THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

IN THE PHILOSOPHY

OF

IMMANUEL KANT, JAMES WARD, S. ALEXANDER

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by

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The aim of this investigation is to discuss the merits of the three radically divergent views as to the nature and function of the categories held by Kant, Ward and Alexander.

The scope of the study is expressly limited to considerations and problems of a general nature with reference to the epistemological categories. Consequently, if, as some maintain, there are categories unique to the several sciences, our discussion may be described as confined to the categories of Consciousness. It is, therefore, not directly concerned with such subsidiary problems as the number of the categories, or the status of unique categories in such special sciences as morality and aesthetics.

These delimitations of the problem require no apology. They are justified on the methodological principle that the basic issues of a problem should be thoroughly investigated and clearly defined before embarking on subsidiary questions.

This subject was suggested some years ago by the very cavalier treatment of a priori categories in most contemporary thought. The recent appearance (1) of several works giving explicit attention to the nature of the categories is a gratifying assurance that the problem is not a dead issue.

The somewhat lengthy discussion of Kant is due (1) to the sharing of Professor Alexander's conviction "that with or after Plato

(1) Clarence I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, Scribners, 1929
Studies in the Problem of Relations, Univ. of California
publication in Philosophy, 1930
A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, Cambridge, 1929
there is nothing comparable in importance upon this subject with what may be learned from him," (1); (ii) Exposition of Kant must be supported by detailed and extensive evidence in view of the conflicts of doctrine in the master himself, and the divergencies of interpretation among his expositors.

In tracing the growth and development of the Kantian theory of categories in the seventies, the dating of the "Reflexionen" by Adickes in the Berlin edition is assumed as authoritative.

(1) S.T.D. I.192
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CHAPTER I.

THE INAUGURAL DISSERTATION AND LETTER TO HERZ.

Introduction

With the possible exception of some Reflexionen, the term "category" is used for the first time by Kant in his Letter to Herz 1772.

"While in this way I was searching out the sources of intellectual knowledge, without which we cannot determine the nature and limits of Metaphysic, I succeeded in making a distinct division of the parts of this science; and I sought further to gather Transcendental Philosophy, or, in other words all the notions of pure understanding into a certain number of Categories. Nor did I follow the manner of Aristotle, who simply set them down one after another as they occurred to him in his ten Predicaments, but I arrived at a systematic classification determined by a few fundamental principles. Without, however, going into any further detail, I may say that the essential part of my task is now done, and that I am in a position to lay before the public a Criticism of Pure Reason, which explains the nature of truth both theoretical and practical, insofar as it is derived purely from the intelligence: and I expect to complete and publish the first part of this system, containing an account of the sources of Metaphysic, its methods and its limits, within about three months."

The Letter gives no precise connotation to the term "category", but the context indicates that Kant considers he has made a significant discovery, and the terminology "category" and "transcendental philosophy" are introduced to give it expression. To appreciate the significance of this discovery it is necessary to sketch the development of Kant's thinking up to the year 1772.

Kant's Mental History Prior to the Inaugural Dissertation.

Kant's philosophical development prior to 1772 exhibits three stages.
"In the first period of his career he was still under the general influence of the Wolffian rationalism, attempting only to modify it in such a way as to make room for the mechanical conception initiated by Newton."(1) This is the aim of The Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, the Monadologica Physica and the Dilucidatio Nova, of 1755.

The second stage comprises several short treatises written between 1762 and 1766: - The False Subtilty of the Four Syllogistic Figures; The Sole Ground for a Demonstration of the Existence of God; On the Evidence of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals; An Attempt to Introduce the Conception of Negative Quantity into Philosophy; The Dreams of a Ghost-Seer illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysic. This stage exhibits an increasing dissatisfaction with Wolffian rationalism and an empirical trend not untouched with scepticism. In broad outline its doctrine may be summarized as follows: -

(1) Objective and real knowledge is synthetical
(2) Synthetical knowledge depends on experience
(3) Since the movement of pure thought is analytical and proceeds according to the Law of Contradiction, it is impossible to pass directly from thought (concepts) to existence. Consistency alone does not guarantee the objective reality of concepts. The relation of ground and consequent in pure notions must be distinguished from existential 'position'.
(4) The method of mathematics must be distinguished from that of metaphysics. Mathematical procedure is not mere analysis of defini-

All advance in mathematical knowledge is effected by the help of and through an appeal to some real factor in experience which Kant was as yet unable thoroughly to determine. Negatively it could be said that it is not identical with the isolated empirical perceptions; for by their help no explanation could be given of the generality and universality of a mathematical statement. On the other hand, the presence of this factor made a difference of kind between propositions in mathematics and propositions resulting from an analysis of pure notions..."(1) (5) The knowledge of causal relations is synthetical and a posteriori.

"The fundamental conceptions of things as causes and of their forces and actions are quite arbitrary when not taken from experience, and apart from experience we can neither prove nor disprove them." (2)

The implications of these premises might seem not only to involve a breach with rationalism, but to commit Kant to a position little different from that of Hume. Consequently, it is easy to mistake the strongly marked rationalistic position of the Inaugural Dissertation as a violent volte face, unless it be realised (a) that even throughout his empirical trend

"Kant never abandoned his private convictions as to the truth and value of metaphysics: nor was he ever attracted by mere empiricism." (3)

(b) That the Reflexionen assigned to the years 1766-9 by Adickes indicate a natural transition to the position of the Inaugural Dissertation. Evidence for this statement will be incorporated

(1) Adamson. The Development of Modern Philosophy. p.153
(3) Ward. Study of Kant. p. 29 note and references. Cf.also Letter to Lambert (1765) cited by Caird op.cit.144-5
in the following analysis of the Inaugural Dissertation.

II. The Inaugural Dissertation.

The Inaugural Dissertation is the third phase of Kant's mental history prior to 1772. Kant in retrospecting on his mental development says:

"Before the Disputation (i.e. the Dissertation) I had already got an idea of the influence of the subjective conditions of knowledge upon our knowledge of objects. This was soon followed by the discovery of the distinction of the sensible from the intellectual conditions. As yet, however, this distinction was viewed by me merely on its negative side." (1)

In the Inaugural Dissertation this distinction between the intellectual and the sensitive conditions of knowledge is explicitly formulated, and the history of Kant's theory of categories is its subsequent development. This doctrine involves no startling breach of continuity with his previous works. It is but the epistemological counterpart of the philosophical dualism held by Kant in the early sixties.

"Even at this time he had the two worlds, the world in space and time, and the non-spatial, timeless world, each with its own laws. But for the latter, in which he nevertheless believed, he could find no principle of construction. . . . The little essay on the nature of Space of the year 1768 shows how Kant's thought was revolving about this problem." (2)

The characteristics of Sensibility and Rationality as defined by the Inaugural Dissertation require detailed analysis.

SENSIBILITY

"Sensibility is the receptivity of the subject through which it is possible that its power of representation should be affected in a certain manner by the presence of some

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(1). 5015
(2). Paulsen. Immanuel Kant 94. Cf.Adamson op.cit. pp.153,155 who holds that the antithesis of sense and intellect was forced upon Kant by problems arising from a consideration of the nature of space and time.
object." (Par. 3).

Its object is the sensible (phenomena).

Things sensitively apprehended are representations of things as they appear.

In sensitive knowledge, we can distinguish between the Matter i.e. sensation, an affection of the senses, and Form

"an internal principle of the mind through which various impressions may take on a certain form according to stable and innate laws." (Par. 4).

Form here refers to the intuitions of space and time further expounded in Section 2, par. 12; and Section 3. Noteworthy in this connection is the fact that the Dissertation teaches that the form of sensible apprehension is itself capable of ordering the manifold, whereas the Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason shows that the cooperation of the categories is necessary for ordering the manifold.

It would seem that Kant made little advance upon his earlier views of space and time until he published his pamphlet On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space. (1768). In this work Kant drew attention to certain facts which favoured the Newtonian against the Leibnizian view of space. The Newtonian view, however, was beset by serious metaphysical difficulties, and the Reflexionen of 1769 indicate considerable preoccupation with the problems of space and time, which finally result in the views of the Dissertation. Each of the five characteristics ascribed to space and time in the Dissertation is anticipated by the Reflexionen of 1769. Thus:

(1) The ideas of space and time do not originate in the senses. 3930 explicitly asserts this, but terms space and time "notiones
rationales", "conceptus intellectus puri", and groups them with Exiistence, Possibility, Necessity, Ground, Unity, etc. Cf. 4077 and the Reflexionen quoted below.

(2) The ideas of space and time are singular not general. "The concept of Time is a singular concept."...4071. Cf. 3955-6.

(3) Space and Time are pure intuitions.

In 3955 the expression "conceptus singulares" is used synonymously with "intuitus puri" and explicitly contrasted with pure concepts of Reason.

According to 3957 "We have a twofold form of knowledge viz. the intuitive and rational. The first occurs only in the immediate knowledge of particular things; the second in general presentations: the first I call intuiting, the second concepts of reason.... The form of appearances depends solely on space and time, which arise through no senses or sensation, but depend on the nature of the mind, according to which the different sensations can be presented in these relations. Consequently, ... the concept of space and time is a pure concept of intuition. (Italics mine).

In 4072, Space is termed an "intuitive presentation".

According to 4073, "Sprium et tempus sunt conceptus intellectus puri. Notiones metaphysicae sunt conceptus rationis purae."

(4) Time is a continuous quantum. This is laid down as far back as 1756. "Lex continuitatis mathematica est: Sprium et tempus sunt continuas." 3901.

(5) Space and time are not objective and real. So 3953 "but whether a thing is in space or not is subjective, since the concept of Space is not objective."

And again, 4077 "Both space and time are subjective conditions according
to which alone objects can be given to the senses. To consider them as objective would be absurd."

In 3950 and 4191 this statement is qualified by the addition that space "is quite real with respect to outer appearances, since it is their condition."

INTELLIGENCE (rationality)

"Intelligence is the faculty of the subject through which it is able to represent things which cannot by their own characters act upon the senses." Par. 3.

In Par. 5 Kant distinguishes a twofold use of the intellect.

"By the first use, the very concepts of objects or of relations are given through the very nature of the intellect, not abstracted from any use of the senses, and do not contain any form of sensitive cognition as such." Par. 7.

This is the real use.

"By the second use, concepts, whensoever given, are only subordinated to one another, the lower to the higher (the common marks), and compared with another according to the principle of contradiction: and this is called the logical use. The logical use of the intellect is common to all sciences but not the real use." Par. 5.

"No matter to what extent the logical use of intellect has been exercised upon sensitive cognitions, they are still to be considered sensitive... They do not become intellectual in the real sense by being brought to a greater universality and so pass out of the class of sensitive knowledge. However high they ascend by way of abstraction, they always remain sensitive." Par. 5.

The science appropriate to the real use of intellect is Metaphysics.

"Since then, no empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics, the concepts there met with are not to be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature of pure intellect, not as concepts connate to it, but as abstracted (by attention to its actions on the occasion of experience) from laws inborn in the mind, and so to this extent as acquired. Concepts of this sort are possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc. with their opposites or correlates. These never enter into any
This real use of the intellect requires further consideration. Firstly, Kant makes a distinction between "laws inborn in the mind" and the concepts abstracted therefrom. The distinction raises considerable difficulties, but it seems impossible to interpret the text otherwise. The passage just quoted from Paragraph 8 quite definitely makes the distinction. Again in Paragraph 23 the same distinction appears when Kant says

"For since the right use of reason here (i.e. in Metaphysics) establishes the principles themselves, and since only by virtue of its own powers do the objects and axioms which are to be thought about them first become known, the expositions of the laws of pure reason is the very beginning of the science...."

In Paragraph 15 - though Kant is here discussing the "singular concepts" of space and time - the distinction is again made when he speaks of

"the concepts acquired, as abstracted...from the action of the mind in coordinating its sense according to unchanging laws....Nothing is here connate save the law of the mind, according to which it combines in a fixed manner the sense produced in it by the presence of the object." (Italics mine).

Tempting though it may be to identify the concepts with the "laws of the mind" in these passages, the language used quite definitely precludes it. If, however, these concepts are abstracted by attention to the actions of the mind on the occasion of experience, the "laws inborn in the mind" would seem to suffice for rendering experience possible. This, indeed, is eventually recognised by Kant in his doctrine of categories.

Secondly, a very difficult question of interpretation occurs with respect to the function of these concepts, to which Kant very
briefly alludes in Paragraph 9.

"The concepts of understanding have in especial two functions (a) In their critical use they perform the negative service of keeping sensitive concepts from being applied to noumena. Though they advance knowledge not at all, they yet keep it free from contagion of errors. (b) In their dogmatic use, the general principles of pure understanding, such as are dealt with in ontology or rational psychology issue in some exemplar which is conceivable only by pure intellect and is the common measure of all other things as far as real."

The functions assigned to the pure intelligible concepts in this passage, are in the Critique ascribed to the Ideas. Consequently, when we find the pure intelligible concepts and real use of Reason thus reduced to a regulative status, the knowledge of things as they are becomes an empty phrase. Furthermore, since

"the use of the understanding in reference to (phenomena) is not real but only logical," Paragraph 12

it would seem that the "pure concepts" of possibility, existence, substance, cause etc. with their opposites or correlates (Paragraph 8) are precluded from exercising any function in connection with phenomena. Nonetheless these concepts are quite explicitly referred to phenomena in the Dissertation e.g. "We coordinate alike substance and accidents... only through the concept of time." (Paragraph 14).

"Above all when the intellect is applied to experience through the relation of cause and effect"....(Paragraph 15).

Again, the connection of these concepts with phenomena seems sanctioned by the passage in the Letter to Herz (1772) in which Kant is criticising this very doctrine of the usus realis intellectus. Although I fail to see how these two views on the function of the concepts of the understanding can be reconciled, it is difficult to imagine how Kant could have been the victim of such an obvious contradiction.
We are consequently compelled to look for some tacit qualification - unmentioned in the Dissertation - which seemed to him to free his apparently conflicting statements from inconsistency.

There are two possibilities in this connexion

(1) Professor Adamson suggests that we must contemplate a twofold consideration of any such notion as cause and effect.

"On the one hand it appears in the work of pure understanding as expressing a relation of dependence of pure transcendent non-empirical objects; on the other hand it must appear somehow (Kant in the Dissertation makes no reference to it) in regard to the operations by which, through sense perception and the logical use of the intellect, our knowledge is built up." (1).

A hint of this view may perhaps be contained in

"Certainly, according to the laws of pure intellect every series of effects has its assignable ground of existence, while according to the laws of sensibility every series of coordinates has an assignable beginning." (2).

(2) A second possibility is that Kant conceived the usus realis intellectus to be strictly confined to Metaphysics, and regarded the application of pure concepts to phenomena as falling within the province of the logical use of intellect. Thus e.g. a particular instance of two phenomena A - B is subordinated under the pure concept of causality as a particular is subordinated to its appropriate universal in formal logic, and the pure concept thus applied becomes an empirical concept.

I do not maintain that I can conclusively prove this hypothesis, but I would submit the following evidence in its favour.

(1) op.cit. p. 161
(2) Dissertation, par.23
That the relation of the concept of understanding to its object would be naturally regarded by Kant as that of universal to particular (and hence as coming under the logical use of intellect) is evident from the unfortunate persistence of this view even in the developed category theory of the Critique of Pure Reason.

It offers an explanation of the "somehow" of Kant's dual use of the concepts of cause etc. which is forced upon us by the Dissertation and Letter to Herz.

It receives support from many Reflexionen of 1769. In interpreting these Reflexionen it is important to be precise with regard to the connotation of Metaphysics since the pure concepts in question are metaphysical concepts.

"Metaphysics is a philosophy concerning the concepts of the intellectus puri." (3930).

"It is a science of the ground concepts and basic laws of human reason." (3946).

Metaphysics is explicitly distinguished from: - (a) Logic which is analytical and merely concerned with the arrangement of concepts immediately or mediateaccording to the Law of Contradiction, and does not concern itself with the origin and source of its concepts. (3944; 3946; 3949). (b) Ontology: -

"Metaphysics is not ontology, which is falsely regarded as a science of things in general quoad praedica universalia et disjunctiva."

"Metaphysics; other philosophy : : mathesis pura : mathesis applicate" (3950; 3958; 4168).

Metaphysics is thus a critique of the origin and limits of knowledge, its first principles and basic concepts. But though it is concerned with the form of knowledge, the Reflexionen quite definitely
assume that its concepts mingle with phenomena.

"The ideas and rules of reason are also used in relations of empirical concepts, and this is their natural and rightful use, etc. " 3932.

"Metaphysics however contains the rules without which we could not know objects" (3949 l.27). Cf. 3933.

"Metaphysics shows the origin of the universal concepts, to which all knowledge must be referred, if appearances are to be transformed by concepts." (3946).

It remains to justify the further statement that a pure concept when applied to phenomena is regarded as empirical.

"In like manner sensations and appearances made general are not pure but empirical concepts of reason; if however one abstracts all influence of the senses there remains pure concepts of reason, e.g. possibility, substance, etc.... (3957. Italics mine). Cf. 3959; 3961.

All concepts are either sensible or rational. The first are either of sensation or of appearance: these have as a basis the forms of space and time. The second can not be discovered through an analysis of experience - although all experience is coordinate with them - and are pure rational concepts if no object of experience is thought by them. If however this occurs they are empirical concepts."....(3974, italics mine).

It may be said that this interpretation of the metaphysical concepts conflicts with the following passage of the Dissertation

"These never enter into any sensual representation as parts of it, and could not, therefore, in any wise be abstracted therefrom." Paragraph 8.

Kant, however, is here explicitly concerned to show that the source and origin of the pure concepts lies in the nature of reason itself and that they cannot be deduced from any sensual representation through mere abstraction. There is therefore no conflict with the foregoing exposition which is not maintaining that the pure concepts can be derived by abstraction from any sensual representation, but is concerned
to show how these concepts, though not discoverable through an 
analyses of experience, can function for the purposes of experience.

3. CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE DISSERTATION AND REFLEXIONEN OF 1770

(1) One of the most outstanding features of the Dissertation is the 
sharp distinction between the formal concepts of the understanding 
and objects given in sensation. It is not long before Kant realises 
the difficulties of such unmediated opposition, and as a result 
formulates the most difficult but most significant problem of his 
philosophy viz. how can pure concepts which have their source in the 
soul agree with objects of experience? (1)

(2) The Reflexionen of 1769-1770 show that Kant recognised the 
pure metaphysical concepts to be synthetical though subjective: -

"All rational synthetic principles are subjective, and 
only the analytic are objective, principia identitatis et 
contradictionis.
The synthesis of reason (rational) or of experience 
(empirical). 
The first are either of coordination: whole and part, 
number and unity; or of subordination, ground and consequent. 
The second of coordination according to space and time." (3935)

"The logical form of our knowledge must be distinguished 
from the metaphysical; the first is analysis, the second 
synthesis." (3944).

"The rational science of synthetic knowledge and judgments 
is metaphysics." (3974).

Compare also 3950; 3996.

(3) The distinction of the Dissertation between the "leges menti 
insitae" and the concepts abstracted therefrom is untenable. For 
the developed category theory, the categories are themselves Ver-
standes gesetze and there are no more ultimate principles from which

(1) Cf. infra par. 4 Letter to Herz.
they can be derived. Consequently "attention to the actions of the mind on the occasion of experience from laws inborn in the mind" can no longer suffice to account for their origin.

(4). The scepticism of Kant's later thinking with regard to knowledge of things in themselves, ipso facto disposes of the difficult doctrine of the 'real use of intellect'. The 'logical use' of intellect becomes a 'real use' in the sense that the categories are sine quibus non of all possible objects of knowledge.

(5). With his results to date, Kant's penchant for Systematik finds scope in primitive efforts to draw up a table of pure concepts:

"The basic rational concepts whereby alone the sensible qualities of things can be explained are in outer objects Space, Time, Movement. In inner: A 1. The immediate presentation of Present, Past and Future. 2. Comparison, Difference, Unity. 3. Relation (logical) of connection and opposition. 4. Consciousness, Judgments, Conclusions. B 1. Feeling, Pleasure, Displeasure. 2. In relation to the judgment of understanding or of the senses. C. Desire, etc.

Through the nature of understanding not abstrahendo but judicando there arise concepts of synthesis. Existence, Possibility, Unity, Substance, Accident, Relation, Respectus reals, Logical, Necessity, Contingency, Whole, Part, Simple, Composite, Ground, Consequent, Force, Cause." (3927).

This conglomeration of "the inner" at first sight appears to be without any guiding principle of classification. Closer inspection, however, would seem to reveal a crude attempt at division on the basis of faculties. It is scarcely necessary to add that the "judicando" here implies no consciousness of the "clue" to the deduction of the categories— that categories are functions of judgment.

A less unsystematic classification of concepts which confines itself to the "conceptus intellectus puri" claims to be based on the laws of understanding in comparison, conjunction and separation. (3930).
These principles of classification are further qualified by a subdivision on the basis of coordination and subordination:

"Metaphysical concepts arise 1. Merely through coordination: (absolute and relative, Whole, part, continuum, discrep[tum](multiplicity) singularity, totality (first, last, a singular) 2. or through subordination in the logical understanding: universal or particular.... 3. through subordination in the real understanding; ground, consequence, cause, effect. 4. Existence: necessity contingency (possible) 5. Substance (subject, predicate) Simple composite".....(3941). Cf. also 3935; 3976; 4155.

As Adickes points out if one disregards the bracketed words the later categories of Quantity can be detected in (1) and (2); of Relation in (3) and (5); of Quality and Modality in (4). (1).

It would appear then that by this time Kant had already conceived or was on the verge of discovering the basis of classifying the categories "through some few basic laws of the understanding" mentioned in the Letter to Herz (1772).

IV. THE LETTER TO HERZ

Commentators differ in their estimates of Kant's philosophical position indicated in the Letter to Herz.

Caird maintains that at this time the great problem of the Critique - how conceptions, which are not due to experience should yet be conceptions to which experience must conform was already occupying the attention of Kant.

Heering contends (2) that two essential modifications of the Dissertation had already "dawned" upon Kant at the time of the Letter. (1)

The relation between sensibility and intellect is changed.

(1) Adickes' Systematik p.22
(2) Der Diuburg'sche Nachlass und Kant's Kriticismus um 1755. p.121
They are no longer set in absolute opposition but are regarded as complementary for knowledge of objects. (2) Our intellectual knowledge so far as it can claim objectivity is limited to phenomena. If these contentions can be established, it will follow that the term "category" used in the Letter implies the essentials of its "critical" connotation, and that the Letter is an announcement of a significant advance in Kant's mental history.

Professor Kemp Smith on the other hand contends

"that in 1772 there was no real problem for Kant. The assumed fact, that our representations are generated in us by the action of independent existences, is taken as sufficient explanation of their being referred to objects." (1)

But surely the Letter does not warrant us in supposing that Kant made any such assumption. Kant says

"If the representation contains only the mode in which the subject is affected by the object" or on the other hand "if the object itself were produced by the representation", the conformity of representations with objects might be understood. Neither case applies to us.

"Our understanding (leaving moral ends out of account) is not the cause of the object through its representations, nor is the object the cause of its intellectual representations (in sensu reali)."

Kant, it should be noted, also states that this problem was not even raised in the Dissertation.

"In the Dissertation I was content to explain the nature of these intellectual representations in a merely negative manner, viz. as not being modifications of the soul produced by the object. But I silently passed over the further question,

(1) Kemp Smith, N. A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. pp. 206-7
how such representations, which refer to an object and yet are not the result of an affection due to that object, can be possible. I had maintained that the sense representations represent things as they appear, the intellectual representations things as they are. But how then are these things given to us, if not by the manner in which they affect us? And if such intellectual representations are due to our own inner activity, whence comes the agreement which they are supposed to have with objects, which yet are not their products? How comes it that the axioms of pure reason about these objects agree with the latter, when this agreement has not been in any way assisted by experience?"

These quotations together with the fact that Kant has reflected sufficiently to perceive the metaphysical implications of the problem, show clearly that he had become quite cognisant of its difficulties, and that no such superficial explanations as those mentioned in the passage of the Letter could satisfy him. So far from indicating that there was here no real problem for Kant, the purport of the Letter is to show that there is a problem which has never been previously grasped; the solution of which will be given in a promised work entitled a Criticism of Pure Reason. That Kant must have had some solution of the problem in mind different from any previously offered by him, is indicated by the optimism attending his announcement of this work. Were he still confined to the Dissertation stage, it seems inconceivable that he would launch a work upon the public which claimed "to explain the nature of truth both theoretical and practical, and to define the method, sources, and limits of metaphysics", when he himself in this letter expresses dissatisfaction with the Dissertation on a problem which is termed the "whole secret of metaphysic."
Professor Kemp Smith also contends that in the Letter it is the validity of a priori concepts to things in themselves that is under consideration. If this were so, Kant would still be virtually at the Dissertation stage and no special significance can be attached to the term category. There are two arguments which may be offered in support of this interpretation: — Firstly, the passage of the Letter which runs

"But when we ask how the understanding can form to itself completely a priori concepts of things in their qualitative determination, with which these things must of necessity agree, or formulate in regard to their possibility principles which are independent of experience, but with which experience must exactly conform, we raise a question, that of the origin of the agreement of our faculty of understanding with the things themselves, over which obscurity still hangs."

Secondly, the Prolegomena passage

"I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." (1)

As Professor Kemp Smith points out

"The essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry, from the standpoint of their bearing upon Critical issues, lies in the wider scope and more radical character of the earlier work. The Enquiry discusses the problem of causality only in the form in which it emerges in particular causal judgments, i.e. as to our grounds for asserting that this or that effect is due to this or that cause. In the Treatise, Hume raises the broader question as to our right to postulate that events must always be causally determined. In other words, he there questions the validity of the universal causal principle, that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence; and he does so on the explicit ground that it demands as necessary the connecting of two concepts, that of an event and that of an antecedent cause, between which no connection of any kind can be detected by the mind. The principle, that is to say, is not self-evident; it is synthetic." (2)

(1) Prolegomena. Intro. p. 7
(2) Commentary. p. xxvi
In this discussion the crucial question is, to which of Hume's works, the *Enquiry* or the *Treatise*, does the "awakening" refer? There is strong evidence that Kant had not himself read the *Treatise*, but had become acquainted with it through the excerpts in Beatties' *Essay on the Nature and Immortality of Truth*. That Kant had read this work in the original is improbable, owing to his imperfect knowledge of English (1). The German translation of Beatties' *Essay* did not appear until Easter 1772 i.e. after the *Letter* to Herz was written. If then the "awakening" refers to the argument of the *Treatise*, it must have taken place some time after Easter 1772. This of course would be conclusive evidence against our interpretation of the *Letter* as signalling "a quite new direction to Kant's investigation."

With reference to the first of these arguments it appears to me that close inspection of the actual wording and general context of the passage from the *Letter* under consideration, is unfavourable to Professor Kemp Smith's interpretation. The expression used is "Dingen selbst". The usual expression to denote "things in themselves" is "Dingen an sich". The context requires the reflexive pronoun and "Dingen selbst" is simply the "Gegenstände selbst" of e.g. *Reflexionen* 5555.

Again if "Dingen selbst" denotes "things in themselves" then the expression "But with which experience must exactly conform" must be interpreted as "experience of things in themselves." But

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(1) Commentary p. xxviii. Note 3.
here again even philological considerations make this highly improbable; for it is our faculty of understanding that is under consideration, and Verstandesbegriffe denote a reference to the sensible. (1).

In regard to the second argument - the Prolegomena passage - its whole significance depends on the precise reference of Kant's "Erinnerung". Professor Kemp Smith favours the view that the medium of the "awakening" was Beatties' Essay. He suggests that

"Kant's employment of the term 'Erinnerung' may perhaps be interpreted in view of the indirect source of his knowledge of Hume's main position. He would bring to his reading of Beatties' quotations the memory of Hume's other sceptical doctrines as expounded in the Enquiry." (2)

It is admitted, however, that

"we cannot be absolutely certain that it was not a re-reading of the Enquiry or a recalling of its argument that suggested to Kant the central problem of his Critical Philosophy."(3).

In favour of the latter it should be noted that both in the Prolegomena and in the passage of the Critique of Practical Reason (4), in which Kant again acknowledges his debt to Hume, Kant asserts that the "awakening" was due to Hume's sceptical treatment of causality. His own contribution was the generalisation of the problem and its extension to other concepts of similar status. Now the Letter to Herz indicates that this generalisation had already taken place. The passage in the Critique of Practical Reason throws no further light on the point at issue other than to show the importance of deciding whether the "Dingen selbst" of the Letter means "Dingen an sich". For Kant here explicitly states that the key to his solu-

(2) Commentary xxx note.
(3) Commentary p. xxvii.
(4) Critique of Practical Reason. Par.170
tion of Hume's sceptical position was the realisation that "objects of experience" was not things in themselves but phenomena.

The only remaining source of evidence for deciding whether Kant's "awakening" took place before or after the writing of the Letter to Herz is the Reflexionen around 1772. And I would submit that they furnish conclusive evidence that Kant's "awakening" had already occurred before 1772, and that the Letter indicates a significant advance in his philosophical development. The following points are relevant in this connexion:

(1) The nature and function of metaphysics is restricted in accordance with Critical principles.

"The use of Metaphysics with respect to the theoretical is merely negative. It does not reveal the knowledge of things and is not dogmatic, for how could we obtain knowledge of things without the senses.... Metaphysics merely prevents a false use of reason, which would overstep its limits and consider intellectualia as objects; hence it serves only with reference to the modo cognoscendi of sensitive dabilium and its limits..."(4445) Cf. 4459.

(2) The problem of the agreement of a priori concepts and objects is clearly defined.

"The question arises how can we present to ourselves things entirely a priori i.e. independent of all experience, and how can we grasp basic principles, not borrowed from experience and therefore a priori? How comes it about that what is merely a product of our soul should correspond with objects and that objects are subjected to such laws? That there actually is such a priori knowledge is evident from pure mathematics and metaphysics; but it is important to investigate the ground of its possibility..."(4473) Cf. 4470.

(3) A priori concepts are recognised as being synthetic

"We have therefore judgments a posteriori which are synthetic, but also judgments a priori which are also synthetic and which cannot be derived from any experience, since they contain a genuine universality and consequently necessity.
This also applies to the pure concepts contained in them which cannot have been derived from experience..." 4634, 1.26.

(4) The objective validity of a priori concepts is limited to phenomena.

"If certain concepts are contained in us by means of which all experience on our part is alone possible, then they are prior to experience and apply with full validity to every possible experience and may be called a priori. They are however not valid of things in general (Dingen überhaupt) but only of what can be given through experience, since they contain the conditions by which these experiences are possible. But things which can be given through no experience are for us nothing: and though we may very well use such principles as general from a practical point of view, we cannot employ them as principles of speculation concerning objects in general." 4634, 11.1-12, p.618; Cf. 4642: 4650.

(5) The Critical terminology "a priori" (4630; 4634; 4636; 4644, etc) and "category" (4276; 4476) appears for the first time in connection with the pure concepts.

(6) Some improvement is indicated in the determining of a category table. The basis of coordination and subordination which represented the culmination of Kant's efforts around 1770 are explicitly connected with (4276) but merge into the persistent trichotomy of Thesis, Synthesis, Hypothesis - Analysis. The result of the relevant Reflexionen results in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis</th>
<th>Dasein (3941), Existence (4155), Reality (4476)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>Substance (4476), Inherence (4493), Ground and Consequent Dependence. (4493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Total et partiale finitum unum et plura (4476)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the categories of Thesis emerge later the categories of Quality and Modality, from Synthesis those of Relation, and from Analysis those of Quantity.
The Reflexionen dated by Adickes around 1772 indicate quite conclusively that Kant's "awakening" had occurred, and that the Letter marks a significant advance in his philosophical development.

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CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF CATEGORIES FROM 1772 - 1800

In the absence of any published work by Kant between 1772-1800, the Reflexionen provide the only source for discovering with accuracy and in detail the nature of Kant's philosophical development during these eight crucial years. If we confine our attention to the theory of categories, there are two points of special interest in the Reflexionen of 1755, which through elaboration and development eventually result in the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions of the Critique of Pure Reason:

I. The relation of categories and judgments

II. The nature and function of the categories.

I. THE RELATION OF CATEGORIES AND JUDGMENTS

In 1772 or shortly afterwards Kant makes the pronouncement that

"All knowledge consists in judgments... thinking is judging." (1)

Now it has been shown that although Kant had been exercised for some time in obtaining a satisfactory basis for drawing up a category table, there is no indication that up to this time judgment had been considered as having any unique or special significance for the problem. Once, however, this conviction had dawned upon him, it was almost inevitable that an attempt would follow to trace a connection between the various categories which had come to

(1) Reflexionen 4639
light and the table of judgments gleaned from the early logics. The Reflexionen around 1775 show that Kant had conceived the possibility of a classification of categories in accordance with the table of judgments and that he is endeavouring to work out a detailed parallelism of the two tables. That Kant is experimenting with a new idea is attested by the fact that the working out of the symbolism \( \text{a b x} \) exhibits inconsistencies in various passages, and also by the exaggerated importance attached to a new idea. Although the parallelism between judgments and categories survives in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Critique, it is considerably tempered as compared with its possibilities as conceived in 1775. Whereas in the Critique, the parallelism only extends to the kinds of judgments and kinds of pure concepts in a general way, at this time there is an attempt to exhibit a parallelism between the particular factors of judgments and the particular factors which constitute objective synthetic knowledge(1).

Another reason for dating this conception of a parallelism between the forms of judgment and categories around 1775 is that the beginnings of a table of categories on the basis of this classification is making its appearance, e.g. a parallel between the categorical hypothetical and disjunctive judgments and the three categories of relation is explicitly formulated.(2). Again, the relation between categories and forms of judgment is found in 4700.

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(1). Haering op.cit. p.66
(2). 4676
where the categories of Unity, Multiplicity, Totality, Causality, and Inherence are referred to the judgments of relation concerned?[1]

Thanks then to the careful and masterly work of Adickes and Haering on the dating of these Reflexionen we can quite definitely assign this important doctrine in Kant's category theory as having occurred around 1775.

II. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.

The most significant advance in this connexion is the role assigned to the categories in the transformation of the subjective into the objective. In the Reflexionen hitherto considered, the pure concepts - although recognised as synthetic - had consistently been denominated as subjective. The perplexing vacillation in the use of the terms is doubtless connected with the conviction that though categories are functions of the subject they are sine quibus non of knowledge of objects.

The necessary reformulating of the connotation of subjective-objective, however, is not achieved immediately, and in these Reflexionen the opposition between the objective and subjective can signify

1. That between the sensibly given, conceived as independent of the percipient subject, and the apprehending functions of the percipient (sensibly given - functions of the mind).

2. That between the functions of consciousness which refer to objects (Understanding) and the formal analytic functions of Reason.

(1) Adickes' Systematik p.29.
3. That between the appearances brought under concepts of the Understanding = Erfahrungen, and the "mere appearances" not yet "exponierten" "geregelten,"

The third signification is of special interest for the elucidation of the categories. This opposition between subjective Erscheinungen (Wahrnehmungen) and objective Erfahrung or objective Wahrnehmungen, is shown to depend on the following distinctions -

(a) In "mere perception" (subjective) the presentations are simply an "Aggregate" (Zusammehang); in "experience" the presentations are a "Synthesised Unity" (Verknüpfung). (1)

(b) It is necessary for "experience" that merely subjective time sequence shall be determined according to a rule, and thus transformed into objective time sequence. (2).

(c) Here as in the Critique universality and necessity are formulated as the essential characteristics of objective knowledge(3).

(d) In the transformation of the subjective into the objective, the three categories of relation are usually quoted in illustration. They are denominated as "Rules of Perception", "Rules of Apperception", "Titles of Self perception", "Principles of Exposition", "Titles of Thought" and are contrasted with such subjective principles as "Rules of Presumption" and "Petitions of Reason" which have only an "adop- tierte Gewissheit."

(e) These principles of objective determination are a priori.(4)

(f) They are limited to phenomena

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(1) 4674, 1.15, p. 643; 4681, 1.6-10, p. 668
(2) 4681, 1.4(15), p. 666;
(3) 4674, 1.18, p. 643; 4677, 1.21, p. 658; 4681, 1.23, p. 656
(4) 4678, 1.8(20-26), p. 661.
"These three concepts (Substance, Cause and Effect, and Whole) contain objects as appearances." (1)

"It is false to hold that a synthetic proposition, whose subject is a pure concept of the understanding is valid of all things in general (Dingen überhaupt). Though this may be so, it cannot be established objectively, but only under the subjective restriction of the use of reason. For me the conditions of sensibility make the synthesis possible (1) of pure (2) of empirical intuition (outer and inner sense)" (2)

Further specification of the category theory at this time requires consideration of the function of apperception. Haering calls attention to the fact that two significations of apperception are present in these Lose Blätter - a general and a restricted meaning. (3). Passages illustrating the general meaning of apperception are:

"Intuition is either of objects (apprehensio) or ourselves; all knowledge contains the latter". (apperceptio). (4)

"Perception is the position in inner sense in general and contains sensation according to the relations of Apperception... (5)..."

"If anything is to be apprehended, it must be taken under the function of Apperception." (6)

"All appearances must be brought under the title of Apperception." (7)

Contrasted with this general meaning of apperception in which it signifies consciousness of all our functions, we find a restricted meaning in which it is limited to consciousness of thought function. Thus:

"Apperception is the perception of one-self as a thinking subject in general." (8)

(1) 4674, 1.23, p.646.
(2) 4668, 1.15, p. 659.
(3) Haering op.cit. 148-9.
(4) 4675, 1.6, p. 651.
(5) 4677, 1.17, p. 659.
(6) 4676, 1.1, p. 656.
(7) 4679, 1.29, p. 664.
(8) 4674, 1.14, p.647
"Everything which is thought, stands under a rule of apperception." (1)

Haering considers this restricted meaning to be the genuinely Critical view

"We can trace here the concept of apperception evolving from its original meaning to its significance as the highest of the high in the Critique." (2).

A very difficult question in interpreting Kant's doctrine of Apperception is to decide whether he conceives it as a logical condition implied in all experience, but not explicitly articulated; or considers it as embodying explicit self consciousness as an indispensable condition of "knowledge proper".

Haering and some commentators appear to interpret apperception as implying explicit self consciousness; yet Haering himself issues a salutary warning in his prefatory note to Blatt 12

"Man darf aber nie vergessen dass es (Apperzeption) sich im Unterschied von Leibniz hier bei Kant nicht um einen psychologischen Prozess handelt, sondern um Erkenntnis theoretische Abstraktionen."

Both Adamson and Professor Kemp Smith on the other hand, have quite conclusively shown that (3) this interpretation of apperception involving explicit consciousness of self obviously contradicts Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense, the discussion of the Paralogisms and the implications of the Refutation of Idealism in the second edition of the Critique.

(1). 4677, I.1, p. 658.
(2). op. cit. 149. That this restricted meaning of apperception is not the critical view is implied in the arguments of the next chapter.
(3). Adamson, p.44. "The last of the elements which we have to notice is the supreme unity itself or Logical Ego, the indispensable factor in all cognition and consequently in itself according to Kant, incognisable. Kemp Smith Commentary xliii "Consciousness (Kant) maintains does not reveal itself but only its objects. In other words,
A further consequence, or rather inconsequence, of this interpretation of apperception which involves immediate knowledge of self, is the resulting view of the source of the categories. In Ward's language they must be derived "from what the experient subject is, and at the intellectual level knows itself to be." (1)

That this view is not Kant's last word about the categories will be shown in the next chapter. It is, however, present in these Reflexionen

" 'Ich bin', 'Ich denke', 'Gedanken sind in mir'; diese sind insgesamt Verhältnisse, welche zwar nicht Regeln der Erscheinung geben, aber machen, dass alle Erscheinung als unter Regeln vorgestellt werde." (2).

Haering's note on this passage is

" Die drei Funktionen der Apperzeption (= Selbstwahrnehmung) oder die drei Verhältnisse des inneren Sinns werden hier auf die drei Bewusstseinverhältnisse 'Ich bin', 'Ich Denke', 'Gedanken sind in mir' hinausgeführt, die das Prototyp für die drei Verhältnisse der Substanz Kausalität und Ganzes sein sollen. Ich als Substanz (Ich bin 'Dasein') Ich als causa der Gedanken, Ich als das Ganze, das die Gedanken als Teile in sich schliesst. Es ist gleichsam eine Illustration zu dem Gedanken vom 'Ich als dem Original aller Objekte' (768) oder dem Gedanken von 115 ('ursprüngliche Verhältnisse der Appreheension' = Selbstwahrnehmung) und davon derivierte der (äußeren) 'Wahrnehmung der realen Verhältnisse.' (3)

A similar view of the categories is found in

"Die drei Verhältnisse im Gemüt erfordern also drei Analogien der Erscheinung, um die subjektiven Funktionen des Gemüts in objektive zu verwandeln und sie dadurch zu Verstandesbegriffen zu machen, welche den Erscheinungen Realität geben."(4)

Again "Das Gemüt ist sich selbst also das Urbild von einer solchen Synthesis durch das ursprüngliche und nicht abgeleitete Denken". (5)

(1) Ward, J. Study of Kant. p.81
(2) 4675. 1,3, p.666
(3) Haering op.cit. p.68
(4) 4675, 1.23, p. 548
(5) 4674, 1.3, p. 647
These passages show that Kant still (1) considered that categories arise through abstraction from the inner activities of the self and are then applied to objects by analogy. For such a doctrine three crucial problems arise (2):-

(1) Can the apprehension of the inner precede the outer?
(2) Is there a unique form of awareness of self which can provide the categorial prototypes?
(3) Can there be a non categorial level of experience preceding the "transsubjective level" at which ex hypothesi the categories first emerge?

The Refutation of Idealism in the second edition of the Critique precludes (1). (2) is inconsistent with the doctrine of Inner Sense which asserts that immediate awareness of our inner states is impossible, and which puts them on the same plane of mediacy as outer appearances; hence the appearances of inner sense are no more privileged as a source of the categories than those of outer sense. Knowledge of either inner or outer appearances presupposes the categories.

It remains to show that the third implication of this "Projection Theory" is at variance with the Critical philosophy. As in all theories of this type, the preconceptual level of experience does not receive adequate analysis. Kant accords it some degree of articulation by introducing certain "subjective" principles of determination which he calls "Principles of Presumption." (3)

(1) Inaug. Diss. par. 8: Reflexionen 4412; 4495.
(2) Cf. infra. Part II
(3) 4681.
Their nature and function is very obscure (1), and I can find no adequate justification for them. Their description as "preliminary determinations of appearances" would seem to anticipate the distinction drawn in the Prolegomena between judgments of perception and judgments of experience - a distinction which "cuts at the very root of Kant's Critical teaching." (2). Consequently, if this suggested identification be correct they must share the ignominy of the latter. (3).

That this projection theory of the categories died hard with Kant is evident from the fact that its terminology still persists in the Critique. I shall endeavour to show by further and more detailed argument in the next chapter that it cannot be incorporated in the Critical philosophy. I shall also argue that in many passages we are constrained to interpret the language in a logical rather than a psychological sense, e.g. when Kant asserts

"It must be possible that the I think should accompany all my representations," (4)

the "I think" is not disclosed by introspection nor "enjoyed" by some unique form of awareness, but is a logical reconstruction through reflection on the factors necessary for the possibility of experience.

The Reflexionen around 1775 indicate that Kant had by this time grasped the basic principles of the Critique. Nevertheless more detailed investigation on crucial points and considerable concentration were necessary before the scattered details could become welded into a systematic unity (5). Kant's punctiliousness in this regard, his excessive

(1) Vide the notes by Haering op.cit. pp. 16-19; 40
(2) Kemp Smith. Commentary p. 288
(3) Cf. infra pp. 43-47
(4) Critique B. 132
(5) Cf. Reflexionen Phases U - $\Phi$ and X
load of University duties and his indifferent health were probably the reasons for the delay in publishing the _Critique_. (1)

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(1) Haering, op.cit. pp.153-4
CHAPTER III

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF KANT'S THEORY OF CATEGORIES RESULTING FROM THE AMBIGUOUS TERMS 'OBJECT' AND 'EXPERIENCE'.

The aim of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories is to show that they are a priori synthetic functions, which first make experience possible and thereby make knowledge of objects possible - for the conditions of possible experience are equally the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.

The real significance of this statement depends on discovering what is meant by the ambiguous terms "experience" and "objects".

Does Kant use "experience" in a restricted sense, meaning thereby a systematic and coherent body of knowledge recognised as such? Is the function of the categories to render such experience possible by clarifying and systematising the interrelations of phenomena? Or does he mean by "experience" any form of apprehension which conveys meaning? Would he hold that the categories are involved in any apprehension that may be called cognitive - in perception, as well as at the higher level of systematic and scientific knowledge?

A similar ambiguity attaches to the term "object". Does Kant mean to restrict the meaning of object to a unified complex of data, definitely and deliberately distinguished as such by a self conscious subject? Does consciousness of an object only emerge in dis-
tinction from a subject which is conscious of itself as such? Or would Kant's use of the term "object" be included in the naive experience of a child and in the ordinary unsophisticated experience of the man in the street? Does Kant differentiate an early preconceptual level of immediacy, in which the data hang together independently of the categories, from a late conceptual level of immediacy in which experience and knowledge proper first emerge through the application of the categories to the data of the perceptual level?

Radically different views as to the nature and function of the categories result according as one or other of the above interpretations of "object" and "experience" is adopted.

On the first interpretation, since "experience" and knowledge of objects is restricted to the reflective level, the categories arise relatively late in mental development. Their emergence is due to introspection and reflection upon "the mind's own activities on the occasion of experience." The a priority of the categories is explained by the fact that they are abstracted from the activities of the mind and applied by analogy to outer phenomena. The function of the categories is to render "experience" possible; but the term experience is used in a specially restricted and sophisticated sense to denote an objective system involving universal and necessary laws, explicitly apprehended as such.

On the second interpretation of experience and objects, the function of the categories is much more fundamental. They function ab initio as synthetic activities which transform sensations into perceptions. Since they are conditions of perception and consciousness
of any kind, they are not themselves consciously apprehended, and must, therefore, be considered as functioning unconsciously, prior to the conceptual level. Our so-called knowledge of them, is simply a conceptual expression and explicit formulation of relational syntheses, which have been already active in rendering perceptual experience possible. On this view, then, the categories are dispositions (which may or may not be spiritual) (1) immediately evoked through the affection of stimuli. They are not essentially and primarily methodological concepts which are abstracted by introspection and projected by analogy upon outer experience.

To interpret Kant's theory of categories entirely from the self-reflective standpoint, results in a timorous and hopelessly inadequate idealism, which could have no claim to being a "Copernican revolution" in philosophy. To show that such an interpretation is a travesty of Kant's whole theory of knowledge is the purport of this chapter.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SIX ARGUMENTS PRIMA FACIE FAVOURABLE TO THE FIRST INTERPRETATION OF THE CATEGORIES.

(1) Passages in the Transcendental Deduction Distinguishing Phenomena or "Objects given" from Categorial Objects.

There are many passages in the Analytic in which this distinction occurs, and which may therefore be thought to imply that Kant sanctions the notion that knowledge of objects by the categories super-

venues upon a non categorial perceptual level in which objects simply are, but not recognised. I cannot deal with all such passages, but by analysis of some typical examples, I shall show that no such inference is justifiable.

"The categories of the understanding, on the contrary are not conditions under which objects can be given in intuition, and it is quite possible, therefore, that objects should appear to us without any necessary reference to the functions of the understanding, thus showing that the understanding contains by no means any of their conditions a priori." (A 89).

"It cannot be denied that phenomena may be given without the functions of the understanding." (A 90).

"To know a thing as an object is possible only under two conditions. First there must be intuition by which the object is given us, though as a phenomena only. Secondly, there must be a concept by which an object is thought as corresponding to that intuition." (A 93).

In all these passages it appears as though an object were first given and that afterwards the categories function in reference to it, and make our knowledge of it explicit. Such a view obviously conflicts with such passages as:

"Consequently, all synthesis, without which even perception would be impossible, is subject to the categories." (B 161).

"All possible perceptions, everything in fact that can come to empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature must... be subject to the categories." (B 165).

In view of their contradiction with this maturer thinking, we may be justified in simply designating such passages - (A 89-90) as "uncritical" and in disregarding them as authoritative evidence for any Critical doctrine. (1). They must be regarded then as vestigia of earlier reflections which have crept into the Critique through...

(1). A 89-90 are regarded as uncritical by both Adickes and Kemp Smith.
defective and hurried editing. It seems to me, however, that their uncritical nature must have been somewhat less naive than is usually supposed, to escape excision even in a final proof reading. I would suggest that both the term "object" and "phenomenon" is used loosely and refers to the content of knowledge. (1). That the material of thought must be given and cannot be invented is sound Critical doctrine, and only by thus interpreting his terminology could Kant have allowed the passages to stand. As thus understood the terminology is uncritical but not the doctrine. And even in regard to terminology Kant might not unreasonably excuse himself by reminding us that a problem cannot be expounded by using the language of a revolutionary and novel solution. All the quotations occur in the introductory sections of the Deduction, and it may be that in order to induce comprehension of the problem in hand Kant thought it necessary "to speak with the vulgar and think with the learned." (2).

When "object" and "phenomenon" are equated with the content of knowledge, the passages under consideration lend no support to the First Interpretation - that the categories are superinduced simply to clarify and systematise our knowledge of "things".

(2) Objects as Causes
Another group of passages speak of

"the material for cognition being given by the object". (B 145),

"attributing a degree of influence upon the senses to objects of perception." (B 208)

"representations being given by phenomena" (A 115).

(1).Cf. Kemp Smith Commentary 79-80 where the same use of object = content is noted in the opening of the Aesthetic.
(2) That Kant was skilful in this respect is noticed by Adickes in Kant's Lehre von der Doppelten Affektion. p. 63.
In these passages the object to which causal agency is attributed is not a noumenon but a phenomenal object. Does not then this recognition of existences distinct from their representations render the function of the categories entirely regulative? And if this be so, have we not incontrovertible evidence for the view that the categories are in no way constitutive of objects, but presuppose and simply articulate our knowledge of non categorically determined objects? The problem in this connection may be defined as the determining of Kant's "Phenomenalism" (1) or Kant's theory of "Empirical Affection" (2) in relation to his category theory. I must particularly insist that the following outline of Kant's theory of "Double Affection" is not concerned with the philosophical merits of the doctrine. My purpose is not to decide whether it should be considered as the "Key" to Kant's theory of knowledge (Adickes) or whether, it should rather be regarded as "a vain attempt" (3) to reckon with his more developed realistic outlook. Whether for better or for worse, Kant surmised that his Phenomenalism "involving a realist view of the world both of science and of ordinary experience can...only be defended through a doctrine of double affection" (4).

Since this doctrine is present, though not developed, in the Critique (5), an exposition of his category theory must give it consideration.

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(1) Kemp Smith. Commentary 270 ff.
(2) Adickes, op.cit. Ch.1. etc.
(3) Professor Kemp Smith in correspondence
(4) Kemp Smith. Commentary. p.810
The doctrine of double affection asserts (a) that the I an sich (the transcendental I, the pure I) is affected by things in themselves (1) - Transcendent affection. (b) That the empirical I is affected by Erscheinungen an sich (i.e. phenomenal objects minus the secondary qualities) - Empirical affection.

(a) Transcendent Affection. The relations between things in themselves cannot, of course, be known. Negatively, it may be said that their nature must be non-temporal and non-spatial. Positively, they may be speculatively conjectured as logical - teleological, and analogous to the relations pertaining to the several moments of a mathematical proof. Through affection by things in themselves, the I in itself is induced to transform - by means of its a priori forms of intuition and synthetic functions - these non-temporal and non-spatial relations into temporal and spatial language. It thus constructs the spatial-temporal world of Erscheinungen an sich which confronts the empirical I. It must be noted that the I an sich does not create the phenomenal world; rather it translates into spatial and temporal language the prevailing "Gesetzmässigkeit" of the purely noumenal. The objects thus constructed are not endowed with secondary qualities. They are groupings of atoms - the objects of physical science. This whole process proceeds unconsciously for the empirical I.

(1) Adickes points out that though passages may be found asserting an affection of our senses by things in themselves, strictly speaking things in themselves can only effect the I in itself. (Ding an sich p.36) Professor Kemp Smith suggests the terminology "outer sense" (Commentary pp. 275; 276.)
Empirical Affection: The empirical I is affected by Erscheinungen an sich acting upon the sense organs and brain. It reacts with sensations, which it projects into space and which through its synthetic functions it unifies and objectifies into Wahrnehmungsgegenstände. The empirical I does not have to translate a non-spatial and non-temporal order into the language of space and time, but to reproduce as accurately as possible in the world of perceptual objects which it constructs, the temporal-spatial relations which it finds pertaining to "Erscheinungen an sich".

Now while fully admitting the difficulties and obscurities inherent in this doctrine of double affection; nevertheless, there emerges therefrom two very significant features for defining the nature and function of the categories. In the first place, Kant is so far from restricting categories to a privileged "transsubjective level" that he cannot even confine them to the conscious level. All the order and conformity to law (Gesetzmäßigkeit) in the phenomenal world of Erscheinungen an sich is assigned to the synthetic functions of the I an sich. And this infusion of unity and connection is performed unconsciously. (1). Professor Kemp Smith - even before perusal of the Opus Postumum - had also recognised that

"The synthetic processes must take place and complete themselves before any consciousness can exist at all. And as they thus precondition consciousness, they cannot

themselves be known to be conscious...." (1)

In the second place, the function of the categories is not to clarify our knowledge of objects or to make vague experience systematic but to make objects possible. The accounts of both transcendent and empirical affection insist that the apprehension of objects - nay the very possibility of objects - is only possible through the employment of the synthetic functions.

I conclude then that passages attributing causal agency to objects and savouring of Realism do not justify "the first Interpretation" of Kant's categories.

(1) The question arises as to whether Professor Kemp Smith considers the "synthetic processes" and categories to be identical. They seem to be distinguished in ".... The synthetic processes, interpreting the manifold in accordance with the fixed forms space, time and the categories...." Commentary p. 276. [Italics mine]

Again, "... It may be objected that this is virtually what Kant is doing when he postulates synthetic activities as the source of the categories." op.cit. Introduction LI. note. [Italics mine].

On the other hand their essential identity seems implied in "The conscious processes of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition necessarily conform to schemata, non consciously generated, which express the combined a priori conditions of intuition and understanding required for unitary consciousness." op.cit. p. 267.

Unless the essential identity of the synthetic processes and the categories be allowed, a very awkward problem confronts us in determining their relation. I would submit that the requirements of Kant's phenomenalism increases the connotation of the term category, so that it denotes both the synthetic processes and the results of their activity - the "forms" or "concepts" of Unity, Causality, etc. (Cf. Adickes, Ding an Sich p. 157).
The Distinction Between Judgments of Perception and Judgments of Experience.

The locus classicus of this distinction is *Prolegomena* 18-20; 22; 29. It has been strongly condemned by Professor Kemp Smith

"The illegitimacy and the thoroughly misleading character of this distinction hardly require to be pointed out. Obviously Kant is here confusing assertion of contingency with contingency of assertion....Even a momentary state of the self is referable to an object in judgment, only if that object is causally and therefore necessarily concerned in its production."(1)

The following discussion is directed to enforce this criticism, and to show that the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience is at variance with the fundamental principles of the Critical philosophy.

The *Prolegomena* asserts that "judgments of experience" have objective validity. They require for this, besides the representation of sensuous intuition, "particular concepts originally begotten in the understanding" i.e. categories. "Judgments of perception", on the other hand, are only subjectively valid. They require no concept of the understanding, "but only the logical connexion of perceptions in a thinking subject." Unfortunately Kant gives no explanation of the grounds of this "logical connexion".

So far as can be gathered from the context the indications are that the connexion is not "logical" at all, but due to mere association.

"All our judgments are at first merely "judgments of perception": they hold good only for us, and we do not till afterwards give them a new reference (to an object) and desire

(1) op.cit. p. 288.
that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else." (1)

This argument implies that "experience" is being used in a highly specialized sense. It would seem to imply that "experience" is a judgment or system of judgments with an explicit and deliberate objective reference. It also implies that the categories are the constitutive factors peculiar to such experience.

To illustrate the matter

"When we say, 'the room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter,' - we have only subjectively valid judgments. I do not at all expect that I or any other person shall always find it as I now do; each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, to myself, and that only in my present state of perception; consequently they are not valid of the object." (2)

This argument is a non sequitur. When we make such judgments of perception, we certainly do desire that I and everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same circumstances. Otherwise, (provided the factors remain constant) we would be frivolous or foolish.

The continuously reiterated assertion that "judgments of perception" only refer to my mental states and are not referred to an object, is at variance with actual facts. It ascribes to naive consciousness a sophistication which is entirely absent. It is, no doubt, true that ordinary consciousness is also guiltless of an explicit distinction of self and object; but nevertheless it would be much more in accord with the findings of psychology to say that

(1) Prolegomena, Par. 18
(2) Prolegomena, Par. 19
objective reference rather than subjectivism is an outstanding characteristic of naive perceptual consciousness,

In his examples of "judgments of perception" Kant makes a distinction.

"Such perceptual judgments as 'the room is warm', 'sugar is sweet' could never become judgments of experience, even though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because they refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely subjective, and which, of course, can never be attributed to the object and consequently can never become objective." (1)

Contrasted with these is a species of judgment of perception such as "the air is elastic" which can become a judgment of experience, provided that "the perception be subsumed under a concept of the understanding," e.g., cause and effect. The "easier" example given in the note on Paragraph 20 viz. the transformation of the perceptual judgment "When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm" to the judgment of experience "The sun warms the stone" is unfortunate. Since warmth is feeling and is purely subjective, should not this be excluded from ever becoming a judgment of experience on the same grounds as the judgment "the room is warm"? It may be rejoined that the two examples are not on a par; that the judgment "the room is warm" is equivalent to "the room is warm to me", whereas in the judgment "the sun warms the stone" the reference is entirely objective. But surely the truth of the matter is that the two judgments have a similar logical status. Though both judgments have a secondary quality as predicate, in each case the secondary quality has an objective reference which transcends itself, and therefore requires

categorial determination. This indeed follows from Kant's own teaching on the nature of judgments in B 140-2.

Kant's failure to realise the full implications of his doctrine of judgment in this connection, is due to the domination of his thinking by the viewpoint of physical science. He tends to regard the non-qualitative object of physical science, with its mathematically determinable primary qualities, as the only genuine object. Following his predecessors he considers secondary qualities as intrinsically subjective, and thus fails to realise that though they are private they are not necessarily subjective. Having, however, fallen into this confusion, it was easy for him to consider that judgments about such "subjective" states must be treated on a different plane from judgments about physical objects.

While then it cannot be denied that Kant explicitly makes a distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience in the Prolegomena (1), it nevertheless stands self condemned through its incongruity with his more considered doctrine of judgment. According to Professor Kemp Smith

"This Kant seems to have himself recognised in the interval between the Prolegomena and the second edition of the Critique. For in the section before us (B 140-2) there is no trace of it. The opposition is no longer between subjective and objective judgment, but only between association of ideas and judgment which as such is always objective." (2)

I would submit, then, that this distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience is too precarious to afford

(1) Cf. also supra Ch.2, p.
(2) op.cit. p. 289.
an authentic basis for formulating genuinely Critical doctrine and
cannot by itself afford evidence for the First Interpretation.

(4) Association

The observed fact that representations which have fre-
quently accompanied one another become so closely united, that the
presence of one tends to recall the other is as old as the Greeks.(1)
The doctrine of association had, however, a special significance
for Kant, since according to Hume, all syntheses ultimately resolve
themselves into mere imaginative associations. To establish his
own theory of relations, Kant is constrained to show that empirical
association is not an ultimate fact incapable of further analysis,
but that on the contrary, it presupposes certain transcendental con-
ditions. As Professor Kemp Smith neatly puts it

"Kant's argument is therefore as follows. Ideas do
not become associated merely by co-existing. They must
occur together in a unitary consciousness; and among the
conditions necessary to the possibility of association
are therefore the conditions of the possibility of experi-
ence. Association is transcendentally grounded.....In
other words representations must exist in consciousness
before they can become associated: and they can exist in
consciousness only if they are consciously apprehended.
But in order to be consciously apprehended they must con-
form to the transcendental conditions upon which all con-
sciousness rests; and in being thus apprehended they are
set in thorough going unity to one another and to the self."(2)

Consequently, since association presupposes self identity,
Hume's attempt to make self identity a product of association is
a hysterot profetn. So far the argument is quite clear.

We must now consider the very difficult part of the discus-
sion which outlines the doctrine of "objective affinity". Even
empiricists would admit that associations are not entirely hap-

(1) Plato Phaedo 73-4
(2) op. cit. p. 254
hazard. Unless they exhibited a certain uniformity and regularity, they could not serve as a plausible explanation of experience.

What then is the ground of this regularity? It cannot be due to the "reproductive imagination" for this simply reproduces an order that is already there.

"This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the phenomena themselves are really subject to such a rule.... If cinnabar were sometimes red and sometimes black, sometimes light and sometimes heavy, if a man could be changed now into this, now into another animal shape, if on the longest day the fields were sometimes covered with fruit, sometimes with ice and snow, the faculty of my empirical imagination would never be in a position when representing red colour, to think of heavy cinnabar." (A 100-1).

Similarly A 121-3 insists that the subjective and empirical ground of reproduction must possess an objective foundation.

"If this unity of association did not possess an objective foundation also, which makes it impossible that phenomena should be apprehended by imagination in any other way but under the condition of a possible synthetical unity of that apprehension, it would be a mere accident that phenomena lend themselves to a certain connection in human knowledge." (A 121).

In these passages Kant asserts that a certain minimum of regularity is necessary in order that association may take place. This appears at first to be begging the whole question at issue. In A 101: A 123; however, we find that this regularity is ascribed to the "pure transcendental synthesis of imagination", more usually termed "the productive synthesis of imagination." According to A 123:

"This objective ground of all associations of phenomena I call their affinity, and this can nowhere be found except in the principle of the unity of apperception applied to all knowledge which is to belong to me. According to it, all phenomena, without exception, must so enter into the mind or be apprehended as to agree with the unity of apperception."
Kant may seem here to be simply refuting the associationists under cover of a Berkeleian subjectivism. It may be allowed that Kant has pointed out a significant fact in his contention that associationism cannot explain self identity, for the possibility of association presupposes unity of consciousness. It might also be admitted that it is but an application of the principles of the Transcendental Deduction to assert that any experience depends on relational syntheses which are its formal conditions. Something more penetrating however, seems required to guarantee such de facto regularity outlined in A 100-1.

As Adickes points out the full significance of Kant's teaching here can only be grasped when read in connection with the "doctrine of double affection".

"All difficulties vanish when one employs the doctrine of double affection, and perceives the I in itself is the cause of Affinity in the phenomenal world. Then the Kräftecomplexen, upon which everything depends and on which the Erscheinungen an sich subsist, must have been already oriented in direction to the unity of transcendental apperception and its requirements. Since all synthesis and all connection in the phenomenal world - and therefore obviously also in the case of Erscheinungen an sich - can only arise through us and our a priori faculties, consequently the Kräftecomplexen are, of course, connected through the synthetic functions of our I in itself into objects and these again synthesised in accordance with the unified spatial system of experience. These naturally impart their unity to the effects which proceed from them (movements) and to the perceptions resulting from the latter. These perceptions must already from the very beginning be associable: they are planned by Nature both in relation to one another and the developing system of unitary experience. Hence Affinity loses its mysteriousness, since the world of Kräftecomplexen confronting our empirical I as an independent actuality, which meets us in one of our requirements in so accommodating a manner - is not being in itself, but the phenomenal world posited by the I in itself and dependent on its functions of unity." (1)

(1) Adickes Lehre von Dopp.Affek. pp. 91-2
Association, then, is transcendentally conditioned, and its possibility presupposes categorial determination by the I an sich. Hence the function of the categories cannot be restricted to a level of experience supervening upon "mere association." (1)

(5) Distinction of Function Assigned to Imagination and Understanding.

Kant frequently speaks of imagination and understanding as separate faculties with distinctive functions. To imagination is assigned the function of synthesising the raw material of the manifold so as to produce images (e.g. A 120); to understanding the function of "intellectualising" the "figurative synthesis" of imagination by bringing it under concepts, and so producing "knowledge properly so called" (A 78). Such distinction between the two faculties would seem to support the contention that understanding and the categories belong to a special level of experience and "knowledge proper", superinduced upon the relatively vague level of imaginative synthesis or "apprehension" (A 120). Typical of this view are the following passages:

A 78. "We shall see hereafter that synthesis in general is the mere result of what I call the faculty of imagination, a blind but indispensible function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of the existence of which we are scarcely conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to concepts is a function that belongs to understanding, and by which the understanding supplies us for the first time with knowledge properly so called......"

"The first that must be given us a priori for the sake of knowledge of all objects is the manifold in pure intuition. The second is, the synthesis of the manifold by means of imagination. But this does not yet produce true knowledge. The

(1) Kant unfortunately lapses in this regard, e.g. in the proofs of the Second Analogy where he contrasts purely subjective succession from objective succession. The incongruity of such an expression with his Critical principles is noted by Kemp Smith, Commentary p. 367.
concepts which impart unity to this pure synthesis, and consist entirely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, add the third contribution towards the knowledge of an object end rest on the understanding."

Similar teaching is contained in A 118-119. Preliminary synthetic activities are assigned to Imagination; such "constitute the ground of the possibility of all knowledge nay of all experience" but knowledge proper does not arise until these synthetic activities of the imagination have been referred to the transcendental unity of apperception. "Knowledge!" Kant seems to contend in A 118, requires not merely synthesis, but the representation of the unity of synthesis:

"and the unity of that synthesis (viz. of imagination) is called transcendental, if with reference to the original unity of apperception it is represented as a priori necessary."

The relation between unity of apperception, understanding and imagination is briefly set forth in the next paragraph.

"This unity of apperception with reference to the synthesis of imagination is the Understanding, and the same unity with reference to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understanding. It must be admitted therefore that there exist in the understanding pure forms of knowledge a priori which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in reference to all possible phenomena. (These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of the understanding)." (A 119).

Similarly, A 123-6

"Apperception.... must be added to pure imagination in order to render its function intellectual. For by itself, the synthesis of imagination, though carried out a priori, is always sensuous, and only connects the manifold as it appears in intuition, for instance, the shape of a triangle. But when the manifold is brought into relation with the unity of apperception, concepts which belong to the understanding become possible, but only as related to sensuous intuition through imagination."
B Paragraph 21 says of the categories:

"They are merely rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in thinking, that is in the act of bringing the synthesis of the manifold, which is given to it in intuition from elsewhere to the unity of apperception."

All these passages appear to recognise a preliminary synthesis by imagination and subsequent synthesis on the part of the understanding. But to sustain the thesis that the categories condition each and every experience, however simple or however complex, it must be shown that even on the imaginative level categorial functions are involved. Further investigation into the nature of the synthesis of the imagination shows that such is the case. Thus for example B 152:

"As however its synthesis (i.e., the synthesis of productive imagination) is an act of spontaneity, determining, and not, like the senses, determinable only, and therefore able to determine a priori the senses, so far as their form is concerned, according to the unity of apperception, the faculty of imagination is, so far, a faculty of determining our sensibility a priori, so that the synthesis of the intuitions, according to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the faculty of imagination. This is an effect, produced by the understanding on our sensibility, and the first application of the intuition which is only possible to us." (1)

This passage unequivocally asserts that the synthesis of productive imagination takes place in accordance with the categories.

The last sentence of the quotation implies that Understanding and Imagination are in actual fact indispensably united with one another. This is indeed asserted in A 326:

"Pure Reason leaves everything to the Understanding, which has primarily to do with the objects of intuition, or rather their synthesis in imagination."

(1) The very obscure language of this passage and of B 154 is no doubt due to the fact that Kant is using the terminology of the doctrine of "Self Affection" which first receives explicit formulation in the Opus Postumum (Cf. Adickes Op. Post 251)
Again the affinity between understanding and imagination is implied in the chapter on Schematism. The scheme is a product of productive imagination. Yet the schematism of our understanding is the necessary condition of its application to phenomena.

According to B 165

"That which connects the manifold of sensuous intuition is the faculty of imagination which receives from the understanding the unity of its intellectual synthesis and from sensibility the manifoldness of apprehension."

Similarly in the note to B 162

"In this manner it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily conform to the synthesis of apprehension, which is intellectual, and contained in the category entirely a priori. It is one and the same spontaneity, which there, under the name of imagination, and here, under the name of understanding, brings connection into the manifold of intuition."

It would seem evident therefore that for experience and knowledge of objects it is impossible for understanding to function without productive imagination or for productive imagination to function without the use of categorial syntheses. And that "experience" and "knowledge" here apply to the perceptual level is shown by the following quotations:

B 161 "Consequently, all synthesis, without which even perception would be impossible, is subject to the categories; and as experience consists of knowledge by means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and valid therefore a priori also for all objects of experience."

B 165. "Thus, as all possible perceptions depend on the synthesis of apprehension, and that synthesis itself, that empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental, and, therefore, on the categories, it follows that all possible perceptions, everything in fact that can come to the empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature, must, so far as their connection is concerned, be subject to the categories."
The results of our investigation seem to have led to an impasse. We have on the one hand a number of passages which explicitly distinguish imagination and understanding. On the other hand there are many passages which stress their affinity and essential identity.

The solution of this difficulty seems to be provided by Professor Kemp Smith's ingenious discussion of productive imagination. (1). He points out that the requirements of the Critical philosophy demands a recognition of activities which are non-conscious. Now such activities being the conditions of consciousness cannot themselves be consciously apprehended. This preconscious activity is the main characteristic of productive imagination. (2).

Unfortunately Kant gives no detailed and explicit exposition of this revolutionary doctrine. It is, however, quite unmistakably implied in such passages as:

A 78. "We shall see hereafter that synthesis in general is mere result of what I call the faculty of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of the existence of which we are scarcely conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to concepts is a function that belongs to the understanding, and by which the understanding supplies us for the first time with knowledge properly so called."

A 141. "This schematism of our understanding applied to phenomena and their mere form is an art hidden in the depth of the human soul, the true secrets of which we shall hardly ever be able to guess and reveal."

Further the discussion of Association showed that preconscious categorial synthesis by the productive imagination is an

(1) op. cit. pp.263-70
(2) Cf. Adickes Lehre 48;84; Opus Postumum 295; 314.
Also Reininger, Kant Seine Anhänger und Seine Gegner pp.98-9.
indispensable presupposition of the doctrine of "objective affinity".

A 123. "The affinity of all appearances near or remote is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination which is grounded a priori on rules."

Understanding, on the other hand, is regarded as the faculty of conscious apprehension. Now, as Professor Kemp Smith observes:

"Though Kant's insistence upon the conscious character of understanding compels him to distinguish between it and the imagination, he has also to recognize their kinship. If imagination can never act save in conformity with the a priori forms of understanding, some reason must exist for their harmony. This twofold necessity of at once distinguishing and connecting them is the cause of the hesitating and extremely variable account which is both editions of the Critique is given of their relation." (1)

Though Kant may be vague and vacillating as to the precise relation between understanding and imagination, the requirements of the Critical philosophy definitely commit him to the view that the activities of productive imagination involve a preconsciuos use of categorial functions. (2)

Thus the distinction between understanding and imagination so far from supporting the view that categories belong to a sophisticated conceptual level, shows on the contrary that they function at the very threshold of experience.

(1) op. cit. p. 264
(2) Cf. supra p. 31-2
The Doctrine of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

Ward's interpretation of Kant maintains

(1) that the transcendental unity of apperception belongs to the transsubjective level.

"It is not enough for knowledge that its data should be strung together as occurrences (Erlebnisse) and so perceived in a single sentient consciousness. Only when they are, in thought, brought together in the 'apperception' of a subject aware of its own unity, can they be said to be effectively synthesized. Only then do they form 'an object' for such self-conscious subject."

"First, Kant finds it needful to point out more explicitly what so far has been only implied, viz. that the unity of apperception entails the objective unity, in which experience at the thought-level begins; for it is through it 'that all the manifold given in an intuition is unified in some concept of the object.'"

(2). That the self conscious subject is the source of the (real) categories of substance and cause.

"But if formal logic is not the source of these categories whence then are they ultimately derived? From what the experient subject is and at the intellectual level knows itself to be. This seems to be the true answer, and it is the answer which really underlies the whole of Kant's 'transcendental deduction' in its final form."

"Must we not then conclude that Kant's transcendental deduction clearly points to the experient subject as the source whence these real categories of substance and cause are in fact 'deduced'? In maintaining these categories to be indispensable to the possibility of any intelligible experience of the world is Kant not really maintaining that the world is intelligible only when it is interpreted in terms of what the experient subject at the transsubjective and self conscious level knows itself to be?" (1).

The wording of many passages would appear to support Ward's interpretation. The following will serve as typical

A 107. "No knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or unity of one kind of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuition, and without reference to which no representation of objects is possible. This pure, original, and unchangeable consciousness I shall call transcendental apperception."

A 108. "Therefore the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which render them not only necessarily reproducible, but assign also to their intuition an object, that is, a concept of something in which they are necessarily united."

Both these passages belong according to Professor Kemp Smith to the "First Stage", but the same teaching is found in

A 116. "We are conscious a priori of our own permanent identity with regard to all representations that can ever belong to our knowledge, as forming a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations...."

A 123. "This apperception it is which must be added to pure imagination in order to render its function intellectual." (Italics mine).

B 133. "The unbroken identity of apperception of the manifold that is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of that synthesis....Only because I am able to connect the manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations."

B 131. "Connection is representation of the synthetical unity of the manifold."

These passages seem to imply that the unity of apperception is explicit self consciousness; and consequently, that the categories which are indissolubly bound up with the unity
of apperception can only emerge at the level of explicit self consciousness.

We contend, however, that both the general principles of the Critical philosophy, and a closer inspection of Kant's explicit teaching on the transcendental unity of apperception renders this interpretation impossible. In the first place, this "unbroken identity of apperception" is not a direct awareness. The "representing to myself of the identity of consciousness in these representations" is a necessary logical presupposition of the accomplished fact that synthetical unity has taken place. This is explicitly pointed out by Kant in :

B 154. "The thought that the representations given in intuition belong all of them to me, is therefore the same as that I connect them in one self consciousness, or am able at least to do so; and though this is not yet the consciousness of the synthesis of representations it nevertheless presupposes the possibility of this synthesis."

B 278: Note II of the Refutation of Idealism. "The consciousness of myself, in the representation of the Ego, is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity "of a thinking subject."

B 157. "In the transcendental synthesis, however, of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, neither as I appear to myself, nor as I am by myself but only that I am. This representation is an act of thought not of intuition."

A 117 note. "It does not matter whether that representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or confused, not even whether it is real; but the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge rests necessarily on the of this apperception as a faculty.

A 546 must be interpreted in the light of these passages. Accordingly when Kant says there that "man knows himself through
mere apperception" we must substitute for "Erkennen" some such term as "erleben". According to Adickes

"Das indifferentere "erleben" bzw "sich erleben" dürfte besser als Gefühl, Wahrnehmung und Erkennen das bezeichnen, was ihm vorschwebte." (1).

In the second place the transcendental unity of apperception is not restricted to the conceptual level. Conclusive passages in this connection are A 113-14 and A 121-3 already discussed at length in connection with "Association" (2). To these may be also added,

B 129 "We see that all connecting whether we are conscious of it or not, and whether we connect the manifold of intuition or several concepts together, and again, whether that intuition be sensuous or not sensuous is an act of the understanding."

A 127 "This sensibility, as an object of our knowledge in any experience, with everything it may contain, is possible only in the unity of apperception, which unity of apperception is transcendental ground of the necessary order of all phenomena in an experience. The same unity of apperception with reference to the manifold representations (so as to determine it out of one) forms what we call the rule, and the faculty of these rules I call the understanding. As possible experience therefore, all phenomena depend in the same way a priori on the understanding, and receive their formal possibility from it as, when looked upon as mere intuitions, they depend on sensibility, and become possible through it, so far as their form is concerned."

The transcendental unity of apperception is thus shown to be a logical presupposition of all knowledge, not itself a species of immediate self knowledge. As the indispensable condition of

(1) Adickes Ding an Sich p. 125. Cf. also the list of passages cited in the Opus Postumum as illustrative of logical -conceptual meaning of "self positing."

any mental process which is cognitive in character, it cannot
be restricted to the transsubjective level. (1)

Thirdly, and as a consequence of the preceding argument
Ward's other contention that the categories are derived from the
transcendental unity of apperception must also be denied. The
categories cannot be "derived from" the transcendental unity of
apperception, for the transcendental unity of apperception is not
a species of knowledge at all. Rather, the transcendental unity
of apperception and the categories are inseparable presupposi-
tions of any kind of knowledge, which mutually imply and condi-
tion one another. Neither the categories nor the transcendental
unity of apperception can be themselves directly apprehended.

Kant deduces both as necessary conditions of a fait accompli
consciousness. As conditions of consciousness, they cannot them-
selves be apprehended. Our so called knowledge of them is
simply a conceptual expression of factors which the possibility
of experience implies.

Fourthly, the contention that the categories are derived from
the transcendental unity of apperception is in blatant contradic-
tion with Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense; for this doctrine implies
that all knowledge requires both the categories and an intuitional
manifold, and that these requirements are as necessary for the ex-
perience of our mental states as they are for experience of external

(1) I would also point out that the identification of Kant's
transcendental unity of apperception with Ward's empirical
ego or Me in Psychological Principles p. 377, cannot possi-
bly be allowed.
It remains to consider Ward's contention that Kant's doctrine of the "transcendental object" supports his interpretation of the transcendental unity of apperception and the categories.

"On what other grounds can it be assumed that the transcendental object or non Ego so far from being utterly alien is verily the Ego's own correlate." (1)

It is true that Kant speaks of the transcendental object as the "correlatum of the unity of apperception" (A 520), but in this same passage Kant very explicitly says that we can have no knowledge of the transcendental object.

"This means a something equal to X of which we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our understanding, cannot know anything...."

Similarly

A 253 "The object to which I refer the phenomenon in general is the transcendental object, that is, the entirely indefinite thought of something in general. This cannot be called the noumenon, for I know nothing of what it is by itself, and have no conception of it, except as the object of sensuous intuition in general, which is therefore the same for all phenomena."

So also A 191 "the transcendental object of which is unknown" and A 104 "such an object can only be conceived."

A 540 "as we must always admit in thought a transcendental object as the foundation of phenomena, though we know nothing of what it is by itself."

Thus although the transcendental object is the "correlatum" of the unity of apperception it is unknown, and neither the transcendental unity of apperception nor the transcendental object permits of schematised categorial determination. Consequently,

(1) Ward, J. Study of Kant p.82
when Kant ascribes the category of cause to the transcendental object in A 393, we learn from A 540 that this causality is "intelligible"; and

"so far as it is intelligible, it would not have a place in the series of empirical conditions by which the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense."

Similarly, in the case of the transcendental unity of apperception, the I is substance in concept, simple in concept, etc. but such "pure" categories cannot by themselves render knowledge possible. As regards the application of categories both the unity of apperception and the transcendental object are in the same position as other things in themselves. Kant allows that they may be thought by means of the pure categories, but they cannot thus become objects of knowledge. It follows therefore that the "real" categories of substance and cause cannot possibly be "derived from" the transcendental unity of apperception through psychological introspection.

III. SECOND INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S CATEGORY THEORY.

The results of the above criticism of the six arguments in favour of the First Interpretation of Kant's category theory have not been merely polemical and negative. The discussion has also afforded positive results which allows us to dispense with detailed argument in support of the Second Interpretation. It will be sufficient to outline the fundamental features which, on this view, characterise Kant's categories.
(1) **Their Function**

When Kant says that the categories are essential for 'experience' and 'knowledge of objects', the term 'experience' is not restricted in meaning to systematic experience; it denotes any form of meaningful apprehension. Again 'object' is not that which is deliberately contrasted with subject - i.e. an object explicitly recognised as such. 'Knowledge of objects' denotes the apprehension of existences in space and time as exemplified by naive experience. For Kant, then, the categories are indispensable factors in any form of apprehension that may be called cognitive. Their function is not to clarify experience and knowledge, but to make objects, experience and knowledge possible.

(2) **Their Nature**

Since the categories are the sine quibus non of experience and knowledge as thus defined, they precondition apprehension; and since they are preconditions of apprehension, they cannot themselves be directly apprehended. Reflective thought may disclose their conceptual expression; but the categories as synthetic functions are the source of concepts, not themselves concepts. This, I have argued, (1) is an indispensable requirement of the Critical philosophy; it is a view, however, which Kant never clearly formulates owing to the persistent influence of formal logic and rationalistic prejudices. He continually speaks of the categories as though they were concepts under which particulars were subsumed. Such a mode of expression completely distorts their nature and function as demanded

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(1) Cf. supra pp. 55-60
by his own philosophical system. As Professor Kemp Smith justly observes

"A category... cannot be viewed as a predicate of a possible judgment, and as being applied to a subject independently apprehended; its function is to articulate the judgment as a whole." (1)

Misinterpretation of Kant's category theory is inevitable unless it be realised that he employs the term category in a double meaning.

"In the first place it represents the conceptual expression for the synthetic functions of our transcendental unity of apperception, by means of which we synthesise the material of perception, and form objects. In the second place, it denotes the results of this activity - the most general qualities, syntheses and relations in things created or posited (by these functions) e.g. the Unity, Multiplicity, Quantity of objects, their causal connections, etc." (2)

Exclusive attention to the second meaning of the term yields not merely a superficial but an actually mistaken view of the categories. They are primarily dynamical synthetical functions and the source of relations and formal determinations. Only in a derivative and secondary sense are they concepts.

(3) Their Source.

Adamson points out

"That Kant is forward in rejecting... the hypothesis that mind has somehow a structure which is adapted to the reception of the objects furnished in experience." (3)

Such a "bifurcation" of subject and object would be attended with all the difficulties of the Cartesian dualism, and would

(1) Kemp Smith. Commentary p.335
(2) Adickes. Ding an Sich pp.57-8
(3) Adamson. Development of Modern Philosophy p. 185
preclude any natural explanation of synthetical a priori knowledge.

When, however, this unmediated opposition between subject and object is transcended, and mind is recognised as (in a sense) the "maker of nature", this objection no longer applies. So far as Kant means by mind the power of representation he seems committed to the view that categories form part of the inherent structure of mind. From the genuinely Critical standpoint, however, this affords no basis for dogmatising as to the metaphysical nature of the categories. As Professor Kemp Smith points out for Kant "Mind (Gemüt) is a neutral term without metaphysical implications."(1)

IV. Conclusion

My interpretation of Kant's category theory stands or falls with the legitimacy of extending the denotation of the term category to the synthetic processes. I have supported my contention in this regard primarily by appealing to the requirements and doctrines of the Critical philosophy, but also by the authority of a great master in Kantian exegesis - Erich Adickes. I have also set forth its advantages by showing that it avoids the difficult implications of a privileged categorial level and the Pickwickian interpretations of the a priori which attend the exclusively conceptual view. I might also add that it directs attention to the highly significant role of unconscious factors in the constitution and nature of mind - a suggestion which contemporary thought is making its own.

(1) Commentary p. 81
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PART II

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE CATEGORIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WARD

The categories are forms of synthesis by which the content — "the sensory elements we are said to receive" (p. 315) — of experience is combined. Three distinct modes of synthesis are recognized: (1) The formal (mathematical and logical) categories such as Unity, Plurality, Number, Difference, Likeness, Identity; (2) The real categories Substance and Attributes, Cause and Effect, End and Means; (3) The so-called ontological categories of Being and Worth.

(1) All references are to the Psychological Principles unless otherwise stated.
INTRODUCTION

Incidental references to Ward's doctrine of the categories have been made in discussing his interpretation of Kant. This part seeks to substantiate the criticisms already presented by a closer analysis of the doctrine as expounded in Psychological Principles. (1)

We shall first state in summary fashion Ward's view of the nature and function of the categories, and then seek to show that his theory is unacceptable and open to the following criticisms:

(1) That the perceptual level of experience asserted by Ward to be antecedent to the categorial level is possible only by the employment of categories. (Ch. I. Perception):

(2) That the development of self consciousness asserted to be the presupposition of categories, is possible only by the employment of categories. (Ch. II (1) The Development of Self Consciousness):

(3) That the account of the Self - the pattern and prototype of the categories - is defective (Ch. II. (2) The Nature of the Self).

The categories are forms of synthesis by which the content - "the sensory elements we are said to receive" (p. 315) - of experience is combined. Three distinct modes of synthesis are recognised; (1) The formal (mathematical and logical) categories such as Unity, Plurality, Number, Difference, Likeness, Identity; (2) The real categories Substance and Attribute, Cause and Effect, End and Means; (3) The so-called axiological categories of Value and Worth.

(1) All references are to the Psychological Principles unless otherwise stated.
With the possible exception of the mathematical categories of Unity, Plurality and Number, which "depend primarily on intuition" (1), these various modes of synthesis belong to the reflective level. Thus the logical categories of Difference, Likeness, and Identity result from "reflective comparison," (2), and the formation of the real categories of substance and attribute, cause and effect "depends primarily on self consciousness." (3).

The ensuing discussion will be confined to the 'real' categories of substance and attribute, cause and effect, since these may be regarded as crucial to this theory.

The outstanding characteristic of Ward's view of these categories is their "anthropomorphic" nature. They are forms of synthesis which the subject projects upon things on the analogy of the self and through explicit self consciousness.

"We find again without us the permanence and individuality, the efficiency and the adaptation we have found first of all within.....we attribute to extended things a unity which we know only when we act and suffer ourselves..." (4)

This "anthropomorphic" view of the categories implies that they are not employed until late in the development of mental life.

"The formation of these concepts depends primarily upon the facts of what in the stricter sense we call self consciousness - implying intersubjective intercourse - and secondly, upon certain spatial and temporal relations among our presentations themselves."(5)

(1) There appears to be two different principles of formation assigned to the category of unity. In 321, its source is traced to the "movement of attention"; whereas in 335 it is said to be a projection upon external things of the unity of the self. "We attribute to extended things a unity which we know only as the unity of an enduring subject."

(2) 325
(3) 334
(4) 335, Cf. 338; 343
(5) 334
It must not be supposed that in maintaining the late emergence of these categories, Ward is concerned with an exclusively psychological account of how factors implicit in the formation of experience come to explicit consciousness. The employment of the categories at the "transsubjective level" virtually introduces a transfigured world and

"we pass from mere perceptual experience to that wider experience which transcends it." (1)

That Ward's analysis of experience is not merely psychological, but is also regarded by him as epistemologically valid, appears evident from the important role which it plays in his strictly philosophical works. (2). Consequently, the following discussion is not concerned with the psychological development of the categories, - the history of how the individual comes to an explicit consciousness of substance and cause - but with the logical applications of psychology which have been grafted into his philosophy.

From this point of view the basis of our criticism consists in challenging the view that experience can be divided into non-categorial and categorial levels; on the contrary, we contend that categories are indispensable constituents of all meaning, and therefore of all experience. In like manner, we question the legitimacy of Ward's sharp demarcation between the perceptual and conceptual levels of experience; and will argue that even perceptual experience requires judgment, and the implicit use of conceptual

(1) 33
(2) e.g. Naturalism and Agnosticism Vol. II. xvi; Realm of Ends Intro. p. 11; ch. VI.
syntheses which transcend bare immediacy. The most elementary
and ultimate of these syntheses are the categories.

It may be suggested that Ward's insistence on the principle
of continuity, (1) and various passages of the Psychological
Principles explicitly repudiating a sharp demarcation between the
perceptual and conceptual levels, (2) render this criticism an
ignoratio elenchi. In reply, we contend that in so far as consis-
tency between such statements and the doctrines of various levels
of experience is preserved, it depends on maintaining that thought
knowledge develops out of sense knowledge. Subsequent analysis
will seek to confirm Professor Stout's criticism that

"It is misleading to speak, as Ward does, of a continuous
development from sense knowledge to thought knowledge. All
knowledge and all development of knowledge involves both
thought and sense in inseparable unity. A blind sense ex-
perience is not knowledge at all and could not become so by
any process, however continuous, of differentiation and
integration." (3)
CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTION

I. The Presentational Continuum.

The problems connected with Perception arise out of Ward's views of the "Presentational Continuum." This doctrine is thrown into relief by contrasting it with the atomistic psychology of Hume and Kant.

"The notion - which Hume and Kant did so much to encourage - that psychical life begins which a confused manifold of sensation is one that becomes more inconceivable the more closely we consider it. An absolutely new presentation, having no sort of connexion with former presentations, till the subject has synthesised it with them, is a concept for which it would be hard to find a warrant. At any given moment we have a certain whole of presentations, a 'field of consciousness', psychologically one and continuous; at the next we have not an entirely new field, but a partial change within the whole. (1)

Mental advance does not consist in the combination of discrete elementary units, but in the gradual differentiation of an objective continuum.

"The so called elementary sensation is really a partial modification of a pre-existing and persisting presentational whole which thereby becomes more complex than it was before." (2)

Differentiation, Retentiveness and Assimilation are the three intimately related processes (3) which give complexity and qualitative richness to the originally homogeneous presentational continuum. Differentiation implies that the seemingly simple

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(1) 77. (Italics in text)
(2) 78
(3) 83
becomes complex or the complex more complex. It implies also that this increased complexity is due to the persistence of former changes - Retentiveness. Finally, the process in which later differentiations 'blend with' and specialise what is retained of earlier less definite presentations, is Assimilation.

It is difficult to determine whether Differentiation, Retentiveness and Assimilation are to be regarded as characteristics of presentations or as functions of the attending subject. On the one hand are passages reminiscent of Locke's conviction that

"in bare naked perception the mind is for the most part passive." (1)

"Retentiveness and associability of 'ideas' in the narrower sense, or representations, pertain primarily to the objective factor in experience." (2)

"What are here called objects or presentations are not the products of a sort of creative activity pertaining to the conscious self, which it is somehow mysteriously stimulated to exert. They have properties and laws of their own, in accordance with which indeed their interactions may be modified, but that is all. It was perhaps a wild dream of Herbart's that there could ever be a statics and dynamics of presentations; but his attempt may at least serve to exhibit more impressively the large amount of independence there is between the subject of consciousness and its objects." (3)

"Can we provided we credit presentations with certain mutual attractions, repulsions, associations, complicating etc..."(4)

"We have already described the process from the objective side as assimilation or immediate recognition..."(5)

On this view it would seem that the subject but mirrors the properties and relations of the presentations confronting it.

(1) Essay II,ix,1; II, xix,3-4
(2) 69
(3) 56
(4) 71
(5) 133
Differentiation, retentiveness and assimilation are characters of
the presentational continuum, not mental functions of the appre-
hending subject. The three taken together are said to constitute
"the plasticity of the presentational continuum." (1)

On the other hand evidence is not lacking for the view that
differentiation, retention and assimilation are characters of atten-
tion.

"What we effectively retain assimilate and integrate is just what we have attended to and no more." (2)

"Every acquisition, whether cognitive or practical, presupposes such acts of attention, and to these its retention, assimilation and association...are largely due." (3)

"So the objective differentiation progresses on subjectively determined lines." (4)

Again the explicit caveats against confusing retentiveness with memory (5) and the synonymous use of assimilation and recog-
nition, (6) would certainly indicate that retentiveness and assim-
ilation belong to the apprehending subject rather than to presen-
tations.

This view receives further confirmation from Professor
Stout's penetrating analysis of Ward's theory of attention.

"(Ward) extends the term Attention to cover both theoretical and practical activity. What is distinctive of practical activity is that Attention is in it directed to 'motor presentations' which are thereby translated into actually experienced movements of the body, producing change in its environment. This happens for

(1) 83
(2) 69. Cf. Naturalism and Agnosticism II, 158
(3) 72
(4) 415
(5) 81
(6) 142; 183
instance when I actually dissect a flower. Now Ward seems to hold as a fundamental principle, that we also produce objective change, though in a very different way; when, by attentively contemplating a strange flower, we gain a more distinct and detailed apprehension of its partial features. According to him there is not merely discrimination of pre-existing differences; new differences actually emerge, through the interaction of subject and object. Further the process throughout is an interaction of subject and object in which the action of the subject in attending is the formative agency. In attending, the subject alters its object; it makes, instead of merely apprehends differences." (1)

Though this view is not without difficulties (2), it clearly indicates that attention is no mere passive mirroring of an objective continuum; on the contrary, by interested selection it is a formative agency in the construction of the objective continuum. Regarded thus, attention transcends the merely given, (3), and differentiation, retentiveness, and assimilation are its modus operandi. Differentiation, retentiveness and assimilation cannot be described as laws of attraction and repulsion belonging to presentations; they are analytical-synthetical functions essential to attention and judgment. As

(1) Monist xxxvi. 30-1
(2) Especially its implications with respect to the problem of Appearance and Reality Cf. Mind xxx "Professor Ward's Psychological Principles" by G. Dewes Hicks pp.12-13; Monist xxx. pp.31;34.
(3) The purely immediate or "merely given" would appear to be a fiction. Cf. Phil. Rev. xxxvii.2.
such they witness to the implicit (1) operation of thought (2) factors or categories at the very threshold of experience.

II. PERCEPTION

Differentiation of the sensori-motor continuum could not proceed far without integration.

"On the contrary there is every reason to think... that further differentiation was helped by previous integration, that perception prepared the way for more distinct sensations, and purposive action for more varied movements." (3)

The various though related meanings ascribed to Perception by psychologists indicates its relatively complex nature. Its analysis requires a discussion of

(a) The Recognition of Impressions
(b) The Localisation of Impressions
(c) The Intuition of Things.

(1) Ward condemns the word "implicit" in Mind N.S. xxviii, p.265 Sense Knowledge (1). "Perhaps it would be fairer to say that all they mean is that whatever is logically implicated is unconsciously involved. But surely this is bad psychology and assumes a scientifically unwarranted use of the notion of potentiality."

On the other hand, exclusive attention to the explicitly, conscious may result in erroneous analysis through over simplification. That which can establish itself as necessary for the possibility of a given experience - even though not consciously realised in the experiencing - may surely claim to be "implicit". The term appears to be used in this sense by Ward himself in Mind N.S. xxvii pp.448-9 Art. Sense Knowledge. (II).

(2) By thought factors is meant factors which transcend the immediacy of sense.

(3) 139
(a). Recognition of Impressions

Recognition is a term of wide range. Its more developed forms require free ideas, distinct memories and distinct anticipations. In its simpler forms it appears to be closely allied or even identical with Assimilation (1); and as such involves "no confronting the new with the old, no determination of likeness, and no subsequent classification." (2)

According to Ward, perceptual recognition functions on a strictly sensory level and without the cooperation of thought factors. This, I submit, is impossible; and subsequent analysis will indicate that Ward's account of perceptual recognition implies thought as well as sense.

In recognition we have not merely S, a presentation or sensation, but S gamma. Suppose for example

"A new or strange situation A; then after more or fewer repetitions we say this situation was recognised, became quite familiar. If A was a complex movement, we say that at first it was hard to perform, but that after repeated trials it was performed with perfect facility. Familiarity and facility then may be regarded as characters that perceptions or actions gradually acquire..."(3)

I do not think it would be correct to say that Ward explains recognition in terms of familiarity and facility. Familiarity, facility and recognition appear to be regarded as involving one and the same problem — viz. to determine the nature of gamma which a presentation acquires as the result of recogni-

(1) 142;183
(2) 143
(3) 180
tion (1). Unless this be so, the explanation is obviously circular, for the familiarity which would explain recognition can only be familiar because it is recognised.

The enquiry as to the nature of gamma is considered under two headings - the subjective and the objective.

Under the former we shall have briefly to note what changes the process of such development entails upon the subject. Under the latter we shall have to ascertain more at length the characteristics thereby entailed upon the presentational continuum. (2)

Consideration of the subjective phase of the problem reveals (1) that though familiarity and facility are closely related to feeling, they are not the result of feeling (3);

(2) that gamma does not result from a mere association of a plurality of identical presentations. A gamma is neither the mere sum nor a mere fusion of a series of preceding experiences \[ a_n \ldots a_3 a_2 a_1 \] (4)

(3) "That apart from subjective selection and interest the percept or movement A could never have acquired the characteristic gamma at all." (5)

(1) I am assuming that recognised should be read for "cognised" in the sentence "We may indicate this acquired characteristic by gamma so that A in becoming cognised or assimilated becomes gamma" (180);

(2) 179

(3) 180

(4) 183

(5) 182
The statement of the objective phase of the inquiry is primarily concerned with the rise of 'free ideas'. Its bearing on the nature of recognition is indirect and negative. It argues that perceptual recognition is confined to the sense bound level; and though it results in something additional to the mere percept, this additional feature must not be confused with a memory image or a 'free idea'.

"It is, as it has been happily called, - a tied or implicit idea." (1)

As further evidence of the sense bound stage of this immature idea "after percepts" - the so-called memory after image - and "preperception" is submitted.

The evidence to show that preperception is in all its factors sense bound is quite unconvincing. Examples of preperception are furnished by every day illusions, such as the hailing of a scarecrow by a traveller who mistakes it for a farmer, or the attempts to eat wax models of fruit. But surely these illustrations show conclusively that the immediacy of the sense presented is transcended. The scarecrow is hailed, questioned, etc. because it is judged to be a particular of "such a kind" that can be hailed and questioned. Though in such a case there is no explicit psychological analysis sundering the particular and the universal, there is an awareness of the general embedded in the awareness of the particular (2). The implicit universal enshrouds the presentation

(1) 183
(2) Stout Manual 4th ed. revised 310
in a context, and endows it with a meaning pointing beyond itself.

The illustrations of the scarecrow and wax orange are particularly obvious on this point, because they happen to be cases of error, and - as Plato showed (1) - the very possibility of error or mistake involves the transcendence of the immediate; but transcendence of the immediate is also a necessary constituent of true prepercepts, as when the sight of ice yields a forefeel of its coldness, or the smell of baked meats a foretaste of their savour.

It will be observed that Ward's discussion makes little positive contribution to the determining of perceptual recognition or the nature of gamma. We learn what gamma is not rather than what it is. The negative result is significant. It is the inevitable outcome of refusal to recognise that thought as well as sense is involved in attention and conation. Ward insists "That apart from subjective selection and interest, the percept or movement A could never have acquired the characteristic gamma at all" yet he endeavours to account for the nature of gamma exclusively in sensory terms. Now as Stout says

"What is sought must be predetermined for the psychological subject himself as a change in the given situation in those respects in which the situation is felt as unsatisfying. This implies that something is thought that is not given in actual sense experience. The immediacy of sense is so far transcended". (2)

(1) Theaetetus 195 d; Sophist 264 c.
(2) Monist xxxvi. p.42
This also holds for attention in its theoretical aspect.

"What is here sought is more complete apprehension of an object as initially given or presupposed. The tendency is to make the object more distinct and to relate it to its context - to develop it more fully in consciousness. Even in the most primitive stages of the process there must be some inarticulate counterpart of the question which we should formulate as: what? or what next? or what more?"(1)

(b) The Localisation of Impressions.

"To treat of the localisation of impressions is really to give an account of how the psychological individual comes to a knowledge of space."(2)

Spatial experience is a complex affair. It requires the apprehension of externality, juxtaposition, distance and internality. The problem is to discover how the perception of this complexity has come about. According to Ward it depends on three factors:

(1) The intrinsic extensity of sensation
(2) The extensity of the presentational continuum
(3) Movement.

Since my primary concern in discussing spatial perception is to show that not only sensory but also cognitive factors are involved, I shall not challenge the validity of the extensity theory of sensation or question the legitimacy of ascribing the term continuum to an 'originally dimension-less' and 'primitively amorphous' totum objectivum. (3). I shall therefore proceed to consider the role of movement in spatial perception.

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(1) Monist xxxvi. p.43
(2) 144
(3) Cf. N.K. Smith Prolegomena pp.100-5
According to Ward both local signs and movement are necessary for apprehending position and spatial relations. Local signs without movement may render possible qualitative differences, but the additional factor of movement is necessary for the apprehending of position. Local signs are not perceptual localisations, they are merely sensory marks that make localising in filled space possible. On the other hand, movement apart from local signs would not give place, but possibly a successive series of kinaesthetic sensations.

"The one yields potential position without place, the other potential place without position." (1).

Hence both local signs and movement are necessary for spatial perception.

Thus

"If Fd and Fg are e.g. two impressions produced by compass points touching two different spots as ld and lg on the hand or arm, and we place a finger on ld and move it to lg, experiencing thereby the series P1P2P3P4, this series constitutes ld and lg into positions and also invests Fd and Fg with a relation not of mere distinctness but of definite distance." (2)

Now it is not at all evident how on a strictly sense presented level the series P1P4, which is successive should give distance. Even if we suppose the series P1P4 to come into relief from a presentational continuum through each being connected with a specific local sign, yet the connection of the intervening position P1 - P4 is not continuous as presented successively.
On a strictly sense bound level what retains $P_1$ and $P_2P_3$ when $P_4$ is reached, so that the successive series $P_1 - P_4$ yields distance?

This difficulty is present even in the simpler case where localisation is carried out by active and passive touches on the body; but it becomes much more acute when distance perception between external bodies is in question, for here active touch is alone operative. In the latter case the question is, how does a series of touches sensed successively in an exploring member of the body e.g. the finger, yield distance between objects, external to the body? Ward answers

"When the series of movements is accompanied by active touches without passive, there arises the distinction between one's own body and foreign bodies. When the initial movement of a series is accompanied by both active and passive touches, the final movement by active touches only, and the intermediate movements are unaccompanied by either, we get the further presentation of empty space lying between us and them - but not until, by frequent experience of contacts along with these intermediate movements, we have come to know all movement not merely as a succession but as a change of position. Thus active touches come at length to be "projected" passive touches alone being localised in the strict sense of the term." (1)

As an account of certain factors involved in the genesis of the spatial relations concerned this quotation may be unimpeachable, but does it describe what takes place on a merely sensory level? Can the triple comparison, or if this term be objected to, the awareness of a threefold unlikeness in the series of movements accompanied by both active and passive touches, accompanied by active touches only and unaccompanied by either be apprehended on the level of strict sense presentation? (2)

(1) 151
(2) An analysis of Ward's account of temporal perception discloses difficulties analogous to and no less formidable than those indicated in the case of space.
Lastly the apprehension of things as present is not an
apparent datum, but a projection on the analogy
of what appears.

(c) The Intuition of Things

The intuition of things necessitates the discussion of
(i) the objects reality, (ii) its solidity or occupations of
space, (iii) its unity and complexity (iv) its permanence or
rather its continuity in time (v) its substantiality and the
connexion of its attributes and powers.

The complexity of perception is hereby clearly indicated,
and it requires no lengthy analysis to show that thought factors
transcending the immediacy of the merely sense presented are
necessary.

Thus though the real is not strictly an item by itself but
a characteristic of all the items enumerated, its recognition rests
primarily on distinguishing presentations from representations.
"Now this distinction...depends partly upon the relation of the
presentation of the thing to other presentations in consciousness
with it, partly upon the relation to it, the attitude which it
evokes in the subject whose presentation it is." (1)

Again the apprehension of unity and complexity requires
the discrimination of a thing as relatively fixed in its temporal
and spatial relations.

"It is only where a group, as a whole, has been found
to change its position relatively to other groups, and to
be - in general - independent of changes of position among
them, that such complexes can become distinct unities, a
world of many things." (2)

(1) 162
(2) 164
Lastly the apprehension of things as permanent is not an immediately presented sense datum, but a projection on the analogy of the bodily self.

"As we have existed - or more exactly, as the body has been continuously presented - during the interval between two encounters with some other recognised body, so this comes to be regarded as having continuously existed during its absence from us." (1)

These passages speak for themselves in every case they imply that the merely sense presented is transcended.

The other issues involved in Ward's theory of perception require discussion of the development of self consciousness and projicience, and are reserved for the next chapter.

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(1) 165 (Italics mine).
CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURE OF THE SELF.

In outlining Ward's account of the 'Real' categories their dependence upon self consciousness was emphasised. The categories of substance and cause are said to have their source in the explicit consciousness of self and are then attributed by analogy to things.

"We find again without us the permanence and individuality, the efficiency and adaptation we have found first of all within." (1)

Self consciousness is not attained until the immanence or immediacy of individual experience has been transformed by social life. Its emergence thus presupposes stages of experience in which categorial functions play no part. The aim of the ensuing discussion is to show (1) that the development of experience prior to the level of self consciousness is only possible by means of categories; and that therefore since self consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects, and consciousness of objects is only possible by the categories, self consciousness cannot be the source and origin of the categories; (2) that the self revealed in self consciousness cannot be the prototype and paradigm of the categories.

(1) 335
(2) Mind and Matter 288
The Development of Self Consciousness

Professor Stout expounds Ward's earliest level of experience as follows:

"In the first place there is purely individual or immediate experience in which the individual is confined to his own sense and feelings and has no cognisance of independently existing things or other selves." (1)

This statement might seem at first to misrepresent Ward, since it appears to conflict with his cardinal principle of the duality of subject and object (2), with statements in his account of perception (3), and with such assertions as:

"The psychologist must maintain that no experience is merely subjective." (4).

Nevertheless, unless Professor Stout's estimate of Ward's position be correct, the importance assigned to introjection and intersubjective intercourse as preliminary to the transsubjective level - at which consciousness of objects first arises - seems misplaced.

Assuming then that Ward considers experience begins by being purely individual, how is the experient released from his solipsistic confinement? Ward's answer is afforded by his account of the transition to the level of intersubjective intercourse. (5). The following typical passage will serve for the purposes of critical analysis:

"Again such special parallax or acquaintance with others of its own kind, is the direct outcome of the extended range in which the individual's progress in perception

(1): Mind and Matter 288
(2): 30-53; 37-8; 45; 47-8 etc.
(3): 161
(4): 32
(5): I take it that 'ejective' and 'intersubjective' refer to the same level of experience.
and memory secured; and when in this way its (bodily) self has become an object, the objects that resemble it become other selves or 'ejects'.......

and once the ejective level is attained, some interchange of experience is possible. So disappears the great gulf fixed between subjective or individual and intersubjective or universal experience by rival systems in philosophy. (1). When subjected to careful scrutiny this passage proves to be tantalisingly indefinite. The significant phrase "the objects that resemble it" etc. is especially ambiguous.

On the one hand "the objects that resemble" has been taken to signify other organic bodies. The passage would then assert that when the body has become an object for the individual experient, he will attribute to all other bodies like his own, mental faculties, powers, feelings, sensations, etc. Hence recognition of other embodied selves is what immediately supervenes upon the purely individual level of private sensa and feelings.

The following considerations would seem to support this interpretation;

(a) The apodosis of the phrase in question viz. "become other selves or ejects:"

(b) Ward's contention that knowledge of objects and things as distinct from selves does not arise until the later transsubjective level;

(c) it appears to receive the endorsement of Professor Stout.

Stout describes the transition to the intersubjective level

(1) 33-4 Cf. Realm of Ends 28-9; Naturalism and Agnosticism II,165
as follows:

"The next step is that he finds his actions conditioned and limited in ways which can only be interpreted by assuming other active selves interested in what he himself is interested in. As this interpretation proceeds on the analogy of his own existence as an experiencing individual, it is a 'projection of the self.' Ward illustrates by the case of several men contending for the same loaf of bread. This is the stage of intersubjective intercourse. It involves the recognition of other selves as members of a society, or at least the rudimentary beginning of a society. But it does not involve the recognition of other things, e.g. the loaf of bread, as independently existing in the way that the individual himself and his fellow-men exist." (1)

I shall not dwell on the insuperable objections to which the theory is open, as thus interpreted. Ward becomes committed to the outrageous assertion that initially the perception of the experient consists exclusively in the recognition of organic bodies like his own. Ward certainly says nothing of the kind in the passage we are considering. On the contrary he says:

"acquaintance with others of its own kind is the direct outcome of the extended range in time which the individual's progress in perception and memory secured."

It is surely obvious that if perception were developed enough to perceive our own body and other complexes of presentations like our own body, Ward is compelled to admit that foreign bodies are perceived as things. A foreign body is not presented as a self, it is endowed with a self. Furthermore the exclusive recognition of such complex appearances as organic bodies appears incredible, when one realises how intimately the early life of the individual is associated with non bodily appearances such as bottles, rattles, etc. Can we suppose that Ward can have overlooked the facts of infant and animal

(1) Mind and Matter 236. Of course Professor Stout does not himself subscribe to the doctrine.
behaviour which so obviously refute the restriction of initial recognition to members of our own species?

A much more plausible theory results if the phrase "the objects that resemble" be taken to signify not merely organic bodies but any complex of sense presentations, capable of being handled and manipulated like the body. Experience is still of course, conceived as being essentially anthropomorphic and built up on the pattern of the self. And though this theory is by no means free from difficulties, as thus interpreted it escapes the absurdity of restricting initial recognition of the not-self exclusively to organic bodies like our own. I would urge the following considerations as evidence for this interpretation:

(a) Such passages are:

"Up to this point the presentation of self has shaped that of not-self - that is to say, external things have been interpreted more or less ejectively." (1)

"Things for primitive minds are much nearer to what we call 'ejects' than to the seemingly inanimate objects which we now discriminate from these. The term 'eject' then may be regarded so far as covering the two cases - that of things personified and that of actual persons; and the assumption of the former seems to be implicit before the recognition of the latter is explicit. (2)

(b) The discussion of Perception in the Psychological Principles, which though it maintains that the intuition of things is anthropomorphic gives no indication that it is preceded by a recognition exclusively confined to embodied selves. (3).

(1) 366. (Italics mine)
(2) Contemporary British Philosophers Second Series. p.34 (Italics mine).
(3) There are ambiguous passages on 165 which might be construed to the contrary; but the discussion as a whole would be against restricting recognition to organic bodies like our own.
Nevertheless, even on the second and more plausible interpretation of the ambiguous phrase 'objects that resemble it', Ward's account of the transition to the 'ejective' level must be pronounced invalid. The entire procedure is vitiated by the illegitimacy - at this level of mental development - of the projection theory of the self on which it depends.

Ward never shows successfully how a transition is made to the perception of the not-self by means of his projection theory of the self. The following passages dealing with this specific problem are obviously inadequate for this purpose, since they indicate that our body is only recognised in distinction from other bodies.

"As soon as definite perception begins, the body is distinguished as an extended thing from other bodies."(1)

"As we have existed....during the interval between two encounters with some other recognised body, etc."(2)

Again to say, "that the primordial factor in external reality.... is due to the projection of a subjectively determined exertion which meets with resistance..."(163), is, as Stout remarks, an obvious petitio principii to account for the way in which objects become known.

"Awareness of an embodied self in interaction with an embodied not-self is already presupposed in the awareness of resisted effort." (3)

In the first place, does not 'projicience' presuppose the external reference which it claims to render possible? If the answer be in the affirmative there is an obvious petitio principii; if the answer be in the negative, we are still within the circle of private individual

(1) 365
(2) 165
(3) Mind and Matter 167
sensa and feelings.

In the second place, how can there be a projection of the self at this level of experience? Since 'ejects' are characterised by a thorough going animatism, the projection which ex hypothesi renders their recognition possible cannot be a projection of the self as body. (1). To render the apprehension of 'ejects' possible, the self on which they are patterned must be an 'anima'. The subject must have appropriated experiences of activity, efficacy and permanence before it can attain the "ejective level". How is this awareness of activity and the other attributes characteristic of 'ejects' possible? It cannot be through the consciousness of M, the empirical Ego, for this - in any appropriate sense - would involve the social milieu which it seeks to explain. Nor can the projection be consequent upon a direct awareness of the activities of the pure Ego or I, for the pure Ego, according to Ward, is by its very nature as ultimate subject precluded from being known. Neither the pure Ego (2), nor activity (3), nor attention (4), nor pleasure and pain (5) can be known immediately in themselves. Yet they cannot be known at this stage "mediately and by their effects" (6), for this would require the recognition of a not-self which is the thing to be explained.

(1) To perceive the body as object would indeed be but a particular instance of the general problem to be solved.
(2) 380
(3) 344
(4) 58
(5) 375
(6) 68
In the third place as Professor Stout says

"We have no conception of the action of an individual self except as essentially including transactions between him and other beings which appear to him as bodies and embodied selves. In being aware of himself as active he is already aware of an independent not-self with which he interacts." (1)

It is evident then that the projection theory of the self must be rejected as an explanation of the transition to the level of intersubjective intercourse. Nor can recognition of things as independent of self, await a transsubjective level, reared upon the developed self consciousness resulting from the social cooperation and conflict of intersubjective intercourse. The duality of subject is as primordial for epistemology as psychology. Only by transcending the immediate is any experience possible. But, as has been repeatedly urged, transcendence of the immediate involves cognitive factors, universal principles of relation or categories. These fundamental constituents of experience must function ab initio. They cannot be assigned to a late stage of development. Their primary function is not to clarify experience, but to render it possible.

"The function of the fundamental categories...is to endow the mind with the capacity to apprehend certain universal meanings which are indispensable for the intuition of time and space and objects." (2)

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(1) Mind and Matter 293
(2) Smith, N.K. Prolegomena 176
II. The Nature of the Self.

I shall now seek to show that the Self revealed in Self consciousness cannot be the prototype and paradigm of the categories.

Ward distinguishes sharply between the pure Self and the empirical Self. The pure Self or I is the knowing experiencing self,

"the thinker of all our immost thoughts, the doer of all our very deeds," (1)

the indispensable subject of all experience. The empirical Self is the self which is known in internal perception of self consciousness.

"Self consciousness is attained when besides knowing feeling and acting, we also know that we know, know that we feel and know that we act; when in short we can say 'I know myself', or as the French more aptly say Je me connais. The self known we call the empirical Ego or Me, and distinguish it from the self-knowing, the I, which Kant was wont to call the pure Ego." (2).

The empirical Self is a genetic product. Its development is traced from its nucleus, the vital sense or coenesthetic, through the levels of the bodily sensitive self, the imagining and desiring self to the thinking and willing self - the most developed and "immost" self known. (3). Nevertheless, this "immost self" is not the pure Ego.

"To identify I and Me is logically impossible for ex vi terminorum, it is to identify subject and object." (4).

(1) 371
(2) 361
(3) 364-370
(4) 379
It is by no means easy to determine precisely Ward's opinion as to the relationship between the pure Self and the empirical Self. Although, no development of the empirical Self can make it identical with the pure Self, nevertheless, the empirical Self is "appropriated by the I as a presentation of itself." (1). Evidently, then, the empirical Self is regarded as, in some sense, a presentation of the pure Self. Yet since the development of the empirical Self is but an asymptotic approach to the pure Self, the presented Self must be of a different order from the pure Self. As Professor Stout points out "For (Ward), the empirical Self of the lower levels is a 'double' which does not include, but is provisionally substituted instead of the pure Ego." Stout pertinently asks "How then can it be revealed, directly or indirectly, merely by removing these empirical substitutes?" (2).

Now this representationism has serious consequences for Ward's deduction of the categories. It is obvious that it is the empirical Self which must be regarded as the paradigm of the categories. The pure Self is excluded, since it is unknowable save in so far as it is represented by the empirical Self; also the late emergence of the categories is precisely due to their prototype - the empirical Self - not being revealed until the self conscious level has been attained.

Our problem then is to determine whether the empirical Self revealed in internal perception is an adequate paradigm of the categories. A serious difficulty immediately arises owing to the external relationship just indicated between the pure Self and empirical Self.

(1) 381
(2) Monist xxxvi. p.49
The pure Self is the knower, the subject of attention and its modes. The empirical Self is a presentation, and like all presentations is contemplated, known — in short a content. Now the categories as forms of synthesis must be employed by the knower — the pure Self. The question, therefore, arises — How does the pure Self contemplate the categories in a presentational medium, without already employing the categories? Furthermore, it might be asked, if it can do so in the case of an inward presentational complex, why not in the case of the outward presentational complex? Since the empirical Self is only a representation what special claims has it for privileged intimacy with the pure Self? If, however, the pure Self employs categories in contemplating the empirical Self, the empirical Self is not the source and origin of the categories.

In the next place, how can a presentation — a content contemplated and known — be a prototype of 'synthetic functions'? Ward himself says of the categories

"Unlike other concepts, categories....do not in the first instance signify objects of thought but these functions of the understanding in constituting objects." (1)

That synthetic functions connote activity is particularly evident in the case of cause and effect.

"It would seem that when in ordinary thinking, we say A causes this or that in B, we project or analogically attribute to A what we experience in acting, and to B what we experience in being acted on." (2)

More precise determination as to the adequacy of the empirical Self as the paradigm of the categories requires an analysis of 'internal perception'.

(1) 316
(2) 343
The symbolism suggested for internal perception is Ip(MIplo). It designates such experiences as "I am conscious of hearing the thunder." I is the pure Self. M is the empirical Self at whatever stage it is known, but for our purposes its highest stage. o is a differentiation of o, e.g. my thunder as I hear it and "own" it, is considered as a differentiation of thunder not so qualified.

p is exemplified by: - I am conscious of seeing the lightning, of hearing the thunder, of remembering the morning's news, of imagining a tropical forest, of enjoying music, of enduring toothache, etc......

"We might say with Locke that p here answers to the perception of the operation of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got." (1)

Now as Professor Laird very justly observes

"If p is correctly described as remembering, hearing, imagining (and the rest), then not only may M be indistinguishable from a continuity of p's, but p bids fair to be indistinguishable from p. As we have seen, these very instances of remembering, perceiving and the rest were stated in an earlier chapter to be instances of attention; and attention it is here stated (and in general abundantly evident) is a faculty of I (it is p not p)." (2)

This overlapping between p and p raises difficulties on every hand.

In the first place, imagining, desiring, thinking and willing are modes of attention attributed to I; to attribute them to M is a duplication threatening the unity of consciousness. Secondly, even if we suppose M endowed with these capacities and powers, it

(1) 371-2
(2) Monist xxxvi. p.100.
would seem impossible - on Ward's principles - that the I could apprehend them. Since neither attention nor feeling can be known immediately, there seems no ground for assuming that the I could apprehend the Me qua attending and feeling. Thirdly, what justification is there for calling the empirical Self described as thinking, willing, etc. a presentation? To know the empirical Self as a presentation involves that it be "more or less attended to" (1); hence to know M qua feeling, imagining, thinking, willing, etc. implies that I attends to M presented as thus described. But neither activity nor attention and its modes are presentations (2). Hence M as thus described cannot be a presentation, and therefore cannot be the paradigm of the categories.

Our account of M and p¹ would be incomplete unless attention were drawn to passages indicating a very different meaning for these terms.

"We have to ask concerning the subjective factors - symbolized as M_p¹ - what exactly it is that, at the self conscious level, we are said to 'perceive'?... All that we can be said to perceive answering to subjective factors, must, it would seem, be something pertaining not directly to the subject but to the organism and its environment. This we have found to be true of M as the presentation of the sensitive and appetitive self. It is true also of the p¹ relating this zone of M with its objective differentiation o¹." (3).

Thus, p¹ denotes the sense organs or that part of the organism instrumental in apprehending an object, which are they referred to M.

This reference, however, is not direct, but is 'prompted' by the

(1) 46
(2) 58;344;380
(3) 373
pleasure and pain attending the strains and muscular adjustments involved in looking, listening, recollecting, etc.

"This is especially the case when owing to fatigue, functional defect, or intensity of stimulus any further activity is for the time painful. Here the pain felt prompts the reference of p^1 to M or the bodily self." (1).

Ultimately, then, p^1 is neither the sense organs nor the muscular adjustments and strains, but the pain arising from fatigue, functional defect or intensity of stimulus, which makes further activity for the time painful.

Now it seems impossible to reconcile this assertion with Ward's contention that feeling, and its modes pleasure and pain, are incapable of being directly known. (2). This, indeed, is expressly reiterated in the present chapter and the conclusion reached is that

"The so-called 'internal perception' of feeling, then, is not a perception of the feeling itself, which is supposed to be its direct object. It is rather, as in the case of attention and its operations, a reference of its objective accompaniments to the appropriate zone of the empirical self:" (3).

Nevertheless as we have just shown

"the reference of its objective accompaniments to the appropriate zone of the empirical Self"

ultimately depends on the perception of pleasure and pain which accompanies impeded or unimpeded functional activity.

It is a significant reflection on Ward's theory of categories, that his account of their prototype the empirical Self proves so vulnerable. I shall now endeavour to show that the modifications

(1) 374
(2) 58
(3) 375
necessary for a satisfactory theory of the Self involve the surrendering of its being the paradigm of the categories.

We have seen that Ward insists that although the pure Self cannot be known (as a presented object) nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid. His solution of this difficulty is to render the pure Self vicariously known through a presentational duplicate, which though increasing development, asymptotically approaches the I as a limit. Two criticisms arise in this connection:

(1) The empirical Self in its development appeared to take on functions which obviously belong to the pure Self. (p1 was described as remembering, hearing, imagining, etc.)

(2) We get the extraordinary result that the development of the Self consists in sloughing off successive stages of outwardness and gradually reducing to but never attaining a focus imaginarius.

"We began with self represented by concentric objective zones, sensory, ideational, personal, spiritual, and end with a focus imaginarius, as Kant called it.....This concept of the pure Ego, or I, in other words is the limit to which the empirical Ego points." (1)

Ward indeed protests that

"the pure subject or Ego which we reach in our analysis of experience at its rational level stands for no abstraction so long as we are content to distinguish it without attempting to separate it from its objective complement, the non-Ego." (2).

I agree with Ward that it is 'outrageous' that the I of which one speaks in some supreme issue should be regarded as an utter abstraction; but I fail to see how Ward's account of the
Self consistently applied can escape it.

I would suggest that the pure Self can only escape becoming an abstraction by recognising that it is not a *focuś imaginarius*, but a growing structure of appetitions, habits, beliefs, and sentiments. If all that makes the Self a dynamic centre be assigned to a presentational substitute, how can we avoid making the pure Ego an abstraction? There are therefore not two selves, but one self, and we must guard against hypostatising the Self of "internal perception" which is but a partial reconstruction of the actual, dynamic, spiritual Self. That the Self is not a presentation "to be taken in at a single gulp by an act of sensing",(1) seems evident from the difficulties and intricacies attending its analysis. Consequently, if an immediate awareness of conscious activity be denied, the "empirical Self" must be a reconstruction of the experiencing Self. Such reconstruction, of course, to be adequate is an extremely complex affair, but Socrates' "know thyself" should have made us realise that. I would hazard the suggestion that some of the obscurity attending the problem of the Self might be avoided by abolishing the expressions "pure Self" and "empirical Self". The problem of internal perception would then be formulated as that of reconstructing the Self in idea.

Such a view will assign the categories to the Self as functions indispensable for any apprehension that may be called cognitive. They are as original as attention, and indeed indispensable for its exercise. They are not acquired at a certain level of experience but indispensable factors for the possibility of experience.

(1) *Monist* xxxvi 108
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According to Alexander, the categories are determinations of all things which arise within Space-Time. (1) They are structural determinations of what is existent in virtue of their intrinsically spatiotemporal nature, e.g. the stuff of which matter and all things are composites, and the categories are pervasive features of these spatiotemporal complexes. They are not concepts by which we shape a chaotic meandroid; rather the "meandroid" is intrinsically categorical, and mind—when in communion with things—does not apprehend by intuition (2) the categorical features already in the stuff of things.

The common expression "application of the categories" must be used with caution.

"The clue to the understanding of our thesis is that the categories are not applicable as it were an extra to spaces and times, but that they are applicable to things (including minds), because they flow from the nature of the space-times which they occupy or which they are; applicability to space-times has no meaning for the categories, which are the features or determinations of the space-times themselves." (3)

Now although the categories are not due to mind, they are non-empirical and a priori. The universality and necessity, which Kant designated as the criteria of the a priori, belong to the categories not through dependence on mind, but because they are present in every existent however simple or however complex.

(2) Cf. infra: 4:162 ff.
(3) 1: 190; 195; 217; 305.
INTRODUCTION

According to Alexander, the categories are determinations of all things which arise within Space-Time. (1). They are structural determinations which belong to existents in virtue of their intrinsically spatio-temporal nature. S-T is the stuff of which matter and all things are complexes; and the categories are pervasive features of these spatio-temporal complexes.

The categories are in no sense due to mind. They are not concepts by which we shape a chaotic manifold; rather the "manifold" is intrinsically categorial, and mind - when in compresence with things - does but appropriate by intuition (2) the categorial features already in the stuff of things.

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(2) Cf. infra pp. 148 ff.
(3) I. 190; 195; 217; 306
"This does not imply that a priori or categorial characters because not empirical are not experienced. On the contrary, they are the essential and universal constituents of whatever is experienced, and in the wider sense of that term are therefore empirical." (1).

Their non-empirical character means that they cannot be derived from existents, for they are the sine quibus non of the possibility of existents. This protean characteristic of the categories is strikingly formulated in the following passage:

"The categories apply obviously to all finites in the ordinary sense of that term; but they apply also to everything empirical, everything which is not the whole of S-T, but a part of it. Thus they apply to what I have called empirical infinites, like the infinite numbers, or as we shall see later to the infinite deity, because they are not the whole of S-T." (2)

This outline of Alexander's categorial theory shows that its basic foundation is S-T. It is essential therefore, in appraising the theory of categories, to examine the validity of this foundational doctrine.

We shall therefore first outline briefly Alexander's doctrine of S-T, and then urge against it the following criticism

(1) The nature of S-T disclosed by the empirical method cannot establish its claim to be the basic stuff of the world;

(2) S-T as primordial stuff cannot account for becoming and creative process which are admitted as real features of the world;

(3) The notion of S-T as stuff is incompatible with the nature of categories which Alexander claims to be a "central" doctrine of his philosophy. (3).

(1) I. 185
(2) I. 324-5
(3) Mind xxx.120. p.411.
CHAPTER VI.

ALEXANDER'S THEORY OF SPACE-TIME

Fundamental Characteristics of Space-Time

(a) Space and Time are Interdependent.

The interdependence of Space and Time is argued at great length and ingenuity. The initial arguments show that the empirical face to face characteristics of Space and Time depend on their essential interconnection. Thus the continuity and successiveness of Time - its outstanding empirical characteristics - requires the offices of Space.

"Now if Time existed in complete independence and of its own right there could be no continuity in it....if it were nothing more than bare Time it would consist of perishing instants. Instead of a continuous Time, there would be nothing more than an instant, a now, which was perpetually being renewed. But Time would then be for itself and for an observer a mere now, and would contain neither earlier nor later. And thus in virtue of its successiveness it would not only not be continuous but would cease even to be for itself successive."(1).

"If, therefore, the past instant is not to be lost as it otherwise would be, or rather since this is not the case in fact, there needs must be some continuum other than Time which can secure and sustain the togetherness of past and present, of earlier and later....This other form of being is Space; that is, Space supplies us with the second continuum needed to save Time from being a mere 'now'." (2).

In a similar manner, the continuity, infinity and co-existence of Space are shown to be dependent on Time.

(1) I. 45
(2) I. 45-6
"Space taken by itself in its distinctive character of a whole coexistence has no distinction of parts. As Time in so far as it was temporal became a mere 'now', so Space so far as merely spatial becomes a blank. It would be without distinguishable elements. But a continuum without elements is not a continuum at all.....Thus the empirical continuity or totalness of Space turns out to be incompatible with the other empirical feature of Space, that it contains distinctness of parts. That distinctness is not supplied by the characteristic altogetherness of Space. There must therefore be some form of existence, some entity nor itself spatial which distinguishes and separates the parts of Space. This other form of existence is Time." (1).

This correspondence of Space and Time is not a one to one correspondence, it is a one-many correspondence.

"One instant may and does occupy several points...... and one point may and does occur at more than one instant. ....If the correspondence were unique, neither would Space be able to perform its office of saving the instant from perishing, nor Time its office of saving Space from blankness." (2).

It is unnecessary for our purposes to enter into the details of the one-many correspondence between Space and Time, or into the arguments which seek to establish the connection between the characteristics of temporal order and the three dimensions of space. They are considered invalid by both Dr. Broad (3) and Professor Murphy (4). We must of course distinguish between a conclusion and the arguments for it. Thus even though Alexander's arguments for the interdependence of Time and Space be inconclusive, it does not follow that the interdependence of Time and Space is thereby disproved, unless it could be shown that the arguments employed were the only possible proofs. Again, as Mr.

(1) I. 47
(2) I. 49
(3) Mind xxx. 117. p. 37 ff.
(4) Monist Vol. xxxvii
Leighton remarks, "One might demur to (Alexander's) doctrine that Space-Time is the one all-inclusive living stuff or body-soul of reality, and accept his conclusion with regard to the interdependence of space and time...." (1)

The interdependence of Time and Space is now a scientific and philosophical commonplace; but this characteristic of Space and Time is by no means the prerogative of the doctrine that Space-Time is the primordial stuff of the universe. Indeed Alexander's arguments for the interdependence of Space and Time are derived not from the consideration of pure Space-Time, but from the nature of S-T as a relational continuum of events; and the subsequent discussion shows that the doctrine of pure Space-Time as a stuff owes its plausibility to the surreptitious employment of considerations belonging to the relational view of Space-Time.

(b) S-T, the Ultimate Stuff of the Universe.

A brief outline must now be given of this other main feature of Alexander's doctrine of S-T.

The following will serve as typical of many passages:

"Space-Time is a stuff which is the simplest form of reality, and all existents which are made out of this stuff, are, as it were, crystals within this matrix." (2).

Alexander rejects explicitly the relational view of S-T which declares

"Space and Time to consist of relations between things or entities, these entities with their qualities coming first, and Space and Time being then respectively the order of coexistence and succession of entities." (3)

(1) Philosophical Review xxx.3
(2) Abstract of Gifford Lecture (hereafter quoted as Abstract) p.5; I.38;60;163;329;342; P. vi Preface to New Impression.
(3) I.37; ch.vi; 49
Space-Time is absolute, logically and temporally prior to all finite being. (1). All difference and heterogeneity fall within the all embracing medium to which any finite being however complex is ultimately reducible.

I. Criticism of Alexander's Doctrine of S-T

(a) The Nature of S-T Disclosed by the Empirical Method Cannot Establish its claim to be the Basic Stuff of the World.

The characteristics of Space directly experienced are continuity, coexistence and infinity. The characteristics of Time directly experienced are continuity, successiveness and irreversibility. That these empirical characters of Space and Time are also characteristics of Space-Time as the primordial entity is evident from many passages.

"The elements of the one reality which is S-T, and not either Space or Time alone owe their distinctness in either kind to the complementary element." (2).

"It is because Time is intrinsically repeated in Space and Space in Time, that it is possible at all to speak of Time or Space by themselves, when in fact neither exists apart from the other." (3)

"We are to consider how Space and Time are related to each other, and we shall find that neither is a reality without the other, and that instead of two realities - Space and Time, there is but one reality, which is S-T." (4).

The purport of these typical passages is to insist that the Space and Time of common parlance, reveal on fuller analysis their interdependence. The characteristics of Time and of Space so called, are dependent on their mutual salvation. Strictly speaking the em-

(1) II. 48-9
(2) I. 60
(3) I. 61
(4) Abstract p. 6
Empirical features of Space and Time are features of spatio-temporal reality. Furthermore, if S-T were not revealed by the analysis of the empirical features of Space and Time and by perspectives, 'the empirical method' (1) would be entirely abortive. We would then be committed to the sceptical conclusion that Space and Time as experienced can supply no information about the nature of S-T the ultimate, and it must therefore be essentially unknowable. It seems evident therefore, that Alexander considers the empirical characters of Space and Time to be expressive of Space-Time, the ultimate stuff of things. Now our contention is that the S-T thus disclosed is not the S-T described as the primordial entity, the stuff of the world. The following investigation shows that Alexander has two incompatible connotations of S-T in his system, and that the S-T established by the empirical method and the discussion of perspectives is toto genere different from the pure primordial S-T stuff. The latter is not justified by empirical verification, and is the product of a mistaken metaphysical prejudice.

Let us then consider the derivation of Space and Time from S-T expounded in the chapter on perspectives and sections.

The simplest basis of reality is S-T or pure Motion. The history of the world is a "perpetual redistribution of motion, or in more exact phrase a perpetual redistribution of the instants of Time among the points of Space within the one infinite S-T. The world grows and changes not by addition but by internal redistribution, like the movements in a disturbed ant heap." (2)

(1) I. Intro. p. 10
(2) Abstract p. 8; cf. I. 53
Consider the universe at any moment. What will \( S-T \) be under these circumstances?

"The natural and immediate answer would be, the time section consists of the whole of Space as occupied in every point by events occurring at that moment.....Space may be described as the assemblage of events which occur at the same moment of time." (1)

Such an assemblage of events constitutes a section.

Thus if we take a point instant \( E_{st} \), we can consider all the events contemporary with \( E_{st} \). We then might say that the Space section would be the \( S \) factors of all these events at the moment \( t \), and the time section all the \( t \) factors at the point \( S \).

The notions of space and time thus obtained are legitimate enough within certain limits, (2), but they do not actually represent what \( S-T \) is at any moment of its history. 'Space at a moment' is not instantaneous space, for space at any moment is "full of memory and expectation". (3)

The method of perspectives, however, affords a more legitimate and less artificial account of \( S \) and \( T \) at a moment. In a perspective we have the whole of Space not occurring at one instant, but filled with events of different dates, just as the animal body consists at any moment of cells of different stages of maturity. In like manner, if we take a perspective of \( S-T \) from a point

"we shall have the whole of Time occurring not the same point, but points of Space at all manner of distances from the central point of reference." (4).

Note that "A perspective from an instant of time and one from a point of space are different perspectives, and cannot be combined into a single perspective." (5)

(1) I.67; I.75

*The symbolism is Broad's.

(2) I.67; I.83

(3) I.67

(4) I.75

(5) I.75
It is also of importance to note the following statement with regard to point-instants:

"Thus in describing S-T in reference to a centre of reference which is now - its perspective from that point of view - we are not supposing that the universe is stopped at that moment artificially, in which case there would as some think be a now spread out over infinite space." (1)

Thus the connectedness of perspectives is not a juxtaposition of instantaneous snapshots. To borrow Bergson's celebrated simile, the connectedness of perspectives is not cinematographical:

"One perspective cries out for the next to complete it, they fit together by themselves." (2)

"Each perspective leads on to some other. The redistribution of dates among points are linked in one transitional process." (3)

What then is the relation between the Space and Time of perspectives and Total Space-Time? (4). Total Space-Time is the synthesis of all partial space-times or perspectives of S-T (5).

The above account of the relation of Space and Time to Space-Time contains two difficulties. The first concerns the legitimacy of perspectives at a level of "non qualified events"; the second is that the characteristics of S-T as revealed in perspectives is not the pure primordial stuff postulated by Alexander as the basis.

(1) I.72
(2) Mind xxx.120.p.417
(3) I.79
(4) Total Space-Time must, of course, be distinguished from total Space and total Time which are the products of a perspective, and also from the more artificial total Space and total Time of sections. Total S-T contains not only all S and all T but all point-instants. Cf. Mind xxx.120; 418
(5) I.76; I.80; I.82; I.86.
of reality, The legitimacy of perspectives.

"within the region of S-T pure and simple, before qualified events, like the fall of a stone or the birth of a flower or the existence of complex percipients like plants or ourselves," (1) has been challenged by Broad. (2). Alexander replies (3) that though the term perspective is metaphorical at this non-mental level, the metaphor is well grounded because (for him) the point-instant is a sort of body mind. (4). Also Broad is said to have forgotten the "intuition" (5) which point-instants possess.

This is not a satisfactory reply. It relies entirely on metaphors which are meaningless at the level of pure S-T. Since the issue is the legitimacy of perspectives at the pure S-T level, how can the appeal to "intuition" and the quasi body-mind character of point-instants be allowed?

It is significant that all the illustrations of point-instants and perspectives belong to the 'higher' level of qualified events - the cells of a man's body (6), the concentric rings on a tree trunk(7), the bullet killing a man (8), Sirius and the earthly percipient (9), the points on the hand as related by the discharge of an electric current (10).

Mr. Hallett also pertinently asks whether the real characteristics of Time, viz. its continuity, successiveness, irreversibility,
and uniformity of direction can be the characteristics of a 'time' emancipated from all points of reference; or whether they do not belong to time only in its relation to that moving origin of reference, this or that finite individual, or supposed mean or representative, experient or indicator; and whether when that point of reference is in every sense and form excluded, time will still flow." (1)

In one passage Alexander says

"We have seen in fact that physical Time is only earlier or later and that the instants in it are only past, present or future in relation to the mind which apprehends." (2) This would grant all Mr. Hallett requires, but it appears obviously inconsistent with the central principles of Alexander's doctrine of S-T. True Alexander is speaking here of "physical" Time, not metaphysical Time, but no such radical differences between the two as are here indicated could be allowed if the realism of the system be sustained.

Alexander suggests the following practice as an aid for the apprehension of pure S-T.

"In practice I am accustomed in thinking of Space and Time by themselves to keep constantly pictures of material things and events before my mind and then forget their richness and smells and other qualities." (3)

This personal testimony is very significant. The supposition is that by gradually eliminating "qualities", we attain grasp of Space and Time by themselves. But in assuming this, we have "forgotten" more than the colour, smells and other qualities. We have forgotten that our S-T residuum is an abstract formulation of relations between concrete things, and must not be hypostatized.

(1) Aeternitas p. 30
(2) I.95
(3) I.39
into an ontological entity.

Since the notion of perspectives is only intelligible when construed in terms of relations between qualified events, we must conclude that the empirical method — the beacon of this philosophy — does not justify the notion of perspectives at the level of pure S-T. (1)

We pass to the second difficulty in Alexander's doctrine viz. that the characteristics of S-T as revealed in perspectives are not those of the pure S-T stuff postulated as the basis of reality. Point-instants are said to be "pure events". (2). As the previous argument has shown, the discussion and illustrations afford no evidence that point-instants are events. The discussion shows nothing more than that point-instants are termini of reference in the interrelation of events. (3). There is no proof given for the view that point-instants are stuff. On the contrary, their essentially relational character precludes their being stuff. How could "stuff" allow the vagaries ascribed to points in such a passage as

"In general a perspective of S-T from one point-instant differs from the perspective from another point-instant, whether the perspectives be taken in respect of the instants or points. Points which were simultaneous in the one may be successive in the other; the interval of time or space may be altered, and even two points may reverse their dates in the different perspectives." (4)

As Murphy insists, (5), if a relation is reduced to stuff it fails to connect. If the relation between point-instants is only another point-instant, it fails to connect them, and we are thrown

(1) I.325
(2) I.48
(3) I.151; I.238
(4) I.78
(5) Monist Vol. xxxvii
into the infinite regress of the "third man". Furthermore, we are explicitly told that point-instants are not constitutive of motion, the stuff of things.

"Motion is not a succession of point-instants, but rather a point-instant is the limiting case of a motion."(1).

Point-instants admit categorial determination (2) and therefore must be distinct from S-T the primordial stuff which is supra categorial.(3)

In all these passages the essentially relational character of point-instants is evident. To make them stuff or pure events appears to result from a hypostatization of conceptual termini in the interrelation of events into real ontological units. Thus the S-T that would result from the synthesis of all partial space times or perspectives (4) is not a stuff but a system of spatio-temporal relations between entities.(5).

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(1) I.321; I.61
(2) I.325
(3) I.327
(4) I.76; I.80;82
(5) It might be suggested that S-T the primordial entity is not identical with "total S-T", "S-T as a whole," the synthesis of all perspectives. The necessity of "taking time seriously", the emphasis on the reality of the world's history and the doctrine of emergent evolution suggest that S-T is pregnant with novelty and becomes fuller as it matures. This interpretation would undermine the legitimacy of perspectives as a method of disclosing the nature of the primordial entity. Also it seems excluded by such passages as "But a beginning of existence is itself an event in S-T which is the system of point-instants and it is therefore clear that S-T as a whole begins either everywhere or nowhere." I.62.
I. (b) S-T Cannot Account for Becoming and Creative Process

Which Are Admitted as Real Features of the World.

S-T is "the matrix of things, the nurse of becoming." (1).

"S-T in its simplest terms is a growing universe and is through and through historical." (2).

These typical passages show that growth and creative process are fundamental in the philosophy of Alexander. If, then, S-T is to justify its claim to be the primordial basis of the universe, growth and creative process must be shown to flow from its intrinsic nature.

Professor Alexander chafes because he has been criticised for not explaining why in the development of S-T colours and life etc. should emerge. He replies

"That is not my business and further I don't see how it can be anybody's business except to note the facts and be grateful for them, or at least put up with them." (3)

Of course there are questions which may legitimately be asked and there are also questions which should never be put, and to

"Know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence." (4)

Now to demand that the basis of a metaphysical system shall exhibit itself as the ground of admittedly fundamental characteristics of the world is surely not unreasonable; and therefore we feel justified in requiring that growth and creative process be shown to flow from the intrinsic nature of S-T.

(1) I.331
(2) I.66
(3) Mind. xxx. 120 p.410
Our discussion will confine itself for the most part to Vol.I and reserve the consideration of the doctrine of emergence until we are dealing with Mind.

Our contention is that the claim of pure $S-T$ to be the basis of becoming and creative process is plausible only through the surreptitious endowment of pure $S-T$ with characteristics which can only belong to $S-T$ as a relational system of events. Thus by an independent line of argument we reach the same conclusion as in the foregoing section II(a).

$S-T$ is pure Motion (1) and we are assured that

"If we are serious with Time, there is no difficulty in the thought of a $S-T$ which contained no matter or other qualities but was, in the language of Genesis, without form or void before there was light or sound." (2)

Quam mirum praemium pietatis naturalis! Unless there is gross misunderstanding our discussion will show that such a notion is fraught with insuperable difficulties.

In the first place, if Time be taken seriously, is it legitimate to speak of "total $S-T$" and "$S-T$ as whole"? Observe that we are not thereby speaking of the total Space or the total Time of perspectives and sections; we are referring to the total $S-T$ which is "the synthesis of all perspectives." (3)

As we have already pointed out total $S-T$ is different from total $S$ and total $T$. (4)

"Each perspective contains all Space (or) all Time, whereas total $S-T$ contains not only all $S$ and all $T$, but all point-instants." (5)

(1) I.62; I.320
(2) I.65
(3) I.76; I.77; I.80; I.82
(4) Supra p. 110 Note 4
(5) Mind. xxx.120 p.418
The impropriety in speaking of "Total S-T" in this system is well expressed by Alexander himself when he tells us S-T is not a whole of parts.

"If S-T were such a whole, it would be given all at once. But being Time (or indeed Space which is the same thing) it is not, as Mr. Bergson rightly says, given altogether. To suppose so is to ignore the reality of Time, to fail to take Time seriously. At any one moment the universe is the whole of its existent parts, but at any moment the universe is not the whole universe of parts. (1). For in the real distribution of dates among places new existents are generated within the one S-T. It may indeed be called not a whole of parts, but the whole system of all existents." (2)

An earlier passage though immediately concerned with Space seems to have a similar implication.

"Under a certain condition, to be explained presently, we may indeed contemplate Space as an infinite whole when we consider only the points it contains. Directly we allow for its Time, we realise that while there may be a complete whole of conceived timeless points, there cannot be one of real point-instants or events. For incompleteness at any moment is of the essence of Time." (3).

(1) This sentence is very puzzling. In the first place does the phrase "At any one moment" mean a perspective from an instant? This would at first seem the most natural interpretation of the phrase, but it does not satisfy the requirements of the discussion. A perspective from an instant would give us total Space. What the text requires in the consideration of S-T in reference to a point-instant. The (at least theoretical) possibility of this seems sanctioned by "S-T considered in reference to a point-instant, from the point of view of both the point and the instant is nothing but S-T". I.76. This consideration offers some assistance in interpreting the distinction drawn between "the universe as the whole of its existent parts" and "the universe as the whole universe of parts." S-T from a point-instant would presumably be S-T at a moment. At such a moment the universe or S-T would be the whole i.e. an aggregate of its existent parts; but since S-T is filled with "memory" and "expectation" a sum of parts does not adequately describe S-T, therefore S-T is not a whole universe of parts. The objection against this explanation is that "S-T at a moment" seems a contradiction in terms; and also that a characteristic of a perspective is that it allows for differences of dates among point-instants and therefore S-T from a point-instant would not be adequately described as a whole of parts.

(2) I.339
(3) I.66
In view of these considerations "total S-T" "S-T as a whole" are seen to be illegitimate expressions to describe the primordial entity, the basis of the world. If they are taken seriously - as Alexander does - they are incompatible with process and becoming.

A second difficulty in reconciling Alexander's account of S-T with process arises when we ask how pure motion becomes - so to speak - scrambled.

Alexander endeavours to achieve the scrambling process by properties ascribed to point-instants.

"S-T consists of what may be called lines of advance connected into a whole or system in a manner to be described." (1)

"Lines of advance" are illustrated as follows:

"Call 0 the instant of reference. One of its points is o; there are points intrinsically contemporary with o. A point a is earlier than o, and if we call the time of o the present, a is past. The point a is of the same date as b and is earlier than c....Now the meaning of such reference in date to o is that the events a b c lie on lines of advance which connect them with o." (2)

Further 'lines of advance' would appear to constitute motion.

"In a line of advance c b a we have the displacement of the present from c through b to a, so that a becomes present while b becomes past and c still further past. Points do not of course move in the system of points, but they change their time coefficient. What we ordinarily call motion of a body is the occupation by that body of points which successively become present, so that at each stage the points traversed have different time values when the line of motion is taken as a whole." (3).

Thus though the 'lines of advance' and movement are elucidated

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(1) I.61
(2) I.69
(3) I.61
in terms of perspectives, yet the exigencies of the metaphysical hypothesis of a pure S-T stuff, drives Alexander to maintain in other passages that pure motion is prior and presupposed by events whether pure or qualified.

"Motion is not a succession of point-instants, but rather a point-instant is the limiting case of a motion." (1)

"Movement is anterior to things which are complexes of movements." (2)

Notwithstanding the commendations of perspectives as being genuine historical phases, and the descriptions of S-T as being the synthesis of all perspectives (3), an infinite continuum of pure events or point-instants (4), we now discover that these descriptions are inadequate as applied to pure Motion the stuff of things. Thus point-instants cannot adequately describe pure Motion, because they presuppose Pure Motion. Their ontological inadequacy is further evidenced by their amenability to categorial determination.

"They exist, have universality, and substance and the like" (5).

S-T, however, is not subject to the categories (6). Again, the description of S-T as an "infinite continuum of pure events" must be metaphysically inadequate, for S-T has no parts "while a continuum without elements is not a continuum at all." (7). Lastly, "lines of advance" do not constitute motion for they necessarily depend on

(1) I.321
(2) I.329
(3) I.76
(4) I.66
(5) I.326
(6) I.357
(7) I.47
point-instants, and share the ontological inadequacy of the latter.

Can pure Motion admit change? It must admit change if it is to fulfill its claims to be the basis of a growing historical universe, for becoming and creative process involve change. Change is change of something else; (1):

"it implies movement and is movement from one movement to another" (2),

and is "strictly empirical" (3). But how can pure Motion in which nothing moves, and which admits no points of reference really change?

Since it has been shown that a reply in terms of lines of advance, point-instants and perspectives is inadequate, the only alternative is the doctrine of emergence. Now unless we are content to take refuge in sheer mystery, emergence depends on constellations and configurations of motion.

"The emergence of a new quality from any level of existence means that at that level there comes into being a certain constellation or collocation of the motions belonging to that level and possessing the quality appropriate to it, and this collocation possesses a new quality distinctive of the higher complex." (4).

Emergence thus presupposes that pure Motion has already suffered the "empirical infection" necessary to process and becoming. We are forced to conclude that Alexander's doctrine of S-T or pure Motion as the stuff of things affords no intelligible basis for the admitted facts of change and becoming, and the plausibility of its being an intelligible notion is due to surreptitiously endowing it with properties belonging to the relational view of S-T.

(1) I.329
(2) I.330
(3) I.328
(4) II.45
(c) The Notion of S-T is Incompatible with the Nature of Categories Which are "Central" to the Entire System.

The errors detected in the S-T doctrine cut at the root of the categorial theory.

"Categories are for us expressions of the nature of S-T itself"(1). But it is also asserted that "The categories are fundamental properties or determinations of S-T itself not taken as a whole, but in every portion of it."(2).

Here again we encounter the difficulty of the S-T doctrine in a new setting. How can the primordial S-T which is supra relational and non categorial(3) descend into the relational so that categories shall be the expression of its nature? Just as the togetherness and distinctness attributed to S-T is by means of perspectives which are not ultimate, so the relational structure intrinsic to the categories is extraneous to S-T as such.

Notwithstanding protests to the contrary (4), pure primordial S-T which allows no relational or categorial determination, appears to be as much of a philosophical strait jacket as the ancient Parmenidean One. As Mr. Hallett says

"In attempting to escape from the limitations and particularities of empirical duration...we find ourselves condemned to a 'dateless night'"(5).

So also as the notion of pure S-T stuff could only march through a tacit substitution of a relational S-T of perspectives and qualitied events, so the categories can function only by abandoning the

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(1) I. 191
(2) I. 189 (Italics mine).
(3) I. 337
(4) I. 346-7
(5) Aeternitas 31.
notion of their being stuff and making them essentially formal. We shall therefore render this contention more explicit by examining Alexander's discussion of Universality, Substance and Relation.

**Universality**

Universality is generic identity or identity of kind, e.g. a dog is qua dog generically identical with another dog.

"It is the existence or subsistence of a universal or concept which unites its particulars, which they imitate or in which they participate, or however else we may provisionally and traditionally describe the relation between the universal and its particulars." (1)

The essence of universality flows from the nature of S-T. Universality arises from 'uniformity' of S-T. (2). It is not due to mind, nor does it have its source in an eternal region of Forms. (3). Universality is the category in virtue of which there are universals. What then are universals?

A Universal is a plan or pattern or 'habit'. Universals may exhibit degrees of complexity e.g. the constancy of form or pattern in marble balls turned out from one machine is simpler than the pattern exhibited in the universal dog or man; but whether simple or complex, the essence of a universal is constancy of plan or pattern amid particulars.

What kind of being do universals possess? The answer appears to be unequivocal.

"There is no category of being other than that of determinate being or the existent." (4)

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(1) I.208
(2) I.213;215
(3) I. 217
(4) I. 200
"Being is an occupation of a space-time (1)....", and "occupancy of a space-time is ipso-facto exclusion of other space-times. There are no beings (occupants of space-times) which are not existents." (2).

Now as Mr. Murphy points out

"We should have supposed that a plan or pattern is not at all the sort of thing that could occupy one space-time in exclusion of other occupancy, for many particulars partake of the same universal. Yet, if universals are made out of space-time stuff, they are obviously as particular as their instances, and exist in the same exclusive sense. A universal can no more be in two places at once than a particular dog. And in that case it has lost all vestige of universality." (3)

Of course Alexander cannot accept this result; and so notwithstanding the caveats about subsistence (4), we are now informed that the universal may be said to have that reality of existence which is called subsistence (5). A valiant but unsuccessful effort is made to reconcile the two points of view in the following passages-

"The universal subsists in so far as its particulars exist and is spatio temporal though not particular. The universal is nowhere and nowhen in particular but anywhere and anywhen. It is not timeless or eternal as being out of time but as being free from limitation to a particular time." (6).

Again, "(Universals) are never dead or petrified because in the end they are spatio temporal plans and instinct with time. And above all they are never bare potentialities, the creatures of abstract thinking, but possess such actuality as they can possess, which is not particular actuality or existence." (7)

(1) I.198
(2) I.199
(3) Monist xxxvii
(4) I.200;202
(5) I.222
(6) I.222
(7) I.226
In each of the quotations the insistence on the freedom from limitation to a particular time and particular existence essential to a universal is rendered nugatory by the assertion of its spatio temporal nature and determinate being, which is necessary to a stuff. The universal cannot be both form and stuff; if it is a spatio temporal existent it cannot also be a unifying principle for distinct existences.

Universality "the category in virtue of which there are universals whether empirical or a priori ones" (1) fares no better than its offspring.

The feature of S-T which conditions universality is the constancy or uniformity of S-T.

"It is because S-T is uniform or constant in curvature and admits a plan that existents which are patches of space-time possess universality." (2).

"In a Space which is not uniform I do not see how there should be universals, for each plan would suffer distortion as it was transferred." (3)

Alexander claims that there is no contradiction between the assertion that space is of constant curvature and Einstein's doctrine that space is warped wherever there is matter.

"When I say that bodies do not change their configuration in S-T, I mean this only so far as S-T itself is concerned. On the relativity theory too, S-T in which there is no gravitational field is uniform. A body may on the view of the text undergo distortion through its relation to other bodies..." (4)

(1) I.215
(2) I.217
(3) I.215-6
(4) I.xxvii
Judgment as to whether this statement really reconciles the two views of S-T need not detain us. Its immediate interest is that it certainly appears to depend on the distinction between S-T and matter being sharply drawn. Now as Mr. Murphy points out.

"Surely (Alexander) is of all men the least entitled to distinguish between "S-T itself" and that which occupies it or which it relates. For the determinate being of particular things as particulars is constituted by the S-T which they are. Each event, so far as it is different from any other is thereby a warp in S-T; the difference is not something extrinsic to S-T itself and to which it is indifferent; the difference is S-T, and so far as particular things exist at all S-T is not uniform." (1)

We conclude therefore that the doctrine of a S-T stuff if consistently maintained would involve a nominalistic impasse; and that Alexander's category of universality is inconsistent with his doctrine of a pure S-T stuff.

Substance

The characteristic of S-T which underlies substance is the relation between the spatial and temporal elements in any space-time. Expressed in its simplest terms, a substance is a contour of space persisting through a duration.

"When we come to the simplest substance of all, the life of which is movement in a straight line, what we have is the occupation of the most elementary contour in space viz. a point by an instant in time." (2)

If as Mr. Murphy urges, for Alexander a point is not a piece of space, and an instant is not a duration, then it is obvious that the category of substance as here defined is not applicable. But if the category is not applicable to point-instants, it has not been

(1) Monist xxxvii
(2) I.271
deduced from the intrinsic nature of S-T, for ex hypothesi points and instants are the elements of S-T.

There are indeed passages which support the interpretation that points are extensionless and instants durationless.

"Space and Time then are presented to us as infinite and continuous wholes of parts. I shall call these parts points and instants, availing myself of the conceptual description of them, and meaning by their connectedness or continuity at any rate that between any two points or instants another can be found. To me, subject to what may be said hereafter, this is a way of saying that the points and instants are not isolated. But if any reader jibs, let him substitute lengths and durations," (1)

The following passage - in the demonstration of the interdependence of Space and Time - would seem to imply that instants are durationless.

"If (Time) were nothing more than bare Time it would consist of perishing instants." (2)

A corresponding conclusion might be drawn with regard to points from "Merely as points, as positions in space, they do not possess order, any more than instants merely as temporal possess position in time." (3)

The same conclusion follows from such passages as "Motion is not a succession of point-instants but rather a point-instant is the limiting case of a motion." (4).

On the other hand, the discussion of perspectives with its emphasis on point-instants being real would preclude the notion of extensionless points and durationless instants. In this connection, however, we call attention to the conclusion of our discussion of perspectives, which showed that Alexander never explains satisfactorily

(1) I.43-44 (Italics mine)
(2) I.45
(3) I.56. The remainder of the sentence seems to imply that points and instants thus conceived are merely fictions.
(4) I.321
how perspectives and point-instants emerge prior to the level of qualified events. But even if we ignore these considerations, and allow that points are spatial and instants durational, the deduction of substance from point-instants does not follow. The legitimacy of deducing substance from the intrinsic nature of $S-T$, depends on establishing the validity of the assertion

"When we come to the simplest substance of all, the life of which is movement in a straight line, what we have is the occupation of the most elementary contour in space viz. a point by an instant in time."(1)

My contention is that this contour of space is not realisable at the level of pure $S-T$, and that it depends on a conceptual view of points and instants which has been shown to make substance as defined inapplicable. A definite contour of space is entirely extraneous to point instants as such. The correspondence between points and instants is not a one to one but a one-many correspondence. One instant may and does occupy several points, and one point may and does occur at more than one instant. In the pure continuum of $S-T$, points and instants flow, and definite contours are arbitrary cuts foreign to the nature of $S-T$ as such.

The deduction of substance from the intrinsic nature of $S-T$ is thus fraught with insuperable difficulties. Unless instants are durational and points spatial, $S-T$ cannot yield a definite contour in space which the definition of substance requires. On the other hand, if instants are durational and points spatial they still fail to

(1) I.271
disclose definite contours, for there is nothing in the nature of point-instants as such which make them cease to flow.

We conclude then that the deduction of substance from the nature of S-T has failed.

It would be tedious to pursue this investigation throughout the whole list of categories, and we may conveniently generalise our conclusions by examining the basic category of Relation itself.

Relation

Relation is a category, and arises from the continuity of S-T.

"Relations are in no sense subjective or the work of the mind." (1)

Relations are spatio-temporal and of the same stuff as their terms.

"Not merely in bare Space or Time, but in the empirical relations that subsist between things with qualities, the relation is just as concrete and just as much a reality (being ultimately spatio-temporal) as the terms and belongs to the same tissue with them." (2)

Three crucial points arise in Alexander's account of relations:—

Are all relations reducible to spatio-temporal terms? Can such relations as maternity(3), truth-telling, and justice (4) be literally and strictly reduced to spatio-temporal terms and retain their meaning?

Since truth and justice are tertiary qualities and impossible apart from mind, their reduction to spatio-temporal terms is possible only if mind and mental relations are spatio-temporal. Decision as to the legitimacy of the spatio-temporal reduction of such crucial instances

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(1) I.246
(2) I.241-2. Cf. I.239;245;246;249
(3) I.241-3
(4) I.211
depends therefore on the discussion of mental space-time and mind, which form the topic of the next chapter. It is desirable to add however that the issue involved is fraught with far reaching implications. If all relations including mental relations are strictly reducible to spatio temporal relations, then physics is the only science. Psychology, ethics and the social sciences are either moonshine or reducible to physics. Alexander would not, I presume, admit this. Indeed he seems to grant the autonomy of the various sciences when he says

"The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that lower level but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behaviour." (1)

But this departs from the strict reduction of all relations to spatio temporal terms. His good sense and emergence save him from doing violence to plain facts, but at the cost of consistency.

If a relation is reduced to stuff can it relate? Are we not committed to the difficulty of the "Third Man". Murphy insists that this crux meets Alexander in each of the categories.

"If universality is substantialized you need a third thing to relate the resulting particularised universal to its instances; if structural continuity is identified with the diversity of movements, it fails to connect them; if the relation between point-instants is only another point-instant it fails to connect them. If the terms are to be identical in mind they must have something in common, but it certainly cannot be the S-T of either for they are diverse and exclude each other. Neither can it be a relation for that is a third space-time "outside" of them both." (2)

(1) II.46
(2) Murphy. Monist. xxxvii
The motive in reducing relation to space-time stuff is to guarantee that relations shall be real and founded in the Real viz. S-T. But S-T as a stuff is supra relational. Hence the relational structure on which the categories are based cannot be a real basis, it is a mere "feature" (1) which does not condition Reality in its absoluteness.

Thus the conflict between the two meanings of S-T pervades the categorial theory. If S-T be a primordial stuff supra categorial and supra relational, it cannot be the basis of relation and categories. If on the other hand S-T be relational and a sum of perspectives, it is no longer a primordial stuff and complete in itself. It is no longer the basis of reality required by this system.

We shall reserve our discussion of this exploration of this terminology employed.

A mind be the potential conditions of certain causes which S-T, the conscious reality. (2)

The relation of mind and its objects is one of contact. It cannot be explained as formal (3).

Any experience shall not be represented by the distinct elements and their relation to the sequence of the elements which are the order of the reality. We can not hand the set of ideas the man possesses, as we can not assert the object of space is to perceive. The human being is such that they are together as experience in the other when in thus so far experienced.

(1) I.337
(2) I. 100-108
(3) II. 6
(4) Intro. 111
CHAPTER VII

MIND AND THE CATEGORIES

Alexander's doctrine of categories may be summarily expressed in two propositions:

(1) Categories are expressions of the nature of S-T (1);

(2) Categories are constitutive characters of all existents including mind.(2).

The previous chapter was concerned with the first statement, and concluded that the deduction of the categories from S-T was unsuccessful. The present chapter will consider the second statement, and will argue that the categories defined as spatio-temporal cannot be constitutive characters of mind.

We shall preface our discussion by some explanations of the terminology employed.

"A mind is the substantial continuum of certain processes which have the conscious quality." (3)

The relation of mind and its objects is one of "compresence." Com-persence is explained as follows:

"Any experience whatever may be analysed into two distinct elements and their relation to one another. The two elements which are the terms of the relation are, on the one hand the act of mind or the awareness, and on the other the object of which it is aware; the relation between them is that they are together or co-present in the world which is thus so far experienced" (4)

(1) 1.191
(2) 1.190-193
(3) II.81
(4) Intro. 11.
Cognition is not a unique relation. It is simply an instance of compresence, where one of the partners has the empirical quality of consciousness. Again, compresence is not peculiar to the conscious level. (1). On the contrary, "it is the simplest and most universal of all relations"(2).

If one of the partners in the compresent relation be a mind, the act of mind "contemplates" its object, and "enjoys" itself. The act of mind qua experiencing is enjoyed; the object upon which the act is directed is experienced and contemplated.

"I am accustomed to say that the mind enjoys itself and contemplates its objects. The act of mind is an enjoyment, the object is contemplated." (3).

Alexander extends the customary connotation of enjoyment which restricts it to pleasureable experiencing.

"It includes suffering or any state or process in so far as the mind lives through it." (4)

Alexander will not allow that mind or its acts can be contemplated.(5). The possibility of introspection might seem to falsify this statement, but that is because introspection is confused with extrospection. Introspection proper is the enjoyment of the acts of perceiving, remembering, thinking, etc. Extrospection is the contemplation of sense or images in perceiving, imagining and remembering.

"But the landscape I imagine or Lorenzo's villa on the way down from Fiesole that I remember with the enchanting view of Florence from the loggia, are no more discovered to me by introspection than the rowan tree which I perceive in front of my window as I write. These objects are presented to me by imagination or

(1) II.31:99;102
(2) II.32:99-100
(3) I.12
(4) Ibid
memory or perception, not by introspection, and are the objects not of introspection but of extrospection, if such a word may be used, all alike." (1)

Enjoyment and contemplation are strictly correlative.

"There are no two separate mental acts one of enjoyment and one of contemplation. The mind, in enjoying itself has before it and therefore contemplates, the object. Contemplation is a name for the same act as enjoyment only in reference to the object. The enjoyment is at once a state of being of the mind itself, and that to which the object is revealed, and so is an act of knowing. Reciprocally, in knowing the object I know myself, not in the sense that I contemplate myself, for I do not do so, but in the sense that I live through this experience of myself." (2).

With these preliminary explanations, we can now proceed to a critical examination of three points essential to Alexander's view of mind:

(1) The theory of Emergence
(2) The doctrine of mental space-time
(3) The doctrine of intuition.

1. The Theory of Emergence

All existents are ultimately complexes of S-T; but correlative to spatio temporal configurations of a certain complexity, there 'emerge' qualities such as materiality, life, colour, consciousness. Such qualities are not - like the categories - pervasive characters of all existents, but are limited to levels possessing the appropriate spatio-temporal configuration.

"The emergence of a new quality from any level of existence means that at that level, there comes into being a certain constellation or collocation of the motions belonging to that level, and possessing the quality appropriate to it, and this collocation possesses a new quality distinctive of the higher complex." (3).

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(1) I.18
(2) I.xiv.Preface to New Impression.
(3) II.45
"An 'emergent' differs from a 'resultant'. A resultant is predictable on the basis of the nature of its components. An emergent on the other hand is unpredictable before the combination takes place, and is different from any of the qualities possessed by the separate elements that enter into the combination.

"Thus certain physical and chemical processes of a certain complexity have the quality of life. The new quality life emerges with this constellation of such processes, and therefore life is at once a physico-chemical complex and is not merely physical and chemical, for these terms do not sufficiently characterize the new complex which in the course and order of time has been generated out of them.....The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behaviour." (1)

Thus for example "Mind is a new quality distinct from life, with its own peculiar methods of behaviour, for the reason already made clear, that the complex collocation which has mind, though itself vital, is determined by the order of its vital complexity, and is therefore not merely vital but also mental." (2)

The relation between the various levels of existence should be noted. Emergent qualities presuppose the earlier, less complex, lower grades of existence.

"Each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage, and therefore indirectly in terms of all lower stages." (3)

Thus the qualitative level of mind presupposes and is expressible completely in terms of living process; life presupposes and is expressible completely in terms of physico chemical process. It should be noted, however, that only some vital processes give rise to mind,

(1) II.46
(2) II.45-6
(3) II.67
and only some physico chemical processes are vital. For example, in order that life may emerge, its physico chemical processes must possess a certain kind of 'constellation' of physico chemical processes which makes the structure to which they belong an organism. Furthermore,

"The empirical qualities of the 'material' are carried up into the body of the higher level, but not into its new quality. Life is based on material existents which have colour or smell or weight. But life itself is not coloured .... The living thing has colour in respect of its body, but in respect of its distinctive life it has not. Mind has no secondary qualities, nor even has it life, but only as identical with a living thing has it life.... Conversely the categorial characters are carried up into the emergent existent. For everything is a complex of space-time and possesses the fundamental properties of any space-time, which are the categories. Hence though life is not coloured it is extended and in time, and this we have seen to be true of mind as well." (1)

It is not necessary for our purposes to challenge the doctrine of emergence as such, but we are concerned to show that its acceptance is incompatible with the reduction of the 'higher' level emergents to spatio temporal terms. Alexander doubtless considers that the emergent theory affords very definite corroboration of his thesis that the categories are non mental. Since mind is a late emergent quality, the categories as pervasive characters of all levels of existence must precede the emergence of mind, and be entirely independent of mind. But the plausibility of this argument depends on showing that the categories are pervasive of all levels of existence; and our contention is that this pervasiveness of the categories is precluded by the acceptance of the doctrine of emergent

(1) II.71
evolution. We shall argue that if emergence be taken seriously, the continuity of evolutionary development necessary for the perversiveness of the categories through all levels of existence is inconsistent with the like insistence on the radically new and original character of the emergent qualities and with the autonomous nature asserted of the various levels.

Let us confine ourselves to investigating the relation pertaining between an emergent and the level from which it emerges. The following passages are typical on this point:

"The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges from and it does not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behaviour." (1)

"The quality and the constellation to which it belongs are at once new and expressible without residue in terms of the processes proper to the level from which they emerge." (2)

The underlined passages lose some of their blatantly verbal inconsistency when it is remembered that the basis of an emergent quality is a privileged constellation of its own level. For example a neural process which possesses the mental quality is privileged among neural processes. It differs in some respect from neural processes not possessing the mental character.

"A neural process does not cease to be mental and remain in all respects the same neural process as before." (2)

The assertions that the higher quality (e.g. mentality) emerges from a lower level of existence (neural process), and yet is something new with its special laws of behaviour, is thus rendered much

(1) II.46 (Italics mine)
(2) II.49 (Italics mine)
(3) II.8;46;62;69;74
more plausible. But do the passages really escape contradiction? Are not the neural processes underlying mentality admittedly of a specific kind having a privileged status? If so they are not accurately described in mere neural terminology. If a neural process with mental character is different radically from a neural process which is not mental, it cannot be merely neural. The feature distinguishing neuro mental processes from merely neural processes is not yet known, but that is no justification for identifying them. If there be - as Alexander admits - a difference between the neural process and the mental process, it is not permissible to say of a mental process that

"The quality and the constellation to which it belongs are at once new and expressible without residue in terms proper to the level from which they emerge." (1)

This inaccuracy swells as we descend through the hierarchy of qualitative levels, until an initial lapse detected with difficulty becomes the palpable falsehood, that

"Each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage and therefore indirectly in terms of all lower stages."(2)

Ergo Mind is expressible in spatio temporal terms.

The fallacy disclosed is a species of the "nothing but" fallacy frequently appearing in genetic explanations. It argues that because C rose out of B and B out of A, therefore C is nothing but A. Applied to the present context the argument runs, because life arose out of physico-chemical processes which are spatio-temporal and mind arose from vital processes therefore mind is spatio temporal.

(1) II.45
(2) II.67 (Italics mine)
The reduction of mind to spatio-temporal terms and its consequent dependence on the categories as constituent factors, depends on a fallacy which fails to take the notion of genuinely new existents seriously. If the emergent qualities are genuinely new existents, they cannot be regarded as simply spatio temporal complexes in disguise.

Furthermore, since on this view evolution is essentially "jumpy" there is no reason why an emergent should exhibit any continuity with the lower levels of existence; and consequently, there is no reason why categories defined as spatio temporal should pervade any level other than the physico chemical.

Alexander's rejoinder would doubtless be to admit that the pervasiveness of the categories is not deducible by logical deduction, but to remind us that it is not precluded by the absence of such demonstration. The facts of experience, he would contend, demonstrate the spatio temporal nature of mind, and that these facts are set forth in his doctrine of Mental Space-Time.

**Mental Space-Time**

"If S and T are the stuff of things of which all things are made, it is necessary to show that mind is both spatial and temporal....and that mental or 'enjoyed' space-time is part of the one Space-Time in which physical things also exist." (1)

In this discussion mind is regarded as "the substantial continuum of certain processes which have the conscious quality."(2)

The extension by analogy of mind to point-instants and lower levels of existence is considered irrelevant, since strictly speaking

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(1) Abstract p.9
(2) II.81
"Mind exists only on its own level of existence." (1)

We propose to confine our attention to the more difficult and crucial demonstration that mind is spatial. Notwithstanding Alexander's assurance that the temporal nature of mind is a "common place" and "would be admitted on all hands", I would contend that the difficulties attending the demonstration of the spatial nature of mind also apply to the proof of its temporal nature.

Since according to Alexander consciousness is the distinctive feature of mind (2), it must be shown that space is "carried up" into the emergent quality mind or consciousness; and consequently, that mental acts are spatial. Now mental acts cannot be contemplated (3), they are enjoyed, hence the data relevant for demonstrating that mind or consciousness is spatial can only be disclosed in enjoyment. This condition of proof seems to be recognised in the following passages:

"By mental Space, I mean, assuming it to exist, the space in which the mind experiences itself as living or which it enjoys." (4)

"By mental space and time I do not mean the space and time which belong to our images or thoughts: these, according to our assumption, are nothing but physical space and time, as they are represented in images or thoughts. I mean the space and time in which the mind occurs." (5)

(i) The Spatiality of Mind Shown in Enjoyment.

The proof that mind or consciousness is spatial begins by an appeal to introspection.

(1) II.41
(2) This assertion may doubtless be challenged. That it is maintained by Alexander seems assured from the definition of mind quoted above from II.31 Cf. also the oft recurring expression "mind or consciousness" and the Index heading Mentality = consciousness.
(3) I.12; II.156
(4) I.35
(5) Abstract p.9
"My mind is for me, that is for itself, spread out or voluminous in its enjoyments. Within this vague extension or volume the separate and salient mental acts or processes stand out as having position and 'direction'. My mind is streaked with these more pungent processes, as when a shoot of painful consciousness is felt or a sudden thought produces a new distribution in this extended mass. These streaks and shoots of consciousness have the vaguest position, but they have it, and such position and direction are most clearly marked in the higher acts of mind, imagination or desire or thinking, and especially when there is a change in what we call the direction of our thinking."(1).

Appeal to this type of argument occurs but in two other passages in the two chapters on Mental Space and Time. And though this, in my opinion, is the only kind of proof relevant for Alexander, it is not pursued with any thoroughness or conclusiveness. As I shall endeavour to show later, it is subordinated entirely to another mode of proof which appears to me to be a complete ignoratio elenchii.

None of the three passages, however, which appeal to introspection seem to establish that consciousness is extended or voluminous, or spatial. No doubt the enjoyment of having stitches put in one's scalp is differently toned from the enjoyment of a 'fuzzy' dull headache; but the spatial differences implied in the descriptive adjectives 'sharp' and 'dull' are extrinsic to the enjoyments and due to analogical transference. (2). The sharp piercing pain of the stitching is a transfer by analogy to the enjoyment, of the contemplated spatial properties of the surgical instrument and the area of skin mutilated. The pain of the headache is described as dull because the underlying physiological processes are spread out over a wider contemplated area of the head and do not allow of precise localisation.

(1) I. 97-8
(2) Prof. Stout allows that the 'reasoning self' is localised, but the localisation is dependent on referring it to a special part of the body (viz. the brain). He adds, however, "The so-called 'localisation' of the self in the body, and distinctively in different parts of the body, is, strictly speaking, not a localisation of the mind or its functions, but only of its experienced embodiment." Mind and Matter p.159
That our enjoyments are spatially described through analogical transference is also evident by considering such enjoyments as anger, disappointment, hope, anxiety in which analogical transference of the spatial agencies concerned to the description of the enjoyments, is less prone to occur. In such instances the qualitative differences of the enjoyments in spatial terms is either meaningless or frankly analogical. A plausible illustration in support of Alexander's theory of mental space-time is the contrast of 'direction' of the vague premonitory shoots of consciousness which anticipates the winding up of my watch at night and those connected with some other habit like turning off the electric light. (1). But the contrast of 'direction' indicated in the anticipatory consciousness of the two habits would seem to be dependent on imagery. The anticipation of each act is dependent on the (visual) image of finger commencing to turn the winding key or the pressing of the switch. The space factors involved belong to the objects of the mental act and are therefore contemplated not enjoyed.

For the same reason I challenge the passages from Tennyson, Keats and Wordsworth (2) as evidence of enjoyed space. The point of reference for comprehending "Somewhere, dead, far in the waste Soudan" is not, I would suggest, mental or enjoyed space, but my body.

I find two outstanding difficulties in Alexander's introspective type of proof for enjoyed space.

In the first place, he fails to establish the fact of spatial enjoyment. In every illustration, the position and direction attri-

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(1) I. 212. The illustration is used by the author in another context; but is closely connected with the present topic.
(2) I. 98-9
buted as intrinsic to the mental act, appears on analysis to be the contemplated space of the sense, images etc.

Secondly, the underlying principle of the whole discussion appears to be that the mind is as it enjoys, and hence, the enjoyment of space and time constitutes the mind spatio-temporal. This extraordinary assertion is not explicitly formulated, but there are many passages - in addition to the present topic - which presuppose it, e.g.

"The mind enjoys itself as substance through intuition of an external substance." (1)

"When the mind is aware of number, it also enjoys itself as number." (2).

"The mind enjoys itself categorially in contemplating the corresponding categorial feature of the object which it contemplates." (3)

Now this principle if consistently applied becomes a reductio ad absurdum. If the mind is as it enjoys, then the mind is itself, sweet, blue, infinite, and illusory in its enjoyment of sweet, blue, infinity and illusion.

"In becoming aware of external things as a totality of appearances, sensory, ideal, or of thought, and some real, some mere appearances, some illusory, we enjoy ourselves under the same denominations." (4)

This principle becomes self contradictory in the case of illusion. If enjoying illusion constitutes our mind illusory, illusion would be impossible, for "illusory appearances have their source in the mind itself" (5). We conclude, therefore, that introspection fails to establish the spatial nature of mind or consciousness.

(1) II.155 (Italics mine)
(2) I.319. Cf. II.151. Where the assertion is softened to "our enjoyment has number."
(3) II.144
(4) II.226
(5) II.211
Proof of the Spatial Nature of Mind From the Spatio-Temporal Properties of the Neural Processes.

We shall now examine the proof of the spatial nature of mind from the spatio-temporal properties of the neural processes. This argument appears to me to be inconclusive for two reasons. In the first place, the spatio-temporal properties of the neural processes are physical and contemplated. They are therefore irrelevant as evidence for proving the existence of mental or psychological space and time, which is enjoyed. In the second place, the implications of identifying neural and mental processes, on which the proof depends, commits us to epiphenomenalism and behaviourism which Alexander rejects.

The irrelevancy of the proof of the spatial nature of mind from the nature of the neural processes is most evident from the discussion on 'direction'. That consciousness exhibits differences of position and direction is a fundamental premise in proving the spatial and temporal nature of mind. The following passages elucidate the meaning of direction.

"The direction of a mental process is that of its specific anatomical or physiological path." (1)

"Direction of the mental process means the actual movement within the neural space which is enjoyed in the identical mental space." (2).

Now if by mental space is meant "the space in which the mind experiences itself as living or which it enjoys" how can the space and

(1) I.110
(2) II.128
direction of neural processes which are never contemplated by their owner be relevant to the discussion? (1) The neural processes are neither apprehended by themselves nor are they apprehended as constituent factors in the contemplation of objects. (2). As Alexander himself points out

"It is a commonplace that in seeing a tree I know nothing of the occipital movement, and when I think of the occipital movement I am not seeing the tree." (3)

It might however be contended that this interpretation is mistaken since it concentrates attention exclusively on the neural processes; and that a more accurate analysis would show the direction and position of the neural process to be a relational affair determined by its composure with the appropriate object.

"...the form or pattern of the process is determined by its relation to its object." (4)

Such would seem to be the presupposition of such statements as

"In being conscious of its own space and time, the mind is conscious of the space and time of external things and vice versa."(5)

"Thus not only does mind enjoy its own space through intuition of its own space, but the enjoyed and the contemplated spaces both belong to the same space." (6)

(1) Under certain conditions we may of course perceive other people's neural processes, or we may hear about them from observers. We can then contemplate our own neural processes by ideal construction. But this circuitous procedure is not the type of apprehension considered by Alexander.

(2) Even if the neural processes were contemplated, their space and time would be irrelevant for mental space-time, For "of course, if you will try to find a direction of mental process which you can contemplate, you find none and the problem is queered from the outset." Preface xv.

(5) I. 109
(4) II.117
(5) II.144
(6) II.155
A space which enjoys itself consciously or mentally as space (e.g. a neural tract AB) contemplates the space of the object (e.g. a line of colour ab), or rather has for its object an external, non-mental, contemplated space, contemplated that is in its form and position in total space." (1)

Now there are two objections to be urged against such statements. Firstly - It is not at all evident that contemplation by a neural tract of the space of a line of colour justifies us in saying that the neural tract thereby enjoys itself spatially, or still less that it thereby enjoys its own space. The enjoyment in such an experience would be the enjoyment of contemplating the space of the line of colour. (2) Secondly, I would reiterate an argument used in criticising the introspective type of proof, and point out that in being conscious of the space of external things the body or skin is the subject's coordinate of reference not the neural processes engaged in the transaction.

Let us now consider the second objection against Alexander's proof of the spatiality of mind from the spatio-temporal nature of the neural processes, viz. that it commits us to epiphenomenalism and behaviourism which are explicitly repudiated.

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(1) II.145
(2) Cf. II.153. "In contemplating the action of the wind blowing down a chimney, we enjoy first the act of contemplating the blowing wind, and the standing chimney......"(Italics mine). As this assertion is crucial to the criticism, it was gratifying to find it supported by Mr. Hallett in commenting on Alexander's use of enjoyment; "Thus the deliverance of immediate experience is that we enjoy the contemplation of the objects. It is only an outside observer (or the mind itself in thought II.9) who says that what we enjoy is the neural process." Aeternitas 261. Again "I understand Mr. Alexander to assert; when two things A and B are cognitively compresent one of them (say A) is of the order of complexity to which the quality of consciousness or mind belongs. A then has (or is) a neural system which is innervated in response to stimulus from B which is mediated by ordinary physical or organic processes. This innervation is enjoyed by A, but not as a neural innervation; it is enjoyed as the contemplation of B ibid 262 (Italics Hallett's)"
Holt's behaviouristic view of consciousness is rejected by Alexander, because it fails to account for self consciousness or self experience as exhibited in enjoyment. (1)

Epiphenomenalism -

"the theory that mind is but an inert accompaniment of neural process, a kind of aura which surrounds that process but plays no effective part of its own," (2) -

is rejected because there is no evidence that a neural process possessing the mental character would possess its specific neural character if it were not also mental.

Now as I have already argued (3), to denominate a "mental neural" process which ex hypothesi possesses a unique character in virtue of its being mental, merely neural, and a non-mental neural process which lacks that character in virtue of its being non-mental, also neural, is fallacious. If the neural process without consciousness be called neural, we are victims of a breach of the Method of Residues in calling the mental process also neural. The mental process exhibits peculiarities too strikingly different from other neural processes to be glibly identified in the class neural. If, however, this contention be not admitted, all neural processes must be conceived as fundamentally alike, and mentality or consciousness makes no difference. Consequently,

(1) II.111
(2) II.8
(3) Supra p. 137
"Consciousness would appear to be related to the mechanism of the body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without the power of modifying that working as the steam whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery." (1)

We must on this view eliminate from Alexander's doctrine the purposiveness and selectiveness attributed to mind, its unique role with respect to the tertiary qualities (2), and the appeals to consciousness as unique "with its own peculiar methods of behaviour" by which Alexander refutes epiphenomenalism and behaviourism.

A consistent theory of mind must choose between these alternative views. Alexander however seesaws perplexingly from one to the other. The theory of the spatio-temporal nature of mind with its proof from the spatio-temporal nature of the neural processes, and the doctrine of the spatio-temporal nature of the categories, require the epiphenomenalist view of mind. The selectiveness of mind, its autonomous nature, its role in illusion and the doctrine of tertiary qualities requires an idealistic view of mind. We conclude, therefore, that the attempt to prove the spatio-temporal nature of mind and its constitution by the categories is inconclusive both by the introspective line of argument and also by the argument from the nature of the neural processes.

(2) II. Ch. IX.
II. The Doctrine of Intuition.

We pass to the consideration of intuition which we assigned as a third doctrine integral to Alexander's theory of the spatio-temporal nature of the categories and mind. I shall endeavour to show that intuition can function only through the cooperation of categories, and that therefore the categories cannot be characteristics of spatio-temporal complexes revealed to intuition.

Alexander maintains that the spatial and temporal characteristics of objects are not apprehended by the senses but by intuition. The sense organs acquaint us with the secondary qualities of matter; intuition reveals its spatio-temporal properties. Since, however, our experience of external things is 'provoked' in us through sensation, we cannot intuite their spatio-temporal characteristics without sensing some of their secondary qualities.

Thus

"When I see a blue patch I see its blue quality, but I have intuition of its extent. I do not see a blue which possesses an extent, but I intuite an extent of space which I see blue. I do not apprehend an extended colour but a coloured extent". (1)

Consequently, "Every sensory act contains in itself and consequently conceals or masks a simpler act of intuition." (2)

(1) II.164
(2) II.148
This statement must not be so interpreted as to give rise to phantom difficulties with respect to the coordination of the acts of intuining and sensing.

"There are not two acts of mind, but only one act of mind which in its sensory character apprehends the colour and in its intuitive character apprehends the place of it. We are conscious of a place coloured or of colour in a place." (1).

Nonetheless in evolutionary development Alexander would seem to maintain that intuition is temporally prior to other modes of apprehension. (2)

"Intuition is different from reason, but reason and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empirical determinations of it." (3)

"Intuition pure and simple is more elementary than sensation." (4)

Conscious intuition, however, is inextricably dependent upon sensation.

"(Intuition) is not to be had as consciousness in the absence of sensation (or else of course ideation)" (5).

As a result of this connection with sensation intuition procures consciousness at a price, for

"whatever makes the sensory excitement in the brain indistinct ........affects the intuition of the sensum." (6)

As Murphy points out there appears to be a departure from this position in the treatment of illusion. Although illusion is relative to mind, there is no relativity so far as the appearances themselves are concerned (7). Illusion consists in misplacing appearances through

(1) II.148
(2) Vide infra p. 155 ff.
(3) II.147
(4) II.201
(5) II.147;149;201
(6) II.149;193;201
(7) II.203;215
wrong reference.

"So long as the object is contemplated in and for itself there is no question of illusion. When the mind goes on to refer these illusory objects, illusory in reference to the real thing, to the thing, then it is in a state of illusion, and we have an illusory appearance of the thing." (1) Mistakes arise then not in the appearance, but in 'squinting' at it, so that it appears to belong where it does not. (2)

"What then," asks Murphy, "becomes of the theory of intuition? On that view, the place of the object is given directly and is the one thing about which we are never mistaken as such. Now (in the treatment of illusion) it appears to be the only thing about which we can be mistaken. There (in treating of intuition) the reference only deceived us in so far as the sensory content was deceptive, here the sensory content only deceives us so far as the reference is mistaken." (3)

In passing, it may be noted that the doctrine of intuitional apprehension gives no support to the statements questioned in the preceding section on mental S-T such as "The mind enjoys its own space through intuition of its objects space."

These assertions are supposed to be

"a direct consequent of the continuity of S-T, in virtue of which any point-instant is connected sooner or later directly or indirectly with every other." (4)

This consideration is however irrelevant for the discussion of conscious enjoyment, for the enjoyment of continuity by point-instants is but a mythical analogy. So far as conscious apprehension is concerned the intuition of the neural tract is directed upon the spatio-temporal properties of the object presented in sensation.

"Though it possesses perfect 'knowledge' as spatio-temporal, of all parts of Space-Time, it is conscious only of the space and time of its object."

(1) II.213
(2) II.216
(3) Monist vol. xxxvii
(4) II.144
Consequently the enjoyment of this experience has nothing to do with the space-time of the conscious neural tract; it is the enjoyment of contemplating (intuitively) the spatio-temporal properties of the object.

In conformity with the view that the categories are fundamental characters of S-T, the doctrine of intuitional apprehension ipso facto applies to the categories. Since intuition is the peculiar mode of apprehension appropriate for awareness of S-T, and since the categories are essentially spatio-temporal, it necessarily follows that the categories are apprehended by intuition. (1) If, however, the spatio-temporal nature of the categories be denied, the theory of the intuitional apprehension of the categories must also be denied; but we are not thereby committed to a complete rejection of the doctrine of intuition. It can still be retained (with modifications) as the mode of apprehending space and time; and as a theory of spatial and temporal apprehension it has much to recommend it. In the first place it affords valuable suggestions for dealing with the vexed problem of correlating the spaces of vision and touch.

(1) Il.151. The necessity of forms of apprehension other than intuition would seem further evidence of the artificiality of analysis which reduces everything ultimately to S-T. For if everything is strictly speaking spatio-temporal, and if intuition be the form of apprehension appropriate to S-T, then no other kinds of apprehension should be necessary. But other forms of apprehension are necessary. Therefore there must be something in qualities etc. not reducible to spatio-temporal properties which is therefore not revealed to intuition.
"If we suppose that our colours are extended and our touches also, we are faced with the problem of correlating the spaces of vision and touch. ... Now if extent does not belong to colour as such, but colours are seen in their places within an extent, and the like is true of touch, it follows that when we apprehend the same object by sight and touch we are apprehending the same extent, and in the one case seeing its colours and in the other feeling its pressures, and these objects though they do not ultimately occupy, microscopically, the same places, do all fall within the same area or volume and macroscopically coincide. There are not two distinct spaces which have to be connected by custom, or otherwise, but one space which is the scene of different qualities." (1)

Secondly, the theory is free from subjectivist implications. Spaces and times are objective and revealed to apprehension, not forms of apprehension which, as it were, enshroud appearances. It thus precludes any form of representationism. No intermediary sensuous or otherwise is introduced between the mind and real space. (2).

Nevertheless the theory of intuition requires an important modification. Analysis of our apprehension of the spatial and temporal properties of objects, discloses that intuition requires the cooperation of certain relational forms or categories. As Prof. Kemp Smith points out

"Even intuition involves the apprehension of meanings, and as factors indispensable to the possibility of such meanings, categorial relations." (3)

He argues that

"there are at least two categories which are indispensable for any kind of intuition, whether of time or space - the categories of totality (whole and part) and necessitation (determining ground and conditioned consequent)" (4)

(1) II.164-5
(2) Cf. Kemp Smith. Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge p.114
(3) op. cit. p.132
(4) op.cit. p.134-7
(5) op.cit. p.138
His conclusion is that

"the primary function of such categories as the above is not to clarify (Alexander's expression in II.147) our intuitions, but to make them possible... Categorial thinking is a condition of and is not derived from intuition." (1)

For example, continuity, a fundamental of Space and Time, and presented - however crudely - in the experience of every finite space and time, (2), involves the transcending of the immediacy of intuition as such. According to Professor Kemp Smith the apprehension of continuity involves the employment of the categories of whole and part.

"For only as we employ the concept of whole and part can we apprehend specific times and specific spaces as being continuous, i.e. as always being wholes, relatively to their constituent parts, and yet at the same time as always being themselves parts of a time and space which transcend them. If there be no apprehension of the relation of whole and part, there can be no apprehension of continuity."

The apprehension of continuity also involves the employment of the category of necessitation.

"Any particular time or any particular space, however large or however small, is conditioned and made possible by the earlier time and by the wider space which leads into or contains it. That is to say, the kind of wholeness which is to be found in time and space is one that determines the elements constituent of it. Though the category may therefore be said to express a feature quite fundamental to both time and space, and actually constituent of them, none the less this feature, in order to be intuited, must be apprehended, not merely in the particularity of some one actual instance, but again as a universal meaning in which the categorial relation is involved." (3)

The term "concept" used by Professor Kemp Smith is liable to misunderstanding. He, himself, is careful to add "initially, the

(1) op.cit. 138
(2) op.cit. 134
(3) op.cit. 137
presupposed categorial concepts must, indeed, be employed without explicit formulation, much in the manner in which a child employs the category of causality when it assumes that the fire which has burnt it once will, if approached too closely, burn it again." (1)

In like manner, Professor Stout maintains that while we cannot attribute a full and articulate consciousness of categories to the undeveloped consciousness, nevertheless

"they belong even to rudimentary perceptual consciousness as a condition of its further development." (2).

It may be objected that such statements are vague, and are also guilty of the "psychologist's fallacy" by reading into rudimentary consciousness the products of deliberate reflective analysis. Professor Kemp Smith could, I think, rejoin that the objection is taken from the very standpoint it censures. In thus speaking of categories, the objector is himself thinking of their explicit formulation by reflective consciousness. Such formulations, however, are descriptions of the categories, indirectly obtained by the method of reflective analysis. The categories since they condition consciousness can not themselves be directly apprehended. (3)

Analysis discloses that dependence upon categorial functions is not confined to intuition. A like dependence is found to be necessary in all forms of meaningful apprehension. For example consider sensory apprehension. No doubt there is an element in sensory apprehension which is immediate, irreducible and apprehended by direct acquaintance; but the apprehension of a sensum would never seem to be restricted solely to the awareness of these immediate factors.

(1) op.cit. 136
(2) Stout, Manual of Psychology 4th ed. p.414
(3) op.cit. 176. Commentary xliii-iv
"In sensing a red we apprehend an entity by direct acquaintance. We stand over against it, and it reveals to us its actual nature. It cannot, of course, by itself, form a complete field of consciousness. Consciousness, if limited to it, would thereby be made to vanish." (1)

Even a sense datum, in being attended to, is apprehended as being invested with some meaning which transcends its immediacy.

"Try to take it at the level of apprehensio simplex, of immediate awareness without any admixture of judgment. Even so, there is a wide gulf which separates the sensory content as given, and that content as something of which one is aware and to which one attends. As given it is a bare that; when apprehended even most simply, it is a that which is apprehended as something. This "something", which the immediate datum is apprehended as being, spreads beyond the datum. The awareness of meaning is the awareness of that spread." (2).

To generalise, apprehension of the immediate is possible only by transcending the immediate, and the transcending of the immediate is an act of judgment involving categorial functions. (3)

We conclude, therefore, that analysis of experience shows Alexander's view - that the categories are characteristics of spatio-temporal configurations revealed to intuition, - to be untenable.

This conclusion receives corroboration from the neurological evidence adduced by Alexander in support of his distinction between intuition and sensing. Passages have already been quoted (4) which show that although Alexander admits that in conscious intuitional apprehension, intuition and sensation are characters of one mental act, not two distinct mental acts, he also insists that in evolutionary development intuition is a distinct mode of apprehension temporally

(1) op.cit. 156
(3) Cf. Commentary xlii
(4) supra p. 149
prior to sensing and reason. Now from Alexander’s epitomised version (1) of Dr. Head’s neurological studies, I can find no support for regarding intuition either as temporally prior to reason and sense or as capable of functioning by itself apart from these other modes of apprehension. On the contrary, the results of this neurological research favour the preceding logical analysis which argued that spatial and temporal apprehension is impossible apart from the categories.

Intuition is not shown to be prior to sense, for we are told that

"Pain, heat, and cold impulses cross in the spinal cord first, touch impulses later. Localisation and discrimination remain at first grouped with touch impulses....Finally in the last of these researches, the result is arrived at roundly that the optic thalamus is the special seat of sensation so far as its mere quality is concerned, while the special function of the cortex is the apprehension, not of the quality of sensations but of their differences of intensity, the likeness and difference, the weight, size, shape of things, or in general the spatial aspects of sensation." (2).

Now if spatial apprehension be thus intimately connected with the cortex, so that below the cortical level it is but vague and merged with sensory process, how can it be maintained that sense is an "outgrowth of intuition"? If we must speak of sense and intuition as separate and distinct processes, the evidence indicates that intuition is posterior to sensation, and is relatively late in phylogenetic development. This indeed is recognised by Alexander, but

(1) II. 178-182
(2) II. 179
without realising that it contradicts his assertion of the priority of intuition.

"The question may still be asked how, if Space and Time are the simplest and most fundamental characters of the world, the apprehension of them should be entrusted to the latest and most highly developed part of the nervous system... The answer is that spatial character, as I understand these inquiries does belong to sensory process below the cortical level, but it is vague and undifferentiated... And, secondly the vaguer, more extensive reactions are suitable to that stage of life, and the precise apprehension of Space and Time made possible by the cortex is appropriate to the higher type of mental life." (1)

Without introducing the highly speculative question as to what subcortical consciousness involves, it is certainly significant that where cortical development has been attained, intuitional apprehension is assigned to the cortex. It indicates that intuition at this level of development no longer functions merely in conjunction with sensory process, but requires the cooperation of mental functions which we call the categories.

Perhaps it will be said this discussion about intuition does not affect Alexander's theory of categories at all. The most, it will be alleged, that the discussion shows is that for the categories to be revealed, modes of apprehension other than intuition are required.

Alexander insists on calling the features revealed, categories; whereas his critic attributes the term to features implied in the mode of apprehension. Thus the argument is at cross purposes, since the term category is being used by the disputants in different senses.

(1) II. 182 (Italics mine)
What is to decide which of the two connotations of the term category is more appropriate?

In reply I would point out—

Firstly, that the whole of this discussion on Alexander is designed to show that his use of the term category is inappropriate; and I would especially refer to the demonstration of its resulting impasse in the case of Universality, Substance and Relation.

Secondly, I beg to challenge the notion of contextual relationships from the cosmic point of view, which is a presupposition of Alexander's non-mental theory of categories.

"Finites below the level of mind and before the emergence of minds in the order of empirical history stand in categorial relations to one another though there is no mind to know them." (1)

Take for example causality.

"Causation is the continuous connection in sequence of two events within a substance." (2)

Now cosmically, and apart from our mind, what will be termed a 'substance' and what pair of the connecting continuous threads which hold between events shall be privileged as 'causal'? The shock of an event vibrates throughout the whole universe as the splash of a stone in a stagnant pond sends the ripples to its nethermost reaches. Why should one pair of these varied connections be regarded as 'closer' than the others? Shall we say that two events are in all circumstances causally related if the event A immediately precedes B, and is a factor without which B would not occur? But why should the Universe allow A to be thus privileged, since it is but one such

(1) II.157
(2) II.153
event essential to B, and is itself dependent on many factors which are thus — as we say indirectly — also essential to B? Some such definition of 'closer connection' is appropriate enough from the anthropomorphic point of view. Because of the limited range of our apprehension and the immediate necessities of survival, we are constrained to make a selection from the endless connecting cosmic threads; and those that subserve our interest and practical needs are termed 'close' 'causal', etc. In such wise I would explain the contextual relationships which categories as such imply; and apart from such a perspective or centre of reference, I can attach no meaning to categorial relations. As I shall try to show in the concluding section there is nothing subjective or arbitrary about this procedure. Our selections must bow to the necessity of stubborn reality, and are made from features in the world that owe nothing to our mind; but their meaning, importance and relational intimacy are dependent on mental functions or categories which enable us both to live and to "live well."
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CONCLUSION

BASIC ISSUES OF THE CATEGORY PROBLEM

Though disclaiming any attempt to formulate an articulate category theory, obligations to the authors discussed can be most appropriately acknowledged by showing that a study of their systems has at least resulted in a grasp of the basic issues of the problem.

I. Connotation of Category

It is important to distinguish between an unrestricted use of the term category, denoting any concept or principle of organization, and the more precise meaning here adopted, which confines it to the fundamental forms involved in experience. Reserving the characteristics of a priority and the source of the categories for special discussion, the following observations may be pertinent for elucidating this restricted meaning of category.

(a) Since the categories are presupposed in all experience they themselves cannot be directly experienced. They must function in the early stages of mental development without being explicitly formulated. It is on this account I prefer to call the categories synthetic functions rather than 'pure concepts' or 'principles of organization'. These expressions suggest deliberate and explicit formulation of concepts which are then applied to a sensuous manifold. The result is a series of embarrassing problems as to the a priori status of the categories, their objectivity and range of application. On the
contrary, when the categories are recognised as indispensable conditions of any kind of cognitive apprehension, there is no need to postulate a privileged categorial level of experience or to resort to artificial meanings of the *a priori*.

Such a view is, doubtless, committed to the 'rationalist prejudice' that the categories are rooted in the 'rational nature of man'. It does not, however, imply that the mind is a static, ready made, miraculous entity beyond the bounds of psychological analysis and genetic explanation. Though the categories are the *sine quibus non* of any experience, they are formal and problematical. They are capable of an indefinite range of application, as developing experience introduces new content and fresh interests. If we eschew an obsolete faculty psychology, which would delegate the categories to an hypostatised reason, and recognise the organic connexion of the cognitive, conative and emotional aspects of the mind, we escape the 'rigidity' of both classical rationalism and empiricism. Hence mind and content are not crystallised entities standing frozen over against one another in unmediated opposition. Yet at the same time neither pole is completely characterless. The predispositions of mind no more preclude its growth and development and as little confine it within narrowly prescribed limits as congenital physiological structures do the body.

Hence though the categories are the same for savage and civilised, child and adult, their sweep, their content and the resulting experience will be very different with the variation of interests, past experience and social milieu in each case.
If the categories are essential constituents of any experience, they cannot be restricted to veridical experience. They cannot therefore be regarded as criteria of truth. This follows not only from their ubiquity which implies their cooperation in all experience whether true or false, but also from their flexibility and the close knit connexion with interest already indicated. As Professor Kemp Smith, insisting on the 'problematic' character of categories, says "the mere employment of the category, by itself, decides nothing" (1). While the true is categorially determined, it would seem that the validity of specific categorial determinations must be tested by criteria other than themselves. Professor Lewis' sensational statement

"It is the a priori element in knowledge which is thus pragmatic, not the empirical," (2)

is not so outrageous as it might seem at first glance. It would seem then that such criteria as consistency, coherence or successful working must supervene upon the functions of the categories in order to determine whether an experience is true. (3)

The categories, then, are fundamental analytical-synthetical functions which render possible meaningful apprehension. Being functions, which render consciousness possible, they cannot themselves be directly apprehended. They are brought to explicit consciousness and given conceptual expression by reflective analysis on the conditions necessary for experience.

(1) Smith, N.K. Prolegomena 150
(2) Lewis, C.I. Mind and the World Order. p. 266
(3) As to whether this involves subjectivism or not Cf.infra IV.
II. The a priori Nature of the Categories

The discussions of Chapters III and V and VI indicated the ambiguity of the term a priori. Three different meanings emerged:

(i) The a priori categories are the result of the mind's explicit reflection on the activities of the self. (Ward).

(ii) The a priori categories are those pervasive features which characterise all existents. (Alexander).

(iii) The a priori categories are the fundamental synthetic functions of the mind which are universal and necessary for the possibility of experience. (Kant)

Kant and Alexander maintain that the a priori nature of the categories is guaranteed by their pervasiveness, universality, and necessity, and thereby establish one set of categories with complete sovereignty. This procedure has been challenged by Professor Loewenberg. He holds that primacy itself is a category. It has the three characteristics of Kant's use of the term category being formal, protean and democratic.

"Present me with any content, and I can undertake to defend its hold on one of the protean aspects of primacy." (1)

As a result of his analysis of the various types of priority, he demonstrates the presence of competitive principles of organisation each of which claims complete autonomy and inclusiveness. And just because these competitive principles of organization are simply schematisations of primacy, no one of them can establish a claim to priority over its rivals.

(1) Univ. of Cal. Publ. in Phil. 13. p.42
It does not appear that this 'concentric predicament' prevails, if the categories are regarded not as abstract principles of organization but as the fundamental and indispensable modi operandi of mental activity. Could not these elementary functions legitimately claim sovereign priority in the sense that they are presuppositions of all experience and of subsequent conceptual schematization?

The categories then are a priori as being presuppositions of all experience.

III. Source of the Categories

The critical study of Alexander's category theory disclosed three fundamental difficulties in the view that categories are intrinsic features of the cosmic stuff and in no sense dependent on mind.

Firstly, the resulting theory of knowledge is confronted by a nominalistic impasse, since the categories lose all vestige of universality and are as particular as the stuff in which they are merged. (1).

Secondly, the spatio-temporal nature of the categories was shown to be at variance with the indisputably dynamic and selective functions of mind. (2)

Thirdly, the criticism of Alexander's doctrine of Intuition shows that the apprehension of relational features is not a presentati-

(1) Cf. supra p. 129
(2) Cf. supra pp. 146-7
tion to be taken in at a single gulp by some unique and privileged faculty. Apprehension of relational features implies the transcending of the immediate data by an act of judgment involving analytical-synthetical functions. Because of their a priority, pervasive-ness and indispensability for apprehension these synthetic processes are here denominated categories. (1)

We concluded, therefore, that the source of the categories cannot be in the "given" or in some cosmic stuff independent of mind.

IV. The Categories are Mental but not Subjective.

Conclusions resulting from a critical study of the present kind must depend on the validity of the analysis which has eliminated alternatives. Consequently, a positive and constructive argument to show that the source of categories is mind falls outside the scope of this work. Nevertheless, since this view has been criticised on the ground of inherent subjectivism, it seems advisable to outline — in a very general way — some considerations by which a systematic formulation would seek to dispose of the charge of subjectivism.

It must be reiterated that the view here adopted contends that the function of the categories is to render possible the apprehension of reality. It in no way countenances the notion that mind creates reality, or that reality in being known becomes transformed into a representational substitute.

(1) Cf. supra pp.152 ff.
The discussion may be divided into two parts:

(a) The Nature of Sense Data

(b) The Function of Categories

(a) The Nature of Sense Data

Sense data are the starting point for any theory of knowledge. They result from events in compresence with an organism. (1) They are not created by the organism nor subjective modifications of a Reality in se. There appears to be no evidence for Reality simpliciter. It discloses itself as a transaction of events; and sense data are simply the resultant of a complex transaction of events, one member of which is an organism. (2) Sense data are reality specifically conditioned. For example, 'red' is one set of events attuned to a periodicity or tempo appropriate to a transaction with another complex of events - the sensory organs. In general, sense are simply a set of characters belonging to a complex of events in relation to a human body.

It does not seem necessary to suppose that the esse of sense data depends on percipi. For example, the detection of one species of error reveals the presence of sense hitherto unnoticed, which it would

(1) I cannot here discuss the difficult problem of universalia in rebus - the status of 'essences' and 'eternal objects'. The results of our critical analysis at least commits us to maintaining that the apprehension of such would be only possible through the categories.

(2) The basis of the Gesetzmässigkeit which characterises events is a metaphysical problem which is irrelevant to the present discussion, since I grant that it cannot be due to individual minds.
be fantastic to maintain had not existed previously. (1). Whether
consciousness be an indispensable for the existence of sense data
or not, physics, astronomy and biology show that consciousness -
as a function of animal organisms - depends on a set of conditions
which is relatively unique in the planetary system, and afford conclusive
evidence against its indispensability for all forms of actuality and
existence. Whatever explanation be offered of its 'emergence',
consciousness justifies itself not through any essential conditioning
of reality, but by its indispensability to the survival of animal
organisms.

(b) The Function of the Categories.

The eminently practical role of consciousness is of the
utmost significance in elucidating its nature and functions.

The ultimate fact from which analysis of consciousness
must start is that of an organism reacting to sense. (2). The initial
reactions are instinctive and disclose modes of behaviour preadapted
to specific kinds of sense. Now, whether consciousness be considered
as an integral factor in instinct, or as arising owing to tension and
blockage in a chain reflex, it immediately discloses a selective and
normative attitude with respect to sense. It contemplates sense with
an ulterior motive - for what they imply rather than for what they

(1) Nevertheless as Dr. Broad remarks "Since we cannot get a
brain and nervous system like ours working properly without
a mind like ours, it is obviously impossible to be sure that
the latter is irrelevant for the present purpose and that the
former is sufficient by itself." The Mind and Its Place in
Nature. p.177

(2) I do not say a 'presentational continuum', because as I have
argued, its apprehension involves the categories. Again
however, I must plead to be excused a lengthy discussion
with reference to the spatial and temporal characters of
sense.
merely are. This transcendence of the merely immediate is - as I have repeatedly argued - only possible by means of analytical-synthetic sweeps of thought proceeding on what we descriptively term the concepts or categories of whole and part, necessitation, etc. Again this procedure - it has been insisted - is essentially problematical, and though the categories are a priori, the validity of their application to specific situations can only be determined by empirical considerations.

Without entering into further detail, this brief discussion discloses two reasons for repudiating the charge of subjectivism against the view of the categories here adopted.

(1) Since the categories are necessary to consciousness and apprehension which are indispensable to survival, they cannot conceivably be supposed to fulfil their function by capriciousness or an inherent distortion of the real.

(2) Though the categories transcend the immediacy of specific sense data or fields of sense data, they can never lose their footing in sense data. Their validity can only be established by an appeal to sense data.