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of
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by A. M. Armstrong, M.A.
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PART I - GREEK THOUGHT.

CHAPTER I.

Early Poetic Theology.

1. Greek thought is dominated by the idea of Destiny or Necessity, the power which apportions one's lot and against which all effort is unavailing. In examining Greek theological ideas we must begin with Homer and Hesiod, because, as Herodotos remarked, it was they who first made a theogony for the Greeks and gave the gods their names and characters. In the Iliad the whole story is set to the dark background of the destined fall of Troy. The Trojan warrior Hektor is fully aware that no victories of his can prevent the coming of the day when holy Troy shall be laid low, when King Priam and his brave countrymen shall fall in the dust before their foes, and his wife Andromache shall be led weeping into captivity to work the loom at another's bidding (Il. VI, 447-456). On the opposing side the Achaian hero Achilles is also doomed to an early death, though his fate is conditional; if he fights he wins everlasting fame but must be killed, while if he returns home, he will end his days in peace and obscurity (Il. IX, 412 sqq).

2. Nothing /
2. Nothing ever happens contrary to destiny. Homer sometimes speaks of events that would have taken place contrary to destiny, but one of the gods always intervenes. When, for instance, the Argives are feeling depressed and would have returned home, Athene darts down from the peaks of Olympos and encourages Odysseus to dissuade them (Il. II, 155 sqq.), and when Achilles is going to kill Aineias, who is destined to found a new dynasty to rule over Troy, Poseidon interposes to snatch Aineias away (Il. XX, 293-329). In face of destiny men feel their own helplessness; King Agamemnon, looking back on the train of disasters which followed his depriving Achilles of Briseis, excuses himself and lays the responsibility on Zeus and Fate and the Fury that walks by night, and Achilles believes that it was all a plan of Zeus' to bring death to many of the Achaians (Il. XIX, 270-274). So does Homer himself (Il. I, 5).

3. Even the gods themselves are bound by fate. Against Necessity, says Simonides with his usual proverbial wisdom, not even the gods fight (VIII, 20). In the Iliad Zeus weeps over the impending doom of his son Sarpedon. He is not, however, bound by fate in the sense that he is absolutely impotent to prevent it. The words for destiny (μοίχα, μάκα, μετέχωμα, καταρτιν etc.) originally connoted, like the Latin "fatum" and the English /
English "doom", a judicial decision, and accordingly we sometimes find "fate" simply and sometimes "the fate of Zeus" (e.g. Il. I, 418; XVII, 321). The position is brought out clearly in Hera's rebuke to Zeus when he thinks of saving Sarpedon. She says that he can do it, but the rest of the gods will disapprove and he ought to bear in mind that if he saves Sarpedon they may begin intervening to save their sons (Il. XVI, 433-461). Athene says the same thing to him when he contemplates saving Hektor (Il. XXII, 168-181). Poseidon again does not regard it as impossible for Zeus to save Troy from her fate, but merely promises that Athene and he will be furious if Zeus does (Il. XV, 213-217). Destiny is thus originally a legal decision of the council of the gods, resembling a primitive aristocracy, where the dooms possess numinous value since they depend on auspices. The outcome of a duel is looked upon as a divine judgement. Before the fight Zeus weighs the souls of the combatants in his scales, and the issue of the duel is decided by the result of the weighing (Il. XXII, 209-212; cf. VIII, 69-74). Hesiod represents the gods as unable to prevent what is destined, even though they are aware of it. Kronos knows that it is destined for him to be overcome by a son of his, and this, despite all his efforts, is what comes to pass (Theog. 455 sqq.). Zeus again knows that /
that his wife Metis is fated to bear a child of exceeding wisdom; he devours her to prevent this, but Athene springs from his head (op. cit. 886-900; 924-926). It is noteworthy that there is no personification of Destiny here, simply the verbal forms (τρίερως τοι, ἔμετο) being used.

4. Only in a few passages of Homer do we find Fate or the Fates as distinct persons, represented as spinning the thread of men's lives (Il. XX, 127; XXIV, 49; Od. VII, 197). In the Theogony of Hesiod the three Sisters appear as granting good and evil to mortals (904-906), and, in a probably interpolated passage, as exacting vengeance for the transgressions of gods and men (217-222). Morality always goes along with religion, because it is recognition of the numinous, a power over against him in comparison with which he is utterly insignificant, that stops man from the unthinking pursuit of his private ends. If morality seems unrecognizable in the primitive juridico-religious dooms, that is because it is judged by our standard of morality; primitive religion when judged in the light of our notion of religion is equally unrecognizable as religion.

5. Though the gods in Homer are expected to punish wrong (Il. III, 351-4; Od. XVII, 483), their conduct is usually capricious. They try to help their favourites /
favourites and injure those to whom they have taken a
dislike. Their favour can often be secured by the
offer of a sacrifice (Il. IX, 499 sqq.). They are,
however, by nature jealous, and aim at striking down
any man above the ordinary. Penelope ascribes all the
troubles which Odysseus and she have had to the gods' jealously of their happy life together (Od. XXIII, 210 sqq.). In a late passage of the Odyssey there is an attempt at a theodicy; Zeus claims that men themselves make things worse than is appointed (Od. I, 33). Yet the idea of divine jealousy persists, and appears in the pages of Herodotos, who makes the Athenian sage Solon, the Egyptian king Ahmose and the Persian noble Artabana all give warnings that the gods object to too much success and humiliate the outstanding (I, 32; III, 40; VII, 48).

6. It is not possible to determine precisely the relation between Fate and the will of Zeus in early poetic theology, because we have to do with figurative ideas and not with concepts. The vagueness of these ideas is evident in Pindar, who in one place depicts Zeus as escaping destiny through his knowledge; Zeus knew that if he married Thetis he was destined to beget an offspring mightier than himself, so he married her to the mortal Peleus and in this way avoided being overthrown (Isthm. VIII, 32 sqq.). In other places, however /
however, Destiny is the judgement of Zeus (Nem. IV, 61; Ol. II, 21). In general Findar stresses the divine government of the affairs of men, in granting good or evil. "Zeus apportions this and that, Zeus the lord of all." (Isthm. V, 52). "Surely the great mind of Zeus pilots the destiny of those whom he loves." (Pyth. V, 122). "It is easy even for the weak to shake a city, but to set it in its place again is hard indeed, unless Zeus suddenly becomes a pilot for the rulers." (Pyth. IV, 272).

7. Findar preaches resignation to one's fate. This resigned bowing to the inevitable is the typical attitude of the epic hero, the stilling of one's hopes and desires and the acceptance of one's life as constituting what it is to be oneself. It is so; to rebel is futile and unseemly. "Against God one should not strive, who now upholds these and now again gives great glory to those... It is best to take the yoke upon one's neck and bear it lightly, but to kick against the goad is a slippery path." (Pyth. II, 89-95).

8. In Findar there appears another of the leading ideas of poetic theology, that of Fortune, Luck or Chance (τοῦχαγ). Even the word does not occur in Homer, and in Hesiod Tyche is only a nymph. (Theog. 360). Chance, which from its very name is what happens to us, just as the Latin "fortuna" is what is brought /
brought us, is for Findar the daughter of Zeus the Deliverer, one by whom the swift ships are piloted on sea, and on land impetuous wars and meetings of councils (Ol. XII, 1 sqq.). Herodotos has the same idea of Chance as a divine power when he makes Kuruš say that it was by divine chance that he was born to set free the Persians from their Median overlords (I, 126). The ideas of Destiny, Chance and Deity pass into one another. Destiny or the necessary is that which overpowers human effort (cf. Aristotle, Met. XII, 7).

Chance is that which is not brought about by human effort, and is opposed to human strength (cανονοσία), forethought (τροχονοκαταφυτοτήτα) or sagacity (φρονησις) when asserted to be the power determining human affairs (Pindar, Frag. 256 Bowra; Sophokles, O.T. 978; Greek Lit. Pap., ed. D. L. Page, Vol. I, p. 190). Thus both Necessity and Chance are the negation of human effort, the former as that which human effort cannot prevent, and the latter as that which it cannot effect. "Divine chance" and "divine fate" are interchangeable phrases, and Sophokles speaks of "necessary chance" (ανάγκη και τυχή) (Ajax 485, 803). In Hesiod the souls of the men of the golden age act as tutelary deities or daemons (Opp. 121), and the fortune of an individual or a family is often pictured as an attendant daemon or genius (Sophokles, O.C. 76; Aischylos, Agam. 1569). Indeed /
Indeed the two characteristics, that of necessity, the overriding of human aims, and that of chance, which in its unconcern for human aims and merits is caprice, both belong to the idea of deity. It is Homer's belief that the fate which the gods have spun for miserable men is to live in sorrow, while they themselves are free from trouble, and that on the floor of Zeus there stand two jars filled with evil gifts and another one filled with blessings: the man to whom Zeus apportions a mixed lot meets now with ill and now with good, while the man who receives a lot which is wholly bad is brought to scorn, harried over the fair earth by evil famine, and wanders honoured neither by gods nor by men (Il. XXIV, 525-533).

9. Such were the fluctuating pictorial ideas with which the philosophers worked when they began to elaborate clear and distinct concepts of the divine government of the world.
CHAPTER II.

The Ionians, Xenophanes and Herakleitos.

10. The early Ionian philosophers sought for a principle among events of the world, some underlying unity from which everything originated. Their suggestions were materialistic; they thought that everything came from water, or air or the unlimited. These are, it should be noted, metaphysical and not physical entities. Thales, as Gentile has observed (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 335) could never have drunk a glass of this "water". But these principles would not account for the observed variety of things. (Aristotle, Met. I, 4).

11. The Ionians seem to have identified their principles with the divine, but as they did not independently determine their concept of the divine, their identification was of little theological significance. Xenophanes took a more immediate interest in theology. He vigorously attacked the theology of Homer and Hesiod for attributing to the gods what would be held shameful among men, theft, adultery and mutual deception (fr. 11, Diels), and for supposing them to have human clothes, voices and figures (fr. 14). If horses and oxen could draw they would represent the gods in the shapes of horses and oxen!
(fr. 14). For the discredited mythology he substituted the metaphysical notion that the universe is one, and that this is God, greatest both among gods and among men, and unlike mortals in shape and thought (fr. 23). God is not limited as we are; he is all sight, all thought, all hearing (fr. 24), always staying in the same place and not moving about like us (fr. 26), and without toil he governs everything by the purpose of his mind (fr. 4). Aristotle remarks that Xenophanes was over-hasty in his unification (Met. I, 5). His was rather a luminous intuition than a developed theory; he left it to other thinkers to show how things form a unity, and how variety springs from that unity.

12. Herakleitos despised Xenophanes as a mere polymath with no insight into reality (fr. 40 Diels). True insight into the nature (φύσις) of things and how they are is attained only through the logos. (The prime meaning of "logos" is tale, from which derive the other meanings of proportion, speech, word, reason, thought etc. It is the revealer of the hidden reality). The logos is unheeded in men's ordinary life and not understood the first time it is heard. Men do not realize what they are doing and go through life as though they were asleep (fr. 1; 73). Yet
while this logos is that of Herakleitos himself it does not belong to him as a private individual, for the logos or genuine insight is common or universal (ἑυς), though men ordinarily behave as though each had his own private insight (fr. 2: 113). Herakleitos is thus in the strongest contrast to his predecessors with their concentration on the investigation into Nature. "I sought myself" he says (fr. 80). The source of truth is in the soul, whose limits you can never discover, so deep a logos it has (fr. 45).

13. What does the logos reveal? Herakleitos, like the Sibyl who is moved by God (fr. 92), proclaims his message in an oracular style, full of puns and riddles, and quite in the manner of Apollo, who, he says, neither reveals nor conceals but speaks in symbols (fr. 93). "If you hearken not to me but to the logos it is wise to say in agreement with the logos (ὡς ἔχειν) that all things are one" (fr. 50). This one is an identity of opposites, a harmony of conflicting phases. "Conjunctions: wholes and not-wholes, congruent-discrepant, harmonious-discordant, and from all things one and from one all things" (fr. 10). The clashing coalesces, from the differing comes the finest harmony (fr. 8), a harmony plainly metaphysical, for, Herakleitos says, invisible harmony is /
is superior to visible (fr. 54).

14. This harmony is not static but incessant restlessness, and Herakleitos illustrates it by the various pictures, some representing the opposites as compresent, others as successive, of the bow and the lyre (fr. 51), of the stream which is never the same (fr. 12), of the fire into which all things are changed and which is changed into all things, like objects for gold and gold for objects (fr. 90), and of war, the father and king of all things, which reveals some as gods, others as men, and makes some slaves and others free (fr. 53). The way up is the way down (fr. 60). Alive and dead, awake and asleep, young and old are the same, for this changes and is that and that changes back again and is this (fr. 88). The unity is a unity of being and non-being. "In the same stream we step and we do not step, we are and are not" (fr. 49a).

15. Neither opposite is self-subsistent. The name of right would not have been known but for wrongs (fr. 23). It is better that men do not get all that they wish (fr. 110); disease makes health sweet and good, famine plenty, weariness repose (fr. 111). This fairest cosmos (the word means order and is a military metaphor transferred to the world-order) seems like a jumbled rubbish heap (fr. 124), and men suppose that some /
some things are wrong and others right, but to God, in comparison with whom the wisest man is like a monkey in wisdom, beauty and everything else, all things are fine and good and right (fr. 83; 102).

16. Herakleitos sets aside the current notions of the making of the world, which he declares to be eternal, the ever-living fire, consuming in measure and going out in measure (fr. 30), but he proclaims the origin of reality to be the living God. "The One, the only wise, wills and wills not to be called by the name of Zeus" (there is a play here on the etymological meaning of Zeus as living) (fr. 32). Herakleitos pours contempt on ordinary ritual and worship. Men clean themselves from blood with more blood insanely as though some one were to fall into mud and wash it off with mud. They pray to statues as though they were to adore houses! (fr. 5). Really God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, plenty and famine (fr. 67). Not that God is simply identical with the cosmos, for Herakleitos blames all his predecessors for not saying that the All-wise is separate from all things (fr. 108). God is altered just as fire, when it is mingled with incenses, is called after the odour of each (fr. 67), i.e. it is mere appearance when the separate entities are treated as self-subsistent and given distinct names, for the plurality /
plurality is only made possible and controlled by the living unity. Everything happens according to the Logos (fr. 1). The One, the All-wise, has true insight to pilot all things through all (fr. 41); Lightning (the usual symbol of Olympian Zeus) steers everything (fr. 64); by God's lash everything that creeps is tended (fr. 11).

If morality a new problem arises, that of reconciling the morality of the divine with the affairs of men. If Zeus acts morally and not from a purely arbitrary dispensation, why does he not punish the wicked as we think it our duty to do? Solon's answer is that God is not quick like men to take offence, but that he does eventually punish wickedness, if not on the doers, at least on their posterity (Stobaeus, Eclo. III. 9, 23). Theognis, on the other hand, who like Solon is troubled by the prosperity of the bad and the poverty of the good, poverty which tempts them to evil-doing (373-386), prays that the sins of the father may not be visited on the children, regarding as an injustice what Solon had viewed as the vindication of justice. He can find no solution to the problem, and ends with the doubt now anyone can henceforth reverence the Immortals (731-732).

18. Alcibiad insiste above all on the justice of the divine government. The principle on which it rules the world is the apportionment of good to the bad
17. As a result of the attack on the Homeric notions of the gods and the attribution to the divine of more advanced notions of morality a new problem arises, that of reconciling the morality of the divine with the affairs of men. If Zeus acts morally and not from a purely arbitrary dispensation, why does he not punish the wicked as we think it our duty to do? Solon's answer is that God is not quick like men to take offence, but that he does eventually punish wickedness, if not on the doers, at least on their posterity (Stobaeus, Ecl. III, 9, 23). Theognis, on the other hand, who like Solon is troubled by the prosperity of the bad and the poverty of the good, poverty which tempts them to evil-doing (373-386), prays that the sins of the father may not be visited on the children, regarding as an injustice what Solon had viewed as the vindication of justice. He can find no solution to the problem, and ends with the doubt how anyone can henceforth reverence the Immortals (751-752).

18. Aischylos insists above all on the justice of the divine government. The principle on which Zeus rules the world is the apportionment of evil to the bad /
bad and prosperity to the righteous (Supp. 402-404); he laughs at the hot-blooded man who boasted that he could do ill and escape calamity, and leaves him crying in despair for help which cannot come (Eum. 553-565). Destiny, though depicted in the story of Prometheus as a power stronger than Zeus (Prom. Vinc-tus, 511 sqq.), is elsewhere nothing but the instrument of Zeus, which he guides by ancient law (Supp. 673), and it is he who sends on their tasks the Furies, the daughters of Night, who derive their functions from Destiny (Agam. 747).

19. But the Destiny with which the omnipotent and just decree of God is thus identified is the Destiny of the royal houses of the heroic age, pursued by a curse which descends from generation to generation, driving them to deeds of horror and visiting them with fearful calamity. Aischylos' way of reconciling the two is to affirm that the curse upon the family does not inevitably compel the individuals to commit the crimes; it is their own wickedness which leads them to it. He does not tolerate, what Homer tolerated, the ascription of human wrongdoing to Fate. When Klytaimnestra tries to excuse herself for the murder of her husband Agamemnon by pleading that it is all due to the Avenging Spirit who is working out the curse which rests upon the house of Atreus, the Chorus repudiate her /
her excuse emphatically - it is Klytai'mnestra who is guilty, though the Avenger might have helped her (Agam. 1497-1507). When she pleads with her son Orestes, in a vain effort to dissuade him from killing her to avenge Agamemnon, that Fate shares the responsibility for the murder, he retorts grimly that it is Fate who is sending her doom too (Choe. 909 sq.).

20. Sophokles makes his Chorus say that "great still is Zeus in heaven, who oversees and governs everything" (El. 173-175), but he differs from Aischylos in not depicting Zeus as apportioning prosperity and calamity in accordance with the merits of individuals. He gives the impression of divine mysteries which, if the gods conceal them, none can find out however long he looks (fr. 883). It is true that the gods, though slow, are sure in punishing wickedness (O.C. 1536), but the good suffer as well as the bad. The long torments of Philoktetes are represented simply as a divine dispensation to prevent Troy falling before the appointed time (Phil. 191-200). Oidipus, as he claims himself, is not guilty seeing that he acted unwittingly, and his calamities are due to the pleasure of the gods, who were enraged against his family of old (O.C. 960 sqq.)

21. Oidipus, however, learns patience from suffering /
suffering (O.C. 7). His attempts to avoid the destiny which the oracle foretold him only served to realize that destiny. Now in resigning himself to the divine will and as it were ceasing to kick against the goad, he finds peace at last, since his will is no longer opposed to the divine but identical with it. So he treads upon the sacred grove of the Furies, and, finding his place in the universal order, becomes imbued with the power of the Furies, able to bestow good on his benefactors and evil on the Thebans who had unjustly exiled him, because his dooms are the execution of the divine judgment (O.C. 1450). Events therefore substantiate Oidipus' belief that Justice, proclaimed from of old, sits beside Zeus with ancient laws (O.C. 1381), for a just God exalts him in recompense for the sorrows that came to him without cause (O.C. 1565), and he is miraculously translated beyond the grave (O.C. 1621-1665).

22. Euripides hardly attained the serene reconciliation of Sophokles with the calamities of life. Though he makes one of his characters refer the injustice which we ascribe to the gods to the confusion caused by men (fr. 609), he generally represents the gods in problematic guise. As one of his characters says, if the gods do anything shameful they are not /
not gods at all (fr. 292. 7.), and yet the stock Olympians like Hera and Apollo play hardly creditable parts. No attempt is made to fit calamities into a scheme of rewards and punishments for virtue and vice. Yet there is a sort of justice. Aphrodite in the "Hippolytos" and Dionysos in the "Bakchai" are not persons but life forces, the powers of love and inspiration; those who ignore them pay the penalty. Thus the motif of Euripides also is the futility and peril of kicking against the goad (Bacch. 795). Peace comes only with resignation to Nature. The seer Amphiareos tries to console Euridike, who has lost her son, by reminding her that men are born to suffer, that Life is a harvest which must be reaped like ears of corn, and asks why should we lament what we must go through in accordance with Nature. Amphiareos has himself attained peace, for earlier on he tells Hypsipyle that he knows he is fated not to return from the expedition against Thebes. She asks him why he is sacrificing when he knows that he must die, and he replies that it is no labour to worship the gods (Hypsipyle, 146 sqq.; 266 sqq. - D. L. Page, Greek Literary Papyri, I, p. 92; 102).
CHAPTER IV.

Anaxagoras and Sokrates.

23. The philosopher Anaxagoras followed on the lines of Xenophanes, and asserted Nous or Mind to be the first principle. Everything was jumbled up together, he declared, until Mind entered in and introduced order (Diogenes Laertius, II, 6). The fantasies of the old cosmogonies are thus reduced to concepts. But after asserting merely a general relation of mind to all things, he made no use of his principle in the explanation of particular events. There is a story that his friend Perikles, the Athenian statesman, had brought to him from one of his farms a ram’s head with only one horn. The diviner, Lampon, seeing that the horn grew solidly out of the creature’s forehead, interpreted this as meaning that only one prominent politician would be left at the head of affairs, and that victory would go to the one, whether Perikles or his rival Thukydides, in whose grounds the prodigy had been found. Anaxagoras opened the ram’s head and showed how the abnormality was due to some malformation of its brain. Everyone applauded Anaxagoras at the time, but afterwards /
afterwards when Thukydides was ostracized, they all admired Lampon. (Plutarch, Per. 6)

24. Now while these physical explanations, as Plutarch observes, helped to do away with superstition and left room for a more genuine piety, Sokrates felt a profound dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras' failure to employ his principle in concrete cases. He had expected him to point out that mind must order all things for the best, and then show in detail how things are ordered for the best (Phaedo 97B-98B), whereas he actually gave only physical causes as explanations. That was as absurd, thought Sokrates in prison, as for someone, after asserting that Sokrates' actions are governed by mind, to explain his remaining there by his having muscles, sinews, etc., instead of giving the real reason, that he had thought it best to submit to the judgement of the Athenian people. Had it been left to his muscles and sinews, he says in his usual teasing way, they would long ago have carried him to the safety of Megara! To call bones and that sort of thing causes is rather queer; true, without them he could not do what he thought best, but to say that it is because of these things that he does what he does, and at the same time to say that he acts from intelligence, is a slovenly way of putting it. (Phaedo 99B).

25. Sokrates /
Sokrates looked not only for physical or secondary causes, but for primary or mental ones, i.e. purposes, and attempted to reveal mind not merely as a general relation to all things, but as a relation holding between particular things. Herodotos had already noted as an instance of the providence of the deity (τὸ θεῖον γῆ προνοεῖ) that timid and edible animals like the hare are prolific, to prevent their becoming extinct, whereas noxious ones like lions breed rarely (III, 108). Sokrates pours scorn on the notion that man, who with his body is such a very small part of the universe, should alone possess the privilege of reason. The whole of Nature evidences Design. What exists for some purpose is the work not of chance but of intelligence. Sokrates emphasises the adaptation of means to ends observable in the human body, e.g., the guarding of the tender eye with eyelids like doors, which are opened when it is necessary to see and closed when one sleeps, and the making the eyelashes grow as a screen to prevent the winds hurting it. Nor have the gods provided for man's body only; they have given him a soul, which enables him to understand the beautiful order of things, to guard against hunger and thirst, to get strength by exercise and to remember what he has perceived or learned. Then the world /
world in which we live is designed for us. We have light to enable us to see and night for us to rest; since we need food they produce it for us from the earth and appoint appropriate seasons, so that we get abundance and variety of food not only to satisfy our needs but also to give us pleasure. The gods have given us fire to help against cold and darkness, and air not only to preserve life but to enable us to cross the sea. Certainly the other animals enjoy these benefits as well as man, but then they are themselves produced for the sake of man, to supply him with food and labour. Lastly, since we cannot foresee what will be to our advantage in the future, they assist us through oracles and divination. (Xenophon., Mem. I, 4 & IV, 3.).

26. Thus just as man is governed by his intelligence, so the world is governed by the intelligence in everything (γιὰ νὰ παρὶ φρονής). Man, as we have seen, is especially dear to God. For the good man there can be no evil in life or after death; nor are his interests neglected by the gods (Plato, Ap. 41 D). It is easy to scoff at this affirmation as though Sokrates were blinking obvious facts. As, however, he maintained in his own case that he was unjustly condemned to death, he cannot mean that no good /
good man will ever be unjustly treated. But for him the essence of man is his morality, and so no evil can befall him in the sense that nothing from outside can make him a worse man, i.e. an immoral one.

27. Plato begins to integrate the work of Anaxagoras and Sokrates by showing that natural objects essentially presuppose a purposive intelligence. He sums up his doctrine of Providence in one of his last works, the "Laws". There he demonstrates by what Proklos calls adamantine proofs (a) that the gods exist, (b) that they care for everything, (c) that they are not to be bribed.

28. (a) What is really dangerous, in Plato's view, is not the old theogonies, which have the necessity of antiquity, but the latest materialistic theories. On these theories the origin of the universe is due to nature and chance, i.e. to the fortuitous combination of the elements, which have produced the heavens, the seasons, and, last of all, souls (389 B-0), and the existence of the gods is a legal fiction which varies according to the legislation of the country (389 B). But this is a quite perverted and unreasonable view. What is moved by something else cannot be first, since it presupposes what moves it; hence in all movement what is first is what moves itself.
Plato.

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itself and imparts movement to another. Now soul is by definition what moves itself. Hence soul instead of being subsequent to body is the prime origin of all that is, has been and will be. Accordingly what belongs to soul, i.e. wish, reflection, opinion, fear, hate and so on are prior to the qualities of body, heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, etc. (893B-897B).

29. It is evident that the cosmos is directed by a beneficent and rational soul, since the heavens rotate in a regular and semi-rational manner (897B-898C). The movements of all the heavenly bodies are caused by one or more souls, so that Thales was right to proclaim that all things were full of gods (899B).

30. (b) The theory that the gods exist but do not care for everything, which is based on observation of the apparent happiness of the wicked, is untenable because the gods know everything and are not lazy. Nor is it the case that they do not consider everything worth looking after, because man is the possession of the gods and nobody good neglects his own property (899E-902B). The parts of the Whole are produced for the sake of the Whole, and perplexity arises because people fail to see that what is best for the Whole is best for them too. The divine wisdom has devised a place for each of the parts so as to secure the victory of goodness and the most complete and easy defeat of badness, /
badness, though men themselves choose what they will be (904B). The divine judgement is that as a man grows worse he joins the company of the worse souls, and as he grows better he joins the better souls. From this decree there is no escaping, not if one makes oneself small and dives into the depths of the earth, nor if one makes oneself tall and soars to the heavens above. The penalty will be paid, either on earth or in Hades or in a place still more terrible (905A).

31. (c) Equally open to objection is the idea, popular among poets and priests, that after doing wrong one can escape by appeasing the gods with bribes. The gods, who are the greatest guardians, would in that case be inferior to dogs and ordinary men, who would never betray righteousness for bribes offered impiously by unrighteous men.

32. The theological doctrines thus enunciated had been worked out by Plato in his earlier works. Driving a wedge between the intelligible and the sensible, he had maintained that what was truly real was the eternal intelligible form or idea in which the sensible and transitory particulars more or less participate, and which makes them what they are. Sokrates, after finding difficulties with theories of the natural world, had obeyed the maxim "Know thyself" and turned to /
to what is human, our concepts, always asking what a thing is and seeking for universal definitions, since all knowledge is of concepts. Plato converted these concepts into self-subsistent entities existing apart from particulars and apart from our thinking (cf. Aristotle, Met. I, 6; XIII, 4). In the "Republic" he maintained that the highest of the forms, the one which is presupposed by all the others, is that of the good, which he meant not in the sense of moral, but in the wide sense in which we say that truth is better than falsehood. It is the Form of the Good which imparts the power of knowledge to the knower and truth to the known, and is the cause of all existence, as the good is beyond or higher than being (Rep. 508E-509B). The unrighteous are not really happy, for righteousness means making one's passions obey one's reason, whereas unrighteousness means the supremacy of the passions and consequently discord in one's soul (Rep. 577-590). As for pain, one cannot have pleasure without pain; without the antecedent itch there would be no pleasure in scratching (Phaedo 60 B-C.).

33. Plato later realized that a merely intelligible form could not be an efficient cause, and the wholly real must have motion and life, soul and intelligence (Sophist 248E). Accordingly he identified the Good with Mind, not the mind of an individual, but /
but the true and divine Mind (Phil. 22C). In his elucidation of this concept, he explains all being as the product of the two factors of the indeterminate (ἀνεξαρτήτων) and the determinant (περὶ). The indeterminate is that which is always more or less and never any one thing, and the determinant is that which makes the indeterminate measurable and comparable, so converting it into something determinate. Thus music is produced by the introduction of determination into indeterminate tone and time, and from similar combinations result the seasons, the health, vigour and beauty of the body, and the law and order of the soul (Op. cit. 23 C-26C). Then anything which comes into being must have a cause. Now our body depends on the body of the universe and not the other way round. But our body has a soul. Whence could we get our soul, unless the body of the universe has a soul superior to ours? Hence the cause which operates in us and is called wisdom and mind must be operating on a vaster scale in the universe. This grand cause we may call the imperial mind, residing in the imperial soul of Zeus (Op. cit. 26E-31A). Hence it is not man, as the sophist Protagoras had said, but God who is the measure of all things (Laws IV, 716C).

34. But how do the changing sensibles derive from the unchanging forms, which constitute an eternal world where /
where no wrong is inflicted or suffered? (Rep. 500 C). Plato betrays his uneasiness in the mythical figure of the Demiurge or Craftsman in the "Timaios", where fantasy, certainly beautiful and suggestive, takes the place of thought. According to the myth the Craftsman was good, and since envy is incompatible with goodness he desired that everything should be as far as possible good like himself. So he took the indeterminate welter, and by his Providence (Pronoia) made it into a cosmos and gave it life and intelligence. He moulded it on the model of the eternal living universe in the world of forms, that just as this intelligible universe includes all intelligible animals, the visible universe should include all corporeal animals. As the eternal animal is essentially unique, the Craftsman made only one corporeal universe (Tim. 29D - 31B). He brought order into the primitive confusion and gave it definiteness by means of shapes and numbers (Op. cit. 41B - C). The four elements of fire, air, water and earth are different sorts of triangles, and the Craftsman set air and water between fire and earth, fastening together the structure of the visible and palpable universe by geometrical proportion, arranging the elements so that air is to water as fire is to air and water is to earth as air is to water (Op. cit. 31B - 32B; 53C).
35. The visible is as perfect as God could make it, but it is not absolutely perfect, for though it receives only good things from its Fashioner, it still retains to some extent its old constitution, which produces harshness and wrong. Before the imposition of order and purpose the world was ruled by Necessity, that power which produces effects without having any purpose in doing so and therefore may be called the Wayward Cause (τραχύς τρόπος τις τῆς Νέκταίας) (Polit. 273B - C; Tim. 48A). God employs the necessary i.e. physical causes to subserve his purposes. For instance he used the capacity of the fire within our eyes of coalescing with the fire of daylight, which is the physical or secondary cause of sight, in order that the sight of the stars might give us number, the concept of time and the study of nature, from which we have derived philosophy, the greatest benefit ever bestowed on humanity (Op. cit. 45B - 47C). Yet Reason cannot entirely overrule Necessity but has to persuade it, and Necessity does not always respond. Evils cannot be abolished altogether, for there must be something opposed to good; they cannot be established among the gods but necessarily hover round mortal nature and this earth. Hence man should flee from the corporeal and aim at becoming as like as possible to God (Theaet. 176A). This means having an incorporeal existence /
existence. The corporeal world is a sort of prison into which souls are thrust for their crimes (Phaedo 114C; Phaedrus 248C - D).

36. Plato’s depreciation of bodily existence rests on his conception of reality in terms of being, the fundamental category of Hellenic thought, which was brought to the light of consciousness by the Eleatic thinkers. Parmenides of Elea declared that being is and non-being is not, arguing that "the matter is settled on these terms: either it is or it is not" and so excluding coming to be and perishing (fr. 8, 1-20 Diels). His follower Zenon employed this disjunction in his denial of the reality of motion, which is the sensuous form of becoming, arguing that what moves does not move in the place in which it is and does not move in the place in which it is not (fr. 4 Diels). Plato sees that becoming is neither being nor non-being but the conjunction of the two, and he does not therefore dismiss it as sheer illusion, but he sets it down as semi-real (Tim. 27D). Now, as we saw, he could not admit the wholly real to be lifeless and immobile, but then he hesitates and on reconsidering how the real can combine being and non-being he comes to the conclusion that it is not both together but something different from them, and he explains the combination of being and non-being as meaning simply that /
that when one form participates in another form it both is and is not that other form (Sophist 250C - 259C). Thus the eternal forms do not admit of novelty, and man cannot introduce anything of his own into reality. Plato draws the just conclusion that man is made to be a plaything of God, and that this is the best thing about him (Laws 803C).

37. What Plato prizes is the hyperuranion or eternal world of forms, the beauty of which draws the philosopher by his love (eros) for it (Symposium 203B - 213B). He finally identifies these forms with numbers (Aristotle, De Anima I, 2). In the "Epinomis" he sings the praises of number, cause of all good and no evil (978A), and of the new marvels of astronomy, a science introduced from the East but brought to perfection by the Hellenes (987E). This divine science has discovered the seven planets, and revealed, with the perfect science of number, the celestial bodies (983A), which the masses believe to be no larger than they look, and by revealing their perfect nature and the regularity of their movements has revealed the divine in the world. The celestial stars, the astral gods (conceived numerically and not anthropomorphically) have bodies of pure ethereal fire and the wisest and happiest souls (981D). In astronomy, therefore, with its confirmation of the geometrical /
geotrical order of the universe depicted in the "Timaios" Plato finds the refutation of the sophists' attempted reduction of good to a matter of convention. Astronomy reveals in the stars a divinity satisfying the demand for the true and good which exists by nature (990B).

Aristotle at first accepted Plato's notion of a self-moving soul originating all other movement, a soul composed not of earth, air, fire or water but of an unnamed fifth element (Cicero, Tusc. I, 36, 65 sq.). Yet he did not manage to reconcile divine transcendence and divine connection with the world, and the Pythagoreans pointed out that there was an incoherence between his theory that the universe was itself a time.
CHAPTER VI.

Aristotle.

38. In one of his early works Aristotle gives vivid expression to this Platonic theology. Suppose, he says, that there were people living under ground in splendid houses fitted up with statues, pictures and so on, suppose that they had heard of some strange power belonging to some beings called gods, suppose then that they should come forth into the light of day and behold the earth, the sea and the sky, with the grandeur of the clouds, the force of the winds and the sun in the glory of his radiance, or at night behold the sky bespangled with stars, and the moon, and the eternal immutability of their courses, then they would certainly think that there were gods whose works these wonders were (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. II, 37).

39. Aristotle at first accepted Plato's notion of a self-moving soul originating all other movement, a soul composed not of earth, air, fire or water but of an unnamed fifth element (Cicero, Tusc. I, 26, 65 sq.) Yet he did not manage to reconcile divine transcendence and divine connection with the world, and the Epicureans pointed out that there was an inconsistency between his theory that the universe was itself divine and his other /
other theory that it was controlled from outside and that the divine was pure mind (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 13). This inconsistency is not a superficial oversight, for once God is conceived as absolutely perfect and transcendent - and it was this conception which Plato had established - the problem necessarily arises, how can God both be self-complete apart from the world and yet have anything to do with it? In his mature period Aristotle put forward the subtle solution that God moves the world by the attraction which he exercises upon it, which explains how, though complete in himself and not having to go outside himself to supply any deficiency, he is yet the mover of the universe, - i.e. the origin of all its changes, for movement (κίνησις) includes not only change in place but also change in substance, quality and quantity (Phys. III, 1).

40. Aristotle does not seek to leave the changing and corporeal behind and soar into the unchanging hyperuranion. His point is that to know anything is to know the reason for its existence. Now the reason for anything's existence has four constituents. (a) First there is the matter of which it is composed, e.g. bronze in the case of a statue. (b) Then there is the form, which for Aristotle is the essence or what-it-is-to-be of a thing, and thus in it and not, as on Plato's theory, set apart from it as something which it imitates or /
or participates in. Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic forms is that there is no way of seeing how the sensibles come to participate in them, and that they do not account for movement. It is not the form of man but man, the individual composite of form and matter, who begets man. (c) Next there is the efficient cause, which brings something into being, as e.g., the father is the efficient cause of the child or some one who gets somebody to do something by giving him advice. (d) Most important of all there is the end or purpose (τέλος), i.e. that for the sake of which the process is begun, for instance being healthy in the case of people who take exercise (Phys. II, 3; Met. I, 9; XII, 3; XII, 10).

41. Movement is the process of actualizing the potential, of bringing something from potentiality to its entelechy, i.e. that completed state when it has reached its end (Phys. III, 1). Now this passage from potentiality to actuality is the passage from matter to form; the bricks, for instance, which are the matter out of which a house is made, are potentially a house. As matter is thus what is not but may be, it is incidentally the deficiency (καταλείπουσα) of form, and all coming to be is out of this relative non-being, relative because what is potentially one thing is still actually /
actually another and not nothing at all. Since matter is thus what is deficient its very nature is to strive and yearn after its own nature (Phys. I, 9). Matter, however, is always correlative to form, for what is matter to one thing is form itself to something else. Anaxagoras' theory of a primitive formless state of chaos on which Mind supervened breaks down because matter is only potentiality, and if there were nothing but potentialities then there would be no reason why there should ever be anything actual at all. Hence the eternity of the cosmos (Met. XII, 6).

42. Aristotle's notion of movement is essentially teleological, and is summed up in his own maxim that God and Nature do nothing in vain (De Caelo I, 4). By holding that the form or essence of a thing is what its perfect state or entelechy is, he gives its charter to natural science, the very possibility of which had vanished with the Herakleiteans' theory of the unceasing flux of sensibles. When everything is changing, why do we call a thing a tree rather than a cabbage? We call it a tree because that is the end to which it tends if nothing interferes. As for Aristotle a thing's end and its good are synonymous, he thus elucidates the Platonic notion of the good, the obscurity of which had become a jest on the stage (Diogenes III, 27).

43. Aristotle's /
43. Aristotle's teleology is not the external teleology which would attribute rain to its effect on the crops. The question arises why, if he abandons this external teleology - popularized, as we saw, by Sokrates - he should not also admit that in the case of the teeth it is mere necessity that the front teeth grow sharp and adapted for dividing food, while the back ones are flat and suited to grinding it, a simple coincidence without any design. It was in fact the theory of Empedokles that Nature produced all sorts of animals, and the ones that just happened to be adapted to survive did so, while creatures like man-faced oxen, who were not so adapted, died off. Aristotle disposes of this theory magisterially. Phenomena like the growth of teeth are either absolutely or practically invariable, and this is contrary to chance or the accidental. Nobody thinks it a coincidence if there is abundant rain in the winter, though he would if it rained in the dog-days. If these occurrences are either coincidences or purposive, and if coincidence is ruled out, then they must be purposive. But even the champions of the coincidence theory admit that these occurrences are natural. Hence there is purpose in what happens in Nature. Even plants, though less articulated than animals, evidence purpose, e.g. produce leaves to shelter the fruit. Is it to be supposed /
supposed that there were olive-bearing vines as well? Moreover if Nature just happened to produce all sorts of things, it should still be a matter of luck what comes up when you sow a seed. It is perverse to suppose that there is no purpose in Nature because we never see the moving force deliberating (Phys. II, 8).

44. Aristotle's conception of causality leaves no room for chance, but characteristically he considers himself bound to explain what we are driving at when we do attribute certain things to chance. An event which we attribute to chance is not one which has no cause, but one the cause of which is incidental, i.e. produces effects which do not result unconditionally or generally, though the act might have been done for their sake. We say, for instance, that it was good luck that Plato's friend was on the spot and able to ransom him, as this is a case where the friend paid the ransom as if he had come for that very purpose though in fact he did not (Phys. II, 5-8). Yet Aristotle does admit a real contingency or irrationality in Nature, for he thinks that like conscious agents Nature sometimes fails to hit the mark and does not succeed in mastering matter, and that this accounts for freaks and monsters (Phys. II, 8; De Gen. An. IV, 4). In this way he reaffirms Plato's concept of the intractability of matter. Nature is an ascending scale /
scale in which each stage is form to what is below and matter to the stage above, and it is in the lower stages to some extent even in human actions, that there is this contingency or purposelessness. All things are ordered together, but the lower stages only in some respect. It is like a household, where the free are the ones who are least allowed to act anyhow, practically everything being appointed for them, whereas the slaves and the animals are allowed to contribute but little to the common good and to act anyhow in most things (E.N.I, 3: Met. XII, 10).

45. As for the efficient cause of movement, everything that is moved is moved by something, either directly or indirectly. A stick, for instance, which moves a stone is moved by the hand which again is moved by the man whose hand it is. We should say that is both the first and the last in the series which moved the stone, but it is strictly the first mover, since the last could not effect any movement without the first, whereas the first could move the stone without it. Now if everything in motion must be moved by something, and that again by something else or not, then unless we are to have an infinite regress, we must admit the existence of a First Mover, either self-moved or unmoved (Phys. VIII, 5). The same argument applies to final causes, and there cannot be several first principles,
principles, because then there would have to be some principle over them interrelating them (Met. I, 2).

46. Aristotle rejects the alternative of the self-mover, which had been Plato's profound intuition, remarking on Plato's inconsistency in the "Timaios" in not putting the soul right at the beginning but making it come into being only at the same time as the heavens (Met. XII, 6). The kernel of his objection to the concept is, however, that it conflicts with the principle of non-contradiction, for the self-mover must be both actually something and also only potentially and not actually that thing. For instance what warms something must be actually warm itself to impart warmth and the thing which it warms must be only potentially warm and actually cold, so that a self-mover would in this case be both warm and not warm. Apparent cases of self-movement accordingly are resoluble into two constituents, one of which does the moving while the other is moved (Phys. VIII, 5). Aristotle characterizes as most illogical of all the theory of the Academic philosopher Xenokrates, who had put together Plato's definition of the soul as self-moving and the later Platonic identification of the forms with numbers and explicitly defined soul as a self-moving number (Plutarch, De An. Procr. I, 5). How can a unit be conceived as moving and by what and in what way, seeing that it is without parts /
parts and indivisible? If it is capable of imparting and receiving motion it must have divisions (De Anima I, 4).

47. Aristotle consequently adopts the concept of the unmoved mover as the efficient cause of all the movement in the universe. The three causes, formal, efficient and final, coincide in God as the First Mover. God is the summit of the scale of Nature, pure form without any admixture of matter, separated from all sensibles (for in the case of God Aristotle agrees with Plato as to the transcendence of form to matter), and so pure actuality without any potentiality, the eternal living perfect substance. Then God is the ultimate efficient cause who directly excites the movement of the heavens and indirectly that of the sublunary world. The heavens are moved and themselves move the sublunary world, which is only moved and does not move anything else. God is no cosmic soul moving the universe, who would be condemned to the eternal punishment of Ixion! (De Caelo, II, 1). As he is the Unmoved Mover, he moves things as though by being loved (ἐκ ἑλπίδος), i.e. by the attraction which he exercises upon them as their ultimate final cause. Now what moves things in this way is the object of desire and thought, and God is therefore Mind, the eternal activity of thought which does not change, since any change would be for the worse,
worse, and thinks only thought, for any other object of thought would be inferior (Met. XII, 6-9). As God is the supreme reality who is outside the world but yet moves everything by exciting Eros - which, as Plato had made clear (Symp. 203c), is the child of Poverty, a sense of defect and an aspiration to completeness - the good of the cosmos exists both apart from it and in it as its order, just as with an army its good consists both in its order and in its commander, but more so on the latter, because the order depends on him and not the other way round (Met. XII, 12).

48. Aristotle in this way very subtly contrives to illuminate the Platonic concept of the good as the source of existence, by conceiving the course of the world as a perennial victory of form over matter, since even corporeal things which decay and depart from their perfect stage reproduce others to strive towards their end, and reaches a unification of divine transcendence with the divine order in events. This unification, however, is not entirely satisfactory, for it involves a relation of God to the world which is not a relation of the world to God, the world being inconceivable without God while God is conceivable apart from the world. God moves the world by attraction, like a magnet, to use the simile of Eriugena (De Divisione Naturae, I, 77). But, the Neo-Platonists object, if the world loves Mind and /
and moves towards it, whence does it get this urge? As the world is not what is first it must get this urge from some cause which moves it to love, for Aristotle himself says that the object of desire moves what is desirous. But if this is true and the world is naturally and from its very being desirous of Mind, it obviously derives from Mind not only its being desirous but its whole being. (Proklos, In Tim. 82A).

49. The Neo-Platonists corrected this defect by conceiving the cosmic process as an eternal departure from God as well as an eternal return to him, but to his immediate successors Aristotle's mature works were practically unknown, for they remained within his school and after the death of his follower Theophrastos were lost for over a century (Strabo XIII, 608). Only his early published or exoteric works were known, and the succeeding philosophy revolved round the problem, which he had there left unsolved, of reconciling divine separation from and identity with the world. Aristotle never uses the term Pronoia or Providence, no doubt because as Plato and Sokrates had used it it involved the conscious execution in matter of a preconceived plan. The notion came to the forefront of theology in the comparatively cruder thinking of the Sects. It could only attain clarity and distinctness when God was no longer pictured as one of the many beings in the world but conceived as separate from it, when the question arises what connection, if any, God has with the world. The dilemma is, either God is separate from the world or he is identical with it.
CHAPTER VII.

Epikuros.

50. Epikuros took the first path and flatly denied Providence. This denial provoked wild accusations of impiety, but he entirely repudiated these, urging that it was the popular beliefs which were really impious, since they attributed to the deity what was incompatible with the divine characteristics of blessedness (μακρακρύστα) and imperturbability or serenity (ἀταγώναστος). There certainly are gods, he maintained, since we have a direct intellectual perception of them, but the popular beliefs are mistaken suppositions and attribute to the divine what is inconsistent with the conception which is derived from our direct perception.

51. "That which is blessed and incorruptible has no trouble itself and gives no trouble to any other, so that it is not constrained by anger or favour; for all that sort of thing belongs to the weak." From this principle, the first of his "Principal Doctrines", Epikuros infers the falsity of the idea of the gods bestowing benefits on the good and misfortune on the bad, a supposition based on our behaviour to each other. The deity can be disturbed by /
by no feelings of anger or favour, since this would imply a dependence on something other than itself. Epikuros similarly infers the falsity of the Platonico-Aristotelian notion of the deity controlling or having set in motion the heavenly bodies. This is a mere supposition grounded on the regularity of their movements, but in reality such a task would detract from the divine majesty (ευμετάβλητος). Accordingly the motions of the heavenly bodies, eclipses and so forth, are to be explained not by myth but by natural principles, i.e. atoms and the void. Even worse than supposing the heavenly bodies to be controlled by the deity is to suppose that they are themselves divine, for they are nothing but agglomerations of fire (Ep. I, 77; Ep. III, 123; Lucretius, V, 1183 sqq.).

52. Epikuros declares that there is no such thing as divination (fr. B3 Bailey), and ascribes to mere coincidence the weather signs given by certain animals. The animals, he says, do not exercise any compulsion on winter to make it come, and there is no sort of god watching the animals' behaviour and then making the weather fulfil the signs that they give. Not even the lowest sort of animal would be so stupid, let alone one who possessed perfect happiness (Ep. II, 115).

53. According /
53. According to Epikuros some events happen by necessity, some by chance, while others are within human control. He is commonly accounted the champion of chance, and not unfairly, for if there be anything irregular in the world it will be able to disturb the regular, so that the whole must be irregular. Epikuros' notion of chance has, however, its own peculiar flavour. In the uncertainty of the Hellenistic age, with its unexpected triumphs and catastrophes, Chance became a leading deity, proverbially blind. A bronze statue of Tyche was set up in Antioch as the guardian of the city (Pausanias, VI, 2, 6.). Herakleitos (fr. 121 Diels), echoed by the Sicilian poet Epicharmos (fr. 17 Diels), had declared with prophetic trenchancy that a man's character was his daemon, but the Athenian orator and statesman Demostenes was so afraid of his evil daemon, with which his opponent Aischines reproached him (In Ctes. 157), that he got his friends to put their names to his decrees instead of putting his own (Plutarch, Vit, Dem. 21). Alexander's spectacular successes were ascribed (v. Plutarch, De Alex. Magni Fort. aut Virt., I, 9; II, 6-10) not to his abilities (ἀρχή) but to his luck and inspiration (ἡθομοσύνη). Indeed Alexander's tutor Aristotle had distinguished two sorts of fortune, saying that one sort was divine, and /
and that some people succeeded in their enterprises even without reasoning since they possessed divine inspiration, a principle superior to intelligence and deliberation (E.E.VII, 14). Epikuros disposes of this theistic notion of chance by his usual method of referring it to the notion of divinity. Chance is not something divine, because it is variable, and variability is incompatible with divinity. Nor does it cause great good or evil, it simply provides us with opportunities for great good or evil (Ep. III, 133).

54. Epikuro's notion of chance is essentially opposed to that of necessity. In Plato Necessity and the Wayward Cause were identical, because they were together set in opposition to purposivity. When contrasted with necessity, however, chance gets its meaning of the contingent, i.e. that which does happen but could conceivably not happen (Aristotle Phys. VIII, 5; Cicero, De Div. II, 6, 15). Then just as the notion of cause (τιτρικ) was transferred by the Ionian Pre-Sokratics from human responsibility to the initiative of the inanimate, so correspondingly chance, the negation of human initiative, becomes with the Atomists the negation of causality. The theory of Leukippos was that nothing happens at random but everything for some reason and by necessity (fr. 2 Diels) /
Diels), and Demokritos too held that everything happens by necessity, the world having originated from the vortex of atoms (Al Diels). It is against this theory of an all-determining necessity that Epikuros champions the notion of contingency, since he grasps the ethical implications of the necessitarian theory. It would, he remarks, be better to believe in popular mythology than in the destiny of the naturalists, for mythology does hold out some hope of appeasing the gods by worship, whereas the destiny of the latter is quite implacable. The objection to the theory that everything happens by necessity is that necessity is not responsible, whereas our actions are subject to approbation or disapprobation. The necessitarian cannot criticize any one who denies that everything takes place by necessity, since on his own theory this very denial takes place by necessity! Since, then, there are some things not necessitated but in our power, the sage who holds reverent views about the gods, has realised that death is not to be feared, and understands the nature of pleasure and pain, can attain serenity and live as a god among men (Ep. III, 133; fr. A XL).

55. Epikuros was reverent himself (Vita 10) and urged his followers to sacrifice devoutly on the usual occasions, but from his standpoint of the transcendent majesty /
majesty of the deity prayer was futile, and he observed drily that if the deity had listened to men's prayers all men would speedily have perished, for they are always praying for each other's destruction (fr. B 57-58). Epikureanism is the reductio ad absurdum of Platonico-Aristotelian transcendence. If God is immutable, as Plato said, because any change could only be for the worse, and if he is self-complete apart from the world, then, as Epikuros made clear, any connection with it could only detract from his perfection. Why should God suddenly fabricate the world after slumbering for an infinite duration? How could Providence have refrained so long from action? God could not have avoided work! Why again should he want to beautify the world and adorn it with lights? If he did so in order to have a better habitation, he must obviously have been dwelling in a dark hovel for an infinite period. What delight could the beauties of the world give God? If the world did delight him he could not have gone without it for so long! (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 9). Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil? (Lactantius, De Ira, XIII).

56. Epikuros thus attacked philosophical theories of
of the deity which conceived God as the fabricator of the world or as a vital energy, which seemed to him to destroy the very significance of the divine. He clung indeed to the old idea of a plurality of gods, having a sort of body and in the shape of man, the only shape in his view worthy of the deity (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 13; I, 18-19).
CHAPTER VIII

The Stoics.

57. The Stoics rejected the Epikurean notion of the changeless self-contemplation of God on the ground that it credited God with a quite trivial occupation and was tantamount to atheism, since it asserted the perfection of the divine nature and yet denied it beneficence, the essential characteristic of perfection (Cicero De Nat. Deor. I, 41-44). Like Epikuros they realized that there could be no connection between a self-complete God and the world, but they denied the connection in the opposite way by identifying God with the world. Here they were more in line with Aristotle’s own school, the Peripatetics.

Straton, who was accounted one of the best of the Peripatetics, accepted the concept of God as the force producing natural changes, but rejected the notion of a power outside the world and conceived the divine as an unconscious power in nature causing growth and decay (Cicero, Acad. II, 38; De Nat. Deor. I, 13).

58. Destiny (ἐγκεκριμένη) is likewise defined by the Stoic Zenon as the power which moves matter, a power which may indifferently be called Providence and /
and Nature (Von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum Fragmenta, I, 176), and the Stoics conceived God as Fire, which is a metaphysical and not a physical principle, since it is synonymous with aether and spirit (πνεῦμα) and is explicitly distinguished from ordinary fire by preserving instead of destroying (Von Arnim, S.V.F., I, 154, 159; Cicero De Nat. Deor. II, 15). The Stoic theory differed, however, from the pure naturalism of Straton in that it regarded God not as a mere unconscious power operating in nature but as an intelligent and beneficent being directing the affairs of the universe. Regarding Nature as living and purposive, the Stoics revived the logos theory of Herakleitos, interpreting it, however, in their own way. Destiny is the logos of God according to which the past has happened, the present is happening, and the future will happen (Von Arnim, S.V.F., II, 913, 937). This logos is the seminal power, embracing a plurality of seminal logoi, which makes matter produce things in order and turns it into a cosmos (Von Arnim, S.V.F. II, 180, 306, 314).

59. Destiny is conceived not, as in the old poetical idea, as the apportioning of special lots to individuals, but as an inevitable chain of cause and effect proceeding from the will of God (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 20; Von Arnim, S.V.F., II, 933). Nothing can interrupt the fatal chain, for nothing happens without /
without a cause - otherwise the unity of the universe would be broken (Von Arnim, S.V.F., II, 945) - Chance is simply a cause which is not plain to human reasoning (Von Arnim, S.V.F., II, 965, 973). If the same causes occur the same results follow inevitably (Von Arnim, S.V.F., II, 991). History proceeds in cyclical revolutions; every period is a repetition of its predecessor and there will be another Sokrates who will be accused by another Anytos and Meletos (Tatian, Contra Graecos, III). Each period ends in a universal conflagration, the reduction of everything to the vital element of fire which produces the new period (Cicero, De Nat. Deor., II, 46).

60. Chrysippos, who was chiefly responsible for the elaboration of the Stoic concept of Providence, shared with the Sceptics a certain distrust of reasoning. "Give me the principles," he said to his master Kleanthes, "and I can find the proofs for myself" (Diog. VII, 179). In reality the matter is not so simple, for the different proofs, apart from the argument from the general consensus of mankind, which is easily refuted by pointing to well-known agnostics and atheists, lead to different determinations of the concept. Chrysippos, who was born, like his predecessors, in the devout atmosphere of the Hellenized Orient, wished to save popular mythology and allegorized popular deities into divine /
divine faculties (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. III, 24), whereas Epikuros, who was as clear-sighted as he was narrow-sighted, realized that the perfection of the Platonico-Aristotelian God was incompatible with the old notion of a spasmodically active deity, and accordingly discarded the old conceptions as being not religion but superstition. Development is not simple accumulation; it involves negation and the transformation of the original element. Hence all development in religious thought means that the old religion becomes superstition.

61. The first argument is that the universe is preserved by the all-pervading element of fire. Everything that receives nourishment and growth contains a principle of fire or heat within it without which nourishment and growth would be impossible. Food, so Kleanthes observed, is digested by the heat of the stomach, and the arteries throb with a sort of fire-like movement. Fire is elicited by striking flints. Hence as everything which lives does so by virtue of the fire enclosed within it, the continuance of the universe itself must be due to the same element (Cicero De Nat. Deor. II, 9). This element of fire or spirit which holds the universe together, must have sensation and reason, for, so Zenon argued, nothing that is inanimate and without reason can produce from itself an /
an animate and rational being; the universe does produce animate and rational beings, hence it is animate and possesses reason (Op. cit. II, 8). Providence is thus God's intelligent and productive activity.

62. The Stoics regarded the divine activity as proceeding by an irresistible chain of causes from an eternal decree. In an argument which contains the very nerve of determinism, they urged that as every judgement ($\alpha\sigma\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\omega\mu\alpha$) is true or false, when we say that some event will happen, it must already be determined one way or the other, and it can only be determined epistemologically if determined causally (Cicero, De Fato, X). A similar argument was based not, as in this case, on the knowability of the future but on its actually being known in the omniscient mind of God (Von Arnim, S.V.F., II, 940, 943). Against this the Epikureans enunciated their principle of indeterminacy, the uncaused swerve of the atoms, and denied the validity of the disjunction "either it will happen or it will not" (Cicero, De Fato, X). The Peripatetics, however, following Aristotle's line of thought (De Interpretatione, 9), pointed out that it was only the whole disjunction which is true or false, which part is true and which false being from the nature of the case unknowable and indeterminate ($\zeta\lambda\gamma\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\nu$ $\kappa\alpha$ $\chi\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\nu$). Neither part taken by itself is true or false.
false, but only will be true or false, for in the case of disjunctions about the future the position itself is not settled, as it is in the case of disjunctions about the past and the present (Simplicius, In Cat. 103B).

63. Of a more popular character was the argument that Providence is presupposed by prophecy and divination (Cicero De Nat. Deor. II, 65). This argument goes deep into the religious consciousness. The very roots of religion have been held to rest in the "numinous", and this word derives from "nuere" (to nod) and indicates the celestial nodding of Jove who by his thunder signifies his pleasure or displeasure at what men have done or propose to do. The connection of divination with the divine is attested by the word itself. The Sceptics, however, objected to the Stoics arguing from divination on the ground that divination implies contingency, for which there is no place if nothing can happen without its being certain from all eternity that it will happen at the appointed time (Cicero De Div. II, 7). Certainly divination arises from a desire to affect rather than merely to learn the future. The Romans took the auspices to decide whether heaven approved of a given course of action; for instance, they watched how the sacred chickens were feeding before they engaged in battle.
The King of Lydia consulted the Delphic Oracle to find out whether it would be to his advantage to attack the Persians. Chrysippos, however, did not agree with the absolute Fatalists like Diodoros who maintained the necessity of future events. He enunciated the profound thesis that while the past is necessary, since it is immutable and cannot be otherwise than it is, in the future even what will not happen is still possible. The future is thus contingent. For example when Apollo foretells that Kypselos will be tyrant of Korinth, it is possible that he might not be, even though in fact he will be.

64. Chrysippos accordingly wished prophecies to be couched not in the form: "Nobody who is born under the Dogstar will drown", but in the form: It is not the case that anyone will be born under the Dogstar and will drown", i.e. he wished to assert not a connection between the two events such that it would be self-contradictory for the first to be without the other, but a negation of a conjunction, so that even granted the first the non-realization of the second is still conceivable (Cicero De Fato VI - VIII). Cicero is sarcastic about Chrysippos' teaching the prophets their own business, and with reason, for the subtle refinements of Chrysippos are obviously alien to the mentality from which ideas of divination spring.

Chrysippos /
Chrysippos attempted to show that divination was entailed by the Platonic notion of God, urging that from his beneficence God was bound to reveal the future to men unless he were ignorant of it (Cicero De Div. I, 38; II, 49). But his position provokes Epikuros' satirical picture of God anxiously looking to see what the animals do and making events take place in conformity. The Stoic concept of destiny is that of an unbreakable chain of causes proceeding from an eternal decree, whereas the destiny presupposed by popular ideas of divination consists of ad hoc decisions. The Stoic view is put by Seneca with his usual terseness: "The creator of all things decreed fate, but follows it; he always obeys, he once ordered." (De Prov. 5). In the Iliad, on the other hand, where we find the augur Kalchas predicting the future, the appointments of Zeus are not eternal. Homer relates how, when the sun bestrode the midst of heaven, "then" (καὶ ἂν ἄπέδεικτο πόλην) Zeus put the fates of the Trojans and the Achaians into the scales, and when the Achaians' fate sank down they lost the day (Iliad VIII, 68 sqq.). Again, it is not till Achilles has pursued Hektor four times round the walls of Troy that Zeus puts the fates of the two into his scales (Op. cit. XXII, 208 sqq.). The Sceptics pointed to the many cases of unfulfilled prognostication, and refuted the excuse that diviners made mistakes /
mistakes just like doctors by asking what analogy there was between medicine, the principles of which are understood, and a pretended science which possessed no known principles for its rules of interpretation (De Nat. Deor. III, 6). It is noteworthy that among the Stoics themselves Panaitios had no use for divination, (Cicero De Div. I, 3; I, 7; II, 42), and Seneca expressly maintained that the inevitable course of events made astrology a futile science (Ep. LXXXVIII 14-15).

65. Zenon had really got beyond the primitive idea of God making known his pleasure through auspices with his notion of the divine law of nature, which enjoins what is right and forbids what is wrong. Law is indeed the normative aspect of God as Logos, which clears up the Epikurean puzzle how a law could have the animateness which God must have (Cicero De Nat. Deor. I, 14; II, 31). This notion of a natural law providentially granted to man became fundamental in Roman jurisprudence, chiefly through the work of Cicero. The Roman jurisconsults were the real philosophers of Rome, and that just because jurisprudence was a knowledge of things divine and human, the science of right and wrong (Dig. I, 1, 10, 2), and wisdom (sapientia) was, as Horace remarks, a knowledge of the ritual necessary for marriage and all other legal institutions (Ars Poet. 396-399). Roman law, like the founding of the city itself /
itself, depended originally on the auspices. Providence was thus always the basic presupposition of jurisprudence. It remained so right to Justinian, but the notion of law and the divine were revised by Cicero to make them acceptable to the level of thinking of his own day.

66. Cicero points out that particular enactments presuppose natural law, i.e. the supreme reason implanted in nature which orders what is to be done and forbids the opposite (De Leg. I, 6). If right were constituted by resolutions of peoples, edicts of princes, or decisions of the courts, then robbery, adultery and forgery would be right! Yet these legal decisions do not make us consider what is good. By the standard of nature, then, we distinguish good law from bad law and indeed morality (honesta) from immorality (turpia) (De Leg. I, 16). This rational standard did not come into being by being written in the statute book. Horatius Cocles obeyed natural law without there being any statutory rule that one man should stand alone on a bridge against the whole force of the enemy. Natural law was never thought out by human ingenuity or anywhere positively enacted: it is something eternal, not only older than the age of peoples and states, but co-eval with God who watches and rules over heaven and earth. For the divine mind cannot be without reason, nor can the divine reason not have this force /
force in sanctioning right and wrong (Op. cit. II, 4-5).

67. Cicero therefore tells his friend Atticus that he can make no progress in expounding jurisprudence to him till he abandons his Epikureanism (Op. cit. I, 7). It is well, when considering the stability and excellence of Roman law, to remember that it rested upon a critically established notion of Providence. Now Cicero showed that Providence was presupposed by our judgements of right. The Sceptics, however, maintained that moral judgements were based not on the nature of things but on opinion, i.e. a purely arbitrary and conventional estimate. Cicero has therefore to dispose of this objection. He does so with his usual good sense. If, he argues, goodness (virtus) depends on opinion, the same must hold good in the case of a horse or a tree, and you will not get the farmer to admit that the goodness of a tree or a horse depends not on its nature but on someone's opinion. If goodness as a whole depends on opinion, then so must all its parts; but who would judge a man clever or shrewd not from his character but from something external? Just as truth and falsehood, consequence and inconsequence are judged on their own account, so goodness, which is a constant and lasting way of life, and badness, which is inconstancy, are approved or disapproved from their own nature. Anything that is of value must have /
have in itself what is praised, for value (ipsum bonum) does not rest on people's opinions but on nature. Otherwise you would be forced to the absurd conclusion that one's happiness rests on other people's opinion! (Op. cit. I, 16-17).

68. By saying that right was natural and not artificial the Stoics meant not only that it was not brought into being by any positive enactment, but also that there were natural tendencies towards it. On this side Nature is regarded as implanting, for the preservation of the species, a love of children by their parents, and of wives and husbands (Cicero De Fin. IV, 7). Thus the distinction between men and animals which holds good when the law of nature is a norm, viz. that only men have reason and hence knowledge of God (Cicero De Leg. I, 7-8), disappears when the law of nature is regarded as a driving (instinctive) force, and Ulpian and Justinian define natural law as that which Nature teaches to all animals, instancing the union of male and female, and the procreation and education of children (Dig. I, 1, 1, 3). This reduction of men to the level of animals is part and parcel of the Stoic identification of God with the world. Yet this pantheism was the least plausible part of Stoicism, and the Roman jurists actually treated natural law according to the Ciceronian notion as an eternal rational standard, i.e. equity, and made no methodical /
methodical attempt to infer it from the behaviour of animals. Slavery, for instance, which might seem an obvious example of the right of the stronger, was not regarded as being in accordance with natural law. (Dig. I, 1, 4). Thus the Ciceronian concept of Providence lay beneath the noble trend of Roman law towards equity and the interpretation of laws by their intention, so that whereas in early days, when law depended on the caprice of auspices, the letter of the law was saved at all costs and the only remedy was to adjust the facts to the law by means of legal fictions, in Imperial times, when law was conceived as the dictate of the reasoning Mind, it became more and more the practice to adjust the law to the facts. (English law, which is empirical in character, has to stick far closer to the letter. Hence its proverbial asininity).

69. The notion of Providence as the basis of society and as concentrated in the person of the Emperor, regarded after Augustus, who seemed "something more than human" (Dio LIII, 16), as possessing a numinous character, was driven home to the peoples of the Empire by the issue of coins bearing the legend "Providentia deorum" (v. C.A.H. Vol. XII, p. 354). This tradition remains in the "Dei Gra:" of our own coinage.

70. The last determination of God, the artistically working /
working Fire, as Zenon styled him, is that of working for a purpose, this purpose being the preservation and adornment of the universe (Cicero De Nat. Deor. II, 22). Chrysippos amplified this by saying that except for the universe itself everything was made for the sake of something else, the crops and fruits for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of men, and men to watch and imitate the universe, the universe alone being perfect and men merely imperfect parts of it (Op. cit. II, 14). The universe is thus to be considered as the common habitation of gods and men (Op. cit. II, 62), or rather as a society of gods and men all regulating their conduct in obedience to the Supreme Mind (Cicero De Leg. I, 7). This is the notion which underlies Vergil's vision of Roman history as a divine plan for mankind (Aeneid VI passim).

71. Providence moves and moulds everything in the same effortless fashion that a man moves his limbs. As the material out of which and in which everything exists is plastic there is nothing into which it cannot be transformed (Cicero De Nat. Deor. III, 39). The Stoics accordingly propounded the argument for Providence from design, both in the aesthetic and in the utilitarian sense, Kleanthes emphasizing the beauty of the starry heavens and the regularity of their motions, and Chrysippos pointing to instances of usefulness. /
usefulness. A characteristic argument of Chrysippos was that in the case of a beautiful dwelling-place we should infer that it was built for its owner and not for the mice, hence we ought to conceive the universe as the dwelling-place of the gods. The Sceptics pointed out that this really presupposed what was to be proved. We should conceive the universe as the dwelling-place of God if we thought that it had been built and was not the mere resultant of physical forces (Op. cit. III, 10).

72. It will be remembered that Chrysippos believed that if Kleanthes gave him the principles he could find the proofs for himself. Proof is therefore clearly secondary to him. He omitted, however, to ask himself Plato's famous question: "Are we going to or from first principles?" (v. Aristotle E.N. I, 4). All arguments to Providence from instances of design are vicious in that without presupposing Providence it is not possible to discern any instances of design. The Roman Stoic Rufus, however, resisted the temptation to argue from particular facts, for when after Galba's death some one exclaimed triumphantly: "Now the world is certainly governed by Providence," he replied drily that he had never thought of drawing any proof of the divine government of the world from Galba (Epiktetos, Diss. III, 17).

73. Once /
73. Once Providence is presupposed, then it is possible to recognize instances, and the Stoic examples ranged from the marvels of the digestive system to the impulses of crocodiles to bury their eggs (Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, II, 51-65). Purpose for the Stoics is not the inner purpose of Aristotle, i.e. a thing's perfection, but external purpose, i.e. a thing's usefulness for something else. The instances, being picked up by observation, often give the divine purpose a quite trivial content, as when Chrysippos claims that dogs are intended for hunting, horses for riding, and oxen for ploughing (Cic. D.N.D., II, 14). They were opposed by other instances taken up from observation such as the existence of apparently useless things like mice and bugs. But when it is a case of external purpose there is nothing for which with a little reflection one cannot find some purpose, and Chrysippos retorted that bugs were useful to us by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice by teaching us not to leave things about (Plut. De Sto. Rep. XXI, 4).

74. If, however, everything proceeds by a designed and inevitable chain of causes, is not human action superfluous? If I am fated to get well, I shall get well whether I see a doctor or not; if I am fated to die, I shall die whether I see a doctor or not; hence there is no need for me to see a doctor. Chrysippos /
Chrysippos answered this famous argument, the ἀργος ἥγος, by pointing out that there were complex as well as simple cases of predestination. A simple case is, "Sokrates will die on such and such a day". His dying day is destined whatever he does or does not. But in a complex case, e.g., Milo will wrestle at Olympia, it would be absurd to say that he would do so even if he had no one to wrestle with, i.e. in this case the action of someone else is required for the fulfilment of destiny. In the instance given in the ἀργος ἥγος, what I do about seeing the doctor is required for the fulfilment of my destiny, and is as much destined as the final issue (Cic. De Fato XII and XIII). Our characters, Chrysippos asserted, are contributory factors, just as the nature of a stone contributes to its movement when it is given a push (Gellius Noct. Att. VII. 2).

75. Chrysippos realized that only the universe is self-sufficient and unimpeded, and that all the parts are impeded. To this the objection was made, "How can the whole be free if the parts are not? How can I freely move my body if my hand and my foot are not free to move?" (Plut. De Sto. Rep. 47). But here Chrysippos is right - to admit absolute freedom in a part of the Universe is absurd. There cannot be two or more absolutes, for they would condition each other.
other and so not be absolutes. It is on the contrary only because of the mutual obstruction of the parts that the whole is unimpeded. We could not move our bodies if our members did not prevent each other from coalescing.

76. Yet what place is then left for virtue? The sage with a spark of the divine logos in him can indeed treat all outward events, everything except his own virtue or vice, as indifferent, but how is he to realise his virtue? The course of the world proceeds on its way from its everlasting concatenation of causes, and so far as we do anything it belongs to the course of the world and not to us. One's goodness of character therefore cannot be realised in action; Brutus, who attempted to realise the Stoic notion of virtue, found himself swept away by the current of events and killed himself, crying out that virtue was an empty name (Florus, Epit. IV, 7). Suicide was the characteristic death of the Stoic.

77. As, however, Chrysippos attempted to find some place for human responsibility, insisting firmly that men, and not God, were bad and responsible for their misdeeds, he was asked how he could reconcile his doctrine that there was nothing blameworthy in the world with his assertion of the general depravity of mankind and with evil at all (Plutarch De Sto. Rep. 31). He replied /
replied that evil was in some cases consequential and that evil was inseparable from good. By an evil which is consequential (κατὰ προκοιλομένως θείων) Chrysippos meant one entailed by some advantage, like the fragility of our heads, which is a defect but entailed by the advantage of their being delicately constructed, and so in general with diseases. The destruction of war, again, he justified as preventing over-population. On the second point he remarked that good is essentially related to its opposite, evil, so that if you take away evil good follows it. "How could there be a sense of justice unless there were injuries? What is justice but the privation of injustice? How could courage be understood except in contraposition to cowardice?" (Gellius, Noct. Att. VII, 1; Plutarch, De Sto. Rep. 32).

Hence Chrysippos was able to avoid the quasi-Epikurean notion that the gods trouble only about important things and to maintain stoutly that not even the least thing is contrary to the logos of nature. Even badness "occurs in a way according to the logos of nature (γινόμενος καὶ αὐτὴ πῶς κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον) and is so to speak useful to the whole, for otherwise there would not even be good" (Plutarch, De Sto. Rep. 35).

78. Chrysippos insisted on the responsibility of man for his own misdeeds, urging that God is not responsible for them any more than the law is responsible for /
for illegality (Op. cit. 33). He could not, however, explain how, if God is the power who moves everything, he is not responsible for the evil that men do. This problem was insoluble so long as good and evil were conceived as opposites on the same level, injustice indeed being even described as that of which justice is the privation. It was solved when the Neo-Platonists grasped the concept of the essential negatitivity or privativeness of evil and hence ascribed evil not to power but to impotence.

79. The more obvious difficulty, why evils befall good men (Cic. De Nat. Deor. III, 31), was met energetically by the Stoics, who rejected the problem as wrongly put. No evils can befall the good man, because everything is indifferent to him except his own character. Man's good is within him, and indeed he even surpasses God, for he is not exempt from suffering like God but above it. This doctrine is stated with greater authority by Roman Stoics like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, who took part in public affairs and did not, as people pointed out jeeringly of Zenon, Kleanthes and Chrysippos, spend placid academic lives. The good man, says Seneca, turns everything to his own hue (colorem). Nothing is an evil unless you take it as such. The good man certainly suffers troubles but he
is not harmed, i.e. made worse by them (feritur, non laeditur). These troubles are trials by which God, who is paternally inclined towards men, prepares them for himself, since virtue decays without an opponent. We should not consider that we have been injured by God, but take our trials as indications that he thinks well of us, for it is the best men whom a commander chooses for the most dangerous expeditions. It was heroes like Mucius and Regulus who suffered apparently the most horrible fates. We should therefore follow our Commander without grumbling (De Prov., passim). It was in this spirit that Marcus Aurelius himself faced mutinous troops and told them that they had no power to kill him unless it were granted them by God (Dio, LXXII, 11).

80. Stoic cosmological theory is summarized by Seneca (Nat. Quaest. II, 45), who says that you would be right in calling Jove either Fate, because he is that on which everything depends, i.e. the cause of causes, or Providence, because by his design it is provided that the world should proceed unshaken, or Nature, because from him all things are born and by his spirit we live, or the World, because he is everything that you see and sustains himself by his own power.

81. It is to be noted that Seneca puts all these determinations as optional, and makes no attempt to articulate /
articulate them or place them as more or less concrete. As Stoicism does not make intelligible how the various determinations form a unity, it passes into mysticism, which explicitly sets the divine unity beyond human understanding, either as the One of the philosophers or as some divine figure of popular religion like Isis whose worshippers believe that all other gods are really identical with her and differ only in name. By the time of Seneca, who pokes fun at Zenon's syllogisms (Ep. LXXXII), Stoicism itself has acquired a religious colouring. Abandoning the old Stoic notion of the self-sufficiency of the sage, he declares flatly that no man is good without God's aid (Ep. XLI), and transforms the old materialistic pantheism into the conception of a personal and paternal God who holds out his hands to men as they ascend and makes them good by entering into them (Ep. LXIII).

82. The Sceptic in Cicero's "De Natura Deorum" does not dispute the validity of the concept of Providence, he merely objects that the Stoics have found bad reasons for what he is himself content to accept on the authority of ancestral custom. Ancestral custom (mos maiorum) had a peculiar appeal for the Romans with their long history of successful development, whereas the Hellenes had no history of continuous development but only brilliant episodes in various cities, and, impressed /
impressed by the differences of custom as opposed to the uniformity and invariability of Nature, set custom down as pure conventionality or artificiality. The appeal among non-Roman peoples was to revelation. If, as the Sceptics held, we know that thought does not give us reality, there must be some other non-logical cognition which enables us to know this reality which thought does not grasp. Scepticism in this way leads to the mystical theory that reality is such as to be grasped not by thought but by intuitive or immediate apprehension. Philosophy is defined as divine revelation and inspiration (Philostratos, Life of Apollonios, XL, 4).

83. The popular mystery religions are religions of salvation. When other types of divination had become obsolete, despite the antiquarian efforts of Claudius to revive Etruscan divination, astrology became master of the field, largely owing to the Chaldaeans who treated it systematically and erected it into a science of human affairs. To take astrology as the ancient counterpart of modern astronomy is entirely to misunderstand it, for astrology studied the stars not as things worth knowing in themselves, which is a Renaissance attitude, but as the conditions influencing human life. The modern counterpart of astrology is psychology, which substitutes psychical complexes /
complexes or constellations for sidereal conjunctions as the determining factors of human actions. Just as the psycho-analyst does not picture the influences of these complexes as so inevitable that he cannot liberate his patients from them, so the ancients looked to the mystery religions to find gods who would grant them special insight and power to prevail over the fatal influences of the stars. Isis, for instance, promises to bestow on the faithful immunity from the buffets of Fortune and claims the power to set aside the decrees of Fate and the appointments of the celestial planets (Apuleius, Met. XI).
CHAPTER IX

Plutarch.

84. Philosophically the concept of Providence is now sharply distinguished from that of destiny, with which the Stoics had identified it. Plutarch, who followed in the track of Plato and purged Hellenic and Oriental myths of their grossness, formulated the theory of a threefold Providence, of which the highest is the beneficent thought and will of the supreme God, the second that of the heavenly deities which order mortal things, and the third that of the daemons, beings half divine and half human, who look after human affairs. (De Fato, 9). Destiny and Fortune are both subordinate. Like civil laws, the laws of Destiny deal with the universal, and only consequentially with the particular events which fall under them. Certain consequences follow necessarily from certain acts, but the acts are not necessarily determined. So to say that everything is in accordance with Destiny is true only if it is meant not that everything is destined but that Destiny covers everything (De Fato 4-5).

Some things happen from necessity while others are variable. It is the variable that is matter for our free will.

85. Chance /
85. Chance is not the origin of the world, for hardly ever does anything of value come from chance. Plutarch can recall but one instance, when a painter was trying to depict the foam on a horse's mouth, and produced a superb effect by throwing his sponge at the picture (De Fortuna, 4). Chance is itself a cause but one that is contingent, i.e. not productive by itself, but productive, in matters where our intention is concerned, in combination with other causes, e.g. when one digs to plant something and finds a pot of gold (De Fato, 7). On the vexed question of Rome's rise to empire Plutarch comes to the conclusion that while the Romans possessed great daring and courage, their success was due not to human hands and human effort, but to divine aid and the breath of Fortune (De Fortuna Romanorum, 11).

86. Plutarch fiercely attacks the Stoic attribution of all things to God. Chrysippos had said that God granted the beginnings of destructive wars to prevent overpopulation. This is to make God resemble the Galatian king Deiotaros, who had several sons and as he wished to hand down his kingdom intact to one, slaughtered all the rest! (De Sto. Rep. 32). Plutarch ascribes evil not to God, from whom only good proceeds, nor to matter, which cannot be the source of evil since it is absolutely indeterminate and characterless, but to/
to an intermediate principle, which Plato had styled Necessity and described as a soul opposing God's beneficent work. (De An. Procr., 6). It was an immortal and irrational soul which moved matter before mind entered in and introduced order. (Ibid. 7). God took it and after giving it mentality and orderliness, established it as ruler of the world he made. (Ibid. 9). Some of the daemons are bad and produce evil. (De Is. XXV-XXVI). Each of the blessed gods has a diabolical counterpart who commits iniquities in his name.

Plutarch thus admits the presence of evil in the world, and explicitly ascribes it to a principle opposed to God. But though evil exists, it is always overcome in the end by the power of God, who, like the sun and the moon, is common to all but called by various names. (De Is. LXVII). The proverb says that the mills of God grind slow, but they grind exceeding small. Yet why does God delay and thus cause doubts of Providence? The most efficacious punishment is the one which follows immediately after the crime. Then the punishment of an injury is due to the injured party, and delay in executing it emboldens the wronger and discourages the wronged. What is the good of punishment which comes too late? The Messenians were overcome owing to the treachery of Aristokrates, king
of Arkadia, who was bribed by the Spartans. By the time his treachery was found out the Messenians were already destroyed.

88. Plutarch answered these difficulties in a classic essay (De seris numinis vindicta) in which he employed his wide historical knowledge to refute objections based on historical instances.

(a) God is not afraid of making a mistake, but he is setting us an example not to be hasty in inflicting punishment, since we are liable to be unbalanced immediately after the offence.

(b) Human justice is merely retributive, but God aims at healing vicious souls, and cuts off immediately only the absolutely incurable; the rest can wait, for there is no fear of their escaping!

(c) People often change for the better, even tyrants like Gelon and Peisistratos, who seized power wrongfully but governed most equitably, giving good laws and advancing agriculture. The Egyptians and many Hellenes have a law forbidding the execution of a pregnant woman. Similarly, God does not at once destroy those who have within them a potentiality for good. If Dionysios had been punished forthwith after his usurpation, there would have been nobody to save Sicily from the Carthaginians.

(d) The /
(d) The wicked are often used by God as instruments of his purpose against those who are even worse, like the followers of Timoleon who defeated the Carthaginians and destroyed tyrannies before they perished miserably in expiation of their pillaging of Delphi.

(e) The bad often have good sons. Perikles belonged to an accursed house, and Pompeius was the son of Strabo, whom the Romans hated so much that they cast out his corpse and trampled it under foot.

(f) Delayed punishment is more appropriate. Kallippos pretended to be Dion's friend and assassinated him; later he was killed by his own friends and with the same dagger.

89. All this assumes that divine vengeance is delayed, but, strictly, Plutarch points out, the punishment begins immediately after the crime, and it is only the final catastrophe which is delayed. Vice gives one a life of misery and shame and brings unceasing terror and remorse. To admire the prosperity of the wicked is to be as silly as the children who admire criminals in the arena when they see them arrayed in royal robes, and do not realize that they are doomed to be decapitated or burnt alive! We call the divine justice slow because it is long. The wicked man is
like a fish, on the hook as soon as he sins though not cooked till later. We should also remember that to God the longest human life is an instant.

90. As for children's suffering for their father's sins, that is as reasonable as their receiving benefits on account of their ancestry like the Heraklids in Sparta. There is a kind of unity in the family and in the state, just as there is in the individual, and to deny this is to make the same sort of mistake as those who deny the unity of the individual. In both cases the identity persists through the change. Children are not, however, always punished for their father's sins, if they are themselves good.

91. Plutarch concludes with a myth in Platonic style, in which one Thespelios has a vision of Hell and its torments; those who have suffered bodily before death are treated mildly and much is overlooked, the more perverse are chastised according to their deserts, while the incurable are plunged into a bottomless abyss.
CHAPlER X.

Plotinos.

92. For Plutarch and devout minds like his the content of their intuition of reality was borrowed eclectically from traditional and current beliefs. For the Neo-Platonists, the culmination of Hellenic philosophy, the content of their intuition was derived from the metaphysical systems of their philosophical predecessors. The Neo-Platonists view reality as a series of grades descending from the Good or One down to matter, each of the lower grades being an effluence or emanation (ἔκτροποις) from the one above it. In this way Neo-Platonism supplies the deficiency in Aristotle's conception of the relation of God to the world, for from the emanationist standpoint God is that from which everything proceeds as well as that to which everything returns. The concept of emanation, which is an unreflective operation, is intended to reconcile the divine transcendence with Providence. The Neo-Platonist holds that God is utterly separate from everything else, but he accepts the Stoic argument, urged against the Epikureans, that a god who does not exercise Providence is not a god at all. God must exercise Providence, for providential activity is /
is the bestowal of good on the objects of Providence, and God is essentially goodness. How then is Providence compatible with transcendence? The Neo-Platonic answer is that this bestowal of good is not a reflective activity; the gods, who emanate from the Good, bestow good by being what they are and the objects on which it is bestowed receive it according to the limitations of their nature. Thus in exercising Providence the gods have no connection with the objects of Providence, because they make everything good by being what they are, and what acts in virtue of its being acts without connection, for connection is a qualification of being and hence contrary to nature (Proklos, El. th. 119-122).

93. Plotinos dismisses out of hand the notion of an event occurring without a cause. Granted, however, that every event has a cause, it is lazy to stop at the proximate causes of events, which we can generally find without difficulty. The cause, for instance, of a man's going to market is his thought that he ought to see somebody, the cause of getting rich is finding a treasure or making money from one's work, and the cause of a child is the father together with the external circumstances which cooperate. Nature, in short, is the source to which all events are ascribed. But we cannot rest content with these proximate /
proximate causes, since they do not account for the differences in people's character and conduct (Enneads III, 1, 1-2).

94. Before proceeding to elucidate his concept of Providence Plotinos eliminates four theories attempting to go beyond proximate causes (a) the atomic theory, (b) the astrological theory, (c) the Stoic theory of a single soul animating the universe, and (d) the Stoic theory of the chain of Destiny.

95. (a) Atomism and similar theories of elements are unsatisfactory because no movement of physical bodies can account for the admitted regularity in nature, or for men's becoming geometricians or astrologers. These bodies may be able to warm us or chill us or even kill the weakest, but they do not account for any of the actions performed by the soul.

96. (b) The objection to the astrological theory of the stars determining human life is the observed difference in the lives of the different individuals, both human and non-human, born under the same conjunction. The stars can only be signs and not determinants, just like the birds and other beings on whom divination is based, for the astrologers admit that things like nobility and physical features come from a child's parents, and they cannot come from the stars if they come from the parents, since the parents antecede /
antecede the conjunction of the stars at the child's birth.

97. (c) The defect in the Stoic concept of a single all-pervasive soul which effects everything, so that every entity is a part which follows as the universe leads, and the causes which follow from it form the continuous chain of destiny, is that this simple unity excludes the duality of agent and patient implied in causation. When our arms and legs are moved by the governing part of our souls it would be ridiculous to say that they were moved by destiny. Similarly if everything in the universe is one it is not true that everything has a cause. In that case we should not be ourselves nor would our actions be ours; we should not ourselves think, but our deliberations would be another's thinking, just as it is not our feet which walk but we who walk with them (III, 1, 4).

98. (d) In their concept of the chain of causes Stoicism admitted the human will as an accessory cause, but since the causes all spring from a single source they will leave us nothing but to be carried wherever they push us. Our ideas will be the outcome of their antecedents, and our impulses will conform to our ideas; our freedom will therefore be only nominal, since it will not make any difference to an action that it is our action. What is ours in an action will be the same /
same as in the case of animals and children who follow blind impulses (III, 1,7). The keenness of this criticism of Plotinos' is evident when we reflect that according to the traditional story the destiny of Oidipus was settled before his birth and so was a series of events that might equally well have happened to anyone else.

99. It is therefore necessary to find an ultimate cause which does not leave any event without a cause, which preserves the sequence and order of events and allows us to be something, without however destroying prediction and divination (III, 1, 8-10).

100. Plotinos urges that universal Providence is not exactly like providence for a particular object, i.e. thought before an operation is performed how it is to be carried out and what will be the outcome, and that we are not to take literally Plato's account in the "Timaios" (cf. 47A - C) of the gods adding eyes and the other organs of sense to the human face because they foresee the dangers which these organs will enable men to escape. In the first place the world is eternal and not made. In the second place all reasoning starts from premisses which are intuited, either sensuously or intellectually. In this case the premisses cannot be derived from sensation because sensible things do not yet exist. But if the reasoning starts from the in-telligible /
intelligible it will end with the intelligible and not have anything to do with sensible objects. Moreover reasoning is not appropriate to God, since it involves the exclusion and hence the entertainment of an alternative, whereas the perfection and completeness of the divine is incompatible with alternatives and making part by part. The truth is that in God the future is already present and so we speak of the reasoning of God because everything is as if a wise being had reasoned and made some parts for the sake of others (III, 1; VI, 7, 1).

101. Universal Providence (τὸ ἱερὸν πνεύμονα πρόδοτικ) is accordingly not the reasoning of God how he can make the best possible world, but the accordance of everything with Mind, Mind being prior to everything not in the temporal sense but in the sense of being the cause and pattern of everything. The nature of Mind and Being constitutes the true and first world, a living and intelligent unity. From it emanates the material world, which is not truly a unity, since it is manifold and changing. It has come into being not because Mind produced it reflectively or trying to do so, for Mind has the power of doing something without effort, and therefore remains at rest even while giving something of itself to matter. The material world emanates by a natural necessity, for it is necessary that the perfect /
perfect sphere of Mind should not be in the lowest grade of entities; what is highest must have something inferior to it. The element of itself which Mind gives to the material world is Reason or Thought (Logos). Plotinos agrees with Plato that the material world is a mixture of Logos and Matter, governed by the soul of the world, but he differs from Plato in his emanationist ascription of matter itself to Mind. His position is that from Mind and the logos which springs from it necessarily emanates the divided material world, a world divided and in conflict because inferior to the perfected united world from which it emanates. In the seminal logos of an animal all the parts are together and they do not conflict with each other, but the animal is born with material extension, and material parts are all outside each other so that they impede and destroy each other (III, 2, 1 - 2).

102. Yet as everything proceeds from unity so it returns to unity. The whole, by anticipating and embracing everything in a single harmony, forms a unity just through everything's obeying its own nature, by fire burning, horses doing what horses do, and soon (III, 3, 1). The controlling element interconnects everything while the particular beings follow their own nature, just as a general controls military operations while his men co-operate with him. The whole is ordered /
ordered by the providence of the general who foresees what is going to happen and what food and equipment will be required. Of course, what the enemy do is outside his control; he does not command their army. But in the case of the great Commander who is over everything what can there be not ordered together and harmonized? (III, 3, 2).

103. Providence extends throughout the scale of existence from beginning to end, even to things which are sometimes wrongly supposed unworthy of Providence, like the flowers with their beauty, for the beauty of corporeal things derives from their participation in form and logos (I, 6, 2; III, 2, 13). Providence is not, however, arithmetically equal in all the grades of existence; it is proportioned to every grade. Hence in the lower grades of existence there is that lower grade of Providence which is called Destiny, the seminal logos or organic power in plants and animals (III, 2, 5). In this way Plotinos is able to maintain the rationality of the universe without having, like Plato and Aristotle, to admit irrationality or rather counter-rationality among plants and animals, or, with the Stoics, to attempt to find among plants and animals something belonging to conscious rational processes. The universe is rational, but rationality varies according to the character of the beings who compose it.

104. Though /
104. Though Plotinos conceives of the universe as emanating and not produced reflectively, he contends that even if it had been produced reflectively no fault could be found with it, so that there is no support for the theory of a wicked Demiurge. In his theodicy Plotinos repeats the Stoic maxims about the utility of vice and the indifference of poverty and ill-health to the good man (III, 2, 5), but his whole emphasis is different because he does not regard man as the most important being in the universe. He follows Plato in regarding man as a plaything and human life as a game, not a palaestra. If children who are physically well-trained overcome children who are neither physically nor morally educated, steal their food and take away their nice clothes, what is that but a matter for laughter? Is not the legislator right to let the weak children suffer for their laziness? The good who are overcome by the bad are always inferior to them in some respect, and as for those who commit injuries, they suffer the penalty of becoming wolves and scoundrels. When the children grow up they take up arms, and the armed beat the unarmed. It is not for God to fight for the unwarlike; the law says that safety in battle is to be found in courage, not in prayer. It is not prayer, but farming, which brings in a harvest, and there is no ground for complaint if the wicked have a better harvest than the /
the good when they are the ones who do farming, or do it better. Providence would be negligent to let the weaker rule. The wicked rule owing to the cowardice of the people under them, and it would be unfair if they did not! (III, 2, 8). But animal and human life, with its internecine conflicts, is really only like a scene on the stage. If death consists in changing one's body as an actor changes his costume, what is there terrible in animals changing into one another? Is it not better than that they should be born for nothing? Human wars concern only the outer man, which is a mere shadow, ( согл счт) and not the soul within; they should not be taken seriously. Tears and lamentations are not evidence of real evil, for children weep and howl for quite imaginary ills (III, 2, 15).

105. Yet Plotinos is not content simply to dismiss all evils as imaginary, since that would make nonsense of the distinctions which we make between good and bad actions (III, 2, 16). His view is that evil is a deficiency of good, and that there must be some evil in the material world because it is other than the perfect intelligible world, so that Plato was right in saying that evils can never pass away (III, 2, 5). It is not, however, even desirable that they should, for in such a manifold work as the material world how could /
could the better exist without the worse? Who would want a picture all light and no shade? Instead of being sorry because the worse exists in the better, we should be glad that the better has given some of itself to the worse. To remove the inferior from the universe would be to remove Providence itself, for Providence is Providence over what? Not over itself and not over the better. In speaking of Providence on high, we think of it in relation to what is below (III, 3, 7).

106. This does not mean, however, that Providence produces wickedness. Both good and bad acts are due to us, since we have a free source of action in ourselves, but the good acts are in accordance with Providence while the bad ones are in the first instance opposed to it but so comprehended by it as to bring about the triumph of good. The health, for example, of an animal's body is a gift of the Providence in him; if he is cut anywhere, the seminal logos organizing the body brings the edges of the wound together and heals the place (III, 3, 5). It is this interconnection of all things, even contraries, which explains how divination is possible from the movements of celestial bodies and so on. The seer predicts only facts and not the reasons for them, and his art consists in reading the letters of nature and using the /
the rules of analogy to interpret the qualities of a being and the number of these qualities before they are actually seen in them. The celestial bodies do not stand in a causal relation to the terrestrial; they act on the terrestrial only in the way that one part of an animal acts on another, i.e. not producing it, for they are produced together, but each is affected in the way that it is its nature to be affected and they are related accordingly (III, 3, 6).

107. Plotinos sums up his concept of Providence by saying that the principle or source is all things in one; in it all things are together and all things are the whole. From this source, which remains motionless in itself, issue all the particular things, just as a tree comes out of a single root fixed in itself; there is a multiplicity of shoots but they all bear a likeness to it. Some parts contain others, some are near the root while others get further away from it and divide into branches, fruit and leaves. Some parts are lasting, while others, i.e. the fruit and the leaves, are constantly changing, and these have in them the logoi of the original parts as though they would like to be little trees themselves. The tips of the branches seem to get their nourishment only from the adjacent parts, but really it is owing to the root that one part undergoes a change and another brings /
108. Plotinos conceives the material world as emanating from Mind by a natural necessity and therefore no longer as accidentally related to God, as was the case in the Platonico-Stoic conception criticized by the Epikureans. But while avoiding the error of assimilating the production of the material world to the deliberative procedure of a craftsman, Plotinos turns it into a natural process. It is by this natural necessity, the necessity that everything should emit some inferior sort of likeness of itself, that fire emits heat and snow emits cold. Indeed Plotinos gives as the most obvious instance the emission of scents from sweet-smelling flowers. This, too, is the process by which God or the One emits Mind (V, 1, 6).

109. Now Plotinos insists more than any one before Augustine on the inwardness of God. He agrees with Plato about the futility of trying to escape from God, but the reason he gives is not that God's arm can reach anywhere but that to try to escape from God is to try to escape from ourselves (VI, 9, 7). He introduces the concept of God as self-actualizing (ἐντὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνέγκυμα), a concept which is a revival of the Platonic Self-Mover. God is not something whose existence is contingent, a mere matter of fact. God does /
does not simply exist, he makes himself. He is, not as he just happened to be, but as he desires to be; and his desire is not a random desire, since it is desire for the best (VI, 8, 16). But this self-actualizing remains an unsatisfied postulate in Plotinos' thought. The "self" of this self-actualizing is not conceived as the self or subject of self-consciousness, for God is regarded as beyond being and mind and conscious life. God emits mind because he is essentially correlative to it, but he is not a principle that can account for it from himself; he emits it because it is his nature to do so. In the last resort, then, it is natural necessity which has the word.
CHAPTER XI.

Proklos and the end of Greek Thought.

110. With Proklos, the last of the grand Neo-Platonists, the difficulty reappears. Providence (Pronoia) is interpreted as "that which is prior to intellect", i.e. as the operation of the Good, while Destiny is defined as the cause of the connection between corporeal things. Thus what is embraced by Destiny falls within the sphere of Providence, on which Destiny depends, but not everything that is governed by Providence comes within the domain of Destiny. Destiny is the same as Nature, that which presides over corporeal and sensible things and is their life, performing a double function of renewal and preservation (De Prov. 7).

111. Corporeal things are moved by necessity, since they do not, like us, possess a potentiality of inclining either way, to the good or to the bad. The freewill of human souls is presupposed by praise and blame, by advice, encouragement and discouragement, judicial procedure, legislation, oratory, sacerdotal ritual and finally by philosophy. Without freewill philosophy would be superfluous. What could it teach, if there were nothing to be taught? How could there be /
be anything to be taught, if there were nothing in us by which we might improve? (De Prov. 52).

112. Our will is not only effective but selective, and it is from the agent's choice, not from the universe, that an action acquires its quality. If the deed is done well but the agent's choice was bad, we consider the action to be bad, since what is good in it is due to something other than the agent's intention. We are not under compulsion like corporeal things, but we subject ourselves to Destiny when we follow our feelings, since feelings are essentially related to the bodily organs of sense. Now Providence is to Destiny as intellectual is to sensible. Hence when we pursue the intellectual we raise ourselves above the realm of Destiny to the rule of Providence from which all good proceeds, and when we attain union with God by supra-intellectual ecstasy, we rule the whole world (De Prov. 27).

113. How, then, does evil exist, if Providence exists? Proklos rejects the answer that evil is really non-existent, being only a lesser good, on the ground that if an evil is increased it does not get better but worse, so that it is evidently opposed to good and not merely a degree of it (De Mal. Sub.1). He likewise refutes the suggestion that evil is due to some principle opposed to Providence, for there cannot be two /
two first causes. Evil has therefore to be admitted to exist, but not so as to violate the supremacy of Providence.

114. What is evil? The concept of evil is purely negative, but actual instances do exist in so far as they are mixed with good. Evil is neither absolute privation nor wholly opposed to good, for privation has no power to effect anything, and evil itself has no power of effectiveness. Hence evil is rather a sub-contrary of good, deriving from good its power and strength (De Mal. Sub. 6). There are two kinds of evils, those in the body, which are contrary to nature, and those in the soul, which are contrary to reason. Bodily ills are decay and deformity. Now the decay of one thing is the means of the growth of another, so that decay is only contrary to the nature of some particular thing, and not to nature as a whole. So with deformity. Moral evil is the use of the higher by the lower, the degradation of the reason to serve the feelings. Fury is not bad in lions and leopards, because that is just their nature, but only in humans. It is only from the higher standpoint that the action is bad, since the feelings act quite rationally in acting irrationally, since it is their nature to act irrationally. Then every power is good, and action is the exertion of a power. Hence so far as any one effects /
effects anything he exercises good qualities. Plato had rightly remarked that unrighteousness is weak; the band of robbers only succeed by their loyalty to each other (De Mal. Sub. 5). In general the existence of the corruptible and the fallible is necessary to the perfection of the universe, in order, (as Plotin- os had pointed out), that the primary beings should not be the last grade of existence (De Decem Dub. 5).

115. What is the cause of evil? It cannot pro-
ceed from a principle opposed to good, as there cannot be two first principles; two principles imply a higher one above them. Matter is a production of God, and being indeterminate is neither good nor bad. The fall of the incorporeal into matter is not the cause of evil, since the souls sinned before their fall (De Mal. Sub. 2). Evil is not due to the angels, who are God's messengers and characterized by good. Nor was Plutarch right in ascribing it to daemons. The dae-
mons are either bad to themselves or only to others. In the first case, are they always bad or do they change? God cannot be thought to have produced what is eternally bad, for it would be better for something not to exist at all than for it to be eternally bad, while if they change they are not essentially daemons but only behave like them. In the second case, if they are bad only to others in leading them to a worse /
worse state; it is as absurd as to call teachers bad because they prevent their pupils from entering on a stage for which they are not fitted, or to condemn priests because they stop the sinful from entering the shrine. The evil does not consist in stopping the sinful but in deserving to be stopped. The daemons merely execute the divine justice by which any one who acts wickedly is degraded to the level for which he is fitted, acting like physicians who open up ulcers to the light (De Mal. Sub. 8).

116. What, then, does cause evil? There is no one cause of evil, as God is the sole cause of good. Evil has an indefinite number of causes, some for souls and some for bodies, since the very form of evil is defect and indeterminateness (De Mal. Sub. 4). Evil has no efficient cause but an impotent cause, for the effectiveness of an evil consists of its goodness. Proklos thus solves the problem over which Chrysippos and Plutarch had stumbled, how God could be the power working in everything and yet not the cause of evil. The goodness of an act proceeds from God, and its badness is due not to power but to impotence (De Mal. Sub. 9).

117. But does Providence distribute good and evil in accordance with people's deserts? Are there not depraved governors and virtuous slaves? Proklos replies /
replies that in fact God does give everyone what they deserve. The virtuous are not grieved because they do not become rich and powerful, any more than sailors are disappointed at not reaping. The good find their satisfaction in the pursuit of virtue, and are content that external goods should fall to the bad. Only there is this difference, that those who pursue virtue cannot fail to attain their object, while those who seek after externals are often disappointed. The good receive from God what is enduring and self-sufficient, whereas those who pursue externals get an uncertain satisfaction which depends on other things. It would not indeed be fair that the same people should enjoy every sort of good. Since souls have descended into the sphere of becoming, it is right that they should have some experience of the evils of this world, to stimulate them to pass to a place which is beyond evil. Providence may be purifying us from the faults of a previous existence, educating us in this, or preparing us for the future by teaching us that only virtue is good (De Decem Dub. 6).

118. Why, then, does Providence apportion the like to the unlike, e.g. when both good and bad go down in the same boat? In the first place, they suffer the similar not in respect of their dissimilarity but in respect of their similarity. They are drowned because /
because they are all alike in the same boat, but in so far as they are unlike they take their fate very differently, the worse taking it hardly and the better calmly. In the second place, in the general order there is a weaving together of processes moving towards the same and from different starting-points, and in this order the subordinate parts are compelled by necessity (De Decem Dub. 6).

119. Yet though it is not everything which is in our power, of what is in our power we are absolute masters. We cannot e.g. prevent our city from being overwhelmed, but we can control the character of our actions. We are able either to serve Providence, which means complete freedom and makes us rule the world, or to follow our feelings and inclinations and subject ourselves to Destiny or Nature— in modern terms, to become a function of our environment. Man has freedom to choose whether he will be free or not, and if he chooses freedom he unites himself to the supreme God, who alone is self-circumscribed and self-actualizing (αὐτοπεριβάλλοντος, αὐτεξουργότος) (De Prov. 46). It is noteworthy that Proklos has got beyond the false infinity or indefiniteness of Philo, who conceived God not as self-circumscribed but as uncircumscribed.

120. Here Greek philosophy breaks down. The supreme /
supreme principle is to be self-actualizing and self-circumscribed, but there is no place for such a principle on their theory of reality. While human souls have the power of choice, and even when the instruments of Providence are self-moving, God is like a natural object in that he can only act in one way (De Prov. 48). Reality is for the Greeks a reality that already is all that it can be, a reality all ready-made. Even the indeterminate is, Proklos insists, known by God determinately. Hence our thought and action must be annihilated as distinct and merged in this pre-existent reality. We must cast aside all the categories of thought to achieve a supra-intellectual, a completely unitary, cognition of it. But this is to descend to instinct, for it is in instinct that there is not yet the duality of consciousness and the object of consciousness.

121. In this way both our cognition and the reality to be cognized are purely natural. Destiny dominates the scene at the end of Greek thought as much as at the beginning. There is no room for freedom in their concept of reality, since everything that can happen is eternally anticipated. As God can act only in one way, his acts are deprived of value, for value is synonymous with preferability and involves choice. His acts are therefore mere facts falling under /
under the rule of Destiny. The Neo-Platonists state that God is independent, but as they look for the Independent not in the subject who makes this statement but in a reality presupposed, they fail to discern what they seek, even in the supreme principle of the One.

122. As Damaskios points out, that which requires something else is necessarily dependent on it (De primis principiis, 11), and correlative terms require each other (Op. cit. 12). Thus the principle or origin requires what proceeds from it, the cause requires the effect, the prior the posterior, and the best the inferior. Now the One is called everything on account of the anticipation (προλήψις) in it of everything just because of its alone being the One, though it does not change because it is the antecedent and cause of everything but is this on account of being the One. Hence the One, in that it is alone, is the absolute or most independent (ἐνδιακτέτον) but in that it is most independent it is the principle and root of all principles, and consequently requires its correlatives. Thus the One is both independent and dependent, though not in the same respect, for it is independent in respect of being what it is, and dependent in that it produces and anticipates other things, though this does belong to the /
the One. Damaskios concludes that we must seek beyond the One for something which is not in any way dependent, although we cannot call it a principle or even most independent since that implies a superiority over the dependent (Op. cit. 13). Greek philosophy brings itself to a close with this search for something which we can neither enunciate nor conceive nor surmise (Op. cit. 2), and precipitates itself into nothing, although, with the irony peculiar to mystical philosophy, with its unbounded confidence in the power of thought to prove its own impotence, it is compelled, in order to defend itself from the charge of logicking-chopping and raving about things of which it is ignorant (Op. cit. 6), to enunciate the laboriously thought out distinction between the nothing which is sheer non-being and the nothing which is not even the first One (Op. cit. 7).
PART II.

BIBLICAL, PATRISTIC AND SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT.

CHAPTER I.

The Old Testament

123. To understand the Christian concept of Providence which overcame the Hellenic by satisfying the exigencies which the Hellenic could not satisfy, it is necessary to turn back to the Jewish ideas from which the Christian concept developed. In the earliest stage of Jewish thought, God is the God of a people, he is the God of Israel, and he is so intimately connected with his people that in the Song of Deborah it is treated as the same thing, to help the Israelites as to help Yahweh (Judges V, 23). It is upon Yahweh, the Lord of Hosts, that victory depends. The Book of Judges describes how the Israelites were defeated whenever they turned from his worship to that of the Baalim and Ashtaroth, the local nature-deities of the surrounding tribes, and how they managed to triumph only when they had turned again to Yahweh (Judges III). Similarly, in the Books of Kings and Chronicles national triumph and failure are shown to depend /
depend not on the capacities of their enemies, but on their own pleasing and displeasing Yahweh.

124. The prophets proclaimed Yahweh as a cosmic power and the God of morality, affirming that his connection with his people was conditional on their obedience to his religious and moral precepts. (Amos IV, 12-13; V, 6-15; IX, 9-10; Isaiah I, 16-20). Yahweh’s rule is ultimately directed, not to external and superficial ends, but to his own glory (Isaiah LXIII, 14) and when his chosen people disobey he employs foreign nations like the Assyrians as the rod of his anger to punish them. The success of the Assyrians is not due to their own strength or wisdom, and when they have fulfilled their function they will be discarded and broken (Isaiah XIV, 25). No calamity occurs which is not sent by God; it is he who brings about both good and evil (Amos III, 6; Isaiah XLV, 7).

125. The notion of the pursuit of private or indeed evil ends serving the divine purpose is illustrated in the story of Joseph. Joseph’s brothers resent his attitude of superiority and the favour shown to him by Jacob, and they sell him into captivity to get rid of him. In Egypt, where he arrives as a slave, he eventually becomes Pharaoh’s chief minister, and by storing grain in plentiful years he is able to mitigate the effects of famine later on. Even Joseph’s brothers /
brothers benefit from this, and when he is reconciled to them he recognizes that their selling him into slavery promoted the purpose of God. "Ye meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive" (Gen. L, 20).

126. After the Babylonian captivity the prophetic programme of sanctification was finally accepted, and the Law, which had come into prominence before the fall of Jerusalem, was elaborated and codified. The goal of the rigorous fulfilment of the Law is the glorious day in which Israel will rest in the peace of the Lord, when the glory of God will be the light of the world and descend upon Israel, no longer rebellious but a holy people, and when the universe will centre in the sanctuary of Zion (Isaiah XL-LV). In Nature the divine Providence extends even to the birds in the cedars of Lebanon and to the rabbits who take refuge among the rocks (Ps. CIV). The Babylonian myth of the creation is therefore absorbed into Jewish belief. As for human life, God loves the righteous, upholds orphans and widows, and overthrows the wicked (Ps. CXLVII). This notion of the attendance of prosperity on goodness and calamity on badness entered into the heart of Jewish belief, and was always being brought before them by the Law, which was intended, by its imposition /
imposition of penalties for every infraction, to be a pattern of the divine order. The tenet survived even in the time of Plutarch, who scornfully remarked on the Jewish habit of rolling in the dust when any misfortune befell them and attributing it to the divine vengeance on their sins (De Superstitione ?). Yet while the divine justice could still be discerned in the national disaster, as regards the life of individuals this presupposition of Judaism was subjected to stress which it could not ease, and which was indeed more troublesome than the same difficulty in Hellenic thought, for by the time Hellenic thought had come to the conclusion that the divine was wholly good and incapable of producing evil, it was able to consider what virtue and happiness were, and so maintain that the virtuous man could be happy even on the rack.

But, for the Jews, prosperity is taken as health and wealth, i.e. what are really proximate conditions of happiness.

127. This perplexity is the theme of the "Book of Job". Eyob considers himself a just man, but yet he loses his property and sons, and contracts a disfiguring and painful disease. His judgement that he is just, and yet suffers calamities, does not refute the principle that calamity is a punishment for sin, because a principle of interpretation, i.e. a presupposition /
presupposition of all judgement, cannot be refuted by a particular judgement. So long, for instance, as we presuppose that every event has a cause, when our car breaks down and we are unable to see why it has broken down, we cannot leap to the conclusion that there is no cause for its breaking down. So long, again, as our friends make this presupposition, they would tell us, if we said that there was no cause, that it was simply that we could not find the cause, and that the mechanic at the garage would find it.

128. Similarly, Eyob's friends, who presuppose that all calamity is for sin, tell him that he must have sinned in some way, even though he cannot remember anything that he has done wrong. By holding fast to his judgement of his innocence, Eyob does not refute the old presupposition; what he does is to abandon it, he ceases to presuppose it. Yet he does not fully grasp the logic of his own position, for he does not make clear to himself his new presupposition that God is not such as to apportion prosperity for justice and calamity for sin. He still, in a way, clings to the old notion of God, and since he has already implicitly abandoned this notion, he is unable to find God.

Where is God when he, a just man, loses his property and his health, while the wicked flourish and even go to the grave in peace? (Job XXXI, 7-13). Wherever Eyob /
Eyob turns, forwards, backwards, to the left and to the right he fails to find God (Job XXIII, 8-9). His perplexity ceases only when God appears to him out of a tempest, proclaiming the infinity of his power which produces everything in Nature, and demanding how critics can dispute with the Almighty (XV, 1-14). Eyob realizes his own insignificance, and regains his trust in God from his vision of him and in the recognition that God can do everything (XLII, 1-6).

129. Eyob is then given again sons and property. Some editors have suggested that this is a pious interpolation, but the suggestion is unfounded, because this restoration of sons and property, far from being superfluous, is required to balance the prologue, where Satan, a carping spirit whose position is enigmatic, hints to God that Eyob is serving him only for the rewards which he gets for his service, and is permitted to try what Eyob will do in adversity (Job I, 6-12).

There is a parallel in Plato. In the "Republic" Plato sets out to consider whether we ought to be righteous even if we do not profit by it but are, e.g., impaled. After showing that righteousness is the harmonious condition of the soul in which the passions obey the command of reason and which therefore of itself leads necessarily to happiness, he finally restores to the righteous man gifts at the hands of gods and men. In
both cases the epilogue stands or falls by the main demonstration and is not meant as an alternative to it.

130. Eyob himself was satisfied because he had seen God, and was convinced that God could be trusted. He had not, however, solved the problem why God allows the righteous to suffer calamity, and his successors continued to wrestle with it. Some, like the Stoics, turned from the inequities of outward events to the inward, only the inward was not for them consciousness of virtue, as it was for the Stoics, but association with God (Ps. LXXIII). Others looked to the next world to redress the unfairness of the present (Ps. XLIX). The meditative Ecclesiastes, in some ways like Epikuros, considers that God is to be worshipped, but has no connection with this world where tyrants exult and the oppressed have no champion (Eccl. V, 1-6; IV, 1-3).

131. Since the agency of God is no longer recognized in human history, attempts are made to apprehend him intuitively. Hence arise the apocalyptic fantasies, depicting the imminent overthrow of the alien nation and the entrance of the Kingdom of God. These eschatological prophecies, though echoing the utterances of the early prophets, have a vastly different tonality. The prophets expected the reign of righteousness to be attained in the course of history, considering the victorious Assyrian army as the rod /
rod of God's anger and Kuruş in his conquests as fulfilling a divine mission. The apocalyptic seer, on the other hand, dreams of the triumph of righteousness and Judah as taking place only at the end of history and through an intervention by God, who is to set the Son of Man on the throne of his glory to judge all souls (Enoch LXII).

132. Characteristic of these writings is Nabû-kudurri-usur's dream, interpreted by Daniel, of the succession of the four monarchies, the gold, the silver, the brass and the iron joined with clay, which are all to be broken in pieces by the eternal kingdom which the God of heaven will set up (Daniel, II, 31-44). Now the idea of history as a movement towards a goal and not simply an interminable succession of events or cycles of events, is of immense importance for the philosophy of history, but in the apocalyptic writers it is a fantasy and not a concept. History is not determined from its very concept to be movement towards an end, but rather it is held to be a matter of fact that there will be an end to it, just as Polybios maintained that history had, in fact, tended to the dominion of Rome, while the divine providence is not conceived to occur but only imagined to occur, and the final end of history is not the end towards which history moves but an intervention from without.

133. Both /
133. Both Hellenic and Jewish thought arrived at the same problem, how to overcome the absolute transcendence of God; God transcends the world and human intelligence, and is thus an Unknown God. Cultured Jews, therefore, found it quite natural to employ Greek categories in their thinking. The learned Philo of Alexandria, who treats the Pentateuch as the source of all truth but regards it as allegorical in character, interprets the story of the creation in a manner which smacks more of Plato than of Moses. After attacking the Aristotelian notion of the eternity of the world as invalidating the concept of Providence, since nobody cares for what he did not make himself, he goes on to state that the world was, before the creation, only indeterminate, lifeless and disorderly matter, which obtained order and harmony only from the activity of God. Our sensible world has been modelled by God after the thought of it, the intelligible world, which he produced in his mind, just as an architect constructs a city after the idea of it he has in his mind. Now in man, who possesses a spark of the divine logos, logos is both the inner meaning and the outer expression. In the same way the divine logos is both the eternal intelligible world and the external visible image impressed upon formless matter so far as the receptivity /
receptivity of matter permits (De Opificio Mundi, 1-28 & Vit. Mosis II, 127-130).

134. Though Philo rejects the notion of the eternity of the cosmos, the formed world, he inconsistently holds that there was no time before the origin of the cosmos (De Opificio Mundi, 26), and so in effect attributes eternity to formless matter, which is the sheerest abstraction, nothing actual, but the mere concept of the indeterminate. In the "Timaios" the pre-existence of unformed matter is myth, but Philo prides himself on having got beyond myth.

135. Philo explains that the production of anything requires the co-operation of (a) that by which it is made, or the cause, (b) that out of which it is made, or the matter, (c) that through which it is made, or the instrument, and (d) that for the sake of which it is made, or the purpose. Thus in the construction of a house there must be (a) the architect, (b) the stones and timber, (c) the tools, and (d) the purpose of providing shelter. In the case of the cosmos, the greatest of all constructions, God is the cause, the four elements are the matter, the instrument is the logos, and the reason for its existence is the goodness of God, who wishes to impart as much of his own goodness as matter can receive (De Cherubim, 125-127). Logos is thus for Philo, as for the Stoics, the bond of
of the cosmos, holding together all the parts (De Vita Mosis II, 133). It pervades not only nature but also the course of history. The kaleidoscopic vicissitudes of empires are governed not by Chance but by the everflowing Logos, which aims at making the whole inhabitable world into a single city with the best constitution, viz., democracy. In Philo, therefore, since the very mainspring of the universe is thought, history is essentially a purposive movement, and the end of history is no longer external to it, as in the apocalyptic dreams (Quod Deus immut. 36).

136. The Logos, which is a product and instrument of the divine activity, mediates between the made world and its Maker. It is characterized in terms which have affinities with the personification of the faculties of God in the Jewish Wisdom Literature. The Logos is called the suppliant for afflicted mortality before the Immortal, and the ambassador of the Ruler to the subjects. It is neither uncreated like God nor created like the mortal (Quis rer. div. her. 205-206), but the first-born son (Somn. 215).

137. God in himself has no qualities (Leg. All. III, 36) and is infinite or uncircumscribed (\textit{\textasciitilde}{\textit{\textgamma} \texti{\textphi} \textomicron} \textomicron \textomicron) (SS. Abelis et Caini, 59). It is his nature to be, not to be enunciated (Leg. All. I, 51). He is the eternal and uncreated cause of everything (Dec. Orac.64), who /
who never ceases his creative activity (Leg. All, I, 3), and continues to hold the world together (SS. Ab. et Caini 40). It is accordingly possible to know God only as he is in relation to the world, but not to pass beyond the Logos to comprehend the essence of God as he is in himself (Somn. 65-67). The transcendence of God, implicit in "Job", is here made explicit.
CHAPTER II

The Synoptics and St. Paul

138. In the N.T. the transcendence of the O.T. is overcome, and the O.T. concept of Providence is negated and at the same time conserved by being raised to its truth. The central theme of Jesus' teaching is the Kingdom, and his new concept of that involves a new concept of God's sovereignty. The vague eschatological figure of the Anointed, the mystical Son of Man, is realized in the historical person Jesus, and the Kingdom of God descends from the clouds of apocalyptic dreams and turns into the concrete kingdom of those who become sons of God. It is, as Jesus explains to Pilate (John, XVIII, 36) not a kingdom of this world, i.e. it is not a national state, but it comprises all who do the Father's will. As God is the Father, his relation to men is not that of a potentate dispensing external goods and ills in accordance with desert. While Jesus reaffirms the prophetic view that God's care is absolute, extending even to the birds (Mt. VI, 25), he teaches that the benefits of sun and rain are bestowed on good and bad indiscriminately (Mt. V, 45), and that it was not simply the bad who were killed by the fall of the Tower of Siloam (Lk. XIII, 4). The Son
of Man himself has nowhere to lay his head and must in the end be crucified (Mt. XVI, 21). Yet Jesus affirms even more emphatically than the prophets and the psalmists the doctrine that well-being attends well doing, since he teaches that to the good are given the gifts of seeing God and becoming his sons (Mt. V, 9). The beatitudes are not rewards external to our actions - the labourers of the parable all received the same wage however many hours they had worked (Mt. XX, 1-16) - they are what we make ourselves by obedience to God. A man finds his life only by losing his life for Christ's sake (Mt. X, 39; Mk. VIII, 35; Lk. IX, 24).

139. Providence accordingly becomes not only, as in the mystical philosophies, a soteriological concept, the saving of the faithful from the rule of Destiny, but a concept of atonement, of ransom from sin, and interest begins to centre on that part of Providence which relates to the destination of the soul, i.e. on Predestination. Paul enunciates the doctrine that the law of the spirit of life in Jesus Christ liberates men from the law of sin and death. He looks forward to the overthrow of the existing world order and its replacement by the heavenly order. The whole of creation waits for the final day, the day of the freedom of the sons of God. The members of the /
the Church, the mystical Body of Christ, belong to it not owing to their merits but by Grace, the free gift of God who predeterminated before the establishment of the world who were to be the elect. The elect cannot be separated from the divine love by any earthly or celestial powers. At the Last Judgement, when Christ pleads for them, they will be justified by God; and justification is the prelude to glorification, i.e. participation in the new age (Rom. VIII, 2 sqq.). In the fulness of time everything in heaven and earth will be summed up in Christ (Eph. I, 10). As Christ is God become man, Paul in effect satisfies the opposing claims of Protagoras and Plato that man and that God is the measure of all things.

140. Paul is conscious of the transformation of the old Judaic national hope into a concept of universal salvation. He is torn between recognition of the fact that Israel is largely in rebellion against the faith of Christ (and this must be justified in the eternal decree) and his longing for Israel to be admitted as a whole to salvation. Why are the Gentiles supplanting the Jews in their adherence to the faith? To account for the rejection of Israel (which he still hopes is not final) and to show that God has, in any case, not broken his promises, he declares that the true Israel, to whom the promises were made, is not the sons /
sons of Abraham in the flesh, but Abraham's sons in the spirit. The absolute right of God to choose when he pleases is illustrated by the typical example of Jacob and Esau, elected and rejected by God before they were born and had acted either well or badly. It is not a matter of human effort but of divine grace and mercy. The other side of the predestination of the elect is the predestination of the lost. At once the ethical question arises: "If God has mercy on whom he pleases and hardens whom he pleases, why does he blame anyone?"

Paul tries to answer this by resorting to the O.T. and citing Jeremiah's analogy (Jer. XVIII, 6) developed in the Wisdom of Solomon (XV, 7-8) of the potter who makes two pots out of the same lump of clay, one for a noble and the other for an ignoble purpose. Has not the potter complete power over his pot? So even supposing that God has made vessels of wrath - for Paul this is not a certainty but a supposition, which he prays will not be verified - his conduct is not open to criticism (Romans IX, 1-22).

141. Paul has illustrated vividly enough his belief in the gratuitousness of God's grace. It would be perverse to try to find in these illustrations, which, after all, occur not in a philosophic essay but in a hastily dictated letter, a systematic account of the relation of the human to the divine will.
will. If these had been the only words of Paul preserved to us, it would no doubt have been an irresistible temptation to construct from them a theory of absolute transcendence, which would make man a mere spectator of reality. Actually, Paul emphasizes man's responsibility and the part that he ought to play in furthering the divine purpose, enunciating a theory of divine immanence, as when he urges the Philippians to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling, since it is God who is working in them (Phil. II, 12-13).

In the holy war against the powers of evil, Paul accepts pain and calamity not as divine castigation, like the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (XII, 3-11), but rather in the spirit of his contemporary Seneca, as privileges of which he can be proud (II Cor. XII, 10), and the pain of which is insignificant in comparison with the glory to be revealed after the dissolution of this world (Rom. VIII, 18). Like the epic heroes of old Paul is bidden to cease kicking against the goad (Acts XXVI, 14) but the destiny which he is to accept is one which involves instead of cancelling his individuality, since it is not outward compulsion but inward responsibility, his vocation to evangelize the Gentiles. In his attitude to his destiny Paul differs also from Seneca. In the first place he is not resigned to a blind or formal destiny, resigned,
resigned, that is, to whatever happens, whatever it is that happens. Paul relies on his knowledge of the content of the divine purpose, which is that in the fulness of time everything in heaven and earth shall be summed up in Christ (Ephes. I, 10). It is true that the Stoics had believed the purpose of the world to be the society of gods and men, but this was a vague abstraction, which they used as a canon for the interpretation only of Nature and not of History, (Vergil alone has an inkling of History or the realization of divine purpose and of destiny as vocation) whereas for Paul this society was an actual concrete society, the Church, the Body of Christ.

143. In the second place, Paul does not merely accept life like Seneca, who relates how he schooled himself in adversity not only to obey God but to agree with him, and to follow from his heart, and not because he must (Ep. XCVI, 3). Paul's attitude is one not of mere resignation like the epic hero nor of willing acceptance like Seneca but of faith. In Paul there appears the significance of the Christian prayer that God's will may be done, i.e. that God's will is not a will which has already been willed, either an eternal standard determined to the last detail, which was the Jewish Law, or an eternal decree now followed by God himself, which was the Stoics' Destiny, but a will
that is being willed. Hence Paul, feeling himself transformed, the old natural self dead and Christ living in him, not only accepts but also transforms life. His message is therefore not the Senecan one of consolation - "it is a great consolation to know that you are being carried along with the universe" (De Prov. 5) - but one of joy - "Rejoice in the Lord always!" (Phil. IV, 4).

144. With this faith in the divine purpose as the advancement of the Church Paul can apply his maxim that everything combines to produce good for those who love God (Rom. VIII, 28) to his own imprisonment at Rome, and seize the opportunity to continue his work among the Praetorian Guard (Phil. I, 12-14), whereas Seneca on his fall from power had to wait inertly till Nero should order him to commit suicide or indeed till some one should assassinate Nero. Stoic Optimism is quietistic, because it aims at a tranquillity reached through indifference to what befalls one. Seneca's ideal is the philosopher Stilpon, who when his city, Megara, was sacked, his patrimony plundered and his daughters outraged, told Demetrios Poliorketes, the commander of the victorious enemy, that he had lost nothing (De constantia sapientis, 5). The Greco-Roman notion of history is that of a series of incidents happening to people, and the dispute between the upholders /
upholders of the theory of chance and the upholders of
the theory of destiny is only whether the incidents
are isolated or linked. This notion can, as José
Ortega y Gasset has remarked (El tema de nuestro
tiempo, p. 32), be symbolized by the falling of a
tile from the roof on to the head of a passer-by.
For Paul, however, his life is not what happens to
him, a being "carried along", but the fulfilment of
his vocation, a work which is being carried out by God
in him.

145. Paul does not dwell always on this immanen-
tistic moment of his thought, as he looks forward to
the new age which is to replace the present one,
believing that in the present world men can have only
the foretaste of the future glory (Rom. VIII, 23 sqq.).
From this point of view Providence is the divine decree
before the creation of this world which is realized
after the overthrow of this world. In the Fourth
Gospel this eschatological standpoint is tacitly
abandoned, and the eternal is shown not to follow but
to enter into the temporal.
CHAPTER III

The Fourth Gospel.

146. According to the Fourth Gospel the Logos is essentially in relation to, and identical with God. Everything that has come into being came into being by him, and nothing came into being without him. He became flesh, entering into the world which he had made, and is the light of men, separating the darkness from the light. Redemption is therefore an increase of the creative action of the Logos. The darkness failed to grasp him, i.e. either to understand him or gain the mastery over him (John I, 1-10). The malignant Jews fail to understand him and equally fail to kill him till the providential moment (X, 9).

147. The Johannine Logos differs from the Philonian in that it is no mere product and instrument of God which although not produced like other things is still inferior to God, but the self-expression or self-externalization of God himself. The Son is in the Father as the Father is in the Son (X, 19 and XIV, 11). This Logos becomes visible, the eternal becomes temporal. Providence is not an infinite divine plan feebly reflected in finite matter so far as matter can receive it, but God manifesting himself in the flesh,
flesh, which he himself has made. The absolute barrier between the eternal and the temporal, which led to the docetist heresy that the historic and crucified Christ was a mere wraith or image, is in John emphatically rejected. The Logos dwelt among men and was seen by them, and to see the Son is to see the Father. The final self-expression of the Logos is the sending of the Defender, the spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father and is the teacher of those who understand and become sons of God (John I, 12; XIV, 16-26).

148. The eternal is conceived as historical, no longer as immutable and immobile, for the Logos became flesh. Eschatology is implicitly superseded, for there is no need or place for a divine prologue or epilogue to history when the Logos himself enters into history. The story which the fourth gospel tells is no mere account of celestial history, like the Gnostic theories of fallen aeons whose sin produced the material world, nor on the other hand is it the mere record of events in the time of Tiberius. The eternal is not brought under the category of being, as in Greek thought, but under those of becoming and activity. The eternal and the temporal coalesce, so that it is the story of the events in the time of Tiberius that is the heavenly history. There is no election at the beginning /
beginning of time or passing sentence at the end. It is the entry of the Logos into the world that is the judgement or discernment (κρίσις) of the sons of God who come to the light from those who act evilly and so love the darkness and hate the light (John III, 8 sq.).

149. Whereas the synoptics regard Providence as a plan conceived in the mind of God and made known to the prophets, whose prophecies are fulfilled by events - indeed sometimes the only justification for the event seems to be the fulfilment of a prophecy (e.g. Mt. II, 23, XXI, 4) - in John, though he too often remarks on the fulfilment of prophecy, the notion of Providence is treated more subtly. The Logos is life and truth, that by which everything has come into being, so that everything actual is always the creation of the Logos. The forces of darkness are impotent to realize their evil intentions. When the High Priest declares the expediency of one man dying for the whole people, he only means what is false and base, what he actually says is true and noble. Satan and the dark rulers of the world intend to destroy Christ, but they actually carry out the divine purpose of gathering into unity all the sons of God. (John XI, 49-52). Christ gives his followers the consolation of knowing that though their conflict with the world will bring them tribulation, it is a conflict that he has already won (John XVI, 33).
CHAPTER IV

The Apologists.

The Apologists, with their intention of expounding Christianity intelligibly to the Greco-Roman world, began the work of explaining Christianity in the categories of Greek thought, which led ultimately, in default of a sufficiently energetic formation of new categories - for even Tertullian, by his very contraposition of the philosopher to the Christian, of the disciple of Greece to the disciple of Heaven, treated Greek philosophy as the only philosophy (Apol. 46) - to a return to the Greek philosophy of being, i.e. metaphysically to the transcendence of God and epistemologically to the conversion of the intuitions of the N.T. into dogmas, ready-made truths immutable as the Platonic Forms, which thought can only receive as they are handed down, and which to modify is heresy. Yet though this was the theory of dogma, actually dogmas were always formulated to solve problems, since indeed all thinking is the solving of a problem. The theory, however, had the unhappy consequence that unsolved problems, exigencies aroused by heresies, tended to be sanctified as doctrines incomprehensible to human intelligence, with the consequent petrification of thought.
151. The divinity of the subject-matter does not, however, entail the consequence that human thought must be unable to solve problems of theology, because the thought that puts the problem can solve it, and it is human thought that has put its problem, (granted with divine assistance, but why should the assistance stop short there?). If the solution of the problem is far above the human intellect, so that only God can comprehend it, why suppose that it has even been put as God puts it? In fact no dogma was held to be so incomprehensible that heresies were not to be distinguished from it.

152. The Apologists maintain without hesitation that all events are subject to the divine rule. Justin appeals to the fulfilment of prophecy in the same way as the Stoics (Apol. I, 32). Like the Stoics again Minucius Felix, in his "Octavius", appeals to the regularity of the celestial motions and of the seasons, and to varied ways in which animals are provided with protection; he quotes the philosophers from Thales to Chrysippus as more or less concurring in the Christian view that God is the eternal Father of all things, who gave everything its origin, regulates all things by his wisdom and completes them by his goodness. Minucius emphasises that God is the sole ruler of the universe, a divided rule being inconceivable since even in earthly /
earthly kingdoms no divided sovereignty is ever enduring, while swarms of bees, herds of cattle and so on have only one leader, but he posits the existence of evil demons to whom he ascribes the occasional truthfulness of pagan oracles and whom, like Justin (Apol. 1, 5) he considers the authors of the malicious tales about Christian orgies and atrocities.

153. Yet despite the existence of these malevolent demons God is present everywhere in the world just as the sun from its place in the heavens illuminates all lands. While, as Plato had recognized, we cannot expect to grasp the infinity of God, we all, since we all possess reason, can properly investigate divine matters. And we can recognize, Minucius points out, here following Seneca, that the tribulations of the good are not incompatible with Providence, for tribulations are a sort of training, and it was through suffering that the famous Romans of antiquity rose to greatness.

154. Another Apologist renders the concept of Providence more specifically Christian by conjoining with it that of the Incarnation. He affirms that the omnipotent creator of the universe has fastened the truth and the holy logos in men's hearts by sending to them no mere subordinate but the very craftsman and artificer of the whole, by whom he created the heavens, and /
and by whom all things are ordered, restrained and kept in subjection. It is the Saviour who is the power in Christians which enables them to face the beasts in the arena (Ep. ad Diognetum 6-7).

155. Providence is accordingly (1) the power which created and sustains nature, and (2) the power which is present in human actions. (1) The concept of creation, which originated with the magical idea in Genesis that God brought things into existence simply by speaking, was soon developed by the adoption of the Gnostic distinction between making in the ordinary sense, which implies a pre-existent material on which a form is imposed, and creation, which is making out of nothing or the production at once of form with its matter, as e.g. in speaking we do not emit sound and then form it into words but produce sound and words at once (Hippolytos VII, 22; Shepherd of Hermas, Vis. I, 1; Augustine, De Gen. ad litt. I, 15). (2) Was there, then, no Providence, in the sense of divine power in human endeavour, before the Incarnation? The reply is that Christ is the Logos in which every race of men shared, so that all who lived with the Logos are Christians, even if accounted godless, like Sokrates and Herakleitos among the Hellenes and men such as Abraham among the barbarians (Justin, Apol. I, 46).

156. The Christians rendered more precise and concrete /
concrete the Stoic notion of the world's existing for the sake of the community of gods and men, because for them this community was not simply the abstract connection of belonging to the same genus (cf. Cicero de Leg. I, 10), but the concrete one of co-operating within the Church. The Church, they proclaimed, had been created before the world, and it was for the sake of the Church that the world was created (II Clement XIV; Shepherd of Hermas, Vis. II, 4, 1); the magnitude of their claims aroused the scorn of their opponent Kelsos, who compared them to frogs and ants (Origen c. Cels. IV, 23).

157. Despite, however, the firm attitude of the Apologists, there were certain questionings within the Church itself. For the early Christians what is is not what ought to be. God's omnipotence is understood as involving not that everything which happens is in accordance with his will, but that he has the power to break down all opposition to it and is going, after the succession of earthly monarchies, to appear in glory and bring about the restoration of all things. The constant prayer was that Grace should come and the world pass away (Didache,X, 6).

158. Markion accepted from Paul the opposition of the present world and the glorious world of God which is to come, and learning from Hiero the difference /
difference between the O.T. and N.T. concepts of God, which Kerdo rather inadequately schematized as that between the God of Justice and the God of Goodness, concluded that this world was the fabrication not of the benevolent Father but of the O.T. God, who was a maker of evils and a lover of wars, inconsistent and vacillating of purpose, and whose works Jesus came from the Father to destroy (Iren. Adv. haer. I, 27). In his insistence on the difference between the two conceptions Markion was both right and wrong, right in affirming the difference, wrong in denying the identity, for the N.T. conception is a development of the O.T. one, and development involves both difference and identity. Markion was declared a heretic, but even the orthodox really agreed with him about the difference, only they evaded the difficulty by adopting the Alexandrian method of allegorical interpretation, which, since there was no criterion of interpretation, permitted them to impose their own lofty doctrines on the Jewish writings, a proceeding which did not escape the penetrating eye of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Porphyry (Eusebios, Hist. Eccles. VI, 19).

159. Yet even if the O.T. God is allegorized into the N.T. one, the evils in the present world have still to be reconciled with the concept of God as a benevolent Father, and the learned theologians of Alexandria /
Alexandria set themselves to this task. The final outcome of their reflections was the elaboration of the dogma of the Fall of Man (through his free will), which provided a link between the optimism implied in the dogma of the Creation and the pessimism implied in that of Redemption.
CHAPTER V.

Clement and Origen.

160. The scholarly Clement of Alexandria sets out to reconcile the existence of evil with the character of God. He attacks the Epikurean notion of blessedness, i.e. giving neither oneself nor anyone else any trouble, remarking that this misses out the divine love for man, on account of which God condescends to emotion towards us, and so is angry with us for our sins, if it can be called anger in his case. Justice and goodness are not incompatible, because praise and blame are medicines. The Logos punishes men for their sins, but his punishments are not really evil, but evidence of his benevolence, since, as Plato had taught, to punish is to make better. The work of Providence is educative (Paed. I, 7-10).

161. As for the evil that men do, this is due to their own free choice. When God bade Moses adjure Pharaoh to send forth his people and at the same time told Moses that he knew that Pharaoh would not do so, he manifested his divinity not only in his foreknowledge but in his love in allowing Pharaoh a chance of repenting (Op. cit. I, 9). God permits men to act badly, but is not on that account the author of
of their misdeeds. To refrain from preventing is different from causing; otherwise it would be not Hektor but Achilles sitting in his tent who burnt the Achaians' ships, or the shield which let the javelin through which caused the wound! It is, however, the work of the divine wisdom to turn to good any evil that has been committed (Strom. I, 17).

162. If we are permitted to do evil, what is the justification of the injuries that we inflict on others? One early author had believed that evils were sent to us in this world to stop us from carrying out God's will from merely interested motives (II Clement XX). This theory breaks down because if it were true and we recognized it to be such, we might still follow God purely from motives of expediency, so that the divine plan would be thwarted by its very revelation. The Gnostic Basilides refurbished the Judaic theory of poetic justice with the thesis that when men had done nothing in this life to merit the misfortunes that befell them, they must have sinned in a former life. Clement rejects this notion of Basilides on the ground that the martyrs suffered for their goodness and not for their wickedness, since if they had recanted they would have escaped their torments. Even if we merit our misfortunes, Christ and the Apostles suffered not for their sins but for ours. God /
God does not indeed wish Christians to be persecuted, but still he foretold that they would be. The injustice of the judge is no limitation of God's Providence, because the judge is not a marionette. All that can happen to us is to be released by death to join the Lord. If Sokrates could say that Anytos and Meletos could not harm him, the Christian can quote with confidence the words of the Psalmist: "The Lord is my helper; I will not fear: what shall man do to me?" (Strom. IV, 11-12).

163. Clement's pupil Origen welded together Clement's fragmentary intuitions into a system, basing it on the dogma of the Fall. God created all the spirits good, but in the exercise of the freedom which belongs to them as rational creatures they deteriorated, becoming idle, negligent and disobedient. As they thus became deficient in mind they needed gross matter, and God created the material world to discipline, correct and eventually save them. In support of this theory of the Creation, which recalls Plato's myths about the descent of souls into bodily existence, Origen appeals to the N.T. references (Matt. XXIV, 21; Ephes. I, 4) to the foundation of the world, where the word "foundation" (κατά τὰ βοῶν) strictly means descent (De Principiis I, 5; III, 6).

164. God in his wisdom arranges that the variety and /
and different tendencies of all beings all conduce to the common good, which is the salvation of all creation. While spirits, being rational creatures, are not compelled to act against their own free choice, for then they would not be what they are, God orders it so that their activities all combine to produce the harmony of a single cosmos, some needing help, others able to give it, others again providing struggles for those who are making progress, the world being like an enormous animal held together by God's reason and power (Op. cit. II, 1, 1-3). Admittedly Providence is not so easy to discern in terrestrial matters as in the celestial bodies, and it is not so obvious in human affairs as in the souls and bodies of animals, but our ignorance of the details of God's operations is no ground for disbelief in his Providence (Op. cit. IV, 1, 7).

165. Origen argues energetically for human free-will, as that which distinguishes man from the animals, and cites passages from the O.T. to show that it presupposes the possibility of our choosing to do either good or evil. He discusses the references to the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, which seem to represent God as deliberately making Pharaoh wicked, and explains that God's action is always benevolent, but that the effect produced depended on Pharaoh's character. The same /
same action produces the opposite effects of softening and hardening according to the nature of the recipient, just as the heat of the sun melts wax and hardens the ground. But Providence is not finished with Pharaoh, even after his drowning (Op. cit. III, 1).

166. Origen points out that while Paul seems to deny human freedom and ascribe everything to God in the passage in Romans (IX, 21), where he attributes to God the power of moulding men like pots for a noble or an ignoble purpose, in II Timothy II, 21, where Paul says that if a man purges himself of evils he will be used for a noble purpose, he seems equally to ascribe everything to us and leave nothing to God. The conclusion of the two passages taken together is that it is not in our power to make any progress without God's help, nor does God compel us to do so unless we contribute something towards the good result ourselves (Op. cit. III, 1, 24).

167. Origen's anti-Christian opponent Kelsos argued that Jesus at the Last Supper foretold that one of his disciples would betray him; now as Jesus was divine, what was foretold had to happen in any case (πρότωκον), so that Jesus conspired against his disciples, making them sinful and traitorous. Origen's answer is that it is not the prophet who foretells the future event who causes it, but it is the future event which /
which is the cause of the prophet's foreknowledge. Nor does foreknowledge exclude the possibility of the event's both happening and not happening. It is easy to see from the story of Laios, assuming it to be true for the sake of the argument, that foreknowledge does not imply the fatalism of the sophistical τά ἡγεμόνη λογος. Suppose you apply to the case of Laios, who was warned by the oracle that if he had a child he would be killed by him, the fatalistic argument that it is useless to go to a doctor, since if you are fated to recover you will recover and if you are fated not to recover you will not recover. Then it appears in the absurd form that if Laios is fated to have children he will have them whether or not he has intercourse! To take the case of Judas, if Kelsos, when he says that the betrayal must happen in any case, means necessarily by "in any case", then he is wrong, since the event might possibly not happen. If by "in any case" he merely means that it will happen, though it might not happen, then it does not exclude human freedom. It does not follow from Jesus' having foretold the betrayal that he caused the sin, for he made the prophecy seeing Judas' character and to what his greed was going to lead him (Contra Celsum II, 20).

168. The devil and the evil powers of the world are at war with the human race, but they are not the sole /
sole cause of evil, as even without them we are liable to excesses in eating and drinking; the devils merely grasp their opportunity. God permits us to be tempted by the devil, in order that we may win a real fight. He gives us the power to resist but he does not make us resist, for otherwise the struggle would be bogus. The injuries inflicted on us are not caused by God, but he permits them to happen at certain times, so that nothing happens without him (De Principiis III, 2).

169. God is long-suffering with sinners, because he wishes to cure them. He looks after souls not for their fifty years or so on earth but for eternity. He has made the rational soul immortal and like himself, so that it is not cut off from cure as if it were restricted to this life. Just as the doctor refrains from treating his patient immediately if he suspects that there is some hidden poison in the system, and gives it time to come to a head, so God, who foreknows the secrets of the heart and foreknows the future, waits till men's sins have come to the surface in order that they may eliminate them completely (Op. cit. III, 1, 13).

170. As God is said in Exodus III, 14 to be the real and in Mark X, 18 to be alone good, the good is the same as the real. Now evil or wickedness is the opposite of good, and the irreal the opposite of the real; /
real; hence evil or wickedness is irreal. This is what is meant by the saying in the Fourth Gospel that nothing came into being without the Logos. The devil and the murderer are not qua devil and murderer creations of God, though as substances coming into being they are (In Joann. II, 7). As evil is thus unsubstantial (ἀνυπόκτατον), the alienation of spirits from God cannot be permanent. In the end they will lose their corporeality and even the devil will return to God (De Principiis I, 6, 2; III, 6, 5).
CHAPTER VI.

Augustine.

171. After being attracted at first by Manichaeanism, which, as a theory of reality as a cosmic conflict between the opposing natures of God and the Devil, good and evil, light and darkness, seems at first sight to afford an interpretation of the drama of life, Augustine derived from the Neo-Platonists the main categories in terms of which he conceives Providence.

172. God and the Devil are not two independent substances, but everything, including the Devil, comes from God. Augustine, however, transforms the Neo-Platonic doctrine by making the relation one of creation and not emanation. He also attacks the Neo-Platonic worship of demons as intermediaries between God and man. Why ought we to worship beings who are admittedly subject to passion? Granted that their bodies are superior to ours, in that they are aerial, yet various animals surpass us on that score. Dogs have a more acute sense of smell, we cannot run as fast as stags, and we are not so strong as elephants! Augustine, from his monotheistic standpoint, succeeded in giving the idea of demon its Christian and modern connotation of a fallen spirit possessed by perpetual malignity.
malignity (De Civ. Dei VIII, 14 sqq.). While some angels are good and others are bad, all demons are bad without exception (Op. cit. IX, 19).

173. Evil has no positive character, but is a deficiency which is known only by the absence of the positive character of good, just like darkness which one sees only when one ceases to see. In the same way as Proklos, who was indeed a younger man, Augustine points out that there is no efficient cause of evil, so that to try to discover the causes of the evil will is as reasonable as trying to hear silence or see darkness (Op. cit. XII, 7). It is not the flesh which is evil, as the Manichaeans supposed, but living after the flesh (Op. cit. XIV, 2). It is the deficiency in our conduct and not that to which our action is directed that is bad; it is avarice and not gold which is evil (Op. cit. XII, 8). Nothing is bad when it is what it is by nature, as the animals are, and even the Devil cannot have been created with a sinful nature, just because if sin is natural it is not sin at all. Vice is contrary to nature; turning away from God would be no sin if it were not the nature of man and the angels to abide with God (Op. cit. XI, 15-17).

174. Augustine avails himself of the Platonic contrast between the eternal and the temporal. While in the next world there will be rewards for the righteous and torments for the bad, in this world temporal
temporal goods and ills are bestowed indiscriminately and not in strict accordance with virtue and vice. Both the honest statesman Metellus and the scoundrel Marius ended their days in the utmost prosperity, while both the hero Regulus and Catiline met a horrible doom (Op. cit. II, 23). Proklos maintained simply that this was the very essence of the temporal and finite, but Augustine, with his doctrine of creation, endeavoured to discern some further divine purpose in this. God, he holds, exposes men to adversity - and even Christians are not so good as to deserve to escape all punishment - in order to test their perfections or correct their imperfections. Temporal goods and evils are bestowed indiscriminately that we may not be too eager for the good that the wicked enjoy also, or shrink from the evils that we see even the good endure. If every sin were punished now, there would remain nothing for the Last Judgement, while if no sin were punished now there would seem to be no Providence. If good were never granted to those who asked for it, we should suppose that it was not in God's power to give, whereas if good were always so given we should become greedy for these rewards. But - here again Augustine agrees with the Neo-Platonists - the righteous and the wicked react very differently. The righteous are never elated by good /
good fortune, and in the midst of a misfortune in which the bad hate God and blaspheme, the good turn to prayer and praise, just as mud emits an unpleasant smell and ointment a fragrant odour when stirred with the same movement of a stick (Op. cit. I, 8, 9 & 29).

175. The Jewish theory of poetic justice is thus decisively rejected, but Augustine finds a historical justification for it. The education of the human race has advanced, like that of an individual, through certain stages, so as to rise gradually from the temporal to the eternal. The point of promising temporal rewards was to ensure that men should not worship any other than the true Creator. And it is true that everything is in the hand of God. Plotinos was right in recognizing the divine Providence in the beauty of leaves and flowers. Hence it was fitting that when men were still feebly yearning for earthly things they should learn to ask God alone for the temporal benefits, contempt for which we find is our way to God (Op. cit. X, 14). The cause of the creation of the world is indeed, as Plato had asserted, the goodness of God. To confirm this view we must remember that the beauty of the world is achieved by opposition, as in the case of rhetorical antitheses, and not reckon the value of things by their convenience or inconvenience to us. It is necessary to consider how excellent they are in themselves and how they are fitted /
fitted to perform their function in the universe. The very inequalities of things are for the sake of their all existing. The little things should be measured by the wisdom of the Designer: if you shave off a man's eyebrow you take away very little from his body but detract enormously from his beauty! Even things like poisons we find serviceable when used as medicines, so that we should believe that there is some purpose in things even when we do not see any (Op. cit. XI, 22). Complete freedom from pain in this world is possible, as the Academic philosopher Krantor had remarked, only at the price of blunted sensibility in body and mind (Op. cit. XIV, 9).

176. Appreciating as he does the beauties of nature, Augustine has little patience with Origen's concept of the world as a penitentiary for fallen souls. He comments on Origen's failure, surprising in one so erudite, to see the incompatibility of his theory with the statement in Genesis that God considered everything that he had made to be very good. Then on Origen's theory the devils, being the worst offenders, ought to have the heaviest bodies, whereas in fact they have the airiest. Human sin did not involve the badness of the whole, for the greater part of the universe remained good. Indeed the evil wills broke only the laws of nature and were unable to escape the /
the just laws of God. They are God's opponents only in their will to resist him and not in any power to hurt him, for their wickedness hurts only themselves, by corrupting their good nature (Op. cit. XI, 23; XII, 3).

177. With his contrast of the eternal and the temporal Augustine transforms the Apostolic distinction of the present transitory city and the city which is to come (Hebrews, XIII, 14; Shepherd of Hermas, Similitudes, I). Augustine's philosophy of history is founded on the contrast between the earthly city, springing from self-love and predestined to perdition, and the heavenly city, originating from love for God, which is predestined to reign eternally with God. On earth the citizens of the heavenly city are but pilgrims, and the two cities or societies will be separated at the Last Judgement (De Civ. Dei XIV, 28; XV, 1; XX, 27). Augustine regards Rome, which had just been sacked by the Goths, as having been the greatest power in the earthly society. He does not deny that the Romans scorned delights and were ready to sacrifice themselves, rather he insists that their readiness to sacrifice themselves is an example to Christians, but his point is that they devoted themselves not to the glory of God but to the glory of Rome. God's Providence gave them the earthly and therefore /
therefore transitory dominion which they deserved. They had their reward (Op. cit. V, 12-16). Even though the history of the earthly society is a dark record, it does not fall outside Providence, for God uses the sins of angels and men for the promotion of good (Op. cit. XIV, 27). The history of the heavenly city, i.e. of the Jews before the Incarnation and the Christians after that, is the manifestation in time of the eternal, and so the temporal event itself is a symbol of the eternal. Thus the building of Noah's ark was a historical event and not a poetic figure, but yet it symbolizes the Body of Christ, i.e. the Church (Op. cit. XV, 26 sq.).

178. In conceiving history as leading somewhere Augustine diverges sharply from Greek thought, because to the Greeks history was only a succession of events. Herodotus certainly attempted to make clear a rhythm of overweening confidence followed by disaster, but each cycle is nothing but a repetition of what went before, differing only in its scale, whereas Augustine looks on history as consisting of seven unique periods or stages, corresponding to the seven days of the Creation mentioned in Genesis. The first period is from Adam to the Flood, the second goes up to Abraham, the third to David, the fourth to the Exile, the fifth to the Incarnation, the sixth is our present /
present age, and the seventh will be the eternal Sabbath (Op. cit. XXII, 30). Yet for Augustine the movement does not import any absolute novelty, though the eternal life of the saints with which it concludes demolishes the theory of the circularity of history (Op. cit. XII, 19). He is indeed highly sensitive to the Epikurean gibe about God's having suddenly decided to create the world, and insists that God's creation was according to his eternal and unchangeable will, joined to his foreknowledge. He urges Neo-Platonically that God does not like us look forward to some things and backward to others and at the present, but comprehends the whole in an eternal present, so that he has no increased knowledge of an event after it has occurred in time than before it occurred. Paul (Romans VIII, 29) and Isaiah (XLV, 11 - LXX ἡ ἐπεξέχθη ἡ ἐπεξέχθη) were right in using the past tense of the future, since God has fixed everything from eternity and thus already realized the future. The divine knowledge of the world is prior to its existence, for while the world could not be known by us unless it existed, it could not have existed unless it had been known by God (Op. cit. XI, 21; XXII, 2; De Trin. 15; De Corr. et Gratia, 23). It is according to this category of the fixity of reality that Augustine conceives his theory of Predestination, which is the culmination /
culmination of his concept of Providence, as it relates to the goal of history. Predestination differs from Hellenic Destiny in that it concerns personality and not simply career. The destiny of Oidipus which the oracle foretold referred to his body (O.C. 355), whereas Predestination concerns the salvation of the soul.

179. How does man come to be saved? At first Augustine had supposed that man entered into the company of the elect by first believing and then for his belief receiving God's grace. But after his conversion from Neo-Platonism to Christianity, with his feeling of his own entire unworthiness to be singled out by God, he came round to the view that our belief is itself due to the divine grace, so that the belief which we receive for our belief is grace for grace. What chiefly convinced him was the Pauline text I Cor. IV, 7: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" (De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, 10). Grace is grace only when it is gratis, and the most illustrious example of its gratuitousness is Jesus himself, who without any antecedent merit was chosen to be the only-begotten son of God (Op. cit. 30).

180. This conviction that man by himself is not free and can achieve nothing of any value, expressed in Augustine's characteristic cry to God, "Give what thou /
thou commandest and command what thou wilt!" seemed intolerable to the monk Pelagius (De dono perseverantiae, 53) who championed human freewill from no profoundly speculative standpoint but to provide a foundation for his exhortations to virtue. Yet Pelagius was not at his ease when attacked by Augustine's followers and though his own supporter Caelestius said bluntly that the will was not free if it required God's help, Pelagius was compelled, protesting that this was not a matter of dogma, to anathematize the thesis that man can be without sin apart from God's help and grace (De gestis Pelag. 42, 44). The admission does not, however, amount to much, for Julian, the ablest of the Pelagians, represented this "help" (adiutorium) as the dogmas and mysteries of worship which man could not have found out for himself (Op. imp. III, 106). God's help is thus for the Pelagians only an instrument which man needs to use to save himself, whereas for Augustine it is the power which realizes salvation.

181. Pelagius' thought hardly reaches a speculative level, for the freedom which he attributes to man, surrounded and therefore limited by a host of other beings, could only be illusory. Augustine, on the other hand, goes far beyond the empirical concept of man as a particular being. Like Herakleitos, Paul and Plotinos, he insists on the immanence of God in man, bidding us return /
return into ourselves, for in the inner man dwells Truth (De vera religione, 39). When we understand anything, he points out, and think it to be true, we depend not on what is said outside us but on the inner Truth, i.e. Christ, within us (De magistro, 38; 41; 45).

182. Now this consciousness that except as the organ of the universal intelligent power man's thoughts and actions are worthless whims, when expressed in terms of the eternal present, is turned upside down, appearing as the theory that what we do has been eternally fixed by God. Our action is thus already essentially realized, and only the temporal manifestation is lacking. Our action becomes not God's doing but something done by God. The Augustinian God therefore turns again into the transcendent God who settles but does not share human destinies, a God represented by the picture of the potter with his pots.

183. What Augustine explicitly desiderated was a defence of Grace which would not take away human freewill (De gratia et. lib. arb. 1), but as he works out the concept of Grace as the irresistible force of Predestination, so that Grace is not the power immanent in the process by which man rises to God but that whereby he is immediately raised, Augustine is brought by the stress of polemic to place increasing emphasis on /
on the predestinational aspect of Grace. But if our action is foreknown and predestined what is there left to our will? The reply is that there must be something in the power of our will, because God knows what will be in our power and his knowledge must be of something (De Civ. Dei V, 10). In thus suggesting that the divine cognition does not affect the object known, Augustine reverts to a notion which he had set forth in an earlier work, where he was concerned to attack Manichaeanism. There he had urged that just as our memory does not compel to have been done what is past, so God's foreknowledge does not compel to be done what will be done, and that just as we remember some things that we have done but we have not done all that we remember, so God foreknows everything of which he is the author, but is not himself the author of all that he foreknows (De libero arbitrio, III, 11). This is the thought which was elaborated by Boethius, who gives to God's foreknowledge the value of a present vision. The divine knowledge is a direct synoptic vision of the totality of the real, in which the separation of the real into past, present and future is cancelled. Some events are necessary, like the rising of the sun, and others are due to freewill, like a man's walking. If I see someone walking he does not walk because I see him walking but because he chooses to do so. Certainly if /
if I see him walking he must be walking, but this is a conditional necessity and not an inherent one. Hence the divine foreknowledge, as it is vision, does not make events occur but carries with it this conditional necessity (De consolatione philosophiae V, 6).

184. Augustine, as we saw, abandoned this notion of God's knowledge as inert contemplation by treating it as a presupposition of the existence of the world, but in any case it does not help to leave any room for human freedom. What is incompatible with our freedom is our act's being already settled, and even if the act be not settled by God's knowledge of it, it must be settled in some way in order to be known by God.

185. In this way Augustinianism posits the very knowability of the future from which the Stoics deduced their fatalism. Augustine indeed indignantly denied the charge of fatalism, endeavouring to escape it by a subtle distinction. If by "necessity", he says, we understand what is not in our power, e.g. death, then it is clearly false that the wills by which we live well or badly are under such a necessity, for we do all sorts of things which we should not do if we were not willing, and this is primarily true of the volition itself. If, however, we mean by "necessity" that according to which we say that it is necessary that something should be so-and-so (i.e. logicality), e.g. when /
when we say that it is necessary that God should live for ever, then there is no fear of that sort of necessity depriving us of our freewill. To deny the certainty of events and the foreknowledge of God, who is the bestower of all power though not of all wills, is to be the Biblical fool who said in his heart that there was no God (De Civ. Dei, V, 9-10). But if our actions are already essentially realized, and they must be realized to be knowable, then it is not in our power to act otherwise, for we cannot make undone what has been done. Augustine himself relates how a certain monk argued that whatever he was now he would be what God had foreknown he would be, and turned to evil ways, finally leaving his monastery (De dono perseverantiae, 38).

186. Like Origen, Augustine seeks to mitigate the harshness of the Pauline saying that God has mercy on whom he will and hardens whom he will. On Augustine's interpretation God's obdura- tion is his refraining from mercy, which means not that he makes men worse but that he does not make them better (De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, I, 15 sq.). Adam could by his freewill have continued without sin, but in fact he did sin and thereby involved the whole human race in condemnation. We could not therefore have criticized God if he had condemned everyone, but in /
in his mercy he has decided to save a certain number, who are few in comparison with the damned (De correp-
tione et gratia, 28). Augustine will have none of
Origen's theory that ultimately everyone, even Satan,
will be saved, on the ground that it is incompatible
with Matthew XXV, 41, which speaks of the eternal fire
prepared for the Devil and his angels (De Civ. Dei
XXI, 23). The eschatological notion of the Last
Judgement was, as we saw, overcome in the Fourth Gospel,
and indeed the eschatology in the story of the Last
Judgement in Matthew is simply the framework, the point
of the story being the criterion by which God differenti-
tiates the righteous from the unrighteous, but as in
Augustine's own time there was no notion of the develop-
ment of the Scriptures his appeal to Matthew was cogent
enough. Yet his opponents put him in a difficulty by
citing the text I Tim. 2, 4: "God wills all men to be
saved", (Deus vult omnes salvari) for he could not
admit that God's will was ever thwarted. He escapes
only by a far-fetched interpretation of the text, tak-
ing "all men" to refer only to the elect and explaining
the text to mean "It is by God's will that all so.
the elect are saved, i.e. nobody is saved unless God
wills it", (De corr. et gratia, 44).

187. For Augustine the distinction between the
elect and the reprobate does not, as for Paul, corres-
pond /
correspond simply to the distinction between those inside the Church and those outside it, but is a distinction within the Church itself, and he can see no way of knowing who really is to be saved (Op. cit. 40). In striking contrast to the assurance with which he speaks of the gratuitousness of Grace, the concept to which he always returns to gather fresh strength, is the embarrassment which he betrays over his thought that there are some people who God knows will receive eternal punishment. When preaching to believers, he says, it is preferable not to mention that only some are predestined to be saved (De dono persever. 58), and it is better to use the third person than say directly to the congregation: "If any of you are obedient now but predestined to be rejected, the power of obedience will be taken away from you", though this is true (Op. cit. 61).

188. Julian objected to the notion of humanity's inheriting sin from Adam that it made sin a natural evil, and that consequently Augustine had relapsed into Manichaeanism, which differed from Christianity in ascribing evil not to an evil will but to an evil nature (Op. imp. I, 1; I, 24). The sting of this objection lies not only in its logical cogency but in its being Augustine's own line of thought against the Manichees. Augustine can only answer Julian by declaring /
declaring that his doctrine is Christian and not Manichaean, but he died before finishing his detailed reply. The extreme consequences of Augustinianism were drawn by Isidor of Seville, who formulated the doctrine of the twofold Predestination, i.e. to salvation and perdition, (Sent. II, 6, 1) but the crisis came only when what Augustine had wished to be preached with great discretion was proclaimed with evangelistic fervour and passion.
CHAPTER VII.

Gottschalk and his Opponents.

189. The centuries that followed the death of Augustine were passed in the slow acquisition of the philosophy of their predecessors by the peoples whose rule succeeded the Roman Empire. The difficulties raised by his theory of Predestination occasioned various unsatisfactory compromises, but the trouble did not come to a head till the Ninth Century, when the Augustinian theory was proclaimed in an accentuated form by the monk Gottschalk, who had studied the Scriptures in the light of the expositions of Augustine and Pope Gregory. The doctrine which he discovered there, and which he stoutly maintained even after its condemnation as heretical, professing that he dared not contradict the truth and that its opponents were enemies of the Christian faith, was that of the double Predestination (praedestinatio gemina) formulated by Isidor of Seville. "Just as unchangeable God before the establishment of the world by his gratuitous grace predestined his elect to eternal life, in exactly the same way by his just judgement he unchangeably predestined to deservedly eternal death all the reprobate who will be condemned on the day of judgement for their ill deserts" (Hincmar /
Isidore, he pointed out, had rightly spoken of a double predestination, for there were not two predestinations but a single one with two sides to it (Confessio Prolixior).

190. Gottschalk supported his thesis with copious citations from Augustine and Gregory which spoke of predestination to eternal death or of God as having already made the future as well as the past and present. Then arguing from the unchangeability of God, an axiom of theology ever since Plato and based by Christian theologians on James I, 17, he urged that God must always have condemned the reprobate since for him to do so at a certain time would involve a change in him. He followed Augustine in interpreting the text which states that God would have all men saved as referring not to all men without qualification but merely to those predestined to be saved, on the ground that God does everything that he wills, and denied that Christ had been crucified for those foreordained to eternal torment (Hinc. De Praed. XXIV and XXVII).

191. This doctrine incurred the disapproval of Hincmar, the Archbishop of Rheims, as attributing unfairness to God. Gottschalk was thrown into prison, where he remained unrecanting till his death twenty years later. His cause was, however, by no means unespoused, and Hincmar triumphed in the end only by
his influence with the Papal legates. Like Hrabanus, the Archbishop of Mainz, who first informed him of Gottschalk's preaching, Hincmar interpreted Gottschalk as meaning that God's predestination is in evil as in good, and that there are some people in this world who, on account of God's predestination which compels them to go to death, cannot correct their error and sin, as though God had made them incorrigible from the beginning (Hinc. De Praed. II). This interpretation conflicts with Gottschalk's express statement in the Confessio Prolixior that God foreknew before the centuries all the future whether good or evil, but predestined only the good, which is either mercy for the elect or justice for the reprobate. Yet Gottschalk gives ground for Hincmar's interpretation by going on to say that God would have had no cause for predestinating punishment for the reprobate if he had not also predestinated them for it, and by his insistence on God's having already made in predestination even what is not yet realized, his Augustinian quotation about Judas' being predestined to betray Christ, and his emphasis on the identification which Augustine had sometimes made between the divine foreknowledge and predestination, while passing over Augustine's doctrine that God did not make men sin but merely refrained from saving them from the sin which they had inherited from Adam.
192. At the Synod of Quiersy in 1853 Hincmar gained acceptance for his four points:

(1) God constituted man righteous and with a free will, but by using his freewill badly man sinned and fell, and became the mass of perdition of the whole human race. From this mass of perdition God elected, according to his foreknowledge, those whom he predestined to eternal life. The rest, whom he left in the mass of perdition, he foreknew would perish but did not predestine that they would perish, though in his justice he predestined eternal punishment for them.

(2) We lost freedom of will in the first man, and received it through Christ. We have freewill to do good when assisted by Grace, and freewill to do evil when it is abandoned by Grace.

(3) God wishes all men without exception to be saved, though all are not saved. That some are saved is a gift of the Saviour; that some perish is what they deserve.

(4) Christ suffered for all, though all are not redeemed by the mystery of his passion. The reason for this is the lack of faith in the unbelievers, just as a potion of medicine which can effect a cure does not do so unless it is drunk.

193. Hincmar's position, while it certainly avoids representing God as making men sin, is a Crypto-
semi-pelagian compromise between the freedom of God's will and the freedom of man's. While man is to be able only to do ill without Grace, yet Grace itself is impotent unless man by his own power co-operates to make it effective.

194. To assist him in the struggle with the Predestinationists Hincmar appealed to John Scotus Eriugena, who attacked Gottschalk energetically, and exposed the crudities of his view that men were driven inevitably to good or evil. Quoting freely from Augustine's "De libero arbitrio", which was written to vindicate man's freedom and responsibility against the Manichees, he pointed out that freedom is of the essence of will, so that if a will is not free it is not a will at all. Hence man cannot be forced to act well or badly. This also answers the question, or rather pseudo-question, (raised again in the Nineteenth Century as though it had not been raised and answered ten centuries before), why God does not grant man freedom to do right alone. Morality consists in obeying God's command, and God commands us to refrain from doing certain things, which would be superfluous if we did not have the power to do them. Without freedom of the will there could be neither good nor ill desert (De Praed. V).

195. Eriugena thus lifts the shadow that had lain /
lain over Christian thought ever since Paul had employed the image of God as a potter fashioning men like pots for noble or ignoble ends. As a pictorial idea it illustrates vividly enough Paul's notion that man is insignificant in comparison with God and has no right to challenge his plans, but as a concept it is fallacious, since if a man does not act voluntarily he is not acting but being acted upon, in which case there is no question of value or disvalue attaching to him.

196. While for Eriugena God is the creator of everything, in the case of a man's acting morally with the co-operation of Grace the divine will is not a necessary cause, as fire is of burning, nor a coercive one, as thirst of drinking, but a voluntary one, as wisdom is of the wise man. In the case of immorality the cause, which lies in the perverse use of freewill, is again voluntary, as avarice is of deceit. In this delicate analysis Eriugena departs notably from the later Augustinian insistence on the irresistible character of Grace.

197. What is evil? Eriugena learnt from Augustine the negativity of evil, understood as disvalue in general. Wickedness and punishment are negative and known by not being known, in the way in which we see the darkness when we cease to see. They are therefore unknown to God. Now as foreknowledge and predestination are /
are identical in the divine substance, neither sin nor punishment are predestined by God. Hence Gottschalk's error in maintaining a twofold predestination.

198. Gottschalk was also wrong in not recognizing the metaphorical character of predestination as applied to God. In the first place, preparation of what one is going to do cannot strictly be attributed to God, since for him nothing is future and nothing is past, though anyway, Eriugena urges, following an argument of Augustine's, God's foreknowledge of a man's action does not make it involuntary any more than our memory of it (De Praed. V-VI). In the second place, while Augustine admittedly does speak on occasion of a predestination to death, this also must be taken as a metaphorical usage. The metaphor here takes the form of a contrary, as when it is said that God is going to destroy the wisdom of the wise, where "wisdom" really means stupidity. When Augustine speaks of a predestination to death he really means permitting man to feel the bitterness of their own sins, sin being the only punishment of sin, (Op. cit. XVI-XVII).

199. This profound speculation, though it reached the desired conclusion that Predestination is single, brought Hincmar embarrassment rather than assistance, as it appeared to the orthodox to be the deceit of the devil rather than a proof of faith. The "capitula Carisiaca /
Carisiaca", though speculatively weak, were more immediately effective in meeting what was especially objectionable to the churchmen Hincmar and Hrabanus, the implication of Gottschalk's doctrine that man was not responsible and that the sacraments were otiose or ineffective. Gottschalk himself retained his trust in the divine Election and when dying refused the sacraments offered to him at the price of recantation.
200. Scholasticism, which is in large measure a commentary on Aristotle, was preceded by the Arab students of Aristotle. Ibn Roschid, the Commentator per antonomasia, discusses the opposing views that there is nothing to which Providence does not extend, since it is not proper for a wise being to leave anything alone without caring for it, and that Providence does not extend to the world, because there are many evils in it, and a wise being ought to leave those alone. His own solution of the difficulty is based on the Aristotelian dualism of form and matter. Providence does exist; if there are any things without it, they proceed from the necessity of the matter and not from the weakening of the agent (Met. XII, 52E).

201. Ibn Roschid interprets the Aristotelian theory of the First Mover, the object of whose thought is thought itself, to mean that God's care extends to individuals only according to their species (Met. XII, 37f). Not that the divine knowledge extends only to universals. God's knowledge is not like ours; it is the cause of being, while being is the cause of ours. It is neither universal nor particular. Knowledge of universals /
universals is knowledge of actual particular things in potentiality, and there is no potentiality in the divine knowledge. Even less is it particular, for particulars are infinite and not determined by knowledge. The divine intellect understands itself and nothing outside. The First Mover knows everything not discursively but according as he knows himself alone by knowledge in being, since he is the cause of their being. For example, if someone knows the nature of heat in fire alone, he is not said to be ignorant of the nature of heat which exists in other hot things but to know the nature of heat according as it is heat. Similarly the First Being knows the nature of unity in what is being without qualification, i.e. in himself (Met. XII, 51A-C).

202. But then, as Thomas Aquinas objects, how do the particular things, which are not the object of knowledge, come into being at all? It is moreover absurd that God, who possesses all the perfections of created beings, should not be able to know what men know (Thomas S. Th. I, 14, 11; I, 103, 5). For Thomas God is the creator of everything and the divine goodness the end towards which everything tends. Providence is thus the idea (ratio) in the divine mind of the order of things directed to an end. The execution of this order is sometimes performed directly by /
by God and sometimes through intermediate or secondary causes (I, 22, 1-3). Herein lies the explanation of fate and chance.

203. Fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things, i.e. the series of secondary causes which is dependent on God and thus his will. The existence of fate is thus to be admitted, not as determination by the stars or as containing necessity within itself, but as the ordering of secondary causes to effects foreseen by God. What God does directly, like the creation or the glorification of spiritual substances, is thus not subject to fate (I, 126, 1-4).

204. The existence of the contingent is also to be admitted. Contingency is a concurrence of causes; thus that a man is white has a cause and that a man is musical has a cause, but that he is white and musical has no cause, since every effect is something and a unity while white-and-musical is not anything or a unity (I, 125, 6). It is true that there is nothing absolutely contingent, since everything is subject to Providence. When the sinner is said to resist the divine order, this does not mean that he resists it entirely, for he actually intends the attainment of a certain good, but that he resists some particular good which belongs to his nature or condition (I, 103, 8). The existence of evils is no valid objection. A particular /
particular provider admittedly eliminates all defects from the thing under his care so far as is possible, but God, whose providence is universal, allows a small defect in a particular thing to subserve the good of the whole. The decay of one thing is the generation of another, and this is how the species is preserved. Indeed if all evil were eliminated the world would be deprived of much good; without persecution there would not be the heroism of the martyrs (I, 22, 2). There are however events which are contingent in relation to the secondary causes. An illustration of something accidental in relation to lower causes and directly intended in relation to a higher one is the meeting of two servants who are sent by their master to the same place. As regards the servants the meeting is accidental, but as regards their master it is designed (I, 126, 1).

205. Predestination is a part of Providence. Providence being the direction of things to their ends Predestination is the direction of a rational creature to eternal life. There is also Reprobation, the permission to some to fall away from that end. Both Predestination and Reprobation involve not only the divine foreknowledge but also the divine will, in the first case to confer grace and glory and in the second to permit the fall into sin and to impose the penalty of damnation /
damnation. Thomas insists on the gratuitousness of Grace, as an explanation of the apparent unfairness of God in saving only some, and cites the parable of the labourers who all received the same pay however many hours of work they had put in (I, 23, 5). He emphasises the impossibility of anything begun in us being the reason of the effect of Predestination (ibid.). Yet as a churchman Thomas resiles from this strongly Pauline position and attributes to one human action, submission to the Pope, the value of being essential to salvation, a doctrine afterwards formulated officially in the Bull "Unam Sanctam" (Opusc. contra errores Graecorum XIX, 25a).

206. Thomas is at pains to distinguish his theory of Providence from determinism. God is the First Cause who moves both natural and voluntary causes; and just as by moving natural causes he does not stop their action being natural, so by moving voluntary causes he does not stop their being voluntary (I, 83, 1). Still it is the essence of natural things to be moved by something else, whereas if the will were moved by something else so as not to be moved by itself, it would have no responsibility. The reply is that to be moved voluntarily is certainly to be moved by self, i.e. by an internal principle, but this internal principle may itself be moved by an external principle, so that to be moved /
moved by oneself is not inconsistent with being moved by another. The will is in fact moved by its object, viz. good, and by God who creates the power of willing (I, 105, 4).

207. This is the concept of God to which we are to rise through sensuous experience, for Thomas will not, like the Platonizing Franciscan Bonaventura, leap immediately to the vision of Nature as the outward page of God's great book (Breviloq. II, 12). The demonstration is on Aristotelian lines: we observe one thing moving something else and being itself moved by something else. The series cannot be infinite, as without a First Mover there would be no movement at all; and everyone understands the First Mover to be God. God's existence as First Cause is demonstrated similarly. Now what is the effect when viewed mechanically is the end when regarded teleologically, so that in the concrete God is to be apprehended as Purposive Intelligence. The proof of this begins from the observation that things without intelligence, like natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in one way, so as to achieve the best. Hence it is clear that they attain their end by design and not fortuitously. Now something without intelligence cannot move towards an end unless it be directed by a being with knowledge and intelligence.
intelligence, as the arrow is directed towards its mark by the archer. Therefore there is some intelligent being by whom all natural things are ordered towards their end; and this we call God (I, 2, 2).

208. God, then, is to the world as the archer to the arrow. The flaw is that though the arrow has only the potentiality of being shot before it is actually shot, it still is something even before being shot. The existence of natural objects is already given by the senses when the existence of God can be denied by the Biblical insipiens. The world is conceivable by itself when the existence of God is still being questioned. On the other hand God is outside the entire order of the world so that the end of all things is something external to them (I, 103, 2), and though God could not make this world better, since if he improved any one thing the harmony and proportion of the world would be disturbed, he could make other things or add things to the present creation, and thus there could be another and a better world. Thus the mutual relation of God and the world is essential to neither of them. God is left without a world to govern and the world is left deprived of its very being. There is no bridge between the world (which includes man) and God. This gulf is no mere peculiarity of the angelic doctor's thought; it is characteristic of the Medieval thinker /
thinker, who, after seeing Christ, the Mediator, recede out of sight with the Father, raised up the Virgin Mary and then innumerable patron saints and guardian angels to act as mediators.

209. The failure to reason from natural things to a transcendent God is manifested even more clearly in the course of Thomas' theology. The argument to God as First Cause presupposes the finiteness of the series of causes. Yet Thomas holds that it is not demonstrable but only a tenet of faith, that the world has not always existed (I, 46, 2). With the Aristotelian notion of form and matter the form is indeed only conceivable in relation to its matter, so that there is no possibility of a form which produces its matter from itself. Hence for Thomas, as for Ibn Roschid, it is conceivable, or rather an irrefutable position, that the world is co-eternal with God and that the creation is thus eternal, in which case the series of causes is after all interminable and therefore does not postulate a First Cause. To reach God outside the world means leaping beyond the understanding.

210. The alternatives for Scholastic thought are therefore a faith without understanding or an understanding which cannot grasp the truth and is condemned to spin out endless distinctions in a fruitless elaboration of concepts which contain nothing real.

211. Thomas /
Thomas had followed Augustine in pointing out the justice of Providence in granting world dominion to the ancient Romans (De Reg. Princ. III, 4 sqq.), and this observation, together with that of the necessity of the Roman Empire as an antecedent to Christianity which had already been made in the Patristic Age (Origen, C. Celsum II, 30) was developed in a remarkable manner by Dante (De Monarchia II-III). What is noteworthy in Dante is his vindication of human worth. The Romans are for him no mere blind instruments of the divine purpose, but a holy people who rightly attained the government of the world, to which they were assisted by the miraculous interventions of God, in that the end of government is the common good and the ancient Romans were the people who were most ready to sacrifice themselves for the common good (De Mon. II, 5). Not only does Dante in this way reverse the monkish verdict on the Romans as mere lustful idolators, he also reverses the old Augustinian antithesis of the eternal and earthly cities. The history of the earthly city ceases to be a record of horror, begun in Cain's murder of Abel, the prototype of Romulus' murder of Remus (De Civitate Dei, XV, 5). In fact Dante, who longs for the Grey-hound who is to hunt the Shewolf of greed and oppression from every city and drive her back to Hell, (Inferno, Canto I, vv. 91-111) hopes to see this /
this consummated not at the end of time through the
dissolution of earthly society - the apocalyptic
consummation is in any case alien to his outlook, as
he views the divine judgment as following immediately
on every man's death - but through a revival of the
Roman Empire. He appeals to Henry VII of Luxemburg
as King of the Romans by divine Providence, urging him
to fulfill his divine mission and reminding him that
the Empire of Augustus had extended everywhere (Ep. VII).

212. The appeal is not on merely political
grounds; it has a metaphysical foundation. Though
Christ has redeemed man from his original sin, yet sin
has left behind a certain weakness which requires not
only the regimen of the Pope (who was hardly a glorious
figure as the French King's chaplain at Avignon) but
also that of the Emperor, who derives his power and
authority not through the Pope but directly from God
(De Mon. III, 4). The State is thus no purely natural
formation but possesses a spiritual function.

213. By the Roman Empire, therefore, the will of
God in human society is made known, and the invisible
things of God grasped by the intellect (De Mon. II, 2).
Yet Dante is still a Thomist, and makes the Virgil of
human understanding depart once the Beatrice of Faith
appears (Purgatorio, XXX, 49 sqq.).

214. Scholasticism accordingly dissolves into
Nominalism /
Nominalism, which openly turns philosophy into a game with words, or else into the negative theology. Thomas indeed trusted to analogical reasoning and the way of remotion to lead to an apprehension of God. Yet as for the analogical reasoning, he had himself admitted that there is no comparison between the finite and the infinite, so that God cannot be comprehended as he is, though he can be grasped in some measure (S. Th. I, 12, 7). This is a marked deviation from the promise of I John III, 2 quoted by Thomas himself that we shall see God as he is. He does not himself emphasize the impossibility of knowing God precisely as he is, but with Cusanus this impossibility, which is the impossibility of knowing anything precisely as it is, becomes the foundation of philosophy (De docta ignorantia I, 3).

215. As for the way of remotion, the scraping off of all attributes of human thought to reach the pure notion of God, the result is the notion of matter, the pure abstraction of substantiality. Thomas fulminates against David of Dinant's identification of God and matter; but admits his inability to differentiate the two. He attempts to escape from the difficulty by distinguishing between difference and diversity: God and matter are not to be differentiated but they are diverse, being the opposites of pure actuality and pure potentiality (S. Th. I, 3, 8). But Cusanus recognized that God is /
is the absolute reality in which all possibilities are realized and that in the infinite opposites coincide. An illustration is given by the straight diameter and the curved circumference of a circle, which become more alike the larger the circle and coincide when it is infinite (De docta ignorantia I, 21). The Providence of God accordingly embraces contradictories: whether I read a book tomorrow or do not, it equally falls within Providence. Thus Providence embraces both what will happen and what will not but might, just as a genus embraces opposite differentias. God does not know events with differences of time; he knows the future and the past not as future and past but eternally, and he knows the mutable immutably. Hence Providence is inevitable and immutable, and what is related to it is rightly said to possess necessity, since God is absolute necessity (Op. cit. I, 22).

216. As God is the Absolute (absolutum), who excludes nothing from himself, there can be nothing else with an entirely different existence. The universe is "contracted" from the Absolute. Just as humanity is not Sokrates or Plato but in Sokrates, it is Sokrates, and in Plato it is Plato, the universe is contractedly in every creature. This makes it possible to understand how God, who is the most simple unity existing in the unique universe, exists consequently through the universe /
universe in all things, and the plurality of things exists through the universe in God (Op. cit. II, 4). God and the universe are opposed as absolute and relative, infinite and finite, one and many. But the highest nature only embraces the lower if the unity of higher and lower is greater than their separation. The link between them contains all natures within itself, being the lowest of the higher and the highest of the lower, and so if it rises to union with absolute greatness in respect of all that belongs to it, all natures and the whole universe in every possible way reach their highest stage in it. Now human nature is that which is raised above all the works of God and is a little below the angels, containing intellectual and sensible nature, and bringing everything within itself as a microcosm. Hence human nature is that which if it were raised to union with absolute greatness would be the fulness of all perfection of the universe and particular things, so that they would all attain their highest stage in humanity itself. Humanity, however, does not exist except contractedly in this or that. Hence, if it were not possible for more than one true man to be able to rise to union with absolute greatness, he would certainly be man because God, and God because man, the perfection of the universe, holding the primacy in all things. The smallest, greatest and intermediate natures, /
natures, being united to absolute greatness, would coincide in him, and through him, the greatest contracted from the absolute Greatest, all things would both issue into contracted being and come back again into the Absolute. He would be the beginning of the emanation and the end of the return. This link is actually Jesus, the first-born of all creation (Op. cit. III, 3-4). Man in a way resembles this Son of God, for though not God absolutely he is a human god, and in him there is a unity which is infinity itself, humanly contracted (De coniecturis, II, 14). Hence reality, which at first seemed alien and incomprehensible, appears humanized. This humanistic conception, which infuses new life into the dry bones of quasi-Neo-Platonic cosmology, creeps into the exegesis of the commonplace saying in Wisdom XI, 21, that God made everything by number, weight and measure. "In the creation of the world God has used arithmetic, geometry and also music and astronomy, the arts which we too use in investigating the proportions of things, elements and motions" (De docta ignorantia, II, 13).
PART III.

RENAISSANCE, REFORMATION AND ILLUMINISTIC THOUGHT.

CHAPTER I.

Ficino.

217. With Marsilio Ficino the notion of the Incarnation becomes predominant. He revives the Athanasian thought that God became human that man might become divine (De Incarnatione LIV), which could not be taken seriously by Patristic and Scholastic theology, because from the standpoint of the transcendence of God the Incarnation is a mystery, not a union of real God and real man but a modification of the deity, whose humanity is not our humanity. For Ficino the Incarnation is the indispensable means of giving us the hope of divinization. Even more emphatically - "Since God" he says, "joined himself to man without an intermediary (absque medio), we must remember that our happiness consists in cleaving to God without an intermediary . . . Let men cease to distrust their divinity" (De Christiana Religione XIX).

218. In this way the Medieval gap between God and the world is bridged. God does not control the world /
world from outside, but drives it from within (Theologiae Platonicae II, 13). Ficino elucidates this by his concept of creation, another of the profound Patristic dogmas which had ceased to be taken seriously because turned into a mystery, i.e. something enunciated but not thought. The Ficinian concept of creation is that of an extratemporal and extraspatial activity, which requires an infinite operative capacity and does not presuppose a subject-matter, so that there is no question of its being limited by the limitations of its subject-matter (Theol. Plat. V, 13). That God's activity should not be limited by any material was indeed an old postulate, but Ficino renders the concept luminous by identifying God's nature and his intellect, so that God is to be spoken of as acting neither through his bare nature nor through an adventitious intellect but through his intellectual nature and his natural intellect (Op. cit. II, 11).

219. Ficino refutes the Plotinian concept of God acting from natural necessity. He agrees with Plotinus that God's action must be such that he does not depart from his state and his simplicity, but he points out that natural action begins in the agent and terminates in the object acted upon, as e.g. heat begins in fire and terminates in wood; hence God's action must be the activity of mind (operatio mentis), for it is only /
only intellectual activity which begins and terminates in the agent. Through this activity God, "while by self-contemplation abiding with himself, moves external things everywhere" (dum se speculando versatur secum, undique versat externa). Then God must be absolutely uniform, as he is above the forms of everything, and he must be omniform, because he is the former of everything. It is only his intellectual nature which makes it possible for him to be uniform and omniform together, for since its nature is intellectual the form of God by apprehending itself conceives itself as the ground which belongs to all forms. For it sees in itself what belongs to everything, when it discerns to what degree anything can imitate, or fall short of, the divine form. (Op. cit. II, 11). The products of the divine creation are as it were externally expressed words of God's thoughts (De Christiana Religione XVIII). This is not an intellectualist concept of creation, because Ficino proceeds to identify the divine intellect and will. While the First Cause cannot direct everything to the best end by the most righteous means in the most appropriate manner, without anticipating the end, discerning the means, and calculating the proportion between the means and the end, he must approve the end through his will and choose such means in preference to others. Mere intellect brings about no substantial /
substantial effect. Hence God does not act either from natural necessity or from intellectual necessity (Theol. Plat. II, 11).

By his identification of God's will and intellect Ficino is able to elucidate the character of the divine freedom of action. So long as intellect and will are contraposed, the will is conceived as having in front of it its most desirable objective already fixed by the intellect. In that case either the will simply has to pursue its most desirable objective (be moved by the strongest motive) and then it acts necessarily, or else it acts in disregard of the most desirable objective, and then it acts contingently, for no reason at all. Ficino, on the other hand, conceives the divine will as necessary and free together. If to nothing, he says, its being and doing what it is and does is contingent, then God, who is the supreme being (or more than being), cannot possibly be or act contingently. Now as the more reason there is anywhere the less chance there is, nothing fortuitous can be conceived in God, who is the supreme reason (or the source of reason). Then if chance cannot produce the reason which is contrary to it, how could it ever produce God (or some action superior to any reason)? God therefore is and acts as is necessary. God, Ficino repeats after Cusanus, is necessity itself, and on /
on him depends the necessity of everything else that is necessary. So God is as he is and acts as he acts, and because necessity presupposes no necessity, here there is supreme freedom. To be free is to live as one wills. But more than anything else goodness itself lives as it wills, since it is the sole object of every will. God is therefore what he is in such a way that he could not be other than he is or will anything other than he does, because he is the supreme good (Op. cit. II, 12).

221. Now for Ficino God's being, intellect and will are the same. He is thus able to develop the Plotinian concept of God as self-actualization (actus sui), which in Plotinos himself was abortive because he set God above thought and consciousness. The object of the divine mind is God himself, because no force can go beyond its object though it may be equated with it, and apart from God there is nothing beyond which God cannot go. By willing himself God wills all other things, which, in so far as they are in God, are God himself, and in so far as they emanate from him, are images of the divine countenance (Ibid.). This extratemporal and extraspatial act of self-consciousness produces the temporal and the spatial. God is the universal nature of things, but not nature as it appears to our imagination, i.e. corporeal, extended and /
and capable of being divided indefinitely, but nature as totality. It is not God who is extended through the world but the world which, so far as it can be, is extended through God (Op. cit. II, 6).

222. The divine Providence and love towards the world derive from the act of creation; indeed preservation is inferior to creation, - God would know how to govern all things even if he did not know how to make them. The craftsman loves the works which he made from an external material. Much more does the father love his son, whom he generated from an internal material (though he received it from elsewhere in the act of eating). More warmly does God love any of his works, for he did not receive the material from elsewhere but himself created it as well as formed it, so that he is the sole cause of the work and the cause of the whole work. Now if God loves his works he wills good to them, and what he wills he achieves. Hence he orders them well, and as his goodness is supreme he orders them in the best possible way. He governs them with wonderful facility, for he is not handling alien material which he received from elsewhere but handling his own material, which he made himself. Nor does he push things from outside, but drives them from within (Neque attingit extrinsecus, sed intrinsecus agitat), for he is inside the heart of everything. /
everything. Nor is his work concerned with a plurality of objects; he is the pivot of everything, and so through his own very being he moves the pivots which follow, i.e. essence, life, mind, soul, nature and matter. Through the pivot which belongs to each order he moves the order itself, i.e. he moves all essences through one essence, all lives through one life and so on (Op. cit. II, 13). Ficino gives a bizarre illustration of his thought, mentioning that if you pull a certain sinew in the nape of an animal's neck you can move all the animal's limbs together, so that each moves with its own peculiar motions (Ibid.).

223. God is the centre of all things, and as such he is more inward to them than they are to themselves. He is also the circumference of the world, since he surpasses everything. As centre he is in everything, but as circumference he is outside everything. Yet he is not included in everything, because he is also the circumference, and he is not excluded outside everything, because he is also the centre. What then is God? Ficino answers appropriately with the Hermetic saying: "He is a spiritual circle, whose centre is everywhere and circumference is nowhere" (Op. cit. XVIII, 3). This attempt to achieve an immanentistic concept of God, i.e. one which synthesizes transcendence or separateness from the world and identity with it, is a conscious effort /
effort on Ficino's part, for in a letter containing a short dialogue between God and the soul he represents the soul as lamenting because it cannot see how God can be both outside us and within us. If God be within us, must he not be smaller than we are? God gladdens the soul by explaining how it is that he fills heaven and earth. "I fill, but I am not filled, because I am fulness itself. I penetrate, but I am not penetrated, because I am the very power of penetration. I contain, but I am not contained, because I am the very capacity for containing."

in the case of the Anabaptists subjecting the Scriptures themselves to the interpretations of their own spirit (ibid.), and on the other hand they reject the offices and sacraments of the Roman Church as the means of ensuring salvation, as well as the second-order religions of indulgences (cf. Luther, Capita fiei Christianae contra Rahan et portas inferiorum constantiae - Op. cit. p. 466-461). God is no longer the Platonic God, hard to find and capable of being revealed only to a few, but the Christian God whom, as the Apologist Tertullian had said, "the Church, speaking by S. Paul, says to all the unlearned and contemptible, 'If anyone wishes to speak to God, let him understand the theologic sncritical theology' (Tertullian, Expel. 79). Take these precepts and you have nothing to improve upon.
CHAPTER II.

The Reformers and the Problem of Predestination

224. The starting-point of the Reformation is the principle enunciated by Ficino that there is nothing mediating between God and man. In the light of this principle the Reformers on the one hand reject human tradition mediating the inner clarity (interior claritas) of the Scriptures (cf. Luther, De servo arbitrio- Erlangen ed. Opera Latina var. arg. Vol. VII, p. 176), in the case of the Anabaptists subjecting the Scriptures themselves to the interpretations of their own spirit (Ibid.), and on the other hand they reject the offices and sacraments of the Roman Church as the means of ensuring salvation, as well as the second-order religion of indulgences (cf. Luther, Capita fidei Christianae contra Papam et portas infernorum constanter asserenda - Op. cit. p. 455-461). God is no longer the Platonic God, hard to find and capable of being revealed only to a few, but the Christian God whom, as the Apologist Tertullian had said, with polemical reference to Plato, every Christian workman knows and reveals (Apology, 46). Luther vehemently attacks the "moderate sceptical theology" of Erasmus, declaring: "Take away assertions and you have taken away Christianity"/
Christianity" (De servo arbitrio p. 120 sq.; 131), while Zwingli insists that while we cannot by our own unaided efforts (nostro Marte) attain knowledge of God, God reveals himself to us (De vera et falsa religione - ed. Corpus Reformatorum, Sämtliche Werke, Vol. III, p. 614 sq.).

225. The Reformers conceive God's activity according to the Paulo-Augustinian categories of Grace and Predestination. Luther rejects Origen's attenuating interpretation of the O.T. statement that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, remarking shrewdly that Origen's metaphorical interpretations gave Porphyry his opportunity (De servo arbitrio p. 242 sq.), and Calvin expressly holds the doctrine of the twofold Predestination (Inst. III, 21, 5). Luther considers it essential for the Christian to know that God foreknows nothing contingently, but foresees, prearranges and does everything by his unchangeable, eternal and infallible will. With this thunderbolt, he says, freewill is laid low and crushed. The conclusion which he draws is that every event, even if it seems to us to take place changeably and contingently, really takes place necessarily and unchangeably (De servo arbitrio p. 133 sq.) Calvin closes the last loophole by pricking the distinction between God's will and his permission. Why does God permit anything except because /
because he wills it? Hence Calvin endorses Augustine's conception of God as the necessity of things (Inst. III, 23, 8).

226. This necessitarianism is not antique fatalism, because in the first place it presupposes not an impersonal force but a personal God. Luther indeed says that he would prefer not to use the word "necessity", which does not strictly apply either to the divine or to the human will, since it signifies coercion and, in general, what is contrary to the will. What he means is that God's will, which governs our changeable will, is unchangeable and infallible, and that our will, especially if evil, cannot of itself do good. "Necessity", therefore, signifies the unchangeable will of God and the impotence of our own evil will, what some call the "necessity of unchangeableness" (necessitatem incommutabilitatis), though even this is not quite satisfactory grammatically (!) or theologically (De servo arbitrio, p. 135). Zwingli again conceives Predestination as springing from Providence, or, rather, to be Providence itself in terms of efficient causality, and Providence itself, from which all discussion of Predestination must start, to be that care of God's for things which Christ had spoken of as extending even to the sparrows (De vera et falsa religione, p. 649). Calvin's concept of God as the protector /
protector of innocence and the chastiser of wickedness (Inst. I, 5, 7 sq.) has an O.T. ring, and in fact the Scottish Presbyterians took their defeat by Cromwell at Dunbar not fatalistically as something that could not have been avoided, but as a "dreadful appearance" of God against them and a sign of their own shortcomings (v. G. Davies, The Early Stuarts, p. 166). Cromwell took the same view of the battle (T. H. Green, Works Vol. III, p. 354).

227. In the second place, Protestant Predestination, because conceived absolutely, is not contraposed to man, whereas Fate, as we saw, is the power against which struggles are unavailing, but still can be made. According to Zwingli all the things which we see derive their existence not from themselves but from that origin of the world which is God. God alone is self-dependent, and confers being on all things in such a way that they could not for a moment exist but for the existence of God, who is their being and life and sustains and governs them (De vera et falsa religione, p. 644 sq.). God is not only as it were the matter out of which all things exist, move and live but also a wisdom, knowledge and sagacity to which nothing is unknown or disobedient. Not even a mosquito has its lance so sharp and its trumpet so resounding apart from the wisdom, knowledge and sagacity of God. Hence, because everything /
everything depends on God, to take away Providence is to take away human freedom and merit (Op. cit. p. 647).

228. The point of the Reformation concept of Predestination is that while natural man, i.e. man opposed to Providence, is entirely powerless, man redeemed by faith acts with the very power of God working in him. The Reformers grasped the logic of the position that if God and man are set over against each other so that what the one is the other is not, and hence what the one does the other does not, then granted that God is omnipotent, man must be impotent and have only the illusory freedom of the small animal in the large cage. Compromises trying to apportion activity between the two and distinctions, dear to the theologians of the Counter-Reformation, of types of foreknowledge, are utterly valueless, since they do not touch the duality. The Scholastic dualism is illustrated by the story of Fra Angelico, who had parts of his pictures painted for him when he was asleep, while the Protestant concept of the unity of God and man comes out in Cromwell's adjuration to his troops to trust in God and keep their powder dry. Luther goes to the root of the matter when he asks Erasmus, who attributed to man a partial freedom, why he will not call acts ours when they are given to us by God (De servo arbitrio, p. 237). He is ready to grant Erasmus, once Erasmus admits that the human
human will is ineffective without divine Grace, not merely that it has a modicum of power but that it possesses angelic or divine power (Op. cit. p. 157). This is not sheer polemical irony, for elsewhere he states quite frankly that the man who abides in love is no longer human but divine, as God is in him and doing what no man or creature could do (Weimar ed. 36, p. 438). Similarly, Zwingli first quotes the Pauline texts about our living, moving and existing in God, and about God producing in us intention and deed, and then proclaims in the Johannine spirit that if anyone has faith in God, God is in him and he in God (De vera et falsa religione, p. 843-848). With their consciousness of the divine immanence in redeemed man, the Reformers are more assured champions of human freedom even than the Humanists, who conceived man naturalistically as one of a number of other men and things. The patriotic visionary Machiavelli, when discussing the "fortune" of the Romans, maintained against Plutarch that any people who had had the same ability and had proceeded in the same way would have had the same success (Discorsi, II, 1) but he admits that he is sometimes inclined to agree with the theory that human affairs are so governed by fortune and God that men cannot alter /
alter them through their sagacity or find any remedy against them (Principe, 25). The Puritan position is put clearly by Richard Steele: "God doth call every man and woman . . . to serve him in some peculiar employment in this world, both for their own and the common good . . . The Great Governour of the world hath appointed to every man his proper post and province . . ." (The Tradesman's Calling etc., p. 1, 4). This is not the antique notion of the appointment of a man's lot, i.e. of the events of his life, but derives from the Pauline notion of the appointment of a man's responsibilities. Paul's notion of calling is extended to cover not only evangelization but ordinary economic occupations when directed to the glory of God. Hence the issue of books such as those written by John Flavell entitled "Husbandry Spiritualized, or the Heavenly Use of Earthly Things" and "Navigation Spiritualized: or a New Compass for Seamen etc."

229. Machiavelli's collocation of God and Fortune is not simply a piece of classicism, for the devout Dante had believed that God committed to Fortune the distribution of mundane splendours (Inferno, VII, 67 sqq.). If God is confronted with man and yet acts in disregard of him, then his action /
action must be capricious. To take as a concept Paul's picture of God preferring Jacob to Esau quite apart from their conduct would be to ascribe caprice or favouritism to God, since caprice consists in acting without regard to the situation presupposed by the action and consequently without any criterion. The Reformers, however, free the divine will from all suspicion of caprice by conceiving it as creative, i.e. presupposing nothing, and as self-criteriological. In speaking of God's love Luther says expressly that it creates and does not find its lovable object; the object is made lovable by God's loving it (Heidelberg Disputation 28 - Weimar ed. 1, p. 365).

Calvin conceives God's will as the supreme rule of justice, so that whatever God wills must be accounted right from the very fact of his willing it. "When, therefore, it is asked why God so acted, the reply must be: 'Because he willed it'. If you go further and ask why he willed it, you are asking for something greater and better than the will of God, and there is not any such thing" (Inst. III, 23, 2). God, Calvin continues, is law to himself; God's will is not only absolutely pure but the supreme rule of perfection, or rather the law of all laws (Ibid.).

230. The /
230. The same apprehension of the ultimateness of the divine will is shown by the Renaissance philosopher Vanini, who, like Calvin, had had a legal training. In answer to the question why God does not himself obey the divine law to men to prevent wrong-doing, he refers to Ulpian's maxim "Quod Principi placuit legis vigorem habet" (Amphitheatrum aeternae providentiae, XV). In championing the view that God acts not from necessity but from his own good pleasure (pro arbitratu suo), Vanini refutes the Stoic and Thomist notion of the necessity of evils to the good of the universe. Evils proceed from the human will, and are only permitted by God. It is not true that without the savagery of the tyrant there would not be the virtue of the martyr, since St. John the Evangelist had at least as much charity as any of the martyrs, and those who are merely prepared for martyrdom display as much courage as those who actually suffer it (Amphitheatrum, XIX, XLVI).

231. The fundamental thought of the Reformation was that man is good only from the presence of God in him, and that without God man is necessarily bad; all right acts are done by the one free creative spirit, which man cannot deserve to have dwelling in him because if he achieves anything of good desert he must already have /
have God within him. Now when this thought is formulated in terms of Predestination, i.e. in terms of an eternal decree whereby God unchangeably ordained whatever happens, it appears, for instance, in the Calvinist Westminster Confession of Faith, as the doctrine that "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death" (III, 3). As with Augustine, Predestination dominates the scene, and the Redemption becomes simply a means of appointing the elect to glory. The Redemption covers only the elect (Op. cit. III, 6). The rest of mankind God decided to "pass by", i.e. to withhold the "grace whereby they might have been enlightened in their understandings, and wrought upon in their hearts", and so he ordained them to "dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice" (Op. cit. III, 7; V, 6).

232. The problem at once arises, as it had arisen in Stoicism, how in view of the eternal decree anyone has any responsibility. Sin is defined as "any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature" (Larger Catechism, 24). How is foreordination compatible with a conscious choice between conformity to, or deviation from, a rule? The Westminster Confession certainly states /
states that God ordained from all eternity all that comes to pass "yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of evil, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures" (III, 1), and repeats again, "Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently" (V, 2). This is to put the problem rather than to solve it.

233. The problem is not confined to Protestant thought but inherent in the concept of foreknowledge and the predetermination which that implies. The Humanist Lorenzo Valla, whom Erasmus classed with Luther (v. De servo arbitrio, p. 612), imagines Sextus Tarquin telling Apollo that he is not going to commit the enormities which Apollo prophesies that he will. Apollo reiterates his prophecy and explains that everyone is made what he is. Jupiter has made the wolf ravenous, the hare timid, etc. Sextus has been given a wicked and incorrigible soul, and will act in accordance with his nature. Valla sees the objection that this convicts Jupiter rather than Sextus, but simply dissolves the problem by appealing to the goodness of God, which implies that his actions do not destroy our freedom (Leibniz, Théodiceé 405-412).

234. Vanini, /
234. Vanini, following Pomponazzi (De Fato III, 13-14; IV, 3) goes deeper into the matter. After citing Origen's view that God's knowledge does not cause human actions, but presupposes them, he proceeds to examine the concept of futurity. The future is contingent, i.e. what may be or not be. Hence it does not follow from God's knowing that Judas will sin that he will necessarily sin. Admittedly, if God knows he will sin, he will, but since God knows the future qua future as that which may or may not be, Judas has the same possibility of sinning or not sinning. Future events are known by God in two ways, first, within their own causes, and here they exist only as bare potentiality, i.e. as what may or may not be; secondly, in the eternal present outside their own causes. Admittedly when you consider Judas' sin outside its own causes, and as known with certainty by God, it is necessary and not contingent, but then from God's knowing the sin in this way it follows not that Judas will sin but that he is sinning or has sinned.

235. To say that God knows the future qua future only as what may or may not be, does not argue any imperfection in the divine cognition, since, as the future is the undetermined, that which may or may not be, God's apprehension would be false if he apprehended it as other than undetermined. This does not mean /
mean that God knows the event at one time as undetermined and at another as determined, which would involve a change in the divine cognition. God knows the event at once as undetermined and determined, just as he knows man both as undetermined and determined, undetermined as animal and determined as rational. Although the time in which the event is determined is different from that in which it is undetermined, God knows the event as both together, since in eternity there is no succession and every time is present to him (Amph. XXIII-XXV). Vanini has very subtly improved on Chrysippos' attempt to reconcile Predetermination with the contingency of the future. Yet the distinction established is between abstract and concrete. In the concrete man is rational, only abstractly is he an animal. Only in the abstract is it then true to say that anyone will do anything, in the concrete he has already done it. Hence the affirmation of human freedom, as the Protestant Fausto Sozzini (Socinus) realized, entails the denial of Predestination and implies that the future is absolutely future even to God and is not embraced in an eternal present. Seizing on the commonplace of Hellenic and Christian thought that God cannot make undone what has been done, he urges that similarly God cannot make exist what does not yet exist (Praelectiones theologicae 6-9). Yet with the denial /
denial of Predestination the vigour of Protestantism fails; it can neither live with Predestination nor live without it. Renaissance Naturalism.

836. The overcoming of the transcendence of God brings with it a new concept of nature as well as of man. The Medieval concept of Providence included Aristotle's cosmology as well as his theology. In Aristotle's system the heavenly bodies are the means through which the earth is influenced by the First Cause, which is first in the sense of being the beginning of a series, as in Aristotle's own example of the man who moves the hand that moves the stick that moves the sphere. Certainly the Medieval adoption of the notion of creation imported a greater intimacy between God and the earth than was possible in pure Aristotelianism, and Dante speaks of the glory of him who moves all things penetrating through the universe and shining in various degrees in the various parts (Paradiso, I, 1-3). Then although the notion of God as the first in the causal series is implied in the Thomist argument based on the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes, it is superseded both by the notion of miracles and by the distinction between primary and secondary causation, which no longer seem to stand on the same plane as natural activity.
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does not do away with the notion of the heavenly bodies as being nearer to God than the earth. When Dante renders poetically the Thomist theory of the divine order and describes how the instinct which impels all things towards the eternal value carries them over the great sea of being to their several harbours, he declares that the Providence which arranges all this keeps for ever at rest the Empyrean which encircles the First Moved, the swiftest of the material heavens (Op. cit. I, 103-124), and again he pictures the Empyrean as the light which makes the Creator visible to the creature and as composed of rays reflected from the First Moved, to which it gives life and power (Op. cit. XXX, 100-108). This explains the sensitivity of the Roman Church to astronomical speculation, for it was not a matter simply of physical objects but of the system of Providence.

237. Telesio began the demolition of Medieval cosmology with his book "De rerum natura iuxta propria principia", the very title of which is a proclamation of the autonomy of Nature. Telesio attacks the transcendence of form to matter implied in the Peripatetic theory that all forms are existent in the whole of matter and in all parts of it, though in any one thing only one is actual and the rest potential. This, he says /
says, is inconceivable, for it means that active natures, divested of their power of action and snoring away (sterententes), are, despite their extreme contrariety, for on the Peripatetic view change is by contraries, joined together and united, seeing that any portion or point of matter can be changed into any entity. Then if all the forms are perpetually in matter, no form will ever grow or decay, but what seems to be destroyed and to decay is as it were sent to sleep, always retaining its identity, but now actually and now potentially existent, now flourishing and active, now snoring and divested of its power of action.

It is strange, too, that the form which dislodged and destroyed its opponent when it was actually existent and active, does not oust and destroy it altogether when it is defunct or plunged into deep slumber and is divested of its power of action, for it is an opposite which is assiduously striving to bring about its destruction and will ruin it in the end (De rerum natura, II, 1).

238. Telesio's satire is matched by Julius Caesar Scaliger's attack on the Peripatetic notion of the yearning of matter for form. Matter already has the form of formlessness, so why should it seek to put off one form to acquire another? And if Nature does nothing in vain, why should it yearn to put off the noble form /
form of man and acquire that of a putrefying corpse? (De Subtilitate, XVII).

239. To remedy the defects of the Peripatetic theory Telesio reforms its three principles, substituting for form, privation and matter the two active natures of heat and cold and the passive one of matter. Telesio's principle of heat, being an active force, comes to practically the same as Aristotle's form, but cold is not privation, the sheer absence of form, but an active principle struggling against heat. Aristotle, Telesio emphasises, had treated privation as an active principle when considering the general constitution of things, and it was only when he came to consider the generation of particular things that he treated it as purely negative, the reason being that he was trying to avoid the difficulty of his predecessors that either a thing comes to be out of what is, but what is does not come to be since it already is, or else it comes to be out of nothing, and that did not seem possible, and so he said that things came to be not out of absolute non-being, but out of non-being relative to the form (De rerum natura, III, 2-5).

240. Heat is the principle of motion, which secures its preservation, of rarity, light and life, while cold is the principle of rest, density, darkness and death. Both heat and cold, which are incorporeal, require /
require matter, not as the mere potentiality which it was on Aristotle's view, but as the corporeal mass underlying their conflict, a conflict in which victory means occupying the space previously occupied by the other (Op. cit. I, 1-5). From the Telesian standpoint Nature is thus not a bare potentiality having to be moved from without but contains within itself the opposition of the two contending forces, each striving to preserve itself, which gives rise to motion. In carrying out the explanation of Nature "on its own principles" Telesio attributes the movement of the stars not to immobile movers but to their being hot bodies (Op. cit. II, 19), and he applies his principles even to morality, accounting the supreme value which the spirit seeks, the value from which all others derive, to be its own preservation (Op. cit. IX, 2).

241. Is it possible, however, to conceive a purely materialistic system consisting of contending forces and matter? Telesio answers emphatically that both the Scriptures and human reason teach that it is God who has created and directs these forces. This is obvious from the way in which they are kept within their bounds so that neither the hot heavens nor the cold earth over-whelms the other. Things have a certain constitution according to which they act, but it is God who has given them their constitution and could alter it if he chose. Anyone /
Anyone who considers the constitution of the universe and the composition of individuals, above all of animals, must be not only impious and savage but also mentally defective if he fails to recognize the wisdom of God (Op. cit. I, 10; IX, 6).

242. From the new standpoint, Providence is thus discerned not in natural objects being the image of transcendent forms, which was the view of the Platonizing Medieval thinker, nor in their aspiring towards an end outside them, which was the view of the Aristotelianizing Medieval thinker, but in their having a certain composition or structure. This standpoint is common to the Reformation also. Calvin emphasises that Providence is evidenced in the structure (fabrica) of the universe. Even the unlearned can see the marvels of God’s wisdom in the heavens and above all in the human body, so ingeniously constructed with its connection, symmetry and beauty (Inst. I, 5, 2). Mechanistic theories are incapable of accounting for the organic. What concourse of atoms could produce the digestive system and make all the various members work together as though there were that number of souls governing a single body with a common purpose? (Op. cit. I, 5, 4).

243. Bacon found Telesio’s philosophy rather a pastoral one, which was plausible only if you removed man /
man from Nature together with the mechanical arts which
torment matter, and simply contemplated the structure
of the universe (De Principiis ed. Ellis III, p. 110).
Bacon agreed with Telesio in thinking of Nature as
having been given a certain structure by God which en-
ables natural events to be attributed to natural or
secondary causes, and to those who supposed that ignor-
ance of the secondary causes of events helped people
to depend more devoutly on Providence, as though the
events proceeded immediately from the hand of God,
he reiterated Job's question to his friends: "Will ye
lie for God as man for man to gratify him?" (Of the
Interpretation of Nature, Ellis III, p. 219). Yet this
was not enough to satisfy Bacon's demand for the Regnum
Hominis.

244. For Bacon, man, though bound by the laws of
Nature (De Interpret. Ellis III, p. 785), is capable
of dominating over it and using it for his own ends,
not by magic but by putting Nature to the question, ex-
perimenting and after finding how Nature works, setting
it to work for human purposes. With his interest in
what is under human control, Bacon distinguishes physics
as the study of material and efficient causes, from
metaphysics as the study of formal and final causes.
To say that the leaves of trees are for protecting the
fruit, or that the solidity of the earth is for the station /
station and mansion of living creatures, is well enquired and collected in metaphysics, but quite irrelevant in physics. Bacon accordingly considers that Demokritos and his followers, who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, were, as far as can be judged from the fragments, more on the right track in the investigation of particular causes than Plato or Aristotle, who intermingled physical and final causes. Not that the final causes are not true and important, but concentration on them prevented a proper investigation of the physical causes. There is no incompatibility between the two. To say that the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold, is not inconsistent with saying that contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies. Both causes are true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other only a consequence. Bacon is quite clear that this insistence on efficient causes is not to call in question or to derogate from Providence, but rather to confirm and exalt it. Just as in politics the man who can make others serve his ends, without informing them what he intends, so that they do not realize that they are serving his purposes, is a greater statesman than the man who reveals his purposes to them, so when
Nature intends one thing and Providence draws forth another, the wisdom of God is more admirable than if he communicated to particular creatures and motions the characters and impressions of his Providence. It is only superficial thinking which does not get beyond secondary causes and see their dependence on Providence.

245. Ficino had introduced the concept of religion as an "instinct common and natural to all peoples, by which a Providence governing the world is everywhere and always conceived and adored" (Theolog. Platon. XIV, 9), and Bacon distinguishes metaphysics, the study of formal and final causes, from natural theology, the knowledge or rudiments of knowledge of God obtained not, like divine theology, from divine inspiration, but from the contemplation of his creatures, a knowledge which is divine in respect of the object and natural in respect of the light. This study is sufficient to demonstrate God's power, goodness and providence, but not to reveal the mysteries of the divine character, which faith alone can do. Just as the works of a workman show the power and skill of the workman but not his image, so the works of God show only the omnipotence and wisdom of the Maker and not his image (Advancement of Learning, II, 6). This distinction between natural theology and divine theology is a distinction of content, so that to pursue natural theology /
theology involves, since such theology is natural in being common, putting aside anything specifically Christian. 246. Bacon's concept of nature as the instrument of human aims is radically different from the Greek concept. For the Greeks the contrast between the natural, which is invariable, and the positive, varying human custom, was to the disadvantage of the latter, and the ultimate aim of life was (explicitly with the Stoics) to live docilely in conformity with nature. The Renaissance, on the other hand, whose indocility appears sometimes as quite extravagant wickedness, asks with Galileo how the person who depreciates change would like to see the Gorgon's head and be turned into marble (Intorno alle macchie solari, Opere, ed. naz., V, 234 sq.; 260), and with Bacon regards obedience to nature as a tactical manoeuvre to enable man to dominate over her. We can thus appreciate why Bacon, though he considered Telesio to be the best of the "moderns", summed him up as better at destroying than constructing (De principiis, Ellis III, p. 94, 114). What Telesio did effectively was not so much to provide a new philosophy of nature as to destroy the transcendence of form to matter. Telesian naturalism is not the naturalism of the Pre-Sokratics, for it is reached by denying the transcendence of form to matter, whereas /
whereas in the Pre-Sokratics the distinction does not even occur.

247. The overcoming of the transcendence of form to matter modifies the old conception of freaks. Freaks had seemed to Aristotle the result of the recalcitrance of matter to form and to Ibn Roschid likewise an instance of the resistance of matter to the divine care. Now a freak (monstrum) is an animal which either lacks something that belongs to its nature, like a dumb or blind man, or has something excessive, like a man with six fingers. Ibn Roschid's argument was that as freaks are imperfect they cannot depend on God who does everything perfectly. In its own kind, however, the Renaissance thinker Vanini pointed out, the freak is supremely perfect, for it would not be what it is unless it were in its own highest kind of being, which may seem imperfect if compared to others, but then the comparison is not proper, since the snail is imperfect if compared to the mole, the mole is imperfect if compared to the dog, the dog is imperfect if compared to man, and everything piled together is imperfect if compared to God. So strictly there is nothing maimed in Nature. The birth of freaks is to be ascribed to natural genetic causes (Amphitheatrum Aeternae Providentiae XXXIX-XLI).

248. Vanini argues, in support of Plato, that
the world is in the best possible state because it was
created and is ruled by the best of all rulers.
Genesis I, 31 describes how God contemplated all the
things that he had made and thought them very good.
This is true, because everything created by God is
supremely good, since from the absolute supreme good
nothing can proceed except the supreme good in every
kind or grade of being. Man in his own kind is
supremely good; the bug and the flea and everything,
in its own essential limitations, is supremely good.
For they would not be what they are, unless they were
in their own highest kind and grade of being (Op. cit.
XVII). In other words there is nothing wrong with
the flea so long as you consider it as a flea.

249. Telesio had attacked Aristotle's theory of
the heavens being composed of a matter superior to sub-
lunar matter (De rerum natura, II, 3-18), and Vanini
disposes quickly of the elaborations of this theory
made by the Neo-Platonists and Ibn Roschid. The Neo-
Platonists had urged that just as there is a certain
material form which exists in the first matter and
therefore can hardly be called form (i.e. the form of
corporeality), so there is a certain matter which can
hardly be styled matter; this is the matter of the
heavens and is called formal matter. Vanini objects
that matter is only differentiated by the arrival of
form.
form. Ibn Roschid had said that the heavens were material but incorporeal. Vanini retorts that this is a purely verbal distinction with no real basis. The matter of the celestial bodies is the matter of our world (materia nostras) and their motion is directed to the advantage of the lower world (Amphi-theatrum V; De Admirandis Naturae Reginae Deaeque Mortalium Arcanis II).

250. This parification of heavens and earth was principally the work of Giordano Bruno. Bruno adopted the Copernican theory of the movement of the earth, thus displacing it from its special position as the centre of the universe, but not to establish a heliocentric conception, since for Bruno, who had learnt from Cusanus, the universe is infinite and therefore has no absolute centre or circumference (Cena de le ceneri, Dial. III, ed. Gentile² p. 78 sq.). To the question what is the quality of the globes other than the earth, Bruno replies that the other globes which are earths do not differ at all from this earth in kind, but only in being greater or smaller, though the spheres which are fire like the sun differ in kind as the hot and the cold, as what is bright through itself and what is bright through something else (Op. cit. p. 80 sq.).

251. From this standpoint the stars lose their privileged /
privileged position as the external producers of motion in the earth. According to Bruno we find that the earth and all the bodies which are called stars, the chief members of the universe, just as they give life and nourishment to the things which derive their matter from them and restore it to them, much more so have life in themselves; and so with an ordered and natural will they move from an inner principle to the things and through the places suitable to them. As the male moves to the female and the female to the male, every plant and animal more or less obviously moves to its vital principle. Everything proceeds to find its like and avoid its opposite. Accordingly the earth and the other stars move according to their own local differences from the inner principle which is their own soul. To say that the earth is animate does not mean that it has organs just like ours, but the parts of the animals which we ordinarily call animals are in continual alteration and movement, with a certain flux and reflux, always taking in something from outside and putting out something from inside, and in the same way the earth suffers the efflux and influx of its parts (Op. cit. 83 sq.).

252. In an impassioned outburst Bruno claims to have liberated human reason from the chains of fantastic moveables and movers, eight, nine and ten. We /
We know that there is but one heaven, an immense ethereal region, where these splendid lights keep their own distances. These flaming bodies are the ambassadors who proclaim the excellence of the glory and majesty of God. Thus we are led to discover the infinite effect of the infinite cause, the true and living footprint of the infinite power; and we have learnt not to seek divinity at a distance from us, as we have it next to us, or rather within us, more than we are within ourselves, while the inhabitants of the other worlds do not have to seek it next to us, as they have it next to and within themselves, since the moon is no more heaven to us than we are to the moon (Op. cit. Dial. I, p. 27).

253. The overcoming of the remoteness of God leads Bruno to a rehabilitation of matter. Matter, as he elucidates it, is first of all the eternal substrate which remains identical beneath all the change of forms which issue from it and are received into it again. In the second place, it is the unity of possibility and actuality, since it is all that it can be, so that here matter coincides with form. Then just as the change of one corporeal substance into another presupposes matter as the basis both of the community of things and their diversity, the differences in the spiritual world similarly presuppose a substrate. In the /
the same way corporeal matter and spiritual matter must have a common basis. Hence the whole in substance is one (De la causa, principio e uno, Dial. III, pp. 213-224).

254. Thus the differentiation, which Aquinas had made to confute David of Dinant, between God as pure actuality and matter as pure potentiality is negated by the coincidence of absolute actuality and absolute potentiality in the unity of the universe. Bruno appeals to Ps. CXXXIX, v, 12: "Even the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day: the darkness and the light are both alike to thee". The unity of actuality and potentiality had already been demonstrated by Bruno's hero Cusanus at the beginning of his "De possest", but Bruno emphasizes its anti-Thomist significance by vindicating David of Dinant for taking matter as most excellent and divine (De la causa, Proemiale epistola, p. 139; Dial. III, p. 222). Bruno illustrates the coincidence of opposites not only with Cusanus' geometrical examples but also with physical instances, hot and cold, decay and growth, love and hate, concave and convex, and so on. Is not the end of the decaying thing the beginning of the growing one? Hatred of the opposed is love of the agreeable; love of this is hate of that. So in substance and root love and hate are one and the same thing. /
thing. Where does the doctor get the antidote except from the poison? What produces a better toxoid than the viper? The concave dwells in the convex, the hot-tempered man lives attached to the patient man, the humble man is most agreeable to the proud, the generous man to the miser (Op. cit. Dial. V, p. 262 sqq.).

255. How does spirit fill the universe? Bruno's answer is that the soul of the world and divinity are present not corporeally and dimensionally but spiritually. They are wholly in the whole and wholly in every part, whereas what is corporeally present is only partly in the part. Bruno has recourse to Plotinos (Enneads IV, 4, 12) for an admittedly rough illustration. You can imagine a voice which is wholly in the whole of a room and in every part of it, because it is heard throughout (Op. cit. Dial. II, p. 195 sq.). This immanentistic concept does not involve the identification of natural objects as such with God. In fact Bruno remarks that nobody ever worshipped crocodiles, cocks and so on as such, but the divinity in crocodiles and cocks (Spaccio de la bestia trionfante, Dial. III, p. 177).

256. The infinite universe is conceived negatively in Cusanus' fashion. In this infinite all things are indifferent, for you do not approximate more closely to the infinite by being a man than by being
an ant (De la causa, Dial. V, p. 249). The finite differs from the infinite not in what it is but in what it is not. The reason for death, decay, vice, monsters, etc., is that finite entities are not actually all that they are potentially. They try to be everything, but being unable to be everything at once, they lose one being in having another, and sometimes they confuse one being with another and thus are enfeebled, defective or distorted through the incompatibility of this being with that (Op. cit. Dial. III, p. 220). Yet as everything proceeds from God everything is really good. It seems otherwise only when you do not see anything but the present, just as the beauty of a building is not apparent when you only see a stone or a piece of cement, and is most apparent when you see the whole and can compare the parts together (De l'infinito, universo e mondi, Proemiale Epistola, p. 282).

Besides this soul of the world Bruno conceives a supreme principle which is in itself absolutely unknowable and can be known only through its effects, as Apelles is known through his portrait of Helen, though admittedly the comparison is not exact because we can see and examine Apelles' works part by part, whereas we cannot do that with the infinite effect of the divine power. According to Bruno philosophy must content /
content itself with contemplating the infinite universe and leave to theology the apprehension of the absolutely supreme principle, which is grasped not by natural but by supernatural light (De la causa, Dial. II, p. 175; Dial. IV, p. 240). There is an obvious contradiction in Bruno's thought, for there cannot be another infinite besides the infinite Nature which is all that it can be, the union of possibility and actuality. The contradiction is, however, fundamental in Bruno's philosophy. At his trial in Venice he stated that he believed the universal Providence, by virtue of which everything lived, grew, moved and stood in its perfection, to be present in two ways: the first was the way in which the soul was present in the body, i.e. wholly in the whole and wholly in the part, which he called Nature, the shadow and footprint of divinity, and the second was the ineffable way in which God was in all and above all (v. G. Gentile, Giordano Bruno e il pensiero del Rinascimento, p. 55).

258. Other thinkers simply eliminated the ghost of the Medieval transcendent God. Apart from Spinoza, who intrepidly equated Nature with God, Zwingli described God as controlling the universe in the way that reason controls the human body, meaning by "reason" the power by which man decides to act in this way or that (Sämtliche Werke III, p. 842). Vanini, again, who was /
was martyred in 1619, 19 years after Bruno, openly acclaims Nature as "Queen and Goddess of mortals", and after remarking on the ineptitude of the Thomist definition of Providence, the idea of the order of things, in that it defines what is provided in things and not the providing, proceeds to accept Cardano's theory (De rerum varietate, 93) of God as the soul of the universe (Amphitheatrum, III; XI). At his trial when charged with atheism Vanini epitomized the philosophy of the Renaissance, which is no mere entertainment of propositions but a faith, by picking up a straw and telling his judges that even this would suffice to convince him of the existence of God (v. Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Michelet, Vol. III, p. 244).

259. This marks the end of Thomism with its notion of God as the external Mover. True, there are Neo-Thomists to this day, but Thomism has entered into the eternal and generous rhythm of the history of philosophy. Thomism was a genuine philosophy, which Thomas thought out for himself and maintained against strong opposition from the theologians of his time. Neo-Thomism is now an officially encouraged doctrine - it was sanctioned and supported in Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical "Aeterni Patris" of 4th Aug. 1879. As Croce has pointed out, the Counter-Reformation differed from the Renaissance and Reformation in that it championed not /
not human ideals but an institution (Storia dell' Età barocca in Italia, p. 9 sq.). M. Maritain, one of the most eminent of Neo-Thomists, declares illuminatingly that St. Thomas supplies Catholicism with its "intellectual arms" (True Humanism, Eng. tr. p. 64). This is the point; Thomist theology is now merely ancillary to Catholicism, which since 1870 has been Curialism. Thomism is indeed only one of the intellectual arms of Curialism, for M. Maritain is ready to use Freud to attack the rationalist conception of human personality and rehabilitate "intervention from without" (Op. cit. p. 20-22). Neo-Thomism is logical as a tactical defence of Curialism, but it is powerless to understand the Reformation and the Renaissance, for it moves from a presupposition which they have abandoned. M. Maritain distinguishes between a theocentric and an anthropocentric humanism, (Op. cit. p. 19) but does not as a Thomist consider the possibility of that anthropocentric humanism which the Reformation and Renaissance strove to achieve. Yet Curialism itself accepts the Protestant principle of "private judgement", i.e. the autonomy of human thought, which it reproduces in its most pronounced form, though limited to one man and to certain of his utterances, as the dogma of Papal Infallibility.

260. Bruno, as we saw, still retained the external /
external Mover in his philosophy, though the notion is simply mentioned and plays no real part. Yet, like Telesio before him, he is not less resolute than Cardano or Vanini. His introduction of an external principle has no positive value, but it indicates his recognition of the inadequacy of the category of Nature when applied to God. As Calvin said, the identification of Nature with God may be meant quite piously, but it is harsh and inexact, for strictly Nature is not God himself but the order prescribed by him (Inst. I, 5, 5).
261. Spinoza transformed Bruno's Nature by geometrizing it, forming a more rigorous conception, but eliminating that coincidence of opposites, which, like Telesio's clash of heat and cold, had been the recognition of the conflict of reality. Bruno had ridiculed the exclusive use of mathematics in the study of Nature, saying that without physical cognitions knowing how to count and measure and geometrize was a pastime for ingenious madmen, and he had emphasized the distinction between mathematical signs and real causes (Cena de le ceneri, Dial. III, p. 67; Dial. V, p. 112 sq.). The general trend of thought, however, was to a Platonizing conception of the mathematical formation of the world, though this formation was viewed as creation and not, as with Plato himself, as the imposition of a mathematical order on a somewhat recalcitrant material. In Kepler's view God created the world in accordance with standards of quantity, and hence made the human mind such that it can know only by quantity (Opera ed. Frisch, I, p. 31). Galileo champions the same thesis when he declares that philosophy is written in the great book of the universe which /
which is always before our eyes, but that we cannot understand it until we have learnt the language and the characters in which it is written. The language is mathematics and the characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without the aid of which you cannot understand a word and wander helplessly through a dark labyrinth (Saggiatore, Opere ed. naz. VI, p. 232).

262. Galileo accepted the Copernican theory of the revolution of the earth round the sun which was attacked on the ground of its incompatibility with statements in the O.T. about the sun moving. To meet this attack he elaborates a thought of Bruno's (Cena de le ceneri, Dial. IV, p. 91). The world is God's works and the Bible is his words. Now while the Bible cannot lie, yet it is not always to be taken literally, which would lead to heresy and indeed blasphemy, by involving the attribution to God of hands, feet and eyes, and of human feelings like anger, repentance and hatred. In natural problems we should begin from sensuous experiences and necessary demonstrations and use these to interpret Scripture, because while Scripture and nature proceed equally from the divine Word, the former as the dictation of the Holy Spirit and the latter as the most obedient executrix of God's dispositions, Scripture has to be made to suit the limited /
limited intelligence of the common people and so to say what is apparently in conflict with the absolute truth, nature is inexorable and never departs from the bounds of the laws imposed on her, being indifferent whether or not her hidden reasons and modes of working are made clear to human intelligence. Hence what sensuous experience lays before our eyes or necessary demonstration concludes should never be brought in question, let alone condemned, by passages of Scripture which are in verbal contradiction to it.

263. Not that the passages of Scripture are not to be given the highest consideration, but Scripture aims at teaching men the articles of faith about the salvation of the soul which men could never have learnt in any other way. It is not necessary to believe that when God gave us sense, discourse and intellect he wished to give us in any other way the information which we could acquire by means of these, and so have us deny sense and intellect even in natural matters, especially in sciences like astronomy which are hardly touched on in the Bible (Letter to the Grand Duchess of Tuscany, Opere V, 309-348; Letter to Diodati, XV, p. 23 sq.).

264. The old unknowability of nature is overcome by the concept of its Providential ordering by mathematical laws, i.e. quantitative relations. Galileo distinguishes /
distinguishes between extensive and intensive knowledge. In comparison with the infinite number of intelligible things, human knowledge is admittedly negligible, but as far as concerns knowing things intensively, i.e. perfectly, the human intellect understands some propositions as perfectly and with as absolute a certainty as nature herself. Such propositions belong to the pure mathematical sciences, arithmetic and geometry. In this sphere the divine mind knows far more propositions than the human mind, but in the case of the few that the human mind does understand its cognition equals the divine in objective certainty, since it comes to comprehend their necessity, and there is no certainty greater than that (Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, Opere VII, p. 128 sq.). It was this confidence in human thinking which enabled Galileo to establish the Copernican theory, in which, as he says himself, reason outrages the senses (Op. cit. p. 355).

265. The adoption of the mathematical method in the study of nature marks the transition from the Renaissance to the Age of Natural Science. The Renaissance did not consider the problem of method as such, and the agglomeration of different methods is illustrated in the title of Vanini's book on Providence, "Amphitheatrum aeternae providentiae divino-magicum, christiano-physicum, necnon astrologo-catholicum".

The /
The new conception is not simply that nature has quantitative determinations, but that these are its real determinations, for Galileo, like the Greek Atomists (Cf. Theophrastos, De sensu, 63 - Demokritos A135, Diels; Epikuros, Ep. I, 54), considers qualities such as tastes and odours not to be determinations of objects but merely modifications of our senses resulting from the movement of bodies (Saggiatore, Opere VI, p. 347 sq.).

266. The presupposition of the mathematical ordering of nature by Providence is the justification of applied mathematics and the foundation of modern natural science. Galileo's pupil Torricelli is as clear as Galileo himself that the characters of the great manuscript of the divine philosophy written in the book of the Universe are nothing but the figures seen in geometrical elements (Lezioni accademiche, in Croce, Saggio sullo Hegel, p. 266). Yet while the confidence reposed in this science is characteristic of the Renaissance vindication of the value of man, the nature which is the object of this science is a nature indifferent to man. As regards the comparative value of God's works and his words, the Calvinists had no doubt that God's works manifested his goodness, wisdom and power sufficiently to leave men inexcusable, but only Scripture could give the knowledge of God
and of his will necessary to salvation (Westminster
Confession of Faith, I, 1). Galileo also, even though
in natural matters he sets nature above the Bible be-
cause it is not accommodated to human weakness, thinks
that only the Bible deals with salvation. Because,
however, God's works are grasped by sense and intellect,
and God's words are given by revelation, Galileo's very
defence of the independence of natural science leads
him to conceive nature as a mechanical system indiffer-
ent to man's highest ends.

267. Descartes forms a rigorously mechanical con-
cept of Nature as extended substance, which he distin-
guishes from the thinking substance which is mind
(Principles, I, 8-12). A purely mechanical system
cannot be a first principle, for it cannot account for
itself, and so Descartes ascribes to God the creation
of matter with motion and rest and the maintenance by
his ordinary concourse of the same amount of motion and
rest in the universe (Op. cit. II, 36). It was Spinoza
who attempted by identifying Nature with God to con-
ceive Nature as a principle which accounts for itself.

268. Spinoza conceives God as substance, i.e.
that the concept of which does not require the concept
of something else from which it has to be formed, and
so as causa sui, i.e. that whose essence involves
existence (Ethics I, Def. I). The existence of finite
natural /
natural things is not involved in their essence (it is not possible e.g. to infer from what it is to be a tree that any trees actually exist). Their essence is the same before they came into existence as it is when they have come into existence. As, then, the beginning of their existence cannot be inferred from their essence, so neither can their continuing to exist, but they require the same power to enable them to continue their existence as that which enabled them to come into existence. Hence the power by which natural things exist and act can be nothing but the eternal power of God (Tract. Pol. II). God alone is free since he is the only being that exists and acts from the mere necessity of its nature (Ethics, Part I, Prop. 17, Coroll. 2).

269. The relation of God to the world is that of ground to consequence. The infinite variations of the world follow from the essence of God as the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles follows from the nature of the triangle (Ethics, Part I, Prop. 17, Note). It seems at first sight surprising that Spinoza should reduce all the restlessness of Nature to an eternal calm, but after all to the astronomer who calculates an eclipse the future position of moving heavenly bodies is nothing but an inference from their determinations, velocity, direction etc., at the time of his calculation. Nature is a self-identical whole, in which everything is the inevitable outcome of its /
its conditions. Spinoza himself, however, admits that, as it is obviously impossible for us to know exactly how particular events are ordered and concatenated, it is preferable, or rather necessary, for us for practical purposes to consider things as contingent (Tract. Theo.-Pol.IV).

270. All events obey the laws of Nature. Law is that according to which each individual, either everything or everything belonging to a species, acts in one fixed and determined manner, depending either on natural necessity or human decision. Law which depends on natural necessity is that which follows necessarily from the very nature or definition of a thing; e.g. that all bodies striking other smaller ones lose as much of their motion as they impart to the others is a universal law of bodies. This concept of Nature is more elaborate than the Greek. Uniformity and unalterability were part of the Greek concept of Nature — fire burns, as Aristotle says, the same in Persia as in Hellas, and a stone always falls to the ground however often you throw it into the air (E.N. V, 7; I, 2) — and the Stoics had thought of all events as occurring by an immutable concatenation of causes, but, as Spinoza remarks, the general notion of Fate does not help much in elucidating particular questions. Nature is now conceived as a system of definite laws.

271. These /
271. These laws are universal and necessary. But necessity, the character of that whose opposite is self-contradictory, follows only from the divine decree, which is the same as the divine understanding, for with God intellect and will are the same. The universal laws of Nature are therefore decrees of God following from the necessity and perfection of the divine nature. Providence is really nothing other than the order of Nature. Spinoza ridicules the popular refusal to recognise the working of Providence in anything except the spectacular and attacks the current idea that Providential activity involves a setting aside of secondary causes, as though God ceased to act when Nature began and vice versa. To reconcile his denial of any supersession of natural causes with the Bible he explains Scriptural miracles as being really due to natural causes or as metaphors, though maintaining that if any instances cannot be so explained they are to be rejected as irreligious interpolations (Tract. Theo-Pol. VI).

272. The ordinary difficulties in the concept of Providence accordingly vanish. Good and evil do not exist in Nature; they are mere relations, for we call things good or bad only in relation to our purposes or to some general idea, e.g. we call a clock good if it tells the time as its maker intended it to and bad if it does not. Strictly, however, when considered apart /
apart from its maker's intention and not as an instance of the general idea of clock but as what it is itself, and after all it is upon individual things that Providence is exercised - it does just what it is its nature to do. Spinoza concludes, like Vanini, that in Nature everything is perfect. To ask why God did not make Peter and Paul like Adam before the Fall is to forget that in that case Peter and Paul would be Adam and not Peter and Paul (Short Tractate I, 6, 10).

273. In Nature, then, good and evil are purely artificial characterizations of ours; the highest category is that of power, which is the essence of God (Tract. Theo.-Pol. IV). Hobbes, who followed Telesio's naturalism in reducing morality to the striving for self-preservation, had previously found in God's omnipotence the key to theodicy, interpreting the mystical dissolution of Job's problem, where the appearance of God in his power and glory stills Job's doubts about why he permits the innocent to suffer misfortune, as an argument that as right derives from power and God is omnipotent, everything that he does is right (Leviathan II, ch. 31). Spinoza conceives Providence as the striving for self-preservation, which is the supreme Law of Nature (Tract. Theo.-Pol. XVI, and distinguishes a general Providence, by which all things are produced and preserved in so far as they are parts of Nature as a whole, from a special Providence /
Providence, which is the striving of each thing separately to maintain and extend its existence. God acts by a changeless Predestination, for if he omitted to do anything that he could or changed his mind it would be an imperfection in him (Short Tractate III-IV).

274. Like the Stoics, Spinoza views Nature as a divine system in which all events occur by an immutable necessity, but the difference in their views comes out clearly in the very different ways in which they conceive of Providence. Reality for the Stoics was both Reason and Nature, but the two were juxtaposed rather than connected, and as Reason meant purposive activity and as the purpose of the world was taken as the good of gods and men, the Stoics had to attempt to show that what happened by necessity from antecedent causes was also for men's good. But Spinoza comes after Galileo and his Nature is a geometrical Nature. (The two attributes of thought and extension are not so clumsily set together in Spinoza as is sometimes alleged, for in the case of geometrical figures extension and thought do coincide). He takes the rationality of Nature as nothing but the obedience of all events to intelligible natural laws, so that natural and logical necessity coincide, while - except in so far as the effort to preserve itself belongs to the essence of everything (Ethics Part III, Prop. 7) - purposivity as a /
a metaphysical category is decisively rejected. Final causes are only fictions; the endeavour to show that Nature does nothing in vain leads to the conclusion that Nature is mad! The supposed order in the world is a product of the imagination, as we call things well-arranged if they are so disposed that we can imagine them easily and so readily remember them (Ethics Part I App.).

275. If therefore Spinoza is strongly reminiscent of the Greeks in his search for an abiding essence beneath the change of the sensible, in his view that when grasped by reason things are seen under the form of eternity, temporal relations being the product of the imagination, and in his recognition that a reality which eternally is all that it can be renders man’s freedom illusory and leaves him nothing but contemplation, he is utterly opposed to them in his denial of order in the universe, as for them the universe was from its very name order (cosmos), the metaphor being taken from the marshalling of troops.

276. The highest folly seems to Spinoza to suppose that man is the chief part of Nature or that particular peoples are specially favoured by God. He claims accordingly that while almost all the prophets found it very hard to reconcile the order of Nature and the affairs of mankind with the concept which they had /
had formed of Providence, the matter is perfectly plain to the philosopher who tries to understand things not from miracles but from clear concepts. The philosopher recognizes that God directs Nature according to his universal laws, and therefore takes account not of man alone but of the whole of Nature (Tract. Theo.-Pol. VI). Spinoza is right; the ailments of Job present no difficulty when they are considered purely as medical problems, as cases to be subsumed under some universal law.

277. Spinoza was styled "atheist" by Bayle in the very first sentence of the relevant article in his Dictionary. As Hegel says, Spinoza was not really an atheist but an acosmist, only people consider it quite reasonable to deny the existence of God but perfectly inconceivable to deny the existence of the world (Enc. 50). The label stuck, for most people find it too laborious to understand someone's thought and prefer to invent a system for him which suits the label applied to him. Spinoza's Nature, which he expressly protests includes an infinite number of things besides matter and its modifications, is an Infinite reached by denying all determinations, on the principle that determination is negation. This is the Infinite of Cusanus and Bruno, the Infinite to which all things are equally related. Now when Spinoza ridicules the popular /
popular idea of an intermittent Providence, he fails to grasp the truth behind it, which is that all things are not equally related to God. His concept of Providence is indeed open to the objection which Richard Price brought against Priestley's necessitarian system, that the whole creation is nothing but the divine agency; and consequently it must be nothing at all. "For what idea can be formed of the creation of the divine agency; or of an agency that acts upon itself?" (Free Discussion of the doctrines of Materialism etc. p. 339). On the title-page of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Spinoza put the text I John IV, 13, which says that we know that we abide in God and God in us because he has given us a share in his spirit, but he failed to notice what he could have learnt from Irenaeus (Contra haereses IV, 38, 4) - that unity with the divine is not an immediate unity - man can become the son of God but he is not so to begin with.

278. Spinoza was no atheist, but his conception of God as power is inadequate, and, as Schopenhauer remarks (Parerga und Paralipomena, 69), the identification of God and Nature means merely giving another name to Nature. The Illuminist Holbach said that if all that was meant by the word "atheist" was someone who denied the existence of a power in matter and if the name "God" were given to this power, then he quite admitted that no atheists existed (Système de la Nature II, ch. 11).
CHAPTER V.

Leibniz.

279. Protestantism rejected the radical theories of Spinoza and held rather to the Telesian notion of a world to be explained on its own principles with a Creator external to it though preserving it. Providence is therefore to be looked for in the structure and contrivance of the universe and its parts, in things having been made in a certain way. From the Telesian standpoint Leibniz ridiculed the Newtonian conception of God having to intervene in the affairs of the world, as though it were a sort of watch which he had to wind up from time to time to prevent its running down (Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, 1st letter), being unable to endow it with perpetual motion, and having made it so imperfect that it had to be set right from time to time. The English theologian Clarke objected that to conceive the world as a great machine moving without God's intervention in the way that a clock continues to go without the aid of the clock-maker was to introduce materialism and fatalism and to banish Providence from the world. The sceptic, he urged, might easily accept the view that after the creation everything in the world happens without Providence /
Providence playing any part in it, and push this to the conclusion that things have gone from all eternity as they go at present, and that it is unnecessary to admit a creation or any author of the world other than Nature (First Reply 4).

280. In reply Leibniz explained that what he meant was not that the world was a machine which went without the intervention of God, or that his creatures had no need of his continual influence, but that it did not require setting right, God having foreseen everything and provided for everything in advance (Second Letter 8). Clarke agreed that God's wisdom and foreknowledge consisted in his having from the beginning a design which his power put continually into execution (Second Reply 9). Thus for both thinkers there can be no novelty in reality. The present is pregnant with the future (Théodicée 360). The whole history of mankind is contained in God's notion of Adam (Letter to Landgraf von Hessen - Rheinfels, 1686). The world is, then, as in Campanella's poetic vision, a theatre in which souls act in accordance with the scenario of the divine comedy (Poésie, ed. Gentile, No. 14). The English Necessitarian Priestley considered the happy effect of his doctrine to be self-annihilation (Free Discussion of Materialism etc. p. 313; cf. p. 356). As it appeared to Crabbe's Edward Shore,
"We think our actions from ourselves proceed, 
And idly we lament th' inevitable deed; 
It seems our own, but there's a power above 
Directs the motion, nay, that makes us move; 
Nor good nor evil can you beings name, 
Who are but rocks and castles in the game; 
Superior natures with their puppets play, 
Till, bagg'd or buried, all are swept away!"

281. To meet the difficulty that human freedom is eliminated Leibniz proposed a distinction between absolute and conditional necessity. Like Chrysippos he thought that true statements could be made about the future, but that future events, though certain, were nevertheless contingent. Absolute necessity belongs to that the opposite of which involves self-contradiction, whereas future events, even though they infallibly will happen, are still contingent, i.e. something else is conceivable (Théod. 36-37). Leibniz attacks the Necessitarian theory of Spinoza, according to which everything exists by the necessity of the divine nature, without God's making any choice, on the ground that this theory would mean that it was as impossible from all eternity that Spinoza should not die at The Hague as it is for $2 + 2 = 6$. It is true that Spinoza did die at The Hague, but it would not be self-contradictory to say that he died at Leyden. Historical events are therefore not absolutely necessary, which admittedly would be incompatible with human freedom, but necessary only in that they are decreed /
282. Leibniz is insistent on God’s acting for some reason, as against both Spinoza and the notion of the mere will, remarking on the second point that even Calvin had conceived God as acting not from no reasons at all but from reasons unknown to us. Now as there is a reason why everything is as it is and not otherwise, there must, Leibniz argues, be some reason why God acted as he did in the creation. The reason why God chose to realize this world must be that it is the best of all possible worlds, which he knows through his wisdom, chooses through his goodness, and realizes through his power (Monadology, 53-55).

283. Leibniz takes up Valla’s dialogue and adds another chapter. He makes Sextus Tarquin leave Apollo and go to consult Jupiter at Dodona. Sextus asks Jupiter why he does not give him another heart and lot. Jupiter tells him that he will be happy if he renounces Rome. Sextus cannot reconcile himself to that and rushes out of the temple, abandoning himself to his destiny. The priest Theodorus wonders why Jupiter could not have given Sextus another will. To allay his misgivings Pallas takes him in a vision to the palace of the Fates, which contains representations not only of what does occur but of everything possible, so that he can see what would have happened if /
if things had been different. In the different apartments which contain the various possible worlds he sees one Sextus going to Corinth, buying a garden, finding a treasure in it and dying in a ripe old age, beloved by the whole city. In another apartment he sees a Sextus going to Thrace, marrying the King's daughter and being adored by his subjects. In the topmost apartment, which holds the best of all the possible worlds, he sees Sextus as he is and as he actually will be, dashing from the temple in a fury, reaching Rome and throwing everything into confusion, and from his crimes springing the Roman Empire. Pallas tells Theodorus that now he sees that her father has not made Sextus bad, for he was bad from all eternity. Jupiter has only made him pass from the realm of the possible to that of the actual (Théod. 413-416).

284. The necessity by which God realizes the best of all possible worlds is, according to Leibniz, not a metaphysical or absolute necessity but a moral one, the necessity which makes a respectable magistrate refrain from running naked through the streets for fun, though such an action on his part would not involve self-contradiction (Théod. 282). It is the necessity which makes a wise being choose the best course. It follows that the world which he has chosen is the best of all the possible ones.

285. This /
285. This does not mean that everything, taken by itself, is as good as possible. Such an inference is certainly valid in mathematics; if AB is the shortest distance from A to B and C is a point on AB, then AC is the shortest distance from A to C. But where qualitative determinations are in question this inference no longer holds; the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful. Leibniz therefore explicitly endorses the saying of Thomas (Contra Gent. II, 71) that it belongs to a prudent ruler to neglect some deficiency of goodness in the part to secure an increase of goodness in the whole (Théod. 212-214).

286. He agrees with Chrysippos that the evils which God permits are consequential. The evil which God allows is not an object of his will as end or means, but only as a condition indispensable to the greatest good of the universe. Without the crimes of Sextus there would be no Roman Empire; without the "felix culpa" of Adam there would be no Redemption (Théod. 209; 336). Leibniz here adopts the Thomist distinction between the antecedent and the consequent or decretory will of God. God's antecedent will is directed towards the production of good and the prevention of evil, everything being considered by itself, according to the measure of the degree of each good and each evil; whereas his consequent will is directed
towards the production of as many goods as can coexist, the combination of which is determined by that and involves the permission of some evils and the exclusion of some goods, according as the best possible plan of the universe requires.

287. Leibniz reaffirms the classic doctrine of the negativity of evil, which he divides into metaphysical, i.e. simple imperfection, moral, i.e. sin, and physical, i.e. suffering, which derives either from moral or metaphysical evil. He illustrates the notion with the image of two boats drifting down a stream, one with a cargo of wood, the other with a cargo of stones. The boat with the heavier load moves more slowly than the other, though it is carried by the same current. The force which the current exercises on the boats and communicates to them is like the divine action in producing and conserving all that is positive in creatures and giving them perfection, being, and force, while the inertia of matter corresponds to natural imperfection and the slowness of the boat to the defect which is found in the qualities and action of the creature. The current is the cause of the movement but not of its retardation; similarly God is the cause of perfection in the nature and actions of the creature, but the limitation of the creature's receptivity is the cause of the defects in its
its actions. God accordingly is the cause of the
matter of evil, which is positive, but not of the form
of evil, which consists of privation, just as the cur-
rent is the cause of the matter of the retardation with-
out being the cause of its form, i.e. it is the cause
of the speed of the boat without being the cause of the
limits of that speed. God is as little the cause of
sin as the current is the cause of the slowness of the
boat (Théod. 30).

288. Hence Leibniz reaffirms as valid the Platonic
testory of the world's having its origin in understanding
conjoined with necessity, explicitly giving it a new
sense, however, by taking necessity not as what Aris-
totle called matter, but as the essential nature of
things. It is the region of eternal truths, the
object of the divine understanding, which is the source
of evil (Op. cit. 20). God is not the author of the
essences in so far as they are mere possibilities, but
he has decreed and given existence to everything that is
actual, and he has permitted evils because involved in
the best plan in the realm of the possibles (Op. cit.
335). The thesis that this is the best of all possible
worlds is a general principle and does not mean that one
can recognize Providence in every detail. For that
knowledge we must wait till the next world. Providence
is, however, to be discerned in wholes, e.g. the solar
system /
system, a plant or an animal (Op. cit. 145-146).

289. Leibniz has no difficulty in defending the traditional theory of the origin of evil against the dualism of Bayle. Bayle contended, as superficial thinkers of every age contend, imagining that they have come across something which traditional thought has overlooked, that when you argue a posteriori, i.e. from facts, you have to posit opposing principles of good and evil. Leibniz points out that it is the sheerest scholasticism to posit a good principle for the good that exists and an evil one for the evil that exists. Why not a primum frigidum for the cold that exists? (Op. cit. 152-153).
CHAPTER VI

The Optimists.

290. In the case of Leibniz optimism is tempered by his denial that God's sole aim is human happiness (Théod. 118), and by his insistence that the way to salvation is ordinarily the way of suffering and bearing the cross of Christ (Op. cit. 122), though this rather points to a defect in his thought than remedies it. Optimism becomes intoxicated, however, when it rests upon a frankly utilitarian concept of goodness, as with Soame Jenyns, to whom the production of happiness seems the only motive that could induce infinite Goodness to exert infinite power to create all things, happiness being the only thing of real value in existence, virtue, religion and so on being of value only as means to happiness (Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil, Letter III). Priestley, who likewise considers God's purpose to be the greatest happiness of his creatures, regards Necessitarianism as leading us to "consider ourselves, and every thing else as at the uncontrolled disposal of the greatest and best of beings; that, strictly speaking nothing does, or can, go wrong; that all retrograde motions, in the moral as well as in the natural world, are only apparent, not real, /
real. Being under this infallible guidance, our final destination is certain and glorious. In the language of Pope,

All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good;
And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear, whatever is, is right."

(Free Discussion of Materialism, etc., p. 220).

291. This deistic Optimism is devoid of the grandeur of Stoicism, which had likewise maintained that there was nothing blameworthy in the universe, for whereas the Stoics thought that man had, or was given by God, the power to uproot his feelings and triumph over circumstances, Optimism conceived circumstances as so contrived as automatically to lead to the greatest human good. One ingenious author suggested that the wicked were useful in making the present life a proper school of virtue to those who are going to be saved, and are accordingly like dung in a garden which, though itself loathsome, helps the growth of some choice plants. Richard Price, himself a warm advocate of the doctrine of Providence, was moved to reply magisterially: "The wicked may with no less truth be considered as the weeds and briars that choke the plants, than as the manure that helps their growth. If the temptations and difficulties of human /
human life are the means sometimes of improving virtue, by affording it exercise, they are also generally the very causes which overwhelm and ruin it" (Dissertation on Providence, 1768 ed., p. 141 sq.).

292. The goodness of the world is laboriously investigated. The exponents of natural theology, i.e. theology deemed to be grasped by the unaided light of human reason as opposed to supernatural revelation (cf. Bacon, Advancement of Learning, II, 6), attempt to quote from the Introduction to Derham's "Physico-Theology" - a "demonstration of the Being and Attributes of an infinitely wise and powerful Creator from a cursory Survey of the Works of Creation, or (as often called) of Nature". Derham begins by citing Psalm lill, where the Psalmist says that "the works of the Lord are great; sought out of all them that have pleasure therein" and professes his agreement with the Psalmist that the works of God are "made with the most exquisite Art, contrived with the utmost sagacity, and ordered with plain wise Design, and ministering to admirable Ends" (Ibid.).

293. Derham's "Physico-Theology" is a catalogue of the beauties, necessities and uses of all the works of creation relating to our terraqueous globe, ranging from the outworks or appendages of the globe, viz. the atmosphere, light and gravity, through its constituent parts /
parts up to its inhabitants. It differs from the Stoic sections of Cicero's "De Natura Deorum", from which it quotes freely, chiefly in its more systematic character. From its very nature as part of natural theology it is precluded from considering any doctrine peculiar to Christianity, and so its concept of Providence is entirely lacking in the concept of the Incarnation, which had been the heart of the Reformation and Renaissance concepts of Providence. Whereas, too, the Reformation had attributed to God's Providence an infinite and absolute end, the "praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy" (Westminster Confession of Faith, V, 1), this theology puts forward finite, relative and indeed trivial ends.

Derham's method of demonstration, the so-called physico-theological proof, is to point to observed instances of the beauties and uses of natural objects, and conclude that these must have been designed by a wise and omnipotent Contriver. Derham's range is wider than that of the Stoics, for he regards the Stoic theory of everything being made for man as having been "exploded" since the discovery that the limits of the universe are of infinitely greater extent than the ancients supposed, and he thinks that the "liberal Creator" has provided even for the inferior creatures everything necessary or in any way conducing to their happy and comfortable
comfortable living in this world (Physico-Theology, II ch. 5). He urges, for instance, that the distribution of earth and water is so made as to cause all the parts of the globe to balance and assist each other (Op. cit. II ch. 5), that the soils and moulds of the earth are necessary for the growth of the various vegetables (Op. cit. III ch. 1), and that the earth's strata or beds afford us materials for tools, firing, medicine, money and so on (Op. cit. III ch. 2). It was this procedure of the physico-theologians of observing instances of external purpose that provoked Goethe's joke about cork-trees being created to provide us with stoppers for our bottles: (Conversations with Eckermann, April 11, 1827).

294. Derham also gives cases of the inner purpose which holds in the organic realm, e.g. the curious apparatus in all animals for gathering, preparing and digesting their food (Physico-Theology, IV ch. 11), but he does not grasp the distinction between external and inner teleology, because for him, as for Pope, "all nature is but art", i.e. he conceives God as an external contriver whose Providence consists in adapting material to purposes not inherent in it in a way which differs from human craft only in "supereminent dexterity". Typical of his arguments is that dealing with the clothing of animals:— "The gaudy, or even the meanest /
meanest Apparel which Man provideth for himself, we readily enough own to be the Contrivance, the Work of Man: and shall we deny the Cloathing of all the Animal World besides (which infinitely surpasseth all the Robes of earthly Majesty; shall we, dare we, deny that) to be the Work of any thing less than of an infinite intelligent Being, whose Art and Power are equal to such glorious Work!" (Op. cit. IV ch. 12).

295. Hume disposed of this sort of argument by raising the objection of the ancient Sceptics, that it really presupposed the theory of a grand Designer of the Universe (Dialogues of Natural Religion, Part VII, ed. Kemp-Smith p. 221). We cannot without this presupposition infer from the fact that certain things do suit certain beings that they were intended to do so. Admittedly the inter-adjustment of the parts of vegetables and animals does enable them to exist, but were there not this inter-adjustment the vegetable or animal would cease to exist and something else would come into being (Op. cit. Part VIII, p. 227-228). Pascal made the same point when he said that no canonical writer had ever attempted to prove the existence of God from the works of Nature and that such arguments never convinced unbelievers but only the faithful, who, because they already had the living faith in their hearts, saw that all existence was the work of the God whom they worshipped.
worshipped (Pensées, IV, 242).

296. Optimism was able to survive the loss of the argument from nature or from observation (which is the same thing, for nature is what is apprehended by observation). Leibniz had not reached his optimism by that way, and Rousseau freely admitted that optimism could not be directly proved (much less disproved) from the properties of matter or the mechanics of the universe, but urged that it was an inference from the existence of God, which was apprehended by inner feeling or conscience (Letter to Voltaire 13 Aug. 1756, para. 27-30; cf. Confession de Foi du Vicaire savoyard). It is the conviction, affirmed at the very beginning of the first chapter of "Emile", that God has made all things good, which dominates Rousseau's thought. His notion of man in the state of nature is theological and not anthropological. His natural man resembles not savages but the Paradisal Man of Patristic thought. Education is therefore for Rousseau the task of bringing men into harmony with their natural tendencies. The same optimism appears in Montesquieu, who, keenly alive to the differences of the spirits of different nations and the consequent folly of trying to give them all the same set of laws, conceives spirit naturalistically as the product of various physical and psychical factors, viz. climate, religion, laws, customs and manners, and /
and advises against seeking to correct too much, in case the virtues are removed along with the vices. It is best to leave things to Nature, which puts everything right. "La nature répare tout" (De l'esprit des loix, livre XIX, ch. 4-6). The quietistic character of this optimism is even plainer in Soame Jenyns, who conceives the Almighty repaying the sufferings of all by some kind of equivalent, and considers ignorance in the poor to be the only opiate capable of infusing insensibility to their miseries. "It is a cordial administered by the gracious hand of Providence; of which they ought never to be deprived by an ill-judged and improper Education" (Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil, Letter II).

297. Derham mentions various objections against the optimistic concept of Providence, censuring them as the products not of people's reason but of peevishness. "They have been incommode by Storms and Tempests; they have been terrified with the burning Mountains, and Earthquakes; they have been annoyed by the noxious Animals, and fatigued by the Hills; and therefore are angry, and will pretend to amend these Works of the Almighty" (Physico-Theology, III ch. 4). The Lisbon earthquake of 1755, as we know from Goethe (Poetry and Truth, Part I, Book I), spread terror through the world, and the devout could not agree in what light the disaster...
disaster should be viewed. Voltaire took the opportunity to write a set of satirical verses entitled "Poème sur le Désastre de Lisbonne, ou examen de cet axiome: Tout est bien". He imagined that producing startling examples of human misfortune constituted a refutation of Leibniz, but as Rousseau politely pointed out to him in a letter of 18 August, 1756, Leibniz' position was not that everything was good but that the whole was good or that everything was good for the whole, i.e. that of all possible economies this is the one which combines the least evil with the most good (paragraphs 4-5; 23). Voltaire wrote back on 12 September very amiably but excusing himself on the ground of ill-health from replying immediately on the philosophical issue. In fact he never answered Rousseau on this point, but instead wrote the novel "Candide", in which the hero is brought up on the tenets of the optimistic Dr Pangloss, but after being gradually disillusioned by the unmerited sufferings that he endures and the calamities like the Lisbon earthquake that he perceives, the admirable contrivance of which Dr Pangloss is ever ready to point out, learns at last to cultivate his garden instead of concerning himself with metaphysics.

298. Voltaire's appeal is to the imagination; it is the spectacularity of disasters which strikes him /
him, just as it strikes those who believe that it is more difficult to hold the doctrine of Providence in times of war. But this is not really the point, for as Price remarked in his level way: "No objections can be made against any natural evils overbalanced by good, which may not equally be made against communicating a smaller rather than a larger quantity of good, or granting narrower rather than greater capacities of happiness. Thus, if all the animals on this globe (supposing all along happiness to prevail in their existence) should be exempted from the greater calamities which befall them, they should, for the same reason, be exempted from the smaller, and enjoy a uniform happiness, without being, at any time, in the least annoyed or disturbed. This happiness also they may expect to be the greatest their natures are capable of, and to continue for ever. They ought, therefore, to be immortal, subject to no decay, liable to no accidents, and secure of enjoying every pleasure in the highest possible degree. But we cannot stop here. For the same reason that they ought to be happy to the utmost extent of their capacities, they ought to have had higher capacities. But how extravagant is all this? At this rate, no finite or imperfect Being must ever be created." (Diss. on Providence, p. 112).
CHAPTER VII

The Pessimists.

299. Hume contented himself with affirming the impossibility for natural reason of justifying the character of the Deity (Enquiries, 81) but dissent from optimism proceeded to the logical conclusion indicated by Price. The optimistic theory was resolutely opposed by Schopenhauer and Leopardi, and the complacency of Pope was succeeded by Byron's gloom. The physiognomy of this pessimism is given by Schopenhauer's description of life (in English words) as "a disappointment, nay, a cheat" (Parerga und Paralipomena, II, 146). It is not the serene pessimism of the ancient Hellenes, which rested on a comparison of life with death; it is a bitter pessimism, based on a comparison of life as it is with life as it ought to be. The Sophoklean Chorus declares simply that it is best not to be born and second best to return with all speed whence one came (O.C. 1225 sqq.). But for Byron,

"Our life is a false nature, - 'tis not in
The harmony of things, this hard decree,
This uneradicable taint of sin,
This boundless Upas, this all-blasting tree
Whose root is earth, whose leaves and branches be
The skies, which rain their plagues on men like dew -
Disease, death, bondage, - all the woes we see -
And worse, the woes we see not - which throb through
The immedicable soul, with heart-aches ever new."

(Childe Harold's Pilgrimage CXXVI)

300. Leopardi /
300. Leopardi in one of his dialogues represents an Icelander conversing with Nature. The Icelander explains that he was early convinced of the vanity of life and the foolishness of men, who struggled ceaselessly for pleasures that failed to please and possessions that failed to satisfy, and succeeded only in inflicting real pain on themselves. The more eagerly they sought happiness the more elusive it proved. He therefore decided not to contest anything with anyone but to live in peace and obscurity, despairing of happiness and merely trying to escape suffering. He soon found, however, that he could not secure peace by being inoffensive. So he fled to solitude, only to find suffering from the extreme cold of winter and the intense heat of summer. He tried other climates, but found new troubles, earthquakes, floods and the attacks of wild animals, and now in the desert of Africa he is succumbing to disease. The Icelander accuses Nature of being at war with simple people like himself. Nature replies that she did not design the world for human happiness and would not notice it if the human race disappeared. "Then why," the Icelander asks, "did you make the human race?" Nature answers that the life of the world is a cycle of production and destruction, so interrelated that the one serves the good of the other. The world would pass away if either ceased. "But," enquires /
enquires the Icelander, "with all this cyclical repetition, to whom is the unhappy life of the universe any good, when it is preserved by the suffering and death of all the things that compose it?" At this point two lions appear and devour the Icelander, but they are so famished that this meal keeps them alive for only one more day (Dialogo della natura e di un Islandese).

301. Schopenhauer is equally emphatic. "That a God Jehovah should have produced this world of misery and woe animi causa and de gaieté de coeur, and should then have clapped his hands in praise of himself saying 'τάν πόσιν θεον θεόν' - that is intolerable" (Parerga, II, 156). Schopenhauer finds two things incompatible with belief in the world as the successful work of an omniscient, benevolent and omnipotent Being, first the misery which prevails in it everywhere, and second the obvious imperfection of its highest product, man, who is a caricature of what he ought to be. Even granted Leibniz' contention that this is the best of all possible worlds, this is no theodicy, for the Creator has created not only the world but possibility itself, and hence ought to have ordered possibility so that it would have admitted of something better (Ibid.).

302. Schopenhauer deals peremptorily with the aesthetic and teleological arguments. Granted the beauty of the world, that only concerns what it is to look /
look at, not what it is, and the world is not an exhibition! Granted again that it is only by delicate manoeuvres that the celestial bodies keep from colliding and obliterating the world, that is nothing but an indispensable condition to the world's continuing to exist. A possible world is not one that can be imagined, but one that can actually exist. Now the animals are always on the verge of destruction, and even among men the life of the individual is an unceasing and desperate struggle for existence; if the celestial bodies deviate slightly from their path, if there were terrestrial upheavals, if there were a moderate increase in heat, which would dry up the rivers and springs, then the world would cease to exist. The world is therefore as bad as it can be if it is to exist at all; it is not the best but the worst of all possible worlds (Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, IV, ch. 46).

303. What, then, is the reason for its existence? There is no reason, answers Schopenhauer, since the principle of sufficient reason applies only to objects of our consciousness and not to the subject, which is will. The world is the manifestation of the blind selfish will to live (Ibid.). The world is theoretically what ought not to be and practically what ought to be denied. It is the result of sin, as set forth in the myth of the Fall, the sole thing which reconciles Schopenhauer /
Schopenhauer to the O.T. (though borrowed, as he points out, from the Avesta) (Ibid.; Parerga, II, 163).

304. Once the doctrine of the Fall is accepted, however, the way is open for a new theodicy. Hume's view of the impossibility of a rational theodicy was refuted by de Maistre as follows:- "injustice is a violation of a law, and law is the will of a legislator manifested for his subjects to be their rule of conduct. It makes sense to talk of human laws being unjust if they violate the divine law, but what law can there be higher than the divine, what legislator above God? Unless you take up the standpoint that the world is governed by a Being who is just according to our notions of justice, there is nothing to complain of and it is meaningless to talk of "injustices", but once you have adopted this standpoint you cannot without glaring inconsistency go back and complain of injustices in the course of the world but must explain the course of the world as being just, even though in certain cases you do not see how it is just (Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg, Huitième Entretien). Schopenhauer, like de Maistre, ascribes the suffering of the world to Original Sin. Once you regard the world as a penal colony and our existence as the consequence of sin you cease to look upon life's unpleasantnesses, sufferings, vexations and misery as irregular and unexpected and find them quite /
quite in order (Parerga, II, 156). The world is itself the Last Judgement (Op. cit. II, 118).

305. Yet though Schopenhauer in this way asserts the justice of the course of the world, he does not cease to insist on the vanity (Nichtigkeit) of existence (Op. cit. II, 142-147). This view, however surprising it sound, is only the result of conceiving Reality in terms of Nature, for in Nature, as Spinoza recognized, there is no freedom and hence no purpose or value. Leibniz also adopted the category of Nature when he held that the course of the world was foreknown and predetermined, being contained in the divine notion of Adam, for in the case of a natural object like a celestial body the scientist does foresee its future position, which is contained in its determinations and can be calculated from them. Schopenhauer considers freedom to be something metaphysical and impossible in the world of Nature, where the whole course of a man's life is as necessarily predetermined as that of a clock (Op. cit. 116). He sees the substantial identity of Predestination and Fate, the only difference being that the given character and external determination of human action proceeds in the first case from a conscious and in the second from an unconscious being. The result is the same; that happens which must happen (Op. cit. II, 118). Leibniz had attempted to save human freedom /
freedom by the theory that the divine will inclined without necessitating, i.e. that it determined an event without the non-occurrence of that event being self-contradictory. This will not do, for it is not the case that something is free when it is contingent. To return to our example, the eclipse of 586 B.C. was a determined event and not a free action, and because predetermined could be foreseen by Thales.

306. Schopenhauer goes to the heart of the matter when he says that the concept of moral freedom is inseparable from that of originality (Ursprünglichkeit). "It is possible to state but not to think that a being is the work of another and yet free in his will and action. He who brought him into existence out of nothing has thereby created and settled his essence, i.e. all his characteristics, for no one can create without creating a something, i.e. a being determined throughout and in all its characteristics... As a man is, so must he act... Hence theism and moral responsibility are incompatible" (Ibid.). This is very much to the point, for in Valla's dialogue which is quoted by Leibniz it is stated that Jupiter has made the hare timid, the lion brave, and Sextus Tarquin wicked, and that they all act in accordance with their nature.

307. Predestination and foreknowledge, however, are /
are incompatible with divine as well as with human freedom. Leibniz tried to avoid the difficulty by distinguishing between absolute necessity and the hypothetical necessity under which God is obliged to do things by virtue of resolutions already made (Letter to Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, 12 April. 1686). This does not really escape the difficulty. Richard Price, who conceived Providence as administered by constant influences, so that God could intervene in answer to prayer, objected to the notion of an original establishment going on to open and unfold itself without any occasion for God to interpose, that it reduced God to a mere spectator. "Must he have been only looking on ever since the creation; and is this what is most becoming him?" (Dissertation on Providence p. 64).

308. Nor is God free even in the initial decision. On Leibniz' theory God realizes the best of all the possible worlds contained in the realm of eternal ideas. Thus God's creation presupposes this eternal realm. Hume's sceptic objects cogently: "An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former" (Dialogues, Part IV, ed. Kemp-Smith p. 203). Leibniz indeed combats the view that the eternal truths would subsist /
subsist were there no understanding, even that of God, and goes so far as to speak of the divine understanding making the reality of the eternal truths, but he protests that the divine will has no part in it (Théod. 184). God is not the author of the possibilities (Op. cit. 335). Yet, as Schopenhauer insisted, God must be the creator of the possibilities. On Leibniz' theory the best possible world is eternally what it is, and Sextus has avowedly been wicked from all eternity. But for God not to make bad what has been bad from eternity would be a self-con-
tradiction, and that Leibniz admitted would permit no freedom.

Leibniz' reason for making God's will pre-
suppose the eternal realm was to avoid the notion of a mere will, i.e. an indeterminate one. Here he was right, for it is no wisdom or freedom to act for no reason at all. But, as Price urged in his long con-
troversy with Priestley, there is self-determination as well as determination and indeterminacy, and self-
determination involves not acting for no end but giving ends to one-
self. Price conceived God and man as self-determining, and reaffirmed the Patristic distinction between the divine appointment and permission, ascribing God's permission of wickedness to God's desire to make moral action possible, for the same reason that a wise govern-
ment does not prevent crimes by shutting men up in their houses, or that a parent does not prevent his children from /
from doing wrong by tying up their hands and feet, since, in short, to prevent wickedness by denying a share of agency to beings would be to prevent one evil by producing a greater. But when challenged by Priestley to reconcile foreknowledge with the contingency of the future he frankly confessed his inability to do so (Free Discussion of Materialism etc. p. 174 sq.). Knowledge indeed is of what is the case, either explicitly or implicitly, and it is in the anticipation of events by foreknowledge that Fate consists. As the divine creation is anticipated by eternally determined truths, Providence is engulfed by Fate.
PART IV.

VICHIAN THOUGHT.

CHAPTER I.

Giambattista Vico.

310. Giambattista Vico, a schoolmaster who had learned the power and predominance of the imagination in the young and in the primitive, a philologist and student of ancient history who anticipated Lachmann in the discovery of the real Homer and Niebuhr in his account of early Rome, a man who had practised advocacy and studied Roman jurisprudence, the first principle of which, as he never tired of repeating, was divine Providence, begins his "Scienza nuova" by remarking that hitherto philosophers, having contemplated divine Providence only in the natural order, have demonstrated only one part of it, that part for which adoration and sacrifice is paid to God as the Mind which freely and absolutely governs nature, because with his eternal purpose he has given us being naturally and naturally conserves it for us, but have not contemplated the part which rather belongs to us men, the chief property of whose nature is to be sociable. God, Vico continues, has /
has so ordained and disposed human affairs, that men, after falling from complete justice through original sin, and intending almost always to do something different and often quite the reverse, so that they lived like wild beasts in solitude in the pursuit of their interests, were induced by interest itself through these very different and contrary aims to live as men in justice and preserve themselves in society, thus celebrating their sociable nature (Op. cit. ed. Nicolini 2).

311. Vico's grand epistemological principle is that we know what we have made. Thus we know geometry, because it consists of our own constructions, and we know history, because it is axiomatic that the civil world, the world of nations, is made by men, so that we can, because we must, find its principle in the very modifications of our human mind. On the other hand, we have no knowledge of nature, as it is God who has made it and so only he knows it (Op. cit. 331). Vico accordingly sets out to establish the principles and axioms of an ideal eternal history, above which run in time all the nations in their rise, growth, maturity, decay and fall (Op. cit. 245). The cursus is from an age in which sense prevails through an age of imagination to the age of developed reason. History for Vico is not, however, cyclical but spiraliform, though he /
he never says this explicitly, for the Medieval barbarism differs from that of Homeric times in being Christian.

312. It is axiomatic for Vico that philosophy, if it is going to assist the human race, must support fallen and frail man, and not tear his nature from him or leave him in his corruption. This axiom rules out the Stoics who want the mortification of the feelings and the Epikureans who make them into a norm; both sects deny Providence either by making man dragged along by Fate or abandoning him to Chance, and both ought to be called monastic or solitary philosophers. The axiom supports the political philosophers, especially the Platonists, who agree with all legislators that there is a divine Providence and that human passions ought to be controlled and made into human virtues. Philosophy considers man as he ought to be and legislation considers him as he is, to make good use of him in human society. Out of ferocity, avarice and ambition, which are the three vices which run through the whole human race, legislation produces military service, commerce and the court and so the courage, wealth and wisdom of republics. In this way it produces civil happiness out of the three vices which would certainly wipe the human race off the face of the earth.

313. This proves that there is a divine Providence /
Providence and that it is a legislative mind, which, from the passions of men all intent as they are on their private interests, living as wild beasts in solitude, has produced the civil orders by which they live in human society. As things do not go smoothly or endure outside their natural state, and as the human race, within the memory of the world, has lived tolerably in society, Vico concludes that there is a right in nature, or, what is the same thing, that men are naturally sociable. From this conclusion, taken with the previous ones, he infers that man has free will, despite his frailty, to make virtues out of his passions, but is helped by God, naturally through Providence and supernaturally by divine Grace (Op. cit. 129-136). Grace and Providence do not go apart, however, since God makes his Providence serve the ineffable decrees of his Grace (1046).

314. Vico defines "common sense" as a judgement without reflection, felt in common by a whole order, a whole people, a whole nation or the whole human race (142). It is by this that we apprehend natural right, which is found substantially the same in all nations. It was not passed on from one nation to another, because in antiquity there was not the intercommunication, but was granted to all nations by divine Providence (146).

315. Vico's Providential justification of evil is
to be distinguished from that of his contemporary Leibniz, whose thesis that God brought good out of evil, which is indeed the Patristic thesis, was stigmatized by Schopenhauer as a lame excuse (World as Will and Idea IV, 46), and justly so, since a thing is not less bad because productive of good. What Vico points out is not that what is produced by men's actions is good but that what they actually do is not what they set out to do or imagine that they are doing. They set out, he says, to satisfy their own restricted aims and actually realize far wider aims. In their savage state they wish to enjoy their animal lust and achieve the chastity of marriage, which is the origin of families; the fathers wish to exercise their paternal power immoderately over their clients, and subject them to civil power, which is the origin of cities; the ruling order of nobles wish to abuse their seigniorial liberty over the plebs, and come under the dominion of the laws, which produce popular liberty; the free peoples wish to rid themselves of the curb of the laws, and come under the yoke of monarchs; the monarchs wish to degrade their subjects and make them ready to endure enslavement by other stronger nations; the nations wish to scatter themselves, and succeed in saving the remnants in solitudes, whence like a phoenix they rise again.
316. It was mind, Vico concludes, which did all this, because the men acted with understanding; it was not fate, since they acted from choice, and not chance, because the same actions invariably had the same result. Vico accordingly agrees with the Roman jurisconsults that Providence is the first principle of the natural right of nations. Even the false religions were Providential. It was the superstitious terror of the thunder and lightning which first turned men from their entirely animal and selfish mode of living. The essential difference between our Christian religion and the false religions is that in ours divine Grace makes us act for an infinite and eternal good, which cannot fall under the senses, and for which the mind accordingly moves the senses to virtuous actions, whereas in the case of the false religions, which put forward finite and transient ends for this life and the next (where they expect a blessedness consisting of bodily pleasures), the senses must drag the mind along to perform virtuous deeds (518; 1108-1110).

317. The Lykurgoses, Solons and decemviri have always been praised for establishing with their good orders and laws the three grandest cities of Antiquity, but Sparta, Athens and Rome were of short duration and restricted in extent compared with the universe of peoples with such orders and laws, who from their very corruptness /
corruptness take the only form of constitution with which they can be preserved and endure perpetually. It is a superhuman intelligence which, in order to preserve the human race on earth, governs it not by the force of law but by making use of men's very customs, which are free from all force because the celebration of their nature. Hence the admiration paid to the wisdom of the ancients is really due to the infinite wisdom of God (1107; 1111).

318. Vico is reminiscent of Dante in his vindication of human history as the march of Providence and not, as Augustine would have it, the deeds of the city of the devil. But Vico's theory is no mere repetition of the old; he is the herald of a new era, an innovator equal to the Italians of the Renaissance. They proclaimed the autonomy of Nature; Vico proclaimed the autonomy of History. History is intelligible to men, because they have made it themselves. This means in the end the overcoming of the transcendence of God. A dualism of God and the world negates the absoluteness and freedom of both, for the essence and consequently the activity of each would limit the other. In Vico the world made by men is the world made by God, and the mind whose modifications are the principles of history is both the divine and the human mind. The "Scienza nuova" is conceived as a "reasoned civil theology of the /
the divine Providence".

Thus the Illuminist position loses its justification. For the Illuminist Providence is beyond all experience, and so, like Voltaire, he advocates the cultivation of one's garden and the abandonment of metaphysical juggling. Kant, who, as Hegel remarked, developed the Illumination into a philosophical method, converted Voltaire's jest into the thesis that statement about matters beyond our experience are capable neither of proof nor disproof. The modern Positivists have strengthened this by holding that such statements are neither true nor false, i.e. are nonsensical. But do we leave the sphere of Providence when we cultivate our garden? It is in the cultivation of the soil and reaping of crops, the "gold" of ancient mythology, that Vico saw one of the grand advances of the human race. True idealism is, in T. H. Green's words, "not the admission of an ideal world of guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical, but the recognition of the empirical itself as ideal" (Works, Vol. I, p. 179). Such a recognition was, however, impossible for the Illuminist, because he divided the human from the divine mind and humbly forbade the "finite" human mind to attempt to comprehend the "infinite".

What is the human mind which in Vico (whether he saw it clearly or not) is identical with the divine?
It is not the particular mind of the rude Polyphemos governed by the imagination, but the "common sense" of the nations. Vico left to posterity the elaboration of this notion of "common sense" or spirit, a notion which involves (what is often overlooked) a revision of the notion of man as well as that of God.

321. Vico also left to his successors the task of reconciling the two Providences, that in history and that in nature, the one intelligible to man and the other not. He could disregard this problem himself because he was occupied with an attack on the current concentration on nature, but the problem is inescapable, because after all it is the same mind which created history and nature, and the Providence of history which is the celebration of humanity is not compatible with the intrusion of an inscrutable Providence known to God alone, though admittedly nature is not intelligible in the way that history is. Hence whereas Spinoza, with his usual consistency, absorbed history into nature, expressly denying it a special place (Ethics III, Introd.), modern philosophy, with equal rigour, resolves nature into history.
322. Vico was a contemporary of Leibniz, and was too advanced for his own age to appreciate him. Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century, however, Herder began to arouse philosophy from physico-theology and its branches, astrotheology, insecto-theology and so on, by urging that if God is in nature, he is in history too (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, XV - Werke, ed. Suphan, Vol. 14, p. 207). Many, he admits, who on the firm ground of natural knowledge behold God in every blade of grass and every grain of dust, imagine that they have lost sight of him in human history, where they see nothing but a cockpit of irrational passions, brutal forces and destructive arts without any lasting good intention. They see themselves included in the chain of transient things and so bound to follow the laws of their course, i.e. to be born, exist and pass away. The father who has grown wise with age goes to the grave, while his son begins again as a child. Civilizations pass away and are succeeded by others. To what end, then, the unhappy toil that God gives the human race as its daily work? (Op. cit. XV, p. 204-207).

323. To /
323. To answer this question Herder sets out to investigate the laws by which Providence governs history. Now the end of anything which is not an inert instrument must lie in itself. If we consider humanity as we know it, and according to the laws which are found in it, we see nothing in man superior to humanity, for even if we think of angels we think of them as ideal superior men. Hence the end of human nature is humanity, and with this end in view God has put the destiny of the human race into its own hands. We know nothing in creation except through what it is and the way in which it acts, but in all his activities, in providing for material needs, in framing law and government, in securing property, in making war and signing treaties, and in setting up a sort of international law, man's sole aim is humanity (Op. cit. XV, 1, p. 207-209).

324. The principle of this divine law of nature reconciles us marvellously not only with the appearance of our species all over the earth, but also with its variations through all periods of time. Everywhere man is what he was able to make himself, what he had the will and the power to become (Op. cit. XV, 1, p. 212). Man could not live without learning to use his reason, and though this opened the door to a thousand errors, yet even so the way was prepared for a better /
better use of his reason. God made man a god on earth, by giving him a principle of activity in himself (Op. cit. XV, l. p. 210). Indeed man can aspire even higher, for as nature is a scale of organizations each of which is the matrix of the one above it, humanity is the bud of a future flower. The end which the Creator has set before us reaches beyond the present life. This earth is only a place of exercise, a state of preparation (V, 5 - Vol. 13, p. 189 sqq.).

325. The whole of history is a school to teach us the way to the goal. God assists the advance of humanity not by miracles, because he has put its destiny in its own hands, but by his sacred and eternal laws of nature. The destructive forces in nature must in time yield to the preservative, or rather themselves subserve the improvement of the whole, the human race is destined to proceed through a series of degrees of culture, but its well-being is essentially based on reason and justice, and reason and justice must gain more footing among men and promote the formation of a lasting humanity. Thus, Herder concludes, a wise goodness rules over the destinies of men (Op. cit. XV, 2-5). The thoughtful contemplator of history who doubts of Providence must have fallen into this misfortune either through taking a superficial view of history, or from having a wrong concept of /
of Providence (Vorsehung). If he expected Providence to meet him like a spectre at every turn and continually interrupt the current of human actions to fulfil some aim of his whim or fancy, then history is the grave of such a Providence, but this is to the advantage of truth. What sort of a Providence could it be that anyone could use as a boggart (Poltergeist) in the ordering of things, or as an ally in the accomplishment of his narrow aims? The whole would then be left without a master. The God in history must be the same as the God in nature, for man is only a small part of the whole. In human history, therefore, there must prevail the natural laws which are inherent in the essence of things (Op. cit. XV, 5, p. 244).

326. While, then, Herder begins the transformation of the concept of the nature of man into that of the destiny of man, his optimism remains within the Leibnizian orbit. Despite his thought of the earth as a place of exercise (Uebungsplatz), he is unconscious of the tragic element in history, insisting that the law which brings about the advance of humanity is the law which brought the world system out of a whirling chaos and then reduced this earth to a harmonious order (XV, 2, p. 214 sq.). He therefore tends to divest events of their historical individuality and represent them as cases of general laws. The Romans, for /
for instance, are represented as brutal oppressors whose downfall, resulting from a revolt of the oppressed, is an example of the working of the laws of disturbed equiponderance. Yet Herder's hope that such laws will eventually be recognized as no more open to question than the multiplication table conflicts with his conviction that God has given man a principle of activity within himself. As he admits himself, some of the nations oppressed by the Romans tamely submitted (Op. cit. XV, 2, p. 217 sq.). Hence it is not the operation of the laws of disturbed equiponderance which ensures the downfall of oppressors, but the decision of the oppressed to revolt which secures the operation of the laws of disturbed equiponderance. Herder's laws, excogitated on the model of those of the natural sciences, are far less substantial than the axioms of the Vichian cursus, to which Vico himself pointed out exceptions, and which is, as Croce remarks (La Filosofia di Giambattista Vico, p. 125 sq.) the history of Rome generalized and integrated here and there with that of Greece.
CHAPTER III.

Kant and Fichte.

327. Vico and Herder left the two fields of history and nature side by side, but Fichte set human activity over against nature and linked this opposition with the opposition of faith and reason which derived from Kant. According to Kant our ordinary thinking is bringing under concepts of the understanding the sensuous intuitions which arise from the stimulation of our senses by things existing apart from us. He gives a merely subjective value to the presuppositions of the applicability of mathematics to the study of nature. To the question what right we have to use mathematics in the study of natural things his answer is not the Galilean one that God has created nature mathematically, but that this is the way in which our minds work and that what we ordinarily call "things" are the products of our thinking and not the things-in-themselves which stimulate our senses and of which we can have no knowledge whatever (Prolegomena, 13).

328. Kant regards it as necessary for a true appreciation of metaphysics to draw a distinction between understanding and reason. The concepts of the /
the understanding receive filling from the senses and are given in experience, and their axioms can be verified by experience. In the case of reason, on the other hand, and it is with the concepts of pure reason that metaphysics is concerned, its ideas are not given in experience and its axioms can neither be verified nor be refuted by experience, because they relate not to particular experiences but to the totality of all possible experience (Op. cit. 40-42). The three ideas of reason are those of the Soul, the unconditioned Cause, and God. They are principles necessary to bring unity into the use of our understanding, i.e. presuppositions of any systematic thinking, but they are only regulative and do not extend our knowledge, because they relate to the totality of possible experience, and that is not an object of possible experience. (Kant takes this totality to be a sum-total, a quantitative whole composed of parts). It is a misconception of the use of reason to treat its ideas as though they reached beyond experience, for they are only the presuppositions of our experience, and we cannot leap beyond experience to the things-in-themselves (Prolegomena, 56). Hence we cannot prove that God actually exists and governs the world, but for the purpose of the systematic thinking of natural science we have to view the world as if it were the work of a supreme
supreme understanding and will, i.e. as standing in the same relation to some unknown as a watch, a ship and a regiment do to a craftsman, shipbuilder and general (Op. cit. 57). Kant here simply accepts the current external teleology, but later he distinguishes between external or relative teleology, in which one thing is adapted to suit the end of something else, and the inner teleology of an organism, in which the parts are adapted for the preservation of the whole, every member of the organism being in turn end and means (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 63-66). As Schopenhauer observes, it is upon a failure to make this distinction that Bacon's and Spinoza's attacks on final causes are founded (Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung, ch. 26).

329. While Kant considers illusory the extension of the ideas of reason beyond experience, he finds some justification for our natural disposition to extend them in the liberation which they effect from the mere contemplation of nature. The idea of the soul (as simple substance), though it does not in the least enable us to know what the soul is, shows up the inadequacy of materialism. The idea of an unconditioned Cause saves us from regarding nature as self-sufficient. The idea of God, though it does not give us any knowledge of what God is, saves us from fatalism /
fatalism. In this way there is room left for morality (Prolegomena, 60).

330. Kant considers that the only convincing proof of Providence is drawn not from nature but from morality. Moral teleology concerns us as beings who are in the world, and so connected with other things in the world as ends or circumstances. Now the moral law sets before us as the ultimate aim the highest good in the world possible through freedom, i.e. the aim that every rational being should be under moral laws, which is Kant's interpretation of the N.T. concept of the Kingdom of God. The subjective condition on which man sets before himself an ultimate aim under these laws is happiness; happiness is accordingly the highest possible physical good in the world and our ultimate aim so far as it is in our power. The objective condition is the harmony of men with the law of morality, i.e. that merit should be happy. It is impossible for us to satisfy these two exigencies. Hence the concept of the practical necessity of this aim through the exertion of our power does not cohere with the theoretical concept of the physical possibility of its execution, unless we posit some third causality to mediate between our freedom and the causality of nature. We must therefore admit a moral origin of the world (an author of the world) in order to /
to set before ourselves an ultimate aim which accords with the moral law, and so far as the moral law is necessary, it is necessary to admit that there is a God.

331. This is, Kant observes, not an objectively valid proof of the proposition that God exists, but a subjective proof for a moral being that if he is going to think consequentially in morals he must accept this proposition among the maxims of his practical reason. Not that the validity of the moral law is dependent on the existence of God, so that if I am not convinced of the existence of God I can judge myself absolved from its obligations. The moral law is valid in any case, but I cannot hope to achieve the ultimate aim of morality, except — here there is a distant echo of the Reformation — through the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good author of the world, and from the practical standpoint, i.e. to conceive the possibility of the realization of the ultimate aim, I must admit the existence of God (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1 Theil, 2 Buch, 2 Hauptstück, V: Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 87). In contrast, therefore, to the preceding Optimism, it is upon the very discord of morality and nature, of merit and happiness, that Kant bases the postulate of Providence. Yet it is only a postulate. Kant's last word /
word is that it falls under the heading not of matter of fact (Thatsachen, scibile), which is given by reason or understanding, but of matter of faith (Glaubenssachen, mere credibile) (K.d.U. 91).

332. This is the starting-point of the Romantic philosophers, but they look at it in a different way. From the Kantian premiss that our apprehension of God is a matter of faith, faith being the moral thinking of the reason in accepting as true what is inaccessible to theoretical knowledge, they drew, not Kant's conclusion: so much the worse for our apprehension of God, but the conclusion: so much the worse for theoretical knowledge. The scepticism of Hume and the Critical Philosophy ended the Age of Reason, for they made plain the impotence of reason, understood as ratiocination (raisonnement, Räsonnement), an analytic faculty which combines and rearranges what is given to it but does not originate. Hence the Romantic philosophers, like Rousseau in the Age of Reason, acclaim inner feeling or faith, some sort of intuition, as the highest and true faculty of apprehension. Jacobi wrote to Fichte in February 1800 that philosophy now rested on the bookshelf so far as he was concerned, and expressed his relief at having crossed the mountain tops of pure reason. But far from having left philosophy on the bookshelf

Jacobi /
Jacobi is philosophizing in the very declaration of having done so! What is put on the shelf is a philosophy which is no longer his, but what puts it there is his actual philosophy, which is admittedly not mere ratiocination.

333. To depreciate ratiocination without realizing that it is thought which depreciates it opens the way to every sort of caprice. For Fichte, however, faith is no sheer voluntary assent which you can make or not as you please, i.e. a free resolution to deem true what the heart wishes, a substitute through hope for an adequate ground of conviction. Here Fichte differs from Rousseau, who had found himself attracted to the more consoling side (Letter to Voltaire, 1756).

What is grounded in reason, says Fichte, is absolutely necessary, and what is not necessary is eo ipso irrational. Deeming things true is illusion and dreams, even if the dreams are pious (Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung, Werke, Vol. V, p. 179). In maintaining Providence to be a matter of faith Fichte's point is that the existence of the divine order is not the result of an inference and so does not admit of demonstration. Philosophy, he says, does not implant any faith in us, it can only explain facts without introducing any new ones (except itself as a fact). It can no more teach us to believe in the divine /
divine government than it can teach us to think that objects are arranged side by side in space and that their changes occur successively in time. It simply has to point to this faith as a fact and deduce the fact from the necessary processes of any rational being. Fichte does not intend his reasoning to overcome unbelief but to be a deduction of the conviction of faith. What he avowedly sets out to do is not to show some ground from which the divine order follows, which would make the divine order derivative, but to answer the question how we have reached our faith in it (Ibid.).

334. Where is the philosopher to seek for the necessary ground of this faith? Not in a supposed inference from the existence or characteristics of the sensible world to a rational author. For if we look at the sensible world from the standpoint of ordinary consciousness, which is that of natural science, our reason is compelled to stick fast to the being of the world as an absolute; the world is, because it is, and is what it is, because it is as it is. From this standpoint we have reached an absolute being, and this absolute being is the world; the two concepts are the same. The world is self-dependent and self-complete, an organized and organizing whole which contains in itself and the laws immanent in it the grounds of the phenomena arising in it. An explanation of the world
and its forms as the purposes of an Intelligence is quite meaningless so long as we are trying to explain only the world and its forms and confining ourselves to the sphere of pure natural science. It does not answer our questions or take us any further to be told that an Intelligence is the author of the sensible world, but merely presents us with a couple of empty words.

335. On the other hand if we adopt the Kantian standpoint, we certainly avoid the difficulties of understanding how the determinations of an intelligence, which are concepts, can change into matter. From the Kantian view-point there is no self-subsistent world, for in everything that we see we see only the reflection of our own inner act of consciousness, arising from a stimulus from some absolutely unknown source. But we cannot seek for the ground of what does not exist, nor can we get outside ourselves to explain ourselves - the Ego for which an explanation is sought is clearly not the pure, absolutely free and self-dependent Ego, because to explain something is to make it dependent (Op. cit. p. 180).

336. As there is no possible way of reaching a belief in the divine order from the sensible world, our faith must be grounded through our concept of a supersensible world. Now I find myself free from all influences of the sensible world, absolutely active in and through myself, and so a power superior to the sensible /
sensible world. This freedom is not undetermined, it has its end; only it does not get its end from without. I myself and my necessary end are the supersensible. I cannot doubt of this freedom and this determination or vocation (Bestimmung), without renouncing myself. Here we have something for which we cannot seek any explanation; it is the absolutely positive and categorical. I cannot go beyond it without negating myself. I cannot go beyond it simply because I will not go beyond it. Here is something which limits the unbridled flight of reasoning, the point which unites thought and will and brings harmony into my being. I certainly could go further if I wished to bring myself into contradiction with myself, for there is no limit in ratiocination itself to prevent its going on to infinity. The conviction of our moral vocation proceeds only from moral temper (aus moralishe Stimmung), and is faith. It is therefore right to say that the basis of all certainty is faith. Morality, certain though it be, can be established only through itself and not by means of any logical compulsion (Op. cit. p. 182).

337. When I consider the end which is set before me through my own essence, and make it the end of my real action, I consider its accomplishment through my own action as possible. To consider something as my end is to consider it as actual in some future time, and
and actuality entails possibility. Now since I must propose to myself the accomplishment of that end, unless I wish to deny my very being, I must accordingly admit its practicability. This is not a wish, a hope, or a deliberation of grounds for and against, a free resolution to assent to something the opposite of which is quite possible. This assent is absolutely necessary on the supposition of the resolve to obey the law in one's inner self; it is immediately contained in this resolve or rather is this resolve itself (Op. cit. p. 183).

338. The inference is not from possibility to actuality but vice versa. The inference is not that I ought because I can, but that I can because I ought. That I ought and what I ought is the underived first, and requires no further explanation or justification. It is known and true by itself; it is not grounded and determined by any other truths, but all other truths are determined through it.

339. When we proceed to analyse the thought that I must simply set before myself the end of morality and that its accomplishment is possible through my action, we find it implies that every action that I do and the circumstances which every action requires are means to the end proposed. My whole existence, the existence of all moral beings, and the sensible world, as the
common theatre of our activity, now acquire connections with morality. A quite new order arises, for which the sensible world is only a foundation. The sensible world (to adopt the standpoint of natural science) goes on its own way in obedience to its eternal laws in order to provide a sphere for freedom, but it has not the slightest influence on morality or immorality, because it has no power over a free being who is self-subsistent and independent of all nature. The whole world takes on a changed appearance.

340. The change is even more evident if we adopt the Kantian viewpoint. If the world is nothing but the appearance, apprehended sensuously in accordance with conceptual laws of reason, of our own inner activity of consciousness, within the inconceivable barriers within which we are for ever confined, the only sure foothold to save us from the bottomless morass is our determined position in the moral ordering of things. "Our world is the sensuously apprehended material of our duty; this is the genuine reality of things, the true basis of all phenomena" (Op. cit. p. 189).

341. In my conviction that the accomplishment of my duty is possible is implied not only that there is something, i.e. the determination of my will in accordance with duty, which depends exclusively and absolutely /
absolutely on me, but that something is accomplished as a result of this determination of my will which lies outside the compass of my will, a thought which must be admitted to give the determination purpose and meaning (Rückerrinnerungen, Antworten, Fragen-Werke, Vol. V, p. 363). I cannot foresee the consequences of my act, but I have faith that they will be good and serve the purposes of reason in the general connection of things. This is a principle which has the same underivative certainty as the command of duty.

342. The determination of my will is something which is only present, but it presupposes something past and postulates something future, which is to be modified by my action. My duty is always the doing of some determined act, since I can only will something limited and determined, and my particular determined duty arises from the situation in which I am. I ought in this situation simply to follow the dictates of conscience, but I cannot do this except on the supposition that this situation was calculated with a view to the purpose of reason and is the result of the operation of that absolute principle (Op. cit. p. 365). This implies, since the same must hold good for the actions of all rational beings, that the whole world of reason has been produced and ordered by that absolute principle, or, to express it popularly in the analogies of our finite /
finite consciousness, that the world of reason is created, preserved and governed by that principle.

343. The postulate of the determination of my will is its "continued causality in furthering the purpose of reason, and therefore the preservation and steady development of all rational beings in the identity of their self-consciousness, the constant progress of all towards the ultimate goal of reason, and so the preservation of all rational beings in eternal existence, and the direction of their destinies to blessedness, i.e. to their liberation through pure morality" (Op. cit. p. 366).

344. It is therefore a sheer mistake to say that it is uncertain whether God exists or not. Certainty is an immediate feeling, for granted that certainty springs from theoretical insight that one's thinking is in agreement with the laws of thought, how can one be certain that one is not wrong about this agreement? It would require a still higher theoretical insight, and so on to infinity (Op. cit. p. 356). Now it is not at all uncertain, but the most certain thing that there is, the ground of all other certainty, that there is a moral world-order, and that a determined position in this order has been assigned to every rational individual and calculated with a view to his action; that everyone's destiny, so far as it is not brought about /
about by his own behaviour, is the result of this plan; that without it no hair falls from his head, and no sparrow from the roof; that every good act succeeds and every bad one fails, and that all things must work together for the best to those who really love good (Ueber den Grund, p. 188).

345. Fichte is thus as optimistic as Leibniz, but his concept of the divine order governing the world is far different. For Leibniz everything already is as good as it can be, with Fichte everything is to be good. Whereas Leibniz considers the whole history of mankind to be contained in God's notion of Adam, Fichte insists that the world of reason is a world not in the sense in which the term is used of real things, a completed whole of existent objects reciprocally determined by each other, so that with a perfect knowledge of the laws of the world we could infer from the nature of anything that of everything else, but in the sense of a whole where the influence of rational beings on each other cannot be determined in advance, because it has its ground in freedom (Rückerinnerungen, p. 361). Again, the law of this world is not something from which consequences can be deduced, but (a) when applied to finite beings, who are free in the empirical sense of being not determined but determinable, is no mechanical determination but an Ought, a categorical imperative, a determinedness /
determinedness of freedom through freedom, and (b) when applied to reason itself or the Infinite, the necessity to expect from it an inexhaustible content of freedom for all rational individuals, though what the content is cannot be inferred (Op. cit. p. 361). The term order, again, is meant not as though order were imposed on something pre-existing; the world only became a world by being ordered (Ibid.)

346. In Fichte's view this active and living moral world-order is God Himself. In our certainty of our duty, he points out, we think only of action and movement, and not of being or immovable permanence, of creating, preserving and governing, and not of a creator, preserver or governor (Op. cit. p. 366). We cannot conclude from the former to the latter, which are nothing but empty words. Suppose we attempt to conclude from the moral world to a separate substance; when we apply the predicates of consciousness and personality to him we merely make him finite like ourselves, and instead of conceiving God merely reduplicate ourselves in thought (Ueber den Grund, p. 187).

347. Here philosophy revenges itself on Fichte. In his attempts to defend himself from the charges of atheism, he claimed that philosophy was not on the same ground as religion because it did not set out to introduce /
introduce new truths, which only life could give. He declared categorically that life was not-philosophizing and philosophizing not-life (Rückerinnerungen, p. 343). His declaration has indeed this truth, that philosophical thinking is reasoning not to a proposition, which unless tautological is something which can be denied without contradiction, but to an absolute presupposition which cannot be questioned without involving ourselves in contradiction with ourselves. But thinking never leaves intact anything that it touches, even absolute presuppositions, and therefore it does enter the field of religion. Not only does Fichte use the avowedly critical character of philosophy to remove false conceptions, he proceeds to substitute a new category for the thinking of God. The concept of God, he explains, (and that of the human soul) can be determined not by existential propositions but only by predicates of an activity (Op. cit. p. 371). In this way he revives the profound thought of Vanini, that Providence is not an order but the ordering, a thought which with characteristic Renaissance exuberance Vanini had thrown off without elaborating and to which Spinoza and Leibniz never attained.

348. With his concept of Providence as the presupposition of human activity Fichte distinguishes between history and chronicles. The chronicler,
when he sets out to describe an age, collects and enumerates many striking phenomena, just as they happen to come to his notice, without being sure that he has got hold of them all and without being able to indicate any connection between them other than that they all happened at the same time. The philosopher, on the other hand, seeks a concept of the age independently of all experience and exhibits the ways in which the concept enters into experience as the necessary phenomena of the age, showing the necessity of the interconnection of the phenomena by means of their common fundamental concept. But the fundamental concepts of the separate ages can be thoroughly understood only through their connection with the whole of time, and so the philosopher who wishes to characterize any age aright must understand quite a priori the whole of time and all its possible eras. This understanding of the whole of time requires a concept of unity, i.e. a World-plan, which is clearly conceived in its unity and from which the main eras of human earthly life derive.

349. What is this World-plan? Fichte's answer, which is a development of Herder's, is: "The purpose of the earthly life of humanity is that they organize all their conditions with freedom in accordance with reason" (Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters - Sämtliche /
Sammtliche Werke, Vol. 7, p. 7-9). From this Fichte derives five eras, the first, where reason rules as blind instinct, the second, where this instinct is changed into an externally imperative authority, the third, where the rule of this authority, and with it reason itself, is overthrown, the fourth, where reason and its laws are conceived with clear consciousness, and the last, where through perfect art all the conditions of the human race are organized in accordance with the laws of reason. He places his own age in the third era, though admitting that here he is no longer speaking as a philosopher (Op. cit. p. 17 sq.).

350. In thus affirming a World-plan Fichte is unfaithful to his concept of Providence as not the order but the ordering, for this world-plan is a plan already planned, a whole already fixed and settled even though events are at present only in the middle of the historical process. Fichte's new insight is clogged with the old logic. The conceptual unity under which he wishes to bring all the phenomena (Op. cit. p. 4) is still the abstract Platonic form which transcends the particulars, (a transcendence reproduced in modern logistical theories of classes which do not need to have any members and descriptions which do not need to fit anything). The concept of the vocation of man is an abstract concept.
351. It was the emptiness of Fichte's concept of the vocation of man which struck the youthful Hegel, whose interests lay mainly in the sphere of history and whose studies were of the spirits and destinies of peoples, spirit being conceived not in the manner of Montesquieu as a product of natural conditions but as an autonomous Genius animating the history of a people. In his introductory essay on the positivity of the Christian religion Hegel points out that positivity is a concept which appears only when philosophers have gathered together the infinite multiplicity of historical phenomena into the unity of general concepts. These simple concepts become characters of humanity, and all the customs, habits and opinions of peoples are treated as mere contingencies or errors. "But living nature is eternally something other than its concept, and hence what for the concept was mere modification, pure contingency, a superfluity, becomes the necessary, the living, perhaps the only natural and beautiful reality" (Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl, p. 6; 141).

352. The general concept of human nature is therefore /
therefore an inadequate criterion when it is a question of judging the positivity of a religion. Admittedly a religion which demands blind obedience is now a positive one, but it was not so to begin with, for in an age when blind obedience is natural a religion which demands blind obedience is natural too. Every stage is originally natural and becomes positive in relation to a later stage. This is not to justify every aberration and superstition, for though the grossest superstition is not positive to the man who really believes it, it is so for us, since we who judge must have a glimmering of an ideal (Ideal) of humanity. "An ideal of human nature is, however, something quite different from general concepts of the vocation of man and of the relation of men to God. The ideal readily allows peculiarity and determinateness, and even demands special religious acts, feelings and usages, a superfluity, a mass of superfluities which in the lantern-light of general concepts appears only as ice and stone" (Op. cit. p. 142).

353. In his first sketches Hegel defends the Greek concepts of the gods, connected with the general concept of Destiny (Schicksal), a "quite human theory", and attacks the "ridiculous ratiocination about the permission by God of many events", by which people believe they can save Providence (Vorsehung), though Providence /
Providence is a concept which cannot be used in particular instances and elucidates nothing (Op. cit. p. 58; 355). He contrasts the spirit of the Greeks, who had the daring to effect single unions with Destiny, which were their gods, and the spirit of Abraham, which was the spirit of the Jews. In Abraham's case the separation between himself and the multiplicity of events was not so complete as to make him contrapose Destiny to himself, but there was a measure of division which made him regard Destiny as Lord and resulted in passivity and dependence. All the circumstances of Abraham's life are unified in the concept of his whole existence, including that of his posterity, for it is this reflection on the whole of his existence which characterizes Abraham's life. This whole again is unified with Abraham himself in the assurance of his own preservation. But his highest and greatest object was his own preservation; his firm faith in this unity beneath the change in the multiplicity of events was his faith in God. He never achieved the Greek union with Destiny. The separation from his fatherland and from his father's house drove him to reflection, but not to find a strength within himself with which to withstand objects (Op. cit. p. 367-369).

354. In the case both of Abraham and the Greeks the /
the unity with Destiny is imperfect, in the former case because of the division, in the latter because the union is only in single instances. Yet in both cases there is some sort of unity. Sometimes, however, the separation between aims and reality is so great that real sorrow arises. Then if a man has enough strength and consciousness of his own purity to be able to bear this complete separation he sets Destiny in opposition to himself as an unknown might in which there is nothing human, without however yielding to it or reaching a union with it, which with a mightier being could only be slavery. On the other hand if a man has not this strength he attributes his calamities to some independent activity as a hostile being. If he has never known any benefits from it, he regards it as a hostile and unchanging nature, but if he has received joys in the past, then he must consider the hostile attitude to be only temporary, and if he is conscious of iniquity on his part, he sees in his sorrow the chastising hand of God which was kind to him before.

355. In both cases, whether or not a man possesses strength and consciousness of purity, we have an attempt to unify what is incapable of unification by the mere intellect, and this is positivity, not in the good sense of what is superfluous to the abstract /
abstract concept, but in the bad sense of what is unreasonable. What, then, is the solution of the difficulty? "We cannot put the ideal outside ourselves, because then it would be just an object, and we cannot put it only in ourselves, because then it would not be an ideal." Religion is one with love. The beloved is not opposed to us, but one with our being; we see only ourselves in him, and yet he is not ourselves, a miracle that we cannot understand (Op. cit. p. 377). The unity of love is a perfect unity, which unifies unity and separation, resolving the one-sidedness of reflection, and sets itself in opposition to itself and feels itself, but does not make this opposition absolute. The living feels the living in love. (Op. cit. p. 379).

356. This reconciliation (Versöhnung) of Destiny through love was achieved by Jesus, who attacked the root of Judaism, which is the service of an alien being, slavery to the law, the will of the Lord, and it is in this restoration of unity with God that Jesus' forgiveness of sins consists. Destiny is the consciousness of oneself, not of the single action, of oneself as the totality of all the circumstances of one's life, or rather the consciousness of this totality reflected and objectified. Destiny can be reconciled, because it is itself a member of an organism, something /
something separated which is not destroyed by its opposite but can be overcome or set aside (aufgehoben) through unification. Destiny is the very law which I have established in my action (whether or not this is the transgression of an alien law) in its reaction on me, whereas punishment is only consciousness of an alien law and so consciousness of an alien might. Hence Destiny as the reactive law itself can be overcome, for a law which I have established myself, a separation which I have myself made, I can also destroy. Since the whole is a living whole which has hurt itself, it can return to its life, i.e. to its love. Its consciousness is again confidence in itself, but its view of itself is now different from what it was before as a result of the reconciliation of Destiny. It can no longer rest in itself, and love is now a necessity. The lacerations which it inflicted on itself remain to prevent it from viewing itself in the old way as a reality striving to preserve its independence. But this is not a loss, for then it strove without success and so was subjected to necessity and consequent melancholy, which departs only with love, i.e. striving which attains satisfaction.

357. Forgiveness of sins is therefore neither the setting aside of punishment (for punishment is something positive and objective which cannot be destroyed /
destroyed) nor the setting aside of the bad conscience (for no deed can become undone) but Destiny reconciled through love. Now the power which Jesus gave his friends to bind and loose presupposed the high faith in him which he found in them, a faith which sounds the depths of human nature. This faith alters the Jewish conception of the relation between God and man. If man has a will of his own, then he does not stand in a purely passive relation to God; there are not two wills and two substances, God and man must be one - not in an undifferentiated unity but in one in which God is the Father and man is the Son. Here man is not independent and self-subsistent, he exists only in so far as he is opposed to the Father, only not absolutely opposed but as a modification of the unity, so that the Father is in him, and in this Son are his children. They also are one with him, a real transsubstantiation, a real indwelling of the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father. All these are not substances, quite separate and united only in general concepts, but are united as the vine and its branches (Op. cit. p. 386-393).

358. Love is the blood of life. The Kingdom of God is the whole tree with all necessary modifications, the grades of its development. These modifications are exclusions, not absolute oppositions, i.e. there is /
is no law, for law is a merely thought interconnection between objects, and in the Kingdom of God there is no merely thought connection, since no being is here just an object for another. This is not simply the synthesis: no subject without object or no not-self without self, for in this case their character as absolutes is not overcome. A thought connection is fixed, without spirit, - it is a conjunction, a lordship and slavery - activity and suffering - determination and determinate. But in the Kingdom there is nothing fixed, the possible is equivalent to the actual, there is nothing general, and all connections are living and proceeding from the development of life (Op. cit. p. 394 sq.).

359. This consciousness of life as a process of unification through the reconciliation of opposites is the heart of Hegel's thought. In this way he regains the Christian and Renaissance-Reformation consciousness of the dynamic character of the real, a consciousness which was practically suffocated in the first case by Patristic and Scholastic thought and in the second case by the geometrical reasoning of the Illumination. In his maturity Hegel pronounces the overthrow of Eleaticism, the theory of reality conceived in terms of being. Being is a mere abstraction, which taken purely by itself is identical with its opposite, nothing; what is concrete is becoming, the passage from /
from the one to the other, the synthesis in which both find their meaning. Hegel says that there is none of Herakleitos' sayings which he has not incorporated in his Logic, and it is as the philosopher of becoming that we must in the first instance understand him, for otherwise we convert him into a sort of Plato. Yet becoming, though it is the first concrete category or determination of thought, is itself pretty poor, and needs to develop into the category of life and Spirit (Encyclopaedia, 87-88).

360. This is the Hegelian dialectic, which is not our movement towards a fixed truth, but the movement of truth itself. If dialectic were just our journey towards the truth, we ought simply to forget philosophical errors as we forget mistakes in the multiplication table, but as dialectic is the process by which truth comes to itself, error is contained within the process as what is overcome. Hegel is clear that the refutation of a philosophical system only means that its barriers are crossed and its special principle reduced to a factor in the richer principle which succeeds it. We must go beyond being, but that does not imply that we proceed to something outside and besides being, but that being is true only in becoming (Op. cit. 86).

361. Hegel therefore does not just assert Providence /
Providence and dismiss chance and necessity as oversights. Indeed he admits that chance ranges not only in Nature but also within the province of the Spirit (e.g. in language), and expressly protests against well-meant endeavours to show the necessity of everything, to show that it could only have been as it was and not otherwise, or, to put it otherwise, to deduce things a priori. The contingent is that which, while actual, has the value of mere possibility, i.e. is that which might not be. Hence the transition from a pure possibility which is not an actuality to contingency, actuality which has the value of possibility only, rests on the content of the contingent and not on its form (its being contingent), and this content is a possibility which is not compatible with inactuality, i.e. is a condition. If all the conditions are there, the fact must be actual. Developed actuality is the coincident alternation of inner and outer, i.e. the transition from mere possibility which is not actuality to mere actuality which is compatible with inactuality and back again to the possibility which is real possibility and incompatible with inactuality. It is this developed actuality which constitutes necessity. As Hegel remarks, necessity is the unity of possibility and actuality, but this definition is superficial and hence unintelligible /
unintelligible (Enc. 144-147).

362. Professor Frichard has observed that in the end the conceptions of the possible-but-not-actual and the actual-but-not-necessary are untenable (Kant's Theory of Knowledge p. 160). This is true, but "in the end" (a phrase which like "in the long run", "in the last resort", "at bottom" and "ultimately", is a way of formulating the category of mediation) is essential; it is not everything which is immediately necessary, for it is impossible to deduce natural events in the same way that the properties of a triangle are deduced. The actual-but-not-necessary is only an abstraction, but still the contingent is just this abstraction; this is the very concept of the contingent, and the defect lies in the category itself and not in our formulation of it. Every category is defective, but when the defect is eliminated a higher category is reached, and so on up to the category of the Spirit. To get beyond contingency, however, does not imply that we cease to regard the particular fact as contingent, for it is the very character of a particular fact to be contingent. When we have got beyond contingency we have got beyond the particular fact.

363. When anything is said to be necessary, the question arises, Why? In so far as the answer refers simply to antecedents, necessity does not differ from contingency /
contingency, which likewise requires something else to precipitate it from pure possibility into actuality. The difference lies in necessity's having its conditions in itself. Hegel endorses the customary characterization of necessity as blind, on the ground that the end or final cause is not explicitly present. What emerges from the conditions is something other than them, whereas in purposive action the content is known beforehand. Hence, he continues, to say that the world is ruled by Providence implies that design, as what is absolutely predetermined, is the active principle, so that what emerges is what is foreknown and forewilled. Yet necessity and Providence are not mutually exclusive, because to exclude necessity from Providence is to degrade it to pure caprice. This is implied in the religious doctrine of the immutability of the divine decrees, which distinguishes them from the arbitrariness of human beings, who often find that their actions turn out to be different from what they intended, whereas God knows what he wills and accomplishes what he wills (Op. cit. 147).

364. Now necessity involves the three factors of the conditions, the fact and the activity which translates the conditions into the fact. But as all of the factors as well as being correlates possess an existence independent of the others, necessity is in its form /
form external to itself. The necessary is not in and for itself but has a hypothetical character. It cannot indeed not be the case, but only given the circumstances. Yet when the fact is necessary, then the circumstances are given and so the fact concludes with itself, as the circumstances which render it necessary are necessitated just to render it necessary. "The necessary is so, mediated through a circle of circumstances: it is so, because the circumstances are so, and at the same time it is so, unmediated: it is so, because it is" (Op. cit. 148-149 Eng. tr. Wallace).

365. The necessary is in itself an absolute correlation of factors, in which the correlation turns into an absolute identity. In its immediate form this is the correlation of substance and accident. The absolute self-identity of the relation is substance itself, which as necessity negates its own inwardness, i.e. bare possibility, and so invests itself with actuality, but also negates this mere outward actuality. In this negativity the actual, an immediate, is only something accidental which passes over into another actuality. This transition is the identity of substance, viewed as form-activity. Substance is thus the totality of the accidents, revealing itself in them as absolute power and at the same time the wealth of their content. Substantiality is the absolute form-activity and
and the power of necessity: all content is nothing but a vanishing element which merely belongs to this process where the form which the content has becomes the content of the form which is substance.

366. Hegel therefore admits the validity of the Spinozan concept of God as substance, but up to a point. It is true, he says, that God is necessity or in other words the absolute thing, but it is no less true that he is the absolute Person. Spinoza's substance is the dark shapeless abyss which swallows up all content as radically null and produces from itself nothing that has any positive subsistence of its own (Op. cit. 150-151).

367. At the stage where substance is absolute power which determines itself as the self-relating power in relation to accidentality, necessity is the correlation of causality. Substance is cause in so far as it turns back on itself as the primary fact in contrast to its passage into accidentality, but overcomes this reflection-into-self and lays itself down as the negation of itself, thus producing an effect, which is something necessary through the process which effectuates it. As the primary fact the cause is independent of its effect, but it loses this independence by being a cause. Yet it is only in the effect that a cause becomes a cause, and so every cause is in its full /
full truth causa sui. Hegel accordingly defends Spinoza from Jacobi's criticism that God ought to be defined not as the ground of the world but as the cause of the world. This will not do what Jacobi wants, for even in finite causes we see the identity as regards content between cause and effect. Take the example of the grass being wet because it has rained. The rain (the cause) and the wet (the effect) are the self-same existent water. As regards form the cause is lost in the effect, but when it is lost the effect ceases to be an effect, for only the unrelated wet is left (Op. cit. 153).

368. The finitude of things consists in cause and effect being two different things. Thus though the cause is also an effect and the effect is also a cause, they are not so in the same respect. Hence the interminable chain of causes which is at the same time an interminable chain of effects. But as it is only by being the cause of an effect that a cause is a cause, it is cause of itself, and likewise an effect is also effect of itself since it is only by being the effect of a cause that an effect is an effect. In this way causality passes into the relation of reciprocity or action and reaction. Now reciprocity only distinguishes the two factors alternately, but all this alternation is strictly the cause in the act of constituting /
constituting itself, and its being consists in this self-constituting. Thus the two sides cease to be barren facts, which leaves the demand for mediation unsatisfied, and the characteristic of each side turns into that of the other. This pure self-reciprocity in which cause is effect and effect cause is Necessity unveiled or realized. The link of necessity is identity, but in pure necessity this link is only implicit, since it is the identity of what are deemed actual things. The circulation of substance through causality and reciprocity makes explicit that self-subsistence in the infinite negative self-relation, a relation which is negative since in it the act of distinguishing and intermediating becomes a primariness of actual things independent of each other, and an infinite self-relation since their independence lies only in their identity.

369. The truth of necessity is freedom, and the truth of substance is thought or the concept (Begriff, notio). To illustrate the transition from reciprocity to the concept Hegel remarks that if we make the customs of the Spartans the cause of the constitution and conversely their constitution of their customs, this is correct in a way, but as we are left with two bare facts and have comprehended neither their customs nor their constitution, the result is unsatisfactory. Satisfaction /
Satisfaction is attained only when the two are seen to be founded on the concept of Spartan history (Op. cit. 156-159).

370. The concept is a systematic whole in which each of its functions is the very totality which the concept is, and is put as indissolubly one with it. Hegel thus in effect reaffirms the Neo-Platonic theory of the whole which is wholly in the part. This is not the Kantian sum-total, a fantastic quantitative whole made up of parts, but the totality which is inherent or resonant in the part. The concept is not an abstract logical universal which we are supposed to form by collecting together the points which things have in common. It is not formal, with a content standing apart from it, because the concept is reached through the overcoming of the distinction between form and content and so it contains this distinction within itself. The concept is the unity of being and essence. In other cases being is one thing and essence another, and from essence (the what-it-is-to-be, as Aristotle used to say) we cannot infer being, but in the case of the concept the two form one, as here to be is to be the what-it-is-to-be. Thought is the principle of freedom; it exists by thinking and so constitutes itself concept of itself. "The notion is the genuine first; and things are what they are through the action of /
of the notion, immanent in them, and revealing itself in them. In religious language we express this by saying that God created the world out of nothing. In other words the world and finite things have issued from the fulness of the divine thoughts and the divine decrees. Thus religion recognizes thought and (more exactly) the notion to be the infinite form, or the free creative activity, which can realize itself without the help of a matter that exists outside it" (Op. cit. 163 tr. Wallace). The concept presupposes nothing. The Kantian thing-in-itself, the negative of every feeling, image and definite thought, is still nothing but a product of thought, such as comes out when thought is carried on to pure abstraction. It is the concept of empty substantality, and far from being incapable of being known it is the easiest thing that there is to know! (Op. cit. 44).

371. Hegel points out the formal unsatisfactoriness of the proofs to God's existence from the world, in that by questioning the existence of God while taking as settled the existence of the world they attribute to the world the self-dependence which is the characteristic of the divine. It is not by taking as settled but by negating the existence of the world that we rise to the existence of God (Op. cit. 50). Hegel's point is worth emphasizing. Leibniz had declared that the /
determination, which he brings into existence (Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Michelet, Vol. I, p. 159). Hegel's position is not that there exists a world so fabricated that it must have had a fabricator, but that in their difference from the Creator the world and the finite spirit are untrue (Enc. 83).

372. This concept of the relation of God to the world was attacked as "pantheism". In reply Hegel points out that even admittedly pantheistic writers like the Iranian poet Jalálu 'l Dín Rúmí never do what the critics imagine, i.e. identify finite things as such with God. Otherwise we should be expected to fall down and adore, say, a tree. Everything is indeed thought, or, still more concretely, Spirit, but not so immediately. Only in the abstract is there such a thing as the tree, and what the tree really is is God, but still the tree just is this abstraction. Hegel's God is not the negative infinite, that from which finite things differ by reason of what they are not, a sort of night in which all cows are black; it is not the negation but the truth of the world, for instead of repelling outside itself it contains within itself all the determinations of the world. The determination of the tree as a tree is an abstract and inadequate determination of it, but still it is not one for /
for us to discard as though it belonged to us and not to the tree. It is not that we falsely suppose things to be finite, an error which can be rectified by our knowing them better. The finite carries out this rectification itself by negating its own self-sufficiency. Being essentially alterable it leads a precarious existence which is liable to be terminated by something other than itself, and must in any case perish, if not by an accidental then by a natural death, since the species of finite entities is conceivable without the instances, which therefore fail to instantiate it adequately, and the working out of this contradiction is the dissolution of the finite (Phenomenology, Preface; Encyclopaedia 92; 221; 573).

373. Hegel's concept of the relation of God to the world is the philosophical expression of Goethe's conviction that God does not let the world spin round his finger but moves it from within, and of Wordworth's "sense sublime

Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. . ."

(Lines composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey)

374. This does not imply that evils are simply non-existent, an illusion due to the limitations of our viewpoint. The mistake is to take evil as a permanent /
permanent positive instead of something that has no real persistence but only the sham-existence of negativity (Enc. 35). To judge a work of art to be beautiful or an action to be good requires a comparison of it as it is with what it ought to be, i.e. with its concept. A thing is untrue or bad if it is not adequate to its concept. A sick body is one which is not in conformity with the concept of body, and a bad man is one who does not behave as his concept or vocation requires. Bad poets do exist, but in so far as they are bad poets they are not real poets, and a bad man is one who in so far as he is bad is not really a man but a beast. Nothing, however, can subsist if there is no identity between existence and concept (Op. cit. 171-172; 213).

375. The result is summed up in the twofold formula: what is reasonable is actual and what is actual is reasonable (Op. cit. 6). Yet like Plotinos Hegel distinguishes the providentiality of the various grades of reality. There is some truth in Vico's distinction between the Providence of Nature and the Providence of History, only it lies not, as he supposed, in the limitation of our apprehension but in the essence of History and Nature. The rationality of Nature, according to Hegel, is in general its obedience to universal laws; its reason is not self-consciousness /
self-consciousness, but, to adopt Schelling's illuminating phrase, "petrified intelligence" (Enc. 24). There is purpose in the world, but it does not remain simply identical wherever it occurs. In the mechanical, the relations of which are purely external, purpose is itself external, i.e. utility. In the chemical or organic, where there is assimilation and no longer mere externality of relations, purpose is the formative principle and the energy immanent in the whole, where every member is both means and end. In human activity purpose is a preconceived plan (Op. cit. 57; 205-209).

376. Purposive action involves first of all a plan in our heads, a subjective concept which lacks the objectivity to be achieved. This subjective concept can only become objective by employing immediate objectivity, i.e. the mechanical and chemical. In the realization of the subjective end the end dominates the processes in which objective things wear each other out, and yet contrives to keep itself free from them and preserve itself in them. This Hegel calls the astuteness of Reason (die List der Vernunft). It is the inter-mediative action which allows the objects to follow their own tendencies and wear each other out, but at the same time, though it does not directly interfere in the process, is working out its own purposes. (Op. cit. 207-209). Hegel gives as an example the /
the building of a house. We take the various substances required, iron, stones and wood, and to work up the material we use the elements, fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire, and water to turn the wheel of the saw which cuts the wood. The result is that the house is made fire-proof and shuts out the wind and water which helped to make it. Again, it is just because the stones and beams follow their own nature and press downwards in obedience to the law of gravity, that we are able to build the walls up. The elements are in this way made use of to produce something which limits their own operation.

377. Divine Providence may therefore be said to stand to the process of the world in the capacity of absolute astuteness. God lets men follow their own inclinations, but the result is the accomplishment of his plans instead of theirs. They follow their natural tendencies, but actually erect the edifice of human society and so create right order and authority against themselves (Enc. 204-209; Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Einleitung, ed. Gans³, p. 34).

378. This is the Vichian concept of Providence (not that there is any evidence that Hegel ever read Vico) only no longer simply enunciated as axiomatic. To act involves issuing from one's particularity or subjectivity into objectivity. One's private aims must /
must cease to be private and by becoming fact turn into something public. If, therefore, our aim is universal and not a private selfish one, then what we intend can be realized, but since realization is the universalizing of our end, a purely selfish end cannot be realized as it is but must turn out otherwise (cf. Phänomenologie des Geistes, C, (AA)B, c, ed. Schulze, p. 284-292). The concept which ceases to belong to the particular being and becomes objective is what Hegel calls the Logos (Idee). This unity of the concept with objectivity is what he understands by Reason, as opposed to the "Reason" of the Eighteenth Century. The Logos is the self-mover which was the Platonic postulate. It is not only its own basis of existence and absolute final aim but the power which realizes this aim both in Nature and in History.

379. The Logos is the unity of the concept and objectivity, of the ideal and the real. A pure ideal which is not realized cuts a sorry figure. Hegel's satire about the mere "ought-to-be" has been vigorously supported by Gentile. "A value which can not be realized means that when it is realized it is not realized through itself; because otherwise, being always certainly at least itself, it could not ever not be realized. And not being realized through itself means being realized by something else; which carries with /
with it a twofold incongruity, one worse than the other.  (1) The value which should be a First, something original in relation to the activity through which it must be of value, is something secondary in relation to it, something opposed on which neither the being nor the operation of the activity depend, and is therefore nothing original as regards it, and that which is really of value then turns out to be this activity which is and operates, and so creates, through itself.  (2) If the value and the activity which should realize it are two, the value, far from being realized only sometimes, can never be realized.  For why should the activity which is not value realize the value?  A reason why, to be such, must (a) be immanent in the activity, and (b) possess value, be a true, a good reason why; which would imply that unity of activity and value which is denied by the hypothesis" (Riforma della dialettica negeliana, ed. 2., p. 182).

380. Against this there is often made an appeal to the "facts". Is it not true as a matter of fact that bad people do triumph over the good? To this the answer is people who have some bad characteristics do triumph over ones who have some good characteristics, but by reason of their good characteristics and not of their bad ones, for badness, as Plato and the Neo-

Platonists /
Platonists saw, involves impotence. Wordsworth, meditating over the wars of his own day, put the point precisely:

"For by superior energies; more strict Affiance in each other; faith more firm In their unhallowed principles; the bad Have fairly gained a victory o'er the weak, The vacillating, inconsistent good."

(Excursion, Book IV.)

381. The realization of the ideal involves the universalizing of private aims. Equally the ideal is realized only through private aims. Hence, Hegel says, nothing great has ever been achieved without passion (Leidenschaft), i.e. concentration on one object to the exclusion of other aims and interests. There are thus two moments, the Logos and human passions, forming the warp and the woof of the great carpet of world-history unrolled before us. Periods of happiness are blank pages in the history of the world, for they are periods when there is not the opposition between the Logos and finite personality, and men succeed in securing the satisfaction of their own fancies and purposes.

382. Now morality is never in the concrete a doing of good for good's sake; we have not only to intend to do good but also to decide whether this or that particular act is good. What particular act is good is settled, as regards ordinary life, by the laws and /
and customs of one's State, and to decide what is right in this sphere presents no special difficulty. In the sphere of history, however, there are grand clashes between systems of established and acknowledged duties, laws and rights on the one hand and on the other hand contingencies opposed to these systems. These contingencies come into being historically, and they involve a universal of a different sort from that which provides the foundation of the endurance of a State or a People. This universal is a moment of the productive Logos, a moment of Truth striving after itself. World-historical individuals, the heroes, are those who have an insight into what their time is ripe for, and in the prosecution of their private aims, without being conscious of what they are doing, actually promote the development of the Logos (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Einleitung, ed. Gans, pp. 29-39).

383. This is a graphic concept, which is echoed in the writings of Napoleon III: "When Providence arouses men like Caesar, Charlemagne and Napoleon it is to mark out for the peoples the way that they must follow. Happy the peoples who understand and follow them! Woe to those who ignore and combat them!" (Histoire de Jules César, Préface). Nietzsche's supermen, again, as Croce remarks, are sons, though somewhat degenerate, of /
of the Hegelian heroes. Croce, however, quite under-
estimates the degeneracy, and he is wrong in supposing
himself to detect in Hegel a reminiscence of Jehovah
and the crimes which he commands, and which, being com-
mmanded by him, are not crimes because they are higher
than the morality which is something human (Saggio
sullo Hegel, p. 160). Hegel is not saying that an act
which is wrong when done by an ordinary individual is
right when done by a world-historical individual, for
he introduces the world-historical individual as an
illustration of the working of the astuteness of
Reason, the actualizing of something other than what
lies in the agent's intentions, and it is in assessing
actual achievement that he says we ought not to drag
in irrelevant moral considerations. "World-history
moves on a higher plane than that on which morality has
its place, which is that of the character and con-
science of individuals, their peculiar will and conduct;
these have a value, imputation, reward or punishment
for themselves. What the explicit ultimate aim of the
Spirit requires and achieves, what Providence does,
lies above the obligations and imputations which belong
to individuality in respect of its social behaviour"
(Philosophie der Geschichte, Einleitung, p. 83).

384. This concept is no doubt baffling to the
moralist whose horizon is bounded by such problems as
whether /
whether a man ought to do some act A if it will cause
X units of pleasure to his wife and X - 1 units of pain
to his mother-in-law, but it was familiar to the
Fathers, who readily discerned the providentiality of
the Roman Peace, and it is familiar to modern histor-
ians. What, for instance, was the achievement of
Augustus? Mr Ronald Syme sums it up as follows:
"For power he had sacrificed everything; he had
achieved the height of all mortal ambition, and in his
ambition he had saved and regenerated the Roman People"
(The Roman Revolution, p. 524). This illustrates
Hegel's point admirably. If we set out to assess
Augustus' achievement in terms of the social relations
in terms of which we interpret his intentions and
estimate his character - and Mr Syme brings out the
element of truth in Gibbon's estimate of Augustus as a
subtle tyrant with a cool head (Op. cit. p. 3) - we
fail to grasp what it was that he actually achieved.
To ignore the astuteness of Reason is to be a bad
historian. Thus with his diplomatic concept of Provi-
dence Hegel vindicates the old doctrine of God's bring-
ing good out of evil, though this is not the extraction
of good out of some actual bad thing, for evil inten-
tions are not translated into actuality.

385. To find Hegel's notion elsewhere it is
necessary to turn not to the Book of Judges but to
Wordsworth: /
Wordsworth:
"So Providence is served; The forked weapon of the skies can send Illumination into deep, dark holds, Which the mild sunbeam hath not power to pierce."

(Excursion Book IV.)

This is no incitement to enormity. It is one thing to be an instrument of Providence and another to be its agent. Hegel certainly admires Caesar and Napoleon, but even more does he admire Martin Luther, whom he regards as having enabled the actualization of Christian freedom.

Hegel's insistence on the importance of the negative and on contradiction is born of the saving principle that reality is becoming, not being, and so evil is not the sheer non-existent, it is present as a moment that is overcome. Virtue is not simply being good /
good but triumphing over one's wickedness. Hence for Hegel good is not, as for Leibniz, already accomplished (so far as finitude permits) nor, as for Fichte, not accomplished but to be accomplished. While the world is ruled by Providence, and therefore correspondent with what it ought to be, this harmony between the "is" and the "ought to be" is not static. Good, the purpose of the world, has being only while it constantly produces itself (Op. cit. 234). In this way we can understand the point, in the moral sphere, of Hegel's insistence on the importance of the negative, and on contradiction's being the moving principle of the universe.

387. Yet even the Logos, which is concept of itself, is still abstract. The wholly concrete, the Absolute, is the Spirit, which is self-consciousness. Reality, as Hegel conceives it, is not substance but subject. He remarks that Kant was right to object to the concept of soul as simple substance but objected for the wrong reason. The real reason is not, as Kant supposed, that in applying the category of simple substance Reason is hopelessly out of its depth, but that the category is hopelessly inadequate, since the soul is to be conceived in terms of self-determining activity (Op. cit. 34; 47).

388. As the Logos in the concrete is the Spirit, Hegel /
Hegel seeks Providence not only in the natural, which though a revelation of God is not conscious of its divine essence (Enc. 140), but, like Vico, in the history of the world. He points out that Providence is a presupposition of historiography. No historian simply compiles all the scraps of information at his disposal. History must have an object, e.g. the decline of the Roman Empire, which is that chosen by the illuminist Gibbon. But this object is "the presupposed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves, as of the critical examination into their comparative importance, i.e. their nearer or more remote relation to it. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbecile mental divagation, not as good as a fairy tale, for even children expect a motif in their stories, a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation," (Op. cit. 549, tr. Wallace).

389. If, however, Rome is an actual and genuine object of political history and the purpose to which the phenomena are to be related and by which they are to be judged, in world-history the Spirit is to an even higher degree the true and actual object and theme, and the aim to which all the phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. Now all the qualities of the Spirit subsist only through freedom, they are all only means /
means to freedom, and they all seek and produce freedom alone. What the Spirit is can be made clear by the contrast with matter. Matter possesses gravity, which is its essential characteristic, in so far as it tends towards a central point; it is composite, consisting of parts which are outside each other, and if it achieved the unity towards which it strives it would cease to be matter. The Spirit, on the other hand, has its centre within itself; it does not have its unity outside itself, but has found it; it is within and by itself. Matter has its substance outside itself, whereas the Spirit is being-by-oneself (Bei-sich-selbst-seyn). This is freedom, for if I am dependent on something I am related to some other thing which I am not, I cannot be without something external; I am free if I am by myself. This self-complete being of the Spirit is self-consciousness. In consciousness we have to distinguish that I know from what I know, but in self-consciousness the two coincide, as the Spirit knows itself; it is the judging of its own nature, and it is also the energy to come to itself, and so to produce itself, to make itself what it is in itself. World-history is the exhibition of the Spirit's growing consciousness of its own freedom, and is accordingly to be divided into three eras. The Oriental world only knows that one man is free, the Greco-Roman world only knows that /
that some men are free, while the German world, under the influence of Christianity, knows that all without restriction are free, i.e. that man as man is free (Op. cit. 549; Phil. der Geschichte, pp. 22-24).

390. The activity of the Spirit is not mere change, it is making itself what it is in itself, making itself its own deed and work and so an object to itself. The same thing holds good of the spirit of a people; it is a determinate spirit, which builds itself up into a real world, which exists and persists in its religion, worship, customs, constitution and political laws, in the whole compass of its institutions, in its adventures and deeds. A people is what its deeds are. Any Englishman, for instance, would say that the English were the people who sailed the ocean and possessed the trade of the world, who had a parliament and juries etc. The relation of the individual to this spirit is that he assimilates this substantial being, and this becomes his disposition and capability, so that he can be something. But when the contradiction is removed between what the spirit of a people is in itself, subjectively, in its inner aim and essence, and what it is actually, when it is by itself, and is objectively present to itself, then its fundamental and highest interest is lost from its life, for interest is present only where there is opposition. It may continue to /
to drag on an existence, but its life is one of mere custom, like a watch which has been wound up and goes on by itself, and eventually it dies a natural death. To find a truly universal interest the spirit of the people would have to come to the point of willing something new, which would be a higher idea of itself, an advance beyond its principle, and then a further determined principle, a new spirit has arrived.

391. Every determinate form of the Spirit not only passes away naturally in time, but is overcome within the self-productive, self-conscious activity of self-consciousness, since this overcoming, which is at once preservation and transfiguration, is the activity of thinking. Accordingly while on the one hand the Spirit overcomes the reality, the continuance of what it is, on the other hand it gains the essence, the thought, the universal of what it only was. Its principle is now no longer the immediate interest and aim which it was, but the essence itself. The result of this process is that the Spirit, in objectifying itself and thinking this its being, while destroying the determinateness of its being, grasps the universal itself, and so gives its principle a new determination. In this way the substantial determinateness of the spirit of the people has been altered, i.e. its principle has risen to something different and higher.

The /
The principles of the spirits of peoples in their necessary succession are only moments of the one universal Spirit which through them raises itself in history to a self-comprehending totality.

392. The Spirit is immortal, i.e. it is neither past nor future but essentially present. Hence the present form of the Spirit comprehends within itself all previous stages. These have been exhibited independently in succession, but what the Spirit is it has always been in itself, and the moments which it seems to have left behind are there in the depths of its present (Phil. der Geschichte, pp. 96-98). Hegel in this way vindicates the concept on behalf of which he had in his youth attacked the theory of God's allowing events to occur. "That world-history is this process of development and the actual becoming of the Spirit, amidst the changing scenes of its events, - this is the true theodicy, the justification of God in history. The Spirit can only be reconciled to world-history and to actuality by the insight that what has happened and happens every day is not only not without God but is essentially his work" (Op. cit. p. 547).

393. Hegel's concept of the Absolute Self-consciousness is the truth of the dogma of the God-man. Hence the vehemence with which he has been attacked by theists /
theists and atheists alike, for they are both agreed that theology is a collection of unintelligible statements, and differ only in that the former attribute their unintelligibility to the imbecility of the human intelligence while the latter attribute this to the imbecility of the theologians' intelligence. Historically the formula of Chalkedon can be justified, for it kept open the problem of how God and man can be one. But it did not solve the problem, nor indeed could it, since the two concepts to be identified are conceived as mutually exclusive. The concept of divine immanence involves a concept of the God-man which is sui generis. Now how can a person among persons and things, a transitory self, be or become God? To set man apart from God, however, is to credit him with the absoluteness and eternity of the Absolute.

394. The particular self-consciousness realizes itself in the first place through slavery, having to obey someone else, and so recognizing that it is not a sole subject surrounded with mere objects of its consciousness, but is itself an object for the consciousness of another self-consciousness, and in this putting off of self (which means ceasing to regard all beside ourself as the objects of our satisfaction) passes to universal self-consciousness. The fear of the Lord, Hegel quotes, is the beginning of wisdom. It is this universal self-consciousness, the reciprocity according to /
to which each is for the other what the other is for it, which lies at the root of all spiritual life in the family and in the nation and is the basis of all virtue (Op. cit. 430-436). The concept of this universal self-consciousness, the affirmative awareness of self in another self (not just negative as in the case of the slave) is apt to awaken distrust in those who suppose that it involves the engulfing of what is ours in a sort of bottomless pit. But here again we must remember that reality is not being but becoming. The identity of self with self is not an immediate identity, an identity that simply is, but one that is made, one indeed the making of which is the whole business of morality. It is this concept, even though we may not make it a special object of thought, which is at any rate presupposed in practice by our condemnation of people for being selfish, self-willed, or self-centred and by our demand for self-sacrifice. Every act, hence self-sacrifice too, is an assertion of the self, so the exhortation to self-sacrifice has a meaning only if the self which sacrifices is not immediately the same as the self which is sacrificed. The absolute self is indeed realized only by this negation of the immediate or empirical self, only when we treat others as ourselves, when we make ourselves an object to ourselves and decide not to satisfy our immediate desires.
desires. "Die to live" Edward Caird never tired of repeating. In this way alone can we overcome the limits to our freedom. To be free we must feel the presence of nothing which is not from ourselves. But the natural, i.e. self-centred man, who simply follows his appetites and impulses, is - a truth stressed by Plato and the Neo-Platonists - not his own master, since in the case of the appetites the origin is from without. Freedom contains necessity within itself as a moment that is overcome. Necessity, Hegel says, is hard only when it means determination by something else, but freedom is self-determination. A good man is conscious not that there is nothing which he has to do but that his conduct is determined by what is necessary and obligatory. Man is most independent when he knows himself to be wholly determined by the absolute logos (Op. cit. 24; 158).

395. Hegel's theory of the essential unity of the divine and the human must be taken with the due emphasis on "essential". Man is divine not by nature but by concept. To be what it is to be man is to be divine, but what man simply is is a natural being, who since he is natural and ought to be spirit, fails to conform to his concept and is therefore not really a man but a beast (Op. cit. 24).

396. On the other side to the divinization of man /
man is the humanizing of God. The logos, says Hegel, is truth, but not truth aware of itself, it is only God by himself, God in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite spirit (Wissenschaft der Logik, Einleitung, ed. V. Henning, p. 36). In the concrete God is Spirit, and this means that "God is God only so far as he knows himself; his self-knowledge is, further, his self-consciousness in man, and man's knowledge of God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God" (Op. cit. 564 tr. Wallace).

Hegel condemns as utterly false Schiller's couplet from his poem on the gods of the Greeks

"When the gods were more human, Men were more divine,"

on the ground that the Greek gods were creatures of the imagination, not possessing real flesh and blood, whereas Christianity introduces flesh and blood as the determinate life of God himself, so that anthropomorphism is sanctified. Just as man was created originally in the image of God, so God is the image of man. Anyone who sees the Son sees the Father (Phil. of Art., Part II, subsection II, chap. 3, 2). While God is the sheer object as opposed to our particular opinions and desires, in comparison with which they have no value, the meaning of the Christian doctrine that God wills all men to be saved is that God contains subjectivity within himself. God is /
is not simply the Object, and so purely to be feared; as he is known in Christianity he is Love, because "in his Son, who is one with him, he has revealed himself to men as a man amongst men, and thereby redeemed them. All which is only another way of saying that the antithesis of subjective and objective is implicitly overcome, and that it is our affair to participate in this redemption by laying aside our immediate subjectivity (putting off the old Adam), and learning to know God as our true and essential self" (Enc. 194 tr. Wallace). Here again it must be remembered that reality is not being but becoming. The unity of man with God is not one which simply exists but one that is made. First the natural, then the spiritual. As Athanasios said, God became man that we might become divine.

397. Hegel makes a gigantic step forward towards an immanentistic or theanthropometric concept of Providence. The Spirit is the self-creative activity which creates everything else, but the Spirit is not something alien to man, in which case he would be a mere chessman moved over the board of life, but man's true self. Hegel professed himself a Lutheran, and the significance of this appears when we recall Luther's assertions of his unity with God, assertions which, like those of the Renaissance philosophers, begin to make /
make sense of the N.T. concept of the unity of God and man, a concept totally different from the contemporary deification of Roman rulers, for deification in the latter case imports merely becoming one of a countless horde of divine and semi-divine beings, whereas in the former case it means identity with the Absolute.

398. Protestantism did not perish with the illumination, but revived with Hegel, and in this country his work was carried on by William Wallace and the two Cairds. This is not to say that the Hegelians aimed (or would have been consistent if they had aimed) at a docile repetition of the thought of the Reformers in the way that the Neo-Thomists aim at repeating the thought of Aquinas. John Caird grasped the principle that for the human race to arrive at maturity is to reach a point from which it will still ever advance to new developments of knowledge, goodness and blessedness, and pointed out that the Reformers, even though they might seem even to themselves to be aiming at producing a simple copy of the spiritual life of the early Church, actually regained the old faith at a higher level. Accordingly he recognized that as human progress had not been arrested with the passing of the Reformers, and as problems had arisen which the Reformers had never contemplated and to which no solution could be found in their writings, the application to these problems of the fundamental principles of religious /
religious truth must develop in those principles meanings which they did not have for the Reformers (Essays for Sunday Reading, p. 231-238).

399. The Hegelian concept of the divine immanence in man makes possible an adamantine proof of Providence. Providence is, as the late Dr. John Oman emphasized, a matter of "attitude" and not an inference from observed facts (Honest Religion, p. 80), in other words, it is a fundamental presupposition. If we proceed by the analysis of concepts, which is the method which Kant styled dogmatic, we reach at the end no conclusion that can withstand denial of our starting-point. Hence, as Josiah Royce points out (v. Fugitive Essays, Intro. p. 19), the only method to secure absoluteness is to show that the thesis is presupposed by its own denial. Now, as Edward Caird was conscious, "All knowledge implies the universality of thought, i.e. it implies that man, as a thinking being, can, and indeed must, apprehend the world from a subjective, which is also an objective point of view. For man's consciousness of himself is at the same time a consciousness of the not-self, and of the unity to which both of these correlative elements belong. From the dawning of self-consciousness he is thus lifted above his own separate and partial existence as an individual; he lives /
lives a life which is not merely his own life, but the
life of the world. He is, and can become more com-
pletely, the organ of that universal spirit which
transcends and includes all things, which

"Lives through all life, extends to all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent."

It is this which makes him capable of science, of moral-
ity, and of religion; for in so far as he speaks his
own words, or does his own deeds, or thinks his own
thoughts, he speaks and acts and thinks folly and evil;
and it is only in so far as he becomes the instrument
of some universal power or interest, that his individual
action, or thought, or utterance can have any dignity or
value" (Social Philosophy of Comte\(^2\), p. 123 sq.),

400. Herein lies the answer to Mr Ryle's attack
on the concept of the essence which involves existence
(Mind, 1935, p. 137 sqq.; Mind, 1937, p. 53 sqq.).
His speculative objection, which lies beneath the
superstructure of "nouns of assemblage", "copula-
 adjective patterns", "type-fallacies" and so on (for
Oxford philosophers are still, as in Giordano Bruno's
day, predominantly "dottori in gramatica"), is that
there is no self-contradiction in saying: "Nothing has
deitas" (Mind, 1935, p. 146). He argues that we cannot
infer from the essence of a bicycle that there actually
are any bicycles, and so from the concept of deitas we
cannot /
cannot infer that there is anything which has deitas. But this is an analogical argument which begs the question. Admittedly again there is no self-contradiction in denying the existence of God if his existence is a "particular matter of fact", but that is just the question. The concept of the Absolute must be examined by itself. Now if you say: "There is no God", you are reversing Herakleitos and asserting that your utterance is not that of the Logos but of yourself as one particular being among others. In that case your utterance has no more value than a yawn or a grunt. Hence to the question what contradiction there is in saying that there is no God the answer is that the contradiction is in you, for you presuppose in making your statement that it has the universal value which your statement itself denies it can have. To think, i.e. to talk intelligently to yourself or to others, is to preach, to speak in demonstration of the Spirit and of power. Admittedly many bear unwitting witness to the existence of God, but then, as Herakleitos said, many people go through life as though they were asleep.
CHAPTER V.

From Hegel to the Actualists

401. Even in Hegel, however, there is a relic of transcendence. His system is a montriad composed of Logos, Nature and Spirit. This means that Spirit presupposes Nature (cf. Enc. 381), and its own process has therefore a path already made for it to follow. Then the dialectic of Nature, since the process of Spirit has not yet begun, is a real and rational system already completed before the real and rational process of Spirit. Hence Nature must be something external to and transcending Spirit. Similarly the Logos, which is God himself in his eternal essence before the creation of the world and the finite spirit, transcends both Nature and Spirit, and because it is not the process of Spirit must be a system of what is thought and not of thinking, of an order and not the ordering. The Logos therefore transcends history.

402. The claims of the positive, which Hegel had himself championed against Fichte, accordingly arise again, and this is the historical justification of the Positivistic philosophy. Who is the subject of history? For Comte the subject is no transcendent being but Humanity, that organic Great Being of which we are members. This is the true Providence, which needs our service /
service and to which we owe gratitude and adoration, for we are nothing without it. Man, strictly speaking, exists only in the too abstract brain of the metaphysicians. There is, at bottom, nothing real but humanity, though the complexity of the nature of humanity has hitherto prevented us from systematizing the notion (Système de politique positive, Tom. III, p. 328).

403. Comte conceives humanity as progressing in accordance with the unique law of human evolution, which is that man becomes more and more religious (Op. cit. Tom. III, p. 10). This law, when further determined, is the law of the three stages, the necessary passage of all human theories from the first stage, the theological or fictitious, which is always provisional, through the second, the metaphysical, which is purely transitory, to the third, the positive or scientific, which alone is definitive (Op. cit. Tom. III, p. 28). From the first rudiments of civilization up to the present state of the most advanced peoples, history shows the continuous development of the order determined by the laws of human nature (Op. cit. Tom. III, p. 620). Apparent retrogressions are merely the oscillations of progress (Op. cit. Tom. III, p. 72).

404. Comte's philosophy of history faintly echoes the Hegelian notion of history as the Spirit's developing consciousness of itself, but it differs on three essential /
essential points. In the first place, the process of history is from Comte's standpoint a process whose future is predetermined, a Campanellian comedy proceeding along the lines laid down in the divine scenario, even though Comte would banish all theological and metaphysical notions. He credits sociology, the science of collective humanity, with the capacity, after appreciating at each epoch the present as the necessary product of the past, of predicting the future advance of humanity. The perfect stage lies ahead of us, but we can foresee it. For Hegel, on the other hand, history is a genuine process, not one which is foreknowable and therefore essentially already realized. For him the present is the perfect stage, and that is why he concluded his history with his own age. Not that he thought that history had suddenly come to a full stop, but, as he said at the end of his lectures on the Philosophy of History, this was as far as consciousness had yet developed (Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. Gans³, p. 546).

405. In the second place, Comte's humanity has nature outside it, a fatality against which it has to struggle. True, he expects the poets to fill the gap by representing the victorious struggle of humanity against this fatality (Op. cit. Tom. I, p. 340), or even by representing space and earth as helping humanity /
humanity (Synthèse subjective, p. 10 sq.). But such a task could lead only to insincerity and therefore unpoetical work. In any case, when Comte has insisted that the single man apart from humanity is a mere abstraction, he ought consequentially to go on to insist that humanity apart from nature is a mere abstraction.

406. In the third place, Comte prides himself that his Great Being is relative and not absolute, and is being extended through the continuous succession of human generations. This totality constitutes in his view a more imposing spectacle than the sublime inertia of the old Supreme Being, whose passive existence was suspended only by inexplicable caprices (Système de politique positive, Tom. I, p. 335). But this increase from less to more is an empirical concept of development, and logically implies a beginning out of something else and a dissolution into something else. The shadow of the dissolution of humanity is hardly dispelled by Comte's declaration that it will be many centuries before the Great Being has to occupy itself with its own decline (Op. cit. Tom. III, p. 73). The Hegelian development of the Spirit, which is the truth of the temporal development, is an eternal process in which alpha is omega, for though Hegel makes Nature a presupposition of the Spirit, he says that it is the Spirit which gives itself a presupposition in Nature.
in other words creates Nature (Enc. 239), and condemns as superficial the view of development as simply the issuing of the more perfect from the less perfect (Op. cit. 159).

407. Comte aims at eliminating transcendent, but he fails to attain the thought of immanence and falls into naturalism, with his notion of collective humanity or society, the object of social statics and dynamics. It is true that he accounts Nature a metaphysical and not a positive concept, but nature is the determined, and Comte does regard society as an object which is determined and whose operations are predictable, not as spirit, who is the self-determining. Society is a quantitative sum-total which admits of extension; it is a totality which is the arbiter of our lot and is objectively external to us like the other real existences, though subjectively we form part of it, at least in hope (Système de politique positive, Tom. II, p. 68).

The living are always and increasingly dominated by the dead. During his life a man can serve humanity as a being, but it is only after his death, by his effect on posterity, that he really becomes an organ of humanity. (Op. cit. Tom. II, p. 60 sq.). Yet according to Comte the individual man is a mere abstraction and humanity alone is real. Is the individual then only to attain concreteness at his death?

408. Croce /
Croce grasps the error of taking man naturalistically, either in the singular or collectively, as the subject of history, and comes to the conclusion that the real subject is the Vichio–Hegelian Providence, when divested of the relics of transcendence, a Providence that works not on but in individuals, or in other words the Spirit as it appears in man, universalized (Teoria e storia della Storiografia, p. 88; Filosofia della Pratica, p. 178; Saggio sullo Hegel, p. 167). Croce arrived at his philosophy independently of Hegelianism from a study of the problems of art, morality, law and historical method (Contributo alla critica di me stesso, p. 56 sq.), but he deepened his philosophy by studying Hegel later, and both he and Gentile have reformed Hegelianism after their own fashion. Both reject the configuration Logos, Nature, Spirit and resolve the whole into a philosophy of Spirit, identifying the divine with the human thought. Both therefore attack the Vichio–Hegelian notion of a development from less to more, the Vichian development from the savage immersed in sense to the fully rational being, and the Hegelian development in the "Phenomenology" from the sensuous stages of consciousness to the Absolute Logos, or from the stage when one alone is free to the stage when all are free. Their criticisms apply to Comte even more forcibly, since he did not posit an eternal history /
history integrating if transcending the temporal history.

409. If, Croce urges, the course of history is depicted as a series of actions and persons, each of whom represents only a part or particle of humanity, men could not be called even half-men but would be fractionated to infinity and reduced to worse than dust. Even a progress in which every succeeding part is superior to the preceding is impaled on the fatal dilemma of being either a "progressus ad finitum" or a "progressus ad infinitum". In the first case the progress concludes with its own negation, a state of rest, and in the second it is reduced to a breathless accumulation of particles which never reaches anywhere. The true concept of progress must involve an attainment at every instant of the true and the good and a bringing in doubt at every new instant of what has been attained, though without losing what has been gained, i.e. a perpetual solution and a perpetual problem arising again for a new solution. This concept unites the two one-sided opposites of an end that is reached once for all and an end that is never reached. The two propositions "Humanity makes itself in history" and "The presupposition of this history is humanity" are not distinct or contradictory but form a single proposition. Humanity is always whole in every epoch and person, because /
because to imagine it without any one of its categories would be to overthrow them all. The procession of the four categories or moments of the Spirit, i.e. art, thought, efficiency (economicità) and morality, is an eternal procession in which the distinction of the moments is only ideal; in any concrete historical actuality they must all be present. Humanity could never begin with an unconscious stage because then it would be degraded to nature. This is the basis of the popular saying that man is always the same. Not that there is a permanent and perpetual humanity and a changing and transitory humanity which can be separated from or attached to it. The entirety of humanity is present only in doing, and doing is never a doing in general but doing a determined and historical task, so that in accomplishing this determined task humanity is celebrated in its entirety (Storia come pensiero e come azione², p. 274 sqq.; Saggio sullo Hegel, p. 163 sqq.). Similarly Berdyaev rejects as the negation of Providence the theory of a progress in which only the last generation is admitted to the presence of God, insisting that every generation has its own goal, justification and values through which it has contact with the divine (The Meaning of History, Eng. tr. p. 193).

410. Now Croce rejects the notion of a humanity ignorant of itself on the ground that it would be degraded /
degraded to nature. Why should there not be nature to begin with? Because, on Croce’s view, nature is not real but consists of our own abstractions or fictions, “pseudo-concepts” i.e. classifications which we make for the practical purpose of exercising dominion over nature. Why then do we not write a history of the tree in our garden as we do of ancient Rome? Because of the historical canon which forbids our thinking one fact on the model of another. In the same way as it is wrong to disguise primitive Christians as Catholics of the Counter-Reformation or Thales as Galileo, it is wrong to conceive the life of an organism like that of a city with houses, streets, theatres etc. Everything lives, and there is nothing material or mechanical, but the forms of life are infinite. The psychology of many men is hard or impossible to understand, and the animals evidently understand each other better than a man understands an animal. But we understand as much as we require. As Hegel observed, in his development man has discarded certain forms of cognition as useless burdens, and regains them only in sickness or psychic disease, e.g. in cases of telepathy or hypnotism. Yet though we do not require to understand everything historically, in reality everything is historical (Saggio sullo Hegel, p. 201 sqq.).

411. De Ruggiero would have us take as the motto of /
of our speculative life the saying of Bertrando Spaventa, the Nineteenth Century Hegelian, that the Spirit is an eternal problem which is an eternal solution (La filosofia contemporanea, Vol. 2, p. 147). This concept of the Spirit, which is common to Croce, Gentile and De Ruggiero, is the overcoming of the Hellenic opposition of the unchanging eternal to the changing temporal. Change without permanence, Croce points out, turns out the same as immobility without change, because the mobility of change is empty just like the immobility which is devoid of life. "The symbol of humanity is neither God nor man but the God-man, the Christ, who is the eternal in the temporal and the temporal in the eternal" (Saggio sullo Hegel, p. 164).
412. The concept of the unity of God and man is the kernel of the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, who intends his philosophy to be one which is, or rather begins to be, adequate to Christianity, and takes his Christianity seriously; for in a country which is divided practically into Catholics and atheists, he is a Christian who is not a Catholic but, as he used to be called at the beginning of his career, a Neo-Hegelian, a title which suits him better than it suits Croce, for Croce approached Hegelianism from without and attempted to sever the living from the dead, whereas Gentile has tried to reform Hegelianism from within by making it true to itself. Gentile therefore belongs to the history of Protestantism, and De Ruggiero, who belongs to the same trend of thought, while having little sympathy for modern Protestantism, expresses in his "Rinascimento, riforma e controriforma" the warmest appreciation of the Reformers.

413. Like Croce, Gentile is clear that historical reality is the only reality and is not to be distinguished from some transcendent reality, natural or supernatural. The naturalist puts nature outside history and
and denies the historicity of nature, while the Platonizing or Aristotelianizing theist puts God outside history, making him external to the process of the real which derives from him. Then they proceed to talk of the eternal laws of immutable nature or, more profoundly, of the eternal thought of God, which is perfect and so does not admit of growth or of that development through which human thought is constituted historically and every human work progresses from time to time.

414. Now modern philosophy claims that the thought through which the human spirit is manifested must at least be something, i.e. that something, however limited, on which the naturalist and the theist must rest when they talk of the eternal reality which is the presupposition of thought. Even the most dogmatic of naturalists and theists attempt to show the truth of their assertions and so justify them in face of thought, so that implicitly or practically by expecting you to believe what they say they recognize the authority of thought. In this way they recognize thought to be something, if not everything. Yet this something which thought is, the denial of which involves the entire cessation of thought and the disappearance of any object which we could seem to require, has certain characteristics to renounce which is the same as denying /
denying thought absolutely. However modest man wishes to be in the presence of nature or God, he cannot help attributing to his thought, however limited he tries to conceive it, the capacity of doing homage to the truth, i.e. of enunciating a true judgement and so of realizing a value, which is possible only to a free being. Hence he cannot continue to conceive himself as limited, since what is limited is conditioned, determined, not free. As a being of nature man would be limited, but as the being who is able to distinguish himself from nature and so put himself above all natural beings, i.e. as that being who actually is in so far as he thinks and endeavours to form a precise concept of himself, he cannot be limited in spite of the sincerest intentions of humility. The spirit is nothing or everything (Il superamento del tempo nella storia - in Memorie italiane, p. 303 sqq.).

415. There are cautious minds which shrink from Gentile's insistence on thought's being nothing or everything, and would rather maintain that there is a subjective factor in cognition. Like all compromises in philosophy, this is the worst of all the theories. If thought be merely a contributory factor, then things as we think them will be the result of the combination of our thought and things as they are, so that things as we think them will never be what they really are and /
and all our thought is necessarily false, a judgement which contradicts itself in its very enunciation. Things therefore are not that of which our thought is a quasi-photographic reproduction, but just what we think them to be, and we come back to Gentile's "either nothing or everything".

416. Even if we wished, in defiance of logic, to retain the theory of nature or God as presuppositions of the spirit, we should come up against the unshakable Sokratic doctrine that what we can know can only be thought and can only be determined in the form of a concept. Hence either we must cease to talk of God or nature or else we must admit that we can only talk of the concept of God and nature. In the latter case theology is resolved into the history of theological doctrines, and nature, as natural science gradually acquires consciousness of the logic of its proceedings and of the origin and ground of the problems which it puts, reveals itself as the work of human thought in its development. For if something is wanted which is not spirit, it must still be thought to be for the spirit, i.e. an object of thought; and thought tries to appropriate its object by penetrating it with itself, analysing it to reconstruct it and animate it with itself, and so assimilating it, even in the desire to distinguish it from itself and set it over against /
against itself, and investing it with the very form of the process by which it is realized itself (Memorie italiane, p. 306). Nature, to put it otherwise, is indeed the limit to our thought, the unthinkable, but still it is that which we think to be unthinkable, and so it is after all within our thought, a limit which our thinking sets to itself (Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, p. 221).

417. In this way we Neo-Hegelians can appreciate the hard saying of Sir James Jeans: "Before man appeared on the scene, there were neither waves nor electric nor magnetic forces; these were not made by God, but by Huyghens, Fresnel, Faraday and Maxwell" (Physics and Philosophy, p. 171). The author of course intends it in a sceptical sense, since behind these "mental constructs" he posits an unknowable reality (which is the Kantian Thing-in-itself over again), and one could derive support from it for Croce's theory that the concepts of natural science are classifications which are pseudo-concepts or fictions. But however fictitious a concept like the zoological species dog looks when you consider it by itself, it is not fictitious when you are actually using it, i.e. when you are not thinking of the species dog but of something as a dog. The thought with which you actually study nature is the same as the nature which you study (Gentile, Filosofia/
Thus while Gentile agrees with Croce that nature is an abstraction, he takes this not in Croce's sense of a fiction, a manipulation of reality for practical purposes, but in the sense of the mere product of thought. Natural science is not a manipulative distortion, for it is no more abstract than its object.

Only through the absolute freedom of the human spirit does history get a value and meaning and acquire the intelligibility which distinguishes it from nature. It is commonly supposed that a complex of natural facts is intelligible when the facts are explained through the relation of causality, but causality really explains nothing and merely extends the sphere of mystery. If A and B are two facts which are inscrutable taken by themselves in their singularity, i.e. when they are immediate apprehensions by which our thought is checked and stopped from proceeding further, then when A is understood as the cause of B, they are shown to be parts of a more complex fact A - B, but this complex fact is no different in character than the first two facts. The new event is just a fact, an object of immediate apprehension, which our thought cannot explain. Why does A produce B? Because it does. We cannot get beyond the simple observation of the fact. Every natural investigation /
investigation is an endeavour simply to widen the extent of the facts which are immediately perceived. Natural events are a matter of description (Introduzione alla filosofia, p. 117). Gentile's point is reinforced by the modern natural scientist's abandonment of the principle of causality in the sphere of the infinitely large and the infinitely small. According to Sir James Jeans "The astronomer of today makes no claim to understand why the planets move as they do; he is content to know that the pattern of events can be described very neatly and concisely by picturing planetary motions as taking place in a curved space" (Physics and Philosophy, p. 5; cf. p. 42 sq.).

It is tempting to try to make history intelligible by means of a transcendent teleology treating history, which as a complex of facts is indistinguishable from nature, as the instrument of a good which could not otherwise be realized. Yet this sort of teleology is self-contradictory, since it renders impossible the concept of that good which is to explain history. If history were only the instrument of the universal good, this good would not have its beginning, let alone its accomplishment, in history. Man would not be the author of even the smallest part of this good, nor could he ever benefit from it, since good can only belong to the being who does it. If the
the good be transcendent, then so is the will which does the good, and vice versa. This position is conceivable in the case of an instrument which man uses and which is not himself, e.g. in the case of a saw which man uses to cut wood, where the saw accomplishes not its own but its user's good, but it is absurd where the instrument which is to subserve the good without sharing in it is the very man who puts the problem of it, because one of the forms of good is that of thinking the truth, and this would not belong to man if he were excluded from the sphere of the good by reason of his instrumental nature. The man who cannot do good but can only be guided by a superior hand to the production of a superior good cannot even think that this is true. He can say it like an automaton but not think it; someone else would think it in him but he would remain extraneous to this thought (Op. cit. p. 119 sq.).

420. Hence history can only be explained, as Vico saw, in so far as the men who are endeavouring to explain it are the very beings who have made it. Here is the crisis of the doctrine of Providence, for it is on the philosophy of history that it must depend, as if history can be written intelligibly without recognition of the action of God, then God is reduced to a marginal existence, and Providence becomes a superfluous /
superfluous supposition. Now in his early struggles against the Roman Catholic Modernists, whose general position he assailed on the ground that it was an irreligious half-way house between Catholicism, which is essentially Platonism (in the wide sense in which as the philosophy of transcendence it includes Aristotle, who proverbially is always Platonizing), and Hegelianism, which grasps the essence of Christianity, Gentile demolished the Modernist attempt to make history a neutral study. Loisy had distinguished history as science from theology as faith and urged that history apprehends only phenomena, with their succession and interconnection, and does not reach the bottom of things, and that if history deals with religious facts it sees them in the limitations of their sensible form and not in their profound cause, just as the scientist has before him an infinity of appearances or manifestations of forces, but the great force hidden behind all phenomena is not reached directly by experience. God does not reveal himself at the end of a telescope. History, even in the Gospels, is a human history, in so far as it is produced in humanity, and it was as a man, not as God, that Jesus entered into the history of men.

421. Gentile pointed out in reply that it is impossible to write the history of a religious dogma
or of any historical fact, without certain determined concepts which are included in that of religious dogma and of this religious dogma, without a certain initial orientation and indeed a certain faith, just as I cannot construct and understand Spinozism without a concept of determinism, naturalism etc. and without being in a position to grasp what truth there is in these concepts. Of course Christ in the Gospels does not and cannot appear more than man to anyone who starts to study them without any faith, but I cannot open the Gospels, granted that I open them not casually but from a genuine historical interest, without having my own philosophy about the divinity of Christ. This philosophy will be my mind and as it were the eyes with which I look into the Gospels, and according to the kind of philosophy, the result will naturally be that I find God as a true or rather as the true historical personage, or that I am unable to see him at all. Certainly the astronomer cannot find God at the end of his telescope. But was the telescope ever invented in order to see God? The astronomer does not propose to see anything but the stars; but he does not propose to understand even them; he describes, observes, measures, represents and does not seek the truth which ought to shine even in the stars; he does not know nor does he wish to know what these /
these stars are and why they are, if they are there for a reason and if it is possible to know what they are. The historian who collects sources does like the astronomer, but the historian who reads the sources must also know the language in which they were written, and so must understand the soul which is within. If this soul is moved by the thought of God, the historian must also see God and say to himself, to see him really, whether the God of this soul is an illusion or a reality. He can also say nothing, and he can concern himself with the phenomenal humanity of Christ, as Loisy wants, leaving to faith the question of the divinity of Christ. But to say nothing, or rather not to be able to say anything, is still to say something and is already a philosophy and faith. It is what the Encyclical Pascendi, which condemned Modernism, called agnosticism. Now if history is like the philosophy which it presupposes, a history which is based on agnosticism cannot but be agnostic, and an agnostic history must for the Catholic seem governed by apriorisms which distort and falsify the historical reality (Modernismo e i rapporti tra religione e filosofia, p. 49 sqq.).

422. The director of the Modernist review "Nova et vetera" protested that to have an interest in the object of one's history does not mean to relive it, adhere /
adhere to it, assimilate it from the philosophic and religious point of view, and that the historian can be compared to the visitor at a gallery who does not buy the pictures but can still admire them. This separation, Gentile rejoined, between the spirit and truth, through which the spirit can contemplate the truth without adhering to it, is a separation which depends on the fantastic concept of truth itself in so far as object or content of the spirit, whereas truth is act, moment, life of the spirit. The spirit can never stay external to the truth, because it cannot be external to itself. To persuade oneself of this one naturally must think not of the possible relation of our spirit with an abstract truth which is not truth for anybody or at least not truth for us, but of the relation of our spirit with our truth, of this man's spirit with his truth, and so on, for this is the only truth which exists as such.

423. There is no abstract notion of the Resurrection common to the believer, the unbeliever and the neutral, with the difference that the second restricts himself to taking cognizance of it without adhering to it, the first adheres to it and makes it substance of his spirit and flesh of his own flesh, while the third says neither yes nor no. This judgement conceived in the three distinct spiritual conditions is each time a different judgement: (1) I /
I believe that Jesus is risen, (2) At a certain time the false legend was formed that Jesus was risen, (3) I cannot say whether it is true that Jesus is risen. These three judgements or notions about the Resurrection of Christ, three distinct answers to the question whether Christ is risen, presuppose not only hermeneutics and a criticism of sources, but a certain philosophy which is different in the three historians and also a different faith or fundamental conviction (Op. cit. p. 91 sq.)

424. History, then, must be the testing place for our concept of Providence. At first sight Gentile might seem to have made history atheistical by his conclusion that history is intelligible only if it is made by men, but he insists that on the contrary history conceived immanentistically is the only history with a religious character. Transcendentism wants two terms, and rightly so. Intelligent immanentism does not take one of two terms and cancel the other. But the question is to determine the connection between the two (Introduzione alla filosofia, p. 120). Here Gentile parted from Croce, who attacked Gentile's philosophy as a "theologizing philosophy". But, Gentile retorted, if immanence and transcendence were two authentic opposites, as Croce and the orthodox Catholic theologians seemed to take them, then on Croce's /
Croce's own principles the truth would lie in the synthesis of the two. Immanence, however, is not identity as opposed to transcendence, it is the synthesis of the two (Filosofia dell' arte, p. 42).

425. Once the transcendent theories have been, set aside, the question is to determine more concretely the humanity of history. Who is it who makes history? Is it the heroes or the masses? Do the artificers of history participate as single individuals or as representatives of the society to which they belong, i.e. is history biography or sociology in motion? Each of the opposing theses has much to be said for it, but they all break down over irreconcilable dualisms.

426. The masses are aggregates of individuals each of whom is conditioned by all the others, so that none is free and all are overwhelmed by the universal mechanism. So either man is man, and then he is unable to act historically, or else he succeeds in acting historically and then he has ceased to be a man, a free subject conscious of his practical purposiveness. The heroes, on the other hand, are heroes because they stand above the crowd and are separated from it, and do not draw from the multitude and so from tradition the ideas which are their strength. The multitude is around and behind them, simply an indifferent material. But still they have to reckon with it, and it will limit /
limit them and condition their action, subjecting them to an insuperable law. So even the heroes are not free.

427. The view that all take part in the historical process as single individuals will not do because the single individuals are particulars, and every particular is outside the rest, and so can only act if he does not know what he is doing, since to know is to judge, and judgement entails universality. To do something, however, and not to know what one is doing belongs not to the spirit but to an instrument. Then is society the subject of history? No, because the society of the sociologist is not an attribute of man but among men, and so above every man. Thus to have the society of the sociologist you must relinquish men, none of whom can be said to be the subject of a thought or action, or rather none of whom will be able to say even that the sociological conception of history ought to replace the individualist!

428. There are two further perplexities which Gentile indicates. The first is that history is thinkable only through determinations of space and time, and the man who acts in history acts as a subject who is here and not there, and there now and not before or after. Now the particularity of the subject entails his limitation, i.e. that he can be thought only together /
together with other subjects or other things, which by closing him within certain conditions make his freedom impossible. The second perplexity is that all history is thinkable in so far as the action precedes the consciousness of it. Historiography looks to the past, and the historian is uneasy when dealing even with relatively contemporary history. Now the past, in that it is past, is by its very nature absolutely necessary; it is what it is. The historical fact is necessary just as much as a natural fact. If it took place it could not not have taken place (Introduzione alla filosofia, p. 124 sqq.) Here Gentile is in agreement with Croce, who remarks that imagining what might have taken place if something had not happened is the sort of game which we play in an idle moment when we imagine what course our life would have taken if we had not met somebody whom we did meet or made some mistake which we did make. In doing this we calmly treat ourselves as the constant and necessary element, and do not think of mentally changing our own self, which is what it is at this moment, with its experience, its regrets and its imaginings, just through having met that person and made that mistake (Storia come pensiero e come azione, p. 15).

429. As history is intelligible only if made by men, we are compelled like Vico to postulate an ideal eternal
eternal history besides the history which runs in time, since the latter does not permit of human freedom. Here Croce and Gentile divide. Croce, as we saw, regards Vico's notion of history's being a development from an age of sense through an age of imagination to one of reason as a confusion of categories or moments of the life of the spirit, which are pure philosophical concepts, with historical epochs, which are empirical classifications. But the Crocean ideal process of the spirit is conceivable by itself, and so differs from the Platonic forms merely in being a succession of four moments. Croce therefore does not satisfy his own profound demand that the eternal should be in the temporal and the temporal in the eternal.

Gentile, on the other hand, does satisfy this demand, since he regards the eternal history not as a second history but as the truth or concept of the temporal. Whether in the shape of a history of a people or of a period or of a part of a people or of a part of a period or of the life of one man, history is intelligible only if through the succession of its chronological moments there shines the rhythm of the ideal history which is not in time but eternal. From the standpoint of this ideal history all time is contracted into the instant, which has no parts or possibility of succession. What is intelligible is the concept /
concept of e.g. the Roman Revolution, which is considered in eternity, in which there is no succession and no following of the past by the present and so no past. The ideal history is present history. This is not the present which we set between the past and the future, because the latter is itself one of the moments of time, but the true present which comprehends all time within itself (Introduzione alla filosofia, p. 125 sqq.; Riforma della dialettica hegeliana², p. 269 sqq.).

For Gentile history is eternal without losing any of its particular and concrete determinations. It is important to realize that Gentile does not conceive eternal history as a sort of geometry, as the sociologists do. To return to the previous example, the concept of the Roman Revolution, far from excluding the determinations of Rome and the First Century B.C., requires the prosopographical details which Mr Syme uses to reveal the workings of the dynastic alliances. The Roman Revolution is not one instance of the type revolution, of which the French and the Russian would be other instances. The comparative method, as Adolfo Omodeo says à propos of comparative religion, deprives everything of its individuality and is therefore the absolute contradiction of history (Tradizioni morali e disciplina storica, p. 85).

432. As
432. As history is eternal without losing any of its particular determinations, the same individual who in respect of those determinations is represented as acting in time as a particular agent, governed by particular motives which Vico called passions because in their immediate particularity they conflict with the universality of reason, Vico's "common sense", is seen, when considered more profoundly, to be the universal agent of the historical process. True individuality is certainly particularity, but particularity in so far as it is resolved in the universality of the reason or consciousness which belongs to man, since the individuality which is an element of the multiplicity and so pure and simple particularity is not a subject who affirms himself, but an object and presupposes the subject to whom the multiplicity is relative and who in front of him can only have multiplicity, though on the other hand his unity can only be inside him. Individuality, however, entails unity, and so an objective individuality is nonsense.

433. Man can be considered from two sides. From one side he is an object and belongs to natural reality, and so cannot be free or have a judgement made about him attributing or denying a value to him. From the other he is the very man who looks at nature and makes it a problem, and is specifically man by distinguishing /
distinguishing himself from nature, and cannot but be conceived free, since without freedom he could not put the problem of freedom even to give it a negative solution, and lives and acts in a world where the judgement of approbation and disapprobation is never suspended, a world which is, to use the late Dr. Collingwood's term, criteriological. From the first side, (which does not permit of the putting of the problem of history, since from it man belongs to nature), the man who empirically appears as the agent of history is represented in the midst of a host of others, a thing among things or a man among things and men. From the other side man is considered not from outside but from inside, where each of us can meet and perceive his own humanity with its needs and interests, with its sense of unfailing freedom and the duty which derives from it. In that case man is always a unity of a multiplicity, a unity without which the multiplicity, whether that of space or time, or that of atomic and mechanical nature or that of history in space and time, is quite unintelligible. He is therefore a unity which cannot be transcended on any condition, and so an infinite and eternal unity.

434. It is essential to get clear the relation between the unity and the multiplicity. If the unity be conceived abstractly as standing by itself and the multiplicity /
multiplicity consequently as external to it or derived from it, the concept of the infinite and eternal unity of the individual ends by turning into solipsism or illusionism. Gentile dismisses these theories out of hand, and indeed they are never taken very seriously, for granted, as realism is always on the verge of granting, that there is a subjective factor in cognition and so every subject has his own world, there must be a large world containing all these subjects with their queer little worlds. The relation, Gentile explains, is that of original synthesis, so that the unity which is distinguished from the multiplicity and contraposed to it is not a cause but itself an effect of the more profound unity which produces the relation between unity and multiplicity, centre and circumference. Man as a unity who finds the multiplicity outside him is not the true individuality, for this true individuality belongs to man as a unity who produces at once and in an absolute synthesis the unity of the man who has the multiplicity outside him and the multiplicity which is round about such a unity.

435. To put it otherwise, the man in whom is actualized the true humanity, creative spirit and freedom is not the superficial man (l'uomo superficiale), since this man is himself in time and space and /
and in nature, and so is not a cause but an effect. This man only exists because there is the profound man (l'uomo profondo) who brings into being the superficial man who has consciousness of himself and of other and contraposes himself to other and so makes himself external and other to himself, thus finding a place in the multiplicity. This superficial man may be the centre of a circle relative to this centre, but the circle varies to infinity with the varying of the centre itself. This is therefore the relative centre, the subject of sceptical relativism, the scepticism which, as Novalis was aware (Schriften, ed. Minor, Vol. 3, p. 57) is immature idealism. This idealism, which has haunted British epistemologists ever since Bishop Berkeley, the more oppressively since it is practically the only idealism known to them, is immature in that it treats the subject as one of the objects. It may regard qualitative determinations like colours and odours as our sensations; it may even regard quantitative determinations as mental constructs, but it always demands an unknown or unknowable reality looming behind these sensations and constructs, since it is impotent to deal with the question whether Herculaneum did not continue to exist all the centuries it was buried when everyone was quite unaware of it. Hence the realist claims that objects are independent of the subject, not seeing /
seeing that those whom he calls subjects are really objects, the true subject being himself thinking of the relation between Herculaneum and all the people who were unaware of it. The world cannot be a product of a minute part of itself. Herein consists the plausibility of putting a transcendent Being outside history, for the transcendence is relative to the superficial subjects and not to the profound subject. The true individuality is self-consciousness which is the self-consciousness of man in so far as it is the self-consciousness of the whole (Introduzione alla filosofia, p. 19; 126 sqq.).

436. This is a point which is worth emphasising, for even so understanding a critic as Prof. De Burgh considers that while it is reasonable for Gentile to speak of the Ego as the subject who thinks, for him to speak of "we" as the subject is "intolerably ambiguous" (Towards a Religious Philosophy, p. 87). It is clear from this that Prof. De Burgh by asking who thinks, means which one out of a number, as it were which pebble on the beach, whereas Gentile denies that the subject is an element of the manifold. The subject is not an exclusive unit but has the power to negate itself and overcome every limit, leaving nothing outside itself, and hence is quite accurately designated by the indifferent usage of "I" or "we". The unity of personality /
personality is not the unity of a thing but the living unity which Hegel grasped in his historico-theological studies.

437. Gentile does not mean by his distinction of superficial man and profound man, or, as he usually says, of empirical ego and transcendental ego (transcendental in the Kantian sense of what is not beyond experience but immanent in it though not derived from it), to revert to the transcendence which, as we saw, remained even in Vico and Hegel, who, though they both consider the divine thought as the living heart of the human thought, yet make a real distinction between the two, conceiving human thought as rising from lower stages of consciousness, ascending from sense to reason or absolute knowledge.

438. To conceive thought as our own actual thinking and to identify the Logos with the Spirit is to overcome the remnants of transcendence, and to make Hegel true to his own notion of the identity of being and thought. Since the Spirit is dialectical activity, the process of thought cannot properly be represented as a system of concepts or categories ascending from that of pure being to that of Spirit. The process of thought can only be the act of thinking (cogitare) and not a system of concepts or things thought (cogitata); it is not pure being but the being of thought which is identical /
identical with non-being, since when thought simply is it has ceased to be thought. Becoming is not something to be deduced from the analysis of being and nothing, but that which is realized in the act of thinking. The unity of being and nothing in Hegel, as indeed every synthesis of opposites in Hegel, is a synthesis which is contemplated, static, existent. It is certainly composed of inseparable co-elements, but their unity is a necessity of fact which does not justify itself and show its own necessity. Our thinking is not present at its birth because it does not participate in it. It is, in short, synthesis but not autosynthesis. The real unity of being and nothing is one which is not thought or analyzed but realized, or rather one which can indeed be thought, but only as the same as, and not an image or copy of, the unity of the thought by which we think it. Spirit or self-consciousness is the process which does not require to be altered by anything other than itself, it is inward alteration (intima alteritá). A thing simply is (what it is), whereas the act of thinking is not pure being but being which is turned back upon itself and so denies itself as pure being. Being, pure being, in its abstractness is nothing. But still this nothing is affirmed by thought, and because it is the nothing of thought is the thought of nothing. Here is the true /
true becoming, the act of thought which denies being only as pure being and so realizes it as thought.

439. In Hegel's logic the synthesis, becoming, presupposes the thesis and antithesis of being and nothing, but the becoming which is the act of thinking alone makes the thesis possible by creating it along with its antithesis. The act of thinking is therefore autoctosis (self-creation). This process is not one which we find taking place, i.e. a natural process, for natural movement is, as Spinoza saw, a play of the imagination. The fire of Herakleitos, Gentile remarks, is a painted fire, for any series of natural changes forms a thinkable self-identical totality. The planets, for instance, move, but their movement is an immutable fact. The same holds good even of nature conceived evolutionistically, since the evolutionary process is only the explication of what is implicit, every stage being regarded as able and bound to turn into the next stage. The process of thought, on the other hand, is not one which we watch and which possesses the self-identity of what is thought, but a process through which we go, one realized by our thinking (Riforma della dialettica hegeliana: Parte prima, passim; parte seconda, p. 206 sq.; Teoria generale dello spirito p. 47; Sistema di logica$^2$ Vol. II, p. 58, 72 sqq.).

440. The /
The act of thinking, the concrete logos, must have infinite individuality, since without it there would be neither truth nor freedom, and thought would lack not this or that particular characteristic but the universality which is its very essence. This universality is not the universality of thing thought, the abstract universality of the concept of man, triangularity etc., since these concepts do not exist either in heaven or on earth; what exists is the thought which thinks them. It is the universality of the thought which when it actually is being thought is not the thought of a particular thinker from whom other thinkers may diverge, but the thought of the only possible subject, the Whole as thinking subject (Riforma della dialettica hegeliana, p. 201, 269; Memorie italiane, p. 329). Hence it is no longer possible to distinguish divine thought as infinite from human thought as finite. A thought is overcome when it is shown to be just finite and can be considered particular and hence true only in the abstract and false in the concrete or deficient by itself and requiring supplementation or correction, which, however, can only be given by a subsequent thinking activity. The thought which has become object to itself has been overcome in an act which is the negation of this thought, the negation by concrete thought (thinking) /
(thinking) of abstract thought (thing thought). This self-distinction of thought whereby thought opposes itself to itself and multiplies itself is the overcoming only of something thought, an overcoming which is the realization of thinking. In the abstract there is what is overcome, in the concrete there is the eternal act which cannot be overcome.

441. In the abstract there is the multiplicity, the more and the less, history in space and time, and progress from less to more, but in the concrete there is the unity which creates all this. In the abstract there are men, including all sorts from savages to fully civilized men, but in the concrete there is man, who is not of course an additional man but is every man and no man, since nobody can confuse himself with him and yet nobody can find him outside himself. The distance between savages and ourselves is enormous, but when we understand the savage, not regarding his deeds as mere facts, the object of the empirical science of anthropology, but understanding what he had in mind when doing them and so reliving his humanity in us, then we overcome the distance and he is no less human than ourselves (Introduzione, p. 131 sqq.).

442. This is the dialecticizing of history, the resolution of the abstract logos into the concrete logos /
logos, by identifying the subject of the judgement judged with the subject judging or the activity of judging. The abstract logos is the synthesis of sensation and thought (subject and predicate in the logical sense of the terminated term and the terminating term, not in the grammatical sense of the first noun in the sentence and the rest of the sentence).

But in the concrete the sensation which is the immediate and the thought which mediates it are our sensation and our thought, and so the synthesis is auto-synthesis (Sistema di logica, Vol. I, p. 197 sqq., Vol. II, p. 74 sq.; Introduzione, p. 159). Dialectic is not simply a concept but our very conceiving this concept and so strictly self-concept (autoconcetto), and every concept is converted into the self-concept in so far as it is actually thought and dialecticized in the act of thought. (Gentile accordingly distinguishes his philosophy from Hegel's Absolute Idealism as Actual Idealism or simply Actualism.) Nature is dialecticized as well as history, but not in the same way, for nature just is what is abstract and so must be kept in its proper place; to dialecticize nature is to understand the object of thought as a form of thought, dialecticizing the notion in which it is, in virtue of the thinking subject, that given nature. To dialecticize history, on the other hand, is to resolve historical objectivity into /
into the actuality of the historiographical spirit and so into the eternal dialectical concrete logos (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 74).

443. This resolution is not, however, performed once for all. The constituting of the individuality of self-consciousness is not an act which develops and is exhausted. There are no constituted individualities, for there is nothing settled and fixed. If you try to fix with your thought something presupposed already determined, your act will be a new creation which will reopen the process. No interpretation of a historic individual can be definitive, since the interpretation itself needs to be interpreted. Thus self-consciousness in its individuality is constituted to infinity, though this is not split up into a discrete multitude of individuals, for such an individual would not be unique because it would be one among many, but into a continuous process of individuation (Riforma della dialettica hegeliana, p. 269).

444. This infinite individualization of the self in history cannot, however, be grasped so long as the self is conceived in terms of substance. The subject who knows is the subject who is realized in the act of knowing. My being in the act of knowing is nothing but my very knowing, and on the other hand my knowing is not a knowing which can be abstracted from me, /
me, because it is nothing but my act, and so that act in which I, in so far as I know, am all that I am. This conception of the Spirit according to the Hegelian category of self-determining activity is the conception of the philosophers who have thought deeply about history, not only of the Italians, but also of Berdiaev (Solitude and Society, Eng. tr. p. 160 sq.) and now of José Ortega y Gasset.

445. In an early work Ortega y Gasset set aside both the collectivistic and the individualistic interpretations of history, on the ground that the masses are receptive and only offer support or resistance to the men of initiative and creative personality, while the heroes cannot be separated from the masses just because the life of outstanding individuality consists in exercising influence upon the masses. History has always been a functional structure in which the more energetic men have acted upon the masses, giving them a determined configuration. This implies a certain community between the superior individuals and the multitude, for an individual absolutely heterogeneous to the masses could produce no effect on them and would be an eccentric. Now historical phenomena are not all dependent on each other; the body of historical reality has a perfectly hierarchical anatomy, an order of subordination between the different classes of
of facts. Thus industrial or political transformations are not profound; they depend on the ideas and the moral and aesthetic preferences of the age. But ideology, taste and morality are no more than consequences or specifications of "vital sensibility" (sensibilidad vital), i.e. the feeling of existence in its undifferentiated entirety. Since neither the heroes nor the masses are independent of each other, the variations of the vital sensibility which are decisive in history appear in the form of generations. A generation is a human variety, the members of which come into the world provided with certain characteristics which give them a common physiognomy, distinguishing them from the preceding generation. Within this identity there may be differences and sharp antagonisms, but the identity is greater than the opposition; for instance the reactionary and the revolutionary of the Nineteenth Century are much more akin to each other than either is to us (El tema de nuestro tiempo, p. 16-20).

If each generation consists in a peculiar sensibility, in an organic repertory of inward propensities, each generation must have its own vocation, its historic mission. Since each generation is a hierarchical organism, and human life is an internal development in which what is essential comes from within, it is possible, Ortega y Gasset argues, to predict /
predict future history in its essentials. It was an accident that in the First Century B.C. there was a man called Caesar, but there were several other men who could have done what he did, though not with all his brilliance. A Roman of the Second Century could not foresee the unipersonal destiny which was Caesar's life, but he could, and Cato did, foresee an epoch of Caesarism (Op. cit. p. 27; 33 sq.).

447. Ortega y Gasset recalls Fichte's lectures, "Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters", but he sets himself the task only of expounding the main theme of our time (which is that of restoring the values of life, i.e. sincerity, impetuosity and delight, long and wrongly subordinated to the values of culture, i.e. truth, goodness and beauty), and does not predict the whole future course of history. Now, granted that a man can see the general movement of his time, and the example of Cato is very much to the point, how can he predict the movement which is going to succeed that of his time? Neither Cato nor anyone else foresaw the rise of Christianity. Ortega y Gasset bases his argument on the necessity of history, a psychological and not a physical, mathematical or logical necessity. When we learn that Pedro, an honourable man, has murdered his neighbour, and we find that the neighbour had outraged Pedro's daughter, we understand Pedro's homicidal /
homicidal act adequately. Our understanding consists in seeing the vengeance spring from the dishonour in an unequivocal trajectory and with evidence equal to that which guarantees mathematical truths. But, he continues, with the same evidence we could, on hearing of the dishonour, predict the murder before it actually takes place (Op. cit. p. 35 ssq.). This is where we Actualists disagree. The past is necessary, because it is past and so fixed and settled, for what has been done cannot not have been done, but to make the future foreseeable is to reduce life to a static and fixed condition. Yet this is what is repugnant to Ortega y Gasset's own insistence on life as "peculiarity, change, development - in a word: history" (Op. cit. p. 141).

448. In his later essay "History as a System" he comes to fuller consciousness of his own position, and attacks the fixity of Eleaticism, which reduces man to nature, to a thing, calling on us to reap the harvest sown by Herakleitos, and insisting that the only category adequate for conceiving human life is that of becoming or rather of "fabricating oneself" (Philosophy and History, Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer, ed. Klibansky and Paton, p. 303). "The mode of being of life, even as simple existing, is not a being already, since the only thing that is given us and that is when when there is human life is the having to make it, each one /
one for himself. Life is a gerundive, not a participle: a faciendum, not a factum. Life is a task" (Ibid.). "The past is past not because it happened to others but because it forms part of our present, of what we are in the form of having been, because, in short, it is our past. Life as a reality is absolute presence: we cannot say that there is anything unless it be present, of this moment. If then, there is a past, it must be as something present, something active in us now . . . The past is man's moment of identity, his only element of the thing: nothing besides is inexorable and fatal. But, for the same reason, if man's only Eleatic being is what he has been, this means that his authentic being, what in effect he is - and not merely 'has been' - is distinct from the past, and consists precisely and formally in 'being what one has not been', in non-Eleatic being . . . Let us say, then, not that man is, but that he lives" (Op. cit. p. 310 sq.).

449. To solve the difficulties put to him by experience man invents a programme of life, a static form of being. When experience shows that it fails to solve his difficulties, he thinks out another programme. But this one is drawn up in the light not only of circumstance but of the first, since man aims at avoiding the deficiencies noted in it. So man "goes /
"goes on accumulating being - the past; he goes on making for himself a being through his dialectical series of experiments." This is a dialectic not of logical reason but of historical reason or logos, a reason that does not tolerate anticipations, for it is "not an extra-historical reason which appears to be fulfilled in history, but, literally, a substantive reason constituted by what has happened to man, the revelation of a reality transcending man's theories and which is himself, the self underlying his theories" (Op. cit. p. 311-321).

450. The necessity for a logic of history as well as a logic of nature is now widely recognized. Oswald Spengler shows himself a Neo-Hegelian by his distinction of nature as the become (das Gewordene) from history as the becoming (das Werden), history accordingly including nature; by his banishment from history of the principle of causality, and by his recognition that whereas natural events are cases of general laws and so capable of being repeated, historical events occur once and never again. But then he blurs the distinction and reduces history to a sort of nature by employing the comparative method, which turns unique historic actualities into symbols of types, and also by predicting the future and filling up lacunae in our historical knowledge, a method which presupposes that history /
history runs along preformed grooves. History is in this way reduced in effect to something which has become (Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Vol. I pp. 4-12, 68-71, 209-211).

451. The true dialectic of historical reason is the Actualist dialectic of the concrete logos, which includes the abstract logos within itself, for there is no thinking without thing thought, no process of thought which is not moving towards a conclusion (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 23) - a necessity which is not the natural necessity of Plotinos, for thought does not find it imposed on itself but creates it and imposes it on itself. Now the law of the abstract logos is self-identity, schematized as "A is A". A thing is what it is, a chair if it is a chair, and then it cannot be anything else like a table or a pen. Being a chair implies that its concept is determined as a certain essence, which presupposes terms of thought interconnected and forming a closed system. But a person cannot be defined in such an immutable way, at least until he is dead and buried, and every time that we judge him we expose ourselves to error, or strictly we are always wrong, for we judge him only by what he has been or done, and treat him not as subject but as object. There is no human life or Ego without an ideal, high or low, an urge towards being what one is not /
not and wishes to be. The Ego is this being which is not, but is by not being, this reality which annuls itself on comparison with a reality which is not, but is conceived. If a man does not deny himself and is completely satisfied with himself, and so does not work or think or wish and does nothing at all, then he ceases to be a man and vegetates, becomes petrified, or rather fades away. A man is a man the less content he is with himself and the more he thinks and wishes and works, the indefatigable artificer of his own destiny (Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 52 sq.).

452. This truth is put in other words by Whitehead, who lays down the principle that the essence of the completely real is process, so that each actual thing is to be understood only in terms of its becoming and perishing, there being no halt in which the actuality is simply its static self, accidentally played upon by qualifications deriving from circumstances. From this he infers that advance or decadence is the dilemma set before mankind; adventure is a necessary element in civilization (Adventures of Ideas, p. 354).

453. The law of the concrete logos is therefore not "A is A" but "I am not-I". I am what I am not but make myself. The Ego can affirm itself in its identity and in its difference only in the first person, for nobody and nothing else can do this for it. Its being is not thinkable in independence of the affirmation which it makes of itself, and so its affirmation is self-affirmation /
self-affirmation. The being of my Ego is nothing but the act with which I affirm myself, not just stating or thinking but making and realizing its being. The Ego is therefore truly autoctosis (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 54).

454. This is the dialectic of self-consciousness, which is not being in a state of knowledge but coming to know. As the object to be known but not yet known is a problem, dialectic is a process of solving a problem. Now only in the abstract is there a multiplicity of problems, for when we have a multiplicity none of these problems is the problem actually engaging us. In the concrete there is the unique and eternal problem of philosophy, which is to conceive the world so that we can live in it, or, to put it otherwise, to actualize the conditions of our life. To say that the problem of philosophy is unique and eternal is not to say that it is generic and indeterminate, for it is always historically determined. A problem is a particular and non-philosophic problem not because it concerns some particular, but because it concerns that particular conceived abstractly. A problem is philosophic or non-philosophic not because it refers to this or that object abstractly determined, but because it refers to that object conceived in the concrete as a part which stands by itself, or as the whole which is that /
that part. The blade of straw is the object of a particular problem for the farmer, but it was the object of a philosophic problem for Vanini when in the presence of his judges he used it as a proof of the existence of God. Philosophic thought would be generic, a mere determinable, if it could be self-concept without being concept. But all the richness of the determinations is the actuality of the self-concept itself. The problem is eternal and unique, but always historically determined, and we must recognize as philosophic the problem of the hungry man who tries to satisfy his hunger, for the satisfaction of hunger is not only a physical but also a spiritual problem, since a man can if he likes choose to die of starvation (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 224 sqq.; 244 sqq.).

There is, however, no definitive solution. Civilizations which imagine that they have no more problems to solve are those which we stigmatize with the terms Byzantinism or Mandarinism. Every solution reached enables the problem to be put better. This does not imply, however, that there is a chain of solutions linked to each other. Progress is not a series of concepts added to each other. Quantitative progress is no progress, and so civilizations do not progress by means of an increase in the material goods of life. Progress is qualitative, i.e. it modifies reality /
reality by transforming it. The road which the Ego traverses does not extend behind its back as a course over which it could run back if it chose. The line of its journey is more like a collapsible ladder which is fastened at the top instead of the bottom, so that the steps surmounted can be pulled up and annulled, except that this image has the other defect of representing as pre-existent the steps which have not yet been reached. The truth is that the spirit resolves all time, past and future, into the actuality of the present, which is its eternity (Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 93).

456. This new concept of the world is summed up by De Ruggiero: "The world of thought is actuality, concreteness, search and attainment, striving and possession; this new concept of the world which is the world of our work and toil must replace the old concept of the world as a natural whole, a plaything of the imagination, arising from the sedimentation of past experiences and the expectation of new ones. But past and future gathered together in this inert and dull mass are a nothing, a double void, and only get a true and profound meaning in the new world of thought, where the past is the experience which was ours and lives through us, in our actual experience, and the future is not the interminable void before us, but /
but the new problem which arises from the actuality of our thought. This actuality which sights itself in the new problem is science, as creation of new experiences, of new life; the past which is concentrated in the same actuality is history, as creation of us through ourselves, as creation of a humanity which is from a humanity which was, and as new creation of a humanity which was from a humanity which is. This is the meaning of the eternal in history" (La filosofia contemporanea 2, p. 189 sq.).

457. This concept of historical reality as pure experience, pure in the sense that it has no data transcending it, involves doing away with the distinction between theory and practice, which appears in the sphere of history as the distinction between history (res gestae) and historiography (Historia rerum gestarum). Theory is contrasted with practice in that it is related to a world which it presupposes, whereas practice is related to a world which presupposes it. Thus the contrast of theory and practice rests upon the Greek intellectualistic notion of reality as presupposed and passively mirrored by thought. With the overcoming of this notion theory becomes identical with practice (Teoria generale dello spirito, p. 200 sqq.).

458. Croce attacks this identification and holds that even though thought is to be conceived not as a copy /
copy of reality but as the putting and solving of problems, the old distinction remains substantially valid (Storia come pensiero e come azione, p. 27 sq.). Yet he does not say what it is, and there is then no way of escaping the difficulty which Gentile had already raised, that if action is other than thought, then thought in relation to it finds itself before a ready-made reality to which it must conform and by which its freedom is limited, just as by Nature in the old epistemologies (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 247 sqq.).

459. If thought and will are different they cannot both be free, since the one would limit the other. Now thought cannot but be free, since the very supposition of reality as independent of it and acting on it rests on our reasoning and so on our way of apprehending reality; and the supposition can have a value only if we are entitled to attribute a value to our apprehension, and we could attribute no value to it if we had to consider it as the necessary effect of causes independent of us (Gentile, Filosofia del diritto, p. 112). Hence if thought is different from action then only our thought is absolutely free and our action must be conditioned. This is indeed the view taken by the Italian writer G. Calogero (Philosophy and History, Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer, ed. R. Klibansky and /

460. It is therefore necessary to determine more exactly the notion of volitional act. Its fundamental characteristics are first, that the reality which is the term of the volitional action is not a presupposition but a product of the volitional activity, and second, that the subject which originates the volitional action cannot be abstracted from the act in which the activity is manifested. The two characteristics hang together, because the freedom which is the point of the first consists of the inwardness of the act to the subject, an inwardness which would be negated if the act were related accidentally or externally to the subject, as the accidental character of the relation would derive from the act's not being a manifestation of the very nature of the subject but the result of an action exercised upon it from outside. The will is not to be thought of as creating a world which issues from it and stands by itself in independence of its origin, (Filosofia del diritto, p. 39 sqq.).

461. Certainly the Oxford Moralists offer us a grotesque picture of action as a mental decision followed unaccountably by the movement of our bodies (though other bodies strangely disobey our mental decree) and conclude that when we say that we can move our hands or make a loud noise what we really mean is that we can /
can set ourselves to move our hands or make a noise, the movement and the noise being a result of our mental activity (W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 153 sq.). It is not clear how we can set ourselves to do anything if we know that we can never do it but only set ourselves to do it. Then the supposed result of the action is only an abstract element of it. To say that my hand moved down to the floor and removed a match from it is only an abstract way of saying that I picked up a match from the floor. The will, as Gentile points out, never produces anything but itself; what I do is my deed. An act of murder is completed in the victim's death (Fil. del diritto, p. 116). It is only necessary to consider how the Oxford Moralists' theory would sound if brought forward by a man accused of murder to be convinced that it is very far removed from common sense.

462. To appreciate the distinction of will and intellect, it is necessary to grasp its epistemological origin. We look at reality from two aspects, from without and from within. Reality (i.e. the reality realized by thought) appears in the one case as nature or will, and in the other as thought. It is nature or will when the act which realizes it is regarded as already completed, either by a subject empirically assignable (will), or by a subject assignable only metaphysically /
metaphysically (nature). It is thought on the other hand when the act which realizes it is completed by the very thought by which it is thought. When I think of an act already completed my thought is contrasted with it as theory with practice, as intellect with will. Thinking of my eating my breakfast this morning is different from eating it. But for this very contrast my thought must oppose the act of volition to itself, producing it by virtue of an act which is cognitive in so far as it is productive and creative. Hence when regarded from within, or in the concrete, thought is found not to be contrasted with will but to be thought as will. Similarly with the act of volition. When the will is objectified then the real production consists of this objectification, as the volition is considered as something completed, a self-identical totality reduced from act to fact. When, however, the volition is considered in its actuality, when it is being done and not when it has been done, when its reality is its own and not that of the act which objectifies it and absorbs it in itself, then it is will, freedom, self-production, but neither more nor less than the act by which it is then cognized. My eating of my breakfast cannot be separated from the act by which I think it, so if it is not to be a product of my thinking, when it is an act completed and not an act in action, it /
it must be the same as my act of thinking, the act which produces itself by knowing itself. The pure experience of self-consciousness is therefore a self-realization of thought which is the same as the self-realization of will. To use Gentile's own terms, pure experience is a synthesis of autonoesis and autopraxis (Filosofia del diritto, p. 38-47; Sistema di Logica, Vol. II, p. 220 sqq.). This is the truth of the Patristic and Scholastic notion of the divine thought as creative.

463. As in pure experience theory is identical with practice, the theoretical value of truth is identical with the practical value of goodness. Now as the Spirit produces nothing but itself, good is not the result of spiritual activity or the goal towards which it travels, but just what is realized by the action. Because, however, the Spirit is not a fact determined once for all, because it is dialectical and cannot be conceived as purely positive or purely negative, its being consists not in simply being but in positing itself. Hence the good which is realized is, as Chrysippos said, inseparable from evil; the one cannot be had without the other. But this is not to say that the Spirit is both good and also bad, or good at one time and bad at another, because good and bad are opposites. The Hegelian and Gentilian concept of their unity is to be /
be distinguished from the Stoic, since the Stoics did not make clear that good and bad are not immediately opposed, as though there were good on one side and bad on the other, just as when we look at a page of writing we see the black that is not white and the white that is not black, each by itself, simultaneously. This black and white are not true opposites, for if we consider them in their simultaneousness (and not in the successive construction which we make of the space in which they exist beside each other), each is itself without any relation to the other and consequently without the relation of contrariety. According to Gentile good stands to evil in the relation of an opposite which is being substituted for its opposite, as black is substituted for white in the act of writing. The being of the Spirit, which is the realization of good, is the cessation of evil. Good is opposed to evil in the actuality of the inner life, where good is always a victory over evil and loses its worth as soon as there is no foe to combat and defeat. Hence the paradoxical requirement that evil should never pass from the world!

464. Gentile does not mean that we ought to leave evil to stimulate people to virtue, as Scipio would rather have liked Carthage left to stimulate Rome. This would be, as Adolfo Omodeo remarks, a policy of aphrodisiacs /
aphrodisiacs (Tradizioni morali e disciplina storica, p. 242). Indeed we do not need to put artificial difficulties in people's way since they have always to strive against their own selfish aims, the old Adam. It is sometimes objected as a disagreeable consequence of the concept of goodness as triumph over evil than then the saint, i.e. a perfect man, will not be good. This is not a consequence of this concept at all, for it presupposes just what the concept denies, that one could be in a state of goodness. But is not satisfaction with one's character the sin of Pharisaism? Paul, who is by common consent a saint, expressly denied that he was perfect (Phil. 3: 12). While perfection is the goal, to reach the goal does not enable us to rest there, but only to press on towards a new goal which only becomes practicable when the other has been reached. Perfection is the highest conceivable, the ideal, but thought does not leave its ideals fixed; it remoulds them eternally.

465. At first sight the evil of which good is the overcoming seems sometimes external and sometimes internal to the subject, either as other people's badness or our own selfish inclinations. Evil, however, of any sort, which can always be brought under the negative category of moral disvalue, is not a self-subsistent entity but the object of a judgement. Injustice only has /
has the character of injustice within the consciousness which evaluates it. Spinoza pointed out with his usual acuteness that in the state of nature there is no good or evil (Ethics IV, prop. 37, schol. 2). The unjust will can only be contrasted with the just will inside the just will, which is the criterion both of itself and its opposite. We combat what we see and disapprove of. But this disapprobation is not the antecedent of a later will which is to replace with good the evil which has previously been negated. The act of disapprobation is not negative but positive, for it is a rebellion of conscience, or an act of good will, and so good is realized just when it is opposed to its opposite. In every case, therefore, whether the evil seems external and someone else's or internal and our own, the good will is an internal crisis whereby good springs from evil, not by presupposing it but by posit-ing it in the act by which it negates it and withdraws itself from it. To imagine that an evil is a concrete historical actuality, existing apart from the act which overcomes it, is to be like the man with the donkeys who went everywhere looking for the donkey which he thought he had lost and did not notice because he was riding on it! (Filos. del diritto p. 53 sqq. 121 sqq.: Teoria generale dello spirito, p. 208 sqq.). Hence the falsity of what Prof. Broad considers the "judicious conclusion/
conclusion that the world contains much good and much evil and not a sufficient balance of either over the other to compel us to accept or to reject a belief in Divine Providence" (Mind, April, 1942 p. 185 - review of Laird, Mind & Deity).

466. Spiritual activity, the synthesis of theory and practice, is the realization of the self, but not the empirical self, a person among other person and things. Morality is the overcoming of the separation of the agent and his world, between his law and its law. When we think we deny ourselves as empirical ego and realize ourselves as Absolute or Transcendental Ego, since we think not for ourselves but for everyone, and in this case we are not the object of our thought, one object among other objects, but the subject whom we can never catch thinking because it is ourselves doing the chasing (Riforma della dialectica hegeliana, Parte seconda, VII, 11; Teoria generale dello spirito, p. 6).

467. Professor De Burgh finds difficulty in seeing how the empirical ego and the transcendental Ego are to be thought together, and how Gentile justifies his assertion that the particular individual does not vanish in the bosom of the Person who has no plural, and he considers that Actualism is open to the objection which Aquinas pressed home against the Averroist doctrine of the active Intellect (Towards a Religious Philosophy, p. /
Aquinas' criticism is not unknown to Gentile, for he expounds it in the course of his lectures on Scholastic philosophy. Ibn Roschid had taken the human soul to be essentially like that of all other animals, a vegetative and sensitive principle which can rise to imagination and appetite, but has no power of understanding, just as coloured bodies, if light is removed, cannot be said even to be able to be coloured, since the very potentiality of colour resides in light. Hence in the same way that light is divided according to the division of bodies, but still always remains in itself a unique light, the multiplicity of the human intellects is a mere reflection of the multiplicity of the material individuals, and the intellect by which every man is illuminated is one. Aquinas pointed out that the intellectual light which shines in the human mind cannot stand in the same relation to it as light does to a wall. The intellect which can be communicated is intelligible species and not intellective power, and so the Averroists explain the something but not the someone. The wall does not see but is seen, and on the Averroist view it would follow that man does not understand but that his ideas are understood by the divine intellect.

468. Far from seeing in this criticism any objection/
objection to his own position Gentile acclaims it as a stupendous intuition, requiring several centuries to be justified systematically and to become the basis of a new world, of the inwardness and absolute freedom of the subject (Problemi della scholastica, p. 106-111).

To class the Averroist with the Actualist position is to fail to understand Gentile's express statements that the transcendental Ego is not a being or a state but a constructive process, and that it must deny itself as empirical ego (Riforma della dialettica hegeliana, p. 202; Teoria generale dello spirito, p. 13).

The question which anyone who is moving towards a religious philosophy must ask is: How is the natural man to be thought together with the spiritual man? Gentile himself, when dealing with the charge of pantheism, refers to Paul's words about man dying to himself to be reborn in Christ. The spirit, he says, is not, and so its birth supposes a death. One must cease to be what one is to become spirit (good, wise etc.). The pantheist, on the other hand, does not want any death; he says that everything which is, since it is what it has to be, has to be God himself. The spiritualist maintains that nothing which is has to be; even spirit, if it is, has to be denied, has to die (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 339).

469. This negation of oneself as empirical ego which /
which is the realization of oneself as transcendental Ego is not, however, the destruction of one's personality, for the negation of subjectivity (abstract subjectivity) is the affirmation of concrete subjectivity. When Paul says that he is no longer alive but Christ lives in him he does not cease to regard himself as possessing the historical determination of an apostle (Gal. I, 1; II, 20). What meaning can be attached to the Gospel saying that to preserve one's life is to lose it while to lose it for Christ's sake is to preserve it? In the light of the logic of identity this is absurd, and Tertullian, who took Greek logic, which is a logic of identity, for the only logic, was right to call Christianity incredible and absurd. But in the light of the Actualist logic of the concrete the saying is exact, for when a person simply is then he is a thing and not a person.

470. Prof. De Burgh’s question which personality, the empirical or the universal, is revealed e.g. in a work of art, is not one which can properly arise, since empirical personality is a contradiction in terms, for only by denying his empirical self does a man attain personality. As an empirical being a man has no more personality than a chair. Not that history should be deprived of its chronological and geographical determinations, but these belong to the abstract logos, which /
which is contained within, by being resolved into, the concrete logos. When a man has attained personality we cannot distinguish his self-consciousness from ours, for self-consciousness is an act, and when we have a plurality we have descended from act to fact. The difference between act and fact is that the act is in the doing (flagrante), while the fact is completed; the one is present, the other is past. The first is therefore spirit, and the second nature. Hence the act possesses value, while the fact cannot have any value (Sistema di logica, Vol. II, p. 277). There can be only one centre of consciousness, for if we try to conceive two they are fixed and determined by our very thinking, which is the real subject, the act in action, whereas the two supposed subjects are just its objects. The multiplicity of personalities in a pathological case, again, exists for the patient's doctor (Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 61 sq.).

471. The Actualist concept of the concentration of reality in the transcendental Ego, the God-Man, gives a new significance to the Pauline teaching that in the fulness of time everything will be summed up in Christ, though this eternal concentration cannot be conceived by us as coming after the end of the world, for in that case it would become part of the temporal sequence. With the establishment of this concept "every reason" as /
as De Ruggiero says "for idleness, fatalism, easy-going reliance on a benevolent Providence disappears, and we must draw our strength from ourselves alone, because we are what we make ourselves, and our reality is our very own work. In this consciousness, that very history which deprives us of hope in a provident help consisting of external forces is a source of comfort and new energies to us: it tells us that we are not alone, abandoned in the world, but that in us is concentrated and individualized all our past, and that what we imagine we are doing as individuals we are actually doing as servants of the Whole; the contingency of our action is not outside the eternal, but is the very act of the eternal" (La filosofia contemporanea, Vol. 2, p. 194).
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