A BREAKDOWN OF COSMOPOLITANISM

Self, State and Nation

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Declaration

1st May 2007

I declare that, except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is entirely my own work, and that no part of it has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Asaf Sokolowski
Abstract

In this study in political theory I challenge the way in which national identity and liberalism are traditionally counterposed, by arguing that this opposition does not obtain in the work of one of the key figures in liberal thought, John Locke. This controversial assertion is supported by arguing that the conventional reading of Locke is tainted by Hobbesian preconceptions. Rejecting the view that Locke builds upon, or enhances, Hobbes’s position, this thesis instead maintains that Locke is replying to, and moreover divorcing himself from Hobbes. Thus Locke’s stance is portrayed as a distinctive and far more substantial contribution to political theory than he has traditionally been credited with. Furthermore, the distancing of Locke from Hobbes serves to expose the roots of the misconception of Locke’s political thought as a precursor of, and foundation for, a boundary-free cosmopolitanism.

It is argued here that Locke’s political theory has become entangled with Hobbes’s due to a lack of attention to the formative relation between metaphysics and politics in their thought. This has obscured the metaphysical foundation of the social problem they are attempting to resolve, reducing it to the language of a clash of conflicting interests, so that the difference between their political prescriptions is presumed merely to echo the different degrees of potential conflict they observe, rather than being a substantive difference. The conventional framing of such conflict as a security problem, a concern for the harm of one’s person and possessions, is replaced here with that of an insecurity problem: an anxiety about the inability to identify regular rules that attach attributes, including possessions, to persons. In social terms, the future having not been secured, it cannot be trusted to connect with the past and present in a continuum.

On the interpretation proposed here, Locke and Hobbes offer radically different measures for the artificial generation of this ‘continuum’. Their divergence concerns the degree of control they assume political solutions can exert over the social parallel of the metaphysical ‘continuum’ problem. It is maintained that Hobbes proposes to reverse the causes of anxiety about the future by artificially generating a constant environment, detached from the fluctuations inherent to a mode
of existence rooted in time and space. On the proposed understanding, Locke’s position is a reaction to Hobbes’s demand for the complete surrender of individual particularity in exchange for an immutable state of perfect stability. It is argued that Locke appreciates the requirement of stability for generating future-oriented motivations in individuals, but exhibits a more humble approach to the human capacity to rule its own existence. The unbound autonomy to take charge of reality that Hobbes grants to humanity is replaced by a constrained ability to administer its existence within the corporeal confines of time and space. It is argued that the time-space constraints that Locke insists are metaphysically inherent to humankind, conflict with the boundary-free assumptions of cosmopolitanism. Conversely, it is maintained, Hobbes’s radical argument for dislodging humankind from spatio-temporal constraints serves as a platform for a cosmopolitan outlook, albeit a markedly authoritarian one.
Acknowledgements

Out of Time, Out of Space

dedicated to my father

Jerzy Sokolowski

(1928-2002)

I was privileged to have been supervised by Prof. Russell Keat, whose fine balance of encouragement and criticism as well as his meticulous reading of countless versions, have been invaluable. I was equally fortunate to have had the opportunity to try-out the ideas presented here in political theory tutorials conducted at Edinburgh and at Stirling. A special thanks to my students for submitting to be experimental ‘guinea pigs’.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Liberalism, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism

Contemporary liberal thought has for the most part converged with cosmopolitan thought, to the extent that cosmopolitanism\(^1\) has come to be regarded as derivable from classic liberal positions\(^2\). It is widely held that even if classical liberals were unaware of the cosmopolitan implications of their own writings, these are logically entailed by the liberal idea they set in motion. At the core of the liberal idea is a respect for individual identity that cosmopolitan thought proposes must be reflected in the disjoining of traditionally parcelled groups of individuals. The unleashing of the authentic, autonomous individual requires liberating the human experience from binds and boundaries. The divisions imposed by national identity are considered at odds with the process of liberalisation. Moreover, national sentiment is regarded as supported by the counter-liberal collectivist argumentation of communitarianism, according to which, by contrast with liberalism, the authentic individual is the ‘naturally’ occurring community-immersed one. This parcelled unity of environment and individual is held to be not only inescapable, but also invaluable for the creation of social consensus, thus striking a similar chord to traditional associative notions of nationalism.

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\(^1\) Understood here as a sense of liberation from physical and territorial attachment that is conducive to the establishment of a single universal-governing body, or world State.

\(^2\) Charles Jones asserts that ‘Cosmopolitanism as a moral perspective is closely akin to liberalism...Accordingly, we might understand cosmopolitanism as the ethical standpoint underlying modern liberal political theory.’ (Jones in Conway In Defence of the Realm: The Place of Nations in Classical Liberalism 2004: 16)
This thesis challenges the opposition traditionally posited between national identity and liberalism, by arguing that this opposition does not obtain in one of the cornerstones of liberal thought, John Locke. This somewhat controversial assertion is substantiated by proposing that the conventional reading of Locke is tainted by Hobbesean misconceptions. On the traditional interpretation of Locke, his contribution to political theory is seen as no more than a modification of Thomas Hobbes’s social contract position, replacing Hobbes’s bleak portrayal of unmediated natural human interaction in the state of nature with an inclination towards civility. Consequently, the artificial mediatory intervention he prescribes is of a less drastic nature, avoiding the Hobbesean empowerment of a draconian sovereign. In this view, the revision that Locke is thought to have made to the Hobbesean political stance is not considered to have strayed far enough from the original mould to be a significant departure from Hobbes. On the contrary, Locke is often viewed as having ‘cultivated’ the individualist foundation of social interaction initiated by Hobbes.

This thesis offers an alternative understanding of the relation between Locke and Hobbes. It rejects the view that Locke builds upon, or enhances, Hobbes. Instead, it maintains that Locke is replying to, and moreover divorcing himself from, Hobbes. Thus his stance is portrayed here as distinctive, and his contribution to political theory as much more substantial than the one with which he has traditionally been credited. Furthermore, this distancing of Locke from Hobbes exposes the roots

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3 The notable attempts by Yael Tamir and David Miller to marry nationalism with liberalism, rather than with communitarianism, are acknowledged in the conclusion of this thesis, and differentiated from the Lockean-based argument for liberal nationalism purported here.

4 That is not to say that Locke is consciously replying to Hobbes, but rather that in retrospect the analysis of his thought reveals that it stands in contrast, or in logical response, to Hobbes.
of the misconception of Locke’s theory as a precursor of, and foundation for, a boundary-free cosmopolitanism.

It is argued here that Locke’s political theory has become entangled with Hobbes’s due to a lack of attention in the literature to the formative relation between metaphysics and politics in their thought. The discussion of their politics in isolation has obscured the metaphysical foundation of the social problem they are attempting to resolve, reducing it to the language of a clash of conflicting interests. The solutions offered to this formulation of the problem take the form of mediation bodies, whose character matches the assumed degree of inherent conflict. For example, Hobbes’s absolutism reflects the perception of an invariable spill-over from conflict of interests to violence, whereas Locke’s pluralist constitutionalism is a reflection of the state of conflict of interests as an inefficient, albeit not perilous, condition. Thus the difference between their political prescriptions is presumed merely to echo the degree of potential conflict they observe, rather than being a substantive difference. It is conventionally assumed that they are both concerned with what is essentially a security problem, the degree of threat they identify generating differences of nuance in basically the same strand of liberal thought.

By contrast, the metaphysically saturated reading adopted here rejects the reduction of the social problem, addressed by both thinkers, to a clash of interests. The conventional framing of the conflict as a security problem, a concern for the harm of one’s person and possessions, is replaced with that of an insecurity problem: an anxiety about the inability to identify regular rules that correlate attributes, including possessions, with persons. In other words, they are addressing a crisis in the generation of long-term identity, which presents itself as a problem in employing
rationality: if personal identity, and by extension entitlement to possessions, cannot be preserved over time, rational future-oriented considerations in the interaction are made redundant. The future, having not been secured, cannot be trusted to connect with the past and present in a ‘continuum’.

In the interpretation to be presented here, Locke and Hobbes propose distinct measures that need to be taken for the artificial generation of this continuum, in the absence of which they agree that social interaction would degenerate. They diverge in their views on the degree of control that political solutions can exert over the metaphysical sources of this social problem, namely the irregularity of uncontrolled change. It is maintained that Hobbes proposes to reverse the causes of anxiety about the future by artificially generating, indeed creating, an immutable environment detached from the fluctuations inherent to a mode of existence rooted in time and space. He thus endeavours to form a body of governance of such immense power as to enable it to grind time and change to a halt. By contrast, it will be argued that Locke’s solution rejects the prospect of unbinding humankind from its spatio-temporal constraints, since it finds these definitive of individuality itself.

Indeed, in the proposed understanding, Locke’s position is a reaction to Hobbes’s demand for the complete surrender of individual particularity in exchange for an immutable state of perfect stability. It is argued that Locke appreciates the requirement of stability for generating future-oriented interest in individuals, but exhibits a more humble approach to the human capacity to rule its own existence. The unbound autonomy to take charge of reality and infuse social interaction with certainty that Hobbes grants to humanity is replaced with a constrained ability to administer a secure existence within the corporeal confines of time and space. Locke
allows individuals to invest themselves in the future, by instituting a State that provides institutional guarantees for the vessel of their corporeal preservation, namely their property.

It will also be argued that the time-space constraints that Locke insists are metaphysically inherent to humankind, conflict with the boundary-free assumptions of cosmopolitanism. Conversely, it will be maintained that, despite the contention of the realist school in international relations theory, Hobbes’s radical argument for dislodging humankind from spatio-temporal constraints serves as a platform for a cosmopolitan outlook; albeit a highly authoritarian one. It is conceded that an alternative, non-authoritarian, platform is to be found in Friedrich Hayek’s adaptation of what may be termed the ‘Smitho-Humean’ market model. However, it is demonstrated that despite the similarity in terminology, the Lockean market should be distinguished from conceptions of the market that claim their origin in Smith and Hume, namely Hayek’s supposedly liberal model and Robert Nozick’s libertarian one. It is argued that for Hayek and Nozick the individual is, in effect, generated by the market, so that preserving the market necessarily preserves particularity. By contrast, for Locke individuality is a condition for the market, not its product, and to protect individuality from encroachment requires recognition of its primality and its conceptual separation from the market. Thus while the Smitho-Humean model is essentially compatible with cosmopolitanism, it is at odds with Locke’s brand of liberal individualism.
1.2  *Time and Space – The Metaphysical Leash on Politics*

This thesis can be seen as attempting to put a human metaphysical leash on a perfectionist strand of the social contract tradition it proposes can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes. The leash consists of the finite constraints of corporeality, boundaries that restrict human existence and by extension the perspectives that are humanly attainable. In the first instance it insists that we are mortal beings, our mortality pronouncing itself in the limited lifespan of our existence. In the second instance it asserts that our corporeality not only restricts our temporal existence, but also constricts our spatial existence by barring us from being in two places at the same time. These constraints are found to be definitive of the human condition, differentiating the bound human from the unbound deity, which is by definition incorporeal, immortal and omnipresent. As humans we are bound to bodiliness; consequently, it is argued, we cannot be expected to be socially motivated by insights gained from an unbound perspective.

The object of the proposed metaphysical leash is Hobbesean rationality. Applying rationality, both in science in general, and in politics in particular, is considered here as an exercise in ‘rule making’. In making or formulating rules we take particular experiences and extend them to other occurrences by generalising them into other-referring statements. It is suggested that Hobbes, anticipating Kant, takes rationality in itself to be unbound; like mathematics in itself, it tells us nothing about the world and is therefore liberated from worldly constraints. Yet it is argued here that our inherent material constraints prevent us from living out the liberty of
perfect rationality. Moreover, it is maintained that not only can we not achieve such a state of liberty naturally, we cannot achieve it artificially either, by means of the ambitious ‘rule making’ projects of the social contract and the State. Indeed, the Hobbesian rationalist tradition is here charged with attempting to achieve the impossible, namely to artificially bypass human constraints by magnifying human rationality into perfect, Godly proportions.

The leash metaphor has been chosen with the intention of conveying a sense that the rationalist position has let rationality loose from the material world. It has allowed rationality to outstep human boundaries, thereby engaging in the self-deception of likening the human condition to the incorporeal condition of God. Consequently, it utilises unbound perspectives in time and space to form a social structure that is theoretically sound, yet actually unbefitting of a bound existence – it is in this sense unreal. This charge differs from that of the Humean conventionalist and also from the somewhat related communitarian critique of contractarianism. Humeans charge contractarianism with being unreal on empirical grounds: it is accused of being a ‘folly of the mind’ that does not match empirical facts. Communitarians have criticised contractarianism on sociological grounds for abstracting itself out of reality, conjuring up an imaginary solitary position that no one could ever occupy in a real existence.

The charge of unreality made here is neither empirical nor sociological; it is metaphysical. All three critiques highlight the detachment of contractarianism from the real world. For the empiricist it is detachment from historical fact, and for the communitarian it is detachment from the formative impact of actual social surroundings. By contrast, for the corporealist position defended here it is
detachment from the metaphysical constraints that define us as human, namely the finitude of our existence as projected in time and space. Moreover, while the conventionalist and communitarian critiques reject contractarianism altogether, it will be argued here that the metaphysical critique divides contractarianism into a rationalist, Hobbesean strand, that grows distant from materialism, and a Lockean strand that rectifies the Hobbesean drift away from the constraints of time and space.

While time and space are woven together in this thesis, this does not imply that they are one and the same, nor that they are symmetrical. Consider the mundane fact that we can visit a single point in space at different points in time, but we cannot be at two distinct points in space at a single point in time. Yet time and space are still interlinked. If we dispose of time we dispose of space as well, since if it takes me no time whatsoever to travel between point A and point B, I am effectively omnipresent at both point A and point B, making their spatial distance or location inconsequential.

The time-space constraints I employ here are borrowed from Kant's famous epistemological claim about human perception (Kant 1973: 203) and converted into an ontological claim. Time and space in this thesis are not lenses through which we perceive the world, but the confines of our material existence, boundaries that we part with only upon parting with our life. In life we are bound to time and space, and while we can attempt to artificially challenge these natural binds, we cannot and should not hope to relieve ourselves of them. However, that we cannot escape time and space does not entail that we cannot temper their effects upon us as individuals. Indeed it is acknowledged that the dispiriting effect of our limited lifespan on our

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5 With the notable exception of Jean Hampton (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997) and Russell
motivation to contribute anything to the world requires serious attention. Without such redress, we may come to consider life to be in vain, resigning ourselves to passivity as our contributions to the world would seem to have only momentary value that ceases with the demise of our bodies.

In the Hobbesean ‘equation of life’ time is identified as the villain. Accordingly the objective is to take time out of the equation altogether, thereby silencing the disheartening considerations of temporality. This is achieved by disputing the distinction between life before and after death. It is argued that Hobbes diverges from the orthodox Christian divide of his era, between a material earthly life and the immaterial existence of the afterlife, replacing it with the original Jewish and early Christian Church conception of the afterlife as a resurrection that recaptures the ‘flesh and blood’ condition. He does not merely lengthen life by delaying death, thus creating long term incentives for shortsighted individuals, he makes death inconsequential.

The flaw that is identified in Hobbes’s position is the overambitious pursuit of an airtight solution to the problem of temporality. It is maintained that in an attempt to avoid ‘temporal remissions’, he sets out to surgically sever time from humanity. Once this procedure has made time immaterial, space becomes meaningless as well, and the emulation of deity conditions is complete. It will be argued that Hobbes is the founder of a rationalist brand of social contract tradition which, in its attempt to escape 'once and for all' the misery of the natural human condition, i.e. the state of nature, deludes itself that humans can artificially mimic a

Hardin (Hardin Collective action 1982), who attempt to forge a Humean variant of contractarianism.
condition that is natural for God but impossibly contrived for mortal beings. Anticipating Rousseau, the envisaged process allows for the metamorphosis of the natural human being into the rationalised demigod of the citizen. In other words, it allows the mortal to raise itself to the stature of the immortal. It wishes to establish the *Kingdom of God* by populating it with Godlike creatures.

In reaction to the Hobbesian conclusions as developed here, it is maintained that as theoretically attractive as this proposed route to perfection may seem, in practice it is bound to lead to dissonance within the individual. There is a conflict between the particularity of material individuation and the generality of immaterial perfection. While the human individual is physically bound to a singular existence in time and space, the demand upon him is to shed these inherently human limitations, simulating God and entering into the realm of the unbound.

As is already apparent, God figures strongly in this thesis, but as a metaphor and not as a performing entity. Although the argument is not antagonistic to belief in God, it does not require it. God is employed here to summon the traits that have come to be associated with the term, namely: creation, perfection, immateriality, omnipresence and immortality. The concept of God as encompassing the above attributes, and therefore oblivious to time and space, is juxtaposed with the concept of ‘the human’ as set in the material world, from which it can be completely detached only in death. Indeed, the Hobbesian tradition is charged with 'deifying' mere mortals, or with seeking to establish ‘heaven on earth’. In its attempt to seize ultimate rational control over the material world it neglects the fact that we are trapped in that very same world we are trying to control, rendering the attempt to completely relieve us of material constraints a futile exercise.
In this context we should remind ourselves that even the technologically feasible virtual existence that some contemporary ‘techies’ are said to have adopted, still requires the consumption of real material food sourced at the other end of the online takeaway service. They have not escaped corporeality; their takeaway food does not appear magically out of thin air. It is not ‘created’, rather it is *manufactured*. Accordingly, when this thesis refers to God in his capacity as the creator, it is not an assertion of religious belief, but a reference to the concept of something that is immaterial, transcendental and beyond question. Indeed, the Hobbesian is here charged with confusing the human capacity to manipulate matter, with the capacity for *creation*. He is accused of attempting to perform the impossible feat of uniting the corporeal and material with the immaterial and transcendental.

Those who, despite the above disclaimer, still feel uncomfortable with such a secular employment of God, or by contrast wish to avoid the religious connotations which it might summon, should consider replacing occurrences in this thesis of the term ‘God’ with the alternative ‘Nature’. This particular ‘Nature’ should, however, conform to the Hobbesian attribute of rationality in addition to the traditional attributes of God; in other words, nature must conform to rationality, thereby allowing for rationally equipped creatures to study it. The makeup of the God, or ‘Nature’, is one of ultimate rationality that reveals the one and only Truth. Consequently it exhibits a sound reassuring consistency that defies any challenge – it is at peace. Like the mathematical expression 1+1=2, it has no exceptions and does not succumb to any circumstantial changes - it is unbound, it is free.
1.3 *Locke, a rejoinder to Hobbes*

Unconventionally, the Lockean position is not portrayed here as redressing the Hobbesian stance by introducing some 'liberal niceties'. Rather, it is asserted that the divergence between their conceptions of metaphysical individuation places their political stances radically at odds with each other. Unlike Hobbes, who is attempting to rationally perfect the corporeal, Locke is attempting to address the difficulties spawned by the complexity of humankind’s split constitution between the material and the ideational. Locke is attempting to balance the perfection of rationality with the imperfection of corporeal existence. It is proposed that the Lockean position is a response to the impossibility of the Hobbesian stance, offering a distinctive alternative to it. Moreover, this alternative should be considered a substantial contribution to the social contract tradition, one that accommodates the theoretical difficulties in applying the unbound tool of perfect rationality to an imperfect existence that is bound by time and space.

The confusion of the Lockean position with the Hobbesian one is attributed, in the first instance, to the wrongful divorce of their political positions from their metaphysical positions, which disguises the opposing character of their respective approaches to individuation, both metaphysical and political. In the second instance, the confusion is attributed to a related unsubstantiated carry-over, of their widely acknowledged analytical convergence on the identification of distrust as the culprit of social tension, to an alleged shared resolution they proposed to apply. It is argued that the prevalent tendency to discuss their positions on distrust solely in a political
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context lends itself to their differences being reduced to nuances of an essentially identical theoretical position.

Taking account of their metaphysical theories as well as their political ones, it is maintained here that the problem of distrust is on both accounts an expression of the ‘continuous personal identity’ problem. The source of friction in interaction outwith familial circles is a sense of insecurity about the continuous identity of one’s counterparts. Individuation entails that each and every one of us holds the key to our own identity. We are therefore at liberty to transform ourselves at will, thus causing confusion, if not chaos, in future encounters.

As an illustration, consider that you and I met yesterday and encountered each other again today. Yesterday you presented yourself as an Italian wine merchant and I presented myself as a Scottish restaurateur. We agreed on the purchase and delivery of a case of wine every week thereon. Yet with nothing to hold us to the identities of the previous encounter, neither of the parties could securely attach anything of the past stranger to this present stranger that stands before them. Either side could detach itself from the obligation to carry out the transaction by shedding its former identity and inventing a new one. Such a scenario would render the long-term possession and exchange of goods among us impossible. In a village setting, where our encounters would be frequent and repetitive, we might form a persistent idea of other individuals and ‘pin’ them with it. But once we leave the village and begin to associate on a grander scale, the integrity of ‘the other’ would not hold, and friction would abound.
This essentially descriptive analysis of individuation has, it will be argued, wrongfully led to the attribution of normative individualism to Hobbes, and to the assumption that it is mirrored in Locke. Instead, it is maintained that while Hobbesian theory does much to uncover individuation, it does not do so in order to celebrate it, but rather in order to ‘treat it’. Individuation is considered a disorder that renders us semi-rational and holds back the grand potential of rational social prosperity. It is a by-product of material particularisation that needs to be remedied if the prospects of unity are to be gained. The prescribed cure for the semi-rational individuated human condition is an extra dose of rationality administered by the sovereign. This is either overseen by an external super-rational sovereign or is self-administered by a super-rational Kantian-like being. The dose of ‘artificial’ rationality complements the natural future-promoting rationality embodied in the aversion of death principle: our natural desire for life that is pronounced in our inclination to forestall our exit from this world.

Applying or administering rationality is understood as an exercise in ‘rule following’ or succumbing to the rule. On the proposed understanding, rationality for Hobbes is reduced to repetition. The ruler is rational in as much as she imitates God, and the individual vicariously imitates God by imitating the ruler. Thus Godly rationality enters into the individual’s conduct and transforms him into the citizen – a keeper of rules. The ruler is charged with creating a consistent environment, the State, which would relieve us of the constant questioning of identity and possession that is brought about by individuation. It is a condition in which acting on the basis of a continuum of experience ‘makes sense’.
The setting to be constructed is one designed to defeat insecurity in the interaction among strangers. Such interaction no longer need be disconcerting, as the integrity of ‘the other’s’ identity is set and guaranteed by the sovereign. This is achieved by instilling, or rather enforcing, a propensity to follow a prescribed set of rules. If everyone followed the lead of the ruler to the letter, there would be no surprises whatsoever in conduct among strangers. The rules, having been set in ‘absolute’ stone, are clear and constant, to the extent that they leave no room for change of circumstances brought about by shifts in time and space. This airtight security provides for an ease of mind in following the rules, converting the cautious semi-rational being into a fully-fledged rational and carefree one.

The objection voiced here to this ‘chain of reactions’ is that although it produces an infallible rational being, that being is no longer human. A cognitive dissonance emerges between a theoretically flawless Hobbessian construction, and the real experiences of actual human beings. The term human rationality reflected upon here suggests that the material shell that constrains human existence cannot be ignored. It is argued that Locke counters Hobbes by rejecting the proposition that any earthly power could insulate individuals from the effects of individuation. Indeed, from the Lockean perspective particularisation is distinctly human. This imperfection is not an ailment to be rectified, it is a defining feature of who we are. As long as we are alive, we are trapped in a state of material restrictive imperfection. As creatures that by definition inhabit time and space, we are unable to abolish them. Yet we must contend with the negative impact of individuation, as failing to do so would unleash the social trust problem highlighted by Hobbes and acknowledged by Locke. It
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reduces the horizon of non-familial exchanges to ‘here and now’ interactions of short-term benefits, reducing the human to the beast.

It is further maintained that the State-generated ‘memory’ offered by Hobbes, which puts an absolute hold on identity in order to escape regression into a ‘here and now’ perspective, is related to a monist tradition in which the abstract and the actual are essentially one and the same. For Hobbes one can literally place mind over matter, and rationalise oneself out of individuation. It is a notion of control, or creation, of one’s environment by imitating the creation exhibited by God. It is argued that the Lockean position stands in contrast to the Hobbesean monistic resolution of social tension through adoption or mimicry of a stance of perfect rationality. The Lockean stance is rooted in an opposing dualist tradition, in which I am in this world in as far as I have a material corollary in it, a body; I am in the next world in my self, as an idea.

For Locke, creation is a Godly prerogative not availed to living humans due to their being bound by time and space. As humans we are inherently restricted to manipulating creation. We do not create liberty, we can merely administer license. Therefore, it is within the scope of manipulation, and not of creation, that we can hope to find resolution to social conflict. In contrast to Hobbes, within the Lockean paradigm the problem of continuous identity is addressed by establishing a licensing agency that registers individuals and their possessions, allowing public access to a perduring and reliable source of identity. By alienating or mediating the relationship among strangers via the official sovereign record, a consistent environment is achieved. Yet it is not the Hobbesean closed and set environment, achieved by rendering the changes of time and space immaterial; rather, it is open to inputs of
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identity and conduct from the constituency as long as such inputs follow a set procedure for registry (e.g. majority rule).

It is held that the insistence on groundedness in the Lockean position extends beyond the critique of rationalist contractarianism, into a debate with a Hayekian, materialist brand of conventionalism. The discord is over the latter’s proposal that individuation and order emerge spontaneously in the material realm and are maintained by a market mechanism. Accordingly, it does away with the dualist perfection-imperfection contrast attributed here to Locke. Moreover, although the Hayekian derivation from Humean conventionalism develops as a reactionary vision that is staunchly opposed to rationalist contractarianism, it is maintained that its attitude towards boundaries is remarkably similar to the one extruded from the rationalist Hobbesian position, presenting conventionalism as a free market, non-authoritative and possibly liberal, alternative route to cosmopolitanism.

Countering this proposition, the unrestricted openness offered by conventionalists is construed in this thesis as a mirror image of the unbound detachment demanded by Hobbes. While Hobbes is accused of receding into an illusory, immaterial and unbound condition, Hayek is charged with releasing the bound from the unbound. No longer a constrained form of the unbound, the bound is neither incomplete nor imperfect, and ultimately nothing of its boundedness survives in any meaningful sense. Indeed, it no longer has any relation with perfection. The only relation it allows for is an inter-subjective one between corporeal entities. These entities are said to be ‘naturally’ preserved by the act of interaction, a free market relation that is expected to regenerate their subjectivity. The Lockean objection levelled in this thesis at the conventionalist contention is that a system that is entirely
self-contained is conceptually free-floating. Since it has no anchored understanding of the ideas of self and property outwith its own evolving system, it carries the potential to evolve away from individuation, rendering it cosmopolitan, but arguably no longer liberal.
1.4 Outline of the chapters

2. Hobbes: A Metaphysical Interpretation of his Politics

The function of this chapter is to outline an unconventional metaphysical interpretation of Hobbes’s political theory, to be developed in full in the following two chapters. It argues that his political stance is derived from his general scientific quest for the attainment of an indisputable truth that spans the entirety of human knowledge-seeking enterprises. It is argued that at the foundation of this endeavour is the monotheistic metaphysical idea that the singularity of truth is rooted in the singularity of creation. It is maintained that Hobbes believes he has figured out the puzzle of creation. He has found in rationality the methodological solution for the reign of a single, interdisciplinary and indisputable, Truth. Once this scientific method is applied to all knowledge-seeking activities, they will be found to connect together and form a perfect equilibrium that revolves around the Truth.


This chapter argues that the Hobbesian enterprise is engaged with finding a ‘once and for all’ geometry-like cure for the social deficiencies of the human condition. The disease for which the cure is being sought is a spiral-like ‘fall’ into disintegration, and therefore public discord in interpersonal encounters. It is a descent from an original non-corporeal unison, free of particularity and therefore of competing claims that lead to conflict. Hobbes, it is argued, proposes to remedy the ailing condition of society by reversing the process of corporeal
fragmentation. Contrary to the traditional understanding of Hobbes as both a modernist and an advocate of individualism, it is maintained that he argued for the reversal of the natural course of human history by the negation of individuation. His position is best thought of in renaissance terms, as seeking to reinstate a long lost peaceful Edenic prototype, and to replace the chaos which he perceives in his era. It is argued that in an effort to replace individuation with unison, his sovereign is charged with the creation of a fabricated existence in which temporality and by extension spatiality become redundant. The production of an ‘earthly Eden’ effectively raises all to a godlike stature, establishing a perfect equilibrium in which all remain at a ‘stand still’, since perfection is already at hand.

4. Rationality as recurrence

An extension of the previous chapter, here it is argued that Hobbes conceptualises rationality as part of a holist paradigm that is defined by resistance to change, or recurrence. It maintains that Hobbes strives to achieve an existence in which complete predictability in social conduct will replace fear; one in which rationally deficient ‘fooles’, who exert their energy aimlessly, will be converted into rational objective driven citizens. It is asserted that far from being a theory, comparable to Machiavelli’s, on how to utilise force to one’s advantage, he is advancing a theory of peace in which force becomes redundant. The chapter goes on to compare this interpretation of Hobbes with David Gauthier’s attempt to recreate Hobbesan authority without resorting to a sovereign, arguably removing from Hobbes’s theory the striving towards perfection and modelling on
God that are attributed to it here. While acknowledging the credibility of Gauthier’s interpretation, it is argued that his position exacerbates the problem of continuous identity that Hobbes set out to solve with his strong sovereign and matching State.

5. **Locke: Removing the misconceptions**

The objective of this chapter is to dispute conventional misconceptions of Locke. Firstly it aims to refute the orthodox association of Locke with Hobbes, arguing instead for a unique Lockean property-focused political stance, which stems from his distinct metaphysics. It is put forward that contrary to Hobbes, who wishes to solve the irregularity generated by motion by grinding the world to a halt, Locke’s vision is one in which human boundaries and imperfections are taken as a given. Consequently, his theory aims to accommodate rather than eliminate them. Moreover, Hobbes is posited as antagonistic to both metaphysical and political individuation, whereas Locke is presented as its defender metaphysically and therefore also politically. The chapter goes on to differentiate Locke’s defence of individualism and his market orientation from the Smito-Humean market vision of political exchange. Finally, it distances the Libertarian ideas trumpeted by Robert Nozick from the interpretation of Locke provided here, by claiming they originate in Hobbes instead.
6. **Locke: The Self, The State and the Continuous Identity of Property**

This chapter expands upon the distinctly Lockean understanding of metaphysical individuation and transposes it onto his political theory. It attempts to establish that although the Lockean position borrows the Hobbesian analysis that corporeal individuation results in difficulties in the integrity of one’s social counterparts, it seeks an ongoing solution, as opposed to a ‘once and for all’ solution, to what it views as an ongoing inescapable metaphysical problem. It further argues that while for both theorists the resolution consists in erecting a reliable source that assures the integrity of one’s counterparts, for Hobbes this is achieved by reversing the process of individuation and replacing it with an institution that enforces solid unity, whereas for Locke it is attained by institutionally mellowing it via a repository, namely the State. Finally, it is suggested that while the State is perfectly equipped to sustain elements of identity that lend themselves to commodification, it is unsuited for preserving identity that cannot be commodified.

7. **Locke: The Nation – A depository of Heritage**

This chapter argues that Locke’s position is incompatible with a cosmopolitan stance. Following upon the preceding chapter, the objective here is to demonstrate how a concept of ‘national identity’ is both necessary for and compatible with Locke’s notion of the State as an identity-fostering apparatus. The nation is understood as complementary to the State in the provision of a future outlook that motivates individuated beings to interact with each other in
the creation of prosperity. The parallel between the function of the State and national bodies, within their respective realms of commodity and non-commodity preservation, is demonstrated. The possibility of replacing national identity with alternative Statist or cross-national identities is explored but rejected.

8. Conclusion – A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism

This final chapter briefly considers the implications that the metaphysically saturated readings of Hobbes and Locke have for the foundations of cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and nationalism, on the other. The first section reconsiders who the custodians of the Hobbesean legacy are within the schools of thought in international relations. It applies the metaphysically inspired conclusion that Hobbes’s political aspiration is for rest and peace, to challenge the traditional association of Hobbes with the realist school and its vision of international relations as a struggle for domination. By contrast, according to the unconventional understanding of Hobbes presented in this thesis, he becomes a proponent of a world absolutist State, as a direct extension of his own argument for the peace-generating benefits of the State. The second section explores the type of national identity that Locke’s metaphysically saturated political position lends itself to, and distinguishes this both from communitarian versions and from the views of arguably ‘liberal nationalist’ theorists such as David Miller and Yael Tamir. Finally, it attempts to define the national, or at least the anti-cosmopolitan aspect of Locke’s metaphysically saturated political position, by contrasting it with Jeremy Waldron’s depiction of cosmopolitanism.
1.5 A note on Text and Context

It should be noted that my use of political theory texts follows the method that Charles Tarlton, in an essay examining scholarly approaches to the analysis of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, discredits under the label 'rewriting Hobbes'. I have no qualms with the label chosen by Tarlton; I do however object to his discrediting it. Indeed, the label is a true representation of an approach that is not seeking to expose the truth *about* the author or the text, but is rather seeking truth *within* the authored text. Consequently, the intentions and the formative historical context are sidelined in favour of theoretical modeling and logical argumentation from which we may derive insights as to contemporary political conditions.

Tarlton's concern is to criticise contrived rehabilitating readings that turn a blind eye to what he views as Hobbes's inherent despotism. He seems intent on forcing commentators to take a 'political' stance, either sanctifying the text as a whole, thereby implicitly condoning anything it might contain, or vilifying it as a

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*In line with David Gauthier’s assertion that ‘The underlying rationale of our study…is that Hobbes has something of value for us, confronted with moral and political problems, even if what is of most value is not what he intended’ Gauthier *Logic of the Leviathan* in (Tarlton *The despotic doctrine of Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan* 2001: 602).*

*Under the assumption that the text is ‘intelligible in its own terms as some kind of classical expression independent of both time and space’ (Tarlton *The despotic doctrine of Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan* 2001: 607).*

*See Jean Hampton *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* in (Tarlton *The despotic doctrine of Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan* 2001: 602): ‘the principal reason for studying Hobbes’s work is that doing so will improve our understanding social contract theories generally’ eventually leading us to ‘construct new philosophical views about our contemporary political life in this case about the very regimes in which many of us live.’

*As he claims commentators from Jeremy Bentham onwards have tended to do.

*A position sympathetically attributed to C.E. Vaughan see (Tarlton *The despotic doctrine of Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan* 2001: 614) ‘Vaughan cast Hobbes in the part of the villain…’*
whole, thereby opposing the crux developed therein. His position implies that once sealed by the author's intentions and context, the text is 'parceled', and offered to us either to reject or accept. On this view, the text is not a logical framework worthy of intellectual dissection, it is a social agenda promoting platform\textsuperscript{11}. Accordingly, the authenticity\textsuperscript{12} of the text cannot be 'messed with' or, employing the words of Max Weber, as Tarlton does, it is 'not a hired cab which one may stop at will and climb into or out of as one sees fit' (Max Weber in Tarlton 2001: 603).

By contrast, the approach taken in this thesis is close to the one set out by Gregory Kavka in his *Hobbessian Moral and Political Theory*: ‘This book is less concerned with what Hobbes said for its own sake than with what may be learned from what he said.’ (Kavka 1986: xiv) and ‘The ultimate goal of this process is to explicate and defend a plausible system of moral and political hypotheses suggested and inspired by Hobbes.’ (Kavka 1986: 3). Thus the references within this thesis to the authored text are not intended to support a definitive interpretation, and it is not suggested that the ideas or conclusions derived may be attributed to the original author, or connected to the context of their historical period. Its commitment is not to

\textsuperscript{11} The Marxist ‘theory versus praxis’ debate that no doubt informs this position, is evident in Tarlton’s disapproving remark: ‘We should not be surprised, however, that when the main question has become the ‘truth’ of the political theory [with which Hobbesian contractarians are presumed to be engaged], then the idea of theory as a political act, as a provocation to action in a particular kind of situation gets lost.’ (Tarlton *The despotic doctrine of Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan* 2001: 601).
be true to the 'authentic text', be it Hobbes’s or other ‘Old Masters’’, but rather to uncover and examine the logic of the timeless argumentation it claims is found within the text.

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Seeking the theoretical ‘truth’ in the logic of the words having eclipsed the praxis of action that the words hold.

12 The intent to promote a social stance.
Chapter 2. Hobbes: A Metaphysical Interpretation of his Politics

This chapter outlines an unconventional interpretation of Hobbes’s political theory, to be developed in full in the following two chapters. It argues that his political stance should be understood as an integral part of his general scientific quest for the attainment of an indisputable truth that spans the entirety of human knowledge-seeking enterprises. It maintains that underlying this endeavor is the monotheistic metaphysical idea that the singularity of truth is rooted in the singularity of creation. Once the puzzle of the Truth is deciphered, once all the pieces that compose it are in place, the order of creation will be restored to its perfect original state. The indisputability of the reign of Truth will make this the most secure of existences. Everything will unfold according to a predetermined plan; the world will come to the standstill of a perfect equilibrium.

The first section of this chapter unravels the idea that the political stability which Hobbes strives to achieve is rooted in theological holism. It distinguishes this understanding from the conventional interpretation of Hobbes, as demarcated by Sharon Lloyd (Lloyd 1992), as well as from her own unconventional amalgamation of his theology and politics. The latter comparison is especially helpful, as it highlights the metaphysical nature of the proposed theological argumentation. While both Lloyd’s position and mine are divergences from ‘the standard’ view, defended by an appeal to logical consistency, she is making a narrow claim for a logical connection between the religious idea of belief and Hobbes’s political stances,
whereas I assert a wider logical claim that places the metaphysics of monotheism at the core of his system of thought as a whole.

In the second section, the argument for a monotheistic creationist foundation for Hobbes’s notion of order is further unfolded. It sets out to piece together Hobbes’s eschatology, politics and science, into a consistent system of thought. Essentially adopting J.W.N. Watkins’s holistic approach to Hobbes’s system of thought, I supplement it with an account of the source of this holistic attitude, namely metaphysical monotheism. Thus, I challenge Watkins’s own reduction of the theological themes in Hobbes’s works to prudential ‘lip service’. I am equally critical of Michael Oakeshott’s attempt to harmonise Hobbes’s academic activities by compartmentalising them into complementary non-competing jurisdictions of knowledge-seeking disciplines. Contrary to both Michael Oakeshott and Gordon Hull, who assert that Hobbes’s political theory is a product of his realisation of the incompatibility between biblical and scientific knowledge, I claim he is reacting against the subjectification of knowledge. What he prescribes is therefore, not the separation of conflicting types of knowledge, but a countermeasure against conflict between autonomous agents that motion for themselves, making competing claims in the name of their *particular truth*.

It is argued that the political ‘once and for all’ surrender of autonomous motion that Hobbes envisions, is derived from a metaphysical understanding that views both individuation and motion as deviations from an original state of perfection. This assertion draws upon a comparison of Hobbes’s theological metaphysical position with that of Lady Anne Conway. Additionally the comparison reveals that Hobbes is troubled, rather than impressed, by the notion of atomisation.
It is maintained that the political system he devises, is aimed at countering a negative, but contingent, social process of fragmentation that he observes empirically. Although he cannot deny the empirical evidence of the individuation of social interaction, he does not view it as an innate feature of humankind, rather he views it as a deviation from humankind’s nature as originally instilled by creation. His prescription should not be deemed a positivist surrender to reality, it is an ambitious attempt to reform humankind’s existence on the basis of the lost direction of creation, namely that of a motionless and timeless eternal Truth.

2.1 Metaphysical Monotheism – All for One and One for All

Sharon Lloyd proposes a ‘rough grouping’ of analytic philosophical (i.e. non-“contextualist” (Lloyd 1992: 323 note 2)) Hobbes scholarship, according to its affiliation with the ‘standard philosophical interpretation’. Adherents of this interpretation hold some significant subset of the following\textsuperscript{13} views (Lloyd 1992: 7,14):

a. The essentials of Hobbes’s theory can be captured without reference to religious interests;

b. That according to Hobbes might makes order, and correspondingly that fear of death and the desire for self-preservation are the strongest motivators of human action;

\textsuperscript{13}Note that the sequence in which these are here ordered is of my choosing, and merely reflects the order in which I will address them hereafter.
c. Hobbes intended to derive a necessary form of political organisation from fundamentally [individualist] egoistic human nature;

d. Hobbes was a materialist reductionist;

e. That political obligation in Hobbes’s theory is solely prudentially based;

f. Hobbes was a moral subjectivist or relativist; and,

g. That the Hobbesean state of nature corresponds to the model of a prisoner’s dilemma.  

Lloyd concedes that within this standard bent, interpretation may vary considerably, nevertheless, she contends one can still demarcate commentators into three camps: protagonists, complete antagonists, and substantial antagonists. Variants of the conventional stance include in her view the writings of authors such as Gauthier, Watkins, Macpherson, Nagel, Plamenatz, Skinner, Kavka and Hampton. Interpretations ‘deeply at odds’ with the standard view are attributed to Taylor, Warreender and Hood. Whilst positions that require ‘rejection of substantial portions’ of the standard are found in Barry, Oakeshott and Johnston. Although one might differ with Lloyd on the positioning of certain authors, overall I find the sketch of the traditional understanding of Hobbes, against which she measures them, accurate.

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14 The discussion of this last attribute falls somewhat outside the scope of this thesis. I do however address it in part in with reference to the differences between David Gauthier and Jean Hampton in chapter 4, section 2.

15 It is worth noting, however, that adherents of the standard seem to share more as a group than its detractors. For instance, the grouping of Oakeshott and Johnston within the camp of ‘substantial antagonists’, does not reflect in the least on a shared attitude towards the political role, if any, of Hobbes’s eschatology. As noted by Overhoff (Overhoff The Theology of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan 2000: 545), Johnston arrives with J.G.A. Pocock to the conclusion that Hobbes’s eschatology plays a political role, whereas for Oakeshott knowledge is acquired in distinctly different ways in these two
A brief review of Lloyd’s concise list of the conventional perception of Hobbes’s views will help to flesh-out the inverse understanding that is to be defended here. Lloyd herself discusses this list critically as a prelude to her alternative interpretation. Although I share some of Lloyd’s criticism of the traditional understating, the theoretical grounding for our respective arguments is distinctive. While we both find the conventional interpretation lacking, we disagree on the causes and the remedies for its deficiencies. In order to avoid any confusion, it would be prudent to differentiate my divergence from the conventional interpretation, from Lloyd’s.

In Lloyd’s view the difference between the conventional interpretations of Hobbes and the one she proposes stems from opposing views taken to the relationship between Hobbes’s politics and his theology, as well as from a somewhat related dispute over the prescriptive moral stance, if any, which Hobbes holds. She finds that Hobbes’s theology provides an insight to the unrecognised significance of passionate beliefs as a counterbalance to rationality in Hobbes’s thought. Her concern is that the standard interpretation overemphasises the role of might, thereby distorting the indispensable contribution of faith to the political system that Hobbes devises. She claims that by ‘dismantling’ the Hobbesian social enterprise of the ‘tool’ of faith, the traditional interpretation subverts his contribution to political theory. Detached of his ‘theological backbone’, he is degenerated into a materialist reductionist, a theorist of self-obsessed prudentially-oriented entities, whose only mode of communication is force and whose sole moral criterion is Power. By
contrast, armed with ‘faith’, the Hobbesean position implies the conversion of passionate false beliefs to passionate true beliefs, not by duress, but solely by means of education. Moreover, according to Lloyd passionate belief is invaluable to the maintenance of an undisputed truth, and therefore to the perdurance of the unchallenged peace that Hobbes strives for (Lloyd 1992: 43).

Like Lloyd (Lloyd 1992: 17) and others I am not content to reduce the recurrence of theological themes in Hobbes’s works to mere ‘lip service’. I equally dispute the depiction of Hobbes as a theorist of power relations. Furthermore, I endorse Lloyd’s identification of the maintenance of the singularity of truth, as key to Hobbes’s argument for stability and peace. However, I do not share with her the theoretical foundation for these conclusions. I view Hobbesean theology, not as an insulated religious source of belief that infuses the Hobbesean system with a unique passionate hold on the rational truth, but as the foundation for a holistic understanding of order. I claim that Hobbes’s sense of order draws upon the monotheistic idea of a single indisputable design, ordained by God in his capacity as the creator. I wish to highlight the overlooked logical importance of the idea of a single Creator to Hobbes’s understanding of the singularity of order, and examine how this affects the interpretation of his idea of political rule. I draw my political conclusions from the logical implication of the metaphysical aspect of creation in Hobbes’s theology, whereas Lloyd draws hers from the logical application of the religious idea of faith to social interaction.

16 Such as J.G.A. Pocock and Richard Tuck (Tuck The civil religion of Thomas Hobbes 1993)).
17 I will return to this point, and expand upon it with reference to the employment of Hobbes in international relations theory, in the conclusion.
This is not, however, the only difference between my unconventional interpretation and Lloyd’s. My divergence from the ‘standard’ interpretation additionally reflects a discord with what I view as a conventional simplified, perhaps even positivist version of Hobbes, in which his prescription is defined by an empirically observable, unavoidable conflict of desires between firmly set individuals. By contrast, I would argue that his normative stance is the polar opposite of his description, demanding the reversal of the cause that brought about the state of war of all against all, i.e. individuation itself. It is my understanding that in the standard view, the task of Hobbesian rational governance constitutes continually ameliorating recurring conflict between ‘set’ individuals by ‘routing’ their desires through the calm-inducing filter of the sovereign\textsuperscript{18}. In my unconventional view, Hobbes’s demand for rational governance is not an exercise in conflict management, but rather an attempt to achieve its total elimination. It follows that the observed conflict of desires is not set. Moreover, the contingency of interpersonal conflict suggests that it can be avoided altogether.

In my view, the solution that Hobbes proposes is to trace (scientifically) social instability back to its source, to rectify the causes of disorder, and to start over afresh. In the newly imposed ‘revolutionary’\textsuperscript{19} order, in which selves have surrendered their voice to the ruler, a subdued peaceful interpersonal coexistence is enabled. The mad havoc of a world inhabited by a cacophony of unsustainable

\textsuperscript{18} That this understanding blurs the difference between Hobbes’s prescription and that of Locke into mere nuance, is a point that I take up later on and attempt to refute.

\textsuperscript{19} In the sense of starting from scratch, or borrowed from the context of computers: restarting, rebooting.
individual voices, is subdued by the silencing, within the public sphere, of unsanctioned individual claims and desires.

The individuals are more than willing to impose these restrictions upon themselves, since in Hobbes’s view they only stand to gain from them. In the pre-restrained state of nature each individual was sovereign ‘de jure’ over their desires, however, due to insufficient assurances as to the conduct of others, could not securely exercise them ‘de facto’. The conflict as understood here is not reducible to multiple individuals making opposing claims, for example to the same object, and without any other recourse employing violence in an attempt to dominate one another. The risk is not so much a corporal one, as a socially debilitating one that has a detrimental influence on grand scale enterprise. It is argued that what troubles Hobbes is the threat posed to rational conduct by the detachment of actuality from rationality. His concern is that the rationale behind farsighted social engagement with non-familial others (with whom one does not have inherently repetitive encounters) dissipates in the absence of a matching, actual stabilizing recurrence to sustain it. It is his recognition of the lack of a naturally-occurring order that prompts him to advocate an artificial order imposed by the State.

Hobbes’s affluence aspiring individuals acknowledge that in order to increase prosperity, commercial interaction must be expanded to distant strangers. Unfortunately, there is a social obstacle in the path to such potentially profitable dealings; a persistent stalemate as a consequence of empirically observable distrust among strangers. Hobbes proposes to overcome this impasse by substituting the naturally lacking direct mutual trust in one’s counterpart, with a trust in ‘the other’ that is mediated by an artificially constructed, trusted third party. This external entity
enables carefree commerce by issuing guaranteed certification of persons and goods. For without such assurance, the identity of persons and the attachment of belongings to them would remain forever in a state of dispute. What the State offers in this respect is the comforting peace of mind that tomorrow’s social experiences will not be radically different from those of today; a frictionless coexistence that is conducive to prosperity.

Hobbes further develops this idea of a connection between recurrence and a carefree economical state of rest, by employing an ongoing analogy between Physics and Politics; using the tenets of one to explain the other. Indeed, it is purported that this is part and parcel of his holistic ambition to reunite reasoning into a singular original Truth. Friction, a futile exertion of force, produces nothing but waste in both Physics and Politics. I suggest that Hobbes is intent on repairing the social mechanism by reengineering it so as to perfect its efficiency. Should the elements of his reconstruction of the world as we know it (i.e. from empirical observation), fit neatly together into an ultra-efficient orderly mechanism, friction will have been removed and the highest productivity will have been gained with minimal expenditure of energy.

It is the appreciation of this cost-benefit equation, and not the standard egoistic one (Gowdya and Seidl 2004: 345), that makes the Hobbesean individual a variant of ‘economic man’. It is not only preservation that is yearned for in the state of nature, but prosperity as well: ‘all controversies are bred hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning meum [mine] and teum [yours]….it belong to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly,
by which every man may know what might be called his, what another’s’ (Hobbes 1998 (1656, 1642): 178 De Cive, VI, 9).

The assumption is that the toll of exchange without certification is spread equally among individuals. In the absence of supplied assurances by the mechanism of the State, lack of confidence in the act of exchange would prevail.

It is further argued that in order to assure the perpetual perdurance of such a mechanism, so that it will not revert back into unreliability, Hobbes resorted to modeling it after a ‘perpetum mobile’. It is maintained that here he enters into yet another phase of his holistic outlook; one which would join the metaphysics of theology to the already conjoined Physics and Politics. The condition for an everlasting mechanism is its achievement of perfection. If such an infinite loop of comforting repetition could only be ‘jump started’ and left undisturbed, its state of perfect equilibrium would allow it to carry on perpetually.

The only mechanism known to humankind that functions in this manner is God. It is therefore proposed that the Hobbesian ambition was to artificially construct a social ‘perpetum mobile’, mimicking the natural ‘perpetum mobile’ that is God. Yet, it is asserted that not only does Hobbes draw upon the special ‘Physical’ attributes of God, but he also draws upon the metaphysical engagement with the concept of God in monotheistic theology, and more specifically upon the idea of ‘rule following’ as the route to salvation in Jewish theology. Indeed, it is proposed that Hobbes's understanding of rationality itself is as an exercise in seeking rules to follow; an endeavor that should inevitably lead to the realisation of the unison of order as pronounced by creation.
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism

The focus on creation and the creator places God, not man, at centre stage. The conventional understanding of Hobbes as an advocate of individualism is consequently disputed. It is proposed that the source for this confusion is inattentiveness to the split in Hobbesian theory between description of the state of nature and the prescription of ‘the State’. It is maintained that in the former we are motivated by a fear of death, whereas the latter acts as a peril-free sanctuary that makes life worth living. It is asserted that while Hobbes describes in detail a condition of individuation, he does so not in order to celebrate it, but in order to gain an understanding of how to uproot it. His political organisation is therefore derived not from an acceptance of egoistical behaviour as the standard interpretation would have it, but from its defiance. The political state is structured in order to negate such behaviour at its source. In a similar vein, it is maintained, against the traditional understanding, that the materialist reductionism he employs is no more than a methodology for the attainment of descriptive data on the individuated condition; and therefore, does not, as the standard interpretation holds, positively define his prescription.

It is argued that Hobbes is not a modernist revolutionary, rather he is a renaissance reformist. Individuals and their desires are not the fundamental building blocks, which Hobbes need only ‘sort out’ by prescribing a mechanism that will allow them to live in harmony, despite their inclination towards hubris. Egoistical individuals are instead understood by Hobbes to be the product of a setback in the originally created reign of rational conduct. The metaphysical fragmentation of humankind is for Hobbes the primordial cause of ‘the fall’ into interpersonal tension. Subjectivism and relativism are a contingent feature of a contemporary-perceived
world, they by no means reflect on the future-normative world. Indeed, it is here maintained that the condition that Hobbes aspires to, is one in which the insecurity rendered by subjective disputes has been ‘once and for all’ resolved. Prudence is a safety measure that directs us in the flux that is the state of nature. Once individuated selves are relieved of their autonomy by the ruler, the perfect efficiency of the originally created order will have been reinstated. Once the State is established, it ends the folly of risk-encumbered engagement, replacing it with the rational orderly conduct of civility. Under absolute sovereignty prudence becomes redundant, replaced with the liberty to trust in the future and consequently to act industriously.

This section has briefly outlined my proposed departure from the list of views conventionally attributed to Hobbes. The foundation for this challenge is the claim that the standard interpretation wrongly makes Hobbes into a positivist, whose political prescription is defined by an immutable observable ‘real politiqué’. Instead, he is here understood as a reactionary thinker, who endeavors to take control of a reality that indisputable empirical indications suggest has gone mad. Moreover, he holds that the features and motivations that he identifies in this mad existence need to be extracted from it, if sanity is to be restored.

In a rule-based society, the anxiety produced by the instability of interaction between individuals ruled by contingent power relations needs to be replaced by predictable conduct. Fear of the future, and by extension fear of death, are not to be utilised in the ‘restored order’, as they are implicated in the condition of disorder that we are attempting to rectify. Misguided, shortsighted self-preservation considerations are to be eliminated, and replaced by ones overhauled in the context of a secure future. In such a state, prudential reasoning is replaced by trust in a recurrence
imposed by an enduring sovereignty. The subjectivity of social reality is replaced by a scientifically deducible objectivity. This is not however a new and enlightened science that divorces itself from the ‘old ways’, it is a renewed science that rediscovers the lost unison of Truth.

2.2  **Seeking the Truth - Perfectionism not Positivism**

The main argument in J.W.N. Watkins’s seminal book *Hobbes's System of Ideas: A study in the political significance of philosophical theories* (Watkins 1965) is that one can piece together the Hobbesian philosophical ideas of nature, of man, and of civil society into one coherent system that spans moral, psychological, epistemological, metaphysical and political thought. Watkins notes that for the most part, with the exception of Michael Oakeshott’s *Introduction to Leviathan*, modern studies of Hobbes either did not assert that the pieces fit together, or positively asserted that they did not fit together. He contrasts this modern trend with a tendency of Hobbes’s contemporaries, identified by I. Mintz in *The Hunting of Leviathan*, to regard Hobbes’s moral and political theory as part and parcel of his world-view. Although Watkins commends Oakeshott for not overlooking the unity of the Hobbesian system, they clearly do not share an understanding of how the pieces fit together. Watkins is seeking to demonstrate that Hobbes employs a single method and a single set of ideas in his discussion of the natural sciences and in his discussion of the social sciences, thereby merging them into one art. By contrast, Oakeshott
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asserts that the Hobbesian system of ideas holds together precisely because it is compartmentalised into complementary, non-competing jurisdictions.

In his *Introduction to Leviathan* Oakeshott is keen to present Hobbesian ‘civil philosophy’ as an integral part of the Hobbesian understanding of philosophy. For Oakeshott this ‘division’ of human understanding restricts itself to analytically plotting an image of the world in which every event can be accounted for in terms of cause and effect. Oakeshott asserts that Hobbes differentiates this reasoning ‘take’ on the world, from other outlooks, namely, the sensual ‘take’ that produces an experience outlook, the empirical ‘take’ which produces a scientific outlook, and the ‘take’ of faith which produces a theological outlook. The subject matter is what divides these ‘takes’. Clearly delineated, they do not ‘step on each other’s toes’, rather they are structured so as to complement one another.

The image produced by the senses is a necessary condition for the development of the reasoning image, as it provides the raw data for the mind to process. Yet the processing activity that sorts out the causes and effects by manipulating the data in the imagination, is not subject to the restrictions of the senses. It is free to shuffle sensory memories. It can dissect these memories into bits and pieces, reforming them into a coherent system of causes and effects. Oakeshott acknowledges that the distinction between the scientific engagement and the philosophical engagement is not as clear-cut in Hobbes. However, he claims that it anticipates the later division ‘between a knowledge (with all the necessary assumptions) of the phenomenal world and theory of knowledge itself.’ (Oakeshott 1975: 20). Finally, the image produced by faith complements that of reasoning by
addressing a transcendental to which one has no sensory access, and therefore to which reasoning could not be applied.

It is Oakeshott’s contention ‘that the system of Hobbes’s philosophy lies in his conception of the nature of philosophical knowledge, and not in a doctrine about the world. And the inspiration for his philosophy is the intention to be guided by reason and reject all other guides: this is the thread, the hidden thought, that gives it coherence, distinguishing it from Faith, “Science”, and Experience. It remains to guard against all possible error.’ (Oakeshott 1975: 27). I support Oakeshott’s conclusion that the Hobbesean aspiration to faultlessness requires a divorce from the world, however, I challenge his assertions that ‘The lineage of Hobbes’s rationalism lies, not (like that of Spinoza or even Descartes) in the great Platonic-Christian tradition, but in the sceptical, late scholastic tradition. He does not normally speak of Reason, the divine illumination of the mind that unites man with God; he speaks of reasoning.’ (Oakeshott 1975: 27).

As opposed to Oakeshott who argues that the Hobbesean ‘civic philosophy’ is an exercise in analytically charting the causal route that would unite personal desires into society, I maintain that Hobbes is engaged in devising a method to force reason back on to a world that has gone mad with desire. Detachment from the corporeal is not only the method he applies, it is also the objective. A goal that is presumably derived from the prevalent medieval conception of ‘man’s greatness’ as ‘embodied in his ability to rise above nature – indeed, to be “saved” from nature altogether – and to achieve eternal association with God’ (Netanyahu 1982: 113). He is not simply engaged in analytically making sense of ‘a reflection’ of the world, in a positivist manner, he is analysing the reflection in order to prescribe the reformation of the
world itself, so that it may regain its original lost sensibility; he is reshaping it into a single coherent reality along the holistic lines ascribed by Watkins.

It is here claimed that Hobbes draws on the parallel between the detachment of both God and reasoning from the corporeal, to form a system in which reasoning and God are interchangeable terms. Indeed it is held that he is on a quest to replicate the unison of God in the corporeal context. The order that he seeks must be one that can unite theology and science into a ‘one and only’ indisputable art. Hobbes wishes to assure the endurance of peace by commensurating the two ‘once and for all’ into a single system of ideas, an unquestionable Truth. He would appear to follow the dictum: one God, one Truth, one Reasoning.

Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our Senses and Experience; nor (that which is the undoubted word of God), our naturall Reason. For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the Napkin of an Implicite Faith, but employed in the purchase of Justice, Peace, and true Religion. For though there be many things in Gods Word above reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskillful Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination. (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 255-6 Leviathan Ch. XXXII).

My understanding of this statement is that Hobbes is attempting to achieve the harmony of the unison of the ‘two book’ doctrine, according to which God has spoken to us in two great books: the Book of Nature, in which created things speak to us directly, and the Book of Revelation, where God himself reveals to us his own inner nature and his free gifts and special plans for humanity. As Norris Clarke notes:
‘These two books, both written by the same Author, cannot contradict each other; if there is an apparent contradiction, either one side or the other, natural reason or theological interpretation of the revelation, has made an error, and each possibility must be re-examined more carefully. (Clarke 2001: 7).

The political implications of such a doctrine are especially troubling to Hobbes. The traditional medieval theory positively welcomes an ongoing debate between a theological outlook on politics and a scientific approach to it, supposedly leading ultimately to a harmonious coexistence; yet for Hobbes, this is both a lengthy and dangerous route to the reconciliation of the two. I maintain he fears that although the two books should be reconcilable, the culture of deliberation would deteriorate into a competition over authority between scripture and science.

The solution to this difficulty, conventionally attributed to Hobbes, has been the severance of scripture from politics altogether. Gordon Hull asserts that Hobbes takes his cue from the prominent medieval reading of the book of Job by Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas, as a parable intended to humble man’s reasoning abilities, divorcing them from the infinite capacity of God and by extension from theological matters. He provides textual evidence to this effect from De Corpore and Leviathan respectively:

Against this Empusa I think there cannot be invented a better exorcism than to distinguish between the rules of religion, that is, the rules honouring God, which we have from the laws, and the rules of philosophy, that is, the opinions of private men; and to yield what is due to religion to the Holy Scripture, and what is due to philosophy to natural reason. (Hobbes, De Corpore, in Hull 2002: 14)
The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdom of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that, being dead, are to rise again at the last day:… (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 419 Leviathan Ch. XLIV).

Yet, contrary to the spirit of Hull’s argument, Hobbes does not disengage with theology altogether. Instead, he takes steps to split it into an otherworldly strand and a worldly one. It is a division between the marginalised prerogative of the church to speculate on the afterlife, and the privilege of the civil sovereign to administrate a worldly theology. The church is free to engage itself in theological matters, as long as these are restricted to the realm of faith, and therefore have no temporal public consequences. Hull himself admits as much when he asserts that Hobbes went to great lengths to demonstrate that the age of prophecy is over, and therefore questions of scriptural exegesis are subordinate to the will of the sovereign. Indeed, Hobbes states so unequivocally:

Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man; (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 259 Leviathan Ch. XXXII).

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20 For internall Faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human jurisdiction; whereas the words, and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civill obedience, are injustice both before God and Man.’ (Hobbes Leviathan 1991 (1651): 360). See also Richard Tuck’s comment that ’An important and surprising feature of Hobbes’s argument [in Elements of Law as well as Critique of White]… was to protect theology from philosophy – more or less the opposite of what is conventionally supposed to have been his intention.’ (Tuck The civil religion of Thomas Hobbes 1993: 126).
Moreover, he clarifies that prophecy was the sole privilege of the ancient Jews:

there may be attributed to God a twofold Kingdom, *Natural* and *Prophetic*: Natural, wherein He governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the natural Dictates of right reason; And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not only by Natural Reason, but by Positive laws, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy Prophets. (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 246 Leviathan Ch. XXXI).

The Hobbesean stance is understood here as a variant on the position Benzion Netanyahu attributes to St. Augustine:

Augustine’s City of God was not an established power, as was the Church of medieval times, but a utopia which was once achieved by man, then lost, and which should be the final goal of all humanity’s efforts. The City of Man was not accepted by Augustine as a legitimate phenomenon, as the temporal power was by the Church. The purpose of history, as he understood it, was constantly to minimize and narrow the limits of the City of Man and broaden those of the City of God. These two domains were antagonistic to each other and their conflict was beyond compromise. The full materialization of one ideal meant the total ruin of the other, and the purpose of history was, indeed, completely to eliminate the City of Man and to establish the sole reign of the City of God. (Netanyahu 1982: 190)

I assert that Hobbes believes he has figured out the formula for artificially hastening the Augustinian progress of history, a theory that will allow for the ‘once and for all’ vanquishing of the City of Man, which he observes empirically. The difference
between Augustine and Hobbes is that the latter’s messianic version pertains to the here and now, and is to be administered politically\textsuperscript{21}.

To the extent that I am here engaged in theology, I do so in the ‘Hobbesean spirit’. Namely, I illustrate my argumentation by utilizing scriptural exegesis as historical narrative\textsuperscript{22}. Like Hull I am convinced that Hobbes was troubled by the issue of the possibility of knowing the will of God, and applying it correctly to the interpretation of concrete political situations (Hull 2002: 19). But I would assert, contrary to Hull and Michael Oakeshott, that the difficulty which Hobbes identifies is not a consequence of mismatch between two distinct types of knowledge, biblical and scientific (Hull 2002: 24), but rather the difficulty of multitude of opinion. Social tension does not arise out of the lack of proper demarcation between biblical and scientific knowledge, it arises out of individual differences of opinion as to the implementation of their reconciliation. The hubris exhibited by human beings is individual, as opposed to the collective hubris of the rational ambitions of humankind, against which Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas were arguing. I would assert that Hobbes does not separate contemplation of the divine from contemplation of the political.

Indeed, I agree with Jürgen Overhoff’s statement that: ‘The Scriptures, as Hobbes believed, certainly contained nothing of the kind of speculation as to whether and how incorporeal soul might dwell in heaven. And the Bible was, as he stressed,
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the ultimate yardstick by which Aristotle’s or any other man’s philosophical views on this matter were to be measured.’ (Overhoff 2000: 534). What Hobbes wishes to divorce is not biblical and political forms of contemplation, but rather to detach the act of contemplation from the individual and relegate it to the sovereign (See also Martel 2004: 3). The individual is barred from acting in God’s name, while the sovereign is entrusted with ‘deciding for God’. The reason the church cannot undermine the ruler’s absolute monopoly over contemplation, or for that matter rule itself, is because engagement in ecclesiastical matters of the afterlife is irreconcilable with administration of the temporal. ‘Internal’ beliefs, and ‘External’ reason, are incommensurable.

I wish to extend the Hobbesian holism, as defined by Watkins, to include what I contend is its underlying monotheistic theology. Watkins himself argues for a secularised materialist understanding of the Hobbesian project. He believes that the hostility of Hobbes’s contemporary religious orthodoxy was aroused by

their realization that he [Hobbes] was attempting to transform their God-supervised, man-oriented, law-bound and comfortably articulated cosmos into something quite alien: into a material expanse within which lonely individuals are driven by terror to manufacture a Leviathan whose definitions will create an artificial morality for them, and whose sword will impose an artificial unity on them. (Watkins 1965: 9-10).

I think Watkins is confusing the Hobbesian unorthodox approach with a secular one. Hobbesianism is unorthodox in replacing God’s direct supervision with a surrogate

22 Reaffirming Megan Clive and Iain Hampsher-Monk, Jürgen Overhoff suggests that it was Hobbes’s
manufactured human one, yet it does not cross the secular line because it does not consider the manmade version of law as having been created anew. Instead, it considers itself as engaged in the revival of natural law.

The Hobbesean position artificially pursues the restoration of an original perfectly created peaceful condition. Therefore its employment of God does not require a belief in God’s authority to command us, on which Watkins challenges Warrender (Watkins 1965: 87). It merely demands the acknowledgement of creation itself. Moreover, I would suggest that the ‘creationist’ version of Hobbes actually sits very well with the crux of Watkins’s own argument, i.e. the unification of Hobbes’s ideas into a singular cohesive system. What Watkins fails to appreciate is that on a philosophical monotheistic understanding, the abstract conception of God is that of the unity of ideas, which he himself claims is Hobbes’s aspiration. In the argument proposed here, the holistic interpretation of Hobbes that Watkins endorses, including his absolutism, is not only modelled after staunch monotheism, it is positively derived from it.

I am not denying that Hobbeseanism is essentially reformist, I am arguing that it is, however, not modernist in the revolutionary sense that is often attributed to it. Hobbeseanism does not consider itself as ushering in something ‘alien’, but rather something ‘familiar’. It is unfortunate that Watkins chose the term ‘alien’ with relation to the reception of Hobbesean ideas among the religious orthodoxy of his time (Watkins 1965: 9-10), when he himself goes to great lengths to show that Hobbes’s scientific method came under the influence of the Platonist metaphysics of reading of the Bible ‘the same was as any other historical narrative’ that infuriated church officials.
remembrance (Watkins 1965: 61-63). According to which, while the language and laws of humankind appear to be fabricated, to the extent that they are effective, they are actually reconstructed in the mould of the original natural law as instilled in humankind by creation.

2.3 Out of Time, out of Space - The reign of an immutable Truth

At the heart of ‘Hobessian renaissance’ is a conceptual fusion of God, perfection, standstill and rationality. It is an idea that is shared and expounded upon by Hobbes’s contemporary, and sometimes critic, Anne Conway\(^2\). Lady Conway was staunchly opposed to what she perceived as Hobbes’s essentialist materialism, (Loptson 1982: 13, 57), due to the implication she found it to have on the status of God. Her contention was that if, as she understood Hobbes to be arguing, everything were a body and all bodies were by definition corporeal, it would follow that God must be corporeal as well. This conclusion was not only demeaning to God, it was for her a logical impossibility. For Conway held that while corporeal bodies are defined by their susceptibility to change, God stands for perfection, and as such is immune to change. In her view only corporeal, imperfect bodies, which require change in order to perfect themselves, are amenable to motion and by extension to time as well:

\(^2\) On a biographical note, it is worth mentioning that Anne Conway suffered from chronic headaches, and that her physician was none other than Hobbes’s close friend William Harvey (Loptson The Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy 1982: 4)
Time is nothing else but the successive Motion or Operation of Creatures; which motion or Operation, if it should cease, Time would also cease, and the Creatures themselves would cease with Time: Wherefore such is the Nature of every Creature, that is in Motion, or hath certain Motion, by means of which it advances forward, and grows to a farther perfection. And seeing in God there is no successive Motion or Operation to a farther perfection; because he is most absolutely perfect. Hence there are no Times in God or his Eternity. And moreover, because there are no Parts in God, there are no Times in him; for all Times have their Parts, and are indeed infinitely divisible, as before was said. (Conway in Loptson 1982: 155).

Her vision of God is that of an anchored Archimedean point, a singular stationary instance of equilibrium towards which corporeal entities strive, but which by definition remains forever beyond their reach.

Conway’s argument is reiterated by Aloysius P. Martinich (Martinich 2005: 203-206). On similar grounds, he too finds Hobbes to be implying that God is material. The consequences of which are twofold. In the first instance, by binding God to materiality, God’s infinite incorporeal liberty is severely limited. In the second instance, the playing field of humankind and God is leveled. If both are corporeal entities credence is given to the equation of God’s creative liberty to ‘put things into motion’ with the rationally generated human autonomy (the ability to direct the motion of one’s destiny).

Yet, both Conway and Martinich, wrongly identify Hobbes with a subjectivist position that displaces God’s uniqueness as the transcendental anchor of the material universe, trading it for self-imposed rules manufactured by the human ‘ratio’. I propose an alternative reading of Hobbes that presents him as a reformist, rather than
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the revolutionary he is often made out to be. Moreover, I would argue adopting such an interpretation lends one a much more coherent Hobbesian outlook on metaphysical and political issues alike. I charge the modernist interpreters of Hobbes, Conway included, with confusing his description with his prescription. The contention advanced here is that while his description submerges God into corporeality, his prescription is its contrasting mirror image. It wishes to lift humankind into virtual incorporeality; to make its conduct Godlike. The empowerment of humankind is thus achieved, not by lessening the eminence of God, but by raising its own stature to meet God’s.

Despite the reservations voiced by Conway, Peter Loptson argues that she and Hobbes would appear to share a remarkably similar account of substance and essence (Loptson 1982: 57). Amplifying Loptson’s assertion, I claim that the foundations for their respective arguments can be understood as essentially identical, save one crucial element – the sourcing of motion, and the consequent implications on our attitude towards it. Consider the proposition that Conway and Hobbes share an understanding of God as the epitome of perfection, as well as the identification of perfection with an effortless standstill, outwith time and motion. Consider that they equally share the idea of God as the creator and additionally both observe the corporeal world that inhabits humankind to be in motion rather than at a standstill. Finally, they share the common purpose of bringing more Godly conduct into corporeal life. Where they diverge is on the role of motion and consequently on the extent to which humankind can pursue Godliness.

It is argued that Conway sources motion in God and therefore views it as an instrument of perfection, a positive force that is fuelled by creation in order to assist
corporeal beings in changing and thereby nearing perfection. Yet, as much as they might aspire to perfection, they are barred from reaching it. By contrast, it is asserted that Hobbes divorces motion from God. On the Hobbesian understanding offered here, creation could not have originally created anything short of a *perfect* and by extension *motionless* world. The observable motion in the corporeal world is an indication of imperfection, it is a departure from the moment of creation, and must therefore have an alternative source – a human one. In other words, creation is not responsible for the friction-rife state of nature that threatens our prosperity, it created the Edenic blissful paradise that logically precedes it. Humankind by its own hand, by its own carelessness, could bring the state of nature upon itself.

Observation of the social condition of humankind in his day and age suggests to Hobbes that the continuity of the original harmonious creation was somehow impaired. Still in awe of a perfect creator, Hobbes’s analysis cannot presume the creation of a faulty world, and is therefore drawn to the conclusion that the worrying condition of humankind is self-inflicted. It is the consequence of a departure from, or a rebellion against, the original order of creation. Humankind’s rebelliousness is identified as having interrupted the orderly progression of creation. This perception of human action as the root of social conflict, combined with great confidence in the remedying potential of the inherent rationality embedded by the original harmonious moment of creation in every member of humankind, empowers humankind on an individual level.

Granted with autonomy, each and every member of the human race can take charge of their own destiny. The individual can act to reverse the unruly liberal rebellion, by absolute submission to a single sovereign. He can put a stop to free-
spirited, havoc-producing forces of particularity, and facilitate the return to the original, single voice of rational authority. Since humankind introduced the imperfection of motion into the world, it is entirely within its capacity to reverse its actions, and restore matters to their original motionless, frictionless state; perfect equilibrium is within humankind’s grasp.

Mark Larrimore captures the contrasting attitudes of Hobbes and Conway in the prefaces to chapters from their respective works that he includes in his collection of texts addressing ‘the problem of evil’. To Conway he attributes, through the influence of the Jewish Kabala, the belief ‘that all creation would eventually achieve salvation, and that suffering was God’s educative punishment…’, trying to demonstrate ‘…that God created a world in which every thing achieves salvation through its own efforts over many incarnations24.’ (Larrimore 2003: 174). Compare with his portrayal of the Hobbesean position in which the volatility (in ‘socio-physical’ terms constant motion) of social conduct, calls for ‘the establishment of states whose sovereigns have virtually unlimited power to set the terms for the lives of their citizens.’ (Larrimore 2003: 149). Indeed from the Hobbesean perspective, motion, far from nearing us to perfection, distances us from it. Motion is not an act of creation, it is an act against creation. Consider that the Hobbesean sense of motion is contrasted, both in physics and in politics, with rest or peace. In order to promote peace one is required to curtail motion. In a noncorporeal existence peace is availed

24 See also Peter Loptson: ‘Her [Conway] idea [of essence] is that we can conceive of an individual substance, whatever its biological or chemical classification, gradually undergoing transformation or metamorphosis, like a caterpillar turning into a moth – yet remaining the same individual.’ (Loptson The Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy 1982: 47)
strictly by rational argument (i.e. the laws of nature), but in the corporeal world, peace requires the application of force as well (i.e. the ruler’s sword).

Still, Hobbes does share with Conway the idea of a conceptual fusion between God and perfection on the basis of a common immutability to time and therefore to change (Conway in Loptson 1982: 155). Both also hold strongly that motion or change defines materiality. Thereby confronting both with the difficulty of marrying the stationary creator with its perpetually in motion creation. For Conway only the creator has the capacity to create and therefore motion must be the handiwork of creation. Moreover, anticipating Leibniz, creation is not regarded as a singular event, but rather a continual occurrence. In line with the vitalist tradition and again in anticipation of Leibniz (Loptson 1982), creation keeps feeding motion into corporeal existence thereby rendering it perpetually in motion. Furthermore, as the handiwork of creation this motion must be an instrument towards the perfection for which the creator stands. We are therefore left to ‘ride’ the wave of motion, utilising it to steer ourselves towards perfection. The description and the prescription, the real and the ideational, are one and the same in her thinking. They converge into what Leibniz would later coin as ‘the best of possible worlds’.

The Hobbesean perspective rejects these last few inferences. On the reading proposed here, while its description is positivist, its prescription is reactionary. It denies that the ever-changing instability of the perceived world, could represent the best of possible worlds. Not only is the misery in it too prevailing, but humankind’s corporeal existence is pervasive with the imperfection of inconsistency. Conway and
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Hobbes like the biblical Job are both in awe of the creator, but Conway accepts creation as continually self-generating the potential betterment of humankind through the instrument of motion and change, whereas Hobbes rejects the continuity of creation and thereby also the positive implications attached to motion and change. For Hobbes creation is a ‘once and for all’ perfect event\textsuperscript{26}, any change in it could therefore only be a turn for the worst.

The hint of Stoicism in this interpretation of the Hobbesian position is fortified by considering Conway as responding to the Stoic position, and by extension to the Stoic in Hobbes\textsuperscript{27}. Consider that Conway’s position has a Humean\textsuperscript{28} or Smithian air to it. Like Adam Smith (Packham 2002: 477) she borrows from Vitalism (Loptson 1982) in order to form an alternative to the Stoic formulation of the relation between the particle and the whole. If the suggested parallel is indeed sustainable, she is conducting her own version of the Smithian challenge to the Stoic assertion that one needs to accept one’s place as ‘an atom, a particle in an immense infinite system, which must and ought to be disposed of, according the conveniency of the whole’ (Smith in Packham 2002: 477). For Hobbes, even more so than for the

\textsuperscript{25} It is perhaps the projection of her own conjecture as to the relation between the real and the ideal onto Hobbes, which leads her to consider him a materialist essentialist and moral subjectivist.

\textsuperscript{26} Note that it is probable that God’s ‘once and for all’ act of Creation, serves as a model for the ‘once and for all’ endorsement of the State in Hobbes’s version of the social contract. Once order has been established, it may never again be questioned.

\textsuperscript{27} For a detailed account of the resemblance between the Neostoicism popularised by the Flemish philologist Justus Lipsius and Hobbes’s social, political and theological ideas see (Burchell \textit{The Disciplined Citizen: Thomas Hobbes, Neostoicism and the Critique of Classical Citizenship} 1999). Moreover Burchell notes that ‘John Bramhall, the Bishop of Derry, repeatedly identified Hobbes’s arguments for “destiny” or necessity with those of classical Stoics like Seneca and Zeno, but more particularly with Lipsius and Neostoicism.’ (Burchell \textit{The Disciplined Citizen: Thomas Hobbes, Neostoicism and the Critique of Classical Citizenship} 1999: 521)

\textsuperscript{28} Peter Loptson repeatedly draws attention to the similarity between Conway and Hume, in their ethics as well as their metaphysical stances. He even goes so far as to say that had Hume had a philosophy of substance and essence, he would have adopted hers. (Loptson \textit{The Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy} 1982: 47)
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Stoic, the atoms must be fused back together. A fusion into singular perfection, in which motion has ceased and by extension time has stopped.

The realisation attributed here to Hobbes of the troubling implication the atomist stance has for political interaction, is eloquently reiterated in the concern voiced by his ‘would-be disciple’ (Battigelli 1998: 63), Margaret Cavendish29:

for if Every and Each Atome were of a Living Substan ce, and had Equal Power, Life and Knowledge, and Consequently, a Free-will and Liberty, and so Each and Every one were as Absolute as an other, they would hardly Agree in one Government, and as unlikely as Several Kings would Agree in one Kingdom, or rather as Men, if every one should have an Equal Power, would make a Good Government; and if it should Rest upon Consent and Agreement, like Human Governments, there would be as many Alterations and Confusions of Worlds, as in Human States and Governments. (Battigelli 1998: 62)

Accordingly, I would argue that the ruler that Hobbes seeks is an instrument for the provision of a motionless timeless existence, lest we find ourselves spiralling by the force of motion into more and more social friction.

29 Anna Battigelli recounts a bemusing account by Margaret Cavendish herself, of how Hobbes, of whom her husband was not only a patron but an academic discussant, shunned her invitation to dinner, despite her own extensive interest in his writings. Battigelli comments that Hobbes kept Cavendish at a comfortable distance ‘despite and even because of her active interest in his philosophy’ (Battigelli Margaret Cavendish and the exiles of the mind 1998: 65) Although well aware of ‘some striking similarities between Hobbes’s and Cavendish’s views’ (Boyle Fame, Virtue, and Government: Margaret Cavendish on Ethics and Politics 2006: 256), Deborah Boyle identifies an original contribution to ethics and politics in Cavendish’s work that differentiates her from Hobbes (Boyle Fame, Virtue, and Government: Margaret Cavendish on Ethics and Politics 2006: 259). For Boyle what distinguishes Cavendish from Hobbes is the motivation for the pursuit of public order. Boyle states that Hobbes relies on an innate desire for self-preservation, whereas Cavendish builds upon an inwrought ambition for fame. Yet in so demarcating the two, Boyle is assuming the simplified, admittedly somewhat justified reading of Hobbes as concerned primarily, if not solely, with corporal preservation. My own employment of Cavendish is as a ‘Hobbes interpreter’, who by reiterating Hobbes in her own style often offers an extra lucidity to his arguments. Moreover, as shall become apparent in what follows, I contend that the ‘future outlook’ approach that Hobbes’s
It might be helpful to think of the Hobbesean ruler as physically restraining a group of free-roaming individual madmen, or to use his own term ‘fooles’. For only such a ‘restraining jacket’ can provide them with the peace of mind necessary to regain the rational orderliness that is embedded in all creation by definition. Contrary to the conventional visualisation of the sovereign poised at the centre and circled by increasingly distant rings of subjects, over which she would have perhaps less control; the Hobbesean sovereign is here understood as encircling her subjects, holding them with equal power to their constant positions. She defends them from interfering with each other, by directing their every move. Their interpersonal wellbeing is guaranteed, if they relinquish their individuality and allow her to define them.

rationality wishes to teach the ‘foole’, relies on instilling in the latter a posterity motivation similar to Cavendish’s fame.
Chapter 3. Hobbes: A Holistic Interpretation

This chapter develops the idea introduced in the previous chapter that Hobbes is guided by a monotheistic metaphysical conception that stipulates adherence to one God, one truth and one order. It demonstrates that his metaphysical and political positions represent an attempt to piece together a holistic stance that revolves around a notion of the ultimate singularity of Truth. It is argued that the objective of his system of thought is to achieve the unison of the arts that will render all physical and social interaction scientifically predictable and thus restore the world to the perfect order of its moment of creation. Once the re-engineering of our existence is complete, once perfect order is restored, we will enter a state of perfect equilibrium, one of rest and peace.

Building upon the comparison of Hobbes and Conway in the previous chapter, the first section demonstrates the connection between physical and political equilibrium and the idea of creation by a perfect being. It goes on to model the equilibrium that Hobbes is striving for, relating it to the idea of the creation of humankind in the image of a perfect being. Finally, it claims that Hobbes, perhaps unintentionally, ultimately elevates humankind to the rank of the creator.

The second section argues that although Hobbes seemingly empowers the individual, he is wrongly understood to be supporting individualism. It is maintained that individualism is a subject matter that he studies, but does not endorse. It is not his political prescription, it is a descriptive effort ultimately aimed at restoring a condition of original unity that has degenerated into fragmentation. Hobbes is
understood as borrowing the rationalist method of Descartes, for whom, in Friedrech Hayek’s interpretation, individualism is a means to achieving a liberating unity, but not an end in itself.

The third section argues against the notion that Hobbes was a modernist thinker whose defence of rationalism is a revolutionary departure from earlier political thought. Building upon the previous two sections, it is claimed that his conception of rationalism fits the model of achieving equilibrium by echoing the perfection of creation, and thus challenges the idea that rationality is an expression of human autonomy. Instead, it advances that rationality is understood by Hobbes as being an act of following God.

The fourth section pursues the connection between rationality and following God. It asserts that the interconnectedness of his ideas of physical and political equilibrium with his theological perception of redemption, lead him to advance the ‘interdisciplinary’ pursuit of the Truth. The key to the realisation of the Truth is uncovering the rational element in these practices. Once the rational elements are extracted and fitted together, like the pieces of a puzzle-board, the puzzle of creation will have been solved; it will be complete and final.

Building upon the fourth section, the fifth section represents Hobbes’s realisation that the thread that connects the disciplines, the basis for rationality, is the word of God as expressed in media accessible to humankind, namely scripture and nature. Consequently, Hobbes understands the placement of the words in the ‘correct order’ as key to the realisation of the Truth. This maintains the recurring theme of
reassembling existence into its original format, as it was prior to its fall into the rule of chaos.

The sixth section considers the material aspect of the mental process of unification that is sketched out in the previous sections. It identifies a dissonance between the mental convergence into rational unity and the corporeal reality of diversity. It argues that the emulation of the incorporeal that Hobbes prescribes slips into an illusionary belief in the ability of inherently corporeal beings to live out a virtual state of incorporeality.

3.1 Perfect Equilibrium – The Russian Doll model of order

I would argue that the political equilibrium that Hobbes is striving for is intrinsically connected to Hobbes’s physical perception of equilibrium, namely that as long as no force is exerted upon a body it remains at rest. Recall that in the final section of the previous chapter I argued that contrary to Conway, Hobbes views autonomous motion as an act against the bliss of creation. The fragmentation of agency has a negative influence on the interaction between bodies, namely loss of productive efficiency due to the apprehension of unforeseeable actions by other autonomous agents. Uncontrolled change, or motion, produces an unsettling instability.

Politically, unless undue force is applied, society will potentially remain at a state of peace. Empirical observation leads Hobbes to the conclusion that humankind has lost its natural balance, but fortunately not its predisposition towards order,
namely its rationality. Peace can therefore be rekindled by artificially regenerating a
state in which unwarranted force ceases to interfere with the human inclination
towards rational conduct. We should be able to restore stability to social conduct by
activating the dormant rationality within, thereon remaining in equilibrium; we
interfere with no one and no one interferes with us, we are at mechanical rest – at
peace with each other.

However, empirical evidence suggests to Hobbes that having been disrupted
by individual autonomy, orderliness in humankind can no longer sustain itself. Once
each component of society acts with a mind of its own, the unpredictability of inter-
individual relations produces a debilitating social anxiety. The restoration of
confidence in orderliness requires a champion of the original overarching rationality.
Our submission to her sovereignty strips us of our ‘right to motion’ of our own
accord. Relieved of our autonomy we are transformed into mechanical puppets. We
become for all goods and purposes, the ‘living dead’, reprogrammable zombies.
Recall Conway’s assertion that ‘...Time is nothing else but the successive Motion or
Operation of Creatures; which motion or Operation, if it should cease, Time would
also cease, and the Creatures themselves would cease with Time:’ (p. 49). If, as I
argue in the final section of the previous chapter, Hobbes and Conway share a sense
of time and motion, it follows that in the motionless state constructed by the
Hobbesean ruler, time would cease and with it the creatures themselves.

Bringing death into life, so to speak, may actually assist Hobbes in resisting
theological arguments asserting that the betterment or salvation of humankind could
only occur after death. In the pre-treatment sovereign-absent stage, the rationality-
deficient state of nature, man is as Oakeshott asserts ‘a complex of powers…life the
unremitting exercise of power, and death the absolute loss of power.’ Yet the civil order is not, as he argues, ‘a coherence of powers’ (Oakeshott 1975: 19), rather it is the complete surrender of power. Subjects are compelled to check into the sovereign’s ‘rehab clinic’ and undergo drastic treatment, due to the debilitating social apprehension from which they suffer. Accordingly, they agree to allow the ruler complete access and control over their person. It is in this uninhibited, putty-like, state of mind that they are reintroduced to the rules that allow for the restoration of the frictionless, motionless existence they came to lose. The entire re-education process is held within an artificial sanctuary, a reservation in which motionlessness order prevails and can therefore thrive – the State.

Hobbes does not only portray the absence of a State as a grim condition of chaos, but also as an expression of foolishness. The volatility of the state of nature and its sporadic coalitions motivate the Hobbesian rational individual to seek a more permanent haven. The Hobbesian ‘foole’ is introduced as one who ‘hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 101 Leviathan Ch. XV), wishing to convey the notion that the foole cannot conceive a state which would dispense justice. The Hobbesian foole has a ‘reasoning disability’: he is incapable of ‘reckoning’, calculating his actions in relation to the actions of others, far enough into the future to realise the benefits he may individually reap from conducting himself in a social manner. His inability to elevate himself beyond current events and practices drives him to deny the long-term benefits of an orderly State. By doing so he is in fact denying the personification of justice.

The Hobbesian attempt to rationalise justice is further highlighted by identifying the substitutions Hobbes chose to make while paraphrasing the original
biblical text: ‘the scoundrel/wicked said in his heart, there is no God’\textsuperscript{30}. Hobbes replaces God by justice and the original ethical term ‘scoundrel’ by the foole. The implications of this parallel, I would argue, are far-reaching. Hobbes attempts to reconcile faith and reason by portraying them as analogous efforts. Both are understood as rule-following enterprises that must ultimately converge on a ‘one and only’ truly viable order. They are not posited as factions that compete for the title of the Truth, but rather as its two champions. Reaching an uninterrupted, unchallenged order, ‘The Truth’ depends on the integration of these two knowledge-seeking enterprises.

The resolution of the potential conflict, as offered by Hobbes, is that underlying these activities is a single method instilled in existence by creation. The structure of existence that I interpret Hobbes to be suggesting, resembles in its construction the layered manufacture of a ‘Russian Doll’ toy. The classic Russian Doll, known also as nested doll or stacking doll, is a collection of hollow figurines crafted with precision as incrementally larger sized replications of an original solid doll that is nested at the core. Due to the precision with which the doll-layers are made to mimic one another’s features, albeit increasing in size, the multiplicity of layers stack together to form a singular unity. Similarly, in the proposed model of creation the harmony of nature or coexistence without friction, is sustained since each layer of ‘creation’ has been fashioned to echo its predecessor; stretching back to the original mould of creation - authentic God. By extension a social state of peaceful coexistence is to be achieved by submission to an artificial order that emulates a

\textsuperscript{30} Psalms, 53, 2.
natural one that has unfortunately been lost. For social order to function, i.e. to remove friction from social interaction, each social layer needs to echo a preceding layer. An ordered society is one whose components echo the original source of order.

In the corporeal existence of humankind, the reverence with which God is held as the original source of creation needs to be transposed on to a reverence with which the State is regarded, and more particularly on to the reverence of the ruler. Indeed, I maintain that Hobbes conceptually fuses God with rationality and stability, and utilises the constructed corporeal medium of the State, in an attempt to infuse all three into the ailing society he perceives. The method of infusion and the objective of said infusion are one and the same, echoing the rules. A society in which all follow the rules is one of complete subordination. It is an existence in which permanent order prevails, thereby relieving its inhabitants from concerns about what the future might hold.

I would argue that the level of security that Hobbes promises requires the complete dislodgment of humankind from its corporeality and the uncertainty that goes with it. Admittedly, by placing governance into the hands of a corporeal sovereign, Hobbes acknowledges the barrier to direct Godly rule and seemingly reinforces the division between the corporeal and the incorporeal. However, he also realises that the indisputability of rule to which he strives is that of a perfect order, a Godly one. Anything short of perfection risks receding into the anxiety of indeterminate social conduct, igniting a cycle of distrust. He therefore proposes to overcome the difficulty in synthesising the corporeal and incorporeal by picking up on the echo of the original order and reproducing it. A chain of imitation is
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established, the sovereign mimics God and the public mimics the sovereign, thus vicariously the public follows God.

Yet the Godlikeness which Hobbes aspires to achieve by means of the Russian Doll model, soon slips from ‘emulation of God’, which regards God as a role model, to assuming the position of ‘native God’; in other words it elevates humankind to the rank of God. From frail foolish beings who are incapable of managing their interaction with each other, it is presumed we undergo a transformation into perfect rational citizens. Thus Hobbes tries to improve upon the sorry human condition in the state of nature by ‘surgically removing’ the source of the problem, namely the psychologically debilitating effects of corporeality. Challenging this position, it will here be argued that even if it were possible to lose one’s corporeality through a process of rationalisation, the advantage of a frictionless existence comes at the cost of individual particularity: being at one with the Godly comes at the expense of purging what defines us as particular selves.

3.2 Hobbesean rationality as hostile to individualism

Both J.W.N. Watkins (Watkins 1965: 71-72) and Gregory Kavka cite a passage from the English translation of De Cive (Philosophical Rudiments), from which they derive conclusions as to Hobbes’s dissection-based scientific method as well as his attitude towards individualism.

For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter figure, and motion of the wheels insunder and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take them
insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they were dissolved, that is, that we rightly understand what the quality of human nature is,…and how men must be agreed among themselves that intend to grow up into a well-grounded state. (Kavka 1986: 83).

Watkins suggests that the adoption of the dissection method implies empowering the lowest level of deconstruction as the source of the construction itself, which in the political context he translates into the liberal empowerment of the individual level (Watkins 1965). By contrast, Kavka concludes that the primary function of the proposed dissection method is to determine ‘what the proper function of the State is, what undesirable conditions or features of the state of nature it serves to ameliorate’ (Kavka 1986: 83).

I wish to lend support to Kavka’s position, arguably pushing it further than he had intended. The argument being defended here is that Hobbes disassembles society into individuals, merely in order to reconstruct them in ‘the correct’ order. He sets out to solve the puzzle of reconstructing them into a single coherent rational body. It is argued against Watkins’s assertion that dissection only implies reductionism, if the outer layers of the dissected ‘onion’ are sheltering an explanatory primary component that is found at its core. The liberal conclusion is only warranted if one considers dissection as a process of peeling away distracting layers in order to reveal an essentiality.

In order to assist in conveying an alternative function of dissection in Hobbesian theory, I propose to re-label it ‘decomposition’. This new label insinuates that the primary matter, the prevalent individualism that Hobbes observes empirically, is the result of a ‘rotting process’. Contrary to Watkins’s suggestion, it is
here maintained that Hobbes does not employ dissection as a means towards understanding the primary building blocks that generate reality. Rather, he is studying the ultimate product of decomposition (i.e. the individual) as a means towards the end of understanding the process that is eating away at a harmonious productive society, to the extent of threatening its very existence. He is observing the phenomena of social matter (i.e. society) disintegrating into anti-social matter (i.e. the individual), in order to prescribe measures for halting the debilitating effect of the fragmentation process. The antidote he consequently devises against the encroachment of the malignant process is the application of rationality to counter what he perceives is an increasing distance between individual action and rational conduct. Individuation within Hobbesean theory is thus no more than a reflection of a chosen scientific method. It has no intrinsic value whatsoever. It is an ‘as if’ postulation for the perfection of a collective ‘well-grounded state’; no more than a ‘ladder’ en route to rational liberty, to be discarded as soon as the objective is achieved.

I would argue that Hobbes’s individualism falls under what Friedrich Hayek terms ‘pseudo-individualism’ (Hayek 1949: Ch. 1 'Individualism: True and False'). For Hayek proper individualism is founded on a process of constant questioning, similar to Karl Popper’s idea of scientific method (Popper 2002: ch. 1). It pronounces eternal doubt as the means by which the end of individualism is to be achieved. By contrast, pseudo-individualism relies on individualism as a reactionary measure that aims to dethrone traditional authoritarianism (i.e. religion and monarchy) in the name of a rational and revolutionary commonly shared authority. It is held that liberty
consists in the collective eradication of irrational conduct, and that liberation is to be advanced by the most effective of means.

For the pseudo-individualist therefore, individualism is not an end in itself, it is merely a means towards the end of an unbound liberty, which is to be achieved through the rationalisation of individuals. This position is taken, albeit to a differing degree, by such authors as Rousseau, Mill and Marx; or as Hayek would put it they ‘…are all manifestations of the same basic view which wants all social activity to be recognisably part of a single coherent plan. They are the results of the same rationalistic “individualism” which wants to see in everything the product of conscious individual reason.’ (Hayek 1949: 25).

For the purpose of illustration, consider the tale of the metaphorical banishment of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. On a true individualist interpretation Adam and Eve could no longer be contained in the safe certainty of the Garden of Eden because they bit into the fruit of self-awareness and individual doubt. They went through a process of irreversible fragmentation into individuals. Consequently they find themselves split between the awareness of their actual physical individuation and its mental corollary that was previously joined with God, seamlessly interlinked into a monistic generality. The difficulty of coming to terms with the emerging tension not withstanding, it is acknowledged by adherents of the Smitho-Humean school of thought, of which Hayek is representative, as an irresolvable dissonance. By contrast, on the rationalistic individualist Cartesian school, a remedy to the predicament is within Adam and Eve’s grasp. By biting into
the forbidden fruit, they attained a measure of Godly rational certainty, thereby unlocking the gates of naivety that held them. Adam and Eve lost their childlikeness forever, they were no longer seamlessly interlinked into a monistic generality, yet it is proposed by Hobbes that this generality could be recaptured by cultivating their rationality. They might rejoin the ‘great link’ of perfect harmony, artificially rebuilding the original unity by applying rationality. In doing so they would dissolve the tension brought about by physical corporeality, they would cure themselves completely of the evils of fragmentation.

It is the hubris of this rationalist approach, the assumption that perfection is attainable through the flexing of our faculties, which threatens Hayek’s sense of individuality. The idea of perfection, a perfect equilibrium, would leave no scope for contention, no room for competition, no space for alternative individual positions. It would be a world, as stagnant and dead as it is complete - an inhuman motionless void; the definitive aspect of Humanity, the capacity to rebel, having been quashed. By contrast, an aversion to the tendency towards dissent seems to have served as the impetus for the Hobbesian enterprise. Although Hayek makes no reference to Hobbes in the entire ‘Individualism: True or False’ chapter, and reflects mostly on a Rousseau-Kantian authoritarian tradition, I am inclined to agree with Norman Barry that it is just as much an indictment of Hobbes:

31 While this may or may not be theologically plausible, I am deliberately choosing to interpret the banishment of Adam and Eve as a metaphorical banishment rather than a physical one.
32 That equilibrium contradicts the epistemological boundaries set by Hayek, is well demonstrated by Chandran Kukathas in his discussion of the role of competition in Hayek’s theory: ‘...Hayek was attempting to draw economists away from their tendency to characterise the competitive order as an equilibrium state, arguing that because equilibrium “presupposes that the facts have already all been discovered and competition therefore ceased”’ (NS 184), such a concept was of limited theoretical use.’ (Kukathas Hayek and Modern Liberalism 1989: 96)
The 'rationalism' to which the theory of spontaneous order is in intellectual opposition precedes the Enlightenment and perhaps is most starkly expressed in seventeenth-century natural law doctrines. In Thomas Hobbes' model of society, for example, a simple 'natural' reason is deemed to be capable of constructing those rules which are universally appropriate for order and continuity. (Barry 1982: 3 electronic version).\textsuperscript{33}

And if it is, then Hobbes is neither the sceptic nor the proponent of individualism that some (Oakeshott 1975: 60-62) have deemed him.

3.3 The Renaissance of Order

Elevating ourselves from the darkness of a disordered human condition, to an enlightened Godly conduct is a process that bears some of the marks of a revolutionary act. However, it is probably best thought of as a renaissance: a realisation of the dormant Godliness within. The Hobbesian aspiration for progress is a counter measure to the regression of humankind. It is a yearning for the recapture of past glory. With such an approach, forming a forward-looking perspective is intrinsically connected not only with rediscovering the past, but with reviving it, and literally reliving it, re-entering an infinite loop in which the predictability of the familiar fosters security.
Contrary to Arrigo Pacchi’s contention that ‘… Hobbes’ state of nature had no biblical connotation whatever [whatsoever]: no God governed it, not even in that original and individually savage state’ and that ‘Hobbes mentioned Creation and the Fall of man purely in a casual manner’ (Pacchi 1988: 234), I argue that, far from being casually mentioned, these form the backbone of Hobbesean theory. On the reading proposed here the state of nature is precisely man’s and not God’s. It is therefore no wonder that it is not governed by God. By contrast, the original state of nature, God’s created one, is explicitly described by Hobbes in *Leviathan*:

And first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandment of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden everlasting. For there was the Tree of Life; whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil; which was not allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise… (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 307 *Leviathan* Ch.XXXVIII).

I therefore contend that the entirety of the Hobbesean enterprise should be conceived as an anticipation of John Milton's famous titles *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, answering 'the fall' by proclaiming that the State can 'catch' us in a reclaimed corporeal Eden, a realm of artificially induced consistency modelled on a long lost natural consistency, in which the original naive trust can be rekindled. It is a response to Garrath Williams’s observation that:

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33 Barry reinforces this contention by positing Sir Matthew Hale’s reply to Hobbes *Dialogue of Common Laws*, as an argument against rationalism in the tradition of Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, and in the present day, Friedrich Hayek. (Barry *The Tradition of Spontaneous Order* 1982: 6)
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It is part of our fallen condition that no transcendent authority speaks to us alike; we can and must decide on the meaning of our own acts and lives. (Williams 2000: 309).

The stance taken here is much in line with the position Pacchi attributes to Klaus Michael Kodalle:

Seen in this light, the painful march of humankind from the natural state to the social contract is interpreted as a movement of reconciliation of man with God after the sin of Adam, the restoration of an alliance which evolved gradually through a succession of covenants – Abraham, Moses the coming of Christ – culminating in the eschatological vision of the final establishment of the Reign of God on Earth. (Pacchi 1988: 236).

Pacchi himself shrugs off Kodalle’s proposition, citing Hobbes’s ‘effort to keep religious tradition and theology at bay never letting them gain control’. It is my intention to refute Pacchi not so much on textual exegesis grounds, nor by means of Kodalle’s ‘theology of history’, rather, I mean to do so on grounds of coherence, claiming that on the whole a renaissance Hobbesian position self-integrates better than a modernist one.

From Hobbes’s perspective, the understanding of the shape that society must take so as to recapture the original order is to be sought in the accessible traces of the order of creation: namely, the words of scripture and the rules pronounced therein. The words of God are a scaled replica of their origin. If we abide by the rules dictated by the words, we become a link in the Godly order. Moreover, we become a scaled-down replication of it ourselves. By linking up with our origin we consolidate
ourselves into a society. Having followed the Russian Doll model, we achieve a synchronised harmony. Note that the method and the objective of the enterprise are one and the same: the establishment of a faith in rules.

Jumpstarting this circular, law-abiding eternal loop, out of which we were ejected by the ‘incident’ of original sin, requires a leap of faith. But since distrust now prevails, a resurrection of law and order requires the assistance of a surrogate that will reinstate the long lost link with natural order. The Hobbesian ruler is fashioned to function as an artificial substitute for this missing link. We follow the ruler and the ruler follows God, so by proxy we follow God, and order is restored to the world. Once we have re-established the link it would be foolish to fiddle with it, along the lines of: ‘if it ain’t broke don’t fix it’. The assumption is that the only viable orderly society is a Godly one that establishes itself in the Truth. As Hobbes indicates in *Leviathan* other forms of order only masquerade as the Truth:

> men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so. (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 48 Leviathan Ch. VII).

The lack of viability of competing forms of pseudo-orderly societies is due to their inability to ‘deliver the goods’ of perfect equilibrium. Their instability pronounces them untrustworthy and therefore ill-fit for restoring faith among the socially disillusioned.
The rationality that the Hobbesian State introduces into the lives of the fragmented individuals should be familiar to them both in content and in method of administration. It is no more than a reproduction of the original order embedded in them by the creator. It is reborn as a replica of the original master mould; the method, employed in order to school the subjects in it, equally follows a replication model. They take their place in a chain of emulations of order: the ruler emulates the order as set by the creator, and the subjects emulate the order as set by the ruler, consequently achieving a conduct matching that of original creation. In this respect rather than being a break with tradition, the Hobbesian position adopts the scholastic method of education by apprenticeship. It is a practice that lives on in contemporary schooling, at least in the plastic arts, in which as part of their training students literally reproduce masterpieces. It is also a tradition that is supported by the original creative act, as described in scripture, in which Man is created in ‘God’s image’ or in other words as a scaled down replica of God. Indeed if all of creation were to organise itself in a chain of emulation that reached back to God, our puzzle would be solved and the original harmony of creation would reign again.

Hobbesian empirical observation of humankind reveals that the original harmonic order was disrupted. Explanation for the disruption is identified analytically by tracing the phenomena of insubordination and the associated fragmentation effect back to its original occurrence, namely, the dispersal of Edenic human collectivity, symbolised in the shift from the singular appearance of only one Adam and subsequently only one Eve, into a plurality of individuated human beings. This plurality of human beings places a wedge between it and the singularity of God that threatens to place the world in a state of disorder, due to a lack of common
ground between the fragmented individuals. The conventional answer to this difficulty, under the title ‘divine right theory’, was to establish a privileged lineage that connected a sovereign to ancient father figures, working back to direct knowledge of the original order. Averse to the demonstrability of divine lineage, Hobbes is charged with providing an alternative route to the original common ground.

The mission taken up by Hobbes is to prevent the unwelcome outcome of individuation, namely anarchy. The ambition is to overcome the barrier between the necessary singularity of common rule and the effective plurality of fragmented individuals: ‘But one and the first which disposeth the to sedition, is this, that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man.’ (Hobbes 1998 (1656, 1642): 244 De Cive, XII, 1). The instrument for achieving the objective of reintegration is the ruler. The method applied is that of replication: more specifically the artificial recreation of a worthy, master-like corporeal figure, who acts as a surrogate source of the original lost order. It is an attempt to mend a broken society that has lost touch with the original order, by cloning it in the image of a model with proven credentials. Much like a broken vase, humanity has been reduced to fragments and rendered dysfunctional. Since the fragments can no longer hold themselves together, and since God’s “hands” cannot be soiled in corporeality, the sovereign’s hands must actively hold the pieces together. In other words, the sovereign is acting for God.

The role is essentially one of a coordinator that holds her subjects in their place vis-à-vis each other, and in as far as she is merely a conduction vessel for the Godly to enter this world, she is not strictly speaking ‘running the show’. That is not
to say that ‘the show’ runs itself or self-replicates. The sought after coordination is not that of Adam Smith or David Hume which is achieved by means of a correlating ‘invisible hand’ that relies on the exchange of signals between individuals. The sovereign does not teach the individuals to properly communicate with each other, nor does she provide them with a method to recognise each other’s signals. Such efforts would be futile since direct communication would only reiterate their irreconcilable differences. Instead, she offers them a role model to fashion themselves after – herself.

The subjects are entirely alienated from each other, acting only in accordance with prescribed standardised guidelines. If they all follow the sovereign’s order to the letter, they will become synchronised into unison. Moreover, she herself is compelled to reaffirm her role model status by practicing what she preaches. In her corollary relation with God she too works within the strict guidelines that she subsequently projects upon her own prescriptions. The trickling down of rationality follows a living Russian Doll model. Yet, unlike the solid version in which each doll is prefabricated to fit perfectly into its larger facsimile, in the living version the perfect match between the components requires that every level shape itself in the image of the previous level, forming a chain of replications that goes back to the original master copy.

For further clarification consider the difference suggested by David Lewis between endurance and perdurance (Conn 2003: 95). Endurance is persistence through time in a complete form. In each and every time frame nothing is lost and nothing is gained. The object persists through time as a replication of itself; its
facsimile keeps surfacing again and again. The source of its recurrence is either something inherent to it, or is achieved by an external ‘fax-machine’ that keeps recreating it. In certain accounts such an external source would be named God. By contrast, perdurance is persistence that is stretched through a set of time frames, just as a road would stretch spatially. It allows for both losses and gains to the object, thereby drawing the essence of its existence from a deeper layer of existence or from an exterior source; again perhaps God. The Hobbesian God would appear to be a replicating one of the former type. Replication embodies rationality for Hobbes, as it achieves a permanent order of things. The sovereign is an artificial replication of God. She is charged with replicating our lives, thereby generating a sense of familiarity that brews security. We, in turn, are expected to take part in the interlinked replication process by replicating the method of replication, i.e. employing rationality in our consideration of the reign of the sovereign. Breaking the chain of replication would therefore be both irrational and unGodly.

Although something of the traditional hierarchy between God, Sovereign and individual survives; in Hobbes’s version, the flock are Godly creatures, and as such are order-aspiring. It is this aspiration for order that legitimates the sovereign as its provider. In sufficiently large groups, due to sparse interaction, natural replication of order becomes unviable. If we rarely meet naturally, we might need to meet artificially. It is such artificial mediation that is provided by the sovereign. The

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34 Recall that the scriptures speak of Man being made in God’s image.
35 Note that the replication analogy would also assist Hobbes in contending with the difficulty of a potential conflict between the ruler’s bidding and God’s bidding, which he recognises in chapter XLII of Leviathan (Hobbes Leviathan 1991 (1651): 388).
36 I believe so called ‘netizens’ (Hurwitz Who Needs Politics? Who Needs People? The Ironies of Democracy in Cyberspace 1999: 655) have taken this idea to its extreme, claiming that the ease and frequency of virtual interaction could replace sovereignty altogether.
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State is a rational node\textsuperscript{37}, an artificial mechanism that duplicates a process at the macro level, with which we are intimately familiar, that occurs naturally at the micro level of the family or the village. Once again we are merely expected to reacquaint ourselves with an inwrought order; to re-establish contact with the root of our creation.

3.4 The Edenic prototype – Reestablishing the peaceful kingdom of God

Following the Church Fathers, the Hobbesean text observes in scripture the description of an original sin-related ‘fall’, from the pinnacle of an innocent, seamlessly peaceful social unison in the Garden of Eden, to the dire straits of individuated social hostility. For Hobbes, contrary to the pessimism often associated with his approach (Williams 2000: 312), hope is not, however, lost. Humankind can still hope to redeem itself, not only in death, but in life. The evidence for this is to be found in the biblical account of the rise of the ancient Hebraic society. Again, in accordance with the Russian Doll model, Hobbes views the replication of the course of law-abiding society charted in scripture as the medium for re-unification with the one and only sustainable order. Life need not be wasted in a miserable solitary wait for reunification in death, meanwhile breeding superstitious worldly beliefs. Instead, union can be achieved here and now by employing the instrument of reason to clone the original position, picking up the pieces of the human condition, the human state of nature, and rationally working out the puzzle for putting them back together in just

\textsuperscript{37} A central intersection of information exchange.
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the right order to reform the *Godly* state of nature: an order of perfect equilibrium that, if achieved, will have an indefinite hold.

The Hobbesian rational engagement with worldly matters, as opposed to superstitious (or perhaps more precisely awe-struck) attitudes that riddled pre-Hobbesian Christian theology, amounts according to David Johnston, to no less than a ‘transformation of the human psyche that would prepare men and women to be assembled….into a truly lasting political community.’ (Johnston 1986: 130). This divergence from the orthodox Christian thinking of his contemporaries may be related to Hobbes’s adoption of the Mortalist or ‘soul sleeping’ heresy (See ref. 2 in Maclear 1981: 75), (Pocock 1972: 175). I believe Maclear correctly traces these differences within the Christian faithful38 to the ‘...tension between the Hellenic concept of psychic immortality and the Hebraic emphasis on the Last Judgment…’ (Maclear 1981: 78). In the former, ‘the waiting’ is an attribute of corporeal life, with death pronouncing the end to the queue and the transmutation into a sublime psychic form that spends eternity either in heaven or in hell. In the latter, death has no liberating connotations, on the contrary, in death one is cocooned in a ‘soul sleeping’ state of limbo, awaiting the final judgment. Arguably as Hobbes immerses himself more and more in the old-testament, his political theory becomes encumbered with Hebraic theology (Pocock 1972: 193-194, 200), which by obscuring discussion of the afterlife, forces one to focus on life here and now. Moreover, its “afterlife” is a resurrection of the material world of the form depicted in the biblical ‘dry bones

38 As Maclear disapprovingly states: ‘apparently to most modern students denial of immortality belongs properly in a secular materialist, or rationalist context, and its appearance in the intensely religious atmosphere of the Antinomian struggle is inappropriate.’ (Maclear *Anne Hutchinson and the Mortalist Heresy* 1981: 76)
vision’ of Ezekiel (Ezek. 37:1-14), not the nullification and replacement of it with an immaterial one.

One cannot overstate the importance that the de-glorification of death has to the Hobbesean project\(^{39}\). Still, the proposition that death is the greatest of all evils is a postulation that draws on little more than intuition (See also Johnston 1986: 93). Recall however, that theologically, death, like pain and hardship, is itself a repercussion of original sin. The aspiration for a reversal of these calamities implies an ambition for the defiance of death.

But where it is said, in the day that thou eatest thereof, though shalt surely die, it must needs bee meant of his Mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then Eternal life was lost by Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancel that forfeiture was to recover thereby, that Life again. (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 307 Leviathan Ch. XXXVIII).

While death cannot be eradicated, it can be made inconsequential by erecting a political body that will vicariously immortalise its members, the proxy for this immortalisation being a conservative State that is immune to change. Indeed it requires no change, it is just right – it is perfect.

Since the sinful actions of man distanced God from regulating such a State, a mortal ruler is required. Modeled after God, the ruler must be immortal, if not literally, then at least in spirit in the form of a conservative dynasty. The logic behind this move is that what does not change is forever left uninterrupted, even by death. In a world guided by consistent rules, nothing changes and nothing dies. In such a

\(^{39}\) On a side note consider that suicide bombers can be considered irrational, precisely because they have no appreciation of the value of life here and now. For them the corporeal world is merely a gateway to the incorporeal one.
world everything is predictable and therefore nothing is to be feared. Thus having removed death from the equation, one has ‘willy-nilly’ removed irrational fear as well.

The aforementioned division between the afterlife as ‘God's business’ and life (of ‘embodied minds’) as ‘our business’ lends itself to being misconstrued as a move towards secularisation. For example, Fania Oz-Salzberger claims that thinkers like Hobbes and John Selden followed a modern implementation of a Hebraic model that originally ‘achieved the breakthrough of removing civil society from its divine cradle…’, thus paving ‘the way for the secularization of modern European politics.’ (Oz-Salzberger 2002: 6). My contention is that while Hobbesean texts may have been an inspiration for such secularisation in the thought of later thinkers, Hobbesean theory loses much of its robustness without its theological metaphysical grounding. Although one can make a good case for the secularisation of Hobbes (see Moloney 1997), one can equally view this secular analysis as a confusion of the Hobbesean social prognosis with its prescription.

Upon sorting out the two, one appreciates that the Hobbesean acknowledgement of a division between the profane and the holy is not meant as an endorsement, but rather a description of the malady of society, of which individuation is a symptom. Far from advocating individuality, Hobbes seeks to annihilate it by re-establishing the long lost orderly unison that has been preserved in the words of scripture. The proper use of words, their use according to infallible rules of logic, holds the key to an everlasting perfect order of peaceful existence. Once

\[\text{Inaccessible to humans due to their corporealy}\]
such perfection is reached, nothing will be wanting, and the world will have come to a state of rest. There can, however, be only one order that remains in perfect equilibrium – a Godly order. Godliness imposes only one workable peaceful order on the physical world; the same scientific approach that is applied to physics should be successfully applied to politics. Indeed the same rules should apply in all orderly engagements. As Benzion Netanyahu notes

the prevalent opinion [across monotheistic theology of the middle ages, from Maimonides and Al-Ghazali through Averros to Roger Bacon] was that it [scripture] contained not only “wonders of wisdom”, but all the truths concerning all the problems which baffle the human mind. It is only through Revelation, through God’s word to the Hebrew prophets, that man learned what he knew, and it is therefore on the foundations of revealed knowledge that all sciences rest. (Netanyahu 1982: 99).

Nevertheless, this does not entail that reason is superior to revelation. Instead it is suggested that for Hobbes, reason and revelation, both being derivatives of infallible logic, should be regarded as two sides of the same coin. Netanyahu provides an explanation for such a relationship in the context of the theology of the middle ages:

There seemed to be no question, then, that one must look to Holy Writ as the source of all truth. But the question was how to understand or interpret Holy Writ. Here human reason, seemingly suppressed and relegated to secondary importance, began to manifest its strength. Instead of guiding and controlling Reason in accordance with what they found in Scripture, people began to interpret Scripture in accordance with the directives of Reason. (Netanyahu 1982: 100-101).

41 Borrowing a term used by Jean Bethke Elstein (Elshtain Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self 2006)
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It is proposed that where Hobbes diverges from the orthodoxy of the Middle Ages, is not in the role of reason in the interpretation, but in the understanding of the role of sovereign as God’s proxy for the assurance of the reasonable behaviour of each and every individual. It is only the sovereign’s singular unquestioned interpretation that can restore peaceful order to the world. Only if it does not, can we ascertain in retrospect that this particular sovereign was ‘a false messiah’.

The Hobbesian theory of State is therefore not a break with God, nor is it putting God in ‘his place’

rather it is putting humankind ‘in its place’. It does not imply God's redundancy in humankind's world; rather it implies humankind's redundancy in God's domain (Martel 2000: para. 10 & 98). Thus, contrary to the dominant view that Aloysius P. Martinich attests is shared by both atheist and theist interpreters, I contend Hobbesian theory is not attempting to ‘domesticate religion, in order to make sure that it served the interests of civil government’ (Martinich 2005: 176), but that it is domesticating civil government to make sure its serves religion. God and humankind are never regarded as of equal stature, and it therefore makes perfect sense that their relation is not one of reciprocity.

Indeed Hobbes himself (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 97 Leviathan Ch. XIV) makes this exact point, exclaiming that reciprocal relationships are by definition only possible among equals. This leads to his denunciation of such relations, not only with brute beasts, but also with God. Recall his critique of making believe, by means

42 More than one point of equilibrium carries with it the implication of Polytheism.
43 In the sense of limiting his context.
44 As P. Monoley states Samuel Parker argues in A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie (Moloney
Leaving the garden of eden: linguistic and political authority in Thomas Hobbes 1997: 251)
45 This correlates with yet another odd biblical tale – the Tower of Babel. Recall that those engaged in
the construction wished to reach the sky, which could be construed as an attempt to physically
equalise their stature with that of God in the sky.
of a vow, that humans can contract with God. This does not merely rely on the lack of clear indication as to whether God is receptive to the 'offer'. It is not strictly a communication problem, as it might be with the beasts. It is a complete mismatch between humans, who are by definition bound, and God, who is by definition unbound. The bound should not therefore deceive themselves into thinking that by the trickery of vows they can compel that which is unbound. Humankind cannot properly interface with God, moreover it ultimately has nothing to offer God but belief itself\textsuperscript{46}.

Consider my proposal that the Hobbesian objective may have been to protect faith by distancing it from the earthly realm of doubt. The manipulation of souls is recognised as outwith the reach of human knowledge and should therefore remain in the realm of faith, over which only God can preside\textsuperscript{47}. By contrast, earthly matters are of man's doing and therefore within a mortal jurisdiction. I accept P. Moloney's thesis that '…Hobbes comes to realise that the acceptance of his own state-of-nature scenario required a radical reinterpretation of its competitor the Genesis story, a retelling that severed Adam completely from divine knowledge, language and precepts, casting him into the world of an autonomous fabricator of language and law.' (Moloney 1997: 248). However, I reject his claim that this entails parting with the Godly altogether.

\textsuperscript{46} This is a recurrent theme in the old testament, beginning with Cain’s misunderstanding of the essence of offerings to a God that by definition ‘already has everything’, carrying on in interpretations of the story of the binding of Issac as a pronouncement of Abraham’s conviction, as well as in the interpretation of the tragic fate of Iftach’s daughter as the result of Iftach’s vanity rather than his conviction. An echo of which might be found in Hobbes’s own attitude towards vows.

\textsuperscript{47} Thereby denying acts of religious inquisition.
Retelling the story, as demanded by Moloney, one could hold that with the consumption of the forbidden fruit of cognition we took matters into our own hands:

‘Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 144 Leviathan Ch.21). We were expelled from the seemingly immaterial bliss of Eden into the material hardships\(^48\) of this world, including death. As a repercussion of Adam’s actions a corporeal world materialised into which we were banished and left to our own devices (on the Hobbesean account, two devices to be precise: passions and reason). Left to fend for ourselves\(^49\), we would be foolish to sit idle and await redemption, since on the ‘soul sleeping’ account redemption occurs post-mortem, and in God’s good time. Having not lost our gift of rationality we can, just as scripture tells us the ancient Israelites did, put time on earth to good use by recreating a land of milk and honey: we can clone a heaven for the living. Moreover, in so acting we might be promoting redemption itself.

I am further puzzled by Moloney’s employment of the phrase ’cheat of words’ (Moloney 1997: 249) with reference to the solution that the Hobbesean divorce from the ’Edenic discourse’ (Moloney 1997: 248) incurs. He implies that in order to challenge the mechanical passing of ‘true words’ from God through Adam and Noah to a select few, Hobbes not only had to assume that human language and law were

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\(^{48}\) Contrasted with the imperfect corporeal state, in which sustenance depends on work, the immaterial Eden is defined by effortlessness and lack of friction.

\(^{49}\) See also James Martel: ‘For Hobbes, the absence of a clear and authoritative divine voice, far from being the cause of our woes enables and even requires the possibility of human agency. Our reason is a gift from God, a “talent” given to us in order to negotiate a world marked by God’s (relative) absence. Rather than despair, we must endeavour to become aware of our own power to discover and produce truths in God’s name.’ (Martel Strong Sovereign, Weak Messiah: Thomas Hobbes on Scriptural Interpretation, Rhetoric and the Holy Spirit 2004: 2)
necessarily fabricated, but also had to adopt Francis Bacon's notion, widely accepted by his contemporaries, of language as an agent of perversion. This encapsulates a vision of a pure Godly language that is lost on an impure world, for which an entirely new language inflicted with imprecision has been humanly devised, and thus insinuates that the Hobbesian stance subscribes to the idea that in the Machiavellian, earthly political arena, words are employed to disguise the truth rather than reveal it.

Moloney finds textual evidence for the proposed mischief of language: in the disharmonious and discontentful effects attributed to it in *Leviathan* Chapter 17, in the disturbance and error ascribed to it in *De Homine*, and finally in its being accredited as a 'trumpet for war and sedition' in *De Cive* (Moloney 1997: 260). I am inclined to accept Moloney's general assertion that if language were immune to manipulation, it could stand its own ground, and would not require the aid of a political body to enforce it. However, it is quite a leap from this to the conclusion that language is untrustworthy. Although the Hobbesian concern with lack of trust among strangers might be reduced to communication problems induced by the fluidity of language, distrust could be equally attributable to subjective perspective within a solid language. Moloney seems to assume that human beings are 'hardware', whereas language is amendable 'software'. But the mirror image of this view, wherein human beings are softly conducive to perspective and language is soldered hardware, would seem just as plausible. In this understanding it is not that language requires unification by means of the ruler, but rather the correction of the distortion of perspective by the adoption of a single outlook. For Moloney, the ruler establishes (fabricates) language and law anew, whereas on the proposed reading the ruler does
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not write her own law, but rather enables or revives the pre-established\textsuperscript{50} natural law that all would follow naturally if they only could.

Preventing natural law from being relegated to a dead letter makes the ruler an agent of God, not in the divine right sense, but as an instrument that enables individuals to act in accordance with the laws of nature, or in other words in a Godly manner. The crux of the argument is that the Hobbesean position is wrongly understood to have discarded God, replacing him with a mortal ‘God’. The Hobbesean stance may have detached the umbilical cord between God and the ruler, however, the ruler still facilitates the pursuit of God in a corporeal existence. She ceases to be God on earth in the divine right sense. She is not a vehicle for rational Godliness to reach us\textsuperscript{51}, a vessel through which God speaks; she is instead a vehicle for the pursuit of rational Godliness. Moreover, as suggested above, our relationship with God is perceived by Hobbes as a unilateral one. As a result God's direction will not pursue us - we must pursue it.

The secularisation of Hobbesean thought fails to generate a legitimacy of authority that would, once and for all, put to rest the Hobbesean social nightmare of mutiny. Understood in a secularised fashion, apart from reducing human interaction to a material struggle over the source of social motion (i.e. material power), the Hobbesean position does nothing to finalise the struggle for power. Indeed it may even be perpetuating it\textsuperscript{52}. It is on the grounds of ineffectiveness at advancing this foremost goal of the Hobbesean endeavour, i.e. peace, that the secular interpretation

\textsuperscript{50} Arguably by God.
\textsuperscript{51} Such an assumption would place a restriction on God, essentially binding God to the ruler.
\textsuperscript{52} I will elaborate on this point with relation to Hobbes’s contribution to IR theory in the conclusion.
is rejected. Without the appeal to the singularity of a ‘one and only’ ordained order, so perfect that no one could reasonably object to it, and no one in their right mind would hope to unseat it, the entire project collapses.
3.5 Worshipping the power of words to conserve the Truth

According to the interpretation being proposed here, for Hobbes rationality is a feature of Godly origin, perhaps related to the Jewish tradition\(^\text{53}\) that the world was created, not by the causal actions that are required of those of corporeal existence, but rather by the transcendental power of a Godly utterance\(^\text{54}\). A tradition that lives on not only in charms and amulets, but also in a reverence of words to the extent, perhaps most strongly pronounced in the Kabala, that their misuse is believed to be the cause of real world calamities. Within Judaism, as well as outwith it, the tradition of ‘Word worship’ splintered into magical and rational offshoots. For the magically inclined the mastery of words was a recipe for manipulating the elements from proper witchcraft to alchemy, whereas for the rationally disposed it held the key to deciphering the truth. Yet both strands converged in their ambition, not only to understand nature, but to control it. Most telling in this respect are the various incarnations of the Jewish Golem myth dealing with the bringing to life of dead matter. The most prominent of which is a tale that attributes the 16\(^{\text{th}}\) century real life figure Rabbi Judah Loew, the Maharal of Prague, with the act of bringing to life a creature formed of mud by inscribing the Hebrew word ‘truth’ on its forehead. The creature, who much like Marry Shelly’s Frankenstein, subsequently went out of

\(^{53}\) For a corroboration of the proposed link between Hobbes and Hebraic thought see also Fania Oz-Salzberger’s case in *The Jewish Roots of Western Freedom* for ‘the sustained effort to read the Bible politically during the seventeenth century…’ that ‘…affected early modern thinking about the state and about political liberty, and took part in the birth pangs of classical liberalism itself.’ *(Oz-Salzberger The Jewish Roots of Western Freedom 2002)*

\(^{54}\) In this respect the aforementioned ‘foole’ may be said to be acting in an unGodly fashion, or on another version, against the laws of nature.
control, was said to be subdued by removing one letter from his forehead thus forming the Hebrew word ‘dead’.

Although in *Leviathan* Hobbes voices fierce opposition to the occult, he does so on the grounds of its irrational implementation by charlatans who abuse the public’s fear of the unknown ‘So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 82 Leviathan Ch. XII), rather than on grounds pertaining to the internal methodology employed by these arts. It should be noted that in its infancy the grand masters of the scientific tradition from DaVinci to Newton, were engaged in a wide array of order and control seeking activities including those that contemporary scientists would associate with the occult. Furthermore, fallibility criteria such as have been raised in contemporary philosophy of science, are discerning from a Hobbesean stance, since they undermine the absolute infallible solidity that is being sought. Or as Alan Ryan puts it, it is implausible to suppose that Hobbes was a defender of Popper’s methodology of conjecture and refutation *avant la lettre*; in Hobbes’s account true science renders refutation inconceivable…It is more persuasive to assimilate Hobbes and Galileo; Galileo thought that geometry was the key to celestial mechanics…once it was spelled out, was a matter of necessity. (Ryan 1988: 85)

Accordingly, I find it curious that Michael Oakeshott throughout his *Introduction to Leviathan* is insistent on labeling Hobbes a sceptic. It would be less curious had he not chosen to marry Hobbes’s alleged scepticism with an alleged individualism. For if Hobbes was a sceptic, it was in so far as he appreciated diversity in the perceived world (Lister 1998) and not in a meaningful epistemological manner.
In Hobbesian theory, if a proposed solution is only transitional, it is no solution at all, as it provides no improvement upon the current uncertainty and its disturbing social distrust side effects. The Hobbesian mission is to reduce the realm of the unknown to the point of inconsequentiality, thereby reducing to nil the spectrum in which fear mongering could occur. This mission of peace is to be achieved by demystifying material phenomena, accounting for it in a systematic format that can be conserved and communicated in words and formulas. Once all is rationally accounted for, the demons of irregularity will no longer haunt us. We will come to control our mortal fears; we will be in possession of the Truth.

Words are considered vessels of rationality, carrying it either verbally or scripturally. The advantage of script is in its endurance. It defeats the frailty of corporeal individual recollection and enables inter-personal relations to build upon past experiences, thereby opening the door to a collective form of progress. Or as Oakeshott eloquently puts it: ‘the achievement of language is to “register our thought”, to fix what is essentially fleeting.’ (Oakeshott 1975: 24). This analytical approach, is opposed to Aristotle's empiricism (Hobbes 1991 (1651): Leviathan Ch. XVII) that observed predetermined sociability on the basis of a perceived ability to cooperate towards the achievement of a common goal. As well as differing from Smitho-Humean perceptions of rationality as a process that relies on the interaction between creatures endowed with no more than signaling abilities. Aristotle's bees and ants are excluded because their actions are merely pseudo-social. Their predetermined objective, combined with signaling abilities, lead to efficient automation that mimics social autonomous interaction based cooperation. The hive is not social, because it is not rational. It cannot be rational because, although its
members can communicate information to each other, they do not have access to the tools of reflection (i.e. written language and mathematical equation). Lacking autonomy to reflect they are reduced to automation. Their routine does well to sustain them in an evolutionary sense, but it also bars progress beyond their predetermined characteristics. It inhibits their advance to perfection through self-betterment. The hive and the hoard have reached the height of their development, there is nothing that they can yet learn, whereas humans still have untapped social potential\(^\text{55}\).

Setting us apart from the beasts\(^\text{56}\), in Hobbesian theory, rationality and sociability are interchangeable. Primates, although not addressed within the Hobbesian text, would probably have earned the title 'modicum rational'. Indeed, Zenon Bankowski in an attempt to illustrate rationality, makes use of a David Attenborough nature program depicting monkey behaviour:

The monkey displays rationality when it universalises and transcends the particular experience. When it sees that what happened is not something that stands alone. It sees the event as something that can be connected with past and future experiences and it so connects them…. It is a refusal to see the world as a chaotic universe of particular instances which have no connection. (Bankowski 2001: 24).

It is my understanding that in a Hobbesian view the human advantage over the primates' 'modicum rationality' is derived, from our ability to build upon a legacy of accumulated rational discoveries. Modicum rationality allows one to transcend particularity, arriving at general rules. Nevertheless, comprehensive rationality that

\(^{55}\text{Understood in this fashion Hobbesianism feeds into Marxism.}\)

\(^{56}\text{By contrast to Aristotle's notion of society.}\)
transcends the limits of a mortal lifespan must rely on traditionally written
documentation. Although contemporary forms of documentation such as video and
pre-historic documentation in the form of cave-art may serve as records as well, the
written word remains the most efficient medium for communicating data. Consider
how much more information is conveyed in a novel than its film adaptation, or how
much longer it would take you to listen to an audio recording of the pages you have
just been reading.
3.6 Escaping corporeal boundaries.

By using words we are emulating God\textsuperscript{57} in at least two ways. Firstly we are
emulating his aforementioned action of creation and secondly we are emulating his
immortality. Utilising the registrar\textsuperscript{58} of the written word, we may be said to be
‘defying death’. Leaving the finite and the particular behind, we attempt to join with
God on the eternal plane. Still, recognising a distinction between emulation of
perfection (imitating God) and perfection itself (‘native God’), which I argue it soon
loses track of, the Hobbesian position acknowledges the weakness of the binding
effect of human utterances. If we were not the moral weaklings that we are, we could
rely on each other’s word. This not being the case, in order to achieve Godly conduct
(preserving the intentions behind the words), humans need to crutch themselves on
the State.

Without this artificial support we would collapse into the ‘momentariness’ of
the fool and the beast. By safeguarding rationality, acting as a guarantor of words\textsuperscript{59},
the State brings God into our lives. Since words are of God’s image, they carry with
them the essence of perfection; they carry the endurance and decisiveness that the
human state of nature, as opposed to the Godly state of nature, lacks. With the
assistance of the sovereign’s sword, words can be upheld in the earthly context,
literally ‘making heaven a place on earth’. The State acts as a proxy in the service of

\textsuperscript{57} ‘The first author of speech was God himself’ (Hobbes \textit{Leviathan} 1991 (1651): 24)
\textsuperscript{58} ‘Speciall uses of speech are these: First, to Register what by cogitation wee find to be the cause of
any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which, in
\textsuperscript{59} Which are presumed to be of God’s domain, and to have preceded the creation of the physical
world.
perfection. In order to accomplish this it takes on (clones) Godly features, pronouncing itself as an earthly irrefutable source of endurance. It bridges the gap between the corporeal and therefore bound, and the incorporeal unbound.

Hobbes never wholeheartedly acknowledges the ‘boundedness’ of humankind to its corporeality, most certainly not as an inherent and therefore inescapable feature of human existence. No sooner does the Hobbesean argument recognise individual human imperfection, than it ‘moves to strike it’. At once the State shifts from a form of prescribed medication aimed to relieve the chronic frailty of the human condition, to an absolute cure. Hobbes plays the role of the rational physician that is intent on solving, what he views as our fatal ailments, by applying drastic measures of social engineering. He identifies that the human social body, very much like the physical body of the individual, is imperfect in that it is prone to breakdown and ultimately death. Again seemingly relying on an analogy between the physical body and the body politic, he would appear to be attributing malfunction to the unavoidable existence of friction in a corporeal world. In order to remove the friction, the State is required to generate a vacuum, protecting us from direct contact with each other\(^{60}\). Unmediated material relations\(^{61}\) are bound to result in friction of the joints, which would eventually lead to the pains of conflict.

Hobbes, as opposed to Hume, clearly does not believe that nature has blessed us with enough innate ‘lubrication’. Moreover, he seems to be implying that we brought ruin upon ourselves\(^{62}\). But is he advocating a bionic society? Is he suggesting that we replace one type of fragile material bond with sturdier

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\(^{60}\) Presenting a positive ‘take’ on what Marx would later term ‘alienation’.  
\(^{61}\) Authentic relations in Marxist terms.
reconstructed material variants? Is the solidity of the new form of authority he aspires to the product of mastering a chemical recipe, thereby producing the political equivalent of super-reinforced concrete? In a section entitled *Hobbes's Materialist Psychology* (Hampton 1986), Jean Hampton argues for the orthodox view of Hobbes as a strong physical reductionist that builds upon the emerging ‘natural philosophy’ of his day to establish a physics of the body politic. Relying on exerts from *De Corpore* she concludes that not only does he insist ‘…the explanation of human behavior is to be found in the study of physics…’, moreover she contends that he adopts the view that the behavioural functions of humans can be reduced to ‘the (deterministic) natural laws of motion that the ultimate [atomistic] particles always obey’ (Hampton 1986: 12), and finally she deduces from ‘the tone of his discussion in Chapter 6 of Leviathan…the more controversial thesis that there was a unique reduction of a psychological state to a physical state..’ (Hampton 1986: 13).

The breadth and depth of textual evidence, notwithstanding, accepting this radical reductionist portrayal of the Hobbesean stance supports the conclusion that his is a bionic project. On this understanding it proposes to reconstruct faulty ‘fooles’ by manipulating the physical occurrences that induce their social motivations. The worry I have about such an interpretation is that should this construction be anything short of perfect, surely it would eventually suffer from the same physical ailments, and by extension social ailments, that it was put in place to eradicate. Consequently, either the eradication is left incomplete, or it relies on a ‘perpetuum mobile’ device

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62 Alluding to the story of the banishment of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden.
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that would either be inapplicable outside the vacuum of theory, or would defy the very laws of physics in practice. It is tempting to answer this dilemma by projecting Gregory Kavka’s assertion as to the idealised sense in which Hobbes conjures up a state of nature populated by idealised individuals (Kavka 1986: 84), onto its ‘negative’, the State. On Kavka’s account, in the context of the counterfactual state of nature, the hypothetical idealised individual serves a heuristic purpose. In the factual world, could the idealised rational individual not serve as a model, an ‘ideal type’, to be aspired to, if never to be fulfilled? I would argue that coherence considerations would suggest otherwise. It would be difficult to detach Hobbeseanism from its absolutist, all or nothing, tenets. Hobbesean theory places individuals on a slippery slope. They are either rational agents or ‘fooles’. Either there is an absolute captain at the helm, or the social vessel goes completely out of control. There is no room for partial allegiance, those who comply are friends and those who do not are foes. The citizenry either complies absolutely, or it does not comply at all.

The Hobbesean project is not about controlling the fire within, but rather about extinguishing it. It is a ‘once and for all’ act of contracting apprehension of ‘the other’, out of existence. The Hobbesean logic asserts that distrust is like a bonfire, if one does not put it out, it will spontaneously reignite. To the extent that we are presented with a choice at all, it is an all or nothing choice between: gaining the security that goes hand in hand with submission to the sovereign, or facing the

\[\text{\cite{Kavka}}\]

\[\text{\cite{Kavka}}\]

\[\text{\cite{Kavka}}\]
insecurity of incompliance. The latter being for the most part a hypothetical deterrent that no one in their right mind would choose over the former. As Kavka contends (Kavka 1986: 84), it serves as motivation for making the grade, for stopping ‘the fall’ into the state of nature. However, just as much as the state of nature remains an impossibility, the ‘negative’ image of a perfect State populated by rational citizens must be real. It must be achievable in its entirety, or not at all. It cannot be hypothetical, not even in part. Once the puzzle has been pieced together, it has been solved once and for all. It is the attainability of the Truth through the tool of rationality that puts all discord to rest. It is a single Truth that spans all of creation.
Chapter 4. Hobbes: Rationality as Recurrence

This chapter further develops the relationship between rationality and resistance to change, or recurrence. It maintains that Hobbes strives to achieve a political existence in which complete predictability in social conduct displaces fear of the unknown; one in which rationally deficient ‘fooles’ that exercise their force aimlessly, will be converted into rational, objective driven citizens. It asserts that far from being a theory, comparable to Machiavelli’s, on how to utilise force to one’s advantage, Hobbes is advancing a theory of peace in which force becomes redundant.

The first section reinterprets Hobbes’s employment of fear as a motivator for human action. It challenges the conventional understanding that social anxiety in Hobbes’s state of nature stems from fear of damage, if not the irreversible damage of death, which aggressors might inflict upon one’s person. Instead, it recasts fear as the apprehension of the unforeseeable. It argues that Hobbes is not merely ‘administering threat’, replacing unsanctioned interpersonal threat with a legitimate one imposed by the sovereign. While it acknowledges that the Hobbesean sovereign is authorised to threaten the insubordinate, it maintains that her first order of business is to generate an anxiety-free environment, a society that is not preoccupied by distrust. The sovereign’s primary function is to stabilise the rules of conduct, to generate a predictable existence that is conducive to rational behaviour. The enforcement of the rules positively reinforces rational behaviour, it is not intended to place fear into our minds, but to liberate us of fear. The sovereign has the right to
punish the rebellious, because their actions pose a threat to an anxiety-free existence. By questioning the given rules, they reintroduce the unknown into interpersonal conduct, and with it, fear.

The second section compares this interpretation of Hobbes with David Gauthier’s attempt to recreate the Hobbesian argument without resorting to a sovereign; arguably removing from the latter’s theory the strive towards perfection and the modelling after God, attributed to it in the preceding chapters. It maintains that Gauthier’s system presumes that stability can be generated from the grassroots of the individual, a position that is at odds with the top-down application of order, attributed here to Hobbes. While it acknowledges the credibility of Gauthier’s interpretation, it argues that his position exasperates the difficulty of continuous identity that Hobbes set out to solve with his strong sovereign and matching State.

4.1 **Hobbes - The reassuring certainty of the outcome of an infinite loop**

Hobbes is a theorist of anarchy, but not of despair. The pre-social, sovereign-absent ‘state of war’ he conjures up, does not strictly prohibit reciprocal social behaviour, rather it places those engaged in such conduct at risk. My understanding is that the individuated beings he envisages are not necessarily in actual jeopardy at any given moment, rather they are numbed by their preoccupation with the inconsistency of their social interactions; an irregularity that is associated

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66 See also (Ritschl *Can Ethical Maxims be Derived from Theological Concepts of Human Dignity?* 2002: 96) ‘…both Hobbes and Locke operate with presupposition that the destiny of the human race is not destruction or extinction (This too, is a parallel to the biblical concept of covenant…’
with peril. The following illustration and its subsequent modulations articulate the differentiation between the immediate threat of bodily harm that Hobbes is often thought to be addressing, and the threat to industriousness posed by the erratic behaviour of one’s social counterparts, to which I claim he is attending.

For example, while I am walking through a meadow I encounter an apple tree. Seeking to benefit from it I claim it for my own. Not an hour goes by before a stranger comes along claiming the same tree for herself, disputing my possession and threatening my exclusive access to its benefits. Lacking any manmade rules to govern our conflict, we are guided by shared natural corporeal inclinations, split between passions on the one hand and reason on the other. Additionally, being a product of sin-imposed corporeality, we cannot help being entirely self-centered. Accordingly, in the worst-case scenario, we completely succumb to our passions, misguidedly waging war on each other and effectively risking our own survival. It is conventionally assumed that Hobbes is responding to this kind of threat, attempting to steer individuals away from an inevitable clash between desires.

Among the upper classes, resolution of the conflict of desires historically often led to a somewhat alternate approach that would equally lead to risking one’s survival; challenging our adversary to a duel. Hobbes himself labeled such an option as honorable yet unlawful and most certainly irrational:

private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in
Hobbes’s staunch opposition to dueling as a mode of conflict resolution was probably not due to the lack of stability it generated nor the lack of procedural structure, since as we learn from Sivert Langholm, in practice duels were not only conducted in a strict orderly fashion, but also: ‘with the aid of (controlled) violence appear to have produced a large frequency of definitive conflict resolutions.’ (Langholm 1965: 324).

Perhaps he branded it an irrational act of ‘rashness’, since the stability of the resolution was reliant upon a clear-cut outcome achieved only by leaving at least one party dead. He could also have foreseen retaliation by members of society affiliated with the deceased and not compelled by the finality stipulated in the rules of engagement. More interestingly however, he also deems the act illegal. He might only be mirroring irrationality as illegality, but he might also be reacting to the commonplace idea that dueling, much the same as medieval battles between knights, was in essence leaving the decision to God. The widely held expectation being that God would intervene on side of the righteous. Not only can the imposed involvement of God in the conflict be considered demeaning to God and an infringement of his unboundedness (related to the discussion in the previous chapter on p. 84 of the disapproval of compelling God to one’s ambitions through personal vows), it may serve to perpetuate aggression, encouraging an endless array of would be ‘God’s

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67 As a complete ‘foole’ might do.
champions’ challenging each other for the throne.

The conventional understanding of Hobbes is that he replaces these ‘barbaric’ life-endangering exchanges of aggression and the never-ending cycle of retaliation thereof, with a civil conduct imposed by a sovereign who monopolises the use of force. Yet I would argue that there is more to Hobbes’s forward-looking and reason-based society than the resolution of day-to-day survival. The State does not merely function as minder of ‘unruly children’,68 preventing them from physically challenging each other; instead, it is argued that it is an instrument of economic prosperity that allows us to overcome the material worthlessness of brief non-secure possession. The primary condition for possession is, as the conventional view would have it, survival69. The secondary is however the ability to introduce meaningfulness into possession. The latter is achieved by securing our hold on possessions beyond the inconsequentiality of the momentary. In other words, true possession must be the reasonably lasting possession provided by the stability and security of law and order.

It is at this juncture that Hobbes introduces time as a factor in the rational equation. The establishment of rational conduct requires the establishment of a time continuum; a mode of consistency that assures that the engagements of tomorrow not only follow on the engagements of today, but that the rules of conduct stay roughly the same. Evidently, however, this cannot be achieved by sheer human will, relying on its natural inclination towards rationality. Even if we make an effort to ‘open the

68 The imagery is borrowed from Jean Hampton (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997: 63)
69 Recognising that survival is posed as a logical condition for possession may serve to relieve worries attributed by Jean Hampton to J.W.N. Watkins: ‘that one might judge Hobbes’s entire political theory as unsound on the basis that it appears to be founded on the unqualified and thus implausible psychological assumption that death is always feared above all else by the normal human being.’ (Hampton Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition 1986: 15). Although it does require a further development of the role of acquiring possessions within Hobbes.
future\textsuperscript{70} by thinking rationally, it would appear that mere verbal commitments (the product of 'the ratio') are too weak, in the context of a human corporeal existence, to naturally withstand the internal pressure presented by our 'passions side'.

In order to illustrate this inner conflict I return to the apple tree example. Reason might guide us to explore non-violent resolutions of the conflict of interests we have encountered. In this particular case we could resort to a form of 'power-sharing'. Yet, sharing responsibilities for the tree demands a close relationship that would perhaps lead, due to communication problems or professional disputes over methods of cultivation, to further friction between us. An alternative would be a rotation agreement. One of us would have the tree for the initial two years, the other would have it for the following two years. The issue of who will have the tree first is probably most conveniently addressed by randomly drawing straws, or as some might have it, a benign version of 'leaving the decision to God'\textsuperscript{71}. Still, even the intricate procedure we have attempted to develop is bound to leave some doubt in the minds of recently acquainted strangers. The original rational good will might very well be eroded by the temptation\textsuperscript{72} of short-sighted gain\textsuperscript{73}, as the critical point of the transfer of possession draws nearer. After all, we are only human.

\textsuperscript{70} The expression is borrowed from Roberto Bernasconi discussion of Hobbes (Bernasconi "Opening the Future" - The paradox of promising in the Hobbesian social contract 1997) under the title: "Opening the Future--The Paradox of Promising in the Hobbesian Social Contract."

\textsuperscript{71} Note that as the results are random, this version does not involve second-guessing God or presumptuously claiming his affiliation with one's cause.

\textsuperscript{72} It is worth noting that drawing upon Eve's role in the Edenic narrative, monotheistic thought came to associate temptation with women, perhaps originating the alignment of passions with femininity, and rationality with masculinity, and on an extreme version of women with the devil and men with God. Once such a division is accepted and the project of the State is understood as a project of pure rationalisation, the exclusion of women from Statesmanship is explained.

\textsuperscript{73} The position of Hobbes's fool.
Our primary problem seems to be one of distrust of others with whom we might not share future interaction, strangers as opposed to relations\textsuperscript{74}. Indeed this may have prompted the ancient practice of inter-marriage as a means of achieving trust and peace. Yet there are boundaries to familial acquaintance. Moreover, our aspiration to prosperity takes us out of the familiar clan and village and into encounters with ‘the other’ in the town and the city. It is the shift from the micro to the macro level of engagement that is disconcerting to Hobbes.

He appears to hold that the macro-interaction is a qualitative leap that requires artificial administration in order to achieve the orderly conduct that is naturally maintained in micro-interaction. As Russell Hardin observes

Hobbes thinks immediately of such large societies as his own, in which one may interact with new people almost daily…To resolve problems of a large society, Hobbes supposes we require the imposition of a powerful sovereign so that our relationships with thousands of others are regulated by dyadic relationships with the sovereign. (Hardin 1993: 70).

Hobbes further contends that if we are to enter into peaceful commerce with each other on a grand scale, not only must rules of conduct be in place, but all participants must be party to them. Indeed, by remaining outwith the peaceful arrangement one would be contributing to its destabilisation, in effect declaring war on it, and by extension on its constituency. In other words, third parties may cause us to renege on our promises.

\textsuperscript{74} Note this problem is avoided in a divine right based theory, since strictly speaking all humans are kin going back to the original forefathers of humanity. Authoritative figures are understood to have gained their stature by a mythical direct line to the truth originally handed to their ancient ancestors by God himself.
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For instance, say I have reached a sound agreement with a city business partner as to the exchange of my cows’ milk for the apple cider she produces of fruits acquired elsewhere. Can she and her dependent apple farmer, truly be assured of a white coffee each morning hereafter? Surely not, since a third party who has not signed up to our rules of conduct may decide to acquire my farm by conquest. The threat of injury or death that I might incur should I not submit to the transgressor notwithstanding, my business partner’s standing is reshuffled. At best she must renegotiate the terms with the new proprietor. Moreover, if she employs her rationality, she may very well consider dividing her time between securing her ciderworks against a recurrence of the actions of the transgressor, to the extent that the surplus of tradable goods would no longer be generated. Although the interaction described does involve violence, or the threat thereof, at the end of the day the threat is to commerce rather than to one’s corporal being.

This is further illustrated in an altered, violence-reduced scenario, in which the transgressor steals my cows and sells them to a slaughterhouse, not only depriving my friend of her coffee and myself of cider, but also leaving us both without any recourse. This condition of helplessness in the face of the unreliability of trading might put us off trading altogether. On a similar note, Gregory Kavka finds a disparity between the Hobbesean definition of the condition of war and the ‘sorry state of affairs’ it is said to bring about. Kavka summarises the characteristics of the Hobbesean state of war in three points:

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When I use the term assured, I mean assured to a reasonable degree.

In line with Hobbes’s insistence that no one remain outwith the contract. Since, having retained the ability to threaten our contracted stability they have identified themselves as the foe of our efforts to achieve a peaceful commonwealth.
a. a relational concept that may exclude or include others parties;

b. a known willingness to fight that does not necessarily pronounce itself in actual violence at any given moment; and,

c. a disposition to fight unless assurances are provided.

Baring these characteristics in mind, he observes that actual occurrences of ‘violence, and the injury, death, and the fear that it engenders’ would not be prevalent (Kavka 1986: 90). He therefore concludes that it is the alternative threat of an ‘absence of the fruits of social cooperation and of the incentive to labour productively’ that makes remaining in the state of nature so unattractive.

Yet, Kavka might be selling the Hobbesean argument short. The ‘fear of death and injury’ can also be understood in a much less literal manner. I am not denying that in the first instance the Hobbesean argument identifies corporeal existence as primary, and consequently its demise as detrimental to any social, cultural or commercial activity. Still, I would argue that in the second instance the survival of the body, must be matched within the Hobbesean framework with a survival of identity: a name, an address, a deed to property. Without the preservation of such attributes the rational differentiation between man and beast that Hobbes cultivates is left meaningless. On a broader interpretation of ‘fear of death’, it involves an insecurity of identity over a time-continuum that might be secondary to corporal insecurity, but is necessary for the employment of rationality. Such an interpretation is complementary to the earlier identification of the fundamental Hobbesean problem of distrust, as one that occurs among strangers. It also accounts for an extremely bleak portrayal of the state of nature. Matching the Hobbesean proclamation that: ‘In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation…no society; and which worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 89 Leviathan Ch. XIII).

Without identity there can be no consistency, and without consistency there can neither be commerce nor science. Echoing Hobbes, the version of the famous description of the state of nature composed by his contemporary Margaret Cavendish, is arguably more lucid:

If [there is] no safety [there is] no propriety, neither of goods, wives, children nor lives, and if there be no propriety there will be no husbandry and the lands will lie unmanured; also there will be neither trade nor traffic, all which will cause famine, war, and ruin, and such a confusion as the kingdom will be like a chaos, which the gods keep us from. (Cavendish, Orations, in Boyle 2006: 258).

The lack of propriety that worries both Hobbes and Cavendish, is in my view intrinsically connected to a concern about continuous identity. This is exemplified in the above illustration of commercial exchange. If I am offering you an exchange of my cows’ milk for your cider, as much as we should mutually be concerned about the physical availability of the product and the well-being of its producer, we should equally be concerned about the consistency of each other’s identity. Am I who I present myself to be, and how can you be assured that I will continue to represent myself in the same fashion. If I do live up to my responsibilities I will have generated a consistency of credit. But this welcome condition cannot be established on goodwill alone, it requires a ruling body to provide longstanding reliable assurances.
In comes the ruler to administrate our identity, to steer us in the Godly persistent way of language and law, and if necessary utilise force to keep order within and transgressors of our established identity at bay. The State apparatus can be regarded as an extension of the ruler, with the State acting as the ruler’s stability management firm. Since insecurity is the mother of all ills, causing the future to collapse and individuals to react in an irrational unGodly fashion, the enterprise aspires to reach a state of stability that can no longer be disrupted. It seeks to provide a perfect equilibrium – it aspires to Godliness. Yet, this uncovers tension within the Hobbesean system. If the State and the ruler are roughly, as I have suggested, one and the same and the ruler is not Godly by divine right, then the aspiration to perfection is unattainable and the construction, not being free of the risk of collapse, is ultimately ineffective. Alternatively, if the perfect equilibrium is within reach, then the ruler, and by extension the ruled, have inexplicably transcended emulation of Godliness and entered into a state of ‘native God’. We find ourselves elevated to the rank of the creator.

4.2 Gauthier – The emergence of perfect equilibrium anew

David Gauthier’s adaptation of Hobbes is a development of the extreme conclusion that ends the previous section. He elevates each and every individual to the ranks of an autonomous creator, and presumes that the interaction between these agents will generate agreement on conduct. Reducing, if not entirely omitting the role of the sovereign from his reconstruction of Hobbes’s argument, Gauthier seemingly avoids the difficulty of establishing the source of authority for the
indisputability of the governing rules. He suggests that the future-oriented outlook that Hobbes seeks, does not need to be imposed externally, as it will emerge from the cost-benefit considerations of utility-oriented beings. This section questions whether Gauthier’s version of Hobbes improves upon the latter’s capacity to generate apprehension-free interpersonal interaction.

As I have argued in the previous chapters, Hobbes’s concern is to develop a structural antidote against the fatal implications of social disorder. His project is within the realm of what one might refer to as ‘political engineering’. Moreover, it will not allow scientifically questionable considerations derived from disputable sources of authority (anything from unfounded superstitions to self-appointed messiahs), to interfere with the solidity of his enterprise. In a similar vein, he rejected his contemporaries’ appeal to the authority of Aristotle, in place of acceptable first principles (Kavka 1986: 4). In fact he was so much impressed with the unequivocal testimony of the methodology employed in geometry that according to Kavka he credits it, in the Epistle to Philosophical Rudiments, ‘with producing all the advantages of civilization’ (Kavka 1986: 5). Consequently, I would propose that he intentionally insulates his theory from the obscurity of a morality of faith, securing himself within the scientifically deducible.

Nevertheless, Gauthier cannot be faulted for diverting Hobbes’s political focus on the emergence of the State to a moral one that is concerned with social conduct. As long as his methodology remains anchored in ‘geometrical rationalism’ his attention to morality can be regarded as ‘refocusing’ the Hobbesean project, rather than challenging it (See also Kraus 1993: 254-259). That said, his attention to
the moral aspect of contractarianism does generate a divergence with Hobbes on the contribution of a sovereign body to social harmony.

Under the title ‘non-tuism’ Gauthier adopts the Hobbesian utility-oriented model of the self, but rejects the idea that order is established by rationalising one’s submission to a higher power. He replaces consensual submission to an external entity with an internal rational process, generating morals by agreement that ‘bind rationally, and independently of all particular preferences.’ (Gauthier 1987: 328).

The original Hobbesian remedy that achieves harmonious conduct by means of a self-imposed (due to the demand for consent) artificially constructed authority, is supplanted with a naturally distilled authority that every individual, by virtue of their self-interest, exercises upon themselves. While Hobbes employs what could be criticised as a logical trick (imposition by consent) in order to internalise a conduct that is ultimately externally enforced, Gauthier attempts to integrate rationality and morality in order to completely internalise social rules and thus avoid the tension between the external and the internal.

The emergence of these individually internalised social restraints is derived from two tiers of rational self-interest motives with which Gauthier attributes his individuals: straightforward maximisation (SM) and constrained maximisation (CM). Straightforward maximisation addresses social encounters on a singular basis. This is essentially the Hobbesian foole’s approach. It divorces the event at hand from prior or future interactions and assesses it accordingly. Conversely, constrained

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77 Following Rousseau, Gauthier concludes that: ‘If morality is represented as a conventional constraint on the natural mode of human behaviour, as a necessary evil rather than as integral to human good, then any genuine adherence to morality is undermined’ (Gauthier Morals by Agreement 1987: 315)
maximisation is a more sophisticated, forward-looking, form of maximisation that matches current considerations with past performance as well the prospects of future encounters. It is argued that repeated encounters (not necessarily with the same partners) give rise to the benefits of a socially positive reputation, as over time, by weighing the consequences of previous interactions, the parties will reward each other for acting out of CM motives and will penalise each other for acting out of SM motives, thereby achieving a standard of acting out of CM motives.

Gauthier is suggesting that the solution arises out of the reiteration of promise-making contract situations (reiterated prisoner’s dilemma\textsuperscript{78}), where the reiteration essentially acts as our coordinator to a cooperation problem. It is worth noting that in his version of the reiteration solution, as opposed to the propositions made by Michael Taylor (Taylor 1988), enforcement can be achieved even within a large non-familial setting. For Taylor it is necessary that individuals be in continual frequent contact with each other in order to produce sufficient communal deterrence against anti-social behaviour; whereas Gauthier relies on the communicability of reputation to carry deterrence much farther. This is not only a change in scope, it also redefines the concept of reiteration. For Taylor reiteration consists of a repetition in encounters between the same closed group of individuals along a relatively lengthy period of time. As such, one would eventually be playing a multiple set of identical recurring games with recurring partners.

\textsuperscript{78} The game-theory mathematical model of a situation in which suboptimal outcomes stemming from the inability to trust one’s partner in an initial stand-alone interaction, are commonly understood (Schofield \textit{Modeling Political Order in Representative Democracies} 1996: 94) to be avoided by presuming a recurrence of the encounter.
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For example, if one were placed in a prisoner’s dilemma situation today, in all likelihood one could expect to find oneself in a more or less identical situation involving the same set of individuals in the future. Reiteration in this context is a replication of the particularities of a distinct former situation, and what emerges is a multiple-play game. It has been demonstrated by Robert Axelrod (Axelrod 1990) that such iterated or multiple-play games promote stable ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies. For Gauthier, since encounters are non-familial, reiteration is defined as a mental replication of a generalised single-play scenario. Although every repetition may be new in itself, it is overshadowed by the inclination towards positive ‘reputation building’.

For further clarity, it might prove helpful to contrast Gauthier’s stance with Jean Hampton’s position that in the state of nature we are never required to contend directly with a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Like Russell Hardin (Hardin 1993: 71-72), she reiterates the Humean stance that promissorial agreement is neither fruitful nor necessary. In her view the issues do not resolve themselves through recurrence (be it theoretical or actual), rather they are resolved by the introduction of the powerful coordinating ruler, as the original Hobbesian text would suggest.

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79 A strategy devised by mathematician and game-theorist Anatol Rapaport, in which on the first interaction one attempts to cooperate with one’s counterpart and thereon one replicates the action taken by the counterpart in the previous engagement. (Rapoport Game Theory As a Theory of Conflict Resolution 1974: 27)

80 ‘But we have seen that prisoner’s dilemmas do not underlie the institution of the state in Hobbes’ or Locke’s theory. Although they are the sort of problem precipitating conflict for which the state is supposed to be a solution, they are not the problem which must be solved to create that solution. Another more easily solved problem underlies the state’s creation – i.e., the conflict ridden coordination game.’ (Hampton The Contractrian Explanation of the State 1990: 351)

81 By means of hypothetical rational calculation, or thought experimentation as Rawls’s theory perhaps suggests.

82 By the historical reiteration of prisoner’s dilemma situations, as Gauthier seems to suggest.

83 See also Hardin, R., p.164 (my highlights):
order to be resolved matters must be taken out of our hands – alienated. Any resolution that we are directly involved in is bound to regress into a problematic original promise scenario.

Gauthier casts Hobbes as a liberal rational-choice contract theorist, with essentially no role for the forceful ruler; whereas Hampton wishes to resurrect Hobbes’s insistence on the creation of a powerful Leviathan. The sheer extent of power of the Leviathan is her solution to the natural mistrust (prisoner’s dilemma). Where she thinks Hobbes went wrong is in the explanation of the creation of the Leviathan. On her account the Leviathan cannot rely on promises, and for that matter it makes no difference if it is a grand-promise (the third law of nature) or an aggregation of minor promise situations (reiterated prisoner’s dilemma). The Leviathan, the first form of cooperation, can be preceded by coordination alone.

Gauthier returns matters to our own hands. He empowers individuals by enhancing the original Hobbesian future-oriented rational outlook. Individuals are no longer weaklings, susceptible to an inherent human ‘foolish’ frailty of the mind. Society is no longer an arena of measured civilised competition, but rather a platform for the exercise of rationality enhancing cooperative encounters. Both God and the coercive sovereign State that emulates Him, are rendered obsolete. Instead, a self-

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84 See also (Freeman Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views 1990: 134)

1 'Gauthier sees no need for a coercive state to enforce these constraints or pre-existing rights among rational beings; in contrast to Hobbes, that is not the purpose of his social contract.'

85 See also Jean Hampton’s clarification of Gauthier position: ‘Gauthier is, I believe trying to make the following point. If people have decided to enter into a world in which their interactions are cooperative rather than coercive, then coercive power and the goods that this power has amassed no
contained and self-reinforcing system, as further developed by Robert Sugden (Sugden 1989) is relied upon. All that is required is that we turn our attention to the rational. Once we have tuned ourselves to the language of logic, long term reciprocity will gradually self-regenerate, eventually eradicating remaining strands of noncooperative foolishness.

Society will show its, bionic, superhuman potential, if we allow it to. Socialised individuals, having been ‘other encounter-encumbered’, will transcend their current particular ‘momentary me’, by means of the rationalised overview of ‘future me’ contingencies. Our projected ‘future-me’ casts a shadow on our current interactions. The possibility of future dependency redefines our here and now independency, thereby converting us into pseudo ‘other regarding’ beings;86 effectively generating a self-centered system of morality out of thin air. This highly individualistic, if not solipsistic, tendency in Gauthier’s position, implores an epistemological respect for the impenetrability of the mind of the other, yet it equally encourages their treatment solely as a means for the achievement of one’s own satisfaction.

Gauthier is intent on distinguishing his own rational morality which he claims is derived from Hobbes’s early conception of economic man, from the later drift by Adam Smith and David Hume into moral sentiment. Much like Rousseau he wishes us to rely solely on our own factual judgment, without contaminating it with the counterfactual self-deception of imagined empathetic feeling. Placing ourselves

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86 For example an employer that introduces a policy that encourages the employment of single-parent women, since, almost paradoxically, statistically they will be less likely to risk their employment by...
‘in someone else’s shoes’ is not a route to empathetic understanding, but rather to intrusion. Reasoning has nothing to do with the illusion of an out of body experience. Reason is defined as self-reflective and would appear to be trapped within a singular self, with which, we have unmediated contact. In order to rule out contextual diversions of my current self, it is proposed that I entertain a ‘future-me’ perspective. Although Gauthier himself does not put it in as many words, what he appears to be doing is merging Rousseau and Hobbes’s rational positions into one.

Yet, is Gauthier’s demand for a ‘future-me’ perspective not an out of body experience akin to the one that he so fiercely rejects with regard to ‘the other’? Is ‘future-me’ not a form of ‘other-me’? The assumption of an unmediated relationship with my own future could fall prey to objections fueled by continuous identity debates such as prominently figure in the writings of Descartes and Hume. Gauthier could work around this problem by resorting to ‘past-me’ instead of ‘future-me’. This would partially address and partially exacerbate a concern voiced by Jean Hampton that ‘for “proto-me” to agree to in some extra-societal bargain seems to have little bearing on what is rational for “determinate-me” to accept now.’ (Hampton 1991: 47-48). On the one hand, resorting to the past to justify the future may result in the in self-sublimation along traditional roles. On the other hand, relying on past experience and a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy avoids the controversy of ‘hypothetical contracts among protopeople’ (Hampton 1991: 50) thereby refraining from attributing others with more than the instrumental value they were originally accredited by Hobbes.
Further difficulties arise if the past merely simulates the future. Consider a PhD student on the verge of ‘writing up’ who has been struggling with funding throughout her studies. As long as this person remains a student, it is rational for her, in straightforward maximisation terms, to support the waiving of council tax for students. Does this rationale change the instant she completes her studies and begins subsidising other students? If she is concerned about her accumulated constrained maximisation reputation, it would appear to make sense for her to continue to support the council tax waiver even once her status has changed.

The source for this empathy is not, as perhaps Smith and Hume would have it, a sentiment of solidarity to the particular student status which one has experienced, it is a general rational consideration about sustaining past reputation of sincere intentions. But will this ‘playing it safe’ strategy not ultimately result in an inflation of support for any demand by any group or individual. After all, one never knows who might end up as one’s future ‘bedfellow’. Moreover, the fear of retaliation might deter participants from publicising unpleasant encounters, leading to an artificial mutual padding of reputations.

On a micro-level this can be demonstrated by referring to the phenomenon of anonymous online trading, in which documented reciprocal ‘feedback’ acts as moral deterrent (Dellarocas, Fan et al. 2004). These virtual bays in which strangers encounter each other for the purpose of trade, rely on the provider of the service acting as a data banker, compiling an openly accessible yet secure database of user profiles containing voluntary reciprocal comments on the users’ past conduct. The fraudsters that are attracted to these communities (Güth, Mengel et al. 2006: 2) notwithstanding, the risk of losing one’s untarnished reputation to retaliatory defamation
might deter equally reputable agents from voicing grievances. In the micro-cosmos of the online trading community this goes no further than to artificially inflate the general sense of confidence, however if as Gauthier claims this is the conduct of the rational self-interested individual at large, one must ask oneself whether under this populist regiment will not demand outstrip supply?\textsuperscript{87}

One could still argue that contemporary research of online trading provides a degree of corroboration for Gauthier’s view that self-interested reciprocity is sufficient in order to generate trust among strangers. Gauthier’s position is reinforced by the reliance of the virtual community on a reciprocal ranking system. Moreover, disputes are primarily referred to mutually accepted mediation that holds limited, if any, coercive power. However, in the particular case of the exemplar online trading service, EBay, a further purchase protection program is offered to buyers; with increased insurance provided when purchasing through EBay’s own proxy payment service PayPal. Although the effect of buyer protection on trade has yet to be studied (Güth, Mengel et al. 2006: 2), it should be noted that in practice self-interest and reciprocity do not necessarily emerge spontaneously. The contribution of both actual insurance provision, as well as, trust in the brand name under which the trading activity is being conducted, should not be overlooked. While coercion might play a miniscule role in these commercial exchanges, it is submission to an external authority, and not to a rational autonomous one, which generates the observed orderly conduct.

\textsuperscript{87} Or ‘Overload’ as it is referred to in the title of Anthony King’s address of the ‘Crisis of Governobility’ discussion initiated in the mid 1970’s by Samuel Brittan, Giovanni Sartori, Samuel Huntington and others (Parsons Politics Without Promises: The Crisis of “Overload” and Governability 1982: 421-423).
EBay is perhaps not the best of illustrations since it is a market of limited trust, as indicated by David Lucking Reiley’s finding that although collectables accounted for some 85% of listings ‘high priced collectibles (valuable art and antiques) have remained the purview of brick-and-mortar auction houses such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s.’ (Lucking-Reiley 2000: 232-3). Lucking-Reiley himself observes that this may be in the process of changing due to the acquisition of traditional auction houses by their online counterparts, however, it is doubtful that high profile artwork would truly follow the anonymous carefree process by which less valuable items are exchanged. Equally, although vehicles sales are not uncommon on EBay, the completion of the deal would need to involve transfer of registration ‘the old fashioned way’. Certainly, even the most imaginative mind, would find it difficult to envisage the sale of real-estate by means of EBay without the verification of identity and legal transfer of ownership provided by conventional State institutions.

The reciprocal verification of identity has, and continues to be, the role of the State. It serves its citizens as the technical reciprocal guarantor of the singular and continued identity of strangers we encounter on a first or occasional basis. Thus it extends our trust and opens the door to dealings outwith the intimate circles of our family, our clan, and our village, to those whom we have just met. The sovereign is the keeper of our integrity, without her, as far as our interaction with a stranger is concerned, each and every one of us could wake up every day, quite literally as a different person. Without the sovereign, as the keeper of records, spontaneous

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88 Those who find this assertion farfetched should consider the difficulties with which immigration services are confronted in identifying individuals from ‘disorderedly’ States, in which records are
orderly conduct would only occur as Michael Taylor correctly observes (Taylor 1988) in a size-restricted closely knit community. While some forms of social conduct among strangers may not require coercion, if they are to occur on a grand scale, they ultimately rely on a much more substantial role of sovereign authority than Gauthier allows for. Moreover, although the registrar of the State serves to extend the boundaries of our sociability, it does so at the expense of binding ourselves to a singular place.

One could argue that a demand for singularity does not entail a demand for particularity. On the contrary, would a universal registrar not provide the utmost value in the facilitation of peaceful interaction among strangers? I do not challenge the logical validity of the universalist stance, I question its ability to contend with the actuality of a human existence restricted to time and space. The theoretical formula which universalists employ defies these restrictions. Their individuals are assumed to interact with each other on an entirely detached dimensional plane. This cannot be faulted on the formulaic level and must therefore be conceded as a theoretical truth, nevertheless, it is in dissonance with our perception of ourselves. Unfortunately we cannot be both at the dentist’s and at a relative’s funeral at the same time, nor can we deny the finality of our relative’s death⁹⁹. Experience convinces us that we must resign ourselves to being in one place at any particular time. In the Gautherian-Hobbesean formula, time is at a standstill as our future is considered a reiteration of

often abused. Thereby, allowing their citizens to ‘re-invent’ themselves when interacting with foreign authorities. Indeed, one could argue that the lack of trustworthy authoritative record keeping undermines the entire claim to Statehood.

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our past, and spatial restriction is of no consideration\textsuperscript{90}. I have already pointed out both ethical and practical difficulties that arise as a result of adopting a past reputation-based morality, in subsequent chapters relating to John Locke, I hope to demonstrate that any account of the exchange of individuated property cannot discount the spatial limitation that real property carries with it.

\textsuperscript{90}There are interesting parallels between my portrayal of Gauthier’s Hobbesian position and the Buddhist aspiration to Nirvana as well a possible relation to such notions as Karma and Samsara, unfortunately this observation cannot be further developed here.
Chapter 5. Locke: Removing the Misconceptions

The purpose of this chapter is to remove the misconceptions associated with Lockean theory so as to unearth the uniqueness of the metaphysical position that I would argue defines Locke’s distinct political stance. The first misconception is that Locke is in all key respects a Hobbesean. The second, which is closely related to the first, is that his contribution to political theory is marginal at best. Finally, the third is that his understanding of individualism supports Libertarian notions of the market.

The first section pertains to the traditional assimilation of Locke to Hobbes, wherein the former is considered merely to have embellished the latter’s theory. It rejects the conclusion that the distinction between the two is reduced to a matter of nuance, if not personal taste. It argues that the empirically-based account of the human condition shared by Hobbes and Locke is misguidedly projected on to their normative conclusions, thereby implying a normative convergence as well. It maintains that a ‘metaphysically-aware’ examination of their positions finds that they draw radically different political conclusions from a shared empirical observation. Moreover, it is maintained that the same ‘metaphysical-awareness’ improves the integration of Locke’s anthropological observations into his political theory, by providing reason for the specific choice of the emergence of property and money, as its subject matter.

The second section considers the nature of Locke’s original contribution to political theory. It argues that his innovation is in regarding the State as an instrument for the administration of a problem ridden, but metaphysically inescapable state of human individuation. Locke’s position is fleshed-out by
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contrasting it with Hobbes’s. It is argued that Hobbes’s solution to the problem of individuation involves establishing a reign of perfection that would completely replace the observed reality of disorderliness. The new order he proposes, would substitute the observed motion in the world with peaceful stillness. By contrast, Locke is understood as devising a system of administration that allows humans to contend with the inevitability of imperfection. It acknowledges the inescapability of the change brought about by motion, and the inherent constraint of humanity by time and space.

This is demonstrated by highlighting Locke’s attempt to incorporate the constraints of ‘the real’ into ‘the ideational’, pursuing his recognition that the bound human mortal cannot hope to emulate the unbound deity. It is argued that by placing property on a pedestal, he aligns his political stance with his metaphysical understanding of individuation as rooted in corporeality. It is consequently maintained that his is therefore a demand for the erection of an earthly power to match the earthly individuated manifestation of property, as opposed to the Hobbesean demand for the unitary perfection of heaven on earth. By contrast with Hobbes, it is argued that Locke is not seeking a political system that would annihilate individuation, but one that would reconcile a productive life with it.

The third section distinguishes Locke’s defence of individuation from that provided by theories of convention, and more specifically by Friedrich Hayek in his interpretation of Adam Smith’s idea of the relation between individuation and the

91 Save human rights theory.
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market. While in this vein of Libertarian thought individuation is guaranteed by the market, it is argued that for Locke individuation, and by extension the concepts of property and self, must be anchored outwith market forces. Otherwise the market can potentially redefine the components of individuation.

The final section distances Locke’s position from the Nozickean variant of Libertarian thought. It maintains that contrary to Nozick’s self-professed affiliations, the foundation for his position is neither Lockean nor Smitho-Humean, but rather can be understood as related to Gauthier’s evolutionary interpretation of Hobbes.

5.1 Is Locke a Hobbesean?

This section holds that Locke metaphysically breaks with Hobbes, arguing that this divergence is reflected politically in his amendment of the sovereign’s role from the defence of reason to the preservation of property. Hobbes assigns the sovereign with the grandiose role of shifting the bi-polar human psyche from its inclination towards passions to its inclination towards reason, re-engineering ‘the foole’ into the citizen. By contrast, Locke charges his sovereign with the humble role of securing property. Whilst Hobbes’s ruler is a reformist educator charged with the enforcement of reason, Locke’s sovereign is merely a magistrate assigned to the task of property management. At the core of the former’s notion of a secure, and therefore prosperous, social existence is the principle of an enduring rational predictability; whereas the latter relies on the preservation of property in order to achieve a degree of stability that is conducive to carefree economic exchange.
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Hobbes defeats interpersonal apprehension in his social enterprise, by constructing a mechanism of rule that he believes can redirect the human psyche from corporeal fixation on the particular to incorporeal considerations of the general. It is a shift from the ‘traitorous waters’ of the chaos of unforeseen conduct, to the ‘calm’ of predetermined orderly engagement. I have argued that he anchors this political construct in a metaphysical idea of perfection, a moment of creation in which allegedly, the corporeal and incorporeal were fused together. His political apparatus is designed to emulate the conditions of this moment and thereby revive it.

Locke too, strives to remove peril from social interaction, however, he metaphysically rejects the idea that humankind can be perfected, as this would involve a disembodiment that is availed only in death. Locke’s position does not deny that this illusionary state of ‘calm’ can be induced by duress, it objects to its portrayal as natural and Godly. Moreover, it is my understanding that from Locke’s perspective the radical measures taken by Hobbes are unnecessary for the achievement of his objective.

For Locke, the difficulty of multitude of opinion, or personal autonomy, does not require the refashioning of all in the single mould of an original indisputable Truth. Moreover, the corporeality of human beings, even if it is a repercussion of humankind’s doing, namely original sin, is not reversible in life. We cannot politically reinvent the condition of corporeality, we do not have the power to overthrow our corporeality and recreate ourselves. We are trapped, our redemption and recreation is in the hands of God. The logic behind this is the reversal of the famous ‘he gaveth and he taketh away’. Locke reserves the ultimate control, the creationist control, for God. He who placed us into corporeality, will at His own
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discretion relieve us of it. Meanwhile, we must find corporeal measures that make the best of the condition we are in; we must find the means to prosper.

As I suggested before, Hobbes stipulates rationality as an aspect of human behaviour that is Godlike. Acting rationally is therefore acting in accordance with the laws of nature, or in other words attempting to mimic God. We are attempting to escape the misery of the natural human condition (the state of nature) by entering into a condition that is artificial for man but natural for God. This put Hobbes on the slippery slope of rationalism, gradually diminishing the ungodly (material) dimensions of humanity in an attempt, under the supervision of the sovereign, to achieve a metamorphosis of the 'foole' into the rationalised demigod of the citizen.

I claim that Locke drops Hobbes’s bleak portrayal of the state of nature, on metaphysical grounds and not due to a discord with Hobbes on the psychological nature of humankind. Locke’s state of nature is not to be escaped, precisely because it is one and the same as the state of corporeality. The state of nature can and should be reorganised so as to ‘best fit’ prosperity, it is not however within human capacity to depart from it by overhauling it. Unlike Hobbes, for Locke the corporeal perspective is not a matter of choice, but a matter of fact. It is not a degenerated form of the incorporeal perspective, to be restored to an original unison through proper guidance. For Locke the barrier between the corporeal and the incorporeal is here to stay. The function of the sovereign is not to instruct us in escaping the state of nature, it is to assist us in administrating it.

92 Although Hobbes’s approach to morality, as Jean Hampton states: ‘is not an approach that assumes there is a naturally good object in the world’ (Hampton Two Faces of Contractrian Thought 1991: 33), it does not prohibit the existence of a naturally good object outwith the actual world.
Locke identifies the state of nature as God’s property in his capacity as its creator. I would argue that his discussion of the human acquisition of property by means of labour is a reflection of a metaphysical and political distinction he makes between the bound material human condition and unbound creationist capacity of Godliness. This division not only denounces projecting God’s creative abilities on to human capacities, but also rejects projecting unbound perception on to a bound existence. We are not in a position to envision the unison of creation, because we are the created, not the creator. True to empiricism, we are engaged in discovery, not in creation. Trapped within the sandpit that has been constructed for us, we are merely mixing and matching a prefabricated world. Humans must settle, both epistemologically and politically, for the mere manipulation of creation, while paying due respect to the founding principle of creation: making as much as possible from what is given.

From the Lockean perspective the idea of creation is logically inescapable and by extension the idea of collective property is inescapable.

all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state (Locke 1980 (1690): 18 Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §26)

However he also contends that:

being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him
any good for the support of his life. (Locke 1980 (1690): 18 Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §26)

The implication is that the ‘use of men’ can only be achieved in the particular individuated form. In other words, humans do not occupy the generality of a world of ideas, but rather the concrete one of particularities.

I would argue that this essentially political position exhibits a blend of the political and the metaphysical, derived from Locke’s metaphysical contributions. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke expressly states that ‘all things that exist are only particulars’ (Locke 1997 (1690): 368 Book III, Ch. III §6). Although he makes this assertion in an epistemological rather than an ontological context, I hold with Christopher Hughes Conn (Conn 2003) that the ontological argument, with the exception of God, is implied. Having been created into a material individuated existence, we are confronted by the political requisite of administering individual property so as to address the moral concerns it raises: ‘… private possessions and labour, which now [post original sin] the curse on earth made necessary, by degrees made a distinction of conditions, it gave room for covetousness, pride, and ambition, which by fashion and example spread the corruption which has so prevailed over mankind.’ (Locke 1997 (1693): 321 Homo ant et post Lapsum).

Enter the Lockean acquisition of property through the mixing of labour argument (Locke 1980 (1690): 19 Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §27). We
cannot resist the logic of adherence to natural law, since we cannot resist the logic of creation and the collective property it entails. Equally, we cannot escape the individuation of property brought about by the materiality of our existence. In a strictly Godly (non material) existence property takes on a collective and secure form, God and God’s property are one and the same. In a human (material) existence the generality is broken. Moreover, material individuation places a logical divide between God and God’s property, such that God can no longer be expected to guarantee the integrity of property. The State can thus be understood as an artificial substitute in the material individuated existence for the perdurance of property that is naturally provided by God in an immaterial unison. Indeed such is the end that Locke ascribes to government: ‘The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.’ (Locke 1980 (1690): 66 Second Treatise of Government Ch.IX §124).

By metaphysically and politically distancing Locke from Hobbes, the above account avoids traditional difficulties in Locke’s interpretation that have led commentators to reduce the value of his contribution to political theory. The strict division between the corporeal and the incorporeal and the understanding of the cultivation of prosperity as the corporeal aspect of creation, makes sense of an otherwise baffling invitation for conceptual contradiction and actual conflict between God’s authority and ownership of property and a parallel human set. It additionally explains his descriptive attention to the development of property as part of a

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93 Note that for the purposes of this argument, the theological debate over whether we were directly created into the material or ‘materialised’ as the result of ‘the fall’ is inconsequential.
reiteration of his unique theoretical perspective, and not merely as a coincidental choice of subject matter that immerses the political theory he inherits in history and anthropology.

Standing in contrast to the interpretation proposed here, Patrick Coby in his paper *The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesean?* advances the assertion that Locke's political theory is a milder, more palatable version of Hobbesean theory (Coby 1987: 16-17) - 'Hobbes-light'\(^94\). He contends the major difference between the two is that in the latter, society rallies strictly on security, while in the former society comes together on the principle of fairness in the administration of property. Although Coby eventually finds the Lockean version more appealing (Coby 1987: 23), along the way he uncovers discrepancies in Locke's attempt to legitimise justice on the basis of his argument for property.

He is troubled by the two tiered property relationship in which Locke places humans, wherein they are at once both the property of God and labour-induced ownership creators. He foresees a conflict between the laws of nature sanctioned by 'man's creatureliness' (Coby 1987: 7) and the autonomy of self ownership, arguing that the second and first laws of nature, in drawing upon the sanctity of God's creation, are at odds with his teachings on property (Coby 1987: 10). He grapples with a tension between a collective Godly ownership of creation that Locke seems to subscribe to, and from which he derives the concept of the sanctity of each and every element of creation, and a human self-generating self-ownership that Locke is evidently intent on promoting. Subsequently, he attempts to explain these difficulties

\(^{94}\) My own wording.
away by adopting a cynical understanding of Locke's laws of nature, according to which they are conceived as legitimisers of the use of power on the part of the sovereign, rather than inducers of moral human restraint among the subjects. Thus, reiterating his position that Locke is essentially a Hobbesean, and consequently severely diminishing Locke's original contribution to political theory.

Likewise, Jeremy Waldron worries about an apparent tension between Locke's discussion of political morality and rights under the title of the 'social contract', and his alternative discussion of an evolving economic drive under the title 'political anthropology'. He observes that:

The contrast between the two stories could hardly be greater. On the first account, government is explicitly conventional: its institution is the deliberate act of free and equal individuals acting consciously and rationally together in pursuit of their goals. On the other account, the growth of government is largely unconscious – it develops by what Locke calls "an insensible change" (II 76)…

(Waldron 1989: 7).

Nevertheless, Waldron is intent on retaining both the 'normative punch' (Waldron 1989: 10) of the Social Contract scenario and the historical validity of the Political Anthropology. He proposes that one is necessary in order to serve the other, perhaps even to compensate for the other's misgivings.

95 'The second law of nature is not a golden rule commanding that we treat charitably our fellow human being; nor is it even, in any serious way, a restrictive injunction ordering that we hold back from gratuitous harm. What purpose the second law of nature mainly serves is to supply man in nature with a license to kill, and to explain how political authority comes by the right to inflict punishment on its subjects.' (Coby The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian? 1987: 10-11)
Having found what he perceives to be Locke's own attempt to defend the historicity of his social contract (Waldron 1989: 11-14) unconvincing, and relying on a journal entry of Locke's noted by Richard Ashcraft, Waldron argues for a functionally complementary relationship between the moral and historical accounts: 'It is the function of the political anthropology to offer an account of what actually happened; while the contract story offers us the moral categories in terms of which what actually happened is to be understood.' (Waldron 1989: 17-18).

Unlike Coby, Waldron gives Locke credit for a substantial contribution to political theory, one that goes beyond adding pleasantry to Hobbes. For Coby it is the degree of forthcomingness as to power relations, that differentiates Hobbes from Locke. He asserts that while they both hold the same political view the latter makes more of an effort to conceal it (Coby 1987: 17). By contrast, although Waldron does not put it in so many words himself, he implies that Locke adds a 'real' historicity aspect to the theoretical template sketched out by Hobbes. Waldron views Locke's achievement to be the weaving of 'real' history into the theoretical social contract stance. By entering into political anthropology Locke is credited with demonstrating the applicability of the virtual political theory in the actual practice of history. Yet, by casting the role of the social contract as a provider of 'a moral template' to be placed over historical events, Waldron diminishes the role of the particular 'historical

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96 [history is useful only] 'to one who hath well settled in his mind the principles of morality and knows how to make judgment on the actions of men.' Richard Aschcraft citing Locke in (Waldron John Locke: Social Contract versus Political Anthropology 1989: 17).

97 See (Waldron John Locke: Social Contract versus Political Anthropology 1989: 4) 'Treating the social contract as a purely normative model is one way of responding to its evident implausibility as an historical hypothesis….I shall argue that the political theory of John Locke provides an example of a somewhat different approach to the issue of historicity…'. Although Waldron does not explicitly name Hobbes as representative of the 'purely normative model’ it is implied by the lack of identifiable ‘political anthropology’. to use Waldron’s term, in Hobbes.
case study’ chosen by Locke, i.e. property. Indeed, it would seem that on Waldron's account, Locke could have chosen any number of other developmental historical test cases, for example the development of language or of law.

5.2 Locke’s Originality

The division itself between the divine and human manifestations of property is not an innovation of Locke’s. As noted by Benzion Netanyahu it can be traced back to the Church Fathers who held that: ‘According to the law of nature, none of the earth’s goods belonged to any one in particular, but property is an institution recognised by civil law, as well as the law of nations.’ (Netanyahu 1982: 155). Locke’s originality lies rather in the suggestion that distinctively human measures need to be taken to secure the individuated property form.

For Locke, Hobbes's state of nature scenario is unthinkable, since acting towards one’s fellow being in such a manner is disrespectful of creation itself. In civil society we appreciate creation but we lack procedures that allow us to effectively contend with problems that might arise as a result of the shift from single general property ownership (God's perspective) to a multiplicity of property owners (Human perspective). The State, by means of its institutions and administrative procedures, offers perdurence to actual property in its real, materially individuated, form. I would argue that for Locke the State’s chief concern is to oversee the fair individuation of property. Locke can be understood to be suggesting that in civil society ‘property disputes’ would be difficult to settle, since material individuation is
embedded in us to the extent that we would not be able to judge the situation from a general perspective.

that self love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. (Locke 1980 (1690): 12 Second Treatise of Government Ch. II § 13)

In order to avoid conflict of opinion, we require the establishment of an objective institution that would enforce generality.

An appeal to God to settle earthly differences is of no avail, since it would be asking the impossible. Either God would have to lessen himself to the level of the particular, shedding his immateriality, unity and generality, or Humans would have to raise themselves beyond the material barrier of their existence to become Godly themselves. The latter, I have purported, is where Hobbes's theory ultimately leads. Hobbes's stately institutions are earthly ones that masquerade as immutable heavenly ones, whereas Locke's are earthly contingent ones that are open to change as long as they do not challenge the inescapable ‘first principle’ of property. Locke's metaphysical divide between the corporeal and the incorporeal not only saves him from struggling, as Hobbes does\textsuperscript{98}, with the theological implications of strict monist materialism, it equally insulates him from being coopted into the Spinozist school

\textsuperscript{98} Stewart Duncan discusses at length Hobbes’s struggle with outright materialism and its implications, observing an inconsistent shift in his views (Duncan Hobbes’s Materialism in the Early 1640s 2005)
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that ultimately befalls the Hobbesean position. Having chosen to disregard the inescapable division of the mortal and the immortal, the finite and the infinite, Hobbes walks perilously close to Spinoza.

Admittedly, Hobbes unequivocally denounces pantheism since it undermines the existence of God: ‘that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denied his Existence: For by God, is understood thee cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651); 250 Leviathan Ch. XXXI). His assertion is, however, asymmetrical. The statement is one of a list of consecutive arguments that are intended to discourage attempts to force the limitation of our own corporeal empirical cognition on an unperceivable infinite God. Yet while these arguments prevent the ‘dragging down’ of God to the corporeal plane, they do not preclude humans from ascending to the rank of the autonomy of the creator.

Indeed, I have argued in Chapter 3 that humankind is encouraged by Hobbes to use the gift of rationality for that precise purpose. By contrast, for Locke such an exercise implies an impossible reversal of the reality of humankind’s epistemological and ontological experience; an extreme abstraction of existence that occurs only when we are literally separated from materiality at death. In Locke’s epistemological terms, Hobbes aspires to the reduction of humans into ‘general words’, amalgamating them into a unitary system that avoids conflict and contradiction:


100 Recall the argument on p.66-68 as to Hobbes’s employment of words in general, and more specifically God’s word, in order to generate an endurance that combats the ‘fleeting’ reality that is the cause of social instability and inter-personal friction.
Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one (Locke 1997 (1690): 368 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book III, Ch. III §6)

Our ability to live out the ontology of these ‘general words’ is suspect, according to Locke. In the absence of the particularising circumstances of time and space, we would share with God the physical attributes accorded to him by Hobbes: ‘God is eternal, omnipotent, the creator and infinite’ (Martinich 2005: 200). As omnipresence is a derivative of infiniteness, it should follow that I could be present simultaneously both at my office and at the pub, as well as at all the spatial points in between. For Locke the empirical evidence dismisses this possibility, and supports the inherence of the particularity of time and space to humankind’s corporeal experience.

Once I appear as a phenomenon, I can either be here or there. Moreover, making my way from my current position to an intended destination is not instantaneous. If it were, not only would I have escaped time, but also any meaningful conception of a spatially fixed location. Despite Albert Einstein's famous remark about the inconsequentiality of the death of his close friend Besso, since as physicists they shared the idea that time is no more than a persistent illusion, it appears to be one that is fundamental to the human condition. While time may be disregarded in mathematical formulas that are completely reversible, the idea that the ruler or the State could make time irrelevant and therefore immortalise all, is one that
is difficult to fathom. If time is taken out of the equation, as I have claimed Hobbes
aspires to do, the divide between the corporeal and the incorporeal sketched by
Locke instantly collapses; but can it?

Time and space are woven together here as a defining feature of human
existence. They are considered ‘real’ in as far as they are applied to corporeal entities
such as ourselves, but are not necessarily real in themselves. For the most part I
adopt Christopher Hughes Conn and Eddy Zemach’s suggestion (Conn 2003: 4) that
within the time-space experience, we are availed of several spatio-temporal species:
‘events’ (e.g. a football match) that are occurrences that are bound to both time and
space (i.e. they take on concrete dimensions in time and space); ‘substances’ (e.g.
individuals and objects) that are continuous with respect to time but confined at
every moment to a concrete spatial dimension; ‘processes’ that are continuous in
space (i.e. they lack definitive size) but have a definite temporal dimension; and
‘types’ that are continuous in both temporal and spatial dimensions.

It may be helpful to comment on some points of discord between Conn and
Zemach, in order to further elucidate the notion of time and space attributed here to
Locke. Although unable to refute it, Conn does not feel at ease with Zemach’s
original inclusion of ‘types’ (e.g. ‘The Taxman, The American Woman, The Lion) in
the realm of material objects. I second Conn’s objection. One should consider that
for an empiricist like Locke ‘types’ are the product of inductive reasoning. That is,
they are generalisations induced from particular occurrences. Their existence should
therefore be regarded as ‘once removed’. They exist by virtue of the accumulation of
‘events’, ‘substances’ and ‘processes’ in memory and the subsequent processing of
said material. Indeed ‘types’ are the product of the rationalisation of the material,
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while they are highly related to the material, it is questionable whether they are material in themselves. I have a further minor quibble with the distinction between ‘events’ and ‘substances’ (Conn 2003: 94-95). I am not entirely sure that ‘substances’ could not be reduced to ‘events’ and I suspect that they have not been, due to what Conn acknowledges is a hierarchical bias towards ‘substances’, to which we subordinate other spatio-temporal phenomena (Conn 2003: 5). This difference notwithstanding, I am happy to adopt the general implication of the position Conn attributes to Locke: that as humans we capture the world as it relates to us and not as it is in itself. This should not, however, be confused with a constructivist position. Constructivists question the reality of extra-mental conditioning occurrences, whereas I contend Locke’s intention here is merely to identify the importance of a hard-wired perspective.

This insistence on ‘earthing’ one’s perspective is, I would argue, Locke’s response to the Hobbesean ‘rationalist drift’, one that is not only definitive of their differing conceptions of the control that the human ‘ratio’ can exert over time and space, but also impacts their contrasting holistic and pluralist positions. Although Hobbes, strictly speaking, holds on to a division between reason and passions, between mind and matter, he loses this distinction once he pronounces reason as the caretaker\textsuperscript{101} of matter. In subordinating the contingent particular to the constant and general, I understand him to be anticipating both Rousseau and Kant; stipulating that the contingency of human materiality tends to lead us astray, whereas constant Godly reason sets us right. Ideally, the condition in which all men would live, if they could

\textsuperscript{101} Creating yet another parallel with God as the warden of all his creation.
only afford to, would be one that subjugates passions to reason to the point of their complete suppression.

Again, note the similarity in terms employed by Hobbes and Spinoza as observed by Noel Malcolm:

In Part iv of the Ethics Spinoza explains that, while passions are individual and particularizing, reason is universal and harmonizing. "Men can be opposed to each other in so far as they are afflicted with emotions which are passions"; men necessarily agree with one another in so far as they live according to the dictates of reason’. This "agreement" is a real harmonizing and converging of minds, not just an attitude of liberal non-interference; as Spinoza wrote in his early Short Treatise, if I teach knowledge and the love of God to my neighbours, "it brings forth the same desire in them that there is in me, so that their will and mine become one and the same, constituting one and the same nature, always agreeing about everything". (Malcolm 2002: 52)

Yet, according to Hobbes, weak as we are, we cannot completely rely on our innate rational caretaker. In addition to our internal compass we must take on a professional curator of rationality who will prevent us from inadvertently harming ourselves. Having combined mind (reason) and matter, and having pronounced reason as the overseer of matter within a civil society, the material aspect of Hobbes's political theory is encroached upon by his rationalist approach. Indeed I have suggested here that his rationalism quashes his materialism. Although his analysis of society observes material individuation, ultimately his unifying sovereign is instated in order to rid society of particularisation. Not being divine God herself, his sovereign must be actual and material. However, in order to instil cohesion among independent
monads\textsuperscript{102} that inhabit a material (by extension particular, finite and contingent) existence, his sovereign must produce the added value of stable eternal immateriality.

Since Hobbes questions the evidence that this has been bestowed upon the ruler by divine providence, the ruler must either be considered a God in her own right\textsuperscript{103}, or alternatively derives her Godliness from public ordainment. If the ruler is an authority in her own right, she in effect replaces God. Yet the ruler’s attempt to act as an artificial substitute for God contains a dissonance between her finite appearance and the infinite rule she is presumed to encompass\textsuperscript{104}. It is an inherent contradiction between her particular actuality, and the generality that no particular finite body can hope to embody. By contrast, public ordainment of the ruler, either implies that a shared immaterial stability can be procedurally extracted from the multitude of material individuation (in the manner of David Gauthier or John Rawls), or alternatively that the sovereign's immateriality is invented by her subjects and thereafter this imagined status is adhered to\textsuperscript{105}.

In both understandings, the resolution of the difficulties presented by material individuation is the subordination of the material to either a real, or a virtual immaterial higher power that cancels out material social disparity. Consolidation becomes both a means and an end; it is a means towards the erection of a single entity powerful enough to awe its constituency; it is an end in itself in so far as it

\textsuperscript{102} To borrow Leibniz’s term.

\textsuperscript{103} Although allegedly speaking of monarchy by divine right, King James VI of Scotland seems to have considered himself a God by his own right. This opinion is expressed in his speech before parliament: ‘For Kings are not onely GODS Lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon GODS throne, but euen by GOD himselfe they are called Gods.’ (King James VI and I and Sommerville \textit{Political writings} 1994: 181)

\textsuperscript{104} Historically leading to notions of hereditary of sovereignty that Hobbes appears to have shared for stability considerations.
displaces our sense of time, disguising itself as the immaterial and therefore the timeless unity we aspire to achieve. Whether this consolidation is distilled as by David Gauthier or publicly reasoned in the manner of John Rawls, changes very little. Inevitably they share a rationalist demand for timelessness and placelessness that conflicts with a real human material existence. This in turn explains the contrast between the strong theoretical appeal of such stances, and the difficulties in their actual implementation.

Locke's theoretical enterprise can be considered as an attempt to restore the political materialism that I have suggested is lost in Hobbes and in Gauthier. I propose that he may have achieved this by importing his dualist metaphysical discussion of material individuation in the Essay (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding) into his discussion of politics in the Second Treatise (Second Treatise of Government). An apparently similar position is expressed by Ruth W. Grant:

Locke maintained the same set of propositions in both the Essay and the Two Treatise. (Grant 1987: 26)

Yet her subsequent explication of this statement:

that there is natural law that is reasonable; that God has equipped men with natural faculties suited to the task of discovering its contents; and that men are obligated to follow its dictates as they are the workmanship of the Supreme Being whose will it expresses. (Grant 1987: 26)

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The latter is endorsed by Jean Hampton as the only coherent understanding of authority by consent, and is attributed by her to G.E.M. Anscome (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997: 77).
seems hostile to the gist of the material individuation versus Godly unity argument advanced here. That is, the idea that the Godly cannot be duplicated and demands a distinctly human, materially individuated version. On the face of it, Grant’s version of Locke, much like the position I here associate with Hobbes, appears to maintain that the Godly can be imported by means of the gift of rationality, virtually without any need of amendment, from the ideational realm into the real one. However, reading Grant more closely one appreciates that this initial impression may be false. Although she does not juxtapose Locke with Hobbes, she does label Locke as a cautious liberal and indirectly also as a cautious rationalist:

Locke’s attitude towards the political is the same as his attitude toward the problem of human understanding. Men cannot know everything, but they can know enough to govern their conduct rationally. Action need not be arbitrary; it can be guided by rational principles of conduct. But the application of those principles to practice will always involve an element of judgment and uncertainty. (Grant 1987: 203-204).

It is the magnification of this element of caution which has prompted my classification of Locke’s pursuit as one of imperfect authority, as opposed to the Hobbesean ambition to attain a perfect one. Both Hobbes and Locke agree that ‘What Adam fell from…was the state of perfect Obedience’ (Locke 1999 (1695): 6 The Reasonableness of Christianity). However, while Hobbes attempts to recapture the original state of perfection by employing reason, Locke considers this ambition unattainable. As Kim Ian Parker notes, for Locke ‘….even though humans can be taught to be reasonable, they still fall short of the standard that God sets.’ (Parker

106 Kim Ian Parker, enlisting to his aid a similar conclusion by both Richard Ashcraft and D.G. James, argues that Locke was sceptical about the capacity of reason. (Parker The biblical politics of John
2004: 61). Indeed, Parker finds that the limit Locke places on reason is intended to reserve for Christ the restoration of what was lost by Adam’s Fall.

I will now return to the dualism I claim Locke imports from the Essay to the Second Treatise. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he argues that:

if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative being, but an infinite number of finite, cogitative beings independent one of another, of limited force and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty, is to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first, eternal being must necessarily be cogitative: and whatsoever is first of all things——higher degree it necessarily follows, that the eternal, first being cannot be matter. (Locke 1997 (1690): 552).

Locke makes the metaphysical claim that a unified order cannot be expected to emerge from the fragmentation and disorder inherent to all that is material. The political implication seems to be that reproducing the ‘order, harmony, and beauty’ of nature artificially in the social context would require the institution of an artificial political God. Indeed this is the conclusion at which I claim Hobbes has arrived.

However, for Locke playing the role of God would amount to both contradiction and blasphemy. It would involve the mortal contingent disguising itself as the eternal truth, no doubt not long thereafter alluding itself to be the bearer of the Truth. Indeed, this is precisely his grievance against the wrongdoing of so called “great men”, who while engaged in lawmaking presume to be speaking in Truth’s name:

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*Locke 2004: 39*.
But laws are not concerned with truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods. Clearly this is no cause for regret. For the truth certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for herself. She has not received and never will receive much assistance from the power of great men, who do not always recognize or welcome her. (Locke 1968 (1686): 123 A Letter on Toleration)

Wishing to avoid the impossibility of a transcendental and yet human consolidator, Locke proposes the property principle as the sole common denominator. The principle of property acts as a medium through which individuals can hold on to distinct thoughts. It is a harmoniser, as opposed to the unifier proposed by the rationalist Hobbesean tradition. In this respect Locke's position seems to coincide with the contemporary market harmony interpretation of Adam Smith, as portrayed in the works of Friedrich Hayek. Locke and Hayek's interpretation of Smith are both intent on conserving individuation in the face of the threat posed by the hijacking of authority. Hayek's individuation occurs on the epistemological basis of an unattainable truth escaping an individuated grasp. Trapped within a particular body, no single human can truly capture the plurality of information. Moreover, we are vessels of limited capacity, carrying conflicting information that, without the moderation of the market, would inevitably clash. The market peacefully sorts and circulates this segmented information, providing a live update as to the relation between the positions taken, and thereby also indicating their relative costs and benefits.

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107 More specifically (Hayek Individualism and Economic Order 1949), (Hayek Freedom, Reason, and Tradition 1958) and (Hayek Law Legislation and Liberty 1982).
The following section argues that despite these similarities we are confronted by two distinct market theories in Locke and Hayek. For Locke the market, like the State, is legitimate as long as it acts to secure property. Property is considered as primary to the social order inducing mechanisms, and is therefore placed outwith their reach. It is untouchable, one could say, sacred. Order is secondary to property; it must remain subordinate and is justified so long as it serves its purpose. By contrast, in Hayek order and property are equally primary. They are mutually evolving, to the extent that they may be considered two sides of the same coin. The market fuels individualism and individualism fuels the market. It follows that by protecting the market we are also protecting the individual. An entirely self-contained system is born, a political 'perpetuum mobile'. The following section further explores the relation between market and self, questioning the complete reliance on the market as the guarantor of individual liberty. More specifically it rejects the notion that Locke shares this view.

5.3 *The free market - convention and Locke*

The purpose of this section is to distinguish Locke’s vision of the relation between the individual and the market from Hayek’s interpretation of the Smitho-Humean one. It is intended to counterpose the associative link between property, the individual and the market in Locke, with the parallel concepts in Hayek’s interpretation of Smitho-Humean theory. It is argued that the Hayekian formulation of the relationship between the individual and the market, is not only distinct from
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the Lockean one, but ultimately, due to its lack of a fixed idea of individuation, cannot match the Lockean safeguard to individual liberty.

Although the previous sections emphasise the prescriptive divergence between Hobbes and Locke, the motivation for their endeavours is presumed to be a shared concern over an empirically observed social instability. They find that the state of nature, albeit to different degrees, cannot generate sufficient regularity. Distrust among individuals is for both of them the product of a lack of consistency. Their political prescriptions are artificial structures aimed at solving the perceived irregularity, either by grinding the ‘fleeting reality’ to a halt as in Hobbes’s formulation, or by alleviating the social ramifications of it as in Locke’s. This essentially interventionist position is contrasted in this section with the Smith-Humean school’s rejection of the claim that a state of nature scenario would be rife with instability. It outlines the Hayekian evolutionary argument that naturally occurring market-based convention would reign.

Hayek asserts that it was notions of spontaneous order, social evolution, and singular origin developed by the Scottish school that informed Darwin’s work; and finds it ironic that these notions later rebounded into the Social Sciences in a distorted and inappropriate form. In an attempt to draw a distinction between the application of these ideas in Biology and their application in the Social Sciences he writes: ‘in social evolution the decisive factor is not the selection of the physical and inheritable properties of individuals but the selection by imitation of successful institutions and habits.’ (Hayek 1958: 233). The former is determined by physiological inheritance, the latter is socially acquired; biological evolution would
seem to be conditioned by nature, whereas social evolution appears to be dependent on nurture. The following model may be helpful in elucidating this difference.

In *Biology* we witness random mutations, these mutations must contend with two reciprocally interacting variables and one constant:

- Evolve (a) - the reciprocal effect on other animates
- Evolve (ia) - the reciprocal effect on the inanimate (e.g. minerals, sunlight, temperature fluctuation, etc.)
- Constant (P) - the rules of Physics

Whereas in the *Social Sciences*, Hayek contends, we witness a medley of evolution that is attached to no constant. This may be modeled in the following manner:

- Evolve (i) – the reciprocal effect on other individuals
- Evolve (r) – the reciprocal effect on resources
- Evolve (p) – the reciprocal effect on social patterns

The individuals play a much more substantial role in the Social Sciences, as they not only inform other individuals and affect the balance of resources, but also take part in the amendment of the social pattern database, which in turn instructs their own actions by way of education and imitation. By contrast, in Biology the constraints of Physics are set. They preside over the interactions but are themselves immune to change.108 There is another striking difference at the model level:

108 Interestingly a legalistic Kantian interpretation, which understands Kant to be attempting to convert contingent social patterns into moral rules, would reduce the Social Sciences into Darwinian Biology.
Darwinian evolution has a starting point. Evolution, as we know it, started with the Big Bang. Before the existence of the laws of Physics evolution seems difficult to fathom, since there is nothing held constant for the evolutionary factor to encounter. Yet, this is exactly what Hayek wishes us to envisage when it comes to social evolution. Society does not have a starting point, there is no ‘contractual moment’; just an endless trail of convention, followed by convention, followed by convention.

For Hayek, in the political context this trail of conventions generates the concept of the market. Supposedly containing no fixed content and therefore no predetermined personal bias, this value-free intangible instrument of communication is said to combine the ultimate in personal liberation with non-coercive social coordination. The partiality of human manipulation is replaced by the marvel of the ‘invisible hand’. Originating in Adam Smith, the concept is understood by Hayek as being an inducer of order in the absence of human intention (Hayek 1982: 37). It follows that the lack of planned order does not lead to chaos, but rather to a distinct form of order, which would not appear to have a particular source.

Unlike the biological model of evolution, nothing is held constant in the social one; it has no grounding point whatsoever. The advantage of such an account of social interaction is that it is highly adaptable. It is a drifting system that assimilates changes or mutations in resources, individual expectations, and social patterns. Hayek maintains that this inherent flexibility prevents individuals from fixing the rules it produces, gaining unfair advantage, and imposing their own preferences on others. Yet this generates an epistemological difficulty. The fleeting
reality of Hayek’s market vision changes at an indeterminate rate. If the changes occur frequently and without intermission, human awareness of them would be put into question. In order to grasp the change we would need intervals of ‘normality’.

Chandran Kukathas offers an interpretation of Hayek that appears to rescue him from this difficulty, by making use of an underlying pattern wrought in our minds - a hidden ‘pattern of patterns’. It is a mindset that Kukathas claims is borrowed by Hayek from Kant’s world-in-itself, and is similarly unapproachable (Kukathas 1989: 51). Trying to access it would be akin to entering an infinite loop. But Kukathas argues that unlike Kant’s world-in-itself, the ‘pattern of patterns’ in Hayek is reflexive. It not only projects on to the world as we know it, but is also reformed by the reflection of its projection. However, by amending the original Kantian position to fit Hayek’s reflexivity, Kukathas effectually reinstates the state of flux of the perceivable world: a never ending stream of reformations proceeding at a pace that humans might not be able to cognitively withstand.

It was a similar epistemological and ontological confusion that I suggested prompted both Hobbes and Locke to offer their stability-enabling political measures. Moreover, even if Hayek’s position can be salvaged by somehow curtailing the rate of change, either on the model or in the real world, his understanding of the market and its relation to individuals and property suffers from further logical difficulties. In particular, I would argue that his insistence on the emergence of individuality out of the market risks undermining individual liberty.

In order to prevent an external override of the market system, Hayek insists on leaving it to its own devices. It would appear that the coordinating mechanism of
the market is ordering itself, and by exhibiting this attribute of autonomy it is often understood as having taken on ‘a life of its own’. The mechanism is commonly referred to as ‘growth’ that cannot be captured in single human moments and therefore does not take well to attempts to formalise it once and for all. Furthermore, since we cannot gain an understanding of this unintentional order, we are advised not to act in a delusional manner and attempt to address it.

But there is more at stake for Hayek than a fancy version of the commonsense dictum ‘if it ain’t broke don’t fix it’. Hayek views the mechanism as an instrument of liberty. A market society is one in which, by virtue of the humble presumption of human ignorance as to ‘the rationale’ behind social phenomena, no individual or group can legitimately monopolise the ‘once and for all’ truth. On this account the divide between political liberalism and economic liberalism collapses to form a single, capital ‘L’, Liberalism. Once the distinction collapses it also becomes less and less clear whether selves and property allow for the market, or the market allows for property and selves.

Hayek appears to portray the relationship between the market and the self as logically circular, in the sense that neither precedes the other. Yet this argument is difficult to accept. Consider that while Hayek’s market system supposedly functions merely as an indicator of prices, if there is to be any consequence to these prices, they must be attached to actual goods, which in turn are attached to actual individuals. Hayek must concede that the exchange that the market facilitates is not

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109 See also Hayek’s citation of Cicero with regard to the Roman constitution in (Hayek Freedom, Reason, and Tradition 1958: p. 231)

110 See also (Hardin Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 1999: 59)
merely that of information, but eventually also the exchange of ownership. He must also allow that the stability of property is a condition of the market system, since in the absence of mutual recognition of ownership, trade could never be initiated. Moreover, having been initiated, should the foundations of property become unstable, commerce would experience breakdown and the market would cease to operate. Furthermore, the stability of property, to which I have argued Hayek’s and any other market system are compelled to commit themselves, presupposes the consistency of selves. The reciprocal acknowledgement of selfness, as demanded by G.W.F. Hegel in the master-slave dialectic, acts as a precursor to the establishment of property, since without individuation, property could not be attached and therefore could not be exchanged under the market. Yet for Hayek individuation, and by extension property and selves, do not precede the market; rather, they are a market effect.

If we do not anchor the market with non-evolving concepts of self and property, there is no reason to think the market would not drift to the point where it no longer coincides with liberty. Without securing the self and property, as I will argue Locke does, the market itself may evolve and mutate undesirably. Some market economists have attempted to remedy this problem by extending ‘the invisible hand’ from its initial classification as an unintentional ordering factor, into an equilibrium-oriented self-balancing organiser. That this contradicts the epistemological boundaries set by Hayek is well demonstrated by Kukathas in his discussion of the role of competition in Hayek’s theory: ‘...Hayek was attempting to draw economists away from their tendency to characterise the competitive order as an equilibrium state, arguing that because equilibrium “presupposes that the facts
have already all been discovered and competition therefore ceased” (NS 184), such a concept was of limited theoretical use.’ (Kukathas 1989: 96).

Yet if Kukathas is correct, then Hayek cannot rely on the self-preservation of the market through its attraction to equilibrium, and therefore it must be accounted for outwith the market system. The only remaining option, in my view, is that the concept of the self and its adjoined property be codified constitutionally outside the mutability of evolution. This Lockean proposition does not sit well with Hayek’s theory, since it would effectively create a prescribed truth. Nevertheless, in the absence of a special standing for the self and property, Hayek’s theory quickly morphs into postmodernism, a theory that, to my mind, begins with a genuine concern for liberty and ends in a confused drift that is unable to hold on to liberty at all.

This can be demonstrated by critically tracing Hayek’s steps. For Hayek the market institutionalises openness. He therefore wishes to assert that the market continuously preserves both property and self. That the initial market-perspective requires equalisation of its participants is undeniable, however, that this feature is self-reinforcing is questionable. Hayek recognises that the market would require anti-trust measures, but even such measures seem to be failing when confronted by the force of ‘market share economics’. I am here referring to the race between firms to capture market share in order to impose their standard, leaving their competition so crippled that they are quite often forced out of business. Such was Microsoft’s move against Apple in the mid 80’s, and again against Netscape and others in the 90’s.

It may be suggested that the current race towards the standardisation of MP3 playing formats between Apple, Microsoft, Sony and others, refutes my claim in that
it shows that the market allows companies to rebound. While this may be true, it still leaves the self and its adjoined property, under the modern label of ‘the consumer’, at a disadvantage. Adam Smith can be excused for not taking such phenomena into account, since his was an era in which firm sizes were constrained, resulting in an adherence to a fair-play equalising market theory (see also Heilbroner 2000: 58). However, in the current day and age, the sheer size of companies and their marketing forces create an imbalance of power.

This concrete economic example reinforces the political theoretical argument I have been attempting to establish with regard to the anchoring of the value of self and property outwith the market. Otherwise, the market will drift, and the self will drift, and through their reflexive relationship they would alter individual liberty to the point where it ceases to pronounce individuality or liberty.

5.4 Nozick and Locke

In the previous section I argued that the Hayekian argument for liberty by virtue of the market alone is not shared by Locke. Yet there is another version of Libertarianism that is often associated with Locke, namely Robert Nozick’s, whose development of the idea of the minimalist role of the State is allegedly based on the model of Locke’s ‘night watchman’ State (Lacey 2001: 58). Despite this conventional association, a careful consideration of Nozick’s references to Locke in Anarchy State and Utopia reveals their differences, and arguably a closer affinity
with Hobbes. Alternatively, one could argue that Nozick follows the trend of reading Hobbes into Locke, blurring the differences between the two.

Nozick himself links his political thought not only with Locke, but also with evolutionary and spontaneous order ideas (Nozick 1994), supposedly drawing upon the same sources that Friedrich Hayek employs in his attempt to revive this school of thought (Barry 1982: 1 electronic version). The shared regard expressed by Nozick and Hayek for the rules and patterns that emerge from the market as the most *fair*, and perhaps the only epistemologically available measures for the administration of social interaction, has more often than not led to the conceptual subsumption of their theoretical positions under the Libertarian\textsuperscript{111} umbrella.

I will argue against this, claiming instead that Nozick is neither Lockean nor Hayekian, but essentially a Hobbesean evolutionist, much like David Gauthier. In order to disentangle Nozick from his self-declared Smitho-Humean roots, I employ a useful differentiation on the basis of the criterion of reflexivity that David Lewis (Lewis 1969) makes between the concept of *convention* which I attribute to the Smitho-Humean school, and of *pseudo-convention*, which I attribute to the Gautherian evolutionary school.

David Lewis’s study of convention (Lewis 1969), reiterates Hayek’s interpretation of the Smitho-Humean tradition, asserting that our attraction to a set of

\textsuperscript{111} It should be noted that Hayek appears to reject the extreme version of the minimalist State that is at the crux of Nozick’s Libertarian response in *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (Nozick *Anarchy, State and Utopia* 1974) to John Rawls justification of State interventionism in *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls *A Theory of Justice* 1999): ‘Far from advocating…a ‘minimal state’, we find it unquestionable that in an advanced society government ought to use its power of raising funds by taxation to provide a number of services which for various reasons cannot be provided, or cannot be provided adequately, by the market…even if there were no other need for coercion…there would still exist an overwhelming case
basic patterns could be sufficient to create a complexity of intricate associations. Lewis argues that much of the social interaction of preference-oriented individuals may be explained by the formation of conventions. Furthermore, he proposes\(^{112}\) that although constructs such as express agreements or social contracts may exert influence on society, they are limited in life-span (Lewis 1969: 84-85). Indeed he maintains that the only way in which an express agreement can subsist is by being subsumed into convention.

Although Lewis addresses the formation of order, or rules, mainly in the context of the philosophy of language, his discussion has clear implications for theorising spontaneous formations of order more generally. In his study he distinguishes between two types of orderly formations that present themselves in a similar fashion: convention and convention-counterfeits. What distinguishes the two is the reflexivity that marks true convention. In other words, in cases of genuine convention, one wants to conform to convention if others do, and one wants others to conform to it if one does so oneself (see also Lewis 1969: 120). As Lewis puts it in formal terms:

A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among members of P,

\begin{enumerate}
  \item almost everyone conforms to R;
  \item almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R;
\end{enumerate}

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for giving the territorial authority power to make the inhabitants contribute to a common fund from which such services could be financed.’ (Hayek \textit{Law Legislation and Liberty} 1982: 41).

\(^{112}\) Following very much in Hume’s footsteps.
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(3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions;

(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R’, on condition that almost everyone conform to R’;

where R’ is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among members P could conform to both R’ and to R. (Lewis 1969: 78).

Lewis separately addresses ‘convention look-alikes’ or ‘counterfeits’. He identifies four\textsuperscript{113} pure species of regularity that, similarly to convention, are sustained by way of mutual imitation, but which nevertheless are not conventions. In essence his claim is that although convention is sustained through imitation, not everything that is sustained by imitation is convention. What is lacking in these ‘counterfeits’ is the distinctly reflexive feature of convention, an established link between the preferences of the parties to a convention that continually sustains it.

One can see the significance of these distinctions by noting that, on a traditional prisoner’s dilemma reading, Hobbes’s demand for reciprocal replicative behaviour relies on the establishment of one such convention-counterfeit, namely trust (see note 113) rather than on the establishment of a convention\textsuperscript{114}. If we can become convinced that others will act rationally, then we can be persuaded to follow

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\textsuperscript{113} Mannerism – often unknowingly mutual imitation with no preference involved.

Preference copying – starting off with one unconditional preference and moving on to another unconditional preference, whereby the preference was influenced but does not remain conditioned by the preference of others.

Trust – copying the preference of others because one trusts that they are acting upon information that one would act on in a similar fashion had this information been at one’s disposal.

Partial conditioning – I would like to conform to a preference if others do, but I would better still like to conform if they don’t.

\textsuperscript{114} Arguably it is a combination of mannerism, preference copying, trust and partial conditioning, yet even so it remains a counterfeit.
suit and act rationally ourselves. Hobbes thinks that such assurance could only be provided by a powerful ruler who would monitor our actions and threaten us with repercussions against anti-social behaviour. Gauthier proposes that such external enforcement is unnecessary, as the mechanism of self-centredness can generate a sufficient amount of deterrence: we can do our own individual bookkeeping, eventually marginalising anti-social tendencies and achieving the required deterrence.

By contrast, conventionalists of the Smitho-Humean school, such as Jean Hampton, assert that since the problem to be solved is one of coordination and not of cooperation, deterrence is not required. As interaction occurs, intentions will become mutually apparent by means of communicative signalling, resulting in the natural emergence of a mutually satisfactory pattern of conduct. That is not to say that governance becomes redundant. It is the role it plays that is amended; it becomes a relay post that amplifies the communication of intentions. This amplification not only prevents misunderstandings, but also educates newcomers (i.e. both children and foreigners) as to the local conventions. Order is thus achieved without the need for intentional rational consideration of relations with others. Actors are assumed to take a malice-free, self-centred approach of self-betterment. They neither consider each others’ conduct as part of some meticulous bookkeeping process (as Gauthier does), nor concern themselves with the reasoning that others might apply; they simply keep attune to each others’ advertised intentions so as to avoid clashes.

Which of the two positions has Nozick adopted? Nozick claims to use Locke’s description of the state of nature as a backdrop for the development of his idea that social dominance resolution emerges from a conflict between competing
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protection agencies (Nozick 1974: 9-12). According to Nozick, individuals turn to such agencies in the first place, because natural law proves inefficient as a governing method. Like Locke, he worries that although such a system would resolve social problems to a certain extent, it would ultimately be incomplete. Not only would it allow personal bias to infiltrate in the form of disproportionate reactions, it would also lack a recognised finality of due process, thereby risking an endless sequence of retaliatory actions. The protection agency addresses both difficulties: it is emotionally detached from the cases it deals with, and the eventual prominence of a single agency as the sole and final legitimate recourse produces a sense of closure that prevents endless feuding.

Strikingly, a very similar argument can be made on Hobbesian grounds. Indeed, Hobbes does not rule out defensive associations in his state of nature: ‘in a condition of Warre…there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 102 Leviathan Ch. XV). It is rather the sporadic nature of these coalitions and their vulnerability to the whims of ‘the passions’, which motivates the individuals to seek a more permanent haven. ‘getting themselves out from the miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as has been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 117 Leviathan Ch. XVII)

The only difference I can discern between a Gautherian interpretation of Hobbes, as discussed in Chapter 4 section 2, and Nozick’s evolutionary understanding of social relations, is that the latter stresses the positive outcome of conflict in ‘knocking some sense’ into subscribers to the competing agencies, often
resulting in a treaty or consolidation emerging out of a condition of anarchy (Nozick 1974: 16-17). Gauthier’s Hobbes appears to merely qualify Nozick’s position, employing rationality so that we may skip the ‘educational conflict’ phase and enter directly into a state of consolidated sovereignty; along the lines of: ‘since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being risen’ (Hobbes 1998 (1656, 1642): 178 De Cive, VI, 9). Although Nozick speaks against the explicit compact between individuals that Hobbes subscribes to and claims that his dominant protection association does not share the State’s monopoly\footnote{Note that it is difficult to accept Nozick’s contention that his dominant protective agency differs from the State, when he himself ascribes the dominant agency with the role of providing closure. After all, if the competition between protection agencies does not generate a sense of finality of discord, the entire evolutionary rationale of these protection agencies becomes questionable.} over violence (Nozick 1974: 24), if one reads Hobbes along the invisible-hand lines, as Gauthier does, the distinction between the two dissipates\footnote{Jean Hampton goes further to argue that Nozick is mistaken in thinking that his framing the social question as one of coordination, rules out a social contract solution: ‘Nozick cited his own invisible-hand explanation of the creation of government to show that he did not have a social contract argument; however, I hope it is clear that he was wrong to say this. What his [Nozick] ability to tell us this kind of a story does illustrate is that the problem people face in choosing a ruler to lead them is a kind of coordination problem that can be solved either by explicit agreement or by some kind of invisible-hand process….battle-of-the-sexes problems have conflicts that can be resolved either by certain devices, such as an election or coin flip, that can cause one outcome to be rational for all people in this situation to pursue, or by use of selective incentives that are used to make it rational for enough people to change their preference orderings over the possible outcomes so that coordination is impossible.}. The difference between Gauthier’s evolutionary path and Nozick’s, boils down, respectively, to positive incentives versus negative ones.

However, although Nozick does seem to develop the State in an evolutionary manner that resembles Gauthier’s, the same cannot be said of his approach to morality. He does not explicitly develop morality, like Gauthier, in a reflexive evolutionary mode. He may therefore require a Lockeian grounding in order to
establish his prerequisite claim that individuals’ property rights override those of any political construct, a claim that would be difficult to derive from a Hobbesean foundation; difficult, but not impossible, as Gauthier’s ‘decapitated sovereign’ version of Hobbes demonstrates. Indeed Nozick’s brief reconsideration of invisible-hand explanations (Nozick 1994) reiterates the indication in Anarchy State and Utopia (Nozick 1974: Ch. 2) that his political theory relies just as much on Adam Smith as it does on John Locke.

Still, Ross Harrison contends that Nozick’s route ‘is meant to be from certainty about morality to enlightenment about politics’ (Harrison 2003: 254). Harrison further questions whether such an ambition is sustainable without sharing Locke’s ‘intellectual and argumentative context’, namely his belief that God is the source of moral law, ‘breach of which he will punish, and that he is entitled to impose on us because we are his “creatures”’ (Harrison 2003: 254). I believe that one can escape Harrison’s demand by subjugating oneself to Locke’s metaphysics, without coming under the influence of his religious beliefs. Whether Nozick himself retains Locke’s metaphysics and more specifically his premise that individuation is part and parcel of a human material existence, is another matter; conceivably warranting Harrison’s doubts in the specific context of Nozick’s adaptation of Locke.


117 I will return to Nozick’s metaphysics, and more specifically to his closest-continuer theory as a contributor to the resolution of the continuous identity problem, in Chapter 6 section 3.
but as I will expand upon in the following chapters, inapplicable to Locke’s position as articulated here.
Chapter 6. Locke: The Self, The State and the Continuous Identity of Property

In the previous two chapters I attempted to metaphysically distance Locke’s position from both the Hobbesean stance and Hayek’s version of the Smitho-Humean account. It is the objective of the current chapter to expound on the metaphysical stance attributed here to Locke, in order to demonstrate the anti-cosmopolitan implication this has on his political stance. We have so far explored two routes to a cosmopolitan outlook, namely an unconventional interpretation of Hobbes, and a conventional interpretation of the Smitho-Humean school, as developed by Friedrich Hayek. In both cases it was argued that one should be attentive to the influence of their respective metaphysical positions on the outcome of their political reasoning. While it has been maintained that both stances logically entail the advocacy of a cosmopolitan political order, their foundation in distinct metaphysical positions, carries over to the ‘flavour’ of the cosmopolitanism they imply.

Hobbesean Cosmopolitanism demands a renaissance of an ‘original position’; a past paradise to which we will ‘come full circle’, should we employ our rationality to stop the insecurity that goes hand in hand with unpredictability. In this respect cosmopolitanism is the End of the Hobbesean endeavour. By contrast, Smitho-Humean cosmopolitanism is metaphysically in constant motion, along the lines of the argument put forward by Anne Conway and discussed above (Ch. 2, pp. 49-55). As such it has no particular end, indeed it cannot have one, it must remain perpetually open to change. Cosmopolitanism for the Smitho-Humean school is a means, albeit an important one, for reducing restraints on movement. It is motion that
is therefore the essentiality that the Smito-Humean would have us preserve; the fewer constraints placed on this liberty, be it of information, goods or persons, the better.\footnote{Granted the main twentieth century thinker of this school, Friedrich Hayek does consider limiting market so it will not infringe upon fair-play or offer products that are unsafe, but these are in line with Nozick’s ultra-minimalist State, and moreover apply just as well to a world-State.}

The first section of this chapter explores the definition of the Self within the Lockean argument and examines its relationship with property. It suggests that the Lockean attraction to the preservation of property has its roots in a joint metaphysical and political attitude towards coping with individuation. In other words, it is established on logical grounds that are well beyond reduction to the context of an apologetic defence of the bourgeoisie\footnote{The conception of Locke as a trumpet for bourgeoisie rhetoric can, according to Jeffery Isaac, be traced back to Karl Marx’s interpretation and is forcefully reiterated in C.B. Macpherson’s work.}. Instead, it is maintained that his defence of property is intended to defuse social difficulties that arise out of the condition of individuation. Contrary to the Hobbesian stance, which as I have argued, seeks to escape the ‘cancer’ of individuation by its surgical elimination, it is proposed that Locke is instead prescribing medication for the condition. For Hobbes, individuation is a terminal condition, which if left untreated, will drag society back into the ‘social death’ that is the unproductive war of all against all. By contrast, for Locke we must make the most of the condition of individuation, precisely because we escape it only when we die.

The second section explores the extent to which the Lockean individuated self survives in Locke’s political framework. It address Jean Hampton’s allegation that the Lockean self, much like the Hobbesian self, must be suppressed in order to
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avoid the ‘paradox of sovereignty’, namely, the circularity that afflicts the argument for the establishment of authority, unless the subjects forfeit their autonomy. It is here argued that although Locke may not have addressed the issue directly, his system of electoral representation and his affinity with constitutionalism, resolve much of the paradox.

In the third section the role of the State as a vessel of memory is explored. It is suggested that the State acts to counter the inherent temporality of the self and the property attached to this self. Borrowing from Locke’s metaphysical discussion of identity and personal continuity, it is argued that the State safeguards the collapse of the rational individual into a momentary, discontinuous being that cannot hope to hold on to property and is thus stripped of selfhood. It is maintained that the State quite literally assures the integrity of individuals, thereby enabling their trust in strangers. Again, Locke’s position is contrasted with Hobbes’s, which is portrayed as a political expression of Berkeley’s solution to the continuous identity debate.

The key to the differences is identified as the human relationship with the time continuum, and the numbing effect that frequent erratic changes may have on rational individuals. Hobbes proposes, in effect, to stop the flow of time by means of an all-powerful consistent form of rule that emulates the ever-present, all-knowing God, whereas Locke offers to manage time by institutional continuity. The institutional function of the State as a registrar for undisputed information is further


I appreciate that this is a controversial statement. After all Berkeley was a staunch immaterialist whereas Hobbes is widely identified with materialism. Yet as I have stressed continually, the monist position adopted by Hobbes cannot help but upset his materialism. Moreover, what is advanced is not
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explored, identifying it not only as a stepping stone for the conservation of stability and perhaps the source for the implementation of fairness, but also potentially as a means towards the assurance of heritage, as a vehicle that vicariously allows rational individuals to take part, and therefore take an interest, in happenings beyond their lifetimes. Hence the State is not only a provider of a secure stable environment in which to live and form property, it also acts to repress considerations of our eventual demise, preventing them from 'eating away' at our motivation to contribute our property offerings to the world.

The fourth section is a prelude to the following chapter, which is concerned with the perdurance of elements of human activity that appear to be irreducible to 'cold currency'. The difficulty is introduced by examining the issue of Land ownership and the implications of the commodification of Land. It is argued that perdurance of Land by its commodification would effectively acknowledge a right to secession, thereby undermining the entire construct of the State.

6.1 The Self and Property

Prompted by his friend William Molyneux (Kaufman 2006: 1), in the second edition of the Essay Locke included the additional chapter Diversity and Identity. This chapter has been extensively discussed and continues to set the tone in the metaphysical debate on the nature of the identity of objects and persons (Lowe 1995: that Berkeley and Hobbes actually had a shared metaphysical outlook, but rather that there are similarities between the role of God as the producer of both infinity and continuity in their reasoning.
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This section touches upon Locke’s ideas of personal identity in order to establish a proposed crossover between these metaphysical views and his intertwined political ideas of self and property. It is maintained that both rely on an understanding of the human condition as a confused dualistic one. It is a condition that can neither deny its immaterial origin, nor escape the spatio-temporal continuum in which it has been trapped. The concept of property figures prominently in the discussion, very much mirroring Max Milam’s attempt to demonstrate a consistency between Locke’s political theory and his epistemology, based upon a shared principle of property (Milam 1991 (1967)).

Locke’s dualism is manifested in his resistance to the corporeal reduction of living organisms. He appreciates that ‘the living’ do not retain their bodily constitution, yet seem to persist in our minds. Consider that over the seasons we continue to perceive the tree outside our window as the same tree, although it continually sheds its ‘skin’: changing its colour, gaining and losing physical dimensions, and so forth. He is therefore led to conclude that the source of persistence relates to our mental picture of the corporeal as a sequence of connected occurrences.

For this organisation, being at any one instant in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life, which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organisation, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united. (Locke 1997 (1690): 298 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II, Ch. XXVII §6)
For the most part we ‘connect the spatio-temporal dots’ collected by our sensory faculties and deposited in our memory, either causally or by means of probability. We stretch these events and organisms across a temporal continuance, thereby achieving their perdurance. As noted earlier (Ch. 3, p.76) the term ‘perdurance’ was introduced into the persistence discussion by David Lewis in order to denote persistence that has a stretched temporal dimension. Still, as Garth Kemerling observes: ‘So long as our knowledge of bodies is derived from the observable qualities of bodies, in ignorance of their internal features and operations, we can have no certain universal knowledge of the material world.’ (Kemerling 2001: Nature/The Natural World). It would appear that if we come close to universal knowledge of anything at all, we would do so with regard to ourselves, since in this special case we would conceivably be jointly aware of the self and its bodily manifestation.

While as far as existence in this world is concerned Locke does subscribe to a dualist position that entertains a difference between bodies and souls or selves, he appears to hold the view that, at least until death, they cannot be entirely divorced. Although certainly not one and the same, they appear to be interrelated, as if the body were a material extension of the self, or perhaps more accurately a shadow of it. Locke may very well have been trying to make the point that our material existence and actions shadow our immaterial intentions, and we must therefore take

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121 For a thorough discussion of why organisms and events in Locke perdure whereas atoms and masses are perdurance/endurance neutral see (Conn Locke on Essence and Identity 2003: Ch.5)

Consider that it is Locke’s dualist position that allows for the differentiation between the animate and the inanimate, a distinction that it is worth noting is impossible for Hobbes. It is perhaps this monistic unity that has led to his strong association with materialism; an association which is continually questioned herein.

122 As opposed to the afterlife.
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responsibility for them. He is concerned with discounting magical accounts or ones that lend themselves to placing a wedge between the material and the immaterial. As Kemerling notes:

...Locke took great pains in showing the Cartesian account of human nature, as an immaterial thinking substance existing in uneasy alliance with a differentiated portion of material universe, is inadequate for the allocation of just punishment to the same moral agent who commits an immoral act. Several of Locke’s notorious “puzzle cases” are intended precisely to undermine any attempt at a Cartesian explanation of moral accountability. [Essay II xxvii 10-14] (Kemerling 2001: Moral Agents).

I leave the intricacies of Locke’s puzzles to scholars of metaphysics. For my purposes it is sufficient to recognise that Locke considered personal memory as both the source of identity and a record that matches causes in the past with future consequences. On a personal, isolated level, identity would be an account that pertains both to internalities of the self to which one would have introspective access, and to externalities of the self derived from sensory data, the link between the two stemming from the attachment of one’s body to one’s mind. On an interpersonal level, there would be a ‘Rashomon Effect’. Since in interpersonal engagement one is limited to the perception of externalities accessed via sensory data, each party to the encounter would resort to conjecture as to the relation between the perceived

123 See also Karl Olivecrona: ‘Here we have a most unequivocal expression of the idea that the personality is extended to encompass physical objects.’ (Olivecrona Apropiation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property 1991 (1974): 319)
124 On a light hearted note, James Matthew Barrie may have hinted at this demand for responsibility when he depicted Wendy sewing Peter’s shadow onto him in his famous Peter Pan tale.
125 The term ‘Rashomon Effect’ was popularised following Akira Kurosawa’s film ‘Rashomon’. In the film Kurosawa questions the existence of a single truth by posing four equally plausible, yet

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world, and the intentions or persona behind them. Assuming that the individuals taking part in the encounter are not identical (e.g. twins), their exchange would either lead to the imposition of one side’s conjectures on the other, or in the absence of an impartial referee, to outright conflict. In comes the State to sort our memories and avoid discord.

For Locke, we require the establishment of the State in order to act as a mechanism for the preservation of the extended self. That is, the self and its property shadow. As Locke states unequivocally:

The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end why they chuse and authorise a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for it may never be supposed to be the will of society, that the legislative should have the power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by entering into society (Locke 1980 (1690): 111 Second Treatise of Government Ch. XIX §.222)

I argued earlier that Hobbes’s argument for the State cannot be reduced to corporeal safety concerns. Indeed, I asserted that remedying the insecurity of the state of nature has more to do with enabling prosperity than with removing the physical threat of death. I maintained that for Hobbes the state of nature was a sorry, but not an impossible condition in which to exist. The question that arises is whether the Hobbesean and Lockean theories converge on the rationale for the establishment of the State.

conflicting, testimonies to a criminal event, including: a raped woman, the alleged perpetrator, an onlooker, and even the woman’s murdered husband via the assistance of a medium.
I will not deny that there is a strong parallel between the rationale I have proposed for the Hobbesean State and the one that is supported by the above interpretation of Locke. Both enact the State in order to address the problem of continuous identity. They both require a solution to the problem of the ‘fleeting integrity’ of individuated beings. As I will reiterate shortly, once individuated beings have the autonomy to assert themselves, they might very well reinvent themselves, thereby causing havoc in interpersonal relations. The State is the provider of the integrity that would otherwise be absent from these interpersonal engagements. Yet, there is a crucial difference between the preservation offered by Hobbes’s State and the one offered by Locke’s.

Recall the difference between perdurance and endurance (p. 76) as suggested by David Lewis and implemented here. Briefly, endurance allows for preservation by setting the characteristics of a body in stone, whereas perdurance is open to change in the characteristics, as long as there is an external observer that can guarantee its identity. I would argue that Hobbes offers preservation of the integrity of individuated beings through a mechanism that provides endurance. As I asserted earlier the Hobbesean State is one in which all motion, and by extension all change, has been brought to a halt. It freezes a ‘shot’ of the world and establishes an infinite loop wherein that very same frame is continuously fed back into individuals’ perception. It creates the ultimate in conservative scenarios, thereby generating predictability that eliminates the stress associated with the unknown. As long as the subjects obey the sovereign they can remain at peace, as the world is guaranteed to unfold itself in a predetermined fashion. By contrast, Locke offers preservation of individuated beings by means of perdurance. Their identity and by extension their
integrity is held in check, as opposed to being held constant, by the institution of the State. The individuals submit to this new external body’s ‘observation’, in order to referee problems that might occur in interpersonal exchange. The State is an honest broker that works according to procedures that are laid out in the open.

6.2 The represented Self – Is self-ownership fictitious?

The difference between Hobbes and Locke in the method applied by the State to preserve identity has implications for the sort of State that they envisage. Hobbes’s position requires the ruling body to gain an absolute control over events. At least publicly, there can be no lengthy discussion and no swaying of opinion, there needs to be just a single line of governance. The Hobbesean reasoning behind this absolutist stance is expressed in Margaret Cavendish’s renunciation of democratic rule. Among other arguments she states that such rule would be so ‘Inconstant’ as to have no ‘Assurance’ (Cavendish, Orations, in Boyle 2006: 282). In other words, it would not generate the degree of stability necessary in order to secure social peace. Locke’s position does not demand anything near the control required by Hobbes’s. Admittedly, in order not to render perdurance meaningless, it needs to curtail the possibility of constant appeals to change in identity or opinion. It does so however by putting in place certain procedures. For example, in the realm of registration of change in opinion, the electoral procedure places constraints on the intervals in which one can apply one’s change to the registrar. In turn ‘fair play’ is achieved by constitutional elements that discourage the frequent amendment of the procedures themselves.
However, Jean Hampton argues that both Hobbes’s and Locke’s positions suffer from the ‘paradox of sovereignty’, the problem of explaining how the people can be both the master of their ruler and yet subject to her. Hampton illustrates the difficulty by way of the metaphor of a babysitter and a group of unruly children (Hampton 1997: 63). The situation of the people vis-à-vis the ruler is portrayed as circular. The babysitter is appointed to take charge of the unruly children, yet it would appear that the unruly children in Locke are in charge of appointing the babysitter. So who is in charge of whom? There certainly is something circular about the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in an agency system. One could even suggest that such a relationship is inherently circular. The tension this puts on stability, as I have suggested above, has been more or less alleviated in modern agency regimes, by setting up cyclic intervals at which the unruly children are allowed a limited amount of intervention. That said, it is a matter of fact that this limit is constantly being questioned in contemporary debates over representation.

In recent years technological development has rejuvenated direct rule through various forms of gauging public opinion, from opinion polls to referendums to e-government. More and more the unruly children are referred to as clients and the services provided as products. This semantic shift no doubt reflects an attempt to emulate the private sector, hoping to mimic their productivity and quality of service; a reaction to the dubious name politicians have gained. This popular, or rather populist, trend undermines one of the agency relationship’s most treasured ‘side effects’, the responsibility and accountability that Machiavelli identified in it (See Balaban 1990). As the general public interjects more and more into the ruling realm, the rulers do much less ruling and much more serving, to the point where they
become mere servants that obey commands. But did we not instate them because we
could not command ourselves?

Locke can be said to have steered clear of direct rule\textsuperscript{126}, and by doing so
circumvented much of the paradox. Yet in order to avoid it altogether, one would
need to adopt a somewhat unconventional and limited notion of representation. A
rule of representatives is often taken quite literally to mean that we elect agents to do
our bidding, as if we do the ruling through them (Hampton 1997: 106). But if they
are doing our exact bidding, how can they be expected to overcome the conflicts
between our biddings that prevented us from doing our bidding ourselves in the first
place? In order to avoid the recurrence of conflict, they would seem to need to
dissociate themselves from us, or at least from our direct requests. But then in what
sense do they represent us?

Here I must agree with Hampton that if they represent us at all, they do so in
a very limited manner. However, Hampton is wrong to commit Locke to any stronger
‘moment by moment’ notion of representation, giving rise to instability as discontent
that quickly translates into the language of misrepresentation.

He himself comments on this:

\begin{quote}
… such revolutions happen not upon every mismanagement in public affairs.

Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{126}His writings may be seen as very much in accord with Hampton’s own statement about America:
\end{flushright}

‘So our government is by the people, for the people and of the people – except that this last
preposition is misleading. Unlike in ancient Athens, in the United States most of us aren’t actually in
the government; only a few of us are. What makes this a government “of the people” is the fact that
built into the governing convention are not only rules that define the object political game but also
rules that grant the people the power to create and dissolve portions of the object political game if the
choose to do so at relatively little cost.’

See (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997: 107).
slips of human frailty will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under and see whither they are going, it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the end for which government was at first erected… (Locke 1980 (1690): 113 Second Treatise of Government Ch.XIX §. 225)

In this respect it is important to make a distinction, as I believe Locke does, between two types of breach of contract: a breach in good faith, and a malicious breach. In more political terms these would correspond to a majority rule policy change versus a revolution. We may be inclined to think that the policy of the current regime hurts our property, however, unless the regime is acting with malicious intent, we would not be justified to revolt against its authority.

We now come again to touch upon the question of the extent of the ruler’s authority. An issue that Hampton claims is exacerbated by the following statement:

It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out his estate his proportion of the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent – i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them. For if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government; for what property have I in that which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself? (Locke 1980 (1690): 74 Second Treatise of Government Ch. XI §140)
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In order to get a clearer picture of the troublesome aspects that Hampton identifies, it might be helpful to break this argument down.

Step 1: A self-centered justification of taxes, without which public goods cannot be provided.

Step 2: Qualification of the right to levy taxes, the logic of which connects with the previous step: since property is by definition exclusive to the property owner, only he can relinquish its ownership by means of consent.

Step 3: Consent is defined as majority rule.

Step 4: Majority rule is enacted either directly or indirectly.

Step 5: Contrasting ‘his own authority’ – illegitimate authoritarian tyrannical rule – with ‘consent authority’, i.e. legitimate majority rule.

Step 1 is rather straightforward and I think raises little concern. Step 2 is an integral part of Locke’s understanding of the notion of property. While it may be opposed on various grounds, it does not seem to raise a problem within Locke’s own system and the argument he is proposing. Step 3 is troubling as it stands on the shaky obligatory grounds of majority rule. One could try to resort to justifying it by means of practicality, submitting that it is entirely arbitrary, but extremely useful for ending endless discussion. Yet a disturbingly similar argument can be made to justify authoritarian rule. So if step 5 is to be maintained, the legitimacy of majority rule needs to be recast more solidly. Step 4 may be understood in two fashions: one would be an advocacy of both direct or indirect rule with regard to policy making, the other is that these two options are presented as a means of achieving authority in
general and not, as Hampton would have it, in each particular instance of tax levy. To conclude this point, I believe Hampton puts too much emphasis on steps 4 and 5, whereas the true problem lies elsewhere – in step 3.

Still, we remain at a loss as to the sense in which representation is being employed, perhaps because we too often envisage representation according to the ancient Greek model, in the sense that ruling actions are either dictated by the public, or at the least represent a compromise that the prevailing majority of the population would adopt. Locke’s interpretation of representation is a much more modest one. For him to represent means to adhere to certain basic ideals, not to be swept by current agendas. Representation is maintained as long as the ruler reveres the sanctity of the self. It is important to note that this is a departure from Hobbes, who believes the ruler, by definition, represents the united interest of the selves. However, all in all Locke’s understanding of what representation entails is quite similar to Hobbes’s. The ruler’s positions are not dictated by the people; instead the ruler, like the entrepreneur, must innovate, and only over time, through elections, is his ingenuity assessed by his public. It is perhaps this superficial convergence that has contributed to the disregard of the completely opposing perspectives of pluralism and holism respectively, which coincidently lead to a similar conclusion.

6.3 The State as an answer to continuous identity problems

In the famous metaphysical debate between Berkeley and Locke, Berkeley asserts that human identity is preserved thanks to God’s omnipresence:
There is therefore some other mind wherein they [sensible things] exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows, there is an omnipresent, external Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules as he himself has ordained, and are by us termed the laws of nature. (Berkeley 2004 (1713): 201 Three Dialogues between Hylas an Philonous).

It is God’s eternal gaze that integrates us and allows us to subsist. He is the source of the human perception of individuation, the keeper of order and the lord of time. In Berkeley’s view we constitute no more than immaterial projections made in God’s image; without the safekeeping he provides, we would literally disintegrate, meshing into indiscernible singularity. God not only enables plurality, but is the conduit for memory and uninterrupted consciousness.

The consequences of interrupted memory and consciousness are well demonstrated in the short story *Memento Mori* by Jonathan Nolan and its subsequent film adaptation *Memento*. Due to an ‘incident’ the main protagonist of the story suffers from the inability to form a continuum of new memories. He has not lost the basic cognitive skills acquired throughout his past, but he is incapable of recording and subsequently recalling events beyond his current waking state. His world disintegrates every time his attention is distracted. As a result he loses touch with time, he is trapped in the ‘here and now’ of the moment:

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127 See also (Johnson *Personal survival and the closest-continuer theory* 1997: 10)
But you're different. You're more perfect. Time is three things for most people, but for you, for us, just one. A singularity. One moment. This moment. Like you're the center of the clock, the axis on which the hands turn. Time moves about you but never moves you. It has lost its ability to affect you. What is it they say? That time is theft? But not for you. Close your eyes and you can start all over again. Conjure up that necessary emotion, fresh as roses. (Nolan 2001)

Nolan is not strictly speaking ‘out of time’, for he is not dead and he keeps waking up; nevertheless, his autonomous existence is in jeopardy. By laying a physical trail of documented evidence in the form of Polaroids and notes, he hopes to artificially secure the continuity of his identity. However, he soon realises that these ‘facts’ are untrustworthy, his condition having left him prey to the manipulation of the ‘strangers’ he encounters every time his mind is ‘reset’. He is essentially being programmed by others, his independent existence has been placed in question.

Gabriella Slomp argues convincingly that Hobbes’s political thought is an attempt to solve an identity problem similar to that with which Nolan confronts his protagonist.

In the Hobbesean state of nature, a person’s identity is endangered in two ways: (i) in a crude and drastic sense: physical life is threatened; (ii) in a more sophisticated sense the ability of the mind to detach itself from the present and to plan the future is wasted. For Hobbes the state of nature is a state of uncertainty, where one cannot trust anybody and least of all one’s experiences of the past…In other words in the state of nature people are victim of the present; the time of the mind is forced to coincide with the time of nature, which for Hobbes is the present. (Slomp 2000: 20).
She even suggests a thought experiment of remarkable similarity to Nolan’s storyline in order to uncover the crucial importance of imagination and memory for Hobbes’s conception of man:

Let us suppose that the ability of the mind to store images of what we have perceived through our senses were to disappear. In other words let’s suppose that we had no imagination and thus when the object is removed, so is our consciousness of it. If we were conscious of external objects only at the very moment when they “act upon us” (i.e., if we had no memory), then each moment would be spent (and wasted) in making ourselves conscious of the elementary objects around us. It is because what we have perceived has become knowledge that we can proceed to learn new things. Without memory, it would be as if we were reborn again at each moment. (Slomp 2000: 18).

Putting together Nolan’s and Slomp’s accounts of identity difficulty, consider a scenario in which we all suffer from this odd amnesia condition. This would be a world of ‘fooles’ in Hobbesian terms. Each individual might strive to maximise their gain between the moment they wake and the moment they fall asleep. Yet to what avail? Upon waking they would have no verifiable recollection of the previous day, neither of their gains nor losses, and would therefore repeat the cycle anew. Additionally, as noted both by Slomp (Slomp 2000: 20) and by Borris Henning (Henning 2005: 7), they could not be held responsible for their prior actions, since there could be no verifiable testimony to them. Even worse, if they were to have foresight of the recurring death-rebirth cycle, they might refrain from any action whatsoever, save one that leads to immediate gratification. Under such

\[128\] Not unlike the Buddhist state of Samsara.
circumstances, reduced to animal-like existence, one would live for the moment, attempting to pack as many pleasures into one day as possible.

If one were interested in putting an end to this unproductive and worthless condition, one would require a trusted vessel that is immune to memory loss as well as protected from manipulation. I would agree with Slomp that: ‘according to Hobbes the sovereign power is created to guarantee the minimal condition necessary to be a person, namely, physical continuity. But in order to guarantee physical integrity, each individual’s mental self-continuity has to be acknowledged in full so that rules can be enforced and punishment administered.’ (Slomp 2000: 20). However, it is unclear how a collection of individuals who all suffer from the same condition could produce an individual that does not, and Slomp never pursues this matter.

A natural candidate for such a role would be Berkeley’s all-seeing, all-knowing God. His records would be official and tamper–free. Yet, while his insulation from manipulation is a blessing, one could argue, as I have claimed Locke does, that it also makes the records themselves humanly impenetrable. While these records may be well and good for conducting the afterlife, they do little to communicate secure order in this life. Henning’s related insight, that: ‘In §20 [Essay II, xxvii], Locke only claims that I cannot be made responsible for something that I forgot “beyond a possibility of retrieving”. God will certainly be able to remind me of anything that I had better remember.’ (Henning 2005: 7), leads to the conclusion that in the absence of access to Godly memory, in order to rescue accountability one must construct an alternative stately one. Moreover, if one holds that the records are
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decipherable, one opens the door to Robert Filmer’s divine right theory, wherein would-be sovereigns could make claims to a direct link to the divine truth.

Hobbes’s solution, as has been proposed here, was to construct a replica of God on earth. Imitating the original, the facsimile’s records would require insulation from public distortion; however, unlike the original, the replica’s records would not be impenetrable to human reason. Devoid of contingent particulars the sovereign produces a solid trail of evidence, a set of causally connected authoritative Polaroids and notes that cannot be disputed. Trust among strangers is achieved via a synthesis of rational humans and a super-rational disinterested third party proxy. The sovereign issues an identity insurance policy to the citizens, one that assures them a non-collapsible span of existence. But unlike Nolan’s character who attempts to escape his condition by reintroducing himself to time, the ultimate security offered by Hobbes’s sovereign leaves no room for contingencies, effectively halting time. Although Hobbes’s social diagnosis is materialistic and individualistic, the state of relief he offers is strikingly similar to the Buddhist state of Nirvana, in which the suffering of an endless cycle of Samsara is escaped only by the annihilation of both time and self.

For Hobbes the acknowledgement of the fragility of the individual leads to a relinquishment of social aversion in favour of the creation of the State. Hobbes suggests that in the establishment of Statehood we surrender to the sovereign our power to hurt, thereby creating an aggregate of forces strong enough to put a stop to foolishness. The strict rational environment he argues for relieves the citizens of their worries by establishing a contingency-free existence. One remains secure because one appreciates that everyone has submitted themselves to a single legal decree.
Apprehension of what the future may hold is replaced by a trust in the sovereign’s ability to conserve over time, the conditions of the present. We become interested in the future, because the future promises to be very much like the here and now. It is a future that is firmly set within rules dictated by the sovereign; one that allows us to engage with each other according to predetermined causal rules.

An alternative view is offered by Locke in which rule is achieved by the accumulation of choice rather than of force. He would appear to reject the idea that one might accumulate enough force to counteract the miseries of the cycle of change and replace them with the soundness of perfection. For Locke, the shifts within the plurality of the material cannot be cured once and for all; instead they need to be managed. The key to such management is in an artificial institutional containment of the natural course of revolution, in the form of the controlled revolutionary act of voting and representational government. Locke is concerned with developing a workable material existence, not a heaven on earth. His sovereign is charged with manipulating time in order to appease an individuated condition that is left ‘wanting’.

Consider the three wantings Locke suggests are our motivation to give up a portion of choice towards the creation of the State:

a. There wants an established, settled, known law...and the common measure to decide controversies between them...

b. ...there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law...

c. ...there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and give it due execution.

( Locke 1980 (1690): 66 Second Treatise of Government §. 124,125,126)

Our wantings could be summarised as a deficiency in order and stability, a lack of institutionalisation, in modern terms. It can be said that we surrender to the
regulation of the State in order to realise our choices. The strength of these institutions is that they outlast us, thereby creating the stability we inherently lack. The transient particular that rules our existence is replaced by the perpetual general rule. Acknowledged public records are kept, and replace particular disputed ones. It follows that the trust invested in the State to settle disputes among individuals does not draw upon utilitarian considerations of the consolidation of law enforcement alone; rather it draws upon the benefits of the entire bureaucratic corpus of the State.

We register ourselves, our possessions and even our ideas with the State for the purpose of safekeeping. Subsequently, its records become an objective reference in cases of dispute. Delegating our protection to the State involves more than giving up arms against each other and surrendering them to the State, it also demands the surrender of information. The amount of information about ourselves that we surrender depends on how much ‘safekeeping’ we desire or require, and is a matter well worth discussion elsewhere; in any event there must be a minimal amount of information at the State’s disposal.

The State functions in a threefold manner: it collects and compiles information into its ‘memory’, creating public records for future use; it uses gathered information in order to gather even more information and to foresee future events, and it attempts to manipulate future events with the information at its disposal. The result is the creation of a stabilising factor in a seemingly chaotic world. This data collection apparatus arguably has the added value of enabling the implementation of fairness considerations. A concern highlighted by Rawls in contemporary political

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129 In the form of patents and copyrights.
discussion, it appears to be implied in Locke and his contemporaries, as is suggested by Lessnoff:

‘In summary, so far as the issue of self-interest is concerned, social contract theory occupies what might be called a middle-of-the-road position. Up to a point, it appeals to the self-interest of the individual (and certainly does not call for self-abnegation), in so far as self-interest is assumed to be the motive for contracting. But the standard of legitimacy that it proposes is not the self-interest of any individual, but rather a (hypothetical) contract that promotes or reconciles the interests of all concerned. Thus the theory appeals not only to self-interest, but also to a due concern for the interests of one’s fellows. It seeks to balance the equally legitimate interests of all. This fact, no doubt, accounts for the continuing popularity of the idea in present-day political discourse; and also makes intelligible the fact that the modern philosophical revival of contract theory has been, above all, as a theory of justice.’ (Lessnoff 1990: 121-122)

Fairness, whether in Locke or in Rawls, is an economic measure towards stability and a moral stance in itself; nonetheless, it is not a synonym of equality. On the contrary, fairness presupposes material inequality and acts as a mere countermeasure against it. Fairness is keeping track of the cards Fortuna\textsuperscript{130} has dealt us, and, over time, counterbalancing them. This is what differentiates fairness from the notion of revolution. Revolution needs no institutional backing, as it simply reshuffles the stack according to a prescribed ideology, whereas fairness must rely on the collective memory bank of State institutions in order to intervene in the turning of the wheel from time to time, subverting it from taking a turn for the worst. These

\textsuperscript{130} In the sense often employed by Machiavelli.
institutions follow our track record and compensate us accordingly via material redistribution.

However, the institution of the State goes beyond the general provision of stability and even beyond fairness. It provides a platform for our heritage. The State enables us to preserve the short impression our lives make on the world, allowing us to transfer our achievements to our kin\textsuperscript{131} by means of the State’s records and the general security it provides. Our kin being an extension of ourselves both on a biophysical level and on a cultural level, we are able to live on through them and through our other physical and mental ‘creations’ in this world. An enhanced version of Hobbes’s ‘aversion of death premise’, the motivation for the formation of the State, may be said to be transcending time. By transcending current events, we are able to take part in the future, either in the flesh or in spirit. We deposit our person and our possessions into the hands of the State, where they are held in safekeeping on the condition that we submit to the government of the State.

It is proposed here that the State is the caretaker of bodily continuity. The State contends with the difficulty presented by severed continuity, be it a momentary lapse as demonstrated in Nolan’s \textit{Memento}, or the inevitable, biological death (Johnson 1997: 1). It is anachronistically suggested that the State is employed to preserve personal identity as defined in Robert Nozick’s ‘closest continuer’ theory. Nozick devised the ‘closest continuer’ theory as a schema for elucidating competing identity claims. He is responding to the classic Ship of Theseus dilemma employed

\textsuperscript{131} This position is similar to that expressed by Edmund Burke with regard to the social contract: ‘As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.’ (Burke \textit{Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches} 2007 (1790): 566)
by Hobbes in *De Corpore*. In the tale, over an extended period, the Ship of Theseus goes through incremental repairs and over time all of its bits and pieces are gradually replaced with spare parts. Yet instead of disposing of these bits and pieces, they are individually refurbished and attached to each other, until a competitor for the title ‘The Ship of Theseus’ is formed. Nozick claims that incremental changes to an original identity do not confuse us, unless we are confronted with a competing claim for the same identity (Nozick 1981: 34). He goes on to suggest how we might solve such a problem by taking into account ‘closeness’ considerations such as causality, spatio-temporal continuity and retention of properties. Yet Nozick refrains from composing a strict formula for the closest continuer, instead offering criteria to be applied in a case by case manner.

It is here argued that the Lockean State is in place to assist with both the preservation of personal identity and the resolution of interpersonal identity disputes. In the first instance it is a trusted depository for the preservation of identity. As such it allows individuals to transcend their short life spans, and to concern themselves with a future in which they can take part vicariously. It supplements them with a continuity that they individually lack. In the second instance, relying somewhat on the accumulated records volunteered by its citizens, it provides a closest continuer procedure that resolves disputes between competitors over the same identity, which in the Lockean frame of mind extends to property.

Compare this with the Hobbesean view as presented above. Confronted with the instability of competing claims, the Hobbesean concludes that such claims are irreconcilable. Still, far from giving up on the prospect of a peaceful existence, he proposes to eliminate the conflict by rooting out its source. He traces back competing
identity claims to the motion of change and its partner individuation. He eliminates the dilemma of The Ship of Theseus by disbarring the element of change that gives rise to it. In order to perform this feat he requires an all powerful State that would contain change. By contrast the Lockean State is a measure for living with motion and change. The Lockean position engages with the difficulties presented by the corporeal restrictions of time and space, while the Hobbesean position proposes to escape them altogether.

6.4 Property and Land

It has been suggested here that depositing one’s property for safekeeping with the State allows for its perdurance. Yet Jean Hampton has identified an inconsistency in the Lockean attitude towards property, which has yet to be addressed here. She asserts that on the one hand, Locke undoubtedly argues that property rights precede the State, and consequently that the State lacks any claim of possession over Land; on the other hand, the Lockean stance places Land under direct governmental jurisdiction, when it denies individuals, even ones who have only given their tacit consent to its establishment, the right to take the Land with them if they choose to leave the State.

I believe that Hampton is misreading Locke on Property, and specifically on the crucial issue of Land possession. This leads her to a paradox, which on a different reading of Locke does not arise. I would argue that there are substantial grounds for thinking that Locke distinguished between the right to the benefits of Land and the
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right to the Land itself. Admittedly, taken at face value, Locke’s own statement in the *Second Treatise of Government* would seem to refute my claim: ‘But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest, I think it is plain that property in that, too, is acquired as the former.’ (Locke 1980 (1690): 21 Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §32). However, a more careful reading, in the context of Chapter V in its entirety, reveals that ‘the earth’ is only property in so much as it ‘carries all the rest’. The title to ‘the earth’ is an instrumental form of property, rather than an essential one. In fact there are strong reasons for holding that Locke believed that the right to Land belonged to God and not to man. George Gale proposes that in Locke Land falls under a complex category of multiple ownership. At the least, Land is owned dually by individuals and government, although ultimately it is subject to God (Gale 1991 (1973): 515). Indeed, Locke, relying heavily on the Scriptures throughout the *Treatise*, never expressly states that God gave up his right to the Land. Rather, it may be inferred (Locke 1980 (1690): 21 Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §34) that Locke holds that God, out of his

132 This position is, I believe, shared by Alan Ryan when he contrasts Locke with Kant: ‘Locke’s mode of argument reverses Kant’s – Kant sees ownership as a claim to sovereignty over the substance of external things and therefore sees landownership as prior to ownership of crops, which are “accidents”; this is a thoroughly Romanised conception. Locke builds up towards ownership in the full, liberal sense defined by Honoré, by extending the functional requirements of “use”’ (Ryan *Locke on Freedom: some second thoughts* 1988: 44)

133 While this presentation makes use of the concept of God in a way I believe to be shared by Locke, it does not rely on a belief in God or on a belief in the stories of the Scriptures. One could easily test this by replacing every occurrence of ‘God’ with ‘No Man’ or ‘Non Man’. It is worth noting that doing so is in stark contradiction to the views of Alan Ryan and Shirley Robin Letwin summed up by Lauchlan Chipman’s statement that:

‘If a secularist analysis of the defence of the institution of private property can be constructed, it will be [read: can only be] essentially non-Lockean’ (Letwin *John Locke–liberalism and natural law* Ibid.: 59)
benevolence, allowed man to benefit from the Land after his banishment from the Garden of Eden and into the hardships of the state of nature.

This position is reiterated in Menachem Lorberbaum’s comments (Lorberbaum 2003: 22) on the idea of the holiness of the Land in (Lev. 25:12,23):

‘That fiftieth year shall be a jubilee for you…It shall be holly to you…But the land must not be sold without reclaim, for the land is Mine; you are but strangers [gerim] resident [toshavim] with Me.’ [My Highlights].

Clearly the only conclusion to draw from the Locke’s text is Lorberbaum’s:

‘Holiness here severely limits entitlement. Ownership is here a divine attribute; it precludes human ownership…The land does not belong to the people; it is God’s.’ In an endnote (Lorberbaum 2003: 35 note 6) Lorberbaum addresses the stress this puts on ownership of any kind, since other passages in the Scriptures suggest that the entire universe belongs to God. This raises the question of how, on Locke’s account, man can gain recognised possession of anything at all. To which he replies with his famous ‘mixing of labour’ argument (Locke 1980 (1690): 19 Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §27). While the same ‘mixing of labour’ rationale is used by Locke to justify entitlement both to benefits from the Land and to the Land itself, it is still possible to argue that the same action creates two distinct forms of property. Moreover, I would argue that unless Locke makes this qualification to property rights, the State will have to acknowledge a basic right to secession, which would inevitably erode the State’s existence.

But if Land belongs to God, how can the State make claim to it? Clearly it cannot. The State is a man-made construct, not a heavenly one, and therefore by
definition cannot gain rights of possession over Land. It does, however, have the capacity to gain authority or dominion over it, since its artificial authority is achieved through consent. Still the question remains, why a retraction of tacit consent to the authority of the State by its inhabitants would not also automatically release Land from any obligation\textsuperscript{134}. Why does Land seem to be bound to the State ‘once and for all’ by mere tacit consent?

Allowing individuals to withdraw from the State with the Land from which they benefit, is granting an effectual right of secession\textsuperscript{135}. By accepting the right to secession ‘willy-nilly’, Land becomes a commodity to be sold, in auction format, to the highest bidding sovereign. Quite apart from the sacrilegious aspects\textsuperscript{136} of this action, this would not only result in a conflict between self-declared sovereigns, but would also promote a state of war between non-aspiring individuals. As long as Land is not reduced to a commodity, the right to the Land’s benefits remains secure. However, if the right to the Land’s benefits is secondary to the right to the Land, then it is easy to see why the lack of criteria of ownership, together with the prospective gains to be had by pledging the ‘Land’s allegiance’ to a certain sovereign, would result in a feud over it.

The implications of Land commoditisation don’t stop there. Consider the following three scenarios:

\textsuperscript{134} One could attempt to resolve these questions by arguing that the State’s authority over Land cannot be revoked by tacit consenters, since they never enacted it. Rather they were placed under the authority of the State by an act perpetrated by express consenters. But this logical parlour-trick comes at a price. It would put into question to what extent tacit consent is consent at all – See also (Plamenatz \textit{Man & Society} 1963: 227).

\textsuperscript{135} Although Locke himself does not follow up on this point, by disenfranchising Land from individuals he is laying the groundwork for negating irredentist claims by minorities.
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i. **Egalitarian**

*Express consenters*, like their tacitly consenting counterparts, are allocated the right to Land itself. In this case the argument above carries over to *express consenters* and for the reasons there mentioned the path to dissolving the State and a return to the state of nature has been set.

ii. **Free Market**

The Land assets held by *tacit consenters* are free of constraints. It follows that such assets may have higher value than those held by *express consenters*. The added value may attract the buy-out of the *express consenters* by *tacit consenters*, thereby literally undermining the State.

iii. **Restricted Market**

Only *express consenters* are allocated Land rights. This scenario effectively drains *tacit consenters* of any constituency. Even if tacit consenters are left the right to benefit from the Land, they become subordinate to the Lands’ owners, so there is good reason to believe they will be coerced into express consent. A similar argument works for children (the natural constituency of ‘tacit consenters’ as they have yet to develop the rational capacity that would allow them to give their express consent). Under a restricted market, fortunate children can only inherit their fathers’ Land through express consent. Less fortunate children would only inherit their fathers’

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136 Bear in mind that on my reading of Locke, regarding Land as a commodity is an act of sacrilege, or in secular terminology a contradiction of terms. By definition the Land itself never exchanges
subordinated right to benefit from the Land. While this scenario leaves the State in tact, it makes a mockery of the concept of consent, and moreover of liberty itself.

Avoiding the commoditisation of Land would seem to be essential both to the makeup of Lockean theory and to an escape from the inconsistency suggested by Hampton. Additionally it fits the view, to be introduced in the following chapter, that Lockean theory indirectly endorses a Nation State rather than merely a State. Since the Lockean State is defined by its enablement of the preservation of identity by means of commodification conservation, it is not equipped to deal with the preservation of matters of identity that have no monetary value. The division between the Land and the proceeds from it leaves the Land outwith the hold of the State. The difficulties discussed above create a demand for a body of identity that corresponds with jurisdiction of the State and preserves the annex of non-commodified property, one that, as shall be argued shortly, reinforces the State rather than challenging it.

hands, rather it is the right to benefit from the Land that is being bought and sold.
Chapter 7. Locke: The Nation – A depository of Heritage

Conventionally Locke’s position has been allied with the cosmopolitan camp, yet the legal scholar Jeremy Rabkin textually and conceptually demonstrates that Locke’s epistemological ‘nurture’ approach lends itself to the adoption of a cultural nationalist position. The cultural differentiation between societies, that Rabkin claims (Rabkin 1997: 308) carries over to Locke’s moral theory. Furthermore, he finds that Locke’s statements on property, and especially his contentions as to the right of the conquered to reclaim their property under their own ‘banner’137, could be construed as an outright endorsement of ‘national rights’. While he concedes that Locke’s theory offers aliens legal safeguards, and that conquerors would not necessarily abuse the strictly legal aspect of property ownership, he finds Locke to be implying that property under a consented sovereignty holds added value.

Making much of what he recognises as a striking parallel between property and nationhood, and controversially associating Locke’s perception of ‘society’ with a perception of nation (Rabkin 1997: 315), he views Locke’s government as an instrument for the effective administration and increased efficiency in the trade of naturally occurring property, as well as the sophistication of the semi-natural ‘pre-political agreement to band together’. Finally, he draws further confidence from the coherence between his position and the one that emerges from Nathan Tarcov’s study of the fence metaphor invoked by Locke (Tarcov 1981), indicating a

137 ‘the people who are the descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off and free themselves from
propensity towards division and borders, thereby uniting concepts of property and nationality again.

Rabkin appreciates his position is not without difficulties. He recognises that stressing the familial descent aspect of nationalism weakens the Lockean argument for rule by consent, playing into the hands of Filmer’s *Patriarcha*. He is equally aware that strongly insisting on ‘the pre-existing cultural unity’, invites troubling questions as to its original source. Still, he remains convinced that: ‘It is not political constitution that makes a nation, in Locke’s account, but the prior existence of a nation that makes it possible to have a liberal constitution.’ (Rabkin 1997: 317). But apart from a few communitarian hints\(^{138}\), the aforementioned ‘added value’ he alludes to with regard to property under a government with which one is affiliated, is not sufficiently theoretically grounded. Moreover, the importance of his identification of a relation between property and nationality not withstanding, I think he exaggerates the parallel between the two.

Relying too heavily on sporadic textual evidence of Locke’s national inclinations, he fails to demonstrate that the strong theoretical grounds on which one may claim that for Locke property is pre-political, carry over to nationality. Furthermore, had the parallel between property and nationality been as strong as he suggests, one would expect the State to take on a similar role in both respects. Yet the administrative efficiency-enhancing role of the State in relation to property does not have a clear-cut parallel in nationality. I struggle to imagine how the advantage

\(^{138}\) He is hesitant to pursue these, no doubt, fearing inconsistency with Locke’s insistence on a consent-based society.
of ‘care-free’ trade mediated by the State is transferred to a comparable advantage in nationality, unless one reduces nationality to an extreme individualist form similar to that expressed by Robert Nozick (See Hampton 1997: 62). Moreover, Rabkin struggles to explain the emergence of a multiplicity of particular nationalities out of a potential joint global national pool that corresponds to a seemingly global Lockeian society. While Locke may very well have had a national division in mind, the theoretical foundation for it needs to be uncovered; it can’t be assumed to be self-evident.

That said, I agree with Rabkin, that Locke has been misclassified as a precursor to cosmopolitanism, probably due to his focus on natural law with a seemingly universal application that has been re-labelled in contemporary discourse as universal human rights. I am not disputing Locke’s contribution to the development of the concept of human rights. I do, however, claim that if one wishes to attach human rights to some political body of a cosmopolitan nature, one cannot do so on the basis of Locke’s theory. Indeed, I wish to demonstrate that his metaphysical stance is incompatible with such a form of governance.

In an effort to distance Locke from the proto-cosmopolitan outlook he has been attributed with, this chapter examines the limits of the solution offered to ‘future anxious individuals’ by the Lockean State. It reveals that the State can only preserve the individuals’ past and present by converting it into currency and commodifying it. The “advantage” of currency is its inherent artificiality. Currency, or money, does not succumb to the forces of natural degradation that face mortal beings. It might be susceptible to artificial loss in its valuation, however, this can be compensated for by the artificial manipulation of interest rates. By transcending the
effects of time, effectively achieving immortality, currency becomes an instrument of vicarious perdurance. This invaluable trait facilitates care-free inter-personal exchange, as well as cross-generational inheritance. By opening the future, it makes sense of investing in the present.

Still this chapter argues that the ‘service’ provided by the State does not satisfy the full extent of human preservation requirements. The chapter explores forms of property that individuals strive to preserve although they are inconvertible into currency. It links such forms of property to the human restriction to a single space in time. Unlike the constriction to time, however, the constriction to space does not seem to be either controllable (Hobbes), or manageable (Locke). It is outwith the administrative capacity of the State. The capacity to bank immaterial legacy must therefore lie elsewhere. The chapter therefore goes on to identify various types of associations that have been historically entrusted with the preservation of non-commodities, suggesting that the nation may have emerged as dominate because it forms the perfect match, in terms of size and counterbalance to the State. Moreover, it proposes that with the exception of certain historical contingencies, the most notable of which is The United States of America, resetting national heritage might act as a ‘spoiler’ to social contribution on the part of the human rational individual, since it would at least partially rob him of the pursuit of continuum.

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139 Just as you would reset a computer and return it to original virgin state, an emptied out platform that can be reprogrammed with content.
7.1 The National Continuum\textsuperscript{140}

I have suggested in the previous chapter that the State is enacted as a countermeasure against the inherent temporality of human existence. Consequently, its first order of business, as identified by Hobbes and concurred to by Locke, is prolonging the life expectancy of its constituency by way of keeping the peace. Keeping citizens out of harm’s way involves mediating potential conflict with others both within and outwith the State’s sovereign borders. This is achieved, as noted by Locke, by the State taking the form of a registrar that serves to watch over social integrity. Acting against those reckless individuals who threaten social stability, it allows the law-abiding counterparts to look away, or go to sleep\textsuperscript{141} and wake up in a largely unchanged environment, thus giving credence to the Hobbesean notion of the State as an anti-revolutionary, if not counter-revolutionary, measure.

This tempered stability establishes the minimal requirements for trust among strangers, thereby providing the perfect backdrop for future-oriented trade relationships. Devoid of State regulation, both individual identities and their association with goods would be in a state of constant flux, a state of revolution. Even staunch libertarians should concede that such is the situation not only in malfunctioning States, challenged by widespread corruption, in which one can reinvent one’s identity for a negligible amount of cash, but also in the common practice of untrustworthy individuals disguising their dubious past business

\textsuperscript{140} In the sense that has been repeatedly employed throughout this thesis, namely a continuity between the past, the present and the future, which both enables rational considerations and provides motivation for finite individuals to invest themselves in what is essentially a ‘fleeting reality’.
performance under the guise of a formally ‘new’ commercial entity. Perhaps this is why Hobbes, intent on providing the utmost in trust, was so adamant on discouraging any kind of reform outwith an original ‘once and for all’ constitutional moment. I have ventured so far as to say that he envisages a sovereign so powerful as to make even changes of time irrelevant. His ideal, super-rational ruler freezes time, and his ideal citizen acts accordingly to reinforce this welcomed condition in which planning is made worthwhile. Consequently, acting against an established lineage of stability is pronounced irrational.

I have argued that the impetus for Lockean social theory may have been a fear that Hobbes had positioned himself on a slippery slope of rationality that would inevitably lend itself to idealism, that Hobbes’s striving for perfection would result in unreal expectations from mere mortals and would ultimately lead to an imposition of the manufactured super-rationality of the sovereign on the natural, moderately rational individual. The Lockean alternative is a ruler who is potentially fallible, yet also attainable. It is a position that shifts the attention from perfect uninterrupted lineage as a source of stability, to the tradition of a ruling institution embodying an image of timelessness. On this account our real sense of time is not being negated; rather it is being managed. Through institutionalisation we harness time to our advantage, we make it productive by accumulating our actions and ‘banking’ them into a shared artificial currency form that we can exchange under the rules set by the State arbitrator.

141 Borrowing from George Berkeley’s attributions of God as noted here p.23, sec. 3, Ch. 6.
In the proposed Lockean understanding, the State does not act as a rational distillery, in the style of John Rawls, nor is its sole purpose, as suggested by Robert Nozick, the mere provision of corporal security. Rather, it performs the necessary function of a material banker. In the hope of defeating our individual inconsequentiality we commit ourselves (including lives, liberties and estates) to the State, for the purpose of safekeeping. As a ‘banking’ institution, in addition to sheltering our property from the natural elements and the harmful intentions of others, it offers a horizon for our individual contributions to this world. The State administers its banking by way of conversion into currency; it provides security by assuring us compensation in kind, in case our property is encroached upon. It is, however, by its own definition as a banker of currency, unable to preserve legacies that do not have a monetary value. Therefore, in order to fulfil its safekeeping function it would need to be complemented by a banker of non-material contributions to the world. It is suggested here that this role is fulfilled by the Nation.

Let us reconsider the solutions offered by Hobbes and Locke to a society populated by Nolan’s amnesia stricken ‘Mementonians’ (see above, section 3, Chapter 6). The future is availed to the populace of such a society by ensuring the integrity of its members. For the Hobbesean this is for the most part an assurance of corporeal continuity through the provision of security. One needs assurances that one might live to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour, otherwise the motivation to invest one’s labour in the world ceases. The ultimate in security is, however, achieved by extinguishing the threat of contingency. As the undisputed authority, the ruler issues his own image of the worldly order and if left undisturbed will continue to do so.

142 Taking on the role of the Temple as a sanctuary in ancient societies.
perpetually. We need not worry about our own continuity because the ruler vicariously supplies us with it, from the moment we are born to the day that we die. Even in our death the order that ruled us supposedly lives on.

Locke offers an alternative, less stifling, form of order. He opens the door to contingencies in the governing rules, save ones that might impinge upon the sanctity of property. One’s motivation to ‘mix one’s labour’ with the world is secured by the assurance that one’s efforts will not have been in vain. No one, not even the sovereign, will be able to unduly reap the benefits of their contribution to the world. Moreover, the institution of a common currency allows us to convert our activities, as extensions of ourselves, into an artificial, non-decaying medium, that may be transferred not only in the process of exchange, but as a cross-generational inheritance. Thus, while we as embodied creatures decay, the added value that we contribute to the world through the disembodied medium of money does not.

Indeed, much of the modern State’s responsibilities lie in the management of currency. It is charged with retaining the value of currency at a stable level by means of State banks. Additionally, it oversees currency transactions, and at least in civil proceedings, issues financial penalties to parties whose conduct has been out of order. Criminal proceedings, arguably, employ a currency of their own. Although they do not convert one’s actions into their artificial alienated monetary value, they do offer an orderly alternative to retaliatory vengeance, converting actions that impinge upon the sacredness of another’s property into restrictions upon the liberty
of the harming side. These might include varying measures against one’s property from having one’s assets frozen to being incarcerated.

Essentially the State, as Marx recognised, is an instrument of commodification by means of alienation. Valuation is achieved either by the means of the market or by the decree of law. Either way, once converted into a formulaic format, mathematical laws are assumed to apply. But what of activities that form elements of our property in the Lockean sense, but that are not easily convertible into currency? Consider religious beliefs, cultural practices, work etiquette or even the architectural aesthetic of city skylines. These defy commodification, and accordingly if we are to rationally justify our investment in them, we require an alternative proxy to carry them through time.

Historically this function has been carried out by a range of institutions: various churches have preserved beliefs; cultural practices and aestheticism have been sustained by appreciation societies; and production standards, as well as work etiquette, were at least originally, conserved by guilds. More recently, assisted by advances in communication technology, these types of associations have in many cases achieved the cross-border global membership that was not so long ago the preserve of religious churches. Much like the majority of religious churches, in an effort to fill their ranks, they have appealed to universal commonality that is dislodged from local, particular experiences. Yet these attempts to transcend borders have not been successful at dethroning boundary-defined national identity of its prominence, if not dominance, in the preservation of cultural identity.

143 In the Lockean extended sense of Lives, Liberties and Estates.
I would argue that by detaching themselves from the particulars of time and space, they have enlarged their potential constituency, but they have lost their foothold in reality as experienced by humans. Moreover, they have lost the sense of assurance that palpability, and more specifically the palpability of space, lends to experience. Once we attach ourselves to a palpable part of space, i.e. Land, we gain a sense of perdurance. Our own bodies might not survive, but through our connection with territory we can leave an impression on an alternative body that does.

Granted, our attraction to the assured perdurance of territory may sway us from reliance on enterprises that have no such grounding, but then why not associate at the local level rather than the National one? Why are the county, the town and even the village not enough? What is distinctive about the National level that makes it the default level of association? If cosmopolitanism fails, what prevents Nationalism from meeting a similar fate and disintegrating to lower associative levels? Indeed, some have challenged the supposed dominance of the nation in the ‘real’ experiences that form individual identity.

Andrew Vincent comes to the conclusion that the ranking of the nation against alternative forms of association has not shown any generalisable promise. Firstly, in terms of intensity of influence on identity, he finds that the nation offers no match for the day-by-day formative influence of family, friends and occupation. Secondly, even if in certain circumstances national association does trump other forms, it does so on a context dependent basis (for

144 The conclusion considers this assertion in more detail.
example the World Cup), rather than as a generalisable rule. Thirdly, he rules out ranking as a function of size, since in this regard he observes the national argument to be self-defeating. If it establishes itself on comparative sizable constituency, it loses out to larger groups such as regions or religion. If it counters these larger associations by citing ‘feeling and everyday presence’ it loses out to smaller associations. Fourthly, he dismisses the suggestion that the nation is a perfectly matching collaborator of the State, on the grounds that the link between them is merely an illusion, ‘a transient phenomenon of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’, which has since been dispelled by the appreciation of the reality of multiculturalism.

I wish to reconsider Vincent’s assertions vis-à-vis the matching of nation and State, not on the historical empirical grounds he puts forward, but, in line with the general theme of this thesis, on metaphysical grounds. My claim is that the State and the nation complement one another, by forming two elements of a rational effort to manage the difficulties of corporeal separation. These are joint measures that provide response to the disharmonising effects of individual fragmentation. They administer anxiety-free interaction in a society that would otherwise be rife with debilitating distrust. That is not to say that there is a strict division of power between the State and the nation. Quite the contrary, on the proposed model, strictly speaking, the State deals with perdurance of currency-convertible property, while the nation deals with
the perdurance of non-currency convertible property; however, the majority nation within a multicultural setting tends to project itself culturally on the State.\textsuperscript{145}

7.2 \textit{Is the Nation necessary - Statisist and extra-Statisist alternatives}

Recall that the rationale suggested earlier for the social grouping of self-centred individuals was to open the future and escape the destructive logic of the momentary. It was argued that this is achieved by the stability of institutions that are able to account for the past and present, thereby manufacturing a future. One is tempted to continue along this line of argument and seek out the ideal dimensions of the assurance-provider\textsuperscript{146} or ‘banker’. In a contrived theoretical exercise of this sort, size would have a gravitational effect. Strength being in numbers, seekers of security and stability for their worldly achievements would gravitate towards assurance providers with enduring large constituencies, thereby reaffirming the provider’s perceived power. The ideal size for both state and national affiliations is, as can be read into Hobbes, one in which we all ‘bank’ with one cosmopolitan entity, putting an end to conflict and replacing it with legal exchange. Indeed, it would be most

\textsuperscript{145}This was the relationship envisaged by Zeev Jabotinsky (the Zionist political activist and thinker of the early 20th century (Bilski \textit{Every Individual, a King: The Social and Political Thought of Ze'Ev Vladimir Jabotinsky} 1993)):

‘I believe Humanity is progressing; and as such, I believe that within a hundred years every State shall be bi or tri national and so forth…and all the equity of rights…even if it is held sacred, will not have the power to change the fact: that every State be its constitution what it may, remains the State of its National majority.’ (Jabotinsky \textit{The story of my days} 1972: 38)

\textsuperscript{146}I am intentionally using the term assurance provider, rather than security provider, in order to differentiate my understanding of the Lockean position from that of Robert Nozick. Assurance is for the most part achieved by the State acting as a collective memory bank, whereas security is the product of collective coercion.
fortunate if we shared a single banking currency\textsuperscript{147}, but lacking one we might resort to an exchange rate. Since the motivation for the setting up of our banks is presumed to have been a shared sense of lack of security, our attitudes towards banking would appear to be commensurate.

In a chapter entitled \textit{Honor among Thieves: Hoarding and Stealing}, Paul Seabright theorises about the role of financial banks in the development of trust among strangers. He contends that 'banks have flourished because of their ingenious capacities for helping people to live with risk.'\textsuperscript{148} (Seabright 2004: 79); they allow us to 'hoard' safely. He goes on to state that 'The ingenuity of banks rests on their using the law of large numbers to create the illusion that anyone's hoard is accessible even while most of peoples' hoards are being made to perform useful service [by being lent out].' (Seabright 2004: 81). For the illusion to be sustained the clientele is required to be of considerable size and exhibit a degree of diversity. Too small a community, or an over cohesive one, would put the bank itself at risk, as too many clients may wish to access their resources at any given moment\textsuperscript{149} (Seabright 2004: 79).

Along the same lines, perhaps too small a community would put the vested interest in it at risk as well. Since I have no hold over my fellow villagers and townspersons, I stand the risk of too many of them deciding to withdraw from our common enterprise at once. The cloud of uncertainty hanging over the continuity of our joint project might give cause for preemptive action, eventually leading to its

\textsuperscript{147} As adopted by an overwhelming majority of European Union. members
\textsuperscript{148} Note the similarity to Hobbes's claim with regard to the role of the State in enabling trust.
\textsuperscript{149} Note the similarity to the 'overload' problem as identified in the mid 1970's by Samuel Brittan, Giovanni Sartori, Samuel Huntington and others (see above ref. 87, p. 23).
complete collapse in the form of a market crash. Does Seabright’s insight not lead to the conclusion that bigger is better? The larger our community, the smaller the risk of it sinking with all our memories and vested interests onboard.

It has been suggested that humankind is too large a group with which to associate. This would be a valid response if one would also be willing to state, and perhaps empirically demonstrate ‘the ideal’ size of association. Michael Taylor has endeavoured to do both (in (Taylor 1982) and (Taylor 1988) respectively). Taylor has an admiration for the coercive coordination tools at the disposal of a close-knit community of a certain size. To use a phrase from familiar language ‘it is a place where everybody knows your name’. In his view, if there is anything at all that can hold grand associations together it is that they can be broken down into familiar relations that exert an authentic form of social glue. Accordingly Nationalism and the State would stand somewhere between genuine communal association and grander scale associative projections, such as Humanity.

David Miller can be said to be making a similar argument. The difference between Miller and Taylor is that Miller believes the clan and the village have been dismantled by modernity and therefore the remaining appropriate level of solidarity is Nationhood: ‘Nationality, one might say, is the appropriate form of solidarity for societies that are mobile - so that clan and village can no longer serve as the primary forms of community - and egalitarian - so that people are no longer bound together by vertical ties to overlords and dependants.’ (Miller 1995: 184). Nationality is in Miller’s account ‘as good as it gets’ in terms of social cohesion in modern societies.
I tend to accept David Miller's assertion that the locality has been dismantled by modernity. Indeed, I would like to stress the significance of the role the modern State has played in this process and the symbiotic relationship that has been forged between Nationalism and the modern State. Historically, the synchrony with which these phenomena rose to prominence suggests a possible connection between them. Post World War II they have been, for the most part, portrayed as competing forces; one a conservative legacy of the past, the other a revolutionary striving towards the modern\textsuperscript{150}. Contrary to this, I would claim that these enterprises were and continue to be mutually reinforcing. In the literature attention has already been drawn to their shared antagonism towards ‘dynastic absolutism and of the censorship and oppression that they brought’ (Hobsbawm in Mentzel 1992). Anthony Smith attributes David Bell with the additional observation that ‘the concept of the nation only gained popularity in eighteenth-century France when God was seen to recede into His heavens and leave civil society and political discourse to humanity.’ (Smith 2005: 414).

The age old debate between primordialists, perennialists and modernists\textsuperscript{151} notwithstanding, this last insight coincides with the idea trumpeted here regarding the place assigned to God and religion in the political thought of Hobbes and Locke. Recall that it was proposed that introducing the State as the referee on disputes of earthly property prevented God from being ‘dragged through the mud’ in the efforts of opposing sides to allege Godly endorsement. It was also argued that the State as defined by Locke inherently lacks the tools to deal with the preservation of property

\textsuperscript{150} Perhaps relying on a “Rousseauist” rather than a “Whigist” notion of nationalism (Mentzel \textit{Nationalism} 1992)
that was currency-irreducible. Therefore a complementary currency-irreducible ‘insurance agency’ needed to be established. The question however remains: Why should this agency take on the national form? Why should other forms of association not serve just as well?

I will now consider some of the major historical association alternatives: class, guild, religion. Class as understood by Marx is most certainly not complementary to the State. Marx’s staunch objection to the State is voiced in his familiar consideration of it as an oppressive entity. Marx’s depiction of the State as a necessary evil, a step in the development of social awareness, which will eventually give way to the emancipation of the individual, can be restated in terms of its attitude towards currency and time. A class outlook opposes the idea of currency because currency artificially ‘fiddles’ with time in a counterrevolutionary way. It attempts to interfere with the natural, individually liberating progression, by allowing individuals to hold on to a past that is replicated in the future.

On a Hegelian interpretation of Marx the future will naturally contain something of the past; any artificial means of intervention ‘messes with’ the direction of the ‘lord of time’. The ultimate direction in which class division leads is to the end of time, not to its management. It wishes to let time run its course, but it assumes that once it has, it stops. Being a revolutionary position, unlike the Hobbesean stance, it is opposed to the halting of change by imposition. Nevertheless, it shares the Hobbesean basic idea that humanity will truly prosper only when time is put to a

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151 For a sketch of the debate see (Hearn Rethinking nationalism : a critical introduction 2006)
halt. In the Hobbesian version time is halted by imposing rationality on it, whereas for Marx time draws to a halt as rationality imposes itself on actuality.

Religion seems a much more likely candidate to complement the State in the preservation of elements of identity that are irreducible to currency. As an institution it can preserve individual contributions that have no exchange value. Yet this complementary relationship is dependent on a lack of conflict of interests between the State boundaries and the church. Historically, religious and State functions, as the latter have been here defined (i.e. currency-reducible identity) were meshed together. Ancient temples doubled as treasuries (e.g. Solomon’s Temple (Wright 1948: 53)) and religious orders (e.g. The Knights Templar (Barber 2003: 272)) dabbled not only in matters of salvation, but in the provision of corporeal security of lives and estates, even founding a rudimentary banking system.

Later western history does, however, reveal a growing tension between the church and the modern State. This tension may have arisen due to the church’s aspiration for expansion beyond the borders of particular states to form a holy empire. One way of resolving such tension is by making the borders of a cosmopolitan church coincide with a matching cosmopolitan State. While the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire were engaged in a power struggle amongst themselves, they shared a cosmopolitan outlook. Indeed it has been implied above that Hobbes advocates a holy empire of sorts. In his version of empire the struggle between sovereign and church is resolved not by subjugating the church to the State, but by subjugating the State to God. However, while the church might complement the State it does so by altering the function of the State. It transforms it from a depository of
individual memories, contributions and identities into a platform through which the original shared identity of creation can be reestablished.

By contract to class and religion, the guild or the association would appear to be compatible with the idea of the State as a depository of individual rather than collective identity. On the condition that the guild supports the State’s functions rather than undermining its authority, a non-competing hierarchy appears feasible. Indeed, Antony Black has argued that Jean Bodin, and Johannes Althusius even more so, put forward systematic corporatist political theories in which States were a conglomeration of guild-like associations. The State was an overarching guild that administered the plurality of associations in a confederative manner. Moreover, Black contends that these corporatist ideas permeated Lockean contractarianism through Grotius and Pufendorf (Black 1984: 151). The Lockean consent-based democratic parliamentarianism and conceptualisation of the State as a ‘joint stock company’ are understood by Black to be indebted to guild practices and conduct. Black notes that G.P. Gooch has uncovered an explicit use of such a stock model, in the words of Peter Cornelius, a Dutchman who visited England during the Commonwealth: ‘individuals were to form joint-stock associations in which they lived together, but in which they might retain control of their property…They were to elect a governor from among themselves for a year, and might re-elect him if they chose’ (Gooch in Black 1984: 151-152).

Not only is the guild or the association not incompatible with the State, it can be understood to provide for the aforementioned ‘non-currency’ preservation ambitions of the individuals that form them. Anything from an artisanal style, through the aesthetic of a skyline, to a linguistic dialect could be preserved through
an association revolving around that particular interest. Each ‘influence group’, in addition to conserving knowledge and traditions, would also engage itself in an attempt to influence State policy, and especially State funding, for causes close to their hearts. So why would the mediation of an overarching association of ‘non-currency’, namely the nation, have any advantage over influence groups as a partner to a currency-based State? Moreover, in such a relationship does not the State make the nation redundant?

William B. Allen (Allen 1996) argues that modern sovereignty has all but replaced nationhood with statehood. He contends that citizenship is the bond that holds modern societies together, while nationhood is but a legacy in the liberal State; thus the age of the state-nation has replaced the age of the nation-state. In an effort to elucidate his point by way of example he observes that:

A Czech Republic becomes a Czech Republic not by virtue of being Czech but by virtue of consciously adopting republican goals. Thus far it is no more Czech than Slovak or American. Founding its statehood on universal principles rather than local claims means that the local claims no longer determine membership. Hence, the republic’s Czechness is an accident, morally speaking, rather than a necessity. This accident occurs for sufficient reason – the Aristotelian reason – that every essence appears (becomes phenomenal) via agencies whose accidental qualities condition being-in-the-world. Thus, universal principles are made manifest only in particular forms. (Allen 1996: p. 7 Electronic version).

Allen’s argument is that universal principles in the modern age are offered by default to inconsequential, pre-packaged historical groups. These affiliations survive only as administrative labels, empty convenient receptacles for universal content. They are therefore particular and exclusive in name only. Yet, Allen seems to be missing the
defining features of local historical ‘baggage’. He seems to be begging the question of universalism by downplaying the role of national identity.

7.3 Nationalism, particularity and individuation

In the tradition of political theory, as has been repeatedly observed, discussion of the State has drawn the attention of many a great mind, whereas nationalism seems almost suspiciously under-addressed. This has fueled speculation that either nationalism is an inconsequential relic of the past, or represents a backward irrationality that deems it unworthy, if not outright dangerous. The events of the post-Soviet era have all but silenced the voice of the inconsequentiality argument, while the branding of nationalism as a war-mongering foe of the peace-making project of the State persists. That numerous atrocities were committed under the label of nationalist ideals is undisputable. Although these acts were first and foremost racially inspired, the ease with which racialism latches onto patriotic sentiment is disconcerting. Yet, I find the inclination in the literature, arguably initiated by Hans Kohn (Kuzio 2002: 21), to draw a Manichean line between benign civic manifestations of nationalism and violently inclined ethnic ones unsatisfying. Moreover, I suspect that civic nationalism can be reduced to the idea of the State, as developed here afore. Indeed civic nationalism might be no more than a celebration of the rule of law\textsuperscript{152}, extending legitimacy to the administrative role performed by the State, and as such enabling an inclusive citizenship-based membership\textsuperscript{153}.

\textsuperscript{152} Chaim Gans observes that in his justification for the unification of the Federal Republic with Eastern Germany Jurgen Habermas lends support to the notion that civic nationalism is encapsulated
As an illustration, consider the contrast between the historical formation of the United States and the unfolding European Union project. From its inception to this day, the prospects of wealth that drew so many to the United States have been intertwined with a strong sense of a legitimate rule of law. This perhaps explains the prominence, if not fascination within the American psyche, with legal matters in general and the supreme court in particular. Thus it should come as no surprise that the phrase: 'sue me' originated in the land of opportunity. For many immigration was an escape not only from stratification, but also from corruption. America was conceived as a level playing field with legal institutions in place to counteract unfair advantage\textsuperscript{154}. The land of opportunity has in return demanded a civic allegiance, most pronounced in its naturalisation procedures, as well as allegiance ceremonies incorporated into the education system. The strictly civic or Statist nature of these demands would seem to challenge the assertion I made earlier as to the symbiotic connection between State and Nation.

Indeed, I suspect that much of the cosmopolitan argument relies on the prototype of the United States as an exemplar of a 'nationless State'. The Cosmopolitan view finds great appeal in starting the world anew, a clean slate, free of past National baggage\textsuperscript{155}. In what follows, I argue that this approach encounters...
two substantial difficulties: firstly that starting anew in the current era is virtually
impossible, and secondly that even if it were possible, it would quickly “regress” to a
quasi-national existence.

The United States may be one of the few examples of resetting the play of
history and redistributing the pawns. This was the initial motivation for settlers to
cross the Atlantic, and it became a continuing pioneering motif in the history of the
expansion into the west. Anyone who was discontented had the opportunity to move
on and start anew. Indeed in the perception of the time, which excluded the native
population, America was a clean slate. America has since been the oddball of
Nationalism. Some (for instance Zangwill 1917) have regarded it as an ‘evolving
National identity’, others (Hans Kohn’s position in Gans 2003: 8) have tried to
capture it as a ‘National vacuum’\(^\text{156}\) that exemplifies how the State is capable of
answering all our \textit{wants}. In many respects ‘the American experiment’ has been a
model for cosmopolitans. They see no reason why the world as a whole could not
become America. Indeed, consistent cosmopolitans may very well view the current
attempts to unite Europe, as a tactical step towards the goal of world unification\(^\text{157}\).

I would argue that the American model cannot be followed in the current era,
since the conditions of 'the original experiment' cannot be replicated. Europe being a
case in point, unlike its American cousin, the EU does not yield to reorganisation

\(^\text{156}\) The distinction between the former and the latter is roughly equivalent to the distinction between
ethnic Nationalism and civic Nationalism introduced by Hans Kohn, or more appropriately, stripped
of moral connotations, as termed by Haim Gans, cultural Nationalism versus statist Nationalism
(Gans \textit{The Limits of Nationalism} 2003: 15)

\(^\text{157}\) Certainly there may be Europhiles that would object to this claim, but they are not truly in the
cosmopolitan camp, and should be labelled Euro-Nationalists.
because it already contains a legacy of order. Preserving this legacy is not merely a matter of conservative policy, it is an indispensable part of the individual’s future-oriented contribution to a social corpus. Much as in the case of the State, without assurances that one’s efforts to leave a mark on the social culture beyond one’s singular corporeal existence, the motivation to create for an audience outwith oneself regresses to nil. As accommodating as the notion of civic nationalism may appear, citizenship tests notwithstanding, those who seek to join established nation states are required to either leave their national baggage at the door or conceive a formula of converting the old to the new.

Consider the ease with which the Euro zone was enacted as opposed to the difficulties surrounding the acceptance of a European constitution. Economic incentives aside, I would suggest that conversion of currencies into a common Euro denominator proved a relatively easy feat, as the principles of conversion, and indeed an actual common exchange rate, were already in place. Moreover, I would argue that economically-oriented laws lend themselves to a cost-benefit calculation. Thus the famous 'chocolate dispute'\textsuperscript{158} could be overcome by means of an agreed financial settlement. By contrast, the commensuration, if not unification, of certain elements of law has proven difficult due to a fundamental problem with the conversion formula.

If all the participants were neutral ‘historyless’ States, the consolidation of law and order would have been a difficult yet manageable task; however it is doubtful whether the inhabitants of these States would accept an imposed ‘amnesia’

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\textsuperscript{158} A discord between the British and other European Community members over the labelling of products as ‘chocolate’ that was finally resolved in 1999 by the compromise of selling the British product on the continent under the label ‘family milk chocolate’ (Pilkington \textit{Britain in the European Union today} 2001: 130).\
\end{flushright}
of the type required. Having served for some time as the historical continuum platform for their respective majorities, such Nation-States have accumulated content. They have come to embody cultural memory banks of non-currency that make it rational for individuals to contribute something of themselves. If such endeavours are at risk of ‘cultural revolution’ they offer no more security to individuals than they may find in their own individuated temporally limited existence. Consequently individuals would recede back into their solitary shells.

Recall that our rational individuals suffer from ‘the human fault’ - they are trapped in time and space. It was suggested that some relief from the detrimental effect that time has on our capacity to aggregate property was provided by the institutionalisation of an authority that was perpetual for all goods and purposes, earthly in the sense that it was comprehensible and rationally undisputable. Its perpetuity was achieved either, as Hobbes suggested, by ‘freezing’ conditions, or by introducing a conservative counter-revolutionary civil society framework as Locke did. It was earthly and comprehensible due to its human rather than Godly origin. Finally, it was indisputable because it relied on consent, either of the Hobbesean, once and for all submission to rationality variety, or of the Lockean renewable consent by rational consideration type. By freezing time, Hobbes ‘kills two birds with one stone.’ By halting the effects of time, he eliminates both time and space from the equation of our existence. I have already shown the difficulties in performing this ‘trick’, yet I must concede that it is an elegant one.

The Lockean version is not as elegant. It decreases the unwanted effects of time, but does not take it out of the equation. As a result, space remains a human constraint with which to be contended. Yet our perception of space remains at odds
with our perception of time. The artificial extension of ourselves through time to form the future, albeit perhaps an illusion, does not seem to have a corollary in space. Our perception of space is captured in the singular, whereas our perception of time is potentially continuous. Our voluminous manifestation suggests that we are not singular in the same sense as a point in space is singular. Still, while we are extended in space we do not extend through it in the same sense that we extend through time. Moments in time seem to connect together into a time continuum, whereas moments in space merely connect serially to each other.

This intuitive notion that although time and space are intrinsically connected, they are not mirror images of each other, is further strengthened by the established fact that one is unable to be in two places at the same time, yet one can easily be in one place at two different times. Our extension in space, as opposed to our contrived extension through time, is defined by our confinement to clear physical boundaries. In other words we can artificially extend ourselves through time, whereas we cannot do so through space. Whether we consider ourselves metaphysically to be ‘substances’ or ‘events’, makes little difference. In either case we would take up an exclusive delineated volume in space. As a ‘substance’ we could not share our exact position with other ‘substances’; alternatively, as an ‘event’ we would need to be scheduled at a ‘venue’ such that our appearance doesn’t conflict with others scheduled for the same ‘venue’.

As we cannot overcome these spatial constraints, neither physically nor mentally, we must submit to them. Moreover, I would contend that these are not
obstacles, but defining features of our existence as ‘property-enabled’ individuals. If we could, by some technological wonder, relieve ourselves of the singularity of spatial existence, our effective omnipresence would relieve us of time restrictions as well. This would return us to the Hobbesian model of perfection, wherein my property would be indiscernible from your property. Indeed, as I have suggested, our whole notion of selves would collapse into a singular collective self\textsuperscript{160}.

While we appear to be able to resist time by artificial means, we cannot and quite possibly should not resist our ‘hardwired’ spatiality, since as I have hinted it may serve to preserve our individuality. Spatial singular exclusivity coincides with individuation, without which it is doubtful if we could form an idea of property that was not collective. This combined notion of individuality and spatiality is easily converted into territoriality or jurisdiction. Robert Nozick has taken this idea to its extreme by concluding that this ‘hardwired’ singularity demands a matching spatially singular association. Accordingly he envisions an ideal society composed of individual territorial jurisdictions sanctioned by the inalienable right to property, to be policed by essentially territorially detached competing law enforcement agencies. As David Miller correctly points out:

…there is nothing in Nozick’s argument to rule out protective agencies competing for clients on a non-territorial basis. So there are no jurisdictional boundaries in a Nozickian world, except in the sense that one may pass from a

\textsuperscript{159} Recall the earlier reflection (see above p. 23) on the difference between the two with reference to Christopher Hughes Conn.

\textsuperscript{160} Related notions may be found in the monistic Hindu aspiration to Moska (liberation) by uniting Atman (self) with Brahman (transpersonal, universal), as well as in the annihilation of the illusion of the self offered by Buddhist Nirvana as the resolution to the misery of the perpetuation of its illusion Samsara (reincarnation). Unfortunately lying outside the scope of this work, the suggested crude parallel between Hobbes’s position towards the individual and the Hindu and Buddhist attitude towards Atman, is worthy of thorough examination elsewhere.
region where most people have signed up with agency A to a region where most people have signed up with agency B. The only firm boundaries are those that demarcate individuals’ holdings of property. (Miller 2003: 264).

On the basis of Allen Buchanan’s preceding contribution in the same volume, Miller goes on to discount the ‘picture’ painted by Nozick, claiming that it ‘collapses as soon as we observe that there is no “natural” system of property, but instead property entitlements depend upon the positive laws of the state.’

I believe Miller is reading Nozick, and by extension Locke, too literally on this matter. The property rights that exist in the State are not necessarily a formalised replication of property rights that precede the State in Locke and Nozick. An alternative reading proposes that property rights exist in natural form as a general ‘liberty’, but do not as yet take on the particularity of licensing. While our right to property is not granted by the State, it is effectuated by it. I would suggest that Miller’s confusion arises from the administrative role of the State in the licensing of property. For clarification consider the role of the State in the administration of ‘the right to pollute the air’ (probably an extension of property rights from a Lockean perspective). In the state of nature there is a general liberty to pollute, whereas in the State there is particular license to do so.

Nozick’s ultra minimalist version of the State is, however, confronted by its own difficulties. Even after an evolutionary process has declared the dominant protection agency, private individuals are within their rights to abstain from joining up, potentially forming a ‘Swiss cheese’ sovereignty in which there are ‘internal as well as external boundaries’. (Nozick 1974: 54). Nozick is not unaware of the
problems that might arise in such an arrangement. Island-like sovereignties could potentially be trapped in their terrestrial isolation. His solution to this difficulty would seem to rely on a lean version of the Lockean proviso, namely that you can not prevent me from entering into a free market exchange with you over the right to passage, since by doing so your acquisition of the land surrounding mine would not leave me access to ‘passage’ of the same quality and extent as you have appropriated for yourself. Nozick does not concern himself with the possibility that these islands might become safe havens for criminals originating in the surrounding territories, or alternatively that they might utilise their seclusion to free-ride on the defensive ring provided by circumfusing territories. Still these issues might be moot, as ultimately he seems to be implying that an ultra minimalist State would gradually evolve into a minimalist one, in which sovereignty is monopolised. Moreover, there is nothing to bar the consolidation trend from reaching global proportions.

Surprisingly, although hardly an advocate of Nozick’s social conclusions, recent commentary by Lynn Dobson on supranational citizenship in the context of the emerging European Union suggests a convergence of her view with his on the function of the traditional nation state. There would be no reason for Nozick to reject Dobson’s redefinition of citizenship:

Citizenship is not about being, but about doing…citizenship defines the space and the possibilities for certain kinds of action within highly structured, impersonal, multitudinous and multisystem worlds, where each of us engages in hundreds or thousands of interactions with others – mostly unseen and unsuspected others – every day; and where each of us is socialised into networks of rules and roles and codes structuring our behaviour and our expectations, most of which we do not even notice. (Dobson 2006: 171).
For both Nozick and Dobson the nation state is a contingent, perhaps even anachronistic, yet effective administrative zone. If nation states are reduced to convenient administrative postcodes, nationalities in themselves are rendered defunct altogether, as they serve no purpose save perhaps a folkloristic one. As far as the nation survives within the nation state it survives in a ‘civic nationalism’ form. Equally, both would champion boundary-free governance – under complete ‘laissez passer’ immigration. They would differ only on the degree of such governance, or on ‘laissez faire’. For Nozick governance would be restricted to the provision of global corporal security, whereas for Dobson it would extend into the provision of global social security, thereby curtailing ‘laissez faire’.

Following Nozick and Dobson, consider now that I am wrong, that individuals might not be easily converted to global Human Nationality, but nevertheless they are convertible all the same. I envision that such a perception of the individual would generate two major strands of ‘world government’ policies\textsuperscript{161}: a planned egalitarian one and a free-market one. In what remains of this section, I develop simulations of these policies aimed at demonstrating that even if the demographics of the world could be completely reshuffled, the attraction of corporeally constrained beings to social frameworks of stability, will ultimately regenerate boundaries and borders.

a. Planned egalitarian distribution
A global government would devise a grand central plan for the even distribution of humankind across the globe. Such a plan would take into account resource distribution in order to assure that choice is not curtailed by our access to goods. But realising the resources may become depleted over time, or their value may change according to technological development, the government must reserve the right to redistribute the world population to accommodate its speculation as to what the future foretells. It would be attaching individual fate to the collective fate of humankind at large.

This would not come without a cost. We could count on very little stability. Our investment, our attachments to anything from skylines to relationships would become extremely limited in their scope. Figuratively, much like the travelling salesman, we would be living in a hotel room without much point in unpacking our suitcase. Furthermore once we left one place for another, there would be nothing to secure its existence in the form we recalled it. For some this may seem too extreme a scenario, describing an exaggerated rate of change. They would perhaps hold that governmental wisdom would curtail the rate of change by applying relocation programs only every so often. In this more moderate account we would be able to live a more stable life and would form attachments to people and places. After a while we would develop local traits and quirks and would become attached to those as well. We might even develop regional traditions.
For the sake of the argument, consider that the tradition we have developed is sports and exercise. We take it so seriously that we elevate it to the degree of body worship, and as we are not shy about it, our tradition is to conduct sports exhibitions in the nude. Now a generation or two have come to pass and the central government has decided that redistribution of the populace can no longer be avoided. But the newcomers who are being transported to our community do not approve of our cherished practice, in fact they consider it vile and immoral. In fear of this increasingly vocal influx of immigrants we demand our own sovereignty so as to protect our cherished practices. We wish to demarcate our borders and exclude these ‘others’ so as to preserve our invested interests.

b. Free Market

Global government wishes to make our *laissez-faire, laissez passer* liberty as effortless as possible. It acts to bring down any formal boundaries between territories in order to allow us to move freely and settle anywhere we like for as long as we like. It is thought that market values of supply and demand will coordinate our migration so as to best accommodate the occurring changes, be they technologically influenced, resources related, etc. Again individual fate is attached to the fate of humankind, albeit in a different manner.

This policy seems to lend itself, even more easily than the centrally controlled one, to a volatile existence with no stability whatsoever. Once more this can be argument.
challenged as an extreme scenario. Still, if humans are indeed stability and
prosperity seeking beings, as reflected in the preceding discussion of the
aspiration for the establishment of the State in Hobbes and Locke, they will
challenge the ‘fleeting reality’ that they encounter. They will attach themselves to
a spatial location, rather than become drifters and wanderers. So a generation or
two would come to pass and our community might develop a tradition of
‘boozing’. Our successful society might attract an influx of immigrants that think
that drinking is a vile habit. We soon realise that these immigrants could come to
threaten our culture and therefore wish to enact our own sovereignty to protect it.

On both accounts, I would argue that the seeds of a Lockean, corporeal-constraint-prompted national identity have been sewn. A mandate for borders is
sought in order to secure personal perdurance through time, which does not expect
human beings to dislodge themselves completely from their unrelenting spatial
limits. In the absence of such boundaries the assurance of continuity is lost, and with
it the entire rationale of social interaction. Cosmopolitans may respond by claiming
that this materially oriented, physical portrayal of the world no longer holds, that
transport, commerce and especially communication have transformed us from
physically constrained beings into virtual ones. That interest groups can converge
through the web from across the world to intervene in some calamity is all very well;
still, we do not live our lives virtually. The technologically developed part of the
world may be headed in this direction, but in our haste we must not forget that we
quite literally feed on the material world, populated by real people across the globe.
We may at some point overcome all material constraints, but I am not sure we want
to reach that point, because if Locke’s argument as to our corporeal boundedness holds, it would seem to imply that we would be dead.
Chapter 8. Conclusion – A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism

This thesis questioned the widely held assumption that cosmopolitanism is rooted in liberal individualism, and more specifically in John Locke. It proposed a match between cosmopolitanism and Hobbeseanism, based on a holistic understanding of the Hobbesean enterprise that argued for the indispensability of the overlap between the scientific, the theological and the political in the Hobbesean system of ideas. Hobbesean cosmopolitanism was portrayed as the political aspect of a Hobbesean yearning to restore the original unitary order of creation; part and parcel of a scientific quest for the truth and a parallel of a theological ambition to reconcile with the creator. Hobbesean political theory was portrayed as an attempt to achieve a renaissance of a lost moment of perfect equilibrium, a moment of indisputable boundaryless truth that would put an end ‘once and for all’ to the debilitating apprehension of ‘the stranger’ in a society in which encounters are no longer restricted to the familial.

It was maintained that Hobbesean theory merges its mechanics with its politics. Change, the social parallel of mechanical motion, is perceived as the initiator of friction between bodies and persons. Motion is presumed by Hobbes to have been absent since the moment of creation, a perfect moment of rest and peace that motion could only disturb. Consequently it was argued that he aspires to reverse the introduction of motion, and return to the initial bliss of stillness. This is achieved by artificially manufacturing a condition, the State, that would insulate its inhabitants from motion and by extension from change altogether. The eradication of instability
accompanies by change required the collapse of the particular into the general, the erratic individual into the regularity-exhibiting rational citizen. Moreover, it required the halting of time in order to assure the conservation of the identity of individuals. Accordingly the association of Hobbesianism with both modernism and individualism were here disputed.

Indeed, it was proposed that individualism for Hobbes, far from being an end, was a symptom of a malignant social syndrome. It was the social extension of a metaphysical split in creation between corporeal particularism and incorporeal generality, which occurred as a consequence of human insubordination. The treatment for this rebelliousness was humankind’s reintroduction to the indisputability of rationality. It was argued that Hobbes’s intricate examination of the mechanics of individuation, while often mistaken for an appreciation of it, is in fact investigated for the purpose of constructing a countermeasure against it. The Hobbesian State was here portrayed as an antidote for combating the disorder of individuation.

Having established that the Hobbesian route to cosmopolitanism involved a procedure of harmonisation by unification founded on anti-individualist principles, alternative paths towards social harmony and their relation to cosmopolitanism were examined, namely the distinctive Smitho-Humean and Lockean approaches; despite not sharing the Hobbesian holistic foundation of a singular moment of creation, they too were treated here as an ensemble of metaphysical, theological and political ideas. This has been adopted more or less as a premise, although at least in Smith one can find the appropriate grounds for supporting a holistic scientific approach. It was further postulated that not only the Smitho-Humean stance, but also the Lockean one,
could be interpreted on logical grounds as a response to the holistic Hobbesian position. Indeed the political differences of both from Hobbes were purported to be the result of preceding theological and metaphysical differences.

It was maintained that contrary to conventional thinking, Lockean political theory was at fundamental odds with Hobbesianism. Again the divergence was sourced to a metaphysical discord that carries over into a political one. The Lockean objection was to the Hobbesian presumptuous attempt to force monism on an evidently dualist reality, and to construct an existence in which change and by extension time and space were suspended. It found the Hobbesian prescription of an emulation procedure that would root out observable unruly elements to be begging the question. Hobbesianism was charged with achieving synchronisation between creation and its unruly creatures by taking charge of creation and rearranging it to suit itself.

Locke considers attaining unification with the incorporeal, while sustaining humankind’s corporeality, a contradiction. Indeed dispensing with individuality would dispense with corporeality as well. The Lockean position, as purported here, argues that both are equally inescapable. Under Lockean dualism, human souls and bodies are married, and remain so until death. Unification with the incorporeal would have to wait until death dislodges one’s incorporeal element, the spirit, from its corporeal partner, the body. Meanwhile, due to administrative difficulties arising from corporeal individuation, a mechanism needed to be devised in order to make corporeal life as pleasant as possible. Just as the body and the soul were conceived as married to one another, so too was the self considered married to property. This fusion made the terms interchangeable in an earthly existence and required the State
to oversee both at once. The Lockean State provided mutual assurances that enabled secure interaction among strangers. In other words, it allowed for the development of exchange relations between them, based on trust in the continuum of identity of the parties to the exchange. It thus accommodates motion and change, while offering a reasonable degree of stability.

Like the Lockean position, it was suggested that the Smitho-Humean stance (represented initially by Anne Conway and later by Friedrich Hayek) was a reaction to the Hobbesian understanding of motion. In an effort to rehabilitate motion it proposed that peaceful harmony required communication between particulars, rather than a draconian fusion into singularity. It offered an alternative holistic approach that utilised the market as an instrument for the propagation of a ‘pantheon’ of equilibrium points. As such, it liberated the seeker of peace from recapturing the single authoritative moment of perfect creation. This revision seemingly retains law and order without a commitment to perfection. By adopting an evolutionary understanding of the relation between individuated bodies, it dismisses the Hobbesian aversion to motion as well as its glorification of rationality. For the Smitho-Humean, motion allows for the exploration of various nodes of stability.

Fluidity encompasses ‘the rationality of nature’, and any attempt to bind it causes a disruption of the seamless drift between points of equilibrium. Moreover, the disruption of the natural motion of ideas, individuals, or assets is not only unwarranted, but also harmful. Artificially suspending the attraction towards frictionless coordination, it ‘messes’ with the proclivity of nature to equilibria. National borders and boundaries being part and parcel of such artificial disruption, they should ideally give way to a global cosmopolitan market that would facilitate
free movement. Yet, it was argued that while Hayek’s model seemingly produces a cosmopolitanism that cherishes particularity, its insistence on allowing nothing, not even individual liberty, to be anchored outwith the forces of change, threatens to mutate the concept of the individual in a way that would redefine and distort its liberty. It was further suggested that Locke’s ‘material anchoring’ of the self is what differentiates his market vision from Hayek’s and Nozick’s adaptation of an idea originating in Smith and Hume.

Having distanced Locke metaphysically from Hobbes’s holistic attack on individualism on the one hand, and from Smith and Hume’s holistic attempt to defend individualism on the other, attention was turned to the exploration of the political implications of the distinct dualist and pluralist metaphysical position which is here attributed to Locke. I examined the function of the State as a medium for the preservation of the otherwise momentary, and therefore inconsequential, human existence in a state of individuation. This attention to the role of the State as an agent of conservation led to the substantiation of Locke’s so-called anthropological discussion of the development of the use of currency in order to achieve perdurance. It was argued that State institutions fulfil a combined human ambition, to stay true to the inherent (created) metaphysical particularity, while ameliorating the discouraging effect that the realisation of our constraint to time and space has on our motivation to contribute our thoughts and actions to the world.

The focus on the legacy function of the State, and the coupling of the application of the State and the purpose that money serves in Locke, raised the question of the perdurance of particularities that individuals may wish to preserve, but which do not lend themselves to commodification. Consequently it was observed
that the State in itself was an insufficient means for the provision of the full scope of human perdurance. Moreover, it was argued that national identity stands out in its ability to balance the tension between the ambition of the particular (the individual) for immortality, and the reality that particularity is by definition constrained by time and space. It was therefore concluded that Locke’s conjoined metaphysical-political stance is conducive to the idea of national identity.

In the remaining two sections of this conclusion I would like to briefly address the implications that the metaphysically saturated reading of the founding fathers of modern political theory, and more particularly such a reading of Hobbes and Locke, have on the foundations for cosmopolitanism on the one hand and nationalism on the other. The following section reconsiders who the custodians of the Hobbesian legacy are within the various schools of thought in international relations. It applies the metaphysically inspired conclusion that Hobbes’s political aspiration is for rest and peace, to challenge the traditional association of Hobbes with the realist school and the vision of international relations as a struggle for domination. By contrast, according to the unconventional understanding of Hobbes presented in this thesis, he becomes a proponent of a world absolutist State, as a direct extension of his own argument for the peace-generating benefits of the State. The final section explores the type of national identity to which Locke’s metaphysically saturated political position lends itself, differentiating it from communitarian versions, as well as from the liberal-nationalism ‘branded’ ideas of such thinkers as David Miller and Yael Tamir. Finally, it attempts to define the national, or at least the anti-cosmopolitan aspect of Locke’s metaphysically saturated political position, by contrasting it with Jeremy Waldron’s definition of cosmopolitanism.
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8.1 Hobbes: Metaphysical Politics and its implications for IR theory

The realist school in international relations theory has, not entirely without textual foundation (Hanson 1984: 332), claimed Hobbesianism for their own, consequently placing it at odds with cosmopolitanism. They make much of the few, but unequivocal statements in DeCive and Leviathan, in which Hobbes addresses the meagre prospects of civil interaction between states. They claim to share with Hobbes the postulation that convergence under a single umbrella of sovereignty, on the general realisation of the irrationality of conflict, is reserved to individual interaction at the State level, beyond which an irrational state of chaos is unavoidable. Moreover, this position is encouraged by theorists of nationalism, such as David Miller, who defend the uniqueness of the social glue offered by the nation-state. In the realist view, lacking a foreseeable body of overwhelming sovereignty to deter them, interaction between states is thought to be doomed to a clash of irreconcilable interests. The international arena is understood as one in which the most one can hope for is short-term treaties which will effectively be revoked at the first sign of a shift of power. The Hobbesian contribution to the discipline of international relations is thought to capture inter-state interaction as a power struggle that is guided by nothing but selfish opportunism.

Yet as Michael Williams teaches us (Williams 1996: 213), within international relations theory there are other contenders for ‘the custody of Hobbes’. The English school of international relations has challenged the couching of Hobbes
as a staunch realist. Martin Wight originated a distinction between three contending patterns of thought in international relations: a realist approach grounded in Machiavelli, a rationalist approach grounded in Grotius and a revolutionary approach grounded in Kant. John Vincent deliberates which category Hobbesian theory falls under. Vincent is reluctant to accept the realist ‘literal’ equation of international relations with the inter-individual state of nature. Intent on demonstrating that Hobbes occupies ‘the marshland’ between Realism and Rationalism, with one ‘keeping check on the enthusiasm of the other’ (Vincent 1981: 96), he explores two alternative accounts of the Hobbesian position. The first is a rationalist account, the second a revolutionary one.

The rationalist account maintains that although Hobbes uses the same name ‘state of nature’ for both a theoretical pre-political condition and the actual interaction between states, there are in fact several crucial differences between the two situations. Firstly, states are more resilient and self-sufficient than individuals, especially at withstanding conflict, and sometimes even benefit from it economically. Secondly, states, more so than individuals, would be compelled to ‘bandwagon’ with the few mighty superpowers, and the latter would be inclined to negotiate amongst themselves and curtail their respective proxy states’ actions. Thirdly, states are not inclined to involve themselves in situations that would be life threatening to their inhabitants, since that would undermine the very legitimacy of their existence.

By contrast the revolutionary account of Hobbes, like the realist account, contends that the term ‘state of nature’ is used consistently with the same meaning in both descriptions of the pre-political and inter-state interaction. Where it differs from the realist vision is in the contention that not only does the logic of the
Hobbesean inter-individual argument impel a theoretical ‘spill over’ of its peace-seeking rationale beyond the state level (Vincent 1981: 95), but that nothing bars the actual realisation of such a ‘spill over’ and the world-governing cosmopolitan order it entails.

Vincent, aided by the respective arguments of Hedley Bull, Charles Brewin and Murray Forsyth, asserts that Hobbes most probably rejected the ‘spill over’ rationale for any of the following reasons:

a. He projected the self-preservation of the individual onto a State that could not surrender its independence.

b. His patriotism would not allow him to forsake Englishness.

c. The State was no less a product of external threat than of internal strife; in other words, external demons sustain the legitimacy of the State.

Having, in his mind, ruled out the revolutionary proposition, but still left with two strong contenders, Vincent seizes the middle of the road position developed by Murray Forsyth. In the latter’s somewhat Lockean adaptation of the Hobbesean state of nature, a differentiation is made between a ‘raw’ brutish state of nature, ‘a deliberately fabricated “not-world”, and the viable Leviathan, or perhaps Leviathan-conducive social condition. Employing this ‘bi-focal’ approach, Forsyth achieves the merging of the realist and rationalist positions. The split of both the inter-individual and the inter-state interaction into matching ‘bi-focal’ manifestations of the state of nature, one theoretical and the other actual, retains the realist insistence on a strict parallel between the inter-individual and inter-state account, as well as the rationalist
insistence on an inter-individual peace agenda\textsuperscript{162} that repeats itself in international relations. The grim realist forecast is thus curtailed, as is the implication by the rationalist interpretation that Hobbes himself had committed the highest offence against his own scientific method; convolution of terms. Moreover, the recognition of the ‘bi-focal’ composition of the state of nature assists in sorting out the historicity controversy regarding it. The resolution is that the Hobbesian argument is at once both ahistorical and historical (Boucher 1990: 213), one focal point being a fictional thought-experiment, the other being an actual pre-civil description.

In the understanding of Forsyth, Vincent, Hanson and Boucher it is rationality that is the driving force behind social peace, leaving little if any effective role for the Hobbesian sovereign. In their interpretation, while the sovereign oversees the execution of rationality, it ceases to emanate from her. She is not the source of social order, rather they are. Indeed she is not sovereign; she is a servant to their sovereignty. Their submission to her rules is contingent upon her devotion to preserving the peace as they understand it. Whether they can collectively form a shared idea of peace notwithstanding, her rule is neither absolute, nor beyond contention. The foundation for her sovereignty is therefore Lockean and not Hobbesian.

Yet I would argue that the implication is not that if one wishes to remain true to the Hobbesian argument, one must choose between a realist position and a conversion to a Lockean stance. Rather, it is the conclusion of this thesis that proponents of the English School have been too quick to discount the third,

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\textsuperscript{162} See Donald Hanson’s argument under the title ‘Thomas Hobbes’s “Highway to Peace”’ (Hanson
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revolutionary option. It is argued that they have been inclined to do so due to a lack of attention to the holistic nature of the Hobbesean endeavour, not giving enough consideration to the integration of Hobbesean monist metaphysics and Hobbesean politics, as well as overlooking Hebraic influences, as opposed to the Greco-Roman ones.

In order to reinstate the revolutionary position one needs to revisit and remove the three English School ‘blockages’ to the ‘spill over’ of the singular sovereignty rationale from the inter-individual level to the inter-state level. I propose to remove the initial two obstacles, and lift the third obstruction by cooptation into an understanding of Hobbesean rationality that is modelled after the by now familiar ‘Russian Doll’ model. The first obstacle to be removed argues that the artificial State is by implication an individual in its own right, thereby carrying with it the same concern for its own ‘life’ as the individual it was modelled after. It would therefore be just as instinctively disinclined to lose its independency. Yet just as in the case of the real-individual, so too in the artificial individual, this argument works both ways. Even if the State is acting in its own right, like the individual, it would be compelled to reach the rational conclusion that its self-preservation interests are better served under global governance. The second obstacle pertains to Hobbes only ad hominem. As such, I am not sure that this thesis is qualified to address it. As I have professed from the onset, I am much more concerned with framing a coherent Hobbesean theory, than with adjudicating historical or biographical accounts of Hobbes himself, or indeed of the context which defines his writings. My bias towards coherent logical argumentation may be getting the best of me, but I find it improbable that in a project

embarked upon by an extremely meticulous mind, specifically in order to produce a science of politics cleansed of logical error, patriotism would have been allowed to subtly creep in without a proper causal explanation.

The third obstruction echoes the inter-individual state of nature. It presumes that the rational state-building process of inter-individual interaction is bound to leave someone as an outsider. It can be argued that this is not a theoretically necessary condition, but rather a stipulation of actuality. Still, it is a state of affairs that effectively occurs in inter-individual interaction, and therefore according to the strict parallel between the situations, should find itself mirrored in the international arena, thereby preventing the formation of a truly global Leviathan. I would argue however that discounting the possibility of a Hobbesean foundation for world government is a reflection of inattentiveness to a theological-metaphysical mould that informs Hobbesean rationality.

Throughout this thesis I have used the imagery of the concentric Russian Dolls to denote the relation between phenomena as understood by Hobbes. On this model each level or sphere echoes the previous layer, going back to a primal mould that was responsible for shaping the layers in its own image. Consider the proposition that until an ‘incident’ derailed natural order, creation had set the layers in a state of frictionless harmony. Post ‘incident’, humankind finds itself faced with a potentially harmonic, yet broken mechanism. Without access to a definitive ‘service manual’, the only recourse left to Hobbes is to piece it back together, to seek out and emulate traces of the original order. Such traces are to be found in the laws of nature as they manifest themselves in the physical world, as well as in the remnants of social laws of nature in biblical accounts of the Hebraic chosen People. Indeed, both
these accounts should be reducible to a synthesis that would ‘distil’ the original order.

It is the biblical account that is helpful in understanding how a particular State of limited size is set to promote the eventuality of a cosmopolitan Leviathan. Consider that the original Hebraic society, prior to falling out of favour for not keeping to the set rules, is not only deemed in scripture to be the chosen People, but also literally translates from the Hebrew as ‘light to peoples’. They are considered a beacon, an example to be followed. In this context it is worth considering Arrigo Pacchi’s assertion that

The history of the Jewish people in their relationship with God, a relationship that had become archetypical of the whole Christian world, had to be assimilated and directed, thus interpreted, in such a way as not to contrast with the results of scientific examination of human society, nor with the similarly scientific project of a well ordered State… (Pacchi 1988).

It should also be noted that the eventual public revelation of the truth of creation, as opposed to ‘private audiences’ with a selected few, does not occur instantly. It is a process in which a righteous People replicating the original rules do not instantly win over humankind. They must face opposition, and indeed a final war, with those who would oppose the renaissance of natural order. From within the proposed perspective, the attitude of Hobbesean theory towards a global Leviathan is not only unhindered by the advocacy of a limited Leviathan, but rather supported by it.

Having digested the Russian Doll model, it is worth revisiting the definition of the ‘revolutionists’ category as originated by Martin Wight and inspired by Christopher Dawson’s *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture*:
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… those who believe passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or international society…and experience an overriding obligation to give effect to it, as the first aim of the international policies. For them the whole of international society transcends its parts; they are cosmopolitan rather than internationalist, and their international theory and policy has a missionary character.’ (Wight 1994: 8).

Unless one takes ‘first aim’ in a literal ordinal sense, rather than as a synonym of primality, the Russian Doll version of Hobbesean theory fits snugly into the definition of ‘revolutionist’ as drafted by Wight.

In order to avoid confusion it is worth noting the other revolution with which Hobbesanism is conventionally associated, and to which the Russian Doll model stands in contrast; the modernist revolution. In this last sense the revolution is a conceptual one, which replaces submission to God with individual autonomy. On a modernist account, Hobbesean theory is engaged with building anew a mechanically synthesised social and physical order, from the most primary building blocks it can identify, i.e. the individual. The rational individual is the architect of an artificial primary State that sheds the natural atomised condition in which individuals would otherwise find themselves, but retains their inherent individuality. On the modernist understanding the individual is the starting point. A collection of such individuals, all equally endowed with a will to preserve their own well being, allows for ascension into peaceful coexistence on the State level. It may or may not also allow for a similar ascension into a peaceful inter-State existence, depending on whether one takes the realist or the rationalist approach.
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On the Russian Doll model individuality, far from being the building block for society, is the very obstacle in the path of a defragmentation process. The original master mould for the sequence of doll layers is a rational system of order, shorthand for which could be the term ‘God’. It is God therefore, and not the modernist rationalised individual, that is set at the core of creation. It is God from which all orderliness thereon emanates. The rationalised individual is merely rediscovering (related to the Platonist remembrance process as discussed on p. 48) the rules of social and physical creation; he is not inventing them. By a combination of empirical observation of social friction, and conceptual analysis of the Creator as peaceful, the Hobbesean identifies a rift between God (order) and humankind. It is has been argued here that what he is offering is a healing process that is designed to achieve closure of this rift between the peacefulness of God (order) and the clash proneness (disorderliness) of humankind. Employing a scientific method that examines the mechanical cause-effect logical trail, Hobbes sets out to ‘repair’ humankind, by tracing its steps back to the cause of the current contradictory condition between its orderly creation and its disorderly conduct.

As has been proposed, since the Hobbesean conceptual analysis disorder cannot have been bred by order, the Hobbesean logical backtracking must reveal a moment of rebellion of the created in the orderly image against the rules of their creator. It is an incident that caused an interruption of the original harmonious existence, the consequence of which is the fragmentation of humankind into distinctive individuals. But humankind, having been part of the original order, is by its own nature also inclined to return to an orderly existence. It has the impetus to escape its completely fragmented state to reverse the chain of cause and effect,
thereby facilitating the return to the original orderliness by entering into a condition that is conducive to it - the State.

Since this stately existence is contrived, it is not properly original. It is an attempt to replicate the original lost order. Ultimately if one were to be careful enough in one’s rational reconstruction of the original truth, and if one were to avoid the pitfalls that befell, for example the ancient Hebraic attempt to do the same, one would hope to complete the full circle from God through the sin of disorderliness into fragmentation, and from fragmentation through the perfection of orderliness offered by the State, back to one, true, cosmopolitan unity with God. Coming full circle is a revolution in itself, yet it is a revolution in a renaissance sense. Moreover, if one can return to the original order, one has in fact reversed the effects of original sin. One has stopped the repetition of the fragmentation cycle, allowing one to remain at rest and at harmony with one’s surroundings. One has arrived at a perfect state in which one is no longer required to exert force.

On this understanding, while the realist school of international relations correctly attributes Hobbeseanism with the introduction of power relations to the analysis of social interaction, it is wrongly projecting its own positivist inclinations on to it. The Hobbesean theoretical stance does not stop at description. Hobbes is neither observing conflict for observation’s sake, nor in order to manage it, but rather in order to uproot it. He is studying the causes of conflict so that it may be eradicated. It has been argued here that his study leads him to identify a dichotomy between the unison of (Godly) order and the divisiveness of (UnGodly) disorder. It is within the framework of this black and white division that Hobbesian theory organises all its conceptual understandings: rationality versus irrationality, wholeness
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versus partiality, unity versus division, submission versus rebellion. Moreover, it is in order to achieve the ‘once and for all’ peace that it aspires to, that the Hobbesean logic is compelled to eliminate the ‘dark side’ altogether. The unification of humankind with God into the original cosmopolitan monism of creation can only be achieved by disposing of humankind’s corporeality. By contrast, this thesis has questioned the ability of human beings to mentally shed their corporeality, making their considerations from a purely impersonal rational stance. It has claimed that the demand for a standpoint that is dislodged from the defining features of human existence, namely time and space, is an otherworldly inhuman one. It is a vacuum in which real human life cannot exist.

8.2 Liberalism and Nationalism conjoined

It has been a key objective of this thesis to disprove the widely held antithetical relation between nationalism and liberalism. The portrayal of nationalism, from Ernst Renan onwards, as a communal defining factor of human consciousness, has deemed it illiberal. Jeremy Rabkin (Rabkin 1997) identifies the source of the conventional conceptual rift between liberalism and nationalism with the post WWII legal attempt to shelter private individuals, under the umbrella of international law, from gross misconduct by their own governments. Moreover, he contends that we are witnessing a contemporary departure from the original liberal tradition, which was highly committed to nationalism, as characterised in the work of
Swiss legal theorist Emerich de Vatell and the political thought of John Locke. While supportive of the general gist of Rabkin’s argument, I find that his documentation of the parallels between Locke’s attitude towards property and his attitude towards nationality, relies too heavily on communitarian argumentation.

Combined with its antagonism towards the abstraction of cosmopolitanism, and the historical lack of substantial theoretical discussion of nationalism, communitarianism is often considered as the missing theoretical foundation for nationalism. In the contemporary debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians each side is seen to be aligned with a corresponding philosophical enlightenment tradition. The cosmopolitan is commonly understood to draw upon the Lockean liberal tradition, with the historical American experiment as its ‘case study’ of an unencumbered individualist rational existence. The communitarian position probably has more ‘flavours’, with a spectrum ranging from rationalist to anti-rationalist depictions of the human psyche, the foundations of which are traced back to the Aristotelian tradition, varying from a rationalist reading of Rousseau that focuses on his organic notion of society, which both Hegelians and Marxists have tended to adopt, to a postmodern perception that builds upon the scepticism towards formalised rationalism that one finds in Rousseau’s tract on education, *Emile*.

Rabkin seemingly challenges this traditional association by arguing for a national conception of Locke’s pre-political society. However, in doing so he combines communitarian argumentation with his essentially liberal position. One could argue that he ‘piggybacks’ a collectivist national argument on a liberal Locke.

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163 See also Judith Lichtenberg’s: ‘How Liberal Can Nationalism Be?’ (Lichtenberg *How Liberal Can
The weakness of this method is that it leaves nationalism just as easily detachable from Locke. Thus, even if Rabkin is correct about Locke’s actual convictions on the matter, the trimmed down version of Locke adopted by cosmopolitans still logically stands. By contrast, the argument that I have put forward logically undermines the Lockean foundation for cosmopolitanism on strictly liberal grounds, by claiming that it does not follow from the fundamental metaphysical tenets that lead Locke to his liberal political position.

My own liberal justification of national identity also differs radically from Yael Tamir’s effort in *Liberal Nationalism* (Tamir 1993). Tamir professes (See Tamir 1994) to working within a Rawlsian framework, attempting to demonstrate that nationalism should be classified as morally relevant, and therefore deserving of inclusion within the public discussion of the reasonable. She is concerned with the ‘well being’ of individuals and more specifically with the recognition that a sense of belonging plays a significant role in this well-being. In the first instance her project wishes to establish that liberalism does not logically exclude nationalism. In the second instance it contends that the contribution that they both make to individual well-being accords them equal stature. Indeed, she is reluctant to chart a general theory of the relation between them, to the extent that she is more than willing to pay the theoretical price; namely, that the balancing of conflicting intuitions would probably need to be resolved case by case on a particular basis.

Building up to this conclusion much of Tamir’s effort is directed towards synthesising an understanding of nationalism that fits the mould of Rawlsian
reasonableness. My own Lockean-labelled effort, although arguing for a compatibility between nationalism and liberalism, neither focuses on a concept of ‘well-being’, nor employs Rawlsian reasonableness. Instead it puts forward a liberal argument for the nation that is a parallel of the liberal argument for the State, contending that both are necessary implications of difficulties in applying individualism outwith an isolated atomistic existence. The nation, like the State, promotes in the rational human\textsuperscript{164} individual, a social, future-oriented industrial approach, without which his motivation to join the social enterprise would be questionable.

This should not be confused with David Miller’s conception of nationality (Miller 1995) as an institution that enables social caring. Miller’s motivation would seem to be salvaging the last frontier\textsuperscript{165} of social obligation. My own concern is with defeating the growing tendency, beginning in Hobbes and epitomised in Kant, to prescribe social conduct by an appeal to an ideal rational individual rather than to a constrained human one. As I have already suggested it should also not be misconstrued as an adoption of a communitarian ‘embeddedness’ line of argument, with which both Rabkin and Miller appear to flirt. The communitarian position stresses the determining impact that our social surroundings have on us. It emulates developmental psychology’s analysis of the opening and shutting windows of our formative years that establish our identity. Thereon, since the self and society are forged together, their unison cannot be interrupted. The universal individual is regarded as a dream-like concept that has no bearing on the real world, reflecting the

\textsuperscript{164} As opposed to the ideal rational individual.
\textsuperscript{165} Having lost the traditional institutions of ‘the tribe’ and ‘the village’ to modernity.
impossibility of detangling the intertwinedness of self and society that make up our identity.

In this respect, communitarianism is a voice against abstraction, which is said to drain discussion of essential content. Yet, unlike communitarianism, the position considered here does not juxtapose unreal-abstracted with real-embedded, it juxtaposes unreal-incorporeal with real-corporeally bound. The detachment it speaks against is not the discounting of the formative nature of our original community, rather it is a critique of the disregard for the basic metaphysical human constraint to a single physical space. It turns on its head the orthodox concept of Humanism, as a Rousseauean rationalised universal outlook, using it instead as a corporeal boundary that divides mortals from deities.

National identity as employed here is considered a manifestation of the human constraint to a single spatial place. Unlike communitarian nationalism, it does not bind the individual to a particular determining place; rather, it binds her to the choice of a single place. In other words the position defended here negates the idea of multiple, vagrant-like, equally binding attachments to an array of spatially distant places, as outlined by H.G. Wells in his portrayal of cosmopolitanism (See Partington 2003); and reiterated in Jeremy Waldron’s contemporary cosmopolitan proposition:

The cosmopolitan may live all his life in one city and maintain the same citizenship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though he may live in San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not take his identity to be compromised when he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori Princess on Japanese
equipment...He is a creature of modernity\textsuperscript{166}, conscious of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self. (Waldron in Lichtenberg 1996-7: 63).

The stance being advanced here does not necessarily oppose multiple identities, or Waldron’s, modernised, \textit{mixed-up self}, rather it wishes to highlight the inescapability of the underlying physical aspect of our being. As mixed up as we may be, at some point in our lives most of us are forced to choose a primary place of attachment. Contrary to Judith Lichtenberg, I would assert that even in this age of technological breakthroughs, the cosmopolitan self, if it exists at all, is at best the preserve of free-thinkers and jet-setters (See Lichtenberg 1996-7: 63).

While it is true that modern transport allows for a globalised outlook on the manufacture and perhaps even on the marketing of goods, seemingly closing the gap between the economic environment one is subjected to on the streets of Rome versus the streets of Hong Kong; in practice, observing the conduct of highly resourced business people, equipped with state of the art video communication systems, one will note that the business-trip including the \textquote{sealed with a handshake} approach, is far from being made redundant. Seeing might be believing, but touching closes the deal. That in this savvy, cost-conscious environment, communication has not replaced the ever more costly physical meeting suggests that we are mentally attached to our physical existence.

But what if the marvels of technology in the field of communication were replicated in the field of transport? Provided with a means to commute door-to-door

\textsuperscript{166} It is worth noting that Waldron is extending Miller’s modernity argument to the dismantlement of the nation.
in a reasonable amount of time\footnote{Including security measures.}, from our residence in the outskirts of Edinburgh to our place of work, at the Toyota factory, just outside Tokyo, would we then become equally attached to both? Where would our children be schooled? En-route to our partner's job in Seattle, or around the corner from their retired parents in Capetown? Indeed, would these physically distant places continue to be distinct, or would they morph into street addresses on our globe-trotter's route.

One could argue that such a technological breakthrough is unnecessary. We do not require instant transportation, as we can stay put, while the world, or one should say: the world of commodities, is delivered to our doorstep. On the recent release of J.K. Rowling’s latest novel\footnote{The Sixth book of the series: \textit{Harry Potter and the Half Blood Prince}}, a news reporter approached two London teenage girls, dressed up in Witch costumes, who had been queuing in the wee hours to get their hands on the Harry Potter novel. When questioned as to why they could not wait for the regular sale of the book the following morning, they replied 'we wouldn't miss this experience for the world'.

While we have been trained to follow events via mediums such as television or the web, we recognise that true experiences are physical and unmediated, anything else, is only second best. This thesis puts forward that our attraction to ‘hands-on’ experience married with our incapacity to be present in several places at the same time, renders our spatial experience at the top of the hierarchy of our sense of identity. Where we are located influences who we will meet, where we will meet them and how often, but most importantly, in what context we will meet them. While
the context is always the present, it adds up in our mind to establish the past, which is entangled with other's perceptions to form a sense of history.

In reply to Jeremy Waldron, the position purported here is that the identity of an American of Irish descent living in San Francisco is not compromised when he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori Princess on Japanese equipment, because he is doing so in an American context with a reminder of his roots in the Irish context. Even if the grand EU state vision is triumphant, and Ireland does not survive as an independent political entity, the context of Ireland will not cease to exist. The place identified as Ireland will continue to exist, but more importantly the context of Ireland in the minds of Irish Americans could live on. How long it would live on, is difficult to say, but the experience of the Jewish historical phenomenon demonstrates that when a culture thoroughly bonds a people with a place, the context of the land of Zion may live on for thousands of years, eventually to be recaptured in practice.\footnote{It might be worth mentioning the fearsome dispute within the Zionist movement in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, when under the title ‘the Uganda Scheme’, it was suggested that a Jewish homeland might be realised in East Africa.}

It is argued that we, as individuals, are drawn to participate in such social, long-lasting enterprises because they complement the finite limitation of our individuality. By incorporating ourselves we salvage something of our individuality from its inevitable corporal demise. Again it is our human physicality that defines us. We are not deities; we are neither immortal nor omni-present. As impressive as technological leaps have been, an omni-presence-enabling gadget does not seem
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around the corner, nor is the fountain of eternal youth. We are, in this life, forever both physically and mentally contained within the spatio-temporal experience.
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