins, i.e. both immanently in being and formally in reflection, or essence. In short, Science and the understanding are essentially the same.

This is why Hegel also takes pains in the Preface to the Phenomenology to explain the link between Science, logic and the understanding by means of, or rather, in and through the Notion, which, as we shall see in Part III, is simply the infinite self-relation of negativity as such that simultaneously constitutes both thought and being (PhS 33:54). For instance, as Hegel says; “Science dare only organize itself by the life of the Notion itself” (PhS 31:53); or “Science exists solely in the self-movement of the Notion” (PhS 44:71); and “simple thinking is the self-moving and self-differentiating thought, it is its own inwardness, it is the pure Notion. Thus, common understanding, too, is a becoming, and, as this becoming, it is reasonableness” (PhS 34:55). Furthermore: “It is in the nature of what is to be in its own being Notion, that logical necessity in general consists. This alone is the rational element and the rhythm of the organic whole; it is as much knowledge of the content, as the content of the Notion and essence - in other words, it alone is speculative philosophy, [or Science]” (PhS 34:56).

There are, of course, many more passages that could be cited and explained in the Preface, as well as the Introduction, to the Phenomenology to support this essential relationship, but there seems little need, since Hegel himself concludes the Introduction with the statement that, despite the appearance of separation and opposition between the unscientific modes of consciousness and Science, “the way to Science,” which includes all of these unscientific modes, “is itself already Science” (PhS 56:88). It is already Science, but has not realized it, and, therefore, continually falls into error. What is more, in both the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia, he makes it very clear that “this science is [simply] the thinking of thinking” (LL 26:19), and that absolute knowledge, which is the standpoint of Science (PhS 486:798), is present, albeit
immanently, from the very beginning of both thought and being (See below on 'absolute beginning'). See also Brod, Philosophy of Politics, p. 18 on the simultaneity of phenomenology and Science.


9Prigigone, Order Out of Chaos, p. xxx.

10For instance, although Taoism regards wu, or being and wu, or non-being as eternally coexistent, and, therefore, equally constitutive of t'ai chi, which is the 'supreme, grand ultimate, or first principle, these are preceded by, or have their origin in Tao, which is the absolute void, or 'nameless'. As Lao Tzu says in the first book of the T'ao-Te Ching: "The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao;
The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth;
The Named is the mother of all things.
Therefore, let there always be non-being so we may see their subtlety,
And let there always be being so we may see their outcome.
The two are the same,
But after they are produced, they have different names" (p. 139, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans. and ed. Wing-Tsit Chan (New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1973)).

The same idea is preserved in Chuang Tzu, who finds the idea of a beginning absurd, but nonetheless regards the Tao as the identity, and source of all things, including being and non-being, and the knowledge of nothing as the "perfect and ultimate" form of knowledge (pp. 184-85, Chinese Philosophy). See also Chi-Tsang, in the Chung-Kuan Lun Shu, on the Buddhist monk Tao-An, the founder of The School of Original Non-Being (p. 338, Chinese Philosophy).

11It must be clear that there is not a real distinction, or difference between speculative knowledge in general and speculative politics in particular. This would be an invalid separation for the reasons provided in the Preface regarding the essential relationship of logic and politics. Furthermore, with regard to Hegel's development of speculative knowledge itself, it is not a question of: "If Hegel's political philosophy is shaped by his philosophical method" (Peter Steinberger, Logic and Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. x). It is also not a question of his political thought being "read, understood and appreciated without having to come to terms with his metaphysics" (Z.A. Peclzynski, Hegel's Political Writings, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 136). As Hegel himself makes perfectly clear in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, the work which he regards simply as a "more systematic exposition of the same concepts," which form part of his entire system of philosophy as laid out in the Encyclopedia, his political philosophy presupposes the method of "speculative knowing" already expounded in the Science of Logic (pp. 1-2).

12I have argued elsewhere, viz. Towards the Science of Martial Art, unpublished, that Eastern systems are no less forms of abstract power for being grounded on the concept of absolute nothing, than their Western counterparts, which are grounded on the concept of absolute being. This, as we shall see in section 3 of this Introduction, is basically because of the immediate identity between absolute being and nothing, and that one can obtain exactly the same results proceeding from the one as the other.


15The African nationalist and political theorist, Franz Fannon, was keenly aware of the annihilatory essence of Aristotelian logic, as he make plain in The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963), pp. 38-39: "Obedient to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. Non-conciliation is possible, for of the two terms, one is superfluous."

16In the History of Philosophy, vol. I, Hegel reports Xenophanes as saying of God: "He sees everywhere, thinks everywhere, and hears everywhere." In The Presocratic Philosophers, ed. Ted Honderich (London: Routledge, 1989), Jonathan Barnes translates the same passage in the following way: "He sees whole, he thinks as a whole and hears as a whole" (p. 93). Now certainly one might object to the notion that God, as an absolute being, is also necessarily absolutely, or omni-present, particularly if he needs to sense things, even all things, with faculties such as sight and hearing. For this implies that God is somehow separate from the things he senses, viz. everything, that they, for instance, are 'there' and God is
'here', or vice versa. This would mean, however, that there is something, i.e. a being, and somewhere, i.e. a being-here, or there, that God is not, in which case God would be a limited, finite being, i.e. not absolute, not God. As Xenophanes also says, however: "Always he remains in the same state, in no way changing: Nor is it fitting for him to go now here, now there" (p. 85 [MI]). In short, God is absolute, immutable identity, i.e. pure 'is', not 'was' and not 'will be'. Furthermore, there is no real distinction between God and everything. For, once again, as Xenophanes says: "Without effort, by the will of his mind, he shakes everything" (p. 93 [MI]). In other words, the thought that is whole, or everywhere is also necessarily everything, or vice versa.

The identity of absolute being and absolute presence is also found in one of the most important works consulting the scientific foundation of the modern form of abstract power, or the moral standpoint, viz. Newton's Principia. In the 'General Scholium' at the end of Book III: The System of the World, Newton provides one of the best descriptions of the fundamental category of abstract power and its necessarily authoritarian implications in the history of human thought. In this scholium, he relies on a combination of the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. Ironically, this is also the scholium in which he makes his famous declaration against the hypothesizing of the metaphysicians. His argument is as follows: "This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the centres of other like systems, these being formed by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially since the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of the sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems: and let the systems of fixed stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other, he hath placed those systems at immense distances from one another.

This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God, or Universal Ruler; for God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and Deity is the dominion of God not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The Supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect; but a being, however perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God .... It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God: a true, supreme, or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme, or imaginary God. And from this true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being; and from his other perfections, that he is supreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space. Since every particle of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere, certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be never and nowhere. .... God is the same God, always and everywhere. He is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him all things are contained and moved; yet neither affects the other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God. It is allowed by all that the Supreme God exists necessarily; and by the same necessity he exists always and everywhere. Whence also he is similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all power to perceive, to understand, and to act: but in a manner not at all human, in a manner not at all corporeal, in a manner utterly unknown to us" (pp. 544-45).

Abstract power, as we shall see, is precisely what Hobbes has in mind in Leviathan, when he describes the natural right of individuals in a state of nature as, everyone's right to everything, "even to one another's body" (p. 91). Hobbes, of course, is aware of the paradox implied by such a right. For, on the one hand, he regards it as a rational imperative that every man should seek the dominion of every other man, that is, absolute dominion, or domination, in order to secure his own conservation, or existence (p. 88); whereas, on the other, he sees that "as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,)" (p.91), and, therefore, that every man ought to embrace the first law of nature and seek peace (p. 91). Hobbes, however, cannot explicitly deduce this moral imperative from the right of nature, since he does not have, or accept the validity of a speculative principle, e.g. "motion produceth nothing but motion" (p. 14), and "there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquility of mind, while we live here, [i.e. the finite world]" (p. 46). In short he has no real concept of becoming, of identity in difference and vice versa. Consequently, his theory, despite its genuinely idealist foundations (e.g. see 'Introduction' of Leviathan on Nature as the self-reflection, or consciousness of God, and Man as the reflection of this self-reflection), stands as one of the definitive expressions of abstract power, or the moral standpoint in modern political philosophy.

17 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 25.

18 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 120.

19 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 322.
See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 254 for the evidence that Hobbes is concerned not with this or that particular State in the *Leviathan*, but rather the ideal or perfect State.


This identity is a qualitative identity, because Hobbes is very clear that all quantity, or "Figure is Finite," and, therefore, not 'attributable' to God in any way (p. 250).


Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 225; and also pp. 128 & 130.


See also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 128.


See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 143 on the "Right of Kings".


Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pp. 120 & 141.

Hobbes implies here that the 'Soveraigne' or State simply maintains its natural Right by default, i.e. every one else having 'laid it down' and recognizing it as 'Soveraigne', so that it need not necessarily constitute an 'Irresistible Power'. Indeed, he says that "if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion" (p. 247). Whether or not such a man existed before the 'Covenant', however, is a moot point. For once the 'Soveraigne' is established he or it becomes that power, and it can never then be known if an indisputable 'Soveraigne Power' could hav emerged from the State of Nature strictly through its own achievements. Of course, one could argue that the issue is then simply transferred to the international arena, which remains in an unadulterated State of Nature presumably until only one 'Soveraigne Power' remains - only time will tell.
When I say 'image', I have in mind here the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern block, caused to a large extent by having to exhaust itself economically in the arms race with the United States, has left only one real 'superpower' in the world, viz. the United States, and that this situation has made the claim best expressed by Francis Fukuyama seem plausible. Fukuyama claims that due to the failure of both "authoritarian Right" and "communist-totalitarian Left" wing regimes during the "last quarter of the twentieth century," 'liberal, bourgeois democracy' and 'capitalist free market economics' remain "the only coherent political aspiration" spanning "different regions and cultures around the globe." Furthermore, he claims that "a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government has emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism and most recently communism;" and, therefore, that 'liberal democracy may constitute the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human government,' and as such ... the 'end of history'" (see The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. xi-xiii.).

Hannes Alfvén, War-Peace Dictionary, Toward a World of Peace: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Conflict Resolution & Peace Studies, eds. Jeannette P. Maas and Robert A.C. Stewart (Fiji: The University of the South Pacific, 1986), p. 9; "An important euphemism is 'nuclear arms'. ... 'Annihilators' would be a more precise term for such arms." "The American philosopher John Somerville has coined the word 'omnicide' (suicide-genocide-omnicide) as an adequate description of what the full use of annihilators would result in."


Quoted from Ervin Staub's, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 7. Staub points out that objections from the Soviet Union and other nations meant that the Genocide Convention passed in 1949 only included national, ethnic, racial and religious groups, not political or other groups. The United States did not ratify this Convention until 1988, and then it did so only conditionally.


Marrus, Holocaust in History, p. 19.

Staub, Roots of Evil, p. 9.

Staub, Roots of Evil, p. 10.


Staub, Roots of Evil, p. 11.

Stannard, American Holocaust, p. x.

Stannard, American Holocaust, p. x.

Stannard, American Holocaust, p. x.

Stannard, American Holocaust, p. xiv.
61 Staub, Roots of Evil, p. 62, 234 & 240.


63 See Karl Marx, Capital, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 423-24; Communist Manifesto, p. 226: "These labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market"; Wage-Labour and Capital, p. 249: "Labour ... is a commodity, neither more nor less than sugar."

64 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, pp. 422-23.

65 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 423.

66 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 429.

67 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 443.

68 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 445.

69 Marx, Communist Manifesto, Selected Writings, p. 230.

70 Marx, Wage-labour and Capital, Selected Writings, p. 257.

71 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 449.

72 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 450.

73 Marx, Communist Manifesto, Selected Writings, pp. 222-23; & Capital, p. 445.

74 See Said, Culture & Imperialism, p. 6: "Consider that in 1800 Western powers claimed 55 per cent but actually held approximately 35 percent of the earth's surface, and that by 1878 the proportion was 67 per cent, a rate of increase of 83,000 square miles per year. By 1914, the annual rate had risen to an astonishing 240,000 square miles, and Europe held a grand total of roughly 85 per cent of the earth as colonies, protectorates, dependencies, dominions and commonwealths."

75 Marx, The Future Results of British Rule in India, Selected Writings, p. 332.

76 Marx, Grundrisse, Selected Writings, p. 359; & Capital, p. 445; Communist Manifesto, p. 225.

77 Marx, Grundrisse, Selected Writings, p. 363. (My italics).

78 Marx, Communist Manifesto, Selected Writings, p. 225.

79 Said, Culture & Imperialism, p. xxvii. Said also goes on in this passage to trace this problem back to the Greek foundations of Western thought: "As I discuss it in Orientalism, the division goes back to Greek thought about barbarians, but, whoever originated this kind of identity thought, by the nineteenth century it had become the hallmark of imperialist cultures as well as those cultures trying to resist the encroachments of Europe."

80 See Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 448 on tautological appearance of capital.

81 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 451.

82 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 432.


84 Marx, Capital, Selected Writings, p. 423.
Fuzzy logic, like speculative logic, has to subordinate, rather than reject, the absolute immediate claims of Aristotelian logic, since otherwise it would simply be affirming the truth of Aristotelian logic's basic proposition, 'A or not-A', and denying its own, viz. 'A and not-A'. The speculative truth of fuzzy logic, therefore, is 'A or not-A and A and not-A'. Bart Kosko does a good job of pointing this out in Fuzzy Thinking (see Chapter 2), although, because the discourse is still dominated and determined by advocates of the Aristotelian view, even fuzzy theorists are often forced to present their views in a bivalent way, e.g. 'Bivalence vs. Multivalence'. Indeed, this has been, and will continue to be, a problem in disseminating the concept of speculative politics as well.

In Fuzzy Thinking, Kosko acknowledges the world's debt to Eastern thought, and much to the chagrin of 'hard' Western scientists, who have had no time for speculative Science's unity of opposites, calls this principle the yin-yang equation. As we shall see in Section 4, this is perfectly consonant with our method.
It has been suggested that referring to Hegel as 'strategically minded' might, once again, have overwhelmingly instrumental implications for his system and method, i.e. that Reason, for him, like the Hobbesian individual in a State of Nature, is ultimately a matter of simply conceiving "the aptest means" to self-preservation (Leviathan, p. 91). I have already made clear in the Preface why Hegel's method is not merely instrumental, and it will certainly become even clearer when we analyse his explanation of the necessary relationship between the 'is' and 'ought' in Chapter 4. However, it must be kept in mind that there is still an instrumental aspect to speculative knowledge. There has to be. Furthermore, where the object of speculative knowledge is, or attempts to be purely instrumental, e.g. abstract power, speculative knowledge's method of knowing this object is clearly going to momentarily give it a predominantly instrumental appearance as well. For it only knows, or overcomes this object by first becoming, or yielding...
to it. In the end, however, the instrumentalist vs. moralist question that presently dogs modern political philosophy is merely a symptom of the moral standpoint which becomes completely superfluous from a speculative standpoint.


128 See Kojeve, Introduction, p.187 fn. on history as a process of transforming human error, or even, the error that preserves itself in existence, viz. humanity, into truth.

129 See Stace, Philosophy of Hegel, p. 393, para. 555.
Part II: The Moral Standpoint - Descartes & Fichte
Chapter 1

The Philosophy of Descartes

The moral standpoint as such appears on the scene with the philosophy of René Descartes, whose influence on the development of Western thought has been so extensive that even now, over three centuries later, both his name and his fundamental proposition are practically indistinguishable from the very idea of philosophy in the popular consciousness - more perhaps even than Socrates. There is a certain appropriateness in this. For Descartes, who is generally recognized as the founder of modern philosophy, initiated this new epoch by rejecting all hitherto existing scientific and philosophical knowledge as "doubtful," and, therefore, "well-nigh false" (DM 23-24); and then, by establishing what seemed to be an absolutely solid foundation for all human knowledge to be re-constructed upon. This foundation is the famous proposition Cogito ergo sum: I think, therefore I am (DM 36 & MFP 80), which originated with Augustine in the fifth century, but only captured the spirit of the age with the philosophy of Descartes. With Descartes, therefore, thought became absolutely and essentially positive in and for itself, and this purely positive thought became the hallmark of the modern Western mind. For it, as we shall see, must always be certain that it knows something. The most fundamental truth for Socrates, on the other hand, and the reason why "the God at Delphi," Apollo, regarded him as "the wisest man" in the ancient world, was the certainty that he knew nothing. No doubt, this essentially negative principle was not readily accepted by all in the ancient world. For the first and predominant school of Greek philosophy until the time of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle was that of the Eleatics, for whom being was the absolute truth. Furthermore, by executing Socrates, the Greek world could certainly said to be rejecting his position. Ironically, however, in killing him, it also affirmed the very negativity it sought to reject, thereby, ensuring that the name 'Socrates' would be forever identified with their world and their thought. This, however, is not the only irony in the history of Western thought. For, although it is to some extent appropriate that Descartes should have eclipsed Socrates with the birth of the modern world, Socrates' form of certainty is probably a more accurate expression of the modern condition and attitude than that of Descartes, whose cogito, as is appropriate for an essentially moral standpoint, often seems to be more of an elusive, unattainable ideal, than it does the most fundamental and certain reality. Thus, whereas the ancient Greeks may very well have celebrated the modern Cartesian cogito for its exaltation of the principle of pure positivity, or being, most moderns would probably receive Socrates' certainty in nothing without surprise, or recrimination. For it confirms the "indeterminate status" that we, as one contemporary theorist puts it, neurotically cling to "as the only firm support of [our] being," despite, or rather, because of Descartes' contribution to the development of the Western mind.

With this in mind, we must now see exactly why what strives to be an essentially positive form of knowledge, viz. the moral standpoint, continually and ineluctably leads, or lapses back into both a
theoretical and a practical indeterminacy, i.e. doubt and annihilation. As we shall see in the analysis of Descartes' philosophy, the main reasons for this are that absolute being is considered the supreme perfection, and negativity, the nadir of imperfection, which is absolutely excluded from the former. This means that negativity has no positive function, or plays no real, productive role in the development of the human spirit, or mind. On the contrary, it is merely a deficiency that humanity must seek to overcome, or, since overcoming, as we have already seen in the Introduction, and shall see further in Part III, requires the notion of becoming, for which negation is an essential and affirmative moment, a deficiency humanity must do its best merely to cope with. Of course, the main consequence of such a position is, as we shall see shortly, an intractable dualism, which expresses itself not only between the concepts of being and nothing, but also in being, i.e. between thought and physical, or material being. The consequence of such dualism, as we shall see, is that the nature and existence of being remains inaccessible to rational thought, and rational thought is, therefore, secondary to immediate knowledge, faith, or intuition. In other words, pure subjectivity comes to constitute the ultimate criterion of truth in a world of completely alien objectivity; and where subjectivity constitutes the ultimate truth, any rival subjectivity, or truth which presents itself must be eliminated. It must be eliminated, because pure subjectivity means pure identity, and anything that contradicts, or threatens to pollute this identity, threatens its very existence. Furthermore, where intuition is prior to rational knowledge, all mediation is merely provisional, which means that conflict and annihilation are more or less the prior and permanent underlying condition.

A. The Cogito and the Division of Being

Descartes' philosophy has long, and, for the most part, correctly, been regarded as the epitome of Western dualism. However, his fundamental proposition, I think, therefore I am, as Hegel points out in The History of Philosophy (HP III 220 & 228), The Encyclopedia (LL 109:76), and the Phenomenology (PhS 352:578), is an assertion of the immediate unity, or identity of pure thought and pure positive being, and, therefore, the first explicit affirmation of the notion of Reason, as the power to overcome limitation and separation. The assertion of this identity arose out of the medieval subject's crisis of certainty as to how it could truly know anything in the face of the absolute doubt, which it discovered could be brought to bear upon a world no longer dominated by an unthinking, arbitrary, and, therefore, unknowable Nature, or an external, infinite, and, therefore, ultimately mysterious God. All of the beliefs that had previously rested upon a world dominated by these powers were suddenly and utterly open to question. As Descartes puts it so well in the Meditations: "firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing belief that there is an omnipotent God who made me the kind of creature that I am. How do I know [however] that he has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now? ... Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us
not argue with them, but grant them that everything said about God is a fiction. According to their supposition, then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means; yet since deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time. I have no answer to these arguments, but am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-out reasons. So in the future I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty" (MFP 78-79 [MI]).

To this end, Descartes holds that the senses have been and can be of little or no use. For they occasionally deceive us, and one cannot completely rely upon what has already proved uncertain (MFP 76 & PP I 4:160). Even mathematical demonstrations, which seem to be supremely evident, are not wholly reliable. For we are apt occasionally to make errors in such procedures, and it is quite possible that some God has created us in such a way that we are always in error, even though we only believe ourselves to be occasionally in error (MFP 78 & PP I 5:161). Descartes, therefore, resolves simply to assume that "some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive" him (MFP 79), and, on the basis of this assumption, or hypothesis, yield entirely to his doubts, or rather, simply doubt everything (De omnibus dubitandum est), including one's most intimate possession, viz. the body (MFP 80 & PP I 7:161). Ironically, however, he does temper the absolute power and freedom implied by such radical scepticism, by recognizing it as a necessary dissemblance in the struggle to restore certain past truths already rejected, particularly God as the absolute being and source of all truth (MFP 79). Whether Descartes himself realized it, or not, however, this is a completely false humility, or a dissemblance concealing the true dissemblance.4 For the ability to question God and the world so absolutely, even with the aim of rehabilitating them, indicates their dependence and human thought's complete pre-eminence. Hegel, therefore, is quite correct, when he observes in The History of Philosophy that: "Descartes started by saying that thought must necessarily commence from itself; [thus] all the philosophy which came before this, and especially what proceeded from the authority of the Church, was forever after set aside" (HP III 224 [MI]).

All truth, and, therefore, all knowledge, even the knowledge regarding one's own existence, becomes a matter of absolute suspicion, given the subject's ability to abstract from reality in thought, at the end of the Middle Ages.5 For something to be true, then, it will have to be capable of maintaining itself, despite thought's radically negative nature. In other words, it will have to be capable of maintaining itself both with and in thought, just as thought will have to be capable of maintaining itself both with and in it. "Hence the knowledge that I think, therefore I am, is what we arrive at first of all, and is the most certain fact that offers itself to every one who follows after philosophy in an orderly fashion" (PP
The T, or subject is the fact which cannot be doubted. For, even in the midst of absolute doubt, there must be one who doubts, viz. T, and, in order to think this doubt, the subject must exist, or be something, since it would be absurd to say that what does not exist nonetheless thinks. This would be equivalent to saying that 'Nothing thinks', and, according to Descartes, this is impossible. For he holds that it is also an immediate certainty, or fact, i.e. one revealed by the natural light, or intuition, that "nothingness possesses no attributes or qualities" (PP I 11:163). Absolute doubt, therefore, is a self-negating proposition, and the subject, which is simply the human mind (MFP App. Def. VI:153), cannot be abstracted from. Even in the face of a malicious demon, or "deceiver of supreme power and cunning, who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me" (MFP 80), one cannot fail to be certain of one's own existence. For there must be one who is deceived. In short, the demon, or deceiver must deceive me. Otherwise, he deceives nothing. Descartes is thus able to issue what is perhaps one of the greatest challenges to the powers of obscurantism, or obscurant power in Western history, that is: "let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something" (MFP 80 [MI]), or rather, I am something, so long as I think, period. This truth cannot be doubted, and, therefore, "is the fundamental truth of all philosophy," all knowledge, all thought.

For Descartes and the modern subject, then, thought and being are self-evident. Furthermore, both are "inseparably bound together" (HP III 228). This is because the "conclusion I am ... affirms for the first time a fact, [or being,] which is more than an idea, [yet which] ... can be stated without reservations as to its ideality, [or existence in thought]." In other words, ideality and reality have become immediately one. Something definitely exists, and with this existent something "we are not without hope of rediscovering in reality what we have hitherto been compelled to regard as merely ideal," viz. everything. Herein, however, lies the irresolvable flaw of Descartes' proposition, as well as the reason it immediately degenerates into a positivistic, or dead fact, as opposed to a true judgement, i.e. something which carries with it all the potential and dynamism of an actual synthesis, or unity of opposites. Despite the 'therefore' linking thought and being in the proposition I think, therefore I am, the proposition is not a syllogism. Descartes himself makes this quite clear in the Replies: "When someone says, 'I think, therefore I am, or I exist', he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind" (MFP 2nd Reps. 127 [MI]). Thus, there is no syllogism. For the absolute certainty of the truth of the proposition supposedly lies in the immediacy of the identity between thought and being, and not in thought's mediated process of objective reasoning, or deduction. If the proposition were to be rendered a syllogism, this immediacy would at once be eliminated, thereby, calling forth the very problem its simple assertoric form is meant to pre-empt, viz. the exclusive priority of either thought, or being, and, therefore, the problem of infinite regression. In the case of the proposition I think, therefore I am, there would have to be a major premise in which the cogito, or T, was "better known than the
conclusion, *ergo sum.* And if this were so the *ergo sum* would not be the foundation of all knowledge,“10 along with the *cogito.* In other words, we would end up with a situation in which the mind was more certain of itself, than its existence, which is clearly a contradiction, since it would be impossible for the mind to be certain of anything, without first being certain that it exists, i.e. that it is something, and, therefore, can have certainty.11 Consequently, the truth of the proposition, *I think, therefore I am,* as already indicated, depends on its *givenness,* or self-evidence, and not its demonstrability. In fact, what is actually true is and must be *undenomestible.* This is because demonstrability implies mediation, which in turn implies derivation, and thus the problem of priority, which leads us right back to the finitude and uncertainty from which we began. Truth, for Descartes, therefore, is ultimately a matter of immediate knowledge, or *intuition,* and the knowledge acquired through intuition must simply "be accepted as *fact"* (LL101:66).

1. The Priority of Immediate Knowledge, or Intuition

In Descartes’ philosophy, there are only two forms of knowledge through which one may discover anything certain, or rather, there are only two "*actions of the intellect* by means of which we are able to arrive at *knowledge* of things with no fear of being mistaken" (*RD* 3 [MI]). They are *mental intuition* and *deduction* (*RD* 3 & 4). In the *Rules for the Direction of our Native Intelligence,* Descartes draws a clear distinction between intuition and deduction, and definitely regards the former as the more essential of the two forms of knowledge.12 This unequal distinction is based on the idea that there is "a movement or a sort of sequence in the latter but not in the former, and also because immediate self-evidence is not required for deduction, as it is for intuition" (*RD* 4). For Descartes, deduction, or "the inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known with certainty" (*RD* 3), depends on intuition, by which he means "the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding" (*RD* 3), but intuition does not depend on deduction. Through intuition, the intellect grasps what is simple, or immediate, whereas what is complex, or mediated is grasped through a combination of intuition and deduction, i.e. by analytically "reduc[ing] complicated and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, and then, starting with the *intuition* of the simplest ones of all, try[ing, by means of *deduction.*] to ascend through the same steps to a *knowledge* of *all the rest*" (*RD* 6 [MI]). As a consequence, "first principles ... are known *only* through intuition, and the remote conclusions *only* through deduction" (*RD* 4 [MI]).13

It is worth briefly noting here the almost exact correspondence of Fichte's view with Descartes' notion of proper science, or *scientia* (*RD* 1-2), and the central role of immediate knowledge, that is, insofar as all human knowledge, or every possible science, as we saw in the Introduction and will see again in the chapters on Fichte, must be deduced from first principles, "which cannot be demonstrated within that science itself" (CCW 108). Rather, these principles must be *intuitively certain,* or, as in Fichte's case,
have been proved in another science, viz. the science of knowledge, the first principles of which are themselves supposed to be absolutely and immediately certain (CCW 108-109). For both Descartes and Fichte, these first principles can be truly known only by a mental, or intellectual intuition (SK 38-42), which is then supposed to serve as the foundation for the subsequent deduction of all human knowledge. As we shall see, however, neither Descartes, nor Fichte are able to maintain the absolute certainty allegedly provided by this form of immediate knowledge. Nor, therefore, do they accomplish a sufficient deduction of the knowledge dependent upon such intuition. This, as we shall see in Hegel's Science, is because systems based on the priority of immediate knowledge, although quite right in "affirm[ing] the unity of the [subjective] Idea, [or thought] with being," do "not see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not merely a purely immediate unity, ... but that - with equal emphasis - the one term is shown to have truth only as mediated through the other - or, if the phrase be preferred, that either term is only mediated with truth through the other" (LL 105:69).

In Descartes' case, his proposition is a judgement of pure assertion. This means that the connection between thought and being, contained in the proposition, I think, therefore I am, is merely posited, and not yet derived, or proved. It, like all purely assertoric judgements (SL II 295-96), is simply put forth and accepted as a fact of consciousness. Aside from the problem that arises from basing a judgement purely on subjective assertion, whereby, it is legitimately refuted by any contrary assertion put forth with equal, or greater force - a problem encountered by Descartes, when Gassendi, for instance, sardonically, but legitimately, asks why not simply say, Ludificor, ergo sum: I am made a fool of, therefore I exist (HP III 230) - a merely posited connection between these two terms, i.e. thought and being, means that their relation is actually one of separation, and not unity, or identity. What we are faced with in Descartes proposition, then, is simply two immediate, and, therefore, purely abstract self-identities - i.e. self-identical because "[t]he form of immediacy ... invests the particular with the character of independent or self-centered being" (LL 108:74) - which are held up together, but fall apart and stay apart, so long as their immediacy is alone seen as what must be preserved.

Descartes' inability to hold together, or unite these two abstract immediacies, after proposing their formal identity, indicates a failure of both comprehension and apprehension, even though it would only be seen as a failure of the former, on the standpoint which seeks to maintain immediacy in its isolation. He fails at both, because the nature of the immediacy, which is deemed so important to the doctrine of immediate knowledge, remains completely obscured by his proposition, I think, therefore I am, and the subsequent treatment thereof. As we shall see later in the section dealing with reflection, and as Hegel notes in his own treatment of Descartes in The History of Philosophy: "Immediacy is ... a one-sided determination; thought does not contain it alone, but also [contains] the determination to mediate itself with itself, and thereby - by the mediation being at the same time the abrogation of the mediation - it is immediacy, [viz. mediated immediacy14]. In thought we thus have being, [just as in being we have thought]; being is, however, a poor determination. It is the abstraction from the
concrete [content] of thought [and is, therefore, the same emptiness as pure thought, viz. nothing]" (HP III 230 [MI]). As we shall see later, Hegel sees that this identity of pure being and pure thought, or nothing, is precisely the identity from which all knowledge, and, therefore, Science must begin. Indeed, this is why he credits Descartes with introducing "the most interesting idea of modern times" (HP III 230). However, because Descartes simply posits it as an immediate truth, which cannot be proved, the beginning of Science is also its immediate end. This is why Hegel then goes on to criticize him for not working this idea out further, thereby, preventing the most interesting idea of modern times from becoming the most problematic idea of modern times.15

Descartes' proposition is problematic for no other reason than that: "In the proposition: I think, I am, the two assertions are to be equated with each other, otherwise there would be no cogito."16 In short, the subject cannot exist in the face of such separation, for it is itself supposed to be the synthesis of the two realms represented by these propositions. Thought and being, for Descartes, then, may indeed be in-themselves the same, but, insofar as these identical emptinesses, or rather, abstractly infinite potentialities, are preserved in their immediacy, their identity remains a merely implicit, or purely formal one, emphasizing their mutual division and independence, instead of their inherent connection and mutual dependence. Simply put, they are two and not one, as implied above. Descartes, therefore, actually begins not from the fact of one immediate identity, but from two independent identities, or two assertions related by nothing more than a conjunction imposed by an external party. Thought and being, therefore, are absolutely opposed to one another, at least insofar as their true content is concerned, which means that Descartes' proposition, I think, therefore I am, is actually nothing more than the subject's dual assertion that it thinks, and it is, or rather, that thought and being are both autonomous facts, for the self.

2. The Priority of Thought Over Being

As a result of the complete separation, or opposition implicit within this proposition of identity, Descartes is forced to make his most famous and problematic division, a division which, contrary to the spirit of the original assertion that neither thought, nor being should be considered as prior to the other, establishes, at least, the formal priority of thought, in his philosophy, and in all subsequent philosophy and science that derives therefrom. As Descartes himself says in The Principles of Philosophy: "In this [proposition, I think, therefore I am,] it is implied that thought is more certain to me than the body" (PP I 11:163). This is because the subject is, in essence, nothing more than thought, and, therefore, can be perfectly certain that it thinks. However, even though the subject also judges itself to exist because it thinks, the nature of this existence is still utterly questionable. The reason for this is that it can be either that I judge, from the fact of my senses, that any physical body, i.e. the earth, my body, etc. exists, or "that I judge [these things] to exist, even if [they] do not exist at all; but it cannot be that, when I make this judgement, my mind which is making [it] does not
exist" (PP I 11:163). The question arises, therefore, as to just what kind of existence we are talking about, especially if all physical existence, that is, all corporeal objects, including the one the subject thinks it refers to when it says "I," viz. its body, can be rendered doubtful, or uncertain by thought. As Descartes puts it: "I know that I exist; the question is what is this 'I' that I know?" (MFP 82).

Since everything is uncertain at this point, except the subject's knowledge that it exists because it thinks, the only answer Descartes finds it possible to provide is: *Sum res cogitans: I am a thinking thing* (MFP 82). Indeed, although he seems to leave open the possibility that the subject may be "identical with" other things, which, at the moment, we are "supposing to be nothing, because they are unknown" (MFP 82), he seems to regard *sum res cogitans* as the only possible answer to the question of what 'I' am. This is because he regards it as a necessary truth that "I am ... in the strict sense only a thing that thinks" (MFP 82). In other words, the subject's knowledge of itself as a thinking thing is immediate and complete, that is, insofar as "it is knowledge of a complete thing." 17 This is important for a number of reasons. The most important reason, however, is that it sets the ground for the conclusion that the mind is an independent substance, which can be known directly through its essence, viz. pure thought, and thus, without the interference of the senses, which, although modes of thought, are, as we shall see, nonetheless obscured by the subject's possession of a body (MFP 117).

Direct knowledge of a substance through its essence, or essential attribute is something that medieval scholasticism, in line with Aristotle and Aquinas, regarded as impossible, at least with regard to the human mind. For instance, as Aquinas unequivocally states, in Summa Theologica: "the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act." 18 For Aquinas, there are two forms of intellectual self-knowledge, or rather, ways in which "the soul knows that it is and ... what it is." 19 His position is not really any different from Descartes' with regard to the first way. For the soul, or mind knows itself, viz. *that it is*, from the fact that it acts. 20 As Aquinas puts it: "no one can assent to the thought that he does not exist. For, in thinking something, [viz. anything] he perceives that he exists." 21 It is only with the second way of knowing the self, viz. *what it is*, that the radical difference between Aquinas' medieval Aristotelian position and Descartes' modern position begins to emerge. 22 The mind's knowledge of *what it is*, is by no means immediate for Aquinas, as it is for Descartes. Rather, "we seek to discover what it is, from a knowledge of its acts and objects;" 23 and, even though the mind, or soul, as well as its faculties, or powers, its acts, i.e. "understanding," and its objects, viz. "the universal natures of things," are, like Descartes' cogito, "inmaterial," or "independent of matter;" 24 we cannot know any of this apart from the senses. 25 For, as Aquinas maintains in accord with Aristotle: "[although] it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, ... it is in a way the material cause [of that knowledge]." 26 Hence, for scholasticism, one can only know the mind remotely, that is, "through its relation to the body," 27 and essence is arrived at only as a result of a highly mediated intellectual process, that is, "We proceed from objects to acts, from acts to faculties, and from faculties to essence." 28
For Descartes, however, it is quite the opposite. As he explains in the Discourse: "From this [certainty that I existed] I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing in order to exist" (DM 36 [MI]). In other words, the subject knows what it is as soon as it knows that it is. It, therefore, has an immediate knowledge of what it is through the intuition of its essence, and what it is, is an independent totality, or something that has no needs outside of itself, viz. an intellectual substance. Not only does this invert the scholastic order of knowledge, by giving the human mind direct and immediate access to what had previously been so remote from man, that real knowledge of it was reserved only for God, that is, essence, it also establishes the foundation for the Cartesian distinction between the mind and body, and thus, the formal consolidation of thought's priority over being. For if the mind is a substance, whose whole essence consists of thought, "this I - that is the soul, [or mind] by which I am what I am - is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist" (DM 36 [MI]). This saves Descartes from merely inferring the real distinction (PP I 60:180) of the mind and body from his doubt over the existence of his body and his certainty over the existence of thought, and, therefore, from, as he is often criticized, committing what the Stoic logicians knew as the masked man, or larvatus fallacy, i.e.: 'I do not know the identity of this masked man; I do know the identity of my father; therefore this masked man is not my father.' In Descartes' case the fallacy would go like this: "I cannot doubt that I (as a mind) exist, but I can doubt that my body exists, therefore I (as a mind) and my body are really distinct." By making the knowledge of what the subject is as complete and self-evident as the fact that it is, Descartes appears to preclude the possibility which this fallacy implies, a possibility raised by Arnauld in the Fourth Objections, when he asks: "although I clearly and distinctly know my nature to be something that thinks, may I, too, not perhaps be wrong in thinking that nothing else belongs to my nature, [or essence] apart from the fact that I am a thinking thing? Perhaps that I am an extended thing, [or body] may also belong to my nature" (MFP 4th Obj.144). This, as we can see, implies that the subject's knowledge of itself as a thinking thing, or an intellectual substance may as yet be incomplete, and that it may at some future time discover that something else besides thought constitutes the mind's essence, i.e. extension. However, if this knowledge were incomplete, then the intellect would not be a substance, and, although the unity of the mind and body would still be a possibility, the subject would once again be utterly vulnerable to the metaphysical doubt which Descartes has already more or less put to rest, with regard to the self.

Descartes himself does not necessarily deny that there may still be many attributes within the subject, of which it is not yet aware (MFP 4th Rep:144). However, since what it is aware of is "sufficient to enable" it to subsist in and for itself, one can safely say that any other possible attributes are not part of its essence (MFP 4th Rep:144). "For if something can exist without some attribute, then it seems ... that that attribute is not included in its essence" (MFP 4th Rep 144). Thought, as we have seen, is
enough to constitute the entire essence of mind for Descartes. Thought is not extended. Therefore, extension cannot be said to belong to the essence of mind (MFP 114). Does this necessarily imply, however, that extension is excluded from the mind, and hence, that the mind and body are really distinct? That thought constitutes the entire essence of mind, and that the mind is a substance which excludes extension, demonstrates that the mind and body are really distinct, only if the subject can establish that the body also exists, and, therefore, that extension is its essence. For if the body exists and extension is its essence, then it too must be a substance, and if the body is a substance, then it may truly be said to be distinct from the mind. "For it is of the nature of substances that they should mutually exclude one another" (MFP 4th Rep:147). It is their nature, because they can exist by themselves (PP I 51:171). Whether or not the body is a substance, however, is a question that has to do with the subject's knowledge about the essence and existence of material things in general, and, at this point, Descartes is still supposedly convinced that nothing else exists, except the mind. In short, there is not yet anything for the mind to be distinct from.

How then can the subject know if the body is a substance, and, therefore, that it is truly distinct from the mind?

3. The Body

At this point, the subject cannot know for certain, for Descartes does not and cannot come to any definitive conclusions about the essence and existence of material things, as we shall see, until after he has re-established God as the absolute principle which guarantees all human knowledge. This, however, does not stop him from laying the ground for this knowledge, by discussing the hypothetical existence and essence of material things, before going on to explain the necessity of proving God's existence. He does this, if for no other reason than to render his own, or the subject's self-knowledge more certain to that part of itself which "cannot stop thinking ... that the corporeal things of which images are formed in ... thought, and which the senses investigate, are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling T' which cannot be pictured in the imagination" (MFP 83). Even in the midst of its doubt about everything except itself, the subject's tendency to obstinately cling to its common-sense belief in the reality of material things, and that this reality is more certain than its own, leads Descartes to momentarily abandon the intellect to its faculty of imagination, so that it can experiment with what "people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all," viz. bodies, or things in general. In the famous piece of wax example, Descartes concludes that a physical body, or thing is not constituted by its sensible qualities, since these can change ad infinitum, while the body itself remains, and, therefore, that a body is truly known, or "perceived by the mind alone," that is, in pure thought apart from its modes, such as the senses, or imagination (MFP 84-85). This is because what is truly known, or perceived about a body, considering that its sensible qualities are infinitely changeable, is its nature, or essence (MFP 85), viz. its extension (MFP 84). Extension, therefore, is
the principal attribute, or essence of material things, including the body (PP I 53:177), which means the body, assuming it exists, would seem to be a substance in its own right. Indeed, as Descartes says in the Principles: "The term substance applies univocally to mind and to body" (PP I 52:117); an idea which is certainly corroborated by Descartes' description of the body in the Sixth Meditation, "as a kind of machine equipped with and made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin, [which] ... even if there were no mind in it, would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those cases where movement is not under the control of the will or, consequently, of the mind" (MFP 119).

As substances in their own right, then, the mind and body are distinct. They subsist as mutually independent of one another, neither seeming to require, nor affect the other, and any identity between the two amounts to no more than a coincidence of similar needs arising simultaneously in both, but each finding satisfaction in its own separate sphere. Even this mutual coincidence, however, cannot be said to constitute an actual relation in itself, for, we must remember that according to Descartes, it is the nature of substances to be mutually exclusive. In fact, even though Descartes ultimately attempts to argue that the mind and body are so "closely joined and ... intermingled" that they "form a unit," or "union" (MFP 116-117), they are still necessarily non-identical, or essentially different. This is because their existence in a union still only implies a relationship in which two separate things are brought together to form a conjunction, or composite of distinct parts (MFP 118). Descartes is certainly aware of some of the practical absurdities presented by such a complete separation of mind and body, as demonstrated by his repudiation of the idea that the mind is present in the body "as a sailor is present in a ship" (MFP 116). As he points out, if the mind were merely present in the body as a sort of intellectual pilot, then "I would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect ... Similarly, when the body needed food or drink, I should have an explicit understanding of the fact, instead of having confused sensations of hunger and thirst" (MFP 116). Thus, as he concludes in the passage immediately prior to this one: "There is nothing that my own nature teaches me more vividly than that I have a body, and that when I feel pain there is something wrong with the body, and that when I am hungry or thirsty the body needs food and drink and so on" (MFP 116). Descartes, therefore, does not doubt that there is some means by which each of the substances is able to coincide with the other, or even, as it would seem, affect the other, i.e. something in the body causing the mind to feel pain, hunger, etc. and the mind somehow willing the body to avoid pain, satisfy its hunger, etc. In fact, at a superficial glance, such a means would seem to be provided by the faculty of sense-perception. The senses, however, "are nothing but confused modes of thinking" (MFP 117 [MI]), and as such, cannot constitute a real relationship between the two substances of mind and body. Of course, it still might be argued that, because the senses are a purely passive faculty "for receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible objects" (MFP 115), and "for inform[ing] the mind [of] what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part" (MFP 118), the mind regulates itself in such a way as to coincide with the body. In short, the senses could serve as a sort of monitoring device, which the mind uses to maintain itself in synchrony with
the body. Such a coincidence, however, would still not explain why the subject feels the necessity of its various sensations, or how it is able to cause the body to perform certain actions through the will, since both sense-perception and the will are, for Descartes, modes of thought, belonging wholly to the intellectual substance, or mind. It would not even explain how the mind could be certain that the ideas it received through the senses were accurate, and, therefore, how it could be certain that it was truly in coincidence with the body, even when it believed itself to be perfectly so. For, as we have already seen, the accuracy of the senses is highly questionable, and the real knowledge of material things comes not through sensory-perception, or the knowledge of a thing's qualities, but through the pure intellect, or the knowledge of a thing's essence. If Descartes, therefore, were to suddenly rely upon the senses to provide the coincidence of the mind and body, it would be possible that the subject not only occupied the body like a pilot in a ship, but a pilot never certain of the condition, direction or speed of that ship, despite his best attempts to sail and navigate it, and despite the most intense feelings with regard to its condition. This, however, is beside the point, for even if the subject could be certain of the ideas it received through the senses, and, therefore, that it was always in coincidence with the body, its thought and activity, in short, its knowledge of itself as a corporeal being, would still not admit of any necessity whatsoever. Instead, it would be purely accidental, for coincidence is by definition what is not necessary. If this were the case, however, then knowledge, although seemingly certain, would never be true, and if knowledge were never true, man would be an essentially irrational being. For Descartes, however, it is precisely the opposite that makes us what we are, that is, "reason ... is the only thing that makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts" (DM 21), who, despite the possession of many similar organs, "have no reason at all" (DM 45). Descartes' problem then is this, the mind and body, assuming the latter exists, must correspond, but they must do so in such a way that neither directly, or immediately influences the other, since such a relation would negate their existence as substances, and, therefore, reduce them to mere parts in a mechanical relationship. In short, he comes up directly against the need for mediation between the two independent substances of the mind and body (HP III 251).

What then could possibly constitute such a mediation, that is, one that can provide for the correspondence of the mind and body, while simultaneously preserving the necessity of Reason, the mutual independence of the mind and body as substances, and, thus, the priority of the immediacy of knowledge?

**B. God as the External Mediator Between the Mind and Body, or the Guarantor of Reason**

Descartes posits God as the independent mediator between the mind and body, and, thereby, attempts to escape a looming irrationalism, by grounding the coincidence of mind and body in an absolute, or
necessary first principle. In other words, "God constitutes the metaphysical ground of their mutual changes" (HP III 251). He is the one "uncreated and independent thinking substance" (PP I 54:178), through which the mutually independent substances of the mind and body supposedly achieve their identity. This means, therefore, that, although the mind and body may be independent with regard to one another, they are dependent with regard to God, who is, as we shall see, the only truly independent substance (PP I 51:177). How, however, can the mind and body be preserved as substances in their own right? Their dependence on God would seem to immediately negate their independence vis-a-vis each other, so that they would instead seem to be mere attributes of the one true substance, as occurs in the philosophy of Spinoza.33 Descartes' theory of substances is certainly problematic, however, he is insistent that the mind and body are themselves substances, since, unlike other things, they require nothing else for their existence, that is, nothing except "the concurrence of God" (PP I 52:177 [MI]). Indeed, it is through this notion of concurrence that Descartes attempts to maintain the independence of the mind and body, as well as to synchronize the mutual changes which occur in them. This is because concurrence can imply that these substances are distinct from God, without entirely precluding the unity with him, that is essential for him to serve as their necessary relation. For instance, their concurrence with God, on the one hand, can mean that their separation from him is also their identity with him, that is, insofar he is something distinct and self-sufficient from everything else, in short, insofar as he is a substance (PP I 51:177). On the other hand, it can also mean that their dependence upon him, and, therefore, unity with him is also their separation, or difference from him, that is, insofar as he is the absolute being, which depends on nothing other than himself for his existence (PP I 51:177).

If we were to attempt to represent this idea as a triangle, for instance, we might see how it is possible for Descartes to preserve the *appearance* of God's privileged position as the absolute, or total substance, in comparison to the mind and body, while, at the same time, preserving the *appearance* of their equality and distinctness, i.e. as substances in themselves:

**Figure 2**

Each point, as we see, would represent the three distinct substances of God, of mind and of body, God being at the apex, while the triangle as a whole would represent him in his unity, or perfection, and the mind and body in their dependence. Such a figurative representation would at least partially explain how Descartes can make the contradictory argument throughout his philosophy that God is distinct from us and all of his creations (MFP 90 & PP I 21:167), but also a purely simple, continuous and
infinite substance, which constitutes the whole of nature in the most general sense of the word (MFP 97 & 116). As we shall see, however, the problem with this illustration is that God is incorporeal (PP I 23:167), and, therefore, must entirely exclude the body (see fig. 2). This is because the essence, or "nature of the body includes divisibility," and divisibility, for Descartes, is the most certain sign of a thing's finitude, or imperfection (PP I 23:168). Thus, although there is, as we shall also see shortly, an intimate, or essential connection between God and the mind, i.e. both are thinking substances, the body, along with all other material things, seems to remain as separate from God, as it does the mind, even in spite of the fact that God's essence will prove to be identical with existence (MFP 107).34 Be that as it may for the moment, Descartes attempts to link the mind and body, while preserving them as substances, and this requires that they be preserved as finite, or created substances in comparison to God, who is the infinite, original substance, in which pure thought and pure being are identical. The question, therefore, becomes how Descartes introduces and proves the existence of God, or what is actually the same thing, how the subject discovers the notion of God, and, therefore, that its knowledge is true knowledge. For God is still subject to the same doubt as everything else, that is, everything other than the subject itself.

Descartes relies on three proofs of God's existence, which may be summed up as follows: 1) the proof of God from the idea of an infinite substance, or perfect being; 2) the proof of God from the existence, or reality of the mind, or subject; and 3) the ontological proof, whereby, God's existence issues directly from his own essence. As we shall see, the first two proofs proceed a posteriori, or from effects to cause, and support one another in such a way that, for Descartes, they constitute one proof (MFP Iae. Resp. VII. 106).35 The third proof is a priori, and, as such, is arguably the most important of the three, insofar as it has logical priority over the others, that is, if God exists he must be "logically prior to his dependencies,"36 i.e. the effects from which the first two proofs begin. Descartes, however, is as concerned with narrating the subject's order of discovery, after its initial self-realization, as he is with strict logical sequence, which is why, in the Meditations, at least, he presents them in the order given.37 The order of discovery is important, for, even though the subject can no longer be deceived about the content of its thought, insofar as it is itself that content, it still "can never be quite certain about anything else" (MFP 88). Therefore, it must use itself as the basis of its inquiries until it has discovered something with as much, or more certainty as its own existence.

1. The Ideal of Perfection, or the Absolute 'Ought'

The mind seems to contain many ideas of different kinds. At this particular point in its investigation, however, the subject has no criteria for judging which of these ideas possess any objective validity, or, therefore, what category each may fall under. This is because the true origin of these ideas is as yet completely doubtful (MFP 89). Nonetheless, Descartes raises questions about what appear to be adventitious ideas, or ideas that seem "to be derived from things existing outside" of the subject (MFP
First, how do I know that the ideas of things come from things outside of me? Second, how do I know that these ideas are accurate representations of these things? (MFP 89-90). It is no longer acceptable to make the common sense assumption that adventitious ideas are externally caused, for it is possible that nothing exists except the subject, and therefore, that the subject generates these ideas, along with the feeling that they are externally caused, "without any assistance from external things" (MFP 90). As Descartes points out: "this is, after all, just how I have always thought ideas are produced in me when I am dreaming" (MFP 90). It is equally unacceptable, therefore, to assume that what appear to be adventitious ideas are accurate representations of external things. As a result, Descartes proceeds to inquire as to whether any of the subject's ideas might contain so much representational, or "objective" reality that they could not possibly have been caused by the subject itself. For, according to his still scholastic notion of causation, there must be at least as much reality in the cause as its effect. Otherwise, something would have to be capable of arising from nothing, even if that something is merely a thing's surplus representational reality (MFP 91). It is crucial for Descartes to establish whether or not there is an idea in the mind that could not possibly have been generated by the mind, since its existence, or non-existence will determine if the subject is confined to an inescapable solipsism, or if there is an other with whom the subject can share its thought and existence. As Descartes puts it: "If the objective, [that is, representational] reality of any of my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure the same reality does not reside in me, either formally or eminently, and hence that I myself cannot be its cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but that some other thing which is the cause of this idea also exists. But if no such idea is to be found in me, I shall have no argument to convince me of the existence of anything apart from myself" (MFP 92). The subject would be necessarily and absolutely alone.

Of all the ideas contained in the mind, Descartes finds only one that he believes could not possibly have originated in his mind, viz. the idea of God (MFP 91-93). God, therefore, is the idea that constitutes the condition of the possibility of otherness in his system, and what ultimately saves the subject from being forever alone. All of these concerns, however, are quite immaterial at this stage in his investigation. For once the subject becomes certain of its existence, it knows ipso facto that there is a distinction between perfection and imperfection, and, therefore, that the idea of perfection is not only present in itself, but that it is so, by virtue of some other substance greater than itself (MFP 94 & PP I 14:164 & 18:166). Indeed, as Descartes points out, the subject's knowledge of God is not simply contemporaneous with its self-knowledge, it must be somehow prior to it (MFP 94). This is because it arrives at its self-certainty by means of doubt, and doubt is a clear indication of the subject's finitude and imperfection, i.e. that it is limited, or lacks something, viz. certainty. Even this doubt, or imperfection, however, would not be an issue for the subject, if it did not already possess some ideal of perfection to highlight its deficiencies. In other words: "how could I understand that I doubted or desired - that is, lacked something - and that I was not wholly perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own defects by comparison?" (MFP
The possession of such an idea, therefore, is not a belief contingent upon the inclination of an individual subject, but rather "the necessary experience of anyone who reflects on his own condition." In fact, we can go further than this and say that it is a necessity for any thinking being, which is not God, whether that being intentionally reflects on its own condition, or not, since without it there would be no movement in thought, that is, no development of knowledge.

As we can see, this implies that there is a very close affinity between the ideas of God and the subject, or rather, that they should share a common attribute. For "if they did not, it would be impossible for us to conceive of ourselves as aspiring [to perfection,] and there would be no natural articulation of ideas by which we could proceed from one to the other." Descartes himself refers to this identity, or affinity in a letter to Chanut, when he says: "In my opinion, the way we ought to follow to attain to the love of God, is to reflect that he is a spirit, or a thing which thinks; for in this respect the nature of our soul has a certain kinship with his own, and so we come to persuade ourselves that it is an outflow of his sovereign intellect." However, as he goes on to warn, and certainly makes plain in the Meditations, there is still an absolute separation between the two ideas, in spite of this kinship.

Both God and the subject are thinking, or intellectual substances. As a finite substance, however, the subject's knowledge appears to increase incrementally towards its ideal of perfection, once it makes its self-realization. On the other hand, as an infinite substance, God's knowledge is and must always be absolute (MFP 95), that is, God does not develop because he is already perfect, or omniscient. Thus, even though Descartes does not immediately rule out the potential perfection of the subject's knowledge, i.e. insofar as he sees no reason it should not continue to increase infinitely, or eventually appropriate all of God's attributes, this "gradual increase in knowledge is itself the surest sign of imperfection" (MFP 95), and in no way implies the eventual achievement of actual infinity. Rather, as we shall see in Hegel's analysis of the true and false infinities, this kind of incremental progress to infinity is in itself wholly finite. Descartes himself recognizes this difference, when he points out that even "if my knowledge always increases more and more ... it will never actually be infinite, since it will never reach the point where it is not capable of a further increase" (MFP 95 [MII]). Indeed, this is why he distinguishes between the terms 'indefinite' and 'infinite' in his philosophy, and attempts to "reserve the term 'infinite' for God alone" (PP I 27:169).

Whereas the subject's potential perfection seems to permanently exclude it from perfection, the idea of God "contains absolutely nothing that is potential, but only what is actual and real" (MFP 95 [MII]). As the perfect being, or infinite substance, he cannot lack anything, or contain something as a mere possibility. For, if God lacked even the most insignificant thing, and had to strive to attain it, his existence would be contingent, or finite. He would no longer be absolute. Instead, he would be immediately limited by the object he lacked and the activity necessary to obtain it. In other words, the most insignificant thing in the world would be enough to render God an imperfect being, or finite substance, if he lacked it. In Descartes' philosophy, therefore, "we are [also] reminded that the gulf
between finite and infinite is itself [ultimately] infinite; that the approximation of man to God never blossoms into attainment, [but remains purely and simply a mere approximation]; and that every human aspiration contains within itself the paradoxical conjunction of intimate union with and insuperable distance from God. Dependence [on God] without affinity would crush the soul under an alien dominion; [and] affinity [with God] without dependence would annihilate the ideal in a perpetual consumption. For Descartes, then, God constitutes the subject's ideal of perfect intellectual being, as well as its absolute beyond. As he puts it himself: 'By 'God' I mean the very being the idea of whom is in me, that is, the possessor of all the perfections which I cannot grasp, but can somehow reach in my thought' (MFP 98). Thus, just as we shall see with Fichte's absolute ego, the essential condition of Descartes' subject is one of infinite aspiring and striving after the absolute ought, which means, as we shall also see, that this condition is nothing more than one of infinite failure and frustration, or insuperable uncertainty. Furthermore, in Chapter 2, when we come to deal with the two fundamental standpoints which result from the divisions upon which Descartes' philosophy is based, viz. egoism and egotism, it will become clear that dependence is no less an alien dominion to the subject for simply being accepted and recognized, than if the subject had no affinity with its absolute lord and master, God. Likewise, affinity is no less destructive, or annihilatory for ultimately being based upon exclusion and the denial of total satisfaction, than if the subject's consumption with God were immediate and complete. Be that as it may, we should recognize that with this idea of perfect being, Descartes has at least established the idea of otherness in his philosophy, and, thereby, saved the subject from immediately succumbing to solipsism. However, as we can plainly see, the only problem is that this idea of perfect being only makes its appearance in and to the subject as the idea of an absolute other.

2. The Doctrine of Continuous Creation & the Rejection of Becoming

Descartes' second proof of God's existence is related to the previous proof, insofar as it appeals to the same causal principle. However, it also differs from that proof, insofar as it dispenses with the distinction between representational and eminent reality. In other words, Descartes is no longer concerned with the question of the cause of the idea of perfection, or "why the idea of a being more perfect than myself must necessarily proceed from some being which is in reality more perfect" (MFP 95 [MI]). Instead, he is concerned with inquiring into the cause of the real being in possession of this idea (MFP 95). In short, what produces, or creates the subject? From what the subject already knows about itself, it follows that its creator must itself be a thinking thing, or substance, since whatever reality is present in the effect must also be present in its cause (MFP 96), and that it cannot have created itself, since it has already proved to be a finite, imperfect being. Indeed, for Descartes, it is self-evident "that a thing which recognizes something more perfect than itself is not the source of its own being; for, if so, it would have given itself all the perfections of which it has an idea, [i.e. absolute knowledge]. Hence, the source of its being can only be something which possesses within itself all
these perfections - that is, God" (PP I 20:167). As the perfect being, then, God is the only self-created being, and, as the only self-created being, he must be the subject's "eminent and total cause."}

This conclusion is inescapable for Descartes. Even if we appeal to the immortality of the soul, which Descartes is certainly concerned to prove in and through his philosophy (DM 46 & MFP 73), the subject still needs a creator. This is because, for Descartes, preservation and creation are identical. According to his doctrine of continuous creation, "the same power and action are needed to preserve anything at each individual moment of its duration as would be required to create that thing anew if it were not yet in existence" (MFP 96). Thus, even if the subject is immortal, it still requires the same power to preserve its existence, i.e. by continually re-creating itself at each successive moment, as it would to create itself ex nihilo at some prior moment, and, since the subject has no knowledge of possessing such a power in itself, it follows that it cannot possess this power (PP I 21:67). It follows because it is contradictory, on Descartes' principles, that the subject should, or even could deny itself a lesser perfection like knowledge, a mere accident of substance (MFP 96), while being in possession of the greatest perfection of all, viz. the power of self-creation. Descartes, therefore, concludes that this power must reside in a being distinct from the subject, but one which, nonetheless, continually creates, or preserves the subject's existence, and thus, is contemporaneous with that subject, that is, God (MFP 96 & PP I 21:167).

Even though this argument provides for the simultaneity of cause and effect, thereby, dissociating the idea of God's causality from the issue of temporal priority, it seems to depend upon the notion that the mind is essentially a discontinuous and divisible substance, like the body. Indeed, Descartes begins the argument for the doctrine of continuous creation with the assertion that the existence of the mind is subject to the nature of time, the parts of which "are not mutually dependent, and never coexist" (PP I 21:167). As he puts it in the Meditations, the mind's "life span can be divided into countless parts, each independent of the others, so that it does not follow from the fact that I existed a little while ago that I must exist now, unless there is some cause which as it were creates me afresh at this moment" (MFP 96 [MI]). This, however, would completely contradict the mind's essential affinity with God, as well as its own nature as "something quite single and complete" (MFP 120). Furthermore, it would establish an essential affinity between the mind and body, or thought and extension, i.e. insofar as both are divisible, which would make it difficult to maintain a real distinction between the two.

To attempt to solve this problem, we must inquire further into what duration and time are for Descartes. In the Principles, he defines duration as "a mode under which we conceive the thing insofar as it continues to exist" (PP I 55:178). Duration, therefore, would appear to be an attribute of existent things (PP I 56:178). Indeed, as Descartes makes plain, there is ultimately no real distinction between duration and existent things, or substances, "since a substance cannot cease to endure without also
ceasing to be" (PP I 62:181). Strictly speaking then, the distinction between duration and a substance is merely a conceptual distinction (PP I 62:181), as implied in the definition of duration just given. However, once duration has been reduced simply to a concept, that is, a mere mode under which we conceive a thing, it can no longer be said to be an attribute of any substance other than the mind, and, as such, can no longer be duration as it pertains to all existing things, viz. extended substances. Rather, it is now something conceptually distinct from duration, that is, duration as existence in general. It is time (PP I 57:179). As Descartes says: "when time is distinguished from duration taken in the general sense and called the measure of movement, it is simply a mode of thought" (PP I 57:179 [MI]). Time, therefore, exists only in thought, or rather, in the mind as a way of explaining duration. This, however, only seems to confirm the essential divisibility of the mind, and, thereby, negate the mind's essential affinity with God, as well as the real distinction, or essential difference between the mind and body. As Spinoza makes clear in his exposition of Descartes' philosophy, however, "duration is an affect of existence not of the essence of things." Thus, duration, although a mode of the mind insofar as it is an existing thing, or an enduring substance, is not necessarily related to thought, which is both the essence of mind and what constitutes its affinity with God. Thought, then, can still be in itself continuous, whereas the mind, as an existent substance, may be discrete. This, however, would still seem to require that Descartes hold a contradictory view of the mind, that is, as both continuous and discrete. Furthermore, it also seems to raise a problem with regard to God's infinite simplicity and continuity, since he too is supposed to be an existent substance, and, therefore, would appear to possess the attribute of duration. This latter problem can only be adequately addressed after having examined Descartes' third proof of the existence of God. Before doing this, however, we should examine Descartes' notion of time more closely. For this may give us some indication as to why he does not have a problem with asserting both the continuity of the mind and its temporality, though we certainly might.

In Descartes' theory of time, time is usually regarded as discontinuous. As we saw above, this only seems to be confirmed by his definition of time as something in which each moment is completely independent of every other moment, and in which no two moments ever coexist (PP I 21:167). If we consider his definition more carefully, however, we find that there is and can only be one absolute moment of presence, or, put differently, the present is an absolute moment, in which there is neither movement, nor divisibility. This is because movement would necessarily imply the transition of one moment into the next, that is, a becoming, and thus, the dependence of the one on the other, i.e. as it becomes the other. "Descartes, [however,] refuses to conceive [of] movement as a flux, [or a becoming,] in which the present filled with [the] past will also be filled with [the] future." As Descartes puts it himself: "It is true that no motion takes place in a single instant of time" (PP II 39:242). As this absolute moment, then, the present is purely continuous. It is a state of being that issues immediately from God's activity of creation, that is, it is the simple positing of absolute being in every sense of the term. "[I]t is [always] the act of creating grasped at its origin, in the
indivisibility that characterizes its, [i.e. this activity's] absolute freedom."57 In short, the present moment is identical with divine activity, and, therefore, with God himself, since there is, as we shall see in the third proof of God's existence, no difference between his essence and existence, or, therefore, between his being, thinking and willing (PP I 23:167). Thus, unlike the indivisibility of the atom, which Descartes regards as an impossibility, since the existence of a completely self-contained, self-sufficient particle would conflict with God's existence as the self-contained, self-sufficient being (PP II 20:197), the indivisibility of the moment of time is not a limitation of God's power. On the contrary, it is that power, or the instantaneous manifestation of that power.58 He creates everything in an instantaneous moment of self-creation, and this moment is infinite, or absolute.

Is there not, however, a multiplicity of absolute, instantaneous moments, a temporal atomism, or succession of states of being, which would account for the movement and, therefore, discontinuity of time? And would this not ultimately render both the mind and God divisible?

The immediate answer would seem to be that there is. For, although Descartes rejects the mutual dependence of the moments of time, a rejection which precludes the possibility of movement in each of the moments, he, nonetheless, talks about time as a plurality of moments, and also, as we saw, the measure of movement. Indeed, he even goes so far as to suggest that, although there is no movement in the moment of time, all movement is possible only in time in general, that is, between its indivisible moments. For instance, in the Principles, he qualifies the argument that no movement takes place in a single instant of time, with the following assertion: "but clearly whatever is in motion is determined at individual instants which can be specified as long as the motion lasts, to continue moving in a given direction along a straight line, and never in a curve" (PP II 39:242). Clearly, then, the motion of time would seem to indicate its ultimate divisibility, i.e. into an indefinite succession of discrete points. Once again, however, we must be careful to distinguish between various attributes and the substances to which they belong. Time, as we have seen, is an attribute of thought. Movement, on the other hand, along with its opposite, rest, is, for Descartes, a mode of corporeal substance, or an attribute of extension (PP II 23, 25 & 27:232-34). Thus, there is a real distinction between time and movement in Descartes' philosophy, just as there is between the mind and body. Strictly speaking, then, Cartesian time does not move, that is, there is no movement in time, nor is time in movement, and, as such, time cannot be said to really be divisible. Nor, therefore, can it be said to be the cause of thought's, or the mind's divisibility. Indeed, this is even confirmed by Descartes' description of the linearity of time given above, since for him a line is something that is not necessarily derived from, or reducible to its parts, or points. As he says in The World, or Treatise on Light: "So it is of all motions, only motion in a straight line is entirely simple and has a nature which may be wholly grasped in an instant. For in order to conceive such motion it suffices to think that a body is in the process of moving in a certain direction, and that this is the case at each determinable instant during the
time it is moving. By contrast, in order to conceive circular motion, or any other possible motion, it is necessary to consider at least two of its instants, or rather two of its parts and the relations between them" (TL 96 [MI]).

Bodies, on the other hand, are, according to Descartes, in direct opposition to Zeno, capable of movement, because extension is divisible. In fact, Descartes' theory of continuous movement, that is, that the quantity of motion in the universe in general is always the same (PP II 36:240), and that a body in motion "always continues to move" unless interfered with by another (PP II 37:241), derives as much from the infinite divisibility of extended substance, or matter, as it does from God's will (PP II 36:240). For, even though "any variation in matter, or diversity in its many forms depends on motion" (PP II 23:232), the fact that all matter in the universe is "one and the same" (PP II 23:232), and that the entire universe is constituted by matter, i.e. there is no empty space (PP II 16 & 17:229-30), movement can only occur relative to that matter's parts, and, therefore, as a consequence of its divisibility (PP II 23:232; see also 33 & 34:237-39). This why Descartes conceives of movement only as local motion (PP II 24:233), which has to do with the transference of a body "from the vicinity of other [contiguous] bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies" (PP II 25:233). In other words, movement is a mere change of place for the same body relative to other self-identical bodies (PP II 14:229). Once again, then, like time, it is not transition, or something's becoming something else.

However, if there is indeed a real distinction between time and movement, and there is no real movement in or of time, or vice versa, then how can time be said to really exist? And if time should prove not to really exist, how can it be said to be the measure of movement, that is, the measure of something it does not itself possess?

We can see clearly from what has already been said, that time, insofar as it is a movement, or succession of moments, does not really exist in Descartes' system, or universe. It is merely a concept which creates the appearance of movement in and to the mind, when it considers its own duration and the duration of other things, in short, when it thinks about existence. The thought of existence, on the one hand, takes the form of an absolute, simple immediacy identical to God's infinite, instantaneous creation of the universe, viz. the absolute moment of time, or the present, which may simply be said to be thought in its truest, most immediate form, i.e. natural light - light, for Descartes, being an instantaneous phenomenon (DM 42). On the other hand, it reflects the divisibility and movement supposedly present in all things which endure, without itself being divisible, or moving. As a consequence, however, the subject can conceive the world only as a "repetition of creations of the universe in which the reciprocal situation of bodies is different each time, each of these instantaneous creations in no way depending on the previous one and entailing nothing for the succeeding one."61

The problem here of course is that, if the world is merely a succession of creations, then a body does
not necessarily contain movement, as Descartes holds (PP II 27:234). "There is no transport of bodies, but something is [merely] created here, and then is created there. The reality of movement is [thus] completely and uniquely located in [the] instantaneous action [of God], and its most perfect image is the movement of the scales of a balance at equilibrium - meaning nonmovement."62 In other words, the reality of movement is located in something that does not and cannot itself contain movement, that is, the present, which is simply another way of talking about God's presence. Hence, the reality of movement is pure rest.63 Indeed, this is the condition of the universe as a whole in Descartes' system, since all movement in general is constant, and God's action is instantaneous, meaning it is a mere tendency towards movement, but not movement per se. Like time, then, movement does not actually exist in itself,64 or rather, there is no need for movement, even in existence. This is because there is only a succession of contiguous, stationary states, or immobile frames, which contain slight magnitudes of difference, so that when the natural light of the human mind shines upon them, they supposedly create the illusion of movement in and to the mind.65 "At each instant [therefore] we face a changed state, not a changing of state - meaning there is no movement."66

Even this changed state, however, is not really changed, or different. For God's creation is absolutely singular, that is, it is an absolute, instantaneous state. The changed state, therefore, is merely what falls within the limited scope of the natural light of the human mind, which is finite in comparison to God (PP I 24 & 26:168-69), and, for that reason, cannot, as it were, shine on everything all at once. Thus, it is merely a different angle on, or changed view of the same absolute state. Only one question remains then. What guarantees the consistency of this view, that is, what causes everything to appear in an orderly and predictable manner? According to Descartes, God's immutability, and the external laws of motion which derive therefrom, guarantee the consistency of the mind's view of the universe (PP II 37:240). However, it is not really clear that such a guarantee is necessary, if there is no real movement in the universe. For, if there is no real movement in the universe, then duration itself is truly only a mode under which we conceive the thing insofar as it continues to exist, as Descartes defined it above. In other words, like time, duration is only an attribute of thought, which the mind uses to think about the only thing that really continues to exist, viz. itself. Nothing else continues to exist, because nothing else is possible; or rather, everything else is possible, it just is not actual. This, as we saw, is because there is no coming into being, or becoming. There is only what is, that is, only absolute being, and the absolute state of this absolute being, viz. pure rest, or thought. Thought, therefore, guarantees the consistent appearance of the world to itself, because the only world that really appears to it is that of its own simple, continuous existence - its own motionless being.

The elimination, or denial of real movement is a necessary consequence of any system based on absolute being to the exclusion of becoming, which, as we shall see in Hegel's philosophy, requires a comprehension of the unity of opposites, and, therefore, a causal function for precisely what Descartes argues has no causality whatsoever, viz. pure negativity or nothing. Descartes, as we see, is
nonetheless able to put forth the basis for quantitative theories of time and motion without contradicting the absolute principle of his system, viz. God. This, however, is only because there is no difference between pure quantity, which is the absolute indifference to real difference - meaning it contains none - and the absolute pure being, which is thought, or God. Indeed, as Hegel points out in his Logie: "The Absolute is pure Quantity" (LL 145:99). This, however, tells us precious little about the true natures of time and motion, and, as we have seen in our brief consideration of these phenomena in Descartes' system, merely results in a number of contradictory arguments which ultimately resolve themselves into nothing, i.e. appearances, or into the pure thought of the mind and God, which is the same as appearance, i.e. nothing in itself. Much of Descartes' problem is simply a result of the fact that he cannot find a way to reconcile what he necessarily sees as "two particular and opposite species of magnitude" (LL 148:100), that is, the continuous and discrete. These two species of magnitude are the result of what, we shall see in Hegel, are two sides in the process of the first moment of explicitly self-mediating being, or being-for-self, viz. attraction and repulsion (LL 148:100). Without a concept of becoming, however, Descartes cannot really develop an idea of being-for-self, or the first moment of actual self-consciousness. For, as we shall see clearly in Chapter 5, being-for-self involves both being and negation in one being as mutually dependent realities. Instead, he is, as we have seen all along, forced simply to posit self-consciousness as the pure immediacies of mind and God.

3. The Identity of Essence and Existence, or the Ontological Proof

Descartes' final proof is certainly the simplest of his three arguments for the existence of God, particularly in that it dispenses with the problem of causality. However, it is also the most notorious of his arguments. This is because the argument was originally put forward in slightly different form by Anselm, in the 11th century, but then rejected by Aquinas, in favour of the a posteriori method, and also because Kant rejects its basic assumption, viz. that existence can be a predicate, in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he dubs it the 'Ontological Proof'. Descartes himself even seems somewhat ambivalent about the value of the ontological proof. In the Meditations, for instance, it is not presented until the Fifth Meditation, where he introduces it almost apologetically for fear that it "has some appearance of being a sophism" (MFP 107). Furthermore, in the replies to various objections, he makes it clear that he regards it as secondary to the two previous proofs, insofar as he believes "that it is manifest to everyone that consideration of the efficient cause is the first and principal means, if not to say the only means, that we have to prove the existence of God" (MFP 4th Rep 238). Speculations as to the reason for Descartes' ambivalence about the ontological proof, or about why it plays a secondary role in the Meditations, however, should not be given too much consideration. For, although its role does appear to be secondary in the Meditations, he still makes his case for its validity therein, and, in the Principles, even goes on explicitly to recognize its logical priority relative to the other proofs, by presenting it as the first and most prominent of the three arguments for God's existence (PP I 14-16:164-65). It is also clear that Descartes' ambivalence about
the ontological proof in the *Meditations*, is less a consequence of his doubt about its validity and truth, than it is his suspicion that the reader may be unable to accept the validity of so simple and immediate a truth, precisely because it is so obvious, or self-evident.

Descartes introduces the ontological proof by first observing that essence and existence are mutually independent in the ideas of most things, that is, what they are by definition does not necessarily imply that they are. To illustrate this point, he uses the example of a triangle, a choice which unfortunately is often credited with more significance than it either deserves, or Descartes intends, as demonstrated in the *Fifth Replies*, where he is forced to point out: "the existence of a triangle should not be compared with the existence of God, since the relation between existence and essence is manifestly quite different in the case of God from what it is in the case of the triangle" (*MFP 5th Rep: CSM II, 262-3, p.97*). The idea of a triangle is merely used to show that a thing may possess a "determinate nature, or essence, or form ... which is immutable and eternal, and not invented by ... or dependent on ... [the] mind" (*MFP 106*), without this determine nature, essence, or form at all implying the existence of that thing. Such an essence allows one to make certain truth statements about what it is, for instance, to be a triangle, or about its properties, such as the sum of its three angles must be equal to two right angles (*MFP 106 & PP I 14:164-65*). One cannot imagine a triangle being otherwise, without it ceasing to be a triangle. It is essential, therefore, that a triangle should possess such a property. It is not essential, however, that this triangle should exist in order to be a triangle. In fact, it is quite conceivable that "no such figure exists, or has ever existed, any where outside my thought" (*MFP 106*), but that certain properties still necessarily determine what constitutes the idea of a triangle. In short, existence is not necessarily a property of the idea of a triangle. It is only a possible property of the idea of a triangle. A triangle, therefore, may, or may not exist without this affecting its essence, viz. what it is to be a triangle, one iota, and this is true of the ideas of all other things clearly and distinctly perceived by the mind, save one - the supremely perfect being, or God (*MFP 107*).

"In this one idea the mind recognizes - not merely the possible and contingent existence which belongs to the ideas of all the other things which it distinctly perceives, but utterly necessary and eternal existence" (*PP I 14:164*). If the idea of God did not necessarily imply the existence of God, then God would not be the supremely perfect being, for he would lack some perfection, viz. existence. Therefore, existence is as much a property constituting the essence of the idea of God, as the supremely perfect being, as any property constituting the idea of a triangle, i.e. that the sum of its angles equals two right angles. In other words, existence stands in the same relation to the idea of God, as essence does to the ideas of all other things clearly and distinctly perceived by the mind, that is, it cannot be separated from it (*MFP 107*). This is the only comparison that can be made between the idea of God and the idea of any other thing, including a triangle. Furthermore, this is also why God supposedly does not possess duration. As Spinoza explains: "duration is an affect of existence not of the essence of things. And since God's existence is his essence, we cannot say that duration belongs to him. For
Two questions immediately arise here however. First, if essence and existence cannot be separated in the idea of God, then how is Descartes able to subject God's existence to the same absolute doubt, to which he subjects the ideas of all other things, at the beginning of his inquiry? Second, if existence is essential only to the idea of God, then how can Descartes legitimately conclude that God himself exists? For, as Descartes himself points out: "it does not seem to follow from the fact that I think of God as existing that he does" (MFP 107).

The answer to the first question simply comes down to force of habit, on the part of the subject. On the one hand, it is used to thinking about all things in the same way, and, on the other, of naively relying on the faculty of sense perception. According to Descartes: "Since I have been accustomed to distinguish between existence and essence in everything else, I find it easy to persuade myself that existence can also be separated from the essence of God, and hence that God can be thought of as not existing." (MFP 107 [MI]). Clearly, this separation can only be made in the finite thought of the subject, and only if the idea of God is first reduced to that of a finite thing, such as a triangle, or say, a hundred thalers, rather than an infinite thing. This is simply because a) it would be impossible for the supremely perfect being to doubt anything, let alone its own existence, since doubt, as we already know, necessarily implies the imperfection of the being which doubts, and b) only a finite thing is capable of both existence and non-existence. Thinking of God in this way, then, is simply the logical consequence of failing to apply the criterion of clear and distinct thinking to the objects of thought, a failure, the correction of which provides the impetus of Descartes' entire philosophy, and, indeed, allows him, whether validly, or invalidly, to subject everything to the method of doubt, at the beginning of that philosophy. This is why he concludes: "as regards God, if I were not overwhelmed by preconceived opinions, and if the images of things perceived by the senses did not besiege my thought on every side, I would certainly acknowledge him sooner and more easily than anything else. For what is more self-evident than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists?" (MFP 109 [MI]). In other words, the subject would not need to deduce God's existence, since its intuitive certainty of this primary fact would not be distorted, or concealed by its confused and obscure modes of thinking.

How Descartes can infer God's real existence from God's existence in thought has to do with what may be described as the essence of essence, that is, essence as something not invented by, or dependent upon the mind, like the immutable and eternal form of the triangle. Since the subject must recognize certain properties of things as eternal, whether it wants to or not, "it follows that they cannot have been invented by" the mind (MFP 106). In other words, the subject's thought does not constitute their essence; or, as Descartes puts it: "my thought does not impose any necessity on things" (MFP 107).
On the contrary, the subject's thought is completely determined by the necessity of things (MFP 107). Something else, then, must be responsible for the properties that constitute a thing's essence, that is, either the thing itself, or something that is absolutely necessary, and, therefore, can also serve as the ultimate source of everything else's necessity, that is, what constitutes essence in general, or God. Consequently, since existence is a property of God, or the subject "cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, [or his essence,] and hence that he really exists" (MFP 107 [MI]).

This issue is similarly, but perhaps somewhat more clearly, dealt with in Anselm's first version of the ontological proof, even though Descartes version has the advantage of a superior definition of God, i.e. as the supremely perfect being. Anselm, who defines God as 'something than which nothing greater can be thought', argues that if one admits that this is an idea which can at least be grasped in thought, or the mind, one cannot help but immediately conclude that this idea must also exist in reality.74 The reason for this is simply that something which does not really exist, is not something than which nothing greater can be thought. On the contrary, one can easily think of many things greater than something which exists only in thought, i.e. anything that possesses an actual autonomous existence. As Anselm puts it: "If ... that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in both the mind and reality."75 Anselm's proof aside, however, Descartes' answers to both questions rely upon the subject's ability to clearly and distinctly perceive certain ideas and their essences, and thus, upon the validity of clear and distinct perception as such. This validity, however, is precisely what Descartes claims to guarantee through the proof of the existence of God: "I am now just as certain of it, [viz. the fact that God necessarily exists,] as I am of everything else which appears most certain, [i.e. the subject's existence, etc.]. And what is more, I see that the certainty of all other things depends on this, so that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known" (MFP 109).

In other words, the subject's clear and distinct perception of the idea of God leads to the clear and distinct perception of the existence of God, and the clear and distinct perception of the existence of God guarantees the validity of clear and distinct perception, or "that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true" (MFP 109). Descartes reasoning, as numerous critics are quick to point out, appears to be circular. As Arnauld succinctly summarizes the problem in the Fourth Objection: "I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God exists. But how can we be sure that God exists only because we clearly and distinctly perceive this. Hence, before we can be sure that God exists, we ought to be able to be sure that whatever we perceive clearly and evidently is true" (MFP 4th Obj.142).

The charge of circularity is a problem, especially if one is unwilling to recognize that there are two
distinct forms of knowledge, that is, intuition and deduction. For then Descartes may legitimately be charged with simply assuming the validity of what he needs to prove, in order to prove the validity of what he assumes. As we have already seen, however, Descartes not only distinguishes between intuition and deduction, but he regards the latter as being dependent upon the former. For Descartes, the first principles upon which all deductions are based can only be truly known through intuition, and God, as the first principle, is no exception. This is why he argues that there is nothing more self-evident than the fact that God exists, not even the subject's own existence (MFP 109), and that it is ultimately inconsequential as to what methods of proof the subject uses to determine the truth of certain things, like God. As he says: "whatever method of proof I use, I am always brought back to the fact that it is only what I clearly and distinctly perceive that completely convinces me" (MFP 108).

Thus, the validity of the subject's clear and distinct perception is, in an important sense, as immediate as the existence of God, and this immediacy, or intuitive validity is enough to provide a secure foundation for the deduction of God's existence from the clear and distinct perception of the idea of God in Descartes' system - even if the subject does not at first seem to be aware of this intuitive validity, or rather, even if it at first seems to doubt it. Clearly though, this doubt is unfounded, for Descartes includes God, and thus, the validity of clear and distinct perception, among those perceptions that "are so transparently clear and at the same time so simple that we cannot ever think of them without believing them to be true ... For we cannot doubt them without thinking them; but we cannot think of them without at the same time believing they are true, as was supposed. Hence we cannot doubt them without at the same time believing they are true; that is, we cannot doubt them" (MFP 2nd Rep. 142 [MI]). This would seem to mean, however, that the only real role for the ontological proof in philosophy is to focus the subject's attention on the fact that the true knowledge of God is a matter of intuition, or faith, and, therefore, that Reason is secondary to faith.

In this respect, Descartes' position is consistent with the early Christian thought of Augustine, as well as the medieval thought of Anselm. One of Augustine's most famous admonitions is crede ut intelligas: Believe that you may understand.76 Likewise, Anselm, although generally regarded as holding faith and Reason to be completely independent of one another,77 adopts this same principle in the Proslogion, immediately before introducing his two versions of the ontological proof: "I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that 'unless I believe, I shall not understand' (Is., vii, 9)."78 Thus, it is easy to see that all three thinkers recognize a certain priority of immediate knowledge, or faith. It may not be argued, however, that any of them regard deduction, or Reason as superfluous, even though this may indeed turn out to be the consequence of preserving the unequal distinction between the two. On the contrary, all somehow regard the pursuit of deductive, or mediated knowledge as an imperative for the true believer, and would certainly find common ground in Anselm's statement that: "it seems to me to be a sign of negligence, if, after we have been confirmed in the faith, we are not eager to understand what we believe."79 In fact, both Augustine and Anselm grant Reason an a priori function similar to that

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implied by Descartes proofs of God's existence, that is, of persuading one about the importance and necessity of immediate knowledge. In Anselm's case, he not only offers his proofs to the faithful, so that they may come to understand the meaning of what they believe, but also to the unbeliever, or 'Fool', who "has said in his heart, there is no God," so that he might be convinced of the falsity of his position.\footnote{Augustine puts it best, however, when he says: "So, therefore, if it is rational that faith precedes reason in the case of certain great matters which cannot be grasped, there cannot be the least doubt that reason which persuades us on this precept - that faith precedes reason - itself precedes faith."} Implied in this notion of the mutual priority of faith and reason, or intuition and deduction is the same abstract unity inherent in immediate knowledge itself, viz. the absolute identity of pure thought, and this absolute identity is, as we have seen, established as the ultimate principle and criterion of truth in the idea, or figure of God, as the absolute, existent being. As we shall see in our account of speculative knowledge, or Science, there is no problem with this idea, as long as we recognize this identity for what it really is, and allow it to develop according to its own inherent logic, rather than seek to preserve it in the privileged isolation which appears as part of its essence, when taken purely in its immediacy. For, otherwise, neither the truth, nor our knowledge of it becomes more than an empty abstraction. In short, it never becomes real knowledge of an actual truth. As Hegel points out in his critique of immediate, or intuitive knowledge, in the Encyclopedia: "Immediacy means, upon the whole, an abstract reference-to-self, that is an abstract identity or abstract universality. Accordingly the essential and real universal, when taken merely in its immediacy, is a mere abstract universal; and from this point of view God is conceived as a being altogether \textit{without determinate quality}. To call God spirit is in that case only a phrase; for the consciousness and self-consciousness which spirit implies are impossible without a distinguishing of it from itself and from something else, i.e. without mediation" (\textit{LL} 108:9:74). In short, God would be nothing.

The fact that Descartes uses the mediated, or deductive knowledge of God's existence to show that the true knowledge of God is immediate, or intuitive, and then uses this immediate, or intuitive knowledge to guarantee, or ground the deductive, or mediated knowledge of everything else, including God's existence, certainly affirms the fundamental identity and truth of thought in general. Indeed, it even seems as if Descartes might finally avoid the trap of pure immediacy by proceeding to a scientific development, or deduction of all knowledge from God, as the absolute first principle. As he says, in the \textit{Principles}: "Now since God alone is the true cause of everything which is or can be, it is very clear that the best path to follow when we philosophize will be to start from the knowledge of God himself and try to deduce an explanation of things created by him. This is the way to acquire the most perfect scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge of effects through their causes" (\textit{PP I} 24:168 [MI]). The only trouble with the acquisition of this perfect scientific knowledge, or the deduction of all things from God, however, is that whereas God is infinite, "we are altogether finite" (\textit{PP I} 24:168). This means
that, although the subject has determined that God exists, and is the ground of the necessity and truth of all of our thoughts, it is precluded from making the required deduction from this absolute ground. As a finite being, the subject is incapable of making any determinations regarding the infinite, "for this would be to attempt to limit it and grasp it" (PP I 26:168-69), in such a way that would immediately render the infinite finite. Hence, as Descartes concludes: "We should never enter into arguments about the infinite" (PP I 26:168). To do so, one would have to make, what is for Descartes, the false assumption that one's own mind is infinite, and, therefore, that one is God, or that there is ultimately no difference between God and finite things (PP I 26:169). Of course, these assumptions will prove to be logically true when we come to the deduction of the categories of finite and infinite in speculative Science, which means that they are not really assumptions. In Descartes' philosophy, however, they remain irreconcilably opposed to one another, which means that the validity of Reason is established in such a way as immediately to render the project of Reason, viz. the deduction of all things from an absolute first principle, an utter impossibility.

This opposition has two important consequences for the Cartesian method of philosophy and science. First, as we have already more or less seen, it establishes intuition, or faith as essential to our knowledge of the truth, even if this faith sometimes seems contradictory to reason. As Descartes says: "We must believe everything which God has revealed, even though it may be beyond our grasp" (PP I 25:168). Naturally, this leads to the possibility of abandoning method altogether, and establishing subjective assertion as the ultimate arbiter of truth in most realms of knowledge, i.e clear and distinct perception, or, rather than abandoning method altogether, using the validity of subjective assertion to justify the assumption of the method of one's choice, or re-opening the door for the scholastic deference to external authority. Descartes himself opts for all of these possibilities. Having established the existence of God, the subject can no longer doubt the truth of what it clearly and distinctly perceives (PP I 30:170). Otherwise, God would be a deceiver, or a creator of falsity, and if God were a creator of falsity, then he would necessarily be an imperfect being, something he cannot be, on Descartes' reasoning, and still remain an infinite being (PP I 29 & 30:170). Since the subject can no longer doubt the validity of its clear and distinct perception, Descartes is also free to re-establish the truth of the two activities he regards as essential to the conduct of the finite sciences, viz. sensation and mathematics. As he says: "Mathematical truths should no longer be suspect, since they are utterly clear to us. And as for our senses, if we notice anything here that is clear and distinct, no matter whether we are awake or asleep, then provided we separate it from what is confused and obscure we will easily recognize - whatever the thing in question - which are the aspects that are regarded as true" (PP I 30:170). He also makes it clear, however, that "[D]ivine authority must be put before our own perception" (PP I 76:188), and, therefore, any method we should choose to adopt on this basis. Although he certainly allows for a realm beyond, or, more aptly, beneath the interest of religious authority, in which one "should give assent only to what he has perceived" by means of a "thorough scrutiny" (PP I 76:188-89), and which we, for reasons already indicated above, may suppose to be that
of material things, or extension, Descartes is not ready to risk abandoning the subject to the absolute power of Reason, which is immanent in the theory of immediate knowledge, and, as we shall see later, would certainly emerge from it, if left to its own development. As he says: "above all else we must impress on our memory the overriding rule that whatever God has revealed to us must be accepted as more certain than anything else. And although the light of reason may, with the utmost clarity and evidence, appear to suggest something different, we must still put our entire faith in divine authority rather than in our own judgement" (PP I 76:188 [MI]).

With regard to the second consequence of the opposition between finite and infinite in Descartes' philosophy, it prevents the subject from ever inquiring into the teleology, or formal and final causes of things, whether we take this telos to refer to the external purposes imposed upon a thing by God, or nature, or, more correctly, to the internal purpose of a thing, that is, the immanent end of its own nature, internal logic, or necessity. The subject is precluded from inquiring into the purpose, or internal necessity of things, because God has already been established as the source of all necessity, or rather, the efficient cause of all things, and beyond the a priori, or innate knowledge of this, the subject, as a finite being, is privy to no more knowledge of the infinite than the fact that it must be, or 'is', as well as certain attributes that are immediately implied by, and, therefore, simultaneously recognized with this fact, i.e. omniscience, omnipotence, eternity, etc. (PP I 22:167). "When dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any explanations from the purposes which God or nature may have had in view when creating them, and we shall entirely banish from our philosophy the search for final causes. For we should not be so arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God's plans. We should, instead, consider him as the efficient cause of all things; and starting from the divine attributes which by God's will we have some knowledge of, we shall see, with the aid of our God-given natural light, what conclusions should be drawn concerning those effects which are apparent to our senses, and we shall be assured that what we have once clearly and distinctly perceived to belong to the nature of these things has the perfection of being true" (PP I 28:169 [MI]). For Descartes, then, human knowledge is limited strictly to figuring out the existence of things in proper causal sequence, and has no business attempting to determine the necessity of things, or their internal relations. In Descartes system, therefore, Reason has nothing to do with the knowledge of how and why, which means that it is not really Reason, which is ultimately only about how and why.

As a result, human knowledge is limited to the strictly random investigation of what the mind happens to find before itself, at any given moment. This is hardly surprising however, for this is precisely how the subject has proceeded since it first discovered the fact of its own existence. As we saw, this fact offered itself to itself, and all subsequent facts merely continue to replay the drama of this original self-offering, in the process of philosophical and scientific discovery. We must recall, that after the subject discovers the fact of itself, it does not really deduce anything new from this fact. Instead, it "looks around in all directions in order to extend its knowledge" (PP I 13:164 [MI]). Except for the fact of
divine revelation, or pre-ordinance (PP I 40:173), then, the Cartesian method of investigation is, at root, nothing more than the enshrinement of fortuitous discovery on the part of a subject, which sets out with no particular direction, or object, that is, its thought is absolutely indifferent with regard to everything apart from itself, qua subject. This quantitative method of procedure is what leads to the degeneration of a priori metaphysics into empiricism. As Hegel points out in his criticism of Descartes' method, in the History of Philosophy: "we see determinations [merely] following one another in an empirical, [or random] manner, and not [being] philosophically proved - thus giving us an example of how in a priori metaphysics generally hypotheses of conceptions are brought in, and these become objects of thought, just as happens in empiricism with investigations observations and experiences" (HP III 237). This gratuitous acceptance of the plurality ideas is precisely what motivates Fichte and Hegel to reject the Cartesian tradition handed down through philosophy and science, and attempt the deduction of all the categories of knowledge from a single absolute principle. For, as Hegel says in the Phenomenology: "to pick up the plurality of categories ... in some way or other as a welcome find, taking them, e.g. from the various judgements, and complacently accepting them so, is in fact to be regarded as an outrage on Science. Where else should the Understanding be able to demonstrate a necessity, if it is unable to do so in its own self, which is pure necessity?" (PhS 142-43:235). As we have seen, however, the subject does not yet recognize itself as pure necessity. Rather, it posits pure necessity outside of itself, in God, the supremely perfect being, which because of this perfection remains an incomprehensible necessity.

C. The Subject as the Intermediary Between Absolute Being & Nothing

Nevertheless, God has been established as the foundation of all truth in Descartes' philosophy. Indeed, it is accurate to say, "the way in which God has been necessarily instituted as the foundation of all truth ipso facto involves the limits of our understanding, [or that the mind is finite,] for God could only have been posited because he infinitely surpasses the possibility of our self, and he is, in the strictest sense of the word, incomprehensible." Thus, even though the subject knows that its knowledge is limited, it also knows that its knowledge is true, or rather, the knowledge that its knowledge is true is simultaneously the knowledge that it is finite. Either way, however, the existence of a supremely perfect, or infinite being, as the guarantee, or foundation of all truth, immediately raises a new problem for the subject, viz. the possibility of error, or falsity. For if God exists, and God is the absolute being and this absolute being is the guarantee of all truth, then everything must be true. However, if everything is true, then nothing is false. Hence, "truth and falsity no longer have meaning, and neither does science," whether we mean, by science, the deduction of all things from God as their efficient cause, or simply, the random investigation into the validity of those ideas that appear in and to the mind at any given moment. This is certainly the case for Descartes, as long as the subject devotes its entire attention to God (MFP 99). For then, as he says: "I can find no cause of error
or falsity" (MFP 99). The subject cannot find a cause for error in the contemplation of God, simply because, as the absolute being and truth, "God is not the cause of our errors" (PP I 29:170). Although this would seem to preclude the possibility of error, Descartes immediately points out, that as soon as the subject turns its attention away from God, and proceeds to reflect upon its own experience, it knows that it is "prone to countless errors" (MFP 99). In short, error is a fact of the subject's existence, which it cannot deny, even though it is difficult to imagine how it is possible for the subject to think about its own experience apart from God at this point, that is, after it has supposedly proved both the existence of God and the intimate, necessary relationship between the idea of God and the mind. Descartes, however, seems willing to again abandon Reason to the imagination, in order to investigate how error, or at least the belief in error might be a possibility for the subject, rather than deny the subject's experience altogether.

1. Negation as Mere Deficiency

The possibility of error gives rise to two questions. First, is it possible for there to be something in the subject that is neither present in God, nor caused by him, and that makes it prone to these errors, even after God has been established as the foundation of all truth? Second, how is this something possible, if God is the efficient cause of all things?

Descartes seeks the answer to these questions in the very same limitedness that is implied in the institution of God as the foundation of all truth, that is, the limitedness of the subject's understanding, or knowledge. In short, he seeks the cause of error in the finitude of and in the human mind. As he says in the Meditations: "On looking for the cause of these errors, I find that I possess not only a real and positive idea of God, or a being who is supremely perfect, but also what may be described as a negative idea of nothingness, or of what is farthest removed from all perfection. I realize that I am, as it were, something intermediate between God and nothingness, or between supreme being and non-being: my nature is such that in so far as I was created by the supreme being, there is nothing in me to enable me to go wrong or lead me astray; but in so far as I participate in nothingness or non-being, that is, in so far as I am not myself the supreme being and am lacking in countless respects, it is no wonder that I make mistakes" (MFP 100). Whereas God, then, constitutes the essence and cause of all being and truth, including the subject's, nothingness seems to constitute the essence and cause of all error. We have already seen, however, that, for Descartes, it is impossible for nothing to be the cause of anything (MFP App., Ax. III:155).

How then can nothing constitute the essence of anything, including the idea of nothing, especially "since there can be no ideas which are not as it were of things" (MFP 93)?

For Descartes, errors, particularly in relation to God, "are not things" (PP I 31:170). They are not real
(MFP 100), and, therefore, may not be said to have an essence. Instead, "they are merely negations" (PP I 31:170), and, strictly speaking, negation, in Descartes' system, appears merely as deficiency (MFP 100), which means as an absence of reality, or being. As a deficiency, negation has no positive efficacy, or, once again, it cannot be said to be the cause of anything. This is why, for Descartes, it is impossible for the subject "to have a faculty [for error] specially ... bestowed by God" (MFP 100). A faculty is something positive, that is, a perfection, and one cannot have either a negative faculty, or, therefore, a faculty for negation, for such a faculty would constitute a perfection that is nothing, or a perfection that is imperfection. Furthermore, God could not bestow such a faculty, or perfection upon the subject, for, as the supremely perfect being, or sum-total of all realities, he must utterly exclude negation, or, more properly, nothing, since the term negation implies the negation of something, a relation which, as we shall see in Hegel's system, cannot help but render pure negativity determinate, thereby, giving it precisely the positive efficacy Descartes attempts to deny.

Absolute being's total and necessary exclusion of nothing may immediately absolve God of responsibility for the subject's errors (PP I 36:172), however, it still does not explain how error is possible. Indeed, to do this, Descartes finds it necessary to abandon the idea of pure nothingness, and turns to precisely what he attempts to deny, viz. the positive efficacy of negativity. As he says: "error is not pure negation, i.e. not simply the defect or lack of some perfection to which I have no proper claim, but rather a privation or lack of some knowledge which somehow should be in me" (MFP 100 [MI]). Otherwise, error, once again, would not be a possibility. Error, then, is determinate negation, or it imminently possesses the positivity it is supposed to lack. For, as we see in Descartes' description, it is determined by a particular content absent from the subject's knowledge, and knowledge is always positive, that is, it must be the knowledge of something, even if that something is absent, or is nothing made into something, viz. the idea of nothing. The knowledge, the absence of which is responsible for error, however, is not, as we see, knowledge that is inaccessible to the subject, i.e. a final cause, or one of God's purposes. This is because, as Descartes points out, the subject should have it. This means then that error cannot arise strictly from the subject's limitedness, or finitude, as previously implied. For what is beyond the subject's knowledge is completely unknown to the the subject, and it is impossible to be mistaken about what cannot be known, just as it is impossible to be correct about it. In short, it is not something the subject should have. "Limitation [of the subject's knowledge, or mind] involves only ignorance; [whereas] error adds to ignorance its affirmation as science - it adds to nothingness its affirmation as being. That is the positive thing that constitutes its essence and that ought not be. If it is thus, error cannot be merely negative. It does not correspond to the least quantity of reality or perfection, to the limitation of a positive quantity, but it is an intrinsic and 'positive imperfection', a negative quantity that destroys the positive quantity. Neither is it a limitation of or absence of being, but a corruption of being, the positing of something contrary to what ought to be. For insofar as some positive element is introduced in error - however contrary that may seem - it is impossible to account for it by nothingness."85 Once again, this is because nothing,
according to Descartes, only causes nothing.

2. Judgement & Free Will

If the possibility of error requires affirmation in addition to ignorance, then it seems clear that error arises only with regard to judgement, but only judgement that does not involve the subject's clear and distinct perception, for clear and distinct perception has already been established as a sufficient criterion for spontaneously determining something's truth, i.e. "the minds of all of us have been so moulded by nature that whenever we perceive something clearly, we spontaneously give our assent to it and are quite unable to doubt its truth" (PP I 43:174). Thus, as Descartes puts it: "We fall into error only when we make judgements about things which we have not sufficiently perceived" (PP I 33:171 [MI]). This means that the material falsity, "which occurs in ideas, when they represent non-things as things" (MFP 93), cannot be the cause of error or "formal falsity," and, therefore, that the subject's intellect is not a sufficient condition for the existence of error. This is because "[t]aken in themselves, ideas include nothing of the false, they have objective realities that always include being in variable quantities, ranging from the infinite (God) to the infinitely small (sensations);" and thus, because Descartes sees the intellect in itself as an essentially neutral, or indifferent faculty, i.e. "when we perceive something, so long as we do not make any assertion or denial about it we clearly avoid error" (PP I 33:171). This is not to say, however, that the intellect plays no part in the production of error. On the contrary, for Descartes, it is still a necessary condition for its existence. Otherwise, the subject would have to be capable of judging something it could not at all perceive, and this, as he argues, is impossible (PP I 34:171). Descartes, therefore, includes it as one of the "two concurrent causes" of error (MFP 101), although, as we shall see shortly, it is definitely the lesser of the two causes.

For Descartes, formal truth and falsity depend on the affirmation or denial of something in judgement, and judgement requires "not only the intellect, but also the will" (PP I 34:171), which is defined simply as the power, or "ability to do or not do something," that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid - in short, the freedom to choose between more or less positive determinations (MFP 101-2 [MI]). Hence, in Descartes' system, "all [of] our errors depend on the will" (PP I 42:173). There is a problem here however. For, unlike the intellect, which is easily recognized as being limited and finite, the will appears to be infinite. As Descartes says: "I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way. Indeed, I think it is very noteworthy that there is nothing else in me which is so perfect and so great that the possibility of further increase in its perfection or greatness is beyond my understanding" (MFP 101 [MI]). In fact, the only real difference that he sees as existing between God's will and the subject's is purely quantitative, i.e. "in that it, [viz. God's will,] ranges over a greater number of items" (MFP 101). Qualitatively, then, that is, "in the essential and strict sense" (MFP 101), the two are the same, that is, at least insofar as God's will may be abstracted from his
understanding in human thought. They share a common essence, which is why the will, of all the subject's various faculties, is the basis of the subject's resemblance to God (MFP 101).

However, if the will is what constitutes the subject's identity with the supremely perfect being, then how can it also be the primary cause of error? Is this not to say the same thing that Descartes has already argued cannot be said, viz. that perfection, whether we call this perfection God or the will, is the source of imperfection, or error?

Just as the intellect in itself cannot be the cause of error, so too, Descartes attempts to argue, the will in itself cannot the cause of error (MFP 102), even though all of our errors, as we have seen, are said to depend on it. This is not only because it is a perfect faculty, and because perfection cannot be said to be the source of imperfection, but also because the will, taken in itself, is also indifferent. Despite Descartes desire, at least in the Meditations, to minimize the indifference of the human will, i.e. as "the lowest grade of freedom," or "a defect in knowledge" (MFP 102), and to even deny that indifference belongs to the essence of human will (MFP 6th Rep.135) in order to preserve the strictly positive nature of freedom, and also to preserve at least the semblance of a distinction between the divine and human will, he cannot help but recognize that indifference is a necessity for free will in general, that is, God's will (MFP 6th Rep.134-35), and that it is the basic condition of the human will taken in its immediacy, or its isolation from the intellect. For instance, in the case of God's will, the denial of its essential indifference would subject his freedom to various necessities, and, thereby, eliminate his status as the total and efficient cause of all things, i.e. truth and goodness (MFP 6th Rep.135). In the case of the subject, the denial of the will's essential indifference would eliminate the possibility of either intentionally withholding judgement (MFP 102-3), or exercising the will independently of the intellect, which, as we shall see shortly, would eliminate the possibility of the subject ever making a wrong judgement, and, therefore, being in error - something Descartes has already claimed to be utterly contrary to the subject's experience. Descartes, however, is not as committed to the denial of the will's essential indifference as he seems to be in the Meditations, which is why, in the Principles, he amends his view in such a way as to suggest its importance. As he says: "we have such a close awareness of the freedom and indifference which is in us, that there is nothing we can grasp more evidently or more perfectly" (PP I 41:173).

3. The Incongruity of the Will and the Intellect, & the Restriction of the Infinite by the Finite

We can now see that error has its cause neither in the intellect, nor the will taken in and by themselves, for both are in themselves indifferent. The cause of error, according to Descartes, therefore, lies in the incongruity, or imbalance between these two faculties, that is, in that "the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect" (MFP 102 & PP I 35:171). The former, as stated above, extends infinitely,
and, therefore, is capable of completely outstripping the latter, which is finite, and, therefore, only extends to a limited number of things. This means that the will can either affirm, or deny something that is completely beyond the intellect's grasp. In other words, error occurs because "I extend its, [viz. the will's,] use to matters which I do not understand" (MFP 102). However, this clearly contradicts Descartes' theory that both the intellect and the will are required for judgement. For if the subject can exercise the will beyond the limits of the intellect, then the intellect cannot be said to be a necessary faculty for judgement in general. Indeed, in the Principles, Descartes expressly acknowledges that the intellect is not required for judgement in general, immediately after having argued that it is required. The subject's will, as he explains, is considered infinite, "since we observe without exception that its scope extends to anything that can possibly be an object of any other will - even the immeasurable will of God. So it is easy for us to extend our will beyond what we clearly perceive" (PP I 35:171-72 [MI]). Indeed, if the subject's will extends to whatever God's will does, then it should be able to pass judgement on anything, whether the intellect perceives it or not. This is because its will, like God's, extends to everything. Contrary to what was said above, then, this would mean that the will in itself is capable of being the source of all errors, and that it is not essentially indifferent. It would also mean that the subject can err without being the slightest bit aware that it does so, which raises serious questions as to the subject's responsibility for error. For how can the subject be held accountable for what it does not and cannot perceive?

Descartes, as we have already seen, does grant the subject the power, or ability to withhold judgement on those things it does not clearly and distinctly perceive, in order that it might avoid error altogether. Indeed, he argues that it is a misuse of freedom to pass judgement on something which the subject does not have a clear and distinct perception of (MFP 103 & PP I 44:174). Confused and obscure perception, however, still implies a certain knowledge, or awareness on the part of the subject, even if it is simply the awareness that there is not sufficient knowledge regarding something, to make a good judgement. Where there is no knowledge, or awareness, however, there can be no such check on the will, which means no possibility of avoiding judgement, or error. However, how can the subject pass judgement upon what it is completely ignorant of? As Descartes says, in the Principles: "it seldom happens that we assent to something when we are aware of not perceiving it, since the light of nature tells us that we should never make a judgement except about things we know" (PP I 44:174). This, however, is not to say that it never happens, or that it is impossible. In fact, it is quite possible for the subject to not be aware of not perceiving something, yet still pass judgement upon it. As Descartes goes on to say: "What does very often give rise to error is that there are many things which we think we perceived in the past; once these things are committed to memory, we give our assent just as we would if we had fully perceived them, whereas in reality we never perceived them at all" (PP I 44:174 [MI]). In short, the subject can imagine that it perceives something which it does not have any perception of whatsoever, and thus proceed to pass judgement on it. Descartes' addition of the memory here is quite superfluous. For the fact is that, since the subject never really perceives the object it
passes false judgement upon, it must conjure up the memory in the imagination, just as surely as it does the object. The memory is merely introduced here, because Descartes assumes that the subject will not mistake imagined clear and distinct perception for actual clear and distinct perception, after the adoption of his method, or, if it does, it will be because of some vestige of its previous confused and obscure thought, which it has failed to expunge through the method of doubt.

Descartes' entire method, however, is called into question by his theory of free will and judgement. This is because the attempt to avoid error by avoiding judgement, should also imply the ability to avoid the truth, that is, to be knowingly indifferent, even when faced with what should be affirmed. Although Descartes denies that this is necessary in the Meditations, where he argues that the subject's most complete freedom is experienced in being compelled by the truth to choose the truth (MFP 102), in the Principles, he points to the ability to avoid the truth, as proof that the freedom of the subject's "will is self-evident" (PP I 39:172). He then specifically refers to the method of doubt and the positing of a supreme deceiver as the conclusive evidence of this fact: "That there is freedom in our will, and that we have power to give or withhold our assent at will, is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions that are innate in us. This was obvious earlier on when, in our attempt to doubt everything, we went so far as to make the supposition of a supremely powerful author of our being who was attempting to deceive us in every possible way" (PP I 39:173). As we have already seen, however, Descartes does not consider such doubt to be a real possibility, since the subject cannot really withhold judgement from what is necessarily clear and distinct, that is, where such things are concerned, judgement must be spontaneous. Spontaneous judgement with regard to immediate truths, however, raises serious questions as to the possibility of Descartes' entire project, for it renders the method of doubt and the positing of a supreme deceiver utterly impossible. In other words, how can the subject be expected to sincerely doubt, or withhold judgement on everything, including God's existence, if it must spontaneously affirm those things that are and must be immediately true, or rather, those things it cannot help but perceive clearly and distinctly? And if it cannot withhold all judgement, how can the subject really be considered to have free will? The answer to both of these questions is that it simply cannot.

Descartes, however, attempts to circumvent these problems by distinguishing between the proper and improper use of freedom. This distinction in turn depends upon his once again distinguishing between those things that must be immediately clear and distinct, viz. first principles, such as God's and the subject's existence, and those things, the clear and distinct perception of which, must be deduced, i.e. the existence of the body (MFP 102-3). The former must be spontaneously affirmed because their truth is a matter of either "divine grace," or "natural knowledge" (MFP 102), that is, they must be affirmed because the recognition of their truth is a matter of absolute rational necessity. The latter, on the other hand, should be neither affirmed, nor denied, because their truth is purely a matter of conjecture, or probability - at least until the subject has established sufficient reason for its knowledge of them to be
considered indubitable - and there is no necessity in what is merely probable (MFP 103). Thus, as Descartes says: "If ... I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoiding error. But if in such cases I either affirm or deny, then I am not using my free will correctly. If I go for the alternative which is false, then I shall obviously be in error; if I take the other side, then it is by pure chance that I arrive at the truth, and I shall still be at fault, since it is clear by the natural light that the perception of the intellect should always precede the determination of the will" (MFP 103 [MI]). Otherwise, the subject can never really be certain that it is not in error (PP I 44:174).

For the subject, therefore, rational judgement, as well as good action - since "we need only judge well in order to act well" (DM 34) - is simply a matter of self-restraint, or of restricting the will in such a way that it conforms to the limits of the intellect (MFP 105). This is because the will, without the clear and distinct perception of the intellect, can only act blindly, and to act blindly, is to spurn all necessity, or to act irrationally, that is, to render accident and error supreme. To engender the irrational in this way is the subject's greatest potential imperfection, since it is based on the ignorance, or nothingness in the subject, and since the subject supposedly has the power "to avoid ever going wrong," and to only ever affirm something (MFP 105). Indeed, the only thing that keeps the subject's potentially irrational action from being the condition of absolute imperfection, or pure nothing is that it involves the will, and, therefore, is still necessarily something. However, if the unrestrained use of the will represents the subject's greatest potential imperfection, then its restrained use of the will must be its "greatest and most important perfection" (MFP 104). As we have seen, however, this perfection is the result of the subject's most perfect faculty, viz. the will, being determined by one that is imperfect, viz. the intellect. In other words, the subject's perfection depends upon what is essentially infinite being limited by what is essentially finite, thereby, being rendered finite as well. The result of this contradiction, or complete finitization of the infinite in the subject is that its highest truth is to be found only in the continuous contemplation of, or meditation upon the truth (MFP 104), and not in the practical activity of determining the truth. For, as something finite, the subject is necessarily excluded from other finite things and from what is actually infinite. No doubt, meditation is supposed to prevent the subject from making rash judgements, or acting impetuously, and, thereby, falling into error, but even the most attentive meditation, since it cannot really participate in either the realm of God, or corporeal nature, cannot make the subject's thought concrete. In short, the subject's thought, of which both the intellect and will are simply modes (PP I 32:171), is forever abstract. This becomes very clear in the philosophy of Fichte to whom we now turn.
Notes


5 The sceptical revolution which marked the end of the medieval view, was largely the result of the rediscovery of classical works by sceptics like Sextus Empiricus, or on scepticism, like Cicero's De Academica, during the Renaissance, and the Reformation, especially the battle between Luther and Erasmus, in which the "recently rediscovered texts of Sextus, Cicero, and others played a major role." (Richard Popkin, Skepticism, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 451-52).


8 Gibson, Philosophy of Descartes, p. 82.

9 Gibson, Philosophy of Descartes, p. 83.

10 Spinoza, Descartes' Philosophy, p. 14.

11 Spinoza, Descartes' Philosophy, p. 23, prop. 1, define. 1.

12 See Gibson, Philosophy of Descartes, p. 77. As Gibson points out, Descartes' appropriation of intuition as the essential form, or act of human knowledge was actually a very audacious theoretical act at the time, since Aquinas had explicitly reserved intuition for God and the angels - M. Maritain 'the sin of pretending to be an angel'.

13 See also Meditations, Selected Writings, p.127-128 on the priority of immediate "internal awareness."

14 See the Encyclopedia, pp. 101-2, para. 66, where Hegel argues for immediate knowledge as the 'product and result of mediated knowledge.'

15 In the Science of Logic, as we shall see, Hegel demonstrates that "there is nothing in Heaven, Nature, Spirit or anywhere else, [i.e. being, thought, or nothing,] which does not contain immediacy as well as mediacy, so that these two determinations are seen to be unseparated and inseparable, and the opposition between them null." (p. 80).


As we have already seen in Hegel’s treatment of being, Descartes can claim that essence and existence are identical in God, because God is the absolute being, which is simply the abstraction from all determinate beings. Thus, while it is true that absolute being is unique, or absolutely distinct from all other particular beings, so that it is legitimate for Descartes to claim that God is distinct from the body and all material things, absolute being is only unique, because it is the only being that is absolutely identical with all other beings. Hence, it is just as legitimate for any philosophy that seeks its ground in the idea of God as an absolute being, to make the exact opposite claim with regard to God’s corporeality, viz. that God has a body, or includes extension as part of his essence, or even to make both claims simultaneously, viz. that God does and does not have a body.

35Gibson, Philosophy of Descartes, p. 105.
Descartes use of the terms objective and formal are the opposite of contemporary usage, and the use to which they are applied in this work in general.

Williams, *Descartes*, p. 141.


Spinoza, *Descartes' Philosophy*, p. 41, prop. IX.


Williams, *Descartes*, p. 150.


Gibson, *Philosophy of Descartes*, p. 130.

Williams, *Descartes*, p. 150.

Spinoza, *Descartes' Philosophy*, p. 130.

Spinoza, *Descartes' Philosophy*, p. 139.


Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 199.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 201.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 196.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 194.


Spinoza, *Descartes' Philosophy*, p. 74, prop. VI, Scholium.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 199.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 197.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 197. See also the letter to Mersenne, 18 November 1640 [III], pp. 245-46.


Spinoza, *Descartes' Philosophy*, p. 81, prop. XV, Demonstration.
Gueroult makes a good argument for Bergson's characterization of Cartesian time as "cinematographic." (pp. 194-201).

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 201.


Spinoza, *Descartes' Philosophy*, p. 139-40.

This phrase is used by Hegel when describing Anselm's version of the ontological proof. See *History of Philosophy*, vol. III, p. 63.

Anselm, *Proslogion*, p.117.

Anselm, *Proslogion*, p. 117.


Anselm, *Proslogion*, p. 117.

Charlesworth, *St. Anselm's System, Proslogion*, p. 27.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 205.


Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 213.


Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 221.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 221.

Gueroult, *Soul and God*, p. 221.
Chapter 2

Fichte & the Project of Philosophy

In the History of Philosophy, Hegel points out that Fichte's philosophy begins in exactly the same way as Descartes', i.e. "with the T as indubitably certain" (HP III 228). Indeed, even though Fichte himself declares that his philosophy is simply that of Kant presented by means of a different method (SK 4), it is Descartes' avowal, in the Meditations, to think only about the self without the interference of anything external, which is immediately brought to mind, when he actually opens the First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge (1797): "Attend to yourself: turn your attention away from everything that surrounds you and towards your inner life; this is the first demand that philosophy makes of its disciple. Our concern is not with anything that lies outside you, but only with yourself" (SK 6). As we saw with Descartes then, philosophical thought for Fichte must begin from a standpoint of renunciation, or complete doubt towards everything that is not itself thought, e.g. ideas, representations, etc., and thus also from the recognition of what alone is necessary and true, or what alone cannot be doubted, and, therefore, what alone makes knowledge possible. In short, thought must begin from itself, or rather, the self.

Like Descartes, Fichte does not necessarily mean the particular, personal self or individual. For this would immediately reduce his project to a kind of crude individualism, which, although definitely a consequence of the limitations inherent in his system, cannot necessarily be said to be its aim. Furthermore, it would have the equally immediate effect of rendering truth a purely private affair, making any further progress, i.e. beyond the mere assertion of this purely indeterminate, or abstract individual, utterly impossible. As we shall see, Fichte, like Descartes, does not escape this view of truth, however, he is scathingly critical of individualism intentionally playing too great a role in philosophy. For him, a clear distinction must be made right away between the self and the individual. This is because the former has priority over the latter, that is, the self is what makes individuality possible, and what individuality should in turn merely be a moment towards the completion of, viz. the universal, rational self (SK 74). Attention to the self, therefore, does not mean self-indulgence of either the psychological, or material kind. For, as we shall see, both in Fichte's and Hegel's philosophies, such indulgence leaves precious little self to be indulged. Rather, attention to the self simply means introspection, or reflection upon the "modifications of our consciousness" (SK 6). In short, it means self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness, however, immediately reveals itself as contradictory. On the one hand, various modifications, or presentations of the subject's consciousness appear to depend only upon itself, i.e. on the subject's ability to conjure them from imagination and nothing else. In such presentations, therefore, the subject has a feeling of complete freedom (SK 6). It can determine them however it
pleases, and, therefore, is not restricted in any way. On the other hand, however, many of the subject's presentations do seem to be determined by things other than, or external to itself, just like Descartes' adventitious ideas. Thus, these presentations are accompanied by a feeling of necessity, or a feeling that the self is determined, rather than determining (SK 6). According to Fichte, only these presentations are of any importance to reflection. For any question as to the nature of presentations accompanied by the feeling of freedom, that is, why they are the way they are, is utterly meaningless. They are the way they are, as stated above, because the subject has so determined them, and they could just as well have been determined any other way the subject desired (SK 6). They are, as it were, products of pure caprice, and this, at least for Fichte, neither explains anything, nor necessitates explanation.

Presentations accompanied by the feeling of necessity, however, call the subject's freedom into question, and this immediately raises the need for explanation both with regard to freedom and with regard to what restricts it. In other words, the subject's experience, which, according to Fichte, is just the "system of presentations accompanied by the feeling of necessity" (SK 6), causes it to question whether or not it is truly free, and thus whether or not it is truly a subject. This question in turn causes the subject to seek out philosophy in order to "furnish the ground of all experience" (SK 6), i.e. through philosophy, the subject must seek to answer the question: what determines me through experience? It must do this so that it may then answer the question: am I really free? Just as we saw with Descartes then, reflection, or the need for philosophy as the highest form of reflection, arises out of a crisis of certainty in the subject. In Descartes' system, it is the subject's uncertainty as to whether or not it really exists. In Fichte's, it is the subject's uncertainty as to whether or not it is really free, which is in fact the same thing, since freedom, in idealism, is considered to be prior to existence, or is regarded as the essence of existence. With regard to idealism then, one may say that freedom is the subject's existence as a subject, and philosophy's task may be further refined as the furnishing of the ground of all experience in order to guarantee the subject's existence qua subject.

Experience itself cannot guarantee existence. Rather, it produces the very crisis out of which the subject seeks to remove itself through reflection. Fichte, therefore, infers that philosophy too must be removed from the realm of experience. It must put itself, as it were, outside of experience, because the ground of experience, or "its object necessarily lies outside all experience" (SK 8). According to Fichte, this self-exclusion of reflection from the realm of experience is necessitated by the law of ground, which requires that the ground and grounded be opposed, or that the two fall outside of one another (SK 8). Thus, since the ground of all experience is the object of philosophical reflection, and not experience itself - for this, the philosopher, like everyone else, already possesses - its inquiry must lead beyond the merely grounded, i.e. beyond mere experience. Even for Fichte, however, that ground and grounded are opposed, and consequently that philosophy's course necessarily leads away from the grounded, does not mean that the two are entirely separate. They are, as he is quick to point out in the
First Introduction: "opposed ... yet linked together" (SK 8). In other words, the ground does at least explain the grounded (SK 8), but this is the extent of their relationship. If the two were absolutely opposed, i.e. separate, then the ground could not accomplish even this. For it is the nature of entirely separate things to be utterly indifferent to one another, i.e. to behave as if the other did not exist at all. Reflection would then have no basis for its inquiry at all. Experience would be independent, and this, according to Fichte, is precisely what it is not. Experience is completely dependent or contingent, and it is so, simply because of the fact that one can and does inquire into its ground (SK 7). As he goes on to say, therefore: "One can ask for a reason only in the case of something judged to be contingent, viz. where it is assumed that it could also have been otherwise, and yet is not a matter of determination through freedom ... The task of seeking the ground of something contingent means: to exhibit some other thing whose properties reveal why, of all the manifold determinations that the explicandum, [or first something] might have had, it actually has just those that it does" (SK 7-8 [MI]).

From this passage, as well as from his notion of the law of ground in general, we can already see that this law will be of vital importance to Fichte's project and his entire notion of philosophy. For when the question which naturally follows from the proposition that philosophy's object lies outside of experience is posed, viz. 'Where?', he can simply answer with the only other place possible, viz. 'in the self'. We can also see, at this early stage, therefore, that he will have to be attacked on this law, if any refutation of his system or notion of philosophy is to prove successful (SK 8) - something he does not believe to be a possibility, since such a refutation would have eventually to argue, against the overwhelming tide of philosophical opinion since Aristotle that there is a unity of the ground and grounded, and, therefore, that two things can be the same thing at one and the same time. It should also be clear, however, that the notion of ground relied upon here is wholly one-sided, and thus, as we shall see in Hegel's philosophy, which is based on a refutation of the law of external ground, completely untenable. Indeed, the opposition which Fichte posits between the ground and grounded can already be seen to be breaking down in his own introduction of the law, and in such a way that each cannot merely be said to be linked to the other, but, in fact, in the process of becoming that other.

To explain this briefly, by inquiring into the reason of something, one seeks out its necessity. Now, although this is certainly confirmation of that something's contingency, i.e. that it is not its own reason, but something which finds its reason in something else, insofar as it provides the reason for something else, and, therefore, is also a ground, it also contains necessity, and, therefore, is not contingent. Fichte of course will argue that this may seem to be true in an immediate sense, but that it is ultimately only the self which is capable of providing both its own and everything else's reason, and, therefore, of constituting the one true ground, that is, the ground that grounds itself, or rather, that to which the principle of grounding does not itself apply (SK 22). However, because this self, as free in itself, is also, as Fichte pointed out at the start, absolutely contingent when considered apart from experience, i.e. considered apart from the presentations accompanied by the feeling of necessity, or
simply as *pure caprice*, it must also be the quintessential *grounded* something, that is, it contains no reason or necessity in itself. As such, it, therefore, provides the first and best example of the ground immediately producing the grounded, and the grounded immediately falling back to, and thus becoming ground. In short, it is the best example of the identity or unity of ground and grounded, and, therefore, the transcendence of the notion of external ground, contrary to Fichte's intent as it has so far been presented. We shall return to the concept of ground in detail, as it occurs in both Fichte's and Hegel's systems of Science. For the moment, however, a problem arises as to how the philosopher can gain access to something outside of experience, or simply, how he can separate himself from experience in order to find its ground.

As Fichte concedes in the *First Introduction*: "A finite rational being has *nothing* beyond experience; it is this that comprises the *entire* staple of his thought" (*SK 8 [MI]*). The subject, therefore, as a finite, rational being, would appear to be circumscribed on all sides by experience. However, if this is so, then the question must arise as to how the philosopher can furnish the ground of what lies outside of or beyond what he supposedly has nothing beyond, i.e. experience. The philosopher after all is human, and, therefore, "necessarily in the same position" as all other human beings (*SK 8*). Philosophy's task of providing the ground of all experience, therefore, would seem to be impossible by Fichte's own admission. Reason, however, as Fichte comments later in the *First Introduction*, does not set itself demands that it cannot satisfy, nor tasks it cannot fulfill. For it cannot proceed without having firmly established each step in its progress, i.e. a chain of reasons (*SK 27*). Thus, even though the subject is a finite being, and, therefore, wholly absorbed in its experience, it is also a rational being, which, for Fichte, simply means that it has the power of *abstraction*, or the same negative force that we encountered in Descartes' philosophy as thought's ability to dissolve all determinacy into itself. For Fichte, abstraction appears simply as the power to "separate what is *conjoined* in experience through the freedom of thought" (*SK 8 [MI]*). Through abstraction then, the philosopher can supposedly separate being and thought, or, in Fichte's terminology: "the thing, which must be determined independently of our freedom and therefore to which our knowledge must conform, and the intelligence, which [simply] must know" (*SK 8 [MI]*)

Within the bounds of experience itself, the thing and the intellect are inseparably connected. However, through the power of abstraction, the philosopher seems capable of considering the two in isolation from one another, and so also, from experience, thereby, enabling him to determine its ground. Although this will be taken up in detail further on, we should note here that such a separation by means of abstraction is only an apparent possibility, not a real one, even for Fichte. This is because one cannot separate what is not in fact *conjoined*, and, according to Fichte as we shall see, nothing is actually conjoined in experience. For, in his system, the *thing is not real*, and, therefore, *does not exist* (*SK 10-13*). He merely uses the image of separation to reveal the division and entrenchment of modern thought into what he sees as two great opposing camps, viz. *dogmatism* and *idealism*.  

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A. The Absolute Opposition Between Dogmatism & Idealism, or the 'Two Worlds' of Modern Thought

Fichte sums up the positions of these two opposed forms of thought quite succinctly in the First Introduction. The philosopher, who in the process of abstracting, denies thought, or the intellect, while preserving a thing-in-itself as the ground or explanation of experience, is a dogmatist. The philosopher, on the other hand, who abstracts from experience, and denies the thing-in-itself, "while retaining an intelligence in itself," is an idealist (SK 8-9 [MI]). According to Fichte, these are the only two possible philosophical systems. However, it quickly becomes evident that he regards idealism as the only true, and, therefore, actual, philosophical system. Indeed, towards the end of the First Introduction, he concludes that dogmatism is not philosophy, "but merely an impotent claim and assurance" (SK 19). "Idealism [therefore] is left as the only possible philosophy" (SK 19) This is largely because the idealist, in abstracting from experience, does so from its "relation to experience," whereas the dogmatist abstracts the thing-in-itself "from the fact that it occurs in experience" (SK 8 [MI]). This means that the intellect or self has an a priori autonomy, which the thing-in-itself does not enjoy, and, therefore, on the law of ground, as it has been presented so far, is the only possible candidate for the ground of experience. In short, the thing-in-itself is a product of abstraction, whereas the intellect is not. As Fichte says with regard to the intellect: "it will indeed become clear ... that what is to rank as intelligence is not something produced merely by abstraction, but under a different predicate really has its place in consciousness" (SK 9). Of course, the qualification that the intellect's autonomous reality is something in consciousness might seem to negate both the intellect's presumed autonomy, as well, therefore, as the idealist's fundamental position, before it has even been demonstrated. However, the fact is that consciousness is the only place where reality occurs for Fichte, and thus the only place idealism, as he sees it, need consider. Everything, for idealism, is a determination of consciousness, and these determinations are explained, as we shall see, only "on the basis of the activity of the intellect" (SK 21). This is not to say that the issue of what is truly real in Fichte's system is resolved at this point. For, as we shall also see, particularly when we come to Hegel's critique of his system, it is quite valid to ask whether or not Fichte demonstrates his claims regarding the intellect so completely as to escape the very thing he attempts to refute, viz. the thing-in-itself. This issue, however, must be postponed until the fundamental principles of his system are given full consideration, and, therefore, until the contradictions both in and between these principles begin to emerge, i.e. in his Science.

According to Fichte, the opposition between dogmatism and idealism is the consequence of an irresolvable difference between their objects. They are, as he says: "exact opposites: they inhabit two worlds between which there is no bridge" (SK 17). One, therefore, can only be affirmed at the total expense, or utter denial of the other. What, however, constitutes an object? For Fichte: "Everything
of which I am conscious is an object of consciousness" (SK 9). This means that there are three possible objects: 1) the object of imagination, 2) the object of experience and 3) the actual object. The first two, as we have already seen, appear to be the products of the intellect or freedom and the thing-in-itself or necessity, and are consequences of the power of abstraction. In other words, they are both contingent, and, therefore, cannot constitute the ground of all experience. The third, however, supposedly exists in-itself, but can be determined, in essence, by the intellect, and is, therefore, the only object that the philosopher should be concerned with. This is because it is the only object that is not abstract. Rather, it possesses reality as its own quality. Fichte calls this object, the self-in-itself (SK 10).

In the First Introduction, the self-in-itself is posited in a somewhat dialectical fashion, that is, through a consideration of dogmatism's object, or the thing-in-itself. As Fichte explains, the subject is free to turn its thought to whatever it chooses, which in this case happens to be the thing-in-itself. This thing-in-itself thus becomes an object for thought. Indeed, inasmuch as the thing-in-itself is an abstraction from all things in particular, it appears to be the object, and as such, what is distinct from the self thinking about it. In short, it seems to be independent of thought. If, in thinking about this object, however, the self abstracts further, i.e. from what is thought, then it too becomes just "such an object" (SK 10). Why? Simply because it then thinks about itself thinking, thus rendering thought an object as well. For Fichte, however, this object is not quite the same as the thing-in-itself, though it will prove to be otherwise in the speculative critique of his system. First of all, in regarding itself, it appears to be determined strictly as an object that thinks, the content of thought aside. Hence, as with Descartes, the self, as an object, is also a thinking thing (sum res cogitans). However, as such, it is determined only by itself, and, therefore, is, as it were, determined to be self-determining. Consequently, the content of its thought "should ... depend on self-determination," or simply, on the self, rather than the other way around, as with dogmatism (SK 10 [MI]). Second, although the self has "freely made [itself] into ... an object, [it has] not made [itself] as it is in itself; on the contrary, [the self] is compelled to presuppose [itself] as what is to be determined by self-determination" (SK 10 [MI]). This is because thought, as we found in Descartes, cannot abstract any further than this, that is, from itself as the object. In other words, the self must always and only presuppose itself if it is to be maintained as a dynamic object, i.e. as one capable of determining itself. For to re-create itself in-itself would mean that it would have to do so in what, as we shall see later, is its original, spontaneous, creative activity, and, as should be immediately apparent, a re-creation of such activity would be a contradiction, negating everything this activity is supposed to be, viz. original, spontaneous and creative. Thus, the self would itself be rendered nothing more than a dead, or empty thing-in-itself, which is precisely what the dogmatist is reproached for in Fichte's philosophy. Indeed, if we anticipate the conclusion that follows from the logic at work here, we discover that the self does not make itself in-itself, but rather, simply presupposes itself. It does so because there is no such thing as real in-itselfness, or being for Fichte. There is only pure activity, that is, the act of thought (SK 21).³
The self, therefore, as an object, depends only on the intellect, which means that it is an invention determined purely by the activity of thought, just like the thing-in-itself. However, it is simultaneously the object "whose existence must always be presupposed" (SK 10 [MI]). Just like Descartes's cogito then, it is always immediately given. The self must be assumed to exist regardless of anything else, that is, regardless of the sum content of thought, i.e. how something is, what something is, or even, whether something is. It is precisely what cannot be abstracted from. Consequently, it is the only object that "actually occurs as something real in consciousness" (SK 10), making it the only wholly real thing whatsoever. It enjoys this reality, however, neither as a thing-in-itself, nor as an object of experience. It is not the latter, because "it is not determined, but will only be determined, [as it were,] by [itself,] and without this determination, [viz. self-determination,] is nothing and does not even exist," thus making it "something that is raised above all experience" (SK 10). It is not the former, simply because the thing-in-itself, as Fichte claims, "has no reality whatsoever" (SK 10). The thing-in-itself is a pure invention, and, therefore, cannot even be really said to "occur in experience" (SK 10 [MI]). The reason for this is simply that, for Fichte, "the system of experience is nothing other than thinking accompanied by the feeling of necessity" (SK 10), which means that only the self, i.e. the being that thinks, exists, even in experience, regardless of the feeling of necessity, which also must be produced in and by the self, and not, as the dogmatist assumes, the thing-in-itself.

Fichte thus rejects the ground upon which the entire edifice of dogmatism claims to stand, and so also its chauvinistic claim to be the most realistic of systems. The dogmatist needs to guarantee reality for the thing-in-itself, so that he can use it to explain experience, and, therefore, also to guarantee experience's truthfulness (SK 11). As Fichte points out, however, this presupposes exactly what needs to be proved, rather than presupposed. The dogmatist, by basing his explanation of experience on an unproven presupposition, and furthermore one which Fichte argues is a pure invention or idea, proves only that he is the worst idealist. This is because the dogmatist's presupposition is not a necessary presupposition, like the proper idealist's, whose object "has this advantage over the object of dogmatism, [viz.] that it may be demonstrated ... in general, in consciousness" (SK 11). In other words, the idealist's object can be demonstrated, because, as already stated, it is immediately present in consciousness, and, therefore, just like Descartes' cogito, is self-evident. The self is the only thing which may be presupposed, because it is precisely what must be presupposed. This of course means that the object is not in fact demonstrable, but must simply be always and already present at the moment of self-consciousness, which "each person must freely create ... in himself" (SK 11).

A question immediately arises then, as to how one can be certain of one's fellow beings. How can one know that others are selves, like the self one presupposes for oneself, and, therefore, that they are even capable of the same experience in general?
Because "this consciousness cannot be demonstrated to anyone" (SK 11 [MI]), one cannot be certain of the other. One must simply assume this consciousness in one's fellow beings, just as one does in oneself, and then proceed upon that basis. We shall deal with the specific nature of this assumption when we come to deal with Fichte's notion of intellectual intuition, in the Science. For the moment, however, we should at least note that the necessity of this assumption bespeaks the principle of infinite resistance, which preserves the integrity, and thus ultimate exclusivity, of otherness in his system, regardless of its form, i.e. as either subjective, or objective. Otherness, as we shall see, can never be completely broken down or overcome in Fichte's philosophy. Consequently, it is forever asserting and re-asserting its impenetrable despotism over the subject, e.g. as the absolute ought of the moral law, the infinite of the religious consciousness, the absolute Other of abstract power, or the moral standpoint, etc. This not only leaves Fichte vulnerable to the charge of solipsism, despite attempts by his various 'inter-subjectivist' defenders to argue otherwise, it also leaves the subject incapable of maintaining itself by any other means than absolute violence towards the other, whether this other appears in objective, or subjective form, i.e. as a thing, or a self-consciousness, and thus ultimately towards itself as well. In short, the subject must vanish in the face of the absolute otherness that characterizes both modern philosophy and the Cartesian world of the moral standpoint.

This goes some way in explaining Fichte's uncompromising view of the relationship of absolute opposition, and thus, annihilation between dogmatism and idealism. As he sees it: "each denies everything in its opposite, and they have no point at all in common from which they could arrive at a mutual understanding and unity" (SK 12 [MI]). In short, any synthesis between the two is utterly impossible. The reason for this, as said above, resides in the total incompatibility of their objects and the conclusions each system comes to based upon these objects. As Fichte points out, with regard to dogmatism: "everything that appears in our consciousness, along with our presumed determinations through freedom and [even] the very belief that we are free, is the product of a thing-in-itself" (SK 12-13 [MI]). This means that there can in fact be no freedom for dogmatism. Dogmatism simply uses the term, when it deigns to use it at all, as a receptacle for what it is unable to explain by means of its essential metaphysic, viz. causality. In other words, where no positive cause has been found to explain the origin of something, the dogmatist simply attributes it "to freedom" (SK 13). Indeed, he may even feel or appear to himself as free. However, this freedom is still simply the result of the limitations of his thought, i.e. that he has not yet discerned his place in the totality of nature, which determines him in all that he ever was, is and will be (VM 14). As Fichte says in The Vocation of Man, momentarily taking up the dogmatist's position: "In immediate self-consciousness I appear to myself to be free; [however,] in reflection on the whole of nature I find that freedom is unfortunately impossible" (VM 15). It is impossible, because the dogmatist explains the self as an effect of the thing-in-itself, thereby, placing freedom itself within the causal chain, and making it into something dependent or contingent, that is, something not free. Taken to its logical conclusion, therefore, dogmatism denies freedom by supplanting it with the notion of mechanism, or a complete determinism, which is why
Fichte makes his famous accusation that: "Every consistent dogmatist is necessarily a fatalist" (SK 13). For the dogmatist: "Whatever I am and become I am and become necessarily, and it is impossible for me to be anything else" (VM 14). "I don't act at all but nature acts in me. I cannot will the intention of making myself something other than what I am determined to be by nature, for I don't make myself at all but nature makes me and whatever I become. I can regret, be glad, and make good resolutions - leaving aside that strictly speaking I cannot do even that either, but rather everything comes to me of itself when it is determined to come to me - but all my regret and all my resolutions won't change in the slightest what I must become. Strict necessity has me in its inexorable power; if it determines me to be a fool and to be given to vice, then without a doubt I will become a fool and be given to vice; if it determines me to be wise and good, then without a doubt I will be wise and good. It is neither that necessity's fault or merit nor mine. It is subject to its own laws and I to its" (VM 19 [MII]).

As we can see, it follows from this strict determinism that the dogmatist must not only deny the existence of freedom, but also the existence of an independent self, which is just what idealism relies upon (SK 13). Fichte, therefore, makes a second charge against the dogmatist, i.e. that "the consistent dogmatist is necessarily also a materialist" (SK 13). We shall refer to this brand of materialism as abstract materialism, since, although Fichte's charge is relatively accurate, the materialism that emerges out of idealism after Fichte and Hegel, viz. that of Marx, is as, if not more, opposed to what Fichte means here by materialism, viz. determinism and empiricism. The consistent dogmatist must be an abstract materialist, because he "construes the self merely as a product of things, an accident of the world" (SK 13), just like any other particular thing. The opposition between dogmatism and idealism, then, is not just a conflict of objects, but also of principles, viz. of dependence and independence, necessity and freedom, and there can be no possibility of either refuting the other, since, as we have already seen in the Introduction, refutation implies at least a latent acceptance of your adversary's ground and principle, if for no other reason than to actually negate it. Here, however, the acceptance of one principle is taken to automatically imply the complete rejection of the opposite principle, meaning, therefore, that the conclusions of the system based on the one "annihilate" those of the system based upon the other (SK 13). A relationship such as this, based as it is on a logic of annihilation, as already stated, pre-empts any possible synthesis between the two systems. Such a synthesis, as far as Fichte is concerned, presupposes the impossible, i.e. it "presupposes a continued passage from matter to spirit or its reverse, or what is the same, a continued passage from necessity to freedom" (SK 13); and any attempt to develop a system based on this presupposition leads only to an "immense hiatus," or to inconsistencies and contradiction (SK 13). Thus, what Fichte quite rightly sees as necessary for a reconciliation of the two systems, or rather, their principles, yet wrongly sees as an impossibility, is a system of contradiction. For Fichte, however, the notion of a system of contradiction is itself a contradictory proposition, since his notion of system, like the dogmatist's, is of something that does not contradict itself in its unfolding and development, even though he expressly
rejects the principle of non-contradiction in the Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge (1797) (SK 67). Fusions are the closest one can come to producing such a system, and fusions are merely aggregates in which "the parts do not mesh" (SK 13). In short, they are not systems.

By rejecting the possibility of a synthesis between dogmatism and idealism, Fichte seems to lead modern philosophy into an impasse which allows for nothing more than a choice of sides in an irresolvable conflict. For the two systems, as he says: "cannot co-exist, [and] neither one can make headway against the other" (SK 13). One's choice, therefore, comes down to "whether the independence of the thing should be sacrificed to the independence of the self, or conversely, the independence of the self to that of the thing" (SK 14). Now Fichte, as we have seen, has already stated that the object of one system is superior to that of the other. However, this in itself is not enough to determine one's choice in the conflict between dogmatism and idealism, or rather, it does not explain why some individuals choose one system of philosophy instead of the other.

What, therefore, motivates someone to become either a dogmatist or an idealist?

It is certainly not Reason. For Fichte's notion of Reason, as we shall see when we come to Hegel's critique of his Science, is still under the sway of the quantitative process, and, therefore, despite his best intentions, dogmatism's metaphysics of causality as well. As such, Reason cannot provide an absolutely first principle, i.e. one that does not collapse in an infinite regression. This is why, on the question of the choice between dogmatism and idealism, Fichte himself concludes: "Reason provides no principle of choice; for we deal here not with the addition of a link in the chain of reasoning, which is all that rational grounds extend to, but with the beginning of the whole chain, which as an absolutely primary act, depends solely upon the freedom of thought. Hence the choice is governed by caprice, and since even a capricious decision must have some source, it is governed by inclination and interest" (SK 14-15). Once again then, we see that, for Fichte, caprice or chance, i.e. the essence of freedom, has priority, but even so, he attempts to stop short at the threshold of complete irrationalism by attributing a source even to chance itself, viz. interest.

But what kind of interest can maintain the self as both free and rational?

For Fichte, it is self-interest. It is not self-interest in its crude Hobbesian determination, e.g. as mere personal welfare and gain, although this, as we shall see shortly, is certainly one of the two general expressions of self-interest in the moral standpoint, and a necessary consequence of the absolute opposition present in Fichte's system. Rather, it is self-interest as "the desire to maintain and assert the self in the rational process" (SK 15 [MII]). Without such constant self-maintenance and assertion, the self, according to Fichte, would simply vanish, and allowing the self to vanish in such a way, must be regarded as the epitome of irrationality. Thus, rational self-interest constitutes the "highest interest
and ground of all others," and governs all thought processes, especially the choice of a philosophy (SK 15). Such self-interest expresses itself in two forms of self-determination, of which dogmatism and idealism are simply the highest formal embodiments. These forms of self-determination are more fundamental than either of their philosophical manifestations, because they are, according to Fichte, indicative of the "two levels of humanity, ... [or] two major types of man" that exist, "before the second level is reached by everyone in the progress of our species" (SK 15).

What are these two levels of humanity, these two kinds of selves?

Although Fichte does not use these specific terms, the two kinds of selves are egoists and egotists, or those who determine themselves by means of egoism and egotism, respectively. Egoism and egotism, which will be defined shortly, have been chosen and distinguished from one another here, because they best describe the processes that make their first mature appearance in Fichte's philosophy, which, like the world of which that philosophy is argued to be the highest theoretical expression, viz. the world of the moral standpoint, is supposed to be grounded upon the notion of the absolute Ego. Egoism and egotism make their first appearance in general, and in Fichte's philosophy, as absolutely opposed forms of self-determination. As we shall see in the course of their development, however, especially when we come to Hegel's master/slave dialectic, they not only depend on one another, but also pass into, or become one another. For the moment though, we need merely keep in mind that egoism and egotism are the essential forms of self-determination in the modern world, and that all other conflicts, particularly the one between dogmatism and idealism, are nothing more than abstract manifestations of the dialectic subsisting between them.

B. The Appearance of Egoism & Egotism as the Two Possible Forms of Self-Determination in the Modern World

What are egoism and egotism?

According to Fichte, those who determine themselves through egoism are not yet fully conscious of the subject's absolute freedom and independence (SK 13). Consequently, they "find themselves only in the presentation of things; they only have that dispersed self-consciousness which attaches to objects, and has to be gleaned from their multiplicity. Their image is reflected back at them only by things, as by a mirror; if these were taken from them their self would be lost as well; for the sake of their self they cannot give up the belief in the independence of things, for they themselves exist only if things do. Everything they are, they have really become through the external world" (SK 15 [MI]). Egoism then, which is the ground of dogmatism, is self-determination immersed in determinate being. It is an essentially positivistic, indirect and, as we shall see, quantitative form of being, which subjects the self to what it necessarily sees as the external world, in order to preserve itself.* This means that it too is a
dependent and external form of being, i.e. a mere something. The egoist, as Fichte makes plain, finds one’s self-value simply in the magnitude of being, the most common example of which is the collection and possession of things, things in which the egoist posits some mysterious creative power.\(^5\) If we, like the egoist, define power generally as the intensity of being, or rather, the capacity to remain in being once present,\(^6\) then we find that one is only as powerful, or one’s self is only as intense, as the sum total of that mysterious power inherent in the things one possesses. In short, the egoist is powerless in him or herself, since his or her self subsists merely as a conduit for the power of things, and thus for the external world.

Although egoism, as we shall see, particularly when we come to Hegel’s treatment of the slave in the *Phenomenology* (see Appendix 1), does constitute one of the two essential moments of the moral standpoint, as well, then, as its first positive determination, it is, for Fichte, as corrupt, and, therefore, false, as its philosophical expression, viz. dogmatism. Hence, it is opposed by what he sees as the true form of self-determination, i.e. egoism’s antithesis, or egotism. As such, egotism is necessarily the standpoint of idealism, and, therefore, of Fichte himself. The egotist, or idealist, as Fichte describes him, is one “who becomes conscious of his self-sufficiency and independence of everything that is outside himself, however - and this can be achieved only by making one’s self into something independently of everything else - does not need things for the support of himself, and cannot use them, because they destroy that self-sufficiency, and convert it into mere appearance. The self which he possesses, and which is the subject of his interest, *annuls* this belief in things; he believes in his independence out of *inclination*, he embraces it with feeling. *His belief in himself is direct*” (*SK* 15 [MI]). Thus, unlike egoism, egotism is an essentially qualitative, but abstractly negative form of being, e.g. what in Hegel’s philosophy will immediately correspond to *essence*, or that part of the will involving the element of indeterminacy. For it excludes the external world, and appears to preserve itself through its direct, or immediate relationship with itself. The egotist subjects him or herself to no thing-in-itself, but considers him or herself a self only insofar as he or she relies upon him or herself, and maintains an independent stance towards what appears to be the world around him or herself. He or she believes themselves to be an absolute power unto themselves, because they have realized that they are an absolute Ego. Indeed, this is why for Fichte, as for all egotists, the truth is ultimately a matter not of *proof* and *objective reasoning*, but of *conviction* (*SK* 82).

Conviction is simply that purely subjective condition of immediate self-certainty in which the self has established its independence from the thing or object in it otherness, e.g. the external, sensuous world, but, as we shall see in Hegel’s philosophy, has yet to realize, or denies the object’s independence from it (*PhS* 106:168). The self has yet to realize, or denies the object’s independence, because it is indifferent to what appears as an other to it, or rather, because its certainty of itself, as the only true object, is, at the same time, the certainty of it’s other’s essentially negative character, viz. that the object, or thing-in-itself is really *unessential*, and, therefore, as Fichte has already informed us, *nothing*
at all. Conviction, therefore, is just consciousness' emergence, as self-consciousness in philosophical or reflective form, and the expression of this form is what Hegel, in the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology, calls: "the motionless tautology ... I am I" (PhS 105:167). As we shall see in the next chapter, this tautology constitutes both the ideal starting point and end of Fichte's entire philosophy, or Science. As a consequence of conviction, or the immediate self-certainty of self-consciousness constituting the ultimate criterion of truth, the truth and its philosophical expression, such as it is, are a purely solitary, mute and changeless affair, which Fichte ironically provides eloquent testimony to in the Second Introduction. As he says: 'If even a single person is completely convinced of his philosophy, and at all hours alike; if he is utterly at one with himself about it; if his free judgement in philosophizing, and what life obtrudes upon him, are perfectly in accord; then in this person philosophy has completed its circuit and attained its goal. For it has assuredly set him down again at the point whence he started with all the rest of mankind: and now philosophy, as a science, is genuinely present in the world, even if no man but this should grasp or accept it, and even if this one should be quite unable to give it outward expression ... Conviction is that alone which has no dependence on time or change or situation; which is not something merely contingent to the mind, but is the mind itself. One can be convinced only of the unchanging and eternally true [viz. the absolute self, or Ego]: conviction of error [viz. in anything apart from that absolute self,] is utterly impossible" (SK 81 [MII]).

A problem immediately arises for self-consciousness as this undifferentiated unity or condition of conviction however. For, although the external object or thing-in-itself has been reduced to a mere appearance, i.e. something that in itself is nothing, or in itself is something simply and purely for-another, viz. for consciousness, and, therefore, reduced to something seemingly unessential to self-consciousness, which is its own essential object, the external object immediately becomes essential for self-consciousness' existence qua the essential object. In other words, self-consciousness, qua the essential object, must be opposed to what is unessential in order for it to be essential. Thus, the object, or thing-in-itself becomes more than just a mere appearance. It becomes an independent object as well, and thus challenges self-consciousness in its simple unity. The logic of this development will become clear, when we deal with Hegel's analysis of the categories of essence in the Science of Logic, and the master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology, where he, unlike Fichte, shows that both moments, i.e. subject and object, egotism and egoism, idealism and dogmatism, etc., are essential (PhS 115:189), and, therefore, that these determinations not only depend on one another, but also become one another, in the process of their transcendence. Indeed, even the division that Fichte posits between them is so untenable that it begins to show signs of strain in his descriptions of egoism and egotism, as so far encountered in the First Introduction.

Briefly, egoism, which is supposedly a purely positivistic form of self-determination, i.e. consciousness in its thinghood, by subjecting the self to the external world, negates itself in order to,
as Fichte puts it, indirectly affirm itself. Hence, egoism must introduce negation, i.e. as self-negation or suppression, into the process of self-determination in general, thereby, making it possible for negation to ultimately become the primary mode of self-determination, and thus transform the egoist into an egotist. Egotism, on the other hand, must negate everything else, i.e. deny, abstract, or annihilate it, in order to make itself independent. Now, although Fichte wants to stress the independence and negativity, that is, negativity as the exclusivity of the self, in egoism, he recognizes, as we saw above, that this is only achieved for the self as something. Admittedly, this something's special quality is that it contrasts itself with everything else. However, it is still a something, and, therefore, related to what is deemed merely positive. This is why the egotist, on Fichte's description, must be satisfied not so much with the actual independence and self-reliance of one's self, but with the feeling of and belief in this independence and self-reliance, i.e. with the conviction that one is free and right. The egotist's self, therefore, is essentially positive, despite its overtly negative form, making it possible, even necessary, that this positivity will at some point gain priority in the process of self-determination, and so transform egoism into a kind of egoism. Just how this occurs is dealt with in the analysis of Hegel's master/slave dialectic, since Fichte does not really recognize this as a legitimate possibility. The question at the moment, however, and one which shall shed more light on Fichte's one-sided, yet, nonetheless, dialectical view of the relationship between these two forms of self-determination, is how dogmatism proves itself to be the inferior standpoint in relation to idealism, especially since the two cannot, as he insists, refute one another.

We saw above that self-interest causes an individual to choose one philosophy over another, meaning, therefore, that one's choice depends upon the kind of self one wants to be, or more accurately, already is. We also saw that there are two kinds of individuals or selves, viz. the egoist and egotist, and that each chooses a philosophical system because its fundamental principle is consonant with their method of self-determination. What, however, happens after the choice has been made? The dogmatist, as Fichte describes him, lives in constant fear of attack. For he intuitively knows that "an attack on his system exposes [him] to the danger of losing his self" (SK 16). Ironically, he is in danger of losing his self, simply because "he is not armed against this attack" (SK 16), despite the colossal edifice of positive being, i.e. the entirety of Nature, which he erects around himself. In other words, his so-called system provides him with no actual techniques for self-defense, because it does not account for the possibility of anything other than mere things, or because it does not account for the possibility of a true self to be defended.

As Fichte notes, however, because even dogmatism's object, i.e. the thing-in-itself, as a pure invention, must be the consequence of some self's activity, albeit an arrested, and thus deformed self, "there is something within the dogmatist that sides with the attacker" (SK 16). What is this something? Simply, it is his own suppressed self or T, which he has never come to know, since he lacks, as it were, the concept of this concept (SK 74), but without which he could never have invented
the concept of a thing-in-itself. As a result, the dogmatist is not only nagged by a constant fear of attack from without, but also, according to Fichte's reasoning, a chronic feeling of uncertainty or suspicion within, i.e. self-suspicion, both literally and figuratively. Thus, if and when an attack does occur, or seems imminent, the dogmatist responds with all the hysteria, or "passion and animosity" (SK 16), of one who secretly has confidence in neither his or her defenses, nor his or her capabilities. For such a person has never known just what either are. They are not, as it were, a man or woman of conviction, but, instead, the epitome of belligerent insecurity.

"By contrast, the idealist [supposedly] cannot refrain from regarding the dogmatist with a certain contempt, for the [dogmatist] can tell him nothing save what he has long since known and discarded as erroneous; for one reaches idealism, if not through dogmatism itself, at least through an inclination thereto. The dogmatist flies into a passion, distorts, and would persecute if he had the power: the idealist is cool and [only] in danger of deriding the dogmatist" (SK 16 [MI]). In short, the idealist regards the dogmatist with a lordly indifference. Why? Simply because the idealist has realized that the self is all that one truly possesses, and that whatever things the dogmatist may attempt to marshal against this self are so many appearances, which cannot have any effect upon what alone is real, viz. the self. Insecurity and self-doubt, therefore, are impossible for the idealist. For how can he doubt precisely what he knows cannot and must not be doubted? Indeed, in the Second Introduction, Fichte is incredulous that his acknowledged master, Kant, should not have been completely convinced of his own philosophy, and thus self, but instead should speak as a man plagued by "a deception which constantly recurs, even though one knows it to be a deception ... He [Kant] could have had this experience only in his own person [that is, as a mere individual, rather than as a self]. To know that one is deceived, and yet to be deceived, is not the state of conviction and agreement with oneself, but rather that of an unstable inner conflict, [in short, self-doubt]. In my experience there is no recurrence of deception: for in reason generally there is no deception present" (SK 82 [MI]).

We can see that the dogmatist, for Fichte, then, is nothing more than a man who craves the security of an immediately necessary existence, "in which he [can] always take refuge under all afflictions that might now and then assail him" (SK 69), but which does not require his comprehension in order to exist. The idealist, on the other hand, knows that there is no security in such existence, that there is no security in existence at all, and, therefore, that the notions of security and existence are mere appearances, or illusions. Thus, whereas dogmatism is merely an abstract expression and justification of the desire to exist without the responsibility of independent thought and work, idealism is the knowledge that "the only positive thing is freedom; [and that even] existence ... is a mere negation of the latter" (SK 69). Fichte's idealist supposedly knows that humanity is responsible for everything, or that everything is achieved solely through its constant thought and work. In other words, everything is derived only from its freedom, including, or especially existence (SK 69). Where the dogmatist is worthy only of contempt then, the idealist, at least for Fichte, inspires respect, if not awe and
admiration. Fichte portrays the dogmatist as an individual arrested by simple egoism, and thus also by fear. Hence, like the slave which we shall encounter in Hegel’s analysis, the dogmatist, or egoist possesses a slavish consciousness. He is in bondage to objectivity in the form of things-in-themselves. Unlike the slave, however, whose consciousness is no mere inclination in the development of true self-consciousness, but instead an essential moment, Fichte’s egoist is not allowed to work through his fear, and, thereby, realize the "essential nature of self-consciousness, [viz.] absolute negativity, [or the] pure being-for-self, which ... is implicit in this consciousness" (PhS 117:194). In the context of Fichte’s system, as we shall see, it is impossible for the egoist to do this, since the acceptance of one principle of self-determination automatically implies a refusal to recognize the other.

This does not mean, however, that all is lost for the egoist, and that he must simply be written off altogether. For it is evident, from what has been said so far, that dogmatic insecurity is, even for Fichte, a latent affirmation of the idealist’s position, and, therefore, of the truth, viz. the absolute self. This is because the egoist’s suppressed self, in the fact that it is a self, necessarily implies a secret desire in the egoist to be free, and, therefore, that self-consciousness, as already stated, is implicit in his consciousness. According to Fichte, it is merely a matter of casting off the chains of one’s dogmatism, and choosing to become an idealist, or rather, an egoist, in order to realize this secret desire or implicit truth. It is an immediate, spontaneous act, as opposed to a process in which the act is realized, as it is in Hegel’s system. In the dogmatic world, then - and the world, by virtue of its appearance as independent objectivity, cannot help but be dogmatic in Fichte’s system - the egoist, or idealist emerges as the enemy within, and the T as an entity that thrives on individual insecurity. In short, the egoist, or idealist, in Fichte’s system, appears as the terrible champion of a subversive self.

Indeed, it is this self’s subversiveness, and hence the subversive role of the idealist, that allows Fichte to claim that dogmatism and idealism cannot refute one another, while, at the same time, ensures dogmatism’s demise and idealism’s triumph. By engaging the dogmatist, the idealist does not refute, or even pretend to refute, dogmatism. He or she merely plays upon the dogmatist’s inherent insecurity, and, thereby, encourages him or her to refute themselves before the world. As Fichte says, at the beginning of the Second Introduction, with regard to those already prejudiced by philosophical dogmatism: "we must imbue them with a mistrust of their own rules" (SK 29 [MI]). In other words, dogmatism must be compelled to prove its own untenability to itself, by revealing to all its complete inability "to explain what it must," viz. the fact of presentation or thought (SK 16). It cannot do this, according to Fichte, simply because its "principle contains only the ground of being, but not that of presentation, [or thought,] which is the exact opposite of being" (SK 18 [MI]). Consequently, the dogmatist must either dismiss the whole notion of thought or presentation, or, since this might seem too outrageous even for the most nescient egoist, "take an enormous leap into a world quite alien to their principle" (SK 18). There are a variety of ways in which dogmatism may attempt to "conceal this
leap” in order to maintain at least the semblance of consistency in a system that otherwise demands the strictest sequential progress, i.e. from cause to effect. For example it might posit a soul, or a (re)active thing (SK 18). However, it must still ultimately end in either an irreconcilable dualism, as found in Descartes, or an utter denial of thought (SK 19-20).

C. Idealism

&

the Deduction of the Necessary Laws of the Intellect

Idealism, according to Fichte, does not have this problem, a) because it begins with precisely what it seeks to explain, i.e. thought, or presentation, which means that it does not need to make a qualitative transition from one substance to another, and b) because its principle supposedly already contains the ground of both thought and being within itself, i.e. at least to the degree that the latter can be said to exist in and for idealism, as Fichte envisions it. Idealism begins with the intellect, and the intellect, as we have already seen, in Descartes, and, to some extent, Fichte, is its own object. As such, it must be the immediate comprehensive knowledge or intuition of itself, or rather, the immediate knowledge or intuition of itself as something comprehensive and complete. As Fichte puts it in the First Introduction: “The intellect as such observes itself; and this self-observation is directed immediately upon its every feature. The nature of intelligence [therefore] consists in this immediate unity of being and seeing, [i.e. being and presenting, or thinking]. What is in it, [viz. the intellect-in-itself,] and what it is in general, [viz. absolute,] it is for itself; and it is that, qua intellect, only insofar as it is that for itself ... The intellect is ... necessarily what is for itself, and requires nothing subjoined to it in thought. By being posited as intellect, [then,] that for which it exists is already posited with it” (SK 17 [MI]). Nothing else can make this claim, or have this claim made for it. Things-in-themselves certainly exist as objects. However, they neither posit themselves, nor exist as objects in and for themselves. Otherwise, they would be intellects, not things. Insofar as things exist in themselves, therefore, they are merely objects for another, i.e. for thought, and, therefore, insofar as things do not exist in themselves for thought, they do not exist. Thus, things-in-themselves are thought, or rather, determinations of thought posited by thought, and it is the task of idealism to explain, or deduce these determinations not necessarily from the freedom of the intellect, but certainly "on the basis of the activity of the intellect" (SK 21), which is free.

"The intellect, for it, [viz. idealism,] is only active and absolute; it is not passive because it is postulated to be first and highest, preceded by nothing which would account for a passivity therein" (SK 21). In other words, something is passive only insofar as it is determined by something else, which is not itself; and since the intellect must be completely self-determining in order to be an intellect, it must be purely active, even, as we shall see in the next chapter on Fichte's Science, when it appears to be completely passive. This means then, that the intellect "has no being proper, no
subsistence" (SK 21). Furthermore, since the intellect is absolute, it means that there is no proper being, or subsistence at all, i.e. no being as such, only being for thought, or thought's being, which is being-for-self. Being as such, or being-in-itself, as we shall see clearly in Hegel's Science, necessarily involves being-for-another, or relation, albeit as exclusion. However, even exclusion implies the presence of something else, where, according to Fichte: "there is nothing either present or assumed with which the intellect could be set to interact" (SK 21), or relate. For idealism, therefore, there is only the intellect, and this intellect "is an act, and absolutely nothing more; we should not even call it an active something, for this expression refers to something subsistent in which activity inheres" (SK 21).

A problem arises here however. For Fichte's notion of idealism, despite some genuinely speculative or dialectical qualities is still, as previously stated, essentially non-speculative. Idealism, as explained by Fichte himself, must deduce the determinations of thought or "specific presentations" (SK 21) from the activity of the intellect, which is absolutely free; and this is the same as saying that the intellect is not a being as such, or something, but rather an act, pure and simple. The intellect, therefore, would seem to be essentially indeterminate, i.e. it is not limited either from within, or without. However, this would then mean that idealism, in order to fulfil its proper task of deducing specific presentations from, on the basis of the activity of the intellect, has to deduce what is determinate from what is essentially indeterminate. In other words, it would have to show how something can arise from nothing, i.e. it would have to be transcendent idealism (SK 21-22). However, as Fichte says in keeping with the majority opinion in logic and philosophy from Aristotle to Descartes: "a determinate cannot be deduced from an indeterminate" (SK 21 [MI]). In short, nothing cannot produce something, even if that something is merely a specific or determinate presentation, and not a being as such, or thing-in-itself.

But how then can idealism proceed?

As Fichte says, it must simply assume that the act is determinate from the start (SK 21). Furthermore, since this act cannot be determinate without being determined, it must be self-determined (SK 21). Otherwise, it could not also be absolute. This, however, is not to say now that the intellect is something. For that this act is determinate simply means that the intellect "can only act in a certain fashion" (SK 21 [MI]). In other words, a limit must be posited in order to constitute an act, or rather, the act, since the former once again implies that activity is no longer absolute. Fichte calls the need to act in a particular way the law of action, and, from this law, infers that there are "necessary laws of the intellect" (SK 21). The necessity of these laws is supposedly what constitutes the subject's feeling of necessity in experience. However, as we can see, it is implied that it is a completely self-generated feeling of necessity, i.e. one that does not have its origin in externality. It is the intellect's feeling of "the limits of its own being" (SK 21), i.e. being in action, since that is the only time or place in
which being is supposed to exist for Fichte. Thus, the feeling of necessity is simply the feeling that the self, or intellect must act by limiting itself, and must limit itself by acting. Now, according to Fichte, that the intellect must act in a certain way in order to constitute itself, or rather that the intellect has necessary laws by which action proceeds, comes into being, takes shape, etc., is the "one and only rationally determined and genuinely explanatory assumption" (SK 21) that can be made in thought or by philosophy. It is 'rationally determined', because it is necessary. It is an assumption, however, because it can, as we shall see in the next chapter, never actually be proven. It can only be assumed to be true. Otherwise, everything, even this assumption, would be rendered an impossibility. For necessity would then have to be deducable from, or have its ground in freedom, chaos, or pure arbitrariness, and, as Fichte has already made clear by his rejection of transcendent idealism, this is completely contradictory (SK 22). Unlike Hegel, he cannot, as we shall see, conceive of a ground of the ground, or actually self-grounding ground, which renders the absolute ground demonstrable, while, at the same time, preserving it as absolute.

According to Fichte, however: "the intellect's assumed laws of operation themselves constitute a system" (SK 22), which simply means that the intellect itself is a system, i.e. a system created by the free act of the intellect (SK 28). It also means that the reason it acts in a particular way, in specific circumstances, can be deduced from "definite modes of operation," under more general conditions, and, furthermore, that these definite modes of operation can ultimately be deduced from a "single fundamental law," i.e. the primordial law, or that the self be necessarily self-determining, and that it necessarily do this by means of presentation, or thought (SK 22). Thus, most false philosophies can be attributed, as we have seen, simply to erroneous assumptions as to what the fundamental law actually is. This is precisely the problem with the dogmatist, who assumes that the laws of causality are fundamental, when in fact they are merely one of the self's definite modes of operation, which should be deduced from a higher law, and so on, until the absolute law is reached (SK 22). Idealism's task at this point, therefore, is to reveal these laws or this system, in all of its manifold connections.

There are, however, two ways in which idealism can attempt to do this. It would seem clear, from what has so far been said, that the only method of procedure would be to provide an explicit deduction of the intellect's laws or categories from one another, thereby, revealing the system as only a system can be revealed, i.e. systematically and entirely. There are, however, idealists, according to Fichte, who attempt to posit these categories as "already and immediately applied to objects" (SK 22) - the assumption being, whether intentional or not, that the objects are not produced out of these categories, but merely organized by means of them. Such idealists, therefore, take up their, so-called, categories ready made, and attempt to affirm them as inherent laws of the intellect, without the all important deduction of both categories and objects. Whereas idealism in general allows itself only one assumption, viz. that of necessity, which it then attempts to prove by means of a complete logical sequence, this other form of idealism proceeds on assumption after assumption, or from one object to
the next with no real deductions. We encountered the tendency towards this method of procedure in Descartes' somewhat arbitrary treatment of ideas in his metaphysics, and, saw that Hegel criticized this so-called method for being the same as that of empiricism, i.e. it is entirely random, and, therefore, completely contrary to the nature of thought, which is itself pure necessity, or Reason. Thus, we shall call this arbitrary form of idealism, dogmatic, or analytic idealism.

Such idealism attempts to explain the laws of intellect by means of an object, without directly abstracting from that object, and thus working its way back to the point where it has to reconstitute the system of categories in its entirety. The problem then, is that analytic idealism, according to Fichte, never sees the process by which the object arises, nor how any of the other necessary laws of the intellect are produced. "Hence [the analytic idealist] can in no way confirm that his postulated laws of thought are really laws of thought, really nothing but immanent laws of the intellect" (SK 23). He has no real knowledge of the intellect itself. "Such idealism is, therefore, unproved and unprovable" (SK 24), and as such, must proceed by means of utter caprice (SK 28), or what Hegel calls, "a dogmatism of assurance, or ... self-certainty," in the Phenomenology (PhS 33:54).

Naturally, this renders idealism vulnerable to attack by the dogmatist, who, seeing the object's presumed independence untouched by what he correctly considers the dogmatic idealist's mere assertion to the contrary, "maintains ... that [these laws] are universal properties of things grounded in the nature [of things themselves, rather than the intellect]" (SK 23). Thus, one purely assertoric judgement can be legitimately supplanted by the contrary judgement, and so on, except that the analytic idealist, being incapable of accounting for the origin of the object, i.e. he can merely account for its "dispositions and relations" (SK 23), ends up indirectly affirming dogmatism's object, especially when asked to say what possesses the dispositions and relations. For then he can only answer, 'substance', 'matter', etc., which are nothing more than other ways of talking about dogmatism's thing-in-itself. As Fichte says: "We know well enough that the thing comes into being surely through an action in accord with these laws, [viz. causality and substance,] that it is nothing else but the totality of these relations unified by the imagination, and that all these relations together constitute the thing; the object is surely the original synthesis (my italics) of all these concepts. Form and matter are not separate items; the totality of form is the matter (my italics), and it is through analysis that we first obtain individual forms" (SK 23). The question, however, is: how one can and does know this?

Because analytic idealism cannot demonstrate how it knows what it claims to know, its knowledge is grounded in pure caprice, and its method is purely arbitrary. Its knowledge, therefore, is not really knowledge at all. For it does not have access to the "necessity which is the fundamental law of all reason" (SK 25). In other words, it does not know what reason is, and, therefore, cannot, really be said to have knowledge. Nothing, for it, is necessary. Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, although it too would seem to be grounded upon pure caprice, i.e. insofar as its principle and method are the
result of an absolutely free act of the intellect, has the proof of this fundamental necessity as its goal, i.e. through having freedom as its goal (SK 25). For Fichte, the difference between the two is essentially a difference between how freedom proceeds, that is, either "lawfully or capriciously" (SK 25). As stated earlier, idealism's general advantage over dogmatism is that its object, its fundamental principle is demonstrated immediately in consciousness. However, as we have just seen, if idealism simply relies upon the immediate consciousness of its claims, it also degenerates into dogmatism. Thus, its claims so far, i.e. "that from [reason] one can deduce the whole system of our necessary presentations - not only of a world whose objects are determined by the subsuming and reflective judgement, but also of ourselves as free practical beings under laws - [are] mere hypothesis. Idealism must prove this hypothesis by an actual deduction, and this precisely is its proper task" (SK 25 [MI]).

The actual deduction of necessary presentations constitutes both the form and content of Science itself, of which Fichte gives an important description at the end of the First Introduction. It is important because it establishes the standard by which his own, as well as all subsequent systems claiming to be scientific, must be judged: "It, [viz. idealism,] shows that what is first set up as [the] fundamental principle and directly demonstrated in consciousness, is impossible unless something else occurs along with it, and that this something else is impossible unless a third something also takes place, and so on until the conditions of what was first exhibited are completely exhausted, and this latter is, with respect to its possibility, fully intelligible. Its course is an unbroken progression from conditioned to condition; each condition becomes, in turn, a conditioned whose condition must be sought out" (SK 25). It is certainly to Fichte's credit that he realized the importance and necessity of revealing the conditions of reason in an unbroken progression. For otherwise, as already made clear above, one does not have Reason. However, one cannot always achieve what one sees as necessary, and, as we shall see, Fichte is never able to exhaust, as it were, the conditions of Reason. This causes his deduction to succumb to a false quantitative infinite, which means simply that "the entirety of experience [that] must emerge as the final result, as the totality of the conditions of the original premise" (SK 84), never in fact emerges, at least not as a totality. Instead, it becomes lost in an ever increasing approximation of this totality in and by consciousness (SK 84). In other words, as we shall see in the following chapter, Fichte reduces this totality to a mere series (SK 28), and, therefore, the self to a mere quantum. Thus, we must now proceed to Fichte's Science and the attempted deduction of the necessary laws of the intellect. For this is where the limitations of his philosophy, and thus the moral standpoint, truly begin to reveal themselves in full.
Although this notion is implicit in the First Introduction, it is in the Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge, in an attack on his critics, that Fichte makes it clear: "In brief, selfhood and individuality are very different concepts, and the element of composition in the latter is very plain to see. By the former we contrast ourselves to everything outside of us, and not simply to other persons; and under it we include, not merely our specific personality, but our mental nature generally."

"But our critics stand firm on their inability to frame the concept required of them, and we must take their word for this. Not that they have been wholly deprived of the concept of the pure self through mere rational or mental deficiency; for then they would have had to abstain from objecting to us, just as a block of wood is obliged to do. It is the concept of this concept that they lack and cannot rise to. They certainly have it within them, and are merely unaware of possessing it. The ground of this inability of theirs does not reside in any special weakness of intellect, but rather in a weakness of their whole character. Their self, in the sense they give to the word, that is, their individual person, is the ultimate goal of their action, and so also for them the boundary of intelligible thought. To them it is the one true substance, and reason a mere accident thereof. Their person does not exist as a specific expression of reason; on the contrary - reason exists to help this person along in the world, and if only the latter could get along equally well in its absence, we could do without reason altogether and there would be no such thing. This is apparent in every claim made throughout the entire system of their concepts; and many among them are honest enough to make no secret of the fact. In declaring their inability, these latter are, for their own part, perfectly correct; only they should not give out as objective truth what is only valid for themselves. In the Science of Knowledge, we have exactly the opposite relationship; there, reason is the only thing-in-itself, and individuality merely accidental; reason the end, and personality the means; the latter merely a special way of giving expression to reason, and one which must increasingly merge in the general form thereof. Reason alone is eternal, on our view, while individuality must constantly decay. Anyone who does not first accommodate his will to the order of things will also never obtain a true understanding of the Science of Knowledge." (pp. 74-75).

This particular conception of the law of ground will eventually lead to one of Fichte's, modern philosophy's, and the moral standpoint's most distinguishing self-deception's, viz. freedom's other worldliness, or its unrealizability in the realm of practical human experience, and thus to our understanding that this deception, as well as its violent consequences, can only be overcome by means of a wholly speculative, or dialectical system, rather than a merely partial one, as, we may already conclude, i.e. on the basis of the law of external ground, we are confronted with in Fichte's philosophy. This is because a truly speculative system, as we shall see when we come to Hegel, is one that is based on the unity of ground and grounded, and not simply on their opposition.


We shall see when we come to deal with egotism, in both Fichte's system and Hegel's, that the appropriate counter to this charge is: "Every consistent idealist is necessarily a terrorist;" and thus, ultimately as fatalistic as the dogmatist.

The positivistic, quantitative and external nature of egoism is implied in the ordinary use of the term, i.e. as indicating a person who is excessively self-interested. Egotism, on the other hand, although often used interchangeably with egoism in ordinary usage is distinct from egoism insofar as it implies an inwardness, or self-obsessiveness not necessarily implied by egoism, i.e. excessive use of the term 'I'. (OED)

See Fichte, On the Vocation of Man, Find Quote.

Benedict Spinoza, The Ethics and Selected Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), p. 37, prop. 11, Third Proof: "To be able to not exist is weakness; on the other hand to be able to exist is power, as is self-evident."

This will be the first sign of pure being-for-self in the slave, in Hegel's master/slave dialectic.

As we shall see when we come to deal with Fichte's Science per se, the idealist knows this immediately through intellectual intuition.

This is like Hegel, but we get an inversion here which is characteristic of all societies that retain a master/slave relation regardless of how mediated. What is it? Simply the belief among the master class that
those who do the work in society are inherently lazy and that they would immediately cease to work, if the master class did not somehow make it imperative for them to do so.
Chapter 3

Fichte's Science of Knowledge

The task of Science, as Fichte states at the beginning of *The Science of Knowledge* (1794-95), "is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge" (SK 93). For with the discovery of this principle, as Descartes made clear, it becomes possible to put an end to the doubt and uncertainty that plague human thought. As with Descartes' *I think, therefore I am*, which we saw in Chapter 1 could in no way be regarded as a syllogism, this first principle also "can neither be proved nor defined" (SK 93). It can neither be proved nor defined, because both of these processes necessarily imply mediation, and mediation implies the dependence of what is proved or defined. In other words, if the first principle is not absolute, then knowledge is susceptible to either the problem of infinite regression, or mere assumption. Of course, that the first principle can neither be proved nor defined seems to make this last problem inescapable, though, as we saw in the last chapter, for Fichte there is a world of difference between mere assumptions, such as those made by dogmatism, and the necessary presupposition of idealism. Be that as it may, like Descartes' cogito, the first principle is and must be self-evident, or immediately true; and nowhere does Fichte make this more clear than in his prospectus, *Concerning the Concept of Wissenschaftslehre*, where he says: "All knowledge is based on this principle, and apart from it no knowledge at all would be possible. It itself, however, is based upon no other knowledge; it is the principle of knowledge as such. It is absolutely certain; that is, it is certain because it is certain. It provides the foundation for all certainty; that is, everything that is certain is so because it is certain, and if it is not certain, then nothing is (my italics). It provides the foundation for all knowledge; that is, if one has any knowledge at all then one knows what this principle asserts. One knows it immediately as soon as one knows anything at all. It accompanies all knowledge. It is contained within all knowledge. It is presupposed by all knowledge" (CCW 109:2).

Strictly speaking, however, this first principle is not the actual foundation for all human knowledge. Instead, as he makes clear in *The Science of Knowledge* itself, it is merely "intended to express that Act which does not and can not appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible" (SK 93 [MI]). It cannot appear among the empirical states, facts, or determinations of consciousness, simply because an empirical state, fact, or determination is something conditioned by something else, and, therefore, not the cause or condition for the possibility of consciousness as a whole or totality, only other specific states, facts, or determinations thereof. Fichte, therefore, posits an absolute Act as the condition for the possibility not only of every state, fact, or determination of consciousness, including an absolute fact, i.e. the first principle, but also consciousness as such; and, even though this absolute Act does not appear in consciousness, it nonetheless must always be present with, or as consciousness. As he says with regard to the project of Science, therefore: "there is less risk that anyone will perhaps thereby fail to
think what he should - [for] the nature of our mind has already taken care of that - than that he will thereby think what he should not” (SK 93). In other words, we cannot help but think the Act, even when we are in complete error as to what the Act is. We can only express it badly or incorrectly.

Consequently, thought can never really err in beginning its search for this Act. For it is present, as we saw with regard to the object of dogmatism, viz. the thing-in-itself, even in the most fallacious of thoughts. Science, therefore, may begin anywhere. One need merely "reflect on what[ever] one might at first sight take it to be, and abstract from everything that does not really belong to it" (SK 93), viz. its empirical content or determinations. In both Concerning the Concept and The Science of Knowledge, Fichte makes it very clear that this reflective abstraction, or abstracting reflection, since neither can occur without the other, is essentially free (CCW 127-28:7 & SK 94), so "that it matters not from whence it starts" (SK 94) in any of its activities, including, or especially Science. Of course, once a start is made, it becomes a different story altogether. For then, as he explains most clearly in Concerning the Concept, thought’s activity is completely determined by the demands of the particular science to which it has committed itself (CCW 122:5). This, however, is an issue that does not concern us here, since we have yet to make a formal start in Science. The point here is that reflection may start anywhere it so chooses, so long as it is completely thorough in abstracting from or negating everything that can be negated by abstraction. For, as we shall see once again, Fichte, like Descartes, holds that we must ultimately and necessarily arrive at a point where something can not be abstracted from, in, or by thought, viz. thought.

Despite this freedom, however, Fichte does not advocate Science beginning purely at random. For this might turn out to be a largely superfluous, not to mention monumental, exercise, depending upon where we eventually chose to begin. On the contrary, since the work of abstracting from the determinations or empirical content of consciousness, as well as reflecting on its pure form, is something that has already been largely accomplished in and by the particular science of logic, one need merely begin with logic in order to make a beginning in Science, or the science of science as such (SK 93-94). This does not mean that Fichte, contrary to what was said in the first section of the Introduction, sees any essential relationship between logic and Science, as does Hegel. For, although both are "supposed to establish the form of all possible sciences," Science is also supposed to establish all content as well. It does this, as Fichte tells us, because its form and content, which represent absolute form and content, are identical (CCW 122:6). Logic, on the other hand, supposedly has nothing to do with the content of knowledge, or any of the particular sciences, since it is the result of a "free separation of mere form and content" (CCW 123:6). Of course, this does not mean that logic entirely lacks content. For, as Fichte also makes clear in Concerning the Concept, every proposition must have both a form and a content, regardless of the particular science to which it belongs (CCW 109:2). Rather, it means that its content is what is "merely form in the Wissenschaftslehre" (CCW
Nevertheless, logic still offers a legitimate and, above all, convenient point of entry to and for Science. This is because the Act must still be immediately thought as the absolute ground or foundation of knowledge in logic (SK 93). It must be immediately thought in logic, a) because, as we have seen, this Act must always be thought, regardless of the particular science in and through which thought determines itself, and b) because no science is more abstract than logic, so that to inquire into the source of its laws is necessarily to reflect upon the origin and nature of thought in its purity, i.e. apart from the content of experience. In other words, there is no place else for thought to go from logic except itself, and, therefore, Science, i.e. as the representation of thought in itself, or, as we saw in the Introduction, as thought thinking itself as such. This is not to say, however, that Fichte thinks that anything is proved in logic prior to Science, or, for that matter, that the logician is aware that he or she thinks this Act as such in the practice of his or her particular science. On the contrary, logic, in and by itself, for Fichte, never enables one to think this Act as such. For the Act is absolute, and, therefore, actual, content, something logic traditionally has nothing to do with, except insofar as it is a constituent part or product of this content (CCW 6:124), and this Act, as will only be discovered in and through the Science itself, is essentially unthinkable, i.e. it is strictly a matter of intellectual intuition. In fact, as should already be obvious, given that Science is the ground of all of the particular sciences, nothing can actually be proved or thought in the particular science of logic prior to the Science (SK 93). For, as with all of the other particular sciences: "Prior to the Wissenschaftslehre, one may not presuppose the validity of a single proposition of logic - including the law of contradiction. On the contrary, every logical proposition and logic in its entirety must be deduced from the Wissenschaftslehre. We have to show that the forms which are established within logic really are the forms of a particular content within the Wissenschaftslehre. Logic, therefore, derives its validity from the Wissenschaftslehre, but the validity of the latter is not [at all] derived from the former" (CCW 124:6 [MI]).

The validity of logic, however, is not yet at issue for Fichte, only the most expedient point of entry to Science. Indeed, one might argue that the validity of logic need never be at issue for Fichte, since only the Science is something absolutely necessary (CCW 124:6) "Logic, on the other hand, is an artificial product of the freedom of the human mind, [and, therefore, essentially arbitrary]. Without the Wissenschaftslehre, no knowledge or science would be possible at all; without logic, all of the sciences could still have come into being, only somewhat later. The former is the sole condition for all the sciences; the latter is [merely] a highly beneficial device for securing and facilitating scientific progress" (CCW 124:6 [MI]). For Fichte, therefore, logic is helpful insofar as it "offers us the shortest road to our goal" (SK 94), but it is not, as we saw in the Introduction, at all essential. Of course, this purely instrumental view of logic is, as has already been argued in the Introduction, what firmly positions
Fichte's system within the moral standpoint, and what establishes his Science in direct opposition to the thoroughly speculative standpoint of Hegel. This is because, in the first instance, logic, which is the process of mediated knowledge, or Reason, is eventually subordinated to the subject's supposedly immediate form of knowledge, i.e. intellectual intuition, which is the absolute arbiter of truth for the moral standpoint, and because, in the second, Hegel demonstrates quite clearly throughout his system that logic is absolutely essential to everything, especially Science. This aside for the moment, the question certainly arises here as to what this particular, unproven and unessential science of logic could possibly provide as a point of entry to and for Science. According to Fichte, it provides a proposition of apparent absolute and immediate certainty, i.e. one that no one could possibly deny, the validity of logic notwithstanding (SK 94).

A. The First Principle of All Human Knowledge, or the Law of Identity

This proposition is A is A, or the law of identity. According to Fichte, this law is immediate and absolute, because it requires no more than its mere positing to be explained, or demonstrated. It is, therefore, self-evident or "intrinsically certain" (SK 94). As such, it is an absolute assertion, which, as we shall see shortly, is simply the expression of the subject's power of absolute self-assertion, or positing, since only a self, according to Fichte, can provide its own ground. In logic, however, the proposition, or law of identity is still only a hypothetical judgement. For logic, according to Fichte, is, as we have just seen, supposed to be based on the free separation of form and content, or rather, its content is still only what is form in Science, even though form and content are supposedly absolutely united in the latter. As Fichte says, in The Science of Knowledge: "The proposition A is A is by no means equivalent to A exists, or there is an A ... On the contrary, what we are saying is: If A exists, then A exists. Hence there is simply no question here as to whether A actually exists or not. It is a matter, not of the content of the proposition, but simply of its form; not of that about which you know something, but of what you know about anything at all, whatever it may be" (SK 94). Every possible object of knowledge, including the subject, therefore, must be identical with, or related to itself. This, however, does not necessarily establish that anything exists.

How then do we make the transition from logic, which in itself does not tell us whether or not anything exists, to Science, which must tell us about the existence of things, since it is supposed to deal not only with absolute form, but also absolute content - the two once again supposedly being identical in Science?

Although A is not necessarily posited in the proposition A is A, the form, relation, or "necessary connection between [if and then] ... is posited absolutely" (SK 95). However, the question then arises as to what posits, or constitutes this form, relation or necessary connection. Fichte provisionally
designates the necessary connection between if and then as X, and begins his investigation by pointing out that X must, at the very least, be posited in and by the subject or self (SK 95). The reason for this is simply that it is used as a law of judgement, and judgement so far appears to be an activity only of the self or subject, i.e. only the the subject judges. Furthermore, as something which is both posited and absolute, X must be something self-posed, or self-grounded, which means that it is necessarily a product of and in some subject.

In this case, does X simply designate the self, and, if so, is it the Act Fichte seeks?

Certainly, it can no longer merely be said that "X is the licence to say A is A without committing ourselves to the being of A."\(^1\) For X "is possible only in relation to an A" (SK 95 [MI]). Otherwise, there would be nothing to connect, and X would simply vanish. It may be assumed, therefore, that, since X is posited in and by the self, A is also posited in and by the self. Thus, X and A would seem to presuppose each other. It would also seem then, that it is only with this mutual presupposing that either can really be said to be present in the self at all (SK 95). To move closer to answering the question of the condition of A's existence then, it may be said that, "if A is posited in the self, it is thereby posited, or, it thereby is" (SK 95). However, as Fichte makes plain with regard to the relationship of logic and Science, as well as their respective fundamental propositions, there is no such mutual presupposing (SK 99). This can be seen in the form of the proposition of A's existence, as just given, i.e. it is still only a hypothetical judgement, or an if/then statement. For Fichte, therefore, it can still not be said that A definitely exists. In fact, the above proposition seems to shift the question of A's existence entirely to the self which supposedly posits it. This is because, although X is possible only in relation to an A, A can, as already indicated, designate anything and everything. It is completely indeterminate, and, therefore, nothing in itself. Hence, it is not A that X must presuppose, but something which, although capable of being designated by A, is, nonetheless, the condition of A's existence and not vice versa. In short, X designates a relationship to which A is A can be and always is applied, but of which A is A is merely an abstract expression. Positing A's absolute existence in the self by means of X then, is to assert "that within the self - whether it be specifically positing, or judging, or whatever it may be - there is something that is permanently uniform, forever one and the same; and hence the X that is absolutely posited can also be expressed as I=I; I am I" (SK 95-96[MI]). X, then, is simply the self's necessary self-relation, or self-presupposing.

Have we then arrived at the Act which is always present in every fact of consciousness?

According to Fichte, we have again arrived only at what we can call, 'a fact', although it is a fact that greatly differs from the one that came before it, i.e. the proposition A is A. With the I am I, we have "arrived unnoticed at the proposition: I am" (SK 96 [MI]), or the fact of the self's existence. It is unnoticed because, as with Descartes, this fact is simply given, and, therefore, already present before,
during and after any alleged departure from it in thought, i.e. there must have been something to depart from. Be that as it may, this fact differs from the others, however, because the proposition I am I, unlike A is A, is not merely an assertion of form, which "has content only under a certain condition" (SK 96 [MI]), but also of content pure and simple. The I cannot be conditionally posited in the proposition I am I. For it is the absolute condition of its own possibility. Thus, it is unconditionally and absolutely valid (SK 96). For Fichte, however, even this proposition still only has factual validity. For it is founded only upon a fact, albeit the fact of facts, X, which is existent self-equivalence, or, since only what is self-equivalent exists, existent equivalence (SK 96, 100 & 129), which is why I am is always sufficient to the expression of I am I (SK 96).

The I am, then, is simply found or discovered, i.e. as already posited. It is a fact. The I am, however, must be more than a fact, even the highest fact, if the task of Science, as Fichte sees it, is to be fulfilled. For this task, as we saw, is the discovery of the Act that grounds all human knowledge. In other words, the fact, insofar as it is the self and not merely a representation of the self, has to prove itself to be both a fact and an activity, or rather, it must prove itself to be the fact that is simultaneously activity, and vice versa, contrary to what was implied above. This identity of fact and act, as well as act and fact, is precisely what Fichte proceeds to try and demonstrate in the Science. First, he recapitulates the previous development, in order to draw out the hitherto implicit consequences of it. He reminds us that we began with a judgement, viz. A is A, and that "all judgement, ... is an activity of the human mind" (SK 97). The ultimate ground of this activity is X, and this X is equivalent to I am (SK 97). "Hence what is absolutely posited, and founded on itself is the ground of one particular activity of the human mind, [viz. judgement], and thus of its pure character" (SK 96 [MI]), i.e. the essence of all activity, or activity as such. This is simply because particularity has been stripped away from judgement by abstracting reflection, leaving what is always present in activity, i.e. its pure, or universal character, which is nothing but its own self-positing.

As Fichte explains, therefore: "The self posits itself, and by virtue of this mere self-assertion, [that is, an act which is also a judgement in that it is a self-sundering, or division (Urtiel),] it exists, [or becomes a fact ]; and conversely, the self exists, [i.e. is a fact,] and posits its own existence, [i.e. it acts,] by virtue of merely existing, [i.e. being a fact]. It is at once the agent and the product of action; the active, and what the activity brings about; action and deed are one and the same, and hence the I am expresses an Act, and the only one possible, [i.e. the Act,] as will inevitably appear from the Science of Knowledge as a whole" (SK 97 [MI]). In other words, the self is active facticity, and facticity that is and can only be active, never passive, or inert, that is, even its apparent passivity will prove to be a result of its own activity, its own determination of itself as passive (SK 139). The I am, therefore, is immediately active existence, or immediate existence as activity (SK 129). Fichte's subject, therefore, represents an apparently dynamic Cartesianism, which even he recognizes, albeit critically, since for him the I am is more than sufficient to the expression of Descartes' proposition I think, therefore I am.
It is sufficient to this expression, simply because "the I is posited absolutely" (SK 97). That the I is posited absolutely, means, therefore, that it occupies the place of the formal subject in all propositions, whether they are rendered as I=I, or A=A (SK 97). In short, "the self behaves as absolute subject" (SK 97 [MI]).

For Fichte, being an absolute subject means being the subject of pure being, or rather, the subject of all possible predicates, these predicates being whatever the self has found to already have been posited, viz. what appears to have been found in existence, or simply, other facts (SK 97). Whereas the first term in any proposition, e.g. A is A, designates the self as the activity of positing, therefore, these other facts are represented by the second term in this proposition. However, because all positing can occur only in the self, this "second A designates what the self, reflecting upon itself discovers to be present in itself, because it has first set this within itself" (SK 97), by means of its positing. The second A in the proposition, therefore, although representing what has past and would, therefore, seem to be prior to what the first A represents, i.e. the activity as it occurs, actually presupposes the first A. For it represents the activity as it has already occurred. In fact, the only difference between the first A and the second A, or between the subject and the predicate is the difference between positing and the result thereof. This is the only difference between act and fact, and, therefore, between the subject and object, in Fichte's system so far. Thus, the copula in A is A represents the self's transition from the activity of "positing to reflection on what has been posited" (SK 97), viz. itself. In both cases then, the self is active, i.e. it is either positing, reflecting, or both, making it indifferent, at this point, as to whether we regard the fact as act, or the act as fact. 2 The self "posits itself by merely existing and exists by merely being posited" (SK 98). Both subject and predicate are identical in the T, or the self, as absolute subject, which is precisely what the term T means for Fichte. Each reflects the other to the other, which is simply the self necessarily and immediately reflecting upon itself, in its positing of itself, or in its mere existence. As Fichte himself says: "the self-positing self and the existing self are perfectly identical, [i.e.] one and the same" (SK 99 [MI]); or better yet: "As it, [viz. the self,] posits itself, so it is; and as it is so it posits itself" (SK 98).

Existence then is never mere existence where the self is concerned. For the very fact of the self's existence implies reflection, which means existence, with regard to the self, is always existence for the self, or simply, the self is existence for itself. Indeed, mention of the self is completely superfluous here, since ultimately there is, according to Fichte, only existence for itself. This is why he amends Descartes's proposition from cogito ergo sum: thought, therefore, being, to sum ergo sum: being, therefore, being (SK 100). It is also why he claims that "in saying for myself, I already posit my existence" (SK 99). Although Fichte merely implies here that, "what does not exist for itself is not a self," it is already implied, in his notion of the absolute subject, that what is not a self does not exist at all. This is why, for instance, when he considers the category of reality shortly afterwards, as well as the subject's right to apply it - a right seemingly questioned by scepticism, but one the very
possibility of scepticism necessarily presupposes, and, therefore, affirms - he simply concludes that it is a right the subject and only the subject is entitled to possess, claim, or exercise (SK 100). In other words, reality is the absolute right of the self, and it is so, because "the self is the necessary identity of subject and object: a subject-object; and is so absolutely without further mediation" (SK 99 [MI]). In short, the self is the necessary and immediate identity of subject and object.

As we shall see later, however, Hegel demonstrates the insufficiency of this identity, when he points out that Fichte only provides for the subjective subject-object and not the objective subject-object, or rather, that Fichte's handling of the fundamental principle of Science does not allow for the subject to objectively prove itself, as this identity. For the moment, however, all subsequent questions regarding the self's existence, or the nature of that existence, are immediately answered by the Act, or in the assertion which expresses this Act, viz. I am. For I am is really the assertion that, I am absolutely, which necessarily implies a) that: "I am absolutely because I am; and am absolutely what I am; both for the self" (SK 99); and b) that apart from this self "there is nothing" (SK 100 [MI]). Now any time the proposition, A is A, is put forth, there can be no question as to the existence of A, or that A is. For it will only be applied to what is posited in and for the self, viz. everything. Everything as such, however, is extremely abstract. Indeed, it is completely indeterminate, and, therefore, would seem to preclude any further development, especially with regard to how the self can come to know itself as such. This, therefore, raises the problem of the I am's knowability and determinacy, which means Fichte needs a second principle, one absolute in form, like the I am, but conditioned as to its content, in order to provide this determinacy. Before going on to discuss this principle, however, we must consider the nature of the first principle further, because it is still not necessarily what it might seem to be, that is, it is still not absolute.

**Intellectual Intuition**

Even though we have arrived at the expression of the Act in the I am, and can now at least presuppose the truth of the fundamental assertion of reality, viz. A is A, the I am can still only be a fact, presentation, or determination of the Act, and not the Act itself. In short, it is not pure activity. This is because it is conceptual, and, as Fichte continually reminds us, the I, as the Act, is pure immediacy, or the immediate self-identity from which all further identity springs. It cannot, therefore, be conceptual. For what is conceptual is mediated. This is why Fichte, especially in the Second Introduction, stresses that the self, as it is originally, cannot be thought (SK 60-61). For the very act of thought "separates the reflected from what reflects" (SK 61 [MI]). This can be immediately seen in the proposition I am I, or I=I. I=I is only a representation of the unity of the absolute subject, or Ego, i.e. it is already a product of reflection. What the I' is originally, therefore, viz. the union of the
reflecting and reflected, or subject and object without distinction, etc., in short, pure activity, remains beyond the scope of, and thus inaccessible to, thought as such or consciousness. Hence, for Fichte: "what acting is, can only be intuited, not evolved from concepts, or communicated thereby" (SK 36 [MI]). This is because the mediation of concepts, according to Fichte, suggests the passivity of mere being, which, although an important contrast in realizing the necessity of intuition, is useless in attempting to regard the self, i.e. as the purely active moment of self-generation the subject or self really is (SK 36).

Only through intuition, therefore, can the self, as the Act, be immediately known, apprehended, or simply, known in its immediacy; or put differently, since this still implies a degree of mediation, i.e. in that something is known, it is more proper to say, as Fichte does, that the Act itself is intuition (SK 35). However, it is no mere intuition in the manner of a feeling for something, i.e. a "material, static existent" (SK 40), as one might claim to have in experience, or empirical consciousness. This is what Fichte refers to as a sense intuition, and he makes a point of distinguishing such intuition from the intuition whereby the self apprehends itself (SK 38). For such self-apprehension is not the apprehension of something, meaning it cannot, therefore, be sensory. Rather, it is apprehension of the self as it truly is, that is, as pure or "sheer activity, not [at all] static, but [absolutely] dynamic" (SK 40). Fichte calls this intuition, intellectual intuition, and defines it as, "the immediate consciousness that I act and what I enact, [viz. myself]: it is that whereby I know something, [not because it is a thing, but] because I do it" (SK 38 [MI]). In intellectual intuition, therefore, knowing and doing, or acting are one and the same, or rather, intellectual intuition is simultaneously both, which is precisely why Fichte decries the demand for proof of intellectual intuition's existence (SK 38). Where one can only know by acting, and act by knowing, the demand for proof can only appear as meaningless, and, therefore, as the epitome of intellectual indolence. For the demand itself affirms intellectual intuition's exact opposite, viz. an inert being that is purely passive, rather than absolutely dynamic, and thus precludes a true grasp of the self's dynamic essence, i.e. the sheer or pure activity just spoken of above. As Fichte unequivocally states: "Everyone must discover it, [viz. the power of intellectual intuition,] immediately in himself, or he will never make its acquaintance" (SK 38 [MI]).

Everyone, however, must already be acquainted with intellectual intuition in some way. Otherwise, they would not be subjects or selves. In other words, they would not possess consciousness, and consequently, would not be in a position to either affirm, or deny the existence of intellectual intuition. As Fichte says himself: "I cannot take a step, move hand or foot, without an intellectual intuition of my self-consciousness in these acts ... Whomsoever ascribes an activity to himself, [therefore,] appeals to this intuition. The source of life is contained therein, and without it there is death" (SK 38 [MI]). Thus, for Fichte, it is a question of the manner, or mode of one's acquaintance with intellectual intuition, and not whether one has it or not. Whereas, it is primarily a fact of consciousness for the philosopher, qua philosopher, which he discovers in a mediated fashion, viz.
conceptually, or as the I am, for the original self, meaning the philosopher and everyone else, as they are immediately, viz. as absolute agency, it simply is, and it is whether it is grasped conceptually or not (SK 40). The Act makes the concept of itself a possibility, but the concept cannot, according to Fichte, be the Act as such (SK 41). The I am, therefore, should, or, as we shall see, ought to be intellectual intuition. However, as we can see, it is not. It merely expresses what it ought to be. True to the law of external ground, as set forth by Fichte in the First Introduction, then, intellectual intuition, as ground, remains external, or beyond what it grounds, viz. its conceptual form.

This is perfectly consistent with the ideal nature of intellectual intuition, both as the starting point of Fichte's Science and the end of moral action, such as it exists, for the self. According to Fichte: "intellectual intuition is the only firm standpoint for all philosophy" (SK 41 [MI]). All philosophy, therefore, begins from intellectual intuition, whether it realizes it or not. For all philosophy begins as a free act of the very self which is originally the absolute Ego of intellectual intuition. What separates particular philosophies, therefore, is the express recognition, or belief in intellectual intuition's reality, and also its vindication in reason to the greatest extent possible, through adherence to the moral law - the only medium in which the T is, according to Fichte, able to behold itself as it is, i.e. as necessarily self-active (SK 40-41).

Intellectual intuition, taken as the beginning of Science and the end of moral action, however, appears as the difference between intellectual intuition as such and intellectual intuition as Idea (SK 83-84), although this difference cannot really be sustained. For Fichte, intellectual intuition as such and intellectual intuition as Idea are the same in that "neither of them is the self viewed as an individual" (SK 84). Rather, both are the absolute subject or Ego. The former is simply the absolute Ego before it has been "particularized into individuality" (SK 84), while the latter is the absolute Ego after "individuality has vanished through cultivation according to general laws, [i.e. logical and moral laws]" (SK 84). Both forms of intellectual intuition, however, supposedly differ, in that the former is only the pure form of the absolute subject, or self, "whereas, in the [latter,] ... the complete material, [or content,] of self-hood is envisaged" (SK 84 [MI]). This difference is not really valid though. For Fichte is clearly attempting to differentiate between a form of intellectual intuition which is only arrived at through abstraction, and thus in contrast to, or exclusion from the empirical material of consciousness, and which, therefore, cannot be real intellectual intuition, only its expression, or representation, and intellectual intuition as the absolute Ego, which has supposedly appropriated all of this material back into itself, or has realized it as itself, and, therefore, should be actual intellectual intuition. It cannot be actual intellectual intuition, however, since even this actuality, as Fichte says, is merely envisaged, making the Idea as much a bare form of the self, as intellectual intuition as such. Furthermore, in sofar as intellectual intuition as such is supposed to constitute the first principle, or Act, which grounds all human knowledge, it is the unity of absolute form and content, which means that it can never simply be the pure form of the self, apart from its content.
Be that as it may, there is no real comparison to make between intellectual intuition as such, or the intellectual intuition, which constitutes the real starting point of all philosophy, as well as all other things, and intellectual intuition as the Idea, or intellectual intuition, which is the "supreme goal of the striving of reason" (SK 84). For both are characterized by the exact same law, viz. the moral law, or the law which says they are merely what ought to be, and, for this very reason, what are-not. This can be clearly seen with regard to intellectual intuition as the beginning of all thought, in Fichte's assertion that: "I ought in my thinking to set out from the pure self, [or absolute Ego,] and to think the latter as absolutely self-active; not as determined by things, but as determining them" (SK 41). He ought to, but does not. For thought, by its very nature as separating, prevents him from doing so, meaning intellectual intuition is always only an ideal beginning for self-conscious thought. So too, as an Idea, intellectual intuition "cannot be determinately conceived, and will never be actualized, for we are merely to approximate ourselves to this Idea ad infinitum" (SK 84). This is because actualization would mean an end of activity, and an end of activity would mean an end of the self. The existence of both, therefore, depends upon there not being any fulfilment, or actualization of the Idea. As Fichte argues, when he criticizes Spinoza for positing the highest unity, viz. of thought and being, in substance as "something that exists" (SK 102), or is real, rather than merely ideal, intellectual intuition, as this very unity, in Science, ought to be achieved, but cannot and never will be (SK 102). Otherwise, the self would simply disappear. Intellectual intuition, therefore, is precisely what does not exist at the beginning of philosophy, including Science, or at the end of either philosophy, or action. In short, it is always merely ideal.

As a consequence, intellectual intuition, the I am, pure consciousness, etc., is reduced to, what Hegel refers to in his essay, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, as, a "supreme demand [that] remains ... [only] a demand" (DFS 132 [MI]), and a "self-destructive demand" (DFS 134), or rather, a demand for self-destruction at that. As Hegel says in his famous criticism and reformulation of Fichte's first principle: "Ego equals Ego turns into Ego ought to equal Ego" (DFS 132 & 117). The I am is precisely this ought at both the beginning and the end of the system, as it must, according to Fichte, be in any system (LSV 148). The fundamental principle of Fichte's Science, therefore, is really abstract becoming, as opposed to absolute identity, which is perfectly consistent with his insistence that the I am is essentially pure activity, and thus results, as we shall see, in contradiction and opposition being established as absolute, rather than Reason, which is the power of overcoming opposition. The I am, therefore, becomes I become. However, this presupposes Fichte's second and third principles, with which we have yet to deal. Hence, we shall merely say for the moment that the absolutely ideal nature of intellectual intuition, or its nature as eternally becoming, yet never being, is its existence as something incomplete. Indeed, this is why Fichte himself says: "[Intellectual] intuition ... never occurs in isolation, as a complete act of consciousness; any more than sensory intuition occurs singly or renders consciousness complete" (SK
30). Intellectual intuition, therefore, rather than being absolute in Fichte's system, is *primordially defective* (*DFS* 129 & 149). The *I am* is a positing of itself, but also a *not*-positing of itself, which, as we shall see shortly, is necessarily a positing of something else that is not the self, or an opposing, which brings us to Fichte's second principle, viz. *the principle of difference*, or negation, which, like the first principle, is simply posited as absolutely and immediately certain. Unlike the first principle, however, it is supposedly *conditioned* as to its content.

**B. The Second Principle, or the Law of Difference**

"The proposition that *-A is not equal to A* will undoubtedly be accepted by everyone as perfectly certain and established, and it is hardly to be expected that anyone should demand proof of it" (*SK* 102). It cannot be proved, because its proof, in Science, would depend on its being derivative from the first proposition, viz. *A is A*; or, in terms which shall be introduced shortly, negation would have to be derived from what is supposed to be absolutely positive, and this is a possibility, as we have already more or less seen, which is utterly denied by the traditional Aristotelian logic inherited and nurtured by both Descartes and Fichte. Indeed, this is one reason why Hegel criticizes Fichte in the *History of Philosophy*, for abandoning the speculative foundation of his system, viz. the unity of opposites inherent within the principle of absolute being, or identity, and, thereby, reinforcing the dualism that inevitably leads to an abandonment of Reason (*HP* III 481), not to mention the annihilatory consequences of the moral standpoint. For Fichte, however, if the proposition *-A is not A* were to be derived from *A is A*, the former would simply be a negative expression of the latter, i.e. *-A is -A* (*SK* 102). "[W]e should then be asserting *absolutely the same connection*, viz. *=X*, as before; and it would in no sense be a proposition derived from and proved by means of *A=A*, but just that very proposition itself" (*SK* 102 [MI]). Thus, positing and negating would be absolutely indistinguishable from one another, and, although there is, as we shall see, an identity or relation of content between *-A* and *A*, the two are and must be formally distinct. For "the form of counter-positing is so far from being contained in that of positing, that in fact it is flatly opposed to this, [viz. *A=A*, or *-A=-A*]" (*SK* 103 [MI]). Otherwise, it would not be counter-positing, and Fichte, on his own reasoning, would be left with an *insurmountable* identity, that is, one with no difference, and thus no possibility of proceeding to empirical consciousness from pure consciousness. Instead, of course, he is left with an *inaccessible* identity in the form of intellectual intuition or the absolute Ego, but this is beside the point at the moment.

As we can see, *-A* must be and is posited as absolutely and unconditionally *opposed*, which means an absolute opposition is present among the acts of the self. The act whereby *-A* is posited, or more simply, the *act of opposition* is a distinct activity of the self. Like the first act, the second act, with regard to its form, has no higher ground than itself, thus making it an "absolute act," and, therefore, independent of the first act. As Fichte says: "*Opposition in general is posited absolutely by the self*"
(SK 103 [MI]). In other words, we have the absolute opposition of two absolute acts of the self, both of which appear in consciousness, and thus Science, as mere facts, viz. the fact of positing, or identity and the fact of counter-positing, or opposition (SK 104). Considering this similarity, viz. their nature as absolute and unconditional in form, it is difficult to see how these two acts will be maintained in their separation. For to be such they must be formally indeterminate, in which case there is nothing to hold them apart, that is, no real determination, or difference. Despite Fichte's protestations to the contrary then, both acts would seem to be identical, and, therefore, deducible from one another, as will be shown to be the case by Hegel, in his treatment of these principles. Fichte himself, however, anticipates such criticism, and is quick to admit that -A is not A, although absolutely opposed to both A is A and its negative form -A is -A, does presuppose "the identity of consciousness" (SK 103), insofar as their must be a positing for their to be counter-positing. As he says: "It is only in relation to a positing that [the second act] becomes a counter-positing" (SK 104). Nevertheless, Fichte still insists that this opposition must be external to the act of self-positing. Otherwise, "-A would be equal to A" (SK 103), and, once again, we would be left only with the first principle, and no possibility of moving beyond it. Therefore, it may be that "the transition from positing to counter-positing is possible only through the identity of the self" (SK 103), but this opposition is still posited apart from, or external to that identity as such. That the act of absolute counter-positing, as it were, is only possible as such in relation to the first act would seem to indicate, however, that the second act is not absolute at all, but rather, that it is conditioned by the first act, i.e. that it depends on the first act (SK 103). Thus, as Fichte says: "if any -A is to be posited, an A must be posited [as well]" (SK 103). This, however, has nothing whatsoever to do with the form of -A is not A, with which Fichte has so far been concerned. Rather, it has to do with its content.

With regard to its reason, viz. its how and why, the second act, therefore, is what it is, and nothing else. This means that it is formally unconditioned. "Its matter, [or content, however,] is governed, [or determined] by A; [that is,] it is not what A is, and its whole essence consists in that fact" (SK 104 [MI]). A, it must be remembered, supposedly designates something in particular, and the designation of this something by A automatically excludes something else, something else which isn't A, but, therefore, is -A. "I know of -A that it is the opposite of some A. But what that thing may or may not be, of which I know this, can be known to me only on the assumption that I am acquainted with A" (SK 104 [MI]). At this point, we know that A designates reality, or what so far is alone absolutely real for Fichte, viz. the self.

What then is -A?

-A is simply the not-self. As Fichte says: "there can be an absolute opposition only to the self. But what is opposed to the self equals the not-self" (SK 104). This is simply because: "Nothing is posited to begin with, except the self; and this alone is asserted absolutely" (SK 104 [MI]). If we then ask
what the not-self is, the answer must be, nothing, or rather, what is absolutely ideal. For this alone is the absolute opposite of what alone is absolutely real, or what constitutes all reality.

The not-self, as opposed to the absolute self, therefore, is absolutely nothing (SK 109), and it is from this nothingness that Fichte obtains the category of negation, which is so essential to human knowledge and the development of the science thereof (SK 105). However, this immediately raises a number of problems or contradictions which Fichte must resolve. First of all, he is immediately confronted with two absolutes, neither of which can be absolute so long as there are two. For then each is limited by the other, and what is absolute must be the only one. Second, these absolutes are absolutely opposed, which means that one negates the other absolutely, thereby, cancelling the unity of consciousness, and leaving us with absolutely nothing. This nothing, however, as we just saw, is the second principle, and this principle depends on its opposition to the first. So, although "the not-self completely nullifies the self," it "can be posited only insofar as a self is posited in the self, to which it can be opposed" (SK 106 [MI]). In nullifying, or negating the self, therefore, the not-self also negates itself. In short, absolute opposition is opposed even to itself. This, however, is as much a self-affirmation of the principle of opposition, as it is its negation, which is why Fichte himself must conclude: "The second principle annuls itself; and it also does not annul itself" (SK 107 [MI]). Since all of this goes on in the self, however, it must be recognized that what applies to the second principle must also, therefore, apply to the first, which creates the very problem Fichte's Science must attempt to overcome, yet, at the same time, must not and does not overcome, viz. the division between the subject and object. Hence: "I does not equal I, but rather self=not-self, and not-self=not-self" (SK 107).

This brings us to Fichte's final problem, one which, although raised here and touched upon throughout the Science, is only dealt with implicitly, thus preventing him from ever adequately resolving the contradiction of his first two principles. Both absolutes, as they have so far been given, are indeterminate, and thus annul each other not by virtue of their absolute opposition, but rather, their identity - something, as we have already remarked, Fichte is unable to fully concede. The absolute subject or Ego is all reality. It is, therefore, absolute being, and the not-self is absolutely nothing, both of which, as we have already seen, are utterly indistinct. Of course, this identity of identity and opposition, or difference is precisely what enables Hegel to develop Science beyond the standpoint of subjective idealism, abstract power and the moral standpoint, all of which must ultimately deny this identity in order to preserve themselves, to the objective standpoint of Science, speculative politics and absolute idealism, which is not really idealism, since it is simply a recognition of the essential negativity of determinate, finite being, and, therefore, recognition of the self-negating essence of absolute negativity.

Despite what shall be seen as Fichte's fatal flaw in not recognizing this identity fully, however, he does not flinch in the face of these other contradictions. As he says: "All these conclusions have been
derived from the principles already set forth, according to laws of reflection that we have presupposed as valid; so they must be correct. But if so, the identity of consciousness, the sole absolute foundation of our knowledge, is itself eliminated. And hereby our task is now determined. For we have to discover some X, by means of which all these conclusions can be granted as correct, without doing away with the identity of consciousness" (SK 107); or, as he puts it more succinctly: "How can A and -A, being and non-being, reality and negation, be thought together without mutual elimination and destruction?" (SK 108).

C. The Third Principle, or the Law of Ground

Fichte once again turns to consciousness to find what will allow these opposites to be unified, to find what he has again provisionally termed, X. The reason for this is simple: "The opposites to be unified lie in the self, as consciousness" (SK 107 [MI]). X, therefore, must exist in consciousness as well, and furthermore, just like the first two acts, it must be the product of "an original act of the self" (SK 107 [MI]). This is because the self and not-self would eliminate each other if this act succeeded those acts whereby the self and not-self were established. Neither, however, can this act precede the first two, since it is necessitated by them, that is, there can be no unifying act, no synthesis without those acts in need of synthesis, i.e. a thesis and an anti-thesis, or the self and the not-self (SK 108). This is why the third act, although original, is completely determined as to its form (SK 107). In other words, it is determined by the necessity of uniting the first two acts in such a way as to preserve the unity of consciousness.

For the moment, Fichte designates this third act, of which X is the product, as Y. Y, therefore, is the activity whereby A and -A, being and non-being, reality and negation, can be thought together, and this activity can be nothing else but "a limiting of each opposite by the other" (SK 108). As the product of this activity then, X stands for the limits which arise as a result of Y (SK 108). We have already encountered limitation in the absolute opposition of the self and not-self, i.e. they limit each other absolutely in that the reality of one completely negates the reality of the other. As Fichte points out, however, reality and negation do not constitute the extent of the concept of limitation. Otherwise, this concept would be no more sustainable than the opposites it is meant to unite. For then limitation would not be synthetic, merely annihilatory. In other words, such limitation, i.e. absolute limitation, would be self-negating, and thus no different from the second act of opposition. For the total negation of the one principle by its opposite would make for that opposite's unlimitedness. Limitation, therefore, implies partial negation, which means that it "also contains [the concept] of divisibility" (SK 108), which is the very X Fichte seeks.

"[H]ence, by the act Y both the self and the not-self are absolutely posited as divisible" (SK 108). This divisibility allows the subject to maintain both the self and the not-self, in their opposition to one
another, without disappearing, by transforming them into something. In the case of the self, it is posited as something that is no longer simply pure activity, and, therefore, only what it is, but rather, something that can be explained by reference to something else, viz. a predicate. In the case of the not-self, it is posited as something that is not simply the absolute nothing it is in opposition to the absolute self, but rather, something "opposed to the limitable," and, therefore, a negative quantity, or determinate negation (SK 109). Consequently, a double opposition appears in the self. For, in order to maintain the unity of consciousness, there must be an absolute self, and this absolute self must be "posited as indivisible" (SK 109). The not-self, of course, is opposed to the self. However, it must be opposed in such a way as not wholly to abrogate the unity of consciousness, by negating either its opposite, or itself. Thus, as already said above, it is opposed to a divisible self, which is not the absolute self. "Hence, insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, the self is itself in opposition to the absolute self" (SK 109 [MI]). In other words, the divisible is opposed to the indivisible in the form of the self, or rather, the finite self and absolute self, the subjective Ego and objective Ego, are set in opposition to one another.

Opposition, therefore, makes its explicit appearance as self-opposition. It is self-opposition in the sense that the identity of the absolute self represents an opposition to opposition, and that all of this is contained in consciousness. Fichte expresses the fact of this self-opposition in the following proposition: "In the self I oppose a divisible not-self to the divisible self" (SK 110). He then merely abstracts from the specific content of this proposition, viz. the self and not self, to obtain the logical form of the concept of divisibility, which serves as the grounding principle. "[T]he logical proposition known hitherto as the grounding principle [is] A in part = -A, and vice versa. Every opposite is like its opponent in one respect, [viz. that it] = X; and every like is opposed to its like in one respect, [viz. that it] = X. Such a respect, [viz.] = X, is called the ground, in the first case of conjunction, and in the second of distinction: for to liken or compare opposites is to conjoin them; and to set like things in opposition is to distinguish them" (SK 110).

Thus, from the concept of divisibility, we see that Fichte derives both the synthetic and the analytic methods of philosophy. For judgements aimed at the conjunction of opposites are synthetic, whereas those aimed at the distinction of things are the anti-thetic judgements of the analytic method (SK 111). Since both methods are derived from the concept of divisibility, and the concept of divisibility is contained within that of limitation, which is the result of an original act of the self, analysis and synthesis are inseparable logical procedures for Fichte. As he says: "There can be no antithesis without synthesis; for antithesis consists merely in seeking out the point of opposition between things that are alike; but these like things would not be alike if they had not first been equated in an act of synthesis ... And conversely, too, there can be no synthesis without an antithesis. Things in opposition are to be united; but they would not be opposed if they had not been so by an act of the self" (SK 112). Both the ordinary analytic and synthetic procedures, however, tacitly assume the fact that the opposite
procedure has already been carried out by the self, and, therefore, that, in the self, they are simultaneous and necessarily related activities. This then leads to the traditional assumption in philosophy and science of a separation and opposition between the two methods. According to Fichte, this occurs because these procedures are aimed at revealing the ground either of distinction, or of conjunction, but never both.

The synthesis represented by the third principle, however, is the ground that both conjoins and distinguishes, which is why, for Fichte, it is the highest synthesis from which all other syntheses must be derived (SK 112 & 113). In short, "they must all be contained in it" (SK 113). However, so too then must all antitheses be contained therein. Indeed, Fichte recognizes this in that the method of deriving all syntheses from the highest synthesis turns out to be a search for the "opposing characteristics, [or antitheses] that remain" (SK 113 [MI]) in the self and not-self, subsequent to the original act of synthesis, opposing characteristics that must then be united in new syntheses, and so on, until an antithesis is discovered which can no longer be synthesized. Consequently, the highest synthesis is by no means complete, and rather than resolving opposition in this synthesis, Fichte preserves it in such a way as to render it absolute. It is preserved as absolute in the highest synthesis not only because it contains all antithesis, but because it is, as we just saw above, also opposed to the first act of absolute self-positing, or simply, to the absolute self.

Self-opposition, absolute opposition, or the opposition to opposition does not negate itself in Fichte's system, as we shall see it must in a truly speculative one such as Hegel's. In fact, Hegel raises precisely this issue with regard to Fichte's system, in the Difference essay, when he says: "What union is possible ... once absolute opposites are presupposed? Strictly speaking none at all" (DFS 126). In Hegel's logic, this proves to be false right from the start. For the presupposition of such opposites is just what leads to the negation and transcendence of the presupposition of their opposition, and thus their real identity, as opposed to their merely formal, or ideal identity, which can only relate itself to these opposites through immediate, or abstract negation, i.e. negation without transcendence, and, therefore, totality, in short, unproductive negation, or annihilation (DFS 158). Be that as it may for the moment, the point is that Fichte has no intention of resolving opposition, since, as we shall see shortly, "this absolute opposition is ... meant to be the very condition which alone makes productive imagination, [or the self in its theoretic capacity,] possible" (DFS 126). This is why, in Fichte's system, besides antithetic and synthetic judgements, there must also be thetic judgements, "which should in some respect be directly opposed to them" (SK 114 [MI]).

Thetic judgements are judgements in which something is absolutely posited. "The first and foremost judgement of this type is I am, in which nothing whatever is affirmed of the self, the place of the predicate being left indefinitely empty for its possible characterization. All judgements subsumed under this, i.e. under the absolute positing of the self, are of this type (even if they should not always have
the self for logical subject)" (SK 114 [MII]). In other words, a thetic judgement asserts something to be absolutely self-identical, rather than showing it to be either the same as, or distinct from something else, which means that it supposedly presupposes no ground, that is, neither a ground of conjunction, nor distinction. It stands on its own, or is its own ground. Its subject, therefore, is absolutely independent and its predicate ultimately unfulfillable. For it is the possibility of all predicates, making the thetic judgement an infinite judgement (SK 115). Insofar as thetic judgements are infinite, however, they differ from, or are opposed to analytic and synthetic judgements, both of which presuppose some ground, and, therefore, are finite. By virtue of this opposition then, these judgements must also be finite. For they are limited by what stands opposed to them, which raises one of the most central problems in Fichte's system, as well as the most pernicious consequences of the moral standpoint, viz. the downgrading of the self, or self-determination as self-degradation, and mere assertion as the most authentic expression of the self's freedom, e.g. self-assertion as the most immediate, and, therefore, authentic re-enactment of the original self-positing.

Normally, that is, in the course of empirical consciousness, which proceeds by means of analytic and synthetic judgements, concepts expressing the conjunction of opposites are regarded as higher concepts, and those expressing their distinction are regarded as lower ones. This is because syntheses are more general and comprehensive, and thus more immediately akin to the highest synthesis, from which they must ultimately be derived. Antitheses, on the other hand, because they focus upon specific features, or particularities, require more intermediary concepts in their derivation from the highest synthesis (SK 116). Hence, for Fichte, the greater the mediation involved, the lower the concept, and vice versa. This, however, does not change the fact that the highest synthesis equally contains all antitheses, or, therefore, that syntheses and antitheses generally presuppose one another. On the contrary, we saw above that the highest synthesis, as well as containing the principle of all reality, also contains the principle of absolute negation, or nothingness. Higher concepts, therefore, merely presuppose lower concepts, and lower concepts, higher ones. It does mean though, that the more comprehensive consciousness becomes, the more supposedly exalted it is, giving the process of empirical consciousness the appearance of an ascending, or progressive movement. In other words, it becomes more real.

This apparently progressive movement, however, is counter-acted in two important ways, although Fichte only directly recognizes the second with which we shall deal. First, if analytic and synthetic judgements mutually presuppose one another, then it follows that the greater the synthesis, the lower the concept that serves as the ground of distinction "from which abstraction is made in the conjunctive judgement" (SK 116). In other words, the higher the concept is, the greater the diversity upon which it is based, or rather, the more particulars it brings together. Thus, empirical consciousness' movement is an inverse ratio, which is perfectly consonant with Fichte's view that freedom, the highest practical goal of humanity, and thus the realization of the absolute self, is an asymptotic movement, or infinite
task. As he says: "Man must approximate, *ad infinitum*, to a freedom he can never, in principle, attain" (SK 115).

Second, the act by which the highest synthesis is necessitated serves as an *absolute regression* which can never be overcome. As he says: "In the very act of opposing a not-self to it[self], the [absolute self] is simultaneously equated thereto, but not, as with all other comparisons, in a *higher* concept (which would presuppose both contained in it, and a higher synthesis, or at least thesis), but rather in a lower one. The self as such is degraded into a lower concept, that of divisibility, so that it can be set equal to the not-self and in the same concept it is also opposed thereto. Here, then, there is no sort of upgrading, as in every other synthesis, but a *downgrading*. Self and not-self, as equated and opposed through the concept of their capacity for mutual limitation, are themselves both something (namely, *accidents*) in the self as divisible *substance*; posited by the self, as absolute, illimitable subject, to which nothing is either equated or opposed" (SK 116-17 [MI]). Therefore, all properly thetic judgements, i.e. judgements with the absolute self as subject, apart from making all other forms of judgement possible, lie outside the progressive process of their determination. Such judgements, as Fichte says: "can be determined by nothing higher; for nothing higher determines the absolute self" (SK 117). There can be no higher concept in which such judgements resolve themselves, because, as we saw above, the absolute self as such is not conceptual, but rather, is pure activity. This means that thetic judgements have their ground immediately in this spontaneous creative activity. Each properly thetic judgement then is a self-grounding judgement, meaning that all properly thetic judgements are equally valid with regard to each other, but higher than the highest synthesis, which proves itself to be imperfect in comparison to the thetic judgements which stand above it, and with regard to its own nature as a synthesis, i.e. it is a synthesis *incapable* of fully synthesizing the thesis that calls it into being.

As a consequence of the imperfection of the highest synthesis, however, the absolute activity of self-positing, viz. I=I, is reduced to a *relative identity*, once again rendering what is supposedly absolutely real merely an *ideal factor* in a condition of absolute opposition (DFS 126). In other words, the self, or Ego is never more than an abstract or formal identity of subject and object, i.e. an identity that, once established, can only ever really assert itself by means of an *immediate* negation of what stands opposed to it. Thus, it is an identity *without* difference, and a negation *without* preservation, or *annihilation*. Hegel expresses it well in the *Difference* essay, when he says: "As soon as the Ego is placed in absolute opposition to the object, it is *nothing real*, but is only something thought, a pure product of reflection, a mere form of cognition. And out of products of mere reflection, *identity cannot construct itself as totality*; for they, [viz. the products of mere reflection,] arise through abstraction from the *absolute identity* which can only relate itself to them *immediately through nullification, not through construction*" (DFS 158 [MI]). Of course, if identity cannot construct itself as totality, the self cannot realize itself as a *dynamic* and whole being *in and for itself*. For the self is supposed to be
precisely this totalizing activity. It, therefore, remains a more or less partial self, or an *infinitely imperfect being*.

This imperfection, as we shall see, is supposed to provide the dynamic tension, or resistance necessary for the self's, or Ego's *striving*, a striving which should be resolved in the Ego's practical activity. Indeed, even Hegel recognizes that "this absolute opposition is just meant to be the very condition which alone makes productive imagination possible. Productive imagination, however, is the Ego only as [the] theoretical faculty which cannot raise itself above the opposition. For the practical faculty, the opposition falls away; and it is only the practical faculty that suspends it" (*DFS* 126).

More will be said about this shortly when we come to deal with Fichte's treatment of theoretical and practical reason, where it is discovered that the opposition never in fact falls away, or is suspended, in either theory, or practice. For the moment, however, it must be pointed out that the imperfection resulting in this opposition not only means that absolute identity, and thus the self or Ego are reduced to an ideal factor, but so too is the very condition of opposition, which, only a moment ago, was said to be absolute. This opposition certainly *seems to be* absolute from the point of view of the self, or Ego, which finds all of its synthetic activity ending in merely partial syntheses. However, opposition, we must keep in mind, implies confrontation not just by "any other but by *its*, [viz. the self's,] other" (*LL* 172:119).

We have already seen that the self's other is the not-self, or object, which represents the very principle of opposition itself. As *the* other of *the* self, therefore, opposition is as conditioned by the self as the self is by it, which means neither can truly be said to be absolute. *Both are relative.* This will become clearer in the discussion of Hegel's treatment of these categories in the *Science of Logic*. It must also be kept in mind, however, that opposition which is said to be absolute, because the separation of things, i.e. self and not-self, subject and object, finite and infinite, determinate and indeterminate, real and ideal, identity and opposition, etc., is preserved despite the self's apparently synthetic activity, can only be falsely maintained in thought, and abstract thought at that, that is, the kind of thought that depends upon separation, viz. the understanding, or reflection. It cannot be preserved in reality. The reason for this, as we have already seen, is that absolute opposition is a self-negating, or contradictory notion. In other words, if opposition is the absolute condition, then even opposition must be opposed. Absolute opposition that does not succumb to negation, therefore, is abstract, or *ideal opposition*. As Hegel says in the *Difference* essay: "An ideal opposition is the work of reflection, which totally abstracts from absolute identity; while a real opposition ... is the work of Reason, which posits the opposites, identity and non-identity, as identical, not just in the form of cognition, but in the form of being as well. And the only real opposition of this kind is the one in which subject and object are *both posited as Subject-Object, both subsisting in the Absolute, and the Absolute in both, and hence reality in both*. For this reason it is only in real opposition that the principle of identity is a real principle, [and vice versa]. *If the opposition is ideal and absolute, identity remains a merely formal*
principle, for it is posited in only one of the opposite forms, and cannot claim recognition as Subject-Object" (DFS 159 [MI]).

This means that the self, even as subjective Subject-Object, falls apart. For, as Hegel goes on to explain: "Only in real opposition can the Absolute posit itself in the form of the subject or of the object; and only then can there be a transition of subject into object or of object into subject in their essence: the subject can become objective to itself, because it is originally objective, that is, because the object itself is Subject-Object, or the object can become subjective because originally it is just Subject-Object. Both subject and object are Subject-Object. This is just what their true identity consists in, and so does the true opposition they are capable of. When they are not both Subject-Object, the opposition is merely ideal and the principle of identity is formal. Where the identity is formal and the opposition is ideal, nothing more than an incomplete synthesis is possible. Or in other words, the identity, insofar as it synthesizes the opposites, is itself just a quantum, and the difference is qualitative ... On the other hand, if opposition is real, it, [viz. difference,] is merely quantitative. The principle is simultaneously ideal and real, it is the only quality; and the absolute, which reconstructs itself out of the quantitative difference, is not a quantum, but totality" (DFS 159-60 [MI]).

Thus, where both the subject and the object are not both subject-object, and, therefore, the principle of identity is merely formal, not only is the identity between the subject and object merely formal, so too, as we have already to some extent seen, is the self-identity of the subject, i.e. the I=I, and the object, i.e. at least insofar as the object may be said to have a self-identity, for if it is not really a subject-object as well as an object, it cannot contain the principle of subjectivity, i.e. identity. Self-identity, therefore, is merely ideal identity, and as such, is external even to the subject. This is why such identity is merely a quantum. If such identity is merely a quantum, however, then so too is the self that is supposed to have this identity as its essence. For a quantum is precisely what is completely external to itself, or is something in itself only insofar as it completely refers to an other (LL 149-55: 101-104).

D. Theoretical Reason & the Self as Absolute Quantum

Indeed, Fichte himself confirms this in both the law of ground, where the self, as we have already seen, posits itself and the not-self in quantitative terms (SK 124), and the theoretical portion of the Science, where he inquires further into the possibility of the mutual limitation, and, therefore, determination of the Ego, or self and the not-self. According to Fichte, two propositions are implicit in the law of ground, in which the mutual limitation, and thus opposition of the self and not-self, is determined. The first proposition is: "The self posits the not-self as limited by the self" (SK 122). The second is: "The self posits itself as limited by the not-self" (SK 122). At this point, however, Fichte is only really concerned with the second proposition. For, even though the first proposition, which is the foundation of the practical portion of Science, has priority over the first in that it is the condition of
the second's possibility, i.e. practical reason grounds theoretical reason (SK 123), not enough has been determined about the not-self yet to make it of any consequence in Fichte's view. In other words, despite the fact that the not-self has been found to be a determinate negation with regard to the finite self, it still has no reality as such, or is still, strictly speaking, nothing (SK 122), which would mean that the foundation of practical reason is that the self limits nothing, not even itself. Thus, Fichte turns first to theoretical reason in the hope that the not-self will become more determinate, and, therefore, that the inquiry into practical reason will become more tenable. According to Fichte, the necessity of proceeding in such a way is not contradictory, since, even though practical reason supposedly grounds theoretical reason, "the thinkability of the practical principle depends on that of the theoretical" (SK 123). Furthermore, the division between the theoretical and practical faculties, like all of those encountered in the course of the Science, "is a purely problematic one" (SK 123), which should, therefore, ultimately eliminate any concerns over where Science's project should or should not begin. In short, there should ultimately prove to be no difference between theoretical and practical reason.

Be that as it may for the moment, that the self posits itself as limited by the not-self means that: "the self posits itself as determined by the not-self" (SK 123). This means that the self determines itself to be determined, which once again immediately calls into question the not-self's actual role in the determination of the self, and also, therefore, the determinability of the self, i.e. its status as something determined (SK 124). For the proposition of theoretical reason also implies that: "The not-self (actively) determines the self, (which is to that extent, [viz. the extent it is something determined,] passive" (SK 124). How, however, can the not-self determine the self, if it is the self that determines the not-self to determine it? It would seem that the activity of the not-self is in fact a passive activity, while the passivity of the self is an active passivity, and, therefore, that these two principles are self-contradictory. As such, they are self-negating, and so is the the basic principle of theoretical reason, which "contains them" (SK 124). However, if this were indeed the case, the unity of consciousness or consciousness per se would also be negated (SK 124). Fichte, therefore, correctly resolves to "reconcile the opposites in question" (SK 124) - a reconciliation which is again found in the concepts of limitation, determination and quantity.

This reconciliation, however, seems to call for a new division to be posited, i.e. between the self and reality. We have already seen that the self is absolutely real, and this is certainly affirmed in the basic principle of theoretical reason insofar as the self is recognized as self-determining. As Fichte says: "we ascribe to it, [viz. the self,] an absolute totality of the real" (SK 125 [MI]). As such, the self contains no negation (SK 125). Insofar as it determines itself, however, it is also necessarily something determined, i.e. something determined by itself, and, therefore, something nonetheless limited, or negated. "This cannot mean, [however,] that it abolishes, [or negates] some reality in itself, for then it would at once be thrown into contradiction with itself" (SK 125). In short, the absolute totality of
Reality would also have to contain negation, or the not-real. Fichte concludes, therefore, that: "The meaning must be: the self determines reality, and, by means of that, itself" (SK 125).

Reality, therefore, is posited by the self as something external to itself. It is posited as external in two senses. First, the self posits reality as something external to the self as the absolute totality of reality, and second, it posits reality itself as something completely external to itself in itself, viz. a quantum, or number. This is only possible, however, because the self "posits all reality, [including itself,] as an absolute quantity" (SK 125). For a quantum is a definite, or determinate quantity, i.e. quantity with a limit (SL 1 216). Consistent with the spirit of the modern age and the moral standpoint, therefore, the absolute totality of reality is posited as pure positive quantity; and, as Fichte says: "Beyond this reality there is no other" (SK 125 [MI]). There is no other, because pure quantity is indefinite (SL 1 202), i.e. it extends forever.

This raises a number of problems however. First, if the self is absolute or pure quantity, and reality is a definite portion of this quantity, i.e. a quantum, then the self in fact is also a quantum. It is a quantum, because it is just as limited by the quantum of reality as this quantum of reality is by it. This is precisely why Fichte concludes that: "the self is determined, insofar as this reality is so" (SK 125). The self and reality, therefore, are identical, and it is not at all clear how the self can determine itself without contradicting itself, i.e. its existence as the absolute totality of reality. Even if the distinction between the two is maintained by regarding them as discrete, rather than continuous magnitude (SL 213-14), the self cannot be this totality. For a totality is something that is in itself infinite, or 'for itself', and, as Hegel makes clear in his Science, quanta, or numbers, even, or especially in their infinite progression, are completely for another, and, therefore, finite (SL 217-53 & LL 101-104:149-56). The absolute self, therefore, would seem to determine itself by positing itself as an absolute finitude, which even Fichte recognizes as a contradiction. Indeed, this is why he rejects purely quantitative idealism, and calls his own system, critical quantitative idealism (SK 171-72), though it is not clear how the two really differ, since Fichte's inability to reconcile the finite and infinite ultimately renders his notion of the infinite finite. That aside for the moment however, a further problem arises insofar as the not-self is supposed to be opposed, if even ideally so, to the self, and, although the positing of a discrete reality through which the self determines itself superficially eliminates the problem of the self as pure positive quantity, containing negation, it is not yet clear that the quantum of reality has anything whatsoever to do with the not-self contained in the basic principle of theoretical reason.

As Fichte says: "The not-self is opposed to the self; and it, [viz. the not-self,] contains negation [just] as the self contains reality. If an absolute totality of the real is posited in the self, [therefore,] there must necessarily be posited in the not-self an absolute totality of negation; and negation must be posited as an absolute totality" (SK 125). It must be posited as a totality, because it would seem that
only a total absence of reality, or absolute nothing, can be the opposite of the totality of the real. Such an opposition, however, is not as pure, or absolute as it might at first seem. For the opposition between the absolute totality of the real and that of negation ignores the fact that the two are identical insofar as each is a totality. In other words, the true opposite of the totality of the real could just as easily be said to be a fragment of negation. 'A fragment of negation', however, already implies the synthesis between the absolute totality of the real and that of negation, which is precisely what is necessary if the unity of consciousness is to be preserved. For insofar as it is merely a negation, it is determinate, i.e. the negation of something, and determination is supposed to be the synthesis of reality and negation (SK 125). For Fichte, determination is the ideal unity of reality and negativity, and, therefore, of the self and not-self. It is ideal at this point, because, like all of the syntheses in his Science, it may not be sufficient to maintaining the unity of consciousness.

Determination, however, is not merely ideal. The opposition of the absolute totality of the real, in the self, and that of the negative, in the not-self, would seem to result in their mutual negation. However, as we have already seen, this opposition is not a pure one. The mutual negation of the two, therefore, does not result in their mutual, qualitative annihilation. As already stated, their existence as totalities is also the determination that makes them identical, and as such, they limit one another equally, without destroying each other outright. In short, they are not necessarily the totalities they seem to be. Rather, they are both determinate quantities, or quanta, i.e. a positive and a negative quantity (SK 128), and their existence as such is supposed to allow the self to determine itself without necessarily destroying itself, as a self, i.e. by determining itself and being determined only partially (SK 125).

To be determined, as Fichte explains, means that reality is destroyed in whatever it is that has been determined (SK 125). For it no longer exists for itself. When the self determines itself partially, therefore, it only posits a part of the absolute totality of reality in itself, and "thereby destroys the remainder of this totality within itself" (SK 125). To this extent then, the self is determined, or no longer exists strictly for itself. This reality, however cannot simply be destroyed. For the destruction of only a portion of reality necessarily preserves this reality in the form of a determinate negation, which is why Fichte can correctly claim that: "A degree is always a degree, whether it be a degree of reality, or of negation" (SK 126 [MI]). Therefore, when the self determines itself, "it posits a portion of reality, equal to that destroyed [in itself,] in the not-self" (SK 125-26). This means that the relationship between the self and the not-self is actually one of both direct and inverse ratio, that is, there is a direct ratio between reality and negation in the self and not-self, and an indirect ratio between the portions of reality in the self and not-self, as well as between the portions of negation in the two. Fichte calls this new quantitative determination of the synthetic concept of determination interdetermination (SK 126-27), and this concept allows self-determination and being determined to be regarded as identical, so that there is now no apparent contradiction in the absolute activity of the self.
(SK 126). For in determining itself, the self also determines the not-self, which, by virtue of the positing of reality in itself, now determines the self, i.e. insofar as it is real, it posits an equal number of parts of negation in the self. In short, the self is determined, but it is so, by its determination of the not-self, which is also now determining and determined itself.

This means that the not-self then is also clearly a quantum. For "every quantum is determined by another quantum" (SK 145). It is also, therefore, something real (SK 128). For, as Fichte says: "every quantum is something, [i.e. a definite quantity, even of negativity,] and hence also a reality" (SK 128). In short, the not-self is a real negation, or a negative quantity (SK 128). The positing of the not-self as a quantum, however, immediately raises a new problem for Fichte, viz. the complete relativity, or indifference of interdetermination. As quanta, the self and not-self "are no longer in opposition" (SK 129), but are completely identical. Consequently, it is a matter of complete indifference as to which of the two thought attributes reality, and, therefore, grants priority to in the process of determination (SK 129 & 131), i.e. realism and idealism are equally true, or false. Reality is entirely relative, viz. a relative reality (SK 129). Fichte, like Hegel, recognizes this as the fundamental limitation of mathematics, "which disregards quality and looks only to quantity" (SK 129). However, unlike Hegel, it is not clear that he is able to progress beyond this limit, since, as we shall see, his system will conclude with an infinite egression, or, what Hegel calls, the false infinite of mathematics (SL I 242-44).

1) The Concept, or Synthesis of Causality

Fichte immediately attempts to resolve this problem, however, by deriving the concept of causality, or the synthesis of efficacy, from that of interdetermination (SK 131). This is intended to eliminate the "ambiguity in the concept of reality" (SK 129), which results in the absolute indifference of relativism, by reaffirming that the self is the actual source of all activity, and, therefore, absolutely prior to the not-self. We have already seen to a large extent, the reason that the self should be the "source of all reality" (SK 129). Reality is an immediate consequence of the self's absolute positing of itself. Self-positing and reality, therefore, may still be regarded as identical (SK 129). Self-positing, however, is supposedly absolutely active, or the Act. "Hence, all reality is active; and everything active is reality. Activity, [therefore,] is positive, absolute ... reality" (SK 129 [MI]). It is not relative. As Fichte goes on to explain, however, insofar as the self is also determined, reality, or activity must be negated therein. The opposite of activity, therefore, must also be posited in the self (SK 130). In other words, rest is also posited in the self. Fichte, however, regards rest as a complete absence, or negation of the concept of activity, which does not take the quantitative character, which this negation must also be regarded as having, i.e. by virtue of its identity with the self and reality, both of which are quanta, into consideration (SK 130). Instead of rest then, Fichte identifies the concept of passivity as the opposite
of activity in the self (SK 130). For Fichte, there is no such thing as rest, because the self is all activity and reality.

Fichte describes passivity as "positive, absolute negation," which, insofar as it is absolute, "contrasted to merely relative negation" (SK 130), i.e. to the determinate negation so far encountered. It is not at all clear, however, how this contrast can either be made, or maintained. For the very act of contrasting limits those things being contrasted, so that neither is really absolute. Furthermore, if passivity is to be positive, absolute negation, it must also be quantitative (SK 130); or rather, it must be a quantum of inactivity, which negates the absolute activity of the self, and, therefore, is relative, i.e. it is a definite quantity, or limited negation. As we shall see shortly, Fichte himself acknowledges and attempts to solve this very problem. For the moment, however, he is merely concerned with the fact that the concept of passivity seems to resolve the problem of indifference resulting from the concept of interdetermination. Passivity immediately resolves this problem, because now Fichte can claim that the not-self has no actual reality in itself (SK 130). Rather, "it has reality [only] insofar as the self is passive," or "affected" (SK 130). This is because it must still transfer that reality, which it does not posit in itself, to the not-self, in order to preserve the, so-called, absolute totality of the real. Put in terms of the concept of causality, the self is the cause of the not-self's reality. A further problem arises here however. For Fichte defines a cause as what is active, or not-passive, and an effect as what is not active, or passive (SK 131). To the extent that the self is passive, therefore, it may not be regarded as a cause, i.e. of the not-self's reality, that is, unless its passivity actually turns out to be precisely what it was said to be at the start of this section, viz. an active passivity, or a passivity that is really active.

2) The Concept, or Synthesis of Substantiality

Indeed, this is more or less what is discovered in Fichte's subsequent derivation of the concept, or synthesis of substantiality (SK 136). According to Fichte, the problem is essentially one of measurement, since we are now confronted with a series of quanta, i.e. "we must establish a scale of measure" (SK 132). This scale, however, has already been established, since the self is supposed to be the absolute totality of the real (SK 132). The self is the scale of measure for all other quanta, simply because it is, as it were, the absolute quantum, i.e. "the quantum in which all others are contained" (SK 132), "a quantum which is ... unsurpassable by any other" (SK 132), or "an absolutely posited quantum" (SK 132). Furthermore, since Fichte regards absolute nothing as utterly indeterminable (SK 132), passivity must be determined in relation to this standard, even though this standard is supposed to be its opposite. Passivity, therefore, which is supposed to be inactivity (SK 133), is actually "a quantum of activity" (SK 133). It is still the negation and opposite of the self. For, even though the self is also a quantum, it is, according to Fichte, quantum in general, and as such, unlimited, or whole (SK 134).
Passivity, even as a quantum of activity, therefore, is opposed to the self, i.e. as activity. For, as Fichte explains, limited, or determinate quantities are not equal to, and, therefore, both negate and oppose, the absolute quantum, or whole, in which they are contained (SK 133). Thus: "If all activity in general is posited in the self, then the positing of a quantum of activity represents a diminution of the same; and insofar as it is not the whole of activity, [which is unlimited, or absolute quantum,] such a [finite] quantum is a passivity; even though in itself, [or essentially,] it may still be activity" (SK 134). "Hence by positing a quantum of activity we posit a passivity" (SK 134). "All passivity is a negation of activity; [for] a quantum of activity negates the totality of activity" (SK 134). This totality is an unlimited, or indefinite area, which contains all of the other quanta as specific regions, and, therefore, constitutes, what Fichte regards as, substance (SK 136). The self, as and absolute quantum, therefore, is substance, whereas the definite quantities contained in it are merely the accidents of substance (SK 136). Passivity, therefore, is an accident of the self as substance.

As Fichte himself explains, however, substance and accident necessarily presuppose one another (SK 136). It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible to imagine how passivity in the self is actually possible. For even Fichte recognizes that the self, as substance, is supposed to be purely active, and, therefore, not capable of positing smaller quantities of activity within itself (SK 139). Such a positing would either have to be an absolute positing of passivity, for the positing of one quantum necessarily limits the rest, i.e. implies the existence of a second, or means that this smaller quantity simply appear as the totality of activity, for there would be nothing else against which to measure it. It would seem, therefore, that such a positing in the self could not be a result of the self's own positing of itself. Rather this positing "would have to be preceded by an activity of the not-self" (SK 139). If the self is indeed the cause of the not-self, however, "this is impossible" (SK 139). For the not-self should be active only insofar as the self has posited a passivity in itself, meaning the activity of the not-self must be preceded by the activity of the self, i.e. its self-positing. As Fichte himself points out, therefore, we seem to have returned to the very problem with which we started, viz. the problem of the self's determination (SK 139 & 140).

Fichte's subsequent attempts to resolve this problem are based on an application of the concepts of causality and substance taken in tandem, rather than isolation (SK 140), and constitute the greatest portion of the theoretical section of Science. However, these concepts, as so far developed, constitute the whole foundation of theoretical reason, i.e. at least insofar as it can ever be said to be whole, and certainly reveal the need for positing the self as an absolutely quantitative entity. Therefore, we shall merely give a brief explanation of the more important remaining concepts in the section on theoretical reason, as well as their consequences, before then going on to complete our analysis of Fichte's Science with a brief discussion of its practical portion, or what is commonly referred to as, practical reason.

3) Independent Activity
Fichte first falls back on the quantitative nature of the relationship, or **conjunction** of the self and not-self, in an attempt to solve the problem of passivity and activity. What results is the concept of **independent activity** (*SK 144*). As we have seen, it appears that the self can posit neither passivity in itself, nor activity in the not-self. For each requires the priority of the other. According to Fichte, however, this is only the case if the self's positing of passivity and activity is to be regarded as absolute. These posittings are possible, however, as **partial posittings**, the occurrence of which are perfectly consistent with the purely quantitative nature of both the self and not-self at this point (*SK 141*). Partial posittings of passivity and activity by the self, in both the self and not-self, and then by the not-self, in both itself and the self, however, result in an activity in both the self and the not-self that is not opposed to any passivity in the other (*SK 141*). This activity, therefore, appears to be immediately independent of the relationship that subsists between them (*SK 141*). Its status as independent, however, is merely provisional, because it seems to contradict the interdetermination of the self and not-self, which demands that: "All activity in the self determines a passivity in the not-self and **vice versa**" (*SK 142*); and because it is clear that an independent activity of both the self and the not-self can just as easily be said to be a determination of the partial interdetermination of the two, and, therefore, itself subject to the rule of interdetermination (*SK 142-44*). This means that the concept of independent activity, therefore, is also subject to the terms of quantity, and as such, only **partially independent** (*SK 142*). Indeed, this is confirmed in Fichte's formulation of the principle of independent activity, so that it does not contradict the principle of interdetermination. As he says: "Independent activity is determined by interaction and passion ...; and, conversely, interaction and passion are determined by independent activity" (*SK 142*). "Each is determined by the other, and it matters not whether we go from interaction and passion to independent activity, or **vice versa**" (*SK 143*).

A number of questions immediately arise here, however. First, if independent activity is engaged in a relationship of mutual determination, then how is it at all independent, even partially so? Second, what are interaction and passion? What is the nature of their relationship? And how, if at all, are they derived from the principles that preceded them?

Fichte explains that "determination occurs by the exhibition of a ground" (*SK 143*), viz. the ground of either what is determined, or the process of determination itself. Insofar as there is a truly independent activity, therefore, it must be one that is itself ungrounded and indeterminate (*SK 149*). As we have already seen, the only activity that could possibly meet this requirement is the absolute self's original self-positing (*SK 150*). As we have also already seen, however, such activity can only be attributed to the self, and even it immediately becomes limited, albeit by itself. Fichte's apparent solution to the problem of independent activity, therefore, is simply to **postulate** a formal distinction within the concept of activity itself. As he says: "The answer to this [problem] is as follows: Simply insofar as it, [viz. the Act.] is an action at all, and nothing more, there must be no ground or condition to restrict
it; it may or may not take place; *action as such* occurs with absolute spontaneity. But insofar as it [then] requires to be directed at an object, it is restricted; there might be no action ...; but once an action takes place, it *must* be directed to this very object and can relate to no other" (SK 150). Therefore, insofar as the Act is purely immediate or *action as such*, and all individual acts are expressions of *action as such*, they are independent.

However, insofar as *action as such* becomes limited in any way, i.e. insofar as it aims at an object, or results in something, it is not really independent. This means that, although the concept of independent activity is a result of the process of interdetermination, this activity is only independent insofar as that process is itself activity, and not because of the concept, which, for Fichte, is dependent. For the concept implies the entry of the independent activity into the process, which thereby determines it and renders it a *passivity* (SK 150). In short, it is a determinate, or *diminished activity* (SK 154). *Action as such*, therefore, is the ground of this process of interdetermination, but it is not itself grounded (SK 150). That *action as such* is the only independent activity also means that the independent activity of the not-self is really the result of an *alienation* of the absolute activity of the self (SK 154), and, therefore, not at all independent with regard to the not-self. It only appears to be independent. For its activity is posited by means of a non-positing in and by the self, which is nonetheless identical with the self's positing of passivity, or diminished activity in itself, and, therefore, still an aspect of its absolute activity of positing, or absolute positing (SK 159-60). Thus, as Fichte says: "No positing by a non-positing [in itself] - no activity of the not-self" (SK 159) - indeed, no not-self at all. For the not-self is *what is not posited in itself*, meaning not posited in the self as such, and also not posited in its own self. In other words, the not-self is simply posited for the self, but external to the self (SK 163).

Such positing, as Fichte points out, is *mediate positing*, i.e. "a positing of reality by means of a non-positing thereof" (SK 167), and mediate positing is the ground of the identity between the *essential opposition* and *real annihilation* of the self and not-self, despite their underlying identity (SK 167-68). For each is only posited, as real, insofar as the other is not, or rather, insofar as the other is annulled, or negated (SK 168). Fichte identifies mediate positing as the *law of consciousness*, which states: "*no subject, no object; no object, no subject*" (SK 168). Mediate positing, therefore, is also the ground of all reality, since both the reality of the self and the not-self are posited in this way (SK 168-69). This means, however, that mediate positing "must be located ... in the absolute self, [which is supposedly the totality of reality]; and this mediacy must thus itself be absolute, that is, grounded in and through itself" (SK 169).

Absolute mediacy, or activity as absolutely mediated, however, is an impossibility. For, as Fichte himself points out in his critique of both qualitative and quantitative idealism, such activity necessarily implies the positing of absolute finitude, i.e. the positing two determinations that completely limit
one another, which, as we have already seen, is self-contradictory (SK 169). Furthermore, insofar as such activity is self-grounded, i.e. ungrounded by anything other than itself, absolute mediacy may also be said to be immediate, in which case its absoluteness is again negated in self-contradiction. In either case, therefore, it can be shown that essential opposition and mutual annihilation are just as much the ground of the mediacy of positing, as this mediacy is the ground of essential opposition and mutual annihilation (SK 170-71). Neither, therefore, actually grounds the other, or rather, has priority in the process of determining. They are mutually determining, and, therefore, mutually grounding, or vice versa (SK 172). Thus, mediate positing is not identical with the absolute activity that constitutes the only possible independent activity. However, it does begin to explain why the not-self, despite its absolute dependence on the activity of the absolute self, appears to affect the self like an independent determination. For, insofar as the self's positing of itself is mediated, an object must be posited, i.e. even if not expressly posited as an object, or rather, even if non-posed (SK 173). In other words, even if the self posits itself as a subject, and thereby annuls, or negates itself as an object, this object still affects the self insofar as the self's existence as a subject necessitates this negation.

This is why the self, according to Fichte, always experiences a feeling of resistance in itself, even in the absence of the not-self as something real, i.e. an object, or rather, even as an absolute self. As he explains at the end of the section on theoretical reason, there is no need for an object to be present in or to the self for it to have this feeling, because this feeling is simply the absolute self's intuition of the inevitability of the object's presence, and thus the subject's limitedness (SK 189). As Fichte says: "A self that posits itself as self-possiting, or as a subject, is impossible without an object brought forth in the manner described" (SK 195). To explain this feeling somewhat differently, it is the intuition of and by the self that it is determinable, even if its determination is only ultimately accomplished by itself, and that this determinability necessarily implies a negation of itself as absolute activity, or action as such (SK 190 & 194). For, even if we regard this determinability of the self as a mere determination of the self, i.e. something it posits itself to be, and thus something that can be abstracted from in and by thought, this feeling must still be present in the absolute self. This is because determinability, although the essential quality of everything finite (SK 192), necessarily implies the existence of what is indeterminate and ultimately indeterminable i.e. the infinite (SK 192). In other words, there must be an unbounded, or unlimited sphere in which boundaries or limits may be posited: "no infinity, no bounding" (SK 192). Likewise, however, only with the positing of boundaries can a sphere beyond those boundaries arise: "no bounding, no infinity" (SK 192).

This certainly implies that there is a kind of unity between the finite and the infinite in the self. For, as Fichte explains: "If the self's activity did not extend to the infinite, it could not itself set limits to this activity; it could posit no bounds thereto, though this it is obliged to do. The activity of the self consists in unbounded self-assertion; to this there occurs a resistance. If it yielded to this obstacle, then the activity lying beyond the bounds of resistance would be utterly abolished and destroyed; to that
extent the self would not posit at all, [and, therefore, would not exist]. But for all that, it must also posit beyond this line. It must limit itself, [or be finite.] that is, it must posit itself to that extent as not positing itself; it must set the indeterminate, unbounded, infinite limit within this sphere; and if it is to do this, it must be infinite" (SK 192). However, it also means that the self contains the only absolute, and, therefore, irreconcilable opposition Fichte believes possible, viz. the opposition of the finite and the infinite (SK 137 & 192). Therefore, the mere presence of the self, as absolute, necessarily involves this feeling of resistance. For there is always a check, boundary, clash, opposition, etc., present within it. As Fichte says: "The check (unposted by the positing self) occurs to the self [merely] insofar as it is active, and is thus only a check insofar as there is activity in the self; its possibility is conditional upon the self's activity: no activity of the self, no check. Conversely, the activity of the self's own self-determining would be conditioned by the check: no check, no self-determination" (SK 191 [MI]).

With the appearance of this feeling of resistance in the absolute self, we may now answer the second series of questions that arose from the proposition of the mutual determination between independent activity and interaction and passion, and thus conclude our analysis of the section on theoretical reason, viz. what are interaction and passion, and how are they derived? Quite simply, interaction is the interaction of all of the components hitherto encountered, which ultimately signifies the absolute self's own interaction, or interplay with itself. "This interplay of the self, in and with itself, whereby it posits itself at once as finite and infinite - an interplay that consists, as it were in self-conflict, and is self-reproducing, in that the self endeavours to unite the irreconcilable, now attempting to receive the infinite in the form of the finite, now, positing it again outside the latter, and in that very moment seeking once more to entertain it under the form of finitude - this is the power of imagination" (SK 193). The imagination, therefore, is, what Fichte aptly describes as, "a faculty [constantly] wavering in the middle between determination and non-determination, between finite and infinite" (SK 194 [MI]).

In short, it is the area of instability and tension between absolute, irreconcilable absolutes, which nonetheless holds them together and preserves them, i.e. prevents their total and mutual annihilation (DFS 128-29). This is why the imagination, for Fichte, is the source of, or faculty whereby all reality is produced, yet which no reality can be said to inhere in (SK 207). Reality, as we have seen, ultimately requires determination, or the positing of a limit, or boundary. "The imagination, [however,] posits no sort of fixed boundary; for it has no fixed standpoint of its own" (SK 194). Thus, only through reason, or the understanding, which is equated with reason in Fichte's system, are boundaries fixed, so that reality becomes truly real (SK 194-95 & 207-08).

What then of passion?

Insofar as passion is at all distinct from the imagination, it is the feeling of resistance in the self, which may be experienced by the imagination. It is the intuition of passivity in and by the absolute
self, even if this intuition is merely the feeling of passivity's impossibility, i.e. as the opposite of absolute activity (SK 211). Thus, it is best described by Fichte himself as, "a feeling of being compelled to a specific act" (SK 211 [MI]). As such, it is ultimately a feeling of the absolute self's own self-negation, or its death as an absolute self, i.e. absolute passivity. Passion, therefore, may be described as the infinite's feeling of the finite latent in it, or as the unlimited's feeling of the presence of a limit lurking somewhere within itself. According to Fichte, however, this feeling of death, finitude, or limitation is not merely the anticipation of some future death, finitude, or limitation. For feeling itself, as we shall see, is necessarily a limitation of the self (SK 282). Briefly, this is because feeling implies something felt - even if that something happens to be indeterminate, and, therefore, nothing in and for itself, i.e. death - and something that feels. In short, it implies a relationship of externality, or one between a subject and an object. Feeling in general, therefore, is the death of the self as absolute.

However, this death of the self as absolute, which may also, therefore, be described as an absolute negation, or absolute death, is also the essential condition for life in Fichte's system. For feeling will prove to be the inner force that drives the self to reality, and, therefore, constitutes the boundary between the living and the dead. Here, however, it will suffice merely to point out that, according to Fichte: "The feeling of force is the principle of all life; the transition from death to life" (SK 260 [MI]). Furthermore, the self that does not feel anything at all, "is not alive," and, therefore, "is no self, which contradicts the presupposition of the Science of Knowledge" (SK 280). Even the self that only feels its absolute limitedness, finitude, or death, and nothing else, therefore, must be alive. For it does not simply feel nothing. Rather, it feels its own nothingness, i.e. as absolute, which is, therefore, something, viz. determinate negation. Before saying anything further about feeling and the self, or rather, the self as feeling, however, we must embark upon our explanation of the activity of practical reason in Fichte's system. For with the emergence of categories such as feeling and drive, life and death, etc., we have entered into the practical domain of the Science of Knowledge (SK 274).

E. Practical Reason & the Infinite Striving of the Self

Now that the emergence, and, therefore, reality of an object for the self, even insofar as that self is absolute, seems to be ineluctable, it is possible to analyse the fundamental proposition of the practical portion of Science, viz. The self posits the not-self as limited by the self. In other words, it now appears that there definitely must, or, at least, will be something other than the self, which is real, and can, therefore, be determined by the self, even though the reality of this other thing originates with and in the absolute self as such. A great deal of Fichte's analysis of the foundation of practical reason, however, simply recapitulates the problems and conclusions encountered in the analysis of theoretical reason, albeit in somewhat different form, e.g. the problem of how the self can exert causality on the not-self, which is implied by its limiting, or determination of the not-self, without the not-self being eliminated as something opposed to and distinct from the self (SK 225). Clearly, this is an extremely
important issue in the practical portion of Science. For if the not-self cannot be preserved in its opposition to the self, despite the self's determination of it, there is nothing other than the self for the self to determine; and if there is nothing other than the self for the self to determine, even if that other something is just the self in its objective form, there is no practical reason. Hence, the recapitulation of the analysis of causality would certainly seem to be just as necessary for establishing the possibility of practical reason, as it was theoretical reason.

It is not necessary for us to follow Fichte back over this entire ground, however, for two very simple reasons. First, practical reason, as already stated, is, indeed, for Fichte, the absolute ground of theoretical reason, but theoretical reason is the condition for the thinkability of this ground. The explanation of theoretical reason, therefore, should in no way contradict the constitution of practical reason. On the contrary, it should simply reflect it. Second, the entire problem of causality in practical reason is, according to Fichte himself, the exact same problem encountered at the end of the section on theoretical reason, viz. the contradiction in the self between its infinite and finite aspects (SK 225). Indeed, it can legitimately and conclusively be stated that practical reason consists in nothing more than the endless, and, therefore, in Fichte's sense, infinite, activity of attempting to resolve the very contradiction which he has already pronounced to be irresolvable. Fichte, therefore, appropriately calls this activity, infinite striving (SK 231).

However, as Hegel often points out with regard to Fichte's system, where striving is infinite, so too is failure and dissatisfaction. For achievement and satisfaction would mark the end, and thus finitude, of striving. Thus, one might validly ask what is the reason, or purpose for continuing with either the study and exposition of Fichte's Science, or existence itself, if that Science is indeed true a priori, and, therefore, completely invulnerable to refutation. To this question, I can only provide three answers. First, a closer look at Fichte's treatment of practical reason, albeit without going into all of the detail he does, will reveal some important characteristics about the absolute self, and thus the moral standpoint, of which this self is both the ground and highest theoretical embodiment. Second, it will make the consequences of Fichte's Science and the moral standpoint more explicit, so that the solutions offered in and by Hegel's Science will appear that much clearer and necessary. Third, no system in which opposition is purported to be absolute can also claim with absolute certainty that it is invulnerable to refutation. For, even though subsequent attempts to refute it are to some extent fated to affirm its essential principle, viz. absolute opposition, by opposing it, it has already refuted itself by claiming opposition to be absolute and then precluding the success of all future opposition, even, or especially to itself. In short, it renders real opposition impossible.

The infinite striving of the self would seem to be a consequence of the immanence of the object in the pure activity of the absolute self. As Fichte argues, however, it is quite the opposite: "The boundless striving, carried to infinity, is the condition of the possibility of any object whatsoever: no striving, no
object" (SK 231). To see how this can be the case, we must first look briefly at his derivation of the concept of striving. We have already seen why and how the self must be infinite and unbounded for Fichte. Insofar as it posits itself, it is and must be absolute, and insofar as it is absolute, its self-positing is necessarily a positing of everything. "From this point of view, therefore, the self includes everything, that is, an infinite, unbounded reality" (SK 225). From this point of view, therefore, the self also posits itself as infinite and unbounded (SK 225). For the moment, we shall reserve comment on the fact that infinity from a particular point of view is necessarily bounded by that point of view, and, therefore, finite, as well as the fact that a posited infinity is necessarily finite, since Fichte himself addresses the possibility of such an infinity in the derivation of the activity of striving. Furthermore, the infinity of the self has already been contradicted by the self’s positing of itself as a finite and bounded being, as well as an infinite being, i.e. insofar as it necessarily posits a not-self, or object opposed to itself (SK 225-26).

Fichte attempts to resolve this contradiction, insofar as it can be resolved, by once again distinguishing between the notions of pure and objective activity, even though it has already been more or less shown in theoretical reason that such a distinction is impossible to maintain, and analysing the nature of their relationship. Pure activity, which is simply activity as such, as we may recall, is simply the activity of the self insofar as it is absolutely self-returning, i.e. it is positing as absolute and immediate self-positing. It is pure, because the activity, agent and product are identical, and, therefore, because there is apparently no object to resist, or impede it, i.e. from returning to itself (SK 226). Furthermore, without an object, or impediment, it is clearly unlimited, and, therefore, infinite, according to Fichte’s notion of the infinite (SK 226). However, when and where there is an object to impede activity, i.e. when the self posits a not-self, or orient itself towards something specific, activity is no longer pure activity. Rather, it is an act, or objective activity (SK 227). As Fichte says: "Every object of an activity, so far as it is so, is necessarily something opposed to the activity, which rejects, or objects to the same, [i.e. activity]. If no rejection or resistance occurs, then there is simply no object of the activity and no objective activity either; on the contrary, the activity, if it is indeed to be such, [i.e. not objective,] is pure, and reverts into itself" (SK 227). Pure activity and objective activity, therefore, are opposites, and insofar as its activity is objective the self is posited as finite (SK 227).

Has it not already been shown, however, that there is a feeling of resistance in the absolute self from its very inception, i.e. that resistance is immediate, and, therefore, that pure activity is in fact itself objective activity?

Fichte himself admits that these activities are "one and the same" (SK 227). Indeed, he says that they are posited as such by the self, even in the contexts where activity appears as either infinite, or finite. It must be. For it is "the activity of one and the same subject" (SK 227). However, he still attempts to maintain a distinction between the two, by arguing that they are different kinds of the activity of the
subject (SK 227). This necessitates "a bond of union, whereby consciousness is conducted from one to the other" (SK 227). For him causality constitutes this bond, which simply means that pure activity is the cause of objective activity (SK 227). As such, activity must still be related to itself immediately, i.e. insofar as the causal relation is immediate, and to the object, or not-self, both mediately and immediately, that is, pure activity relates to the object "through the intermediacy of objective activity" (SK 228). However, this is only possible, according to Fichte, if there is "another activity occurring in the self, distinct from that of positing" (SK 228). For the self's positing of itself cannot also simply, or immediately be the positing of the object, which it would be if pure activity as such is the cause of objective activity as such. Absolute self-positing would then be the absolute non-positing of the self. Thus, the next question Fichte attempts to answer is: "What sort of activity is this?" (SK 228). It is the infinite striving spoken of above.

Striving is distinct from positing in a number of ways. First, it is distinct from positing simply in that it is posited. Second, it is not negated by the positing of the object, and, therefore, is absolutely independent of, or unconnected to the object. Third, it must nonetheless be the condition of objective activity's, and thus the object's possibility, without having anything to do with either (SK 229). But how is this possible? It is possible for Fichte insofar as striving is merely a tendency towards objectivity, and not objectivity itself (SK 231). As such, no object is ever actually posited, only the movement towards, or possibility of an object, or, as said above, any object whatsoever (SK 231). No object is posited in the activity of striving. For, even though it is itself posited, it is posited as an activity that never achieves its object. This means that pure activity can be maintained. For if it is posited simply as striving, it never relates to an object as such, only the possibility of an object. However, it also means that the self too is only a possibility. For even in self-reverting activity, the self must be posited as an object, i.e. the absolute object of its own activity. The striving of the self to maintain itself in its absolute, infinite, purity, therefore, becomes a striving for this absolute, infinite, purity. As Fichte ultimately says himself, therefore: "The self is infinite, but merely in respect to its striving; it strives to be infinite" (SK 238 [MII]). Clearly, this presupposes a finitude in striving, which has yet to be explicitly revealed in the derivation of striving, except perhaps insofar as it is a posited activity.

How then does Fichte account for this finitude? For, as we shall see, he knows full well that the very concept of striving depends upon this inherent finitude - in short, no finitude, no striving. To put the same question somewhat differently: how is striving both infinite and finite?

We have already seen that, insofar as the pure activity of the self is an absolute self-positing, it must posit itself as an object, and thus either become, or cause objective activity. In short, infinite activity becomes finite. However, we have also seen that the self attempts to preserve the infinity of its pure activity by positing it as a mere striving towards this objectivity, i.e. something that never achieves
objectivity. Insofar as the self merely strives towards this positing of itself, however, it is not at all infinite, and there are a number of reasons for this. First, the self is supposed to be infinite only insofar as it reverts to itself, or is self-identical. In striving, however, the self cannot revert to itself. For this would immediately posit the subject as an object, and thus produce the very problem striving is meant to overcome. Striving, therefore, merely aims at self-reversion, or identity. In other words, the striving self merely has its self-reversion, or identity as an ideal, and even though an ideal object, which is the same as an imaginary object, is determined purely by the self, and, therefore, can be extended infinitely by the self, it is still an object, and, therefore, finite (SK 236 & 237). As Fichte says: "at each determinate moment it has its limits, which at the next determinate moment must be utterly different" (SK 237). To this extent then, viz. that it is limited and contains difference, the ideal object is itself finite, and does not offer a means of preserving the self's infinity (SK 236-38). Nevertheless, insofar as the self itself merely strives towards self-reversion, or identity, and, therefore, does not actually revert, or achieve identity, it too must be finite. For then it must itself be different, i.e. from itself, and, therefore, contain limitations. Second, insofar as striving merely aims at self-identity, or has it as an ideal object, it is limited or finite. For, as Fichte makes quite clear: "Anything that relates to an object is finite; and anything finite relates to an object" (SK 237). It ultimately does not matter, therefore, whether this object is real or ideal. For striving has an object, and, therefore, is itself finite. It is, as it were, infinite objective activity (SK 236). Infinite objective activity, however, is limited by its object, objectivity, and, therefore, just as much finite, as infinite.

But how then does this activity differ from the finite objective activity, which the pure activity of the self was originally supposed to be distinct from?

It is only different insofar as the infinite objective activity of the self presupposes an ideal object, whereas its finite objective activity presupposes a real one, i.e. an object not explicitly determined purely by the self, but rather, the not-self as well (SK 236-37). In other words, it presupposes a self-determining object. Even this difference, however, is less actual than it may at first seem. For if the self must strive to be infinite, then it follows that it must already be finite, or rather, that there is an object limiting it which it must strive beyond. As Fichte says: "An activity extending beyond the object becomes a striving precisely because it proceeds beyond the object, and thus only on condition that an object is already present" (SK 239 [MI]). Furthermore, a self-determining object is necessarily a subject. For only a self is capable of positing or determining itself.

This means that there is also already a striving towards self-identity, or infinity in the finite objective activity of the self, i.e. in the mediated form of the object, which is why Fichte claims that where there is a striving, a counterstriving must also be posited (SK 248). Counterstriving at first seems to mean simply repose, or the opposite of the striving of the self (SK 253-54). However, it also can and must be posited as another striving present to, and, therefore, ultimately in the self, by the self (SK 252-53).
This is why striving always seems to be a movement in two directions, i.e. one backwards, towards the self in its original pure activity, or as self-identical, and one forward, beyond both the self as an object and the object as a not-self. In both instances, however, striving is simply just the self's movement towards an infinity that always remains a pure ideal, or absolute ought, which can never be realized, no matter how intensely or endlessly the self might strive (SK 238). Indeed, the more intense the striving, the more endless it must appear, and thus the clearer is infinity's pure ideality.

For Fichte, infinity is never real or complete, at least not so that the self can know it (SK 237). "Nevertheless, the idea of infinity, [which is the same as infinity as purely ideal,] to be thus completed floats as a vision before us, and is rooted in our innermost nature. We are obliged, as it enjoins us, to resolve the contradiction; though we cannot even think it possible of solution, and foresee that in no moment of an existence prolonged to all eternity will we ever be able to consider it possible. But this is just the mark in us that we are destined for eternity" (SK 238 [MI]). This passage is extremely important not only because it sums up the essential condition of Fichte's, so-called, absolute self, but also because it provides the link, and thus transition, between the philosophies of Descartes and Hegel; or rather, it explicitly establishes the ground on which Hegel will provide the Science for overcoming the condition of the moral standpoint. It constitutes this transition, or ground, because, in this passage, we find that the idea of a completed or real infinity, which is just another way of presenting the notion of God, is the mark of the infinite in ourselves, as the author, creator, producer, etc., of our being, just as we did in Descartes' philosophy. However, due to our necessary, or inescapable finitude (SK 247), we are forever precluded or excluded from actual knowledge of this infinity, i.e. the moment such beings attempt to reflect upon the infinite, it is necessarily rendered finite, and, therefore, is no longer the infinite we seek to know (SK 237). As we shall see, this is precisely the condition which Hegel describes in the Phenomenology as, the unhappy consciousness (see Appendix 2). Before taking up Hegel's discussion of this consciousness, or, for that matter, any other part of his system, however, we must first conclude our analysis of the practical part of Fichte's Science with a look at the source and consequence of the self's infinite striving, viz. the feeling of longing. For this feeling characterizes the life of the moral standpoint better than just about any other phenomenon.

The Feeling of Longing

According to Fichte: "This [feeling of] longing is of importance, not only for the practical, but for the entire Science of Knowledge. Only thereby is the self in itself - driven out of itself; only thereby is an external world revealed within it" (SK 266). As we have already seen, the self in itself, or in essence is supposed to be pure activity. Furthermore, it attempts to maintain this essence through the positing of itself, or its activity as striving. However, as we have also seen, this striving requires the simultaneous positing of a counterstriving in and of the not-self, which is in fact just another striving in and of the self itself, albeit in the opposite direction. As Fichte himself points out, this two-fold
positing of striving, in and by the self, results in an equilibrium (SK 251-54). Even though all of this, including the equilibrium between the two strivings, must be posited in and by the self, the positing of this equilibrium creates the appearance of an internal and external realm of fixed determinations in and to the self that posits all of these things in itself (SK 253-54). For the self must mediate this contradiction in order to maintain itself at all. Thus, its immediate striving, or the striving which immediately appears to be its own, is posited as an inner force, which Fichte calls, drive, i.e. the self's drive towards something (SK 257-58), while the counterstriving of the not-self, which is just its own more mediated striving, i.e. by the not-self, is posited as what resists, repels, or, to use Fichte's word, arrests this drive (SK 254). This is necessary, according to Fichte, first, because the concept of drive implies something purely internal, even, or especially insofar as it aspires to external causality (SK 253), and second, because striving would immediately negate itself, if it either achieved its result, or explicitly appeared as the aspiration, or drive of the same being in two opposing directions, at the same time. "Hence, if posited, this ground [of striving's deficiency, i.e. its self-contradiction, or opposition] must be posited outside the self, and again merely as [another] striving; for otherwise the striving - or drive, as we know it - would be suppressed, and could not be posited" (SK 254 [MI]).

The result of the self's drive and this drive's repulsion by the counterstriving of the not-self is what Fichte refers to as a compulsion, or inability of the self to accomplish something, viz. anything and everything (SK 254). He uses the two terms interchangeably, simply because both imply the continuous attempts, but failure to achieve a satisfactory end. Be that as it may, for Fichte this compulsion, or inability of the self to accomplish anything is simply the manifestation of the equilibrium posited in and by the self, and, although the self need not be consciously aware of this compulsion, or inability, it does experience it as feeling, which is all that is really necessary for Fichte, since it is, as we shall see shortly, the first and most essential form of reflection (SK 254). Now, as Fichte himself says: "Feeling is entirely subjective" (SK 255). This means that it is something contained entirely in the self, i.e. as a subject. However, this also then seems to mean that the object need not at first appear as what repels, or arrests the drive of the self, at least not to the self that is repelled. Feeling itself, or in general, therefore, must appear as the repulsion or inability of the driven self to accomplish anything. Indeed, this is what Fichte himself claims, when he says: "There is a feeling in the self; this represents a restriction of the drive; and if it is to be positable as a determinate feeling, distinct from other feelings, (which at this point admittedly we do not yet see to be possible), it must be the restriction of a determinate drive distinct from other drives" (SK 255 [MI]).

Feeling as such, or as the inability of the driven self to accomplish anything, however, is not simply a suppression, or negation of the self's drive, as it might at first appear. For, as Fichte explains, the repulsion of the drive immediately repels the drive back into itself, and, therefore, is the satisfaction of the self's essential drive, as a self, immediately and absolutely to reflect itself (SK 256). Thus, feeling
as the satisfaction of the drive to reflection is not simply feeling as such, or feeling as the driven self's inability to accomplish anything. Rather, it is the immediate accomplishment of the self as an object of reflection, and, therefore, as a self, i.e. I=I. This is why feeling, according to Fichte, is the first and essential form of reflection for the self, that is, even before it is conscious of itself as a self (SK 261), and, therefore, what distinguishes it as a living self, distinct "from inanimate bodies, though these too can also have a drive in them" (SK 259). Feeling as such, therefore, is not really distinct from the self's drive at all, but is simply the completion of this drive.

Since feeling is this satisfaction of the drive to reflection, or the accomplishment of the self, as an object of reflection, however, it is not simply feeling as such. On the contrary, it is determinate feeling (SK 256 & 261). Thus, it not only immediately becomes distinct from other feelings in and of the self, but also from distinct drives in and of the self. This is because the satisfaction of the self's drive to reflection is also the dissatisfaction of the self's drive to accomplish something. What is this something? It is literally and figuratively everything. It is, as Fichte describes it, the self's drive to fill out the infinite (SK 256), which, as an absolute self, it is supposed to do. Now that the self is an object of reflection, however, it is limited, whether it realizes it or not, and, insofar as it is limited, its drive to be infinite, or absolute is not satisfied (SK 256). Feeling, therefore, as the dissatisfaction of the self's drive to be infinite, is also the immediate restoration, or preservation of the self as driven, despite the suppression, or apparent negation of the self's drive in the satisfaction of the drive to reflection (SK 262). Clearly though, this feeling cannot then simply be distinct from the self's drive to be infinite, which is precisely what all drive is supposed to be in the first place, i.e. the preservation of the self as infinite. Rather, it is identical with it. As such, it is the self's feeling of itself as something inherently determinate, or limited, and, therefore, as something "driven out abroad from itself" (SK 260). It is driven away from itself as limited, or beyond this limit, which is simply the first and only possible object for Fichte, viz. the subject as object (SK 274).

Fichte aptly describes this feeling as the self's ability "to feel itself driven towards something unknown" (SK 261). At this point, we know that this something unknown, or unknown something is the external object which the self must posit as the ground of its drive's restriction, so that its own feeling does not appear to be what is opposed to its drive (SK 255). However, for the self not yet necessarily aware of this external object, this unknown something is simply the unknown as such, i.e. a void which has not yet appeared as determinate in itself, simply by virtue of its externality to, or exclusion from the self, or a void in which nothing determinate has yet appeared, or presented itself to the self, e.g. an object distinct from itself as a subject, which, as we have just seen, is also necessarily an, or the object. As we shall see, this is very similar to what Hegel describes in the Phenomenology as pure being-for-self and the process of desire, which drives the self out of itself, and thus leads it to determine itself in the struggle for life and death, the master/slave dialectic, etc. (see Appendices 1 & 2). For the moment, however, we must simply note that this feeling of being driven towards, or into
something unknown is precisely the feeling of longing Fichte claims is so important to his Science, and indeed the feeling with which this Science more or less ends, as it were. According to Fichte, longing is both the source and consequence of the activity of the self (SK 266). This is simply because the self, although limited by its positing of itself as a self, would not be compelled to posit, or "issue forth from itself" (SK 266), in the first place, if it did not feel itself as limited all along, which means even in its absoluteness.

What, however, could such a self feel limited by?

Simply put, it could only feel limited by its own lack of limitation, or its indeterminateness (SK 283). This indeterminateness of the absolute self is precisely the determination in and of the self as longing, which is why Fichte describes it as, "a drive towards something totally unknown, which reveals itself only through a need, a discomfort, a void, which seeks satisfaction, but does not say from whence. - The self feels a longing in itself; it feels in want" (SK 265). The self, therefore, is determined as something which is in itself, or essentially indeterminate, and this indeterminateness expresses itself as a universal want of the self, or, what Hegel calls, desire. The self wants, or desires determinateness. Its original drive, therefore, is the drive to determination (SK 269-70). Insofar as this indeterminateness is its determination, or is in the self; however, the self is and must always already be determinate. Its drive to determine itself, therefore, immediately becomes its "drive to the determination, or modification of something external to the self, namely the reality already given by feeling in general" (SK 269).

This means that the longing self must always find the unknown to be something, or rather, it must always find something in the unknown. For, as Fichte himself claims: "all determination presupposes a determinable matter" (SK 269 [MI]). But where does this matter come from? It is simply the determinacy of the unknown as a void which is posited outside of the self. In short, it cannot help but be there if there is a self, even if it does not at first seem to be there for this self. This is why Fichte can correctly claim that: "All determination occurs through ideal activity" (SK 269). The void outside the self becomes determinate, the moment the self posits itself. Nevertheless, if this matter is always already present with the self, whether the self is immediately aware of it, or not, then the drive to determination that "manifests itself in the self is directed, not to matter in general, but [only] to a certain determination thereof" (SK 269). This means simply that the whole process of determination, i.e. both the explicit self-determination of the self and the apparently external determination of objective reality, which we should realize by now is supposed to be nothing more than a latent, or implicit form of the absolute self's self-determination, is a process of infinite refinement, or modification of what already exists. As Fichte says: "It is this determination by the drive which is felt as longing. Hence the longing aspires not at all to the production of matter as such, but [merely] to its modification" (SK 269). Even the discovery of something in the unknown, as a void, therefore, is
simply a modification of matter as such, or matter in general, to matter in particular, i.e. matter in a specific form. This is why the self, according to Fichte, never really feels that its drive is restricted by the existence of matter itself, although it is and must be if it is to feel anything at all, or simply, feel per se, "but [merely] by the constitution of matter" (SK 271), which it, therefore, seeks to continually change.

It seeks this continual change in the constitution of matter both ideally and really, i.e. both in itself and outside of itself. It seeks it ideally, or in itself through reflection upon whatever the object is that is present to it, and thus by the modification of this presentation in itself (SK 271-74). It seeks it really by then positing this new determination or presentation outside of itself (SK 275). This new presentation, however, may only appear as the discovery of some hitherto unknown quality of the specific object, or of matter in general, and thus a new object, so that this presentation of reality, or real presentation still only appears to the self as the striving for, or drive to reality on the part of the self as a subject (SK 273-75).

As we have already seen, however, subjectivity is the source, and, therefore, always implies the existence of objectivity, at least for the self, so that this drive to reality actually manifests itself as a drive to interdetermination on the part of the self, that is, interdetermination between the self and not-self, subject and object, reality and ideality, etc. (SK 279). Furthermore, reality, as we have seen, is always present in and to the self as feeling. "The drive to interdetermination is therefore simultaneously directed to a feeling. In it, ideal activity and feeling are thus internally united; in it the whole self is one. - We can to that extent entitle it the drive to change in general. - It is this which finds expression in longing; the object of longing is some other thing, opposed to what is present" (SK 280). This means that the drive to interdetermination is in a sense always already complete, or satisfied (SK 282 &285). For it achieves the interdetermination of these opposites in itself simply by being a determinate, feeling being, or a being that feels, i.e. its own determinateness. As we have already seen, however, insofar as it is such a being, its satisfaction is limited. For it is finite, and, therefore, something continually driven on by and to other feelings, other things, ad infinitum. Its drive to change in general, therefore, is merely a drive and not really change at all. Rather, it is, what we shall see shortly is, the spurious, or false infinite, which is nothing more than an endless monotony of finitude, or being "directed to something else" (SK 280), or what, in Hegel's Science, we shall encounter as the progress to infinity - the highest point reached by the moral standpoint.
Notes


2This is consistent with what Fichte sees as the duality of the activity of the self. As he points out in the 'Second Introduction' the act of self-generation, or positing is simultaneously an act of self-reversion, or reflection. (SK 37).

3This is why Fichte is willing to grant even dogmatism ground in Reason. Even though dogmatism degrades the self by explaining it as a product of the thing-in-itself, and is, therefore, false, because there could not be a thing-in-itself without the self already having been posited, even by the dogmatist who doesn't realize it, dogmatism obliquely affirms the self. It cannot help, but do so. (See SK 38, 75-76).

4See also Fichte, Science of Knowledge, p. 108.

5See Fichte, Science of Knowledge, p. 113 on the impossibility of the unity of opposites.

6Ironically, it is Fichte's preservation of intellectual intuition's absolute ideality which keeps his system of transcendental idealism from becoming any more than subjective idealism, as opposed to objective or absolute idealism, in which absolute ideality is self-negating and the ought never remains absolute.

7Rosen, Science of Wisdom, p.98.

8See Rosen, Science of Wisdom, p. 98. Also, it is interesting that with regard to this issue, Fichte appears to be at a less advanced standpoint than Spinoza, who saw very clearly that determination was the same as negation.

9See Rosen, Science of Wisdom, p. 100: "[T]he discontinuity of the formal elements of position and negation underlies the inaccessibility to analysis of this unity [viz. the Ego as pure activity]."


11It is important to note the order of priority here. Fichte talks about the transition as one from death to life, not life to death. In other words, the transition from the absolute self to the finite self of experience is one of death to life.
Part III: Speculative Science - Hegel
Chapter 4

Hegel &
the Real Beginning of Real Science

It has already been shown in the Introduction, as well as the section on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, how Fichte's Science is fundamentally different from Hegel's, particularly with regard to the role of logic, i.e. Fichte considers logic as a beneficial, but essentially unnecessary device in the development of human knowledge, whereas Hegel considers logic as absolute essence of both thought and being. Furthermore, we have seen that the unity of opposites is absolutely essential to Hegel's Science not just as an ideal for the self or thought to aspire to or strive for, but as something actual. Clearly, this means that Hegel's Science must accomplish or demonstrate certain things that we have seen Fichte's does not. Indeed, the first thing that comes to mind here is precisely what Fichte has supposedly shown to be impossible, viz. a reconciliation of the contradiction between the finite and the infinite. Hegel must reconcile these opposites in such a way that thought is not forever oscillating back and forth between the two in its, so called, infinite progress. For just as surely as Fichte takes this oscillation to be the mark of eternity in the self, it is also the mark of the self's insurmountable limitedness or finitude, and thus its inability to do precisely what both he and Descartes set out to ensure it could, that is, know anything, including itself with certainty. As we shall see when we come to the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology, this oscillation is the very condition of scepticism, which means that Fichte, in a sense, took us back full circle to Descartes and the problem of uncertainty or doubt.

The other contradiction which it is incumbent upon Hegel to resolve, and which we have also seen Fichte regards as an impossibility, is that between the self and the thing-in-itself as independent realities. Of course, we have already encountered this resolution in the Introduction when we discussed Hegel's notion of an 'absolute beginning' and the necessary relationship of thought and being. This resolution, however, is still very abstract, and, therefore, not necessarily clear to the understanding which demands more thorough, or concrete demonstrations. By concretely resolving this contradiction, Hegel will put to rest, once and for all, the conflict between realism and idealism, which, as we saw in the First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge, Fichte posited as absolute. Hegel will do this, however, not by demonstrating the superiority and truth of one system over the other, as Fichte attempted to do, but rather, by providing the synthesis between their primary objects or basic principles. Fichte, we will remember, declared that attempts at such a synthesis presupposed a mutual and continuous passage from matter to thought, or necessity to freedom, and, therefore, were fated to contradiction and failure. Ironically, this mutual and continuous passage, along with the resolutions of the above contradictions, is exactly what Hegel, using Fichte's espoused dialectical method, begins to
explicitly demonstrate in the second chapter of the first section of his Science of Logic, i.e. 'Determinate Being'.

Hegel’s Science, as we also saw in the Introduction, does not begin with the same principles or categories as Fichte’s Science. For Fichte’s fundamental principles do not represent the ultimate limits of abstraction for Hegel. As he says in the Encyclopedia, the ‘I=I’, or the principle of identity contains mediation, "and hence cannot be the real first [principle]: for all mediation implies [an] advance made from a first on to a second, and proceeding from something different" (LL 125:86). In other words, thought can and does abstract further than the principles of identity, difference and ground, all of which indicate the explicit presence of reflection. In fact, beginning with these principles can be seen as a tendentious attempt on Fichte’s part to guarantee the triumph of idealism from the start. For by positing these principles as the absolute beginning of Science or thought, reflection itself is not then subjected to its own negative power, i.e. the power of abstracting reflection, as is everything else. Of course, putting reflection or thought beyond this power is the point of the Cartesian project, but even Descartes, as we saw, begins by resolving to subject everything to this power, including or especially those things that should be beyond it, viz. God and mind, the latter being the very thing which enables him even to conceive of this project. Be that as it may, even though thought and reflection, or rather, thought as reflection is admittedly and necessarily present from the beginning of Hegel’s Science, i.e. as external reflection (SL I 122), it does not appear to be explicitly present as reflection in the categories that constitute its beginning. Instead, as we saw in the Introduction, Hegel begins with what generally appears to be the essential category of dogmatism or realism, viz. pure, immediate being.

A. Sense-Certainty and the Beginning of Thought

As he explains in the Phenomenology, pure being is the essence of sense-certainty, which is the faculty or consciousness for which the thing or object in its simple immediacy constitutes the truth (PhS 58-59:91 & 61:99). As he says: "One of the terms is posited in sense-certainty in the form of a simple, immediate being, or as the essence, the object; the other, however, is posited as what is unessential and mediated, something which in sense-certainty is not in itself, but [is] through [the mediation of] an other, the T, a knowing which knows the object only because the object is, while the knowing may either be or not be. But the object is: it is what is true, or it is the essence. It is regardless of whether it is known or not; and it remains, even if it is not known, whereas there is no knowledge if the object is not there" (PhS 59:93). Hegel, therefore, begins his Science in both the Phenomenology and the Logic from the position of dogmatism, or realism. We quickly learn in and through sense-certainty, just as we did at the beginning of the Logic in the Introduction, however, that "this pure being is not an immediacy, but something to which negation and mediation are essential" (PhS 61:99 [MII]). Hegel demonstrates this in the Phenomenology, for instance, by simply analysing
sense-certainty's fundamental proposition, viz. 'This is'; or rather, by subjecting sense-certainty to its own criteria and asking: "What is the this?" (PhS 59:95).

By the term 'this', sense-certainty means what is immediately present, or, as Hegel properly infers, what is 'Now' and 'Here' (PhS 60:95). The question, 'What is the this?', therefore, becomes, 'What is Now? or, 'What is Here?', or both (PhS 60-61:95-101). If we, like Hegel, say, for example: 'Now is Night', or 'Here is a tree', because it is night, and because we are standing beneath, or looking at a tree, then we seem to have answered the question to sense-certainty's satisfaction. However, when the sun comes up and we walk or turn away from the tree, the 'Now' is no longer night, and the 'Here' no longer a tree. In short, 'Now' is not night and 'Here' is not a tree. On the contrary, 'Now is day', and 'Here is a house'. Neither vanished with the negation of its original content, but rather is preserved in and through, or in spite of the negation of this content. For neither the 'Here', nor the 'Now' is immediate. Rather, they are mediated (PhS 60-61:96-98). They are mediated by the constant negation of what is immediately present as the 'Here' and 'Now', and by the fact that the 'I', which, as we saw, is supposed to be nothing in itself, is constantly and immediately present in the determination of the 'Here' and 'Now', or simply, the process of sense-certainty (PhS 61:100-101). In other words, "'Now' is day because I see it; 'Here' is a tree for the same reason" (PhS 61:101).

This is not to say, however, that sense-certainty was simply mistaken in its original assumption about the object and the knowing 'I'. For the 'I', although now immediately present in the process of sense-certainty, is no less mediated than it was originally. This is because it is also preserved in and through, or in spite of the negation of the content of its sensation (PhS 62:102). As Hegel says: "the 'I' is merely universal like 'Now', 'Here', or 'this' in general; I do indeed mean a single 'I', but I cannot any more say what I mean in the case of 'I' that I can in the case of 'Now' and 'Here'. When I say 'this Here', 'this Now', or a single item, I am saying all these, Heres, Nows, all single items. Similarly, when I say 'I', this singular 'I', I say in general all Is; everyone is what I say, everyone is 'I', this singular 'I'" (PhS 62:102). The essence, or truth of sense-certainty, therefore, lies in neither the object, nor the self. For both moments are mediated in and through their opposites, and, therefore, are unessential according to sense-certainty's own original criteria. Instead, the whole of sense-certainty itself must be posited as its essence (PhS 62:103). "Thus, it is only sense-certainty as a whole which stands firm within itself as immediacy and by so doing excludes from itself all the opposition which has hitherto obtained" (PhS 62:103).

Of course, not even sense-certainty as a whole, or as the immediate unity of its two moments really stands firm or remains constant in itself as an immediacy. For just as we saw with becoming, as the immediate unity of its two moments in the Logic, it must itself succumb to its own logic, or the very same movement that negated its moments. In the case of sense-certainty as a whole, we immediately discover that it is itself a movement (PhS 63:107). It is the movement of 'this particular I' attempting
to point out 'this or that' particular Here or Now' (PhS 63:66:106-110). In pointing out 'this or that particular Here or Now', however, even if only for myself, I enable any other particular 'I' to gain access to what I mean as 'this or that particular Here or Now'. Once again, therefore, 'this particular I' is not necessarily a single individual, but 'every other particular I' as well (PhS 63:105 & 66:110). As such, sense-certainty allows no privileged, or personal access to anything, but is purely universal. Furthermore, when 'this particular I' points to 'this or that particular Here or Now', 'this or that particular Here and Now' "has already ceased to be, [i.e.] in the act of pointing to it" (PhS 63:106 & 64:108 [MI]). In short, it has passed away, or become what has been (PhS 63:106). For instance, in the case of a particular Here to which 'I' point and attempt to hold fast, it is just as much 'not this particular Here'. For it is constituted by a plurality of Heres, i.e. in 'this, or that particular Here', there is "a before and behind, an above and below, a right and left" (PhS 64:108), all of which are immediately indicated in the act of pointing out, or, for that matter, negated in the attempt to point out more specifically what I mean by 'this or that particular Here' (PhS 64:108). Likewise, when I attempt to point out a particular Now, do I mean this particular second, the one that just passed, the one about to come, the minute that these seconds constitute, the hour in which this minute falls, the day, the week, and so on ad infinitum? "The pointing out of the Now is thus itself movement which expresses what the Now is in truth, viz. a result, or a plurality of Nows all taken together; and the pointing out is the experience of learning that Now is a universal" (PhS 64:107).

Our point here, however, is not to engage in an exhaustive analysis of this particular section of the Phenomenology, even though it just as certainly constitutes the beginning of Science, as the categories of being, nothing and becoming in the Logic, and, therefore, is just as important. Rather, it is to demonstrate clearly, contrary to Fichte's position, that actual Science can begin with the fundamental principle of either realism, or idealism. For both equally constitute its beginning. With this said then, we shall return to Hegel's development of Science in the Logic, from where we left off in the Introduction, i.e. with the emergence of determinate being. We shall, however, need to refer back to the corresponding sections of the Phenomenology during our investigation of determinate being i.e. 'Sense-Certainty' and 'Perception', for both illustration and added support of various important points. Furthermore, we shall return to a detailed analysis of the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology, after investigating its corresponding section in the Logic, i.e. 'Being-for-Self'. For as previously indicated, this section of the Phenomenology contains the critical analyses of 'the struggle for life and death', 'the master/slave dialectic' and 'the unhappy consciousness' (see Appendices 1 & 2). These analyses are critical not just for the purpose of explaining Hegel's system and its relation to that of Descartes and Fichte, but also for consolidating the ground of speculative politics. For speculative politics, if we recall from the Introduction, involves a struggle for life and death in and with the modern world insofar as that world is dominated by the moral standpoint. The moral standpoint, as already indicated, is ultimately nothing more than a form of the unhappy consciousness, i.e. its highest and last form, and speculative politics' strategy, in this struggle for life and death with the moral
standpoint, i.e. the strategy of overcoming through yielding, is born, as a strategy, in, and as a result of, what has been dubbed in Hegelian scholarship, 'the master/slave dialectic'.

B. Determinate Being and the Appearance of the Real

In the Introduction, we saw how determinate being results from the self-determination, and, therefore, self-transcendence, of becoming. Just briefly and generally to review this process, insofar as becoming is the disappearance of pure being and nothing, it is the disappearance of indeterminacy, or rather, indeterminacy's appearance as determinacy. This can be interpreted either as indeterminacy itself being what determines pure being and nothing as what they are, i.e. apart from everything else, or indeterminacy simply being replaced by something determinate. We can of course follow the same process further through its development, as we did in the Introduction where being and nothing first became the distinct moments of becoming, viz. arising and passing away. Each of these moments both represents the disappearance of either being, or nothing into the other. However, each also, therefore, represents the other's re-appearance, and, since this re-appearance is a result, or is mediated through the negation of its opposite, it is a definite appearance, or rather, one that does not simply disappear again. Such an appearance, according to Hegel, is a determinate being. Even if this appearance should disappear for some reason, in our attempt to derive determinate being from arising and passing away, there is still no problem. For, insofar as arising and passing away are specific moments, or reflections of becoming in general, each constitutes the disappearance of disappearance, which once again results in a definite appearance, or simply, what no longer simply disappears, and, therefore, what is real, viz. determinate being.*

1. Determinateness, or Quality as such

&
the Foundation of All Determination

The determinate being, which immediately results from the negation of becoming, does not at first appear as a particular determinate being, but rather, as determinate being in general, or, what Hegel calls, determinateness as such (SL I 122). This is simply because difference momentarily disappears into determinate identity, i.e. the difference between being and nothing, which becomes dependent upon and collapses into the determinate identity of and in being and nothing, or arising and passing away. Determinateness as such, therefore, is the immediacy of existence, or the quality of having clear and discernible limits. At this point, as Hegel explains in the Science, it is immediately identical with being (SL I 123). This simply means that being is now truly qualitative, whereas before this qualitativeness dissolved into the complete qualitilessness of pure being and nothing. At this point, therefore, there is absolutely no difference between determinateness and being, and, as Hegel explains, there "never" really will be again, since, in determinateness being and nothing find their true and
immediate unity, or one that does not immediately succumb to the flux of becoming. In other words, determinateness provides a stable foundation for "all further determinations" (SL I 123 [MII]).

This does not mean, however, that no distinction will arise or be posited between determinateness and being (SL I 123). For then there would be no possibility of differentiation, or further particular determinations of or in determinateness as such, which means that it would slip right back into complete indeterminateness. As we have already seen in the Introduction, however, this is impossible. For even indeterminateness turns out to be a determination, i.e. of pure being and nothing, and, therefore, an instance of determinate being in general or determinateness as such. This was even true in Fichte's Science, as we saw with the concept of 'the unknown'. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, this determination of indeterminateness, or, at this point, simply, determinate indeterminateness is preserved in determinate being, both in general and in particular. For the moment, however, we are merely concerned with the fact that determinateness as such first appears as immediately identical only with being, and this immediate identity is quality, nothing more and nothing less.

Even though Hegel immediately explains this category in the Encyclopedia, by saying that it is what makes something what it 'is', and, therefore, that by "losing its quality, it ceases to be what it is" (LL 134:50), something has yet to really be deduced properly from the categories that precede it. Furthermore, it implies a degree of mediation that has yet to be reached. Thus, as Hegel says in the Science of Logic itself, the apparent simplicity of determinateness as such, and, therefore, quality, "makes it impossible to say anything further about quality as such" (SL I 123). It just 'is'. We do not necessarily know what it is at this point, or even, as Hegel makes clear, where it 'is' (SL I 123). For until there is another determination, quality, or point of reference in or to determinateness as such, or rather, quality as such, neither we, nor, for that matter, it, can know anything other than the fact that it is real. Quality as such, therefore, is nothing more than what is real.

2. Reality & Negation

a) The Abstractions or Falsifications of the Real

Reality, however, is an extremely problematic term. For it is often "employed for different and even opposite determinations" (SL I 124). In his Science, Hegel explains at least three different general ways in which it is used, all of which are implied or contained in the concept as it is here derived, but which are nonetheless all abstract forms or falsifications of it, i.e. insofar as they are used to exclude, whether intentionally or not, all of the others. These abstract forms or falsifications of reality may be classified in the following way: i. realism or empiricism; ii. the metaphysical or religious concept of reality; and iii. the Spinozistic concept of reality, which is ultimately identical with nihilism. We need to investigate these falsifications of reality here, so that they will no longer act as the intractable
obstacles to the development of thought they have proved to be in the history of philosophy and science, especially since the fundamental questions of both may certainly be expressed as, what is real?. We also need to investigate them, so that we may derive the category of reality as it is in its truth.

i. Empiricism and Sense-Perception

In the case of realism or empiricism, "external existence is taken as the criterion of the truth of a content" or object (SL I 124). As Hegel explains in the Encyclopedia, this means that experience, or sense-perception constitutes the essence of knowledge, or rather, the essential means of determining what is real; and that the supposedly empty abstractions of pure thought or metaphysics are spurned in favour of the objects or things of sense-perception (LL 62:38). We have already encountered the problems inherent in sense-certainty, as Hegel describes it in the Phenomenology, and, even though we have only just embarked on our analysis of the categories which constitute determinate being in the Logic, it will be beneficial for us to look here at Hegel's account of perception as well. As we saw in sense-certainty, consciousness believed that its process of knowledge was immediate, or rather, that its knowledge was of an immediate, or particular thing, or of simple being. However, both this knowledge and this being turned out to be something mediated and purely universal or abstract. Simply put, the object of its knowledge was merely pure being, and, therefore, its immediate knowledge, nothing, or rather, knowledge of nothing real in itself. For its object, viz. 'this or that particular thing', continually disappeared in its attempt to know it only as it is, i.e. immediately. In its attempt to prevent the disappearance of 'this or that particular thing' for itself, as this particular T, which also continually vanished in mediation and universality, consciousness, therefore, pointed out its object, and, although we did not point it out at the time, this movement of pointing out an object to and for oneself is the act of perceiving (PhS 67:111). However, as we saw, even, or especially the act of perception, results in a plurality of universals within the universalities of sense-certainty, so that this act brought consciousness no closer to the truth or reality it seeks as sense-certainty, viz. pure immediacy.

As perception, however, consciousness accepts "what is present to it as a universal" (PhS 67:111 [MI]). Indeed, as Hegel says: "the universal, as principle, is the essence of perception" (PhS 67:111). Now this essence at first appears as something different from either of the two moments that are supposedly distinguished in the act of perception, i.e. the perceiver and the perceived, for the simple reason that these two moments continually break down into a plurality (PhS 67:111). This plurality of universality, therefore, or rather, what we shall see is, the universal medium (PhS 68:113) of this plurality, is regarded by consciousness as essential, while both it, i.e. as the perceiver, and the perceived are regarded as the unessential (PhS 67:111). As Hegel immediately makes clear, however, this will prove to be an error on the part of consciousness. For both have proved themselves to be
universal as well (*PhS* 67:111). Therefore, they are also essential, or, at least, will once again prove themselves to be so (*PhS* 67:111).

Be that as it may, what is this plurality of universality or universal medium which perception takes to be essential?

As Hegel says: "This abstract universal medium, which can be called simply 'thinghood' or 'pure essence,' is nothing else than what [the] Here and Now have proved themselves to be, viz. a *simple togetherness* of a plurality" (*PhS* 68:113). In short, it is what the object of sense-certainty showed itself to be, viz. a *thing with many properties* (*PhS* 67:112). In the Science, the categories of 'the thing and its properties' does not appear until the explicit derivation of essence as such, or rather, essence as appearance and existence; and, as Hegel expressly warns in the *Encyclopedia*, the property of a thing "should not be confused with quality" (*LL* 182:125), i.e. the quality of *something*, which itself has yet to be expressly deduced in our analysis of determinate being. This is because the relationship between something and its quality is, as we shall see, far more immediate, than the relationship between a *thing* and its *properties*. Indeed, as Hegel puts it in the *Encyclopedia*: "*Something* is what it is only by its quality, [i.e. they are directly identical]; whereas, though the *thing* indeed exists only as it has its properties, it is not confined to this, or that definite property, and can therefore lose it, without ceasing to be what it is" (*LL* 182:125).

Why discuss perception in the sphere of determinate being then?

First, it must be discussed to show how unsuitable it is in the determination of reality, and vice versa. Second, just as pure being, as we saw in the *Phenomenology*, is the essence of sense-certainty, so too determinateness, and, therefore, quality as such is the essence of perception (*PhS* 75-76:124 & 125). There are several reasons for this, the first of which begins to emerge with Hegel's definition of the object of perception. In sense-certainty, we saw how consciousness 'this' was continually negated, or how it became 'not-this'. Whether we regard the 'this' as sense-certainty desired it to be regarded, or as the pure abstract universality it continually showed itself to be, the 'not-this' is not simply pure nothingness. For, as we have certainly seen in the Introduction, and as Hegel explicitly says in the *Phenomenology*, such negation is *determinate negation* (*PhS* 68:113). This is simply because it is the "nothing of a content, viz. the This" (*PhS* 68:113). Thus, even if this content is in fact pure, abstract universality, i.e. nothing in itself, the 'not-This' is a negation of this nothingness, and, therefore, *determinate*.

Hegel identifies the determinate result of the transcendence of the 'This', or rather, sense-certainty itself, as a *property*. However, it is not immediately a property. On the contrary, as he says himself, it is "what will be defined as a property" (*PhS* 68:113 [MII]). Furthermore, if we regard the object of sense-
certainty from the point of view of being, i.e. as it immediately re-emerged from its negation, and, therefore, from what we discovered was really the first moment of perception, we find that it is no longer universal as pure being. Rather, it "is a universal in virtue of having mediation or the negative, [i.e. the 'not-This',] within it" (PhS 68:113). In short, it is a plurality of 'Thises'. Each of these different 'Thises', however, is as much a simple immediacy in its first appearance, as sense-certainty assumed the original 'This', i.e. from which they emerged, to be (PhS 68:113). The difference, however, is that they are immediately determinate, because, even though they appear to be indifferent to one another, i.e. as 'Thises' in themselves, they are also differentiated, or rather, there are, from the start, clear and discernible limits between them (PhS 68:113). This is why Hegel defines these so called 'properties', as determinacies, "which are properties strictly speaking only through the addition of a further determination" (PhS 68:113 [MI]). Consequently, the universal medium in which these determinacies first appear, and which Hegel defined as the 'thing', is not yet a thing, but simply determinateness as such; and these determinacies are simply qualities that have yet really to be distinguished from this medium. They are the medium, and the medium is them.

This is why Hegel, as we saw above, defined the medium merely as a simple togetherness of a plurality, or "the indifferent also" (PhS 69:113) that links qualities together. This simple togetherness of a plurality, or indifferent relationship of what as yet are only qualities, therefore, is simply determinateness or quality as such. However, this determinateness or quality is also immediately distinguished from these qualities, whose relationship with one another cannot simply be one of indifferent differentiation, but rather, mutual exclusion or opposition (PhS 69:114). For all of these qualities, including, therefore, quality in general or as such, "are only determine insofar as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others as to their opposites" (PhS 69:114). Once again, then, they are determinate only insofar as they posit limits between themselves, limits which by their very nature as limits are both an exclusion of and a relation to something else. The opposition of all of these qualities, therefore, falls outside of quality as such, as their simple togetherness or indifferent unity, since it cannot then be such a simplicity.

At the same time, however, the exclusion of this relationship of opposition, i.e. in the attempt to preserve this simple unity, negates quality as a simplicity, and establishes it as another exclusive quality, or, what Hegel describes in the Phenomenology, as, a one "which excludes an other" (PhS 69:114). As such, this "one is the moment of negation" (PhS 69:114), i.e. of the plurality of qualities. Negation, therefore, is immediately united with its being, or is inherent in it, which, as we shall see, is the essential quality of determinate being. This one, therefore, "is itself quite simply a relation of self to self, [a simple self-identity,] and it excludes an other; and it is that by which 'thinghood' is determined as a Thing" (PhS 69:114 [MI]); or, perhaps it would be better to say, as something in itself since this is what will result from the moments of quality as such in the Logic. As such, the determinateness or quality as such, which served as a mere medium for the plurality of
qualities is, as Hegel says in the *Phenomenology*: "set free from this [simple] unity with its opposite, [i.e. either negation as such, or as the plurality, since the plurality is simply its negation as something in itself,] and exists in and for itself" (*PhS* 69:114). In short, it is merely a sensible being as such (*PhS* 71:117).

This completes both the definition of the object of perception for Hegel - albeit apart from the explanation of the process inherent in this object - and the explanation of the initial reasons for determinateness being the essence of perception. It does not, however, provide all of those reasons, or make absolutely clear why perception is unsuitable in itself to the determination of reality. For this we must, as Hegel himself says, "see now what consciousness experiences in its actual perceiving" (*PhS* 70:117 [MI]). In other words, we must look back from the object of perception to the act of perception, although we can already more or less see the potential for consciousness' deception of itself in the process of apprehending its object, and, therefore, determining what is real or true, or rather, truly real, or really true (*PhS* 71:116 & 117).

As Hegel explains in the *Phenomenology*: "the percipient is [also] aware of the possibility of deception [in the process of perception]; for in the universality, [or object] which is the principle [for perception determining the truth], otherness itself is immediately present for the percipient, though present as what is null and superseded. His criterion of truth is, therefore, self-identity, and his behaviour consists in apprehending the object as self-identical. Since at the same time, [however,] diversity is explicitly there for him [in the plurality of qualities], it is a connection of the diverse moments of his apprehension to one another, [i.e. differences in his perception of the self-identical object]; but if a dissimilarity makes itself felt in the course of this comparison, then this is not an untruth of the object - for this is self-identical - but an untruth in perceiving it" (*PhS* 70:116). The object of perception, therefore, is supposedly something self-identical in itself, or a sensible being. This is the essential truth of perception. However, there is also a plurality or diversity present in consciousness' perception of this being. In order to preserve the integrity of its object, and, therefore, to protect itself against deceiving itself, consciousness posits this diversity in itself. Each 'property' of the object of perception, therefore, is consciousness' experience of the object's essential 'quality' through one of its own "quite distinct" senses, i.e. taste, smell, sight, touch, hearing (*PhS* 72:119). "We are thus the universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist each on its own" (*PhS* 72:119). We are thus the universal medium of difference, and any untruth, which occupies perception, therefore, falls in us (*PhS* 72:118). However, insofar as we recognize this, the untruth in us must immediately and necessarily be transcended. For such recognition implies a distinction in consciousness between the true and the false, and, therefore, the self-correcting nature of perception. Thus, "since it undertakes to make this correction itself, the truth, qua truth of perception, [also] falls ... within consciousness" (*PhS* 72:118). Consequently, the self-identical object, or sensuous being, in and by itself, does not
constitute the entire truth of consciousness, *qua* perception, but nor does consciousness, i.e. as reflection into itself, or as itself *self-identical*.

This means, however, that consciousness, *qua* perception, is also a determinate or sensuous being distinct from both the object as a simple unity, or one and the plurality of qualities that will constitute its properties *as* a thing. Furthermore, these qualities, as Hegel explains, are themselves specifically determined, and, therefore, determinate, insofar as each is something in itself which is opposed to something else, e.g. "White is White only in opposition to black, and so on, and the thing is a *one* precisely by being opposed to others" (*PhS* 72-73:120 [MI]). Determinateness, therefore, constitutes both the medium of these relationships, or identity and their mutual exclusion, or simply, their relationship of exclusion. Thus, things are essentially determinate, as are their properties, i.e. they are *determinate properties*, which, precisely because of their determinateness, constitute a plurality, but a plurality which nonetheless makes the thing *what it is*, or is its quality (*PhS* 73:120). In short, it is the quality of a thing to have properties, and if it does not have this quality, it is not a thing, although consciousness does not immediately recognize this, and thus falls into the *sophistry* of perception, or rather what passes for *common sense* in our everyday thought process. As Hegel explains further on, consciousness sees that it is the simple nature of the object to contain diversity, "which though necessary is not essential" (*PhS* 76:127), i.e. a *necessary unessentiality*.

This contradiction aside, since it is the thing's quality to contain a plurality of properties, it is also, therefore, the universal medium or indifferent 'also', which consciousness took itself to be. Consciousness, therefore, now regards itself as the moment of unity, i.e. its work is the positing of these properties as a oneness that does not vanish into the merely formal unity of the thing. The thing, therefore, merely becomes an envelope for its properties which are now 'free matters', or, what Hegel defines in the *Encyclopedia* as, "qualities proper, a reflected being - one with their being - they are the character that has reached immediacy, existence: they are 'entities'" (*LL* 183:126 [MI]). As such, they are "self-identical, independent and relieved of their attachment to the thing" (*LL* 182:126), but not necessarily as *things-in-themselves*, i.e. "if things be concrete" (*LL* 182:126).

As we have seen, however, things are not at all concrete any more. For the thing itself has become, for consciousness, a mere envelope of matters, and both consciousness and these matters now appear to be more real than it. At this point, Hegel introduces a rather abstruse version of the logic of *for-itself* and *for-another* in conjunction with the quantitative term 'insofar', to explain how consciousness futilely attempts to contain the contradictions of perception's object and activity. However, we shall not enter into this particular part of the analysis, since the logic for-itself and for-another is actually dealt with much more clearly in the analysis of determinate being in the Logic as, *in-itself* and *for-another*. Furthermore, we do not really need to engage this part of perception's logic in order to see its collapse. For it has, in essence, already collapsed in the identity of its various moments, i.e. they are
equally reflected into themselves, or have a being of their own (PhS 82:136), and thus become the absolute unconditioned universality, which, for Hegel, marks the emergence of consciousness as theoretical understanding, as opposed to mere experience or sense-perception (PhS 77:129).

It is true that universality was supposed to constitute the essence of consciousness qua perception. However, this universal, "since it originates in the sensuous, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly self-identical universality at all, but one afflicted with an opposition" (PhS 76:129). In short, it is merely a sensuous universality (PhS 77:130). As we have seen, and, as Hegel himself reiterates at the end of the section on perception in the Phenomenology, the collapse of perception, or rather, its transcendence into the understanding occurs precisely because of its object's determinate essence, or essence as determinate (PhS 76-77:125-29). As Hegel says: "it is really the essential property, [i.e. the determinateness, or quality,] of the thing that is its undoing" (PhS 76:125). As we shall see shortly, when we return to the analysis of determinate being in the Logic, this is because of determinateness' essence as self-negating, or finite, and, therefore, something that only "has its essential being in another thing" (PhS 76:126). Indeed, this can be easily seen in the infinite regression of pure analysis, which is the primary method of sense-perception in its formal guise, i.e. as empiricism, and which is forever finding the real nature of the object in some new property, that itself has its nature in something else, and so on. In the meantime, however, we may simply conclude by pointing out that perception as such, which begins by attempting to grasp reality in all of its infinite diversity, results in "a universality which is devoid of distinctions and determinations" (PhS 77:130), and, therefore, which is as impoverished in its determination of reality as sense-certainty, if it attempts to preserve itself as perception. In short, it results in absolute identity.

ii. The Metaphysical or Religious Conception of Reality

The next general falsification of reality which Hegel exposes in the Science, and which has already more or less been criticized in our analysis of absolute being in the Introduction, is the metaphysical or religious notion of reality. Even though Hegel generally intends this notion to designate the scholastic attitude towards the determination of reality, its quintessential expression is found in the philosophy of Descartes, which should not be any surprise to us at this point, since, we have already seen, that Descartes' philosophy represents as much a continuation of that school of thought, as it does a break from it. As Hegel explains in the Science, the metaphysical notion of reality is rooted in the ontological proof of God's existence (SL I 124). As we may recall from our analysis of Descartes and Anselm, in this proof, God constitutes the ultimate reality, i.e. he is the "sum-total of all realities" (SL I 124), in which there is no contradiction, no negation. All negation is supposedly removed in thought's process of abstraction - ignoring the fact that this process is itself essentially negative - so that all that remains is pure or absolute affirmative being, e.g. God. However, as Hegel says, "this removes every determinateness" (SL I 124). In other words, reality, as pure affirmative being, is
completely indeterminate. Thus, "God, as the purely real in all reals, or, as the sum total of all realities, is that same indeterminate and nebulous something as the empty absolute where everything is one" (SL I 125). As such, both reality and God are the same perfectly self-identical abstract being, which was encountered at the beginning of Science, and which constitutes the foundation of the moral standpoint, viz. abstract power, or, what appears in the realm of metaphysics as, the absolute power of God.

As we have already seen in the Introduction, however, abstract being and the power which is an expression of its movement are absolutely contradictory, that is, they are immediately identical with pure nothingness. Reality, therefore, emerges in its determinateness, i.e. as the sum-total of all reality, negation and contradiction (SL I 125). This determinateness, however, does not necessarily lead to reality being constituted as something determinate - at least not insofar as thought attempts to preserve this particular standpoint on reality. On the contrary, as Hegel reminds us, in what is perhaps one of the best descriptions of the essence of abstract power, such reality "becomes ... absolute power, which holds absorbed everything determinate, but, since it exists only insofar as it has opposed to it something not yet subjected to it, any thought which extends it to perfected and unbounded power leads it back to abstract nothingness"(SL I 125). Simply put, the determination of reality by thought, either in its theoretical, or practical aspect, is annihilation, and reality, once again, is identical only with nothing (SL I 125), which brings us to our last falsification of reality.

iii. Spinozism or Nihilism

The last falsification of reality which Hegel alludes to is the Spinozistic notion, and this can be seen, both logically and historically, as an immediate result or consequence of the metaphysical standpoint. This attitude towards reality, as Hegel points out in both the Science of Logic (SL I 125-26) and the Encyclopedia (LL 135:91), is summed up in Spinoza's famous proposition: omnis determinatio est negatio: all determination is negation. All determination is negation for Spinoza, as it must be in any system based on the idea of an absolute being, substance, or God, because determination, as we have already seen, implies the existence or positing of limitation, and limitation, as we shall see shortly, even if it only appears to be the limitation of something else, i.e. something that neither is, or should be an infinite or unlimited being, indirectly, but necessarily distinguishes the absolute being from what is limited, and, therefore, limits the absolute as well. Simply put, where there are limits there is no absolute - at least not in the traditional meaning of the term. Determination, or determinateness, therefore, negates absolute being, substance, or God, or rather, God, as the absolute being or substance. Furthermore, since determination necessarily implies limitation, or being limited, it also necessarily implies the finitude of that being, i.e. it changes, ends or dies.
Determinateness not only acts as a, or rather, the negation of the absolute, it is itself essentially negative. Although Hegel recognizes the "infinite importance" (SL I 125) of Spinoza's proposition in the development of human thought, he also recognizes its one-sidedness, and, therefore, what can only be described as the limitedness of this, so-called, infinitely important proposition. We will not go into this in any great detail here, since, with the emergence and explanation of Spinoza's proposition thus far, we have already directly resumed the derivation of categories in Hegel's Science, and, indeed, have run over much of what must be more carefully analysed and explained. For the moment, however, suffice it to say, that the fundamental limitation of Spinoza's proposition and philosophy is that it does not recognize that 'negation is also determination', and, therefore, not merely a deficiency of determinate being, as it has been regarded in most mainstream Western philosophy since its formal beginning with the Eleatics. Negation is also determination, because, as we have already seen and shall continue to see, even in its absolute form, being, something, existence, are all inherent in it, and, therefore, the negation of something can never simply result in nothing. It falls to Hegel, however, to provide this proposition, and thus complete or rather save the truth of Spinoza's contribution to the development of Western thought. For Spinoza ends up affirming "the same negative movement of [the] understanding, which causes everything to disappear in the abstract unity which is substance" (SL I 126), as well, therefore, as reproducing the petrified dualism of Descartes, i.e. as substance and negation, finite and infinite, etc. (HP III 228). This is a completely comprehensible result for Hegel. For, despite the tremendous importance of negation in his Science, and, indeed, all speculative thought, he makes it very clear that: "Speculative philosophy must never be accused of making negation, or [rather] nothing, its end: negation is as little the end of philosophy as reality is the truth" (SL I 125 [MI]).

b) The Abstractness of Reality and the Reality of the Abstract

Reality cannot be the truth of philosophy, science, or simply thought in general, because it is, as we discover in Hegel's derivation of categories, immediately opposed and, therefore, limited by negation (SL I 123 & 126). In short, it is not absolute or ultimate. Indeed, we see here that terms such as, 'the ultimate reality', are actually self-contradictory, and only indicate that those seeking such a reality have not bothered to think through the logic of what they seek. Consequently, they will never find what they seek. Nevertheless, reality is opposed and limited by negation, because nothing must also be preserved in the transcendence of becoming, or rather, he posited as a determinate being, i.e. real negation, which is just another way of saying, 'the negation of something real'. Negation, therefore, is also a quality, though external reflection still mistakenly believes that it is merely a void into which quality merely vanishes, and, therefore, subsists outside of, or external to real quality. In short, it still only sees negation as negation in general, and not as a determinate being, like reality (SL I 123). As Hegel says: "Each, [viz. reality and negation.] is a determinate being, - but in reality, as quality, with the emphasis on being, the fact is hidden that it contains determinateness and therefore negation. Reality therefore is taken [only] as something positive from which negation, limitation and deficiency
are supposed to be excluded. Negation taken as mere deficiency, [however,] would be equivalent to nothing; in fact it is a determinate being, a quality, but one has a not-being for its determination" (SL I 124). Regardless of whether thought realizes this or not at this stage in its development, negation's inherent being, as quality, provides the differentiation necessary to produce what appears as the immediate break up of the indistinct realm of determinateness, or quality as such into qualities or a plurality of determinate beings, since a quality, as we must again keep in mind, is still simply identical with what it is the quality of. However, we must follow this immediate break up in all of its logical necessity, or mediation, since it does not, at this point, simply become a purely arbitrary process, i.e. chaos, even though it will indeed appear as such to a consciousness that only sees negation as deficiency.

The distinction that exists in quality between reality and negation is transcended just as soon as it appears. For, as we have already seen, reality itself contains negation, and negation is real. This is because reality, as we saw in the analysis of Spinoza's proposition, is the negation of the indeterminateness of pure abstract being, i.e. it is "not indeterminate nor abstract" (SL I 127). It is also because negation is the negation of reality, i.e. it has a determinate content, and, therefore, is not simply nothing in general (SL I 127), even though nothing may appear that way to naive reflection. It cannot be nothing in general, because the distinction between it and what is real, is just as much a limitation of it, as it is of what is real, thus making it determinate. In both cases, we can see clearly not only that reality and negation are identical in their distinction, i.e. both are determinate, but that each is equally a negation of negation, i.e. reality is the negation of what is indeterminate, or nothing, and negation is the negation of this reality which is negative. Of course, this latter negation can just as easily be said to be a negation of the negation of negation, which will certainly turn out to be the case when it appears as the other. For the moment, however, this does not change the fact that it is also a negation of negation, and, therefore, that it immediately appears as such.

However, what exactly does it mean for reality and negation to be the 'negation of negation'?

C. Something & the Other

First, it means that there is, once again, an immediate relationship of identity established in determinate being in general, although this immediate relationship is the result of the transcendence of a distinction, and, therefore, mediated as well. Second, it means that both reality and negation in particular, or simply, this self-identical determinate being in general are a being-in-itself, or something (SL I 127). For what possesses being in itself, or is something, is not nothing, and, therefore, is a negation of negation. Indeed, as Hegel says: 'Something is the first 'negation of negation', as simple existent self-relation" (SL I 127). This is because something, as we saw in the Introduction, can immediately be deduced from pure nothing, i.e. without necessarily acknowledging the process of
becoming inherent in this process, making it the first negation of negation; and because none of the previous negations of negation, e.g. those contained in becoming, or arising and passing away, and, indeed, becoming itself, could really be said either to exist, or exist in a simple self-relation, i.e. they continually and immediately vanished into their opposite determinations, making existence virtually impossible until they were overcome or transcended.

Although Hegel makes it clear that this determination of something, or rather, the determination of all the various abstractions in thought, including thought itself, as something, is extremely important in taking thought beyond the stage of abstract universality, e.g. from existence, life and thought, etc. to what exists, what lives and what thinks, etc., it is still merely the beginning, e.g. what we saw in the Introduction is the real beginning (SL I 128). For, as he says: "something is still a very superficial determination" (SL I 128). This is why, even though speculative politics, for instance, had to recognize the tremendous contribution of Descartes in positing thought, the mind, or the self as something, it also had to criticize his system for failing to take this discovery further. By failing to take this discovery further, which is just another way of saying, by failing to determine something further, the self slips right back into indeterminateness. For, even though something has being in itself, this being-in-itself is indeterminate, particularly insofar as it is the self-identity of negativity. In fact, as the self-identity of negativity, being-in-itself can be said to be absolute nothing, or rather, actual absolute nothing, even or especially in comparison to the nothingness with which we began the Science, or the general negativity which is supposed to be opposed to reality (SL I 128). These are only forms of what Hegel calls abstract negativity (SL I 128).

Be that as it may, Hegel leaves no doubt that something is, as Descartes established, the first real determination of subjectivity. For, even though it represents "the restoration of simple self-reference" (SL I 128), insofar as its being-in-itself is a self-identity, i.e. of negativity, "something is equally self-mediation" (SL I 128 [MI]). It is, as it were, existent self-mediation, which is the hallmark of human subjectivity. Something is existent self-mediation, because self-identity also implies the relationship of two terms, i.e. negation=negation, and because something unites both being and negation in itself, or rather, as a result of the negation of negation. Nevertheless, it is also quite clear just how unstable this incipient subjectivity is. For, as Hegel says: "This self-mediation, which something in itself is, taken merely as negation of negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides: it therefore collapses into that simple unity which is being" (SL I 128). Something, therefore, immediately appears as a being, which excludes the absolute negation inherent in it, or rather, which constitutes its being-in-itself. In its immediacy, therefore, something literally and figuratively has no being-in-itself. It simply is (SL I 128), and as such, does not appear to be either mediated, or mediating (SL I 129). This does not mean, however, that something, even in the first moment of immediacy, is not a determinate being. For, whatever else we may say, something is something, and, therefore, determinate. Indeed, it
is, as Hegel says, "the one determinate being" (SL I 130). Something, therefore, is like a single point posited in the otherwise emptiness of seemingly infinite space (SL I 141).

However, what then happens to the negativity supposedly preserved in determinate being? For, even though it is negated in and by something, as the one determinate being which is the negation of negation, the negation of negativity is just as much an affirmation, and, therefore, preservation, of this principle, or rather, the determination of negativity, as it is its negation.

Since something at first appears only as a being, however, this negativity does not seem to be in it. Rather, something's negativity at first seems to be outside of it, at least insofar as it is something (SL I 130). The negativity external to something is pure or absolute otherness (SL I 129 & 130), and, although Hegel identifies 'something and an other' as the two equally determinate moments of something in general, i.e. both are somethings (SL I 129), this is not necessarily self-evident to external reflection, e.g. sense-perception, etc. (SL I 130). Put differently, an other may very well be immediate existence, and, therefore, a something which negation also seems to be external to (SL I 129), just like something in general, but we need to demonstrate this, since as yet there only appears to be one something, not two. As Hegel himself says, though in a slightly different context, i.e. one that still assumes two somethings: "Otherness thus appears as a determination alien to determinate being determined in this manner: it is the other and is external to the one determinate being" (SL I 130). Such otherness, therefore, is the abstract, or absolute other, which Hegel, referring to Plato's notion of the other in the Sophist,\(^1\) describes as the other related only to itself, and, therefore, as opposed, or indifferent to the one determinate being, i.e. something (SL I 130). Furthermore, such otherness is identical with the negativity at first excluded from something, because nothing is precisely what is absolutely other to something, i.e. the seemingly infinite empty space that surrounds the point is the absolute otherness of that point.

The question, therefore, becomes: how does the abstract or absolute other become a determinate being, or something?

We have already seen often enough that even the emptiness or void external to something determinate, must itself be determinate insofar as it is as limited by the limits defining the thing, as the thing defined, i.e. it is a determinate void; and this is certainly enough to explain how the absolute other is something determinate. However, there is another way, which is even more appropriate to the method of Science, and which we have also already encountered in the Introduction, i.e. something may be derived from the standpoint of the absolute other itself. The absolute other, as Hegel explains in the Science, may not necessarily be considered an other to something (SL I 131). Instead, it is an other through and through, or an other in and for itself, which is just another way of saying that it is an absolute other. If, however, it is an absolute other, an other through and through, or an other in and
for itself, it is necessarily "its own other" (SL I 131[MI]). As Hegel says: "the other for itself is the other in itself, and hence what is other to itself, or the other to the other" (SL I 131[MI]). As such, it is what is in itself "absolutely non-identical [with itself, i.e.] the self-negating, or changing" (SL I 131).

The question thus becomes: what is the other to the other? Or what is the result of the self-negation of the absolute other? What does it change itself into? What is absolutely non-identical with or opposite to it?

Clearly, something is the other to the other, or the absolute other's opposite. The absolute other, therefore, changes itself into something. Indeed, it is something, even before this change manifests itself. For, as the absolute other, or the other to the other, i.e. other=other, it is in itself a relationship of self-identity, which, as we have already seen, is the essence of something. Furthermore, the self-identity of the absolute other preserves itself through its explicit change into something, since what it changes into is also the other, viz. the other of the absolute other, or something, which, insofar as it is the other to the absolute other, must also have been, or contained otherness from the start, e.g. in form of negation. Consequently, there are now not only two separate somethings, where before there only appeared to be one, each of these somethings is also explicitly determined as an other (SL I 129 & 130). Each is an other to the other something, as well as to otherness in general, or the absolute other, which seems to be, but is not yet, transcended, since it is still completely preserved in the relation of these moments as others to each other. Thus, we are now clearly in the realm of 'something and an other', or more specifically, something's being for another something, which Hegel simply refers to as the moment of being-for-other (SL I 131). It is important to realize here that something "is not simply its otherness" (SL I 131), but that it "is in relation to its otherness" (SL I 131[MI]), as indicated above by the phrase, 'other to'. For, even though something, as we saw, immediately becomes or is an other in itself, e.g. to the absolute other, or insofar as it is simply the self-identity of negation, it also preserves itself in its negation, i.e. by still being the self-identity of negativity, and, therefore, something. Furthermore, the appearance of externality, as we shall see, is just as important, if not more so, to and for something, as it is to and for its alleged being-in-itself, which once again is simply the result of the self-identity of negativity.

1. Being-for-Other and Being-in-Itself

As Hegel says: "Being-for-other and being-in-itself constitute the two moments of something"(SL I 132). However, they first appear as separate or exclusive determinations (SL I 133), which are only related to each other insofar as they refer to, or are determinations of the same something. Indeed, something's being-in-itself is ordinarily regarded as its purely positive and exclusive being or existence, which is why Hegel describes it as, the "negative relation to [something's] non-existence" (SL I 132),
and then goes on to say: "so far as something is in itself, it is removed beyond the sphere of otherness and [therefore] of being-for-other" (SL I 132 [MI]). Of course, since something's being-in-itself is usually thought of as being purely primary, it would be more apt to say that something in itself remains untouched by otherness, rather than removed beyond it, though the result is essentially the same.

Something's being-for-other, on the other hand, is ordinarily regarded as having little or nothing to do with how or what it is in itself, but merely as it is, or, to use a category that will be derived in the section on 'essence', appears to some other being, which itself is in itself. In other words, there does not ordinarily seem to be any real being in something's being-for-other (SL I 132), which means that it is an essentially illusory or unessential determination of something. Thus, something's being-for-other does not seem to matter in the slightest insofar as it is a being-in-itself. If this were the case, however, then all mutual knowledge and recognition would be impossible. For something would be accessible in itself only to itself, and no other. However, if this were truly the case, something would not even have this privileged access to itself, and there would be no possibility of knowledge or recognition at all. For, as we saw to some extent in the Introduction, something's actual or concrete being-in-itself is a consequence or result of its being-for-other, and something can only be what it is for another, if it has the capacity to go or be outside of itself, in itself, i.e. something's being-for-other must constitute an essential part of its being-in-itself; or rather, it must be a quality of something to be for another being (SL I 135). Otherwise, there is only abstract being-in-itself, which means something is simply the absolute nothing or indeterminateness in itself, we have already seen it to be, and abstract being-for-other, which means something is simply an appearance that has no being-in-itself, for something else.

Clearly, however, something here must have being-in-itself, even if it is only that something for which there is an abstract being-for-other, and this being-in-itself, must include being-for-other, thus making both concrete. This is because that something, which is a being-in-itself, must have taken the being of something other than itself into itself, if that other something is to be distinguished, or determined as a being-for-other, and, therefore, a not-being-in-itself, i.e. an abstract-being-for-other. However, the being-in-itself of that something, which has rendered something else a pure or abstract being-for-other, and thus a not-being-in-itself, is not-being-for-other. This means that its being-in-itself is as much a result of the distinction or determination it has made in, or taken into itself, as it is the alleged immediacy of its self-identity. In other words, its being-in-itself is a product of reflection in and upon a being-for-other-not-in-itself, i.e. something which supposedly has no being-in-itself, and which is not in the something that does have being-in-itself. However, this would then mean that its being-in-itself is a product of reflection in and upon nothing in itself, or simply, absolute nothing, which is precisely what something and the absolute other are in the first place, i.e. the self-identity of negativity. Its reflection, therefore, is as much a confirmation of what something is in itself, as it is what the other is in itself, viz. the absolute self-identity of negativity or something. For now it is
itself a two-fold self-identity of negativity, negation of negation, or something-in-itself. It is, therefore, in itself a being-for-other to itself, as well as to an other, which is also a being-in-itself.

Why, however, is something now a being-for-other in itself to something else, which is also a being-in-itself? For, although it is clear why it is now in itself a being-for-other to itself, it may still not be clear why what is merely an abstract being-for-other, is also necessarily a concrete being-in-itself, for which the first something is a being-for-other.

First, insofar as something is a pure or an abstract-being-for-other, it can simply be said to be a pure or abstract-being-for-other in itself, which seems to mean it has no being-in-itself. However, being-in-itself, even or especially in its immediacy, is the self-identity of negativity, which is the negation of negation that first results in or is determined as something. To say that it is a pure or abstract being-for-other or a not-being-in-itself, therefore, is to confirm this self-identity, i.e. if something has no being-in-itself, its determination as not-being-in-itself, is just as much a statement of 'not-nothing', or the negation of negation, as it is pure or abstract nothing. Second, insofar as this something was determined as a pure or abstract-being-for-other in itself, by something that was determined as a pure being-in-itself, the determination of this pure being-in-itself, as a not-being-for-other, is a negation of being-for-otherness in general, or what is the same pure or abstract being-for-other. If pure, or abstract being-for-other is nothing in itself, then its negation is in fact the determination of something in itself, i.e. either in itself as something, or something else that is also a being-in-itself. Third, insofar as something's being-in-itself is said to be 'a product of reflection upon a being-for-other not in-itself', this being-for-other can just as well be said to be something outside of itself, as it was something without being-in-itself, i.e. another something at being-in-itself, or its own being in another, which is simply itself as a pure or abstract being-for-other, since, as we have already seen, its reflection turns out to be a reflection of absolutely nothing in itself. Fourth, insofar as something is determined as a pure being-in-itself, it is contrasted or opposed to something that is supposed to be a pure or abstract being-for-other, or not-pure being-in-itself. In other words, it is only a pure being-in-itself to and for a pure or abstract being-for-other. Its being-for-other, therefore, is its pure being-in-itself. However, insofar as it is a pure being-in-itself for an other, it is clearly not a pure being-in-itself. Rather, it is a being-in-itself mediated through its being-for-other, vice versa, or both. All of this is why Hegel says: "The in-itself into which something is reflected into itself, out of its being-for-other is no longer an abstract in-itself, but as negation of its being-for-other is mediated by the latter which is [also] thus its moment. It, [viz. the new or concrete in-itself,] is not only the immediate self-identity of something, but [also] the identity through which there is present in the something what it is in itself, [i.e. there is another something, or something else in it, or rather, it is itself now two somethings]; being-for-other, [therefore,] is present in it, because the [concrete] in itself is the transcendence of the being-for-other, [i.e. because it] has returned out of the being-for-other into itself; but also, [as we saw,] because it is
abstract and, therefore, essentially burdened with negation, with being-for-other" (HSL 122 & SL I 135 [MI]).

2. Determination & Constitution

As we can see, something is now explicitly determined as something in itself. This means that it is no longer simply something determinate, but that it also possesses or has something in it, i.e. something is something in itself, as its determination (SL I 136). Even though Hegel defines determination as "affirmative determinateness" (SL I 135), it is, as we saw, the result of the unity of being-in-itself and being-for-other in something, and, therefore, not simply determinateness as such. This is why Hegel also insists that the two be distinguished from each other (SL I 135). They must be distinguished, because of the apparent immediacy of determinateness as such, or rather, because determinateness, as we saw, is simply nothing in itself, or is essentially indeterminate. Something's being-in-itself, however is no longer immediate, or indeterminate. It is itself something, and, therefore, the real self-equality of something in itself, i.e. something=something, which maintains itself even or especially "in its entanglement with the other, by which it might be [otherwise] determined [i.e. as something else, or nothing]" (HSL 123). In other words, something's determination, viz. as something in itself, is what endures through, or resists opposition, and, therefore, change, in it by another, and thus provides the standard for all subsequent determination in itself. As Hegel says: "Something fulfils its determination insofar as the further determinateness, which at once develops in various forms through its relation to other, is [or becomes] congruous with its being-in-itself, [i.e.] becomes its fulfilment" (SL I 135-136 & HSL 123 [MI]).

However, why is there still a possibility that something will be determined as something other than what it is in itself, and why does further determinateness immediately develop in something, as a result of its relation to an other? Was this possibility not eliminated in and by the establishment of the identity of being-in-itself and being-for-other, or, what is the same thing, the transcendence of abstract being-in-itself and being-for-other?

Although the separation of being-in-itself and being-for-other is transcended in the establishment of their identity, their distinction is not eliminated altogether, i.e. it is not annihilated in this identity. For then there would be no real transcendence, nor real mediation of the one by the other, and thus no concrete being-in-itself, or, for that matter, being-for-other. Furthermore, neither this identity, nor, therefore, this transcendence is as yet complete, since as we saw, each of the two somethings involved in the initial relationship of pure or abstract being-in-itself and being-for-other, is now reproduced in itself. This means that the relationship between a pure or abstract being-in-itself and being-for-other is also reproduced in each something, rather than simply between them. In other words, even though each of the two primary or original somethings as a whole, is a concrete being-in-itself, and, therefore,
being-for-other, one of the somethings that constitutes each one's self-identity is determined as its in-itself, i.e. its determination, while the other, which is really just the original something with something now in itself, is determined as "the determinateness which is only being-for-other and [therefore] remains outside the determination" (HSL 123), even though this determinateness must conform to the determination, i.e. as its fulfilment.

As we can see, the reason for this is that the second, or original something is just as much an other to the something now determined as its in-itself, as it is an essential term in and of the identity which makes this determination possible. Furthermore, as Hegel himself explains: "in the sphere of quality, the differences in their transcended form as moments, [or distinctions] retain immediate and qualitative being relative to one another. What something has in itself, therefore, divides itself, and is from this side, [viz. the side of the other, second, or original something] an external determinate being of the something, which is also its determinate being, but does not belong to its being-in-itself" (SL I 136 & HSL 124). Therefore, insofar as this other something, which is just something's external existence, is determined, this determination appears to be something extrinsic to something's real determination (SL I 136). Thus, it is not something's determination, i.e. it is not-determination, but rather, its modification, or constitution (SL I 136 & HSL 124), which simply means 'how something is' as opposed to 'what something is'.

"Constituted in this, or that way, something is conceived as being externally influenced and related. This external relation on which constitution depends, and the fact that determination takes place through the medium of an other, appears as something contingent" (SL I 136 & HSL 124 [MI]). Constitution, therefore, is something's re-appearance as pure being-for-other, or rather, what is purely being for another something in something. As Hegel goes on to explain, however, this appearance of contingency, which is just a re-appearance of pure being-for-other, is just an appearance. For, as we have already seen with regard to being-for-other, "it is the quality of something to be open to external influences and to have a constitution" (HSL 124). This means that constitution is not simply contingent, but also necessary. Otherwise, something could not change. However, if something could not, indeed, did not, change, it would not be a determinate being. Rather, it would be absolute being, and we would be right back where we started, i.e. with the complete indeterminacy of pure or abstract being and nothing.

Something, however, has and does change, and, insofar as it does change, "the change [appears to] fall within its constitution" (SL I 136), not its determination, which, as we saw, is what resists change, or preserves something in change (SL I 136). Change, therefore, seems to occur only in or upon, what Hegel describes as, something's "unstable surface" (SL I 136), but what is in fact the in-itself of the original or second something, which also has something in it as its determination (SL I 137). Thus, determination and constitution may very well appear to be distinct, but this distinction becomes
increasingly difficult to maintain. For something is determined in itself to change, or rather, it has its constitution in itself, as a determination, just as much as it does the determination which is supposed to be opposed to this constitution. Furthermore, insofar as the determination of something is opposed to its constitution, it is itself "infected with being-for-other" (SL I 137). Determination, therefore, not only "remains liable to a relation to other" (SL I 137), it is an other in itself. It is another way of being determined, e.g. as something constituted to resist, or to not change - though the fact that determination is an other in itself, or absolute other implies that determination itself does also change, or rather, something changes in its determination. Be that as it may, determination and constitution, therefore, spontaneously become one another in themselves (SL I 137 & HSL 124).

Hegel also explains this mutual transition of the one into the other, as a consequence of determinateness as such, which is the "simple mean" or "middle term" between the two (SL I 137). Briefly, insofar as something's determination and constitution are both determinate, which they must be, if they are to be distinguished from one another, they constitute the identity of determinateness as such, or, as Hegel puts it, they "belong to its identity" (SL I 137). However, this means that determinateness as such also constitutes their identity, or rather, the medium in which they determine themselves as identical, i.e. as identical determinations. Simply put, determinateness, as the common or universal medium between determination and constitution makes the mutual infection or permeation of the two not only possible, but inevitable. For, insofar as determinateness has determination and constitution within itself, as its determinations, it is itself a qualitatively distinct moment or determination of something, and not simple determinateness as such (SL I 137 & HSL 124). In short, determinateness becomes something in itself. Hence, as an other in and to the first being-in-itself or determination of something, it both reduces this determination to something's constitution, and, therefore, usurps its original position as something's determination (SL I 137 & HSL 124).

As an other to this being in itself, or determination, however, determinateness can just as easily be posited as a being-for-other, and, therefore, something's constitution (SL I 137 & HSL 124). However, even if this determinateness is posited as a pure being-for-other, or the absolute other, it is just as much a being-in-itself, and, therefore, determination, as it is constitution. For, as the absolute other, it is the self-identity of otherness, and therefore, in itself something, or something in itself, i.e. determination as a result of constitution (SL I 137 & HSL 124). However, as we can see here, the distinction between determination and constitution, while overcome, is also preserved in this identity, since its determination, as the absolute other in itself, also necessarily implies self-negation, or otherness to the other, and, therefore, change and constitution resulting in or from determination (SL I 137 & HSL 124-25).

How then are determination and constitution transcended? For, their identity seems to result just as much in a re-assertion of their distinction, as their original distinction did in their identity.
Determination and constitution have in fact already been transcended. For it should be clear that the change, and, therefore, constitution, resulting from the determination in and of determinateness as such, are not at all external. Rather, determinateness is something, and this something is determined in itself to change through its relationship to an other external to it (SL I 137 & HSL 125), although this externality is now, as we see, posited in it, and, therefore, not really external, i.e. it is also a determination.

The question, therefore, should actually be: what is this new something, which has both determination and constitution as its determination. Or simply, what is this something which determinateness as such has become in something?

3. Limit and the Third Something

Determinateness as such has become limit (SL I 138). For in limit, as Hegel explains, the not-being-for-other of something once again “becomes prominent” (SL I 138). The only difference is that something, or rather, the two original something's related to one another are now explicitly intro-reflected (SL I 138). Each, as we saw, contains otherness, and, therefore, is a negation of that otherness. However, this must also then mean that each now contains the other original something in itself, and, therefore, be the negation of that something, which is why Hegel defines limit as the "qualitative negation of other" (SL I 138-39). It is the negation of a qualitatively distinct being as such. The mutual negation of these two something's, however, just like the negation of the other, constitutes a negation of negation, and, therefore, itself results in a third something, i.e. it is also a quality producing negation. This third something is their limit, or what appears between them (SL I 139-40).

Before their limit can appear as something between them, however, it must first appear as something in them, or rather, something itself must appear as a limit before limit can appear as something. Otherwise, it would simply be an externally imposed limit, which would have nothing to do with something’s nature or quality and development, except to indicate that it is capable of being limited. As Hegel says in the Encyclopedia, however: "A thing is what it is, only in and by reason of its limit. We cannot therefore regard the limit as only external to being which is there and then, [or simply, determinate]. It rather goes through and through the whole of such existence" (LL 136:92).²

Something, however, appears as a limit, or possesses limit within itself, as soon, and insofar, as it negates the other (SL I 138-39). For the other ends in it, or "where it begins" (SL I 139 [MI]). As Hegel explains, therefore, in the first appearance of a limit in something, i.e. as a single intro-reflected something, something limits the other, but not necessarily itself (SL I 139). It is, however, not
necessarily unlimited. For, "insofar as something exists as limiting, it itself is [also] degraded to the rank of something limited" (SL I 139); and this is true whether something limits a pure or absolute other in itself, or another something, i.e. something else. As we have already seen often enough, this is because something's distinction of something from itself is just as much a distinguishing of itself from that other something, even if that other something is now nothing. However, that other something is not nothing. For, as we have also already seen, even if it were, something's negation of otherness in the process of limitation would then be an explicit negation of negation, and, therefore, the positing of something, which would then act upon it in exactly the same way, i.e. as limiting. As we know, however, this other is itself already something. Therefore, the first something's limitation of it is the limitation of something else.

Insofar as it is the limitation of something else, therefore, something in general is self-limiting, or limited. Thus, the first something must limit itself just as surely as it does the other, in its negation of the other. For the limit establishes what it is not, viz. negated, as well as what it is, viz. not negated, just as surely as it establishes what the other is, viz. 'negated', and what the other is not, viz. 'not-negated'. Something, therefore, is not what the other is, and something is what the other is not. This then means that the distinction and externality supposedly negated in the first appearance, or moment of limit is simultaneously re-established, or affirmed in and by that negation. For the limit is also the negation of something, and, therefore, an affirmation of what the other is in itself. In short, the limit too is an other. Thus, as Hegel says: "Limit is the mediation through which [both] something and other is and also is not" (SL I 139).

However, insofar as the limit is simultaneously both the affirmation and the negation of something and an other, it is also distinct from them. It is, therefore, an other to both something and an other, and thus the absolute other (SL I 140). As the absolute other, however, it is also, therefore, something in itself, or the third something mentioned above. Their limit, therefore, is something. However, as that something which limits both something and an other, or rather, as that something "in which they cease" (SL I 140), it is not their determinate being, i.e. they do not have determinate being in it. Nor, as we have seen, do they have determinate being in one another, since each is what the other is not, and is not what the other is. In other words, something and an other cease to be, or do not have determinate being in one another, or in their limit (SL I 139). Instead, as Hegel concludes: "They have their determinate being beyond one another and beyond their limit" (SL I 140).

If they have their determinate being beyond or outside of their limit, however, then both are not limited, or are "unlimited" (SL I 140), i.e. insofar as they have determinate being. If both are something unlimited, however, then both are simply determinate being in general, or determinateness as such (SL I 140). For determinateness as such is, as we have already seen, simply determinate indeterminateness, or indeterminate determinateness. However, if both are simply determinateness as
such, then both are not only identical with one another, as Hegel makes clear (SL I 140), but also with their limit. For the determinateness of or in something and an other, or rather, the two intro-reflected somethings, is precisely what became their limit. Thus, they find their determinate being in their limit, as much as they find it beyond that limit (SL I 140). That limit, however, is now something in itself, and, therefore, distinct from both something and an other, as well as determinateness as such. Indeed, with regard to something and an other, it "is their common distinctness, their unity and distinctness" (SL I 140 [MI]). For, even though something and an other are identical in determinate being in general or determinateness as such, they are also distinct from one another by virtue of their being determinate, i.e. they are determinate beings.

The limit, therefore, is in itself something self-contradictory; or, as Hegel puts it: "Something with its immanent limit, posited as the contradiction of itself" (HSL 129 & SL I 141 [MI]). For it is at once identical with and distinct from something and an other as well as determinateness as such, i.e. it is what Hegel calls, a "double identity" (SL I 140), which necessarily implies being a double distinction as well, since every identity, as we have seen and shall continue to see, is constituted by distinct terms. As such, the limit necessarily "severs itself from itself and points beyond itself to its not-being and predicates this as its being, thus passing over into it" (SL I 140). In short, it behaves just like what it is, another limited something, but something that explicitly has limitation or not-being as its being. As we shall see shortly, this limitation of the limit is barrier. Barrier, however, is a moment of that being which explicitly has its not-being as its being, or rather, of something constantly "driven and forced beyond, [or outside of,] itself" (SL I 141), by itself, viz. the finite.

a) Finitude, or Death

The finite, as we have already seen in our analysis of Descartes and Fichte, is the first term in the ultimate or absolute contradiction in and for thought, viz. that between the finite and infinite. Indeed, Hegel himself acknowledges the apparent intractability of this opposition, and attributes it to the nature of the finite itself. As he says: "finitude is the most stubborn category of the understanding. Negation in general, constitution and limit do not war with their other, that is, determinate being, [like the finite]; and even abstract nothing is abandoned as an abstraction; but finitude is negation based on, [or fixed in] itself, and is, therefore, in abrupt opposition to its affirmative, [viz. the infinite]. It is true that the finite can be put in motion: it is itself the fact that it is determined as doomed to end, but only to end - or rather, it is the refusal to move affirmatively to its affirmative, [viz.] the infinite, and to allow itself to be united with it; it is therefore posited inseparably from its nothing, and every reconciliation with its other, [viz.] the affirmative, is thus precluded" (SL I 142 & HSL 129-30 [MI]). As we shall see shortly, however, it is the very intransigence of finitude that marks and affirms its, albeit surreptitious, move to the infinite. Before discussing this though, we should return to Hegel's description and explanation of the finite in general. For not only is it important for us to have a full
understanding of this category before seeing how it reconciles itself with its opposite, Hegel is often at his most eloquent when speaking about the nature of finite beings.

As he explains, to say that things are 'finite' basically means "that not-being constitutes their nature and being" (SL I 142). This means they are not only determined to change, but also to perish, end or die (SL I 142). Furthermore, their being determined to perish, end or die is no mere accident of existence, but an absolute necessity of their existence as determinate beings (SL I 142). As Hegel puts it: "It is ... the very being of finite things that they contain the seeds of perishing as their own being-in-self, and, [therefore, that] the hour of their birth is [also] the hour of their death" (SL I 142). Determination, therefore, once again becomes indistinguishable from destruction (SL I 142), thus confirming the essential truth of nihilism, Spinoza's proposition that all determination is negation, and Fichte's position that all self-determination is basically self-degradation. Indeed, it is the ultimate form of degradation - death.

Death appears to be the absolute form of determination in, of and for finite being, which is an important point, since it serves as the basis for the interpretation that speculative knowledge, or Science necessitates an essentially tragic view of human existence and history, thereby, opens it to the charge of being a form of romanticism.4 In the Science, for instance, Hegel claims that the thought of finitude is necessarily associated with a feeling of sorrow, because of death's constant and inescapable presence for it (SL I 142), and certainly, insofar as thought does not turn away from, or attempt to suppress the consciousness of this presence, but, instead confronts it, endures it, and maintains itself despite it, there is a tragic element in speculative knowledge or Science (PhS 19:32). However, it must also be recognized that Hegel himself criticizes that very understanding associated with romanticism, which "persists in this sorrow of finitude, by making not-being the determination of things, and also, [therefore,] making finitude at once enduring and absolute" (SL I 143). Finitude, however, is precisely what does not endure, and what is not absolute. The underlying feeling of sorrow that affects or colours the entirety of finite beings’ existence for thought, therefore, is a contradiction that must be overcome or transcended in and by Reason. Insofar as thought persists in this sorrow then, it is not rational, but irrational. Furthermore, insofar as such thought indulges its romantic inclination towards sorrow or melancholy, it does not have the slightest idea of tragedy, nor can it claim that it is itself tragic. For there is no struggle to overcome in such indulgence, only a movement towards the surrender as such explained in the Introduction, and, therefore, towards a slave's annihilation, which is completely counter to the principle and aim of Science and speculative politics. Instead, such thought knows only pathos, and is itself pathetic.

As already stated, however, the standpoint of the romantic understanding, which is characteristic of all thought that, like Fichte, sees the finite and infinite as absolutely opposed, is self-contradictory. This self-contradictoriness, however, is a direct consequence of the contradiction inherent in finitude itself,
and makes itself immediately apparent in the assertion or "fact that something is finite or that the finite is" (SL I 144), both of which are just another way of saying 'finite being'. For how can something finite be, if it is precisely what is determined not to be, or to not-be? In other words, finite things may have being, or exist, but they ought not to. Their existence, therefore, is purely accidental, whereas their non-existence is, as already stated, absolutely necessary. Thus, non-existence appears to be the "unchanging quality" of finite being (SL I 143); or rather, finite being is simply the existence of non-existence, i.e. the assertion that, nothing exists.

If, however, the non-existence of finite things is their unchanging quality, or it is true that nothing exists, then this non-existence, or nothing is absolute. For, as Hegel explains, insofar as it exists as unchanging, "it is eternal" (SL I 143 & HSL 130). Therefore, not only must everything end, or die, death is forever, which is just what was meant above when we said that death appears to be the absolute determination in, of and for finite being. However, if non-existence, or nothing and death are absolute, there would be nothing to end or die. For death presupposes the existence of something to be negated, or to become nothing, e.g. it presupposes the existence of life. Death, therefore, can never really be an absolute determination. Rather, it is something limited by the very existence it negates, i.e. it is a determinate negation. In short, death itself is finite, which is a tautology, just like 'nothing is nothing', or 'the self-identity of negativity'.

The self-identity of negativity, however, is, as we have already seen, absolute nothing. Thus, death and finitude may still be equated with absolute nothing, but, as we have already seen, absolute nothing must always beget something, thereby, negating its own absoluteness, i.e. it is the negation of negation. Nothing, therefore, is not absolute. Nor, therefore, is finitude, which, as Hegel makes clear, is just the expression of the same contradiction which occurs in absolute or abstract nothing (SL I 143). As Hegel also makes clear, however, no form of self-respecting thought would "allow itself to be saddled with the point of view that the finite is absolute" (SL I 143). For the finite is, by definition, what is not absolute, i.e. it is the limited (SL I 143), and this, as we saw, is certainly confirmed in the philosophies of Descartes and Fichte. Elevating the finite to the status of an absolute, however, is the exact consequence of insisting on the irreconcilability of the finite and infinite. For, if it cannot be reconciled with, or affirmed by its opposite, then "it remains absolute on its own side [of this opposition]" (SL I 143), which is just another way of saying, it is absolutely limited by its opposite, or death is the absolute limit of finite being. Being absolute, however, necessarily implies being unlimited. Thus, not only is the idea of an absolute limit itself a contradiction, so too is the idea of two co-existent absolutes in opposition with one another. The presence of two such absolutes, therefore, automatically negates the claim of both to be absolute. For both are limited or restricted by the existence of the other.

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In the case of the finite, however, the negation of its claim to absolute being by the presence of its opposite, is simply an affirmation of what it is to be finite. In short, it is affirmation that the finite is not the infinite or not-infinite. Thus, even, or especially when the finite is barricaded on its own side of the opposition with the infinite, it cannot help but be affirmed by its opposite. Still, the thought which clings to this opposition, might argue that such affirmation is not really affirmation at all, since recognition that the finite is not-infinite is equivalent to the recognition that the finite dies. Such affirmation, therefore, is really just negation, and not just negation of the finite's claim to absolute being, but to any being whatsoever. We must point out, however, that even if this is true, such negation is not simple negation. For it is a negation of what is in itself negative, and, therefore, a negation of negation, or affirmation through negation. In fact, this becomes clear if we look closely at the affirmation of the finite, i.e. the statement that, 'the finite dies'. Surely no one would object to this statement, since it seems perfectly consistent with the nature of the finite to die. However, if the finite is itself what dies, then the statement affirming the finite can just as easily be rendered, 'what dies dies', which is precisely what Hegel refers to as the perishing of perishing, or the infinite (SL I 143). The affirmation of the finite, therefore, is just as much the death of death, as it is death as such, or rather, the recognition of death as absolute begets its negation, which is simply the negation of the finite. However, since this negation is as much the self-negation of the finite, as it is the finite's simple negation in and by its opposite, viz. the infinite, we must see how it occurs as a result of its own determinations, that is, we must inquire into the moments of finitude itself (SL I 144).

b) Barrier & Ought

In the Science, Hegel identifies these moments as barrier and ought (SL I 144), both of which have already, more or less, come into play in the development of limit and the finite, though without really being obvious. For example, they appeared in the finite as something which exists, but ought not to; in death as the absolute limit or barrier for finite being; and in the absolute opposition between the finite and infinite, which simply means that there is an absolute limit, or barrier between them. Hegel specifically defines barrier as the limit of something posited by it as something negative, but something negative which at the same time is essential (SL I 144 & HSL 132). It is, therefore, "no longer limit as such" (SL I 144), or mere limit. For mere limit, as we saw, is also something positive, i.e. it defines something as 'what it is'. In contrast, barrier is the limit explicitly determined as something both negative and essential, or rather, something essentially negative. This means, therefore, that a barrier is not only the limit which defines something as what it is not, since this is the immediate result of defining something as what it is, but also the limit which itself realizes this negative essence, or actually negates all other possible limits, including, therefore, limit as such, or mere limit. In short, barrier is the absolute or unsurpassable limit.
As we just saw, death appears to be this limit in and for finite being, i.e. death is the barrier of finite being. However, as we also saw, this barrier is not at all unsurpassable. Rather, it is what is in itself eminently unsurpassable, i.e. it surpasses itself in fulfilling, or realizing itself. For death is not simply the death of finite being, but also death itself. Barrier then is ipso facto what can, and, therefore, ought to be, surpassed (SL I 146); or the positing of the limit, as a barrier, in something, also necessarily implies the positing of the potential to overcome that barrier in something.6 The positing of the barrier, therefore, is also necessarily the positing of the ought (SL I 145), e.g. insofar as something is finite, it is determined to die, but, insofar as its death is also a negation of this negative determination in itself, it ought not die. On the contrary, it ought to live.

However, does the mere positing of this ought, necessarily negate the barrier? In other words, does something necessarily not die, simply because it ought to live?

The positing of the ought does not negate the barrier immediately. For, insofar as something merely ought to be, it does not necessarily have being. Rather, it is not (SL I 145). Otherwise, it would be something real, and, therefore, not merely something that ought to be (SL I 145). Thus, insofar as something merely ought to live, it cannot necessarily be said to be alive, and, if it is not alive, it must be dead. This is why Hegel points out that the ought is at first identical with the determination of the finite, i.e. what is in itself nothing, even though "it is only barrier which appears at first as the finite" (SL I 145). As he says: "the being-in-itself of something in its determination reduces itself to an ought by reason of the fact that what constitutes its being-in-itself exists in exactly the same respect, [viz.] as not-being" (SL I 145 & HSL 133 [MI]). As we can see, however, such an ought is indistinguishable from barrier. Indeed, they are identical, or rather, ought's barrier is the fact that it does not have being in itself, just like finite being. However, insofar as the ought does not have being in itself, or is in itself negative, or is the being-in-itself of something, or simply has a barrier in itself, it is also, therefore, something, i.e. it is a finite being (SL I 145). Thus, the ought also necessarily has being; or, as Hegel says: "What ought to be is" (SL I 145[M]). Insofar as something ought to live, and this ought has being, or is real, then something is not dead. Rather, it can or does, or can and does live, precisely because it ought to, or rather, because it ought not be dead. The positing of the ought, therefore, is just as much the negation, or transgression of barrier, as it is the affirmation of that barrier, or rather, as it is itself, or itself has a barrier (SL I 145-46).

According to Hegel: "In the ought the transcendence of finitude, that is, infinity, begins" (HSL 134 & SL I 147[M]). However, as the ought, it is still only the last moment of finitude, and, therefore, itself finite. For it must still have a barrier in order to be what it is supposed to be, viz. the ought (SL I 148). This is why Hegel is so critical of philosophies like Fichte's, which, as we have already seen, seek resolution in the moral law, and thus recognition of the ought as absolute. As he says with regard to such reification of the ought: "There are those who esteem the ought of morality thus highly, and
see an attempt to destroy morality in the refusal to accept it as something ultimate and veritable; there are reasoners whose understanding indulges in the unceasing satisfaction, [which is in fact unceasing dissatisfaction,] of being able to adduce, against everything which is, an ought, and thus a superior knowledge, and therefore are also loth to see themselves robbed of their ought; they do not see that as regards the finitude of their sphere, the ought is fully recognized. [For the two are identical]. - But in actual fact Reason and Law are at no such sorry pass as that they merely 'ought' to be; it is only the abstraction of being-in-itself which stops dead at this point; nor yet is the ought in itself perpetual, nor finitude, which would be the same, absolute. The philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the contradictions of Reason; but in truth, this is only the standpoint where they persist in finitude, and, which is the same thing, in contradiction" (SL I 148-49 & HSL 136 [MI]). In short, it is the moral standpoint. For, as we saw in Parts I and II, the moral standpoint is that standpoint which posits the contradiction between the finite and infinite as what should be resolved, but cannot be, at least not in this world, i.e. the world that 'is'.

However, if neither the ought, nor the standpoint based upon it are absolute, then how does the transcendence of finitude, or infinity begin?

**C. The Appearance or Beginning of the Infinite in the Finite**

The ought itself may not be the transcendence of the finite, or, therefore, the appearance of the infinite, since it is itself finite, but it does mark the beginning of this transcendence, or of the appearance of the infinite. For both are nothing more than the determination of the finite as what it ought to be, viz. finite, and, insofar as the finite is determined as what it ought to be, it is negated. This is simply because what the finite ought to be, is what it is in itself; and, as has already been established, what the finite is in itself, is nothing, i.e. it is nothing in itself, because it ends or dies. Thus, insofar as the finite has come to an end or died in the realization of its ought, this ought marks the beginning of finitude's other, its opposite, or what is not-finite, viz. the infinite (SL I 149).

As Hegel explains, however, the infinite is no simple negation. Rather, it is an independent determination. For, insofar as it is the negation of finitude, it is explicitly the negation of what is essentially negative, and, therefore, the self-identity of negativity, negation of negation (SL I 149), or what he calls, "indeterminate self-relation" (SL I 150). Consequently, the infinite not only 'is', it is the first determination since the emergence of determinate being, which "may be regarded ... as a fresh definition of the absolute" (SL I 150). Indeed, it is itself the absolute. For, it, unlike something and other in relation to their limit, is supposed to be the negation of all limitation, and, therefore, what is itself not limited, or what actually is the unlimited (SL I 150). Thus, Hegel calls what is actually unlimited infinity in general (SL I 150).
Infinity in general, however, is not separate from determinate being, nor, therefore, finitude. For, as Hegel explains, it appears as a consequence of determinate being's determination of itself, as finite. Simply put, infinity is a result of finitude's self-determination. "Thus the infinite does not stand above the finite as something complete in itself, as if the finite had an enduring being apart from, or subordinate to the infinite" (SL I 151 & HSL 138). Instead, it arises out of the finite's being-in-itself, in such a way that one can say, as Hegel does, that it is just as much the nature of the finite to become infinite, as it is to be finite (SL I 151). Indeed, the finite is infinite in itself, or, as we shall see shortly, it ought to be infinite (SL I 152), even though it is not.

Contrary, therefore, to those who would preserve the utterly misguided belief that Hegel's Science, or any other form of truly speculative knowledge, has anything to do with heaven, God, or some other demiurge, there "is no external power which impels" (SL I 151 [MI]) the finite into becoming infinite. There is only the internal power of the finite (SL I 159), which relates itself to itself as absolutely limited, or as barrier in its double determination, both as itself and the ought (SL I 151), and, therefore, which itself constitutes a negation of negation, or the self-identity of negativity which is the infinite (SL I 151). As Hegel himself concludes, therefore, "Infinity in general is not created by the cancellation of finitude in general: [rather] the finite is just what itself becomes infinity through its own nature. Infinity [therefore] is its affirmative determination, [by itself,] or what it truly is in itself" (SL I 151 & HSL 138). Thus, the finite is the infinite, and, insofar as it is now the infinite, it is no longer finite, or rather the finite 'is' no longer. It has disappeared (SL I 151). This disappearance, however, is essentially the same as the disappearance which occurred in becoming, i.e. it is the disappearance of disappearance, or an appearance, which, as we shall see shortly, is also a re-appearance. In fact, it is a re-appearance that will cause the finite and the infinite to momentarily appear as the entirely separate determinations, or 'worlds' they have normally been considered in philosophy, religion and science.

1. The 'Two Worlds' of the False Infinite, or the Progress to Infinity

As a result of this disappearance of disappearance, the finite appears as the infinite. This infinite has being in itself, since, as we have seen, it is itself the negation of negation, or the self-identity of negativity. Furthermore, the two are inseparable. For not only does the finite become the infinite, the finite is negated, and, therefore, does not enjoy any being, or existence of its own, which would distinguish it from anything else. Insofar as it is in unity with the infinite, therefore, this unity is merely an abstract unity. For to be a real, concrete, or actual unity, there would have to be two coexisting determinations, or moments, which are united. In infinity, in general, however, there only appears to be one, viz. the infinite. Thus, there is no real unity between the finite and the infinite in
infinity in general, only the infinite as such. As Hegel puts it: "The infinite is" \( SL I 151 \) (MI), and nothing else.

What exactly does it mean, however, that 'the infinite is'?

From the point of view of the finite which has disappeared, and, thereby, become the infinite, it means nothing. For in the disappearance of the finite as finite, *something has literally become nothing*, i.e. it ends or dies. Therefore, now to say that 'the infinite is', simply means that 'nothing is'. As we shall see shortly, this is why the infinite at first appears to stand in relation to the finite, as an *indeterminate void* \( SL I 152 \), existing beyond the finite. However, as we have already seen, *the existence of nothing* is precisely what the finite was. The finite and the infinite, therefore, can be said to be immediately identical *in themselves*, or essentially. Indeed, Hegel admits that the infinite, in its immediacy, is or immediately becomes the finite, even or especially though it is the negation of the finite \( SL I 151 \). This is not simply because both are the existence of nothing. For, insofar as we are speaking here about existence, or the possession of being, we are not dealing with a mere absence of determination and difference, i.e. we are not dealing with nothing in general or abstract nothingness, but rather, *the nothing*, negation, or not-being of a specific determinate being, i.e. the finite. Once again, therefore, we are dealing with *determinate negation*, and, insofar as the infinite is a mere determinate negation, it is dependent upon what it negates to be what it is, i.e. the infinite, as the negation of the finite, is simply the *not-finite* \( SL I 156 \). It is, therefore, itself something determinate, even though it may not yet have appeared as such to thought, which still regards it as something absolutely different from and superior to the finite. This is why Hegel says that the infinite, upon appearing regresses, or "has fallen back into the category of something with a limit" \( SL I 151 \).

As the potential negation of the finite, it was *the other* of the finite. However, the finite, even or especially in its negation, becomes *the other* of the infinite. For it is now the potential negation of the infinite, i.e. if it were to *re-appear* the infinite would *disappear*, as infinite. In fact, this has already more or less occurred, since the infinite, in becoming something determinate, has become a being limited by an other, or since, in maintaining itself as not-finite, it is determined, or defined by the finite, and, therefore, is just as much *not-infinite*, or finite, as infinite. Thus, the finite's disappearance, which is the infinite's appearance, is essentially a *re-appearance of the finite* and the *disappearance of the infinite*, which is also just a disappearance of disappearance, or becoming, since the infinite is supposedly the disappearance of something, viz. the finite. Something, therefore, may become nothing in the infinite, but this nothing immediately becomes something, or something re-appears in and from it.
This re-emergence of something in and from the infinite, or rather, this emergence of the infinite as something, results in a qualitative opposition between the finite and the infinite, even though the infinite has in essence already vanished, as infinite (SL I 152). For there are again two determinatenesses, or somethings confronting one another (SL I 153). There are two somethings, because the infinite, insofar as it is itself merely something, affirms the finite in such a way that it cannot be the total negation, or annihilation of the finite it at first seems. On the contrary, as Hegel notes: "The finite is real determinate being, which remains so, still even after the transition has been made to its not-being, [viz.] the infinite; and this, [viz. the infinite.] ... is determined relatively to the finite merely as first, or immediate negation; and the finite, opposed to this negation, and as negated, has merely the meaning of an other, [i.e. to the infinite.] and, therefore, still is something" (SL I 153 [MI]). Since there is still something finite on the side of the finite, even after its negation by the infinite, the appearance of the infinite, or, more precisely, the appearance of something else which seems to be infinite, creates the appearance of two separate, but coexistent worlds - one finite and the other infinite (SL I 153).

The infinite world may very well appear as nothing more than the indeterminate void immediately beyond the finite one (SL I 152), but, as we already know, it is no less real, or determinate for this appearance of being indeterminate and void. In short, it is a real void, and, therefore, something, which Hegel identifies as the spurious infinite, or the infinite of the understanding (SL I 152 & HSL 139). It is spurious, because it seems, and is considered by thought qua the understanding, to stand over and against the finite as both infinite and absolute, when in fact it is neither. It is neither by the very fact that it appears to stand over and against something, viz. the finite (SL I 157). For the finite, as humble as it might seem relative to this indeterminate void, endures in spite of it, and, therefore, limits the infinite, just as much as it appears to be limited by it. Each, therefore, is limited by the other, which means that both, despite the infinite's appearance of superiority, are equally finite.

However, as finite, neither is simply limited by the other. Rather, "both are limited and finite in themselves" (SL I 153 [MI]). For only what is finite and limited in itself is capable of being limited by an other. This means that each is in a relation of self-identity with its negation, or limit (SL I 153). Each, therefore, negates, or "immediately casts off the limit as its not-being, and thus qualitatively separated from it, posits it as another being outside itself" (SL I 153 [MI]). This then means that there is a doubling of the finite and the infinite in the relationship of the finite and infinite in general, so that a finite being now explicitly appears on the side of the infinite and an infinite on the side of the finite (SL I 153). Thus, not only is the apparent opposition between the finite and infinite in general reproduced on each side, there is also now an identity posited between each side; that is, there is an identity between the original finite and that posited by the infinite; between the original infinite and that posited by the finite; and between the two new relationships of opposition established by these posittings and the original opposition between the finite and the infinite in general. Each side,
therefore, now constitutes an opposition to opposition in itself, and thus an essential identity, or unity between the two sides in general (SL I 154). As Hegel explains, however, this unity is still implicit, or "hidden in their qualitative otherness" (SL I 154 [MI]). For, even though we can see that this qualitative otherness is really just an external appearance, and, therefore, not at all qualitative, only the interaction of the determinations can actually reveal what is internal to them. Their unity, therefore, at first appears as nothing more than what we have already seen is the external transition, or disappearance of the one into the other, and then the disappearance of this other back into what disappeared into it, i.e. the finite disappears into the infinite, and then the infinite disappears back into the finite.

However, since the infinite is supposed to be superior to the finite, thought does not see that this disappearance, or regression of the infinite into the finite is a result of its own determinateness, or nature, i.e. it does not see that it is the infinite which itself becomes finite. Instead, it regards the finite, which emerges from the infinite, simply as a hitherto unknown existent, which "is accidentally discovered" (SL I 154), in its continuous attempts to understand the infinite. Thought, therefore, assumes that its understanding, or determination of the finite was simply incomplete before it attempted to understand the infinite, and that it can make a new attempt after extending its understanding to include this new determination of the finite, never realizing, of course, that it has already grasped it, and that this new determination of the finite is the result. Of course, thought will never grasp or understand the infinite as such, since this process of mutual transition between the two, or, what Hegel calls, "the reciprocal determination of the finite and infinite" (SL I 155), can go on indefinitely. It can go on indefinitely, simply because the finitude that arises from the infinite is, in its immediacy, still only something finite, and, therefore, something that ends, dies, or simply, disappears back into the infinite, as the apparently indeterminate void, which is, itself determinate, and, therefore, again something finite, and so on forever (SL I 154).

As Hegel says: "this reciprocal determination, negating both itself and its negation, appears as that progress to infinity, which, in so many forms and applications, is taken as something ultimate, beyond which no progress is possible: having reached this and so on to infinity, the train of thought generally is at an end" (SL I 155 [MI]). The regress of infinity, therefore, appears as a progress to infinity, and is precisely what we encountered in Fichte's Science, as the absolute ought towards which the moral standpoint must always strive (SL I 155). As Hegel makes perfectly clear, however, the progress to infinity is not real or concrete progress, but rather, abstract progress (SL I 155). It is an abstract progress, first because, insofar as the infinite is never really reached, or is reached only to immediately become finite, it is forever incomplete, and second, because, insofar as this progress is considered absolute by the understanding, which is nothing more than the thought of the moral standpoint, "there is no progress beyond this progress itself" (SL I 155 [MI]). In short, the progress to infinity as absolute is the negation, or end of progress in general, or rather, actual progress. Instead, it is only a recurring monotony, one and the same wearisome alternation of this finite and infinite" (SL I 155 [MI]).
progress always ending, in fact, it merely constitutes a truth as we saw in the Introduction, change without the rationality of progress, and, therefore, merely an "empty restlessness" (SL I 155), which seems to go everywhere and do everything, when, in fact, it goes nowhere and does nothing, that is, nowhere other than where it was and nothing other than what it did to begin with, i.e. as something finite. It is a condition of eternal something elselessness, or finitude. This is why Hegel, for instance, cannot regard history as an absolute process, but sees it as always necessarily ending, or being transcended in the present. Otherwise, it would simply be a progress to infinity, or an abstract progress, and would not embody actual progress, or progress beyond this apparent progress. In other words, for history to be an actual progress, it must progress beyond itself. This means, however, that the infamous 'end of history' is hardly an end, or regress at all, but a movement beyond both.

How, however, is progress made beyond the progress of infinity? Or, what is the same, what constitutes true infinity, and, therefore, actual progress?

2. Affirmative or True Infinity &

Actual Progress

The progress to infinity constitutes the truth of the finite and the infinite taken as immediately separate, and, therefore, finite determinations, which reciprocally determine and alternate between each other (SL I 156). Thus, this progress is essentially the self-determination of finitude in general, and, therefore, something truly infinite in itself. However, so long as these determinations merely appear as separate, or appear separately in this progress, there does not seem to be any unity between them; or rather, the unity that does appear is merely a conjunction of separate terms (SL I 157), and, therefore, not really infinite. This is why, for Hegel, even the phrase, 'the unity of finite and infinite', which can certainly be used to define the progress to infinity, is a distortion of the actual unity, or true infinite, and, therefore, of the finite and infinite as individual moments as well, i.e. in their truth, or as they truly are (SL I 156). We have already seen, however, that the two determinations are in themselves identical, regardless of how we look at them i.e. in and by themselves, or together. Taken as simply, or immediately identical, however, their unity is still only abstract. For then this unity still only appears as either finite, or infinite, i.e. there is no distinction between them whatsoever.

As Hegel makes clear, however, their distinction does not necessarily disappear. For, insofar as they are only in-themselves, or essentially identical, they are also not immediately identical, i.e. they do not exist as identical. Rather, they must become what the other already supposedly is, and, insofar as they must become this other, each is a result, and, therefore, mediated (SL I 160-61). Indeed, we have already seen this in the finite's positing of an infinite from itself on its own side, and the infinite's positing of a finite from itself on its side. As a consequence, the finite and infinite "lose their
qualitative nature" (SL I 157), which as we saw, was the ground of their separation and opposition. This will ultimately mean that it is indifferent as to which determination each appears as, i.e. itself or its other, and also which side the unity in general is determined from, but not yet. For their distinction, although essentially, or qualitatively negated, has yet to appear as such, particularly for the understanding, which attempts to preserve their difference and separation. Consequently, the actual unity, or true infinite "is determined in each of them in a different manner" (SL I 158 [MI]); or rather, each is determined as a different unity within the true unity, though this true or general unity is still hidden from thought as the understanding.

This difference results in the dual phenomenon of degradation and exaltation. In the former, the unity is determined as in itself, or essentially infinite. However, this infinity is burdened by the quality of determinateness, which limits it, and, therefore, is finitized infinity (HSL 145). Such degradation is characteristic of the longing we already encountered at the end of Fichte's philosophy, and, as we shall see, determines the moral standpoint in the unhappy consciousness. In the latter, the same unity is seen from the standpoint of the finite, which, although supposedly the negation of the being-in-itself or essence of this unity, viz. the infinite, nonetheless has infinity present within it, i.e. as what it burdens, and, therefore, is "infinity exalted above its worth" (SL I 158 & HSL 145). As Hegel says, therefore, "it is posited as the finitized finite" (HSL 145). This standpoint is characteristic of the body that realizes it has a soul or mind for the first time. Both of these standpoints in and by themselves, however, are abstractions, which, according to Hegel, represent the falsification of the finite and infinite, and, therefore, of their unity as well - falsifications characteristic of the understanding, which once again attempts to preserve the separation of these determinations by giving preference to one over the other in their unity, thus reducing their unity to a mere combination of incongruous determinations. These unities, however, are no mere combination of "separate and opposed" terms (SL I 158). Indeed, as Hegel explains, and as we have already largely seen: "each in itself is this unity, and is so only in transcending itself, neither excelling the other in being-in-self, [or essentiality,] and affirmative determinate being. ... [F]initude exists only as a passing beyond itself; it thus contains infinity, which is its other. And, similarly, infinity exists only as a passing beyond finitude; it thus essentially contains its other, and so is in itself its own other. The infinite does not transcend the finite as a power existing external to the latter; rather it is the infinity of the finite to transcend itself" (SL I 159).

The transcendence of the finite, therefore, is an explicit result of its determination of itself, or self-determination as what it is in itself, and, as we can see, it does not matter whether we call this essence, or in-itselfness the finite or the infinite. For both necessarily imply a negation of negation. Thus, the transcendence of the finite, as Hegel explains, is not just alteration or transition into otherness. In short, it is not mere change. Rather, it is the self-realization of its essence, i.e. self-transcendence or real progress (SL I 159). Indeed, this is why Hegel eventually claims that the true infinite "essentially
exists as becoming, a becoming which is now further defined in its moments" (SL I 161). As we saw, however, the infinite, as well as being the transcendence of the finite, also transcends itself in the finite, i.e. as a determinate negation, it is itself finite, or, even as the apparent negation of all determinateness, it immediately becomes determinate, since it is then an absolute negation, a negation of indeterminateness, or simply, a negation of negation. Regardless, its negation of itself in finitude is a negation of itself as the negation of finitude, and this is achieved simply by determining itself as what it is in itself, or essentially, i.e. either finite, or infinite. "In both [the self-transcendence of the finite and the infinite], therefore, we have the same negation of negation. But this is, in itself, [or essentially,] a self-relation: it is affirmation in the sense of a return to itself, that is, through mediation [by the other,] which is negation of negation" (SL I 159 [MI]).

This is precisely what happened in becoming, when being, having passed through, or become nothing, returned to being, i.e. as determinate being, and nothing, having passed through being, returned to nothing, i.e. as negativity (SL I 161). The identity of the finite and infinite in their self-transcendence, viz. as the same negation of negation, however, is not merely an essential identity, or an identity as the mere in-itself of the true infinite. For, even in the infinite progress, as Hegel points out, both are exactly the same movement of self-return through negativity (SL I 160). As he goes on to explain: "they are in themselves only as mediation, and the affirmative of both contains the negation of both and is the negation of negation" (SL I 160). Furthermore, since they are identical movements, even in the progress to infinity, it does not matter that there seem to be two results, i.e. the mediated finite and the mediated infinite. For "it is perfectly indifferent which is taken as the beginning [of this movement]; and this disposes in itself of the distinction which caused the double result" (SL I 161 [MI]). Both are "the accomplished return into self" (SL I 162 & HSL 148), and, therefore, the true or affirmative infinite. In other words, true infinity is self-affirmation, and as such, must be what "exists, and exists as a determinate being, present and before us" (SL I 162 [MI]). Why? Simply because, even as absolute negation, or the apparently indeterminate void into which finite determinate being seems to pass, it is real self-identical, self-affirming determinate being, or being-for-self, for which there is no beyond to pass into, outside of itself. This simply means there is no real beyond, only an ideal one posited in and by the very determinate being which is really or truly infinite (SL I 162-63).

This ideal beyond, which is not really a beyond, is absolutely essential. For, as Hegel says: "Ideality may be called the quality of infinity" (SL I 163). As such, ideality constitutes the actual being-in-itself, essence, or real nature of true infinite being, or being-for-self (SL I 163). What, however, is ideality? At its most basic level, it is simply negation (SL I 163). Thus, whatever is in itself nothing, or essentially negative possesses an ideal nature, e.g. finite being (SL I 163). Indeed, idealism, as Hegel points out, "consists in nothing else than the recognition that the finite has no veritable being [in itself]" (SL I 168 [MI]). It is now clear, however, that there is no such thing as
merely simple negation, or rather, that simple negation is also necessarily the negation of negation, and, therefore, what is completely or concretely real (SL I 168). This is why Hegel's claim that his philosophy is an 'absolute idealism', for instance, is completely ironic. An absolute ideality or idealism is necessarily self-negating, and thus just as realistic, as idealistic. As Hegel himself says, in the Science of Logic: "the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy is without meaning" (SL I 168). It is without meaning, because the determinations upon which they are grounded, and, therefore, which supposedly hold them apart, are not at all separate. Rather, they are one, and this one, as we shall see shortly, is immediately being-for-self, or being-for-self in its immediacy (SL I 170).

Before going on to discuss this new category in the development of Hegel's Science, however, we must point out that, in the affirmative or true infinite, Hegel has completely refuted the ultimate truth of the moral standpoint, particularly as this alleged truth is presented in Fichte's Science. For, as we may recall, the mark of infinity in ourselves is supposedly the longing that compels us to strive ever on, into or towards a beyond that we can never reach, in our attempt to realize the moral law, or ideal. As Hegel says, however: "It is only the spurious infinite which is the beyond, because it is the negation, and nothing more, of the finite posited as real; it is thus abstract and first negation; it is determined as merely negative, and is without the affirmation implicit in determinate being; and, if held fast as merely negative, it is even supposed to be non-existent and beyond reach. But to be thus beyond reach is not its glory but its shame; ... What is untrue is beyond reach; and it is evident that such an infinite is the untrue" (SL I 162 [MI]). Thus, insofar as the moral standpoint posits an ideal forever beyond its own reach, it posits what Hegel shows to be the the untrue; and, insofar as it forever attempts to reach or fulfil what it knows it cannot reach or fulfil as in Fichte's system, it is doubly untrue.
Before going on to analyse the categories implicit in this determinate being, it should be made clear, once and for all, that Hegel's deduction of determinate being from becoming is perfectly valid. For he has often been criticized, even by sympathetic commentators such as W. T. Stace in The Philosophy of Hegel, for relying on "a play of the word 'definite'," in order to achieve it. In other words, he is accused of improperly using 'definite' "as a synonym for 'determinate'." Insofar as both words indicate the possession of limits, and limitation will prove to be one of the most important categories of determinate being, there does not seem to be a real problem. However, we can easily see that Hegel does not simply use the term 'definite' in and by itself as a synonym for 'determinate', or rather, 'determinate being'. Rather, he uses the term 'definite appearance'. A definite appearance, whether real, or imaginary is something, especially if it has 'clear and discernible limits', as the word 'definite' certainly implies. As we shall see, therefore, insofar as a definite appearance is something, it must be a determinate being. However, should we choose to avoid this debate all together, this is also possible. For, as we have seen both here and in the Introduction, determinacy can easily and validly be derived from becoming without even mentioning the word definite, though so much of the rich and diverse developments of the logic of becoming might then be missed. Indeed, this issue appears to be more an indication of the narrowmindedness of those who would assume that there is only one way of proceeding from category to category in Hegel's Logic - when, in fact, there are many - than it does any logical deficiency, or sleight of hand on Hegel's part, i.e. to cover up "a shaky deduction." (p. 140, para. 185).


2 Hegel goes on in this passage to explain that the view of limits as strictly something external is due to a confusion of quantitative and qualitative limits. The former are purely external and generally speaking do not affect something's nature, or qualitative existence, whereas the latter, even though it will also prove to have an external existence is directly related to something's nature.


4 For example, see Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 1984), p.165.


7 Stace, Philosophy of Hegel, p. 146, para. 199.
Chapter 5

Being-for-Self

Being-for-self is perhaps the most important concept of Science, even though the latter is still in a very early or abstract stage of development. For not only is being-for-self the realization of being as infinite, i.e. the true infinite, and, therefore, the resolution of the age old contradiction between the finite and infinite, it is also the category with which important determinations such as life, consciousness and self-consciousness, begin to make their explicit appearance in and to thought, out of mere being, albeit all in different ways.\(^1\) Now it is certainly true that in determinate being, the category of life, for instance, has already been employed, i.e. we talked about 'living things' in the analysis of death as the absolute limit or barrier of finite being. However, this concept or determination only appeared in the discourse on determinate being as a result of its being the negation, or opposite condition of death, which is identical with the infinite as a seemingly indeterminate void, i.e. death is the false infinite. Other than this though, we learned nothing else about life, except perhaps that it is something, or rather, we merely talked about things not dead, as if they were, or could be alive. In determinate being, therefore, life was merely equivalent with the possession of being by something, or the existence of determinate being.

Life, however, is much more than mere existence, or the totality of the categories of determinate being. Indeed, it is even more than the totality of the categories of being-for-self, which is why Hegel does not introduce it as a category, or determination in its own right, until the very last stage in the development of his Science, viz. the Idea (SL I 395-415). Even at this highly developed and concrete stage of Science, however, the Idea of life, in its immediacy, is at first equated with, what Hegel calls, the universal creative soul, and this soul is nothing more than "that positing in itself which becomes being-for-self" (SL II 405). It becomes being-for-self, simply because it determines itself as the Notion, both of which, according to Hegel, are essentially the infinite self-relation of negativity as such (SL II 405), or what we have already seen in the true infinite is "the posited negation of negation" (SL I 170 [MI]).\(^2\)

Life, the soul, the Notion, etc. only become being-for-self, and therefore, appear at all, as a return into self (SL II 405); and this return into self is precisely what we encountered at the end of determinate being, which, among other things, has now begun to show itself to be alive, i.e. it shows itself to be alive in the face of death, to other determinate beings, which may or may not show themselves to be alive, and, most importantly at this point, to itself.\(^3\) This becomes very clear in the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology,\(^4\) where Hegel introduces his famous notion of desire (see Appendix I), and where both self-consciousness and life appear as immediate results of a "return from otherness" (PhS 105:167), and, therefore, a "reflection into itself" (PhS 106:168), which is just

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how he defines being-for-self in the Logic. As he says in the Science of Logic: "we say that something is for itself insofar as it cancels its otherness, its relatedness to and community with an other, rejecting and abstracting from them. In it, [viz. being-for-self] the other only exists as having been transcended, or as its moment; and being-for-self consists in this, that it has passed beyond the barrier and its otherness in such a manner that, thus negating them, it is infinite return upon itself" (SL I 171 [MI]).

We shall return to the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology (see Appendices 1 & 2), since, as already stated, it contains Hegel's analyses of the phenomenological predecessors of the moral standpoint. However, we shall do so only after we have first analysed the logic of its fundamental determination, viz. being-for-self. For, insofar as the moral standpoint is distinguished from abstract power, i.e. the former is the latter's modern form, and thus begins with Descartes' cogito, or thought, rather merely than absolute being, being-for-self may also be said to be the moral standpoint's fundamental truth. This is why consciousness and self-consciousness, for instance, appear as examples at the beginning of the explanation of being-for-self in Hegel's Science. Both imply a negation of external otherness, and, therefore, a return or reflection into self, whether this self is regarded as purely positive in itself, like Descartes' cogito, or purely negative. For, even, or especially as purely negative, the self is posited as the negation of negation, i.e. the self-identity of negativity, and, therefore, something that exists, e.g. res cogitans: a thinking thing.

In the case of mere consciousness, this negation seems to be merely partial. For consciousness, by representing an object in and to itself, does not necessarily annihilate that object in its reality and otherness. It merely renders it an ideal in its own self (HSL 158 & SL I 171). Mere consciousness, therefore, contains being-for-self, but only in itself, or immanently (HSL 158 & SL I 171). For, even though the positing of the object in consciousness, as precisely what it really is in itself, viz. negative, or ideal, is the positing of the self-identity of negativity in consciousness - which is also essentially negative - and, therefore, being-for-self, and, even though the rendering of the object as an ideal being in its own self, i.e. in consciousness, is also essentially a return of being in general into itself, and, as such, intro-reflected being, or again being-for-self in general, "the reality of the object is also still preserved, since it is also simultaneously known to be an external determinate being" (SL I 171 & HSL 158 [MI]). In short, consciousness "is [still] confronted by the brute givenness of reality." "In this, its phenomenal aspect, [therefore,] consciousness is dualism: first it has knowledge of another object external to it; secondly, it, [viz. consciousness,] is for itself, it contains the object in an ideal manner; its being is not only with such an other, [as in the immediate relation of two merely determinate beings, e.g. something and an other,] but being with such an other, it is also in the presence of its own self" (SL I 171 & HSL 158 [MI]). In other words, consciousness has a sense or feeling of itself as something, and, therefore, as something distinct from the other, which it contains only ideally, but this feeling is still contradicted by the existence of what appears to be an independent
object. This feeling of itself as something, or this presence to itself, however, is extremely important. For it is the only thing that can distinguish consciousness from simple determinate being at this point. This is because being-for-self may be said to be immediately present in being in general the moment a) there is a return of being into being, as in becoming; b) there are two coexistent beings with the same determination, e.g. as something; or, c) there is a self-identity of negativity, as in absolute nothing, otherness, finitude, etc.. For, in all of these, there is, at the very least, an implicit return and reflection into self.

"Self-consciousness, on the other hand, is being-for-self accomplished and posited; the aspect of relation to an other, [i.e.] an external object, has been removed" (SL I 171 & HSL 158). It has been removed not because it has been annihilated, though this, as we shall see in our analysis of the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology, will certainly appear to be the case in self-consciousness' first attempt to prove and preserve itself, as pure being-for-self, or, what Hegel calls, "being-for-self as such" (SL I 170). Rather, it is because this other has been realized and recognized, by self-consciousness, as an essential determination, or moment in and for itself. In short, self-consciousness is accomplished and posited being-for-self, because it is the actual, and, therefore, non-annihilating, unity of self and other. According to Hegel, therefore: "Self-consciousness is ... the nearest example of the presence of infinity - indeed an abstract infinity, but also of a concrete determination very different from that of being-for-self in general, the infinity of which is still wholly qualitative determinateness, [and, therefore, quite abstract]" (SL I 171 [MI]). It is still quite abstract, because only with the appearance of Reason and Spirit, and, therefore, the transcendence of self-consciousness, does infinity become truly, actually, or completely present for Hegel. The issue of self-consciousness' transcendence, however, must be postponed until we have at least developed self-consciousness' fundamental determination to its highest possible degree, viz. being-for-self. Thus, we shall leave this issue of the transcendence of self-consciousness as such until our analysis of the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology, and the categories of reflection in the Logic.

A. Being-for-self as Absolutely Determined Being

Even though being-for-self is the negation of external relation, and, therefore, the transcendence of determinate being, it is clear that it is not merely indeterminate. On the contrary, as Hegel makes clear in the very first sections of the analysis of being-for-self, it is infinitely or "absolutely determined being" (HSL 158 & SL I 170). This is simply because it has appeared as explicitly self-determining, i.e. it can and has determined itself as everything both in and outside of itself. Furthermore, determinate being is not simply annihilated in its transcendence by or in being-for-self; or rather, if it is or seems to be, it immediately re-emerges in and from being-for-self. Simply put, being-for-self immediately becomes or remains determinate being, despite the negation or transcendence of determinate being as such. For, insofar as being-for-self is the posited infinite self-relation of

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negativity as such, the self-identity of negativity, or the negation of negation, and, therefore, also simply negation in general, it is the same 'first negation' that determinate being was, when it negated the absolute indeterminateness of pure being and nothing, i.e. "simple qualitative determinateness" (SL I 171); or, as we have already seen, the negation of negation must always also be, or result in something.

This means, however, there must be a distinction immediately present in being-for-self, i.e. between its re-emergence as determinate being and itself as being-for-self, or being-for-self as such, which is just being-for-self as self-identical. In short, there now appear to be two kinds of determinateness in being-for-self in general, viz. a finite one and the infinite one (SL I 171-72), although this finite one now supposedly only "exists in its unity with the infinite, or as an ideal nature" (SL I 172 [MI]), i.e what was, or what ought to be. The determinate being in being-for-self in general, however, is not simply distinct from being-for-self as such. For, insofar as it arises out of or results from being-for-self, or, insofar as being-for-self is the transcendence of determinate being and not the mere annihilation it might at first seem, "determinate being is a moment of being-for-self" (SL I 172 [MI]). It is a moment of being-for-self in general, though it may not yet seem so, and it is a moment of the being-for-self as such now supposedly distinct from it, in being-for-self in general. Why? Simply because it is still the same posited infinite self-relation of negativity, or, as Hegel puts it, "being infected with negation" (SL I 172), i.e. infinite or absolute negation. Thus, there is no difference whatsoever between being-for-self in general and the self-identical being-for-self, or being-for-self as such, which seemed to emerge as distinct from the determinate being in being-for-self. Indeed, they are the same, or are one self-identical being-for-self. Furthermore, since determinate being is now merely a moment of the being that is being-for-self, not its fundamental determination, and since there is supposedly no longer any external other to limit this determinate being, or to render it a being-for-other, in being-for-self, "the moment of determinate being is here present as a being-for-one" (SL I 172 & HSL 159 [MI]).

1. Being-for-One

What one, however, is this moment of determinate being a being for?

The immediate answer would seem to be the being-for-self which it is a moment of, yet which it is also supposed to be distinct from. However, this cannot be, because, as Hegel is quick to point out: "In being-for-self, negation is not present as a determinateness, or limit, and not, therefore, as a relation to another distinct determinate being" (SL I 172 & HSL 159 [MI]). In being-for-self as such, all of these things are supposed to be negated, or transcended. Furthermore, it is supposed to be nothing more than the infinite self-relation of negativity as such, and, therefore, nothing at all. As Hegel says, therefore: "This moment [of determinate being, in being-for-self] has been called being-for-one, but so far there is nothing for which it could be - there is no one, of which it could be the moment" (SL I 172
Hegel explains, therefore, this ought to be for, and, therefore, absolute determinateness, which is to be determination. Thus, essentially the "being-for-one. self-consciousness & HSL 160 (HSL & HSL & "being-for-one something for self & one, determinate being that re-emerged, if this being-for-self which has posited as infinitely negative self-relation, and, therefore, absolute determinateness, which is identical with indeterminateness, needs to become something for a being to be for (SL I 172 & HSL 159). In short being-for-self as such should or ought to be a one, but is not.

As Hegel explains, therefore, this means that here "there is only one ideality" (HSL 159 & SL I 172); and "being-for-one and being-for-self are not true determinatenesses relatively to one another" (SL I 172 & HSL 159). They are not opposed. Rather, they "are essential, inseparable moments of [ideality]" (HSL 160 & SL I 173), which, as we shall see in the Phenomenology, is precisely what characterizes self-consciousness qua desire. Being-for-one, therefore, is as much being-for-self, as being-for-self is a being-for-one. "The moments of being-for-self, [therefore,] have collapsed into indistinguishability" (SL I 176); and, as such, constitute a "simple unity" (SL I 176), or "immediacy, based on that negation which has been posited as its determination" (SL I 176), i.e. the negation of negation. This is why Hegel says that: "Here there is only one determination, [viz.] the self-relation of transcendence" (SL I 176); or, what is better described as, 'the transcendence of the transcendence of determinate being', which is, therefore, a return to a kind of determinate being, viz. one that is for itself, or a determinate being-for-self (SL I 176-77).

If this is the case, however, then we must certainly ask: why should the distinction between the determinate being that re-emerged, or was preserved in being-for-self, even or especially as being-for-one, and being-for-self as such have been made or admitted in the first place? Furthermore, why can't the one for which the moment of determinate being in being-for-self is a being, i.e. a being-for-one, simply be itself? For if being-for-one and being-for-self are really indistinguishable, it is itself a being-for-self, and, therefore, not merely a moment.

Hegel does not really regard the first question as important. For, at the end of the development of the true infinite, there is a being, which is for self, and from which determinate being re-emerges, and it does so for precisely the reason we saw, i.e. the posited negation of negation in it. He is, therefore, quite willing to "let the distinction be granted for a moment" (SL I 172), only to watch it immediately dissolve. It dissolves, because being-for-self, "as the cancellation of otherness" in its external form, "relates itself to itself as to the cancelled other" (SL I 172). In other words, it relates itself to itself in itself and negatively, or rather, as the negation of negation in itself. As we have already seen and as Hegel re-emphasizes, being-for-self "is thus for one, and in its other, [i.e. the moment of determinate being, or being-for-one,] relates itself to itself" (SL I 172 [MI]), or is the self-identity of being-for-one,
and, therefore, a being-for-one for itself, or simply, a being-for-self, which answers our second question. There is no distinction, which is why Hegel himself says: "What is of ideal nature, [i.e. in itself negative,] is necessarily for one, but not for an other: [and] that one for which it is, is merely itself" (SL I 172). It is not for an other, as we have already seen often enough, because, insofar as the other is, or would be the negative of it, the two constitute the very self-identity of negativity that is being-for-self. Indeed, this is why it is now "the posited unity of being and determinate being, [i.e.] as the absolute union of the relation to other and self-relation" (SL I 177). Rather than being limited by something else then, being-for-self "is its own completely abstract, [or negative] limit - the one" (SL I 176 & HSL 163).

2. The Real Immutable One In-Itself

As a consequence, however, the essential and inseparable moments of the ideality, which is being-for-self, "now have determinate existence" (SL I 177), which means they do become separate. Furthermore, this ideality, which Hegel identifies with "being-for-self as totality," becomes real or "passes into reality" (SL I 177). This passage of being-for-self into reality, however, is in fact a regression by being-for-self, back to one of the first, and, therefore, most abstract, determination's of determinate being, which is why Hegel describes the real one in itself, or rather, the one that is real in itself or implicitly as, "the most fixed and abstract of all forms" (SL I 177 & HSL 164), i.e. all the forms of being. The real one is abstract and fixed, because, even though in essence it 'is' or has being in itself, "its being is neither a determinate being, nor a determinateness as a relation to an other, nor is it a constitution" (HSL 164 & SL I 178). Rather, it "is the accomplished negation of this circle of categories" (HSL 164 [MII]), all of which are what enable or cause being to change. "Consequently, the one cannot become an other: it is immutable" (HSL 164 & SL I 178). As such, however, the real immutable one in itself is not simply a return to the pure changeless being of the beginning, although it too possesses indeterminateness, and pure being was also real in itself (SL I 178). Rather, "its indeterminateness is that determinateness, which is self-relation - the fact of being absolutely determined, posited being-in-self" (SL I 178). In short, its indeterminateness, unlike that of pure being, which is or seems to be immediate, is absolutely mediated. It is absolutely mediated, because it is self-mediated, and because there is no other to mediate it. It is, therefore, the self-relation or posited identity of determinateness as such or in general, with determinateness in general or indeterminateness posited in itself by being-for-self. The real immutable one in itself, therefore, corresponds, as we shall see later, to that moment in the Phenomenology, where there is or appears to be no difference, and where self-consciousness is only the inert tautology I am I" (PhS 105:167). 9

As Hegel immediately points out in both the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic, however, this real immutable one in itself must also contain difference. For, as we already know, "in its concept it is self-related negation" (SL I 178), or the infinite self-relation of negativity as such, which means a
being is necessarily posited in and by it. Therefore, "it passes away from itself towards an other" (SL I 178 & HSL 165). However, this movement, which is perhaps better described as a tendency (SL I 178), i.e. to movement, rather than an actual movement, "is immediately reversed; for this moment of self-determination, [as absolutely negative of all external determinations,] brings it about that there is no other to which the one can go; it thus returns to itself" (SL I 178 & HSL 165); or, if we choose to see it as an actual movement, the one simply moves from one side of its self-identity to the other, whether this identity is looked at as positive or negative, so that it merely appears or feels as if its movement is only a tendency or a return. It appears or feels as such, because the one seems to end up right back where it started. Regardless, since this movement, return, or tendency is again that of negativity, "all differentiation and multiplicity, [i.e. that there was or may have been in the one,] has disappeared" (SL I 178 [MI]), or is negated. Consequently: "There is nothing in it; and this nothing, which is the abstraction, [or negation] of self-relation, is here distinct from [the] being-in-self [of the one, which is self-relation]; it is a posited nothing, since this being-in-self no longer is that simplicity, [or immediacy] proper to the category of something, but has a determination, namely that of being mediation, [i.e. of negation,] and hence concrete" (SL I 178 & HSL 165 [MI]).

B. The One & the Void,

or Void as the Quality of the Real Immutable One In-Itself

As Hegel explains, however, as nothing, it is also still abstract, and, therefore, not distinct from the one, only the one's determination (SL I 178), i.e. as real and immutable being in itself. "Nothing thus posited as within the one, is nothing as the void" (SL I 178 [MI]). It is what pure being and nothing could only be for the thought reflecting back upon them, rather than explicitly for themselves, since their determination was still only implicit. "This void is thus the quality of the one in its immediacy" (SL I 178), though, unlike something finite, the one is aware, e.g. through feeling, sensation, consciousness, etc., of its quality. Its quality is in and for itself, not in itself and for another. Since this indeterminateness or void is the quality of the real immutable one in itself, and the quality of something is identical with its being, this "one is the void" (SL I 178).

However, since the void, as mere nothingness, i.e. nothing in general, appears to be "absolutely different" from the determination of the one as a real being in itself, i.e. insofar as this being is regarded as purely positive, the distinction between the moments of being-for-self is once again posited (SL I 178). The void, therefore, appears as something external to the one, insofar as this one has being or exists. For, in an immediate sense, it must exclude what is non-existent, or does not seem to exist, viz. the void. In fact, as we already know from determinate being both do and must exist. For the void is itself a determinate negation, as well, therefore, as something, and this does not change in being-for-self. Indeed, as Hegel makes plain, the category of determinate being once again re-asserts itself in being-for-self, which "has once more acquired determinate being" (SL I 178 & HSL 165); or, as he says
further on: "The one and the void constitute the first stage of the determinate being of being-for-self" (HSL 167 & SL I 180). This means that being-for-self, determined as the existent one, is a determinate being, whereas being-for-self, determined as the void, not only has the one as a determinate being in itself, i.e. the one in the void, but also, as we shall see, is, like all the apparent voids before it, a determinate being, i.e. as the void, and as the essential source of all new determinate beings (SL I 179).

**Atomism**

This is why Hegel, at this point in the Science, takes special care to emphasize the importance of ancient atomism in his critique of the atomic metaphysics in general. For not only does he regard being-for-self, determined as the one and the void, as the logical equivalent of the atomic principle in the history of philosophy, science and politics, according to him, it was "only when the void was understood to be the source of movement," that this principle had any rational, or speculative content whatsoever (SL I 179). Briefly, atomistic philosophy and science originated with Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, sometime between 460 and 360 B.C., in response to the Eleatic denial of change and movement. For the Eleatics, change and movement were impossible, precisely because they presuppose the existence of the void, and, for them, nothing could not exist. Of particular concern for the atomists were Zeno of Elea's four paradoxes regarding motion. Without going into the specifics of these paradoxes, Zeno, like the other Eleatics, concluded that motion is impossible, since it requires the movement of an object through an infinitely divisible space, in a finite period of time - not that the limitedness, or unlimitedness of time would affect the ability of an object to reach its destination, if the space in which it is already supposedly present can be divided ad infinitum. It simply cannot move. Leucippus and Democritus, therefore, introduced the notion that everything is constituted by an infinite number of indivisible, or "uncuttable (atamos)" substances, which, contrary to the modern conception of the atom, are of an infinite diversity of shapes and sizes, in an attempt to limit divisibility, and, thereby, overturn Zeno's paradoxes.

What makes movement possible for the ancient atomists, however, is not simply the existence of these indivisible substances or atoms, but that: "In truth, there are atoms and void." This is usually interpreted as meaning that atoms can only move if there is an empty space for them to move in and through. However, even though this interpretation presupposes what was, and, to some extent, still is, the controversial position that the void, i.e. nothing, or the non-existent, exists, Hegel regards it as a trivial and external conception of being-for-self (SL I 179). This is basically because the void then "would be only the presupposition, or condition of movement, not its ground, just as the movement itself would also be presupposed as already existing, and its ground, which is the essential thing, forgotten" (SL I 180 & HSL 166). It is not immediately evident from the classical reports of the atomists' philosophy, however, that they did any more than presuppose the void, and thus movement,
in precisely this way. Indeed, this is what Aristotle criticizes them for. Furthermore, Epicurus, who largely follows Democritus in his own atomism, provides little more than an appeal to empirical evidence to demonstrate the truth of atomism. As he says: "If there were not what we call void and place and intangible nature, bodies would not have anywhere in which to be, or through which to move - and they evidently do move." 14

It is possible, however, to justify Hegel's interpretation that the ancient atomists did not simply see the relationship between atoms and the void in this trivial and external way. For both Leucippus and Democritus are reputed to have held that: "what exists exists no more than what does not exist - because the empty exists no less than body;" 15 and furthermore, that: "there is a void not only in the universe but also outside the universe." 16 At first glance, both of these propositions seem to confirm nothing more than the fact that the void is as much a determinate being as the atom, and, therefore, that they are in a relationship of externality. However, we can also read them as follows: If what exists, exists no more than what does not exist, then what exists does not exist as much as what does not exist exists; and, if the universe, which is, by definition, everything, both contains, and is contained by, a void, then everything is as much negative in and for itself, as it is positive. In both cases, therefore, Hegel's condition for the void constituting the ground of movement is more or less satisfied. For, as he says: "The void is the ground of movement not only as the [explicitly] negative relation of the one to its negative, to the one, that is, to itself, which, however, is posited as having determinate existence" (SL I 180 & HSL 166-67); and, insofar as atoms are as negative in and for themselves as the void, which is also positive, they have this ground, i.e. the posited self-relation or self-identity of negativity, in themselves. They have this ground in themselves, even though, as Hegel says later: "Atomistic philosophy does not know the concept of ideality; it does not grasp the one as an ideal being, that is, as containing within itself the two moments of being-for-self and being-for-it, but only as being simply and bluntly for-self" (SL I 183 & HSL 169 [MI]).

Ancient atomism may not know the concept of ideality, or grasp the one as an ideal being, but, as we can see, it certainly posits this ideality in its notion of the atoms and the void. In fact, this is one of the main reasons why Hegel, in the Encyclopedia, rebukes Newton and his followers for thinking that they can avoid engaging in metaphysics or idealism by adopting atomism. As he says: "it is not possible to escape metaphysics and cease to trace nature back to terms of thought, by throwing ourselves into the arms of Atomism. The atom, in fact, is itself a thought; and hence the theory which holds matter to consist of atoms is a metaphysical theory." 17 Newton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is true; but, to his honour be it said, he did not by any means obey his own warning. The only mere physicists are the animals; 18 they alone do not think: while man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician. The real question is not whether we shall apply metaphysics, but whether our metaphysics are of the right kind: in other words, whether we are not, instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of thought, rigidly fixed by the
understanding, and making these the basis of our theoretical as well as our practical work. It is on this ground that one objects to the Atomic philosophy" (LL 144:98 [MI]). Hegel particularly objects to the application of atomism in political philosophy, or rather, a "theory of the State which begins from the separate wills of individuals" (SL I 180), such as we find in the social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, etc. 19 For such atomism purges human political activity, and, therefore, the results of such activity, like the State, of all necessary and social content. In short, it negates their rationality. The consequence of such a negation, of course, is that chance, externality and the abstract individualism of the moral standpoint all appear as absolute, with the various forms of social, political and economic organization as alien impositions on these absolutes.20

C. The Many Ones,

or Repulsion as Generation and Exclusion

Even though the ground for the derivation of other ones, atoms, or whatever else we choose to call such beings-for-self, has been well established in this critique of atomism, we have yet to see how it explicitly occurs or is accomplished in Science. Hegel provides this derivation in a subsection entitled the 'Many Ones' - which no doubt seems to be a contradiction - or 'Repulsion', which is the force that generates the many ones from the one One. As we have already seen, both the one and the void are "posited as an affirmative determinate being" (SL I 180 & HSL 167). This is because both constitute "the relation of negation to negation" (SL I 180 & 167 [MI]), or rather, the self-identity of negativity, which is the negation of negation, and because they do so both in themselves and together. As affirmative, the two are related to each other and to themselves in the same way as something and other. As negative, the two constitute the self-identity of otherness, or absolute otherness, in both their mutual and self-relation (SL I 180 & HSL 167). There are, therefore, two ones, and, insofar as there is an infinite relation of negativity to negativity in and between these two ones, the ground is prepared for an indefinite proliferation of more ones - hence, the many ones.

This, however, is not exactly how Hegel derives the many ones. For him, it is enough that the one, which the understanding fixes as being-for-self, apart from the void, is itself both affirmative and negative, and, therefore, the infinite self-relation of negativity in itself. For each of these sides is the negative of the other. This "negative relation of the one to itself is repulsion" (SL I 181 & HSL 167), which Hegel first describes as the one's "becoming many ones" (HSL 167 & SL I 181). However, as we can see, it is "not really a becoming" (HSL 167 & SL I 181). For, as we saw in the Introduction, before something can be said to become itself, it must first become its other or opposite. Here, however, "the one only becomes one" (SL I 181 & HSL 167 [MI]). "Instead of a becoming, then, there is present first the immanent relation of the one" (HSL 167 & SL I 181), i.e. to itself. In other words, it is the self-identical one, and, since this self-identity is also that of negativity, "the one [simply] repels itself from itself" (SL I 181 & HSL 168), and, thereby, becomes or is two ones, and so
on, *ad infinitum.* According to Hegel, there are two distinct instances, or moments of repulsion in general. The first is *generative repulsion,* or repulsion as the reproduction of the one, which is simply repulsion in its concept, or in itself (*SL I* 187). The second is *exclusive repulsion,* which, as Hegel points out, is how external reflection normally imagines it, i.e. "repulsion not as the creation of ones, but [as] the mutual exclusion of ones which are presupposed as already present" (*SL I* 181 & *HSL* 168). In fact, however, these distinct moments are the same. For, as we will begin to see here, and will conclusively see in the analysis of the various forms of reflection (see Appendix 2), *positing* and *presupposing* are identical.

The question here, however, is merely: how does generative repulsion become, or determine itself as exclusive repulsion?

Since the result of generative repulsion is many ones, which are all strictly for-themselves, i.e. purely self-related, the process itself is simply a self-repulsion, or reproduction of the original one. As a process then, it is simply an indefinite repetition of the same thing, viz. the one, as we found in the false infinite. In short, it is a *reproductive identity.* As Hegel says, therefore: "The multiple becoming, or production of the many ones vanishes immediately, [i.e.] as the fact of being posited; the products are ones, but not for an other; [rather] they are infinitely self-related. The one, therefore, repels only itself from itself: it does not become, but already is" (*SL I* 181 & *HSL* 168 [MI]). Put differently, *there is no generative repulsion.* For if all the many ones posited in this process are exactly the same as or identical with the original one, then they certainly cannot come after it. Their posteriority would make them dependent upon the one, and, therefore, different from that one, i.e. each one would not be infinitely self-related. It would not be a one. This is why Hegel concludes that: "relatively to one another, the ones are presupposed" (*SL I* 181). They are "pre-supposed as not posited" (*SL I* 181) in their positing, by the one that repels itself, just like the one itself. Thus, "the fact of their being posited is transcended" (*SL I* 181), and so, therefore, is the original one that supposedly repels itself. It is transcended, because they are all this one, i.e. they are all infinitely self-relating, self-repelling ones. As such, their relation to one another is one of absolute exclusion, or rather, they are related in the fact that they are related "only to themselves" (*SL I* 181 & *HSL* 168 [MI]). In short, their relation of absolute self-relatedness is one of absolute unrelatedness relative to one another.

1. The Contradiction of Plurality

As already indicated above, in the critique of atomism, this absolute self-relatedness, which is an *absolute unrelatedness,* constitutes the foundation of modern political theory, i.e. insofar as it presupposes the existence of individuals prior to any form of collectivity, and ironically, is the basis of this theory's claim to *pluralism.* As Hegel points out, however: "plurality does not [even] appear as an
otherness, but as a determination completely external to one” (SL I 181 & HSL 168[M1]). For plurality implies a relation to, or being-for an other, which, as a self-subsistent unity, or unit, the ones do not have, or need (SL I 182 & HSL 168). In 'the plurality of many ones', therefore, their relation is "determined as none" (SL I 182 & HSL 168 [M1]), which, as we have just seen, means that they are related by the fact that they have no mutual relation, i.e. the relation of unrelatedness. The plurality of the many ones, and, therefore, their relation, "is once more the void, [which has been] already posited" (SL I 182 [M1]); and this pre-existing void "is their limit, a limit, however, which is external to them" (SL I 182), both literally and figuratively, yet in which they also "both are and are not" (HSL 168).

It is literally the limit external to them insofar as it is the empty space between them, yet in which they exist, i.e. "they are in the void" (SL I 183). However, insofar as there are empty spaces between the many ones, they do not exist in these spaces, and, therefore, can also be said to 'not exist in the void'. The void is figuratively outside the many ones, simply because, as ones, they are each supposed to be everything in and for themselves, and, therefore, not-void, or absolutely affirmative, though we have already seen otherwise, particularly in the critique of atomism. Regardless, as Hegel concludes: "the plurality of the one is its self-positing, [i.e. as self-identical, or as a one]; the one, [therefore,] is its own negative self-relation and nothing else, and this relation of the one to itself is the many ones" (SL I 182 & HSL 169). For, even as the self-identical one, i.e. one=one, it is, as we see, necessary that there be two ones in order to constitute this or any other identity. There is, therefore, both mutual negation and plurality in the one, as self-identical. "But equally, plurality is [then] merely external to the one; for the one is also the transcending of otherness, [i.e. there is nothing that is different from it, everything is an identical one, even the void itself, insofar as it is one void]; repulsion is its self-relation and simple self-identity. The plurality of ones, [therefore,] is infinity, as a contradiction, which unconstrainedly produces itself” (SL I 182 & HSL 169[M1]).

2. The Relationship of Exclusion

&

the 'War of Every One Against Every One'

Once the contradiction of the one's existence, viz. as an indifferent, independent being, which, however, is simultaneously one of a plurality of ones that are all exactly the same, and, therefore, related in their unrelatedness, becomes manifest, the ones, as this negative relation, and the plurality, as their common relation, are affirmatively present as existent others and otherness in general (SL I 183 & HSL 170). Plurality now is not simply where the ones are not, viz. the void, or rather, the empty space between them, but also, as we have already seen to some extent, what they are in. "Thus now repulsion immediately finds what is repelled from it" (SL I 183 & HSL 170), i.e. both the void and "the many ones which were neither created nor posited by it, [but which simply are]" (SL I 183 & HSL 170). Repulsion, therefore, is determined merely as exclusion, and, even though exclusion is the immediate
consequence of what Hegel calls, "mutual, or universal repulsion," it is, as he also points out, "relative, or limited by the being of the ones" (SL I 183 & HSL 170 [MI]). Exclusion, therefore, is not universal or absolute. For the concept of exclusion depends on the existence of something to be excluded and something to exclude, even if this something is, as we have already seen, simply the void made determinate by exclusion. Furthermore, universal, or absolute exclusion is the exclusion of exclusion, and, therefore, self-limiting, or negating. Therefore, exclusion, which is now, as we can see, "the posited determinate being of the many ones" (SL I 183), is no mere passive unrelatedness, isolation, or pure being-for-self (SL I 183). Rather, it is an active form of self-distinction and self-preservation by the many ones or the plurality (SL I 183). For, since they are all identical, in order for them really to be a one, they must "negate one another, [or rather,] posit one another as being only for-one" (SL I 183 [MI]). What one? Each one itself.

This, however, is not simply a return to the one. For the quality of only being-for-one has undergone a subtle, but radical transformation. Whereas being-for-one was originally and immediately identical with being-for-self, it now means the possibility of being for another, which is also a one. As Hegel says: "Each [one] is thus repulsed by an other, is transcended, and is made into something, which is not for itself, but for-one, and in fact is another one" (SL I 184 & HSL 170 [MI]). Oneness, or the one, therefore, becomes the ideal of the plurality of ones. This, however, leads to the paradox of self-preservation, which will reveal itself even more starkly in the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology (see Appendix 1), and is embodied by one of the fundamental ideas of modern political philosophy, viz. bellum omnium contra omnes: the war of every one against every one,21 As Hegel says: "The being-for-self of the many ones thus shows itself to be their self-preservation, [i.e. insofar as each seems to remain indifferent to its other,] due to the mediation of their mutual repulsion, in which they cancel one another [as independent ones,] and posit the others as mere being-for-other" (SL I 184 [MI]). In short, each one maintains itself as a one by and while, or in and through denying the privilege of also being a one to all of the others with which it is in the plurality. It denies, as it were, the very quality of negativity, viz. imagination, or ideality, which makes them all what they are, viz. beings-for-self, or ones, while asserting that one, viz. itself, is not a being-for-other.

Self-preservation through negation, however, is the dissolution or negation of the many ones, and, therefore, of plurality (SL I 184). For, insofar as they all attempt to be, distinguish, or preserve themselves, as ones, through the negation of one another, they "posit themselves as identical" (SL I 184 [MI]) or rather, are "necessarily identical" (SL I 184 [MI]). Thus, they "do not repel," or exclude one another (SL I 184). Rather, "according to their being and positing, they are but one affirmative unity" (SL I 184 [M y italics]), although, as Hegel is quick to point out, they must realize this themselves, through their own activity and reflection, rather merely than ours (SL I 184 & HSL 171). Furthermore, insofar as they all attempt to preserve themselves as ones in themselves, through the negation of one another, this negation is mutual, and, therefore, is the negation of their mutual
negation (SL I 184). Each, therefore, neutralizes, or repels the self-preservation through negation, or exclusion by every other one, which is why, for instance, 'the war of every one against every one' is ultimately and necessarily a self-negating concept.

As Hegel explains, however, the many ones are, and "they are only insofar as they negate" (SL I 184). Insofar as they negate their negation, therefore, "they negate their being" (SL I 184), i.e. they negate their being as beings-for-self. This is basically because the ones cannot return into themselves from their negation of the others, which is essential to them being beings-for-themselves in themselves. They cannot return into themselves, simply because of the mutual negation of their negative activity by the same activity of every other one, i.e. "the negation of the other rebounds from them and touches only their surface" (SL I 184 & HSL 171). As Hegel concludes, therefore: "Insofar as their negation effects nothing, by reason of the resistance offered by the existent ones as such, or as negating, they do not return into themselves, do not preserve themselves, and so are not" (SL I 185 & HSL 171 [MI]). Consequently, the ones all "collapse into themselves" (SL I 185), or each other, since there is no longer any difference. Plurality is negated, and repulsion becomes a pure or abstract identity (SL I 185). "This identity, into which their repulsion passes, is the transcending of the distinctness and externality, which, as excluding, they ought to mutually assert (SL I 185 & HSL 173). Exclusion, plurality, or repulsion, therefore, are merely the abstract ideal of the many ones (SL I 186 & HSL 173), which in positing themselves as such, have merely done so in or as the one One of attraction (SL I 185 & HSL 172).

3. Abstract Freedom & Attraction

This is why, for Hegel, such basic notions and ideals in modern political thought as complete individual independence are ultimately self-contradictory abstractions, which represent the epitome of human irrationality (SL I 185 & HSL 172). This particular abstraction, according to Hegel, manifests itself "more concretely as abstract freedom, pure ego, and further, as Evil" (SL I 185), and corresponds with what we encountered in Fichte's philosophy as egotism. Abstract freedom is a very important notion to grasp here, since it is everything freedom should not be, according to a speculative system, and since it is abstract power's basic idea of what freedom is or should be. As Hegel explains, abstract freedom "is freedom which goes so far astray as to place its essence in this abstraction [of the independent being-for-self of the one,] and flattering itself that being thus by itself, it possesses itself in its purity. Determined more closely, independence is that error which regards as [purely] negative, and maintains a [purely] negative attitude towards, what is its own essence. It is thus a negative attitude towards itself, which seeking to possess its own being destroys it; [so that] this activity only manifests the vanity, or futility of its activity" (SL I 185 & HSL 172). In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel appropriately refers to such freedom as "negative freedom, or freedom as the Understanding conceives it," and briefly describes how it finds its practical, political expression in the fanaticism, or
fury of destruction against the "whole subsisting social order" (PR 22:5 [MI]), e.g. the terror of the French Revolution (PR 227:[A]5).

Of course, Hegel's most famous explanation of this relationship between abstract, or negative freedom and the will to destruction occurs in the section on 'Spirit', in the Phenomenology, under the heading 'Absolute Freedom and Terror'. Here, Hegel describes how being-for-other returns into being-for-self as pure Notion, or rather, in its attempt to become certain of itself as "the universal Subject" (PhS 356:583 [MI]). Extrapolation is hardly necessary to see the connection between Hegel's analysis of being-for-self in the Logic and that of absolute freedom and terror in the Phenomenology. For his talk about "spiritual 'masses', or spheres, of the real, as well as the supersensible world" (PhS 356:583), at the beginning of the subsection in the Phenomenology, is not only redolent of the activity of the ones or atoms in being-for-self, he actually describes the activity of consciousness, qua the establishment of absolute freedom, as the "self-willed atomism of actual self-consciousness" (PhS 359:590 [MI]). It is a self-willed atomism, on the one hand, because self-consciousness attempts to realize its absolute freedom through the concentration of "itself into the One of individuality" (PhS 359:589), and, on the other, because it can only do this through purely "negative action" (PhS 359:589), which results in the return of the many ones or plurality. As Hegel says in the Phenomenology: "The sole work and deed of universal, [or absolute] freedom is ... death" (PhS 360:590). "Absolute freedom, as pure self-identity of the universal will, thus has within it negation; but this means that it contains difference in general, and this again develops as an actual difference. For pure negativity has in the self-identical universal will the element of subsistence, or the Substance in which its moments are realized, [i.e. it is the self-identity of negativity]; it has the matter which it can utilize in accordance with its own determinateness; and insofar as this Substance has shown itself to be the negative element for the individual consciousness, [which strives to be the One,] the organization of spiritual 'masses', or spheres to which the plurality of individual consciousnesses are assigned thus takes shape once more" (PhS 361:593).

This is precisely where Hegel picks up the development of attraction in the Science, albeit in much more abstract terminology. For, even though repulsion, and, therefore, plurality have supposedly been transcended in the one One of attraction, attraction, as we shall see shortly, at first appears in such a way that repulsion, and, therefore, plurality are immediately restored. Hegel uses the physical, or spatial conception of attraction as illustration of this point. As he says: "the place of the atoms which vanish into the point of attraction is [immediately] taken by a new multitude surging out of the void, and so on, to infinity, if desired" (SL I 186-87 & HSL 173). We may, therefore, refer to this process as, the false infinite of abstract repulsion and attraction, and conclude that it is a process which can be applied as much to human history, e.g. the French Revolution, as to Nature, or the physical universe. Before going any further into either Hegel's development of this logic, or its application in the Phenomenology, however, we should first point out that, for him, there is no great secret to
overcoming this indefinite cycle of absolute freedom and terror, or the false infinite of abstract repulsion and attraction. Indeed, he points the way out in a single sentence, in his critique of absolute independence in the Science of Logic. As he says: "The reconciliation is the recognition ... that what is counter to the negative attitude [of absolute freedom] is its [own] essence; it is a letting go of the negativity of its being-for-self, instead of [a] clinging to it" (SL I 185 & HSL 172).

D. The Mutual Presupposition of Repulsion and Attraction

& Community

As we have already seen, repulsion is merely ideal, or it becomes attraction (SL I 186). As Hegel explains, however, the two still appear as distinct, despite repulsion's transcendence in attraction. Furthermore, repulsion is still understood to be "the reality of the ones," while attraction is merely "their posited ideality" (HSL 173 & SL I 186 [MI]). In short, the condition of repulsion and attraction appears as the opposite of what it really is. The reason for this is simply that attraction seems to presuppose repulsion, and not vice versa (SL I 186 & 187 & HSL 173 & 174). Repulsion, therefore, seems to enjoy a necessity and priority that attraction does not. It seems to enjoy this necessity and priority, simply because: "Repulsion furnishes the material for attraction, [i.e. the plurality of ones]. If there were no ones, there would be nothing to attract: the idea of continuous attraction, or consumption of the ones presupposes an equally continuous creation, [and, therefore, repulsion] of them" (SL I 186 & HSL 173).

However, as we saw, repulsion repels or immediately negates itself, i.e. through the repulsion of every single one by every other single one. This means that attraction is not simply some contingent ideal externally imposed on the plurality of ones from god only knows where, but that it "belongs equally to each of the many ones as immediately present" (HSL 173). It is their property, along with repulsion (SL I 187). This, as Hegel explains, is evident by virtue of their identity and equality with one another, even or especially as mutually exclusive (SL I 187 & HSL 173). As he says: "Attraction ... is the positing of the immediately present indistinguishability, [or identity] of the ones" (SL I 187 & HSL 174 [MI]). Attraction and repulsion, therefore, are coexistent in the plurality of ones. Neither presupposes the other, or, as Hegel concludes in the last subsection of 'Being-for-Self', viz. 'The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction', both presuppose each other (SL I 188), and, therefore, are equal in their relationship and essentiality. For without the original self-identical, and, therefore, attractive, one, i.e. one=one, there can be no self-relation of negativity, and thus no repulsion, exclusion, or plurality.

Just as attraction is no mere abstract or external ideal, however, neither is it merely a property of each of the many ones which exists alongside repulsion. For then there would merely be "an equilibrium of attraction and repulsion," or a state of inertia, "in which there is no determinate ideality" (SL I 187 &
Attraction, however, is also the result of the self-negation of repulsion, or simply the negation of the many ones. It is, therefore, mediated, as is the one One, which is posited in and through attraction (SL I 187 & HSL 174). Hence, "the one One is ideality realized and posited in the One. It attracts by the mediation of repulsion, and contains this mediation as its determination" (SL I 187 [MI]). This means that attraction is not abstract, or absolute. For, as Hegel points out, this would also result in a state of inertia, in which there could be no attraction. In short, absolute attraction is self-contradictory, or self-negating. Furthermore, it also means that repulsion does not simply vanish, or return in such a way that it will vanish again in the false infinite of attraction and repulsion. Rather, it is realized and preserved in attraction, i.e. as its determination, so that the one One does not simply cancel the many ones, but preserves them in itself and itself through them (SL I 187 & HSL 174), i.e. as a community.22 In the one One, or community, therefore, there is a genuine unity, or relation of repulsion and attraction (SL I 187). However, even though this unity, or relation is more concrete than the conjunction which exists in the plurality, it is, according to Hegel, still only general. For, although we have seen that attraction and repulsion are each mediated by the other, and that this mediation enables them to be what they are supposed to be (SL I 188), "the mediation of each through the other is here in fact ... negated, and each of these determinations is self-mediation" (SL I 189 & HSL 175 [MI]). In other words, each not only presupposes the other, but also itself; or rather, the conclusion that each presupposes the other, and, therefore, exists in unity with the other, still implies
"that attraction and repulsion, albeit working jointly, are two qualitatively different - indeed qualitatively opposed - forces."\(^{23}\) Thus, it is necessary to see that attraction and repulsion are in fact the same force, so that in presupposing, or being mediated by the other, each necessarily presumes, or mediates itself. Of course, as Hegel argues, attraction and repulsion, in their immediate, and, therefore, relative sense, i.e. as existing separately, but side by side in the many ones and the one One, do presuppose themselves. However, such presupposition is not really mediated. Rather, it is immediate. For, as relative, they are immediately self-identical. Such immediate self-identity, however, is abstract, and, we have already seen, how abstract attraction and repulsion both result in and presuppose the other. Hegel now reaffirms this conclusion, saying: "What is posited in a repulsion and attraction which are relative ... is this, that each is in itself its own negation, and, therefore, the continuation of itself into its own other" (SL I 190).

How then can attraction and repulsion be said to be one and the same self-mediating and self-presupposing force?

The answer, despite Hegel's rather complex analysis in the final subsection of being-for-self, is actually quite simple. Insofar as repulsion is the relation of the plurality of ones, and these ones are all identical to one another, the relation of one to another is actually a relation to self. However, this relation to self is attraction. For attraction is the self-identity of the ones, or rather, the one One.\(^{24}\)

Repulsion, therefore, is attraction, and if repulsion is attraction, then, insofar as repulsion presupposes and is mediated by attraction, it also necessarily presupposes and mediates itself. On the other hand, insofar as attraction is the relation of the one One to itself, and this relation is an actual self-identity, i.e. one=one, it is, as we have already seen, the relationship of two identical ones, or is a plurality. However, this relation is repulsion. Attraction, therefore, is repulsion, and, if attraction is repulsion, then, insofar as attraction presupposes and is mediated by repulsion, it also necessarily presupposes and mediates itself. Repulsion and attraction, therefore, are the same self-presupposition and mediation: and, as Hegel says: "With this [concrete identity of repulsion and attraction], the development of being-for-self is completed and has reached its result" (HSL 177 & SL I 190). For the posited self-identity of negativity as such, or infinite self-relation of negativity, with which being-for-self began, is now truly mediated and infinite, i.e. it is mediated by itself. The one One is itself in and through the many, just as the many is itself in and through this one. In other words, they are explicitly the same, which means the one One is no longer limited by the immediacy of determinate being, i.e. the many. Instead, it has or is this determinate being, yet is indifferent to it. This is why Hegel concludes: "hence the one, the absolutely determined limit, is posited as the limit which is no limit, which is present in being, but is indifferent to it" (HSL 178 & SL I 191-92).

E. The Transcendence of Being-for-Self in Quantity
Being-for-self, therefore, has been transcended, and the result of this transcendence is quantity (SL I 191). For quantity, as Hegel explains in 'Section Two' of the Science of Logic, is determinateness that "has become indifferent to being" (SL I 198). It is indifferent to being, because being-for-self and being-for-other have again, as we have seen, become identical. This identity means that the being in question now remains precisely what it is, regardless of which side of its limit it happens to find itself on. Hegel illustrates this at the start of the section on 'Quantity' in the following way: "In something, its limit, as quality, is essentially its determinateness. If, however, by limit we mean quantitative limit, then when a field, for example, changes its limit, it remains what it was - a field" (HSL 186 & SL I 199). It is simply larger, or smaller. "If, on the other hand, its qualitative limit is changed, then its determinateness, which makes it a field, is changed, and it becomes a meadow, forest, and so on" (HSL 186 & SL I 199). A quantitative limit, therefore, is a limit that is no longer immediately identical with the determinateness of being, i.e. what is now, or was being-for-self. Thus, it does not really affect its quality, being-in-self, essence, etc. This is why the quantitative category seemed to prove so useful to Fichte in preserving the self as absolute activity in itself, despite having to be limited by the not-self, or object. However, as Hegel goes on to show in the remainder of the sections on quantity, it is not really, or rather, does not remain indifferent to quality. On the contrary, quantity in its specific determination as quantum, or number is determinateness that has the quality of indifference in itself (SL I 243), and this quality goes on to become the "non-indifferent relation to the external," in its self-relation, i.e. as degree (SL I 235).

Degree then passes over into the various forms of quantitative infinity, in which the quantum, by passing into other identical quanta, becomes self-relating, self-determining quantity, and, therefore, something qualitative, though this qualitative aspect of its being is still only general, i.e. a beyond (SL I 333). The emerging unity, or conjunction of quantity and quality in quantitative infinity then produces the quantitative ratio, in which quantum is supposedly no longer indifferent, but rather "qualitatively determined as absolutely related to its beyond" (SL I 333). This unity then produces, what Hegel describes and explains in 'Section Three' of the Science, as measure. As he says: "measure is the simple self-relation of quantum, [i.e.] its own determinateness determined by itself: thus quantum exists qualitatively" (SL I 351). In measure, therefore, quantum explicitly emerges as the self-determining determinateness it already implicitly was in the quantitative infinite, and as such, becomes one with its determinate being, just as determinate being becomes one with it. "All determinate being has a magnitude, and this magnitude belongs to the nature of something itself; it constitutes its determinate nature and being-in-self. Something is not indifferent to this magnitude, nor does it remain unchanged when the latter changes: a change in the magnitude would change its quality. As measure, quantum has ceased to be a limit which is no limit; it is now a determination of the thing in such a way that an increase, or decrease in this quantum would destroy it" (SL I 351-52 [MI]). We see this, for example, when the temperature of water, which is supposed to be external to its determination as a liquid, is increased, or decreased to "a point where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and
the water is suddenly converted into steam, or ice" (LL 159: 108 & SL I 357). In short, its liquid
good is destroyed. Hegel offers other examples of the unity of quantity and quality in measure,
including its application to politics and the result of quantitative changes on the qualitative constitution
of the State (LL 159:108 & SL I 390). However, these examples are only of passing interest to us
here. For, despite the importance of both measure and quantity in the development of thought and
Science, and the fact that quantity, at least, is one of the fundamental categories of the form of self-
determination discovered in Fichte's philosophy, viz. egoism, this analysis is more concerned with
being-for-self's manifestation and transcendence in and through the activity of self-consciousness vis a
vis another self-consciousness. At this point, therefore, we shall turn to the 'Self-Consciousness'
section of the Phenomenology (see Appendix 1), while just making a few closing remarks about
quantity and measure.

F. The Emergence of Essence through Absolute Indifference

Even though Hegel demonstrates the mutual dependence and unity of quality and quantity, and,
therefore, disproves the validity of the modern prejudice regarding their mutual independence and
indifference, they do again collapse into a substratum of absolute indifference, "which is mediated in
itself through the negation of every determination of being" (SL I 394), including, therefore, quantity.
As Hegel says: "in it the distinction between quantitative and qualitative determination falls asunder ...:
it is the dissolution of measure, in which both moments were posited as one" (SL I 402). Briefly, this
is because even measure succumbs to its own version of the false infinite (SL I 391-93). Measure
seems to vanish momentarily in the measureless, which is simply the state of destruction suffered by a
quality when a specific quantum is exceeded. For instance, water's liquidity is destroyed at either 100
degrees C. or 0 degrees C.25 Quantity, therefore, seems to have once again become independent from
and indifferent to quality, and as such, the measureless. However, as has already been pointed out, it is
not that quality as such has disappeared, only a specific quality, e.g. liquidity, which is immediately
replaced by another, e.g. gaseousness, or solidity, and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, the measureless
continually collapses back into measure, and, thereby, constitutes an infinite series of measures, which
is indifferent to all particular measures, and, therefore, itself, since these are its determinatenesses.

Absolute indifference, as we saw in the Introduction, however, is a self-negating category. For it is the
indifference to indifference (SL I 403). This indifference to indifference results in difference, which, as
we shall see, is one of the fundamental determinations of essence (SL II 43). Absolute indifference,
however, insofar as it is the negation of every determination of being, is the absolute identity of every
determination of being, and, therefore, in itself, as such, the first fundamental determination of essence,
viz. identity (SL II 37). The determinations of essence, as we can see, bring us to the point at which
Fichte's Science began, and at which Hegel's Science may certainly said to formally begin. We shall,
therefore, return to these determinations, along with the third fundamental determination of essence,
viz. contradiction, in the conclusion. For a proper understanding of these categories and their
relationship constitutes the explicit ground of authentic Science, and, therefore, of all knowledge and activity that might claim to be speculative, e.g. speculative politics.
Hoffman, Piotr

Exclusivity constitutes sense, Cartesian

See Harris, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel (Maryland: University Press of America, 1983), p. 113; "Being-for-self ... is the primary emergence of the dominance of holism which propels the dialectic. It is the whole, sustaining and comprehending itself in its differences, sublating and uniting its diverse moments."

See Stace, Hegel, p. 283, para. 393. The relationship of the soul and the body, even, or especially in the Cartesian sense, can be said to constitute such an infinitely negative relationship. For, even though the two substances that make up the self are supposed to be entirely independent and positive in themselves, their exclusivity constitutes a mutual limitation, and, therefore, negation, i.e. an immanent relation of negativity to negativity, or self-identity of negativity.

See concept of manifestation in Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 16-18, paras. 383.

Piotr Hoffman, Violence in Modern Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 120.

Hoffman, Violence, p. 122.

Hoffman, Violence, p. 122.

Harris, Logic of Hegel, p. 112: "Being-for-self is not just the reflection of an object, but the awareness of the relation between the subject and object."

Issue, therefore, must be taken here with Stace in his analysis of being-for-self. For, even though he claims that pure thought, or the idea is an example of the true infinite, and thus of being-for-self, and furthermore, that this example becomes "truer when the abstract logical idea becomes concrete spirit," his statement that, "The highest form of spirit is self-consciousness" (p. 150, para. 205), is simply mistaken. Spirit is self-consciousness in Hegel's system, but self-consciousness is not necessarily Spirit. For self-consciousness, as is clear in the Phenomenology and The Philosophy of Mind, must be transcended, and, therefore, is merely preserved as a moment in both Reason and Spirit.


Barnes, Pre-Socratics, pp. 346-52.

Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 402.

Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 402.

Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 404.

Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 402.

Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 402. (My italics).

Find affirmation in quantum theory.

Find ref. about animals and idealism in the Phen.

Hegel makes it very clear in the Philosophy of Right that the category of contract is completely inappropriate with regard to the relationship between the individual and the State, since, unlike contract, he does not see the relationship in and with the State as an arbitrary one. As he says in the main text: "It is equally far from the truth to ground the nature of the state on the contractual relation, whether the state is supposed to be a contract of all with all, or of all with the monarch and the government. The intrusion of the contractual relation, and relationships concerning private property generally, into the relation between the individual and the state has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life. Just as at one time political rights and duties were considered and maintained to be an unqualified private

Notes

1 Errol Harris, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel (Maryland: University Press of America, 1983), p. 113; "Being-for-self ... is the primary emergence of the dominance of holism which propels the dialectic. It is the whole, sustaining and comprehending itself in its differences, sublating and uniting its diverse moments."

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11 Barnes, Pre-Socratics, pp. 346-52.

12 Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 402.

13 Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 402.

14 Barnes, Pre-Socratics, p. 404.

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19 Hegel makes it very clear in the Philosophy of Right that the category of contract is completely inappropriate with regard to the relationship between the individual and the State, since, unlike contract, he does not see the relationship in and with the State as an arbitrary one. As he says in the main text: "It is equally far from the truth to ground the nature of the state on the contractual relation, whether the state is supposed to be a contract of all with all, or of all with the monarch and the government. The intrusion of the contractual relation, and relationships concerning private property generally, into the relation between the individual and the state has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life. Just as at one time political rights and duties were considered and maintained to be an unqualified private
property of particular individuals, something contrasted with the right of the monarch and the state, so also in more recent times the rights of the monarch and state have been regarded as subjects of a contract and as grounded in contract, as something embodying merely a common will and resulting from the arbitrariness of parties united into a state. However different these two points of view may be, they have this in common, that they have transferred the characteristics of private property into a sphere of quite different and higher nature." (59:75). Then in the Addition to the same paragraph, he says the following: "It has recently become very fashionable to regard the state as a contract of all with all. Everyone makes a contract with the monarch, so the argument runs, and he again with his subjects. This point of view arises from thinking superficially of a mere unity of different wills. In contract, however, there are two identical wills who are both persons and wish to remain property owners. Thus contract springs from a person's arbitrary will, an origin which marriage too has in common with contract. But the case is quite different with the state; it does not lie with an individual's arbitrary will to separate himself from the state, because we are all already citizens of the state by birth. The rational end of man is life in the state, and if there is no state there, reason at once demands that one be founded. Permission to enter a state, or leave it must be given by the state; this then is not a matter which depends on an individual's arbitrary will and therefore the state does not rest on contract, for contract presupposes arbitrariness. It is false to maintain that the foundation of the state is something at the option of all its members. It is nearer the truth to say that it is absolutely necessary for every individual to be a citizen. The great advance of the state in modern times is that nowadays all the citizens have one and the same end, an absolute and permanent end; it is no longer open to individuals, as it was in the Middle Ages, to make private stipulations in connexion with it." (242). (See also PR 71:100 & 156-57:258).

20 Marx also rejects the applicability of atomism in and to the State. For instance, in The Holy Family, he says the following: "Speaking exactly in the prosaic sense, the members of civil society are not atoms. The specific property of the atom is that it has no properties and is therefore not connected with beings outside it by any relations determined by its own natural necessity. The atom has no needs, it is self-sufficient; the world outside it is an absolute vacuum, i.e. it is contentless, senseless, meaningless, just because the atom has all its fullness in itself. The egoistic individual in civil society may in his nonsensuous imagination and lifeless abstraction inflate himself to the size of an atom, i.e. to be unrelated, self-sufficient, wantless, absolutely full, blessed being. Unblessed sensuous reality does not bother about his imagination; each of his senses compels him to believe in the existence of the world and the individuals outside him, and even his profane stomach reminds him every day that the world outside him is not empty, but is what really fills. Every activity and property of his, every one of his vital urges becomes a need, a necessity, which his self-seeking transforms into seeking for other things and human beings outside him. But as the need of one individual has no self-understood sense for the other egoistic individual capable of satisfying that need, and therefore no direct connection with its satisfaction, each individual has to create that connection; it thus becomes the intermediary between the need of another and the object of that need. Therefore, it is natural necessity, essential human properties, however alienated they may seem to be, and interest that hold the members of civil society together, but the fact that they are atoms only in imagination, in the heaven of their fancy, but in reality beings tremendously different from atoms, in other words, not divine egotists, but egoistic human beings. Only political superstition today imagines that social life must be held together by the state, whereas in reality the state is held together by civil life." (p.148).

22 Hoffman, Violence, pp. 139-41.
23 Hoffman, Violence, p. 141.
Chapter 6

The Determinations of Reflection,
or
The Formal Beginning of Science &
the Concrete Ground of Speculative Politics

With the emergence of essence from being and of absolute self-identity from determining reflection as such, Science and speculative politics have returned to the formal beginning of abstract power and the moral standpoint. For, as we may recall from the Introduction, the first of Aristotle's three laws of thought, which were shown to constitute the logical foundation of abstract power, is the law of identity. Furthermore, in our analysis of the philosophies of Descartes and Fichte, which represent the beginning and end of the moral standpoint's theoretical development, respectively, this law was shown to be a manifestation or expression of the self-identity of the cogito, or absolute self. This principle is also the formal beginning of Science and speculative politics. For, in identity, thought has determined itself as a law unto itself, which simply means that its development from here on can be and is explicitly systematic.

However, just because Science and speculative politics share the same formal beginning as abstract power and the moral standpoint, does not mean that they are essentially identical with one another. This is because the principle of identity, as we shall see very shortly, is perhaps the most meaningless or trivial truth next to pure being and nothing, when taken in its immediacy, and because all the difference in the world results from the various ways in which this principle is comprehended and developed. We have already seen how abstract power, especially as the moral standpoint, attempts to comprehend this principle, and how this comprehension, which is merely an apprehension, ultimately leads only to uncertainty and annihilation. What remains to be seen, therefore, is how Science, and thus speculative politics, comprehend and develop it, and whether this comprehension offers any alternative to the uncertainty and annihilation of abstract power qua the moral standpoint.

Before embarking on this explanation, however, I should first point out the reason for concluding or ending, as it were, with the formal beginning of Science and speculative politics. First, as explained in the Introduction with regard to the concept of the 'absolute beginning', one can never really help ending with the beginning for the simple reason that the beginning is always present in some form or another. Why, however, should this work end, when so much of Hegel's Science still remains or follows after the analysis of the determinations of reflection? Aside from the constraints of time and space, the reason is as follows. In the Encyclopedia, Hegel claims that: "The theory of essence is the most difficult branch of logic. It includes the categories of metaphysic[s] and of the sciences in
general" (*LL* 166:114 [MI]). Since the errors that result in abstract power and the moral standpoint have been shown to begin with a failure to comprehend the first principles of this theory, therefore, one cannot only conclude that Hegel is correct in his appraisal of the difficulty of this particular branch of logic, but also that a full explanation, and, therefore, successful comprehension, of these principles is paramount if any further progress whatsoever is to be made in understanding metaphysics, the sciences, Science and especially, speculative politics. The beginning, therefore, must at least momentarily serve as the end in order to provide solid ground for the future.

A. The Principle of Identity

The determinations of reflection, as Hegel makes clear at the start of his analysis in the Science, are identity, difference and contradiction, (*SL II* 35 & *HSL* 40), all of which eventually transcend themselves, so that in the end "only the transcendence of [essence's, or reflection's] determinativeness is its [true] determining" (*SL II* 71). In other words, the last determination of reflection or contradiction, as the self-reflection of opposition, i.e. absolute opposition, or *opposition=opposition, negates itself*, and, therefore, "returns into its own ground" (*SL II* 35 [MI]). This is why, in the Science, ground, which constitutes a category unto itself, apart from these determinations, can also be regarded as "itself one of the determinations of reflection" (*SL II* 71), though, as already stated, the one "which determines that it is transcended determination" (*SL II* 71 [MI]). It is also why, in the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel conflates contradiction and ground, so that the determinations of reflection are there given as *identity, difference and ground* (*LL* 166-78:115-121). This difference, as we can see, therefore, is not of any real significance. For the last two determinations are more or less identical, and, in either case, the presentation of these determinations, or principles, is consonant with the traditional presentation of the universal laws of thought, as we found, for instance, in Aristotle and Fichte.

What is significant, however, is that these determinations "were formerly cast into the form of propositions, in which it was asserted that they were of universal application. These propositions, [therefore,] were counted as the universal laws of thought, lying at the root of all thought, absolute and undemonstrable in themselves, but recognized as true, and acknowledged, immediately and without contradiction, by every intelligence which grasps their meaning" (*SL II* 35 & *HSL* 409 [MI]). Indeed, this is precisely the position that we encountered in Aristotle, Descartes and Fichte, (though Descartes does not really mention these laws as such). Hegel, therefore, is quite correct, when, in the *Encyclopedia*, he identifies "the logic, which seriously propounds such laws," with the Aristotelian world of scholasticism, "in which alone they are valid" (*LL* 167:115). He is incorrect, however, in his assertion that these laws "have long been discredited with practical common sense as well as with the philosophy of reason" (*LL* 167:115). For, as already established in the Introduction, these laws, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, are the fundamental laws of the moral standpoint, and, insofar as we still live in the world of the moral standpoint, the logic which seriously propounds these laws,
and, therefore, scholasticism, are alive and well, awaiting, if not theoretical, certainly practical refutation.

Be that as it may, the first essential difference between the moral standpoint and Science, or speculative politics is that neither Science, nor speculative politics regard these determinations as absolute and undemonstrable in themselves, or rather, as *immediately true*. On the contrary, they see that, despite the immediate appearance of pure self-relatedness, and, therefore, separation, these determinations are essentially related or mediated by, and, therefore, dependent upon, one another, and as such, quite demonstrable. We have already begun to see this in that identity, for instance, is itself the result of the transcendence of being in essence or reflection, which means that it is not simply immediate, but also mediated. This is why it will be important to distinguish these principles as the understanding attempts to grasp them, i.e. as fixed in their immediacy and separation, and as they are in themselves, i.e. as inherently concrete. The former, as we shall see, therefore, are, what Hegel refers to as, abstract identity, difference and contradiction, while the latter are the concrete concept of these determinations (SL II 38).

This distinction appears immediately in the analysis of identity. For, even though the concept of identity does at first appear as absolute and immediate, like abstract identity or the law of identity, it is "not the product of a relative negation taking place outside it" (SL II 35 [MI]), i.e. an external reflection or abstraction from being, as is abstract identity. Rather, it is pure essence, which "is self-identical in its absolute negativity" (SL II 37 [MI]), i.e. the absolute negativity that constitutes the being of essence and the essence in being itself (SL II 37). As Hegel says: "Essence is, therefore, simple self-identity" (SL II 37 & HSL 411); and: "This self-identity is the immediacy of reflection" (SL II 37), i.e. negativity=negativity. Such simple self-identity, as we can see, is still absolutely identical with essence, which is why, at this point, Hegel provisionally refers to the concept of identity as, "essential identity" (SL II 38 & HSL 411). However, insofar as essential identity is purely negative, and insofar as it is immediate reflection, which is the same as pure negativity, it is also abstract. For, even as Hegel himself says, after making an effort to point out and maintain their distinction, identity has yet to become a determination of essence, or moment of reflection (SL II 39). This is simply because essence, reflection and identity are all the same indeterminacy. Essential identity, therefore, can be seen as identical with abstract identity. Furthermore, insofar as pure essence determines itself as external reflection, essential identity will at some point appear to be the product of abstraction from and reflection upon some being, i.e. as a relative, rather than an absolute negation. This will not really matter, however, since, as we shall see shortly, it is equally possible to demonstrate the mutual dependence of the abstract forms of identity, difference and contradiction, as it is the concept.

As for the concept of essential identity at this point, however, it is immediately self-negating. For, as
we already know, the self-identity of negativity, absolute negation, etc., is the negation of negation (SL II 39). As such, it posits the opposite of itself as purely negative, or the purely positive, and, therefore, itself as absolutely different from itself as absolute negation. However, it is just as much an immediately vanishing negation and difference, since the result is also what is absolutely identical with itself, i.e. pure positive being (SL II 39). This being, as we have already seen throughout Hegel's logic, however, is also necessarily determinate, which means that the resultant identity is also determinate identity, although it only appears as such when "opposed to absolute difference" (SL II 39). Absolute difference, therefore, must still somehow be present with and in identity. As Hegel explains, difference is only absolute if it is self-relating difference. For otherwise there would necessarily be an external other, which would limit difference, and, thereby, negate its absoluteness. This means, however, that absolute difference must be essentially self-identical, or have identity in itself, i.e. difference=difference. In other words, it is the identity of absolute non-identity, or self-relating negativity (SL II 39 & HSL 413).

How, however, is this self-relating negativity maintained in the negation of the concept of essential identity if it becomes purely positive?

Simply put, insofar as what is purely positive is the negation of what is purely negative, it is also negative, and, therefore, identical with what is supposedly negated, i.e. the self-identity of negativity. Furthermore, since this self-identity is preserved in negation, or is the result of it, it is no longer merely abstract, but determinate, i.e. it is the determination of identity, which is different from absolute difference. However, insofar as it is different, it is also a confirmation of difference, or a moment of it. Hegel also demonstrates the essential relationship of identity and difference through an analysis of the law of identity. As we have also already seen, particularly in Fichte's Science, this law, or A=A, is regarded as purely formal, and, therefore, completely independent of anything else, i.e. difference. It is contentless (SL II 39). Thus, as Hegel says: "In its positive expression, A=A, this law is nothing more than an empty tautology" (SL II 39 [MI]). As such, it is true, but completely barren, i.e. it "leads no further" (SL II 39).

Both its emptiness and independence, however, break down immediately in the assertion that "identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different" (SL II 39-40 & HSL 413 [MI]). For, as we have already seen, this is merely confirmation "that identity is different" (SL II 40), and, therefore, in itself difference, or absolute difference in itself, i.e. as self-identical. This is why we normally expect a different determination to be provided, when an inquiry is made into the nature of something (SL II 41 & HSL 415). "If, for example, the question 'What is a plant?' is met by an answer 'A plant is a plant,' the truth of the proposition is straight away admitted by the entire company upon whom it is tested, and it will be admitted with equal unanimity that this answer says nothing" (SL II 41 & HSL 415). Since nothing is the consequence of the tautological proposition, the highest form of which is
A=A, it is self-contradictory (SL II 41). As Hegel concludes, therefore: "Identity is not truth and absolute truth in itself, but quite the opposite; it is not a rigid simplicity, but a passing beyond self into self-dissolution" (SL II 42 [MI]).

Even the law of identity then, which is intended as an expression of the truth of abstract identity, or of identity as completely independent from difference, "contains more than simple, abstract identity" (SL II 42 & HSL 415). It contains the same negative movement, or "pure movement of reflection" (SL II 42), as the concept of essential identity, i.e. the one that produces absolute, self-identical difference. Indeed, the law of identity, or A=A, contains difference in itself. For, as has already been pointed out throughout our analysis of Hegel's Science, especially in being-for-self and self-consciousness, "the first A must be distinguished from the second; and if it is, the second is not the first ... If they were the same, [i.e.] identical without distinction, the proposition, [i.e. A=A,] could not be formulated. So it contradicts itself, and the traditional statement of the law of identity violates the law of non-contradiction.}\footnote{1}

We encountered Aristotle's law of non-contradiction in the Introduction. Hegel refers to it here as the law of contradiction, which is the negative form of the law of identity, or \( A \neq A \) (SL II 42). It cannot be both \( A \) and \( \neg A \), because it is supposedly purely self-identical. It is, therefore, only \( A \), which means, as Hegel explains, the not-\( A \), the pure other of \( A \) "shows itself only in order to vanish. In this proposition, therefore, identity is expressed as negation of negation, [i.e. the not-\( A \)]" (SL II 42 & HSL 416). This is why Hegel regards the law of non-contradiction as a "more developed form" of the principle of identity, than the law of identity itself (SL II 42). Simply put, it expresses "the pure movement of reflection," or "simple negativity," which is identity in its essence, or essential identity (SL II 42 & HSL 416). However, the law of identity, insofar as it is, what Hegel here refers to as, "difference in one relation" (SL II 42), i.e. the distinction between the first and the second \( A \) in \( A=A \), immediately resurrects the not-\( A \). For, as we have already seen, in relation to the other, each is just as much \( \neg \) the other, and, therefore, not-\( A \), as it is \( A \). This is why \( A=A \) appears to be a violation of the law of non-contradiction. However, it only appears to be such a violation. For even the law of non-contradiction violates itself insofar as the negation of negation, or of the not-\( A \) contained in it, is just as much an affirmation of the pure negativity of the not-\( A \), as it is a negation. Both laws, therefore, are "not merely analytic, but synthetic" (SL II 42), and as such, contain and express the opposite of identity, viz. absolute non-identity or difference.

B. The Principle of Difference

1. Absolute Difference

Absolute difference, therefore, is "the essential moment of identity" (SL II 43). As we have seen, this
difference does not result from anything external to either identity, or difference - for each is contained in the other - and, therefore, is self-related, or simple difference (SL II 43 & HSL 417). According to Hegel: "It is essential to grasp absolute difference as simple" (SL II 43 & HSL 417). For, insofar as difference is absolute, it must not presuppose anything, even identity, to be different from, but must arise from itself. Otherwise, it would be relative. This is why Hegel identifies it with "the simple not" of the not-A from the law of non-contradiction (SL II 43 & HSL 417). Like identity, therefore, even though, as we shall see shortly, the term 'like' implies mutual relation, and, therefore, determinate, or relative difference, absolute difference is the same pure or self-relation negativity as identity (SL II 44). This means that it is also necessarily reflected difference (SL II 44 & HSL 417), and "as such, it is the negativity of itself - difference not from an other, [as in mere determinate being,] but from its own self" (SL II 44 & HSL 417 [MII]). In short, it is the difference from difference, which means that it is also "not itself, [i.e. not-difference,] but its other" (SL II 44 & HSL 417).

What, however, is difference that is also not difference, difference different from difference, or an other to difference that, at the same time, is not an other?

As we have already seen, and as Hegel immediately points out, it is identity (SL II 44). "Difference is therefore both itself and identity. Both together constitute difference; it is the whole, and its moment" (SL II 44 & HSL 417). This means, however, that difference is not just simple, self-related difference, but rather, concrete, mediated difference. It does not mean, however, that difference, or identity is not, or does not also contain the immediate relation to itself as itself. For, as we have already seen, each is essential to the other, and always, therefore, present, despite the mediation. Instead, difference, like identity, at first appears as a separate, simple determinateness, or, what Hegel calls, diversity (HSL 418), or variety (SL II 44).

2. Variety, or the Appearance of

External/Indifferent Difference

Indeed, it is identity itself which immediately becomes variety, or "falls apart" (HSL 418) into two separate, or diverse moments (SL II 44). This is simply because it is the self-identity of negativity, or absolute difference in itself, and, therefore, the positing of what is not identity (SL II 44). Insofar as identity is negated then, these moments are separate from one another, or have no relation to one another, and as such, are completely self-identical, or, as Hegel also says, "intro-reflected" (SL II 45). They are, therefore, "different from and indifferent to one another" (SL II 45). In the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes this as immediate or external difference (LL 169:117). For neither is at all affected by this relation, which is really no relation. In fact, we can only speak about a relation between diverse or various things insofar as the difference falls "into a third thing, [viz.] the agent of comparison" (LL 169:117). As we shall see, therefore, variety demands the complete re-emergence of external reflection.
In the meantime, however, we can see clearly that immediate difference, or variety implies no essential difference between the two moments here distinguished, i.e. identity and difference, which is why variety is indifferent difference (SL II 46). On the contrary, as Hegel himself admits: 'they are not different in themselves' (SL II 45); i.e. essentially. As we have already seen, there is no essential difference, which means that identity and difference are essentially identical, though this identity still only appears as the self-identity of each of the separate or indifferent moments. However, even if we, like Leibniz, embrace the validity of the law of diversity, and say, 'Everything is different', which seems to affirm immediate difference as the absolute, essential truth, it is easy to see that difference is not essential. For if everything is different from everything else, every individual thing is purely self-identical, and if every individual thing is identical only with itself, it is identical with everything else. For everything else is also identical only with itself. Everything, therefore, is essentially identical, not essentially different, and the law of diversity is as self-contradictory or negating, as the laws of identity and non-contradiction (SL II 50).

Difference, therefore, has nothing whatsoever to do with these two apparent determinations of identity and difference. Instead, it 'is only a positedness, or transcended being' (SL II 45 & HSL 419). In short, it is negated. As such, however, 'it is also itself the whole of reflection' (SL II 45 & HSL 419). For it is once again purely negative and essentially identical. However, insofar as difference is a positedness, and reflection is the self-identity of negativity, reflection at this point is also external reflection (SL II 45), and, therefore, not really whole. 'What is present, therefore, is a duality, [viz. of] intro-reflection as such and determinateness as negation or positedness' (SL II 45 & HSL 419).

This determinateness, as we already know, is itself intro-reflection, but only implicitly (SL II 45). For, even though, as negative of intro-reflection, which is itself essentially negative, and as the result of the negation of negation, it is itself the self-identity of negativity, which constitutes intro-reflection, it must once again overcome its apparent externality, or realize itself as identical with intro-reflection. At the moment then, this determinateness seems to be different from intro-reflection. Indeed, as the determination of external reflection, in contrast to the intro-reflection, which is an essential moment of external reflection, but seems to be something distinct from it insofar as it is self-identical, it is the determination in which difference has posited itself. Likewise, identity, as we can see, has posited itself in or as intro-reflection (SL II 45). This is simply because they are external to reflection as a whole, and because they appear to exclude, and, therefore, be limited by one another, even though, as we have already seen, they are fundamentally and mutually dependent.

Likeness & Unlikeness

Hegel identifies external identity and difference as 'likeness' and 'unlikeness' respectively (SL II 46).
According to him: "Whether something is, or is not like another something concerns neither term: each is referred only to itself, and is what it is, in and for itself. Identity, or non-identity, as likeness, or unlikeness, relates only to their aspect from a third view-point, which falls outside of their sphere" (SL II 46 & HSL 420). For example: "A zebra and a horse are different (unlike) yet alike. Yet a zebra is what it is without any reference to the horse, and even if no horse existed in the universe. Hence its quality of being 'like a horse' is no part of its own being, but is external to it."2

Where, however, does this third view-point or term arise from? Or what is its derivation?

It is not contradictory for Hegel simply to posit a third term which is external to the determinations of identity as likeness and difference as unlikeness here, since everything, at this point in the Logic, appears as posited, and, therefore, as external to everything else, even external reflection, which "is external to itself" (SL II 46), i.e. as pure intro-reflection, the reflection of determinateness and the determinateness itself. As he explains, although likeness is external identity and unlikeness, external difference: "External reflection refers the different to likeness and unlikeness" (SL II 46). This is simply because it seems absurd to say that something is like or unlike itself. Thus, these two determinations presuppose the existence of two different things, which are then compared and judged to be externally identical, i.e. alike, or externally different, i.e. unlike. Of course, since these determinations presuppose difference, neither is related to the other. For they are still different determinations "related separately to a third term" (SL II 46), i.e. "intro-reflection, which stands over and against them" (SL II 46).

However, this then means that each also presupposes self-identity, i.e. a) insofar as they are the determinations of this third term, which is intro-reflection, and, therefore, self-identical; b) insofar as reflection applies them both to one and the same thing, and, therefore, they are indifferent difference; and c) insofar as they must themselves be considered to be purely self-identical in themselves, if they are to be preserved as separate or different determinations. As Hegel says with regard to this last point: "Likeness is related only to itself, and in the same manner unlikeness is just unlikeness" (SL II 47). As we can see, this means that unlikeness is explicitly, or essentially self-identical, i.e. unlikeness=unlikeness, which means that it is just like, or rather, essentially identical with likeness. Their separation, therefore, is itself the cancellation of this separation, and thus "their destruction" as different determinations (SL II 47). Indeed, this was true from the start insofar as "both are determinations of difference" (SL II 47).

This essential identity means a number of things however. First, it means that the two are in fact related to one another. As Hegel says: "As determinations of difference, each is what it is as distinct from its other" (SL II 47 & HSL 420 [MI]), which means their relation is actually one of opposition. Second, it means that difference is determinate, and, therefore, not really indifferent or external, i.e.
specifying or determinate difference (LL 171:118). Rather, it is an essential difference between two things, which once again implies opposition (LL 171:119), i.e. "like is not unlike, and unlike is not like" (SL II 47 & HSL 420 [MI]). As we have just seen, however, "each now is likeness and no more" (SL II 47). As Hegel says: "external difference thus transcends itself and is its own negativity in itself" (SL II 47 [MI]). This means that external difference is in itself and has become the very intro-reflection which serves as the third, or "comparing term" in the process of determining likeness and unlikeness (SL II 47). In other words, subjectivity is the "negative unity of both" (SL II 47), or unity in self-identical negativity, and this negative unity is their nature or essence, even though they necessarily appeared as external to it, as to everything else in the beginning of absolutely external reflection (SL II 47).

However, since this is their essence, "their negative unity is also posited in them" (SL II 47 [MI]). Therefore, they do not simply disappear into this unity or identity. On the contrary, they are as much the whole of intro-reflection, as intro-reflection as such, or as the third term. This means, however, that unlikeness must also be somehow preserved in these determinations, which have already proved to be likeness. In fact, it is in the very self-identity, which, as we have already seen time and again, necessarily involves difference or distinction between the identical terms. Furthermore, insofar as the determinations of likeness and unlikeness are themselves the whole, i.e. intro-reflected, they are as much "the likeness and unlikeness of a third term, which is other than they" (SL II 47-48), as they are determinations in that term. Of course, another way of seeing the unlikeness preserved in likeness and unlikeness is this: insofar as unlikeness is self-identical, it is absolute unlikeness, and, therefore, unlike even itself, and insofar as likeness is related to unlikeness, its essence is determined just as much by its not being unlikeness, as its being likeness, i.e. it contains unlikeness. "The like and the unlike, are, therefore, unlike themselves. Each accordingly is the reflection which makes likeness to be both itself and unlikeness, and unlikeness to be both itself and likeness" (SL II 47 & HSL 421).

3. Opposition,
or the Positive & Negative

Such intro-reflected determinations, or rather, determinations that are in themselves also their opposite, and, therefore, whole, are no longer mere likeness and unlikeness. For the apparent indifference of variety has been overcome, i.e. it is no longer even apparent. Not only are the things to which these determinations are applied not indifferent to one another, these determinations are not indifferent to things, or one another. Thus, likeness and unlikeness now "constitute the determinations of opposition. Their intro-reflection consists in the fact that each in itself is the unity of likeness and
unlikeness. Likeness is only in reflection which uses unlikeness as its standard of comparison, and consequently, is mediated by its other, indifferent moment; similarly unlikeness is only in the same reflective relationship in which likeness is; ... each thus contains the relation to its not being, and is only intro-reflection, or the whole which essentially relates itself to its not being" (SL II 51 & HSL 424 [MI]). This essential relationship of opposition, as Hegel notes in the Encyclopedia, becomes particularly obvious in the empirical sciences, even though these same sciences do not necessarily grasp this themselves. For "the scientific problem at one time is to reduce existing difference to identity; on another occasion, with equal one-sidedness, to discover new difference" (LL 171:118 [MI]). The one-sidedness of these sciences aside, it is clear that their activity is essentially dependent upon the existence and presupposition of the opposite determination, and would not be possible without it.

As opposites, however, likeness and unlikeness are no longer these determinations as such, but rather the positive and the negative. "Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference" (LL 171:118). Indeed, this is why Hegel describes opposition at the beginning of his analysis as the completion, or perfection of difference (SL II 50 & HSL 424). This is because the moments of difference are now clearly seen both as different and as independent from one another (SL II 52), even though, as we shall see, they "are at bottom, [i.e. essentially,] the same" (LL 173:118).

What exactly are the positive and negative however?

In its immediacy, the positive is simply "intro-reflected self-likeness, which contains in itself the relation to unlikeness" (SL II 51). Likewise, the negative is simply intro-reflected unlikeness, which contains the same relation to its opposite in itself (SL II 51). This relation in both, however, is purely negative, i.e. it is purely exclusive, or, as we have already seen, it is likeness that is not-unlikeness, and unlikeness that is not-likeness. In opposition, therefore, the two seem to have become absolute or pure in themselves (SL II 52). As absolute, they must also then be independent, but their independence for Hegel supposedly comes from their being "the intro-reflection of the whole" (SL II 52) of opposition, which is both positive and negative. This means, therefore, that neither determination is really pure, but is essentially its other as well. This can be seen even in the positive's and negative's first determination as mere positedness. For, even as merely posited, "it is not true that one is [simply] positive and the other negative" (SL II 52). The positive is as much the negation of the negative, as the negative is that of the positive. The positive, therefore, is negative and the negative, as something, either through the negation of the positive, i.e. a determinate negation, or through the self-identity of negativity established by its identity with the positive as negative, is positive (SL II 52).

Thus, the positive and negative do not appear to be independent. However, insofar as the positive is negative and the negative, positive, they are essentially indifferent, i.e. it is indifferent as to which one
is referred to in the determination of opposition. In short, "they are interchangeable" (SL II 53). This means, therefore, that they are not only indifferent to one another, but also to their "own positedness" (SL II 53), and, therefore, to opposition in general, or intro-reflection as a whole. "Here [then] the two sides [of opposition] are merely various" (SL II 53 [MI]), and as such, still seem to enjoy the independence at first manifested by likeness and unlikeness. As merely various determinations, however, neither is "determinate in itself, but is only determinateness in general" (SL II 53), or what is essentially indeterminate, and, therefore, once again intro-reflection, i.e. the self-identity of negativity.

As such, they "are not only something posited, nor merely indifferent" (SL II 53 & HSL 426). In other words, the moments or determinations of opposition are not either positive, or negative, but rather, both positive and negative. As Hegel says and we have already seen: "Each is in itself positive and negative" (SL II 53). This means that "each is therefore complete and self-contained opposition" (SL II 58); or rather, that each is both dependent, i.e. because it must include the relation to its alleged other, and independent, i.e. because it is a whole or self-existent unity, which means the one also still "excludes the other" (SL II 58 [MI]). In short, there are two exclusive oppositions. This also means, however, that each one "excludes its own independence. For this [independence] consists in containing within itself its opposite determination - through which alone it is not a relation to something external - but no less immediately in the fact that it is itself, and also excludes from itself the determination that is negative to it. Thus, it is contradiction" (SL II 58 & HSL 431). This means that each determination of opposition is contradictory in itself, i.e. self-contradictory, and that opposition in general is itself contradiction. For all three, as we already know, are whole intro-reflections, or rather, intro-reflections of the whole. Furthermore, for Hegel: "Opposite terms contain contradiction insofar as they are negatively related to each other in the same respect, or cancel out and remain indifferent to each other" (SL II 68 & HSL 441), as do the positive and negative.

C. The Principle of Contradiction, or
the Actual Ground of Speculative Knowledge

Science, speculative knowledge, or, whatever else we may choose to call it, "is essentially distinct from any other way of knowing" (PR 2 [MI]). We have seen many reasons for this throughout this work, beginning with Science's fundamental logical determinations, viz. the unity of being and nothing, or becoming. Perhaps none make this distinction more clear, however, than the determination or principle of contradiction. Like the principle of negation, with which contradiction is more or less identical, since "it is no more than developed nothing" (SL II 66 [MI]), contradiction has and continues to be regarded as the ultimate deficiency in human thought, i.e. in both its theoretical
and practical capacities. As we have already seen in the Introduction, Hegel is acutely aware that contradiction is usually "considered as an accident, a kind of abnormality, or a passing paroxysm of sickness" (SL II 67 & HSL 440), in both ordinary modes of thinking and the highest. Indeed, all of the various forms of thought attempt to remove contradiction "first of all from things, [i.e.] from the sphere of being and truth in general; and it is asserted that there is nothing contradictory. Second, it is shifted into subjective reflection, which alone is said to posit it when it relates and compares [things]. But even in this reflection, it does not really exist, for it is said that it is impossible to imagine, or think anything contradictory" (SL II 67 & HSL 439-440). In short, there is no contradiction. Although this, as we have already seen, must be the position of abstract power as such and as the moral standpoint, that there is no contradiction is so absurd that even Fichte, who has the dubious distinction of representing the philosophical apotheosis of the moral standpoint and being the formal originator of Science, or Wissenschaft, is unwilling completely to dismiss its existence and possibility. As he makes clear, one cannot reject, avoid, or deny contradiction, if one does not already have some idea of what contradiction is or might be. Furthermore, for Fichte, all human thought is the result of absolute opposition (SK 202), which, as we have seen, is the first moment of contradiction as such, or abstract contradiction, i.e. the contradiction that appears to admit of no resolution, and, therefore, is absolutely essential even for the moral standpoint, try as it might to deny or eliminate it.

The difference between the moral standpoint and Science or speculative politics then, once again lies less in its determinations as such, than in the recognition of the nature and value of these determinations and their treatment. Thus, as we also saw in the Introduction, what differentiates Science, or speculative politics from abstract power as such and as the moral standpoint, is the recognition that "if there were any question of rank [between contradiction and identity], and the two determinations had to be fixed as separate, [then] contradiction would have to be taken as the profounder and more fully essential" (SL II 67). It would have to be taken as such, simply because, without it, there would be no movement, change, life, thought, progress, etc. (SL II 67-70). Of course, in reality there is, or should be no question of rank between contradiction and identity. For, as we have already seen, contradiction is immanent in identity, and this identity, therefore, itself ultimately becomes and is contradiction. We may, therefore, safely follow Hegel's advice and disregard the statement that, contradiction doesn't exist. In fact, we have already shown that non-existence is in itself a contradiction resulting in existence, so that statements such as 'nothing is contradictory', or 'contradiction is not', possess more truth than those who assert them would care to admit. What we must do, however, is analyse the nature and movement of contradiction. For, where there is no comprehension of the principle contradiction, there is no real possibility of politics, i.e. no actual political activity, only the inevitable isolation and annihilation of abstract power and the moral standpoint.
At the end of opposition, we saw how the division between the positive and negative as wholes is also necessarily a division between these determinations in each of those wholes. For, insofar as they are themselves intro-reflected, they are also reflections of opposition in general. Both the positive and the negative, therefore, transcend themselves, i.e. as intro-reflected wholes, and, in so doing, posit themselves and their opposite moment, outside of themselves as mutually exclusive determinations, i.e. they are no longer intro-reflected through the other (SL II 59). Thus, we once again seem to be left with a condition of abstract self-identity, i.e. P=P and N=N, and absolute difference, i.e. P≠N - only this time between the positive and the negative. In short, we are left with the positive as an immediate determinateness, on the one hand, and the negative as such, on the other (SL II 59).

As Hegel says then: "the positive is positedness as reflected into self-equality; positedness which is not a relation to other" (SL II 59), i.e. P=P. It, therefore, posits itself as self-identical, and thus not as a mere positedness. For it has transcended the immediacy of positedness by virtue of its relation to the other or negative, which is now excluded, thereby becoming self-mediated. In doing so, however, the positive also "converts itself into a relation of a non-being" (SL II 59 & HSL 432), and thus reduces itself back to the positedness which is supposedly excluded. It does so by virtue of the logic of identity, i.e. P=P becomes not-P either by P=not-P, or P= the 'not' of not-P, or P=N, the latter being the same as not-P=not-P, or N=N, or N. The positive, therefore, is the contradiction which, in positing itself as excluding its other, or opposite, not only posits that opposite as excluding it, i.e. the positive, but posits itself as that opposite which excludes it. Indeed, this is why it excludes itself, or is self-exclusive (SL II 59). However, we do not even need to go through this whole process again. For the negative is immediately posited by the positive, as a free, self-identical, and, therefore, exclusive determination in itself, when it is initially excluded from the positive as an intro-reflective whole, i.e. one that includes its opposite. Thus, it is still responsible for its own exclusion from the negative, and, therefore, excludes itself or is an absolute contradiction.

Of course, the negative suffers the same absolute contradiction as the positive (SL II 59). For, whether we consider the negative by itself, or as the negation of the positive, i.e. as excluding the positive, it is self-related, and, therefore, positive. As we have already seen, but as Hegel reiterates: "Negation in general is the negative as quality, or immediate determinateness" (SL II 59 & HSL 432). For it is the negation of negation, and, therefore, something. Furthermore, "the negative as negative, is [necessarily] related to the negative of itself, or its opposite, [i.e. the positive]" (SL II 59 & HSL 432), in which case it is a determinate negation or the self-identity of negativity, both of which are in themselves positive, or immediately lead to its posing, and, therefore, the exclusion of the negative. As Hegel points out, however, "the positive is only implicitly this contradiction, while the negative is contradiction posited" (SL II 60 & HSL 432). This is because its self-identity is explicitly the
negation or "exclusion of identity" (SL II 60), i.e. the negation of negation is immediately and expressly the positing of the opposite determination, and, therefore, absolute difference. "The negative is then the totality of opposition resting upon itself as opposition" (SL II 60 [MI]). It is, therefore, the self-identity of absolute difference, or opposition, which is why, as Hegel claims, it simultaneously excludes both identity and itself from itself (SL II 60). However, insofar as we now have the self-identity of difference, or opposition: "Contradiction resolves itself" (SL II 60 & HSL 423). For, just as the intro-reflection, or self-identity of negativity as such is the negation of itself, so too is the intro-reflection, or self-identity of difference, or opposition, the difference from difference, or the opposition to opposition.

The question, therefore, becomes: what is the result of the self-resolution of contradiction? Or rather, what is different from difference, and opposed to opposition?

It would appear that contradiction resolves itself simply by returning to identity. For identity is certainly different from difference and opposed to opposition. However, insofar as identity is present in contradiction, i.e. as the self-identity of negation, difference, or opposition, there can be no mere return to abstract identity (LL 174:119). This is because abstract identity, as we saw, itself contained contradiction, and because abstract identity too must be transcended in the self-negation of absolute, i.e. self-identical, difference and opposition. In fact, it is, in a manner of speaking, the reason for transcendence in the first place. Furthermore, in absolute difference, it can just as well be said that the determination of difference is what is different from itself, and in absolute opposition, opposition is opposed to itself, so that they are just as qualified, or unqualified as identity for the role of being the resolution of contradiction.

As Hegel explains in the Science, insofar as the positive and negative become one another, or disappear in themselves, pure or absolute nothing would seem to be the result of the self-resolution of contradiction (SL II 60 & HSL 433). However, this is the very same negativity that was the positing of absolute difference, or the totality of opposition. Thus, it would represent the same simple return to identity just ruled out, i.e. N=N, or P. Also, insofar as the positive and negative disappear in themselves, it is clear that "contradiction contains not only the negative, but also the positive" (SL II 60). It is not so much that the positive and negative disappear, or are transcended here then, but rather, the independence which each one attempted to establish in and for itself through the positing of itself as self-identical, or, what is the same thing, through the positing of the other outside of itself. As Hegel says: "their self-negation transcends the positedness of independence" (SL II 60). For this is in fact what is posited in the positing of each moment as self-identical, or of the other outside of itself. "It is, [therefore,] this [positedness of independence] which in truth perishes in contradiction" (SL II 60).
Does this then mean that there is nothing which is independent, or no independence as such?

Even though the positive and negative have become one another, and, therefore, proved their absolute mutual dependence, that the positedness of independence is transcended does not necessarily mean that independence itself is transcended. On the contrary, only the immediate assertion of independence by the positive and negative as separate or exclusive entities is transcended, i.e. independence's positedness. Their unity is still something self-identical, which also now contains relation to otherness, or difference in itself, and, therefore, is what is truly or concretely independent (SL II 60-61 & HSL 433-34). "It is true that, by the transcendence of otherness, or positedness, we are again presented with positedness, [i.e.] the negative of an other. But in fact, this negation is not only the first and immediate relation to other, [i.e.] not positedness as transcended immediacy, but as transcended positedness" (SL II 61 & HSL 434 [MI]). In other words, it is not simply something, but also the negation, or transcendence of something, which, as we already well know, is the other, i.e. it is also explicitly the self-relation, or identity of otherness, in short, other=other. This is why Hegel describes this unity, which is both positive and negative as, "transcending self-relation" (SL II 61 [MI]).

According to Hegel, transcending self-relation is that independent unity which, or, more accurately, that unity which is independent because it, returns into itself, establishes its self-identity, etc., not through the negation of an other, but through the negation of itself, i.e. its own positedness, which may very well have appeared as an other to external reflection, but is, in fact, itself. He calls this independent unity, or unity which is independent, "the unity of essence," or "ground" (SL II 61 & HSL 434 [MI]). In other words, ground is the self-determination of essence (SL II 71). Now it might very well be wondered here, how this ground is different from any other previous determination of essence, or, for that matter, being, since the other has always eventually proved itself to be essential to the determination of something, and since there is little comfort in the thought that something can still negate the other and then claim that it merely negated what appeared to be, or what it posited as an other, but was, in fact, itself. Indeed, Hegel himself admits that ground was already present in the determination of opposition insofar as it was both "self-contradictory and independent" (SL II 62), i.e. insofar as it was absolute opposition. For as such, it was self-negating, self-identical and positive, all at the same time. As with say, Heraclitus and Hobbes then, absolute opposition, conflict, or war would seem to be the ground of all things, or rather, the self-determination of all things as ground.4

This, however, is not at all the case. For in or with ground, as Hegel makes clear in the Science, "the determination of self-unity has been added" (SL II 62 [MI]) to the previous determinations, especially that of absolute opposition. In the case of absolute opposition this self-unity "results from the fact that each of the independent opposites, [i.e. positive and negative,] transcends itself and becomes its other, thus perishing, [dying, or] falling to the ground, [i.e. as what it was, or as independent and exclusive]; but in this process it, at the same time, only unites with itself, [because it originally
posited the other, which it now becomes, outside of itself); so that only in perishing, [dying, or] falling to the ground, i.e. in its positedness or negation, does each now in truth become intro-reflected and self-identical essence” (SL II 62 & HSL 435 [MI]). In the case of ground, therefore, the determinations of unity, intro-reflection and self-identity are all already explicitly present. On the ground, or as the ground then, something must already be aware, or know about the essentiality of otherness, and that self-determination demands explicit self-negation, not mere, or indiscriminate negation justified, or rationalized as 'self-negation' after the fact, i.e. if what is ground negates an other, it is not any other, but its other (LL 173:119). This is why even Hobbes, for instance, who sees absolute opposition, conflict, or war as the ground of all things, i.e. the State of Nature, posits the pursuit of peace as the first imperative or law of this ground, i.e. "The first branch of which Rule, [found out by Reason,] containeth the first and Fundamental Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it." As soon as Nature is capable of self-reflection, or Reason, i.e. in the form of human individuals, and, therefore, is true, or actual ground, according to Hegel’s logic, its first imperative is to determine itself not by negating others, but by limiting, and, therefore, negating itself, i.e. its absolute right to everything, or, what Hobbes calls, The Right of Nature. It does this in order to resolve the contradiction inherent in itself, i.e. that of absolute opposition, or war, and, therefore, to realize itself as an absolutely active being, or, what is the same for Hegel, absolute ground (SL II 70 & HSL 442). This can even be seen to some extent in Hobbes’ philosophy insofar as the accomplishment of anything positive presupposes the establishment and security of real, i.e. political, relationships between individuals, and, therefore, at least the apparent transcendence of Nature by the State. As Hobbes himself says in the famous passage from the Leviathan: "In such a condition, [i.e. of absolute war, or insecurity,] there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." Even in Hobbes’ philosophy, therefore, which represents one of the classical and most complete expressions of abstract power qua the moral standpoint, Nature cannot be considered complete, or actual ground by itself, since ground implies the establishment of real relationships, i.e. "ground is the real mediation of essence with itself" (SL II 72 & HSL 445). Rather, it is, in Hegel’s terminology, pure essence, or the movement of pure negativity. Thus, it is only with the State that Nature even comes close to constituting an actual ground for Hobbes.

Be that as it may, in Hegel’s words, "opposition has not only perished, it has withdrawn into its ground" (SL II 61 & HSL 434). This is simply because the self-identity or reflection of absolute opposition, i.e. opposition=opposition, negated itself, and, therefore, also posited itself as something in which the previously independent determinations of positive and negative are reduced to moments which ground, and are grounded by, each other (SL II 61-62 & HSL 434-35). In ground, therefore, we
not only find the unity of positive and negative, identity and difference, etc., but also that of ground and grounded, which, we may remember from Fichte's rendering of the law of ground in Chapter 2, was said to be impossible, i.e. ground and grounded were supposed to be strictly external. In short, we now have the self-grounding ground. We could already see this insofar as the negative determination of opposition showed itself to be a totality resting upon, or grounding itself, though now we have seen it clearly for both moments, i.e. insofar as the negativity is also a positedness by virtue of the negation of negation, as well as itself the self-identity of negativity insofar as it is negative of negativity, and, therefore, also the self-identity of positivity. As Hegel says: "Ground is essence as positive self-identity, which, however, simultaneously relates itself to itself as negativity, and it, therefore, determines itself and becomes excluded positedness; but this positedness is now the totality of independent essence, and essence is ground, since in this its negation, it is self-identical and positive" (SL II 62 & HSL 435 [MII]). Opposition and contradiction, therefore, may be preserved in ground, but, as we can see, they are so only insofar as they are transcended (SL II 62).

The Transcendence of the Law of the Excluded Middle

That opposition and contradiction are transcended in ground means that the fundamental law of human, or rather, inhuman thought, which, as we saw in the Introduction, makes politics a theoretical and practical impossibility, is also transcended. In other words, we have reached the point where Aristotle's law of the excluded middle is no longer valid, and where a middle ground is not only possible, but essential. Hegel explains this in a Remark at the end of the section on 'Contradiction', in the Science of Logic, and it is with this that the explanation of the ground of speculative politics and the critique of the moral standpoint concludes. As Hegel points out: "The determination of opposition has been made into a law, the so-called law of the excluded middle: something is either A, or not-A; there is no third" (SL II 65 & HSL 438). Everything, therefore, is either A, or not-A, either positive, or negative (SL II 62). Now Hegel admits that this law does contain an important idea insofar as it implies the passage of identity into difference, and difference into opposition. However, this is as far as its significance goes. For the law of the excluded middle is not an absolute law, except insofar as opposition can be regarded as absolute, and we have already seen what that results in, viz. ground; and furthermore, the law of the excluded middle has never really been understood, or recognized as being an indication, or result of this passage (SL II 65), i.e. the determinations of reflection, as previously indicated, were, and, to a great extent, still are considered to be immediate and separate truths in themselves.

The law of the excluded middle is usually understood as referring simply to the fact that, of all the possible predicates that a subject can have, they must either be "this particular, [i.e. determinate,] predicate, or its not-being" (SL II 65 & HSL 438). For example, something may be 'sweet', or 'not-sweet', 'sour', or 'not-sour', 'red', or 'not-red', 'good', or 'not-good', and so on, ad infinitum. This, as Hegel points out, means that negation is still only considered as a mere deficiency, or absence of
being, and, therefore, indeterminateness as such, as we saw in Descartes’ philosophy in Chapter 1, and not as determinate negation, and, therefore, something in itself. From a speculative point of view, therefore, such a law "is a triviality which, [like the individual laws that came before it, i.e. identity and difference, or non-contradiction,] leads to nothing" (SL II 65). Of course, insofar as it leads to nothing as the self-identity of negativity, and this identity is recognized as constituting the middle ground between A and not-A, it may not be so trivial. For then, as we now well know, there is something determinate that constitutes the middle ground, or that is the comprehensive result of the increased self-determination of the two determinatenesses considered as separate in themselves, viz. A and not-A. However, this is not how abstract power as such, or as the moral standpoint, understands this law. Instead, it only sees in its application the passage from "determinateness ... back to indeterminateness" (SL II 66); and, as shown in the Introduction, this indeterminateness will always be its final result, at least as long as it does not find the third term in this law, i.e. abstract power, or the moral standpoint by itself will always end in or produce annihilation.

This third term is present in the law of the excluded middle in the mediated, or derivative way just described. However, it is also present immediately, i.e. not necessarily as the result of nothing, or, more precisely, the self-identity of negativity being posited as the middle ground, e.g. no middle ground, but rather, as something already present and "indifferent to the opposition" of A and not-A (SL II 66). This something is simply A. "This A is neither +A, nor -A, and is also equally +A and -A" (SL II 62 & HSL 439). This is because it is, as we can see, present in both terms, or because positivity and negativity are equally or indifferently applicable to it. Thus, it is as distinguishable from the strict opposition of its determinations, as it is indistinguishable. "The something itself, therefore, is the third term that was supposed to be excluded" (SL II 66 & HSL 439). Exclusion, opposition and contradiction then, are all still present in the ground, but only ideally so, or in essence. For they are transcended.

Does this then mean that ground is absolutely indifferent?

We should already know the answer to this. For even this indifference, as we saw in the Introduction, is necessarily a determination, and, therefore, not simply indifferent. Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this, however, is Hegel’s own description of innocence in the Remark preceding that one on the transcendence of the law of the excluded middle in the Science of Logic. In it he says: "innocence, which is lack of both good and evil, is indifferent to both determinations, and, [therefore,] is neither positive, nor negative. But [even] this lack, too, must be taken as a determinateness: it must be considered on the one hand as the positive nature of something, and on the other of relating itself to an opposite, [viz. the determinations of good and evil] - every nature leaves its innocence, its indifferent [or abstract] self-identity, spontaneously relating itself through itself to its other and thereby destroying itself, [as innocence, or indifferent, abstract self-identity] or, in the positive sense, passing back into ground" (SL II 64 & HSL 437 [MI]). Once this positive passage into ground is made, and
human thought or spirit realizes itself as what grounds itself, it exists as a truly rational, political being in and as community with other rational, political beings, all of whom simultaneously enjoy the freedom and responsibility of creating an infinite wealth or diversity of properties in and for themselves and this community. In other words, as ground, human thought is truly the existence of the 'I' that is 'We' and the 'We' that is 'I'. For it knows that it cannot be otherwise, or that if it attempts to be otherwise, the only truth for it as either 'I', or 'We' is the denial and annihilation of abstract power and the moral standpoint, in which case there is no 'I', there is no 'We', only what we saw in Chapter 5 is the necessarily temporary labour of abstract, or absolute freedom, viz. death.

This positive passage into ground, however, is not the end of the matter. On the contrary, it is only the beginning. For the positive passage into ground of human thought or spirit is merely the first explicit appearance of thought or spirit as speculative politics in and for itself, i.e. without the potentially overwhelming burden of the absolute opposition by and conflict with abstract power or the moral standpoint - though vestiges of this opposition and conflict may certainly linger long after this standpoint has ceased to have any real force of its own, or, at least, appear to have any real force of its own. Only then will speculative politics' method of overcoming through yielding cease to also be a strategy, (and a predominantly subversive one at that,) and, therefore, be recognized as what Hegel appropriately established as the life of Reason and Spirit. Until then, therefore, the work of defining, refining, determining, developing, etc., this life as both a method and a strategy must continue. For the life that will not fight for itself and others is not the life worth having, or living.
Notes


2Stace, Hegel, p. 186, para. 257.

3"To everything but this [viz. contradiction] the logically trained thinker can rise. He is on guard against contradiction. But, in that case, how about the possibility of the maxim of his own logic that we can think no contradiction? In some way he must have got hold of contradiction and thought it, or he could make no communications about it. Had such people only once regularly asked themselves how they came to think the merely possible or contingent (the not-necessary), and how they actually do so. Evidently they here leap through a not-being, not-thinking, etc., into the utterly unmediated, self-initiating, free - into beent non-being - in short, the above contradiction as it was laid. With consistent thinkers the result of this incapacity is nothing but the utter abolition of freedom - the most absolute fatalism and Spinozism." (LL, p. 324, fn para. 119).


5Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 92.


7Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 91.

8Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 89.
Conclusion

What remains to be seen at this point then is whether or not there are any historical, or contemporary examples of speculative politics, aside from Hegel's own system, which hold out the real possibility that overcoming through yielding will eventually become the primary and explicit means of human interaction, and, therefore, that abstract power and the moral standpoint will ultimately be overcome. Thus, I will first briefly mention and explain what I see as the most important historical instances of the application of the strategy of overcoming through yielding in the twentieth century, as well as what these examples generally imply and do not imply about the method of speculative politics. Then, I will briefly explain what I see as one of the most promising contemporary development for speculative politics, aside from the system of fuzzy logic which received brief mention in the Introduction, i.e. the method of principled negotiation from the field of conflict management and resolution. I should add here, however, that it is my firm belief that great and obvious progress towards the fulfilment of speculative politics' aims will only begin to be made when all of these fields, viz. Science, fuzzy logic and conflict management, are brought together in an interdisciplinary dialogue and collective research effort.

A. Speculative Politics
&
the Strategy of Overcoming through Yielding
in the World History of the 20th Century

As argued in the Introduction, it is essential for us to willingly and self-consciously become individual moments in the world's historical development, in order to escape the indefinite cycle and irrational consequences of abstract power and the moral standpoint, and to determine ourselves as the infinite, rational beings we are capable of becoming (see Section 5). It follows, therefore, that it is necessary to understand that speculative politics' strategy of overcoming through yielding is as pertinent to the large movements and conflicts characteristic of historical development or history, as it is to those on an individual level. Indeed, the world has been transformed by two of history's most successful applications of this strategy in the last half of this century, and is presently in the process of being transformed by a third, although those of us standing on what we believe to be the victorious side may still be too blinded by our own 'ideological pretensions' to see it. I shall simply mention the first two, and then explain the third in slightly more, but by no means sufficient, detail.

At the end of World War II, Germany and Japan faced either annihilation, or what appeared to be total surrender, and thus an abandonment of the political, social and economic objectives that had brought them into conflict with the rest of the world's nations and states. Both had arrived at this juncture through the zealous application of abstract power's and the moral standpoint's strategy of denial and
annihilation. As a consequence, surrender became the first and only possible step towards abandoning at least the more overt manifestations of this strategy, and attempting to seek out a new one, e.g. the strategy of overcoming through yielding. This is not to say that such surrender guarantied this new strategy would be discovered or developed, even though, upon reflection, we may say that the choice to surrender, rather than be annihilated, certainly represented its first moment. For, as has already been stated in the Introduction, and as history has shown time and again, total or absolute surrender, i.e. surrender as such, is ultimately equivalent to death or annihilation for the surrendering subject or entity. If, however, this subject or entity risks death through its surrender, and is either spared by its enemy, or survives that enemy’s attack in some other way, surrender as such immediately begets the possibility of yielding. Surrender as such, however, can still be distinguished from yielding insofar as the surrendering subject or entity has mere survival or existence as its sole aim, and not life, which, for our purposes, is the totality of aims that presupposes mere survival or existence. For, although life may be survival, survival is not necessarily life. Thus, a subject or entity which surrenders, or becomes a slave and remains a slave, in order to preserve its life, as is seen in the master/slave dialectic (see Appendix 1), cannot really be said to have a life, only an existence, or a potential for life which is realized to the degree that it begins and accomplishes the work of overcoming those powers enslaving it. Therefore, when surrender as such has not led to immediate annihilation, it is distinct from yielding, i.e. it is not yet yielding, although it may indeed beget yielding as it did to a large degree in the cases of Germany and Japan, both of which have since all but reduced their one time enemies to a condition of political and economic dependence, thereby, realizing objectives far beyond those imagined possible either before or during the war. Germany, for instance, has so far demonstrated the ability to assume the financial, industrial and political leadership in what may very well prove to be the most momentous organization of nation-states in world history, viz. the European Community. Japan, among other things, has, through the painstaking study and appropriation of systems in other countries, especially the United States, developed an entirely new method of production called, lean production, which has not only contributed to making it the leading economic power in the world today, but is in the process of rendering the modern method of mass production completely obsolete. It is rendering mass production obsolete, not only because it is more efficient and productive than mass production, and, therefore, has proved better able to compete in the international economy, but also because it has both the positive supersession of the traditional division of labour between workers and management and the divisive competition between corporations characteristic of capitalism as its essence, if not its explicit aim.² Be that as it may, if surrender as such does not beget yielding in a particular instance, such as Germany’s, or Japan’s, then, as is demonstrated in the master/slave dialectic, it has simply lead to a more mediated, or protracted form of annihilation for the surrendering subject, or party. For confinement to mere existence is equivalent to annihilation for all rational, or rather, all self-conscious, self-determining beings. The point for a scientific consciousness, however, must be to never allow matters to deteriorate to the point of surrender as such, or annihilation. Rather, such consciousness must seek to reduce and eventually overcome the risk of annihilation by the regular
practice and application of the strategy of overcoming through yielding, or simply, speculative politics.

The application of the strategy of overcoming through yielding presently unfolding on the world stage seems to be progress towards this end, even though that progress is often dreadfully obscured by the furious pace of events and the imminent threat of widespread conflict and suffering. Just as the collapse of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989 was heralded in the West as the beginning of the "death of Communism," the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 was jubilantly seized upon as the final confirmation or proof of this idea. From the standpoint of speculative politics, this reaction, although predictable, represents a complete failure on the part of Western leaders and observers to know either the system of those whom they regarded as their mortal enemies until a short time ago, or the profound contradiction which existed between that system and the principle it claimed to be based upon. It also, therefore, represents a potentially disastrous failure on the part of these leaders and observers to understand their own system, as demonstrated by their perplexity over the economic, social and political crisis the Western world now finds itself in, despite its victory in the Cold War and the emergence of a 'new world order' based on the values of Western bourgeois democracy.

According to Marx, the, so-called, father of modern Communism: "Communism is ... not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from premises now in existence,"3 viz. the relationships and forces of capitalism. This immediately distinguishes Marx's concept of communism from the Communism of the former Soviet Union, and the predominant perceptions of communism in the West. First, communism, according to Marx, is not a motionless thing, fact, or institution. In short, it is neither a state, nor a State, both of which imply a condition of equilibrium, and, therefore, an overriding tendency towards inertia. Rather, communism, for Marx, is a movement, in which both states and States arise and pass away. Second, communism is not a utopian ideal, which individuals, or parties can attempt to impose on society from above. Rather, it is a movement that must arise out of society in the broadest sense of the word. Third, communism is both a negative and a logical movement, but not in the Aristotelian sense, which, as we have already seen in the Introduction, involves the position and logic of abstract power. Rather, it is negative and logical in the sense of speculative logic. Finally, communism requires the existence of capitalism in a given time and place, before it can occur in that time and place. Communism, therefore, is the movement of capitalism itself; or, as Marx puts it in Capital: "capitalist production begets ... its own negation."4 Communism, therefore, represents the self-transcendence, or self-negation and self-preservation of capitalism, which explains why even Russian revolutionaries at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, were so concerned to determine whether or not Russia could yet be considered a capitalist state. Indeed, Lenin
himself originally argued that Russia would have to undergo a full capitalist transformation before communism could become a real possibility in that country. For, whereas the Industrial Revolution had already established vigorous capitalist economies in most of the countries of Western Europe, as well as the United States and Japan, by the mid to late 19th century, Russia was still in the grip, albeit tenuous, of feudal absolutism at the beginning of the 20th century.

Be that as it may, Marx demonstrates quite clearly throughout his work that capitalism cannot produce its own negation as communism, until it has reached a specific level of development as the universal mode of production and consumption. This does not mean capitalism as a mere series of similar, but largely separate, capitalist economies existing in every state throughout the world. For a series as such is no more universal than one of its units. Rather, it means that within one wholly integrated system, or world economy, in which every state exists, plays a part and is an accurate reflection of the whole. Without the fulfilment of this essential condition, Marx himself concluded long before the contemporary collapse of European Communism: "1) communism could not exist as a local event," which means as a relatively isolated and primitive form of social, political and economic intercourse, in comparison to the dominant form of intercourse, viz. capitalism; "2) the forces of [capitalist] intercourse themselves could not have developed as universal, hence intolerable powers," which people and States would seek to overthrow by means of revolution - (in fact, quite the opposite, the absence of these forces in certain regions and States of the world dominated, but not yet completely integrated by them, would create an intolerable condition, which people and States would seek to overthrow by means of revolution, war, or both, as we are presently witnessing); and "3) each extension of [capitalist] intercourse would abolish local communism," which would itself be seen as the cause of the intolerable condition in those regions and States not yet fully integrated by the capitalist forces of intercourse. It is obvious, therefore, that Marx at least would not have been at all surprised by the failure and disintegration of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Indeed, he probably would have seen it as more or less inevitable, given that the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a relatively isolated event, which did not immediately result from the need to overthrow a mature system of international capitalist production, but rather, from the need to overthrow the vestiges of feudal absolutism in a country that had only just begun to enter into serious conflict with the infant capitalist forces emerging within its own borders, and the more mature, but by no means unified, or, therefore, universal, capitalist forces in Europe, America and Japan. According to Marx, "if [the] material elements of a complete revolution are not present ..., then, as far as practical development is concerned, it is absolutely immaterial whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves." It proved it in Marx's time. It proved it in 1917, and it proved it again in 1991. It does not prove, however, that communism is dead, or, therefore, that capitalism is alive and well. On the contrary, as a consequence and product of the self-determination and universalization of capitalism, communism's potential to overcome capitalism would seem to exponentially increase with the breakdown of its initial exclusion from and of
capitalism, a breakdown which, according to the basic principle of speculative politics, must at first appear as the "triumph of Capitalism" and, therefore, the "death of Communism," but only communism as a local event.

Capital, then, which Marx referred to as, "the all-dominating economic power" of the society grounded upon capitalism,\(^8\) may indeed appear to be uncontested in the international arena at the moment, "tearing down all obstacles that impede the development of productive forces, the expansion of needs, the diversity of production and the exploitation and exchange of natural and intellectual forces."\(^9\) However, this is precisely the necessary condition for capital revealing itself as the primary "barrier to production, and therefore also to consumption, quite apart from [the] other contradictions, [e.g. national boundaries, prejudices, etc.,] which make it appear as a burdensome barrier to production and commerce."\(^10\) For, although "production founded upon capital,"\(^11\) even a universal form of capital, has its limits, which lead to all of the various curbs placed on production and distribution in capitalism, production in general or human production, which is what Marx's concept of communism is all about, is not limited. It is infinite. From the standpoint of speculative politics, therefore, it would be naive at best to simply dismiss communism off-hand as something dead and gone, especially in light of the gross social, political and economic inequities which still exist between individuals, nations and States, and which will only continue to stand out even more starkly in a system of triumphant universal capitalism. Furthermore, if anything actually represents the "death of Communism" it was and still is those communist countries under the domination of their respective Communist Parties and attendant bureaucratic colossi, which by their very nature as hierarchical organizations are the embodiments of abstract power and the moral standpoint. The collapse of these systems, therefore, is as much a liberation for the concept of communism from the tomb of its torturous imprisonment, as it is for the different peoples who have suffered and continue to suffer under it.

B. The Radical Objectivity &

Rational Historicity of Speculative Politics

Does speculative politics' unwillingness to dismiss the concept of communism mean that its standpoint is necessarily 'left wing', as many critics will no doubt charge?

The standpoint of speculative politics is ultimately neither 'left wing', nor 'right wing'. For not only does it see the limitations inherent in the positions represented by these poles of the political spectrum, it also sees that 'left' and 'right wing' politics are simply products of abstract power's quantitative illusion of qualitative diversity, and, therefore, something to be overcome or transcended. This of course does not mean that speculative politics is something neutral. For, contrary to our
modern belief, *nothing is ever really neutral.* Nothing is ever really neutral, because the notion of objectivity's neutrality ultimately derives from the category of indifference, which is itself based on the assumption of an underlying substratum of being, e.g. matter, that is indifferent to its external manifestations, or rather, to the determinations which make it appear as difference, e.g. the forms of matter. In this substratum, which is equivalent to what we have already encountered as absolute being, all things are supposedly equal or the same. This means that there is ultimately no real difference in the universe at all, e.g. *everything is matter;* and where there is no difference, indifference is absolute. Absolute indifference, however, can be anything but indifferent. For such indifference is ultimately self-indifference, or the *indifference to indifference,* which necessarily gives rise to difference, difference being precisely what is indifferent to indifference.

Ordinary science has attempted to maintain the illusion of neutrality or indifference under the guise of 'scientific objectivity', often with tragic consequences for both the planet and its inhabitants. Generally speaking, ordinary science does this by arguing that the substratum, which it generally holds to be the ultimate objective truth, i.e. matter, is indifferent to its external manifestations or determinations, precisely because of their externality. In other words, the form of things is not considered *essential* to the existence of the matter which constitutes their content. However, as should be clear to even the most ordinary scientist, such indifference is *dependent indifference,* and thus not really indifferent at all. For, in order to be indifferent, the substratum or content, i.e. matter, must have something to be *indifferent to,* viz. its external manifestations or determinations, its form. Otherwise, it becomes absolute indifference or the indifference to indifference, which, as we just saw, begets the self-negation of indifference, which is difference. Dependent indifference, however, is equally self-negating, since what appears to be *unessential to* the substratum is actually *essential to* its existence as indifferent. Once again then, this means that the substratum or content, i.e. matter, is not really indifferent at all, but is itself essentially difference, and, therefore, ultimately just another external manifestation or determination. In short, the substratum, content, matter, or whatever else we might call it, is just another form (*SL I* 394-98).

This does not mean, however, that difference is absolute, or, therefore, that the standpoint of speculative politics is an uncompromising ethical, cultural, historical, or scientific relativism. For this would certainly be contrary to its espoused ground and methodology, viz. the unity of opposites and dialectic, both of which, as we have already seen, require the recognition of absolutes as reciprocally conditioning elements in a single living totality. Furthermore, relativism depends as much upon a fundamental indifference between the various objects that constitute the universe, and in the subjects observing them, as it does upon their difference, i.e. consistent relativism judges everything as being of equal value, or, therefore, equally value free. Thus, relativism is a product of that very understanding which is responsible for the modern notion of 'scientific objectivity', and which is opposed by the actual science of speculative politics, viz. abstract power and the moral
standpoint.

How then may the standpoint of speculative politics be classified?

Insofar as it needs to be classified at all, the standpoint of speculative politics' is *radically objective*. This simply means that it seeks to know things, i.e. phenomena, people, conditions, relations, systems, etc., at their root and comprehensively, and, *through this process*, to determine the most rational course of action for everyone and everything. In this respect then, the standpoint of speculative politics is perfectly consonant with the spirit of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "Hitherto philosophy has only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." 12 Mere change, however, is not necessarily rational. The standpoint of speculative politics, therefore, must be further defined as *rationally historical*, and this determination of speculative politics' standpoint is perhaps best expressed by Hegel's infamous declaration that: "What is *rational* is *actual*, and what is *actual* is *rational*" (PR 10 [MI]). Although this statement has been continually seized upon by critics as evidence of what even Marx considered Hegel's "uncritical positivism," 13 and, therefore, his lurking conservatism, if not fascism, no charge, as should by now be clear, could be more groundless. Indeed, the fact that it has been made, and continues to receive a hearing, can only be attributed to either an irrational suspicion or hatred of speculative knowledge and the absolute freedom which constitutes its essence and aim, or the ignorance of those who would sooner become the pawns of such suspicion and hatred than risk the pain of thinking and judging for themselves. Nevertheless, I shall attempt to briefly explain what has already been argued by more accomplished thinkers than myself, in the hope that it will shed new light on an old problem. 14

What is rational is what is *absolutely necessary*. What is absolutely necessary, however, is neither the simple necessity of immediate existence, i.e. the fact, nor the formal necessity of the understanding which attempts to merely reflect the simple necessity of this existence, e.g. as empiricism, or impose its own form of ideal necessity upon it when it has realized that the simple necessity of immediate existence is an empty appearance, e.g. as subjective idealism (HSL 552-53). This is because "what is simply necessary, [viz. immediate existence,] only is because it is" (HSL 552). In other words, it is conditionless and groundless (HSL 552), and thus *in itself* devoid of all reason. What is simply necessary, therefore, is actually *purely contingent*, or what occurs only by chance (HSL 541-43), which is why the thought that gives up merely trying to be a reflection of the simple necessity of immediate existence can and does *attempt* to impose its own purely ideal or formal necessity upon it. This formal necessity, however, is equally illusory, or self-negating, since, by its own admission, there is no relationship of mutual necessity between it and the existence that is supposed to constitute its content, i.e. formal logic and its material content, as we have already seen, are indifferent to one another. Realism, or crude materialism, therefore, becomes equally crude, or subjective idealism. Realism sees only what *is*, and subjective idealism, only what *ought to be*. Neither, however, see that
the former is only possible because of the latter, and that the latter only becomes a reality in and through the former. What is, therefore, is just as much the existence of the potential to become, not anything, but certainly something new, as what ought to be is the essence of everything that is real. What does not have this ideality, this real potential within itself, as its essence, is not real. For without such potential, it is dead, though even death implies that this potential was at one time present, since life, regardless of its level of development, is simply the infinite demonstration of potential, i.e. the potential for more life, or the demonstration of the infinite potential of thought and being. Without such potential, therefore, there is nothing, not even death, although even this, as we have already seen in Chapter 4, is logically impossible, since absolute nothingness is a self-negating void that contains the potential for something other than itself within itself, viz. being. What is absolutely necessary, therefore, is the explicit, and thus completely self-conscious unity of simple necessity and formal necessity, of reality and ideality, of is and ought, and this unity is precisely what constitutes the actual for all speculative knowledge, including, or especially speculative politics.

When Hegel talks about the rationality of the actual and the actuality of the rational, therefore, he is neither rationalizing the status quo, nor attempting to secure the position of the dominant form of rationality at a given time, as he is so often accused. In other words, he is not declaring an end to the process of change and development identified with history. On the contrary, he is making an appeal for, and offering the key to, authentic, qualitative, or rather, revolutionary change and development. In short, Hegel is arguing for progress,\(^{15}\) which may be vaguely and provisionally defined here as, the logical movement in which "an end whose content is determinate" is realized (PH 127). "And we have made it clear from the outset what this end is: it is the [life of] Spirit in its essential nature, i.e. as the concept, [or knowledge] of [human] freedom" (PH 127). I realize that progress is an unfashionable idea these days, especially among the ideologically elect, who, at least, since 1991, fancy themselves living in the post-historical era, and the disenchanted, who, for one reason or another, believe that humanity, despite tremendous changes, has not advanced one iota, socially, politically, or ethically, since it first emerged from a 'State of Nature'. However, it is, as I hope we have seen, an idea that is theoretically and practically undeniable, especially if we are to make anything of our existence whatsoever, i.e. render thought, existence, etc., determinate.

It is true that Hegel does away with at least the idea of history as an external process of contingency, i.e. as a process which is merely the by-product of the largely accidental interaction of individuals, nations and States, and, therefore, which seems to be something that merely happens to most individuals, nations and States - but then history itself always seems to be attempting to do away with itself as just such a process, in that every new interrelationship, whether inclusive, or exclusive, is in some way formalized and preserved, so that the world now appears a very small place indeed. Regardless, for Hegel, purely external history is irrational history, and it is irrational, simply because:

a) it is a predominantly accidental process, or rather, a series of what are essentially accidents, in which
progress is something merely implicit; and b) this series exists in opposition - often deadly - to those supposedly rational beings responsible for making it, i.e. external or irrational history is a state of continual crisis, which is simply a superfluous reification or abstraction of the necessary principle of contradiction. Hegel, therefore, quite properly regards it as an imperative to overcome this history and all of its effects, including, or especially, I would argue - though not here - the State. Indeed, this is why he explicitly presupposes a full knowledge of speculative logic at the start of the Philosophy of Right (PR 1-2), and why, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, he makes it plain that the human "mind must pass beyond" the "realization of the Notion of objective mind," which "is achieved only in the State," to "the standpoint of absolute mind, i.e. of art, religion and philosophy" (PM 22:385). By demanding that philosophy or Science begin with the actual in its study of the entire human and natural universe, and that it never seek to be more than the comprehension of the world that exists at the time this study begins (PR 10-11), he is neither cutting Science off from the past, nor shutting its door to the future. For then there would be no present from which to begin. Instead, he is simply acknowledging that yielding is the first essential step in any overcoming, no matter how humble or grand that overcoming may be. History must become internal for those who make it, even when it seems to be external. Otherwise, neither the product, the process, nor the producer can ever be said to be actually rational. History too, therefore, must eventually become a moment in the totality which is the life of Spirit, and this totality can never really be static or inert, since movement and the mastery of change, i.e. progress, are precisely where it finds its most complete and satisfying rest. As Heraclitus says: "It rests by changing."16 History, however, can only become an explicit moment of this totality, when speculative politics becomes a regular practice for a significant portion of humanity. Until that time, therefore, those who would seek mastery of change on an individual basis, which of course is an essential moment in speculative politics being and becoming the practice of humanity, or a truly human practice, may draw strength from the following words: "those who master change are those who address themselves to the time. For those who address themselves to the time, even danger is safe; for those who master change, even disturbance is orderly."17

C. Speculative Politics & Principled Negotiation

Does our time contain and recognize any methods, other than Hegel's, that will allow individuals to make the universal practice of speculative politics a reality?

Until recently, I did not think so. However, I was wrong, and, although I am by no means an expert in the field, I will attempt to briefly explain what I now see as one of the most promising practical methods for transcending abstract power and the moral standpoint, and thus realizing speculative politics, in the world today. The field is that of conflict management and resolution, and the method is one of the relatively new forms of creative, non-adversarial negotiation known as principled negotiation. Principled negotiation, 'negotiating on the merits', or 'win-win bargaining', as it is often
referred to in the popular jargon of business and politics, was formally originated by Roger Fisher and William Ury at the Harvard Negotiation Project in the 1980's. It is basically a creative and collaborative, problem-solving approach to conflict based on the notion of mutual gain, which developed out of various techniques, such as the One-Text Procedure, used by the United States to negotiate an agreement between Egypt and Israel, during the Camp David Peace Talks in 1978. As Fisher and Ury describe in their first work on principled negotiation, Getting to Yes: "The one-text procedure is of great help for two-party negotiations involving a mediator. It is almost essential for large multilateral negotiations. One hundred and fifty nations, for example, cannot constructively discuss a hundred and fifty different proposals. Nor can they make concessions contingent upon mutual concessions by everybody else."\(^{18}\)

The One-Text Procedure is a relatively basic, but effective, method of involving all of the various conflicting parties in the process of inventing a resolution, without asking them to either put forward, or abandon their positions, and of simplifying what could easily become an unmanageable complex decision-making process. It more or less involves seven general steps. First, one inquires into the interests of the various parties, rather than their positions. In other words, one seeks out the reasons why the various parties in a conflict need and desire the things which may cause them to adopt a relatively fixed position. Thus, there is no need to ask any of the parties to either give up, or put forth their positions. Second, one lists all of the parties' expressed interests. Third, one submits the list to the parties for their criticisms and suggested improvements. Fourth, one constructs a provisional plan for satisfying these various interests within existing constraints, e.g. economic, technological, logistical, etc. Fifth, one submits the plan to the various parties for criticism and suggested improvements as many times as necessary until there appears to be no more room for immediate improvement. Sixth, one recommends a final version of the plan. Seventh, the parties decide either yes, or no.\(^{19}\)

As we can see, the end of the One-Text Procedure is still an 'either/or', and thus dualistic or bivalent, decision. However, the process leading up to that decision is an essentially synthetic or multivalent one, in accord with the basic principle of speculative politics, viz. the unity of opposites. Furthermore, it should be clear by now that speculative politics' principle does not, indeed, cannot, simply be a choice between the dualistic principle, 'A or not-A', and the multivalent principle, 'A and not-A', since this would simply be a confirmation of the ultimate truth of the law of the excluded middle, rather than the unity of opposites - even though it would superficially appear as a confirmation of the latter. Instead, the unity of opposites demands the following formulation, viz. 'A or not-A and A and not-A'. This of course means, as we saw in the last chapter, that there will always be a moment of dualism or bivalence in any movement or process, but that this moment is transcended in the process as a whole, or rather, progress of the whole. This becomes clearer in the method of principled negotiation, which represents an advancement upon the simple One-Text Procedure, and, as we shall
see shortly, comes much closer to explicitly recognizing the unity of opposites as its fundamental principle and ground.

Principled negotiation, as Fisher and Ury develop it, begins with the recognition that conflict has become "a growth industry" in the modern world, and, therefore, that negotiation, if it has not always been, has become "a fact of life." They are not really concerned to go into the reasons for either the growth of conflict, or the need for negotiation, other than to make a few very general observations about people differing, wanting to participate more and more in the decisions affecting their lives, being less willing to accept decisions dictated by another and having to use negotiation "to handle their differences ... and reach most decisions." This is certainly a limitation in their work, which, as we shall see, is expressly inconsistent with the method that they are concerned to develop, i.e. insofar as the first question that the method of principled negotiation demands be asked and answered when one is confronted with an opponent, and, therefore, a conflict is, "Why?". However, they are concerned to pass themselves off as 'hard-headed pragmatists' in order to appeal to the modern age's apparent prejudice for realism in politics and business, and, thereby, transform this prejudice. For, even though they claim to be offering "practical, not moral, advice," in their various works on 'principled' negotiation, it should quickly become clear to even the least philosophically inclined reader that the ideal dimension is equally present in and important to their work and the practice of principled negotiation. This would be true if for no other reason than that they generally posit the ultimate source of conflict "not in objective reality, but in people's heads." As stated above, conflict, for Fisher and Ury, is a result - though not necessarily a consequence - of the differences between people, and these differences supposedly exist in and because of thought. Indeed, this is why in principled negotiation, like speculative politics: "Understanding the other side's thinking is not simply a useful activity that will help you solve your problem." Rather, it is absolutely essential. Although Fisher and Ury's own reasoning, from the standpoint of speculative politics, seems unnecessarily subjective and one-sided on this issue, they are more or less correct when they conclude: "Their, [viz. the other side's,] thinking is the problem. Whether you are making a deal or settling a dispute, differences are defined by the difference between your thinking and theirs. ... Truth is simply one more argument ... for dealing with the difference. The difference itself exists because it exists in their thinking."

Be that as it may for the moment, Fisher and Ury define negotiation in general as "a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared, [i.e. identical,] and others that are opposed." However, as they observe, most of our 'standard strategies of negotiation' do not seem to be very effective in facilitating either this communication, or its aim, and often seem to simply compound, rather than resolve, conflicts. This is basically because people see negotiation as matter of taking up a position, arguing for it, and making "concessions to reach a compromise."
Fisher and Ury aptly call this general method of negotiation, *positional bargaining*. The fundamental problem with positional bargaining is exactly the same as that with abstract power and the moral standpoint, i.e. it is inherently static, which means, therefore, that it is also inherently antagonistic. As Fisher and Ury say: "When negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock themselves into those positions. The more you clarify your position and defend it against attack, the more committed you become to it. The more you try to convince the other side of the impossibility of changing your opening position, the more difficult it becomes to do so. Your ego becomes identified with your position." Indeed, given the purely positivistic conception of identity and the self one has as a result of abstract power and the moral standpoint, one's ego cannot help but be identified with one's position. For, as we have already seen throughout this work, being necessarily implies presence, and presence necessarily implies position, i.e. being here, being there, or, in the case of God and the modern subject, being everywhere. In other words, the predominant standpoint of the modern world only allows for self-determination by means of adopting and occupying one or a series of positions, and, therefore, communication by means of positional bargaining.

In *Getting to Yes*, Fisher and Ury go on to describe how positional bargaining "becomes a contest of will" between what are more like combatants waging war by more indirect means than the application of brute physical force, than negotiators seeking agreement, and, therefore, how positional bargaining "creates incentives that stall settlement," as well as breeds "anger and resentment," all of which endanger and often destroy the relationship, such as it is, between the two parties. "In positional bargaining you try to improve the chance that any settlement reached is favourable to you by starting with an extreme position, by stubbornly holding to it, by deceiving the other party as to your true views, and by making small concessions only as necessary to keep the negotiation going. The same is true of the other side." Thus, each side tends to neutralize the other, delaying the movement towards a possible agreement or resolution even further. This process also produces a proliferation of individual decisions which appear to be increasingly crucial to the outcome and existence of the negotiations, since each move involves a counter-move designed to increase the security of one's own position, while rendering the other's position more vulnerable. "Dragging one's feet, threatening to walk out, stonewalling, and other such tactics, [therefore,] become commonplace. They all increase the time and costs of reaching agreement as well as the risk that no agreement will be reached at all." As already stated, this proliferation of decisions makes multilateral negotiations virtually impossible. Consequently, most multilateral negotiations, such as those in the United Nations, break down into bilateral negotiations, if they do not break down completely; i.e. parties tend to form coalitions, which must then agree on a common position, and such a position is even less likely to reflect the substantive interests of all of the parties constituting the coalition, than were these parties' individual positions. "What is worse, once they have painful developed an agreed upon position, it becomes much harder to change it."

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According to Fisher and Ury, positional bargaining not only produces dualism or bivalence, but is itself bivalent. In other words, there are two kinds of positional bargaining, and most "standard negotiating strategies fall somewhere between" these two extremes. They are soft and hard positional bargaining. The soft bargainer is concerned with creating and maintaining the relationship. "Instead of seeing the other side as adversaries, they prefer to see them as friends. Rather than emphasizing a goal of victory, they emphasize the necessity of reaching agreement." As a result, he or she "wants to avoid personal conflict and so makes concessions readily in order to reach agreement." However, even though the soft bargainer desires "an amicable resolution," the adversarial nature of positional bargaining in general tends to favour the hard bargainer, so that the soft bargainer usually "ends up exploited and feeling bitter," or "producing a sloppy agreement," or both. Whichever, the concessionary nature of soft bargaining means that many genuine issues go unaddressed or unresolved. The fundamental determination of the soft positional bargainer is what we examined in Hegel's system as the category of being-for-other, which is the essential determination of the slave in the master/slave relationship.

In contrast to the soft bargainer, the hard bargainer willingly embraces the adversarial nature of positional bargaining. As Fisher and Ury describe: "The hard negotiator sees any situation as a contest of wills in which the side that takes the more extreme positions and holds out longer fares better. He [or she] wants to win," and either does not care about, or does not think about the relationship with the other side - at least not until it is too late. Hard bargainers will "demand concessions as a condition of the relationship." They will never trust the other side. They will entrench their position, "make threats," 'deceive' the other side as to their 'bottom line', constantly attack the other sides position, or person, or both, "demand one-sided gains as the price of agreement," search for the right answer for themselves alone, and so on. In short, the hard bargainer is a being-for-self, and as such shares the same fundamental determination as the master in Hegel's system. Consequently, the hard bargainer produces "an equally hard response, which exhausts him [or her] and his [or her] resources and harms his [or her] relationship with the other side," or eventually destroys that relationship.

The alternative to positional bargaining's dualism is principled negotiation's multilateral, or, what I would describe as, speculative approach. As Fisher and Ury say in the Introduction to Getting to Yes:

"There is a third way to negotiate, a way neither hard nor soft, but rather both hard and soft. The method of principled negotiation ... is to decide issues on their merits rather than through a haggling process focused on what each side says it will and won't do. It suggests that you look for mutual gains whenever possible, and that where your interests conflict, you should insist that the result be based on some fair standards independent of the [individual] will of either side. The method of principled negotiation is hard on the merits, soft on the people." They then go on to describe
principled negotiation as "an all-purpose strategy," which "can be used whether there is one issue or several; two parties or many; ... a prescribed ritual, as in collective bargaining, or an impromptu free-for-all, as in talking with hijackers." As we can already see then, principled negotiation presupposes the fundamental principle of speculative politics, rather than that of abstract power and the moral standpoint. For, as we have already seen throughout this work, only the unity of opposites can allow for an all-purpose strategy which is simultaneously hard and soft, multilateral in nature, of use for immediate and mediated application and, most importantly, capable of realistically conceiving of the possibility of mutual gain.

The speculative foundations of principled negotiation become even clearer as Fisher and Ury define the four basic components of this method. These components are as follows: "(1) Separate[ing] the people from the problem; (2) Focus[ing] on interests, not positions; (3) Generate[ing] a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do; (4) Insist[ing] that the result [of the negotiations] be based on some objective standard." The first component begins from the recognition that human beings are creatures of emotion as well as 'rational' thought, and, therefore, that it is as important to satisfy their emotional needs as it is their intellectual ones. For even the most seemingly objective solutions to a problem can be undone or overwhelmed by subjective factors. As we already know, this is very compatible with the position of Hegel, for whom feeling and thought are not different or separate aspects of human nature, but rather, one aspect at different levels of development. This recognition enables one to see that any negotiation involves two problems which must be effectively addressed, not simply one. Obviously, there is the substantive problem which the negotiation is meant to resolve. However, there is also the personal dimension, or, what Fisher and Ury call, "the people problem." As they say: "A basic fact about negotiation, easy to forget ..., is that you are not dealing with abstract representatives of the 'other side', but with human beings;" and: "Failing to deal with others sensitively as human beings prone to human reactions can be disastrous for a negotiation." Once it is recognized that every negotiation is a concrete process in which there are in fact two problems, then one can distinguish between and attend equally to both, so that they do not become entangled and interfere with one another. Instead, they should be made to compliment each other. As Fisher and Ury argue: "Dealing with a substantive problem and maintaining a good working relationship need not be conflicting goals if the parties are committed and psychologically prepared to treat each separately on its own legitimate merits. Base the relationship on accurate perceptions, clear communication, appropriate emotions, and a forward-looking, purposive outlook. Deal with people problems directly; don't try to solve them with substantive concessions."

Their advice for dealing with the personal dimension falls under three categories which we shall just briefly touch upon, but which are perhaps most indicative of the compatibility between principled negotiation and speculative politics. They are perception, emotion and communication. Although an individual's perception of a situation may be false, unless they can be persuaded that that perception
is false, it can and will in all probability still determine, or, at least, significantly affect their actions. Hence, perceptions, even false ones, are real powers which must be reckoned with, and which, to some extent, are therefore true. People will, as was pointed out throughout this work, go to war over their perceptions, convictions, etc., no matter how much the other side may deny their legitimacy and truth. Furthermore, it is more likely that what is judged to be a false, is so only from the one-sided perception of the other side. Thus, as Fisher and Ury point out: "As useful as looking for objective reality can be, it is ultimately as each side sees it that constitutes the problem in a negotiation and opens the way to a solution."55 Or rather, objective reality is not constituted by the perception of one side or the other, but rather, by that of both or all of the sides. This means that "one the most important skills a negotiator can possess" is precisely that skill afforded by speculative politics, and excluded by abstract power and the moral standpoint, viz. the ability to become the other, or, as Fisher and Ury describe it, "to see the situation as the other side sees it."56 As in speculative politics, Fisher and Ury mean neither mere formal knowledge of the other, nor complete identification with that other. For, as we have already seen, particularly in Chapter 5, neither is really a becoming, not a real becoming. For becoming involves both the preservation of one's identity in difference and of the differences in identity, both one's own and the other's. This is why Fisher and Ury claim that: "It is not enough to know that they see things differently. If you want to influence them, you also need to understand empathetically the power of their point of view and to feel the emotional force with which they believe in it. It is not enough to study them like beetles under a microscope; you need to know what it feels like to be a beetle. To accomplish this task you should be prepared to withhold judgement for a while as you 'try on' their views."57 Then, as they add further on: "Understanding their point of view is not the same as agreeing with it. It is true a better understanding of their thinking may lead you to revise your own views about the merits of a situation. But that is not a cost of understanding their point of view, it is a benefit. It allows you to reduce the area of conflict, and it also helps you advance your newly enlightened self-interest."58 This means that perceptions on both sides must eventually be made explicit and discussed in as open and honest a way as possible, which also means that both parties must be involved in as much of the process of resolving the conflict as possible from the beginning. For both the process and the product must eventually belong equally to both sides.59

Such discussion facilitates both the second and third categories for dealing effectively with the personal dimension of negotiations, i.e. emotions and communication. As we have already noted, it is essential to recognize the importance of human emotion in any negotiation, particularly since many negotiations involve the existence or possibility of real conflict. As Fisher and Ury point out: "The parties may be more ready for battle than for cooperatively working out a solution to a common problem. People often come to a negotiation realizing that the stakes are high and feeling threatened. Emotions on one side will generate emotions on the other. ... Emotions may quickly bring a negotiation to an impasses or an end."60 Then of course there are the emotions of the constituents of
the various negotiators which must also be taken into consideration. For they are the ones who the negotiators are ultimately answerable to, and who will have to live with the resolution. Fisher and Ury's advice, therefore, is not to keep these emotions suppressed, at least not completely, for there are moments when this is necessary, e.g. to prevent or defuse an unnecessary escalation of emotional reactions. Rather, they recommend that emotions be made explicit and acknowledged as legitimate. "Talk with people on the other side about their emotions. Talk about your own. ... Making your feelings or theirs an explicit focus of discussion will not only underscore the seriousness of the problem, it will also make the negotiations less reactive and more 'pro-active'. Freed from the burden of unexpressed emotions, people will become more likely to work on the problem."

With regard to the third category in dealing with the personal dimension of negotiations, viz. communication, the importance of open and honest discussion is virtually self-evident. For, as Fisher and Ury correctly state: "Without communication there is no negotiation. Negotiation is a process of communicating back and forth for the purpose of reaching a joint decision." Most of the problems in negotiations, however, come from an inability, or unwillingness of the parties involved to engage in genuinely reciprocal communication, which, according to Fisher and Ury, involves, at the very least, speaking to each other to be understood, not playing to a third party or 'gallery', listening attentively to what the other side is saying, and thus granting their case legitimacy and demonstrating that you are following it. As Fisher and Ury re-emphasize: "Understanding is not [necessarily] agreeing. One can at the same time understand perfectly and disagree completely with what the other side is saying. But unless you can convince them that you do grasp how they see it, you may be unable to explain your viewpoint to them." As in speculative politics, in principled negotiation one should be able to put the other side's case as well as, or better than they do themselves. For, as said in the Introduction, refutation is essentially a process of derivation or development from what is being refuted. Furthermore, as Fisher and Ury note: "If you can put their case better than they can, and then refute it, you maximize the chance of initiating a constructive dialogue on the merits and minimize the chance of their believing you have misunderstood them."

The second component of principled negotiation, viz. 'focusing on interests, rather than positions', is very closely related to the first. For, as Fisher and Ury note, interests are usually the true determinants of the substantive problem in a negotiation. As they say in *Getting to Yes*: "The basic problem lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns and fears. ... Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide."

Indeed, this is why positional bargaining makes conflict management and resolution so difficult, i.e. both parties come to the negotiation with a predetermined resolution in mind when in fact their task should be to find or construct a resolution together; and why it is ultimately opposed to the notion of negotiation in general, the task of which is to serve, not obstruct, one's interests. One of the first and foremost things that must be done in any negotiation, therefore, is to make oneself aware...
of one's own interests and to inquire as to the other side's. This will often mean uncovering the interests underlying predetermined positions, which is the reason that in principled negotiation the questions 'why?' and 'why not?' are the two most important conceptual tools one can have at their disposal.

Uncovering both one's own and the other side's underlying interests by asking 'why?' and 'why not?' when confronted by opposed positions will usually reveal a number of very important things. First, one realizes that "each side has multiple interests," and, therefore, that these interests vary in nature, importance, etc., which can greatly increase one's room for manoeuvre in negotiations. Second, one also discovers that among this multiplicity of interests many will be shared by both sides and many will be compatible. The discovery of shared interests, of course, can immediately and significantly reduce the field of conflict over positions. Different interests do not necessarily conflict, and may even be compatible, which can provide an incentive to reach agreement. Fisher and Ury use the example of children fighting over an orange to illustrate this. There is conflict over who gets the orange until it is discovered that one child wants the peel to use in a recipe, while the other simply wants to consume the fruit. Thus, contrary to the law of non-contradiction, 'A' can serve the varying interests of two different beings, in two different places, at one and the same time from the standpoint of principled negotiation, like that of speculative politics. Be that as it may, both shared and compatible interests provide both parties with common ground to work out the resolution of whatever conflicting interests they may discover in a mutually beneficial or non-destructive way - although it may very well be discovered that they do not have any conflicting interests and that there is not, or never was a real reason to be opposed to one another in the first place. Focusing on the interests rather than positions is extremely compatible with the method of speculative politics, since it demands that negotiators be primarily future, and, therefore, purpose, oriented, rather than causally oriented and reactive. For, although understanding the problem is necessary, solving it is the point. It also requires that you make your interests "come alive for them," and theirs for yourself, i.e. "acknowledge their interests as part of the problem." This means entering into the specific details of both your interests and theirs as speculative politics' strategy of overcoming through yielding demands, and not just surveying them as some vague, abstract whole, as does the formal understanding of abstract power and the moral standpoint. Such a method allows one to be concrete, but at the same time remain fluid and flexible. For interests, unlike positions, are more likely to change in nature and priority, and if one is constantly having to move back and forth between a variety of interests and points of view, one is far more likely to avoid the inertia and reification of positional bargaining. This is why Fisher and Ury demand specificity and concreteness in the application of principled negotiation, yet, at the same, time reject the modern ideal of mathematical precision in attempting to understand, determine, or predict human interests, decisions and the consequences thereof. As for the speculative thinker and contemporary fuzzy theorists then, the world is not simply black and white for the principled negotiator, but infinite shades of grey between black and white extremes which never last. Finally,
focusing on the interests rather than positions means that one can attack the problem without attacking the people. In fact, because one has demonstrated a grasp of, and, therefore, concern for, their interests as well as one's own, one can afford to be supportive of the other side without appearing or being weak. "This combination of support and attack may seem inconsistent. Psychologically, it is; the inconsistency helps make it work. A well known theory of psychology, the theory of cognitive dissonance, holds that people dislike inconsistency and will act to eliminate it. Fighting hard on the substantive issues increases the pressure for an effective solution; giving support to the human beings on the other side tends to improve your relationship and to increase the likelihood of reaching agreement. It is the combination of support and attack which works; either alone is likely to be insufficient."  

The third component of principled negotiation, viz. 'inventing options for mutual gain', is the moment at which speculative politics' principle of yielding, which has priority in the first two components of principled negotiation, begins to reveal itself explicitly as overcoming; or rather, it is the moment at which overcoming begins to have priority over yielding in the process of overcoming through yielding. For this is where the attack on the specific problem begins to become more and more direct, even though it is still a stage in which solutions are still merely possibilities rather than concrete realities. As Fisher and Ury observe: "In most people's minds, inventing simply is not part of the negotiation process. People see their job as narrowing the gap between positions, not broadening the options available. They tend to think, 'We're having a hard enough time agreeing as it is. The last thing we need is a bunch of different ideas'. Since the end product of negotiation is a single decision, they fear that free-floating discussion will only delay and confuse the process." However, nothing could be further from the truth. Inventing options may not only make the difference between reaching agreement and not reaching it. It is also the best way to maximize the result of negotiations. "All too often negotiators 'leave money on the table' ... Too many negotiations end up with half an orange for each side instead of the whole fruit for one and the whole peel for the other." This is because the standard method of negotiation through positional bargaining, as we have already seen, means that the parties come to the table with the 'right answer' already in mind, and, as a result, usually have to end up compromising, i.e. splitting the difference, to produce an agreement.  

To prevent this problem Fisher and Ury advise that one should not come to the negotiating table presupposing that they have the right answer to the problem, or that there is a single right answer to the problem. In keeping with the dialectical nature of thought, ideas usually beget new ideas, and these new ideas may yield solutions never before conceived. Negotiation, therefore, should be looked upon as an essentially open-ended process in which their are many potential answers to a single problem. This prevents the dogmatism which we saw is one of the fundamental consequences of Aristotelian thinking, viz. seeing "the situation as either/or - either I get what is in dispute or you do," and, therefore, the intractable dualism of abstract power and the moral standpoint. Such
thinking usually works from the assumption of a 'fixed pie or sum'. However, as Fisher and Ury note: "Rarely if ever is this assumption true." When one considers the plurality of different interests and priorities that people enter a negotiation with, the sum becomes a more and more ambiguous entity. Recognizing this can reveal that the field of negotiation is in fact much broader than originally believed. Fisher and Ury consider 'brainstorming' to be one of the most effective methods of inventing a multitude of options for mutual gain. This is quite compatible with the method of speculative politics. For, even though Fisher and Ury claim that much of the negotiator's inventing is a solitary affair, brainstorming recognizes and exploits the social nature of thought, i.e. the fact that thought develops itself through a process of exchange with others, or rather, through making itself an other and engaging in a relationship with itself as other. They then offer some fairly sound advice for what they see as the best ways of brainstorming, which we shall not go into here, except to point out that a) the imagination initially should be allowed to work without being inhibited by premature criticism, i.e. suspend judgement in the beginning; b) the problem should be confronted, even physically, not one another; c) the problem should be examined from the perspectives of as many different professions, disciplines and standpoints as possible; d) one should constantly move back and forth between the general and the particular nature of both the problem and its possible solutions; e) one should not necessarily look for final solutions, since provisional agreements often serve people's changing interests better and are generally easier to reach agreement upon; f) one should break a large problem down "into smaller and perhaps more manageable units," which may be easier to agree upon than something that appears large and complex; and g) different interests should be dovetailed wherever and whenever possible, for difference is often what makes mutual gain and agreement possible.

The fourth component of principled negotiation, viz. insisting on the use of objective criteria, is where the ideal dimension of principled negotiation begins to become fully apparent, without sacrificing or denying its practical efficacy and efficiency in the slightest. For it is here that the necessity of what Fisher and Ury refer to as the principles of wisdom and fairness in negotiation is demonstrated; in short, that: "right makes might." As Fisher and Ury concede: "However well you understand the interests of the other side, however ingenuously you invent ways of reconciling interests, however highly you value the ongoing relationship, you will almost always face the harsh reality of interests that conflict." For, even though conflict is for them, as we saw above, essentially a problem of thought, i.e. the difference between one's own thinking and that of the other, as we have also seen throughout this work, thought is and has being in itself, just as being is and has thought in itself. The problems of thought, therefore, are not simply abstract or ideal problems. They are real, often very real problems. Thus, even though it does not always have to exist, for the moment conflict does exist. It is a fact of human life, the ultimate fact of human life in the world of abstract power and the moral standpoint; and, as Fisher and Ury rightly say: "No talk of 'win-win' strategies can conceal that fact." The point is to deal with it on whatever level it is encountered, and to eventually overcome it. This is the aim of both principled negotiation and speculative politics.
As has already been argued throughout this work, and, as we have seen Fisher and Ury argue in theirs, attempting to deal with the fact of conflict by means of abstract power, the moral standpoint, or positional bargaining only compounds this fact. This is basically because such means ultimately attempt to reconcile the differences between the parties based solely on the individual will of each of the parties involved, even if these individuals attempt to conflate their particular will into the absolute, universal will. Such means, therefore, involve very "serious costs" for the parties involved. Indeed, if followed through to their logical conclusion, these means can and do involve the ultimate 'cost' for one or more of the parties involved, viz. annihilation. According to Fisher and Ury, therefore, should merely be interpreted as meaning the 'particular' will of either side, when they say 'criteria independent of the will', and not the human will in general. For the human will in general determines objectivity. This becomes clear even in Fisher's and Ury's work, when they begin to explain what counts as objective criteria, i.e. how a negotiator can develop them, and how one can use them. They provide a number of examples of how to go about finding and developing objective criteria or 'fair standards', by using categories such as, market value, precedent, scientific judgement, professional standards, efficiency, costs, legality, tradition, etc. What all of these have in common, however, is that they must be agreeable to both sides in the negotiation, i.e. both sides must will the existence and use of criteria independent of both their particular wills in the negotiation. In essence, then, the negotiation over the substantive problem presupposes a negotiation over the standards by which the negotiation will be conducted. Indeed, Fisher and Ury recognize this very early on in Getting to Yes, when they say: "The game of negotiation takes place at two levels. At one level, negotiation addresses the substance; at another, it focuses - usually implicitly - on the procedure for dealing with the substance. ... This second negotiation is a game about a game - a 'meta-game'. Each move you make within a negotiation is not only a move that deals with ... substantive questions; it also helps structure the rules of the game you are playing. Your move may serve to keep the negotiations within an ongoing mode, or it may constitute a game-changing move." Their advice in principled negotiation, therefore, is essentially to make this implicit meta-negotiation explicit. For this is the only way both parties have of maintaining control over the negotiating process, and, thereby, ensuring a rational or reasoned result, rather than an arbitrary one.

Once again Fisher and Ury offer a number of basic points of advice on how to discuss objective criteria during a negotiation, which are very compatible with the principle and method of speculative politics.
First, one should "frame each issue as a joint search for objective criteria." This can provide parties who have conflicting interests with a shared goal, e.g. "to determine a fair price." It can also give one important knowledge of the other side's reasoning, and thus provide one with extremely potent instruments of persuasion. As Fisher and Ury say: "your case will have more impact if it is presented in terms of their criteria to the problem. ... What makes conceding particularly difficult is having to accept someone else's proposal. If they suggested the standard, their deferring to it is not an act of weakness but an act of strength, of carrying out their word." This, as we saw in the Introduction, is the essence of the method of speculative politics, i.e. entering upon the enemy's or other's ground, and using that ground to your own best advantage, which means to produce a mutually beneficially solution. Second, one should both "reason and be open to reason." Many people use reason in a purely instrumental way, i.e. to construct their own arguments and criticize their opponent's arguments. However, this is more or less positional bargaining, and, as has already been made clear, opposed to the nature of reason. One can often recognize the illegitimate use of reason, when, for instance, "people begin by announcing that their position is an issue of principle and refuse even to consider the other side's case. It's a matter of principle' becomes a battle cry in a holy war over ideology. Practical differences escalate into principled ones, further locking in the negotiators rather than freeing them." This is positional bargaining masquerading as principled negotiation, but it is not at all principled negotiation. It is false, or abstract principled negotiation. For it recognizes only one standard of legitimacy, one way to the truth, where there are in fact many, or at the very least two, i.e. 'A' and 'not-A'. As Fisher and Ury rightly conclude: "The difference between seeking agreement on the appropriate principles for deciding a matter and using principles simply as arguments to support positions is sometimes subtle, but always significant. A principled negotiators open to reasoned persuasion on the merits; a positional bargainer is not. It is the combination of openness to reason with insistence on a solution based on objective criteria that makes principled negotiation so effective at getting the other side to play." Third, this enables one to make a self-conscious decision to "never yield to pressure, only to principle." This is where principled negotiation becomes like positional bargaining, or rather, it is the moment of position in principled negotiation, which according to the fundamental principle of both speculative politics and principled negotiation, viz. the unity of opposites, must be contained therein. There is a tremendous difference in the position of principled negotiation and that of positional bargaining. The first has reason, right and recognition in general at its core, the latter coercion. It is also more practical. For, as Fisher and Ury point out: "A refusal to yield except in response to sound reasons is an easier position to defend - publicly and privately - than is a refusal to advance sound reasons." Furthermore, it makes it much easier to see the nature of the situation in which one finds oneself. For: "If the other side truly will not budge and will not advance a persuasive basis for their position, then there is no further negotiation. You now have a choice ... You can take it or leave it." If leaving it means having to fight, so be it. For, in a world still dominated by abstract power, it is true that those not prepared
to wage war, are destined to have war waged upon them. It should be remembered, however, that speculative politics teaches that there are many ways to wage war, some direct, some indirect, some rational, some irrational.
Notes


2 See James P. Womack's, Daniel T. Jones' & Daniel Roos', The Machine That Changed The World (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1990), which is based on M.I.T.'s five year study of the international automobile industry, for an excellent analysis of the method of lean production in contrast to mass production, and its projected significance for other industries and the development of the international economy.


8 Marx, Grundrisse, Selected Writings, p. 357.

9 Marx, Grundrisse, Selected Writings, p. 364.

10 Marx, Grundrisse, Selected Writings, p. 365.

11 Marx, Grundrisse, Selected Writings, p. 364.

12 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Selected Writings, p. 158.

13 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Selected Writings, p. 100.


15 See Kojeve, Introduction, p. 164.

16 Heraclitus, Art and Thought, p. 53.


19 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 112-16.


21 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xvii.

22 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 44; Fisher, Kopelman & Schneider, Beyond Machiavelli,

23 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. x.
24 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 22.
26 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 22.
27 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xvii.
28 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xviii.
29 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 3.
30 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 3.
31 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 5. (My italics).
32 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 6.
33 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 6.
34 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 6.
37 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xviii.
38 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xviii.
40 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xviii.
41 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 8.
42 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xviii.
45 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xviii.
46 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. xviii.
48 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 11.
49 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 11 & 19.
51 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 19.
52 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 20.
54 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 22.
55 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 23.
56 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 23.
57 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 23.
60 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 29.
62 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 31-32.
64 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 32.
65 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 32-34.
66 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 35.
67 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 35.
69 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 50.
70 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 44.
71 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 47.
72 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 42. (My italics).
73 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 50-53.
74 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 50-52.
75 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 47.
76 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 55. (My italics).
77 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 59.
78 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 57.
79 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 57.
80 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 59.
81 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 70.
82 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 60.
83 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 60.
84 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 60-71.
85 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 91.
86 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 81.
87 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 81.
88 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 81-82.
89 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 81.
90 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 82.
91 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 85.
92 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 85.
93 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 10.
94 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 88.
95 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 88.
96 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 88-89.
97 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 89.
98 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 89.
99 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 89.
100 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 90.
101 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 91.
102 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, p. 91.
103 Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes, pp. 91-92.
Appendix 1

Self-Consciousness

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel claims that: "With self-consciousness ... we have ... entered the native realm of truth" (*PhS* 104:167). For, with the emergence of self-consciousness from the world of simple determinate being, or mere consciousness, there simply does not appear to be an external other to limit, challenge or contradict a being's position, nor, therefore, any certainty it *may* have in that position at this point (*PhS* 104:166). As we have already seen, such otherness was taken into being, and thus transcended, in the transition from determinate being to being-for-self, or, what is essentially the same thing, in the transition from the modes of consciousness, which grasp the world and consciousness only in terms of the categories of determinate being, to self-consciousness, which is "to begin with, *simple being-for-self" (*PhS* 113:186 [Ml]). Before entering completely into Hegel's analysis of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, however, it is important to grasp two things about self-consciousness. First, there is a distinction between certainty and truth in self-consciousness. This is implied in the introductory paragraph to the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the *Phenomenology*, which comes under the heading, 'The Truth of Self-Certainty', when Hegel says that here, "certainty gives place to truth" (*PhS* 104:166); or rather: 'a certainty [emerges] which is identical with its truth; for the certainty is to itself its own object, [i.e. the certainty of certainty,] and consciousness is to itself the truth" (*PhS* 104:166). This distinction is important, because, what Hegel regards as: "Ordinary thinking does not distinguish between certainty and truth" (*PM* 154:416); and because it seems to imply that certainty somehow precedes truth, which touches directly upon the second important thing regarding self-consciousness, or, more specifically, the relationship between self-consciousness and mere consciousness. For it might seem, particularly from the mode of presentation in the *Phenomenology*, that consciousness, which may be described as, 'the faculty of certainty', rather than truth, also precedes self-consciousness.

According to Hegel, it is necessary to make a distinction between certainty and truth in order to avoid one of the more serious consequences of Cartesian dualism, viz. a correspondence theory of truth. For, even though such a theory constantly seeks the verification of its subjective thought, or ideas by reference to objects, it never attains objectivity itself, which means that its certainty, or truth is never really certain, or true (*PM* 157:416). This is simply because the objects it refers to for verification of its thought are posited as completely external to thought. Thus, what it seems to verify now, it may completely refute later, and, even if not, thought still has no guarantees, since the object, as completely external to it, is ultimately inaccessible to it. It simply does not and cannot know with certainty. Furthermore, "no matter how trivial and bad the content of this subjective thought may be" (*PM* 157:416), i.e. no matter how irrational, as long as it can be verified by reference to some external object, it suddenly ascends to the status of 'truth' - *reason be damned! -* at least for a moment.
Consequently, if thought is to possess any certainty, and knowledge is to be about truth at all, i.e. if both are to have any kind of an existence other than one immediately vanishing in both the theoretical and practical destruction of absolute scepticism, the distinction must be made. As Hegel says in the Philosophy of Mind: "Philosophy ... must essentially distinguish the Notion of truth from mere certainty; for the certainty which mind has of itself at the stage of mere consciousness is something as yet untrue and self-contradictory, since here, along with the abstract certainty of being at home with itself, mind has the directly opposite certainty of being related to something essentially other to it. This contradiction must be resolved; the urge to resolve it lies in the contradiction itself. Subjective certainty must not find itself limited by the object, but must acquire true objectivity; and, conversely, the object, on its side, must become mine not merely in an abstract manner, but with regard to every aspect of its concrete nature" (PM 157:416).

None of this, however, means that mere consciousness, subjective certainty, etc., is prior to self-consciousness, despite Hegel's mode of presentation in both the Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia, and that consciousness, as, so-called, immediate knowledge, i.e. "a knowledge of the immediate, or of what simply is" (PhS 58:90), appears to be antecedent to self-consciousness. On the contrary, for Hegel, self-consciousness enjoys all priority. It is not only the truth of consciousness insofar as it is the immanent content of consciousness, which is realized in the negation and transcendence of consciousness, but also in the fact that mere consciousness is a "consequence of" self-consciousness (PM 165:424). This is simply because "all consciousness of an other object" must occur through, or as a result of one's idea of the object, and, therefore, is ipso facto self-consciousness (PM 165:424). As Hegel says in the Philosophy of Mind: "The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine; and thus in it I am aware of me" (PM 165:424). The object is my idea, because there is no other way of it being for me. It is mine, because, even in its most seemingly remote and exclusive form, it is still a remote and exclusive object for me. Lastly, I am aware of myself in my awareness of it, because otherwise there would be absolutely no difference between me and it, which means that it would not be an object, and I would not be a subject.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that self-consciousness is immediately aware of itself as a self, in the full sense of the term, i.e. as I=I, or as a rational, thinking, human, etc., self. Nor does it mean that mere consciousness needs to be distinguished yet from the objects which appear to constitute the world it is conscious of, i.e. the seemingly unreflective, and, therefore, non-conscious determinations of determinate being. For, as we have already seen in being-for-self, being-for-self, which is the essential determination of self-consciousness, can be said to occur the moment there is a return, or reflection of being, i.e. any being, into itself. Indeed, this is why the category of being-for-self seems as applicable to, or immanent in the atomic realm, as the realms of animal life, which Hegel begins the analysis of self-consciousness with in the Phenomenology, and describes in the Philosophy of Mind as, "incipient being-for-self" (PM 10:381), and human relations, which are what
he is most concerned with deriving, explaining and developing. Furthermore, self-consciousness, insofar as it is itself a form of mere consciousness, i.e. it has consciousness as an object, or is its idea, can just as easily be said to be not distinct from its object, as it is distinct from it. This is why, in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel explains that self-consciousness is a movement of self-differentiation, which results in a difference that is also not a difference. Consequently, self-consciousness is also immediately "the motionless tautology of: I am I" (PhS 105:167), already encountered through out this work, and, therefore, not self-consciousness.

It is not self-consciousness, simply because the difference in and for it can be said not to have being (PhS 105:167). Just as we saw at the beginning of being-for-self with the re-emergence of determinate being then, difference, or otherwise immediately re-emerges for self-consciousness "in the form of a [separate] being, or as a distinct moment" (PhS 105:167). Thus, at first, "self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness, and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it" (PhS 105:167). At the same time, there is, as we see, difference in it, or "there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a second distinct moment" (PhS 105:167). Therefore, there is self-consciousness, for which the seemingly existent world "is only an appearance, or a difference which, in itself, is [actually] no difference" (PhS 105:167), and, therefore, which will allow, or enable self-consciousness to realize for itself, or realize itself as the totality which is not continually slipping back into separation or mere plurality. In any event, Hegel makes it clear that the object, consciousness and self-consciousness are all just as immediately identical, as they are distinct, and that any appearance of priority is just that, an appearance. This is why, in the *Philosophy of Mind*, for instance, he points out that: "what in the sphere of consciousness is only for us who contemplate it, [e.g. philosophers,] becomes in the sphere of self-consciousness for mind itself" (PM 158:417). In other words, the real beginning of all development, which was previously held to be in determinate being, is, or occurs with and in self-consciousness, or being-for-self; and everything that precedes it in the formal structure of Science, i.e. in both the Logic and Phenomenology, is merely a reflection of thought back from this point, and then a movement forward again to self-consciousness and beyond, viz. to Reason and Spirit.

With this said, we can now proceed to Hegel's analysis of the emergence and development of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology. This analysis is crucial to both the development of speculative politics and the critique of the moral standpoint. For, in it, we not only begin to get a much more concrete image of the horror inherent in the moral standpoint, especially as a consequence of what Fichte posited as the irreconcilable opposition between idealism and dogmatism, or egoism and egotism, but we also begin to see in a more concrete fashion, the necessity and application of the strategy of overcoming through yielding, as well as its result, i.e. mutual recognition. Even though this concept of recognition was first introduced by Fichte, in his *Foundations of Natural Law*, or *Science of Rights* (1796), he was unable to provide any more than a superficial description of its
nature and importance (SR 160 & 182). This, as we have already seen, is basically because he cannot derive, maintain, or both, the other, as another object, let alone a self, in his system of Science; or, as Hegel might say, Fichte is unable to account for, or produce "the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness" (PhS 112:185), which is the essence of recognition as such. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in Fichte's Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation (1794), when he asks the following question: "How does a man come to assume that there are rational beings like himself apart from him? And how does he come to recognize them, since they are certainly not immediately present to his pure self-consciousness?" (LSV 153). Once again, if I need simply to assume, or presuppose the existence of rational beings apart from myself, then I can never really be certain of their existence. For, as we have already seen, there is no proof, or necessity in presupposition as such. Furthermore, if I can never really be certain of the existence of other rational beings apart from myself, and if I cannot recognize such beings as both immediately and mediately present in pure self-consciousness, then I am not only uncertain of myself, I cannot be self-conscious. For, as we have already begun to some extent see, there is an essential difference that is also no difference, and vice versa, in self-consciousness. This means that it is immediately an other, e.g. object, consciousness, or self-consciousness, in itself, and, insofar as it both is and knows itself as such an other in itself, the knowledge of other beings, including, or especially self-conscious ones, is just as much immediate, as mediated, and, therefore, essential to self-consciousness.

A. Self-Consciousness as Life & Desire, or the Realm Between Life & Death

The object, consciousness and self-consciousness, as we have seen, are all immediately identical at the beginning of self-consciousness' emergence and development. However, they are also different. They are different for the same reason that we saw with regard to the self-repulsion of the one in being-for-self, i.e. self-consciousness, as an identity, even of itself, must contain a distinction, which, as we saw above, results in the re-appearance of the sensuous world. As Hegel explains, therefore, self-consciousness, as consciousness, or: "Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the immediate object, [i.e.] that of sense-certainty and perception, which however for self-consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second, viz. itself, which is the true essence, and is present in the first instance only as opposed to the first object" (PhS 105:167). In other words, there are two opposed objects, or beings, each negative in themselves and towards the other, at the beginning of self-consciousness. Neither, however, is merely a determinate being. For together, or alone, both are the explicit self-identity of negativity, and, therefore, a reflection into self. Furthermore, determinate being returned into itself, in its passage, or transformation into the infinite, which amounts to the same thing. In the Phenomenology, this corresponds to the third moment of consciousness, viz. the understanding, which negates itself in the infinite play of forces. Regardless, as Hegel says of the first object in self-consciousness: "Through this reflection into itself the object has
become Life" (PhS 106:168), or, more specifically, "a living thing" (PhS 106:168). This is simply because it resists negation, and, therefore, self-consciousness, which must seek the negation of anything that appears to contradict, or negate its pure being-for-self, i.e. what makes it self-consciousness. Determinate being, or the object, therefore, no longer seems to be something passive, or completely subject to an other. Rather, it has force, or something active within itself.

However, what then is self-consciousness, or the second object? For, although it is identical with the first object, it is also opposed by and to it, i.e. it appears as both a different object and a different kind of object. How then is it different from a living thing? Or, what is it, if it is not a living thing?

It would seem absurd to say that the second object, viz. the one that is self-consciousness as such, is a dead thing. For it is also the return of determinate being into itself, and, therefore, the self-reflection of negativity. Furthermore, one's own self-consciousness immediately recoils from, or is repulsed by the notion that what is supposed to be the 'true essence', even or especially of life, is dead, which certainly demonstrates that self-consciousness cannot simply be dead. However, as we shall shortly see, death does constitute an important part of the essence of this second object, or apparent thing. For, insofar as the living thing opposes, or is negative for it, it is not necessarily living, i.e. there is death in it, and insofar as it opposes, or is negative of the living thing, it must cause this thing to nor be alive, or, more specifically, to die. In short, it brings death to the living thing. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the object that contains death within itself, and thus is not completely alive. Nor, however, is it simply dead. For, insofar as it kills the living thing, it is active, or it too contains force. Self-consciousness, therefore, is something both living and dead, or rather, something existing between life and death, i.e. in or on a middle ground.

What is this middle ground that self-consciousness at first occupies, or is?

As Hegel notoriously declares in the Phenomenology: "self-consciousness is desire" (PhS 109:174). It is desire for the living thing (PhS 106:168), which is also a way of saying that self-consciousness is simply a desire for life, i.e. a desire to be, or stay alive, or both. As we shall see shortly, however, self-consciousness is also equally a desire for death. It is a desire for death insofar as it seeks the death of what is living, and insofar as it renders the living thing identical with itself by killing it. As we shall see, therefore, it is also a desire for its own death, or rather, itself as dead. Be that as it may for the moment, what is most important to grasp here is that self-consciousness is not simply 'this' or 'that' particular desire, although it must certainly appear as such in its first moment, but rather, "desire in general" (PhS 105:167 [MI]). In short, it is pure desire. This is, or, at least, will prove to be important. For it is what will finally distinguish self-consciousness, qua desire, from mere animal desire, or rather, what will cause self-consciousness to distinguish itself from such desire. Again, as we shall see shortly, this is simply because pure desire is infinite in its negativity - unlike animal
desire, which is merely indefinite - and, therefore, cannot be satisfied in or by particularity. This means that self-consciousness' activity and development will not necessarily be halted or repelled backward every time it finds some limited satisfaction, as occurs with mere animals. Rather, with each satisfaction, the desire that is or becomes self-consciousness, and vice versa, will have the opportunity to increase in magnitude, and change in quality, i.e. self-consciousness will always desire more and different things.

However, that aside for the moment, there are now two objects, viz. life and desire, both of which, as we have seen, are simple beings-for-self, i.e. insofar as each is intro-reflected, and these two objects provide all that is necessary for Hegel to derive, demonstrate, reveal, develop, etc., the existence of self-consciousness as such. Since being-for-self is inherent in both life and desire, each immediately appears as independent, although, as Hegel points out, self-consciousness, qua desire, regards this independence negatively, and, therefore, has to "learn through experience that the object, [viz. the living thing,] is independent" (PhS 106:168). This inherent being-for-self, or independence of the living thing is immediately important, because it means that life is not merely one particular thing, but rather a universal or infinite movement, or flux of seemingly independent shapes (PhS 106-07:169-70), just like the plurality of ones in being-for-self, as the many ones. This of course prevents life from being immediately exhausted by desire in its drive to negate it. Life, therefore, is not merely the, or a living thing, but also "a process" (PhS 107:171). It is a process that generates an indefinite plurality of living things, and which also dissolves them. It dissolves them because, as a single continuous process, it must also be opposed to the plurality of shapes, which, insofar as each shape enjoys an independent existence, is not continuous, but rather discrete (PhS 107:170-71).

Continuity and discreteness are actually terms or categories of quantity, rather than quality, and, therefore, do not appear in the logic of being-for-self as such. However, they are, as it were, imminently immanent in being-for-self. Indeed, when it passes into or is transcended in pure quantity, attraction becomes the moment of continuity, and repulsion that of discreteness (SL I 201). Their application to or presence in the analysis of the sphere of life, therefore, is not inappropriate. For the determinations of quantity are constantly lurking close beneath the surface of both being-for-self and self-consciousness. Indeed, as we shall see, one of the most important qualitative changes in the initial development of self-consciousness, i.e. from 'the struggle for life and death' to 'the master/slave relationship', is brought about by what, in the immediate sense, can be seen as a simple or purely quantitative demand. What is of most concern here, however, is the fact that this opposition within the life process, is not simply the arising and passing away of the various shapes of life, but the negation, and, therefore, separation, of these shapes into a passive, inorganic element and an active, organic one, which preserves itself by consuming the former (PhS 107-8:171). In other words, desire is inherent in the life process itself, as well as appearing as an independent being along side or with it. Indeed, at this point, they are identical. For both are the negation of the living thing.
Just as we saw in being-for-self in the relation of repulsion and attraction, however, the opposed sides of life, viz. the discrete inorganic element and the continuous or continuity producing one, which is here identical with immediate desire, undergo an inversion, so that: "The latter is just as much an imparting of shape as a supersession of it; and the other, the imparting of shape, is just as much a supersession as an articulation of shape" (PhS 108:171). For, in consuming the passive, inorganic element of life, it, as Hegel explains, takes the other back into itself, and, therefore, transcends "its simplicity, or essence [as something merely attractive, or continuous,] i.e. it divides it, and this dividedness of the differenceless fluid medium is just what establishes individuality [in the first place]" (PhS 108:171). In short, it preserves and reproduces itself as an individual in the life process, apart from other individuals, or shapes, i.e. both organic, and inorganic. The inorganic, on the other hand, in being consumed, is the actual dissolution of shape, and, therefore, itself the passage back into a continuous fluid element of apparent shapelessness, or identity with other shapes, especially the organic one that consumes it (PhS 108:171). Thus, "the two sides of the whole movement, which before were distinguished ... collapse into one another" (PhS 108:171), or become identical. This means that life, rather than being associated with one side, or the other, is now truly "the whole round of this activity" (PhS 108:171). It is a whole round, which is in fact round, i.e. cyclical. For now, as we can see, life, rather than being explicitly productive, is simply reproductive; or, as Hegel says: "Life consists ... in being the self-developing whole, which dissolves its development, and in this movement simply preserves itself" (PhS 108:171).

How then does self-consciousness as such emerge in and from life? For, as we can see, the desire that life contains, and is immediately identical with self-consciousness qua desire, appears to be caught in the false infinite of life's cycle of reproduction. How does self-consciousness, or desire break, or break out of this cycle?

The answer is not really as obscure as it might at first seem from Hegel's analysis in the Phenomenology. For, in the cycle of reproduction, life reproduces itself, or is self-reproducing. Therefore, it still contains the true infinite, or is being-for-self. Consequently: "Life points to something other than itself, viz, consciousness, for which life exists as this [universal] unity, or as [simple] genus" (PhS 109:172), i.e. the genus of all living things. Life, therefore, is transcendental, i.e. it points beyond itself, and, as such, is not really the universal unity it at first seemed to be, i.e. there is something else, even if this something else is as yet not manifest, or known as such. This something else, which we know to be consciousness, however, is by no means something completely different, or separate from life, since it arises out of life's own implicit being-for-self. In fact, as Hegel says, it is simply an "other life" (PhS 109:173), or life as an other to itself. The genus of life exists for this life, but, at the same time, this life is the genus. For what we have here is simply the self-reflection, or identity of life, i.e. life=life, or self-consciousness (PhS 109:173). Life, therefore, is also
transcendent.

However, does this then mean that self-consciousness is not simply desire?

It means that self-consciousness is not simply immediate desire. For, in the reflection of life, it too must be mediated, i.e. desire=desire. Thus, self-consciousness, as indicated above, is absolute desire, which means a number of things that need to be made explicit. First, absolute desire, as we shall see shortly in the process of desire and satisfaction, is desire that cannot find a particular form of satisfaction, or satisfaction in anything particular, i.e. absolute desire requires absolute satisfaction. Second, absolute desire, as the self-mediation, identity, or reflection of desire, is actually desire for itself, i.e. desire for desire, self-desire - both itself, as desire, and another desiring being (PhS 110:175). Since self-consciousness is absolute desire, however, it is, as we saw above, at first identical with, or inclusive of immediate desire, which means that it is only certain of itself, as absolute, in the negation of the "other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life" (PhS 109:174). Its first form of self-determination, or of establishing self-certainty, therefore, is the very process present in the reproductive cycle of life, viz. the process of desire and consumption, or satisfaction. Hegel describes this process in the following way: "Certain of the nothingness of this other [object or life form,] it, [viz. self-consciousness,] explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; [i.e.] it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness in an objective manner" (PhS 109:174).

This true certainty, or certainty that has become explicit for self-consciousness, qua desire, in an objective manner, is simply the satisfaction self-consciousness, qua desire, feels in and through the consumption or destruction of the object as an independent life form. For, as yet, it does not see the desire, self-consciousness or being-for-self, inherent in this object, and this causes it to regard the object as something completely unessential and opposed to its own being-for-self, or inherently absolute desire, i.e. its desire to be everything, or to be absolutely independent, which is the same thing. This means that self-consciousness qua desire is itself still only pure, immediate, or abstract being-for-self. For it has not yet presented itself to itself as an independent and absolutely essential object, i.e. another being-for-self. It also means, therefore, that self-consciousness, qua desire, is, at first, simply a desire for objectivity.

As Hegel explains, however, if self-consciousness is a desire for objectivity, then even its satisfaction cannot provide it with the true self-certainty that seemed to be immanent in its certainty of the other object's essential nothingness, or simple unessentiality. This is because satisfaction, as the destruction of the object, is a destruction of objectivity, i.e. what self-consciousness desires, and, therefore, the reproduction of dissatisfaction. It is also because: "Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its
gratification, are *conditioned* by the object, for self-certainty [only] comes from superseding this other, [which contradicts it as a being-for-self]; [and] in order that this supersession can take place, *there must be this other* (PhS 109:175). In short, self-consciousness' certainty in itself, *qua* the process of desire and satisfaction, is actually dependent upon the seemingly unessential object, which now shows itself to be essential. Self-consciousness *needs* the object in order to *destroy* the object, and, thereby, provide itself with the objectivity it craves. Furthermore, the object is re-created, or preserved in and through its destruction by self-consciousness, *qua* the process of desire and satisfaction, which, as Hegel points out, only demonstrates to self-consciousness that whereas it is dependent upon the object, "the object has its own independence" (PhS 109:175). This is because self-consciousness, in consuming the object, preserves itself as a living thing, or object. It must re-create, or seek out other objects in a renewed attempt to satisfy its unlimited desire for objectivity successfully; and the object, as something essentially negative, as Hegel said above, has this essence *affirmed* in its negation by self-consciousness, i.e. it constitutes an explicit self-identity of negativity, when it comes into relation with the negative activity of self-consciousness, so that something immediately arises or reappears out of the negation of something, e.g. excrement.

Despite the dissatisfaction produced by the process of desire and satisfaction, self-consciousness does not forsake its, or rather, the possibility of, its satisfaction completely. This is because, even the dissatisfaction, which occurs as a result of its first attempts at satisfaction, is also still an experience of its own autonomous essence, i.e. as something completely negative in itself, and, therefore, confirmation of its being-for-self. Also, self-consciousness, *qua* desire, is as much the self-identity of negativity in the moment of satisfaction, as the object. Thus, it is only the object's independence and its own dependence which are seen as the problem by and for self-consciousness, which has now, therefore, realized that it is only by truly transceding the object that it may experience its self-certainty, or satisfaction (PhS 109:175).

How though is such transcendsence supposed to occur?

It can occur only if self-consciousness, *qua* desire, does not itself negate the object, since this is the relationship that confirms its dependence and the object's independence. As Hegel explains, self-consciousness "can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation [of itself] within itself" (PhS 109:175), and, thereby, itself demonstrates, for self-consciousness, that it is in itself negative, or rather, simply a being-for-other (PhS 109:175). Of course, in doing this, the object is also demonstrating that "it is consciousness" (PhS 110:175). For, even though it appears to be doing this for self-consciousness as an other, it is doing so itself, i.e. it demonstrates its own being-for-other in itself for another, which is a self-demonstration (PhS 110:175 & 176). As Hegel is famous for concluding, therefore: "Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (PhS 110:175). "A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in
fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it ... A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much I as 'object'" (PhS 110:177).

Self-consciousness, however, although it can, does not necessarily allow, or recognize the self-consciousness of the other self-consciousness immediately. It can, as we already know, because, insofar as it is self-identical in itself, it is also immediately an other in itself, i.e. another self-consciousness, and, insofar as it knows this other, or itself as this other, it ipso facto has immediate knowledge of other self-consciousnesses. However, it does not necessarily recognize itself as this other, because this knowledge, as we have already seen throughout this work, is also necessarily mediated, which not only makes possible the demonstration of knowledge, but also creates room for the possibility of error, so that self-consciousness often loses itself in what have proved, and will continue to prove, false forms of self-determination, before finding itself in its truth. Indeed, this is just what happens now in the transformation of self-consciousness, qua the process of desire and satisfaction, into self-consciousness, qua the struggle for life and death, as well as the master/slave relationship.

B. The Struggle, or Fight for Life and Death

Self-consciousness, in its desire for objectivity, reveals itself as indifferent to objectivity, i.e. it regards objectivity as nothing in itself, and proceeds to prove it as such. Its indifference to objectivity, therefore, is an indifference to life in general. For life in general seems to be constituted by the object in its immediacy - the very object self-consciousness uses to satisfy its desire (PhS 113:186-187). This means, however, that self-consciousness in the satisfaction of its desire must prove itself as indifferent to its own life, as it is to life in general. For its life is as much an obstacle to proof of itself as a pure being-for-self, as any other object it does not negate. This is what Hegel means in the Phenomenology, when he says: "The presentation of itself ... as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such, [e.g. the body.] that it is not attached to life" (PhS 113:187 [MI]). Every time the self satisfies its desire by negating the object, an act that not only proves itself as a self, but also has the indirect effect of preserving its own life, it thus demonstrates a willingness to forsake its life. In short, the self is willing to die in order to exist as a self, i.e. to be for itself.

This willingness to die, however, remains merely implicit in the self, until it finds itself confronted by another abstract individual. Until then, it is merely expressed in an alienated, or non-self-conscious fashion, i.e. as the animal drive to destroy other objects in its quest for the satisfaction of its desire, and to do so without regard for the risks it might incur in such a quest. These, however, are themselves essential moments in bringing the individual to the point where the willingness to die becomes
explicit, and so too the truth of self-consciousness, viz. the self recognized. What is this point?
Simply, it is the point where the self encounters the object, which, possessing the same self-certainty
that it does, regards it in the same way that it is regarded, i.e. as an object. In short, it is the point
where: "Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; [where] it has come out of itself"
(PhS 111:179). Although each faces the other, each sees the other merely as an object, and thus
proceeds to do what it would to any object that it encountered in a state of desire, viz. consume, or
destroy it. Each, therefore, seeks to negate the life of the other in order to affirm its own objectivity.
As Hegel says: "each seeks the death of the other," and, at the same time, manifests its willingness to
die, or rather, "staking its own life," in order to preserve, or prove its self (PhS 113:187). In short,
both prove their indifference.

Consequently, self-preservation, or proof of self becomes a life and death struggle (PhS 114:187).
"They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth,
both in the case of the other and in their own case" (PhS 114:187). In other words, self-preservation,
or self-proof involves proving the self to the other, as well as to itself, i.e. "it is only through staking
one's life that freedom is won" (PhS 114:187). This means freedom from life in its immediacy, as
well as the false infinite of desire and satisfaction.3 As Hegel continues: "only thus is it proved that
for self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not the immediate form in which it
appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which
could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only pure being-for-self. The individual who
has not risked his life, [or, therefore, sought the death of the other,] may well be recognized as a
person, but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness" (PhS
114:187). The struggle for life and death, therefore, is a struggle for recognition, i.e. recognition of
and by the self, by both the self and the other.

The recognition gained in this struggle, however, is essentially flawed by its fleetingness, or finitude;
and if recognition is fleeting, or finite, then so too is the truth that depends on it. In the struggle for
recognition both selves prove themselves as indifferent or free individuals - one by killing the other,
the other by dying. By killing the other, the victorious self-consciousness negates not only its
objective existence, but self-consciousness as an external object as well. For self-consciousness, in
order to be absolute, in order to be pure being-for-self, must be completely internal, i.e. it "must rid
itself of its self-externality" (PhS 114:187). In order to maintain itself as such, however, it will have
to engage in this struggle with every self-consciousness that it encounters, until it has eliminated every
one that is external to itself, or until it is eliminated itself. We shall deal with the latter possibility
shortly, when we consider the position of the loser in the struggle for recognition, qua the struggle for
life and death. With regard to the former, however, self-consciousness finds that a) it cannot tolerate
any form of externality, particularly that of self-consciousness, and b) it can only preserve the truth of
its self, i.e. its self-certainty, when it is actively staking its life, and thus seeking the death of another
self-consciousness. Hence, self-preservation compels self-consciousness to reproduce this struggle ad infinitum, landing it right back in the same situation in which it found itself in the process of desire and satisfaction. The struggle for life and death, therefore, is the false infinite of recognition, and this false infinite must manifest itself as the desire to fight, regardless of any object other than the fight itself. In other words, the struggle for life and death is merely an implicit struggle for recognition.\textsuperscript{4} Furthermore, self-consciousness also finds that c) each time it kills another self-consciousness to gain the essential recognition of itself for itself, it kills off the only other thing capable of recognizing it as self-consciousness, i.e. another self-consciousness. For, even though it did not recognize this other as a self-consciousness at the start of the struggle, but simply as another object, by willingly staking its own life and dying in the struggle, this other proved itself to have been as much a being-for-self as the surviving self-consciousness. Thus, even though the surviving self-consciousness need not immediately comprehend it - though it certainly feels it in the return of its dissatisfaction and desire - every death achieved in the struggle for recognition, qua the struggle for life and death, is as much a self-death, as it is a self-affirmation. It is self-death in that a) another self must die in order for the first self to prove itself; b) the other self must die in order to prove itself a self, both to itself and perhaps the self that kills it; and c) the first self kills itself by killing what could, and did, viz. at the very moment of death, give it the recognition it needed, and vice versa.

Therefore, at the end of the struggle for recognition, qua the struggle for life and death, that is, insofar as we may speak of an end in an indefinite process, we are not left with true self-certainty, or rather, a self that is truly certain of itself, but once again, what Hegel calls, a lifeless unity, or self-consciousness unable to transcend immediate objectivity, i.e. thingness, and thus a wholly false sense of freedom. It is actually a freedom that has proved itself false, viz. the freedom from the immediacy of life and the indefinite process of desire and satisfaction (PhS 114:188). In other words, self-proof here is actually a failure of self-preservation. The self finds only death, i.e. both for itself and for the other, in this struggle, and, therefore, a re-affirmation of objectivity's independence from the self. As Hegel put it: "Death certainly shows that each [individual] staked his life and held it of no account, both in himself and in the other; but that is not for those who survived this struggle. They, [viz. the victors in the struggle,] put an end to their consciousness in its alien setting of natural existence, that is to say, they put an end to themselves, and are done away with as extremes wanting to be for themselves, or to have an existence of their own. But with this [end] there vanishes from their interplay the essential moment of splitting into extremes with opposite characteristics; and the middle term, [viz. self-consciousness,] collapses into a lifeless unity which is split into lifeless, merely immediate, unopposed extremes; and the two do not reciprocally give and receive one another back from each other consciously, but leave each other free only indifferently, like things, [e.g. an active object and a passive object, a live body and a dead one]. Their act, [viz. the struggle that results in death,] is an abstract negation, not the negation coming from consciousness, which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded, and consequently survives its own supersession" (PhS 114-115:188)
If the struggle for recognition, qua the struggle for life and death, yields only death for the self as such, and if proof of its freedom from life is actually unfreedom, then how does self-consciousness preserve and maintain itself? How does self-consciousness survive its process of self-affirmation? Does it survive this abstract negation in which there is no self-preservation?

Self-consciousness does not survive if its struggle for recognition remains immediate, i.e. an immediate struggle for life and death. However, if "self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness" (PhS 115:189 [MI]), i.e. through the experience of death in general, then the possibility of transcending the struggle for life and death, while preserving the struggle for recognition, and thus the possibility of true self-consciousness, arises once again. Upon killing the other, self-consciousness finds itself in the same position that it was in when it was mere desire, i.e. it is confronted by an independent object. For instance, it is confronted the body of the other, and its own feeling of emptiness. It could and may, indeed, consume this body in an attempt to satisfy the desire that has returned to torment it after the struggle, but this shall no more satisfy its desire than any of the other objects it has consumed, especially since its desire has already become not simply a desire for objectivity as such, but a desire for objectivity through recognition, or rather, the desire "of another desire, and an other desire."

Self-consciousness knows, therefore, that it must have its desire satisfied by an other, and that it must not kill this other, if it is to satisfy its desire for recognition. In the struggle for life and death then, self-consciousness develops the capacity for fear, on the one hand, which is simply a renewed desire for life that appears as the desire to stay alive, or more simply, to not die, and mercy, on the other, which is simply the willingness to either give quarter to, or receive quarter from, the other, in what would otherwise simply be another fight to the death. Only with this act of mercy, which is necessarily a dual act of giving and receiving on the part of two individuals, can consciousness, as stated above, be posited in its pure form as pure self-consciousness, and its impure form as mere consciousness. In other words, it is the first time that the individual explicitly appears either as an egotist, or as an egoist, i.e. "one [being] the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other [being] the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live, or be for another, [viz. the independent consciousness and the realm of things-in-themselves]" (PhS 115:189).

The former stops short of killing the latter in their struggle, and offers it the chance of life. The latter surrenders, and, thereby, accepts the offer of life, since it does not want to die. This acceptance of life from the victor, however, is, at the same time, a latent offer of life to the victor. For by surrendering, and, thereby, recognizing the victor's power over the immediacy of life, the loser provides the victor with the recognition self-consciousness needs in order to preserve itself as self-consciousness. The
loser of the struggle, therefore, enables the self to live in the victor. However, in order to maintain this life, it must forsake its own self, and offer its life back to the victor in the form of service.

This offer, however, must at first appear merely as an act of self-humiliation, motivated by fear and gratitude, before the master of life and death, rather than something this master needs, so that he can go through the lordly charade of receiving something with indifference. Otherwise, the loser's recognition of the master's self-consciousness, or rather, the mastery of self-consciousness would immediately negate its pure being-for-itself, by revealing self-consciousness' independence as dependent on what has just proved itself to be in bondage to objectivity. There would then be no difference between the moments of winning and losing in the struggle for recognition. Both would appear as immediately equal, i.e. as things, just as they did when self-consciousness killed the other in the struggle for recognition, qua the struggle for life and death. Self-consciousness would then find itself right back at the point where objectivity rose up to confront it as an independent other. For the overcoming of objectivity is so far merely negative, i.e. abstractly negative. It must be overcome positively as well, i.e. in a way that is negative, but negative in a mediated fashion.

If the equality of self-consciousness and consciousness, or egoism and egotism were to emerge here, it would merely be a formal equality, which would not necessarily satisfy either individual's desire for recognition. Rather, it might serve only to suppress this desire in such a way that the process of desire and satisfaction, as well as the struggle for recognition qua the struggle for life and death could continue in more oblique forms. This is why Hegel admits that, although "[b]oth moments are essential," and thus will ultimately prove themselves as equal, "to begin with they are unequal and opposed" (PhS 115:189 [MI]). "[T]heir reflection into a unity has not yet been achieved, [therefore,] they exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness" (PhS 115:189 [MI]), viz. those of the master and the slave, or egotism and egoism. As a consequence, recognition, at the end of this discontinued struggle for life and death, is completely one-sided, "one [individual] being only recognized, the other only recognizing" (PhS 113:185). This means that the struggle for recognition, although removed from the immediacy of life and death, or rather, the immediate return to life and immediate death, continues on a new plane, viz. that of lordship and bondage, or the master/slave relationship.

C. The Master/Slave Relationship, or Dialectic

There is no doubt that the transcendence of the struggle for recognition, qua the struggle for life and death, to the relationship between master and slave seems like a return to the immediacy of life for the consciousness that becomes the slave, rather than a move to a new, higher plane. For it is now forced, through both its initial surrender and the continuous presence of the fear of death, embodied in the person of the master, to concentrate wholly on the independent object, or thing-in-itself. In other words, the master interposes the slave between himself and the immediacy of life, or the realm of
things, in order to perform the very activity that he learned by experience negated the independence of his self-consciousness, or being-for-self, in the process of desire and satisfaction. If the master does not have to pursue the object, but instead has the object presented to him by the realm of objectivity, or Nature, represented here by the slave, then he can engage only in that activity which gives him true self-certainty, or rather, which explicitly affirms his self-consciousness in an objective manner, i.e., pure satisfaction, "the sheer negation of the thing, or the enjoyment of it" (PhS 116:190 [MI]). "What desire failed to achieve, [therefore] he succeeds in doing, viz. to have done with the thing altogether, and to achieve [pure] satisfaction in the enjoyment of it" (PhS 116:190 [MI]). Hence, satisfaction becomes divorced from desire, so that it can be purified of positivity, or so that it can be absolute negativity. Of course, as we shall see shortly, it is not so much that desire and satisfaction are divorced from one another, but rather, that they become mediated, i.e. the slave mediates the master's desire and the master mediates the slave's enjoyment.

Through his purely negative power over objectivity, or thinghood, the master is in an immediate relation to both the object and the slave, which affirms the independence of his self-consciousness, or rather, his independence as self-consciousness. However, this immediate relation can only be maintained, because he is also related "mediately to each through the other" (PhS 115:190), i.e. to the slave through the thing and the thing through the slave. The slave bears the burden of positive existence, and thus both the dependence of consciousness and the independence of the object that resulted from the pursuit of the object in the process of desire and satisfaction. Consequently, the slave must be denied the moment in this process that affirms the independence of self-consciousness, viz. satisfaction.

To deny the slave satisfaction all together, however, would be tantamount to killing him, or her outright, and this would return self-consciousness to the same predicament it was in at the end of the struggle for recognition, qua the struggle for life and death. It would be recognitionless. The slave, therefore, cannot be denied satisfaction completely. In fact, there is no need to do this. For true satisfaction was already denied to self-consciousness in the process of desire and satisfaction itself, i.e. it was found to be limited in this process by the object, and thus by renewed desire. The slave, therefore, need only be forced to remain at the level of desire, in order to be denied the kind of satisfaction obtained by the master, viz. satisfaction without desire, pure satisfaction, or simply, enjoyment. For only enjoyment gives self-consciousness pure, or true satisfaction. Satisfaction for the slave then, is life without enjoyment, and this gives his, or her life the appearance of being that pure state of desire it was at the end of the process desire and satisfaction.

There must, however, be a difference in the the condition of pure desire for the slave and its original appearance in self-consciousness' general activity. This difference is at first merely quantitative, and thus does not appear to be different at all. It does, however, beget the qualitative difference which will
transform the master/slave relationship. Simply put, the slave must produce *more* in the reproductive activity characteristic of life in the process of desire and satisfaction, so that the master may have the moment of satisfaction without having to go through the process as well. In other words, his moment of pure satisfaction, or enjoyment depends on the production of a *surplus* in the slave's own process of desire and satisfaction. At first, of course, this dependence appears to be the other way around, since the master has established his immediate absolute power over both the thing and the slave; i.e. because he can destroy them both at will, they possess nothing, and exist *only* for him, which means that his moment of enjoyment must at least seem to be prior to the slave's limited satisfaction, and thus life. The slave lives only to serve. His, or her life has no inherent value beyond this, and, therefore, is regarded as unessential.

This apparent priority of enjoyment over life, however, can only be demonstrated in particular, and not in general, should it become necessary for self-consciousness to actively re-assert its dominance over consciousness. Otherwise, self-consciousness would once again find itself right back at the point of the struggle for recognition, *qua* the struggle for life and death. Hence, the master can only have his moment of enjoyment at the expense of a slave's life, e.g. one who starves to death because he, or she does not produce an adequate surplus, but not at the expense of slavery and life in general. The master, however, does not and cannot make such a distinction for reasons that will become clear shortly, and, in order to avoid it, must introduce a parallel quantitative difference into his relationship with the slave, i.e. he must have more than one. Before exploring this further, however, we must first see how the quantitative difference in the slave's process of desire and satisfaction becomes qualitative.

In order to survive, the slave must produce a surplus in his, or her simple process of desire and satisfaction. Mere reproduction, or reproduction as it occurred in the original processes of desire and satisfaction, viz. for the self, is no longer adequate. The slave must now *produce* for another. His, or her being-for-another then, is actually his, or her production-for-another. The demand for surplus, therefore, creates a necessary transformation in the activity of the slave, or rather, the slave's activity explicitly becomes one of *transformation*. It is 1) transformation of the object, and thus the world of objectivity in general; 2) transformation of the process of desire and satisfaction; and 3) transformation of the self. The slave, who has been forced to concentrate on the independent aspect of objectivity by his, or her loss and surrender in the struggle for life and death, must now utilize this concentration, in order to transform objectivity in such a way as to yield *more* objects ready to be consumed by both themselves and the master. This transformation of objectivity, or rather, this transformative activity is a *limited negation* of the object, as opposed to desire's and the master's absolute negation of it (*PhS* 116, 190), and, therefore, is "the one concrete achievement of the relation of lordship and bondage," *i.e.* *work*, or *human labour*. Labour represents the "animation of the (objective) world. Through 'labour' the purely thinglike quality of objects is stripped away; as products of labour, they are transformed into forms of *Life* and are grasped and appropriated by self-consciousness as such, [that is,
it negates them in order to prove itself.] The 'labour' process is the concrete instance of the overcoming of objectification ... This is attained through the activity of the bondsman, a self-consciousness who lives in objectification and is fundamentally a non-independent being."^11

Indeed, the slave becomes more than self-consciousness simply existing in objectification. For in the labour process he, or she is objectivity that concentrates, or reflects upon objectivity, i.e. objectivity=objectivity. He, or she is the thing that does not merely destroy things, but forms, or fashions things. In other words, through labour the slave becomes self-conscious objectivity, or rather, the objective self-consciousness implicit in Descartes' sum res cogitans. He, or she is objective self-consciousness, because the reflection of objectivity upon objectivity is the reflection of an essentially negative being upon an essentially negative being, i.e. the negation of negation, the self-identity of negativity, or self-consciousness and objectivity with permanence (PhS 115:195). "The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This negative middle term or the formative activity, [viz. labour,] is at the same time (my italics) the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence" (PhS 118:195). Thus, labour, although at first the servant of external self-consciousness, is also the first and essential stage in the synthesis of consciousness and objectivity, or rather the emergence of the consciousness implicit in objectivity and the objectivity implicit in consciousness. It is the first time either come into actual being. As Marcuse puts it: "Labour is ... the fundamental relation of self-consciousness to thinghood, whereby the pure negative objectivity of the latter is sublated and animated. Thinghood first attains its 'subsistence' through this animation; it thereby receives and remains in that 'form' which makes it actual."^12

Self-consciousness in the form of mastery, however, never achieves this synthesis, at least not in its capacity as master. It never becomes truly objective, and objectivity never becomes actual for it, i.e. as master. Indeed, objective self-consciousness, or self-conscious objectivity will eventually rise up before pure self-consciousness, as something external to it, and supplant it as something superfluous. Objective self-consciousness will also begin to emerge within pure self-consciousness, as the overwhelming feeling of uncertainty in its own absolute power, its existence as an absolute being-for-itself, or simply, an absolute self. This is because the master, in pursuit of the two moments that affirm his self-consciousness as a pure being-for-self, viz. recognition and enjoyment, unintentionally does to himself what he does to the slave. He unintentionally forces himself to remain at the level of desire. However, he remains at this level in such a way that his relationship to objectivity denies him access to the productive activity, which enables the slave to transcend his, or her bondage. In short, the master does not work. He cannot work, because he obtains his recognition as a master, as an absolute self only through the work of an other, i.e. through having another consciousness, which is not an
absolute self, work for him. The moment of recognition for the master is present in the work of the slave. For in work, as said above, "the other consciousness sets aside its own being-for-self, and in so doing, itself does what the [master] does to it" (PhS 116:191). In other words, consciousness suppresses its being-for-self internally, or degrades itself in work, thereby, re-affirming its thinghood, and thus dependence on everything around it, or simply, its essential nothingness in comparison to self-consciousness, and re-enacting, or reflecting the master's action in him, or herself as the essential action of overcoming objectivity. By degrading him, or herself in work, therefore, the slave is able to see the master as such, and he, or she enables the master to see himself as such. This is why "what the bondsman does, [by suppressing his, or her own being-for-self,] is really the action of the lord" (PhS 116:191).

This suppression of being-for-self by being-for-self in work, however, is a self-suppression. For the slave always has the option of renewing the struggle for life and death, even though it might mean certain death (PM 175:435). Thus, this suppression is as much a real presence of self-consciousness in the slave, as it is a merely representational, or imitative one. In fact, it is superior to the self-consciousness of the master, precisely because it is a self-suppression of being-for-self, as opposed to a suppression of one being-for-self by another being-for-self. For even though this latter suppression can also be said to be a self-suppression of being-for-self, it is an alienated form of self-suppression, i.e. one that still appears to be external to itself. It is a general abstract suppression, rather than a concrete individual one. Work, therefore, rather than simply being a self-degradation on the part of the slave, from which the master gains his essential recognition, is the presence of the lordship in bondage, or the mastery in slavery, whereby, the self overcomes this alienated form of existence. By not working then, the master never overcomes this alienated existence, and his recognition, as master, necessarily vanishes in contradiction and uncertainty. As Hegel says: "In this [one-sided] recognition the unessential consciousness [of the bondsman] is for the lord the object, [that is, the object of his desire for recognition,] which constitutes the truth of his certainty" (PhS 116:192).

By compelling the slave to degrade him, or herself through work, however, this object "turn[s] out to be something quite different from an independent consciousness" (PhS 116-117:192), which, as we discovered above, is the only other entity capable of truly satisfying self-consciousness' desire for objectivity through recognition, or rather, of providing it with true certainty. In work, the slave appears to the master as a dependent consciousness, i.e. dependent upon the realm of life, or objectivity, as he understands it, and dependent upon himself as the guarantor of life for the slave. Consequently, the master must eventually see the slave as incapable of providing him with the essential recognition of his mastery. For essential being, or self-consciousness would then have to seek satisfaction in an unessential being, and independent being would have to depend on dependent being. "He is, therefore, not certain (my italics) of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action" (PhS 117:192).
His truth, as it were, is the miserable existence of the slave, and the feeling of chronic uncertainty, which marks the realization in the master of this fact, is the irony of mastery. It is the feeling of his own slavery rising to the surface, and the beginning of the universal realization of his superfluous position in both the activity of self-consciousness and the process of recognition.

Two important questions arise here. First, how does this feeling of uncertainty first manifest itself in the master, and, second, how does he attempt to suppress the realization of his superfluity, in both himself and the slave, in order to preserve his position as master?

Just as the mastery in slavery first appears to be merely the action of the master, and, therefore, external to slavery, (rather than implicit in the slave's productive activity,) so too the slavery in mastery "appears at first outside of itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness" (PhS 117:193). In other words, the master's uncertainty is really at first the action of the slave. The slave suppresses his, or her own being-for-self, because he, or she has experienced the fear of death in the person of the master. The slave's work, or labour for the master then, is at first simply an expression of this fear. If he, or she does not work, he, or she will be killed. For such a refusal on the part of the slave is a failure to recognize the lord's mastery, and, therefore, is tantamount to renewing the struggle for life and death. By working, therefore, the slave expresses the fear which is essential to providing the master with the recognition he needs, in order to be certain of himself as master. This condition, of course, depends upon an enduring willingness in the master to kill the slave at any given moment, particularly the moment he refuses to work, i.e. the moment he ceases to be afraid. The master's activity, therefore, must be an expression of this continued willingness to kill at will, which it most certainly is. For in enjoyment the master, as we have already seen, continually and casually negates the fundamental determination of the slave's world, viz. the object, thus expressing his utter disregard for the slave and everything he, or she represents, viz. Nature.

This disregard, as we saw, is then emphasized by the master's apparent indifference to the plight of the slave, in that his enjoyment takes priority over the individual slave's limited satisfaction, and, therefore, life. However, as we have also seen, this lordly indifference can only be sustained in particular, and not in general, since the master must have slaves, in order to remain the master. This means that his indifference must be limited to the number of slaves he can allow to die, and therefore, so must his willingness to kill. Neither are absolute. Whereas the master's indifference towards 'this' or 'that' particular slave is reproduced in the slave as the self-indifference that allows him, or her to suppress his, or her own being-for-self then, the slave's fear of the master must be reproduced in the master, as the fear of rebellion, i.e. fear that slaves in general will refuse to work, or strike, and that he will lose his recognition as master. Hence, the master's uncertainty of being-for-self, as his truth, first manifests itself as his suspicion of the slave, and his indifference towards slaves in particular is nothing other than his attempt to suppress his fear of slaves in general. The master suspects that the slave may
be more than just a dependent consciousness, that he, or she may be a potential self-consciousness lying in wait for the moment it can re-assert itself, and usurp the master's position, and he will latch on to any sign of self-will, or resistance in the slave no matter how trivial, as confirmation of this suspicion.

The slave of course, without being self-willed or resistant, for this, as Hegel says, is simply a confirmation of his slavery (PhS 119:196), is busy proving to the master, from the moment he, or she begins to work, that he, or she is indeed more than a mere consciousness. However, despite the fact that that this work goes on in plain view of the master, because the master does not do it himself, he cannot experience first hand its transformative effects on the consciousness of the slave. As a consequence, he is blind to self-consciousness' own transformation, i.e. its emergence from work as something different from the purely negative moment it is in himself. Whereas, the slave's activity becomes a realization of objective self-consciousness, the master's activity necessarily undermines his self-certainty in direct proportion to the slave's progress through labour. As a result, the master eventually degenerates into a condition of absolute fear, not unlike the one from which the slave begins in his, or her relationship with the master, except with one crucial difference. The master has not developed the discipline that comes from service and obedience, and is characteristic of essentially productive labour, which, as Hegel points out, is necessary to taking fear beyond its formal stage, i.e. the stage where one fears everything, and it becomes impossible to determine whether that fear originates from within oneself, or without (PhS 119:196).

To protect himself against the realization of his complete uncertainty from both within and without, therefore, the master's actions must become more and more cruel and indifferent - the latter simply being a more mediated form of cruelty - towards the slave, depending on the degree of mediation in their relationship, i.e. how close the master stands in relation to the slave, while compelling him, or her to work, and appropriating the fruits of his, or her labour for his own enjoyment. Hence, the master's moment of enjoyment becomes a desperate orgy of annihilation, which differs from the consumption characteristic of the process of desire and satisfaction only in its magnitude, i.e. the greatly increased quantity of immediately consumable objects made possible by the slave's labour. Enjoyment, or pure satisfaction, therefore, reveals itself as pure desire, and self-consciousness, qua mastery, finds itself right back where it was before the struggle for life and death, uncertain and unsatisfied.

"Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing" (PhS 118:195). This work, however, is more than the slave's forming and shaping of the objective world as such, important as we have seen this to be. It is more than work on the object as such, because, in the master, the slave also has pure being-for-self "as his object" (PhS 117:194). His, or her work for the master then, is as much his, or her work on the master, or rather, on the power which the master has over the slave, and the work on this power necessarily implies his,
or her work on the fear which the master, through his power, precipitates in the slave, viz. "the fear of death, the absolute Lord" (PhS 117:194). Work on the object as such, or thing-in-itself and work on this fear, therefore, are one and the same, or identical. As Hegel says: "in fashioning the thing, the bondsman's own negativity (my italics), his being-for-self, becomes an object for him only through (my italics) his setting at nought the existing shape confronting him, and creating a new one. But this objective negative moment is none other than the alien being before which it has trembled, [that is, being-for-self in the person of the lord, or master]. Now, however, he destroys this alien negative moment [as something alien or external], posits himself as a negative [moment] in the permanent order of things (my italics), and thereby becomes for himself, someone (my italics) existing on his own account, [rather than something existing because of an other, viz. other things and self-consciousness as an absolute other]. ... [I]n fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, [that it is an essential moment in his activity] that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. The shape [that he gives to the object as such] does not become something other than himself through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape that is his pure being-for-self, which in this externality is seen by him to be the truth" (PhS 119:196). In other words, externality is also transformed into an essential moment of his, or her activity, a moment within the labour process that allows the slave to realize his, or her essence in such a way that he, or she can reflect upon it.

This internalization of externality in the labour process and the externalization of what, until now, has been internal, viz. lasting, or concrete being-for self, finally makes true self-certainty a possibility. This is because it is the first time that it is possible for the self to know itself as anything more than the power of negation, anything more, as it were, than nothing, which is what self-consciousness ultimately amounts to in every activity and, so-called, relationship, up to mastery. Unproductive self-consciousness then, may have everything, as we see in mastery, but it has nothing to reflect upon, and, therefore, is nothing. It cannot do what productive self-consciousness can, viz. reflect upon itself as something. Mastery, therefore, lacks what slavery possesses, actual self-reflection. "For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service as such, as also that of formative activity are necessary, both being at the same time (my italics) in a universal mode" (PhS 117:194). In other words, they are simultaneous in the universal movement, or absolute melting away of everything stable, viz. existence, which is pure being-for-self.

"Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at the formal stage, and does not extend to the known real world of existence. Without the formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become explicitly for itself. If consciousness fashions the thing without that initial absolute fear, it is only an empty self-centred attitude; for its form or negativity is not negativity per se, and therefore its formative activity cannot give it a consciousness of itself as essential being. If it has not experienced absolute fear but only some lesser dread, the (my italics)
negative being has remained for it something external ... Since the entire contents of its natural consciousness have not been jeopardized, determinate being still in principle attaches to it; having a 'mind of one's own' is self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in servitude. Just as little as the pure form can become essential being for it, just as little is that form, regarded as extended to the particular, a universal formal activity, an absolute Notion; rather it is a skill (my italics) which is master over some things, but not over the universal power and the whole of objective being" (PhS 119:196). In short, it has yet to become work, or labour. Skill is incomplete transformation, or simply transformative activity that does not extend beyond the first moment of the three essential moments spoken of above, viz. transformation of the object and thus of the world of objectivity in general. Indeed, it cannot even be said that skill is a complete instance of the first moment. For it does not extend to the objective world in general, only to some particular objects in it. If skill did extend to the objective world in general, it would no longer be mere skill. For it would necessarily involve the two latter moments of transformative activity as well, viz. transformation of the process of desire and satisfaction and of the self, and, therefore, be work. Mere skill then does not take one beyond the process of desire and satisfaction, beyond the standpoint of mastery in its relationship to slavery, or beyond the moment of enjoyment, or absolute annihilation, towards which the pure self-consciousness must strive in order to prove itself once and for all. Only through work can this striving be halted. For only through work is pure self-consciousness, or pure being-for-self rendered a moment in the process of real, concrete self-determination, rather than an end. This means that the master's orgy of annihilation can be stopped only when self-conscious objectivity, or objective self-consciousness emerges, and becomes a power unto itself, which then does away with the master as pure self-consciousness by either killing him, or compelling him to change his mind, his ground and his allegiance, by acknowledging the inherent slavery in his position. The slave's overcoming of fear in work then, is tantamount to overcoming the master. For by overcoming this fear he, or she renders the master as such superfluous to the progress of self-consciousness.

However, does this not put an end to the process of recognition, and, therefore, constitute a renewal of the struggle for life and death?

On an immediate level, the elimination of the master either by killing him, or, as it were, converting him would certainly seem to be a renewal of the struggle for life and death, in which one self-consciousness challenges another for mastery and recognition, and thus merely a confirmation of, what we saw above, to be the master's suspicion of the slave, i.e. that the slave is merely a deceitful self-consciousness waiting to usurp his power and position. The slave's rebellion, however, is not a renewal of the struggle for life and death as such. For, by eliminating the master, the slave merely is helping the master to realize the full truth of his being as master, i.e. the pure negativity of pure being-for-self's abstract notion of freedom, or the freedom from life. In other words, he, or she is fully recognizing him for what he is. In killing the master then, the slave merely affirms, or ushers him
into a state of pure nothingness, by eliminating the last obstacle which the realm of life has placed between him and his notion of freedom, viz. his body. On the other hand, in converting the master, the slave gives him a chance to become the true embodiment of absolute negation, or rather, the truth of absolute nothing, i.e. the nothingness that negates even nothing. The slave's activity, therefore, is fundamentally different from self-consciousness' activity in the struggle for life and death and as master. Self-consciousness in, or as these modes of activity is merely an abstract negation, whereas, self-consciousness, in its final act as a slave, is an annihilation of annihilation, or rather, the negation of negation which transforms self-consciousness as such into Reason, i.e. the scientific consciousness which eventually realizes that it is self-conscious, or human nature, and Spirit, or Mind, which is the human consciousness that becomes completely aware of itself as an essentially social being.

Once established as master, there is no preservation in self-consciousness' negative activity. Therefore, it has no real future, i.e. one that holds the possibility of qualitative change, beyond mere death. "The master is fixed in his mastery. He cannot, [as master] go beyond himself, change, progress. He must conquer - and become master[,] ... preserve himself as such - or die..." He has risked his life to be master. Therefore, mastery is the supreme given value for him beyond which he cannot go [as master]. The slave, on the other hand, did not want to be a slave. He became a slave because he did not want to risk his life and die to become a master. In his mortal terror he understood (without noticing it) that a given, fixed and stable condition, even though it be the master's, cannot exhaust the possibilities of human existence. He understood the vanity of the given conditions of existence. He did not want to bind himself to the master's condition, nor does he bind himself to his condition as a slave. There is nothing fixed in him. He is ready for change; in his very being, he is change, transcendence, transformation, education; he is historical becoming at his origin, in his essence, in his very existence." As we saw, becoming necessarily implies preservation in negation, or stability in change. Hence, even though the slave kills, or converts the master, he, or she preserves mastery in its rational capacity, i.e. he, or she preserves it in his, or her own mastery of the process of desire and satisfaction, which is the first step in humanity's mastery of nature through work, and of itself, or its being-for-self through the realization that being-for-another is not only as essential to the truth of self-consciousness as being-for-self, but that the two moments are equal.

Transition to Pure Essence and Reason

Self-consciousness, however, does not necessarily comprehend its truth as Reason and Spirit immediately upon eliminating the master. In fact, it recapitulates its experience from the three previous modes of determination, as Hegel demonstrates in the section on 'Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness', only this time, within its own self, or rather, in its thinking; i.e. in an opposition between its abstract thought, which it takes to be its true essence, and the practical activity of its existence, which it takes to be unessential. This is because its activity, although inherently
positive insofar as it is a negation of negation, or annihilation of annihilation, still appears as a negative relation, or attitude towards otherness, i.e. its first act as objective self-consciousness is to kill, or eliminate the other that forced it to work.\textsuperscript{15} It is, therefore, a primarily external negation. In other words, self-consciousness has not yet comprehended itself as otherness in general, or rather, otherness has only just begun to comprehend itself as such, and, therefore, also as subject. This only begins with the emergence of thought as reflection, or reflection as such, rather than reflection immersed in the immediacy of determinate being, which everything up until now has been, including the slave's work, the highest form of reflection in the master/slave dialectic.

The emergence of thought as reflection corresponds, in speculative logic, or Science, to essence. Now, it has already been stated that self-consciousness, in its determinations as desire, the struggle for life and death and the master/slave relationship, or dialectic, determines itself according to the logic of essence as the essential and the unessential, which, as we saw, is a distinction made, for the most part, in and between determinate beings, or things - albeit living self-conscious things, but no less things because of their life, or self-consciousness. In fact, both life and self-consciousness have so far only confirmed this thinghood, either intentionally, or unintentionally. The reason for this, as Hegel explains in the Science of Logic, is the following: "The distinction between the essential and unessential has allowed essence to fall back into the sphere of determinate being, for so far essence is here determined as an immediate existent, and therefore merely as other as opposed to being. Here then the sphere of determinate being is the basis" (SL II 20-21). However, as he continues to explain, although the fact that what counts as a being, in this sphere, is a being in-and-for-itself, and, therefore, a determination external to the sphere of determinate being in its simplicity, or immediacy, the fact that essence is this being in-and-for-itself, "only in opposition to another," means that it is essence only "in a determinate respect," i.e. as a determinate being (SL II 21).

Through his, or her work and consequent realization of being-for-self in him, or herself, or simply, his, or her becoming a being-in-and-for-itself, the slave has eliminated the oppositional basis, and, therefore, determinate respect, of essence's being-in-and-for-itself. The slave has done away with the master. The master, however, is, or was, when it comes right down to it, just another determinate being, which means that even this negation is "only [a] first negation, or that negation which is determinateness, and which narrows down being into determinate being and determinate being into other" (SL II 21). What the slave must learn, therefore, is that "essence is the absolute negativity of being [in general]" (SL II 21 [MI]). This does not mean the absolute negation of all being by self-consciousness, at least not in the same way that this negativity was sought by the master, viz, as pure satisfaction, or enjoyment. For this implies a strictly external negation, at least until the time comes for being-for-self, as this absolute egotist, to do away with its own body, as the last obstacle to its freedom. On the contrary, it means the absolute negativity that "is being [in general] itself, being determined not merely ... as an other, but being which, both as immediate being and as immediate
negation (negation which is infected with other-being), has transcended itself" (SL II 21). In other words, self-consciousness must now internalize what so far has largely been an external experience. It must reflect upon, or come to know what it has become. For, as Hegel explains: "Only when knowledge, coming out from the sphere of immediate being, internalizes itself, does it through this mediation, discover (my italics) essence. - ... being which has passed away (my italics), but passed away non-temporally" (SL II 15).

With this internalization, we shall once again be on ground that immediately brings to mind Fichte's command in Chapter 2 to turn our attention away from everything that surrounds us and towards our inner lives; to escape the feeling of necessity created by experience by getting outside of experience, and going inside of ourselves. For this is the ground of essence as such, or pure reflection, and pure reflection, as we shall see shortly, is necessitated as much by the practical need to escape experience, as it is by the philosophical, or Scientific need to find experience's ground. Indeed, there is ultimately no difference at all. Stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness, therefore, will take us back to the beginning of Fichte's Science, i.e. the point where he attempts once and for all to eliminate the ground of the opposition between egoism and egotism, and all the oppositions that result therefrom, especially that between dogmatism and idealism. This is because stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness correspond to the first historical moments of the three kinds of reflection, viz. positioning, external and determining reflection, all of which lead to the establishment of the three essentialities, or determinations of reflection, or, what Fichte sees as, the "fundamental principles of the entire Science of Knowledge" (SK 93), and, therefore, of all thought and freedom, viz. identity, difference and ground. In other words, before we arrive at these principles in scientific form, i.e. apart from their determinate appearances, and, therefore, at the beginning of Science as such, we shall encounter the historical and religious essence of Fichte's philosophy, and so too the moral standpoint, in the forms of stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness. It is only appropriate, therefore, that we deal with these first. For they are, as it were, the essence of essence as such.
Although this desire to fight represents the false infinite of recognition, we shall see shortly, that it does represent a significant moment in the development of self-consciousness, or rather, self-consciousness' differentiation of itself from Nature. [See if the desire to fight, which is an implicit desire for recognition, is maintained in its false infinity as Natural religion, or rather, see if Natural religion is a deification of the struggle inherent in Nature. Natural religion, unlike religion as such, can only be the alienated desire for recognition, not alienated recognition as such. Why? Because self-consciousness has yet to determine that recognition is even something it desires. This will only come about with the master and the slave. Eating and killing have proved unsatisfying, but the struggle itself has not yet necessarily proved unsatisfying. This is why it will be maintained in the master/slave dialectic. Indeed, the master/slave dialectic could be seen as the rational way of preserving struggle, for it leads to the positive moments, i.e. work that allow struggle to be overcome. Natural religion, on the other hand, which is equivalent to the desire for recognition qua the desire to fight is the irrational means of preserving it, because it in itself does not lead to real, i.e. non-religious transcendence.]

This would certainly explain the transition in the human species from gathering herbivore to hunting carnivore. It could also explain the emergence of both natural religion, particularly the deification of certain animals, and cannibalistic cult practices in primitive societies, for the return of self-consciousness' desire marks the express beginning of its search for recognition, not just the recognition of an other, but that recognition is what it desires.

Kojeve, Introduction to Hegel. p. 40. This desire for another desire and an other desire, or simply the desire for desire, is actually the same as the desire to fight. The reason for this is that both are the first non-animal desires possessed by man insofar as they are, as Kojeve says, directed "not (my emphasis) toward a given being, but toward a non-being" (p.40); i.e. that they are not directed toward the simple abstract negation, which all desire aims at in the process of desire and satisfaction, but towards a situation of mutual negation, the first real, or intentional negation of negation. As Kojeve goes on to say: "To desire Being is to fill oneself with this given (my italics) Being, to enslave oneself to it. To desire non-Being is to liberate oneself from Being, to realize one's autonomy, one's Freedom. To be anthropogenic, then, Desire must be directed toward a non-being - that is, towards another Desire, another greedy emptiness, another I. For Desire is absence of Being (to be hungry is to be deprived of food); it is a Nothingness that nihilates in Being, and not a Being that is. In other words, Action that is destined to satisfy an animal Desire, which is directed [immediately] toward a given, existing thing, never succeeds in realizing a human self-conscious I ... To be human, man must act not for the sake of subjugating a thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire (for the thing). The man who desires a thing humanly acts not so much to possess the thing as to make another recognize his right ... to that thing, to make another recognize him as the owner of the thing." (p. 40).

There is no doubt that such activity, directed as it is towards active non-Being, is fighting. However, one could certainly argue that animals fight, and that this does not make them human. It would be foolish to argue that fighting itself is what makes man human, as Kojeve seems to. Even Kojeve, however, whom we have already seen argues that History does not begin, and thus true Man does not appear, until the immediate fight is suspended and the two combatants are left alive, would probably only argue that fighting makes man something more than an animal, something potentially human, even if this something is called the inhuman. It is not the fact of fighting that gives man this potential, for then one would certainly have to admit that most animals possess a self in the same sense as man, which is not the case. It is the active pursuit of the fight as an end, or object in itself, rather than fighting as a mere means to some other object, which constitutes man's impulse beyond nature, and thus towards humanity. It is the difference between fighting when confronted with a situation in which it is absolutely necessary in order to satisfy one's immediate desire, and actually seeking out situations in which it is necessary to fight in order to satisfy one's desire. The former is perfectly in accord with Nature and the instinct to live (p. 49) - even the most predatory animals

Notes


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only seek out the hunt because they have to. The latter, however, implies a qualitative break with, and thus transcendence of, Nature in that a being that seeks out the fight has freed itself from the basic instinct to live. Even if one should attempt to argue that the fight is still thing oriented, or aimed at being insofar as it is aimed at the recognition of ownership of the thing, as Kojeve says at the end of his description of the desire for desire, it would have to be pointed out that this desire is social, and, therefore, universal in nature. As such, it is directed at the realm of being in general. It is a desire for absolute Being, which we have already seen to be identical with nothing. Therefore, it is just as much the desire for nothingness, or the desire for desire, as it is the desire for Being.

Kojeve's interpretation makes this contingent on accident: 'One must suppose (my italics) that the Fight ends in such a way that both adversaries remain alive. Now if this is to occur, one must suppose (my italics) that one of the adversaries gives in to the other and submits to him, recognizing him without being recognized by him. One must suppose (my italics) that the Fight ends in the victory of the one who is ready to go all the way over the one who - faced with death - does not manage to raise himself above his biological instinct of preservation (identity)” (p. 41). One must suppose nothing. There is no no reason to assume anything here that would break the logical development Hegel has set forth. Self-consciousness learns from its experience, not necessarily what it needs, for this it must find, but certainly that it lacks something. It is still unsatisfied, and it is this dissatisfaction which compels it to seek out a transformation in the process of satisfying its desire. In the struggle for life and death, self-consciousness finds satisfaction that it did not find in the simple process of desire and satisfaction, but this satisfaction also proves to be limited. After killing its opponent, and even eating its opponent, desire returns. Experience, therefore, teaches self-consciousness - and it does not matter whether it is eventually, or immediately - that fighting gives it a certain satisfaction, but that killing, like consuming does not satisfy that part of itself which is seeking something more, something we know to be recognition of its being-for-self, but something it only feels as a desire for self-certainty. This in itself is enough to create, in self-consciousness in general, what we shall immediately see is, the dual capacity for fear and mercy.

We infer from this first that as the medium and substance of beings, Life can constitute itself only in an activity that inverts and transforms. 'Labour is the first form of this activity." (My italics).

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See Kojeve, Introduction, p. 42 on work as the transformation of Nature in relation to a non-material idea.

Kojeve holds that the master can only be killed for self-consciousness to advance. This, however, is not consistent with Hegel: see Philosophy of Mind, p. 176, para. 435 on the persuasion of the master by a higher rational order, and for the justification to kill him otherwise, p. 174, para. 433.


See Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology, pp. 266 & 267.

Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology, p. 257.

Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology, p. 257.

Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology, p. 257.

Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology, p. 257.
Appendix 2

Reflection
&
the Internalization of Self-Consciousness' Experience qua Egoism & Egotism

By way of a preliminary explanation as to how stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness correspond to the three forms of reflection, we shall see that the slave's rebellion against the master is at first merely show. It is the self-positing of thought, which is essence, against the insatiable, and thus annihilatory, desire of pure being-for-self, or pure negative freedom as a determinate being, as well as everything this being desires, viz. the rest of determinate being, or simply, being in general. This self-positing of the disciplined and productive self over and against the master's undisciplined and destructive self, as well as everything this undisciplined destructive self desires, constitutes the essence of stoicism. This self-positing, however, is only an ideal positing, and, as an ideal positing, although it is something that can be aspired to by all, it is in fact empty. In reflection, therefore, this ideal shows itself to really be nothing in itself. It is merely an appearance, just like every other thing that thought presupposed as having immediate existence, which it now sets out to show or demonstrate as well.

Hence, reflection has become the "phenomenon of scepticism" (SL II 22 [MI]), which is all the slave's rebellion really was in the first place, i.e., scepticism regarding the master and his world. However, even though reflection, as scepticism, aims at demonstrating the identity of these other things, which it presupposes, with itself, and that this identity is simply the self-identity of nothing, it begins from its presupposition as from an other. Therefore, it again becomes determinate, and as such is external to what it reflects upon. Finally, in its determining of everything as a mere appearance, thought as reflection discovers that it is in fact the determination of appearance, which, therefore, is not really an appearance at all. Rather, it is the beginning of actuality (SL II 18). Self-consciousness then, as this power of determining appearance, once again begins to work.

This time, however, it begins the work of rendering its ideal, not-ideal. This making of the ideal not-ideal is that ideal's passage into "existence and appearance" (SL II 19), and marks the beginning of the work of revolution and thought's creativity, as thought, as well as the beginning of the end of the immediate wilfulness of rebellion that occurs in, or rather, first appears as, stoicism. However, because thought still desires that its ideal be immediately real, which is why it sets to work at all, this ideal still lies beyond its grasp. It is still not real. It still exists merely as an appearance, even though it has started making this appearance into existence. Thus, it cannot yet let go of its wilfulness completely. Self-consciousness still desires, or wishes that its ideal would be real immediately, and it
reflects on this possibility, just as it reflects upon its creative activity. Indeed, it is impossible to tell the difference between these two activities at times, since it spends as much time imagining what this world of possibility might be, as it does working in and on this one. It simultaneously exists, therefore, in world of real ideality, or existence and of ideal reality, or appearance, a world, as it were, of what we saw in Chapter 5 is, two worlds, and it cannot be satisfied, or happy until its work somehow gets done, and these two become one. Consequently, self-consciousness, as determining reflection, is unhappy consciousness. We must now see, however, how self-consciousness learns this for itself.

A. Stoicism and the First Moment of Positing Reflection as such, or the Formal Act of Rebellion

When the slave eliminates the master, being-for-self is no longer an external object for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, therefore, is now free to reflect upon itself immediately as a being-in-and-for-itself. The power that it previously experienced only as a feeling of independence emerging from its work, suddenly becomes objectified to itself in the form of its own act, and through this act, self-consciousness comes, as it were, face to face with itself, without the mediation of an external other. Being-for-self has been internalized, and self-consciousness no longer needs to look for itself outside of itself in either the objects it produces, or what compels it to produce. It is its own object. As a consequence, however, "these two moments, [viz] itself as an independent object [for-itself], and this object, [or product] as a mode of consciousness, and hence its own essential nature, fall apart" (PhS 120:197 [MI]). On the one hand then, self-consciousness continues to live and work, i.e. it continues to produce objects. On the other, however, it begins to reflect upon itself as an object apart from these others. In short, it thinks (PhS 120:197).

Self-consciousness, therefore, no longer identifies itself with the activity associated with these other objects, viz. its practical activity. Instead, it only identifies itself with its thought of itself. It has excluded all determinateness. It is indifferent to what it does, because it has learned, through its experience as a slave, that all people are essentially the same, regardless of their activity. Indeed, self-consciousness, at this point, is even indifferent to what it thinks, since its essence lies not in the particular nature, determinations, or content of its thoughts, i.e. whether they are of 'this' or 'that' object, whether they are lofty thoughts, or simple ones, etc., but simply and solely in the fact that it is "a being which thinks, or is a free self-consciousness" (PhS 120:197).

Thinking in general, or pure thought then, is what is regarded as essential and true without regard to content. For self-consciousness has learned through work that it determines this content, "that a thing exists, not because it is, but through thought" (HP II 253), i.e. the thought that gives it its form through work. This is not to say that thought no longer requires objectivity in order to exist. For
this would certainly constitute a complete rejection of everything self-consciousness supposedly learned in the struggle for life and death, i.e. that life is as essential to self-consciousness as being-for-self, and of everything self-consciousness has become, i.e. the immediate unity of self-consciousness and objectivity, objective self-consciousness, or self-conscious objectivity. On the contrary, self-consciousness merely recognizes the universal nature, or absolute form of life. In other words, it recognizes that all things in nature arise from a "ruling principle" and "power" (HP II 247), which is the rational, or thought in general, i.e. Logos, or God, and for which everything is the same, or not different.

Self-consciousness, at this stage of development then, is indifferent, and by virtue of this indifference, it becomes the immediate equality of all beings that think. For that they think implies that they embody this ruling principle and power in themselves. It is the stage where all people are generally recognized, in thought, as human beings, or, since this term implies more than just formal recognition, we should say, not simply as things, but as free self-consciousnesses. "This freedom of self-consciousness [to be indifferent to all content and activity, and, therefore, to be equal to every other self-consciousnesses,] when it appeared as a conscious manifestation in the history of Spirit has ... been called stoicism. ¹ Its principle is that consciousness is a being that thinks, and that consciousness holds something to be essentially important, or true and good only insofar as it thinks it to be such" (PhS 121:198).

The separation of thought from practice does, indeed, enable self-consciousness to constitute itself as a real self, as opposed to the merely abstract individual it was immediately prior to the process of desire and satisfaction, i.e. as pure self-certainly. According to Hegel, this is because "to think does not mean to be an abstract T, but an T which has at the same time the significance of intrinsic being, of having itself for object [and thus the object inside of itself], or of relating itself to objective being in such a way that its significance is the being-for-self of the consciousness for which it is [an object]" (PhS 120:197). However, because thought by itself, or thought that has excluded determinateness, and, therefore, is thought without regard to content, is abstract, this real self has an abstract essence, which means, therefore, that its freedom is still only abstract, i.e. the freedom from life. Stoicism lets life, as it were, go free in its indifference to it (PhS 122:200), and in letting life go free, it momentarily lets go of the positive freedom self-consciousness experienced through its work as a slave.² Self-consciousness, therefore, may have freed itself from the master as a separate individual, but, as begins to appear in the Phenomenology, it resurrects him, or, at this stage, simply the pure being-for-self that produced him, and thus simply the idea of him in every individual.

With even the idea of the master, however, comes only the idea of freedom, not actual freedom. As Hegel says: "Freedom in thought has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking the fullness of life. Hence, freedom in thought, too, is only the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom" (PhS
122:200). To be this living reality of freedom, self-consciousness would have to be an "individuality [that] in its activity ... show[s] itself to be alive, or in its thinking grasp[s] the living world as a system of thought, [that is, thought with an essential content]" (PhS 122:200). Life and the living world, however, are precisely what the master and his notion of freedom showed themselves to be opposed to. The master showed himself to be dead in his activity as an individual; or rather, the activity, through which he attempted to affirm his notion of individuality, produced only death in and for the living world, and ultimately even himself. His interest was not in grasping the living world as a system of thought, with an inherent value, or content in itself, but in grasping it as a fundamental emptiness. The master was not a real individual, merely an abstract one.

What then is the freedom of stoicism, or put differently, what is the pure thought of free self-consciousness?

1. Slavery & Rebellion as Show

The freedom of stoicism, i.e. the pure thought of free self-consciousness, is nothing, or, as Hegel puts it: "this self-identity of thought is again only the pure form, [or I=I,] in which nothing is determined" (PhS 122:200 [MI]). Consequently, self-consciousness still exists only as a slave, even after having supposedly eliminated the master. In fact, we now discover, as does self-consciousness, that the act by which the slave freed him, or herself from the master, in short, his, or her rebellion, was merely a show. This, however, is exactly what slavery was all along. As Hegel says in the Science of Logic: "Essence comes out of being and appears to stand opposed to it, [i.e. as the essential, or as mastery]; here this immediate being is the unessential [viz. both the object and the slave]. But ... it is more than only the unessential [that is, an unessential determinate being, or an object and a slave], it is essenceless being, it is show" (SL II 20 [MI]). It is what is in and for itself nothing, or "the negative posited as negative" (SL II 21 [MI]). It is determinate being that negates itself before the essential, through surrender, labour and the presentation of the products of labour, for enjoyment, to the essential. Thus, it is determinate being that retains its existence only through its active self-negation for another. However, as we saw, it does so only in order to satisfy this other's pure being-for-self, or what is, in this other, also opposed to existence, and, therefore, also negative. Hence, "show is this immediate non-existence, and it is this - in the determinateness of being - in such a manner that it has existence only in relation to another, in its non-existence: it is that instability which is only in its negation. There remains therefore only the pure determinateness of immediacy; it exists as reflected immediacy, that is, as that immediacy which exists only through the mediation of its negation, [i.e. first by mastery, then by itself through work,] and is nothing in relation to its mediation, [which is everything,] but the empty determination of the immediacy of non-existence" (SL II 22 [MI]). In other words, the slave, as was shown above, without either a master, work, or both, may as well be dead. For his, or her existence has no mediation, and, is therefore, null and void in itself. The slave as such
then is mediated immediacy.

Slavery, however, proved itself to be as much being-for-self, and, therefore, as much a determination of essence as mastery. Likewise, show, although in itself nothing, and, therefore, distinct from essence, as what is essenceless, proves to be essence. "Essence is being transcended" (SL II 20) i.e. both the condition of being transcended and the transcendence of the sheer of being. As we have just seen, what remains of this sphere, after its transcendence, is show, or what cannot exist without the mediation of what has stepped forth out of this sphere, and set itself apart from it. Show then is immediate not-being. However, this is also what essence is in itself, i.e. when we consider it immediately. For being transcended, or transcended being is being that no longer is. Thus, it is literally not-being. "In essence, being is not-being" (SL II 23), which is simply another way of saying what we already discovered about being itself, viz. that the essence of being is nothing. This is all that essence is in itself, viz. nothing, or pure negativity. "The negativity of essence, [however,] is its self-identity, or its simple immediacy and indifference" (SL II 23). As we discovered in our consideration of pure being and nothing, there is no way to distinguish nothing from itself, or anything else. It is absolutely identical with everything, including itself. Insofar as nothing else is identical with everything else, however, nothing is also absolutely different from everything else, or rather, it is identical only with itself, i.e. it is absolute self-identity.

Through this absolute self-identity of nothingness, however, "being has preserved itself in essence" (SL II 23). For the nothing of nothingness is being, which, as we also saw, is the condition of everything's identity, and, therefore, absolute self-identity. In other words, the essence of nothing is being, and, therefore, "essence itself is being" (SL II 23). It is being "not as being [in general]," but "being as moment" (SL II 23). It is being as a moment, because it is being that cannot, as we just saw, exist immediately, or in itself, but only by being "mediated or reflected" (SL II 24). It exists as "reflected immediacy" (SL II 24). Being that is the result of the persistent negativity that constitutes essence then, is the "show of essence itself" (SL II 24). Put differently, essence must show itself, and it does so in the determinateness of being, or as a being that is in itself nothing, but must nonetheless manifests itself as something. The moments of show, therefore, "are the moments of essence itself" (SL II 24). They are essence in its immediacy, which is simply the same as saying essence in its determinateness.

This determinateness of essence, and, therefore, the immediacy of essence showing itself in the determinateness of being, however, is, as Hegel says, "equally transcended in [essence]" (SL II 24 [MI]). For, as we have seen, both in general and in particular, and as the slave has experienced, in his, or her work upon both the object as such and the object as being-for-self, show is the relation of negativity to negativity, and thus the self-relation or identity of negativity. It is determinateness that is self-determining negativity, and, therefore, return to itself (SL II 24). Either way then, "it is [the]
absolute transcendence of determinateness itself" (SL II 24). Just as the absolute uncertainty and instability of the slave's existence is subverted when he, or she "posits him, [or her] self as a negative in the permanent order of things" (PhS 118:196), and, thereby, becomes a moment of stability, or rather, a stable instability, so too show's inherent instability is actually unstable instability, insofar as it is "a determinateness which is infinite: ... determinateness which as such is stability and is not determinate" (SL II 24 [MI]). Show then, like work, is the infinite internal movement of essence's "showing of itself in itself" (SL II 24), i.e. in essence, or essence's self-movement, and thus more than what it is or appears to be, which, in essence, is the same thing. It is, what Hegel calls, essence's "self-positing" (SL II 19), or reflection, in its first moment, as positing reflection, and this is precisely what constitutes the slave's first act of rebellion against the master, i.e. the positing of him, or herself, as a self, in and for him, or herself. In order to find out what immediately happens as a result of the slave's self-positing, however, we must inquire further into the nature of positing reflection.

2. Positing Reflection

Show shows itself to be nothing, and as such, it is essenceless being. However, insofar as show shows itself to be nothing, it is, as we saw, self-determining negation, and, therefore, the negation of negation in itself, not "in an other" (SL II 26). Show, therefore, is essence, or rather, it has become reflection, or the "absolute reflection of essence" (SL II 26 [MI]) - essence being transcended being, or not-being, which is nothing. In show then, we simply have nothing reflected back against nothing. This is why Hegel describes reflection in general as, "the movement from nothing to nothing and through nothing back to itself" (SL II 26). So far, however, we merely have the first part of this movement, which does not seem to be a movement at all, but rather, the simple face to face, or side by side of two identical nothings in a single show of essence. In short, it seems to be only the self-identity of nothing in an immediate determinate being, which is simply something that "consists ... in [both] being itself and not itself" (HSL 400).

Two negations, however, are in fact present here, which reveal the movement in its entirety. First of all, nothing cannot face itself indifferentely in its self-identity. For, as we have already seen numerous times, self-identical nothing is absolute nothing, and the nothing of nothingness is being. When nothing faces itself, therefore, it immediately produces, or posits being. Nothing then, posits being, or if nothing posits being, then being posits itself. Nothing posits being, therefore, being posits itself, or is self-positing. The self-positing of being then, presupposes nothing. However, if being is the result of nothing's negation, then being too is negation. It is the negation of nothing, and this negation of nothing by being provides the ground for the second negation of negation: The determinate being, in which the self-identity of nothing resides, is also a negation. It is a negation of nothing, and so also of the self-identity that resides in itself, viz. the self-identity of nothing. Determinate being, therefore, as the negation of nothing, also immediately produces, or re-produces, or
simply, posits itself from itself, as determinate being, not nothing. This, as we see, however, is also an affirmation of nothing in its self-identity, and, therefore, a return to nothing. For this determinate being is itself the negation of negation, or self-negation, which posits determinate being, and, thereby, presupposes nothing, nothing but itself, which is the same as presupposing nothing pure and simple. In its immediacy, it is the negation of nothing, and, in its self-positing, it is the negation of its own immediacy. It is a mediated immediacy, or it is no longer merely a show, but a posited being.

This immediacy, which could only exist through mediation, however, is also what determinate being was in show. Reflection's apparent beginning, or rather, the moment that reflection first shows itself, and from which it appears to begin, viz. immediate determinate being, or show, is a return, but not just a simple return. It is the return to itself, which begins as a return to itself, or what is already returned to itself, and, therefore, a reflection of reflection (SL II 27). Positing reflection then, is actually presupposition, which is the transcendence of positing, i.e. the presupposing of the posited, and presupposition is once again the the presupposition of nothing, which is essence, or being transcended and transcended being. "The presupposing is the manner in which [reflection] relates itself to itself, but to itself as the negative of itself; only thus is it the self-relating negativity that remains internal to itself, [or essence]" (HSL 401).

To presuppose nothing, however, is to presuppose show, which proved itself to be nothing. "Accordingly, the return of essence is [simultaneously] its self-repulsion. In other words, reflection-into-self, [or self-reflecting reflection] is essentially the presupposing of that from which it is the return" (HSL 401). It is the presupposition of show, or presupposition is the "show of the beginning" (SL II 27), which means either the pretence of beginning the process of reflection, or reflection's sudden appearance out of determinate being as if from nothing, or both. In either case, reflection is determinate being's self-presupposition as something immediate, but something that is really not and cannot be immediate. Reflection, as self-presupposing, therefore, is actually a presupposing of presupposing, and this is exactly what Hegel means, when he says: "It is only through the transcendence of its self-identity, [viz. as nothing and as determinateness,] that essence is self-identity, [viz. as reflection]. It presupposes itself, [as reflection,] and it is itself the transcendence of this presupposition; and conversely this transcendence of its presupposition is the presupposition itself" (SL II 28 [MI]). Simply put, one cannot presuppose what one has not already moved beyond, or passed by, and what is, therefore, transcended, or what is not.

Equally, however, one cannot move beyond what is not already present, and, therefore, what is capable of being presupposed, i.e. what is, just as much by being presupposed, as not. In what seems to be the beginning of reflection then, "reflection finds itself faced with something immediate, beyond which it passes, and out of which it is the return. But this return is only the presupposition of what has been found, [viz. the immediate something]. And this [something] arises only as it is left behind; its
immediacy is *transcended immediacy* (SL II 28 [MI]), [that is, mediated immediacy, or something mediated by the movement away from itself, i.e. its negation]. Conversely, transcended immediacy, [or mediated immediacy, or something negated,] is *return to self*, [as pure immediacy,] the *arrival of essence at itself*, [as the condition of being's transcendence, or simply being transcended], *being simple* and *self-identical*, [viz. abstract being, or nothing]. Thus, this arrival at self is *self-transcendence*, it is *self-repellent and presupposing reflection*, and its *self-repulsion is its arrival at itself* (SL II 28 [MI]). Pure immediacy, absolute (presupposing) reflection, *essence in itself*, etc., therefore, *immediately reproduces*, or *posits the process of mediation* that constitutes the intro-reflective being of essence, or the *movement*, Hegel describes as, *"absolute recoil into itself"* (SL II 28 [MI]), i.e. a progress, or egress beyond the self that is *simultaneously a regress* (SL II 28), or withdrawal back into itself (PhS 122:201).

This absolute recoil is precisely what happens to the slave during his, or her first explicit act against the master. In the slave's rebellion against the master, the slave posits him, or herself as a self, but in so doing, actually does no more than he, or she already did in his, or her work as a slave, where he, or she has *already* proved and found him, or herself to be a being-for-self in him, or herself. The slave, therefore, merely presupposes him, or herself as a slave. His, or her act then is simply the act of thinking, or more precisely, the act of *thinking about thinking*, since he, or she thinks from the moment he, or she begins to transform objectivity according to an idea not already determined by the realm of life, or *Nature*, viz. the idea of *more, surplus, or quantity*. In thinking about thinking, or reflecting upon him, or herself as a thinking being then, the slave merely *presupposes* him, or herself as a being-for-self, and, therefore, *posits* him, or herself as the master's equal. This self-positing is *ipso facto* the death of the master, as master. For in recognizing him, or herself, the slave no longer recognizes the master as master, and thus withdraws the essential determinant of the master's self-consciousness.

The absolute nature of this self-recognition, however, is also an affirmation of the master's being-for-self insofar as it reflects the master's original refusal to go out of himself, and recognize the inherent value of anything other than himself, i.e. either the slave, or the objective world. Thus, just as the master never truly acts again after his moment of recognition, but instead merely has the world of objectivity presented to him in and for an eternal *re-enactment* of the act by which he became master, the slave is immediately pulled back into him, or herself by reflection, before he, or she necessarily has a chance to eliminate the master once and for all. In short, the slave kills the master, but only in thought that is abstract, or rather, he, or she kills him by the fact of the presence of pure thought in him, or herself, which, at the moment, is all that matters to the slave, since abstract, or pure thought, for the slave, is essence. \(^3\)

Insofar as stoicism merely represents the formal death of the master, and not his actual death then,
stoicism, in actuality, only represents a world of slaves dreaming about, or reflecting upon the idea of freedom, while continuing to exist in the society determined by the relationship with their masters, and thus a society in which masters still exist in practice, if not thought. This is of course why stoicism is actually the original form of dogmatism in the history of Western philosophy, i.e. the demand for strict adherence to rules and the laws of nature, regardless of how much this adherence might actually conflict with the stoic ideal of freedom. Freedom for the stoic in this world lies only in his, or her conscious resignation to and acceptance of fate - hence Fichte's judgement that all dogmatists are necessarily fatalists - and his, or her fatalism becomes nothing more than a rationalization for inaction, passivity or simply, his or her "refusal to fight to realize his [or her] libertarian ideal." In other words, stoicism's conviction regarding freedom in thought, or freedom merely as an ideal, is simultaneously a denial of freedom in existence, and, therefore, of the existence of freedom as well.

The stoic, therefore, is a slave, who, through reflection, will have to rediscover that his, or her freedom is work, both for him, or herself and an other at the same time, or that freedom in general is practical human activity, which is necessarily revolutionary activity. Until then, he, or she is merely a slave reflecting upon his, or her experience as a slave, or, even though he, or she may not realize it, imagining what it would be like to be a master in a world of slaves. This is why Hegel says in the Phenomenology that: 'It is clear that stoicism corresponds to the Notion of the independent consciousness which appeared as the master and slave relationship' (PhS 123:202 [MI]). Indeed, this is the reason for the periods of disillusionment which inevitably follow mere rebellions, or what are in fact simply formal, or purely political revolutions, like the one that begets stoicism i.e. revolutions in consciousness alone, or consciousness that either knowingly, or unknowingly excludes existence. Once the euphoria of such revolution dies down and one looks around to see what has changed, only to discover that nothing in fact has changed, one's new found conviction, or the conviction in one's new found self, which accompanies reflection, as we have so far described it, i.e. as posting, or presupposing reflection, disappears, and stoicism begets its opposite tendency, viz. scepticism.

B. Scepticism and the First Moment of External Reflection as such, or the Appearance of Becoming in Thought

Scepticism is not a regression from stoicism, even though it may at first certainly seem to be one, particularly for those who experience it first hand, as well as those who might seek justification for their reactionary standpoint in the fact that nothing has changed, despite the slave's show of rebellion, viz. the master. Indeed, scepticism as such, or what will be revealed shortly as external reflection, can be neither a regression, nor a progression upon stoicism and positing reflection. For, a) even though the freedom of stoicism, or the pure thought of free self-consciousness has turned out to be nothing, this nothing still possesses, as was said above, the significance of intrinsic being, and b) the absolute reflection, which is immediately both positing and presupposing reflection, is also immediately
external reflection. In other words, the phenomenon of scepticism, as indicated in the preliminary explanation of stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness as the first actual moments of positing, external and determining reflection as such, is present from the beginning, along with stoicism. In fact, its movement is the same absolute recoil as stoicism is, but with a slight difference which enables it to set itself apart from stoicism in the beginning.

Reflection, as we saw, is the reflection of itself, or what is self-reflecting. Thus, as with any reflection, the image of the original is going first to appear inverted. This means then that if the positing and presupposing reflection of stoicism is a progress that immediately becomes a regress, the external reflection of scepticism is a regress that immediately becomes a progress, specifically a regress into itself that is progress from itself. We have already glimpsed this in the positing reflection of stoicism, insofar as the determinate being, which in itself is nothing, nonetheless posits itself as a determinate being, by presupposing itself as a determinate being, and insofar as absolute (presupposing) reflection immediately reproduces, or posits the process of mediation that gives rise to determinate being in the first place, i.e. the mediation between pure being and nothing, or becoming.

To be sure, the pure thought of free self-consciousness vanishes in stoicism. It shows itself to be nothing, but, in showing itself to be nothing, it becomes the thought of nothing, which, as we already know, immediately begets being (SL I 111-12). It begets being, however, not as the absolute being of pure being-for-self in its immediacy, i.e. as rampant desire, mastery, or both, but rather, as the absolute restlessness of simple, or abstract becoming in thought. Whereas the transformative activity of the slave represented self-consciousness' appearance as becoming in the realm of existence, i.e. the first moment of historical becoming, then, scepticism represents this concept's self-conscious appearance. This is why, for Hegel, "scepticism corresponds to [self-consciousness'] realization as a negative attitude towards otherness, that is, to desire and (my italics) work" (PhS 123:202); and "[e]ssence is reflection, [or] the movement of becoming and transition which remains within itself" (SL II 25 [MI]).

Thus, just as we saw in the Introduction how he describes becoming in the Logic as the first concrete thought, and, therefore, the first concept, (LL 132:88), so too he describes scepticism, in the Phenomenology, as the stage where abstract "thought becomes ... concrete thinking" (PhS 123:202 [MI]).

Becoming, as was previously shown, however, is characterized by the immediate appearance of difference and determination. Indeed, it utterly depends upon absolute difference, viz. the difference between absolute being and nothing, and determination, viz. indeterminacy as the determination of being and nothing, in order to subsist. So far we have been able vaguely to discern that determinativeness is present in external reflection insofar as it remains present through the process of absolute, or positing and presupposing reflection. However, we are told right away, that scepticism represents thought's annihilation of "the being of the world in all [of] its manifold determinateness"
(PhS 123:202 [MI]). This means that "independent things in their differences from one another are for [thought] only vanishing magnitudes" (PhS 123:202 [MI]). In short, scepticism is the disappearance of difference in a fundamental self-identity. Self-identity, however, supposedly belongs to, and, therefore, is left behind, with stoicism; or rather, since stoicism and scepticism are coextensive, this identity proves to be merely the self-identity of nothing, which is the essence of stoicism.

How then can scepticism be distinguished from stoicism, when, from what we have just been told, it would seem to be the same thing; or more importantly, how can scepticism be said to represent the first appearance of the concept of becoming in thought, when it would seem to be the exact opposite of this concept?

Scepticism is not the complete annihilation of determinateness and disappearance of difference that it at first seems to be. This is because it is merely the annihilation of determinateness in what appears to be its independent otherness from thought, or as something separate from itself, in this case its self as thinking. In stoicism thought turns out to be nothing, i.e. it has no content. It is purely abstract. In scepticism, however, "the negativity of free self-consciousness comes to know itself in the many and varied forms of life as a real negativity" (PhS 123:202 [MI]). In other words, when thought, thinking upon itself, discovers itself to be nothing, it is left only with what it tried to let go of or exclude from itself as thought, viz. the realm of life, or determinate being. Thus, it once more turns its emptiness, or absolute negativity in itself against all of the forms through which life presents itself, in order to show that these too are in themselves nothing, or are merely a show, just like the self it posited in and for itself. Self-consciousness, therefore, becomes the sceptical polemic directed against all reality (PhS 123:202), and, insofar as this negativity must be directed against something, even if that something, as we shall shortly see, is at first nothingness, pure thought assumes a content. It becomes the negation of something, which represents the other of thought, or simply, determinate negation. However, thought, or reflection, as it has so far been encountered, i.e. as absolute reflection, is not supposed to have its being in or for an other, "for there is [supposedly] no other" (SL II 27) in essence - at least not a real other.

Where then does this other, which is so important to the realization of thought, as determinate, come from? We have asserted that it comes from the realm of life. Why, however, should self-consciousness now include what it has already excluded, simply because pure thought has shown itself to be nothing? In short, how does the other re-emerge in thought?

1. The Twofold Reflection of External, or Real Reflection

"The immediacy that reflection, as a process of transcendence, presupposes for itself is purely and simply a positedness, [a self-positedness.] an immediacy that is in itself transcended, [and, therefore,
nothing, or merely a show] that is not distinct from the return-into-self and is itself only this movement of return. But, at the same time, it is determined as negative, as immediately opposed to something, [even though this something is actually nothing, viz. nothing as the negation of itself, or determinate being as the negation of nothing,] and therefore to an other (my italics)" (SL II 28 & HSL 402). For there cannot be something, as we saw in Chapter 4, without an other, or something else, and it is the presence, in thought, of this something else that makes reflection determinate, or rather, causes absolute reflection to show itself as external, or real reflection (SL II 28-29). We have already seen that reflection's presupposition of show is really a self-presupposition, and, therefore, a presupposition of itself. This means then, that reflection is not only the presupposition of being transcended, or transcended being, but also of "itself as transcended, as its own negative" (SL II 29 [MJ]).

External reflection, therefore, is, as Hegel points out, twofold (SL II 29), or doubled (HSL 403) reflection. On the one hand, it is the presupposed immediate, which we have already seen to be introspected being, or the reflection of negativity upon nothing, and, on the other, "reflection, which, as negative, refers itself to itself," which means it is not what is presupposed, and, therefore, not immediate being, but rather, purely negative in relation to its presupposition, and also, therefore, "related to itself as to its non-being," viz. the immediate presupposed being (SL II 29 & HSL 405). In other words, reflection, as the second moment of external reflection, is itself both an immediate being, like its presupposition, and pure negativity. Thus, this moment is in itself the reflection of external reflection in general. This difference of reflection, both from itself and in itself, is precisely what emerges in the transition from stoicism to scepticism, where the indifference of pure thought, in its absolute indeterminateness, is at first replaced by the absolute difference in and of concrete thinking; or, as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology: "The differences, which in the pure thinking of self-consciousness are only the abstraction of differences, here [in scepticism] become the entirety of the differences, and the whole of differentiated being becomes a difference of self-consciousness" (PhS 123:202). Before we examine this difference in scepticism as such, however, let us first finish with its development in the essence of scepticism, or external reflection.

Whereas positing reflection seemed to begin with the presupposition of a show, and, therefore, with nothing, external reflection begins with the presupposition of that show as already posited, and, therefore, with immediate being. The immediacy of this being, however, is not simple, or, as Hegel puts it, not "only positedness or a moment" (SL II 29 & HSL 403). It is also self-relation (SL II 29). It is the self-relation of nothing, which is, therefore, something in which "determinateness exists only as a moment" (SL II 29), and of itself as a determinate being, since, as we saw, it could also immediately reproduce, or posit itself, as a determinate being, from itself, as a determinate being. Thus, this immediacy, which external reflection first associates with its not-being, or, does not consider reflection, seems to be what endures, rather than reflection as such. External reflection then,
is in a negative relation with its presupposition, because this presupposition is the positive result of the negation of negation in positing reflection. However, this negative relation, because it brings negation, i.e. by the positive being, into relation with what is in itself negative, viz. external reflection, also means that this presupposition, as negative, "is transcended" (SL II 29); or that, although it is not reflection, it is also not simply the negation of reflection. Rather than a positedness then, this presupposition is, as Hegel describes it, an immediate presupposition of external reflection. This is because positedness is transcended as soon as positing occurs, which means that positing reflection, upon its appearance, immediately becomes external reflection (SL II 29 & HSL 403).

External reflection "therefore finds this [immediate presupposition, or being] before it as something from which it starts, and from which it is first the return-into-self, the negating of this its negative" (HSL 403 [MI]). In short, reflection is driven back into itself by this something, to find that it is not simply nothing, but the nothing of something, i.e. of both the nothing in itself and outside of itself. External reflection, as Hegel points out, however, "does not concern it[self]" with the fact that this immediate presupposition is actually negative towards reflection, because "this determinateness [as the negation of negation, and, therefore, reflection,] belongs only to the positing reflection," which is transcended (HSL 403). Put in terms of the Phenomenology, it is only the stoic, or, as we shall see, the stoic in the sceptic, whose pure thought has already proved to be nothing, who could have that nothingness confirmed, or driven home for him, or herself by the intrusion of the realm of determinate being or life. This is because scepticism and external reflection are determinate from their inception, viz. determinate negation, which means that they impose the determination of negation upon what they find before themselves. Scepticism's activity, as external reflection, is the activity of negation. "The determinations posited by external reflection in the immediate, [therefore,] are to that extent external to the latter" (HSL 403 [MI]). This is what prompts Hegel to describe external reflection as: "the syllogism in which the two extremes are the immediate and reflection-into-self; the middle term of the syllogism is the connection of the two, [viz.] the determinate immediate, so that one part of the middle term, [i.e.] immediacy belongs to one of the extremes, [and] the other, [i.e.] determinateness, or negation, belongs to the other extreme" (HSL 403 [MI]).

It is not, however, so neatly divided. External reflection may not at first concern itself with its presupposition's actual negativity, since this negativity belongs to the positing reflection which has already been transcended, but external reflection, in positing the immediate presupposition as its negative, is actually positing its identity with reflection. For reflection's determining of its presupposition as negative is actually the transcendence of that presupposition's negativity. Consequently, "this immediate from which it seemed to start as from something alien, is, [or exists as, an appearance, an apparent beginning] only in this its beginning" (SL II 30 & HSL 404 [MI]). External reflection then negates even its own determination of its presupposition as the negative of reflection, by virtue of this determining, and thus itself as external reflection (SL II 30 & HSL 404).
"Hereby the externality of reflection is transcended; its self-negating positing is the coincidence [or union (HSL 404)] of itself with its negative (the immediate), and this coincidence [or union] is essentially immediacy itself, [or the immediacy of essence itself (HSL 404), for this is what immediacy was (in and for positing reflection), or is in essence, essence being transcended being, or being transcended]. We thus discover that external reflection is not external but also [the] immanent reflection of immediacy itself, or that what exists by positing reflection is essence which is in and for itself. It is thus determining reflection" (SL II 30 [MI]). Before discussing this, however, we must first see how this self-negating movement manifests itself explicitly as becoming in scepticism.

2. Becoming in Scepticism

The absolute identity and inertia of pure thought in stoicism, which corresponds, as we saw, to the re-appearance of the absolute being and nothing from which speculative logic began, vanishes in the pure movement of thought as absolute difference or becoming. This is why, in the Phenomenology, Hegel calls scepticism, absolute dialectical unrest (PhS 124:205); or rather, the stage where thought begins to master the dialectic, rather than be mastered by it; the stage where dialectic becomes a moment of self-consciousness, rather than self-consciousness merely being a moment of the dialectic in general; and finally, the stage where thought begins to express itself in "scientific Notions," or concepts, rather than the images and static, one-sided categories of the understanding (PhS 123-124:203-205). However, just as becoming first seemed to be the identity of being and nothing, so too self-consciousness, as scepticism, first seems to be the real experience of the stoic ideal of indifferenc, or pure thought's absolute self-identity. This is due to its determination as negative, i.e. negative of itself as nothing, and of the object as something separate from thought. "The sceptical self-consciousness thus experiences in the flux of all that would stand secure before it its own freedom as given and preserved by itself (my italics). It is aware of this stoical indifference of a thinking which thinks itself, the unchanging and genuine certainty of itself" (PhS 124:205). Self-consciousness then, in the passing away of all being into the void of thought, arises as the absolute being in thought, or thought arises with the certainty of itself as absolute being.7 Such being, however, as has already been shown in the original treatment of becoming and the various forms of reflection, is not really absolute, and neither is the nothingness into which thought makes all being pass. They are merely moments in the determinate unity, or movement of becoming, which is the disappearance of indeterminacy and indifferenc, or the appearance of something, viz. a determinate identity - this identity being reflection, or the mind of the sceptic.

Scepticism, however, depends upon the "vanish[ing] ... [of] the determinate element, or the moment of difference, which, whatever its mode of being and whatever its source, sets itself up as something fixed and immutable" (PhS 124:204). In other words, even the unchanging and genuine certainty of thought must be immediately dissolved by sceptical thought upon its appearance; "for it is itself
determinateness, as contrasted with the non-identical" (PhS 124:205), which has been determined as the negative of thought, or reflection. Self-consciousness, therefore, "instead of being self-identical," passes back into life, and becomes "a consciousness which is empirical, which takes its guidance from what has no reality for it, which obeys (my italics) what is for it not an essential being, which does those things and brings to realization what it knows has no truth for it, [viz. everything it did and concerned itself with, both as a slave and a stoic]" (PhS 124-125:205).

Self-consciousness, as scepticism, then, is merely an endless process of thought's arising and passing away, viz. abstract becoming. For once it becomes empirical consciousness and its self-consciousness seems to have once again been reduced to nothing by the object, this absolute negativity re-asserts itself against "all singularity and all difference," i.e. it begins the process of negating everything it comes into contact with or presupposes all over again. This is perfectly consistent with the concept of becoming in its simplicity, or immediacy, as arising and passing away, but not with becoming in its truth, i.e. as the first concrete thought. The reason for this, as we know from the Introduction, is that becoming is not merely a disappearance, viz. of being and of nothing, but also a disappearance of disappearance.

Arising and passing away are the first appearance of becoming in its immediacy, and this immediacy depends on the absolute difference between being and nothing, which emerges from their immediate disappearance into one another. Arising and passing away, however, proved themselves to be particular movements in the general movement of becoming. In short, they are merely moments of becoming, which means that they too must disappear in the movement of becoming as a whole. Being and nothing, therefore, are no longer in a continuous state of restlessness, i.e. of arising and passing away, but have become, which means that becoming itself has disappeared as a consequence of its own necessity and movement, leaving us, once again, with the realm of determinate being that self-consciousness, as scepticism, finds so intolerable, both in itself, i.e. as the certainty of self-identical self-consciousness, and outside of itself, in life's vast wealth of others and objects. Simply put, determinate being, or just plain determinateness continually re-asserts itself against, and as a result of, self-consciousness' activity as scepticism, viz. negation.

As a consequence of determinateness' recalcitrance in the face of sceptical self-consciousness, two possibilities arise, or rather, one real possibility and one abstract possibility. In the latter case, self-consciousness attempts to maintain itself, as scepticism, through the elevation of its oscillations between self-consciousness as such and empirical consciousness, or between identity and difference, into a system, which applies the laws of identity and difference to both itself and the world in a strictly separate fashion, depending on its need at any given moment. As such, "it keeps the poles of this its self-contradiction apart, and adopts the same attitude to it as it does in its purely negative activity in general. Point out likeness or identity to it, and it will point out unlikeness or non-identity; and when
it is now confronted with what it has just asserted, it turns round and points out likeness or identity" (PhS 125-26: 205 [MI]). Scepticism, thereby, becomes a form of what it claimed to be its exact opposite. It becomes dogmatism, which, as Hegel says in the Encyclopedia: "consists in the tenacity which draws a hard and fast line between certain terms and others opposite to them. We see this clearly in the strict either/or: ... The contrary of this rigidity is the characteristic of all speculative truth. There no such inadequate formulae are allowed ... These formulae speculative truth holds in union as a totality, whereas dogmatism invests them in their isolation with a title to fixity and truth" (LL 52:32).

Scepticism, as dogmatism, therefore, becomes fixed in its oscillation between its separate truths of identity and difference, and as such, becomes "the unconscious, thoughtless rambling which passes back and forth from one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness to the other extreme of the contingent consciousness that is both bewildered and bewildering" (PhS 125:205). At one moment then, self-consciousness sees its own self-identity reflected in the realm of determinate being, that is, when it passes to the contingent empirical consciousness which sees all things as different from one another, and thus as identical only with themselves - in short, absolutely self-identical. At another moment, it sees the difference of life reflected in itself, that is, when it passes from the contingent empirical consciousness to self-consciousness which sees itself as the only truly absolute self-identity, even if it is only the self-identity of nothing, and thus different from anything else in the universe. "It [simply] does not bring these two thoughts of itself together, [i.e. of itself as both identity and difference, simultaneously]. At one time it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising above all the confusion and contingency of existence, and at another time equally admits to a relapse into occupying itself with what is unessential ... Its deeds and its words always belie one another and equally it has itself the doubly contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and sameness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself" (PhS 125:205 [MI]).

Scepticism can go on like this indefinitely as long as it remains in a constant state of self-denial, i.e. so long as it denies one side of its being, while it is in the process of becoming the other. However, once it becomes aware of itself as this dogmatic, contradictory consciousness, as opposed to merely experiencing itself as such, there "emerges a new form of consciousness which brings together the two thoughts which scepticism holds apart" (PhS 126:206), and which constitutes the only real possibility for self-consciousness progressing beyond this equally slavish form of thought and existence. Its awareness of itself, as this dogmatic contradicting of itself, comes about a) "because it is in fact one consciousness which contains within itself these two modes, [viz. identity and difference]" (PhS 126:206), or, what is the same thing, because external reflection imposes its determinations on the object, thus positing this object as identical with itself, even though it appears to be different; and b) because the endurance of determinateness, despite thought's negativity, causes self-consciousness to reflect back upon itself, not as this or that particular movement, i.e. either the movement towards self-
identical self-consciousness, or simply, identity, or towards the contingent consciousness, or simply, difference, but as movement in general; not as this or that immediate disappearance, i.e. either the disappearance of thought, or its content, but as the disappearance of disappearance. In other words, self-consciousness becomes sceptical about scepticism, and thus, like becoming, transcends itself by realizing itself; or rather, by becoming absolute, it negates itself and becomes something else. It becomes something else "which knows that it is the dual consciousness of itself, as self-liberating, unchangeable, and self-identical and as self-bewildering and self-perverting, and ... is the awareness of this self-contradictory nature of itself" (PhS 126:202 [MI]).\(^8\) Hegel calls this something which knows itself as contradictory in nature, which knows itself as a thing that thinks (res cogitans), the unhappy consciousness.

C. The Unhappy Consciousness and the First Moment of Determining Reflection as such, or the Religious Attitude

Before continuing with our discussion of determining reflection and the unhappy consciousness, it is appropriate that we make a few introductory remarks regarding the importance of the unhappy consciousness in the overall development of this work. For it does play a central role in the development and critique of the moral standpoint. For instance, J. Hyppolite points out: "We should not be surprised that Fichte's early philosophy, [or science] ..., which is a philosophy of subjectivity, of self-consciousness, should end with an unhappy consciousness. Nor should we be surprised that the chapter on unhappy consciousness in the Phenomenology occasionally reminds us of Fichte's first philosophy, as interpreted by Hegel."\(^9\) We should not be surprised by this, because the relationship between the unhappy consciousness and Fichte's absolute self, or Ego, which forms the ideal basis of his entire philosophy, both early and late, is no mere casual coincidence. This is not necessarily because Hegel had Fichte explicitly in mind while writing the section on the unhappy consciousness, though it is certainly a possibility. Rather, it is because the unhappy consciousness and the absolute Ego are the same universal self-consciousness at opposite poles of its development. The unhappy consciousness is this consciousness in its first real, or phenomenal appearance, or rather, at its birth,\(^10\) whereas the absolute Ego is this consciousness at the height of its theoretical, if not practical, development. As universal self-consciousness, both are, what Hegel calls in the Philosophy of Mind, the notion of Reason (PM 177:437). They are this notion, because "universal self-consciousness has revealed itself to us as this unity [of subject and object], for we have seen that this [consciousness, i.e. as external reflection, or sceptical self-consciousness], in its absolute difference from its other, [i.e. its immediate presupposition, or object], is yet at the same time absolutely identical with it" (PM 177:437 [MI]); i.e. external reflection's determining of the object as negative is, as we saw, posited identity, or rather, the positing of the identity between subject and object. "It is precisely this identity of subjectivity and objectivity that constitutes the universality now attained by self-consciousness and which overlaps or overarches these two sides or particularities which are resolved in it" (PM 178:437
However, just as we shall eventually see that posited identity is merely formal identity, and thus not actual identity, so too the notion of Reason is not yet Reason in the true sense of the word, i.e. it is not concrete, or actual Reason. This is because self-consciousness, in becoming Reason, must first pass away as self-consciousness "in the proper or narrower sense of the word" (PM 178:437). In other words, it must pass away as that consciousness, which even in rising above all particularity, "hold[s] fast to the particularity of the self" (PM 178:437), or, what amounts to the same thing, the notion of the self as a thinking thing, which we are left with at the start of the unhappy consciousness. "By yielding up this particularity, self-consciousness develops into Reason. In this context [then] the name Reason has the meaning only of the initially still abstract or formal unity of self-consciousness with its object. This unity establishes what must be called, in specific contrast to the true, the merely correct. My idea is correct merely if it agrees with the object, even when the latter only remotely corresponds to its notion and hence has hardly any truth at all. Only when a true content becomes an object for me does my intelligence acquire the significance of Reason in its concrete sense" (PM 178:437 [MI]). Consequently, the development that begins with the unhappy consciousness as such, and ends with the absolute self, or Ego of Fichte is in fact merely the conception of Reason, or, as we shall see, "the dream of the human mind," viz. religion or God.\footnote{11}

We should not be surprised, therefore, that, despite universal self-consciousness' status as immanent Reason and the emergence of immature, but nonetheless scientific thinking in the previous mode of consciousness, self-consciousness, qua the unhappy consciousness, first appears as a distinctly religious attitude towards itself, towards the world and towards what it takes to be the true essence of both. Although this is an attitude which seems opposed to Reason, not only as we have come to think of it, but also as the most mature development of universal self-consciousness in its theoretical aspect, viz. Fichte's philosophy, imagines it, universal self-consciousness, so long as it remains merely the notion of Reason, rather than actual Reason, preserves this attitude even in its most rationalistic and scientific forms. We need only call to mind the importance of conviction, or belief as the ultimate criteria of truth in Fichte's philosophy, and God as the guarantor of the coincidence between the various substances that comprise the world, and thus of the world's rationality, in the philosophy of Descartes. We should also not be surprised then, that Descartes' philosophy serves as the bridge, or absolute middle ground between the two poles of universal self-consciousness' development, as put forth here. For not only do Descartes and Fichte, as we saw in Part II, begin in the same way, i.e. with the T as absolutely certain, both the unhappy consciousness and Descartes begin with the same awareness of what this absolutely certain T is, viz. a thinking thing (res cogitans). Hence, to the extent that these philosophies represent stages in the development of universal self-consciousness, yet remain merely the notion of Reason, thus preserving what is the unhappy consciousness' religious attitude, they too may simply be thought of as forms of unhappy
## 1. The Unhappy Consciousness & Determining Reflection as Abstract Unity

The unhappy consciousness is the unity of stoicism and scepticism. For with the positing of identity by external reflection in scepticism, the two-fold nature of reflection, i.e. as the immediate presupposition which is in itself intro-reflected and as reflection which is both pure negativity and an immediate being in and for itself, becomes internalized by self-consciousness in general. In other words, self-consciousness has become *determining reflection*, and, as Hegel says in the *Science*: "Determining reflection in general is the unity of *positing* and *external reflection*" (SL II 32 & HSL 406). Self-consciousness, however, "is not yet explicitly aware ... that it is the unity of both" (*PhS* 126:207 [MI]). Nor, therefore, has the duality of its existence been eliminated all together. On the contrary, as Hegel tells us in the *Phenomenology*: "the duplication which was formerly divided between two individuals, the master and the slave, is now lodged in one. The duplication of self-consciousness *within itself* ... is thus before us, but not yet in its [complete] unity: the unhappy consciousness is the consciousness of the self as a *dual-natured*, merely *contradictory* being" (*PhS* 126:206 [MI]).

This means not only that the empirical, changeable consciousness of external reflection and the self-identical self-consciousness of positing reflection are immediately present in a single individual consciousness, or self, for then the unhappy consciousness would be no different than scepticism, but also that each is now present in the other (*PhS* 126:207). The same thing, we must remember, occurred as a result of becoming's self-transcendence in determinate being, where something appeared as a finite, determinate being, and thus as nothing *in itself*, and nothing as an infinite other, and thus as *in itself* something, viz. something other than the first something, or something *else*. Self-consciousness, *qua* the unhappy consciousness, however, is not immediately aware of this identity, or unity of the two moments in itself and each other. For just like *something* and *other* in determinate being, they appear at first to be wholly separate moments. In order to see why this is the case, it is necessary to look at determining reflection as such, before then going on to discuss the unhappy consciousness' logical and phenomenological natures. For, although it is, as Hegel said, *in general* the unity of the two previous moments, this unity is still merely abstract, i.e. it is not yet an explicit or actual unity.

## 2. Determining Reflection

That determining reflection is merely the unity of positing and external reflection *in general* means, as
we have seen, that a) positing reflection has shown itself in its externality, and b) external reflection is a positing. In the first instance, positing reflection, although it presupposes nothing, posits something, and this something, although a self-positing, and, therefore, something that does not seem to be external to positing reflection, is reflection's positing of itself as an other. It is not the pure negativity absolute reflection is presumed to be. Furthermore, as we also saw, since positing reflection presupposes nothing, and since determinate being is the immediate result of pure negativity, positing reflection also presupposes itself as a determinate being, or something that is already posited, which in turn posits itself as another determinate being. Consequently, positing reflection is self-positing reflection, which means that it is an internal process, but that it is also reflection that posits itself as external to itself insofar as it posits itself as something determinate, i.e. something which is an other in relation to pure negativity, and something which is an other in relation to the original something presupposed by positing reflection, or something else. In short, self-positing reflection is also self-external reflection. In the second instance, external reflection, although it presupposes the transcendence of positing, i.e. insofar as it begins from what has already been posited, i.e. immediate being, or something, posits something explicitly as an other, and this positing, although an express positing of otherness, is, as we saw, a positing of identity between external reflection and its object, or other. In short, external reflection's external positing is a self-negating positing, or a posting that is negative of reflection's externality.

In both cases, reflection begins and ends with determinate being. It does so, however, in such a way that reflection is preserved. This is because, in essence, as has already been shown: "Determinate being is merely posited being or essence" (SL II 32 & HSL 406); and positedness is the immediate result of the activity of reflection. Reflection, however, as we saw in external reflection, is still also opposed. It is opposed by a positedness that appears to be external to itself, qua pure reflection, or itself, qua essence. Thus, as Hegel says: "Positedness [itself] stands opposed, on the one hand, to determinate being, and on the other, to essence, and is to be considered as the middle term which unites determinate being with essence, and conversely, essence with determinate being" (HSL 406 [MI]). In other words, positedness appears as what simultaneously relates and distinguishes the two extremes of reflection, and also what is itself distinct from them. We shall see this clearly in the unhappy consciousness, where humanity in general and Christ in particular serve as the mediation between the apparently separate realms of determinate being or life, and pure reflection or essence, i.e. God. As Hegel goes on to explain, however, positedness is really only distinct from essence at this point (SL II 32 & HSL 408). This is because immediate or determinate being is itself a positedness a) insofar as it is the result of the self-negating identity of nothing, and b) insofar as it has been posited as identical with external reflection in the latter's determination of the object as negative towards reflection in its purity. This is why Hegel says that: "positedness is only positedness with respect to essence, [which is nothing,] as the negation of the accomplished return-into-self" (SL II 33 & HSL 406 [MI]); and, therefore, what is external to itself. Whereas positedness then would certainly seem to be a
determination of being, i.e. being as negative, it "is not yet a determination of reflection" (SL II 33 & HSL 406), at least not explicitly.

Positedness, however, "is determinateness only as negation in general" (SL II 33 & HSL 406), which means only as absolute negativity, or the negation of nothing, and absolute negativity is precisely what constitutes pure reflection. Hence, whether we look at positedness simply as the determinate being presupposed by external reflection, or as the determinate being which negates pure reflection and stands in relation to the determinate being reflection has become, i.e. as external reflection, it is itself reflection, i.e. the self-reflection of pure negativity, or the self-reflection of what is essentially negative, what is nothing in itself, or simply, determinate being. In other words, it is the negation of determinate being's negation of reflection as such, and, therefore, the same pure, or self-identical negativity that constitutes pure, or intro-reflection. "Positedness is thus [also] a determination of reflection" (HSL 406). It is something determined by reflection and a determining of reflection itself.

Here, Hegel makes an important distinction between the determinateness of being and the determination of reflection which may be summed up as follows: the determinateness of being is transitory, and, therefore, not essential, whereas a determination of reflection is not transitory, and, therefore, essential (SL II 33 & HSL 407). This is because the determinateness of being, even when regarded as the quality of negation, or determinate negation, still has being for its immediate ground, and being, as we have seen throughout, is fleeting. In other words, it eventually disappears in otherness (SL II 33 & HSL 407). "The determination of reflection, on the other hand, has for ground intro-reflectedness" (SL II 33 & HSL 407). Absolute nothing, therefore, constitutes the ground of a determination of reflection. "Positedness [therefore] crystallizes [or fixes itself (HSL 407)] into a determination just because reflection, [even] in its negatedness, is self-identity" (SL II 33 & HSL 407 [MI]). It is the self-identity of either negativity as such, or determinate being, which, as we know, is negative both essentially and explicitly. "[T]herefore [reflection's] negatedness is [still] intro-reflection" (SL II 33 & HSL 407). It is still the reflection of nothingness, i.e. the nothingness of nothing. Consequently, the determination of reflection subsists, or persists in the face of, in spite of, or, even, as begins to become clear, by means of change, something it could not do with immediate being as its ground, since being, in essence, is always transcended, i.e. transcended being and being transcended. In other words, reflection does not disappear even in its disappearance, but rather, persists by means of its own absolute self-identity, viz. the self-identity of negativity.

As a result of reflection's persistence as the intro-reflection of negativity, however, "the determinations of reflection appear, [or are posited] as free essentialities floating in the void without mutual attraction, or repulsion" (SL II 33 [MI]). They appear to float in this void, because, even though this void is itself intro-reflection, i.e. the pure nothingness, or self-identity of negativity that constitutes pure reflection, as soon as it is reflected upon, it simply appears as another independent determination,
The absolute indeterminate consciousness hitherto, undiscovered parade of spontaneously exclusive posited, or immediately posits itself as another determination of reflection, e.g. in the unhappy consciousness the absolute indeterminate being, or God will appear to posit himself as Christ. "In [these determinations of reflection] determinateness has confirmed and fixed itself as infinite through self-relation, [viz. the self-relation of negativity, or absolute self-identity, and, therefore, identity exclusive of any other determination]" (SL II 33). In the unhappy consciousness, for instance, this parade of spontaneously self-generating determinations, or free and independent essentialities will first appear as the three determinations of the Unchangeable, viz. the Father, Son and Holy Spirit (PhS 127:208), and then, when the unhappy consciousness reveals itself as the absolute self, or Ego, as the three essentialities of thought, viz. identity, difference and ground. In both cases, i.e. the unhappy consciousness, qua the religious consciousness, and the unhappy consciousness, qua the secular, scientific consciousness, "these determinations constitute determinate show as it is found in essence, or essential show" (SL II 33 & HSL 407), which is simply show that shows itself, as show, to be essential to the process of reflection, as opposed to its previous unessential appearance in essence as such, e.g. self-consciousness as a mere slave.

"For this reason determining reflection is reflection which has passed outside itself, [or come forth from itself (HSL 407)]" (SL II 33-34 [MI]). Determining reflection, therefore, once again appears as a form of external reflection, or reflection in which "the self-identity of essence, [or pure negativity] is lost in negation, which now prevails" (SL II 34). In other words, the negation of the pure negativity of pure reflection, or intro-reflection appears as the dominant factor (HSL 407), from the point of view of determining reflection, qua external reflection. Thus, reflection, despite its ubiquitous persistence, still seems and feels itself to be dominated by something that exists outside of itself, i.e. both the object, which it has determined as negative of pure reflection, and the free essentialities, or determinations of reflection, which appear as givens it simply reflects upon.12 This is because the positing of identity that takes place in external reflection as such, is first only a positing of reflection's identity with determinate being as such, so that reflection appears itself as a determinate being in which the negation of pure reflection is taken for granted; and then second a positing of determinate being's identity with reflection in its purity, i.e. insofar as determinate being is itself actually positedness, and insofar as this positedness negates pure reflection, or is the same negation of nothing as pure reflection, and, therefore, reflection's self-identity. "In the determination of reflection, therefore, there are two sides, which at the outset are distinguished" (SL II 34 & HSL 407 [MI]).

These two sides are positedness and intro-reflection (SL II 34 & HSL 407). As Hegel explains, the determination of reflection as positedness "is negation as negation" (SL II 34 & HSL 407 [MI]), which simply means, as we have already seen, that what is in itself negative, i.e. determinate being, is posited as negative, i.e. of pure reflection, and, therefore, that positedness itself "is already its unity with itself" (SL II 34 & HSL 407 [MI]), or is determinate intro-reflection. However, because external
reflection's inclusion of determinate being appears immediately as an exclusion of reflection in its purity, positedness is determinate intro-reflection "only in itself or in principle" (SL II 34 & HSL 407). This becomes very clear in the Phenomenology, when self-consciousness, having transcended the external reflection of scepticism, once again posits itself merely as empirical consciousness, or the Changeable, rather than self-consciousness (PhS 127:208), yet, in its awareness of itself as empirical consciousness, or the Changeable, remains self-consciousness in principle, or in itself. Be that as it may for the moment, the first side of the determination of reflection appears simply as the same self-external reflection positing reflection was in itself, and as such, is merely, what Hegel appropriately calls, "an immanent determining" (HSL 407 [MI]). This does not mean, however, that essence, or reflection in general once again "goes outside itself" (HSL 407), as it seemed to in show and slavery. For, insofar as determining reflection posits the independent determinations of reflection, and, therefore, posits differences between these determinations, these differences, insofar as they are "simply posited" (SL II 34 & HSL 407), are "taken immediately back into essence, or reflection in general" (SL II 34 & HSL 407 [MI]). Put differently, because these differences appear, or are posited in the void, which is nothing other than essence, or reflection in its purity, or pure nothing, difference is in essence, or reflection in general, and not different from essence, or reflection in general.

Whereas determining reflection as mere positedness, or rather, as positing reflection, posits these differences in essence, or reflection in general, reflection as intro-reflection, regards these differences, or independent determinations, strictly as intro-reflected, not posited. It regards them as purely self-related, self-identical, self-equal, etc., and, therefore, not reflected into an other, whether this other is regarded as its own other, as in positedness, or an external other, as in determinate being as such. For instance, in the determination of reflection, as intro-reflection, the self-relation of negation is not determinate being qua negative, i.e. of reflection, standing in relation to the pure negation of pure reflection, and, therefore, identity in difference. Rather, it is pure negativity simply in relation to pure negativity, and, therefore, pure identity with no apparent difference in itself - at least not immediately. This is because reflection is immediately preserved, as we have seen, through the self-identity of negativity, not positedness. Thus, as purely self-identical, opposition seems to be absent from the determination of reflection. It does not stand over and against itself as another entity, as it does as positedness (HSL 408), which means then that the two-sides of the determination of reflection are different (SL II 34). They are different insofar as the determination of reflection, as positedness, appears continually to disappear in opposition, even though this opposition is actually the self-opposing activity of imminently determining reflection, while, as intro-reflection, it quietly and peacefully abides without change, or, therefore, internal opposition. This is why Hegel calls positedness the determination of reflection's "transendedness," i.e. reflection's existence as a being, and intro-reflection, its "subsistence," i.e. reflection's preservation as negativity (SL II 34).

Although there is no opposition present in the side of the determination of reflection, which is purely
equal to itself, there is opposition between this self-equality and the inequality and opposition present in the side that is positedness. Therefore, the determination of reflection first appears as an external opposition between its two sides. This external opposition, which first manifests itself in the unhappy consciousness as the separation between the Changeable and the Unchangeable, however, is not absolute. It is not absolute, because a) positedness is also intro-reflection in itself, or the self-identity of negativity, which means that it is imminently equal to, and, therefore, identical with, the purely intro-reflected side of the determination of reflection; and because b) the opposition between the two sides of the determination of reflection itself mirrors, or reflects the inequality and opposition explicitly present in the side of the determination of reflection that is positedness. This means that "the determinateness of reflection is the relation to its otherness within itself" (HSL 408). In other words, the appearance of external opposition is merely an appearance. For the opposition is actually internal to determining reflection in general. Otherwise, the determination of reflection would be no different from the "quiescent determinateness" of being, or "a something that excludes its other and its relation to this other from itself" (HSL 408), and, as a result, ultimately disappears into this otherness. "The determination of reflection, on the other hand, has taken its otherness back into itself" (HSL 408 [MI]). As positedness, we already know, it has taken back pure reflection, and as pure intro-reflection, it is posited, and, therefore, has taken positedness back into itself. Either way then, it is infinite self-relation" (SL II 34 & HSL 408), or absolute self-identity. It is the infinite self-relation not just of simple being-for-self, as in being, but rather, the infinite self-relation of being-for-self with being-for-self; or, what Hegel describes in the Phenomenology as: "The duplication of self-consciousness within itself, which is essential to the notion of Spirit" (PhS 126:207 [MI]). What remains to be seen then, is just how self-consciousness comes to realize this essence, or rather, that this essential duplication lies within itself, as a single being-in-and-for-itself.

3. The Unhappy Consciousness

Self-consciousness, qua unhappy consciousness, first "identifies itself with the changeable, [empirical] consciousness" (PhS 127:208) of external reflection, and, thereby, appears to have escaped the infinite oscillations of scepticism. It does so for the simple reason that its posited identity with its immediate presupposition, or object, which it has determined as the negative of pure reflection, or self-consciousness as such, has rendered it a determinate, rather than abstract identity. In other words, it posits itself as the same finite, changeable, determinate being it takes its immediate presupposition, or object to be.

At the same time, however, it also knows on an immediate level, i.e. feeling, intuition, belief, conviction, etc., that pure reflection, or self-consciousness as such, although apparently negated in the determination of the object as negative, is still present and essential both to itself, as a determinate being in thought, or an empirical consciousness, and to determinate being in general. This, as we
already know, is because determinate being is itself the product of pure reflection, or the self-identity of nothing, and because external reflection not only related to its external object as pure reflection, or self-consciousness as such, but because pure reflection also related itself to itself, in the same manner. Pure reflection, or self-consciousness as such, therefore, is, as we have already shown, still present in reflection, and, in fact, contains the entire movement in one side of itself, as a single intro-reflected being. However, a) the apparent negation of pure reflection, or self-consciousness as such, through the determination of the object as negative towards it; b) the consequent positing of identity between external reflection, or consciousness as empirical consciousness, and this object; and finally, c) the subsistence of pure intro-reflection as the absolute self-identity of pure negativity, all lead to pure reflection, or self-consciousness as such being posited outside of or external to determinate being and empirical consciousness as the essential, but alien being, i.e. as God, or the Unchangeable (PhS 127:208). This seems once again to relegate determinate being and empirical consciousness to the role of unessential being, and, because self-consciousness, qua unhappy consciousness, identifies itself with the changeable, empirical consciousness of external reflection, it is aware of itself as unessential (PhS 127:208).

Awareness of self, however, is self-consciousness. The unhappy consciousness, therefore, although aware of itself as "merely the Changeable" (PhS 127:208), also latently identifies itself with the Unchangeable. As Hegel explains, the unhappy consciousness "is aware that this consciousness, [viz. the pure alien self-consciousness, or Unchangeable,] is its own essence, although in such a way that again it does not itself take the essence to be its own" (PhS 127:208 [MI]). As a result, self-consciousness revives and surreptitiously appropriates mastery's notion of freedom, i.e. as purely negative freedom, or the freedom from life, and "set[s] about freeing itself from the unessential, i.e. from itself, [qua the Changeable]" (PhS 127:208 [MI]). This is why the unhappy consciousness cannot be indifferent (PhS 127:208); i.e. it cannot be indifferent towards either one of its sides, and they cannot be indifferent to one another, or themselves. One immediately aspires to the other, and, in the process of aspiring, necessarily takes up an antagonistic standpoint to the one it attempts to leave behind. Here, for instance, the Changeable immediately opposes itself, as changeable, in aspiring to the purely Unchangeable it has posited outside of itself.

This antagonism, however, is not only the self-antagonism of empirical consciousness, or the Changeable, it is also the sign of self-consciousness, or intro-reflection's presence in the Changeable, i.e. the very presence which causes it to latently identify with and seek after the alien self-consciousness, or Unchangeable. In other words, it is immanent self-consciousness' antagonism towards empirical changeable consciousness. Since the unhappy consciousness, however, does not yet realize that unchangeability is present in itself, this antagonism, which appears only as the Changeable's self-antagonism, qua the Changeable, is also antagonism towards the very thing in the unhappy consciousness which it seeks outside of itself, viz. pure self-consciousness, or the
Unchangeable. This means not only that the Changeable is latently antagonistic towards the Unchangeable, but also that the Unchangeable will prove to be antagonistic towards itself, qua the Unchangeable. As we shall see further on, this antagonism towards pure self-consciousness by both the changeable and the unchangeable sides of the unhappy consciousness, will determine the Changeable's first relationship with the Unchangeable, in the Unchangeable's first determination as an abstract individual, viz. Yahweh, and will then carry through to its relationship with the incarnation of this individual on earth as a particular individual, viz. Christ, who is himself the product of the Unchangeable's pure self-antagonism.

For the moment, however, it is only significant that the Changeable despises its existence as the Changeable, and that it is disappointed by what it finds when it aspires to the Unchangeable, that is, precisely what it despises - itself in its particularity. This is not because it has failed to find the Unchangeable. On the contrary, it simply does not realize yet that it is itself the Unchangeable, or that the Unchangeable is itself at a particular level of development. This is why, with the appearance of the unhappy consciousness' moments, "we have a struggle against an [apparent] enemy, [viz. empirical consciousness, or changeability, and, therefore, determinateness in general] to vanquish whom is really to suffer defeat" (PhS 127:209). As we saw with regard to determining reflection, this is simply because determinateness, in essence, is itself intro-reflection, which means that it immediately arises out of the pure negativity of intro-reflection, and that it is itself the self-identity of negativity insofar as it a) negates pure negativity, and b) contains negativity, or is in itself nothing. Thus, to defeat, or destroy determinateness means two things: first, in destroying determinateness, one destroys the intro-reflectedness one seeks; and second, in destroying determinateness, and restoring a condition of pure intro-reflectedness, or absolute negativity, one is simply creating the condition for an immediate re-appearance of what is believed to be the obstacle to achieving pure intro-reflection, viz. determinateness, or the result of absolute nothing as the self-identity of negativity, or simply the negation of nothing. From the start, therefore, the unhappy consciousness, qua the Changeable, seems to have no hope of satisfying its desire to be a free being-in-and-for-itself, viz. the desire that has compelled it in all of its various activities up to this point, beginning with the natural realm of animal desire and its transition to historical life through the struggle for life and death to the master/slave relationship. In short, the unhappy consciousness is the condition and spirit of absolute hopelessness.

It would certainly seem then that self-consciousness' first experiment with the religious attitude, i.e. pure aspiration, is doomed to failure, thus serving merely to compound self-consciousness' suffering. However, "adversity, suffering, [and] afflictions," in short, failure and hopelessness, are precisely what lead one "back to God." For they are affirmations of consciousness' unhappiness, or rather, the unhappy consciousness. In other words, the religious attitude, rather than failing in its immediate aspiration towards the Unchangeable, creates the perfect medium for its existence and development through its failure.
The unhappy consciousness, upon discovering itself \textit{qua} the Changeable, in the Unchangeable, towards which it immediately aspired, cannot conclude that the Unchangeable does not exist, or if it does, it cannot maintain its certainty in this conclusion. It cannot for the simple reason that it still \textit{feels} the Unchangeable's presence. It still feels this presence for the same reason it felt it initially, i.e. because \textit{it is itself} this consciousness, and because it still contains this consciousness within itself as a moment, even though it has posited it outside of itself, in God, as has already been stated. Thus, unless it eliminates itself altogether in its moment of utter despair, it cannot help but feel the continued presence of the Unchangeable.

When the Changeable \textit{reflects upon} its experience thus far then, it either a) concludes that it has failed in its attempt to raise itself to the Unchangeable, and, therefore, that it should try again, thereby, ensnaring itself in the false infinite of religious desire, or aspiration, or, b) "becomes aware of individuality \textit{in general} in the Unchangeable, and at the same time of its \textit{own} individuality \textit{in the latter}" (\textit{PhS} 128:210 [MI]). In other words, the unhappy consciousness comes to know God as an abstract individual, or pure being-for-self, and itself as an individual who owes its existence to this pure being-for-self, or God, who "created man in his \textit{own} image" (\textit{Genesis} 1:27). The unhappy consciousness can discover God as such, because the determinations of reflection, which appear to be external to reflection, are, as we have seen, at first absolutely self-identical - even if this self-identity is nothing more than the self-identity of negativity - and this self-identity is precisely what constitutes the essence of pure being-for-self, or abstract individuality. To conclude that this absolute self-identity didn't exist then, self-consciousness would have to deny what it feels to be true, and attempt to return to what it has already transcended, and thus what has no truth for it either in thought, or in feeling, except insofar as it has been preserved in what self-consciousness has become.

Even though self-consciousness, \textit{qua} the unhappy consciousness, has, through reflection upon its experience, discovered that individuality is the middle term that unites it with the Unchangeable, "this unity ..., in the first instance, becomes for it one in which the \textit{difference} of both \{itself and the Unchangeable\} is still the dominant feature" (\textit{PhS} 128:210). The Unchangeable has certainly become determinate for the unhappy consciousness, that is, insofar as God is now determined as individuality in general, but the separation between the Unchangeable and the Changeable is by no means overcome, since individuality in general is still only individuality that is abstract. In fact, the separation is reinforced. This is because the previously \textit{indeterminate} Unchangeable had \textit{nothing} whatsoever to distinguish itself from the unhappy consciousness as a particular individual, except its utter indeterminacy, which was why reflection, as external reflection, or a determinate individual posited it outside of itself in the first place, but also why it could raise itself to it so easily, i.e. without really having to do anything except aspire. However, now that indeterminacy has become determinateness, \textit{i.e. the determination} of the Unchangeable to be indeterminate, the Unchangeable appears to the unhappy consciousness as pure negation's first determination in the realm of determinate being, viz.
absolute otherness, or the Absolute Other, that has yet to even reveal itself as another something. As such, the Unchangeable once again appears to be opposed to the unhappy consciousness. Indeed, it seems to be absolutely opposed to the unhappy consciousness, and, in this absolute opposition, the unhappy consciousness’ inherent self-antagonism in general begins to manifest itself fully. It manifests itself as the relationship between a mysterious, but real, absolute power, and a people whose recognition of this mysterious power takes the slavish form of fear, i.e. fear of God (Genesis 22:12), and whose lives eventually become so circumscribed by the dictums handed down by this mysterious, all-powerful God, that their own individuality is ultimately "overwhelmed by a burden of statutory commands which pedantically prescribe a rule for every casual action of daily life, [thus giving] the whole people the look of a monastic order" (ETW 68).

a) Judaism and the Emergence of Revolutionary Self-Consciousness

The Unchangeable, which here corresponds to the Hebrew God of the Old Testament, and to a lesser extent the Christian Father of the New Testament, is a real power, because he passes and executes judgement upon the particular individuals, whose lives and consciousness constitute the Changeable, in their own realm, viz. that of determinate being, or existence. He is an absolute power, because he executes his power over the Changeable, as the power over life and death. Finally, he is a mysterious power, because he reveals no truth about himself other than the empty tautology of pure being-for-self, or absolute self-identity, viz. "I AM THAT I AM" (Exodus 3:14). The Jewish people, on the other hand, whose lives and consciousness, at this point, constitute the Changeable, are indistinguishable from a society of dogmatists, or slaves, because their relationship with the Unchangeable leaves them, as Hegel says in The Positivity of the Christian Religion, with "nothing save pride in [the] slavish obedience to laws not [directly] laid down by themselves" (ETW 69). For Hegel then, there seems to be a re-emergence of both the master/slave relationship and stoicism with the appearance of Judaism, or, at least with regard to the latter, "stoicism in reverse."14 Judaism is stoicism in reverse, rather than simple stoicism, because the absolute power and principle, which constitutes God in Judaism, is posited outside of the self, in Yahweh, so that every particular individual, or T initially feels itself to be nothing, whereas, in stoicism, this power and principle was, as we saw, expressly posited in the self, so that every particular individual, or T initially felt itself to be everything. As Hyppolite puts it: "In Judaism, man feels himself to be nothingness [from the start]. He is the thought of all finitude, and God necessarily remains a beyond that is never reached, the only negation of the finite."15

Since God is everything and humanity is nothing in Judaism, externality and exclusion turn out to be the immediate truth of the unhappy consciousness at this stage in its development. This means not just the externality and exclusion of Nature and humanity from God, but also of human from human and of humanity from Nature. It is not, however, simple externality and exclusion. Rather, it is externality as we encountered it at the end of external reflection, viz. as posited identity, and exclusion
as, what Hegel calls in the Philosophy of History, "exclusive unity" (PH 195). What is significant about these forms of externality and exclusivity is that they result in the two ideas, which, viewed against the condition of the unhappy consciousness qua Judaism, viz. the feeling of humanity's nothingness, constitute the contradiction of its existence, and thus prepare the way for its transcendence to a new form. They do this by imposing an inexorable movement towards particularity upon the supposedly one universal and indeterminate God. The first is Judaism's assertion that the Jewish people are the chosen people, or the belief that "only the One People which adopts it, recognizes the One God, and is [therefore] acknowledged by him" (PH 195). The second is the doctrine of Creation, or "the standpoint where man in practice makes Nature merely the servant of his will and needs, and hence in thought also degrades it to a mere machine, a product of the will, [viz. God's will]."16 In these two ideas, the unhappy consciousness, qua Judaism, finally combines the extremes of egoism and egotism not as a mere sceptical oscillation, but as the simultaneous moments, or feelings, in a single individual, of utter self-worthlessness, on the one hand, and absolute entitlement, on the other.17

These simultaneous, but contradictory feelings, in the unhappy consciousness, result in the appearance of the need for and right to a saviour, or Messiah in the unhappy consciousness qua Judaism, i.e. one who shall deliver the people from suffering, or rather, their condition of bondage to particularity. Far from Judaism simply being a regression to a kind of slavery and stoicism then, it is also the consolidation of the potentially revolutionary consciousness in a people and world still burdened by the conditions of slavery. For in its messianism, Judaism acknowledges the pain of reality, while, at the same time, "desir[ing] harmony and reconciliation in its [own] sphere" (PH 323), viz. the sphere of life, or determinate being. In other words, Judaism gives birth to "that revolutionary zeal that can throw at its adversary the defiant words: I am nothing and should be all."18

The need for and right to a Messiah on the part of the unhappy consciousness, qua the Changeable, that is, qua Judaism, however, does not in and of itself guarantee the movement that leads to the appearance of this Messiah, and thus to unhappy consciousness' transition from Judaism to Christianity. This transition occurs, because self-consciousness' experience as the unhappy consciousness is reflection, and, therefore, "not its own one-sided movement" (PhS 128:211). As reflection, it "is just as much the movement of the unchangeable consciousness" (PhS 128:211), which, although part of the unhappy consciousness in general, has been positèd outside of self-consciousness, qua the particular individual unhappy consciousness, or Changeable. In other words, the Jewish people's need for and right to a Messiah must be reflected in the fact that God cannot remain an abstract individuality beyond the realm of existence, but must posit himself outside of himself, as a particular individual, among other particular individuals.

God thus appears to respond to their need and right by fulfilling the reflection of that need and right in
himself, or rather, by satisfying his need and right as an absolute being to become wholly determinate. This need in God is the necessary consequence of his nature as a) an absolute other. For, as we already know, the absolute other is an other through and through, and, therefore, even unto itself, which means that it is something, just like the first something, for which it acted as a pure negation, or an absolute beyond. It is also the necessary consequence of his nature as b) the manifestation of the positedness inherent in the determination of reflection which is pure intro-reflection, i.e. the self-identity of negativity, which is ultimately the nothingness of nothing, or determinate being. God then is the infinite self-negation, or the self-negation of the infinite, and thus the infinite that becomes finite. In short, God posits himself as a man, or as Christ.

b) Christ as the Incarnation of the Tragic Consciousness

With the positing of Christ by the Unchangeable, "consciousness learns that individuality belongs to the Unchangeable itself" (PhS 128:210), rather than simply believing that individuality lies in the Unchangeable. This means that it no longer merely attributes to the Unchangeable individuality in general, simply because it feels the presence of this individuality. Rather, it comes face to face with the Unchangeable in its determination as another determinate being. Christ, therefore, is the positedness of the Unchangeable's self-identity, or the Unchangeable's apparent positing of identity, or posited identity with the Changeable, i.e. with individuality and existence (PhS 128:210). As such, Christ, at least on the surface, brings to the Changeable, or his people a message of love and reconciliation, where before there was, and could be, only fear, or love backed up by a threat, i.e. "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world" (John 12:47). He thus brings the promise of satisfaction for the unhappy consciousness' longing, i.e. the satisfaction of its desire for pure knowledge and union with the Unchangeable. As Christ says in the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled; Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God" (Matthew 5:6, 8 [MII]), 19

The promise of satisfaction in the presence of desire, or suffering, however, is not actual satisfaction. Deferred knowledge and union, in the presence of ignorance and separation, is not actual knowledge and union. Christ himself certainly represents a present, or real union of the Unchangeable and the Changeable, and thus the mutual knowing of each. However, the particularity of this union, and, therefore, the apparently privileged status of this knowledge, means that the opposition, and thus antagonism between the Unchangeable and the Changeable are still present in and for the unhappy consciousness in general. This too can be clearly seen in the Sermon on the Mount, in which Christ's message of love and reconciliation is nonetheless followed by a powerful re-affirmation of, if not the particular content of Hebrew law, the idea of law in general, and thus a threat: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or prophets: I am come not to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one title shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be

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fulfilled. Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, 
he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven ... For I say unto you, That except your 
righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into 
the kingdom of heaven" (Matthew 5:17-20).

Indeed, Christ's presence does more than just maintain the established opposition and antagonism 
between the Changeable and the Unchangeable, it compounds them. For, as a determinate being, he 
now stands opposed to both God in his purity, or abstract determinacy, i.e. his determination as 
indeterminate, and the unhappy consciousness, i.e. as the plurality of other determinate beings still 
apparently denied access to or union with the Unchangeable. In short, he is the determinate 
embodiment of the limitation between humanity and God; or, as Hegel says: "through the 
Unchangeable's assuming a definite form (my italics), the moment of the beyond not only persists, but 
really is more firmly established: for if the beyond seems to have been brought closer to the individual 
consciousness through the form of an actuality that is individual, it henceforth, on the other hand, 
confronts (my italics) him as an opaque sensuous unit with all the obstinacy of what is actual" (PhS 
129:212).

Christ then, as the limit between God and humanity, as the other of the Absolute Other and 
something, i.e. existence and the consciousness thereof, becomes a barrier within the unhappy 
consciousness in general, and to the unhappy consciousness in particular. The presence of this barrier 
in the unhappy consciousness thus means that its "hope, [qua the Changeable,] of becoming one with 
[the Unchangeable] must remain a hope, i.e. without fulfilment and present fruition. For between the 
hope and its fulfilment there stands precisely the absolute contingency or inflexible indifference, which 
lies in the very assumption of a definite form, which was, [before it occurred.] the ground of hope" 
(PhS 129:212 [MI]). In short, the one has already become, which means the simple Changeable has 
missed its chance to become that one which Christ has supposedly become. Rather, the Changeable is 
now simply the other of this exclusive one, which is the Unchangeable, qua Christ (PhS 461:762). 
Consequently, Christ becomes as much the embodiment of the unhappy consciousness' frustration, as 
he was of its hope before his appearance on earth.

However, we must recall from the logic of determinate being, that, as a barrier, Christ must be 
determined as what ought to be overcome, and this ought is the unmistakable requirement" (PH 327) 
expressed even in his own message. In Christ's message, as Hegel puts it: "The infinite exaltation of 
Spirit to absolute purity is placed at the beginning as the foundation of all" (PH 327). "Whatever 
might disturb the purity of the soul, [or Spirit, therefore;] should be destroyed" (PH 327). On this 
very point, Christ himself is emphatic: "if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from 
thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish and not that thy whole body 
should be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is
profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell" (Matthew 5:29 & 30). Christ then, as the barrier between humanity and God, as an offence to the purity of Spirit, or the pure Unchangeable, must be cut off from the body politic of the one chosen people, lest they as a nation should suffer the ultimate judgement of the Father, and be cast into the depths of hell, i.e. forever denied knowledge of and union with the Unchangeable in its purity. Thus, as it is reported in the Gospels, when the council of Pharisees came together after Christ raised Lazarus from the dead: "one of them, named Caiaphas, being the high priest that same year, said unto them, Ye know nothing at all. Nor consider that it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not. And this spake he not of himself: but being high priest that year he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation: And not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one the children of God, [viz. the Jews] that were scattered abroad. Then from that day forth they took counsel together for to put him to death" (John 11:49-53 [MI]).

Unlike his people, who are only aware of the contradiction of Christ's existence on an immediate level, (which is why, for instance, Caiaphas must resort to prophesy to determine Christ's fate,) Christ himself, as the explicit positedness of intro-reflection, or the existence of pure self-consciousness, is fully aware of the contradiction of his own existence, and this awareness, which causes him great inner turmoil and suffering, even before he must endure the external sufferings of public humiliation, torture and crucifixion, makes Christ the quintessential individual unhappy consciousness, as well as one of the supreme tragic figures in Western history. For, as Hegel says in the section on 'Revealed Religion', at the end of the Phenomenology: 'This [unhappy] self-consciousness knows what the validity of the abstract person, [or individual] amounts to in reality and equally in pure thought. It knows that such validity is complete loss; it is itself this conscious loss of itself, [i.e. as an individual, or pure being-in-and-for-itself, whether it remains attached to life, or gives it up,] and the alienation of its knowledge about itself [to another realm beyond life, i.e. heaven] ... The unhappy consciousness ... is ... the tragic fate of the certainty of [the individual] self that aims to be absolute. It is the consciousness of the loss of all essential being in this certainty of itself, and of the loss even of this knowledge about itself, [because it must die in order to achieve both this certainty and knowledge] - the loss of substance as well as of the self[;] it is the grief which expresses itself in the hard saying that God is dead" (PhS 454-455:752 [MI]); or equally in Christ's own last words, before dying on the cross: "Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? that is to say, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Matthew 27:46).

As the Unchangeable posited as the Changeable, Christ is attached to existence, and this attachment to existence manifests itself in his love of the world and his people, i.e. his desire to save them both. In short, he loves life. Indeed, his love of life is so great, that he even asks his Father to release him from the fate he knows he must suffer at the hands of the Jews and the Romans: "O my Father, if it be possible, let the cup pass from me" (Matthew 26:39 [MI]). In this love of life, Christ reveals
himself as *human*. However, his humanity is unsustainable, because the life he loves, and thus the love he feels are different from the life and love of the simple Changeable, which has yet to discover the Unchangeable in its own self, or, therefore, itself as the Unchangeable. The life Christ loves is not just physical existence, not life in its bare particularity, as desire and satisfaction, "which [at this point] may be called not *life* but rather the mere *possibility* of *life*" (ETW 285 [MI]), or simply, the potential *in* existence. Nor, is it the exclusive relationships associated solely with this particular life, i.e. family, tribe and nation, all of which Christ shows himself to be quite opposed to, e.g.: "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I am come not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household" (Matthew 10:34-36).

It is not even the activity which has so far brought self-consciousness in general closest to the satisfaction of its desire to be free and certain of itself, viz. work: "Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body more than raiment? Behold the fowls of the air; for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature?" (Matthew 6:25-27). What Christ loves is the pure potential in existence, the possibility not just of life as such, which is transient, but of *life everlasting*, which is universal mind, universal freedom and universal community, or 'the kingdom of heaven' (Matthew 5). In short, Christ loves the life he represents as the union of the Changeable and the Unchangeable.

The mere representation of this potential in one individual, however, even though this one individual is God, is not a sufficient condition for maintaining it in that one individual, or realizing it in the rest of the individuals whose lives and consciousness constitute the Changeable. For, as Hegel says in his essay on *Love*: "True union, or love proper, exists only between *living beings who are alike in power* and thus in one another's eyes living beings from every point of view; in no respect is either dead for the the other. *This genuine* love excludes all opposition*" (ETW 304). Far from excluding opposition, or being love among equals though, Christ's love is besieged by opposition on all sides, and is, by his very nature, as the exclusive one in union with the Unchangeable, anything but love among equals, despite his best efforts to make it so. Indeed, there is so much opposition in and to Christ's love during his life, that he is already dead in many respects, even before his actual death on the cross. He is dead for his Father, in that he represents the finitization of the infinite, or pure Spirit, which must be eliminated in order to make the Spirit pure and whole again. He is dead for the Jews, who feel compelled to seek his death in order to rectify this perceived offence to God. He is dead for the disciples, who are constantly struggling with their doubt in him, especially after he tells them that he, the incarnation of the Unchangeable, will die, and then does indeed die. And finally, he is dead for himself insofar as he knows that he must eventually die in order to fulfil his appointed task of restoring the purity of Spirit, or the Unchangeable for all mankind, i.e. of eliminating the barriers that
stand between the union of the Changeable and the Unchangeable, and insofar as he is ultimately compelled to take up a purely polemical, i.e. sceptical, standpoint towards the particularity of life, or existence.

He, however, is not the only one who is already dead before his actual death. Both the pure Unchangeable and the simple Changeable are also dead for him in many respects. His Father is dead for him, in that he is indifferent, and, therefore, antagonistic to, Christ's attachment to life, i.e. when he asks to be released from his fate, his Father answers from the purest standpoint of pure Spirit, i.e. he answers him with silence. His people are dead for him, in their inability to see beyond the particularity of their own lives and relationships, and, therefore, to recognize the humanity of Spirit, viz. that "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (Matthew 22:32), or rather, that God walks and lives among men, as a man, as Christ. Indeed this is why Christ must reproach even his own disciples, who, unlike ordinary people, are supposed "to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven" (Matthew 13:11), yet remain fixed upon ordinary life, or existence, i.e. "Follow me; and let the dead bury the dead" (Matthew 8:22).

Certainly, if Christ's people possessed the same love of universal life, they would immediately recognize the humanity of Spirit, or that the Unchangeable is human. They would recognize Christ for who and what, or rather, what and who he is. Instead, they still only recognize Spirit in its inhuman, and thus separate manifestation, i.e. as the Father, the Lord they recognize, or rather, fear, for his all-powerful, judging nature, i.e. "Jesus cried and said, 'He that believeth on me believeth not on me, but on him that sent me'" (John 12:44), viz. God. From their standpoint, this God can come among men, or send his son, because he can do anything he wills. This is why, as Hegel points out in the Phenomenology, Christ's coming at first appears to be an arbitrary event for the unhappy consciousness, qua the simple Changeable, even though, as we have already seen, it felt entitled to it, and expected it. As he says: "the fact that the Unchangeable receives the form of individuality is only a contingent happening, [for the unhappy consciousness qua the Changeable]; just as it also merely finds itself, [as the simple Changeable,] opposed to it, [viz. the Unchangeable in the form of Christ,] so that the [antagonistic] relation seems to result from its own [changeable, limited, etc.] nature, [that is, its own finitude and doubt, and not the Unchangeable's nature]" (PhS 129:212 [MI]). The fact is of course that if Christ's appearance did not at first seem to be such a pure contingency from the point of view of the unhappy consciousness, qua the Changeable, then the Changeable would not need him. His people would not need an external reflection of the humanity of Spirit, or the positedness of the Unchangeable to confront them, because they would already have found it in themselves.

Since Christ's life and death would be unnecessary if the Changeable already possessed the explicit, or self-conscious awareness of itself as the Unchangeable, it is perfectly logical that it should immediately respond to Christ by falling back upon scepticism, especially when he tells his people...
that he, the incarnation of the Unchangeable, will die. For, although it makes sense that the Unchangeable, which is all-powerful, should be capable of accomplishing anything, i.e. appearing in existence as an individual, it does not make sense to the Changeable, still separate from the Unchangeable, that death too should be one of these accomplishments; that death should lie within the Unchangeable's own nature, as what enables it eternally and self-consciously to change, and, therefore, in this eternity of self-conscious change, be unchangeable, or forever self-returning. As Hegel says in the History of Philosophy: "Absolute Spirit implies eternal self-identical existence that is transformed into an other and knows this to be itself: the unchangeable, which is unchangeable in as far as it always, from being something different, returns into itself. It signifies the sceptical movement of consciousness, [i.e. negation, death, etc.,] but in such a form that the transient objective element at the same time remains permanent, or in its permanence has the signification of self-consciousness" (HP 379-80).23

This cannot make sense to the Changeable, however, because Christ's people are not yet privy to the same knowledge of necessity that he is. It is certainly a necessity that they are caught up in by virtue of their own positing of the Unchangeable outside of reflection, (thus making reflection external,) but it is a necessity that they have yet to become explicitly aware of, viz. as determining reflection. Christ attempts to give them access to this knowledge, but try as he might, he cannot make them privy to what they are as yet incapable of comprehending, even or especially when he "speakest ... plainly, and ... no proverb" (John 16:29), as his disciples request at the Last Supper. This is because they hear only contradiction in propositions like, God shall die, and contradiction, without a system for comprehending it, i.e. Science, can only fuel doubt, or make it seem as if Christ is talking to the dead. This is why, for instance, he is forced to teach by example, i.e. indirectly through proverbs and directly through commands and individual actions.

Such teaching methods, however, cannot overcome the contradictions experienced by the unhappy consciousness in general, or the specific contradictions of Christ's existence. On the contrary, if anything, Christ's method merely exacerbates the contradiction, and hence, the frustration of the unhappy consciousness' existence; and it does so in such a way, that his own fate is guarantied the moment he delivers his message. This is because, in an immediate respect, Christ does not offer his people any new knowledge, nor, therefore, any means of transforming the conditions of their existence to conform with the requirements of pure Spirit, or the Unchangeable, which has the immediate effect of confirming only what the people already feel, or believe about themselves, viz. that they are nothing. As Hegel says in the Philosophy of History: "The form of the instrumentality by which that result, [viz. the perfection of life, or the purity of the spirit in this life,] is to be accomplished is not yet given [by Christ], but the result itself is the subject of an absolute command" (PH 327 [MI]).

As soon, therefore, as Christ issues a command like, "Take no thought for your life" (Matthew 6:25),
he seals his own fate. For he must be willing and able to demonstrate everything he commands, in order to ensure at least its future comprehension in and by the unhappy consciousness, *qua* the simple Changeable; and such a command, in a world still determined by the rule of mastery, which depends upon its slaves thinking of nothing else, except their own lives, is tantamount to death. Indeed, at this particular moment in self-consciousness' development, it does not even matter that such a command could just as well be interpreted as an exhortation for individuals to trust *in* and act *for* themselves, i.e. in the pursuit of spiritual, or actual universal freedom, as it could a reproach to slaves obsessed with the satisfaction of physical desires - particularly since it is followed by a question, i.e. "Is not the life *more than* meat, the body *more than* raiment?" (Matthew 6:25 [MI]). For with only the capacity and not yet the capability of seeing, or doing this, the individuals, whose lives constitute the unhappy consciousness, *qua* the simple Changeable, can only hear such exhortations as commands from, and such questions as rhetorical punctuations by one who stands over and against them as a master at the same time as he pretends to stand among them as a fellow slave, or vice versa: "And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting the nation, and ... saying that he himself is Christ a King" (Luke 23:2 [MI]). Thus, just as the slave is ultimately compelled to kill, or eliminate the master in order to realize that master's notion of the truth fully, viz. abstract freedom, so too are Christ's people, a nation of slaves, compelled to kill the one who lives among them as a fellow man and slave, but preaches a message they take to be identical with the truth of mastery.

There can be no doubt that Christ's death is simply the demonstration of the truth of mastery. For, as Hegel says in *The Spirit of Christianity*: "Because of the impurity of [Jewish] life, [which was one of the highest forms of life in the ancient world,] Jesus could only carry the kingdom of God, [viz. the vision of eternal life, genuine love, or the freedom from external opposition, which is the essence of true being-in-and-for-self,] in his heart; he could enter into relationships with men only to *train* them, [to discipline (Zucht) them, to draw (Ziehen) them, to drag (trainer) them (PH 320),] to develop in them the good spirit which he believed was in them, and thereby to create men whose world *would be his world*. But in his everyday world he had to flee all living relationships because they all lay under the *law of death*, [for self-consciousness as such] ... *The result was that he could only find freedom in the void*" (ETW 285 [MI]). In short, Christ could only find true freedom *for himself* in death, just like pure being-for-self, or the master.

In another more important sense, however, his death is also an escape from and negation of self-consciousness' living death *qua* slavery. For, insofar as Christ is willing to die in order to defend and preserve his idea of eternal life, self-consciousness proves for the first time in its development thus far, that it is actually willing and capable of both *loving life* (in general) and *risking its life* (in particular) *simultaneously*, which is precisely what it proved incapable of in the original struggle for life and death and the master/slave relationship. Consequently, Christ's death is as much the representation of self-consciousness' glory, as it is its tragedy. This is because the death of Christ in fact represents the
explicit self-negation of positedness as positedness, and, therefore, reflection's first real appearance as self-determining, or rather, as determining reflection, instead of merely determinate reflection. As Hegel says in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: "the finitude of humanity [in general] has been put to death in the death of Christ. This death of the natural [substance and consciousness, i.e. determinate being and empirical consciousness,] has in this way a universal significance: finitude and evil, [which is just finitude at its furthest extreme (LPR 466),]* are altogether destroyed. Thus, the world has been reconciled [with God, or the pure Unchangeable]; by this death it has been implicitly delivered from its evil, [or its fixation with and bondage to particular life]. In the true understanding of death, the relation of the subject as such [to death] comes into view in this way" (LPR 467). Indeed, this understanding constitutes the true significance of the notion of resurrection, i.e. as the resurrection of humanity in general, or of the freeing of the human spirit from the living death of its slavery to both Nature and humanity.

We must remember, however, that positedness, in essence, although a determination of reflection, is negation as negation. In other words, it is the essentially negative, i.e. determinate being, or the finite posited as negative, i.e. of pure intro-reflection, self-consciousness as such, or the infinite. Thus, positedness, in its first moment of self-negatedness, becomes negation as immediately affirmative, i.e. of pure reflection in its positive appearance and of positedness. Christ then, who originally appears as pure intro-reflection’s, or the Unchangeable’s positing of itself in its particularity, its finitude, is, through his negation by the Changeable, immediately (re-)posited, this time by the Changeable, as the Unchangeable’s positive determination; or, put differently, it is the Changeable’s immanent positing of itself, qua the Changeable, as the Unchangeable, viz. the finite as infinite. Thus, the unhappy consciousness resurrects Christ as a particular individual, or living being, immediately upon killing him.

Such a resurrection, however, does little more for the unhappy consciousness than satisfy its own initial uncertainty, or scepticism, with regard to the idea of, and thus Christ’ own claim to have been, the Unchangeable in determinate form. The unhappy consciousness, qua the Changeable, therefore, now believes in Christ, as well as the Father. It believes in him, for the same reason it initially believed in the Unchangeable in general after its negation, qua pure intro-reflection, in and by external reflection. It believes in him, because he seems to have maintained his self-identity in and through the absolute negativity of death. However, it still has not realized that this identity is only preserved through the reflection of positedness in general, and not because of any special power, or essence on Christ’s own part in particular. Hence, even though we can see that this resurrection is a logical consequence of the nature of reflection at this stage of development, and, therefore, to some extent necessary, or inevitable, its only immediate external effect is to prolong unhappy consciousness’ realization of reflection’s true role in its own experience, which in turn merely prolongs the "reconciliation of its, [viz. the Changeable's,] individuality with the universal" (PhS 128:210 [MI]).
This is because "there is [still] something hidden from consciousness in its object if the object is for consciousness an other, or something alien, and if it does not know it as its own self" (PhS 459:759). Put differently, Christ is no less an opaque sensuous unit for having been resurrected, than he was prior to being killed, and the unhappy consciousness, qua the Changeable, therefore, will prove no more successful at hanging on to and entering into an enduring relationship with the Unchangeable through the resurrected Christ, than it was through the Christ it first doubted.

The living individual Christ, even though he is now recognized as infinite, or divine, cannot simultaneously enter into a direct, unmediated relationship with every other single living being which constitutes the Changeable, thereby achieving the union unhappy consciousness desires. For he is still an exclusive one, or unit. Thus, as Hegel says: "By the nature of (my italics) this immediate present unit, through the actual existence in which it has clothed itself, [viz. a single individual body,] it necessarily follows (my italics) that in the world of time it has vanished, [i.e. because it still eventually goes away, or dies,] and that in space it had a remote existence and remains utterly remote, [i.e. because it was always somewhere else in relation to all of those individuals constituting the Changeable except one, viz. Christ]" (PhS 129:212). Whether alive, dead, or ascended then, Christ still represents the spatial and temporal beyond of the Unchangeable, and, therefore, the dissatisfaction of the unhappy consciousness. Indeed, Christ himself has an intuitive awareness of this before his death, and attempts to warn the disciples about it at the Last Supper: "... I tell you the truth: It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you" (John 16:7 [MI]). Who is this comforter? "... [T]he Spirit of the truth; whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him; but ye shall know him; for he dwelleth with you and shall be in you" (John 14:17 [MI]).

The unhappy consciousness, however, does not receive the Spirit of truth, or rather, the truth of Spirit, when Christ goes away, because it still confuses the truth of the particular individuality, which is pure being-for-self in a single isolated being, with the truth of actual universal individuality, which is the true essence of every particular individual and of Christ's message to these individuals, viz. "Abide in me, and I in you" (John 15:4 [MI]). Hence, as Hegel puts it in one of his most famous passages from the Phenomenology, which is reminiscent of Christ's message of universal individuality, and, therefore, Spirit, i.e. Holy Spirit: "What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: [the] I that is We and [the] We that is I" (PhS 110:177 [MI]).

Even the disciples, who are, as we saw, promised this experience and knowledge because of their proximity to Christ during his particular life, i.e. that he, the speaker of truth, lived with them, are no more advanced in this regard, than any other particular individual who remains fixed upon the
determinate existence, or person of Christ, rather than his word, or message. In fact, they are the first to succumb to consciousness' "sad need ... for a mundane reality" (ETW 293-4), or particular object, in unhappy consciousness' attempt to satisfy its desire for union with the Unchangeable as a particular individual, immediately following the negation of the Unchangeable's incarnation. For instance, when Christ's followers go to his sepulchre to tend to his body and pay homage to their dead friend and teacher, they are met with an empty tomb and a question from two apparently divine strangers, which is perfectly consistent with Christ's own teaching on the presence of the Unchangeable in the living world, or the world of the living: "Why seek ye the living among the dead?" (Luke 24:5). Rather than interpreting this question as referring to the essence of Christ's individuality, i.e. the works and message that mediated his particular individual being, his entire reason for being, however, the disciples run off in search of Christ himself. Not only is this contrary to Christ's charge that: "If a man love me, he will keep my words," and "If ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I said I go unto my Father: for my Father is greater than I" (John 14:23 & 28); it is a failure of their love and comprehension, which sets the stage for the unhappy consciousness' subsequent recapitulation of its experience, rather than its immediate transcendence to the higher stage of Spirit. According to Hegel, this is because their love, which is the first moment and model of early Christian love in general, fails to become life, i.e. the life which would result from the love among equals spoken of above, or the life of actual freedom and Spirit, not life as mere existence (ETW 294). Such life, as Hegel has already stated, comes about through the union of equals, who come together in love, of their own volition. It is the product of their own self-conscious activity. "To the spirit, to life, nothing is given. What it has acquired, that it has itself become" (ETW 294 [MI]). By immediately setting off in search of their dead teacher and master though, the disciples are in fact recognizing that their only living bond lay in Christ himself, and that without him, they have nothing in common, except their own feelings of isolation and ignorance. In short, they are still dependent upon him, as an external other.

c) Christianity & the Community of Dependence and Death

"This is a remarkable aspect of the spirit of the group, that in its eyes the divine, its unifying principle, has the form of something given" (ETW 294 [MI]). It is remarkable, because they have obviously not understood a word of what Christ has spoken to them. Instead of reflecting upon his words to determine their true significance, and then using this knowledge to organize a community of free individuals, who mutually recognize themselves in one another and one another in themselves, thus realizing the kingdom of God, or heaven on earth, they flock together as a group of slaves, or sheep (ETW 291) pining for their vanished master, or shepherd (ETW 291). On an immediate level, this flocking together of lost sheep, or slaves represents the absolute nadir of self-consciousness' development thus far. For by setting Christ up as an immediate object of desire after having negated him, self-consciousness, qua unhappy consciousness, not only displays a willingness to be enslaved, viz. to save its particular life, or existence, it fully demonstrates, for the first time in its development.
the desire to be enslaved, i.e. that it wants to be, or enjoys being a slave. Hegel points this out in The Spirit of Christianity, where he explains that the spirit of the early Christian sects contains "the consciousness of discipleship and of a lord and master" (ETW 294).

This truly slavish "spirit was not completely manifested" (ETW 294) in the disciples' relationship with Christ prior to his death. For a certain passivity was necessarily involved in that relationship, i.e. insofar as they had something to learn from him about the nature of the Unchangeable. In other words, Christ was the authority, or teacher, and learning necessarily involves a temporary subjection to the authority of the teacher. Even this subjection, however, is less a subjection to the individual possessing authority, than it is to the source of that individual's authority, viz. the knowledge to be revealed, which, once revealed, constitutes the possession of equality among those it is shared by. The truly slavish spirit of their group only becomes completely manifest in their relationship, such as it is, with the resurrected Christ, who no longer lives with them, but, nonetheless, exercises a mysterious power over them, a power which holds them together, and makes them act in a certain way. As such, Christ "is something [merely] positive, an object which has in it as much foreignness, as much dominion, as there is dependence in the spirit of the group, [viz. dependence upon this external, mysterious power]" (ETW 295). This is because this object once again does not appear as self-consciousness' object.

Thus, Hegel, rather unflatteringly, but correctly, refers to these groups, which constitute the primary mode of organization for self-consciousness, qua early Christianity, as "the community of dependence" (ETW 295 [MI]). The community of dependence is not an authentic community, or a community that would constitute the existence of Spirit, as it has so far been described. For, although the mutual dependence of its members is not necessarily eliminated in the authentic community, which exists in and through its recognition of the needs, and thus inter-dependence, of individuals as living determinate beings, the community of dependence exists by means of a positive, and, therefore, predominantly alien notion, or object, i.e. one that it does not appear to make, or, therefore, understand, which provides all the members with a common consolation in the face of what they all need but lack, viz. mutual recognition as free and equal beings. The community of dependence is dependent upon its separate members' common love not of each other, but of the risen Christ, to hold it together, and, insofar as this love is merely the love for the particular individual Christ, or the desire to possess him in his immediate, and, therefore, external existence, it is love of what has already proved to be dead for self-consciousness, viz. mere existence. Christian love then, is not only a love of the dead, it is dead love, and as Hegel says: "in the lifelessness of the group's love[,] the spirit of its love remained so a thirst, felt itself so empty, that it could not fully recognize in itself, living in itself, its corresponding spirit; on the contrary, to this spirit, [its spirit,] it remained a stranger" (ETW 294). The community of dependence, therefore, insofar as it is held together by the weight of its dead love, and, insofar as it cannot recognize the spirit living, or living spirit in itself, as well as in each and every one of its
members, is the community of death.  

As a consequence of the disciples and early Christians organizing themselves into the community of death, self-consciousness, qua the unhappy consciousness, becomes what Hegel aptly describes, in The Spirit of Christianity, as "a vague hovering between reality and spirit" (ETW 300). Christianity, according to Hegel, holds these two moments apart, so that they do "not coalesce into a [single] pure nature, but ... [instead] ... become a pairing of the living and the dead, divine and actual" (ETW 300 [MI]). The unhappy consciousness itself, therefore, now "occupies ... [an] intermediate position" (PhS 130:216) between life and death, and becomes, as it were, something that was alive, but now is dead, something that is dead, but still acts as if it were alive. In other words, self-consciousness, qua Christianity, becomes the religion of the Holy Ghost, and thus something that is neither really alive, nor completely dead. Rather, it again exists in a kind of living death, or stasis, e.g. desire.

Self-consciousness, however, is not comforted by, and does not find comfort in, this static, vague, ghost-like existence, that results from bringing Christ, the individual man, back from the dead. On the contrary, as Hegel goes on to say, in The Spirit of Christianity: "By conjoining the man Jesus with the glorified and deified Jesus, [through the instrumentality of the resurrection,] this vagueness pointed to a satisfaction of the deepest urge for religion, [or unity with the Unchangeable,] but it did not provide this satisfaction, and the urge was turned into an endless, unquenchable and unappeased longing" (ETW 300 [MI]). Thus, the community of death only reinforces self-consciousness' condition qua unhappy consciousness, at the same time, as it attempts to offer its members comfort in the idea that Christ is risen; or rather, the consolation of the Christian community merely aggravates self-consciousness' unhappy condition, by magnifying its desire, and making satisfaction impossible. This desire, or 'longing', as Hegel calls it here, "remains unsatisfied [simply] because even in its highest dreams, even in the transports of the most finely organized love-breathing souls, it is always confronted by the [particular] individual, by something objective and exclusively personal. In all the depths of their beautiful feelings those who felt this longing pined for union with [Christ], though this union, because he is an individual, is eternally impossible. The [particular] individual always confronts, [or opposes] them; he remains eternally in their consciousness and never allows religion to become a perfected, [or universal] life" (ETW 301 [MI]).

Despite the preservation of Christ's particularity, and thus of this opposition, self-consciousness' existence as a vague hovering between and consequent pairing of life and death, reality and negation, existence and spirit, finite and infinite, etc., does indicate - however faintly - that pure intro-reflection is still present in the unhappy consciousness in general. Indeed, this presence now begins to make its hitherto merely immanent presence in the unhappy consciousness in particular explicit. This is because the pairing that occurs in the community of death is actually a pairing of two proven
negatives, two realms of essentially dead being for self-consciousness, and, therefore, the self-identity of negativity in positedness. In other words, insofar as death, or negativity constitutes the true ground of the community of death, it is the self-reflection of nothingness. In the community of death then, positedness can eventually come to know the pure intro-reflection in itself, and, therefore, itself as determining reflection in general, viz. the infinite self-relation, or absolute identity of being-for-self with being-for-self in itself, as spoken of above. Ironically, however, this process of doing away with the figurative notion, or positive idea of Christ, which the unhappy consciousness qua the Changeable, itself posits and maintains after its first negation of him, begins with the internal search for him; and, if only to compound this irony, the internal search for Christ begins at the same time as the external search, that has already been more or less described in its origin - although the unhappy consciousness does not of course realize it. In other words, the process of negating the positive idea of Christ begins along with the process of establishing it. In fact, the former, as we shall see shortly, is an essential aspect of the latter. It gives it life. Thus, insofar as both processes mark the beginning of a new relationship with the Unchangeable for the unhappy consciousness in particular, they both correspond to a new, third determination of the Unchangeable, viz. the Holy Spirit, or the living side of the Holy Ghost.

The unhappy consciousness' relationship with this new determination of the Unchangeable is itself divided into three determinations, or modes of consciousness, i.e. modes of the Changeable's consciousness. This is because its experience is still primarily that of reflection. Generally speaking, it is a reflection of the three determinations of the Unchangeable, the three overall determinations of the Changeable's relationship with the Unchangeable, viz. Judaism, life with Christ and Christianity, the three determinations of objective self-consciousness' thought about its experience, viz. stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness, and finally, the three overall determinations of self-consciousness' experience in the process of becoming objective, viz. its existence as pure being-for-self in itself, the negation and suppression of pure being-for-self through the process of desire, satisfaction and work, and the recognition of being-for-self in and for itself. Hegel describes these three modes of the third determination of the unhappy consciousness' relationship with the Unchangeable as: 1) "pure consciousness," or the unhappy consciousness as a simple searching for the essence of the incarnation of the Unchangeable; 2) "a particular individual who approaches the actual world in the forms of desire and work," or the unhappy consciousness returning to life, after having failed to find, or hold onto the apparent object of its search; and 3) "consciousness ... aware of its own being-for-self," or the unhappy consciousness surrendering its finite powers and pleasures in the realm of life, or existence, having realized their limited nature, and, therefore, the vanity of the enjoyment associated with them (PhS 130:214). In short, the unhappy consciousness, qua the Changeable, becomes searching consciousness, living consciousness and discovering/surrendering consciousness. This last mode will mark the end of the unhappy consciousness' expressly religious existence, by immediately giving way to its reflection, or inverse form, viz. the surrendering/discovering, or realizing consciousness, which
is Reason, and the first explicit moment of speculative politic's strategy of overcoming through yielding. First, however, we must address the question of how the internal search for Christ is essential to, or implicit within the external search. Put differently, how is what appears to be just another form of empirical consciousness, or external reflection actually pure consciousness?

d) The Incarnation and
Pure Consciousness as the Intuition of Self, or Devotion

We have already seen that the nature of reflection leads to the immediate (re-)positing of Christ by the Changeable, after that same Changeable negated him, and that this (re-) positings is positedness' first explicit moment of self-determination, as determining reflection, or reflection that is the identity of being-for-self with being-for-self within itself. Furthermore, we have also seen that this (re-)positing, or resurrection provides the ground for the negation of the doubt caused by the apparent limitedness of the individual Unchangeable, specifically, its death. For the determination of reflection subsists in and through its negation, as the self-identity of negativity. This means that Christ's death actually appears as the death of death to the unhappy consciousness (LPR 466-67). In other words, his essence does not vanish with his being, but merely seems to return to being immediately, and this immediate return to being allows the unhappy consciousness, qua the simple Changeable, to believe in the incarnation of the Unchangeable, which now "seems to be present in its own proper nature" (PHS 130: 215 [MI]), viz. as a real individuality that does not vanish for the unhappy consciousness. This, as Hegel is quick to point out, is not because the incarnation of the Unchangeable, or Incarnation for short, is actually present as it should be. For "its own proper nature, [as an actual individual, or enduring universal self-consciousness,] has yet to come into existence" (PHS 130:215). This existence "would ... have to come about from its own side" (PHS 130:215), i.e. from the side of the Incarnation self-consciously positing itself as the Incarnation. This does not mean Christ positing himself on earth again, as Christian theology is apt to interpret it, i.e. the Second Coming. On the contrary, it means the Changeable positing its unchangeability not just as the Changeable, so that it is, as it were, changeable unchangeability, (which is precisely what it has become by (re-)positing itself in the form of Christ), but also as the Unchangeable, so that it is also unchangeable changeability. This can only come about, as we shall see, when the Changeable posits all individuals as the Unchangeable, which means all individuals positing themselves as such.

That aside for the moment, however, the Incarnation appears to be present as it should be, because the unhappy consciousness, qua positing reflection, has (re-)posited Christ, or posited itself as Christ - (although it does not yet know Christ to be itself, or itself to be Christ, or Christ's (re-)positing/resurrection to be its own self-positing) - and because the negation of doubt, which this resurrection brings about, frees the unhappy consciousness to feel the potential for the Incarnation within itself (PHS 130:215). This feeling of the potential for the Incarnation in itself constitutes the
unhappy consciousness' existence, qua pure consciousness, in relation to the Incarnation as a purely external object. It is pure consciousness, because "it does not relate itself as a thinking consciousness to its [actual] object, [viz. the Incarnation] ... though it is indeed in itself, or implicitly a pure thinking individuality and its [actual] object is just this pure thinking" (PhS 131:217). If the unhappy consciousness, qua pure consciousness, did relate itself to its object as a thinking consciousness, this would mean the use of concepts, and such concepts would make pure thought and pure consciousness determinate thought and real consciousness. It is true that the unhappy consciousness at this point does possess a concept, viz. "the specific conception of the Son" (PH 333), but this concept does not yet appear to be its own. Rather, as we have already seen, it appears to be something, or an object given to consciousness from outside of itself. It, therefore, belongs not to the unhappy consciousness' present moment, which is the Changeable as pure consciousness, or intro-reflection in itself, but rather, to its previous moment, or the Changeable, as a form of external reflection. One might object at this point, that the unhappy consciousness, qua pure consciousness, does not seem to be an advance beyond either stoicism, or scepticism, that is, insofar as it is the pure feeling of self-identical self-consciousness, on the one hand, and the empirical consciousness of external reflection, on the other. However, Hegel assures us that an advance has indeed occurred (PhS 130:216). For the unhappy consciousness, qua pure consciousness, self-consciously conjoins "pure thinking, [or feeling] and particular individuality" (PhS 130:216). In other words, it is aware of itself as a particular individual, and this individual is aware that it is filled with the certainty that comes from realizing that unchangeability lies in individuality, rather simply, than individuality in unchangeability, as in the unhappy consciousness qua Judaism. This individual, however, is not yet aware that this feeling is for itself as an individual, rather than another. In short, it knows that this feeling is in itself, but it does not yet think that it is for itself (PhS 131:216).

The unhappy consciousness, qua Christian pure consciousness, feels the presence of the potential Incarnation within itself. It believes in it. It is possible. However, because it does not relate to its real object on any level other than that of pure intuition, feeling, belief, conviction, etc., it has no idea of what this potential object really is. Therefore, it identifies its feeling and object with the external object of Christ, i.e. the object given to it. Christ claimed to be the Incarnation. The Changeable now believes in the Incarnation. Therefore, the Changeable now believes in Christ. This is why, even though the unhappy consciousness, qua pure consciousness, is implicitly pure thinking individuality, the object of which is this same pure thinking, "the relation of the one to the other is not itself pure thinking" (PhS 131:217 [MI]). It is the empirical thinking of external reflection, which regards pure intro-reflection as an external determination (and is in fact transcended with the death of Christ), and "a movement towards [actual] thinking" (PhS 131:217) in its own self. Hegel calls this latter movement, devotion (PhS 131:217). Devotion implies the giving up, or giving over of oneself to one's object, e.g. the Incarnation.
However, since the unhappy consciousness still has no idea of this object other than the one given to it, its devotion takes the form of devotion to Christ as an external object, i.e. external reflection. Without devotion, which in essence represents the disciples surrender to the person of Christ, i.e. the surrender of their individuality qua scepticism, they would have no reason to set off on their external search for Christ, when informed of his resurrection. Despite their previous doubts regarding Christ himself, and even the idea of a person returning from the dead, the feeling of the Incarnation's potential within themselves, after Christ's negation, or death makes even this most unlikely event seem possible. Indeed, it makes it seem possible enough to at least go and see for themselves whether or not Christ had indeed returned from the dead as reported, as well as to see and hear Christ himself, when he supposedly appeared to them afterwards.

Devotion to Christ may be enough to compel the disciples to go off on their external search for Christ. It may even be enough to cause Christ to re-appear to them and others after his death, i.e. by virtue of his re-positing by the Changeable (PH 390). However, it is not enough to satisfy the unhappy consciousness' longing, or make Christ's various re-appearances endure. On the contrary, devotion to Christ necessarily becomes, as it were, "the inward movement of the pure heart which feels itself, but itself as agonizingly self-divided" (PhS 131:217). In other words, it becomes the feeling of itself precisely as unhappy consciousness, rather than the potential Incarnation in itself. This is because, even in finding Christ again, the unhappy consciousness does not, as we have seen, achieve its actual object, i.e. the real source of devotion.

As the "infinite, pure inner feeling, [it] does ... come into possession of its object, [that is, insofar as this object is nothing more than that same pure, infinite feeling, or the feeling of the Incarnation's infinite potential in its own self]; but this [object] does not make its appearance in conceptual form, not as something [speculatively (sic)] comprehended" (PhS 131:217). Furthermore, insofar as it is not comprehended, it is something that does not appear to be the unhappy consciousness, qua the Changeable, or pure consciousness. Rather, it appears as something other than the Changeable, and: "Where that other is sought [by the Changeable], it cannot [really] be found, for it is supposed to be (my italics), [viz. in essence,] just a beyond, something that can not be found" (PhS 131:217); i.e. something ideal, rather than real. Thus, by again becoming a specific here and now, i.e. Christ, the Incarnation is no longer what it should be, but precisely what it should not be, i.e. a real, particular individuality standing over and against all other individuals. As Hegel says: "When sought as a particular individual, [the Incarnation] is not a universal individuality in the form of thought, not a Notion, but an individual in the form of an object, or an actual individual; an object of immediate sense-certainty, and for that very reason only something that has already vanished (my italics)" (PhS 131:217), or disappeared, even, or especially upon re-appearing, e.g. "And it came to pass, while he blessed them, he was parted from them, and carried up into heaven" (Luke 24:51 [MII]).
e) The Grave of Life

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the Crusades as the Practical Beginning of Modern Subjectivity

Since the (re-)posing of Christ by the Changeable, which results in the immediate (re-)appearance of Christ to the Changeable, actually turns out to be the positing of disappearance by what is already determined to disappear, the unhappy consciousness "can only find as a present reality (my italics) the grave of its life" (PhS 132:217); its life being the life, or past life of the Incarnation as a particular individual, viz. Christ, and especially, the life the Changeable has continued to lead without having achieved its true object, or the actual Incarnation in each and every individual, viz. the living death of existence and slavery. In other words, the external search for Christ leads the unhappy consciousness, qua Christianity, whence the search began, viz. back to the Holy Sepulchre, and back to the activities of life as mere existence, viz. the process of desire and satisfaction and work. The empty grave of Christ, therefore, is at once the last determinate vestige of the Unchangeable's presence as a particular individual, and the "historical symbol of a metaphysical truth,"25 regarding self-consciousness' existence, qua the unhappy consciousness in general. As the former, Christ's grave becomes the only external object of desire left in the Changeable's quest for union with the external Unchangeable, and thus the motivation behind Christianity's last and most monumental collective enterprise, viz. the Crusades.26

The Crusades are simply the logical conclusion of the external search for Christ initiated by the disciples, and, therefore, an enterprise doomed to failure from the start. This of course is "because this grave (my italics) is itself an actual existence, [or a determinate being,] and it is contrary to the nature of what actually exists [simply as a determinate being] to afford a lasting possession" (PhS 132:217). In other words, the grave, like its occupant, must eventually vanish in space and time, and, therefore, become lost to the unhappy consciousness, which futilely struggles to possess and maintain what it falsely believes will provide it with the self-certainty in continually craves. For Hegel, the Crusades offer a particularly appropriate, if not terrifying and ridiculous,27 testimony to the futility of the unhappy consciousness' attempt to possess the Incarnation merely in the form of an external object. In the Philosophy of History, for instance, he describes how the nations of Europe became so caught up in the fervour of devotion to Christ, that they were "almost [completely] robbed ... of their senses" (PH 392); how armies were mobilized for a succession of wars to conquer and hold the Holy Land for Christianity; and how, in these wars, "Christendom found the empty Sepulchre, but not the union of the Secular, [or Changeable] and the Eternal, [or Unchangeable]" (PH 393), which it sought. Rather, "in the grave is found [only] the real point of retroversion" (PH 392 [MII]) for the unhappy consciousness, qua Christianity.

That the unhappy consciousness finds the real point of retroversion in the empty grave of Christ,
however, is significant in a number of different ways. For retroversion is ultimately nothing other than reflection. Generally speaking, the emptiness of the grave is symbolic of the absolute negativity of essence in its purity. It is also symbolic of how this negativity itself posits the determinateness of being, i.e. the matter surrounding the space, or void, and how this negativity endures as the essence of determinate being, i.e. the grave, or tomb is literally nothing in itself. As a hole, or void, it has nothing within itself, and as such, is, as it were, the point from which all reflection begins, as we have already seen. In rolling back the stone of the Holy Sepulchre a second time then, self-consciousness not only affords itself a glimpse of the source of all being and reflection, it also sees for the first time the intro-reflection inherent in positedness in general. Indeed, this return to the place from whence it started is itself an act of reflection, which negates intro-reflection's externality as an individual positedness, and posits it in positedness, or life in general. From this act of reflection, therefore, the unhappy consciousness learns "that the grave of its actual unchangeable Being has no actuality, [and] that the vanished individual [it mistook for the exclusive embodiment of the Incarnation.] because it has vanished, is not the true individuality" (PhS 132:217). This grave has no actuality, a) because, as has already been pointed out, it is a mere determinate being, or a positedness, and, therefore, itself eventually passes into nothing, and b) because the grave of what has not yet come into being, viz. the true Incarnation, cannot yet be. Furthermore, the vanished individual is not true individuality, because the true Incarnation, when it comes explicitly into being, or arises, will not pass away, and, therefore, will not need, or desire a grave. For it shall be universal.

When the unhappy consciousness returns to the grave, therefore, it implicitly realizes that its devotion to the person of Christ is actually a perversion of the essence of Christ. This means that it finally begins to comprehend the word it could previously only hear: "At that day ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you" (John 14:20 [MI]). As a result, the unhappy consciousness abandons its external search for the Incarnation as a particular individual, or object, or both, and "stop[s] trying to hold on to what" is already dead for self-consciousness, viz. the person and body of Christ, and all the attendant relics that go therewith (PhS 132:217). Hegel actually sums up the process of the unhappy consciousness' emerging self-comprehension and transcendence, upon its return to the Holy Sepulchre, more elegantly and, in some respects, more instructively in the Philosophy of History, than in the 'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology. As he says in the former: "Christendom was not to find its ultimatum of truth in the grave. At this sepulchre the Christian world received a second time the response given to the disciples when they sought the body of the Lord there: 'Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen'. You must not look for the principle of your religion in the sensuous, in the grave among the dead, but in the living Spirit in yourselves (my italics) ... [Christendom] was practically undeceived, [when it regained and lost the Holy Sepulchre]; and the result that it brought back with it was of a negative kind: viz. that the definite embodiment which it was seeking, was to be looked for in subjective consciousness alone, and in no external object; that the definite form in question, presenting the union of the Secular, [or
Changeable] with the Eternal, [or Unchangeable,] is the Spiritual self-cognizant independence of the individual (my italics); [that is, the self-conscious community of self-conscious, and thus independent individuals]. Thus, the world attains the conviction (my italics) that man must look within himself for the definite embodiment of being which is of a divine nature: subjectivity (my italics) thereby receives absolute authorization, and claims to determine for itself (my italics) the relation [of all that exists (sic)] to the Divine" (PH 393).

For Hegel, modern subjectivity, or actual determining reflection has its practical beginning as "the absolute result of the Crusades" (PH 393), and Christianity itself vanishes as a universal external power with the achievement and subsequent loss of the Holy Land, i.e. "Christendom never appeared again on the scene of history as one body" (PH 132:393 [MI]). Even though the unhappy consciousness has become the principle of absolute subjectivity through the positing of the unchangeability of intro-reflection in positedness in general, and not just this or that particular positedness, however, it is obvious, from what Hegel said above, that it is still only this subject in practice, or in itself. In other words, it does not yet know itself as this absolute subject, despite the fact that it begins to conduct itself as such, upon returning from its external search for the Incarnation. This is because, as Hegel just pointed out, its knowledge and experience at this point appear to be merely negative, i.e. the unhappy consciousness knows what and where the Incarnation is not.

Where then does the conviction that the individual must look within itself to find the true Incarnation originate?

f) The Christian Return to Desire, Life and Work, or the Divine World

Although this knowledge and experience seems to be merely negative for the unhappy consciousness, which has just failed in its search, we have seen that this knowledge and experience is as much an act of positing, and, therefore, in itself positive, as it is negative, i.e. it is a reflection upon reflection and all that this entails, viz. the self-identity of negativity, the negation of negativity and the positing of determinate being. According to Hegel, the unhappy consciousness experiences this immanent positivity insofar as it still possesses its feeling of itself, even after its latest failure. Indeed, since its devotion to Christ was as much the reinforcement of self-consciousness’ separation from the actual Incarnation, and, therefore, the painful feeling of itself as unhappy consciousness, as it was the ecstatic feeling of the Incarnation’s infinite potential within self-consciousness, the self-feeling of unhappy consciousness as such can only be compounded by its latest loss. In other words, the self-feeling of the unhappy consciousness is now truly self-feeling. For there is no longer an external object of desire to which self-consciousness can attribute this feeling. "Its pain ... and its feeling of divine absence belong [only] to it;"28 or, as Hegel says: "Thus it comes forward here as self-feeling, or as an actual
consciousness existing on its own account" (PhS 132:218 [MI]). Both the pain and the feeling of the self are now pure, or, more accurately, pure pain is the condition of the pure feeling of self, or the pure self feeling itself qua unhappy consciousness. Once again then, self-consciousness appears to be left with nothing except its own feeling of emptiness, i.e. desire, and its life, i.e. existence. Put differently, it is left with the feeling of the meaningless of its life as mere existence, and what this life entails, viz. desire and work. Thus, after its return to the grave of Christ's life, as well as its own, "the unhappy consciousness merely finds itself desiring and working" (PhS 132:218).

As we saw, intro-reflection has been posited by reflection in positedness in general, and, although this means that the world of things, or life as mere existence is still in itself nothing, the immanent self-identity, viz. of nothingness, has imbued the world, or life with a significance it did not previously possess for consciousness. In short, the world, or life is now, at one and the same time, both an empty thing-in-itself and something sacred for self-consciousness. "[I]t is the form of the Unchangeable" (PhS 133:219). As such, the world is now "something like (my italics) [the unhappy] consciousness itself, an actuality broken in two" (PhS 133:219). Like consciousness then, it is now a mere being-in-itself that is passive, on the one hand, and a being-for-self that is active, on the other. This means that, even though the unhappy consciousness can negate the world through the process of desire and satisfaction and work, this negation must be due, at least in part, to the being-for-self of the world, which negates itself for consciousness. Indeed, the unhappy consciousness, as Hegel points out, at first attributes its own negation of the world, after its return from the Holy Sepulchre, entirely to the world's being-for-self, since it still sees this being-for-self as the Unchangeable, and it does not yet see itself as being capable of negating the Unchangeable as a whole (PhS 133:220).

For the unhappy consciousness, therefore, its negation of the world actually "comes about through the Unchangeable's itself having surrendered its embodied form, and having relinquished it for the enjoyment of consciousness" (PhS 133:220). Furthermore, it even regards the "faculties and powers" by and through which it achieves this negation as "a gift ... which the Unchangeable makes over to consciousness, [or the Changeable] to make use of" (PhS 133:220), i.e. "Bless us O Lord, for these thy gifts, which we are about to receive from thy bounty, through Christ our Lord, Amen." This of course is because the negation of the world through desire and work is the achievement of the being-for-self of self-consciousness, and to the extent that self-consciousness regards itself merely as another finite thing-in-itself, or a positedness, it assumes that the presence of being-for-self in itself is the presence of the Unchangeable in itself, viz. God, or Christ. Hence, it is God who appears as the power of absolute self-determination, or simply, the absolute power for the unhappy consciousness, qua living and working consciousness, and not self-consciousness, qua the Changeable (PhS 133:221). For, insofar as actuality seems to be negated through the desire and work of an active self-consciousness, it is only because the Unchangeable has determined itself to be passive, or to allow self-consciousness to negate it; and, insofar as self-consciousness seems to negate actuality through
desire and work, it is only because of the presence of the same active being-for-self, or Unchangeable in its self, as in the world, which, therefore, negates its own determination of itself as a passive actuality (PhS 133:221). "It is, therefore, only a superficial element from each side that is involved in the moving interplay of their mutual opposition" (PhS 133:221). The underlying self-identity remains the same, that is, God is the being of pure activity, or the purely active being, and humanity is nothing.

With God as such, self-consciousness once again seems to be reduced to the level of a mere slave, who lives because of, and works at the whim of, another. Whereas before it lived and worked for the enjoyment of the master, it now lives and works for the glory of God. Despite this apparent regression, however, we can see from what Hegel has said above, that self-consciousness in general has made a very important discovery. For it does finally see the essentiality of the act of surrender. In other words, the slave's initial act of surrender to the master can now be recognized as being as much an act of giving life to another, i.e. the master, and, therefore, an act of being-for-self, as the master's initial act of conquest and mercy. Of course, that the essential act of surrender here is seen as coming from the Unchangeable, which, although present as an individual in positedness in general, is still regarded as an alien, superior being, means that self-consciousness' recognition is still flawed by domination and one-sidedness. This, however, does not take away from the fact that self-consciousness now recognizes, at least in principle, the essential value and importance of the giving of oneself to another in general, which, as we saw in the discussion of the master/slave relationship, is a crucial step in its development towards true recognition and Spirit. Furthermore, the unhappy consciousness, by recognizing the Unchangeable's essentiality to its own life and work, "denies itself the satisfaction of being conscious of its [own] independence" (PhS 134:222), which would normally be the result of desire and work, and, thereby, commits an act of "reciprocal self-surrender" (PhS 134:222).

Self-suppression, as was just pointed out, is itself an act of being-for-self, even or especially in the consciousness that does not at first appear to be a true being-for-itself in itself, i.e. the simple surrendering consciousness, or slave, and now the Changeable. Self-consciousness, qua the unhappy consciousness, therefore, possesses being-for-self in itself, as much by virtue of itself, or its own activity, as it does by the Unchangeable's, and through this dual presence of being-for-self in itself, the unhappy consciousness "gain[s] a sense of its unity with the the Unchangeable" (PhS 134:222). However, it is only a sense, or feeling of this unity, because these two moments of being-for-self in itself subsist in a merely formal identity, or side by side, as a "double reflection" (PhS 134:222), instead of being a true synthesis, or concrete unity. In short, the unhappy consciousness in itself, qua living and working consciousness, is actually two competing moments of individuality, and not one individual. As Hegel puts it: "this unity ... is again broken within itself, and from it there emerges once more the antithesis of the universal [individual] and the [particular] individual" (PhS 134:222 [MI]).
g) Hypocrisy, the Evil in Existence and Asceticism

Be that as it may, even though self-consciousness, qua the Changeable, seems to renounce its self by denying itself the certainty that comes from satisfaction, or enjoyment, and recognizes the Unchangeable's absolute power and essentiality in the maintenance of its life, thereby, positing itself, once again, as nothing, it does so only by its "own act" (PhS 134:222). Self-consciousness' self-abnegation and consequent humility, therefore, are merely a show, through which it preserves its own individuality in the face of an apparent absolute power, i.e. these acts are the show of self-denial, the show of humility, the show of surrender, the show of gratitude, etc., behind which self-consciousness experiences real satisfaction, real dignity, real willing, real enjoyment, etc. Thus, self-consciousness finally becomes the lurking being-for-self that the master feared the slave of being in the master/slave relationship. The unhappy consciousness, however, is not deceived by its own hypocrisy, viz. "its own seeming renunciation, for the truth of the matter is that it has not renounced itself" (PhS 134:222). Indeed, if anything, it has glorified its self. As Hyppolite puts it: "the humiliation of man, who attributes everything to grace and grants himself nothing, is in fact an elevation. For it is man himself who poses, [or posits] God ... In posing, [or positing] himself as the lowest [therefore] he, [viz. man,] is the highest ... Self-consciousness glorifies God and denies man's freedom, but that, precisely, is its grandest act."29

The unhappy consciousness does not rejoice, or find lasting enjoyment in this latent self-glorification. On the contrary, it has merely "renewed [the] division into the opposed consciousness of the Unchangeable, and ... the consciousness [of itself]" (PhS 134-35:222), as competing individualities in itself, and, therefore, driven itself further into despair, by an apparent lack of vigilance in the face of its most insidious enemy as self-consciousness, viz. desire and particularity (PhS 135:223 & 225). "Work and enjoyment thus lose all universal content and significance" (PhS 135:223), as does the world. In other words, neither life, nor its associated activities are sacred any longer for self-consciousness. Instead, self-consciousness once again sees that reality, particularly its own, is "immediately a nothingness" (PhS 135:225), or nothing in itself.

This nothingness, however, does not lose its self-identity for the unhappy consciousness, which is why Hegel here refers to it in figurative terms as the enemy, i.e. the devil, or Satan. It only loses its identity as the Unchangeable, or God. This is because the self-identity of negativity is, as we have already seen, absolute, and because all of self-consciousness' activities, even its most apparently self-abnegating activities, continually re-affirm a sense of individuality in itself. Thus, once the unhappy consciousness renews the separation of its being-for-self from that of the Unchangeable in itself, and life, or existence loses its significance for it, viz. as an embodiment of the individual Unchangeable, it becomes "aware of itself as this actual, [or rather, particular] individual in the animal functions" (PhS

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135:225) associated with its own life and desire; and furthermore, since there is also still a self-identity present in the remainder of the living world, which is neither God, nor itself - for it has yet to identify itself in its particularity with the entirety of being - it must also become aware of the devil, or Satan in existence.

Existence, therefore, becomes a matter of shame and guilt for the unhappy consciousness. For, although the Unchangeable appears to be entirely giving and gracious towards the Changeable, the Changeable appears to continually exploit the Unchangeable's beneficence to satisfy its most base desires, i.e. hunger, lust, etc., despite its show of self-abasement and expressions of gratitude. In this contrast in particular are present, what Hegel later refers to as, "the specific differences yielded by the thought of Spirit as immediately existent" (PhS 469:777), viz. good and evil, each of which seems to possess "an independent existence, [or being-for-self] of its own" (PhS 469:777) for the unhappy consciousness, which in turn is the unessential being that serves as "the synthetic ground of their existence and their conflict" (PhS 469:777). According to Hegel, the good is simply the self-sacrificing divine being, which first surrenders, or renounces its "abstract and non-actual nature" (PhS 470:777) to become Christ, and then sacrifices its immediate being as Christ and the world, for the life of another, viz. the particular individual, or Changeable (PhS 472:780). Ultimately, therefore, "goodness is what is simple and without a self" (PhS 472:780), i.e. pure being. Evil, on the other hand, is simply "the self-centredness of the natural existence of Spirit" (PhS 470:777). It is pure being-for-self, or consciousness as it first began, i.e. as desire and pure knowing, or self-consciousness at its simplest and most abstract level (PhS 472:780).

As Hegel points out, it is clear that these two notions have a great deal in common, viz. that "each in its own self [is] equally pure negativity or absolute difference" (PhS 472:780), and, therefore, that the two shall prove to be utterly united in "their [reciprocal] movement" (PhS 472:780). For the moment, however, the unhappy consciousness sees only their absolute difference, and that life, or mere existence is evil, at least for itself. For the unhappy consciousness, the devil reveals himself in its own shameful desire and the activities associated with it (PhS 135:225). Thus, rather than treating them with the indifference of Spirit, as Hegel sees they must ultimately be treated, all of self-consciousness' thought and activity is directed towards the suppression and negation of the evil in the activities of its own existence. These activities, therefore, become "the object of a serious endeavour" (PhS 135:225) for the unhappy consciousness, i.e. the struggle with evil, and thus what are supposedly matters of shame and guilt, "become ... matters of the utmost importance" (PhS 135:225), i.e self-consciousness becomes asceticism.30

The unhappy consciousness' shame and guilt, therefore, imbue these activities with a significance the individual attempts to and would rather deny. As we have already seen numerous times, however, the self-identity of negativity is preserved even in the negation of negation, and positedness, or, in this
case, existence and its associated activities are the result of absolute negativity, the negation of
negation, the self-posing activity of determinate, or posited being, or however else we choose to look
at it. This means that self-consciousness' negation of existence, and, therefore, evil, simply produces
existence and evil anew. Consequently, its struggle with evil is really a never ending battle, which is
actually a losing battle for self-consciousness in its drive towards freedom. It is a losing battle
because: "This enemy ... renews himself in defeat, and consciousness, in fixing its attention on him,
far from freeing itself from him, really remains forever in contact with him, and forever sees itself as
defiled" (PhS 136:225). In other words, the unhappy consciousness, qua asceticism, is just another
form of self-centred existence, and, therefore, a petty, brooding consciousness, "as wretched as it is
impoveryed" (PhS 136:225).

h) The Priesthood as the Mediation Between the Unchangeable and Self-
Consciousness qua the Changeable

The unhappy consciousness' negation of existence, and, therefore, attempted transcendence of evil,
however, does arise out of its conscious desire to be good. This means that even its latest failure and
the feelings associated therewith are related to "the consciousness of its unity with the Unchangeable"
(PhS 136:226). It wants to be good. It wants to realize the Unchangeable that it knows should be and
can be in itself. As Hegel puts it: "the attempted direct destruction of what it, [viz. the individual
unhappy consciousness,] actually is, [i.e. a living, desiring being,] is mediated by the thought of the
Unchangeable, and takes place in relation to it" (PhS 136:226). This thought and relation, however,
must be more than the direct relationship to positedness, or existence in general, which it was in the
unhappy consciousness' activity after returning to life and work from its external search. Otherwise, it
will merely find itself right back in the false infinite of its struggle with evil. For it will still be
affirming its own particular individuality through real willing and enjoyment, while pretending to
recognize the essentiality of God, or Christ, by forsaking the appearance of its willing and enjoyment.
In other words, its own self-surrender must be more than just the formal, or abstract surrender to an
abstract being. It must surrender itself to another real being-for-self, which it recognizes as possessing
the same essentiality as the Unchangeable. Only in this way can its self-surrender, and thus being-for-
another, or goodness be actual. The unhappy consciousness, therefore, as a result of its negative
activity in the struggle with evil, which is in essence a negation of negation, and, therefore, inherently
positive, posits a real being to serve as a middle term between the Unchangeable and itself (PhS
138:230). "[T]his middle term is one which presents the two extremes to one another, and ministers
to each in its dealings with the other. This middle term is itself a conscious being, for it is an action
which mediates consciousness as such; the content of this action is the extinction of its particular
individuality which consciousness [in general] is undertaking" (PhS 136:227 [MI]).

However, if the individual unhappy consciousness was unable to overcome its particular individuality,
then how can this conscious being which it posits to serve as the middle term between itself and the Unchangeable, be free of the wretchedness and poverty that keeps the unhappy consciousness, *qua* asceticism, from achieving the desired union? How is it purified of its particular individuality, and thus evil, while being maintained as an actual, or existent being?

To as great an extent possible, it is freed from the activities that nourish the unhappy consciousness' sense of its own individuality, viz. those associated with desire and existence in particular and work, in the same way that the master was by the slave. The only difference here is that the unhappy consciousness' decision to enslave itself to its mediator does not appear to be an immediate decision of life and death, as was the slave's. Rather, it is a decision of universal life and living death, or, what, for the unhappy consciousness, appears as eternal life in the beyond of unchangeable being, i.e. in heaven, and eternal suffering in separation from the Unchangeable, i.e. in life on earth and in hell. In other words, because the unhappy consciousness' life and death are more mediated than those of self-consciousness in the transition from the struggle for life and death to the master/slave relationship, there seems to be more freedom in the unhappy consciousness' decision to enslave itself, than there was in simple self-consciousness' decision. Indeed, the unhappy consciousness, at this point in its development, explicitly chooses slavery, because it sees slavery as freedom, viz. freedom from the responsibility of and for the particular individuality it regards as evil. As Hegel puts it: "In the mediator ... this consciousness frees itself from action and enjoyment so far as they are regarded as its own" (*PhS* 136:228 [MI]).

Ironically, the unhappy consciousness frees itself from its own action and enjoyment, by first freeing the mediator from his action and enjoyment, i.e. it works for him, and then by "cast[ing] upon the mediator or minister [priest] its own freedom of decision, and herewith the responsibility, [and thus guilt,] for its own action" (*PhS* 136:228), as a particular individual. It is assumed that the mediator has "a direct relationship with the unchangeable being" (*PhS* 136-37:228). For the surrender of his own individuality seemed to be pure, i.e. he forswore his own desires and activities, thus realizing the Unchangeable in himself, and then never again had to engage in the activities which bring about the re-assertion of one's individuality and the consequent negation of the Unchangeable in oneself. His being-for-self, therefore, seems to be purely for another, viz. God, on the one hand, and the individual unhappy consciousness, on the other. He is not evil. He is good, and thus capable of determining, "or giving advice on what is right" (*PhS* 137:228 [MI]) to the unhappy consciousness, *qua* the Changeable.

The unhappy consciousness of course found that it did not know what was right. It thought it knew, but every time it acted upon its alleged knowledge, or belief, it discovered itself to have been wrong. Each time it acted, it seemed to further the cause of evil, and thus move further and further away from the Unchangeable in itself, by reinforcing itself, rather than surrendering itself. However, its "action,
since it [now] follows upon the decision of someone else, [or an other,] ceases, as regards the doing or the willing of it to be its own" (PhS 137:228). Rather, it is the will of the mediator, or priest, but since the mediator, or priest has no will of his own, it is in fact the will of God. Theoretically then, self-consciousness is purely a being-for-another, just like the Unchangeable.

Such self-surrender, however, although certainly more complete than it was in the unhappy consciousness' determination as living and working, where it attributed everything to God, but still had to make the decision as to how it should act and what it should enact, is still largely abstract, or formal. This is because it is still apparently in possession of "the objective aspect [of its activity,] viz. the fruit of its labour, and [therefore] its [own potential] enjoyment" (PhS 137:228). The unhappy consciousness, however, has already surrendered this objective aspect of its activity insofar as it has freed the mediator from the activities of his existence, so that he can act as its minister, or priest, i.e. the unhappy consciousness "gives away part of what it has acquired through work" (PhS 137:228), or it pays a tithe. The mediator then further ensures that the unhappy consciousness will not again deceive itself by eking any enjoyment, and, therefore, sense of individual being-for-self, out of the existence and activities left to it, by demanding, upon threat of eternal separation from the Unchangeable, that it participate in an utterly alien activity, or "a thinking and speaking of what is utterly meaningless to it" (PhS 137:228), i.e. the Latin mass,31 and that it satisfy the needs of its existence with only the bare minimum, i.e. the individual is required to fast and give alms.32

"Through these moments of surrender, ... [the unhappy consciousness] truly and completely deprives itself of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of the actuality, [or rather, particularity] in which consciousness exists for itself" (PhS 137:229). It achieves its ultimate idea of goodness, which, as we saw above, is to be a simple being without a self, i.e. a non-self-centred existence; or, as Hegel says: "It [now] has the certainty of having truly divested itself of its 'I', and of having turned its immediate (my italics) self-consciousness into a thing, into a [simple] objective existence [that is completely for another, and, therefore, good]. Only through this actual sacrifice could it demonstrate this self-renunciation [for itself, in itself]" (PhS 137:229 [MI]), i.e. the self-renunciation that would make it identical with the Unchangeable, which constitutes the entirety of being, in its own mind.

The unhappy consciousness' sacrifice, however, is "not a one-sided action" (PhS 138:230), which merely posits a formal identity, or mere likeness between itself and this Unchangeable. For this action, as we have already seen, is implicitly "the action of the other" (PhS 138:230), viz. the Unchangeable. It is implicitly the Unchangeable's action, because the negation of its own individual, particular will was "the positing of will as the will of an other" (PhS 138:230), viz. the mediator, or priest, and this other's will turned out not to be the particular will of the unhappy consciousness, qua living and working consciousness, but "a universal will" (PhS 138:230), which the unhappy consciousness takes "to be the will of the other extreme" (PhS 138:230) in the syllogism, of which
the mediator, or priest is the middle term, i.e. it is God's will. Therefore, insofar as the unhappy consciousness performs God's will, its action is in itself, implicitly, in principle, etc., the Unchangeable's, or God's action. "[F]or [the unhappy] consciousness, [then,] its will does indeed become universal and essential will" (PhS 138:230).

To the degree that its will is God's will, however, the unhappy "consciousness does not take itself to be this essential will" (PhS 138:230). This is because it still does not realize that its act of self-suppression, or self-negation in general is an act of universal being-for-self in itself, as itself, and not as God, or the master. All of the negative activity that is "in principle the positive aspect of universal will ... is not regarded as its own doing" (PhS 138:230). It still sees its negative activity simply as negative, and the positive results as coming from another source, i.e. God, through itself, or rather, through the mediator, who is the real, particular embodiment of God's will for the unhappy consciousness, and thus, the only real embodiment of the "unity of objectivity and being-for-self" (PhS 138:230) for it.

"This unity, ... [however,] which lies in the Notion of action, and which therefore becomes for consciousness essence and object ... is not the principle of its action" (PhS 138:230), because its action apart from the direction of the mediator and the self-surrender of the divine being in itself, still appears merely as work. It is, therefore, simply an indirect object for the unhappy consciousness, or rather, an object that it can only be certain of because the mediator, who does not have to engage in work, is certain of it, and assures the unhappy consciousness of its truth (PhS 138:230). In short, the unhappy consciousness can have certainty only in its minister's, or priest's certainty. In turn, the minister, or priest mitigates the unhappy consciousness' pain and misery by granting it absolution for the particularity that is still preserved through its existence and work, and by assuring it that its wretched condition and pitiable action in this world, "is in principle the reverse" (PhS 138:230), so that it will be rewarded, or become absolute "self-satisfaction or blessed enjoyment" (PhS 138:230) in the next one. "But for itself. [i.e. for the unhappy consciousness immediately, or apart from its mediator and his certainty,] action and its own actual doing remain pitiable, its enjoyment remains pain, and the overcoming of these in a positive sense remains a beyond" (PhS 138:230 [MI]), viz. something to be achieved by the unhappy consciousness in heaven, or by self-consciousness in general from a standpoint that has not yet evolved, a standpoint other than that of religion, i.e. Reason and Spirit.

According to Hegel, this standpoint is already present in the unhappy consciousness' object, viz. the unity of objectivity and being-for-self, which constitutes the notion of action in general, and which the unhappy consciousness' self-surrender, in essence, is, since this too is an act of being-for-self in itself, which ultimately confirms the notion of individuality in spite of the fact that it only seems to represent individuality's negation. However, since the unhappy consciousness, qua self-sacrificing
consciousness, is only aware of this object to the extent that its mediator makes it aware of it, it does not yet see this new standpoint. Indeed, the mediator does not really see it either, even though he is himself the embodiment of it (PhS 139:231). This is because his certainty in the unhappy consciousness' object, although direct (PhS 139:231), is "a certainty which is itself still incomplete" (PhS 138:230). It is still incomplete, because of the separation that exists between itself and the unhappy consciousness, qua the particular self-sacrificing individual.

This separation is constituted of course by the privileged existence which the former enjoys at the expense of the latter, that is, the priest does not work, or labour, while the unhappy conscious does. This separation was, as we saw, precisely what allowed the particular individual, who became the mediator, or priest, the freedom to realize its unity, as an individual, with the universal unchangeable, that constitutes the entirety of being, and thus the certainty that absolute being is in itself, or rather, that it is itself absolute being in principle. So long as it enjoys this certainty at the expense of another individual, however, its certainty is dependent upon that individual, and, therefore, doomed to the same fate as the certainty of the master. Indeed, in a superficial respect, self-consciousness seems to merely have come full circle from the master/slave relationship, with the only apparent change being that both master and slave now possess a rationalization for their respective roles, beyond brute force. This is because the priest still does not recognize the necessity of work in general to the life and development of Spirit.

However, to the extent that the priest is himself the unity of particular individuality and absolute being in himself, and to the extent that he, unlike the master, does at least recognize the self-sacrifice of the individual unhappy consciousness, or simple Changeable as being good, he does represent a new standpoint for self-consciousness in general, i.e. he embodies "the idea of Reason" (PhS 138:230), and thus is the object for, and truth of, the unhappy consciousness, qua the simple Changeable. As Hegel says: "Its truth is that which appears in the syllogism whose extremes appeared as held absolutely asunder, as the middle term which proclaims to the unchangeable consciousness that the single individual has renounced itself, and, to the individual, that the Unchangeable is for it no longer an extreme, but is reconciled with it. This middle term is the unity directly aware of both and connecting them, and is the consciousness of their unity, which it proclaims to consciousness [in general,] and thereby to itself, the consciousness of the certainty of being all truth" (PhS 139:231).

i) The Emergence of Protestantism

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Self-Consciousness' Appropriation of the Idea of Reason

In the Phenomenology, the positing, or appearance of the mediator or priest, the recognition of this priest by the unhappy consciousness in its particularity, and finally, the self-recognition of the priest
as immanent Reason, constitutes the general transition from self-consciousness' religious standpoint, *qua* the unhappy consciousness, to the secular standpoint of idealism, in which "the existence of the world becomes for self-consciousness its own truth and presence" (PhS 140:232). In its existence as a priest, therefore, self-consciousness finally experiences what it has so far always lacked, viz. immediate self-certainty (PhS 140:232-33). This immediate self-certainty will eventually be "give[n] direct expression" (PhS 140:233) in philosophical idealism's declaration of pure being-for-self, e.g. Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* and Fichte's first principle of all knowledge, or 'I am I' (PhS 140:233). Self-consciousness' declaration of its pure being-for-self differs from the pure being-for-self with which it began, because, as Hegel points out: "Here, the 'I' that is object for me, is not merely an empty object in general, [or void,] as it is for self-consciousness as such, [or pure desire,] nor is it, as in free self-consciousness, [viz. reflective self-consciousness,] merely an object that withdraws itself from other objects which retain their worth, [or being and independence] alongside it; on the contrary, it is for self-consciousness an object such that any other object whatever is a non-being. But self-consciousness is all reality, not merely for itself, but also in itself, only through becoming this reality, or rather through demonstrating itself to be such" (PhS 140:233).

This demonstration of course will ultimately take the form of what first Fichte, and then Hegel, call Science. However, before Science can begin in earnest, that is, explicitly as Science, and before idealism can even make its first crude appearance as the pure assertion of the truth of Reason, i.e. the philosophy which "does not demonstrate the path" (PhS 141:234) by which self-consciousness becomes, and, therefore, comprehends, this truth, e.g. Descartes' philosophy, one final development must occur in the unhappy consciousness, *qua* religious consciousness, which Hegel does not mention in the *Phenomenology*, but certainly recognizes the importance and necessity of in both the *Philosophy of History* (PH 415-424) and the *History of Philosophy* (HP III 146-55). This development constitutes the essential contribution of the Protestant Reformation to the appearance and development of actual Spirit, from the experience and reflection of self-consciousness, and prevents self-consciousness from simply slipping back into a rationalized version of the master/slave relationship. Specifically, it is the recognition first put forth by Luther, that "there is no true, basic difference between laymen and priests, ... between religious and secular, except for the sake of office and work, but not for the sake of status. They are all of the spiritual estate, all are truly priests."33

With the express recognition by the mediator, that all individuals are essentially mediators in and for themselves, that they are all in a direct relationship with the Unchangeable, or that they are all in themselves absolute unchangeable being, the inequality still present in the unhappy consciousness' existence is at least formally eliminated. Self-consciousness *as a whole*, therefore, is brought up to the same level of immediate self-certainty which constitutes the true ground and first real appearance of Reason, but which was previously the exclusive enjoyment of a few. As Hegel says, in the *Philosophy of History*: "we no longer find one class in possession of the substance of the truth ...; but
the heart - the emotional part of man's Spiritual nature - is recognized as that which can and ought to come into possession of the truth; and this subjectivity is the common property of all mankind" (PH 416).

Consequently, self-consciousness can no longer abdicate its freedom and responsibility to an external authority such as the Catholic Church. For there is no longer any real external authority for an individual to take his, or her direction from. Insofar as they are all now in a direct, self-conscious relationship with the Unchangeable, or rather, insofar as the Unchangeable is in them and they are aware of it, they know what is right. They are recognized as possessing a conscience, which, according to Hegel, "involves the possibility of a development of Reason and freedom, and of their introduction into human relations" (PH 423 [MI]). "[F]or all that is demanded [by self-consciousness, qua Protestantism,] is that the particular should yield to the general" (PH 423 [MI] italics), or universal - not be eliminated, or destroyed altogether. This does not immediately resolve self-consciousness' problem with work - a problem that can only find resolution in the Scientific work, or speculative self-demonstration, mentioned above. However, insofar as the recognition of all individual's spiritual equality does eliminate the qualitative distinction between a) different kinds of office and work, i.e. as good and evil, etc., and b) the ecclesiastical and secular spheres, so that the latter is now seen as "capable of being an embodiment of the truth" (PH 422), and insofar as both of these c) allow for an actual re-introduction of the mediator into the community, e.g. through allowing priests to marry, it does contain a latent, or an intuitive grasp of the value of work for self-consciousness aiming to become Spirit. In fact, with Protestantism, according to Hegel: "Industry, crafts and trades now have their moral validity recognized, and the obstacles to their prosperity, which originated with the [Catholic] Church, have vanished" (PH 423 [MI]).

Work may indeed have its moral validity recognized in Protestantism, viz. Luther's notion of good works, which includes practical activities, such as "when a man works at his trade, walks, stands, eats, drinks, sleeps and does all kinds of works for the nourishment of his body or for the common welfare,"34 and this recognition may free the creative power of human industry, but it is still largely a negative relation to the particularity of the world. In other words, work is still seen by the unhappy consciousness, qua Protestantism, primarily as a discipline that prevents self-consciousness from slipping back into a condition of unrestrained desire, or evil,35 and, therefore, not necessarily as the objective appearance of human thought and freedom. Thus, after the formal elevation of all individuals to the status of mediators, and the consequent release of self-consciousness' creative powers, Protestantism's only significant contribution to the development of Spirit is that it marks self-consciousness' recognition of the obsolescence of the explicitly religious standpoint in its movement towards freedom and knowledge, and, thereby, prepares the ground for the express appearance of Reason with the philosophy of Descartes. This can be clearly seen in that self-consciousness, qua Protestantism, only advances insofar as it becomes united with the secular, Scientific pursuits of
Reason, but degenerates into the same superstitious dogmatism as Catholicism, insofar as it simply remains another form, or other forms of faith, e.g. it develops an obsessive fear of evil, or the devil, which leads to the trials, torture and execution of individuals for witchcraft, on no more than the basis of suspicion (PH 425-27). Only with Science and Reason is self-consciousness' "hitherto negative relation to otherness, [viz. positedness in general, or the particularity of all being,] turn[ed] around into a [truly] positive relation" (PhS 139:232). For only with Science and Reason is thought, or reflection posited as the principle of absolute identity. In other words, only then is absolute self-identity seen as being the self-identity of thought, or thought qua reflection, rather than, the self-identity of either being, or nothing, and thus a unity that is re-constructed out of an other, instead of constructed from itself (SL II 37).
Notes

1 See Hegel, History of Philosophy, vol. II, p. 235, on the connection between empire and indifference, etc.

2 It should be noted that this letting go of life and practical activity, or work does not necessarily mean that self-consciousness ceases to live and work. It only means that it lets go of life and work as essential modes of determination. Life and work have become matters of indifference for the individual who lives and works. Since they are matters of indifference, there is no reason why the individual should cease to work after having eliminated the master. This would imply a qualitative change in his practical activity, which would then mean that life and work made a difference to him. Thus, he continues to live and work after his rebellion, for no other reason than the fact that this is what he already does. As for those who, for some external reason, do not work after the rebellion, unless they can continue to live off the labour of others, which, as we shall see shortly, is a distinct possibility, they simply die. They do so, however, stoically.

3 This of course is an essential stage in the actual killing of the the master, since his death does not become a real possibility until it has appeared in thought. Otherwise, it would simply be a contingent act, rather than a rational one. In other words, it would simply be a spontaneous regression to the struggle for life and death, an act of passion, rather than an assault aimed at overcoming the system of mastery and slavery. It would be a rebellion, rather than a revolution. This is not to say that acts of passion and rebellions cannot turn into revolutions. Indeed, most revolutions must at some point begin with a sudden outburst of passion, i.e. rage and resentment. However, without the express intervention of reflective thought, such outbursts, although they may trigger others like it, thus increasing the rebellions magnitude, do not become purposeful movements, but rather seem to diffuse and disappear as quickly as they arise.

4 Kojève, Introduction, p. 53.

5 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Selected Writings, p. 156.

6 This is the case, even though, as Hegel himself points out in the History of Philosophy, "to the stoics everything is merely Becoming." (246). Reasons: 1) the concept is uncritically assumed from Heraclitus, an assumption perfectly consistent with presupposing reflection; 2) just as there is no such thing as pure being and nothing, this concept must be immanent in stoicism; and 3) insofar as external reflection is explicitly present in absolute reflection from the start along with positing and presupposing reflection, so is becoming as a concept, though this does not necessarily imply that it be understood.

7 See Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), where he compares Hegel's view of scepticism to Pascal's, that is, "the double feeling of its nothingness and granduer." (pp. 187-87).

8 In The Science of Knowledge, Fichte not only points out that: "Thoroughgoing dogmatism is a skepticism which doubts whether it doubts; for it must do away with the unity of consciousness, an thereby with the whole of logic; hence it is no dogmatism at all, and contradicts itself in purporting to be one" (pp. 117-18); but then goes on to makes a similar distinction between scepticism as such, or dogmatic scepticism, and scepticism aware of the dogmatism inherent in the former. He calls the latter, critical scepticism, and, without coming right out and calling it idealism, certainly attributes it with a value above and beyond dogmatism in general and certain forms of idealism, i.e. dogmatic idealism: "Skepticism, as defined above, would be no system at all, since it denies the very possibility of any system. But this it can only do in systematic fashion, so that it contradicts itself and is totally unreasonable. The nature of the human mind has already taken care to ensure that it is also impossible. Never yet, in good earnest, has there been a skeptic of this kind. A critical skepticism, such as that of Hume, Maimon or Aenesidemus, is another matter; for it points out the inadequacy of the grounds so far accepted, and shows in doing so, where better are to be found. And if knowledge gains nothing as to content from this, it certainly does as to form - and the interests of knowledge are but poorly recognized in denying to the sharp-sighted skeptic the respect which is his due" (p. 118, fn. 5 [My italics]).

9 Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, p. 191. (My italics).

10 Stoicism and scepticism merely represent universal self-consciousness' conception.

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Feuerbach,

Essence of Christianity, p.185.

Hyppolite,

Genesis and Structure, p. 192.

Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, p. 192. (My italics).

Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, p. 112. (My italics).

Although this view of Judaism is often pointed to as evidence of both Hegel's and the left Hegelians' antisemitism, nothing could be further from the truth. Without going into a detailed argument in defence of Hegel on this point, particularly since far more eloquent defences than could be given here, have already been provided by the likes of Shlomo Avineri in Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 119-20, 170-71, and Stephen B. Smith in Hegel and the Jewish Question: In Between Tradition and Modernity, History of Political Thought, vol. XII, No. 1, Spring 1991, I shall merely point out that Hegel, although critical of Judaism, also recognizes its "world-historical importance and weight." (PH 321). This is why he includes it in the development of universal self-consciousness. Furthermore, what is true for Feuerbach in an appendix to The Essence of Christianity, called, Egoism of the Israelitish Religion, is, as we shall see, equally true for Hegel, viz. that: "The Christians blamed the Jews for this arrogance, [which regards itself as entitled to all things, because of its chosen status,] but only because the kingdom of God was taken from them and transferred to the Christians" (p. 299, para. 10); thus, supplanting Jewish arrogance, with Christian arrogance.

Marx, Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Selected Writings, trans. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 71. The ancient Jews certainly proved this zeal, as both Hegel and Stephen Smith point out: "When the promise of messianism turned out to be chimerical, the Jews took up arms with 'the most enthusiastic courage' [against the Romans] and later endured 'the most appalling of human calamities', [viz. the destruction of the temple, the burning of Jerusalem and dispersion] in their struggle to restore their state." (p. 94).

See also Hegel's references to the Sermon on the Mount in The Philosophy of History, p. 326.

Hegel remarks on John's report of Caiaphas' prophecy in The Spirit of Christianity, Early Theological Writings: "Where we, [as modern consciousnesses,] decry a unity in the conjunction of actions which taken individually and by themselves lack this unity, (i.e. the intention behind the entire effect), and where we regard these actions, e.g., Caiaphas, as subject to the intention, as unconsciously guided and dominated by it in their relation to the unity, and treat them as mere events and instrumentalities, John sees the unity of the spirit and, in Caiaphas' action the agency of the spirit of the entire effect. He [thus] speaks of Caiaphas as himself filled by that spirit in which lay the necessity of Jesus' fate" (p. 300 [My italics]). In short, John sees it as the fulfilment of God's plan, whereas in fact it is the fulfilment of the logic of the unhappy consciousness.

Perhaps no more poignant expression of the sorrow caused by this tragic certainty exists, than in the Gospel According to St. John, where Christ, having foretold of his own death and thus revealing the truth of the unhappy consciousness to his people, meets with their scepticism. Their scepticism, which ultimately serves as the vehicle of his death, not only wounds him personally, that is, as a man, it also causes him to reflect specifically on the difference, and, therefore, opposition present in the determination of reflection that is supposedly pure intro-reflection, or absolute self-identity. That is, he reflects upon the difference between himself and his Father as two aspects of the one unchangeable Spirit, i.e. Spirit in union with the finite and pure infinite Spirit, Spirit as the movement towards determinate identity and Spirit as the movement towards abstract identity, (which is in fact absolute difference,) Spirit as loving and Spirit as judging, etc., and, at the end, at least momentarily, emerges as the absolute self it will take the remainder of the unhappy consciousness over a millennium and a half to become: "Jesus cried and said, 'He that believeth on me believeth not on me, but on him that sent me. And he that seeth me, seeth him that sent me. I am come a light into the world, that whatsoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness. And if any man hear my words, and believeth not, I judge him not: for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him on the last day. For I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak. And I know that this commandment is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak" (John 12:44-50 [My italics]).
22It is also why they fail so miserably at tasks, viz. the miracles, which are effortlessly accomplished by Christ. Even for Christ, the miracles are less signs of his own exclusive divinity, than they are illustrations of the contrast between those who appear to have no more effect on their environment than dead matter and one who behaves like matter imbued with energy, with life. As Christ himself points out to the disciples, it is not because of their mortality and his divinity that they lack the same potential displayed in his, as it were, miraculous powers: "If ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only do this which is done to the fig tree, but also if ye shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea, it shall be done" (Matthew 21:22 [My italics]). Rather, they lack this potential and power, because, as he says, they lack the same belief in themselves and him that he has in them and himself. In short, they lack his love of life.

23According to Hegel, consciousness does begin conceptually to grasp this idea with the emergence of neo-Platonic philosophy, which has its beginning in Jewish thought: "In the Christian religion this spiritual reality, [viz. Absolute Spirit,] was first of all represented as indicating that eternal reality becomes for itself something different, that it creates the world, which is posited purely as something different. To this there is added later this moment, that the other element in itself is not anything different from eternal reality, but that eternal reality manifests itself therein. In the third place there is implied the identity of the other and eternal reality, Spirit, the return of the other into the first: and the other is here to be understood as not only the other at that point where eternal reality manifested itself, but as the other in a universal sense. The world recognizes itself in this absolute reality which becomes manifest; it is the world, therefore, which has returned into reality; and spirit is universal Spirit. But since this Idea of spirit appeared to Christians first of all in the bare form of ordinary conception, God, the simple reality of the Jews, was for them beyond consciousness; such a God doubtless thinks, but He is not Thought, for he remains beyond reality, and He is only what is distinguished from the world that our senses perceive. There likewise stands in opposition to the same an individual man - the moment of unity of the world and reality, and spirit, the universality of this unity, as a believing community, which possesses this unity only in the form of ordinary conception, but its reality in the hope of a future. The idea in pure Thought - that God's way of working is not external, as if he were a subject, and therefore that all this does not come to pass as a casual resolution and decree of God, to whom the thought of so acting happened to occur, but that God is this movement as the self-revealing moments of his essence, as His eternal necessity in Himself, which is not at all conditioned by chance - this we find expressed in the writings of philosophic or expressly Platonic Jews" (HP II 379-80). (My italics).

24Hegel does not specifically refer to the early Christian community as the community of death in either the Early Theological Writings, or the Phenomenology. Indeed, in the section on Revealed Religion, in the latter, he talks about "the life of the [Christian] community" (PHS 436:766 [My italics]) being the movement of substance, or positedness to actual selfhood, or subjectivity for the community as a whole, and how this existence as an actual self, or subject, for the community as a whole, constitutes the existence of Absolute Spirit. However, insofar as this community remains at the level of mere existence, and, therefore, remains dominated by an existence, wherever and whoever this existence may be, it also represents the "Impoverishment of Spirit" (PHS 463:766), for Hegel, or is the community of death both for itself and its individual members. This is simply because it does not allow the development of actual universal selfhood, self-consciousness, subjectivity, or whatever else we choose to call it, among its members. The community of death, therefore, is a term that is perfectly consistent when talking about any religious community in connection with Hegel's philosophy, but especially the Christian community.


26Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, p. 208.

27Perhaps it would be better to say that the Crusades are an appropriate symbol for the unhappy consciousness at this stage in its development precisely because they capture this contradiction. In The Philosophy of History, Hegel talks about "the greatest excesses and outrages" of the Crusaders in their campaign to conquer Jerusalem, and how these are immediately and enormously contrasted with acts of the "profoundest contortion and humiliation," and, as we might add, the profoundest absurdity. For instance: "Still dripping with the blood of the slaughtered inhabitants of Jerusalem, the Christians fell down on their faces at the tomb of the Redeemer, and directed their fervent supplications to him. Thus did Christendom come into possession of its highest good. Jerusalem was made a kingdom, and the entire feudal system was introduced there ... Another crusade in the year 1204 resulted in the conquest of Constantinople and the establishment of a Latin Empire there. Christendom, therefore, had appeased its religious craving; it could now walk veritably unobstructed in the footsteps of the Saviour. Whole shiploads of earth were brought from the Holy Land to Europe." (p. 392).

28Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, p. 209.

40 Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure*, p. 212.


34 Luther, *Treatise on Good Works*, *Selected Writings 1517-1520*, p. 106.

35 Luther, *Treatise on Good Works*, *Selected Writings 1517-1520*, p. 186.
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