ON SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

[THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY]

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE POSITIVE CHARACTER OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
Philosophy has been defined as a criticism of categories; and whenever an attempt is made to provide an intellectually consistent form for the spiritual content of Christianity, Philosophy, so understood, has a function of its own to perform. Since the days of Alexandrian thought, it has played its part in determining the form of Christian doctrine; and although at times Theologians have sought to make their study independent of philosophical presuppositions, yet that effort can never be completely successful. Religion may exist in its own right independently of Philosophy, but Theology, which is its statement in terms of the intellect or reason, cannot afford to use intellectual terms and categories without first inquiring what metaphysics has to teach regarding the range of their validity. That this is increasingly recognised in our own day is shown by the growing importance assigned to the "Philosophy of Religion", as the common ground on which the philosopher and the theologian may meet and compare results to the mutual advantage and enrichment of their respective spheres of thought.

Now, if this contact between Theology and Philosophy is of advantage to both studies, we may expect the same to hold as regards Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy. These subjects lie so close together, and are in contact at so many points, that it is almost surprising that they have so often been treated in comparative isolation. It is the object of this essay to attempt to indicate certain of these points of contact, and to show how each of
these historical divisions of Ethics is adapted to throw light on the problems of the other. On the one hand, since the ethical teaching of Christianity must be largely formulated in terms which have a long philosophical history behind them, it is important that that history and usage should be clearly understood; and here Moral Philosophy is of service as providing a criticism of ethical categories. But on the other hand the ethical facts which underlie the Christian faith and life may add both width and depth to the content of Moral Philosophy, and in the light of New Testament thought it may become apparent in what direction the solution of certain of the most persistent ethical problems is to be looked for. It is thus the aim of these pages to examine the borderland of philosophical and Christian Ethics, and by examining several of the chief concepts of Moral Philosophy - such as the idea of Virtue as Positive and Synthetic, the Value of the Individual and the Primacy of the Practical Reason, the Community of the Good, and the relation of the Inward and Outward, or the Statical and Dynamical, Aspects of Virtue - and tracing in outline their philosophical significance, to show how this is extended and enriched when they are applied to the teaching of the New Testament.

First of all we are met by a question as to the form in which the Christian idea of virtue may find the most adequate expression. The systematic treatment and classification of virtue has never been more thoroughly and impressively carried out than in Aristotle's Ethics, and thus his doctrine of the Mean has gained a great ascendancy and influence in ethical thought. But if there is one
thing which the recent discussions on Christian Ethics have tended to make increasingly clear, it is that its character is essentially positive; and thus the question arises whether the doctrine that Virtue consists in avoiding excess and defect and following the Mean - a doctrine which has, prima facie, a somewhat negative appearance - is adapted to express the Christian idea completely and exactly. Or, if the Doctrine of the Mean proves too narrow to express the varied wealth of Christian character, is there any other philosophical theory which will do it fuller justice?

Now, before attempting to answer this question, I may remark on a distinction between two different senses of the term "Virtue". The character of every man has as its natural basis a certain complex of qualities, some lovable and others unlovely. These qualities are part of the original endowment with which he faces the world; and they are commonly and popularly described as "virtues" and "vices". But this description is not according to strict philosophic usage; for these purely natural qualities are not the outcome of struggle or of indolence: they are given to each man rather than wrought out by him. They are rather the raw material of character than its component parts, and so are the subject rather of aesthetic than of strictly ethical appreciation. For "character" in the full sense implies effort, self-determination, conscious aim; and hence, if the ethical meaning of the term is to be safeguarded, "virtue" must be understood as the result of the organisation of these natural impulses and aptitudes by a ruling principle into a consistent whole. Thus we may follow Aristotle
in describing moral virtue as the actualisation of natural capacities for good, and in saying that we receive from Nature the disposition or capacity for virtue, but that virtue itself is gained by the habitual use of the powers implanted in us.*

This distinction between the natural capacity for different kinds of goodness and the developed good character, both of which are commonly designated by the word "virtue", is important for our present purpose because the positive or negative character of a philosophy of conduct depends largely on the view which is taken of the relation between these dispositions or potentialities (δυνάμεις), and Virtue in the conscious and final sense of the word. Two such views are possible; and both appear in Greek philosophy. One is the Doctrine of the Mean, by which Virtue is defined as conduct following a middle course between the opposite extremes of excess and defect into which human nature tends to fall away. It thus tends to emphasise the aspect of avoidance in the guiding of life, and in so far as it concentrates attention on the excess or deficiency which is opposed to virtue, it has a negative character.** But our concern is rather with the other doctrine which requires a fuller description, both because it is less

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* οὐτ' ἀκρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἄρεται, ἀλλὰ 

** For a fuller discussion and qualification of this statement see Note A, p.46.
distinction from formal logic, while the contradictory of any special virtue is undoubtedly a vice, its contrary is rather another virtue. Thus the problem of moral education may be stated in Hegelian terms as that of combining two partial, and at the outset apparently inconsistent, virtues in a higher synthesis or unity. We say of the ordinary man that he has the "defects of his qualities"; but in the character of the completely virtuous man this opposition of the "dissimilar and divergent virtues" has disappeared, and they are united as by "a divine bond."

The first hint of this doctrine in Plato occurs in the Second Book of the Republic, in the course of the discussion on the character and training of the Guardians. They must of course be brave and high-spirited, but the question arises whether they will not on account of these qualities be dangerous to their fellow-citizens as well as to enemies. "What then," asks Socrates, "shall we do? Where shall we find a character at once gentle and high-spirited? For I suppose a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one?" "Apparently it is." "Nevertheless a man who is devoid of either gentleness or spirit cannot possibly make a good guardian. And as they seem to be incompatible, the result is that a good guardian is an impossibility." The solution of the difficulty is found in the consideration, that if the guardians are trained in philosophy

* τούτων θειότερον εἶναι τῶν ἄνω μορφοτεχνικοί μέρων φύσεως ἀνομοίων καὶ ἐπὶ τάναντια φερομένων, Polit., 310A.

** Rep., 375C (Davies and Vaughan).
as well as in martial exercises, their courage will be tempered with gentleness. Through philosophy they will learn the right occasions for spirited and for gentle action, like well-trained watchdogs, who are fierce in encounter with enemies, but never towards their friends.

The same subject recurs in the following book, where "gymnastic" and "music," in the wide meaning which they bore in the Greek theory of education, are being discussed. Plato argues that an excess of the former discipline makes character harsh and rough, while a too exclusive devotion to music tends to softness and feebleness. But by a fitting use of both gymnastic and music, the two temperaments may be harmoniously developed; and, he concludes, "whosoever can blend gymnastic with music, and bring both to bear on the mind most judiciously, such a man shall we justly call perfect in music and master of true harmony."*

But the fullest development of this idea in Plato is found at the close of the Politicus, where the art of the Statesman is compared to that of the weaver who unites different strands in the same web. The Eleatic Stranger, who conducts the argument, propounds "a strange theory" that temperance and courage (σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνόρεσις) though both "parts of virtue," are in reality examples of "two principles which are full of hatred and antagonism to one another, and pervade a great part of nature." A discussion of the two groups of qualities follows - "Sharpness, quickness,

* Rep., 412A.
hardness" on the one side tending to violence, and "slowness and gentleness" on the other tending to cowardice; and the conclusion is reached:

"that these qualities, and in general the temperance of the one class of characters and the manliness of another are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and . . . that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are endowed with them."

To remedy this defect and harmonise this discord is the task of the statesman. In the first instance he must eliminate those natures which have no tendency to virtue, by exile or the heaviest punishments. Only when this has been done are there fitting materials for the weaving of the "royal Web." Thereafter,

"the rest of the citizens, of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of social science, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft after the manner of the woof - these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together." For "in this single word, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised, never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and opinions, and the giving and receiving of pledges to one another." And the dialogue concludes with these words: - "This then, according to our view, is the perfection of the web of political action. There is a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, when the kingly science has drawn the two sorts of lives into communion by unanimity and kindness; and having completed the noblest and best of all the webs which civic life admits, and enveloping therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, omitting no element in a city's happiness."*

* Politicus, 306-311 (tr. Jowett.) The metaphor of the web recurs in Laws 735A; and a similar idea with a different metaphor (that of the mingling of wine and water) Ib. 773.
This idea which we have traced in the Republic and Politicus, was not unfamiliar to Aristotle. In one passage of the Politics he speaks of the political capacity of the Hellenic race as due to the fact that they combined the intellect of the Asiatic peoples with the courage of the Northern nations; and he adds the remark that "a people which is to be easily guided by the lawgiver in the path of virtue should be at once naturally intelligent and spirited".* Perhaps we have here a reminiscence of the famous description and eulogy of the Athenian character which Thucydides ascribes to Pericles in the funeral oration; for the idea of political and military success as depending on the fortunate combination of the powers of reflection and action is the same in both. In another passage Aristotle quaintly remarks in criticism of the brutalising influence of the Spartan training, that courage does not commonly accompany the most savage natures, but rather such as are "gentle and lion-like."**

It is true that in these two references to the conception of virtue as consisting in the union of courage with intellect or gentleness, Aristotle has in view the natural temperament which is best fitted to respond to wise legislation and government; whereas Plato, with perhaps deeper insight, looks on the attainment of such a harmony of opposite virtues as the highest aim of the political art. In the one case it appears as a presupposition of outstanding

* Bk.VII, c. 7, 1327b36, (Welldon's trans., p. 181)
** Politics Bk.VIII, c. 4, 1338b18 (τοις ἀνεμπτέροις καὶ ἐοντώδεσιν ἡθοῖς)
political excellence, in the other as its rarest flower and result. But the chief point to remark is not this distinction, but the fact that the conception of virtue as a synthesis or harmony of opposite qualities, has a distinct place in the ethical thought of Greece. And indeed we may trace it beyond the theories of Plato to the character of his master, with whose personality and teaching Moral Philosophy began. So rich and varied a personality as that of Socrates cannot be explained on the theory that virtue is summed up in the observance of a just mean between opposite defects. It was the combination in him of the most opposite gifts and faculties which charmed and baffled his contemporaries, as the study of his character fascinates men still. He was at once brave and temperate, serious and playful, more critical and argumentative than the Sophists and yet a loyal servant of Apollo and of the "divine voice" within. He was both rationalist and preacher, and the two most extreme schools of ethical thought both claimed him as their founder; for he showed in himself virtues which in ordinary men only exist fragmentarily and in isolation.

This view of excellence ( ἀρετή ) as consisting in a balance or harmony of apparently opposite characteristics, which is suggested by the character of Socrates not less than by the passages quoted from Plato, and which underlies Thucydides' appreciation of the Athenian character and polity, has been emphasised in a wider connection by one of the most sympathetic writers on Greek subjects of our day. Professor Butcher has called attention to
"that balance of contrasted qualities, that reconciliation of opposites, which meets us at every turn in the distinguished personalities of the Hellenic race, and which is too often thought of, in a merely negative way, as the avoidance of excess, rather than as the highest outcome of an intense and many-sided vitality."

Thus, we find a double strain in Greek ethical thought. Alongside of the Doctrine of the Mean, with its emphasis on the avoidance of excess, there runs a tendency to look on Virtue as consisting in a process of moral synthesis, in which the stress is laid on the addition of one virtuous characteristic to another, on the interweaving of contrasted strands into the varied yet harmonious pattern of a perfectly developed manhood. We have thus found an alternative theory of virtue, which may serve to express that type of character and those moral facts which form the data of Christian Ethics. Thus some examples must first be given of the way in which this formulation of the relation of "the virtues" to the complete moral character provides a key to the ethical interpretation of the New Testament. This can only be done in outline here; but even a rapid survey of the possible applications of the doctrine of Virtue as a moral synthesis to the material of Christian Ethics, enable us at the close of the chapter to point out certain broad contrasts between the Christian view of goodness and that which is implied in the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean.

(1) 

Courage and Gentleness.

The view of Virtue which I have sought to indicate as present in Greek thought is finely expressed in a passage in Pascal's Pensées, which we may take as our starting-point in passing from Greek to Christian thought.

"Je n'admire point," he says, "l'excès d'une vertu, comme de la valeur, si je ne vois en même temps l'excès de la vertu opposée, comme en Epaminondas, qui avait l'extrême valeur et l'extrême bénignité, car autrement ce n'est pas monter, c'est tomber. On ne montre pas sa grandeur pour être à une extrémité, mais bien en touchant les deux à la fois, et remplissant tout l'entre deux."*

It is interesting to note that here Pascal fastens on the same union of courage with gentleness or kindliness which had appealed to Plato as the mark of the highest virtue whether in the individual or the state, and which was also the ideal of the noblest Mediaeval chivalry. The example which he cites is classical, but the narrative of the New Testament also illustrates this combination of opposite virtues, though in its pages they appear in an altered form. It is important to emphasise the fact that early Christianity was a school of bravery and endurance, as well as of those more feminine virtues - gentleness, forbearance, kindness, brotherly love - which we more readily associate with the teaching of Jesus. It is true that this was the side on which His influence was most distinctive and original, for in the Ancient World the lesson of courage had been thoroughly learned and the sterner virtues did not stand in need of reinforcement. Thus the familiar statement regarding the effect of Christianity

* XXV, ix. Cf. XVI, xiii.
in causing a "transvaluation of values" is accurate, if it be understood in the sense that a new rank and standing were now given to qualities which had been but grudgingly admitted to the accepted catalogue of virtues; but it is misleading if it is taken in the Nietzschean sense, that Christianity introduced a "slave-morality" which left no place for manliness or the more heroic elements in human nature.

The real effect of Christian morality was not to dethrone the virtue of courage or to disparage heroism, so much as point to a new ideal of courage, and to sever it from that association with arrogance and brutality which Aristotle condemned in the case of Sparta,* and which was hardly less characteristic of Rome.

It is true that there was a "transvaluation of values" - a decisive shifting of relative emphasis. As the preface to the teaching of Jesus, the author of the First Gospel has placed the Beatitudes, in which a new appreciation appears of those gentler virtues which by Greek or Roman standards were admitted grudgingly, if admitted at all, to the rank of virtues. In the "royal web" of Plato, the warp or groundwork is courage, the woof gentleness and temperance: in the teaching of Christ it is rather love or gentleness that forms the groundwork, and yet the necessity for courage is not only recognised but emphasised throughout. Even in the Beatitudes, this is the case; for in that which refers to the

* Vide supra, p. 276. An American scholar has said that "the difference between the Greek and the Christian courage is not so much in the attitude of mind as in the enemies one must withstand." Mathews. The Messianic Hope in the New Testament. p. 278.
peacemaker a duty is commended which requires often or always a
higher type of courage than that displayed by the combatants whom
he seeks to separate; and the list closes with those who are per-
secuted and suffer calumny and reproach for righteousness' sake.*
And this is but the first hint of one of the dominant characteristics
of the New Testament - the emphasis placed throughout on the pa-
tient endurance of suffering for the sake of the faith.

This was not indeed a new or unknown virtue. From the days of
Socrates onwards in the Greek and Roman world, it had been proclaimed
that truth was more important than life, and thus the passive and
enduring type of courage had been assigned a place beside the ac-
tively daring type, - that of the Sage beside that of the Soldier.**
This was the chief element in the fortitude which the Stoics con-
stantly enjoined and which they often so nobly practised. The
history of the Old Testament, also, especially in its later stages,
was a long education in the constancy which endures and waits.
This virtue found its most conspicuous example in the life-long
struggle of Jeremiah, and its highest ideal expression in the
figure of the Suffering Servant; and in both cases, the actual and

* Matt. V, 9-11. I quote throughout from the Revised Version,
except where otherwise stated.

** Cf. the identification of the two in Plato, Apol. 28f., and
the contrast in the Gorgias between the boastful, overbearing type
of courage represented by Callicles, with his contempt for those
slavish natures who "praise temperance and justice out of cowardice"
and the strong, quiet fortitude of Socrates, who holds that suffer-
ing and death are no real evils in comparison with the evil of doing
injustice (Cf. 483-484 A, with 511-2, 522 D.)

492,
the ideal, its ethical character had been emphasised because the suffering of the single innocent man was so clearly recognised as a burden laid upon him for the good of his fellows. It was through the unflinching loyalty of one that help was to come to many.

But while this patient courage inspired by the love of truth or of mankind had been recognised as noble and heroic, before the time of Jesus, it gained a new place in the New Testament and pervades its whole thought. And at the same time it recovered something of the spontaneity, and even gladness, which are leading characteristics of the martial spirit, but which hardly characterised even the highest fortitude of the prophet or the sage. There had been many who faced suffering and death calmly for the sake of the best they knew; but it was a new thing when men were summoned to do so gladly, to "rejoice in persecutions", and when they found strength to obey the summons.* Throughout the New Testament, there are few subjects of more frequent exhortation than this; indeed it may be said that the duty of constancy and cheerfulness under trial occupied a place in the thought of the early church only second to that of love and goodwill.**

It is perhaps well to lay special emphasis on the former group of virtues, because no proof is needed of the place held by the latter in early Christianity. But the harmony and balance of both

* Matt. v.12; Rom. v.3; 2 Cor. xii.10.

** It will be sufficient to cite the following passages, Matt. xxiv. 6 ff. and parallels; John xiv. 27, xv.21; 1 Cor. xvi.13; Eph. vi. 10 ff.; 2 Tim. 1.8, 11.1,3; Heb.x.23; James 1.12; 1 Pet. iii.14; Rev. ii.10.
is most perfectly exemplified in the life of Jesus. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews rightly considered that no appeal against faint-heartedness could be so effective as the appeal to "consider him that hath endured such gainsaying of sinners."* In a life wholly given to the service of others, but passed amid constant misunderstanding on the part of friends and ever-deepening hatred on the part of those who should have been the first to accept His message, it is possible for every age to recognise that highest type of courage, which pursues the appointed path, even when unsupported by any human sympathy.**

It should also be remembered that such perseverance in the face of misunderstanding and calumny must have been harder for Jesus than for those men of sterner nature whose courage is untempered by sympathy. And in truth, just because the perfect balance of contrasted virtues is a noble thing, it is also difficult of attainment. Throughout all the instances which we have to consider it will be found that the very bent and trend of nature which make a certain virtue easy render its contrary and complement more than ordinarily difficult. To the man of ardent and generous impulse prudence and forethought are difficult, just as charity in

* Heb.xii.3.

** A recent writer in the Hibbert Journal (Oct., 1908, p.20), reported a conversation on the subject of the Christian religion with one of the leading Chinese statesmen of the reforming school, who said that the leading impression made on his mind by a study of the gospels was that of the courage of Jesus. This testimony is interesting as coming from an eminent man who approached the New Testament narrative with an entirely fresh and unbiassed mind.
judgment is to one with a strong natural sense of justice. And so it is with sympathy and courage.

But it is just this union which is so strikingly exemplified in the Gospel story. In the moments of severest personal danger or conflict, Jesus is never represented as self-absorbed, but always as ready to sympathise both with the joys and the sorrows of those about Him. On His last journey to Jerusalem, he has leisure and detachment to receive the children gladly; and in the account of His last days in the Third and Fourth Gospels more than one saying is recorded which show that courage which can forget personal danger in the concern and thought for others - "I told you that I am he; if therefore ye seek me, let these go their way." "Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and for your children."**

After the death of Jesus, it is recorded in the Book of Acts that the "unlearned and ignorant men," to whom He left the carrying on of His work, compelled the wonder of the rulers and proved their connection with Him by their boldness.† This tradition of courage long continued in the Church; and passages which at once come into the memory in this connection are the varied list of sufferings endured for the sake of the Gospel given by St. Paul, and the stirring roll-call of the heroes of Israel by whose memory

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* Mark x.13.


† Acts iv.13; Cf. vv.20,21.
the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews exhorts to constancy and patience.* At the close of the New Testament canon, the Book of Revelation, like other apocalyptic writings, is one long appeal call to the same virtues - an appeal which was nobly answered by the Early Church.

There remains the question of the bond or organic connection between the two virtues; and this is answered by the consideration that both are altruistic in character. The Christian principle of love towards and responsibility for the welfare of other men shows itself, not only in avoiding harshness and unkindness, but also in resisting the fear of pain which may lead to the betrayal of their interests. No man can do any great service to the world without cost to himself: if he would save others, he cannot save himself,** and so the principle of both courage and gentleness is seen to be the will to serve. In the Republic Plato taught that both virtues were necessary for the true guardian, for only by showing both in turn could he give complete protection and do full service to those who depended on him for help and safety. And so it is also in Christian thought. Or we may set the question in a rather different light by saying that in the New Testament both virtues are founded on the same high estimate of the Value of human life and destiny.† Because man is of so great value,

* 2 Cor. xi. 23 ff. Heb. xi. 32 ff.

** Matt. xxvii, 42.

† Cf. the two following chapters.
it is worthwhile to contend bravely in his defence; but it is also a duty to show kindness to the least and weakest member of the race. Christ's exhortation to courage in confession is strengthened by the assertion that the destiny of His followers is of high moment; just as the duty of considerateness is enforced by the teaching that even the small and weak are of value to God.\footnote{Cf. Matt. x. 26-31 with xviii. 6-10.}

(2) Earnestness and Equanimity.

Still following out the same contrast between the active and the passive elements in human nature, we may now look on the harmony of opposites which is reached by the developed Christian character from a somewhat different point of view, but one which is of great importance for Christian Ethics. Much might be said regarding the effect of Christianity in fusing different emotions and in combining in itself at once the darkest and the brightest judgments on the world and the history of man. It is significant that it has been described at different times as the Religion of Joy and the Religion of Sorrow; and Jesus Himself admitted that there was room in the Kingdom of God for men who displayed both types of character. When the Jews of His day contrasted His own joyful and natural attitude to life with the severity of John the Baptist, and found fault with both, He attacked their narrowness of view and proclaimed that both elements had a necessary place in the life and experience of His kingdom. For, as He said, "wisdom is
justified of all her children. "*

But it will be best to consider two qualities which are more clearly of the nature of duties than Joy and Sorrow. In facing the problems of the world the Christian is encouraged both by example and admonition in the New Testament to maintain a double attitude, and is directed to a double type of virtue. On the one hand there is impressed upon him the duty of strenuousness in service, on the other that of confidence and quiet trust. Or we may take the contrast as Paul states it between offensive and defensive armour, "the sword of the spirit" and "the shield of faith." **

In either case the antithesis is that expressed by the heading of this section - Earnestness and Equanimity.

Under the former head may be placed the exhortations to courage and endurance already referred to; and also such a parable as that of the Talents, † in which the coming of the Kingdom of God is represented as relatively distant, and the leading thought is that of the strenuous use of every faculty in the interest of His cause until it draws nigh. To the same effect are the numerous sayings which bear on the cost of service, such as the warning against looking back when once the hand has been set to the plough. ‡‡

Nor is it needful to multiply instances from the epistles to show

* Luke vii. 35. νομοθ., standing at the end of the sentence, is emphatic.

** Eph. vi. 16, 17. There is a similar reference to offensive and defensive weapons in 2 Cor. vi. 7, "by the armour of righteousness on the right hand and on the left."

† Matt. xxv. 14 ff.

how strenuous a thing the Christian life was to those who first practised it: Paul's statements, are typical of their attitude - "I therefore so run, as not uncertainly; so fight I, as not beating the air;" "Seeing we have this ministry, we faint not;" "One thing I do . . . I press on toward the goal."* To the same end are directed the exhortations of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that want of earnestness be not allowed to result in "drifting away", and that Christians maintain an unwavering confession and "provoke one another to love and good works."** The spirit of the New Testament is a spirit of energetic, fervent, unwearied activity; the hours of daylight are precious because the night is at hand.†

But quite as notable as the energy of the Christian ideal is its spirit of calm and repose. From the story of Moses' command to the Israelites "Fear not, stand still, and see the salvation of the Lord" †† - on through the course of Old Testament history, the duty emphasised is often less that of active endeavour than that of trustful and patient waiting for the Lord to work out His own ends. The keynote of the teaching and the policy of the first Isaiah, especially in face of the threatened Assyrian invasion may be found in the words, "in returning and rest shall ye be saved; in quietness and confidence shall be your strength" †††; just as

* 1 Cor. ix. 26; 2 Cor. iv. 1; Phil. iii. 13.
** Heb. ii. 1; x. 23,24.
†John ix. 4 (R.V., "We must work the works" etc.); Rom.xii.11; Gal. vi. 9,10.
††Ex. xiv.13.
†††Is. xxx.15.
the keynote of the apocalyptic literature which arose when the earthly kingdom had utterly passed away from Israel lies in the blessing upon him that waiteth.*

This emphasis on the thought of salvation as a thing to be waited for, quite as much as worked for, was one of the points in which the New Testament was in contact with reflections in the New Testament of Jewish, and especially Pharisaic, apocalyptic thought. But the duty of confidence and hope in the religious life was placed by Jesus on a much wider foundation than the merely apocalyptic. He rather goes back to the trust in the divine protection and rule which the greatest of the psalmists and prophets had held, before any definite scheme of the establishment of the Messianic Kingdom had been formulated. In instructing the disciples, He applies the same principle to the material needs and cares of ordinary life in the present as to the great persecutions and trials of the future. In neither case is anxiety encouraged, or indeed allowed.** This, then, is the complementary duty to that of earnest endeavour - the complementary feeling to that of personal responsibility for the progress of the Kingdom. The two attitudes differ widely: they belong naturally to very divergent types of character; and yet they must in some way be combined by every one who would obey the precept, "Strive," or agonise, "to enter in by the narrow door," and at the same time live in the

* Dan. xii.12.

** Cf. Matt.vi.25-34 with x.19, 26ff. and parallels.
spirit of the saying, "Fear not, little flock; for it is your
Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom."*

In the teaching of Paul also there is the same conjunction of
exhortations to diligence and to confidence; and he repeats the
admonition, "In nothing be anxious."** It is by the example of
Paul that Newman illustrates, in his sermon on Equanimity, the
combination of qualities which we are considering as characteris-
tic of Christian Ethics.

"When we are told both to fear and to rejoice, we gain
thus much at first sight, that our joy is not to be irreverent,
nor our fear to be desponding; that though both feelings are to
remain, neither is to be what it would be by itself. This
is what we gain at once by such contrasts. I do not say
that this makes it at all easier to combine the separate
duties to which they relate; that is a further and higher
work; but thus much we gain at once, a better knowledge of
those separate duties themselves. . . . How joy and fear
can be reconciled, words cannot show. Act and deed alone
can show how. Let a man try both to fear and rejoice, as
Christ and His apostles tell him, and in time he will learn
how; but when he has learned, he will be as little able to
explain how it is he does both as he was before. . . . He
becomes the paradox which Scripture enjoins."†

There is an interesting parallel to the teaching of the New
Testament in this respect in the Discourses of Epictetus. He
says that "it seems to many to be a paradox" of the philosophers
that confidence (or courage) and caution should both be displayed
by the good man; but he meets this objection by seeking to show

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* Luke xiii.24; xii.32. This contrast will be more fully
dealt with when we come to discuss the different aspects of the
Kingdom of God. (Infra, ch.vi)

** Phil. iv.6.

† Parochial and Plain Sermons, vol.v, pp.66-7 (The italics are
mine.)
that both virtues are necessary, and that they are not inconsistent. He does so by means of the distinction which played so great a part in Stoic thought, - the distinction between the things that are and that are not in the power of the human will. "Where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should employ caution," or care. The discourse concludes as follows:-

"Do you labour at thinking about death, chains, the rack, exile; and do all things with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous: courageous towards the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in the things which are within the power of the will."*

Have we then in this Stoic distinction the key to the New Testament paradox? Does this double duty rest on an absolute division between inward and outward? We may at once admit that the doctrine of Epictetus has here a close affinity to that of Jesus. In both the classes of sayings referred to above He recalls men's thoughts from anxieties regarding the course of events which lie beyond their control, and urges them to concentrate on the things which are actually in their power. "Seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you."**

* Disc., Bk.II. ch.1, (Long's trans.) The Fifth Discourse in the same book, "How Magnanimity is consistent with Care," is to the same effect.

** Matt. vi.33 (A.V.)
A clear line of division seems here to be drawn between those opportunities of definite and personal service which come as an immediate call to the will, and the external chances of life which, in the view of Jesus, should prove the occasion not of foreboding, but of equanimity and trust.

But it has often been said that the Stoic division of all things into those absolutely within, and absolutely beyond, the power of the will is itself an abstraction, useful for purposes of moral appeal, but impossible to apply universally as a strict philosophical principle. There is no such absolute dichotomy in fact between man's will and his surroundings. Thus the Stoic solution of the paradox has a false simplicity from the standpoint of Christian ethics. In particular we cannot believe that Jesus would have confined the divine action, with the correlative duty of trust, to the outward sphere, or denied that the inner life of man was also the scene of God's work. In the Fourth Gospel the contrary view is very clearly set forth;* and it often appears in the epistles.

The truth seems rather to be that we cannot hope to find a complete philosophical reconciliation of the two duties; for that of earnestness depends on the view that man is free, and responsible not only for his own conduct but for the progress of the world, while that of equanimity has for its foundation the belief in the divine government of the world which brings about its own

* E.g., John iii, 8; xv, 4 ff.
high ends, and leads men on whether they follow willingly or rebel.* So, until we resolve the ultimate antinomy of philosophy, and delimit the bounds of divine and human action, we cannot hope to give a full account of the relation between these two duties. For the practical paradox corresponds to the speculative antinomy. In a bold passage Paul links together the two thoughts as if they were inseparable in his mind:— "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure."** Here the two duties are evidently looked on as involving one another, and not as contrary.

The point of view in this passage of Paul's is not easy to rise to; but even those in whose minds the two points of view alternate rather than coalesce, may see the defect of either taken alone. One sign of the greatness of Christian Ethics is that it has not rejected either aspect of truth in the interests of philosophical consistency or simplification. That the quietist attitude of trust in isolation is dangerous needs no proof.

"Quietness", says Newman in the sermon already quoted, "is a grace, not in itself, only when it is grafted on the stem of faith, zeal, self-abasement, and diligence." † Men need the belief that their strivings count for something to spur them to the greatest effort.

* Cf. the familiar lines in Cleanthes' hymn. Stoicism did, after all, like Christianity admit both sides - divine government as well as human responsibility.

** Phil. ii.12-13.

And we, far more than for the early Christians, are forced to believe that moral and spiritual progress depends on human effort, for no otherwise can we explain the failure of historical Christianity to accomplish its early ideals and its promise of a regenerated world.

But the other side, though perhaps less obvious, is no less important. If men are to work with the fullest energy and success, it is not enough that they should feel their own responsibility for the outcome of the work. The sense of responsibility alone may oppress and retard; and a constant anxiety for the wider issues of the conflict is sure to do so. The force and decision lent by Calvinism to the Puritan character have been remarked on as an anomaly; but it was just the sense of an all-powerful purpose directing the forces of the world which gave the Puritans such vigour in doing their several portions of the great work; just as the absence of such a belief divides the attention of many of the best men of our day and lessens the energy which they have to give to their immediate tasks. It is where the two points of view, held together, lead to the union of strenuousness and calm that the highest and most effective effort becomes possible. Thus the Christian life has been aptly defined as "a trustful activity."

Thus also in the lines entitled "Heroes", Browning truly expresses the access of fresh power to fulfil the nearest duty which comes

to those who believe that the guiding of the whole battle for the
good is in stronger hands:-

"How of the field's fortune? - That concerned our leader.
Lea, we struck our stroke, nor cared for doings left or right;
Each as on his own head, failer or succeeder,
Lay the blame or lit the praise. - No care for cowards: Fight!"

(3) But the Christian character necessarily shows its espe-
cial stamp not only in action but also in the standard which it
applies to the deeds of others.

Here we again meet with a union of apparently opposite charac-
teristics in the teaching and attitude of Jesus - a combination of
Mercy, gentleness, readiness to forgive, with Severity and moral
stringency. As in our first example, the former element is so
familiar and so universally recognised that it scarcely needs illus-
tration. But it is important to give due emphasis to the other,
sterner side; for mercy gains an entirely new character when it
is associated with a burning anger against selfishness and sin.*

* "It was Mercy, which is not Pity - a thing comparatively weak
and vulgar - but Pity and Resentment blended at the highest power of
each, the most powerful restorative agent known in the medicine of
the soul; it was Mercy that revealed itself in Christ's words, the
Pity slightly veiled under royal grace, the Resentment altogether
unexpressed and yet not concealed because already too surely divined
and anticipated by the roused conscience of the criminal." Ecce Homo,
ch.xx, "The Law of Mercy." Cf. the following chapters on the "Law
of Resentment" and the "Law of Forgiveness.

"For suffering, Jesus had a true compassion, but He knew that
it could be borne; what was intolerable, because it was daily rob-
ing men of life, was this habit of evil, and against that He daily
measured Himself. . . It was for that reason that men besought Him
to depart out of their coasts. . . There was in Jesus this element of
the inexorable. He forgave sin, but no one ever supposed that He
thought slightly of it, or that, even for a moment, He became less
absolute in His demands." W.M. Macgregor, Jesus Christ, the Son of
God, pp.139 f.
This aspect of severity comes out in many of the sayings of Jesus, such as that regarding the sin against the Holy Spirit.* Nor did He disguise the fact that His mission would not wholly of at once tend to peace. "Thing not that I came to send peace on the earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword!"** In His own teaching He was unwilling to purchase peace by silence regarding abuses; and He attacked the self-righteousness, the pedantry, the exclusiveness and narrowness of sympathy of the religious class among the Jews in language of almost unmeasured indignation and scorn; so that history has almost forgotten the virtues of the Pharisees, and their name is now used only to denote those faults which Jesus saw and scourged in them. But His summons to repentance was not addressed to the Pharisees alone. John the Baptist had reproved the sins of all classes, and summoned all alike to repentance, and it is recorded that the ministry of Jesus began with a similar summons.† As His ministry went on, it became clear that there were certain sins which more especially roused Him to anger. Such were vindictiveness and the absence of mercy. The saying, "If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses," occurs both as a comment on the petition for forgiveness in the Lord's prayer and as the moral of the Parable of the Unforgiving Servant.‡‡ Closely related to this is the condemnation of those who place hindrances in the way of the weak, and

* Matt.xii.32.
** Matt.x.34.
‡‡ Matt.vi.15, xviii.35. Cf.2 Sam.xii.6, "Because he had no pity."
thus show want of consideration for the good of others. "Woe to
that man by whom the offence cometh!", "Woe unto you, scribes and
Pharisees, . . for ye enter not in yourselves, neither suffer ye
them that are entering in to enter."* No judgment could in Christ's
view be too severe for those who so acted.

But if His sternest condemnation fell on those who sinned
against others, He also applied a severe standard to those who hesi-
tated to perform the act of renunciation which was necessary to their
own spiritual life. Thus beside mercilessness, and the causing
of offence to the weak, we must place hesitation as a quality which
called forth the "element of the inexorable" in the character of
Jesus. It appears in the stringent tests which He applied to those
who professed willingness to follow Him, but pled for delay.** It
appears also in the warnings that the time in which repentance was
possible had strict limits, and that beyond these lay the danger of
utter loss.†

In other passages we find the two characteristics of gentleness
and severity shown at the same time; and this suggests that
they were never far apart in the thought and actions of Jesus. The
great attack on the sins of the scribes and Pharisees, the rulers
of the Jewish nation, which introduces the especially eschatological
section of the Gospel of Matthew, closes with the lament over Jerusalem.‡

* Matt.xviii.7 (A.V.); xxiii.13.
** Luke ix.57 ff.
† Luke xiii.9; Matt.xxv.1-12.
‡‡ Matt.xxiii.37.
This passage of unmatched tenderness and pathos, following the bitter invective of the rest of the chapter, shows that even in His anger Jesus was moved by a deep love for the Sacred City, and that His grief over her apostasy was due to His sense of the greatness at once of the part that she had played in His country's history, and of the destiny that she was failing to fulfil.

Again, in Mark's account of the question addressed to Jesus by the rich young Ruler, it is said that "Jesus, looking upon him, loved him." This phrase (Ὑποτεύχων αὐτῷ) shows that the searching demand which Jesus proceeded to make of him - a demand to which his faith proved unable to respond - was prompted not by mere severity, but by a love which saw and welcomed the latent powers of his nature, but saw also that only by a great decision and renunciation could these powers be brought into full exercise. Jesus required a strong proof of devotion from a character which he recognised as strong and noble - hence the apparent severity of His demand. Nor was this an isolated case; for throughout His life we feel that it was His high estimate of the capacities and the worth of Man which made Him set so high a standard before His followers, and which prevented His treating as small or negligible offences against Humanity, whether they took the form of shrinking from personal duty or of indifference to the welfare of others. In this respect the character of Jesus is best understood when He is recognised as the great Example of all those who have "hated wickedness that hinders loving."

* Mark x.21.
One might again compare Christianity in this respect with Stoicism. It is true that in the development of the latter both elements played an important part; but they were never held in the same balance and union as by Jesus. The Ideal of the Sage in its earlier form, did indeed set a high estimate on the capacity for virtue of human nature, but at the expense of gentleness and pity. These qualities found an increasing recognition among the later Stoics, and in Marcus Aurelius they are very fully developed. But in his case their development is accompanied by the decline of the old robust faith in the worth of ordinary humanity; and at times he finds an argument against anger in the very poverty and insignificance of the natures among whom he moved. Is it worth while, he seems to ask, to expect much of such men or to be perturbed or distressed when they act basely? Now it may well be that even the virtue of pity is won at too dear a price, if it rests upon the denial of man's responsibility and capacity for good. There is even a danger in its exclusive development apart from the strictness of moral judgment which comes from a strong belief in the universal and categorical nature of the claim of the Good upon the human will. "There is reason, indeed, to fear," as the late Mr. F. W. H. Myers said in his essay on Marcus Aurelius, "that Marcus loved his enemies too well; that he was too much given to blessing those that cursed him. It is to him, rather than to any Christian potentate, that we must look for an example of the dangers of applying the gospel maxims too unreservedly to the

* iv, 48; v, 10, 33; vi, 15; viii, 21.
business of the turbid world."** But to this remark of Mr Myers' we should add that the "gospel maxims" referred to do not represent the whole of Christian teaching, but that they must be taken along with those other passages which thrill with hatred of sin, and condemn all who place hindrances in the way of the advancing Kingdom of God.

Thus it becomes clear that the duty of pity and forgiveness, as it is understood in Christian Ethics, cannot be based on a deterministic denial of man's responsibility and power for good, just as we have already seen that it does not countenance the merely passive quietism of the fatalist. Jesus did not argue from the weakness and incapacity of human nature to the need for forgiveness and forbearance. His appeal took a more positive form than that of Buddhism or of Stoicism as represented by Marcus Aurelius. It has been said that the great distinction between Buddhism and Christianity is that the former sets at the sense of misery, but the latter in the sense of sin;** and Jesus clearly distinguished between more and less conscious forms of sin - a distinction which does not exist for the determinist - treating this as a fundamental point in His judgment of its guilt.† His own assertion of the duty of mercy was not due to His taking a low view of the powers and destiny of man; but to His great belief in them. There was always some positive ground or preparation for forgiveness - "some good

* Essays, Classical, p.199.

** Dods, Mohammed, Buddha and Christ, p.469.

† Luke xii.47. Cf. John ix.41. For the contrasted view see M. Aurelius, vii,22; ix.42.
thing toward the Lord"** - which others did not perceive, but which was visible to the sympathy and insight of Jesus. Whenever He perceived any movement of faith or love, any desire for higher things, His mercy was shown in His readiness to encourage the effort after goodness.** Thus the Christian virtue of mercy is not a weak or sentimental thing. It has a strong and bracing quality, for it exists in union with the severity which belongs to all who take a high view of the capabilities of man, and who thus cannot regard as light or trifling any action which destroys these capabilities whether in the man himself or in others. The union of these two apparently divergent virtues is thus seen to be necessary if both a hope of goodness and a motive power to attain to it are to be provided for all.

(4) The same principle might be followed out in other regions of character and conduct; but it will be sufficient to mention two or three cases in which it applies. The attitude of the Christian to the past and the future should be one that combines Reverence and Independence. In the life of Jesus this union was very remarkable. His mission was grounded on a deep loyalty to the past. He not only knew the scriptures of the Old Testament intimately, but He made use of the established religious ordinances of His day, and in certain instances enjoined conformity to the ceremonial law.† His professed aim was not to overturn the

* 1 Kings xiv.13.
†Matt.iv.23; viii.4; ix.35; xiii.54; xxiii.3; xxvi.18; Luke iv.16 ff.
Jewish religion, but to complete and perfect it by leading the
nation to understand and to fulfil its deeper meaning and purpose.*
But along with His reverence for the history of His people and His
appreciation for their past, there was that in his message which
was new, and He claimed the right to amend and even abrogate all
that contradicted or fell short of His own teaching. Nor would
He allow Jewish tradition to check Him in carrying out the work He
had undertaken:** His independence and refusal to be fettered by
the past was most clearly expressed in the metaphor of the new wine
and the old wine-skins; but even here, if we accept the sequence of
this discourse as given in the Third Gospel, we see that Jesus did
not let this lesson stand alone, but proceeded to state the comple-
mentary truth in the words "No man having drunk old wine desireth
new: for he saith, The old is good."†

Now it is doubtless true that the attitude of sovereignty
over all former statements of truth which Jesus assumed cannot be
fully reproduced in the Christian life; for the New Testament, and
especially the Gospels, have a normative value for the Christian
such as the Old Testament did not possess for Christ. But there
remains a wide sphere in which the Christian is called upon to
exercise both these virtues, to be loyal to the past and yet to be
independent and willing to strike out new paths both in thought and
action. And the best assurance of their possible harmony is to be

** Matt.v.21,28 etc., xii.1 ff., xix.8.
found in that strong sense of continuity between the past, the present, and the future which Jesus, in spite of all that was revolutionary in His mission, never lost.* The same conflict goes on in varying forms, and an appreciation of and sympathy with the past is one of the best incentives to faithfulness in the present.** So also, in the deepest Christian experience there is a freshness as of that which is wholly new, but it is combined with the familiarity of a truth long known; for its "new commandment" is one that has been of old, even "from the beginning."†

Other examples of this harmony of opposites might be found in the union of personal humility with the sense of a great and dignified vocation, which has been remarked on as characteristic of Christianity; or in the union of veracity with considerateness which is pointed to in Paul's exhortation to "speak the truth in love;"†† or again in the contrasted sayings of Jesus which proclaim the duty of reticence with outspoken courage.††† But enough has been said to indicate that this is one main characteristic of the Christian character, and that any attempt to treat Christian Ethics

* E. Caird, Lay Sermons and Addresses, pp. 161-2.

** Matt.v.12, ("So persecuted they the prophets which were before you").

†1 John ii,7,8.


††† The saying, "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs" (Matt.vii.6.), may be contrasted with "What ye hear in the ear, proclaim upon the housetops" (x.27); or "Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men" (vi.1), with "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works" (v.16). Cf. Stalker, The Ethic of Jesus, pp. 73 ff.
as dealing with one set of virtues alone must fail of adequacy and completeness. If Christianity teaches the gentler virtues - patience, forbearance, resignation, pity, gentleness - it also points to another side of human character as requiring development, and exalts the virtues of constancy, strenuousness, courage, and the frank condemnation of all that is base and mean. Nor is it possible to have too much of any one virtue, provided only that it is balanced by the presence of that which forms its complement. Thus the Christian character is formed by a process of addition rather than of limitation, and cannot be readily or accurately described in terms of the doctrine of Virtue as a Mean. It is too varied and too positive to find expression in such a scheme. And so it is rather to the Hegelian idea of a union of contraries in a higher synthesis, which, as we have seen, goes back in its ethical form to Plato, that we must look for an adequate expression of the form of Christian Ethics. There is something which necessarily transcends the limits of the Aristotelian formula in the Christian ideal, if that ideal is truly described by Newman in the passage already quoted as to "become the paradox which scripture enjoins."

† This point of view has been vigorously stated by Mr Chesterton; - "Christianity is a superhuman paradox whereby two opposite passions may blaze beside each other. The one explanation of the Gospel language that does explain it, is that it is the survey of one who from some supernatural height beholds some more startling synthesis." Orthodoxy, p.270; cf.ch.VI passim.
III.

Are we, then led to the conclusion, in the face of all common preconceptions in regard to Hellenism and Hebraism, that Christian ethics is essentially positive and Greek ethics, as formulated in the doctrine of the Mean, essentially negative? This would indeed be an inaccurate description of the Aristotelian point of view* - save in so far as omnis determinatio est negatio. And undoubtedly determination, in its original sense, plays so large a part in the typically Greek idea of the formation of character that the whole process may be conceived as one of negation. But the more important point of view is that which looks upon the process as directed towards and conditioned by an ideal of humanity which is perfectly definite, and which cannot be described as ascetic. The difference between Greek and Christian ethical thought is rather that, while both aim at a positive result, this result is in the former case essentially limited, and lacks the wide sweep of the Christian ideal. This may be traced to a difference of attitude to the ἡμιμον, which, in the sense of the Indefinite and Formless, represented the antithesis of all Hellenic ideals; but which, as the Infinite, has been in Christian thought the expression of the immeasurable possibilities and demands of the moral life. To this difference of the result aimed at there corresponds a difference of method, the element of restriction necessarily taking a more prominent place in the Greek system.

*Cf. Note A, p. 46.
Both these distinctions may be illustrated by the consideration of three passages in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the first Aristotle draws a practical conclusion from his theory of virtue.

"As it is difficult then to hit the mean exactly, we must take the second best course, as the saying is, and choose the lesser of the two evils, and this we shall best do in the way that we have described [- i.e., by steering clear of the evil which is further from the Mean.] We must observe also the things to which we ourselves are particularly prone, as different natures have different inclinations, and we may ascertain what these are by our feelings of pleasure and pain. And then we must drag ourselves in the direction opposite to them; for it is by removing ourselves as far as possible from what is wrong that we shall arrive at the mean, as we do when we pull a crooked stick straight. But in all cases we must be especially on our guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure, as we are not impartial judges of pleasure."

Now in part the injunctions of this passage merely stand on common ground of all practical morality - that men ought to avoid things and places which they have found to be dangerous to virtue, and that where the danger is extreme the measures taken against it must be extreme also. There is probably no system of morality which does not admit the negative element of avoidance in these cases; and this duty is expressed in the New Testament with the vehemence of the preacher, as contrasted with the restraint of the philosopher: "If thy hand or thy foot cause thee to stumble, cut it off, and cast it from thee: it is good for thee to enter into life maimed or halt, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into the eternal fire."

*Eth. Nic. II, ix, 1109b 34ff. (tr. Welldon, p. 56.)

**Matt. xviii.8 and parallels. Cf. 1 Cor. ix.27, and the petition, "Lead us not into temptation." (Matt.vi,13,A.V.)
But there is this difference, that while the maxim and the accompanying illustration of the bent stick seem to be applied by Aristotle to the conduct of life generally, the command to cut off an offending member is given as exceptional in the New Testament. The general rule is undoubtedly the positive one of Love. The gospels and epistles agree in this; and Paul expresses the principles of the new life in the words, "Walk by the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh." Thus while the Greek pursuit of virtue is marked by a certain timidity and self-consciousness, which comes out in the idea that "it is by removing ourselves as far as possible from what is wrong that we shall arrive," the morality of the New Testament is marked by a great freedom and spontaneity.

The New Testament urges men to direct their thoughts neither complacently to their own dignity or merits, nor anxiously to the pleasures which may seduce them, but to an ideal above themselves which remains steadfast and fixed. Its rests on the principle expressed in Chalmers' famous phrase - "the expulsive power of a new affection;" and while it recognises that every character needs to be developed in some directions and repressed in others in order to attain to completeness and harmony.

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* Gal.v.16.

** As in Aristotle's description of the μεγαλομαχος - Eth.Nic. Bk.iv,c.iii. Contrast the description of the Christian ideal in 1 Cor.xiii,4,5.

† 2 Cor. iii,18; Heb,xii.2.

††Commercial Discourses, Disc. IX.
the chief stress is laid on the former need. For it is not by
contemplating the defect that is to be eradicated so much as the
virtue that is to be strengthened that a man can attain to this
harmony; and the mere removal of faults may be worse than useless
if a positive principle of virtue be not established in their place.*
There is a closer analogy to Christian thought in this respect in
the passages in which Plato speaks of the secret of virtue as rest-
ing in a steady vision of the beauty and truth of the eternal world.**

(2) The second passage is that in which Aristotle concludes
his definition of the Good for Man with the qualifying words,
εἰς δ' ἐν τῇ τελείᾳ "But also in a complete life."† The thought
is that unless a life is long enough to develop into completeness
and allow of the full and unhampered exercise of all human powers,
it cannot be considered happy (οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐσίμωνα [ποιεῖ]
μὴ ἡμέρα οὗτος ὀλίγος χρόνος.)

Now, when it is argued that complete virtue cannot be attained
in a shortened life, it is clearly implied that it can be attained
in a life of full or normal duration. The ideal of virtue is
fashioned to the measure of the ordinary span of human life, on
the analogy of full development in the region of organic physical
life, or of the completeness with which a painting or a statue may

* Matt. xii. 43 ff.

** Rep. 517 BC, 521C; Etaedrus, 250.

†Bk. I, C. 7, 1036a 16. It is clear that this contrast also
would need great modification if Plato instead of Aristotle were
taken as the representative moralist of Greece.
express the idea in the artist's mind. This point of view harmonises with the doctrine of the Mean. For if the perfection of the human character consist in the avoidance of excess, and the attainment of a due balance and harmony of powers, both in body and mind - then the lifetime of a man, if it be well employed, may suffice for its attainment. But if the clue to the nature of progress be looked for in the full and unfettered exercise of each several virtue, if there be no fear of any one being overdeveloped, but only of its being developed to the prejudice of others, and so if the perfect symmetry of character be sought not by limitation but by the addition of virtue to virtue* - then there is no limit to the greatness of the task, and an endless horizon opens.

Now it is this positive view of the making of character as a process of building up which is characteristic of the New Testament; and there is in it no apprehension lest the different virtues should be over developed, but rather a sense of the difficulty of complete attainment in any one direction, much more in all.** Thus if Aristotle's standard of a complete life as one in which complete virtue can be acquired be applied to the Christian character, we are led straight to Kant's argument for immortality - that an infinite task requires an endless time for its fulfilment.†

(3) The same conclusion may be reached by a criticism of a passage in which Aristotle, following the Pythagoreans, connects

* Cf. 2 Pet.i.5,6; Luke xvii.10.

** Phil.iii.12.

† Critique of Practical Reason, Dialectic, 2,iv.
good and evil with the ideas of the Limit and the Unlimited.

"There are many different ways of going wrong; for evil is in its nature infinite, to use the Pythagorean figure, but good is finite. But there is only one possible way of going right. (τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστὶν . . . τὸ δὲ κατορθεῖν) Accordingly the former is easy to hit and the latter difficult; it is easy to miss the mark, but difficult to hit it. This again is a reason why excess and deficiency are characteristics of vice and the mean state a characteristic of virtue.

'For good is simple, evil manifold.'"

Here we find the description of virtue by the spatial metaphors of the Limit and the Mean, carried to the logical conclusion that virtue is a single point in the wide field of possible action. This exactness of determination seems to exclude the recognition of variety in virtue, and thus to narrow the scope of goodness. But the truth would rather seem that any single virtue has as many subtle varieties as the opposing vice, and offers as wide a scope for the expression of the most delicate shades of individuality. In an important sense there are as many ways of doing a right action as a wrong one; and no misconception is more fatal than that wrong-doing gives free play to individuality, while goodness means the close following of a strictly determined and monotonous path. If growth in virtue be an adding of stone to stone in the edifice of character, then there is no limit to the variety and interest of the life of goodness. For Christian thought it is vice and not virtue which circumscribes the powers of man and narrows His outlook, while goodness is the enlarging and emancipating power in

* Bk.II, c.vi, 1106b 28 ff. (tr. Welldon.)
This conception was clearly expressed by Dr. Rainy in the words, "Sin is in its nature limited: you soon come to the end of what can be got out of a sin. But the Christian life is eternal, for God is inexhaustible."

This, then, is the idea of the Infinite as it appears in Christian Ethics. It is not the boundless "indeterminate" from which the thought of the Greeks recoiled, nor is it the entire negation of Form and Measure. It rather provides the assurance that, though each step on the pathway of moral progress is clearly defined, that path does not lie across a boundless monotonous plain, but ever leads to new interests and new experiences, and that there can never come a time when there will be no further need to add virtue to virtue in the upbuilding of character.

Yet in truth perfection, in the sense of a full union and harmony of diverse forms of goodness, is hardly to be looked for in the sphere of the individual character. For this idea of Virtue which we have been following out has a wider scope; and the final harmony lies rather in the union of many varied individual characters, each retaining some dominant characteristic, and bringing some special contribution of talent or virtue to the common wealth of all. It is neither possible nor needful that all should excel the same virtue, but it is the part of each man to contribute something of his own to the wider harmony; and the same thought may be applied to the different nations and races which form together our conception of Humanity.** The great thinkers of

* Cf. Luke xv, 17; John viii, 32-6; Rom. vi. 17 ff; 1 Cor. iii, 22; 2 Cor. iii.17; Gal. v. 1, 13.

** Cf. Bishop Gore's Hampton Lectures, pp. 169 ff.
Greece held that men of every rank and office were needed to form a perfect and happy state; and Paul raised the same idea into the sphere of religion by teaching that, only when all Christians had brought their various gifts into the common service, would they "attain unto the unity of the faith," or "unto a full-grown man."* In Sir Thomas Brown's phrase, "'Tis well if a perfect Man can be made out of many Men, and, to the perfect eye of GOD, even out of Man-kind."** Thus for Christian thought Plato's metaphor of the "royal web" passes into that of the "seamless robe," which is the type of the ideal unity of the Church Universal.

* Eph.iv.13.

** Christian Morals, Part 1, sect.xxviii.
NOTE A.

On the Positive and Negative sides of the Greek Conception of Virtue.

That there is a double strain in Greek ethical thought has been shown in the preceding pages, where we have seen, along with the Doctrine of the Mean, a view which might be described as the Doctrine of Moral Synthesis, which emphasises the addition of one virtuous tendency to another rather than the avoidance of vicious excess.

At the same time there are indications that the view of Virtue as a Mean between Excess and Defect cannot be described as purely negative in character. It is first clearly formulated in the dialogue in which we found the clearest statement of the other view which we have examined (Politicus, 283 C); and although the discussion of the Mean is there introduced in a mere digression, in Plato's later manner, and has not the same bearing on the general course of the argument as the other theory, yet Plato does not seem to perceive any inconsistency between the two points of view. In the same way Aristotle speaks in one passage of the Mean state as one in which both the extremes can be seen, and says that when this is so it is due to the success of the combination or mingling of both—οικ; τὸ μεσεῖχται καλὸς (Pol., Bk. IV, ch. 9, 1294 b, 16-18.) Elsewhere he states that "in
temperance and courage there cannot be an excess or defect, because the Mean is in a sense an extreme" (διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πᾶς ἑκρον Eth. Nic., Bk. II, ch. 6, 1107a23.) Prof. Burnet illustrates this aspect of the Mean in his edition of the Ethics (P. 103 - ad 1108b11) by a quotation from the Eudemian Ethics which is worth reproducing:

"The Mean is more opposed to the extremes than these are to one another, because it cannot co-exist with either of the extremes, while they may exist together, as sometimes men are foolhardy cowards (Θρούσσειλος) or are prodigal in some respects and miserly in others, and such are paradoxes of evil.* But if there are ever paradoxes of good (ἀνόμολοι καλοί . . καλοί) then such exemplify the Mean. For in a certain sense the extremes are present in the Mean."

Here the Θρούσσειλος is taken as representing on the side of vice the same combination of apparent opposites, as we have seen exemplified on the side of virtue by the man who combines gentleness with courage, and who answers to the description in this passage of the καλοί ἀνόμολοι. Indeed this phrase might be used as a general characterisation of the man of fully developed virtue, when virtue is viewed as a harmony of opposites.

But, apart from these refinements upon or additions to the theory of the Mean, the conception itself had a positive meaning for Greek thought. It involved more than a mere negative avoidance of contrary extremes: it involved the positive determination of virtue. As Prof. Burnet says, the view of it "as a

* Or "inconsistent in a bad sense."
mere medio tutissimus ibis" is misleading. "The Mean is the regular Platonic and Aristotelian way of explaining the Formal Cause." Goodness is a mean because "it is the form which is the true nature of the human soul when fully developed." (The Ethics of Aristotle, p. 73 and note.) This idea certainly had a positive content for the Greek mind, just as the corresponding idea of the fully developed human body found a definite expression in the best Greek sculpture. But though it stood for a positive and definite conception of human nature, as opposed to any mere negation of its wilder impulses, yet just because it was so clear and definite, it was also limited, (cf. the root meanings of the two words); and this brings us within sight of a principle of differentiation between Greek and Christian ethical thought.

But first it will be well to touch on this idea of the Limit; for one of the fundamental features of Greek thought is the part played by the opposition of τὸ ἄνερον and τὸ πέρος. The former term appears in the early Ionian thinkers, and as used by Anaximander, it probably means less the Infinite as we understand it, than the Indefinite or Formless. In this "Hylistic" conception we have the first appearance of the ὄλη which had so important a place in the thought of Aristotle. It is by limitation, the function of τὸ πέρος, that this undifferentiated substrate of things, itself "without form and void," receives Form and Meaning. The Greek conception of evolution, then, is that the principle by which the original Chaos (ἄνερον) becomes an intelligible and Ordered Cosmos is
(See Appendix C in Mr R.G. Bury's edition of the Philebus - On ὶτὶ ἄμειρον: in Early Greek Thought; also for what follows. App. D and E.)

This emphasis on the importance of the Limit, influences Greek thought in many directions. In one of the most striking sayings of Heraclitus, who is commonly said to be the first philosopher who applied his metaphysical ideas to Ethics, the universal sway of Law is enforced by the words, "The sun will not exceed his measures; for if he does, the Erinyes, the avenging handmaids of Justice, will find him out." (Fr. 29, Burnet.)

By the early religion of Greece no sin was so severely condemned as displeasing to the gods as that of ὀργή and in the dealings of man with man, πλεονεξία was held as correspondingly blameworthy. In both cases the idea of Law is that of a restraining influence, imposing strict limits on thought and action. So also wherever the Greek applied the wide conception of ἀρετή its rule and maxim was μὴ δὲν ἄγαν. In Plato, the same idea appears as early as the Protagoras (356) in the suggestion that Virtue is an art of measurement, and in the recurring application to Ethics of mathematical ideas and analogies; and closely connected with this is the saying ὃ θεὸς ἄμειρον γεωμετρεῖ. But the best example of the Greek attitude in this respect is to be found in the long discussion regarding τὸ ἄμειρον and τὸ πέρας in the Philebus, where Limit or Measure is described as the principle which brings Form into the Indefinite and "binds down" its varying elements. (ἐμματὰν τῶν ἄμειρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων - 27 D)
The conclusion of the argument is that "the eternal nature is to be found in Measure, the Measured, the Suitable" (66A). But it is worth remarking that the action of τὸ ἁπάσης does not appear as wholly negative. Its result is the harmonious mingling of diverse elements - in this case of knowledge and pleasure in the complete life. This result seems to correspond to the similar conclusion of the Politicus in the practical sphere.

The conclusion to which these facts point seems to be that, while the Greek conception of Virtue was a decidedly positive one, and was only with some difficulty comprised within the formula of the Mean; yet the Greek horror of the ἅπασης, and the idea that excellence of every sort was due to the action of measure and restraint tended in some directions to confine and narrow it. The Greek ideal of conduct, like the ideal of bodily beauty, was a definite formative influence; but its very definiteness and finitude appears as a limitation when it is judged by Christian standards.

Dr Strong, in his Bampton Lectures, (Christian Ethics, pp. 8, 31-33; cf. p. 99), has stated (perhaps with insufficient qualification) the view that Greek thought failed to give a positive ideal for the guidance of life and the subduing of passion. As against the old conventional antithesis of Hellenism and Hebraism it is well that it should be clearly seen how large a part sheer restraint played in the moral attitude of the Greeks; but I should rather hold with Green, that the Greeks had a positive moral
principle — positive, but when compared with that of Christianity, limited both in intensive force and in width of obligation. (Prolegomena to Ethics, Bk. III, ch. v; cf. ch. iii, §§ 206ff.)
CHAPTER II.

THE VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL -

CONFLICTING TENDENCIES.
We now turn to the consideration of the universal character of Christian Ethics, and in particular the Christian view of the value of the individual soul. This subject is so familiar, and it has been so often maintained that the ascription of infinite worth to even the lowliest of mankind is the central truth of Christianity and its most original discovery, that it may be felt that a fresh discussion is needless, because nothing new remains to be said. But the very importance of the subject demands that the Christian point of view should be apprehended not only in itself, but also in relation to other tendencies of thought, whether past or present. For it is not and cannot be so far isolated as to be independent of support, from the great bodies of fact and theory on which the ordinary life of the world is based; and still less can their opposition, where it exists, be disregarded. Accordingly this chapter will be taken up with the indication of the chief quarters from which such support or opposition has come and still comes. In other words we shall consider the doctrine of the Infinite Value of the individual as it is found in the Gospels both in its positive and its negative relations to secular thought, reserving for two later chapters the question of its bearing on the view of social life which forms the other side of Christian Universalism.
I.

First we are met by the consideration that the Christian estimate of the individual may be and has been thought of as in line with the whole course of development both biological and historical—as, in fact, the consummation of the process of Evolution and the last word of evolutionary theory. From one point of view the leading mark of the higher stages of Evolution is the differentiation and specialisation of individuals. As the process advances mere numbers become of less, and the perfection of single organisms of more, importance. In the case of the lower types of life, the great weapon in the struggle for existence is fecundity; for, other things being equal, the type which reproduces itself most readily and rapidly will survive. And so of this stage in the history of life it may be said that "It was probably a better arrangement to produce a million and let them take their chance, than to produce one and take special trouble with it."*

But it was only in as far as this primitive form of race-preservation was replaced by a method of less diffusion and more individualisation that progress became possible. The higher orders of life could only come into being when Nature began to "produce one" - or at least a small number - at a time, and to "take special trouble with it." For one thing, such a concentration on the forming of individuals of that reproductive energy which had formerly been dispersed in the production of hundreds or thousands, gave for the first time to these individuals plasticity enough to adapt themselves to, and ultimately in the case of Man to control, the most

* Henry Drummond, _The Ascent of Man_, p. 348.
varied environments. This change in the character of the evolutionary process is, it may be said, veiled in metaphor when we speak of Nature ceasing to work through numbers and fecundity in reproduction, and beginning to "take trouble" with the fashioning of individuals; but whether we personify "Nature" or not, the fact so described cannot escape us. The individual is beginning to emerge from the throng as an object of independent importance.

This aspect of Evolution is not an unfamiliar one; and the two writers who some years ago brought its significance vividly home to both sections of the English-speaking world - John Fiske and Henry Drummond - both emphasised the importance of two factors in the change from the lower to the higher stage of Evolution. Of these, the first has already been indicated - the limitation of offspring to a number low enough to call out the individualising interest and care of the parent. The other is the lengthening of the period of infancy, and this in turn is significant in two directions. For the parent, the longer the period during which the new life is a helpless and dependent one, the greater becomes the call on parental care and patience. Affection is strengthened by the very strength and continuance of the demand made upon it; and "the cosmic roots of love and self-sacrifice," to borrow Fiske's phrase, have time to strike deep and firm into the soil of the parental nature. But this fact has immense importance for the offspring as well. When a child comes into the world it does not bring a fixed character and an all-but complete equipment for the battle of life with it, as do the young of the lower orders of life. The long period of dependence
is also the period of the plasticity and adaptibility to which we have already referred; **education** is possible, and **character** remains to be formed by reaction upon the environment of childhood and youth. Indeed in the highest members of the human race this plasticity is retained beyond the period of youth, and the capacity for learning, i.e., for fresh reactions upon environment, only comes to an end with life itself. It is clear how entirely the possibility of variety in character, of what we commonly refer to as individuality, is bound up with the extension of the period during which responses to stimuli are still variable, and have not hardened into the "secondarily automatic" type.

It is worth while to pause for a moment on this double character of the individualisation which is the mark - or at all events one mark - of the higher stages of Evolution. On the one hand (to reverse the order of our previous statement) it implies that individuals vary more appreciably from a common type. It would probably be held that, the Law of Continuity forbids us to suppose that any two members of the same order, however low in the scale of being, could be completely similar, even though their presumed difference should evade the closest and most exact observation. But it can hardly be denied that, with every advance in the evolutionary process, these differences become more visible and pronounced; and at the higher levels they give a very large part of its interest and variety to life. The individual no longer arouses interest merely as a specimen of his type; he ceases to be describable and in merely generic terms, but comes to have a character and idiosyncrasy
of his own; and as Professor Royce has suggestively argued, we may consider that the end of the whole process, which for us lies in the future, consists in the transcendence of all merely common and generic characteristics and the attainment of a completely distinctive individuality.

But along with this increase in the variety of character among members of the higher orders, and particularly of the human race - this development of individuality in the objective sense - there is also a more subjective development. Self-consciousness, with all that it involves of distinction from the world and other selves, begins to dawn; and, what is more closely involved in our present argument, the power of sympathy begins to make it possible to enter into the thoughts and interests of others. We have already seen that the earliest source of sympathy is in the love of offspring, the solicitude and care which is called out by the helplessness of those who are too immature to care for themselves; and the very need for this prolonged and unremitting care awakens an interest in its object which is at once stronger and more penetrating than that of the ordinary observer. It is by the quickened observation of this sympathy and interest that individuality is first recognised; as is apparent from the commonly noted fact, that individuality and uniqueness are attributed to the human child by its nearest relatives at a stage in its life history when to the unsympathetic outsider it appears to be exactly like all other members of its class.

Thus we find that this new element of individuality develops in two directions; or it would perhaps be more accurate to say that
two aspects, an outer and an inner, can be observed in it with increasing clearness. Objectively, the individual, the formative period of his life being lengthened, comes to vary more widely from his fellows; and he thus gains in interest for them, and in the ability to serve the social body in some more or less highly differentiated function. And subjectively, a power is developed of entering into the interests and feelings of others, and of realising that each regards the universe from his own point of view and makes his own demands upon it. Before the close of this discussion we shall be able to appreciate the importance for our subject of the second point of view in particular, that of imaginative sympathy.

(2) But by this time we have passed beyond the stage of infra-human development; for self-consciousness and the use of special powers to perform a specialised function are the distinctive marks of human society. From this point forward we may follow the guidance of Hegel in his Philosophy of History. His thesis is that human history should be interpreted as the development and extension of the idea of Freedom. In this process he distinguishes three main stages. In the great empires of the East, one is free (the monarch), and society beneath him resembles in its monotony the vast level plains of the Eastern rivers; in Greece and Rome, some are free (those enjoying full rights of citizenship), and in the former especially the variety of character and life reflects the mingled landscape of mountain and sea amid which the Hellenic race lived; finally, in the Modern World under the influence of
Christianity, all are free, and the goal of History is reached.* Now, it might conceivably be objected that Hegel's argument relates to the extension of Freedom to all, whereas we are concerned with a different category and are tracing the developing idea of the Worth of all, or more accurately of each. But for Hegel such a distinction hardly existed, since he thought of Freedom not only in a negative way as emancipation from the control of the external and material, but as Self-consciousness and Self-determination, the distinctive attribute of Spirit, founded in the nature of the Divine Being. Thus the extension of Freedom to all meant that each individual acquired the full dignity of a spiritual being.**

Now when Hegel describes the transition from the East to Greece as a transition from a stage at which one is free to that at which some are free, he is only repeating the distinction the Greeks themselves drew between the despotic rule of the Persian King under which all save the King himself were slaves, and their own reasonable liberty. As the narrative of Herodotus passes back and forward between Persia or Egypt and Greece, no reader can miss the contrast between the great empire in which the greatest and the most inconspicuous alike held life and possessions at the mercy of the royal

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* The Philosophy of History, treating as it does the extension of Freedom from one to all, has a more democratic tone than some of Hegel's other works. Yet in a characteristic passage in the Introduction (tr. Sibree, p.70) he argues that the great individuals of the World's history are to be considered as raised above criticism by the moral standards which apply to ordinary men. (On the elements in Hegel's philosophy which are opposed to the Christian view of the individual, vide McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology §§157,180, 254f.)

** Philosophy of History, Introduction, "Freedom can exist only where Individuality is recognised as having its positive and real existence in the Divine Being." (tr.Sibree,p.53) Cf.Part.III., Sect.III., ch.11 ad fin.
caprice, and where a city might be sacked or a thousand men butchered at the King's pleasure, and the free republics of Greece where every citizen felt that his action in the Ecclesia or on the battlefield had a definite importance, and a definite bearing on the welfare of the state. In the former the royal will was enforced by compulsion in some form: in the latter, Law was supreme because its sway was willingly accepted by the citizens.*

We cannot hold that the Greeks over-estimated the importance of the contrast. The rise of the free City-state marked a very definite stage in the progress of the idea which we are tracing. A new value was placed on the individual when he was set free to direct his own actions and to render a willing, instead of an enforced service to the state, and when he came to realise his responsibility for his share of the work of government or of national defence. And this was the actual achievement of the Greek spirit on the stage of history. But the importance of the Hellenic development for our purpose does not end here. Greek thought advanced beyond Greek achievement, and pointed the way to a still further development of the principle of Freedom. It was impossible that it could rest where it stands in the thought of Aristotle, who represents the "Commonsense" of reflective Hellenism in its highest development. For Aristotle, the culture and liberty of the minority who must have leisure for Virtue, rested upon the all-but complete exclusion of the majority from participation in either. In the best-ordered state a mechanic or labourer (δαναος) will either be excluded altogether

* See especially the speech of Demaratus to Xerxes, Herod.VII,104.
from citizenship, or at least will not be considered as displaying the virtue of a true citizen, for it is impossible for one so employed to give himself to the practice of virtue.* And when this position is assigned to the free labourer or artisan, it is not surprising to find the slave treated as hardly a human being in the full sense. Aristotle's doctrine of the ἐργανόν is too familiar to require discussion here; but it may be worth while to quote the passage in which it occurs, as showing the hesitation which Aristotle felt in carrying it to its logical conclusion.

"There is nothing in common between a master and his slave. The slave is an animate instrument, and the instrument an inanimate slave. It is impossible therefore to be friends with a slave qua slave, but not with a slave qua man, for there would seem to be a possibility of justice between every man and any one who is capable of participation in law and covenant, and therefore in friendship in so far as he is man."**

This qualified recognition of the common humanity which unites master and slave has a parallel in the discussion in the Politics where Aristotle speaks of the relation subsisting between them as one of mutual helpfulness and friendship,† and

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*Pol., III, 1278a8ff., 21. In another passage (VIII, 1337b12-13) the term ἐργανόν is defined as including both such occupations as impair the well-being of the body, and "mercenary occupations" (μισοθερμανικαί ἐργασίαι) which do similar injury to the mind by rendering it ὠσχολον καὶ λαμπενήν.


† I, 1255b13. (συμφέρον ἀντει τι καὶ φιλία δούλω καὶ συνόπτη πρὸς διάλεκτου τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἰξιμωμένοις)

[Footnote continued foot of p. 61]
in such passages we can see the deeper idea of a common humanity not altogether crushed by the harsh logic of slavery.

But in the thought of Aristotle's two great predecessors, there were currents flowing which eventually carried ethical reflection completely beyond the outlook of Greek "common-sense," and far in the direction of Christianity. The first of these is to be found in Plato's doctrine of the nature of the soul, which came to him from Egypt through the Pythagoreans. It is true that the theory of Transmigration does on one side tend to connect man with the animal world, and so represents a lower point of view than the Greek separation and idealisation of humanity; but at the same time it breaks down such distinctions as depend on the merely external world, and gives to the life of man a new scope and significance.* It is needless to dwell

In this discussion there is a hesitation somewhat similar to that in the quotation from the *Ethics* above. A slave is "only so far rational as to understand reason without possessing it (1254b23 - κοινωνίας λόγου τοὐσοῦτον ζοόν αἰσθητευομένων οὐκ ἔχειν). He is "wholly destitute of the deliberative faculty" (1260a12 - οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν.

Cf. III, 1280a33.) On the other hand it would be a paradox (ἀτομον) to deny that slaves may possess virtue, since "they share in humanity and in reason" (1254b27 - ὄντων δὲν ἀνέρτωμα καὶ λόγου κοινωνίατον).

* Hegel emphasises both points in his section on Egyptian thought. (Phil. of Hist., I, III, iii), but especially the latter when he finds in the belief in Immortality, the discovery that Spirit is independent of Matter, and that "the human individual inherently possesses infinite value."
on the effect of the Platonic theory in raising the whole estimate of the destiny of the good and noble soul, but in the earliest passage in which the Pythagorean doctrine appears in Plato we may, without over-subtlety, see a suggestion which if followed out would have led straight to ethical universalism. I refer to the incident in the _Meno_, in which Socrates is represented as using his "maieutic art" to elicit from one of Meno's slaves the proof of a geometrical proposition.* Now if the theory of Reminiscence was capable of such an application, and if skilful questioning could enable a slave-boy to rediscover from his inner consciousness the theorem of the great Pythagoras, then there was clearly ground for the complete reconstruction of the Greek estimate of the relation and comparative value of the different orders of mankind. How far Plato saw this in his later works is a question on which different opinions are possible.*

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*Meno, 82 ff.

** Prof. Gilbert Murray argues that in the Republic Plato abolishes slavery "silently by merely constructing a state without slaves." (The Rise of the Greek Epic, p. 17) But it is hard to reconcile this view with the argument against the enslavement of captives of Hellenic race (469 BC), which seems to imply that other captives may be enslaved. Still clearer is the statement in Book IV, (433 D) that the virtue of the state consists in the presence of Justice "in every child and woman, in every slave, freeman, and artisan, in the ruler and in the ruled, requiring each to perform his own task." Here slavery is explicitly recognised, but the chief point to observe is certainly that the slave is given a definite place in the ethical life of the state. On the whole question, we may accept Prof. Murray's conclusion that "the main point which distinguishes Greece from other ancient communities is not something actually achieved, but something seen and sought for. In Greece alone men's consciences were troubled by slavery." (Ib, p. 19).
But in spite of the limitations imposed by Plato's own aristocratic sentiment, and by the contempt of his successors the Neo-Platonists for what they considered gross and material, one can hardly dispute the influence of the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy in preparing the way for the Christian view of the worth of Man.

But there was another influence which did more than even the Platonic doctrine of immortality and the nature of the Soul to prepare the ancient World for the Christian assertion of the Worth of the Individual. Its full development is to be found in the Stoicism of the Roman Empire, but to understand its origin we must once more turn to the character and life of Socrates. One of the features in his character which most deeply impressed both his contemporaries and the men of succeeding centuries was independence. With Socrates we find a new importance attached to ὀστρήκω, a term which from that time onward came to stand for one of the master-thoughts of Greek ethics. In some directions Socrates fell short of the typical Hellenic grace of form and character, but just on that account he showed more conclusively of how little importance any external characteristic is when contrasted with the inner qualities of strength and purity of will and entire devotion to truth. His outward form might be a "mask of Silenus," but those who penetrated beneath the surface knew that the mask concealed the
"image of a god within;" and in the same way, though his
talk was all of "pack-asses and smiths and cobbler and
curriers," those who once understood his words found them
the best of all words, "abounding in fair examples of vir-
tue, and extending to the whole duty of a good and honour-
able man,"* In this studied informality of the Socratic
discourse, this determination "not to despise even the mean-
est things;"** in the search for truth, there is an implied
criticism of Greek exclusiveness which surely is due to more
than mere irony. Even if the incident in the Meno be not
literally historical, it was a characteristic idea which
Plato attributed to his master in representing him as draw-
ing a proof of the highest philosophical doctrine from so
unpromising a source. There are indications also that Soc-
rates held those occupations which involve manual labour
in higher esteem than did most of his contemporaries. As
Zeller says, "Socrates speaks as the son of a poor labour-
er, Xenophon and Plato as men of rank and property."†

It is a point of no small importance that the founder
of Moral Philosophy was one who owed little to outward ad-
vantages, and much to the unaided pursuit of virtue; one who
taught his followers to depend first of all on the power of

* Symp., 215, 221-2 (Jowett); cf. Zeller, Socrates and the
Socratic Schools, cc. iv and vii (Eng. Tr., pp. 70, 134-2)

** Parm., 138.DE.

the will and to be independent of outward conditions, one who habitually looked for the illustrations of the principles of virtue in humble vocations and among unlikely people.

Into the subsequent developments of the Socratic teaching, its exaggeration into Cynicism, and its eloquent statement by the greater Stoics, it is needless here to enter; but two passages may be quoted from Epictetus to show the point to which the Stoic doctrine of the dignity of Man, and its corollary of universal brotherhood, had been raised about the time when Christianity appeared.

"If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and that God is the father both of men and gods, then he would never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance, and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Since then it is of necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinion which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances, have no mean or ignoble thoughts about themselves."

Nor will they think meanly of any other man, not even of a careless slave -

"Will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seed and of the same descent from above? Will you not remember who you are, and whom you rule? that they are kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?"

*Discourses, I, 3, 13, (tr. Long). It is worthy of remark that, while in the Platonic idealism and in the development of Jewish religion the ideas of the value of
The successive stages of the process which we are considering might be described in terms of religion as well as of political freedom or philosophical reflection. The attitude of established religion to the individual is a not inaccurate index of the rank assigned to the latter at any given stage of social development. We may follow Hegel in taking the religion of China, in which the Emperor alone has the right to approach Heaven, as the first type of religion from this point of view. A definite advance was made by the religion of Persia which, as Herodotus tells us, allowed the single worshipper to sacrifice, but enjoined him not to ask anything for himself alone, but only to pray for the king and the whole body of the Persians of which he was a member. In Greece the recognised worship of the Olympians held a somewhat similar position; for religion was looked on less as an individual duty or privilege than as a state function, and the temples of the gods were often regarded chiefly as necessary to the completeness of a "beautiful and ample city." Any attempt

the individual and of immortality were closely interwoven, in Stoicism the former doctrine came to be held more and more independently of the latter.

*Philosophy of History, Part I, Sect. I.
† "The Old Oligarch," quoted by Miss Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, p. 2. The above statement does not apply to certain of the later developments of
on the part of the individual to obtain access to the gods by ways independent of the ritual of the state was looked on with disfavour, and the bitterness with which Socrates was attacked by the orthodox party in Athens was in part due to the feeling that his claim to possess direct spiritual guidance by means of the "divine sign" involved a certain ἄρνια. Again Aristotle says that no mechanic nor husbandman ought to be appointed to the priesthood; and we gain the measure of the advance made by Christianity in the fact that, even in the midst of mediaeval feudalism and class-separation, it was open for members of the humblest class to enter the calling, which according to the teaching of the Church, was the highest of all.*

In the case of Greece, religion cannot be said to have led the progress towards a fuller recognition of the claims of the individual. In Jewish thought on the other hand, it was entirely through the medium of religious experience that the worth of the single soul came to be felt. Yet here also the psalmists and prophets, in emphasising the supreme importance of purity of heart and of a right devotion of Greek religion. Orphism, in particular, made its chief appeal to the longing of the individual for purification and communion with the Divine.

*Politics VII, 1322 a 23; Hegel. Phil. of Hist., Part I, Sect.II. (Tr. Sibree p. 154.)
to the law of God on the part of individuals, often came into sharp collision with the priestly party who relied on established ritual and understood the meaning of the Covenant with God in a purely external and national sense.* Another point of contact with the Greek development is that the worth of the individual began to come to light in the fact that he was a member of a relatively small state for which his activity and loyalty had a measureable importance; and thus even while his part in the divine calling was still mediated through his nation, yet his individuality was not lost in a multitude so great as to destroy all sense of responsibility. But while this was a first step, it was not final, and the principle only approached recognition when the national freedom was lost, and when the Jewish nation became a hardly distinguishable element in the vast heterogenous population of an Eastern empire. It might have been expected that this calamity would have crushed out all sense of individuality along with that of nationality; but the former principle was by this time too deeply rooted to be readily overturned, and the distraction of the nation as a separate political whole, only liberated instead of extinguishing it. So we find that, just as the destruction of the free city-states of Greece provided the opportunity for Stoicism, and the philosopher was at once thrown back on his own inner life and thrown out upon the whole

*Eg., Ps.li; Jer.xxxi, 33-4; Mic.vi.6-8.
world of those who sought the truth, so the prophets of the Exile, in the loss of all merely political hopes, on the one hand proclaimed the hidden possibilities of the spiritual life within, and the fact of individual responsibility for obedience,* and on the other became conscious of a wider religious message than they had ever before contemplated, a message which embraced all the nations of the earth. It was at the same period that the idea of "evangelical poverty" arose - the idea that the promises were rather for the poor than for the rich, not because poverty was in itself a virtue, but because it disciplined the heart to feel the pressure of spiritual needs and to long for their satisfaction, and with this conception there came the belief in immortality as the answer to the demand that those who had suffered in the calamities of their people and for their sake should have a share in the triumph of the future.**

Any one of the points which we have glanced at might be expanded indefinitely, and in particular it might be shown how these tendencies continued to gather strength throughout the centuries which remained until the rise of Christianity. Among the Greeks not only Stoicism, but the later forms of Greek religion - Orphism, the cult of Asclepius, and the Mysteries - tended to

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*"Every soul is mine," Ezek. xviii.4; cf. Jer. xxxi. 29f., cf. Is. lvii.3ff., lvii.15.

**Is.xxvi, esp.vv 16-19. On the date of this section of Isaiah and on the connection of the idea of "evangelical poverty" with that of immortality and with the Beatitudes of the N.T. See Prof. G.A. Smith's chapters on "God's Poor" and "The Resurrection" (The Book of Isaiah, I, cc.xxix & xxx).
appeal to the individual more and more directly, and so to strengthen the sense of the independent personality as the true unit of spiritual value. Among the Jews the Diaspora continued the work begun by the Exile; and even after the Temple was rebuilt the growth of the Synagogue provided a centre of worship and prayer for their now widely scattered communities, and rendered the pious Jew in great measure independent of the national religion of ceremony and ritual still observed at Jerusalem.*

Religious ideas and observances now passed rapidly from land to land, and their acceptance came to depend on the individual's sense of what met his own soul's need instead of on the tradition of his nation.

But enough has already been said if it has been made clear that there was a preparation, both in History and in the earlier processes of Evolution which lie behind History, for the Christian view of the Value of the Individual. This view may be and has been regarded as the end to which all these tendencies of life and thought point the way; as no isolated or unsupported phantasy of the imagination, but as "the main stream of history and of science, and the only current set from eternity for the progress of the world and the perfecting of a human race."**


**Drummond, The Ascent of Man, p. 441.
From the thesis of our argument we now pass to the anti-
thesis, from the tendencies which helped to prepare the way for
the Christian estimate of the individual to those which have
hindered its acceptance and still hinder its realisation. Of
such counteracting and thwarting influences which have tended to
depress the individual and obscure his independent value, the
most important may be summed up under two heads, (1) physical
and (2) economic. The former tend to merge the isolated man
in the vastness of the cosmic process; the latter to lose sight
of his identity in the mass of his fellow-men.

(1) The scientific theories referred to in the last section
were susceptible of an interpretation which exalts the individ-
ual man by representing him as the highest product of Evolution.
But there are other points of view from which the study of
Nature has a quite opposite effect. The "ancient world," in
which the Western nations first began to reflect upon the charac-
ter and destiny of Man and to set so high a value on the in-
dividual was a small and compact world. Geographically it was
limited to the Mediterranean and the lands which bordered on
it, and astronomically it was generally considered as forming
the centre of the Cosmos. It was a world which could be
explored and comprehended by the imagination. Further, it was
a world the whole span of whose history was to be reckoned in
hundreds or at most thousands of years. The lives and achievements of great men bore a measurable ratio to the whole course of things; and the Greeks especially counted their noble families to be but a few generations removed from the gods from whom they sprang; though the Greek imagination was at once fascinated and alarmed by the far-stretching history and chronology of Egypt. And so it was also among the Jews, although their greater thinkers felt once and again the hopeless insignificance of man when contrasted with the measureless sweep and majesty of the divine work in Nature.

What is true of the Ancient World in this respect is true also of the Middle Age. The cosmology of Dante belongs to the time when the universe was still looked on as limited, measurable and symmetrical; and moral characteristics could still be expressed in terms of spatial position. But with the Renaissance and the rise of science, especially astronomical science, all this was changed. It is true that the full implications of the change were not at first understood; for the Copernican theory, while making the sun instead of the earth the centre of the Solar System, did not at once displace the Solar System from its position as the supposed centre of the universe. But the initial step had been taken, and in time the inevitable conclusion was reached, that the geocentric view of the universe was a sheer error, and that the home of Man was but one of the less conspicuous of countless worlds scattered through infinite space. Thus at the very time at which the
Reformation was reasserting the dignity of the individual, and his right and duty to approach God without any human or ecclesiastical meditation, astronomy had begun to throw down all the limits and barriers of his world, and to call him to look forth on a universe infinite both in space and time, whose vastness baffled and paralysed his imagination, and humbled him with a sense of unutterable insignificance and weakness. To those under the power of this over-mastering sense of the greatness of the physical universe, the assertion of the ultimate worth of the human soul and the divine significance of human history has often seemed utterly impossible and vain.

It is not a mere instance of prejudice or intellectual confusion which has made the defenders of orthodoxy fear the effect upon belief of scientific thought, especially of astronomy, the boldest of the sciences. The pious Greeks who attacked Anaxagoras as a dangerous innovator because he declared that the sun was a glowing stone, "as large as the Peloponnese," and the inquisitors who, centuries later, sought to stamp out the "heresy" of Galileo had some justification for their fears. In the latter instance, the new astronomy was gradually but surely breaking down the framework within which Christian belief had developed; nor was it entirely unreasonable to suppose that the destruction of the geocentric view of the physical might involve also the abandonment of the anthropocentric view of the moral universe. The framework within which the Christian view
of History had grown up was being removed, and men were forced to strain their imaginations in the vain attempt to compass spaces and eras before which the whole long drama of human life and history shrank to nothingness. Modern astronomy has placed a new and often an overpowering emphasis upon the words of the Hebrew poet, "Lo, these are but the outskirts of His ways; and how small a whisper do we hear of Him! But the thunder of his power who can understand?" And on the question which inevitably follows close upon this thought, "What is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou visitest him?" **

Now it may be said that the feeling of awe in face of the grandeur of the material universe which oppresses one who looks upward on a starry night, and tries to realise the least part of the majestic sweep of the cosmic times and spaces, in comparison with the insignificance and the shortness of human life, belongs only to the earlier and more primitive stage of religious experience; that this antithesis between the physically finite and infinite is soon transcended, and the problem of man's relation to the world takes other forms. We may freely admit that this is not the final statement of the ethical or religious problem or the highest form in which it arises. And yet this difficulty

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** Ps. viii. 3,4; cf. Is. xl, 26, 27.
cannot be disregarded, nor can the power of material immensity to oppress the human mind and dwarf the individual life be considered as wholly limited to the past. It is still felt, and this for two reasons. The victories of thought are not won once and for all; they have to be won afresh by each new generation. To borrow the illustration which Sabatier uses in this connection, just as physiologists have found in the human organism the traces of all the previous forms through which it has developed, so we find in the consciousness of the individual something of all the phases of the moral and religious evolution of the race.*

The other reason lies in the fact that in modern times science has placed in stronger relief than ever before the disproportion between the material insignificance of Man, and the greatness of the value which Christianity claims for even the humblest of men.

That this problem is no trivial or antiquated one is proved by the part it played in determining the thought of Pascal, one of the greatest of modern thinkers, and also by the place it holds in the philosophy of Kant. Early in the Nineteenth Century the extraordinary popularity of Chalmer's Astronomical Discourses was not only a tribute to the genius of the preacher but also a proof that he had good ground for his belief in the influence of what he styled "The astronomical objection against the truth of the Gospel," The same question gave Tennyson the

theme for his poem, "Vastness," and one of the leading thinkers of our own day, in arguing that the old forms of religious belief have become inadequate and untenable, bases his contention largely on the removal of those limits to the universe both in space and time, which ancient thought had established— or rather had taken for granted—and within which theological reflection had moved.*

Thus from each period of the modern world proofs may be drawn of the well-nigh crushing effect of the new conception of cosmic grandeur which astronomy has borne in on the human mind. And apart from the vastness of the material universe—a fact which is always present to those who care to reflect upon it—there come at intervals those great catastrophes, such as the earthquakes of Lisbon or Messina, which bring home even to the least thoughtful the feebleness of man, and the insecurity of his tenure of life in the midst of forces which seem to take no account of individuals and to involve good and bad alike in a common doom.** Thus we are forced to consider the greatness of the material universe and the apparent pitilessness of its forces, not as an influence which can be discounted, or as a problem which has been for ever set at rest, but as a real challenge to the Christian exaltation of the Individual.

(2) The other tendency of which account must be taken may

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* Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion, pp. 41-57.
** Cf. Gen. xviii.25.
be described as economic. The individual man is here considered merely as one among an incalculable number of his fellows; and it is the vastness of humanity, not the infinity of space, which threatens to absorb and annihilate his separate individuality. In the earlier part of this chapter we considered the evolutionary process as one which more and more tends to distinguish the individual from all the others of his kind, and to give him independent interest and worth. But if this is a main tendency of Evolution, there are many things which show how far it still is from having attained complete fulfilment, and which suggest that there are powerful forces working against its realisation. It is a significant fact that the Darwinian theory had one of its chief sources in the teaching of Malthus. In other words, it was after the effect of over-population and the pressure on the means of subsistence had been recognised in the case of human society, that the wider generalisation regarding the struggle for existence throughout all nature was reached. In the last section we considered fecundity of reproduction as marking the lower stages of the evolutionary process; but a century ago its effect in hindering the development of the individual and the progress of the race was first seen and emphasised in the sphere of human society, and only thereafter came to be recognised in its wider bearing on the lower orders of life.

From this point of view, society is still marked by many of the traits of the infra-human cosmic process. It may be
considered merely as a mass of competing units, not yet possessed of any distinct individuality and swayed by influences as general as those which determine the behaviour of the species of the animal kingdom. The sting of Malthusianism lies in this, that although it may be criticised as a one-sided and partial doctrine, yet there is a side or aspect of life to which it does apply. Further, while the range of those economic forces which bear upon the material needs of society is no wider than it has been from the beginning, yet now their operation is more widely understood, and we may also add that their impersonal character is more keenly realised. Here also the old limits of our world have been broken down, and we are forced to look forth upon the working of laws, whose full sweep was less fully present to the imagination of earlier times. Our very knowledge of the conditions of life in distant parts of the world, and of the increasing rapidity with which economic influences spread from one continent to another, tends to confirm and deepen our impression of their non-moral character, and of the helplessness and insignificance of the individual whose life in all its material aspects lies at their mercy. There is indeed the same indiscriminateness and indifference in the operation of these forces, whether they originate in physical events such as drought or in changes in the customs of society, as that which impresses us in the "blind" workings of Nature in the earthquake or the tempest.

There is also a sense in which not only economics but
political theory and practice tend to disregard the individual, and so to cast a shadow of doubt upon the value of his life. Nor is this aspect of political action a new one; for in spite of the great reverence for Law which distinguished the thought of Plato and Aristotle, they both recognised that Law is defective in so far as its "generality" prevents it from taking note of individual differences and adapting itself to the endless variety of life. Hence Plato compared it to an ignorant and unfeeling ruler who seeks to apply an entirely rigid rule to infinitely varied circumstances, while Aristotle held that Law must be supplemented by Clemency (ἐμείκεια) where it fails through excessive generality.** Now in the ancient city-state it was possible to look for this "Rectification of Law" in the personal judgment of a wise ruler, as Plato and Aristotle did, but the rulers of a great modern state are as far from being able to apply "the leaden rule of Lesbian architecture" which adapts itself to the varied angles and facets of individual character, as is the most rigid code of written law. In an age which seeks to reduce even "charity" to rule, we can hardly dispute the saying of Bentham that "the legislator can know nothing of individuals," for he must only interfere with their action "with respect to those broad lines of conduct in which

* Polit. 294 BC.
** Eth.Nic., E 1137b26 - καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐθονόρθωμα νόμου, ὡς ἔλλειπει ὁ πεπεθέλου.
all persons or very large and permanent descriptions of persons may be in a way to engage.* It is as impossible for the ruler of a great community to legislate for individuals as it would be unwise for the economist to confuse his generalisations by trying to give an account of the variety of their tastes; and it is this necessary limitation of Law which has led such thinkers as John Stuart Mill to desire the restriction of state action within the narrowest possible limits in order that the principle of individuality may have the freest possible play.**

It is indeed inevitable that both legislators and economists should show the same "tendency to confide in large numbers and averages;" and it is instructive to find that even Kant, the greatest defender of Freedom in the moral sphere, is at one with Hume in holding that the law of averages holds good when applied to the collective action of large bodies of men.†

In recognising this tendency of political economy to disregard the individual, we do not necessarily accept as well directed all the gibes that have been levelled against "the dismal science." The point of view of the economist or the statesman is a necessary one,** and the fruitfulness of the results

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* Cited by Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy, p. 228.

** Cf. especially On Liberty, ch. III. - Of Individuality, as one of the Elements of Well-being.

† Bonar, op. cit., pp. 386, 121, 27. The reference is to Kant's Rechtslehre.

** More than this, it is capable of subserving high ethical ends. See below pp. 163, and Note B, at the end of this chapter.
of political and economic science proves that it is in contact with a large section of the circle of human experience. Yet, as we have seen, it tends to disregard that element of individuality which is one of the chief characteristics of the Christian view of the world. And in so far as it is taken as all-inclusive, or even as the controlling point of view, from which all other facts or theories are to be estimated, we find ourselves occupying a standpoint from which it is hard, or perhaps impossible, to justify the Christian separation and exaltation of the individual man. In so far as our thinking is dominated by purely economic categories, we are bound to the method of averages, we must look on the individual not as a person but as a unit, subject to or actuated by wide impersonal forces, and so we fall short of the ideal of the Christian thought; and in so far as the life of our time can be adequately and completely described in these terms, society has failed to reach a level at which this ideal becomes a concrete fact.
NOTE B.

I do not think that what is said in the text is inconsistent with Dr. Bonar's argument that there is no necessary opposition between Political Economy and an idealistic ethic. (Philosophy and Political Economy, pp. 218 ff.) Nor do I disregard the sympathetic statement of the Christian view of the Individual by so distinguished an economist as Professor Marshall. (Economics of Industry, p. 3) These may be taken as proofs that the polemic of Carlyle and Ruskin against the narrowness of the older economists, though necessary in their day, is not in the same degree necessary now. To the same effect one might cite the argument of another Cambridge economist, which practically reproduces the position of Kant referred to above, that the law of averages enables us to hold to the scientific postulate of predictability when dealing with the collective actions of bodies of men, while at the same time holding that individuals possess freedom from determination. (A. C. Pigou, The Problem of Theism and other Essays, pp. 74-6). But these references only point to a growing recognition of the one-sidedness of Political Economy taken in isolation. Even for Professor Marshall it still retains its characteristic method of abstraction. As economists, "we take as little notice as possible of individual peculiarities of temper and character. We watch the conduct of a whole class of people." (Op. cit., p. 25). Now what
I have tried to establish in the text is simply that the economic point of view, taken before its abstractions have been rectified by an idealistic and (if the term is permissible) personalistic philosophy, tends by its very neglect of the individual as such - necessary as this is for its own purposes - to act as a negative influence in regard to the Christian view. And even though the leading economists of the present day are the first to proclaim that strictly economic facts need to be revised from the ethical point of view; yet the older and harsher form of economic doctrine continues to tell as a popular force, just because it is the theoretic formulation of the methods of a civilisation which in practice is still largely materialistic and heedless of the welfare of its individual members.
CHAPTER III.

THE VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS A POSITIVE DOCTRINE.
I.

It thus appears from the facts mentioned at the end of the last chapter that there have been, and are, strong forces working against the acceptance of the Christian view of the value of the Individual; and that, although nineteen centuries have elapsed since its first proclamation, it cannot yet be held up as an unquestioned or axiomatic principle of thought or of action. It is still, in some measure at least, on its defence; and so the question comes to be an important one whether philosophy has any contribution to make to that defence. When man is awed by the greatness of the stars, and feels himself as of no account in a universe which so surpasses the utmost flight of imagination, or when he is borne helplessly hither and thither by the uncontrolled forces of physical catastrophe or economic change, has philosophy any thought that may relieve the sense of paradox, or even irony, with which the high claim that humanity has infinite worth sounds in his ears?

(1) The first answer to this question is based on the nature of Thought itself. One of the favourite topics of philosophers has always been the power of the mind to transcend local and temporal conditions; and from this power the conclusion has been drawn that the mind is in some sense superior to these conditions, and may gain an inner freedom and independence from the limitations of merely material existence. In the inner life of thought and feeling, there is a satisfaction, and a sense of abiding worth which, to those who have experienced it, makes all questions of physical
magnitude wholly irrelevant. Hence Hegel and others have argued that the attempt to escape from the sense of finitude by sending the imagination ever farther into the recesses of the physical universe is a vain and hopeless one. To do so is to pursue the "false infinite" which consists merely in endless repetition. And however far such repetition be carried, it brings us no new truth or insight into the real nature of the world; for according to the Greek saying, "it is the same to say a thing once, and to say it for ever."* Such an attempt to reach a purely quantitative infinite only takes us ever further away from the discovery that the true meaning of the world lies in the thought and the objective work of the human spirit, which satisfies the desire for the infinite by providing an ever-deepening and widening content of experience and reflection. In seeking to transcend the finite by the method of spatial and temporal addition, the human spirit is traversing an alien region; but in returning upon itself, and finding that the meaning of life lies within, thought is emancipated from bondage to the categories of quantity and number and enters the world of inner freedom.

*Encyclopaedie.

q 104. (Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, pp. 194 ff.) It is worth while to quote the striking lines of Albr. von Haller, with which Hegel illustrates his argument:

Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen,
Gebirge Millionen auf,
Ich setze Zeit auf Zeit
Und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf
Und wenn ich von der grausen Höh'
Mit Schwindel wieder nach Dir seh:
Ist alle Macht der Zahl
Vermehrt zu Tausendmal,
Noch nicht ein Theil von Dir -
Ich zieh sie ab, and Du liegst ganz vor mir.
But there is another and simpler way of stating the case. We may accept to the full all that has been said as to the overwhelming grandeur of the physical universe, and yet hold that this grandeur bears some close and necessary relation to the mind which apprehends it, even when sinking oppressed by its magnitude. The mind is judged by other standards than that of spatial extent; yet even by this standard the faculty which measures the stars is comparable in greatness to the stars themselves. Without the presence of intelligent beings, fitted to comprehend the significance of the Universe, it has been said that the Heavens themselves would be in the strict sense insignificant,* and a modern poet has expressed the same thought in the words,

"And the departing sun his glory owes,
To the eternal thought of creatures brief,
Who think the thing that they can never see."

There is thus a real sense in which the greatness of the Macrocosm depends upon the power of Man, the Microcosm to apprehend it; and in which the mind of the thinker shares the magnitude of the spaces and times which form the object of his thought.


** Stephen Phillips, Marpessa.

† Cf. Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, II, xi, "The earth is a point not only in respect of the Heavens above us, but of that heavenly and celestial part within us. . . . Whilst I study to find how I am a Microcosm, or little World, I find myself something more than the great."
The argument may be carried a step further. Even when the mind has to confess its weakness, and to fall back before a vastness which transcends conception, yet this consciousness of failure is in itself a sign of grandeur. For a meaner being this sense would be impossible; but in the very recognition of that which transcends his finite being, man shows that he is not wholly finite. "He is very great because he knows his weakness." The clear perception of the greatness which is implied in the recognition of the weakness and limitations of humanity is the great contribution of Pascal to modern thought.* In his physical powerlessness Man, the "thinking reed" confronts the universe, and transcends, because he comprehends it. By the very reach of his imagination and the height of the standard by which he judges his own life, he bears unconscious witness to his own greatness.

There are thus two different lines of argument by which we may approach the same result. The one dwells on the inner life of spirit as exhibiting a completeness, a wealth of meaning, and an inner harmony which give to it a higher order of magnitude than that of the external and material world. The other looks out upon this world, and shows that the mind which understands and measures it is also great, and that even man's sense of his own insignificance is a tribute to the greatness of powers which cannot rest satisfied with the limitations of his experience in time and space.

These are indeed only slightly different paths to the same conclusion - that the mind must be judged by its own standards, and not

* Pensées XVIII, viii - xviii.
by those of spatial or temporal extent. And to this right there corresponds the duty of finding the highest exercise for the powers of thought. Thus Pascal draws the natural conclusion from his famous argument in saying, "Man is clearly made to think: here lies all his dignity and all his merit, and his whole duty is to think aright."

(2) This, then is the first answer to the theories which reduce man to an insignificant place in the Universe. On the one side of his nature he is but "the quintessence of dust", but on the other he is a being "of large discourse, looking before and after."* It is on this side, by his power of encompassing the world by Reason, that he is raised above all material magnitude. But this argument is in itself insufficient as a defence of the Christian view of the individual because of its entirely intellectual character. For the Christian view the purely intellectual and rational elements of man's nature are neither the highest nor the most characteristic; and Pascal's statement that the whole duty of man is to "think aright" would need to be understood in a wider sense than that which it at first sight bears before it could be accepted as the verdict of Christian Ethics.** The appeal of Christianity has always been made to a wider circle than that of the thinkers, to a wider range of human faculties than the merely intellectual; and especially in its beginning.

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* Hamlet II, ii, 321; IV, iv, 36.
** There is another passage in the Pensées (IX, 1.) which distinguishes this intellectual point of view from that of the N.T., and definitely advances from the former to the latter,"Tous les corps, le firmament, les étoiles, la terre et ses royaumes, ne
it depended little upon the impression produced by close reasoning or intellectual argument.* Hence, while the argument from the greatness of man's rational nature is of value as a refutation of the naturalistic estimate of man as a mere part of the physical world, yet it is possible to find a nearer approach to, and consequently a more telling defence of, the Christian view in another form of philosophical theory. The essential element in that view has received philosophical formulation in the Kantian doctrine of "the Primacy of the Practical Reason," and it is from Kant that we may most suitably borrow the next stage of our argument.

The ethics of Kant have as their starting-point the famous statement of the absolute worth of the Good Will. All other things, whether gifts of fortune, or endowments of nature, have only a conditional value, which depends on the use made of them by the will. But the will itself, as that which directs the use and determines the value of all other things, has itself a higher and intrinsic value.** Every material "good" and even every capacity of the mind (understanding) or the emotional

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* Mark xii. 37 (Cf. Dr Whyte, The Walk, Conversation and Character of our Lord, pp. 170) 1 Cor. i.20, ii.4, xiii.2 Cf below p. 104 f

** Grundlegung, init. (IV. 393-4; Cf. V, 60; Abbott pp. 9-10, 151) I refer to the pages of the "Akademie-ausgabe" of Kant's works, and to the Fifth Edition of Abbott's translation.
nature has a contingent character from the point of view of morality; for all these things are merely instrumental to the ends of the free moral agent. Now it was inconceivable to Kant that this contingency should run through all experience, or that there should be no fixed point of value, itself raised above contingency, from which the relative and instrumental value of material objects or mental powers might be derived. Consequently he drew a distinction between Things (Sachen) and Persons (Personen), of which absolute value belonged to the latter alone, but also to all the latter.

In so doing, he was repeating the procedure of the Critique of Pure Reason, the object of which is to distinguish in the sphere of knowledge between the constructive work of the mind and the flux of contingent phenomena. We may perhaps bring out the parallelism between the two spheres, apart from the special form of the Critical Philosophy, by saying that just as the knowing mind gives to material objects a character and a greatness which cannot be assigned to them as apart from knowledge (even assuming that they can exist in such isolation); so also the will of man as a rational being gives them a new value by relating them as means to the attainment of his highest purposes. The organising and vitalising work of knowledge has its counterpart in the activity of the moral nature, or "practical reason," of man. Now these statements may each be taken in two different senses. They may be taken in the sense usually attributed to the formula of Protagoras, that "Man is the Measure of all things," and in this case the
argument only proves that objects gain a new value for us when they are worked into the fabric of our knowledge, or used as means to the ends of our wills. Or we may take both statements in an objective sense, holding that our point of view has more than a merely relative validity, and that in the subordination of things to the principle of personality some end of positive and universal value is attained.

It is hardly necessary to say that the second is the point of view of Kant in his practical philosophy, which alone concerns us at present. The end gained in morality is objective because, not we alone, but all rational beings are unable to treat their moral nature, in its subjection to the Law of Duty, as a mere means to the ends of others. Humanity has an absolute worth, and so the practical imperative of duty assumes the form of a command to treat it "in oneself or others, always as an end, never as a means."* Hence it follows that the predicate of "value" is applied in a different sense to things and to persons; or rather that a different predicate is needed to mark the distinction in rank between them, and so Kant reaches the distinction between Value (Preis) and Dignity (Würde).**

* Grundlegung, II. (IV, 428-9; Abbott, pp. 46-7.)

** Kant distinguishes Preis into Marktpreis and Affektionspreis. But if we take the other distinction between "value-in-use" and "value-in-exchange," the result is the same. Both are economic categories, and on Kant's principles neither can rightly be used in the ethical sphere. Just because a man as a moral being is unique he cannot be exchanged or replaced, and because he is an end in himself, he ought not to be used (i.e., treated as a mere means.) It would have been more strictly accurate to have used
"In the Kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity. Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. . . . That which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e., value, but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity. Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself. . . Thus morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has dignity."

If it should now be asked on what grounds Kant claims this unique worth for humanity, we may distinguish two elements in his thought. (a) The first emphasises man's relation to the moral law and to the intelligible, or, in the language of subsequent idealism, the spiritual, world; and (b) the second, which is adumbrated rather than clearly developed, suggests that from the point of view of the inner life each man has a unique value for the universal life.

(a) Kant's whole conception of the moral life is that of obedience to a supreme and unconditional law. Such a law cannot be found in Nature; and if it were found there, it would not satisfy the definition of morality, for it would be merely external, that is to say imposed from without. But a free and responsible being cannot be bound by any law of conduct which does not spring from, and make its appeal to, his own inmost nature.

the term worth (Kant's Werth) or dignity of the Individual throughout this discussion, thus marking its distinction from the economic idea of value; but the phrase "Value of the Individual" is so well-established in this connection that it is enough to indicate the distinction here.

* Abbott's tr., p. 53 (IV, 434-5).
It is when he recognises and obeys such an inward command that he becomes truly a man and truly free. But in the very fact that he can and must conceive himself free to obey the law of conscience, there is sufficient proof that he is no longer completely ruled by natural and external law. He is a subject not of the realm not of Nature but of Freedom: he has taken his place as a "member of the kingdom of ends". This principle of "The Autonomy of the will" is one of Kant's greatest contributions to ethical thought; while on it he was prepared to base the whole argument for the supreme worth of man.*

As has already been remarked, Kant did not confine this attribute of autonomy to a few especially favoured individuals: he saw in it a universal characteristic of human nature in every rank or condition. Wherever a man resists the promptings of impulse and follows the command of duty, he is by the very fact raised above the causal sequence of the physical order; and, in obeying the law of his own higher nature, has asserted his freedom and given proof of his dignity as a moral being in the face of all the forces of the sensible world. To such an action a greatness belongs which surpasses all the conventional distinctions and dignities of society; and such actions are possible to all men alike. Such an action awakens in us the feeling of Respect (Achtung) — whatever be the rank of the man who performs it.

* "Autonomie ist also der Grund der Würde der menschlichen und jeder vernünftigen Natur" - Grundlegung, IV, 436; cf. 430 ff., and Kr. der Prakt - Vernunft, V, 43. (Abbott, pp. 54, 59-73, 137.)
"Fontenelle says, 'I bow before a great man, but my mind does not bow. I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose it or not.'* Ultimately, the object of respect is the same Moral Law which we recognise as binding on ourselves; but the man whom we respect as enriching, it shares in its dignity, whether he be great or poor, learned or simple.

As the late Professor Paulsen himself, like Kant, a North-German and a man of the people - has said, "Kant here stands in close connection with the Christian view of life and attitude towards it. . . . To the Christianity of the heart and will, as it was and still is practised among the common people, his relation was close and intimate. Indeed one may say that his morality is nothing but the translation of this Christianity from religious language to the language of reflection."**

We cannot leave the ethics of Kant without referring to the great passage at the end of the Critique of Practical Reason, in which he sums up the teaching of his philosophy on the relation of man to the double universe of his experience and thought:—

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law.

* Kr. der Prakt. Vernunft, V, 76-7 (Abbott, pp. 169-70) Achtung corresponds to Würde, of which it is the subjective recognition, and like it extends only to persons, as exhibiting the power and dignity of the Moral Law.

** Immanuel Kant, His Life and Doctrine, (tr. Creighton and Lefevre, P. 339). The eloquent passage from which these sentences are taken is well worthy of study in this connection.
within. . . . The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital power, one knows not how, must again give back the matter of which it was formed to the planet it inhabits (a mere speck in the universe). The second, on the contrary, infinitely elevates my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent on animality and even on the whole sensible world - at least so far as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite." *

This is in truth the grandest answer that philosophy has given to the objection that the rank claimed by Christianity for man is inconsistent with his humble position in the great universe of space. It calls us to consider the inner greatness of the free personality which is able to take its stand against all the forces of Nature and to obey a law which these forces could neither create nor annihilate - a law bearing the impress of a higher order which lends grandeur to what is least in the scale of merely physical being. Nor, for all its boldness, is this a new conception. It is rather a statement in modern language, and in face of our modern knowledge of the infinite magnitude of the universe of space and time, of the old thought that the secret of man's destiny is not afar off in the heavens, but that it is "very nigh" - a word and a law that is in our hearts, that we may do it.**

(b) If this conception of the moral law as raising man above the natural order and its standards of greatness meets the

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** Deut. XXX. 11-14.
first type of objection against the Christian view of the individual, an answer to the other type, which we distinguished as the economic, may be found in the other line of thought suggested by Kant. This relates to the uniqueness of the moral individual. Now there is here a distinct limitation in Kant's thought. His abstract way of conceiving the universality of the Moral Law prevented him from working out the idea of uniqueness on its objective side - the idea of each individual as making his special and distinctive contribution to the good of all; and hence as acquiring a unique value for the outward and visible life of the whole. But just because of his limitation in this direction, he was able to lay down more clearly the foundation for the doctrine on its subjective side. We have already seen something of the importance of this element in the estimate of individuality;* but it must be developed somewhat further at this stage.

The recognition of the subjective worth of the individual means that the point of the outside spectator is departed from, and the fact recognised that any true estimate of a man's worth must take into account his own inner attitude to life and sense of its value and import. Now the political or economic standpoint is simply that of the spectator, who surveys men in masses. It is that of the manufacturer who reckons his "hands" in hundreds, or of the general who counts the thousands of his troops, estimating their value by their total or corporate efficiency. Or in so far as individuals are considered, it is on the ground of what

* Supra, p. 57.
they can do through some special natural gift or acquired aptitude. But over against this external estimate idealistic ethics places that of inner feeling. It contends that a man's place in the world cannot be rightly determined without some degree of imaginative sympathy. To understand him in his real worth we must know something of his ideals as well as his deeds, nor may we forget that he has been made what he is by inward conflicts which remain unknown even to the keenest and most sympathetic observer. But much has been gained when it is recognised that he does possess such interests and ideals, such incommunicable hopes and fears, and that the eyes with which he looks out upon the world are indeed his own. Thus, however much he may resemble others, from the outer point of view, and however commonplace his utmost contribution to the common stock of human thought or achievement may appear, yet his universe is his own, and his life has value for himself at least. But it will also have value for others just in so far as they have insight enough to respect the individuality of another's outlook. So we may adopt the familiar idea of Leibnitz, and say that each intelligent being reflects the universe from an independent standpoint, and that, although no one can enter into another's consciousness, yet it is possible to realise that each has such a unique and inalienable view of life.

It is clear how much support this view derives from the Kantian doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will. No moral person can promulgate the law for any other. To each it must come as
a call and a command from his own higher nature, and in so far as
he obeys it he is entitled to an inalienable respect. The im-
portance of this standpoint of imaginative sympathy has also been
brought out in one of Professor James' most brilliant and incis-
ive passages at the close of his lecture on Human immortality.
He first states the view that the claim of infinite value, for
the individual with the consequent doctrine that immortality
does not belong to a few outstanding spirits but may be the her-
itage of all, imposes an intolerable strain and burden on the
imagination. For of what use can be the preservation of innum-
erable commonplace and undistinguished lives? He then points
out that this argument is only cogent from the purely external
point of view, from which the most essential fact is overlooked.

"Not a being of the countless throng is there whose
continued life is not called for, and called for intensely
by the consciousness that animates the being's form. That
you neither realize, nor understand, nor call for it, that
you have no use for it, is an absolutely irrelevant circum-
stance. That you have a saturation-point of interest tells
us nothing of the interests that absolutely are. The uni-
verse, with every living entity which her resources create,
creates at the same time a call for that entity, and an ap-
petite for its continuance, - creates it, if nowhere else,
at least within the heart of the entity itself.

. . . Each new mind brings its own edition of the universe
of space along with it, its own room to inhabit; and these
spaces never crowd each other. . . The inner significance
of other lives exceeds all our powers of sympathy and in-
sight. If we feel a significance in our own life which
would lead us spontaneously to claim its perpetuity, let
us at least be tolerant of like claims made by other lives,
however numerous, however unideal they may seem to us to be."

In the same way another modern writer has shown suggestively
the importance for philosophy of the stage in experience at
which it becomes possible to identify one's own interests with
those of another. . . For in this relation (love) the external-
ity of knowledge and volition are overcome. The object is no
longer interesting for his qualities, but for himself; that is,
another's life is regarded from the same standpoint of inner ap-
preciation from which he regards it himself.

"Reference to the object tends to become equivalent to re-
ference to self. . . . We feel that this dependence on
another is as directly and truly self-realisation as is the
dependence of others on us. All through life self-surrender
is the condition of self-attainment. Here for the first time
they become identical."* 

In this recognition of the importance of entering into the
interests of others in order to estimate truly the worth of their
lives, there is clearly a close approximation to the Christian
standpoint. Here in truth Moral Philosophy is only placing in
a reflective light the principle which underlies the Christian
estimate; and if the principle had not first been stated as an
intuitive truth and a direct moral duty, it is improbable that
the philosophical formulation would ever have been reached.
But the Christian attitude has not only been reflected in the
trend of ethical thought, especially in modern times; it has
also determined and been illustrated by many of the masterpieces
of literature. There is a sense in which all great tragedy de-
pends for its effect on the dignity of the individual man, and
the essential kinship of spirit between men of the most widely
separately ages and characters. If our minds "are purified by
pity and terror," in reading Oedipus Coloneus or King Lear, this
is not primarily due to the kingly rank of these heroes of

* J.E.McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, 294-8.
tragedy. That is a relatively accidental or conventional matter, while the essential features of the drama, — the serene dignity of Oedipus when he has borne the punishment of his guilt to the end, or the agony and madness of Lear — belong to the human experience which in its capacity for suffering and endurance is the same in every age. Tragedy is universal just in so far as it speaks the language of this common experience; and in recent times the real nature of its universality has been made more evident by the abandonment of the old convention that heroes must be of royal rank, and by the discovery and representation both of pathos and heroism in common life and among common people.*

The same principle that, through some measure of identification, in imagination at least, with the lives of others can an adequate estimate of their worth be reached, is exemplified in the history of the Jewish nation. It was through their harsh and repeated experience of the sorrows of exile that the Jews were able to transcend in some measure their natural exclusiveness, and that the finer spirits of the nation held up as an

* This recognition of the artistic and ethical value of apparently commonplace lives is not only exemplified incidentally in the imaginative literature of the Nineteenth Century. It was consciously adopted and explicitly defended early in their careers by two writers so great in their respective departments as Wordsworth and George Eliot. Cf. the opening paragraphs of Wordsworth's prose Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads, and several passages in George Eliot's first work, Scenes from Clerical Life. (Amos Barton, ch. v, Janet's Repentance, ch. x, xxii). One passage may be quoted from the latter. "The only true knowledge of our fellow-man is that which enables us to feel with him. . . Our subtlest analysis must miss the essential truth, unless it be lit up by the love that sees in all forms of human thought and work, the life and death struggles of separate human beings."
ideal the treatment of strangers and homeless folk with the same consideration and justice that were acknowledged to be due to fellow-countrymen. It is true that the feeling of a special obligation towards those who lacked the ordinary protection of citizenship was not unknown among the Greeks, and that throughout Greek literature we find the saying that "strangers and suppliants come from Zeus."* But the "autochthonous" Athenian or the conquerian Dorian invader could never feel his kinship with or his duty to the stranger with the same intimacy as the Israelite, on whom it was enjoined with the added stress of the repeated words, "for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt".**

Again, the feeling of ethical obligation to help others or to refrain from injuring them cannot but lead on from respect for their rights to recognition of their worth. When humanity to those of humbler rank or to the defenceless is held up as an incontestable moral duty, as in a remarkable passage in the Book of Job,† the feeling that such men have an inner worth cannot be far distant. To recognise an obligation to any man is implicitly to feel that he has an independent value, and that he is more than a mere chattel, but must be treated as a moral person.

* From Homer to Plato, Laws, 729-730.

** Ex. xxxiii. 9, also xxii. 21; Lev. xix. 34; Deut. v. 15, x.19. Cf. Clark Murray, op. cit., pp. 56. 96.

† xxxi, 13-22, 29-32.
II.

When we come to the teaching of the New Testament, we find this principle clearly embodied in the practical rule, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do ye also unto them, for this is the law and the prophets."* To those who had fully accepted the Christian estimate of the worth of every human being, this maxim might indeed seem needless; for to obey it would be the necessary consequence of a vital belief in the principle which underlies it. But there is also a converse relation between the maxim and the principle, and the attempt to obey the former may be the best, may the only, way of gaining a firm hold upon the latter. The effort to help others has often proved the surest way of coming to feel the hidden worth of their lives. Active help is not only the consequence of sympathy and appreciation: it is often the condition of their growth. Hence the importance of seeking to apply the practical rule of considerateness if we would penetrate to the truth of the gospel doctrine of the worth of the individual. How infinite its importance was in the eyes of Jesus is shown by the place given in the account of the Judgment in Matt. XXV to deeds of kindness to the obscure and the suffering. The man who had made no practical effort to place himself beside such humble sufferers and to help them was unworthy of the Kingdom. He had failed to recognise that they were worthy of his help, with a worthiness

* Matt. VII. 12.
which Jesus even compared and identified with His own.

This judgment is indeed a stern one, but the reason for its severity becomes clear when we remember how far agreement or disagreement with the Christian estimate of the individual depends on the practical attitude to individuals. He who judges their worthiness of help by purely external standards must remain outside the standpoint of the gospels; but he who seeks to exercise the double sympathy of feeling and of active help has some chance of passing from without to within, and coming to know something of the inner worth of their aspirations and efforts.

There is no need to enlarge on the unique degree in which Jesus Himself habitually entered into the hopes and the difficulties of those among whom He lived. Men instinctively applied to Him such passages as those of the Second Isaiah, "A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench"; "Himself took our infirmities, and bare our diseases."* There was in His ministry at once a new appreciation of the possibilities of neglected lives, and a limitless willingness to penetrate to their secrets and win their confidence through a voluntary sharing of their distress.**

In other points the ethical theory outlined in the previous section is in harmony with the teaching of the gospels. They most clearly proclaim the truth that for each man the secret of life lies within, and that, when the inward good is subordinated

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* Matt. xii. 20, viii. 17.
** Cf. Matt. xi. 28f.
to even the widest possible appropriation of the goods of the material world, the result must be the loss of all that gives human life its ultimate significance. "What shall a man be profited if he shall gain the whole world and forfeit his life? or what shall a man give in exchange for his life?" The same judgment of value underlies the saying "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth" and the parable of the Rich Fool which follows it. Each man's first concern must be for his own inner life, for the rightness of his own will, and not for the outward and material, which he must be willing, it need be, wholly to renounce. Only by such renunciation does the true life of the spirit become possible: only so can the claim of its exaltation above all the forces of the material world be securely established.

Since this is so, it is not hard to see how the absence of preoccupation with worldly possessions and rivalries is the necessary condition of a receptive attitude to the spiritual good of the Kingdom of God. Hence wealth and position are treated rather as a hindrance than as a help to the attainment of this highest good. At one time a child is taken as the typical subject of the Kingdom:

†Matt. XVI.26.


††Matt. XVIII.2,3, XIX.14.
the qualification for admission to it is said to be meekness and poverty - poverty of heart in the first instance, but also to some extent external poverty, for the two ideas were interwoven in Jewish thought far more than with us.* Or again, the emphasis is laid on openness of mind, the attitude of one who has not been confused or sophisticated by involved intellectual discussions, but is ready to accept that which is intellectually simple as the highest truth.** But in every case the thought is the same that the "good soil" in which the words of Jesus may readily strike root is to be found in open, receptive, hearts, without pride either of knowledge or possessions, who feel the need of a deeper satisfaction than the world is able to give. Only where there is this sense of want and imperfection can the new life enter; and it is most likely to be found among the obscure and the humble, among those who are not endowed so liberally with the goods of this world as to have no longing for a better order without or within.

At the same time it is clear that Jesus did not teach that outward poverty is the invariable condition of self-criticism and spiritual receptiveness. The parable of the Pharisee and the Publican suggests the opposite view - that riches, if accompanied by humility, are not an impassable obstacle against entry

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into the Kingdom. It is because he shares the feelings of self-dissatisfaction and desire for a nobler life, which are possible to men in every station that the Publican is commended.* This is not inconsistent with the severity of the judgment of Jesus on the rich, for it is based on the fact that they "have received their consolation," and so are as a rule less ready to feel the "hunger and thirst after righteousness."** We may thus sum up this aspect of the teaching of Jesus by saying that while the absence of outward distinction is no barrier against any who would enter the Kingdom, the barrier which is serious, nay insurmountable, is that confidence in either wealth or knowledge which stifles the aspiration of the heart after a higher good or is offended by His call to simplicity of heart and life.

From the condemnation of wealth regarded as an end in itself, apart from the use to which it is put and the character of the user, Jesus passes naturally to the converse truth that the wealth of this world, though not intrinsically or invariably a good, gains a borrowed virtue from the good will of the man or woman who uses it. This is most clearly shown in the saying regarding the poor widow who cast two mites into the treasury - "Of a truth I say unto you, this poor widow cast in more than they

* Luke XVIII.9-14. This parable has at times been treated as showing an antinomian tendency to minimise the sins of the Publican's life and discount the righteousness of the Pharisee. But this is a misconception. It is not the righteousness but the self-righteousness of the Pharisee which is condemned, just as the Publican is commended not for his past life, but for his recognition of its baseness and longing for something higher.

This incident may be taken in conjunction with that of the anointing by Mary of Jesus' feet, and of His rebuke when the onlookers condemned the wastefulness of the deed—"She hath wrought a good work. . She hath done what she could." **From these two stories may be gathered the teaching of Jesus regarding the use of wealth and its real value. The size of the gift is not indifferent, but neither is it the essential thing: it has value in relation to the spirit of the giver, and as manifesting the completeness of his or her devotion.†

Another reflection suggested by these two stories which has a direct bearing on our subject is that of the influence of Christ's life and teaching in raising the estimate of the place and dignity of Woman. This thought is perhaps less familiar than that of His appreciation of childhood, but it is hardly less important, and it is shown in many ways in the gospels. The very fact that He placed so high a value on the gentler virtues and on the inner qualities of devotion and sympathy sufficed to destroy the old prejudice as to the inferiority of woman's powers and to set in a new and bright light her special aptitudes and the special function which she had to fulfil in the Kingdom. Again, the teaching in regard to marriage which to the contemporaries of Jesus seemed so exacting and so revolutionary, tended

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**Mark. XIV. 6,8.

†Cf. Jesus' command to the young Ruler (Matt. XIX, 21), and Ruskin's chapter on "The Lamp of Sacrifice," (The Seven Lamps of Architecture, chap. I, sect. VIII.)
to the same end. By giving "a new reading of old texts," He at once rebuked and reversed the low Jewish estimate of the worth of Woman and the nature of marriage; and so dealt one of the most telling blows against all exclusive and particularist views of virtue.

But it is the teaching of Jesus regarding the "Child-element" in religion which takes us furthest into the heart of our subject. For in the last resort His claim that the life of the individual has value, not only for himself or as a call on the active love of others, but for God - has an absolute as distinct from all relative and derived value - rests upon the thought of the Fatherhood of God. Into this region it is hard, perhaps impossible, for philosophical thought to follow. The words in which Jesus makes his mighty claim, founds it upon the Fatherhood of God, and draws from it the practical lessons of freedom from distracting anxiety and of respect for "these little ones," are among the simplest and most familiar in the New Testament; but in their simplicity they transcend in an especial degree both the experience of the "practical man" and the speculations of the philosopher. Those who have understood and accepted them have done so by rising into an atmosphere of clear intuitive vision in some measure like that in which Jesus lived and taught;

*Matt. xix.3ff., and Bruce's note in the Expositor's Gk. Test.

**Matt. vi.25ff. x.24ff.; Luke xii.32; Matt.xviii.10.14. "I say unto you that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father. . . Even so it is not the will of your Father which is in heaven,that one of these little ones should perish."
although the principles so learned have not seldom proved their power when brought back and applied in the world of ordinary experience.

One thing, however, stands out clear from our previous discussion—that this is the highest expression of all those tendencies which have helped to set the individual man in relief, to separate him from the multitude, and to treat him as possessing independent interest and value. And the Christian religion makes the claim that these tendencies are the strongest force in the universe by teaching that they are in harmony with the character of God. If the idea of Fatherhood, as distinct from Power or Sovereignty, be the highest and the most accurate conception that we can form of the Divine Being, then the worth of the individual is grounded in the nature of the universe. The politician and the scientist may still treat men in masses and aggregates, but their view does not represent the ultimate truth of things. "The individual citizen may be lost in the crowd of the sovereign's subjects; the Father's child can never be lost in the crowd; he is singled out as the object of the Father's individualising love." *

There still remains one aspect of the Christian teaching on this subject which must be referred to before this chapter is brought to a close, and which will serve to lead on to the Christian doctrine of the Community. The attitude of Christianity

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* D. M. Ross, The Teaching of Jesus, p. 92.
to the Individual is essentially dynamical. It does not merely declare that he has intrinsic value, as a new fact or aspect of truth may be declared. Still less does it make a sentimental assertion of the value of humanity, and leave the assertion standing. Christianity not only proclaims, but creates, the fact. In other words its character is redemptive; and it is in this light that its claim of the worth of the individual soul is to be judged. For the highest attestation of that claim is to be found in the fact that He Who made it, was willing to suffer even death for those whose value He proclaimed. Heine once said that he too might have died to save men, had he not shrewdly suspected that they were not worth saving; and this remark, by displaying the absolute contrast and antithesis to the attitude of Jesus, makes that attitude more luminously clear. Whatever interpretation be placed upon the saying, "The Son of Man came... to give his life a ransom for many," the fact for which it stands has done more than anything else to raise the individual men for whom this sacrifice was made to a higher level; and it must ever be the most powerful influence in transforming the Christian assertion of their supreme value from an ideal into a fact.

This view of the Christian teaching is clearly implied wherever such metaphors as "healing" or "search" are used to describe the work of Jesus. The value of the souls of men depend on their

* Matt. xx. 28.
relation to His work; and hence that value is asserted less as an accomplished and unalterable fact than as a great possibility. No other view is consistent with the severity of Christ’s judgment on whole classes of men whom He perceived to be hindering the advance of His kingdom.* The lives of such men as they actually were, not only failed to show positive value, they were definitely opposed to all true value and it had been better for them never to have begun to live. The definiteness with which He distinguished between those who were on the side of the Good and those who were its enemies, wholly separates Jesus from those who apply the idea of the value of humanity in an indiscriminate and merely sentimental way to all alike. For Him, the human soul had real value only on certain conditions.

But the universalism of Jesus’ teaching lay in His confident proclamation that these conditions were open to all who would accept His Message. In philosophic language, while we cannot hold that He taught that every soul has actual or realised value, yet He did believe in the potential value of all. And it is as the possibilities of good in each life are drawn out into activity, that that life acquires value in the absolute sense. In the words of Jesus Himself, "there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth."** His work was to "call sinners", to be the physician of the sick; and the recovery of one such was worth the monotonous uniformity

* See references above, p. 111 p. 28-30.

** Luke xv.10.
of many respectable lives.* But the whole view of the value of the wanderer or the suffering one turns on this word, recovery. If the Christian teaching regarding the worth of Man had been merely the proclamation of a fact which had already full existence, this emphasis on recovery would have been needless; but because the Gospel was an affirmation at once of the need and of the possibility of a complete change in life and of its acquiring an entirely new value, this conception is fundamental.

When this point is grasped, certain of the initial difficulties of the Christian view disappear. It does not demand that we should so far disregard the facts which are sternly forced upon us by an impartial view of the world and of society as to attribute actual moral value to lives which are ranged on the side of evil rather than of good, nor are we called upon to declare that moral beauty exists where only meanness and deformity can be seen. So far, the Christian doctrine is easier to accept than any attribution of an actual developed value to every human soul; for it recognises the fact of evil and the present degradation of many lives. But at the same time it asserts that evil may be overcome and that each life may become valuable, or, if we choose to put it so, that each life has value in virtue of its hidden possibilities of good. And this is a sufficiently daring challenge to all the conclusions of ordinary experience - a hard enough and exacting enough creed to hold and to apply seriously. Perhaps there is no other doctrine to which it is

so fatally easy to pay lip-homage as this of the Value of the Individual, when we are far from realising its full import, and further still from carrying it steadily into practice. It has always been the mark of a great Christian to do so, to care for all and to despair of none. *Pauci, dis geniti potuere.*

Servants of God!—or sons
Shall I not call you? because
Not as servants ye knew
Your Father's innermost mind;
His, who unwillingly sees
One of His little ones lost.*

But if this be the true view, and if the doctrine of the Worth of Man be a task and a challenge as well as a truth, then it follows that it cannot be taken as proved once for all. It is one of those practical truths, which, must be rediscovered and applied anew by every generation of men. This is indeed a characteristic of all the highest truths; but it is especially true of those which concern the will rather than the abstract intellect. Under the influence of the theory of Evolution, we are at times too apt to take for granted that the achievements of one generation are passed on entire and unimpaired to form the starting-point for fresh endeavours, and that a higher ethical point of view, once attained, is never abandoned. But the facts of history hardly warrant this optimistic view. They rather suggest that constant effort is needed if the results of past

* Matthew Arnold, Rugby Chapel.
progress are to be conserved, and that possibilities of retrogression are no less real than those of fresh advance. Hence, if we hold to the finality of the teaching of Jesus on this subject, we must also hold that to every age His declaration of the Worth of Man comes as a problem to be worked out afresh amid its own conditions. If we accept the statement that what Jesus did, "in bringing the value of every human soul to light, no one can any more undo," we must balance this truth, as Harnack proceeds to do, by recognising "what a paradox it all is," and how directly it "flies in the face of things as they are actually constituted."* That there is this direct opposition between the Christian ideal and the actual constitution and judgments of society needs no elaborate proof. Here also, "we see not yet all things subjected unto him,"** and if the light kindled by Jesus has never been extinguished, it is often obscured by the driving spray and the mist of the world's storm. It is better to regard His teaching as paradox than as platitude; for then the question arises how this doctrine which is now both an ideal and a paradox can be related to the facts of life, or rather how they may be brought into harmony with it.

When this question is asked seriously, it will be seen that by considering the Christian view of the Individual as a task to be carried out, and not only as a principle to be assented to, we come into contact with encouraging as well as discouraging


** Heb. ii.8.
facts. For when those tendencies which tell against the Christian position are examined from this standpoint, it becomes clear that in many cases they are not so rigid and so unalterable as at first appeared. Especially is this true of economic factors. Some of these exist not "by nature" but merely "by convention" and so may be modified; and even those which seem most deeply involved in the character of man as a natural being, may be changed by the action of ethical and spiritual forces. Thus we may give the fine remark of Ruskin regarding Malthusianism a wider application, and hold that the man's increase both in numbers and in inner worth "is limited only by the limits of his courage and his love."*

Finally, the dynamical or redemptive view of our subject leads us beyond the mere isolated man. In the Third Gospel, Jesus is represented as defending the healing of a deformed woman and marking the moral recovery of the publican, Zacchaeus, by pointing out their right to share in the heritage and the hopes of the nation from whom they were sprung. "A daughter, a son, of Abraham" had claims on the mercy of Jesus and the forbearance and sympathy of their fellow-countrymen which neither physical nor moral deformity could annul.** And the words with which the evangelist brings his account of Zacchaeus to a close, "the Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost", suggest that the restoration of Zacchaeus to the fellowship of his people, no less than the initial claim which his nationality

* Unto This Last, § 78.
** Luke xiii.16, xix.9,10.
gave Him upon the interest of Jesus, is referred to in the words, "He also is a son of Abraham." But wherever the work of Jesus is referred to as a search, this further truth is implied. Recovery is incomplete without restoration to the body from which the lost one had been severed. The assertion that the individual man has value cannot be taken to mean that he has value in isolation. Rather his value can only be developed in the life of the community to which, even when isolated and alone, he truly belonged. Separated from it, and from its Head, he is valueless;* for his will and his affections alike need an object, and can only develop in reciprocal action with those of other men.

But this point need not be laboured; for both Christian teaching and philosophy mean by the Value of the Individual a value which, however deeply hidden may be its source, manifests itself outwardly in the life which he shares with others in the contact and the harmony of a community of moral natures.

CHAPTER IV.

THE COMMUNITY OF THE GOOD
IN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT.*

[* This chapter is expanded from an article entitled "Green and Sidgwick on the Community of the Good," which appeared in the Philosophical Review for March 1908.]
At the close of the last chapter, it became clear that the Christian doctrine of the value of the individual soul cannot remain merely subjective. If we would state it in its completeness, we are forced to take a wider field into view, and to consider the individual man in relation to that wider whole in and through which he can reach full development and the realisation of that value which Christianity attributes to him. Thus the question of the relation of the moral individual to the Community, and of his good to the wider good, must inevitably arise. The Greeks stated this problem by asking whether the good of the state and of the citizens who compose it was the same of different.* For us, it takes the more general form, as to how far the true good is common to all who partake in it, and so non-competitive in nature.** On the one side it has often been argued that, when the nature of the Good is rightly defined, there can be no opposition of individual interests in its attainment - that it is in the strict sense a common good. Thus Augustine says that "the

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* Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1, 2.

** The terms "competition" and "competitive" are throughout this chapter used as referring to material "goods", or, more generally, to those in regard to which the gain of one man is necessarily the loss of another. The theory that "virtue is non-competitive" does not exclude that wider sense of "competition" in which it refers to advancement in those activities in which there is no collision of interests. It has been recognised even by convinced Socialists that "competition" of this kind cannot be dispensed with. (H.G. Wells, New Worlds for Old, p.110). But this element in life seems to me to be more accurately defined as emulation than as "competition." Cf. Heb. x.24, "Let us consider one another to provoke unto love and good works," and 1 Cor. xii.31, xiv.1.
blessedness of a community and of an individual flow from the same source; for a community is nothing else than a harmonious collection of individuals."*

But against this view it has been held that the wider and narrower Good are not necessarily coincident, but that there is a certain degree of inevitable divergence between that which is good for any particular individual and for other individuals or for the community; that, in short, such a conflict of claims to the good or desirable is not, as Augustine elsewhere suggests, a result of human "corruption"**, but that it is the necessary accompaniment of the moral life lived under the conditions that we know.

The question gains importance from the part played by this theory of the Community of the true Good at many points both in Greek and Christian ethics, and from the central place assigned to it in modern times by Spinoza, as well as by T.H. Green and other writers under the influence of Kant. But its importance is not merely historical. For it is clear that this characteristic is closely involved in the Christian conception of the Good. We have to admit and allow for the fact that, in regard to the ordinary "goods" or advantages of daily life, men's interests do not always coincide, and that "competition" for material goods appears to be inevitable, in the sense that the things which one man enjoys another must forego. But it is hard to reconcile such a view of ultimate good with the spirit of Christianity. In the sphere of spiritual good, which for Christian

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* De Civ. Dei (tr. Dods) I.15.

** Ib. XII.27. "There is nothing so social by nature, so un-social by its corruption, as this race."
Ethics is the highest and most important, such competition would seem to contradict the whole conception of harmony with others and joy in their good. The truly spiritual man will not offend the least of his brethren, nor could he rest satisfied that the development of his higher life should depend upon their spiritual loss or disadvantage.* However wide may be the sphere of competitive goods, it seems necessary to the Christian view of life, and especially of human solidarity and brotherhood, that there should be a region in which the enjoyment of good things is not limited and exclusive, but capable of being shared by all alike; and that whatever is really essential for the deepest wellbeing should lie within this region.

There are, we may remark at the outset, facts in the moral life, accessible to common observation, which go far to support this view. It is easy to see that those things or qualities which are subsumed under the designation of "goods" can be classified according to the degree in which they are necessarily competitive or not. At one end of the scale, typical of all competitive goods, are those material things of which the supply is limited, and of which the possession and enjoyment is confined to a few men to the definite exclusion of their fellows. At a higher point are found those goods which depend partly on purely material conditions but partly also on social conditions; and here, because comradeship is a necessary element in the pursuit and enjoyment of such goods, there is an approximation to the

* This principle underlies the practical argument of Rom.xiv, 21, xv.1; 1 Cor.viii.9,11. The morally strong (ἡμεῖς of οὐκ ἔχοντος) have no right to advance at the expense of the weak.
nature of common good. Finally in goodness of character there is that which rises above the conflict of interests, for its presence in one life is a help and not a hindrance to its development in others. Goodness can be seen to have a self-propagating tendency, when we think of it not as an abstract good will, but as manifesting itself in actual and concrete form in purity of motive and devotion of will. In this respect it may be contrasted with pleasure; for, while pleasure is to a limited extent self-propagating, yet the enjoyment of one individual often rests on pain suffered by another, or by reaction causes pain to the same man at a later time. Goodness, on the other hand, is not limited in this way. It is cumulative for the individual and contagious in its tendency to pass from one to others, and thus may be taken as the type of that higher order of good which is superior to the law of reciprocal gain and loss. And this characteristic is an important one for ethical theory. For if pleasure be taken as the Good, endless difficulties are encountered in determining the distribution of means for the gaining of pleasure, and in adjusting the claims of different men and classes of men to share in the possession of these means. But if the Good be thought of as goodness in the sense defined, including fidelity to duty as an essential constituent, such conflict of divergent claims is to a large extent avoided; and just in so far as it is shown to have a truly non-competitive character the difficulties of hedonism disappear. * This

* In his criticism of Green's theory of the Common Good the late Professor Sidgwick freely admitted the advantage which this theory, if it could be established, would have had over his own Universalistic Hedonism, in avoiding the difficulty of adjusting divergent claims mentioned above. (Lectures on the Ethics of T.H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau, p.65.)
fact has influenced many thinkers; but one of its most impressive practical applications is to be found in the political writings of Mazzini, with their strong insistence that no theory of rights can overcome the clash of various conflicting interests, but that harmony can only be attained when the emphasis is transferred from rights to duties. For from this ethical point of view the conflict of interests gives place to the concord of many diverse wills each striving along its own line for the realisation of the Common Good. "Once admit the principle of duty, and the possibility of strife has gone."

It may, then, fairly be concluded that the establishment of this view of the true good would be of great importance for general ethical theory, but especially for Christian Ethics; and that there is reason to think that the highest type of good transcends those limitations of outward "goods" by which their exclusive possession by one man renders it impossible that they should benefit another. But a closer examination is necessary before we can either affirm or deny the theory that the true Good is necessarily common, and that it may be enjoyed in equal measure by all who rightly apprehend its nature, and sincerely follow after its attainment.

This closer examination will first of all show that there are two ways by which the doctrine may be defended. In the first, stress is laid on the inwardness of virtue, the power of thought and will to transcend material conditions and conquer external influences, the independence of the inner life; and on this foundation is based the argument that for each man the possibility of a good life depends not

* The Duties of Man, ch.I; Faith and the Future. (Dent's ed. pp. 11ff. 169.)
on the action of other men nor on circumstances, but solely on his own fidelity to duty. Virtue, it is argued, is too entirely personal a concern to be subject to the law of competition, nor can its possession by one man possibly interfere with its exercise by another. The other argument depends on the conception of the ethical end as social; and it emphasises the fact that for the exercise of the higher functions of man the society and cooperation of his fellows are essential. He is so constituted that any good which he seeks to keep jealously to himself soon escapes his grasp, while in sharing the labours and enjoyments of his fellows he gains a width of life and a fulness of experience which he could never reach in isolation.

Now when these two arguments are thus baldly stated in their contrasted terms, their difference is at least as apparent as their agreement. Indeed it may be said that the position of this theory of the Community of the Good must be a singularly unstable one if its twin supports are the belief that the Good is purely individual and that it is purely social. And this criticism is, as we shall see, a concise summary of the objections to the theory. Yet the two lines of thought have again and again been combined; and from Plato to Green there has been hardly any exponent of the theory who has not used them both, though now one and now the other has been more prominent. This suggests the question as to whether some synthesis of the two is really impossible. But before a synthesis can be attempted the alternative arguments must be placed in a clearer light.
II

The first argument, which depends on the inwardness of virtue and the independence of the good will, need not here be stated at great length, both because it is simple in itself and because the ethical bearing of these ideas has been indicated in the last chapter. But it may be illustrated by a reference to what might in general terms be described as the Stoic tradition in philosophy. We saw (pp. 63f.) that this originated in the character and teaching of Socrates, and that one side of the Socratic life which made a lasting impression was its independence (αὐτάρκεια). Thus it is not surprising to find at a comparatively early point in the Republic that this quality of αὐτάρκεια is assumed as one of the recognised characteristics of the brave man, who will in the highest degree show in his own character those things which are necessary to the good life, and will be marked out from others by his independence of externals. To have the power of rising above circumstances and to be secure in the possession of a virtue and a calm which fortune cannot touch has in all ages been considered as the characteristic of complete manhood; while dependence on the support of others or the concurrence of favouring events has been looked on as marking a lower and feeble type of virtue. Again, the moralist or preacher who rises to a high level of intensity and enthusiasm inevitably appeals to the power and duty of each man to

*ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῇ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. καὶ
dιαιρεθείσας τῶν ἄλλων ἡκίστα ἑπέρου προσδέεται, Rep. 387 DE.
decide for right and not to count the cost. Thus it is in Plato's great argument in the Gorgias that it is better to suffer than to do injustice. In this dialogue the inward evil of consent to injustice and the corruption which it brings on the soul are set forth as far outweighing any external advantage which may follow an unrighteous act; and the single good of a soul purified by discipline and obedience is held to be of greater importance than any outward loss; while in the myth which closes the dialogue, all the outward conditions of action and the trappings of circumstance are represented as being torn away from the soul, which goes forward naked to judgment in its own inherent strength or weakness.*

This appeal to the power of the will to decide for good in the face of the strongest conjunction of hostile influences is constantly repeated by the Stoics. "Nothing which is independent of the will can hinder or damage the will, and the will can only hinder or damage itself."** The man who has won inner freedom by controlling his own desires cannot be moved by any outward event. Others cannot harm him, for his desires are wholly set on these qualities of purity and fidelity to duty which lie within the power of his own will.† The will is indeed strong enough in itself completely to transform outward events, which are when rightly considered but the formless matter on which it may impress its own image. This is the converse and complement of the view which we found in the New Testament that

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* Gorg. 469 ff., 508 to end.
** Epictetus, Disc., III xix.
† Ib. IV.i. Cf. Plato, Apol., 39.
the most favourable outward circumstances may become the occasion of sin; and it is incisively stated in one of the Discourses of Epictetus, entitled "That we can derive advantage from all external things."

"Is my neighbour bad? Bad to himself, but good to me; he exercises my good disposition, my moderation. Is my father bad? Bad to himself, but to me good. This is the rod of Hermes; touch with it what you please, as the saying is, and it will be of gold. I say not so; but bring what you please, and I will make it good. Bring disease, bring death, bring poverty, bring abuse, bring trial on capital charges; all these things through the rod of Hermes shall be made profitable."

In the same spirit Marcus Aurelius says, "Material things cannot touch the soul at all, nor have any access to it; neither can they bend or move it. The soul is bent or moved by itself alone, and remodels all things that present themselves from without in accordance with whatever judgment it adopts within." For it "can convert and change everything that impedes its activity into matter for its action; hindrance in its work becomes its real help, and every obstruction makes for its progress."*

Thus to the wise man everything external is in its own nature indifferent, but all things are alike capable of being moulded to the uses of the human will. Nor are any outward circumstances essential to his happiness, for

"The mind is its own place, and in itself

Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven."

When so lofty a view is taken of the power of the will and of the independence which virtue confers, it is natural that this inner strength

* III.xx.

**v.19,20 (tr. Crysta)
of purpose to which all else must bend should be looked on as alone truly good, while the goods of Fortune are at most preferable (προϊτούμενα), and there is clearly here no question of any conflict of interests in the Good, for its progress is helped by obstruction and its enjoyment becomes secure in adversity.

The ethical theory of Spinoza seems also to fall within the scope of the present discussion; for he connects with exceptional clearness the idea of the Community of the Good with that of its inward character. In this respect he sees a thorough-going contrast between the evil and good life, the sway of the passions and the rule of Reason. In the former case a man is influenced by external causes, carried away by a desire for objects which lie outside his own proper nature; and because in this condition he is at the mercy of outward events which are constantly changing, passion is the cause of inconstancy and variableness. But it is also the cause of discord between man and man, when men are diversely affected by the same external object.* Hence the frequent clash and incompatibility of human desires; and hence when men pursue those external things which cannot be possessed in common discrepancy and discord inevitably result. They can only be avoided when those whose material interests conflict, transfer their desires to some higher good which has a uniting instead of a dividing influence. Nor has Spinoza any doubt as to the existence of such an object which can give satisfaction to all alike, for it belongs to his faith in the unity of Reason to hold that, when its guidance is steadily followed, it cannot but lead to a good in which

* Ethics, Part IV, prop.xxiii.
all may share.* This belief that the commands of Reason for different men cannot ultimately lead to an irreconcilable divergence between their true interests is the analogue in the intellectual sphere to the Christian intuition already referred to,** that there is no ultimate collision of interests in the moral and religious region, and that the highest good is wide enough to be shared by all. But although this faith in Reason doubtless underlies Spinoza's argument, and gives it a certain intellectualist character, his account of the nature of this Common Good is couched in the language of religion.

"The highest good of all those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein." For "to act virtuously is to act in obedience to reason, and whatsoever we do in obedience to reason is to understand; therefore the highest good of those who follow after virtue is to know God; that is a good which is possessed by all men equally in so far as they are of the same nature... The good which every man in so far as he is guided by reason, or in other words, follows after virtue, desires for himself, is to understand; wherefore the good which each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others." ..."This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason, it is common to all men, and we desire that all should rejoice therein; therefore it cannot be stained by the emotion of envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy; but contrariwise it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein."†

At this point we may trace a connection between the theory of Spinoza and that of Kant. For the love of God in which Spinoza teaches that all men may agree is a disinterested love; and the words last quoted immediately follow the famous proposition, "He who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return."‡‡ Now Kant

* Cf. Part IV, props. xxxi,xxxv.

** Supra, p.119.

†Ethics, Part IV, props.xxxvi,xxxvii; Part V, prop.xx (tr. Elwes.)

‡‡Ibid, prop.xix.
lays the greatest stress on the fact that only a disinterested will can be universal, i.e., can lay down laws valid for all alike; because only such a will can aim at a good which transcends personal differences and is open to all men without distinction.* There is undoubtedly a wide difference between the form given by Spinoza and by Kant to their ideas of the Good, between the "intellectual love of God" and the "good will;" but their systems, in most respects so dissimilar, agree in their identification of the morality of a principle with its universality,** and in the emphasis which they lay on the inwardness of the Good. Both think of virtue as consisting in the escape from the enslavement to desires for external things, and the gaining of inner freedom, and so as a possession or a function of the soul which all men may share.

III.

From this view that the true good is inward, and so non-competitive, we turn to the consideration of its social character. The argument that in this sense it is common is also ultimately derived from Greek Ethics; indeed it is more characteristic of Greek thought than

* Grundlegung, IV, 432 (Abbott, pp. 50f.)

** Dr. Duff points out this parallel (Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy, p. 130), but adds that "Spinoza's point of view is rather 'that only a moral principle can be universally willed than that only a principle capable of being universally willed can be a moral one.'" But from whichever side it is made - and Spinoza's makes it from both - the important point is the identification of morality and universality, and the distinction between such a moral principle and all cases in which the ends are personal and lead to conflict between man and man. (Dr. Duff gives an excellent statement of Spinoza's doctrine of the Common Good and its place in his system. - Cp. Cit., chh. viii-xi).
are those ideas which we have just traced. For in the main the Greek spirit was objective. It went forth eagerly to meet the beauty and variety in the world; and the self-absorption of one side of the Platonic thought and of the teaching of the Stoics scarcely represents its distinctive genius. The typically Greek conception of ἀρετή was objective and many-sided. Human nature was observed coming into manifold contact with the world, and impressing all external objects with the stamp of its own individuality; and those who held this rich and concrete ideal naturally refused to identify the good of Man as a whole with his inner life alone, or to allow that the development of that type of virtue which is independent of outward circumstances could make up for the loss of many other forms of human excellence which flourish only in a favouring environment.

From this point of view the theory that true virtue is purely individual and inward has often been criticised. It may be argued that the attempt to render man independent of outward circumstances constantly defeats itself; for the ascetic seldom enjoys the highest type of freedom, and is apt in the end to identify the good life with the absence of worldly goods, just as the ordinary man identifies it with a state in which they are abundantly present. Thus a sort of inverse bondage to material things arises in the form of a constant dread of their corrupting influence, and a state of outward poverty is looked on as the necessary presupposition of virtue. As against this tendency, exemplified in the case of the Cynics, it may well be argued that the ἐκ καὶ ἐκ ἔκχωμα of
Aristippus represents a higher moral principle, however dubious its special applications may have been. If the attempt to eliminate and negate the influence of material things in human life thus tends to result in a new form of bondage to them, this is certainly an argument against the purely inward view of the ethical end.*

Thus against the depreciation of all external goods and conditions, the typically Greek view of life, which is also the view of "common-sense" both ancient and modern, asserts that virtue does depend on these goods, at least in many of its forms. When a wide view is taken of life and its manifold demands, the virtue of the hero or martyr who is ready to disregard any suffering or loss in following the highest good, appears to be only adapted to great occasions, while other less splendid virtues are needful for the daily working life of the world. But the latter, because they lie closer to the sphere of man's ordinary needs, both of the body for outward necessaries and of the mind for art and education, must be affected and influenced by the presence of the want of material means. In the absence of such means these activities, which cannot be regarded as indifferent from the standpoint of the Common Good, may be altogether brought to an end; while for their full development no small number of outward conditions must be present. And if this be admitted, the contention that virtue is independent of outward conditions fails to the ground.

The writings of Aristotle may be taken as typical of this view; though there are two distinct tendencies in his treatment of the subject which correspond to his division of virtue into "theoretic" and "practical" or "moral." (a) We may consider the latter first, since it deals with the sphere of practical life and ordinary morality which has just been referred to. Here his theory is that, although happiness (the ethical end - εὐδαιμονία ) is "an activity of the soul," yet it depends for its complete realisation on the presence of external goods, which give the material and the arena for the actual exercise of this activity. Without these it remains incomplete and indeed unrealised, just as the best tragedy would fail of its end if, through the lack of a choregus to provide for its production, it were never actually performed. *

When the idea of ὀρετή is held in this objective form, and when it is frankly recognised to depend for its realisation upon the presence of favourable outward conditions, it is obvious that the idea of self-sufficiency must be in some degree modified. Hence we find that in one passage Aristotle applies the word ἀυτάρκεια not to the "independence" of the good character and will, but in the sense in which the word is popularly used to-day - that of a sufficiency of outward goods for a good (i.e., happy or complete) life.** This, he says, is not unlimited, but

** ἐν γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτίσεως ἀυτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἀπειρός ἐστιν, Pol. I. 1256b31
he clearly implies that it cannot be dispensed with. Still clearer is his verdict on the necessity of the immaterial good of social companionship. Aristotle holds that the state is prior to the individual and that without it he cannot reach complete individuality; so that he who professes such entire independence of it as to have no need of association with others, is not truly a man, but is "either a beast or a god." * Thus the conclusion is that in the full ethical sense of the word, αὐτάρκεια cannot be attributed to the individual as such. It is fully realised only in the State, which possesses in itself all that is needful, not for life only, but for the good life; ** and it is to the political community alone that we can rightly apply the term "self-sufficient," which from this point of view is the mark of ethical completeness and perfection. † Now when the state and not the individual is taken as the complete ethical unit, it is clear that there is at least a possibility of conflict between those individuals who compose it. The share of those material conditions which are held to be necessary to a complete development of virtue will vary from man to man; and in so far as the good is necessarily presupposed in their possession, its attainment by individuals will be competitive rather than common.

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** ἡ πόλις ... πάον τῆς αὐτάρκειας κ.τ.λ., Pol. 1,1252b28. The conjunction of these two significant words, πέρας and αὐτάρκεια, is a striking illustration of the place of the State in Greek thought.
† ἡ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ ἰδιότητον, Ib., 1253a1.
When we turn to Aristotle's picture of the contemplative or "theoretic" life, we find that this conclusion is modified, but that the difficulty is not entirely overcome. It has been often remarked that there is a certain dualism or contradiction between the two sides of Aristotle's thought; and this appears in the fact that in the concluding book of the Ethics he does to a great extent claim that the contemplative life brings self-sufficiency even to the individual. For, while justice, courage and the other "moral" virtues can only be practised in the midst of society and are essentially related to social life, the philosopher stands alone in his contemplation. Although it may be "better for him to have fellow workers," yet in himself, he is αὐταρκέστατος, "in the highest degree self-sufficient."** Here Aristotle anticipates the Stoic ideal of the Wise Man, which we touched on in the preceding section; and yet this view of the Sage is not wholly inconsistent with that already quoted from the Politics, for it is there said that the entirely self-sufficient life is either that of a beast or of a god, and in this culminating passage in the Ethics, it is distinctly indicated that the contemplative life, in this high sense, is more than human, and is attainable by man only in so far as he shares in the nature of the divine.***

But even so, it is not raised above all conditions. One of these remains, for leisure at least is needed by the

*Eth. Nic., X. 1177a27-34.

**Ibid. 1177b26ff.
philosopher;* and thus other men who provide for his bodily needs contribute to a good which they do not share. The contemplative life is not strictly common or non-competitive, but is rather the privilege of a few; while most men are shut out from participation in it by the physical needs of themselves and others. This suggests a doubt regarding the argument of Spinoza quoted above that the highest life is possible to all; for his description of that life has points of close contact with Aristotle's.

The criticism would take the form of an inquiry as to the precise character of Spinoza's ideal. If it is one of pure self-absorption, the retreat of the human spirit within itself, the meditation of an Eastern mystic, then it is ἀφθαρσίατον, and as far as is possible for any human activity it is equally open to all. But there are many indications that Spinoza's ideal is in reality a more concrete one, and that by the intuition which forms the highest type of knowledge and brings the greatest "acquiescence of spirit" he understands something other than mere rapt contemplation of the idea of the infinite. Thus he argues that "we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could understand nothing besides itself.

There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to

us, and are, therefore to be desired."* Still more conclusive is the short proposition which states that "the more we understand particular things, the more we understand God,** when it is remembered that the action of the mind in "understanding particular things," implies that the body is capable of being "influenced in many different ways." Thus Knowledge, like the Greek ἀπεικόνισις, proves to be to some extent at least implicated in physical conditions the moment that we attempt to take it in a wide and a concrete sense; and although, as Aristotle and Spinoza both rightly affirm, the higher good is by no means so exclusive in its nature as the material "goods" for which men strive against one another in ordinary life, yet it is not wholly raised above the sphere of competition. For even knowledge depends upon conditions external to the mind, in which one man is more favoured than another, and in which his gain is not necessarily the gain of all.

Thus we find that that ideal of virtue which may be distinguished as Hellenic, aims at the inclusion of all the faculties of man and the relations of political life, including wisdom, theoretic and practical, as well as inner virtue and the good will; and that the attempt to take in this wide range of material involves at all events a prima facie conflict between the claims of individuals to share in the Good. But the bearing of the Greek view of life on our subject is by no means entirely

* Part IV. prop. xvii, schol. (tr. Elwes.)

**Part V, prop. xxiv. cf. Part IV. prop. xxxviii.
negative: it has also a definite and essential contribution to
make to the doctrine of the Common Good, which must not be passed
over without mention here. The nature of that contribution has
already been suggested by Aristotle's argument, which is no less
characteristic of Plato, that man's good is not something solitary, but is essentially social. It is perhaps the greatest
achievement of Greek ethics to have made it clear for all time
that no man can reach the full development of his nature save in
association with other men, and in the service of an ideal wider
than that of his own private interests. The good is common in
so far as it belongs not to the ἴδιωτης but to the πολίτης, and
is won by the efforts of many workers striving for the same end,
and not by the exertions of any isolated man. As long as man
lives for and by himself, his nature, physical and psychical as
well as moral, is stunted, but in cooperation with others it is
drawn upwards to completeness, and the larger good which could not
have been attained by any man alone, becomes a corporate good in
which all may share. Thus, if Greek ethics tend to reject the
argument that the Good is non-competitive because it has its
seat in the heart of man and is unaffected by the outward events
of his life, yet from the other side it gives a fuller content to
the idea of the Good as common, both by emphasising its wealth
and variety and by proving that this wealth belongs to those
alone who are willing to sink their private aims and interests
in the wider life of the Community.
IV.

There are thus two aspects of the theory of the Community of the Good, which are approached by two different lines of thought; and the question to be answered is whether these aspects can be reconciled in a single view, or whether they are radically divergent. The latter position is that of Sidgwick, who defends it at length in his searching criticism of Green's theory. His position may be stated in the form of a dilemma:— Either take the Good in the Stoic or Kantian sense, in which case it is strictly non-competitive but entirely without content; or in the Greek sense, when it becomes concrete but loses its non-competitive character. The substance of Sidgwick's argument is given in a passage in which he charged Green with having "allowed his thought to swing like a pendulum between a wider and a narrower ideal of true good, sometimes expanding it to Culture, sometimes narrowing it to Virtue and the Good Will. When he thinks of full realisation of human capabilities, he brings in the development of artistic faculties, and the cultivation of taste, as well as the development of scientific faculties and the pursuit of knowledge of all kinds; When he wants to bring out its non-competitive character, we find it shrunk to virtue and goodness of will."*

Now we may admit that it is of the highest importance to appreciate the significance of these two distinguishable points of view without thereby conceding that they are incapable of

*Lectures on T.H.Green, p. 71.*
being brought into harmony. The assumption that they are necessarily contradictory is closely connected with the view which Sidgwick shared with Mr Bradley, that there is a radical divergence in all ethical reflection between the form of theory which sets forth the highest good of the individual as the ethical end, and that which seeks to find it in pursuing the widest good for others; and that this dualism, being rooted in the facts of the moral life, can only be transcended in the region where ethics passes over into religion.* Whether the opposition be stated in hedonistic terms as an opposition of Reasonable Benevolence and Reasonable Self-love, or in terms of idealism as that of Self-sacrifice and Self-realisation, the view taken is fundamentally the same; and the sharpness and completeness of the antithesis may be traces to the predominantly analytic method which, amid all other differences, is common to both thinkers. Now this antithesis, though not identical with that between the inward and outward conceptions of virtue with which we have been dealing, is closely related to it. For it is inevitable that the idea of Self-realisation should be connected with the objective, Hellenic view of virtue as the development of human capabilities; while on the other hand the Stoic conception of virtue as an attitude of the will, and as independent of outward events because it is the complete negation of natural impulse, has an obvious affinity with

*Of. the concluding chapter of The Methods of Ethics with Mr Bradley's well known chapter on "Goodness" (Appearance and Reality, ch. xxv.)
the conception of Self-sacrifice. In whichever form the problem is stated, the solution must be sought for along the same lines.

We may, after this explanation, go back to the dilemma as stated in Sidgwick's criticism of Green. His argument that the good must either be considered as inward and noncompetitive, but void of content, or as objective and concrete, but competitive, implies that the "formal" and "material criteria of virtuous action" are mutually exclusive, and that their application leads to contradictory results. But is it not possible that either criterion by itself is incomplete, and that the full doctrine of the Common Good would do justice to both formal and material elements? Sidgwick's separation of the two seems to rest upon a double assumption - in regard to the former that the good will is purely abstract, "a will that wills nothing;" and in regard to the latter that the exercise of the varied powers of human nature, which is connoted by the Greek term ἀπειτή is purely self-regarding.

Both these assumptions may be questioned. In regard to the first, it is impossible consistently to carry out the idea of a purely inward good. The good will necessarily expresses itself in outward action, and a large part of its activity must necessarily lie among "those things which admit of being given and taken." It is defined by Green as "the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own

*Cf. Lectures on T.H.Green, p.72.

**Prolegomena to Ethics, §. 256.
person and in the persons of others;"* and this description breaks through the rigidity of the strict Stoic theory and combines the two ideas which Sidgwick insists must be held apart. Even the idea of Self-sacrifice must be related to that of some end to be achieved, some effect to be wrought in the objective world-order by its means.

The other assumption, that the exercise of the intellectual and aesthetic faculties is necessarily self-regarding, is still more open to criticism. The truth is rather that in these activities the claims of the Common Good may be no less readily recognised and steadily kept in view than in many more obviously altruistic or philanthropic forms of endeavour. This point, however, calls for some further exposition, for it is often supposed that there is something peculiarly self-centred in the pursuit of knowledge or of artistic excellence, and that these activities necessarily stand outside the idea of the Good as common rather than individual. Nor is this merely a popular impression. It underlies all the criticism which we have been considering, and it has been most vigorously and categorically stated by Professor Taylor. In arguing for the ultimate dualism of self-realisation

*ib., § 244. It is worth while to give the context of this sentence, as the passage is perhaps the most succinct statement of Green's position. "The only good in the pursuit of which there can be no competition of interests, the only good which is really common to all who may pursue it, is that which consists in the universal will to be good, - in the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own person and in the persons of others. The conviction of a community of good for all men can never be really harmonised with our notion of what is good, so long as anything else than self-devotion to an ideal of mutual service is the end by reference to which these notions are formed." Other passages of importance for the Doctrine of the Common Good are §§ 199-205, 229-232, 246-7, 232-3, 258.
and self-sacrifice he says,

"By agreeing to call anything in which I am interested myself, you can, with some violence to language and some confusion of thought, continue to make all morality wear the shape of self-satisfaction, but there is no conceivable device, short of boldly denying the facts, by which you can make it all look like self-surrender or self-forgetfulness." *

Before so confident an attack as this the mere layman in matters artistic might well feel it prudent to retreat; and fortunately for the present argument he can shelter behind the opinions of those who are admittedly qualified to pronounce on this subject. And first he may appeal to the greatest of English critics.

"The love of nature is the first thing in the mind of the true poet: the admiration of himself the last. . . . He who thinks much of himself, will be in danger of being forgotten by the rest of the world. . . . They cannot be expected to admire his works because they are his; but for the truth and nature contained in them, which must first be inly felt and copied with severe delight, from the love of truth and nature, before it can ever appear there. Was Raphael, think you, when he painted his pictures of the Virgin and Child in all their inconceivable truth and beauty of expression, thinking most of his subject or of himself? . . . Do you imagine that Shakspeare, when he wrote Lear or Othello, was thinking of anything but Lear and Othello? . . . No: he who would be great in the eyes of others, must first learn to be nothing in his own." **

It may, indeed, be objected that, even if we accept this view of art, it is by no means proved that the true artist works with a view to the Common Good, but rather that his attention is fixed on the object. But this is in itself sufficient to undermine the theory that all exercise of artistic faculty is self-regarding, and to show that only as far as the artist ceases to be


occupied with the thought of his own faculties and their realisation and loses himself in the object, can he express his vision of it in the highest artistic form. Thus it is not by "boldly denying the facts" but by facing them impartially that we are led to the conclusion that there is an essential element of "self-surrender" and "self-forgetfulness" even in those activities which are least akin to the ordinary forms of altruism. The same truth is implied in Hegel's view of art as one means of reaching the universal. But the truly universal can only be reached in the measure in which the artist transcends the limitations of his own individuality, and rises above "particularity" and mere mannerism. "Phidias has no mannerism."*

But when true art is thus looked on as the Universal, it becomes possible to relate it to the idea of the Common Good which expresses universality on another side. We may take the example suggested by Hegel, that of Phidias and the Parthenon. In the supreme work of Phidias and Ictinus, there is no trace of self-assertion. Their whole endeavour was to give a worthy embodiment and expression to a great ethical idea - the idea of united wisdom, courage and liberty, which was personified in the figure of Athene, and in some measure realised in the polity of Athens. Just as truly as the unknown masters who raised the Gothic cathedrals, their whole personality found its fulfilment in the service of an ideal, and wide as was the difference between the Greek and Christian conceptions of the divine nature and of

*Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 15
religious service, the result was alike in this, that the building raised in honour of the divinity became a κτήμα & ζει — a possession for all generations of men.

It is possible, however, to show a still more direct connection between the two ideas. Professor Murray has recently pointed out that in classical times Art, and especially Poetry were valued and judged according to their effect in furthering or hindering the Common Good to an extent that the modern aesthete would cry out against as Philistine and utilitarian. In a later age Dante begins his De Monarchia by saying that the lover of truth, who has gained knowledge of the ways of men, will be "far astray from his duty if he cares not himself to contribute aught to the public good." For then he is like "the devouring whirlpool, ever engulfing, but restoring nothing." And in our own day the principle which we are seeking to establish has been expressed in the legend which Watts inscribed on his picture, Sic transit, and which well expresses the character of his own life, "What I spent I had: what I saved I lost: what I gave I have."

Finally we may appeal to the authority of the greatest modern prophet of Self-realisation. In the second part of Faust, Goethe represents the salvation of his hero as only attained when he gives his strength to unselfish work for the good of others; and in the chorus of the angels which marks the completion of his deliverance, he is referred to, not as an isolated individual,


** De Mon., I, I (tr Church).
but as "the noble member of the spirit world."

We are thus led to the conclusion that on the one hand the good will must become operative in the external world and that the form of its operation will depend upon material conditions, and on the other that the idea of the Common Good is wide enough to embrace the most varied forms of human excellence and activity. With these two facts in view, it may be possible to bring together both the elements which we distinguished into a consistent theory. If this is to be done it must be by recognising that external things are indeed of importance for the moral life, but that they must be regarded from the point of view of contribution and not from that of acquisition. Just in as far as they are so regarded they acquire true value as the means of expressing the good character and furthering moral ends. The Good Will is not "a will that wills nothing," but one that uses external things for its own purposes. The objective results of its action will indeed depend on many things external to itself, but no combination of outward circumstances can render it wholly ineffective, for goodness has a power of impressing its stamp on the most unyielding material. The essential point in conduct - and hence the central category of ethics - is neither self-sacrifice nor isolated self-realisation, but the use of whatever power each man may possess for the furtherance of the Common Good.

This view of moral progress as an advance from the spirit

of acquisition to that of contribution is no new one. The antithesis is the same as that between rights and duties already referred to in connection with the teaching of Mazzini, or that between competition and cooperation, proclaimed by Maurice and the "Christian Socialists" and echoed by many thinkers since. But all its modern forms may be traced back ultimately to the ruling idea of Plato's *Republic*, that all the weakness and misgovernment of actual states is due to the conflict of interests and desires among their citizens, and that for the building up of a strong and stable polity the one great need is that conflict of interests should be replaced by unity of desire and aim. The first step towards this end is the recognition that the happiness of the whole state is of more importance than that of any individual or class within it.* And it is further needful that the objects which can be shared by all should be of more account than those which occasion competition between different citizens; while the supreme principle of the Platonic legislation is that "the law does not seek to procure an exceptionally favoured life for any one class in the state, but it works for the accomplishment of this end in the state as a whole, binding the citizens together by persuasion or by constraint, and so bringing them to share with others the particular contribution which each can make to the common weal, to the end that each man should not turn aside to follow his own pleasure, but that all should be of service for the welding together of the state."**

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*Rep.*, 420B. Cf. 462, and Cf. Cromwell's saying, "If there be anyone that makes many poor to make a few rich, that suits not a Commonwealth." (Morley's *Cromwell*, p. 334.)

**516E-520A. The central words of this passage are of especial importance for our argument, παρατηρώντας όλην της ψεφήλετος, ἵνα ἢκομιστοί τό κοινὸν οὖντοι ήλθος ψεφήλευ, Cf. the conclusion of the quotation from the *Politicus*, supra p. 2.
Nor is this principle to be considered as purely Platonic, in the sense of being bound up with the literal communism of the Republic. Plato had in this respect no more severe critic than Aristotle; yet Aristotle fully endorsed the end at which Plato aimed, while rejecting the means by which he sought to realise it. While vigorously defending the institution of private property, he taught that property must be held ready for the use of friends or of country when it was needed by either. "Private possession with common use" was his formula for the best form of property, and he repeated the Pythagorean proverb with approval, "Friends' goods, common goods."* His defence of private property may be said to rest upon the principle of possession as a means to contribution; for what each man gives to his friends or the state will have greater worth if it is a free gift of that which he himself values. Aristotle only supports the institution of private property on the condition that it is not allowed to obscure the higher principle that all things should be at the service of the community when it stands in need of them.

We may now ask how far this view of the Good as the will to contribute to the needs of the social whole meets the objections which have been urged against the theory that the Good is essentially common. At the outset it must be emphasised that it does not depend on any supposed equality in the lives of individuals, either when estimated subjectively by the standard of pleasantness,

*Pol., II, 1263a22ff.
or objectively by the concrete and measurable value of their work. Such equality is impossible to attain; and, in any society which we can think of as possible, differences must continue to exist both in the inner fullness and the outward effectiveness of various lives. But is it therefore impossible to imagine a polity in which all desires and efforts would be directed to and would converge upon a Common Good? In view of what has already been said, this does not seem impossible; for the solution of the difficulty is to be looked for in the fact that all those endowments, both inward and outward, which cause the inevitable differences both in breadth and intensity of various lives, are from the higher point of view regarded as given for the service of all and not in the first instance for private enjoyment or advantage. In a community ruled by this principle those to whom had fallen the duller and more monotonous tasks would realise that these, no less than the more attractive and conspicuous, were needful for the Common Good; while they would feel that the faithfulness of their labour was not unappreciated nor its difficulty underestimated. For the complement of the principle of contribution, of the good will as directed to the Common Good, is that with which we dealt in our last chapter— that the ultimate standard of value is what a man is, rather than what he does, not the outward effectiveness of his work, but the sincerity with which it is carried out. If such a standard of judgment were not only formally recognised but consistently applied, the sense of injustice and lack of due appreciation which causes much embittered feeling between class
and class would of itself pass away. Even now, where such a mutual appreciation does exist, there is not seldom a willing acceptance of their position and function on the part of those who are less fortunately placed than others in respect of outward goods and opportunities; in this voluntary acceptance of a relatively humble place in the economy of the state or community we see the principle of human instrumentality reappearing in a moralised form. For while it is contrary to all Christian morality to use other men as means to ends in which they have no share, it is of the essence of morality that they should be ready to sacrifice their own immediate advantage to the forwarding of a wider good, and so become instruments indeed, but willing instruments in its realisation. And such acquiescence in the less conspicuous and outwardly desirable forms of labour is made far more natural and easy, in proportion as those in higher station make it clear that they also are actuated by the desire to contribute to, and not to live upon, the common weal. To borrow the classification of the Republic, when Wisdom and Courage are shown by the rulers of the state, then the complementary virtue of Self-control is readily acquired by the other classes who know that, although in less conspicuous stations, they are not cut off from participation in the Common Good.

There are two objections to this view which call for notice before this chapter concludes.

(1) It has been said that the principle of self-sacrifice cannot be consistently carried out or regarded as the supreme
law of ethics, for if it were universally practised a paradoxical condition of things would arise in which each man sacrificed his own good to the good of others but nowhere was a concrete good realised or enjoyed. Herbert Spencer, who used this argument, accordingly reached the ingenious conclusion that egoism is no less necessary to successful altruism than altruism to successful egoism. Egoism must persist in order that the self-denying efforts of altruism may not be wasted. Enjoyment must begin somewhere. To the last statement we may heartily agree, nor is it inconsistent with the theory of Plato, Spinoza and Green when this is rightly understood. And it is easy to see that here the definition of the good life as that of "contribution to the Common Good" is superior to the theory of "altruism" strictly understood. For the latter does lead to a theoretic contradiction, however far we may be in practice from a time when the danger of excessive altruism will be a common one. But the theory which we have been following out is not that of mere self-sacrifice or self-denial. The will to bring the best possible contribution to the public weal, involves the element of self-development as well as of self-denial; and for many men it will involve a high degree of such self-culture. Hence the emphasis on the education of the Guardians in the Republic: they were to be made the best men in order that they might perform the highest service. Such a training and exercise of the powers of body, mind as Plato there describes brings with it its own reward; while in a community in

*The Data of Ethics, chh. xiii, xiv.
which the ruling spirit were that of service, the general level of well-being would be so high, the diffused capacities of happiness so great, that even those whose toil hardest and in itself least remunerative would not fail to share not inadequately in the fruits of the common endeavour.

Thus the theory of the Common Good is not open to all the objections that beset the attempt to universalise the principle of mere "self-sacrifice." Its very designation shows that it is wider in its scope; for the idea of common Good suggests community of enjoyment as well as of endeavour. What it does negate is the setting of immediate individual acquisition or enjoyment in competition with the good of the wider circle of men. Its advantage over such theories as those of Spencer and Sidgwick, which start from Egoism and Altruism as definitely separated factors in morality and so can only arrive at a "conciliation" by a process of "trial and compromise," is that it does justice to that vital unity of the Individual and the Community which, even though it be "last in the order of nature" is the presupposition of a completed morality.

(2) The other objection is that in our discussion the question has been unduly simplified; for so far we have only considered the possibilities of conflict between Egoism and Altruism, and not between a narrower and a wider Altruism. Yet the latter is also possible.* To speak of the Common Good as a unity set

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over against the individual may have been accurate in the days of the Greek city-state, but fails to represent the complexity of the problem as it confronts us now. For the individual of today is commonly surrounded not by one, but by four or five circles of varying circumference whose members have claims on him. He has to consider his relation and duty not only to the state, but to the narrower circles of family, church, or profession, and to the all-encompassing circle of Humanity; and this rise into prominence of the family, the church, and the idea of Humanity as a whole, which are all due to different operations of the Christian ideal, has undoubtedly introduced a new complexity into the problems of ethics. While the questions thus raised are too wide for full discussion here, it may be observed that the conflicts which thus arise are often placed in too absolute a light. The claims of parental and civic duty do in many cases seem divergent; and yet it is becoming increasingly clear to all save the more extreme Socialists that the welfare of nations depends primarily on the strength and completeness of the family life within them. In the same way it is more and more generally realised in how far the separate welfare of Church and State depends on the due performance by each of its own special functions.

Yet it is possible to admit that there are such conflicting claims on the loyalty of individuals without thereby surrendering the doctrine of the Common Good. For, like the complementary doctrine of the Value of the Individual, it is rather the statement of an ideal than of a fully realised fact. Thus Green says,
"The idea of the good, like all practical ideas, is primarily a demand. It is not derived from observation of what exists, but from an inward requirement that something should be."* Even if we may hold that this statement on its negative side requires qualification, and that there is positive evidence, to be gained "from observation of what exists," of the actual operation of the principle of Common Good, and of tendencies to reconciliation between its divergent applications, yet we may emphatically agree that it must be used and judged as an ideal. This principle is not indeed removed from all possibility of verification in experience, for in the fact of the self-propagating character of goodness and the elevation of ethical influences above the limitations which affect ordinary material goods, we see its continuity with the facts of life as we know them; and in every instance in which personal advantage, and even life itself, is surrendered for the sake of a wider good than that of the individual himself, it appears as an actually operative ideal. Yet its complete realisation lies beyond present experience, and when its ideal character is thus understood, the actual conflict of claims between a wider and a narrower altruism ceases to appear as a final objection to its validity. Such conflicts must be recognised, but they will not appear final if it is held that their solution is part of the ethical task which runs through all the history of man. It is no doubt a temptation for the idealist to represent the process by which the Common Good is established as simpler and more direct.

*Prolegomena to Ethics, § 230. Cf. supra pp. 112 f.
than experience shows it to be. But if the recognition that it is often indirect and involved removes the possibility of a full realisation of the ideal further from us, yet this is not wholly a loss; for the growing complexity of the idea of the Common Good, which leads to the emergence of these new problems, is in itself a sign of the enrichment of the ideal, and the widening of its scope.

In thus considering the Community of the Good as a regulative principle, whose working may be traced in experience but which points beyond any present experienced fact, we are in agreement with the view of Kant.* The validity which he claims for it is of this order; and if Ethics, as a "normative science" can claim to establish and apply any principles of this nature, then it can hardly be denied that this must be among their number. For in spite of all divergences among ethical thinkers as to the form of the ideal polity, two statements regarding it would command wide, if not complete agreement, - that every man should contribute according to his ability (but voluntarily, and not of constraint) to the Good of the Whole, and that no man should be debarred from sharing in the Good which he helps to create. But these two conditions represent the Doctrine of the Common Good in its positive and negative applications.

There are thus two aspects of the idea of the true Good as common in nature. That from which we started represented it as

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an inward possession, that which we have now reached as the principle of an objective order. But the principle, as it passes from the subjective to the objective stage, from the implicit to the explicit, is still essentially the same. For that inward inalienable character of the Good as the life of Spirit, by its freedom from the clash of contending interests and its power of passing undiminished from man to man, points the way to an outward and visible manifestation of the same idea. It provides a goal for human effort by showing that the highest goods are not to be reached through competition but through co-operation, and that it is possible to imagine and work for a state of society in which every individual would have some adequate sense of the significance of the Whole, and some worthy share in its activities.
CHAPTER V.

THE COMMUNITY OF THE GOOD AND CHRISTIAN UNIVERSALISM.
I.

The same tendencies, which in the last chapter were considered in a philosophical connection, meet us also in the ethical teaching of the New Testament. Indeed they are even more strongly marked, for nowhere do we find more strongly stated both the view of the inwardness of virtue, and that of the Good as realised through outward agencies and even material objects; and thus the problem of the real relation of these two ideas is no less important for Christian Ethics than for General Moral Philosophy.

(1) On the former aspect of the ethical end - its independence and inwardness - the teaching of the New Testament is so clear and strong that at first sight it might seem possible to rest the whole structure of Christian morality upon this foundation; and this has indeed been done, not only by the early Christian ascetics, but by St. Francis, to a great extent by Tolstoi, and by all who have taught that the secret of Christianity lies in a holy poverty and in the effort to gain perfection by renouncing rather than by using aright the benefits of the material world. And although this view is incomplete, it can be defended by an appeal to many of the most familiar passages in the New Testament. There is much in the teaching of Jesus which strongly suggests that He looked on the roots of character as lying too far beneath the surface of human nature to be readily reached by the rain or sunshine of outward events. It is needless to repeat what has
been said above regarding this side of His message, * - His recognition of goodness in unsuspected places, His proclamation that the blessings of His kingdom lay nearer to the poor than to the rich, and His assertion of the absolute worthlessness of worldly possessions in comparison with the value of the soul. In this respect the Beatitudes are rightly taken as the centre of His teaching; and there are many incidents and sayings in His life which show how firmly He asserted the superiority and independence of spiritual interests, when material needs come into conflict with them. Such are the quotation from Deuteronomy in the narrative of the Temptation, "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God;" ** and the exhortation of His disciples, "Be not afraid of them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul."† Again Jesus laid great stress on the necessity of concentrating on one great object those faculties which are too often dispersed over many trivial objects. "One thing thou lackest;" "Thou art anxious and troubled about many things: but one thing is needful" † † - in such words as these Jesus seems to lay supreme emphasis on a single and simple act. And if this be all, if His whole teaching can be summed up

* PP. 103 ff.

** Matt. iv. 4 Here as elsewhere Jesus taught even more by His example than by his commands. Compare the warning to a would-be disciple that "the Son of Man hath not where to lay His Head." (Matt. viii. 20).

† Matt. x. 20.

†† Mark x, 21; Luke x. 41-2.
in the single exhortation to take up the cross and follow him,* and
the whole lesson of discipleship be that of the need for the spirit
of the little child, may it not be said that no man, whatever his
intellectual attainments or worldly position can plead inability to
hear and answer so simple a call and that the highest Good is directly
brought within the grasp of all? Does not Christianity do
away with all need for the alteration of material conditions and
for "the gifts of civilisation" by teaching that faith is the one
thing needful, and that it may be exercised by all, ignorant as
well as learned, Gentile as well as Jew? And if the highest ethi-
cal and spiritual gifts are thus placed within the reach of all men,
do we not find in the teaching of the New Testament a direct proof
of the doctrine that the true Good is common to all, and that there
can be no possible conflict of claims to share it? The same sense
of spiritual good as being something simple, secure and inalienable
pervades much of the thought of Paul. He is ready to lay aside
all the weapons of learning or of intellect to proclaim the simple
message of the Cross; he "counts all things but loss," and is eager
to divest himself of all human and individual powers in order to
be known as the mere instrument of a divine power;** while in the
Quis separabit? which concludes the eighth chapter of Romans his
faith rises to a height at which all material aids or hindrances
to goodness seem alike negligible in face of an all-controlling
spiritual experience. Such a faith as there finds expression in

* Matt. x. 38.

** I. Cor. ii.2; Phil.iii.8; 2 Cor.iv.7; cf. xii.10.
the free working of the Spirit sees in it a power able to bring all things into subjection to itself, and it seems the merest irrelevance to speak of goodness as in any sense dependent upon the possession of material things, in regard to which the interests of one man conflict, and the success of one man involves the failure of another.

This sense of the benefits of Christianity as open to all and independent of mediation through any external agency was strengthened by the apostolic belief in the presence and activity of the Risen Master, now set free from all the physical conditions which had limited the scope of His earthly ministry. There can be no doubt of the central position which the belief in the Resurrection held in the belief of the primitive Church, nor of its effect in making it possible for the smallest and most isolated body of Christians to feel themselves in contact with the source of all spiritual power. During the ministry of Jesus in Palestine, His words had been heard by comparatively few men and women, and His influence travelled by the uncertain means of ordinary human communication. But in the epistles, the Fourth Gospel, and at least twice in the Gospel of Matthew, there appears the assurance that these limitations were only for a time, and that the forces which Jesus wielded for the redemption of man, were no longer confined in their working to a few favoured disciples, but had become universal in operation and independent of the restrictions of space and time.*

To the primitive Church the conclusion of the earthly life of

*Matt. xviii.20; xxviii.20; John xii.32.
of Jesus, so far from limiting His power, made it possible for Him to bestow the highest gifts to all men without distinction of rank or place or time.*

It is thus apparent how Paul reached the conviction that spiritual wealth was independent of outward conditions, and that one who was outwardly destitute might yet have the power to enjoy and to bestow the greatest benefits. He expressed this belief in one of the most striking of New Testament paradoxes, when he described himself and his fellow-workers "as sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things;" for the message which they carried could make its way in all conditions, "by glory and dishonour, by evil report and good report."** Here we find the Christian analogue of the conception of αὐτάρκης; only it does not appear as self-sufficiency; for this Paul denies - "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves, to account anything as from ourselves; but our sufficiency (ἵκανότης) is from God."† Many other passages might be referred to; but enough has been said to indicate the presence in the New Testament of the thought that external things are indifferent when compared with spiritual good, and that the attainment of the latter is directly and immediately possible in any outward state.

* Eph. iv.7ff.; John xvi.7; and cf. Somerville, St. Paul's Conception of Christ, pp. 17, 56.

** 2 Cor. vi. 8-10.

† 2 Cor. iii.5. In Phil. iv.11, where the word αὐτάρκης does occur, it is to be read in the light of v. 13. Cf. infra, p. 166f.
(2) But this side of the Christian religion - on which it approaches the Stoic insistence on the inward and inalienable nature of virtue, though with a warmth and persuasiveness to which Stoicism never attained - is not the only one, nor may Christianity be identified with a Stoic or ascetic indifference to outward conditions or to physical suffering. This is shown by the fact that Jesus gave so large a portion of his short ministry to relieving physical suffering. "The healing ministry was a tacit but effective protest against asceticism and the dualism on which it rests, and a proof that Jesus had no sympathy with the hard antithesis between spirit and flesh."* It is true that, as Dr Bruce, from whom these words are taken also says, preaching was always first with Jesus, and that more and more as His ministry proceeded He sought to limit his work as a physician of the body, in order that He might concentrate His effort on the spiritual training of those who were to carry on His mission; but when all deductions are made, the care of Jesus for the bodily wants of men, and His sympathy with all forms of suffering stand out as among the clearest features of the gospel narrative. The importance which He attached to this side of His work appears in His answer to John's question regarding His messianic claims; and He clearly dwelt with especial delight on the passages in Isaiah which describe such works of mercy as among the chief glories of the Messianic

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** Ib. on the healing of the Palsied man (Mark ii.2.) The paramount importance of moral, as compared with physical recovery in the sight of Jesus is clearly brought out in this story. In the
Kingdom.* Even in comparison with the question of political freedom which filled the minds of so many of His fellow-countrymen, or with the directly moral reformation on which the hopes of John were set, Jesus would not allow that this labour was unimportant; nor did His sense of the burden of the nation's moral destiny prevent Him from seeking to lighten the burden of physical pain which oppressed even its feeblest member.

The work of healing was in Jesus' view so urgent that in pursuit of it He was ready to break through the Jewish restrictions regarding the Sabbath, and so to call forth the criticism and opposition of those whose religious reputation stood highest in the eyes of His countrymen. The words, "Is it lawful on the sabbath day to do good, or to do harm? to save a life, or to kill?"** show that He looked on this as an essentially religious duty, appropriate to the sacred day and place; and the hardness of the Pharisees in refusing to admit this moved Him both to grief and anger.† Again, it is clear that this side of Jesus' ministry

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**Mark iii.4; Luke vi.9.Cf.Matt.xii.11; Luke xiii.16; xiv.3.

†περιπλήκτηκενος αὐτοῦ μετ' ὑπής κ.τ.λ., Mark iii.5.
was no merely external process, but that it depended for its efficacy on the same inward conditions and religious attitude as His preaching. To the author of the First Gospel it showed that bearing of the sufferings of other of which Isaiah 1111 speaks;* while Jesus Himself taught that faith on the part of the sufferer is no less essential a condition of healing than is prayerfulness, in which faith is implied, on the part of him who would exercise healing power.**

To this direct evidence of the extent to which Jesus rejected the ascetic ideal of self-sufficiency and independence of all outward means of encompassing the good, there may be added one or two less immediately obvious considerations. We have seen how, in the thought of Aristotle, a sufficiency of worldly goods, friendship, and leisure are all looked on as needful to the good life.† Now Christianity has certainly modified the Greek idea of what constitutes a "sufficiency" of material "goods" for the good life, and has shown how the noblest character and the truest happiness deny may be found in conditions of poverty; yet Jesus did not overlook the need for the ordinary supports of life.

"While He earnestly deprecated carefulness about such things as food and clothing, He nevertheless recognised these as things which all have need of, and He took it for granted that they must be sought, only urging that righteousness should be sought first."††

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* Matt.viii.17; cf. supra.

** Mark v. 34 and par., ix.29 (R.V.om "and fasting"); cf.vv.23-4.

† Supra, pp.131 ff. Also Eth.Nic, Bock VIII, init. "No one would choose to live without friends, even if he possessed all other good things."

With regard to the other two requisites of the truly virtu-
cous life, as Aristotle conceived it—friendship and leisure—it
is still less clear that they can be dispensed with without detri-
ment to the growth of character. Under normal conditions, the
Christian life is not solitary but social, and can only reach its
perfection in the presence of friends and in the community of
love and service. In the same way, although it does not by any
means demand for its development, the ample leisure of the phil-
osopher or the Athenian gentleman, yet a certain detachment from
the pressing interests of the world, and some opportunity for
quiet thought, is in most cases, if not in all, essential for the
Christian. Jesus recognised this when he set the seal of His ap-
proval upon the institution of the Sabbath rest;* and when He saw
that the excitement and the crowds which attended on His Galilean
ministry were becoming a danger to the spiritual development of
the disciples and that a season of leisure was needful for them,
He called them to come apart by themselves into a desert place and
to rest awhile.** Again, He enjoined times of solitary thought
and prayer in the words, "Enter into thine inner chamber, and hav-
ing shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret."†

Now, sayings such as this point to real conditions of spiritu-
al progress; and we cannot hold that they are altogether independ-
ent of external things. The opportunity for solitary thought

* Mark 11.27.
** Mark vi.31.
† Matt.vi.6.
and devotion, which the passage last quoted assumes as essential for the normal Christian life is not in fact possessed by tens of thousands of the inhabitants of the vast blocks of two-roomed and even one-roomed houses in the crowded quarters of our cities; and we can by no means assume that the difficulties which such conditions throw in the way of the life of goodness would have appeared indifferent to Christ. Again, His teaching was thrown into a form which presupposed knowledge in His hearers of the quiet life of the country. He drew lessons from the birds and the flowers, and the patient comradeship of the oxen beneath the yoke provided one of His most memorable illustrations of the nature of the new life to which He called men.* But it has been observed that those who pass their lives amid the gloom and the ceaseless rush and noise of a great city have often no opportunity of becoming familiar with these things, and hence for them one means of access into the heart of Jesus' message is closed, simple as that message is.

From all these facts we may conclude that the principle which underlay the healing work reported in the Gospels finds its legitimate and necessary application in the view that it is as important to prevent disease by the creation of a healthy and spacious environment as it is to relieve the suffering that actually exists. This principle may be defined as that of the unity of human nature. Strongly as Jesus asserted the power of the spirit and the supremacy of spiritual forces over those of the material world, yet His

*Matt. vi. 26, 28; xi. 29 etc.
teaching cannot be appealed to in support of the ascetic method of simplifying moral problems by neglecting their material elements. Body and spirit form one man; and this unity explains the fact that Jesus approached men, now by a direct moral appeal, and now by the silent persuasion of deeds of mercy. He knew the various entrances to the secret places of Man's nature, and He did not neglect even indirect means of compassing spiritual good. This union of carelessness and care for the body, of contempt for and sympathy with suffering, which marked the ministry of Jesus descended also to His followers in the early Church. It has been characterised by Seeley in a striking passage, in which he describes the appearance in the Roman Empire of a sect "which distinguished itself by the assiduous attention which it bestowed upon the bodily wants of mankind," and the appearance at the same time of "a sect which was remarkable for the contempt in which it held human suffering." "These two sects," he continues, "appeared to run into contrary extremes. The one seemed to carry their regard for the body to the borders of effeminacy, the other pushed Stoical apathy almost to madness. Yet these two sects were one and the same— the Christian Church."

This point has special importance in relation to the beginnings of the higher life; and it may help to explain the antithesis between the insistence on the inner and on the outer aspects of life, both of which are emphasised in the New Testament, if we observe

*Ecce Homo, ch.x, Cf. ch. xviii.*
that their relative importance differs at different stages of religious development. From a mature disciple a degree of spiritual independence and of contempt for outward obstacles may be expected which could not be demanded from one to whom the whole spiritual region was an unexplored country. The ultimate end of Christianity, the supreme gift, may be raised above material conditions; yet, as has been well said, "sometimes this gift can only be apprehended through lowlier gifts... And when life is sunless, and all its relations are debased, and fortune is unfriendly, how is a man to begin to believe in the love of God? When he has learned to know Him, he can walk with God even in the dark, but how shall he know Him first?"* At the outset, before the source of strength has been found within, it is necessary that moral and religious impressions should come to the individual in such a concrete form as will appeal to his actual powers of apprehension, and so gradually awaken a response from his higher nature.

The same distinction between the beginning and the full development of the spiritual life in respect of independence may be illustrated from the writings of Paul. He speaks of his power to meet good and evil fortune alike with calm and gladness as the ripe result of his whole religious experience and development.

"For I have learned in whatsoever state I am, therein to be content. I know how to be abased, and I know also how to abound; in everything and in all things have I learned the secret both to be filled and to be hungry, both to abound and to be in want. I can do all things in him that strengtheneth me**

* W.M. Macgregor, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, pp.216-7. (The italics are mine)

** Phil. iv.11-13.
Here the word ἐμημοίωσι ("I have learned the secret," or "been initiated into") represents the faculty of gaining good from all circumstances as one that has been acquired by slow degrees and by the long lessons of experience.

Again we may observe that, in spite of Paul's belief that "the word of God is not bound" and can make its own way even if the ordinary means of carrying it are removed, he does not deny the use, and even the necessity of these ordinary means, especially in relation to the beginnings of the spiritual life. For in the same passage in which he quotes the saying "The word is nigh thee," and says that "the same Lord is rich unto all that call upon Him," he proceeds, "How then shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him Whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except they be sent?" ** Here it is implied that in the manifold and complex order of the world of experience one element cannot be completely isolated from the rest, nor can the idea be consistently carried out that spiritual and material agencies are wholly independent. Roman roads and posts, and Phoenician merchantmen had a definite part in making possible the spread of the Christian faith; nor did the spirituality of that faith, and its character as something directly given to the receptive mind and heart of man, release those who had felt its power from the obligation of extending its sway by the help of ordinary material

* 2 Tim. ii. 2.

** Rom.x. 8, 12-15.
agencies. Thus we return to the description of Christianity given in the first chapter; for in so far as it is looked on as an inward and irresistible spiritual power the fitting attitude of the believer is that of expectation and quiet trust; but in so far as it is mediated through outward events and advanced by human effort there is a call for the greatest earnestness in using all the ordinary methods of human activity to further its progress.

(3) We are thus led to recognise a double character in Christianity. On the one side it is a direct inspiration, an immediate gift;* but on the other it depends, especially in its origin, on human influences and even on outward events and circumstances. From the philosophical point of view this contrast may be expressed in the antithetic statements that Spirit is all, and that Spirit apart from its material embodiment and expression is nothing. In the gospels it takes the form of an apparent opposition between those passages in which inward disposition is represented as all-important and those in which a large importance is clearly attributed to physical conditions and means of operation; while in the epistles the contrast is that between Faith and Works. But just as we saw that the philosophical antinomy loses its absoluteness when it is recognised the inner and outer aspects of morality are not in fact separable, but must be treated in their concrete unity, so the apparent dualism of New Testament teaching

is only a dualism of contrasted aspects, and not of contradictory facts, of experience. In the nature of man the unity of spirit and body is deeper than their difference, and his nature, normally at least, functions as a whole.* It has already been pointed out that this fundamental unity of human nature explains the sympathy of Jesus with suffering and His readiness to reach the hearts of men by acts of kindness in the outward and visible order; but it is also clearly present in His thoughts when He says that "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh," and that "the tree is known by its fruit."** Just as on the passive or receptive side of man's nature, his heart can be reached through his feelings and outward experiences, so on the active side the bent of his inmost thoughts and the disposition of his will must manifest themselves in word and action. Hence in the teaching of Jesus virtue is described as consisting now in purity of thought and inward intention,† again in the nature of the spoken word,‡ and yet again

* For St. Paul the body had an essential part in the spiritual life - See 1 Cor. vi. 13b, 19, 20, and Rom. xii. 6, with Dr. Denney's penetrating note on the latter passage in the Expositor's Greek Testament, "The body is in view here as the instrument by which all human service is rendered to God, and the service which it does render, in the manner supposed, is not a bodily but a spiritual service."

** Matt. xii. 33, 34. Cf. Hegel's remarks on the unity of human nature in his Smaller Logic, § 140, where he quotes the similar saying in Matt. vii. 20.

† E.G., Matt. v. 3, 8, 22, 28, xv. 3ff.; cf. xxiii, 27, 28; Luke xxi. 3.

in actual deeds of obedience and kindness.*

Yet there is here no real inconsistency; for the evil heart is bound to bring forth evil of every kind, in word as well as deed, as Jesus make clear in the list of those evil things which "come forth out of the heart and defile the man."** The same principle applies in the life of goodness. "The good man out of his good treasure bringeth forth good things."† As Paul insists, the Christian is not changed in one faculty or division of his nature alone: he is "a new creation," living a new life by which all his powers are given a new direction.†† This phrase, "a new creation," occurs twice in the epistles of Paul, the first passage being near the close of the epistle to the Galatians in the text, "neither is circumcision anything or uncircumcision, but a new creation." But in the previous chapter in the same context the words are "but faith, working through love;"††† and from this we may gather that Paul thought of that change by which human nature is created anew as effected by an inner principle, that of faith, which yet necessarily works itself out in the activity of love.

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* Matt. vii.16-20, 21, 24; xxi.30, 31; xxv. 31-46; cf. xiii, 9; Luke xi.23. The thought that the test of goodness is to be found in actual results, in the bearing of fruit, is also emphasised in John xv.3.

** Matt. xv.13-16.

† Matt. xii.35.

++καινη κτισις, R.V. marg., Gal.vi.15 and 2 Cor.v.17. The A.V. & R.V. rendering is "a new creature."

††† Gal.v.6, ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ οὐτε περιτομῇ τι ἱσχύει οὐτε ἀκρο-βυστία, ἀλλὰ πίστις ὑπ' ἀγάπης ἐνεργημένη.
So in the Sermon on the Mount the disciples of Jesus are urged not to conceal the light that has been kindled in their own hearts, but to let it go forth to illuminate the surrounding world.* And just as we cannot think of the Good Will as remaining self-centred and making no endeavour to conquer the stubborn facts of its physical and social environment, so it is, but even more emphatically, with the principle of inwardness as Christianity expresses it. For this is no other than Love; and while it originates as an inward experience, and a change of disposition, it necessarily seeks to pass over into the objective world and to express itself in actual deeds. Nothing can be more entirely inward and personal, and yet nothing so inevitably passes beyond itself, and seeks its sphere of action among the concrete goods of the material world.

This fact that the spirit of love cannot remain subjective or merely spiritual is strongly enforced in the apostolic injunction. "Whoso hath this world's goods, and beholdeth his brother in need, and shutteth up his compassion from him, how doth the love of God abide in him? My little children, let us not love in word, neither with the tongue; but in deed and truth."**

Thus, if love be the principle of the Christian life, it finds its expression, and indeed its realisation, in Service. Now this is only the more direct and simple expression given by Christian Ethics to the principle of contribution to the Common Good to which the philosopher must look for the solution of the double antithesis

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* Matt. v. 15,16.
**1 John iii. 17-18. Cf. James ii. 15, 16.
of the inward and outward, and the individual and social, aspects of the Good.

No elaborate proof is needed to show that this assignment to the idea of service of a central and determining position in Christian Ethics is in accord with the teaching of the New Testament. The whole narrative of the Gospels is in itself the proof and the justification of this position. But in one passage it appears most clearly that Jesus proclaimed this as the grand distinction between His Kingdom and the kingdoms of history - that in the former, service, and not power or high rank, was both the universal law and the insignia of greatness.

"Ye know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them. Not so shall it be among you: but whosoever would be great among you shall be your minister; and whosoever would be first among you shall be your servant: even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many."*

The same thought of the reversal and transvaluation in the Christian community of all the ordinary standards of leadership and greatness is expressed and illustrated by the story of the washing of the disciples' feet in the Gospel of John, with the solemn words that follow, "Know ye what I have done unto you? Ye call me Master, and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am. If I then, the Lord and the Master, have washed your feet, ye ought also to wash one another's feet."** The same principle, that in the Christian

* Matt xx. 25-28; cf. xxiii.11; Mark ix.35.

** John xiii. 12-14. Cf. 1 Peter v. 5, "All of you, gird yourselves with humility, to serve one another."
economy greatness is attained and maintained by service instead of by coercive power, and that contribution takes the place of acquisition as the ruling motive of the Christian life, finds expression in the saying of Jesus preserved in the Book of Acts, "It is more blessed to give than to receive."* And Paul in his own writings enforces the double duty of humility and service by appealing to the example of his Master, Who "took the form of a servant," and "became obedient unto death."**

The practical side of Paul's teaching centres round the exhortation to a constant and deliberate practice of this principle of service. No support can be gained from his teaching for the idea that enlightened self-love is sufficient to bring men into a relation of harmony and mutual helpfulness, or that by some alchemy, unrestricted, self-regarding competition can lead to universal happiness. The effects of such a rule of life are indicated by a single warning - "If ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another;" and the true way is pointed out in the words, "through love be servants one to another."†

But even if a natural harmony of interests had been possible in the sphere of material wants and possessions, Paul, like Plato, would have rejected this as an unworthy ideal of life, in comparison with the conception of a community as consisting of individual men, bound together not by the external and accidental ties of

* Acts xx. 36.
** Phil. ii. 3, 7, 8; cf. 2 Cor. viii. 9; 1 John iii. 16.
† Gal. v. 13. 15.
self-interest, but by the vital bond which unites the members of a single living body.* The metaphor of the body and its members was a favourite one in antiquity, but it was never applied more forcibly and thoroughly than in the epistles of Paul. To the use which he makes of it to illustrate the diversity of function in the Christian community we shall shortly return: what is of importance at this point is its significance as enforcing the fact of function, that is, of service, as the great condition of the Christian life.

It is indeed true that love has a still higher importance, as the animating and inspiring spirit of true service;** but the love which Paul commends cannot be interpreted as a self-contained love, isolated from the material world or indifferent to the ordinary needs of man. The spirit of the giver, for Paul as for Jesus, is the chief thing, — for "if the readiness is there, it is acceptable according as a man hath, not according as he hath not;" and the highest praise bestowed upon the generous Macedonians is that "first of all they gave their own selves to the Lord."†† Yet at the same time the gift is in itself not to

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* Cf. Rep. 372 D with 462 CD. The latter passage may have influenced 1 Cor.xii.26. to which it is closely parallel.

** 1 Cor xiii.3.

† 2 Cor. viii.12. This principle is recognised by Aristotle when he says that "liberality lies not in the actual amount given but in the moral state of the giver," and that one who gives less may be more liberal than another if his means are smaller. Eth. Nic. IV. 1120b8ff.

†† 2 Cor. viii.5.
be despised. It is a duty to obtain by labour the material of generous action, and the opportunity of giving liberally is itself a good gift of God.* In the same way the First Epistle of Peter shows the nature of love as expressing itself in service in the sphere of material things, "Above all things being fervent in your love among yourselves... according as each hath received a gift, ministering it among yourselves as good stewards of the manifold grace of God."**

Now it is doubtless true that this characteristic of Christianity has not always been recognised as essential and central. There have been periods in which the Christian life has been reflected upon itself and ceased to go forth into the world around, in which it has been thought that the inward and the upward view were sufficient, while in truth apart from the outward view and the forgoing activity they lose even their own proper clearness and strength. Such have been the periods of Christian asceticism;

* Eph. iv. 28; 2 Cor ix. 8. In Luke xvi. 11, Jesus places great weight on the importance of faithful stewardship of wealth.

** 1 Peter iv. 3, 10. This teaching is in accord with the practice of the early Christian community in Jerusalem as recorded in Acts xi. 45, iv. 34 ff. But it does not yield any support to the moral of one of Count Tolstoi's apologues, "that God and men can be served, not by gold, but only by deeds." (Ivan Ilyitch and other Stories, p. 187.). This conclusion seems to rest on an impossible abstraction of deeds from their instruments. Gold is far from being the most important, but it is one of the media through which brotherly kindness expresses itself. It is even treated by Paul as a means of returning spiritual benefits, though not of course as a true equivalent of the latter. ("If the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, they owe it to them also to minister to them in carnal things," Rom. xv. 27; cf. 1 Cor. ix. 11.)
and it was one great achievement of the Reformation to break with this subjective conception and to restore the life of the world and the affairs of men to their true place in relation to the spiritual life, as the field both of its discipline and of its efficient working. Hence the place of work, that is of practical service, in the Christian scheme.

This lesson of the Reformation has at times been obscured; and the charge of excessive subjectivity has been brought, not without reason, against some forms and tendencies of Protestant teaching. This charge cannot indeed be justified if it is advanced in criticism of the doctrine that the Christian life must be founded upon an inner change, a personal and incommunicable experience by which the whole outlook upon life is altered, it may be suddenly or it may be gradually and almost unconsciously. That this moment of the Christian life, this "transaction" (to use the old term,) is essentially inward is indubitable. But the error creeps in if the same subjective character is attributed to its progress and development. Where "sanctification" was treated by the older theology as no less private and personal than "justification", there was ground for the charge of over-emphasis on the purely individual, and neglect of the social, aspects of Christian virtue. Not that inward and secret discipline has no place or use in the further development of Christian character. But, if the previous argument is in any degree valid, its full unfolding is possible only in the intercourse of social life and in the effort to serve others and to promote the Common Good.
If the doctrine of the Brotherhood of Man and the metaphor of the body and its members have any meaning or force, then the idea of isolated development is a contradictory one, and the calling of the individual can be realised only in union with a community bound together by mutual service. The full growth of the Christian character which is implied in the idea of sanctification must, normally and in the main, be a social process.

We have now reached a point from which the teaching of Christian Ethics regarding the Common Good can be briefly summed up. The two aspects of the Good as inward and outward, or as independent of outward circumstances and as making them instruments in its own development and expression, which from the first we distinguished still remain as distinguishable elements in the Christian view. But though still distinguishable they are not rigidly separate, still less at war. In the former aspect, the Good transcends the limitation which clings to all divisible and material goods: if a material illustration of its nature be sought, it may be found in the flame which increases instead of diminishing as it passes from torch to torch, or as Dante found it, in the light which gains brightness as it is reflected from mirror to mirror.* On this side the immediacy and independence of the Christians good removes it above the sphere of competition, and history has confirmed its claim to give strength to bear the most crushing misfortune, and to bring peace into the midst of extreme suffering.

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*Purgatorio*, xv, 75.
II.

It is now possible to define certain broad aspects of Christian Universalism, and to state more precisely the sense in which it is to be understood. We have seen that Christianity penetrates behind all superficial qualities and all outward advantages of race or education, and finds in the inner nature of Man that which is of supreme value. But this does not imply that the value of the individual man, as Christianity finds him, is an actual, accomplished, developed fact. Rather it is in the language of philosophy a potential value, which needs to be actualised. The strongest bond by which men of every race are held together is that of a common need; for the common potentiality for good, which Christianity recognises and claims to be able to develop, is first witnessed by a sense of need, that is of dissatisfaction and shortcoming.

In this need Jew and Gentile alike shared; or, as Jesus and Paul both taught, the Jewish nation were even at a disadvantage in so far as their tendency to trust in a legal righteousness prevented them from feeling that "hunger and thirst after righteousness" which was the first condition of spiritual progress.* When the sense of need was thus emphasised as the only, but also the sufficient preparation for the reception of Jesus' message, the barriers

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* Cf. Matt. v.6; ix.13; with Rom. i-iii and x.3; and Rev. iv.16-17. In Rom. ii. 28-9 there is one of the most striking assertions of the independence of true goodness on external distinctions, "He is not a Jew which is one outwardly, but he is a Jew which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter." Cf. 1 Cor. vii. 19.
of nationality or of social distinction inevitably fell away, and the universality of that message became fully evident. When He found in the centurion this openness of heart and readiness to believe in His power outside the Jewish nation, Jesus welcomed it in the words, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel. And I say unto you, that many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven."* The same emphatic assertion that the benefits of the Gospel transcend all national limitations is found in several of Christ's later parables, spoken when it had become apparent that the leaders of the Jewish people were too deeply entangled in their own narrow religious prejudices to appreciate or respond to His message. Thus the parable of the Good Samaritan teaches that a despised stranger might give a high example of the love and helpfulness in which the Priest and the Levite failed;** while in those of the Two Sons and the Wicked Husbandmen it is shown that ethical performance, and not profession or privilege, is the real mark of membership in the Kingdom of God.† Finally in the parable of the Marriage Feast, which follows them in St. Matthew's narrative, the lesson is once more enforced that the one thing that prevents men from accepting the benefits which Jesus came to bestow is that preoccupation with outward things which does away with all sense of need for a higher good, and that consequently

* Matt. viii, 10-11.
** Luke x. 30-37.
† Matt. xxi. 28-46.
those who have been regarded as social or religious outcasts may enter the Kingdom before many whose reputation for piety has stood high with the world. *

Thus Christian Universalism implies a recognition of the solidarity of the human race in respect of its needs, whether these needs are consciously felt or not; but it goes further - and herein lies its originality - in that it teaches that wherever the need is consciously recognised, there is already present in the recognition an earnest of its satisfaction. It is needless to repeat what has been emphasised above, ** that it is virtue of the assurance of the possibilities of human nature at its weakest that the teaching and ministry of Jesus are unique, and that thus the Christian assertion of the Value of the Individual points less to a present fact than to a task - but a task which is not to be looked on as hopeless. Nor is it necessary again to point out at length that the realisation of that hardly suspected potentiality for good which Christianity detects, is not a purely individual process; but that the development of character depends on education, and education - the "drawing out" of immature powers - is largely a social process, while its end is to be sought in the fitting of the individual to take his place as a member of a wider whole.

It is not in the mystical teaching of the Gospel of John or

( Cf.Rev.iii.18-19 );

* Matt. xxii. 1-10. It has been suggested that the universalism of Jesus' idea of His mission is evidenced by His preferring, "the unmistakably humanitarian title 'Son of Man' " to the "purely national" title, 'Son of David'. Clark Murray, Hand-book of Christian Ethics, p. 106.

** Pp.110 ff.
the Pauline epistles alone that the Value of the Individual is treated as dependent on his relation to the whole body of believers and to their Head. The same thought can be clearly traced in those words in which Jesus, as reported by the Synoptists, speaks of the value of single souls, and hence their claim on the service of others, as conditioned by their relation to Himself. "Whoso shall receive one such little child in my name, receiveth me."*

"Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me."** And conversely, Jesus teaches that all truly ethical service necessarily brings men and women into the closest relationship with Him: "Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in Heaven, he is my brother and sister and mother."†

Thus the author of Ecce Homo gave a true account of the teaching of Jesus as to the condition on which human lives become truly valuable, and also as to the ground on which the feeling of brotherhood and the activity of kindness should be founded in the Christian

* Matt. xviii. 5. Cf Mark ix. 41-2, "Whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink because ye are Christ's, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward. And whosoever shall cause one of these little ones that believe on me to stumble, it were better for him, etc." The phrase translated "because ye are Christ's" in the R.V. runs in the original, ἐὰν (ἐὰν) ἵνα (μου) ἐὰν ἤρετο ἐστί. In Matthew xviii. 5, it is ἐὰν ἵνα (μου).

The difference is slight, and both are closely related in meaning to the ἐὰνκεκαυκέν ἵνα, of other passages, for the import of which, see Denney, Jesus and the Gospel, pp. 224, 234.

** Matt. xxv. 40.

† Matt. xii. 50.
community, when he said that "Christ believed it possible to bind men to their kind, but on one condition - that they were first bound fast to himself. He stood forth as the representative of men, he identified himself with the cause and with the interests of all human beings, he was destined, as he began before long obscurely to intimate, to lay down his life for them." And thus all men, "as the brothers of Christ, as belonging to his sacred and consecrated kind, as the objects of his love in life and death, must be dear to all to whom he is dear."*

Thus it is that the scattered sheep are to be gathered into one flock, and so to find out themselves and display to others the hidden meaning and value of their lives. So, in truth, that value is to become actual and real, not in isolation but in the life of a community. For the ideal of the Value of the Individual carries with it in Christian Ethics, the ideal of the Common Good, and the process by which both ideals come by degrees to penetrate and control the life of the world is one and the same.

(2) If this is the first characteristic of Christian Universalism - that it describes an ideal rather than an accomplished fact, and belongs less to the statical than to the dynamical order of truths - the second important observation that must be made is that, for Christian Ethics, universality is not identical with uniformity. Christian universalism is of a kind that does fullest justice to the differences of individuals, and comprises within itself the widest diversity. This holds true both of the development of the Christian life and of its matured activity.

* Ecco Homo, ch. xiv.
and it appears as a diversity both of discipline and function.

One of the most striking things in the gospel narrative is the way in which Jesus adapted His teaching to the needs of individuals. He never addressed Himself to a merely abstract or typical man, but always to the particular man or woman with whom He was in contact at the moment; and He dealt with each according to his special circumstances and limitations. In harmony with this fact, the whole Christian conception of Providence suggests that the moral government of the world is not a mere uniformity, but that individual differences, so far from being of little consequence, are of real significance for the whole, and that the circumstances of life are tempered and attuned to individual needs. Such a doctrine is indeed a difficult one for certain minds and from some points of view. The philosopher in his effort after the "synoptic" view of the world, tends to overlook details and to see only the greater correspondences and adjustments between the outer and the inner world. Or he falls back on the Stoic view that the former is of moment only as the negative, the opposing force against which Spirit has to make good its own character and destiny; and thus he comes to look on external circumstance as important and yet indifferent - important in as far as it draws out the power of the will and strengthens it through conflict, but indifferent in that the virtue of the good man can prevail against any obstacle, and find means of realisation in any outward condition.*

* Cf. supra pp. 124-5.
But this view, while it is both intelligible and important, does not fully represent the teaching of the New Testament. Clearly as its pages demonstrate the power of faith to rise superior to circumstances of pain or danger, it does not regard the form of these circumstances as indifferent. The course of events is never a mere negative to be overcome. It has always some positive meaning, and the form which the conflict takes has a necessary influence on its result. The highest example of this is the fact that the close of Christ's ministry in apparently irrecovable failure was not regarded merely as a supreme example of the power of a good man to win a victory by patience and courage over the power of his enemies, and to turn the triumph of evil into a demonstration of the power of constancy and love. Rather, the whole course of Christ's ministry was treated by His apostles, and also, we may gather, by Himself, as showing how in the divine order even the most tragic outward events and the utmost forces of evil are made to subserve supreme moral and spiritual ends.*

The same principle that external events, and even apparent hindrances, are not merely a negative background of the Christian life, but have a definite and positive meaning for it, is applied in the New Testament to the smaller things as well as to the greatest. They are not looked on as uncontrolled, but as "working together" with the directly spiritual forces of life;** and Browning truly interprets the Christian attitude to the chances


** Cf. Matt.vi.25ff.; x.30. Rom.viii.23.32.
and the changes of the world, the "dance of plastic circumstance," when he describes it as

"Machinery just meant
To give thy soul, its bent,
Try thee, and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed."*

From this point of view the varying experiences of different lives have a positive import as disciplining them for varying tasks, and giving a concrete variety and fullness to the idea of human value which it would lack in a world where circumstances and characters were alike uniform. It is not enough that men should be good, but there must be originality in their goodness, and this originality is drawn out by the varying forms in which the discipline of life, even in small things, comes to each.

It was pointed out above that the philosopher naturally tends to concentrate his mind on the great features of human life and history, and so to miss the importance of the less conspicuous influences which help to mould and direct them. This attitude is exemplified in Plato's description in the Republic of the lover of Wisdom as one whose thoughts are so filled with "the vision of all time and all existence" that he considers this life and its petty interests of small account.** But at the end of his life, when he wrote the Laws, Plato came to see the inadequacy of this ideal, and the weakness even from the philosophical point of view of a theory which neglects the small things for the sake of the great.

* Rabbi Ben Ezra.

** 436 A.
He then argued that if the idea of divine government be applied to
the course of the world at all, it must be carried out consistently
and thoroughly; for great issues cannot be wisely directed if small
details are overlooked or despised.

"Let us not, then," he concludes, "deem God inferior to
human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and
perfect their works, small as well as great, by one and the
same art." Rather, "let us say, 'The ruler of the universe
has ordered all things with a view to the preservation and
perfection of the whole, and each part has an appointed state
of action and passion. And one of these portions is thine own,
which, however little, has the whole in view.'"*

If then, care for the whole involves care for the several min-
ute parts, "Providence", if it exists at all, cannot be other than
"particular," and the infinitely varied circumstances of human life,
in which the conflict takes a different shape for each man, are not
indifferent or meaningless, nor are they simply the hard and in-
tractable material - ὅλη - the virgin forest through which he has to
hew his way to the attainment of truth and goodness. They are in
some sort the necessary presupposition of the existence of a virtue
as varied and many-coloured as the "manifold grace of God."** They
provide the training necessary for service in a world where every
kind of service is called for.

Thus in the thought of the New Testament, as in that of the
ancient philosopher and the modern poet, we naturally pass from the
idea of the influence of variety of circumstance in helping to
produce variety of character to its effect in calling for and

* _Laws_, 902-3.
** ποικίλη χάρις θεοῦ, 1 Peter, iv. 10.
providing a sphere for variety of gifts. In other words, the thought of diversity of discipline passes over into that of diversity of function, and this, as we have seen, is a cardinal idea for those who would attain to a full, varied and concrete conception of the Common Good. In the parable of the Talents* the greatest emphasis is laid both on the absolute value of faithfulness in service, even in the smallest sphere, and on the complementary truth that the actual and measureable results of service must differ according to the endowments and opportunities granted to different men. Thus the parable teaches a double lesson - that of the diversity of gifts, and that of the worth of every gift when applied in and increased by service; and it may be taken as an illustration and enforcement of the principle that "to whomsoever much is given of him shall much be required."** In the conclusion of the parable of the Sower the same emphasis is laid on variety of attainment. Not only does the good soil differ from the stony or the hard or the thorny ground; but of the seed which "fell upon the good ground, and yielded fruit," some brought forth "a hundred-fold, some sixty, some thirty."†

The same thoughts underlie the metaphor of the body and its members as it is used by St. Paul. Functions and capacities vary, but all work harmoniously for the good of all, so long as they are obedient to the direction of the Spirit which permeates and co-ordinates them all.

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** Luke xii, 48.
"There are gifts, each from each distinct, but the same Spirit; modes of service, each from each distinct, and the Master served the same; manifestations of energy, each from each distinct, and the same God, sole source of all energy whatsoever, in whomsoever manifested. None but has the opportunity offered him of revealing the Spirit for a beneficent end." "God has attempered the body, part to part, assigning to that which ranks the lower a greater dignity, that the sundry members may all be concerned alike for the well-being of the rest, and may work together without jarring." "Just as in our one body we have many members, and these members have not all the same function, so we many form one body in Christ, and severally are members of the rest. Possessed of gifts, differing according to the grace that has been given to us, let us exercise these gifts aright."*

In these passages there is the fullest recognition of the fact that the unity of the Christian life is not a dead uniformity of similar objects cast in the same mould, but a living and organic unity of dissimilar persons, each maintaining his own individuality, but subordinating it to the needs of the whole, and enabled to do so by the living principle which controls every will and harmonises all effort. In the First Epistle to the Corinthians Paul works out this idea by giving a list of the various functions and duties of members within the unity of the Spirit in the Church; and the order in which they are named suggests the relative importance which he attached to these different offices of service.**

First he names those of the most directly inspired and the most distinctively spiritual order, "First apostles, secondly prophets;" then teachers of the truth; next, those occupied with less purely inward things, healing and administration; and finally those possessed of the gift of "tongues." In this order there is a

* 1 Cor. xii. 4-6, 24-5; Rom xii. 5-6. I quote from Dr W.G. Rutherford's translation. Cf. Eph. iv. 11-16.

** 1 Cor. xii. 23.
distinct gradation, the more external forms of service being subordinated to those which more directly touch and influence the inner life, while the need for the former no less than the latter is recognised. This is in fact a reassertion of the double principle of Christianity, that while the external is ever to be treated as subordinate to the spiritual, there is no impassable gulf between them, but that material things can and must be used in the service of the spiritual, stamped with its image, and made the medium of its manifestation.

This Pauline conception of a hierarchy, not of power, but of service, has the advantage of bringing out the continuity of different kinds of service, and showing that those which we consider external are separated from the inward by a series of steps, or even a continuous gradation, rather than by a single sharp break. And yet for many purposes it remains needful for the sake of clearness to draw a more or less definite line between the two. At a very early stage of Church History, this line was drawn, when the order of Deacons was instituted, in order that they might "serve tables," and so set the Apostles themselves free to "continue steadfastly in prayer and in the ministry of the word."* Thus early it was acknowledged that even within the church there is a twofold need to be met, and that the care of its more external affairs calls for a distinct class of office-bearers. In this position matters remained for three centuries; for while this side

* Acts vi. 2-4.
of the church's work increased with its growing extension and power, yet as long as it remained a persecuted or merely tolerated minority under the autocratic power of the Empire, the external, objective side of Christian activity was confined to works such as almsgiving, the care of the sick, and church administration. But when Christianity gained the opportunity of influencing directly the course of secular history the great problem emerged - a problem that has exercised all the ages since - How are the principles of Christianity to be objectively worked out in the political and social life of man?

Attempts have indeed been made to evade this problem by treating the Christian religion as purely spiritual, and as separable from the course of history and political life. But if our previous analysis has been in any degree accurate, this attempt to render religion purely subjective fails to do justice to the comprehensiveness of Christianity. And if it be admitted that such objects as the relief of suffering and of want by an external organisation form part of the Church's duty, the right of the State must be recognised also to prevent these evils by its own proper means of action. If the end of the Christian religion is only to be reached in the upbuilding of an organised society constituted on Christian principles, then questions of outward organisation cannot be dismissed as irrelevant, nor can it be denied that it is of importance to regulate wisely the external circumstances of life.

Thus the State has been held to have a place beside the Church
in forwarding the one great end - the perfecting of the human race. This conception ruled the thought of Dante, who held that the Empire as well as the Church existed by direct divine authority, and that each was charged with a definite share in the redemption and education of mankind.

"For as man alone of all beings participates both in the corruptible and the incorruptible, so he alone of all beings is ordained to gain two ends. . . and has need of two guides for his life. . . whereof one is the Supreme Pontiff, to lead mankind to eternal life, according to the things revealed to us; and the other is the Emperor, to guide mankind to happiness in this world."*

This conception of a fundamental duality in the divine education of mankind, and of the incompleteness of either the spiritual or temporal rule in isolation, is the more striking in that Dante possessed to the full the mediaeval longing for unity. His De Monarchia is in great part occupied with the defence and exaltation of the principle of unity; but at its close he recognises that the "fountain of authority, one in its unity, flows through many channels out of the abundance of the goodness of God."**

And in particular he condemns any attempt either to merge the temporal rule in the spiritual or to confuse their separate spheres and methods.

In the light of this idea, and in view of the recognition by Christianity of the influence of outward circumstance in helping or hindering the good life, especially when it is still immature, it is necessary to correct what was said above† regarding the

* De Mon., lili.xv. Cf. Purg. xvi,107ff., where occurs the warning against "grafting the sword upon the crook."

** Ibid.

† Pp. 78 ff.
relation of political action to the Christian estimate of man.

I there emphasised the negative side of this relation, and the fact that both law and its administration, "by reason of their general-ity," tend to cast a shadow on the individual, and to treat men in masses, to the neglect of their different needs and the disparagement of their separate value. But, when once the central Christian assertion of the ultimate value of the single soul has been received, when it has been acknowledged that in the deepest sense the individual man is the true ethical unit, it is possible to reinstate the methods of action peculiar to political rule, and to look on the statesman as not less really, though perhaps less directly, than the preacher an exponent of the Christian principle of service. In his special sphere, it is true, he is in the main removed from contact with individuals, and cannot minister as Jesus and His immediate followers did, to individual needs. But if outward circumstances count for much in life, then it is necessary to deal with men in classes as well as man singly. As has been well said by Dr Denney, "a man here and there may be raised in spite of his circumstances, but a class of men can only be raised in and with their circumstances."* Now the alteration of the circumstances of a class of men demands something other and wider than the method of individual alleviation. The claims of the individual as such must be for the time ignored by the statesman in order that he may seek to reach the individual by raising the circumstances of the whole class to which he belongs. Nor is this a lapse from the

* In an address at Edinburgh, May 22nd 1906.
Christian standpoint - unless it be held that the statesman's methods are in themselves sufficient, or that his point of view is the ultimate one. At the last, we are always thrown back on that inward reformation, that experience in which each man is most entirely alone; but if this be once clearly recognised, the objective work of the statesman or reformer, whatever its precise form, has an inexpugnable place in the Christian scheme.

But the variety of service which is required in the realisation of the Christian ideal of life is not exhausted by the division into political and directly spiritual work. "The objective work of Spirit," to borrow Hegel's phrase, includes art and literature as well as political activity. The Christian spirit of love towards Nature as well as Man, is bound to seek and to find expression along these lines also; and its embodiment in a renewed society would not only bring in juster social relations, it would transform the outward conditions of life into new and more fair and worthy forms. It is impossible here to enter on a full discussion of the connection between the spirit of Christianity and the expression of its inner content in the sphere of art. Enough has been said if it has been made clear that the Christian ideal is not that of mere uniformity or sameness, but that the most widely varying forms of human genius and human effort may find a place in the carrying of that ideal into every province of life. Our conception of its richness and scope has been largely built up by the lives of those great thinkers, artists or poets, who have not only enlarged the intellectual horizon of mankind, but have shown that the
spirit of religions devotion may inspire the highest efforts of
the mind of man.

Such lives as those of Michael Angelo, of Milton, or of Newton,
do indeed exemplify one form of the Christian spirit of service.
But there are other forms no less essentially Christian. The
Carpenter of Nazareth has found followers in the humblest as well
as the most exalted paths of life; and of the spirit which has
animated such men we may find an example in the words of Brother
Lawrence that "he was always finding pleasure in every condition
in doing little things for the love of God."* In the whole range
of duties, and in all forms of service from the most ordinary to
the most exalted and unique, there is none that fails to find its
place and its recognition within the Christian life.

* Brother Lawrence, The Practice of the Presence of God. He
was a lay-brother who served in the kitchen of the monastery of the
"Carmelites Déchaussés" at Paris from 1666 till his death twenty-
five years later. One may compare the close of Wordsworth's son-
et to Milton.
CHAPTER VI

THE KINGDOM OF GOD AS PRESENT AND AS FUTURE.
Our argument up to this point has led to the conclusion that no one term is sufficient to exhaust the Christian principle. Any exposition of it as purely inward, or purely outward, as concerning the individual alone, or as entirely social, in its bearing, is fatally one-sided; for it is in reality a synthesis of all these elements. The principle is one, but it has a necessary duality of aspect; for it appears first as an inward state of love and trust, but afterwards as the expression of this in the world of material things and social action, Love thus passing into service and seeking to build up an actual polity in which its own genius shall become fully visible and objectively real. Thus on one side the inner attitude of the soul is all-important, and is complete from the first moment in which it consciously turns from the old to the new life; but on the other, this is a mere potentiality, which must be actualised through self-discipline, but more especially through the effort to extend the sway of the Christian principle in the world. Hence the Christian life is both something given once for all, and something to be wrought out hour by hour and year by year. "The imperative mood is used as well as the indicative. We are personally to become what in Christ we already are."*

So far, however, the terms used have been largely philosophical and abstract. We have dealt with the antitheses of outward and inward, potential and actual, implicit and explicit, the Individual

* Somerville, St Paul's Conception of Christ, p. 103.
and the Community. It is now time to test the results reached by comparing them more closely with the concrete teaching of the New Testament, in which we read, not of the Community of the Good, but of the Kingdom of Heaven, or the Kingdom of God. And we at once find that the conclusion of the last paragraph meets us again here; for it has become almost a commonplace of modern ethical theology, especially in Germany, that the Kingdom of God is at once present and future, both a Gift and a Task. This German distinction between Gabe and Aufgabe probably has a philosophical origin in Hegel's criticism of Fichte, where he asserts that the realisation of the end of progress is not to be looked on as a task dependent for its fulfilment on the strength of human wills; but whether philosophical or not in its origin it has readily become acclimatised in theological ethics, and writers like Hermann, Holtzmann and Haering have joined in asserting that the Kingdom is both a gift and a task.*

But although the definition of the Kingdom as possessing this double character is very generally accepted, it is not adopted universally. As against the view that Christ's teaching regarding the Kingdom has reference both to the present and the future, it is maintained that it can be sufficiently explained by one or other point of view taken alone. Not only have the ethical and eschatological aspects of the teaching of Jesus been distinguished: they have been separated, and either by itself has been taken as the key to the whole. At present attention is being largely directed to the eschatological element in the Gospels; and it is natural that

* See Note C. at the end of this chapter.
this should be so, for the increased knowledge of their historical setting, and the sense of its importance, which is largely due to the labours of adherents of the "religious-historical" method, have shown that these eschatological elements which Christianity shares with contemporary Judaism have often been unduly neglected. The fact that these ideas are so remote from our modern conceptions of religion, and that their spiritual significance is often so far from clear, goes far to explain their having commonly been passed hurriedly over; but it cannot justify a continuance of this neglect in so far as a just and impartial criticism has now set their place in New Testament thought in a fresh light. To adjust our ideas of the New Testament to the double fact that a marked eschatological strain runs through most of its books and that history has made it impossible to accept this element in the original, literal sense; to show just how far the discounting of temporary eschatological features must alter the general aspect of the teaching of Jesus and His immediate followers - this is one of the most, perhaps the most, difficult and yet essential tasks that now challenge the interpreters of the New Testament; and it is useless to essay such a task, until full value has been assigned to the presence of pervading thoughts of a glorious future Kingdom.

But while this may be freely admitted, a protest must be entered against the view that eschatology forms the kernel of the gospels, or that its categories can be treated as providing the master-key to the interpretation of the teaching of Jesus. The purely apocalyptic features of the New Testament are closely related to the
Messianic beliefs which were commonly held at that time by the Jews, and especially by the Pharisaic party. This is in a sense the least distinctive and original side of early Christianity, and that in which it most clearly shows the influence of local and temporary currents of thought; and only by inversion of sound historical method and a loss of true perspective can the religion of the New Testament be interpreted from this point of view to the relative exclusion of these ethical and spiritual elements in which its originality chiefly appeared and on which its permanence depends. If Christianity had been at the centre an eschatological faith, it would have passed away with the passing of those conditions which made Jewish eschatology possible. Just because there was a deeper and more original form of spiritual vision underlying the apparently different teaching of the Synoptists, of the Fourth Gospel, and of Paul, have men of all ages found in them words which speak to the universal conscience and need of mankind. The new apocalyptic interpretation of the gospels doubtless has a relative justification in that it corrects the tendency to express their teaching in too exclusively modern terms which marked the era inaugurated - for English thought, at least - by Ecce Homo. Yet if it were needful to adopt one view to the exclusion of the other, it would surely be our wisdom to emphasise, as Ecce Homo so persuasively does, those characteristics in the life and teaching of Jesus which bring Him near to ages so different from His own. But it is better still to say with a recent writer, that either interpretation by itself is one-sided and incomplete, and that this one-sided outlook in the case of both the
purely ethical and the purely apocalyptic interpreters "rests upon a failure to apprehend the spiritual greatness of the Personality with which they are dealing."

Both interpretations, then, may be considered legitimate and necessary, but the ethical must be treated as in the last resort dominant and determining. If a less general proof of this position is desired, it may be found in the relation of Jesus and the Pharisees. On purely eschatological grounds, He might have found little reason to attack their system. But the gravamen of His charge against them was simply that they had separated this side of religion from the ethical side, and that they had lost the moral insight and fervour which thrills through the greatest passages of Old Testament prophecy. The bitterness of Jesus' denunciations of Pharisaic religion shows that He considered that, in ceasing to be ethical, it had lost all its value, and thus shows also how central and how distinctive were the ethical principles in His own teaching. It is a familiar truth that one of the great aims of His life was to introduce a new ethical and spiritual content into the idea of the Messianic character; and no less remarkable was the way in which He gave a new moral significance to the apocalyptic ideas which He adopted from the thought of His time.

To this point we may return shortly. But before we proceed further it is necessary to make a further distinction. So far we have spoken only of two aspects of the Kingdom of God as it appears in the New Testament; and we have referred to these indifferently

as present and future, as ethical and eschatological, or as representing the blessings of the Kingdom as a gift and a task. But closer reflection shows that this is not an entirely precise or adequate division. For the last antithesis has within it elements requiring a further distinction. Both the gift and the task have present and future aspects. Under the former the Kingdom may be considered either as a direct, spiritual endowment conferred on the individual believer, or as a glorious revelation and consummation of the divine purpose in the future. Similarly the task necessarily begins in the present, but stretches forth into the far future. But in the latter case the continuity is not broken as it is in the former, for the ethical process is one and the same. So that there are three terms to be taken into account; and the Kingdom must be contemplated under three aspects, (1) as immanent - as a present, spiritual gift, (2) as an ethical task linking the present with the future, and (3) as a completely realised and divinely instituted Kingdom to be established at "the end of the age." These three aspects might be distinguished as the spiritual, the ethical, and the eschatological. But, indeed, if we would give an adequate account of the ideas of early Christianity on this subject, we should need to add a fourth aspect - the Kingdom as actually existing in a transcendent and super-human sphere. The authority in the Synoptic Gospels for this fourfold characterisation of the Kingdom may now be briefly reviewed.

(1) The view of the Kingdom which may be distinguished as preeminently spiritual is that in which it appears as a direct gift
to the hearts of men, enabling them to enter into a new life of confidence and peace, which does indeed open a prospect of effort and attainment reaching into the future, but is in the deepest sense complete and satisfying from the first.* It is this element which is denied in the assertion that Jesus thought of the Kingdom as belonging entirely to the future. The passage by reference to which that denial may be most readily answered is the saying recorded in Luke xvii.21, "The Kingdom of God is within you." The decisiveness of this saying has, however, been disputed, for it has been argued that the word ἐντὸς, which in both the English versions is translated "within", may also mean "among." This would give the rendering, "The Kingdom of God is in the midst of you."** The traditional interpretation seems more in harmony with the spiritual character and the originality of Christ's teaching, and it also seems to meet more effectively the question of the Pharisees regarding the time at which the Kingdom of God should come. On the other hand it is argued that the verse should be taken in connection with the passage which follows in which the coming of the Son of Man is described as like "the lightning," flashing from one side of heaven

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* Where a strict line is drawn between Christian Ethic and Dogmatic, the Kingdom regarded as a gift naturally falls within the latter rather than the former, as it is here looked on as relatively independent of human effort. But to enforce such a division rigidly would be somewhat pedantic; and this side of Christian thought does directly concern Ethics in that it is the ground of trust, confidence, and those other qualities which I have already grouped under the heading "Equanimity," and which the New Testament treats as duties rather than merely as graces of character. Cf. Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, (tr. Mackintosh & Macaulay), p. 14.  

to the other, for suddenness and brightness; and in this case the words, "the Kingdom of God cometh not with observation," would mean that it will come so suddenly as to baffle observation and be present in a moment "in the midst." But, even although the traditional interpretation of this saying be surrendered, the idea of a present Kingdom by no means falls with it. There are other points of vantage for its defence.

In the first place it seems clear that Jesus claimed that His ministry of beneficence marked the real appearance of the Kingdom of God in power among men. This is shown by the discussion between Jesus and the Pharisees regarding the power by which He expelled evil spirits, which He concludes with the words, "If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the Kingdom of God come upon you." The same conclusion may be drawn from Jesus' answer to the question of John, which claims that whereas, John had been "the last and greatest herald of Heaven's King," Jesus was actually exercising kingly power and carrying out the tasks of the Messiah in His work of mercy, humble though that work might appear. And if this was true even of His activity as a Healer of the body, much more did it apply to the function with which Jesus closed His reply, "the poor*

* Matt.xii.28 - Luke xi.20. Even J. Weiss, the leader of the eschatological school of interpretation, admits the importance of this saying. (Vide Muirhead, The Eschatology of Jesus, App.A.) Such passages as Mark i.27, Matt.ix.3, have an indirect bearing on this question, as showing the immediate impression made on the people by Jesus' work, and the sense it conveyed of a definite and decisive new departure. Cf. also Luke iv.21, ("Today hath this scripture been fulfilled in your ears.") and 36-44.

** Matt. xi.2-5; in vv.11,12, it seems to be clearly implied that the Kingdom could be entered or "taken by storm" at that very time.
have good tidings preached to them." For this cannot be taken as referring merely to the proclamation that a better era was about to dawn, although the "good tidings" doubtless bore such a forecast of good: it must be taken also as referring to the spiritual benefits which Jesus held out for immediate acceptance, and especially to the sense of forgiveness.

At this point we have the strongest proof that the view of the Kingdom as a present reality is not a mere misconception but is warranted by the thought and the words of Jesus.

"It is by his healing," Harnack has said, "above all by his forgiving sin, that the kingdom of God comes. This is the first complete transition to the conception of the Kingdom of God as the power that works inwardly. As he calls the sick and the poor to him, so he calls sinners also, and it is this call which is all-important."*

It seems certain that, here at least, Jesus did not simply act as herald of a future benefit. It might perhaps be said that in thus passing to the region of the individual soul, to which is addressed the offer of immediate entrance into spiritual peace, we are leaving the idea of the Kingdom behind. But it is easy to see that this is not so; for, in the mouth of Jesus as of John, the preaching of the Kingdom was a preaching of repentance, and He "upbraided the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, because they repented not."** But if the preaching of the Kingdom and the mighty works which evidenced its presence were both designed to lead to repentance, and so to forgiveness, the connection of

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* What is Christianity? p. 60.

** Matt. iv. 17; xi. 20.
the latter with the Kingdom is established. It must be more than a passport valid at a future time: it must in some sense give access to immediate blessedness.

This impression is borne out by such sayings as, "Thy faith hath saved thee; go in (or, into) peace."* In the great invitation in the eleventh chapter of Matthew, the words "I will give you rest," "Ye shall find rest unto your souls," speak of no distant future, but of an opportunity that is near at hand; and the same timelessness runs through many of Jesus' sayings. Especially is this true of the Beatitudes; for while they undoubtedly refer to a future time, at which the mourners shall receive a more complete consolation and the meek shall more fully and evidently than at present "inherit the earth," yet there is a present reference as well. The first beatitude in particular, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," seems clearly to make the possession of the Kingdom dependent on an inner state of mind, and so to bring it from the apocalyptic to the spiritual and universal order of truth. Only two more passages need be cited, but they are among the most decisive of all. The first is the saying, "Blessed are your eyes, for they see; and your ears, for they hear. For verily I say unto you, that many prophets and righteous men desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not; and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not."** The second is the


** Matt. xiii.16,17. The parallel passage in Luke (x.23,24), is introduced in the same context as the invitation "Come unto Me" in Matthew.
saying of Jesus in regard to the children who were brought to Him, that "of such is the kingdom of heaven." Nothing could more clearly show His anxiety that the timeless and spiritual aspect of His Kingdom, of which He chose childhood as the fittest type, should never be forgotten or eclipsed.

It would be easy to trace the same line of thought through the writings of St. Paul, but one or two references must suffice. His teaching regarding the gift of the Spirit affirms that the central benefit of Christianity is both immediate and a gift. It does indeed look to a more glorious future, of which it is "an earnest," but is also true for the apostle that "the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given unto us." In the one place in the Epistle to the Romans in which he uses the phrase, "the Kingdom of God," he defines it as consisting in "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." And the idea that its blessings must be accepted as a gift and not treated as cause for self-congratulation or laudation is more than once strongly enforced.

** 2 Cor. v.5; of. Rom.viii.18ff. Eph. i. 13,14.
† Rom. v.5; of. 2 Cor. iv, 6.
‡‡ Rom.xiv.17.

†††Rom. iii.27ff.; Eph. ii.8; 1Cor. iv.7. The last is rendered as follows by Dr. Rutherford, "What hast thou which has not been given thee? If given it was, then why applaud thyself for it, as though it were a feat and not a gift."
But throughout the New Testament the complementary view of the Kingdom as ethical and progressive in its development balances this first aspect. Or rather, it is not so much an addition to it as its necessary result and fruit, as I have already tried to show. The implicit must become explicit, the inward gift by its very presence institutes an outward task. Thus there is a constant call on Christians to make good their profession. This can hardly escape recognition; but it may be reconciled with the purely eschatological view of the Kingdom by the argument that the call to moral effort as it came to the first Christians, did not summon them to the attempt to transform the present world or "age" into the likeness of the Kingdom, but only to prepare themselves for the destiny that awaited them in the "coming age," when the rule of God would be made evident in a perfect state revealed from above. In other words, their task was less to reclaim the world, than to reclaim themselves from the world, that they might be ready to welcome and enter the Kingdom of their Master at His return. Now this was undoubtedly a note of great importance in the New Testament idea of duty and "calling." Watchfulness and patience and preparedness were among the great concerns of the early Church. "To be accounted worthy to attain to that world"* did in a sense sum up all aspiration, and constancy in watching for the Parousia was the measure both of duty and of hope. "In your endurance ye shall win your souls," "If we endure, we shall also reign with him."** Nor is


** Luke xxii.19; 2 Tim. ii.12. My justification for the use of "endurance" in the former quotation is the desire to bring out the identity of thought in John viii.46, 

\[\text{\textit{with} \textit{you}.} \text{In Matt. xxiv.13, Mark xiii} \]

13 (which are really parallels to Luke xxii, 19, see Huck's Synopse) it is so translated - "He that endureth to the end."
this motive only appealed to in support of such individual duties as personal watchfulness and purity, it is also used to emphasise the condemnation of those who fail in the duty of justice and consideration to others.*

But while all this is true, there is another side to Jesus' teaching. He did not look on this world as an altogether hopeless place; and it is hard to believe that He meant His followers to look on work done in it by Himself or by them as having a merely indirect and disciplinary value without real, immediate significance. If we examine the parables of the Kingdom in Matthew xiii, and the additional parable of the Seed growing secretly recorded in Mark iv. 26-9, we shall find support in these eight parables for all three views. The aspect of the Kingdom as an immediate inward gift or discovery, which we considered first, is exemplified in the Parables of the Hid Treasure and the Pearl. The eschatological reference is foremost in that of the Drag-net. But in the Parables of the Tares and the Seed growing secretly, there is a double reference - to a future consummation and judgment ("the harvest"), but also to a period of present growth, the relative emphasis varying in the two.** And in the remaining three parables, those of the Sower,

* Matt.xxiv.48f.

** Professor Shailer Matthews says that "in the case of the parable of Mark iv.26-29, the teaching as to a present evolving kingdom is wholly dependent upon a disregard of vs. 29." (The Messianic Hope in the New Testament, p.70). This seems too sweeping a statement, although the parable has perhaps at times been used in too exclusively modern a sense. At a later point, and with a more general reference, (p.112), the same author says that "in the teaching of Jesus the most fundamental thing was not the kingdom itself, but that quality of life which assured a participation in its blessings." With the substance of this remark one can heartily agree; but why
the Leaven and the Mustard-seed, the stress undoubtedly lies on the
growth to maturity and perfection of the seed implanted by Christ
under the quietly fostering influences of Nature; while in the Par-
able of the Sower it is made very clear that the bringing forth of
abundant fruit is largely dependent on the presence of receptiveness
and constancy on the human side. There seems nothing to prove
that the fruits of the Kingdom are confined to the period beyond
the Parousia. Rather one must believe that Jesus Himself thought
of these results of His teaching as gradually but steadily altering
the present order of the world; for this seems clearly taught by
the Parable of the Leaven, slowly penetrating the whole mass in which it was hid, and by the similar description of the
Christian community as "the salt of the earth."* Such is the power
of the Christian life to permeate its whole surroundings, preserving
what is good from decay and purging away what is evil or corrupt.

Other passages in which the emphasis lies on the ethical side
of life, on the contribution of human effort to the coming of the
Kingdom, are the exhortation, "Seek first the Kingdom of God and His
righteousness;"** and the saying which prefaced the sending out
of the disciples to preach and heal the sick:— "The harvest truly is

in the interests of a dominantly eschatological view of the Kingdom,
should it be thought needful to make this rigid distinction the
Kingdom itself and the character of its citizens? Is not the former
category, as used in the Gospels wide enough to include the latter,
which indeed provides its essential content?


** Matt. vi.33. How closely the different aspects are inter-
woven is shown by the fact that Luke's version of this saying is im-
mediately followed by the words, "Fear not, little flock; for it is
your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom." (xii.30,31)
plenteous, but the labourers are few. Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he send forth labourers into his harvest."*

In the gospel of Matthew this incident immediately follows the passage which tells of the compassion felt by Jesus for the helpless and unshepherded multitudes; and it can be clearly seen how His sense of their need awoke in His heart the longing to bring them immediate succour, and to find fellow-workers through whom His power to help might be widened and diffused. Thus for the first time the band of disciples were called to perform the task of carrying forth their Master's power into the world.

But the strongest proof of the place assigned to this element of effort and progress in the complete idea of the Kingdom lies not in any single passage, but in the general ethical character of the gospels.

He who "came to fulfil the law and the prophets" refused as sternly as the prophets had done to allow the hope of a glorious release and restitution of all things in the future to excuse blindness to the actual needs and claims of others in the present. He agreed with the Pharisees against the Zealots in holding that the Kingdom was not to be advanced by the violent methods of political revolution; but He turned on the former more than the indignation of an Old Testament prophet when the question was that of their extortion and oppression of the weak.** These could not be covered by professed faithfulness to the Messianic hope.

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* Matt. ix.36-x.1. In Luke (x.2) the words precede the report of the sending of the Seventy.

** E.g., Matt. xxiii.23; Mark xii.40.
Again, in Jesus' teaching the duty of mercy and kindness is not only re-affirmed but set in a hundred new lights. Forgiveness, courtesy, love towards enemies, pity towards the suffering are all enjoined in the Sermon on the Mount and in many other passages. And is all this teaching of a new, more intimate, more searching morality, with its respect for the small and immediate opportunities of life as well as for the great possibilities of the future, to be looked on as simply the setting forth of a moral discipline and probation directed to the changed conditions of a new era, still to be revealed? However fully this aspect of New Testament ethics may be recognised, it is impossible to rest content with this as a complete account of its meaning. For it is universally recognised that the carrying out of this morality would in fact transform the world, and create a new and better order of society; and we can hardly suppose that this gradual introduction of a better order through the efforts of men inspired by His spirit formed no part of Jesus' plan, when we remember His warnings that the present age might be prolonged, and that for a long time His servants might have to employ their talents under the ordinary conditions of its life.*

The attempt to view the whole of Christian morality in the light of probation for a future life has indeed been made, but at a heavy cost. For if virtuous action be directed not to bringing about an immediate result in the improvement of this world, but only to securing the fitness of the good man for entrance into another, it loses all the naturalness and spontaneity which shone out in the life of Jesus.

* Matt. xxiv. 36, xxv. 5,13,19.
His pity was real pity, unfeigned and unforced, which led directly to the effort to bring relief; and so must it be with His followers. Efforts for others with no arrière pensée must be made for the sake of others, and not for the sake of exercising the virtue of the benefactor. Otherwise in place of the ready and natural sympathy of Jesus, with all the beneficent power which it gave, there arises a form of piety which looks on misery as possessing value as providing the corpus vile on which benevolence may be exercised, and which encourages pauperism in order to provoke the faithful to benevolence. Against this state of mind the polemic of Nietzsche is in large measure justified. But it is surely clear that this is a perversion of the spirit of the gospels. Yet, if the efforts of good men are not to be directed to the advancement of a Kingdom of God, actual, present, and progressive, we are shut up to some such view as this.

(3) Yet, notwithstanding all this, the element of hope is present also throughout the New Testament, and the hope is that of a consummation which does not wholly depend on human effort. Regarding this eschatological side of the Kingdom nothing need be added here; unless we pause for a moment to emphasise the remark already made regarding the way in which in the Gospels eschatology is ever closely linked with morality. The former element Jesus took over from the thought of His time; but it provided only the form of His teaching, and into this form He introduced the content of His essentially original ethical teaching.

It has been said that the Jewish apocalypticist saw the advent of the Kingdom, but not the Kingdom itself.* This content which was

* Muirhead, The Eschatology of Jesus, p. 65.
deficient in Jewish apocalyptic, Jesus supplied by His whole teaching regarding the nature of the Kingdom's growth and the character of its citizens. In particular is this true of Matthew xxv, where with an unparalleled boldness, He reaffirms all that He had taught regarding the worth of humble individuals and the value of small and inconspicuous acts of love, and sets it in relation to the grandest possible portrayal of the future judgment. In this passage the most opposite elements of humility and majesty in the whole range of the gospels are combined into one scene: and, as has well been said, "the audience feels that, whoever the 'Son of Man' may be, He will not judge otherwise than Jesus of Nazareth." Thus the ultimate value of moral effort and the ethical character of the Kingdom are confirmed by the greatest apocalyptic utterance in the Gospels.

So also in the reply to the sons of Zebedee, Jesus refused to countenance ideas of the future Kingdom which were still tainted with personal ambition, and recalled the thoughts of His disciples from the individual advantages which it might bring them to the certain and immediate duties of service and constancy under trial."** Thus while the idea of a Kingdom to be hereafter revealed had an important place in His thought and teaching, it was so stated by Him as to reinforce, and not to annul, the moral ideals which He proclaimed, and especially the all-comprehending duty of love.

(4) It is worth while to devote a few words to unfolding the implications of this description of the Kingdom as something "to be

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** Matt.xx.21-23.
hereafter revealed." It was looked on as the subject of revelation in the future, not of creation; and hence it must already exist elsewhere. It was to come down from Heaven, "made ready," or "prepared:" it was to be manifested by God, to appear for the first time on earth,* but it was not then only to come into existence when it should first appear to the eyes of men. Thus Jewish piety tended to depict the Kingdom as having a present, transcendental existence, upon which its future manifestation depended, and to imagine some higher order of life, in which the rule of God was unassailed and undisputed—not an ideal but a fact.

This conception was closely connected with the belief in angels, as the spiritual beings who perfectly and continually fulfilled the will of God, the "armies of Heaven" who never failed to respond to His commands.** Their lineage could be traced back to those angels who appeared as unfallen in the story of the Creation and Fall which were elaborated from the opening chapters of Genesis, just as the "prince of this world" and the spirits of evil who owned his sway, were the angels who fell at the beginning, and who were still responsible for the disease and disorder of the world. To the latter side of this belief, which gave rise to the demonology of the gospels, we need not now refer; but it is important to notice the significance of the belief in angels; for it pointed to the realisation and supremacy of the will and purpose of God in a transcendent region, and so gave support to those who were seeking to practice His will and

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* Rev.xxxi.2; cf. 1 Tim. vi.15.

** Psa. ciii.19-21; Dan.iv.35.
awaiting the fulfilment of His purpose amid the discouragement and the frequent conflicts of earth. This thought continued to exert its influence for centuries; for when Augustine wrote his *City of God*, he described the *Heavenly State*, which was opposed to the earthly *Empire of Rome*, as consisting of two parts. There was not only the part whose progress on earth could be traced through the development of Jewish religion and the history of the Christian Church. There was also that angelic community which had ever remained constant in their original vocation and obedience. Thus in treating of "the origin of the holy city," he first mentions "the holy angels, who constitute a large part of this city, and indeed the more blessed part, since they have never been expatriated."*

This view seems also to have been accepted by Jesus, Who thought of the angels as representing an order of life in which the characteristics of the Kingdom which He had come to inaugurate on earth were constantly and perfectly realised. Thus He could appeal to that higher order as exemplifying His conception of the Kingdom and as ready to support Him in His mission. This appears from such sayings as, "there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth;" "In heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father;" "In the resurrection they . . . are as angels in heaven;"** It is not necessary to determine how far, if at all, Jesus used these words in a consciously metaphorical sense. The essential significance which they bear is that He did

* Book XI, 9; cf. 32ff., and Book X, 6ff.
not look on the Kingdom as merely an ideal, but that His thought of it in all its earthly aspects, whether spiritually present, progressive, or apocalyptic, claimed for it the sanction and support of the highest order of life and power in the universe. At once the simplest and the clearest expression of this attitude is to be found in the petition, "Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth."*

But behind the thought of the Kingdom in all its forms lay the belief that it represented the will of God, and so was founded on the deepest reality which could be conceived. The phrase "the will of God" is not among those most frequently used in the Synoptic Gospels; but it can hardly be doubted that it constituted the undercurrent of all Jesus' teaching; and that it was no occasional or random thought which found utterance in the saying that the truest kinship to Himself belonged to those who do the will of His Father; or that "it is not the will of the Father in Heaven that one little one should perish."** No less characteristic is the saying recorded in the Fourth Gospel, "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me and to accomplish his work."† The same consciousness that the progress of His work depended on contact with a power above the earth is evidenced by the place taken by prayer in the life and teaching of Jesus. Quotations might be multiplied to illustrate this; but it is indeed implied in the first point from which we set out on this survey, the idea of the Kingdom as a gift. For if it has this

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* Matt. vi.10.

** Matt.xii.50, xviii.14.

†John iv.34; cf.vi.38.
character there must be some great reserve of spiritual power in the universe from which such gifts come;* and the spiritual order, of which the belief in angels is an imaginative expression, must actually exist. Jesus did in truth most directly teach that those who followed His precepts were not building on sand, but on the bedrock of that order which is largely concealed by the course of outward events, but which to religious faith is the ultimate truth of things.**

I have attempted in thus indicating the different aspects under which the Kingdom of God is represented in the Gospels to avoid undue modernisation and the intrusion of ideas which belong to the present rather than to the beginning of the Christian era. Yet it has become apparent that the New Testament doctrine of the Kingdom has certain philosophical bearings - or, as it may perhaps be better expressed, that it has closer affinity to some forms of reflection on the universe than to others. Attempts have been made in recent times to separate Christian Ethics from any belief regarding ultimate questions, and to represent Christian morality as self-contained, requiring no other support than is provided by those human needs which all thoughtful men cannot but see, and that sympathy which all good men cannot but feel. It has thus been held that an ethic of sympathy and service may be founded on, or rather exist along side of, the associationist empiricism of Mill or even of Hume; and that the Kingdom of which Christianity tells may be completely understood.


** Matt. vii. 24-25.
and unswervingly pursued by those who look no further for its significance than to the presently experienced life of mankind.

To the service of the Kingdom so understood as the instrument of the highest human progress much noble thought and effort has been given. A high ideal of the future of the race may be seen and followed on these lines; only it cannot be taken as representing the Christian ideal in its completeness, for the Christian ideal is that of a "Kingdom of Heaven," arising and growing strong in the life of the world, but answering to and supported by a hidden reality in a sphere above that of ordinary experience. The Christian conception cannot be held in its full comprehensiveness unless it is at the same time held that the operative forces of the Kingdom and the ideal which it sets before mankind are in harmony with the ultimate reality and power in things; and this belief is closely related to the Platonic doctrine that the Good, which in our ideals we dimly apprehend and in our moral life we strive to realise, is indeed the deepest Truth and the central Reality of the universe.

In other words Christian Ethics implies an idealistic view of the world; but at the same time it is clear that most of the actual systems of idealistic thought prove too narrow to express its full range of meaning. At some point or other they prove defective. Thus intellectual idealism, which looks on man chiefly as a spectator of the slow unfolding of the Divine Purpose in Nature and History, fails to recognise that Christianity has a moral significance in the strict sense of the word - that it teaches man to look on the Kingdom as a Task entrusted to his care and in some sense
depending for its fulfilment on his faithfulness. The mystical
and emotional form of idealism is for the same reason incomplete;
while on the other hand a purely ethical and voluntaristic philosophy
which lays the whole emphasis on the exercise of the will, fails to
do justice to the Christian view of the Good as a Revelation and an
Endowment. In the same way the description of the Kingdom as purely
immanent or purely transcendent is defective; for as it appears in the
New Testament it has both characteristics. It is immanent in that
it appears in human life, first as a light in the hearts of men, and
then as a power transforming their relations in social life; but in
so doing its evolution is not strictly creative, for it answers at
every step to a transcendent Kingdom, from whose existence it gains
its own validity and power.

Thus the central ideas of Christianity are synthetic in charac-
ter. But it is not therefore a syncretism. For its different ele-
ments are given together in the complex and many-sided nature of man
and in the nature of his destiny; and any one of these is imperfect
when torn from its vital relation to the whole. It is impossible to
follow this line of thought further at the present time; but it is
worth while to notice how the three virtues, which are all necessar-
ily and harmoniously united in the highest type of Christian charac-
ter, correspond to the phases of the idea of the Kingdom or of the
Spiritual Order. If Faith apprehends this order not merely as
really existing but as possessing the highest reality, and Hope looks
to its realisation in the future, Love is its presence as an inward
possession which necessarily passes over into the ethical task of
its actualisation here and now.

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We may conclude this chapter with a comparison between these phases of the Christian idea of the Kingdom and those of the corresponding Greek conception of the perfect polity, which obtained its first and greatest expression in Plato's Republic. The last of the four aspects, the Kingdom as a transcendent realisation of the Divine Will, has its analogue in the Platonic conception of the ideal world, the abode of real being and the object of true knowledge, existing in dependence on the supreme Reality, the Idea of the Good. The inward aspect of the Kingdom as it exists in the heart of the individual man who has caught sight of the ideal, and seeks to transform his life into its image, has a corresponding place in the thought of the Republic and of the New Testament. But regarding the second and third aspects - the progressive and final realisation of the ideal polity on earth - Plato's thought shows more hesitation. Regarding the "theoretic construction of the pattern of a perfect state,"* he spoke with assured voice, for his deepest certainty was that of its transcendent existence in the sphere of supreme reality and its reflection in the souls of those who had "turned to the light." But his hope of its realisation under the conditions of human life was less firm than his faith in its ultimate truth. Not by a manifestation from above could it come, as the Jew and the early Christian expected the revelation of the Messianic Kingdom; for the statical "Ideas" of the Republic had no dynamic energy by which to transform

* οὐ καὶ ἴμεῖς, φαμέν, παράδειγμα ἐποιεῖν ὡς ἡ ἡ ἀγαθὴν πόλεως; Πάντες γε., 472 Ε.
the world of change and corruption. Nor did Plato hope for its realisation through the accumulated labour and devotion of successive generations of humble workers inspired by a single great purpose. If it were to be built up on earth at all, it could only be through the insight and devotion of an elect few - the philosophers who should gain sufficient political power to give the ideal an expression in an actual state.* But this fortunate chance might never occur; and thus in many cases the highest wisdom of the good man was to find shelter for himself from the driving storm of lawlessness and passion, and so to keep his own life clear of stain and to depart at the end with unsullied character and bright hope.** This indeed was not the highest destiny, - which was to be the saviour of his fellows as well as of himself - but often the good man had to give up the effort to influence the world about him and to live the life of virtue for himself alone.

There are circumstances in every life when this appears to be the highest possibility also for the Christian; when, in face of the seeming impossibility that goodness will ever become regnant or the Kingdom of Heaven be realised on earth, he falls back on the thought of personal duty, and on the hope that the values won in the present struggle may perchance be conserved in another sphere where the rule of good is less sorely hindered than here, the hope that the failures

* 473 DE.

** 486C-497A. Cf Theset., 176, "Evils can never pass away . . Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the earthly nature and this mortal sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God as far as this is possible." (Jowett).
of this world may have significance for some other. In this mood he will "look away to the pattern city which is laid up in heaven, treating as of little account the question whether it is or will ever become visible on earth, content to live as a citizen in it and to practise its laws alone."* But such an attitude is not finally possible; for the Christian faith cannot be attained or kept in solitude by the reflection of the thinker or the absorption of the mystic. Such a faith is inevitably shattered by the rude impact of the world's evil. It can only be securely held in so far as it is practised and experienced as a δύναμις εἰς οὐσίαν, ** strong enough to enforce its own right against all that opposes it, whether in the inner life or the life of the world. Thus the characteristic aspiration of the Christian life, Fiat Voluntas Tua, ceases to be "understood only as an act of resignation," and comes to "point out the duty of working with all our strength for the triumph of Divine Law in the field of human liberty."†

* Rep., 592 B.

** Rom. 1.16.

† A. Fogazzaro, The Saint, (Eng. trans.), p. 94.
On the contrast between Gabe and Aufgabe.

* Hegel's position is stated in §§ 6 and 142 of the Smaller Logic. (tr. Wallace, pp. 12, 258). "The idea is not so impotent as merely to have a right or obligation to exist without actually existing." It is not "so feeble as to leave the question of its actualisation or non-actualisation dependent upon our will." Fichte is not mentioned in either passage, but there is little doubt that both are directed against his development of Kant's idealism of will, in which the ethical end is locked on as Aufgabe. Cf. also the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right, towards the end.

As to the union of the two ideas in recent Christian Ethics, I shall quote a few sentences from Professor Haering's treatment of the subject. "Because the Christian task has its grounds in the gift of God, and this gift is personal communion with an eternal personal God, the task is as eternal as God Himself, and yet is complete at every moment of its realisation." "Unless we make clear to ourselves this inseparability, because, they are pairs, of 'gift' and 'task', we cannot understand them at all. But still more: earnestly as Jesus insists that it means striving after righteousness, and that its result is the possession of righteousness, He leaves it in no doubt that this would be ever in vain if God did not bestow it; that prevailing courage for the struggle has its source in the power of the joyful news of that which God does. Conversely as . . .
emphatically does He accentuate that no one can rejoice in the gift who will not attempt the task; that he who has received forgiving love without stint, should without stint practise forgiving love; that the very condition for understanding this task is to receive the gift" (The Ethics of the Christian Life, Eng. tr., pp.107, 129-30).

The same position is clearly, and more briefly stated by Kirk, Grundriss der Theologischen Ethik, S. 26.: "Dieses Reich Gottes ist vor allem die Gabe, durch welche Gott seine Verheissungen erfüllt und das menschliche Verlangen nach Gottesgemeinschaft befriedigt, also das höchste Gut des Christlichen Glaubens. Aber es kann nur angeeignet werden in gleichzeitiger Übernahme der sittlichen Aufgaben, welche es einschliesst. Diese Aufgaben bestehen in der Durchführung der vollkommenen Gottesherrschaft, teils im persönlichen Leben, d.h. in der Heiligung, teils im Leben der Gemeinschaft, indem dieses im Sinn der Liebe geordnet wird."